Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Childhood looms large in our understanding of human life, as a phase through which all adults
have passed. Childhood is foundational to the development of selfhood, the formation of inter-
ests, values and skills and to the lifespan as a whole. Understanding what it is like to be a child,
and what differences childhood makes, is thus essential for any broader understanding of the
human condition. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is an out-
standing reference source for the key topics, problems and debates in this crucial and exciting
field, and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of inter-
national contributors, the Handbook is divided into five parts:
• Being a child
• Childhood and moral status
• Parents and children
• Children in society
• Children and the state.
Questions covered include: What is a child? Is childhood a uniquely valuable state and, if so,
why? Can we generalize about the goods of childhood? What rights do children have, and are
they different from adults’ rights? What (if anything) gives people a right to parent? What role, if
any, ought biology to play in determining who has the right to parent a particular child? What
kind of rights can parents legitimately exercise over their children? What roles do relationships
with siblings and friends play in the shaping of childhoods? How should we think about sexu-
ality and disability in childhood, and about racialized children? How should society manage the
education of children? How are children’s lives affected by being taken into social care?
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is essential reading for students
and researchers in philosophy of childhood, political philosophy and ethics, as well as those in
related disciplines such as education, psychology, sociology, social policy, law, social work, youth
work, neuroscience and anthropology.
Anca Gheaus is a Ramon y Cajal researcher at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain.
Gideon Calder is Senior Lecturer in Social Sciences and Social Policy at Swansea University, UK.
Jurgen De Wispelaere is Political Economy Research Fellow with the Independent Social
Research Foundation (ISRF) and a Policy Fellow at the Institute for Policy Research, Univer-
sity of Bath, UK.
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOKS IN PHILOSOPHY
Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy are state-of-the-art surveys of emerging, newly refreshed, and
important fields in philosophy, providing accessible yet thorough assessments of key problems,
themes, thinkers, and recent developments in research.
All chapters for each volume are specially commissioned, and written by leading scholars in
the field. Carefully edited and organized, Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy provide indispensa-
ble reference tools for students and researchers seeking a comprehensive overview of new and
exciting topics in philosophy. They are also valuable teaching resources as accompaniments to
textbooks, anthologies, and research-orientated publications.
Also available:
Typeset in Bembo
by Sunrise Setting Ltd, Brixham, UK
As editors, we dedicate this handbook to
List of contributors xi
Introduction 1
Anca Gheaus
PART I
Being a child 11
PART II
Childhood and moral status 65
PART III
Parents and children 145
viii
Contents
PART IV
Children in society 247
PART V
Children and the state 315
31 Schooling 351
Gina Schouten
ix
Contents
Index416
x
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
David Archard is Professor of Philosophy at Queen’s University, Belfast, UK, having previously
taught at the Universities of Ulster, St Andrews and Lancaster. He has published extensively in
applied ethics, political philosophy and philosophy of law.
Albert Atkin is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and member of the Centre for Agency,Values
and Ethics (CAVE) at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. He is interested in race and
racism, pragmatism, language and epistemology. He is the author of numerous articles and two
books: The Philosophy of Race (Routledge, 2012) and Peirce (Routledge, 2015).
Ludvig Beckman is Professor of Political Science, Stockholm University, Sweden and research
director at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm. His current research projects concern
the boundary problem in democratic theory and the nature of popular sovereignty as expressed
in national constitutions.
Andrew Botterell is Associate Professor of Law and Philosophy at Western University, Canada.
His primary teaching and research interests are in philosophy of law, metaphysics and the ethics
of parenthood and procreation.
Samantha Brennan is Dean of the College of Arts, University of Guelph. Her main research
interests lie in the area of contemporary normative ethics, applied ethics and feminist philosophy.
She is President of the Canadian Philosophical Association and a co-editor of Feminist Philosophy
Quarterly.
xi
List of contributors
Gideon Calder is Senior Lecturer in Social Sciences and Social Policy at Swansea University,
UK. He is author or editor of ten books, most recently How Inequality Runs in Families (Policy
Press, 2016), and co-edits the Routledge journal Ethics and Social Welfare.
Havi Carel is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol, UK. She is currently a Well-
come Trust Senior Investigator (www.lifeofbreath.org). She is the author of Phenomenology of
Illness (2016), Illness (2013) and Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger (2006).
Suparna Choudhury is Assistant Professor at the Division of Social and Transcultural Psychi-
atry, McGill University, Canada. She studies the developing brain at the intersection of anthro-
pology and cognitive neuroscience. She is co-editor of Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the
Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience.
Matthew Clayton is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Warwick, UK. He is the
author of Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing (Oxford University Press, 2006) and has co-edited
The Ideal of Equality (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) and Social Justice (Blackwell, 2004).
Fabrice Clément is Full Professor at the Cognitive Science Centre of the University of Neu-
châtel, Switzerland. His research at the intersection of developmental psychology, anthropology
and philosophy of mind has been published in journals including Psychological Science, Child
Development and Mind and Language.
Philip Cook is Lecturer in Political Theory in the School of Social and Political Science, Uni-
versity of Edinburgh, UK. He is also joint Editor-in-Chief of the journal Res Publica.
Daniela Cutas is Associate Professor of Practical Philosophy at Umeå University and the Uni-
versity of Gothenburg. She is a co-editor of the volumes ‘Families – Beyond the Nuclear Ideal’
(2012), and ‘Parental Responsibility in the Context of Neuroscience and Genetics’ (2017).
Jennifer Epp teaches Philosophy and Women’s Studies at Western University and Huron Uni-
versity College in London, Ontario, Canada. She received her PhD from Western University.
Her dissertation was called, “Testimony as Significance Negotiation”.
Cécile Fabre is Senior Research Fellow in Politics at All Souls College, University of Oxford,
UK. She has written extensively on distributive justice, the rights we have over our own bodies
and just war theory. Her most recent research monographs, Cosmopolitan War and Cosmopolitan
Peace, came out with Oxford University Press in 2012 and 2016 respectively. She is currently
finishing a book on the ethics of economic statecraft.
xii
List of contributors
Gene Feder is a General Practitioner in Bristol and Professor of Primary Care at the Univer-
sity of Bristol. He leads research programmes on the health care response to domestic violence
and on the management of chronic cardiac and respiratory conditions.
Jonathan Fineberg is Director of the PhD at University of the Arts in Philadelphia, USA, and
author of more than 30 books and catalogues, including When We Were Young: New Perspectives on
the Art of the Child and Art Since 1940.
Anca Gheaus is a Ramon y Cajal researcher at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain. She has
published numerous articles on childrearing and gender justice and has recently edited a special
issue of the Journal of Applied Philosophy on the nature and value of childhood.
Kalle Grill is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Umeå University, Sweden. His research
mainly concerns paternalism and related issues, such as nudging, respect for preferences and
various issues in public health policy. He also works on population ethics.
Gita Gyorffy works as a Consultant General Paediatrician at Gloucester Royal Hospital, UK,
and is a mother of two.
Diane Jeske is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa, USA. She is the author of
Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Generates Reasons (Routledge, 2008) and has pub-
lished widely on the nature of special obligations to friends and family.
Melissa Koenig is Professor of Child Psychology at the Institute of Child Development, Uni-
versity of Minnesota, USA. Her research is at the intersection of cognitive development, social
epistemology and cultural learning. She has published in journals including Psychological Science,
Cognition and Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
Will Kymlicka is the Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy at Queen’s University in
Kingston, Canada. His books include Contemporary Political Philosophy, Multicultural Citizenship
and (with Sue Donaldson) Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights.
