Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Saigal, Romesh.
The University of Michigan
LINEAR PROGRAMMING: A Modem Integrated Analysis
Projected Dynamical Systems and
Variational Inequalities with Applications
Anna Nagumey
and
Ding Zhang
School of Management
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts
~.
"
Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
ISBN 978-1-4613-5972-2 ISBN 978-1-4615-2301-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4615-2301-7
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of
Congress.
Preface xv
Acknowledgments xx
3 Stability Analysis 45
3.1 Basic Concepts of Stability 47
3.1.1 Examples . . . . . . 50
3.2 Local Properties Under Regularity 52
3.3 Properties Under Monotonicity 67
Vll
viii CONTENTS
II Applications 91
Index 293
List of Figures
xi
xii LIST OF FIGURES
Xlll
Preface
xv
xvi
the behavior of many systems over time, cannot in its present state
handle many real-life situations since the existing theory cannot handle
problems with constraints underlying the system in question. Hence, it
cannot adequately model situations where resources, be they financial,
natural, or human, are limited. Nor can classical dynamical systems
theory ensure that prices, production outputs, or commodity shipments
will be nonnegative over time.
This book presents and develops a new type of dynamical system,
which we call a projected dynamical system, which not only allows the
modeler to incorporate constraints but also is intimately related to the
variational inequality problem. Ir. fact, the ordinary differential equa-
tion studied here has stationary points that coincide with solutions to the
associated variational inequality problem. As a consequence, any equilib-
rium problem that can be formulated as a finite-dimensional variational
inequality problem can now also be studied as a projected dynamical
system. Moreover, the associated dynamical system is the natural one.
This book attempts to bring this new class of nonclassical dynamical sys-
tem to the same level of theoretical development as existing for classical
dynamical systems.
The challenges encountered from the study of projected dynamical
systems arise from the fact that the right-hand side of the ordinary
differential equation, which is now a projection operator, is no longer
continuous. The discontinuities arise from the constraints in the varia-
tional inequality problem for the application in question. Hence, existing
methodologies are no longer applicable.
The book is divided into two major parts: Part I lays the theoretical
foundations of projected dynamical systems and variational inequalities
and Part II then utilizes, expands, and applies the theory to a variety
of competitive equilibrium problems that have, heretofore, been studied
primarily in a static setting at an equilibrium state. The applications
studied are drawn from operations research, management science, and
economics, with the intention of selecting problems of sufficiently general
interest which, at the same time, illustrate distinct equilibrium concepts
and possess features that highlight the theory presented here.
Part I consists of four chapters, beginning with Chapter 1 as an in-
troduction and overview of the material covered in the book. Chapter 2
reviews the variational inequality problem and introduces the projected
dynamical system, whose right-hand side is a projection operator and
whose stationary points coincide with the set of solutions of the vari-
XVll
aspatial, and the spatial or network oligopoly model in which firms and
demand markets may be spatially separated. These models are examples
of imperfectly competitive models, where the firms affect the prices of
the commodities in the markets, ra.ther than being price-takers. Starting
with the variational inequality formulations of the governing equilibrium
conditions, the projected dynamical systems are first presented and their
interpretations as adjustment processes given. In contrast to the some of
the previously proposed dynamical models of oligopolies, the projected
dynamical systems models guarantee that both the firms' production
outputs and commodity shipments are nonnegative. Stability analysis
is then conducted for these models, using the two distinct approaches
developed in Chapter 3. Finally, an algorithm is proposed for the com-
putation ofthe solutions, with convergence results, and numerical results
are also presented.
Chapter 6 considers the spatial price equilibrium problem that has
wide applications ranging from commodity and energy markets to in-
ternational trade. The spatial price equilibrium problem is an example
of perfect competition. Here we consider first the quantity model in
which all the variables are in quantity form. Beginning with the varia-
tional inequality formulation of the governing equilibrium conditions, we
obtain the projected dynamical systems model and interpret the dynam-
ical model as an adjustment or tatonnement process. Stability analysis
is conducted by adapting and extending the results of Chapter 3 to this
problem domain. An algorithm is proposed, with supporting conver-
gence results. Finally, numerical examples are presented for illustrative
purposes. In addition, we propose an alternative model in both price and
quantity variables, along with the theoretical analysis. In this chapter
we also implement the numerical schemes on (massively) parallel archi-
tectures, since spatial price equilibrium problems can be large-scale in
practice.
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 consider the traffic network equilibrium
problem, which has been the focus of many modeling efforts and al-
gorithmic advances in recent years. Using as the basis the variational
inequality formulations of what are known as the Wardropian equilib-
rium conditions, we derive projected dynamical systems models in the
case of elastic demands in Chapter 7 and then fixed demands in Chap-
ter 8. We consider two situations of the elastic demand case, one in
which the travel disutility functions associated with traveling between
the origin/destination pairs are given, and the other, in which the de-
xix
mand functions are given, rather than their inverses. Dynamical models
are proposed for both formulations. Stability results are also developed
using as the basis the theoretical results of Chapter 3. Finally, we present
algorithms based on the general iterative scheme for the elastic demand
models in Chapter 7 and for the fixed demand model in Chapter 8. The
algorithms are with accompanied by convergence results and numerical
examples.
Throughout the book figures and examples are provided to illustrate
the main concepts. Each application chapter is self-contained after the
reader has familiarized him/herself with the basic theoretical chapters.
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 are companion chapters that deal with dynamic
transportation models. Sources and notes follow each chapter. Refer-
ences are also given after each chapter for convenience of the reader.
The intended audience for this book includes students, researchers,
and practitioners in operations research, management science, and in
economics, who are interested in the formulation, analysis, and compu-
tation of equilibrium problems in a dynamical setting.
xx
Acknowledgments
The need for the inclusion of the understanding of dynamics in the for-
mulation and study of competitive systems, ranging from a variety of eco-
nomic systems to congested transportation systems, has been sounded
in scientific meetings and discussions over the past decade.
The research that formed the foundation for this book was initiated
in 1992, while the first author was on sabbatical leave from the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts at Amherst at the Lefschetz Center for Dynamical
Systems at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island. While at
Brown, the collaboration with Paul Dupuis was initiated, following his
seminar presentation that highlighted a linkage between the set of solu-
tions of a variational inequality problem and a "new" type of dynamical
system.
In Australia, during a workshop in Mallacootta on the Network Econ-
omy in December, 1992, the first author had the opportunity to meet
Takashi Takayama, with whom began another collaboration to explore
the ideas of projected dynamical systems for the study of spatial eco-
nomic systems.
The research described herein was supported by a National Science
Foundation Faculty Award for Women, NSF Grant No. DMS-9024071.
The resources of the Illinois National Center for Supercomputer Ap-
plications at the University of lllinois at Urbana and at the Cornell
Theory Center at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York were utilized
for the computational work.
We are grateful to our families and collaborators, without whom this
book would not have been possible.
xxi
Glossary of Notation
This is a glossary of symbols used in this book. Other symbols are
defined in the book, as needed. A vector is assumed to be a column
vector, unless noted otherwise.
E an element of
c subset of
union, intersection, Cartesian product
for all
there exists
the real line
Euclidean n-dimensional space
the nonnegative orthant of R n
on the nonnegative orthant
such that j also I
assignment operator
is equivalent to
tends to
maps to
(',' ) inner product
o composition
IIxll = (Li=l x~)t length of x ERn with components (Xl, X2,"" x n )
xT transpose of a vector x
Iyl absolute value of y
[a,b] j(a,b) a closed intervalj an open interval in R
VI gradient of I: R n ~ R
VF the n X n Jacobian of a mapping F: Rn ~ Rn
!!.1 partial derivative of I with respect to Xj also I'
8x
argminxeK I( x ) the set of x E K attaining the minimum of I( x )
VuF the sub-Jacobian matrix of F
restricted to the variables in subset U
transpose of the matrix A
the inverse of the matrix A
the identity matrix
00 infinity
XXII
Theory of Proje'cted
Dynamical Systems
1
Chapter 1
3
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
References
Bertsekas, D. P., and Tsitsiklis, J. N., Parallel and Distributed Com-
putation - Numerical Methods, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey, 1989.
Cournot, A. A., Researches into the Mathematical Principles of
the Theory of Wealth, 1838, English translation, MacMillan, London,
England, 1897.
1.1. SOURCES AND NOTES 7
Projected Dynamical
Systems
9
10 CHAPTER 2. PROJECTED DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
rium point. In addition, one gains access to a powerful theory for both
qualitative and quantitative analyses. Further, one may avail oneself of
alternative algorithmic schemes for determining equilibria. Moreover,
the development of a deterministic dynamical model via the Skorokhod
Problem introduces many of the tools and techniques needed for more
elaborate stochastic models. Finally, opportunities for the further study
of an entirely new class of dynamical system now present themselves
along with the discovery of new phenomena in competitive systems.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 the finite-dimen-
sional variational inequality problem is reviewed and the basic results of
existence and uniqueness of its solution under monotonicity conditions
are presented. For completeness and easy reference, we also highlight the
relationship of the variational inequality problem to well- known problems
in mathematical programming, which have been utilized in the past for
equilibrium modeling and computation. In particular, we recall the re-
lationship of the variational inequality problem to a system of nonlinear
equations, to optimization problems, complementarity problems, and to
fixed point problems.
In Section 2.2, we introduce the definition of a projected dynami-
cal system, which evolves within a constraint set K. Its equilibrium or
stationary points are identified with the solutions to the corresponding
variational inequality problem with the same constraint set. For theoret-
ical soundness, we state in a theorem the fundamental properties of such
a projected dynamical system in regards to the existence and uniqueness
of solution paths to the governing ordinary differential equation. How-
ever, we leave the proof of the main theorem to Section 2.3 since the
proof is rather technical and may be omitted at the first reading of the
book. Also, in Section 2.2, an interpretation of the ordinary differential
equation that defines the projected dynamical system is provided, along
with a description of how the solutions may be expected to behave.
In Section 2.3, we pick up the task of establishing the theoretical
properties of a projected dynamical system. The difficulty in carrying out
this is that the right-hand side of the ordinary differential equation that
defines the projected dynamical system is discontinuous. To overcome
this obstacle, the Skorokhod Problem is introduced here. This section is
further divided into four subsections. Subsection 2.3.1 provides a simple
discrete time model of a "competitive system" to motivate the need
and definition of the Skorokhod Problem. Subsection 2.3.2 states the
Skorokhod Problem in the form appropriate for this book, and introduces
12 CHAPTER 2. PROJECTED DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
-F(x*) E C(x*),
....•.•..•
..................
x#
.. '
minf(x), (2.4)
xEK
Theorem 2.1
If K is compact and convex and F( x) is continuous on K, then the
variational inequality problem VI(F, K) admits at least one solution x*.
The local and global concepts of monotonicity of a vector function F
are introduced in the following definitions.
Definition 2.2 (Monotonicity)
F( x) is said to be locally monotone at x* if there is a neighborhood
N(x*) of x* such that
°
F( x) is said to be locally strongly monotone at x* if there is a neigh-
borhood N(x*) of x* and", > such that
Proposition 2.5
Suppose that F( x) is continuously differentiable on K.
(i). If the Jacobian matrix V F(x) is positive semidefinite, i.e.,
(2.10)
then F( x) is monotone on K.
(ii). IfVF(x) is positive definite, i.e.,
(2.12)
normals to K at x by
where
n*(x) = arg max (v T , -n), (2.17)
nen(x)
and
,B(x) = max{O, (v T , -n*(x))}. (2.18)
Remark
It is obvious from Lemma 2.1 that
(2.19)
2.2. THE PROJECTED DYNAMICAL SYSTEM 19
One sees directly that if there is a solution cPxo(t) to the initial value
problem IVP(F,K,xo), with cPxo(O) = Xo E K, then cPxo(t) always stays
in the constraint set K for t ~ O. However, qualitative properties such
as the existence and uniqueness of the solution to IVP(F, K, xo) have not
been covered by the classical theory of dynamical systems, where it is
assumed that the right-hand side of the ODE is continuous. The study
of these properties, in fact, has partly motivated this book.
We now present the definition of a projected dynamical system, gov-
erned by such an ODE(F, K), which, correspondingly, will be denoted
by PDS(F,K).
Definition 2.6 (The Projected Dynamical System)
Define the projected dynamical system PDS(F, K) as the map ~
K X R 1-+ K where
~(x, t) = cPx(t)
20 CHAPTER 2. PROJECTED DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
and let the constraint set K be the rectangle ABeD shown in both
Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. lllustrated in Figure 2.2 are a portrait of the
(classical) dynamical system defined by
x = -F(x)
and its particular trajectory passing through Xo.
lllustrated in Figure 2.3 are a portrait of the projected dynamical
system PDS(F, K) defined by
x = IIK(X,-F(x))
and its trajectory passing through the same point Xo.
0= IIK(X*, -F(x*)).
A A
c c
A A
D D
Remark
It is clear from Definition 2.7 that x* is an equilibrium point of the
projected dynamical system PDS(F, K) if the vector field F vanishes at
x*. The contrary, however, is only true when x* is an interior point of
the constraint set K. Indeed, when x* lies on the boundary of K, we
may have F(x*) ;j; o.
Note that for classical dynamical systems, the necessary and sufficient
condition for an equilibrium point is that the vector field vanish at that
point. The proposition below presents another representation of this
fact, which identifies the equilibrium points of a (classical) dynamical
system with the solutions of a system of nonlinear equations, which is a
static framework.
Proposition 2.6
The equilibrium points of the (classical) dynamical system governed
by :i; = - F( x) coincide with the solutions to the system of nonlinear
equations F( x) = o.
Proposition 2.6 reveals the connection between the "static" world of
nonlinear equations and the "dynamic" world of classical dynamical sys-
tems. The analogy of Proposition 2.6 to the environment of constraints
that unveils the relationship between a variational inequality problem
VI(F, K) and its associated projected dynamical system PDS(F, K) is
given in the following theorem. In Figure 2.4 we illustrate the rela-
tionships between the static worlds of nonlinear equations and finite-
dimensional variational inequalities and the dynamic realms of classical
dynamical systems (without constraints) and projected dynamical sys-
tems (with constraints).
Theorem 2.4
Assume that K is a convex polyhedron. Then the equilibrium points
of the PDS( F, K) coincide with the solutions of VIC F, K).
Proof:
The statement is a consequence of the fact that
Static Problems
Dynamic Problems
Remark
Theorem 2.4 not only establishes the equivalence between the set
of equilibria of a projected dynamical system and the set of solutions
of a variational inequality problem but also suggests that the finite-
dimensional variational inequality problem, which has been used to study
a plethora of equilibrium problems in operations research and manage-
ment science and in economics is, indeed, a natural framework for the
study of equilibrium problems at their equilibrium states.
Before stating the fundamental theorem about the projected dynam-
ical systems, we introduce the following assumption needed for the the-
orem.
Assumption 2.1
There exists a B < 00 such that the vector field - F : Rk 1-+ Rk
satisfies the linear growth condition: IIF(x)1I $ B(l + IIxll) for x E K,
and also
°
F : K 1-+ Rk is locally Lipschitz continuous if for every x E K there
is a neighborhood N (x) and a positive number L( x) > such that
(2.27)
Then
u(t) ~ Ce Vt , Vt E [0, I]. (2.28)
26 CHAPTER 2. PROJECTED DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
Feasible Set K
.. rr---__---..!~
.' .'
.'
.'
.' .'
.'.'
............
1········· !
IJa ..- ......................................... -_ ............................................... --- ................. -........... -..
: ~.~
.....
(2.29)
(2.30)
Consequently, 4J never leaves K, and '" changes only when 4J(t) E oK,
in which case the change points in one of the directions n(4J(t».
To see that the definition corresponds in some sense with the mapping
that is intuitively desired, we examine the case of (2.29), (2.30). Define
y~ = Xo + Ei;l E- F(xD and yf(t) = y~ for t E [nE, nE + E). Note that
yf(.) is an "unconstrained" path that evolves freely in Rk, and that the
constraint mechanism enters the definition of y~ only through the values
{xi,i = 0,1, ... ,n -1}. One would like to verify that Xf = r(yf). Thus,
if in the definition of the SP 4J = Xf and 'l/J = yf, then we must take
'" = Xf - yf. Properties (i), (ii), and (iii) are easily verified. To check
(iv) and (v), let t be ofthe form nE. Clearly, dl",l(t) = 0 ift is not ofthis
form, since Xf(t) - yf(t) is constant in each of the intervals (nE, nE + E).
Then
Define D([O, T]; Rk) as the set of functions from [0, T] to Rk that are
continuous from the right, have limits from the left. Let DBV([O, T]; Rk)
denote the 'IjJ E D([O, T]; Rk) tha,t have bounded total variation on [0, T].
We topologize D([O, 00); Rk) so that convergence is equivalent to conver-
gence of the restrictions to [0, T] with respect to the sup norm for all
T E (0,00). If K has nonempty interior, then the conclusions of Theo-
rem 2.6 extend to all 'IjJ E D([O, 00); Rk). Even if K has empty interior,
the fact that DBV([O, T]; Rk) is dense in D([O, T]; Rk) with respect to
the sup norm metric means r(·) has a unique Lipschitz continuous ex-
tension to all of D([O, 00); Rk) (Dupuis and Ishii (1991)). However, since
all the paths that must be dealt with in the remainder of this chapter
have bounded variation, the result as stated is sufficient.
In the next two subsections Theorem 2.6 is applied to establish basic
properties of the ODE(F, K).
function y E C([O, T]j Rk) such that (x, y) solves (2.32). Finally, the
IVP{2.21) has a unique solution.
Proof:
To begin, let (x, y) solve (2.32). Since -F(·) satisfies a linear growth
condition the quantity B = ess sup{IIy(t)II : t E [0, Tn is finite, where ess
°
sup stands for essential supremum. Obviously, B is a Lipschitz constant
for y(.). Let r > be arbitrary. If for any z E K we define the function
¢zCt) == z for t E [0, r], then it is trivially true that ¢z = r T( ¢z). By
combining this fact with the Lipschitz property of r T, one sees that for
any ¢ E DBv([O, r]j Rk):
From this and the fact that y(.) is Lipschitz with constant B on [O,T],
onde concludes that x(·) is Lipschitz with constant CB. In particular,
x(·) is absolutely continuous on [0, T].
If we define z(t) = x(t) - yet) for t E [O,T], then x = rT(y) implies
that (x, z) solves the SP for y. Since z(·) is obviously Lipschitz contin-
uous, the definition of the SP implies the existence of measurable func-
tions a: [O,T] ~ [0,00) and I: [O,T] ~ Rk such that x-v = a,1aK(X)
and ,et) E n(x(t)) a.s. in t E [0, T]. Since equation (2.32) states that
y = -F(x), we have x = -F(x) + a,1aK(X) a.s. in t E [O,T].
