In the Shadow of Nikolai Danilevsky:

Universalism, Particularism, and Russian Geopolitical Theory

“[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is
commonly understood.”
John M. Keynes (Kozul-Wrigh 2002, 132)

Abstract
In order to contribute to our understanding of Russian geopolitical theory, this paper
selects for a closer investigation the figure of Nikolai Danilevsky. The paper pays a special
attention to the thinker’s increased influence on contemporary geopolitical thought in Russia by
presenting qualitative and quantitative evidence of such influence. It explains Danilevsky’s rise
by Western pressures on Russia and the country’s internal vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities
emerged from the breakup of the Tsarist and the Soviet state, respectively, by providing the
required context for emergence of defensive nationalist ideas.

Key words
Danilevsky, Russia, geopolitical theory, nationalism, civilization

Introduction
Ideas of important thinkers are responsible for initiating and sustaining intellectual
communities across time and space. In Western IR theory, the influence of scholars such as
Hedley Bull, E. H. Carr, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth
Waltz, Alexander Wendt, Martin Wight, and others has been widely recognized and well-
documented (Doyle 1997; Schmidt 1998; Griffiths 1999; Tsygankov 2004; Neumann and
Waever 2005; Guzzini and Leander 2006). More recently, scholars have begun to turn their
attention to contributions by important non-Western thinkers to development of their intellectual
and social communities (Acharya and Buzan 2010; Horesh and Kavalski 2014). This attention
has been a part of a broader movement in IR theory that President of International Studies
Association Amitav Acharya (2014) has identified as a turn toward “Global International
Relations” sensitive to “regional worlds.” In 2015, the theme of global IR and regional worlds
became the one of International Studies Association’s convention with dozens of panels and
roundtables organized to directly address the theme. Scholars have begun to study the Western
cultural biases and hegemony in IR theory (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Hobson 2012; Tickner
2013) and recognize the necessity of coming to grips with different local perspectives on
international relations. Following the earlier insight by Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker,
(1984) many now view IR theory in terms of culturally grounded images of the world and
historically sustained cross-national debates on the nature of global institutions.
In order to contribute to our understanding of IR development outside the Western
hemisphere, this paper focuses on Russian geopolitical theory. Russian geopolitics is a part of IR
that is preoccupied with political and cultural boundaries in Eurasia and theorizes the nation’s
relations with Western and non-Western nations (Anonymous 2003, 2007;). I select for a closer
investigation the figure of Nikolai Danilevsky. Danilevsky has been a towering figure in Russian
intellectual developments since the late 19th century. A critic of his country’s pro-Western
leanings, he advocated recognizing and cultivating Russia’s indigenous institutions and ability to

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progress separately from European civilization. In many respects, Danilevsky was the first to
systematically challenge the West-centered universalist thinking and to advocate a particularistic
alternative. Ideas that he formulated in his main book Russia and Europe (1869) have anticipated
those expressed by Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Samuel Huntington, and others. These
ideas have also strongly influenced various intellectual currents in Russia including late
Slavophiles, Eurasianists, National Communists, and others. In today’s Russia, Danilevsky is a
standard reference in both public and academic discussions. Today many in Russia view the
contemporary economic, political, and security tensions with the West (Mankoff 2010;
Deyermond 2013; Trenin 2013; Vanden Heuvel and Cohen 2014; Larson and Shevchenko 2014;
Mearsheimer 2014) as a reflection of a broader historical trend of gaining the status of
independent civilization (Utkin 2002; Narochnitskaya 2004; Russkaya doktrina 2007; Kortunov
2009; Dugin 2013).
The intellectual prominence of Russia and Europe is well-recognized1 but its influence
on contemporary Russian geopolitical thinking has been rarely explored.2 In this paper, I
describe content, intellectual influences, and social conditions that became responsible for the
rise of Danilevsky’s geopolitical ideas. I argue that he had articulated ideological assumptions
and theoretical propositions that were then, in different social and political settings, seized by
thinkers fearful of the West’s influence and sympathetic with particularist worldview. He
emerged as the pioneer of the particularist paradigm and his theory proved powerful enough to
impress Russian thinkers on both right and left and flexible enough to be adopted by both
conservative and socialist intellectuals. Although Russian contemporary IR is complex and
encompasses multiple theoretical traditions (Anonymous 2010, 2013), Danilevsky’s ideas
increasingly command attention inside and outside of academia.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I analyze the debate between
supporters of universal and locally-sensitive knowledge in global IR theory by identifying
multiple intellectual paths and traditions both within and outside of Russia. I then present
Danilevsky’s main ideas and their fallout in the late 19th – early 20th century and the late 20th –
early 21st century contexts. Here, I research both universalist and particularist reactions to Russia
and Europe by identifying those who were critical of and attracted to the book’s ideas. I pay a
special attention to Danilevsky’s increased influence on contemporary geopolitical theory in
Russia by presenting qualitative and quantitative evidence of such influence. I offer an
explanation of Danilevsky’s rise by highlighting role of Western pressures on Russia and the
country’s internal vulnerabilities. In the two identified historical periods such vulnerabilities
emerged from the breakup of the Tsarist and the Soviet state, respectively, by providing the
required context for emergence of defensive nationalist ideas. Finally, I reflect on implications of
the rise of particularism for Russia’s foreign policy. I conclude by summarizing my findings and
reflecting on their lessons for understanding Russian and global IR developments.

Universalism, Particularism, and IR Theory

Local and Universal in IR Theory
Scholars of international relations have long established that patterns of theorizing
diverge across the world and reflect cultural and political assumptions of those residing in
various parts of the globe (Hoffmann 1995; Said 1993; Alker and Biersteker 1984; Oren 2002;
Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Jones 2006; Anonymous 2007; Bilgin 2008; Shani 2008; Acharya
and Buzan 2010; Nayak and Selbin 2010; Pellerin 2010; Acharya 2011; Tickner 2013). While
many in the West view American mainstream approaches as rational, objective, and essential for
building knowledge about the world, the “non-Western” thinkers refer to those approaches as

