r

PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATIONS 551

POSSESSION
Possession and the Kinds Thereof
0
conuner~e ~ man _may not be the object of a contract so they are not
Sanly d1squahfied from be1· · '
oeces. . . . . ng considered as property pursuant to
the entenon mentione~ m Art~c~e 414 of the Code. A good illustration
is the property of pubhc domimon pertaining to the State. While they
are outside the commerce of man and cannot be the object of contracts,
nonetheless, they are considered property under the Code. s, On the
other hand, the t~rrn "susceptibility to appropriation" in the present
article is broader m scope for it also refers to things which are within
the commerce of man, aside from embracing the meaning accorded to
it under Article 414 as discussed in supra § 1.4. Stated otherwise, all
things which are outside the commerce of man and those which, by
reason of physical impossibility cannot be subjected to human control,
may not be the object of possession.
With respect to rights, it must be noted that servitudes which are I I
not continuous (discontinuous easements) or apparent (non-apparent
easements) are not susceptible of possession since they are not I
susceptible of continuous exercise. 82
In view of the foregoing discussion, the following are examples of
things and rights which may not be the object of possession:
11

( 1) Things which, because of their distance, their depth or their I

immensity are not capable of human control (res communes
beyond human control) such as the sun, the stars and the
ocean;
(2) Forces of nature in their diffused state unless they are brought
w1der human control through the help of science;
(3) Property of public dominion ;
(4) Discontinuous servitudes;
(5) Non-apparent servitudes; and
(6) Things specifically prohibited by law.sJ

11
~ .\(y• Art, l }4 7, NCC.
1
~ -~'t" .-\.rt.,. 41 IJ to -C.5. NCC'. l C ·oa. Civil Code, l 966 Ed., 174 and lI Reyes
, n 4 1 ~ ee also l agw ·
l.:4 C'Mlan. ~th Ed., 44:'v--:>: s
llnd t\m,1. Outllf\l;' ~,f Phil. C'i,·il Law. Q~ . ., .,O l 'i).
\.,.\i (. Ri:put-ltl." _ . -:..o ,(RA _67 (- -
\ . I.. ,'1'1C1- I \' ~
552 PROPERTY

Chapter 2
ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION

Art. 531 . Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a

thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the acr
of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for'~~
quiring such right. (438a)
Art. 532. Possession may be acquired by the same person Who is to
enjoy it, by his legal representative, by his agent, or by a~y person With.
out any power whatever; but in the last ~ase, the possession shall not be
considered as acquired until the person m whose nar:ne !he act of posses.
sion was executed has ratified the same, without pre1ud1ce to the juridical
consequences of negotiorum gestio in a proper case. (439a)

§ 84. Acquisition of Possession

[84.1] Modes of Acquiring Possession
Possession is acquired in any of the following ways:
( 1) By material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a
right;
(2) By subjecting the thing or right to the action of our
will; and

(3) By the proper acts and legal formalities established for

the acquisition of such right. 84
The first appears to be an original mode of acquisition while the
others refer to derivative modes.

[84.2] Requisites for Acquisition of Possession

As discussed in supra § 79 .2, the acquisition of possession

presupposes the existence of two essential elements: (I) the corpus;
and (2) the animus possidendi. The first refers to the material holding
of the thing or the exercise of the right which may be acquired through
any of the modes mentioned in this article. The second, on the other
hand, refers to the intent to possess the thing or right. In other word ~,
11
possession is not acquired in law in the absence of intent to possess

84
Art. 531, NCC.
 PROPERTY OWNERSI-IIP 553
' • AND ITS MODI PfCATI ONS
POSS ESS ION
Acqui sition of Possession

although there is _Physical holding of the thing. For example, jf stolen

goods are placed m the bag of a person by another without the farmer's
knowledge and consent, the fonner is not considered a possessor in law
because of the absence of intent to possess the goods.

[84.3) Material Occupation

The term "material occupation" in Article 531 of the New Civil

Code is used in its ordinary grammatical meaning, to mean "actual
physical possession" or "material apprehension." Obviously, this
mode applies only to corporeal objects and does not find application to
acquisition of possession over a right. In this sense, the term "material
occupation" in Article 531 is synonymous to "occupation" as a mode of
acquiring ownership under Article 712 of the New Civil Code because
both involve the material apprehension of things corporeal. They differ,
however, in the following respects:
(1) the term "occupation" in Article 531 is used in its ordinary
grammatical meaning whereas the term "occupation" in
Article 712 is used in a juridical and technical meaning;
(2) in Article 531, occupation is a mode of acquiring possession;
whereas, in Article 712, occupation is a mode of acquiring
ownership;
(3) in Article 531 , the occupation must be coupled with intent to
possess; whereas, in Article 712, what is required is intent to
own or appropriate;
(4) in Article 531 , occupation as a mode of acquiring possession
applies whether the property is with an owner or without an
owner, in Article 712, however, occupation can take place
only with respect to property without an owner;
(5) in Article 531 occupation as a mode of acquiring possession
can have as i~s object a parcel of land; in occupation as a
mode of acquiring ownership under Article 712, it cannot
have as its object a parcel of land ·
85

--- =----
sssee Art. 714, NCC.
t I
 PROPERTY
554

TI1e tenn " maten·a1. . . in· Article

occupation" "
. 53 J .includes two •orrn 8
of constructive delivery : ( 1) trad1cwn .brev1 man_u, and (2) tradicton
constituhm1 possessorium. Note that m these km d s of constn.iqj
· · · lved 86 But for thos k'1nds Veof
delivery, material occupat10n ts . mvo ·. . . e
constructive delivery where matenal occupation 18 not involved, such
tradicion symbolica and tradicion l~nga manu, t~e mode of a~quisiti;~
of possession is by subjecting the thmg to the actton of our will and not
material occupation.

