The Reasonable as Rational?

Festschrift for Aulis Aarnio

The Reasonable as Rational?
On Legal Argumentation and Justification

Festschrift for Aulis Aarnio

Edited by

Werner Krawietz
Robert S. Summers
Ota Weinberger
Georg Henrik von Wright

Duncker & Humblot · Berlin

 Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

The reasonable as rational? : on legal argumentation and justification ;

Festschrift for Aulis Aarnio / eds.: Werner Krawietz . . . - Berlin : Duncker
und Humblot, 2000
ISBN 3-428-09265-1

Alle Rechte, auch die des auszugsweisen Nachdrucks, der fotomechanischen

Wiedergabe und der Übersetzung, für sämtliche Beiträge vorbehalten
© 2000 Duncker & Humblot GmbH, Berlin
Fremddateniibernahme: Klaus-Dieter Voigt, Berlin
Druck: Berliner Buchdruckerei Union GmbH, Berlin
Printed in Germany
ISBN 3-428-09265-1
 HOMMAGE À PROFESSOR AULIS AARNIO
TO HIS 60th BIRTHDAY

By Werner Krawietz

Dear Aulis,
Dear Friends and Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen!

I.

1. We have all been invited to this delightful dinner and entertainment in

order to have a celebration, albeit somewhat prematurely, on the occasion
of Aulis' sixtieth birthday which actually takes place on 14th May. This
event, in fact, appears so important to me that I am convinced one can't
begin these celebrations soon enough. I do wonder, however, what his
actual birthday is going to be like if even the run-up to it is being cele-
brated in this way. Looking back over my frequent visits to Finland I
cannot remember ever before having encountered such a large number of
your renowned Finnish friends and guests, with the exception perhaps of
the IVR World Congress of 1983 which was organized by our highly
esteemed colleague and friend Professor Georg Henrik von Wright and
yourself in Helsinki. I have noticed, by the way, that Finnish Fins and
Swedish Fins are peacefully united over dinner here in Tampere, but per-
haps there is nothing unusual in that! I am most grateful, indeed, for the
great honour of being given the opportunity of speaking to you on this
important occasion.
2. I owe this opportunity of addressing a few words to you, Ladies and
Gentlemen, to the fact, above all, that I have arrived so late. Too late , in
any case, to take part in the International Symposium which ended this
afternoon. My foreign colleagues and friends have, therefore, kindly per-
mitted me to address to you a few words in conclusion, on the proviso,
however, that they must be brief. I know very well that the most able repre-
sentatives of their disciplines in many countries have been present here in
Tampere during the last few days engaging in lively discussions and in a
stimulating exchange of ideas in the course of your Symposium, dear Aulis.
In contrast, I find myself in something like the role of the Olympic torch-
 Werner Krawietz

bearer, who carries the message of this great competition without taking
part in it himself. Except that the Olympic torchbearer appears at the begin-
ning of the games while this messenger has arrived very belatedly at the
end, late, indeed, very late, but, I hope, still not too late to honour our
friend Aulis.

II.

1. We have gathered here to pay tribute to our friend and colleague

Aulis, and it is a great privilege and a particular pleasure for me to present
Aulis Aarnio with this Festschrift. In it the work of the international com-
munity of legal Scholars has been collected for the purpose of honouring
him. I should also like to convey warm congratulations from my co-editors,
your friends and colleagues Georg Henrik von Wright in Helsinki, Ota
Weinberger in Austria (Graz) and Robert Summers of Cornell University/
Ithaca. A l l four editors, dear Aulis, are very happy to present to you this
Festschrift with nearly fifty contributions from nearly twenty countries.

2. Together with the other Festschrift editors I should also like to extend
to you the congratulations of the publishing house Duncker & Humblot in
Berlin, in particular, those of its head and director, Professor Simon with
whom you have published over the last decades collections of papers which
have introduced your work to the German-speaking countries. These were
followed by a series of 'Beihefte' to the periodical RECHTSTHEORIE with
the proceedings of international symposia which you organized in Austria
and Finland including the various IVR World Congresses, among them the
memorable X World Congress for Legal and Social Philosophy which took
place in Helsinki in nineteen hundred and eighty-three and set the standard
for all future congresses.

3. It was only a week before the beginning of this Symposium that I

received a single copy of this Festschrift for Aulis from the publishers in
Berlin. This copy is a one-off, a unicum, if you like, and so it will remain.
That is to say, that the volume I brought with me is hand-bound in the
form of a book containing the contributions, but it is made up of page-
proofs some of which have not yet been corrected. The publisher was kind
enough to have this improvised version printed. At least another half dozen
papers are as yet missing. They have been written but their translations into
English have not been completed. These will be included in the final ver-
sion of the printed book. I should, finally, also like to convey warm congra-
tulations from all your friends and colleagues who have contributed to your
Festschrift . A good number of them are present here.
 Hommage à Professor Aulis Aarnio VII

III.

1. Legal scholars rarely enjoy much attention outside their own legal cir-
cles at home. In a very real sense, Aulis Aarnio proves the point by being
the exception that establishes the rule. As far as I have learned during my
visits to Finland Aulis is best known in some circles for his work in Family
Law , Matrimonial Law and Law of Inheritance. But this expertise is not the
reason why I am here and why so many colleagues in Europe and all over
the world have contributed to a Festschrift for Aulis. Most of these collea-
gues are not concerned with these specialized areas of legal dogmatics in
their own countries, but work in the fields of legal theory, philosophy of
law and the like. Among his colleagues from abroad Aulis Aarnio is best
known as a legal theorist and legal philosopher. In my own country it is a
great rarity for somebody to receive a Festschrift on the occasion of a six-
tieth birthday. I have been told that this is also the case in Finland and that
it is unusual for an academic to receive such an honour before his or her
sixty-fifth or seventieth birthday. I am not surprised, however, that Aulis
proves the exception yet again. He sets new standards in whatever he is
involved in.

2. It was quite natural to give your Festschrift the title "The Reasonable
as Rational? On Legal Argumentation and Justification". There is no need
to explain to him or to the assembled company why this is so. The volume
pays tribute to Aulis Aarnio as a figure whose work ranges over the Anglo-
Saxon world of law, on the one hand, and over the European legal systems,
on the other. It has become ever clearer over the course of the last decades
that Aulis Aarnio has given impetus to and even directly influenced many
new developments in our fields. Without the role he has played a number
of these new developments would not have taken place or come to fruition
at all.

3. This, of course, is not the occasion for a lengthy Laudatio. That is

included in the Festschrift and can be perused later. The occasion does give
me the opportunity, however, to say that all those who have contributed to
this volume (and others, no doubt, too) value and appreciate Aulis Aarnio
for his openness and enthusiasm, his boundless energy and vigour and,
indeed, his lust for life. His great warmth, his fairness, and his ability to
engage in a wide variety of different projects and to do so self-critically
have won him a great number of friends over the years. A l l of us here,
Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure, know and agree that Aulis Aarnio is
regarded with great respect, high esteem and warm affection in very many
countries all over the world. Something of that respect, esteem and affec-
tion is reflected in the Festschrift , dear Aulis, as you will see later.
Vili Werner Krawietz

IV.

1. On the whole we think we know reasonably well what the scientific

thinking, achievements and publications of friends and colleagues consist
of. At least, I thought I did in the case of Aulis Aarnio, who has been my
very good friend for something like twenty years. But one can be wrong in
such matters as I found out in the course of preparing this Festschrift .
When I was in danger of being overwhelmed by the wealth of material
yielded up by Aulis' bibliography, I instructed my assistent to make at least
a numerical identification and count of the different kinds and types of pub-
lications which are normally part of a legal scholar's scientific output. This
job took a suspiciously long time for my assistent to complete and to tell
me the result. I learned that our friend Aulis has published twenty-six
books and nine collections of essays since the nineteen sixties. To these we
must add two-hundred and thirty scientific papers both in Finnish and in
twelve international languages, as well as another two-hundred and eighty
newspaper articles in the field of culture, politics and society, not to men-
tion book reviews, commentaries and interviews; five hundred and ninety-
four publications altogether, as my assistent finally announced joyfully and,
no doubt, with some relief. I remember clearly answering my assistent with
a nonchalant "Well, that's very interesting!" But since that day I have been
making a great effort to get up a little earlier every morning in order to
maximize my own scholarly output!

2. It seems that, despite all the above publications Aulis still had some
time to spare, enough, in any case, to write two historical novels and two
plays. One of these plays, "The Priest of Kostia", is going to receive its
first performance in the Ramppi Theatre in Kangasala on the fifteenth of
June of this year.

3. Aulis Aarnio asked me to dispense with the customary Laudatio in

appreciation of his person and his scholarship, and I shall, of course,
respect his wishes. I may be permitted, though, I hope, to make some brief
remarks.

a) I have already pointed out that Aulis Aarnio's work in the field of
legal theory and legal philosophy in the last twenty-five years has done a
great deal to acquaint the European legal systems and the Anglo-American
world of law with the Scandinavian legal theory and philosophy, especially,
the Finnish contribution to it.

aa) The fact that Aulis convened many international Symposia which
served the scientific clarification of this particular field surely deserves to
be mentioned here.
 Hommage à Professor Aulis Aarnio IX

bb) I should also like to point to the work on the theory and philosophy
of law undertaken by Otto Brusiin and edited and published in the German
language by Urpo Kangas which was initiated by Aulis Aarnio.

cc) Equally, the Brusiin-Lectures which have had wide international

recognition and have recently been published in English, are also the result
of his initiative.
b) Another important aspect of his scholarship are his comparative
researches undertaken from the point of view of the Finnish legal system
and its theory and philosophy of law concerning contemporary legal think-
ing in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Great Britain, Poland and in other legal
systems.
aa) These international activities which - ranging beyond Europe - have
also included the USA and Canada, as well as embracing Japan and Korea
took him swiftly to the top of the World IVR, the International Association
for Legal and Social Philosophy which today has forty-four member states.

bb) From nineteen hundred and eighty-three to eighty-seven he held the

office of president of the IVR, and from nineteen hundred and eighty-seven
to ninety-five that of vice-president.

cc) The Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation made Aulis

Aarnio a Full Member in nineteen hundred and ninety-five having already
been a member of the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters and since
nineteen hundred and ninety-one President of the Department of Science of
Law. The University of Lund has decided in nineteen hundred and ninety-
seven to award him an honorary doctorate.

4. From an international perspective it would certainly not be an exag-

geration to say that Aulis Aarnio fulfills an important and successfull
bridgeing function of lasting significance for the development of the theory
and philosophy of law in our time. Today, thanks to a large extent to his
efforts, a dialogue and a mutual exchange in legal thinking exist between
different centres all over the world. This exchange continues despite the
fact that Aulis Aarnio in 1991 finally shifted the centre of his activities
from Helsinki to Tampere. He is one of those individuals who are at the
hub of things wherever they find themselves.

5. Aulis Aarnio is numbered today among the most brilliant minds in

modern legal theory. He leads a life of vigorous scholarly activity prepar-
ing the way for further opportunities for the meeting of minds and fruitful
exchanges of ideas. He himself has often been the first to tread the new
path, and in the course of the past decades he himself has strengthened,
consolidated and expanded such newly established ties. Indeed, it would be
true to say that it was through his diverse and wide-ranging activities that
 Werner Krawietz

the rapidly growing scientific dialogue in legal theory and philosophy was
made possible. The symposium ending today and the Festschrift compiled
by a great number of colleagues from around the world give an idea of the
debt the international academic community owes to Aulis Aarnio.

V.

Let me sum up! In modern legal theory and philosophy of law Aulis
Aarnio is a figure ranging over and facilitating discussion between and
among diverse legal cultures. In recent years various theorists have refined
legal thinking in terms of concepts of practical reason. Such approaches
entail the problem that they very often confuse law with morals ignoring
the fact, as I see it, that there is a clear-cut border-line between these two
disciplines - not only for the legal scholar but for the legal theorist and the
legal philosopher, too. Until now Aulis Aarnio's writings have consisted
largely of scholarly efforts to analyse, reconstruct and evaluate their central
tenets and, where their theories are sketchy and incomplete, to suggest lines
of further development. But that is by no means all. When it comes to
defining the nature of the original contribution which Aulis Aarnio has
made to contemporary legal thinking a great deal could be said. I shall
limit myself to some brief remarks.
1. To explore this wide field would require a new international sympo-
sium in Tampere, and I am putting my name down for it here and now!
2. If there is one thing that has renewed and fundamentally changed
legal thinking in the last century then it is the development of Analytical
Theory and Philosophy of Language in conjunction with the achievements
of formal Logic and its application to law. This development is closely con-
nected with three personalities and scholars of worldwide fame who are
among us tonight, namely with our greatly esteemed colleagues and friends
Georg Henrik von Wright, Ota Weinberger and Eugenio Bulygin. Such a
constellation of stars, Ladies and Gentlemen, can only be compared - if I
may be allowed to avail myself of a reference to the popular music scene -
with an open-air concert of the three tenors, José Carreras, Placido Do-
mingo and Luciano Pavarotti. I would suggest that one needs no more than
the fingers of one hand, in fact, to count the names of that select group of
leading scholars who today determine the fate and the development of a
logic of norms around the globe. We owe it to the research interests and
achievements of Aulis Aarnio that the most famous of them are present
here today.

3. I myself have learned one simple but fundamental lesson from the Big
Three , namely, that it does not suffice simply to do this or that. Rather, one
 Hommage à Professor Aulis Aarnio XI

has to have very good reasons for what one does. Even from the institu-
tional point of view one has to be in the position to justify what one does. I
have also learned that one ought to dinstinguish between internal and ex-
ternal justification in the field of action theory and theory of norms. How-
ever, I must admit, I still dont understand this distinction. Presumably my
lack of understanding is bound up with the fact that the reasons ordinarily
presented within the framework of an internal justification turn up, where I
am concerned, as external reasons and vice versa.
There is a point, though, on which the Big Three agree (more or less!):
Firstly , it makes sense to make use of formal logic in the process of build-
ing a theory of practical legal argumentation; secondly , it would be a mis-
take to regard the interpretation and the understanding of law merely as an
application of formal logic. It is precisely from this point that Aulis starts
with his attempt to rationalize and justify the practical juridical argumenta-
tion. Because of his achievements in this field - which lack of time pre-
vents me from characterizing more closely - Aulis Aarnio must, indeed, be
regarded as one of the founders of a New Analytical Jurisprudence. In the
last decade he has been working on a more wide-ranging theory of the
nature, structure and functions of modern legal systems which in its final
version is not yet fully available.

Conclusion

To return to the person of Aulis, the hero of this story, him whom we
are celebrating today: all these scholarly achievements are only external
indices of his life: of a remarkable career, of his great success in his work.
Underlying them are the internal ones, the attributes of his character, his
compassion and his great generosity as a human being. Both are, without
the slightest doubt, ample justification for these celebrations.
I should like to express here and now our warm and heart-felt congratu-
lations to Aulis, not only on behalf of myself but on behalf of all his
friends and colleagues in the Old and New World, for science is not
national but international in its dimensions. It is in accordance with this
conviction that you, dear Aulis, have, after all, lived and worked all your
life.
 CONTENT

Werner Krawietz
Hommage à Professor Aulis Aarnio to his 60th Birthday V

I. New Analytical Hermeneutics, Moral Relativism

and Legal Rightness

Robert Alexy
Recht und Richtigkeit 3

Âke Frändberg
The Relation between Norm and Reality as a Key to the Understanding of
Law 21

Hermann Klenner
Aufklärungshistorisches zur Gerechtigkeit als Rechtfertigung des Rechts . . . 31

Maija-Riitta Ollila
Moral Relativism and Social Criticism 39

Michel Troper
Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de Γ Homme de
1789 47

I I . On Reasonableness and Legal Rationality

in Modern Legal Systems

Gunnar Bergholtz
Rationality and Reasonableness of Judicial Decisions. Some Thoughts from
the Swedish Point of View on Judges' Decision-Making 69

J0rgen Dalberg-Larsen
Changing Conceptions of Legal Rationality 81

Rex Martin
On Hohfeldian Liberties 87

Ilkka Niiniluoto
Is it Rational to be Rational? 101

Valentin Petev
Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts Ill
XIV Content

I I I . Norms and Normpropositions in the Perspectives

of Legal Expressivism

Eugenio Bulygin
On Norm Propositions 129

Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki
Types of Vagueness 135

Ricardo Guibourg
The Concept of Reasonability and the Argumentative Tree 145

Aleksander Peczenik
Certainty or Coherence? 157

Georg Henrik von Wright

On Norms and Norm-Propositions. A Sketch 173

I V . New Constitutionalism and Legalism

in Modern State Legal Systems

Zenon Bankowski/Neil MacCormick

Legality without Legalism 181

Jes Bjarup
Authority and Roles 197

Werner Krawietz
New Constitutional Patriotism versus Legalism? On how to Differentiate
between Legal Systems and the Modern State 219

Burton M. Leiser
Custom as Constitutive of Law 233

Enrico Pattaro

Language and Behaviour: An Introduction to the Normative Dimension . . . 251

Stig Strömholm
Rationality and Goal-Setting - Tasks for Legal Scholars? 273

Kaarlo Tuo ri
The Supreme Courts and Democracy. Who are the Princes of Law's
Empire? 283
 Content XV

V. Law, Meta-Legal Positivism and Legal Dogmatics

as a Rational Legal Science

Martin Schulte
Prolegomena zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens 299

Matti Sintonen
Fact and Value: The Copernican Revolution in the Sciences of Man 311

Robert S. Summers
The Formality of Rules 321

Sebastiân Urbina
Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress 331

Ota Weinberger
Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik 347

V I . Democracy, Legislative Powers and Ultimate Authority

Ernesto Garzón V aidé s

Democratic Consensus: Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities .. . 367

Stanley L. Paulson
On Hans Kelsen's Role in the Formation of the Austrian Constitution and
his Defense of Constitutional Review 385

Kauko Pietilä
Normative Sociology 397

Mihàly Samu
Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit 417

Agustin Squella Narducci

Democracy and the Law 433

Ruth Zimmerling
Power and Freedom. A Comment on the Conception of Felix Oppenheim . . 441

V I I . On Normative Argumentation and Justification

and the Critique of Legal Reasoning

Paolo Comanducci
Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report 463
XVI Content

Svein Eng
Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments Concerning
the Doctrine of Sources of Law? 483

Hannu Tapani Klami

Cosmos and Chaos in Law and Legal Theory 503

Geoffrey Marshall
Values, Intentions, Objectives and Purposes: Some Fallacies about Statutory
Interpretation 517

Rodolfo Vàzquez
Rights and Tolerance 525

Luc J. Wintgens
On Coherence and Consistency 539

V I I I . Jurisprudence, Jurisdictional Power

and Legal Professions

G hit a Holmström-Hintikka
Reasonable Doubt 553

Raul Narits
Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz und ihre Bedeutung für eine verglei-
chende Rechtstheorie 571

Dieter Wyduckel
Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches und rechtstheoretisches
Problem 591

Marek Zirk-Sadowski
Rationality of Legal Discourse in Relation to Legal Ethics 607

Appendix

Werner Krawietz
Aulis Aarnio - Analytische Jurisprudenz und Neue Hermeneutik im
Dienste des Rechts 621

Bibliography Aulis Aarnio 629

List of Contributors 665

 I. New Analytical Hermeneutics,
Moral Relativism and Legal Rightness
 RECHT UND RICHTIGKEIT

Von Robert Alexy, Kiel

Positivisten wie Nichtpositivisten stimmen heute weitgehend darin über-

ein, daß das Recht aus mehr besteht als aus der puren Faktizität von Ver-
haltensregelmäßigkeiten, Befehlen, psychischen Dispositionen oder der
Ausübung von Zwang. Das Recht hat neben dieser faktischen oder realen
Dimension auch eine kritische oder reflexive Seite, die über jene hinaus-
weist. 1 So findet sich sowohl bei Autoren, die einen begrifflich notwendi-
gen Zusammenhang zwischen Recht und Moral bestreiten, als auch bei sol-
chen, die eine derartige Verbindung behaupten, die These, daß das Recht
einen Anspruch auf Richtigkeit oder Gerechtigkeit erhebt. 2 Der alte Streit
zwischen dem Positivismus und dem Nichtpositivismus kann damit auf
einem neuen Schauplatz fortgeführt werden, der durch die Frage nach der
Bedeutung und den Konsequenzen des mit dem Recht verbundenen oder im
Recht erhobenen Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit abgesteckt ist. Den Dreh- und
Angelpunkt des Streites bildet unverändert das Verhältnis von Recht und
Moral. Dieses wird nun mit der Frage angegangen, ob der Anspruch auf
Richtigkeit einen Zusammenhang zwischen Recht und Moral zu stiften
vermag, der den positivistischen Rechtsbegriff sprengt. Zur Vorbereitung
einer Antwort soll zunächst gefragt werden, was unter einem im oder vom
Recht erhobenen Anspruch auf Richtigkeit überhaupt zu verstehen ist.
Sodann wird es in einem zweiten Teil darum gehen, ob ein solcher
Anspruch tatsächlich notwendig mit dem Recht verbunden ist. In einem
dritten Teil werden dann die Konsequenzen des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit
für das Verhältnis von Recht und Moral zu erörtern sein.

1
Vgl. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2. Aufl., Oxford 1994, S. 57, 82ff.
2
Vgl. einerseits N. MacCormick, The Concept of Law and „The Concept of
Law", in: Robert P. George (Hrsg.), The Autonomy of Law, Oxford 1996, S. 172,
175, 189, und andererseits R. Alexy, Zur Kritik des Rechtspositivismus, in: Archiv
für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 37 (1990), S. 11, 19ff.

2*
4 Robert Alexy

I . Z u m Begriff des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit

/. Die Subjekte

Die Rede davon, daß das Recht einen Anspruch auf Richtigkeit erhebt,
klingt zwar vertraut, erscheint aber bei näherem Hinschauen zunächst
eigentümlich. Daß Menschen oder ganz allgemein Rechtssubjekte Ansprü-
che erheben können, die sich auf das Recht stützen, versteht sich von
selbst; wie aber soll dem Recht als solchem das Erheben eines Anspruchs
möglich sein? Ansprüche können in einem voll ausgebildeten oder strengen
Sinne nur von handlungsfähigen Subjekten erhoben werden. Ein solches
aber ist das Recht weder in Gestalt einzelner Rechtsnormen noch als
Rechtssystem im ganzen. Wenn man nicht auf abstrakte Subjekte oder
Gesamtheiten wie den Staat oder die Rechtsgemeinschaft abstellen will,
was neue Probleme mit sich brächte, bleibt daher nur die Möglichkeit, den
Anspruch auf Richtigkeit mit denjenigen Subjekten zu verbinden, die im
und für das Recht tätig sind, indem sie es schaffen, interpretieren, anwen-
den und durchsetzen. Das sind in letzter Instanz stets einzelne Individuen
oder Personen. Es könnte eingewandt werden, daß der Anspruch auf Rich-
tigkeit durch diesen Rekurs auf Personen zu sehr subjektiviert werde. Ob
jemand irgendwelche Ansprüche erhebe, sei seine Sache. So könne ein
Richter auf die Frage, ob er sein Urteil für richtig halte, den Kopf schütteln
und es als Katastrophe bezeichnen. Um diesem Einwand zu entgegnen, ist
zwischen einem subjektiven und einem objektiven Erheben zu unterschei-
den.3 Eine Person erhebt einen Anspruch subjektiv, wenn sie ihn erheben
will. Es kann dann auch von einem persönlichen Anspruch auf Richtigkeit
gesprochen werden. Demgegenüber handelt es sich um einen objektiven
Anspruch auf Richtigkeit, wenn jeder, der in einem Rechtssystem entschei-
det, urteilt oder argumentiert, diesen Anspruch erheben muß. Dieser objek-
tive Anspruch ist keine Privatsache, sondern mit der Rolle eines Teilneh-
mers am Rechtssystem notwendig verbunden. Man könnte ihn deshalb auch
als „offiziell" bezeichnen. Am klarsten tritt der objektive oder offizielle
Charakter im Falle des Richters zutage, der den Anspruch auf Richtigkeit
als Repräsentant des Rechtssystems erhebt. Mit der Unterscheidung zwi-
schen einem subjektiven oder persönlichen und einem objektiven oder offi-
ziellen Anspruch ist zugleich deutlich, weshalb die Rede vom Anspruch des
Rechts auf Richtigkeit intuitiv so plausibel ist. Der Anspruch wird zwar
von Personen erhoben, aber für das Recht. Man könnte deshalb auch sagen,
das Recht erhebt ihn durch Personen, die in ihm und für es tätig sind.

3
In diese Richtung auch P. Soper, Law's Normative Claims, in: Robert P. Geor-
ge (Hrsg.), The Autonomy of Law, Oxford 1996, S. 218.
 Recht und Richtigkeit 5

2. Die Adressaten

Das Gegenstück zu der Frage, wer den Anspruch auf Richtigkeit erhebt,
ist die Frage, wem gegenüber dieser Anspruch erhoben wird. Ein Kreis von
Adressaten ist schnell identifiziert. Es ist der der Adressaten der jeweiligen
Rechtsakte. So erhebt der Gesetzgeber gegenüber den Adressaten der
Gesetze, der Richter gegenüber den Parteien des jeweiligen Prozesses und
der Verwaltungsbeamte gegenüber den Adressaten seiner Verwaltungsakte
einen Anspruch auf Richtigkeit. Dieser Adressatenkreis kann als „institu-
tionell" bezeichnet werden. Es ist für den Anspruch auf Richtigkeit im
Recht von entscheidender Bedeutung, daß der Kreis seiner Adressaten
weiter ist als der des jeweiligen Rechtsaktes. Es gibt neben dem institutio-
nellen einen nichtinstitutionellen Adressatenkreis. Dieser umfaßt jeden, der
sich auf den Standpunkt eines Teilnehmers des jeweiligen Rechtssystems
stellt. Eine solche innere Perspektive oder ein solcher interner Standpunkt4
wird mit der Frage eingenommen, was in dem jeweiligen Rechtssystem
geboten, verboten und erlaubt ist und zu was es ermächtigt. Diese Frage
kann von jedem gestellt werden, und jeder kann versuchen, eine Antwort
zu geben und zu begründen oder eine von anderen gegebene Antwort zu
kritisieren. Es sind also die auch sonst mit dem Anspruch auf Richtigkeit
oder Wahrheit verbundenen Akte des Fragens, des Urteilens und Behaup-
tens und des Begründens und Argumentierens, die den Kreis der Adressaten
des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit im Recht definieren. Dieser hat somit auch
hier einen durchaus universellen Charakter. Die einzige, allerdings entschei-
dende Einschränkung besteht darin, daß zu dem nichtinstitutionellen Adres-
satenkreis nur diejenigen zählen, die sich auf den Standpunkt des jeweili-
gen Rechtssystems stellen. Das unterscheidet den Anspruch auf Richtigkeit
im Recht von dem einer universalistischen Moral. Hier wird nicht gefragt,
was in einem bestimmten System, sondern was schlechthin gilt. Im einzel-
nen ist wegen der Möglichkeit, an Rechtssysteme, etwa in Gestalt der Men-
schenrechte oder des Postulats der Rechtssicherheit, universelle materielle
oder formelle Anforderungen zu stellen, weiter zu differenzieren. Zu einer
ersten und allgemeinen Bestimmung des Adressatenkreises mag das
Gesagte jedoch ausreichen.

3. Das Erheben

Bislang ging es nur darum, wer gegenüber wem im Recht den Anspruch
auf Richtigkeit erhebt. Die Frage, was das Erheben dieses Anspruchs
bedeutet, blieb dabei offen. In der Literatur wird selbst dort, wo mit dem
Recht verbundene Ansprüche eingehend erörtert werden, kaum Aufmerk-

4
Vgl. Hart (FN 1), S. 89.
6 Robert Alexy

samkeit darauf verwendet, in genau welcher Tätigkeit oder welchen Tätig-

keiten das Erheben jenes Anspruchs besteht.5 Wieder ist zwischen dem
Institutionellen und dem Nichtinstitutionellen zu unterscheiden. Institutio-
nelle Akte werden aufgrund von Ermächtigungsnormen vollzogen. Bei-
spiele sind der Gesetzesbeschluß, das gerichtliche Urteil oder der Erlaß
eines Verwaltungsaktes. Im Kern des Richtigkeitsarguments steht die
These, daß derartige institutionelle Rechtsakte stets mit dem nichtinstitutio-
nellen Akt der Behauptung verbunden sind, daß der Rechtsakt inhaltlich
und prozedural richtig ist. Diese Behauptung der Richtigkeit hat Konse-
quenzen. Richtigkeit impliziert Begründbarkeit. Das Recht stellt mit dem
Anspruch auf Richtigkeit deshalb zugleich einen Anspruch auf Begründbar-
keit. Mit diesem Anspruch erkennt es nicht nur eine allgemeine grundsätz-
liche Begründungspflicht an; es macht auch geltend, diese Pflicht so weit
wie möglich erfüllt zu haben oder erfüllen zu können. Der Anspruch auf
Richtigkeit schließt damit neben der bloßen Behauptung der Richtigkeit die
Garantie der Begründbarkeit ein. Zu der Behauptung und der Garantie
kommt noch ein drittes Element, nämlich die Erwartung, daß alle Adressa-
ten des Anspruchs, wenn sie sich auf den Standpunkt des jeweiligen
Rechtssystems stellen und vernünftig sind, den Rechtsakt als richtig aner-
kennen. Diese Erwartung kommt der juristischen Rede von einem Anspruch
am nächsten. Dieser besteht nach § 194 Abs. 1 BGB in dem Recht, von
einem anderen ein Tun oder ein Unterlassen zu verlangen. Man kann den
Begriff der Erwartung dahin präzisieren, daß der, der einen Anspruch auf
Richtigkeit erhebt, gegenüber den Adressaten dieses Anspruchs das Recht
geltend macht, daß sie den jeweiligen Rechtsakt als richtig anerkennen. Die
im Anspruch auf Richtigkeit enthaltene Erwartung ist also eine normative
Erwartung. Faßt man das zum Erheben des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit
Gesagte zusammen, so kann man sagen, daß dieses aus drei Elementen
besteht: (1) der Behauptung der Richtigkeit, (2) der Garantie der Begründ-
barkeit und (3) der Erwartung der Anerkennung der Richtigkeit.

Diese drei Elemente sind nicht nur mit den bislang betrachteten institu-
tionellen Akten, etwa mit gerichtlichen Entscheidungen, verbunden. Jeder,
der als Teilnehmer eines Rechtssystems, etwa als Anwalt vor Gericht oder
als Bürger in einer öffentlichen Diskussion, Behauptungen darüber aufstellt,
was durch dieses Rechtssystem geboten, verboten und erlaubt ist und zu
was es ermächtigt, erhebt den aus der Behauptung der Richtigkeit, der
Garantie der Begründbarkeit und der Erwartung der Anerkennung bestehen-
den Anspruch.

5
Vgl. etwa Soper (FN 3), S. 237, der ohne weitere Erläuterung schlicht davon
spricht, daß das Recht darauf besteht (insists), daß es glaubt (believes) und daß es
denkt (thinks), daß seine Normen gerecht (just) oder richtig (correct) sind.
 Recht und Richtigkeit 7

Mit der Trias von Behauptung, Garantie und Erwartung ist noch nichts
über den Inhalt des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit gesagt worden, und dies
sollte auch nicht geschehen. Es gehört geradezu zum Begriff des Anspruchs
auf Richtigkeit, daß die Kriterien der Richtigkeit offen sind. Andernfalls
könnte er nicht überall im Recht erhoben werden. Es weichen nicht nur die
Richtigkeitskriterien verschiedener Rechtssysteme voneinander ab, auch
innerhalb einer Rechtsordnung gelten für die Richtigkeit etwa von Geset-
zen, richterlichen Urteilen und Verwaltungsakten Kriterien recht unter-
schiedlicher Art. Die Frage ist, ob trotz aller Differenz etwas Gemeinsames
existiert, das einen notwendigen Zusammenhang zwischen Recht und Moral
herstellt. Doch bevor diesem Problem nachgegangen wird, ist erst zu
fragen, ob der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Recht und dem Anspruch auf
Richtigkeit überhaupt einen notwendigen Charakter hat. Sollte dies nicht
der Fall sein, könnte unser Anspruch auch keinen notwendigen Zusammen-
hang zwischen Recht und Moral stiften.

I I . Die Notwendigkeit der V e r k n ü p f u n g von Recht und Richtigkeit

Der These vom notwendig im Recht erhobenen Anspruch auf Richtigkeit

ist entgegengehalten worden, daß die Frage, welche Ansprüche das Recht
erhebe, eine empirische Frage sei. 6 Sollte dies zutreffen, hätte die Verbin-
dung von Recht und Richtigkeit keinen notwendigen, sondern nur einen
kontingenten Charakter. Das Recht könnte den Anspruch sowohl erheben
als auch nicht erheben. Um herauszufinden, ob tatsächlich die Möglichkeit
besteht, den Anspruch auf Richtigkeit nicht zu erheben, was bedeuten
würde, daß er nicht notwendig ist, seien zwei Beispiele betrachtet.

7. Ein absurder Verfassungsartikel

Im ersten Beispiel geht es um den ersten Artikel einer neuen Verfassung

für den Staat X, in dem die Minderheit die Mehrheit unterdrückt. Die Min-
derheit möchte die Vorteile der Unterdrückung der Mehrheit weiter genie-
ßen, aber auch ehrlich sein. Die verfassunggebende Versammlung be-
schließt daher als ersten Artikel der Verfassung den folgenden Satz:
(1) X ist eine souveräne, föderale und ungerechte Republik.
Dieser Verfassungsartikel hat etwas Fehlerhaftes. Die Frage ist nur, worin
die Fehlerhaftigkeit besteht. Ohne Zweifel wird gegen Konventionen über
das Abfassen von Verfassungstexten verstoßen, doch das allein erklärt den
Fehler nicht. Ein Grundrechtskatalog von hundert Seiten wäre z.B. auch

6
Soper (FN 3), S. 217, 230f.
8 Robert Alexy

höchst unüblich oder unkonventionell, doch er hätte trotz seiner zur Unüb-
lichkeit hinzukommenden Unzweckmäßigkeit nicht das schlechthin Unsin-
nige der Ungerechtigkeitsklausel. Entsprechendes gilt für die moralische
Fehlerhaftigkeit. Vom Standpunkt der Moral aus bestünde kein Unterschied,
wenn der unterdrückten Mehrheit explizit Rechte vorenthalten werden
würden, unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Fehlerhaftigkeit aber doch. Die Unge-
rechtigkeitsklausel ist nicht nur unmoralisch, sondern auch irgendwie ver-
rückt. Es ist geltend gemacht worden, daß die Ungerechtigkeitsklausel nur
einen politischen Fehler darstelle, denn sie sei „politisch unzweckmäßig". 7
Das ist sie sicherlich, doch auch dies erklärt den Fehler nicht vollständig.
Vieles kann in einer Verfassung politisch unzweckmäßig und in diesem
Sinne technisch fehlerhaft sein, ohne daß es so eigentümlich wirkt wie
unser erster Artikel. 8 Weder die konventionelle noch die moralische, noch
die technische Fehlerhaftigkeit erklärt die Absurdität der Ungerechtigkeits-
klausel. Diese resultiert, wie so oft beim Absurden, aus einem Widerspruch.
Ein solcher entsteht dadurch, daß mit dem Akt der Verfassungsgebung not-
wendig ein Anspruch auf Richtigkeit erhoben wird, der in diesem Fall
wesentlich ein Anspruch auf Gerechtigkeit ist. Ansprüche schließen, wie
dargelegt, Behauptungen ein. Beim hier erhobenen Anspruch auf Gerechtig-
keit ist es die Behauptung, daß die konstituierte Republik gerecht ist. Der
Widerspruch besteht also darin, daß mit dem Akt der Verfassungsgebung
implizit eine Behauptung aufgestellt wird, die dem expliziten Inhalt des
verfassunggebenden Aktes, der Ungerechtigkeitsklausel, widerspricht. Man
kann Widersprüche zwischen dem Inhalt eines Aktes und dem, was mit
dem Vollzug dieses Aktes notwendig vorausgesetzt wird, als „performative
Widersprüche" bezeichnen. Wenn man ferner den Ausdruck „begrifflicher
Fehler" so weit verwendet, daß er sich auch auf Verstöße gegen Regeln
bezieht, die für Sprechakte, also sprachliche Äußerungen als Handlungen,
konstitutiv sind oder auf andere Weise von ihnen notwendig vorausgesetzt
werden, so kann man hier zu dem Ergebnis kommen, daß ein begrifflicher
Fehler in Gestalt eines performativen Widerspruchs vorliegt. So führt denn
ein über den konventionellen, den moralischen und den technischen Fehler
laufender Was-denn-sonst-Schluß zu dem Ergebnis, daß nur die Annahme
eines begrifflichen Fehlers die eigentümliche Fehlerhaftigkeit der Ungerech-
tigkeitsklausel erklären kann. Wenn aber der Fehler ein begrifflicher ist,
dann kann auch der notwendige Zusammenhang zwischen dem Recht und
dem Anspruch auf Richtigkeit, auf dem er beruht, als „begrifflich notwen-
dig" bezeichnet werden.

7
E. Bulygin, Alexy und das Richtigkeitsargument, in: Rechtsnorm und Rechts-
wirklichkeit. Festschrift für Werner Krawietz, hrsg. v. A. Aarnio /S. L. Paulson/
Ο. Weinberger/G. Η. v. Wright/D. Wyduckel, Berlin 1993, S. 23f.
8
Vgl. R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, 2. Aufl., Freiburg/München
1994, S. 66.
 Recht und Richtigkeit 9

A l l dies findet eine Bestätigung in einer Art Gegenprobe. So wie die

Ungerechtigkeitsklausel im dargelegten Sinne widersprüchlich ist, so wäre
ein Artikel wie:

(2) X ist ein gerechter Staat

in einer Verfassung redundant. Was notwendig beansprucht wird, muß nicht

nochmals explizit statuiert werden.
Gegen das Argument aus dem absurden Verfassungsartikel ist einge-
wandt worden, daß das Beschließen einer Verfassung durch eine verfas-
sunggebende Versammlung zu einem „entwicklungsgeschichtlich relativ
späten Typus einer Rechtsordnung" gehöre. Es könne nicht ausgeschlossen
werden, daß „bestimmte normative Ansprüche" nur dem modernen Verfas-
sungsstaat „inhärent sind und deshalb nicht als Definitionskriterien eines auf
universelle Anwendbarkeit zielenden Rechtsbegriffs herangezogen werden
dür-fen". 9 Es ist ohne Zweifel richtig, daß mit dem modernen Verfassungs-
staat Ansprüche verbunden sind, die nicht in jeder Rechtsordnung erhoben
werden. Der Anspruch auf Richtigkeit gehört jedoch gerade nicht zu diesen
speziellen Ansprüchen. Er ist ein mit jedem Recht verbundener genereller
Anspruch. Das gilt auch für den von ihm umfaßten Anspruch auf Gerech-
tigkeit. Als genereller oder abstrakter Anspruch zielt der Anspruch auf
Gerechtigkeit noch nicht auf eine bestimmte Gerechtigkeitskonzeption, son-
dern nur auf die richtige Verteilung von Gütern und Lasten und den richti-
gen Ausgleich etwa von Schuld und Strafe und Schaden und Ersatz.
Abstrakte Gerechtigkeit ist nichts anderes als Richtigkeit in bezug auf Ver-
teilung und Ausgleich. So verschieden die Kriterien der Richtigkeit von
Verteilung und Ausgleich sind, so universell ist der Anspruch, daß richtig
verteilt und ausgeglichen wird. A l l dies ist nicht auf neuere Zeiten
beschränkt. Man stelle sich nur vor, Justinian hätte Ulpians berühmte drei
iuris praecepta 10 in folgender negierter Form in den Corpus Iuris Civilis
aufnehmen lassen:

(3) Iuris praecepta sunt haec: inhoneste vivere, alterum laedere, suum
cuique non tribuere. 11

9
U. Neumann, Rezension: Robert Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, in:
Protosoziologie 6 (1994), S. 243.
10
Ulp. D. 1, 1, 10, 1: Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non lae-
dere, suum cuique tribuere. Ebenso Inst. 1, 1, 3.
11
„Die Gebote des Rechts sind folgende: Unehrenhaft leben, den anderen verlet-
zen, niemandem das Seine gewähren." Der Absurdität dieses Satzes entspricht die
Selbstverständlichkeit der Ulpianschen Formel Das dürfte die gelegentlich erörterte
„fehlende Originalität" erklären. Vgl. hierzu W. Waldstein, Zur juristischen Rele-
vanz der Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles, Cicero und Ulpian, in: Der Gerechtigkeitsan-
spruch des Rechts. Festschrift für Theo Mayer-Maly, hrsg. v. M. Beck-Mannagetta/
H. Böhm/G. Graf, Wien/New York 1996, S. 60f.
10 Robert Alexy

2. Ein absurdes Urteil

Nicht alle Rechtssysteme kennen verfassunggebende Versammlungen,

wohl aber dürften in allen wenigstens minimal entwickelten Rechtssyste-
men Akte der Rechtsprechung vorkommen. Hierum geht es in unserem
zweiten Beispiel. Man nehme an, ein Richter verkünde das folgende Urteil:
(4) Der Angeklagte wird, was eine falsche Interpretation des geltenden
Rechts ist, zu lebenslanger Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt.
Dieser Satz gibt zu einer Reihe von Fragen Anlaß, die hier jedoch nicht
verfolgt werden sollen. 12 Im vorliegenden Zusammenhang ist allein von
Bedeutung, daß die Annahme eines konventionellen, moralischen oder tech-
nischen Fehlers ebenso wie die eines Verstoßes gegen positives Recht 13
auch hier nicht ausreicht, um den eigentümlichen Charakter der Fehlerhaf-
tigkeit zu erfassen. Die Absurdität des Satzes erklärt sich auch in diesem
Fall nur aus einem performativen Widerspruch. Mit einem richterlichen
Urteil wird stets der Anspruch erhoben, daß das Recht richtig angewandt
wird, mag dieser Anspruch auch noch so wenig erfüllt werden. Diesem mit
dem Vollzug des institutionellen Aktes der Verurteilung notwendig erhobe-
nen Anspruch auf Richtigkeit widerspricht die mit dem Urteil verbundene
Einstufung desselben als falsch. Daß ein Anspruch auf Richtigkeit erhoben
wird, bedeutet u.a., daß implizit die Behauptung aufgestellt wird, daß das
Urteil richtig ist. Dieser impliziten Behauptung widerspricht die explizit
und öffentlich mit dem Urteil verbundene Behauptung, daß es falsch ist.
Dieser Widerspruch zwischen dem Impliziten und dem Expliziten erklärt
die Absurdität.
Es ist eingewandt worden, daß der Hinweis auf die beiden Beispiele keine
wirkliche Begründung der These von der Notwendigkeit des Anspruchs auf
Richtigkeit sei. 14 Das gibt Anlaß zu der Frage, ob der in ein auf Vollstän-
digkeit zielendes Was-denn-sonst-Argument eingebettete Hinweis auf einen
performativen Widerspruch eine Begründung ist. Die Antwort hängt davon
ab, was man unter einer Begründung versteht. Verlangt man, daß ein Satz
durch einen von diesem unabhängigen Satz gestützt wird, ist der Hinweis
auf einen performativen Widerspruch keine Begründung. 15 Das ergibt sich
aus der einfachen Einsicht, daß ein performativer Widerspruch nur dann

12
Vgl. hierzu einerseits U. Neumann, Juristische Argumentationslehre, Darmstadt
1986, S. 87ff.; ders. (FN 9), S. 244f.; Bulygin (FN 7), S. 23, und andererseits Alexy
(FN 8), S. 69ff.; ders., Bulygins Kritik des Richtigkeitsarguments, in: Normative
Systems in Legal and Moral Theory. Festschrift für Carlos E. Alchourrón and Euge-
nio Bulygin, hrsg. v. E. Garzón Valdés/W. Krawietz/G. Η. ν. Wright/R. Zimmer-
ling, Berlin 1997, S. 247 ff.
13
Vgl. Alexy (FN 8), S. 69.
14
Bulygin (FN 7), S. 21 ff.
 Recht und Richtigkeit 11

entsteht, wenn die Regel, zu deren Begründung er angeführt wird, bereits

gilt. Sollte die Regel, daß mit richterlichen Urteilen ein Anspruch auf Rich-
tigkeit erhoben wird, nicht gelten, entstünde auch kein performativer Wider-
spruch. Performative Widersprüche sind deshalb lediglich ein Mittel, mit
dem gezeigt werden kann, daß bestimmte Regeln notwendig gelten. Das
Zeigen besteht in dem Hinweis auf eine unvermeidbare Absurdität, die
nicht anders erklärt werden kann als durch die notwendige Geltung einer
Regel. Das ist ein, wenn auch fallibles, Argument und damit, faßt man den
Begriff der Begründung nicht allzu eng, eine Begründung. 16

3. Die Alternative

Es könnte eingewandt werden, daß all dies noch nicht die Notwendigkeit
des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit zeige. Die Absurdität sei vermeidbar. Man
müsse nur die bisherige Praxis und das bisherige Selbstverständnis des
Rechts gründlich ändern. Würden Verfassungen erst einmal von allen aus-
schließlich als Ausdruck von Macht, Willen und Stärke gedeutet und rich-
terliche Urteile als eine Mischung von Emotion, Dezision und Befehl, ver-
schwände aus unseren Beispielen mit dem Anspruch auf Richtigkeit
zugleich auch der Widerspruch und damit die Absurdität. Der Anspruch auf
Richtigkeit würde durch so etwas wie einen Machtanspruch ersetzt werden.
Es verbliebe zwar ein Rest an Merkwürdigkeit. Diese wäre aber daraus zu
erklären, daß eine Praxis, in der nur die Macht, der Wille und die Dezision
zählen, jenseits der Kategorien von gerecht und ungerecht und richtig und
falsch liegt. Unsere beiden Sätze wären, soweit sie diese Kategorien ver-
wenden, zwar nicht widersprüchlich, wohl aber sinnlos.
Um die Bedeutung dieses Einwandes zu ermessen, sei ein Blick auf eine
mögliche Erweiterung geworfen. Ansprüche auf Richtigkeit gibt es keines-
falls nur im Recht. Sie werden auch mit moralischen Wert- und Verpflich-
tungsurteilen erhoben, und ihre allgemeinste Form ist mit dem Sprechakt

15
Vgl. hierzu W. D. Fusfield, Can Jürgen Habermas' „Begründungsprogramm"
Escape Hans Albert's Münchhausen Trilemma? In: Jahrbuch Rhetorik 8 (1989),
S. 77ff.
16
Es sei hervorgehoben, daß diese Begründung ausschließlich der objektiven
Notwendigkeit des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit gilt. Das Objektive besteht darin, daß
dieser Anspruch mit bestimmten Akten erhoben wird, unabhängig davon, was die
Akteure denken und wollen. Es ist eine leider nicht seltene Erfahrung, daß der An-
spruch auf Richtigkeit auch von Personen erhoben werden kann, die wissen, daß
das, was sie als richtig darstellen, falsch ist, oder die sich ganz allgemein für Rich-
tigkeit nicht interessieren. Der Anspruch ist deshalb nur objektiv, nicht auch subjek-
tiv notwendig. Die objektive Notwendigkeit hat einen ambivalenten Charakter. Sie
bietet einerseits die Gelegenheit zu Täuschung und Betrug und andererseits die
Möglichkeit von Bloßstellung und Kritik.
12 Robert Alexy

der Behauptung verknüpft. Moralische Stellungnahmen, die diesen

Anspruch nicht erheben, sind, wie Günther Patzig gezeigt hat, allenfalls
„Äußerungen einer emotionalen Reaktion 44 . 17 Ebenso verfehlt die in der frü-
heren analytischen Philosophie verbreitete Deutung moralischer Aussagen
als Berichte über eigene Einstellungen und Gefühle und als Aufforderung,
wie der Sprecher zu empfinden, 18 „den eigentlichen Sinn moralischer
Urteile 44 . Moralische Wert- und Verpflichtungsurteile sind „echte Behaup-
tungen 44 , 19 und Behauptungen sind nur solche Sprechakte, mit denen ein
Anspruch auf Wahrheit oder Richtigkeit erhoben wird. 2 0 Der Verzicht auf
den Anspruch auf Richtigkeit würde unsere Sprache und damit unser
Selbstverständnis und Leben grundlegend verändern. Statt Urteilen und
Behauptungen gäbe es nur noch Gefühle und Meinungen, Begründungen
wandelten sich in Überredungen, und an die Stelle von Richtigkeit und
Wahrheit träten erfolgreiche Manipulationen und festsitzende Überzeugun-
gen. Alles wäre subjektiv, nichts objektiv.
Damit ist deutlich, in welchem Sinne der Anspruch auf Richtigkeit not-
wendig ist. Er ist notwendig relativ auf eine Praxis, die wesentlich durch
die Unterscheidung von wahr oder richtig und falsch definiert ist. 2 1 Diese
Praxis ist allerdings eine Praxis besonderer Art. Wir können zwar versu-
chen, die Kategorien der Wahrheit, der Richtigkeit und der Objektivität zu
verabschieden. Sollte uns dies gelingen, wäre unser Sprechen und Handeln
aber etwas wesentlich anderes, als es jetzt ist. Der Preis wäre nicht nur
hoch. Er bestünde in einem gewissen Sinne aus uns selbst.

17
G. Patzig, Relativismus und Objektivität moralischer Normen, in: ders., Ge-
sammelte Schriften I, Göttingen 1994, S. 21.
18
Vgl. hierzu R. Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, 3. Aufl., Frank-
furt a.M. 1996, S. 60ff.
19
Patzig (FN 17), S. 21.
20
Vgl. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen über Ethik, 2. Aufl., Frankfurt a.M. 1994,
S. 19; R. Alexy, Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs, Frankfurt a.M. 1995, S. 134f.
21
Diese Relativierung der Notwendigkeit des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit auf eine
bestimmte Praxis entspricht in ihrer Struktur der These von Grice und Strawson,
daß es eine Sache sei, einzuräumen, daß es keine absolute Notwendigkeit gebe, ir-
gendein Begriffsschema oder -system anzunehmen oder zu gebrauchen, und eine
ganz andere, zu behaupten, daß es keine Notwendigkeit innerhalb irgendwelcher
Begriffsschemata oder -systeme, die wir annehmen oder gebrauchen, gebe. Letzteres
folgt nicht aus ersterem (H. P. Grice/ P. F. Strawson, In Defense of a Dogma, in:
Philosophical Review 65 (1956), S. 157f.). Die Notwendigkeit innerhalb eines be-
stimmten Begriffsschemas oder -systems und auch innerhalb einer bestimmten Pra-
xis ist anders als die Notwendigkeit eines bestimmten Begriffsschemas oder -sy-
stems als solchem oder einer bestimmten Praxis als solcher durchaus mit der These
Quines vereinbar, daß kein Satz und keine Regel gegenüber einer Revision immun
sei (W. V. O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in: ders., From a Logical Point
of View, 2. Aufl., Cambridge, Mass. 1961, S. 43).
 Recht und Richtigkeit 13

III. Rechtliche und moralische Richtigkeit

Ein Positivist könnte all dies einräumen und doch geltend machen, daß
mit alledem nichts für irgendeinen notwendigen Zusammenhang von Recht
und Moral gewonnen sei. Hierzu braucht er nur zu behaupten, daß der im
Recht notwendig erhobene Anspruch auf Richtigkeit einen rein rechtlichen
Inhalt habe, der keine moralischen Implikationen einschließe. Die Frage
lautet also, ob der im Recht erhobene Anspruch auf Richtigkeit einen
Anspruch auf moralische Richtigkeit einschließt. Diese Frage kann auf alle
drei Gewalten bezogen werden. Hier soll es nur um die Rechtsprechung
gehen.

L Die Offenheit des Rechts

Den Ausgangspunkt bildet eine Einsicht der juristischen Methodenlehre,

über die zwischen Positivisten und Nichtpositivisten weitgehend Einigkeit
besteht. Jedes positive Recht hat, wie Hart sagt, eine offene Struktur (open
texture). 22 Dafür gibt es mehrere Gründe. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind
die Vagheit der Sprache des Rechts, die Möglichkeit von Normwidersprü-
chen, das Fehlen von Normen, auf die sich die Entscheidung stützen läßt,
und die Möglichkeit, in besonderen Fällen auch gegen den Wortlaut einer
Norm zu entscheiden.23 Es existiert insofern eine notwendige Offenheit des
positiven Rechts. Fälle im Offenheitsbereich lassen sich in Anlehnung an
eine verbreitete Terminologie als „zweifelhafte Fälle" bezeichnen.
Im Offenheitsbereich des positiven Rechts kann definitionsgemäß nicht
aufgrund des positiven Rechts entschieden werden, denn wenn aufgrund
des positiven Rechts entschieden werden könnte, befände man sich nicht im
Offenheitsbereich. Positivisten wie Kelsen und Hart sind deshalb nur konse-
quent, wenn sie sagen, daß der Richter im Offenheitsbereich ermächtigt ist,
ähnlich wie ein Gesetzgeber, aufgrund außerrechtlicher Maßstäbe nach
seinem Ermessen neues Recht zu schaffen. 24 Der Anspruch auf Richtigkeit
führt demgegenüber zu einer nichtpositivistischen Deutung. Dieser
Anspruch ist wegen seiner notwendigen Verbindung mit dem richterlichen
Urteil ein rechtlicher und nicht nur ein moralischer Anspruch. Ihm korre-
spondiert eine mit richterlichen Urteilen notwendig verbundene rechtliche
Pflicht, richtig zu entscheiden. Nun ist die Entscheidung im Offenheits-
bereich die Entscheidung einer normativen Frage, denn es geht letzthin
darum, was geboten, verboten und erlaubt ist. Allein aufgrund rechtlicher

22
Hart (FN 1), S. 128.
23
Vgl. Alexy (FN 18), S. 17 f.
24
H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2. Aufl., Wien 1960, S. 350; Hart (FN 1),
S. 126, 135, 204f.
14 Robert Alexy

Maßstäbe läßt sich diese Frage nicht beantworten, denn wäre dies möglich,
befänden wir uns nicht im Offenheitsbereich. Es bleibt deshalb nur der
Rückgriff auf nichtrechtliche Maßstäbe. In Frage kommen allgemeine
Zweckmäßigkeitsüberlegungen, tradierte und verbreitete Vorstellungen des
Guten und Bösen und Gerechtigkeitserwägungen, kurz: Zweckmäßigkeit,
Sitte und Moral. Nun haben Zweckmäßigkeitserwägungen und die Berück-
sichtigung von Traditionen und Wertvorstellungen der jeweiligen Gemein-
schaft in richterlichen Urteilen ohne Zweifel ihren legitimen Platz. Wenn
aber der Anspruch auf Richtigkeit erfüllt werden soll, muß der Frage nach
der richtigen Verteilung und dem richtigen Ausgleich der Vorrang und die
führende Rolle eingeräumt werden. Fragen nach der richtigen Verteilung
und dem richtigen Ausgleich sind Gerechtigkeitsfragen. Gerechtigkeitsfra-
gen aber sind moralische Fragen. Damit stiftet der Anspruch auf Richtigkeit
eine methodologisch oder argumentationstheoretisch notwendige Verbin-
dung von Recht und Moral. Der Anspruch auf rechtliche Richtigkeit ist
zwar keinesfalls mit dem Anspruch auf moralische Richtigkeit identisch, er
schließt aber einen Anspruch auf moralische Richtigkeit ein. 2 5

2. Der Autonomie e inwand

Gegen dieses Argument lassen sich zahlreiche Einwände erheben. Drei

besonders wichtige sollen hier betrachtet werden. Der erste lautet, daß es
falsch sei, die in zweifelhaften Fällen erforderliche Argumentation als eine
moralische zu deuten. Soweit mit diesem Einwand lediglich geltend
gemacht wird, daß nicht nur moralische Prinzipien, sondern auch Zweckmä-
ßigkeitserwägungen und Wertvorstellungen der jeweiligen Gemeinschaft im
Recht eine legitime Rolle spielen, werden offene Türen eingerannt. Die in
zweifelhaften Fällen erforderliche allgemeine praktische Argumentation
umfaßt all dies, 26 allerdings unter dem Primat der moralischen Argumente.
Ein Einwand entsteht erst dann, wenn bestritten wird, daß zur Erfüllung des
Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit überhaupt moralische Argumente erforderlich
sind. Die attraktivste Variante dieses Angriffs bilden radikale Kohärenz-
theorien der juristischen Interpretation. Radikale Kohärenztheorien begnü-
gen sich nicht mit der ohne weiteres einsichtigen und zweifellos richtigen
These, daß die systematische Vollständigkeit und der systematische Zusam-
menhang wesentliche Rationalitäts- und damit Richtigkeitskriterien sind.
Sie behaupten darüber hinaus, daß die Kohärenz in zweifelhaften Fällen ein
hinreichendes und das einzige Kriterium sei. Radikale Kohärenztheorien

25
Das hier skizzierte Argument läßt sich einerseits als „Prinzipienargument"
(Alexy (FN 8), S. 117 ff.) und andererseits als „Sonderfallthese" (ders. (FN 18),
S. 263ff., 426ff.; ders. (FN 20), S. 172ff.) weiter entfalten.
26
Alexy (FN 20), S. 173.
 Recht und Richtigkeit 15

sind damit Ausdruck der Idee des juristischen Holismus, nach der alle Prä-
missen bereits im Rechtssystem enthalten oder verborgen sind und nur noch
entdeckt zu werden brauchen. Diese Idee hat Juristen immer wieder faszi-
niert, verheißt sie doch die vollständige Autonomie des Rechts. Sie ist
jedoch nicht erfüllbar. Alle zu ihrer Präzisierung vorgeschlagenen Formeln
erweisen sich als offen und auf die Sättigung mit Werten und Normen
angewiesen, die sie nicht schon enthalten. Ob man nun die hermeneuti-
schen Zirkel zwischen Vorverständnis und Text, Teil und Ganzem oder
Norm und Sachverhalt nimmt oder die argumentationstheoretische Forde-
rung, alle Umstände des Falles und alle einschlägigen Normen zu berück-
sichtigen und dann abzuwägen, 27 oder aber die lebenskluge Maxime, nach
Ähnlichkeiten zu suchen, stets hat man etwas höchst Vernünftiges, doch
leider auch höchst Unvollständiges und Auffüllungsbedürftiges vor sich. So
wie Normen sich nicht selbst anwenden können, so kann ein Rechtssystem
nicht selbst Vollständigkeit und Kohärenz herstellen. Hierzu sind Personen
und Prozeduren erforderlich, die neue Inhalte einspeisen. Diese neuen
Inhalte aber schließen moralische Inhalte ein, wenn der Anspruch auf Rich-
tigkeit erfüllt werden soll.

3. Der Unmöglichkeitseinwand

Der zweite Einwand geht tiefer. Er macht geltend, daß ein begrifflich
notwendiger Zusammenhang zwischen Recht und Moral begrifflich unmög-
lich sei. Wenn die Moral auf irgendeine Weise notwendig mit dem Recht
zusammenhänge, dann gehöre sie insoweit notwendig zum Recht. Was aber
notwendig zum Recht gehöre, sei stets Recht. Notwendige Zusammenhänge
könne es deshalb stets nur innerhalb des Rechts und niemals über die Gren-
zen des Rechts hinaus geben. Die These, daß im Offenheitsbereich eine
Rechtspflicht zur Berücksichtigung moralischer Prinzipien bestehe, führe
deshalb zu einem Dilemma, dem Dilemma des Nichtpositivismus. Entweder
sei die Berücksichtigung eines bestimmten Prinzips rechtlich geboten. Dann
handele es sich bei diesem Prinzip um ein Rechtsprinzip, denn was anderes
als das rechtliche Gebot seiner Berücksichtigung sollte ein Prinzip zu
einem Rechtsprinzip machen? Wenn das zu berücksichtigende Prinzip aber
ein Rechtsprinzip sei, stelle sich das Problem eines notwendigen Zusam-
menhanges von Recht und Moral nicht. Oder aber das fragliche Prinzip sei
ausschließlich ein moralisches Prinzip. Das setze voraus, daß seine Berück-
sichtigung nicht rechtlich geboten sei, denn wäre sie dies, wäre das Prinzip
ein Rechtsprinzip und kein ausschließlich moralisches Prinzip. Wenn aber
die Berücksichtigung von ausschließlich moralischen Prinzipien definitions-

27
Vgl. K. Günther, Critical Remarks on Robert Alexy's „Special-Case Thesis",
in: Ratio Juris 6 (1993), S. 151 ff.
16 Robert Alexy

gemäß nicht rechtlich geboten sei, könne sich die Frage eines notwendigen
Zusammenhanges von Recht und Moral wiederum nicht stellen. 28
Die Lösung dieses Dilemmas besteht darin, daß man rechtlich zu beach-
tende moralische Prinzipien und Argumente dadurch definiert, daß die
Rechtspflicht zu ihrer Beachtung sich nur aus ihrer inhaltlichen Richtigkeit
ergibt. Die Richtigkeit und sonst nichts holt sie ins Recht. Ihre argumenta-
tive Kraft ist ausschließlich nichtinstitutioneller Art. Genau dies führt zur
Abgrenzung von positivem Recht und Moral. Positives Recht kann nur
durch eine wie auch immer beschaffene Art der Institutionalisierung defi-
niert werden. 29 Die ordnungsgemäße Gesetztheit und die - wesentlich
durch Sanktionen gestützte - soziale Wirksamkeit sind deren Hauptele-
mente. Die inhaltliche Richtigkeit ist neben der ordnungsgemäßen Gesetzt-
heit und der sozialen Wirksamkeit das dritte mögliche Definitionselement
des Rechts. Hinge die Frage, ob inhaltliche Richtigkeit in einem Rechtssy-
stem von Bedeutung ist, ausschließlich davon ab, was jeweils in dieser Hin-
sicht gesetzt wurde und wirksam ist, wäre der Zusammenhang von Recht
und Moral in der Tat ausschließlich durch positives Recht bestimmt. Wenn
aber das gesetzte und wirksame Recht notwendig einen Anspruch auf Rich-
tigkeit erhebt und insofern notwendig die inhaltliche Richtigkeit und mit ihr
die Moral einschließt, dann gehört die Moral zwar im Sinne des erwähnten
Dilemmas des Nichtpositivismus zum Recht, aber das Recht, zu dem sie
gehört, ist nicht das Recht der Positivisten. Es umfaßt neben der Gesetzt-
heit und der Wirksamkeit auch die Richtigkeit und mit ihr die Moral. Der
Anspruch auf Richtigkeit sprengt so den positivistischen Rechtsbegriff und
öffnet ihn zur Moral hin. Das ist, wenn man von dem durch Setzung und
Wirksamkeit definierten positivistischen Rechtsbegriff ausgeht, eine Verbin-
dung von Recht und Moral. Unter Voraussetzung des nichtpositivistischen
Rechtsbegriffs muß demgegenüber nichts mehr verbunden werden, denn die
inhaltliche Richtigkeit und damit die Moral ist nach ihm bereits Bestandteil
des Rechts. Das dem Nichtpositivismus entgegengehaltene Dilemma löst
sich somit vollständig auf, wenn nur Klarheit darüber herrscht, von wel-
chem Rechtsbegriff jeweils die Rede ist.

4. Wirklichkeit und Ideal

Der dritte Einwand richtet sich weder dagegen, daß das Recht notwendig
einen Anspruch auf Richtigkeit erhebt, noch gegen dessen moralischen
Inhalt. Vielmehr wird mit ihm die Möglichkeit bestritten, aus irgendwel-
chen Ansprüchen, die das Recht erhebt, irgend etwas für eine notwendige

28
Vgl. hierzu Neumann (FN 9), S. 246.
29
Vgl. MacCormick (FN 2), S. 164ff.
 Recht und Richtigkeit 17

Verbindung von Recht und Moral zu gewinnen. Daß das Recht einen
Anspruch auf Richtigkeit erhebe, sei offensichtlich. Der Fehler bestehe
darin, daß versucht werde, zu viel aus ihm zu machen. Es sei eine Sache,
was beansprucht, und eine andere, was tatsächlich getan werde. Daß das
Recht beanspruche, gerecht zu sein, bedeute noch nicht, daß es auch tat-
sächlich gerecht sei. Durch einen bloßen Anspruch werde deshalb noch kei-
nerlei inhaltliche Übereinstimmung zwischen Recht und Moral gestiftet.
Man könne daher zwar allem, was bislang zum Anspruch auf Richtigkeit
gesagt worden sei, im wesentlichen zustimmen, müsse aber darauf behar-
ren, daß aus dem bloßen Erheben des Anspruchs nichts gegen die positi-
vistische These, daß keine notwendige Verbindung zwischen Recht und
Moral bestehe, folge. Das zeige sich am deutlichsten daran, daß die Nicht-
erfüllung des Anspruchs dem Recht weder den Rechtscharakter noch die
Rechtsgeltung nehme. Es bleibe trotz des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit dabei,
daß auch unmoralisches Recht Recht sein könne. Die fundamentale Diffe-
renz zwischen dem Erheben eines Anspruchs und seiner Erfüllung sei des-
halb „alles, was der moderne Positivist für seine fortgesetzte Ablehnung
einer notwendigen Verbindung zwischen Recht und Moral brauche". 30

Diesem Einwand ist entgegenzuhalten, daß er die Bedeutung des

Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit verkennt. Hierfür lassen sich drei Gründe anfüh-
ren. Die ersten beiden seien hier nur angedeutet. Ankommen soll es auf den
dritten.
Der erste Grund besteht darin, daß der auf die unbestreitbare Differenz
von Anspruch und Erfüllung abstellende Einwand nur auf die Nichterfül-
lung, nicht aber auch auf das Nichterheben des Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit
blickt. Es lassen sich gute Gründe dafür anführen, daß eine soziale Ord-
nung, die sich ausschließlich als Gewaltsystem darstellt und keinerlei
Anspruch auf Richtigkeit, nicht einmal den verlogensten oder verrücktesten,
erhebt, kein Rechtssystem ist. Sollte dies zutreffen, hätte das Erheben des
Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit, bezogen auf Rechtssysteme als Ganze, eine
erste rechtsdefinierende Bedeutung. 31

Der zweite Grund betrifft die Konsequenzen der Nichterfüllung des

Anspruchs auf Richtigkeit. Es trifft zwar ohne weiteres zu, daß die bloße
Nichterfüllung dieses Anspruchs dem Recht nicht seinen Rechtscharakter
und damit seine Rechtsgeltung nimmt. Es kann erhebliche Bestände unge-
rechten und dennoch geltenden Rechts geben. Vor allem die Rechtssicher-
heit schließt es aus, daß jede Ungerechtigkeit zum Verlust der Rechtsquali-
tät führt. Daraus, daß nicht jede Ungerechtigkeit mit dem Recht unverträg-
lich ist, folgt jedoch noch nicht, daß jede Ungerechtigkeit sich mit ihm

30
Soper (FN 3), S. 220.
31
Vgl. Alexy (FN 8), S. 59 ff., 201.
3 FS Aarnio
18 Robert Alexy

verträgt. Es lassen sich Gründe dafür anführen, daß es von einer bestimm-
ten Schwelle an zur Unverträglichkeit kommt. Diese Schwelle kann durch
den Begriff des extremen Unrechts definiert werden, 32 was im wesentlichen
der Radbruchschen Formel 33 entspricht, die die deutsche Rechtsprechung
bei ihrer Auseinandersetzung mit dem nationalsozialistischen Unrecht 34 und
dem der D D R 3 5 angewandt hat. 3 6 Das alles ist höchst umstritten. 37 An
dieser Stelle ist nur von Bedeutung, daß es leichter ist, extremem Unrecht
den Rechtscharakter abzusprechen, wenn alles Recht den Anspruch auf
Richtigkeit erhebt, als wenn dies nicht der Fall wäre, ein Rechtssystem sich
also auch als bloße Machtordnung verstehen und darstellen könnte. Der
Anspruch auf Richtigkeit kann deshalb bei der Begründung der These, daß
extremes Unrecht kein Recht ist, eine wesentliche Rolle spielen. Gelingt
diese Begründung, so gewinnt er, wenn auch nur in Verbindung mit norma-
tiven Argumenten 38 und lediglich durch das Ziehen äußerster Grenzen, eine
zweite rechtsdefinierende Bedeutung.
Hier soll es nur auf das dritte Argument gegen den auf die Differenz von
Anspruch und Erfüllung abstellenden Einwand ankommen. Dieses Argu-
ment betrifft nicht den dramatischen Fall einer großen Räuberbande und
auch nicht die außergewöhnliche Situation des Zusammenbruchs eines
Unrechtssystems, sondern den juristischen Alltag im Raum vor der
Schwelle des extremen Unrechts. Der Anspruch auf Richtigkeit hat hier
zwar keine Auswirkungen auf den Rechtscharakter und die Rechtsgeltung,
denn vor jener Schwelle bleibt ungerechtes Recht Recht, wenn es nur ord-
nungsgemäß gesetzt und sozial wirksam ist. Er taucht aber alles in ein
anderes Licht. Ungerechte Urteile können nicht mehr als zwar leider mora-
lisch bedenklich, aber doch rechtlich perfekt oder meisterlich bezeichnet
werden. Sie sind auch rechtlich fehlerhaft. Damit ist das Recht nicht nur
von außen her moralischer Kritik zugänglich. Die kritische Dimension wird
vielmehr in das Recht selbst verlegt. Trotz aller Kontingenz der einzelnen

32
Alexy (FN 8), S. 71 ff., 201.
33
G. Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht (1946), in:
ders., Gesamtausgabe, hrsg. v. A. Kaufmann, Bd. 3, Heidelberg 1990, S. 89.
34
BGHZ 3, 94 (107); BGHSt 2, 173 (177); 2, 234 (237ff.); 3, 357 (362f.);
BVerfGE 3, 58 (119); 3, 225 (232); 6, 132 (198); 6, 389 (414); 23, 98 (106); 54,
53 (68).
35
BGHSt 39, 1 (16); 40, 218 (232); 40, 241 (244); 41, 101 (106ff.).
36
Diese Fälle zeigen, daß die Frage, „ob ungerechte Gesetze formalrechtliche
Gültigkeit genießen können", keinesfalls, wie MacCormick behauptet hat (TV. Mac-
Cormick, Recht, Moral und Positivismus, in: N. MacCormick/O. Weinberger,
Grundlagen des Institutionalistischen Rechtspositivismus, Berlin 1985, S. 175), eine
„obsolete Frage" ist.
37
Vgl. hierzu m.w.N. R. Alexy, Mauerschützen. Zum Verhältnis von Recht,
Moral und Strafbarkeit, Hamburg 1993.
38
Vgl. hierzu Alexy (FN 8), S. 71 ff.
 Recht und Richtigkeit 19

Rechtsordnungen k o m m t es zur Verbindung des Rechts m i t der Idee einer

richtigen M o r a l . Der begrifflich notwendig m i t dem Recht verbundene
Anspruch auf Richtigkeit führt so zu einer m i t dem Recht notwendig ver-
knüpften idealen Dimension. Das bedeutet zwar keine schlichte inhaltliche
Übereinstimmung von Recht und M o r a l , w o h l aber deren begrifflich not-
wendige V e r b i n d u n g . 3 9

39
MacCormick spricht einerseits von einer „necessary aspiration of actual legal
process to ideal law, or of the prennial ,claim to correctness' implicit in law-making
and law-applying acts" (ders. (FN 2), S. 189), andererseits beharrt er aber darauf,
daß es keine begrifflich notwendige Verbindung zwischen Recht und Moral gibt:
„there is no necessary conceptual connection between law and morality" (ders.
(FN 2), S. 175). Das läßt vermuten, daß die Differenz zwischen seiner und der hier
vertretenen Auffassung weniger in der Sache, sondern mehr im Begriff des Zusam-
menhangs oder der Verbindung liegt. Diese Vermutung findet auch darin Nahrung,
daß MacCormick sich einerseits als Positivist einstuft (ders. (FN 36), S. 171), ande-
rerseits aber die Existenz einer „scharfen Trennungslinie" zwischen „rechtspositivi-
stischen" und „naturrechtlichen Theorien" bestreitet (ders. (FN 36), S. 175). Dem
scheint die Auffassung zugrunde zu liegen, daß der Magen des Positivismus stark
genug ist, um gewisse moralische oder naturrechtliche Elemente folgenlos zu ver-
dauen. Hier wird demgegenüber die Idee vertreten, daß schon die kleinste Infizie-
rung des ordnungsgemäß Gesetzten und sozial Wirksamen, also des Institutionellen,
mit Moral ausreicht, um das Ganze von etwas Positivistischem in etwas Nichtpositi-
vistisches umzuwandeln (vgl. R. Alexy, A Definition of Law, in: Prescriptive Formal-
ity and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems. Festschrift für Robert S.
Summers, hrsg. v. W. Krawietz/N. MacCormick/G. H. v. Wright, Berlin 1994,
S. 102).

3*
 THE RELATION BETWEEN NORM AND REALITY
AS A KEY TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF L A W

By Âke Frändberg, Uppsala

I.

The title of this paper suggests that that there is a substantial difference
between norm and reality , i.e., that there is a more interesting relationship
between them than the relation of identity, or the relation of proper subset-
ship (norms being a proper subset of real entities). The title rather suggests
that the two phenomena are disjoint. They might even belong to two com-
pletely separate "ontological worlds", like the world of is and the world of
ought in Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law.

To be sure, it no doubt makes sense to talk about existence of norms.

For example, the statement "In Swedish law there exists a norm to the
effect that wilful killing shall be punished by imprisonment" seems most
meaningful, and might even be considered as true.

Much more difficult is to establish what it means for a norm to exist (cf.
G. H. von Wright, Norm and Action , 1963, ch. VII).

Entities which are expressions, or vehicles, of norms can belong to real-

ity as a kind of things, having a physical existence: a written sentence is
matter engraved on matter, and an oral utterance is sound-waves which can
be registered by the help of instruments.

A norm is something that can be expressed by a normative sentence. The

norm can be regarded as the semantical mening, or hypothetical thought
content, of a normative sentence.

In an abstract sort of way, it is not totally unnatural to say that also

hypothetical thought contents exist. After all, our brain is thinking all day
long, and why should not what we think of exist - i.e., exist just as the
content of our thoughts. In Karl Popper's famous 3-world ontology they
belong to World 3.

But for the purpose of this paper - which is to illuminate the phenom-
enon of law as a normative phenomenon by relating it, in different
22 Âke Frändberg

respects, to reality - we have to structure the ontological universe in such a

way that norm and reality belong to different ontological levels.

II.

Let us regard the ontological universe as including three different levels

(the word "including" indicates that the total ontological universe might
consist of other "levels" as well):
1. The universe of reality.
2. The universe of mere possibilities.
3. The universe of human ideas.
The universe of reality consists of things and their interaction in a tem-
poral-spatial dimension.
The universe of mere possibilities are things and their interaction that
could (logically) belong to the universe of reality but do not do so - for
instance, my reading Bleak House just now, when in fact I am sitting in
front of my computer just now.
The universe of human ideas is the world of (hypothetical) human
thought contents, i.e., thought contents which either are the content of
thoughts (in a psychological sense) belonging to the universe of reality, or
of thoughts belonging to the universe of mere possibilities. The members of
this ontological universe range from most private thought objects to phe-
nomena like Einstein's theory of relativity, Brahms' 4th symphony or Sha-
kespeare's The Tempest.
The universe of human thought is separate from both the universe of real-
ity and the universe of mere possibilities. It does not make sense to say
that the thought content "my reading Bleak House just now" could belong
to any of these universes, - which my reading Bleak House can. For a
thought content as an ontological entity is not a state of affairs at all
(although a thought may be about a state of affairs). It is rather an abstract
(non temporal-spatial) thing.
An important member of the universe of human ideas is the idea of
norms (or, more long-winded, the idea that human behaviour - especially
such behaviour that some way or another affect other human beings - can
be influenced by norm-giving).
But not only the idea of norms belongs to the universe of human ideas.
Also every individual norm is an idea which belongs to that ontological
universe.
Here we have a point of departure for our analysis of the relation
between norm and reality. The relation under analysis is the relation
 The Relation between Norm and Reality 23

between the norm as a member of the universe of human ideas and human
behaviour as a member, either of the universe of reality or as a member of
the universe of mere possibilities.

III.

In the analysis of the relation between norm and reality, the concept of
change, i.e., changes in the universe of reality, is crucial.
By his logic of change, von Wright has constructed a fruitful tool for the
analysis of the concept of change. I shall here profit from it in my analysis.
He introduces a symbol . . . Τ . . . . The blanks are filled by expressions
describing states of affairs (Norm and Action , pp. 28 ff.). pTq is a transfor-
mation from ρ to q\ ρ "changes into" q. ρ is an initial state and q an end-
state. To use one of von Wright's own examples, let ρ mean that a certain
window is open symbolizes negation).
(i) ~ pTp means that the window is being opened; first it was closed, then it
is open.
(ii) p T ~ ρ means that the window is being closed; first it was open, then it
is closed.
(iii) pTp means that no change takes place; the window remains open. First
it was open and then it is open.
(iv) ~ p T ~ ρ means in a similar manner that the window remains closed.
If the states of affairs described by ρ and ~ ρ on each side of Τ in
(i) - (iv) belong to the universe of reality, then, in relation to every /?, ~ ρ
belongs to the universe of mere possibilities, and, in relation to ~ /?,
p { = ~ ~ p} belongs to the universe of mere possibilities. If the initial state
and the end-state are not identical, the end-state belongs to the universe of
mere possibilities ex ante, i.e., before the transformation actually is per-
formed. And ex post, i.e., when the transformation is performed, the initial
state belongs to the universe of mere possibilities.
The end-state in an event, described by a formula of type . . . Γ . . . , can be
a desirable state of affairs , and it may be regarded as a good thing if the
initial state is transformed into the end-state.
The idea that transformation can be a transfer of an event from the uni-
verse of mere possibilities to the universe of reality, and that end-state can
be desirable state of affairs - the qualification of an event as desirable
being an idea belonging to the universe of human ideas - can, I think, shed
some light upon the relationship between norm and reality. . . . T . . . can in
this respect be conceived of as a normative mechanism, working upon all
three of our ontological universes (or levels).
24 Âke Frändberg

IV.

Norm-giving (legislation) is to decide that some state of affairs shall be

removed from the universe of reality (and incorporated in the universe of
mere possibilities), and other states of affairs incorporated in the universe
of reality (and removed from the universe of mere possibilities) - all in
accordance with, and under the guidance of, values belonging to the uni-
verse of human ideas and by means of norms (also contained in the uni-
verse of human ideas) and their enforcement (in the universe of reality).
This is a description in nuce of the normative mechanism.
Let us regard von Wright's symbol . . . 7 \ . . as a variable over a set of
transformational mechanisms , of which the normative mechanism is one.
Other such mechanisms could be, for example, non-intentional occurrences
in nature (e.g., the wind slams the window to shut), or an intentional, non-
normative act performed by a human being (e.g., the inhabitant of the
room shuts the window in order not to be cold). If the inhabitant, on the
other hand, takes it as a duty to shut the window as soon as the tempera-
ture of the room falls below 20 degrees C. the normative mechanism is at
work.
In the first example, the transformational mechanism itself (i.e., the wind
slamming the window to shut) belongs entirely to the universe of reality. In
the second and the third example, the transformational mechanism involves
both elements belonging to the universe of reality and elements belonging
to the universe of human ideas. In the third example but not in the second,
normative ideas belong to the transformational mechanism.
Let us now regard the normative transformational mechanism a little
closer. As was suggested supra , this mechanism consists of the following
components: (i) a legislator (in a wide sense of the word) who (ii) decides
upon (the striving at) a transfer of some state of affairs from the universe
of reality to the universe of mere possibilities, or vice versa, and (iii) does
so in accordance with, and under the guidance of, values contained in the
universe of human ideas and (iv) by means of norms (also belonging to the
universe of human ideas) and their enforcement in the universe of reality.
In the following we shall look upon (i) - (iv) more in detail.

V.

The universe of mere possibilities is that strange, heavenly and infernal,

tempting and horrifying universe were all novels and plays of mankind are
enacted, all music performed by virtuosi and the most excellent wines
tasted. It is also the universe where Hitler's Holocaust (which once
 The Relation between Norm and Reality 25

belonged to the universe of reality) is going on forever, together with the

devastating wars. It is the universe where our private hopes, delights and
fears are fulfilled beyond space and time. It is the ontological universe
where anything (save logical contradictions) could be real, but is not. It is
the garden of Eden, and our filthy backyard. It is the repository of man-
kind.
What, then, can justify a legislator to dispose of this fateful universe,
surrounding the real life of mankind, and allow it to intrude upon real life?
First of all, of course, because a piece of reality might be far worse than
a piece of mere possibilities. Wars, murders, theft and neglect of children
belong to real life, but peace, non-violence, safety and caring are possible.
We are indeed all engaged in the project of creating reality out of possibil-
ity.
This justifies the instituting of legislators. But, certainly, it does not jus-
tify any legislator whatsoever having the power to do anything he likes.
I adhere to a humanistic theory of law. By that I mean the conception of
law as an artefact, a creation of human culture. Nothing even similar to
convincing reasons has ever been provided for the thesis that (basic) legal
norms are immanent in (biological) human nature (save in the utterly trivial
sense that legal norms usually have the function to guarantee peace and
safety in human interaction - after all, laws are for human beings, not for
wolves or angels), neither for the thesis of theocratic voluntarism to the
effect that (basic) legal norms are expressions of the will of some god.
History is not unfamiliar with legislative power held by one single
person. But usually legislation is a collective enterprise. Even customs with
status of law are created by individuals in a complex collective endevour
over perhaps a very long span of time, although these individuals are
unknown to us.
So the normative mechanism is completely in the hands of ourselves. In
this vast space of freedom our responsibility is no small.

VI.

Let us now turn our attention to the normative mechanism itself.

One part of that mechanism might seem to belong entirely to the uni-
verse of human ideas. What I think of is the relationship between value and
norm. The idea that values some way or another justifies norms and also
have an impact upon their formulation seems reasonable. Which is, e.g.,
the relation between the valuation
26 Âke Frändberg

(ν) The living of a human being is valuable

and the norms
(n) Thou shalt not kill
and
(n') If somebody wilfully kills another person, he shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment?
First of all, w.e get an impression that the norms, as it were, do not
"cover" the whole of the value. Many other norms corresponding to the
same value could be formulated, e.g.,
(n*) You shall take care of yourself
and it appears to be utterly difficult, or even impossible, to formulate one
single norm which actually covers the whole value. On the other hand, it
seems obvious that (v) is the value that justifies each of (n), (n) and (n*),
and it is hard to imagine more specific values, independent of (v), covering
each norm but nobody else.
Be that as it may, although both values and norms are entities belonging
to the universe of human thought, the process of justification cannot take
place altogether within this ontological universe. In order to, e.g., justify
(n) by means of (v) we must make an excursion into the universe of mere
possibilities, and perhaps also in the universe of reality. (But note that,
e.g., the murder of Olof Palme now , 1997, belongs to the universe of mere
possibilities. No murder of Olof Palme is filling the temporal-spatial room
of, say, March 1, 1997, Stockholm). To make the justification in question
conclusive, we must add the premise
(p) If a person kills another person, the value of the killed person's human
living is violated
which premise is a kind of induction from events taken place in the other
ontological universes.
In the case of (n) - which is a hypothetical norm - we notice that
what is regulated is not killing at all, but the judge's sentencing the mur-
derer to life imprisonment. That the justification of such a norm must
take phenomena in the other ontological universes into consideration is
obvious.
The very raison d'être of a norm is the achievement of its goal. The goal
can be conceived of as an event in the universe of mere possibilities. A
norm is expedient if its observance in the universe of reality transfer the
goal from the universe of mere possibilities into the universe of reality. To
justify a norm is (i) to give reasons for its goal being valuable (and more
 The Relation between Norm and Reality 27

valuable than its probable side-effects), and (ii) to give reasons for its
expediency.
Take an obligatory norm of the structure
(0) If F, then χ shall do Λ
where F is some state of affairs (a legal fact), χ a person and A an action-
type.
A justification of the efficiency of (O) has the following structure (S is
the goal of (O)):
(JO) If F and, simultaneously or later, x does A, then it is probable that S
which hypothetical state of affairs belongs to the universe of mere possibil-
ities.
In the case of a prohibitory norm
(P) If F, then χ may not do A
the justification of efficiency has the structure
(PO) If F and, simultaneously or later, χ does not do A, then it is probable
that S.
With regard to (genuine) permissions of the type options, they cannot be
justified in this manner. But the very fact that a given action is optional, or
free, can, of course, be justified.

VII.

How do we transfer events from the universe of mere possibilities to the

universe of reality, or vice versa, by means of norms and their enforce-
ment?
As a matter of principle, the answer is easy, and consists of two steps:
(1) that the legislator sees to it that the norms are efficient, and (2) that the
norms are actually followed by the public and by the norm-applying author-
ities. To follow an obligatory norm is to do what is obligatory and to
follow a prohibition is not to do what is prohibited, otherwise the norm is
broken. A permission is always followed (it cannot be broken).
A Utopian ideal is that the transformation will take place by itself, with-
out any norm, as an effect, perhaps, of the inherent goodness of man. A
legislative ideal is that the transformation in question takes place as an
effect of the mere existence of the norm. But in real life (a term which I
feel myself free to use, as I find it not being in conflict with my ontolo-
gical standpoint), as we all know, this is seldom the case. In order that the
28 Âke Frändberg

goal shall be achieved, enforcement of the norm is necessary. That this

actually happens we might call a judicial ideal.
The enforcement of law has as an underlying condition the idea that the
norm is only a component - and in some situations even a rather insignif-
icant component - in the complex mechanism aimed at safeguarding law-
abiding behaviour.
Enforcement of law can be said to consist of two levels: the level of
administration (application) of law, and the level of execution of law. Both
levels can be analysed in terms of our ontological universes.
Let us in a schematic form, and by means of an example, try to establish
the relations between different ontological universes with respect to the
application of law.
We use the following line of reasoning as a starting-point:
(1) Anyone who, in a way that might obstruct a restoration, meddles with
something that has been deprived another person by a criminal action,
shall be punished for receiving stolen goods to at most two years of
imprisonment
(2) Anyone who receives a receipt concerning stolen goods which has been
deposited in a railway station's cloak-room, shall be punished for
receiving stolen goods to at most two years of imprisonment
(3) Person X has received a receipt concerning stolen goods which has
been deposited in a railway station's cloak-room
(4) X shall be punished for receiving stolen goods to at most two years of
imprisonment
(5) X is sentenced to one month of imprisonment for receiving stolen
goods.
Sentence (3) describes the case at hand for the judge to decide. His first
task, from the point of view of principle, is, by evaluation of evidence, to
establish whether the state of affairs described in (3) - an element in the
universe of mere possibilities - once has belonged to the universe of real-
ity. Only if he, correctly or not, finds that it has, is there any reason to step
further in the process of application. Evaluation of evidence is an activity
to no small degree regulated by (second order) legal norms.
The next step is to decide whether the norm (1) - a statutory norm - is
applicable to the state of affairs described in (3) or not. In the language of
lawyers this process is often referred to as interpretation. If he finds that
(1) is applicable, (the result of) the interpretation is norm (2).
We see, that (4) does not logically follow from premises (1) and (3). But
(4) follows logically from premises (2) and (3). (2) is the norm that our
 The Relation between Norm and Reality 29

judge in fact applies . Application stricto sensu is to draw a conclusion of

type (4) from sentences of type (2) and (3). A l l three sentences (1), (2) and
(4) express norms (belonging to the universe of human ideas), but the psy-
chological action consisting in drawing the conclusion belongs to the uni-
verse of reality. Application stricto sensu is the third step in the application
of law largo sensu.
By pronouncing sentence (5), the very judgment, the judge fulfils what
he is ordered to do in norm (4). He fulfils it by pronouncing a performative
sentence, (5). This last step in the administration of law, or application of
law largo sensu, we can call the choice of (individual) legal consequence.
Since the possibilities of judgment are many - the judge could have sen-
tenced X to one year of imprisonment instead - , he must give arguments
for his decision, e.g., that the culprit is a young person. In so doing, he
uses elements from the universe of mere possibilities.
Let us finally turn to the execution of law. The executor starts where the
judge stops, viz. at sentence (5). The executor (in our example consisting
of the police and the prison authority) shall see to it that what is sentenced
in the judgment also is realized; in our example that X actually is held in
prison for one month. The theme, as it were, of sentence (5) - X is held in
prison during one month - belongs at the time of the sentencing to the uni-
verse of mere possibilities, but during the month that the sentence is
served, the event is realized. It has been transferred from the universe of
mere possibilities to the universe of reality.
Such a realized state of affairs can be the very goal of the legislator. But
usually realized law is a kind of second best states of affairs, serving in
their turn as causes among others for achieving the ultimate goals.
These most speculative reflections, now concluded, are my humble trib-
ute to my friend Aulis Aarnio on his 60th anniversary.
 AUFKLÄRUNGSHISTORISCHES ZUR GERECHTIGKEIT
ALS RECHTFERTIGUNG DES RECHTS

Von Hermann Klenner, Berlin

Die wahre Klugheit und die Gerechtigkeit

können nicht verschieden sein.1

Der Schlüssel, um die Bedeutung der Rechtsphilosophie zu erkennen,

liege in der Problematik des juristischen Berufes; Rechtsphilosophie sei
notwendig, um das Selbstverständnis des Juristen herzustellen, wozu auch
gehöre, ihn von einer blinden Gebundenheit an die Normen seiner Denk-
weise zu befreien; ein Rechtsdogmatiker, der solche Rechtfertigung von
Rechtsphilosophie leugnet, könne keinen vollgültigen Platz an der Festtafel
der Forschung beanspruchen - so eine Erkenntnis von Aulis Aarnio, die
auch die Qualität eines Bekenntnisses hat. 2
Nun gehört es zu den Spezifika eben dieses juristischen Berufes, an legis-
lativen, judikativen und exekutiven Entscheidungen mitzuwirken, die ohne
des Juristen Gedankenarbeit höchstens unqualifiziert zustande kämen. Ein-
gebunden in das ihm vorgegebene Entscheidungsensemble einer Rechtsord-
nung hat der Jurist, zumal der Richter, in rational nachvollziehbarer Argu-
mentation über gesellschaftliche Konflikte zu richten. 3 Ob seine Entschei-
dungen, etwa in der Rechtsprechung, individuell sind oder, etwa bei der
Gesetzgebung, generell, immer greift er in Interessenkonstellationen ein.
Seine Entscheidungen reflektieren und konstituieren Gesellschaftsverhält-
nisse, die ihrerseits als sich entwickelnde keineswegs nur rechtlich verur-
sacht und bewirkend sind. Das Rechtssystem ist nur eine Komponente des
Sozialsystems, und nicht die letztlich determinierende.
Was aber rechtfertigt dieses Recht und damit die mit seiner Hilfe
zustande gekommenen Entscheidungen des Juristen? Wenn Recht Mittel
und Maß von Macht, im Extremfall sogar von Herrschaft und Gewalt ist
(und das ist es!), welches Maß gilt dann für das Recht selbst?

1
Emst Ferdinand Klein, Ist es Schuldigkeit oder Gnade, wenn ein Fürst sein
Land wohl regiert?, in: Berlinische Monatsschrift 15 (1790), S. 308.
2
Aulis Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, Wien/New York 1979, S.7f.
3
Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts der BRD vom 14. Februar 1973,
in: BVerfGE 34/287.
32 Hermann Klenner

Schönheit ist das Maß für Kunst, Wahrheit das Maß für Wissen, Gerech-
tigkeit das Maß für Recht. So wie die Schönheit eines Kunstwerkes die
Arbeit eines Künstlers rechtfertigt, so rechtfertigt die Wahrheit von Aussa-
gen deren Akzeptanz, 4 und die Gerechtigkeit (justitia legalis et justitia
forensis) seiner Gesetzgebungs- oder Rechtsprechungsentscheidungen recht-
fertigt deren Inhalt. Der Rechtsdogmatiker, wenn er denn ein das Hand-
werkliche überschreitendes Selbstverständnis erlangen will, bedarf des
Rechtsphilosophen, denn zu dessen Metier gehört die Hinterfragung der
Gesetzlichkeit auf ihre Gerechtigkeit. 5 Der Juristenpraktiker zielt jeweils
auf eine res judicata, der Rechtsphilosoph stellt genau diese in Frage.
Was aber konstituiert Gerechtigkeit? Dafür gab es im mittelalterlichen,
feudalklerikalen Welt- und Menschenbild eindeutige Lösungen. Als Wirkur-
sache, Geltungsgrund und daher auch Maßstab für die lex humana galt die
lex naturalis, als deren Wirkursache, Geltungsgrund und daher Maßstab die
lex divina galt. Laut Thomas von Aquin ermöglichte die lex naturalis die
Beteiligung aller vernunftbegabten Geschöpfe am ewigen Gesetz, den für sie
letztlich unerforschlichen Willen Gottes, denn die lex humana müsse, um
verbindlich zu sein, aus dem Naturrecht abgeleitet werden können; wenn
also der Menschen Recht dem von Gott geschaffenen Recht der Natur wider-
spricht, dann sei es gar kein Recht, sondern Rechtsbruch, legis corruptio. 6
Irgendwann zwischen deutschem Bauernkrieg und französischer Revolu-
tion, zwischen Reformation und klassischer Philosophie fand ein Paradig-
menwechsel statt. Die europäischen Aufklärer, die intellektuellen Wegbe-
reiter einer Verständigung zwischen den antifeudalen Klassen über ihre
Interessen und Ziele, kippten das Verhältnis zwischen Gottesrecht und
Menschenrecht um. Die Diesseitsgesetze erschienen nicht länger mehr als
im Jenseits gemachte, und nicht länger mehr sollte ein selbsternannter vica-
rius dei auf Erden das Interpretationsmonopol über irdisches Recht und das
Legitimationsmonopol über dessen Exekutierung beanspruchen dürfen.
Gerechtigkeit, als Übereinstimmungsmaß zwischen dem tatsächlich gelten-
dem und dem eigentlich erforderlichen Recht, zwischen ius positivum und
ius naturalis, erhält ein völlig anderes Gesicht, je nachdem, ob man das
Naturrecht aus dem Idealplan Gottes oder den Realinteressen der Menschen
ableitet. Theologie, Offenbarung und Glauben entscheiden, wenn es zum

4
Vgl. Aulis Aarnio, On Truth and the Acceptability of Interpretative Propositions
in Legal Dogmatics, in: RECHTSTHEORIE, Beiheft 2, Berlin 1981, S. 33f.
5
Vgl. Hermann Klenner, Gerechtigkeitstheorien in Vergangenheit und Gegen-
wart, in: Sitzungsberichte der Leibniz-Sozietät, Band 8, Berlin 1995, Heft 8/9,
S. 9 1 - 1 1 0 ; Heinz Monz, Gerechtigkeit bei Marx und in der hebräischen Bibel,
Baden-Baden 1995.
6
Thomas von Aquin, Summa theologica, Band 13, Heidelberg 1977, S. 46ff.
(I - II, qu. 93 - 95).
 Aufklärungshistorisches zur Gerechtigkeit als Rechtfertigung des Rechts 33

Streite kommt, auf der einen Seite, und auf der anderen: Philosophie, Ver-
nunft und Wissen.
Um diesen Paradigmenwechsel wenigstens an einem den Beginn und an
einem ziemlich das Ende der Aufklärung markierenden Denker festzuma-
chen: Thomas Hobbes läßt die Gesellschaft, den Staat und das Recht aus
den existentiell identischen Interessen und der insoweit identischen Ver-
nunft eines Jeden generieren. „The Right of all Sovereigns is derived ori-
ginally from the consent of every one of those that are to be governed." 7
Es sei der übereinstimmende Wille Gleichinteressierter und Gleichvernünf-
tiger, der das Gemeinwesen samt dessen Gerechtigkeit konstituiert: „Pas-
sions" und „reason" in der englischen Version des Leviathan, „passiones"
und „ratio" in dessen lateinischer Fassung, also Furcht, Begier und Ver-
nunft der Menschen sind es und eben nicht die Vollzugshandlungen eines
Gottes willens, die den Staat zustande bringen und die Gerechtigkeit dazu.8
Und genau das war der Punkt, der damals die Verteidiger der Königsgewalt
von Gottesgnaden auf den Plan rief. Mit der von Hobbes geforderten Abso-
lutheit der Entscheidungsgewalt des Souveräns sei er wohl einverstanden,
schrieb der die Stuartmonarchen verteidigende Sir Robert Filmer, nicht aber
damit, wie Hobbes die Souveränitätsentstehung legitimiert habe.9
Bei Immanuel Kant finden wir den gleichen Rekurs auf des Menschen
Vernunft: das Naturrecht (unter das er die Gerechtigkeit subsumierte) sei
das a priori durch jedes Menschen Vernunft erkennbare Recht, und der Pro-
bierstein für die Rechtmäßigkeit eines jeden Gesetzes bestehe darin, ob es
aus dem vereinigten Willen eines ganzen Volkes habe entspringen können. 10
Und mehr noch: mit dem ihm eigenen Rigorismus beweist der Prinzipien-
denker Kant (und zwar während der Jakobiner-Diktatur!), daß die französi-
schen Revolutionsparolen - in Kants Version: „Freiheit, Gleichheit, Selb-
ständigkeit" - Prinzipien a priori seien, und daß, was aus Vernunftgründen
für die Theorie gilt, auch für die Praxis gelte! 1 1 Damit behauptet der
Königsberger von der Hauptstadt seines unaufgeklärt regierten Landes aus
(denn seine Schrift erschien in Berlin) nicht mehr und nicht weniger als
den Epochencharakter der Revolution in Frankreich sowie deren Identität
mit den sozialen Konsequenzen seiner eigenen Transzendentalphilosophie.

Auch wenn er, was die Details anlangt, den hinterwäldlerischen und Zensur-
bedingungen Preußens Tribut gezahlt hat - die von ihm selbst aus dem Denk-

7
Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], Cambridge 1994, S. 395 (deutsche Ausgabe: Ham-
burg 1996, S. 483).
8
Hobbes, Leviathan, S. 90 (lateinische Ausgabe: Amsterdam 1670, S. 66).
9
Robert Filmer, Patriarcha, Cambridge 1991, S. 184 („Observations concerning
the Originali of Government upon Mr. Hobs Leviathan", 1652).
10
Kant, Rechtslehre. Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie, Berlin 1988, S. 109, 268.
11
Kant, ebd., S. 260, 286, 500.