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revealing colonial biases of the West (Hobson 2012) and “parochial” (Hagmann and Biersteker
2012). For example, Hayward Alker and his collaborators argued that global IR theory produces
different types of knowledge cumulation, or progress and local types of intellectual progress
must be compatible for a successful international dialogue to take place. To quote from Alker,
Amin, Biersteker, and Inoguchi (1998), “world orders are multidimensional [and] are grounded
in widely (and inter-subjectively) shared beliefs, worldviews, historical missions, cosmologies or
modes of thought. They contain ideas of governance and tend to be based on common,
underlying (slowly changing) modes of thought, cohesive systems of ideas, world views or
cosmologies … Different world orders co-exist, at times with mutual incomprehension of one
another.”
Other approaches have emerged to challenge the West-centered thinking in IR and offer
theoretical arguments beyond the Western universalist cannon. Post-colonial scholars wrote on
IR as viewed from global periphery (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Jones 2006; Tickner and
Weaver 2009; Tickner and Blaney 2012, 2013; Hobson 2012). Others (Oren 2002; Pelerin 2010)
pondered Anglo-American bias in Political Science and IR. Following Samuel Huntington’s
(1997) controversial “clash of civilizations” argument there have been also a resurgence of
interest in studying problems of religion, civilization, civilizational identity and their impact on
the formation of different worldviews (Hall and Jackson 2007; Anonymous 2008; Katzenstein
2009, 2012a, 2012b; Bettiza 2014).
Those supportive of the notion of universal scientific standard, particularly as practiced in
the West, are critical of the “non-Western” turn in IR. They express their concern about the
discipline’s coherence and view such standard as reflecting the ontological unity of the global
world with prescribed principles of behavior and procedures to resolve disputes among states.
While liberals emphasize the importance of international institutions, realists continue to
highlight the military-economic dimension of the world order, with some (Brooks, Ikenberry,
and Wohlforth 2012) favoring the leading role of the United States in preserving the West-
favored international balance of power. However, both realists and liberals are convinced that the
ontological unity of the world assumes a commitment to certain epistemological and scholarly
standards. As a result, these scholars view attempts by non-Western cultures to create their own
schools of IR as unsustainable and even prone to self-marginalization because such ambitions are
perceived as questioning the established universal principles of scientific knowledge (analysis,
verification, falsifiability, and others). For example, the American scholar Jack Snyder expressed
his readiness to study Confucianist thought for an understanding Chinese strategic culture, while
refusing to consider Confucianism as a legitimate philosophical foundation behind a special
Chinese school of IR (Acharya 2011).
Challenging the identified pluralist voices are not only Western rationalists, namely
liberals and realists, but also some post-structuralists. Despite being critical of West-centered IR,
these post-structuralist scholars support some commonly agreed principles of research and
express reservations about special schools in IR or even the idea of dialogue between “Western”
and “non-Western” approaches (Hutchings 2011; Makarychev and Morozov 2013). For instance,
according to the British scholar Kimberly Hutchins (2011), the very juxtaposition of “Western”
and “non-Western” excludes the possibility of a dialogue and may result in endless mutual
criticisms and reinforced parochialism.
Locally grounded perspectives on IR progress are less ambitious than various universalist
and rationalist models but are also more sensitive to cultural realities of the human world. Rather
than being timeless and universal, knowledge is contextual, socially constructed, and limited in

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its application. Scholars’ critical task therefore should be to identify (1) social boundaries within
which knowledge is constructed as authoritative and (2) social patterns that make progress of
knowledge possible. Following the approach of intellectual historians, one can argue that
knowledge progresses within a certain analytic tradition. Torbjorn Knutsen (1997, 11-12)
defined the latter as “an inherited pattern of thought or a sustained intellectual connection
through time along which scholars stipulate certain concepts, themes, and texts as functionally
similar.”3
Each analytic tradition is sustained by a certain ideology or a systematic presentation of
challenges for the self and relations with the other.4 Ideologies develop in response to various
historical developments and have a built-in capacity to influence national cohesiveness by
connecting across time and space. What often matters here are certain concepts, rather than fully
developed theories and propositions, that help to define the nature of social reality on a broader
level of abstraction before such a definition becomes accepted in scholarly work. Examples of
such concepts abound, and in the context of Western scholarship include those of “democracy”
and the “market economy.” Through these concepts, tradition and its ideological meaning is
consolidated within a certain discursive area. Conducive institutional arrangements, repetitive
historical practices, and the activities of intellectual entrepreneurs then assist the tradition in
confirming its status relative to others.
Individual contributions of well-positioned thinkers are especially important in
formulating key concepts and ideas behind each tradition. The ability of powerful minds to
influence progress of knowledge should not be taken for granted. Their concepts and theories
may serve as springboards5 for subsequent intellectual developments, thereby becoming isms,
each carrying names of powerful intellectuals – Marxism, Leninism, Keynesianism, Ghandism,
Confucianism, and the like. It would be hard to imagine modern Western realism without
individual contributions by Carl von Clausewitz, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz, just as it
would be difficult to think of contemporary liberalism without Immanuel Kant, Michael Doyle,
and Francis Fukuyama or socialism without Vladimir Lenin and Immanuel Wallerstein.
Intellectuals are frequently responsible for formulating ideas that are then borrowed by
politicians.6 In the post-Cold War context ideas such as “democratic peace” and “clash of
civilizations” became commonly exploited by American policy makers. Concepts such as
Fukuyama’s ‘‘end of history’’ and Samuel Huntington’s ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ each reflected
Western optimistic and pessimistic perspectives on a post-Cold War world. Both views were
received critically outside the United States and Europe, while representing examples of highly
influential ideas that originated in the West (Anonymous 2004).

Russian Geopolitical Theory between Univerisalism and Particularism

As with the Western IR community, Russia has established its own traditions of
intellectual progress. Russian geopolitics studies the country’s cultural and political borders and
identity vis-à-vis the West and non-Western civilizations. Broadly speaking, one can identify two
major traditions of geopolitical thinking – Universalism and Particularism – each with multiple
schools and approaches. Universalists favor global rationalist standards of scientific progress
which frequently translates into following mainstream developments in the West. They view
Russian IR as parochial, prone to isolationism, and not integrated with global research
(Makarychev and Morozov 2013, 332, 335). On the other hand, Particularists believe in progress
of indigenous knowledge as a necessary condition of intellectual development in Russia.7

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 Universalists and Particularists develop in dialogue and competition with each other.
Before the Bolshevik Revolution the main intellectual debate in Russia was between
Westernizers and Slavophiles about conditions of belongingness with the European world.
Westernizers supported Peter the Great’s efforts to modernize Russia and advocated a
widespread application of liberal European institutions on Russian ground. For example, the
Westernizers of the early nineteenth century followed the lead of people like Mikhail Speransky
and advocated constitutionalism and abolition of serfdom in Russia. Other Westernizers
emphasized the need for the country’s industrialization in contrast to Slavophiles, who often saw
the industrialization of Russia as a sell-out to Europe. The latter advocated Russia’s indigenous
tradition, which they visualized as a genuine religious and social community. Like Westernizers,
Slavophiles were thoroughly familiar with Western religious, social, and political tradition, but
they were convinced that the West had finished its role and that Russia must now become the
capital of world civilization. The late 19th century Slavophiles became thoroughly disappointed
in the West which gave impetus to a new intellectual current, Pan-Slavists. Pan-Slavists
advocated a Slav-based unity by proposing integration of Russia and East European peoples of
Slav origins.
After the Revolution, Marxism, a stepchild of Western civilization, became an official
ideology of Soviet Russia, which, for many years ahead, dictated the shape and form of domestic
debates. Yet even while maintaining its Marxist identity Russia developed distinct versions of
Universalism and Particularism. Universalists were unimpressed by Western constitutionalism,
but believed in progress based on technology and economic development. They wanted to
borrow Western technology in order to catch up with the West. Following the death of Josef
Stalin, they became more open to Western ideas and proceeded from the late-Vladimir Lenin’s
notion of “co-existence” with the “capitalist world.” Soviet Russia therefore developed its own
version of democratic socialism culminating in Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ in
relations with the West. The Soviet Particularists advocated a national version of Marxism
following Stalin, rather than Lenin and Lev Trotsky. The debate between Universalists and
Particularists continued although it was often set on the regime’s terms and phrased in Marxist
terminology.8 Following the Soviet breakup, Russia experienced a resurgence of geopolitical
thinking. The disappearance of the empire, collapse of the core state, emergence of ethnic
conflicts in Europe and Eurasia, and growing tensions between Russia and the West have
stimulated emergence of several schools of thought on Russia’s appropriate goals and strategy.9
Today geopolitics is taught in major Russian universities and tends to be essentialist and
influenced by power-centered approaches (Suslov 2013; Makinen 2014, 2015; Verkhovskii &
Pain 2015). The new debate emerged between Westernizers and Statists or supporters of the
status quo state, on the one hand, and those favoring empire and revision of the post-Soviet
boundaries, on the other. In terms of their geopolitical orientation, most Westernizers and Statists
are universalists while maintaining different standards of universalism. Westernizers place the
emphasis on imperatives of modernizing Russia’s economic and political institutions and
associate social and intellectual progress with following the example set by the liberal West.
However, Statists stress the priority of preserving state’s sovereignty and ability to respond to
external threats. Some Statists advocate strong ties with the West, whereas others call for
developing relations with non-Western countries, such as China. While most Statists do not
object the idea of modernization, they insist on preserving domestic order and independence in
foreign affairs.

