Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

Theses on Islam & Truth

He sendeth down water from the sky, so that valleys flow according to their measure, and the flood
beareth (on its surface) swelling foam - from that which they smelt in the fire in order to make
ornaments and tools riseth a foam like unto it - thus Allah coineth (the similitude of) the true and the
false. Then, as for the foam, it passeth away as scum upon the banks, while, as for that which is of use to
mankind, it remaineth in the earth. Thus Allah coineth the similitudes(13:17). 1

1.The purpose of these theses is not apologetic; my aim is rather to clarify the
structure of the Islamic worldview in a way that it would be equally useful to those
who (want to) espouse it as well as to those who (want to) reject it. The paper has
general philosophical significance as well as it builds on core philosophical issues of
truth, reality, worldviews, transformations, critique etc.

2. There is no doubt that the prime value and the defining characteristic of Islam is
the commitment to ‘Truth’. God Himself is ‘the truth’ (al-haq) [32:116, 10:32 and
passim], the revelation and the message of Islam are termed as ‘the truth’ (al-haq) as
well (22:54 and passim). The Arabic word al-haq is used in the Qur’an more than
two hundred times. The basic meaning of the word al-haq includes ‘correspondence
to reality’2 or ‘reality’ itself. It carries the meanings of being anchored in reality,
endurance, continuity, permanence etc.3 ‘Truth’ is so called because it is anchored in
reality and is differentiated from illusions and figments of imagination. Another
word for ‘truth’ in Arabic al-sidq is different from al-haq in that the former refers to
the ‘truth’ of a claim (and the truth from the side of the subject or the claimant)
while the latter to ‘truth’ in its correspondence to reality. 4 Hence a judgement is
‘true’ if it corresponds to ‘reality’ while its ‘truth’ resides in its correspondence to
reality itself. Thus al-haq conveys the meaning of truth in itself, in its basic
correspondence with reality. The ultimate criterion is ‘reality itself’ and the basic


Note: I should like to thank John Campbell, Dirk Mclean, for their detailed feedback on an earlier version of this paper.
Thanks are also due to . . . .

1
Unless otherwise stated all translations of the Qur’anic verses are from Marmaduke William
Pickthall. The meaning of the glorious Qurʼan : text and explanatory translation. New York : Muslim
World League,1977.
2
Masʻū d ibn ʻUmar, Taftā zā ni .̄ Sharh Saʻd al-Dīn al-Taftazānī ʻalá al-ʻAqāʼid al-Nasafīyah li-Najm al-
Dīn ʻUmar al-Nasafī. Karachi: Al-Bushra, n.d., p.25.
3
See Muhammad Ala ibn Ali Thanvi Kashāf istilāhāt al-funūn. Bayrū t : Dā r Sā dir, 2005, ʻAlī ibn
Muhammad Jurjā nī. Kitāb al-ta'rīfāt. Bayrū t, Maktabat Lubnā n, 1996, under al-haq. Also see
Taftā zā ni.̄ Sharh pp. 24-26.
4
Taftā zā ni says that in ‘sidq’ our focus is on ‘correspondence to reality’ from the side of judgment
while in ‘al-haq’ our focus on ‘correspondence to reality’ is from the side of ‘facticity’. See Taftā zā ni.̄
Sharh p. 26. In modern parlance we can say that ‘sidq’ concerns the ‘claim’ to truth while ‘al-haq’
decides the ‘truth’ or otherwise of the claim.

1
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

correspondence with reality gives ‘truth’ in the sense of al-haq its ultimate
authority.5

‘Truth’ then is what is the case (fact).6 There are two sides to our understanding of
truth; the ‘subjective’ side, where one makes a claim to ‘truth’ and depending on
whether the claim matches what is ‘out there’ i.e. reality, the claim is true/false,
valid/invalid. The other side is the reality itself, which is ‘true’ in the sense that ‘it is
the case’. In this second sense God is ‘the reality’, ‘the truth’.

Muslims are so named because they are witness to truth (the whole of truth, the
unadulterated truth)7: ‘O ye who believe! Be ye staunch in justice, witnesses for
Allah8, even though it be against yourselves or (your) parents or (your) kindred,
whether (the case be of) a rich man or a poor man, for Allah is nearer unto both
(than ye are). So follow not passion lest ye lapse (from truth) and if ye lapse or fall
away, then lo! Allah is ever Informed of what ye do.’ (4:135). God Himself proclaims
truth: “He said: The Truth is, and the Truth I speak” (38:84). Which can mean I’m the
truth and I speak the truth only, or all truth is from me and I speak only truth.
Similarly, God Himself is proclaimed as the truth, the truth is one of His names “On
that day Allah will pay them their just due, and they will know that Allah, He is the
Manifest Truth” (24:25). The messenger of God is reported to have said that “Four
are the qualities which, when found in a person, make him a sheer hypocrite, and
one who possesses one of them, possesses one characteristic of hypocrisy until he
abandons it. These are: When he is entrusted with something, he betrays trust;
when he speaks, he lies; when he promises, he acts treacherously; and when he
argues, he behaves in a very imprudent, insulting manner”.9

5
See Jurjā nī, Kitā b al-taʻrīfā t under al-haq and al-haqiqah.
6
This is the minimalist working definition of truth. The debates in modern philosophy, for example,
the debate between those who espouse a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth and those who don’t are
subsumed within this definition and don’t concern us here because they are debates about how best
to analyse and understand the terms involved in the meaning of truth, and not about the meaning of
truth itself and are broadly compatible with it. Thus one can believe in ‘true’ in my sense but might
deny correspondence theory of truth. My position here is even compatible with the Berkeleyian
idealism. The only position, which is excluded by our definition, is the one, which denies ‘truth’ tout
court. Classical Muslim Mutakallimūn thought that the Sophists espoused such a position, so they
spend considerable time in rejecting their position.
7
This is not incompatible with the claim that a Muslim is the one who submits to God because the
submission in question must be based on the realisation of its truth; that it is (that’s the submission
to one and true God) the truth, the reality of this universe. As the Qur’an puts it: ‘Say: This is my Way:
I call on Allah with clear evidence. I and whosoever followeth me - Glory be to Allah! - and I am not of
the idolaters. ‘ (12:108). I have changed Pickthall’s ‘sure knowledge’ with ‘clear evidence’ based on
Jalālayn. Karā chī : Qadīmī Kutub K̲h̲ā nah, 2002, under the verse.
8
Concerning truth, as the context makes clear (see Jalal al-Din Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Mahalli;
Jalal al-Din 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr al-Suyuti. Jalālayn. Karā chī : Qadīmī Kutub K̲h̲ā nah, 2002,
under the verse).
9
Narrated by Al-Bukhari and Muslim from ‘Abdullah bin ‘Amr, Riyad as-Salihin, Book 2 Hadith no.
690. rf

2
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

In a verse which was revealed in a specific context10 but which has quite general
meaning warns all creatures11: “Confound not truth with falsehood, nor knowingly
conceal the truth” (2:42). It warns against mixing truth with falsehood through
sophistry and other tricks, and against hiding the truth, once it becomes known; the
two biggest crimes a human being can commit is to hide truth and knowingly
confound truth with falsehood. The Messenger of God is reported to have said “ No
one should be deterred by the might of anyone from uttering truth and proclaiming
and defending it wherever one might be”12 The basic duty of a human being is to
recognise truth, confirm it, accept it, proclaim it, dedicate her life to it, bear hardship
for it, congregate with others on it, and separate from others due to it. 13

The Qur‘an proclaims to all its readers (present and future, potential and actual):
‘Verily We have brought the Truth to you: but most of you have a hatred for Truth’
(43:78). About the messenger it declares: ‘With truth have We sent it down, and
with truth hath it descended. And We have sent thee as naught else save a bearer of
good tidings and a warner.’ (17:105). The Messenger is taught to ask God in the
following way: ‘Say: ‘O my Lord! Let my entry be by the Gate of Truth and Honour,
and likewise my exit by the Gate of Truth and Honour; and grant me from Thy
Presence an authority to aid (me)’ [17:80]. His conquest over his enemies is
described as the conquest of truth: ‘And say: Truth hath come and falsehood hath
vanished away. Lo! falsehood is ever bound to vanish’ (17:81). It’s reported that the
messenger of God was reciting these verses when he entered Mecca as a conqueror
emphasizing that his struggle with the Arab pagans was not over the worldly
kingdoms or material bounties but over Truth.

