SANSONI, J .—Senadhira v.

The Bribery Commissioner Sid

1961 P r e s e n t : Sansoni, J., and T. 8. Fernando, 3.

M. S. T . P . S E N A D H IR A et al., A p p ella n ts, a n d T H E B R I B E R Y

CO M M ISSIO NER, R esp o n d en t

S. C. 4 -5 of I960—Bribery Tribunal Case No. 19/1. 159169

Bribery Tribunal—Members cannot exercise judicial power—Incapacity of Tribunal

to convict a person and pass sentence on him—“ Judicial power ”—Judicial
Service Commission—Power to appoint judicial officers—‘‘ Judicial officer ”—
Procedure in Bribery Tribunals—Joinder of charges and accused persons—
Permissibility—Bribery Act, No. 11 of 1951', as amended bL, Bribery (Amend­
ment) Act, No. 40 of 1953, ss. 5, 6, 19, 25 (2), 26, 28, 29, 41, 42, 45, 48 (2),
52 (1), 66, 68, 69A—Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, ss. 52, 55—
Letters Patent, 1947, s. 9.
The power given to e Bribery Tribunal by section 66 (1) of the Bribery Act,
No. 11 of 1954 (as amended by Act No. of 195S) to convict, fine and imprison
persons charged before it is unconstitutional inasmuch as ruch power, being
exclusively a judicial power, can be exercised only by a judicial officer appointed
by the Judicial Service Commission in terms of section 55 of the Ceylon (Con­
stitution) Order in Council, 1946. The members of a Bribery Tribunal were not
so appointed, having been appointed by the Governor-General on the advice
of the Minister of Justice in terms of amended section 41 of the Bribery Act.
The right of appeal given by section 69A of the Bribery Act may be availed
of by a convicted person to show th at a Bribery Tribunal, although it is a valid
body possessing certain powers, has assumed other powers which it could not
exercise, as it was not properly constituted for^that purpose.
Section 52 (1) of the Bribery Act makes a Bribery Tribunal master of its own
procedure so long as it does not offend against the principles of natural justice.
Joinder, therefore, of charges and accused persons in the manner it thinks best
fitted to serve the ends of justice is permissible.

A ppea ls again st tw o convictions for offences specified in P a rt I I o f th e

B rib ery A c t, N o . I I o f 1954.

H. V. Perera, Q.C., w ith Sunil Rodrigo, S. S. Basnayake and

N . S. A. Goonetilleke, for th e 1st A ccu sed -A p p ella n t.

Colvin R. deSilva, w ith B . J. Fernando, for th e 2nd A ccu sed -A p p ella n t.

V. S. A. Pullenayegum, Crown C ounsel, for th e R esp on d en t.

Cur. adv. vult.

N o vem b er 27, 1961. S ansoni , J .—

T he tw o ap p ellan ts were p ro secu ted before a B rib ery T ribunal

c o n stitu te d under th e B ribery A ct, N o . 11 o f 1954, a s a m en d ed b y th e
B rib ery (A m endm ent) A ct, N o . 4 0 o f 1958.

14—T.YTTT
2----J. N. $ 562—2,033 ( 1 2 / 6 1 )
 314 SANSONT, J .—Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner

T he first ap p ellan t, a junior assistan t v a in er in th e V a lu a tio n

D epartm ent, w as charged w ith tw o offences. T he first w as th a t, being
a p ublic serv a n t, h e so licited a gratification o f R s. 2 0 ,0 0 0 as a n inducem ent
or a rew ard fo r p erform in g an official act, t o w it, reducing th e valu ation o f
properties b elo n g in g t o th e e sta te o f a deceased person. The second
offence w a s t h a t h e so licited a gratification o f R s. 2 0 ,0 0 0 w h ich he w as n o t
authorised b y la w or th e term s o f his em p lo y m en t t o receive. E a ch
offence is p u n ish a b le und er sectio n 19 o f th e B rib ery A c t N o . 11 o f 1954
w ith s e v e n y ea rs rigorous im prisonm ent or a fin e o f R s. 5,000 or both.
The seco n d a p p ella n t w a s charged w ith h a v in g a b e tte d th e offences w ith
w hich th e first a p p ella n t w as charged, a n d th ereb y com m itted offences
punishab le u n d er se c tio n 19 read w ith sectio n 25 (2) o f th e A ct.

A fter tria l, b o th a p p ella n ts Were fou n d g u ilty o f th e charges preferred

again st th e m ;• th e first ap p ellan t w as sentenced t o a term o f nine m onths
rigorous im p riso n m en t and a fine o f R s. 1,000 on t h e first count and to
nine m o n th s rigorous im prisonm ent on th e oth er count, th e sentences to
run concurrently. T h e second appellant w as sen ten ced t o a term o f
six m o n th s rigorou s im prisonm ent on each o f th e tw o co u n ts w ith w hich
he w a s charged, th e sen ten ces to run concurrently. T w o warrants o f
com m itm en t, d irected t o th e F isca l o f th e W estern P rovince and th e
Superin ten d en t o f th e P rison a t W elikada, sign ed b y t h e P resident o f th e
T ribunal, com m an d ed th ese officers to carry th e sen ten ces in to execution.