Lars Lindblom is Associate Professor at Umeå University, Sweden. He works on issues at the
intersection between social science and philosophy, and has published on whistleblowing, risk,
education, the market, work and equality.
xiii
List of contributors
Mianna Lotz is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Macquarie University, where she teaches
in Ethics and Applied Ethics. Her research focuses on vulnerability; reproductive technologies
(including uterus transplantation); the family; parents’ rights, interests and liberties; children’s
welfare; and adoption.
Carolyn McLeod is Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies and Feminist Research at
Western University, Canada. Her philosophical interests lie in the areas of applied ethics and
feminist philosophy. She has a long-standing interest in the ethics of procreation and parenthood.
Colin M. Macleod is Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Victoria, Canada.
His most recent book, co-authored with Ben Justice, is Have A Little Faith: Religion, Democracy
and the American Public School (University of Chicago Press, 2016).
Jana Mohr Lone is Director of the Center for Philosophy for Children at the University of
Washington, USA, author of The Philosophical Child (2012), co-author of Philosophy in Education:
Questioning and Dialogue in Schools (2016) and co-editor of Philosophy and Education: Introducing
Philosophy to Young People (2012).
Amy Mullin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, Canada. She is especially
interested in questions about children’s capacities and responsibilities.
Robert Noggle is Professor of Philosophy at Central Michigan University, USA. His research
interests include moral issues relating to children, personal autonomy, the limits of moral obliga-
tion, philosophical psychopathology and the ethics of manipulation and influence.
Serena Olsaretti is an ICREA Research Professor at the Department of Law, Universitat Pom-
peu Fabra, Spain. She has published work on liberty, desert, well-being, equality, responsibility
and is recently focusing on questions concerning justice and the family.
Gina Schouten is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, USA. Her research
interests include gender justice, educational justice and political legitimacy, including especially
questions about whether political liberalism can constitute an adequate theory of legitimacy.
Jonathan Seglow is Reader (Associate Professor) in Political Theory at Royal Holloway, Uni-
versity of London, UK. He is the author of Defending Associative Duties (Routledge, 2014) and
is currently working on issues of free speech, religious accommodation and the relationship
between self-respect and social justice.
xiv
List of contributors
Julie Tannenbaum, Associate Professor at Pomona College, USA, received her doctorate in
philosophy from the University of California, Los Angeles and did postdoctoral work at the
Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health. She publishes in bioethics, ethical
theory and metaethics.
Daniel Weinstock holds the James McGill Chair in the Faculty of Law at McGill University.
He has published extensively in moral, legal and political philosophy, particularly on issues to do
with the management of ethno-cultural and religious diversity in liberal democracies, and on
the issues that arise within such societies in the relations between parents and children.
xv
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4S
5N
6L
INTRODUCTION
Anca Gheaus
A burgeoning field
Children and childhood have, until recently, been largely neglected as philosophical topics. In
a way, this is puzzling: we all start life as children and childhood spreads over a very significant
proportion of the typical human life. It is during childhood that we change most, and acquire
the physical and mental characteristics that individuate us. Moreover, many people tend to think
that having a good childhood is very important for leading a successful life.
The scarcity of philosophical reflection on children and childhood can perhaps be explained
through the belief that childhood is a state of being inferior to adulthood (Brennan 2014).
Philosophers have always worked with a model of the human being that is adult and, at times,
have explicitly defended this choice (Slote 1983). Their remarks about children have most often
assumed that the latter are merely in-progress, unfinished, versions of the former. Further, phi-
losophers have traditionally assumed that children’s moral status is clearly inferior to that of
adults: it is not only that children’s lack of full autonomy disqualifies them from the same level
of moral responsibility that we attribute to adults, and, therefore, denies them the same level
of authority concerning their choices. These are fairly uncontroversial beliefs, especially with
respect to infants and young children. But children have also been seen as individuals whose
moral status cannot prevent adults – usually parents – from using them in order to further their
own interests. Legal regimes have often sanctioned this view, with the most extreme illustrations
being parents’ right to expose or sell their children. Such legal rights are, thankfully, old history,
but many social and legal arrangements, including parental powers, continue to allow us to use
children as means to promoting adults’ projects and goals. Thus, some philosophers claim that
the legacy of the children-as-property view is still with us (Brennan and Noggle 1997; Archard
and Macleod 2002; Brighouse and Swift 2014). This traditional representation of children and
childhood also justifies a host of existing limitations on children’s moral, social and legal entitle-
ments, freedoms and powers, and liability.
But the traditional representation of children and childhood has been rapidly changing, first
in law – where the principle of the child’s best interests is now frequently used as a guideline –
and, more recently, in philosophy. In moral and political philosophy, the literature on childrear-
ing, and especially on the parent–child relationship, has been multiplying at an exponential
rate during the past four decades, starting with an influential collection by Onora O’Neill and
1
Anca Gheaus
William Ruddick (1979) and Jefferey Blustein’s 1982 monograph, and continuing with the
groundbreaking work of David Archard (1993). These days, numerous articles, collections and
monographs on childrearing are being published on a regular basis. The question of children’s
moral status – of their fundamental rights and duties – is, implicitly, at the core of these inves-
tigations: today the prevalent belief is that children have full moral status – that is, that their
interests have the same weight as the interest of adults. At the same time, in the philosophy of
education, several authors have noted that before puberty children are more capable to ask deep,
competent philosophical questions than adults who are not professional philosophers (Matthews
1980). On average, children’s interest in philosophy – and in epistemic pursuits more generally –
is less clouded by conventionalism and less dampened by the responsibilities of life than adults’.
These, as well as other goods to which children seem to have better, maybe even unique, access,
have been recently called “the special goods of childhood” and have been drawing increasing
attention (Macleod 2010; Brennan 2014; Brighouse and Swift 2014). If these goods are indeed
very weighty, then childhood is not entirely a predicament, but also a privilege insofar as it is a
state of life when we display higher abilities to experiment, learn, enjoy and relate to others in
trustful and spontaneous ways (Gheaus 2015; Alexandrova 2017). In this case, children are more
than deficient adults.
Some philosophers reject the above, neo-romantic, representation of children (Hannan 2018).
Whatever the truth about the value of childhood, it is uncontroversial that children are uniquely
vulnerable to the actions – and inactions – of adults. Moreover, it is now generally accepted that
children are recipients of duties of justice, although there is much debate with respect to the
exact content of children’s rights and the identification of duty-bearers.
Bringing children to the forefront of philosophical investigation is, therefore, a natural devel-
opment. Some of this interest has been centred around the question, “what is a child?”, where
“child” is to be understood in terms of biological facts – as an individual who is at a stage of
development in human life where they have not yet reached biological maturity. What are the
unique characteristics of children, and what, if any, special abilities do they have? Answers to
these questions bear directly on the issue of what the value of childhood is. In turn, axiological
issues bear on the more practical ones concerning how we – as individuals and as society –
ought to treat children. Finally, there is the fascinating matter of how thinking about children
may challenge theories designed with the model of the adult in mind. If we give systematic
philosophical attention to children and childhood, will this lead us to revise some of our views
concerning values, morality, political institutions and even knowledge?