4 FS Aarnio
34 Hermann Klenner

ansatz seiner praktischen Philosophie gezogenen Folgerungen trafen präzis

den Gesellschafts- und Rechtsantagonismus seiner Zeit und seines Landes.
Das gilt vor allem für seine am staats- und völkerrechtlichen Material belegten
Thesen a) von der despotischen Natur jeder väterlichen, d.h. die Bürger wie
unmündige Kinder behandelnden Regierung, die das Volk nach ihren Begrif-
fen glücklich machen will; b) von der Ungerechtigkeit jeder Ständegesell-
schaft, also auch dem von Preußens Landrecht legalisierten Angeborensein
des Gutsuntertanenstandes gegenüber den durch Geburt qualifizierten Eigen-
tümern von Rittergütern; c) von der objektiven Notwendigkeit einer die Koali-
tion aller Privatwillen zu einem Gemeinschaftswillen organisierenden staats-
bürgerlichen Verfassung, welche die Einschränkung der Freiheit eines Jeden
auf die Bedingung ihrer Übereinstimmung mit der von Jedermann nach einem
allgemeinen Gesetz ermöglicht (womit die bürgerliche Gesellschaft als ein
Verhältnis freier Menschen definiert wird); d) von dem Erfordernis schließ-
lich einer weltbürgerlichen Verfassung republikanischer Staaten, die konti-
nuierlich zum höchsten politischen Gut hinleitet, zum ewigen Frieden.
Auch wenn Kant keiner Revolution, auch keiner Konterrevolution übri-
gens, das Wort geredet und sich damit begnügt hat, eine Reform nach Prin-
zipien zu fordern, so ist er der tatsächlichen Revolution seiner Zeit, der
französischen, doch nicht in den Rücken gefallen: wie die englische so sei
auch Frankreichs Revolution dadurch legitimiert, daß beide tatsächlich, da
von oben initiiert, eine Reform seien. Gewiß überforderte Kant mit seiner
Substitution jedes transzendent abgeleiteten oder schlicht empirisch gegebe-
nen Rechts durch einen transzendental begründeten Verhaltenskodex seine
Zeitgenossen. Das gilt vornehmlich für seine starrköpfige Weigerung, sich
von puren Empirikern in seine A-priori-Prinzipien pfuschen zu lassen, und
für seine Zurückweisung des gesunden Menschenverstandes als Argumenta-
tionsgrundlage. Flick- und Stückwerkstechnologie an einem sich reformie-
renden, und das heißt auch: sich perfektionierenden Feudalismus war die
Sache dessen nicht, der eine Gesellschaft absolut setzte, deren Recht nach
dem Maß einer durch jedes Menschen Vernunft erkennbaren Gerechtigkeit
konstruiert und exekutiert werden soll.

Aber wird nicht mit dem voranstehenden, an Hobbes und Kant exempli-
zierten Vernunftkonzept von Gerechtigkeit eine der Gesellschaftswirklich-
keit inadäquate Gleichheitsidee, eine Illusion bloß, transportiert? Hat nicht
Aufklärung, so unbestreitbar ihre Verdienste auch sein mögen in den allfäl-
ligen Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Feudalismus in Theorie und Praxis,
versagt, als es darum ging, die dem Postfeudalismus, der bürgerlichen
Gesellschaft also, wesenseigenen Ungleichheiten (= Ungerechtigkeiten) zwi-
schen Mächtigen und Ohnmächtigen aufzudecken?

Mitnichten. Es gehört zu den herausragenden Ergebnissen aufklärender

europäischer Rechtsphilosophie zwischen Hobbes und Hegel, die von Ari-
 Aufklärungshistorisches zur Gerechtigkeit als Rechtfertigung des Rechts 35

stoteles via Patristik und Scholastik tradierte Behandlung des Verhältnisses

zwischen Herr und Knecht, zwischen dominus und servus auf eine völlig
neue Stufe gestellt zu haben. Aristoteles hatte die gesellschaftliche Diffe-
renzierung zwischen Freien und Sklaven wie die zwischen Bürgern und
Nichtbürgern als naturgegeben legitimiert und daraus geschlußfolgert, daß
es auch für die Sklaven nützlich und gerecht sei, Sklave zu sein. 12 An
dieser sozialkonservativen Position und damit an der überkommenen
Macht/Ohnmacht-Struktur der Gesellschaft haben die biblischen Bücher
des Christentums ebensowenig gerüttelt wie die Patristiker und die Schola-
stiker. Die Apostel forderten die Sklaven auf, sich ihren Herren unterzuord-
nen (wie die Frauen ihren Männern), und zwar in allem und in Furcht und
Zittern und wie dem Herrn Christus selbst (Epheser 6,5; Kolosser 3,22;
Titus 2,9; 1 Petrus 3,1; 1 Timotheus 6,1)! Aurelius Augustinus verschärfte
eher noch diese Demutshaltung, indem er von der Knechtschaft behauptete,
daß sie gerecht, weil nur dem Sünder auferlegt sei, 13 womit das Herrschafts-
faktum noch eine höhere Weihe erhielt. Die Legalität von Sklaverei und
Leibeigenschaft wurde mit einer Legitimität gekrönt. Das Schicksal der Skla-
ven und der Leibeigenen ist die Folge ihrer Schande. Unter Berufung auf den
heidnischen Aristoteles (und nicht auf Paulus oder Petrus) hat auch Thomas
von Aquin an dieser Qualifizierung des Herr-und-Knecht-Verhältnisses als
Moment der Naturordnung nicht gedeutelt. Wie der Sohn dem Vater, so sei
auch der Sklave seinem Herrn zugeordnet, gehöre ihm also: filius est ali-
quid patris; et similiter servus est aliquid domini. 1 4 Ausdrücklich handelt es
sich nicht um ein Rechts-, sondern um ein HerrschaftsVerhältnis.
Der Paradigmenwechsel, wie er sich auch hier im 16./17. Jahrhundert
auf breiter Front nachweisen läßt, ist bei Thomas Hobbes bereits vollzo-
gen. Für ihn ist die gesellschaftliche Stellung der Individuen, insbesondere
ihre Position als Herr oder Knecht, nicht durch eine Naturordnung vorge-
geben. Ganz im Gegenteil. In ausdrücklicher Abgrenzung von Aristoteles
besteht er darauf, daß die Menschen von Natur aus nicht ungleich, son-
dern gleich seien („equal by nature") und daß die von Haus aus gleich
freien Menschen ihre soziale Stellung als Ergebnis ihrer Willensüberein-
stimmung einnehmen: master and servant were introduced by consent of
men. 15 Wenn aber die Individuen erst durch wechselseitigen Vertrags-
abschluß in Herrschafts- und Knechtschaftsverhältnisse eintreten (John
Locke: A free man makes himself a servant to another by selling him for

12
Aristoteles, Politik, 1255 a.
13
Augustinus, Vom Gottesstaat, Band 2, München 1978, S. 557 (Buch 19, Kapi-
tel 15).
14
Thomas von Aquin, Recht und Gerechtigkeit, Bonn 1987, S. 10 (Summa theo-
logica I I - I I , qu. 57).
15
Hobbes (FN 7), S. 107 (deutsch: S. 129).
4*
36 Hermann Klenner

a certain time the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he

is to recieve) bleibt auch für transzendente Apologien kein Raum: die
realexistierende Gesellschaft basiert dann auf menschlichem Interesse und
menschlicher Vernunft, und die Beziehungen zwischen „master and ser-
vant" beruhen dann auf einem „contract between them", jedenfalls in
einer „civil society". 16
Hegel hat nun diese bürgerliche Gesellschaft einschließlich der ihr imma-
nenten Herr-und-Knecht-Beziehungen auf einem rechtsphilosophischen
Niveau analysiert, daß es noch dem heutigen Leser den Atem verschlägt.
Indem Hegel eine Rückbindung des Rechts an das Kategorienpaar Herr-
schaft/Knechtschaft vollzieht und dieses mit dem anderen Antagonismus
Reichtum/Armut verknüpft, erreicht er eine Tiefsicht der Dinge, deren
Sprengkraft bis in die jetzige Weltgesellschaft reicht. Also der Meister
selbst: Der Gegensatz großen Reichtums und großer Armut trete in der bür-
gerlichen Gesellschaft auf; der Reichtum, wie jede Masse, mache sich zur
Kraft; diese Ungleichheit des Reichtums und der Armut werde zur höchsten
Zerrissenheit des Willens, werde innere Empörung und Haß; die Furcht des
Herrn sei der Anfang seiner Weisheit; das niederträchtige Bewußtsein, wel-
ches die Ungleichheit mit der öffentlichen Macht und dem Reichtum fest-
hält, sehe in der Herrschergewalt eine Unterdrückung und stehe immer auf
dem Sprunge zum Aufruhr; der Knecht sei in seinem Werte höher als der
in seiner Selbstsucht befangene Herr; die Knechtschaft sei in der Ge-
schichte der Völker eine notwendige Stufe und somit etwas nur vorüber-
gehend Berechtigtes; der knechtische Gehorsam bilde nur der Anfang der
Freiheit; erst durch das Freiwerden des Knechtes werde auch der Herr frei;
wenn die bürgerliche Gesellschaft sich in ungehinderter Wirksamkeit befin-
det, vermehre sich die Anhäufung der Reichtümer auf der einen Seite wie
auf der anderen Seite Abhängigkeit und Not der an die Arbeit gebundenen
Klasse; die Armut an sich mache keinen zum Pöbel; dieser werde erst
bestimmt durch die sich mit der Armut verknüpfende Empörung gegen die
Reichen, gegen die Gesellschaft, gegen die Regierung; bei allem Übermaße
des Reichtums sei die bürgerliche Gesellschaft nicht reich genug, dem
Übermaße der Armut und der Erzeugung des Pöbels zu steuern; durch
diese ihre Dialektik werde die bürgerliche Gesellschaft über sich hinausge-
trieben. 17

16
Locke , Political Writings, London 1993, S. 303 (Two Treatises of Government,
1690, 2/85).
17
Zum voranstehenden: Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts [1821],
Berlin 1981, S. 91, 232, 268 ff., 430, 483, 506, sowie die Details bei Hermann Klen-
ner, Hegels Herr-und-Knecht-Struktur der Gesellschaft und die Volkssouveränität,
in: K. Michaelis/H.-M. Pawlowski (Hrsg.), Auseinandersetzung mit der realsoziali-
stischen Vergangenheit, Baden-Baden 1992, S. 95 ff.
 Aufklärungshistorisches zur Gerechtigkeit als Rechtfertigung des Rechts 37

Gewiß, die so auf den Begriff gebrachte Dialektik von „Herrenschaft und
Knechtschaft" innerhalb der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft treibt diese bei Hegel
in kein Nichtbürgerliches, auch wenn er dem verhungernden Menschen das
absolute Recht zuspricht, das Eigentum der anderen zu verletzen. Was sich
aber aus dieser Embryonalform einer Einsicht in die Klassenstruktur der
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ergibt, ist die Erkenntnis (zu der es nicht eines
Karl Marx bedurfte!), daß die Machtexpansion des einen Teils der Gesell-
schaft ohne eine Machtreduktion des anderen Teils nicht zu haben ist.
Bereits der von Hegel sehr wohl benutzte (und heutige Säulenheilige der
Neoliberalen) Adam Smith wußte, daß es für jeden Reichen zumindest 500
Arme geben müsse, und daß die staatliche Regierung zur Verteidigung der
Reichen gegen die Armen eingerichtet worden sei. 18 Unter den Bedingun-
gen einer gewiß unverzichtbaren égalité de droit, die nicht den Weg zu
einer égalité de fait ebnet, perpetuiert sich ein Zustand, bei dem ein
gesamtgesellschaftlicher Gerechtigkeitskonsens nicht erreichbar ist. Da ist
keiner gerecht, auch nicht einer (Römer 3,10). Wenn individuelle Freiheit
der einen Seite der Gesellschaft und individuelle Unfreiheit auf der anderen
Seite reziprok sind, können Gerechtigkeitskonzeptionen nicht abstrakt
genug sein, um konkret zu werden. Sie justifizieren dann alles, freilich
auch nichts.
Ein Jurist sollte das wenigstens wissen, selbst wenn er daran - als Jurist -
kaum etwas zu ändern vermag.

18
Adam Smith, Eine Untersuchung über das Wesen und die Ursachen des Reich-
tums der Nationen [1776], Band 3, Berlin 1984, S. 86, 91.
 MORAL RELATIVISM AND SOCIAL CRITICISM

By Maija-Riitta Ollila, Espoo

Most people of postindustrial societies today tend to think that cultural

relativism is a feasible approach to morality. When these very same people
are asked about their attitude to human rights, they warmly support those
rights. When the contradiction between these two alternatives is pointed
out, they look puzzled.
Moral considerations have sometimes been taken as a tool in criticizing
the contents of norms of law. In this context it is not possible to deal with
the different points of view concerning the relationship of morality and
law; it has to suffice to mention that the idea of moral criticism is a plausi-
ble option in many interpretations of this tricky relationship; one notable
exception, of course, is the positivistic approach. There is also a tradition
of criticizing social institutions and practices in general from the moral
point of view. However, this very idea brings forth a fundamental concep-
tual quandary: if we assume a relativistic stand to morality, can morality be
the ground of criticism? Some thinkers say that moral criticism calls for
objective morality; otherwise we are stuck in a power struggle of different
interests instead of finding a method of reconciliation on moral grounds.
(For example Tapio Puolimatka has argued for the necessity of postulating
moral realism and objectivism about values to render criticism of different
social practices plausible. 1 ) Is this a pseudoproblem, or one that will shatter
the project of moral criticism?
Lawyers in different countries operate in the framework of a national code
of law, and this may obfuscate the idea of the necessity of universal moral
norms as the basis of criticism of legal norms and practices, because nation-
ally it seems to be easy enough to compare people's current (and relativistic)
moral intuitions with positive law. No objective morality is required to sub-
stantiate those factors that render law as something which is experienced
just. (Some issues are constantly debated, partly because moral intuitions
differ, but most of these problems are not only culture-related.) However, on
the international level, we come across with the problems of relativism. We
very often ask questions like "Is it morally permitted to establish business
relations with a country who routinely violates human rights?"

1
Puolimatka 1995, pp. 5 9 - 7 1 .
40 Maija-Riitta Ollila

Paul Feyerabend - well-known for his philosophy of science and method-

ological anarchism - regards himself as an armchair philosopher while dis-
cussing relativism, but, even in that capacity, I think his views are highly
noteworthy:
" I am referring to my 'relativism', to the idea that cultures are more or
less closed entities with their own criteria and procedures, that they are
intrinsically valuable and should not be interfered with. To a certain extent
this view coincided with the views of anthropologists who, trying to under-
stand the confusing complexity of human existence, divided it into (mostly)
nonoverlapping, self-contained and self-maintaining domains. But cultures
interact, they change, they have resources that go beyond their stable and
objective ingredients or, rather, beyond those ingredients which at least
some anthropologists have condensed into inexorable cultural rules and
laws. Considering how much cultures have learned from each other and
how ingeniously they have transformed the material thus assembled, I have
come to the conclusion that every culture is potentially all cultures and that
special cultural features are changeable manifestations of a single human
nature.
This conclusion has important political consequences. It means that cul-
tural peculiarities are not sacrosanct. There is no such thing as a 'culturally
authentic' suppression, or a 'culturally authentic' murder. There is only
suppression and murder, and both should be treated as such, with determi-
nation if necessary." 2

Aarnio and Peczenik discuss value relativism as well. They presuppose

what they call the common core of different cultures. Based on this notion
they present as their conclusion the following:

"First, prima-facie value propositions, belonging to this core, are objec-

tively valid in the sense that their validity (or their truth) does not depend
on an individual's preferences. Neither are they culture-bound. Their valid-
ity (or truth) does not depend on an individual's background either. But
such prima-facie propositions do not logically imply a moral judgment in
any particular case. They are merely a starting point of an evaluation proce-
dure. i.e., of weighing and balancing, nothing more.

On the other hand, the final (contextual, all things considered) evalua-
tions are necessarily relative to a certain culture." 3

Both Feyerabend and Aarnio & Peczenik seem to make the same
assumption: they presume the common core in cultures. The conclusions,
however, differ from one another. According to Aarnio and Peczenik, the

2
Feyerabend 1995, pp. 151 - 152.
3
Aarnio and Peczenik 1995, p. 6.
 Moral Relativism and Social Criticism 41

final contextual morality is necessarily relativistic. Feyerabend finds a basis

for social criticism in the universal core of all morality; universality is
final. Both views take into account the dual nature of moral values: on one
level they are universal, on another level they are relativistic. But the prac-
tically interesting issue is this: which level is fundamental from the point
of view of criticism of social practices?
Let us take human rights as our case. Robert Alexy lists eight attempts to
justify human rights. Those are "religious revelation, human nature, undeni-
able evidences, great traditions, existential decisions, individual interests,
collective goods and far-reaching factual consensus."4
Alexy himself refers to discourse theory as a feasible way of substan-
tiating human rights. Discourse theory takes care of the procedure only; it
is compatible with the procedure that each individual takes into account the
contextual and cultural factors in the contents of his speech acts and ends
up with a result all things considered. It is also possible that all individuals
in the discourse situation bracket their cultural and contextual peculiarities
and rely on their mutual and shared rationality. But the discourse method
as method takes care of the justifiable preconditions of the process only,
the discursively necessary rights.
In order to settle the issue we might need some speculation concerning
the primacy of individuals over the culture, or vice versa. When Feyer-
abend states that all cultures are basically one culture, it is interesting to
ask what is the reason for this essential similarity of different cultural pat-
terns and formations? He states the reason: "special cultural features are
changeable manifestations of a single human nature". Someone with Marx-
ist or communitarian sensibilities might speak differently: an exponent of
dialectical materialism would like to point out that human nature is liable
to historical modulation and a communitarian would like to think of a
human being as growing from the soil of culture. They would not postulate
a "single human nature". We are beginning to see the essence of the con-
troversy emerge: if we presuppose a single human nature, we can come up
with shared values (like human rights), because our shared essence will
finally emerge no matter what the decision procedure. There is no need to
postulate objective values independently of human valuing: we can over-
come the problems related to relativism, because we are all basically alike,
and can agree on values no matter what the method.

As I understand it, in discourse theory the universality of values is the

final truth, partly because of the universal validity of discourse rules. 5 It is

4
Alexy 1995, p. 22.
5
Alexy presupposes the rules of discourse in his paper without argument but
states: "Elsewhere, I have tried to show that the universal validity of discourse rules
42 Maija-Riitta Ollila

interesting to notice the central role of rationality in this context; relativism

does not cut very deep, if we still proclaim universal rationality. Those
thinkers who have undermined common human rationality, have taken a
huge leap towards irreversible relativism. 6
As Alexy points out, "on the level of argumentation these [discourse]
rules express the liberal ideas of universality and autonomy". If the human
preconditions of the discourse are universal, then it is not a big surprise
that the result (human rights) is also something universal.
On the other hand, if culture, society and history determine (in some
sense of the word) the constitution of the personality of an individual, and
there is no single human nature, then relativity of values is the final truth.
Communitarianism has often been seen as a plausible alternative of social
thought for those who do not like the notion of exaggerated individual
autonomy, which often boils down to an atomistic view of an individual.
The ideal of organic connectedness forms a complement to individual
autonomy.
Sometimes moral concepts play havoc with their human creators, and
this holds true with the idea of social criticims based on liberal values of
universality and autonomy. Liberal presuppositions of moral discourse a la
Alexy give credence to universal values; thus they render social criticism
possible. However, social criticism on the collective level as such is unac-
ceptable in this framework. There are many versions of liberalism that deny
the concept of social justice, because liberalism is all about individuals, not
collectives. We can ask how effective social criticism can be, if collectives
do not fall in its scope?
As far as different values are concerned, liberalism requires tolerance, in
order to create a circle of freedoms around an individual and to minimize
social interference. But this very same principle of tolerance is at the core
of cultural relativism. On the basis of liberal presuppositions we can come
up with universal values, and criticize clear cases of violations of individ-
ual human rights (killing, torture), but we cannot use these universal values
for criticism of any extensive social problems, like gross economic inequal-
ity that leads to poverty, for example.
In this kind of situation naturalism seems like an easy way out. Let us
rely on something like socio-biology. The factual aspects needed in natural-

can be substantiated by a complex argument, in which a transcendental argument

following Kantian lines, an argument concerning maximation of utility and by this
belonging to the Hobbesian tradition, and an anthropological thesis, perhaps Aristo-
telian in character are combined." Alexy 1995, p. 23.
6
Peter Winch was the celebrated proponent of this line of thought in his 'Un-
derstanding a Primitive Society', American Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1964),
pp. 307 - 24.
 Moral Relativism and Social Criticism 43

ism will be adopted from biology, and from these facts values can be
deduced easily enough. (If we want to speculate about human nature at all,
it is easier when we can talk in terms of biology instead of an infinitely
wider and more speculative field of philosophical anthropology.) But then
we can forget relativism in its more sophisticated forms, and all writers
thus far quoted are somehow recognizing the appeal of relativism, the
enchantment of cultural diversity. Naturalistic moral theories of the socio-
biological type are not a convincing tool of social criticism, because values
are not created in a human discourse process or negotiating process (as in
contractualism). If people do not live according to naturalistic values, they
are perverted and sick rather than irresponsible and blameworthy in the
sense of culpability. Social criticism may not be the appropriate way of
dealing with the problems. Thus far it has been suggested that values are
something man-made,7 and if we want to stick to this position, the contro-
versy between objective vs. relativistic values remains with us.

There seems to be a discrepancy concerning the opposite of relativism of

values. Realism and relativism are a pair of opposites, but so are absolut-
ism and relativism. In this paper I am taking part in the discussion in terms
of cultural relativity vs. objectivity of values. My presupposition is the
following: there is no way out of human subjectivity. The complete denial
of a subjective component of value awareness entails two things. Firstly,
we would have to assume that values reside in nature and are reflected in
our consciousness in an unbiased form. The second alternative is to assume
that values are God-given, through detailed and literal revelation, and we
should assume that the human capacity for receiving information about
these values is flawless. However, my starting point consists of two conten-
tions: we human beings are the creators of the values related to human
affairs; we render value qualities to the things we face in our encounters
with reality. We are also stuck with subjectivity, and the reason for the
inescapable subjectivity of the values of the moral agent is his limited epis-
temic capacities and his bondage to a specific point of view. She has no
access to a "view from nowhere". 8 Only God can look at things sub specie
aeternitatis. This means that human beings cannot talk about values all
things considered. Moreover, there is no clear-cut line line between facts
and values, our subjectivity concerns even our perception of facts. Perhaps
we should talk about "judgement of facts". 9 However, values have to have
a supervenience-relation to the reality we inhabit. Otherwise they do not
enhance our orientation in the world we all share.

7
Even if values supervene on facts, human valuation process intervenes in the
forming of values.
8
Nagel 1989.
9
See Putnam 1981, pp. 127 - 149.
44 Maija-Riitta Ollila

Some of us take moral values - social values among others - seriously,

while others neglect the whole discussion. Personal commitment is neces-
sary, because responsibility (in the moral sense of the word) is something
that is assumed; legal responsibility can be forced on an individual, but
moral responsibility requires personal commitment. But those of us who
volunteer as the proponents of certain values in society, will have to justify
their claim to certain kind of values. Now we are trying to clarify the
nature of this justification? Are we justified in our criticism in our own
societies (not to mention other societies) on the basis of relativistic values
only? It may be safe to state that if we want to speak for ourselves only and
proceed to exclusively prudential goals, relativistic values are good enough.
If we want to speak for humankind, we better look for universal values. Is it
possible to choose either the universal or the relativistic outlook on values?
Maybe we can honour the possibilities of metaphor and pick an analogue
from quantum physics. Asking 'Are values subjective or objective?" is like
asking "Are beings at the subatomic level solid particles or waves?" What
quantum physics teaches us is that both aspects of a particle have to be
taken into account if we want to give an adequate description fo the stuff
that things are made of, and the duality of values (objectivity/universality
vs. subjectivity/relativity) as such is of fundamental importance to the
understanding of the whole of reality. Each description complements the
other. The whole picture includes both elements. It seems to me that we
cannot focus on both aspects at the same time. The Janus-faced quality of
both values and particles makes it necessary for us to pay attention to the
dual qualities alternately. Depending on the overall conditions and the time
of observation we see either objectivity/solid particles or subjectivity/
waves. If a particle is a wave function pattern in an infinite-dimensional
Hilbert space, and "there is no constancy at the perceptual level nor is there
any universally agreed-upon constance at the theoretical level", 1 0 this per-
tains to the subjective vs. objective values controversy as well. We need to
fix the moment of perception and the perceptual standpoint, if we want to
stop the kaleidoscopic fluctuation for a while. In order to accomplish this in
moral thought we need to fix the frame of reference. 11

In this case, let us say that we want to practice social criticism in an

international context. Is there any justification for this kind of procedure?
Is there a shared conception of good or right beyond individualistic liberal

10
Rucker 1988, p. 102.
11
The approach I have developed is presented in "The Ethics of Rendezvous"
(from 1993), but in this context I am trying to proceed in the framework that is put
forth in the claim of social criticism of law and other social institutions. In order to
do this I am pertaining to the presuppositions of Feyerabend , Aarnio & Pezcenik
and Alexy.
 Moral Relativism and Social Criticism 45

sensibilities included in the discourse theoretical approach? Aarnio and Pez-

cenik raised the same question and their answer was that universal values
have no application as such. We need to start a weighing and balancing
process, which creates a set of relativistic values. I feel a big temptation to
look at the situation from the opposite angle.
Let us imagine a discourse situation between cultures; different cultures,
instead of different individuals, are supposed to participate in the discourse.
(We shall have to use this as an heuristic device at this point, because
formal criteria for this kind of process are vague, to say the least.) In this
situation relativistic standpoints are present on the prima facie level. A l l the
discrepant features of morality are genuinely included in the discussion.
Communitarian overtones are part and parcel of the procedure. However, in
a heavily idealized case, a new level of objectivity is achieved in the dis-
course process. Mark Johnson calls this "objectivity as transperspectivity".
It is not necessary to assume the achievements of the postmodern, postin-
dustrial societies of the white race as yardsticks; a genuine learning process
between all cultures is a possibility in the Johnsonian framework. Criticism
concerns our ways of moral dealing as well.
Johnson clarifies his concept of moral objectivity:
"We are now in a position to make some general claims about the nature
of a reasonable and realistic human objectivity , as opposed to an impossible
Gos's-eye-view objectivity. Human objectivity is what characterizes a
reflective process by means of which we are able to take up multiple per-
spectives as a way both of criticizing and transforming our own views and
those of others.
Steven Winter has characterized such a human objectivity as a form of
transperspectivity , which is the ability of a physically, historically, socially,
and culturally situated self to reflect critically on its own construction of a
world, and to imagine other possible worlds that might be constructed." 12

Johnson's book has often been taken as a critique of universal and

rational moral laws. Maybe it criticizes universal morality from this point
of view, but the conceptualization of objectivity certainly helps to build a
bridge between universal and relativistic morality. We can picture different
cultures in a mutual learning process, in which we start from prima facie
relativism, go through a dialogical process in which we could proceed in
terms of Alexy's discourse method. (Alexy wants to point out that this
method differs from the Rawlsian approach.) In this learning process objec-
tivity of values is defined as transperspectivity. The dialoque between cul-
tures will help to elevate compatible and overlapping features of different

12
Johnson 1993, pp. 240-241.
46 Maija-Riitta Ollila

cultural moralities to a higher level, and this level constitutes what we have
called universal morality all things considered (not in an individualistic but
in a cultural sense). Each culture has it tenable share of values; the dia-
logue will reveal which part this is.
Prima facie, we have relativistic values, but all things considered we
have universal values. They are the values of human beings not as they are
in their specific cultures now, but as they could be in the best of all imagin-
able worlds. Cultural differences in many different respects remain: eco-
nomic, aesthetic, religious, political and life style valuations may vary and
diversity may flourish, but things like social justice can in principle be dis-
cussed. There is room for mutual social criticism on the basis of the
common core of cultures.
In an ideal situation we could have universalized moral values. Criticism
in this situation is possible (in each separate culture) against the back-
ground of the highest shared and transperspectivally tested values. In the
present state of art, we have a very narrow universal value code for individ-
uals only, namely the human rights. In social criticism they have a limited
scope in comparison to the potential shared ideals of universal social jus-
tice, the great contractarian dream.

References

Aarnio , Aulis and Peczenik , Aleksander: On Values. Universal or Relative?,

Challenges to Law at the End of the 20th Century, Plenary and Parallel Sessions,
CLUEB, Bologna 1995, pp. 1 - 7. - Alexy, Robert: Discourse Theory and Human
Rights, Challenges to Law at the End of the 20th Century II, Plenary and Parallel
Sessions, CLUEB, Bologna 1995, pp. 2 2 - 2 8 . - Feyerabend, Paul: Killing Time,
The Autobiography of Paul Feyerabend, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
and London 1995. - Johnson, Mark: Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive
Science for Ethics, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1993. -
Nagel, Thomas: The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1989. -
Ollila, Maija-Riitta: The Ethics of Rendezvous, Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 54,
1993. - Puolimatka, Tapio: Democracy and Education: The Critical Citizen as an
Educational Aim, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, Helsinki 1995. - Putnam, Hilary:
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981. - Rucker,
Rudy: Mind Tools, The Mathematics of Information, Penguin Books, London 1988.
 JEFFERSON ET L'INTERPRÉTATION DE L A DÉCLARATION
DES DROITS DE L ' H O M M E DE 1789

Par Michel Troper, France

Entre toutes les œuvres qui témoignaient de la profondeur et de la variété

de ses talents, celle dont Thomas Jefferson tirait à juste titre le plus de
fierté, au point de demander qu'on en fît mention dans l'épitaphe qui serait
inscrite sur sa tombe, était la Déclaration d'Indépendance. Le mérite lui en
était d'ailleurs universellement reconnu. De plus, s'il n'était pas l'auteur de
la Déclaration des droits de Virginie, il en avait publiquement approuvé le
principe.
Nous savons que ces textes étaient connus en France à la veille de la
Révolution, qu'ils étaient largement commentés, que Jefferson était ambas-
sadeur des États-Unis à Paris, qu'il était l'ami de Lafayette et de beaucoup
d'autres personnages influents, si bien que l'hypothèse semble s'imposer
naturellement d'une influence sur la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et
du Citoyen de 1789 et qu'on est tenté d'en tirer des arguments susceptibles
de peser dans la controverse presque séculaire sur les influences américai-
nes sur la Déclaration française.
Les termes généraux du débat sont bien connus et l'on peut se borner à
les résumer: en 1902, Jellinek, le maître de l'école positiviste allemande,
défendit la thèse d'une influence américaine sur la Déclaration des droits
de l'Homme, il invoquait tout particulièrement l'influence qu'avait pu exer-
cer la Déclaration de Virginie. Par delà l'influence américaine, c'est en réa-
lité l'origine allemande des idées révolutionnaires que Jellinek entendait
démontrer et tout particulièrement leur origine protestante, attestée selon lui
par l'accent mis sur la liberté de conscience.1
La riposte vint d'Emile Boutmy. D'après lui, la Déclaration de 1789 ne
devait rien aux États-Unis et encore moins à l'Allemagne. Elle était «la
plus éclatante manifestation de l'esprit latin à la fin du XVIIIè siècle».
Autrement dit, elle exprimait la philosophie des lumières et s'inscrirait
ainsi dans une tradition purement française.

1
La controverse est excellement présentée dans Riais 1988, Fohlen 1990 et La-
corne 1991.
48 Michel Troper

Nombreux sont ceux qui jugent aujourd'hui cette controverse vieillie.

Stéphane Riais renvoie ainsi les deux adversaires dos-à-dos: les déclara-
tions française et américaine «plongent leurs racines dans un humus doctri-
nal voisin, qui est ... celui d'un lockianisme assez largement entendu. Ce
sont des textes non jumeaux, mais simplement frères, ce qu'atteste la
composition des bibliothèques en partie communes, mais aussi en partie
différentes, puisque bien entendu les américains ont lu davantage la
common law et les français le droit romain». 2

Mais d'autres continuent de prendre parti. Les uns, comme G. Chinard

prolongent le raisonnement de Jellinek et soutiennent que la Déclaration
des droits de 1789 a été inspirée par les Américains via Jefferson. 3 D'autres
adoptent le point de vue de Boutmy. Ainsi Nicolas Wahl estime que «les
véritables origines de la Déclaration de 89 sont sûrement dans les idées
françaises du 18ème siècle et non pas ces curieuses déclarations et constitu-
tions américaines des années 1770 et 1780 et, tout d'abord celle de la Vir-
ginie». 4 D'autres encore, comme Gordon Wood, croient à une influence en
sens inverse de la France sur l'Amérique. Jefferson aurait d'ailleurs joué ici
un rôle décisif. 5

On peut donc tenter de mobiliser en faveur de l'une ou l'autre des thèses

en présence les arguments proprement historiques tirés du séjour de Jeffer-
son à Paris.

A l'appui de la thèse de l'influence américaine, on invoquera avant tout

l'amitié avec Lafayette et le fait, attesté par plusieurs sources, qu'au mois
de janvier 89, celui-ci a soumis un projet de Déclaration à Jefferson, qui l'a
annoté et corrigé de sa main. Il suggérait notamment à Lafayette de suppri-
mer de la liste des droits inaliénables le «soin donné à son honneur» et la
propriété, l'un parce qu'il s'agit d'un principe de la monarchie, l'autre
peut-être parce qu'il ne figurait pas dans la Déclaration d'Indépendance.
Lafayette acceptera la première suggestion, mais maintiendra la propriété à
laquelle les physiocrates du Tiers tiennent particulièrement. De même, il
persuadera Lafayette d'ajouter le droit du peuple de réviser sa constitution
à intervalles réguliers. 6

Au mois de juillet, Jefferson rédige une «charte des droits établie solen-
nellement par le roi et la nation», dont il adresse le texte à Lafayette et à

2
Riais 1988, p. 357.
3
Chinard 1939.
4
Wahl 1990, p. 30.
5
Wood 1993: «Actually it may be the drafting of the French Declaration of
Rights that influenced the creation of the American Bill of Rights». Ds. le même
sens, Kaplan 1991.
6
Chinard 1939.
 Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 49

Rabaut Saint-Etienne. Ce texte, remanié par Lafayette, sera restitué à Jeffer-

son, qui l'annotera une nouvelle fois avant de le renvoyer. 7 Jefferson orga-
nisera encore, à la demande de ses amis français, avant son départ pour les
États-Unis, un dîner où sera discutée la question des pouvoirs suspensifs du
roi. 8

Tout cela suggère évidemment que Jefferson a été mêlé de très près à la
vie politique des débuts de la Révolution et qu'il y a même joué un rôle
important, spécialement dans la rédaction de la Déclaration des droits. Lui-
même paraît d'ailleurs si convaincu d'exercer une influence qu'il écrit à
Madison
«Everybody here is trying their hands at forming declarations of Rights.
As something of that kind is going on with you also, I send you two spe-
cimens from hence. The one is by our friend of whom I have just spoken
(Lafayette). You will see that it contains the essential principles of ours
accommodated as could be to the actual state of things here. »9

Aussi, Chinard s'empresse-t-il de conclure qu'il y a bien une influence

de Jefferson, d'autant plus que la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme finale-
ment adoptée conserverait beaucoup du texte de Lafayette.

Ce raisonnement n'emporte cependant pas la conviction. Tout d'abord, la

lettre à Madison, sur laquelle Chinard insiste évidemment, peut avoir une
signification différente et l'on peut soupçonner qu'elle a une fonction
essentiellement rhétorique. Il s'agit pour lui de persuader Madison, très réti-
cent à cette époque, qu'il manque à la constitution américaine un Bill of
Rights. 10 D'autre part, même si les liens entre Jefferson et Lafayette sont
incontestables, le projet de Lafayette n'est pas la Déclaration des droits de
l'Homme. Finalement, Marcel Gauchet le montre bien, s'il est vrai que les
hommes de 1789 veulent faire une déclaration des droits comme les améri-
cains, ils ne veulent pas l'imiter mais faire mieux. 11

D'où la thèse du feedback} 2 Pour Gordon Wood, «sans l'expérience

française, sans la conception française de l'importance de la Déclaration
des droits, les Américains n'auraient jamais rédigé leurs 10 premiers amen-
dements et adopté ainsi leur Bill of Rights». Là encore les arguments prin-

7
Fohlen 1992. L'esquisse de cette Charte se trouve ds. Boyd 1958, vol. 15,
p. 167.
8
La lettre de Lafayette (du 25.8.89) demandant à Jefferson d'organiser ce dîner
est reproduite dans Boyd 1958, vol. 15, p. 354.
9
Lettre du 12.1.89, ds. Boyd 1958, vol. 14, p. 436.
10
Koch 1950.
11
Gauchet 1988, p. 688.
12
L'expression est de Lacorne 1991, qui cite Gordon Wood. Cf. aussi Kaplan
1991.

5 FS Aarnio
50 Michel Troper

cipaux sont tirés de Jefferson: Ainsi, Boyd, le responsable de la publication

des papiers de Jefferson, estime que l'idée que «la terre appartient aux
vivants» a été conçue sous l'influence de la nuit du 4 août et de l'abolition
des privilèges. 13 Jefferson lui-même notera dans ses souvenirs, écrits en
1818:
«I returned from that mission in the Ist. year of the new government ,
having landed in Virginia in Dec. 89. & proceeded to N. York in March
90. to enter on the office of Secretary of State. Here certainly I found a
state of things which , of all I had ever contemplated , I the least expected.
I had left France in the first year of its revolution , in the fervor of natu-
ral Rights , and zeal for reformation. My conscientious devotion to these
rights could not be heightened , but it had been aroused and excited by
daily exercise».
II faut toutefois éviter de se laisser prendre à ce lyrisme: l'adoption du
Bill of Rights américain n'a pas été dictée par le souci d'imiter les Fran-
çais, mais par la nécessité politique, reconnue par Madison, d'obtenir la
ratification des états, qui en faisaient une condition.
A vrai dire, il faut considérer la question de savoir si la Déclaration des
droits de 1789 est due ou non à des influences américaines comme propre-
ment insoluble. D'abord parce que la réponse dépend de la signification
lockienne ou rousseauiste qu'on lui reconnaît et qu'il est loin d'être certain
qu'on puisse lui attribuer une signification unique. Comme toute œuvre col-
lective, elle résulte d'influences multiples et de compromis, qui pouvaient
être compris différemment par chacun des membres de l'Assemblée Natio-
nale. 14 Ensuite parce que l'on ne peut guère tirer d'arguments univoques
des écrits et des attitudes de Jefferson, qui recèlent des contradictions ou
des positions peu claires. Sur le pouvoir judiciaire, par exemple, ses décla-
rations varient beaucoup selon les époques. Sa pensée n'est d'ailleurs pas
fondamentalement originale et, comme il le reconnaîtra lui-même, la Décla-
ration d'Indépendance a beaucoup de points communs avec la déclaration
de Virginie de George Mason.
Surtout, on aurait tort de lire les écrits de Jefferson comme une œuvre
philosophique. C'est avant tout un politique, dont les arguments visent
avant tout des résultats pratiques et dont les opinions tiennent compte des
circonstances. De ce côté de l'Atlantique, il apparaît beaucoup moins radi-
cal, par exemple que Lafayette. Pour la France, il n'est pas partisan de la
démocratie, ni même de la république au sens américain, c'est-à-dire du
système représentatif, mais d'un système de contrat entre le roi et le
peuple, d'une «Charte».

13
Sylvers 1993.
14
Riais 1988, p. 335.
 Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 51

Enfin, comme le dit lui-même, à l'époque où la Déclaration d'Indé-

pendance a été rédigée «nous étions inexpérimentés». Cette inexpérience
explique sans doute que dans les premiers projets de Lafayette, comme
dans ses propres projets de Charte de l'été 89, la distinction soit aussi floue
entre principes constitutionnels et Déclaration des droits de l'Homme.
Il apparaît donc que de la présence à Paris de Jefferson ou de ses écrits,
on ne puisse tirer aucun argument décisif, ni pour la thèse d'une influence
américaine sur la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme, ni pour la thèse
inverse d'une influence française sur le Bill of Rights américain. Cela dit,
on peut légitimement considérer que si la controverse pouvait avoir quelque
intérêt quand elle avait pour arrière-fond la querelle culturelle franco-alle-
mande, elle a aujourd'hui perdu l'essentiel de sa portée.
En revanche, il est une question qui, pour les constitutionnalises français
d'aujourd'hui, est d'une difficulté considérable et d'une très grande portée
pratique. C'est celle de l'interprétation qu'il convient de donner - c'est
notamment la tâche des juridictions françaises, à commencer par le Conseil
constitutionnel - à la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de
1789. 15
La solution de cette question dépend des conceptions de la nature ou du
statut modal de ce texte, des fonctions politiques qu'on lui attribue, de la
rédaction, et, bien entendu, de son contenu matériel. Or, sur ces différents
points, les conceptions américaines, notamment celle de Jefferson offrent
des éclairages précieux.
N'y a-t-il pas cependant quelque inconséquence à affirmer notre igno-
rance de l'influence de Jefferson sur la rédaction de la Déclaration des
droits, tout en prétendant utiliser son œuvre comme instrument d'interpré-
tation de cette même Déclaration? Nullement, et cela pour deux raisons.
D'abord, même s'il n'avait exercé aucune influence et même si en 1789, il
avait été radicalement hostile à la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme, sa
correspondance serait de toute manière une source d'information précieuse.
D'autre part, et plus généralement, la signification de la Déclaration des
droits de 1789 ne peut être dégagée que par la méthode comparative et
c'est la conception américaine de la Déclaration des droits, dont Jefferson
est le principal représentant, qui est le meilleur terme de comparaison pos-
sible. Un texte juridique peur parfaitement en éclairer un autre, même s'il
n'a exercé sur lui aucune influence - et même s'il lui est postérieur. Il
suffit que les deux textes portent sur les mêmes questions pour que leur
rapprochement permette de comprendre la nature des problèmes. Ce sont
ces différences qui, autant ou plus que les similitudes, permettent de saisir
le sens des éléments en présence.

15
Troper 1989 et 1994.

5*
52 Michel Troper

On recherchera donc successivement ce qu'on peut apprendre de Jeffer-

son au sujet de la Nature de la Déclaration des droits, de ses fonctions et
de son contenu.

Nature de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme

Il importe de préciser d'emblée ce qu'on entend par «nature de la Décla-

ration des droits». On ne vise pas ici le vieux débat sur le point de savoir
si le texte, comme son nom semble l'indiquer, se borne à déclarer des
droits qui lui préexistent dans quelque nature objective ou s'il prétend seu-
lement le faire pour mieux dissimuler qu'il les créé et les concède aux
sujets. Cette question ne peut en effet être tranchée par la méthode histo-
rique et la réponse dépend avant tout des prises de position métaphysiques
sur l'existence ou l'inexistence d'un droit naturel.
En revanche, une controverse est apparue récemment en France, qui n'est
pas sans présenter quelques points communs avec celle qui oppose aux
États-Unis les interprétivistes et les non interprétivistes. Elle porte sur la
manière dont les juges de notre époque doivent considérer la Déclaration
des droits et elle comporte un enjeu très important pour ce qui concerne les
méthodes d'interprétation qu'il faut lui appliquer. Les juges peuvent, sans
professer eux-mêmes une croyance dans les droits naturels, considérer que
les hommes de 89 ont pensé faire une simple déclaration. Ils peuvent à
l'inverse prendre le texte comme un acte de volonté par lequel ont été
posées des règles nouvelles créatrices de droits. Dans le premier cas, le
sens qu'ils donnent au texte n'est pas l'intention originale de ses auteurs et
ils peuvent parfaitement donner aux droits fondamentaux tel ou tel contenu
conforme aux besoins de la société contemporaine. Dans le second cas, au
contraire, puisque la «Déclaration» n'est que l'expression de la volonté de
ses auteurs, l'obligation d'appliquer ce texte signifie l'obligation d'exécuter
cette volonté et il importe avant tout de la retrouver par l'interprétation
littérale et le recours aux travaux préparatoires.
On peut noter en passant que les positions théoriques habituelles sur le
pouvoir des juges sont ici inversées; les formalistes, qui pensent que le
juge est lié, soutiendront que la Déclaration des droits est un acte de
volonté, tandis que les réalistes, qui considèrent qu'il jouit d'un pouvoir
discrétionnaire considérable, estimeront au contraire que le juge traite la
Déclaration des droits comme si elle était une véritable déclaration, parce
que c'est l'attitude qui lui procure la plus grande marge d'interprétation.
De la même manière, sont inversées les positions idéologiques habituelle-
ment liées au jusnaturalisme et au positivisme. Le jusnaturalisme, fréquem-
ment associé au conservatisme (le droit positif ne doit pas porter atteinte à
 Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 53

des valeurs considérées comme éternelles), pousse ici à traiter la «Déclara-

tion» non comme une véritable Déclaration de droits naturels, mais comme
un simulacre, de telle sorte qu'elle soit interprétée conformément à la
volonté de leurs auteurs, c'est-à-dire selon une conception des principes
fondamentaux datant de deux siècles. Les jus-positivistes, qui nient l'exi-
stence de droits naturels, sont au contraire amenés à affirmer le caractère
déclaratif du texte, de manière à interpréter les principes qu'il contient,
compte tenu de l'évolution de la nature et des besoins de la société.

Cependant, la controverse sur la manière dont les juges doivent considé-

rer la Déclaration des droits se déroule sur le terrain historique, même si ce
n'est pas exclusivement sur ce terrain. Pour contribuer au débat, il faut éta-
blir comment les hommes de 89 concevaient la nature du texte qu'ils adop-
taient. Or, la pensée de Jefferson fournit des arguments précieux à l'appui
de la thèse de la conception déclarative.

Comme les autres révolutionnaires américains, Jefferson semble varier

quelque peu dans sa conception des droits, qu'il présente tantôt comme des
droits historiques, tantôt comme des droits naturels.

Comme des droits historiques, lorsqu'il affirme, dans la «Summary

View», conformément à une mythologie très répandue que les Anglais
avaient hérité des droits des anciens saxons, que ces droits avaient été
reconnus et sanctionnés par différentes chartes et que les émigrants les
avaient emportés avec eux en Amérique. 16 Mais aussi, dans d'autres passa-
ges, comme des droits naturels. Ils doivent être considérés comme «the
laws of nature and not as the gift of their chief magistrate», 17 ce qui corres-
pond tout-à-fait à ce qu'écrivait Hamilton en 1775 «ils se trouvent écrits
par la main même de Dieu, comme un rayon de soleil, dans le grand livre
de la nature humaine et ne peuvent être effacés ou obscurcis par une puis-
sance mortelle». 18

De même, dans la Déclaration d'Indépendance, les droits sont présentés,

très explicitement et dès les premières phrases, comme des droits naturels:
«lorsqu'il devient nécessaire pour un peuple de ... prendre parmi les puis-
sances de la terre la place séparée et égale à laquelle les lois de la nature et
du Dieu de la nature lui donnent droit...». Aucun besoin de faire la preuve
de l'existence de ces droits, parce qu'il s'agit de vérités qu'on tient pour
évidentes.

En réalité, on n'est pas en présence de deux visions incompatibles. Il s'agit

simplement de deux justifications de l'existence de droits naturels, présentées

16
Jefferson, 1774, Sylvers, Wahl 1990.
17
Cité par Bay lin 1967, p. 189
18
Cité par Baylin 1967, p. 188.
54 Michel Troper

à des moments historiques différents. L'argument historique était mieux

adapté aux revendications adressées au Parlement et au roi d'Angleterre, mais
ne permettait pas de prétendre à des droits, dont les ancêtres saxons ou
anglais n'auraient pas joui. Mais il présente aux yeux de Jefferson un incon-
vénient majeur au moment de la rédaction d'une Déclaration, car il conduit à
confondre les droits naturels et les droits positifs et à faire passer pour des
droits naturels ce qui est seulement conféré par la loi civile. Ainsi la
propriété, que l'on confond seulement avec un droit naturel par la force de
l'habitude et que l'on peut donc passer sous silence dans la Déclaration
d'Indépendance. Tout cela concourt à l'abandon dans la Déclaration de toute
référence au mythe saxon. 19 Il faut ajouter que si certains des droits ont pu
être hérités des anciens saxons, ce n'est pas que ceux-ci se les seraient donnés
par une décision arbitraire pour les transmettre à leurs descendants, c'est
qu'ils les tenaient de la nature. 20 La référence à l'histoire apparaît alors seule-
ment comme un procédé rhétorique, auquel les révolutionnaires français fai-
saient d'ailleurs eux-aussi largement appel, pour démontrer l'existence de
droits naturels. Les textes des deux déclarations emploient, quant à eux, un
autre procédé, le recours à l'évidence et au style descriptif.
Ainsi, une Déclaration des droits se présente, selon une définition de
Brissot - qui vaut également pour la Déclaration française et pour les
textes américains - comme un «un acte énonciatif des droits essentiels,
inhérents aux hommes en société», c'est-à-dire comme un discours indica-
tif, une suite de propositions vraies. Comme le dit Sieyes dans le préam-
bule de son premier projet
«une Déclaration des droits du citoyen n'est pas une suite de loix , mais
une suite de principes ... [dont il faut établir la vérité]. [Or...] la
seconde manière d'offrir la vérité est de ne pas la priver de ses caractè-
res essentiels , la raison et Γ évidence», 21

19
Jefferson l'écrit clairement: «I deride ... with you the ordinary doctrine, that
we brought with us from England [and hence were entitled to] the common law
rights. This narrow notion was a favorite in the first moment of rallying to our
rights, before they had thought of their explanation. The truth is, that we brought
with us the rights of men, of expatriated men» cité par Berman 1992, p. 322, n. 24.
20
Jefferson, 1774: «our ancestors, before their emigration to America, were the
free inhabitants of the British dominions in Europe, and possessed a right which
nature has given to all men, of departing from the country in which chance, not
choice, has placed them» ou encore «The God who gave us life gave us liberty at
the same time; the hand of force may destroy, but cannot disjoin them». De même,
i l présente les réclamations des américains comme celle d'un «free people claiming
their rights, as derived from the laws of nature, and not as the gift of their chief
magistrate».
21
Ds. Rials, p. 591.
 Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 55

formule qui répond à celle de la Déclaration d'Indépendance «Nous tenons

pour évidentes par elles-mêmes les vérités suivantes ...».
Le premier enseignement à tirer de l'œuvre de Jefferson est donc que la
Déclaration des droits de 89, pas plus que les déclarations américaines,
n'est, dans l'esprit de ses auteurs, un acte de volonté mais un véritable acte
déclaratoire de droits qui lui préexistent. A vrai dire, on ne voit pas
comment il pourrait en être autrement et comment il serait possible, sur le
fondement d'une théorie sceptique ou relativiste, de justifier un acte de
création de droits. Mais, si les conceptions française et américaine sont sur
ce point semblables, par l'effet d'une sorte de nécessité à la fois historique
et logique, elles diffèrent profondément quant aux fonctions qu'on attribue
à une Déclaration.

Fonctions de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme

La différence dans les fonctions des deux déclarations a été parfaitement

mise en évidence par Marcel Gauchet: il s'agit en France de fonder le pou-
voir et en Amérique de le limiter. 2 2
L'examen des écrits de Jefferson confirme amplement cette thèse. C'est
ce qui ressort tout d'abord de sa définition du Bill of Rights:
«By a declaration of rights I mean one which shall stipulate freedom of
religion , freedom of the press , freedom of commerce against monopolies,
trial by juries in all cases, no suspension of the habeas corpus, no stand-
ing armies. These are fetters against doing evil which no honest govern-
ment should decline». 23
Par conséquent, la Déclaration devrait, selon lui, énumérer non les droits
naturels qui fondent les règles protectrices (liberté, égalité, etc ), mais ces
règles elles-mêmes. C'est d'ailleurs ce qui explique le style très concret des
déclarations adoptées par les différents états américains et c'est précisément ce
type de Déclaration qu'il préconise pour la France et que Lafayette s'efforcera
en vain de faire adopter. Dans une lettre du 3 juin 1789, Jefferson suggère à
Lafayette que le roi vienne en séance royale et qu'il offre une charte, qui
contienne tout ce que les parties ont accepté. «J'ai fait, écrit-il, une esquisse
d'une telle charte. Je vous l'envoie, ainsi qu'à M. de St Etienne». 24 Le mot
«charte» fait référence à un pacte aux termes duquel l'une des parties accepte
de limiter son pouvoir en reconnaissant à l'autre des droits spécifiques. Il va
jusqu'à en préparer une esquisse, sans référence expresse au droit naturel,

22
Gauchet 1988.
23
Lettre à Alexander Donald, du 7 fév. 1788, ds. Boyd, 1958, vol. 12, p. 571.
24
Boyd, 1958, vol. 15, p. 165.
56 Michel Troper

mais au contraire très concrète et précise. 25 On peut certes penser - du reste,

il le dit lui-même - qu'il s'agit d'une mesure de circonstance, destinée avant
tout à gagner du temps et à éviter l'épreuve de force, mais ce style correspond
aussi parfaitement au modèle américain. C'est la raison pour laquelle on doit
considérer que le ralliement ultérieur de Lafayette à la Charte de 1815, loin
d'être une manifestation opportuniste, est au contraire le signe d'une remar-
quable constance intellectuelle. Constance chez Jefferson également, qui vers
1817 - 1818 écrira à Lafayette que cette Charte de 1815 marque un retour aux
idées sur lesquelles ils étaient tous deux d'accords en 1789.
La conception de Jefferson, qu'il partage avec nombre de ses contempo-
rains américains, s'explique assez bien. Il faut exprimer des règles précises,
parce qu'il s'agit avant tout de limiter le pouvoir. Dans la tradition
anglaise, les chartes et les Bill of Rights sont des compromis négociés entre
le roi et les sujets, dans lesquels sont précisés les droits de chaque partie.
Dès lors que ce compromis est en vigueur, il n'y a pas ou plus de souve-
rain. C'est bien pourquoi, l'idée, esquissée par Coke, d'un contrôle de
constitutionnalité par référence aux droits reconnus par la Common Law,
s'est immédiatement révélée incompatible avec la théorie, dominante au
XVIIIè siècle de la souveraineté du Parlement. C'est aussi pour cette raison
que la Déclaration française ne pouvait pas à la fois proclamer la souverai-
neté nationale et tenter de limiter le pouvoir.
Cette conception d'un Bill of Rights comme pacte explique aussi les
réserves de certains contemporains de Jefferson et notamment celles de
Madison et Hamilton, qui pouvaient soutenir que, dans une république, il
n'y a pas deux parties, comme dans l'Angleterre du XVIIè siècle, car le
pouvoir appartient au peuple. Il serait donc absurde de préciser les droits
du peuple contre lui-même et s'il faut limiter le pouvoir de chacune des
autorités, c'est seulement pour éviter qu'elle ne devienne despotique et cela
ne peut se faire que par le mécanisme des checks and balances.

25
Cette esquisse d'une «charter of rights» (Boyd , 1958, vol. 15, p. 167) contient
les règles suivantes:
1. les Etats se rassemblent une fois l'an le 1er novembre et siègent aussi long-
temps qu'ils le veulent. Ils règlent leur propre élection et leur procédure. Ils
sont élus pour trois ans
2. seuls les Etats lèvent les impôts
3. Ils font seuls la loi, avec le consentement du roi
4. L'habeas corpus
5. Le Pouvoir militaire est subordonné au pouvoir civil
6. Liberté de la presse
7. abolition des privilèges pécuniaires
8. Les dettes du roi deviennent dettes de la nation
9. Les Etats votent un crédit de 80 millions de livres pour le roi, financés par un
impôt qui sera payé une fois cette année.
10. Les Etats se séparent jusqu'au 1er novembre.
 Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 57

Au contraire, ceux qui, comme Jefferson, insistent pour qu'on rédige une
Déclaration des droits sont républicains et non démocrates. Ils pensent qu'il
ne doit pas nécessairement exister un souverain et que, même dans une
république, le gouvernement est distinct du peuple et doit être limité. C'est
non seulement le peuple qui doit être protégé contre le gouvernement, mais
aussi la minorité contre la majorité.
173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it
turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us that
they are chosen by ourselves. An elective despotism was not the govern-
ment we fought for. 26
Limiter le gouvernement est donc tout à la fois concevable en raison de
l'absence d'un souveraineté et nécessaire à cause de la distinction du gouver-
nement et du peuple. Cela ne présente même pas l'inconvénient de réduire,
en même temps que son pouvoir, la possibilité qu'il a de travailler au bon-
heur des hommes, car le gouvernement n'a pas pour fin le bonheur. Il doit
seulement permettre à chacun d'exercer son droit à la recherche du bon-
heur, qui est l'un des droits naturels, alors que la propriété ne l'est pas. 27

Mais la limitation du pouvoir est aussi possible. Le désaccord porte seule-

ment sur les procédés les plus adéquats. Certains des pères fondateurs de la
constitution américaine, parmi lesquels se situent en 1787 Madison et Hamil-
ton, pensent qu'une Déclaration des droits n'est qu'une «barrière de parche-
min» 2 8 et que seul l'équilibre des pouvoirs serait de nature à empêcher le des-
potisme et à garantir les droits. Comme l'écrit Hamilton «the constitution is
itself ... a Bill of Rights». 29 Jefferson, s'il est un ferme partisan d'une Déclara-
tion des droits, n'y voit cependant ni un remède parfait, ni un rival du méca-
nisme des checks and balances, mais plutôt un complément et cela de plusieurs
manières: un Bill of Rights permet aux citoyens de constater qu'une violation
a été commise et d'exercer alors leur droit de résistance; Le pouvoir des auto-
rités est limité par la structure fédérale du pouvoir, mais il faudrait pouvoir
compter sur la jalousie des états, ce qui implique que ceux-ci puissent mesurer
les actes du gouvernement fédéral à l'aune d'une déclaration des droits; Enfin
- argument qu'il affirme être d'un très grand poids - parmi les freins, l'un des
plus importants doit être placé dans les mains de l'autorité judiciaire. 30

26
Notes On The State Of Virginia.
27
Sylvers , pp. 49 - 50.
28
Fédéraliste n° 48.
29
Fédéraliste n° 84.
30
Lettre du 18 mars 1789 à Madison, ds. Boyd, vol. 14, p. 658. «In the argu-
ments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one which has great weight with
me, the legal check which it puts in the hands of the judiciary. That is a body,
which if rendered independent, and kept strictly to their own department merits
great confidence for their learning and integrity. »
58 Michel Troper

En d'autres termes, un Bill of Rights n'est pas un substitut, mais un moyen

de l'équilibre, puisqu'il renforce les états contre le gouvernement fédéral et
le pouvoir judiciaire contre le législatif.
Cependant cette idée que le pouvoir judiciaire pourrait être un contre-
pouvoir est loin d'être claire. D'un côté plusieurs auteurs se réfèrent à
l'autorité de Coke, dans les années qui précèdent la Révolution, pour soute-
nir qu'un acte du Parlement contre la constitution est nul. Sans doute, cer-
tains travaux relativement récents ont pu démontrer que la pensée de Coke
était sensiblement différente et qu'il préconisait seulement que les tribu-
naux appliquent les lois de manière à les concilier avec des principes juridi-
ques supérieurs. 31 Mais, dans l'Amérique du XVIIIè siècle, la doctrine
dominante, interprétait Coke, de façon à affirmer le pouvoir des tribunaux
d'annuler les lois contraires à certains principes fondamentaux. Jefferson
lui-même semble de cet avis, quand il préconise que le pouvoir judiciaire
serve de frein au législatif.
Mais d'un autre côté, il exprime la plus extrême méfiance envers le pou-
voir d'interprétation des tribunaux:
«qu'on libère les juges de la rigueur du texte de la loi , pour leur permet-
tre , avec un pouvoir d'appréciation prétorien de divaguer sur l'équité, et
le système tout entier vacillera». 32
Il reviendra sur cette idée dans sa controverse avec John Marshall. Telle
qu'elle est rédigée, la constitution américaine est trop vague, si bien qu'on
peut l'interpréter comme on veut. 33
Ces idées apparemment incohérentes ne peuvent être conciliées que si
l'on tient compte de la théorie de l'interprétation qui régnait à cette époque
des deux côtés de l'Atlantique et qui a d'ailleurs inspiré l'institution fran-
çaise du référé législatif et ultérieurement les articles 4 et 5 du code civil:
l'interprétation est le fait de déterminer la signification d'un texte, mais
seulement lorsque celui-ci est obscur. L'interprétation ne peut être que dis-
crétionnaire et interpréter c'est refaire la loi, comme l'avait déjà proclamé
au siècle précédent l'évêque Hoadley. C'est la raison pour laquelle, il faut
refuser ce pouvoir au juge et ne l'accorder qu'au législateur lui-même. En
revanche, lorsque les tribunaux appliquent la loi et qu'il leur faut pour cela
rappeler la signification d'un texte clair, ils n'expriment aucune volonté et
se bornent à «dire le droit qui est». Dans ces conditions, il suffit pour que
le juge ne puisse s'ériger en législateur ou en constituant, qu'il n'ait à
appliquer que des textes clairs et non pas des principes non écrits. Voilà
pourquoi il faut écrire la constitution et rédiger un Bill of Rights. On ne

31
Baylin, p. 177.
32
Lettre à Philip Mazzeim 1785, citée par Wood 1991, p. 717, note 15.
33
Murphy & Pritchett 1961, p. 4.
 Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 59

pense pas au XVIIIè siècle, comme on le pensera plus tard, qu'on élargit
ainsi le pouvoir d'interprétation des tribunaux. On juge au contraire qu'on
le restreint. Comparant ces textes, dont la clarté en fait des étalons invaria-
bles, aux lois nouvelles, les juges pourront alors facilement, et sans jamais
devenir eux-mêmes législateurs, vérifier qu'ils n'ont pas été violés, Ils
jouent le rôle de contre-pouvoir sans être eux-mêmes un pouvoir.
Il est clair que cette théorie de l'interprétation manque tout-à-fait de per-
tinence, mais c'est elle qui a permis aux américains et notamment à Jeffer-
son d'accepter l'idée d'une limitation du pouvoir par les juges et par suite
celle du contrôle de constitutionnalité. Ce rôle ainsi dévolu au Bill of
Rights fait ressortir par contraste celui que la Révolution française assignait
à la Déclaration des droits.
En France, il ne s'agit pas de limiter le pouvoir, mais de le fonder. D'où
l'universalisme. Comme l'écrit Marcel Gauchet, la Déclaration des droits a
pour fonction d'expliciter les fondements. Cette explicitation est indispen-
sable, parce que
«rassemblée nationale autoproclamée est en posture d'exercer le pouvoir
constituant , alors que la représentation actuelle , comme Sieyes l'admet
très significativement en tête de son projet, n'est pas rigoureusement
conforme à ce qu'exige une telle nature de pouvoir. La déclaration va
remplir un rôle de substitut par rapport à ce déficit, la constitution étant
supposée sortir tout droit de l'autorité des principes inaliénables et sacrés
de toute société, que l'Assemblée se borne à exposer et servir. D'où le
préambule qui, via Mirabeau, vient de Sieyes.» D'où la nécessité de
l'universalité, «L'ancrage dans l'universel n'est ni le fruit d'un génie
particulier, ni la marque d'une irréalité spécifique. Il résulte des nécessi-
tés d'une situation». 34
L'universalisme du texte français ressort par contraste de quelques traits
importants, qui manquent dans la déclaration de Virginie ou dans la décla-
ration d'Indépendance ou encore dans les projets de Lafayette. Une déclara-
tion qui entend limiter le pouvoir énumère les droits, que les hommes tien-
nent de la nature et dont ils peuvent se prévaloir contre l'État. Au contraire,
un texte qui entend fonder le pouvoir expose la manière dont ce pouvoir
doit organiser l'exercice des droits ou en fixer les limites. C'est ce qui

34
Gauchet 1988, p. 685. V. aussi Gauchet 1989, p. 58: «nos constituants avaient
impérieusement à satisfaire à la triple nécessité de procurer une autorité irréver-
sible à leur coup de force instaurateur, de marquer un écart philosophique maximal
vis-à-vis de l'état de choses existant et d'introniser enfin une légitimité d'évidence
tellement irrésisitible que toute la suite de l'organisation politique en découlerait
comme d'elle-même. L'universalisme de leur texte est le fruit de cet impératif de
l'enclanchement de cette obligation de l'origine qui le consacreront symbole de la
naissance d'un monde.»
60 Michel Troper

explique ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler le légicentrisme français, c'est-à-

dire l'organisation de la liberté par la loi. 3 5 Selon cette conception, le droit
naturel, loin d'être un système rival du droit positif, est ce qui le fonde et
le justifie, sans limitation véritable. Puisque «la loi est l'expression de la
volonté générale», toute loi en vigueur peut prétendre être obéie comme
expression de la volonté générale. Quant aux droits individuels, s'ils ne
peuvent ni être invoqués contre la loi, ni être exercés en l'absence de loi,
ils se ramènent au droit d'être gouberné par la loi.
Comme ils ne sont pas destinés à être utilisés directement, ils seront pré-
sentés dans le texte français non pas, à la différence des textes américains,
sous forme de règles portant sur les objets les plus divers - les libertés bien
sûr, mais aussi le jugement par jury, le logement des soldats ou le cumul
des emplois - et ils seront formulés sous forme de principes et de défini-
tions, de la liberté, de la loi, de la séparation des pouvoirs, plutôt que
comme des prescriptions. Quant aux règles qui découlent de ces principes,
elles seront renvoyées à la constitution proprement dite, au chapitre
«garantie des droits». Prenons la séparation des pouvoirs: là où les textes
américains énoncent une prescription («la Puissance législatrice et la Puis-
sance exécutrice de l'Etat doivent être distinctes et séparées de l'autorité
judiciaire...» 3 6 ), la Déclaration française énonce une vérité: «toute société
dans laquelle la garantie des droits n'est pas assurée, ni la séparation des
pouvoirs déterminée n'a pas de constitution». En d'autres termes, une
constitution n'est rien d'autre qu'une répartition des compétences entre plu-
sieurs autorités. 37 L'Assemblée ne dit pas que les pouvoirs doivent être
séparés, mais que, lorsqu'une telle séparation existe, alors la société est
constituée. Pourquoi faire figurer une telle définition dans une déclaration?
Parce que, comme il n'y a pas de liberté si ces compétences sont toutes
entre les mains d'un seul, l'homme a un droit naturel de vivre sous l'em-
pire d'une constitution. 38
Ce sont ces différences entre les fonctions assignées en France et en
Amérique à la Déclaration des droits, qui expliquent que les contenus
soient eux-aussi sensiblement différents.

35
Cf. Jaume 1989, spécialt. p. 54 et s.
36
Déclaration des droits de Virginie (juin 1776) art. V, ds. Riais, p. 495. Formu-
lation presque identique dans la Déclaration du Maryland, art. V I «la puissance
législatrice, la puissance exécutrice & Γ autorité judiciaire, doivent être toujours
séparées & distinctes l'une de l'autre», ds. Riais, p. 503.
37
«Tel est le vrai sens du mot constitution; il est relatif à l'ensemble et à la
séparation des pouvoirs publics» (Sieyes, Premier projet de Déclaration, 2 0 - 2 1 juil-
let 1789, ds. Riais, p. 591.
38
Troper, 1988.
 Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 6 1

Contenus de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme

Les différences de contenus entre les textes français d'une part et les
textes proposés, rédigés ou approuvés par Jefferson d'autre part, tiennent,
comme on l'a déjà souligné, au niveau d'abstraction, dans l'ensemble plus
élevé en France, mais aussi aux droits qui y sont énumérés.
C'est ainsi que les textes américains mentionnent des droits nombreux et
variés, qui ne figurent pas dans celui de 89. Il s'agit d'abord de droits très
concrets, dont la mise en œuvre est précisée dans le texte même de la
déclaration, de sorte qu'ils puissent être invoqués directement sans interven-
tion de la loi. Ainsi pour l'habeas corpus, le jugement par jury, le principe
de la rotation des postes, le logement des soldats ou le droit de posséder
une arme. Mais il s'agit aussi de droits généraux et abstraits, comme le
droit à la «recherche du bonheur» ou le droit de chaque génération de révi-
ser la constitution, suggéré à Lafayette, qui ne parvint pas à l'imposer.
Dans le premier cas, le caractère très concret des textes américain
s'explique par la fonction que l'on attribue à la Déclaration des droits, c'est-
à-dire à la conception de la société et de ses fins. Si l'on considère, comme en
Amérique, qu'elle est établie seulement pour fixer les limites du pouvoir et
permettre à l'individu d'exercer les droits qu'il possède au delà de ces limi-
tes, alors la Déclaration doit comprendre tout ce qui est immédiatement
nécessaire: le droit au jury, les diverses libertés, le droit à la recherche du
bonheur. Le droit naturel c'est le droit de l'individu de poursuivre ses propres
fins et il est clair que la propriété n'en est pas une. Si l'on estime au contraire,
comme en France, que le premier droit naturel est celui de vivre dans une
société organisée conformément à la nature, alors la Déclaration doit d'abord
organiser le mode de confection des lois et déterminer les tâches du législa-
teur. Le caractère légicentriste de la Déclaration des droits de 89 ne tient donc
pas à la volonté de mettre des limites aux droits que l'on a proclamés, mais à
l'idée que la loi est pour les droits la seule garantie possible.
Le cas de la propriété est significatif. Les Français le placent parmi les
«droits naturels et imprescriptibles de l'homme», ce que Jefferson refuse.
Mais, il ne s'agit pas d'un véritable désaccord. Les Français, pas plus que
Jefferson, ne pensent que l'homme à l'état de nature disposait de propriété.
Or, Jefferson ne veut mentionner que les droits, mais tous les droits, que
l'homme tient de la nature et dont il doit conserver la jouissance en société.
Le droit à la recherche du bonheur en fait partie, mais non le droit de pro-
priété, qui est conféré par la société. Au contraire, les hommes de 89, qui
veulent énumérer les droits dont l'homme pourra jouir grâce à la société, doi-
vent mettre la propriété au même rang que la liberté. De même que la société
transforme l'indépendance naturelle en liberté, de même l'homme possède un
droit naturel d'entrer en société pour commencer d'être propriétaire.
62 Michel Troper

Il en va de même pour le bonheur: la Déclaration française ne mentionne

pas la «recherche du bonheur», mais le «bonheur de tous» («afin que les
réclamations des citoyens ... tournent toujours au maintien de la constitu-
tion et au bonheur de tous). Si l'homme a bien, pour les Français comme
pour Jefferson, un droit naturel à la recherche du bonheur, on ne peut pas
le mentionner sous cette forme, puisqu'on n'énumère que les droits dont
l'homme jouira grâce à la société, si celle-ci est organisée conformément à
ses fins naturelles. Or l'une de ces fins est non de permettre la recherche
du bonheur, mais le bonheur lui même, qui apparaît comme une consé-
quence du maintien de la constitution. La Déclaration de 89 préfigure ainsi,
celle de 93, «le but de la société est le bonheur commun».
De même encore pour la différence dans la présentation de la séparation
des pouvoirs. On a déjà souligné que les Français en faisaient le definiens de
la constitution parce qu'il s'agit pour eux de fonder et non de limiter le pou-
voir. La différence est liée aussi aux conceptions du droit naturel. En Amé-
rique, s'il s'agit de préserver les droits dont l'homme jouit dans la nature, la
liberté qu'il faut préserver ne peut être que la liberté individuelle, qui, en
société, résultera du respect par le pouvoir de la sphère privée. En France,
puisqu'on vise le droit de vivre dans une société organisée selon la nature, on
doit rechercher avant tout la liberté politique, c'est-à-dire le droit de n'être
jamais soumis qu'à la loi - c'est la définition de Montesquieu et de Rous-
seau - et ce droit ne peut être garanti que si une décision administrative ou
judiciaire n'est jamais prise qu'en application d'une loi antérieure, autrement
dit, s'il existe une séparation des pouvoirs ou encore une constitution.
Et c'est encore ce qui explique la différence de traitement du droit à la
révision de la constitution. Jefferson y attachait une grande importance. Il
avait persuadé Lafayette de le faire figurer dans ses projets. Le dernier en
date, celui du 11 juillet 1789, se termine par le paragraphe suivant:
Et comme Vintroduction des abus et le droit des générations qui se suc-
cèdent nécessitent la révision de tout établissement humain , il doit être
possible à la nation d'avoir dans certains cas une convocation extraordi-
naire de députés, dont le seul objet soit d'examiner et corriger s'il est
nécessaire les vices de la constitution. 39
Ce point de vue n'était pas isolé. En France même, il était partagé par
beaucoup, notamment par Sieyes 40 et Condorcet. 41 Ce dernier l'expri-

39
Ds. Riais, p. 590.
40
Son premier projet, article X X X I I , ds. Riais, p. 606.
41
«Un peuple a toujours de droit de revoir, de réformer et de changer sa consti-
tution. Une génération η a pas le droit d'assujettir à ses lois les générations futures
et toute hérédité dans les fonctions est absurde et tyrannique», (art. 33 du projet du
15 février 1793, ds. Jaume 1989, p. 240. Ce texte sera repris en termes presque
identiques à l'article X X V I I I de la Déclaration montagnarde du 24 juin 1793.
 Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 63

mera plus tard dans des termes très voisins de ceux de Jefferson. Un
droit à la révision se justifie par deux types d'arguments. Tout d'abord,
il importe de garantir la liberté, entendue cette fois non comme liberté
civile, mais comme liberté politique, c'est-à-dire comme le fait d'être
soumis non à d'autres hommes, mais aux lois seulement. Or, les lois
sont faites par des hommes et l'on serait bien soumis aux hommes et non
aux lois, si l'on ne pouvait pas les changer. Le rejet de l'hétéronomie
doit donc valoir non seulement à l'égard des contemporains, mais égale-
ment à l'égard des hommes des générations passées, qui ont fait les lois
sous lesquelles nous vivons. Symétriquement, le principe d'auto-nomie ou
principe de liberté envisagé dans la dimension temporelle signifie que
chaque génération doit pouvoir déterminer les lois auxquelles elle sera
soumise. C'est ce que Jefferson exprime par la formule «la terre appar-
tient aux vivants» et qui doit évidemment s'appliquer aux lois constitu-
tionnelles dans la mesure où elles expriment une volonté contingente.
Or, et c'est le deuxième argument, une constitution est précisément une
construction humaine, fréquemment comparée à une machine. Elle est le
produit d'une décision et doit donc pouvoir être changée.
On pourrait penser que cette argumentation se heurte à l'idée, égale-
ment défendue par Jefferson, que la déclaration des droits fait partie de
la constitution. Si elle est une Déclaration des droits naturels, comment
peut-elle faire partie d'une constitution, qui exprime une volonté contin-
gente? Et si elle fait partie de la constitution, sera-t-elle révisable
comme le reste? En réalité, comme on l'a vu, si les droits existent bien
dans la nature avant d'être déclarés, le texte de la Déclaration énonce,
dans le conception américaine, plus que les droits eux-mêmes, les règles
qui en dérivent. Or, ces règles reflètent bien la volonté contingente
d'une génération.
A l'inverse, selon la conception française, la Déclaration des droits
énonce les droits que l'homme possède par nature et qui ne dépendent en
rien des volontés humaines. Elle exprime des vérités éternelles et il serait
absurde de la soumettre à des révisions périodiques. Quant à la constitution,
elle exprime bien une décision, mais une décision non arbitraire. Elle doit
présenter en effet un rapport étroit avec la société et faciliter l'adoption des
lois les plus propres à réaliser ses fins. Selon les termes de l'article 16 de
la Déclaration, c'est la société qui doit avoir une constitution: «toute
société dans laquelle ... n'a pas de constitution». 42 Dans ces conditions,
cette constitution doit pouvoir être révisée, dès lors qu'elle n'est plus adap-
tée à l'état de la société. Comme le dit Brissot,

42
Troper 1988.
64 Michel Troper

il ne faut pas confondre avec cette Déclaration des droits la constitution

dont nous allons parler. La constitution peut changer , jamais les droits
43
ne peuvent varier.
Cependant, comme la constitution est conçue comme un procédé
d'organisation sociale, la faculté de révision ne se justifie pas comme chez
Jefferson par l'idée qu'une génération ne peut être soumise aux volontés de
la précédente, mais, comme pour une machine, seulement par nécessite de
l'adapter au changement social ou au «progrès des lumières». Aussi, la
constitution doit-elle être rigide, car le changement ne doit intervenir que
lorsqu'il s'avère évidemment nécessaire.
En définitive, l'influence de Jefferson sur la Déclaration des droits de
l'homme et du citoyen se révèle très faible. Sans doute, sa conception de la
nature et du statut modal du texte est la même, mais il s'agit d'un point de vue
commun à tout le courant issu du jusnaturalisme, donc d'une extrême banalité
et sa conception de la fonction et du contenu d'une Déclaration est profondé-
ment différente de celle qui, en France, a inspiré l'Assemblée Nationale. Pré-
cisément en raison de ces différences, il est également impossible de parler
d'une influence en retour du texte français sur le Bill of Rights américain.
En revanche, l'analyse des idées de Jefferson conduit à mettre en lumière
trois traits du texte français: la Déclaration a été pensée comme une véri-
table déclaration de droits naturels; elle a pour fonction non de limiter,
mais de fonder le pouvoir; elle n'énonce pas des droits que les individus
pourraient faire valoir contre l'État, mais différentes version d'un droit
naturel de vivre en société sous le seul empire des lois, ce qui est la défini-
tion même de la liberté.
Ces caractères devraient comporter au moins deux conséquences quant à
l'interprétation du texte. Tout d'abord, un texte qui déclare des droits ne
peut être interprété comme un texte qui exprime la volonté du souverain. Il
ne s'agit pas de retrouver l'intention profonde de son auteur, mais,
puisqu'il prétend décrire des principes de droit naturel indépendants de la
formulation contingente qui en a été faite, il faut admettre que leur contenu
doit être adapté aux nécessités de chaque époque et que c'est au pouvoir
politique qu'il appartient de réaliser cette adaptation. Ensuite un texte qui
fonde le pouvoir ne peut être interprété comme un texte qui le limite et
consacre les droits des individus contre le pouvoir. Il faudrait donc laisser à
la loi la tâche de déterminer l'étendue des droits.
En d'autres termes, la conception française de la Déclaration des droits
devrait conduire à Γ auto-limitation de l'interprète. Pourtant, à considérer la
manière dont la Déclaration est effectivement interprétée, on ne saurait dire
que ces conséquences aient été entièrement tirées. Sans doute, le Conseil

43
Projet de Déclaration (1er mai 1789), ds. Riais 562.
 Jefferson et l'interprétation de la Déclaration des droits de l'Homme 65

constitutionnel proclame-t-il régulièrement q u ' i l ne dispose pas d ' u n pou-

voir général d'appréciation. Mais d'une manière générale, i l ne se comporte
pas très différemment des autres cours constitutionnelles ou de la Cour
suprême des États-Unis, c'est-à-dire q u ' i l utilise le texte de la Déclaration
des droits comme si elle avait pour fonction de reconnaître des droits et
libertés qui serviraient à limiter le pouvoir.
On admet en général trop rapidement que le contrôle de constitutionnalité a
été institué en Europe dans le cadre d'une théorie générale de la structure de
l'ordre juridique, pour assurer le respect de la hiérarchie des normes et non,
comme aux États-Unis pour veiller aux droits des individus contre l'État,
d'une théorie démocratique, plus que libérale. C'est d'ailleurs la raison pour
laquelle Kelsen, le meilleur théoricien moderne du contrôle de constitutionna-
lité, refusait que le contrôle s'exerce par rapport à une Déclaration des droits.
Mais, l'institution s'est surtout développée après la seconde guerre mondiale,
sous l'influence et avec l ' e x e m p l e américain, au point que l ' o n parle aujour-
d ' h u i d ' u n droit c o m m u n constitutionnel. Ce droit c o m m u n n'est pas le pro-
duit des Lumières, mais celui du libéralisme moderne.

Bibliographie

Adams, Willy Paul: The First American Constitutions, University of California

Press, 1976. - Baylin, Bernard: The idelological Origins of the American Révolution,
Cambridge, Mas., Harvard UP, 1967. - Berman, Harold J.: The Impact of the Enligh-
tenment on American Constitutional Law, ds. Yale Law Journal, vol. 4, number 2,
1992, p. 311. - Binoche , B.: Critiques des droits de l'homme, Paris, PUF, 1989; Ben-
tham contre les droits de l'Homme, ds. Bourgeois & D'hondt (ed.) La Philosophie et
la Révoution française; Actes du Colloque de la Société Française de Philosophie, 31
mai, 1er et 2 juin 1989, 1993, p. 79. - Boorstin, D.: The Lost World of Thomas Jeffer-
son ( l è édit. 1948), Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1981. - Bourgeois , B.: Philosophie
et droits de l'homme de Kant à Marx, Paris, PUF, 1990. - Boyd, Julian (ed.): The
papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 12. Princeton, NJ, Princeton UP, 1958. - Burdeau,
F. & Morabito, M. Les expériences étrangères et la première constitution française,
ds. Pouvoirs, 1989, p. 97. - Chastellux, François Jean de: Voyages dans l'Amérique
septentrionale dans les années 1780, 1781 et 1782, Paris, 1980 ( l è édit. 1786). - Chi-
nard, G.: The letters of Lafayette and Jefferson, Batimore, The Johns Hopkins Press.,
1929; Thomas Jefferson, apôtre de l'américanisme, New-York, 1939. - Condorcet :
De l'influence de la révolution d'Amérique sur l'Europe, Paris, 1786; Déclaration des
droits, Versailles, 1788. - De Baecque, Α., Schmale, W., Vovelle, M.: L'an I des
Droits de l'Homme, Paris, Presses du CNRS, 1988. - Delvaux, P.: La controverse des
droits de l'Homme de 1789, thèse, Paris, sd. - Fohlen, Cl.: La filiation américaine de
la Déclaration des droits de l'homme, ds. C. A. Colliard, G. Conac (ed.) La Déclara-
tion des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, Paris, Documentation française,
1990, p. 31; Thomas Jefferson, Nancy, PU de Nancy, 1992. - Gauchet, M.: Droits de
l'homme, ds. F. Furet & M. Ozouf, Dictionnaire critique de la Révoution française,
Paris, PUF, 1988, p. 685: La Révolution des droits de l'homme, Paris, Gallimard,

6 FS Aarnio
66 Michel Troper

1989. - Higonnet, P.: Sister Republics. The origins of French and American Constitu-
tionalism, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard UP, 1988. - Howard, D.: Article «Jefferson;
La Déclaration d'Indépendance», ds. Chatelet, Duhamel, Pisier (ed.), Dictionnaire des
Œuvres Politiques, Paris, PUF, 2è édit., 1986, p. 476. - Jaume, L.: La Révolution
française en tant qu'objet de la théorie politique, ds. Cahiers Bernard Lazare, n° 121 -
122, 1988- 1989, pp. 137- 149; Les Déclarations des droits de l'Homme, Paris,
Flammarion, 1989. - Jefferson, T.: A Summary View Of The Rights Of British Ame-
rica, 1774; Notes On The State Of Virginia; Common Place Book; extraits du
Common Place Book, Paris, édit. par G. Chinard, 1925; The Papers of Thomas Jeffer-
son, Princeton, Princeton UP, 1958. t. 14 - 15. - Kaplan, Lawrence S.: Jefferson and
France. An essay on Politics and Political Ideas, New-Haven Conn., 1967; Jefferson
and the Constitution: the view from Paris, ds. Focus, Le temps des constitutions, actes
du colloque sur le bicentenaire de la constitution américaine, 1991, p. 23. - Koch,
(Adrienne, Jefferson and Madison; The Great Colaboration, New-York, Knopf, 1950.
- Lacorne, Denis: L'invention de la république; Le modèle américain, Paris, 1991;
Essai sur le commerce atlantique des idées républicaines, ds. Y. Mény (ed.), Les poli-
tiques du mimétisme institutionnel; La greffe et le rejet, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1994,
p. 38. - Mably: Des droits et devoirs du citoyen, Kell, 1789. - Manin, Bernard: Fron-
tières, Freins et contrepoids; la séparation des pouvoirs dans le débat constitutionnel
américain de 1787, ds. RFSP, vol. 44, 1994, n° 2, p. 257s. - Matthews, R. K.: The
Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson, Kansas, U. Press of Kansas, 1984. - Murphy,
W. F. & Pritchett, C. H.: Courts, Judges and Politics. An introduction to the Judicial
Process, lè édit. 1961, Me Graw Hill, 4è édit., 1986. - Raynaud, P.: Révolution amé-
ricaine, ds. F. Furet & M. Ozouf, Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution française,
Paris, PUF, 1988, p. 860. - Riais, S.: La Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du
citoyen, Paris, Hachette, 1988. - Shuffelton, F.: Thomas Jefferson. A comprehensive,
Annotated Bibliograhphy of Writings about him, New-York, Garland Publishing,
1983. - Stone, G. et al.: The Bill of Rights in the Modern State, Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press, 1992. - Sylvers, Malcolm: Il pensiero politico e sociale
di Thomas Jefferson, Manduria - Bari, Piero Lacaita, 1993. - Troper, M.:
L'interprétation de la Déclaration des Droits; l'exemple de l'article 16, ds. Droits n° 8,
1988, p. I l l s . ; La déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen en 1789, ds.
Conseil Constitutionnel; la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen et la juris-
prudence, Paris; PUF, 1989, p. 13s.; The interpretation of the Declaration of Human
Rights by a constitutional judge, ds. Krawietz, MacCormick, von Wright (ed.), Per-
spective Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems. Festschrift
for Robert S. Summers, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1994, p. 591. - Vedel, G.: La
place de la Déclaration dans le bloc de constitutionnalité, ds. La Déclaration des
Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen et la jurisprudence, Paris, PUF, 1989, p. 35; Le
Conseil constitutionnel, gardien du droit positif ou défenseur de la transcendance des
droits de l'homme, ds. T. Marshall (ed.), Théorie et pratique du gouvernement consti-
tutionnel, La Garenne-Colombes, Editions de l'Espace Européen, 1992, p. 311. -
Wahl, Ν.: Les déclarations des colonies américaines: une autre tradition de la liberté,
ds. C. A. Colliard, G. Conac (ed.) La Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du
Citoyen de 1789, Paris, Documentation française, 1990, p. 30. - Wood, G.: La créa-
tion de la République américaine, trad, fse, Paris, Belin, 1992; The origins of the
American Bill of Rights, ds. La Revue Tocqueville, Les droits de l'homme: une expé-
rience franco-américaine, 1993, vol. X I V , n° 1, 1993, p. 33.
II. On Reasonableness and Legal Rationality
in Modern Legal Systems
 RATIONALITY AND REASONABLENESS
OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Some Thoughts from the Swedish Point

of View on Judges 1 Decision-Making

By Gunnar Bergholtz, Lund

I. Introduction

It has occasionally been stated in the legal debate that the decision or
verdict in a judgment is decided before the motivations and reasons there-
fore are articulated. The conclusion is manifested before its premises are
formulated. The idea could be that the judges - one judge rarely decides a
case in most civil law legal systems - find the decision intuitively or by a
hunch without having thought of the reasons for it. One could possibly ima-
gine that the judges of a case would argue: " X is the only reasonable out-
come." This without the judges having contemplated on the reason why
that particular outcome would be the only reasonable one. Perhaps the
judges might have thoughts on reasons which are irrelevant from a legal
standpoint, but not on various legally relevant reasons which constitute the
basis for the judgment.
I would forthwith like to try to explain some typical characteristics of the
legal decision-making process and then indicate some ways to analyze the
reasons and finally observe what it can mean that the decision could come
"before" the motivations or reasons for the decision.

II. What Actually Happens in the Court?

The prosecutor's submission in criminal cases is primarily a description

of the alleged criminal act which he must prove and in civil cases the plain-
tiff must specify the relief sought and the grounds therefore from which the
court may not deviate. This in itself constrains the judges. Thus the court
has before it a detailed and precise realm of inquiry. Naturally, the judges
then prepare themselves by studying the materials relevant to the particular
problem at hand. In collégial courts - especially appellate and supreme
courts - the case is prepared for a decision by one of the judges or some
70 Gunnar Bergholtz

other court-appointed officer through the preparation of a brief setting out

any relevant legal sources on which the case may be decided. Lower
court(s') judgments may also be appraised at this stage. Thus, already prior
to the main or oral hearing, the judges will often have formulated a hypoth-
esis regarding relevant reasons and a hypothetical outcome based on prece-
dents, general principles, legal doctrine or preparatory legislative materials.
If this were not the case it would be difficult to appraise the relevancy of
the facts which, according to the hypothesis or its antithesis, are to be con-
sidered as facts of law or evidence. This relevance appraisal has actually
been made already by the parties in their submissions and briefs to the
court as well as through their submission of evidence. The court merely
accedes to or rejects it. It is only a question of the court saying yes or no,
in full or in part, to the prosecutor's or plaintiffs submissions. Possible rea-
sons /interpretations are normally known to and considered by both parties
and the court. One could possibly concur with MacCormick in that the
plaintiff in the case attempts to construct a syllogism, i. e., the grounds for
the claim comprise a constellation of facts which correlates with the requi-
site components of the legal rule in question.1 After having heard the par-
ties, the court then appraises whether the plaintiff has succeeded or not, in
the latter case either in the sense that the relevant legal rule is found to
have a content different from what the plaintiff assumed or that the asserted
constellation of facts has not been proved.

III. The Analogy from Theory of Science

The theory of science utilizes a well known distinction between context

of discovery and context of justification. The former concerns the question
of how a scientist has come to formulate a theory and the latter addresses
the problem of the scientific justification of that theory. The context of dis-
covery hence concerns the psychological and sociological processes that
lead to the discovery of the solution/theory. It is a controversial question
whether there also exists a "logic of discovery" - a logical means to
achieve the discovery. 2 The context of justification concerns how the scien-
tist within his scientific field defends the theory. In that context it is
obvious that, i.a., various logical arguments play important roles. The con-
ceptualization of these two contexts evolved in the theory of science fore-

1
Neil MacCormick , The Reasons of Judgment in the Common Law, p. 177 et
seq. La reasons des decisions de justice. Etudes publicees par Chaim Perelman et
Paul Fortier. Bruxelles 1978.
2
Cf. Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge 1979 and Karl
R. Popper , The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London/Melbourne/Sidney/Auck-
land/Bombay/Toronto/Johannesburg/New York 1968.
 Rationality and Reasonableness of Judicial Decisions 71

most as an epistemologica! tool. It was not intended to reflect empirical

matters / procès ses.3

IV. The Context of Discovery

Hempel addresses the context of discovery with the following example:

"The chemist Kekule tells, for example, that he had for a long time
unsuccessfully attempted to find a structural formula for the benzol mole-
cule when, during an evening in the year 1865, he found the solution to his
problem while dozing off in front of his fireplace. When he stared into the
flames he thought he saw atoms dance in snake-like formations. Suddenly
the snakes form a ring by gripping their own tails and then twirling deceiv-
ingly before him. Kekule wakes up with a twitch: he had come across the
now famous and well-known idea of representing the molecular structure of
benzol by a hexagonal ring. He spent the rest of the night working out the
consequences of this hypothesis." 4
It may be that similar processes occur among judges, or all human
beings for that matter. However, it is obvious that Kekule's dream could
not have come flying to just anybody, it least not with the implications that
it had. Kekule's knowledge and thinking comprised a necessary context.
Hanson has claimed that there actually is a logical pattern in the context of
discovery. 5 Judicial decision-making is based on both theoretical proposi-
tions and norms such as, e.g., genuine and descriptive judicial propositions.
The idea of a logical pattern is therefore not applicable in exactly the same
way in the judicial decision-making process. However, there are grounds
for making an interesting comparison.
According to Polanyi one could speak of tacit and of focal knowledge. 6
The tacit knowledge exists at the subject which is non-articulated and is a
condition for the utilization of focal knowledge. Tacit knowledge operates
in a given situation as background knowledge. 7 Every discovery process

3
Jan Wolensky, Context of Discovery, Context of Justification, and Analysis of
Judicial Decisions, p. 115 et seq. Reasoning on Legal Reasoning, Aleksander Pecze-
nik and Jyrki Uusitaalo (eds.). Vamala 1979.
4
Carl G. Hempel , Philosophy of Natural Science. Prentice-Hall Inc. 1966, p. 16.
See also Martin P. Golding, Discovery and Justification in Science and Law, p. 295
et seq. Theory of Legal Science, A. Peczenik, L. Lindahl, and B. van Roermund,
(eds.), D. Reidei Pubi. Co. Dortmund/Boston/Lancaster 1984.
5
Hanson, op. cit.
6
See Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge. New York 1964 and the same
author's Knowing and Being (Part Three: Tacit Knowledge). London 1969 as well
as Bertil Rolf, Personlig kunskap och kulturförmedlingens villkor. Forskning och
utbildning 1990: 2, p. 17 et seq.
7
Swedish: "kringvetande." Rolf op.cit.
72 Gunnar Bergholtz

relies on tacit knowledge, states Bertil Rolf, and the mapping of reality is
tacitly compelled from a background of knowledge and proficiency. 8

As regards the judge, Esser has spoken of the judge's "Vorverständnis"

by which is meant the judge's "predispositions, preconceptions, possibly
even intuition or hunch." 9 The judge has acquired this disposition or orien-
tation in various ways, through legal studies and the identification of work-
ing modes of courts. 10 Most important of all is, however, the particular
cases the judge works on. 1 1 Also, language itself conveys specific values,
everyday language as well as technical legal terminology. Other things also
become part of the role as citizen and jurist and is gradually internalized
"so as to become part of the individual's very character." 12 The legal
system's traditional concepts comprise a crystallization of values that prior
generations have acquired and developed as answers to problems - and
they constitute guidelines for the judge. 1 3 There is hardly anything strange
about this. It may well be self-evident that the judge does not approach his
profession as a judicial tabula rasa. The judge is directed by this "Vorver-
ständnis" and can thereby orientate himself in the judicial landscape.14 In
addition to this comes the concrete and specific preliminary work in each
individual case. The judicial thinking in "hard cases" resembles in many
ways the position-taking process in matters of ethics. 15 It can therefore be
enlightening to point to a significant similarity. Prawitz discusses moral and
logical propositions' truthfulness. 16 In this context he means that we often
argue in the same way when we take positions on values and on assertions
of a logical character. Sometimes a principle can determine the particular
result and sometimes a result in a particular case will make us modify a
principle. We strive to achieve a "reflective equilibrium" - a balanced posi-
tion. 1 7 Prawitz' thesis can be compared to what below is called a feed-back

8
Ibid. Cf. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (II Knowing How and Knowing
That, p. 26 et seq.) Penguin Books 1968.
9
V. Lyndel Prott, Updating the Judicial "Hunch": Esser's Concept of Judicial
Predisposition. The American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 26 1978, p. 461
et seq.
10
Ibid., p. 463.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid., p. 465.
14
Cf. Knud Ilium , Some Reflections on the Method of Legal Science and Rea-
soning p. 49 et seq. Scandinavian Studies in Law 1968. Uppsala 1968.
15
Aleksander Peczenik, et al., Juridisk argumentation - en lärobok i allmän rätt-
slära, Lund 1990, p. 58 et seq.
16
Dag Prawitz, Om moraliska och logiska satsers sanning, pp. 144- 155. En
filosofibok tillägnad Anders Wedberg. Stockholm 1978.
17
Ibid., p. 153.
 Rationality and Reasonableness of Judicial Decisions 73

between reasons and decision. A reciprocal action occurs and neither rea-
sons or decisions can be seen as primary or secondary. Because legal think-
ing includes, i.a., norms relating to legal sources and methods, the scope
for modifications of principles is much more limited than in the purely ethi-
cal sphere. I will let it suffice to refer to the court's practical way of work
and the judge's "Vorverständnis" to make probable that also a context of
discovery to a significant degree can be a pursuit of legal knowledge.

V. The Context of Justification

The theoretical judicial equivalence to the context of justification will

relate to the reasons for decision as presented in the written judgment or
opinion. In this context, the issue concerns primarily an examination of the
validity and tenability of the reasons for decision. 18 Issues of justification
and rationality belong according to this terminology to the context of legit-
imation and concern the motivation as a form of justification.
I will here let it suffice with a simplified and summarized analysis. 19
As a concept, justification has two sides; the internal and external. The
internal justification concerns the relationship on the one hand between
legal facts and the legal norm as premises and on the other the decision
and the decision's conclusion. If the conclusion follows from the premises,
the decision is internally justified. E. g., if a plaintiff seeks the legal entitle-
ment to break a purchase of goods contract on the grounds that the goods
are damaged, that particular remedy must, according to Swedish law of
sales, be statutorily allowed and follow from the given facts of the particu-
lar case at hand. In the reasons, the court concludes that the goods are
defective and that the defect constitutes grounds according to the law of
sales to break the contract. One who reads the court's reasons thus sees
that the facts of the case compared with the rules of the applicable statute
as stated in the judgment give rise to the particular remedy. The external
justification concerns the question of the correctness of the norms which
constitute premises for the deduction. Here it may, e.g., be questioned
whether a legal rule relied upon, as interpreted, is applicable. It must thus
be proved that legal part of the premises are good law and that they can
and should be applicable. Here the court ought to explain in the reasons
why the above exemplified rule of the law of sales is applicable. Most

18
Cf. Gunnar Bergholtz, Skäl och orsaker i samband med rättsliga avgöranden.
Tidskrift för rättssociologi 1983/84, p. 277 et seq.
19
See also, e.g., Robert Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation (p. 273 et
seq. 1. Die interne Rechtfertigung, 2. Die externe Rechtfertigung). Frankfurt am
Main 1978.
74 Gunnar Bergholtz

common are references to sources of law such as precedents and travaux

préparatoires. If the premises are deemed acceptable and the decision fol-
lows from them, the decision is both internally and externally justified.
For the sake of clarity, it should also be noted that a justified judgment
is equivalent to a rational judgment.

