This Brexit disaster has been brewing in the Conservative party for 30 years

by John Harris, The Guardian, Sun 13 December 2020

Margaret Thatcher helped turn the Tory right into a force for instability – and now we are all living with the
consequences

What a strange, head-spinning moment this is. The news is awash with reports
of queues at the ports, the stockpiling of food and medicines and a government
committee charged with “exit operations”, but the plain political fact that sits
under everything is in a surreal league of its own. Amid an unprecedented
pandemic that blurs into an equally unprecedented economic and social crisis,
Britain has a government more than prepared to take the deranged option of
inflicting even more disaster on its own country. Everything remains uncertain;
both sides say the chances of a trade deal remain slim.
As a reminder of the stupidity and arrogance that got us into this mess, the
Conservatives and their cheerleaders in the press are inevitably blaming the
supposedly vengeful Europeans. Of late, some people have even been heard
alleging that some of the responsibility lies with Remainers who refused to back a
softer Brexit in parliament. The truth, of course, is that leaving the EU in this
chaotic way is the work of the pro-Brexit right: not the result of other people’s
failings, but its own conscious designs.
The future this country is limping into has its roots in whole centuries of myth,
emotion and the kind of national delusions on vivid display in last week’s
headlines about scaring French fishermen with the aid of gunboats. But, clearly,
to understand the history of Brexit demands close study of the Conservative party,
and its 40-year transformation from a cautious, risk-averse institution to the
unstable political force it has become. This is the key political story of the last
half-century, and some of its most important chapters centre on one person in
particular, and arguably at the heart of national events even 30 years after she left
office: Margaret Thatcher.
In 1988, she gave the legendary speech in Bruges that effectively launched modern
Tory Euroscepticism by warning of the concentration of power “at the centre of a
European conglomerate”. Its pithiest statement still stands as most Conservative
Brexiteers’ basic credo: “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the
state in Britain only to see them reimposed at European level, with a European
super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.”
Two years later, after her party had replaced her with John Major, she claimed
“We are not a ‘conservative’ party, we are a party of innovation, of imagination,
of liberty, of striking out in new directions, of renewed national pride and a novel
sense of leadership … That’s not ‘conservative’. The name is all wrong.” If you
want to grasp the mindset that has led Britain to this point, this is where you have
to start.
Thatcher’s 10-year upturning of Britain was predicated on the return of a
prosperity that, for some people, actually materialised. But her Brexit-supporting
successors have so embraced the politics of restless radicalism that they have
moved their party squarely into the realm of abstract ideas and distant utopias.
The most honest statement of why Tories so fervently believe in leaving the EU,
whatever the cost, was Jacob Rees-Mogg’s claim in 2018 that “the overwhelming
opportunity for Brexit is over the next 50 years”. This is the kind of fanatical
belief rarely heard in the democratic mainstream: we are all now living with the
terrifying consequences of it.
In his latest work “Conservatism: The Fight for a Tradition”, the former Economist
journalist Edmund Fawcett analyses the latter-day arrival of what he calls the
“hard right”, and highlights its footing in two starkly different ideological strands
that some Tory Brexiteers apparently manage to believe in simultaneously.
“Economic liberalism and nationalism point, intellectually, in opposite
directions,” he writes. “The first is open-bordered and global; the second,
sheltering, exclusive and shut-in. Both, however, when supercharged as “hyper”
and “ultra”, serve to abandon right-wing centrism.” Each strand wants to “leave
the liberal centre, but by different exits”. They share, he writes, “a destructive
common purpose strong enough to conceal their differences, but with no promise
of a stable alternative”.
This is where Britain now is. Brexit has turned out to be like most revolutions: it
has destroyed things but offered very little to put in their place. How will we
possibly manage both exiting Europe and the long tail of the coronavirus? What
about the growing budget deficit – once the justification for 10 years of austerity –
and the prospect of even more diminished tax revenues? What will become of
“levelling up”? Inevitably, no one knows: when confronted with the complexities
of reality, revolutionaries usually don’t.
