Cardiff University

Introduction
Author(s): Peter Fitzpatrick and Alan Hunt
Source: Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 14, No. 1, Critical Legal Studies (Spring, 1987), pp.
1-3
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Cardiff University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1410292
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JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 1, SPRING 1987
0263-323X $3.00

Critical Legal Studies: Introduction

PETER FITZPATRICK and ALAN HUNT

'Critical Legal Studies' has origins in the late 1970s with the work produ
the Conference on Critical Legal Studies in the U.S.A. Comparable g
and organisations were also created independently in France, Germany a
number of other countries. In Britain the Critical Legal Conferen
formed in 1984.' There are considerable variations in the style, foc
method of work produced under the label of 'critical legal studies'. C
legal scholarship has not formed clearly delineated 'national' varietie
collection of work produced in the United Kingdom is presented
contribution to the wider project of critical legal studies.
It is significant that critical legal studies has developed within sp
organisational forms. This attests to a strong sense in which there is a
aspiration amongst participants to be a 'movement' within the field of
studies. Yet, at the same time, as is evident from the essays presented i
collection, there is very considerable diversity. Indeed, that diver
celebrated as a positive achievement to be nurtured and protected.
Critical legal studies draws heavily on the radical political culture
period since the 1960s. It asserts the inescapability of commitment and
the aspirations of the preceding intellectual climate's search for v
neutrality. Yet, at the same time, it seeks to avoid the vice of sectar
which has so scarred radical politics during the same period. Critic
studies seeks to provide an environment in which radical and comm
scholarship can thrive in diversity with no aspiration to lay down a 'cor
theory or method. The element of cohesion is provided, in the first instan
a shared rejection of the dominant tradition of Anglo-American l
scholarship, the expository orthodoxy or, more crudely, the 'black-lett
tradition. But the critical movement also shares a recognition
limitations of the socio-legal approaches which have characterised
recent attempts to escape from orthodoxy which tend to see law throug
conceptual apparatus of other disciplines. There is, as well, a shared con
with the politics of law, with the stress on law as significant precisely bec
is not immunised from the realm of politics and thus has definite effe
consequences for the multitude of arguments, battles and struggles
produce the human condition. The formative statement of the Critical L
Conference put it this way:
The central focus of the critical legal approach is to explore the manner in whic
doctrine and legal education and the practices of legal institutions work to buttr

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 support a pervasive system of oppressive, inegalitarian relations. Critical theory works to
develop radical alternatives, and to explore and debate the role of law in the creation of
social, economic and political relations that will advance human emancipation.

But, as with any family resemblance, there are also important differences.
Thus, for example, the early period of the critical legal studies movement in the
U.S.A. was characterised by the key role played by one or two individuals
which resulted in a certain surface uniformity in language and style of
presentation, whereas in Britain there has been no such unifying individual or
group of individuals. Our colleagues in the U.S.A. have been more prepared to
borrow extensively from a great diversity of intellectual traditions to produce
a milange of influences. In Britain critical legal studies has been less eclectic:
the key traditions informing debate have been Marxism, feminism and critical
social theory of the Frankfurt variety.
The essays presented here bear strong evidence of a more recent intellectual
engagement. A rough characterisation of this controversy is that of the issues
joined between 'critique', drawing heavily on Marxism and critical social
theory, and 'post-modernism', drawing on Foucault and deconstruction, for
example. There is a growing following for Lyotard's post-modern clarion:
"Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witness to the unpresentable; let us
activate the differences ... ."2 It remains to be seen if the critical legal studies
movement can accommodate the gulf between these two traditions. They are
both well represented in our collection: Hunt, Cotterrell, Ireland et al. and
Thompson exemplify different aspects of the tradition of critique. Hirst and
Jones, Douzinas and Warrington, and Rose reject critique and, again with
considerable variation, epitomise post-modernist themes. It is far too early to
summarise this engagement, let alone to announce the triumph of one side or
the other or to celebrate a successful synthesis.
Yet, despite the fact that engagement and controversy are at the very heart
of the critical project, the essays presented here are, in a sense that is both
hopeful and accurate, a 'collection'. The diversity of post-modernism and its
break with critique have, somewhat paradoxically, provoked greater com-
munication and cohesion within critical legal studies in Britain. There is a
significant core of unity, even if expressed in different language, in opposition
to the dominant orthodoxies in legal scholarship and in agreement around a
commitment to the necessity and possibility of social transformation.
In short, critical legal studies in Britain has been able to accommodate a
diversity of perspectives whilst retaining an effective identity. Not everyone
within the critical legal studies movement shares the same concerns; the family
resemblances result in overlapping and interlocked configurations of intel-
lectual and political concerns which continue to ensure that the critical
movement provides a friendly and supportive framework for discussion and
debate within legal studies.
This collection is by no means exclusively concerned with general
theoretical debate. It features the strong presence of essays concerned with the
relevance and application of a critically informed approach to important
fields of substantive law. One of the significant differences between critical

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legal studies and many 'social' approaches to law is the former's concern to
take legal doctrine and judicial reasoning seriously. The essays on contract law
(Collins), trusts (Cotterrell), company law (Ireland et al.) and labour law
(Conaghan and Chudleigh) are of interest not only for their contributions to
their respective fields but for their contrasting and complementary methods of
interrogation of substantive law.
We would like to signal an important omission in the hope that it will be
made good. These essays have little to say about the varieties of legal practice
and their problems. The work presented emanates from those working in legal
education. Whilst the aspiration of critical legal studies is strongly committed
to developing an interchange and co-operation with radical legal practitioners
and other legal activists, little progress has been achieved. This is not the
occasion to explore the problems involved; we merely wish to signal this as an
issue which the critical legal studies movement must address more produc-
tively.
We would like to thank all of our authors for their co-operation. We would
like to thank the publishers and the editorial team of the Journal of Law and
Society for encouraging and facilitating this project.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

SDetails about the Critical Legal Conference can be obtained from Alan H
School, Middlesex Polytechnic, The Burroughs, London NW4 4BT.
2 J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition.: A Report on Knowledge (1984) p.

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