Let L be any linear subspace of Rk. It is a standard fact from real
analysis (d. p. 335 of Ethier and Kurtz (1986)) that for any absolutely
continuous function 4> : [0, T] ~ Rk the set
°
-F(x(t))IaK(X(t)) can be written in the form vet) - a(t)-y(t)IaK(X(t)),
where (v(tf, n) = for all n E n(x(t)). Using this decomposition, one
directly calculates via (2.6) that
°
i.e., (x, x - y) solves the SP. We use the fact that TI(x, v) is always of
the form v + a'Y whenever x E oK, where a 2: and l' E n( x). This im-
plies <p(t) = x(t) = f~ [-F(x(s)) + a(sh(s)IaK(x(s))]ds, 'IjJ(t) = yet) =
f~ -F(x(s))ds, and q(t) = x(t) - yet) = f~ a(sh(s)IaK(X(s))ds. One
may easily check that all parts of the definition of the SP are satisfied.
Thus (x, x - y) solves the SP.
We next prove the uniqueness of solutions to (2.21). Since we are
considering the case of projection along the inward normal, we can apply
an argument that appears in Fillipov (1960).
°
Recall that TI( x, v) = v if x E K O, and that for x E oK we have
TI(x, v) = v+ an where a 2: and n E n(x). Let Xi; i = 1,2, be solutions
to (2.21). Then a.s. in t E [O,T] one has
~ :t IIxl(t) - x2(t)1I 2
L: ai = 00 "In E N, (2.36)
i=O
and
lim sup d(Fr(x),F(x)) =a (2.38)
n->oo iENU{O}
yi+l = - L aj FP(xj) + x~
j=O
and the analogous continuous time interpolation
Let
rM,n = inf{t : lIyn(t)1I ~ M} AT.
One can then define the version of yn(-) that is stopped as soon as it
leaves the ball of radius M:
t E [O,rM,n)
t E [rM,n, T].
36 CHAPTER 2. PROJECTED DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
and the discrete version xp,n = xM,n( tf). The fact that rT( 1/7)( t) de-
pends only on the values {1/7(s),s E [O,t]} implies xM,n(t) = xn(t) for all
t E [0, rM,n].
Note that the uniform boundedness of yM,n(t) in n E Nand t E [0, T]
and the Lipschitz property of rT imply the uniform boundedness of
xM,n(t) in the same variables. We define measures J.lM,n on [0, T] X Rk X
Rk by
JfdJ.lM,n JfdJ.lM,
-t
(2.39)
2.3. THE SKOROKHOD PROBLEM 37
where
°
satisfies
sup IIgn(t)1I --+
tE[O,TM,nj
°
as n --+ 00. It is straightforward to show that the t-marginal of p,M is
Lebesgue measure, i.e., for all ~ Sl ~ S2 ~ T,
[ f(s,x,{3)p,M,n(ds X dx x d(3)
J[O,tj X Rio X Rio
as n --+ 00 for all t E [0, T]. Thus, by (2.39), yM,no converges uniformly
on [0, r M] to a function yM (.) that satisfies
for t E [0, r M]. The continuity of rT(·) implies that xM,n converges
uniformly on [0, r M] to x M = rT(yM).
38 CHAPTER 2. PROJECTED DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
f
J[O,tjXRkXRk
{3J.LM (ds X dx X d(3) = r f
Jo JRkXRk
{3J.L~ (dx X d(3)ds
for all t E [0, T]. (The method used to construct the measures J.L~ is
essentially the same one used to show the existence of regular condi-
tional probabilities. (See page 502 of Ethier and Kurtz (1986).) One can
assume that the mapping s ~ J.L~ (A) is Borel measurable for all Borel
sets A, so that the integral on the right-hand side above is well defined.)
We next claim that
The fact that J.LM (((s,x,{3): x::p xM(s)}) = 0 follows easily from the
fact that xM,n -+ x M uniformly on [0, T] and the definition of J.LM,n. To
prove J.LM ({(s,x,{3): (3::p -F(x)}) = 0 we note that the continuity of
the mapping x ~ -F(x) implies the set ((s,x,{3) : d({3, -F(x» > t5}
is open for all t5 ~ O. This implies (Ethier and Kurtz (1986) Theorem
3.3.1) that
J.LM (((s,x,{3): d({3,-F(x» > t5})
~ lim inf J.LM,n ({( s, x, (3) : d({3, -F( x»
n-+oo
> t5}) .
For each 0 > 0 equation (2.38) implies
iJM (s) = f
JRkxRk
{3J.L~ (dx X d(3) = 1 _
{XM(S)} X {b(xM(s))}
{3J.L~ (dx X d(3)
= _F(xM(s»
2.4. SOURCES AND NOTES 39
n
defined as
F(x) = cov ({F(y): Ilx - yll ~ f})
f>O
where the overline indicates the closure and cov(A) denotes the convex
hull of the set A. Then F(x) is convex and upper semicontinuous, par-
ticularly, F(x) = F(x), when F is continuous at x. Assumption 2.1 then
has the interpretation under this extension that, for any u E F( x) and
any w E F(y):
lIuli ~ B(l + IIxll), "Ix E K,
((-u + w)T,x - y) ~ Bllx - y1l2, Vx,y E K.
2.4. SOURCES AND NOTES 41
In this case, Theorem 2.5 holds for the solutions to the generalized
version of the IVP(2.21), which becomes a differential inclusion at points
where F(x) is discontinuous. For the theory of differential inclusions, the
reader is referred to the book by Aubin and Cellina (1984). However,
such a discussion is beyond the focus of this book, and we will always
assume that F( x) is continuous.
Assumption 2.1 was first observed by Filippov (1960) to be a sufficient
condition in establishing the uniqueness of solution to a classical ODE:
x = -F(x).
Section 2.3
As noted in Dupuis and Nagurney (1993), many properties of the
solution to the Skorokhod Problem generalize to domains that are not
convex polyhedra. However, the Lipschitz property does not. Since it is
the Lipschitz property that makes much of what has been presented here
simpler, K is restricted to the case of a convex polyhedron. It is still
possible to handle more general domains via "localization" arguments,
or directly by using the results in Dupuis and Ishii (1993). Nevertheless,
numerous applications, as will be shown in Part II of this book, are
characterized by a feasible set K, which is precisely a convex polyhedron.
For the initial setup of the Skorokhod Problem, see Skorokhod (1961).
For a summary of recent contributions to the study of this problem, see
the introduction in Dupuis and Ishii (1991).
The results in this section are taken directly from Dupuis and Nagur-
ney (1993).
References
Aubin, J.P., and Cellina, A., Differential Inclusions, Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, Germany, 1984.
Billingsley, P., Convergence of Probability Measures, John Wiley
& Sons, New York, 1968.
Coddington, E. A., and Levinson, N., Theory of Ordinary Differen-
tial Equations, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1955.
Cournot, A. A., Researches into the Mathematical Principles of
the Theory of Wealth, 1838, English translation, MacMillan, London,
England, 1897.
Dafermos, S., "An iterative scheme for variational inequalities," Mathe-
matical Progmmming 26 (1983) 40-47.
42 CHAPTER 2. PROJECTED DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
Stability Analysis
45
46 CHAPTER 3. STABILITY ANALYSIS
We will use B(x,r), hereafter, to denote the open ball with radius r
and center x.
Definition 3.2
An equilibrium point x* is stable if for any € > 0, there exists a 6 > 0
such that for all x E B( x* ,6) and t ~ 0
x·t E B(x*,€).
Feasible Set K
Feasible Set K
Feasible Set K
B(X*,E)
Definition 3.3
An equilibrium point x* is asymptotically stable if it is stable and
there exists a 6 > 0 such that for all x E B( x*, 6)
IIx, t - x*1I :s; Bllx - x*1I exp( -I-"t), 'It ~ 0, 'Ix E B(x*,6); (3.2)
d(x,t)=lIx.t-x*1I (3.3)
Feasible Set K
B(x',t}
3.1.1 Examples
The following two examples show how greatly the stability of the pro-
jected dynamical system (PDS) can differ from the stability of a classical
dynamical system (DS) in the same vector field.
Example 3.1
In Figure 3.5, let the constraint set K be the square ABeD. Let
3.1. BASIC CONCEPTS OF STABILITY 51
o 2 3 4
x = II(x, -i'(x)),
and it is asymptotically stable.
B is also an equilibrium point of the usual DS solving
X = -F(x),
but it is not even stable there .
Example 3.2
Let the vector field F( x}, X2) = (Xl + 4X2, -xt} and the constraint
set K be the triangle AOB depicted in Figure 3.6. Then the origin 0(0,0)
is the only equilibrium point for both the PDS solving
x = II(x, -F(x))
52 CHAPTER 3. STABILITY ANALYSIS
XI - > : - F(x)
_ : lr K ( x,-F(x»
A(-2,-l) B(2,-1)
E(x) == n
EEF(x)
E. (3.5)
For any x E K, let lex) == {i : Bi_X = bi} and IC(x) == {i : Bi_X <
bi}, so that l( x) U IC(x) = {1, 2, ... ,m}. It is apparently true that
Define the induced governing function (about x*) g(.) = g(., x*): S(x*)n
B(0,6) ~ S(x*) as
(3.10)
Proof:
For any Zl E S(x*) and A E R small, AZI +x* is always in K. Since
x* solves VI(F, K),
(F(x*l,(AZl+X*)-X*)) = AF(x*lzl ~O
for A small. Therefore, F(x*l Zl = 0, and, hence, F(x*) E S.l(x*).
Consequently,
-g(O) = PS(x*) ( -F(x*)) = 0,
i.e., 0 is an equilibrium point of MFF(F, K, x*), by Definition 3.8 . •
Notice that an MFF is a DS in a subspace, for whose stability study
there is a relatively mature theory available. Hence, it is appealing to
explore the stability relationships between a PDS and its MFF. This is
done, in this section, under some regularity conditions on a VI solution,
which we now introduce.
Recall from Chapter 2 that x* solves VIC F, K) if and only if
and
F(x*) = 0, when x* E KO. (3.18)
(3.19)
Proof:
For any w E C( x*), one has, by definition,
(3.20)
whenever x solves
Ex ~ b. (3.21)
3.2. LOCAL PROPERTIES UNDER REGULARITY 57
Therefore, it follows from (3.28) that Z2(X) E C*(x*), "'Ix E J(, and
(3.30)
58 CHAPTER 3. STABILITY ANALYSIS
(3.31)
If this were not true, then there would be a w' E C*( x*) n SJ.( x*), w' 'I 0,
°
such that yT w' == 0. Now w' E SJ.(x*) and y E riC(x*) imply that there
is a sufficiently small E > such that
y + EW' E C(x*).
Hence,
(y + Ew'f w' == Ellw'112 > 0, (3.32)
which contradicts that y + EW' E C(x*) and w' E C*(x*). Therefore,
(3.31) is true.
C*(x*) n SJ.(x*) is a closed convex cone. Denote its intersection
with the unit ball B(O,l) by W. Then W is compact and contains an
element Wo, which maximizes the linear functional (y,.) on W. Namely,
yT Wo == max { yT w: II w ll == 1, wE C*(x*) n SJ.(x*) }. (3.33)
Therefore, letting a == _yT Wo > °, from (3.31), we obtain
(3.34)
for all w E C*(x*) n SJ.(x*), from which the result of the lemma follows
directly. •
Lemma 3.2
Suppose that x* is a regular solution ofVI( F, K) and xo(·) solves the
IVP(F,K,xo). Let Zi == Zi(X)j i = 1,2, be as in (3.9). For any E > 0,
and small enough, there exists a neighborhood N(x*) of x*, and some
T(xo, E), 0 ~ T(xo, E) ~ 2a- 1 1Iz2(xo)lI, such that, when Xo E N(x*)
xo(T(xo,E)) E B(O,E)nS(x*) + x*, (3.35)
where a is the constant provided by Lemma 3.1.
Proof:
Let xo(t) and x, as its abbreviation, be the solution to IVP (F, K, xo).
Let To = 2a- 1 Ilz2(xo)1I and Zi(t) = Zi(XO(t))j i = 1,2. By definition,
and since PS(x*) is linear and continuous, one has
3.2. LOCAL PROPERTIES UNDER REGULARITY 59
In fact, if this were not true, there must be some v, v E [0, w], such that
xo(t) E N3(X*), 'tit E [O,v), but xo(v) ~ N3(X*), and xo(t) ~ S(x*), 'tit E
[0, v). This is because xo(O) = Xo E N4(X*) C N3(X*) and xo(t) is con-
tinuous.
Notice that, for all t E [0, v)
d d
d/ IIZl(t) + z2(t)1I 2/2) = dt (lIxo(t) - x*112 /2)
= ((xo(t) - x*l , II(xo(t), -F(xo(t))))
= ((xo(t) - x*)T , -F(xo(t))) + ((xo(t) - x*l , f3(xo(t))n*(xo(t)))
:::; ((xo(t) - x*l , -F(xo(t)))
= (zl(tl,-F(xo(t))) + (z2(tl,-F(xo(t))). (3.42)
The first term in the right-hand side of (3.42) can be rewritten as
(zl(tl, -F(xo(t)))
= (Zl (tl, PS(x')( -F(xo(t))) + (Zl (tl, PS.L(x')( -F( xo( t) )))
= (zl(tl,ps(x.)(-F(xo(t)))) = (zl(tl,Zl(t)), (3.43)
where the last equality follows from (3.39).
The second expression in the right-hand side of (3.42) can be esti-
mated from (3.41), namely,
Substituting (3.43) and (3.44) into the right-hand side of (3.42) gives
3.2. LOCAL PROPERTIES UNDER REGULARITY 61
Since Ilz2(t)11 > 0, Vt E [0, v], we have directly from the above that
(3.46)
So
xo(y) E B(O, E) n S(x*), and y:S; To.
Let T( Xo, E) = y. The proof of the lemma is complete .•
The major results of this section are now ready for presentation.
First, it is pointed out by the following theorem that PDS(F, K) has
the best stability around its regular solutions to VI(F, K) when they are
extreme points of the feasible set K.
Theorem 3.2
When S(x*) = {O}, any regular solution x* to VI(F, K) is a finite-
time attractor for the PDS(F, K). Particularly, there exists a neighbor-
hood N(x*) of x*, such that, when Xo E N(x*),
°
Suppose that x* is a regular solution to VI(F, K) and dimS(x*) ~ 1.
Then there exists an € > such that x* + B(O,€) n S(x*) c K, and for
any x E x* + B(O,€) n S(x*),
n(x,-F(x» = -g(Zl). (3.53)
Nr(€) C K, (3.55)
and
(IVP(B»
we have
(3.60)
when IIz~1I < 01.
Let r > 0 be arbitrarily fixed and
then
(3.64)
By the uniqueness of the solution to the IVP(A) (d. Theorem 2.5),
for t ~ T(xo, 01),
(3.65)
where X1(T) solves IVP(C):
(IVP(C)) Xl = next, -F(X1)), X1(0) = xo(T(XO,Ol))'
zr = zl(T(xo,Ol)), (3.67)
or
(3.69)
It is now left to be shown that during the time interval [0, T(XO,Ol)],
xo(t) does not exit B(X*,f). First, it will be shown that
If not, let
lim Xo· t
t ..... oo
= x* (3.74)
lim Xo· t
t ..... oo
= tlim
.....oo
xo(T(xo,D1))· (t - T(xo,D1))
= x* + tlim
..... oo
Z1(t) = x*. (3.75)
Theorem 3.5
Suppose that x* solves VI(F, K). If F(x) is locally monotone at x*,
then x* is a monotone attmctor for the PDS(F, K); if F(x) is monotone,
then x* is a global monotone attmctor.
Proof:
By Lemma 2.1, for any x E K,
(xa(t) - x*?,,8(xa(t))n*(xa(t)))
Theorem 3.6
Suppose that x* solves VI( F, K). If F( x) is locally strictly mono-
tone at x*, then x* is a strictly monotone attractor; if F( x) is strictly
monotone at x*, then x* is a strictly global monotone attractor.
Proof:
Since strict monotonicity implies monotonicity, (3.77)-(3.82) in the
proof of Theorem 3.5 still hold true here. Moreover, inequality (3.82)
now has a strict sign, due to local strict monotonicity of F( x) at x*, that
is,
D(t) ~ -((xo(t) - x*l,F(xo(t)) - F(x*)) < °
(3.83)
when xo(t) i:- x*.
Therefore, D(t) is monotonically decreasing but nonnegative. Let
D_ = tlim
..... oo
D(t). (3.84)
so x* is exponentially stable.
3.3. PROPERTIES UNDER MONO TONICITY 71
logd(xo,t) ~ 10gd(xo,0)-."t
or
IIxo(t) - x*1I ~ IIxo - x*1I exp( -."t). (3.97)
Hence, x* is exponentially stable.
When F(x) is monotone at x*, then (3.93) has no restriction for Xo.
The same arguments above will apply and give either (3.95) or (3.97),
with no restriction for the initial value Xo. Therefore, x* is globally
exponentially stable . •
In the following definition, the concept of strong monotonicity is gen-
eralized to strong monotonicity with a certain degree.
Definition 3.10 (Strong Monotonicity with Degree a)
°
F( x) is said to be locally strongly monotone with degree a at x* if
there is a neighborhood N(x*) of x* and." > such that
(3.100)
72 CHAPTER 3. STABILITY ANALYSIS
Remark
Let x* be a solution to VIC F, K) and F be locally monotone at
x*. Then, with notice to (3.82), Ilx - x*112/2 is a Liapunov Function
of PDS(F, K) at x*.
75
76 CHAPTER 4. DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHMS
(4.3)
..........•....
- - _ . : Discrete time algorithm
;/
...............l'> : Projected dynamical system
(/----~'-'\]
!
V
L··_\·:·_·:···_···.""
...._. --'_\"'-i-:--~~///
Figure 4.1: An illustration of a discrete time algorithm in the background
of its associated projected dynamical system
(4.4)
min
xEK
~xT.