This handbook is a result of the growing interest in philosophical analyses of children and
childhood. It introduces readers to various debates about the nature of childhood, children’s
moral status and its direct implications, duties owed to children by various agents and the ways
in which society ought to treat children. Our aim is not merely to present the state of the art,
but also to draw attention to the many issues that are still under-explored and, therefore, to
encourage future research. Most of the handbook discusses children in general, although chil-
dren of different ages are, obviously, very different in their abilities and level of autonomy; these
differences have normative and practical significance. Some chapters address these differences,
and one of them focuses exclusively on adolescents. Across the handbook, our aim has been to
stay true to the diversity of childhood phases.
The philosophy of children and childhood spans across several sub-fields such as axiology,
ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics, epistemology and feminist philosophy. It also bears on
research in other fields, such as psychology, neuropsychology and neurolinguistics, anthropology,
sociology, social policy, medicine and law. Readers from these disciplines are likely to find some
of the chapters directly relevant.
2
Introduction
3
Anca Gheaus
or for others, etc.This is largely unexplored territory. One part of the chapter is on the question
of whether childhood is valuable for the individual who is experiencing this stage of life and
whether it would be rational for her to skip it or speed it up, if possible; some of this discussion
also introduces the recent literature on the goods and bads of childhood. A closely related chap-
ter is written by Anthony Skelton on the topic of childhood and well-being. It discusses in depth
one of the questions identified by Tomlin, namely the nature of children’s well-being: How
should we account for how well a child’s life is going from the point of view of the child living
it? Skelton proposes that the nature of a child’s well-being changes over the course of childhood
and, therefore, theories of well-being must be differential and developmental.
Robert Noggle’s chapter introduces the topic of children’s rights. Noggle proceeds by
explaining the advantages of thinking about obligations toward children in terms of rights and
then examines the ways in which the two main theories of rights – the will theory and the
interests theory – apply to children.This chapter also discusses some of the specific rights attrib-
uted to children and the contribution that the child liberationist movement made to thinking
about children’s rights.
In her chapter about children’s autonomy, Sarah Hannan explains how the most influen-
tial accounts of autonomy entail that children can display it to a smaller or larger extent. She
argues that autonomy develops in domain-specific degrees; Hannan, like other authors in the
handbook, concludes that the current level of interference with children’s choices is not always
justified. In a similar vein, the chapter by Kalle Grill shows why it is wrong to assume that pater-
nalism towards children is always and obviously justified. By contrast, Grill believes that instances
of benevolent interference with children are in need of justification; most likely, paternalistic
behaviour towards children can be justified to the extent to which children are less prudent than
adults and less harmed when subjected to paternalism.
The final chapter in the section about children’s moral status, by David Archard, is about
consent. We think that children lack the power to render permissible what is otherwise imper-
missible by the communication of words or actions – that is, by giving consent. Archard defends
a duty on the part of adults to give children a voice – if not necessarily final say – on matters that
concern them, in proportion to the child’s level of developed autonomy. He also examines par-
ticular cases to which children’s limited ability to give consent is particularly relevant – including
political legitimation, sexual relationships, medical treatment and research involving children,
and the conditions necessary for securing children’s open future.To the extent to which children
lack the power of giving consent, adults’ choices ought to be guided by children’s interests.
4
Introduction
interest and by hybrid theories that appeal to both. It is generally believed that one of the duties
we have towards children is to ensure they have good parents.
Colin Macleod writes about several aspects of good parenting. He argues that genetic ties
and sexual orientation do not make a difference to the quality of parenting. Further, Macleod
engages with the recently much-discussed issue of whether parents have a duty to love their
children, with the parents’ duty to promote their children’s autonomy, with the limits of legiti-
mate parental paternalism and with the question of whether good parents must strive for perfec-
tion. Next, Jonathan Seglow looks at one particular feature of good parenting, namely partiality.
There is a long-recognized conflict between ethical theory – which usually requires impartiality
– and our tendency to be partial, in particular towards our own children. On the one hand,
parental partiality is valuable, and even praiseworthy; on the other hand, given the inequality of
resources between different parents, it seems to unavoidably upset fair equality of opportunities.
The best answer to the practical problem raised by parental partiality is to curb its expression by
putting limits on how many resources parents pass on to their children and, concomitantly, to
enact more egalitarian public policies.
Not all parents are their children’s procreators; Jurgen De Wispelaere and Daniel Weinstock
write about the special issues raised by children in need of adoption, and by the process of adop-
tion itself. First, is the question of whether children have a moral right to be adopted rather than
raised in institutions or foster homes, and the correlative duties of prospective parents to prefer
adoption over procreation as a means to satisfying their desire to parent. Second, is the question
of how to best design policies and regulations that are sensitive to the messy realities of interna-
tional adoption and of potential parents’ preferences for certain kinds of children.
Introducing licenses for parents is another topic that has received much attention from phi-
losophers. The chapter by Andrew Botterell and Carolyn McLeod analyses the suggestion that
parents be licensed in the same way in which we license those who engage in high-risk activ-
ities. This proposal draws support from the fact that we do, indeed, require adoptive parents
to have licenses for the sake of their prospective children’s well-being. Alternatively, given the
reasons to oppose the licensing of natural parents, we should stop requiring licenses on the part
of adoptive parents. Botterell and McLeod assess proposals to introducing parental licensing with
an eye on the risks of discrimination against adoptive and fostering families, and prospective
parents who are already subject to racism, classism, homophobia and ableism.
Daniela Cutas looks at the importance of family shape for children’s well-being. The domi-
nant view has been that rearing children by their heterosexual procreators is best for them, and
the debate between the proponents and the critics of this view has often been hidden behind the
apparently semantic question of what a family really is. Cutas examines the debate, introduces
the readers to the intricate realities of contemporary family formation and presents evidence that
children’s well-being is primarily influenced by how good the care is that they receive and by the
quality of the relationships between the adults who raise them. She also addresses the question
of whether the presence of dependent children is necessary for something to count as a family.
In her chapter on parenting and gender, Amy Mullin discusses parental responses to children
whose identities and preferences deviate from gender norms and who face particular difficulties
in allowing their children to flourish in societies that are hostile towards their deviance. The
second focus of the chapter is on parents’ gendered behaviour and on their beliefs and implicit
associations about gender roles. Parental endorsement of traditional gender norms tends to
perpetuate unfairness towards women. This happens partly by directly reinforcing a gendered
division of labour – for instance, when girls alone are trained to perform unpaid domestic
work – and partly by encouraging gendered aspirations in children and, in girls, higher levels of
responsibility for those in need of care.
5
Anca Gheaus
The section ends with a chapter about filial duties, written by Diane Jeske. Most people share
a strong intuition that grown-up children owe special duties to their parents; yet, philosophers
have found it difficult to account for this. Jeske presents – and vividly illustrates – some of the
most prominent and plausible accounts of filial duties, based on gratitude, friendship and the
existence of special goods within parent–child relationships. She also provides an account of
what theory of filial duty should be able to do in order to be adequate.
6
Introduction
circumstances of injustice or serious scarcity. We are used to thinking that child labour is an
instance of, or at least in the vicinity of, violations of children’s rights. Yet, older children are
able to work in paying jobs and some children’s labour is essential to their and their families’
survival; in certain circumstances, allowing children to work, and directing efforts at improving
the conditions in which they do so, is the best practical decision. Cook explores the limita-
tions of objections to child labour, which appeal to harm, to failing to benefit children and to
exploitation. He concludes that one of the best ways to contain the exploitation of children is
to empower them qua workers.