VI. The Reasons as a Description of the Decision Process

To what extent does the reasoning describe the thought processes of the
judge or his course toward the judgment? It is evident that in a compli-
cated case, e. g., in an appellate court, where the judges may deliberate on
a case for several weeks after a hearing, any introspection of a biographical
nature concerning the context of discovery is neither possible nor desirable.
If the particular judge who is preparing the case for a decision gets stuck,
but one night has a dream in which he gets associations which point out
something relevant for the decision of the case, that mental process ought
not become a part of the reasons of the judgment. The reasons can merely
constitute a result of the mental process. On the other hand, the character
of the practical work of the court as well as the judge's "Vorverständnis"
cause the decision process to occur within the framework of the law.

VII. The Reasons as Justification of the Judgment

Deliberation and the actual writing of a judgment do not as a rule give

rise to discussions of a radically different nature than what is contained in
the reasons. One must consider that the case has been prepared and the
parties have discussed issues in legally relevant terms and the judgment
will also be written in that way. What makes the issue intangible is that
deliberations are secret. It would also be very strange if a judge, entrusted
to prepare the case for decision in a supreme or appellate court, concurrent
with the presentation of a proposed decision and the grounds therefore, did
not reason along the lines expressed in his written preliminary legal find-
ings.
It can obviously occur that the court does not fully explain its reasoning
in the reasons, possibly out of reluctancy to entrench itself in a position
which it subsequently must derogate from in light of a different case. Nor
is it excluded that a bad or incorrect judgment will be written. Such judg-
ments can possibly give the appearance that the reasons so to speak came
afterwards. If judges who work under harsh time limitations, which is cur-
rently the case, pronounce judgment right after the hearing, the case can on
second thought be found to be less well considered and then the reasons
will naturally not be so good.
 Rationality and Reasonableness of Judicial Decisions 75

Lee brings up a couple of cases from England. An important decision in

a case involving schools was of such a character that an answer must
necessarily be given before the start of the school semester, and this
resulted in less than convincing reasons. 20 The actual decision was then
probably not dealt with particularly thoroughly. Lack of time explains,
according to Lee, "the practice of deciding first and explaining later." 2 1
Lord Denning explained his "unguarded statements" in a case by referring
to the fact that the judgment was pronounced ex tempore. 22

In these described situations one might say that the judgments were not
well founded, but that issue could hardly be of principal importance for the
question I am addressing.

Almost all Swedish appellate courts, and in many cases district courts,
pronounce judgment after a certain time. During the time between hearing
and judgment - commonly one to six weeks - various lines of reasoning
and legal findings can be actualized in the process. In the Swedish Parlia-
ment's 1984/85 session, a bill was introduced (concerning non-professional
judges' legal liability) which according to the drafters, i.a., sought to
increase "democracy" in courts. The drafters mentioned two ways to
achieve this aim. Either the recording clerk - through means common in
local governmental bodies - could draw up a decision-report based on the
minutes which then is verified. Another way was considered to be that the
non-professional judges sign the judgment. The various committees that
commented on the bill all rejected - some with very irritated wording - the
drafters' proposals. 23 To verify directly after the hearing, through the min-
utes, the judgment's reasons was considered unworkable considering that
the reasons for the decision must be thoroughly deliberated upon, and that
in some cases, when writing the judgment, it could be necessary to recon-
sider the decision. In those cases, it would apparently not be enough with
the deliberation that has taken place between the professional and non-pro-
fessional judges.
Swedish judges, as well as judges from e.g., the U.S.A., Canada and
France, have borne witness to the fact that the actual writing of the reasons
have caused them to change their opinion of the decision. 24 The American
legal realist and judge Jerome Frank has e.g., stated that:

20
Simon Lee, Judging Judges. London/Boston 1989, p. 42.
21
Ibid., p. 43.
22
Ibid., pp. 43 - 44.
23
JuU 1985/86: 4, p. 3 et seq.
24
Gunnar Bergholtz, Ratio et Auctoritas, Ett komparativrättsligt bidrag till frâgan
om domsmotiveringens betydelse främst i tvistemâl. Lund 1987, pp. 376 - 381.
76 Gunnar Bergholtz

"Often a strong impression that, on the basis of the evidence, the facts
are thus-and-so gives way when it comes to expressing that impression on
paper. So too, a judge inclined to decide a case in a certain way may dis-
cover that his decision won't write." 2 5
Eckhoff and Sundby talk about feed-back in the decision process and
criticize the position that one can in a distinct way differentiate between
reaching a position and justifying i t . 2 6 Furthermore, they mean that one
might "say that at the same time as the premises give cause to the conclu-
sion, it gives cause to the choice and form of the premises." 27 The descrip-
tion above thus has the support of, i.a., statements from judges.

The feed-back between the reasons and the decision per se is, i.a., of
such nature that a solution which does not allow itself to be justified
according to common sense must be discarded. A few words on what then
will be the result must here nonetheless be intercalated - a decision that
appears wholly unreasonable is discarded and reasons are then sought for a
contrary solution. This is surely the choice the court has - to assent or dis-
miss. 28 In such situations it is sometimes stated that the decision "steers"
the reasons. However, the reasons nevertheless exhibit a defense of the
decision, e.g., why a particular rule of law has been modified by the court.
So long as the court fulfills its obligation to state reasons, this does not
constitute a ground for objections. What is at issue is the judgment as a
finished product. During the work with it, hypothetical reasons and findings
may naturally arise, but the sequences of mental processes while working
on the judgment are of no importance as regards the justification of the
result.

VIII. Rational Reasons

The preceding presentation has attempted to show that the practical work
in the courts and the judge's "Vorverständnis" point to a process of discov-
ery that is contained, possibly broadly, within a legal framework neverthe-
less. In that way the judicial decision process is simpler and less creative
than the scientific context of discovery. The work with the judgment more-
over shows that reasons and decision are considered in a reciprocal context.
Reason and decision should exhibit congruency and hence it is the entirety

25
Ibid., p. 379.
26
Torstein Eckhoff, & Nils Kristian Sundby, Rettssystemer. Oslo 1976, pp. 218-
220.
27
Ibid., p. 220 (author's translation).
28
But compare sentencing and choice of sanctions and other cases less of an
either - or alternative. For such cases the discussion should be modified mutatis
mutandis.
 Rationality and Reasonableness of Judicial Decisions 77

that counts. What can come first, "intuitions" or ideas about decision or
motivation, can hardly be unraveled and is of little significance. The pro-
cess of feed-back between motivation and decision indicate that such a line
of inquiry is faulted. However, it could well be a requirement that the judg-
ment, in the precedingly submitted sense, is rational. If reasons and deci-
sion comply with requirements of consistency and coherency, and if the
judgment can be said to be internally and externally justified, the critique
misses the mark.

IX. Some Critical Voices

Strömholm has taken the position that the reasons for decision do not
provide a historically correct account of how the judge comes to the result:
"Worse, it could appear that reasons - which administrators of justice
often clearly state - do not constitute any historically correct accounts of
how a particular result was reached. The 'decision' in a judgment can have
been formulated long before the reasons came into being, and it could be
the result of intuitive considerations and positions, which are not at all
accounted for in the reasons." 29
Strömholm has in another context declared:
"The parties of the case are probably prepared to accept the authority of
the law, but it is harder for them to accept a decision that is based on and
openly states the judge's values. It could lie within easy reach that the
judge attempts to avoid criticism by setting out the path traveled when
reaching the decision as though he all along followed a marked path." 3 0
Strömberg states that a judgment created by subsuming facts under a par-
ticular legal rule can constitute a reversed reasoning. 31 This happens when
the desired decision affects the rule formulation in the justification. Hence
Strömberg concludes "that it finally does not become a question of deduc-
tion but one of a taking a practical position." 3 2 This would then be dis-
guised by dressing it in the cloth of logical deduction. 33 However, one must
remember that Strömberg speaks of the written opinion.
Strömholm's criticism hardly hits any mark. Discussions and thoughts
(i.a., thought processes and dreams) during the actual work with the judg-

29
Stig Strömholm, Rätt, rättskällor och rättstillämpning. Stockholm 1981, p. 358
(author's translation).
30
Stig Strömholm, Allmän rättslära. Stockholm 1987, p. 75 (author's translation).
31
Tore Strömberg, Inledning till den allmänna rättsläran, 7th ed. Lund 1978,
pp. 187 - 188 (author's translation).
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
78 Gunnar Bergholtz

ment can, as earlier mentioned, only to a lesser extent be set out in the
reasons. When Strömholm hence speaks of the parties' deference to the
authority of the law, that must refer to older conditions of society. One
ought also to remember that the parties are usually assisted by legally
trained counsel. Moreover, Strömholm's criticism could also be perceived
as if it were better that the context of discovery replaced the judge's own
control through the actual writing of the judgment.
As to Strömberg, he assails the written reasons. It is surely those,
through incomplete reasoning, that make the impression of reversed reason-
ing. In this regard, one could then agree with Strömberg that a judgment
with incomplete reasons are insufficient as regards rational justification. 34

X. The Sociology of Knowledge Analogy35

It is not very farfetched to think that critique of judgments and judges

often attempts to show that there are reasons or causes behind a judgment
which are not part of what is legally relevant. It could henceforth be appro-
priate to make a comparison with the way of looking at the matter from the
standpoint of sociology of knowledge.
Sociology of knowledge attempts, i.a., to explain "beliefs" as an empiri-
cal problem, e.g., why a scientist holds a particular view. Explanations are
sought "in terms of the social situations of believers." 36 Laudan further
states that an important task for the sociology of knowledge must be to
show the roots and origins of every belief that is sought explained. 37 He
further means that there is a need for a way to identify the situations that
are accessible to a sociological analysis. 38 Evidently tension between ration-
ality and sociological explanation can here arise. Here Laudan makes an
assumption concerning a-rationality (the a-rational assumption) which
requires that sociology of knowledge can explain beliefs if and only if
these apprehensions cannot be explained "in terms of their rational
merit." 3 9 This assumption is a statement of principle concerning method
and does not constitute any metaphysical doctrine. 40 It is not a presupposi-
tion that a belief which can be explained with adequate reasons could not

34
Aleksander Peczenik, On Law and Reason, Kluwer 1989, p. 114 et seq.
35
The following is based on Larry Laudan, Progress and its Problems, Towards
a Theory of Scientific Growth (7 Rationality and the Sociology of Knowledge).
London and Henley 1977.
36
Cf. Bergholtz, supra note 19.
37
Laudan, op. cit., p. 199.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid., p. 201.
4ύ
Ibid.
 Rationality and Reasonableness of Judicial Decisions 79

be socially caused. The weaker assumption is instead made that "whenever

a belief can be explained by adequate reasons, there is no need for, and
little promise in, seeking out an alternative explanation in terms of social
«41
causes.
Greatly simplified, one might say: Seek out social causes first when rea-
sons are lacking or when the reasons do not appear to be rational.
Regarding the judicial decision process, one could hence formulate some-
thing akin: Seek out explanations only in those cases where the judgment
and its reasons do not appear to be rational. According to the previously
asserted definition, a judgment is rational if it is internally and externally
legitimized. 42 In that way the question of decision and reasons would fall
into a perspective that is possible to deal with. Vedung has, regarding the
interpretation of political messages, advanced similar thoughts. He too
builds on the basis of sociology of knowledge. 43 With a certain ideally
typical simplification one might be so bold as to understand Vedung so that
he means that a so called "genetical fallacy deduction" exists if one - as
regards political messages - without exploring whether they can fulfill
rationality criteria, directly explores the conditions of the social origin of
the message, or assumes some other functional perspective. As to "judicial
messages" there are in my view strong reasons to also examine the validity
of these before seeking out an alternative explanation in terms of genesis.
Finally, I conclude by answering the initially posed question as follows:
1. The judge's "Vorverständnis," the nature of the practical work in
courts and the process of feed-back all strongly indicate that the decision in
no clear sense can come before the reasons.
2. If the judgment is rational, the question of different sequences of
mental processes during the time when the judgment is being practically
worked out becomes irrelevant.
3. If the reasons are insufficient or in some other way not rational, the
following, i.a., can be of interest. The wording of the justification is insuf-
ficient and the mode of presentation lacks "logic" (Strömberg). If a logical
deficiency in the mode of presentation exists, that may in turn be due to

41
Ibid., p. 202.
42
See previously cited works of Alexy and Wroblewski, and as regards rationality
criteria in other respects, Aulis Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, A Treatise on
Legal Justification. Dordrecht 1987.
43
Evert Vedung, Det rationella politiska samtalet. Stockholm 1977. See espe-
cially, pp. 113-114 (4.1 Det genetiska felslutet), p. 116 (4.3.1 Mannheims lära om
kunskapens ursprung och giltighet), p. 117 (Leder den kunskapsrelativistiska tesen
till en logisk paradox?) and p. 118 (4.3.3 Kunskapsrelativismen och det genetiska
felslutet).
80 Gunnar Bergholtz

the judges' lack of time or other reasons for their failure. However, from
this does not directly follow that the decision would come before the rea-
sons. Deficiencies in the modes of presentation can, however, be a symp-
tom of something else.
If a judgment is rational despite, e. g., an alleged sociological or other
explanation, one could question whether not the instrument of sociology of
knowledge should be aimed at the person who asserts that explanation. 44
It is a most legitimate scientific task to seek out what actually happens in
that which seems to happen. If that which seems to happen actually is what
happens, the pursuit of that which actually happens becomes a vain search
for the ghost in the machine.

44
Cf. Vedung, op. cit., p. 117.
 CHANGING CONCEPTIONS
OF LEGAL RATIONALITY

By J0rgen Dalberg-Larsen, Ârhus

I. Introduction

Some people maintain that the greatest difference between economics

and sociology is that economists deal with rational acts and sociologists
with irrational acts. But in the words of the Danish sociologist Heine
Andersen, "it is somewhat inadequate to say that sociology has disregarded
the rational aspect; it has, however, firstly treated a rational act as one
course of action out of several ones and secondly in general attempted to
regard rationality as being variable and conditional on history...". 1 In the
following brief sketch of the lines of development in the conception of
legal rationality, I agree with Heine Andersen as far as I also regard the
legal conception of rationality as being variable and conditional on history,
just like Max Weber did.
My main intention is to draw attention to some circular tendencies in this
historical development which I think can also be found when other aspects
of the legal development are examined more closely. 2 These circular ten-
dencies are in striking contrast to the former predominant modern concep-
tion of the development as being a linear process characterized by constant
progress. This idea of progress has been strongly criticized by others, latest
by the postmodernists. This short contribution can thus in a way be
regarded as a defence of a postmodern conception of law, even if I shall
definitely not advocate all the philosophical and legal conceptions of the
postmodernists.

1
Cit. Heine Andersen, Rationalitet, velfaerd og retfaerdighed (Rationality, Wel-
fare, and Justice), Copenhagen 1988, p. 25.
2
See J0rgen Dalberg-Larsen, Lige linjer, cirkler, trekanter eller spiraler i rettens
og samfundets udvikling (Straight Lines, Circles, Triangles, or Spirals in the Evolu-
tion of Law and Society), in: Reflexiv ret, ed. by Asmund Born a.o., Copenhagen
1988, and same, Rettens enhed - en illusion? (Unity of Law - An Illusion?), Co-
penhagen 1994, pp. 101 - 117.

7 FS Aarnio
82 J0rgen Dalberg-Larsen

I I . Two Conceptions of Legal Rationality

Fundamentally, there are at least two completely different ways of char-

acterizing the legal way of thinking as far as its rationality is concerned.
Either of these ways have deep historical roots and occur in numerous
variants. In some periods, one of them has been the predominant way, but
they have often coexisted as two "competing paradigms". 3

According to the first and oldest conception 4 there is no basically funda-

mental difference between legal rationality and rationality within the gen-
eral non-scientific thought and debate on for instance moral questions. In
legal thinking, however, you will probably in some respects be forced to
apply certain arguments - references to generally accepted sources of law
a.o. - in a particular way. But this does not mean that the argumentation
and the legal thought in full are primarily subordinate to special legal cri-
teria of rationality. In this school of thought the jurist is often regarded as a
person who is given the task of arguing as convincingly as possible for his
own conception of how a particular legal problem ought to be solved, and
with this end in view a wide range of arguments can be applied which are
also used when ordinary sensible people discuss for instance moral and
political questions.
Consequently, one of the main points in this way of thinking is the view
that the broad everyday debate is not necessarily less rational than the
debate within for instance the exact natural sciences. The criteria of ratio-
nality are only of a more qualitative and informal nature. 5

The reason why highly formalized criteria of rationality cannot be

applied within legal thinking is - according to the supporters of this school
- certain fundamental features in legal terminology and legal problems.
The legal norms must for instance always be worded in everyday language
in order to be applied to the problems of real life, and new and unpredict-
able situations can arise in society where the existing rules have to be
applied. In these circumstances, very formalized rules for how a jurist
ought to think will result in cutting off law from its primary social func-
tion: to solve the conflicts arising in real life in a way which is comprehen-
sible and acceptable among the population.

In the wording of present theoretical terminology, this means that legal

science in its legal-dogmatic form must be perceived as a hermeneutic

3
As to the situation in the Middle Ages, see Erik Anners , Den europeiske retiens
historié (The History of European Law), Oslo 1983, p. 118.
4
See J0rgen Dalberg-Larsen , "Er der grundlag for en juridisk metodelaere?" (Is
there Basis for a Legal Methodology?), in T.f.R., 1969, pp. 568 - 603.
5
Cf. Aulis Aarnio , The Rational as Reasonable, Dordrecht 1986.
 Changing Conceptions of Legal Rationality 83

science - a branch of knowledge with the function of interpreting law so as

to make it applicable to the problems which occur in the actual life of the
community. In order to understand the special form of rationality of legal
science, it is thus necessary to take a look at the theory of humanistic
sciences and at practical philosophy. One result of such approach will actu-
ally often be that legal thinking and legal dogmatics are found to be accen-
tuated as examples of rational thinking 6 quite distinct from how most scien-
tists (or economists) evaluate what is going on at the faculties of law.

It might be discussed, however, whether the concept "rationality" is well

suited for characterizing the quality of this sort of thinking. Nowadays,
rationality is often perceived as something different and more technical;
thus you might choose instead to speak of the reasonableness or quality of
legal thinking rather than of its rationality when referring to this way of
understanding legal thinking.
According to the other perception, the above view on legal rationality
reflects a regrettable absence of understanding of the basic difference
between rational legal thinking and all other thinking, especially the gen-
eral everyday debate. Perhaps there are certain practical problems of appli-
cation of law which cannot be solved in a completely rational way, but the
core of legal-scientific thinking must be the application of a conception of
rationality which is just as formalized as the one used within classic eco-
nomics or mathematics. Sometimes, this specific legal form of rationality
has been designated the norm-rational form. 7

According to this opinion, legal rationality consists in drawing logically

correct conclusions within a preconstructed, closed and precisely elaborated
system - a system of norms. The task of legal science is here seen either as
working up the available sources of law in such a way that the underlying,
hidden norm structure stands out clearly or laying the groundwork for a
scientifically founded codification of law according to such logical, formal-
istic ideal of style. Having determined the contents of the system of law
according to these lines, you will regard correct logical conclusions to be
the main task of practical jurisprudence. More specifically, you will have to
find the proper rule of law for the concrete situation, to find the correct
legal qualification of a given case, and finally to draw the necessary logical
conclusion in the form of a correct settlement of the case in question.

If you comply with this school, you must perceive legal thinking as
being just as rational as the one to be found within the most exact sciences.

6
See e.g. H. G. Gadamer , Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen 1965.
7
See e.g. Vilhelm Aubert, Rettens sosiale funksjon (The Social Function of
Law), Oslo 1976, pp. 3 1 - 3 2 . The concept norm rationality can also be used in
other (and possibly broader) senses.
7*
84 J0rgen Dalberg-Larsen

On these grounds, you may also argue that legal science is a peculiar cate-
gory of science which does not consider it necessary to ask for assistance
and advice elsewhere, except perhaps within formal logic and mathematics.
Important historical amplifications can be found in rationalistic natural law
and in the conceptual jurisprudence (Begriffsjurisprudenz) of the previous
century; but also nowadays many people consider (to some extent) legal
thinking to be a field where it is particularly important to think in strictly
logical courses.

In this place, I shall not take a definitive position on the question

whether the first or the second conception is the correct one. The respective
schools emphasize widely different aspects of legal thinking, and the differ-
entiation between highly important and less important matters is dissimilar.
On one hand it may be correct to regard a judgment as the conclusion in a
logical syllogism, as happens in the latter school. But at the same time, you
can also hold that legal thinking really develops and manifests its quality
criteria in the processes of thought and argumentation which result in the
proper choice of a specific rule of law as the relevant one and a specific
legal qualification of some social events.

Moreover, the actual character of the positive legal matters will be very
essential to the sensible way of conceiving the character of legal activities
and as such their kind of rationality. There is great difference between the
work of a lawyer and a dogmatist of law in a static and harmonious society
with a detailed and consistently amplified legislation and in a dynamic and
conflictual society with a vague and inconsistent legislation which is based
on a number of mutually contradictory values.

III. Lines of Evolution

The emphasis (in the end of the above passage) of the dependence of
legal thinking on time and place takes us to the subject of this passage, i.e.
an investigation of the changes which consciously or inconsciously have
taken place in the legal ideas of rationality as a result of the social evolu-
tion especially in this century. In this context, special attention should be
paid at three courses of evolution, which will not be treated in detail here:
changes in the social conditions where law has to be applied, modifications
of the form and contents of law, and finally alterations of the tasks of law. 8
As far as the last point is concerned, the most important change seems to
be that law, to a still increasing extent, is used as an instrument in the gen-
eral State regulation on a par with the economic means.

8
See J0rgen Dalberg-Larsen , The Welfare State and Its Law, Berlin 1987.
 Changing Conceptions of Legal Rationality 85

The most pronounced change relates to the increased application of goal-

means views within jurisprudence. You will find a more and more evident
tendency that judicial decisions are not exclusively or primarily evaluated
from the fact that they are formally correct or just in a broad sense of the
word, but from the fact whether they perform the function of making a
contribution to the realization of some specific goal - usually formulated in
the legislation. With this evolution is becomes increasingly more evident
that legal thinking can no longer be regarded as something quite specific
and dissimilar to the thinking within other social sciences, especially eco-
nomics. When the legislation calls for the realization of a given state of
affairs, you must try to live up to these demands in order to obey the
demands of law, whether the aim is to promote the interests of the child or
a more healthy working environment. When such rules have to be obeyed,
it will often be just as useful to study the cost-benefit analyses used within
economics as studying the traditional kind of legal dogmatics.

However, the character of the legal rationality is certainly not changed

all at once as a result of such new demands. Jurists, both lawyers and legal
dogmatists, still have to consider a number of traditional legal points of
view, like for instance legal security, equality, and proportionality. There-
fore, the perception should rather be that new elements have come into
legal thinking and that a shift of emphasis has taken place between the
well-known elements.

You might say that the change towards a goal-means conception men-
tioned above leads legal thinking towards the adoption of well-known and
respected (non-legal) ideas of rationality. However, much public activity of
regulation can hardly be comprehended from such ideals, as it has already
been indicated by several others. In many fields, there are in fact no evi-
dent endeavours to attain the politically given objects. You will rather find
attempts to perform the work so as to make it possible at all to make the
decisions you are charged with in a way which is not criticized too much
by the parties involved. 9 You might call this a new form of rationality,
where the rationality consists in reaching decisions which are acceptable
for all involved parties. Naturally, such "rationality criteria" are especially
developed in fields where representatives of many different interests have
been assembled in order to arrive at the necessary decisions.

The indication of the fact that many, and especially a great number of
very important, decisions are made according to such criteria will obviously
result in considerable disillusionment and attempts at pointing out other and
better ideals of regulation and rationality than those which have been

9
See Ellen Margrethe Basse, Milj0ankenaevnet (The Environmental Appeal
Board), Copenhagen 1987, e.g. pp. 502 - 503.
86 J0rgen Dalberg-Larsen

advanced or practised so far. An example is several variants of the idea of

considering rationality of decisions to be dependent on the quality of the
open, informal discussion which have preceded them. In this context, spe-
cial mention has to be made of Jürgen Habermas' idea of communicative
rationality as a positive alternative to the forms of rationality mentioned
above. Legal rationality, too, can be regarded as a form of communicative
rationality which contrasts with the narrow formal-legal rationality and the
technocratic goal-means rationality as well as with the form of compromise
rationality based on power just mentioned. In this place, I shall only refer
briefly to two modern legal theorists who in different ways have pursued
these thought tracks - i.e. the Norwegian Hans Petter Graver 10 and the
German Günther Teubner. 11

IV. The Circle is Closed

The modern idea of communicative rationality as an ideal, also for legal

thinking, closes the ring. At this rate, we have returned to the old concep-
tion which was mentioned in the beginning of passage 2: that legal ration-
ality must be regarded as being closely bound up with the rationality or
common sense which at best operates as a regulating idea in the everyday
debates on moral and other interhuman questions.
In this short contribution I find it impossible to go into these very com-
plicated questions in depth. But I hope to have illustrated that a jurist - as
distinct from for instance a classic economist - can have different
"rational" theoretical starting points when discussing for instance social
regulation and that it might come into fashion again to be premodern.

10
See Hans Petter Graver, Den juristskapte virkelighet (The Reality Created by
Jurists), Oslo 1986.
11
See Reflexiv ret (Reflexive Law), ed. by Asmund Born a.o., Copenhagen
1988.
 ON HOHFELDIAN LIBERTIES

By Rex Martin, Lawrence

1. One of the views commonly held nowadays as to the character of

rights is often put by saying that rights correlate with duties - meaning
thereby that a right always implies or has attached some closely related
duty of others. 1 There are, I think, serious difficulties in the way of holding
a thesis of correlation in precisely this form.

The most interesting arguments against correlations of this sort derive

from Wesley Hohfeld's classification of rights. On his view a legal right
could be constituted by any one of four elements: by a claim, but also by a
liberty, by a power, or by an immunity. Let me be more specific here. Hoh-
feld identified four basic types of rights, each type having a unique second-
party correlative. For a legal claim right the correlative element is a legal
duty of some second party. Analogously, the legal liberty to do X - which
consists in the absence of any duty on the agent's part to refrain from X -
is matched with other people's lack of a claim that X not be done by the
agent. A legal power to do X consists in a person's legal competence to
perform an act which will create, or at least bring to bear, certain legal
consequences for a second party - and the situation of the second party
constitutes that party's liability (or susceptibility) to this particular power.
Finally, a person's immunity from X is necessarily correlated with a lack of
power on the part of others to do X, and thus the correlative of an immu-
nity is a disability. (Hohfeld, 1964: 36, 39.) The four italicized elements
were thought by Hohfeld to give legal "advantage" (Hohfeld, 1964: 71)
and their correlates legal "disadvantage."

Now, an example developed in terms of Hohfeld's classificatory analysis

might help to indicate the difficulty in the way of the thesis that rights
always correlate with duties. Take the constitutional right of Americans to
free speech. This right does not create an area of free choice by imposing

1
This thesis has deep roots in the philosophical literature on rights and has been
advocated, without commitment to the parallel thesis that duties logically entail
rights, by MacDonald (1946-47), Hart (1955), Mayo (1965), Feinberg (1970,
1973), Sumner (1987: 8, 12, 15 - 17, 35, 36), and Rawls (1971). For a discussion of
Rawls, in particular, on this point see my book Rawls and Rights (Lawrence, Kans.:
University Press of Kansas, 1985), ch. 2, sect. 2.
88 Rex Martin

obligations on others; instead it does so by imposing a normative disability

or lack of authority on Congress. The first amendment "deprives Congress
of the authority ... to enact laws requiring or prohibiting speech of certain
kinds." An attempt by Congress to legislate in this area could presumably
be challenged successfully in court and declared null and void. Thus,
although the right to freedom of speech has a conceptual correlative, "it is
not an obligation; it is a legislative disability. . . . " 2
We are not saying here that Congress has a constitutional duty not to
pass such laws and, hence, that it should not; rather, we are saying that
Congress is constitutionally unable to legislate in this area and, hence, that
it cannot. By analogy, we might say that a person cannot legally contract
two marriages over one and the same stretch of time; for one of the mar-
riages, the second, is necessarily invalid. This says something quite differ-
ent from the injunction that one should not have two same-time marriages,
for this suggests merely that such a course would be legally wrong (and not
that it would be - or would also be - in some sense legally impossible).
Hence, duty and disability are distinct notions in law and some legal rights
imply legal disabilities, not legal duties.

Of course, it may still to be said that Congress has a duty not to make
laws "abridging ... the freedom of speech"; but this particular duty cannot
be fully stated (as I indicated above) without bringing in the notion of a
disability, or "no-power" as Hohfeld called it, nor is it enforceable along
the lines of most duties but requires instead the "sanction" of nullity. There
is considerable bite, then, to the contention that a normative disability or
lack of authority rather than a duty may sometimes be the main correlative
of a given right.
It seems, therefore, that arguments based on the existence of rights of the
sort we have been discussing - immunity rights - are telling against the
view that every right is necessarily connected to a closely related second-
party duty. We can still accept the important point that a right which
doesn't guide anyone's behavior is no right at all; but to do this we should
add that this guidance need not involve a duty - a disability or liability will
do as well in some contexts.

The truth, which the rights-correlate-with-duties thesis skews, is that any

genuine right must involve some significant normative direction of the
behavior of persons other than the holder. It is this truth about normative
direction, crucial to the concept of rights, which I want to endorse in the
present paper. The idea that all rights attach to certain directives for the

2
The two passages quoted are from David Lyons (1970: 5 0 - 5 1 ) . In this inter-
pretation of the constitutional right of free speech Lyons is actually following Hart
closely (see Hart 1961: 242, note to p. 64).
 On Hohfeldian Liberties 89

conduct of others is weaker than the claim that they are necessarily linked
to specific and closely correlated protective duties, but it is, I believe, a
sounder and more defensible notion.
2. There is, however, a serious problem in holding even this weaker
thesis, that all rights involve normative direction of persons other than the
rightholder. For it seems to run up against the authority of Hobbes, one of
the founders of rights theory, and of Hohfeld himself, as we shall see.

In his account of natural rights Hobbes appeared to argue roughly as fol-

lows. A natural right is a liberty; such a right specifies a way of acting that
is rational for anyone in the state of nature and, on reflection, we determine
that it would be rational for persons in such a state to do anything to pre-
serve their own life and substance. Hobbes's account here is specifically
intended to endorse as rational, hence as a natural right, each person's fol-
lowing a policy of first-strike violence. But the conduct of other people
was in no way normatively directed by these liberty rights. True, they had
what Hohfeld would call a no-right (or no-claim) against any exercise of a
natural right, but this amounted simply to saying that others could call on
no duty of the rightholder not to do the thing he or she was doing. But
beyond this there was no positive normative direction that could restrain
their conduct, not even given by such other duties as might exist in a state
of nature. In this respect their responsive conduct towards another's exer-
cise of a liberty right was completely ungoverned normatively: just as the
rightholder could (normatively) do anything that the holder was physically
able to do so all other individuals could in anticipation or in response do
literally anything, presumably in virtue of their natural right. Hence, we
could say for Hobbes that no person - no second party - is afforded any
normative constraint on how that person is supposed to act in virtue of the
natural liberty rights possessed by others. And we conclude, then, that for
Hobbes at least, a right qua right involves, can involve, no normative con-
straint on the behavior of others. For if he had conceived rights differently,
as always involving second-party obligations or directions of some sort, he
would simply have been unable to talk in the way that he did of rights in a
state of nature.
Now, Hobbes stands at the very beginning of the tradition of talking
about rights with which we are concerned in this paper. He wrote at a time
when the concept of rights was actually being molded. The development of
rights theory has tended to go against Hobbes and to side with Locke. For
Locke did see normative direction attached to all rights, even rights in a
state of nature. Thus, on the Lockeian view, rights as rights (and hence as
natural rights or human rights or constitutional rights or civil rights, what
have you) always correlate with some significant normative direction of the
conduct of others (the so-called second parties); and in the absence of such
90 Rex Martin

directives one could not speak of rights. A consensus has developed (as I
suggested at the very beginning of the present paper) that rights have a
normative character and, among other things, have the normative force of
implying (or, if not that, of always being correlated with) significant norma-
tive directions for conduct incumbent on second parties.

It is important to see that the issue we have been briefly considering is

in no way special to Hobbes's thinking about rights. Rather, it applies to
the whole category of Hohfeldian liberty rights (with respect to which
Hobbes's account of natural rights is but an example).

In saying this we should note here that Hohfeld, unlike Hobbes, actually
subscribes to the basic thesis of the consensus, at least formally; for he
does appear to believe that every proper right logically entails some norma-
tive direction for the conduct of second parties (but varying, of course,
from case to case, depending on what kind of right we are concerned with).
Thus, a liberty right implies a "no-right" of others. And a no-right is the
total absence of a claim on the duties of others. Thus, the second party, in
the case of a liberty right, can claim no duty of the rightholder not to do
that action respecting which the holder is said to have a liberty.

One of Hohfeld's classic illustrations of a liberty so conceived is the

right of someone to eat a salad. Here the others at the table can call on no
duty of the rightholder not to eat it. Presumably, they would be unjustified,
then, in simply restraining the eligible eater from proceeding in due course
to eat the salad, or by otherwise making that eating physically impossible.
But, interestingly, Hohfeld specifically denies this. His point here is a
rather technical one. He wants to emphasize that the one thing specified as
certain that these others cannot do is point to a duty, on the rightholder's
part, to forbear eating. Indeed, in Hohfeld's actual example, this is the only
normative direction that relevantly pertains to their conduct. So we are free
to imagine a number of scenarios: thus, the others might feel perfectly free
to put their forks into the rightholder's salad and help themselves to por-
tions of it as the holder nibbles along; or (in the scenario Hohfeld actually
cites) one of them might feel free to grab the bowl away from the right-
holder. 3
I should add that some of the curious features of Hohfeld' s analysis can
be traced back to questions of ownership. However, if we specify that no
one of the people at the table owns the salad or the bowls or the table, and
add that the actual owner has left only a very loose set of rules for behav-

3
For the wonderful salad example, see Hohfeld (1964: 41 -42). Hohfeld took
the example, but added all the interesting refinements on his own, from John C.
Gray's classic The Nature and Sources of the Law (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1909), sect. 48.
 On Hohfeldian Liberties 91

ior at meals and each agrees that each has a liberty right (as Hohfeld under-
stood that term) to eat a bowl of salad, then something very chaotic (rather
like a Hobbesian state of nature - without the mayhem) could result within
the confines (such as they are) provided by a Hohfeldian liberty, given his
emphases.
If this is a paradigm example of a liberty right, such a right is indeed an
odd one. Why so? Not because no normative direction is involved but
because no significant normative direction is involved. If, perhaps, the rele-
vant duty had embraced at least two explicit features in particular - the
Hohfeldian no-claim and a duty of second parties not to interfere directly
with a proper exercise of the liberty (and maybe to restrain themselves in
other ways as well) - that would be all right. But the Hohfeldian correlate
to a liberty right does not require this (and Hohfeld goes out of his way
graphically to point that fact out); rather, only the first of the these direc-
tives on conduct is actually entailed in Hohfeld's view.
It would follow from the analysis I have been developing, then, that
those liberties (in Hohfeld's sense) that provide no significant normative
direction to the conduct of others (in being correlated with mere no-claims,
for example) would be bracketed off from the class of rights. They would
simply be licenses or mere liberties or "privileges," as Hohfeld called them,
but they would not properly be called rights. 4 For rights are protected ways
of acting or of being treated. Or so my analysis is meant to suggest.
3. Can anything more be said in defense of Hohfeld's basic account of
liberties as rights? We might begin this brief reprise on Hohfeld's behalf
by noting a simple fact.
Some liberty rights may be specifically identified by name, and even
spelled out, in a constitutional or legal document (as was the liberty to
travel, which was mentioned in the U.S. Articles of Confederation [1781],
though not in the Constitution [put into effect in 1789]). Here we can
assume that the liberty in question is specifically protected; its exercise is
allowed or even encouraged and people (including governments) are explic-
itly forbidden to interfere directly with any proper exercise of that liberty.
But many liberties, perhaps most liberties, are not like this. For many
liberties, such as the right to dress, or not dress, as one pleases in one's
own living room or to paint one's barn purple, if that's what the individual
wants, or the right to scratch one's left ear (or Hohfeld's right to eat a
salad, from section 2), are not formulated or named in legal rules at all.

4
Indeed, Hohfeld's preferred term here is 'privilege.' See Hohfeld (1964: 36;
also 38 - 50, esp. 42).
92 Rex Martin

Rather, these unspecified liberties are more like authoritative conclusions

drawn on a particular occasion.
One notable feature of these unspecified liberties is that they consist in
the mere absence of any (legal) duty to do or not do that particular thing
- e.g., paint one's barn purple - on the part of the agent, coupled with the
absence of a legal claim on the part of others that it not be done by the
agent (which would imply, of course, that they had no duty to prevent it).
Since such liberties exist in all areas where there is such an absence of
legal inhibition they are apt to be rather numerous. More important, there
may be in most of these cases no duties which specifically protect the par-
ticular liberty in question.
In sum, many determinate liberty rights have the rights character of
being, at least on their face, mere liberties. For both the liberty to do that
thing and the normative direction of others respecting the liberty are wholly
unspecified in law, or largely so. (At the least we can say: their being spe-
cified in law is not a necessary condition of their counting as liberties
under the law.) Since the law makes no explicit statutory (or constitutional)
recognition of the liberty in question (or oftentimes even of the main head-
ings under which it could conveniently be lodged) and affords no protec-
tions per se, we can call these weak liberty rights. Thus, weak liberty rights
(and the fact that they are so prevalent in law) would appear to reinstate
Hohfeld's notion of liberty rights as an authentic "fundamental legal con-
ception."
In particular, competition rights, a special case of liberty rights, are
thought by some to provide a peculiarly strong illustration of the analysis
just given in support of Hohfeldian liberties. So, before I criticize this ana-
lysis, I ' d like to spell out a bit more the support that competition rights are
said to afford.
Such rights of competition occur in many places, often in games. A spe-
cific example might help fix attention. In a baseball game, a runner is at
third base with no outs; a sharp ground ball is hit between second and
short. The runner has a right to run and heads for home. Now the catcher,
guarding home base, has no duty to allow the runner to score. Indeed, the
catcher has a right to try to stop the runner. Thus, the catcher can, if he has
the ball (or, perhaps, even if he is awaiting the throw), stand athwart the
base path and block the runner.

But it is an illusion (I would add) to think that there is, in these cases,
no normative direction at all afforded the competitors in their responses to
the other side. For the catcher cannot stand there at his pleasure, without
the ball or without awaiting the throw on the instant. Why not? Because
the rules of baseball do not allow these things. Although the catcher has no
 On Hohfeldian Liberties 93

liberty-protecting duty specifically correlated with the baserunner's right to

run home and has himself a right to prevent the runner from scoring,
the catcher's conduct towards the baserunner is, nonetheless, normatively
directed by the rules of baseball.
A number of duties, institutional duties, are built into the playing of the
game and these duties govern this case insofar as it comes under the rele-
vant rules. No competition right, in baseball or in any other game, is
wholly free of such constraints.
By the same token, the catcher cannot pull out a gun and shoot the base-
runner. For this would violate not only the rules of the game but also the
laws of the land.
I realize that not every reader will be familiar with my example. Accord-
ingly, it might be helpful simply to state my main point directly here. It is
an error to think that in cases of competition we have a small-scale state of
nature. Competitors should not be imagined as standing toward one
another, on the model of gladiators, wholly bereft of obligations that corre-
late, if only loosely, with each other's right to "win, score, or advance."
There is, in sum, no such thing as a completely uninhibited competition
right, a liberty toward which there is no significant direction afforded
second parties whatsoever. In the case of structured games (like baseball),
normative direction of the players' conduct is provided at two distinct
levels: in the rules of the game, in the laws of the land.
Even in relatively unstructured cases of competition, some of these con-
straints nonetheless apply. Thus, they would apply to two persons both
rushing to pick up an unclaimed five-dollar bill or to people fishing who
are angling for the same trout or to business competitors in a contest to
obtain a contract or to put a new state of the art personal computer on the
market. For no one of them could shoot the other or do unallowed violence
to them. Thus, the laws provide normative direction to the conduct of all
competitors, for all are citizens or subjects of the laws.
So, by attending to what seems the strongest version of Hohfeldian lib-
erty rights - the rights of competition - we reach in the end an interesting
conclusion. There may be no normative direction - of others' conduct -
directly and specifically correlated with a given liberty (a directive
designed to protect that liberty and specified either in the rules of the game
or in law of the land or in both) but there is, nonetheless, significant nor-
mative direction for the conduct of these second parties in the case of all
(or almost all) liberties. For, at a minimum, standing duties designed to
provide security to persons surround the playing of games (such as base-
ball) and other, less-structured forms of competition (recall the example of
two people rushing to pick up the unclaimed banknote) - just as they sur-
94 Rex Martin

round a whole host of situations in life, circumscribing all liberties in the

process. 5
Thus, to go back to an earlier example, standing duties prohibit such
things as trespass and violence against persons or property and effectively
restrain the neighbors, who detest the barn's purple color, from stopping
the owner or from repainting it themselves. These unspecialized, standing
duties - which tell people the sorts of things they cannot do - constitute a
sort of "perimeter" (in Hart's term, 1973: 180- 1) upon which any number
of unspecified liberties could rest for legal support and protection.
In short, such things as dressing as one pleases (in one's own home) or
painting one's barn purple or scratching one's ear can count as legal rights
because they can be seen and officially accredited as special cases of very
general legal categories - like property or privacy. Or, more crucially, they
can count because significant normative direction of the conduct of other
persons toward the liberty in question is provided by standing legal duties,
which are themselves standardly enforceable by governmental action.
Ultimately, as we have seen, the matter is no different with the liberties
of competition (or, as they are often called, competition rights). I do not, of
course, want to say that competition rights are, flat out, legal rights. For
their implication in the network of laws and so on is for the most part a
peripheral one. Under their proper names, so to speak, such liberty rights
are never or only rarely mentioned in law or in judicial proceedings. But
they are legal rights - or, better, they can come to be involved in legally
valid claims and hence count as legal rights - simply insofar as relevant
normative direction is provided by a perimeter of standing legal duties,
duties made effective by the action of government.
Competition rights can be seen to conform, then, in the same way as all
other liberties do, to the general analysis of rights that I set forth in the
very first section of this paper, where it was said that all rights involve
significant normative direction of the conduct of second parties (that is, of

5
The term 'competition rights' is taken from Rawls (1971: 239η). The rules
relevant to the baseball example are rule 2.00 and rule 7.06. The example of com-
petition over an unclaimed bank note is from Hart (1955: 179; see also 1968:
126 - 127, for a related example).
I am indebted to Gerry MacCallum for forcefully bringing the notion of competi-
tion rights to my attention, in an unpublished paper on competition (since pub-
lished, in MacCallum 1993), and for suggesting that such rights pose a challenge to
my account. It is, perhaps, worth mentioning in this regard that if one regards com-
petition rights as liberties and if one means by liberty roughly what MacCallum
meant by freedom (in his essay [1967] on that topic) then such rights will neces-
sarily direct the conduct of others at some point, at the point where it is specified
what the freedom is a freedom from.
 On Hohfeldian Liberties 95

persons other than the rightholder). Absent all such significant direction,
we might still call any one of these a liberty (meaning a mere liberty) but
not a liberty right .
4. Two final points need to be noted in our discussion of Hohfeldian
liberties, for both of them have evoked considerable discussion and criti-
cism. The first is this: for Hohfeld legal rights are radically atomistic. They
always involve a single pair of correlatives (for example, a single specific
liberty matched with a single specific no-claim) that holds between two,
but no more than two, determinate people.6 Second, Hohfeld's conception
of a liberty can usefully be contrasted with what Hart called a "bilateral"
liberty (Hart, 1973, pp. 175 - 6). In the case of a bilateral liberty the agent
is free both to do X and not to do it - that is, there is an absence of any
duty on the agent's part either (1) to do X or (2) to refrain from doing it.
Hohfeld, it will be recalled from sections 1 and 2, meant by a liberty only
part (2), as Hart notes. So we can, following Hart's lead, refer to Hohfeld's
conception of liberties as "unilateral." 7
In this final part of my paper I want to explore more carefully some of
the ramifications of Hohfeld's "unilateral" conception. Let us begin by con-
sidering what appears to be a relatively simple example. The law might
allow people to make right turns at a red light, after stopping; let us sup-
pose, next, that they are sometimes required to do so. Does this make
sense?
On Hohfeld's account it does. If one has in mind what Sumner calls a
"half liberty" (Sumner, 1987: 34), the reasoning would goes as follows.
One has no duty not to do A (that is, where one has a proper Hohfeldian
liberty, one has no duty to refrain); thus, one may do it. But nothing is said
at all as to whether one might have (or not have) a duty to do it (for this is
left open in Hohfeld's account). The governing intuition, then (in the case
of both Hohfeld and Sumner), is that it is not inconsistent to say that one
can have a duty to do what one is permitted to do. Or, in a famous but
shopworn phrase, ought implies can (here the 'can' in question is a norma-
tive one, a permission or "half liberty"). Thus, a Hohfeldian (half) liberty, a
liberty to do A, is compatible with a duty to do it.
I am reluctant to accede to this claim, for I do not fully share the govern-
ing intuition. I think the notion of a bilateral liberty captures an important
insight. Here one is said to have a liberty when one is normatively able
either to do something or not to do it. On this view, then, a requirement

6
For discussion, see Campbell (1997). The term 'no-claim' I have taken from
Carl Wellman.
7
The careful reader may have noted, however, that in section 3, where I was
defending Hohfeld's analysis, the notion of liberty used there was a "bilateral" one.
96 Rex Martin

that an agent do something (say, the action A) would be incompatible with

a "full liberty" (in Sumner's phrase) respecting the doing of A. In short,
where one has a Hartian bilateral liberty (that is, one has no duty to do A
and no duty to not do it), one cannot, logically cannot, be required either to
do or not do the relevant action A.
Are we simply at an impasse here, at loggerheads in our intuitions? Let
us consider a further case or two in point, using this time the notion of a
right, to explore the ground a bit more. In doing so, we would hope to
resolve the impasse, or at least weaken its grip.
Some might find it strange to say that someone has a right which that
person is required to exercise. One might even urge that these two notions,
of having a right and of being required to exercise it, are incompatible.
But we are in fact familiar with rights whose exercise is required. The
right to an (elementary) education is one example. In many modern socie-
ties schooling - education in that sense - is thought to be a right of chil-
dren and its exercise is required. Indeed, the UN's Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948) couples these two ideas closely when it says,
"Everyone has the right to education. ... Elementary education shall be
compulsory" (article 26). It might be contended in response that it is the
parents, not the child, who are being compelled here. But this rejoinder
seems rather hollow when we consider that the school-leaving age in many
societies is as high as sixteen. The requirement would seem to be on the
child or teenager as well as on the parents. In any event, there are other
examples.
The right to vote is one whose exercise is required, in some contem-
porary societies (e.g., Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica), without losing the
name of right. In some countries the requirement is even enforced, with a
fine for those who do not vote.
It is difficult, of course, to regard a right to a liberty of action as a right
that one is required to exercise. Here there may be a genuine incompatibil-
ity. But the right to vote need not be construed as of precisely this nature.
The right to vote involves, admittedly, something that the rightholder does
or can do but, where it is required (as it is in some countries), it is a right,
though clearly not a right to a liberty of conduct. We might, then, prefer to
call such a right a power or a competence, rather than a liberty.
Some rights are not rights to a way of acting at all; rather, they are rights to
a way of being treated (at the hands of others). Such rights may concern the
avoidance of injury at the hands of others (e.g., the injury of torture) or con-
cern the receipt of beneficial services (e.g., an education, medical care, or
social service benefits). And among rights of these two kinds (avoidances of
injury, receipt of services) we may find' some that are compulsory with
respect to the rightholder. Education, I have already suggested, is one such.
 On Hohfeldian Liberties 97

Clearly, then, there is no incompatibility in being required to receive a

service that one has a right to or in being required to avoid an injury, like the
injury of torture, where one is said to have a right to such avoidance. (By
required to avoid here, I have in mind the simple claim that one could never
be allowed to waive the right in question, the right not to be tortured.)
The long and the short of my argument, then, is this. If we have in mind
a right to a liberty of conduct, we typically or paradigmatically have in
view a "full" or "bilateral" liberty; and the notion of liberty here resists the
idea of a duty or requirement so to act.
Where requirements are imposed on conduct that the agent has a right to
perform (as in the case of the right to vote) we describe the conduct dif-
ferently, not as a liberty, but as an exercise of a power (or a legal com-
petence). A similar device could be employed with our earlier example of
making right turns "on a red."
Where such turns are required, one is said to have right to make such
turns, but not a liberty. One could even say, in such cases, that one is per-
mitted to make right turns at a red light (or that one has the privilege so to
act); one could add, then, that one is normally permitted to make such
turns but here one is required to do so. But if one were always required, on
each and every occasion, it would strain language (and ordinary understand-
ing) to describe this as a permission (or as a privilege), let alone a liberty.
Nonetheless, I must concede that it would not be logically contradictory
to say that one is permitted to do that which one is required to do - though
I hope I ' m permitted to add that this is a simple and obvious (and for-
tunate) matter of consistency in law and not a deep truth about liberties
(even legal ones). It serves to establish that we are in a deontic system and
not in Alice's Wonderland.
But it would, I repeat, be overstraining the point to say that one has a
liberty to do A where one is required to do it. The turn to the language of
rights (which Hohfeld himself was exploring with his "fundamental legal
conceptions") serves to bring this out: we would not say that one has legal
right to a liberty of conduct respecting the doing of A where one is legally
required to do it.
There is, however, one thing that could not be said under either of the
main headings we have introduced, be it that of "full" liberty or only
"half." A person could not say that one has "a moral right to do A and still
have a moral duty to not do A " (contrary to the author of the passage just
cited). 8 For this is inconsistent not only with a full liberty but even with a

8
Rainbolt (1993: 105) says this thing. The context of Rainbolt's passage, as
quoted here, is provided in the following example: a member of the Ku Klux Klan
(a virulently racist organization) is on the ballot in Rainbolt's state.

8 FS Aarnio
98 Rex Martin

Hohfeldian half one. It is equivalent to saying, in the Hohfeldian context,

that one has no duty to refrain from doing A, on the one hand, and that one
has a duty not to do it (a duty to refrain from doing it), on the other. And
these claims are logically incompatible. 9

References

Campbell, Kenneth (1997): "The Variety of Rights," in R. Martin and G. Spren-

ger. Editors. Rights. ARSP Beiheft volume 67. Proceedings of the IVR World
Congress, Bologna 1995. Stuttgart, Germany: F. Steiner, pp. 2 2 - 2 9 . - Feinberg,
Joel (1970): "The Nature and Value of Rights," Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 4,
pp. 243-257. - Feinberg, Joel (1973): Social Philosophy. Foundations of Philo-
sophy Series. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Esp. ch. 4. - Hart, Herbert
L. A. (1955): "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review, vol. 64,
pp. 175 - 191. - Hart, Herbert L. A. (1961): The Concept of Law. Oxford: Claren-
don Press. - Hart, Herbert L. A. (1968): Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in
the Philosophy of Law. New York, N Y : Oxford University Press. - Hart, Herbert
L. A. (1973): "Bentham on Legal Rights," pp. 171-201 in A. W. Simpson. Editor.
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. 2d Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Reprinted,
unchanged, as ch. 7, pp. 162 - 193 in H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in
Jurisprudence and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.) - Hoh-
feld, Wesley N. (1964): Fundamental Legal Conceptions. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press. (The two papers printed under the above title first appeared as
articles in the Yale Law Journal, one in vol. 23 [1913], pp. 16 - 59, and the other in
vol. 26 [1917], pp. 710-770. Subsequent to Hohfeld's untimely death in 1918 the
articles were reprinted, with manuscript changes by the author, in a single book by
Yale University Press, 1919, edited and with an introduction by Walter W. Cook.
This book has been reprinted twice: once in 1923 and again in 1964, in the latter
case with an additional foreword [by Arthur L. Corbin].) - Lyons, David (1970):
"The Correlativity of Rights and Duties," Nous, vol. 4, pp. 45 -55. - MacCallum,
G. C. (1967): "Negative and Positive Freedom," Philosophical Review, vol. 76,
pp. 312 - 334. (Reprinted, with revisions, in MacCallum 1993.) - MacCallum, G. C.
(1993): Legislative Intent, and Other Essays on Law, Politics and Morality. Mark
Singer and Rex Martin. Editors. Madison, W I : University of Wisconsin Press. The
essay on competition is found on pp. 203-223. - MacDonald, Margaret (1946-

I could readily make sense of the contested passage here if Rainbolt had said:
one can have a legal liberty right to do A and still have a moral duty to not do it.
So, to make sense of the alleged right in the passage quoted, Rainbolt will have to
take the path just suggested or, failing that, to deny that the right is to be under-
stood as a liberty right at all. He appears to do the latter (pp. 105 - 6), but the move
is not convincing.
9
I have used earlier writings of my own, sometimes verbatim, as sources of the
present paper. Thus, one source of section 1 is "Recent Work on the Concept of
Rights," with James W. Nickel (co-author), American Philosophical Quarterly 17
(1980), 165-80, esp. pp. 165-7. And for sections 2 - 4 1 have used, as sources,
chs. 2, 3, and 11 of my book A System of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993, in paperback 1997).
 On Hohfeldian Liberties 99

47): "Natural Rights," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 47, pp. 225 -
250. - Mayo , Bernard (1965): Symposium on "Human Rights," II, Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, vol. 39, pp. 219 - 236. - Rainbolt,
George (1993): "Rights as Normative Constraints on Others," Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research, vol. 53, pp. 93 - 111. - Rawls, John (1971): A Theory of
Justice. Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press. - Sumner, L. Wayne (1987):
The Moral Foundation of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 IS IT RATIONAL TO BE RATIONAL?

By Ilkka Niiniluoto, Helsinki

I. Introduction

The concept of rationality is a key to Aulis Aarnio's theory of legal

justification, as exposed in his most important treatise The Rational as Rea-
sonable (1987). In opposition to "realistic" approaches, which take the
search and identification of true norm propositions to be one of the impor-
tant tasks of legal dogmatics (see Niiniluoto, 1985, 1991a), Aarnio argues
that the goal of legal dogmatics is to maximize rational acceptability , i.e.,
it ought "to attempt to reach such legal interpretations that could secure the
support of the majority in a rationally reasoning legal community" (p. 227).
For this purpose, Aarnio devotes careful attention to logical and discursive
rationality principles concerning the procedures of legal interpretation and
justification.
Aarnio suggests quite convincingly that, in the theory of legal inter-
pretation, one must combine the "how" and the "why" (p. xiv). Given
the nature of Aarnio's treatment, this leads directly to two general ques-
tions: How can the law be rational? Why should the law be rational?
These questions can be abstracted from the legal context to other social
institutions and to human life, thinking, and action - eventually to the
general philosophical queries: What is rationality? Why should we be
rational ?
In this paper, I consider only briefly the first question by distinguishing
three aspects of rationality in Section 3. Then I shall use, in Section 4,
these three notions to give nine reformulations of the puzzling question 'Is
it rational to be rational?' (cf. Section 2). My main task is in the analysis
of the relevant questions, not in their answers. I hope this approach helps
us to understand in a clearer way the nature and importance of human
rationality, but the possible applications to the theory of law can only be
sketched in Section 5.
102 Ilkka Niiniluoto

II. The Rationality of Rationality: A Puzzling Question

Why be rational? It is tempting to offer the straightforward reply:

because it is rational! But isn't this merely a trivial tautology? Black is
black, and rationality is rational. Indeed, the question
(Q) Is it rational to be rational?
sounds so strange that must be philosophical - and perhaps one that should
be eliminated or dissolved as a pseudo-problem.
An argument along these lines has been put forward in connection with
Hume's problem of induction. G. H. von Wright (1957) argues that the
rationality of induction is a "disguised tautology", since "the inductive
character of a policy is the very criterion by means of which we judge its
goodness" (p. 175). Hence, the impossibility of justifying induction in some
stronger sense is "grammatical" and again "a disguised tautology" (p. 178).
Peter Strawson (1952) claims that the rationality of induction is a matter of
what we mean by the word 'rational': there is not much point in asking
whether it is reasonable to place reliance on inductive procedures, since in
such contexts 'being reasonable' means that convictions are proportioned to
the strength of inductive evidence. To ask for a justification of induction in
general is, according to Strawson, like asking the question: Is the law
legal? While a particular action may be legal relative to a system of law,
"it makes no sense to inquire in general whether the law of the land, the
legal system as a whole, is or is not legal. For to what legal standards are
we appealing?".
Still, it is well-known that the surface form of a statement does not
always reveal its hidden structure. For example, the statement 'Boys are
boys' has a non-tautological reading, as the same words may have different
meanings even within one sentence. Similarly, questions which have the
same form as (Q), e.g., 'Is it happy to be happy?' and 'Is it fun to be
funny?' may be perfectly legitimate, as the tokens of same words may be
associated with different criteria. Being funny for others can be sad for
oneself, as witnessed by many tired and tragic clowns and comediens.
In the next section, I shall propose three basic meanings of the term
'rationality'. This allows us to distinguish several interesting readings of
the question (Q).

III. Three Notions of Rationality

The English word rational comes from the Latin ratio , which means the
faculty of reason. The verb 'to reason' refers to the process of thinking or
'reasoning', and 'reason' is also a ground presented in favour of the conclu-
 Is it Rational to be Rational? 103

sion of an argument. A reasonable person is one who is guided by reason

or appropriately moved by reason (cf. Siegel, 1988).

The Greek terms for theoretical reason (thinking) were nuus and logos ,
and for practical reason (deliberation) phronesis. When Aristotle gave his
famous definition of man as "a rational animal", descriptively he was
asserting that the essence of man as a species is the faculty of reason. Nor-
matively he implied that man ought to be rational or reasonable in the
sense of being guided by reason, i.e., men ought to think and act in accord-
ance with the rational principles of logos and phronesis.

It would be naive to assume that human beings always and everywhere,

by their intrinsic nature, are moved by reasons. This illusion of intellectual-
istic psychology, which simply equates descriptive and normative rational-
ity (cf. Elster, 1988), has been refuted both by classical philosophers
(David Hume, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche) and modern psy-
chologists (from Sigmund Freud to Amos Tversky). However, already Plato
and Aristotle knew that the only chance of making the normative standards
of reason into descriptive patterns of rational human behaviour is by educa-
tion (Gr. paideia). This is the grand idea of the Enlightenment, expressed
by Immanuel Kant in his slogan Sapere aude!, and continued today by the
teaching of critical thinking (cf. Siegel, 1988). These educational pro-
grammes aim at enlargening the domain of human freedom in the sense of
self-determination: as von Wright (1994) suggests, an action can be called
free if there is a reason for it.

The opposite to rational is irrational or anti-rational which is in conflict

or contradiction with reason. Beyond the two opposites there is the neutral
area of arationality or non-rationality, where the distinction between
rational and irrational is irrelevant. It would be unrealistic and too strained
to demand that we ought to maximize our rationality in all of our affairs:
there is a domain of arational everyday thoughts and actions, such as
impulsive playful behaviour and expressions of emotions (e.g., I let my
mind play with an idea in daydreaming, I whistle while walking and in
passing rumple my wife's hair), where the question about rationality does
not, or need not, arise at all (see Hursthouse, 1991).

Nicholas Rescher (1988) states that "rationality consists in the intelligent

pursuit of appropriate ends", "deliberately doing the best one can with the
means at one's disposal". Thus, rationality is systematic use of reason to
give grounds for beliefs, actions, and values. For Rescher, the three forms
of rationality are "cognitive" (What to believe or accept?), "practical"
(What to do or perform?), and "evaluative" (What to prefer or prize?). I
shall use a similar three-fold division in this paper.
104 Ilkka Niiniluoto

First, cognitive rationality (or C-rationality) concerns human beliefs and

knowledge claims. Plato's classical definition equates knowledge with justi-
fied true beliefs. The standards for rational beliefs about the world (includ-
ing nature, mind, society, and culture) are studied in epistemology. Rational
belief systems (such as scientific theories and world views) are studied in
the philosophy of science. Rational changes of belief by means of inference
are investigated in logic. Thus, logical rationality (Aarnio's L-rationality) is
a part of cognitive rationality.
Secondly, instrumental rationality (or I-rationality) concerns the use of
effective or optimal means for realizing the given goals. The appropriate
relationship between means and ends is the basic idea of Max Weber's
Zweckrationalität. The key concepts in this field include effectivity, effi-
ciency, utility, instrumental goodness, technical norm, and practical syllo-
gism. Instrumental rationality is studied in decision theory, game theory,
utility theory, management, operations research, praxeology, action theory,
planning theories, and the various branches of technology and applied
research.
Thirdly, value rationality (or V-rationality) concerns the appraisal of the
goals of human action. If we ask, whether a goal is realizable by available
means or useful for some further purpose, we are still within the domain of
instrumental rationality. But if we ask, whether the goal as such is intrinsi-
cally valuable, not only accessible or instrumentally valuable, we come to
Weber's Wertrationalität. The study of value rationality in this sense
belongs to value theory and ethics.
Classical utilitarianism assumed that happiness is the ultimate goal of
human life, and then evaluated particular acts by their instrumental effectiv-
ity in promoting this goal. A larger domain of intrinsic values can be
included in those theories of ethics that are based on the ideas of virtues,
rights, and duties. V-rationality is also defended by theories which assume
value realism (Plato) or objectivism (Kant, Chaim Perelman, Jürgen Haber-
mas). Radical relativism, which takes values to be merely expressions of
personal wants and emotions or social interests, does not leave room for
value rationality. However, moderate value relativism, which sees values as
social constructions, does not exclude the possibility and even necessity of
rational discussion of values (see Aarnio, 1987; Niiniluoto, 1991b).
Habermas (1981) has attempted to unify cognitive and value rationality
in his discursive approach to epistemology and ethics. I am sceptical about
the possibility of justifying the validity of values and norms by means of
an ideal communication situation. For factual truth, the consensus theory is
clearly insufficient, as it does not contain non-discursive rules for the
causal interaction between the investigator and external reality. Such a
causal interaction between the scientific community and the "real things"
 Is it Rational to be Rational? 105

was a crucial element of Charles Peirce's characterization of truth as the

limit of inquiry (cf. Niiniluoto, 1984).
In English discussions, a distinction is often made between 'rational' and
'reasonable' (cf. Perelman, 1979). It seems that often 'rational' refers to
what I have called instrumental rationality, while 'reasonable' refers to the
nature of the goals and thereby to value rationality (cf. von Wright, 1994).
It is important to emphasize, though, that the distinction between means
and ends is not absolute. In evaluating a particular human act, we may ask
about its instrumental rationality by investigating the link between its
means and intended end, but also its links to unintended consequences (i.e.,
the so-called side effects). The intended end may be instrumentally rational
for some further purpose. Moreover, we may evaluate both the end and the
means for their value rationality.
In environmental philosophy and business ethics, we frequently encoun-
ter situations where the demands of I- and V-rationality are in conflict,
since the most effective means for some end are morally harmful. The con-
flicts between science and religion (e.g., Darwin's theory of evolution) also
show that C-rationality may lead to results which challenge socially
accepted doctrines of V-rationality.
Rescher (1988) argues that cognitive, practical, and evaluative rationality
are "inseparably intertwined". I agree that the three types of rationality may
support each other, but there are also potential conflicts between them. This
gives a special flavour to the analysis of the question (Q).

IV. Is it Rational to be Rational?: Nine Questions

The distinction between cognitive (C), intrumental (I), and value (V)
rationality gives us a method of reformulating the question (Q), 'Is it
rational to be rational?', in nine different ways, obtained by replacing the
first and second occurrences of 'rational', respectively, by C, I, or V. Brief
comments on each of the questions are given below.

( Q l ) Is it C-rational to be C-rational?
Comment: It has been often claimed, by Michael Polanyi for example,
that the method of critical doubt cannot be justified by non-dogmatic doubt,
but only by faith. Therefore, it is argued, the adoption of a rational scien-
tific world view cannot itself be a rational choice, but has to be based upon
faith. Now it is of course possible that someone uncritically assumes or
accepts science as the only rational world outlook, which is expected to
give final solutions to all cognitive problems. In this sense, "scientism" can
be an irrational or religious position. But still Polanyi's claim is incorrect,
106 Ilkka Niiniluoto

as argued by William W. Bartley, I I I (see Radnitzsky and Bartley, 1987).

Not only the scientific world view at any moment, but also the method of
science is always open to criticism and improvement. The scientific method
should not be adopted in a dogmatic way, but as a cognitive procedure
which can be critically studied and revised.

(Q2) Is it I-rational to be C-rational?

Comment: It is an important idea of William James' pragmatism that
"truth pays". If cognitive rationality increases our chances of finding the
truth, then it also improves our chances of practical success in instrumental
action. This is also Rescher's rationale of rationality, although (as a fallibil-
ist methodological pragmatist) he points out that practical success cannot
be proved in a strict sense: at best it can be claimed that "the counsel of
reason represents the most promising prospect of realizing our objectives"
(p. 33). Siegel (1988) argues that our possession of knowledge helps to pro-
tect us from manipulation. It may be added that rational and public meth-
ods of knowledge formation save us from the various kinds of miseries
(persecutions, fights, wars) that result from dogmatic and irrational belief
systems.

(Q3) Is it V-rational to be C-rational?

Comment: This is Aristotle's thesis that good and valuable human life is
life with reason. It expresses the core of the commitment of the Enlighten-
ment ethics. Siegel (1988) defends this view by suggesting that C-rational-
ity is constitutive of the respect for persons and the preparation for adult-
hood and democratic forms of life.

(Q4) Is it C-rational to be I-rational?

Comment: This is the basic idea of Francis Bacon's programme of the
scientification of technology: instrumental rationality presupposes cognitive
rationality, since the links between means and ends have to be established
by scientific research. Applied science is the result of this insight (see
Niiniluoto, 1993).

(Q5) Is it I-rational to be I-rational?

Comment: The answer is trivially yes in many cases, but not always.
Instrumental rationality may be understood in different ways relative to var-
ious criteria. For example, it is known from technology assessment (TA)
that a tool or a procedure may be effective relative to its intended use, and
also efficient relative to economic considerations, but still harmful for e c o -
nomical, ecological, and social purposes (cf. Niiniluoto, 1990). Indeed,
many central institutions of instrumental rationality (e.g., economic and
 Is it Rational to be Rational? 107

urban planning, bureaucratic administration) can be critized for being too

narrow and one-sided, and thus failing to be sufficiently I-rational.

(Q6) Is it V-rational to be I-rational?

Comment: An unqualified positive answer is given by the technocratic
ideology, which limits the domain of rationality to I-rationality, and simi-
larly by those who take money to be an intrinsic value. This view has been
effectively criticized by the Frankfurt School. According to Max Horkhei-
mer (1974), "man's urge to dominate nature" is the "disease of reason"
(p. 176), and "denunciation of what is currently called reason is the great-
est service reason can render" (p. 187). These formulations seem to sug-
gest, in spite of Horkheimer's demand that the two concepts of reason (i.e.,
I and V) should be "reconsiliated" (p. 174), that I-rationality as such is
something to be rejected. In my view, I-rationality is dangerous when com-
bined with V-irrational ends (e.g., nuclear weapons). I agree with Rescher
(1988) that, when the goals are appropriate, it is for us an important respon-
sibility to attune the means to the ends. For example, we should rationally
prefer that medical treatments of diseases are instrumentally effective (and
tested by critical scientific methods).

(Q7) Is it C-rational to be V-rational?

Comment: This is the thesis of rationalistic ethics, from Plato (virtue is
knowledge) to Perelman (universal audience) and Habermas (discourse
ethics). Even for a moderate moral relativist, knowledge is relevant to the
rational discussion of values, but appraisals of goals are not reducible to
purely cognitive considerations.

(Q8) Is it I-rational to be V-rational?

Comment: It may be sometimes, but surely not always. A positive exam-
ple is provided by products (e.g., leadless gas) which satisfy our ecological
values and at the same time, due to their prize and demand, are useful and
profitable both for the producer and the consumer. But in many cases deep
commitments to intrinsic values (e.g., to one's occupation, country, or god)
are held even at the risk of one's health and life.

(Q9) Is it V-rational to be V-rational?

Comment: This is denied by the opportunist and situationist ethical
views: intrinsic value commitments are not needed anywhere, and each
conflict is solved as a power struggle between the interested parties. But
those who subscribe to some principles of V-rationality usually accept the
meta-statement that it is good to have intrinsic values, even when they are
not instrumentally useful (cf. Q8).
108 Ilkka Niiniluoto

V. Concluding Remarks: Rationality and Law

It is reasonable to be rational, and rational to be reasonable, with some

important qualifications. I think Aulis Aarnio will agree with this general
conclusion from Section 4. More specifically, a similar rationale can be
given for rationality and reason in law. However, there is still room for
debate on the ways in which rationality enters the juridical processes.

A special meaning to the distinction between 'rational' and 'reasonable'

in the context of law has been given by Perelman (1979): the rational in
law corresponds "to the spirit of the system, to logic and coherence, to con-
formity with precedents, to purposefulness", whereas the reasonable in law
characterizes a decision that is acceptable by public opinion and has
socially useful consequences (p. 121).
For Aarnio (1988), the law should be both rational and reasonable.
Besides logical principles of L-rationality, he follows Robert Alexy in
applying discursive rules of "D-rationality" in his theory of legal justifica-
tion. And he combines this approach with moderate value relativism by
requiring the acceptability of legal interpretations in a maximally large ra-
tionally reasoning legal community. This condition is intended to guarantee
the respect for democracy and societal relevance.
In.Aarnio's highly interesting construction, the rational audience is ideal
and particular at the same time. One way of understanding this suggestion
would be to assume that the members of the audience are working behind
the Rawlsian veil of ignorance about their position in the society. Maybe
this is implied by the principle of generalizability (p. 198). But then one
may wonder in which sense this ideal audience has relevance to real-life
"socially and culturally determined" societies (p. 225), where the members
are rationally protecting their personal and class interests.

Suppose that a legal scholar is working in a society, not much unlike our
present Western world, where the majority of citizens or lawyers support
the libertarian credo of selfish and unlimited competition in the "free
market", and are willing to argue rationally from the value premises of
their form of life. Would the scholar, if he or she shares Aarnio's intuitions
about moral responsibility (p. xvi), be inclined to maximize rational con-
sensus in that society?

Aarnio points out, against my definition of validity, that the actual accept-
ance of legal norms is often random, and based on non-rational persuasion,
force, manipulation, and error. I think this is correct: the systems of law
that have existed in different societies have been arbitrary and defective in
many respects (cf. Niiniluoto, 1991a). Existing legal systems are not ide-
ally rational or reasonable. It is a task of legal dogmatics to improve such
 Is it Rational to be Rational? 109

systems - by reinterpreting the law and proposing changes to it. But, in my

view, to define validity in terms of hypothetical rational acceptability (cf.
Aarnio, 1989) is too wide: for example, there are certainly many rational
laws about environment and bioethics which no one has yet thought about,
but which would be accepted if someone proposed them. It is also too
narrow in such cases where the legal scholar has to acknowledge sources of
law (e.g., statutes and precedents accepted in his community) that he does
not regard as reasonable.
Niemi (1996) has recently defended the requirement of rational accept-
ability by claiming that actual acceptance as a criterion of legal validity
would transform legal dogmatics into legal sociology. This argument over-
looks my distinction between two notions: a norm is valid! if it is accepted
as lawful by the legal community on the basis of appropriate sources, and
valid 2 if it is a consequence of valid ι norms (see Niiniluoto, 1985). Actual
acceptance is required only of validity!, and validity 2 is something to
which the legal community is committed.
In this picture, rationality principles enter at many stages. However, in
the realist's view, purely discursive principles of rationality are not suffi-
cient to link a system of law to a real-life community where it is valid.
Identification of the sources of law requires cognitive rationality. Legal
argumentation for validi norms, and the derivation of valid 2 norms from
validi ones, employs cognitively rational logical principles, instrumentally
rational considerations of the social relevance of alternative interpretations
of the law, and value rational considerations of desirable social states of
affairs.

Bibliography

Aarnio , Α.: The Rational as Reasonable: A Treatise on Legal Justification, D.

Reidel, Dordrecht, 1987. - Aarnio, Α.: Laintulkinnan teoria, WSOY, Porvoo, 1989.
- Elster, J.: 'Rationality', in G. Flöistad (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 2,
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1988, pp. I l l - 131. - Habermas, J.: Theorie des kommunika-
tiven Handelns. I - II, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1981. - Horkheimer, M.:
Eclipse of Reason, Continuum, New York, 1974. - Hursthouse, R.: 'Arational
Actions', The Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991), 57 - 67. - Niemi, Μ . I.: Päämäärien
valtakunta (The Kingdom of Ends), Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, Helsinki, 1996.
- Niiniluoto, I.: Is Science Progressive?, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984. - Niiniluoto,
I.: 'Truth and Legal Norms', in N. MacCormick et al. (eds.), Conditions of Validity
and Cognition in Modern Legal Thought, ARSP Beiheft Nr. 25, Franz Steiner
Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1985, pp. 168 - 190. - Niiniluoto, I.: 'Should Technological
Imperatives be Obeyed?', International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4
(1990), 181 - 189. - Niiniluoto, I.: 'Norm Propositions Defended', Ratio Juris 4
(1991), 367 - 373.(a) - Niiniluoto, I.: 'What's Wrong With Relativism?', Science
Studies 4:2 (1991), 17 - 24.(b) - Niiniluoto, I.: 'The A i m and Structure of Applied
110 Ilkka Niiniluoto

Science', Erkenntnis 38 (1993), 1 - 2 1 . - Perelman, C.: 'The Rational and the Rea-
sonable', in The New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays in Rhetoric and its
Applications, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979, pp. 117- 123. - Radnitzky, G. and Bart-
ley, W. W. I I I (Eds.), Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of
Knowledge, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1987. - Rescher, N.: Rationality, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1988. - Siegel, H.: Educating Reason: Rationality, Think-
ing, and Education, Routledge, London, 1988. - Strawson, P.: Introduction to Logi-
cal Theory, Methuen, London, 1952. - von Wright, G. H.: The Logical Problem of
Induction, Blackwell, Oxford, 1957. - von Wright, G. H.: Normen, Werte und
Handlungen, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1994.
 DIE RATIONALITÄT EINER SOZIO-AXIOLOGISCHEN
KONZEPTION DES RECHTS

Von Valentin Petev, Münster

In der gegenwärtigen Debatte über die Regelungsmöglichkeiten und die

Funktionen des Rechts in der komplexen (postmodernen) westlichen Gesell-
schaft wird immer wieder deutlich, wie wichtig es ist, über ein ausgereiftes
Konzept des Rechts der Gegenwart zu verfügen. Die Kritik, die von ver-
schiedener Seite am Recht der offenen, pluralistischen Gesellschaft geübt
wird, geht so weit, daß sie dem Recht die Kompetenz und die Fähigkeit
abspricht, in einer deliberativen Politik die sozialen Beziehungen substan-
ziell zu regeln. Die Vorstellungen von den „Grenzen" des Rechts und die
damit zusammenhängende Idee einer „Deregulierung", und das heißt einer
Zurückdrängung rechtlicher Regelung sozialer Verhältnisse, haben Raum
für verschiedene theoretische Ansätze geschaffen, mit denen das Recht der
Gegenwart erfaßt, erklärt und auf ein neues Maß festgelegt werden soll.
Dies sind z.B. die institutionalistischen, systemischen (autopoietischen),
prozeduralistischen und diskursiven theoretischen Modelle, die den
Anspruch erheben, eine adäquatere Konzeption des „postregulativen"
Rechts (responsive law) darzustellen. Weil aber nicht zu erwarten ist, daß
die westliche, komplexe Gesellschaft durch Regelungen, die spontan in der
gesellschaftlichen Interaktion entstehen, ihre Angelegenheit regeln wird,
sind alle Bemühungen um ein gesellschaftliches Regelungskonzept mit den
Mitteln des Rechts zu begrüßen. Die Fülle der bereits bestehenden Theo-
rieansätze unterstützt die Vermutung der Notwendigkeit, sie zu einer stim-
migen Gesamtkonzeption des Rechts der offenen Gesellschaft zusammenzu-
führen.
Das Recht wird im 21. Jahrhundert sicher in verschiedener Hinsicht
anders sein als das Recht unserer Gegenwart. Seine Quellen werden sich
jedenfalls verändern. Die politische Autorität, die hinter einem jeden
Rechtssystem steht, wird sicher nicht mehr der Nationalstaat und vielleicht
überhaupt nicht ein Staat im heutigen Verständnis sein. Lokale, regionale
und überregionale politische Körperschaften werden sehr wahrscheinlich
die Träger rechtlicher Regelungen sein. Was sich aber nicht ändern wird,
ist die Allgemeinverbindlichkeit der Rechtsnormen. Denn sie ist die spezifi-
sche Normativität des Rechts, die es zu einer geeigneten Normenordnung
112 Valentin Petev

für pluralistische (heterogene und konfliktuelle) Gesellschaften macht. Die

Notwendigkeit solcher verbindlichen normativen Regelungen wird es auch
in der Gesellschaft der Zukunft geben, eine Gesellschaft, die sicher nicht
weniger komplex und nicht weniger pluralistisch sein wird als die heutige.
Insofern ist es wichtig, die Konzeption eines effizienten Rechts zu entwik-
keln, das unter den Bedingungen einer hohen Komplexität, der Divergenz
gesellschaftlicher Interessen und der Integration im Rahmen einer neuen
politischen Einheit (wie der Europäischen Union) seine Funktionen erfüllt.
Im folgenden werde ich eine neue, sozio-axiologische Konzeption des
Rechts der offenen Gesellschaft präsentieren. Diese Konzeption ist in ihrer
Anlage definitiv soziologisch, weil sie von der Vorstellung einer Gesell-
schaft ausgeht, in der Individuen und soziale Gruppen um die Realisierung
ihrer ideellen und materiellen Interessen bemüht sind, und dies im Rahmen
einer sozialen Interaktion, die ihren institutionellen und personellen Charak-
ter beibehält und nicht zu einem selbstregulativen funktionalen System
wird. Diese Rechtskonzeption ist auch als axiologisch zu qualifizieren, weil
in ihr die handelnden Individuen und soziale Gruppen Träger von bestimm-
ten sozio-ethischen und politischen Überzeugungen und Konzeptionen sind.
Die sozialen Akteure versuchen ihre ethischen und politischen Konzeptio-
nen zu realisieren, indem sie sich in gesellschaftlichen Diskursen engagie-
ren. Hier entstehen die Legitimationsgrundlagen der rechtlichen Ordnung,
die diejenigen sozio-axiologischen Positionen institutionalisiert, die sich mit
Erfolg in den genannten Diskursen durchgesetzt haben.
Die sozio-axiologische Konzeption, für die ich hier plädieren werde,
möchte ich einer Prüfung unter Rationalitätsaspekten unterstellen. Von vor-
neherein möchte ich aber Mißverständnissen begegnen, indem ich sage, daß
diese Konzeption keineswegs den Anspruch auf alleinige Rationalität erhebt
und somit anderen Rechtskonzeptionen diese Eigenschaft abspricht. Ich
werde nur versuchen, die Ergebnisse zeitgenössischer Rationalitätstheorien
für die Begründung der Rationalität des hier vertretenen Rechtskonzepts
fruchtbar zu machen. Das erzielte Ergebnis wird, so glaube ich, sein, daß
für die sozio-axiologische Konzeption dbs Rechts mehr Rationalitätsgründe
sprechen als für andere theoretische Modelle. Wenn dies aber so ist, dann
wäre diese Konzeption den anderen vorzuziehen.

I. Welche Rationalität?

In den Sozialwissenschaften wie in anderen Wissenschaften hat die Frage

nach der Rationalität einen ständigen Status: Jede Theorie innerhalb eines
Wissensgebietes ist nach einem Rationalitätskonzept ausgerichtet. So entste-
hen Theorien durch rationales Denken, und die Theorien selbst, die eine
Wissenschaft konstituieren, bilden ein System rationaler Aussagen. Für die
 Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts 113

Wissenschaft beantwortet sich die Frage nach der Rationalität insofern von
selbst.
Im praktischen Leben kommunizieren die Individuen, indem sie Aussa-
gen machen, und diese Aussagen beanspruchen einen gewissen Grad an
Rationalität, das heißt einen durch Angabe von Gründen nachvollziehbaren
Inhalt. Die Entschlüsse, bestimmte Handlungen vorzunehmen, bedürfen -
für den Handelnden selbst - einer Begründung. Der Handelnde muß sich
sagen können, warum er gerade diese und nicht eine andere Handlung vor-
nimmt in bezug auf ein bestimmtes Ziel, das er sich gesetzt hat. Die Frage
der Rationalität stellt sich also sowohl bei Aussagen wie auch bei Handlun-
gen. Die gedankliche Konstruktion ist in beiden Fällen vergleichbar. 1
Auf die Frage warum wir rational begründete Aussagen machen und
rational handeln müssen, gibt es vielleicht eine evolutionstheoretische Ant-
wort. Sie besagt, daß wir uns an neue Lebenssituationen nur anpassen
können, wenn wir für unsere Handlungen und Äußerungen in der sozialen
Interaktion Gründe angeben. Eine weitere pragmatische Anwort könnte
sein, daß wir unsere Ziele eher erreichen können, wenn wir rational han-
deln. Und das Gefühl, daß wir rational handeln, gibt uns zugleich eine
Gewißheit und einen Optimismus.
Rationales Denken und Handeln ist sicher eine besondere Fähigkeit des
menschlichen Subjekts. Es kann sicher auch als spezifische Differenz zwi-
schen dem Humanen und dem Natürlichen bezeichnet werden. 2
In der philosophischen Literatur herrscht heute - bei allen sonstigen
Unterschieden in den Rationalitätstheorien - darüber Einigkeit, daß die
rationalen Denkstrukturen keineswegs auf deduktive Ableitungen von
Sätzen reduziert werden können. Und dies trifft nicht nur auf praktische
Syllogismen, sondern auf rationale Argumentationen in allen Wissensberei-
chen zu. Eine weitere grundlegende These älterer Rationalitätstheorien,
nämlich die These, daß rationale Aussagen auf empirisch-kognitive Wahr-
heit abzielen, wird heutzutage nicht mehr aufrechterhalten. Denn in der

1
Die Frage, wie wissenschaftliche Theorien formuliert werden, ist wiederholt un-
tersucht worden. Die allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie formuliert heute, in Anleh-
nung an die formale Heuristik und an die Theorie der künstlichen Intelligenz, die
Strukturen einer jeden wissenschaftlichen Theorie. Danach bedarf es zunächst der
Formulierung eines „intellektuellen" Problems, der Beschreibung seines ursprüngli-
chen Zustandes, der Vornahme zulässiger Operationen und der Transformation des
Problems. Die Lösung dieses Problems, die die wissenschaftliche Theorie erzielt,
erscheint als die Folge zulässiger Operationen, die den ursprünglichen Zustand so
transformieren, daß das Ergebnis mit dem gesteckten Ziel zusammenfällt; vgl. im
einzelnen Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality, Princeton 1993, S. 164.
2
Vgl. „Rationality", in: The Oxford Companion to Philosophy; herausg. von Ted
Honderich, Oxford 1995, S. 744f.; „Rationalisation", in: Dictionnaire de philoso-
phie politique, herausg. von Philippe Raynaud/ Stéphane Riais, Paris 1996, S. 535 ff.

9 FS Aarnio
114 Valentin Petev

Struktur rationalen Denkens figuriert als wesentliches Element das Ziel,

was erreicht werden soll. Und dieses - kognitive - Ziel kann, braucht aber
nicht immer eine Wahrheit zu sein. Als wertvolle kognitive Ziele erweisen
sich neben der Wahrheit (das Glauben, daß es wahr ist, daß p) auch fol-
gende Ziele: das Vermeiden von Fehlern, der Erklärungswert einer Aussage
oder die theoretische Ergiebigkeit von rational erzielten Aussagen.3
Aber auch der Begriff der Wahrheit hat verschiedene Modifikationen
erfahren. Man muß berücksichtigen, daß die heutige Erkenntnistheorie die
Außenwelt als Erkenntnisgegenstand nicht mehr als einfach reflektiert
ansieht. Es gibt demnach nicht eine vom erkennenden Subjekt unabhängige
Welt, eine Außenwelt an sich, die es zu erkennen gilt. Die (objektive)
Erkenntnis wird demnach nicht mehr als eine Entsprechung zwischen Vor-
stellung und objektiver Außenwelt angesehen. In der modernen Erkenntnis-
theorie spielt bekanntlich die Sprache und ihre Kulturgebundenheit eine ent-
scheidende Rolle bei der Erkenntnisgewinnung. 4 Erkenntnisse sind danach
kultur- und theoriegebunden. Sie müssen sich auch in unserer Erfahrung
einbinden lassen und unseren sich verändernden Vorstellungen von der
Welt und von den Zielen, die wir verfolgen, entsprechen. Die Rationalitäts-
theorie hat darüber hinaus noch weitere Spezifizierungen der Wahrheit als
Ziel rationalen Denkens eingeführt. Es wird im Prozeß rationalen Denkens
erwartet, daß die Wahrheit als Ziel rationaler Aussagen nicht eine schlichte
„Korrespondenz" mit vorgegebenen Fakten aufweist. Zweifel darüber sind
in großen philosophischen Systemen der Vergangenheit geäußert worden. 5
Von rationalen Aussagen wird erwartet, daß die „Wahrheit", auf die sie
hinzielen, eine gewisse „Dienlichkeit" (serviceability) und eine Verläßlich-
keit (reliability) aufweisen. 6
Man muß auch bedenken, daß das rationale Denken, das auf menschli-
ches Handeln abzielt, die Entscheidung für die Vornahme einer Handlung
vorbereitet und als rational rechtfertigt. Hier geht es also nicht darum,
Behauptungen mit Wahrheitsgehalt aufzustellen, sondern um die Angabe
von Gründen, aus denen heraus die Vornahme einer Handlung sich als ratio-
nal darstellt. Die Rationalität besteht hier insbesondere in der Bestimmung
von geeigneten Mitteln, um das anvisierte Ziel zu erreichen. Letzteres wird
wiederum qualifiziert durch seine Nützlichkeit aus der Sicht des Handeln-
den. Sehr oft gibt es aber in dieser Hinsicht eine Diskrepanz zwischen dem
als rational gekennzeichneten Weg, der zu einem bestimmten (nützlichen)
Ziel führt, und dem sogenannten „besten" Ergebnis der Aktion, das sich

3
Nozick (FN 1), S. 64ff., 67.
4
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge 1989, S. 3 ff.
5
Nozick (FN 1), S. 107.
6
Nozick (FN 1), S. I l l , 113.
 Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts 115

nicht voll mit dem rationalen Ziel deckt. Das paradigmatische Beispiel für
ein solches Handeln findet man im Bereich der Politik.

Auch die allgemeine philosophische Frage nach der rationalen Wahl von
Zielen, die traditionellerweise bezweifelt wurde, wird heute anders beant-
wortet. Man sieht menschliche Ziele (Werte) keineswegs als grundsätzlich
außerhalb des Bereiches der Rationalität liegend an. Es wird aber auch
nicht behauptet, daß die Wahl von Zielen menschlicher Handlungen einer
operationalisierbaren rationalen Prozedur völlig unterliegt. Letztere trifft auf
die Vorbereitung und Begründung der Entscheidung zum Handeln, auf die
vernünftigerweise gangbaren Wege zum bereits gewählten Ziel zu.

Man kann zusammenfassend sagen, daß die Rationalitätstheorien in

ihrem gegenwärtigen Stand viel komplexer, aber auch viel flexibler sind als
früher und insofern einen höheren Erklärungswert haben. Sie stellen heraus,
daß das rationale Denken auf verschiedene Ziele gerichtet sein kann,
sowohl im theoretischen wie auch im praktischen Bereich. Sie machen
deutlich, daß im Prozeß des rationalen Denkens die Gründe für (und wider)
eine Aussage (oder Entscheidung) in ihrer gegenseitigen Verbindung
(Unterstützung) ausschlaggebend sind für die Annahme, daß die Aussage
zutreffend ist („wahr" oder „nützlich"). Man beharrt nicht mehr auf strikte
(logische oder mathematische) Wahrheit, sondern arbeitet mit Begriffen wie
„wahr genug", „verläßlich", aus Erfahrung und Evolution „evident" gewor-
dene Tatsachen und ähnlichem. Somit entsteht ein reiches Bild von Gedan-
ken und Aktionen, das zeigt, auf welche komplexe Weise wir unsere Über-
zeugungen bilden, wie wir von Fakten, die sich in unserer Vorstellung
erfahrungsmäßig bewährt haben, auf andere schließen, wie also, allgemein
gesprochen, Gründe (Argumente) entstehen und für die Unterstützung unse-
rer Annahmen nutzbar gemacht werden. 7 Dieses Theoriedesign von Ratio-
nalität ist besonders geeignet, die Bemühungen um rationale Begründungen
in rechts- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Theorien zu fördern.

Es sei auch darauf hingewiesen, daß in den Sozialwissenschaften ver-

schiedene, spezifizierte Rationalitätsbegriffe verwendet werden, wie z.B.
der Begriff einer kognitiv-empirischen (technischen), einer evaluativen,
einer instrumenteilen, institutionellen aber auch einer moralischen Rationa-
lität. 8 Mit Bezug auf das Recht spricht man auch von formeller, materialer,
systemischer und prozeduraler Rationalität. Solche Unterscheidungen
hängen mit dem spezifischen Erkenntnisinteresse in den einzelnen Wissen-
schaften, aber auch oft mit dem konkreten Forschungsvorhaben zusammen.
Es sind aber auch Zusammenhänge in umgekehrter Richtung festzustellen:

7
Vgl. dazu die überzeugenden Argumente von Nozick (FN 1), S. 107 ff.
8
Vgl. die sehr detaillierten Ausführungen dazu bei Bernhard Peters, Rationalität,
Recht und Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M. 1991, S. 167ff., 183ff.
9*
116 Valentin Petev

Um einige dieser Rationalitätsbegriffe haben sich weiterreichende theoreti-

sche Ansätze gar ganze Theorien entwickelt, so z.B. die systemischen oder
die prozeduralistischen Theorien. Manche von diesen Theorien, so z.B. die
systemische und die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, haben ihren
konzeptuellen Apparat dermaßen verfeinert, daß es hier zu vielen Hyposta-
sierungen einzelner Elemente (z.B. System, Funktion oder sprachliche
Kommunikation) kommt, die dann die ganze Theorie dogmatisieren.
Ich werde daher im folgenden nicht all diese spezifizierten Rationalitäts-
begriffe verwenden, sondern nur die bereits dargelegten allgemeinen
Aspekte einer philosophischen Rationalitätstheorie, unter denen ich dann
die wesentlichen Elemente einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des
Rechts untersuchen werde.

II. Elemente einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts

Ich möchte zunächst versuchen, eine allgemeine Charakteristik der heuti-

gen westlichen Gesellschaft zu geben und vor diesem Hintergrund das
sozio-axiologische Konzept des Rechts dieser Gesellschaft vorzustellen.
Man kann allgemein sagen, daß die heutige westliche Gesellschaft sehr
komplex, heterogen und konfliktuell ist. Dies charakterisiert zugleich ihre
personale Struktur, das heißt, die in ihr wirkenden sozialen Gruppen. In
dieser Gesellschaft werden unterschiedliche, divergierende ethische Stand-
punkte und politische Überzeugungen vertreten. Sie ist offen, weil sie diese
Unterschiede akzeptiert und als normal ansieht. Sie ist insofern auch tole-
rant, weil in ihr ein freier politischer Wettbewerb herrscht, in dem die poli-
tischen Parteien sich in einer argumentativen Auseinandersetzung befinden
und sich nicht gegenseitig für Gegner erklären und bekämpfen.
Wenn man den Blick nach hinten richtet, ist es sicher nicht zu bestreiten,
daß die moderne Zeit und der Liberalismus viele Konzepte entwickelt und
Institutionen hervorgebracht haben, die einen materiellen Aufschwung für
breite soziale Schichten ermöglicht haben. In dieser Zeit wurde die soziale
Lebensfürsorge gestärkt und die Bildung gefördert. Beim Einzelnen wurde
das Gefühl der eigenen Würde geweckt und er wurde ermutigt, für die
Erlangung seiner Emanzipation zu kämpfen. Der Liberalismus hat einen
klar definierten rechtlichen Status für den Einzelnen im Geflecht seiner
sozialen Beziehungen formuliert und die Entstehung von Institutionen
ermöglicht, die diesen Status schützen und fördern. Er hat das Individuum
gelehrt, mit Freiheit und Demokratie umzugehen.
Aus heutiger Sicht wird man sicher sagen müssen, daß nicht alle Ent-
würfe der Moderne voll gelungen sind. Es wird aber dabei auch gleich zu
bedenken sein, daß dem Einzelnen, und der menschlichen Gesellschaft ins-
 Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts 117

gesamt vielleicht nicht gegeben ist, Vollkommenes zu schaffen. Auf diese

genuine menschliche Unzulänglichkeit ist vieles zurückzuführen. Nicht alle
Mißerfolge sollen als Zeichen des Scheiterns der demokratisch-liberalen
Gesellschafts- und Rechtsordnung gedeutet werden. Man soll aber keines-
wegs die Augen vor den Fehlern und Defiziten des liberal-demokratischen
Systems selbst, so wie es konzipiert worden war und so wie es auch tat-
sächlich funktioniert hat, schließen. Man muß vielmehr versuchen, die
gegenwärtige Lage der Dinge richtig zu erfassen, um theoretische wie prak-
tisch-politische Konsequenzen daraus zu ziehen.
Ich möchte hier nicht im einzelnen die Kritik an der „postmodernen" Ge-
sellschaft - wie die gegenwärtige westliche Gesellschaft qualifiziert wird -
aufnehmen. Wenn man von den vielen parziellen Aspekten dieser Kritik
absieht, so ist ihr genereller Vorwurf so schwerwiegend, daß er direkt die
Natur dieser Gesellschaft trifft. Demnach sei die mit der neuen Zeit und der
Aufklärung eingeleiteter Emanzipation des Menschen letztlich nicht reali-
siert worden. Der Einzelne und die Gesellschaft insgesamt seien tatsächlich
nicht von den erdrückenden materiellen und ideellen Zwängen befreit
worden, und die Würde des Menschen habe nicht die ihr gebührende
Beachtung erfahren. Vielmehr sei eine Art Zwänge durch eine andere
ersetzt worden. Was formelle Demokratie und wirtschaftlicher Liberalismus
gebracht haben, sei ein übertriebener Individualismus und eine „Atomisie-
rung" der Gesellschaft. Dies alles führe zur Polarisierung der Lebenswelten
und zu einer tiefgreifenden gesellschaftlichen Krise. 9
Auch die Kritik, die die Kommunitaristen an der heutigen westlichen
Gesellschaft üben, ist bemerkenswert. 10 Ihr Angriffsziel ist bekanntlich der
übersteigerte Individualismus der westlichen Gesellschaft. Die Figur des
„ungebundenen Selbst", dieses Individuums, das sich seiner Bindungen an
die Gesellschaft nicht bewußt ist, sie sogar verneint, ist hier paradigma-
tisch. Auch wenn die Kommunitaristen in ihren theoretischen Ansätzen
voneinander sehr abweichen, stellen sie gemeinsam fest, daß die heutige
westliche Gesellschaft die Fähigkeit verloren hat, Gemeinschaftsziele zu
formulieren. 11

Die postmoderne Kritik an der heutigen westlichen Gesellschaft glaubt

hier auch große semantische Defizite ausgemacht zu haben. Ein gegenseiti-

9
J. A. Hall , Diagnosis of Our Time. Six Views on Our Social Condition, Lon-
don 1981.
10
S. Mulhall/A. Swift, (Hrsg.), Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford 1992; Axel
Honneth, (Hrsg.), Kommunitarismus. Eine Debatte über die moralischen Grundlagen
moderner Gesellschaften, Frankfurt a.M. 1993.
11
Michael Sandel, Die verfahrensrechtliche Republik und das ungebundene
Selbst, in: Honneth (Hrsg.), FN 10.
118 Valentin Petev

ges Nichtverstehen, eine Inkommensurabilität der gesellschaftlichen Dis-

kurse sei überall festzustellen. Dies führe dazu, daß diese Diskurse frucht-
los bleiben und immer Ungerechtigkeit erzeugen. Und dies sei genauso in
der Politik wie in der Wirtschaft und sogar in der Familie der Fall.
Nach meiner Auffassung trifft weder die postmoderne noch die kommu-
nitaristische Kritik der heutigen westlichen Gesellschaft in vollem Umfang
zu. Auch wenn sie viele Schwächen, die sich in der Entwicklung der letz-
ten 50 Jahre gezeigt haben, deutlich macht, so überzeichnet sie das Bild
einer krisenhaften Gesellschaft. Indem sie dies tut, beschwert sie die Gesell-
schaft mit ihrem negativen Urteil mehr als das sie ihr behilflich ist, und
dies in einer Zeit, die für tiefgreifende Reformen der Gesellschaft reif ist.
Wenn die heutige westliche Gesellschaft schlicht als Konsumgesellschaft
qualifiziert wird, so ist darunter zweierlei zu verstehen: Einmal, daß es in
ihr ein sehr breit gefächertes Angebot an Waren und Dienstleitungen gibt
und, zum anderen, daß die Haltung der Einzelnen weitgehend von diesen
Konsummöglichkeiten bestimmt wird. Dies trifft in gewisser Hinsicht zu.
Daraus darf man jedoch nicht, wie öfters geschieht, die Schlußfolgerung
ziehen, daß in dieser Gesellschaft erbitteter Kampf, Egoismus und purer
Materalismus herrschen. Man soll die Bürger nicht gleich diffamieren,
indem man sie der blanken Konsumgier und der sonstigen Interesselosig-
keit bezichtigt. Man muß bedenken, daß immer in Zeiten von Prosperität
und materiellem Wohlstand der Eindruck entsteht, als ob die Gesellschaft
und ihre einzelnen Mitglieder durchaus passiv, ja unfähig zu einem ethi-
schen und politischen Engagement sind, daß ihnen jede Solidarität abgeht
und sie selbstbezogen oder sogar tief egoistisch sind.
Die Defizite der heutigen westlichen Gesellschaft sind sicher in Richtung
der Konstitution von Gemeinschaft zu suchen. Es trifft sicher zu, daß die
Einzelnen sich nicht leicht für Gemeinschaftsaufgaben begeistern lassen. Es
entsteht der Eindruck, als ob die Individuen ausschließlich mit ihrem „Pri-
vatglück" beschäftigt sind. Dies mag vielleicht in ruhigen Zeiten, bei einem
relativ hohen Lebensstandard normal erscheinen. Als gesellschaftlicher
Zustand ist er dennoch zu beklagen. Man wünscht natürlich dieser Gesell-
schaft nicht große Krisen und Kataklysmen um sie aus ihrem „Schlaf
wachzurütteln. Vielmehr erscheint es als Aufgabe der Öffentlichkeit, insbe-
sondere von Politik, Wissenschaft und Bildung, das Interesse der Bürger an
Gemeinschaftsvorhaben zu wecken. Insbesondere müssen neue Formen der
Partizipation gefunden werden. Die Bürger sollen nicht schlichte „Wahl-
bürger" bleiben, indem sie sich in großen Abständen lediglich an politi-
schen Wahlen beteiligen, sondern müssen aktiver auf kommunaler und
regionaler Ebene, aber auch darüber hinaus mitwirken. Dafür bedarf es
sowohl einer theoretischen Konzeption, die den Sinn, den Nutzen und die
Perspektive eines solchen gesellschaftlichen Tuns deutlich macht, wie auch
 Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts 119

der adäquaten institutionellen Arrangements. Hier sind das Recht, die

Rechtsphilosophie und die Sozialphilosophie besonders gefordert. Um dies
zu erreichen, bedarf es nicht unbedingt eines populistischen Enthusiasmus,
der die breiten Massen auf einmal ergreift, sie zur Überaktivität anregt und
so zum Ziel führt. Vielmehr bedarf es der angestrengten, geduldigen und
zähen Arbeit an sozial-ethischen Konzepten, die zu einer neuen substanziel-
len Ethik führen werden. Diese Ethik, die man heute mehr denn je in der
westlichen Gesellschaft braucht, darf nicht im Sinne einer totalisierenden
Ideologie mißverstanden werden. Man braucht heute keinen neuen Glauben,
keine totalisierenden Entwürfe, die alles erklären und die soziale Realität
auf Ewigkeit festlegen wollen. Eine materiale Ethik zu konzipieren, bedeu-
tet, die Werte, auf denen die heutige westliche Gesellschaft sich gründet, zu
analysieren, zu prüfen, neu zu begründen oder auch gegebenenfalls umzu-
bewerten. Natürlich werden dies theoretische Entwürfe und Konzepte blei-
ben, die aus verscheidenen Richtungen der Ethik und der politischen Philo-
sophie kommen. Und gerade dies ist der Vorteil der offenen Gesellschaft,
nämlich über viele theoretische Entwürfe, die in Konkurrenz miteinander
treten, verfügen zu können. Welcher Einzelentwurf in welcher Kombination
mit anderen sich durchsetzt, ist eine Frage des realen politischen Diskurses
in der jeweiligen gesellschaftlichen Situation. Politische Aktivität, für die
wir heute plädieren, bedeutet, die dem Einzelnen in der freien, westlichen
Gesellschaft zustehende öffentliche Autonomie auszuüben. Und gerade dies
ist das große Disideratum der heutigen Zeit. Es wird verstärkt durch die
Bestrebung nach einer politischen Integration Europas. Dabei ist zu erwar-
ten, daß die Bürger der einzelnen gegenwärtig existierenden europäischen
Staaten diese Leistung erbringen und einen funktionsfähigen politischen
Organismus, eine Union Europas schaffen. In diesem Punkt bin ich sehr
optimistisch. Denn die europäische Geschichte in diesem Jahrhundert lehrt,
daß es keine bessere Alternative zu einer solchen Union gibt.
Im Prozeß der Intensivierung dieser politischen Aktivität wird sich auch
das Gefühl der Solidarität der Einzelnen verstärken. Denn Politik ist immer
eine Tätigkeit mit den anderen und auch für die anderen. Der heute von
mancher Seite beklagte Mangel an Solidarität in der westlichen Gesell-
schaft ist nicht als die schlichte Begleiterscheinung einer reichen Gesell-
schaft abzutun. Mangel an Solidarität bedeutet Mangel an Reflektion über
die gesellschaftliche Situation der anderen und der Gesellschaft insgesamt.
Es gibt aber in der heutigen westlichen Gesellschaft viele Manifestationen
von Solidarität, wenn es darum geht, Menschen in Krisenregionen der Welt
zu helfen. In solchen Fällen zeigt sich, daß das Mitgefühl der Menschen in
der reichen westlichen Gesellschaft nicht abgestumpft ist. Worum es aber
heute politisch primär geht, ist nicht eine Demonstration von schlichtem
Mitgefühl und einer Neigung zu spenden, sondern um Konstituierung einer
Eigenschaft beim politisch mündigen Bürger, der wissen muß und weiß,
120 Valentin Petev

daß die Gestaltung der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung die Kräfte und die
Fähigkeiten aller benötigt. Solidarität ist also auf das Engste mit politischer
Aktivität verbunden.