A t th e h ea rin g before u s tw o ob jections were raised t o th e convictions.

T he first w a s t h a t th e pow er g iv e n to a B rib ery T ribunal b y amended
sectio n 66 (1) t o p ass sen ten ce on an accused person w hom i t has found
g u ilty is u n c o n stitu tio n a l. T he other objection w a s t o th e joinder o f both
ap p ellan ts in o n e trial.

W hen th e h ea rin g o f th e appeal began, Mr. P u llen ayegu m raised a

prelim inary o b jectio n t o th e appeal being heard, ap p a ren tly because he
w as under th e im pression th a t th e appellants w ere challenging th e v a lid ity
o f th e en tire B rib ery A c t. B asin g his argum ent on th e case o f The King
Emperor v. Benoari Lai Sarma 1 he su b m itted t h a t w here an A ct is
a tta ck ed a s in v a lid , th e righ t o f appeal conferred b y th e A c t cannot be
exercised, an d som e rem ed y other th a n appeal sh ou ld be sought.
Mr. H . V . P erera, in rep ly to th is objection, said t h a t h e w as n o t chal­
lenging th e v a lid ity o f th e w hole A ct, nor w as he ev en goin g to argue th a t a
B ribery T ribunal is an uncon stitu tion al body. H is objection to the
co n viction s, h e said , w a s th a t th e y were b ad in so far as th e Bribery
Tribunal p u rported to exercise th e power o f co n victin g, fining and
im prisoning persons charged before it. H e claim ed th a t section 69A
o f th e A c t g a v e him a rig h t o f appeal w hich h e w a s e n title d t o exercise b y
asking th a t th e sen ten ce o f im prisonm ent and fine be s e t aside. W ith
regard t o th e finding o f g u ilt m ade against his clien t, h e d id n o t attack
th a t fin d in g a s u n co n stitu tio n a l, b u t h e su b m itted t h a t th e finding could
n o t sta n d in v ie w o f th e objection o f m isjoinder ta k e n b y h im .

»(1945) 4 . C. U .
 BAKSONI, J .— S e n a d h ir a v . T h e B r ib e r y O o m m ie e io n er 315

Since se c tio n 6 9 A g iv e s a c o n v icted p erso n a r ig h t o f a p p e a l a g a in s t a

conviction for a n y error in la w o r in fa c t, I th in k th e a p p e lla n ts h a v e a
rig h t o f appeal in th is case. T h e y are e n title d t o sh o w , i f t h e y ca n , th a t
th e w hole or a p a r t o f th e order is ille g a l; and t h a t th e T rib u n a l, w h ile a
valid b o d y p o ssessin g certa in pow ers, has assum ed o th e r p ow ers w h ich
it could n o t e x ercise, a s i t w as n o t p roperly c o n stitu te d fo r t h a t p urpose.
T he first p o in t ta k e n b y th e appellants raises a q u e stio n o f great
co n stitu tio n a l im p o rta n ce a n d in v o lv es th e in terp reta tio n o f s e c tio n 55
o f th e Ceylon (C o n stitu tio n ) Order in Council, 1946, w h ich I s h a ll refer to
hereafter as th e O rder in Council. T h a t sectio n read s :

(1) T he a p p o in tm en t, transfer, dism issal an d d iscip lin a ry co n tro l o f

ju d icial officers is h ereb y v e ste d in th e J u d ic ia l S erv ice Com­
m ission.
(2) Any ju d icial officer m a y resign h is office b y w r itin g u n d er h is h and
addressed t o th e G overnor-G eneral.
(3) E v e r y ju d icia l officer a p p oin ted before th e d a te o n w h ich th is P a rt
o f th is O rder com es in to operation an d in office o n t h a t d a te
sh a ll co n tin u e in office as i f h e had b een a p p o in te d und er th is
P a rt o f th is Order.
(4) The J u d icia l S erv ice C om m ission m a y , b y O rder p u b lish ed in th e
Government Gazette, d elegate to th e S ecretary t o th e C om m ission
th e pow er to a u th o rise all transfers, o th e r th a n tra n sfers in ­
v o lv in g in crea se o f sa la ry , or to m ake a c tin g a p p o in tm en ts
in su ch c a ses and su b ject to such lim ita tio n a s m a y b e sp ecified
in th e Order.
(5) I n th is se c tio n “ ap p o in tm en t ” includes a n a c tin g or tem porary
ap p o in tm en t a n d “ judicial officer ” m ea n s t h e h o ld er o f a n y
judicial office b u t d o es n o t include a J u d g e o f th e S u p rem e Court
or a C om m issioner o f A ssize.