The last chapter, written by Mianna Lotz, deals with children’s special vulnerability. Lotz
explains the unique ways in which children are vulnerable; this vulnerability puts them at special
risk, but it also makes possible the enjoyment of some of the special goods of childhood. She
argues that protectionist duties do not exhaust the scope of parents’ and other adults’ vulnerability-
related obligations towards children in their care; some of these duties are facilitative and
ameliorative.
7
Anca Gheaus
in the relationship between children and inadequate parents, what makes such interventions
legitimate and how to balance, in this process, the interests of all those concerned: children, their
parents and the wider society. Moreover, children who are raised in institutions tend to be at
significant disadvantage compared to children who are raised by adequate parents. The way in
which we should settle these questions depends on the weight we give to children’s interests and
to the ideal of moral equality in childrearing.
Two of the duties owed to children that we generally believe should be discharged via state
institutions concern children’s education and their access to healthcare. The chapter by Gina
Schouten focuses on the first. Schouten distinguishes between education and schooling, arguing
that the latter is pervasively coercive and seeks to determine what, if anything, could justify the
coercion involved in schooling. Such justification, she thinks, must point to the goods provided
by schooling and explains how these can make schooling legitimate to children, parents and
taxpayers. Healthcare – the subject of the second duty that states owe to children – is discussed
in the chapter by Havi Carel, Gene Feder and Gita Gyorffy. They adopt a phenomenological
approach, trying to uncover what is specific to children’s experience of being subjects of medical
care. The most salient experiences of children in this context, they argue, have to do with their
particular way of being embodied – experiencing constant and relatively rapid change, with
change generated by their development rather than by illness or disfunction alone, as in the case
of old people; by their limited agency, given that adults tend to make most decisions on their
behalf; and by being part of families on whom they necessarily depend for the satisfaction of
most of their interests. All these particularities raise specific ethical challenges; like many other
authors in this handbook, Carel, Feder and Gyorffy support the conclusion that children should
be given more power to participate in decision-making on issues that are of direct concern to
them – in this case, medical procedures and treatments.
Traditionally, children have been disenfranchised (although the voting age varies across juris-
dictions.) This is justified by appeal to several reasons to exclude children from having political
rights, many of which have been recently contested. In his chapter about children’s right to
vote, Ludvig Beckman investigates several grounds for disenfranchising older children – grounds
which have to do with children’s well-being, with improving the results of the democratic pro-
cess and with the claim that excluding children is, in itself, undemocratic.
Christopher Bennett looks at some of the distinctive issues posed by thinking about children
in the context of criminal justice. Children grow up in environments shaped by particular crim-
inal systems; often, these systems perpetuate forms of economic and racial injustice. Children are
sometimes – albeit rarely – the direct targets of criminal justice; but even when they aren’t, their
lives are impacted by the criminalization of their parents and other significant adults. Of special
interest, for Bennett, is the way in which the philosophy of childhood shapes the philosophy of
criminal justice, by providing particular answers to questions about children’s abilities, the proper
length of childhood and the special goods that make childhoods go well.
Our final chapter is on children and war, written by Cecile Fabre. Children are frequent
victims of war, but sometimes they are also its agents: they are often being enrolled as soldiers
and, sometimes, perpetuate war crimes. Fabre argues that the victimization of children in the
context of war, whether intentional or not, is a more serious wrong than the victimization of
adults; further, she defends the standard prohibition against enlisting children as combatants, but
also the permissibility to kill, in self- or other-defence, children who have been enlisted and who
have engaged in wrongful killings. Fabre stresses that, unlike adults, children are always wronged
by war – even when they end up as combatants on the side who inflicts an unjust war.
Together, the thirty-six chapters collected in this handbook provide a general overview of
the contemporary field of the philosophy of childhood and children. Of course, there have
8
Introduction
been difficult editorial choices to be made. Further topics might have been included: childhood
is relevant to almost any aspect of any branch of philosophy, and while the handbook covers
the key terrain, we have not pursued every possible such direction of analysis. Meanwhile, we
have made a conscious decision to include chapters on issues which are important, but which
have been paid relatively little philosophical attention – such as child labour, children and race,
and children and war. Our aim is to draw attention and interest to these under-explored areas.
Doubtless there are other such areas that will become more prominent in time, in a rich and
fast-developing field. Overall, we expect that the philosophy of childhood – already thriving, as
we see from this volume – will continue to grow and deepen.
References
Alexandrova, A. 2017. A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Archard, D. 1993. Children: Rights and Childhood. New York, NY: Routledge.
Archard, D., and Macleod, C. (eds.). 2002. The Moral and Political Status of Children: New Essays. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Brennan, S. 2014. “The Goods of Childhood, Children’s Rights, and the Role of Parents as Advocates and
Interpreters,” in F. Baylis and C. McLeod (eds.), Family-making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Brennan, S., and Noggle, R. 1997. “The Moral Status of Children: Children’s Rights, Parents’ Rights, and
Family Justice,” Social Theory and Practice 23(1): 1–26.
Brighouse, H., and Swift, A. 2014. Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships. Princeton, NJ and
Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Blustein, J. 1982. Parents and Children:The Ethics of the Family. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gheaus, A. 2015. “Unfinished Adults and Defective Children: On the Nature and Value of Childhood,”
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9(1): 1–21.
Hannan, S. 2018. “Why Childhood is Bad for Children,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 35(S1): 11–28.
Macleod, C. 2010. “Primary Goods, Capabilities, and Children,” in I. Robeyns and H. Brighouse (eds.),
Measuring Justice. Primary Goods and Capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Matthews, G. 1980. Philosophy and the Young Child. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
O’Neill, O., and Ruddick, W. (eds.). 1979. Having Children: Philosophical and Legal Reflections on Parenthood.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Slote, M. 1983. Goods and Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
9
Introduction
Alexandrova, A . 2017. A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Archard, D . 1993. Children: Rights and Childhood. New York, NY: Routledge.
Archard, D. , and Macleod, C. (eds.). 2002. The Moral and Political Status of Children: New Essays. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Brennan, S . 2014. “The Goods of Childhood, Children’s Rights, and the Role of Parents as Advocates and
Interpreters,” in F. Baylis and C. McLeod (eds.), Family-making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Brennan, S. , and Noggle, R . 1997. “The Moral Status of Children: Children’s Rights, Parents’ Rights, and
Family Justice,” Social Theory and Practice 23(1): 1–26.
Brighouse, H. , and Swift, A . 2014. Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships. Princeton, NJ
and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Blustein, J . 1982. Parents and Children: The Ethics of the Family. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gheaus, A . 2015. “Unfinished Adults and Defective Children: On the Nature and Value of Childhood,”
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9(1): 1–21.
Hannan, S. 2018. “Why Childhood is Bad for Children,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 35(S1): 11–28.
Macleod, C . 2010. “Primary Goods, Capabilities, and Children,” in I. Robeyns and H. Brighouse (eds.),
Measuring Justice. Primary Goods and Capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Matthews, G . 1980. Philosophy and the Young Child. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University
Press.
O’Neill, O. , and Ruddick, W. (eds.). 1979. Having Children: Philosophical and Legal Reflections on
Parenthood. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Slote, M . 1983. Goods and Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Epistemology
Apperly, I. A. , and Butterfill, S. A . 2009. “Do Humans have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like
States?” Psychological Review 116(4): 953.
Astington, J. W. , and Gopnik, A . 1991. “Theoretical Explanations of Children’s Understanding of the Mind,”
British Journal of Developmental Psychology 9(1): 7–31.
