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    On The Pragmatics of Communication - Compress

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    ‘Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (partial listing) ‘Thomas MeCarthy, general editor wn mn rn pi ry fine Smee cates as en nrg ae ee a a Ra Eee See erate a See en pace ie et (ees Rae Santer fees me ee eee ene eth ete argon Habermas, Poplar! Poe, SS eae eae ame EE eee gee aa wecoan sides (peta ichomae ga ae te eer ene Je cance is Otqur a Poo ce Sage Cra See he, sete Ph ne Ngee, ke fs Seta : Tee Aw can name am et et rcs Ente Sjs Renin vor Habermas en te Unfit [peg pp erage ‘Ricans Feige Ey and Eu ome rece Natere of Madi ‘ete He yearned ft On the Pragmatics of Communication Firgen Habermas edited by Maeve Cooke “The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts ©1098 Nasachets aie of Teta Prete tin Re endosteal eh ne cn ‘Sees | igh reser Nop hs ok aye proce any orm ty ay seco acca mene Grading poscopingrecorig cornu Stove and reel) hea pron wring en be pase hgh was tin erie y Metin eps nda ne an ond itary of Congres Cathiginglo Plein Dat a SPE comm fmt ene re cee demain Inches titographiea references and index, Prgms 1 Cook Mv, Tide. th Sre Contents Editor's Acknowledgments Introduction Marve Cooke 1 What Is Universal Pragmatics? (1976) 2 Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication (asst) ‘3 Communicative Rationality and the Theories of Meaning and Acton (1986) “4 Action SpE Acts, Linguistially Interactions, and the Lifeworld (1988) Comments on John Searle's “Meaning, Communication, ‘and Representation” (1988) 6 Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning (1988) 7 Some Further Clasfications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality (1996) 8 Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn (1996) 9 On the Distinction between Poetic and Communicative ‘Uses of Language (1985) a 105 183 257 a7 307 33 383 Contents 10 Questions and Counterquestions (1985) 403 Selected Bibliography and Further Reading 435 Index a Editor’s Acknowledgments | would like to thank Thomas McCarthy for initiating this undertak- ing, fr fulfilling the role of series editor in an exemplary manne, snd for considerable help over and above his editorial duties with regard to tanslaion dificulies. My thanks are also due to Jargen Habermas for encouraging the project, for replying prompAly to my many queries, and for his unfailing cordial. Ronald Bohne helped, with the proofreading, with financial assistance from the Depart: ment of German, University College Dublin, and he also compiled the index. Here, too, Iam very grateful. Thanks, finally to Marin ‘Sauter not just for hie painstaking help in checking translations but, for his love and support over the many years it took to put this book, together "The translations of many of the chapters have been based on. catler published translations, as follows: ‘A translation of chapter 1 by Thomas MeCarthy was published Jorgen Habermas, Cammunicaton and the Feotution of Soi, ©1979 by Beacon Press, Boston ‘A translation of ehapter 2 by Thomas MeCarthy was published in Jigen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, ©1984 by Beacon Press, Boston, [A translation of chapter 3 by Jeremy Gaines and Doris L, Jones was fist published in Communicative Action: Bxeys on Jirgen Hatermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action, edited by Axel Honneth and Hans Joa, ©1991 by Polity Pres, Cambridge, UK. ‘dior Acknowidymens [A patil wransation of chapter 4 was published in Philosophical Prob lems Tiday edited by Guttorm Floistad, ©1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordseche [Atransation of chapter 5 was published in jul Searle and His Citic, ‘edited by Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick, ©1991 by Basil Blackwel, Oxford, UK ‘A translation of chapter 6 by William M. Hohengarten was published, ‘Firgen Habermas, Pximetaplyical Thinking, D192 by Massachue setts Insitute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. ‘A translation of chapter 9 by Frederick G. Lawrence was published in Jargen Habermas, The Phiasophical Discourse of Modernity, ©1985, by MastachusetsInstiute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. {A translation of chapter 10 by James Bohman was published in Habermas and Modernity edited by Richard Bernstein, O1985 by Polity Press, Cambridge, UK ‘Chapters 7 and # and the fnal part of chapter 4 have been translated by Macve Cooke and appear in English for the frst time Introduction Maeve Cooke “This anthology brings together for dhe firs time, in revised or new translation, ten essays that present the main concerns of Habermas's program in formal pragmatics, Is aim isto convey a sense of the ‘overall purpose of his linguistic investigations, while introducing the reader to their specific details Habermas's formal pragmatics fulfils two main functions. Fst, it serves asthe theoretieal underpinning for his theory of communicative action, whichis # crucial element in his theory of society. Second, it contributes to ongoing philo- sophical discussion of problems concerning truth, rationality action, and meaning, Correspondingly, the aim of the present anthology is twofold. Fist, in providing better access to esays by Habermas that focus explicily on language, it may help those interested in social theory to asses critically the linguistic basis for hie accounts ‘of communicative action and communicative rationality. Second, it ‘may help those interested in more traditional philosophical prob- lems to understand and to appreciate Habermas's treatment of them. Habermas's original term for his linguistic research program was “universal pragmatics” The adjective “universal” was meant to ind ‘ate the difference beoicen his linguistic project and other prag matic analyses of language, Whereas earlier pragmatic approaches to language had tended to analyze particular contexts of language we, Hiabermas set out to reconstruct universal features of using lan guage. This explains the tile of his programmatic essay, “What Inedneon ts Univeral Pragmatic” fst publibed in 1978. However, in a footnote to the 1879 English trunstion, Habermas express di taconite abel rivera” an preerene the em “Sema pragmatics” One advantage of he ate eminolgy. nis Sin that reminds shat formal pragmatssrelated (0 formal itunien As we sale, the nature of thie reatonsbi spare thy crucial in Habermas's account of meanings rth ‘Whats ment by universal or a8 we should now 5 formal rag nae? Habermas's starting point tht formal abso ngage “howl not restricted to sem al, for oral vestigation ibe pragmatic dimensions of language equal posible and impor bythe “pragma dimensions of ahuage, Habermas teas hove pertaining specially to the ele’ of sentences in AMterancen He makes clear that “formal” ito be understood in a tccran seme to refer to the rational reconstruction of general intdons or competences. Formal pragmatic, hen, ims at a9 tematic reconstruction of hein ngusc knowledge of com- prten sugec the inte “rleconsiousnes thas competent Ipesker ha of heron language esa t explet petheoetal Mowtedge of a general sort, as opposed to the competencies of rls india and groups Formal pragmatic thus eal 0 TRind the unavoidable prespposions tat guide Hngulic ex “Changes been spears and hearers in everyday proces of om trun many angage ake ave that pers and ear, ther are cers things we mastan a mater of necessi— way tend ne presposed if communication eo be sicese Zurn focang on ine formal propre of speech sons In roel Habermas program may ts be disingused from en Fire page for came, wccinguicswhich looks pr fray at parca sons of we. Habermas's forma pragmatic vestigations nt every inguis tie pracices in modern soe are aempe to reeset the hier competencies that relied when wil actors era ‘ete sm of aching sna understanding entndgung) Communicative competences crcl for Haberma's social theory. Sticks based on the dis hat acon oriented toward reaching Understanding the fondamental peo al acton. His tame fr 8 Ievrodton action of this ort is“commnicaiv, and his ana of rns on the thes tat eeyay linge hasan inl connection th tad. More precy