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Analytic Theology As Contextual Theology
Analytic Theology As Contextual Theology
eJournal of Theology 18.3 (December 2011)
Analytic Theology as Contextual Theology
Edward F. Tverdek
Abstract: This essay argues that what some scholars describe as analytic theology can
serve a vital practical role in pastoral settings. In the course of developing this point, it
examines what if anything renders analytic theology a unique discipline, and whether it
carries any of the benefits or baggage of its precursor in analytic philosophy. While it
may seem counterintuitive that a field inheriting a legacy of thought seemingly cut off
from history and culture could penetrate the nuances of different faith contexts, the
argument here suggests an appropriately modest aim: analytic theology, understood
generally as the progeny of analytic philosophy by virtue of a more or less common
commitment to evidentialism, can be a particularly useful approach in those cultures
indebted to Enlightenment rationality.
Key Words: analytic philosophy; analytic theology; contextual theology; metaphysics;
language; reason
GOD AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
ow do you know, queried a joke that circulated among my colleagues in graduate
school, when you’re doing analytic philosophy? Answer: Nobody gives a damn
what you’re saying, but they understand every word of it. Analytic philosophers, the punch
line affirms, tend to harbor a certain complex about the esteem of their methods in the
eyes of others, and it’s a bit of a paradoxical complex to boot. On the one hand, they
recognize and repeatedly boast that Anglo‐American Analytic Philosophy, as it is called,
is the dominant brand of philosophy taught at most major universities in the English‐
speaking world. On the other hand, they marvel at the fact that the actual methods, scope,
and practices of analytic philosophy are roundly derided as narrow and insufficient for
the task of examining broad, meaningful questions and further at the fact that others
become increasingly impatient if one indeed does try to argue carefully and analytically
on behalf of, say, some topical issue in politics or culture . The philosophic tradition from
the ancients to the medievals to the Early Moderns, critics of the analytic schools claim, is
better sustained by what are called the continental schools of philosophy referring to
the European mainland rather than the British )sles : existentialism, phenomenology,
hermeneutics, critical theory and, more recently, postmodernism.
There is some superficial rationale for this claim that analytic philosophy is ill‐
equipped to tackle what we loosely think of as big questions of great meaning : the field
was premised upon the dismissal of such questions, their great meaning thought to be
) am grateful to Stephen Bevans, Marya Schechtman, and two anonymous referees for their helpful,
constructive comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
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entirely illusory. The Vienna Circle’s Logical Positivism of the s – the presumed
incubator of modern analytic philosophy – famously rejected metaphysics, morality, and
God as hopelessly inexpressible in our limited language and impervious to empirical
verification. )t wasn’t until the s that P.F. Strawson would make analytic philosophy
safe for the things that are said to really matter in our lives, and faith is no exception. )n
the last five years, no fewer than three polygraphs have been published documenting and
evaluating the influence of analytic philosophy on the philosophy of religion – an influence
that has culminated, as one of those volume’s title indicates, in a distinct field of Analytic
Theology.3
There is, however, much ambiguity packed into this term influence. What exactly are
we saying when we suggest that analytic theology is the theoretical offspring of analytic
philosophy? Even if we put aside the question of just how philosophy as such relates to
theology as such e.g., is one a parent of the other?; do they share objectives? , there are
myriad characteristics of analytic philosophy we might point to that could be said to
survive in analytic theology, and none of them is an obvious candidate for primacy.
)ndeed, given that analytic philosophy, despite having overcome its anti‐metaphysical
origins, still retains a reputation as hostile to those big questions of great meaning,
analytic theology would seem to have a dilemma in pinning down its provenance in
analytic philosophy: either analytic theology inherits the perceived limited scope of
analytic philosophy by virtue of inheriting its substantive philosophical commitments, or
it merely applies the stylistic and rhetorical techniques and professional standards of
analytic philosophy to questions of theological import – in which case it fails to register as
a unique theology with any particular content, further suggesting that there really is no
analytic theology but rather more or less analytical ways of doing traditional theology,
contextual theology, feminist theology, etc. Could this be why so seemingly few
theologians will admit to doing something like analytic theology?
)t is my aim in this essay to suggest that this dilemma is a false one. Specifically, )
will argue that an evaluation of analytic theology’s merits that begins with an attempt to
capture the substantive or methodological essence of analytic philosophy or to reconcile
its perceived ancestral conflicts with the aims of theology will eventually prove unfruitful.
Rather, ) suggest, a fairly innocuous brand of evidentialism that might agreeably be said to
characterize most of what we think of as analytic philosophy can also agreeably be said
to be a useful trait of analytic theology. )t is this commitment to evidentialism, ) further
suggest, that renders analytic theology of particular pastoral use in those contexts from
which it emerged – our own post‐Enlightenment, post‐industrial, and relentlessly
postmodern west, where Truth is wielded like a truncheon by some and consequently
rejected as inherently oppressive if not entirely illusory by others.
