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Sixth Comprehensive Report-Executive Summary-June 2022
Sixth Comprehensive Report-Executive Summary-June 2022
Supported by:
This report was produced with the support of the United Nations Multi-
Partner Trust Fund for Sustaining Peace in Colombia. The views and
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect or compromise the
Fund’s position.
Executive Summary
This report presents the status of implementation of the Colombian Final
Accord from December 2020 to November 2021 in accordance with the
monitoring methodology designed by the Kroc Institute for International
Peace Studies. The report presents a quantitative and qualitative overview
of the implementation of the 578 stipulations found in the text of the Final
Accord to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace
(Final Accord or peace accord). It also includes a special analysis of the
cross-cutting gender and ethnic approaches, for which the Kroc Institute
selected and prioritized stipulations that make up special submatrices, with
the analysis further complemented by a territorial perspective.
The report incorporates a temporal perspective by considering indicators
from the Framework Plan for Implementation (PMI), which aims to guide
the public policies required for the accord’s fulfillment during a fifteen-
year timeline. The report also includes findings from a comparative study
conducted by the Kroc Institute on the implementation of the Final Accord
compared to other comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) signed
worldwide.
Completing the fifth year of accord implementation is a key milestone for
Colombia. International experience demonstrates that after an agreement
is signed, the first five-year period lays the foundation for peacebuilding
processes so that the most significant transformations agreed upon by
the signatory parties can be achieved during the next five-year period.
Creating this strong foundation for implementation enables transformations
to become sustainable patterns, leading to the non-repetition of the causes
that facilitated perpetuation of the armed conflict.
According to the quantitative findings, accord implementation in Colombia
has not stopped during these first five years. However, the report also
acknowledges that the implementation process faced serious internal and
external obstacles. The report’s findings also demonstrate that much more
progress needs to be made in order to guarantee that a significant majority
of the stipulations will be fully implemented within the 15-year period laid out
in the accord.
Regardless, uninterrupted implementation is a positive sign. This finding
reflects the encouragement of the signatory parties who maintain their desire
for peace, and the involvement of broad and diverse sectors of civil society
4 Executive Summary
that contribute to peacebuilding in the territories. It also reflects public
authorities’ territorial ownership of the Final Accord and the international
community’s resolute support for the implementation process.
Executive Summary 5
Quantitative Analysis
Regarding the implementation levels of the accord’s 578 stipulations, the
report shows that 30% of the stipulations have been completed, 19% are
at an intermediate level of completion, 37% are at a minimum level, and
15% have not yet been initiated.1 A comparison of implementation status
between November 2020 and November 2021 reveals that during the fifth
year of implementation, the number of non-initiated stipulations decreased
by 5%, minimum-level stipulations decreased by 1%, the percentage
of intermediate-level stipulations increased by 2%, as did the number of
completed stipulations.
For the third consecutive year, the Kroc Institute observed that implementation
has maintained a linear trend characterized by few changes in implementation
status. This trend indicates a high probability that the vast majority of
stipulations will begin implementation before the tenth anniversary of this
process. This is due to the fact that, as of this report’s cut-off date, only 15%
of the total stipulations have not begun implementation. In addition, the
Kroc Institute anticipates that a failure to take decisive actions, especially to
move most stipulations from an initial phase to an intermediate phase, will
reduce the likelihood of completing the 578 stipulations’ implementation in
a timely and effective manner.
The Kroc Institute identified that the points of the accord with the highest
implementation levels, such as Point 3 and Point 6, are those with the lowest
levels of changes in coding during the study period. On another note, despite
substantive changes in their implementation status during the analysis
period, the points of the accord with lower implementation levels, such as
Point 1 and Point 2, have a higher concentration of minimum-level and non-
initiated stipulations. Finally, the main challenge for implementation as of
November 2021 was the low percentage of intermediate-level stipulations
and the comparatively high percentage of minimum-level and non-initiated
stipulations.
1
The Kroc Institute notes that some percentages in the report’s quantitative analysis total 101 percent
due to statistical rounding.
6 Executive Summary
Implementation Status of the Cross-Cutting Approaches
Ethnic Approach
From December 2020 to November 2021, there was limited implementation
of the ethnic approach. During 2021, changes were recorded in only seven
of the 80 commitments with an ethnic approach. As of November 2021,
13% of stipulations in the ethnic approach had been completed, less than
half of the proportion of completed stipulations in the Final Accord overall,
which reached 30%. The proportion of intermediate-level stipulations
in the ethnic approach continued to differ from that of intermediate-level
stipulations in the Final Accord overall, with 13% and 19% respectively. In
addition, 60% of stipulations in the ethnic approach and 37% of stipulations
in the Final Accord overall were at the minimum level, and the percentage of
non-initiated stipulations was 15% in both cases.