Astuti, R . 1995. People of the Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baillargeon, R . 2004. “Infants’ Physical World,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 13(3): 89–94.
Baillargeon, R. , Li, J. , Gerner, Y. , and Wu, D . 2011. “How do Infants Reason about Physical Events?,” in
U. Goswami (ed.), The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive Development, 2nd edn. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Baillargeon, R. , Spelke, E. S. , and Wasserman, S . 1985. “Object Permanence in Five-Month-Old Infants,”
Cognition 20: 191–208.
Barner, D. , and Baron, A. S. (eds.) 2016. Core Knowledge and Conceptual Change. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Baron-Cohen, S. , Leslie, A. M. , and Frith, U . 1985. “Does the Autistic Child have a ‘Theory of Mind’?”
Cognition 21: 37–46.
Bernard, S. , Proust, J. , and Clément, F . 2014. “The Medium Helps the Message: Early Sensitivity to
Auditory Fluency in Children’s Endorsement of Statements,” Frontiers in Psychology 5: 219.
Bräuer, J. , Call, J. , and Tomasello, M. 2007. “Chimpanzees Really Know What Others Can See in a
Competitive Situation,” Animal Cognition 10(4): 439–448.
Burge, Tyler . 1979. “Individualism and the Mental,” in P. A. French , T. E. Uehling , and H. K. Wettstein
(eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Call, J. , and Tomasello, M . 2008. “Does the Chimpanzee have a Theory of Mind? 30 Years Later,” Trends
in Cognitive Sciences 12(5): 187–192.
Callanan, M. A . 2006. “Cognitive Development, Culture, and Conversation: Comments on Harris and
Koenig’s ‘Truth in Testimony: How Children Learn about Science and Religion,’” Child Development 77(3):
525–530.
Carey, S . 2009. The Origin of Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craig, E . 1991. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Gelman, S. A . 2003. The Essential Child. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gopnik, A . 2009. The Philosophical Baby: What Children’s Minds Tell Us About Truth, Love and the
Meaning of Life. New York, NY: Farrar Strauss and Giroux.
Gopnik, A. , and Astington, J. W . 1988. “Children’s Understanding of Representational Change and Its
Relation to the Understanding of False Belief and the Appearance-Reality Distinction,” Child Development
59(1): 26.
Gopnik, A. , Glymour, C. , Sobel, D. M. , Schulz, L. E. , Kushnir, T. , and Danks, D . 2004. “A Theory of
Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets,” Psychological Review 111(1): 3–32.
Hamlin, J. K. , Wynn, K. , and Bloom, P . 2007. “Social Evaluation by Preverbal Infants,” Nature 450(7169):
557–559.
Harris, P. L. , and Koenig, M. A . 2006. “Trust in Testimony: How Children Learn about Science and
Religion,” Child development 77(3): 505–524.
Harris, P. , Koenig, M. , Corriveau, K. , and Jaswal, V . 2018. “Cognitive Foundations of Learning from
Testimony,” Annual Review of Psychology 69: 251–273.
Harris, P. L. , Yang, B. , and Cui, Y . 2017. “‘I don’t know’: Children’s Early Talk about Knowledge,” Mind and
Language 32: 283–307.
Inhelder, B . 1962. “Some Aspects of Piaget’s Genetic Approach to Cognition,” Monographs of the Society
for Research in Child Development 27(2): 19–40.
James, W . 1981 (orig. 1990). Principles of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Karmiloff-Smith, A . 1998. “Development Itself is the Key to Understanding Developmental Disorders,”
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2(10): 389–398.
Karmiloff-Smith, A . 2009. “Nativism versus Neuroconstructivism: Rethinking the Study of Developmental
Disorders,” Developmental Psychology 45(1): 56–63.
Kaufmann, L. , and Clément, F . 2014. “Wired for Society: Cognizing Pathways to Society and Culture,”
Topoi 33(2): 459–475.
Keil, F. C . 2006. “Doubt, Deference and Deliberation: Understanding and Using the Division of Cognitive
Labor,” in J. Hawthorne and T. Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Kessen, W . 1965. The Child. New York, NY: Wiley.
Kinzler, K. D. , Dupoux, E. , and Spelke, E. S . 2007. “The Native Language of Social Cognition,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104(30): 12577–12580.
Koenig, M. A. , Cole, C. A. , Meyer, M. , Ridge, K. E. , Kushnir, T. , and Gelman, S. A . 2015. “Reasoning
about Knowledge: Children’s Evaluations of Generality and Verifiability,” Cognitive Psychology 83: 22–39.
Koenig, M. A. , and Echols, C. H . 2003. “Infants’ Understanding of False Labeling Events: The Referential
Roles of Words and the Speakers Who Use Them,” Cognition 87(3): 179–208.
Koenig, M. A. , and McMyler, B . 2018. “Testimonial Knowledge: Understanding the Evidential, Uncovering
the Interpersonal”, in M. Fricker , P. Graham , D. Henderson , N. Pedersen , and J. Wyatt (eds.), The
Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.
Koriat, A . 1993. “How Do We Know That We Know? The Accessibility Model of The Feeling of Knowing,”
Psychological Review 100(4): 609–639.
Koriat, A. and Levy-Sadot, R . 1999. “Processes Underlying Metacognitive Judgments: Information-based
and Experience-based Monitoring of One’s Own Knowledge,” in S. Chaiken, S. and Y. Trope (eds.), Dual-
Process Theories in Social Psychology. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Kovács, Á . M., Téglás, E ., and Endress, A. D . 2010. “The Social Sense: Susceptibility to Others’ Beliefs in
Human Infants and Adults,” Science 330(6012): 1830–1834.
Margolis, E. , and Laurence, S. (eds.). 1999. Concepts: Core Readings. London: Bradford.
Moll, H. , and Tomasello, M . 2007. “How 14- and 18-Month-Olds Know What Others Have Experienced,”
Developmental Psychology 43(2): 309.
Moshman, D . 1998. “Cognitive Development Beyond Childhood,” in D. Kuhn , R. Siegler , and W. Damon
(eds.), Handbook of Child Psychology Volume 2, 5th edn. New York, NY: Wiley.
Nagel, J . 2016. “Knowledge as Mental States,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology: 1–37.
Onishi, K. H. , and Baillargeon, R . 2005. “Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?,” Science
308(5719): 255–258.
Pea, R. D . 1982. “Origins of Verbal Logic: Spontaneous Denials by Two- and Three-Year Olds,” Journal of
Child Language 9(3): 597–626.
Perner, J . 1991. Understanding the Representational Mind: Learning, Development, and Conceptual
Change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Piaget, J . 1952. The Origins of Intelligence in Children. New York, NY: Norton.
Piaget, J . 1954. The Construction of Reality in the Child. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Pillow, B. H . 1989. “Early Understanding of Perception as a Source of Knowledge,” Journal of Experimental
Child Psychology 47(1): 116–129.
Povinelli, D. J. , Nelson, K. E. , and Boysen, S. T . 1990. “Inferences about Guessing and Knowing by
Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes),” Journal of Comparative Psychology 104(3): 203–210.
Pratt, C. , and Bryant, P . 1990. “Children Understand That Looking Leads to Knowing (So Long as They Are
Looking into a Single Barrel),” Child Development 61: 973–982.