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 The dominance of modern and pro-Western narratives was soon met with a formidable
opposition, which advanced a different civilizational identity for Russia. The latter perspective
advocated the notion of Russia as a distinctly Eurasianist power. Eurasianists emphasized
Russia’s self-sufficiency and many of the familiar features of the old Tsarist Russia, such as a
strong autocratic state and a state-dependent economy. They were assisted by the work of some
émigré intellectuals who developed the notion of Russia as a principally non-European,
“Eurasian” civilization (Eurasianism 1926). In addition to Eurasianists, there are new
Slavophiles and Pan-Slavists who present Russia as a distinct system of values within the larger
European and/or Western family. Although Slavophiles are particularists, they do not favor
isolation from the West and insist on Russia’s European cultural origins. Since the decline of the
USSR, various Slavophile and Pan-Slavist voices advocated for Russia’s Slavic, religious, and
linguistic affinity with its neighbors and saw the strengthening of these cultural ties as the way to
increase Russia’s profile within the larger European continent. In 1990, Alexander Solzhenitsyn
defended the revival of a Slavic community that includes Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and northern
Kazakhstan. Others advocated the idea of unifying Russian lands in the manner of German
unification at the end of the Cold War. Those with ties to Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) argue
for the notion of a Russian Orthodox empire capable of resisting the United States’ influence and
establishing an alliance with Europe and non-Western nations.
Another important divide within the camp of particularists concerns their
conceptualization of relations between local and universal. While some are inspired by visions of
self-sufficient and autarchic Eurasian or Orthodox empire, others prefer cross-cultural and cross-
civilizational dialogue across the world. Whereas the former are essentialist in viewing culture as
relatively homogeneous and closed to outside influences, the latter define cultures as subject to
change and interaction with other entities. The more isolationist thinkers are convinced that
Russia has everything it needs for its intellectual development and only lacks state ideological
guidance. Interestingly enough, while proclaiming that univeralist and pro-Western approaches
are alien to Russia’s indigenous values, Isolationists nevertheless borrow from Western
traditional geopolitical theories. For example, the recent text by Alexander Dugin, the founder of
neo-Eurasianist school within Russian geopolitical thought, demonstrates knowledge of various
IR approaches, but in constructing a theory of a multipolar world it relies on Carl Schmitt,
Samuel Huntington, and other traditional geopolitically-minded thinkers.10 On the other hand, the
more pluralist-minded particularists support Russia’s selected integration and dialogue with the
global IR community, but also argue for the mobilization of indigenous intellectual capital as a
necessary condition of such dialogue. In particular, for the purpose of bringing the “Russianness”
out, they advocate a stronger interaction of Russian IR theorists with those specializing in
Russian political philosophy.
Overall, Universalists and Particularists have been in complex relations, and have
included areas of both disagreement and overlap. Their historically extended engagement
produced multiple intellectual currents of those who are both universalist and pro-Western,
universalist yet critical of the West,11 particularist and hostile toward the West, and particularists
favoring cross-cultural dialogue. Still, while competing with each other, Universalists and
Particularists have mainly progressed within their own traditions. Universalists have advocated
Russia’s Westernization either in terms of replicating the West’s economic and political
institutions or establishing Russia as a modern great power respectful of existing international
rules and boundaries. In their turn, Particularists have argued for Russia’s civilizational
distinctiveness by viewing the country as culturally distinct from or even diametrically opposed

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to Western nations. Each tradition and each individual approach develop their own set of
theoretical concepts and ideological commitments that are sustained across time. In terms of
important intellectual influences, Universalists actively borrow from Western liberal and realist
thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama, Joseph Nye, and Kenneth Waltz, whereas Particularists rely
on those domestic or foreign thinkers who, like Huntington, tend to highlight Russia’s cultural
uniqueness.12
The most prominent discussed approaches and traditions within Russian IR are
summarized in table 1.
TABLE 1 HERE

Nikolay Danilevsky’s Ideas in Russian Intellectual Context

The Pioneer of Russian Particularism
Danilevsky (1822-1885) laid out his geopolitical ideas in the programmatic work Russia
and Europe published in 1869. He formulated his theory in the context of increased political
competition in Europe, as Russia was trying to recover its losses following the defeat in the
Crimean War. The new international context changed from the traditional Christian values that
united the continent before the war to secular nationalist politics and struggle for political and
military power. In part, Danilevsky’s critique of the Western, liberal Enlightenment ideals
echoed the eastern European and Prussian themes of anti-Westernism, Romanticism, and
nationalism with their emphasis on language, culture, and spirit (Knutsen 1997, 181-182).
Danilevsky championed the idea of culturally breaking away from Europe and completed
Russia’s transition from the country’s earlier particularist thinkers, Slavophiles.13 Slavophiles
emerged in the 1840s and thought of Russia as a unique and better part of Europe, a genuine
religious and social community. Their leaders such as Ivan Kireyevsky, Alexei Khomyakov,
Kostantin Aksakov, Sergei Aksakov, and Vladimir Solovyev placed Christianity at the center of
their reflections about the role of Russia in Europe. As different as they were from Westernizers,
Slavophiles saw Europe as Russia’s only significant other, by viewing development of one in
terms of another.
Danilevsky sought to break with Slavophiles in two ways. First, he designated Russia as a
principally non-European culture. In his view, the critically important features of Russia were
not a social community or its peasant equivalent, commune (obschina), and not even
Christianity, but an ability to develop independently from European and other civilizations as a
separate economic, political, and cultural entity. Although he shared Slavophiles’ criticism of
Peter the Great’s attempts to impose Western European cultural traditions on Russia, Danilevsky
strongly defended Peter’s state-building priorities. “In Peter’s activities, we must strictly separate
two sides – on the one hand, his state role that includes military, navy, administrative, and
industrial initiatives, and on the other hand, his reforms devoted to changing life style, mentality,
habits, and ideas of Russian people. He deserves our eternal recognition and cherished memory
for his state role … However the second side [of Peter] brought Russia the greatest harm”
(Danilevsky 1991, 265-266).14
Secondly, Danilevsky refused to equate Slavic with Eastern Christian religion.
Humiliated by defeat in the Crimean War, Russia was then experiencing revival of the ideas of
Slavic unity. However, a biologist by training, he was closer to the agnostic and positivist
outlook, rather than the religious one. His foundations of cultural-historical types had more to do
with linguistic and ethnographic characteristics than with religion. Philosophical and religious
reflections of early Slavophiles, beginning with Khomyakov and Kireyevsky, were quite alien to