See (ans‐Johann Glock, What is Analytic Philosophy? Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, ,
especially Chapter Two, for a concise survey of the twentieth‐century history of analytic philosophy.
See Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea, eds, Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, st
ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, , Oliver D. Crisp, ed., Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Theology
London: T&T Clark )nternational, , and (arriet A. (arris and Christopher J. )nsole, Faith And
Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion Aldershot, UK:
Ashgate Publishing, . Brian (ebblethwaite’s Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine Malden, MA:
Wiley‐Blackwell, might also be considered an indispensible introduction to the field.
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DISARMING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY FOR THEOLOGIANS
)magine a social organization that is, on paper at least, open to anyone who wishes to join,
but is populated only by men of Czechoslovakian descent between the ages of and .
The organization purports to hold a variety of events, fundraising drives, and the like –
none of which sees the participation of women, young people, or anyone of non‐Czech
heritage. We would no doubt feel justified in referring to it as a club for middle‐aged
Czech men, despite the fact that there is clearly no overt discrimination going on and
nothing we can point to in the organization’s charter that would appear to counsel the
exclusion of applicants for the organization who don’t meet the middle‐aged‐Czech‐man
profile. And members of the organization may well express their own bafflement at the
group’s seeming lack of diversity: We don’t do anything that’s particularly middle‐aged‐
Czech‐guy friendly, and the stuff we do we would have thought would sound interesting to
a much wider swath of people. (ell, we do stuff we think just about anyone would want to
do. Our question for them would be, no doubt, what, specifically, do you do?
Such is the question as we might put it to self‐described analytic theologians. )f
analytic theology is indeed rooted in what few would deny is one of the more prominent
movements in philosophy for the past century, and if even fewer would deny that theology
and philosophy share large portions of their tool kits, why is it that relatively few
theologians seem to want to acknowledge the label or the methods they might think it
implies? Why, for example, has contextual theology, perhaps the branch of the discipline
most open to the findings of the social sciences and other contemporary methods of
understanding the world, apparently found no particular use for analytic methods while
the footprints of continental philosophy are readily evident in its various works? Why is
that, as R.R. Reno puts it, the overwhelming majority of theologians today sift through
(eidegger and his philosophical children and grandchildren to try to find useable
material ? Doesn’t analytic philosophy purport to do what we all say we want to do –
think and write clearly about things important to us? Don’t theologians and their students
– in many cases, budding clerics – want to do these things too? Are pastors and ministers
in Santiago, Chile or Passaic, New Jersey finding themselves cornered by parishioners who
want to sort out whether or not their faith amounts to one of Jean‐Francois Lyotard’s
metanarratives? Why, to put it bluntly, does analytic theology remain largely a club of
particularly philosophically schooled men and, very occasionally, women?
Some of the disdain contemporary theologians may hold for the analytic tradition
must certainly stem from what they believe to be that tradition’s stylistic excesses and
technical pretenses. Reno himself admits that once we concede the
verbal aggressiveness characteristic of analytic philosophers, an intellectual arrogance
that quickly dismisses as fools those uninitiated into the specialized vocabulary, and,
let’s be honest, the natural human impatience with technical arguments that old
empty formalism complaint … it’s easy to see why modern theology would turn
elsewhere.
More likely, though, the resistance to the analytic tradition is thought to be on
substantive grounds: despite the fact that analytic philosophy had early on abandoned its
R. R. Reno, Theology’s continental captivity, First Things, no. April , : ‐ .
)bid., .
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initial contempt for intangibles such as metaphysics, ethics, and God, it retains to this day
the stain of small mindedness, eschewing the big questions of great import for tidy,
technical, and easily managed pieces. Oliver Crisp confesses that analytic theology is [t]oo
often … identified with that mid‐twentieth century phase of [the analytic tradition’s] life
that was largely inhospitable to theology and metaphysics and ethics . Michael Rea
admits in his introductory remarks for the volume he co‐edited with Crisp that the
theologian’s fear is that the adherent to the analytic tradition will miss out on the pursuit
of wisdom simply by ignoring rich and messy topics in favour of ones that admit of neat,
precise, and literal discussion.