(84.4] Doctrine of Constructive Possession

The doctrine of constructive possession applies when the
87
possession is under title calling for the whole. As a rule, the possession
and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is
a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse
possession of another.88 Stated otherwise, the actual possession of part of
the property is deemed to extend to the whole because possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.s9
For this doctrine to apply the following requisites must be present: (1)
the alleged possessor must be in actual possession of a portion or part
of the property; (2) he is claiming ownership of the whole area; (3) the
remainder of the area must not be in the adverse possession of another
person; and (4) the area claimed must be reasonable.
The doctrine of constructive possession was applied in the
following cases: Ramos v. Director of Lands,90 Roa/es v. Director of
Lands, 91 Somodio v. CA, 92 Dela Rosa v. Carlos, 93 and Yu v. Pacleb. 94

86
4 Manresa, 5th Ed., 123-124.
87
Resolution of the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. CA, G.R. No. 145914, June 20, 200I.
88 •
Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918).
01
89 l · f h S
Reso ution o t e upreme Court in Gonzalez v. CA, id., citing Ramos v. Dire · ctor
Lands, supra.
90
Supra.
91
51 Phil. 302 (1927).
92 236 SCRA 307 (1994).
93 414 SCRA 226 (2003).

94
Supra.
 PROPERTY, OWN ERSHIP, AND ITS MODI FICATIONS 555
POSSESS ION
Acquisition of Possession

In Lasam v. :°irector of Lands, 95 while there was evidence

showing tbat _the clannant r~ight_ have possessed a portion of the parcel
claimed by hnn _a nd th e_ regi stratton of which he sought, such evidence,
hOwever, wa~ msufficient to establish with certainly the particular
portion o~cu~ied a nd th e ex~ent of such occupation. In refusing to apply
the doctnne 111 Ra7:ws_ v. Dzrector of Lands, supra, the Court clarified
tbat while possession m the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
bas to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession, the same is not gained by mere nominal
claim. Hence, the mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession
cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract
of territory. In reiteration of the ruling in Ramos, the Court clarified that
the application of the doctrine of constructive possession shall depend,
among others, to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to
the portion actually in possession of the claimant.
In Ramirez v. Director of Laods,96 the Court also noted that
the mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and
visiting it every once in a while, as was done by the alleged possessor,
does not constitute acts of possession. In Director of Lands v. Reyes, 97
the Court further held that a mere casual cultivation of portions of the
land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute
possession under claim of ownership.

[84.5] Subjection to Action of Will

This particular mode does not involve any material apprehension
to distinguish it from the first mode (material occupation). It connotes,
however, a degree of control over the thing sufficient to subject the
same to the action of one's will. What is important in this mode is the
intention to possess manifested by certain facts ~hich ~re present.
98

Included in this mode are the two forms of constructive delivery known
as tradicion simbolica and tradicion longa manu.
Tradicion simbolica takes place through delivery of symbols
or some object which represent those to be delivered, thus placing I '

9,6_
. ::>Phil.367(1938).
%60 Phil. 114. 133 ( I 934 ). I .
97
68 SCRA 177, 193 (1975).
Q8
4 Manresa. 5th Ed .. 133. I I
I
 PROPERTY
556
j 1

I
II
I
. d the control of the transferee. Through this moct e, th
the th mg un er . .
' I 'I delivery of the keys to a warehouse is sufficient to transfer possessi e
co Espanol Filipino v. Peterson, et al., 9<) invoi Vin~n.
In the case of Ban . k .
. f hether transfer of possession too p1ace with resp ect tg
the ques t10n o w
• · ·n the warehouse ' the Supreme Court declared th at theo
goods remammg 1
I I

symbolical transfer of the goods by means of th e keys to the Warehou

where the goods were stored was sufficient to show that the depositase
was legally placed in possession of the goods. ry
Tradicion longa manu, on the other han?, is e~ected by the
I I

I transferor pointing out to the transferee the thmgs which are being
transferred.
Ii I

11
1
[84.6] Proper Acts and Legal Formalities
11 11

11 Iii! This third mode of acquiring possession refers to any juridical act
I I
I
by which possession is acquired or to which the law gives the force of
\ 1111 I
I II
acts of possession. 100 Hence, possession can be acquired by juridical acts.
' I
These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession.
I 1111
Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration
1:1
1
of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information
I 11
I !I
1:, I
titles. 101 The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the
I Ii
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
I Ii square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is
I
I
sufficient that he is able to subject the property to the action of his will. 101
11 I Hence, in certain instances minors and other incapacitated persons may
acquire possession under this mode in those acts where they have the
necessary capacity, such as in simple donation and succession; but they
shall need the assistance of their legal representatives in order to exercise
the rights which from the possession arise in their favor. 103 In the case of
Muyco v. Montilla, et al, 1~ the possession given by the sheriff to the
assignees of the original purchasers of the hacienda, in compliance with

99 7 Phil. 409 ( 1907).

1 ro4 Manre-sa, 5th Ed.. 134-1 36.
,01 Manga$e-r ,·. Ugay. 744 SC RA 13 C:!O1 4); Bunyi ' · Factor, 591 SCRA 350 (2009);
Quizon,·. Juan. 5:'4 SCRA 601. 61~ (:'.!008); Habagar Grill v. DMC -Urban Property Qevelope!,
lnc .. 454 SCRA 65> t2005).
1ti:-Mat1~a.~e-r , . Ugay, id.
1
0.'Art. 5;:-, NC'C'.
l\.,.,. ?h1L-4~S l l,;)O'l.
 PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATIONS 557
POSSESSION
Acquisition of Possession

the order 0 ~ th e court in_ an action brought against the former owners
of said hacie nda was viewed by the Supreme Court as constituting
the proper acts a nd legal formalities referred to in Article 531 of the
NeW Civil Code. In Nu~ez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 105 the
subject parcel was_acquired by the respondent by virtue of the June 4,
1999 Deed 0 ~ Assig~ment executed in its favor by Spouses Ong Tiko
and Emerenciana Syhanteng. The petitioner in the said case argued that,
aside from the admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was
left idle and unguarded, the respondent's claim of prior possession was
clearly negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof since
1999. The Court disagreed with the petitioner and said: "Although it
did not immediately put the same to active use, respondent appears to
have additionally caused the property to be registered in its name as of
February 27, 2002 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon
alongside the sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the light
of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently did not matter that, by
the time respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003, I
I
petitioner had already been occupying the land since 1999." Hence,
in that case, the Court rul ed that such juridical acts were sufficient to
establish the respondent's prior possession of the subject property.