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Danilevsky. Nikolay Berdyaev (1990, 99) was correct to identify Danilevsky as “a man of an
entirely different origin.”
Danilevsky’s theory bears resemblance with some Western particularist thinkers. Partly
under German influences,15 Danilevsky proposed to rethink the accepted principles of analyzing
world history as universal by rejecting the linear view of progress and identifying local
“historico-cultural types.” (HCTs) Anticipating the later theories of Spengler, Toynbee, and
Huntington, Danilevsky (1990, 88) distinguished multiple civilizations in the past, of which
Romano-Germanic or European was only one. Other HCTs included Egyptian, Chinese,
Assyrian-Babylonian-Phoenician, Indian, Iranian, Jewish, Greek, Roman, and Arabian. “These
types are not evolutionary stages on the ladder of gradual perfectibility … but entirely different
plans – plans without any common denominator – in which each entity evolves in a specific and
distinct fashion toward the multiformity and perfection within its reach” (Danilevsky 1990, 8).
As he did not view progress in unidirectional and universal terms, Danilevsky (1990,
123) proposed to abandon the concept of “universal humanity” (obshchechelovechestvo) “not
only because it does not exist, but also because to desire it means being satisfied with banality
and absence any color and originality." Having rejected the notion of universal humanity,
Danilevsky introduced the concept of “all-humanity” (vsechelovechestvo), by which he meant a
richness of cross-cultural interactions across the world. He compared those interactions with
those streets that form squares by crossing. For Russia, this perspective did not mean the need to
“lead” Europe or “catch up” with it, as was emphasized by Slavophiles and Westernizers,
respectively. Instead, it meant development of its own, Slavic type that would progress on the
basis of its own laws.
Being a scientist, Danilevsky (1990, 91-92) articulated “laws” in development of HCTs.
The first law posited the linguistic criteria in forming such types. The second one linked political
independence to their emergence and successful development.16 The third one stressed relativism
in development of HCTs which “are influenced by preceding or contemporary alien
civilizations”, yet not transferable to other people. The fourth law concerned importance of
ethnic and political (federation) diversity as preconditions for development and strengthening
various cultural types. Finally, the fifth law described growth of civilization by positing a
relatively long period of its formation and a relatively short period of “flourishing and bearing
fruits.”
Danilevsky’s laws of HCTs are summarized in table 2.
TABLE 2 HERE
These laws were intended to show a way to Russia’s own new and eleventh cultural type
that might yet prove to be the most developed and would not owe anything to Europe.
Danilevsky’s outlook was more optimistic than those of Western particularists like Spengler and
Huntington. Rather than viewing his culture as one in decline or on defense, he thought of the
Slavic type as a young and capable of producing political, social, and economic foundations
required for its authentic development. In his assessment, Russia only completed its state-
building in the second half of 19th century when, by liberating peasants, it entered the stage of
flourishing (Danilevsky 1990, 508). However, the main struggle for Slavic independence was
still ahead and would involve assertiveness of Slavs’ interests before the Roman-Germanic
world. Here, the thinker insisted that Russia had to abandon Christian principles (as the enemy
had already done so) and be guided exclusively by interests of state. “An eye for an eye … is the
law of foreign policy and state to state relations. Here, there is no room for love and self-
sacrifice” (Danilevsky 1990, 34). Danilevsky’s practical recommendations included forming an

8
all-Slav federation with its capital in Constantinople, pushing Turks and Austro-Hungarians from
the Balkans, annexing territories populated by ethnic Russians (Galicia and Russians-Ugors), and
gaining full control over the Black Sea and the Straits. The “Russo-Slavic egoism” also
demanded to pit European nations against each other, and not seek that they balance each other.
Only when Europe “is fighting, it can be secure to us.”17
Overall, Danilevsky produced a principally new version of Russian particularism – the
one that was more expansionist, essentialist, and anti-European than that of Slavophiles.
Although his theory contained some elements of dialogue by reflecting on richness of global
cross-cultural interactions, the general thrust revealed hostility toward the European West.

Russia’s Reception of Danilevsky’s Ideas

Danilevsky’s ideas powerfully shaped future intellectual developments in Russia.
Although these ideas were initially met with critical reactions from Westernizers and
Slavophiles, they provided a vocabulary for a new nationalist thinking and paved a way to even
more radical anti-European reactions.
Westernizers and Slavophiles attacked Danilevsky for his anti-European stance.
Westernizers reiterated their belief in Europe’s future and presented the thinker’s idea of HCTs
as a degradation of Russian discourse. In particular, the prominent historian turned politician and
a leader of Cadets or constitutional democrats, Pavel Milyukov, saw in Danilevsky’s book a
dangerous utopia and hailed Danilevsky’s views of a Pan-Slav federation headed by Russia as
nothing but an ideology of “hatred toward Europe” (Novikova and Sizemskaya 1997, 174). As to
Slavophiles, they accused Danilevsky of a desire to create a Slav future on the ruins of European
culture (Solovyev 2000, 413).18 Unlike the early Slavophiles who believed in the superiority of
Orthodox Christian ideals, new Slavophiles and their intellectual leader Vladimir Solovyev saw
Russia’s salvation in strengthening an ecumenical dialogue with European Catholicism.
Solovyev therefore refused to engage Danilevsky on the issue of potentially progressive non-
European developments. Along with Westernizers, Solovyev did not grant enlightenment to
non-European cultures and his attitude toward the East remained deeply ethnocentric, which was
soon noted by their critics (Strakhov 1990).19 His way of reconciling the East with the West was
through coercive power and the imposition of Russian values.
However, Westernizers and Slavophiles were missing the momentum. Excessively
focused on Europe, they failed to see that under pressures generated by a struggle of liberal and
egalitarian ideas, the European continent began to crumble by splitting into progressive and anti-
revolutionary camps. Europe was increasingly entering the turmoil of war and revolution.
Russia’s alignment with France and Britain and, subsequently, the decision to go to war in 1914
served to strengthen socialist radicals at home at the expense of established liberals and
conservatives. As Germany was increasingly challenging Russia’s position in Europe, new pan-
Slavist voices in Russia grew extremely critical of what they described as the “Romano-
Germanic cultural type’s” encroachment on Balkan Slavs. This presented a contrast to
Danilevsky’s thinking about tactically rebuilding relations with the newly established Germany
for the purpose of regaining Russia’s internal strength. Many pan-Slavists now sympathized with
the idea of fighting Germany as a way to revive Russia (Anonymous 2012, 87). In the end, both
Russia and Germany paid dearly for participating in World War I, and the October 1917
revolution led to establishment of a radically leftist political system.
Despite the radical change, Danilevsky’s ideas proved resilient and in demand on both
right and left. On the right, a new movement of émigré intellectuals soon emerged to introduce