2
x - (XT - aTFT(XT)f . x. (4.5)
In the case where the feasible set K is the nonnegative orthant, that
is, when K = Ri, then the projection operation becomes particularly
simple. In this special case, an iteration of the general iterative scheme
(4.3), given by (4.4) or (4.5), takes on the closed form expression:
for j = 1,2", . ,k. The feasible set is of this type in oligopolistic market
equilibrium problems, spatial price equilibrium problems, and certain
traffic network equilibrium problems that are studied, respectively, in
Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
Hence, in the case that the feasible set K is the nonnegative orthant,
in order to compute the iterate {XTH }, one need only to apply a simple
78 CHAPTER 4. DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHMS
formula. Also, it is worth noting that the evaluation of each (XT +1)jj
j = 1, ... , k, can be done independently and simultaneously. This feature
opens up the possibility of parallel computation for the determination of
the iterates. This avenue is explored in the context of spatial price equi-
librium problems in Chapter 6, where massively parallel architectures
are utilized for the implementation of the numerical schemes.
In the case where the feasible set is no longer the nonnegative orthant,
there are, nevertheless, many efficient algorithms to solve quadratic pro-
gramming problems of the form (4.5), some of which exploit the under-
lying special structure of a problem, such as a network structure, if it
exist~. Examples of such algorithms, include "equilibration algorithms,"
and can be found in Nagurney (1993).
Dafermos (1983), in turn, proposed a general iterative scheme for the
solution of variational inequality problems. The algorithms induced by
her scheme take the following form: At iteration T, compute X T +1 by
solving the variational inequality subproblem:
(g(XT +1,XT l,X - X T +1) ~ 0, "IX E K, (4.7)
where g(x, y) : K x K ~ Rk has the properties:
(i). g(x,x) = F(x)j
(ii). for every fixed x, y E K, the kx k matrix Vxg(x, y) is symmetric
and positive definite.
Since V xg( x, y) is assumed to be symmetric and positive definite,
the line integral I g( x, y)dx defines a function f( x, y) : K X K ~ R such
that, for fixed y E K, f(',y) is strictly convex and
g(x, y) = V xf(x, y). (4.8)
Consequently (cf. Proposition 2.3), the variational inequality subprob-
lem (4.7) is equivalent to the strictly convex mathematical programming
problem:
minf(x,XT ). (4.9)
xEK
This problem, in turn, can be solved using any appropriate mathematical
programming algorithm.
The general iterative scheme of Dafermos induces such algorithms
as the projection method and the relaxation method. Indeed, in that
framework, the projection method corresponds to the choice
1
g(x, y) = F(y) + -G(x - y), p> 0, (4.10)
p
4.1. THE GENERAL ITERATIVE SCHEME 79
(4.11)
This projection method is a fixed step-size method, with the step size
equal to the parameter p.
A characteristic of discrete time algorithms is that, unlike variational
inequality methods, they track the projected dynamical system when the
step sizes aT's are small. Namely, in addition to obtaining the solutions
to the variational inequality problem (4.2), by way of approaching the
stationary points of the projected dynamical system (4.1), they depict
the behavior of the underlying dynamic model (see also Figure 4.1).
(4.12)
1
FT(x) = 2 [F(x) + F(P(x - aTF(x)))].
80 CHAPTER 4. DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHMS
where
k'Tl(X) = F(x),
k'T2(X) = P(x - a; k'Tl(X)),
where
h'Tl(X) = F(x),
h'T2(X) = F(x - a; h'Tl(X)),
4.2 Convergence
We first give the precise conditions for the convergence theorem and
then present a general discussion of the conditions. We conclude with
the statement and proof of the theorem.
Assumption 4.1
Suppose we fix an initial condition Xo E K and define the sequence
{Xn TEN} by (4.3). We assume the following conditions:
5. The solutions to x =
II(x,-F(x» are stable in the sense that
given any compact set Kl there exists a compact set K2 such that
UyEKnKl Ut~O {</>y(t)} C K2.
Remarks
The assumptions are phrased as they are because they describe more
or less what is needed for convergence, and because there are a number
of rather different sets of conditions that imply the assumptions. Hence,
this formulation avoids giving proofs on a case by case basis.
Part 1 of Assumption 4.1 is a general divergent step-size rule for
discrete time algorithms. Among others, Fukushima (1986) and Flam
(1992a) have proposed algorithms with such divergent step sizes, respec-
tively, for variational inequality problems and for optimization problems.
Recall from Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4, that tj = L1:~ ai is, indeed, the
accumulated time for the projected dynamical system prior to step j.
The condition L~o ai = 00 then has the interpretation that one needs
to consider the asymptotical case for the convergence of discrete time al-
gorithms, as is clear from its continuous time analogy of stability analysis
of the projected dynamical system.
4.2. CONVERGENCE 83
since in this case the function V(y) = IIYII can be used as a Lyapunov
function. As a final observation, we note that the last three conditions
all hold under standard assumptions made in the study of variational
inequalities.
Theorem 4.1
Let S denote the set of stationary point of the projected dynamical
system (4.1), equivalently, the set of solutions to the variational inequal-
ity problem (4.2). Assume Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 4.1. Suppose
{Xn TEN} is the scheme generated by (4.3). Then d(Xn S) ~ 0 as
T ~ 00, where d(X'T' S)=infxEsIIX'T - xii.
Corollary 4.1
Assume the conditions of Theorem 4.1, and also that S consists of a
finite set of points. Then lim'T-+oo X'T exists and equals a solution to the
variational inequality.
84 CHAPTER 4. DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHMS
Proof:
The proof is patterned after arguments that are now standard in the
theory of stochastic algorithms (Kushner and Clark (1978), Dupuis and
Kushner (1989)). First note that conditions 3 and 5 of Assumption 4.1
imply that the ODE x = II( x, - F( x)) has at least one stationary point,
and that the set S is bounded. Define
n-l
tn = Lai, k(t) = inf{n : t n > t} - 1,
;=0
and
x(t) = Xk(t).
Let xnO denote the shifted version of x(·) given by
Note that parts 1 and 2 of Assumption 4.1 imply Theorem 4.1 can be
applied (with the af and bf(x) in Theorem 4.1 given here by an+i and
-Fn+i(x), respectively) to xn(-) whenever xn(o) converges.
Now fix € > O. Let KI be a compact set that contains {Xn TEN},
and define K2 according to part 5 of Assumption 4.1. Parts 3 and 5 of As-
sumption 4.1 together with an elementary argument by contradiction im-
ply the existence ofT < 00 such that y E KnK1 guarantees the existence
of t ~ T such that d(¢Jy(t),S) ~ €/2. Indeed, if not true then we could
find Yn --+ Y E K n KI and T.,. --+ 00 such that d(¢Jy(t),S) > €/2 for all
t E [O,Tn]. According to Lemma 2 ¢Jy,.(') --+ ¢Jy(.) uniformly on compact
subsets of [0, 00). By part 3 of Assumption 4.1 there exists T* < 00 such
that d(¢Jy(T*),S) ~ €/4, contradicting liminf.,.-+ood(¢Jyn(T*),S) ~ €/2.
We first claim that d(Xn S) ~ € for infinitely many T. If this claim
is not true then there exists N < 00 such that d(X.,., S) > € for all
T ~ N. According to part 4 of Assumption 4.1 the set {x"'(O),n ~ N} =
{X.,., T ~ N} has compact closure. Suppose that a convergent subse-
quence is extracted (and again labeled by T). Let y E K n K I denote the
limit point of x"'(O). According to Theorem 4.1 x"'O converges uniformly
to ¢Jy(.) over the interval [O,T]. Let t E [O,T] be such that d(¢Jy(t),S) ~
€/2. Then limsup.,.-+oo d(x"'(t), S) = lim sUP.,.-+oo d(Xk(t,.+t) , S) ~ €/2,
which contradicts d(X.,., S) > € for all T ~ N.
We next claim that d(Xn S) ~ € for all sufficiently large T. An
argument by contradiction that is similar to the one used above shows
4.2. CONVERGENCE 85
d(y,S) ~ 8:::} d(¢y(t),S) ~ f/2 for all t E [O,T] and d(¢y(T),S) ~ 8/2.
(4.17)
occurs at most finitely often. When combined with the fact that, for
°
infinitely many T, d(XT' S)~8, this will show d(XT(t), S) ~ f for all
sufficiently large T. Since f > is arbitrary, the theorem will be proved.
Thus we assume the event (4.17) occurs infinitely often. Since the
set {y : d(y, S) ~ 8} is compact, we can assume xT(O) ~ y and (by
Theorem 4.1) x T(.) ~ ¢y(.) uniformly on [O,T], where d(y,S) ~ 8. Since
the definition of 8 and T imply
Proof:
According to Theorem 3.6, x* is a strictly global monotone attractor.
Therefore, for every y E K,
Hence, the w-limit set of K, w(K), is just the singleton {x*}, which is a
stationary point of:i; = II( x, - F( x)) according to Theorem 2.4 . •
Proposition 4.2
If the vector field F( x) is monotone at some solution x* to the vari-
ational inequality problem (4.2), then Part 5 of Assumption 4.1 holds
true.
Proof:
According to Theorem 3.5, x* is a global monotone attractor. We
have for any compact set Kl
u
yEKnKl
U{¢>y(t)} C B(x*, Ily* - x*II)·
t~O
(4.21)
Section 4.2
With the exception of Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2, most of
the results herein were reported earlier in Dupuis and Nagurney (1993).
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4.3. SOURCE AND NOTES 89
Applications
91
Chapter 5
Oligopolistic Market
Equilibrium
93
94 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
ary points of which are equivalent to the set of solutions of the spatial
model. We also provide the projected dynamical systems model for the
classical oligopoly model.
Here for the sake of generality, we consider the oligopoly problems,
operating under the Nash equilibrium (d. Nash (1950, 1951)) concept of
noncooperative behavior, as game theoretic problems. In particular, we
make the association of firms being players and their commodity produc-
tion outputs and shipments as being their strategies. The firms' utility
functions, in turn, correspond to their profit functions. Consequently,
the dynamical models that we propose are also relevant to game theory
problems.
In Section 5.2 we apply the tools of Chapter 3 to study the stability
of the oligopoly models. Examples are included to highlight how the
analysis can be applied. The stability results are presented here in a
manner sufficiently general to be applicable to other Nash equilibrium
problems, since it is well-known (d. Gabay and Moulin (1980)) that
such problems can be formulated as variational inequality problems.
In Section 5.3 we address the computation of equilibria and describe
the Euler-type method. We also give conditions for convergence. We
then illustrate the numerical performance of the Euler method on several
oligopoly examples through the use of tables and figures.
denote the demand for the commodity at demand market j. Let Qij
denote the nonnegative commodity shipment from supply market i to
demand market j. Group the production outputs into a column vector
q E R+, the demands into a column vector d E R+, and the commodity
shipments into a column vector Q E R+n.
The following conservation of flow equations must hold:
n
qi = LQij, Vi (5.1)
j=l
m
Ii = Ii(q)· (5.3)
Similarly, allow the demand price for the commodity at a demand
market to depend, in general, upon the entire consumption pattern, i.e.,
pj = pj(d). (5.4)
We then group the production costs into a row vector I E Rm and the
commodity prices into a row vector p E Rn.
Let Cij denote the unit transaction cost, which includes the trans-
portation cost, associated with trading (shipping) the commodity be-
tween firm i and demand market j. Here we permit the transaction cost
to depend, in general, upon the entire shipment pattern, i.e.,
(5.5)
• • •
• • • n
dl d2 dn
which is the difference between the firm's total revenue and its total
costs.
In view of (5.1), (5.2), (5.3), and (5.4), one may write the profit as a
function solely of the shipment pattern, i.e.,
u = u(Q), (5.7)
(5.8)
where
~ ~ aUi(Q*) . (Q ij Q*ij ) ~ 0, VQ E R+
mn, (5.9)
aQ' .
- L- L-
i=l j=l I, -
V(q,Q,d) E K,
(5.10)
where K == {(q,Q,d)IQ ~ 0,and(5.1)and(5.2) hold}.
In the classical oligopoly model, depicted in Figure 5.2, there is only
a single demand market, the unit transaction costs are identically equal
to zero, and the production cost facing each firm is a function of its
98 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQ UILIBRIUM
2 • • • m
Demand Market
Figure 5.2: Graphical depiction of the classical oligopoly problem
Classical Oligopoly
Corollary 5.1 (Variational Inequality Formulation)
Determine q* E R+, such that
(5.11)
with the feasible set K == {xl x 2: O}, where k = mn. Then, clearly,
variational inequality (5.9) can be placed in standard form (2.1), where,
5.1. OLIGOPOLY MODELS 99
explicitly,
t)
0Ii·
(5.12)
Similarly, if we let x be the column vector x =
q E Rm, F( x) E
R m the column vector with components: (- aUal(qd,
ql
. .. , - au;(qm)?,
qm
and
K = {xl x ~ O}, with k = m, then variational inequality (5.10) governing
the classical Cournot-Nash oligopoly problem can also be placed in the
standard form (2.1), where
(5.13)
8Ui(Q) < 0
(5.14)
8Qij ,
F(Q)
= (Fll (Q), ... ,F1n (Q),F21 (Q), ... , F2n (Q), ... ,Fm1(Q), ... ,Fmn(Q)l,
where Fij(Q)=_8;;S~), for all i and j.
'J
Let r = VmnM. Consider the variational inequality problem VIr
restricted on the closed ball Br with radius r centered at o. That is,
determine Q; E Br n R+n such that
Proposition 5.2
Suppose that F is strictly monotone at any equilibrium point of the
general variational inequality problem defined in (5.9). Then it has at
most one equilibrium point.
Proof:
Suppose on the contrary, that there exist two equilibrium points xi
and x2' Hence, substitution of x2 into the variational inequality for xi
yields
(5.16)
Similarly, substitution of xi into the variational inequality for x2 yields
where Vu(Q) denotes the vector of marginal utilities. Note that this
ODE captures the ODE for the classical oligopoly problem as a special
case when the vector of production outputs q is substituted for the vector
of commodity shipments Q in (5.18), with the utility function u and
the feasible set K defined accordingly. In addition, (5.18) may also be
interpreted as a dynamical model for a noncooperative game, operating
under Nash equilibrium.
We briefly interpret the ODE (5.18) in the context of both oligopoly
models. First, note that ODE (5.18) ensures that the production ship-
ments (and outputs) are always nonnegative. Indeed, if one were to
consider, instead, the ordinary differential equation: x = - F( x), or,
equivalently, Q= Vu(Q), such an ODE would not ensure that x(t) ~ 0,
102 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
cess would evolve within the nonnegative orthant. Okuguchi and Szi-
darovszky (1990) also studied the asymptotical stability of this utility
gradient process at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, under the assump-
tions of linear price functions and quadratic cost functions. For a dis-
cussion of such issues, see Sources and Notes following this chapter.
process.
m n n
= - L:I)9ij(Q1) - 9ij(Q2)][QL - Q~j] - L:[Pj(d1) - pj(d2)][d} - d~]
i=l j=l j=l
= _[g(Q1) _ g(Q2)]T. [Q1 _ Q2] _ [P(d1) _ p(d2)]. [d1 _ d2],
where g(Q) = (gij(Q), i = 1, ... , mjj = 1, ... , n) is a mapping from R+n
to Rmn defined by
(5.20)
then the third term on the right-hand side of (5.19) can be expressed as
m n
= L:L:[hi;(Q1) - hij(Q2)][Q}j - Q~j]
i=lj=l
m n
+L: L:[Ci;(Q1) - Cij( Q2)][Q}j - Q~j]
i=l j=l
= [h(Q1) _ h(Q2)]. [Q1 _ Q2] + [C(Q1) _ C(Q2)]. [Q1 _ Q2]. (5.22)
In the spatial oligopoly model, the production costs are, in general,
functions of the whole production pattern q = (q1,"" qm). For a par-
ticular firm i, denote
(5.23)
106 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Therefore, the second item on the right-hand side of (5.19) can be sim-
plified to
m
(II) = L:[ft(ql) - fF(q~)][ql- ql], (5.25)
i=l
Proof:
Under the conditions of Proposition 5.3, we see immediately that,
for any two shipment patterns Q1 and Q2, (I) at the right-hand side of
(5.19) is nonnegative, since -g and -p are monotone. (II) is nonnegative
because of the convexity of all Jl j i = 1,· .. ,m. Also, (III) is nonnegative
due to the monotonicity of hand c. Therefore, in this case - Vu( Q)
is monotone, and, hence, every Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a global
monotone attractor by Theorem 5.3 (i) . •
Proposition 5.4
Under the condition of Proposition 5.3, plus that anyone of -g, h,
or c is strictly monotone, there exists at most one Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium, which, provided existence, is a strictly global monotone attractor.
Proof:
The conclusion follows directly from Theorem 5.3 (ii). because the
right-hand side of (5.19) is now positive, under the condition . •
Proposition 5.5
Under the condition of Proposition 5.2 plus that anyone of -g, h, or
c is strongly monotone, there exists a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
which is globally exponentially stable. Furthermore, for any initial ship-
ment pattern QO, we have the following estimate of convergence for the
utility gradient process,
(5.26)
where 'f/ > 0 is the constant associated with the strong monotonicity of
anyone of -g, h, or c, whichever is strongly monotone.
Proof:
The proposition follows directly from Theorem 5.3 (iii). with notice
that the right-hand side of (5.19) will be bounded below by 'f/IIQ _ Q*112
for some 11 > 0, which is the constant associated with the strong mono-
tonicity of -g, h, or c. •
Next, we present another two stability results as corollaries of Theo-
rem 5.3, assuming that the demand price functions and the unit transac-
tion cost functions are linear (but not necessarily separable) and that the
production cost functions are quadratic (not required to be separable).
Suppose that for each firm ij i = 1,· .. , m, the production cost Ii is
quadratic and is given by
(5.27)
108 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Proof:
By virtue of Theorem 5.3, it suffices to show that - Vu( Q) is mono-
tone under the condition of the proposition. In fact, for any two shipment
patterns Ql and Q2, the first item at the right-hand side of (5.19) is now
given by
m n
- L L [pj(d 1 ) - pj(d2)] [Qtj - Q~j]
i=l v=l
m
m n m
= LL[L 2A(i)iu(q! - q~)][Qtj - Q~j]
i=l j=l u=l
m m
(5.34)
where the nonegativity follows from the semidefiniteness of A.
The third item at the right-hand side of (5.19) can now be written
as
m n n
(III) = L[L LT(iv)(ij)( Qtv - Q~v)( Qtj - Q~j)]
i=l j=l v=l
m n
+L L[Cij(Ql) - Cij(Q2)][Qtj - Q~j]
i=l v=l
m
L(Qt - Q~fT(i)(Qt - Q~) + (Ql - Q2fT(Ql - Q2), (5.35)
i=l
110 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
m
L(Q} - Q~f( -B)(Q} - Qn + (d1 - d2f( -B)(d1 - d2)
i=l
m
+ L(Q} - Q~lT(i)(Q} - Q~) + (Ql - Q2fT(Ql _ Q2)
i=l
m
> L(Q} - Q~f( -B)(Q} - Qn + (Ql - Q2fT(Ql - Q2). (5.36)
i=l
where "lB is the minimal eigenvalue of -(B + B T )/2. Hence, the right-
hand side of (5.36) is greater than
m
"lB L: IIQ~ - Q~1I2 = "lBIIQl _ Q2112.
i=l
where "IT is the minimal eigenvalue of the symmetric matrix (T +TT) /2.