[84. 7] Acquisition of Possession over Rights

As discussed in supra § 84.3, material occupation is not available
as a mode of acquiring possession over rights since the same requires
actual physical possession and applies only to corporeal objects. With
respect to ri ghts. possession over it is acquired through any of the
follo,:ving means: (I ) by exercise of such right; (2) by subje~t~ng it to
the action of our will; and (3) by proper acts and legal formalities.
.I
l84.8] B)· \ Vbom Possession Acquired
In the same way that possession may be exer~ised b~ t.h~ owner
I
106
or holder either personally or through an agen~, its ~cq~1s1tton may
likewise b e ma. d e pers . ~onally by the person who 1s to enJoy 1t or through
b . d
his' c-.0. .en1 or 1eoa1 repre sentan·ve
0
' .101 It may even e acqurre by any
..._ 0

""~l~ SCRA l .H {2010).

'"-' ·\ rt . ~~◄- NCC
1

I ,•
. Art ~ ,:. ~ C'C.
 PROPERTY
558

person for and on beha1f of the person who is to108enjoy it, even in the
' · · fi the Jatter·
absence of any prior authonzatton rom
" e ,t" i·eferred to. in Article 532 of the New c·1V.1]
Of course, t11e ag 1 • . .

Code is someone who bas been authorized t~ acqui~e-possess ion by the

person who is to enjoy it. In other words, h~ is acqumn g posses~ ion not
0rd er th at ~ossess1on rnay
for himself but for his principal. However, m
1 th
be acquired tlu-ough an agent it is necessary: ( ) at said agent should
have the intention of acquiring for the principa l and not _for_ himself; (2)
that the agent must have authority to possess for the pnnc1pal; and (3)
the principal must have authorized the act of the agent or subsequently
ratified the same. 109 Hence, in instances where a person acquired
possession on behalf of another without prior authoriz ation from the
latter, the possession shall not be consider ed as acquired until the
person in whose name the act of possessi on was executed has ratified
the same. 110 However, the effects of ratification shall retroact to the time
of the apprehension by the person who acquired possessi on on behalf
of the intended principal. If the principal, on the other hand, does not
ratify the acquisition of possession done on his behalf, the juridical
consequences of negotiorum gestio may apply between the parties in
proper cases.
Ji

[84.9] Capacity to Acquire Possession

The rule with respect to the requirem ent of capacity to act in

relation to acquisition of possessi on is embodie d in Article 535 of the
New Civil Code which reads:
I/
I "Art. 535. Minors and incapaci tated persons may
acquire the possessi on of things; but they need the assistance
of their legal representatives in order to exercise the rights
which from the possessi on arise in their favor."

It is c_lear from ~his article that it is applicab le only to acquisition

of possessi on by mm ors and incapaci tated person over things (or
"corpore al objects" ) but not over rights. As explaine d in supra§ 84.7,

108
Supra.
109
II Caguioa, Civil Code of the Philippines , 1966 ed. _178 . • 4 Manresa, 5tb
ed., 140. ' pp. 177 ' citing
110
Art. 532, NCC.
 PROP E RTY, OWNE RSHIP, AND ITS MOD IFICATIONS 559
POSSE SS ION
Acqu is iti on of Posses sion

mod es
poss~ssio_n over right s may o~ly be acquired through any of the
Note. . that tn any of said mod es, capact·ty to act is
tb erelll discussed.
_ .
necessary fort11e acqms1tton of possession .
orea1
With res~ect to acquisition of possession over thing s (or "corp
53 n throu gh
objects_"), Artic le _ ~, c?ntem~Iates principally of acquisitio
to act.
''material occu patl~ n si_nce this mode does not require capa city
isitio n
However, the la': hkew ise contemplates of other means of acqu
ssary
for which the mmo r or other incapacitated persons has the nece
, whet her
capacity, such as pure or simple donations and succession
perso ns
testate or intestate. State d otherwise, minors and incapacitated
suffi cient
may acquire poss essio n in instances where juridical capacity is
essio n
because capa city to act is not required, such as acquisition of poss
through mate rial occu patio n, succession and simple donation.

ed trans mit-
Art. 533. The possession of hereditary property is deem
ent of the death of
ted to the heir witho ut interruption and from the mom
the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.
neve r to have
One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed
possessed the same . (440)
not suffe r the
Art. 534. On who succeeds by hereditary title shall
dent, if it is not
consequences of the wrongful possession of the dece
the effects of pos-
shown that he was awar e of the flaws affecting it; but
the date of death
session in good faith shall not benefit him except from
of the decedent. (442)

§ 85. Transfer of Poss essio n through Succession

[85.1] Effect of Succession
acts
As discu ssed in supr a§ 84.6, succession is one of the jurid ical
mate rial
sufficient to trans fer posse ssion without need of physi~al or
prop erty
~olding of the prop erty subje ct matter thereof. Ifpossess~on of
t~te, such
is effected by way of succession, wheth~r te_state ~r mtes
on from
Possession is deem ed transmitted to the helf without mter rupti
acce pts
the moment of the death of the decedent but only if the heir
in actua l
the inheritance. u1 This rule will apply even if such heir is not
, valid ly
Physical poss essio n of the property. If the heir, on the other hand

------- ---
111
Art. 533, NCC.

.i
 PR OP E RT Y
560
have po ss essed
·11 be de em ed ne ve r to
.
ce _he wi hy sic al po ss es si on of the property
renounces the inheritan 10 actua1 p . . ·
the same 11 even if he wa s n m th e acqu isi tion
. 11 finds applicat10am
2