lngunictterances at they are wed In ‘ery process af commtincaton canbe construe a dans ‘alii From hi perpctne, eer lng nraton i pe marl a mater of ang and responding to ay cme, Haker tas does allow for ctr form of ling iretion sich ms Steaua, orate interaction, bathe contents at ‘hese are pare on communicate action nis simplest terms communicate ston action whose nicest depends onthe hese responding to te vty cm ned She spear with ae” oro" Here, Habermas ientey tree basic peso ality cleat are raed by a pear with her Speech act da tothe truth of what sa oF presppored, ‘ham to the normative rightness ofthe speeeh et inthe gen Context of ofthe dering orm, and cam tothe wate of the speaker I ung Ingle expression communicatively, he speaker ray all ree ofthese cin smatanecusy In piel Communicate cachage, however tone othe cams ed ‘xpi the other two remain inplc pesuppnivons of under Stding the uuerance- The te tld as are deseribed as “anes” by Habermas the sent of bing raed th ay community ied speech st “The tre universal alii ait truth, normate Highness, and truhlnesprovie a bss for easing speech aces Thus Communicate uterances can be divided into hice boa tes according wo the xpi came theyre: conane speech as tre connected in theft intnce dh uh aims, quae speech act wth clans to normate rightness and eapreste speech acts with claims to wuthfalnems mes “Te thes ofthe ner way cams has impieaons or bor language theory and social theory On te one han, mean wo pronide a more convincing bes forcing spect act than for example. the propos of Austin and his floes the Imo there moduated polos of Seale an hi followers Om the other hand, prone tht language hat an iba connection with vay cam, thetey gv te to a paras 4 Tnwodueion ‘conception of social order as reproduced through communicative {In showing that everyday linguistic interaction depen on raising and recognizing validity claims, Habermas presents a picture of so: Gal order as a network of relationships of mutual recognition that Ihave two significant characterises. They are, fist, cooperative rela tionships of commitment and responsibility: participants in comme nicatve interaction undertake to behave in certain ways, and the inieces ofthe interaction depends om the czypration of oth parties involved. Second, the relationships of mutual recognition charac: teristic for communieative action have an inherent rational dimen sion: the communicative actor undertakes an obligation to provide Teasons forthe validity ofthe clams he raises with his utterances, while his counterpart in action may either accept the proffered Teasons or challenge them on the basis of better reasons. In this sense, everyday communicative action involes a rudimentary prac- tice of “argumentation.” Furthermore, these everyday practices of fing reasons for and agsinst controversial validity claims—some times referred to by Habermas as naive communicative action— point toward the possibilty of other, more demanding forms of ngumentation, which he calls “discourse.” Everyday communicative ‘ction normally operates on the assumption thatthe reasons sup- porting the validity claims raised are good ones, When this back: fround consensus fs shaken-—as will happen more frequently in posttraditional societies communicative action cannot continue routinely. Pardcipants then have three options: they can switch t0 strategie action; they can break off communication altogether; they can recommence their communicative activi at a different, more reflective level—namely, argumentative speech. In the proc fess of argumentation known a discourses, certain idealiing sup- positions already operative in everyday communicative action are formalized. These presuppositions are unavoidable in the sense that, they belong to the very meaning of what it isto take part in argu mentation: they are iealizing in the sense that they are spicaly ‘ounterfactal and will not a a rule be satisfied more than approxi ‘mately. Thus, Habermas las, participants in argumentation nec: ‘sarily suppose, among other tings, that they share the common, Inirodction aim of reaching agreement with regard to the validity ofthe disputed validity claim, that no force except that ofthe better argument is Sereno competent pares have been exe om he scussion, chat no relevant argument has knowingly been sup- Pressed, that participants are using the same linguistic expressions in the same way, and so on. These idealizing supponitions refer both to the practice of argumentation and to its outcome. For Habermas, the various idealizing suppostions unavoidably guiding, angumen {ation are what give meaning to the ideas of truth and justice 28 ideas that transcend all local contexts of vit. To the extent that the validity claims raised in everyday procestes of argumentation have connection in principle with possible vindication in dix: course, they have an inherent contextaranscendent power, This power is the rational potential built into everylay proceses of Habermas's picture of everyday communicative action thus has {important implications for critical social theory: For one thing. in presenting social order asa network of cooperation involving com- ‘mitment and responsibil, it opposes models of social order that ‘ake interactions beoween strategically acting subjects as fundamen tal, for example, models grounded in decision or game theory. For another, in the context-eranscendent potential ofthe validity claims raised in everyday communicative procestes, it locates bass for & “postmetaphysical” conception of communicative rationality and, ac cordingly. a standard for critique. As that conception refers to a potential already built into everyday communicative action, it stn tes reason in everyday life: the ideas of truth and justice toward which it points are grounded in idealizing supposiions that are part of everyday human activity. Moreover, communicative rationality i not reducible to the standards of validity prevaling in any local ‘context of communicative activity. Rather the idealizing suppost tions on which it rests provide standards for criticizing local practices, ‘of justification, both with regard to the outcomes ofthe agreements reached and with regard to pracices of justification themselves, ‘Thus the idea of communicative rationality is meant to provide a 6 invoduaon From a more strictly linguistesphilotophical point of view, Haber smas's formal pragmatics offers an approach to questions of meaning fd truth that radcalzes the linguistic turn within modern philoso pp; In his vew, traditional formal semantic approaches to meant have been guilty of three kinds of abstractve fallacies: a semantics abstraction, a cogntivist abstraction, and an objecvist one. The Semanticit abstraction is the view that the analysis of linguistic ‘meaning can confine izelf to the analysis of setenas, abstracting from the pragmatic contexts of the use of sentences in utterances. ‘The cognitive abstraction i the view tha ll meaning canbe traced, back to the propositional content of uterances, thus indirectly re acing meaning to the meaning of asertrc sentences. The objec- tivist abstraction fs the view that meaning i to be defined in terms fof objectively ascertainable truth conditions, as opposed to the Fold of the truth conditions that can be imputed t speakers or hearers. For Habermas, pragmatic theories of meaning have the advantage that they focus not on sentences but on utterances (he is thinking here primarily of the usecoriented theories of meaning _siggested bythe later work of Witigenstein, on the one hand, and the work of Austin and Searle, on the other). Furthermore, prage matic theories of meaning do not emphasize only the asertoic oF Aescriptive modes of language we: they draw attention to the mul tiplicity of meaningful ways of wing language. Finally such theories "tress the connection between the meaning of uterances and social practices; they draw attention t0 the instiutions and conventions fof the forms of hfe in which communicative activity is always em- bedded In Habermas's view, however, existing pragmatic approaches to meaning have weaknesses complementary t those of formal seman- tics. The great strength of formal semantics has been its attempt