The central question of politics in the coming months and years will be how much
people are prepared to put up with in the cause of a specious idea of
“sovereignty”. The Covid crisis has once again proved that Britain does not have
an economy that can absorb shocks and crises of confidence. There will be no
furlough for those who suffer the consequences of withdrawn investment or the
relocation of multinationals.
One of the most wretched cliches of post-referendum commentary is the idea that
many of the places that voted for Brexit had nothing to lose: something disproved
by, say, aviation and aerospace in south Wales, the automotive industry of the
north-east of England, or any number of small- and medium-sized businesses that
tick over in so-called “left behind” places, barely noticed by outsiders.
The 17% of Britons currently reckoned to support a no-deal exit may generate a
lot of noise, but there are still such things as direct material interests, and no
politician is going to endear themselves by insisting that accepting job losses and
pay cuts is the highest form of patriotism.
In the vaguest kind of way, Johnson – a rebel leader who only attached himself to
the revolution as a matter of expediency – may just about understand this. But he
knows he has to satisfy his party, which constantly looks for new wars to wage
and fresh things to smash (and new leaders to topple). What it will end up
creating in the wake of this moment will be like the Britain Thatcher bequeathed
us, only more so: shabby, fearful and run by people who keep telling us that if we
only work harder and dream bigger, something world-beating will sooner or later
materialise.
The right of British politics once presented itself as the antidote to such reckless
schemes: now, it is the driver of them. Here, perhaps, lies the key to what might
eventually follow the Brexit era, and a possible counter-revolution. Amid all the
wreckage, any up-and-coming Tory with their eye on the future might want to
start quietly plotting the revival of the conservatism their party has so
comprehensively left behind.
Brexit is the worst decision of modern times. Why are its critics in cabinet so
silent? Michael Heseltine, The Guardian, Sun 13 Oct 2020
The UK will soon be on its own – sovereign, in charge and control regained. Yet none of that creates jobs
or ensures a glorious future.

What I do know is that both sides will be presenting the story that best serves their
negotiating positions and pleases their most important audiences. Facts are in
short supply; there is a plethora of spin.
“Taking back control” will summon up the blood of British patriotism. The union
jack prominently displayed before the negotiating table reinforces the demand for
sovereignty, while a few asides about cheating foreigners reinforce national
prejudices. The leadership necessary to listen to the other side, and understand
where compromises may lead, all too soon becomes a cult of nationalism led by
the most extreme of partisan groupings.
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“I will have my cake and eat it” is rather a good joke on this side of the Channel.
It has a quite different implication for the rest of Europe where sovereignty
matters as well – theirs, not ours.
I don’t know exactly where all this posturing will end up by January; but I do
know that – deal or no deal – we will in theory and in practice be outside the
European Union. That is the policy on which the government was elected; they
have a mandate and I would not vote against their legislation. I believe that it will
be seen as a Tory measure and I will have nothing to do with it. This government
will be – and should be – held responsible for quite simply the worst peacetime
decision of modern times. I know of members of the cabinet who believe this as
firmly as I do. I cannot understand their silence.
So we are where we are. Christmas is upon us and before the country goes back to
work we are on our own. Sovereign, in charge, control regained. None of that
creates a single job, one pound’s worth of investment or any rise in living
standards. We will have risked our trading relationship with the world’s largest
market on our doorstep, which accounts for nearly half our imports and exports.
Yet we are constantly told of a glorious tomorrow. All that is missing is a shred of
evidence or a single fact.
We are constantly told of a glorious tomorrow. All that is missing is a shred of
evidence
The illusion that Donald Trump would do some favourable deal evaporated with
Donald Trump. We have rolled over 20 existing European deals on the same
terms in the future as we have now. No gain there. What happens when, say,
Country A renegotiates its deal with the EU? Silence. Are we to believe that we
will be able to continue to export to Country A products that will then be of a
lower standard than they will have agreed with the EU? How long would
arguments about British sovereignty or control hold out against the united refusal
of Country A and the EU to let us continue trading on the terms previously
agreed?