le es pe ci a y · t ke thi ~s ex pl e: "A " had been

The foregoing rn .· f10n Le t us a of a pa rc el of land forth d
• n u,e
of property throfu ugh pr es cu perse po ·
ss es sJ O rru pt ed pe r· d
· l d dv db "X " fo r an un in te
an a
m open , peace
th e la o d o~ ne fy rs hi p. U po n hi s death , t;1s
through accretio n on
der claim O ow ne ttl em en t of the
of twenty eight yeards dun· the pr oc ee di ng s fo r · th e se f "B "
. 1 e m . .
e u
property was m placed un de r th e admintS r~ tto n t ° ' one of ~'s
estate of "A " an d summg
co nt in ue d to cu lti va te th e su bJ ec t prop~rty. A~
two heirs who ste d fo ur ye ar s, du nn g. which
"B"
t pr oc ee di ng s la
that the settlemen hi le "C " (th e ot he r hetr) accepte
d
s in he rit an ce w
validly renounced hi em ed ne ve r to ha ve possessed the
er sh al l be de
the inheritance, the form ed its po ss es so r fr ?m th
e moment
th e la tte r sh al l be de em
pr op er ty while no t in ac tu al ph ys ic al po
ssession
A , ev en if he w as
of the death of 's" de at h up to hi s acceptan
ce of
m th e tim e of "A
of th e property fro r of po ss es si on fr om "A " to "C"
, su ch tra ns fe
the inheritance. Further rru pt ed . H en ce , "C :' will acquire
an d un in te
is de em ed continuous pr es cr ip tio n up on hi s accept
ance of
e pr op er ty th ro ug h
ownership ov er th ire d fo r ex tra or di na ry prescriptio
n
th e pe rio d re qu
the inheritance since
is thirty years.
113

De ce de nt
5.2] Co ns eq ue nc es of Wrongful Po ss es sio n by
[8
, a po ss es so r in ba d fa ith is on e in possession
A s defined in the law ence of
in g th at hi s tit le th er et o is de fe ct iv e. 114 Th e exist
of pr op er ty kn ow do es no t, ho w ev er , prejudice
his
of on e po ss es so r
ba d faith o~ t~e pa rt is ju ris di ct io n is th at on ly personal
e ru le in th
successors-m-mterest. Th m od e of ac qu is iti on ca
n make
fla w i~ on e's tit le or
~o w le dg e of th~ d fa ith is no t tra ns m is si bl e from on
e
d fa ith , fo r ba
hi m a po ss es so r m ba 1,s Th is ru le
is ex pr es sl y stated in
en to an he ir.
per~on to another, no t ev l Co de :
Ci vi
A rti cl e 53 4 of the N ew
shall
53 4 · O n w ho suc ce ed s by he re di ta ry title f
"A rt. ·
ffe r th e co ns eq ue nc es of th e w ro ngfu l po ss es si on o
no t su

112
Supra .
113
See Art. 1137, NCC.
114
Art. 526, 2n d par., NC C.
RA 577 (I 987).
Escritor, Jr. v. IA C, 155 SC
115
 TJONS 561
PROPERTY, OWNERPSOHSIP, AND ITS MODIFrCA
SESSION
Acqu isilio n of Possession

is not shown that 11e was aware of th e

tbe decedent,. if. it • d s:-. ·th
flaws affe ctm g 1t; .but the effects of possess1•0n m goo 1a1
death of the
shall not ~,enefit hun except from the date of the
decedent.
faith is pers ona l
The rea~ 01~ for th e above-quoted article is that bad
suffered only by the
and intransnussibl~. Its eff~cts must, therefore, be
be saddled with suc h
person who acted 10 bad faith; his heir should not
aware of the flaws
consequences. Consequently, if the heir is not
116

dent, the heir shal l

affecting the title or mod e of acquisition of the dece
good faith is alw ays
be considered a pos sess or in good faith because
in good faith shall not
presumed. However, the effects of possession
111

the decedent. 118

benefit the heir exc ept from the date of death of

Escritor, Jr. v. IAC

155 SCR A 577 (1987)
on for the titlin g of a
In this case , Mig uel Escr itor filed an appl icati
Ther e bein g no opp osit ion
parcel of land loca ted at Atim onan , Quezon.
a deci sion on May 15, 1958
to his appl icati on, the cada stral cour t rendered
favor of claim ant Escr itor and
adjudicating the lot with its imp rove men ts in
after, Escr itor took poss essi on
confirming his title ther eto. lmm edia tely there
na, filed a peti tion for revi ew
of the prope11y. On Aug ust 2, 1958 , Sim eon Acu
it was obta ined by clai man t
of the abov e-m enti oned deci sion cont endi ng that
. While the proc eedi ngs in this
Escritor thro ugh frau d and misr epre sent ation
eque ntly took poss essi on of
case were goin g on, Escr itor died. His heirs subs
year s after the disp uted deci sion
the prope1ty. On Feb ruar y 16, 1971 or thirteen
of Acufia, orde ring the heir s of
was rendered , the cour t adju dica ted in favor
n was later issu ed and the heir s
Escritor to vaca te the land. A writ of poss essio
n. In 1975, Acufia filed ano ther
of Escritor voh mta rily gave up thei r possessio
of dam ages for the fruit s of
case against the heir s of Escr itor for reco very
the defe ndan ts unla wfu lly for
the land whic h was alleg edly poss esse d by
ion of the lot was effe ctua ted
thirteen years. Acu na alleg ed that the registrat
and mis~epresen~ation. Hen ce,
by the dece ased Escr itor thro ugh fraud, malice,
esso~s m ba~ faith. The low er
according to him , Escr itor and his heirs were poss
I 1

court rendered 8 deci sion dism issin g Acu na 's

com plam t find mg that the heir s
r a just title. On appe al, the
I
of Escritor wer e in goo d faith poss essin g unde

----------
11~ld. . cirim::. ll Ti.') knrin o. Ci,·il Code. I
I I' ~
983 Ed-, 234 ·

Art . S-:. 7, NCC

II K
i\.n 5>4, NCC .
 PROPERTY
562

I t ti heirs of Escritor were posse

Intermediate Appellate Cout1 held t ,a ,e b h Id , ccountable fi d ssors in
bad faith from 1958 up to 1971 and should ~de ant of the IAc°\tllages.
The Supreme Coutt, on appeal; reversed th e JU gme · · e Court
explained -
"Nevertheless, assuming that clai°:1an~ Es~ritor was a
possessor m · bad f:a1·tt1, tt11·s should
·
not prejudice
. h thts . successors-
m-mterest, petitioners herein, as the rule is t a on 1~ _p_ersonal
knowledge of the flaw in one's title or m~de _of acqmsiti~n ~an
make him a possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not transmissible
from one person to another, not even to an heir. As Article 534
of the Civil Code explicitly provides, 'one who succeeds by
hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences of the wrongful
possession of the decedent, if it is not sh,own that he was aware
of the flaws affecting it; ... ' The reason for this article is that bad
I