to retin a connection between the meaning of linguistic expressions \d some notion of contextsranscendent validity In the main prag- ‘matie approaches, however, this connection either sips from view ‘completely or is interpreted too narrowly in a cognitvst way. For fcxample, use theories of meaning derived from the later work of Witigenstein have in effect renounced a contexttranscendent no- tion of validity by reducing itt the presailing validity of local Iniroducton language games and particular forms of life. On the other hand, pragmatic approaches that have attempted to avoid such reduc 'ion-—Habermas mentions Searle's speech-act theor)—aypicaly have ‘succumbed to the cognitist abstraction, interpreting validity 100 narrowly as propositional truth. Habermas sees his onm pragmatic theory of meaning as an attempt to combine the productive insights of existing formal-semamtic and pragmatic approaches to meaning while avoiding their respective weaknesses. He regards speech act theory as a fruitful starting point, but iasuffeient as it sands, and attempts to build into it che formal-semantie emphasis on truth oF sertbilty conditions. Ina sense, then, Habermas's pragmatic the- ‘ory of meaning can be regarded as the proposed happy marriage of ‘Austin and Searle with Frege and Dummett, rom the speect-act theory of Astin and Searle (whom he praises for rendering Austin’s theory more precise), Habermas takes over the emphasis on utterances rather than sentences asthe central unit (of analysis, He also associates himself with their more beyond the traditional narrow focus on asertoric and descriptive modes of lane guage use to inelude—potentially on an equal footing—other ways ‘of using language, such as acts of promising, requesting, warning, or confessing, In addition, he finds fruiul speechaet theory's emphae sison the illocutionary force of utterances thats, om the fact that 3 speaker in saying something also does something. However, may be helpful here to notice Habermas's distinctive conception of ioe tionary force, which goes beyond Austin's in a number of significant respects Austin used the notion of ilocution to refer to the ac of tuitering sentences with propositional content. For him, the force of fn utterance consists in the ilocutionary act—in the attempt to reach an uptake; he contrasted the force of am utterance with its neaning, conceived as a property of the sentence uttered. Haber- ‘mas's objection to this is Uhreefold: rt, Austin's distinction between force and meaning overlooks the fact that utterances have a mean ing distinct from the meaning ofthe sentences they employ, second, itis connected with a problematic clasifcation of speech acts into constatives and performative, whereby initially for Austin, only con staves are connected with validity claims; third, it neglects the ra tional foundation of locutionary force. By contrast, Habermas 5 Tred oposes an account of uence meaning that bring gta the reports of meaning and fre; he mens the notion of cation Sry ore to all uuerances that are wed communicatively and he pss he ial foundation of locatonary force, Abwe shall srTelbermas’s pragma theory ges an account ofthe mening STlterances as inseparable fom the act of tering them. and fine utcranees acts of rising vty claims. His deintion of Sstnary ore follow from he lctonary fre consi na {peech at capaci o motivate a heaer to act on the premise that the commitent sige bythe peker sro meant On his Conception, tcaonary force & bond up with dhe speaker’ a Simpl ofa narran,callenged to provide reson in Support Of the vay ofthe cine se rae. So understood, locuionary force raonal orc. for in peforang a speech at the speaker tindrtakes wo support wha she sy with eons f necessary Ths “Hthough Habermas acknowledges speecact theory a the most itl pinto departure fr hs progran of formal pragmatic, he og ih crea, making wo ome ofa ental categories in dance ways From the pint of view of Habermas’ program of formal pragmat tea, the main weaines of speecvact theory it fare to connect ‘Mcommonicavey used uerances with vay clas that are in princple contextrancendent. He attempt to make good tis AcScieney by droning on Michael Dimmet’s acount of under Standing meaning inten of kooving seri eondons In hatogy with Dumnets formulation of what isto understand the Iheantng of am asertore expresion, Habermas proposes that we Undersea uteance when we know what makes acceptable ‘Trutreonditonalsmantcs rune into dices when explains the meaning of sentences intern of tee truth conan idiout tmeaion through the Kathe speaker o hearer may hav of Sich condionsThut Habcrmi adopt Dumet’sepseric tan Se cies Donald Dvson for offering ano reading of Frege's and Wingenstens thesis hat to undersund a teance i tolutow whatis the ease itis true. He eject thi objeeist eading 1S acy auming that for every sentence, oF atlas for every erin sentence procure are aval for eletney deciding ° Ingoducton when the truth conditions are satisfied, Such an assumption, he angus, implicitly relies on an empiscist theory of knowledge that, regards the simple predicative sentences of an observational lan guage as fundamental. Habermas then follows Dummet, who suggests replacing the emphasis on truth conditions with a consid- «ration of what itis fora speaker to know when the truth conditions would be satisfied, This is what he refers to as Dummett’ epistemic ‘urn; he, however, wants to turn even further. As Habermas reads it, Dummet’s theory of meaning has two main shortcomings that pre- vent his developing fully the inherent potentials of the epistemic ‘urn, The frst i a prioritization of truth claims over other kinds of validity claims: Dummet’s notion of assrsiblty conditions accords priority to astertoric uterances In order to make room om an equal footing for nonassertoric utterances such as promises, imperatives, for avowals, Habermas prefers o speak of aaeplability con second is that Dummet’s notion of assrtibil tons. The ‘conditions isin ‘has it relies on an ideal of validity that is conceptually Independent of discursive practices of redeeming validity claims. ‘This last objection takes us to the heart of Habermas's pragmatic theory of meaning Before considering it, however it may be helpful to clarify the status of the theory. Broadly speaking, it seems possible to distin- juish between two accounts ofits status. According to the frst, a [Pragmatic theory of meaning is merely an extension of truth-condi- tional semantis in the sense tat it broadens its focus. On thie view, Habermas's theory leaves the basic assumption of the formalseman- tic account of the meaning of sentences intact, while expanding its range, first, 9 incude nonessrtorc linguistic expressions and, sec- fond, to embrace ueraces as well as sentences. His earlier essay “What Is Universal Pragmatics” sggests this account of the tasks of «pragmatic theory of meaning, However, in most of his later writ- Ings, he seems to offer a more radial account. According to this, a pragmatic theory of meaning wndecus the formalsemantic ap- proach to meaning, Ths view is suggested, for example, in chapters, 2 and 3 in the present volume, where Dummett’s astertbiltycondi- tional theory of meaning i criticized for failing wo carry through 10 Tieden ‘completely the move from the semantic to the pragnatc level of analysis. In a recent response to objections raised by Herbert Schnadelbach (see chapter 7), Habermas dlaifies the satus of his pragmatic theory of meaning in a way that suggests that both of ‘hese interpretations are correct. Starting from a distinction between the communicative and noncommunicaive use of language, he ac- knowledges that epistemically used propositional sentences and. teleologially used intentional sentences have a meaning content {that isin some sense independent of the illocuionary acts in which they can be embedded. In order to understand propositional sen- fences that serve purely to represent states of affairs or facts, it i sulficient,to know their cruth conditions. In order to understand intentional sentences that serve to calculate action consequences monologicallywithout reference to a second person—it is su cient to knov their succes conditions. Such