Such fears are, for many analytic theologians, unwarranted, and we find many of
those scholars hastening to reassure us that analytic theology need not be weighed down
by any distasteful baggage inherited from that analytic philosophy tradition. A virtual
chorus of recent commentary suggests that analytic theology preserves at most some of
the stylistic and formalistic earmarks of modern analytic philosophy. Rea, for example,
finds in the analytic tradition nothing less innocuous than a particular rhetorical style,
some common ambitions, an evolving technical vocabulary, and a tendency to pursue
projects in dialogue with a certain evolving body of literature. Similarly, (arris and
)nsole, in the counterpart introductory remarks to their volume on the influence of the
analytic tradition in theology, tell us that it amounts to no more than a commitment to
conceptual clarity, rigour and transparency in argument, as well as by a respect for the
discoveries of contemporary science. Lest we think that analytic theology might take the
ball and run with it, exploring territories and making assertions beyond those in which its
analytic philosophical forbearers might indulge, Crisp reassures us that this nascent
theological school is simply about redeploying tools already in the service of philosophy
to a theological end. And for William Abraham, analytic theology is little more than
systematic theology attuned to the deployment of the skills, resources, and virtues of
analytic philosophy. Thus construed, Rea concludes, it is hard to imagine how anyone
could sensibly object.
)n addition to these efforts to render analytic methods stylistically safe for theology,
we find numerous attempts to disarm the substantive implications of analytic philosophy.
)f, as Reno caricatured them, analytic philosophers have earned for themselves the
reputation of the schoolyard bully, forcing a particularly thin metaphysical program on the
quiet continental kids and other unwary students by way of their flashy arguments and
fancy symbolic notation, analytic theologians, we are to believe, will have none of it. Crisp,
for example, notes that analytical methods may involve both procedural and substantive
uses of reason, the former carrying no particular assumptions about the nature of reality.
Analytic theology as such, he suggests, shares only a singular commitment to the
procedural use of reason with its philosophical predecessors; different analytic
Oliver D. Crisp, )ntroduction, in Crisp, .
Michael C. Rea, )ntroduction, in Crisp and Rea Analytic Theology, .
)bid., .
(arriet A. (arris and Christopher J. )nsole, Verdicts on Analytical Philosophy of Religion, in (arris and
)nsole, Faith and Philosophical Analysis, ‐ .
Oliver D. Crisp, On Analytic Theology, in Crisp and Rea, Analytic Theology .
William J. Abraham, Systematic Theology as Analytic Theology, in Crisp and Rea Analytic Theology, .
Rea, )ntroduction, .
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theologians may adhere to different substantive uses of reason and still be considered
analytic, but even this work is consistent with a range of theories of truth. Rea,
moreover, traces this substantive metaphysical pluralism all the way back to its ancestors
in analytic philosophy. (e dissects the claim that the field is steeped in epistemic
foundationalism, noting that such foundationalism can be of different forms. Doxastic
foundationalism, Rea suggests, is merely the assertion that some of the beliefs we have are
properly basic in the sense that we don’t seek justification for them by other beliefs.
Source foundationalism, on the other hand, attempts to offer some substantive grounding
for all beliefs, and the two forms of source foundationalism prominent in philosophy since
the Early Modern period – rationalism and empiricism – aren’t especially hospitable to
religious faith of any sort, much less to theology. Analytic philosophers, and certainly
analytic theologians, Rea contends, are not committed to anything more than the
commonsense doxastic foundationalism.
Nor are they committed to any brand of metaphysical realism or moral or metaphysical
absolutism. )n fact, so far as ) can tell, there is no substantive philosophical thesis that
separates analytic philosophers from their rivals.
To hear some of its practitioners defend it, one might conclude that analytic
theology and philosophy are conducted largely by plebiscite.
WHENCE ANALYTIC?
Rea’s rendering of analytical philosophy points to a larger issue we shouldn’t ignore here.
A key problem underlying each of these attempts to portray analytic theology as
substantively friendlier to the big questions of great import than its ancestral philosophy
is that there is little consensus on just what distinguishes analytic philosophy itself as a
unique, integrated field of inquiry. (ans‐Johann Glock’s volume What is Analytic
Philosophy?, as its title implies, is an attempt to do just that, and Glock admits some
difficulty. (e notes that geographic Anglo‐American, with some Austrian roots and
historical twentieth‐century, perhaps with origins of early British Empiricism criteria
come up short in that they will encompass philosophers that no one would take to be
analytic in their orientation and exclude some that are thought to be unambiguously part
of the tradition. (e concludes that analytic philosophy as a school of thought can be best
described as a collection of family resemblances – overlapping differentia that apply to
some philosophers described by themselves or others as analytic philosophers, with
no particular characteristic common to all such philosophers or their work.
More interesting, however, are the concessions that Glock makes regarding the
methodological, stylistic, and rhetorical commitments that are typically thought to be
endemic to analytic philosophy. Those various elements often attributed to analytic
philosophy’s mode of expression – an emulation of scientific discourse; the breaking down
of large problems into manageable, smaller ones; the modesty of aims; the seemingly
gracious raising of potential objections and counterexamples from a hypothetical
interlocutor; the use of often bizarre, abstract test cases and imaginary examples starring
Crisp, On Analytic Theology, ‐ .
Rea, )ntroduction, . See ‐ for his discussion of doxastic‐ and source foundationalism.