T h is section requires t h a t t h e m em bers o f a B rib ery T rib u n al, before th e y

fu n ction as ju d icial officers, sh ou ld be a p p oin ted to th e T rib u n a l b y th e
J u d icia l Service C om m ission. T h ey were n o t so a p p o in ted , h a v in g been
app oin ted b y th e G overnor-G eneral on th e a d v ice o f th e M inister c f
J u stice, in term s o f a m en d ed sectio n 41 o f th e A ct. I t is n o t th e a p p e lla n ts’
contention th a t th e m em b ers o f a B rib ery T ribunal a p p o in ted in t h a t w a y
h a v e no sta tu s a t a ll, for i t is conceded th a t th e y can be a p p o in ted b y th e
G overnor-G eneral; t h e co n ten tio n is th a t m em bers w h o h a v e been so
appointed can n ot ex ercise ju d icial power. The argument., in b rief, w as
th a t w hile a B rib ery T ribunal can perform certain fu n c tio n s assig n ed to it
b y th e A ct, it s m em b ers are n o t v a lid ly appoinre d t o ex e r c ise judicial
p o w e r : th e C o n stitu tio n requires th a t a n y person ex ercisin g su ch pow er
should be ap p o in ted b y th e J u d icia l S ervice C o m m issio n : t h t fore,
ev en i f a n y p rovisions o f th e A c t purport to confer th a t p o w er o n th em ,
particularly th e pow er to p ass a sen ten ce o f fine or im p riso n m en t, th e y
are n o t en titled in la w to exercise it if th e y were a p p o in ted in th e m anner
stipulated in th e A ct.
516 S A ilS O lfl, J .— Sen aA h ira v . T h e B r ib e r y C o m m issio n er

W e w ere ta k en th rou gh th e B ribery A c t as originally enacted, and as

a m en d ed in 1958. T he former section 5 em pow ered th e Attorney-G eneral,
i f he w a s satisfied th a t there w as a prim a fa cie case o f bribery, to indict th e
offender, i f h e w as n o t a public servan t, before th e Supreme Court or th e
D istr ic t C ourt. W here th e offender w a s a public servant, he could be
so in d icted , or h e could be arraigned before a B oard o f Inquiry. T he
am en d ed sectio n 5 em powers th e B ribery Commissioner, an officer
brought in to being b y th e am ending A ct, to prosecute any person, i f he is
satisfied th a t there is a prim a facie case o f th e com m ission o f an offence
specified in P a rt 2 o f th e A ct, before a B ribery Tribunal. Sw eeping
am en d m en ts were introduced in 1958 w hich abolished trials before th e
D istr ic t C ourt or th e Suprem e Court and inquiries before B oards o f
In q u iry . B oards o f Inquiry were abolished, and Bribery Tribunals
cam e in to ex isten ce : th e former h ad th e power to inquire in to charges o f
bribery a g a in st public servants brought before th em by th e A ttorney-
G eneral, an d to decide w hether or n o t th e accused person w as g u i l t y ;
th a t d ecisio n w ould b e com m unicated to th e authority th a t had appointed
th e a ccu sed person, and certain sta tu to ry p en alties autom atically super­
v en ed . T h e B oard also had certain pow ers o f punishm ent, w hich it is n o t
n ecessa ry to d eta il here ; nor do I consider it necessary to discuss whether,
or t o w h a t e x te n t, th e establishm ent o f such B oards w as in accord w ith th e
C o n stitu tion . B ribery Tribunals were co n stitu ted under am ended section
4 2 “ for th e tria l o f persons prosecuted for bribery ” , w ith power to
“ h ear, tr y a n d determ ine an y prosecution for bribery m ade against
a n y p erso n before th e T rib u n a l” . A ll th e offences o f bribery specified
in P a r t 2 o f th e A ct, all o f them punishable w ith rigorous im prisonm ent
for a term n o t exceeding seven years or a line n o t exceeding R s. 5,000,
or b o t h , becam e triable by th e n ew ly co n stitu ted Bribery Tribunals and
w ere n o longer triable b y th e Courts. Section 28, as am ended, provides
t h a t a sen ten ce o f im prisonm ent passed b y a B ribery Tribunal, on a person
c o n v icted b y th e T ribunal o f bribery, shall be executed in th e sam e
m anner a s i f th e T ribunal were a C o u r t; and th a t a fine or p en alty im posed
b y a B rib ery T ribunal m ay be recovered on a n application m ade to a
D istr ic t C ourt b y th e A ttorney-G eneral. Section 68 empowers a Tribunal
to enforce it s au th o rity and obedience t o its orders b y punishing, as for
c o n tem p t, a n y disregard o f or disobedience to its authority com m itted
in it s p resence or in th e course o f a n y proceedings before it. P or th is
p u rpose i t h a s been g iv en all th e powers conferred on a Court b y S ection 57
o f th e Courts Ordinance and Chapter 65 o f th e Civil Procedure Code.