sentences, which are ‘used noncommunicauvely, can be analyzed exhaustively with the tools of formal semantics. However, they are special cases of lan- ‘quage use, due toa feat of abstraction that suspends their pragmatic ‘dimension: the posable communicative situations which a speaker ‘woule asert the proposition “p,"or decare the intention “P,” with the aim of finding agreement with an addressee are abstracted from. ‘As a rule, however, propositional sentences and intentional sen- tences are embedded in illocuionary acts in the form of assertions dnd announcements. The meaning of assertions and announce- ments, which are part ofthe communicative use of language, can be cexplicated only pragmatically From this we ean see that Habermas does not reject the formal semantic approach to meaning, for he scknowledges its ability to account for the meaning of noncommy nicaively used propositional and intentional sentences, At the same time, he does challenge the claims of formalsemantic theories 10 explain the meaning of ullrance such as asertions and announce ‘ments, or more generally of communicatively used linguistic expres sions. Moreover, i formal semantic theories of meaning can account ‘aly for the noncommunicaive use of language, then their re- Hrcted scope suggests that this approach to meaning itself limited, ‘We have asceresined that a pragmatic theory is required to expli- ‘cate the meaning of communicatively used linguistic expressions. I. inaodaction remains unclear, however, in what Senge suc a theory i pragmatic. ‘As indicated, in his earlier essay on universal pragmaties, Habermas had jusitied his preference forthe category of acceptability condi tions, as opposed to truth or assertibilty conditions, on the grounds that it awoids the prioritization of the assertorie mode of language use implicit in the later categories. In these Inter writings, however, his objection to truth or assertiblity conditions seems to go beyond this. They are said to rest on faulty pictures of truth and justification ‘tht fail to reeognize internal, conceptval Kinks with pragmatic conte of justification and thus remain tapped in abstractive fallacies of a cognitivist and semantcit kind. In Habermas's view, validity and justifeation—and hence utterance meaning—ate inevpably prage matic notions, They cannot be explicated independently of discur sve processes of redeeming different kinds of validity las. While Dummet’s notion of astertibility conditions pushes in the direction ‘of 2 pragmatic account of justification and validity, it does not quite arte there; it remains a semantic theory to the extent that it ails to explicate these notions as comeptual inked to discursive proc: ‘eses of redeeming disputed—assertoric and nonassertoric—valiity aims. ahermas proposes that we understand the meaning of «speech act when we know what makes it acceptable. We know what mikes & speech act acceptable when we know the kinds of reasons that 3 speaker can offer, if challenged, in order to reach understanding, ‘with a hearer concerning the validity ofthe disputed claim. Ia ever day processes of communication, the kinds of reasons that a hearer ‘must know in order to understand a given utterance are circum scribed contextually, Let us imagine a request to a passenger by an airline teward to stop smoking. In order to understand tis request, the passenger has tobe able to reconstruc the kinds of reasons that the aitline steward could proside in order to justify his request, if ‘necessary. These reasons might include che argument that smoking, isunpleasant for other passengers or that ts against the regulations fof the airline or against an international code of airline practice, "These reasons are of certain kinds. If other kinds of responses were offered as reasons —for instance, tht itis raining outside, or hat, innagans Wakes James Joyce's beat book, oF that there are no sakes, Inoue in Ireland—the context in question would render them relevant and, indeed, unintelligible, Thus, although the set of reasons const- tuting# given kindof reasons is always in principle open-ended, in ‘everyday contexts of communication contextual considerations fact as a constraint on the kinds of reasons that are relevant (0 justifiation, “The hearer not only has to know the kinds of reasons the speaker could adduce in a given instance, he has to know how the speaker ‘might use them in order to engage in argumentation with a hearer Concerning the validity of « digputed claim. This focus on knowing, hhow the speaker might use reasons to support a disputed validity claim clearly recalls Dummet’s epistemic turn, Like Dummett, Habermas ako stress thatthe validity of these reasons can never in principle be decided once and for all Rather, their validity must be onstrued falibilstically, that is, ae always in principle subject 10 Fevision in light of new arguments based on new evidence and insights, This is one sense im which the question of validity is ted to pragmatic contexts of justification, and ic constitutes a further rex Son for describing Habermas's theory of meaning (and, indeed, Dummett’) as pragmatic. However, there isa second, possibly more contentious sense, in which Habermas ties validity to pragmatic Contexts of justification. In this second seme, validity is not only always subject in principle to discursive reevaluation, itis in isel/ pragmatic. The pragmatic dimension is not something atached 10 the Hea of valiicy externally as it were; rather, itis internal to the ery concept of tality. A theory of meaning that sees itself as [pragmatic in thie stronger sense must therefore offer a pragmatic Account of validity ise To this extent, Habermas's pragmatic theo- tes of truth (empirical and theoretical valty) and justice (moral, validity) and, indeed, his accounts of ethical and aesthetic valid jiy—are crucial ingredients of his pragmatic theory of meaning. Habermas's theory of moral validity has been the subject of exten- sive commentary and criticism, From the point of view ofthe theory fof meaning, our question isthe followings how isthe conception of ‘moral validity it proposes internally connected with processes of discursvely redeeming validity claims? A norm or principle is mor- ally valid (right or just, for Habermas fits the possible objet of 1s Ingodecon a discursively achieved consensus tothe effect that iti equally in the Inuerest of ll affected. Therefore, agreement reached in dscourse— ‘idealized rational acceptability—contributes constructively tothe v2 iityof moral norms. Its clea from this that Habermas conceives al validity a internally linked to the idea of discursively achieved consensus and hence t pragmatic contexts of justification. Habermas alo proposes a pragmatic theory of truth, Discussion of this is complicated by the fat that he sgnificandy amended the account he originally presented in the 1973 essay, "Wahrheitatheo- ren,” without subsequently presenting a fully revised version, How fever, a recent essay on Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism (included here ax chapter 8) can be seen as.an attempt to rectify this deficiency For our present purposes, what is most interesting about these re- ‘ent remarks is their continued insistence on the pragmatic nature ‘of truth, Habermas associates himself with Rory'saim of radicalzing the linguistic turn within modern philosophy by moving to a prag- ‘matic level of analysis, He criticizes him, however, for drawing the ‘wrong conchsions from his critique ofthe philosophy of language. Rorty reduces truth to practices of justification, thus losing sight of the potential power of validity claims to explode actual contexts of justification. Habermas, by contrast, wants to hold onto the moment ‘of unconditionalty that is part ofthe idea of truth, while retait an internal relation between truth and justifiably. His aim, in other ‘words, is to work outa theory of truth that is inherently pragmatic yet retains the idea ofan unconditional claim that reaches beyond all the evidence available to us at any given time. What would such 4 theory look like? In the 1980s, Habermas defended a view not Unlike Hilary Putnam's conception of truth a¢ idealized rational acceptability a