Court Supreme Court En Banc

Citation GR No. 115863

Date March 31, 1995
Petitioner Aida Eugenio
Respondents CSC, Hon. Teofisto Guingona, and Hon. Salvador Enriquez
Ponente Puno, J.
Relevant topic Abolition of office
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. On August 2, 1993, she was given a
CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank
by the Career Executive Service Board. 1
 All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission 2
passed Resolution No. 93-4359
 The above resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service
Officer, Rank IV.
 Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to
annul, among others, Resolution No. 93-4359

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN the CSC usurped legislative functions when it abolished the CESB YES

 It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by
the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public
offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public Officers
and Employees,5 viz:
 "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is
primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by
constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are
suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to
create and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether
additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-
officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of
that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the
incumbent and, if it sees fit, abolish the office.
 Respondent Commission invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 must be
read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the
respondent Commission. As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent
Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section
16. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the
CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive
manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook." The essential autonomous
character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the
 Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching any functionally inter-related government
agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in
Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code
RULING:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent Commission
is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 116418
Date March 7, 1995
Petitioner Salvador Fernandez and Anicia De Lima
Respondents Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas, Chairman, and Hon. Ramon B. Ereneta, Commissioner, CSC
Ponente Feliciano, J.
Relevant topic Abolition of office
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit
("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations
("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan
Manila. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710, signed by public respondents
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of
the Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994.
 During the general assembly of officers and employees of the Commission held in the morning of
28 July 1994, Chairman Sto. Tomas, when apprised of objections of petitioners, expressed the
determination of the Commission to implement Resolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by
higher authority.
ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN had legal authority to issue the assailed resolution to the extent it YES, authorized and it
merged the OCSS, the OPIA, and the OPR to form the RDO (effectively an was not an abolition
abolition of public offices)

 The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public
 This Court considers that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term
is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in
organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the
termination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its
officers and employees. It is very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code
having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to
freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the
Commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of the
ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority had
expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization," "as the need [for
such changes] arises." Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that legislative authority was
necessary to carry out the kinds of changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the
Court is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative authority was validly
delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be
observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out not only in Section
17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service
Commission "as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish a career service,
adopt measures to promote — efficiency — [and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . . and
 that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the
departments, offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed."
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued by this Court on 27 September 1994 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 174244
Date February 13, 2009
Petitioner Mayor Marcel Pan, representing the Municipality of Goa, Camariens Sur as Mayor
Respondents Yolanda Pena, Marivic Enciso, Melinda Cantor, Romeo Asor, and Edgar Enciso
Ponente Carpio-Morales, J.
Relevant topic Abolition of office
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Marcel Pan (the mayor), after winning the mayoralty post in the Municipality of Goa, Camarines
Sur in the 1998 Elections, initiated a reorganization of the local government, allegedly due to the
large budgetary deficit of the municipality brought about by a bloated bureaucracy. 1
 To start the bureaucratic shake-up, the Sangguniang Bayan (Sanggunian) passed Resolution No.
025-98 2 authorizing the mayor to partly reorganize the bureaucracy. This resolution was
eventually amended by Resolution No. 046-98 3 to give the mayor full authority to restructure the
local government unit (LGU).
 T h e Sanggunian thereafter created a Placement Committee via Resolution No. 054-98 4 to
oversee the LGU reorganization in terms of selection and placement of personnel, in consonance
with the procedures laid down in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6656, 5 the Act to Protect the Security of
Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization of 1988, and its implementing rules. 6 EacHCD
 Affected by this reorganization were herein respondents Yolanda Peña (Peña), Marivic Enciso
(Marivic), Melinda Cantor (Cantor), Romeo Asor (Asor) and Edgar Enciso (Enciso), who were
permanent employees assigned at the various departments of the LGU but whose positions were
abolished. The positions held by respondents were: local revenue collection officer I (waterworks
supervisor) for Peña; utility worker II for Marivic; revenue collection clerk II for Cantor; utility
worker II for Asor; and utility worker I for Enciso.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN the Municipality of Goa undertook a reorganization in good faith NO