A no-deal Brexit would relegate us to World Trade Organization terms. (Forgive
me if I don’t follow the attempt to confuse my affection and admiration for
Australia to adopt the latest propaganda technique of renaming WTO as
Australian.) These mean that any tariffs offered to one country must be offered to
all. Sovereignty over the rules will simply transfer from Brussels to the WTO head
office in Geneva.
A little more light has now been shed on a future support system for agriculture
after Brexit. The old system has always been controversial here. After the war,
French governments were anxious to avoid the flood of people from large parts of
rural France into urban areas. Anyone familiar with southern France can
understand the challenges of maintaining viable economic lifestyles. A deal was
struck with Germany to underpin the countryside with subsidies, in exchange for
access for manufactured goods. It was not a good system and has now been
significantly reformed, but we accepted it in 1973 as a condition of EEC
membership. Its main characteristic was a per-acre subsidy which is now to be
replaced by a more grant-based system. Grant-based systems need forms,
inspection and contributions to cost. Large farms such as my family company will
adjust, although almost certainly prices will rise. However, tenant farmers will be
particularly hard hit, especially those without capital to invest in land they don’t
own, and in areas of marginal viability.
The fishing controversy is a particularly emotive one on both sides of the
Channel. Memories of the cod wars reinforce the consequences of effective
control, particularly when the Royal Navy has only a fraction of the number of
ships deployed at that time. But how little do we hear of the licences issued to
British fishing fleet-owners, when we joined the common fisheries policy, who
promptly sold their licences to the Europeans who could then fish in our waters.
A large proportion of fish caught by British trawlers is landed directly in France
and sold on within the EU. Is it not a racing certainty that, with no deal, the
French fishermen will block their ports to entry by British trawlers to stop this
happening? The Royal Navy has been put on standby to board French trawlers.
The European community was born to prevent such incidents precipitating the
continent into yet greater violence
Of course Britain must use every endeavour to take advantage of the relative high
growth rates of the Asian markets. Success will depend on having something
someone wants to buy at prices someone will pay.
There are virtually no British-owned volume car companies. An exception is
Ineos, whose owner, Sir Jim Radcliffe, last week overcame his enthusiasm for
Brexit by deciding to locate production of his Grenadier 4x4 in France. The
Americans are located here historically, while the Japanese came to secure a
foothold in the European market. If they have significant ambitions to sell in Asia
they will manufacture in Asia, taking advantage of lower labour and transit costs,
and proximity of supply lines.
This will apply to much of manufacturing. We have great strengths in the service
industries but there are few exceptions to the rule that to gain access to a market
you need local managers and employees. To really succeed in these markets you
need to be there, not thousands of miles away with different languages and
culture.
My most serious criticism of the government is that it has done so little to
understand the real nature of the challenges we face or to prepare our country to
meet them. No one can blame the government for the Covid crisis, which, in any
case, may be at last seriously diminished by the vaccine. But Covid has acted as a
curtain behind which, unseen, Brexit has crept closer.
The government has greeted this crisis in the traditional Whitehall-knows-best
way, underpinned by vast quantities of borrowing money. What is missing is any
attempt to recognise the disparate nature of our local city economies. They are all
different, with different strengths and weaknesses, requirements and, above all,
effective local leadership.
Yet the elected mayors in these vital parts of our economy have had no call to
arms. Ministers borrow the money and define how it should be spent along lines
that reflect the structure of Whitehall. No other similar economy so centralises its
decision-making. We need to enthuse communities and build on the partnerships
between public and private sectors that exist there.
My hope is that, by the time you read this, common sense will have prevailed and
both sides will have drawn back from the abyss. But if the prime minister has been
forced to remain inflexible by hardliners at his shoulder, then he will have failed
his test of leadership. We will pay the price.