Die westeuropäische Gesellschaft steht zum Ende des Jahrhunderts vor

einer großen Herausforderung, aber auch kann sie die Hoffnung haben, eine
bessere, gerechtere Gesellschaft zu werden. Die gemeinsame Aufgabe
vieler Staaten in Europa, eine politische Ordnung zu etablieren, die die tra-
ditionelle Staatsform transzendiert, macht neue Bürgerqualitäten erforder-
lich. Das Gemeinschaftliche, das Einigende wird dabei in den Vordergrund
treten, weil die vielen neuen Aufgaben nur gemeinschaftlich gelöst werden
können. Der Einzelne wird aus seinem alten Staatsbürgerstatus, der weitge-
hend durch Passivität und Abwehr gekennzeichnet war, heraustreten und
sich in dem Status des Mitglieds einer neuen politischen Entität, der euro-
päischen Union, einfinden müssen. Und dies erfordert politische Aktivität.
Ich kann nur hoffen, daß gerade der heute beklagte Mangel der westlichen
Gesellschaft, nämlich die Selbstbezogenheit des Individuums, auf diese
Weise überwunden sein wird. Solidarität und Humanität sind nicht nur per-
sonale Eigenschaften, sie sind stark durch die Einbindung des Einzelnen in
eine Gemeinschaft bestimmt.

Die sozio-axiologische Konzeption des Rechts hat als Ausgangspunkt die

heterogene personale Struktur der offenen, pluralistischen Gesellschaft. Sie
baut auf die Kategorie der dynamischen sozialen Gruppen, die die Haupt-
akteure in dieser Gesellschaft sind. Diese Gruppen werden theoretisch nach
einem besonderen Merkmal konstituiert, nämlich nach den sozio-ethischen
Überzeugungen und den politischen Vorstellungen, die jede dieser Gruppen
teilt. Insofern ist dies nicht die Kategorie der sozialen Klasse („herrschende
Klasse" und „unterdrückte, ausgebeutete Klasse"), die die marxistische
Sozialphilosophie aufgestellt hat. Nach der hier vorgestellten Konzeption
konstituieren sich die sozialen Gruppen nicht entsprechend ihrer Stellung
im gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsprozeß und insbesondere nicht entsprechend
ihrer Beziehung - als Eigentümer oder Nichteigentümer - zu den jeweils
wichtigsten Produktionsmitteln der Gesellschaft. Nicht diese ihre materielle
Stellung und auch nicht ein erworbener, formal gesicherter sozialer Status
sind für die relevanten Gruppen der heutigen westlichen Gesellschaft kon-
stitutiv. Es sind vielmehr die Überzeugungen, Einstellungen und Aspiratio-
nen nach einer bestimmten sozialen Ordnung, die die einzelnen Gruppen
konstituieren und sie von einander unterscheiden. Die sozio-ethischen Über-
zeugungen beinhalten Bewertungen von sozialen Zuständen, in denen sich
die Mitglieder einer sozialen Gruppe befinden, sowie die Vorstellungen von
einer erstrebenswerten Gestaltung dieser Zustände. Dies schließt das krea-
tive Moment der Selbstdefinition und Selbstinterpretation der Stellung eines
jeden Individuums unter bestimmten sozialen Zuständen ein und schließt
 Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts 121

eine automatische Zugehörigkeit zu einer Interessengruppe aus. Das heißt

konkret, daß jeder Einzelne seine persönliche materielle Stellung und seine
Vorstellungen von der eigenen Prosperität und der erstrebenswerten gerech-
ten Ordnung der Gesellschaft bewertet und somit seine generelle Interessen-
position in der jeweiligen Gesellschaft bestimmt. Aus der Vielzahl gleich-
artiger Bewertungen von Interessenpositionen entsteht die Grundlage für
die Konstituierung einer sozialen Gruppe mit bestimmten - von ihr selbst
definierten - Interessen und bestimmten Vorstellungen über deren institutio-
nellen Realisierung.

Auf diese Weise bekommt die soziale Ethik bestimmte Konturen: Die
persönlichen moralischen Überzeugungen sind nicht strikt individuell, emo-
tional ja irrational und allein auf das eigene Interesse bezogen. Sie sind
auch nicht einem neutralen, universalistischen ethischen Standpunkt, der
angeblich aus einem absoluten Sittengesetz herrührt, entgegengesetzt.12 Per-
sönliche moralische Überzeugung und gesellschaftliche Moral sind eng mit-
einander verbunden. Erstere entsteht nur im gesellschaftlichen Kontext und
ist insofern nie allein auf das einzelne Subjekt bezogen. Die soziale Moral
trägt wiederum keinen apriorischen, absoluten Charakter, sondern ist das
Ergebnis sozialer Interaktion und einer diskursiven Auseinandersetzung
zwischen divergierenden, aus Einzelstandpunkten erwachsenen Gruppenin-
teressen und Gruppenmoral.

Die einzelnen sozialen Gruppen formieren sich entsprechend den sozio-

ethischen und politischen Positionen, die sie vertreten. Zu den einzelnen
Gruppen gehören nur diese Personen, die diese Positionen jeweils teilen.
Die sozialen Gruppen wechseln also ihr personelles Substrat und sind inso-
fern dynamisch. Die Konstituierung politischer Kräfte in der Gesellschaft
bedeutet wiederum Werben um Anhänger für eine bestimmte Interessen-
position. Diese Interessenpositionen verdichten sich zu politischen Program-
men, die jeweils von einzelnen politischen Parteien vertreten werden.

Ein weiteres wesentliches Element der sozio-axiologischen Konzeption

des Rechts sind die bereits dargestellten sozio-ethischen und politischen
Positionen (Interessenpositionen), die die einzelnen sozialen Gruppen ver-
treten. Diese Interessenpositionen befinden sich in einem Wettbewerb, und
hier entscheidet sich in einer diskursen Auseinandersetzung, welche Posi-
tion sich durchsetzt. Die einzelnen sozialen Gruppen, vertreten letztlich
durch die jeweiligen politischen Parteien, versuchen, ihre eigene Position
durchzusetzen. Dies geschieht in der offenen, pluralistischen Gesellschaft
sowohl in spontanen wie auch hauptsächlich in institutionalisierten Diskur-
sen. Diese Diskurse verlaufen nach festgelegten prozeduralen Regeln. Ihr

12
Vgl. dazu im einzelnen Margaret Moore, Foundations of Liberalism, Oxford
1993, S. 167- 171.
122 Valentin Petev

Ziel ist es, herauszustellen, welche der jeweils vertretenen Positionen in

einem Sachgebiet oder zu einem Fragekomplex am besten - durch Argu-
mente - gerechtfertigt werden kann. Entscheidungen, die auf diese Weise
in der Politik getroffen werden, erhalten eine rationale, nachvollziehbare
Basis. Ihre rein dezisionistischen Elemente werden dadurch reduziert. Die
so konstituierte deliberative Politik wird von einer durch Medien und Wis-
senschaft aufgeklärten öffentlichen Meinung begleitet und kontrolliert.
In dieser Konstruktion wird die Verbindung von sozialer (öffentlicher)
Moral und Politik deutlich. Letztere besteht demnach nicht aus Kalkül und
Machtkampf, sondern nimmt die sozial-ethischen Überzeugungen und Ideen
real handelnder sozialer Akteure auf und bringt diese zu politischen Kon-
zeptionen und Programmen zusammen. Die Rolle der Politik als Gestal-
tungsmittel sozialer Interaktion in der demokratischen Gesellschaft wird
dadurch manifest.
Vor diesem Hintergrund zeichnet sich die herausragende Funktion des
Rechts ab. Das Recht ist diese normative Ordnung, die diejenigen sozio-
ethischen und politischen Konzeptionen, die sich im gesellschaftlichen Dis-
kurs durchgesetzt haben, für alle sozialen Gruppen und Individuen in der
Gesellschaft verbindlich macht. Diese Besonderheit des Rechts als norma-
tive Ordnung, nämlich seine Allgemeinverbindlichkeit, die es von allen
anderen normativen Ordnungen unterscheidet, macht es möglich, daß dieje-
nigen politischen Konzeptionen, die sich rational-diskursiv durchgesetzt
haben, auch für diejenigen sozialen Gruppen Verbindlichkeit erlangen, die
sie von vornherein nicht vertreten haben. Denn die Gesellschaft, und insbe-
sondere die pluralistische Gesellschaft mit den in ihr wirkenden heteroge-
nen Interessen braucht umsomehr eine einheitliche Verhaltensordnung,
damit sie ihre Ziele erreichen kann. Das heißt, daß auch diejenigen sozialen
Gruppen, deren politische Konzepte sich nicht oder nicht gänzlich durch-
gesetzt haben, an der Verwirklichung der obsiegenden politischen Konzep-
tionen mitwirken müssen. Sie können selbstverständlich weiterhin für ihre
eigenen politischen Konzeptionen werben - und das tun sie auch in der
demokratischen Ordnung - , damit diese Konzeptionen sich einmal diskursiv
durchsetzen. Reformen des geltenden Rechts sind demnach das Ergebnis
sich geänderter sozio-ethischer und politischer Überzeugungen in der
Gesellschaft, die neue politische Konzeptionen - früherer im Diskurs unter-
legener sozialer Gruppen - als erfolgreich konstituieren und sie zum Inhalt
des reformierten Rechts machen.
In dieser Perspektive zeigt sich deutlich die ethisch-politische Natur des
Rechts. Das Recht ist nicht eine beliebige, von einem jeweils mächtigen
Gesetzgeber geschaffene Verhaltensordnung, es stellt auch nicht die Ver-
wirklichung einer „ewigen" Gerechtigkeitsidee dar. Das Recht ist die Ver-
haltensordnung einer Gesellschaft in einer bestimmten historischen Zeit, die
 Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts 123

die sozial-ethischen Überzeugungen und politischen Konzeptionen, die in

dieser Zeit in der Gesellschaft vorherrschen - oder besser: sich diskursiv
im bereits erläuterten Sinne durchgesetzt haben - zum Ausdruck bringt.
Diese Überzeugungen, Ideen und Konzeptionen konstituieren den allgemei-
nen sozio-ethischen und politischen Gehalt des Rechts. Und in diesem
Gehalt des Rechts manifestiert sich die untrennbare Verbindung von sozia-
ler Moral, Politik und Recht. A l l diese Aspekte zusammengenommen ver-
mitteln uns das Bild und die Konzeption des Rechts der offenen Gesell-
schaft.

III. Inwiefern ist die sozio-axiologische Konzeption

des Rechts rational?

Die bisherigen Überlegungen haben die komplexe Struktur der sozio-

axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts deutlich gemacht. Ich möchte im fol-
genden versuchen zu demonstrieren, daß die einzelnen Elemente dieser
Konzeption sich unter Rationalitätsgesichtspunkten gut zusammenfügen.

Wie wir bereits gesehen haben, ist das Recht der offenen Gesellschaft
aus einer Reihe gesellschaftlicher Diskurse entstanden. Es durchläuft auch
alle Anpassungs- und Veränderungsprozesse in den gesellschaftlichen Dis-
kursen selbst. Der diskursive Charakter des Rechts ist ein typisches Ratio-
nalitätsmerkmal des Rechts der westlichen, demokratischen Gesellschaft.

Aulis Aarnio hat wesentliche Beiträge zur Erforschung der Diskursratio-

nalität geleistet. 13 Er hat insbesondere herausgestellt, daß Diskurse im allge-
meinen und in der Rechtswissenschaft im besonderen nicht Letztbegründun-
gen anstreben. Er hat überzeugend dargelegt, daß diskursive Ergebnisse
(Werturteile oder Normen) mit guten Gründen gestützt werden und letztlich
eine Akzeptanz im Kreise der Betroffenen wie auch in einer allgemeinen
Öffentlichkeit finden müssen. Dieses Ergebnis ist am deutlichsten am Bei-
spiel richterlicher Urteile expliziert. Denn, wie Aarnio deutlich macht, eine
richtige Gerichtsentscheidung ist nicht das Ergebnis rein syllogistischer
Operationen, sondern muß auch anderen spezifischen Rationalitätskriterien,
die allgemein aus einer „form of life" folgen, entsprechen. 14 Die Interpreta-
tionsaussagen des Richters in bezug auf die im konkreten Fall anwendbaren
Rechtsnormen sowie seine Konklusionen manifestieren eindeutig - beson-
ders in schwierigen Rechtsfällen - die komplexe Rationalitätsstruktur des
Denkens im praktisch-juristischen Bereich.

13
Siehe sein Werk The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise of Legal Justification,
Dordrecht 1987, S. 185 ff., 195 ff., passim.
14
Ebd., S. 209ff.
124 Valentin Petev

Für die Rationalität des Rechts ist aber, allgemein gesehen, auch eine
andere Dimension seiner Existenz- und Geltungsweise wichtig. Dies ist die
Kohärenz seiner normativen Aussagen sowie der Aussagen über seine
Inhalte (Interpretationsaussagen). Es ist für die Anwendung des Rechts, für
das rechtliche Entscheiden schlechthin von grundlegender Bedeutung, einen
Sinnzusammenhang (eine inhaltliche Kohärenz) zwischen den normativen
Aussagen des Rechts, den Interpretationsaussagen, die den normativen
Inhalt ausweisen, der herrschenden sozialen Ethik („Vorverständnis") und
den Problemsituationen (Tatbestandsmerkmalen), in denen es Anwendung
findet, herzustellen. 15 Diese Integrationsleistung von Sinngehalten erbringen
zumeist die allgemeinen Rechtsprinzipien. Es ist aber auch Aufgabe der
Rechtswissenschaft, aus den verschiedenen normativen und interpretativen
Aussagen des Rechts ein kohärentes System zu konstruieren. Weil nur als
ein solches System ist das Recht funktionsfähig. Die analytische allgemeine
Theorie des Rechts hat hierzu Wesentliches beigetragen. 16

Das sozio-axiologische Konzept des Rechts basiert auf der Vorstellung,

daß in der komplexen Gesellschaft der Gegenwart relevante soziale Grup-
pen mit ihren Interessen und ihren spezifischen Überzeugungen in Funktion
sind. Somit trägt es Rechnung der Komplexität, der Pluralität und der Hete-
rogenität dieser Gesellschaft. Es vermeidet sowohl das pathetische Konzept
und die Illusion eines alle Interessen umfassenden, „harmonischen"
Gemeinwohls wie auch die Idee der krisenhaften, ja chaotischen Lage
dieser Gesellschaft mit ihrer völligen Undurchdringlichkeit und Unbere-
chenbarkeit. Dieses Konzept wirkt der Vorstellung einer „atomisierten"
Gesellschaft entgegen, die sich tatsächlich in der Bemühung der Realisie-
rung unzähliger Partikularinteressen aufreibt. Es verneint den nahezu fatali-
stischen Funktionalismus sich selbst erzeugender und sich selbst regulieren-
der (autopoietischer) Systeme, der die Handlungsperspektive reell existie-
render Individuen und ihrer Gruppen negiert und die Gesellschaft und ihr
Recht als ein nach eigener Logik funktionierendes, auf sich selbst bezoge-
nes System mit unklaren Zielen und ohne bezug auf eine praktische Ver-
nunft hinstellt.

Ein weiteres wesentliches Element der sozio-axiologischen Konzeption

des Rechts bilden die sozio-ethischen und politischen Überzeugungen und
Ideen der relevanten Gruppen in der Gesellschaft. Es wird also nicht
behauptet, daß die Individuen oder gar die ganze Gesellschaft eine

15
Vgl. Bernhard Peters, Recht, Rationalität und Gesellschaft, S. 292ff.
16
Vgl. die ausführlichen Darlegungen über Kohärenz in der Ethik und der
Rechtstheorie von Aleksander Peczenik, On Law and Reason, Dordrecht 1989,
S. 158ff.; vgl. insbesondere die zehn Kriterien, die der Autor anführt, um die ver-
schiedenen Reihen von Aussagen der Theorie miteinander zu verbinden und somit
einen hohen Grad an Kohärenz zu erreichen (S. 179).
 Die Rationalität einer sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts 125

abstrakte Gerechtigkeitsidee verfolgt und durch die soziale Ordnung ein

abstraktes Gemeinwohl zu realisieren sucht. Es wird vielmehr der Tatsache
Rechnung getragen, daß in der heutigen westlichen Gesellschaft unter-
schiedliche sozio-ethischen und politischen Konzepte durch die Interessen-
gruppen vertreten werden. Somit entsteht das realistische Bild einer Gesell-
schaft, in der unterschiedliche, divergierende Interessen bestehen und in der
dem Recht dadurch eine besondere Rolle zukommt. Das Recht ist demnach
nicht das Gestaltungsinstrument eines abstrakten allwissenden Gesetzgebers,
sondern das Medium, durch das die relevanten sozialen Gruppen ihre jewei-
ligen Vorstellungen von der Ordnung der Gesellschaft zu realisieren und zu
stabilisieren suchen. Es wird auf diese Weise gezeigt, wie der allgemeine
sozio-ethische und politische Gehalt des Rechts konstituiert wird, indem
diejenigen politischen Entwürfe Verbindlichkeit erlangen, die sich in den
institutionalisierten gesellschaftlichen Diskursen durchgesetzt haben. Dies
erklärt auch die Verbindlichkeit des Rechts.

Das Recht verdankt demnach seine Verbindlichkeit nicht nur dem formal
gerechten Verfahren, in denen es entsteht. Die Verbindlichkeit des Rechts
wird substantiiert: Nur die politischen Entwürfe derjenigen sozialen Grup-
pen werden zu Inhalten des Rechts, welche sich in den gesellschaftlichen
Diskursen argumentativ durchgesetzt haben. Dies erklärt auch warum das
Recht einen unbedingt verbindlichen Charakter tragen muß: weil das Recht
für alle Mitglieder der Gesellschaft (Individuen und unterschiedliche Grup-
pen) verbindlich ist und auf diese Weise auch diejenigen verpflichtet, deren
politische Entwürfe im Diskurs jeweils unterlegen sind. So ist es rational
nachvollziehbar, daß die besseren gesellschaftlichen Entwürfe Verbindlich-
keit erlangen und für die ganze Gesellschaft geltendes Recht werden.
Dadurch entsteht aber auch eine Spannung im Demokratie Verständnis.

Das Demokratieprinzip bringt demnach nicht nur diejenigen Vorstellun-

gen und gesellschaftlichen Entwürfe hervor, die sich in schlichten majoritä-
ren Abstimmungen durchgesetzt haben. In den gesellschaftlichen Diskursen,
die vielfältig sind und den ganzen politischen Willensbildungsprozeß
begleiten, finden argumentative Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den unter-
schiedlichen politischen Positionen der gesellschaftlichen Akteure (sozialen
Gruppen) statt. Hier wird deutlich, daß Demokratie in der offenen, plurali-
stischen Gesellschaft nicht schlichtes Obsiegen von irgendwie zustande
gekommenen Mehrheiten bedeutet, sondern, daß hier inhaltliche, argumen-
tative Auseinandersetzungen unter Rationalitätsgesichtspunkten vonstatten
gehen. Mehrheiten in der Gesellschaft sind dann rational gebildete, über
einen diskursiv begründeten Entwurf entstandene Gruppenmehrheiten.
Sicher wird dabei letztlich den Interessenpositionen der Beteiligten Rech-
nung getragen. Die sich rational-diskursiv durchgesetzte Position mag letzt-
lich von manchem Diskursteilnehmer wegen seiner besonderen Interessen-
126 Valentin Petev

läge nicht durchgehalten werden. 17 Aufs Ganze gesehen, sind jedoch die
Diskursteilnehmer gut beraten, sich an Rationalitätsgesichtspunkten generell
zu orientieren und die Kohärenz ihrer Argumentation im Diskurs einzuhal-
ten, weil sie nur auf diese Weise überzeugen und Anhänger für die von
ihnen vertretene sozio-ethische und politische Position gewinnen können.
Diese Verbindung von eigener Interessenposition, von Demokratieprinzip
und diskursiver Argumentation bildet einen wesentlichen Rationalitäts-
aspekt der hier vorgestellten sozio-axiologischen Konzeption des Rechts.
Wenn man schließlich den Prozeß der politischen Integration Europas in
Betracht zieht, dann erweist sich die sozio-axiologische Konzeption des
Rechts ebenfalls als tragend. Denn sie ist nicht an die Vorstellung eines
Nationalstaates als normgebender Instanz gebunden. Die politische Autori-
tät, die hinter dem Recht steht, kann jede andere politische Entität sein, die
legitime Macht für territoriale Teile oder Sachbereiche der gesamteuropäi-
schen Gesellschaft ausübt. Auch dann wird diese Konzeption eine soziale
Realität widerspiegeln und fördern, die durch unterschiedliche soziale Grup-
pen mit divergierenden Interessen und voneinander abweichenden sozio-
ethischen und politischen Konzepten repräsentiert wird. Denn dies wird
auch die Gesellschaft der Zukunft sein, nämlich eine pluralistische, offene
und tolerante Gesellschaft. Und sie wird weiterhin ein Recht brauchen, das
ihre pluralistische Struktur und Toleranz fördert.

17
Zu den Problemen, die sich durch solche Interessenabweichungen für die ratio-
nalen gesellschaftlichen Diskurse ergeben, vgl. Valentin Petev, Praktische Vernunft
und politisch-rechtlicher Diskurs in der offenen Gesellschaft, in: Archiv für Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 51, 1993, S. 219ff.
 I I I . Norms and Normpropositions in
the Perspectives of Legal Expressivism
 ON NORM PROPOSITIONS

By Eugenio Bulygin, Buenos Aires

It is a well known fact that deontic sentences, i.e. sentences which con-
tain such deontic terms as obligatory, prohibited, permissible, etc., are
ambiguous. They may be used for issuing norms, that is, to enjoin, forbid
or permit a certain action or state of affairs or to describe the fact that a
certain action or state of affairs is obligatory, forbidden or permitted
according to a certain norm or set of norms (like a legal or moral code). If
in reply to a question Mr. X says "You must not park your car in front of
my house" and somebody asks "What did X do when he uttered these
words?", there are at least two possible answers: One is that X issued a
prohibition to park the car and the other, that X gave an information to the
questioner concerning regulations about the parking of cars. In the first
case the sentence was used prescriptively and is neither true nor false, in
the second case the same sentence is descriptive and has a definite truth
value: it is either true or false. Deontic sentences when used prescriptively
express norms; when used descriptively, they express propositions about
norms or norm propositions.
If a deontic sentence is used descriptively and so expresses a norm pro-
position, it can be expanded in a way that avoids the ambiguity. We can
expand the sentence
(1) "You must not park your car here"
into
(2) "There is a norm that prohibits to park here".
The sentence (2) is no longer ambiguous: it clearly states a fact, viz. the
fact that there is a norm prohibiting to park here. But both sentences have
the same meaning. The expanded form shows that the norm proposition is
not about parking, but about norms, more specifically about a normative
system: the system of parking regulations. It says that these regulations
contain a norm prohibiting to park here.
The distinction between norms and norm propositions is not new; it can
be traced (disguised by different terminology) in authors like Bentham,
Kelsen and Hedenius, but it was not before the sixties that it was clearly
drawn in von Wright 1963. In his first paper on deontic logic (1951) von
10 FS Aarnio
130 Eugenio Bulygin

Wright treats of norms as a kind of (true or false) propositions, what he

later regarded as a mistake (see Preface to von Wright 1957). But the situa-
tion prevailing among philosophers concerned with normative discourse is
rather curious. Though most philosophers recognize that norms lack truth
values, they do not see any problem in applying truth-functional connec-
tives like "not", "and" and "or" to norms, i.e. to entities which admittedly
lack truth values. This is especially true of logicians concerned with deon-
tic logic.
But if norms lack truth values and one wants to work with truth-func-
tional connectives, then the variables of a deontic logic can only be inter-
preted representing norm propositions and not norms. So most systems of
deontic logic developed from 1951 to our days which operate with truth-
functional connectives must be regarded as logics of norm propositions
instead of logics of norms. But only very few of them are presented explic-
itly as logics of norm propositions (as, for instance, Alchourrón/Bulygin
1981).
The contention that norm propositions (both in their elliptic and in the
expanded form) are true or false, though widely accepted among philoso-
phers, did not remain unchallenged. We might ask the question what are
the truth conditions of such norm propositions and even whether there are
such truth conditions at all. A powerful attack on the notion of a norm
proposition as a truth bearer has been launched by Tecla Mazzarese in
1991.
Mazzarese argues that norm propositions cannot be regarded as purely
descriptive (true or false) propositions. Contrary to a widespread view that
assumes that a norm proposition is the meaning of a single and simple
statement describing a single and simple entity, Mazzarese maintains that a
norm proposition is the meaning of a conjunction of two different state-
ments: an interpretative statement (of the form "The norm formulation NF
expresses the Norm N") that purports to describe what a given norm
requires and a validity statement (of the form "NF belongs to the sources
of law") that purports to describe the fact that this norm is valid. Now,
Mazzarese's contention is that at least interpretative statements are not
really descriptive, but ascriptive in character and so are neither true nor
false. Hence norm propositions, being a conjunction of two components,
one of which is neither true nor false, also lack truth value. (In fact, Maz-
zarese argues that it is also doubtful that validity statements are purely
descriptive and have a definite truth value. But I shall disregard this part of
her argumentation here, for reasons given below.)

Mazzarese's contention that interpretative statements are not descriptive

but ascriptive is based on a (certainly correct) insight that the widespread
view on "legal interpretation as an activity by means of which the meaning
 On Norm Propositions 131

of a norm formulation may be discovered and/or clarified" is mistaken

(Mazzarese 1991, p. 48). She rightly points out that this view presupposes
that a norm formulation always expresses only one norm and limits the
interpreter's activity to the identification of this norm. This view is cer-
tainly false; so far we agree. But her next step is less convincing. She
argues that to every norm formulation (as linguistic entity) corresponds a
plurality of norms, for norms are meanings of norm formulations and there
is always a plurality of meanings that can be ascribed to a linguistic expres-
sion. Therefore the interpreter is always faced with a plurality of possible
norms and there are no logical criteria for determining which of these
norms is the "right" one. So the interpreter's task is to evaluate these possi-
ble meanings or norms in the light of certain assumed values, to choose
one of them on the basis of such evaluations and to ascribe it to the norm
formulation in question. This he does by means of interpretative statements.
Therefore interpretative statements are not descriptive, but ascriptive and
hence neither true nor false.
There are several reasons for considering Mazzarese's argument as "less
convincing". In the first place, she makes a logically unwarranted step.
From the negation of the sentence " A norm formulation expresses always
one single norm" Mazzarese jumps to the conclusion that " A norm formu-
lation expresses always a plurality of norms". This conclusion does not
follow from the premisses. A l l we can infer is that a norm formulation
sometimes expresses a plurality of norms, but not that it always does so.
To put it in other words: from the negation of the proposition that all norm
formulations are univocal, it does not follow that all norm formulations are
ambiguous. So Mazzarese's assertion that there is (always) a plurality of
norms corresponding to a norm formulation stands in need of an independ-
ent argument. The only argument Mazzarese offers in support of her con-
tention regarding the plurality of norms is based on the fact that there are
different methods of interpretation that usually lead to different results. She
examines some of these methods or criteria, like the criterion that focuses
on the wording of a norm formulation, the criterion based on the so called
ratio legis, the one which focuses on the systemic view and the method of
analogia juris. A l l of them do "not lead in many cases to a unique and
undoubtful interpretative statement" (p. 49). This is true, but from this fact
it does not follow that such criteria never lead to one clear and undoubtful
result. And it is this last assertion that Mazzarese needs in order to support
her claim. Her conclusion of the discussion of different methods or criteria
of interpretation is: "In fact to acknowledge that according to and because
of the different criteria of legal interpretation a norm formulation can be
taken to express more than one norm amounts to doubting both that an
interpretative statement is descriptive, and that an interpretative statement
can be conceived as true or false." Sometimes, but not always. I have the

10*
132 Eugenio Bulygin

impression that Mazzarese tends to commit a mistake that may be called

the fallacy of illegitimate generalization, that consists in inferring a univer-
sally quantified sentence from an existential one. Here are several illustra-
tions of this fallacy:
(1) If in some cases a norm formulation expresses a plurality of norms,
then in all cases a norm formulation expresses a plurality of norms.
(2) If in some cases different criteria of interpretation lead to more than
one norm, then different criteria of interpretation always lead to more
than one norm.
(3) If in some cases it is doubtful whether a norm formulation belongs to
the sources of law, that it is always doubtful whether a norm formula-
tion belongs to the sources of law.
(4) If in some cases it is doubtful whether a given norm is valid, then it is
always doubtful regarding all norms that they are valid.
In the second place, it seems to me misleading to define a norm proposi-
tion "as a proposition to the effect that a given norm is valid, or as a pro-
position describing a valid norm". (Mazzarese 1991, p. 39). It is true that
Mazzarese does not regard this definition as satisfactory: it is only a start-
ing point for her discussion. Moreover she rightly doubts that there can be
something like a description of the validity of a norm (p. 41). I agree that it
is difficult to see what is meant by a description of the validity of a norm,
unless by "validity" we understand that the norm belongs to or is a member
of a set or system of norms. The fact that a norm belongs to a given
system of norms can certainly be described. But I think that the problem of
validity has little to do with the truth of norm propositions. There is no
reason to maintain that norm propositions are about valid norms. The ques-
tion of validity, difficult as it is, is completely irrelevant for determining
the truth of a norm proposition. The reason is simple: a norm proposition
can be true even if the norm referred to is invalid. Take the case of a draft
of a statute; it is certainly not valid, but we can make many true proposi-
tions about it. If I say that according to this draft the action ρ is prohibited,
this proposition is true if the draft contains a norm to the effect that ρ is
prohibited. The fact that the draft is not valid makes no difference what-
soever.
I have already remarked that norm propositions take usually two forms.
In their elliptic form they state that a given action (or state of affairs result-
ing from an action) is prohibited (obligatory, permitted). The elliptic form
is what Carnap called the transposed mode of speech: "By a transposed
mode of speech we mean one in which, in order to assert something about
an object a, something corresponding is asserted about an object b which
stands in a certain relation to the object a." (Carnap 1959, p. 308 ff.). In the
 On Norm Propositions 133

expanded form a norm proposition states that there is (in a given normative
system) a norm prohibiting (enjoining, permitting) a certain action. So in
order to say that in a given normative system there is a norm (object a)
prohibiting the action p, we say that ρ (object b) is prohibited.

In both cases norm propositions are relative to a norm or rather to a set

of norms (normative system), though this reference is often tacitly as-
sumed. It can be argued that both forms are synonymous, because an action
has the property of being prohibited (obligatory, permitted) if and only if
there is a norm (in the corresponding normative system) prohibiting (enjoin-
ing, permitting) this action. But neither in the elliptic form, nor in the
expanded form, do they describe a valid norm, but rather the fact that a
norm belongs to a certain system. So norm propositions are not about norm
formulations, but about norms, i.e. about interpreted norm formulations.
This fact presupposes that we already know which norms are expressed by
the norm formulation in question. If a norm formulation is not ambiguous
no interpretative statement is needed in order to know what norm is
expressed by it. If it is ambiguous, we must first assign to it one of the
possible meanings. So norm propositions (sometimes) presuppose interpre-
tation, but they do not contain interpretative statements. Mazzarese's con-
tention that they are a conjunction of interpretative and validity statements
is, in my opinion, mistaken, because norm propositions state a relation
between a norm (not a mere norm formulation) and a normative system
and as as long as both terms of this relation are not determined, there is no
norm proposition.
Now, I see no reasons to doubt that a norm proposition has a definite
truth-value (i.e. is true), if the norm in question belongs to, or is a member
of, the corresponding normative system. Only if there were no norms at all,
could it be maintained that norm propositions lack truth values.

It could be argued that even in cases when the norm formulation is uni-
vocal situations may arise in which the norm is not clearly applicable, nor
clearly inapplicable. This is true, but it only shows that the norm in ques-
tion is vague and that the case falls within its area of penumbra. But vague-
ness should not be confused with ambiguity. If the norm formulation is
ambiguous, then there are several norms that might be expressed by it. This
situation calls for a decision concerning the question which of the possible
norms we will choose in order to ascribe it to the norm formulation. But a
norm formulation may be perfectly uni vocal, so that we know which norm
is expressed by it and at the same time be vague. This means that in front
of an atypical case we do not know whether the norm is applicable to it or
not. This is what has been called a gap of recognition (cfr. Alchourrón/
Bulygin 1971, pp. 31 - 34). But the fact that norms are vague (or rather that
they contain vague concepts) does not entitle us to deny that norm proposi-
134 Eugenio Bulygin

tions are true or false. They are true i f the norm referred to belongs to the
system i n question and they are false i f this is not the case, even i f i n some
situations we m i g h t not be able to decide whether they are true or false.
B u t the fact that they are true (or false) i n clear cases is enough to main-
tain that they have truth values.

References

Alchourrón, Carlos EJ Bulygin, Eugenio, 1971: Normative Systems, Springer-

Verlag, Wien/New York 1971. - Alchourrón, Carlos E J Bulygin, Eugenio, 1981:
"The Expressive Conception of Norms" in R. Hilpinen (ed.) New Essays in Deontic
Logic, Reidel, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1981, 95 - 124. - Carnap, Rudolf, 1959:
The Logical Syntax of Language, Littlefield, Adams & Co, 5aterson, New Jersey
1959. - Mazzarese, Tecla, 1991: " ' N o r m proposition'. Epistemic and Semantic
Queries" (Rechtstheorie, 22 (1991) 3 9 - 7 0 . - von Wright, Georg Henrik, 1951:
"Deontic Logic", Mind 60, (1951) 1 - 15. - von Wright, Georg Henrik, 1957: Logi-
cal Studies, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1957. - von Wright, Georg Henrik,
1963: Norm and Action. A Logical Inquiry, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
1963.
 TYPES OF VAGUENESS

By Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Krakow

I. Introduction

Vagueness is inherent to natural languages. Both the rule-makers and

interpreters face the problem where exactly to draw the line delimiting the
scope of a vague word or clause. With respect to the rule-makers Holmes
pointed out that "When a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts
that it may be, between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other
extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to be drawn or gradually
picked out by the successive decisions, to mark where the change takes
place. Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it, the line
or point seems arbitrary. It might as well or might nearly as well be a little
more to the one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or point
there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way or fixing it
precisely, the decision of legislature must be accepted unless we can say
that it is very wide of any reasonable mark". 1 The same applies, mutatis
mutandis to the application of law. If the legislature made no decision as to
a vague word or clause, such decision must be made by the judge who is to
apply the relevant rule. The judge cannot say: this rule is vague, therefore,
I refuse to base my decision on it. The judge is bound to decide.
Holmes seems to argue that:
(1) vagueness may be eliminated by drawing a line;
(2) the fact of drawing a line is nor arbitrary, as there exists a necessity of
drawing such line;

(3) on the other hand, the exact point where the line is drawn is arbitrary;
(4) the arbitrariness of such decision is limited by one factor only: such
point must not be "wide of any reasonable mark".
I believe that such picture of vagueness and its elimination is oversimpli-
fied. The phenomenon of vagueness in natural languages is much more

1
Louisville Gas Co. v. Colleman US 32.41 (1928) J. Holmes (dissenting) (cita-
tion after W. Twining & D. Miers, How to Do Things with Rules, London 1982,
2nd ed. p. 214.
136 Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki

complex and complicated and therefore, the methods of its elimination are
not so simple. In the following I will concentrate on elimination of vague-
ness in the process of interpretation, leaving aside the elimination of vague-
ness as a part of the rule-making.
It must be stressed that vagueness is a linguistic feature of words and
expression. Vagueness must be distinguished from the lack of empirical
knowledge. Following K. Ajdukiewicz it may be said that a given word is
vague is at least one "essentially undecidable statement" can be found. A
statement is essentially undecidable if we are unable to decide whether it is
true or false "should we even have at our disposal the most comprehensive
knowledge of the past and should we be endowed with the greatest power
of reasoning". 2 Therefore, a hesitation as to the applicability of a word of
expression caused by uncertainty or gaps in our extralingustic knowledge is
not a symptom of vagueness.

It appears that the definition of vagueness must be based on two idealisa-

tions. If there is a dispute as to the applicability of a given word or expres-
sion to a given fact or thing such dispute may be caused by three factors:
(i) the participants in the dispute do not share the same knowledge of the
extra-linguistic world, (ii) the participants in the dispute do not share the
same knowledge of the language in question or (iii) the word or expression
in question is vague. Therefore, if we wish to define vagueness as a linguist-
ic feature of words and expressions, we must eliminate (i) and (ii). The
simplest method of such elimination is to assume that the participants in a
dispute as to the applicability of a given word or expression have two char-
acteristics: (a) they have the full and coherent knowledge of the extra-lin-
guistic world and (ii) they have the perfect knowledge of the relevant lan-
guage. Therefore, if such a dispute arises, it may be caused only by linguist-
ic features of the word or expression in question.
In linguistics the notion of a "native speaker of the language" is com-
monly used. A native speaker is a person who has acquired the perfect
knowledge of the language in question and who is not subject to any psy-
chological constraints such as memory limitations, distractions, slips of the
tongue etc. The concept of the native speaker renders it possible to ignore
various differences between individual users of the language with their
different habits, abilities, etc. Additionally, while referring to the native
speaker I will assume that such person has acquired a full and coherent
knowledge of the extra-linguistic world. Further, I will assume that the lin-
guistic behaviour of the native speaker is guided solely by his knowledge
of the language (his linguistic competence) and his knowledge of the extra-
linguistic world, and not by his feelings and emotions. Defining vagueness

2
K. Ajdukiewicz, Pragmatic Logic, Warsaw/Dordrecht 1975, p. 54.
 Types of Vagueness 137

by reference to the native speakers allows me to distinguish vagueness

from the lack of empirical knowledge (for example I hesitate to call a turtle
"reptile", because I do not have sufficient knowledge in biology) and to
distinguish vagueness for hesitations caused by our imperfect knowledge of
the language (I hesitate to call this thing "a movable", because I do not
precisely know what "a movable" means).
For the sake of simplicity I will only examine vagueness of predicates.
By a predicate I mean any linguistic expression which may be substituted
for Ρ in the formula "x is P", where ζ is an individual variable.
By extension of the predicate Ρ in the language L I mean the set of
objects to which a native speaker of L will apply the predicate P. By con-
notation of the predicate Ρ in the language L I mean the set of features
F i . . . to F n which for a native speaker of L are criteria for applying Ρ to
any objects (for recognising the designata of P). For example the connota-
tion of the predicate "bachelor" in one of its meanings is the following set
of features: "male", "adult", "never married". Some of the features forming
connotations of the predicates of any natural language are dychotomic (in
the sense that any object either has such feature or does not have it) and
some are gradual (in the sense that objects may have such features to a
greater or lower degree).
The above concepts of extension and connotation of a predicate are prag-
matic, since they refer to the concept of a native speaker of the language.
Therefore, I will adopt also a pragmatic definition of vagueness. The predi-
cate Ρ in the language L is vague, if and only if its fringe is not empty.
The fringe of the predicate Ρ is the set of object to which the native
speaker of L will apply nether Ρ nor negation of P. Such pragmatic defini-
tion of vagueness allows to avoid difficulties connected with the semantic
definition which requires a reinterpretation of the usual sense of negation.3
I believe that the juristic discussions of vagueness are in one respect
oversimplified. Namely, such discussions commonly assume that the elimi-
nation of vagueness is equivalent to the problem of delimitation of the pre-
dicate's extension and the extension of such predicate's negation. Thus, the
question to be answered in legal interpretation with respect to vague predi-
cates is the following: is Ο a designatum of Ρ or of non-P? I wish to argue
that the phenomenon of vagueness in the language of law is far more diver-
sified. I will attempt to distinguish different types of vague predicates and
then I will try to demonstrate how some specific features of such types
influence elimination of vagueness. I will not discuss vagueness of evalua-

3
Comp. T. Kubin< 'ski, Nazwy Nieostre (Vague Names). Studia Logica vol. VIII,
1958, p. 15. For definition of vagueness see also J. Wróblewski, The Judicial Appli-
cation of Law, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1992, p. 97.
138 Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki

tive predicates. 4 In particular I will leave aside the problem of so called

"general clauses", which refer the interpreter to extra-legal criteria or rules
of evaluation.

II. Scale Vagueness

Let us consider the following pair of predicates:

small animal - big animal
narrow street - wide street
long distance - short distance
The connotation of each of those predicates contains one gradual feature.
Such property determines a relation ordering the set of objects which
belong to the extension and fringe of those predicates. The relation of
having such property at a higher/lower degree determines the relative posi-
tion of each object under consideration in respect to others and allows to
build up a scale on which such object are ordered. Vagueness of the predi-
cates listed above is, therefore, considered with respect to one feature of
the predicate's connotation. The problem of vagueness may be reduced to
the question: at which point of the respective scale does the extension of
one predicate begin and the extension of the second one end. Is a distance
of 20 miles already a long distance or still a short distance? Is a dog
already a big animal or still a small animal?
The inclusion of a certain object into the extension of a vague predicate
entails that all object situated on the scale above or below such object
should also be included. Without committing a contradiction one cannot
maintain that a distance of 20 kilometres is a short distance, while a dis-
tance of 19 kilometres is not. 5
Let us call such vagueness which arises with respect to one gradual fea-
ture of a predicate's connotation the scale vagueness. The fringe of a scale
vague predicate is in the same time the fringe of another antonymous predi-
cate. The predicates "long distance" and "short distance" have the same
fringe. Any decision as to the scope of one of those predicates determines
in the same time the scope of the other. I f we say "a long distance is a
distance exceeding 20 kilometres" we determine simultaneously the scope
of the predicate "short distance". It is frequently the case that another pre-
dicates exists which designates objects belonging to the fringe of two
antonymous predicates. For example in may languages the predicate
"middle-aged" exists which covers the common fringe of predicates

4
See A. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, Wien/New York 1979,
p. 191.
5
Ν. Cooper, Scale Words, Analysis, vol. 22, 1961/2, p. 109.
 Types of Vagueness 139

"young" and "old". The existence of such predicate does not eliminate
vagueness, because two other fringes occur: one between the extensions of
the predicates "young" and "middle-aged" and another between the exten-
sions of the predicates "middle-aged" and "old".
Elimination of scale vagueness requires establishing of a borderline
between the extensions of two antonymous predicates. As all objects
belonging to the extensions and fringes of such predicates may be ordered
on one scale determined with respect to the gradual feature of such predi-
cates' connotation, establishing of such borderline eliminates vagueness
entirely.

III. Multidirectional Vagueness

When a connotation of a vague predicate contains more than one gradual

feature, the problem of vagueness becomes far more complicated. Let us
assume that the connotation of the predicate Ρ consists of one dychotomic
feature Fi and two gradual features F 2 and F 3 . Object which do not have
the feature Fi do not belong to the extension of P. Objects which have the
feature Fj may be ordered on two different scales with respect to the fea-
tures F 2 and F 3 ; one determined by the relation of having the feature F 2 at
higher/lower degree, the other determined by the relation of having the fea-
ture F 3 at higher/lower degree. The relative position of each object may be
different on each of those two scales. Therefore, the connotation of the pre-
dicate Ρ does not determine one simple order of object belonging to the
fringe of this predicate. Determination that the object Oj belongs to the
extension of Ρ does not entail that all objects which on one of the scale are
situated above Ο also belong the toe extension of P, as on the other scale
they may be situated below O.
Let us call such vagueness the multiderectional vagueness. Each of the
gradual features of the predicate's connotation determines one direction of
its vagueness. As an example of multidirectional vagueness let us consider
the predicate "a catastrophe". Pursuant to a ruling of the Polish Supreme
Court the connotation of this predicates includes three features; (Fj) a
sudden and unexpected event, (F 2 ) causing extensive and severe effects
which for a large number of people and (F 3 ) causing a severe danger to
common safety. 6 The features F 2 and F 3 are gradual. Therefore all events
which have the feature F] may be separately ordered on two different
scales, one determined by the feature F 2 and the other by the feature F 3 .
On each of those scales three segments may be distinguished: all events

6
Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland, V KZP 2/94, OSN
Izba Karna i Wojskowa 3-4/1975.
140 Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki

having the feature in question to the sufficient degree belong to the seg-
ment I, all events which do not have the feature in question to the suffi-
cient degree belong to the segment III, and all "doubtful" events belong to
the segment II. As the two features in question are different, the position of
one and the same event on each of those two scales may be different. Only
those events which on both scales belong to the segment I, are clearly
included in the extension of the predicate "a catastrophe". On the other
hand, all event which at least on one of the scales belong to the segment
I I I are excluded. A l l other events (that is events which at leas on one of the
scales belong to the segment II) form the fringe of the predicate in ques-
tion.
Since the events belonging the fringe of the predicate are ordered sepa-
rately on two scales, establishing of a borderline on one of the scales only
does not eliminate vagueness. A decision as to the classification of a parti-
cular event as a catastrophe does not entail classification of other events.
Borderlines must be established with respect to each gradual feature of the
predicate's connotation.

IV. Multi-sided Vagueness

Elimination of both the scale-vagueness and of the multidirectional

vagueness requires establishing a borderline between the extensions of two
predicates: two antonymous predicates in case of the scale-vagueness and a
predicate and its negation in case of multidirectional vagueness. Some-
times, however, vagueness is linked to so called semantic fields of the lan-
guage. A semantic field is a set of words referring to a more or less dis-
tinctly separated sphere of reality. The meaning of such words are mutually
interrelated and relations holding among such meanings determine our pic-
ture of a particular sphere of reality. 7 As an example the semantic field of
colours or of kinship may be given. Predicates belonging to a semantic
field are sometimes characterised by a special type of vagueness. In parti-
cular, vagueness arises not only with respect to the borderline between the
extensions of a given predicate and another one (its anonymous predicate
or its negation), but with respect to borderlines among more than two pre-
dicates.

As example let us consider the semantic field of modes of participation

in a criminal offence as determined by the Polish Penal Code. This seman-
tic field comprises the following predicates: (i) "a principal offender" - a
person who commits an offence, (ii) "a co-offender" - a person who com-

7
See for example S. Ullman, Semantics (in:) Current Trends in Linguistics, T.
Sebock (ed.) vol. IX, The Hague-Paris 1972, p. 370.
 Types of Vagueness 141

mits an offence acting jointly with another person, (iii) "a directing offen-
der" - a person who directs a prohibited action being committed by another
person, (iv) "an instigator" - a person who induces another person to
commit a prohibited action and (v) "an abettor" - a person who assists in
of facilitates to commit a prohibited action. The semantic field of modes of
participation in a crime is fully covered by extensions of those predicates.
It means that each action being a crime belongs to the extension of one,
but only one of those predicates. Among those predicates such a relation
holds that if the extension of one of them is restricted or extended by a
definition, the others must be respectively extended or restricted. 8
As each of those predicates is vague, delimitation of the extension of
each of them requires establishing borderlines between such predicate and
all other predicates belonging to the semantic field. For example elimina-
tion of vagueness of the predicate "co-offender" requires establishing the
borderlines between its extension and the extensions of the predicates:
"principal offender", "directing offender", "instigator" and "abettor". Let us
call this type of vagueness multi-sided vagueness.

V. Open Texture

There exists an opinion that all predicates of the natural language are in
some sense vague, because the natural language is open-textured. The con-
cept of open texture in the natural language is, as a rule, introduced not by
definition, but by exemplification. In his famous paper F. Waismann
describes the phenomenon of open texture in the following way:
"Suppose I come across a being that looks like a man, speaks like a
man, behaves like a man, and is only one span tall - shall I say it is a
man? And what about a case of a person who is so old as to remember
King Darius? Would you say he is an immortal? Is there anything like an
exhaustive definition that finally and one for all sets our mind at rest? But
are there no exact definitions at least in science? Let's see. The notion of
gold seems to be defined with absolute precision, say be spectrum of gold
with its characteristic lines. Now what would you say if a substance was
discovered that looked like gold, satisfied all the chemical tests for gold,
whistle it emitted a new sort of radiation? But such things do not happen.
Quite so, but they might happen, and that is enough to show that we can
never exclude altogether the possibility of some unforeseen situation arising
in which we shall have to modify our definition. Try as we may, co con-

8
Comp. W. Mqcior, Postacie zjawiskowe przçstepstwa w ujçciu kodeksu karne-
go ζ 1969 r. (Modes of Participation in Crime on the Ground of the Penal Code of
1969), Pan<'stwo i Prawo, 1971 No. 11, p. 750.
142 Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki

cept is limited in such a way that there is no room of any doubt. We intro-
duce a concept and limit it in some directions, for instance we define gold
in contrast to some other metal such as alloys. This suffices for our present
needs, and we do not probe any further. We tend to overlook the fact that
there are always other directions in which the concept has not been
defined. As if we did, we could easily imagine conditions which would
necessitate new limitations. In short it is not possible to define a concept
like gold with absolute precision, i.e. in such a way that every hook and
cranny is blocked against entry of doubt. That is what is meant by the open
texture of a concept". 9
It is usually stressed that open texture of a predicate cannot be identified
with its vagueness. Open texture is rather a potential vagueness. Vagueness
may be eliminated by giving more accurate rules, while open texture in
inherent and cannot be eliminated. On the basis of the pragmatic definition
of vagueness, however, open texture seems to be a type of vagueness. Pur-
suant to the definition formulated above the predicate Ρ in the language L
is vague, if and only if its fringe is not empty. The fringe of the predicate
Ρ is the set of object to which the native speaker of L will apply nether Ρ
nor negation of P. Open texture seems to fall under this definition.
Two questions arise with respect to open texture. Is it actually the case
that all predicates are vague (open-textured)? If so, what semantic features
of the predicates are responsible for such open texture?
Let us note that the examples revealing the open texture of predicate are
at least in one respect close to multidirectional vagueness. In both cases the
problem consists in establishing a borderline between the extension of a
given predicate Ρ and its negation. As it has been said above, the elimina-
tion of multidirectional vagueness requires ordering all objects under con-
sideration with respect to each gradual feature of such predicate's connota-
tion and establishing of a borderline on each scale on which such objects
are ordered. Such borderlines, taken together delimit the extension of the
predicate in question. According to Waismann, open texture cannot be
remedied in such a way, since it is impossible to delimit the predicate's
extension in all directions possible.

Let us assume that the connotation of a predicate Ρ on the language L

contains two gradual features Fi and F 2 . The extension of Ρ has been
delimited by establishing borderlines on scales determined by features Fj
and F 2 . Let us now consider an object O] which has both features to a
sufficient degree. Nevertheless the native speakers of L still have doubts
whether 0 ! belongs to the extension of P. Such doubts may arise only if

9
F. Waismann , Verifiability, (in:) Logic and Language, A. Flew (ed.), Oxford
1952, p. 120.
 Types of Vagueness 143

the connotation of Ρ has not been properly reconstructed, and in particular

a feature F 3 , with respect to which those doubts arise, has not been prop-
erly taken into account. Therefore, we must reconsider the elimination of
vagueness of Ρ and establish a new borderline with respect to the feature.
Assuming we have done that and, again, we come across an object 0 2 ,
which gives rise to new doubts. We repeat the procedure, but, again, we
find an object 0 3 etc. According to Waismann such procedure has no end,
because the predicate's extension cannot be delimited in all possible direc-
tions.
The doubts of the native speaker as to the objects 0 ! and 0 2 may only
arise, if the predicate Ρ has unclear meaning in L . 1 0 A predicate Ρ has
unclear meaning if the native speaker of L is not able to list all features
forming P's connotation. The existence of doubts as to Oi and 0 2 demon-
strates that the connotation of Ρ has been improperly reconstructed and in
particular that the connotation of P, besides features Fj and F 2 contains also
features F 3 and F 4 , with respect of which doubts as to Oi and 0 2 arise.
Thus, open texture is the same as vagueness caused by unclear meaning of
a predicate. Waismann, however, is advocating for a stronger thesis. He
argues that all predicates are open textured. If such thesis is true, it entails
that all predicates have unclear meaning in the sense that it is not possible
to make an exhaustive list of features forming the connotation of any predi-
cate. Such consequence of Waismann thesis seems to be in conflict with
our common sense. Each speaker of any natural language is able to give
examples of predicates with an entirely clear meaning and, thus, to give
sufficient conditions of applicability for such predicates. The reply of Wais-
mann would be probably that any such set of criteria for applicability is
sufficient only if the examine applicability of predicates in normal condi-
tions. A l l examples given by Waismann refer to extraordinary or abnormal
circumstances with which the speaker is not familiar and which depart
from the circumstances in which he has mastered the language. Therefore,
if the formulation of a predicate's connotation is to give not only the neces-
sary, but also the sufficient criteria for is applicability, it must contain a
qualification "in normal conditions" or "unless something unexpected
occurs". Such qualification is not an additional feature of a predicate's con-
notation with respect to which the extension of such predicate may be
delimited by establishing a borderline. The word "normal" does not denote
any property of things, but serves to exclude heterogeneous and unexpected
circumstances. Thus, open textures is the same as vagueness with respect to
such qualification which is implicitly contained in the connotation of each
predicate. Due to the heterogeneous nature of circumstances to which such

10
Comp. Ζ Ziembiùski, Practical Logic, Warsaw / Dordrecht 1976, p. 39 and A.
Aarnio , The Rational as Reasonable, Dordrecht 1986, p. 112.
144 Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki

qualification refer, open texture cannot be entirely eliminated. The phenom-

enon of open texture demonstrates that the linguistic competence cannot be
entirely separated from the extra-linguistic knowledge. A perfect linguistic
competence fails once the language is to be used in circumstances depart-
ing from our every day's experience.

VI. Conclusion

Let us come back to Holmes account of vagueness. Can vagueness be

eliminated by drawing a line? I believe that this question has no simple
answer. First, sometimes (in case of multidirectional and multi-sided vague-
ness) more than one line must be drawn. Secondly, drawing of a line
cannot eliminate open texture. Two types of decision with respect to vague
predicates must be distinguished. The first type comprises all casuistic deci-
sions in respect of qualification of a particular case. The second type com-
prises general decisions setting out criteria for applicability of vague predi-
cates. Due to the open-texture of the predicates in law, general decisions
are not capable to eliminate vagueness.
 THE CONCEPT OF REASONABILITY AND
THE ARGUMENTATIVE TREE

By Ricardo Guibourg, Buenos Aires

I. Reason & Opinion, Inc.

To be on the side of reason is to be right as regards description, plau-

sible with respect to evaluation, accurate concerning calculations and able
to draw suitable conclusions on from the data available. The ability to
reason is the virtue on which basis man claims to be different from the
rest of the animals; it is the capacity to abstract notions, distinguish
between true and false propositions or link them up into chains of ideas
(reasonings), by means of which, on the grounds of certain statements
taken to be true, other statements can be proved to be true or, at least,
may be admitted as probable. A reason is also a statement or group of
statements considered, as a whole or in part, adequate to account for
accepting a description, evaluating a situation, judging someone's behav-
iour or adopting a given attitude under certain circumstances. Etimologi-
cally speaking, reason is connected to ratio , which may describe a pro-
portion between magnitudes, an interest rate or a commercial or banking
calculation. To give reasons for something consists in describing, explain-
ing or justifying the issue in question. Reason, in short, is always linked
to knowledge, order, justice.

To be reasonable implies, certainly, a tendency to act according to

reason, but also a willingness to listen to other people's arguments and
even partially sacrifice one's own interests on behalf of somebody else's,
as well as a tendency towards moderation, not demanding more than should
be expected (for instance, a reasonable price). A reasonable person does
not always expect the triumph of reason, even it it stands on his side; he is
tolerant, and w i l l be satisfied to strike a fair balance so that nobody's feel-
ings are hurt and his own coexistence conditions are not endangered. Thus,
i f reason is thought of as a bright light, reasonability can be considered the
more or less glowing field around it.

Conversely, it should be noted that there is a difference between unrea-

sonable and irrational. To be irrational means to be opposed to reason or
lacking in it. When a person, situation or opinion are deemed irrational,
11 FS Aarnio
146 Ricardo Guibourg

we imply, express or put forth a strong rejection of the object thus dis-
qualified. On the other hand, to claim that a person, situation or opinion
are unreasonable represents a milder criticism. A person acting according
to reason may be considered unreasonable it he insists on imposing his
viewpoint regardless of its consequences. Thus, i f irrationality is the
absence of light, unreasonableness spreads on to the dim edge of reason-
ability.

I have dwelled on this lexical analysis to show the differences existing

between the words derived from or connected with the term "reason" as
used in practice, but also to suggest that they all share a common link
which w i l l allow us not only to explain this semantic diversification (not an
intended topic in this article), but also to reconstruct an intelligible system
of concepts which may underlie linguistic usage but is, in any case, more
useful than it when working one's way through argumentative pitfalls.

Moral and legal discourse make constant use of this vocabulary with an
intention to persuade which is not always noticed. Reasonability seems to
relate to axiology, but is usually expressed in a more aseptically intellectual
style. We claim that an attitude or an argument are not reasonable when
we do not approve them but not necessarily whenever we disapprove of
them. Instead, the adjective "reasonable" implies a certain degree of
approval, although not necessarily to such an extent that it w i l l involve a
final judgement. Thus, when laws or courts use a reasonability standard to
accept an attitude, behaviour or decision, and authorize rejecting, punishing
or depriving of effects what is considered unreasonable (or arbitrary ), they
do not refer to a simple mistake but to something else. A sentence may
look upon the evidence in a way that is not shared by a higher court, but
the latter w i l l take no action i f the judgement passed was "reasonable", that
is, belongs within a field considered a matter of opinion and regarding
which the higher court judges may think otherwise.

It is possible to suggest a deeper analysis for the concept of reasonabil-

ity, on the basis of the type of criteria we use to decide whether a practical
decision is reasonable or not. By analogy with the different branches of
Semiology (Semantics, Syntax and Pragmatics), we can distinguish three
forms of reasonability.

a) Pragmatic reasonability: which consists in selecting the most suitable

means to attain a given aim. 1

1
Pragmatics studies the relation between language and its users, including the
analysis of the functions of language. Similarly, the acceptance of an argument (or
a system of arguments), or a behaviour choice is judged, in this approach, in terms
of its being useful for the agent.
 The Concept of Reasonability and the Argumentative Tree 147

b) Syntactic reasonability : which deals with connecting the aims into a

consistent system.2
c) Semantic reasonability: which deals with the compatibility of those
aims with another system of aims considered a model (for a norm,
group or community). 3
It can be noticed that to consider a decision reasonable is not the same as to
simply approve it. Approval - always included when judging the reasonabil-
ity of something - is a result of the relation existing between the decision
under study and its own objective, or the relation existing between this objec-
tive and other aims or values entertained by the same subject, or the relation
existing between the set of objectives of a subject and another system of aims.
Legal discourse often resorts to reasonability when making decisions consid-
ered a matter of opinion, although it does not necessarily imply sharing the
opinion each individual has chosen from the available spectrum. However, a
greater axiological perspective of such a judgement (which fails to analyse
the actual action in order to refer to a group of actions, the individual right or
wrong quality of which is up to a point irrelevant) often works as an intellec-
tual disguise to conceal an evaluation. Since diverging opinions are admitted
within the limits of reasonability, it is often pretended that those limits are not
imposed by a particular choice but by reason. That is, by a criterion or set of
criteria shared by all the individuals who are present, or intelligent, or civi-
lized, or rational, whatever their personal or group interests or preferences.
That is why, when we describe someone's behaviour or opinion as unreason-
able (or arbitrary, or ilogical), and especially if we regard it as irrational, we
not only declare our disagreement but also imply that whoever shares it does
not, in principle, belong to the same group as we do and with whose members
we are willing to share our experiences and debate our differences.

II. Acceptability and Thinking Systems

In this way, each of us can place himself at the center of an acceptability

circle. I am acting according to reason. People whose ideas are similar to

2
Syntax studies the relation between signs, determines which are the correctly
framed expressions in a given language, and establishes the means by which some
expressions may be derived from others. Similarly, this type of reasonability exam-
ines the arguments or criteria for acting on the basis of their consistency with a
single ultimate system of criteria, whichever it may be.
3
Semantics studies the meaning of the words, which is interpreted, in each case,
on the basis of the criteria used in a given language: an expression may be assigned
different meanings when interpreted in terms of different semantic codes. Similarly,
the third form of reasonability considers each argument or behaviour from the
standpoint of the acceptability code of the observer, which may not coincide with
that of the agent.

11*
148 Ricardo Guibourg

mine, even if not identical, are reasonable and I respect their opinions, even
regarding those points (of little importance) which I consider wrong. People
whose ideas I cannot or will not understand are irrational. But each of
these concentrical circles are separated by hazy limits, partially logical
rules, epistemological assumptions and, above all, preferences raised to the
noble category of moral or political principles.

Seen in this light, acceptability seems to be subjective and often aleatory.

But it is not always possible to look upon it so severely. A l l of our thinking
may be considered, on the basis of its simplest tools, as built on various
manifestations of acceptability, which appear to be more solid the greater
the consensus they enjoy. This does not mean that our acceptability judge-
ments (which include assigning characteristics as respected as truth, reality,
validity, kindness, beauty, justice or merit) depend on simple mirages, are
always fake or lack any sense. In epistemology it is not necessary to be an
anarchist in order to be a relativist: it is possible to preserve the usefulness
and meaning of those concepts and, at the same time, admit that, as a result
of culture, they are defined in terms of certain premises that work both as
application criteria and as semantic limits.

Let me try to explain this thesis. Each of us entertains a variety of

mental states, sensations, perceptions, ideas, memories, emotions, wishes,
decisions. In general, these mental states relate to each other according to
certain constant criteria or recurrent habits: many people feel like smoking
right after having a cup of coffee, or accept that an event has taken place
only when it is shown on television, or enrol in an environment protecting
organization because they have read about the dangers of pollution or the
depletion of the ozone layer. Or, more simply, they believe mosquitoes are
bothersome because they have been stung several times. When they go
home after a day's work, they have no doubt that they will find the build-
ing where they left it. They pay their taxes on account of a (greatly vary-
ing) mixture of social responsibility and fear of sanctions. And they refuse
to accept a dictatorship because of their democratic principles. Each exam-
ple shows acceptability criteria at work, as well as the way in which
accepting an idea leads to accepting another. When we look at a wall and
by touching it we confirm our visual perception, we accept that the wall
exists. When we think that a legal regulation will be applied, we accept it
to be in force. When we support democracy we accept it as a valid rule of
political ethics. If we watch and event on television we tend to accept it as
real because we trust the image transmission system. When we fight mos-
quitoes we use various criteria simultaneously: we admit that they exist
because we see them; we believe them to be bothersome because we infer
it from previous experience; we rely on the efficacy of the insecticide,
maybe, because we believe the manufacturer would not sell a useless pro-
 The Concept of Reasonability and the Argumentative Tree 149

duct and risk losing customers; and at the same time, we do not attribute a
relevant moral value to the life of the mosquitoes nor do we believe that
some valid law will forbid us to kill them. If we support an environmental-
ist campaign in the situation described above, it will be because we believe
what we have read (we use criteria to decide whether to accept or not what
somebody else claims, probably depending on who makes the claim and
how he makes it) and because this belief has triggered in us an emotive
mechanism (using this adjective in a strict etimological sense: after emo-
vere, to set moving) which according to its own acceptability criteria (not
every new piece of information moves us to act), makes us conceive an
objective to achieve and the decision to do something that will enable us to
reach our goal.
Some acceptability criteria, some "transitive" acceptance mechanisms
seem to be more reliable than others: direct experience is preferred to poli-
tical discourse regarding the existence of objects. Science is preferred to
popular tradition when judging the truth of proportions, deduction is consid-
ered more accurate than induction as a mechanism for passing on accept-
ance. But all those criteria and mechanisms make up, so to speak, our
thinking system: our usual way of processing stimuli to determine our atti-
tudes, beliefs and decisions.
Our thinking system, where criteria and metacriteria (that is, those used
to accept other criteria) interact, assigns an acceptability pattern to each
case. Sometimes it is bivalent: acceptable or unacceptable. In other cases it
is trivalent (acceptable, indifferent or unacceptable) or polyvalent (having
degrees of acceptability or unacceptability). The choice of the pattern -
often under the decisive influence of the culture we live in - depends, ulti-
mately, on what the cultural group considers useful or plausible. When
describing the world around us we commonly use bivalent patterns: exist-
ent or non-existent, true or false. But some phenomena are considered
gradable: temperature, distance, time intervals. So we adopt continuous pat-
terns and set up units to measure magnitudes. In other patterns there is a
small number of different acceptability values: at war, there is a friendly
side, a hostile side and a neutral group. Some patterns, in turn, admit a
variety of acceptability values but lack intersubjective means, supported by
wide consensus, to measure the value of each state of affairs: it is the case,
for instance, of legal norms interpretation or of political opinions.
To determine whether a proposition is true or not we use a bivalent
logic, widely spread and accepted, because our metaphysical background
admits that the world is the same for everybody and that it is convenient to
distinguish true from false propositions in order to use the former as guide-
lines and reject the latter. But there may also be a bivalent logic that does
not include truth, in which acceptability may depend on some other condi-
150 Ricardo Guibourg

tion of the object under consideration. And if we pay more attention to our
knowledge than to the proposed external reality, it may be more convenient
for us to use a "truth" logic (that is, one including our convictions about
reality) with a wider range of values: true, very probable, probable, lacking
data, unlikely, very unlikely, false.
Would it be possible to construct a logic for each of those acceptability
patterns? Or, in other words, which conditions should be met to construct a
logic that can be applied in connection with an acceptability pattern? It is
necessary to be fully aware of the acceptability criteria we use in practice,
in order to identify them and abstract from them a consistent and pragmati-
cally complete theory (that is, one capable of accounting for every accept-
ability decision we make). But even in this case, such a logic would hardly
be useful unless it worked also as a model for the criteria used by other
people. Since our knowledge of our own criteria is generally poor, and
since other people's criteria often fail to coincide with ours, it is techni-
cally impossible for us to build for each pattern an exhaustive logic having
a similar range to that of formal logic. However, by means of introspection
and debate, we may move forward in the desired direction without envis-
aging a definite limit for such progress.
Each thinking system is, probably, as personal and impossible to transfer
as fingerprints. But - just as in the case of fingerprints - it is easy to find
generic similarities between the thinking systems of different people, espe-
cially if they share the same cultural environment. These similarities enable
us to construct common languages and use them to communicate our ideas
as well as our own acceptability criteria. In short, to reinforce similarity as
much as we can. In a culture, communication tends to make thinking sys-
tems uniform, while personal preference and individual experience tend to
diversify them. The usual result of the opposing tendencies is a more or
less recognized frame of criteria in terms of which certain types of diver-
sity are tolerated, more radical dissident views are persecuted, and other
types of diversity (or group similarity) are concealed on behalf of some
emphatically declared uniform condition.

III. Acceptability and Acceptance

At this point it is necessary to distinguish between acceptability and

acceptance, terms which, up to now, have been used almost as synonyms.
We accept a statement when we use it (or are willing to use it) as a reason-
ing premise, that is, when it is a permanent or temporary part of our think-
ing system. We call a statement acceptable when we believe it is likely to
be accepted by others or when we consider it compatible with other
people's thinking systems, or when we maintain that others "should" accept
 The Concept of Reasonability and the Argumentative Tree 151

it if they are to be consistent with their own thinking systems. In other

words, acceptance is a subjective and personal circumstance which is
decided upon or experienced under the responsibility of the individual.
Acceptability, however, is an intersubjective property; that is, it depends on
the resemblance existing among different subjects, which is noticed,
abstracted and described, in turn, by a subject or else by means of proce-
dures which are also intersubjective (attributed to yet another similarity).

Each person may have - and indeed has - a personal opinion about the
acceptability of a statement, on to which he or she often projects his or her
own acceptance: since we are not familiar with the greater part of other
people's thinking systems, we tend to assume that they accept approxi-
mately the same epistemological and practical principles as we do and that,
consequently, are willing to accept the same statements. If this does not
occur, we quickly assume that the other party has a reasoning problem
(inconsistency, fallacy or even insanity), or else that the other party accepts
principles that are incompatible with ours, so that it is useless (stupid,
wrong) to try to communicate with him. However, beyond our emotional
response to the rejection of the ideas we accept, the acceptability of a state-
ment refers us first to the content of other people's thinking systems, and
only secondly to the virtues of the statement itself, which are defined, con-
sidered and evaluated with respect to the previous content of the very think-
ing systems that are expected to accept it.

These three levels (individual acceptance, individual opinion about

acceptability and actually intersubjective acceptability) are often confused,
which gives rise to difficulties not only in the communication and recipro-
cal understanding of each person's ideas but also in the construction and
use of methodological and conceptual tools.

In fact, since acceptance is merely personal, it does not require (not does
it reject) explicit acceptance criteria or an orderly taxonomy of such cri-
teria. Our thinking system may contain (as, in fact, it does) a mixture of
empirical experience, more or less dim memories, emotions stored in the
subconscious since childhood, the remainings of a perhaps partially forgot-
ten religious education, the impact we felt when reading a story by Borges
or looking at a sculpture by Michelangelo, the scientific knowledge
acquired from books and the moral teachings passed on to us by our par-
ents and teachers, adjusted, in turn, to accord with our own personal experi-
ence. It is an extremely complex whole, unknown to a great extent and
impossible to analyse or reconstruct completely: at best, as we debate with
others and find ourselves at a loss with respect to a practical decision, we
sometimes become aware of some inconsistency which, if we feel up to it,
we may try to work out.
152 Ricardo Guibourg

But communication (and its implicit purpose, that is, to modify some-
body's beliefs or attitudes) requires a much deeper analysis. Each message
occupies a space in the thinking system of the person issuing it. For the
message to have an effect it must also occupy a space in the thinking
system of the person receiving it (it must be susceptible of interpretation
and acquisition). In addition, this space must be roughly equivalent to the
one occupied in the issuing system. This depends on a relative code coinci-
dence between those participating in the act of communication. Some codes
are linguistic, but there is also an argumentative code : just as the letter
combination "sale" has totally different meanings in Spanish, English, Ita-
lian or French, the same proposition may be regarded in a variety of ways
as to its acceptability, depending on each thinking system or group of sys-
tems approximately coinciding in this respect.

IV. The Argumentative Tree

In fact, diversity among thinking systems, even within a frame of relative

coincidence, is more serious than a simple difference of opinions. It is an
obstacle to communication and to the success of any debate aimed at
ending a controversy, just as linguistic diversity may prevent a successful
dialogue, especially when the individuals believe that they speak the same
language.
The set of thinking systems may be reconstructed, in fact, as a tree in
which certain basic options (the tree trunk) branch out in countless direc-
tions, each branch being supported by a previous one. An individual who
has adopted his own options thinks in such a way that he considers accept-
able a description, evaluation or attitude represented by a leaf in the outer
layer of the tree top. Another individual may share with the first one some,
or even many, of the basic options, but then follows a different branch and
accepts the leaves growing from a different stem. How serious the diver-
gencies between two individuals can be will depend ont the level where the
two thinking options split apart.
To make this point clearer, let us look at a political example, however
incidental. In a country undergoing the transition towards neoliberalism,
two individuals discuss the privatization of a State-owned company. If they
are talking about the payment options that should be offered to the buyer,
they are likely to be government officials or individuals fully identified
with the current administration's policy. If, instead, one of them is a mod-
erate political opponent, it will be necessary to debate first on what the best
procedure for privatizing would be. If one of them is a citizen who is
mostly in favour of the State's ownership, it will be necessary to discuss
first if privatizations are convenient at all. And if one of them supports the
 The Concept of Reasonability and the Argumentative Tree 153

extreme left or is a 1900-style anarchist, he is likely to examine first the

social, political and economic scheme in which the privatization in question
will make sense. In any of those scenarios one of the participants may walk
out enraged, claiming that the other party's arguments are absurd or dishon-
est, and should not even be considered: whoever behaves like this is refus-
ing to step into the other man's shoes because he believes that some of the
principles he holds as unquestionable, and sometimes evident, are not being
respected. His own acceptability criteria are not broad enough to enable
him to carry out a critical but loyal examination of other acceptability cri-
teria which are excessively divergent.

The idea is not to point our that some cases of dissent are more serious
than others - this is a trivial truth - , but to stress the fact that, however
serious it may be, it does not prevent the honest debate of any topic; it
does, though, bring about difficulties when the participants fail to make
explicit the argumentative environment in which their mind is working;
particularly, if they take for granted that the other party's thinking system
is identical to their own except for the issue under discussion. It is here
that the logical plane interacting with the linguistic one (in the act of com-
munication), becomes an additional code which, just like the others, makes
understanding easier among those who share it, and more difficult for those
who, even unknowingly, do not.

In this context, each tree (that is, the structure of each thinking system,
the set of accepted statements and the criteria used to accept them) depends
ultimately on who waters it and who rests in its shade. But the successful
interaction between them (efficient communication) requires certain struc-
tural similarities (as plants belonging of the same species). This rough simi-
larity is the basis for the concept of acceptability I have previously dis-
cussed.

Now, it is a fact that some structures of the argumentative tree (those

that organize our sensation and group them into perceptions, classify phe-
nomena and make up the more widely spread epistemology) enjoy consid-
erable consensus. This toes not make them "true". In a sense, it goes
beyond that. Since the chance of finding individuals who will disgree with
respect to those basic principles is so small, this consensus makes it possi-
ble to take for granted the acceptability of the statements that are compati-
ble with them. And, should anyone refuse to accept these statements, it
would be possible to demonstrate their acceptability on the basis of
common premises. In this context, and in order to give a name to the
acceptability of the statements, we have coined a noble word: „truth". So
the intersubjective level of the thinking systems reproduces the structure of
the formal systems: axioms are not true within the system but accepted on
154 Ricardo Guibourg

account of external reasons; however, within the system, theorems are said
to be true with respect to those axioms.

"Truth" is the most prestigious word we use when referring to various

segments of acceptability, but it is not the only one: some objects exist (or
are real) and others do not; some norms are valid (in the sense that they
belong to a normative system which we consider relevant, at least at the
moment of speaking) and others are not; some actions are fair (worthy of
approval within a more or less shared system of preferences) and others are
indifferent or unfair. The point is that truth, being based on the segment
supported by the greatest consensus, has become a paradigm of acceptabil-
ity, so much so that the evaluative statements which we accept or consider
acceptable are usually called truths. But it is well known that there is, in
fact, no substantial agreement on the criteria which should be used to
accept value judgements, although there maybe extensive coincidence on
certain specific evaluations.

Using the concept of truth in this way is therefore misleading. Not from
a qualitative point of view, because, after all, consensus is a continuum
susceptible of gradation and it is possible for a certain group of people to
maintain a significant agreement on the criteria used for accepting state-
ments with an axiological content. But from a quantitative point of view it
is indeed misleading because any discourse conceived around the idea of
truth assumes a far greater consensus. An unprepared individual (as most
people are) using the concept of truth to refer to values is as much an
abuse as it may be to say that "the night was so hot that the temperature
reached 30 degrees below zero".

V. Argumentation, or How to Climb the Tree

Despite the previous discussion, the obvious quantitative differences in

the consensus supporting the premises used in descriptive and in evaluative
discourse must not divert our attention from the fact that both refer to the
intersubjective acceptability of certain statements, and are based on pre-
mises that are accepted to different extents.

The above-mentioned broad continuum contains, then, both descriptive

and evaluative argumentation, and the tree analogy applies also in this case.
For an argument to be successful at persuading us to adopt a certain belief
or a certain attitude - that is, to be plausible or reasonable - it must be
based on certain premises (one type or the other, or both) which we accept
and, on their basis, show us that there is an equally acceptable path leading
toward the proposed conclusion.
 The Concept of Reasonability and the Argumentative Tree 155

Both descriptive and evaluative argumentation explain personal preference

(one choses to believe this rather than that, just as one prefers a given state
of affairs to another). And since they are argumentations (that is, linguistic
expressions addressed to an audience), they all have, to a greater or lesser
extent, the purpose of pesuading the other party to share those preferences,
their motivations ranging from love of truth to the most selfish personal
interest.
If amidst these similarities we look for a difference, we may find it in
the different forms of argumentation we admit. The canonical form is noth-
ing but a demonstration the paradigm of which is logical deduction: if per-
suasion depends on the inclusion of a statement within the system of state-
ments accepted by the receiver, it is evident that to meet this condition the
conclusion should derive from the premises and these should lead undoubt-
edly to it. In this respect, it should be noted that in most cases we do not
have all the necessary premises, for which reason - and under our responsi-
bility - we resort to an analogical reasoning which is nothing but a substi-
tution of the missing premises by assumptions or extrapolations taken from
less pertinent experience.
Obviously, this requirement applies more strongly in descriptive argu-
mentation. An evaluative reasoning should have in principle the same form,
but, since it arises less indirectly from the emotional background of the
speaker, sometimes stages are accidentally or deliberately skipped when an
argument - maybe an example, a side remark or a simple reference -
touches a sensitive, intimate spot of the audience and thus triggers an emo-
tion-based agreement. The political and the commercial slogan are some-
what crude examples of this phenomenon (owing to their deliberately irra-
tional side). However, this procedure may be theoretically reconstructed by
bringing to light its hidden premises and its vaguely perceived intermediate
steps. Of course, the receiver might fail to recognize his own thinking
system, in that reconstruction; but if the argument has been successful, he
will have to admit that his system has such hidden premises; and if they
come into conflict with other statements, he will have to reorganize his
system so that it becomes more consistent.

It is at this point that the concept of argumentative code may render a

service. Just as a message has no meaning except with reference to a cer-
tain code, a conclusion must be accepted when it derives from accepted
premises by means of deduction rules which are also accepted, and - in
Kelsen's model - a norm is valid if it has been created by means of valid
procedures, based on other valid norms, the acceptability of an argumenta-
tion depends, above all, on a reasonable code identity between speaker and
listener, including the argumentative code. This condition is not sufficient:
it will be necessary to determine on its basis the intrinsic value of the argu-
156 Ricardo Guibourg

ment. But it is indeed necessary: if it is not met, the argument has no

chance to be understood and evaluated adequately.
Reciprocal understanding of the argumentative code enables us to climb
up the argument tree, which has countless stems and branches. Further-
more, considering certain basic divergencies it is possible to speak of a
veritable forest of argumentative trees which, as in the familiar proverb, is
hard to see when we are looking at the single tree we have chosen. It
would be pointless, then, to try to devise a recipe for reaching universal
agreements in this respect. But from a pragmatic point of view the situation
is not as grim as theory presents it. Most arguments are, in fact, addressed
to people linked to the speaker by a variety of common interests and ideas,
within smaller or larger environments: friends at a coffee shop, lawyers in
court, representatives in Parliament, diplomats at U N meetings, business-
men in Argentina and Germany. They share most of the argumentative tree
(although a revision now and then would be advisable). Many peripheral
aspects differ but only a few of them become relevant to us at a given
moment: when discussing a rental contract, the religion of the parties or the
soccer teams they support do not matter.
In the areas that are relevant to us (and whenever it may matter to us) it
is possible to achieve a reconstructive clarification of the argumentative
codes and of the arguments themselves. This reconstruction may be based,
on both free debate and a strict linguistic and logical control. The first one
will set the limits for dissent and will enable us to decide how close to the
central tree trunk we must get in order to find coincidence between the
codes as well as an agreement with respect to the premises needed. The
second one will provide intersubjective means (not exhaustive but funda-
mental) to judge the acceptability of the arguments under discussion. In this
sense, for the debate to be successful, the parties who disagree must deter-
mine a common point in the tree (even in the central trunk, if necessary) to
make sure that they refer to the same tree. And from there on they will be
able to climb together, always comparing arguments, until they reach and
share the fruit they were after. This fruit is agreement, at best. But it may
also be understanding that the starting point has been wrongly chosen and
that it is necessary to start off again. In this context, any topic can be dis-
cussed. Any opinion can be analysed. The key point is, I believe, to avoid
mistaking reasoning with war, reasonability with participating in a political
meeting, or rationality with an alliance to fight the infidels.
 CERTAINTY OR COHERENCE?

By Aleksander Peczenik, Lund

I. The Background

I share many of Aulis Aarnio's views. In many respects, our philosophy

of law is identical. This is due to the fact that we have closely cooperated
in more than twenty years. This is also due to our common background in
the post-Realist jurisprudence. We agree that valuations play a great role in
legal argumentation and decision-making. We also agree that valuations are
inevitable within the legal dogmatics CRechtswissenschaft, Rechtsdogmatik ,
"science of law"), consisting of professional legal writings, whose task is to
systematize and interpret valid law. Legal interpretation is almost always
value-laden. Furthermore, we both disagree with Legal Realists who
"deconstruct" legal argumentation, both in legal practice and in legal dog-
matics, as a mere façade, concealing the fact that the lawyers execute
power. The emphasis of our philosophy of law is epistemological. The
main question is: In what a sense can juristic statements be correct though
they are value-laden? The following diagram illustrates this problem (cf.
Peczenik 1989, 45, slightly modified here):

valuations made the established knowledge

by the person TOGETHER legal norms, GIVE of valid law
performing WITH traditional legal
legal argumentation
argumentation norms and
values established
in the society

In what sense, if any, can evaluations give us knowledge? To say that a

theoretical proposition gives us knowledge may be thought about as the
same as to say that it is true. Can a legal interpretative statement then be
true, even if justifiable by a set of premises containing an evaluation?

My own way of answering this question involves a theory which is cog-

nitivist as regards prima facie value statements and, at the same time, non-
cognitivist as regards all-things-considered value statements. The former are
true if they correspond to the cultural heritage of the society. The latter
may be more or less çoherent, but not true in the ontological sense. From
158 Aleksander Peczenik

the ontological point of view, such a theory is realist as regards prima facie
values. Such values exist in the culture of the society. At the same time,
the theory is not ontologically realist as regards all-things-considered values.
These are not pre-existent, but continually created in the process of moral
reasoning (cf. Peczenik 1995, 661 ff.). In view of such a theory, knowledge
of prima facie values is possible, whereas a well-argued belief concerning
an all-things-considered value merely expresses something similar to
knowledge, not knowledge in the literal sense. I do not think that Aarnio
would disagree with this. In any case, he has repeatedly emphasized that
there can exist correct (though evaluative) view of the law. But there is an
apparent difference between us: In my opinion, correctness results from
coherence. In Aarnio's opinion, it is ultimately based on the form of life in
Wittgenstein's sense. How important is this difference?

II. Aarnio on Audience and Paradigms

According to Aarnio, what is correct, as well in science as in the law, is

determined by shared views of the people who share the form(s) of life.
This idea is very different from the primitive consensus theory, holding that
the actual majority opinion is always right. What matters for rationality is
not actual consensus but acceptability (cf. Aarnio 1987, 185 ff.) within the
relevant group of people, that is, "audience" (cf. id. 221 ff.), colleagues,
peers etc. These persons accept ρ or at least agree that ρ is acceptable
according to the standards they accept; ρ is acceptable to a person, A, if he
finds it legitimate (or permitted) for another person, B, to accept and assert
ρ even if A himself prefers not to accept and not to assert it.
Against this background, it is easy to understand Aarnio's reception of
the paradigm theory in philosophy of science. In view of this theory,
science is a kind of practice, changing in time and based on norms. One
can thus find analogies between matrices (and paradigms) in natural
science and legal research. According to Aarnio (e.g., 1984, 25ff.), the
matrix of legal dogmatics, in a modified Kuhnian sense, consists of the
following four components.

1. A set of philosophical background presuppositions, inter alia the

assumption that legal reasoning is based on valid law.
2. Presuppositions concerning the sources of the law. One assumes that some
of these are either binding or at least constituting authority reasons.
3. Presuppositions concerning legal method. One thus assumes that legal
reasoning is and should be governed by some methodological norms.
4. A set of values, first of all concerning legal certainty and justice.
 Certainty or Coherence? 159

I have no difficulties to accept all those views (cf. Peczenik 1989,

138ff.). But now, let me approach a more profound matter.

III. Aarnio and Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

Aarnio bases his theory on Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of cer-

tainty. One cannot doubt everything (cf. Wittgenstein 1979 No. 115 and
Iff.), because doubt needs undoubted grounds (cf. Wittgenstein 1979
No. 122 and 217; Aarnio 1977, lOOff.). " I f you are not certain of any fact,
you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words, either" (cf. Wittgen-
stein 1979 No. 114, cf. No. 231 and 1953 No. 481). Consequently: "The
game of doubting itself presupposes certainty" (Wittgenstein 1979 No. 115.
Cf. No. 124 and 253). In the system of our knowledge, "some things stand
unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift" (Wittgenstein
1979 No. 144. Cf. No. 136). These "fast" things are more certain than any
grounds which one can give in favour of them (Wittgenstein 1979 No. 307)
and one can accept nothing as evidence against them. In this context, one
may speak about the "form of life". The concept, created by Wittgenstein,
has been introduced to theory of law by Aulis Aarnio. To be sure, refer-
ences to the form of life do not fulfil standards of clarity, usual in analyti-
cal philosophy. They suggest something important but unclear, "the pre-
sence of things partly hidden and not yet fully disclosed" (Black 1978,
330; cf. Black 1980 passim). Yet, one may state that our picture of the
world - the Weltanschauung - including our most certain and most central
views - continually manifests itself in everyday action (cf. Aarnio 1979, 34
and 1977, 126ff.). The picture of the world was not a basically proposi-
tional matter for Wittgenstein. Rather, one has to say that the foundation of
the picture of the world is a non-propositonal phenomenon. Referring to
this, Wittgenstein did write his well-known words: In the beginning there
was the act. "The speaking of language is a part of an activity, or of a form
of life" (Wittgenstein 1953 No. 23). "Giving grounds... comes to an end;
but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true...; it
is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (Wittgenstein
1979 No. 204. Cf. No. 344). The language-game is "the whole, consisting
of language and the actions into which it is woven". Finally: Language-
games are social in an important sense: private language is impossible,
because no one would correct mistakes committed by the lone speaker.

IV. Description of Reconstruction

Furthermore, the Wittgensteinian basis marks a division between Aarnio

and the logical branch of analytical philosophy. According to Aarnio, the
160 Aleksander Peczenik

task of philosophy is analytic, but not analytic in the Platonic sense of the
term. A philosopher has to explicate the language-games already existing in
our linguistic communication. This explicative function of philosophy can
also be called recontructivist but "reconstruction" means here that one
makes explicit that what is already hidden in the language. And what is
hidden there, cannot be grasped by formal logic alone.
The question occurs, however, whether Aarnio does not leave Wittgen-
stein and moves to a more reconstructivist approach. When Aarnio speci-
fies a number of language-games in legal dogmatics, for instance, logical
deduction, grammatical interpretation, conceptual analysis and reconstruc-
tion of legal concepts, appealing to the intention of the legislator etc., he
refers to very abstract "games", not primitive at all. I like it very much
indeed. But would Wittgenstein? Were his language-games not much sim-
pler than that? Moreover, Aarnio is not merely registering how the lawyers
think on different subjects, but he also attempts an arrangement of the law-
yers's ways of thinking into a coherent whole. Would Wittgenstein accept
this? To him, each language-game is complete. Then, how can they be put
together? To be sure, language-games are related to one another (Wittgen-
stein 1953 No. 65), "form a family" (id. No. 67), and show "a complicated
network of similarities" (id. No. 66). But can they be arranged in a coher-
ent whole?
Aulis knows all these problems, and we have discussed them. His answer
is that Wittgensteinian philosophy merely is a (very) general frame for his
own philosophy, not a firm background of its basic assumptions.

V. Coherence and Epistemologica! Conservatism

The ultimate basis of my own philosophy of law is coherence, instead of

the form of life: each individual has his own system of beliefs. Without
reflection, the cluster of beliefs would be full of gaps and inconsistencies.
The individual person constructs her own system, as coherent as she can,
by continually updating and revising her beliefs, and then confronts it, both
by speach and by action, with other individuals' systems.
Would Wittgenstein accept this as the point of view? Notice that there
are important coherentist insights in Wittgenstein's philosophy: For Witt-
genstein, most statements, taken for granted as certain, are certain as mem-
bers of a system. One may doubt each one of them but no normal person at
the same time puts in question an extensive part of the system. Wittgen-
stein has thus pointed out that our "knowledge forms an enormous system.
And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it"
(Wittgenstein 1979 No. 410. Cf. No. 144, 152 and 225). No single axioms
are as certain as a system in which consequences and premises give each
 Certainty or Coherence? 161

other mutual support (Wittgenstein 1979 No. 142). One cannot simulta-
neously doubt all the "fast" things, but one could every single separately
(Wittgenstein 1979 No. 232. Cf. Aarnio 1979, 29 ff.). Yet, there are two
differences in comparison with coherentism. First, Wittgenstein speaks con-
sistently of knowledge as a social phenomenon, whereas coherentists start
with a single individual. Second, Wittgenstein assigns a special position to
some simple certainties (like famous Moore's example: "this is one hand,
this is another one"). Coherentists, on the other hand, regard all reasons in
general as defeasible.

It appears to them that even the certainties are defeasible. They are hold
together by what lies around them, they can change when this entourage
changes. My conclusion is that the "certainties" are supported by the total -
coherent - system of bieliefs. This applies e fortiori to observational data.
Indeed, the data which allegedly falsify a hypothesis are theory-laden.
There are no unshakeable foundations of science. To be sure, foundational-
ists claim that all knowledge ultimately rests on evident foundations, such
as empirical data (cf., e.g., Chisholm 1966, 30ff.). However, foundational-
ism has been rebutted by coherentism: the alleged foundations are by no
means more certain than some other beliefs. Neither Wittgensten's certain-
ties are.

What is coherence, then? The following restatement of Laurence Bon-

Jour's theory is a good (though not entirely unproblematic) answer to this
question:

" A system of beliefs is a justification-conferring, coherent system iff:

(i) It is logically consistent,

(ii) It has a high degree of probabilistic consistency,

(iii) It has a significant number of relatively strong inferential connections

among component beliefs,

(iv) It is relatively unified, i.e., does not divide into relatively uncon-
nected subsystems,

(v) It contains few unexplained anomalies,

(vi) It provides a relatively stable conception of the word and remains

coherent (i.e. satisfies (i) - (v) in the long run) and

(vii) It satisfies the Observation Requirement, i.e., it must contain laws

attributing a high degree of reliability to a reasonable variety of cogni-
tively spontaneous beliefs, including introspective beliefs." (Cf.
Bender 1989, 5, referring to BonJour 1985, 9, 10, 92, 102-3, 106,
116, 123-4, 141, 151 - 4 , 170, 191).
12 FS Aarnio
162 Aleksander Peczenik

Alexy and Peczenik (1990, cf. also some additions in Peczenik 1989,
158 ff.) have developed a theory which provides for some criteria of coher-
ence.
The more the statements belonging to a given theory approximate a per-
fect supportive structure, the more coherent the theory. The word "theory"
is used here in a broad sense, covering both descriptive, for example
empirical theories, and normative or evaluative theories (norm systems or
value systems).
Ceteris paribus , the degree of coherence of a theory depends on such
circumstances as how great a number of supported statements belong to it;
how long chains of reasons belong to it; how great number of connections
exists between various supportive chains belonging to the theory, e.g., how
many chains of reasons support one and the same conclusion; how many
statements belonging to the theory are relevant in the type of argumentation
the theory uses; how great number of universal statements belong to the
theory; how great number of general concepts belong to it; how high the
degree of generality of these concepts is; how great number of cases it
covers; and how great number of fields of life it covers. The degree of
coherence is determined by weighing and balancing of the criteria. For
example, the supportive chain of reasons may be particularly long when
one uses less general concepts, and shrink substantially when the concepts
applied become more general. In such a case, one must perform a compli-
cated act of weighing in order to answer the question which theory is more
coherent, the more general one, or the one containing the longer chain of
reasons.
An obvious circle involved here is that weighing and balancing of cri-
teria of coherence must be as coherent as possible, which invokes the same
criteria of coherence. There is no way out from this circle. But the theory
as a whole is self-confirming, not self-destroying. It is all you can require
from a theory of coherence.
Aarnio's above-mentioned insight that one cannot simultaneously doubt
all one's beliefs, but one could doubt every single separately is also closely
related to epistemological conservatism (cf., e.g., Bergström 1990, 102).
Epistemological conservatism is easy to understand when we enter the dis-
cussion about coherence in time. When time passes, new data flow in and
have to be accomodated in the system. Some of these new data, when com-
bined with old beliefs, introduce incoherence that must be removed. Con-
servatism comes into play as the principle of minimal change: Modifica-
tions made in a person's belief system, in order to provide space for the
new information, should be as small as possible. But epistemological con-
servatism plays a role within the coherentist context even when there is no
new information coming in but the individual in question discovers that the
 Certainty or Coherence? 163

beliefs she holds are internally incoherent. For the data must cohere in
one's system, regardless whether they did occur in a time-sequence or
simultaneously.

VI. Coherence and Truth

The main point of theories of coherence is epistemological. How do we

know that coherence is a criterion of knowledge and thus a criterion of
truth? Indeed, cannot a coherent system of beliefs be false, isolated from
the world? This objection has two versions, let me call them local and
total. The local version is a simple misunderstanding. It feeds on highly
coherent but false science fiction novels and more or less dubious moral
belief systems. This objection is easy to rebut. The fiction can be internally
coherent, but it does not matter if it does not cohere with other part of a
person's total world view. (Indeed, this reminds very much of Wittgenstein
in Aarnio's interpretation). In this way we arrive at the total version. There
is no easy way to deal with the so-called "isolation objection" as regards
the totality of an individual's views. This is a much more serious objection.
The core of the answer is that neither scepticism in general nor the isola-
tion objection in particular have privileged status, compared with other
beliefs. They are merely competitors of other beliefs. (Even here echoes
Wittgenstein: doubt presupposes certainty!). If someone says that my per-
sonally justified, coherent system of beliefs is not "objectively" justified, he
has to win the competition with my system (cf. Lehrer 1990, 176 ff.). Con-
sequently, if I want to argue that I am justified in accepting that ρ, I must
appeal to my acceptance system at that time. And if the sceptic wants to
convince me that I am wrong, the appeal to my acceptance system at that
time is again all he can make. One cannot "objectively" determine at that
time, t l , whether justification is "really" undefeated.