1' faith is personal and intransmissible. Its effects must, therefore, be

suffered only by the person who acted in bad faith; his heir should
not be saddled with such consequences.
Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof. If no evidence is presented
I'
proving bad faith, like in this case, the presumption of good faith
remains.
1'
Respondent Acufia, on the other hand, bases his complaint
for damages on the alleged fraud on the part of the petitioners'
predecessor in having the land ~egistered under his (the
predecessor's) name. A review of the record, however, does not
,t indicate the existence of any such fraud. It was not proven in the
I
I
I cadastral court nor was it shown in the trial court.
Lot No. 2749 was not awarded to Escritor on the basis of
his machinations. What is clear is that in the hearing of January
22, 1958, the Court permitted Escritor to adduce his evidence
of ownership without opposing evidence as the lot had become
uncontested. Respondent Acufia himself failed to appear in this
hearing because of a misunderstanding with a lawyer. There is no
finding that such failure to appear was caused by petitioners in
this case. On the contrary, all the requirements of publication were
followed. Notice of hearing was duly published. Clearly then, the
allegation of fraud is without basis.
Respondent having failed to prove fraud and bad faith on
the part of petitioners, We sustain the trial court's finding that
 PROP ERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MOD IFIC AT IO NS 563
POSSESSION
Acquisition o f Possession

etitioners were possessors in good faith and should , therefore,

;,ot be held liable for damages."

Art- 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire the posses-
. of things; but they need the assistance of their legal representative s
s,on der to exercise the rights which from the possession arise in their
•nor
~avor. (443)
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or
. t·...,,idation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who
111
reves
"" that he h as an ac t·ion or a right
· to deprive another of the ho Id"mg
~:~thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing. (441a)
Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely
and without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or by violence, do
not affect possession. (444)

§ 86. Instances Where Possession Is Not Acquired

[86.1] Use of Force or Intimidation
The law does not countenance the comm1ss1on of unlawful
acts for the purpose of acquiring possession. Hence, while "material
occupation" is a recognized mode of acquiring possession, the law does
not recognize the acquisition of possession through force, violence or
intimidation. 119 As such, even if a possessor is physically ousted from
the property through the use of force or violence, he is still deemed the
legal possessor in the eyes of the law. 120 His possession is not considered
interrupted because the law does not recognize the acquisition of
possession effected in said manner.
The rule that possession may not be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto applies
even if the one seeking recovery of possession is the owner of the
property himself. This is clear from the language of Article 536 of the
New Civil Code:

"Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired

I I
through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor
I
--- -.:-.-9--_--
.
12
An. :>36, NCC.
°Cequena v. Bolante 330 SCRA 216 (2000), citing Ayala de Roxas v. Maglonso 8 Phil
74 ::>(1906).
' ' .
564 PROPERTY

who objects thereto. He who believes th ~t he has ~n action

or a right to deprive another of the holdmg of a thmg, must
invoke the aid of the competent court, ~ the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing. " (Italics SUPPhed)
Accordingly, a person in possession cannot be ej~cted by force
violence or tenor, not even by the owners, and notwi~hstanding th;
actual condition of the title to the property. I2I If such illegal tnann
. er
of ejectment is employed, the party who proves pnor possession ca
recover possession even from the owners themse 1ves. 122 n

The availment of legal remedy is for the purpose of preventin

breaches of peace and criminal disorder resulting from the use of fore!
by claimants out to gain possession. 123 The rule of law does not allow
the mighty and the privileged to take the law into their own hands to
enforce their alleged rights. They should go to court and seek judicial
vindication. 124

Heirs of Pedro Laurora, et al. v. Sterling

Technopark III, et al.
G.R. No. 146815, April 9, 2003
In 1969, the application of Pedro Laurora to buy the subject lot was
approved by the government. In 1974, Pedro requested the DAR for the
transfer of the lot to Juan Manaig, which request was acted upon favorably by
the DAR. In 1976, the Spouses Laurora executed a Deed of Sale over the lot
in favor of Juan Manaig, which sale was approved by the DAR. Subsequently,
Manaig sold the land to Mile Resources Development Corporation which, in
turn, sold it to S.P. Properties, Inc. Since 1969 up to the time of the sale of
the property to S.P. Properties, Inc., the Spouses Laurora were in possession
of the same where they planted trees. In 1997, Sterling Technopark III and
S.P. Properties, Inc., through its employees, bulldozed and uprooted the
trees and plants, and with the use of armed men and by means of threats and

121
Heirs of Pedro Laurora, et al. v. Sterling Technopark III, 401 SCRA 181 (2003); citin~
Munoz v. CA, 214 SCRA 216 (1992); Joven v. CA, 212 SCRA 700 (1992); German Managemen
and Services, Inc. v. CA, 177 SCRA 495 ( 1989) and Supia and Batioco v. Quintero and Ayala,
59 Phil. 312, Dec. 23, 1933.
122 /d. , citing Gener
v. De Leon, 367 SCRA 631 (2001) and Ceremonia v. CA, 31 4 scRA
731.
123 Villaflor v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 392, Jan. 30, 1968; 17
Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, Sept. '
1952.
124Heirs of Pedro
Laurora, et al. v. Sterling Technopark III, et al., supra.
 PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATIONS 565
POSSESS TON
Acquisition of Possession

. . .dation, succeeded in forcibly ejecting the Spouses Laurora. Th.espous es

011
1ntt · ·
· eafter :filed an eJectment case against Sterling Technopark III an d S · P·
ther erties, Inc. In their defense, the defendants alleged that the complaina nts
prop t the owners of the land because they already disposed of it in 1976
~~I10 .
hown by legal documents. In upholdmg the claim of the Spouses Laurora,
aies court explaine~ that the only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical
t aterial possession of real property. Stated otherwise said the Court, only
orlll . . .
·or physical possession, not title, 1s the issue in forcible ' entry case. The
. .
issue
pof ownership m · eJec
· t ment cases 1s
· to be resolved only when it · lY
is intunate
?rotertWined with the issue
.
of possession, to such an extent that the question of
ho bad prior possession cannot b e determined without ruling on the quest10n .
:fwho the owner of the land is. Since in this case, no such intertwine ment has
been shown since the claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove
prior possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue of
ownership. The Court added -