Arrogance in the face of truth is perhaps the biggest crime. Rejecting the truth
based on ulterior factors once one realizes its truth is unpardonable. Omar wrote to
his governor in Iraq ‘Your prior decisions shouldn’t stop you from returning to truth
once you have reviewed your decisions and found them lacking in truth because
accepting your mistake and returning to truth is better than arrogantly upholding to
what’s wrong.14

10
In general, it’s agreed that a specific context doesn’t annul the generality of a
Qur’anic verse. The specific context is more like an illustration. Rf see Razi.
11
For generality of the verse see Ruhul Beyan, Ismail Haqqi under the verse.
12
Narrated by Ahmed and Ibn Maja. Quoted in Ruhl Beyan under 2:42 and quoted by Maqdisi in Al
Adab al shariya p. 155. rf
13
Of course with all the usual caveat – for e.g. the duty corresponds to each person’s
capabilities and powers because God doesn’t put burden on a person which he can’t
bear (rf).
14
Dar al Qutni, in his Sunan p. 449, Dar al Moyyad, 2001 rf

3
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

3. The absolute allegiance to truth establishes the importance of evidence. 15 What is

your evidence/proof? Bring your evidence is the cry of the Quran. Commenting on
verse 10:36 (Most of them follow not but conjecture. Assuredly conjecture can by no
means take the place of truth. Lo! Allah is Aware of what they do.), Baydawi16 writes:
‘In the verse there is evidence for the opinion that to acquire knowledge of the
fundamentals of religion (for example the knowledge of whether God exits or not, or
whether there is a life after death or not)17 is obligatory for everyone and relying on
imitation and conjecture is not permissible in these (important) matters’. 18 The
Qur’an challenges its opponents to bring evidence for their claims ‘And they say:
None entereth paradise unless he be a Jew or a Christian. These are their own
desires. Say: Bring your proof (of what ye state) if ye are truthful.’ (2:111).
Commenting on this Zamakhsharī writes: ‘This verse demolishes the argument of
those who insist on following authorities (imitating them); it clearly establishes that
any claim without proof/evidence is inadmissible’.19 Rā zī adds: ‘The verse implies
that a claimant whether her claim is positive or negative must produce a
proof/evidence/argument in favour of her claim. This verse is the best proof against
the falsehood of those who insist on imitation and following authorities’. 20

How can then one suppose that the same Quran will allow its followers to accept
something without relevant proof and based on ‘mere’ authority (‘mere’ is here to
exclude relevant legitimate authority which is established through legitimate
evidence in the first place). The Quran describes ‘mere’ following ‘blind imitation’
and it’s full of the repudiation and rubbishing of blind imitation: ‘Whoso is blind
here will be blind in the Hereafter, and yet further from the road.’ (17:72, emphasis
added). The blindness described here is blindness to proofs and arguments and not
the physical blindness. The Qur’an castigates its opponents for taking refuge in
father worship and not heeding to or focusing on the truth of what is presented to
them: ‘And when it is said unto them: Follow that which Allah hath revealed, they
say: We follow that wherein we found our fathers. What! Even though their fathers

15
There are five words which have been used in the Qur’an which can be translated as ‘evidence’ in
English, these words are: ‘dalil’, ‘burhan’, ‘sultan’, ‘hujja’, and ‘bayan’. All five words have the basic
meaning of ‘evidence’ with subtle variation in their meanings. It shows the importance of ‘evidence’
and their internal differentiation in the Qur’an. The concept of ‘evidence’ is very complex and
hard to define. Philosophical and non-philosophical versions of evidence. There is a question
of (complete)
16
The dropping of ‘al’ before the Arabic surnames is intentional. I think it doesn’t make sense in
English and doesn’t sound good. If it’s dropped in Persian, Urdu and Turkish why can’t it be in
English?
17
Explanation in the bracket added.
18
Baydawi, Nasir al-Din al. Anwar al-Tanzil Wa Asrar al-Ta’wil , Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah,
1988. Unless otherwise indicated all translations are mine.
19
Zamakhshari, Mahmud bin `Umar al. Al-Kashshaf `An Haqa’iq Ghawamid al-Tanzil Wa `Uyun al-
Aqawil Fi Wujuh al-Ta’wil , 3 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-`Arabi, 2001, under verse 2:111, this is part
of verse and this sentence occurs throughout the Qur’an at the end of different verses or in the
middle, see for example, 27:64, 28:75, 21:24, 21:25, 28:74.
20
Razi, Fakhr, and Muhammad ibn Umar. Mafātīh al-ghayb, al-mushtahar bi-al-Tafsīr al-kabīr. 32 vols.
Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1981, under verse 2:111.

4
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

were wholly unintelligent and had no guidance?’ (2:170). Instead of bringing to bear
counter arguments against the Qur’anic arguments or to show its inconsistency or
to refer to legitimate authorities (experts in different fields for example), they lean
on their forefathers as their last defense and resort against the Qur’anic and
prophetic arguments.21 They do this not because their forefathers had some insights
into the matter at hand (to which they are referring), but solely because they were
their forefathers so they must be right. Alternatively, they say we follow them
because they are our forefathers and we do not worry about truth any way; or we
generally take into account matters of truth except for in cases when it comes in
conflict with our traditions descended from our forefathers. 22 [We are accustomed
to our ways, which have been descended to us through tradition, culture,
history, etc. and we don’t feel open to your way of life,, and your way of
thinking – they are here to destroy your exemplary life style]

It’s implicit in the use of ‘evidence’ that it may not be circular. Circular evidence is
‘evidence’ only in name. It’s precisely on this base that Muslim scholars have long
recognized that the truth of Islam can’t be established unless the existence of God is
established as a possibility, it’s established that the messenger is a true messenger
of God, and that the Qur’an is a word of God, the truth of Islam can’t be established.
Rā zī makes this point in a debate, which doesn’t concern us here. He says that in
response to someone who believes that God is Sun, or Moon, or heaven etc. it can’t
be said that it’s false because the ‘Qur’an says that the Sun, Moon, and heavens are
all contingent/created beings’. This sort of argument is mere foolishness because ‘
the authority of the Qur’an and the authority of the trustfulness of the messengers
itself is dependent on the existence of God and no intelligent person can in their
right mind invoke the authority of the Qur’an and the authority of the messengers to
prove the existence or the nature of God (because it would be a circular argument)’ 23
Of course Rā zī doesn’t deny that the Qur’anic arguments can be invoked and the
purity of the life and moral of the prophet can be invoked in a non circular way;
rather he says that the mere authority of the Qur’an and the messengers can’t be
invoked to establish the existence of God in a non circular way.

4. The focus on ‘evidence’ establishes the primacy of intellect (reason). There are
three basic types of evidence admitted in the Islamic epistemology viz. sense
experience, testimony, reason. However, all three are included in the meaning of
reason in the broad sense of the word. When the Qur’an asks its opponents to bring
their evidence if they are truthful, it can’t possibly be asking them for something
which is not recognised by its opponents, and at the most general level what is
21
This is a shorthand for all that is similar, for e.g, tradition, culture, our ‘way of life’ etc. [Pharoh says
to to his courtiers against Moses ‘They said: Lo! these are two wizards who would drive you out from
your country by their magic, and destroy your best traditions 20:63 (Yusuf Ali here translates it as
‘your cherished institutions’. A better translation would be ‘your exemplary way of life’ see Sheik
Zadah’s marginal commentary on Baiydawi, vol. 3. P. 323); Ya shoib . . he is trying to destroy our
exemplary way of life]
22
See Tabari under the verse 2:170.
23
Razi under 42:11, explanations in the bracket is mine.