The progress identified in this report was mainly due to the approval of
the Special Transitory Peace Voting Districts (CTEPs), the design and
implementation of the Special Consultation Mechanisms (MECs) in 15 of
the 16 subregions of the Development Programs with a Territorial Focus
(PDETs), and the input of guidelines for the ethnic approach of the National
Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes
(PNIS). The Comprehensive System for Peace (SIP) also made progress
on actions for acknowledgment and truth telling with ethnic communities,
and the Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE) continued
working to fulfill its mandate.
Nevertheless, the implementation levels of PDET ethnic initiatives were
significantly low in this period, as were the reporting levels on ethnic
indicators from the Framework Plan for Implementation (PMI) in the Integrated
Information System for Post-Conflict (SIIPO). There was also significantly little
progress on the Comprehensive Plans for Collective Reparations (PIRCs) for
ethnic groups as collective subjects, despite the completion of the first two
PIRC with an ethnic group as a collective subject. As for the IEANPE, the
allocated financial resources did not enable it to carry out territorial-level
activities, and there were coordination difficulties with the CSIVI due to the
challenges faced by this body.
Executive Summary 7
Another major challenge identified during this period was insecure conditions,
especially the forced recruitment of minors, territorial confinement, and
targeted killings of leaders and ex-combatants in ethnic peoples’ territories.
These situations continue to be a concern as they affect and pose a risk to
the implementation process and the life and integrity of these populations.
These crimes are mostly attributed to armed groups competing for control
over illegal activities associated with illegal mining and drug trafficking.
Gender Approach
During the December 2020 to November 2021 period, the gap between the
implementation of the 130 gender approach stipulations and implementation
of the 578 overall Final Accord stipulations persisted. This gap is mainly due
to the significant difference in completed stipulations. While 30% of overall
accord commitments have been completed, only 12% of commitments
in the gender approach have been completed. Nonetheless, there was
progress on the implementation of gender-specific stipulations that had
not been initiated, with a decrease in non-initiated stipulations from 30%
to 21% between 2020 and 2021. This contributed to the gender-specific
stipulations at the minimum level of implementation increasing from 46%
to 51% during the same period. Finally, stipulations at intermediate status
reached 16% in 2021.
Efforts to operationalize the PDETs with a gender approach were among
the advances observed during this period. As of November 2021, 39%
of PDET initiatives with a “women and gender” label (1,815 of the 4,606
initiatives) had an implementation plan. However, serious challenges persist
in mainstreaming the approach across the PDETs’ eight pillars and across
the 16 subregions, especially as the figures show a marked trend toward
progress being concentrated in certain pillars and subregions. With regard
to the National Sectoral Plans on Comprehensive Rural Reform, although
some of the plans adopted in this period included measures to ensure a
gender approach, others omitted it. The PNIS was able to move forward
with the adoption of a protocol to assist women growers; however,
effectively implementing the protocol involves important challenges around
territorialization and institutional ownership.
Another identified area of progress was the CTEPs’ approval, which included
measures to promote women’s participation through a requirement for
gender parity in candidate lists and the possibility for women’s organizations
to endorse candidates. Congress also approved a reform of the Electoral
Code, which included gender parity in candidate lists for publicly elected
8 Executive Summary
positions in public entities, but did not consider closed and alternating lists.2
Even though the reform represents progress, there was no full guarantee of
gender-balanced composition of public entities at the time this report was
completed.
Among the challenges observed during the reporting period, serious
conditions of insecurity in several PDET regions affected women who
participated and promoted accord implementation. To counteract this
situation, progress was made on some awareness-raising actions for these
women’s protection. However, there were delays in integrating the gender
approach in the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics
(SISEP) planned measures.
During 2021, the Kroc Institute also documented some progress and
challenges in the commitments related to the gender approach and victims
of the armed conflict. As part of its actions to prepare for the presentation
of its final report, the CEV announced the inclusion of a chapter and
recommendations related to the differential impacts of the conflict on women
and LGBTQ people. During this period, both the Unit for the Search for
Persons Deemed as Missing in the context of and due to the armed conflict
(UBPD) and the Unit for the Attention and Comprehensive Reparation of
Victims (UARIV) adopted guidelines for the incorporation of the gender
approach.