"Notwiths tanding the actual condition of the title to the

property, a person in possession cannot be ejected by force,
violence or terror - not even by the owners. If such illegal manner
of ejectment is employed , as it was in the present case, the party
who proves prior possession - in this case, petitioners - can
recover possession even from the owners themselves.
Granting argtiendo that petitioners illegally entered into and
occupied the property in question, respondents had no right to take
the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject the
occupants therefrom.
Verily, even if petitioners were mere usurpers of the land
owned by respondents, still they are entitled to remain on it
until they are /awfully ejected therefrom. Under appropria te
circumstances, respondents may file, other than an ejectment suit,
an accion publician a - a plenary action intended to recover the
better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria - an action to
recover ownership of real property.
The availment of the aforementioned remedies is the legal
alternative to prevent breaches of peace and criminal disorder
resulting from the use of force by claimants out to gain possession .
The rule of law does not allow the mighty and the privileged to
take the law into their own hands to enforce their alleged rights.
They should go to court and seek judicial vindicatio n."
 566 PROPERTY
ij
I

[86.2] Acts Merely Tolerated

The mle is that acts which are merely tolerated do not
. 0f af{'
possession. 125 In other words, persons whose _occupat1011 teq
a property i
by sheer tolerance of its owners are not considered as posse
ssors in 1 s
In the language of the Court, "tolerance in itsel fdoes not
fruit, and it can easily be supp lante d by a sud~en_ chan
bear any le~:i
ge of heart on
the part of the owner. " 126 Hence, the mere penm ssive use,
co_nstituting
acts which are merely tolerated by the possessor, or due
to his licens
cannot be made the basis of acquisitive prescription 121
no matter hoe,
long the possession may be. 128 Possession, to constitute
the foundati:
of a prescriptive right, must be a possession und~r claim
of title (e~
conc epto de dueno), or to use the comm on law equiv alent
of the tenn, it
must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed
by one who
holds by mere tolerance by the owne r are clearly not
en concepto de
duen o, and such possessory acts, no matter how long
so continued, do
not start the running of the period of prescription. 129
The Court has also ruled that persons who occupy the
land of
anot her at the latte r's tolerance or penn issio n, with out
any contract
betw een them , are necessarily bound by an implied prom
ise that they
will vacate the same upon demand, failing in whic h a
summary action
for eject ment is the proper remedy against them. 130
He becomes a
defo rcian t illegally occupying the land the mom ent he
is required to
leave 131 and the cause of action for the filing of the eject
ment case is
coun ted from the date of the demand to vacate. 132
But what constitutes acts of toleration? In the case of Maca
I saet v.
I I Macasaet, 133 the Court explained the conc ept, as follows:

"Toleration is defined as ' the act or practice of

pen11itting or endu ring some thing not whol ly approved
of.'

125
Art. 537. NCC'.
126
Resuena v. CA, 454 SCRA 42, 51 (2005).
1 7
~ Cuaycong v. Benedicto. 37 Phil. 78 1
( 19 18).
12
sLaren a v. Mapili . 408 SCRA 48-+, 492 {2003) .
1
~QCuaycong v. Benedicto, supra.
D 0Resuena v. CA. supra.

i:- 100. Jr.,·. C'A. >6~ SCRA 755. 767

(2001 ). .
1~Lope
z ,·. DaYid. supra: Areal v. Court of Appeals. supra, p. 825; Villalu 344 1
z v. CA. Phi ·
77. tN. St·pt. 5. 1997.
11
\~ >Q SCRA 6::5 t2004) .
 PROPE RTY, OWNE RSHlP, AND ITS MODI FICATIO NS
567
POSSE SSlON
Acqui sition of Possession

Sarona v. Vzlleg as 134 described what tolerated acts mean s, in

this language:

'Prof essor Arturo M. Tolentino states that

ac~s mer~ly tolerated are those which by reason of
ne1ghbor~mes~ or familiarity, the owner of property
allows his neigh bor or another person to do on the
property; they _are generally those particular services
or benefits which one's property can give to anoth er
witho ut mater ial injury or prejudice to the owner, who
permits them out of friendship or courtesy. x x x. And,
Tolentino continues, even though this is continued for
a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription.'
x x x. Furth er expounding on the concept, Tolentino
writes: There is tacit consent of the possessor to the
acts whic h are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of
know ledge and silence on the part of the posse ssor can
be consi dered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance
that is consi dered as an authorization, permission or
license, acts of possession are realized ot performed.
The quest ion red:uces itself to the existence or non-
existe nce of the permission."
In the Maca saet case, 135 the children were invited by the paren ts
to occupy the latter s' lots, out of parental love and a desire to foste
r
family solidarity. Subsequently, however, and out of pique, the paren
ts
asked them to vacat e the premises. The Court ruled that owin g to the
circumstances of the case, a finding of possession by mere tolera nce
is
to be ruled out. In this case, the Court explained -

"We hold that the facts of the present case rule out
the finding of possession by mere toler8:nc~. ~etitioners
were able to estab lish that respondents had mvited them
to occupy the subje ct lots in order th_at they ~ould all live
near one anoth er and help in resolvmg family problems.
·
By occup ymg th ose lots , petitioners demonstrated their
.
acceptance of the invitation. Hence, there was a meet mg of I I

I I
--------
134

135
131 Phil. 365, Mar. 27, 1968. l
I

See further discussion of this case in supra § 83 · · 1·

568 PROPERTY

minds, and an agreement regarding possessio n of

the lots
impli edly arose between the parti es .
The occupancy of the subje ct lots by petitione
rs
was not merely ' something not wholly approved
of' by
respondents. Neither did it arise from wha t Tolentino
refer s
to as ' neighborliness or fami liarity. ' In point of fact,
thei r
possession was upon the invitation of and with the comp
lete
approval of respondents, who desired that their
children
would occupy the premises. It arose from familial love
and a
desire for family solidarity, which are basic Filipino
traits."