proposition was sid to be tru if t could be justified ‘under conditions of an ideal speech situation. Truth, om this ace count, isa regulative idea, the anticipation of an infinite rational consensus. In the recent essy, however, Habermas acknowledges convincing objections to this earlier conception. One set of objec- tions is directed against some conceptual difficulties with the very notion of an ideal speech situation, im particular, the paradox in- tolved in aiming for “complete” or “conclusive knowledge.” The ‘Objection has been raised, fr instance, that it would be paradoxical uw Inwodneton for human beings to strive to realize an ideal, the attainment of ‘which would be the end of human history. Another set of objections “Grave attention to the difficulties involved in concepmualizing the connection between truth and justified accepabiliy. On the one hhand, if there is an unbridgeable gap between de facto and ideal acceptably, the idea of an idealized rational consensus seems 30 fat removed from actual human practices of justification as to under imine the regulative role ascribed to it, On the other hand, such a ‘gap seems to be necessary in order to preserve the inition that {ruth fas a moment of contextaranscendence. In the face of these and ather difficulties, Habermas no Tonger conceives truth as idealized rational consensus. He now focuses on the idealizing supposiions guiding the proass of rational argumen- tation rather than on the ideaizing suppositions marking its outcome. “The former idealrations pertain tothe conduct of discourse rather than to the agreement to which participants in discourse aspire. “They include the ideaizing supposiions that participants are mot ‘ated only by the Force of the better argument, that all competent parties are entitled to participate on equal terms in discussion, that ho relevant argument is suppressed or excluded, and so on. It is from such idealzations, which guide the process of argumentation that the idea of truth draws its power as regulative idea. This power is expressed in the idea that @ claim, if crue, could withstand all tempts to refute it under ideal discursive conditions. The idea of truth has a“decentering” function that serves to remind us that what is currently regarded as rationally acceptable may conceivably be called into question in the fuure, asthe limitations of our current ‘understanding of argumentation become apparent. is important here to beware of confusing Habermas's explica- tion of the idea of truth with an explanation of what makes a proposition tue, The thesis that a proposition, iftrue, can stand up, fo attempts to refute i tinder the demanding conditions of rational fngumentation explicates the pragmatie meaning of ruth IS not, however, an explanation of what makes the proposition true. As to the later, Habermas's postion isthe standard one that a proposition is true if and only its uth conditions are satisfied. Aldiough we ‘can ofabish whether the truth conditions of a given proposition are 8 Inwodton satisfied only in argumentation, their satsfction or nonsatstict |s not itself an epistemic fact. Whereas, as we have seen, idealized rational acceptability cnstiwes the validity of moral norms, it merely indicates the truth of propositions. Nonetheles,i is clear from the foregoing that, on Habermas's account, the cone of truth must be “unpacked pragmatialy; we have no accesso ruth except by way of a concept of validity expicated in terms of how we tak about truth, thats, in terms of an Wealized practice of argumentation "A further concern of Habermas's program of formal pragmatics fs to angue that the communicative use of linguistic expressions i the basie mal of language use on which other modes, for example, "arategic of tional ones, are parasitic. Otherwise, in ignoring these ‘other modes, the demonstration that everyday communicative ac- tion has an inbuilt connection with contextiranscendent validity Claims would he seriously limited. In arguing forthe derivative satus ofthe strategic ue of language, Habermas inidally drew on Austin’s distinction bemeen llocutions and perlocutions (see chapter 3) In response to criticisms of his interpretation ofthis distinction, how- fever, Habermas subsequently modified and clarified his under- Sanding of Austin’s categories (see chapters 3, 4, and 7) while ‘continuing to insist thatthe strategie use of language is parasitic on the use of language with an orientation toward reaching under standing, His argument for the parasite staus of the symbolic, che figurative, and the fiedonal modes of language use is that the every day communicative use of language fulfils indispensable problem- Solving functions that require idealizing sippositions not demanded, by the world-reating and world-dscosing tse of language charac teristic for the aesthetic realm, The idealzing suppositions of, for ‘example, consistency of meaning or a shared orientation toward ital understanding ate suspended in the fictional we of lan- ‘guage, and with these, the Mlocutionary binding and bonding power ‘of everyday speech act (see chapters 9 and 10), Finally, Habermas's pragmatic theory of meaning attempts to do Justice to the relations between utterances and the situations and ‘context in which they are embedded. For to understand an utter- lance is always to understand it as an uterance in a given situation, Which in turn may be part of multiple, extended contexts, Here, 6 Inrodction Habermas draws attention to various kinds of background know edge: for instance, knowledge of the speaker's personal history oF familiatty withthe (culturally specific) contexts in which a given topic is normally discussed. These kinds of knowledge, although “usually only implicit in acts of understanding, are relatively close 10 the foreground and can be rendered explicit without dificult. Thus they can be contrasted with the deep-seated, prerellectve taken for. ‘granted background knovledge ofthe lifeworld that, 2s a horizon of Shared, unproblematic convictions, cannot be summoned to con- sciousness at will or in its entices This background knowledge of the lifeworld forms the indispensable context for the communicative tse of language; indeed without it, meaning of any kind would be imposible, Italo functions to absorb the risk of social dsintegra- tion that arises when a soil order is reproduced primarily through, ‘mechanisms of communicative action, Ics thus a necessary comple- ‘ment to Habermas's theories of meaning and communicative action, (Gee, in particular, chapters 2,4, and 8). "The essays collected in this anthology were selected with the aim ‘of providing general access to Habermas's treatment of formal prag- ‘matics, fom his earliest programmatic essay (chapter 1) to his most recent attempts to resolve some perceived problems with his ac- counts of meaning and truth (chapters 7 and 8). Whereas, in the process of trandating, revising existing translations, and retransat- Ing, every effort has been made to ensure terminological consix tency, no altempt has been made to impose consistency on the arguments as they are presented in the various essays. We have seen, for instance, that Habermas's earliest proposal for a pragmatic the- ‘ory of meaning differs in some respects from his subsequent propos als, and that he himself has modified his distinedon between, illoeutions and perlocutions as initially drawn. In Inter writings (see ‘chapter 7) he introduces a distinction within the category of Ver ‘téndigung between a weak and strong orientation toward consensus, and (see chapter 8) he takes on board abjections to the conception of trath hinted at in chapter 8 of the present volume. With the ‘exception of the lat ewo pieces, which are not directly concerned. ‘with the question of meaning, the anthology present the essays in nw Inwedeon rough chronology in order to show developments and revisions; the reader i encouraged to look out for them In chapter 1 we are introduced to formal pragmatics as a research program aimed at reconstructing the universal validity basis of speech. The procedure of rational reconstruction is elucidated through reference both to empirialanalytic approaches and. to Kantian transcendental analysis. This