R e v e r tin g n o w to section 55 o f th e Order in Council, sub-section (5)

p ro vid es th a t a “ judicial officer ” m eans “ th e holder o f any judicial office
b u t d oes n o t include a Jud ge o f th e Suprem e Court or a Commissioner o f
A ssize ” . S ection 3 defines ‘‘ judicial office ” a s “ a n y paid j udicial office ’’.
S ectio n 4 5 o f th e B ribery A ct, as am ended, provides th a t th e m em bers
o f th e P a n e l ap p o in ted b y th e G overnor-G eneral (from which th e m em bers
o f a B rib ery T ribunal are selected) sh a ll be p a id such rem uneration as
m a y b e fix ed b y th e M inister o f J u stice in co n su ltation w ith th e M inister o f
 SANSOEfl, J .—-Senadhira v. tpKa SrpteryCor^miaaioner ^ _ . 317

Finance from time to tim e. K the memlfersf o f 4 Bribery Tribunal

function as judicial officers when they exercise judicial power, it cannot be
doubted th a t th e y a c t in breach of sectio n 5 5 of the Order in Council so
long as th ey h a v e n o t been a p p oin ted by th e J u d icial Service C om m ission ;
and an y exercise o f ju d icia l pow er by m em bers n o t so a p p o in ted is
necessarily in valid .

I t is essen tia l to read th e Order in Council as a w h o le, le ttin g each P a rt

shed light on th e o th er P a rts, so th a t th ey m ay all be g iv e n effect to .
P art 2 deals w ith th e Governor-G eneral. H e is a u th o rised to exercise
such powers, a u th orities and fu n ctio n s o f H er M a jesty a s she m a y be
pleased to assign t o him , but subject to the prov is ions 'of the Order in Council.
T he L etters P a te n t, 1947, w hich determ ine th e d istrib u tio n o f p ow ers
betw een th e Queen and th e Governor-G eneral, b y se c tio n 9 em p ow er th e
Governor-General to ap p o in t “ all such Ju dges, C om m issioners, J u s tic e s
o f the P eace and oth er officers as m ay law fully be c o n stitu te d or a p p o in ted
by u s”, but th is again is su b ject to th e provisions o f th e Orders in C ouncil,
1946 and 1947. P a r t 3 o f th e Order in Council deals w ith th e leg isla tu re
and th e power o f P a rliam en t to m ake law s “ su b ject to th e p ro v isio n s o f
th is Order” . P a rt 5 deals w ith th e e x e c u t iv e ; th e e x e c u tiv e p o w er
o f the Isla n d con tin u es to be v ested in H er M a jesty, a n d it . m a y b e
exercised on h er b eh a lf b y th e Governor-General “ in acco rd a n ce w ith t h e
provisions o f th is Order a n d o f a n y other law for th e tim e b ein g in fo r c e ” .
P art 6 deals w ith th e ju dicature. T his threefold d iv isio n o f th e le g is la tiv e
power, th e e x e c u tiv e pow er and th e judicial pow er, first m e n tio n e d in
A ristotle’s P o litics, has been d ea lt w ith in B la c k sto n e ’s C om m entaries
published in 1768. T h a t learned author w rote t h a t th e “ le g is la tiv e
pow er ” is v e s te d b y th e E n glish co n stitu tio n in P a rlia m en t, t h e
t: ex ecu tive pow er ” in th e K in g or Queen ; w hile w ith regard to th e
:: judicial pow er ” he sa id : “ B y th e long and u niform u sage o f m a n y
ages, our K in gs h a v e d eleg a ted th eir whole ju d icial p o w er to th e J u d g e s
o f their several courts . . . . A nd, in order to m a in ta in b o th th e d ig n ity
and independence o f th e J u d g es in th e superior courts, it is en a cted b y th e
sta tu te 13 W ill. I I I . c. 2, th a t their com m issions sh a ll be m a d e (n o t, a s
form erly, durante bene placito, bu t) quamdiu bene se gesserint, a n d th eir
salaries ascertained and e s ta b lis h e d ; but th a t it m a y be la w fu l to rem o v e
them on th e address o f both h ouses o f P arliam ent. A n d n ow , b y th e
noble im provem ents o f th a t law , in th e sta tu te o f 1 G eo. I I I . c. 23, en a cted
a t the earnest recom m en dation o f th e K in g h im se lf from th e th ro n e, th e
Judges are con tin u ed in their offices during their g o o d b eh aviou r, n o tw ith ­
standing a n y dem ise o f th e Crown, (which was form erly h eld im m ed ia tely
to vacate th eir sea ts) and their full salaries are a b s o lu te ly 1secured t o
them during th e co n tin u a n ce o f their com m issions ; h is m a je sty h a v in g
been pleased to declare, ; th a t he looked upon th e in d ep en d en ce a n d
uprightness o f th e J u d g es as essen tia l to th e im p artial a d m in istra tio n o f
justice, as one o f th e b est securities o f th e righ ts a n d lib erties o f h is
subjects ; and as m o st co n d u civ e to th e h onour o f th e C row n’. ”
2*------ J . X . R 562 (12/61)
318 SANSONI, J .— S e n a d h ira v . T h e B rib e ry C o m m issio n er