5
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

common among us human beings is ‘reason’ in the broad sense of the word (which
will include sense experience and testimony as well).

I know of no disagreement among the Muslim scholars on this basic point. All
authorities agree that taklif (an attribution of individual responsibility) in this world
and hereafter requires sound reason and intellect. The judgement of reason is
primary in two specific senses: First, it’s needed to understand what the
commandments of God actually mean or amounts to; it’s indispensible for
interpretation. Second, and more fundamentally it’s needed to establish whether
particular claims are attributable to God to begin with. Hence it’s essential to
establish that God exists, that the Messenger is a true messenger of God, and that the
Qur’an is the true word of God. Without this there is no movement as far as the truth
of Islam is concerned.24

In order to follow truth and truth alone one needs a correct epistemology, apart
from a pure heart/intention. God is the creator, He created everything; but He
doesn’t just create and leave them on their own but constantly ‘guides’ them too
(20:15). Because God is the truth only He can guide; guidance is related to truth. But
there are different types of guidance at different levels.25 The most basic type of
guidance is the ‘natural’ guidance (the sort of guidance which comes through
natural laws or instincts depending on the type of being). The natural and
instinctive guidance is mentioned throughout the Quran, for example verses 16:68-
69 mentions how God guides the bee in her activity and this guidance is termed
‘revelation’ in the sense of inspiration through instincts or natural laws: ‘And thy
Lord inspired the bee, saying: Choose thou habitations in the hills and in the trees
and in that which they thatch; Then eat of all fruits, and follow the ways of thy Lord,
made smooth (for thee). There cometh forthfrom their bellies a drink divers of hues,
wherein is healing for mankind. Lo! herein is indeed a portent for people who
reflect’.Then there is guidance through senses, which means the creatures that are
given senses are guided in their activities through them. In the Quran, there is a
great emphasis on using one’s senses where their use is due: ‘And verily We had
empowered them with that wherewith We have not empowered you, and had
assigned them ears and eyes and hearts; but their ears and eyes and hearts availed
them naught since they denied the signs/revelations of Allah; and what they used to
mock befell them’ (46:26). Denying the signs here can mean not using their senses
to look around and derive proper conclusions using their intellect. [Ashari kalam
books make it their business to start with asserting the authority of senses
and rejecting the sophists] Intellect is the third main element through which God

24
See Abū -Hā mid Muhammad Ibn-Muhammad al- Ġ azzā lī. al-Mustasfá min ʻilm al-usūl. 2 vols. Bayrū t,
Lubnān : Dā r Ihyā ʼ al-Turā th al-ʻArabī : Muʼassasat al-Tā rīkh al-ʻArabī, 1418 H, 1997, vol. 1, pp. 15-
17. The later debates between the so called ‘rationalists’ (Mu'tazila and Ash'aris) and the
‘traditionalists’ (Hanbalis and Ahl al-Hadith in general) which are sometime misconstrued as debates
between those who accept the need for the rational justification and those who don’t regard it as
necessary, are in reality rather debates about the nature of reason. All the parties agree upon the
original point.
25
For different type of guidance see Al-Menar under the verse 10:36.

6
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

guides: ‘And in the Earth are neighbouring tracts, vineyards and ploughed lands, and
date-palms, like and unlike, which are watered with one water. And we have made
some of them to excel others in fruit. Lo! herein verily are portents for people who
have sense (use their intellect to understand)’ (13:4). But there is another type of
guidance, which relates to the ultimate reality (metaphysical reality) and about the
things that are beyond senses and intellect; here one needs ‘direct’ guidance from
God, which He provides by revealing the truth through His messengers and holy
books. The conjecture is used in 10:36 in derogatory sense underpinning the point
that the activity, which is proper in the context of normal human intellectual
context, becomes a misuse when brought in the arena where it doesn’t belong (a bit
like the Kantian censure against the misuse of reason). Commenting on 10:35-36
Razi writes: “Intellects are anxious and finding or reaching to the ultimate truth is
difficult. The views regarding this are mixed with truth and falsehood, and seldom
one has trodden this path (on her own without any help from God) and they have
been protected from falsehood. From this it follows that guidance and the cognition
of the ultimate truth can’t be without the help and guidance of Allah (the pure from
any glorified is His majesty). Regarding the difficulty of reaching the ultimate truth
without guidance form Allah. For it was because of the enormity and difficulty of the
task that Moses ((may the peace and salutations of God be on him) after hearing the
eternal speech of the Almighty invoked Him asking ‘O my lord open my heart for the
truth’ (Taha: 25). All the creation seeks guidance and seeks to avoid the falsehood
nonetheless most of them have fallen into falsehood which proves that reaching the
guidance and knowledge and insight can’t be without Allah.’ (Razi, under 10:36-37).
This is the crux of the argument for the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge
based solely on rational endavours.

To witness one needs knowledge: ‘(O man), follow not that whereof thou hast no
knowledge. Lo! the hearing and the sight and the heart - of each of these it will be
asked’ (17:36). Knowledge should be based in its proper sources, based on evidence.
It excludes baseless conjectures, witnessing for the falsehood, sophistry, saying
things without knowing them, that is without them being backed by evidence,
following something purely based on the authority of someone else, following your
forefathers in things for which you don’t have any evidence, in fact in which you
have evidence against them. In general, anything that is ultimately not based in the
legitimate sources of knowledge such as senses, intellect, memory, and testimony is
void of any epistemic worth. The human faculties are to be used legitimately as
every individual being is responsible for their use. The responsibility here is positive
as well as negative. In the positive sense, the responsibility is to use them to acquire
knowledge, and not blindly following others without the evidence. The negative
responsibility is not to misuse them. There can be many scenarios for misusing our
faculties: using sense to claim knowledge of thing which are beyond the reach of
sense is one such misuse. Or increasing the weightage of evidence when the senses
afford only 50% or 60% certainty, claiming to have 100% for example. All these are
examples of the misuse of our faculties. This notion of epistemic responsibility can
be extended to include something like the Kantian critique of pure and pure
practical reason. Thus while, as discussed above, the use of intellect/reason is

7
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

emphasised, its over stepping its boundaries is equally blameworthy. Similarly

making reason look like the thing it’s not in reality, for example, conceptualising it in
the way in which it is given more power than it actually has is its misuse as not
using reason when its use is called for is also it’s misuse. [This sounds like
‘evidentialism’ doesn’t it? Ibn Kuldun, Ghazali, and Ibn Taymiyya on reason]

6. The emphasis on ‘evidence’ has to be understood positively (and non

apologetically). You can’t presume the truth of Islam and then try to mould
everything else, which seems against its vision, in its image by hook or crook. This is
not a way of absolute allegiance to truth; absolute allegiance to truth means
openness to ‘evidence’ as such; the primary allegiance of a Muslim is to truth in its
abstract form, to what is the case and not to this or that interpretation of it. Of
course this is very idealistic but this is what the Qur’an teaches.

Kalām in this purely positive sense is a science or discipline, which establishes all
these three points clearly and persuasively (although non conclusively as the Qur’an
itself consider essential uncertainty in these matters as the condition of trial and
test in this world). This is the crux of the definition of Kalām Ghā zali gives in Al-
Mustasfā and declares it to be the most prestigious and the most basic Islamic
science on which all other Islamic disciplines rely for even the possibility of their
functionality. According to Ghā zali, Kalām in this sense provides ‘the foundation for
all Islamic sciences.’ Of course Ghazā li’s conception of ‘rational’ is a bit different
from ours but that’s not a major point as it’s to be accepted that with progress in
human knowledge our conception of ‘rational’ will also change and develop. 26

Ghazali in Al-Mustasfa establishes the superiority of kalam on all other sciences on

the basis that kalam is the science which establishes the existence of God and the
truth of the Messenger and his message on rational basis. Ghazali says that kalam is
the most (completely?) general (universal) science because its object of study is the
most general (i.e. existence as such). It proceeds from this universal object and first
establishes the existence of God. He goes on to explain briefly how kalam establishes
the existence of God. Then the truth of the messenger is established and the truth of
the day of judgement is established.