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the idea of Russia as a “Eurasian” civilization. Eurasianists drew from diverse sources, but the
influence of Danilevsky was undoubtedly significant.20 One of Eurasianism’s leaders Nikolai
Trubetskoy was a linguist by training, who took Danilevsky’s “laws” of HCTs to his heart. Not
only did Trubetskoy identify linguistic and ethnic foundations of Russia-Eurasia, but he also
built on Danilevsky’s points about non-transferable nature of cultures’ essential characteristics.
Also influenced by Leontyev, Trubetskoy further developed the idea of cultural relativism by
positing the “organic” connection of “culture, ethnicity, and geography” (Eurasianism 1926,
128). Leontyev parted with his teacher Danilevsky’s belief in a kingdom of Slavs as a way to
defend Russia’s distinctiveness and predicted that Russia would create a “neo-Byzantine”, rather
than a Slavonic, cultural type (Leontyev 1875). Russia’s global mission, Leontyev believed,
would be to draw on the moral force of Byzantine Orthodoxy and save Europe from herself by
“uniting the Chinese state model with Indian religiousness, and subordinating European
socialism to them” (Duncan 2000 42-43). These ideas became critically important to Eurasianists
and were highlighted in Trubetskoy’s best known work Europe and Humanity. The thinker also
formulated the idea of Turanian or Turkic and other influences on Russia’s civilization
(Trubetskoy 1993).
Another prominent Eurasianist who lived to see the end of the Soviet era and was a
geographer by training was Nikolay Gumilev. Influenced by classical Eurasianists such as Pyotr
Savitsky and Trubetskoi, Gumilev also spoke highly of Danilevsky, particularly his ideas of
culture’s cyclical development. Gumilev accepted Danilevsky’s view that sufficiently powerful
cultures borrow from each other, but never assimilate and rarely cooperate. In Gumilev’s view,
such cultural values were “mutually exclusive or at least poorly compatible” (Gumilev and
Yermolayev 2002, 469). Much like Danilevsky, Leontyev, and the Eurasianists, Gumilev (1990)
also believed that Europe represents an alien Supraethnic group and can never be mixed with
Russia.
Danilevsky’s ideas of Russia’s cultural self-sufficiency partly resonated even with
socialists, communists and their sympathizers. One admirer of these ideas was émigré
intellectual Nikolay Ustryalov who was sympathetic with the Bolshevik revolution and worked
to develop the particularistic ideology of National-Bolshevism for Soviet Russia.21 In addition,
there was a leftist group within the Eurasianist movement that did not position itself as radically
critical of the Soviet system. Based in Paris, rather than in Prague (as Trubetskoy and Savitsky),
Pyotr Suvchinsky, Dmitry Svyatopolk-Mirsky, Lev Karsavin, and others demonstrated their
openness to Marxism.22 Finally, in response to all these developments, some Soviet communists
entertained merging socialist ideas with those of nationalism and cultural isolationism. The fact
that Stalin at times appealed to Russian, rather than Marxist, slogans and symbols, in his own
way, encouraged the indigenous tradition of nationalist thinking (Dunlop 1983, 15). After the
end of Stalin’s terrorist rule, the Soviet regime became more susceptible to nationalist ideas.23
Many of Russia’s new nationalists opposed the Soviet regime, but, following the Danilevsky’s
tradition, continued to be highly critical of the West and visualized Russia as socially and
culturally superior. Within Russian nationalism, the so-called National Bolsheviks were
advocating a synthesis of the Bolshevik regime and Russia’s indigenous tradition.24

Danilevsky and Contemporary Russian Geopolitics

The Revival of Interest in Danilevsky
After the Soviet dissolution, Danilevsky’s ideas enjoyed a remarkable influence. The first
edition of his book in 1991 sold 70,000 copies and became a standard reading at military

10
academies. At least seven other editions were published since then (Woodburn 2013, xiv, xvii).
The translator of Danilevsky in English wrote than “his book which was only modestly
successful in his lifetime, now enjoys the greatest fame and readership it has ever had – within
Russia at least” (Woodburn 2013, xvii). He appropriately called Russia and Europe “the most
important nineteenth century book for the post-Soviet period and thus an object worthy of further
study by specialists and non-specialists alike” (Woodburn 2013, xxv).
Danilevsky strongly influenced the language and arguments of neo-Eurasianists in their
newly revived debate with Westernizers. Westernizers, as a century ago, asserted that Russia is
an organic part of Western civilization, whose “genuine” identity was hijacked by the Bolsheviks
and the Soviet system and that the country would nevertheless develop in the same direction as
the West. The dominance of pro-Western narratives, associated with Mikhail Gorbachev and
Boris Yeltsin, was soon met with a formidable opposition, which advanced a different
civilizational identity for Russia. Initiated by presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich and then the
Chief of Foreign Intelligence, Yevgeny Primakov, this perspective advocated the notion of
Russia as a distinctly Eurasianist power by advancing the familiar arguments of Russia’s cultural
self-sufficiency in the face of pressures from the West. Outside the political circles, most
prominent Eurasianist, nationalist, and neo-Slavophile thinkers did not hide Danilevsky’s
influence on their theories and heavily relied on his arguments (Zyuganov 2002; Narochnitskaya
2004; Kortunov 2009; Dugin 2013). One of Russia’s leading geopolitical thinkers Vadim
Tsymbursky (2007) even wrote his doctoral dissertation on Danilevsky’s geopolitical theory in
which Tsymbursky especially praised Danilevsky’s vision of Russia and Europe as “distinct yet
partly interdependent and therefore competing for mastering their geocultural spaces.”25
National communist approaches also experienced a revival by drawing on Danilevsky
and other geopolitical theories. The leader of Russian communists Gennady Zyuganov and his
followers produced multiple books, in which they insisted on Russia’s special civilizational role
in the world and argued, alongside Danilevsky, that civilizational differences cause a
“fundamental alienation of Europe from Russia.”26 They advocated the perspective on Russia as
a unique mix of different ethnic groups, with a singular geopolitical mission of pacifying the
Eurasian region and containing Western influences. They further maintained that, as a unique
civilization, Russia must be isolated from the West to survive and preserve its uniqueness.
Many of those in Russian academia, expert, and policy circles who reference
Danilevsky’s work adopt a highly positive tone. In Russia he is widely recognized and credited
as the founding father of the idea of the plurality of civilization in world politics (Dugin 2014).
In the context of broken relations with the West, many view such plurality as a precondition of
Russia’s cultural and political survival. For example, the leading neo-Slavophile thinker Natalya
Narochnitskaya (2004, 105) called Danilevsky’s “theory of HCTs and especially his sociology of
Western culture murderous” for West-centered ideas of Russia. Several prominent theoretical
concepts, including those of the geopolitical “island” (Vadim Tsymbursky), “Orthodox
civilization” (Alexander Panarin), and “Eurasian empire” (Alexander Dugin) all have their
partial roots in Danilevsky.27
The overall revival of civilizational thinking in Russia has been evident in both
intellectual and political circles. Officials, such as Vladimir Yakunin (2012, 2013), Minister of
Railroad Transportation, advance the notion of Russia-civilization in their speeches and public
writing. A number of Orthodox priests, including Patriarch Kirill, endorse the idea of Russia’s
religion-centered civilizational distinctiveness.28 Politicians from the relatively marginal to the