 A reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof

by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." 20 It alters the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them 21 to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of the public clientele
as authorized by law. 22 It could result in the loss of one's position through removal or abolition of
an office. For a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more
efficient to be valid, however, it must pass the test of good faith, otherwise it is void ab initio.
 As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy
or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of
tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition", which is nothing else but
a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or
otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is
void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
 In fine, the reorganization of the government of the Municipality of Goa was not entirely
undertaken in the interest of efficiency and austerity but appears to have been marred by
 other considerations in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil
service employees like respondents.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged July 14, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion and Peralta, JJ., concur.
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 138381, 141625
Date November 10, 2004
Petitioner GSIS; GSIS
Respondents COA; Alfredo Pineda, Daniel Go, Felino Bulandus, et al.
Ponente Ynares Santiago, J.
Relevant topic Retirement
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 On April 16, 2002, the Court promulgated a decision on these two consolidated cases partially
granting the petition in G.R. No. 138381 ("first petition") thereby reversing the Commission on
Audit's (COA) disallowance of certain fringe benefits granted to GSIS employees. As a result, the
Court ordered the refund of amounts representing fringe benefits corresponding to those allowed
in the first petition in favor of the respondents in G.R. No. 141625 ("second petition").
 The benefits which the Court ordered to be refunded included increases in longevity pay,
children's allowance and management contribution to the Provident Fund as well as premiums for
group personal accident insurance. On the other hand, the Court affirmed the COA disallowance
of loyalty and service cash award as well as housing allowance in excess of that approved by the
COA. Amounts corresponding to these benefits were previously deducted by GSIS from
respondents' retirement benefits in view of the COA disallowance in the first petition. COA did not
seek reconsideration of the judgment ordering said refund, which thus became final and
executory

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN COA disallowances could be legally deducted from retirement benefits on the ground NO
that these were respondents’ monetary liabilities to the GSIS under said provision

 Here, the primary issue calls for an application of a specific provision of RA 8291 as well as
relevant jurisprudence on the matter. No useful purpose will indeed be served if we remand the
matter to the Board, only for its decision to be elevated again to the Court of Appeals and
subsequently to this Court. Hence, we deem it sound to rule on the merits of the controversy
rather than to remand the case for further proceedings.
 The last paragraph of Section 39, RA 8291 specifically provides: SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax,
Legal Process and Lien. —
o xxx xxx xxx
o The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or
monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial
agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances
and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability
arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official
functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except
when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
 It is clear from the above provision that COA disallowances cannot be deducted from benefits
under RA 8291, as the same are explicitly made exempt by law from such deductions. Retirement
benefits cannot be diminished by COA disallowances in view of the clear mandate of the
foregoing provision. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain and
 free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This is
what is known as plain-meaning rule or verba legis.
 The ruling was reiterated in Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo , 24 where the Court similarly declared that
benefits under retirement laws cannot be withheld regardless of the petitioner’s monetary liability
to the government.
 The policy of exempting retirement benefits from attachment, levy and execution, as well as
unwarranted deductions, has been embodied in a long line of retirement statutes. Act No. 4051,
25 which provides for the payment of gratuity to officers and employees of the Insular
Government upon retirement due to reorganization, expressly provides in its Section 3 that "(t)he
gratuity provided for in this Act shall not be attached or levied upon execution
 While the GSIS cannot directly proceed against respondents' retirement benefits, it can
nonetheless seek restoration of the amounts by means of a proper court action for its recovery.
Respondents themselves submit that this should be the case, 34 although any judgment
rendered therein cannot be enforced against retirement benefits due to the exemption provided in
Section 39 of RA 8291. However, there is no prohibition against enforcing a final monetary
judgment against respondents' other assets and properties. This is only fair and consistent with
basic principles of due process.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the April 16, 2002 Decision in G.R. Nos. 138381 and 141625 is
AMENDED. In addition to the refund of amounts corresponding to benefits allowed in G.R. No. 138381,
the GSIS is ordered to REFUND all deductions from retirement benefits EXCEPT amounts representing
monetary liability of the respondents to the GSIS as well as all other amounts mutually agreed upon by
the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., is on official leave.
Corona and Tinga, JJ., are on leave.
Callejo, Sr., J., took no part. Ponente in CA decision.
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 111812
Date May 31, 1995
Petitioner Dionisio Rabor
Respondents CSC
Ponente Feliciano J.
Relevant topic Retirement
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered
the government service as a Utility Worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.
 He reached the mandatory retirement age before rendering the necessary number of years in the
service of the government.
ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN dismissal of a mandatory retiree based on age is valid despite such dismissal resulting to YES
him not completing his required years of service to be entitled to the full retirement benefits