26
Those who have criticised Ghazali’s or Ashari position in general on this point (Hanbalis and ahl al
hadit in general) don’t really dispute the need to establish the existence of God etc. independently,
they only dispute Ghazali’s narrow conception of ‘rational’ (based on philosophical and particularly
Greek conception of logic and rationality). But one should remember that is not the heart of Ghazali’s
position and in his other books, especially in Ihya, he works with a broader conception of rationality.
Moreover, what is unique about Ghazali’s position is not his notion of ‘raitonal’ but the claim that all
three fundamental premises need to be established independently. For the proof that this is a general
position of Sunnis (irrespective of whether they are Aharis or Hanbalis) see Ibn Hajr Asqalani’s
commentary on Kitab al Tawhid.

8
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

The basis for this conception comes from the Qur’an itself, which repeatedly
asks its opponent to ‘bring your evidence if you’re truthful.’ (23:117 and
passim). It accuses its opponents of blind imitation of their forefathers (2:170
and passim). It proclaims through the messenger that his calling and of those
who follow him is based on clear evidence, arguments, and proofs, rather than
mere imitation of authorities (12:108). The evidence can be of any type and
can come from anywhere27 but it can’t presuppose what it’s trying to prove (in
which case it would be a form of circular reasoning). The Qur’an itself can be
part of the evidence but only in so far as its evidence is independent of the
belief that it’s a word of God. This would be a case, for example, when a sincere
and open-minded person, who doesn’t yet believe that it’s the word of God,
reads it as to assess its message or just to see what it says and where it would
lead him. Similarly, words of the messenger, his life, they can be part of
evidence but only in so far as it doesn’t presuppose our accepting him the
messenger. Of course, once we have accepted him as a true messenger, his
authority stretches beyond what can be believed on merely rational grounds;
and so is the case with the Qur’an.28 Finally, one needs to believe that at least
there is a possibility that God exists, and then that the God of the Qur’an and
the God of Muhammad is the true God. One needs to establish 29 this basic point
before the Qur’an and the messenger can be accepted as a true word and a
true messenger of God respectively. In order to prove this final point, one can
rely on rational and scientific arguments, but also the bulk of evidence in the
end must come from the Qur’an and the life and the words of the messenger
himself. Without this the Qur’an and the messenger can still be accepted as
marvels of human creativity and inspiration but surely they can’t be accepted
as what they claim to be.

Once the fundamentals of all the rest of the religious sciences are established in this
way the task of the Mutakelim is finished. Ghazali (contra Muteziala) also sets limits
on reason on that very basis. He says once we have established that God exists, once
we have established that the Messenger is truly from God, the fundamental task of
kalam is finished. It’s taken over by the particular sciences, which establish the
reliability of particular attributions to God and the Messenger and interpret the
meaning of those attributions. It would be irrational to deny the commandment of
God and the Messenger once we have established that God exists and once we have
established that Messenger is truthful. It would also be irrational to predetermine

27
Refute here Razi’s position.
28
This is the point Ghazali makes in al-Mustasfa on its basis differentiates his position form that of
Mutezlites.
29
Of course there can’t be any deductive proof for this, otherwise, there won’t be any point of the
notion of this world being the arena of trial and test. One of the weaknesses of traditional Kalam is
that it sometimes gives the impression that such a deductive proof is possible. But this was the case
because the old Kalam was inspired by the philosophies and sciences of its time (which must
necessarily be the case) and was misled by self-certainty of those philosophies in assuming that the
deductive proof for the existence of God can be furnished.

9
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

the will of God on rational basis because that would amount to predetermining what
is infinite with what is finite (something which in his opinion some Mutezlia try to
do).

The basis of Ghazali’s prto Kantian limits of reason is that there are things which
reason can’t grasp conclusively on its own but also doesn’t imply their impossibility,
thus there are things which are possible but it’s hard to say conclusively on the basis
of reason alone whether they are true or not, whether they exit or not. In those
matters, it’s rational to rely on the premises, which have already been established by
the reason conclusively (i.e. the existence of God and the truth of the messenger
etc.). And if the messenger informs us of the things, which cannot be conclusively
established by the reason but are not impossible in reasons’ eyes, it’s rational to
believe in those things. Ghazali gives the example of salvation based on good deed in
the hereafter. He says that unaided reason cannot conclusively establish the truth of
this proposition. But the messengers have informed us that good deeds are going to
be the way to salvation in the hereafter and the bad deeds are going to be the means
of eternal damnation; we believe in them because these propositions are not
impossible in reason’s eyes (they are not self contradictory) and because the truth
of the messenger has already been established by the reason beyond any reasonable
doubt. This position is different from that of Mu'tazila in that they claim that reason
can conclusively establish the truth of such propositions as well. Mu'tazila here are
more in alignment with the continental rationalists like Spinoza and Leibniz in their
view of reason’s powers while Ghazali is more of a Kantian in his estimations of
reason (in a very broad sense intended here). This resolves the antinomy between
reason and belief. The antinomy is resolved through the realization that the belief in
the unseen things (metaphysical reality) is based on certainty that it’s from God and
the messenger is the true messenger of God (and both these truths are to be
rationally established and justified).

It’s well known that the Hanbali tradition especially Ibn Taymiyya reject Ghazali’s
and Ashari position on Kalam and the role of reason in establishing the fundamental
truths of Islam. In my opinion, however, the best way to read Ibn Taymiyya is to
consider him as an empiricist who rejects the conception of reason Ghazali works
with rather than his conception of the fundamental role of kalam (although they
might also quibble on whether to call it kalam or not, but that’s a minor issue). Ibn
Taymiyya and his empiricist Hanbali tradition don’t have the sort of confidence in
the efficacy of the Aristotelian logic, epistemology, and metaphysics which Ghazali
and his fellow Ashari scholastics have. He sees that such confidence changes with
change in time, and Muslim scholars, though should be free to use whatever the
current state of knowledge is, they should not make the mistake of eternalising what
is clearly contingent, i.e. the propositions of Greek inspired epistemology/logic and
metaphysics. Thus we can see that the confidence which medieval metaphysicians
had in the claim that every contingent must refer to something non contingent for
its existence and rationale doesn’t seem very compelling to us today after the
Gallelian and Newtonian revolution. It was the genius of Ibn Taymiyya that he saw
this long ago and though he did not always put it clearly there is no doubt that this

10
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

was his main point. Otherwise, he doesn’t deny (and how can he deny it?) that it is
essential to establish the existence of God, the truth of the messenger to establish
the truth of Islam. What he claims is that in order to do this we need to use common
sense, empirical observations, and should not put too much stock in formal credos
of Greek logic which was in his opinion mixed up with epistemological and
metaphysical presumptions and cannot be treated as a purely formal science.
Moreover, if it’s treated as a merely formal science its efficacy reduces considerably.