VII. Wittgenstein Behind Coherentism?

In this context, the great coherentist epistemologist, Keith Lehrer makes

a move which brings him close to Aarnio and Wittgenstein. Namely, he
admits that later on, at t2, when one's acceptance system changes, one is in
a position to judge whether one's earlier justification was defeated or not.
"How can a person ascertain that she is completely justified in accepting
that ρ or that her justification is undefeated...? At a given point in time, a
person can only evaluate such a claim in terms of her acceptance system...
It is the only epistemic court for synchronic adjudication, judgment at a
time... We are, however, diachronic creatures... As a result, an individual
remembers that... some of the things that he accepted were false...
12*
164 Aleksander Peczenik

(W)hen the time for evaluation of various claims to truth arrives, the basis
for evaluation must be the system he has then... Others... may disagree,
and I may come to agree with them at some later date when further infor-
mation has won my acceptance." (Lehrer 1990, 151). Such correcting of
errors is not merely a matter of coherence of the system at the initial time
t l . It is a matter of correcting of one's system by others! There is a shift of
perspective involved here. When considering time in this way, we leave an
individual perspective, and approach a social one. The time relevant here
neither begins nor ends with the span of life of an individual. In this per-
spective, one may speak about a coherent system of beliefs in a society. Is
such a system a better criterion of truth than a coherent system of beliefs of
an individual? In one respect, it seems to be an even less suitable tool for
the search for knowledge. For surely, various members of the society have
different beliefs about a lot of things. Pressure towards incoherence is thus
greater in the collective belief system than in an individual belief system. It
is not obvious that all (or almost all) members of the society could agree
on one single coherent system of beliefs, regardless how much they work
on belief revision and belief updating. Yet, from another point of view, the
social perspective brings us a hope. For there is no doubt that the members
of the society communicate with each other and thus make it possible for
any single person to correct errors in her belief system. In other word,
asking what other persons think is a good method to pass from a personally
justified belief system to "vérifie system", that is, that part of a person's
(coherent) acceptance system which contains all her true acceptances but
has been purged of all her false acceptances. In this respect, one may use
an analogy to Wittgenstein's famous thesis about the impossibility of pri-
vate language. For Wittgenstein, a private language, belonging to a single
subject only, cannot exist, because such a subject would never know
whether she speaks correctly. Neither would such a subject ever know what
fragments of her belief system have been erroneous.
I am not certain how much this shift of the point of view gives an epis-
temologist. Is the move to "social epistemology" necessary? No doubt, the
views of each person are de facto influenced by social conventions this
person knows and social roles in which she acts. No doubt, each person
can easier doubt the fragments of her belief system which no one else
seems to share that the things everyone seems to take for granted. And no
doubt, an individual person's social role can impose on her moral and legal
obligations. Yet it is logically possible that the inner coherence of the
belief system of a certain subject will force her to abandon points which
others take for granted, and even to abandon her own social role. Or are
these things possible only within some limits, not merely empirical, but in
some sense necessary ones? Without developing this topic, let me just
make a notice that this kind of limits is in the core of many collectivist and
 Certainty or Coherence? 165

communitarian philosophical theories. As a background, mention must be

made here about Hegel and Bradley (cf. Norman 1983, 145 ff.). Modern
communitarian philosophers have emphasized that a person is social (cf.,
e.g., Sandel 1982, 147ff., 173ff. etc.; cf. Peczenik 1995, 430-439). But on
the other hand: no sensible coherentist would deny this. He would only
emphasize that each person, from her internal point of view, has no choice
but to construct her own system of beliefs, in this system taking account of
all those social components.
In other words, while Aarnio starts with the society and moves to an
individual, coherentists start with an individual, and move to the society.
The difference, if any, is the level of abstraction. Coherentists know the
social dimensions of knowledge but construct a theory which abstracts from
them. Wittgensteinians refuse to make this abstraction.

VIII. Social Epistemology of Law?

No doubt, it is plausible to take the social aspect into account when

speaking about the law. Law is a social phenomenon. A legal order, a juris-
tic theory, a moral system etc. can be normatively justified ("legitimized")
as coherent in the light of a legitimate tradition. The known philosopher of
science Michael Polanyi (1962, 54) regards the Common Law as a classical
example of a tradition. Any tradition comprises some basic values and pat-
terns of rationality which are taken for granted within the tradition and may
almost never be criticised. It is rooted in certain social and political institu-
tions. It determines its own standards of rational argumentation and prob-
lem-solving. The law, too, "is a tradition. Like all traditions law is com-
prised of beliefs {and} practices which are, or are believed to be, trans-
mitted from the past and which retain authoritative significance in people's
current beliefs, practices, etc."
Yet, how does all this matter in epistemological context? No doubt, tradi-
tion matters. Not the least, it determines the social roles in which each indi-
vidual must view the law and the moral problems. But I do not know of
any general theory which can state precisely what makes the change of tra-
dition coherent. A living tradition is not static, but it evolves. Old questions
find thus new answers which give raise to new questions. The bearers of
the tradition have a latent receptivity for new questions and can develop a
new more profound perspective, regarded as closer to the truth (cf., e.g.
Rolf 1991, 147 ff. with the references to Polanyi 1962). In brief: changes
are OK if they are coherent with a tradition, but the tradition ... changes.
For example, the so-called improvement (Weiterentwicklung ) of the law by
means of analogy and precedents is based on essential similarities between
(actual or hypothetical) cases. The judgement of essentiality must be rooted
166 Aleksander Peczenik

in the legal tradition of the society. But, at the same time, the improvement
may lead to a change of the legal tradition.

Another way to introduce the social aspect is the discourse theory.

According to Habermas (1973, 218), a proposition is true, if the validity
claim with which we utter it is justifiable. This claim is justifiable if and
only if people participating in the rational discourse would agree that ρ (id.
240). The perfectly rational discourse would exist in the ideal speech situa-
tion in which intellectual communication of people would not be impeded
by violence and everybody would have the same chance to ask and answer
questions, interpret others' views, recommend actions etc. (id. 252 ff.).
Robert Alexy has elaborated a well-known theory of rational practical dis-
course (1989, the German edition 1978). Alexy's rationality rules can be
interpreted as a tool helping the participants to make the outcome of the
debate solely depending on coherent reasons, not on violence or emotions.
Some of the rules express the idea of coherence. For example: (1.1) No
speaker may contradict him or herself. This is the demand of logical consis-
tency, and hence a demand of coherence. (1.3) Every speaker who applies
a predicate F to an object a must be prepared to apply F to every other
object which is like a in all relevant respects. (3.1) Whoever proposes to
treat a person A differently from a person Β is obliged to provide justifica-
tion for so doing. These rules express the idea of generality. As stated
before, generality is a criterion of coherence. (2) Every speaker must give
reasons for what he or she asserts when asked to do so, unless he or she
can cite reasons which justify a refusal to provide a justification. In other
words, in a perfectly rational debate, one's views are supported by reasons.
This idea is also expressed in the rule 3.1., see above. Of course, this is the
central idea of coherence. Other rules introduce another element, that is,
the relation between persons participating in the discourse. For example:
(2.1) Everyone who can speak may take part in discourse. (2.2) (a) Every-
one may problematize any assertion, (b) Everyone may introduce any asser-
tion into the discourse, (c) Everyone may express his or her attitudes,
wishes and needs. (2.3) No speaker may be prevented from exercising the
rights laid down in (2.1) and (2.2) by any kind of coercion internal or
external to the discourse. These rules flow from the idea that neither discri-
mination between persons nor violence is a reason. An optimally rational
debate, by definition governed by reasons alone, must thus be free of both
discrimination and violence. (1.4) Different speakers should not use the
same expression in different senses. This rule expresses the idea that the
participants in a perfectly rational discussion must use a common language.
If they do not do it, the discussion is not perfect.

However, I am still not certain how much this shift of the point of view
gives an epistemologist. Alexy's point is not to find effective rules deciding
 Certainty or Coherence? 167

what a system is more coherent than another one. According to Alexy, his
rationality rules "offer no guarantees that an agreement can be achieved in
respect to every practical issue, nor that an agreement which has in fact
been attained is final and unalterable. There are several reasons for this:
first, some discourse rules can only be imperfectly fulfilled; second, not all
the steps in the argumentation are tied to the rules; and third, any discourse
must start from the existing normative convictions of its participants"
(Aarnio, Alexy and Peczenik 1981, 272). This fact creates "the necessity of
a legal order", that is, "the necessity of three... procedures: (i) the proce-
dure of establishing positive legal norms..., (ii) the procedure of legal
argumentation; and (iii) the procedure of legal court proceedings" (Aarnio,
Alexy and Peczenik 1981, 274). If so, what is the point of the rules? They
are not epistemologically necessary in the sense Lehrer's theory seems to
be. Neither they are an efficient method to settle disagreement about coher-
ence. They are so to say in between these two tasks. Perhaps they can be
understood as a skeleton, into which future search for such an efficient
method can be pressed.

IX. Social Coherence Without Epistemology

No wonder that some coherentist-minded legal philosophers prefer not to

speak about coherence as a criterion for moral and legal knowledge. For
example, Ronald Dworkin (1977, 162) advocates a "constructive model",
not a "natural model". "The constructive model... demands that we act of
principle rather than on faith. Its engine is a doctrine of responsibility that
requires men to integrate their intuitions and subordinate some of these,
when necessary, to that responsibility". I have no space here to make an
analysis of Dworkin's theory. It is brilliant but laden with metaphors and
perhaps ambiguous (cf. Raz 1994, 319ff.). Rather, let me ask a simple
question: Cannot one regard theories of discourse, tradition and suchlike as
political rather than epistemological? They do not elucidate the meaning of
the concept "moral knowledge" but they develop a conception of justice.
Not the truth but justice forces us to think coherently in morality and the
law. It may be so, though I think that the distinction is a bit too sophisti-
cated. For if one discovers what is just in a situation via a reflective equi-
librium, then one surely obtains knowledge about what is just. Dworkin
wants to have a model without ontology (id.), and perhaps even without
epistemology. But, in my opinion, such a model must hover in the air.

Never mind, the important point is something else. Even if one is con-
cerned with justice alone and not with knowledge at all, there is no reason
to think that the social element of coherence gives us any profound
improvement of a coherent system each individual constructs for herself
168 Aleksander Peczenik

For the individual in question must incorporate all her knowledge of her
own social situation, all her knowledge of other peoples' preferences and
everything the discourse theorists and tradition theorists have to say, in
order to find a justifiable answer to the question what is the just thing to do
in the given situation.
Justice is precisely like knowledge: from the external point of view, de
facto socially determined, from the internal point of view achievable for
each individual within her own belief system.

X. On the Postulate that the Law Should Be Coherent

Regardless who is right, we can state that Aarnio emphasizes the social
side of epistemology more than I do. Does this difference matters in the
theory of law? I do not think so. Though basing his theory on Wittgenstein,
Aarnio does not underestimate the importance of coherence in the law. And
though basing my theory on coherentism, I try not to overestimate it. I cer-
tainly do not think that a Lehrer-like coherence theory logically implies the
postulate that the law should be as coherent as possible. For such a coher-
ence theory deals with knowledge. Law, on the other hand, is an institu-
tional phenomenon, categorically different from knowledge. This is what
Raz (1994, 289) seems to have in mind when writing that "coherence is but
one of at least two components in any theory of law. The other component
provides the base to which the coherence account applies". This base must
be the same for all "believers" (id. 288). Aarnio would certainly agree with
this and so do I.
Yet, a postulate of coherence of the law is reasonable. It is obvious as
regards the minimum of perfect coherence, i.e. logical consistency. For no
one doubts that inconsistency is apt to create insecurity in the implementa-
tion of the law: neither the authorities would know what rules to apply, nor
the citizens would be able to plan their lives in trust to the law. Consis-
tency of the law is thus an important value, though it must be weighed and
balanced against other values.
Less trivial is the role of the support component in the law. In general,
the definitive moral obligations are all-things-considered ones. This means
that all reasons for and against such an obligation must be considered
before one knows whether one ought to follow the moral norm in question.
It is a conceptual anomaly to tell that one has a moral obligation to do x,
and yet to refuse to tell why. See also Fuller 1986, 91: "coherence and
goodness have more affinity than coherence and evil". It is even more
anomalous to tell that one has a legal obligation to do χ and to refuse to
tell why. To be sure, the "why" may be simply answered by quoting au-
 Certainty or Coherence? 169

thorities. Yet, one may not ignore the inevitability of "hard cases", occurring
when following the rules is open to serious moral doubt. One can under-
stand the concept of legal argumentation in a way supporting the following
thesis: If decisions in a given kind of cases are open to moral doubts, and
yet are made without attention to moral considerations, it is doubtful
whether these decisions can be called "legal". And "moral considerations"
mean ideally to consider "all things", that is coherence. A legal argumenta-
tion which is not, at least implicitly, based on a coherent system of norms
and values is an ad-hoc argumentation. And its result may easily be unjust
(MacCormick 1984, 243). In the modern society, there are also some more
particular reasons for coherent justification of legal decisions and opinions
(cf. Bergholtz 1987, 352 ff.). The parties of a litigation and the citizens in
general do not blindly trust the law-giver nor the decision-makers. They
want to know why the decisions are as they are. Moreover, a coherent justi-
fication of legal norms and interpretations facilitates the social control over
the law-making and law-implementing institutions, and this is an important
requirement of democracy.

A l l these considerations make the postulate of coherence in the law-

giving and in the implementation of the law reasonable. Indeed, coherence
(sometimes called also "unity" or "integrity") of the legal system is a basic
assumption of legal dogmatics and - to some extent - legal decision-
making, too. For example, according to Kelsen, the lawyers presuppose the
Grundnorm: The laws inherit their validity from the legally valid Constitu-
tion. Then, the lawyers take for granted the Grundnorm that the Constitu-
tion is valid, that is, ought to be obeyed (cf. Kelsen 1960, 203 f.). Accord-
ing to Kelsen, the Grundnorm is the ground for the unity of the law. A l l
norms whose validity can be derived from the same Grundnorm constitute
one system of norms. The Grundnorm is their common validity basis. It
also decides that a certain norm belongs to a certain legal order. This
Grundnorm converts variety of norms into unity, since it is the basis of
validity of all norms that belong to this legal order (cf. Kelsen 1960, 197).
Unity - and coherence - of the law is assumed both in legal practice and in
legal dogmatics, but in two different manners. In legal practice, it is
assumed as much as the decided case and its possible precedent function
requires. In legal dogmatics, it is assumed to the extent enabling the scho-
lar to approximate a total view of the legal system as a coherent totality.

On the other hand, such assumptions are not absolute. They compete
with other values. I thus agree with Raz (1994, 289) that perfection (and -
let me add - coherence) should not be "purchased at the cost of losing con-
tact with reality". For example, coherence of law should be an important
goal of legal argumentation. But it must always be weighed and balanced
against other things. One can, for instance, say that coherence of law com-
170 Aleksander Peczenik

petes w i t h the value o f subsidiarity (decision-making at the lowest efficient

level). Namely, i f the decision-making is decentralised, it may be more
just, more informed and so on, but, at the same time — the coherence
between the practice o f decision-making at one place w i l l be incoherent
w i t h the practice at another place. Moreover, stability o f law competes w i t h
the value o f dynamic adaptation o f the law to the so-called requirements o f
the life. B u t dynamism and subsidiarity can be justified only w i t h i n a
coherent m o r a l / p o l i t i c a l theory. Thus coherence o f one level justifies inco-
herence o f another. I n particular, some incoherence i n the law may be justi-
fiable i f it promotes efficient w o r k i n g o f market economy, conflict-free co-
operation o f people end other values - w h i c h in their turn are justifiable
w i t h i n a coherent moral system. This statement does not exclude other
grounds for the thesis that the law should be as coherent as possible. Such
grounds may be important, but they do not have the profoundly epistemolo-
gical status.

A l l this can be said by a coherentist. A n d Aarnio w o u l d agree, w o u l d n ' t

he?

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 ON NORMS AND NORM-PROPOSITIONS

A Sketch

By Georg Henrik von Wright, Helsinki

I.

As is well known, deontic sentences exhibit a characteristic ambiguity.

Or better: these sentences have two, characteristically different uses. They
can be used prescriptively for giving orders or permissions and for impos-
ing prohibitions. Or they can be used descriptively for stating that such and
such orders, permissions or prohibitions have been issued. When used in
the first way, the sentences express norms; when used in the second way,
they are said to express norm-propositions. The first to draw attention to
the importance of the said ambiguity was, to the best of my knowledge, the
Swedish philosopher Ingemar Hedenius.

On a commonly entertained view, norms lack truth-value, are neither true

nor false. Norm-propositions, on the other hand, obviously have truth-value.

Deontic logic or the formal-logical study of normative discourse and con-

cepts dates, in its modern form, from the early 1950s. I myself originally
thought of it as the creation of a Logic of Norms.

But soon doubts began to worry me. How could logical relations, such as
e.g. contradiction and logical consequence, obtain between entities which
are neither true nor false? The question had been debated in the decade
before the "(re)birth" of deontic logic and several, perhaps a majority of
writers had answered it in the negative.

I raised the question in my book Norm and Action (1963) and answered
it by saying that deontic logic is a logic of norm-propositions but has the
peculiarity that it "reflects" genuine logical properties of the norms them-
selves. This was not a very satisfactory answer.

The first to take serious issue with the question was Carlos Alchourrón.
He believed, like myself, in the possibility of a deontic logic of norms. But
he thought that a logic of norm-propositions - he called it Normative Logic
- had to be developed independently. He set himself to the task in an
174 Georg Henrik von Wright

important essay called "Logic of norms and Logic of normative proposi-

tions", published in Logique et Analyse 1969.

II.

By the "classic" or "standard" system of deontic logic I shall understand

a syntactic structure which is, from the point of view of formalism, "prac-
tically identical" with my original 1951 system. When its formulas are
"read" (interpreted) descriptively, Le. as sentences stating that such and
such norms exist (have been given or issued), then the set (system, order)
of norms which its sentences describe turns out to possess two interesting
but also controversial properties: It is complete or "gap-less" and free from
"contradiction".
That a system of norms, e. g. a legal order, is gapless shall mean that any
conceivable state of affairs ρ and its contradictory (negation) ~ ρ is either
permitted or forbidden in the system. In symbols: Pp V Ο ~ ρ and
Ρ ~ ρ V Op. That the system is contradiction-free again shall mean that no
state is such that both it and its contradictory ought to be, nor such that, if
it is obligatory its negation is permitted. In symbols: ~ (Op & Ο ~ p) and
~ ( Op & P~p).
Some legal philosophers, for example Hans Kelsen, have thought that a
legal order of necessity is ("has to be") gapless and contradiction-free. That
this simply is not the case with (most) legal orders has been emphatically
pointed out by Alchourrón and Bulygin, - by both of them individually and
by them jointly in their classic monograph Normative Systems (1971).
The emergence, under the descriptive reading of the formulas, of the two
controversial features was due to some axioms and definitions in the stand-
ard system. One was the assumption that the notions of obligation and per-
mission ("ought" and "may") are interdefinable , i.e. a permission equi-
valent with the negation of an obligation to the contrary. ("Everything
which is not forbidden is thereby permitted.") Another was a Principle of
Permission to the effect that any given state of affairs either is permitted or
its negation is permitted. In the language of the calculus these two ideas
are reflected in the formulas Pp ~ Ο ~ ρ and Pp V Ρ ~ p. From the
two one easily deduces Op —• Pp or the idea that Ought entails May.

III.

Alchourrón's and Bulygin's criticism soon convinced me that a descrip-

tive reading of the formulas of the standard system gives us a formal
system of norm-propositions which cannot claim universal and necessary
 On Norms and Norm-Propositions 175

validity for its formulas. But the further question for which system of such
propositions this claim can be justifiably made did to begin with not con-
cern me. I implicitly trusted Alchourrón's solution. Only of late have I
come to take interest in the problem. Perhaps there is an alternative way of
dealing with it beside the one proposed by Alchourrón in his 1969 paper
and commented on in later writings. This possibility will be sketchily
explored below.

IV.

The schematic form of deontic sentences is as follows:

a) a sentential variable or molecular compond of variables to which has
been prefixed a deontic operator Ο or P, or
b) a molecular compound of sentences as defined in a.
Under the descriptive reading deontic sentences express norm-proposi-
tions. For them the laws of classical sentential (propositional) logic (PL)
hold good and also a principle to the effect that logically equivalent com-
pounds of sentential variables are intersubstitutable salva verìtate. Thus, for
example, 0{p V q) and 0 ( ~ ρ —> q) are logically equivalent (identical).
Otherwise deontic sentences will be regarded as logically independent of
each other; over the members of a given set of sentences of the form a
above, truth-values may be distributed in any possible combination. No spe-
cial logical truths are assumed to hold for norm-propositions. Thus, for
example, whereas Op & Oq logically entails Op, it is not the case that
0(p & q) logically entails Op. (The existence of a norm pronouncing a
conjunction of states of affairs obligatory does not logically entail the exist-
ence of norms pronouncing the individual conjuncts obligatory.)
Now consider the following three formulas:

(1) ~0~p^Pp

(2) Pp - Ο ~p and

(3) PpVP~p.

That a set of norms satisfies (1) means that, given any arbitrary state of
affairs, there either does not exist a norm in the set prohibiting this state or
there exists a norm permitting it. If the set is said to constitute a normative
order or system then, if it satisfies (1) it will be said to be (normatively)
complete or "gapless".
176 Georg Henrik von Wright

That a set satisfies (2) means that an arbitrary state is either not per-
mitted or not forbidden by any norm in the set. That it satisfies (3) means
that any state is such that either it or its contradictory (negation) is per-
mitted by some norm in the set.
From (2) we infer (in PL) ~(Op&P~p). Its validity for a set of
norms means that there are no two norms in the set such that the one norm
pronounces a state obligatory and the other its contradictory permitted.
From (2) and (3) we deduce (in PL) ~ Op V ~ Ο ~ ρ which is equiva-
lent (in PL) with ~ (Op & Ο ~ p). This means that there are no two norms
in the set one of which pronounces a state obligatory and the other pro-
nounces it forbidden.
The conjunction of (1) and (2) is sometimes said to embody the "inter-
definability" of the deontic characters of obligation and permission. (3) I
called in my early paper the Principle of Permission.
The three formulas are logically independent of each other. A set of
norms may satisfy all or some or none of them. If it satisfies all three the
normative order is gapless and contradiction-free; if it satisfies (2) and (3)
but not (1) it is contradiction-free but not gapless; if it satisfies (1) but not
both (2) and (3) the system is gapless but possibly contradictory; and if it
satisfies none of them the system admits both gaps and contradictions.
(2) is equivalent with Op ~ Ρ ~ ρ and (3) with ~ Ρ ~ ρ —> Pp. Thus
from the conjunction of (2) and (3) we also get Op —> Pp. This means that
in a contradiction-free normative code Ought entails May.

V.

In "classic" deontic logic certain distribution principles hold true for the
deontic operators.
Consider the following formulas:

(4) 0{pkq)-*~p~p and

(5) P(p kq) ~0~p.

The first says that the obligatoriness of a conjunction of states entails

that the contradictories of its individual conjuncts are not permitted. The
second says that the permittedness of a conjunction entails that the contra-
dictory of none of its conjuncts is obligatory. Both formulas are theorems
of classic deontic logic.
 On Norms and Norm-Propositions 177

Assume now (1) and (2), i.e. "interdefinability" of the operators. We get
(PL) —• Op & Oq, and then from (4) by transitivity
0(p & q) —> Op & Oq. " I f a conjuctive state is obligatory, so are its con-
juncts." By a similar argument we obtain from (5) Ρ (ρ & q) —> Pp & Pq.
" I f a conjunctive state is permitted, so are its conjuncts."
Consider Op. It is equivalent with 0((p V q) & (ρ V We then
from (4), accepting (1) and (2), derive Op —• Ο (ρ V g). This is the
famous Ross's paradox.
The weaker formula 0/7 —> ~ Ρ (ρ & ~ q) which we get from (4) alone
without assuming interdefinability, "only" says that if there is (alluding to
Ross's well-known example) an order to mail a letter, then it is not per-
mitted to omit mailing it but to burn it instead. That this should be so is
good common sense and not in the least paradoxical - whereas it offends
our natural way of thinking to admit that an order to mail a letter entailed
(the existence of) an order to mail or burn it. The root of the trouble, as I
see it, is the interdefinability-dogma. A wish to avoid the paradox is there-
fore one reason, among others, for according an independent conceptual
status to obligation (prohibition) and permission.

VI.

What is the logical status of principles like (1) - (5)? They must not be
regarded as logically true. Whether a set of norms satisfies them is a con-
tingent matter. In particular, if one admits that a normative order may con-
tain "gaps" or even norms which "contradict" one another, then one cannot
expect or insist on that the principles (1) - (3) are satisfied in this order.
The same is true of the distribution principles (4) and (5).
These facts, however, do not mean that the principles in question may be
dismissed as uninteresting to a theory of norms. They may be regarded as
having a normative force as ideal rules for norm-giving (legislating) activ-
ity. A lawgiver may think that the normative (for example legal) order he
is engaged in creating should conform to one or several of the principles in
question - and adjust his normative activity accordingly. One could then
say that he follows the rules as meta-norms.
I shall here not further inquire into the question how such meta-norms
may affect the issuing and withdrawing (coming into existence and passing
out of existence) of norms. One single example will suffice:
Suppose there is in a given normative code no norm permitting but also
no norm prohibiting either the state of affairs ρ or its contradictory ~ p.
There is thus a "gap" in the code. It can be abolished ("covered up") in
one of two ways, viz. either by permitting this state and its contradictory or
13 FS Aarnio
178 Georg Henrik von Wright

by prohibiting this state or its contradictory. If the law-giver agrees that the
law should be without gaps, he will have to perform either one of these
"legislative acts". But no norm-logical considerations can tell him which
alternative to choose.

References

Alchourrón , Carlos E.: "Logic of Norms and Logic of normative propositions."

Logique et analyse Nr. 47, 1969. - Alchourrón, Carlos E. & Bulygin, Eugenio: Nor-
mative Systems. Wien: Springer-Verlag, 1971. - von Wright, G. H.: Norm and
Action. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.
IV. New Constitutionalism and Legalism
in Modern State Legal Systems
 LEGALITY WITHOUT LEGALISM

By Zenon Bankowski and Neil MacCormick, Edinburgh

I . Introduction

Legalism is a subject in which both present authors have been long inter-
ested, originally from rather opposed points of view, but now in search of
common ground. Bankowski's earliest book (with Geoff Mungham) Images
of Law (1976) amounted to a sustained critique of one kind of legalism.
MacCormick on the other hand, at a symposium convened by Aulis Aarnio
at Murikka in 1988 advanced a case for an 'Ethics of Legalism' (1989), in
critical response to some aspects of (American) Critical Legal Studies. It
sets a happy opening note for this essay in tribute to a great scholar and a
great friend to remember that memorable Murikka symposium, with excel-
lent Finnish hospitality on the shores of the lake, and a distinguished
German philosopher of law smoking his pipe for the sake of warmth while
bathing in the lake post sauna, and above all with the deep-going
exchanges of ideas about law that are so characteristic of the meetings of
the Finnish section of the IVR. We have both profited on many occasions
from the Finnish IVR's hospitality and from that of Aulis and Aira Aarnio.
As members of IVR in its World-wide role, we have been glad to partici-
pate during Aarnio's distinguished presidency, and as scholars we have
benefited from his penetrating approach to law and to issues of rationality
in law.
The question in this paper is about rationality in law and in our response
to law. Autonomy in morality seems to us to be fundamental to moral
agency, and from that point of view it seems that we confront positive law
as something extraneous to the individual will. Is the fate of the law-abid-
ing citizen then that of a heteronomous being, bound by an extraneous
will? Or is there a moral stance of legalism that one could autonomously
adopt, freely taking the positive law as one's guide to conduct so far as it
goes. Should the rules of the law be adopted as part of a personal moral
position and commitment?
Some have argued that such a stance and ideology is very common
among members of the legal profession. This is worthy of investigation.
We start by reflecting on Judith Shklar's characterization of legalism.
182 Zenon B a k o w s k i and Neil MacCormick

II. Shklar and the Meaning of Legalism

Judith Shklar (1986) describes the legalistic attitude well. For her it is an
ethical attitude. It represents correct social and personal conduct as a matter
of rule following, and the rules as fixing the rights and obligations that we
have. It is thus both a personal ethic and a social ideal. It reaches its high
point, Shklar claims, in the legal systems of the Western World. It thus
also serves as an ideology for those who value these institutions; for those,
like lawyers, who are professionally involved in staffing and running them.
It is a moral attitude that wants to insulate law from politics, preferences
and the like. Though it is something that specifically originates in lawyers'
thoughts about the world, it seeps through a wide spectrum of opinion and
people. Legalism, as an ideology, can run across the institutions of morals
and law. Thus some moralities can be highly legalistic while others are the
exact opposite.
As Shklar points out, the great philosophers of the western tradition have
insisted on morality as something that can be deduced from prior rules.
This is so even if these rules are, as in Hobbes and Hume, based on the
passions. For Hobbes and Hume the reason that we have the particular
rules that we do is something do with the way we are as animal beings.
Thus for Hume we have desires for comfort and procreation which drive us
to construct societies on the basis of 'artificial virtues'. These virtues, jus-
tice is an example, do not directly relate to some drive that we have.
Rather we construct them in order that we achieve certain ends that are
based on drives we have - 'Reason is only the slave of the passions'. We
then follow the rules that constitute this virtue even when it is not though it
might not seem to be in our immediate interest. This emphasis on instru-
mental reasoning is used by Hume to debunk those who see these virtues
as part of some objective morality or natural law. For him the strict rules
that surround the rituals of primitive societies are little different in principle
from the rituals that surround, for example, the way that we buy and sell
property, or the regard that we have for the sacredness of ownership. In
both cases the rules are artificial, a product of human artifice, but their
very point is that we must observe them meticulously. They serve a useful
end, but only provided we follow them without direct regard for the end
they serve.

The Humean approach applied to developed legal systems yields what

H. L. A. Hart calls the 'minimum content of natural law'. Given certain
facts about human nature and the fact that we want to survive, we can
know that we have to have certain sorts of rules in society. Thus the fact
that we are not immortal but are both highly vulnerable and approximately
equal in strength means that we have to have rules that regulate the use of
 Legality without Legalism 183

force in society, and enshrine a right to life and to personal security against
violence. Likewise, the need to use the products of nature to secure individ-
ual and group survival points to the need for some form of property law
regulating people's rights to use of and access to material things. Rules are
not in fact of value in themselves; but the values they serve are effectively
served only where a reasonably strict attitude to the rules is maintained.
Kant, by contrast, might be seen as the high priest for a rule based mor-
ality. We can see this in the categorical imperative, ordaining that we shall
act only under a maxim that can be universalised as a rule for all. We see
it in the insistence that our emotions and inclinations, even our needs, in
the phenomenal world cannot determine what morally one ought to do.
What is important is following the rule of right. Acting in the form of law
is good in itself.
What contrasts with such legalistic moralities? It is the abundance of
irrationalist moralities, based on the heart and on feeling or 'the will to
power'. Existentialism, and the 'flower power moralities' of the sixties also
come into consideration. But we must be careful not to dismiss these alter-
natives out of hand. 'All you need is love', even when seen in the context
of the heady days of dope smoking might not seem a satisfactory alterna-
tive to Kant. But what it does point to is that social values can be legalistic
or non legalistic; that saints and heroes are as important as rights and
duties and that morality always aims towards supererogation. Here the
question of what is 'owed' does not have pride of place. What we might
distinguish here is moral systems that depend on ideas like 'authenticity' or
being 'true to oneself'. These can easily collapse into irrationality or worse.
Thus the ethics of the heart, moral action must be out of the compassion or
feeling that you have for someone, can easily collapse into mindlessness.
What is right to do is what you feel It can also collapse into the more
totalitarian tendencies of doing what is in the 'blood' ; of the importance of
the 'superman'. Here also we can see a 'situational' ethic. What is impor-
tant is an appreciation of the particular situation and what it is right to do
in the unique circumstances of that particular situation. This can depend
upon the careful weighing of reasons or, as in act utilitarianism, the careful
calculation of what the consequences will be. It can, however, collapse into
an excuse to do anything at all.

Religion also provides us with an example. Christianity can be seen as a

legalistic religion, especially in the Pauline tradition. But there has always
been a strong sector in the church which has stressed the opposite.
Christianity was a religion of love and that what mattered was not so much
following the law as being pure at heart. Jesus came to destroy the old law.
It is well illustrated by the Pharisee as he stands in the temple proud that
he obeys the laws and is not like the sinners. Jesus damns that pharisee.
184 Zenon B a k o w s k i and Neil MacCormick

One can also here the emphasis on mysticism and the rejection of ritual
that goes with some of the expressions of Christianity and indeed other
forms of religion. What matters is oneness with God rather than ritual and
rules. Shklar quotes Petrazycki who sees the important distinction as not
being between law, morals and religion. Rather we must look to the distinc-
tion between legalistic and non-legalistic values. We may then place forms
of social ordering on a continuum, running from the legalistic to the non-
legalistic.

Petrazycki thinks that the term 'morality' ought to be limited to autono-

mous 'other worldly', self imposed duties, a view he ascribes to Kant. Here
we see an ambiguity in looking at Kant. He can be considered as reaching
the acme of a rule based morality and thus of a form of legalism. Yet he is
also taken as the epitome of autonomous morality. Indeed R. P. Wolff
(1976) considers him to be just that. The categorical imperative is some-
thing that you set for yourself. It is thus a case of acting autonomously. But
it is a rule. Though you make it, it applies in all instances in which its
conditions are fulfilled. This point can be made clearer if we look to
the difference between generality and universalizability. For L. L. Fuller
(1969), one of the eight conditions of law, is that it has to be a rule. This is
not to say that it has to be general. He disagrees with John Austin who
claims that laws properly so called must be general. For I can intelligibly
make a rule that only applies to a single person. That does not negate its
status as a rule for it applies universally each time the conditions for its
application are fulfilled. It is a law because, though it might apply only to
me, I know that each time the conditions that the law specifies are fulfilled,
it will apply. And this is the case even if I might be able to calculate
empirically that the conditions will in fact only apply once. This is also the
difference between a command and a rule. It is not generality, as Austin
though, but rather that the command will connect up to all the other
instances when it is applied. I cannot teach behaviour merely by command.
That command must finally be understood as a rule. If I teach dog to hold
his paw out when I offer him a bone, I command him. But he learns when
he sees that a rewards will be applied each time he does so. And this will
not contingently depend upon the particular instance. One might say that
the rule makes you act heteronomously but it is autonomously set.

In the law, legality is expressed, for Shklar, in what she calls formalism.
It is in that way that the law gets the requisite degree of impartiality. It is
viewed as a system of perfectly clear and consistent rules. These contain
precise and 'scientifically' analyzed terms, elaborated out of perfectly anal-
yzed and synthesised concepts, the concepts being unvaryingly used in the
same sense throughout the whole body of law. Law is treated as a self con-
tained and autogenerative system which needs to be kept distinct from poli-
 Legality without Legalism 185

tics in order to organise our lives. Politics is a dirty business and it is only
through the pristine objectivity of pure law that we can have clean systems.
This can also be seen in the 'World Peace through World Law' move-
ments. Law, which is right, will replace politics, which is power even if
hidden power. Thus law is cut off from being contaminated by politics and
has a history of its own. International law is a 'primitive stage in the his-
tory of law'. Though law in general has 'clouds of history trailing behind
it', the content of this is seldom spelt out. It is as if law is its own history,
prompted by its own internal mechanisms (Bankowski and Mungham 1976:
32 - 38).

Legalism is uncompromising because rules are, according to Shklar,

binary. They either exist and apply or they do not. So legalism has nothing
to say about relations between incompatible systems of rules except that
one set must be binding. Shklar says:

The urge to draw a clear line between law and non-law has led to the construc-
tion of ever more refined and rigid systems of formal definitions. This procedure
has served to isolate law completely from the social context within which it
exists. Law is endowed with its own discrete integral history, its own 'science'
and its own values, which are all treated as a single 'block' sealed off from gen-
eral social theory, from politics, and from morality. The habits of mind appropri-
ate, within narrow limits, to the procedures of law courts in the most stable legal
systems have been expanded to provide a legal theory and ideology with an
entire system of thought and values. This procedure has served its own ends very
well: it aims at preserving law from irrelevant considerations, but it has ended by
fencing legal thinking off from all contact with the rest of historical thought and
experience. (1986: 2 - 3)

Though legalism's ideal of objectivity through formalism depends upon

some sort of consensus, it is not the only thing involved. Legalism pre-
scribes agreement through rule-following. Though the theory uses rules to
create agreement, rules also presuppose that agreement. Thus we can see
that natural law theory is not exempt from the ambit or ambitions of legal-
ism. It is the rules that are important, not how they are arrived at. For leg-
alism the power of natural law would lie in the rules that it generates and
not in the nature, God or practical reason that might be said to produce
them. The particular moral view that natural law has, becomes infected
with the neutral ideology of legalism. Rules save the day and evade per-
sonal responsibility.

This is not to say that laws do not encompass the values of the particular
culture that they find themselves in. Legalists and lawyers admit that. The
claim here is rather that no matter where the rules come from, the effect of
legalism is to make them appear objective and unchangeable. Legalism
doesn't so much deny the connection between law and values as hide it and
186 Zenon B a k o w s k i and Neil MacCormick

tuck it away from view. Since it concentrates on the rules to the exclusion
of everything else, the rules lose their sense of contingency. They dominate
the entire moral universe. They are the islands of stability in a chaotic uni-
verse. This kind of view is something of the sort that was set up as a target
of criticism in Images of Law , and it plays a similar part for many pro-
ponents of Critical Legal Studies. This concentration on law and the rules can
tend to make us forget that it is we who make the rules and we that can
change them. We see ourselves instead as the technicians of rules that we
do not and cannot challenge. The morality of law (or of legality) becomes
one of legalism; of the purely technical manipulation of rules. The rules
appear as though they have a life of their own which cannot be challenged.
They control us rather than we control them. What we concentrate on is the
rules themselves; rather than to look at their instantiation in the social con-
text. Fiat iustitia ruat caelum or as Kant would argue, one should act on
one's universalizable maxim no matter what the consequences; never tell a
lie, not even to save a life.

III. Legalism and Legal Theory

Shklar connects systems of legal theory which do not, at first sight, seem
at all closely connected. Thus analytic positivism, natural law and the
American realist movement are seen as connected by their link with legal-
ity. She does this by making a connection between, legalism, formalism,
and the felt need for certainty. Let us examine her view of these theories in
turn.

7. Positivism

For Shklar, analytic positivism, and positivism in general, have an easy

connection to legalism. Positivism in all its forms is concerned with look-
ing at law as a system of rules, divorced form other branches of human
affairs. It is this that makes it necessary for positivism to separate law from
morals. This can be seen as an aspect of the search for certainty. Since
morals are seen as subjective and unclear as with all aspects of value, then
the only certainty that can be got is from rules. They are clearly and objec-
tively out there. They do not depend upon the subjective preferences of the
people. This certainty, for positivism, is achieved through formalism. A
formalism which, as we have seen, means the ability to make clear and
objective deductions from rules. The certainty stems from the agreement
but it is agreement directly through the rules. Not as in the case of natural
law which takes an agreement, and in some cases at least, transforms it
into rules. Shklar claims that positivism ignores the social conditions neces-
 Legality without Legalism 187

sary for the creation of agreement in any particular society as irrelevant to

that certainty produced by the rules. Thus it is important to show how
values, especially in the shape of morality, do not impinge and indeed are
separate from law.
How does this work? Shklar examines one historically important way.
Here the claim was that morals were internal whereas law was external. To
understand this, she claims, one has to understand the Christian context.
For Christians, it is the difference between sin and immorality that is
important. Sin has to do with the personal relationship to God that every-
one has. It is something between you and God. The state of sin is the
breaking of that relationship with God. When we are in sin we are in Hell
because we can no longer stand to be within the burning love of God.
Immorality is what we externally do. Every act of immorality is necessarily
sinful. Immorality can be private and public. Here, for Shklar, it maps on
to the debate as to whether only public (as opposed to private) violations of
common morality can be subjected to criminal sanctions. But this is not
internality in the sense of sin. Sin in that sense cannot be touched by law
for, in the end only you can mend your relationship with God. The church
can help you. It tries by enforcing certain precepts in order that you might
not fall into the state of sin. But it cannot, in theory, touch the actual rela-
tionship. On that analogy morals is something private and internal. It
cannot be touched by the force of the law. The law can never get at the
internality that is the essence of morals. Shklar emphasises that this did not
mean that governments stopped trying to punish sin. But it was only when
sin stopped being generally believed in that punishing morals came to be
seen as such an outrage.
It is only, she claims, if one believes in sin in this internal sense, that
punishing morals becomes an issue. For by and large the practical question
of both theologians and governments was whether acts that were private,
but not in that internal sense, should be punished. However it was not only
religious moralities that stressed this internality. Consider the morality of
motives that lays emphasis on the motive of the act. This extends the scope
of individual autonomy. By making the internal the distinguishing feature
of the moral it stands against external pressure on the individual. For how
can one be made to think right. Thus external demands for compliance are
not only wrong but they do not have any real effect on the internal and
thus the morals of the individual. The individual may do what he is forced
to but that will not make them moral. 'Iron bars do not a prison make'.

Law then, might be reserved for dealing with human beings in gross
while morals deals with the personal and particular. But all of this takes us
back to that autonomy that Petrazycki wanted to be reserved for morals.
Let us see how this might come out in the way law and morals might be
188 Zenon B a k o w s k i and Neil MacCormick

treated by some positivists. How do you separate moral rules from legal
rules? For Hart and those that follow him that is a grave difficulty. For the
theory rests on the definition of what makes practices in the world rules of
obligation. This is done by first of all by showing how the idea of habits,
used by Austin and Bentham, relating as they do to observed regularities of
external behaviour, are inadequate to explaining the notion of rules. To
understand the normativity of rules we need to reflect upon the human atti-
tude to the things they do as a rule as distinct to what they do from habit.
[I]f a social rule is to exist some at least must look on the behaviour in question
as a general standard to be followed by the group as a whole. A social rule has
an "internal" aspect in addition to the external aspect which it shares with a
social habit and which consists in the regular uniform behaviour which an ob-
server could record. (Hart 1961)

There are two other aspects to this distinction. Deviation is regarded as

behaviour which is open to criticism and that criticism is regarded as justi-
fied or legitimate. These are aspects of what Hart calls the 'internal point
of view'. But there is, as MacCormick points out, danger of circularity
here. For the internal point of view is supposed to depend upon a critical
reflective attitude while that is itself explained in terms of justification and
criticism. We should therefore best see this in two aspects. One a cognitive
attitude, seeing patterns of behaviour in seeming random human actions.
Second in a volition which comprehends some wish or preference that the
act or abstention from the act be done in the envisaged circumstances. So
rules of obligation depend upon patterns and attitudes. But how, on the
basis of this, can one distinguish morality?
For Hart, in primitive society there is no distinction between morality
and law. But there may develop dispute-settling procedures. Out of them
might come institutionalised systems with enforcement procedures and
institutions for authoritatively making decisions. From this a specialised
system of rules could grow up. We can see here that the problem is solved
by situating the law as such into institutions of this kind. In the process of
the institutionalisation of certain rules as legal rules, it is of course possible
that they will diverge from the morality of various groups in society. So we
get the question why or whether people should morally obey the rules laid
down by the institutions of law. Institutions then are the key. The only
thing that differentiates legal from other rules is their special institutionali-
sation. But as we have seen legalism has precisely nothing to say as to the
relationship between different systems of rules. All it can say, as a matter
of binary logic, is that one must be valid and the other invalid.

This last is the point reached by one of us (See MacCormick 1994) in

the 1993 Hart Memorial Lecture. The argument that follows from the point
can at least to some extent be mapped on to the internal/external distinc-
 Legality without Legalism 189

tion discussed above. This represents law as being distinguished from

morals not only by its institutionality but also by its heteronomy. Morals is
the realm of personal responsibility for a subjectively binding, hence in
principle controversial judgment of right and wrong. Positive law can
secure objectivity and a degree of interpersonal certainty, but at the cost of
being heteronomous, externally imposed. We may indeed need this objec-
tivity and relative certainty in order to be able to live our lives in society
without endless conflict and dissent over every morally significant issue
that arises. We need it precisely because of its crucial difference from mo-
rality. So law and morals are conceptually quite distinct, but they comple-
ment each other.
One can see how this contradicts Shklar's argument. For what she is
arguing is that both law and morality can be on a continuum of legalistic
or non legalistic. Here MacCormick is reserving the legalistic for law and
the non legalistic for morals. His is a version of Petrazycki's argument. But
it is not one that denies the relevance of law to morals. The position here
lies beyond Hart's in the way it makes the conceptual and institutional
distinction, but also in its claim that the two main forms of normative order
complement each other. At the bottom line, however, this remains a
position within the camp of positivism. The work of the legal scientist is
concerned with the legal side of this complementarity.
There is indeed common ground with the earlier Bankowski/Mungham
position. But Ban<'kowski remains insistent that, properly understood, both
law and morals have inbuilt tensions between autonomy and heteronomy.
The question is how are they to be articulated. When dealing with law
then, we must view the relation between autonomy and heteronomy as
something internal to law. it cannot be solved by expelling autonomy into
another, though complementary, normative and conceptual framework. That
way may lead to an unacceptable form of legalism.

2. Natural Law

For the natural lawyers it is quite clear that the attempted purification of
law does not work by bracketing law off from morals. But for Shklar it is
seeing the fragility of consensus that leads natural lawyers to seek some-
thing that will produce the conditions of certainty. This does not imply that
legalism is thereby eschewed. In fact from that certainty springs a strong
rule system which overrides all other systems. 'Lex iniusta non est lex.
Finnis (1980) has attacked this view. In a sophisticated analysis, he
shows how this is not in fact true of natural law systems. In them, the legal
and the moral do not either match up or cancel each other out in that
190 Zenon Barìkowski and Neil MacCormick

binary way. His emphasis on practical reason does much to make his view
of natural law non-legalistic in Shklar's sense. But one can see the germ of
truth in what Shklar has to say. For in his treatment of authority, Finnis
adopts a conventionalist view with elaborations. For him authority has no
necessary nor unitary origin. Society by society, we confront it as it has
there turned out to exist. What matters is not how the persons or institu-
tions that enforce societal co-ordination have come to be in a position to do
this as the fact that, somehow or other, they are in fact to some extent able
to do this and to have their directives treated as authoritative by others. The
mode of achieving authority does not so much matter as the fact that the
authority is effective in its role. For what practical reason demands is some
sort of co-ordination. Authority is legitimate in so far as it can achieve co-
ordination, even where it falls short of setting terms for co-ordination that
match up to what is morally ideal or even entirely satisfactory.
It is here that we can see the force of Shklar's point. For it is at this
intersection that the slide begins. Certainty is only guaranteed by the rules
which, in the end are made by the person in authority. Shklar is making the
point that historically natural law has used a particular form of certainty to
produce, in some cases, legalistic systems. This is not a necessary truth
about theories of natural law. Her point is that they are not in themselves
immune from a legalistic morality. The converse is also true. For legalism
as a practice does need agreement. The classical liberal view is that the
agreement comes from the rules. But legalism does not, as we have seen,
look beyond the rules to the social conditions that make up that agreement.
This agreement is in fact extremely fragile - a fact which extreme market
liberals such as Hayek recognise. For them the 'great society' is extremely
fragile. But guarding this fragile good is the price we have to pay for living
any sort of civilised life. The agreement brought about by rules does in fact
need a whole complex of agreements and consensus among those who are
part of the legal order. Without this it would be very difficult to keep the
system going. That is why, according to Shklar, judges find natural law
theorising so congenial. It gives them the certainty and agreement that is a
necessary pre-condition of the certainty that the rules produce. It is a way
of guaranteeing that possibility. For Shklar then, natural law theory's great-
est ideological function has been to produce a prefabricated set of rules that
people want.

3. American Legal Realism

But this does not only apply to natural law theorising. Shklar also tries to
show how this quest for certainty can be found in the American Legal Rea-
lism. She thus dubs it 'first cousin' of legalism. At first sight the Realists
were far removed from legalism. They were interested in social reform and
 Legality without Legalism 191

wanted to effect the New Deal legislation. They were thus committed to
arguing that the law was not a pre-ordained 'brooding omnipresence in the
sky'. Those were precisely the sort of arguments that the Supreme Court
was using in order to block the New Deal policies. They were influenced
by psycho-analysis. Frank attacked law as being the outmoded expression
of the father figure which we all still hanker after. He argued for a law
administered by judges who, through analysis, could administer socially
sane policies without being hamstrung by legalism in the shape of the
father figure. In fact the entire Realist attack was an attack on the formal-
ism dominant in the law schools of the time.

They claimed that the law in action was more important than the rules in
the book. Thus one had to look to what actually happened rather than look-
ing for legal rules in text books. This is the beginning of sociological theo-
rising in the law. The implication was that the rules were something that
did not just 'exist' but were socially produced. To know them one had to
look to that social process. They went further than that. They also claimed
that, however the rules were produced, they did not have to be followed as
a matter of logic. There was no tight logical connection between rule and
decision. A rule could be made to justify almost any decision. So the
judges who claimed that they were only following the rules when they
struck down New Deal legislation were hiding behind an ideological smoke
screen. They struck down the legislation, not because they had to, but
because they did not like it.

Now this is obviously the sort of particularising, non rule-bound way of

looking at it that is profoundly non legalistic. But the problem then arises:
if you reject all father figures and see the law as something creative, how
do you know that what you decide is right? The opposite of legalism
cannot be chaos, there must be some sort of order. Frank (1942), in fact,
came to look to certainty after all. What drove him to this was the com-
plaint that the Securities and Exchange Commission, which he came to be
in charge of, was operating in a ruleless and arbitrary way. His argument
against these charges was that the courts could not provide the certainty
that was craved. For they had no means of producing the accurate facts
without which sound decisions could not be made. His Commission, which
was staffed by experts and investigators, could. Ironically, the 'fact scepti-
cism' of Frank was not an epistemological scepticism about the possibility
of finding objective facts in the world. Rather it was an attack on the trial
process which he claimed was not able to produce them at all. He thus
proposed an inquisitorial form of process which would be staffed by
experts, trained in getting at the truth of the matter. He thus, Shklar says,
produced a way of getting at certainty while attacking the traditional court
system. The experts were there in the same way as the law was 'there'.
192 Zenon B a k o w s k i and Neil MacCormick

And this expertise took on a neutral, clean aspect in the same way that the
law did. Thus chaos was reduced because the law's certainty was founded
in the agreement of experts who could make the law predictable and safe.

IV. Legalism, Formalism and Certainty

There are echoes here of the way that in the perversions of a communi-
tarian political ethic, 'community' can come to be a mere cloak that covers
the wielding of arbitrary power by the few. But we have to be careful here.
Shklar's strategies for presenting Natural Lawyers and the Realists as 'first
cousins' to legalism are rather ambiguous. For it certainly does not seem
like the legalism that we first described. The certainty that is generated
does not stem from rules. It comes rather from vague and shadowy bodies
of knowledge, that cover the power of the few who claim the expertise to
know this. It is precisely the sort of 'rule in the name of the people' or
'rule by experts' which those in favour of rules fear will happen if law is
jettisoned. For the position under scrutiny does not appear to be formal or
formalist. We saw that a mark of legalism was its certainty. But it is also
its formality; it does not matter what the result is as long as it comes
through the rules, the due process of the law.

But for the realists and the natural lawyers substantive justice matters;
the correctness of the particular decision in the particular circumstances is
also important. Legality works with formal justice which ignores the mate-
rial circumstances of the case as long as the rules are followed. Everything
is treated equally under the laws. Whereas, in substantive justice, the rules
are not so important as getting the right decision. But, one might reply, this
sort of formalism also occurs in the rule of experts. In the end what matters
is whether the result was generated by the expert. This is also a form of
formalism. The only test of the correctness of a decision can be whether an
expert in good faith made it, for the experts are the only ones that can
know. Therefore the criterion of validity is, as in positivism, a formalistic
one. One of pedigree, though the pedigree might be different.

But there is also, for Shklar, a sort of ideological relation. For lawyers
and judges are trained and attuned to the need for certainty and objectivity
in the law. They will automatically, if law seems to fail, look for the cer-
tainty that these other forms engender. If they begin to fail then they will
go back to the old ideas. Thus Shklar says, when the New Deal, the ideo-
logical driving force of the Realists was won, Realism was driven more and
more to legalism. In their later work, some of the leading Realists came to
seem to be nothing more than enlightened legalists. At the same time, the
zeal for creativity etc. in legal education led to a counter trend which
 Legality without Legalism 193

started to reinforce legalism again. We can see, in some respects, how this
story is once again being repeated in the CLS movement in America.

V. Legality: The Same as Legalism?

What we have discussed are all ways of putting certainty into our lives
by some sort of formalism. This might be achieved either through formally
established and rather strictly interpreted rules, or through formal recogni-
tion of the conclusions of experts, or through reliance on an objectively
cognizable natural law. This formalism can in many contexts seem, or be
made to appear, highly attractive. Yet it is open to abuse and can in various
ways, Shklar claims, lead to tyranny and stultification in social life. But
what of legality? Is that linked to legalism and the negative ideology that
flows from over-reliance on rules? Legalism and legality seem to be clos-
ely linked and legality turns out to be rather negative because contaminated
with legalism. Shklar seems to me to be confused. At first she makes the
distinction. Narrow legalism is not to be conflated with the noble theory of
legality. We can see this when she discusses the Nuremberg trials. Her
attack on them not on the ground of what they brought about, but on the
use of the trial-form to bring that about. The error or even crime was to
represent the Nuremberg process as a legal process. The justification of the
trials could only be, according to Shklar, political necessity. They could
teach the German political elite what the loss of legality meant by conduct-
ing a trial which, though it could not be justified by legality, was fair in
stating reasonably exact charges and then proving them by recourse to
incontrovertible evidence. The solution under its guise of ostensible legal-
ism worked because it brought back respect for legality among the German
elite who then fashioned Germany into a Rechtsstaat. This could not work
in Japan because the Japanese did not have a legalistic culture to appeal to.
Most saw the war crimes trials as the work of conquerors acting as con-
querors will always do.
These arguments seem to suggest approval of legalism as a policy which
can, in certain cases, provide a way of showing respect for legality. The
implication of this is however, that the two do have close connections. Yet
Shklar nowhere explains clearly how or on what points the two do differ.
She does, as we have seen, argue that legalism is not only to be connected
with law but spreads across all forms of ordering as well, notably morality
and politics. But her view of what it in fact is, is rather more difficult to
detect. Is legalism to be defined by the need for certainty and formalism,
described in the way we have talked of it above, or through rules? In the
beginning it is rules that she singles out for attack. Her examples contrast
nomian and antinomian systems in law and morality. Later, it appears that

14 FS Aarnio
194 Zenon B a k o w s k i and Neil MacCormick

she sees the defining feature of legalism as formality and certainty. In this
light, she comes to portray nomian systems as being the ones that are
necessarily legalistic because they necessarily aim to produce that certainty
and formalism.
Hence her book is ambiguous. It is no wonder that lawyers, as she says
in the second edition of Legalism , looked at her work askance. For they
saw her attack on rule-based solutions as approval of a more radical anti-
nomian posture in law than which she actually favoured when she came
to explaining her own liberal and tolerant ideology.
Our aim here is to show how legality can be insulated from the attack on
legalism in its negative connotations, and to show how a reliance on rules
do not necessarily lead to that admittedly negative ideology of legalism.
Here it is important to note that formalism and certainty, which for her are
the defining features of legalism, are something which she sees people as
always turning to. To an extent, we agree. States and other durable social
organizations must order themselves in ways that are intelligible to those
whom they govern, even when in their democratic forms the people gov-
erned also participate in governance. To this extent, the legalism that insists
on rules and on their being followed especially by those who hold power in
government is no more than insistence on legality, and legality is a real
virtue in forms of government.
It remains true, however, that rules without underlying principles of a
kind that could be assented to by a rational autonomous being are rules that
can be the implements of tyranny. It is also true that every application of a
rule is also an interpretation of it. Approaches to interpretation that ignore
or undervalue the need for attention to principles, and to the consequences
of decision judged against implicit values and principles of law, are unde-
sirable on the same ground if to a lesser degree. Legalism as vice is indeed
the vice of this narrow governance of rules, unleavened by the principled
approach to interpretation.
Legality without legalism (negative legalism) is then the desirable state
of things in a well ordered normative system, whether state-law or any
other institutional normative order. It remains, from the agent's point of
view heteronomous order, and never trumps the ultimate sovereignty of the
moral agent. But the rational universalizer surely has regard to the need for
order in community, and thereby the need for legality without legalism.
The principled interpretation of heteronomous normative order is in fact
that least likely to pose irresoluble norm conflicts for the reasonable and
conscientious person. This volume is dedicated to one of the most reason-
able and conscientious persons we have had the good fortune to work with,
thereby gaining admission to the circle of his friends. With these words, we
pay the tribute of friendship.
 Legality without Legalism 195

References

Bankowski, Z. and Mungham, G. (1976): Images of Law, London: Routledge and

Kegan Paul. - Fuller, L. (1969): The Morality of Law, New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press. - Finnis, J. (1980): Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Clarendon
Press. - Frank, J. N. (1942): If men were Angels: Some Aspects of Government in
a Democracy, New York: Harper Bros. - Hart, H. L. H. (1961): The Concept of
Law, Oxford, The Clarendon Press. - MacCormick, D. N. (1989): 'The Ethics of
Legalism' in Ratio Juris, pp. 184- 193. - MacCormick, D. N. (1994): The Concept
of Law and the Concept of Law in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 1 - 23. —
Shklar, J. (1986): Legalism, London. - Wollf, R. P. (1976): In Defence of Anarch-
ism, New York: Harper and Row.
 AUTHORITY AND ROLES

By Jes Bjarup, Stockholm

I.

It is a pleasure to write this paper to honour Aulis Aarnio and his accom-
plishments within the world of legal science, legal and social philosophy,
providing a framework for rational argumentation among scholars. I first
met him in the beginning of the 1970s, at a Nordic Symposium, where we
shared common interests in the problems of life and their relations to law
and legal science. We have been in touch ever since. Being nominated to
the chair in Helsinki he provided invitations to visit Finland. His nomina-
tion to be the President of IVR also meant that I had the chance to meet
him outside the Scandinavian countries.
I have given a description of Aulis Aarnio and one can ask the question
whether there is something common in this description. In his writings,
Aarnio often refers to Ludwig Wittgenstein and it is possible to use Witt-
genstein's advice: "look and see whether there is anything in common."
The answer is that there is something common, that is his personal identity.
I do not want to enter into the question what makes the personal identity of
the single human being, although this question surely is important for the
guideline Aarnio is committed to, that is "Know Thyself." 1 I shall follow
John Locke's description of a person as "a thinking intelligent being, that
has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same think-
ing thing in different times and places; which it does only by that con-
sciousness, which is inseparable from thinking and essential to it: it being
impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does per-
ceive." 2 I shall thus leave aside whether Locke's criterion of memory is
tenable. What I need for my purpose is Locke's view that a human being
can be conceived as a rational and reflective person capable of acting
morally and legally according to reasons. As Locke also writes, the concept
of a person is "a forensick term appropriating actions and their merit; and

1
Aulis Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justification.
Dordrecht 1987 p. xvi.
2
John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (ed. Peter H. Nid-
ditch), Oxford 1975 p. 335, cf. p. 346.
198 Jes Bjarup

so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and

misery." This view of human beings is, I believe held by many lawyers,
and non-lawyers as well, although it is not unchallenged as I shall notice
below. On this understanding Aarnio is surely a person. This invites
another way of looking and seeing whether there is something in common
in my description of him. Again the answer is that there is something
common, that is the element of authority. Having graduated he is qualified
to act as a lawyer. By his nomination to the chair of professor, he is later
recognized to be a legal authority. By his membership of the IVR and his
election to the IVR presidency he also has authority as Mr. President of the
IVR. Thus there is this common element of authority. This is the topic of
my paper. I wish to address the question how to look at authority.

II.

Considering the concept of authority it is common knowledge that this

concept gives rise to philosophical troubles. In his book, The Rational as
Reasonable, Aarnio uses the example of traffic to illustrate the difference
between routine cases and the hard cases. The police-officer surely has the
authority, on the basis of law, to fine drivers exceeding the speed limit as
well as ordering the traffic to run smoothly. Following a suggestion by Gil-
bert Ryle, the traffic case also be used to illustrate the problems facing
philosophers. These problems do not arise out of troubles about a single
concept, say the concept of authority. "Philosophical problems arise, rather,
as the traffic-policeman's problems arise, when crowds of conceptual vehi-
cles, of different sorts and moving in different directions meet at some con-
ceptual cross-roads. A l l or a lot of them have to be got under control con-
jointly. This is why, in its early stages, a philosophical dispute strikes
scientists and mathematicians as so messy an affair. It is messy , for it is a
traffic-block - a traffic-block which cannot be tidied up by the individual
drivers driving their individual cars efficiently." 3

If there is a mess among concepts then the lives of persons may be

harmed or damaged. The question then is whether there is an authority in
charge to bring order in the use of concepts. It can be argued that this
authority belongs to philosophers. It is their task to identify the employ-
ment of concepts in order to correct and rectify their proper place within
conceptual schemes addressed to cope with the problems of human life.
This has been the agenda for analytical philosophy dedicated to the clarifi-
cation of concepts. I shall very briefly present three different views con-

3
Gilbert Ryle , Collected Papers, vol. 2, London 1971 p. 325.
 Authority and Roles 199

cerning the nature of this clarification, to be called the constructive view,

the therapeutic view, and the grammatical view. 4
I shall use these different views in relation to a distinction hinted at
above, that is the distinction between problems of life and problems of
reflection. This distinction has been introduced by John Kekes, and I
believe that it is important. 5 What this distinction amounts to is, very
briefly, that problems of life concern a person's attitude to nature or the
physical environment, to other people and society, and to himself - or her-
self. These problems exist merely in virtue of being a human being that has
evolved in a particular way in nature and within a particular society. As
such human problems exist independently of any particular state and any
scientific theory. These problems involve human commitments what to
believe and what to do and these commitments are not tied to any specific
social role. The use of reason leads to the problems of reflection. The
human problems we face lead to the pursuit of truth in order to provide
tenable solutions to solve our problems. Thus scientific theories are put for-
ward to solve problems of nature, e.g. the theoretical questions of science
and the practical questions of technology, the problems of society are
related to theories of politics, morality and law and the practical questions
of social norms, moral conduct and legislation. The problems related to
one-self give rise to literature, art and religion. The problems of reflection
occur against a background of claims based upon scientific theories invol-
ving an appeal to a unified system of beliefs that can be used as a standard
of authoritative justification. Whatever standard is adopted it seems to me
that this standard in turn requires a justification in terms of the unity of
theoretical and practical rationality related to the problems of life. This is
to adopt the Kantian position to employ one's own reason based upon the
application of the maxims: "1. to think for ourselves, 2. to think ourselves
into the place of every other man (with whom we are communicating), 3.
always to think consistently with ourselves." 6 To be sure, no human person
can investigate for herself or himself all the matters. This is a reason for
the deference to authorities, be they theoretical authorities on what to
believe or practical authorities on what to do. But then each of us has to
decide who are the authorities and their credentials on the basis of the use
of reason. The use of reason is essentially public and linked to freedom of
thought and the social communication of thoughts and feelings among
autonomous persons. Considering the role of an authority I also wish to

4
The labels are my own but I am indebted to P. F. Strawson, Analysis and Meta-
physics, Oxford 1992.
5
John Kekes, The Nature of Philosophy, Oxford 1980, especially Ch. 3.
6
Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (transi. & ed.
Mary J. Gregor), The Hague 1974 p. 96 (Ak. Bd. vii p. 228).
200 Jes Bjarup

consider the question this role can be cited as a justification for what to
believe and what to do. 7
In presenting what I have called the constructive view, the therapeutic
view and the grammatical view. I shall suggest that it is the grammatical
view that should be adopted.

III.

The constructive view is held by logical positivism. The central objective

is the unity of science and the correct delienation of scientific method to be
used to put an end to metaphysical disagreements. The task of the philo-
sopher is only to analyze the structure of language on the basis of the veri-
fication principle. This principle states that to be cognitively meaningful, a
sentence must be either a logically true or false proposition, or a sentence
expressing a proposition which is in principle empirically verifiable as the
result of sense-experience. The adoption of this principle leads to the denial
of cognitive meaning to any proposition that is not verifiable by sense-
experience. Logical truth is supposed to be a linguistic matter. What is a
matter for science is then what scientific propositions are about. By con-
trast propositions that do not satisfy the verifiability principle are cogni-
tively speaking meaningless sentences. Thus ethical and metaphysical sen-
tences are considered to be cognitive nonsense, expressing not any beliefs
but feelings or non-cognitive attitudes. The task is to construct a logically
perfect language to be used within science to provide the scientific solu-
tions to human problems of life in nature and society. This view is also
held within the movement known as Scandinavian Legal Realism, although
it must be noticed that the authors typically included, the Swedes Axel
Hägerström, Α. V. Lundstedt, Karl Olivecrona, and the Dane A l f Ross, dis-
agree among themselves.8 The Swedes reject the verification principle as
another example of metaphysics that leads philosophers astray. But they
agree with the logical positivists that only scientific propositions have cog-
nitive meaning or propositional content. They agree that ethical and meta-
physical sentences lack cognitive meaning. This is based upon a theory of
meaning according to which all concepts are names. The meaning of a
name can only be established by reference to what the name denotes. Thus
to mention but one example, the concept of right is a word devoid of cog-
nitive meaning. This is so since the word right does not denote any tangi-
ble facts in the world of scientific experience in space and time. People

7
Cf. Gerald A. Cohen, Beliefs and Roles, in The Philosophy of Mind (ed.
Jonathan Glover), Oxford 1976 p. 53 ff.
8
Jes Bjarup , Skandinavischer Realismus. Hägerström - Lundstedt - Olivecrona -
Ross, Freiburg 1978.
 Authority and Roles 201

suppose they are talking sense when they use the word, but this supposition
is delusive. For Hägerström, this leads to a philosophical inquiry the causes
of the origin of the delusion. His conclusion is that that moral and legal
sentences put forward by human beings only serve to express their emo-
tional or affective states, rather than expressing propositional states in terms
of beliefs that state truths or falsehoods. People using the language of
rights are involved in a sort of magic. This magical use may have a pro-
found effect upon the behaviour of individuals who suffer from the delu-
sion, but this is not the case for the rational human being since he will not
suppose he is talking sense when he is in fact talking nonsense. Häger-
ström's position is a version of non-cognitivism that has had an important
impact concerning the understanding of law and legal science in the Nordic
countries.
The most influential author within the Nordic countries has been Ross.
This is also visible in Aarnio's book. Ross follows the constructive view
held by the logical positivists, especially Rudolf Carnap. According to this
position philosophy is nothing but the logic of science. The philosophical
method is the application of the method of explication or rational recon-
struction, that is to say the replacement of an ordinary and inexact concept
(the 'explicandum') by a scientific and exact concept (the 'explicatum')
belonging to the scientific language of verifiable statements. The ordinary
language of common sense must be replaced by the scientific language of
scientists where scientific propositions may be judged to be true or false
depending upon whether reality matches the physically testable verification-
conditions. The reports from the first-person singular perspective of the
scientists, his protocol statements, lead to the third-person perspective of
intersubjectivity among scientists. Thus the ordinary concept (explicandum)
of the authority or validity of law is reduced to the scientific concept
(explicatum) that the law has authority or validity if a legal directive is
applied by the authorities to whom it is addressed. This scientific concept
implies that there is a behavioural test that can determine whether a scienti-
fic proposition about the authority or validity of law is true or false. The
test is found in the behaviour of the officials, primarily the judges, since
the legal directives are addressed to them and judges have internalized a
peculiar feeling of respect towards the directives.
Thus according to Ross, the law is a system of authoritative directives. 9
The crucial fact is that directives are devoid of any cognitive or proposi-
tional content. It follows that they are devoid of any information. The pri-
mary function of directives is to express practical states of feelings or inter-
ests and put motivational pressure on the behaviour of people through the

9
Alf Ross, Directives and Norms, London 1968 Ch. 3, cf. Om Ret og Retfär-
dighed, Köbenhavn 1953 p. 14ff (On Law and Justice, London 1958 Ch. 1).
202 Jes Bjarup

possibility of using force. The authority or validity of the law can only be
found in the behavioural response of people, especially the legal officials.
If this view is accepted then it follows that there can be no such thing as
legal interpretation as ordinarily conceived since this presupposes that legal
rules have a propositional or cognitive content. It follows again that there
can be no such thing as practical reasoning in terms of reasons for belief
and action. Ross is committed to the claim that the distinction between
doing something for a reason and being caused to do something cannot be
maintained. Human beings only behave according to causes. The rejection
of practical rationality implies that practical reasoning is not reasoning at
all but rather the skilful employment of words to influence the behaviour of
people. It follows that the legal reasoning as a species of practical reason-
ing is either skilful manipulation or else must be transformed to emulate
the scientific reasoning in terms of causes. It follows again that there is a
difference between the emotive method used by judges to justify their jud-
gements and the scientific method used by legal scientists to verify their
propositions. This is so since the scientific method is the only form of
genuine reasoning.
The constructive view implies that the scientific view of the natural or
empirical sciences is the only rational approach to consider the place of the
authority or validity of law in society. The authority of law is reduced to
the coercive control of human behaviour by means of the regular applica-
tion of force by legal officials. This is to look at law as fact, to mention the
title of the book by Karl Olivecrona. 10 The Scandinavian Realists are
strongly opposed to any kind of metaphysical fantasy. They are empiricists
who wants facts like Mr. Gradgrind in Charles Dickens's "Hard Times":
Now what I want is Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts.
Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything
else." The facts referred to are the social facts of human behaviour in terms
of causal regularities between events. By adopting the empirical approach
legal science can achieve the scientific status leading to scientific informa-
tion in terms of description, explanation and prediction of the causal behav-
iour of people. This is also what legal education is about, that is to say to
present scientific information to the audience concerning the behaviour of
people. In this respect it is rather odd that the Scandinavians, having
rejected the concept of right as a piece of metaphysical nonsense continue
to employ the word. But then there is an explanation - and also a reason -
for this use. The explanation is that it is hard to find a proper substitute to
replace the word. The reason is that the Scandinavian realists know that the
word "right" is a meaningless noise, but then the noise can be used by
intelligent people. It can be used in legislation where it has the function to

10
Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact, 1st ed. London 1939, 2nd ed. London 1971.
 Authority and Roles 203

be a causal stimulus which will influence and affect the behaviour of ordin-
ary people to respond in particular ways. It can be used in legal science as
a tool of representation of the causal networks between human beings and
things and events.

Since law as legal directives are devoid of any cognitive content this
enhances the importance of legal science to present scientific information
concerning the function of these directives to control human behaviour by
means of the use of authorized force. Human rationality is reduced to the
theoretical reason exemplified in theoretical reasoning in the natural
sciences which is the only rational use of language. This scientific world-
view carries with it that human problems of life can be solved in two ways.
One way is to solve the problem by declaring that it is meaningless and
thus does not exist. The other way is to admit the existence of the problem
and then try to solve it in the only rational way there is, that is to say by
means of scientific knowledge of causes of behaviour. This knowledge can
in turn be applied in legislation which serves as the motivating element
through the application of force. By means of scientific knowledge through
legislation it is possible to establish the conditions for people to live a life
in security, productivity and peace.

The scientific worldview elevates the authority of science to be omni-

competent to solve human problems. This may lead to a version of scient-
ism that put the scientists in authority and stress the importance of their
role. In this respect there is a tension between the authority of the scientists
based upon the cognitive use of language in scientific propositions and his
- or her - personal views. The personal view can only be the use of the
non-cognitive language which expresses the feelings of the scientist. This is
what is called "legal politics" as the expression of personal feelings or pre-
ferences. The crucial thing is that these preferences cannot be justified in
terms of reasons. This implies that there can be no rational discussion con-
cerning the content of legal directives. The constructive view may also lead
to the position that a human being occupies a set of roles, e.g. the public
role of occupying a chair of professorship and the private role of the
human being. This raises an important issue. It may lead to look at human
beings in terms of their various roles. If a set of roles is conceived as con-
stitutive of a human person then there is a possibility to conceive a person
as a "split person" doing role-thinking in the sense that one can cite one's
role as ground for one's beliefs and feelings. The legal scientist may use
the public role of being an authority as ground for the possession of knowl-
edge and use the private role to express feelings. This is surely a possible
position but the question is whether it is a tenable position. To me, follow-
ing Cohen, it seems that knowledge and beliefs cannot be justified by refer-
ence to one's social role since a person must take responsibility for the
204 Jes Bjarup

beliefs as well as feelings that are expressed. Thinking in terms of roles

may also lead to look at human beings in terms of a set of roles. This may
lead to treat human beings not as Lockean persons deserving respect but
rather as objects to be manipulated. The scientific view may claim to take
the realistic view of human beings as they are in contrast to what they
ought to be according to ideals put forward by the well-meaning but igno-
rant metaphysical philosophers. The rejoinder surely is that these scientists
forget - or overlook - that the phrase "human beings as they are" may
forget, or overlook, that the phrase "human beings as they are" must be
understood, to quote Immanuel Kant as "we have made them by unjust
coercion, by treacherous designs which the government is in a good posi-
tion to carry out." 1 1
It seems to me that the recommendation of the philosophical analysis of
logical reconstruction of ordinary concepts may lead us astray in law. This
is so since the constructive view leads to a distorted view of practical
reason as a non-cognitive faculty of feeling. It eliminates practical reason-
ing as a matter of argument in favour of the skilful employment of utter-
ances to inculcate proper feelings and behaviour by means of psychological
pressures. It may also lead to a distorted view of human beings as social
entities rather than human beings to be respected as human persons. To be
a human person, from a Kantian perspective, requires that one is able to
see one's beliefs, feelings and actions as forming an intelligible unity in
terms of reasons for believing, doing and feeling. Human persons are auton-
omous and responsible agents. It is for this reason that they must be treated
with respect by the authorities. In a similar way the authority of science
based upon the constructive view must be questioned. The constructive
view leads to sever the connection between law and legal theory on the one
hand and political and moral theories on the other. This has implications
for legal education and legal science since it is to reduce the human prob-
lems of life to be technical questions of the empirical sciences to be solved
by theoretical reason at the expense of practical reason.

What is wrong with the constructive view is an anti-metaphysical posi-

tion based upon the principle of verifiability and the denotative theory of
meaning which leads to the view that the language of causation is the only
scientific language to be used to describe and explain human behaviour.
This is to overlook another use of the language, that is to say the language
of action used to explain and justify human conduct in terms of reasons
and intentions. This leads me to consider what I have called the therapeutic
view.

11
Kant's Political Writings (ed. Hans Reiss), Cambridge 1970 p. 178.
 Authority and Roles 205

IV.

The therapeutic view is also concerned with the philosophical analysis of

concepts based upon the ordinary use of linguistic expressions as a human
activity. This is the approach favoured by Wittgenstein in his advice, quoted
above p. 1. Wittgenstein's advice is put in the context of considering what is
called a game, where he says "Don't say: There must be something
common, or they would not be called 'games' - but look and see whether
there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see
something that is common to all , but similarities, relationships, and a whole
series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but l o o k ! " 1 2 Wittgenstein's
approach is based upon the various uses of language. Thus it is possible to
use the language of causation and seek to explain human behaviour in terms
of causes. But it is one thing to explain bodily motion in terms of causes. It
is quite another thing to give an account of human action. To give an
account of human action is to make references to reasons and intentions
within a social context. This approach can be applied to the concept of
authority that can be looked at as a rule-governed activity. This is linked to
his view concerning the meaning of words in sentences, that is "the meaning
of a word is its use in the language." The phrase "in a language" is impor-
tant, since an adherent of the denotation theory, e.g. the Scandinavian real-
ists, may argue that the only meaningful use of a word is to denote things or
facts. But then the rejoinder is that this suggests that the word has a mean-
ing in isolation from other words, and this is just false. The basic unit of
meaning is not the single word but the sentence used in the social communi-
cation of thoughts and feelings. To the Scandinavian emphasis on facts,
Wittgenstein's rejoinder is that the notion of bare facts - facts that are noth-
ing but facts untainted by interpretation or arrangement in a language - is
another metaphysical fantasy. It is a case of the bewitchment of our intelli-
gence by means of language. The cure is to liberate the human mind from
this bewitchment and look and try to bring the words back from their meta-
physical use to their everyday use in ordinary human conversation.
Within this human communication the authority of knowledge depends
upon acceptance to participate in a rule-governed activity, just as the
authority of law also depends upon the acceptance to be a citizen within a
particular state. The question of an independent justification concerning
what to believe and what to do cannot be put since any justification is
internal to the particular human activity. Wittgenstein's aim, in his philoso-
phical analysis, is then a kind of therapy. In this respect his philosophy is
akin to the philosophy of Hägerström.

12
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (transi. G. E. M. Ans-
combe), Oxford 1968 § 66, cf. § 43 for the next quotation.
206 Jes Bjarup

Hägerström would endorse the idea of the bewitchment of the human

mind. For Wittgenstein, this is rooted in the illusions of grammar, i.e. the
failure to recognise the use of various games of language. For Hägerström,
the bewitchment is due to the influence of feelings and volitions, rooted in
the ignorance of the causes to human behaviour as manifested in ordinary
language. Hägerström's conceptual analysis is offered as a psychological
analysis of the human mind looking for the origin of error and ignorance in
men's ideas infused by feelings and volitions. The aim of this analysis is to
enlighten the human mind to understand and master the causes which
govern the behaviour of human beings. This in turn implies that the feel-
ings must be eradicated or at least be controlled by thinking. Hägerström's
prescription is then to replace the ordinary language of feelings with the
scientific language of thinking. The metaphysical nonsense of ordinary lan-
guage must be replaced with the scientific language of causes. This is the
only language which makes sense. This in turn leads to the claim that
knowledge is restricted to scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge based
upon knowledge of the working of causes implies the prospect of mastering
the causes in order to regulate human behaviour by means of law to live a
flourishing life in a peaceful society of community and solidarity. This is
the message of the authority of science to govern human behaviour in
society, cf. above sec. 3.
Wittgenstein is also concerned with the liberation of the human mind by
the bewitchment of our intelligence but then he claims that this is due to
the uses of language. It is the various uses of language which may lead us
astray and this gives rise to conceptual confusions. Thus Wittgenstein
accepts the ordinary language as well as the scientific language. His con-
ceptual analysis is concerned with the various uses of language by human
beings as persons and looks for misconceptions or misunderstandings pro-
duced by the use of different language-games, e.g. the use of the language
of action which is conceptually distinct from using the language of causes.
Wittgenstein's message is, as I understand it, that it makes no sense to
think that there is something underlying the actual employment of the use
of different concepts. What has to be accepted is various forms of life
which depend upon human agreements. This is the end of the matter. It is
not the task of philosophy to interfere with the use of the conceptual lan-
guage of causation or the conceptual language of action, nor is it a task to
provide any kind of foundation for these various uses. The philosophical
task is solely to provide reminders of the uses of language which will solve
the problems by making them disappear. Thus Wittgenstein's prescription
is quite different from Hägerström's. Hägerström claims that ordinary lan-
guage is not the language of thought. This is only found within the use of
the scientific language. Wittgenstein claims that there is room for the ordi-
nary language as well as the scientific language. The various uses of lan-
 Authority and Roles 207

guage have all their proper uses which must be recognized within the forms
of life of persons living together in society.

Wittgenstein has been influential also within law and legal science. His
approach makes room for seeing law as a cognitively meaningful activity
based upon the use of the language of action to establish a normative
system of rules of conduct that persons can choose to follow. Thus the
authority of law can be seen in terms of conduct based upon reasons. By
contrast the view held by the Scandinavian realists for whom law is a
system of directives or imperatives using the language of causes to govern
the behaviour of human beings. Wittgenstein's approach then makes room
for the corresponding legal discipline concerned with the scientific descrip-
tion of the normativity of a legal system in terms of reasons for belief and
action. There is also room for a discipline concerned with an evaluation in
terms of moral norms. This is not to deny that there also is an empirical
study of legal norms as causes to human behaviour but this is an altogether
different language-game within the social sciences which must not be con-
fused with the normative language game of lawyers.

Whatever the merits of this approach, I cannot help thinking that Witt-
genstein's view implies that we have to accept the legal system as given as
a form of life which cannot be put into question. Surely, I am tempted to
ask: doesn't this view entail that the human problems of life in the end are
reduced to problems of reflection within various forms of life? An affirma-
tive answer is given by the adoption of the constructive view, cf. sec. 3. I
suspect that this is also the case if you adopt the therapeutic view. There is,
of course, an important difference since the constructive view implies a dis-
torted view of human beings. By contrast, the therapeutic view implies a
view of human beings as persons whose conduct can be guided by use of
reason. But then they share the common element that all problems can be
reduced to problems of reflection. Wittgenstein is, it seems to me, com-
mitted to the view that it is not possible to stand back from one's roles
within a form of life and appraise one's beliefs and actions independently
of these roles. The solution he offers is that problems of reflection can be
solved in the only way they can be solved, that is by their disappearance. It
follows that it is possible to protect the current forms of life, including the
political and social status quo, by playing one's role in the game. The
judge must believe and act as a judge in his role. It seems to me that the
therapeutic view implies that a judge can cite his role as justification for
his judgements. It is the role that can provide judges with the possibility of
escaping the responsibility of facing the claims of human reason based
upon the Kantian maxims. A similar case can be made for legal scientists.
This is the consequence of Wittgenstein's reminder: "don't think, but
look!". For Wittgenstein there is no way of separating commitments from
208 Jes Bjarup

beliefs and actions. Commitment to a form of life is prior to what to believe

and what to do, and this commitment cannot be justified by citing reasons,
it just occurs. This is Wittgenstein's position which ignores the availability
of human reason and freedom in Kantian terms to address human problems
and reflect upon the place of human persons in a just society where politics
pay tribute to moral principles. If I am right then this is a failure. I am not
sure whether Aarnio will agree. But we do agree that it is Wittgenstein's
view that a particular form of live can only be replaced, if at all, by means
of persuasion, and not by means of rational argumentation. 13 Aarnio admits
that there is at least a possibility of addressing human problems of life by a
rational argumentation. I would like to address his view.

V.

I shall do so in relation to what I have called the grammatical view of

philosophical analysis. The grammatical view is related to the therapeutic
view held by Wittgenstein by stressing the relation between ordinary ways
of thinking and scientific ways of thinking, but then it also differs from the
therapeutic view. To repeat the latter view holds: "don't think, but look."
The grammatical view holds that this is a false dichotomy since we should
both think and look upon ordinary and scientific thinking. We can consider
the question that there may be a hidden structure underlying all forms of
thinking. To me the answer is that there is a common structure since human
thinking is concerned with the problems of life and the related problems of
reflection. The starting point is that there is a connection between these prob-
lems in terms of human beliefs and action. This is so since we are living as
space-occupying persons in a world of other persons and things. We begin
by learning the nature of things by means of sensations and this enables us
learning the possibility of various kinds of activities. The possibility of
activities is in turn related to learning about the nature of persons and
things. Learning is also related to the use of language since the sensations
have a content that can be expressed in language that something is - or
should be - the case. Thus the grammatical view can be seen in relation to a
theory of linguistic meaning in terms of human intentions and the perform-
ance of linguistic actions. This is to think of human beings becoming human
persons through the common use of the language of action governed by the
aim of making the individual person's conduct intelligible in terms norms of
rationality and social contexts. Long ago Thomas Reid pointed to the
neglect of what he calls the "social operations of mind." 1 4 By the social

13
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable p. 218.
14
Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (ed. Baruch Brody),
London 1969, Essay I, Ch. 8 p. 7 I f f .
 Authority and Roles 209

operations of mind Reid understands such operations that necessarily imply

social intercourse with some other intelligent being who bears a part in
them, using expressions in terms of words and sentences. By contrast, the
solitary operations may be performed by a man in solitude without inter-
course with any other intelligent being where the expression in words is
accidental. Thus the solitary operations are exercised in cases "where a man
may understand and will; he may apprehend, and judge, and reason, though
he should know of no intelligent being in the universe besides himself." The
social operations are exercised "when he asks information, or receives it;
when he bears testimony, or receives the testimony of another; when he
asks a favour, or accepts one, when he gives a command to his servant, or
receives one from a superior; when he plights his faith in a promise or con-
tract; these are acts of social intercourse between intelligent beings, and can
have no place in solitude. They suppose understanding and will; but they
suppose something more, which is neither understanding nor will; that is,
society with other intelligent beings. They may be called intellectual,
because they can only be in intellectual beings: but they are neither simple
apprehension, nor judgement, nor reasoning, nor are they any combination
of these operations." As Reid puts it, "all languages are fitted to express the
social as well as the solitary operations of the mind. It may indeed be
affirmed, that, to express the former, is the primary and direct intention of
language." For Reid the reason why this is so is that "the Author of our
being intended us to be social beings, and has, for that end, given us social
intellectual powers, as well as social affections. Both are original parts of
our constitution, and the exertions of both no less natural than the exertions
of those powers that are solitary and selfish."
One may doubt the validity of Reid's reference to God to substantiate his
claims. Although it can be noticed that the ideas of God and man as made
in the image of God have been rather important within the theory of knowl-
edge and scientific thinking. It may also lead to neglect the social opera-
tions of the mind in favour of the solitary operations of the lonely mind of
the philosophers. The latter has been the dominant philosophical view of
the first-person access to reality that is put under attack by Wittgenstein's
so-called private language argument. It seems to me that Wittgenstein is
rejecting the first-person singular view if favour of the first-person plural
view. It is not I but we who look on everything. Then there is also the
common access to an independent reality through the activity of another
person. This is to see human beings not as isolated individuals but in rela-
tion with other human beings. This is exemplified in Reid's view of "the
second person of verbs" to express that we become aware of ourselves as
persons through realizing that other persons want us to act for reasons. This
'second-person view' is based upon that it is possible to use language in a
meaningful way to speak not only about how reality is but also how reality

15 FS Aarnio
210 Jes Bjarup

ought to be. This is made manifest in learning the use of concepts as a

rule-governed activity rather than, as the Scandinavian Realist claim, as
regular behaviour. The learning of a concept as a rule-governed activity
implies that there are correct and incorrect ways of using concepts. It also
implies that a concept is a rule that, unlike past regularity, automatically
covers new cases. It is the social operations of the mind that are expressed
in the common structure of language used by intelligent human persons to
orientate themselves in the world and in society. This orientation is
expressed in propositions how people act, feel or think and propositions
how they ought to act, feel or think. This distinction is not isomorphic with
the distinction between thinking and feeling as the constructive view holds.
Thinking - and feeling - is involved in propositions about how the world is
and how it ought to be. This is duly noticed by the therapeutic view but
then this view claims that the meaning of a proposition is based upon
agreement among human persons living within various forms of life. The
grammatical view stresses that we live in a common world where there is a
fundamental distinction between the way the world is and what we say
about it, even if we all happen to agree. It is also the case that there is
a difference between descriptions how persons act, feel or think, and
prescriptions how they ought to act, feel and think. Both descriptions and
prescriptions are related to the common use of language between persons
and both uses certainly have some cognitive or propositional content that
are related to common standards of rationality that are exemplified in a
person's knowledge of concepts.
What is crucial is that Reid has a valid point, that is that the social
operations of the mind are the primary and direct intention of language. As
I see it, it is Reid's point that is taken up and elaborated by John Searle in
his theory of linguistic meaning in terms of intentionality. 15
We learn to perform various linguistic acts in the social intercourse with
other persons. Thus we learn how to operate with these expressions consis-
tently and systematically before we can consider the question of formulat-
ing theories concerning their underlying structure. This is what Searle has
been doing, putting forward his theory of speech acts in terms of their
structure of propositional content, their illocutionary force and the different
directions of fit to the world. It seems to me that this theory of linguistic
meaning is also of interest to lawyers who are, after all, concerned with the
intelligent activity of using language to inform and guide what other per-
sons are to believe and what they are to do.

15
Cf. John Searle and His Critics (ed. Ernest Lepore and Robert van Gulick),
Oxford 1991.
 Authority and Roles 211

In this respect authority is important since many of the things we know

or believe, we know or believe from the authorities, just as many our
actions we do, we do on the basis of what the authorities tell us to do.
Authority is important for our reasons for beliefs as well as reasons for
action. This is also duly noticed by Reid since "in the first part of life we
have no other guide; and without a disposition to receive implicitly what
we are taught, we should be incapable of instruction, and incapable of
improvement." 16 We believe what we are told by trusting the information
put forward by various authorities. This makes trust an all important ele-
ment in gaining knowledge from other people. This involves what Reid call
"the principle of credulity", that is persons are so constituted that we natu-
rally and unreflectively tend to believe what other persons tell them is true.
This principle is paired with "the principle of veracity", that is the propen-
sity to use language to tell the truth and convey our social affections. Reid
also stresses that it also important that we learn to develop a critical and
moral attitude to various authorities and their testimonies in order to accept
what they tell us. This is so since even in our lives as adults. Many of the
most interesting things that we know or believe, we know or believe
through learning from the authorities within a given area or subject. This
view connects knowledge and learning, and learning with teaching in rela-
tion to the question what to believe in terms of reasons. This raises the
issue of the sources of knowledge. If we follow Locke's account then the
individual can use perception and thinking but we also have to take
account of the authority of testimony that is emphazied by Reid. It may be
a mistake to disparage the authority of testimony since this source of
knowledge is "fundamental to the very idea of serious cognitive activity." 1 7
The authority of testimony is surely important within the theoretical area of
beliefs. It is also important within the practical activity of human action. If
this is so then it important to understand what is said in order to decide
whether or not to agree with what is said. This is to endorse Searle's point
that we must distinguish between the meaning of various speech acts using
sentences to express intentions, e.g. in theoretical or practical propositions
on the one hand and human communication on the other. We are engaged
in communication when we listen to the propositions and judgements of
other people but then the understanding of the propositions and judgements
is prior to any agreement with their propositional content. It cannot be the
case, as I understand Wittgenstein to claim, that there must be agreement in
propositions or judgements as a pre-condition of communication. If this is
the case then it follows that those who basically and persistently disagree

16
Reid , Essays on Intellectual Powers, Essay vi, Ch. viii p. 692, cf. Ch. iv,
p. 609.
17
C. A. J. Coady, Testimony, Oxford 1992.

15*
212 Jes Bjarup

in theoretical or practical matters are in effect using a different language,

living in another world using different concepts. This is hardly a plausible
analysis of the human condition where persons are facing theoretical and
practical disagreement in a common world. In this world we face various
persons having - or claiming to have - authority to pass information in
terms of descriptions and prescriptions what to believe and what kind of
action it is right or wrong, good or bad to perform. What we need to
develop is a critical stance in order to act as a responsible and autonomous
human agent considering the question what to believe and what to do in
terms of reasons.
This raises the familiar distinction between theoretical and practical
reason. This distinction is sometimes put in terms between two entities
within the human mind. If so, then this seems to me to be mistaken. It is
after all the same person who both believes and acts so, following Stanley
Benn, "rationality in belief is no more and no less a matter of logical
necessity than is rationality in action." 1 8 Traditionally, what a person
believes is a matter of theoretical reason using theoretical reasoning that
issues in belief, by contrast what a person does is a matter for practical
reason using practical or normative reasoning that issues in action. Theore-
tical reasoning can be put in the theoretical syllogism as a set of proposi-
tions: i. all men are mortal, ii. Socrates is a man, iii. Socrates is mortal.
But then the conclusion (iii) does not entail that anyone actually believes
that Socrates is mortal. The conclusion (iii) only entails that (iii) is the
thing to believe if one also believes that the premises (i and ii) are true. So
the theoretical syllogism yields not a belief but only a belief commitment.
The same applies to the practical syllogism, which also can be rendered in
the scheme of a practical syllogism: i. A l l criminals ought to go to jail, ii.
Socrates is a criminal, iii. Socrates ought to go to jail. But then this conclu-
sion (iii) does not entail that Socrates actually goes to jail. The conclusion
(iii) only entails that (iii) is the thing to do if one believes that the premises
(i and ii) are true. Traditionally the conclusion of a practical syllogism is
considered to be an action, as distinct from the proposition in the theoreti-
cal syllogism. But then again the conclusion of this syllogism is not an
action but an action commitment. In both cases the commitment only fol-
lows if both premises are believed. In both cases the crucial question is a
question of rationality, that is to say whether or not to believe the premises.
This raises the question of commitment and the deference for the authori-
ties who claim to provide us with reasons based upon knowledge or super-

18
Stanley /. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, Cambridge 1988 p. 25. - Benn's view
is opposed to the Humean view of practical rationality as grounded in desires. I
cannot address this topic in this paper, but only wish to say that it is important for
the understanding of legal reasoning.
 Authority and Roles 213

ior position for our beliefs and actions. This in turn raises a host of ques-
tions which cannot be dealt with in this paper. Suffice it to suggest that we
must give authority its due but we must also remember, again with Reid,
"to give no more to authority than is its due." Thus it follows as Reid puts
it "in all matters belonging to our cognizance, every man must be deter-
mined by his own final judgement, otherwise he does not act the part of a
rational being. Authority may add weight to the scale; but the man holds
the balance, and judges what weight he ought to allow to authority." 19

Thus the important message is that reason is not the slave of passions
but practical and theoretical in its own right. It is up to us to judge the
credentials of any authority just as any authority must consider its reasons
for putting forward its claims concerning what to believe and what to think.
This is to accept the Kantian claim to think of human beings as autono-
mous persons having reasons, as opposed to causes, for their beliefs con-
cerning the various theories put forward as attempt to provide solutions to
the human problems of life, cf. above sec. 2. It is also to suggest that
beliefs and actions cannot be justified by appealing to any social or legal
role which a person occupies as an institutional authority. The reason why
is that it is always possible to stand back from these institutional roles and
consider our beliefs and actions independently of them. This critical atti-
tude is linked to the human problems of life and common sense that it is
rational to believe things because they are true and rational to do things
because they are just.
This position offers then a perspective of how to look and think about
the solutions to the human problems of life provided by the theories put
forward in the natural sciences but also by considering political, moral and
legal theories. The latter theories are important since to quote Locke "our
business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our con-
duct. If we can find those measures, whereby a rational creature put in that
state, which man is in, in this world, may, and ought to govern his opin-
ions, and actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled, that some
other things escape our knowledge." 20 The difficulty is of course to find
the proper measures for the evaluation of human conduct but this is pre-
cisely what is the subject matter of law and legal science is about. The
grammatical view stresses the importance of the normative language of
action in terms of reasons in relation to the human problems of life. It also
links this use of language in law and legal science to moral and political
theories rather than to the theories of natural and social sciences using the
language of causes. For the Scandinavian realists this is to engage in meta-

19
Reid , Essays on the Intellectual Powers, Essay vi, Ch. viii p. 693.
20
Locke , An Essay concerning Human Understanding, p. 46.
214 Jes Bjarup

physics and taking a political stance. So be it. It must then be added that
the Scandinavian realists - despite their anti-metaphysical position - also
endorse a metaphycical view cf. sec. 3.
Concerning the authority of law I shall be brief since this topic has been
extensively examined. 21 Suffice it to say that the authority of law depends
upon an institutional structure which empowers some people to issue
authoritative utterances which have an important impact upon the condi-
tions of life for persons living within their jurisdiction. Legislation is an
example of a distinct type of authoritative utterance, a directive in Searle's
terminology. 22 The defining point of a directive consists in the attempt by
the speaker to get the hearer to do something, where the crucial point is
that the meaning of the directive, its propositional content, has a world-to-
sentence direction of fit, that is to say the propositional content does not
yet exist, but ought to exist. The propositional content tells the hearer what
to do, and understanding this is of course important for actually doing what
is requested. The crucial point is that this is not part of the meaning of the
directive. It is one thing to tell people to do things, quite another to get
them to do so. The latter can be characterized as the perlocutionary effect
and then this effect is not part of the propositional content or meaning of
the directive. This analysis applies to legal rules. The law is an institutional
system of rules. These rules have a propositional content that qualifies
human actions as legal or illegal. The authority of law provides a norma-
tive structure of guidance and evaluation of human conduct in terms of rea-
sons for beliefs and action. The structure of reasons can in the end can be
supported by the use of force authorized by the law. This makes the differ-
ence between the authoritative claim of the police-officer to use force if
need be and the order and threat of the robber. Legal officials can concep-
tually do things which other people cannot do. But then people do not have
to agree with the police-man in order to understand his claim. The signifi-
cance of this is that the Scandinavian realists cannot make the distinction
between the law and its enforcement and this leads them to concentrate on
the perlocutionary effects of the enforcement of the law at the expense of
its propositional content. The approach favoured by Wittgenstein will
acknowledge the distinction but then look at the law in terms of agreement
or acceptance of the authority. But the meaning of the law, its propositional
content, does not depend upon any agreement by the people it addresses.