I n Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation *, Lord A tk in referred

t o th e B ritish N o rth A m erica A c t, 1867 w hich protected th e independence
Of th e jud ges in Canada b y provisions th a t th e judges o f th e Superior,
D istrict and C ounty co u rts sh a ll be appointed b y th e Governor-G eneral,
t h a t th e judges o f th e Superior courts shall hold office during g o o d '
behaviour, and th a t th e salaries o f th e judges o f th ose three courts shall
be fixed and provided b y th e P arliam ent o f Canada. H e th en s a i d :
“ T hese are three p rin cip al pillars in th e tem p le o f justice, an d th e y are
n o t to be underm ined.” W e find these sam e safeguards in sectio n 52
o f th e Order in Council w h ich deals w ith th e judges o f th e Suprem e Court.
T h e y and Com m issioners o f A ssize are to be appointed b y th e Governor-
G eneral. T he fram ers o f our C onstitution erected a fourth pillar in th a t
tem p le w hen th e p ow er o f appointm ent, transfer, dism issal and d is­
cip lin ary control o f ju d icia l officers w as vested in th e J u d icia l Service
Com m ission. B la ck sto n e, h a v in g d ealt a t page 267 o f V olum e I w ith th e
ju d icia l power, ex p la in ed o n p age 269 w hy a distinct and separate existen ce
o f th e judicial pow er is n ecessary in a free sta te. H e w rote : “ I n th is
d istin c t and separate e x iste n c e o f th e judicial power in a peculiar b od y
o f m en , nom in ated in d eed , b u t n o t rem ovable a t pleasure b y th e Crown,
co n sists one m ain p reserv a tiv e o f th e public lib erty w hich ca n n o t su b sist
lo n g in a n y sta te, u nless th e adm inistration o f com m on ju stice b e, in som e
degree, separated b o th from th e leg islative and also from th e ex ecu tiv e
pow er. W ere it join ed w ith th e legislative, th e life, lib erty an d property
o f th e subject w ould be in th e hands o f arbitrary judges, w hose decisions
w ou ld be th en reg u la ted o n ly b y their ow n opinions, and n o t b y any
fund am en tal p rinciples o f la w ; which though legislators m a y d epart from ,
y e t judges are bou n d t o observe. W ere it joined w ith th e ex ecu tiv e,
th is union m ig h t soon b e a n overbalance for th e leg isla tiv e.”

W h at is th is “ ju d icia l pow er ” w hich is exercised b y judges, and

w h en can it be said to be exercised ? From such inquiry as I h a v e been
ab le t o m ake in to th e su b ject, I h a v e learnt th a t i t is difficult to define th e
precise lim its o f th e pow er. T here are, how ever, cases w hich raise no
d o u b t, and I n eed o n ly consider where th is particular case lies.

Tn th e Canadian case m en tio n ed earlier, th e P riv y C ouncil h a d to

d e c id e w hether certain p ro v isio n s o f an A ct passed b y th e Ontario
legislature offended a g a in st th e Canadian C onstitution. I t h eld th a t
w h ile th e M unicipal B o a rd co n stitu ted under th e particular A ct w as
prim arily en tru sted w ith a d m in istrative functions it w as also en trusted,
b y certain section s o f th e A ct, w ith th e jurisdiction and p ow ers o f a
Superior Court, su ch a s th e pow er to se t aside a contract and im p ose new
te r m s upon th e p a rties t o it. “ I t is difficult ” , sa y s th e ju d g m en t, “ to
a v o id th e conclusion th a t, w h a tev er be th e definition given t o Court o f
j u s t i c e , or judicial pow er, th e section s in question do purport t o clo th e th e
B o a r d w ith th e fu n ctio n s o f a Court, and to v e st in it ju d icia l powers.'”