Ghazali’s conception of Kalam is also liable to a more general objection, which

comes from Kant himself. Kant’s objection was directed to his rationalists
predecessors but it also applies to Ghazali’s conception of Kalam from one aspect
(despite Ghazali’s own objections to ‘pure’ rationalists of his own time). Ghazali and
his fellow Mutakallims seem to think that Kalam is able to establish the existence of
God beyond any doubt, with absolute certainty. This is the position of rationalists in
general who consider reason as capable of deciding these issues conclusively. But
the possibility of absolute certainty attracts the following Kantian objection:

‘... instead of the conflict which now the moral disposition has to wage with
inclinations and in which, after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be
gradually won, God and eternity in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly
before our eyes. /.../ Thus most actions conforming to the law would be done from
fear, few would be done from hope, none from duty. The moral worth of actions, on
which alone the worth of the person and even of the world depends in the eyes of
supreme wisdom, would not exist at all. The conduct of man, so long as his nature
remained as it is now, would be changed into mere mechanism, where, as in a
puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but no life would be found in the
figures.’ (CPrR 147)

The point is that if the present life (life in this world) is a test, which the Qur’an says
it is: Blessed is He in Whose hand is the Sovereignty, and, He is Able to do all things.
Who hath created life and death that He may try you which of you is best in conduct;
and He is the Mighty, the Forgiving (67:1-2). If the existence of God can be
established beyond doubt (conclusively) then the point of trial is defeated. The
objection cannot be circumvented by saying that it’s only possible for the minority
of the parishioners of Kalam, but this is not a good answer for various reasons. God
has not given even the best of his prophets absolute certainty as Abraham asks God:
complete

[Evidentialism implies that full religious belief is justified only if there is conclusive
evidence for it. It follows that if the arguments for there being a God, including any
arguments from religious experience, are at best probable ones, no one would be justified
in having a full belief that there is a God. And the same holds for other religious beliefs,
such as the belief that God is not just good in a utilitarian fashion but loving, or the belief
that there is an afterlife. Likewise it would be unjustified to believe even with less than
full confidence that, say, Krishna is divine or that Mohammed is the last and most
authoritative of the prophets, unless a good case can be made for these claims from the

11
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

evidence. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-epistemology/]

5. The ultimate criterion for the recognition of truth is one’s own faculties (reason,
senses etc.). This is of crucial importance, since many philosophies and religions pay
lip service to truth but then muddy waters by imposing transcendent conditions on
the recognition of truth.30 Thus, it is a person’s own cognitive faculties which are
decisive in accepting or rejecting a validity claim (the claim to truth). If one sincerely
believes in something as true and upholds it because of its truth alone, one is
absolved (at least in the eyes of God). It’s reported that the messenger of God said
‘on the day of judgment people will be judged based on their level of intellect
(understanding)’31. This fits with the overall picture presented in the Qur’an. If
everyone is individually responsible for the recognition and acceptance of truth, and
if people have varying capabilities as far as intellect/reason is concerned, then it
stands to reason that a just God will judge everyone according to their respective
levels of intellect and understanding.

The responsibility32 is of an individual’s alone.33 The Qur’an, depicting the day of

judgement, records: ‘Now have ye come unto Us solitary as We did create you at the
first, and ye have left behind you all that We bestowed upon you, and We behold not
with you those your intercessors, of whom ye claimed that they possessed a share in
you. Now is the bond between you severed, and that which ye presumed hath failed
you’ (6:94). The Qur’an records several dialogues between powerful and the
oppressed on the day of judgement in which the oppressed try to seek refuge in the
fact that they were powerless and hence were unable to accept and follow truth in
30
By ‘transcendent’ (as against ‘transcendental’) conditions what I have in mind are any conditions
which escape and defy the criteria of publicity and inclusivity and are so hard to be beyond the reach
of most ordinary mortals, thus for example, claiming that access to truth is based on faith (or grace),
or in philosophical tradition, basing it on ‘intuition’ which is exclusive to few trained experts and
can’t be scrutinised and challenged based on ordinary human faculties. This is not deny that some
individuals have special faculties or that they receive revelation (prophets for example) but to claim
that if recognition and proclamation of truth is a condition of salvation, the road to its access can’t be
exclusive or open to experts only. It’s in this sense that one should read the significance of the finality
of prophethood in Islam (see Iqbal, Mohammad. The reconstruction of religious thought in Islam.
Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1982, 127).
31
Ibn-Haǧ ar, al-ʻAsqalā nī A. I.-A. Al- Matālib Al-ʻāliya Bi-Zawāʼid Al-Masānīd At-Tamāniya. Ar-Riyā d:
Dā r al-ʻĀ sima, 2000, vol. 12p. 91-92 (Hadith no. 2767). Baqir Majlisi has narrated a similar saying
attributed to Ali, see Muhammad Bā qir ibn Muhammad Taqī Majlisī. Bihār al-anwār : al-jāmiʻah li-
durar akhbār al-aʼimmah al-athār. Bayrū t, Lubnā n : Muʼassasat al-Wafā ʼ, 1983 (chapter 3 Hadith no.
2). There is no doubt about the authenticity of the meaning of the Hadith. The narrations with similar
meaning are found in both Sunni and Shi‘a books. Moreover, the meaning of the Hadith is in
accordance with various Qur’anic verses and the basic Islamic teachings as will become clear in our
expose in the main body of the paper.
32
Responsibility for recognising and proclaim truth (and of course the judgement as to the success or
failure of this also will be tuned to the individual opportunities, capabilities, and circumstances).
33
This should not be read as protestant style individualism; what is being claimed here is merely that
whether on rely on one’s own judgement or rely on the judgment of an expert, one can’t bypass the
ultimate individual responsibility of understanding, deciding, and accepting/rejecting a particular
understanding. Of course, I don’t mean to deny the existence of protestant/puritan tendencies and
movements within modern or classical Islam.

12
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

the world. But the Qur’an rejects this as a general argument (although in the end
matters would be decided a case by case). The Qur’an records this lengthy dialogue
between the powerful and the powerless on the day of judgement:

And those who disbelieve say: We believe not in this Qur'an nor in that which was before it; but oh, if
thou couldst see, when the wrong-doers are brought up before their Lord, how they cast the blame
one to another; how those who were despised (in the earth) say unto those who were proud: But for
you, we should have been believers.

Those who were proud say unto those who were despised: Did we drive you away from the guidance
after it had come unto you? Nay, but ye were guilty.

Those who were despised say unto those who were proud: Nay but (it was your) scheming night and
day, when ye commanded us to disbelieve in Allah and set up rivals unto Him. And they are filled
with remorse when they behold the doom; and We place carcans on the necks of those who
disbelieved. Are they requited aught save what they used to do? (34: 31-33).

Obviously the verses above don’t imply that every one is ‘equally’ responsible for
what they do because that would be unfair; it only means that everyone is
responsible for what they do matching with their physical, intellectual, and other
capabilities relative to each person’s individual circumstances. This much is a direct
corollary of the principle of fairness espoused by the Quran: ‘Say (unto them, O
Muhammad): The comfort of this world is scant; the Hereafter will be better for him
who wardeth off (evil); and ye will not be wronged the down upon a date-stone’
(4:77). Treating the one all powerful and the one powerless as equal is prima facie
wronging the powerless. Moreover, the Qur’anic injunction is not merely a negative
principle (not wronging anyone) but also is a positive one. In one of the most oft
repeated and the most beautiful and sublime verses of the Qur’an, it says: ‘Lo! Allah
enjoineth justice/fairness and kindness, and giving to kinsfolk, and forbiddeth
lewdness and abomination, and arrogance and oppression. He exhorteth you in
order that ye may take heed’ (16:90). God Himself is just and His justice requires
that no one is wronged, and everybody is treated justly and fairly, which implies
treating everyone according to her understanding and perception, intention and
relative striving: ‘Perfected is the Word of thy Lord in truth and justice. There is
naught that can change His words. He is the Hearer, the Knower’ (6:115).

6. One might object to the above by referring to a well known diction in the Islamic
sciences that the non expert in a specific field must ask the experts and that non
expert is absolved of any responsibility if the expert makes any error (he has not
committed any sin even if his action is sinful as it’s based on the opinion of the
expert, and the expert must carry his and the questioner’s responsibility). The
objection in the nutshell would be that the imitation of experts is a widely accepted
practice among different schools of Islamic thought, and even those who allow for
continuity of Ijtihad deem it appropriate for non-experts to follow expert opinions.
The simple (and also a bit simplistic) answer to this is that the reliance on experts is
indispensible in any complex (or probably even a simple) society. The imitation
talked about in this context is not in the fundamentals of dogma and conduct on

13
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

which the salvation of a person is based. It’s more to do with the detailed and
complex non-fundamental matters. Each and every person is individually
responsible for deciding on matters on which her ultimate salvation is dependent,
be it a belief whether God exits or not, or whether a messenger and his message in
general is truthful or not. Of course she can seek advice in these matters but the
ultimate decision is her own. Even in the derivative and detailed matters it’s not
black and white. The person who is not a doctor still uses all her intellect to choose
the best doctor she can (and she is responsible for that choice to a certain extent).
Similarly someone who asks a scholar or a jurist for matters in which he has no
expertise he is responsible for making sure that he asks the best available person in
his opinion (and once he has done that only then he is absolved of the responsibility
for his conduct in that matter). Therefore, it has been said that everyone, even, a non
expert partakes in the process of ijtihad to a certain extent (to the extent that she
chooses who to ask for example) and everyone partakes in imitation to the extent
that even the expert relies on other experts in areas in which she doesn’t have
enough expertise (no one can possible be expert in all aspect of a field of study or a
field of life).