The main challenge identified by the Kroc Institute in this area relates to the
Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). During this period, the JEP did not
open a macro case that specifically studies sexual violence and gender-
based violence during the armed conflict. In addition, some segments of civil
society consider that the gender approach has been limited in the macro
cases that are furthest along.
Territorial Approach
The report includes an analysis of some experiences of implementation
in the territories with the purpose of identifying opportunities to improve
implementation levels and quality. First, during 2021, most PDET
Roadmaps were approved. Although this exercise supported aligning
resources, capacities, and goals to make the initiatives a reality, its structure
had challenges with meeting the expectations of civil society participants
engaged in developing the Action Plans for Regional Transformation (PATRs)
2
In April 2022, the Constitutional Court stated that the reform was unconstitutional due to flaws or
shortcomings in the legislative process.
Executive Summary 9
and interpreting what is stated therein. Second, the Kroc Institute found
that bodies such as the Municipal and Departmental Councils for Peace,
Reconciliation, and Coexistence in some territories were critical settings
for facilitating social dialogue and conflict de-escalation during the 2021
National Strike. Third, in following the precautionary measures decreed by
the JEP in the interest of former FARC-EP combatants as parties required to
appear before court, efforts to bring protection and security guarantees to
the territories faced several challenges. Given the serious circumstances of
insecurity in numerous territories, the actions reflected reactive operations
that are ordinarily carried out by protection and security agencies and the
entities in charge of implementing the Final Accord, without achieving the
expected results per the JEP’s orders and the communities’ needs.
The Kroc Institute determined that during 2021, the changes in the
implementation status of Point 1 were concentrated exclusively in non-initiated
stipulations. Most of these changes were due to the national government’s
adoption of National Sectoral Plans on Comprehensive Rural Reform, such
as the Special Plan for Rural Education. Thus, non-initiated stipulations fell
from 17% in 2020 to 14% in 2021 and minimum-level stipulations rose from
66% in 2020 to 67% in 2021. Intermediate-level stipulations increased from
13% to 14% during this same period, and completed stipulations remained
at 4%, with no recorded changes in this period.
The Kroc Institute also highlighted some setbacks during this year for
stipulations that were on the advanced implementation track but, due
to political decisions, moved backwards to the minimum level. This was
the case with the commitment to create a Special Agrarian Jurisdiction
after Congress closed the file in July. The Kroc Institute considered this
commitment’s early implementation to be crucial for increasing and boosting
measures for land access and formalization, since the establishment of a
system of judges specializing in resolving agrarian and rural conflicts was
intended to move judicial proceedings along swiftly, with special attention to
disadvantaged parties in agrarian matters.
During 2021, the pace of implementation of Point 1 stipulations was first
and foremost marked by the completion of most planning and structuring
10 Executive Summary
processes for plans, programs, and public policies, which were mainly
guided by national-level authorities. These processes include the formulation
of 14 of the 16 PDET Roadmaps and the adoption of 11 of the 16 National
Comprehensive Rural Reform Plans. Likewise, progress was made due to
the creation of guidelines for special credit lines, a comprehensive subsidy
for land access, and institutional strengthening of the Multipurpose Cadastre
public policy, among other advances.
Although these actions are strategic for the implementation of Point 1,
challenges were also observed. First, some of the actions where considerable
institutional efforts were focused were not outlined in the Final Accord,
but arose due to the need to align their implementation with the national
government’s National Development Plan. Therefore, they lack specific
stipulations associated with the accord’s explicit text and, consequently, are
not reflected in the overall status of implementation according to the Kroc
Institute’s methodology. Second, the Roadmaps’ development took longer
than anticipated, partly as a result of the pandemic. According to the PMI,
most of the National Comprehensive Rural Reform Plans have a 2017 or 2018
starting date, except for the National Irrigation and Drainage Plan for Rural,
Family-Run, and Community-Based Economies that has a 2021 start date.
And third, some actions have not yet been translated into implementation
per se, since they are essentially about planning—not executing—programs
and projects that may be enjoyed by the communities.
In addition, with the adoption of various implementation instruments
for Point 1 measures, the Kroc Institute found limitations in the ability of
these instruments to operate in a smooth and coordinated manner. This
situation could affect the interrelated nature of comprehensive rural reform’s
three components, especially with regard to land access in PDET areas
and disparities in the distribution of hectares from the Land Fund in these
subregions.