See Glock What is Analytic Philosophy?, Chapter Eight.
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what Eleonore Stump wryly calls the philosophical crash‐dummies Smith and Jones ;
even analytic philosophy’s ostensible preoccupation with conceptual clarity and rigor of
argument – Glock finds to be true of other philosophical schools and often lacking in what
no one would dispute in calling analytic philosophy. Rational argument is, of course,
thought to be the hallmark of philosophy as such, and has distinguished the field since
ancient Athens. Even Martin (eidegger, Logical Positivism’s favored punching bag, could
and did describe his broad, dense philosophical project as somehow constituting
analysis. And even if contemporary continental philosophy is more or less united in its
suspicions regarding the modern scientific enterprise, its commitment to more literary
approaches to philosophy are punctuated with traces of analysis – to the point that
continental postmodernists may be virtually scientific in their deconstruction of the
sciences witness Michel Foucault’s orientation throughout his The Archeology of
Knowledge . At the same time, the excessive technicality indulged in by much of
contemporary analytic philosophy has often rendered it as difficult to scale as the most
challenging edifices of its continental counterparts. As Glock confesses, )f a stylistic
feature separates continental and analytic philosophy at present, it is rather a different
kind of obscurantism.
SITUATING THE ANALYTIC IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
)f my aim in this essay is, in part at least, to identify just what this field of analytic theology
might offer to those who theologize, )’ve arguably moved us in the wrong direction –
outward one level of abstraction – in considering the question of whether its presumed
progenitor, analytic philosophy, is itself a uniquely identifiable school of thought. Before
we can remedy this, ) wish to move us up yet one more level of abstraction and further
away from our very practical stated goal to ask an even more general question: what
exactly are we doing when we try to capture and pin down a particular school of
thought, be it of philosophy or theology or whatever? )n doing so, ) think we will be better
able to see that our chain of inquiry – what if anything does analytic theology inherit from
analytic philosophy?; and, subsequently, just what unique traits does analytic philosophy
have to pass on to its progeny? – is the wrong route to take if we are to determine whether
analytic theology is a unique, viable discipline worth engaging.
Note, however, the peculiarly self‐defeating nature of any attempt to define a
school of philosophy: to do so presupposes that one already accepts the notion of
schools of philosophy and that one is already subscribing to one. Yet how can one then
impartially evaluate the criteria used to distinguish schools of philosophy themselves?
Glock concedes that some philosophers – most notably, Gilbert Ryle – have escaped
this conundrum by denying that there are indeed distinct schools of philosophy or valid
sub‐disciplines of this or that ‐ism ; there is only philosophy and non‐philosophy. Glock’s
solution is somewhat more hospitable to the fact that, in the real world, philosophers
Eleonore Stump, The Problem of Evil: Analytic Philosophy and Narrative, in Crisp and Rea, Analytic
Theology, .
See Glock What is Analytic Philosophy?, Chapter Six.
See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language New York, NY: Vintage,
.
Glock What is Analytic Philosophy?, .
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certainly seem to act as if they are guided by the first principles assumptions of a
particular approach, be it a specifically named school or a loose set of common
foundational beliefs. (e argues more or less for a philosophical exceptionalism: it is, in
fact, a characteristic unique to philosophy that the attempt to define its proper nature,
scope, and methods is itself an example of doing philosophy – a self‐employment not true
of other disciplines. Sub‐distinctions are thus inevitable when various approaches vie for
unique rights to the label philosophy, and each approach may be valid in its own way
and on its own terms. The very nature of philosophy Glock tells us, is itself a
philosophically contested issue, and views about this issue are philosophically
controversial.
Glock is surely on to something here. )ntellectual disciplines other than philosophy
might require a meta‐discipline in order to arbitrate disputes over just what are the
discipline’s proper aims and methods, and that meta‐discipline is not properly thought of
as the domain of the discipline itself. When we, for example, debate whether modern
political science should be caught up in the statistical and mathematical arcana of
economics or more prone to imitate sociology – or whether it should take neither as its
model – we are not necessarily doing political science; rather, we are engaging in some
broader field that speaks to political science’s attributes and its purposes – perhaps the
philosophy of social science. But this example, to the extent that it illustrates Glock’s point,
demonstrates that his pronouncement on the nature of philosophy to be a
philosophically contested issue is largely an arbitrary one; the phrase philosophically
contested merely begs the question. )s it indeed to do philosophy to dispute its proper
aims and methods? From what philosophical perspective do we speak when we suggest
that the analytic and continental traditions both have legitimate claims to the title
philosophy, and that they may thus contest each other in a philosophical forum to see
which survives as the winner? What are the ground rules for that forum, i.e., the rules of
inference and justification, if indeed rules of inference and justification are to be the
nature of the criteria agreed upon? Are there any criteria that are likely to be acceptable to
all participants? )f there are, what are those participants disputing in the first place other
than their stylistic applications and matters of professional taste?