The Islamic scholars have clearly stated that there is no imitation of others
(following the opinion of others) when it comes to the fundamentals of creed and
the fundamentals of conduct. Therefore, it’s obligatory on every Muslim to acquire
knowledge to the extent to which it is needed for her salvation in this world and
hereafter. An illiterate Muslim in this minimal sense is a contradiction in terms.

However, using one’s intellect does not mean to establish everything from scratch.
Some Mu'tazila have maintained that one who doesn’t believe in God based on
rational evidence is not a Muslim. Similar opinion has been upheld by some Ash'aris.
The majority of Ash'aris and Hanbalis have however rejected this position as
extreme, as it would amount to making majority of Muslims into non-believers.
Those who reject this position can be further divided into two camps: First, those
who maintain that those who believe in God without proper evidence, and without
putting due effort in searching for the truth in the matters of creed, although not
non-believers, are sinful for their negligence. There are others who have said that as
long as what they believe is true they are not to be blamed for not making an effort
to establish their effort on rational grounds. Perhaps the rationale for this position is
that as long as one is convinced on what she believes in there is no rational
requirement to ask them to bring forth rational evidence for what they believe in.
What rationality requires is that one forms one’s opinion based on rational
evidence, or should procure rational evidence for the beliefs which are shattered by
a doubt or counter arguments of the opponents, however, it seems to be no
requirement of rationality to bring evidence for opinions one finds herself holding
and one doesn’t feel any doubt in them or is not faced by any counterarguments
from one’s opponents. Others aim to combine the two basic positions, i.e. the one’s
who require everyone (irrespective of their capability) to base their belief in
rational evidence and those who deny any such need for the non-experts. They say
that belief based on rational evidence is required of all, but rational evidence should

14
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

not be restricted to philosophical and scholastic arguments, rational evidence

includes common sense reasoning, scientific reasoning, and reasoning based on
one’s understanding of what reasoning is. Similarly, they maintain that one needs to
have evidence, which satisfies one; one is not required to express those evidence in
a way which will be understandable and persuasive to others. This seems to me a
reasonable opinion and drives from the basic understanding of the Quranic view of
individual responsibilities. The Quran categorically states that: ‘Allah tasketh not a
soul beyond its scope’ (2:286) and if one reads this verse with other Quranic verse
which emphasise God’s justice and fairness and with the Messenger of God’s saying
quoted above that on the day of judgement everyone would be judged according her
understanding and rational capability, it becomes clear that the more lax view is the
one which has more weight on its side. Of course, this doesn’t mean that it’s not
desirable to be able to gather the best evidence for one’s position, but that’s not an
obligatory requirement.

The individualism discussed above works both ways. The individual understands
(and are in turn judged) based on her own understanding of the scared texts.
Similarly, she also understands reason/evidence according to her own
understanding of it (one can present a richer conception of reason to her, but in the
end she has to ‘see’ our point, and she is ultimately responsible for adopting it or
rejecting it).

7. Freedom of thought in Islam is derived from this absolute allegiance to truth and
the individualistic basis for the search for and responsibility for upholding and
understanding truth.34 The freedom of thought is of course not absolute, the primary
allegiance is to truth and there is always an uneasy relation between truth and
freedom. However, in Islam, the primacy of freedom of thought is derived from a
few basic propositions:

i) There is no absolute certainty as to the truth of one view over another in this
world. This derives from the basic Islamic proposition that this world is the plane of
trial and contention and not of the ultimate judgement as to who is right and who is
wrong. Every one is to use one’s God given faculties to live according to what is right
in her estimation. The Qur’an clearly states that the unity of mankind (on the basis
of one truth) is not part of God’s plan in this world: ‘And if thy Lord had willed, He
verily would have made mankind one nation, yet they cease not differing’ (11:118).
Clearly God’s plan is to give humans a set time to live a life using God given faculties.
The decision as to the truth is only in the hereafter and not in this world: ‘And if thy
Lord willed, all who are in the earth would have believed together. Wouldst thou
(Muhammad) compel men until they are believers? (10:99).

Absolute allegiance to truth minus the individualistic basis for recognising truth
34

would not necessarily entail freedom of thought discussed here.

15
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

ii) The second proposition which we have already discussed is the individualistic
basis of recognising, following, and understanding truth. It’s a person’s own
understanding which is the ultimate criterion to judge what is true and what is false;
it’s her own understanding and intention which will be judged on the day of
judgement. It’s a common knowledge that without personal conviction as to the
truth of Islamic no one can be deemed a Muslim.

‘There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from

error. And he who rejecteth false deities and believeth in Allah hath grasped a firm
handhold which will never break. Allah is Hearer, Knower’ (2:256).

iii) The contingencies of life in a society impose lots of legitimate constraints on a

person’s life but in an Islamic society the overriding concern should be of giving
people full freedom of conscience to recognise and espouse what they deem as
truth. [one of the slogans in early Islamic conquests was to free human beings
of shackles which were imposed on them by false religions, philosophies, and
customs and institutions).

Nevertheless what defines Islam and Islamic society is truth and not freedom; only
truth has intrinsic value. However the individual basis of salvation makes freedom
an indispensible even though non-intrinsic condition of the Islamic worldview. This
creates a space for the Islamic tolerance. The tolerance starts from freedom to
choose one’s worldview. The compulsion in adopting a worldview is ruled out by
the fact that it has to be based on inner conviction about the truth of a worldview in
order for it to be acceptable as a genuine effort in God’s eyes. Furthermore, it creates
tolerance for difference of opinions and difference of interpretation within Islam
itself (whether the difference of opinion is concerning practical matters or matters
of creed). The existence of legitimate and diverse schools of thoughts to this day
testifies to this basic tolerance. Finally, tolerance for even those who are deemed on
the wrong path, as long as this is not based on arrogance and disregard for truth,
and as long as one is a true seeker of truth and genuinely believes that what she
stands for is the right and true opinion. It has been said that:

‘Whosoever strives sincerely in search for truth is absolved, whether she ends up
with a correct opinion or wrong opinion; it doesn’t matter whether this is related to
the fundamentals of Islam or to the secondary matters’. [rf – exp]

(i) Anarchy: A sincerely raised truth claim gives anyone credibility to stand up and
assert and if needed resist the majority opinion, be that in political matters or
religious matters. This, among other things, led to the failure to establish strong
states and the recurrence of mutinies against the ruling authorities and
mushrooming of different ‘sects’ in the early history of Islamic community. The
failure of Uthman to eliminate the uprising against him and the failure of Ali to
eliminate the Khawarij can be attributed, at least partly, to this, for example.
Although the basic loyalty is to truth, the fact that the world is an arena to recognise,

16
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

accept and proclaim truth, and since the conditions in this world are such that it’s
possible to differ as to the veracity of many claims, the question of freedom to
recognise, accept/reject, proclaim/denounce becomes naturally paramount. The
loyalty to truth can degenerate into a struggle for freedom. It’s hard to fine a balance
between the humbleness and surrender in the face of truth on the one hand and the
sense of freedom associated with the individual-cantered notion of truth explained
above on the other hand.