Executive Summary 11
well as actions by Congress. Considering this, the Kroc Institute witnessed
a decrease from 34% to 28% in Point 2’s non-initiated stipulations between
2020 and 2021.
Progress was made on Point 2 due to territorial actors driving implementation
forward, especially civil society organizations. The actions of local authorities
and international cooperation were also essential for this point’s progress,
particularly through partnerships among them. One example was the opening
of the second call for community radio stations focused on ethnic groups,
which was managed by the Ministry of Information and Communication
Technologies (MINTIC) in coordination with the National Spectrum Agency
(ANE). This call enabled an increase in the percentage of completed Point 2
stipulations moving from 13% in 2020 to 14% in 2021.
Nonetheless, a significant number of Point 2 stipulations continue to
lag behind schedule, and some have even regressed. These are mainly
stipulations that aim to introduce reforms for greater democratic openness
and to promote reconciliation. This situation affects the participation of
women, LGBTQ people, youth, and ethnic communities, who Point 2
seeks to include, in a differential way. The National Strike protests between
April and June 2021 underscored limitations in Point 2 implementation,
specifically on the sub-topic of guarantees for gatherings and protest, due in
part to the failure to develop a clear regulatory system and to follow through
on existing protocols for use of force. This partially explains the decrease
recorded by the Kroc Institute in the implementation status of stipulations
that were at the intermediate level of implementation, which fell from 15% to
14% between 2020 and 2021.
The Kroc Institute identified some factors that limited the comprehensive
implementation of Point 2 during the analysis period. First was the lack of
consensus between the national government, Congress, political parties, and
oversight bodies on how to implement pending commitments. The second
reason was the fragmentation of public debate on how to deepen political
participation and enhance Colombian democracy; the Institute observed
especially low prioritization of these issues in the legislative agenda. Third, the
national government failed to recognize pending Final Accord commitments
that are not in the PMI. And, finally, limited implementation was due to a
budget reduction and decreasing execution of this point’s commitments
that has been constant over the last years, affecting their implementation
quality and levels. The Kroc Institute suggests that these commitments
need greater political will and state effort as part of an approach that links
political parties, public authorities, social organizations, and the private
sector, among others, to advance the Point 2 stipulations that have not yet
been initiated.
12 Executive Summary
Point 3 “End of the Conflict”
During 2021, compared to the same period in 2020, non-initiated stipulations
in Point 3 decreased by three percentage points, from 14% in 2020 to 11%
in 2021. Two of the stipulations that went from a non-initiated to minimum
level of implementation during this analysis period were the identification of
the human, physical, and budgetary resources required to implement the
Strategic Plan for Security and Protection (PESP) and the provision of tools
related to individual or collective psychosocial care for ex-combatants and
their families. These tools also included a gender approach.
Similarly, the report notes a three-percentage point increase, from 17% to
20%, in the number of stipulations that went from an initial to intermediate
level of implementation between 2020 and 2021. One of these stipulations
is associated with the allocation of 8 million COP to each person in the
reincorporation process for undertaking an individual or collective livelihood
project. Minimum-level stipulations decreased from 20% in 2020 to 19%
in 2021, and there was no change in the percentage of completed Point 3
stipulations, which continued to be 49%.
In terms of reincorporation, the political and technical agreements that
came out of the “Pilgrimage for Life and Peace,” promoted by the ex-
combatant communities at the end of 2020, mobilized actions associated
with access to land and housing in 2021. With this group’s support
and aid from other entities and organizations, the Reincorporation and
Normalization Agency (ARN) continued to implement programs, plans, and
projects that make up and boost socioeconomic reincorporation. However,
they have not yet succeeded in establishing mechanisms that determine
long-term reincorporation plans and formalize the responsibilities of other
state institutions with indicators, targets, and budgets, as established in
the National Policy for the Social and Economic Reincorporation of Former
FARC-EP Members (CONPES 3931 of 2018).
At the same time, court orders promoted coordination between the
reincorporation process and security measures for ex-combatants.