This is not to say that agreement does not matter. But it seems to me
that the question to submit or agree to the authority of the law is a different
question from understanding the meaning of the law as a distinct type of

21
Cf. Authority (ed. Joseph Raz), Oxford 1990.
22
Searle's use of 'directive' must not be confused with the quite different use of
this term by A l f Ross.
 Authority and Roles 215

human communication. You need to understand the meaning of the law in

order to agree or obey. Despite what the Scandinavian realist teach it also
makes sense to ask the question whether or not the law should be obeyed.
But this is a separate question from the question that some people are
authorized to issue binding norms or rules. This in turn implies that other
people have a corresponding liability to treat these norms or rules as exclu-
sionary reasons to use the terminology of Joseph Raz. Thus the authority of
law can be looked at, and thought of, in terms of reasons for beliefs and
actions.
This is also what is crucial for the related legal discipline of law or legal
science. Since knowledge is related to teaching and learning, the question
is what can be taught? Since legal rules have a cognitive or propositional
content, the answer is clearly that it is possible to teach and offer informa-
tion of this content to the audience of students or the public at large. Surely
it is possible to teach students what kind of conduct is considered legal and
illegal according to the legal point of view. It is possible to teach the pro-
positional content of legal rules without considering their perlocutionary
effects. The latter can of course be studied and also taught but this is sec-
ondary importance in relation to the propositional content of legislation.
Legal education, I submit, is primarily concerned with the understanding of
the propositional content of the law as reasons for legal activity. In this
respect there is a connection between the law as a system of internal rela-
tions between legal rules on the one hand and the external relations of the
divisions of the legal system into various branches of law on the other, e. g.
the division between public and private law. It seems to me that these rela-
tions have something in common since both are based upon reasons. But
then the relations also differ since the former relations are based upon the
authoritative structure of a legal system whereas the latter are based upon
the authority of legal scientists. This can make a difference since the
authority of legislators or judges may be different from the authority of the
legal scientist. This is to ask the question whether legal science can be con-
sidered as a source of law where the answer will depend upon the structure
of the legal system. Whatever the answer is, it is certainly the case that
legal science offers information of what the law is in terms of legal rea-
sons. In this respect there is a line between what is settled and beyond dis-
pute among lawyers on the one hand and what is not yet settled or still in
dispute on the other. But what is common among lawyers, e.g. the judges
and the legal scientists, is a common structure of legal reasoning. The
judge as well as the legal scientist are engaged in practical or legal reason-
ing putting forward their propositions or judgements in terms of the claims
of truth, sincerity and legitimacy. They are both committed to having
grounds or reasons for the truth of their propositions and these propositions
are concerned with reasons for beliefs, as opposed to causes, concerning
216 Jes Bjarup

the appropriate legal conduct according to the law. They both face the
question whether one's role as an authority can be cited as justification for
one's beliefs where the answer is, I suggest that although it is possible it
may not be a defensible position. At least for the legal scholar it seems to
me, following Cohen, that " I am committed to the beliefs I have and
cannot, while sane, escape this responsibility by retreating into the role or
roles I occupy." In this respect there is a close connection between legal
science and moral and political theories.
Moral - and political - theories are also important for considering the
question what the propositional content of legal rules should be. This ques-
tion is rejected as senseless by the Scandinavian Realists but then the
rejoinder is that their non-cognitive view of practical reasoning is meaning-
ful but false. The therapeutic view fares better acknowledging that it is pos-
sible to argue but then only within specific forms of life so this also
implies a non-cognitive approach. A cognitive approach is offered by
Aarnio stressing the importance of the ideal audience and rational accept-
ability for communication and interpretations in legal dogmatics. This is to
engage in a rational argumentation and the question is whether this also
implies that there must be agreement or consensus for the argumentation to
be meaningful. It seems to me that Aarnio, following Habermas, offers an
affirmative answer to this question. I do not deny that human persons may
aim at consensus or rational acceptability when engaged in human commu-
nication and rational argumentation. This involves a spirit of co-operation
between the contending parties. But then I suggest, following Searle, that
understanding an argument is prior to whether or not to agree and accept
its conclusion. It follows that the meaning of a statement or a judgement
cannot be based upon agreement or consensus. Surely the task of legal
scholars is to inform the audience of the existence of legal reasons for legal
activities. It is another and important task to consider legal reasons from a
critical perspective asking whether these legal reasons are acceptable or not
acceptable according to moral standards. But it seems to me to be a mis-
take to claim that the audience must agree in order to understand the state-
ments put forward. It seems to me to reverse the relation between rational-
ity and truth. It is to put forward the claim that truth is what is rational - in
the conditions of an ideal audience - to believe, and that principles of jus-
tice are what it is rational - in the conditions of an ideal audience - to
adopt. To me it is the other way round that it is truth and justice that serve
as criteria for judging both belief and conduct. It is rational to believe
things because they are true, and rational to do things because they are just.
We are in search for answers to the problems of life knowing that there is
a right answer. There is a right answer in the logical sense that every
answer to a question is either true or false, but not both. The question
about any proposition is therefore not whether to believe it or not. The
 Authority and Roles 217

question is rather whether to believe it or its contradictory, for one of them

must be true. This is what is a matter for rational discussion among law-
yers concerning the law and its proper interpretation. The difficulty in dis-
covering the truth does not prove that there is no truth to be discovered.
There is room for rational argumentation to decide in accordance with the
available reasons whether to doubt the statement or to believe it or to
believe its contradictory. To conclude where I started, what unifies the
positions held by Aarnio as a professor and a president is precisely that he
is engaged in this rational argumentation as a human person who cares for
the lives of other human persons. In the end of the day this is a truth that
matters.
 NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM
VERSUS LEGALISM?

On how to Differentiate between Legal Systems

and the Modern State

By Werner Krawietz, Münster

I. Constitutionalism and Constitutional Patriotism -

New or Old?

Instead of viewing the modern state and the constitutional state from the
point of view of legal dogmatics I shall adopt in the following the more
abstract standpoint of legal theory and legal philosophy. In referring to con-
stitutionalism in this context I am not thinking of the historical constitu-
tional movement which lead to written constitutions in 19th century Ger-
many and, in turn, came to form the foundations on which the modern
German 'Rechtsstaat' was established and developed in my country. Quite
the opposite! I wish to discuss a new form of constitutionalism which is, if
anything, critical of existing legal systems. That means that I have to talk
about some argumentations, tendencies and forces which in Germany
- although by no means only there! - have in recent years played off the
written constitution against the established constitutional state and the
'Rechtsstaat' in order to change both.
1. In the political systems of contemporary society the constitutional
state has gained all but complete predominance. The constitutional state
also dominates legal systems today. As a result, law is - if one accepts the
definitions of Dreier and Alexy - the entirety of the norms which constitute
the norm system organized within a single state or on an interstate basis
including those norms which have been laid down in accordance with the
constitution. 1
a) This approach regards the legal system as a system of laws and sta-
tutes connected with eachother as in a family-tree, as it were. Such a

1
Robert Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts (Freiburg i.Br.: Alber, 1992),
pp. 201 - 2 0 2 ; Ralf Dreier, Recht - Staat - Vernunft (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp,
1991), p. 116.
220 Werner Krawietz

theory of law according to which everything that derives from the tree of
the constitution - but nothing else! - is law, appears to me to be far too
one-sided. It is also unconvincing, in my view, because of its claim that all
sources of law rest exclusively in the state legal system. There are also
informal, non-state systems of law as, for instance, the Islamic system of
law within which the religious-societal law of the Sharia takes precedence
over all state law. Furthermore, the question, what the content of the
demands made on law and state within the constitutional state is or should
be, remains unanswered in this theory of law.
b) Normally additional requirements and conditions which the constitu-
tional state has to comply with are made on account of the constitution.
Among these, we find, above all, the postulate that this state is or ought to
be a 'Rechtsstaat' or, in the English terminology, has to follow the princi-
ples of the 'rule of law' and of the 'due process of law'. In view of the fact
that no exact equivalent of the German term 'Rechtsstaat' exists in the Eng-
lish language - the terms 'legal state' or 'law-state' being ambiguous - I
shall use the German word 'Rechtsstaat' in my following attempt at defin-
ing the concept Rechtsstaat more closely. In its meaning as a political and
legal principle structuring the whole legal system the concept of the
'Rechtsstaat' belongs to the politico-legal achievements without which no
community system from the Federal government down to the Länder and
even the local authorities believes itself able to manage. Supranational com-
munities, too, like the European Community wherein states are the relevant
agents of authority are required to fulfill the demands of the rule of law. 2
c) The constitutional state, very often wrongly seen as identical with the
'Rechtsstaat', represents, moreover, not only a pre-condition of human free-
dom and human rights but also functions as its guarantor by safeguarding
the institution, realization and implementation of the constitutional rights
ensuring this freedom.
2. No regime, however despotic, no police state and no military dictator-
ship could afford nowadays to ignore for any length of time all postulates,
principles, rules and maxims normally bound up with the modern constitu-
tional state or even to disregard them openly. Some rules belonging to the
rule of law are observed by every state nowadays, at least in its relations to
other states and with the world outside, if for no other reason than to be
taken seriously. The innovative effectiveness of the concept of the legal
state is and was manifesting itself nowhere more than in places where it is

2
Neil MacCormick, O n Institutional Normative Order: An Idea about Law' in
Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory: Festschrift for Carlos E. Alchour-
rón and Eugenio Bulygin, ed. by Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Werner Krawietz, Georg
Henrik von Wright, Ruth Zimmerling (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997),
pp. 411 -425 (p. 423).
 New Constitutional Patriotism versus Legalism? 221

and was being undermined, opposed and trampled in the dust as, for
instance, in the German national-socialist state of the Führer. Those who
- living in a communist or post-socialist society - were or still are dealing
with a state which for ideological reasons treated or is even now treating
the concept of the civil 'Rechtsstaat' with disregard or even contempt
would have a good deal to say on the subject, too.

3. It is not my intention to pronounce some kind of normative recom-

mendations in the following deliberations. What is central to my reflexions
is the task of contributing to the conceptual definition of the 'Rechtsstaat'
as it is presenting itself and as it might develop in the future.
a) This task precludes the possibility of starting from a preconceived
concept of law and of the legal state, which makes a difference from my
point of view.
b) Far be it from me, furthermore, to have any wish of holding up the
situation of constitutional law as it exists in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many as a general standard. In considering it here as an example, as it
were, I am doing so for no other reason than to demonstrate a number of
structural problems inherent in the modern state. A conceptual definition in
terms of legal norms or even a definition of the 'Rechtsstaat' cannot stand
at the beginning of our analyses but must - if at all - stand at the end.
c) For reasons of timing and lack of space I shall concentrate on just
three problems in the following.
- I shall begin by (i) discussing the concept of the modern state or
'Rechtsstaat' as it appears in the perspective and from the point of view
of the German legal system.
- In addition I shall (ii) consider the relations between constitution, legal
systems and state. My criticism is directed against two misleading identi-
fications made in contemporary German legal thinking, namely, (a)
against seeing the constitutional state and 'Rechtsstaat' as identical
which I believe to be misguided, and (b) against the conventional con-
cept of the 'Rechtsstaat' in which law and state are wrongly considered
as identical.
- Finally I shall deal with (iii) the relationship between constitution, state
legal system and society. In examining this relationship I shall consider
the distinction between a formal (state) law and an informal (non state or
societal) law. This conceptual distinction opens up more scope for infor-
mal cooperation within the formal 'Rechtsstaat' and between state and
citizens even - and despite the fact that all institutions of the state are
bound by constitutional law to the valid law of the respective state.
222 Werner Krawietz

II. The Concept of the Constitutional State ("Rechtsstaat")

as an Ideal Type

1. From the point of view of a purely formal conceptual definition of the

modern state in terms of legal theory and theory of the state any state-like
entity which regulates, organizes and controls itself with reference to itself
on the basis and in accordance with the law already validated by itself is
- seen sensu largo - a state legal system or a 'Rechtsstaat'. This conceptual
definition would, strictly speaking, also have included the nationalsocialist
Führerstate under Adolf Hitler and the Soviet Union under Stalin. What
further premisses for their content are added to this conceptual definition
on account of constitution and state legal system is, therefore, crucial for
the concept of the modern state or state legal system.

2. Not every political system calling itself a 'Rechtsstaat' is, in fact, a

genuine 'Rechtsstaat'. On the other hand, we could - at times - well be
dealing with some kind of state legal system even though the state in ques-
tion does not see itself as a 'Rechtsstaat'. Consequently, the question arises
which structural elements and components, in fact, have to be 'given' or
'fulfilled' for us to be able to refer strictly speaking to a 'Rechtsstaat'.

3. The term and the concept 'Rechtsstaat' refers - as is well-known - to

the tradition of the German constitutional state and to the public state law
emanating from it which I cannot go into in this context. 3

4. In the written constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany the

concept 'Rechtsstaat' serves to characterize the constitutional order
intended to be valid in the Federal Republic and in the Länder.

a) According to article 28 of the Grundgesetz of the Federal Republic of

Germany the constitutional order must "correspond to the principles of the
republican, democratic and social, legal state ('Rechtsstaat') as set out by
this constitution". In using those words with reference to the constitutional
order of the German state legal system and to the normative meaning of
these principles and maxims the constitution, therefore, refers back to itself.
The well-known legal philosopher limar Tammelo 4 formulates this insight
in general terms when he says: "Law is a reflexive phenomenon which
relates to itself. " While the actual word "Rechtsstaat" does not appear in
the definition of the form of government in art. 20 of the Constitution
according to which "the Federal Republic of Germany is and is meant to

3
See, for example, Dieter Wyduckel, lus Publicum (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
1984).
4
Quoted with an interesting discussion in: On the Advancement of Theory and
Technique in Law and Ethics, ed. by limar Tammelo and Aulis Aarnio (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot, 1981).
 New Constitutional Patriotism versus Legalism? 223

be a democratic and social federal state" this legal postulate is, neverthe-
less, - if not in word so in essence - among the fundamental political for-
mative principles on all levels of law production.
b) Consequently the Federal Constitutional Court views the decision of
opting for the 'Rechtsstaat' as fundamental and as a guiding principle of
the constitution.
c) The Federal Constitutional Court also points out that the constitutional
legislator has committed himself - and I quote - to a "preconstitutional
general image " of the modern state ('Rechtsstaat') by taking this decision.5
I would like to raise the question whether this general image is to be
regarded merely formally as a means of establishing a framework of valid
legal norms connecting diverse principles, rules and maxims or whether the
modern state ('Rechtsstaat') also has informal features of a very different
kind.
5. This also raises another question, namely, what exactly the basis for
the validity of the legal system is. Is it the fundamental political decision
or the written constitution itself? Does the legal system simply refer back
to itself to establish its validity? Or is the basis for the validity of the con-
stitutional state or the 'Rechtsstaat', as the case may be, to be found in
principles and rules with their origins in laws of nature and of reason
which precede the constitution or rather are ranked above it and have
priority before it? If we were to assume the latter possibility without, how-
ever, acknowledging it - how would one rank human reason or the rationality
of the sciences in their understanding of these principles? And how can we
ascertain and identify these principles cognitively, that is, how can we
recognize them if we are working in the field of jurisprudence, i.e. in the
science of law (and not in the realm of practical politics)?
6. The concept of the modern state ('Rechtsstaat'), of course, manifests
itself not only in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany but it
is to be found embodied expressis verbis in a number of other constitutions
of European states. This is not the place, however, to discuss this point.
a) The following achievements are usually counted among the key prin-
ciples relating to the concept of the modern state ('Rechtsstaat'):
one: the existence of a written (or, at least, unwritten) constitution;
two: the power of the state is linked to and restricted by the constitution;
three: division of the power of the state by internal organization (separa-
tion of powers) into different functions: legislation, government,
administration, and jurisdiction;

5
BVerfGE 2, 403.
224 Werner Krawietz

four : rule of law including the legal principles contained in the written
constitution;
five : guarantee of the rights of all individuals, especially fundamental and
human rights;
six : control of these rights through independent courts of law.
b) These principles, however, do not say enough about the concrete and
detailed organization of the state legal system. This is accomplished with
the means of state law, be it public or private, by way of legislation,
always with reference, however, to the principles, rules and maxims men-
tioned above.
c) This characterization of the formal state legal system presents, how-
ever, only an ideal type leaving more questions open than it can answer.

7. Law and the modern state legal system have their own distinctive tra-
ditions and their own respective histories in the West, the North, the East
and the South-East of Europe although the development of law and state
legal systems in modern times must be seen as a Central European prob-
lem.
a) For the moment, quite apart from for ever, nobody is able to define
with any certainty what the nature of the modern state legal system
('Rechtsstaat') will be (1) in the successor states of the former Soviet
Union, particularly in those of the Russian Federation, (2) in the countries
which have emerged or will still be emerging in the area of the former
Jugoslavia and so on.
b) Depending on what kind of political-legal system is referred to when
the word and concept of the modern state, especially of the 'Rechtsstaat' is
used this label assumes a different meaning in each case. A l l legal systems
organized by states are to be regarded as systems referring to themselves
and - only by reference to themselves, i.e. to their own formal/informal
normative legal structures - are they capable of deciding on whether and to
what extent certain elements and components of the modern state, espe-
cially of the 'Rechtsstaat', to adopt as binding. It is, however, only by addi-
tional reference to the respective political, economic and social context of
the constitution in question, that we can discern whether or not the societal
conditions permit a political system to move in the direction of the
'Rechtsstaat' and to transform itself accordingly.
 New Constitutional Patriotism versus Legalism? 225

III. Critical Review of the Relations between Constitution,

Legal Systems and the State Legal System

1. I am now coming to the second of my three points. I shall begin by

discussing different approaches and paradigms in legal theory. Today there
are at least two contrasting approaches to the study of law which are more
or less common in all countries and all state legal systems all over the
world, even in non-state systems of law. The first one, which I shall refer
to as the black letter law approach , is sometimes known as legal formalism
or legalism. In this approach the study of law consists predominantly of the
analysis, exposition and criticism of the rules of positive law in force in a
given jurisdiction. This approach to law has provided the main underlying
basis for the discourse within the law of most practising lawyers and judges
and, consequently, for the way of thinking and the nature of legal discourse
used in modern legal theory.
The alternative which I shall here refer to as the contextual approach to
law holds that rules are an important - indeed, a central feature of law -
but for the purposes of understanding, criticising or even expounding the
law the study of rules is not enough. Legal phenomena need to be set in
some broader political, cultural, economic or religious context. I shall refer
to this alternative as the legal contextualism.
2. In the following my reflexions will be focussed on two problems: I
should like to do away with some entrenched habits of thought 6 concerning
the relations between constitution, legal systems and the state legal system
which, in my view, are in need of a critical examination and reassessment.
My criticism is directed against (a) the view that the constitutional state
and the 'Rechtsstaat' are identical concepts whether they are seen empiri-
cally or only conceptually (as I have shown above), and (b) against the
conventional concept of the modern state ('Rechtsstaat') shaped by the nor-
mativism of Pure Legal Theory which wrongly views law and state as iden-
tical.
a) I shall first comment on the identification of the constitutional state
with the modern 'Rechtsstaat' :
To this very day the nature of the concept of the modern state is being
obscured by the mistaken practice of treating the constitutional state and
the 'Rechtsstaat' as one and the same. For those who equate the constitu-
tional state conceptually with the 'Rechtsstaat' any constitutional state is a
'Rechtsstaat' and any 'Rechtsstaat' is a constitutional state. In continental
Europe and, especially, in Germany it was not until the nineteenth century

6
Cf. Wolfgang Fikentscher, Modes of Thought. A Study in the Anthropology of
Law and Religion (Tübingen: Mohr, 1995).

16 FS Aarnio
226 Werner Krawietz

that old-style constitutionalism succeeded in laying down all legal powers

institutionally in a written constitution. However, in the social reality
which, after all, determines all law, legal systems without formal constitu-
tion are also conceivable and possible in practice, as the case of the United
Kingdom proves. The same is true of non-state systems of law as we can
see in a number of political communities under the rule of Islamic Law.
The constitutional state and the 'Rechtsstaat' are neither one and the same
nor are they two sides of the same coin.
Consequently, it does not seem advisable for legal theory to assume as
the basis of its approach that they are identical with eachother. In the fol-
lowing I shall, therefore, proceed both empirically and conceptually on the
principle - and this is my central thesis which can't, unfortunately, be sup-
ported with any more evidence in the framework of this paper - that the
constitutional and the modern 'Rechtsstaat' are not identical. This stance
opens up a realistic approach to the law and to modern legal theory as it
appears today from the perspective of institutional and systems theories. It
is also supported by Max Weber's theory of the sociology of law which
distinguishes between (i) legal systems and (ii) state legal systems. The
social differentiation and the legal distinction between the constitutional
state and the 'Rechtsstaat' show that the production and reproduction of
legal systems is in no way exclusively determined by the constitutional
state. The constitutional state has neither a monopoly nor the prerogative of
producing and establishing law.
b) I shall now discuss the identification of law or the legal system with
the state in the concept of the modern 'Rechtsstaat'.
The contemporary concept of the 'Rechtsstaat' is blurred by the view
that law and state are ultimately identical, in the sense, that they belong
together like two sides of the same coin and in substance form a single
entity. Hans Kelsen, for instance, says expressis verbis in his work
"Hauptprobleme der Staatslehre": 7 "Die staatliche Natur des Rechts und die
rechtliche Natur des Staates bedeutet materiell nichts Verschiedenes" or, in
its far less elegant translation: "Materially there is no difference between
the nature of the law pertaining to the state and the nature of state pertain-
ing to the law." He continues: "They [law and state] are nothing but the
two sides of the same coin; it is the identity in substance rather than in
form between law and state that forms its core and its content." In the
modern theories of norms and action it was particularly normativist legal
positivism including that of Kelsen and the Vienna School of legal theory
that was upholding the "thesis of the identical nature of law and state".

7
Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 2nd edn. (Aalen: Scientia,
1960) p. XVI. Idem, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edn. (Wien: Springer, 1960) p. 319.
 New Constitutional Patriotism versus Legalism? 227

Kelsen's theory of a substantial identity between law and state can no

longer be maintained nowadays, not even if this identity is seen only as a
formal one. Theodor Geiger in his ideology-critical studies, especially in
his Vorstudien zu einer Theorie und Soziologie des Rechts had already
warned of the danger "of defining law through the state and the state
through law" since this approach prevents us from "getting beyond the
fluid commonplace conceptions of everyday life". 8 The fact that the Anglo-
American version of the modern 'Rechtsstaat' is referred to only as "the
rule of law, not men", i.e. not as legal state but as rule of law should per-
haps also give us food for thought.

It is undoubtedly true that modern society recognizes a "Verkettung" of

law and state, to use Theodor Geiger's fitting formulation, that is, a chain-
like interlinking of law and state. The state, however, which is seen here
as large-scale organizational government machinery and decision-making
bureaucracy provides, above all, additional support, safeguards, guarantees
and social control for the established legal system. Consequently - and this
is my second key thesis - law and state are neither empirically nor concep-
tually identical. Instead, they are, seen from the point of view of a modern
theory of law, normatively different, institutional facts which must not be
bound up with eachother even from the conceptual or legal theoretical
point of view.

Modern States, especially the European 'Rechtsstaat', nowadays function

in their respective social environment as organizations or social systems,
meaning that they have a sphere of normative influence that is environmen-
tally limited. As a result, they also operate only with a politically and
socially limited degree of effectiveness. Sensu stricto the term and the con-
cept 'Rechtsstaat' describes first and foremost a normative, above all, organ-
izational, but also procedurally ordered, institutional fact, namely, that in a
number of regional societies bureaucratically organized systems of action
and decision-making do exist and are developing continually. This process
takes place on the basis of already established valid laws by way of politi-
cal-legal self-organization, self-regulation and decision-making. As states
these organizational systems - which cannot be characterized more closely
in this context - exert a normative social control over the continual produc-
tion (and self-reproduction!) of law by way of institutionally ordered poli-
tico-legal decisions following the lines of the written constitution. Once the
legal order has been created and validated these organizational systems are
meant to safeguard its existence as far and as much as that is at all possible
in practice - and if necessary with the means of law enforcement by the

8
Theodor Geiger, Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des Rechts, 4th edn. (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot, 1987), pp. 87 - 88.

16*
228 Werner Krawietz

state-machinery. In this way the continually changing legal norms, too, can
be established institutionally and procedurally.

IV. Relations between Constitution,

State Legal Systems and Society

1. I am now coming to the last of my three points. In recent debates the

relationship of state and society as it appears from the perspective of the
modern constitutional state has been blurred, above all, by a moral-political
liberalism, on the one hand and by communitarianism, on the other. Both
appear unsound and insufficiently founded from the point of view of legal
and social theory. There is, however, neither room nor time to discuss this
point here in detail.

2. Instead, I should like to refer to the, in my view, wholly misguided

equasion of society and state which distorts the image of society pro-
jected by contemporary political liberalism, by the critical social theory
of Habermas and by the associated theory of democracy. Habermas who
in a variety of studies has dealt at some length with the relations between
law, morality and reason seeks to base the functional legal system as it
operates in the whole of society on morality, or, at least, to found it on a
universal morality ('Vernunftmoral') and to substantiate it in the sense of
his moral theory. 9 In his most recent work "Faktizität und Geltung"
(published in 1992) Habermas introduces the concept of association for
the purpose of characterizing modern society and the democratic state.
Associations are forms of man's socialisation, that is, artificial creations
of communities in which associates in law live with eachother in equality
and freedom. According to Habermas communal life is characterized by
an increasing fragmentation of society into ever new forms of association
in the way men conduct their lives. 1 0

9
Jürgen Habermas, 'Grenzen des vernunftrechtlichen Normativismus - Interview
mit T. Hviid Nielsen', in Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution. Kleine
Politische Schriften V I I (Frankfurt a.M., 1990), pp. 114- 145 (pp. 118, 120). How-
ever, Habermas nowadays distinguishes between (1) moral questions which concern
'all of us' and deal with norms which "do not vary across different social spaces
and times", and (2) ethical-political questions concerning 'our respective political
communities'. This means that only the first refer to humanity as a whole or to an
- assumed - republic of citizens of the world and leads to a strict distinction be-
tween law of reason/universal morality, on the one hand, and law or legal ethics,
on the other. For details see: Werner Krawietz, 'Anerkennung als Geltungsgrund
des Rechts in modernen Rechtssystemen' in Recht und Ideologie: Festschrift für
Hermann Klenner (Freiburg/Berlin, 1996), pp. 104- 146 (pp. 114ff., 119).
10
Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992),
at p. 23.
 New Constitutional Patriotism versus Legalism? 229

The state, too, especially the 'Rechtsstaat', could in this way be charac-
terized and, at the same time, also relativized as one association among
others.
3. The political community, the modern state, in particular, is interpreted
here sensu largo with little precision in a conception embracing the legal
community of all its citizens also as a civil society (societas civilis). In this
way society is identified with the state, or with the entire community of its
citizens according to the motto, as it were, "We are the people, the state is
us!" which ended the life of the former German Democratic Republic.
a) By defining the state a priori as a comprehensive social structure that
includes the entirety of all individuals it seems to be possible to interpret
and understand it as a societas maxima.

b) In this way society and state ultimately appear identical.

c) If the legal system is conceived as a system of 'natural' rights that is,
reasonable rights (i.e., as an order of rights) then it becomes possible to
play off this system of 'natural rights' against the valid legal order or legal
system. This is done nowadays at least by some of the adhérants of consti-
tutional patriotism.
4. In the current legal-theoretical debate which I can only touch on here,
various conceptions of the constitutional state, especially the 'Rechtsstaat'
are reached depending on which concept of law and which concept of
theory is adopted by the participants. Dreier and Alexy, for instance, pursue
an analytically and conceptually oversimplified approach to the problem
with its theoretical base in the law of reason and adhere to a concept of
law and to a concept of theory which, in my view is too one-dimensional. 11
They base their concept of law and their conception of legal theory mainly
on the moral philosophy of Habermas and on the normative discourse
ethics without adopting his communication and action theories. Both the
constitutional state and the 'Rechtsstaat' are seen by them as concepts of
"law of reason", in other words, as "concept of a state" interpreted "in
accordance with the principles of the law of reason". 12 In the realm of
social reality where all law is enacted this view must inevitably lead to
misconceptions about reality, rule-guided interactions and so on. The one-
sidedness of such a concept of law which contributes to the shaping and
determination of the relations between constitution, law and state is to be
seen in the fact that it does not open itself ab ovo to an approach based on
historical and institutional facts and social experience. Nor, it must be said,

11
Robert Alexy, 'Idee und Struktur eines vernünftigen Rechtssystems' in Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie in Deutschland heute, ed. by Robert Alexy, Ralf Dreier, Ul-
frid Neumann (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1991), pp. 163 - 177 (pp. 164- 165).
12
Ralf Dreier, Recht - Staat - Vernunft (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), p. 75.
230 Werner Krawietz

is the scientific understanding of law based - from the outset - on experi-

ence, observation or the comparative study of law - as the point of view of
normative legal realism and of sociological jurisprudence ought to
demand. 13 What is really needed is not only that the formal, material and
procedural relations are reconstructed, as is done in legal dogmatics, but,
above all, that the real relations between constitution, state and law are
identified and explored as they appear in social reality, and, especially, in
modern society. 14
5. In practical legal argumentation as also in legal theory the question
has to be asked whether we ought, in fact, to accept the language used in
practical juridical life as it is with all its inexactitudes? Can it be right to
eliminate social concerns from legal thinking only because they do not
show up in the prevailing juridical language?
Even if we accept the social concerns as relevant we still know very
little about the elements and components that make up the law and the
legal systems, and not very much about what our conception of a rule,
above all, a legal rule, is or ought to be. If we take all the analyses of the
meaning, inference and following of rules seriously we cannot be content
with spelling out the norms or rules to which interactions, institutions, orga-
nizations or social systems subscribe. What is left unexplained in these
cases is not only where these rules come from but what counts as following
the rules in question. What does it mean to follow an institutionalized legal
rule? However, normative understanding, or the explanation of behaviour
with reference to the rules, principles or maxims which the legal system is
said to embody can never count as a satisfactory end for analysis, but only
as a starting point.

V. Résumé

1. Those who conceive the legal system first and foremost as a 'system
of rights' predating the state and who interpret constitution, law and state
merely in terms of a theory of reason in law may, from the standpoint of
their concept of a law of reason, tend to set a priori rules, principles and
procedures above the constitution and above the constitutional state. In the
light of this concept the modern state, especially in its form of a

13
Further to this new line of research in the comparative theory of law see: Raul
Narits, 'Interpretation of Law in the Estonian Legal System' in: Juridica Interna-
tional 1996, pp. 11 - 15 (pp. 11-12).
14
For an extensive discussion of the implications of these points see: Werner
Krawietz, 'Recht als normatives Kommunikat in normen- und handlungstheore-
tischer Perspektive' in: Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory. Festschrift
for Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin, pp. 369 - 390.
 New Constitutional Patriotism versus Legalism? 231

'Rechtsstaat', established on a societal basis and institutionally maintained,

may appear merely contingent and in need of permanent reform, if not
altogether irrational, as some critics say.
2. Considering that legal structures are always normative-institutionally
and socially determined and, for their part, significantly shape all social
relations it has to be concluded that this kind of individualism which is
rooted in moral philosophy, as briefly outlined above, must be rejected
unequivocally. The same also applies to the kind of moral- and social-phi-
losophical holism founded on more or less vague entities (individuals,
groups of individuals). This form of constitutionalism and the patriotism
associated with it may be 'reasonable' in their wish to bring new ideas
based on the individual and natural laws or laws of reason to bear on the
written constitution ab extra, and their desire to introduce changes in line
with these ideas to the fundamental political-legal decisions shaping the
constitution may be understandable and equally 'reasonable'. However, this
form of constitutionalism must never be played off against the well-
founded and institutionally established legalism of the modern 'Rechts-
staat'.
3. Attempts to do just that and, thereby, to undermine the institutions
and procedures of the 'Rechtsstaat' in endless critical discourses ought to
be accompanied by efforts to take the written constitution seriously. Such
efforts directed against the mere reasonableness of this kind of legal think-
ing must draw on the support of analytical hermeneutics, philosophy of lan-
guage, legal anthropology and the theory of discourse schooled on Wittgen-
stein, a whole series of approaches, in other words, which understand law
not solely as texts but see it in the whole breadth of its impact in its widest
social context. From a point of view of an intercultural comparison of law
and legal systems individual action appears to be largely informed and
determined by socially established associations, institutions and social sys-
tems. What matters is not only to understand the law but to explain it, too.
 CUSTOM AS CONSTITUTIVE OF L A W *

By Burton M. Leiser, New York

Many positivist philosophers of law contend that international law is a

fiction, because (as they say) the word "law" cannot appropriately be
applied to the relations among sovereign states. I shall argue that to the
extent that this is true, it demonstrates a significant weakness in some tradi-
tional positivistic analyses of law. The basis of my argument will be that
there is a sense in which international law clearly does exist, and that if we
conceive of custom as constitutive of law, we may account for that fact
without doing violence to rational, scientific conceptions of law.

I. Positivist Conceptions of the Relations of Custom to Law

Hobbes, Spinoza, John Austin, Pufendorf, and other positivist philoso-

phers, have denied that there is any positive international law.
As anyone familiar with Hobbes's political philsosophy would expect,
Hobbes denies the capacity of custom to effect changes in any positive law
or to give rise to any kind of legal obligation. Since the sovereign alone
possesses the capacity to make or abrogate law, his consent, either express
or tacit, is a sine qua non for any law. Without his consent, no law can be
made and none can be abrogated. Therefore, if the people attempt to estab-
lish a custom - deliberately or unconsciously - that happens to be contrary
to the will of the sovereign, however long that custom might have been in
effect, if the sovereign was unaware of it or had not given conscious assent
to it, it would have no legal status. He would be under no obligation to
permit its continued observance once he learned of it, and might condemn
and prohibit it if he so desired. Furthermore, any person who observed such
a custom, knowing that it was contrary to law, would to that extent be
breaking his covenant with every other citizen, no matter how widespread
such observance had been prior to his act. Finally, where there is no sover-
eign at all, as among nations, custom could have no lawmaking effect what-
ever. Custom, in short, could never serve as a source of law strictu sensu.

* Portions of this article are based upon my book, Custom , Law, and Morality
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1969).
234 Burton M. Leiser

In De Cive, Hobbes carefully distinguished written from unwritten law.

Any law that has been promulgated, whether in writing or orally, is a writ-
ten law:
By written, I understand that which wants a voice, or some other sign of will of
the legislator, that it may become a law. For all kinds of law are of the same age
with mankind, both in nature and time, and therefore of more antiquity than the
invention of letters, and the art of writing. Wherefore not a writing, but a voice is
necessary for a written law; this alone is requisite to the being, that to the remem-
brance of a law. For we read, that laws, contracted into metre, were wont to be
sung.1

The unwritten law, however, is not customary law but "that which wants
no other publishing than the voice of natural reason; such are the laws of
nature." 2 Customs, including those established by judicial interpretations of
the law, are not laws unless they have the sovereign's consent. "They are
to be received among the written laws, not for the custom's sake, (which
by its own force doth not constitute a law) but for the will of the supreme
commander." 3
Again, in Leviathan, he wrote:
When long use obtains the authority of a law, it is not the length of time that
makes the authority but the will of the sovereign signified by his silence, for
silence is sometimes an argument of consent; and it is no longer law than the
sovereign shall be silent therein. 4

If the inhabitants of a conquered land continue to observe their ancient

usages, such practices do not have the status of law, which are properly
"the civil laws of the victor and not of the vanquished commonwealth. For
the legislator is he, not by whose authority the laws were first made, but by
whose authority they now continue to be laws." 5
Thus, if the various provinces of a given commonwealth observe widely
divergent usages, "we are not to understand that such customs have their
force only from length of time, but that they were anciently laws written or
otherwise made known for the constitutions and statutes of their sovereign,
and are now laws, not by virtue of the prescription of time, but by the con-
stitutions of their present sovereigns." 6
Law is by its very nature a command, and as such can exist only where
there is someone who has the authority to issue commands. Hobbes care-

1
Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, Sterling, P. Lamprecht (ed.) (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1949), Chapter xiv, Sec. 14, 164.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., at 165.
4
Leviathan , Part II, Chapter xxvi.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
 Custom as Constitutive of Law 235

fully distinguished between law and counsel, and also between law and
covenant. He held that law is the command of a person whose power dis-
poses others to obey. 7 Therefore, one obeys laws because of the power of
the one who commands, but one obeys a counsel because he deems it wise,
prudent, or desirable to do so. Thus, counsel is given to and obeyed by
those who are willing, while even the unwilling are subject to the dictates
of the laws. Law is not equivalent to contract or "common consent," as
Aristotle thought. In the state of nature, contracts have no obligatory force
except in conscience, in "foro interno , " as Hobbes puts it. Where there is
no enforcing power, they may be obeyed or disobeyed at will. A person
may be under a moral obligation to fulfill his promises, but the law com-
pels him to obey through the threat of punishment if he fails to do so.

II. Implications for International and Primitive Law

Since the nations of the world are in a state of nature relative to one
another, according to Hobbes, there is no international law. It follows a
fortiori that there is no customary law of nations.8
Primitive societies lack the hierarchy of courts with their judges, lawyers,
and prosecutors, the army of sheriffs, jailers, parole officers, and police
officers whose duty it is to enforce the laws, and the great libraries of
tomes in which the laws may be found, either in the ordinances of the leg-
islatures or in the decisions of judges. Moreover, they lack any formal body
that is empowered to make law or to judge cases. Hence, it would follow
that from the kind of positivist view enunciated by Hobbes and other posi-
tivists, there can be no primitive law either.
But this view, which is shared in many essentials by all of the principal
positivists, reveals some possible weaknesses in traditional positivistic legal
theory.

III. Critique of the Positivist Position

Primitive peoples do not now and probably never have lived in a condi-
tion of total anarchy. Anthropological investigations lend no credence to
early theories that primitive peoples had no conception of crime, liability,

7
De Cive , Chapter X I V , Sec. 1, 55.
8
Cf. Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 1500 to 1800, tr. By
Sir Ernest Barker (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 289, note 63. See Leviathan I,
chap. 14: "In all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their
independency, are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators,
having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another - that is, their
forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies
upon their neighbors - which is a posture of war."
236 Burton M. Leiser

or property, of the distinction between accident and design. As William

Seagle observed, "The court of the bush is nonetheless a court because it
does not sit every day, because it may not always employ compulsory pro-
cess, because it is not housed in a permanent structure upon whose lintel is
inscribed Fiat justitia ruat caelum. " 9 The court of the bush is a legal insti-
tution - primitive in some respects, but invested with limited power to
make judicial decisions and determinations, to render verdicts affecting the
interests, right, duties, powers, and liabilities of those who come under its
jurisdiction. Primitive men are governed by law, though their institutions
may not be as fully developed or as sophisticated as ours.

The case for international law is very much the same. Here too, the insti-
tutions are weak and often ineffective; but there exist circumstances in
which the institutions set up to govern nations function relatively well.
Moreover, the law of nations has been codified, analyzed, and discussed at
great length by wise and reputable scholars and jurists. One cannot reason-
ably argue that these scholars and jurists have codified laws that are no
laws, and are writing learned articles and books about figments of the ima-
gination. From the mere fact that learned scholars study the law of nations,
it does not follow that there is such a law. In the past, they have devoted
much effort to the study of such fictitious inventions as phlogiston, the epi-
cycles of planetary motion, and angels. But there is one form of evidence
for the existence of international law that is virtually decisive: international
practice. The nations of the world behave as if there were a law governing
their actions. Each nation claims that it obeys the law and that its adver-
saries violate it. From time to time, a nation will acknowledge that it has
violated the law and strive to make amends. The rather nebulous interna-
tional "community" sometimes acts in concert to apply sanctions against
those who are judged to have violated the law and to enforce coercive meas-
ures against those who are reluctant to obey it. Although such efforts are
not always successful, they do not differ in that respect from efforts to
enforce and achieve universal respect for domestic laws.
The very rarity of such incidents is by far the best indication that there
is a law of nations and that most of the time, it works. Commercial agree-
ments between states involving great sums of money are seldom broken.
Treaties are rarely violated. Vessels of all nations ply the seas without
molesting one another. Diplomatic courtesies are extended and respected
and seldom violated. When people behave as if there were some law gov-
erning their actions, there is strong reason to believe that in some sense, at
least, there is such a law.

9
The History of Law, first published as The Quest for Law in 1941 (New York:
Tudor Press, 1954), 34.
 Custom as Constitutive of Law 237

From the traditional positivist's point of view, however, that is impossi-

ble, for, as John Austin insisted, law is command, and in the so-called law
of nations, it is impossible to locate the one who must be issuing the com-
mands in question.
What shall we say of those situations, which arise every day, in which
judges decide cases for which no clear legislative mandate exists? They
render their verdicts, basing them in part upon an exegesis of the law into
which they may read rights or duties that were never intended by the legis-
lators who passed the acts in question. With the rapid progress of science
and technology, no legislature can possibly anticipate every new contin-
gency. Thus, courts must inevitably decide cases based, not upon the origi-
nal true intentions of the framers of the laws they are sworn to uphold, but
by adjusting and adapting them to fit current conditions and needs. Her-
mann Kantorowicz called such rules, derived from legal exegesis,
"dogmas," which he defined as "rules which are recognized as binding, not
because they are commands of personal authority, . . . but because they are
logically implied by other rules the validity of which has already been
recognized." But the kind of "logical implication" to which he is here refer-
ring is not precisely the same as traditional or syllogistic reasoning. It is a
process of "unending mutual adaptation, completion and elimination," in
which we do not base the validity of one rule upon the other, but rather
"adapt rule Β to rule A, and conversely, with the result that they become
A ( l ) and Z?(l) and so on ad infinitum." 10

This is an accurate picture of the nature of judicial review. Whether such

a procedure should be dignified with the title "logic" is not germane to the
present inquiry, though so long as it is made clear that the term is not
being used in its usual technical sense, there is no reason why we should
refuse to call such judicial reasoning "logic."

The command theory of law does not do justice to the way in which the
law actually operates, or to the vast complexity of legal systems and the
richness of the term "law" as it is used in legal discourse.
"Law" refers, for example, to the procedures of the courts and the
manner in which lawyers, judges, witnesses, and jurors must behave, many
of which have been set forth by no legislature and have been neither
decreed nor promulgated by any sovereign. It also refers to the provisions
of the Constitution, written or unwritten, which are rarely thought to be
commands. They are rather the embodiment of a consensus of the people
or their representatives, a social compact whereby they agree to give up

10
H. Kantorowicz, The Definition of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1958), 31.
238 Burton M. Leiser

certain rights in exchange for a form of government under whose laws they
consent to be governed.
Legislation and regulation are linguistically and operatively closely
related. It is not surprising that what has been legislated should be consid-
ered right (which is derived from Latin rex, as is "regular"), 11 if only
because of a natural tendency to confuse the liquid sounds / and r. In addi-
tion to the possibility that folk etymologies and post hoc reasoning con-
fused rex and lex , assuming that lex could not exist without the command
of the king, there may have been a tendency to suppose that whatever was
regular , in the sense that it occurred with some frequency and predictabil-
ity, must have occurred because of a command issued by some legislator.
Hence the concept of law is transferred from the domain of human conduct
to that of the natural world, and we have the origin of the notion that the
motions of the heavenly bodies and other natural phenomena are the result
of divine legislation. As the Psalmist wrote:
The heavens declare the glory of God,
the sky proclaims his handiwork.
Day to day makes utterance,
night to night speaks out.
. . . He placed in the heavens a tent for the sun, . . .
whose rising-place is at one end of the heaven, . . .
And his circuit reaches to the other . . .
The Law of the Lord is perfect, renewing life,
the decrees of the Lord are enduring, making the simple wise.
The precepts of the Lord are just,
rejoicing the heart. 12

Thus the comparison is made explicit: The sun and the other heavenly
bodies testify to God's rule over the universe, and the perfection of their
motions is a sign of the excellence of God's laws, which are perfect and
will assure human beings of happiness if they are followed. The laws that
govern natural events and the laws that govern human events are identical
and flow the same source. Human beings who seek wisdom, justice, and
righteousness will find it in God's law - presumably not only through
studying it, but also by obedience to it.

11
Cf. the German Recht and Reich, the French droit (derived from roi, which
ultimately comes from rex), and such derivatives as "regime," "correct," "recti-
tude," and many others. A straight piece of wood, in Latin régula, from a feminine
diminutive of rex, came to be called a "ruler." "Law" and "legislation," like most
words derived from Latin lex, were also connected with the concept of that which
is right. Thus, a delegate is one who has been entrusted with a mission, a legacy is
an inheritance to which one has a right, and loyalty (derived from lex via French) is
right behavior toward those to whom one owes obedience.
12
Psalm 19.
 Custom as Constitutive of Law 239

IV. What Is Custom?

As Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out, certain concepts have such "blurred

edges" that it is impossible to find clear, unambiguous definitions for
them. 13 Instead, he suggested that in certain areas, at least, we ought to
look for what he called a "family of meanings." 14 "Custom" is one of those
"systematically ambiguous" terms that Wittgenstein had in mind.
A custom may be a habit or routine, or it might be an instance of a
maxim or principle that one follows more or less regularly, a rule of proce-
dure, a standing order or regulation of some sort, or a stylistic or linguistic
usage. Rules of etiquette might be called customs, and so might rites or
rituals.
Practices that vary in detail from one place to another might be called
"customs," even though they are sanctioned by law in those places. In one
place, for example, it might be "customary" to have wills attested to by at
least two witnesses, and in others by three or more. Whereas in the former,
wills witnessed by two persons would be valid, in the latter they would
not. It might be appropriate for a lawyer in a place where three witnesses
were the norm to say that it is customary for three persons to witness the
signing of a will; but such a "custom" has the force of law, for if one
failed to follow it, his or her will would have no legal effect. Marriages in
some places might be solemnized by actions analogous to the transfer of
property between the father of the bride and her new husband. In others,
the ceremony must be a contractual relationship willingly entered into by
the parties, i.e., the bride and the groom. In still others, a couple's cohabi-
tation is sufficient for them to be deemed to be married, so long as neither
of them is prohibited by some other rule from marrying the other party.

Similarly, certain moral norms might be called customs, especially when

it is recognized that those rules are not adhered to universally. Thus, one
might say, correctly, that at one time, it was customary among Eskimos to
share their wives with their guests. An Eskimo returning from an anthro-
pological tour of Europe or the United States might report, correctly, that it
is customary for the people inhabiting those regions of the world not to
share their wives with their guests.

Consider the following statements:

(AO It is not customary for people in our community to do X, since X is
required by law.

13
Philosophical Investigations , tr. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1958), 36.
14
Ibid.
240 Burton M . Leiser

(Bj) It is customary for people in our community to do X, since X is

required by law.
To anyone unsophisticated in the vocabulary of legal philosophy, (AO
would sound very odd indeed. It would sound, in fact, as though the people
in that community were inveterate and determined lawbreakers.
In (Bi) there is no apparent contradiction, though there would be one if
custom and law were mutually exclusive. Instead, everyone would under-
stand (BO to mean that the people in the community regularly acted in
accordance with the law, that X was required by law, and that the people in
that community accordingly did X. If "custom" and "law" were mutually
exclusive, as "horse" and "fish" are, then (BO would be nonsensical. Since
(BO makes perfectly good sense, it follows that "custom" and "law" are
not mutually exclusive, at least not in ordinary usage.

When (BO is written as follows, however, we seem to run into trouble:

(B 2 ) X is a custom in our community since X is required by law.
This sounds odd for reasons that will be explained shortly. Consider first
an alternative formulation of (AO:
(A 2 ) X is not a custom in our community, since X is required by law.
(A 2 ) does not seem, prima facie , to be exactly equivalent to (AO- It is
not difficult to see why. We are used (accustomed?) to seeing "custom"
and "law" differentiated from one another, so that if a given kind of act is
required by law, that act is not called a "custom." Notice how (AO differs
from (A 2 ). If "custom" is loosely defined as "a practice not required by
law," then (A 2 ) would be analyzed as follows:
( A 2 0 X is required by law in our community.
(A 2 . 2 ) ["Custom" and "law" have mutually exclusive denotations.] 15
( A 2 3 ) Therefore, X is not a custom in our community.
( A 2 3 ), then, is true because of a linguistic truth, a fact about the way
"custom" and "law" are defined.
(AO seems to be saying the following:
( A i . 0 X is required by law in our community.
(A 1.2) [No acts required by law in our community are regularly prac-
ticed.]
(Ai.3) Therefore, X is not regularly practiced in our community.

15
Suppressed premises are enclosed in brackets. The word " l a w " in (A2.2) is an
ellipsis for "act required by law."
 Custom as Constitutive of L a w 241

Notice that ( A L 2 ) , the suppressed premise in the enthymeme, is a state-

ment of fact about the community, not a statement about linguistic usage.
This is significantly different from (A2.3). Since one of the meanings of
"custom" is "an act regularly practiced," we obtain by substitution in
(A,.3):
(A 1.31) Therefore, X is not a custom in our community.
The form of this statement is identical with that of (A2.3), but its mean-
ing is quite different. For (A2.3) means, " I f X is practiced in our commu-
nity, it is required by law," or "Either X is not practiced in our community,
or it is required by law," while ( A 1 > 3 0 means, "X is not regularly practiced
i n o u r c o m m u n i t y . " T h e f o r m u l a t i o n s o f ( A 1 - 3 i ) a n d (A2.3) are e q u a l l y l e g i t -
imate. It is important, however, to keep clearly in mind their very different
meanings.
With this in mind, we can return to (B 2 ):
(B 2 ) X is a custom in our community since X is required by law.
If the world "custom" in (B 2 ) is taken to mean "a practice not required
by law," then (B 2 ) is patently contradictory. However, if "custom" is taken
to mean "an act regularly practiced," (B 2 ) is not only not contradictory; it
makes eminently good sense, and is in fact a completely adequate render-
ing of (BO.
If we now take "custom" in (A 2 ) in the same sense - i.e., as meaning
"an act regularly practiced" - we have another version of (A 2 ) that is iden-
tical in meaning with the apparent meaning of (AO as outlined above.

Thus, (B 2 ) and (A 2 ) are unacceptable translations of (AO and (BO only

if one of a number of possible meanings of the word "custom" is applied.
We are strongly inclined, at first, not to accept them, because when
"custom" is juxtaposed to "law," it is regularly understood to mean "a prac-
tice that is not required by law." But since there are other common mean-
ings of the term, there seems to be no prima facie justification for insisting
that only this narrow construction be placed upon the term when it is used
in legal contexts.
Customs are of course acts, not mere happenings. Human agency freely
exercised is a necessary condition for an act to be called customary. More-
over, what people do out of physical or biological necessity cannot prop-
erly be called customary. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say of people that
they customarily eat or drink, or that it is a custom among women to bear
children, or that it is customary among members of a certain tribe to be
born with kidneys.
A custom may be the practice of a single individual, but it is more com-
monly the practice of an organized group of persons.
17 FS Aarnio;
242 Burton M. Leiser

Habits are rather similar to customs, but they are not identical. Habitual
acts, such as smoking, tend to be compulsive, done without or even against
the subject's will, and changeable, if at all, only with difficulty. Customary
acts, however, are intentional and are generally done because one wants to
do them. 16
Constitutive rules differ from any of the above in that in order for the
activity in question to be performed, it must be performed in accordance
with certain rules. For example, if one does not know the rules of chess,
one cannot play the game at all - not even badly. In this respect, it differs
from fishing, for one might catch a fish without quite knowing how it is
done, but one cannot play chess unless one knows the rules. In such activ-
ities, it is not sufficient to say that certain practices are regularly observed.
Moving the bishop along the diagonals is not a custom , but an absolute
requirement if one is to move a bishop while playing chess. 17 Such rules
are obeyed, not because they are written into law books or enforced by
courts, but simply because the only way to play the game is to abide by the
universally understood rules under which it is played.

Similarly, the Constitutions of various states, including that of the United

States, simply cannot be reduced to commands, though they have the force
of law. They are more readily compared to a covenant under which each of
the parties agrees to abide by certain rules in order to play what we may
call, for lack of a better term, the "Constitutional game."

The mistake positivists often make may arise from concentrating exclu-
sively on one aspect of law, or upon law observed from one point of view.
From the legislator's point of view, law appears to be what the legislator
decrees it to be. From that of the lawyer or the judge, it seems to be what
the judge deems it to be. When a citizen contemplates the options he has,
the law may be what he expects the police to enforce, with no more than
perfunctory attention to what legislators have decreed or courts have writ-
ten.

16
There are exceptions. People sometimes adhere to custom, not because they
desire to do so, but because they feel compelled by social pressure to conform to
customary norms.
17
A chess player who moves his bishops along the horizontals or verticals is
either cheating or he is not playing the game of chess at all. Chess simply does not
provide for exceptions. Other games, however, do provide for violations of the
rules, with penalties attached to such violations. In such cases, the rules are not
constitutive in the same sense as they are in chess.
 Custom as Constitutive of Law 243

V. The Unwritten Law

The positivist approach to law fails to account for many familiar legal
phenomena. Its paradoxical inability to locate a sovereign in the United
States should surprise no one, since there is no such person in the complex
hodgepodge of legal institutions that constitute the legal "system" of the
United States - and of many other nations as well. The legal positivist's
conclusion that primitive law and international law do not exist derives
from a simple failure to recognize that the essence of law is neither its
source nor the means by which it is enforced by institutionalized instru-
ments of legal administration, but its function - regulating the lives of
human beings and the groups into which they form themselves. Much of
this actually takes place outside the institutionalized forms of law, and
indeed, without the unwritten laws that govern most human behavior, life
on this planet would be intolerable, more like Hobbes's state of nature,
even with the formal legal institutions in which we have invested so much.
When two men shake hands on an agreement, it generally does not
matter whether the agreement they have made is legally binding. They
usually abide by the terms of their agreement because they believe that
they are morally or ethically bound to do so. It can do no harm if they also
believe that they are legally bound to abide by the deal they have made. In
any case, the law does not come into the case at all unless one of them
fails to keep his end of the deal and the other appeals to the courts to come
to his aid. It is important to note, though, that even if their agreement was
legally unenforceable, it was nevertheless an agreement, so long as they
both believed that it was.

VI. Custom and the Abrogation of Law

If customs originate in the will or desire of the people and derive their
authority primarily from them and only secondarily from the consent of the
sovereign, as Francisco Suârez argued, 18 then it would seem that neither
the sovereign's consent nor even the sovereign himself is necessary for the
establishment of a custom. Suârez goes on to say that a custom that is con-
trary to the law cannot be reasonable, both because it is contrary to the law
and because actions done in accordance with such a custom cannot (or
should not) work to the favor of those who offend against the law or liber-
ate them from the yoke of the law. 1 9 Nevertheless, Suârez maintained that

18
Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver (De Legibus, ac Deo Legislatore),
1612 (London: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oxford University
Press, 1944), at 562, 468 f.
19
Ibid, 591.

17*
244 Burton M. Leiser

because the power to abrogate law rests in the hands of the people, they
may manifest their will by observing customs and thereby abrogate the law.
He disagreed with those who claim that there is a tacit assumption
embedded in positive laws to the effect that they are to exist only so long
as the people want them to remain in force. Nevertheless, he conceded that
the community possesses the power to establish a custom contrary to exist-
ing positive law. The establishment of such a custom is, in effect, a
demand by the community that the ecclesiastical or temporal authorities
abolish the law that is inconsistent with the custom.

Suârez also recognized "privative" customs, whereby the community, by

repeatedly omitting acts that its members are legally required to do, causes
a law to fall into desuetude, thereby sending a message to the authorities
that the community wants the law in question to be abrogated. If this hap-
pens very often, Suârez concludes, the law is shown to be useless, and is
abrogated simply "because it has been proved to be burdensome and of no
effect." However, he concluded, until a customary law has fallen into
desuetude, those who disobey it must be committing crimes.

Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, argued that when the need arises,
human law may properly be disobeyed. If such occasions arise frequently,
he said, a new custom contrary to the old law will have been established,
thus abrogating the old, because it would have been shown that the old law
was disadvantageous to the community. 20 Suârez's reply was that since
such acts were not contrary to the law, especially if there was no clear evi-
dence that the people were opposed to the law, they could not thereby have
established a custom contrary to the law. In his view, frequent "violations"
of this sort are in themselves sufficient to show that the law was useless,
and it would be abrogated simply "because it has been proved to be bur-
densome and of no effect," and not because of the establishment of a con-
trary custom. 21
The problem for Suârez seems to arise from lack of clarity as to what is
advantageous to a community and what is reasonable. In his view, a law
cannot be established unless it is reasonable. Therefore, a practice or
custom that is opposed to it must be unreasonable, both because it is unlaw-
ful and because it tends to abolish or at least be inconsistent with a reason-
able law. If this were correct, however, it would necessarily apply to
express legislative abrogation of a law, since a law that is abrogated must
have been reasonable to be a law, and its opposite would therefore appear
to be unreasonable. This in turn appears to follow from his view that con-

20
Summa Theologica, Qu. 97, Art. 3.
21
Suârez, op. cit., 606.
 Custom as Constitutive of Law 245

formity to reason is a necessary condition for the existence of a law - and

this in turn suggests that no law can exist unless it conforms to the natural
law. Abrogation of such a law, either by establishment of a custom so that
the old law falls into desuetude or by legislative enactment would therefore
appear to be contrary to natural law.

The fundamental difficulty in such a position lies in the conclusion that

seems to follow from it: that it is impossible for laws to be wicked or evil.
Nothing could be more obvious than the fact that some laws have indeed
been evil. Such theories as those of Suârez and Aquinas simply fail to offer
meaningful criteria for distinguishing them from good or reasonable laws.
Since any attempt to resolve that problem would lead us too far astray, let
us return to an analysis of abrogation of law through desuetude.

In Fundamental Legal Conceptions , W. N. Hohfeld explained that certain

rights, which he called demand-rights , always have correlative duties which
exist in other persons. Thus, if one person, A, has a demand-right x, there
must be at least one other person, Β, who has a duty to fulfill A's expecta-
tion that χ. Thus, for example, if A has entered into a contract with Β under
which Β has agreed to repair A's automobile within twenty-four hours, A
has a demand-right that Β complete the repairs within the designated time
period, and Β has a corresponding duty to complete them within that
period. Since Hohfeld made it clear that he was analyzing fundamental
legal conceptions, he evidently felt no need to explain that such relation-
ships were not diadic , though they might appear to be so, but triadic, for in
addition to B's duty to repair A's automobile, there must be a court that has
jurisdiction over the relationship created by A and Β and sufficient execu-
tive power to enforce their agreement. The relationship is thus far more
complex than it appears on superficial examination to be. The complete
relationship may be set forth as follows:

If (1) A has a demand-right over By then,

(2) Β has a duty toward X, and

(3) the court having jurisdiction over A and Β has the power to uphold
and enforce A's demand-right over Β, or (to express the same thing slightly
differently)

(4) the court has the power to compel Β to fulfill his duty toward A. In
addition,

(5) A has the privilege-right [in Hohfeld's terminology] to petition the

court to uphold his demand-right over B. And

(6) Β has a duty to obey the court's command that he fulfills his duty to A.
246 Burton M. Leiser

Notice that B' s duty to the court is somewhat different from the duty he
owes to A. What Β owes to A is that he fulfills the terms of the agreement
he made. What he owes to the court, on the other hand, is simply that he
comply with its commands. A can get compliance only by petitioning the
court, so long as Β refuses to comply voluntarily. The court, on the other
hand, can secure compliance with its command directly, by sending the
sheriff, armed with his badge, his handcuffs, and his gun to enforce the
court's will.
Notice also that the duty Β owes to the court must at some point be dif-
ferent from that which he owes to A because if the law is ever to be
enforced, there must come a time or a point in the chain of judgments
where no further appeal is possible. Otherwise, we would find ourselves in
an infinite regress. Higher courts cannot be said to owe a duty to lower
courts, for if they did, someone would at some point have to possess the
power to enforce some court's decrees, at which point the "duty" of that
court becomes meaningless.
The crucial distinction between customary law and the law of the state
lies precisely in the area of enforcement. In the international arena as in
domestic customary law, formal courts either do not exist or, if they do,
they have no enforcement powers. There is no sheriff with badge, hand-
cuffs, and gun who has the power to compel the United States, for exam-
ple, to comply with a world court's determinations on the mining of Nica-
raguan harbors or even to appear before the court if the nation's leaders
choose not to do so. Nor domestically has any official court been desig-
nated for the enforcement of customs. But in neither case does it follow
that custom is not enforced.
The loose "community of nations" can enforce its determinations, as
indicated above, through the application of sanctions or, in extreme cases,
by more forceful means up to and including war. Similarly, on the domestic
level, customary law can be enforced by boycott, ostracism, and in extreme
cases, by force. Citizens cannot generally be compelled by the state to pur-
chase goods or services that they have chosen to boycott. They cannot be
compelled to associate with individuals they have chosen to ostracize. And
on occasion, citizens can thwart efforts by the official organs of the state to
prevent or punish violations of the law through such measures by willful
noncompliance and lack of cooperation. 22

22
Many interesting examples might be cited to illustrate this point. The Mont-
gomery, Alabama, bus boycott led by Martin Luther King, Jr., proceeded despite
attempts by the authorities to compel black citizens to ride the buses. After a town
bully in a Midwestern State was shot and killed by citizens who were outraged by
his violent behavior and the failure of law enforcement authorities to bring him to
justice, members of the community erected a wall of silence around the killing that
 Custom as Constitutive of Law 247

If they can do all of this, they can also cause some of the laws of the
state to become so unenforceable that they no longer exist in any meaning-
ful, practical sense. Changes in the public's moral perceptions have such
effects upon the law. In recent decades, the authorities in many nations
have given up trying to enforce laws punishing adultery, and such laws,
though still on the books in some places, are about as meaningful as laws
prescribing the death penalty for witchcraft. A similar fate has befallen
laws proscribing contraceptive devices, abortions, and homosexual rela-
tions. The people have led the way toward the abolition of old laws, and
either by design or by silent acquiescence, are witnessing the establishment
of entirely new laws in these and other areas. Whether this is beneficial or
detrimental to society in the long run is not the issue with which we are
here concerned. The point is simply that through desuetude as well as
through repeal, the law, for all practical purposes, can be abolished.
The abrogation of a law does not leave no law in place, however. When
a law comes into existence, it confers rights or imposes duties, liabilities,
or disabilities where there were none before. For example, if no law cov-
ered the right to collect the shells on a certain beach, everyone would have
the right to collect shells there, and correlatively, no one would have the
right to demand that anyone not do so. If later a law were passed taking
the beach out of the public domain and conferring an exclusive right upon
a particular individual, Webster, to gather shells there, Webster would have
acquired a privilege-right to gather shells and a demand-right that all others
refrain from doing so. Those others would have had a duty not to gather
shells on Webster's beach imposed upon them.
If at some later time the law just described (L) were abrogated, every-
thing would return to the status quo ante - all rights, duties, and privileges
would be what they were prior to the passage of L. But there would be one
important difference: Under L, the courts had a duty to enforce Webster's
demand-right against all other potential shell gatherers. Once L is abro-
gated, they are obliged to refrain from respecting Webster's demand that
others refrain from gathering shells on the beach, e.g., by dismissing his
plea for an injunction. The effect of abrogating L is identical with that
which would obtain if some other law, M, were enacted conferring upon
people other than Webster the right to gather shells on the beach. The court
would be required by M to refrain from respecting Webster's demand that
others not gather shells just as it was after the abrogation of L. Whether the

prevented the authorities from prosecuting the vigilantes who had done the deed.
Throughout history, citizens have employed self-help techniques to frustrate efforts
to force them into compliance with official edicts that they believed were inconsis-
tent with their way of life - i.e., with their customs.
248 Burton M. Leiser

law is silent about shell-collecting or explicitly grants the right to collect

shells to everyone is of no material consequence.
The establishment of any law is equivalent to the abrogation of a correla-
tive law, and the abrogation of any law is equivalent to the establishment
of its correlative.
If this is correct, and if custom can establish law, then it follows that
custom can also abrogate law; for the establishment of any law is the abro-
gation of its correlative.
Suârez thought that the prince might "tolerate and consent" to the cus-
toms of his people, even when they were in conflict with his laws. But
under the theory I have been propounding in this essay, neither the tolera-
tion of the state nor its consent is necessary either for the establishment of
a law or for its abolition. The mere presence of some words in a legal code
is no guarantee that the actions prohibited or required by them will be car-
ried out. That happens only when the people actually practice what the law
requires of them, or at least the great majority of the people most of the
time. This happens only when the law conforms to their expectations, their
demands, and their needs. Words in legal codes may encourage people to
conform their actions to what the law requires. The ideas expressed in
those words may be woven into the warp and woof of the people's lives,
and thus become a living law. But however rigorously the written law is
enforced, however harsh the penalties for failing to abide by it, it will not
endure unless it conforms to the deep emotions and feelings of the people
who are expected to live by it. Even in the most undemocratic state, their
desires will ultimately determine what the law will be. Even without repre-
sentation in the government, the people's intentions, for good or for ill, will
ultimately establish the laws that will govern their lives, and will abolish
those laws that they find too onerous to be tolerated. Princes, kings, dicta-
tors, presidents, and prime ministers cannot rule for long over a people that
obstinately insists - wittingly or unwittingly - on living by its own rules.
Hobbes's state of nature will not exist for long if it ever exists at all, for
he was correct in assuming that nature demands of all human beings that
they make peace with one another, that they structure their social lives in
accordance with some orderly pattern. The physical power that Thrasyma-
chus so admired 23 might enable some would-be rulers to prevail over some
people for a time. But eventually, the indomitable will of the people them-
selves will assert itself in large ways and small, and will establish and
abolish laws, either directly or indirectly, through the sheer power of their
behavior - that is, through custom.

23
According to Plato in the Republic.
 Custom as Constitutive of Law 249

What is true of people in their domestic relations is true as well of

nations in their relations with one another. Even in the absence of effective
means of enforcing international law, such law exists nevertheless. There is
no sovereign and such courts as do exist generally lack the power to punish
violators or even to compel them to attend a hearing, as the world has seen,
for example, in the refusal of the United States to accede to the World
Court's jurisdiction in the Nicaraguan matter, in Iraq's persistent refusal to
adhere to commitments it entered into at the conclusion of the Gulf War,
and in Libya's refusal to extradite the suspects who allegedly blew up a
Pan Am flight with an extraordinary loss of life over Scotland, to mention
only a few recent cases.
To focus on the failures of international law without taking due notice of
its successes is akin to noting the large numbers of persons who have com-
mitted crimes and concluding that punishment must therefore be an ineffec-
tive deterrent without also noting the large number of persons who do not
violate the law.
The mistake the positivists have made rests, I believe, on their assump-
tion that any system that lacks certain characteristics of domestic legal sys-
tems cannot be a legal system at all. They have failed to observe that there
are certain other attributes that are common to all legal systems, including
those that are purely customary as well as those that rely upon the formal
institutions of law-making and law enforcement. Such systems, including
religious or canon law, the customary law of aboriginal peoples, and inter-
national law, exist and confer a degree of regularity upon the people who
are bound by them, despite their relative lack of formal means of enforce-
ment. To suggest that they do not exist because they do not conform to
some predetermined, dogmatic principle derived from a close study of one
paradigm of a legal system is unscientific, for it elevates the purely theo-
retical over the actual, whereas proper scientific method, in the study of
law as in all other studies, should be precisely the reverse.
 LANGUAGE AND BEHAVIOUR:
A N INTRODUCTION TO THE NORMATIVE DIMENSION

By Enrico Pattaro, Bologna

I. Senders and Receivers: Uses and Effects of Language

A language operates in the psychological and social contexts of its users:

"senders" and "receivers". It is linked to contexts and situations and it oper-
ates, brings about its effects , in so far as such contexts and situations
endure, or at least repeat themselves through time and space, remaining
substantially identical (or similar) to themselves with respect to different
senders and receivers (cfr. Charles Morris). Linguistic signs are stimuli.
When I speak of language "effects", I mean, roughly, types of reaction
(response) language is apt to stimulate in the receiver. The perspective for
identifying the effects of language, is that of the receiver, not the sender.
Notice, however, that the sender is the first receiver of the signs he/she
himself/herself sends (uses, produces). When I speak or write, my words
act upon myself, affect my linguistic production, my thoughts, my feelings.
I am at the same time a sender and a receiver. The sender, on the contrary,
comes to the fore when it is language uses that are to be identified, that is
to say, the ways and circumstances in which it is used, as well as the pur-
poses for which it is usually employed. In any case, for the identification of
the effects of language it will not be possible to refer sometimes to the
sender, sometimes to the receiver; consistency requires that the perspective
be kept constant. This caution is sometimes neglected by people concerned
with law in a linguistic vein.
One should distinguish between the individual and maybe occasional and
incidental reaction-response of a particular receiver to the concrete percep-
tion of a certain linguistic expression on the one side, and the typical
effects a linguistic expression is apt to bring about in a given linguistic
community on the other. When undertaking a classification of the effects of
language, one refers to shared and recurring contexts, and to the linguistic
expressions that are usually connected to them, leaving aside rare and
maybe exceptional responses. Speaking of the "ability of language" to
bring about certain kinds of reactions or effects, will then be tantamount to
252 Enrico Pattaro

saying that, given certain common and recurring psychological and social
contexts, certain linguistic expressions prompt in most cases - that is to
say, excepting certain uncommon cases or special conditions - particular
kinds of response in their receiver. Indeed, a linguistic expression brings
about an effect in so far as there is somebody who receives it. However, by
way of idealisation we say that a linguistic expression we believe to be
capable of bringing about a certain effect in a given linguistic community
has that effect even if it is not actually received by anybody.
In what follows I will identify four effects of language: the representa-
tive, illative (belief-inducing), emotional and conative effects. As it has
already been said, the sender comes to the fore when one sets to identify
the uses of language. Linguistic uses are distinguished according to the
aims for which language is used and/or according to the circumstances that
lead to its being used. The decisive criterion refers to the sender.
Moreover, one should distinguish between the particular intention or the
particular circumstances with respect to which a certain person sends a cer-
tain linguistic expression on the one side, and the linguistic uses that have
become established or typical within a linguistic community in connection
with certain aims or circumstances which are themselves typical. A linguis-
tic expression is used in so far as it is sent by somebody. However, by way
of idealisation we say that a linguistic expression which is ordinarily used
in a given linguistic community for a certain purpose or in certain circum-
stances has that use even if it is not actually sent by anybody. The estab-
lished uses of language thus involve the existence, in a linguistic commu-
nity, of dedicated linguistic expressions and idioms, i.e., of expressions and
idioms which are permanent, institutionalised - indeed consecrated by use,
in certain cases even stereotyped - for certain purposes or in connection
with certain circumstances.
In various languages there are linguistic expressions that have become
typical for a certain use; so much so that in certain cases grammars name
them after the use to which they are usually or mostly devoted. In English,
the imperative mood (e.g., "Go!") is such a case. Indeed, we can say that
the English expressions in which the imperative mood occurs are expres-
sions which are typical of the directing use of language. This does not
mean, however, that expressions in the imperative mood cannot have, in
certain circles and contexts within the linguistic community, a non-direct-
ing use. On the other hand, there are linguistic expressions which do not
employ the imperative mood and yet have an established directing use. For
example, the Italian penal code makes a directing use of the Italian lan-
guage which is nearly always based on the present indicative. Thus, "who-
ever misappropriates the personal property of others ... is sentenced to up
to three-years' imprisonment" (Art. 624 of the Italian Penal Code) clearly
 Language and Behaviour: Introduction to the Normative Dimension 253

means, "whoever misappropriates the personal property of others must be

sentenced to up to three-years' imprisonment".
We have distinguished the effects language is capable of bringing about
from incidental and extemporary reactions-responses of individual receiv-
ers; we shall likewise distinguish the expressions commonly and prevail-
ingly occurring in certain linguistic uses - we can call them linguistic
expressions dedicated to a use - from the extemporary linguistic uses of
one or another linguistic expression or idiom by an individual sender.
In the following I will identify five uses of language: the representative,
declarative, expressive, emotional, and directing uses.

II. Representative Effects and Uses of Language -

Meaning as Representative Effect of Language

The first linguistic effect to be distinguished is the representative effect,

consisting in language's ability to evoke representations of things and /or
states of affairs in the receiver. While closely connected with declarative
linguistic contexts (for which it is necessary), this effect cannot thereby be
identified with declaring tout court , since it can be performed, and is in
fact widely performed, in non-declarative linguistic contexts. Certain lin-
guistic expressions may not declare and yet represent something - evoke
representations in the receiver. For example, the phrase "rise your right
hand and say, Ί swear it' " may have a representative effect - it may evoke
in an English-speaking receiver the representation of a ritual gesture made
with the right hand - but it is not a declaration. Its representative effect is
combined with a directing, and not with a declarative, use of language. It is
the psychologists' and neurologists' task to tell us what happens in our
mind (a chemical or electrical reaction, or something like that) when we
perceive a word and react to it by forming a certain representation.
For merely classificatory purposes, we shall state our point by saying
that the representative effect of language consists in the stimulation of
representations of things and/or states of affairs in the receiver's mind.
Other writers in our field have used different terms to express similar views
on the matter.
- Richard M. Hare has proposed the term "phrastic" to refer to that part of
a linguistic sentence the effect of which is "to point out or indicate".
- A l f Ross has talked of an ideographic function of language.
- Karl Olivecrona calls ideatum the part of a directive the effect of which
is to represent a context and the action to be performed in it, analysing it
into the requisitum and the agendum .
254 Enrico Pattaro

Words or more complex linguistic expressions can obviously be used,

and are mostly used, to bring about a representative effect, as I have just
characterised it.

Therefore there can be in a sender a representative intention with respect

to a receiver. Moreover, there are representative linguistic uses which have
become established within linguistic communities, as well as dedicated lin-
guistic expressions which are capable of evoking in the receiver's mind
certain representations - and not others. To say that a word or a linguistic
expression "exists" in a language is to say that it is used - successfully
used - in a linguistic community to bring about certain effects. For exam-
ple, the word "burro" (English: butter) exists in Italian and in Castilian; it
does not exist in German. In Italian the word "burro" exists, that is, is
used, successfully used, to evoke the representation of a white, fat sub-
stance produced with cow's milk, etc.; also, it is used, in different contexts,
for example in the phrase "mani di burro", to evoke the representation of
hands which do not hold things. In Castilian the word "burro" exists, that
is, is used, successfully used, to evoke the representation not of a white, fat
substance produced with cow's milk, etc. (for which purpose the word
"mantequilla" is used), but to evoke the representation of the animal which
in Italian is called "somaro" ο "ciuco" (English: ass). Lastly, in German
the word "burro" does not exist, that is, it is not used, if it is used it is not
used successfully and fails to evoke any representation, but merely elicit
answers such as " I don't understand!?", "what are you saying?". Other-
wise, if the word "burro" is not well pronounced, it can be perceived as a
different word, for example it can be mistaken for the word "Büro" and
evoke the representation of an office, or a writing-desk. One may also say
that the Italian word "burro" and the Castilian word "burro" are two differ-
ent words, both because they belong to different languages and because
they have different meanings. Using Saussure's terminology, one may then
specify that the signifier "burro" exists both in Italian and in Castilian, but
with different "signifieds" (a white, fat substance and a braying quadruped
respectively).

I define "meaning" as the representation a word or a more complex lin-

guistic expression is capable of evoking in a receiver. In this sense,
"meaning" takes place in connection with the representative effect of a lin-
guistic expression. If "representation" is understood in a sufficiently broad
sense, this definition turns out to be closer to a number of current concepts
of meaning than it may appear. For instance, it is in agreement with Saus-
sure's opinion on the matter:

A linguistic sign does not unite a thing and a name, but a concept and an acous-
tical image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the
mental trace of this sound, the representation that is given to us by the testimony
 Language and Behaviour: Introduction to the Normative Dimension 255

of our senses: it has a sensory character, and if we happen to call it "material",

this is only in this sense and as opposed to the other term of the association, the
concept, which is generally more abstract. The mental character of our acoustical
image is apparent when we observe our language. Without moving our lips or
tongue, we can speak with ourselves or recite mentally a part of a poem. We call
"sign" the association of the concept and the acoustical image: but in current
usage this term generally designates only the acoustical image, for example a
word (arbor, etc.). It is forgotten that, if arbor is called a sign, this is only in so
far as it bears the concept "tree", so that the idea of the sensory part implies that
of the whole. Our proposal is to keep the word sign to designate the whole, and
to replace concept and acoustical image with signified and signifier respectively. 1

According to Saussure, the signifier (acoustical image) and the signified

(concept) reside in the mind of the speakers of a language, just as in their
mind resides the (psychological) link between signifier and signified. The
association signifier-link-signified Saussure calls a "sign". The mental
nature of meaning, its location in the minds of individual receivers, and its
inter-subjectivity, which is the outcome of a linguistic education shared by
its receivers, stand out clearly in Saussure. My definition of meaning, how-
ever, need not be construed as involving any particular answer to such
vexing questions as whether our representations ("meanings") should be
construed as psychological states in the "narrow" or in the "broad" sense
(Putnam). Apart from Saussure, our definition provides a concept of mean-
ing which is in keeping with the traditional notion of "intensional meaning"
and close to Frege's notion of the "sense" of a linguistic expression as
opposed to its "reference". The above-mentioned concepts of "phrastic" in
Hare, "ideographic function" in Ross, "ideatum" in Olivecrona, all corre-
spond to the concept of "meaning" as we have defined it.
Words and more complex linguistic expressions have no intrinsic mean-
ings, because meanings are not immanent in words, they do not reside in
words; they are a mental fact of people. For example, it is an intrinsic
property of the word "apple" that it is a five-letters word; it is not an intrin-
sic property of the word "apple" that it means the fruit of the apple-tree.
This datum, unlike the number of letters in the word "apple", is not imma-
nent in, nor inferrable from, the word in itself. Meanings are associated
with signifiers (words) in the minds of people. The same meaning can be
associated with different signifiers in different persons or in the same
person at different times or in different circumstances. On the other hand,
the same signifier can be associated with different meanings in different
persons or in the same person at different times or in different circum-
stances. Even when, as it is desirable, the same meaning is associated with
the same signifier in different people, we do not have an intrinsic, but an

1
Saussure, Cours de linguistique generale, Paris, Payot, 1994, pp. 98 - 99. My
translation.
256 Enrico Pattaro

inter-subjective meaning of a certain signifier - which is as good as one

may desire.

III. The Declarative Use of Language and its Illative

(Belief-Inducing) Effect

The act of declaring, i.e., of saying that things are one way or another,
has, if successful, an illative (belief-inducing) effect on the receiver: it
makes him/her believe what is represented to his/her mind in virtue of the
representative effect of language. If I ask, "Is Mr. Smith in his office?" and
I get an answer to my question, this will probably mean that I have suc-
ceeded to evoke in the receiver a representation of the state of affairs con-
sisting in Mr Smith's being in his office. For the receiver must be able to
represent the state of affairs consisting in Mr. Smith's being in his office to
tell me whether it obtains or not. My words may thus have a representative
effect on the receiver even if their utterance does not involve any declara-
tion concerning the state of affairs they represent. Now, suppose that the
answer I get is, "Yes, Mr. Smith is in his office". Not only will this answer
evoke a representation of Mr. Smith's being in his office; by declaring that
Mr. Smith is in his office, it will make me believe (if I trust the person
who answered my question) that he is in his office. Declarative use of lan-
guage, if successful, brings about an illative effect on the receiver. Lan-
guage can have a representative effect outside of declarative contexts; but
declaring (and inducing beliefs) implies representing.
The declarative use of language consists in saying that things are the
way they are represented. What is declared is thus something which is
pointed to or represented. In spite of this, in a declarative sentence the
representative effect is not performed by the act of declaring. The act of
representing consists in evoking representations in the receiver and per-
forms the representative effect. On the other hand, the act of declaring
makes someone believe what is represented. If something is declared, a
receiver who places sufficient trust in the sender will believe that the
declared state of affairs is just as it is represented. Declarative language is
also said "constative" (J. L. Austin) or "apophantic" (from the Greek verb
apofainein = to declare). In sum: (a) declarative, constative, or apophantic
language is used for the purpose of saying that things are one way or
another. This is the declarative use of language; (b) what is declared is
represented thanks to the representative effect of language; (c) what is
declared is believed in virtue of the illative effect of language, which con-
sists in inducing or suggesting beliefs to the receiver.
 Language and Behaviour: Introduction to the Normative Dimension 257

IV. Emotional Uses and Effects of Language -

Expressive Use and Illative Effects of Language

If a sender wants to evoke emotions, he/she will use emotional lan-

guage; for example, if his/her purpose is to evoke a feeling of confidence
in someone who is about to face a difficult trial, he/she will use encour-
aging words. The emotional effect of language consists in its ability to
evoke in the receiver feelings, moods, emotions. The emotional effect,
unlike other effects, can be brought about also by linguistic expressions
without any representative effect (and without reference to a state of affairs
represented by the receiver): think of some meaningless onomatopoeia, or a
musical piece evoking different moods, for example good humour or nostal-
gia. The emotional effect is sometimes mistaken for, or at least associated
with, the expressive use of language. This is inaccurate and can be mislead-
ing. Among the reasons that prompt the confusion between "expressing"
and "evoking emotions" it is likely to be the fact that the very same lin-
guistic expression is often expressive as to its use and emotional as to its
effect. However, this affects neither the difference between language used
expressively and language used and/or acting emotionally, nor, of course,
the difference between expressive and emotional uses of language. Lan-
guage having an emotional effect acts on the feelings of the receiver,
makes the receiver feel some way or another; expressive language, on the
other hand, acts on the receiver's intellect: it makes the receiver believe , it
brings about an illative effect. If you are listening to a lecture and murmur
"how boring!", you express boredom and evoke in the person next to you,
the receiver of your exclamation, the belief that you are bored (apart from
other feelings you can stir up).

It is not even the case that the expression of certain feelings (by the
sender) will necessarily evoke similar feelings in the receiver. For example,
words of praise or admiration can evoke annoyance or irritation. As a
matter of fact, in this case, as well as in the case when the feelings evoked
in the receiver are similar to those expressed by the sender, we are not
faced with an expressive effect of language, but with an expressive use
(made by the sender) and an emotional effect (on the receiver). A sender
expressing his/her own mood will use expressive language, maybe without
any intention of evoking emotions in a receiver: think, for example, of the
exclamations of someone who has unwittingly hammered his/her own
finger, who will be typically totally indifferent to the possible reactions of a
receiver. Expressing is closer to declaring than to evoking emotions. More-
over, expressing, like declaring, in so far as it prompts beliefs, requires a
representative effect; for, if it makes the receiver believe, it makes him/her
believe something (e.g., the existence of a certain mood in the sender),
something the receiver must be able to represent to himself/herself. Evok-

18 FS Aarnio
258 Enrico Pattaro

ing emotions, on the other hand, as I have already remarked, can do with-
out the representative effects of language. As in the case of declaring, also
in the case of expressing we are faced with a "use", rather than an "effect",
of language; we shall speak of an "expressive use", but not of an "expres-
sive effect"; of a "declarative use", but not of a "declarative effect". On the
other hand, to refer to the typical effect of the expressive and declarative
use of language, we shall speak, as we said above, of an "illative effect" of
language.

V. The Illative Effect of Language and of Non-Linguistic Signs

Language can stimulate the receiver's intellect and make him/her

believe something in all its uses, and not merely in the declarative or
expressive ones: it can make the receiver believe something about the
sender. The receiver may be led to believe that the sender is using a certain
linguistic expression for a particular motivation, cause, or goal having some
relation with the linguistic expression in question. Thus, for example:
- use of representative language, besides evoking representations of things
and/or states of affairs in the receiver's mind, can make him/her believe
that the sender is an imaginative and fanciful person;
- use of directing language, besides prompting volitional impulses in the
receiver's will, can make him/her believe that the sender wants him/her
to behave in a way and not in another;
- use of emotional language, besides evoking feelings in the receiver, can
make him/her believe that the sender is an effective orator;
- use of declarative language, besides evoking in the receiver beliefs on
what is being declared, can make him/her believe that the sender is a
well-informed person (note that in this case we have a twofold illative
effect of the language being used: concerning the thing the declaration is
about and concerning the degree of the sender's information on it);
- use of expressive language, besides evoking in the receiver beliefs on the
sender's mood, can make him/her believe that the sender is a very sensi-
tive person (note that also in this case we have a twofold illative effect
of the language being used: concerning the mood being expressed and
concerning the sender's type of emotionality).
With reference to the ability of language to induce the receiver to infer
and believe something, we shall then speak of an illative effect. This is an
effect which, as I said above, can be brought about in conjunction with any
use and overlap with any other effect of language. Any linguistic expres-
sion can be a symptom or a hint of something for the receiver's intellect,
 Language and Behaviour: Introduction to the Normative Dimension 259

inducing in it some beliefs and not others. As a matter of general fact, all
uses and effects of language are commonly intertwined in actual linguistic
practice; in this sense, our classification must be seen as an idealisation of
the concrete operation of language.

The illative effect, moreover, transcends linguistic phenomena. A symp-

tom is, according to a common definition, the sign of the existence of
something. The illative effect transcends linguistic phenomena because it
can be brought about by non-linguistic signs. For example, for a good
hunter a certain smell is a sign of game; and the consequent, immobile
posture assumed by the dog - the point - is a sign, for the huntsman, that
the dog has perceived the smell of game and, according to circumstances,
can lead him to believe (illation) that game is around. The illative effect -
making someone believe something - is therefore not peculiar to language.
Non-linguistic natural phenomena have an illative effect on an observer,
leading him/her to formulate opinions, maybe also scientific opinions, such
as an hypothesis or a law. Newton is recounted to have formed the first
idea of the law of universal gravitation by seeing an apple fall from a tree.
If this is how things went, that apple had indeed an important illative
effect. A very large part of our behaviour is indeed oriented, directed, by
beliefs and opinions which form in us on the basis of symptoms and
illations. The relation symptom-illation-belief is determined in us by experi-
ence. The use of linguistic expressions by a sender has an illative effect on
a receiver, just as a natural phenomenon has an illative effect on an obser-
ver. For example, as far as directives are concerned, if a good communica-
tion takes place, it is the linguistic expression itself (say, its imperative
mood) and/or the context in which it is sent that provides the receiver with
such symptoms as are sufficient to understand that the sender has a direct-
ing intention. The receiver is in the position to understand (infer, make an
illation) that the sender has formulated a directive and not, for example,
some declarative judgement about a state of affairs: the receiver thus forms
an opinion about the sender's intentions. When the imperative mood is
used and in other similar cases, the illative effect of language is ensured by
established linguistic uses, which are shared by the receiver. In our ex-
ample, the receiver is used to associate the idea of directive with use of the
imperative mood by the sender and to infer from use of this mood that the
sender is directing him/her to do something. A normally experienced
person is likewise led to infer, thanks to ordinary habits of life, the pre-
sence of fire from that of smoke.

However, unlike the case of use of the imperative mood, the illative
effect of language is not always based on established linguistic uses which
are shared by the receiver; sometimes it depends on factors or circum-
stances of a non-linguistic nature. If I say "my car goes 250 kilometres an
18*
260 Enrico Pattaro

hour", a receiver will be able to understand, on the basis of his/her linguis-

tic competence, that this is a declaration, and to understand and believe that
I mean that my car is fast. But, as to believing that my declaration is true,
that will depend on his/her opinion of myself and, in general, of people
speaking of their cars' performances; it will depend on the information he/
she may have about the power and the condition of my car in particular.
The receiver's opinion on my trustworthiness and his/her information
about the characteristics of my car are not part of language. In this case,
the illative effect of a linguistic expression thus depends on non-linguistic
factors. In sum, the following conclusions can be established about the illa-
tive effect:
- It takes place also outside language, on the basis of non-linguistic signs
or symptoms.
- It is uniquely based on the receiver's linguistic competence as far as the
recognition of dedicated linguistic expressions and established linguistic
uses is concerned. This is also true of the consequent opinions and
beliefs the receiver forms as to the type of discourse the sender means to
engage in, given the linguistic expressions he/she employs.
- Except for the cases covered by the previous paragraph, it is largely
based on non-linguistic factors, that is to say, on the receiver's knowl-
edge and opinions about the person of the sender and the subject the
sender is talking about.

VI. Language, Communication, and Causes of the Linguistic Effects

which are neither Linguistic nor Communicative

In the different effects we are in the job of ascribing to language (repre-

sentative, illative, emotional, conative), it is necessary to distinguish
between linguistic factors, communicative factors, and factors which are
neither linguistic nor communicative. Linguistic factors pertain, in Saus-
sure's terminology, to the langue (to established linguistic uses, according
to the terminology that has here been adopted), independently from any
actual communicative process: a language ( langue ) can be used privately or
to send messages to receivers who can neither speak nor understand it -
who do not share the established linguistic uses employed by the sender.
Communicative factors pertain, in Saussure's terminology, to the parole:
they are necessary for actually bringing about the effects of language. Lin-
guistic communication requires the concurrence of both linguistic (langue)
and specifically communicative (parole) factors, such as the transmission of
the linguistic expression by a sender and its reception by a receiver that
understand the language (langue) spoken by the sender. The factors which
 Language and Behaviour: Introduction to the Normative Dimension 261

are neither linguistic nor communicative show up especially in the illative

and conative effects of language.
The representative effect of language does not necessarily require the
concurrence of factors which are neither linguistic nor communicative. Lin-
guistic and communicative requirements are sufficient for adequately bring-
ing about the representative effect; if the receiver has an adequate linguistic
competence, he/she will understand the meaning (in the sense we have
defined it) of the words addressed to him/her. It goes without saying that
the common person can fail to understand the technical discourse of jurists
or scientists. But if we admit that jurists, scientists and other specialists
speak special languages of their own, we shall be able to say that the
common person does not understand, or does not understand well, the
words of jurists or scientists because he/she does not understand their lan-
guage (langue), or hardly understands it (he/she does not have an adequate
linguistic competence).

VII. The Directing Use of Language

As I said above, it is expedient to distinguish between the use a sender

makes of a linguistic expression and the effect a linguistic expressions
brings about on a receiver. We name "directive" the linguistic expression
used to make someone do something (independently from its being success-
ful or not). We name "conative linguistic expression" the linguistic expres-
sion that makes the receiver do something (independently from the inten-
tion of the sender and the use it is usually employed for). The established
uses which are typically capable of bringing about the conative effect in a
given linguistic community will be appropriately called "directing uses".

1. Illative Effect and Directing Use of Language

A directive must be capable of being recognised as such by a (potential)

receiver. The receiver must be in a position to understand when he/she is
faced with a directive rather than, for example, a declaration of a state of
affairs. The crucial point is that the linguistic expression must bear, in
virtue of the context and/or the words being used (e.g., the imperative
mood), such symptoms as can make a receiver understand the directing use
of the linguistic expression. In this connection we spoke above of the illa-
tive effect of language.

2. Representative Effect and Directing Use of Language

Moreover, the (potential) receiver must be in a position to understand

which behaviour is being directed and in which circumstances it ought to
262 Enrico Pattaro

be performed. In this connection we spoke of the representative effect of

language and of meaning. A crucial warning is however in order. "Direct-
ing linguistic expression" surely includes "representative effect" (hence,
"meaning") and, to a certain extent, also "illative effect". This, however, is
not sufficient to have us include among the requirements for a directive the
receiver's understanding that he/she is faced with a directive, or the under-
standing of its meaning. Indeed, the condition for the realisation of such
things is that the sender and receiver speak the same language. "Directing
linguistic expression" does not mean "linguistic expression in a language
shared by sender and receiver". If someone talks to me in Arabic, I am not
able to understand whether he/she is sending me a directive, nor what he/
she is directing me to do. Yet, the sender is using linguistic expressions (in
Arabic) which are capable of bringing about representative and illative
effects (if the receiver understands Arabic).

3. Some Distinctions Concerning the Definition of Directive

Even though these remarks may appear pedantic, they serve to draw dis-
tinctions and thresholds that are crucially important. We can thus state the
following:
(a) Unexpressed directing intention. It is not a directive.
(b) Directing intention manifested by means of non-linguistic expres-
sions. A directing intention manifested through non-linguistic expressions,
that is to say, in a completely extemporary way by means of gestures or
sounds, outside any established linguistic use, is not a directive because it
is not expressed by linguistic signs. Indeed, our definition of language
requires the (at least potential) inter-personality of the signs it is made up
of, which in this case does not exist.
(c) Directive. A directive formulated by means of linguistic, interperson-
al signs (e.g., in a natural language or in Morse code) is a directive even if
the receiver does not understand the language used by the sender or does
not actually come to know its existence. For example: a directive expressed
in Arabic and addressed to a receiver who does not know the Arabic lan-
guage nevertheless meets all the requirements of our concept of directive;
and a directive addressed in whatever language to an absent receiver (who
is therefore incapable of perceiving it) nevertheless satisfies our concept of
directive.
At the present stage of our analysis, "directive" includes:
- the language's capability of bringing about an illative effect,
- the language's capability of bringing about a representative effect,
- a directing use, but not a conative effect.
 Language and Behaviour: Introduction to the Normative Dimension 263

A linguistic expression brings about a conative effect if it evokes a voli-

tional impulse in a receiver. Is a directing use of language sufficient for a
linguistic expression to bring about a conative effect on the receiver? The
answer is of course in the negative. For a directive to bring about a cona-
tive effect on a receiver something more is required than a directing use of
language by the sender, something more, that is, than his/her using a lin-
guistic expression which is adequate in both the illative (recognisability of
its directing character) and the representative (recognisability of the behav-
iour which is being directed and of the circumstances in which it is to be
performed) respect. To be sure, a linguistic expression can bring about a
conative effect, that is to say, it can prompt in the receiver a volitional
impulse to act, even if there is no directing use of language by the sender
and the receiver is perfectly aware that no directive is being given to him/
her. "Effective directive" and "linguistic expression with a conative effect"
are only partially overlapping. All effective directives are linguistic expres-
sions with a conative effect, but not all linguistic expressions with a cona-
tive effects are directives, since there are linguistic expressions which are
not used to direct (and which are therefore no directives) which may never-
theless bring about a conative effect on their receiver. For example, if I am
going home and someone who does not know me and does not know
where I live tells me, casually and totally unwittingly, by means of non-
directing, but, say, declarative or expressive, linguistic expressions, that the
house round the corner is on fire, I will start running to get there as soon
as possible because I know that that is my house. The stranger's linguistic
expression is no directive, and yet it brings about a conative effect on
myself. A linguistic expression can then bring about a conative effect when
it meets an adequate mental disposition in the receiver.
Notice that also the illative and representative effects of language require
a mental disposition on the part of the receiver, because a language (a
langue ) is a socio-psychological fact. However, while the representative
and illative effects belong (the former partially, the latter completely) to that
socio-psychological fact that is a language (langue), the conative effect is
largely dependent on other (non-linguistic) facts in individual or social psy-
chology. Indeed - to pursue our example further - if someone talks to me
in Arabic, I will not understand a word either in the illative or in the repre-
sentative respect, since I have never learnt to speak Arabic. If, on the other
hand, someone addresses me in Italian, I will understand, since learning has
adequately disposed my mind to this language. If someone directs me to do
something in Italian, I will understand that I am being given a directive
(illative aspect) and I will understand what behaviour I am being directed
to perform (representative aspect). But as to obeying the directive (that is,
as to experiencing a volitional impulse to act according to its content), this
will depend on further mental conditioning, which is not, properly speak-
264 Enrico Pattaro

ing, a part of the mental conditioning in virtue of which I am a speaker of

the Italian language.
(d) Directive in a Language Shared by the Sender and Receiver and
Actually Perceived by the Latter. On the other hand, it should not be for-
gotten that it is not an essential requirement for a linguistic expression to
be a directive that it be expressed in a language known to the receiver and
be received and perceived by him/her. We have distinguished linguistic
uses from linguistic effects, as well as language ( langue ) from communica-
tion. Language (langue) is the main instrument of communication, and
communication is the main purpose of language; but language (langue) can
be used for non-communicative purposes: one can have language without
communication. It is then appropriate to distinguish between requirements
of language and requirements of communication. The formulation of the
directive by means of linguistic expressions (in Arabic, Italian, Morse code,
etc.) which are abstractly capable of bringing about representative and illa-
tive effects is a linguistic requirement - a requirement the satisfaction of
which makes the expression linguistically adequate and turns it into a direc-
tive. The formulation of the directive in a language known to the receiver
and its being received from him/her are communication requirements -
requirements the satisfaction of which is necessary for the linguistic expres-
sion to bring about a conative effect in a communicative process, even
though it is not necessary to turn it into a directive.

4. Definition of Directive

Our definition of "directive" does not include psychological requirements

about the sender, i.e., his/her having a directing intention (cfr. supra,
VII. 3., sub a). Our definition, however, does include:
- Behavioural requirements on the sender: the directive must be expressed
(cfr. supra, VII. 3., sub b). A directive is such whether the sender has
expressed it with a directing intention or not (he/she may have expressed
it in fun, by mistake, while sleep-walking): the sender's intentions do not
belong to the concept of directive.
- Linguistic requirements: in order to express the directive, the sender
must use linguistic, and therefore interpersonal, signs, that is to say, cur-
rently used linguistic expressions; or, if he/she develops a new language,
this must be complemented by "keys", such as definitions, formation and
transformation rules, etc. (cfr. supra, VII. 3., sub c). Communication
requirements (such as the requirement that the directive be formulated in
a language known to the receiver and that it be received and perceived
by the receiver; cfr. supra, VII. 3., sub d), on the other hand, are not
 Language and Behaviour: Introduction to the Normative Dimension 265

such that their satisfaction is necessary for a linguistic expression to be a

directive. They are not part of our definition of "directive". Indeed,
directing belongs to the use of language, not to its effects: it belongs to
language (langue), not to communication (parole).

VIII. Conative Effects of Language

The conative effect is the effect of language that most concerns us here.
It consists in making somebody do something. More precisely, it is the re-
alisation of a linguistic expression's ability to prompt volitional impulses
in a receiver. A linguistic expression cannot bring about a conative effect
without bringing about a representative effect (without referring to a state
of affairs the receiver is able to represent). Moreover, a linguistic expres-
sion's conative effect acts on the receiver's will, it prompts in his/her mind
a volitional impulse to act; the receiver must therefore know the way in
which he/she is to act, if the linguistic expression is to prompt such a voli-
tional impulse.
The directive's adequacy in the communicative respect (its being formu-
lated in a language known to the receiver and its being received and per-
ceived by the receiver) is a necessary but in itself insufficient condition for
the conative effect. A linguistic expression formulated in a language
unknown to the receiver, or a linguistic expression which is not received or
perceived by the receiver, will be unable to bring about any effect, let
alone a conative effect, on the receiver. But an adequate communication is
not sufficient for bringing about a conative effect. As I said above, if some-
one orders me to do something in good Italian, I will certainly understand
that I am being given an order and what I am being ordered to do. How-
ever, the successful communication of the order will be insufficient to
make me obey it, that is, unless other factors, external to mere communica-
tion, concur in making me obeying it. Such factors, which transcend lin-
guistic and communication requirements and enable a linguistic expression
to bring about a conative effect, can be roughly identified as: the receiver's
suggestibility, the receiver's interest (especially avoidance of sanctions),
and the idea or belief of duty or obligation. These are receiver's attitudes
that can converge and add up or clash with each other.