11
well-established ones regularly speak on issues of Russia’s national interests as tied to its
geopolitical and cultural self-sufficiency.
A recent survey of leading experts on Russian IR theory found that Danilevsky’s
influence in Russian academia is considerably more prominent than that of other Russian and
Western thinkers. The survey was conducted in August-October 2013 among experts teaching IR
theory in Russian universities in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan’, Irkutsk,
Tomsk, and Vladivistok in order to assess the state of Russian IR theory relative to its
development in the 1990s and in comparison with foreign/Western countries. In particular, the
survey asked IR scholars to choose among the categories of “successful development”, “crisis”,
and “overcoming crisis,” or propose a classification of their own; explain the state of Russian IR;
assess the need to develop a special Russian school of IR; and propose avenues for development
of IR in the country.29 According to the survey, Russian academics view as especially promising
those thinkers who theorize nation as a special system of values. In response to a request to
identify the three most important Russian thinkers of the 19th-20th century relevant to the
development of RSIR, 35% identified Danilevsky, 18% did Konstantin Leontyev, and 15% did
Alexander Panarin (see table 4 for all identified thinkers). Around 15% of respondents indicated
their support for ideas of Eurasianism and Eurasian integration as especially significant for
Russia.30 Eurasianists, of course, were themselves influenced by Danilevsky.
TABLE 3 HERE
The findings from the cited survey are further supported by analysis of citations of
Danilevsky’s Russia and Europe relative to work by prominent Western and Russian thinkers.
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate patterns of such citations. Relative to Western thinkers, Danilevsky’s
work is cited considerably more frequently – especially since 2010 – than two best known works
by contemporary American intellectuals Fukuyama and Huntington. The dominance of
Danilevsky in comparison with national particularist thinkers is even more evident. Table 6
compares his citation rating to those by prominent thinkers Ivan Ilyin and Nikolay Trubetskoy.
The latter two are especially well-known and were selected as favorites of Vladimir Putin and
the Kremlin’s best known chief propagandist Vladimir Surkov.31 The results were obtained
through https://scholar.google search engine.32
TABLES 4, 5 HERE

Explaining the Rise of Danilevsky’s Ideas in Russian Geopolitics

In order to understand the rise of Danilevsky’s ideas in Russian geopolitical thinking, this
section employs a social identity explanation. I treat the shift to Danilevsky as a national identity
reaction to socially perceived outside challenges. Scholars have documented how outside
changes challenge nations’ distinct identities creating the condition of ontological insecurity
(Kinnvall 2004; Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008; Zarakol 2011; Bettiza 2014) and “identity crisis”
(Guzzini 2012).33 In such cases, ideas of prominent thinkers serve to articulate national concerns
and propose appropriate responses. In cases when outside pressures to comply are combined with
highly unstable domestic conditions, national reaction may take form of a cultural backlash by
encouraging nationalist feelings and perception of threat to national values.
In case of Russia, the identity crisis is a product of historically contested relations with
the West. In some cases Europe and the West’s influences have tied Russia closer to the Western
nations. The West often served as the source of Russia’s modernization, and Russia fought
multiple wars alongside European nations. On the other hand, each time the Western nations
have pressured Russia to revise its values in line with those of the West, Russian elites have

12
mobilized for a counter-response. Due to Russia’s cultural distinctiveness, such pressures served
to further alienate Russia from its significant other (Anonymous 2012). In addition, Russia has
historically suffered from breakups of its state by exacerbating its sense of vulnerability in face
of Western pressures. In the unstable environment that follows state collapse and confronted with
outside pressures, Russian thinkers are more likely to stress the country’s need to preserve its
distinctiveness or even pursue isolation from the West. A Russia that is more vulnerable to
domestic instability is likely to react to external challenges defensively, viewing them as
threatening its system of values.
Table 6 summarizes our explanation of Danilevsky’s influence.
TABLE 6 HERE
In the first half of the 20 century, Danilevsky influenced Eurasianist and national
th

communist thinking in the context of state revolutionary breakdown and Western military
intervention against Soviet Russia. To Russian particularists the intervention had less to do with
the nature of new regime in the country than the West’s ambitions to undermine Russia’s identity
and downsize its territory. Both Eurasianists and national communists felt this way. Eurasianists
were deeply suspicious of Europe’s intent to pressure Russia from the Balkans and impose its
culture on Russia. Their leader Trubetskoi (2002) spoke of the need to establish Eurasia as a
“special autarchic world.” Exacerbated by the West’s military hostility some Eurasianists even
felt compelled to forget their old hatred for Bolshevism. As to national communists, they too
wanted to preserve the traditional historical area of Russian domination by pursuing self-
sufficiency and minimized reliance on the outside world. In particular, Stalin’s policies reflected
external insecurity and perceived weaknesses at home. Despite diplomatic recognition by the
West, the Soviet leaders had a fresh memory of Western military intervention and lived in
constant fear of being attacked. At home, the Soviet Union was recovering from a long, violent
and devastating civil war that killed millions of people and disorganized industrial and
agricultural production. Stalin’s idea of “socialism in one country” was a particularist project
couched in Marxist terms of the unequal and uneven development of capitalist countries. It was
only a matter of time before communists would turn to nationalist ideas that had strong roots in
Danilevsky.
With respect to contemporary Russia, Western pressures took form of NATO expansion and
global democracy promotion. In the context of domestic instability following the Soviet disintegration,
these pressures served to revive nationalist ideas. Such ideas have been available since the 1990s and
have been adopted by movements of neo-Slavophile, neo-Eurasianist, and neo-communist orientation.
This explains the above-cited proliferation of attempts to theorize nation as a special system of values
particularly as grounded in Danilevsky. In his Russia and Europe nationalist authors found a key
intellectual foundation that provided them with relevant theoretical arguments and conceptual
apparatus. Proposed culturally specific concepts also included those of the geopolitical “island” (Vadim
Tsymbursky), “Orthodox civilization” (Alexander Panarin), “Eurasian empire” (Alexander Dugin), “new
West” (Dmitry Trenin), “peripheral empire” (Alexander Kagarlitsky), and others (Anonymous 2014). At
least some of them such as Tsymbursky, Panarin, and Dugin were influenced by Danilevsky. 34Nationalist
ideas influenced the Kremlin which then provided the environment favorable for their further
proliferation. The sharp rise of references to Danilevsky’s work by intellectuals as noted in tables
4 and 5 may be explained by the state turn to the exclusionary language of Western threats to
Russia’s identity after 2010. The next section considers the role of state and foreign policy in
greater details.