 It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil
Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission
was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate
policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective
 personnel administration in the government." 23 It was also discharging its function of
"administering the retirement program for government officials and employees" and of
"evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement."
 In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with
providing leadership and assistance "in the development andretention of qualified and efficient
work forcein the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement of the constitutional
and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective implementation
of the retirement of government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]).
 We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an
employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not
germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and
psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the
efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy
considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of
service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Griño-Aquino,J. in her dissenting
opinion in Cena:
 "Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the
service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-
comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service
at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3)
prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicantswho have already
passed the various government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by 'extendees'
who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their
government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old- age pension."

RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., I vote to grant the petition for the same reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Cena vs.
CSC reported in 211 SCRA 192.
Quiason, J., is on leave.
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 126576
Date March 5, 1997
Petitioner Mayor Ricardo Angobung
Respondents COMELEC En Banc and Atty. Aurora De Alban
Ponente Hermosisima, Jr., J.
Relevant topic Recall
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local
elections of 1995. He garnered 55% of all the votes cast. Private respondent de Alban was also a
candidate in said elections.
 Sometime in early September, 1996, private respondent filed with the Local Election Registrar of
Tumauini, Isabela, a Petition for Recall 3 against petitioner. On September 12, 1996, petitioner
received a copy of this petition. Subsequently said petition was forwarded to the Regional Office
in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval.
 Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson submitted to the
COMELEC En Banc, a Memorandum 4 dated October 8, 1996 recommending approval of the
petition for recall filed by private respondent and its signing by other qualified voters in order to
garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters as required by Section 69(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991
ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN the filing of a recall petition by a number less than the foregoing 25% statutory YES
requiremen“ is violative of clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law

 "Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office.
The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in
the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such
power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. Not
undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative
democracy.
 Recall as a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in section 2 of
Article XI entitled Local Government, viz.:
o 'SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may not
thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more
responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of
recall . . .'
 The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled, 'The Local Government Code of 1983.'
Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local
election officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned . . . .
 Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by BP 337
was exercised by our people.
 In the instant case, this court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly repugnant to the
applicable law and no less such to the spirit underlying that law. Private respondent who is a
lawyer, knows that Section 69 (d) of the Local Government Code plainly provides that recall is
validly initiated by a petition of 25% of the total number of registered voters. Notwithstanding such
awareness, private respondent proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as the filer
 and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini,
Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership of petitioner. But the petition does not bear the names
of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner
from the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private respondent is truly earnest in her cause,
and the very fact that she affixed her name in the petition shows that she claims responsibility for
the seeming affront to petitioner's continuance in office. But the same cannot be said of all the
other people whom private respondent claims to have sentiments similar to hers. While the
people are vested with the power to recall their elected officials, the same power is accompanied
by the concomitant responsibility to see through all the consequences of the exercise of such
power, including rising above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be recalled, his family,
his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate end. The procedure of
allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then setting a date for the signing
of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting the public which may have not, in the first
place, even entertained any displeasure in the performance of the official sought to be recalled, is
not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an attempt to go around the law. We can
not and must not, under any and all circumstances, countenance a circumvention of the explicit
25% minimum voter requirement in the initiation of the recall process.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is hereby GRANTED.
COMELEC Resolution No. 96-2951 is hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID and accordingly SET ASIDE.
The RESTRAINING ORDER heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban andTorres, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 136871, 136786, 136795
Date October 6, 2000
Petitioner Veterans Federation Party
Respondents COMELEC
Ponente Panganiban, J.
Relevant topic Political parties
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and
 Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
 First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number ofall party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
 Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
 Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.
 Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
 Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck
down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce
and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does
it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
 Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws
— not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
 In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system — a normal feature of parliamentary
democracies — into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory
parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal
solutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested
jurisprudenc
ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of YES
the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues: aIDHET
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified
party be determined?