(ii) Sectarianism: Ironically extreme tolerance combined with staunch loyalty to

truth can also be a fertile ground for sectarianism. Sectarianism thrives on the
notion of loyalty to truth and individualistic basis of interpreting truth. It’s easy to
forget the tolerance part (that’s the chance of your being wrong and the opposing
party being right) when the loyalty to truth is fierce and there is an ongoing struggle
among different claimants equally sure of the truth of their own interpretation. The
foundation of many sects in early Islam was based on this (perhaps in many other
religions/philosophies as well).

8. The above results in a general paradox. Islam as a system of thought claims to be

the absolute truth; so how can this be compatible with the ethos of tolerance pointed
to above? The short answer to the paradox is that there can be no error in it as far as
it’s the revealed word of God (truth in itself is devoid of error by definition);
however, there can be an error in one’s interpretation of it or one’s recognition of it.

The above creates another paradox however. The Qur’an also emphasizes the need
for faith and belief. The paradox is resolved through the realization that the belief in
the unseen things (metaphysical reality) is based on a prior certainty that the belief
system is from God and the messenger is a true messenger of God (and both these
truths are to be independently established and justified). The point is corroborated
by Ghazali’s definition of Kalām in al-Mustasfā discussed above. There he argues
that Kalām is the noblest Islamic science on the basis that it establishes the
existence of God, the truth of the messenger, and the truth of the Qur’an on rational
bases before any other Islamic sciences can start rolling. Therefore, belief and faith
in Islam are rationally grounded in the fact that they are based on independently
justified true sources.

[faith is not ‘hunches’ ‘eivdentialism’ in SEP/ priority of ‘belief’ in modern

epistemology – Wittgenstein etc.
Lot of Epistemology when it talks about belief in God, it’s talking about
personal experience of God by a believer. It’s very protestant and
individualistic notion of belief.
What is full belief in SEP entry?
In fact it seems that many religious believers combine full belief with “doubts” in
the sense of some reasons for doubting, or they combine partial belief with what
they take to be weighty reasons for disbelief. According to evidentialism this is not
justified. SEP

17
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

“It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe

anything upon insufficient evidence” (Clifford 1879: 186)]
9. What are the consequences of the above for a Muslim or anyone interested in
Islam today35? We live in a world which claims36 to be committed to ‘evidence’ alone
but its understanding of what constitutes evidence has changed drastically. 37 We live
in an intellectual and cultural milieu in which Islam seems out of place. 38 The reason
Islam seems out of place is that the background understanding (lifeworld) has
dramatically and revolutionarily changed as compared to the background
understanding before three hundred years ago, for example. 39 The new dominant
paradigm sees things differently than the old paradigms. In Habermasian terms, it’s
not necessarily the case that ‘reasons’ cannot be put forth for a claim anymore
between Islam and the other worldviews but the very meaning of ‘reason’ has
changed, the very meaning of ‘what makes sense’ is changed. The dispute is no
longer manageable in a communicative action or discourse aimed at arriving at
truth because the fundamental differences have penetrated lifeworlds and have
made communication in deep matters impossible for people with allegiances to
different worldviews.40 There are two types of reactions to this. Either to shy away
from confronting the modern understanding of evidence or try to reinterpret it in
less than objective light or take solace in different forms of
subjectivisms/pragmatisms (freedom to believe, will to believe etc.). 41 But Islam
cannot condone either of these; its commitment to truth, evidence, etc. is too
straightforward for this to be a viable project.

9. If someone rejects Islam based on evidence and evidence alone; they do what
Islam asks them to do. There is nothing heretic about it in my opinion. 42 That’s what
one should do. One should always follow evidence (like our spiritual father Ibrahim
(Abraham) did). God asks to follow the path or way of our father Ibrahim: ‘the way
of your father Abraham; he named you Hanif and Muslim’ (r) His path consisted of
following evidence and critically assessing anything presented to him. The corollary
of this is that Islam unlike other weltanschauungs can be rejected in a
straightforward empirical sense. The Qur’an is the word of God. If (for example)
there is a straightforward contradiction in it then one can be certain that it’s not a

35
A person can be one who is born to a Muslim family and is already a believer, at least formally, or
someone who is confronted by or has confronted the call for Islam.
36
It’s hard to challenge or test those claims objectively because in Foucault’s words ‘they are our
present’ and hence a priori for us (see How to save society from science).
37
In a way in which, for example, Charles Taylor explains it in his Secular World
38
For similar reasons as Christianity or Judaism feel out of place (see Taylor)
39
Why background understandings change is a huge subject [comp]
40
On this see Rawls, Rizvi etc.
41
I have in mind here Jamesian and Kierkegaardian inspired ideas.
42
I say this solely from an epistemological persective, ignoring entirely social/political and
legal/moral implications for the purpose of this essay.

18
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

word of God. Islam in fact fulfils the Popperian criterion of falsifiability 43. The Qur’an
encourages us to bring forth what can refute it or surpass it or its evidence (why
should we stop people from doing what the Qur’an is asking them to do?): ‘And if ye
are in doubt concerning that which We reveal unto Our slave (Muhammad), then
produce a surah of the like thereof, and call your witness beside Allah if ye are
truthful.’ (2:23).

Examples of straightforward empirical claims are many and refuting any one of
them decisively can destroy the very foundations of Islam. On the other hand if one
finds them convincing and prescient with the passage of time (as Qur’an claims they
would) then they are definitely ways of establishing and strengthening belief in the
divinity of Islam and the Qur’an. Some claims of empirical claims in the Qur’an are
following:

‘Verily We created man from a product of wet earth; Then placed him as a drop (of
seed) in a safe lodging; Then fashioned We the drop a clot, then fashioned We the
clot a little lump, then fashioned We the little lump bones, then clothed the bones
with flesh, and then produced it as another creation. So blessed be Allah, the Best of
creators!’(23:12-14).

He hath loosed the two seas meeting together. There is a barrier between them.
They encroach not (one upon the other). 955:19-20].

And He it is Who hath given independence to the two seas (though they meet); one
palatable, sweet, and the other saltish, bitter; and hath set a bar and a forbidding
ban between them. (25:53).

Abraham was not a Jew, nor yet a Christian; but he was an upright man who had
surrendered (to Allah), and he was not of the idolaters. (3:67).

About the internal coherence the Qur’an says:

‘Will they not then ponder on the Qur'an? If it had been from other than Allah they
would have found therein much incongruity.’ (4:82).

43
See Karl Popper. Logik der Forschung, Vienna: Julius Springer Verlag, 1935. Poppoer claims relate
to empirical observation and not to logical contradiction but I bring in logical contradiction in the
same breath as empirical observation because they both relate to the point about falsifiability.
Popper’s argument against Marxism, for example, was that it’s in principle irrefutable as it doesn’t
provide any chance for us to refute it. Islam in this sense is not an ideology and provide chances for
us to refute (or confirm) it, depending on what might be the case. [check]

19
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

10. One can also lose one’s convictions.44 Here we have not necessarily shown any
contradiction but the reasons under consideration don’t make any sense to a person
any more. Certain ‘reasons’ lose their convincing/persuasive power (it can happen
for an individual as well as for a group as a whole). Thus, for example, one can lose
conviction in the existence of God because one sees suffering 45 which one sees
incompatible with the notion of a just God. This is not a strict contradiction or
irrefutable proof against the existence of God, but for the person concerned it has
become a surmountable hurdle, which may or may not be overcome by counter
reasons. If the person cannot overcome her doubts and settle in a new position he
has lost conviction in Islam, not out of caprice but rather solely on the basis of
conviction or loss thereof. Such a person cannot be blamed for anything; he is
following what Islam asks him to, his own sincere convictions.

11. The Qur’an (apart from the standard static conception of evidence) also puts
forth a dynamic conception of evidence. The Qur’an’s claim is that with progress in
human knowledge, be that cosmic/physical knowledge, or psychological/social
knowledge, the truth of the Qur’an will become clearer; with the passage of time
everyone will be able to see that its contents are true. This is a dynamic and
continuous process, which will continue until the end times. As the Qur’an says: ‘We
shall show them Our portents on the horizons and within themselves until it will be
manifest unto them that it is the Truth. Doth not thy Lord suffice, since He is Witness
over all things?’ (41:53). The Qur’an presents itself in a position where it accepts the
external criterion (that’s the historical increase in human knowledge) as the
arbitrator of the veracity of its truth (and logically also its falsehood if that was to be
the case). This is yet another way in which the Qur’an makes itself vulnerable as
well as by the same token extremely powerful. The only condition is an unalloyed
loyalty to truth.