Proust, J . 2013. The Philosophy of Metacognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rogoff, B . 2003. The Cultural Nature of Human Development. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B . 1959 (orig. 1912). The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scott, R . M., and Baillargeon, R . 2013. “Do Infants Really Expect Agents to Act Efficiently? A Critical Test of
the Rationality Principle,” Psychological Science 24(4): 0956797612457395–474.
Shatz, M. , Wellman, H. M. , and Silber, S . 1983. “The Acquisition of Mental Verbs: A Systematic
Investigation of the First Reference to Mental State,” Cognition 14(3): 301–321.
Spelke, E . 1994. “Initial Knowledge: Six Suggestions,” Cognition 50(1–3): 431–445.
Spelke, E. S . 2000. “Core Knowledge,” American Psychologist 55(11): 1233–1243.
Spelke, E. S. , and Kinzler, K. D . 2007. “Core Knowledge,” Developmental Science 10(1): 89–96.
Sperber, D. (ed.). 2000. Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Sperber, D. , Clément, F. , Heintz, C. , Mascaro, O. , Mercier, H. , Origgi, G. , and Wilson, D . 2010.
“Epistemic Vigilance,” Mind & Language 25(4): 359–393.
Stanovich, K. E. , and West, R. F . 2000. “Advancing the Rationality Debate,” Behavioral Brain Science
23(5): 701–717.
Thomsen, L. , Frankenhuis, W. E. , Ingold-Smith, M. , and Carey, S . 2011. “Big and Mighty: Preverbal
Infants Mentally Represent Social Dominance,” Science 331(6016): 477–480.
Tooby, J. , and Cosmides, L . 1990. “The Past Explains the Present: Emotional Adaptations and the
Structure of Ancestral Environments,” Ethology and Sociobiology 11(4–5): 375–424.
Turiel, E . 1983. The Development of Social Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vygotsky, L . 1962. Thought and Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wellman, H. M . 1990. The Child’s Theory of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books.
Wellman, H. M . 2014. Making Minds: How Theory of Mind Develops. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wellman, H. M. , Cross, D. , and Watson, J . 2001. “Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The
Truth about False Belief,” Child Development 72(3): 655–684.
Williams, B . A. O. 2002. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Williamson, T . 2002. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press on Demand.
Wimmer, H. , and Perner, J . 1983. “Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of
Wrong Beliefs in Young Children’s Understanding of Deception,” Cognition 13(1): 103–128.
Wittgenstein, L . 1968. On Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wynn, K . 1992. “Addition and Subtraction by Human Infants,” Nature 358(6389): 749–750.
Children’s rights
Andersson, A .-K. M. 2015. “Rights Bearers and Rights Functions,” Philosophical Studies 172: 1625–1646.
Archard, D . 1993. Children: Rights and Childhood, London: Routledge.
Beckman, L . 2001. “Rights, Rights-Talk, and Children,” Journal of Value Inquiry 35: 509–515.
Blustein, J . 1982. Parents and Children: The Ethics of the Family. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Brennan, S . 1995. “Thresholds for Rights,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 33: 143–168.
Brennan, S . 2002. “Children’s Choices or Children’s Interests: Which do their Rights Protect?,” in D. Archard
and C. Macleod (eds.), The Moral and Political Status of Children. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brennan, S. , and Noggle, R . 1997. “The Moral Status of Children: Children’s Rights, Parents’ Rights, and
Family Justice,” Social Theory and Practice 23: 1–26.
Brighouse, H . 2002. “What Rights (if any) Do Children Have?,” in D. Archard and C. Macleod (eds.), The
Moral and Political Status of Children. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brighouse, H. , and Swift, A . 2014. Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Clayton, M . 2011. “The Case against the Comprehensive Enrollment of Children,” Journal of Social
Philosophy 20: 353–364.
Cohen, H . 1980. Equal Rights for Children. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, & Co.
Cowden, M . 2016. Children’s Rights: From Philosophy to Public Policy. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
Farson, R . 1974. Birthrights. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Feinberg, J . 1980. “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,” in W. Aiken and H. LaFollette (eds.), Whose
Child? Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, & Co.
Godwin, S . 2011. “Children’s Oppression, Rights, and Liberation,” Northwestern Interdisciplinary Law
Review 1: 247–302.
Griffin, J . 2002. “Do Children Have Rights?,” in D. Archard and C. Macleod (eds.), The Moral and Political
Status of Children. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Guggenheim, M . 2007. What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
Henley, K . 1979. “The Authority to Educate,” in O. O’Neill and W. Ruddick (eds.), Having Children:
Philosophical and Legal Reflections on Parenthood. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Holt, J . 1974. Escape from Childhood. New York, NY: E.P. Dutton & Co.
LaFollette, H . 1989. “Freedom of Religion and Children,” Public Affairs Quarterly 3: 75–87.
Liao, S. M . 2006. “The Right of Children to Be Loved,” Journal of Political Philosophy 14: 420–440.
Lotz, M . 2006. “Feinberg, Mills, and the Child’s Right to an Open Future,” Journal of Social Philosophy 37:
537–551.
MacCormick, N . 1976. “Children’s Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right,” Archiv für Rechts und
Sozialphilosophie 62: 305–317.
Macleod, C . 2003. “Shaping Children’s Convictions,” Theory and Research in Education 1: 315–330.
Macleod, C . 2007. “Raising Children: Who Is Responsible for What?,” in S. Brennan and R. Noggle (eds.),
Taking Responsibility for Children. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
Mason, M . 1994. From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Mills, C . 2003. “The Child’s Right to an Open Future?,” Journal of Social Philosophy 34: 499–509.
Noggle, R . 2002. “Special Agents: Children’s Autonomy and Parental Authority,” in D. Archard and C.
Macleod (eds.), The Moral and Political Status of Children. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nozick, R . 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York, NY: Basic Books.
O’Neill, O . 1988. “Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives,” Ethics 98: 445–463.
Purdy, L . 1992. In Their Best Interests? The Case against Equal Rights for Children. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Schoeman, F . 1980. “Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family,” Ethics 91:
6–19.
Schrag, F . 1977. “The Child in the Moral Order,” Philosophy 52: 167–177.
Schrag, F . 1980. “Children: Their Rights and Needs,” in W. Aiken and H. LaFollette (eds.), Whose Child?
Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, & Co.
Thomson, J . 1990. The Realm of Rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Vallentyne, P . 2002. “Equality and the Duties of Procreators,” in D. Archard and C. Macleod (eds.), The
Moral and Political Status of Children. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wellman, C . 1984. “The Growth of Children’s Rights,” Archiv für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie 70: 441–453.
Wenar, L . 2005. “The Nature of Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33: 223–252.
Wolgast, E . 1987. “Wrong Rights,” Hypatia 2: 25–43.
Parental partiality
Archard, D . 2010. The Family: A Liberal Defence. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Barry, B . 1995. Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bou-Habib, P . 2013. “The Moralised View of Parental Partiality,” Journal of Political Philosophy 22(1):
66–83.
Brighouse, H. , and Swift, A . 2009. “Legitimate Parental Partiality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37(1):
43–80.
Brighouse, H. , and Swift, A . 2014. Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Calder, G . 2016. How Inequality Runs in Families. Bristol: Policy Press.
Clayton, M. , and Stevens, D . 2004. “School Choice and the Burdens of Justice,” Theory and Research in
Education 2(2): 111–126.
Cohen, G. A . 2008. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cordelli, C . 2015. “Justice as Fairness and Relational Resources,” Journal of Political Philosophy 23(1):
86–110.