Glock is also undeniably on the right track in observing what so‐called analytical
philosophers actually do rather than stipulating what our measuring stick tells us they
ought to be doing if they are truly to be considered analytic. But even this approach is
largely ahistorical and acontextual, privileging what so‐called analytic philosophers claim
to be doing or what their peers believe them to be doing over the actual circumstances of
their thinking and the historical and cultural context in which they practice philosophy.
What matters is not so much whether analytic philosophers maintain a commitment to
certain epistemic doctrines or to clarity or to rationality but whether and how they
maintain such commitments in light of the alternatives available to them in their place and
historical situation. Certainly, many philosophers outside of analytic philosophy do
analysis at some point in their work or are committed to linguistic or logical clarity, but
analytic philosophers are arguably different to the extent they consciously choose these
methods despite or because of what else counts as philosophy in their milieu. Thus it
may seem reasonable to some to describe Descartes’ philosophy as analytic and thereby
Glock What is Analytic Philosophy?, .
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stretch the definition over centuries. But Descartes’ elaborate philosophy was conceived
largely in response to Scholasticism – a school no less analytical by such a broad
understanding of analytic. Practitioners of twentieth‐century analytic philosophy on
the other hand, sought to restore a rigor and clarity they perceived to have been
abandoned by their recent predecessors and contemporaries.
Many of these practitioners of analytic philosophy might, of course, shun a
conception or their discipline that effectively historicized it, for fear that this would
historicize the content of what it might tell us about the world. Such a fear is warrantless.
To situate analytic philosophy and, as we’ll see by implication, analytic theology
historically – to understand how and why it emerged as an intellectual possibility at the
time and place it did – is not to undermine the truths it might reveal or to deny it any
substantive claims. Marxism, for example, has famously told the story of how and why
historical materialism the formal name for Marx’s method of analysis came to be in a
particular place and time, and the ability to articulate that story – to render Marxism
itself an historically contingent phenomenon – does little to cast doubt upon any truths
that Marxist analysis may tell us about the world which we inhabit now. Analytic
philosophy has no such story about itself. )t doesn’t preclude that story, but it has
habitually ignored the task of writing it.
EVIDENTIALISM AND ANALYTIC THEOLOGY
Could it be that the desire to lasso analytic philosophy and its theological offspring within
a single substantive metaphysical or epistemological rope has historically been thwarted
only because what groups them, if only loosely, is a normative characteristic? ) think this is
a distinct possibility, and )’ll go so far as to propose a particular characteristic – one that
would require a far more exhaustive comparative examination to demonstrate it as
genuinely unique and specific to analytic theology but which, ) think, bears a certain prima
facie plausibility that can be outlined here: analytic theology is fairly unique among
theological methods insofar as analytic theologians adhere, consciously or not, to
evidentialism. )t’s a characteristic arguably true of many if not most of analytic theology’s
philosophical ancestors though, as we’ve seen, it’s possible that no single characteristic
ever defined analytic philosophy as such , and it’s a characteristic that can provide a
unique deliberative and probative potential to what we might call analytic theology.
Few people have put this point as eloquently as the (ungarian Marxist Georg Lukács: )t is therefore no
accident … that historical materialism evolved into a scientific method around the middle of the nineteenth
century. )t is not the result of chance that social truths are found when the soul of an age is revealed in them;
the age in which the reality corresponding to the method becomes incarnate. For, as we have already
explained, historical materialism is simply the self‐knowledge of capitalist society. See Georg Lukács, History
and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, Cambridge, MA: M)T Press, , .
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competing claims. )t is, in other words, a philosophical proposition that we do not have the
right to ignore the deliverances of reason, as analytical philosophers are disposed to call
them; whether or not we act according to what we believe to be true a separate
normative question , we are not entitled to disbelieve something we understand to be true
and justifiable, be it for the sake of superstition, overriding personal interests, or even the
demands of faith.
) think it can be argued that a shared commitment to evidentialism is what unites
analytic theologians and what makes analytic theology a substantively unique approach to
theologizing. The question is, of course: Even if it could be demonstrated that analytic
theologians embrace the normatively compelling qualities of argumentative evidence, how
unique could this be? Wouldn’t all theologians who share any respect for philosophical
methods assent to the evidentialist principle? For that matter, don’t we all pretty much
abide by the tenets of evidentialism in our everyday lives, accepting that evidence matters
and that our beliefs should be supported by it if they are to be considered sound?