Two aspects here: contemporary knowledge helps us understand the Qur’an

in a better way (in certain aspects of course, and of course this is not
necessary); the second aspect is that the understanding will reveal the
superiority of the Qur’an by showing that this can’t be but from God.

‘Anfus’ (self) and ‘Afaq’ (world) as sources of knowledge. God reveals His signs
in inner as well as outer experience. (RRTI: 127).

More importantly, it follows from the above that

12. There are three interrelated cautionary concerns which must be borne in mind
when one abandons a proposition of Islamic worldview thinking that it’s contrary to
44
This can happen for various reasons. For, example, the background understanding can change
drastically, for various imaginable reasons. In an important narration the Messenger of God has been
reported as saying, that every child is born on ‘nature’ (the right path which God has ordained for
her) but her parents (for example) cause him to become a Christen or a Jew. This underlines the
importance of background understanding and the context for the perception of truth. [comp]
45
This is just one example, one way it may happen.

20
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

the objective standards of the accepted epistemological standards of the age and
claims that it is entirely due to concern for truth. The upshot of all three points is
that the ‘environment’ or ‘background’ is extremely important for any search for
truth, as all our understanding is in the end, at least partially, contextual:

(i) Conservative Epistemology: Conservatism in contemporary Epistemology is used

in a variety of ways46 but my reference to it here is limited to a few intuitive points
which are narrow in scope and can easily be upheld. 47 First, the individual
conviction is the central issue; if one is content with a position one upholds she has
no further responsibility to pursue a philosophical inquiry into it (of course if she
wishes to she has all the right to). All overburdened conceptions of responsibility in
epistemological matters are groundless; no one has a responsibility to be a
philosopher or fuel curiosity if one possesses none. What one is required is to be
open to truth, and whenever one is convinced by an argument to accept it and retain
it until the conviction survives. Second, it follows from the first point that one
doesn’t have any duty or responsibility to justify oneself when it comes to one’s
inner convictions. I’ve a responsibility to hold only those beliefs about which I’m
reasonably confident, but I don’t have any responsibility to justify myself in front of
anyone! Of course, if I raise a claim (a validity claim) I’m also contracting some sort
of responsibility to give reasons for my claims and give counter reasons if rebutted
as much and as long as it’s pragmatically feasible. Third, I’ve a responsibility to be
respectful to truth at least minimally to the extent that one should always try to
‘listen’ to it if it’s presented to him and not act arrogantly and close one’s eyes and
ears out of arrogance or negligence. Fourth, to be rational one it’s not required that
one is able to articulate or express one’s reasons for one’s position. This is related to
the above point about justification. Fifth, if someone puts forth an argument or
evidence against your position, or a doubt creeps in (for whatever reason) about a
position you hold, then it’s your rational responsibility to do something about it
(rebut the doubt by a counterargument or evidence or otherwise if the argument is
persuasive and evidence overwhelming then abandon the weak position and adopt
a new stronger position). Sixth, it also seems rational to differentiate between types
of belief (in terms of the importance or in terms of the place it holds in the system as
a whole) and treat them accordingly at the appropriate level of sensitivity. One
cannot rationally treat a marginal belief at the same level as the one that will affect
one’s worldview as a whole. Rationality dictates that one should give enough time to
the beliefs that are important before one is ready to discard them. This last point is
the reiteration of the general legitimate inertia in abandoning one’s long held beliefs
as long as it’s compatible with the general concern for truth.

(ii) Dominant worldviews: One must differentiate between rational persuasiveness

of an argument or a piece of evidence or a reason and its persuasiveness due to
contingent historical circumstances. The distinction is very hard to articulate but
46
Christensen, David. "Conservatism in epistemology." Nous 28.1 (1994): 69-89.
47
All the following maxims follow from one’s concern for truth; if someone doesn’t believe in such a
concern than probably they don’t apply to her. The inspiration for these maxims came from the
readings of Ibn Hajr Fath al bari Kitb al Tawhid

21
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

must be made and upheld otherwise we will be in danger of following whatever is

the prevailing current and whatever is the dominant view. To be ready to submit to
truth, whenever one is presented with it, and to be ready to abandon one’s
cherished beliefs, if found lacking in truth, is a great quality but one must also guard
against the temptation to jump on the bandwagon. The act of upholding truth can
also often require swimming against the current as without it many a truth would
have laid hidden (think of Copernicus and Galileo!). There are different types of
necessities: natural, physical, rational, historical etc. Kant talked about ‘rational a
priori’ but since then, thanks to people like Paul Veyne and Michel Foucault and of
course many others48, we have ‘discovered’ what can be termed as ‘historical a
priori’ (the type of necessity, which seems eternal but is only necessary as long as
it’s intellectually dominant; once it loses its hegemony it no longer seems
necessary). This was the discovery of the fact that necessity can be contingent;
alternatives may seem to be exhausted but only as long as we are living under the
hegemony of certain epistemological and intellectual presuppositions. Once the
hegemony breaks down (for whatever reason) formerly closed options and
alternatives become visible again. The task is to be able to differentiate between
what’s the requirement of eternal rationality, of truth, or reality from what’s
cotangent, what’s fleeting.49

(iii) Imperialism: A dominant view combined with material hegemony built and
sustained, at least partially, on the basis of the imperial plunder is doubly deceptive.
Material well-being and commitment to truth don’t necessarily go hand in hand.
What is produced and reproduced and circulated as truth is at least partially imbued
with material motives rather than rational convictions. Moreover, the dominance of
a civilisation, which rejects the key premises of Islam, combined with the imperial
hubris and disdain of its key epistemological underpinnings creates an environment
in which the impartial assessment of its objective worth is not straightforward. The
dominant imperial civilisation often looks down upon it and the civilisation it
created and either totally ignores it or when considered looks at it from an alien
lenses which hide rather than shine its truth. This makes it important that we don’t
take the pronouncements of the scientists and scholars of the dominant civilisation
as necessarily the outcome of an objective impartiality merely because such
impartiality is practiced in some other dominant and successful epistemological
sectors of that civilisation. [civilisational hatred of islam]

13. The conception elaborated above presupposes certain idealistic/transcendent

conception of truth, which assumes the possibility of objective knowledge. One can
totally opt out of this and take a ‘Nietzschean’50 stance on truth. This would amount
to opting out of the ‘truth game’ altogether and claiming that truth is a product of
the struggle for survival (or something like that). The Islamic position doesn’t have

48
Veyne, Paul. Comment on écrit l'histoire. Essai d'épistémologie. Seuil, 2013.
49
See Foucalt Words and Things for this
50
By calling it ‘Nietzschean’, I’m not necessarily claiming that it’s necessarily Nietzsche’s own
considered opinion.

22
Second draft 13/07/2016 © Ali Rizvi

to deny the moderate claim that truth and untruth, power and knowledge are
entangled in this world. In fact, it’s implied by the notion of this world being the
place of trial, and the place where ‘truth’ is ultimately hidden in a way that it
requires lots of struggle to arrive at it and even then the final truth might be beyond
reach in this world (see 50:22). However, opting out of the ‘truth game’ altogether
will result in playing a different sort of game; it will amount to rejecting the
universalism, which is at the heart of Islam as well as Christianity and the
mainstream Western Philosophy since Socrates. It would result in espousing
another tradition, which emphasises various forms of particularisms whether in the
form of culture, ethnicity, tribe, race, or community. This includes religions, which
are particularistic in their worldview as well as secular philosophies, which are
particularistic in their ethos. If these particularistic traditions have a point then
Islam doesn’t have anything further to say.

23