i followed by a sketch of a theory of speech acts, which diverges from Austin's and Searle's theories in several important respects, and in which speech acts are characterizedin terms of claims to vali Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6, though situating formal pragmatics in relation to Habermas's theory of communicative ation, focus on the theory of meaning, The coordinating power of speech acts is ex- plained through an account of understanding utterance meaning in terms of knowing acceptability conditions. This pragmatic theory of ‘meaning is presented as an attempt wo overcome the limitations of semantic theories through drawing on Karl Bibler's schema of lan suage functions and on speech-act theory. In addition a typology of specch acts hased on their connection with one of three tniversl ‘validity claims is set up in chapter 2, forming the background for Habermas's discussion in subsequent chapters, The concept of life world a5 a kind of deep-seated, implic, background knowledge Is also introduced in chapter 2 and developed, in particular, in chapter 4. Habermas stresses the importance of this concept, on the one hhand, as a presupposition for understanding utterance meaning and, on the other, asa riskabsorbing counterpoise tothe potendally, disinegrative effects of action oriented toward reaching under standing, Further, Austin’s ditinction between illocuions and per- Jocutions isa thread running throxigh these chapters, and is used by -iabermas o support his thesis that the strategie mode of language tse is parasitic on the communicative use. This involves him in discussion about the status of simple imperatives (for example, threats), which as a ype of utterance not apparendy connected with validity claims, seem 10 undermine his claim that strategic utterances, have a derivative status. ‘Chapter 5 is critical discussion of Searle's theory of meaning 2s developed from the late 1970s onwards. Habermas exposes some 9 Inweduedon Ingotocion problems attached o Searle's view, which he reads as a modified Note intentionalit one, arguing that his own pragmatic theory is beter able to account for the meaning of, in particulas, imperatives and promises. ‘Chapter 7 responds to Herbert Schniidelbach’s criticisms of Habermas's concept of communicative rationaliy. Accepting Schnidelbach’s crtcism that he has hitherto accorded ita priv leged position, Habermas now identifies three core strucures of rationality this leads him to make some new distinctions between, diferent modalities of language use. One noteworthy modification here is his introduction of a distintion between action oriented toward reaching understanding in a weaker sense and action ori- ‘ented toward agreement in the strict sense and, corresponding, ‘between weak and strong communicative ation. Some implications ‘of these distinctions for the theory of meaning are also discussed. Chapter 8 examines Richard Rortys neopragmatism, interpreted by Habermas as an attempt to carry the linguistic urn through © its conclusion, and eriizes it for its asimilation of truth claims co justified asertbiliy. ‘Chapter 9 focuses on the relation between the fictional or poetic tse of language and language a itis used in everyday communica tive action; it extcizes Derrideans for faulty accounts of everyday and poetic language, for a consequent problematic leveling of the distinction between literature and communicative acion, and for a failure to appreciate the disinctive mediating roles of philosophy and literary’ criticism. In chapter 10, Habermas responds to several criticisms of his theory of communicative action. Against Rorty, he defends his view ‘of philosophy as guardian of reason, while acknowledging that this ‘ole must be defined in new way. He then clarifies his postion with respect to modern art and the validity claims connected with it, fealfirms his positon that interpretive understanding inescapably involves evaluation, clarifies his idea of the unity of reason as an interplay of validity dimensions, and concludes with a discussion of the abjecton that his theory concentrates on justice atthe expense of happiness een a tn a tg smancaon” Te cred tery ak wg A Haber sno ie keeper een ata oe Seas hantepeuecira ae ae enact eaten fechas oem teens Sit age eee ntiseemeneas Re Seer s gear ‘emf omnia ecle ome ena ‘ccatonaly rendered ty Habermas t ntanajuapessonasig 1 ‘What Is Universal Pragmatics? (1976) The tsk of universal pragmatics isto identify and reconstruct uni versal conditions of possible mutual understanding (nding). In other contexts, one alo speaks of "general presuppositions of ‘communication,” but I prefer to speak of general presuppositions of ‘communicative action because I take the ype of action aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental, Thus I start from the sumption (without undertaking to demonstrate it here) that other forms of social action—for example, conflict, competition, strategic action in general—are derivatives of action oriented toward reaching. understanding (Virstindigung). Furthermore, since language i the specific medium of reaching understanding at the sociocultural ‘Sage of evolution, I want to goa step further and single out explicit speech actions from other forms of communicative action. I shall, ignore nonverbal actions and body expressions? The Validity Bass of Speech KarLOto Apel proposes the following formulation in regard to the {general presuppositions of consensual speech acts: to identify such Presuppositons we must, he thinks, leave the perspective of the ‘observer of behavioral ficts and call to mind "what we must neces sarily always already presuppose in reyard to ourselves and others as 2 Ghapeer 7 normative conditions of the possibility of reaching understandings find in ths sense, what we must necessarily always already ave Sceepted"" Apel here uses the aprioristic perfect (immer schon: always liready) and adds the mode of necessity in order 1o express the transcendental constraint to which we, as speakers, are subject 38 oom as we perform or understand or respond to a speech act. fn oF fice the performance ofthis act, we can become aware that we have {involuntarily made certain assumptions, which Apel calls “norma: the conditions of the possibilty of reaching understanding.” The aujectve “normative” may give rise to misunderstanding. One ean fay, however, that the general and vnavoidable—in this sense ta Scendental—conditions of possible mutual understanding have a hhormative content wher ont thinks not only of the validity dimer fiom of norms of ation or evaluation, or even ofthe validity dimen- Son of rules in general, but alo ofthe validity bass of speech across {es entire spectrum. As a preliminary, I want to indicate briefly what mean by the ‘ality basis of speech.” T hall develop the thesis that anyone acting communicatively sms, in performing any speech act, raise universal validity claims find suppose that they can be vindicated (enlisen). Insofar as she Wants to participate in a process of reaching understanding, she ‘Cannot avoid rating the fllowing—and indeed precisely the follow ing-—valicity elaims. She claims 0 be a. uttering something inuligiy, bi. giving (the hearer) somahing to understand, ‘making hers thereby understandable, and 4. coming to an understanding with anather person “The speaker must choose an intelligible (eestndlich) expression so that speaker and heater ean comprelend one anothex The speaker nus have the intention of communicating a true (2h?) proposition {ora propositional content, the existential presuppositions of which realise) so that the hearer can share the nowledg ofthe speaker. The speaker must want to express her intentions tradhully (ahr hafig) so that the hearer can find the utterance of the speaker ‘redibte (can tust her). Finally the speaker must choose an utter 2s ‘Whats Univeral Pragmaia? nce tha sigh (ici wit epet open norms and vals so thatthe heer can acrp he uteraec and bls ad hearer ea inthe eran they age eth oe ah With ‘epect tos recogined normative background Moreen comm ctve ston can contin undiurbed only song aval parc ne sippom sha the vay lame they repeal rae are Pin jst “he nm of reaching understanding (Votan) i on sboutanapeement (tna te ats tener [fctve muta of reco comprehension shared Knog, tilts an accord wth one tothe Agreements bed ‘ecogidon ofthe four corresponding wy ce comprehen tig rh, suhtanesy and rights: We can se tthe word “Nenndgng i ambigonsInts narrowest meaning nets that wo bec understand a ing enpeson nthe sme we ins roc meaning inticats tht an accord exis eee siete concerning the righne of an uterace in velon vo 4 tty ecoguied normative tachground ato, the par pats in communication can each understanding sont something inthe worl and they ean mike thc intentions understandable fo oe snsher TE fil agreement, embrating al four of hese components were a normal Sate of igus cmmaniain, would ot be necee fay wo amee the proce of reaching undertandng fom the dynamic perpecte of binging sh an agreement Ee, ped ster ar inthe gray aca beteen, on the one hand ack of tentang and misunderstanding, intotonal sd ivanry Cntuthfulnes, conceded and ape ord, and, on heer and preening orachired contenu Reaching undertanding the proce of tigi about an aprement on he prespposcd bass aval hi that are manly recog. In eer ie, tesa om backround conse perening tthe interpre Shion ken fr grated anon param, A 0s his coe ‘Sno ie shaken, ann soom m the presppnion ta he aly Gin are mt (or cold be vind) Se pended inte ese of a leat one of the four cla communi ston cannot be contac 2 Ghapier “The sk of muta nerpretatin, then sto achive anew defi son tthe stanton hat a parip ean share 1th emp fio bua confronted wih de alternates of ching to Stoic acon, breaking off communication allogedic, 0 econ ‘toncing ation oncaed toward reaching understanding a dif Tale the level of gumentaive. speech (or purposes of “Tuan eamining the problema wl elm nich are now rare as hypesesea. what fll shal take no Consieradon ony consenea speech act leaving aide both di tours and sage action In communica acon, partcpansprenppose that they know sina mutual recognition a ecipoclly ised vay ai means Trin dion they can rely on shared dfn of dhe station td thereupon conn, he backround onsen ines the flowing 4 Speaker and hearer now imply that ech of them has wo rie the torementoned valid clams iter is tobe communication Bl the se of ation ent toned reaching under sanding bBo epoca suppose that they ata do sty hee pre Supposiionsofcommmicaon, Ua hy tat they jsiBably rae ther ey came This means that there sa common conviction tha any val Slams abe ether ave aeay indicated, an the ese ofthe comprehensbiliy ofthe sentences tered oa in the case of truth, wanes and rine, could be vine Deca the sentences ropotons, expect netiony and terances sats the corepontng ade conditions “Tus dings () the cnditons forthe vay fa grammate cal semence, eve proponion, tui inennal expression, of Stormaunly correct unrance appropiate to costes om (8) the ca with which speakers dead interject recognition for he wllformednes of sentence, rth oa propostio, the fue ofan itentana expression, and ight of speech at tells i the endnote ay ain ‘Vindeadon means thatthe proponent, wheter though appeal Pa ‘Wars Univer Pragmatic? Imus deren or hough argument and aon cone auences jer cin write be eogancland Sg thoata tpanijeceecpion ftw capone ae, ity cin rine he peer te heuer ener ea the sma sete thay he Tenge the eens tranatl sans sent apesuon Sl ot tmterce core The ey of ese eee wren uty te heey ces nang oa Son the ean of he yc nt re reopi atathe jane ta mere eo None be mong sbnt er ue enon Thaw prop the ame “ural pega fore rsh progr ne at fronting the tnera wy oro frech! 1 would now ie to deat te theme ets teen fron i's ysiay wy, Ts bre pang oh tothe theory tyes aT al pre for sng ea Scag with () anal einiaon ofhe ce Soeie ee propose rogram of ute page th anccanocnatng Procedure oa reconucton a appecd tw an Sp auc procedure mower ch haf meno tet renng om te a gists dns th aot ‘contrive seer and aly he ue of wheter te fropse nn pgs sesh Sat fs tees Sr thoy of erton or taf an empl sean toe Src sence al reais my epg rears bec seth uctone ae fundamental deri tobe emi Inupeneny hy fmol te tomato he pe al et ot ein nb Preliminary Delimitation of the Object Domain ta seal won Apel has pone othe ace al thane he ppon th lp of nef ya temporary sac ny The peal nas tanga ‘rated wa Cn fos pinay on acca sean reopen fing frmsons Ea acorn iit tet dona yf abatacng om the ngs 26 rapier tes of language, and subsequent ntoducing the pragmatic {imerson n such way thatthe consatve connection betwee the generadheaccomplshinen of jects capable of speaking and tcting: on the one hand, and the general rctres of speech, on the othe, cannot come into ew Ie cei legitimate daw fm astacve dncton beoweeningunge a seine apd pea ing a process A langage wl then be underwood a gem of fs for gencaingexpesons, sich that ll welMormed expres Sons (cig, sentences say count at elements o this langage: On the ether hand, subjects capable of speaking can employ sch ex prestions av parikipants in-process of communication: for in Stace thc) can itr senences a well as undettand them and Teor to them, This abusacion of ngage fom the use of a> fig in sch (lange vera rl, which made in bo the fogeal and the srr aa of language, is meaning NBnethelss this methodological step isnot sient reason forthe fiew that the pragmatie dimension of language fom which one Sharacs i bend formal fr ngusie) nab An absracive fay aris in that the succes o at es promiing, econsrue tion af linus rule stems acen ation for resting formal anasto this object domain, The separation of the eo tnac level, limgungeand spec sold note mad in mach aa that the pragiatie dimension of language i eto excise) em pirical analso—tat to empirical sciences wich ax pct tes and secolinguiicn. Toul w defend the thes that no onl ngage but speceh too hat ithe employment of sentences in terances—i ace Tew formal ana Like the elementary units of language (en tence) the elementary ui ofapech terances) canbe anand from the methodslogial ance ofa reconstruc cence Apptoaches wa gencal theory of conmnicaion have been deseloped from he emi of Charles Moi I ei amework of untamentl concept thy Sntegrate the model of ngusic be Rersa (he ombulcaly mediated behavioral reaction of the Stimulated nial organisa) wih the model of information Cramansion eneoing and decoding signal between snd and reece forage channel and an et parally common store = = ‘Whar i Univeral Pragmatics (of signs). Ifthe speaking process is conceptualized in this way, the fundamental question of universal pragmatics concerning the gen: cral conditions of possible munual understanding. (Vestindigung) ‘cannot be posed in an appropriate way. For example, the intrsub- _jectvty of meanings that are identical fora least two speakers does ‘not even become a problem (i) the identity of meanings is reduc to extensionally equivalent clases of behavioral properties, as is done in linguistic Behaviorism” or (i) i te preestablshed at the analytic level that chere exists a comnon code and store of signs between sender and receiver, a it done in information theory. In addition to empiricist approaches that issue, in ome way OF another, rom the semiotics of Morris, there are interesting ap- proaches tothe logical analysis of general struetures of speech and Action. The following analyses can be understood a6 contributions along the way toa universal pragmatic. Bar Hille pointed out quite carly the necessity for a pragmatic extension of logical semantics.” Also of note are the proposal for dente logic (Hare, H. von Wright, NN. Rescher)"" and corresponding attempts at a formalization of speech acts such as assertions and questions (Apostel) approaches toa logic of nondeductive argumentation (Toulmin, Botha) belong, hhere a wel.” From the side of linguistics, the investigation of pre supposiions (Kiefer, Petfi),!converstional postulates (Gree, Lake ‘off, speech acts (Ross, MeCavley, Wunderlich), and dialogues and cexts (Fillmore, Posner)” lead to a consideration ofthe Prag matic dimension of language from a reconstracionist pon of view. ‘The difficulties in semantic theory (Lyons, Katz) point in the same direction." From the side of formal somatic, in particular the dis cussion—going back to Frege and Rustellof the structure of