Danilevsky, Particularism, and Foreign Policy

13
 Danilevsky’s ideas and the particularist turn they represent have also affected Russia’s
official thinking about the world and foreign policy. The above-cited expansion of the West’s
political and security institutions created the room that became filled with increasingly
nationalist justification of Russia’s international position. President Putin’s own transformation
is instructive here. Throughout the 2000s, he sought to position his country as a part of the Euro-
Atlantic world and was commonly dismissive of calls to address the identity issue by formulating
a new version of the “Russian idea”35 by instead filling his speeches with indicators of Russia’s
economic and political successes. However, following the series of colored revolutions in
Eurasia in the mid-2000s, his attitude began to change in the anti-American and anti-Western
direction. Increasingly, Putin speeches were couched in terms of the West not granting Russia
equal status and recognition it deserved. Designation of the West-sympathetic Dmitry Medvedev
as his successor was Putin’s last attempt to strengthen relations with Western nations, but did not
lead to the aspired recognition of Russia.36
Putin’s announced decision to return to power in September 2011 was followed by
powerful political protests over fraudulent parliamentary elections in December and then by
renewed Western pressures to democratize Russia’s political system. In response, Putin moved
toward embracing the language of civilization and Western threats to Russia’s values that had
been commonly employed in the circles of Danilevsky admirers. In particular, Putin articulated
the idea of Russia as a state-civilization. The new official nationalities strategy until 2025 signed
by Putin in December 2012 reads like a statement on Danilevsky’s HCT. It re-introduces Russia
as a “unique socio-cultural civilizational entity formed of the multi-people Russian nation”
(Gorodetskaya 2012). In foreign relations, the Kremlin’s new language is also that of
samobytnost, or distinct values and cultural self-standing. In various speeches, Putin has
emphasized Russia’s special characteristics by declaring his country’s right to independently
choose its own identity and development path. Indeed, the language and arguments in some of
Putin’s public statements have been so strikingly similar to those by Danilevsky that a number of
scholars have explicitly connected the two (Yanov 2012; Guillory 2013; Malykhina 2014, 50).
For instance, in his Valdai Club speech, he quoted Russian particularist thinkers Konstantin
Leontyev and Alexander Solzhenitsyn and declared “the desire for independence and sovereignty
in spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres” as an “integral part of our national character”
(Putin 2013).
Russia’s foreign policy remains a work in progress and is yet to fully embrace
Danilevsky’s isolationism and hostility toward the West. The Kremlin continues to look for ways
to engage the West in common economic and security projects. Russia’s officials also frequently
position the Eurasian Union as a predominantly economic union and prefer to exercise influence
in the region through informal channels and soft power. Although Putin’s increasingly nationalist
vision is couched in Eurasianist terms in order to reach out to traditional critics of the state, the
Kremlin kept political and ideological distance from radical nationalist organizations and ideas
(Laruelle 2015a, 2015b). Despite nationalist pressures, Russia refused to recognize separatist
entities in the eastern Ukraine, let alone annex them in the manner of Crimea. Those who
expected Putin to assemble the historic Russian lands were disappointed.
At the same time, Russia’s foreign policy began to reflect the new particularist
conceptualization. In addition to considerations of economic development and balance of power,
Russia’s emphases on building the Eurasian Union, turning to Asia-Pacific region, or resisting
Western interventions are influenced by the new vision of state-civilization. Increasingly, the
new motivation behind Russia’s actions abroad is to rebuild relationships in the post-Soviet

14
Eurasia by presenting a new cross-ethnic community and civilizational alternative to the
European Union (Lukin 2014; Anonymous 2015a). The fact that the U.S. and the EU have
worked to keep Ukraine away from the Russia-dominant Eurasian Union may have contributed
to the Kremlin’s motivation to develop Russia’s own civilizational ideology. The West’s
sanctions against the Russian economy in response to the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea and
support for eastern fighters in Ukrainian civil war served to strengthen Russia’s reorientation
away from Western nations and toward China (Trenin 2015). Such foreign pressures also
emboldened those defending the objective of Russia’s development in isolation from Europe
(Glazyev 2014).

Conclusion
The paper analyzed the particularist ideas of Danilevsky as expressed in his main book
and their influence in Russia over the last hundred years. I have found that his notion of HCTs
preempted ideas of some prominent European and American thinkers and have proliferated in
both conservative and socialist circles in Russia. In the twentieth century, Eurasianists and
National Bolsheviks drew on particularism in order to preserve what they saw as foundations of
Russia’s civilization. In the contemporary Russian geopolitical discussions the influence of
Danilevsky is even more pronounced as indicated by references to his work by academics and
public figures. Russian international and political theory continues to progress in his shadow.
Such prominence of Danilevsky as well as other particularist thinkers can be explained
by Russia’s growing sense of vulnerability and desire by the country’s leading intellectuals to
preserve their culture in the face of what they perceive to be the West’s relentless economic and
political expansion. The Bolshevik Revolution served to mobilize those inside and outside
Russia who were preoccupied with its survival as a state. Even some descendants of those who
fought against Bolshevism joined in advocating Russia’s principal difference from Europe, as
inspired by Danilevsky’s work. Among them, the Eurasianist movement was especially
important. In the late 20th century, the breakup of the Soviet state reactivated Russia’s fears for
its survival as exacerbated by the West’s policies of NATO expansion and global democracy
promotion and regime change. In the words of editors responsible for translation of Danilevsky’s
book in English, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, his message about a special
Russian destiny has again found a ready audience among many (Danilevskii 2013, back cover).
In today’s Russia Danilevsky and other culturally essentialist IR theories dominate over
constructivist and agency-sensitive approaches. In the contemporary climate of Russia-West
tensions, Danilevsky’s geopolitical ideas will continue to serve as a justification of anti-Western
foreign policy and domestic consolidation of the state. Continued pressures on Russia by the
United States and the European Union may further strengthen the discourse of nationalism and
imperial conquest inside Russia. If, however, engagement of Russia in joint projects and
endeavors is preferred to Western pressures, Danilevsky’s ideas may be read differently – as a
moderate nationalist interpretation of the country’s cultural identity. The West’s difference will
still be viewed as fundamental, but not as principally threatening Russia’s own development. The
nationalist work by Danilevsky and other particularists may then serve to raise awareness of
Russia’s distinct cultural values and their potential to contribute to the country’s economic and
political development.

15
Table 1 Russian IR Traditions: Universalism Vs Particularism

Universalism Particularism

Pre-Soviet Westernizers Slavophiles

Soviet Democratic socialists National Communists

Post-Soviet Liberal Westernizers (Neo) Eurasianists

Statists (Neo) Slavophiles

Table 2 Danilevsky’s “Laws” of Historico-Cultural Types (HCTs)

1. Linguistic foundation HCTs are founded by a common language

2. Political independence HCTs must be politically independent
3. Cultural relativism Characteristics of HCTs cannot be transferred to other people
4. Internal diversity HCTs must be internally diverse ethnically and politically
5. Growth HCTs take a long time to form and a short one to bring results

Table 3 Most Important Russian Thinkers as Viewed by IR Scholars in Russia

Russian Thinkers Assessment

N. Danilevsky 35%
C. Leontyev 18%
A. Panarin 15%
V. Vernadsky 10%
N. Gumilev 10%
N. Berdyayev 10%
V. Solovyev 8%
N. Тrubetskoi 8%
A. Gertsen 5%
N. Savitsky 5%
P. Sorokin 5%
V. Lenin 5%
S. Witte 5%

Table 4 Danilevsky & Contemporary Western Thinkers: Russian Citations, 1995-2015

16
 1000
900
800
700
600
500 Danilevsky
400 Fukuyama
300
Huntington
200
100
0
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Danilevsky: “Rossiya i Yevropa”, 1869 (Russia and Europe)

Fukuyama: “End of History”, 1989
Huntington: “Clash of Civilizations”, 1993

Table 5 Danilevsky & Russian Particularists, Russian Citations, 1995-2015

1000
900
800
700
600
500 Danilevsky

400 Ilyin
300
Trubetskoy
200
100
0
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Danilevsky: “Rossiya i Yevropa”, 1869 (Russia and Europe)

Ilyin: “Nashi zadachi”, 1956 (Our tasks)
Trubetskoy: “Yevropa i chelovechestvo”, 1920 (Europe and humanity)