Much as we might think evidentialism to be the people’s epistemology – the
boilerplate story of why we believe or reject anything in our sophisticated Western
cultures just look at the evidence – ) think there’s ample reason to concede that this
isn’t, in fact, true in all circumstances, even in those Western cultures weaned on
Enlightenment thought. And one of the most prominent examples of where we might feel
we have a duty to hold beliefs in spite of evidence comes, for better or for worse, in the
form of religious faith. Even when we paint the epistemic contrasts of theology with
coarse textures rather than with a fine grain, those broad, enduring distinctions such as
that between natural and revealed theology or between rationalism and fideism suggest
that there remains a certain moral imperative to reject the evidence of the senses and the
deliverances of reason and embrace faith on strictly personal, idiosyncratic, or
impressionistic grounds – as if Pascal’s god of the philosophers were unworthy of our
devotion.
Evidentialism’s origins, though evident as early as the writings of John Locke, are often traced to the
germinal lecture The Ethics of Belief by W.K. Clifford; see William Kingdon Clifford The Ethics Of Belief
and Other Essays Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, , ‐ . Much of the field since then has been taken
up with the question of doxastic voluntarism – i.e., the question of whether we have sufficient control over
our beliefs to be morally responsible for them, or whether we simply believe what we believe. G.E. Moore
would later seed a fertile discussion of what has come to be known as Moore’s Paradox: the fact that it is
logically coherent to assert the truth of a proposition without actually believing it p but ) don’t believe p .
For interesting analyses of the doxastic voluntarism question, see Jonathan E. Adler, Belief’s Own Ethics
Cambridge, MA: M)T Press, , and Matthias Steup, Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic
Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, , On the corollary
question of culpable ignorance, see Owen Anderson, The Clarity of God’s Existence: The Ethics of Belief After
the Enlightenment Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, .
Readers familiar with the corpus of work we have inherited from Alvin Plantinga might point out here that
Plantinga, widely considered a practitioner of the analytic methods of theology and philosophy of religion,
has spent much of his career arguing that belief in God is itself properly basic and thus without need of
evidence cf., Rea, footnote above . Pivotal as this notion may be to Plantinga’s so–called reformed
epistemology, we should note that, to the extent that he is indeed an example of analytic theology in practice,
Plantinga takes great pains to provide evidence for his belief that we don’t rely on evidence for theism. (is
commitment, moreover, to properly basic beliefs in God need not entail that he has no use for evidence
regarding other theological claims. )ndeed, to read Plantinga – whether one agrees or disagrees with his
conclusions – is to appreciate the beauty of rational argumentation in modern theological discourse.
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This is especially true in Christianity, where we are taught that we have an
obligation to hold certain creedal beliefs about God, the Trinity, the virgin birth, etc., for
purposes of fidelity to the faith and for purposes of our own salvation. )f those duties are
inconsistent with the duty to believe what we find evidence for in our daily lives and our
reasoned theological reflection, the conflict might be troubling. This wouldn’t by itself
defeat other forms of knowledge of God – most notably revelation and personal, mystical
experience. But the fact remains that, in assessing and evaluating that knowledge and
what it means ecclesiastically for the Church as a whole, we must rely on the propositional
knowledge of what is publicly accessible to all. Richard Swinburne, perhaps the
prototypical analytic theologian, sums this up aptly, noting that this is all that natural
theology has ever sought to achieve – not a displacement of revelation, but a meaningful
expression of it in a wider forum where our duties to rational belief can be made explicit:
Not that any of the natural theologians thought that people had to believe as a result of
considering arguments. The existence of God might be accepted on authority or as a
result of religious experience. But, the claim was, the evidence for the existence of God
is publicly available, and so atheists and pagans were not objectively justified in their
disbelief. And natural theology could show that they were not justified.
)f, in short, we have an obligation to direct our minds to assent to those things which
evidence supports and we seem to find this an acceptable duty for most of our beliefs ,
and if we have as Christians the duty to assent to particular creedal principles, it would be
unwarranted for us to set these things at odds since, as seems reasonable, it would be
wrong to knowingly subject others to conflicting moral duties . Analytic theology is thus
merely the attempt, under present circumstances, to reconcile these epistemic duties.
ANALYTIC THEOLOGY IN CONTEXT
) wish to close this discussion by raising and, ) hope, disarming what ) take to be an
obvious and important potential objection to the way )’ve characterized analytic theology
here and to what ) have in effect advocated regarding its use. Doesn’t all of this, we might
respond, pretty much exalt the Eurocentric, Western rationalism that is thought by many
to be the modern vehicle of cultural imperialism? Christianity alone – not to say a host of
other faiths that flourish by way of theological reflection and teaching – inhabits almost
innumerable cultures around the world, and all but the most ultramontane of Catholics
accept that God may speak through those local dialects and idioms. Doesn’t analytic
theology just take the milieu that spawned it – white men in suits in philosophy
departments at prestigious universities – and makes this the universal standard for
theologizing?
The short answer is, well, yes, of course it does. What this means, though, needs
some unpacking.