propositions of referential terms and predicates (Strawson)"® is sige nificant fora universal pragmatics The same holds for analytic action theory (Danto, Hampshire, Schwayder)® and for the discusion that hhas arisen in connection with the logic of the explanation of inten ‘ional action (Winch, Taylor, von Wright). The use theory of mean Ing introduced by Witigenstein has universal-pragmatic aspects (Alson),2 as does the attempt by Grice 10 trace the meaning of | sentences back to the intentions of the speakers (Bennet, chi fer) As the most promising point of departure for 4 univers 28 rapier pragmaucs 1 shall draw primaiy on the theory of speech acts Inte by Aviin (Searle, Wunder = “These approaches developed! rom log, nguiic, andthe ana tye phluopiy of language fave the common gol of caring Sis of language tse fom the wewpoit of formal arabs oweve i one cate them with regard ote contbton they Inake ta unre pragmatic, dee weakness aio become appar Ene In many cet tse dager that the ana of eandons af posible mutal understanding is oreshortened ether a, because these approaches do not generalize radically enough and ‘do not push through the eve of fortuitous contexts to general and ‘unavoidable presupponitions—as isthe case, for instance, with most ‘ofthe linguist investigations of semantic and pragmatic presuppo- ’. because they restrict themselves to the instruments developed in logic and grammar, ven when these are inadequate for capturing pragmatic relations —ae, for example, in smactic explanations of the performative character of speech acts or because they mislead one into a formalization of basic concepts that have not been satisfactorily analyzed—as can, in my view, be shown in the case ofthe logis of norms which trace norms of action back to commands; or finally 1 Decause they start from the model of the isolated, purposive: rational actor and thereby fail—as do, for insanee, Grice and TLewis™™to reconstrct in an appropriate way the specific moment ‘of matali in the undersanding of identical meanings or in the recognition of intersubjective validity claims. tis my impression that the theory of speech acts is largely free of these andl similar weaknesses, Some Remarks on the Procedure of Rational Reconstruction | have been employing the expression “Formal anahsls” in opposi tion to empiricalanalytie procedures (in the narrower sense) with: 2 detailed explanation, This i, at least, misleading. 1 ‘Wha is Unie Pragmatic am not using formal ana in a sense ha rfers, a 10 the san dard predicate Togc or wo any specie lg The tolerant sense in HT understand formal als can best be characters through the methodslogial atte we adopt the aan Yeon struction af concept itera, rule, and schemata: Ths we speak of the expleaion of meanings and concepts of the ames of Presapeston and rle mtn ands forth, OF eure een Sucve procures size ao important for empatiaansje te search for example for expliaing frameworks of baie concep for formating aston italy formulated in oriary tage, for caring deduct rains snony parular hypothe So forioterpretng esl af messcement an Goon, None, reconsructe procedures are not charscterisie of scence tat de ‘elop nomotogealhypothcies about damns of observable abject thd events rer, these procedure ate characte of thos sc ces tht emanate ne nee of empen sje In caning the dasneon between empirical ana and recon: structive cences {woud eto begin with te dsieton bemeen semury experience or barat ad communicate experience or ‘ndeslondng Vike), Oberon s dected ward perepable things and event (or te) underside toward the rmeaning of uterances” In experiencing the observer in rine ple alon, een the ego nen which experenes are a lean cxperincs tying cao jersey shared by several or een all indi, conta the interpre derstand meaning undergoc her experiences fandamently 2 parcipan in communication, onthe tase ofan interabjectine Fellonesublded though smc wih other indi even ‘he infact alone wih book a document ora work ofa Tcl dot ere anae te complex relationship herven oberon and Shndertanding any fuer, woud Hke vo direct steno to ust tne spec of his the diference in evel been percept realiy thd the understandable meaning ota bac frat, Sensory perience rented to myn ofa witout medion, cont trnkave experince only mediately at Manrted in the dlgram below: oe » Chapear 1 Lewd 1 Observable vents €— Observation (Observer) * I t Understanding Lave 2 Oberon etence eet 1 Let 3 Q ~ Interpretation “This diagram represents three different relationships: «4. Epistemic relations between experiential acts and their objects. In this tense, the act of understanding relates to the symbolic expres ‘sion (here ofthe observation sentence). in a way similar to how the act of observation relates tothe objects and evens observed, ». Relations of representing an aspect of realty in a propositional sentence, In this sense, the interpretation represents the semantic Content (here of the observation sentence), in a way similar 10 how the observation sentence represents certain objects and events, «Relations of expressing intentional acts. In this sense, the under Standing (here of the observation sentence) is expressed in the propositional content of the interpeetation, just a8 the observation {s expressed in the propositional conterit of the observation, [Apart from the fact that all three types of relation simply point to fundamental problems, there is an addisonal difficult in specifying the precise differences between the epistemic relations of the ob- server and the interpreter to their fespective objects and between the representational relations of the observation sentence co reality, fon the one hand, and that of the interpretation sentence to (sm Dolically prestructured) reali, on the other. This specification ‘would require a comparison between observation and interpreta tion, between description and explication. For the time being, the tlagram is intended merely to ilustrate the two levels of reality 10 which sensory and communicative experience respectively relate. ‘The difference in level benseen perceptible and symbolically pre- siructured reality is reflected in the gap between direct access through observation of rely and communicatively mediated access through understanding an utterance concerning reality What i Unions Praga? ‘The ewo pairs of concepts—"pereeptible realy" versus “symbol: cally prestructured_ reality" and “observation” versus. “under- ‘anding™—can be correlated with another pair “description” versus "explication." With the aid ofa sentence that represents an observa tion, I can dacnie the observed aspect of realty. With the aid of @ ‘sentence that represents an interpretation of the meaning of asym bolic formation, I can explicate the meaning of such an utterance. Naturally, only when the meaning of the symbolic formation is un- ‘lear does the explication need to be set off as an independent analytic step. In regard to sentences that we use to describe objects and evens, there can be a lack of clarity at various levels, Depending ‘on the level, we demand explications of different kinds. I the phe- nomenon described isin need of explanation, we demand an expli- cation that_makes clear how reality operates and how the phenomenon in question comes about. If, by contrast, the descrip ion itself is incomprehensible, we slemand an explication that ‘makes clear what the observer meant by his utterance and how the symbolic expresion in need of elucidation comes about. In the frst cise, 4 stistactory explication will have the form of an explanation ‘we undertake with the aid ofa causal hypothesis In the second case, wwe speak of explication of meaning. (OF course, explications of ‘meaning need not be limited to descriptive sentences; any meaning: fully structured formation can be subjected to the operation of meaning explication.) Descriptions and explicaions have different ranges, they can be- sin on the surface and push through to underlying structures. We fare familiar with this fact from the explanation of natural phenom fena—the more genral the theories are with which we explain nats ral phenomena, the more penetrating the corresponding theoretical

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