It is clear that in either case - V'u is strongly monotone and we have the
desired estimate of the convergence rate. •
5.2.1.1 An Example
For illustrative purposes, we use the established results to examine the
stability at Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the following example, taken
from Qiu (1990). This example will be revisited in Section 5.3 for the
computation of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Example 5.1
Consider a spatial oligopoly problem consisting of two firms and two
markets. The production costs are quadratic and are given by:
for firm 2:
and
(2,5,4, If.
B = ( -3° 0)
-1 and,B = T
(10,9) .
if Q13'!'. = 0
'Vi = 1"" , m; 'Vj = 1"", n. (5.37)
if Qij :2: 0,
U(Q*) n V(Q*) = 0.
Correspondingly, any vector W E Rmn can be decomposed into
(S.40)
and
(S.41)
Let I be a homomorphic identity I : R U I--? R mn such that, for any vector
Y E RU, I(Y) E Rmn is a vector whose V components are zeroes and U
components form vector Y, namely,
IU(y) = Y, IV(Y) = O. (S.42)
Then, we have, by definition,
(S.43)
Introduced below is a classical dynamical system which evolves in
the face {Q E Rmn : QV = O} of the constraint set R+n, where the
Cournot-N ash equilibrium situates.
Definition 5.3
The minimal face flow at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium Q* is the dy-
namical system that solves
where
(S.4S)
Proof:
It follows from the equilibrium condition (5.37) that 8~·4~·) -0,
when (i,j) E U( Q*), i.e., [Vu( Q*)]U = O. The proof is complete with
notice to (5.43) . •
As an application of Theorem 3.4, we have
Theorem 5.6
Let Q* be a regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then Q* is stable for
the utility gradient process (5.18), if Q*u is stable for the minimal face
flow solving (5.44); Q* is asymptotically stable for the utility gradient
process, if Q*u is asymptotically stable for the minimal face flow.
Proof:
The theorem is a direct corollary of Theorem 3.4 . •
The above theorem indicates that, at any regular Cournot-Nash equi-
librium, the minimal face flow provides a local approximation to the
utility gradient process. The relationship is further exploited in the next
theorem which suggests a direct way to justify the asymptotical stability
at a regular Cournot-N ash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.7
Let Q* be a regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium. If all the eigenvalues
of the Jacobian matrix of H at Q*u
(5.46)
have negative real parts, then the utility gradient process is asymptotically
stable at Q*.
Proof:
By virtue of Theorem 5.6, we only need to show that the minimal
face flow is asymptotically stable at Q*u. However, given the condition
that all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix V H(Q*u) have negative
real parts, the result is classical (see, e.g. Hirsh and Smale (1974)) . •
At a regular Cournot-N ash equilibrium Q*, if we call Qij with (i,j) E
U(Q*), the equilibrium-active shipment pairs, and Qij with (i,j) E
V(Q*), the equilibrium-inactive shipment pairs, then Theorem 5.6 states
that the minimal face flow approximately describes the local evolution
of the equilibrium-active shipment pairs of the utility gradient process
116 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
around Q*. Theorem 5.7 further points out that the asymptotical sta-
bility of the utility gradient process at Q* can be determined by a sub-
Jacobian matrix of the utility gradient function V'u(Q) corresponding to
the equilibrium-active shipment pairs. In other words, one only needs
to extract a submatrix of size u from the entire Jacobian of the utility
gradient at Q* , and to calculate the eigenvalues of this submatrix. There-
fore, when the equilibrium shipment pattern contains many equilibrium-
inactive shipment pairs, which is usually the case when there are a large
number of firms and markets involved in the spatial oligopoly problem,
we will considerably reduce the size u X u of the submatrix from the size
mn X mn of the entire Jacobian matrix, and, hence, the computation
of the eigenvalues will be relatively easier. This has been stated as the
major concern in Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1990).
5.2.2.1 An Example
The following example highlights the simplicity of applying Theorem 5.7
in order to check the asymptotical stability at a regular Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.
Example 5.2
Consider a spatial oligoply problem that consists of three firms and
two demand markets. The production cost functions for the firms are
quadratic and nonseparable and are given by:
1
= 2q1 + qlq2 + ql + 1,
2
h(q)
6, C12(Q) 8,
7, C22( Q) 5,
5.2. STABILITY ANALYSIS 117
1 1
A(1) =
(
!°
2 2
°°
and, therefore,
_
A= ( 1° 1 0)
2 2
2 4 ,
°° 1
which is not positive semidefinite. Consequently, the approach following
Proposition 5.6 is no longer applicable here.
However, it is easy to verify that
Vu(Q*)
Vi,Vj. (5.48)
Observe that both (5.47) and (5.48) are parallel adjustment pro-
cesses, where in the classical oligopoly problem all of the production
outputs are updated simultaneously, whereas in the spatial oligopoly
model all the production shipments are updated simultaneously. Ex-
pression (5.47) states that if the marginal utility of a firm is equal to
zero, then the production output of the firm will not change at the next
iteration. If the marginal utility is positive, then the production out-
put will increase; if it is negative, and the output was positive, then the
production output of the corresponding firm will decrease in the next
iteration. Finally, if the production output of a firm is zero, and its
marginal utility is negative (or zero), then at the next iteration the pro-
duction output of that firm will remain the same. Hence, one only needs
to obtain the expression for the marginal utility for each firm for any
such example, and then to apply formula (5.47).
5.3. A DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHM 119
(5.49)
converges to Q*.
120 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Proof:
First note that the existence of an equilibrium pattern is implied
by Assumption 5.1 from Proposition 5.1 while the uniqueness result is
guaranteed by the strict monotonicity assumption from Proposition 5.2.
In order to establish the convergence result, we only need to verify
that Assumption 4.1 is satisfied here, by virtue of Theorem 4.2. Note
that Assumption 4.1.1 is a condition, which is satisfied by the selected
sequence an and Assumption 4.1.2 is also satisfied because in the Euler-
type method we have that FT = F and here F is continuous.
In what follows we shall verify Assumption 4.1.4, that is, {QT} gen-
erated by the Euler method is bounded.
Since aT -+ 0, as T -+ 00, there exists an N > 0, such that
Select now M large enough so that by Assumption 5.1, for any (i,j)
(5.53)
Q ~+I+l
~J
< Q~+l
tJ
< 2M . (5.57)
5.3. A DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHM 121
provided that Qf;+l ~ 2M, 'Vi,j. Therefore, (5.55) holds for all T. Con-
sequently, {QT} is bounded.
Notice that the existence and the uniqueness of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium Q* have already been implied in the conditions of the theo-
rem, with the existence suggested by Proposition 5.1 and the uniqueness
ensured by the strict monotonicity of the negative marginal utility. Ac-
cording to Theorem 5.2 (ii)., Q* is a strictly global monotone attractor
and, hence, is the w-limit of the utility gradient process (5.18), i.e.,
w(K) = {Q*}.
Therefore, Assumption 4.1.3 is verified.
The verification of Assumption 4.1.5 is now direct.
For any compact set KI C K, let rl be sufficiently large so that
K I C BTl (Q) n R+n. Since D( t) is monotone decreasing, we have
IIQ(t) - Q*II ~ IIQ(O) - Q*II, 'Vt. (5.62)
Therefore,
{QCt)} c BTlCQ*) n R+n.
UQeKl Ut~O
Hence, the compact set K2 can be chosen as BTl(Q*) n R+n, where
rl = max IIQ - Q*II,
QeKl
so the solution Q(t) is stable . •
122 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
firm i Ci Ki f3i
1 10 5 1.2
2 8 5 1.1
3 6 5 1.0
4 4 5 .9
5 2 5 .8
with the parameters given in Table 5.1. The demand price function is
given by:
(5.64)
i=l i=l
The convergence criterion utilized was: Iq[ - qJ-11 ~ .001, for all i.
The algorithm was initialized at qO = (10,10,10,10, 10)T. We utilized
the sequence: {aT }=1O X {1,!,!,~,~,~, ... }.
5.3. A DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHM 123
I Iteration I qr
T q'3 q!.
0 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000
1 430.4910 449.5303 468.3089 486.7077 504.5248
2 183.9319 119.1254 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3 61.7332 30.9201 33.9350 43.9350 53.9350
4 43.3268 35.7730 39.6143 39.3464 25.8714
5 42.5794 44.4099 47.1765 47.0852 51.7220
6 34.5229 38.2224 39.8953 37.6687 26.4263
7 39.9391 44.2695 46.4305 46.1774 46.4910
8 36.1503 40.7071 42.4355 40.8833 35.1091
9 37.7967 42.5199 44.4679 43.6605 41.4090
10 36.6446 41.4437 43.2815 42.0909 37.9249
11 37.0751 41.9100 43.8055 42.7939 39.4829
12 36.9359 41.7912 43.6757 42.6207 39.0997
13 36.9529 41.8208 43.7097 42.6656 39.1967
14 36.9393 41.8146 43.7031 42.6561 39.1738
15 36.9375 41.8171 43.7059 42.6592 39.1798
16 36.9355 41.8171 43.7059 42.6589 39.1787
17 36.9344 41.8175 43.7061 42.6590 38.1789
18 36.9337 41.8177 43.7063 42.6591 39.1789
q* = (36.9337,41.8177,43.7063,42.6591, 39.1789f.
The iterates generated by the Euler-type method for this example are
given in Table 5.2. The iterates are depicted graphically in Figure 5.3.
As reported in Nagurney (1993), the projection method, which would
in the above general iterative scheme correspond to FT(Xr ) = F(XT)
with aT = a, for all iterations T, required 33 iterations for convergence
to the same solution with a = .9, under the same initial conditions. The
relaxation method, on the other hand, d. Nagurney (1993), required
only 23 iterations but was more computationally costly, since at each
iteration nonlinear equations must be solved. Also, we emphasize that
124 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
600,--------------------------------,
500
~
~ 400
:;
o
.§ 300
-0
~
-g
L
200
Do-
100
8 10 12 14 16 18
Iteration Number
Figure 5.3: Graphical display of iterates of the Euler method for a 5-firm
oligopoly
the conditions for convergence of both the projection and the relaxation
method are more restrictive than those required by the general iterative
scheme described in Chapter 4.
Example 5.4 (cf. Example 5.1)
The Euler-type method is now applied to compute the equilibrium
shipment pattern for Example 5.1, where the production cost functions
are:
2"q1 + q1 + 7, h(q2) = q2 + 13,
=1 2 2
ft(q1)
the unit transaction cost functions are given by:
5.-------------------------------------.
4.5
4
(Il
C 3.5
"~ 3
:.c
(f)
c 2.5
o
't::l 2
1)
~ 1.5
CL
0.5
O~r-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
o 5 10 15 20 25
Iteration Number
--- Firm 1 Market 1 -+- Firm 1 Market 2 -*"""" Firm 2 Market 1 --Er Firm 2 Market 2
Figure 5.4: Graphical display of iterates of the Euler method for a 2-firm
spatial oligopoly
Example 5.1. The production cost for the third firm is given by:
1 2
!a(q3) = 2"q3 + q3 + 10.
The demand price function for the third demand market are given by:
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Iteration Number
~ 2.5
a
U 2
~
~ 1.5
"- 1
0.5
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Iteration Number
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
o 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Iteration Number
Figure 5.5: Graphical display of iterates of the Euler method for a 3-firm
spatial oligopoly
5.4. SOURCES AND NOTES 129
Section 5.3
The use of the Euler-type method was first proposed by Nagurney,
Dupuis, and Zhang (1994) for the computation of Cournot-Nash equi-
librium in spatial oligopoly problems. The results in this section are
extracted from that reference with the proof of convergence of the Euler
method simplified here with the use of the stability results. The tables
and figures of the generated iterates are included for completeness.
References
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cesses, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1977.
Arrow, K. J., Hurwicz, 1., and Uzawa, H., Studies in Linear and
Nonlinear Programming, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Cali-
fornia, 1958.
Cournot, A. A., Researches into the Mathematical Principles of
the Theory of Wealth, 1838, English translation, MacMillan, London,
England, 1897.
Dafermos, S., and Nagurney, A., "Oligopolistic and competitive behavior
of spatially separated markets," Regional Science and Urban Economics
17 (1987) 245-254.
Dupuis, P., and Nagurney, A., "Dynamical systems and variational in-
equalities," Annals of Operations Research 44 (1993) 9-42.
Flam, S. P., and Ben-Israel, A., "A continuous approach to oligopolistic
market equilibrium," Operations Research 38 (1990) 1045-1051.
Gabay, D., and Moulin, H., "On the uniqueness and stability of Nash
equilibria in noncooperative games," in Applied Stochastic Control
of Econometrics and Management Science, A. Bensoussan, P.
Kleindorfer, C. S. Tapiero, North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Nether-
lands, 1980.
Hartman, P., and Stampacchia, G., "On some nonlinear elliptic differen-
tial functional equations," Acta Mathematica 115 (1966) 271-310.
Hirsch, M. W., and Smale, S., Differential Equations, Dynamical
Systems, and Linear Algebra, Academic Press, New York, 1974.
Murphy, F. H., Sherali, H. D., and Soyster, A. L., "A mathematical pro-
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132 CHAPTER 5. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
133
134 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
is,
p = p(d), (6.2)
where p is a known function.
The unit transaction cost between a pair of supply and demand mar-
kets may depend upon the shipments of the commodity between every
pair of markets, that is,
c c(Q), = (6.3)
where c is a known function.
The supplies, demands, and shipments of the commodity, in turn,
must satisfy the following feasibility conditions:
n
Si = EQij, i = 1, ... ,m (6.4)
j=l
m
dj = EQij, j = 1, ... ,n (6.5)
i=l
• • •
• • •
Demand Markets j =1, 2, ... , n
Figure 6.1: Graphical depiction of the spatial price equilibrium problem
Combining (6.11a) and (6.11b), one can write the following pertinent
ordinary differential equation (ODE) for the adjustment process of the
commodity shipment in vector form as
°
(6.12), that is,
= IIK(Q*, -F(Q*)). (6.13)
6.2 Stability
Given that the projected dynamical system defined by (6.12) depicts an
adjustment process of the commodity shipments through time evolution,
with its stationary points corresponding to the spatial price equilibrium
points, whether and how the adjustment process approaches the spatial
price equilibrium naturally becomes of major interest. Towards these
ends, we now provide two distinct techniques for stability analysis out-
lined in Chapter 3 which we adapt and extend specifically for the spatial
market model in quantity variables.
140 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
with QO(O) = QO. For convenience, we will sometimes write QO. t for
QO(t).
Theorem 6.3
Suppose that (s*, Q*, d*) is a spatial price equilibrium according to
(6.4)-(6.7) and that the supply prices 7r, transaction costs c, and negative
demand prices - p are (locally) monotone, respectively, at s* ,Q*, and d* .
Then (s*, Q*, d*) is a globally monotone attractor (monotone attractor)
for the adjustment process solving ODE (6.12).
Proof:
For any (s,Q,d) satisfying (6.4)-(6.7), (in a neighborhood of
(s*, Q*, d*)), we have
Proof:
Let Ql and Q2 be two distinct equilibrium shipments, and let
(6.16)
However, (6.16), (6.17), and (6.19) could only hold simultaneously when
or, equivalently,
II(Q, -F(Q)) = O. (6.22)
According then to Theorem 6.2, Q is an equilibrium shipment pattern .
• Following Theorem 6.3, stronger stability results can be obtained by
imposing strict monotonicity and strong monotonicity conditions on the
transaction costs, as are listed below.
Theorem 6.4
Suppose that (s*, Q*, d*) is a spatial price equilibrium according to
(6.4)-(6.7) and that the supply prices 7r and negative demand prices -p
are monotone, respectively, at s* and d*. Furthermore, if the transac-
tion costs c are (locally) strictly monotone at Q*, then the spatial price
equilibrium (s*, Q*, d*) is a (strictly monotone attractor) globally strictly
monotone attractor.
142 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
Proof:
In view of (6.15), for any (s,Q,d) satisfying (6.4)-(6.7) (and in a
neighborhood of (s*, Q*, d*», we now have for any Q :I Q*,
The rest of the proof follows directly from Theorem 3.6, by virtue of the
strict monotonicity of F at Q* . •
Analogous to Corollary 6.1, we have
Corollary 6.2
If the supply prices 11" and the negative demand prices -pare mono-
tone with respect to their own arguments, and the transaction costs c
are strictly monotone with respect to Q, then there is at least one spatial
price equilibrium.
Proof:
Obvious from Theorem 6.4 and the definition of a globally strictly
monotone attractor. •
Theorem 6.5
Under the condition of Theorem 6.3 plus that the transaction costs
c are strongly monotone (locally strongly monotone) at Q*, the spatial
price equilibrium (s*, Q* ,d*) is globally exponentially stable (exponen-
tially stable).
Proof:
In view of (6.15), for any (s,Q,d) satisfying (6.4)-(6.7), (and in a
neighborhood of (s*, Q*, d*», we now have, for some 'TJ > 0,
Theorem 6.6
Under the condition of Theorem 6.3 plus that the transaction costs c
are locally strongly monotone with degree a < 2 at Q*, the spatial price
equilibrium (s*, Q*, d*) is a finite-time attractor.
Proof:
For any (s,Q,d) satisfying (6.4)-(6.7), and in a neighborhood of
(s*, Q*, d*), we have, under the condition of Theorem 6.6, that
6.2.1.1 An Example
In the following, we conduct stability analysis at the spatial price equi-
librium for a numerical example taken from Nagurney (1993).
Example 6.1
Suppose that there are two supply markets and two demand markets
that are spatially located. The supply price functions are given by:
It is easy to see that the Jacobian matrices of these functions are posi-
tive definite constant matrices, and, hence, are strongly positive definite.
Therefore, the supply prices, transaction costs, and negative demand
prices are strongly monotone. By virtue of Theorem 6.5, the unique spa-
tial price equilibrium in this example is globally exponentially stable. In
144 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
fact, the equilibrium supply, shipment, and demand pattern (s*, Q*, d*)
in this example is given by Nagurney (1993):
sr = 3, s; = 2,
Qr1 = 1.5, Qr2 = 1.5, Q;l = 0, Q;2 = 2,
~ = 1.5, d; = 3.5,
with equilibrium supply prices, costs, and demand prices:
(6.29)
and
(6.30)
Let I be a homomorphic identity I : Rn ~ Rmn such that, for any
WE Rmn,
(6.31)
Then, we have
(6.32)
The following definition introduces a dynamical system that inhabits
a face of the constraint set where the spatial price equilibrium situates.