Steve Bevans has in his work been a major proponent of what is now called
contextual theology. Bevans emphasizes repeatedly that a one‐size‐fits‐all approach to
theology perhaps to any intellectual discipline for that matter ultimately defeats one’s
purposes in taking up theological reflection, insofar as it leads us to a one‐size‐fits‐all,
Richard Swinburne, The Value and Christian Roots of Analytic Philosophy of Religion, in (arris and )nsole,
.
AEJT 18.3 (December 2011) Tverdek / Analytic Theology as Contextual Theology
nondescript God. )n his Models of Contextual Theology, as well as in digested form in his
An Introduction to Theology in Global Perspective, Bevans outlines the specific methods
and tools used in the practice of contextual theology, situating them in what initially
appears to be a diachronic timeline: where the locii theologicus of previous methods were
Scripture and tradition, modern contextual methods consider ordinary human
experience – both past and present – as an invaluable resource for theologizing. Bevans
cautions the reader, however, against thinking of the contextual embrace of human
experience as simply a late addition to the locii theologicus. Rather, he notes, contextual
theologians point to the presence of contextual sensibilities throughout history, noting its
elements in the writings of the Church fathers and its legacy of theological thought. )n lieu
of an old: bad versus new: good portrait of the long line of theological practice up to
the present day, Bevans suggests that the distinction between methods which ignore
human experience and those which harness it has survived throughout Christendom’s
past and present – more of a good/better distinction over time.
)t’s largely this relative blend of the Scripture/tradition nexus with the
culture/experience nexus that delineates, for Bevans, the various models of contextual
theology, and varying degrees of emphasis on one or the other comprise the poles of a sort
of continuum of these models. At one end lies the anthropological model which seeks to
find God in the already‐existing culture and extract God’s message as reflected through
cultural practice. Scripture and tradition play a role in this insofar as they are ideal types
that help to identify when and where God is speaking through a culture. Toward the other
end of the spectrum, however, lies what Bevans describes as the countercultural or
contrast model of contextual theology. (ere what we typically think of as the enduring
truths of Scripture and tradition carry more weight, and the relative influence of culture
and human experience is more subdued than it is in the anthropological model. The truth
of Scripture and tradition may, in other words, run strongly counter to prevailing culture.
Perhaps more important for our purposes in this discussion, the countercultural
model of contextual theology also appears to imply a normative evaluation of local
cultures that models situated toward the anthropological end do not imply. )f the
anthropological model suggests that we take culture at face value and look for evidence of
Scripture and tradition already alive within it, the countercultural model must inevitably
judge the culture at hand to be somehow lacking in the truths provided by Scripture and
tradition, since it seeks to interpret that culture and determine when and where those
truths may be best sown. This would seem to be a ripe opportunity for contextual theology
itself to engage in cultural imperialism, granting the influence of local practice and
personal experience but deeming it an obstacle to be overcome rather than a resource to
be harnessed.
This might be true if all models of contextual theology were intended to be wielded
in all cultures. They’re not, of course, and where and when particular models might be
appropriate rests largely on the theologian’s ability to discriminate among them and select
the most appropriate for the given context. And where might, Bevans suggests,
countercultural forms of contextual theology be most effective? Precisely in those
Stephen B. Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, .
Stephen B. Bevans, An Introduction to Theology in Global Perspective, First Edition. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, , Chapter Eight.
AEJT 18.3 (December 2011) Tverdek / Analytic Theology as Contextual Theology
Western, developed, countries where English or other European languages are spoken and
where analytic philosophy and, later, theology were cultivated. Analytic theology is, or,
at least, could be, our own culture’s theological self‐awareness. Yes, it seeks universal
truths, but it seeks them for those particular cultures that have acquired the hubris to
treat universals as a license for swagger or to deny they exist at all. This is contextual
theology for the regions of the world that have fed off of the Enlightenment. )ndeed, it is
the Enlightenment turned back upon itself. The commitment to reason in our culture has
been credited both with the triumph of intellectual atheism and religious attrition on the
one hand and the retreat to fideistic, fundamentalist religious zealotry on the other.
Analytic theology – itself a product of that same Enlightenment – seeks to remedy both of
these.
This is, arguably, something very close to what Pope John Paul )) had in mind in the
promulgation of Fides et ratio. Philip Egan observes a poignant difference between Dei
Filius, the Catholic Church’s previous statement on the place of rationality in relation to
faith, and its counterpart over a century later in Fides et ratio. Where Dei Filius sought to
combat what the participants in Vatican ) saw as the threat of modern reason to faith, John
Paul )), under very different circumstances, sought to reassure the Church of the place of
philosophical reason in the face of what he understood to be its abandonment to
postmodern relativism. The same rational faculties that seemed menacing to faith in the
nineteenth century were resuscitated and restored to their role as the foundation of faith
at the end of the twentieth century and, more timely, the dawn of Christianity’s third
millennium.