Dermott, E. , and Pomati, M . 2016. “‘Good’ Parenting Practices: How Important are Education, Poverty and
Time Pressure?” Sociology 50(1): 125–142.
Esping-Andersen, G . 2005. “Inequality of Incomes and Opportunities,” in A. Giddens and P. Diamond (eds.),
The New Egalitarianism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Fishkin, J . 1983. Justice, Equal Opportunity and the Family. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Fishkin, J . 2014. Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gheaus, A . 2015. “The ‘Intrinsic Goods of Childhood’ and the Just Society,” in A. Bagattini and C. Macleod
(eds.), The Nature of Children’s Well-Being: Theory and Practice. Dordrecht: Springer.
Gheaus, A . 2017. “What Abolishing the Family Would Not Do,” Critical Review of Social and Political
Philosophy 21(3): 284–300, doi: 10.1080/13698230.2017.1398449.
Goodin, R . 1985. Protecting the Vulnerable. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Keller, S . 2013. Partiality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kolodny, N . 2010. “Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and Children,” Philosophy
and Public Affairs 38(1): 37–75.
Lareau, A . 2011. Unequal Childhoods: Race, Class and Family Life. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
Lloyd, S. A . 1994. “Family Justice and Social Justice,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75(3–4): 353–371.
Macleod, C . 2010. “Parental Responsibilities in an Unjust World,” in D. Archard and D. Benatar (eds.),
Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mendus, S . 2002. Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miller, D . 2009. “Equality of Opportunity and the Family,” in D. Satz and R. Reich (eds.), Towards a
Humanist Justice: The Political Philosophy of Susan Moller Okin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Munoz-Dardé, V . 1999. “Is the Family to be Abolished Then?,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99(1):
37–56.
Okin, S. M . 1989. Justice, Gender and the Family. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Rawls, J . 1999. A Theory of Justice, revised edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Richards, N . 2010. The Ethics of Parenthood. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Scheffler, S . 2001. Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Schoeman, F . 1980. “Rights of Children, Rights of Parents and the Moral Basis of the Family,” Ethics 91(1):
6–19.
Segall, S . 2011. “If You’re a Luck Egalitarian How Come You Read Bedtime Stories to Your Children?,”
Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy 14(1): 23–40.
Seglow, J . 2013. Defending Associative Duties. New York, NY: Routledge.
Shields, L . 2016. Just Enough: Sufficiency as a Demand of Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Swift, A . 2003. How Not to be a Hypocrite: School Choice for the Morally Perplexed Parent. London:
Routledge
Vallentyne, P. , and Lipson, M . 1989. “Equal Opportunity and the Family,” Public Affairs Quarterly 3(4):
27–45.
White, S . 2007. Equality. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Filial duties
Aristotle . 1985. Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T Irwin . Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Baynes, T. , and Kolers, A . 2003. “Toward a Pluralist Account of Parenthood,” Bioethics 17: 221–242.
Belliotti, R. A . 1986. “Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother and to Thine Own Self Be True,” The Southern
Journal of Philosophy 24: 149–162.
Benatar, D . 2006. Better Never to Have Been Born: The Harm of Coming into Existence. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Brighouse, H. , and Swift, A . 2009. “Legitimate Parental Partiality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37: 43–80.
English, J . 1979. “What Do Grown Children Owe Their Parents?,” in O. O’Neill and W Ruddick (eds.),
Having Children. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 351–356.
Gardner, M . 2016. “Beneficence and Procreation,” Philosophical Studies 173: 321–336.
Hardimon, M . 1994. “Role Obligations,” The Journal of Philosophy 91: 333–363.
Hill, J. L . 1991. “What Does It Mean to Be a ‘Parent’? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental
Rights,” New York University Law Review 66: 353–420.
Hoff Sommers , C. 1986. “Filial Morality,” The Journal of Philosophy 83: 439–456.
Jeske, D . 1998. “Families, Friends, and Special Obligations,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28: 527–556.
Jeske, D . 2008. Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Generates Reasons. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Jeske, D . 2014. “Special Obligations,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/ (last accessed 20 January 2016 ).
Keller, S . 2007. The Limits of Loyalty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kupfer, J . 1990. “Can Parents and Children Be Friends?,” American Philosophical Quarterly 27: 15–26.
Nozick, R . 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Schinkel, A . 2012. “Filial Obligations: A Contextual, Pluralist Model,” Journal of Ethics 16: 395–420.
Childhood and race
Aboud, F. E . 1988. Children and Prejudice. New York, NY: Blackwell.
Atkin, A . 2017. “Race Science and Definition,” in N. Zack (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and
Race. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 139–150.
Brown, C. S. , and Bigler, R. S . 2005. “Children’s Perceptions of Discrimination: A Developmental Model,”
Child Development 76: 533–553.
Buckley, T. , and Carter, R . 2005. “Black Adolescent Girls: Do Gender Role and Racial Identity Impact their
Self-esteem?,” Sex Roles 53(9–10): 647–661.
Caldwell, C. H. , Kohn-Wood, L . P., Schmeelk-Cone, K . H., Chavous, T. M., and Zimmerman, M. A. 2004.
“Racial Discrimination and Racial Identity as Risk Factors for Violent Behaviors in African American Young
Adults,” American Journal of Community Psychology 33(1/2): 91–105.
Clark, K. B . 1963. Prejudice and Your Child, 2nd edn. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Clark, K. B. , and Clark, M. P . 1947. “Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children,” in H.
Proshansky and B. Seidenberg (eds.), Basic Studies in Social Psychology. New York, NY: Holt Rinehart and
Winston, pp. 308–317.
Cross, W. E . 1991. Shades of Black: Diversity in African American Identity. Philadelphia, PA: Temple
University Press.
Derrington, C . 2007. “Fight, Flight and Playing White: An Examination of Coping Strategies Adopted by
Gypsy Traveller Adolescents in English Secondary Schools,” International Journal of Education Research
46(6): 357–367.
Dreeben, Robert . 1987. “Closing the Divide: What Teachers and Administrators Can Do to Help Black
Students Reach Their Reading Potential,” American Educator: The Professional Journal of the American
Federation of Teachers 11(4): 28–35.
Fogg-Davis, H. G . 2002. The Ethics of Transracial Adoption. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Fordham, S. , and Ogbu, J. U . 1986. “Black Students’ School Success: Coping with the ‘Burden of Acting
White’,” Urban Review 18(3): 176–206.
Goff, P. A., Jackson, M. C., Di Leone, B . A. L., Culotta, C. M., and DiTomasso, N. A. 2014. “The Essence of
Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
106(4): 526–545.
Goodman, M. E . 1952. Race Awareness in Young Children. New York, NY: Collier Macmillan.
Haslanger, S . 2005. “You Mixed? Racial Identity without Racial Biology,” in S. Haslanger and C. Witt (eds.),
Adoption Matters: Philosophical And Feminist Essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 265–289.
Husband, T . 2012. “‘I Don’t See Color’: Challenging Assumptions about Discussing Race with Young
Children,” Early Childhood Education Journal 39(6): 365–371.
Kelly, D. J. et al. 2005. “Three-Month Olds, but Not Newborns, Prefer Own-race Faces,” Developmental
Science 8(6): 31–36.
Knoester, M. , and Au, W . 2017. “Standardized Testing and School Segregation: Like Tinder for Fire?,”
Race, Ethnicity and Education 20(1): 1–14.
Lee, J . 2002. “Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gap Trends: Reversing the Progress Toward Equity?,”
Educational Researcher 31(1): 3–12.