1. Conative Effects Determined by the Receiver's Suggestibility

Suggestion as a psychological mechanism producing a conative effect

has been thoroughly investigated by Hägerström and Olivecrona about the
concept of command. Hart also dealt with the same subject in his critique
of Bentham's and Austin's theory of law. A command does not appeal to
266 Enrico Pattaro

the values accepted by the receiver, nor to his/her interests; accordingly, it

acts straight. As a command's operation is independent from any motiva-
tion of the receiver, it consists in a straight, practical suggestion. A com-
mand's operation implies an appropriate relationship between the subjects
involved, such as a superior position of the person that gives the command,
which makes the receiver reactive to the sender's influence. A group of
people - say, during an excursion to the mountains - is suddenly faced by
a situation of danger; in such a circumstance, a strong personality will be
able to give orders that will be immediately obeyed in virtue of their own
suggestive force, which simply prevents any other resolution from arising
in the receivers' minds (Olivecrona's example).

2. Conative Effects Determined by the Receiver's Interests

( Especially His/Her Interest in Avoiding Sanctions)

A typical case of conative effect obtained by appealing to the sender's

interest is a successful directive complemented by the threat of a sanction
if it is not obeyed. Here we need to consider in detail whether the receiver
is afraid of the sanction, whether he/she believes it will actually be
inflicted in case of infraction, how he/she assesses the sanction's damage
as compared to that of renouncing the behaviour he/she would otherwise
perform. In this connection, we can recall Kelsen's pages on the technique
of direct motivation (directing a behaviour immediately beneficial for the
receiver) and the technique of indirect motivation (both rewarding techni-
que i.e., promising a reward if the directive is obeyed, and punishing tech-
nique, i.e., threatening a penalty if it is not obeyed).

The receiver's interest, moreover, must be construed in a broad sense: it

can be a superior interest, a proper value. The receiver's psychological dis-
position that allows the sort of conative effect now under scrutiny is any
attitude (desire, appetite, accepted value or pursued goal) to which the
directive can appeal in the sense that obeying it is in the receiver's estimate
and in the actual circumstances a necessary, appropriate, or beneficial
course of action for the purposes of obtaining a greater benefit or a minor
harm. This evaluation is an assessment of the costs/benefits ratio, a pruden-
tial calculus, a teleologically oriented estimate; oriented, that is, to the goal,
interest, good or value the receiver intends to achieve. If from this type of
evaluation one turns to an evaluation of the intrinsic Tightness of the di-
rected behaviour, the receiver's attitude (to which the directive appeals in
order to bring about its intended effect) will fall within the type represented
by the idea or belief of obligation (opinio obligationis), which is, as we
shall see, a component of norms (customs).
 Language and Behaviour: Introduction to the Normative Dimension 267

3. Conative Effects Determined by the Idea or Belief of Obligation ,

i. eby a Preexisting Norm Internalised by the Receiver

Finally, a directive can be effective because of a preexisting norm, under-

stood as a behaviour pattern internalised and practised by the directive's
receiver. If a person already perceives a certain behaviour pattern, for
example, the behaviour pattern consisting in abstaining from killing other
people or from stealing their belongings, as obligatory, the directive "do
not kill!", or "do not steal!", will have a conative effect on that person. It
will simply strengthen, as it were, the receiver's idea that one ought not to
kill, or not to steal. The directive will be obeyed because it appeals to a
norm its receiver believes ought to be followed.

4. The Nature of the Factors

that Bring About the Conative Effects of Language
is neither Linguistic nor Communicative

From our inquiry it is clear that the motives why directives are obeyed,
the causes that prompt in the receiver of a linguistic expression a volitional
impulse to act in a way and not in another, the factors that make a linguis-
tic expression bring about a conative effect, are not found in the linguistic
expression itself (they are not linguistic causes), nor do they lie in the fact
that it has been received and perceived by the receiver (they are not causes
pertaining to the phenomenon of communication in itself). To be sure, a
directive's bringing about a conative effect does require the contribution of
adequate linguistic and communicative factors. But these are not sufficient,
in themselves, to bring about a conative effect, the production of which
requires the (decisive) contribution of extra-linguistic and extra-communica-
tive factors, such as suggestion, interest, or the prior internalisation of a
norm by the receiver.

IX. Directives and Norms: Norms as Customs

1. Directives are Language. Norms are Behaviours. A directive is a lin-

guistic expression by which somebody is told to do something, and it is a
directive whether it is effective or not. A norm is a pattern of behaviour,
which is performed because it is conceived (felt, lived) as obligatory, and it
is performed independently of any directive. This, of course, does not mean
that there are no relevant factual connections between directives and norms.
These connections need to be properly spelled out.
2. A custom consists in the constant and uniform repetition of a certain
behaviour, which is performed - by an individual (individual custom) or by
268 Enrico Pattaro

the members of a group or society (social custom) - whenever certain con-

ditions take place, because it is believed (by the acting subjects) to be obli-
gatory under those conditions.

Customs can then be analyzed into three components:

(a) The requisition, that is to say, a contextual or conditional component,

i.e., the set of conditions or circumstances (time, space, persons: when,
where, who) under which a behaviour is taken to be obligatory (and
hence practised) by the acting subjects.

(b) The agendum, that is to say, a behavioural component, i.e., the behav-
iour which is performed (because it is deemed to be obligatory) when-
ever the requisitum (the conditions or circumstances mentioned under
a) occurs.

(c) The opinio obligationis, that is to say, a psychological or internal com-

ponent, i.e., the acting subjects' belief that it is obligatory to perform
the agendum (the behaviour mentioned under b) whenever the requisi-
tum (the conditions mentioned under a) occurs. In the case of legal cus-
toms, this last component used to be called, with a Latin phrase, the
opinio iuris seu necessitatis.

A norm, according to this definition, is nothing but a custom. The con-

cept of "custom" is very helpful in so far as it highlights the fact that
norms are behaviour, or rather, behaviour patterns which do not cease to
exist simply because they are no longer performed by some individual
acting subject. The concept of custom expresses the real and at the same
time permanent character of norms: it expresses their certainty. It also high-
lights two of the main differences between directives and norms. Not only
directives are language and norms are behaviour, but: (i) a directive which
is not effective or in force is still a directive, while a norm (custom) is in
force or is not a norm; (ii) a directive which is not deemed to be obligatory
is nevertheless a directive, while a norm (custom) which is not deemed to
be obligatory from the subjects who practice it is not a norm, but some-
thing else (e.g., an habit, an instance of conformity or of fondness of quiet
life, etc.).

3. Within directives we may also distinguish:

(a) The requisitum, that is to say, the representation of a context or situation,

i.e., the set of conditions or circumstances (time, space, persons: when,
where, who) under which a behaviour is prescribed.

(b) The agendum, that is to say, the representation of a behavioural compo-

nent, i.e., the behaviour which is prescribed whenever the conditions
represented in the requisitum occur.
 Language and Behaviour: Introduction to the Normative Dimension 269

4. As I have already remarked, there are important factual links between

directives and norms.

In this connection, it is important to distinguish between two different

types of behaviour ( agendum ) which is covered by a norm (custom), and
correspondingly between two different types of conditions or circumstances
( requisitum ) under which a behaviour is deemed to be obligatory:

(a) on the one hand, we have any specific and determinate agendum , such
as not killing, not stealing, avoiding incest, paying one's debts, shaking
hands with the right hand, etc.;

(b) on the other, we have the generic agendum , which is capable of trans-
lating into very different behaviours, consisting in obeying the direc-
tives given by a certain individual or group of individuals, or by who-
ever holds a particular position, or issued according to certain proce-
dures, or derivable from certain texts (e.g., sacred texts), etc.

In case (a), if someone practising the custom (norm) not to kill ( agen-
dum) except in wartime ( requisitum ) is given the directive not to kill
(agendum) except in wartime ( requisitumJ, he/she will follow it because it
prescribes a behaviour he/she deems to be obligatory independently from
the directive itself. In this case, the directive has a conative effect on the
receiver because it revives a preexisting attitude of his/her, namely, the
opinio obligationis as to the agendum , Do not kill! The agendum is here
common to the preexisting norm and the present directive. The directive is
effective because its agendum is one and the same with that of a preexist-
ing norm of the receiver, which is what makes him/her deem it obligatory.
With reference to similar questions within law, a Latin phrase reads: ius
quia iustum.

In case (b), if someone practising the custom (norm) to obey (agendum)

the directives given, say, by God (requisitum) is given by God the directive
to kill (directive's agendum) one's son (directive's requisitum ), he/she will
follow it not because it prescribes a behaviour (directive's agendum) he/
she deems to be obligatory (Abraham is likely to have deemed it obligatory
to act contrary to the behaviour prescribed by the divine directive), but
because he/she deems it obligatory to obey (norm's agendum) the direc-
tives given by God (norm's requisitum). In this case, the directive has a
conative effect on the receiver because it is an instance of the requisitum
(it is a divine directive) the occurrence of which has the receiver ascribe an
opinio obligationis to the "obeying" agendum which is characteristic of the
norm (he/she has internalised) according to which directives given by God
ought to be obeyed. With reference to similar questions within law, a Latin
phrase reads: ius quia iussum.
270 Enrico Pattaro

The motive why the divine directive is obeyed is not to be found in the
directive's agendum (killing), but in its having been given. For such a
directive, independently from its agendum , is the requisitum of a norm
which has previously been internalised by the receiver, the agendum of
which is to obey (the divine directives: requisitum).
5. In section V I I I I have indicated three (neither linguistic nor communi-
cative) factors to which a linguistic expression can appeal to bring about
conative effects. These were the receiver's suggestibility, the receiver's
interest, and the idea or belief of obligation (opinio obligationis) character-
istic of a norm previously internalised by the receiver.
As to this last factor, I have now pointed to two different but equally
fundamental ways in which a directive can bring about volitional impulses
in its receiver by appealing to a norm he/she has internalised. These are
(a) the case in which a directive duplicates, as it were, the agendum and
requisitum of a preexisting norm; (b) the case in which a directive is an
occurrence of the requisitum of a preexisting norm, the agendum of which
consists in obeying all the directives having a certain origin. These two
ways in which a conative effect is brought about by a norm internalised by
the receiver can be found in the most diverse domains of human behaviour:
in the moral and legal domains, but also, for example, in the domain of
etiquette.
Notice that case (b) as I have described it is in fact a species of a
broader kind. This kind is the kind of those norms the agendum of which is
to obey qualified directives (requisitum). The particular qualification I have
cited is the directives' origin. But with different species of norms the agen-
dum of which is to obey directives, origin can be replaced (or complemen-
ted) by other qualifications which may be necessary to make a directive a
sufficient requisitum for the obligatory character of the agendum consisting
in obeying directives. Such further qualifications may be, for example, the
requirement that the directive's agendum be not in contrast with the agen-
dum of any norm internalised by the receiver (e.g., the norm, "Do not
kill!"); that the directive's agendum be reasonable; that it can be univer-
salised (cfr. Kant, Hare), etc.

X. Some Conclusions With Reference to the Italian Tradition

in Analytical Legal Philosophy

In Italy, from the fifties analytical philosophy of law has tried to bring
the theory of legal norms within a theory of the functions of language.
For example, Norberto Bobbio has distinguished three functions of lan-
guage:
 Language and Behaviour: Introduction to the Normative Dimension 271

The descriptive function, typical of scientific language, consists in giving infor-

mation, in communicating to others certain news, in transmitting knowledge, in
sum, in making somebody know something; the expressive function, typical of
poetic language, consists in disclosing certain feelings and in trying to evoke
them in others, so as to make them participate in a certain sentimental situation;
the prescriptive function, typical of normative language, consists in giving com-
mands, advice, recommendations, warnings, so as to affect and modify other
people's behaviour, in sum, in making somebody do something.

The concept of language function is linked by Bobbio to the intention of

the user of language:
By describing we aim to inform others; by prescribing, to modify their behaviour.

Among prescriptive propositions - more briefly, among prescriptions -

Bobbio includes moral norms, grammar rules, legal norms, medical pre-
scriptions, etc.

Prescriptive propositions may have more or less binding force. Impera-

tives or commands have the greatest binding force; an imperative generates
an obligation. According to Bobbio, legal norms differ from other prescrip-
tions in several respects, into which we need not enter here. 2 Our review of
the classic trichotomy of the descriptive, prescriptive and expressive func-
tions of language has led to a deep revision of the classification found in
Bobbio's writings of the fifties. Indeed, our analysis has identified four
effects of language (representative, emotional, illative, conative), instead of
the three functions listed by Bobbio (descriptive, prescriptive, expressive).
Moreover, among these effects there is no room for two of the three
"functions" considered by Bobbio (namely, the descriptive and expressive
ones).

This means that we have not merely added one function (rectius : effect)
to the traditional ones identified by Bobbio; we have eliminated two items
from his list, and we have added three new ones. We have eliminated: (i)
the descriptive function; (ii) the expressive function. We have added: (a)
the representative effect; (b) the emotional effect; (c) the illative effect.

Moreover, we have argued that describing, or rather declaring, and

expressing are uses of language. The representative effect has been distin-
guished within the old descriptive function and separated from it. It has
been shown to be necessary both for the illative and for the conative effect.
We have also spoken of representative uses of language. The emotional
effect has been distinguished within the old expressive function. There are,
however, also emotional uses of language. The illative effect, which is a

2
Cf. Bobbio, Teoria della norma giuridica, Torino, Giappichelli, 1958, pp. 76 -
77, 83, 87, 100, 109- 110, 177 ss. My translation.
272 Enrico Pattaro

completely new entry, has been described as connected primarily to the

declarative and expressive uses of language. We have renamed the only
traditional function of language that has survived our revision; we have
preferred to speak of a conative effect rather than a prescriptive function of
language. Bobbio's "prescriptive" function is now referred to as a "conative
effect" in order to mark the crucial distinction between the use a sender
can make of a certain linguistic expression and the effects this can bring
about on a receiver. The established uses that are typically capable of
bringing about a conative effect in a given linguistic community have been
called "directing uses". Lastly, it must be emphasized that our concept of
norm as custom is crucially different to the concept of directive (or, in
Bobbio's terminology, prescription). This makes it possible to recover the
distinction between the normative dimension (which is psychological) and
the merely directive, or prescriptive dimension (which is linguistic).
 RATIONALITY AND GOAL-SETTING -
TASKS FOR L E G A L SCHOLARS?

By Stig Strömholm, Uppsala

I.

In a recent incisive and brilliantly reasoned article on some both general

and fundamental problems of what may be called applied jurisprudence. 1
Aulis Aarnio and Aleksander Peczenik conclude by examining two ques-
tions concerning the proper sphere of political planning (a sphere which, in
the earlier parts of the paper, they have reduced dramatically and convinc-
ingly in relation to what has been claimed by the advocates of macro-scale
"social engineering").
The first question is how global goal-setting is to be determined, the
second who is to determine it. The answer to the former question is that a
set of "general rules of the game" providing the framework for the evolu-
tion of a set of spontaneous orders, such as market economics, goes a long
way towards the paramount goal of making the spontaneous interaction of
citizens in a given community as free and peaceful as possible, but that, on
the other hand, this is not enough; to avoid grave injustice, part of the
global goal-setting must be composed of values and patterns of weighing
which indicate the optimal direction of the "game".
This reasoning leads over to the second question:who is to determine?
The only means to mediate between the moral opinions of people and the
political system and thus to give the necessary legitimacy to legal rules and
their enforcement are to be found in the principles of liberal democracy; it
provides the "channel" that transmits the communicative power of the "life-
world", the convictions and values of the people, to the system. The task,
then - this is one of the implicit further conclusions of Aarnio's and Pecze-
nik's article - is to secure the undisturbed and non-manipulated functioning
of that channel. Guarantees can be found in the electoral system, terms of
office, and the political culture in general, but that is not enough. Protec-

1
Aulis Aarnio and Aleksander Peczenik, Suum Cuique Tribuere. Some Reflec-
tions on Law, Freedom and Justice. Ratio Juris, vol. 8, nr. 2, July 1995, pp. 142-
179.

19 FS Aarnio
274 Stig Strömholm

tion must be found against manipulation by the mass media, but also
against the predominance of short-term interests in parliaments. The authors
energetically stress the need for protection in these two respects, but they
offer no answer. "Opinion ought not to be manipulated by the mass
media", they contend; and the dominance of short-term interests "must be
changed".2
In what follows, the present writer will put forward some highly prelim-
inary suggestions as to possible solutions, or rather, more modestly, par-
tial remedies to the dilemma defined so convincingly by Aarnio's and
Peczenik's analysis.

II.

The two writers have in common - and that is a feature characteristic of

the vast body of jurisprudential writing they have produced for some thirty
years - that they insist on the part that rationality plays and ought to play
in political and legal systems. This is, of course, not new or original in
itself and on the level of general principles. The couple ratio and auctori-
tas are as old as Occidental legal science itself, and although auctoritas has
frequently been, for long periods, the stronger of the two, while ratio has
dwelt timidly in the shadow, it has never been absent. At times, the con-
cept has been used so often and so widely that it has lost much of whatever
precision it may have a chance to attain. 3 Yet, it seems useful and capable
of rendering important services to legal theory, for reasons which are not
all strictly related to the logical and semantic potentialities of the term as
such. The work of Aarnio, like that of Peczenik, has therefore contributed
significantly to the deepening of our understanding of the concept "ration-
ality" and its use in the jurisprudential discourse.

There are many signs of the times which seem to indicate that the tradi-
tional forms of governing and conflict solving as known in contemporary
Occidental communities are undergoing a crisis both with regard to their
efficiency - or indeed even their practical viability - and in respect of their
legitimacy. In the present context, the former aspect shall be left outside the
discussion, which would otherwise be unmanageable within the quantitative
limits that have to be observed. Be it enough to say, on the one hand, that
the efficiency crisis is obviously in many ways intimately connected with
the legitimacy problem, on the other hand that it cannot be dealt with prop-
erly unless the notion and the actual and potential methods and techniques

2
Op. cit., pp. 176f.
3
For a collection of comtemporary samples, v., e.g. Beiheft 8 of the review
Rechtstheorie 1985, pp. 91 ff.
 Rationality and Goal-Setting - Tasks for Legal Scholars? 275

of goal-oriented governing as distinct from rule-based steering be discussed

at length. 4
Leaving, consequently, the efficiency crisis, our attention should be di-
rected towards the legitimacy problem. It would seem to be a wide-spread
conviction in modern European communities that the production of statu-
tory and other rules - in short of regulations of all kinds - is far too exten-
sive and far too complicated. Whether this conviction is well-founded or
not is not decisive: it enjoys the democratic privilege of being taken seri-
ously by virtue of sheer numbers; it cannot be simply disregarded (here,
obviously, the efficiency must inevitably be taken into account for practical
purposes). In terms of legitimacy, there is a growing feeling that the powers
interfere with too many questions that do not fall within the legitimate
sphere of action of the political system.
At the same time - and this makes the dilemma more difficult to master
- the claim of public authorities on all levels to take initiatives, to act and
to be obeyed without formal statutory or otherwise legislative authorization
is less and less accepted. In most European countries, the starting point
(subject to great differences in detail in the nations and even regions con-
cerned) was undoubtedly, as late as the middle of the 20th century, that the
State, or the local authority, and its agencies and servants, possessed a kind
of general authority, a right to act and command in the interest of broadly
defined public values such as good order and safety, at least when such
acting did not interfere with legally recognized individual or collective
rights and interests. Today the claim for "legal grounds" or "statutory
authority" is a matter of course and has to be considered even in the most
trivial and down-to-earth situations. Prevailing ideologies - in some coun-
tries expressed in more or less eloquent general declarations of intention in
constitutional texts - explicitly state the need for "democratic legitimacy"
for all public decisions and measures which have any impact upon the life
of the citizens.
One result of this development and of the situation it has created is
obviously a call for more statutory and similar general provisions to legit-
imate public action (which is also frequently called for, in spite of all pro-
tests against public interference). A vicious circle is thus created: while the
citizens, and not least the media, grumble about too many rules wich have

4
The present writer has dealt with some of the general problems involved in the
article Normer och mal - det normbundna beslutsfattandets särart, Svensk juristtid-
ning 1976, pp. 161 - 178, reprinted in the book Idéer och tillämpningar, Stockholm
1979, pp. 157 - 175, and in a revised German version: Normen und Ziele. Besonder-
heiten der normgebundenen Entscheidungsfindung, in Gesetzgebungstheorie, Juri-
stische Logik, Zivil- und Prozessrecht. Gedächtnisschrift für Jürgen Rödig, Berlin
and Heidelberg 1978, pp. 19-33. V. also Strömholm. Mâlstyrning och lagprövning,
in Festskrift tili Bertil Bengtsson, Stockholm 1993, 467 - 478.

19*
276 Stig Strömholm

to be known and observed, ideology and principles call for more rules even
in fields where they were earlier not necessary; and since action is often
wanted in new areas, to which the media attract public attention, and such
action consequently necessitates legislation, the growth of the total body of
rules increases even more.

To this should be added a further force which - unexpectedly - tends to

generate new rules: as a consequence of "deregulation" (in some cases
"privatization") of public bodies and activities, the lower levels of the
public service frequently feel very strongly the need for local or special
rules which they can invoke in their sometimes not very pleasant encoun-
ters with citizens who question the legitimacy of the measures they have to
take. A concrete example: in 1993, the previously very tightly regulated
Swedish university system underwent drastic changes towards a far-reach-
ing "deregulation". This reform ("reform" is the term currently used by
politicians and media for all political changes, regardless of direction - it
should be admitted, however, that the case now referred to did, upon the
whole, deserve that name) very soon forced university leaders to issue
bodies of local rules which tended to grow quickly and soon constituted
impressive administrative codices which, compared with the previous rules,
had the doubtless advantage of being based upon local needs and local
experience. From two other points of view - neither unimportant - more
critical remarks could be made: essentially similar work was performed at
more than a dozen places, not all of them characterized by the highest com-
petence in administrative matters (and in a few places, no work of the kind
was performed at all...), and within a limited national system, different
solutions were adopted to the detriment of that mobility in the system
which is usually described as desirable.

On a different level, in contexts where the principles of society and more

particularly of the exercice of power are discussed, even the legitimacy of
democratic decision-making is increasingly questioned; consciousness about
the risk for oppression by majorities has been enhanced by recent experi-
ence in Eastern Europe and in Africa and elsewhere. It is likely that in the
wake of the terrible events that have taken place and which have been lit-
erally brought home to hundreds of millions of people all over the world
by television and other media, that consciousness will remain awake and
give rise not only to political movements but also to scholarly debate about
the limits of legitimate exercice of majority rule. It is not fortuitous that the
ideas and principles collectively known as "human rights" have undergone
in the course of few decades - an extremely short period in the history of
legal thinking - a development so strong and and so all-embracing that the
enforcement of these rights has become an element of public international
law which breaks through even the otherwise sacrosanct principle of
 Rationality and Goal-Setting - Tasks for Legal Scholars? 277

national sovereignty. This development is the more remarkable since the

human rights idea is, historically, part of a school of thought that is for all
practical purposes abandoned in all other fields: the doctrine of natural law.
Its theoretical foundations can be found only either in a religious creed or
in a frail edifice of pragmatic historicizing thought - "hypothetisches" or
"relatives Naturrecht", to use a term often adopted in German postwar dis-
cussion.5

III.

Aarnio's and Peczenik's discussion in the paper referred to above would

seem to be an attempt to find strategies to meet the crisis caused by the
lagging efficiency of rules, the opposition against too many rules, the con-
comitant paradoxical need for more rules (i.a. as a reaction to the vacuum
created by the transition in many fields from rule-governing to goal-govern-
ing) and the growing doubts concerning the legitimacy of ruling at all in
certain areas.
Among the strategies outlined, an appeal to the rationality of systems
and rules plays an important part. This is certainly a choice well worth
trying, and a road well worth pursuing. "Rationality" is something which
contemporary secularized man usually accepts within very vast areas.
Indeed, when looking more closely at some conflicts, an observer is some-
times struck by the impression that modern Occidental actors on the stage
of public debate and decision-making are so firmly attached to the ultimate
merits of "rationality" that they are prepared to accept, with astonishing
meekness and lack of active criticism, goals and solutions simply because
these are recommended and tinged, as it were, by the impressive technical
rationality of the means required to reach them; far less thought seems to
be given to the desirability of the goals and solutions themselves. Discus-
sions, among modern, enlightened, and progressive politicians and adminis-
trators, concerning public measures, e.g. in such areas as traffic, housing,
health, or for that matter research and higher education, are sometimes
strikingly similar to the learned conversations of IT experts, in whose
mouth the intrinsic value or interest of the messages to be conveyed by
ever more perfect electronic media successively fades, vanishes and
becomes immaterial besides the technical complexity and perfection of the
devices and methods by which these messages are transmitted. There is
nothing absolutely new in this; it is not only in hymns that we find "the
road and the labour" (to quote an old Swedish hymn) more interesting than
the goal and the reward. Modern technocratic rationalism has its own pas-

5
V. the survey in H. Coing, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, 3rd. ed., Berlin
1976, pp. 196 ff.
278 Stig Strömholm

sion, its pathos and its ethos, with strong elements of puritanism and possi-
bly, I venture to claim, a teaspoonful of stupidity. For allowing the means
and methods to take precedence over the goal cannot be honestly described
with any other term...

It is, of course, grossly unfair to pretend that an appeal to rationality as a

means of meeting the crisis just outlined would inevitably lead to mixing
indiscriminately means and goals. There are, however, very strong reasons
for being aware of the risk. It is obviously due. i.a., to the built-in contra-
diction between the"secularization" of legal rules - the ideological impov-
erishment of law in connection with its ever-growing use as a value-neutral
instrument of governing - on the one hand and, on the other, the attempts,
inherent in democratic ideologies, to legitimize it by raising it, and every
part of it, to the solemn and dignified position of expressions of the " w i l l
of the people". It is likely, however, that it is not easy to make the citi-
zenry at large in modern Occidental communities accept the last-mentioned
view of the law, in its more exalted versions, as part of their private and
individual convictions. Of course, when confronted with easily identified
and interpreted expressions of, e.g., dictatorial commands and systems -
and, even more obviously, when the defence of their own interests in actual
conflicts calls for an appeal to the foundations of rules - contemporary citi-
zens of states where the rule of law prevails are likely to express their com-
mitment to the ideology in question, but for the purposes of normal every-
day life, and normal use of the media, a view and an interpretation of what
happens on the public scene in the light of group interests, group loyalties,
deep distrust of the powers and a corresponding lack of ideological over-
tones are certainly much more common. On the other hand, this widely
spread detached, often cynical, outlook constitutes in itself a further argu-
ment for appealing to rationality as an element in the endeavours to give
law an enduring legitimacy.

Two more arguments should be mentioned briefly before we pass on to

examining the question how Aarnio's and Peczenik's concluding questions
could possibly be dealt with in a society of the contemporary Occidental
kind. First: since some thirty years, the idea of society being based on a
contract - a contrat social - has gained ground to an extent which would
certainly have astonished 19th century and early 20th century legal philoso-
phers. It is impossible to take up for discussion, in the present context, the
reasons why contractual thinking - not quite as old as the law of nature,
but highly venerable when compared with all the schools that have flour-
ished since at least the beginning of the 19th century - has been so success-
ful of late. What should be emphasized here is that the idea, or principle,
of the social contract reinforces considerably the arguments for giving the
notion of rationality an important place in any attempt to give the legal
 Rationality and Goal-Setting - Tasks for Legal Scholars? 279

system a legitimacy of another kind than the mere formal one, derived
from the democratic decision-making procedure.
The second point to be noted is the strong emphasis which, in contem-
porary political discourse, is laid upon proved efficiency as a criterium for
the legitimacy of any exercice of power and authority. This is, in all like-
lihod, a claim upon State and administration which has existed for a very
long time, but it has not been common to formulate it in explicit terms in
the manner now generally adopted. It is obvious that if you make the rela-
tive efficiency of the system a condition for its acceptance, you have
adopted, if only implicitly, a view closely related to thinking in terms of a
contractual relationship, but you are also very close to making rationality a
condition of legitimacy: you, the State, levy taxes from me - now account
for the degree of competence with which you spend them.
At this juncture, it would seem to be of some importance, however, to
make what may seem pedantic: an attempt, at least, to distinguish rational-
ity from efficiency. There are elements of connotation attached to the
former concept which are not part of the latter but which are likely to
matter as soon as we approach the realm of values and value-based goal-
setting. A "maximum of efficiency" may (which is obviously not the same
as "must") be read as the capacity to attain a maximum of effect, without
considering the means, and the economy, of the operation. There are
bombs, as there are heavy tanks, which are undoubtedly the most efficient
instruments to be found within their area of application. "Rationality", it is
submitted, should be reserved for cases which are characterized by a rela-
tion between goal-realization and input of resources that is favourable at
least in some respects of some importance. To achieve a "maximum of effi-
ciency" regardless of costs, e. g. by use of hydrogen bombs or heavy tanks,
is often likely to be irrational in this sense, whereas "rational" acting may
imply the acceptance of a certain amount of inefficiency in terms of actual
result (although it seems highly unlikely that an activity that is totally inef-
ficient can ever be seriously considered as "rational").
Among the "respects of some importance" thus proposed to delimit the
area of rationality, a minimum of harmony with generally recognized stand-
ards of justice, and with prevailing views about adequate proportions
(between, e.g., misdemeanour and punishment) should undoubtedly be
taken into account when the rationality of legislation and of the enforce-
ment of law is discussed. It seems certain, however, that there are many
more considerations of a highly varied kind which ultimately determine the
verdict of those heterogeneous groups that make up, together, the citizenry
of a modern society of the Occidental kind.
280 Stig Strömholm

It would seem to follow that if "rationality" is broadly defined as pro-

posed above and if the immense complexity of contemporary societal struc-
tures is recognized, a clearcut dividing line between "rational" and what is
spontaneously and habitually called "irrational" will frequently not be easy
to find. It would probably be an abomination in the eyes of many spokes-
men of "Scandinavian realism", with their rather primitive "rationalism",
that it is or might often be, more rational, from the point of view of a
society characterized by, and aspiring to, the rule of law, that the methods
and means used by law enforcement agencies are widely accepted as com-
patible with general ideas of justice , than that all breaches of the law are
detected and punished. In fact, it seems possible to contend - without
breaking out of the framework of rational thinking as defined here - that in
a broad perspective, maintaining the symbol position and function of the
legal system is almost as important as keeping it efficient in terms of
results.
If "rationality" is, as proposed here, a way of describing a favourable
relation between goal and means, it is necessary to remind of the inevitable
difficulties arising from the fact that in complex systems, there are regu-
larly not only general, or ultimate, goals, but also part goals and prelimi-
nary goals (and certainly a whole array of objectives for which other names
ought to be found but which defy enumeration and description in this con-
text). What is important to remember is that apparent, but also real, con-
flicts may arise between these different kinds of goals. A part goal, or a
subordinate goal, can be, or appear, irrational when considered in relation
to ultimate goals. On the other hand, conflicts of this kind have the great
virtue of continuously putting proclaimed ultimate goals - otherwise diffi-
cult to question once they have been adopted - to the test with regard to
their rationality. By such tests, the claims of ultimate goals are examined
and compared with the claims of apparently or really incompatible alterna-
tives. And this, it is submitted, works in favour of one frequently neglected
societal interest: that of liberty , which, as experience shows, has no ene-
mies more formidable than unchallenged, officially adopted and proclaimed
"ultimate" goals.

IV.

But neither rationality nor liberty is enough. There remains, as Aarnio

and Peczenik rightly point out, the task of setting values able to correct the
outcome of the game whenever its result appears - by standards which,
rational or irrational, are firm and strong enough, for the elementary pur-
poses of peaceful organized human coexistence in groups, to enforce observ-
ance by those in charge and command.
 Rationality and Goal-Setting - Tasks for Legal Scholars? 281

Rationality can be helpful both as an increasingly powerful instrument of

testing the tools of society and in questioning the claims of officially
adopted and proclaimed ultimate goals as compared with other possible
objectives for its work. Can rationality, in addition to this essentially criti-
cal task, also help towards the fulfilment of the creative task: finding and
formulating values, and setting up new, value-based goals?
In a world deprived of - another term is obviously "liberated from" - a
common religious creed and unable to hope for even a minimum of agree-
ment on basic philosophical tenets, all efforts towards unity in the contents
and substance of ultimate values beyond a bare minimum (to which would
seem to belong, today, the elementary human rights - a hope-inspiring
result of historical experience, so far...) must be treated as illusions if they
are undertaken with a hope to be at the same time compatible with the
claims of rationality and those, concomitant, of liberty.
It is submitted that the only way in which appeal to reason and rational-
ity can contribute, on a general level and with some certainty (as distinct
from possible but uncertain effects, which may occur in élite groups, in
religious congregations, etc.) to value-production is by means of organizing
the continuous and independent study, discussion, and critical evaluation of
value-creating processes - and by protecting the activity thus organized
from external influences. The experience of the last ten to twenty years of
European history seems to indicate that there is at least one kind of perma-
nent institutions that seems able to assume the task: the universities . It is
the present writer's firm conviction that however weak, uneven in quality,
autonomy, breadth of scholarship and influence, however dependent upon
the powers that be, the universities are (still - already - once more: the
situation varies from one country to another) centres where value-setting
has to be undertaken. If they are not alone, if free media and religious and
political organizations contribute, if they are criticized - all the better: then
there are more people working in the fields. But - as rightly pointed out by
Aarnio and Peczenik - the media can be manipulated and manipulate, and
political movements can be caught by too narrow and short-sighted inter-
ests. So can, no doubt the universities. But there is, today as in times of
crisis in the past, strong evidence to show that in the long run, they are
almost impossible to manipulate indefinitely or to bully into silence. Com-
mitted to the pursuit of reason, they have a calling to be the guardians of
rationality and liberty. Where these values are faithfully upheld and
defended as collective ideals, however, they provide a powerful lasting sup-
port for the growth and diffusion of basic societal virtues - which is, in this
context, a synonym of "values" - such as tolerance, fairness, respect for
other people's opinion, truthfulness and even a sense of justice.
282 Stig Strömholm

The powers that be can help by respecting the liberty and securing the
financial independence of these value-manufactures. In so doing they both
promote rationality and help towards the laborious finding and defence of
human values.
 THE SUPREME COURTS A N D DEMOCRACY

Who are the Princes of Law's Empire ?

By Kaarlo Tuori, Helsinki

I . T h e Courts a n d D e m o c r a c y : T h e V u l g a r Conception

In many Western countries, considered to be established democracies,

e.g., in Finland, certain critical analysts have warned of a development
toward what they call a judicial state. The courts, so the criticism goes,
have acquired, at the expense of the legislator, powers for which they have
no democratic mandate. The enhanced position of the courts in the legal
and political system is considered a threat to the very maintenance of
democracy.
This criticism is often based on what I would venture to call a vulgar
conception of the relationship between the courts and democracy. Such a
conception is especially widespread in legal systems such as the Continen-
tal European ones where the legislator is supposed to have the decisive say
in the development of the law. But it has its proponents even in countries
with a Common Law tradition, as can be seen in the debates on the legiti-
mate role of the US Supreme Court.
The vulgar conception equates democracy with the absolute primacy of
the legislator. It tends to see the legitimate tasks of the courts as being
exhausted in the implementation of the will of the legislator. It may con-
cede that the courts have to complement the norm creation of the legislator
in cases of vague statutory regulation. But this is considered a deplorable
situation: the courts are burdened with a task for which they lack both the
proper means and the necessary legitimation. The system of judicial review
is then regarded with suspicion from the very start: the power of the courts
to by-pass or even to declare void statutes passed by the legislator signifies
an outright contradiction between democracy and adjudication. So, accord-
ing to the vulgar view, the courts, especially the Supreme Courts, constitute
a continuous potential threat to democracy, a threat which requires the
latter's constant alertness.
I do not deny that, under certain circumstances, the role of the courts in
general and that of the Supreme Courts in particular can lead to contradic-
284 Kaarlo Tuori

tion with the principles of democracy. This, however, is not inevitably the
case. In the following, I shall, on a fairly abstract level, defend the view
that the courts are a necessary guarantee for democracy and that, as such,
their legitimate role exceeds that of the executor of the will of the legis-
lator.

My argument has three stages. I shall begin by presenting two contem-

porary accounts of law which seem to give mutually contradictory answers
to the question, who the princes of law's empire are or should be. The
accounts in question are those of Ronald Dworkin and Jürgen Habermas.
The second stage in my argument involves a demonstration of how
modern, positive law is able to solve one of the crucial problems it raises,
namely that of its limits. This requires an analysis of law in terms of its
aspects and its levels: the law as a normative phenomenon can be under-
stood as consisting of multiple layers, the relations between which are
mediated by legal practices. Finally, I shall return to Dworkin's and Haber-
mas' accounts. I shall try to show how Dworkin's notions of policies and
principles and Habermas' notions of pragmatic, ethical and moral uses of
practical reason can further elucidate the problem of the limits of the law
and the solution to this problem. The legitimate role of the courts in
democracy can be defined in terms of this solution. That is the main claim
of my paper.

I I . Three Contenders

There are three contenders for the throne of the prince in law's empire.
Accordingly, there also are three rival accounts of law's empire.

The first contender is the judge. At present, perhaps the most influential
account of law's empire, where the judge occupies the throne of prince, is
that of Ronald Dworkin. For Dworkin "the Courts are the capitals of law's
empire, and judges are its princes ..." (Dworkin 1986, p. 407) It is in the
courts that the law maintains its principled nature, its integrity and its
coherence. At times, one gets the impression that, in Dworkin's empire of
law, the legislator is mainly a source of disturbances, and the legislative
procedure mainly a forum for unprincipled bargaining and interest compro-
mises. The legislative procedures are policy oriented; the courts, instead,
are the guardians of the principles on which the law is ultimately based.

But we have another powerful contemporary account of law's empire, an

account in which it is the legislator who occupies the throne of the prince.
In Jürgen Habermas' Rechtsstaat, democratic law-making procedures are to
engender communicative power which is rooted in civil society. This com-
 The Supreme Courts and Democracy 285

municative power is condensed into legitimate laws, enacted by the legis-

lator, and transferred through them to the administrative machinery of the
state. In a democratic Rechtsstaat , communicative power, manifested by
legitimate laws and based on the common convictions of the members of
society, binds the administrative power which is wielded by the state
machinery and ultimately grounded in (the possibility) of coercion. (Haber-
mas 1992, p. 166 ff.)
Habermas' distinction between communicative and administrative power
also provides a solution to the paradox of the Rechtsstaat. This paradox can
be formulated as follows: if, in the era of positive laws, all law is based on
explicit decisions by the state, how can the law restrict the activities of this
very state, the source of the law. According to Habermas' solution, the
restrictive power, i.e., communicative power, is not of the same nature as
the power that is to be restricted, i.e., administrative power.
It is, nevertheless, true that Habermas does not see adjudication merely
as the mechanical application of enacted law and concedes the courts a
certain role also in the creative development of the legal order. But this
does not change the general picture: it is mainly through democratic legis-
lative procedures that legitimate law and communicative power are to be
generated. The primacy Habermas accords to legislative procedures is what
connects him to the vulgar conception, although in other respects he does
not, of course, share its simplistic assumptions.
There has even been a third contender for the throne of the prince of
law's empire, namely the legal scientist or the legal philosopher. We may
recall Savigny's account of law from the beginning of last century. For
him, the development of law was grounded in the legal consciousness of
the people, but it fell upon legal science to give this consciousness a clear
and coherent expression.
Legal science plays an important role even in Dworkin's and Habermas'
contemporary accounts, but it is no longer a serious contender for the posi-
tion of the prince. For Habermas, legal science provides the judges with the
Vorverständnis, pre-understanding, from which they can, in the application
of law, embark on their hermeneutical shuttle between facts and norms.
Dworkin, for his part, assigns legal philosophers the task of seers and pro-
phets. Let us continue the above quotation:
The courts are the capitals of law's empire, and judges are its princes,
but not its seers and prophets. It falls to philosophers, if they are willing,
to work out law's ambitions for itself, the purer form of law within and
beyond the law we have. (Dworkin 1986, p. 407)
Perhaps the time when legal science is assigned a larger role than Dworkin
and Habermas, for example, are willing to grant is over. Let us concentrate
286 Kaarlo Tuori

on the two first contenders, the judge and the legislator. I shall examine
this relationship in the context of a central problem raised by modern, posi-
tive law, namely that of its limits. In due course, I shall return to the views
of Dworkin and Habermas.

I I I . The Problem of the Limits of L a w

Democracy implies positive law, a legal and political system where the
normative structure of society is open to changes through practical human
action. One of the main features of the type of law I call modern is its
positive nature. Modern law is positive law, based on explicit human deci-
sions and amendable or repealable by new decisions. Never before has the
human law-giver produced such a plethora of legal statutes and regulations
as in our era. Meanwhile cultural modernisation - some, as we know, even
talk of post-modernisation - has destroyed the credibility of universal natural
laws that could impose limits on the power of this human law-giver.
The positive nature of modern law has been conceptualised in positivist
theories of law. The demarcation of positivist thinking in the context of
legal theory is a contested one. Let me, however, give a tentative definition
of legal positivism in terms of three features. The first of these refers to the
strict separation of the realms of Is and Ought; the second one to the isola-
tion of the law from other fields of social norms, such as morality; and the
third one to the view of law as a product of practical human action.
Positivist theories of law seem to be forced to concede unlimited powers
to the human law-giver. The law can have any content whatsoever, Hans
Kelsen maintained in his pure theory of law. And, to mention another
example, English literature dealing with the doctrine of the supremacy of
the English parliament likes to illustrate this supremacy through the exam-
ple of a - fortunately hypothetical! - statute ordering all blue-eyed babies
to be killed. We do not have to be Hayekian liberals in order to perceive
the potential danger of totalitarianism pertaining to modern, positive law.
The limiting function which was previously fulfilled by natural law can
be deemed more urgent than ever before. Where can we find a substitute
for natural law? How can the legitimate scope of law be demarcated in our
era of positive law? If modern law is fundamentally positive in nature, its
limits and its criteria of legitimacy should obviously be found from within
this very positivity. Modern, positive law does seem to allow for assess-
ments through external yardsticks.
 The Supreme Courts and Democracy 287

I V . The Aspects and the Levels of L a w

In order to explicate how the problem of the limits of law can be solved,
I would like to introduce a heuristic scheme for the analysis of modern,
positive law. This scheme is based on two distinctions: a distinction
between the aspects of law and a distinction between the levels of law.

One can analyse law either as a phenomenon located in the symbolic

normative sphere - as a set of linguistically formulated rules, principles,
etc. - or as specific social practices located within specific institutions,
fields or action systems and carried out by specific agents. The law has two
faces or aspects: that of a set of norms and that of a body of legal prac-
tices .

In order to delineate law as a normative phenomenon we can tentatively

refer to the notion of validity, a notion which, of course, is a highly con-
tested one. But what about the other side of law's Janus face, the law
viewed as a body of legal practices? What are the defining characteristics
of the social practices we classify as legal?

We can speak of legal practices both in a large and a narrow sense.

Legal practices in a large sense include all social practices related to law
(as a set of norms). So even practices involving only private citizens -
practices related to marriage, commercial exchange etc. - are legal prac-
tices in a large sense.

For the specification of legal practices in a narrow sense, I use two cri-
teria. One of them refers to the agents and the other to the outcomes of the
practices in question. Legal practices are practices whose main agents are
legal professionals and which produce, reproduce and apply the law (as a
symbolic normative phenomenon). The main activities falling into my cate-
gory of legal practices are, first, those of judges and other legal profes-
sionals interpreting and applying the law in specific cases, and, secondly,
those of legal scholars engaged in interpreting and systematising the law.

In the distinction I have introduced, legislative activities are a borderline

case. On the one hand, these activities, of course, are involved in the pro-
duction of legal norms, especially in Continental European legal systems
with their emphasis on statutory law. But, on the other hand, legislative
activities are not carried out by specific legal agents. The exact location of
legislative activities with respect to the borderline between legal practices
in the large and in the narrow sense depends on the objective of the analy-
sis we are engaged in. Let us suppose, for example, that we are interested
in analysing the transformative mechanisms of adjudication and legal
science through which new statutory norms pass, before they can affect the
society. In such an analysis, it seems appropriate to leave legislation out-
288 Kaarlo Tuori

side the field of legal practices in the strict sense and locate it in the politi-
cal sphere, affecting the law with its inputs. And, as to the law viewed as a
normative phenomenon, legislation is in this way of thinking to be consid-
ered as raw material for the law rather than the law in itself, "not-yet-law"
rather than "already-law". The way from "not-yet-law" to "already-law"
passes through the transformative processes of adjudication and legal
science, that is application, interpretation and systématisation.
My second distinction concerns the levels of law, now understood as a
phenomenon of the cultural normative sphere. According to my suggestion,
law can be fruitfully analysed by dividing it into three layers or levels
which differ, for instance, in their historicity or their pace of change:
- the surface level of law,
- the legal culture (or legal ideology), and
- the deep structure of law.
The surface level of law comprises, first of all, individual statutes and
court decisions. Legal dogmatical works are also involved through their
norm and interpretation standpoints in the continuous evolvement of the
legal order and can be located on this level, too. At this level the law can
be conceived of as the constantly changing product of an ongoing discus-
sion where the legislator, the judges and the legal scholars all make their
interventions.
In my scheme, the legal culture is located at the middle or mediating
level of the law. At this level, a differentiation between the general legal
culture of ordinary citizens and the elite or expert culture of legal profes-
sionals takes place. These components of legal culture, of course, mutually
influence each other. At least in modern society, the expert culture of legal
professionals has, nevertheless, attained a high level of sophistication and,
simultaneously, a certain autonomy with respect to general legal culture.
Let us probe a little deeper into this expert culture. What kinds of ele-
ments can we discern here?
First, the expert culture of legal professionals includes what Continental
European textbooks call general doctrines of different fields of law, the
general doctrines of, e.g., private law, penal law, administrative law, consti-
tutional law. These doctrines, in turn, are composed of two main ingredi-
ents: the general principles of the field of law in question and its basic con-
cepts. In a textbook on administrative law, we can, for example, read of
general principles relating to the doctrine of détournement du pouvoir and
concepts such as the administrative act (Verwaltungsakt).
Secondly, the expert culture of legal professionals also involves the var-
ious canons used in interpreting norms or norm formulations (such as ana-
 The Supreme Courts and Democracy 289

logy and e contrario) and in solving norm conflicts (like lex superior, lex
posterior, and lex specialis). In addition, a central element of the legal elite
culture consists of models or patterns of argumentation applied in legal
decision-making and legal dogmatical research. For example the discussion
on subsumptive logical or norm rational, purposive rational and need
rational legal argumentation finds its focus here.
Finally, we have the deep structure of law, the most inert level of law in
its development and change. One can perhaps equate this level with Michel
Foucault's notion of the episteme or the historical apriori. It is the deep
structure of law that divides legal history into epochs, each dominated by a
specific type of law. So to justify talk of, say, traditional and modern law
or, within modern law, of liberal and social law, we should be able to show
the relevant differences in their respective deep structures.
Foucault, with his notion of episteme, was mainly interested in the con-
ceptual structure delineating what can be said and thought during a given
epoch. Even the deep structure of law includes the basic legal categories
characterising the type of law in question. Thus, in the deep structure of
modern law, we can perceive categories such as (general) legal subjectivity
and (subjective) right. These basic categories clear a space for modern legal
though, argumentation and regulation. But, by the same token, they also
close this space from fundamentally alternative ways of thinking, arguing
and regulating legally.
The basic categories do not exhaust the deep structure of law. Apart
from these, the deep structure comprises the fundamental normative princi-
ples of the given type of law. As an attempt to reconstruct the fundamental
normative principles of modern law, we can refer to Habermas', Faktizität
und Geltung. His derivation and justification of the basic rights and the
principles of the Rechtsstaat can be considered an interpretation of the
normative deep structure of modern law.

What, however, is lacking in Habermas' exposition is the conceptual

framework of modern law. My proposition may sound eclectic, but I am
conscious of it: in reconstructing the deep structure of modern law, we
should try to combine lessons to be learned from both Foucault and Haber-
mas. Neither the basic legal categories nor the fundamental legal principles
should be ignored in our reconstruction.

The elements I have differentiated at each level of law are, of course,

interrelated. Thus, for example, the conceptual framework that we find both
in the deep structure of law and in the legal culture restricts the scope and
contents of normative principles. Nor are legal categories and concepts nor-
matively innocent; they have built-in normative implications. However, for
our present topic, what is more important than these horizontal relations is
20 FS Aarnio
290 Kaarlo Tuori

the vertical relations between the levels of law. Let us now turn to examin-
ing these relations.
My proposal for distinguishing different layers of law, all with their spe-
cific historicities, concerns the law primarily in its aspect of the legal order,
that is, as a symbolic normative phenomenon. However, we have to bear in
mind the reciprocal connections between the two aspects of law, between
the law as a set of norms and as legal practices. So the relations between
the levels of law are not realised by "automatic" processes, inherent in the
symbolic normative aspect of law but by human action; these relations are
mediated by the legal practices responsible for the production and reproduc-
tion of the legal order. The immediate outcomes of legal practices are to be
seen on the surface level of law, but they always bring into play even the
deeper levels of law. So if and when the layers of law are interconnected,
their connecting links are forged by legal practices.
How to articulate these connections is, to a certain extent, a matter of
convention, dependent on one's objectives. For the purposes of this paper, I
would like to point out five types of relations between the layers of law:
- (1) relations of sedimentation
- (2) relations of constitution
- (3) relations of justification
- (4) relations of criticism
- (5) relations of limitation.
(1) As I have already emphasised, in legal practices, the levels of law
are closely intertwined. I have located statutes, decisions, and legal dogma-
tical standpoints on the surface level of law. However, every time the legis-
lator issues a statute, a court gives a decision, or a legal dogmatician pub-
lishes an article, even the levels of legal culture and the deep structure are
involved. The legislator, the court and the legal dogmatician apply the con-
ceptual framework of the law, interpret and specify its principles, and - in
legal decision-making and legal dogmatics - have recourse to the models
of argumentation the expert legal culture provides them with. This may
take place - and perhaps mostly does take place - in an unconscious way.
That, however, does not alter the fact that every act of legislation, decision-
making in courts, or legal dogmatical research also has its place in the
reproduction and modification of the legal culture and the deep structure of
the law. From the perspective of the surface level, the legal culture and the
deep structure of law can be regarded as sedimentations of the turbulent
changes on the surface. Through this relation of sedimentation, the legal
culture and the deep-structure of law also partake in the fundamental posi-
tive nature of modern law.
 The Supreme Courts and Democracy 291

(2) On the other hand, the deep structure and legal culture play what can
be called a constitutive role in relation to legislation, legal decision-making
and legal dogmatics. They supply the necessary conceptual, normative and
methodological tools without which it would be impossible for the legis-
lator to legislate, the judge to judge, or legal scholars to come to their
norm and interpretation standpoints.
(3) The third relation we can discern between the levels of law is that of
justification . Thus the general principles of different branches of the law -
principles situated at the middle level of law - give a justification to indi-
vidual legal regulations, court decisions, and legal dogmatical standpoints.
These principles, then, find their justification in the deep structure of law.
An integral part of the deep structure consists of the ultimate criterion of
legitimacy characterising the type of law in question. This criterion can be
termed the principle of justification.
(4) The reverse side of the relation of justification consists of the rela-
tion of criticism. At the level of legal culture, legal principles not only jus-
tify regulations, court decisions and legal dogmatical standpoints at the sur-
face level of law; they provide us with a yardstick for the critique of the
latter as well. And if Habermas has succeeded in his attempt to reconstruct
the fundamental normative principles of modern law, we are allowed to use
these principles in judging the prevailing legal culture and the outcomes of
legislation, adjudication, and legal dogmatics. This relation of criticism pro-
vides us with the possibility for a legal scientific approach which I would
like to term critical positivism, an approach which is excluded by, for
example, Kelsen's pure theory of law.

(5) Criticism can turn into limitation. The relation of limitation is the
fifth and last relation between the layers of law which is mediated by legal
practices and which I would like to draw attention to. Through this relation
we can, to my mind, fruitfully address the role the courts are to play in a
democracy.
In a sense, the relation of limitation can be considered to be the other side
of the relation of constitution. The deep structure and legal culture not only
engender the necessary preconditions for legal regulation, legal decision-
making and legal dogmatic research. They even impose restrictions on these
activities that produce continuous movement at the surface level of law.

Already in Kant's epistemology, constitution implied limitation. The

a priori categories of understanding constituted the possibility of objective
knowledge but, simultaneously, restricted this possibility to the domain of
res phenomena. The Critique of Pure Reason was meant to demonstrate not
only what we can know but also, and maybe primarily, what we cannot
know: the things in themselves, the res noumenona, lay beyond the reach
20*
292 Kaarlo Tuori

of our cognitive abilities. The effect of limitation as the underside of

the relation of constitution is also included in Foucault's notion of the
episteme.
My conception of the multi-layered nature of law is indebted to Foucault's
"historicisation" of Kant, to his notion of the historical apriori. But Fou-
cault's neo-Kantianism, if it may be called that, shares the defect of
Kelsen's legal theoretical neo-Kantianism: even Foucault's relations of con-
stitution and limitation are mainly of an epistemological nature. Even in the
context of the relations of limitation, I would like to argue for a broader
approach embracing a relation of normative limitation between the levels of
law. New laws issued by the legislator, for example, are not only inserted
into the conceptual network of the legal culture and the deepstructure of
law, and submitted to their systematising effect. They are even subjected to
what might be called a normative censorship. The role of censor is played
by principles located in my schema in the deeper layers of law. This censor
enters the stage, for instance, when a court interprets, or perhaps even
declares void, a policy-oriented statute in light of a morally flavoured prin-
ciple.

It is the multi-layered nature of law which provides us with the solution

to the problem of the limits of law in our era of positive law. This positive
law finds its instance of limitation in itself, in the sedimented layers of the
legal culture and the deep structure of law. Let us try to elaborate this
insight by taking a new look at Dworkin's and Habermas' accounts of
modern law.

V . Principles and Policies

One of Dworkin's best-known contributions to contemporary discussion

in legal theory and philosophy is his distinction between policies and prin-
ciples and his thesis on preference given to principles in deciding so-called
hard cases. For Dworkin, the legislative procedure is mainly governed by
policy standpoints, and the task of the courts is to control legislative deci-
sions in the light of principles. So in Dworkin's framework, the issue of the
limits of law appears in the form of the relationship between policies and
principles. (See Dworkin 1978 and 1986)
Here Dworkin's thinking can be deemed to come quite close to that of
Habermas. Habermas has, also in the context of law, applied a differentia-
tion of the use of practical reason into pragmatic , ethical and moral reason-
ing. I hope I am not distorting either Dworkin's or Habermas' ideas too
much in attaching Dworkin's policies to Habermas' pragmatic reasoning
and his principles to ethical and moral reasoning: policies, manifested in
legislation, are based on pragmatic reasoning, while principles are anchored
 The Supreme Courts and Democracy 293

in the ethical values and moral norms of society and the related on-going
discussion.
In accordance with the way Dworkin sees the relationship between poli-
cies and principles, even Habermas, in his elaboration of the presupposi-
tions of the legitimacy of law, requires the submission of pragmatic reason-
ing to the test of ethical and moral reasoning or, to be more exact, to ethi-
cal and moral discourses. Habermas has tried to elucidate the democratic
law-making procedure through which legitimate law can be produced and
communicative power engendered, through an idealised model consisting of
different kinds of discourses as well as bargaining processes. The procedure
begins with pragmatic expert discourses and continues with bargaining pro-
cesses between conflicting interest groups or with ethical discourses. The
results of these forms of communication must then be tested in moral dis-
courses before the final stage, that of juridical expert discourses, can be
reached. Dworkin's policy arguments play a dominant role in pragmatic
discourses and bargaining processes, whereas arguments of principle are in
the foreground in ethical and moral discourses. (Habermas 1992, p. 202 ff.)
Thus in Habermas' ideal model, the problem of the self-limitation of law
seems to be located in the relationship between pragmatic discourses and
bargaining processes, on the one hand, and ethical and moral discourses, on
the other. Where Habermas differs from Dworkin is in his confidence in
the possibility of realising the limiting function of ethical and moral stand-
points already in the law-making procedure, through open and free dis-
courses in the public sphere of the society. Dworkin's legislator, by con-
trast, is capable only of pragmatic reasoning and bargaining; the use of
ethically and morally anchored principles as corrective yardsticks falls on
the courts.

This interpretation of Dworkin's and Habermas' views leaves of course

many questions open. Thus we can ask, how the primacy of principles over
policies or of ethical and moral reasoning over pragmatic reasoning and
bargaining is to be justified. According to my suggestion, this primacy can
be justified by reconstructing the deepstructure of modern law, by showing
that the fundamental normative structure on which the edifice of modern
law arises consists of morally and ethically based principles. This is, in a
way, what Habermas has tried to do in his Faktizität und Geltung. In
Habermas' reconstruction the normative deep-structure of modern, positive
law involves as its essential element a system of rights which guarantee
both the private and the public autonomy of members of society as well as
what Habermas calls the principle of democracy. The central stage for the
use of public autonomy is constituted by the democratic law-making proce-
dures with their ethical and moral discourses where legitimate law and
communicative power are to be engendered.
294 Kaarlo Tuori

In fact, in legal analysis, even democracy can be related to the three

levels of law I have distinguished. On the surface level of law, a constitu-
tion to be called democratic requires two minimum prerequisites: firstly,
provisions concerning basic rights, including political basic rights such as
rights of expression, assembly and association; and secondly, provisions on
an elected representative body, which is to make at least the main legisla-
tive decisions. On the cultural level, a legal and political culture is needed
that respects and encourages free and open discussion on practical issues
concerning common life in society. This legal and political culture, in turn,
is supported by and rooted in an independent and active civil society with
its communicative networks. As to the deepstructure, democracy can be
defined through something like Habermas' discursive principle. This princi-
ple ties the legitimacy of norms in modern society to their acceptability in
open, free and equal discourses, and it is intimately linked to a system of
rights as guarantees for the possibility of such discourses.
The principles and presuppositions without which democracy would be
impossible can, thus, be seen to be included in the deepstructure of modern
law. One of the central tasks of the self-limitation of law consists of pro-
tecting these principles and presuppositions from encroachments by new
positive law. Where that function is exactly located can, in a sense, be
deemed to be of minor importance. Thus Dworkin's demand for the main-
tenance of the principled nature of law does not by any means imply that
the main burden in fulfilling this demand should under all circumstances
fall on the courts; rather the way Dworkin defines the respective roles of
the legislature and the courts is based, I would to claim, on empirical obser-
vations concerning the US legal system.
In a democracy, the role of the courts is not restricted to implementing
and applying to individual cases the norms issued by the legislator. The
courts are also involved in the task of the self-limitation of law. This is
especially the case if and when this task cannot be realised in legislative
procedures or when these procedures have failed in its realisation. At least
viewed through the lenses of Continental European legal culture, the role of
the courts in the self-limitation of law appears a residual one: the courts
enter the stage in order to compensate for the deficiencies and failures of
legislative procedures.
In this context I would also locate the system of judicial review which I
consider an important element in the mechanisms for guaranteeing the prin-
cipled nature of law, including the principles and presuppositions of democ-
racy. Such principles and presuppositions must, when needed, be defended
even against the legislator.
Different legal and political cultures differ as to the extent to which the
institutionalised procedures of legislation and adjudication, respectively, are
 The Supreme Courts and Democracy 295

open to free and open discussion in the public sphere of civil society. What
is to be emphasised, however, is that the self-limitation of law, i.e. the con-
trol of principles over policies or of moral and ethical reasoning over prag-
matic reasoning, requires a transparency of formalised decision-making to
the discourses going on in civil society. The principles of modern, positive
law and the values and moral norms on which they are based are not some-
thing fixed forever but are open to new, alternative interpretations, reformu-
lations and modifications. Their continuous development is not a privilege
of those exercising formal powers but belongs to all members of society, to
their communicative networks. This insight is central to Habermas' concep-
tion of democratic law-making procedures. And, so I have understood, even
Dworkin's judges, though princes of law's empire, are not deaf to the dis-
cussions taking place outside the courts, i.e., the capitals whence they rule.
Thus, regardless of the respective roles judges and legislators play in the
framework of different legal and political systems, what is decisive for the
functioning of democracy is the influence of the discourses on common
practical issues which take place outside the formal decision-making proce-
dures. From this perspective, even the decisions of the courts, especially in
the so-called hard cases, should be seen, not only as final solutions to indi-
vidual cases, but also as interventions in the continuous discussions on the
normative foundations of society, discussions where the participants are not
limited to those holding formal positions of power. And these discussions
and the discursive networks supporting them also constitute the source of
the democratic legitimation which, in the vulgar conception of the relation-
ship between democracy and the courts, the judges are said to be lacking.

V I . A r e There A n y Princes in the R e a l m of L a w ?

Who, then, should be the princes of law's empire? Perhaps there should
be no princes, at least not in the sense of absolute monarchs. Perhaps the
realm of law should be conceived of in terms of a democracy rather than a
monarchy. In this democracy, the legislator, the judges as well as the legal
scientists have their legitimate roles in the constant interplay through which
the law is maintained and developed. And all these functionaries of the
realm of law are influenced and controlled by the on-going normative dis-
cussions in civil society; these discussions also provide them with their fun-
damental legitimation.

References

Dworkin, Ronald: Taking Rights Seriously. Duckworth: London 1978. - Dwor-

kin, Ronald: Law's Empire. Fontana: London 1986. - Habermas, Jürgen: Faktizität
und Geltung. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1992.
V. Law, Meta-Legal Positivism and Legal
Dogmatics as a Rational Legal Science
 PROLEGOMENA ZU EINER THEORIE UND
DOGMATIK DES RECHTSDENKENS

Von Martin Schulte, Dresden

Einem Sammelband ausgewählter Schriften meines Lehrers Norbert Ach-

terberg (1933 - 1988) mit dem Titel „Theorie und Dogmatik des Öffent-
lichen Rechts" (1980) verdanke ich die Anregung, mir Gedanken über mein
Verständnis des Verhältnisses von Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsden-
kens zu machen. Was zunächst als („fixe") Idee begann, hat sich mittler-
weile zu einem langfristig angelegten Forschungsvorhaben entwickelt. Erste
Schritte auf diesem Wege sind bereits getan,1 weitere sollen in der Zukunft
folgen.

Daß ich „Prolegomena zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsden-

kens" gerade dieser Festschrift für Aulis Aarnio beisteuere, hat seinen
Grund. Denn sowohl in seinem Hauptwerk „The Rational as Reasonable"2
als auch in zahlreichen Einzelbeiträgen 3 hat sich der Jubilar direkt und indi-
rekt mit dem Selbstverständnis der Rechtsdogmatik befaßt, und zwar aus
der Perspektive des praktizierenden Zivilrechtlers wie aus derjenigen des
Rechtstheoretikers.

1
Siehe dazu Schulte, Recht, Staat und Gesellschaft - rechtsrealistisch betrachtet,
in: Aarnio/Paulson/Weinberger/von Wright/Wyduckel (Hrsg.), Rechtsnorm und
Rechtswirklichkeit. FS Werner Krawietz zum 60. Geburtstag, Berlin 1993, S. 317,
325ff.; ders., Georg Jellineks „Funktionenordnung" von Rechtstheorie, Rechtsdog-
matik und Nachbarwissenschaften - ein mehrperspektivischer Zugang zum Recht?
In: Paulson/Schulte (Hrsg.), Georg Jellinek - Vordenker einer modernen Theorie
und Dogmatik des Öffentlichen Rechts? (im Druck). Für die großzügige Förderung
meines Forschungsvorhabens sei auch an dieser Stelle der Alexander von Hum-
boldt-Stiftung und der Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung herzlich ge-
dankt.
2
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, Dordrecht u.a. 1987, S. lOff.
3
Ders., Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, 1979, Kap. 2.3 Rechtsdogmatik -
Wissenschaft oder Technik?, S. 33ff.; ders., Rechtsdogmatik - Wissenschaft oder
Technik? In: ders., Wegen Recht und Billigkeit. Vorträge und Aufsätze aus 10 Jah-
ren, 1988, S. 90ff.; ders., Kann sich auch die Rechtswissenschaft entwickeln? In:
ders., ebd., S. 115ff.; ders., Is Legal Science a Social Science? In: Krawietz/Mac-
Cormick/von Wright (Hrsg.), Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in
Modern Legal Systems. FS Robert S. Summers, 1994, S. 3 ff.
300 Martin Schulte

Aulis Aarnio unterscheidet innerhalb der Rechtswissenschaften verschie-

dene rechtswissenschaftliche Teilgebiete (Disziplinen), die durch einen spe-
zifischen Untersuchungsgegenstand und eine spezifische Methode gekenn-
zeichnet sind. So gehe es der Rechtssoziologie um die empirische Erfor-
schung der Regelmäßigkeiten im Rechtsleben; die Rechtsdogmatik befasse
sich demgegenüber unter Zuhilfenahme der interpretativen Methode mit der
Auslegung der Rechtsregeln und ihrer Systematisierung; die Rechtsge-
schichte untersuche hingegen mit den Methoden der Geschichtsforschung
die Entwicklung der Rechtsregeln und die vergleichende Rechtswissen-
schaft analysiere im Wege einer Verbindung von interpretativer, histori-
scher und empirischer Methode die Rechtsregeln des Auslands. 4
Von der Rechtswissenschaft im so beschriebenen Sinne setzt Aulis
Aarnio die Rechtstheorie ab. Bei ihr handele es sich um die theoretische
Betrachtung des Rechts und rechtlicher Phänomene. Zu den Arbeitsgebieten
der Rechtstheorie sollen dabei die „Theorie vom Recht", d.h. von der Ent-
stehung der Rechtsnormen, ihrem Charakter und ihren Auswirkungen in der
Gesellschaft, die „Theorie der rechtlichen Praxis", d.h. die Normanwen-
dung durch Verwaltung und Gerichte und die „Theorie der Rechtsfor-
schung", d.h. die Theorie der Rechtssoziologie, der Rechtsdogmatik, der
Rechtsgeschichte und der vergleichenden Rechtswissenschaft, zählen. Als
Theorie der Rechtsforschung sei die Rechtstheorie die Wissenschaftstheorie
der Rechtswissenschaft. 5
Über diese Systematisierungsleistung in bezug auf Rechtswissenschaft
und Rechtstheorie hinaus hat Aulis Aarnio zu zwei weiteren, wichtigen Pro-
blemkreisen Stellung bezogen, die für die Erarbeitung einer eigenständigen
Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens von zentraler Bedeutung sein
dürften. Ich denke zum einen an die Frage nach der Wissenschaftlichkeit
der Rechtswissenschaft, zum anderen an das Verhältnis von Rechtswissen-
schaft und Rechtstheorie zu den Nachbarwissenschaften.
Aulis Aarnio läßt erst gar keinen Zweifel daran aufkommen, daß er der
Rechtsdogmatik den Status einer Wissenschaft zuerkennt. Ausdrücklich
weist er darauf hin, daß es „vergleichsweise billig" sei, dieses Fachgebiet
„einfach durch die Behauptung vom Tisch zu fegen, es handele sich um
unwissenschaftliche Betätigung". 6 Aus seiner Sicht hängt die Antwort auf
die Frage nach der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Rechtsdogmatik von der Defi-

4
Ders., Rechtsdogmatik - Wissenschaft oder Technik? (FN 3), S. 90, 93.
5
Ebd., S. 93f.
6
Ders., Kann sich auch die Rechtswissenschaft entwickeln? In: ders., Wegen
Recht und Billigkeit, 1988, S. 115, 123.
 Prolegomena zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens 301

nition der gebrauchten Begriffe ab. Soweit man Wissenschaft und Wissen-
schaftlichkeit im Sinne der positivistischen Wissenschaftsphilosophie defi-
niere, scheine die Rechtsdogmatik aus dem Bereich der Wissenschaft aus-
geschlossen zu sein. Sie sei dann praktische Tätigkeit, Technik, die eher
mit juristischem Argumentations- und Entscheidungsverhalten vor Gericht
als mit echter Forschung zu vergleichen sei. Soweit man hingegen einen
weiten Wissenschaftsbegriff zugrunde lege, der als wissenschaftlich auch
solche Sätze anerkenne, die nur eine nicht-positivistische Sicherheit bieten,
lasse sich auch die Rechtsdogmatik als Wissenschaft verstehen. 7
Darüber hinaus hält Aulis Aarnio es auch weder für vernünftig noch für
nützlich, „die Rechtsdogmatik in irgendeine vorgegebene enge Schablone
von Wissenschaftlichkeit einzuzwängen". Jede Gesellschaft habe nämlich in
der Vergangenheit ein „Erkenntnisinteresse in bezug auf Auslegung" gehabt
und werde dies auch in der Zukunft haben. Davon ausgehend könne es nur
darum gehen, eine „Theorie der Rechtsdogmatik" zu erarbeiten, die deren
eigene Bedingungen zur Grundlage nehme. Dies bedeute allerdings
zugleich, daß sie jedenfalls teilweise auf den allgemeinen wissenschafts-
theoretischen Annahmen aufgebaut werden müsse, welche die geisteswis-
senschaftliche Forschung überhaupt betreffen. Rechtsdogmatik als Aus-
legungsarbeit an Texten mit amtlichen Bestimmungen nehme insoweit am
Status der Geisteswissenschaften bzw. der Auslegungswissenschaften teil. 8
Was das Verhältnis von Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtstheorie zu den
Nachbarwissenschaften anbelangt, so vertritt Aulis Aarnio einen arbeitstei-
ligen Forschungsansatz. Der Rechtsdogmatik komme schon bislang und
auch zukünftig die Aufgabe zu, den Inhalt der Rechtsordnung zu klären.
Forschungsgegenstand der Rechtsdogmatik seien die Regeln. Forderungen
nach „Ersetzung" der Rechtsdogmatik durch andere Wissenschaftsdiszipli-
nen - seien es die Politologie, die empirische Gesellschaftsforschung oder
gar die Sprachanalyse - beruhten auf einer teilweise falschen Deutung der
Gesellschaft und der darin wirkenden Kräfte. Außerdem berücksichtigten
sie nicht die gesellschaftlichen Wurzeln der Rechtsdogmatik.9
Statt „Ersetzung" der Rechtsdogmatik durch andere Wissenschaftsdiszi-
plinen komme vielmehr der sog. „Problemorientierung" wachsende Bedeu-
tung in der Rechtswissenschaft zu. In diesem Sinne sei die heutige Gesell-
schaft so strukturiert, daß die rechtliche Problemanalyse ohne die Kenntnis
weiterer Fachgebiete - im Umweltbereich etwa der Gesellschafts- und
Naturwissenschaften - oft nicht problemlos möglich sei und zudem die ver-
schiedenen rechtlichen Fachgebiete untereinander verknüpft seien. Aulis

7
Ders., Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, 1979, S. 39.
8
Ders., Rechtsdogmatik - Wissenschaft oder Technik? (FN 3), S. 90, 102.
9
Ders., Kann sich auch die Rechtswissenschaft entwickeln? (FN 3), S. 115, 122.
302 Martin Schulte

Aarnio sieht darin Beispiele einer immer wichtiger werdenden Wechselwir-

kung zwischen Rechtswissenschaft und anderen Wissenschaften. 10

II.

Vor diesem Hintergrund möchte ich im folgenden den Stand meiner bis-
herigen Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Theorie und Dogmatik des
Rechtsdenkens darstellen. Dabei handelt es sich naturgemäß um erste, noch
vorläufige Grundstrukturen einer im Aufbau befindlichen Arbeitsrichtung.
Daß sie nicht zuletzt durch die langjährigen Forschungen Aulis Aarnios
vielfältige Anregungen erfahren hat und ich in vielen Punkten mit ihm
übereinstimme, wird hoffentlich hinreichend deutlich werden.
Der Arbeitsrichtung „Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens" geht es
nicht nur um die Entwicklung der Rechtstheorie und Rechtsdogmatik als
solcher, 11 sondern vor allem auch um das ungeklärte Verhältnis der beiden
zueinander. Schon mit dem Begriff, den Aufgaben und den Leistungen der
Rechtstheorie wie der Rechtsdogmatik gehen allerdings zahlreiche Fragen
einher.
So bedarf die hier als Arbeitshypothese zugrunde gelegte, noch vorläu-
fige Charakterisierung der Rechtstheorie als „realistische, eine Theorie mitt-
lerer Reichweite intendierende Grundlagenforschung" 12 dringend der Kon-
kretisierung. Dies soll auf der Grundlage des normativen Rechtsrealismus
geschehen, der Eigenständigkeit vor allem dadurch entfaltet, daß es ihm in
ganz besonderer Weise um die rechts- und systemtheoretische Durchleuch-
tung der in einer Gesellschaft wirksamen rechtlichen Systemstrukturen geht.
Wissenschaftstheoretisch wird das Recht als eine universale normative
Struktur der Gesellschaft begriffen und dabei auf eine sinnkritische Refle-
xion der sozialen Wirklichkeit von Recht und Staat geachtet. Der normative
Rechtsrealismus ist perspektivisch nicht auf die Wortnormen des geltenden
Rechts und den darin objektivierten normativen Sinn verengt, sondern ihm
geht es darüber hinaus vor allem um die „ i m Recht zum Ausdruck gelan-
genden gesellschaftlichen Interessen und ihre Bewertung". Aller normativer
Sinn ist als ein gesellschaftlich konstituierter zu denken. Kennzeichnend für
den normativen Rechtsrealismus ist ferner eine konstruktive Verbindung
von Rechts- und Systemtheorie. Der Ausgangspunkt einer solchen system-
theoretischen Rekonstruktion des Rechts muß darin liegen, Genese und Gel-

10
Ebd., S. 128; vgl. auch ders., The Rational as Reasonable, 1987, S. lOff.
11
Siehe dazu jeweils für das 19. Jahrhundert in Deutschland Brockmöller, Die
Entstehung der Rechtstheorie im 19. Jahrhundert in Deutschland, 1997, passim;
Herberger, Dogmatik, 1981, S. 345 ff.
12
Krawietz, Juristische Entscheidung und wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis, 1978,
S. 220; Schelsky, Das Jhering-Modell des sozialen Wandels durch Recht, in: JRR 3
(1972), S. 47, 60.
 Prolegomena zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens 303

tungsgrundlagen des Rechts im Ausgang von der sozialen Wirklichkeit zu

bestimmen. 13
Unter Rechtsdogmatik verstehen wir heute gemeinhin „ein innersystema-
tisch erarbeitetes Gefüge juristischer Begriffe, Institutionen, Grundsätze und
Regeln, die als Bestandteil der positiven Rechtsordnung unabhängig von
einer gesetzlichen Fixierung allgemein Anerkennung und Befolgung bean-
spruchen". 14 Adressat der Rechtsdogmatik ist der praktisch-juristische Ent-
scheider im staatlich organisierten Rechtssystem, dessen Rechtsanwendung
sie steuert und leitet, ihr Orientierung und Sicherheit gibt. 1 5

Die Rechtsdogmatik soll dabei im wesentlichen vier Funktionen erfüllen:

eine Entlastungsfunktion, eine rationalisierende Funktion, eine Systemfunk-
tion und eine Selektionsfunktion. Zunächst kommt ihr bei der Rechtsanwen-
dung und Rechtskonkretisierung eine Entlastungsfunktion in dem Sinne zu,
daß die grundsätzlichen Sach- und Wertungsfragen nicht in jedem Einzel-
fall neu aufgeworfen und beantwortet werden müssen. 16 Damit entspricht
sie einem Entlastungsbedürfnis der Rechtspraxis, die in hohem Maße an
„Standardverfahren und Standardargumenten für regelmäßig wiederkeh-
rende Problemsituationen" 17 interessiert ist. Rechtspraktische Arbeit wird
dadurch nicht nur erleichtert, sondern teilweise überhaupt erst möglich. Die
rationalisierende Funktion der Rechtsdogmatik bedeutet, daß sie sich nicht
in formalen Begriffskonstruktionen erschöpfen darf, sondern im Interesse
der Rechtssicherheit und der generalisierenden Tendenz des Gerechtigkeits-
gebotes unkontrollierbare subjektive Wertungen zurückzudrängen hat. 1 8 In
unmittelbarem Zusammenhang damit steht ihre Systemfunktion. Versteht

13
Vgl. dazu grundlegend Krawietz, Recht als Regelsystem, 1984, S. 132f.,
153ff., 178f.; ders., Akzeptanz von Recht und Richterspruch? Geltungsgrundlagen
normativer Kommunikation im Bereich des Rechts, in: Hoppe/Krawietz/Schulte
(Hrsg.), Rechtsprechungslehre, 1992, S. 455, 476 m.w.N.; ders., Recht als normati-
ves Kommunikat in normen- und handlungstheoretischer Perspektive, in: Garzón
Valdés/Krawietz/Zimmerling (Hrsg.), Normative Systems in Legal and Moral
Theory. FS for Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin, 1997, S. 369ff.
14
Brohm, Die Dogmatik des Verwaltungsrechts vor den Gegenwartsaufgaben der
Verwaltung, VVDStRL 30 (1972), S. 245, 246.
15
Morlok, Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Verfassungstheorie,
1988, S. 39f.; Schmidt, Öffentliches Wirtschaftsrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, 1990, S. V.
16
Brohm, Die Dogmatik des Verwaltungsrechts vor den Gegenwartsaufgaben der
Verwaltung (FN 14), S. 245, 247.
17
Morlok, Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Verfassungstheorie,
1988, S. 40; vgl. auch aus rechtstheoretischer Perspektive Krawietz, Rechtssystem
und Rationalität in der juristischen Dogmatik, in: Aarnio/Niiniluoto/Uusitalo
(Hrsg.), Methodologie und Erkenntnistheorie der juristischen Argumentation, 1981
(RECHTSTHEORIE Beiheft 2), S. 299, 307.
18
Brohm, Die Dogmatik des Verwaltungsrechts vor den Gegenwartsaufgaben der
Verwaltung (FN 14), S. 245, 248.
304 Martin Schulte

man nämlich die rationalisierende Funktion der Rechtsdogmatik nicht allein

punktuell, d.h. mit Blick auf die jeweilige Einzelentscheidung, so werden
mit der Zuordnung gesetzlicher Vorschriften unter Herausarbeitung über-
greifender Rechtsgrundsätze „innere Zusammenhänge" sichtbar, die eine
auf die Einheit der Rechtsordnung gerichtete Rechtsanwendung und Rechts-
konkretisierung ermöglichen. Durch die Herausarbeitung allgemeiner
Rechtsbegriffe und Rechtsgrundsätze wird zudem die Systemflexibilität und
die Fähigkeit gewahrt, neue Interessen- und Wertungskonflikte integrativ zu
erfassen. 19 Schließlich kommt es - bedingt dadurch, daß sich die Rechts-
dogmatik tagtäglich in der praktischen Rechtsanwendung bewähren muß -
zur Kontrolle und autonomen Verbesserung ihrer Selektionsleistung. 20 So
kann sie zu notwendigen Abweichungen von hergebrachten Strukturmustern
gezwungen sein und damit zugleich den Impetus für die Herausarbeitung
neuer Begriffe und Grundsätze erfahren. Mit diesen „Rückkoppelungsver-
fahren" bewahrt sie sich ihre Innovations- und Anpassungsfähigkeit im Hin-
blick auf veränderte Problemsituationen und gänzlich neue Herausforderun-
gen.
Daneben dürfte der Rechtsdogmatik eine weitere wichtige Aufgabe
zukommen, die man die Orientierungsfunktion oder auch ihre Ordnungs-
und Systemfunktion nennen könnte. 21 Ihr zufolge darf Dogmatik nicht so
kompliziert und schwer durchschaubar sein, daß sie von der Rechtspraxis
schlechterdings nicht mehr nach vollzogen werden kann und damit jegliche
Bedeutung für die praktisch-juristische Entscheidung verliert. 22 Dogmatik
sollte in diesem Sinne - kurz gesagt - einen Beitrag zur „Reduktion von
Komplexität" leisten und nicht ihrerseits komplexitätserzeugend wirken.
Gerade dieser Fragestellung nachzugehen, nämlich ob und inwieweit sich
Ordnungs- und Systemdenken als kennzeichnende Leistungsmerkmale der
Rechtsdogmatik erweisen, 23 könnte sich als Kernproblem für das Verständ-
nis der Rechtsdogmatik entwickeln.
Im Verhältnis von Rechtstheorie und Rechtsdogmatik bedarf vor allem
näherer Untersuchung, ob und ggf. welchen Beitrag ein mehrperspektivi-
scher Zugang zum Recht, der zwischen der Rechtsdogmatik und der Rechts-

19
Ebd., S. 248 f.
20
Ebd., S. 249 m. Fn. 16.
21
Im letzteren Sinne Stolleis, Entwicklungslinien der verwaltungsrechtlichen
Dogmatik im industriellen Zeitalter, B W V 1990, S. 152, 156.
22
Siehe insbes. Morlok, Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Verfas-
sungstheorie, 1988, S. 40f.
23
Siehe dazu für das Verwaltungsrecht Schmidt-Aßmann, Das allgemeine Ver-
waltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee und System, 1982, passim; ders., Das Allgemeine
Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee. Grundlagen und Aufgaben der verwaltungs-
rechtlichen Systembildung, 1998, passim; Schulte, Schlichtes Verwaltungshandeln,
1995, S. 183 ff.
 Prolegomena zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des R e c h t s d e n k e n s 3 0 5

praxis, der Rechtstheorie sowie den Nachbarwissenschaften unterscheidet,

zur Problemlösung zu leisten vermag.
Danach geht es der Rechtspraxis um die praktische Handhabung des
Rechts in Alltagssituationen, z.B. im Rahmen der praktischen juristischen
Entscheidungstätigkeit. Die Rechtsdogmatik befaßt sich mit dem Recht und
seiner Auslegung in systematischer Form. In engem Kontakt mit ihr steht
die juristische Methodenlehre, zu deren Aufgabenbereich die Methodik der
praktischen Rechtshandhabung und der dogmatischen Rechtswissenschaft
zählt. Zugleich ist sie die „Methode des juristischen Denkens", der es vor
allem um die Regeln „richtiger" Rechtsanwendung geht.
Begreift man die Rechtstheorie - wie oben erläutert - als Strukturtheorie
des Rechts, so liegt dieser eine bloß analytische Rechtsbetrachtung fern;
vielmehr gilt es gerade aus rechtsrealistischer Perspektive, die sozialstruktu-
rellen Voraussetzungen und Abhängigkeiten einer Rechtsordnung hinrei-
chend zu berücksichtigen. Dabei werden Rechtsnorm und Rechtsrealität als
„empirische Phänomene" zum Gegenstand einer rationalen wissenschaft-
lichen Behandlung gemacht. 24
Ausgehend davon, daß sich die Strukturmerkmale einer modernen
Rechtsordnung heute nicht mehr adäquat herausarbeiten lassen, ohne die
Erkenntnisse benachbarter Wissenschaftsdisziplinen zu berücksichtigen, 25
bilden die Nachbarwissenschaften der Jurisprudenz eine weitere wichtige
Perspektive der Befassung mit dem Rechtssystem. In erster Linie ist dabei
an die Philosophie und Soziologie, aber auch an die Geschichte, Wirt-
schafts- und Politikwissenschaft zu denken. 26 Daneben bedarf es ferner -
worauf bereits Helmut Schelsky hingewiesen hat - der Berücksichtigung
psychologischer und biologischer Erkenntnisse. 27

24
Krawietz, Juristische Entscheidung und wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis, 1978,
S. 219 f.
25
Ebenso Aarnio, Kann sich auch die Rechtswissenschaft entwickeln? (FN 3),
S. 115, 128; vgl. ferner Gromitsaris, Theorie der Rechtsnormen bei Rudolf von
Ihering. Eine Untersuchung der Grundlagen des deutschen Rechtsrealismus, 1989,
S. 226.
26
Als Beispiel einer solchen für die Rechtswissenschaft unmittelbar relevanten
Untersuchung aus dem Bereich der Wirtschaftswissenschaft siehe z.B. Douglass
C. North, Institutionen, institutioneller Wandel und Wirtschaftsleistung, 1992, der
einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Institutionentheorie des Rechts leistet.
27
Schelsky, Über die Stabilität von Institutionen, besonders Verfassungen, in:
ders., Auf der Suche nach Wirklichkeit, 1965, S. 33, 35; vgl. z.B. für das in der
Rechtspraxis und Rechtsdogmatik behandelte Problem der Kooperation zwischen
dem Staat und Privaten die Studien des Oxforder Zoologen Martin Nowak und des
Wiener Mathematikers Carl Siegmund zur Kooperation unter eigentlich egoistischen
Individuen. Dabei wurde die „tit for tat"-Theorie des amerikanischen Politologen
Robert Axelrod grundsätzlich bestätigt, derzufolge Egoismus bestraft und Bereit-
schaft zur Kooperation belohnt wird.

21 FS Aarnio
306 Martin Schulte

Rechtspraxis und Rechtsdogmatik, Rechtstheorie und Nachbarwissen-

schaften der Jurisprudenz befassen sich insoweit auf unterschiedlichem
Abstraktionsgrad und unter je spezifischer Distanznahme in der Perspektive
mit dem Rechtssystem. In Abhängigkeit von der Perspektive der Theoreti-
sierung des Rechtsdenkens kommt es dabei zu einer unterschiedlichen
Rekonstruktion des Rechtssystems und seiner Problemfelder. Dem mehrper-
spektivischen Zugang zum Recht liegt deshalb die Vorstellung zugrunde,
daß die einzelnen Betrachtungsweisen erst in ihrer Gesamtheit ein differen-
ziertes Bild der Rechtsordnung und eine vertiefte Erkenntnis ihrer jeweili-
gen sozialen Bezugsprobleme vermitteln. 28

III.

Auf der Grundlage der hier nur skizzierten, im einzelnen noch auszuar-
beitenden Überlegungen zum Verständnis der Rechtstheorie und der Rechts-
dogmatik als solcher sowie zum Verhältnis der beiden zueinander, ist mit
dem Forschungsansatz auf lange Sicht die Erarbeitung einer eigenständigen
„Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens" verbunden. Dazu wird es
jedoch notwendigerweise zunächst des umfassenden und intensiven Studi-
ums der „Klassiker" des deutschen Rechtsdenkens im 19. und 20. Jahr-
hundert (Savigny, Jhering, Gerber, Laband, Jellinek, Kelsen, Heller, Smend,
Schmitt) bedürfen.
Ein erster Schritt in diese Richtung konnte unlängst durch die Bewilli-
gung eines Forschungsfreisemesters zu den „Entwicklungslinien der Theo-
rie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens" getan werden. Im Mittelpunkt dieser
Forschungen stand die Befassung mit einschlägigen Arbeiten Savignys, Jhe-
rings und Labands. 29 Als besonders ertragreich erwies sich dabei das Stu-
dium der Labandschen und Savignyschen Schriften, deren aufschlußreiche
und vertiefungsbedürftige Stellungnahmen zum Rechtsdogmatikverständnis
hier nur angedeutet werden können. So sieht Laband die wissenschaftliche
Aufgabe der Dogmatik, also die Konstruktion der Rechtsinstitute, die
Zurückführung der einzelnen Rechtssätze auf allgemeinere Begriffe und die

28
Krawietz, Zur Einführung: Neue Sequenzierung der Theoriebildung und Kritik
der allgemeinen Theorie sozialer Systeme, in: ders./Welker (Hrsg.), Kritik der
Theorie sozialer Systeme, 1992, S. 27 f.
29
Zum Rechtsdogmatikverständnis ders. siehe Savigny, System des heutigen
Römischen Rechts, Band 1, 1840, § 20; Jhering, Verhältnis der Theorie zur Praxis,
UB Göttingen, NJ, Kasten II/1 ; ders., Ist die Jurisprudenz eine Wissenschaft? UB
Göttingen, NJ, Kasten 17/Nr. 4 (braune Mappe); Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deut-
schen Reiches, 1. Band, 2. Aufl., 1887, Vorwort, S. IX f. und dazu Herberger, Lo-
gik und Dogmatik bei Paul Laband. Zur Praxis der sog. juristischen Methode im
„Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches", in: Wissenschaft und Recht der Verwaltung
seit dem Ancien Régime, 1984, S. 91 ff.
 Prolegomena zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens 307

Herleitung der aus diesen Begriffen sich ergebenden Folgerungen in einer

rein logischen Denktätigkeit. Ganz bewußt setzt er davon alle historischen,
politischen und philosophischen Betrachtungen ab, die für die Rechtsdog-
matik ohne Belang seien und häufig nur dazu dienten, Mängel konstrukti-
ver Arbeit zu verhüllen. 30 Was Savignys Rechtsdogmatikverständnis anbe-
langt, so bedürfte vor allem die diesbezüglich aufgestellte These, Savigny
breche mit der älteren Dogmatik-Tradition, indem er die Dogmatik in den
Zusammenhang einer Systemtheorie einordne und sich sein Systemkonzept
damit wissenschaftsgeschichtlich betrachtet als Vorläufer neuerer System-
theorien erweise, 31 einmal näherer Überprüfung.
Von Savigny, Jhering und Laband führte die Arbeit an den „Entwick-
lungslinien von Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens" - vielleicht
gleichermaßen zwangsläufig wie zufällig - zum Werk Georg Jellineks. Und
auch hier trat reicher Fund zutage! So hat sich Georg Jellinek erfreulicher-
weise schon in seinem „System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte" (1892)
direkt mit Begriff und Funktion der Rechtsdogmatik - inhaltlich wieder
aufgenommen in der „Zwei-Seiten-Theorie" des Rechts - befaßt. Dort heißt
es: „Gibt es doch überhaupt kein menschliches Wissensgebiet, das zu
seiner gedeihlichen Bearbeitung nicht die Kenntnis anderer voraussetzte. Je
weiter der Blick des Forschers, je umfassender sein Wissen, desto sicherer
und tiefer die Erkenntnis seines Faches! Für Art und Resultat der Arbeit
des Juristen wird daher die Kenntnis und Beachtung anderer mit dem
Rechte sich beschäftigender Disziplinen von Bedeutung sein. Allein die im
forschenden Subjekte sich vollziehende Vereinigung der Kenntnis mehrerer
Wissensgebiete darf nicht ein Ineinanderschieben dieser Gebiete selbst zur
Folge haben. Rechtsdogmatik soll durch Rechts-, Wirtschafts-, Kulturge-
schichte und Gesellschaftswissenschaft ergänzt, aber nicht ersetzt
werden." 32 Jellinek setzt sich dabei übrigens deutlich von Laband ab, dem
er vorwirft, der Bedeutung der Wirtschafts-, Kulturgeschichte und Gesell-
schaftswissenschaft für die Arbeit des Rechtsdogmatikers nicht gerecht zu
werden. 33
Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich die Frage, ob nicht in dieser Jellinek-
schen „Funktionenordnung" von Rechtsdogmatik, Rechtstheorie und Nach-
barwissenschaften einer der Ursprünge eines mehrperspektivi sehen Zugangs
zum Recht gesehen werden kann. Um einen sicheren und vollständigen Ein-
druck gewinnen zu können, wird allerdings eine gründliche Werkanalyse
Georg Jellineks - wie auch des Werkes der anderen „Klassiker" des deut-

30
Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, 1. Band, 2. Aufl., 1887, Vor-
wort, S. IX.
31
Herberger, Dogmatik, 1981, S. 396ff.
32
Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte, 2. Aufl., 1919, S. 18 f.
33
Ebd., S. 19 Fn. 1.

21
308 Martin Schulte

sehen Rechtsdenkens - folgen müssen. Nicht zuletzt darin liegen der Reiz
und die besondere Schwierigkeit des Forschungsvorhabens, weil jeweils nur
vereinzelt mit direkten Stellungnahmen zur Entwicklung und zum Verhält-
nis von Rechtstheorie und Rechtsdogmatik gerechnet werden darf; ganz
überwiegend wird es der angesprochenen, gründlichen Werkanalyse bedür-
fen.

IV.

Bei einer Werkanalyse der „Klassiker" des deutschen Rechtsdenkens

wird man allerdings nicht stehenbleiben dürfen. Vielmehr sind auch die ein-
schlägigen Stellungnahmen „zeitgenössischer" Vertreter der Rechtsdogma-
tik und Rechtstheorie in die Betrachtung einzubeziehen. Hier ist vor allem
an die Arbeiten von Josef Esser, 34 Niklas Luhmann 35 und Werner Kra-
wietz 3 6 zu denken. 37 Zu ihnen ist unlängst Hasso Hofmann hinzugetreten,
der die Problemstellung mit Grund auf das magische Dreieck von „Rechts-
dogmatik, Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie" erweitert. 38
Trotz fast drei Jahrzehnte währender Bemühungen vermag Niklas Luh-
mann noch immer kein klares Profil der Rechtstheorie als Wissenschaftsdis-
ziplin zu erkennen. Zwar gelte die Unterscheidung von rechtsdogmatischen
Theorien und Rechtstheorie in einem allgemeinen Sinne inzwischen als
akzeptiert, doch ordne sich die Rechtstheorie auch weiterhin der Binnenper-

34
Esser, Das Bewußtwerden wissenschaftlichen Arbeitens im Recht, in: Dubi-
schar, Grundbegriffe des Rechts, 1968, S. 95ff.; ders., Dogmatik zwischen Theorie
und Praxis, in: Baur/Esser/Kübler/Steindorff (Hrsg.), Funktionswandel der Privat-
rechtsinstitutionen. FS für Ludwig Raiser zum 70. Geburtstag, 1974, S. 517ff.;
ders., Juristisches Argumentieren im Wandel des Rechtsfindungskonzepts unseres
Jahrhunderts, 1979, S. 20ff.
35
Luhmann, Rechtssystem und Rechtsdogmatik, 1974, S. 15ff.; ders., Selbstrefle-
xion des Rechtssystems. Rechtstheorie in gesellschaftstheoretischer Perspektive, in:
ders., Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts, 1981, S. 419ff.; ders., Rechtssystem und
Rechtstheorie, in: ders., Rechtssoziologie, 3. Aufl., 1987, S. 354ff.; ders., Das
Recht der Gesellschaft, 1993, S. 11 ff.
36
Krawietz, Juristische Entscheidung und wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis, 1978,
S. 21 Off.; ders., Recht als Regelsystem, 1984, passim.
37
Vgl. auch Kaufmann, Rechtsphilosophie, Rechtstheorie, Rechtsdogmatik, in:
ders./Hassemer, Einführung in Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart,
5. Aufl., 1989, S. I f f . ; Roellecke, Philosophie oder Sozialtheorie? In: RECHTS-
THEORIE 13 (1982), S. 393ff.; ders., Theorie und Philosophie des Rechtes, in: ders.
(Hrsg.), Rechtsphilosophie oder Rechtstheorie?, 1988, S. 1 ff.
38
Hofmann, Rechtsdogmatik, Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie, in: Stober
(Hrsg.), Recht und Recht. FS für Gerd Roellecke zum 70. Geburtstag, 1998,
S. 117ff.; vgl. auch ders., Rechtsphilosophie, in: Koslowski (Hrsg.), Orientierung
durch Philosophie, 1991, S. 118 ff. ; ders., Das Recht des Rechts, das Recht der
Herrschaft und die Einheit der Verfassung, 1998, S. 51.
 Prolegomena zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens 309

spektive des Rechtssystems zu. Sie sei damit noch immer „in die Abstrak-
tion und in die interdisziplinäre Kontaktsuche getriebene Reflexionstheorie
des Rechtssystems".39 Man mag schon diesen Befund bestreiten, 40 doch
könnte der weiterführende Gedanke darin liegen, daß eine juristische
Rechtstheorie als Selbstbeschreibung des Rechtssystems ihren Gegenstand
nur dann zu erfassen vermag, wenn sie dies in „Differenz" zu etwas
anderem tut, d.h. ihn „unterscheidet", um sich selbst ihm zuordnen zu
können. 41
Genau daran knüpft übrigens neuerdings auch Hasso Hofmann mit seinen
Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Rechtsdogmatik, Rechtsphilosophie und
Rechtstheorie an. Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtsdogmatik verbindet nach
seiner Meinung die „gemeinsame systembildende Unterscheidung von
Recht und Unrecht". Gerade die „Ausrichtung auf diese Unterscheidung"
sei es, die sie von jeder Rechtstheorie trenne. Die „Differenz" zwischen der
(den) Rechtsdogmatik(en) und der philosophischen Dogmatik dieser Dog-
matikien) einerseits sowie jeder Rechtstheorie andererseits liege „ i m Ent-
scheidungsbezug".42
Bei der Rechtstheorie hingegen trete an die Stelle der Unterscheidung
von Recht und Unrecht die „gleichfalls konstitutive Unterscheidung von
Recht und seiner Umwelt..., kurz: die Unterscheidung von Recht und
Nicht-Recht". 43 Erst damit sei es der „Wissenschaft von Recht als Rechts-
theorie" möglich, Unrecht und ungültiges Recht zum Wissenschaftsgegen-
stand zu machen. In diesem Sinne sei sie „nicht-dogmatische Wissen-
schaft", die ihren Gegenstand analytisch-deskriptiven Verfahren unter-
werfe. 44
Schon diese kurze Skizze der Überlegungen Niklas Luhmanns und Hasso
Hofmanns zum Verhältnis von Rechtsdogmatik, Rechtsphilosophie und
Rechtstheorie dürfte Anlaß genug sein, die Leistungsfähigkeit der System-
theorie für eine Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens einer gründli-
chen Überprüfung zu unterziehen; dies nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil sich
damit möglicherweise gar ein Bogen spannen würde, der - wie oben erläu-
tert - seinen gedanklichen Ausgangspunkt bereits bei C. F. v. Savigny
fände.

39
Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, 1993, S. 11 f.
40
Vgl. dazu Krawietz, Staatliches oder gesellschaftliches Recht? Systemabhän-
gigkeiten normativer Strukturbildung im Funktionssystem Recht, in: ders./Welker
(Hrsg.), Kritik der Theorie sozialer Systeme, 1992, S. 247 ff.
41
Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, 1993, S. 17.
42
Hofmann, Rechtsdogmatik, Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie (FN 38),
S. 117, 125 m. w.N.
43
Ebd., S. 126.
44
Ebd., S. 127.
310 Martin Schulte

V.