* (1 9 3 8 ) A .C . 4 1 5 .
 SANSONI, J .— S e n a d h ira v . T h e B r ib e r y C o m jn ia sio n e r 319

I t was further h e ld in t h a t case th a t so far as le g isla tio n p u rp o rted t o g iv e

it judicial a u th o r ity , t h a t a tte m p t m u st fa il, sin ce i t w a s n o t v a lid ly
co n stitu ted t o receiv e ju d icial a u th o rity ; b u t a s a n a d m in istr a tiv e bod y
its co n stitu tio n w as valid .

A nother ca se c ite d b y Mr. H . V . Perera w a s Attorney-General for

Australia v. The Queen l . T he P riv y Council th ere co n sid ered w hether
i t was co n stitu tio n a l for th e C om m onw ealth P a r lia m e n t t o g r a n t both
judicial and n on -ju d icial powers to judges a p p o in ted for life. T he
C om m onw ealth Court o f Conciliation an d A rbitration w h ich w a s v e ste d
w ith a d m in istra tiv e, arbitral and ex e c u tiv e pow ers, w a s b y certain
section s o f th e C on ciliation and A rbitration A ct, 1 9 0 4 -1 9 5 2 , a lso v ested
w ith judicial p ow ers, su ch a s pow ers to im pose p en a lties for a breach o f a n
order or aw ard, and to pu n ish co n tem p ts o f its p o w er a n d a u th o r ity .
T he P riv y Council h eld th a t under th e c o n stitu tio n it w a s n o t p o ssib le t o
v e s t in th e Court a ju d icia l pow er “ ev en to th e e x t e n t o f fin in g a c itiz e n or
depriving him o f h is lib e r ty .” I t is p ertin en t t o reca ll, a t th is p o in t, th e
provisions o f s e c tio n 68 w hich confer sim ilar p ow ers o n a B rib ery T ribunal.

In th e course o f h is ju d g m en t V isco u n t Sim onds d istin g u ish e d b etw een

arbitral pow er a n d ju d icia l pow er, and q u o ted from th e A u stra lia n ca se o f
Waterside Workers Federation of Australia v. Alexander (J . W .) Ltd. a.
Isaacs, J . and R ic h , J . th ere said : “ T he essen tia l d ifference is t h a t th e
judicial pow er is con cerned w ith th e ascertaining, d ecla ra tio n a n d enforce­
ment o f th e rig h ts a n d lia b ilities o f th e parties as t h e y e x is t , or are deem ed
to ex ist, a t th e m o m en t th e proceedings are i n s t i t u t e d ; w h ereas th e
function o f th e arbitral pow er in relation to in d u str ia l d isp u te s is to
ascertain and declare, but not enforce w h a t in th e op in io n o f th e arbitrator
o u gh t to be th e r esp ectiv e rights and liab ilities o f th e p a rties in relation
to each oth er.” T h e y further said th a t P a rliam en t can g iv e a n arbitrator
pow er to inquire a n d declare w h a t in h is op in ion o u g h t to b e th e res­
p ective rights an d lia b ilities w ith respect to th e m a tte r s in d isp u te, and
sa y th a t w hen so d eclared th ose shall be th eir m u tu a l r ig h ts a n d
liabilities. T h e m a tte r is th en in th e p o sitio n o f a v a lid A c t en a ctin g th e
identical m u tu al rig h ts and liab ilities. I n th is w a y “ th e a rb itral fu n ctio n
is ancillary to th e le g isla tiv e function, and provid es th e fa c tu m u p o n w h ich
th e law op erates to create th e righ t or d u ty . T h e ju d icia l fu n c tio n is an
en tirely separate branch, and first ascertains w h eth er th e a lleg ed rig h t or
d u ty ex ists in la w , an d , i f it binds it, th en proceeds i f n ecessa ry t o enforce
th e law .” T h e ita lic s in each case are m ine. G riffith, C .J. sa id : “ The
question w heth er a n y specific fu n ction does or d oes n o t a p p erta in to th e
judicial pow er d ep en d s u p o n its n ature, and n o t u p o n th e n a m e b y w hich
th e au th o rity w h ich exercises it is d esign ated in a, s ta tu te , or u p o n w h a t
it is called in a rg u m en t.” B arton , J . drew a clear d istin c tio n b etw een a
court w hich co u ld enforce its decisions a n d th e r e b y p erform s str ic tly
judicial fu n ctio n s, an d su ch bodies a s arbitrators w h o se proceedings

i f 7.957) A . C . 288. 3 (1 9 1 8 ) 2 5 C .L J i . 434.

 320 S-AifSONT, J .—Senadkira v. The Bribery Commissioner

la ck ed com pulsive powers a n d esp ecia lly th e power o f enforcem ent.