McKown, C. , and Weinstein, R. S . 2003. “The Development and Consequences of Stereotype-
Consciousness in Middle Childhood,” Child Development 74(2): 498–515.
McKown, C. , and Weinstein, R. S . 2008. “Teacher Expectations, Classroom Context, and the Achievement
Gap,” Journal of School Psychology 46(3): 235–261.
McRoy, R . 1989. “An Organizational Dilemma: The Case of Transracial Adoptions,” The Journal of Applied
Behavioral Science 25(2): 145–160.
Moore, E . G. J. 1986. “Family Socialization and the IQ Test Performance of Traditionally and Transracially
Adopted Black Children,” Developmental Psychology 22(3): 317–326.
Nisbett, R. E. , Aronson, J. , Blair, C. , Dickens, W. , Flynn, J. , Halpern, D. F., and Turkheimer, E. 2012.
“Intelligence: New Findings and Theoretical Developments,” American Psychologist 67(2): 130–159.
O’Hanlon, C ., and Holmes, P. 2004. The Education of Gypsy Traveller Children. Stoke on Trent: Trentham
Books.
Pahlke, E. Bigler, R. S., and Suizzo, M. -A . 2012. “Relations Between Colorblind Socialization and
Children’s Racial Bias: Evidence from European American Mothers and their Preschool Children,” Child
Development 83(4): 1164–1179.
Park, S. , and Greene, C . 2000. “Is Transracial Adoption in the Best Interests of Ethnic Minority Children?:
Questions Concerning Legal and Scientific Interpretations of a Child’s Best Interests,” Adoption Quarterly
3(4): 5–34.
Pinderhughes, E . 2002. “African American Marriage in the 20th Century,” Family Process. 41(2): 269–282.
Quinn, D. M . 2015. “Kindergarten Black-White Test Score Gaps: Re-examining the Roles of Socioeconomic
Status and School Quality with New Data,” Sociology of Education 88(2): 120–139.
Raleigh, E. , and Kao, G . 2013. “Is there a (Transracial) Adoption Achievement Gap?: A National
Longitudinal Analysis of Adopted Children’s Educational Performance,” Child and Youth Services Review
35(1): 142–148.
Reynolds, M. , McCartan, D. , and Knipe, D . 2003. “Traveller Culture and Lifestyle as Factors Influencing
Children’s Integration into Mainstream Secondary Schools in West Belfast,” International Journal of Inclusive
Education 7(3): 403–414.
Rushton, J. P. , and Jensen, A. R . 2005. “Thirty Years of Research on Race Differences in Cognitive
Ability,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 11(2): 235–294.
Simon, R. , and Alstein, H . 1987. Transracial Adoptees and Their Families: A Study of Identity and
Commitment. New York, NY: Praeger.
Steele, C. M. , and Aronson, J . 1995. “Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African
Americans,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69(5): 797–811.
Zempsky, W. , Corsey, J. , and Mckay, K . 2011. “Pain Scores: Are they Used in Sickle Cell Pain?,”
Paediatric Emergency Care 27(1): 27–28.
Schooling
Allen, D . 2015. “What Is Education for?,” Boston Review. Retrieved from
http://bostonreview.net/forum/danielle-allen-what-education (last accessed 19 March 2018 ).
Anderson, E . 2007. “Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective,” Ethics 117(4):
595–622.
Anderson, S . 2008. “Of Theories of Coercion, Two Axes, and the Importance of the Coercer,” The Journal of
Moral Philosophy 5: 394–422.
Ben-Porath, S . 2013. “Deferring Virtue: The New Management of Students and the Civic Role of Schools,”
Theory and Research in Education 11(2): 111–128.
Brennan, S . 2014. “The Goods of Childhood and Children’s Rights,” in F. Baylis and C. Mcleod (eds.),
Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brighouse, H . 2000. School Choice and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brighouse, H . 2005. “Channel One, the Anti-Commercial Principle, and the Discontinuous Ethos,”
Educational Policy 19(3): 528–549.
Brighouse, H . 2006. On Education. New York, NY: Routledge.
Brighouse, H. , and Schouten, G . 2014. “To Charter or Not to Charter: What Questions Should We Ask, and
What Will the Answers Tell Us?,” Harvard Educational Review 84: 341–364.
Brighouse, H. , and Swift, A . 2009. “Educational Adequacy versus Educational Equality,” Journal of Applied
Philosophy 26(2): 117–128.
Brighouse, H. , and Swift, A . 2014. Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Burtt, S . 1994. “Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education,” Review of
Politics 56: 51–70.
Callan, E . 1997. Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Clayton, M . 2006. Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Curren, R . 1994 “Justice and the Threshold of Educational Equality,” in Michael Katz (ed.), Philosophy of
Education. Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society.
Dewey, J . 1916. Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. New York, NY:
Macmillan.
Frank, R . 1999. Luxury Fever. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Friedman, M . 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Galston, W . 1995. “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” Ethics 105: 516–534.
Gutmann, A . 1993. “Democracy and Democratic Education,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 12: 1–9.
Gutmann, A . 1995. “Civic Education and Social Diversity,” Ethics 105: 557–579.
Hart, H . L. A. 1955. “Are There Any Natural Rights?,” Philosophical Review 64: 175–191.
Jencks, C . 1988. “Whom Must We Treat Equally for Educational Opportunity to be Equal?,” Ethics 98:
518–533
Lomasky, L . 1987. Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Macedo, S . 1995. “Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John
Rawls,” Ethics 105: 468–496.
Macleod, C . 2010. “Primary Goods, Capabilities and Children,” in H. Brighouse and I. Robeyns (eds.),
Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Macleod, C . 2016. “Just Schools and Good Childhoods: Non-preparatory Dimensions of Educational
Justice,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 35: 76–89.
Mathews, J . 2009. Work Hard. Be Nice: How Two Inspired Teachers Created the Most PROMISING
Schools in America. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin.
Mill, J. S . 1978 (orig. 1859). On Liberty. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Molnar, A . 2005. School Commercialism: From Democratic Ideal to Market Commodity. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Morton, J . 2014. “Cultural Code-Switching: Straddling the Achievement Gap,” Journal of Political Philosophy
22(3): 259–281.
Norris, T . 2007. “Consuming Schooling: Education as Simulation,” Philosophy of Education Yearbook:
162–171.
Olsaretti, S . 2013. “Children as Public Goods?,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 41(3): 226–258.
Rawls, J . 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rothstein, R . 2004. Class and Schools. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute.
Rousseau, J. J . 1955 (1762). Emile, trans. B. Foxley . London: Dent.
Satz, D . 2007. “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” Ethics 117(4): 623–648.
Schouten, G . 2012. “Fair Educational Opportunity and the Distribution of Natural Ability: Toward a
Prioritarian Principle of Educational Justice,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 46(3): 472–491.
Thernstrom, A. , and Thernstrom, S . 2003. No Excuses. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
Vopat, M . 2009. “Justice, Religion, and the Education of Children,” Public Affairs Quarterly 23(3): 203–225.
Wertheimer, A . 1987. Coercion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Zimmerman, D . 2002. “Taking Liberties: The Perils of ‘Moralizing’ Freedom and Coercion in Social Theory
and Practice,” Social Theory and Practice 28: 577–609.
Zwarthoed, D . 2015. “Creating Frugal Citizens: The Liberal Egalitarian Case for Teaching Frugality,” Theory
and Research in Education 13(3): 286–307.