Definition 6.3
The Minimal Face Flow at a spatial price equilibrium Q* is the dy-
namical system that solves
(6.33)
where
(6.34)
6.2.2.1 An Example
The following example highlights the simplicity of applying Theorem 6.9
in order to check the asymptotical stability at a regular spatial price
equilibrium. The problem consists of two supply markets and two de-
mand markets. Since the supply prices are not monotone, the theorems
established in Section 6.2.1 to examine the stability are no longer appli-
cable.
Example 6.2
Suppose that there are two supply markets, with supply price func-
tions:
1l'l(S) = Sl + S2 + 4, 1l'2(S) = 2s 1 + S2 + 5,
and the unit transactions costs are now fixed constants given by:
Pl(d*) = 7, p2(d*) = 4.
According to Definition 6.2, (s*, Q*, d*) is a regular spatial price equi-
librium. Since the non-zero shipment pairs U(Q*) = {ll}, one has that
(6.35)
where, without loss of generality, the "r" denotes an iteration (or time
period), {an r E N} is a sequence of positive scalars, and the sequence
of vector fields {FrO,r E N} "approximates" F(·).
Recall that the Euler-type method, which is the simplest algorithm
induced by the above general iterative scheme, has, in turn, the form
(6.36)
6.3. A DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHM 149
(6.37)
for all supply and demand market pairs (i,j) and all Q with Qij ~ M.
In fact, Assumption 6.1 is a natural assumption imposed on a spatial
price equilibrium model, guaranteeing an existence of an equilibrium, as
is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1
Suppose that for a spatial price equilibrium problem the supply prices,
transaction costs, and demand prices satisfy Assumption 6.1. Then there
exists at least one equilibrium point.
Proof:
Let R = YmnM. Consider the variational inequality problem VIR
restricted on the closed ball BR with radius R centered at 0. That is,
determine xR E BR n R+n, such that
Therefore, (QR)ij < M for all i = 1, ... ,m; j = 1, ... ,n, that is, IIQRII <
JmnM = R.
Applying again the results of Hartman and Stampacchia (1966), gives
us the existence of the equilibrium pattern for the (original) spatial price
equilibrium problem in quantity variables . •
We are now ready to state the convergence theorem for the Euler-type
method for the spatial price equilibrium problem.
Theorem 6.10
Let Fij(Q) = 1l"i(s)+cij(Q)-pj(d); i = 1, ... ,m; j = 1, ... ,n,
satisfy Assumption 6.1 and assume that F( Q) is strictly monotone at
any equilibrium shipment pattern Q*. Furthermore, assume that F either
satisfies Assumption 2.1 or is uniformly Lipschitz continuous. Then any
sequence generated by the Euler method
(6.39)
and
(6.41)
(6.43)
Since the first N items are guaranteed by (6.44), one only needs to show
(6.45) for T = N + I; I = 1,2, .... However, this can be done inductively
as follows. First, observe that, for I ~ 0,
implies
(6.49)
where the last inequality is from the inductive assumption: Qf;+l :s: 2M.
Combining (6.48), (6.49), and (6.50), one obtains
the demand price function at a demand market j, cf. (6.2), is ofthe form
(6.54)
and the unit transaction cost function associated with shipping the com-
modity between supply and demand market pair (i,j), cf. (6.3), is of
the form
(6.55)
with Ti,ti,mj,qj,gij,hij > 0, for all market pairs i,j.
In view of the Proposition 2.3, it is easy to see that since the J acobians
of the above supply price, negative demand price, and transaction cost
functions are symmetric, in fact, diagonal, (and positive definite) the
problem can be reformulated as an optimization problem, which in view
of the linearity of the functions, becomes a (strictly convex) quadratic
programming problem. The optimization problem, using (6.4) and (6.5),
is given by:
n m m
- :~:) ~j (L: Qij)2 + qj L: Qij).
j=1 i=1 i=1
3.5.,------------------,
~ 2.5
Q)
E
1
Vl
2
>-
'ij 1.5
a
E
E
8 1
0.5
2 3 4 5 6
Iteration Number
Figure 6.2: Graphical display of iterates of the Euler method for a clas-
sical spatial price example in quantity variables
Q* = (1.000,1.001,1.000, 1.oool.
Table 6.1: Iterates generated by the Euler method for a classical spatial
price example in quantity variables
Table 6.2: CM-2 times and CM-5 times for classical spatial price prob-
lems - Quantity formulation
and a linear asymmetric demand price function for each demand market
j, of the form
pj(d) = - L
mjkdk + qj. (6.57)
k
The unit transaction cost function associated with each market pair (i,j)
was of the form
(6.58)
160 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
Q* = (1.496,1.505,0.000, 1.987l.
The convergence tolerance was: £=.001, with the same convergence
criterion as used for the classical examples. The sequence {aT} was set
to: .5 x {1,!,!, 1, 1, 1, ... }.
The iterates generated by the Euler method
are given in Table 6.3 and depicted graphically in Figure 6.3.
The maximum error in the computed solution, when the maximum
error is, again, defined as: max(i,j) l1ri + Cij - pjl, for Qij > 0, was .012.
18o=------------------------------------~
16
14
'"
~ 12
E
0-
~ 10
>-
;g 8
o
~
o
6
u
4
6 12 18 24 30 36
Iteration Number
{Tij} was stored in an m X m array SC, and the matrix of demand price
coefficients {-mjk} was stored in an n X n array DC. We also intro-
duced additional arrays SP and DP to denote, respectively, the supply
prices and the demand prices at a given iteration, where the i-th row of
SP consisted of the identical elements {1l"i} and the j-th column of DP
consisted of the identical elements {Pj}. To compute the supply prices,
we used the spread command to spread the supplies and then multi-
plied the resulting matrix with the SC matrix. We subsequently used
the sum command to add the elements of each row. Finally, this vector
was added to the vector containing the fixed supply price terms {td (cf.
(6.56)). The results was then spread to create the supply prices SP at
the particular iteration. The demand prices were obtained in an analo-
gous fashion. In regards to the transaction cost functions, an additional
array G2 was introduced to store the coefficients {Pij}.
As in the case of the classical model, the Euler method was initialized
with the vector of commodity shipments, QD, set to zero. The same
convergence tolerance and criterion were used as previously.
For the interested reader, we now present the critical steps in the CM
FORTRAN computation section.
6.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS 163
Table 6.4: CM-2 times and CM-5 times for asymmetric spatial price
problems - Quantity formulation
iterations. The same problems were solved on the IBM ES/9000 at the
same convergence tolerance and with the same initial conditions, yielding
the same number of iterations as had been obtained on the CM-2 and
the CM-5. The first example in this set required 129.77 seconds on the
ES/9000, the second example required 767.57 CPU seconds, the third
example, 2,931.18 seconds, and the fourth example, 7,959.43 seconds.
6.4.3 Discussion
As can be seen from the above numerical results, the massively parallel
implementation of the Euler method on the CM-2 and the CM-5 clearly
outperformed the serial implementation on the IBM ES/9000. In fact,
in all cases, the times on only 8K processors were lower than those ob-
tained for the serial implementation. When 32K processors of the CM-2
were used, then at least an order of magnitude in speedup, as compared
to the IBM ES/9000 times, was realized for problems solved on these
architectures.
As one would expect, the CPU times on the CM-5 were the lowest,
with the 90,000 variable problems requiring only about a minute of CPU
time using 256 nodes of the CM-5, and the 160,000 variable problems
requiring less than 2 minutes of CPU time.
We did not report the CPU times on a particular configuration when
there was only a minimal reduction or no change relative to the next
smaller configuration. In other words, the addition of more processors
in such cases yielded no improvement in computational speed. Further
discussion of such parallel processing issues can be found in Nagurney
(1995). Further efficiencies may be realized in the future by selecting
alternative {aT} in a more "optimal" fashion after additional numerical
analysis.
Finally, we'd like to emphasize the simplicity of the implementation
of the proposed algorithm on both the serial and parallel architectures.
Indeed, at each step, the problem was decomposed into subproblems,
each of which possessed a closed form solution using a simple formula.
S=S(1r). (6.59)
The unit transaction costs, in turn, grouped into the row vector c,
may, in general, depend upon the column vector of commodity shipments
Q, that is,
C = c(Q). (6.61)
ifQ'!'·>O
i
1r +Ci j (Q*){ =Pj,
? Pj,
IJ
ifQ'!'·=O
(6.62)
'J '
where
if 1ri > 0
(6.63)
if 1ri = 0,
166 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
and
if pj > 0
(6.64)
if pj = O.
and T : R+n+m+n t---+ Rmn, S : R+n+m t---+ Rm, and D : R+n+n t---+ Rn
are defined by:
( ~)
11" = II (( Q)
11" , (-T(Q,1I"'P)))
-S(Q,1I") (6.72)
P P -D(Q,p)
We now discuss this model. If all the variables x( t) are in KO, the
interior of K, that is, all the commodity shipments at time t, Q(t), are
168 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
positive, and all the supply prices 1I'(t) and demand prices pet) are also
positive, then the evolution of the solution is directly given in terms
of F : x = -F(x). Equivalently, here we have that Q = -T(Q,1I',p),
ir = -S(Q, 11'), and p = -D(Q,p). In other words, the commodity
shipment between each pair of markets (i, j) responds to the price signal,
-Tij, where recall that, cf. (6.71), -Tij = Pj - Cij(Q) - 1I'i. The supply
price at a supply market i, in turn, responds to the undersupply -Si =
Lj Qij - SiC 11'), and the demand price at a demand market j to the unmet
demand - D j = dip) - Li Qij. Hence, in this model there are both price
and quantity signals. Moreover, the markets need not clear before the
equilibrium conditions are met, or, equivalently, a stationary point is
reached.
and for each demand market j, the demand price pj+! according to:
(6.75)
Note that (6.73), (6.74), and (6.75) represent parallel adjustment pro-
cesses in that each of the mn market pair subproblems can be solved
simultaneously at each iteration to evaluate the new commodity ship-
ments, as can each of the m supply price problems and the n demand
price problems. Moreover, each such subproblem can be solved explicitly
in closed form.
This discrete time adjustment process is also economically meaningful
in that the commodity shipment between a pair of markets will increase
if the demand price exceeds the supply price plus the unit transaction
cost; it will decrease if the demand price is lower than the sum of the
supply price and the unit transaction cost associated with that shipment.
In regards to the updating of the supply prices, the supply price at a
market will decrease if the commodity shipments out of the market are
less than the supply of the commodity at that market at the level of
supply prices; the supply price will increase if the commodity shipments
exceed the supply of the commodity at the supply market. On the other
hand, the demand price at a demand market will increase if the demand
for the commodity at the level of demand prices exceeds the commodity
170 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
flow into the demand market; it will decrease if the demand is less than
the commodity shipments into the market.
Furthermore, it is easy to see from expression (6.73), that if QJj is
positive, and the supply price plus transaction cost is identically equal to
the demand price, then the commodity shipment will be left unchanged.
Similarly, if the supply price plus transaction cost exceeds the demand
price at an iteration T for a particular pair of markets i, j, and QJj = 0,
then there will also be no shipment of the commodity between markets
i and j at the subsequent iteration.
From (6.75) we can conclude that if 7ri is positive and the supply is
equal to the commodity shipments out of the market, then the supply
price will not change. Also, from (6.76) it follows that if Pj is positive
and the demand is equal to the commodity shipments into the market,
then the demand price at the market will not change.
We now interpret the conditions for convergence of the Euler-type
method in the case of the application under consideration here.
In a practical realization of a spatial equilibrium problem in price
and quantity variables, one can reasonably expect the following:
(i). At each supply market i, Si(7r) ~ L:j Qij, for sufficiently large 7ri.
(ii). At each demand market j, L:iQij ~ di(P), for sufficiently large Pi.
This condition can be interpreted as follows. The shipment to de-
mand market j will be abundant, attracted by the high demand price
Pi, and, hence, adequate for the demand di' which is relatively lower
because dj(p) is a decreasing function of Pj.
(iii). For any supply/demand pair (i,j) the transaction cost Cij(Q) is at
least of linear growth for a heavy shipment of Qij. That is, there exists
some"., > 0 such that Cij(Q) ~ ".,Qij, for sufficiently large Qij.
Mathematically, the above conditions can be expressed as:
Assumption 6.2
Assume that there exist constants Ms > 0, Md > 0, Me > 0, and an
"., > 0, such that
(6.77)
6.6. A DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHM 171
(6.78)
and any i and j.
We now present the following results.
Lemma 6.1
Under the Assumption 2.1 and the Assumption 6.2, any sequence
{1I"T,QT,pT} generated by the Euler scheme as in (6.73), (6.74), and
(6.75), is bounded.
Proof:
Since aT ---t 0, as T ---t 00, there exists an N > 0, such that
for T ~ N.
(6.79)
Select an M large enough, where
so that
11"[ < 2M, i = 1, ... ,m; \IT::; N, (6.80)
pj < 2M, j = 1, ... ,n; \IT::; N, (6.81)
(6.84)
11"[ ::; 2M, pj::; 2M, Qrj::; 47]-1 M, \li,j, \IT ~ O. (6.86)
Since the first N items are guaranteed by (6.80), (6.81), and (6.82),
we only need to show (6.86) for T = N + I; I = 1,2, .... However, this
can be done inductively.
172 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
:s; 7rf'+1 + aN+1 [~(~ Q~+I - Si(7r N+1))2 + ~(~ Q~+I - dj(pN+I)?
, 3 3 ,
where x N+1 = (7r N+1, QN+I, pN+I) E R++ mn +n , and F is as in (6.70) and
(6.71).
Notice that from (6.79), it follows that
where the last inequality is from the inductive assumption: 7rf'+1 :s; 2M,
P3lY+ 1 <
-
2M "Q~+I
3
<
-
4'1'1-
.,
1 M.
-!,:+I+I <
Q 'J -
Q-!,:+l
tJ
< 4'11-
- ./
1 M. (6.95)
Case (ii). If Q~+l :s; 21]-1 M, then from (6.73) it follows that
(6.96)
where x N+1 = (7r N+1,QN+l,pN+l) and F is as in (6.70) and (6.71).
Notice now that from (6.79) one has that
~+I+1
Q IJ < 4'11-1M ,
_./
\.I';.
Vo,]. (6.99)
Indeed, (6.80), (6.81), and (6.82) mean that one can start this inductive
deduction from 1 = 0 and, therefore, the proof of the lemma is complete .
• Moreover, the following proposition shows that Assumption 6.2 alone
guarantees the existence of an equilibrium solution to the price formula-
tion of the spatial problem.
Proposition 6.2
Suppose that Assumption 6.2 holds for a price formulation of the
spatial equilibrium problem. Then there exists at least one equilibrium
point.
Proof:
Let 1J < 1 in Assumption 6.2 and
Therefore,
(6.103)
Similarly,
pj < 2Md, Vj. (6.104)
If for some (i,j), Qij = TJ-l(Me + 2Md), then Qij > Me, so from As-
sumption 6.2, one gets
(6.105)
Hence, by (6.104)
(6.106)
Q* if (l,k) f (i,j)
Qlk ={ 2 ij' l·f (I ,k)= (i,j ) .
lQUt;
- 1-
(F(x*), z - x*) = (if; + Cij(Q*) - pj)( -2 Q;j)
(6.108)
But
Theorem 6.12
In the price formulation of the spatial equilibrium problem, suppose
that F as defined in (6.70) and (6.71) satisfies Assumption 6.2 and is
strictly monotone at any equilibrium price and shipment vector. Fur-
thermore, assume that F either satisfies Assumption 2.1 or is uniformly
Lipschitz continuous. Then there exists a unique equilibrium price and
shipment vector x* and for any initial condition xO E R~+mn+n the
sequence generated by the Euler method
(6.112)
where
(6.113)
and
(6.114)
converges to x*.
Proof:
First notice that the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
vector x* are already guaranteed, respectively, by Proposition 6.2 and
Proposition 6.3. Hence, we only need to establish here the convergence
result. In view of Theorem 4.2, this can be accomplished by verifying
that Assumption 4.1 is satisfied here.
While Assumption 4.1.1 has been stated as the condition of the the-
orem, Assumption 4.1.2 holds because P r = F in the Euler-type method
and F is continuous. Lemma 6.1, in turn, shows that Assumption 2.1
and Assumption 6.2 together imply Assumption 4.1.4, the boundedness
of the sequence. What is, hence, left to be proved here is that Assump-
tions 4.1.3 and 4.1.5 are satisfied.
Applying Theorem 3.6, x* is a strictly monotone attractor and, hence,
is the w-limit set of the projected dynamical system (6.72), i.e.,
w(K) = {x*}.
Therefore Assumption 4.1.3 is verified.
The verification of Assumption 4.1.5 is now direct. For any compact
set K1, let Rl be sufficiently large so that K1 C BRl(X*) n R~+mn+n.
Since D(t) is montonically decreasing,
Therefore,
separable functions. We now present the supply and demand price func-
tions and their inverses.
In particular, we have that the supply price function at a supply
market i is of the form
(6.116)
dj(pj) =
p'
_J_ + _J
q'
• (6.117)
-mj mj
The unit transaction cost function associated with shipping the com-
modity between supply and demand market pair (i,j) is identical in both
the price and quantity formulations and is of the form
(6.118)
with Ti,ti,mj,qj,9ij,h ij > 0, for all market pairs i,j.
We first present a small numerical example and then present numer-
ical results on large-scale examples, when the Euler method is imple-
mented on two distinct massively parallel architectures.
The demand price functions, in turn, for this example would correspond
to:
PI(d!) = -.15dl + 10, P2(d2) = -.ld2 + 10.
The Euler method was initialized with 11"0 = (O,Of, pO = (O,Of,
and QO = (O,O,o,of. The convergence tolerance f was set to .001 and
the criterion utilized was: 111"[+1 - 11"[1 ~ f, for all i, IQ[t l - QIjl ~ f,
for all i,j, and Ipj+1 - pjl ~ f, for all j. The sequence {aT} was set to:
1. X {1,!,!,~,~,~, ... }. The algorithm converged in 49 iterations, and
in a negligible amount of CPU time, to:
11"* = (6.519,5.153f,
Q* = (1.521,0.000,3.144,0.000f,
p* = (9.300,5.000f·
The generated iterates are reported in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 and dis-
played in graphical form in Figure 6.4.