 In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)
herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat,
 because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and
proportional representation.
 In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the
power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom
and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review. 28
 Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases — both petitioners and respondents —
have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such
requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 29
 The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,30 cannot
simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere
implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is
to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
TIAEac
 Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by
the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution
prohibits, the statute permits. 31
 Neither can we grant petitioners' prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of
three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional
representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
 The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a
total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be
deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the
implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already
popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should
allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite
form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not despair.
 Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve
as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and
vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as
a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
 With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are
confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,
perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of
full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
 egard.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec
are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives
— two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties — are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur in the result.
Puno, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., dissents.
Kapunan and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 147589
Date June 26, 2001
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
Respondents COMELEC
Ponente Panganiban, J.
Relevant topic Promotion/demotion
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed
by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications
were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were
scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and
the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as
deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2)
divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political
parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s]
hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated
only on 10 February 2001." 2
 Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No.
3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and
political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list
elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the YES and
following issues: NO
"1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.

 We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations."
 Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up
the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in
congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this
is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But
this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party- list system."
 The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving
more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable
 lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat,
is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, . . . , to become members of the House of Representatives."
Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.
 While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-
list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute
are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association
RULING:
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately
conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the
guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the
last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that
appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives.
The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from
notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any
winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have
complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena andGonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr.,C.J ., concurs in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is abroad on official business.
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 179271, 179295
Date April 21, 2009
Petitioner BANAT
Respondents COMELEC
Ponente Carpio J.
Relevant topic Policial parties
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. 6
 On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed aPetition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC.
BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have
recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats".7 There were no intervenors in BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.
 On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60.
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections,
namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens' Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), Gabriela's Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural
Concerns (ARC), and Abono
ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
Considering the allegations in the petitions
and the comments of the parties in these
cases,
we defined the following issues in our
advisory for the oral arguments set on 22
April 2008:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or merely a
ceiling?
Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional?
Is the two percent threshold prescribed in
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one
seat constitutional?
How shall the party-list representative seats
be allocated?
Does the Constitution prohibit the major
political parties from participating in the party-
list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the
party-list elections?
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under the
party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those
parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified"
to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional
seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes".
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws
in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation", this Court is compelled
to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional
seats to party-list organizations.
  Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. 33 In defining
a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party", R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution,
the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio- political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party- list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
 Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that
major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk
wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor
 Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. 33 In defining
a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party", R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution,
the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio- political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party- list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
 Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that
major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk
wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor
RULING:
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC
dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-
60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.
The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure
used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list
elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. ECISAD
Carpio Morales, Tinga, Nachura, Brion, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, J., certify that J. Quisumbing joined the Chief Justice's Opinion.-RSP
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., join
the Chief Justice in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. Many
Date April 2, 2013
Petitioner Atong Paglaum, Inc.
Respondents COMELEC
Ponente Carpio J.
Relevant topic Party list
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 COMELEC disqualified 52 political parties on the grounds that they were not representing the
under-represented and marginalized sectors of society.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess YES
of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and
second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong
Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections 49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections.

 The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did
not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2)all nominees must belong to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been
disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized
along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also,
petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed
to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
 This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions areGRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted
Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the
printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which
have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register
under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for
this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr. and Perez, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., I dissent; Ang Bagong Bayani should be upheld, not reversed. See concurring and
dissenting opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to relative's participation in party list election.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., I concur and also with the additional grounds cited in Justice Brion's concurring
opinion for revisiting the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and his erudite analysis of the aim of the party-list
system under the Constitution and law and its implications on political parties, party-list registrants and
nominees.
Brion, J., see: separate opinion.
Peralta, J., I join separate opinion of J. Brion.
Abad, J., I join J. A.D. Brion in his separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur to remand but these was a grave abuse of discretion but only with respect to the
disqualification of nominees separate from the party organization.
Reyes, J., with separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Perlas-Bernabe, J., is on leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.