Bishop Allen Vigneron, in his comments on Fides et ratio, sees this as the aim of the
new evangelization called for by John Paul )) – to identify and purify the semina verbi
[seeds of the word] of our culture’s fundamental attitudes, beliefs, and values. And it is,
for Bishop Vigneron, the special role of theologian and philosopher as teacher to form
those who will carry out this task:
[)]t is at this juncture that our work of teaching philosophy becomes so important: the
Church cannot succeed in this audacious project of the new evangelization without
leaders – both clergy and lay. And they will be incapable of that leading unless we give
them, while they are our students, a sound philosophical training, one that particularly
equips them for the part the pope is calling them to play in the new evangelization of
culture.
This can, of course, be attempted without the aid of analytic theology. But given its
heritage, one might wonder if excluding analytic theology would make the task more
difficult than it already is.
See Bevans, An Introduction, .
Pope John Paul )), Fides et Ratio/On the Relationship between Faith and Reason, st ed. Pauline Books &
Media, .
Philip A. Egan, Philosophy and Catholic Theology: A Primer Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, .
Bishop Allen Vigneron, The New Evangelization and the Teaching of Philosophy, in David R. Foster and
Joseph W. Koterski, The Two Wings of Catholic Thought: Essays on Fides et Ratio Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, , .
AEJT 18.3 (December 2011) Tverdek / Analytic Theology as Contextual Theology
CONCLUSION: TO MAKE THE WORLD (A FEW LITTLE CORNERS OF IT, AT LEAST)
THEOLOGICAL
Catholic author, spiritual director, and my dear friend Judy Logue often reminds me that
you can’t teach theology at a funeral. (er meaning, of course, is that the immediate
pastoral needs of people beset by tragedy, loss, or even the joy of nuptial bonds or the
creation of a new life rarely involve the heady sorts of discourse found in the seminary
classroom. The assumption is that we subject the seminarian to scholarly rigor so that he
or she may draw on the experience to better counsel and shepherd the person in the pews.
We have them rehearse Aquinas and Anselm so that doubts of God’s existence among the
faithful can be disarmed; we school them in the abstract dilemmas of moral theology so
that they may address tangible dilemmas in the lives of real believers; we immerse them
in thoughtful theological and spiritual writers so that the flocks don’t have to trouble
themselves.
But this model presupposes a separation of the ordained and the professed religious
from the rest of us. )t constructs class of individuals steeped in the complexities of faith
who can digest it for common folks.
)f there are practical consequences to what )’ve argued here, they would involve a
model quite different from this – one that ) believe would be more egalitarian and
consistent with the aims of Vatican )). Whether we like it or not, we have, in Western
post‐industrial societies, inherited the legacy of the Enlightenment. That legacy is at its
worst as Foucault would remind us a potential dystopia of regimen and self‐repression,
and at its best as its proponents in the Early Modern period would tell us a liberation
from the fetters of ignorance and despotism. But it is a legacy we live with however we
may wish to characterize it. And it is a legacy that asks us, whatever else it may do, to think
and feel for ourselves, to use our own sense of reason in peaceful communion with others,
to discern our place in the universe and, perhaps with the aid of divine providence, our
role in the design of a Creator. This is what we in the West have grown up with, and this
can be fertile ground for an approach to theology that cultivates reason and discernment
in all believers – perhaps even the sort of reason and discernment that might have at one
time been considered too sophisticated for the hoi polloi.
The philosopher and Vienna Circle co‐founder Moritz Schlick once pined for the day
when there would be no more books written about philosophy, but when every book
would be written philosophically. Many aims and tenets of the Vienna Circle and Logical
Positivism in general have since been rightly discredited, but Schlick’s sentiment remains,
) think, quite noble in a culture where scholarly excess and obscurantism maintain a class
of in‐the‐know academics lording over students hungry for acceptance in the same
societies: the aim of philosophy is ultimately to annihilate itself as a discipline – to make
the world philosophical such that the expert is no longer required. Theological fields
prone to similar indulgences in obscurantism and the intellectual hierarchy it breeds
might distil something, if only this one residue, from the cauldrons of analytic philosophy.
We now have Charles Taylor to thank for pointing out in painstaking detail that these polar interpretations
set up a false dichotomy that misunderstands the history of theistic faith, if not human ideals in general. See
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, .
AEJT 18.3 (December 2011) Tverdek / Analytic Theology as Contextual Theology
Author: Edward Tverdek is a Franciscan postulant in the Order of Friars Minor OFM ,
Sacred (eart Province of the U.S. (is writings cover areas from Marxist theory and
political economy to environmentalism, terrorist profiling, and the privacy and other
moral implications of data technology, and have appeared in publications such as Science
and Society and Public Affairs Quarterly. (e has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University
of )llinois, Chicago.
Email: tverdek@gmail.com
© Edward Tverdek