Since the supply prices and demand prices were positive at equilib-
rium the analogous equilibrium conditions (6.63) and (6.64) held with
"equality", precisely in the case of the demand markets and at a maxi-
mum deviation of .009 for the supply markets. The maximum error was
.003 for the equilibrium condition (6.62).
6.7. NUMERICAL RESULTS 181
Table 6.5: Iterates generated by the Euler method for a classical spatial
price example in price and quantity variables
T 7r7"
1
7r7"
2 QIl Qh Qh Q22 pI P2
40 6.516 5.166 1.521 0.000 3.149 0.000 2.299 5.000
41 6.517 5.164 1.521 0.000 3.147 0.000 9.299 5.000
42 6.517 5.162 1.521 0.000 3.146 0.000 9.300 5.000
43 6.518 5.161 1.521 0.000 3.145 0.000 9.300 5.000
44 6.518 5.159 1.521 0.000 3.144 0.000 9.300 5.000
45 6.519 5.157 1.521 0.000 3.144 0.000 9.300 5.000
46 6.519 5.156 1.521 0.000 3.144 0.000 9.300 5.000
47 6.519 5.155 1.521 0.000 3.144 0.000 9.300 5.000
48 6.519 5.154 1.521 0.000 3.144 0.000 9.300 5.000
49 6.519 5.153 1.521 0.000 3.144 0.000 9.300 5.000
The CM FO RTRAN code for the implementation of the Euler method for
the classical model in price and quantity variables consisted of an input
and setup routine and a computation routine to implement the iterative
steps (6.73), (6.74), and (6.75), in which the commodity shipments, and
supply and demand market prices are updated. The crucial feature in
the design of the program, again, was the construction of the data struc-
tures to take advantage of the data level parallelism and computation.
Towards this end, we defined arrays G, Q, and H, each of dimension
m X n, to store the elements {9ij}, {Qij} at each iteration, and {hij},
respectively. Further, we constructed m X n dimensional arrays SPRICE
and DPRICE, with each element of row i of SPRICE containing 7ri, and
with each element of column j of DPRICE containing Pj, at the partic-
ular iteration. The arrays SPR and DPR stored the new values of 7r and
*
p, respectively, at a particular iteration.
We constructed m dimensional arrays: -h and -h to store (d. (6.116»
the t and coefficients in the supply functions. We constructed n
dimensional arrays: _~ and if to store (d. (6.117» the _~j and ~
demand coefficients. Also, we used arrays QO, SPRO, and DPRO to
denote the values of {Qij}, {7ri}, and {Pj}, respectively, at the preceding
iteration, which were needed for convergence verification.
6.7. NUMERICAL RESULTS 183
35~--------------------------------------------,
30
.!"c 25
OJ
E
CL
:r: 20
III
>-
~
'5 15 b
o
E
E
o 10
u
Iteration Number
60
50
(/l
OJ
.g 40
(L
"'iii
~ 30
o
:::;
20
10
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 ~o
Iteration Number
--- Supply Price(l) -+- Supply Price(2) --?+E-- Demand Pricer I) -8- Demand Price(2)
Figure 6.4: Graphical display of iterates of the Euler method for a clas-
sical spatial price example in price and quantity variables
184 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
Table 6.7: CM-2 times and CM-5 times for classical spatial price exam-
ples - Price formulation
and
We note that in all these examples, in the case that Qii = 0, for a
given market pair i,j, then the inequality in (6.62) was always satisfied.
Similarly, in the case that 1ri = 0 for a given supply market i, then the
inequality in (6.63) also always held. Finally, in the case that Pi > 0
for a given demand market j, then the inequality in (6.64) also always
held. In view of this, we now present the error e for each of the cl?-ssical
examples computed above, since this measure is appropriate.
For the first example in this set, PCSP100, the error e=.0455, for
the second example, PCSP200, the error e=.0502. For the third classi-
cal example, PCSP300, the error e=.0532, and for the fourth example,
PCSP400, the error e=.0560.
6.7. NUMERICAL RESULTS 187
(6.119)
The transaction cost function associated with each market pair (i,j) was
of the form
(6.121)
Q* = (16.222,0.000,1.648, O.OOO?,
p* = (22.734,6.817?
Table 6.8: Iterates generated by the Euler method for a small asymmetric
spatial price example in price and quantity variables
T 1
1['7
2
1['7
QI1 QI2 Q;l Q;2 PI P;
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 66.75 50.00
2 0.000 0.500 32.63 22.75 24.25 18.25 20.88 0.000
3 28.19 22.13 21.178 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.938 0.000
4 0.000 4.354 4.707 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.84 15.021
5 1.902 1.392 8.510 3.840 0.000 0.000 23.79 6.048
6 3.118 0.899 12.56 1.397 2.049 0.000 26.36 5.441
7 2.882 1.349 14.71 0.394 2.777 0.000 25.52 5.567
8 3.232 1.700 16.02 0.000 2.617 0.000 24.38 6.021
9 3.367 1.792 16.54 0.000 2.211 0.000 23.47 6.404
10 3.459 1.725 16.62 0.000 1.872 0.000 22.93 6.634
11 3.455 1.637 16.54 0.000 1.719 0.000 22.74 6.740
12 3.439 1.562 16.44 0.000 1.642 0.000 22.67 6.798
13 3.420 1.510 16.36 0.000 1.613 0.000 22.66 6.825
14 3.404 1.477 16.30 0.000 1.609 0.000 22.67 6.834
15 3.392 1.460 16.26 0.000 1.616 0.0000 22.69 6.833
16 3.386 1.455 16.24 0.000 1.624 0.000 22.70 6.830
17 3.382 1.453 16.23 0.000 1.631 0.000 22.71 6.827
18 3.379 1.453 16.23 0.000 1.637 0.000 22.72 6.824
19 3.378 1.453 16.22 0.000 1.641 0.000 22.73 6.821
20 3.377 1.455 16.22 0.000 1.644 0.000 22.73 6.819
21 3.377 1.456 16.22 0.000 1.646 0.000 22.73 6.818
22 3.377 1.457 16.22 0.000 1.647 0.000 22.734 6.817
23 3.377 1.458 16.22 0.000 1.648 0.000 22.734 6.817
190 35 ~_ _ _ _C_H_A_P_T_E_R_6_._S.;:...P_:A_T_1_A_L_P_RI-,---,-C_E.....;E--",,-,U:;..:::I.:.;cLI=B:;..:::R=I...:.....,UM
30
2c 25
Ql
E
0..
:.c 20
(f)
.....>-
'6 15
o
E
E
o 10
u
0*-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-ffi-ffi~~~~~~--4
o 5 10 15 20 25
Iteration Number
1___ 0('. ') -I- 0('. 2) """*"" 0(2. ') -a- 0(2. 2) 1
70
60
50
(/)
Ql
.g 40
a..
.....
Ql
-:C 30
0
~
20
10
~~ ~ h.~-=
0
0 5 10 15 20 25
Iteration Number
___ Supply Price(') -I- Supply Price(2) """*"" Demand Price(') -a- Demand Price(2)
Figure 6.5: Graphical display of iterates of the Euler method for an
asymmetric spatial price example in price and quantity variables
6.7. NUMERICAL RESULTS 191
eM FORTRAN Implementation
Do while (err.ge .. 001.or.err1..ge .. 001..or.err2.ge .. 001)
1. QO(:,:)=Q(:,:)
SPRO(:)=SPR(:)
DPRO(:)=DPR(:)
2. SPRICE(:,:)=spread (SPRO(:),dim=2,ncopies=n)
DPRICE(:,:)=spread (DPRO(:),dim=l,ncopies=m)
3. temp(:,:)=QO(:,:)+a T *
(DPRICE( :,: )-G2( :,: )*QO( :,: )*QO( :,:)-G( :,:)*QO( :,: )-H( :,:)
-SPRICE(:,:))
4. Q(:,:)=temp(:,:)
5. where(temp(:,:).lt.O.) Q(:,:)=O.
6. stemp(:)=sum (QO(:,:),2)
stemple :,: )=spread( stemp(: ),dim=l,ncopies=m)
stemp2(:,:)= iRe:,:)*SPRO(:,:)
stemp3(: )=sum(stemp2( :,: ),2)+h
7. temple :)=SPRO( :)+aT *(stemp1(: )-stemp3(:))
8. where(templ( :).It.O.)SPRO( :)=0.
9. Compute the demand counterparts
10. err=maxval(abs(Q-QO))
errl=maxval (abs(SPR-SPRO))
err2=maxval(abs(DPR-DPRO))
end do
We solved 4 problems in this set, ofthe same dimensions as in Section
6.7.1.2. We utilized only the CM-5 architecture in view of the results
in Section 6.7.1.2 . The data (d. (6.119), (6.120), and (6.121)) were
generated randomly and uniformly in the ranges: / E [10, 30], ~ E
[10,100], -mjj E [-5, -55], ~ E [50,5000], J3ij E [.0'5, .55], 9ij E [2:60],
11
and h ij E [5,50], for all i = 1, ... , mj j = 1, ... , n. The off-diagonal terms
in the supply and demand price functions were generated to ensure strict
diagonal dominance, and, hence, a unique solution. Each demand and
supply function had five terms. The sequence {aT} that was used was:
1 {I '2'2'3'3'3'
• X
ll 1 I I }
....
The numerical results are reported in Table 6.9.
The first example in this set, PASP100, required 213 iterations for
convergence, the second example, PASP200, required 240 iterations, the
third example, PASP300, 273 iterations, and the fourth, PASP400, 248
192 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
Table 6.9: CM-5 times for asymmetric spatial price problems - Price
formulation
6.7.3 Discussion
As can be seen from the numerical results in Section 6.7, the massively
parallel implementation of the Euler method on both the CM-2 and
the CM-5 clearly outperformed the serial implementation on the IBM
ES/9000. In fact, in all cases, the times on only 8K processors ofthe CM-
2 were lower than those obtained for the serial implementation. When
32K processors were used, then at least an order of magnitude in speedup,
as compared to the ES/9000 times, was realized for problems solved on
both architectures. Finally, when 256 nodes of the CM-5 were utilized,
the computational time was less than half of that required to solve the
6.8. SOURCES AND NOTES 193
Section 6.1
This spatial price equilibrium model and its variational inequality for-
mulation of Section 6.1.1 was first presented in Dafermos and Nagurney
(1985). It has served as the basis for a variety of algorithmic treatments,
some of which also exploit the underlying network structure of the prob-
lem (d. Nagurney (1993)). This model in a limiting sense is attained
by suitable replications of the imperfectly competitive oligopolistic spa-
tial market equilibrium model of Section 5.1, as proven in Dafermos and
Nagurney (1987).
The projected dynamical systems model of Section 6.1.2 was pro-
posed by Nagurney, Takayama, and Zhang (1995). The theoretical re-
sults of this section are taken from that reference.
Section 6.2
Stability and sensitivity analysis of spatial price equilibria in a varia-
tional inequality framework were first addressed by Dafermos and Nagur-
ney (1984). Stability analysis of spatial price equilibria as projected dy-
namical systems was introduced by Nagurney and Zhang (1996), from
which the results in this section are taken.
Sections 6.3 and 6.4
The use of the general iterative scheme, in particular, the Euler-
type method, was first proposed for the computation of solutions to a
dynamical (projected) systems model of spatial markets by Nagurney,
Takayama, and Zhang (1995), from which the results of this section are
extracted. Here, however, we also simplify the proof of convergence of the
Euler method, using our stability analysis results. In addition, we have
included small numerical examples for illustrative purposes, and added
additional computational results using the CM-5 architecture. Addi-
tional background on parallel architectures and CM FORTRAN, along
with additional citations can be found in Nagurney (1995).
Sections 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7
The projected dynamical system model for the price and quantity
formulation of spatial price equilibrium was introduced in Nagurney,
Takayama, and Zhang (1996). The theoretical results therein are simpli-
fied herein, using, again, our stability analysis results. Here we report,
in addition, small numerical examples for illustrative purposes.
6.8. SOURCES AND NOTES 195
References
Dafermos, S., and McKelvey, S.C., "Partitionable variational inequali-
ties with applications to network and economic equilibria," Journal of
Optimization Theory and Applications 73 (1992) 243-268.
Dafermos, S., and Nagurney, A.,"Sensitivity analysis for the general spa-
tial economic equilibrium problem," Operations Research 32 (1984) 1069-
1086.
Dafermos, S., and Nagurney, A., "Isomorphism between spatial price and
traffic network equilibrium problems," LCDS #85-17, Lefschetz Center
for Dynamical Systems, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island,
1985.
Dafermos, S., and Nagurney, A., "Oligopolistic and competitive behavior
of spatially separated markets," Regional Science and Urban Economics
17 (1987) 245-254.
Florian, M., and Los, M., "A new look at static spatial price equilibrium
models," Regional Science and Urban Economics 12 (1982) 579-597.
Friesz, T. 1., Harker, P., and Tobin, R. L., "Alternative algorithms for
the general network spatial price equilibrium problem," Journal of Re-
gional Science 24 (1984) 475-507.
Hartman, P., and Sta.mpacchia, G., "On some nonlinear elliptic differen-
tial functional equations," Acta Mathematica 115 (1966) 271-310.
Hirsch, M. W., and Smale, S., Differential Equations, Dynamical
Systems, and Linear Algebra, Academic Press, New York, 1974.
Kinderlehrer, D., and Stampacchia, G., An Introduction to Varia-
tional Inequalities and Their Applications, Academic Press, New
York, 1980.
Nagurney, A., "Computational comparisons of spatial price equilibrium
methods," Journal of Regional Science 27 (1987) 55-76.
Nagurney, A., Network Economics: A Variational Inequality Ap-
proach, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, Massachusetts, 1993.
Nagurney, A., "Parallel computation," 1995, chapter in Handbook of
Computational Economics, H. Amman, J. Rust, and D. Kendrick,
editors, North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, in press.
Nagurney, A., Takayama, T., and Zhang, D., "Massively parallel com-
putation of spatial price equilibrium problems as dynamical systems,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 18 (1995) 3-37.
196 CHAPTER 6. SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
Nagurney, A., Takayama, T., and Zhang, D., " Projected dynamical sys-
tems modeling and computation of spatial network equilibria," Networks
(1996), in press.
Nagurney, A., and Zhang, D., "On the stability of spatial price equi-
libria modeled as a projected dynamical system," Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 20 (1996), in press.
Samuelson, P. A., "Spatial price equilibrium and linear programming,"
American Economic Review 42 (1952) 283-303.
Smith, T. E., "A solution condition for complementarity problems: with
an application to spatial price equilibrium," Applied Mathematics and
Computation 15 (1984) 61-69.
Takayama, T., and Judge, G. G., Spatial and Temporal Price and
Allocation Models, North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1971.
Chapter 7
197
198 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQ UILIBRIUM
(1993).
The study of dynamic travel route choice models on general trans-
portation networks, where time is explicitly incorporated into the frame-
work, was initiated by Merchant and Nemhauser (1978a, b), who focused
on dynamic system-optimal networks with the characteristic of many ori-
gins and a single destination. The recent book by Ran and Boyce (1994)
gives an overview of both the history of dynamic traffic network models,
as well as distinct approaches for their analysis and computation.
In this chapter we develop a series of projected dynamical systems
models of congested urban transportation systems, focusing on elastic
demand models. As in the preceding application chapters, we utilize
as the springboard for the dynamic model development, the variational
inequality formulations of the governing equilibrium conditions. In par-
ticular, we propose distinct route travel choice adjustment processes that
correspond to projected dynamical systems.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 reviews the traf-
fic network equilibrium model with elastic demands and known ori-
gin/destination pair travel disutility functions introduced by Dafermos
(1982). It then presents the variational inequality formulation of the gov-
erning equilibrium conditions. The projected dynamical system model
is then given.
Section 7.2 develops the stability results for the proposed route travel
choice adjustment process. Presented here are approaches for local sta-
bility at a certain traffic equilibrium and for global stability of the ad-
justment system, which are of interest to both transportation planners
and analysts.
In Section 7.3 discrete time algorithms for the computation of the
solutions to this elastic demand model are proposed that are special
cases of the general iterative scheme of Chapter 4, along with convergence
results. Here we study both the Euler and the Heun methods. Numerical
examples, both small-scale and larger-scale transportation networks, are
then presented in Section 7.4.
In Section 7.5 we consider the elastic demand traffic network equi-
librium problem in the case where the travel demand functions, rather
than their inverses, in the form of travel disutility functions, are given.
Here, we first present the governing variational inequality formulation
and then present the projected dynamical systems model.
Section 7.6 then addresses stability analysis for this model. The
results in this section are subsequently used for convergence analysis in
7.1. THE TRAFFIC MODEL WITH DIS UTILITY FUNCTIONS 199
Section 7.7, wherein discrete time algorithms are described, in the form
of the Euler method and the Heun method. These algorithms are applied
in Section 7.8 for the solution of this model. The numerical examples in
this section are constructed from those in Section 7.4 by retaining the
link user cost functions, but by inverting the travel disutility functions
to obtain the origin/destination travel demand functions.
Let dw denote the traffic demand between O/D pair w, which must
200 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
satisfy
(7.1)
where xp ~ 0, Vp, that is, the sum of the path flows between an OlD
pair w must be equal to the demand dw • We group the travel demands
into a column vector d = {dw,w EO}.
Let fa denote the link load on link a, which, in turn, must satisfy the
following conservation of flow equation
(7.2)
(7.4)
(7.7)
7.1. THE TRAFFIC MODEL WITH DISUTILITY FUNCTIONS 201
(7.8)
(7.12)
if xp >0 (7.14)
if xp = 0,
for all wEn and all p E Pw , or, in vector form,
(7.16)
PRm(X)
+
= ArgminzERmllx
+
- zll· (7.17)
Hereafter, let xo(t) (or simply x) be the solution to the initial value
problem (IVP)
Namely, xo(t) is the path flow pattern at time t when the travel route
choice adjustment process started at time 0 with an initial flow pattern
Xo·
The following definitions mathematically clarify the stability con-
cepts used in this section.
Definition 7.2 (Stability at an Equilibrium)
An equilibrium flow pattern x* is stable if for any f > 0, there exists a
a > 0, such that, for every initial flow pattern Xo in the a-neighborhood1
B( x*, a) of x*, the adjustment process starting from Xo will stay in the
f-neighborhood B(X*,f) ofx*, i.e.,
1 All the neighborhood mentioned in this chapter are, again, of metrical topology
induced by the Euclidean norm. Particularly, we let B( x·, r) = {x : IIx - x·1I < r}
7.2. STABILITY ANALYSIS 205
d = d(x), f = f(x),
d* = d(x*), f* = f(x*).