T h e la tte r for th is reason did n o t exercise judicial power, and th e y could
b e com pared to com m issions fo r in v estig a tin g and pronouncing on
q u estion s o f fa c t for th e inform ation o f th e public or as a foundation for
e x e c u tiv e or legislative action . B o th ty p e s o f tribunals do work w hich is
judicial in th e sense o f bringing to bear th e judicial faculty, b u t it is o n ly
th e cou rts w hich were judicial in th e sense o f th e exercise o f power u pon
th e p a rties in their dispute. G uided b y th ese observations, I regard th is
exercise o f pow er to enforce h is d ecisions as th e k ey to th e m eaning
o f th e phrase “ judicial officer ” in sectio n 55 o f th e Order in Council.
I t is b ey o n d question to m y m in d th a t, a s w as held in th a t case, th e
pow er t o co n v ict for offences and th e pow er to im pose penalties and
p u n ish m en ts are m atters appertaining exclu siv ely to th e judicial pow er.

Mr. P ullen ayegu m argued t h a t th e phrase should be lim ited to th ose

w ho h o ld office a s D istrict J u d g es, M agistrates, Commissioners o f R eq u ests
a n d P resid en ts o f R ural Courts. H e relied on para. 397 o f th e R eport o f
th e S o u lb u ry Com m ission a s h e w a s n o dou b t en titled to dc. I f w e are
confined to th e R eport as a n aid to th e in terpretation o f section 55, th a t
might, b e th e only conclusion. B u t i t is significant th a t th e Order in
C ouncil d oes n o t follow th e w ording o f th e R eport on th is sub ject. I t
does n o t e v e n m ention a J u d icia l S ervice. There has also to be considered
th e M inisters’ D raft, w hich recom m ended in A rticle 69 (3) th a t “ an
a p p o in tm en t to a judicial office (other th a n Jud ges o f the Suprem e Court)
sh ou ld b e m ade b y th e G overnor-G eneral on th e recom m endation o f th e
J u d icia l C om m ission.”

T here are, how ever, m ore w e ig h ty considerations th a t lead m e to hold

th a t “ judicial officer ” includes all persons w ho exercise judicial pow er.
T o h o ld otherw ise w ould be to h o ld th a t Parliam ent can establish new
Courts w ith powers as great as, or e v e n greater than, th ose possessed
b y th e estab lish ed Courts, and d ev ise a n ew m ethod o f appointing th e
ju d ges w h o are to preside over th em . Such su b stitu te or parallel courts
could b e g iv en unlim ited pow er over “ th e life, liberty and property o f th e
s u b je c t,” to be exercised b y persons to be appointed in a n y m anner
P arlia m en t m ig h t choose. T he id ea is n o t fa n tastic. The 1958 am en d ­
m en ts to th e B ribery A c t w ere design ed to deprive th e established Courts
o f th eir jurisdiction to tr y charges o f bribery, and to in vest perm anently
esta b lish ed B ribery T ribunals w ith th a t jurisdiction. L et m e rep eat
t h a t ob servation in different w ords. T h e B ribery Tribunals were Courts
s e t up in su b stitu tio n for th e esta b lish ed Courts, and th ey were en tru sted
w ith th e function o f adm inistering ju stice in a particular sphere.
I t m u s t n o t, o f course, be forg o tten th a t th e trial o f crim inal
p ro secu tion s is th e m ain fu n ctio n o f a Court exercising crim inal juris­
d ictio n . Such an a ttem p t m ad e on ce could w ell be repeated. T rue,
t h e y are called Tribunals and n o t Courts, b u t “ whether persons were
J u d g e s, w h eth er tribunals w ere Courts, and w hether th e y exercised
w h a t is n o w called judicial pow er, depended and depends on su b sta n ce
 SANSOOT, J .—Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner 321

a n d n o t on m ere n a m e .” 1. T hese con sid eration s seem t o m e to be

relevant, becau se “ as g ood a te s t as I k n o w o f th e sig n ifica n ce o f -an
opinion is to co n tem p la te th e consequences o f its o p p o s ite .”

W hen P art 6 o f th e Order in Council sp ea k s o f t h e J u d ic a tu r e and

refers to J u d g es o f th e Suprem e Court, C om m issioners o f A ssize, and
judicial officers i t seem s to m e to be d ealing w ith a ll th o s e p erso n s t o w hom
judicial pow er m a y be delegated . I t includes n o t o n ly th e officers o f th e
established Courts b u t th o se akin to th em in th e sen se t h a t, w ith o u t
being judges, t h e y exercise judicial power. T h e sep a ra te trea tm en t
w hich th e jud icatu re receiv es has its a n teced en ts in B la c k sto n e ’s th esis
a n d rests, I th in k , o n th e fu n d a m en ta l b elief t h a t a p p o in tm e n t b y an
independent b o d y lik e th e J u d icia l Service C om m ission is a n essen tia l
safeguard o f person al lib erty and judicial in dependence.