[86.3] Clandestine and Unknown Acts

Acts whic h are executed clandestinely and without the

knowledge
of the possessor do not affect possession. 136 In orde
r for possession to
rema in unaffected, it is necessary that the acts exec
uted must be both
clandestine and unknown to the possessor. An act is
considered as done
clandestinely if the same is done in secret, hidden
or concealed.131 In
othe r words, the term "clandestine" is used in cont
radistinction to the
term "pub lic" under Article 1118 of the New Civil Cod
e- as a requisite
for acquisition of real property through acquisitive
prescription. If the
act is done clandestinely but the same is known to
the possessor, his
possession will be affected. In the same way, if the
act is done publicly
even without the knowledge of the possessor, the same
will affect the
latter's possession.
If both requisites are satisfied, meaning, the act exec
uted is both
clandestine and unknown to the possessor, the same
does not affect
the true possession of the legal possessor. As a cons
equence, the legal
poss esso r's possession is not deemed interrupted
for all legal intents
and purp oses , e.g., it will not interrupt the running
of the period of
acquisitive prescription in favor of the legal possesso
r nor it will affect
his righ t to receive the fruits . On the part of the actu
al possessor, his
poss essio n acquired through clandestine acts not
known to the legal
poss esso r will not ripen into ownership through pres
cription becau~e
one of the requirements there of - that the possessio
n be "public" in
char acte r - will not be present.

136
Art. 537, NCC.
137 Biack's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 225.
 PROPERTY, OWNERSH IP, AND ITS MODfFICAT IONS 569
POSSESSIO N
Acquisition of Possession

Art, 53~- Possessi on as_ a fact cannot be recognized at the same

tirne in two diff~rent p_ersonahties except in the cases of co-posse ssion.
should a quest10 n arase rega~ding the fact of possession, the present
possessor ~h~ 11. be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer
in possess•~"' if th e ~ates of the possession are the same, the one who
present~ a_ titl_e;_ a nd •f al! th ese _conditions are equal, the thing shall be
1aced m Judicial deposit pending determination of its possessi on or
~wnership through proper proceedings. (445)

§ 87. Conflict over Possession de Facto

The law recognize s a situation where the fact of possessio n
(possession de facto) and the right to such possessio n (possessi on
de Jure) are in the bands of two different persons, as in the case of
possession exercised in another's name discussed in supra § 80. Here,
the possession of the agent is for the benefit of the principal. It is the
latter who is therefore deemed as the possessor.
The law likewi se recognize s a situation w here the owner may
temporarily deprive himself of his right to possess the property as when
he constitutes a usufruct over the sa me in favor of another person or
when he enters into n co ntraL·t of lease wi th a lessee. Here, both the
right of possessio n and the.' f:1ct or possessio n are exercised by the
usufructua ry or by tJ1e lessee. as the case may be. During the duration
of the usufruct or lease, the usufructllaf)' and the lessee are considere d
as the lega l possessor s of the property.
The law does not , however, recognize the possib ility that possessio n
de.facto may reside at the same rime in two different personali ties unless
they are co-posses sors. t h In case of conflict involving the question of
possession as n fact che following mles of preferenc e shall govern:
{l ) T he present possessor shall be preferred ;
{2) l f theft' are rwo possessor s, the one longer in possess ion is
preterrcti: :md
(3) lf the dates of possessio n are the same, the one who presents
a titk .
570 PROPERTY

lf all the foregoing conditio1~s a~e equ~I, the thin

~ shall be Placed
in judi cial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership
through proper proceedings .IJq
In deten11ining who the "pre sent possessor". is,
th~ precepts earlier
disc usse d in this Chapter shall be taken into con
sideration. Hence, if the
controversy is between a previous possessor and
the actual possesso
who acquires possession through force, viol
enc e, intimidation, ~
clandestine acts not known to the previous 0
possessor, the previous
pos sess or shall be deemed as the pres ent
pos sess or because his
pos sess ion was not affected. The same is true
in case of possession
by mere tolerance of the owner, in whi ch case
, the actual possessor is
not dee med as the "pre sent possessor" bec ause
his possession does not
affect the own er's possession.
In applying the foregoing rule of preference, the
case of Cequeiia
v. Bol ant e 140 is instructive. The facts of this case
are presented below:

Cequeiia v. Bola nte

G.R. No. 137944, Apr il 6, 200 0
This case involves a parcel of land situated in
Binangonan, Rizal and
cove red by a tax declaration. Prior to 1954, the
land was originally declared
for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Men doza , father of respondent
Hon orat a Men doza Bolante. Sinforoso was the
occu pant of the said property
until his death in 1930. When Sinforoso died
, his brot her (Margarito) took
poss essi on of the land and cultivated the sam
e with his son, Miguel. At the
sam e time, respondent and her mother continue
d resid ing on the land. When
resp ond ent came of age in 1948, she paid the
realty taxe s on the land for the
year s 1932 up to 1948. In 1953, Margarito
declared the land for taxation
purp oses in his name and paid the realty taxes begi
nnin g 1952. When Margarito
died, Mig uel continued cultivating the land. Dur
ing the time that Margarito
and Mig uel wer e cultivating the land, responde
nt and her mother were living
on the sam e land. In 1985, Miguel was physicall
y oust ed from the property by
the respondent. Litigations thereafter ensued betw
een the respondent and the
peti tion ers (daughters of Margarito and sisters
of Mig uel) on the question of
who shall be considered as the preferred possesso
r.

139Id.
140330 SCR A 216 (2000).
 PROPE RTY, OWN ERS HIP, AND ITS MO DI FIC AT IO NS
571
,
POSSES SION
Acqui sition o f Possess ion

The lower comt in the said case ruled in favor of the petitioners on
,
tl,e strength of the tax declaration of their father (Margarito). On appeal
the appellate corut reversed the ruling of the trial court and ruled that the
sor under Article 538 of the Civil Code
~ . prefe1i. -ed posses
spondent was the
because she was m notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous posses sion of
tlle land since 1985. Petitioners disputed this ruling. They contended that she
came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the
Civil Code. On this particular issue, the Supreme Court made the follow ing
pronouncements -
"We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985,
the petitioners did not lose legal possession because possession
cannot be acquired through force or violence. To all intents and
purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deeme d the
legal possessor. Indeed , anyone who can prove prior posses sion,
regardless of its character, may recover such possession."