Also, where appropriate:
and
Z(x,x*) := ((x - x*)T,C(x) - C(x*)). (7.24)
Then, it follows that
aEL
In this section we present the stability analysis for the system (the
route travel choice adjustment process) using the monotonicity approach
of Chapter 3.
Theorem 7.3
Suppose that the link cost functions c are monotone increasing in the
link load pattern f and that the travel disutility functions A are monotone
decreasing in the travel demand d. Then the route choice adjustment
process (7.15) is stable.
Proof:
Let X* be any equilibrium flow pattern and let Xo be any path flow
pattern. Define
D(xo,x*,t) = IIxo(t) - x*1I2j2. (7.25)
Following the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.5, we have
D(t) ::; (( xo(t) - x*?, ~(x(t)) - ~(x*)) - ((xo( t)- x*?, C( xo(t)) - C( x*))
(7.35)
208 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
and the latter implies f = 1* by (7.30), and c(J) = c(J*), which again
suggests that
Let us write
Hence, for every q E Q(x*) and every x E So, it follows from (7.35) and
(7.36) that
where
vex) := -Y(x,x*) + Z(x,x*) > o. (7.42)
Now, since the compact set S has been covered by
U B(x,8(x)),
XeSOuSl
we can select a finite subset of So, say {xi,i E fo} C So, and a finite
subset of S}, say {xi,i E fd c S1, such that
S c U B(Xi,8(Xi)) Uo U UI , (7.43)
ie10uh
7.2. STABILITY ANALYSIS 209
where
Uo := U B(Xi,6(Xi)) (7.44)
ielo
and
U B(Xi,6(Xi)). (7.45)
ielt
Let
(7.47)
ToUTI = (TJo,oo).
Let m(·) denote the Lebsque measure in RI. We claim that
$ D(xo,x*,O) + f D(xo,x*,r)dr
1('10,t)nT1
210 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
and arbitrarily choose and fix some q and w so that q E Q(x*),q E Pw'
We have
1 *
Aw(x(r)) - Cq(x(r)) < --u (7.54)
2 q'
and, hence,
if xq(r) > 0
(7.55)
if x q ( r)= O.
Define
Then
To = Tooq U T01q . (7.57)
Using the above notation, one has from (7.53) that
Let
Too n
qEQ(z*)
Tooq = {t E To: xq(t) = 0, 't/q E Q(x*)}.
and
(1]0,00) = TlUTooU U Tolq .
qEQ(z*)
(7.65)
212 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQ UILIBRIUM
V(x*) = {p E P: x; = O} (7.81)
u +v = m, and U U V = P. (7.82)
(7.83)
and
(7.84)
Let x* be a regular equilibrium flow pattern. Denote the u x u sub-
Jacobian matrix of ~ with respect to the equilibrium active path flows
x;,p E U(x*), by Vu;\(;*). That is,
~
Vu;\(x*) =
(8 [~(
8
x*)] )
Xp
q (7.85)
p,qEU(xo)
Using relationships (7.4) and (7.12) one can then write V'u~(x*) and
V'uC(x*) more explicitly. Suppose that there are J OjD pairs n
{WI,' .. ,wJ} and corresponding to the equilibrium flow x*, one has
J
U(x*) = U Uj(x*), (7.87)
j=I
For any two OjD pairs: Wi,Wj, let Aij denote the partial derivative
8Aw;(d*)j8dj, and let Eij denote the Ui X Uj matrix all of whose entries
are 1. Then one can write
(7.88)
(7.90)
Theorem 7.5
Let x* be a regular equilibrium flow pattern. Then, x* is asymptoti-
cally stable if all the eigenvalues of
7.2.3 An Example
The following example highlights the simplicity of the regularity ap-
proach.
Example 7.1
Consider the transportation network as illustrated in Figure 7.1,
which consists of 4 nodes and 7 links.
Suppose that there are 3 OlD pairs in this network, where:
h
Figure 7.1: A transportation network example
= (0,4,5,0,0,0,0,0,8)T,
1* = (J;,fb,f;,fh,J;,J;,Jtf = (0,4,5,0,0,0,8f
The induced equilibrium link costs are:
= (100,80,90,95,40,70,100),
which determines the equilibrium path costs as
C( x*) = (100,80,90,95,170,150,130,135,100)
Since 1* is known, one can easily identify its local link cost functions
from the piecewise definition and obtain its Jacobian matrix as
15 4 0 0 0 0 2
0 20 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 10 1 0 6 0
V'c(J*) = 0 0 0 2 0 6 0
0 0 0 0 10 5 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 10
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
bou (bo Pl , boP3 , bo p9 ) =
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1.
220 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQ UILIBRIUM
Hence,
VuC(x")
In this example,
Consequently, Ul = U2 = U3 = l.
Consequently, one has
~2-5 )
Finally, one obtains
-025 o
Ju = VuA(x") - VuC(x") = ( -14 o
-2 )
-5 o -15
and
det (Ju - >.I) = (-25 - >.)( -14 - >.)( -15 - >.).
Therefore, the eigenvalues of Ju are:
which are negative real numbers. It thus follows from Theorem 7.5 that
the route travel choice adjustment process is asymptotically stable at the
regular equilibrium flow pattern x".
Remark
Notice that in the above example:
(i). The link costs are piecewisely defined, which is often the case em-
pirically reported for travel costs with congestion, although this example
is created numerically for illustrating the method. However, the piece-
wise definition may present substantial difficulty for verification of the
global monotonicity of these functions. Hence, the regularity approach
becomes the only privileged approach in such cases.
7.3. DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHMS 221
(ii). The link costs are, in fact, not monotone even locally, as can been
seen from the Jacobian matrix VeU·)·
(iii). Nevertheless, the proposed regularity approach for local stability
analysis can easily overcome these obstacles, as shown in the example.
(iv). The problem is reduced to the computation of the eigenvalues of a
sub-Jacobian matrix, Ju, whose size u can be considerably smaller than
that of the original Jacobian matrix. In this example, the number of the
equilibrium-active paths is u = 3, while the entire Jacobian matrix is of
dimension 9 x 9.
(7.94)
In the case that the sequence {aT} in the Euler method (cf. (7.93)) is
fixed, say, {aT} = p, for all iterations T, then the Euler method collapses
to a projection method, as discussed in Chapter 4.
In the context of the traffic network equilibrium problem with known
travel disutility functions, formulated in Section 7.1, the fact that the
feasible set K is the nonnegative orthant (as was the case in the oligopoly
models of Chapter 5 and the spatial price equilibrium models of Chapter
6), the projection operation in the above discrete time algorithms can
be evaluated explicitly and in closed form. Indeed, at each iteration
T of the Euler method, (7.93) takes the form: For each path p in the
transportation network, compute the path flow x;+1 according to:
(7.95)
Each iteration of the Heun method (cf. (7.94)), in turn, consists of
two steps. First, at iteration T compute the approximate path flows:
(7.96)
222 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
Let
x = {x;,p
T E P} (7.98)
and
(7.99)
Then, for each path p in the transportation network compute the
updated path flows x;+l according to:
It is worth noting that both the Euler method and the Heun method
at each iteration yield subproblems in the path flow variables, each of
which can be solved not only in closed form, but also, simultaneously.
Hence, these algorithms in the context of this model can be interpreted
as massively parallel algorithms and can be implemented on massively
parallel architectures, as was done for the spatial price equilibrium prob-
lems of Chapter 6.
In order to establish the convergence of the Euler method and the
Heun method, it is expedient to regularize the link cost structures.
Definition 7.10
The link cost function c is called regular if, for every link a E L,
Then both the Euler method (7.95) and the Heun method (7.96)-(7.100)
produce sequences {x7"} that converge to some traffic network equilibrium
path flow pattern.
Proof:
In view of Theorem 4.1, one only needs to verify that Assumption
4.1 is satisfied for both methods here. Notice that Assumption 4.1.1 is
already met by the sequence {a7"} selected in accordance with (7.102)
and (7.103).
Assumption 4.1.2 is also satisfied in the Euler method, because of
F7" = F and F is assumed to be continuous.
To verify Assumption 4.1.2 for the Heun method, let S be any com-
pact subset of K = R+. Since F( x) is continuous on S, we have
F(x) = F(x) and IIF(x)11 is bounded in S. Therefore, with notice to
the fact that the projection P is a contraction mapping, we obtain, for
xES C K,
Hence,
(7.106)
and
fa = L oapxp ~ xp. (7.113)
pEP
Therefore, it follows from the regularity ofthe link costs (7.101) that
(7.114)
holds uniformly true. On the other hand, the vector of travel disuility
functions, A, is bounded over K because it is continuous and monotone
decreasing. Consequently, in view of (7.114)
It is clear from (7.102) and (7.115) that there exist some large enough
real number M and integer N such that all three assertions below hold
simultaneously true:
M
aT < 2B' "IT ~ N, (7.116)
(7.125)
226 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQ UILIBRIUM
Vw E n,
x = {x;,p E P},
T
and
(iT = {(i~,w En}.
We will consider now three separate cases:
Heun-Case (i). If x~+l ~ ~M, then by (7.125)
N
Xp +1 _ aN+l Rp (x N +1) <
_ M. (7.127)
(7.127) gives
aN+IF:p (x N+l ) -
>px N+l - M > -M
3 - M
2 = -M2' (7.128)
which leads to
(7.129)
Heun-Case (iii). If ~M < x~+l < 2M and x~+l > M, then it follows
from (7.117) that Fp(x N+1) > 0 and Fp(x N+1) > O. Consequently, one
has
X pN +1+ 1 < x p
N +1 < 2M
- (7.130)
from the inductive assumption (7.120).
Thus, we have shown by induction that the sequence generated by
the Heun method satisfies (7.119) and is, hence, bounded.
7.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS 227
a b
(7.132)
where ga, ha > 0, for all links a, and m w , qw > 0, for all origin/destination
pairs w.
Following Proposition 2.3, the traffic network equilibrium problem
in this case can be reformulated as the following optimization problem,
with the use of (7.1) and (7.2):
(7.133)
7.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS 229
Example 7.2
The transportation network example, depicted in Figure 7.2, con-
sisted of 4 nodes, 5 links, and a single OlD pair WI = (1,4). The user
link cost functions were given by:
The link user travel cost functions are taken from Braess (1968).
The paths joining OlD pair WI were:
I: = 4, I; = 2, I; = 2, Id = 4, I: = 2,
and with the travel demand:
method on the space of path flows (see also, e.g., Aashtiani and Mag-
nanti (1981) and Bertsekas and Gafni (1982)). We first set p = .1 and
did not observe convergence of the projection method in 500,000 itera-
tions. We then set p = .01, and the projection method converged to the
equilibrium solution in 283 iterations and .01 CPU seconds.
The numerical example in this subsection, hence, illustrates another
application of the use of an algorithm induced by the general iterative
scheme of Chapter 4 to solve an optimization problem.
whereas the travel disutility functions were, again linear, of the form
given by (7.132).
Example 7.3
The O/D pairs for this problem were:
WI = (1,4), W2 = (1,3).
The user link cost functions were:
Cl(f) = 5.10- 5 It +5h +212 +500, c2(f) = 3.10- 5 Ii +412 +4h +200,
Cn(J) = 7· lO- sIt + 7In + 4h2 + 650, CI2(J) = 8h2 + 2h3 + 700,
CI3(J) = lO- s It3 + 7h3 + 3hs + 600, C14(J) = 8h4 + 3hs + 500,
ClS(J) = 3 .1O- s Its + 9hs + 2/14 + 200, CI6(J) = 8h6 + 5h2 + 300,
C17(J) = 3 . lO- s It7 + 7117 + 2hs + 450, ClS(J) = 5hs + h6 + 300,
CI9(J) = 8h9 + 3/17 + 600, C20(J) = 3 .1O- s Ito + 6120 + 121 + 300,
C21(J) = 4·10- s It1 +4121 + h2+400,C22(J) = 2·1O- sIt2+6h2+ 123+500,
C23(J) = 3·1O- sIt3+9h3+2h4+350, C24(J) = 2·1O- s It4+8h4+ hs+400,
C2S(J) = 3.10-S/ts+9hs+3h6+450,c26(J) = 6.10-sJt6+7h6+8h7+300,
C27(J) = 3·10- s It7+8h7+3hs+500, C2S(J) = 3·1O- s Its + 7hs+3h9+650.
The OlD pairs were: WI = (1,20), W2 = (1,19), W3 = (2,17), W4 =
(4,20), Ws = (6,19), W6 = (2,20), W7 = (2,13), and Ws = (3,14), and the
travel disutility functions:
C29(J) = 3.10- 5 li9+ 3h9+ ho+450, C30(J) = 4.10- 5 lio+ 7ho+2hl +600,
(7.135)
and we group now the travel demand functions into a row vector d and
assume that the vector ,X is a column vector, rather than a row vector.
Note that the expression (7.2) relating the link loads to the path
flows is still valid, as is the nonnegativity assumption on the path flows.
In addition, the link cost and path cost functions are defined according
to (7.3)-(7.6).
In view of (7.135), expression (7.1) may be rewritten as:
(7.136)
and
dw('x*) { = LpEP", xi'
~f ,X; > 0
::; LpEP", xP' If 'xw = O.
(7.138)
(7.139)
or, in vector form:
the demand dw and the sum of the path flows on paths connecting O/D
pair w. If the sum exceeds the demand, the travel disutility (or price)
will decrease; if the demand exceeds the sum, the travel disutility (or
price) will increase. In addition, nonnegativity of the travel disutilities
must be maintained.
This process continues until there is no change in path flows and
travel disutilities.
The Travel Route Choice Adjustment Process
Mathematically, the route choice adjustment process is defined as:
For all wEn and all p E Pw:
. {AW-CP(X), if xp>O
(7.141)
xp = max{O, Aw - Cp( x)}, if xp = 0,
and
(7.142)
. X =
Lettmg _ (x, A),. F(X) T_{C(X)-BTA} (
= -d(A) + Bx ,7.141 ) and ( 7.142)
one has
D(t)
~ I)(dw(.xO(t» - L: x~(t» - (dw(.x*) - L: x*)][.x~(t) - .x:l
w pEPw pEPw
- L: L: [(Cp(XO(t» - .x~(t» - (Cp(X*) - .x:)][X~(t) - x;l
w pEPw
D(XO,X*,t)
(7.154)
Therefore,
So = {(oX*, x) : (7.154) holds}. (7.155)
Let us write
Q(X*) := {all the paths q: x; = 0, oX: - Cq(x*) < 0,
q E Pw , for some wE O} (7.156)
and for each q E Q(X*) denote
Similarly, for each X E SI, there exists a 8(X) > 0, such that
where
veX) := A(.x,.x*) + Z(x,x*) > 0. (7.161)
Now, since the compact set S has been covered by
U B(X,8(X»,
XeSOuSl
we can select a finite subset of So, say {Xi, i E Io} C So, and a finite
subset of SI, say {Xi, i E It} C SI, such that
where
Uo := U B(Xi,8(Xi» (7.163)
ie10
and
U1 := U B(Xi,8(Xi». (7.164)
ieIl
Let
Denote
To := {t ~ 'fJo : XO(t) E Uo}, (7.167)
244 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQ UILIBRIUM
(7.168)
Then To and TI are Borel sets and
ToUTI = (1]0,00).
(7.169)
(7.170)
whose right-hand side will approach -00, as t ----t 00, if m(TI ) = 00.
Therefore, (7.169) is true.
Since IIXO(t)-X*1I2 /2 is monotone decreasing, there is some compact
set B such that
Let
M := max{IAw - Cq(x)1 : X E B, \fq} (7.171)
and arbitrarily choose and fix some q and w so that q E Q(X*), q E Pw .
We have
Xq(t) = xq(O) + fat xq(r)dr
(7.173)
7.6. STABILITY ANALYSIS 245
and, hence,
if xq(r»O
(7.174)
if xq(r)=O.
Define
Let
Too n
qEQ(X*)
Tooq = {t E To: xq(t) = 0, 't/q E Q(X*)}.
To = Too U U T01q
qEQ(X*)
and
(1]0,00) = Tl U Too U U T01q .
qEQ(X*)
(7.181)
246 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
(7.184)
(7.185)
(7.186)
and, consequently,
dw ()') = dw (>'*) (7.190)
Cp(X) = Cp(X*), 'tip. (7.191)
In addition, (7.184) leads to
if x*p > 0
(7.193)
if xp* - 0.
Therefore, we have
0, if xp > 0 (7.195)
(7.196)
° °
gw('x (t),x (t)) > 2
1 gw ('x,x)
-_ > O. (7.197)
(7.199)
° °
gw('x (t),x (t)) < -21 -
gw('x,x) < O,Vt ~ T. (7.200)
248 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQ UILIBRIUM
(7.201)
(7.203)
Making the observation that the feasible set is simply R'++J, which is
the nonnegative orthant, one, again, obtains closed form expressions for
the above projection operations. In the case of the Euler method (7.202)
becomes: For each path p in the transportation network compute the
path flow X;+l according to:
(7.204)
and for each O/D pair w in the transportation network compute the
travel disutility A:+l according to:
(7.206)
and
(7.208)
and the updated travel disutilities for each OlD pair w according to:
dw(A) ~ E x p, if Aw ~ M A , (7.212)
pEP",
lim aT
T-+OO
=0 (7.213)
and
(7.214)
Then, both the Euler method (7.204)-(7.205) and the Heun method (7.206)-
(7.209) produce sequences {XT} = {(XT, AT)} that converge to some equi-
librium flow and disutility pattern.
Proof:
According to Theorem 4.1, it is sufficient to verify that Assumption
4.1 is satisfied for both methods here. Notice that Assumption 4.1.1 is
7.7. DISCRETE TIME ALGORITHMS 251
where
Hence,
where
p <
x'T+l _ x PT + a'T GP (X'T) (7.222)
>.'T+1
w _ >. 'WT + a'T GW (X'T) ,
< (7.223)
and, for the Heun method, (7.206)-(7.209),
Gp(X'T) = 0, if xp ~ Mx , (7.226)
(7.232)
To show that x:+1 ~ 2M, for the Euler method, we distinguish between
two cases:
Euler( x )-Case(i).
If x;'+1 > M, then by (7.226), Gp(XN+I) = o. Therefore, according to
(7.222), one has
(7.234)
Euler(x )-Case(ii).
If x;'+1 ~ M, then, according to (7.228) and (7.233),
where in the last inequality we invoke the assumption that the travel
demand is bounded by Md in (7.210).
By induction, (7.234) - (7.237) show that the sequence {XT} gener-
ated by the Euler method, (7.204) - (7.205), satisfies (7.232) and, hence,
is bounded.