17
Table 6 Explanation of Danilevsky’s Influence

Historical Period Domestic Instability Western Pressures

Early 20th century Breakup of the Russian state Military intervention

Early 21st century The Soviet breakup Expansion of NATO and

promotion of democracy/

18
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24
Endnotes

25
1
In the West, Danilevsky’s book has been recently translated with an extended introduction by by
Stephen M. Woodburn (Danilevskii 2013). For earlier work on Danilevsky, see MacMaster 1967.
Western surveys of Russian political thought normally include review of Danilevsky. See, for example,
Walicki 1979; Neumann 1996; Duncan 2000; Pipes 2008.
2
For some exceptions, see Rabotiazhev and Solov'ev 2008; Verkhovskii and Pain 2015.
3
For other prominent attempts to reconstruct history and development of IR theory, see Wight 1992;
Doyle 1997; Schmidt 1998; Donnelly 2000; Tickner and Waever 2009.
4
For a theoretical discussion of ideology, see Gerring 1997, Freeden 2006, Anonymous 2010.
5
For a discussion of ideas as springboards, see Goldstein and Keohane1993.
6
The reverse is also true.
7
This section provides a brief summary of Russian intellectual developments. For a more extended
analysis of Russian IR currents, see Anonymous 2010, 2014; Lebedeva 2012; Anonymous 2008, 2013.
8
Within Russian nationalism, the so-called National Bolsheviks, to use Mikhail Agurski and John
Dunlop’s term, were advocating a synthesis of the Bolshevik regime and Russia’s indigineous tradition
(Agurski 1987; Dunlop 1983, 254-265).
9
For some surveys of Russian geopolitical thinking see Tsygankov 2003; Bassin and Aksenov 2006;
Kovalev 2014.
10
Alexander G. Dugin, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya: paradigmy, teoriyi, sotsiologiya [International
relations: paradigms, theories, and sociology] (Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt, 2013).
11
In addition to Statists that are critical of some limited areas of Western universalism, there are also
neo-Marxist scholars who remain highly critical of the West and Western modernity-defined global
status quo (Kagarlitsky 2003, 2010, 2012)
12
For more on intellectual influences on Russian IR approaches, see anonymous 2007, 2014.
13
The second thinker who broke with Slavophile line of thinking was Konstantin Leontyev (1831-
1891), who thought of himself as a student Danilevsky, but went farther than his teacher by embracing
the East and predicting that Russia would establish a “neo-Byzantine”, rather than Slavonic, cultural
type (Leontyev 1875).
14
Everywhere the translation is mine.
15
Vladimir Solovyev offered a detailed critique of such influences in his work “Nemetskiy podlinnik
russkiy spisok” (The German original and the Russian list) (Solovyev 2000a, 561-591).
16
Such approach was developed by Huntington (1997, 310), according to whom power precedes
culture, not the other way around. Other approaches to inter-civilizational interaction assumed more
complex relations between political and cultural (O’Hagan 2001; Tsygankov 2004; Hall and Jackson
2007; Katzeinstein 2009; Bettiza 2014).
17
Danilevsky 1990, 443. Following Feodor Tyutchev, Danilevsky wanted the Russian Empire to be
expanded at the expense of some territories of Austria, Italy, and Prussia (Tsymbursky 2006, 110).
18
Solovyev had a similarly harsh reaction to the writing of Leontyev (Solovyev 2000b, 418).
19
Solovyev, for instance, demonstrated his deep fear of the Muslim East, referred to Islam as an
“inhuman God” and later became obsessed with the “yellow peril” (Duncan 2000, 44-45).
20
On Eurasianism and various influences on it, see Riasanovsky 1967; Shlapentokh 1997; Laruelle
2008; Bassin 2011; Bassin, Glebov and Laruelle 2015.
21
See Mikhail Agursky (1987) for Danilevsky’s influence on Ustryalov’s ideology.
22
Some of them later chose to return to Russia, but were imprisoned by the Soviet government. On this
and other developments within Russian Eurasianism, see Laruelle 2008.
23
For Western studies of Russian nationalism, see Dunlop 1983, 1985; Agurski 1987; Brudny 1998;
Tuminez 2000.
24
Agurski 1987; Dunlop 1983, 254-265.
25
Some fragments of Tsymbursky’s dissertation are available at
http://politconservatism.ru/forecasts/nikolay-danilevskiy-kak-geopolitik-chast-pervaya-/
Tsymbursky also took issues with Danilevsky’s hopes for tactical cooperation with Germany as the
nation capable to destroy Russia’s favored cultural influence in Eurasia.
26
For example, see Zyuganov 1999, 13; Nartov 1999, 95. Both writers discuss the significance of
Danilevsky and other particularists for their own thinking and devote special chapters to Russian
geopolitical schools. For Russian contemporary geopolitical and civilizational thinking, see Bassin and
Aksenov 2006; anonymous 2010; Suslov 2013.
27
For elaboration, see Anonymous 2013.
28
In particular, Kirill endorsed Russkaya doktrina (2007).
29
We identified forty teachers of IR theory and geopolitics to participate in the survey. The rate of
response was 80%. Although the sample was limited in size, the respondents diverged geographically,
with respect to gender, age, theoretical, and methodological preferences. In particular, 65% of them
were males and 45% under the age of forty five. Geographically, 45% teach in Moscow, 20% in St.
Petersburg, 20% in other cities of Russia, and 15% in Europe and the United States. The fact that most
of those surveyed teach in Moscow and St. Petersburg generally reflects the geography of Russian IR
that remains predominantly concentrated in the country’s two capitals. In terms of IR worldviews,
about one third of them come close to identifying themselves as influenced by realism and another third
by liberalism. Influences of the remaining part are either unknown or not related to realism and
liberalism.
In order to further diversify the sample, we also surveyed a small group of those Russian scholars
studying IR developments and well-familiar with IR theory in Russia, but teaching in foreign
universities of Europe and the United States. Although the sample of respondents is small, its results
are suggestive and support results of our qualitative interviews in Moscow and St. Petersburg. For
further details on the survey’s results, see Anonymous 2014.
30
Besides Panarin, other Eurasianist thinkers listed in table 4 as important are Nicholai Gumelev
(10%), Nicholai Trubetskoi (8%), and Nicholai Savitsky (5%).
31
Both Putin and Surkov approvingly quoted Ilyin and Trubetskoy on several occasions.
32
For comparative purposes I entered names of Danilevsky, Fukuyama, Huntington, Ilyin, and
Trubetskoy. In order to isolate the citation impact of their most important works I entered titles of their
best known books. The selected entries were Danilevsky russia and europe, Fukuyama end of history,
Huntington clash of civilizations, Ilyin our tasks, Trubetskoy europe and humanity (all in Russian and
without quotation marks). All categories were entered annually on January 13-16, 2014 using the
“custom range” option beginning with 1996.
33
For identity-based explanations of various Russian IR ideas, see Anonymous 2004, 2008;
Anonymous 2007, 2010; Anonymous 2015b. For other, macro-sociological and materialistic
explanations of ideas’ rise and fall, see Collins 1998; Cox 2000.
34
For elaboration, see Anonymous 2013.
35
For instance, in his 2007 address to Russia’s parliament, Putin spoke of searches for a national idea
as Russian “old-style entertainment” akin to searches for a meaning of life and proposed not to open
discussion of the issue (Putin 2007). It seems that to Putin Russianness was a given because it was not
yet challenged by the West.
36
A number of scholars have documented Putin’s transformation (Nation 2012; Trenin 2013; Stent
2014; Anonymous 2015b)