The question rem ains w hether th e p rovisions o f th e A c t conferring

judicial pow er o n th e T ribunals are d istin ct and sev era b le fro m th e other
provisions w h ich confer other powers. Mr. P erera s u b m itte d th a t up
to th e p o in t o f finding a person brought before it g u ilty o r n o t g u ilty th e
m em bers o f th e T ribunal w ere en titled to a ct, e v e n th o u g h n o t app oin ted
b y th e J u d icia l S ervice Com m ission. Certain s ta tu to r y p e n a ltie s and
disqualifications specified in sectio n 29 w ould a tta c h t o a person found
g u ilty , and its d ecisio n w ou ld be reported to th e p erso n s or bodies
m entioned in se c tio n 66. B u t he su b m itted t h a t th e p ro v isio n s o f
section 26, em pow ering a T ribunal to order th e p a y m e n t o f a p e n a lty b y
th e person co n v icted — a pow er w hich could form erly be ex ercised on ly
b y a Court— clearly confer a judicial pow er, and th e m em b ers h a v e n o t
been v a lid ly a p p o in ted to exercise su ch pow er. I a m in clin ed to agree
w ith th a t view . I t is rig h t th a t we should preserve a s m u ch o f th e w ill o f
Parliam ent as p ossib le : a n d so far as th a t w ill, a s ex p ressed in a S ta tu te ,
is n o t repugnant to th e C onstitution, we should u p h old th o s e provisions
w hich we consider n o t to conflict w ith th e C on stitu tio n . I see n o objection
to the conferm ent o f arbitral functions w h ich in v o lv e th e in v estig a tio n
and pronouncem ent o f a finding on q u estio n s o f fa c t, th o u g h I m u st
confess th a t th e m anner in w hich arbitral and ju d icia l fu n c tio n s h a v e been
conferred on T ribunals m akes th is a border-line case. T o t h a t e x te n t th e
finding o f gu ilt in th is case w ould be op erative.

T he only other m a tter for decision is th e o b jectio n o f m isjoin d er. The

argum ent for th e ap p ella n ts w as fou n d ed on th e term s o f n ew s e c tio n 5 ( 1 )
w hich reads :

“ I f th e B rib ery C om m issioner is satisfied t h a t th ere is a p rim a facie

case o f th e com m ission b y a n y person o f an offen ce sp ecified in P a rt I I
o f this A ct, su ch C om m issioner or a n y a d v o ca te, proctor or officer a u th o ­
rised in w riting b y su ch Com m issioner sh a ll p ro secu te su ch person
before a B rib ery T rib u n a l.”

1 {1918) 25 C.L.B. at 451.

322 Vadamaradchy Hindu Educational Society Ltd. v. Minister of Education

W h ile i t w as conceded th a t tw o p ersons could be charged an d tried a t

one tr ia l w ith tw o or m ore offences, provid ed th e y were offences o f t h e
sam e k in d and th e y were jo in tly liab le, i t w a s urged th a t th e sectio n did
n o t p erm it a joinder such a s w e h a v e in th e present case. I t w as a lso
p o in ted o u t for th e appellants th a t sectio n 6, w hich had m ade th e p rovi­
sion s o f th e Criminal Procedure Code (ex cep t section 325) applicable to
proceedings in a n y Court for bribery, w as repealed in 1958 ; further, th a t
sectio n 48 (2) w hich required a B oard o f In q u iry “ to m ake a thorough
in q u iry w ith o u t regard to leg a l form s an d solem nities ” , w as also repealed
in 1958. One can guess w h y th e se changes were m ade in 1958, b u t I do
n o t th in k i t w ould serve a n y purpose t o go in to further d eta il o n th is
a sp e c t o f th e argum ents. T h e m a tter seem s t o m e to be concluded b y th e
term s o f n ew sectio n 52 (1) w h ich reads :
“ S u b ject t o th e provisions o f th is A ct, a B ribery T ribunal m a y
reg u la te its ow n procedure.”

I agree w ith Mr. P u llen ayegu m t h a t th is provision m akes a B rib ery

T ribunal th e m aster o f its ow n procedure, so long a s i t does n o t offend
a g a in st th e principles o f natural ju stice. A Tribunal is thereby em pow ered
to draw u p a charge sh eet and jo in su ch charges and accused persons in th e
m anner i t th in k s b est fitted to serve th e ends o f ju stice, for th ese are
m a tters o f procedure. I do n o t th in k th a t th e joinder o f th e accused
p ersons an d charges in th is case is o p en t o objection, and I hold th a t th ere
w as n o m isjoinder.

I n th e result I uphold th e first o b jection raised on b e h a lf o f t h e

a p p ella n ts an d m ake order quashing th e convictions and th e sen ten ces
p a ssed o n them .

T . S. F e r n a n d o , J .— I agree.

Convictions and sentences quashed.