We now prove (7.232) for the Heun method. To this end, one first
realizes that X N+1+1 = (xN+1).N+I) generated by (7.206) - (7.209) in
the Heun method, is, indeed, X N+1 = (x N+1+1,)..N+I+1) in the Euler
method. Hence, combining (7.234) - (7.237) demonstrates that
N+1 <
-p
X ,N+I <
_ 2M ,"w _ 2M ,vp,
\.J
vw.
\.J (7.238)
254 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQ UILIBRIUM
Hence,
3 M
aN+l F.p (XN+l) >
-
xpN+1- M > -M
2 - M = -2 ' (7.241)
<
-
xpN+1_ aNti
2
F.P (XN+l) + !!x.G
2 P
(XN+l)
< 2M _
- lM + aNtlXN+l (7.242)
2M + -4 . 1.
2 w
<
- 2 2
2M < -
2M.
which leads to
3 1
~ 2M + gMd ~ 2M. (7.247)
(7.248)
for the Heun method. Therefore, by induction, (7.232) is valid for every
iteration T.
Namely, Assumption 4.1.4 is verified for both the Euler and the Heun
methods.
According to Theorem 7.10, the route choice adjustment process
(7.141)-(7.142) is asymptotically stable, and, hence, every w-limit point
of the adjustment process is an equilibrium flow and disutility pattern.
Therefore, Assumption 4.1.3 is satisfied.
Finally, Assumption 4.1.5 holds true for both methods, because F(X)
is monotone, as defined by (7.215)-(7.216), according to Proposition 4.2.
•
256 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
7 .8 Numerical Results
In this section we present numerical results for the Euler and Heun meth-
ods applied for the computation of traffic network equilibrium problems
with known travel demand functions. We also provide some numerical
results for a projection method. In Section 7.6.1 we consider the compu-
tation of solutions to small-scale problems, whereas in Section 7.4.2 we
consider the computation of solutions to problems of a larger scale.
The numerical examples in this section can be viewed as the "inverse"
problems of those computed in Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 in that the user
link cost functions are the same as in the preceding examples for the
corresponding problems but now we assume that, instead of being given
the travel disutility functions that were assumed to be linear and of
the form (7.132), we now assume that we are given the travel demand
functions, where
(7.250)
we were given the inverse function, that is, the demand function:
Interestingly, although the user cost functions and the travel disu-
tility function are linear and separable, there is no longer an equivalent
optimization reformulation of the traffic network equilibrium conditions,
in contrast to the example of Section 7.4.1.1.
The {aT} sequence used was: {I,!,!, i, i, i, ... }.
With this se-
quence, the Euler method converged in 167 iterations and .00 CPU sec-
onds to the identical equilibrium path flow and link load pattern as in
Example 7.2, that is,
and
f: = 4, fb = 2, f; = 2, fJ = 4, f: = 2.
The Euler method computed the equilibrium travel disutility:
Note that
dWl(A~l) =6 = LX;.
pEP"'l
We then applied a projection method to this example, by replacing
{aT} in expressions (7.147) and (7.148) with p. This projection method
is, again, a projection method in path flow variables. The projection
method exhibited no convergence in 500,000 iterations for p set to 1
and for p set to .1. When p was reduced to .01, this projection method
converged in 600 iterations and .01 CPU seconds.
258 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
Note that
Here,
L x; = 1.67.
pEPW2
1 1000
dW4 (Aw4 ) = -(jAW4 + -6-'
1 1
dws(Aws) = -10Aws + 500, dW6 (Aw6) = -10Aw6 + 200,
1 1
dW7 (Aw7) = -SAw7 + 200, dws(Aws) = -4Aws + 500.
We applied the Euler method with {aT }=.1{1,!,!,~,~,~, ... }. The
Euler method converged in 27,496 iterations and 19.38 CPU seconds.
The Heun method converged in the same number of iterations with the
same sequence, but required 39.21 CPU seconds. The projection method,
in turn, did not converge with a p set to either .1 or .01 in 50,000 iter-
ations but did converge in 30,004 iterations and 21.38 seconds of CPU
tme when p was set to .001.
Example 7.9 (cf. Example 7.5)
The next larger-scale example that we solved is depicted in Figure
7.4 and with user link cost functions and O/D pairs as given in Example
7.5. to further complete this example we inverted the travel disutility
functions given in Example 7.5 to obtain the following travel demand
functions:
1 1
dW3 (Aw3 ) = -10Aw3 + 200, dW4 (A w4 ) = -SAw4 + 1200,
1 8000 1 7000
dws(Aws) = -""jAws + -7-' dW6 (Aw6) = -gAW6 + -9-'
We applied both the Euler method and the Heun method for the solu-
tion of this problem. With the sequence {aT} set to .1{1,!,!,~,~, .... }
the Euler method converged in 31.76 seconds of CPU time and 34,821
iterations, whereas the Heun method converged in 34,805 iterations and
64.80 seconds.
7.9. SOURCES AND NOTES 261
Section 7.1
The projected dynamical system model (7.14)-(7.15) of this section
262 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
Section 7.6
Sensitivity analysis for the elastic demand model with known de-
mand functions was conducted by Dafermos and Nagurney (1984) using
perturbative analysis of the variational inequality problem.
The results in this section were reported earlier in Zhang and Nagur-
ney (1995b).
Section 7.7
The convergence of the algorithms makes critical use of the stabil-
ity results of Section 7.6. The results herein were reported earlier in
Zhang and Nagurney (1995b). Assumption 7.1 is sufficient to ensure the
existence of the equilibrium flow and disutility pattern.
Section 7.8
The numerical examples are taken from Zhang and Nagurney (1995b).
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264 CHAPTER 7. ELASTIC DEMAND TRAFFIC EQ UILIBRIUM
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the dynamic traffic assignment problems," Transportation Science 12
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7.9. SOURCES AND NOTES 265
Zhang, D., and Nagurney, A., "On the local and global stability of a
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(1995b ).
Chapter 8
267
268 CHAPTER 8. FIXED DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
Let d", denote the traffic demand between OlD pair w, which is as-
sumed to be known and fixed. The demand must satisfy
(8.1)
where xp ~ 0, 'ip, that is, the sum of the path flows between an OlD
pair w must be equal to the demand d",.
As previously, we let fa denote the link load on link a, which, in turn,
must satisfy the following conservation of flow equation
(8.2)
(8.4)
if x*p >0
if x; = 0, (8.7)
Here we have also presented the link load formulation since we will
utilize it in the numerical Section 8.4 when we present some computa-
tional comparisons.
8.1. THE FIXED DEMAND TRAFFIC MODEL 271
x = I1K(X,-C(x)), (8.10)
(8.12)
272 CHAPTER 8. FIXED DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
Proof:
Let x* be any equilibrium path flow pattern according to Definition
8.1, and let xO be an initial path flow pattern.
Define
(8.15)
Then, by Lemma 2.1, we have
Theorem 8.5
Suppose that the link costs c are continuous and strictly monotone
increasing in the link loads f. Then, the route choice adjustment process
(8.10) is asymptotically stable.
Proof:
Since the ,condition of this theorem implies that of Theorem 8.4, the
arguments in the proof of that theorem are all valid here, particularly,
(8.15)-(8.19).
The strict monotonicity of the link costs c now yields
= j*
- Z( xO(t), Xo) { :~: when
when
fO(t)
fO(t) ~ j*,
(8.20)
1
Z(X",X*) > 2'Z(x,x*) > 0, 'VX" E B(x,6(x)),'Vx E 81 . (8.22)
For any € > 0, the same reason implies that there exists a corresponding
open neighborhood Uf of 80, such that
{Uf ,B(Xi,6(Xi»,i E If} can be chosen from Of' where {xi,i E If} is a
finite subset of SI.
Let
(8.24)
and
iEI.
Then it immediately follows that
"Ix" E ~. (8.25)
(8.26)
Denote
Then
For every 0 jD pair w, denote A~ as the minimal path cost of all the
paths joining w, i.e.,
Also, denote
Consequently,
rt = pEQ(x*)
min [Cp(x*) - ;\:1 > O. (8.32)
(8.34)
(8.35)
~lIxO(t)-x*1I2::; -21I1xO(Te)-x*1I2--21vem(Be(t))+ f
2 h.w D(xo,x*,r)dr,
(8.36)
which, with notice to inequality (8.16), is followed by
and
L: X~(tk)</*'
qEQ(x*) 'TJ
(8.41)
(8.42)
It follows from (8.40) that X°(tk) E U1, \/k, and, hence, by (8.23)
Ie
Z(x,x*) = 0,
that is,
((1- f*l, c(1) - cU*)} = O. (8.44)
By the stict monotonicity of c, (8.44) ensures that 1 = f*, and, therefore,
c(l) = c(f*), C(x) = C(x*). (8.45)
On the other hand, (8.41) implies that
L: Xq =0
qEQ(x*)
278 CHAPTER 8. FIXED DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
and, hence,
Xq = 0, Vq E Q(x*). (8.46)
Combining (8.45) and (8.46), we conclude that
(8.47)
(8.48)
In addition to the fact that the projected dynamical system has ensured
x ~ 0, (8.47) and (8.48) show that x is an equilibrium path flow pattern.
Since x* as an equilibrium flow pattern is arbitrarily chosen, (8.15)-
(8.18) must hold true with x* replaced by x, namely, D(xO, x, t) is mono-
tone decreasing in time t. In view of (8.42), it follows that
subject to:
(8.53)
and
(8.54)
where
(8.55)
Note that in the above subproblem (8.52)-(8.55), the network sub-
problem that is actually solved takes place on a network, in view of
constraints (8.53) and (8.54), has disjoint paths, that is, the paths con-
necting each O/D pair have no links in common. This is a remarkable
feature of the Euler method in path flow variables.
For completeness, and easy reproducibility, we here give the exact
equilibration algorithm, which is used to solve the quadratic program-
ming problems at each iteration of the Euler method and of the projec-
tion method in path flow variables in the numerical Section 8.4. The
iteration counter r is suppressed below.
Exact Equilibration Algorithm for OlD pair w
Step 0: Sort:
Sort the fixed cost terms, hp, p E Pw , in nondescending order, and
relabel the hp's accordingly. Assume, henceforth, that they are relabled.
Set hmW+l =00. Set p = 1.
280 CHAPTER 8. FIXED DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
Step 1: Computation
Compute:
(8.56)
Step 2: Evaluation:
If hp < hp+b then stoPj set q = p, and go to Step 3. Otherwise,
).~ ~
let p := p + 1, and go to Step 1.
Step 3: Update:
Set
xp = ).~ - hpj p = 1, ... , q, (8.57)
xp=Oj i=q+1, ... ,mw. (8.58)
This equilibration algorithm is to be contrasted with the general equi-
libration algorithm of Dafermos and Sparrow (1969), which does not as-
sume that the paths connecting an O/D pair have no links in common.
This "general" equilibration algorithm (see, also, e.g., Nagurney (1993»
will be embedded in the projection method in link load variables in Sec-
tion 8.4 to solve the resulting quadratic programming problems at each
iteration.
To conclude this section, the following theorem provides the conver-
gence of the proposed Euler method in the context of the fixed demand
traffic network problem.
Theorem 8.6
Suppose that the link costs c are strictly monotone increasing. Let
{a7"} be a sequence of positive real numbers that satisfies
lim a7"
7"-+00
=0 (8.59»
and 00
Proof:
According to Theorem 4.1, the sequence {X7"} generated by (8.61)
converges to some solution to the variational inequality problem (8.8),
provided that the Assumption 4.1 is satisfied. Consequently, by taking
advantage of Theorem 8.1, it converges to some equilibrium path flow
pattern.
Notice that Assumption 4.1.1 is already met by the chosen sequence
according to (8.59) and (8.60). Assumption 4.1.2 is satisfied because
C(x) is continuous and CT = C. By Theorem 8.5, the route choice
adjustment process is asymptotically stable, and, hence, every w-limit
point of the projected dynamical system (8.10) is an equilibrium path
flow pattern. This verifies Assumption 4.1.3. Assumption 4.1.4 becomes
trivial, with notice to the fact that the feasible set K is compact in the
fixed demand model. Finally, Assumption 4.1.5 holds true according to
Proposition 4.2, since -C( x) is monotone . •
demands for each O/D pair equally distributed among the paths con-
necting each O/D pair. The convergence tolerance f was set to .001 for
all the examples. The convergence criterion utilized was: Ix;+l- I ~ f, x;
for all paths p.
(8.62)
(8.63)
f: = 4, fb = 2, f; = 2, fJ. = 4, f: = 2.
The equilibrium path travel costs were:
The path flow iterates generated by the Euler method are given in
Table 8.l.
The iterates are also displayed graphically in Figure 8.l.
We also implemented the projection method in path flow variables
by fixing the sequence {aT} to p for all iterations. We first set p = 1
and did not observe convergence of the projection method in 500,000
iterations. We then set p = .1, and the projection method converged to
the equilibrium solution in 14 iterations and .00 CPU seconds.
The numerical example in this subsection illustrates yet another ap-
plication of the use of an algorithm induced by the general iterative
scheme of Chapter 4 to solve an optimization problem.
Table 8.1: Iterates generated by the Euler method for the Braess network
Iteration T x'Vl
T x'EL
T x'P3
T
6.-----------------------------------------~
4
(IJ
~
o
c;: 3
L
o
[L
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Iteration Nurnber
WI = (1,4), W2 = (1,3).
The travel demand were assumed now to be fixed and given by:
The sequence {aT} used was: .1{1,!,!,l,l,l, ... }. With this se-
quence the Euler method converged in 17 iterations and .00 CPU seconds
to the solution:
For O/D pair WI:
The iterates of path flows generated by the Euler method are given
in Table 8.2.
These same iterates are displayed graphically in Figure 8.2.
286 CHAPTER 8. FIXED DEMAND TRAFFIC EQ UILIBRIUM
Table 8.2: Iterates generated by the Euler method for a nonlinear, asym-
metric cost network
Iteration T x'T
'PI
x'T
'P2
x'T
'P3
x'T
'P4
x'T
'P5
0 75.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.000
1 0.000 28.987 46.013 0.000 2.000
2 3.319 39.364 32.317 2.000 0.000
3 0.832 35.029 39.138 0.000 2.000
4 1.898 36.920 36.182 2.000 0.000
5 1.345 36.409 37.247 1.191 0.809
6 1.472 36.724 36.804 1.476 0.524
7 1.394 36.683 36.923 1.378 0.622
8 1.379 36.707 36.914 1.375 0.625
9 1.367 36.721 36.911 1.370 0.630
10 1.359 36.732 36.909 1.367 0.633
11 1.354 36.737 36.908 1.365 0.635
12 1.351 36.742 36.907 1.364 0.636
13 1.348 36.745 36.907 1.362 0.638
14 1.346 35.748 36.906 1.362 0.638
15 1.344 36.750 36.906 1.361 0.639
16 1.343 36.751 36.906 1.361 0.639
17 1.343 36.752 36.906 1.360 0.640
8.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS 287
80
I
70
60
(/) 50
~
~
0
G: 40
:£
,i' 30
20
10 f
0
0
:L~
2
---4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Iteration Number
travel costs equal to approximately 615, 045. Three of the four paths
connecting O/D pair Ws were used with travel costs approximately equal
to 387,041. Only one of the nine paths connecting O/D pair W6 was used
with a travel cost of: 757,491.31. Both paths connecting OlD pair W7
were used with travel costs approximately equal to 92,636. Both paths
connecting O/D pair W8 were also used with travel cost on a path equal
to, approximately, 52,977.
Example 8.4 (cr. Example 7.5)
The next larger-scale example, depicted in Figure 7.4, consisted of
25 nodes, 37 links, and 6 O/D pairs and had link user cost functions
identical to those of Example 7.5. The travel demands for the O/D
pairs, however, were fixed, and were given by:
Section 8.3
The convergence of the Euler method for the computation of station-
ary points of the projected dynamical systems model of fixed demand
traffic was reported earlier in Nagurney and Zhang (1995). The con-
vergence analysis depends crucially on the stability analysis results of
the preceding section. The Euler method works in the space of path
flows, rather than link loads, and resolves the problem into very simple
quadratic programming problems with special network structure. Each
of the network subproblems, in turn, can then be solved exactly, and
in closed form, using the exact equilibration algorithm of Dafermos and
Sparrow (1969). Moreover, the Euler method is ideally suited for ex-
ploitation of massively parallel computer architectures.
Section 8.4
The numerical examples presented here were reported earlier in Nagur-
ney and Zhang (1995). The computational comparisons include com-
parisons of the Euler method with the projection method in link load
variables of Dafermos (1980). Additional algorithms for the solution of
variational inequality formulations of traffic network equilibrium prob-
lems can be found in Nagurney (1993).
References
Beckmann, M. J., McGuire, C. B., and Winsten, C. B. Studies in the
Economics of Transportation, Yale University Press, New Haven,
Connecticut, 1956.
Braess, D., "Uber ein paradoxon der verkehrsplanung," Unternehmen-
forschung 12 (1968) 258-268.
Dafermos, S., "Traffic equilibrium and variational inequalities," Trans-
portation Science 14 (1980) 42-54.
Dafermos, S., and Sparrow, F. T., "The traffic assignment problem for
a general network," Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Stan-
dards 73B (1969) 91-118.
Nagurney, A., "Comparative tests of multi modal traffic equilibrium meth-
ods," Transportation Research 18B (1984) 469-485.
Nagurney, A., Network Economics: A Variational Inequality Ap-
proach, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, Massachusetts 1993.
Nagurney, A., and Zhang, D., "Projected dynamical systems in the for-
mulation, stability analysis, and computation of fixed demand traffic
292 CHAPTER 8. FIXED DEMAND TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
293
294 INDEX
statjonary point, 20
step size, 76, 82
stochastic algorithms, 84
strictly monotone attractor, 50
global, 50
system of equations, 13, 22
tatonnement process; see adjust-
ment process
traffic assignment, 197
traffic network equilibrium, 201,
237, 270
travel route choice adjustment pro-
cess, 202, 239, 271
uniqueness theorems, 16,24,31-
32
unstable equilibrium point, 47
utility gradient process, 101-102
variational inequality formulation:
Cournot-Nash equilibria, 97-
98
spatial equilibria:
in quantities, 137, 138
in quantities and prices, 167
elastic demand traffic equi-
libria, 201-202, 238
fixed demand traffic equili-
bria, 270
variational inequality problem, 12
geometric interpretation, 13
relationship with:
complementarity problem,
14
fixed point problem, 14
optimization problem, 14
system of equations, 13
Wardrop's principle, 197, 201