Air Campaign—tIraq, 1941 © Target Irag—1990-91 Reinforce the Right! % WNC ociroe ie ben ee 1914 7=@ a Also if®this, Issue: ya rT i Not So.Great Campaign << ¢ For Your InformationCONTENTS MAYIJUNE 1996 (i \\ Number 180 Swreac Sy apts FEATURES DEPARTMENTS 27 FYI:FORYOUR INFORMATION 4 REINFORCE THE RIGHT! The Schlieffen Plan and the Opening Campaign OUTGOING MAIL of the Great War, WORKS IN PROGRESS 1914 CONVENTIONS FEEDBACK RESULTS FEEDBACK by. a ‘Miranda GUESTIONS 19 The Air Campaign in Iraq, 1941 by Timothy Kutta RULES 38 A Flank Too Far: The Schlieffen Plan, August 1914 by Major Bill Reese RI REINFORCETHE RIGHT! 43 Target Iraq: The Air War in the Persian Gulf War, 1990-91 by Kevin S. Cronin 52 Peter The Great’s Not So Great Campaign by Timothy Kutta (On the cover: The Canadians at Second Ypres STRATEGY & TACTICS. 3REINFORCE THE RIGHT! The Schlieffen Plan and the Opening Campaign of the Great War, 1914 by Joseph Miranda “No operational plan extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main body of the enemy. It is only the layman who, as a.cam- paig being systematically fulfilled in every detail to its develops, thinks he sees the original plan preconceived conclusion.” — Helmuth von Moltke, “the Elder” The forces which led to the Great War— later called World War One— are deeply rooted in a century of European military thinking. Since the French Revolution, Eu- rope had been swept by the forces of radi- calism, democracy, nationalism, socialism, and imperialism, as well the industrial revolution and the advancements of modern science. These inevitably led to new ways of ‘fighting wars and would culminate in the great mobile campaign of 1914 in the West. 4 MAYIUNE 1996 #8180 ‘The Napoleonic Wars (1796-1815) and the wars of German unification (1864-71) proved thata country must be able to mobilize its population in well trained and equipped formations in order to win. The Franco-Prus- sian War in particular demonstrated that what counted ‘most was the mumber of trained troops fielded early. While the French army in 1870 was a professional free and was tactically proficient, it could not replace the massive losses it suffered inthe frontier battles at Metz and Sedan, where two entire an ‘The Prussian-German army that dealt its French op- ponent these death blows in 1870 was based on the reserve system. In this system, all able-bodied men were called to the colors fora tour of active duty in ther late teens and were tained by a cadre of active duty person- nal. Upon completion of service, the soldiers became civilian reservists who resumed training for short periods ‘once or twice a ear. were lost.TIAX Uejq pue uayaryog *PI6L Ul subi cual NOIDTAE z 2 VianPLANS 1914 [sce map on previous page...) ‘The Schlieffen Plan divides the German armies into Right (First. Second, Thirl Armies), Center (Fourth, Fifth Armies) and Left Sixth, Seventh Armies) Wings. The German Right Wing will advance through Belgium and sweep around the French leit flank. The rightmost German army (the First) would march west of Pars and fall upon the French armies from the rear. The Center will pin the Allie frontally. The Left wil fll ack and let the French advance farther into the trap. ‘The French Plan XVII concentrates the Fits through Third Armies on the | Alssce-Lormaine frontier for an advance into Germany. Fourth and Fifth | Armies would cover the Belgian-Luxembourg frontiers in the event of a German violation of neutrality. The British Expeditionary Force, meanwhile, sould cover the far left of the French fine, along with some reserve formations, The military establishment relied heavily on reserves tofill the ranks rapidly upon general mobilization. There \were several echelons of reserve organizations, ranging fromunits made up of recently discharged active soldiers down to older militiamen assigned to local security. The system allowed a state to draw upon virtually its entire ‘male manpower to field armies. Therefore, more soldiers than ever before could be brought to bear against the enemy atthe start of war. This, turn, implied thatthe ‘opening battles would be decisive. Military-Industrial Revolution The industrial revolution of the 19th Century served as the foundation for the reserve system. Mass produc: tion of armaments gave nations the capability to equip their armies on a previously unimagined scale. Another facet, often overlooked, was modern industry's ability to supply large field armies. In previous eras, logistical limitations had stymied history's best commanders. AS recently as the Napoleonic Wars it was not uncommon for an army to lose over half of it strength due to disease, ition, Jing agricultural productivity and more du- rable packaging created surpluses of food. When com- bined with advances in medicine, food preservation and hygiene, the result was a dramatic dectine in noncombat casualties. For the first time in history, attrition was no, longer a crippling threat. Armies could now be main- tained in the field for months, and even ‘The development of a continent-wide system of rail- roads across national boundaries allowed the rapid move- ‘ment of troops to the front. It also gave armies the capabilities to bring up the masses of supplies and ammunition they needed for sustained combat. New attention was paid to supporting the troops. All countries created massive logistical organizations to administer, supply and provide medical support for their armies. ‘These logistical developments made armies more mo- bile than ever since they now did not have to waste their time foraging. There wasn't much of achoice, anyway— ‘modern armies had gown so large that foraging was no longer a viable alternative, and the masses of ammuni- tion needed could be provided only by a well organized supply system. MANIUNE 1996 #180 Finally, and most importantly, what held the entire system together were the democratic and nationalistic ideologies which were dominant throughout Europe in the 19th century. Everyone was considered to be a citizen ofthe state, responsible in some form or another for defending the country in the face of aggression, Indeed, some military conservatives feared that the people were becoming zoo militaristic, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, the great Chief of the German General Staff in the late 19th century, warned that mass indus- ttialized armies would unleash forces which nobody could control. But Moltke’s warning was disregarded in the rush to keep up with the other Great Powers. The experience of war in the half century between the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 seemed to indicate that armies could win quickly and decisively. Planning for the First Battle By 1914, each major European country maintained a General Staff. This was a body of officers who prepared for war during peacetime. The idea was to have viable plans before the shooting actually started. ‘The general staffs conducted extensive studies of past wars in order to derive key lessons which would form, the basis of contingency plans for future operations. In the best armies, particularly the German, plans were xed down through the chain of command so that all commanders were aware of what was expected of them, Officers went over the actual ground where possible future campaigns would be fought so they would be familiar with it. During their annual taining maneuvers, units went through full dress rehearsals of anticipated operations. Contemporary studies of recent wars, such as the Boer War, showed that mobile operations were the wave of the future. All concrete experience demon- sirated that there would be a erucial opening period of | maneuver when a war broke out. Armies would exploit the gaps between enemy formations as they mobilized and moved toward the frontier. Then one side would bring the other to baitle, usually within weeks of the formal war declaration. These opening battles generally proved decisive, as the more mobile army could cut the enemy's communications and force it t0 fight at a disadvantage. Once the foe had been defeated in the field, either the enemy's government would capitulate or the war would enter an anti-climactic phase in which the defeated army would fall back into its fortresses or perhaps initiate guerrilla warfare, These latter measures delayed but did not avert final defeat. The lessons seemed quite clear: the next war in Europe would be ‘won in the opening rounds. A country had to obtain the decisive victory atthe start or it would be defe ‘There were other reasons to seek a quick victory. A modern war caused tremendous economic dislocation, ‘The costin taxation and loans could bankruptany nation inanera when hard currency still meant something and disses ted,