After making the said ruling, the Court did not, howev er, consid er the
petitioners as the preferred possessors. Neither did the Court consid er the
petitioners as the present possessors. This is due' to the fact that the posses sion
by the petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest was not exclusive. The
Court explained -
Howev er, possession by the petitioners does not prevai l
over that of the respondent. Possession by the former before 1985
was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before 1985 . The
records show that the petitioners' father and brothe r, as well as
the respondent and her mother, were simultaneously in advers e
possession of the land.
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultiva ted
by the respon dent's father (Sinforoso), who was the brothe r of
petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced by T~.x Declar ation No.
26425. When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took posses sion
of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time '
respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot.
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes
for the years 1932-1948. Margarito declared the lot for taxatio n in
his name in 1953 and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952. When
he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by the
CA, the respondent and her mother were living on the land, which
was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physic ally
ousted by the respondent.
 PROPERTY
57~.

·on the Court eventually ruled i

1n resolving the issue of possess, . ' s1·on for a longer . n favor
of the respondent because sI,e Ims been m posses ' Period ,
· fhe
Court thus held -

"Base d on Art.1•c1e S) 8 ot' the Civil Code, the respondent is

the preferred possessor because, bet,efHing from her. fath er's tax
.
declaration ot, the subJect
• ·
lot since t 926 she has been in possess i
, · .. , on
thereof for a longer period . On the other hao<l, petitioners father
acquired joint possession only in 1952."

°~
The Court emphasized , however, that Article 538 th e_Ne~ Civil Code
settles only the question of possession and that poss~ssion ts different from
ownership. With respect to the question on ownership, the same should be
established in one of the ways provided by law. In this case, according to the
Court, the question of ownership could be settled by determining who between
the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription. The Court ruled again in
favor of the respondent -

"Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary

prescription through possession for ten years. Being the sole heir
of her father, respondent showed through [her] tax receipt that
she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years
since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside
there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband
engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953
when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her
possession, which was in the concept of owner, public, peaceful,
and uninterrupted had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore
she herself, after her father's demise, declared and pa1d realty taxes
for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership
for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of
the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of
farming the subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that
ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled
with the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation
and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or
adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that
their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although
their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through
 PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP AND s1J
PossEss ,o~s MoorFrCATJoNs
Effects of Possession
- .
extraordinary prescription because . of the.ir adverse possession
i irty-two years ( 1953-198 5) ' ti11s supposed h'
for t 1d to the entire disputed I0 t b owners tp cannot
d ,, ' ut must be limited to the port
ion
ex.ten tu II c.
that they ac a y 1am1e .

Chapter 3
EFFECTS OF POSSESSION
to be respected in his pos-
Art. 539. Every posses~or has a right
st ein he shall be protected in or
session; and ~hould he _be di urbed ther
ns established by the laws and the
restored to said possession by the mea
Rules of Court.
through forcible entry may
A possessor deprive~ of his possession
within ten days from the filing of the
complaint present a motion to se-
action for forcible entry, a writ of
cure from the compete~t cou~, in the
ore him in his possession. The
preliminary ma_ndatory mj~nct,~n _to r~st
y (30) days from the filing there-
court shall decide the motion w1thm thirt
of. (446a)

§88. Right to Protection of Possessors

[88.1] Protects All Kinds of Possessors
an outward sign of
The Civil Code considers possession as
ership. For this reason,
ownership, 141 it having all the appearances of own
whether an owner or
the law renders protection to every possessor
142

ase "every possessor" in

not. According to the Supreme Court, the phr
from that of the owner
the article indicates that all kinds of possession,
stitutes ~ crime, should
to that of a mere holder, except that whjch con
blished ~nd the laws of
be respected and protected by the means esta
procedure.143
Code assumes that
The protection is given because the Civil
also because even if the
the possessor of a thing is the owner and
144

uld be protected until it

Possessor is not the owner, his situation sho

-------- 141u .S. v. Rapinan, l Phil. 294 (1902).

142
An. 539, NCC.
citing II Tolentino, Civil Code, 241 ( 1987),
Phil. Trust Co. v. CA, 320 SCRA 719 (1999),
143
cilin
Amandi 170 and 4 Manresa 214.
g 3 Sanchez-Roman 438439 2 Navarro
144
See Art. 433, NCC .
' I
JI

I
 PROPERTY
574

is shown that there is another person ~i~h a better right.1 45The

/act_of
possession in itself, the~efore, h~s a pos1t1ve value and is endow
dw110
a distinct standing of its own m the law of property.146 Tru e, by
le of respect for the possessory statu s, a wrongful possessor fnis
Princip courts, but th .
1s
.
ts on
1
y temporary anct tnay
at times be uphe ld by the · forone
sole and special purp ose, name ly, th e mam tenan ce of publi
· · · c Orde 11
1

orary
The protection is only temp . h b b ecau se 1t ts mten ded that as r.
. soo n
as
the lawless act of d1spossess1on as een suppressed, the quest'
ownership or of posse ssion de Jure is to be settled. in the prop erioncouofn
. 148 anent mterests of property
and in a proper actton. The larger.and perm .
•
require that such rare and exceptional mstance of. preference ID fue
14
courts of the actual but wrongful possessor be permitted. 9

[88.2] Actions to Recover Possession

As discussed in supra § 34, any lawful possessor, not only the

owner, may resort to reasonable force to repel or prevent an actual
or
ty in
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of the proper
time of
his possession. But this doctrine can only be invoked at the
already
actual or threatened dispossession, and not when possession has
process
been lost. 150 In the latter case, the owner must resort to judicial
the New
for the recovery of the property as required in Article 536 of
has an
Civil Code. 151 Pursuant to this article, he who believes that he
action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must
invoke
deliver
the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
(Artic'.e
the thing. This article is complemented by the present article
539) which grants possessors the right not only to be protec
ted in h_is
sion 10
possession, but likewise the right to be restored to said posses
case of disturbance by the means established by the laws and the
Rulei
of Court.
· the
The available actio ns for the purpose of imple menti ng
·o supr0
e are already discu sse d 1
provisions of the present articl

145
II Caguioa, Civil Code, 1966 Ed., 165.
146
Manuel v. CA, G.R. No. 95469 , July 25, 1991.
147id.
14SJd.
149Jd.
( 1989)·
150
Gem1an Management & Services, Inc. v. CA, 177 SCRA 495
15 1
Supra.