Regarding security guarantees, numerous regions of the country, including
several PDET regions, experienced a substantial increase in instances of
forced displacement and confinement situations during 2021. Illegal armed
actors perpetrated targeted killings, massacres, and various attacks against
social leaders, ex-combatants, ethnic communities, and rural populations
across various regions of the country. These circumstances underscored
the limited state presence in the regions facing territorial expansion by illegal
Executive Summary 13
armed groups. In some cases, this expansion is related to illicit economies
and poorly coordinated accord implementation. Although court orders
mobilized the adoption of most of the accord’s security measures introduced
in 2021, the failure to reach agreements with civil society and the Comunes
party on the development of these measures illustrated the undervaluing of
security and protection bodies established in the peace accord’s text.
14 Executive Summary
Point 5 “Agreement on the Victims of the Conflict”
During the analysis period, Point 5 maintained a steady pace of
implementation. Non-initiated stipulations were reduced from 19% in 2020
to 16% in 2021, and minimum-level stipulations decreased from 36% to
33% during the same period. Intermediate-level stipulations rose from
21% to 24%, and completed stipulations increased from 24% to 27%. The
entities that make up the Comprehensive System for Peace (SIP) continued
action to promote implementing their mandates within the framework of
the Final Accord. This was despite persistent obstacles including a lack of
security guarantees, which hinders victims’ participation, and difficulties in
accessing information. Likewise, during the study period, the Kroc Institute
recorded some actions related to comprehensive reparation measures, as
well as examples of coordination between the entities that make up the SIP.
During this period, there was progress on implementation of the truth
component. Specifically, the CEV developed a strategy for liaising with
victims and organizations, in addition to creating a communications strategy
and gaining access to public media through national and regional television
programs such as “Frente al Espejo” and “Hablemos de Verdad.” The UBPD
made progress in gathering the information necessary to establish the
number of people deemed as missing and to prepare the national registry
of graves, illegal cemeteries, and burial grounds. For the justice component,
quantitative progress was also recorded in relation to the referral of cases
in which there is an absence of acknowledgement of responsibility. Cases
were referred from the Judicial Panel for Acknowledgment of Truth and
Responsibility and Determination of Facts and Conduct (SRVR) to the JEP’s
Investigation and Prosecution Unit (UIA) to continue adversarial proceedings.
For the reparation component, the Land Restitution Unit (ART) moved
forward with technical and financial support for beneficiaries of restitution
processes to rebuild their life projects and develop income generation
strategies. Finally, the component on guarantees of non-repetition moved
forward with the launch of the Updating and Strengthening of the National
Plan for Human Rights Education, which includes commitments laid out in
the accord.
Despite these advances, according to the Kroc Institute’s monitoring, there
were few concrete results during this reporting period. This had a negative
effect on implementation levels and poses a risk to the trust that the SIP has
been building with victims and civil society organizations since its inception.
Likewise, the Kroc Institute considers it necessary for the UARIV to promote
Executive Summary 15
collective reparation, not only to fulfill accord commitments but also to act
as a bridge for coordination with other measures mentioned in Point 5 and
Point 1.
16 Executive Summary
Opportunities for Future Implementation
Considering that 2022 is a year of political transition in Colombia, with a new
presidential administration and Congress, this report highlights the following
concrete opportunities for specific entities to continue advancing accord
implementation:
• National government, Congress, CEV, and civil society organizations:
Promote ownership of the CEV’s final report throughout the government
transition and as the new Congress takes office, with the aim of including
the CEV’s recommendations for non-repetition of the armed conflict in
the legislative agenda, National Development Plan, and the overall public
agenda
• CSIVI: In the context of the government transition, develop a work agenda
that sets objectives defining the parameters for PMI review and reviewing
targets that have 2022 as their final year of implementation
• Congress: Develop a multiparty agenda on the legislative implementation
of the Final Accord that focuses on overcoming lags, especially in areas
related to comprehensive rural reform, political participation, and the
solution to the illicit drugs problem
Executive Summary 17
The Barometer Initiative is a program stemming from the
Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies, part of the Keough School of
Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame, in
collaboration with the National Secretariat of Colombian
Social Pastoral Caritas. The Kroc Institute has agreed to
provide technical support for the implementation of the
entire Accord signed by the Government of Colombia and
the FARC-EP in 2016. The Institute is part of the
International Verification Component (CIV) of the
Commission for Monitoring, Promoting, and Verifying the
Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI) referred to
in Section 6.3.2 of the Final Accord. As mandated by the
parties of the Accord, the Institute’s work is technical,
developed with methodological and academic rigor, and
based on the Kroc Institute’s development of and
experiences with the Peace Accords Matrix, which tracks
more than 34 peace agreements around the globe.
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