Prolegomena sind Vorüberlegungen. Mehr konnte und wollte dieser Bei-

trag zu einer Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechtsdenkens nicht leisten. Sollte
deutlich geworden sein, welche Idee das Forschungsvorhaben trägt und wel-
chen methodischen Ansatz es verfolgt, so hätten diese Überlegungen schon
ihren Zweck erfüllt. Im übrigen gilt: für lange Zeit wird der Weg das Ziel
sein müssen.
 FACT AND VALUE: THE COPERNIC A N REVOLUTION
IN THE SCIENCES OF M A N

By Matti Sintonen, Helsinki

In his work The Rational and the Reasonable Aulis Aarnio deals with
the interpretation of juridical or legal norms and with the justification of
these interpretations. The work has an important theoretical goal, that of
explicating the nature of legal dogmatics, but also the clearly practical aim
of giving researchers as well as practicing lawyers and judges tools for
improving their self understanding. One crucial theoretical question is
whether the interpretation of legal norms can in some important sense be
right or correct, and whether or not we can speak about the one true inter-
pretation. A related question is whether truth and acceptability are merely
cognitive issues, and to what extent values and evaluations intertwine with
factual assessments. The general tenor or Aarnio's thought seems to run
against the empiricist current in which the realms of factual and evaluative
assessment are kept at separate quarters.

This paper is an attempt to trace some of these issues to a revolution, or

to two revolutions, which have a bearing on the fact/value-distinction.
They both are part of the Copernican Revolution initiated by Immanuel
Kant in his three critiques. Kant had a view of knowledge according to
which Reason only has understanding into what it has made in accordance
with its own plan. This plan involves certain constraints on the outcome of
knowledge as well as on the procedure of attaining this knowledge. In a
sense it could be argued that certain architectonic and procedural cognitive
values are either regulative or constitutive of the enterprise of knowledge.

The second revolution is a revolution in which the Reason's purely cog-

nitive aspirations are challenged, or more accurately, embedded in a more
comprehensive context. Johann Gottlieb Fichte picked the line of thought
where Kant had left it and argued that a feasible notion of knowledge is
only possible if thought is made secondary to action. What I ' l l suggest
below is that Aarnio's grand view of interpretation as a value-laden process
is best viewed against these stages in the Copernican Revolution. To antici-
pate a little, adopting the point of view that in the beginning there was
action might suffice to justify why non-cognitive values enter into the inter-
312 Matti Sintonen

pretation of legal norms. At least in the sciences of man the revolution is

not complete without this turn.

I. The Rational and the Reasonable

It is perhaps best to start with a brief discussion of the fundamental

issue. Aarnio refers to Chaim Perelman's distinction between the rational
and the reasonable. Rationality and rational inference can be understood in
two ways. Inference which is formally valid, that is, in accordance with the
canons of formal logic, Aarnio calls L-rationality. But because legal inter-
pretation is dialogue or discussion in which the justification of the premises
has a crucial role, we need the wider notion of D-rationality. D-rationality
involves essentially the principles and rules which govern rational discus-
sion and communication.
The requirement of reasonableness is a contentful principle which does
not reduce to the requirement of the consistency of the end result, that is
formal rationality, or to D-rationality, which is why it characterizes the end
result rather than the process through which this result has been achieved.
In the end such reasonableness boils down to the notion of acceptability
within a legal community (cf. Aarnio 1987 especially section 2.2. in Chap-
ter 4). This in turn presupposes that interpretation is in some sense in har-
mony with the epistemic and value system of this community.

We can now see where Aarnio's thought was heading to ten years ago.
In explicating D-rationality he combined Jürgen Habermas's (and Robert
Alexy's) principles of rational communicative action, and the notion of cer-
tainty of the later Wittgenstein. The principles of rational communication
(consistency, effectiveness of discussion, sincerety etc.) extend over all
communication - they do not confine to the epistemic rules for assessing
factual claims. It follows that they can offer a model for argumentation in
which also rules other than those for purely formal-logical inference or for
narrowly legal argumentation can be taken into account.
We can see already in Habermas the thought that reaching consensus pre-
supposes similarity (if not identity) of communal values, as well as deep-
going epistemic and ontological sympathy between souls. But Wittgen-
stein's notion of certainty, Aarnio thinks, provides an explicit epistemologi-
cal and ontological anchor which can be used to fix the communicative
principles. To be able to agree on or disagree over details there must be
what Aarnio, following von Wright's (1972) comments on Wittgenstein's
On Certainty , calls non-propositional certainty about fundamentals. (This is
something which we now might also call trust.) A l l argumentation presup-
poses similar (if not identical) forms of life. Consequently, the process of
 Fact and Value: The Copernican Revolution in the Sciences of Man 313

interpreting norms consists of various kinds of language games which in

the end obtain their meaning from a shared language and life form.

II. Cognitive and Non-cognitive Values

A good starting point for approaching the ontological and epistemologi-

cal tasks is offered by the synopsis which Aarnio gives of the nature of
legal dogmatic research. Consider the notion of a paradigm introduced by
Kuhn to describe research in accordance with a disciplinary matrix. The
idea is that the so-called normal scientific research takes for granted a
number of symbolic generalizations, a set of ontological assumptions about
the fundamental entities of the area of research, a set of values and norms
which guide research, as well as a number of practical model solutions or
exemplars. The point of referring to the notion of a scientific disciplinary
matrix is that normal-scientific legal dogmatic research presupposes an ana-
logous legal dogmatic matrix. Such a matrix provides the communal basis
for interpretation by delineating the object of interpretation (what the valid
legal order is like, and how it has come about), sources allowed in interpre-
tation (in which case the matrix takes, e.g., a stand vis-à-vis legalism and a
more liberal commitment), the methodological norms followed in interpre-
tation, as well as the relevant values and evaluations used in legal interpre-
tation.
Before we proceed to discuss the more radical challenge to the empiricist
distinction between fact and value we should perhaps note that there is a
small lacuna here. When Thomas Kuhn (1970) wrote about the values
underlying normal scientific research, that is, the value-component of the
disciplinary matrix, he had in mind a set of cognitive values. These cogni-
tive values include such values as the scope of a theory, precision or accu-
racy, simplicity or consilience, and fruitfullness. These are cognitive values
in the sense that accepting them involves no moral, social, political, or eco-
nomical commitment. So, according to Kuhn, science is a value-driven
enterprise in the sense that a scientist must balance the various virtues of
scientific theories in theory choice or, perhaps, hypothesis generation. An
inquirer wedded to the traditional cognitivist view in which inquiry is max-
imising (or satisficing) of cognitive aims can accept that research topics are
chosen with non-cognitive importance in mind. However, it does not follow
from such commitements that non-cognitive values should have a say in
the assessment of solutions to problems.
Although this parallel between legal dogmatics and mature natural
science in Kuhn's sense is subject to this equivocation it brings out an
important aspect, namely the contextual nature of legal interpretation. Tra-
ditional legal philosophical research of norms (such as the work on deontic
314 Matti Sintonen

logic) has usually confined to the syntactic and semantic interpretation of

norms (norm formulations), that is, to a largely grammatical task. Although
it has been an oft-repeated truth that legal norms are a part of the larger
moral, economical and political context, and that moral as well as other
social considerations coming out from outside the narrowly juridical point
of view effect the interpretation of norms, the contextual ontological, epis-
temological, and ethical commitments have not usually been subject to
explicit scrutiny.
Another important aspect is the parallel between legal dogmatic and
social scientific research. The legal system of course is part of the social
system at large, but in the social sciences it has been the standard assump-
tion that research must be in some sense objective. A social scientist
cannot, ex officio, commit herself or himself to any particular set of non-
cognitive values or evaluations. Or at least, since their bearing on problem
selection is difficult to deny, they should not be allowed to colour the
results of research. The idea has been that the entities and processes of
social scientific study are objective in some sense, even though they have
perhaps been reconstructed and replicated via social interaction. In this
objectivistic fashion also legal norms could be studied as factual matters. It
is obvious that these two ideas, viz., that inquiry is value-centered and
value-driven, and the requirement of objectivity, are in tension with one
another. Aarnio's suggestion now is that legal dogmatics cannot but make a
commitment, overt or covert, to social and moral values.

Here we come to one fundamental question in the sciences of man. Is it

possible to describe and explain social phenomena, or to adapt the legal
point of view, without committing oneself to other than cognitive values?
The issue is pertinent for a legal philosopher for the following reason. On
the other hand there is the requirement that legal issues be decided in
accordance with valid law, and that legal decisions conform to principles
which at least try to avoid arbitrariness and aim at being explicit on what
infringing on law will bring about. This is because rational social and legal
order presupposes that citizens can expect what the courts will do. On the
other hand, as Aarnio says, legal norms are not theoretical or empirical
claims which describe reality in the same way as the natural sciences
describe nature. In short, law is not mere cognition but also, as Aarnio puts
it, giving of value-based recommendations as well as weilding of power.

It follows from this that norm statements, which assert something about
the content of a norm belonging to a normative system, cannot be simple
claims analogous to empirical claims and statements, but are rather state-
ments which adopt a standpoint. Although according to Aarnio norm state-
ments can be justified claims about what is rational and rationally accepta-
ble (see Aarnio 1987, 52- 55) they are too close to value-judgements and
 Fact and Value: The Copernican Revolution in the Sciences of Man 315

evaluations to be assesed as mere factual statements. This is why a judge

always must engage in value-laden choices, and to the extent a legal dog-
matic scholar and a judge share a problem with the same structure the
former inherits the dilemma the latter.
Philosophers, especially in the Anglo-American tradition, have for a long
time championed the distinction between fact and value. Obviously the dis-
tinction in some sense exists, but the question is what can be said about it,
and can the distinction be drawn as sharply as it appears. One consiliatory
possibility would be to accept values as actual determinants of choices and
decicions, but at the same time to emphasize that such interference is some-
thing that should be avoided. Another suggestion would be to distinguish
between two roles. On this view a sociologists of law or legal domaticists
adopting a stand in part because it favors certain non-cognitive values
would not be commited to any particular set of values ex officio . Rather
she or he would be sitting on two chairs at once, on the chair of a
researcher, and on the chair of a citizen. As a researcher she or he would
be commited to truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth (excepting,
perhaps, the systemic virtues stemming from the architectonic requirements
of reason; see below). As a citizen she or he would be commited to the
values inherited from the moral, political and legal culture. It is of course
possible that the nature of these legal and moral norms depends on the con-
text, and similarly, that the borderline between legal and moral norms shifts
in accordance with the situation.
That there is such distinction can be seen in that according to Aarnio the
acceptability of an interpretation presupposes that it is in harmony with the
values of the legal community of interpreters. As Aarnio puts it, a good
judge or civil servant always attempts to direct her or his decisions towards
the fundamental values of the majority of the society. It is of course true
that in practical choices a judge or a civil servant (as well as a researcher)
leans on her or his own views of the values. It is equally true that there is
no algorithmic method of drawing the boundary. But the methodologically
important difference has to do with the researcher's own moral judgement
and the morally relevant legal and legally relevant moral values. Where is
this distinction? Should or could a researcher as a researcher be commited
to such values, or should she adopt a neutral attitude towards factors
beyond the professional cognitive goal?

III. The Copernican Revolution

The first step towards the rational and the reasonable concerns the over-
all goal of knowledge, and the way it could be achieved. The main meth-
odological import of Kant's Copernican Revolution was that Reason is
316 Matti Sintonen

guided by certain normative constraints which see to it that a body of justi-

fied true belief (expressed in and by certain concepts and laws) must, to
count as knowledge and not just "bare" awareness, fulfil certain architech-
tonic or structural requirements. A good heuristic idea is to think about a
candidate set of beliefs in analogy with some systemic features of a build-
ing or an organism: just as it is impossible to remove or even alter at will
individual items or features of a building or an organism, so it is impossi-
ble to mold and stretch isolated knowledge claims at will, for knowledge is
a totality. Ideally a body of knowledge should be complete (there should be
no gaps) and harmonious: the system should be coherent, but all parts
should also fit in a more demanding "intelligible" pattern imposed by
reason.

To appreciate this systematic constraint, consider a possible parallel

between the cognitive realm and the more obviously normative moral and
legal realms. In natural law moral principles impose certain minimum con-
straints on positive law: not just anything passed by a legislature can count
as valid law. Similarly, there is the architechtonic of Pure Reason which
imposes systemic requirements on unrelated pieces of information before
they can constitute knowledge. This view explains some of what Kant had
in mind when he wrote that "...reason has insight only into that which it
produces after a plan of its own" (Kant 1968, Β xiii). The gist of the trans-
cendental method and the entire "Copernican Revolution" is, on this inter-
pretation, in the active contribution of the mind. But the requirement of
intelligibility and reasonableness is just one part of the Reason's plan. The
second part refers to the process in which knowledge is sought, to a proce-
dure for picking out a more specific realization of the promissory plan.
This process, Kant thought, was that of interrogating Nature. Interestingly,
also this process of putting questions is given an activist reading. It does
not amount to passive registering, and indeed the Copernican quotation con-
tinues as follows: Reason "must not allow itself to be kept, as it were, in
nature's leading-strings". Rather, when it approaches Nature it must do so,
not "in the character of a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher
chooses to say, but of an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to
answer questions which he has himself formulated." (Kant 1933, Β xiii -
xiv, italics added). When Kant then elaborates on the idea of putting ques-
tion to Nature it becomes obvious that the mind not just anticipates but
also commands Nature.

This way of viewing inquiry is particularly appropriate for legal dog-

matic study. It is not possible here to elaborate all of its attractions. But
two of them can be mentioned. Aarnio explicitly thinks that legal dog-
matics is an interpretative or a hermeneutic science which is guided by the
strive towards a unified coherent and comprehensive view (see especially
 Fact and Value: The Copernican Revolution in the Sciences of Man 317

Aarnio 1977). Clearly also this was one of the most important methodologi-
cal features of 19th Century hermeneutics. Secondly, interpretation is not
just holistic reconstruction, but reconstruction which can be understood as a
dialogue with a text (or with fragments of texts). Although Kant speaks
about the question-answer method as a method of putting question to
Nature, the interlocutor can equally well be a text. And even if one could
deny Nature this holistic feature, the realm of linguistic and non-linguistic
meaning conforms to that model.

IV. From Classical to Analytic Hermeneutics

The result of the first stage of the Copernicaln Revolution is an activist

view of the content of knowledge and its acquisition, an explication of
what it is rational and reasonable to believe. The goal, a body of knowl-
edge, which is "in conformity with a single principle", reflects the mind's
plan. But, it can be argued, Kant's a priori forms of absolute space and
time, as well as the categories like causality, are not the forms and cate-
gories through which "objects" permeated by linguistic meaning and eva-
luative standpoints are conceived. True, the aesthetic requirements of sys-
tematicity on the highest level of Pure Reason impose teleology and (pur-
posive) harmony on all knowledge, but they are not specifically geared to
explicating the teleology and harmony of thought and action.
Aarnio gives a succinct characterization of the dispute between positi-
vism and hermeneutics in the sciences of man, suggesting that the various
schools of hermeneutics arose from the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian
background and advocated an independent method of understanding. But to
understand the roots of these movements we need to go further back to
Fichte who continued the line which Kant started but gave it a new twist.
The Copernican Revolution not just revolutionizes our view of knowledge
in which knowledge was seen to reflect an external world of real things,
it also makes a challenge to an epistemogical subject which attempts to
represent things from a purely cognitive perspective. The first stage of the
revolution thus reverses the priority of the mind and the world, or actually,
it embraces both the dogmaticist's idea of an independantly existing world
of real things and the idealist's view that mind is the center around which
the world revolves.
Fichte shared Kant's view that the human mind cannot but aim at a uni-
fied view of the world, and the Kantian aspiration to build up a world view
which is first purged from contingency. Thus science must be based on
reliable first principles, and they must form a unified totality. But his radical
departure consisted in effecting the second stage of the revolution by resort-
ing to doing and activity as fundamental principles (Fichte 1982, see also
318 Matti Sintonen

Wood 1991). His project whas not the ego-centric project of his predessers,
Kant included. It turned out first of all that his "science of science" which
was to provide all foundations is built upon an active agent in the Kantian
sense. Conscioussness is not a passive inner stage on which empirical
experiences dance in accordance with the rigid choreography of causality,
but rather an active reconstructing I.

This I as such is not a crucial step away from Kant, because it's founda-
tions were precisely in Kant's critical philosophy. The crucial thing is that
this I was understood by Fichte to be not just an epistemological subject.
Kant's critics, from Dilthey to the other classical defenders of the sui gen-
eris nature of the sciences if man, saw Kant as presenting an over-historical
and essentially epistemological subject, a subject which hovers above emo-
tions, feelings, and other human practical qualifications. Even Kant's moral
philosophy can be viewed as an essentially cognitive project from this
point of view. Though it postulates free will it is, for the tradition critisiz-
ing him, too thin. In this view the epistemological subject, and not the
living, experiencing, and willing agent, is the starting point.

Fichte was a chief architect of this critical sentiment. The first principle
of science and all experience was the acting I. Any content of conscious-
ness presupposes consciousness or awareness of the I, so that knowing and
other cognitive stages are reflective from the very beginning. But in ideal-
ism "all acts of consciousness are not just knowing but also doing and
thinking, and acting cannot be separated from one another the way dogma-
tism presupposes." (Fichte 1982, 21).

It is clear that idealism understood this way sets itself against the Carte-
sian tradition and anticipates many of the fundamental features of pragmati-
cism, phenomenology and hermeneutics (see Wood 1991). The knowing
subject builds the world essentially from it's own point of view, but cannot
do so in isolation, without positing a world (or worlds) of things and, even
more importantly, other free agents. The world of things, to the extent we
can think about such a world, is nothing for us if it is not a result of consti-
tutive activity of the I, and the consciousness is not a monad which needs
windows to the outer world. Now if acting presupposes not just the exis-
tence of a world of things but of a world of other actors, the enterprise of
knowledge is social from the start. Then the consciousness is in the outer
world, amongst things and other acting subjects from the very beginning.

We can now see what implications this view has for the rational and the
reasonable, especially in the realm of legal theory. In the interpretation of
man the rational includes not just the canons of L-rationality but also the
principles of free communication. This means that already the notion of
rationality extends over the dialogue with Nature to dialogue with fellow
 Fact and Value: The Copernican Revolution in the Sciences of Man 319

inquirers and citizens. Clearly, a dialogue between the I and the world of
things, or the I and other agents, is possible only if there is the kind of
epistemic and evaluative agreement on fundamental facts and values which
Aarnio requires of interpretation.
But equally importantly, at least in the sciences of man (and for Fichte,
in the natural sciences) facts and values cannot form separate worlds. If
action is the point of depature, the distinction between fact and value is a
distinction of reason. This, I surmise, would be congenial to a legal scholar
with an analytic-hermeneutic turn of mind, and indeed Aarnio (1980, 89)
emphasizes the prominent position of values in legal inquiry. And as is to
be expected, here values do not confine to the cognitive values of an indi-
vidual inquiring mind, or even to the shared cognitive values of the inter-
pretative community, but extend to moral and other non-cognitive values.
Indeed, the argument must be that one cannot even identify the legal com-
munity within which interpretation and argument takes place without orient-
ing oneself towards a set of shared values.
This brings us to a final observation about certainty in the sciences of
man. In an interesting article which anticipates his mature view of legal
rationality and reasonableness Aarnio adopts a motto from Wittgenstein's
On Certainty (Aarnio 1979, 18): " I really want to say that a language-game
is only possible if one trusts something." There is a paradox here: knowl-
edge presupposes justification, but sooner or later of chain of justification
must come to an end, to something that is not given a justification. But
how does a chain of justification come to an end? If it is in the form of
propositional evidence, it seems to have the status of the turtle that sup-
ports the elephant that supports the world. If it is non-propositional Vor-
Wissen as von Wright (1972) suggests, how could it count as evidence?
(see Sintonen 1988 where this criticism is discussed).
Now it would be unfounded to suggest any historical influence here, but
Fichte seems to have been the first to outline a plausible solution to this.
With absolutely solid first principles as the foundation his epistemology
looks squarely foundationalist in form. However, it is distinctly modern in
spirit. For fichte grounds certainty in the unity of the theoretical and practi-
cal experience, and in the primacy of the moral over the intellectual (see
Breazeale 1991). In the beginning there was an ungrounded act, and the
epistemological and the moral elements only get disentangled when the I
reflects on itself.

References

Aarnio, Aulis (1977): "Outline of a Hermeneutic Approach in Legal Theory", in

Aarnio 1983, pp. 47 -75. (Originally published in J. Pöyhönen (ed.), Suomalaista
320 Matti Sintonen

oikeusteoriaa, vol. 1, Helsinki 1977). - Aarnio, Aulis (1979): "Linguistic Philoso-

phy and Legal Theory. Some Problems of Legal Argumentation", in Aarnio 1983,
pp. 185 - 208. (Originally published in W. Krawietz, K. Opalek, A. Peczenik and A.
Schramm (eds.), Argumentation und Hermeneutik in der Jurisprudenz, Rechtsthe-
orie, Beiheft 1, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1979). - Aarnio, Aulis (1980): "Form
and Content in Law", in Aarnio 1983, pp. 7 6 - 9 3 . (Originally published in Archi-
vum Juridicum Cracoviense, Vol. XII). - Aarnio, Aulis (1983): Philosophical Per-
spectives in Jurisprudence. Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 36, Helsinki 1983. -
Aarnio , Aulis (1987): The Rational and the Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justifi-
cation. D. Reidel: Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster/Tokyo. - Breazeale, Daniel (1991):
"Why Fichte Now?", The Journal of Philosophy, vol. L X X X V I I I , No. 10, pp. 524 -
531. - Fichte, J. G. (1982): Science of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. - Kant, Immanuel (1933): The Critique of Pure Reason. London and
Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press. - Kuhn, Thomas (1970): The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. - Sintonen, Matti
(1988): "Tieto, tilanne ja tulkinta: Aarnion oikeusteoria" (Knowledge, context and
interpretation, in Finnish). Oikeus 1988, No. 2, pp. 199 - 203. - von Wright, G. H.
(1972): "Wittgenstein On Certainty", in G. H. von Wright (ed.), Problems in the
Theory of Knowledge. The Hague: Nijhoff. - Wood, Allen (1991): "Fichte's Philo-
sophical Revolution", Philosophical Topics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 1 - 34.
 THE FORMALITY OF RULES

By Robert S. Summers, Ithaca

The main questions I consider here are: What is the special importance
of rules? What is a rule? How are rules formal? How pervasive is formal-
ity in rules? These are topics I have discussed with Aulis Aarnio, and it is
for me a special privilege to be invited to contribute to a volume of essays
honoring him and his many major contributions on his sixtieth birthday.

I. The Special Importance of Rules

In any modern system of government through law, rules are to be found

everywhere. This is not difficult to explain. Rules fulfill many functions.
They figure prominently in shaping the various basic functional elements
that make up the very methodology of government through law, including:
- electoral processes
- legislatures
- institutions of private law making for contracts, wills, and the like
- courts and court hierarchies
- administrative agencies
- criteria of valid law, state-made and privately created
- bodies of state-made law
- forms of privately created law including not only rules but particular con-
tracts, wills, negotiable instruments and other creative "acts in the law"
not reducible to rules
- methodologies of interpretation, and of stare decisis
- provisions for sanctions and other implementive devices
- arrangements for a legal profession
In respect to all of the foregoing types of basic functional elements, the
role of rules is to prescribe, constitute, and regulate. Rules provide for
authority to make and apply law, establish legislatures and courts, regulate
interpretive method, and more. In some types of basic functional elements,
22 FS Aarnio
322 Robert S. Summers

e.g., discrete bodies of law, the vast bulk of the very element itself consists
mainly of rules. These bodies of rules are the main instruments for the
embodiment and implementation of problem-specific policies such as com-
munity peace, order, health, safety, and facilitation of economic activity. In
a well designed legal order, rules also serve fundamental political values
such as legitimacy of authority, democracy, freedom, and justice. Rules
serve what I call "general legal values", too, including predictability, the
dignity and efficiency of autonomous citizen self-direction under law,
equality before the law, restriction of administrative arbitrariness, and dis-
pute avoidance. Moreover, rules are typically the most prominent factor in
the organization, integration, and co-ordination of each basic type of func-
tional element within general overall techniques of the system for the crea-
tion and implementation of state-made rules, and of privately created law
such as contracts and wills. Indeed, rules organize, integrate and co-ordi-
nate the various types of basic functional elements, above, into one or more
of the following five general overall techniques for creating and implement-
ing law:
(1) the penal type of technique in which legislatures and courts prohibit
anti-social conduct, and these prohibitions along with police, prosecu-
tors, and systems of punishment operate to punish criminals and deter
would-be criminals,
(2) the grievance-remedial type of technique in which legislatures and
courts define wrongful behavior, with courts providing remedies there-
fore, and with the technique operating not only to remedy grievances,
but also to reduce their frequency and to induce private settlement of
grievance-remedial claims,
(3) the administrative-regulatory type of technique in which legislators,
courts, and administrative officials lay down standards regulating other-
wise wholesome behavior, administrators take steps, such as licensing,
designed to secure compliance with those standards, and administrators
impose sanctions on violators (which may require court action too),
(4) the public-benefit conferral type of technique in which legislatures and
public bureaucracies define substantive benefits such as education,
health care, welfare, public roadways, etc., define the classes of eligible
recipients, distribute these benefits, and secure the material means
required for such distribution (through taxation and otherwise), and
(5) the private-ordering type of technique in which private parties choose
to enter legally recognized types of consensual arrangements such as
marriages, business and other contracts, employment relations, corpo-
rate and other associations, religious and social bodies, and more, with
the law facilitating the realization of the aims of such arrangements in
various ways.
 The Formality of Rules 323

While rules play the largest roles in constituting law's methodology, rules
are not the only building blocks and instrumentalities of the law. Among
other legal means are various types of precepts besides rules. These include
broad grants of discretionary power, principles, maxims, general orders,
decrees, rulings, and the like. Moreover, as the above listing of types of
basic functional elements indicates, other important elements that are signifi-
cantly formal, e.g., institutions and processes, also figure in a functioning
legal order. So, too, do essentially non-formal elements such as official per-
sonnel, various material resources, and language. Without these other ele-
ments, legislatures and courts simply could not be operational. But both
quantitatively and qualitatively, rules are the most fundamental formal build-
ing blocks of the law's methodology for the creation and implementation of
state-made law, and the main instrumentalities of that very law itself. And
very much the same is true with respect to the creation and implementation
of privately created law, except that many of its specific creations, e.g.,
contracts, wills, negotiable instruments, and the like are themselves not
rules and are not straightforwardly reducible to rules.
The foundational nature, the functions, the ubiquity, and the overall
importance of rules in law justifies special emphasis on them. Indeed, with
rules already all over the law, then, insofar as rules are formal, this alone
goes far to establish that government through law is formal in character.

II. The Essential Preceptual Formality of Rules

Most laws in modern systems take the form of rules rather than, say, the
form of maxims, or principles, or broad grants of discretion, or orders or
rulings. At this juncture, I will not attempt to differentiate the "rule form"
from these other forms. For now, it is sufficient to stress that rules are pre-
ceptual. The conceptual essence of a precept is a general prescription of
action or forbearance, or a general prescription of power, or a general pre-
scription of some feature of an institution, process or other basic functional
element. The basic form that a rule takes is thus that of a general prescrip-
tion. This form or concept of a rule as a general prescription is a well
established usage of the word "rule" in our language. I will, however, give
a name to this form that is not itself so well established, namely, "precep-
tual" form. The rule form is preceptual.
Now it may be objected that even if rules are formal in the sense that
they satisfy the essential form of precepts, there is nothing of any special
significance in this because all things and all abstract objects must be
formal in this sense, otherwise, they would not be such things or such
objects. But even if this were so, there are important differences between
the essential form of precepts in the law, and the essential forms of other
22*
324 Robert S. Summers

phenomena of the law such as institutions, processes, entities, and method-

ologies. As I will show, analyses of such differences can cast light. More-
over, rules themselves are formal in ways e.g., simplicity and mode of
expression, that do not pertain at all to their essential form, and analysis of
these differences casts light, too.

III. The Affirmatively Formal Features of Rules

I use the word "formal" in accord with standard English usage, not some
personal theory. Thus, I use "formal" as an adjective, and as an adjective,
it is largely an expression that derives its various meanings from a corres-
ponding noun, i.e., "form", in its various meanings. One primary meaning
of the noun "form" is "of or pertaining to the essence of a thing or idea". I
call this primary meaning "essential form", and will differentiate it from
other recognized meanings of the noun "form". Every thing or idea has to
take some essential form to be a thing or idea of that kind. Thus, a rule, to
be an ordinary legal rule, must at least have prescriptive content, as above.
It must also be sufficiently general, complete, and definite. These are the
essential form, the defining features, of "ruleness".
We frequently use the word "formal" to characterize whatever contrasts
with content, particularly substantive policy content. Here the meaning of
formal might be said to be negative or contrastive rather than affirmative.
That is, the formal is whatever is not substantive policy content, or what-
ever does not pertain to specialized legal personnel, or whatever does not
consist of necessary material resources, etc. Thus this negative or contras-
tive meaning may vary somewhat with the nature of what is negated or
ruled out in the particular context. But "formal" also has affirmative mean-
ings in our language that go beyond this negative or contrastive meaning of
formal, and in this essay, I wish to stress these affirmative meanings. The
various features of rules, defining and non defining, are also attributes of
many abstract objects generally, and these are recognized independently in
our language as affirmatively formal on their own and as such. The fea-
tures of many abstract objects, including rules, are affirmatively character-
ized as configurative or structural. Such features just are, in our language,
also recognized as formal.

Thus, consider the attribute of prescriptiveness, or of completeness, or of

definiteness or of generality. These are defining features of rules and so
formal in the sense they pertain to the essential form of rules. But each of
these is not merely a defining feature. Nor does each merely display some
negation of, or contrast with content. These features affirmatively configure
or structure the content of particular rules, and so are affirmatively formal
on their own and as such. That is, prescriptiveness for example, is not
 The Formality of Rules 325

formal merely in the negative sense that it contrasts, say, with the content
of whatever is prescribed. This is because prescriptiveness is a positive,
i.e., affirmative attribute of a rule (or other precept). It is positive or affir-
mative in the sense that it exists and can be characterized independently of
any relation of contrast that it may have with an "opposite". It thus is a
feature that is actually present, as distinguished from merely lacking or fail-
ing to express an opposed quality.
Moreover, when we say a given rule is formal, we may mean something
in addition to, or other than, that it displays the minimum essential form of
a rule. We may even mean something far more than that the rule is just
barely over the threshold of "ruleness". Often we mean that the rule is
appropriately formal, that is, appropriately prescriptive, appropriately gen-
eral, complete, and definite, and appropriately expressed, given the policies
or values to be served. When we mean by "formal" that a rule is appropri-
ately formal, we are not saying that the rule is formal in a second sense
wholly independent of the essential form of a rule. Although, appropriate
form is not the same as minimum essential form, appropriate form usually
presupposes minimum essential form, at least for most recognized and
established phenomena of the law.
Yet appropriate form often goes far beyond minimum essential form, and
the scope for elaboration and variation in such appropriate form is often
considerable, depending on the policies and values at stake. These elabora-
tions and variations often show themselves in variations in degrees of gen-
erality, completeness, and definiteness. But these elaborations and varia-
tions may show themselves as well in formal features of rules that are
simply continuous with defining features, or, indeed are not so continuous
and thus not really defining features at all. For example, the elaboration of
a degree of definiteness in a rule, a major formal attribute itself defining in
nature, may go beyond that required for ruleness, given what is required if
the rule is appropriately to serve its end. Still, because such definiteness is
continuous with the definiteness minimally required as a defining attribute
of the essential form of a rule, we may still characterize this extra-essential
degree of definiteness as formal precisely because of this continuity, and
thereby adhere to the ordinary linguistic usage of the essential form of
rules.

But, as I have indicated, such extra-essential form that is continuous with

essential form, though over its threshold requirements, can also be charac-
terized as formal in a second familiar, and affirmative, sense of the word,
well recognized in what in our language is also a commonly used noun
form of "form", namely "configuration". Thus "formal" in our language
also means: "of or pertaining to configuration". Definiteness configures
content. Definiteness is formal because it is a defining feature of the essen-
326 Robert S. Summers

tial form of a rule. But definiteness is also formal because configurative,

and this configurative feature of definiteness is continuous with the mini-
mum definiteness required for essential form, even when elaborated beyond
that minimum. Generality is similarly configurative, too. So is complete-
ness. Thus, there is great scope for elaboration and variation here beyond
minimal essential form, depending on the policies and values to be served.
A rule with given degrees of definiteness, completeness, and generality has
one configuration, whereas a rule with other degrees of these attributes may
be said to have another, very different configuration.
It follows that a given rule with attributes that go beyond its defining
requisites can be characterized as formal in two standard senses: (1) as formal
in the sense that it satisfies the requisites of essential form, and (2) as formal
in the sense that its formal attributes are configurati vely formal. Of course, up
to their "essential form" threshold, such attributes are both formal in the
sense that they are defining features of essential form and in the sense that
they are configurative. A feature is nonetheless configurative for also being
defining. But since rules, in their formal attributes, typically go beyond essen-
tial form, it can be said that rules generally just are formal in essential form
and formal in configuration, without any possibility of double counting what-
soever. It is not difficult to explain why many formal attributes of rules go
beyond that required by the minimum essential form of rules. This is required
if the policies and values at stake are to be duly served.
There are still other major varieties of form here - ones not continuous
with attributes of the essential form of rules. That is, there are other major
respects in which all ordinary legal rules are formal. Thus, all rules exhibit
an internal formal feature of content, namely that of being either simple,
not so simple, somewhat complex, or very complex. This third sense of
"formal" derives from another standard meaning of "form" in our language,
namely "of or pertaining to structure". The degree of simplicity or com-
plexity of the structure of a rule is not an attribute continuous with any
defining feature of a rule, and is thus form in a sense quite independent of
essential form and configurative form. It is also affirmatively characterize-
able and so does not depend for its meaning on some contrast with an
opposite. Appropriateness of a degree of simplicity depends, too, on the
policies and values at stake.

Rules vary greatly in the degrees to which they display affirmatively

formal attributes of configuration or structure and these differences can be
described as differences in degrees of prescriptiveness, completeness, defi-
niteness, and generality. Rules can also be evaluated for the appropriateness
of the degrees of such attributes that they have. This is also true of other,
non-defining, formal features of rules such as simplicity which likewise
configure and structure rules. Sometimes the positive law of a society itself
 The Formality of Rules 327

prescribes certain formal attributes in rules. For example, a body of consti-

tutional law may require that rules have a certain generality, or a certain
degree of definiteness (without which they may be void for vagueness).

The law itself has its own special external forms in which the content of
particular rules is contained: written constitutions, statutes, common law,
custom, and more. The English language also includes this "vessel" or
"container" conception of form. Yet, our language lacks any special term
for this type of formality. Here, I choose to call it "encapsulatory". This is
a fourth sense of "formal", in addition to whatever pertains to essential
form, to configuration, and to simplicity or complexity of internal structure.
It should be evident that encapsulatory formality is distinctive, too. Also,
rules differ in encapsulatory formality, and these differences, too, can be
characterized in affirmative terms, and not merely by way of contrast with
whatever is not formal about a rule, such as its policy content. Moreover,
there are often good reasons to encapsulate the formal attributes and the
subject-matter content of rules in one form, e.g., statutory, rather than
another. Indeed, sometimes the positive law of a society itself requires that
a given type of substantive policy content of rules, say criminal prohibi-
tions, be encapsulated in a given form, namely, the statutory form.

There is also support in our linguistic practice for characterizing as

formal various facets of the mode of expression of a rule as relatively
formal or not so formal. This is a fifth affirmative sense of formal. Thus,
we would say a rule is relatively or even highly formal in mode of expres-
sion if it is in all respects explicit, is expressed in writing, is expressed in
fixed verbal ("canonical") form, incorporates a specialized, highly determi-
nate, and consistent vocabulary, is precisely and compactly set forth, and is
rigorously organized in parts and in whole. In addition, such high expres-
sional formality will often incorporate what might be called justified fiat,
i.e., bright lines of quantity, time, or the like.

Again, while our language plainly recognizes the foregoing "expres-

sional" use of "formal", it does not have any special name to refer to it,
and I have here chosen, simply, to call it "expressional" formality. It
should be evident that rules vary greatly in their expressional formality, and
that in particular instances there can be good reasons for this. It should also
be evident that this type of formality is susceptible of affirmative descrip-
tion and characterization. Further, expressional formality overlaps and inter-
acts with other varieties of formality, too. But it is not reducible to any of
these. In particular, it is not identical with encapsulatory formality. A given
rule can be encapsulated in a given form, yet have a relatively low degree
of expressional formality, e.g., it may not be very explicit, or it may utilize
inconsistent vocabulary, and so on.
328 Robert S. Summers

IV. Definiteness as an Affirmatively Formal

Attribute of a Rule - an Excursus

Definiteness is a configuratively formal attribute of rules. It configures

content. It is affirmatively characterizeable, and plays indispensable roles in
resolving and refining the policy and other content of rules. I now briefly
elaborate on definiteness as one major configuratively formal attribute of
rules. Appropriate form by way of high degrees of definiteness in rules has
long been an object of interest in the theory of law. Plato remarked that
" . . . unless you are definite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a
language that can become law." Definiteness is especially important when
the policy involved depends for its implementation on citizen self-applica-
tion of rule.
But first, what is definiteness? There is more to it than I have so far
indicated. It may be defined as a degree of specificity and precision in the
content of a rule. As Plato suggested, some minimal degree of definiteness
is required even for a rule to exist at all. But more than this minimum is
often required if a rule is to serve relevant policies and values.
Although definiteness in a rule is manifest in the content of the rule,
definiteness should not be equated with that content. Rules of very different
content can be judged to have roughly the same degree of definiteness.
Thus one may isolate and analyze the degree of definiteness of a rule inde-
pendently of the content in which it is manifest. Of course, a change in the
degree of definiteness of a rule will change its substantive content to some
extent. Rule A requiring drivers merely to drive reasonably can be changed
to Rule Β requiring drivers not to exceed 65mph. Rule Β has a higher
degree of definiteness, and a somewhat different content. Changes in the
degree of any formal attribute of a rule necessarily manifest themselves in
a change of content (a type of complementarity). This also demonstrates
the "configurative power" of definiteness.

A more definite content is, of course, not necessarily better policy con-
tent. It might even be worse. But, in general, the more definite the content
of a proposed rule, the more it becomes fit as an object for rational scru-
tiny by lawmakers and others, and the less likely bad content will survive
such scrutiny. Here, too, a sensitivity to appropriate form can affect quality
of content in the law creating process. That is, good form may beget good
content.
The configuratively formal attributes of definiteness and completeness
are also not the same. Of course, an incomplete rule in a given respect will
also be indefinite in that respect. We may define complete as: "Having all
its parts or elements; entire; full." A complete rule in this sense could still
be indefinite. The rule requiring drivers not to exceed 65 mph is both com-
 The Formality of Rules 329

plete and definite. But although a rule requiring drivers to drive reasonably
would in the foregoing sense be complete, it would not be definite. Nor is
definiteness the same as the formal attribute of generality. A rule can be
highly definite yet lack appropriate generality. Similarly, definiteness and
simplicity are different. A rule can be highly definite yet not simple at all.
But often only the more definite rule, among the possible alternatives, is at
all plausible as a means to the relevant policies or values.

V. Organizational and Other Formality of Rule Content

Many rules have substantive policy content. Criminal prohibitions against

theft and homicide do. So do rules regulating the use of the roadways. So
do rules against unfair trade practices. So do rules invalidating unconscion-
able contracts. And on and on. But there are also many important types of
rules in any modern legal system that do not have such substantive policy
content, too. This is true of the many rules that prescribe features of the
basic functional elements of the sysetm such as institutions, processes,
methodologies, and entities. Thus we have rules specifying the composi-
tion, powers, and procedures of legislatures, rules defining courts and court
procedures, rules on the separation of powers, rules specifying criteria of
validity, and so on. The many rules that organize, integrate, and co-ordinate
these basic functional elements within the law's overall techniques for
creating and implementing law do not have substantive policy content,
either. A l l such rules are organizational, or in other ways methodological,
in content. This is a formal and positive feature of such rules, affirmatively
so. Thus, much in the law is entirely formal in attributes and in subject-
matter content. This usage of formal to refer to organizational or methodo-
logical content is also borne out in our lexicons, for they recognize the
organizational and the methodological as formal, names I will use to desig-
nate this sixth major type of (content) formality. Of course a given set of
rules or even a given rule may have some formal organizational or other
methodological content and also some substantive policy content at the
same time. Positive law itself often prescribes organizational or other meth-
odological content, as where, for example, a constitution requires that a
given type of judicial procedure be followed before a state sanction can be
imposed on a citizen, or a governmental benefit denied to a citizen.

VI. The Pervasiveness of Formality in Rules

Rules pervade the law. Formality pervades rules. Thus the same rule
will, on analysis, at the same time display:
330 Robert S. Summers

(1) preceptual formality (as its essential form)

(2) negative or contrastive formality
(3) configurative and structural formality
(4) encapsulatory formality
(5) expressional formality, and
(6) in many rules, formality of organizational or other methodological con-
tent.
Much of this formality will be manifest on the face of the rule. Of
course, the formality on the face of a rule may vary from the degree of
formality manifest in the rule as applied. That is, the formality of a "rule in
action" may differ from the formality of the rule as authoritatively formu-
lated initially. Moreover, it may not be enough to consult the face of a rule
to determine the degree of its formality even as initially formulated, for
adjacent rules may modify it.
There are good reasons for the pervasiveness of formality in rules, and in
the law generally. I have merely suggested some of these here. In further
work, I will develop these theses at length.

References

Plato: The Laws, in 2 The Dialogues of Plato, 504, 529 (B. Jowett trans. 1937). -
Summers, Robert S.: "The Technique Element in Law," 59 Calif. L. Rev. 733
(1971). - Summers, Robert S.: Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory ch. 8
(1982). - Summers, Robert S.: The Formal Character of Law, 25 Rechtstheorie 125
(1994).
 LAW, LEGAL DOGMATICS, PROGRESS

By Sebastian Urbina, Palma de Mallorca

In his very last main work, Reason and Authority, (not even published
when I write this paper) Professor Aulis Aarnio deals with basic points of
legal theory although there are some of them of special interest for the
author, that is, legal science or legal dogmatics, the interplay between it
and society and whether there is progress in this task. The subtitle of his
treatise give us a good idea of its aims, A Treatise on the Dynamic Para-
digm of Legal Science. The core is dynamics. Is there any change or pro-
gress at all in this field of knowledge ?

In Part I Introductory Remarks, we can already find, in its Prologue, a

starting idea about what law is. He says, "We think that law is a compro-
mise between justice and predictability, but what kind of a compromise.
This is also the core of the present contribution: How to build up a reason-
able balance between these two." It should be emphasized two more basic
ideas, those of 'justification' and 'control.' As he says, "There is then par-
ticularly one demand that issues above all others. I will call it the demand
on the justification of a decision ... The demand on justifying a decision
grows from society itself and as such it governs all modern Western law."
The other basic idea is related to the title of the first chapter, Reason and
Auhtority, and stems from the crisis of authority in our modern societies.
This crisis exalts 'control' as one of the key elements of democracy itself,
"control of the justification of decision is then just about the only healthy
but also the effective way of control. And it is exactly this that issues the
challenge to the lawyers of modern society." Then, it is clearly emphasized
the idea of a balance between law and justice, in the sense that a legal
interpretation would be properly justified when it moves away either from
blind loyalty to law or moves away from bare equity.

Chapter 2. What is Law ? deals specially with advantages and disadvan-

tages of form and substance in law or formal and substantial law. Other-
wise, he tries to tell what law is. As he says, "law is not a mere power
order nor exclusively a system of norms." He seems to take distance from
any reductionist view. It could be said that he moves away from realistic,
critical legal studies and pure normativistic views. But not only law cannot
332 Sebastian Urbina

be seen in this either-or way but, moreover, law has a constant threat, " I f
law does not adapt itself to the rate of change, it will become a break on
progress." But granted that the legislative power is always too heavy to
fulfil in time that task a new problem stems, "Therefore, a tension easily
arises between the enacted norms and the prevailing values inherent in the
social reality."
Again we find a new tension, that of formal and substantial law, "The
tension between stability and elasticity has received many manifestations in
legal language. Some speak about the collision of formal and substantive
law... The formal rule of law-ideology emphasizes specially predictabil-
i t y . . . The idea of elasticity emphasizes the substantial rule of law-thought."
This tension can be seen, also, from the perspective of legal reasoning and
in that case, "the tension between rigidity and elasticity is intertwined also
with the notion of entrenchement. The more formalistic and stiff the reason-
ing is, the more it is rule based (or rule oriented), whereas the elastic style
of reasoning follows the pattern of particularistic thinking (all things con-
sidered-model)." Here Professor Aarnio criticizes F. Schauer's view of the
particularistic model because in its pure form, the latter says, it would
mean that the rules do not have any more an authoritative role in legal
reasoning. But Professor Aarnio contends that rules in the particularistic
model are not empty, as Schauer seems to defend.
The following words of the author sum up the wide and complex analy-
sis about form and substance, "the advantages of forms and formalities sup-
port, at least in principle, the formal rule of law-ideology due to the fact
that they increase the predictability in society. On the average, form guar-
antees it better than the absence of formal requirements that civil behaviour
as well as the activities of the authorities are predictable... Yet, matters do
have their reverse side as well. Advantages can turn into disadvantages if
forms are followed restrictedly ..." Again we can see that tension and bal-
ance are two key points in Aarnio's work. But, in any case, we should not
talk about form and substance in general because, "The usability of form,
it's advantages and disadvantages vary according to the branches of law
and the types of legal transactions. It is not possible to formulate a uniform
principle of regulation." Professor Aarnio concludes that, "forms are part of
the 'hard core' of law. But in the same way as in other matters as well,
form is a good servant but a bad master."

While rejecting deconstructivist and post-modernist approaches, because

legal dogmatics has a social task to fulfil in modern societies, finishes the
chapter with a hope, "But what one would, in particular, like to be coming
is a new type of lawyers, concious of it's task, socially oriented and cap-
able of seeing behind the statutes." This is a new sample of his dynamic
view of the legal enterprise.
 Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress 333

Chapter 3. Law in Crisis? deals, basically, with 'democracy' and 'law'.

A central point of interest is the distinction made by Habermas between the
Lebenswelt (the world of life) and the system. So, accepting Habermas
view Aarnio claims that, "The system has pervaded the world of life, colo-
nized it and thus jeopardized the natural interaction between people." It is
not clear what 'natural interaction' could mean because it would suppose to
have a unique and share understanding of what is natural and what rela-
tions are natural. In any case, two aspects should be emphasized, the
manipulative plublicity and the bureaucratization. The aspects above men-
tioned produce certain tendency crisis, as Tuori says, affecting, the inner
rationality of law, the object of law and its legitimacy. One important
aspect of the crisis is what Aarnio calls 'incrementalism' and this has, basic-
ally, two trends, "the citizens have, relatively seen, grown away from the
administration ... This tends to lead to the administrative measures having
to be accepted in society based only in their formally conforming to the
legal rules directing the administrative activity" and, on the other hand,
"the Government - partly also the Parliament - have lost a part of their
power to the official administration." Finally, again appears a fundamental
concept of this work and again we can see the tension and the balance,
because he expects than control be not just a formal one, " I f the control
welling from inside becomes impossible, one can say that law is threatened
by a crisis of legitimacy."

Chapter 4. The Dilemmas of the Interpreter , is a very short one but states
some very decisive questions. On the one hand, he claims that the doctrinal
study of the law and the judges' task is different because the latter direct
their atention to particular cases while not the former. On the other hand,
he claims that the decisive aspect is that both accept the internal point of
view as to the content of the law. When dealing with legal interpretation he
differentiates the theoretical dimension and the pragmatical one. The first
one deals with the question, How is the understanding possible? while the
latter deals with the question, What is actually understood when, for
instance, the content of a legal rule is clarified? In this connection he states
that method, in legal interpretation, allow us the following, "Instead of
truth, one has to speak about the acceptability of interpretations". In rela-
tion to the question whether we can reach knowledge or not, he states that,
"it is possible, when interpreting law, to present only better or worse justi-
fied positions (conceptions) about the content of legal rules."

Chapter 5. Levels of Understanding , analyses fundamentally the legal

system, legal domatics and, as the title says, the levels of understanding.
Aarnio warns us about the possibilities of technical skills. He believes they
are important but insufficient, " A person that only persistently stares at
details, for instance, at the analytic properties of a legal concept, keeping
334 Sebastian Urbina

on straining his eyes at them, is helpless in the terrain ... But does he know
something really lasting about the legal order? It is this, knowing the essen-
tial, that is also the problem of the sc. legal understanding." He also com-
pares two views of the legal system, the closed and the opened ones. He
rejects the first view because he believes that this view is, "put to a severe
test, when it is being applied to a concrete social reality. A closed system
only works on the condition that solution situations are repeated as similar
in such a way that they can be controlled by purely deductive means." We
have, then, to take the proper alternative to closed systems, " A system is
open to the social facts, values (moral contentions), ideologies and juridical
theories entering it from outside." Once more is clear in Aarnio's work that
it is rejected any approach that tries to be exclusive. On the contrary, the
core of the problem passes through tension between contraries and through
balance between them. Dynamics is the word.
There are, according to Aarnio, four levels of understanding the legal
order. The fourth level (basis) relates to the question, why this prerequisite
or condition of interpretation?; the third level (sources of law) relates to the
question, on what grounds it is claimed that some legal text has to be inter-
preted in this way?; the second level (system) relates to the question, what
is the systemic relation between statutues?; the first level (statutes) relates
to the question, what statutes do belong to the legal order at issue?. Hence,
first level is seen, by Aarnio, as follows, "In the top area of the pyramid,
pure description of meaning suffice as the method." This means that the
object of this first level is to know what statutes belong to the legal order.
But it is not clear how this fits with former ideas about meanings as some-
thing to be given, not found, with the ideas about balance betwen form and
substance and with the idea of good lawyer as a person looking behind the
statutes.Does he mean an exclusive formal belong? It can be doubt in so
far as he talks about a 'pure description of meaning'. Does he mean a plain
meaning?. The second level asks for the systemic relations between the sta-
tutes. The third level has legal interpretation or individualized meanings as
its essential, claiming that, here, the meanings are not found but given. If
this means that in the first level the meanings are found and in the third
level are given it not clear why he does not add a new level, that of sys-
temic relations between given meanings because he only pays attention to
systemic relations between statutes but not between legal norms. Then,
there is a fourth level. He says, "The basis of the ground floor is not only
an interpretative help. It is the prerequisite of the condition of interpretation
... Therefore, law can only be understood against this social, moral, histor-
ical background'". It is clear in Aarnio's thought that this 'bottom of the
pyramide' is not an outern element of law and legal dogmatics but some-
thing that we cannot dispense with. Is this sense, it is a necessary element
for the proper task of legal dogmatics.
 Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress 335

Part II. The Paradigm of Legal Science. In the first chapter of this
second part, Theories about Legal Science , he uses a counterpoint, Ross'
legal science, not only to show his failures but to better show Aarnio's own
point of view. "The task of the anlysis is to try and explicate what legal
dogmatics does, what it aims at, what kind of paradigm it follows, and
starting from this, to try and outline the requirements of controllability
needed by it. Although he believes that empirical legal science takes the
wrong way he sees in Ross' approach an hermeneutic stance. "Despite his
logical-positivistic starting points, the final result is to endeavour to under-
stand the content of the legal norms... Only a legal norm internalized by
the judge is binding... A l f Ross was thus a positivist in words, a hermeneu-
tician in acts."
Aarnio sees also as wrong to start from a certain definition of science
and, then, applied it to legal dogmatics. On the contrary, he believes that
legal dogmatics should be defined from inside. "The understanding of legal
dogmatics cannot be based on criteria defined outside of the actual research
practice." Another basic feature of Aarnio's work is the importance given
to the citizens and related with it the expectancy of rational controllability.
"The citizens want now and in the future to know their rights and duties,
the content of the legal rules binding on them. It is the task of legal dog-
matics to help them in this."
Chapter 2. Legal Dogmatics as a Paradigm-Based Field of Inquiry , cen-
trally and deeply analyses the object or one of the main objects of this
Treatise. He takes from Kuhn the concept of a matrix and tries to apply it
to legal dogmatics. In this respect he claims that the matrix of legal dog-
matics (at least in Nordic countries) have the following elements: first, "a
set of legal philosophical background assumptions and/or commitments,
normally implicit, very seldom explicitly expressed. As examples can be
mentioned ideas of a) the origin of law, b) the validity of legal norms (prob-
lem of the rule of recognition), c) the concept of norm and normativity, d)
the idea of rational discourse; second, Assumptions concerning ... the con-
tent of the legal order; third, Assumptions about the admissible sources;
fourth, a set of methodological rules and principles showing more or less
exactly how to proceed from legal sources to interpretation; fifth, idea that
values and evaluations do play a role in the determination of the content."
Aarnio adds that legal dogmatics cannot be identified with one of these
elements but only with all of them at the same time.

With this in mind he gives us a more precise idea of a matrix. He says,

"is a basic cognitive structure, whose variables get different solutions by
way of different paradigmatic interpretations." By paradigmatic interpreta-
tions he refers, for example, to conceptualistic jurisprudence, jurisprudence
of interests, etc, which differentiate from non paradigmatic for the exist-
336 Sebastian Urbina

enee of a practice of legal dogmatics. In any case, the author adds an

important restriction, "is that the more or less invariant element of legal
positivism in the matrix 'web' excludes some interpretations." It seems rea-
sonable to think that some interpretations are excluded but, inter alia,
because of the elasticity of the matrix (one of its advantages) it is very
difficult to decide in advance what an excluded interpretation is, except in
formal terms, like the following: those interpretations that contradict the
matrix. But even in this case it cannot be said in advance; perhaps it can
function as a kind of regulative idea, that is, just what coheres with the
accepted matrix can be accepted.
The author finishes the chapter with an important connection between
legal dogmatics and rule of law that reminds vaguely certain ideas of Lon
Fuller, "Legal dogmatics as a type of legal research seems to be essentially
at home in those societies that have come to adopt the ideology of rule of
law (Rechtsstaat)." I suppose the author want to include both the rule of
law in the formal and the substantial sense.
Part III Legal Dogmatics as an Interpretative Activity . In the first chap-
ter, Law and Language, there is a comparison between legal interpretation
and literature. He analyses the importance and consequences of semantic
ambiguity. One basic idea is that semantic ambiguity refers to a gap and
that the reader is driven to fill it for reaching a coherent whole. This pro-
cess is a reconstructive one that would be typical not only of literature but
of legal dogmatics too. It is important to note that, for the author, that
reconstruction will need outside information. What basically differentiates
legal interpretation from other interpretative tasks is that the former has
authoritative grounds, that is, legal sources and standards of reasoning.
Aarnio says that in order to differentiate law from arbitrariness we need
a model, which is a criterion, which is an ideal. With it we can strive for
its realization. That model is an 'interpretation audience' consisting solely
of persons adhering to the principle of rational discourse. But that ideal
legal community 'is essentially 'relativistic', in the sense of admitting the
possibility of disagreement about evaluations. But it seems to have prob-
lems in so far as he adds, "The essentially ideal element of that notion is
quite like the concept of truth in natural sciences." It is doubtful whether
the truth in natural sciences, which is not a relativistic model, can be 'quite
like' the essentially relativistic ideal community model.
In the second chapter, On the Philosophical Background of the Treatise,
in relationship to Hermeneutics, the author gives us a long and deep expla-
nation of its features and bets for Analytic Hermeneutics which, "is not
satisfied with the metaphoric speech about understanding but tries also to
define the conceptual basis as precise as possible." When analysing lan-
guage, (having in mind, basically, the second Wittgenstein) he says, "Here
 Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress 337

we also met the crucial question of this treatise: What is to justify a per-
fectly language-related statement as the legal dogmatic interpretation of a
statute? The interpreter is moving all the time inside the language without
having a possibility to test the interpretation by reference to the empirical
reality." But this crucial point seems to have some difficulties of fitness
with a former claim, "When the legal text under scrutiny is laden with
semantic ambiguity ... the intepreter has to seek for the information needed
from outside." If the legal intepreter has, sometimes, to take information
from outside, either it is taken in at random way or in a testing way. It is
reasonable to suppose that the latter is the correct way although a corre-
spondence view is, rightly, excluded by the author.

Language, following Wittgenstein, cannot be private because, "Verbal

intercourse is possible if the participants in a language-game share some
common cultural background." At the same time, we cannot doubt every-
thing, we have to take for granted certain things. In this vein justification
must have some terminal point. This question leads us to foundations of
knowledge. "The terminal points precede experience and the knowledge
based on experience." But, where do they come from? As he says, "These
foundations are not given to us by our everyday experience and neither are
they realized by inner intuition. They are given to us." The foundations of
knowledge (or of a fragment of knowledge) seems to be equated to lan-
guage granted that, "Language is a thing given to us. Our conception of
reality does change continuously as we learn new things... But all the time
we have to acept something of what is given as certain so as to be able to
doubt in the first place and to acquire new knowlede through doubt." It
seems to be a problem here, because it is claimed that 'foundations are not
given to us by our every day experience' but it is also claimed that 'our
conception of reality does change continuously as we learn new things.' If
a conception of reality is a foundation or a part of it, and if we change that
conception as we learn new things, how is it that these foundations are
given to us not by our everyday experience? If our everyday experience
and our inner intuition do not play a role in it, how are foundations given
to us and how do they change?

Another interesting matter relates to the task of legal philosopher. It is

claimed that a legal philosopher cannot tell the legal participants what they
should do. If he wants to do so he has to participate too, and as a partici-
pant he can do that normative task. But it is also stated that, "yet, the task
of the legal philosopher is a reconstructivist one." But I would say, on the
one hand, that a legal philosopher can remain in his own chamber and
write from the internal point of view, which is the point that allows to
make normative claims; on the other hand, how a legal philosopher can do
a reconstructivist task without implying normative claims?
23 FS Aarnio
338 Sebastian Urbina

Values is another very basic concept and problematic too. It is claimed

that values, are "attached to our form of life... They are no rational in
nature... We simply make choices that we then justify in the secondary
language-games when needed and so required - if we are rational." It
seems like we 'naturally' make choices because these choices are an
expression of our attachment to a certain form of life and then we would
try to rationally justify them. But either these choices are 'natural' and
need not to be justified or they are not natural and have to be justified. In
the latter case, we can be blamed for those choices and we can give rea-
sons pro and con. The author supposedly tries to place values in a vague
intermediate room between reason and feelings. They are neither. They
seem to be rationalizations of 'basic choices' although it is not clearly
stated what they are, at least here and now.

When dealing with the problem of Legal Fictions the author tries to clar-
ify the Ontology of Law. In this respect he says, "In order to understand
them, the outside observer must necessarily have a hermeneutic grip to the
subject-matter in the same sense that Peter Winch so deeply has pointed to.
The 'outsider' also has to 'share' beliefs with the members of the commu-
nity. Otherwise an adequate understanding would not be possible ... here
lies the core of the problem: the difference between the internal and the
external point of view disappears. The outside observer cannot interpret the
modes of behaviour without the internal aspect." I recall here the task of
the legal philosopher. A legal philosopher (in Finland, in Spain) is a partici-
pant. He need not to be a judge or a lawyer. Then, it is not only that the
difference between external and internal point of view disappears, as he
says in relation to an outside observer, it is that the legal philosopher is not
an outside observer and can make normative claims even from his cham-
ber. In relation to the Ontology of Law there is not a simple view, Aarnio
says, because, "Our conception of law as well as other language-games
played in legal terms are a dimension of this common but in many ways
complicated world view. In this very sense, it is impossible to formulate a
simple and easily understandable ontology of law." In this repect the author
settles the problematic claim that "our shared beliefs are based on common
primitive acts, not on linguistic conventions." Perhaps he maintains that
this basement is a kind of bodily support.

In chapter III, On the Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics , the author

divides the practical propositions in four subgroups: 1) norms (commands,
etc), 2) Persuasive sentences (recommendations, manipulative expressions,
etc), 3) expressive sentences (expressions of attitudes, dispositions, etc), 4)
standpoints (contentions) which may be, for instance, value standpoints or
norms standpoints. Aarnio adds that only the standpoints are justified and
they will be his main concern. Nevertheless, he believes that the possible
 Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress 339

"rightness" of a standpoint is only relative. That is, "it is possible to pre-

sent two or more well justified norm standpoints for the same problem of
interpretation." The next step of the author is to go forward towards society
which is a characteristic feature of this treatise, based on "dynamics". In
this respect the possible "rightness cannot be met in the standpoint itself
but, "the wider acceptability the standpoint has the greater societal value it
has as an intepretation of the valid law." The author claims that the accept-
ability is an ideal measure for evaluating and criticizing the real interpreta-
tive task and the real efficacy.
Aarnio divides the norms into Regulative (how the king should be check-
mated) and Constitutive (determine a certain piece of wood as a soldier).
For practical purposes, Constitutive norms are often divided into three main
groups: competence norms, procedural norms and legal definitions. Never-
theless, the author warns us that, "the following tripartition is thus not an
exhaustive catalogue of legal constitutive norms but primarily a practical
specification." It should be emphasized that, in the author's view, some
other norms are very important in the modern law, for example, elastic
norms and goal norms. Although it is not my concern here to comment, at
length, Aarnio's thought, I want to underline the importance of that conclu-
sion, "it seems that in the Welfare State the traditional regulation of rights
and duties is being displaced by weighing, goal and resource norms."
In relationship to the validity of legal norms, Aarnio takes distance from
certain views, like von Wright's or Alchourrón and Bulygin's, who prefer
to speak about existence of norms instead of validity. In this respect he is
closer to Wroblewski and Summers. The author distinguishes between sys-
temic or formal validity, efficacy and acceptability. Not only supports this
multifaceted validity concept but criticizes those who have tried to monopo-
lize one of its dimensions. One of the most famous case is Kelsen's "Pure
theory of law". Contrarily to these opinions and deeply rooted in the ordi-
nary language he says, "in the ordinary language there are several ways
(forms) to deal with validity. It depends on the context which one is the
most adequate way to present the validity problematics." But even claiming
that we should not monopolize these dimensions of validity, Aarnio decides
for justificatory procedure and axiological validity because this would be
the most significant aspect. As he says, "acceptability as the basic concept
is also important in another sense. It makes possible to criticize the sys-
temic valid and effective norms. Acceptability is thus tightly connected to
the dynamics of law."
The important distinction between principles and rules is stated by
Aarnio following F. Laporta's view. In this respect, he says, "1) principles
do not provide concluding or definitive reasons for a solution as rules do,
but only prima facie reasons, 2) principles have a dimension of weight or
23*
340 Sebastian Urbina

importance that rules do not have, 3) principles are mandates of optimiza-

tion, 4) principles have a deep affinity with values as well as with political
and moral goals." But if this is Aarnio's view, it seems a little surprising to
claim, as his main thesis, u the distinction betwen rules and principles is
only a mater of degree of generality..." Furthermore, Aarnio claims that
there is a scale from rules to principles and this scale has four subgroups,
Rules, Rule-like principles, Principle-like rules and Principles. In his view
these four segments have neither simple and clear boundaries. Otherwise, it
is not clear why Aarnio claims that freedom of speech is a Rule-like princi-
ple while the principle of equality or the principle of liberty is a Principle.
But as he says, there are no simple and clear boundaries. He also says that,
"ATC, all norm formulations are thus of similar degree of precision."
Could we say, then, that those structural differences - if any - are only
provisional because they are equalize after the ATC interpretation?
Let us see now the supposed differences betwen rules and principles,
"there is a difference between them as regards their role and use in legal
reasoning ... 1) only the rules belong to the area of deontic logic whereas
principles are used according to the logic of preference. 2) legal rules are a
matter of interpretation, legal principles that of weighing." The author him-
self believes that this is not enough a clear difference and he follows,
according to F. Laporta, claiming that, " I f we turn from a logic of the Tun-
sollen type to a logic of the Seinsollen type we can give an accurate
account of the notion of 'principles' ... principles handle the ideal state of
affairs ordering what ought to be done." Then, the idea seems to be that
principles have an 'ought to be character' while rules have an 'ought to do
character'. But in order the principles not remain just in 'ought to be' we
have to make a bridge towards an 'ought to do'. According to the author
this is a practical necessity, that is, 'if X ought to be good, it is a practical
necessity to do Y in order to achieve X ' .

I think that the above approach is not correct. Aarnio himself says that,
"the content of a principle has to be optimized in the weighing procedure
... the result of the optimization is always a rule." If this is correct we
have that an 'ought to be' always results in an 'ought to do'. Then, we
could say that principles are placed, before the procedure of weighing, in
the 'ought to be logic' realm and in the 'ought to do logic' after the proce-
dure of weighing. The result is that we can apply to principles the logic of
the Seinsollen plus the logic of the Tunsollen. More or less the same
happens with rules. Let us take the prohibition of theft in criminal law.
According to Aarnio's view this content is an action and should be placed
in the logic of the Tunsollen.

But in so far as rules are reasons for action we have to look for the
reason, and the reason is an ideal state of affairs where there is no theft.
 Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress 341

Granted that we believe that this is a desirable or good state of affairs we

have a reason to dive into a logic of action. The result is that we can apply
to rules the logic of the Tunsollen granted that there is a previous ideal
state of affairs. In both cases, principles and rules, there is an ideal state of
affairs (logic of the Seinsollen) and a posterior action (logic of the Tunsol-
len). In the case of rules (at least regulative rules) this ideal state of affairs
is implicit and their antecedent and priority are more determinate than prin-
ciples. If this is correct Aarnio's conclusion should be not, "The answer
can be given and the difficulty solved, if and only if, legal principles and
norms like them are not understood as ought to do - but, consequently, as
ought to be - norms." Otherwise, the dynamic conception of legal system
Aarnio has, can be seen again in the end of this third chapter, " I f a non-
legal principle is part of a coherent justificatory background including at
least one authoritative legal source, for example a valid statute, this prin-
ciple receives legal relevance ATC. A non-legal principle 'enters' law as a
consequences of the appropiate legal discourse."
In this regard, Professor Peczenik believes that values (and not princi-
ples) are always Seinsollen because there is not a one-to-one correspon-
dence between values and principles. Nevertheless I think that although a
value is always an ideal state of affairs and a principle can, at least some-
times, tells us, more or less vaguely, what we should do, the sense of a
value is not to remain as an ideal state of affairs but to be converted into a
social practice. Then, a difference between values and principles is not
based on the goal, to be converted in social practices, but the way to reach
this end. Principles can be more precise as far as what ought to be done is
concerned.
Chapter IV deals with, Justification of Legal Interpretations. It is again
emphasized that, in this treatise, the only relevant perspective of legal dog-
matics will be "how to make the result acceptable (legitimate)". In this
vein two aspects are underlined: that the independence of the courts does
not mean that they are completely outside of the democratic control and
that the model of the 'best justification' presupposes the concept of reason.
Two intertwined aspects are of great importance in Aarnio's view, the con-
cepts of 'rational acceptability' and 'the best possible justification'.
In relationship to rationality and rational acceptability, the author claims
that they are only ideals. When talking about rational acceptability he
deeply emphasizes that this is a culturally bound concept, that is, it is rela-
tive. On the other hand, without a concept of rationality we would be
driven to a situation of chaos where no sound legal culture is possible.
Aarnio takes distance from Haberma's views because while the latter
believes that communicative rationality attempts to guarantee a consensus
between the participants, the author claims that we cannot guarantee that
342 Sebastian Urbina

result even in an ideal speech situation. He is led to the conclusion that the
one right answer is impossible. Instead of the Habermasian consensus
Aarnio claims for compromise. This compromise is situated in a difficult
middle field between rational discourse and taste.

The title of chapter V is, On the Concept of One Right Answer. Aarnio
distinguishes between a Strong and a Weak version. According to the
former there is always a right answer, according to the latter although there
exists it cannot always - or never - be detected. He believes that does not
exist any right answer in legal reasoning. In this vein he criticizes judge
Hercules, "what about two Hercules J's, both of them being rational? In
case there were a 'Super Hercules' this would be like 'a Platonian Tyrant'
who dictates the right solution to people."

The author takes from Perelman the idea that every arguing standpoint is
directed to some audience but rejects Perelman's idea of universal audience
(as a set of judicious recipients) because it cannot guarantee unanimity as
regards values. That is, the univerdal audience is dispersed into ideal particu-
lar audiences which means, inter alia, that only inside of a certain game the
opinions can be 'objective'. Here the author states expressly that "my philo-
sophical background assumption can be called moderate conventionalist rela-
tivism." Perhaps Aarnio tries to say that 'objective' values (that is, objective
between inverted commas) is the middle ground where he places legal
values, between objective values (that do not exist) and personal preferences.
Nevertheless, if he tried to say that legal values are the realm of doxa, while
the 'true knowledge of science' would be the episteme, that is, objective
without inverted comas, I think he would be supporting a wrong view.

The moderate conventionalist relativism of the author has, nevertheless,

problems. When answering the question of why we should live together
with different conceptions of good life, he says, " I do not have any better
answer than that otherwise, at least in extreme situations, there will prevail a
chaos in society, or a dictatorship of certain opinions. To save a sound,
dynamic and safe social development, we must have rational means to
'govern' the disagreement. A fair compromise is always better than chaos or
dictatorship-like manipulation or using power." But, if democracy is not the
'right answer' I could desire another way if I have more advantages. Why
not dictatorship-like manipulation? My personal preferences may coincide
with my 'objective' good life of the dominance of the stronger. There is no
objective (or 'objective') reason able to spoil my internal reason.

This leads to the legal community (1), the realm of real acceptance and
the legal community (2), where the 'best possible justification' takes place.
This happens when "the majority of the rationally thinking members of a
legal community could accept the material justifications of the suggestion
 Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress 343

for interpretation. An interpretation standpoint is a test ball that is thrown

to the ideal legal community Two."

I think that, although the author tries to place himself between inexistent
objetive values and rejected bare tastes, he does not succeed. If I interpret
him correctly we would not have an observational test to reach the truth of
propositions but we neither have a 'correctness test'. At the same time we
need to solve legal conflicts and we want predictability. Furthermore, we
have not rational ends but we can have rational means to reach the above
conventional (and supposedly accepted) goals. We do not know whether
our majoritarian solution is correct but using something like a reductio ad
absurdum, we claim that the alternatives are chaos or dictatorship and there
is no majoritarian agreement for those solutions. Hence, although our
majoritarian solution is not the correct solution (because this does not exist)
we support it because we believe that the alternatives are worse, probably,
from a utilitarian point of view (that could be not accepted by a part of the
population). Then, we have to support a societal proposal without believing
it to be correct. Otherwise, granted that there is no complete agreement in
society we must, as Aarnio says, "have rational means to 'govern' disagree-
ment. A fair compromise is better than chaos or dictatorship." But, what
does 'fair' means here? If nothing is correct why to be 'fair'? Probably
'fair' is, more or less,what is convenient for me. Then, the only rationality
would be the rationality of convenience. But, is this enough for a fair com-
promise, understood in the old meaning?

Part IV refers to The Change and Progress in Legal Dogmatics , and the
title of its first Chapter is, Systems in Legal Dogmatics. He rightly criticizes
the concept of legal systematization developed by Alchourrón and Bulygin
because in this formal positivist view understands that "all sound normative
consequences are derived from the premises by means of deduction only."
Differently from this approaches the author emphasizes the relevance of the
legislation background. The so-called 'pre-theory of law' include a preli-
minary systematized whole and pre-systematized totalities that are like the-
ories lato sensu. Starting from that complex background, legislation formu-
lates norms that are the discoursive object of Legal Dogmatics, in the sense
of reformulating it as well as possible. Then, the author's conclusion is that
"the pre-theoretical systematization (PT) and the dogmatic systematization
(SI) give the systemic framework for lawyers to understand the norms
belonging to L, i.e, the basic system (SB)." Otherwise, interpretation of
norms belonging to SB has, in turn, a feed back effect, and praxis is the
final 'test' of any legal reformulation, which is not understood, as Alchour-
rón and Bulygin, as an equivalent but simpler system. On the contrary, the
author believes that reformulations are not identical to the original legal
system. The legal solutions given are made with the help of legal concepts
344 Sebastian Urbina

and legal purposes and that leads to a 'weak' indentity between object lan-
guage and meta-language. He finally claims that "systematization provides
the indispensable theoretical context for the juridical problem solving" but
for the indentification of the normative and factual dimensions of the juridi-
cal problem, interpretation is needed.
Chapter I I refers to The Paradigmatic Change in Legal Dogmatics.
Taking as a reference some of the Kuhn's concepts but not simply transfer-
ring them to legal thought, the author claims that "the change of the system
is significant for the progress of legal dogmatics." But he states that
although there has been internal changes in the matrix (a framework unit-
ing scientists) there has not been external changes, that is, a move from a
matrix to another. In this respect he analyses Begriffsjurisprudenz, Interes-
senjurisprudenz, empirical legal science, and critical legal studies move-
ment. His conclusion is that "the legal dogmatical method remained per-
fectly unchanged." In relation to the analytical study of law, the author
claims that "never has been realized in the actual research practice."
In this final chapter, he deals with the problem whether the reformulation
of the legal order, which is the basic task of legal dogmatics, means pro-
gress or not. Granted that legal theories tries to systematize certain legal
norms we can face a situation in which a given theory, let us say ( T l ) does
not satisfy the needs of social praxis. The question posed by Aarnio is
whether we should reject this theory or not. He believes that when the ten-
sion between that theory, for example ( T l ) and social reality is big enough,
we are forced to look for another theory, let us say (T2). In this respect an
important and related question is the following: "how to understand the
'correspondence' and 'approximation' between legal dogmatical theory and
'reality'?."
In relation to the change of legal theory, let us say, from ( T l ) to (T2),
there is, according to the author, an 'intermediate' period that prepares, let
us so to speak, the jump to the new theory, "...along with the changes in
the structure of business and financial activity, new situations arose in
which the restrictive interpretation no longer corresponded to the needs of
practical life. In such an 'intermediate' stage, a theory T I posseses a suffi-
cient explanatory power, but its application value is more open to dispute
than before." It is supposed that the 'preparing period' will be followed by
a deeper change. Of course, no one can give an accurate explanation of
when it will happen, that is, when the legal profession will be prepared for
even broader interpretations that make the previous theory at least, partly,
useless. And this happens when, "the pressure for fresh interpretations,
brought about by the societal situations, becomes sufficiently strong." As a
result of those changes a given legal realm is identified in a new way. And
then the conclusion is, "This also shows how a grouth of knowledge takes
 Law, Legal Dogmatics, Progress 345

place regarding the Bill of Echange Act: the number of (potential) cases
covered by the Bill of Echange Act increases due to the increased interpre-
tation possibilities." It is not clear, nevertheless, that any increase of the
potential cases of a given legal regulation should be seen as better in any
case instead of a restriction of the scope.
It seems that we are never aware that our present theory is a 'bad' one
until some societal changes occur and there is not enough adjustement
between legal theory and legal praxis, etc. But that supposes that for a time
this theory is seen as the 'correct one'. We change it because we do not
believe any more that it is good for our purposes. Otherwise, two legal
theories are compared (supossing that the social reality is the same or suffi-
ciently the same) and a new one is considered as 'better' then the former.
Just when we have a new 'correct' theory (although not for ever and not
for every place) we are prepared to claim that the old is not the 'correct'
one. The author emphasizes an important point claiming that, "the pressure
towards Τ 2 is not ultimately due to 'autonomous' theoretical reasons only,
but to the application praxis and the need to make sense of this praxis."
Once more it is claimed the dynamic aspect of the legal enterprise. I would
say, not only this, because the practical needs are seen as the touchstone of
the legal change and not any autonomous internal logic.
Aarnio asks himself whether we can claim that T 1 is 'better' than T2.
He supposes that both theories are incommensurable. I think there is no
sufficient justification of this and it is not clearly stated what does it mean.
It should be explained that lawyers backing T 1 and Τ 2 do not understand
each other. I believe that they do and this dialogue can be, not always, a
means for hastening the change. In any case, it is also supposed that while
not being those theories commensurable, there is a certain order of prefer-
ence between them and it would depend on their capacity for solving the
legal problems in question. Trying to clarify it a little more he says, "In
this respect T 2 is, no doubt, more developed than T l . " But it is not very
clear what 'more developed' means. Then, the author adds, "This means,
more detailed question, and further, more detailed and richer answers."
Until when 'detailed answers' are better? What does 'richer answers'
mean? I think that the author tries to avoid the claim that the new theory is
better than the former and uses expressions like 'more detailed' and
'richer'. In any case, the conclusion of the author is clear, there is progress
in legal dogmatics. His last claim is the following: "This is the basic
reason of my motto: The only laws what the lawyers do not know are the
laws of their own science. Let us take them seriously. Legal Dogmatics is a
social science." This has been a short presentation of a very valuable and
worth reading book.
 WERTEDISKURS IN MORAL, RECHT UND POLITIK

Von Ota Weinberger, Graz

I. Der Non-Kognitivismus und wohlerwogenes Werten

Wertung ist Stellungnahme eines Subjekts, das willens- und handlungsfä-

hig ist. Nur unter der Voraussetzung, daß Wert und Normsetzung stellung-
nehmende Entscheidungen sind und nicht aus kognitiven Daten allein
- d.h. ohne willenhafte Stellungnahme - hinreichend begründet werden
können, ist Wollen, Entscheiden und Handeln sinnvoll. Die non-kognitivi-
stische These ist unabdingbare Vorbedingung jeder praktischen Philosophie:
Wenn praktische Sätze - Normen, Werturteile, Präferenzen - rein kognitiv
begründbar wären, gäbe es eigentlich keine Wert- oder Willensentscheidun-
gen, sondern nur rein deskriptive Erkenntnisse, dann wäre Wollen und
Sollen eine logische Konsequenz der Erkenntnisse. Erkenntnisse sind aber
nur eine Orientierungsbasis des Handelns, die nur aufgrund gegebener prak-
tischer Einstellungen (von Zielen, Werten Präferenzen und/oder Normen)
zu Willensentscheidungen oder begründeter Normsetzung führen kann.

Die semantische Zäsur zwischen rein beschreibenden Sätzen und prakti-

schen - d. h. Stellungnahmen ausdrückenden - Sätzen ist unbestreitbar. Was
strittig ist, ist die Frage, ob die praktischen Sätze - Werte, Normen, Präfe-
renzen - eine von der gegenständlichen Welt abgetrennte Sphäre bilden, so
daß zwischen der Seinswelt und der „Welt der Werte und des Sollens"
keine begründenden Verbindungen bestehen können bzw. möglich sind.

Semantisch ist Sein und Sollen scharf getrennt, ontisch bestehen Bezie-
hungen in beiden Richtungen. Geltende Werte und real bestehendes Sollen
sind von sozialen Realitäten abhängig, und sie haben ihre Auswirkungen
auf das tatsächliche gesellschaftliche Geschehen. Praktische Informationen
sind real, sind Elemente des individuellen und gemeinschaftlichen Lebens:
Sie haben institutionelles Dasein. Als integrierende Bestandteile der Institu-
tionen sind sie systemrelativ; ihr Dasein (ihre Geltung) ist Realsein als
Bestandteil eines institutionellen Systems.

Beschreibende Informationen unterliegen dem Test der Bestätigung oder

Widerlegung durch Prozesse der empirischen Verifikation, die zu guter
Letzt auf Beobachtung basiert. Es gibt Methoden der Wahrheitsprüfung
348 Ota Weinberger

durch Beobachtung. Die Beschreibungen werden in ihrer Abbildfunktion an

der Realität getestet.
Im Bereich der kognitiven Informationen gibt es einen äußeren Prüfstein;
die Erkenntnisse müssen sich an der objektiven Realität bewähren.
Bei stellungnehmenden Informationen bietet Beobachtung allein, d.h.
kognitive Informationen, keinen Beweis noch eine Widerlegung der prakti-
schen Thesen (der Wertung oder des Sollens).
Die Systemrealität der praktischen Informationen eröffnet die Möglich-
keit der inhaltlichen Relativität des Wertens und Sollens: Was in einem
System positiv gewertet wird, kann in einem anderen indifferent oder nega-
tiv gewertet sein. Es bleibt aber die Frage offen, ob es nicht doch Elemente
notwendiger interpersonaler Übereinstimmung gibt. Die Tatsache, daß
Werten und Sollen Ausdruck von systemrelativer Stelllungnahme ist, belegt
nicht, daß keine anthropologisch gegebenen Werthaltungen existieren, die
auch subjektiv freie Stellungnahmen beherrschen.
Nur die Überlegung, daß Stellungnahmen Reaktionen auf aktuelle Situa-
tionen sind, die in der Entwicklung historischer und sozialer Faktoren diver-
gieren, läßt erwarten, daß die individuellen und gesellschaftlichen Stellung-
nahmen wahrscheinlich in vieler Hinsicht divergieren werden. Aber auch
diese Überlegung schließt anthropologisch unabdingbare Wert- und Sollens-
einstellungen nicht aus. Auch der Non-Kognitivist und Vertreter eines
Wertrelativismus kann nicht beweisen, daß es keine anthropologischen
Schranken für mögliche Werteinstellungen gibt. Der Spielraum des Wertens
ist nicht universell: es gibt kein Prinzip der absoluten Willkür, obwohl es
offensichtlich ist, daß verschiedene Menschen und Gemeinschaften Wert-
überzeugungen haben können, die untereinander inkompatibel sind.
Es bleibt also die Humesche Warnung, daß durch beschreibende Seins-
feststellungen allein Sollen und Werten nicht begründet werden kann, weil
im Sinne des Non-Kognitivismus immer ein praktisches (stellungnehmen-
des) Element zur Begründung von Wertungen und Normen hinzutreten
muß, doch folgt daraus nicht, daß es keinen gültigen - die aktuelle subjek-
tive Stellungnahme überschreitenden - Maßstab des Guten, Wertvollen und
Gesollten gibt.

Ein rein kognitivistischer, auf rein beschreibenden Tatsachen gestützter

Schluß auf die objektive Geltung praktischer Sätze gilt nicht, er wäre ein
sogenannter naturalistischer Fehlschluß. Aber die Ablehnung rein kogntivi-
stischer Begründungen praktischer Thesen schließt Überlegungen über gül-
tige Maßstäbe des Praktischen nicht aus.
Vor allem ist wertende und normative Stellungnahme kein Akt der Will-
kür, kein unbegründbarer und unkritisierbarer Akt des „sie volui", sondern
 Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik 349

wohlbedachte Stellungnahme, die Gründe und Gegengründe anführt und

prüft, und welche die Möglichkeit falscher - irriger - Wertungen zuläßt.

Die Möglichkeit irriger Wertung impliziert eine diskursive Einstellung zu

praktischen Thesen. Ihre Begründung und wohlbedachte Setzung wird trotz
Non-Kognitivismus zum Credo der rational-analytischen praktischen Philo-
sophie. Wertungen und Normen unterliegen der Prüfung durch Analyse der
Folgen praktischer Maßnahmen und durch Werterfahrung. Bei diesem
Prozeß ist Beobachtung von Tatsachen beteiligt. Aber die Bewährungsprü-
fung praktischer Einstellungen beruht nicht nur auf Folgenanalyse und
Beobachtung der Ergebnisse praktischer Maßnahmen, sondern immer auf
deren stellungnehmender Bewertung. Sie ist zwar in kognitive Prozesse ein-
gebettet, aber im Grunde Stellungnahme zu Tatsachen oder erwarteten
Folgen praktischer Maßnahmen. Das Testen im Bereich der Praxis ist nicht
Verifikation, sondern wertende Stellungnahme zu festgestellten oder zu
erwartenden Folgen praktischer Maßnahmen. Wenn man einen zur Verifika-
tion analogen Terminus sucht, kann man von ,Rektifikation 4 sprechen als
jenem Prozeß, der wertend aufgrund von Erfahrung praktische Thesen und
Maßnahmen prüft.

Für eine rationale Theorie des Wertens ist von entscheidender Wichtig-
keit, daß interpersonale Wertdiskussionen möglich sind. Sowohl die sach-
lich feststellenden Elemente der Wertbegründung und Wertdiskussion sind
intersubjektiver Betrachtung zugänglich als auch Werteinstellungen und
wertendes Erleben können - wenigstens in gewissem Maße - interpersona-
ler Analyse zugänglich gemacht werden. Übereinstimmung in der werten-
den Stellungnahme ist aber nicht immer erreichbar. Der Wertediskurs ist
aber meist klärend und kann manchmal zu Konsens führen.

Diese Anerkennung diskursiv-analytischer Möglichkeiten ist natürlich

etwas ganz anderes als die Festsetzungen der Diskursphilosophie (Haber-
mas, Apel), daß der im Diskurs erzielte Konsens Kriterium des praktisch
Richtigen sei und daß die Rationalität des Erkennens und Wertens darin
bestehe, daß interpersonale Diskursprozesse realisiert werden. Diskurse sind
keine Rationalitäts- oder Richtigkeitskriterien - auch dann nicht, wenn sie
Idealbedingungen erfüllen - , sondern pragmatische Mittel der Analyse und
der gedanklichen Klärung.

I I . Gibt es Fehl Wertungen?

Grundlagen der Methodologie des Wertediskurses

Wertung ist Stellungnahme und als solche ein Akt des Entscheidens. Wir
wissen aber auch, daß wir Zweifel und Ungewißheit sowie Schwanken
beim Fällen von Werturteilen erleben. Man fragt sich und muß sich als
350 Ota Weinberger

gewissenhafter Mensch fragen, ob unsere Wertung richtig ist. Ich meine,

daß diese prüfende und selbstreflektive Frage gegenüber unserem Werten
„Ist dieses Werturteil richtig, wohlüberlegt, begründet?" berechtigt ist. Sie
ist Ausdruck der praktischen Gewissenhaftigkeit, zu der jeder praktische
Denker, d.h. jeder moralisch orientierte Mensch, verpflichtet ist. Offen ist
hierbei das Problem des Richtigkeitskriteriums für unser Werten. Wenn für
einen Akt der Beurteilung eine Meßlatte gegeben ist, wenn man weiß, wel-
cher der richtige Wert oder der richtige Meßvorgang ist, dann ist es relativ
einfach, von richtiger Beurteilung zu sprechen, dann sind Zweifel nur an
der genauen Durchführungsweise der Messung oder Wertung berechtigt.
Dann können wir Methoden ersinnen - und die empirischen Wissenschaften
tun dies - , wie die Verläßlichkeit der Messung erhöht werden kann. Bei
den Akten der Werturteile haben wir aber keine derartige Situation. Was
der richtige Wert, der richtige Wertmaßstab ist, ist nicht vorgegeben. Es
besteht keine objektive Gegebenheit, an der der subjektive Wertungsakt als
richtig oder falsch gemessen werden könnte. Es besteht Ungewißheit als
Begleiterlebnis von Wertungsakten sowie das Bestreben, durch Analyse und
Argumente bessere Wertungsgewißheit zu erlangen.

Objektiv gültige Standards stehen nicht zur Verfügung, sondern nur dis-
kursive Analysen, wiederholte Wertungen aufgrund erweiterter Überlegun-
gen und eventuell aufgrund neu erlebter Erfahrungen. Es sind im wesent-
lichen drei Typen von erweiterter Wertungsbasis, die als Korrektiv von Wer-
tungen auftreten können: (i) die Ergänzung und eventuelle Modifikation der
Erwartungswertung (von dem gewerteten Erlebnis) durch die Wertung nach
der Realisation, (ii) die Folgenanalyse und die Wertung der direkten und
indirekten Auswirkungen von Handlungen und Maßnahmen; dies impliziert
meist auch eine Transformation des Zeithorizontes der Wertung, meist in
Richtung auf langfristigere oder nachhaltigere Auswirkungen; es bleibt aber
rein vernunftmäßig unentscheidbar, welcher Zeithorizont „der richtige" ist;
(iii) das Werten ist eingebettet in gesellschaftliche Kontexte; interpersonaler
Diskurs - zusammen mit der Diskussion der Begründungen von Wertungen
beeinflußt das Werturteil des Einzelnen, kann zur Entwicklung wohlüber-
legter Wertungen beitragen; diese Auswirkung interpersonaler Diskurse
kann wirksam werden, ohne daß es zu einer interpersonalen Vereinheit-
lichung der Wertestandards und Präferenzen kommt.

Wesentlich erscheint mir die Tatsache, daß es zu einer rational-analyti-

schen und diskursiven Entwicklung des Wertens kommt, sobald man die
Möglichkeit irriger Wertung zuläßt und daher die Wertungen durch Argu-
mentationen zu stützen sucht. Dieser Prozeß funktioniert, obwohl es keinen
objektiv gültigen Richtigkeitsmaßstab für unser Werten gibt. Es gibt im
Bereich des Wertens einen Prozeß, der dem Verifikations-Falsifikations-
Prozeß im Bereich der empirischen Erkenntnis analog ist.
 Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik 351

Das naturwissenschaftlich-empirische Denken hat eine positiv-konstruk-

tive und eine kritisch-destruktive Seite. Es werden Hypothesen (Naturge-
setze) geschaffen und Folgerungen für die Bestimmung des Verlaufs von
Erscheinungen bzw. deren Explikation, sowie für Voraussagen oder retro-
diktive Feststellungen abgeleitet. Im empirischen Denken tritt immer auch
in Prozessen des Testens die kritische Analyse hinzu. Wenn die aufgrund
der deduktiven Folgerung und der konkreten Tatsachenfeststellung erwar-
tete Folge nicht eintritt, wird modo tollendo die Falsifikation der Hypothese
erschlossen. Hypothesenbildung, deduktive Anwendung auf subsumierbare
Situationen und Testbeobachtung erzeugen ein Spiel der Bewährungs- und
Widerlegungsdynamik. Analoges gilt für die Methodologie des praktischen
(handlungsrelativen) Denkens: Soll- und Werteinstellungen werden voraus-
gesetzt, Handlungsergebnisse, welche diesen Einstellungen entsprechend
gesetzt werden, führen zu Ergebnissen, die empirisch-stellungnehmend
gewertet werden und ermöglichen eine praktische Rektifikation oder sie
rufen Zweifel an den praktischen Ausgangsfestsetzungen hervor und setzen
dadurch eine kritische Dynamik der praktischen (Wert- oder Normen-)Vor-
aussetzungen in Bewegung.
Wertungen sind Stellungnahmen eines individuellen oder kollektiven
Subjekts, die direkt und intuitiv oder mehr oder weniger sorgsam erwogen
sind. In der Struktur der Wertungsüberlegung sind zwei Typen zu unter-
scheiden: global-intuitive und durch analytische Argumente gestützte Wer-
tung. Auch die Globalwertung kann wohlüberlegt sein, doch besteht dann
eine Tendenz, die Wertung zu analysieren und Wertungsgründe aufzufin-
den. Die bestimmenden Elemente der Wertung können verschiedener Art
sein: es können Nützlichkeitselemente sein, implizierte Folgen, Betrachtun-
gen unter verschiedenen Zeithorizonten u.a. Die Analyse der die Wertung
begründenden Elemente, d.h. die analysierende Wertung, ist der entschei-
dende Weg zur rational bedachten Wertüberlegung, es muß aber festgehal-
ten werden, daß die Anwendung der analytischen Untersuchungen nicht zur
vollkommenen Kognitifizierung des Wertens führen; die Wertung bleibt auf
jeden Fall Stellungnahme, sowohl bei den bestimmenden Faktoren als auch
bei der Bestimmung der Wertungsresultante.

III. Wertekategorien und die Präferenzentscheidung

In der Werttheorie arbeitet man traditionsgemäß mit Wertkategorien (die

sich analog auch auf relative Wertungen/Präferenzen beziehen): moralische
Werte, ökonomische Werte, ästhetische Werte u.a. Die Kategorisierung,
wenn auch im großen und ganzen einsichtig, ist nicht problemlos gegeben;
vor allem bleibt eine gewisse Unklarheit bezüglich der Relationen und
Abgrenzungen dieser Kategorien bestehen. [Z.B. die Frage: sind ästhetische
352 Ota Weinberger

Werte nicht auch moralisch relevant?] Im Prinzip werden die Wertekatego-

rien als inkommensurabel betrachtet. Wenn das Werten als Basis des Ent-
scheidens und Handelns herangezogen wird, muß eine kategorienübergrei-
fende relative Wertung durchgeführt werden, denn nur durch eine solche
Gesamtwertung wird das Wählen bestimmt. Die Präferenzentscheidung
beruht auf einer Gesamtwertung, die durch kategorial unterschiedliche Fak-
toren bestimmt ist. Die relative Gewichtung dieser Faktoren ist selbst eine
wertende Entscheidung, mehr Dezision als rational begründbar.

IV. Persönlich freie Wertung und gesellschaftliche Einflüsse

Für die Problematik, die ich hier behandeln will, ist eine soziologische
Betrachtung der Beziehungen zwischen persönlichen Werteinstellungen des
Einzelnen und jene der sozialen Gruppen, denen er angehört, wichtig. Die
freie Werteinstellung, die der Einzelne als seine Haltung, sein selbständiges
und freies Wollen und Werten erlebt, ist zwar eine Wesenscharakteristik
der Person, ein essentielles Moment seiner Freiheit, es ist aber nicht etwas,
was nur aus seinem indviduellen Wesen entspringt, sondern eine Reaktion
auf gesellschaftliche Bedingungen und Einflüsse verschiedener Art. Die Art
dieser persönlichen Reaktion auf soziale, die persönliche Werteinstellung
gestaltende Umstände, mag individuell verschieden sein (obwohl sich auch
hier meist Typen dieser Reaktionsweisen ausmachen lassen), doch wäre es
einfach falsch, die subjektive Werteinstellung als etwas der Person unabän-
derbar Anhaftendes aufzufassen. Das wäre in Konflikt mit der Erfahrung,
ferner mit der Grundkonzeption jedes Institutionalismus, der eben durch die
These von der wechselseitigen Beeinflussung der Individuen und der sozia-
len Institutionen charakterisiert ist. Außerdem würden wir wesentliche
Momente der sozialen und politischen Realität verdunkeln, wenn wir nicht
die Beeinflussung des Denkens, Fühlens und Wertens der Einzelperson in
Rechnung ziehen würden. Von der Erziehung über die Einwirkung von
Informationsflüssen, Ideologien, Propaganda, Reklame, der Wirkung von
Massenmedien könnten Faktoren der Persönlichkeitsbildung und Faktoren,
die das Werten und Handeln des Einzelnen bestimmen, nicht erfaßt und
einer Analyse unterzogen werden. Wer in der Einzelpersönlichkeit nur ein
primäres und unveränderbares Datum und fixes Wertungssystem sieht, ver-
schließt sich den Weg zum Verständnis des sozialen und politischen
Geschehens.

Die institutionalistische Betrachtungsweise, welche das Subjekt nicht als

unformbares Individuum ansieht, sondern als Gegebenheit, die von Bedin-
gungen, Umständen und informationellen Einflüssen im Laufe der Lebens-
entwickung geformt wird, bringt kritische Implikation gegenüber gewissen
liberalistischen Vorstellungen und politischen Konzeptionen mit sich: das
 Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik 353

persönlich-subjektive Werten kann nicht als letzte und unabhängige Quelle

der gesellschaftlichen Zwecke gelten, und die demokratietheoretische Kritik
wird die Momente der ideologischen und marketingartigen Ingerenzen in
das - scheinbar freie - Wahlverhalten der Bürger als Momente erfassen,
die das Funktionieren der offenen Gesellschaft und der diskursiven Demo-
kratie gefährden. 1

V. Die Genesis kollektiver Wertungen

Im Recht, in der Moral und in der Politik wird die Frage der Bildung
kollektiver Wertestandards - wenn auch in unterschiedlicher Form - rele-
vant. Einerseits ist jedes Zusammenleben von einer gewissen Gemeinsam-
keit der Werteinstellungen abhängig, andererseits bilden Institutionen - wie
z.B. die Rechtsordnung oder das politische System - ihre spezifischen Wer-
tungsstandards heraus.

Kollektive Werteinstellung, soweit sie als Übereinstimmung der Mitglie-

der einer Gruppe zustande kommt, hat verschiedene Ursachen. Menschen
haben ihrer Anlage gemäß eine gemeinsame sozusagen biologisch (oder
erbkoordiniert) kategorial gleiche oder wenigstens sehr ähnliche Ausstat-
tung. Sie ist allerdings sehr plastisch und verbunden mit Prägungen in den
Frühstadien der menschlichen Entwicklung. Es ist nicht ganz einfach, die
Grundanlage isoliert zu erfassen; ich glaube, Prägbarkeit, eine prinzipielle
Solidaritätseinstellung und die Tendenz zur Nachahmung des Verhaltens
und der Handlungsweisen gehören zur menschlichen Grundausstattung, und
dies sind Faktoren, die zur Entstehung von Gruppenübereinstimmungen ten-
dieren.

Die spontanen Lernvorgänge werden in der menschlichen Kultur ergänzt

durch Lehr- und Lerninstitutionen. Überall, wo von Vorgängen des Lernens
die Rede ist, geht es nicht nur um die Gewinnung von Sachwissen und das
Erfassen von realen Zusammenhängen, sondern immer auch um Erleben
emotionaler Begleiterscheinungen und hierdurch um die Herausbildung von
Werteinstellungen, Wertestandards und Werungsdispositionen. Dieser
Prozeß ist im großen und ganzen auf die Entstehung von gemeinsamen
Wertestandards gerichtet, was manchmal durch institutionelle Erziehungs-
maßnahmen verstärkt wird. Durch verschiedene Lebenseinflüsse und indivi-
duelle Erfahrungen entstehen aber auch innerhalb der Gruppe Differenzen

1
Vgl. O. Weinberger, Information and Human Liberty, in: E. Dias et al., Conse-
quences of Modernity in Contemporary Legal Theory. Proceedings of the IVR
World Congress in Bologna, Ratio Juris, 1996, Vol. 9, No. 3, S. 248 - 257; ders.,
Zur Theorie der politischen Argumentation, in: Rechtstheorie 27 (1995), S. 163-
182.
24 FS Aarnio
354 Ota Weinberger

der Werteinstellungen. Die kollektive Werteinstellung stellt zwar eine

gewisse Gruppencharakteristik dar, sie ist aber keineswegs strikt einheitlich.
Der Mensch ist zeitlebens einem Informationsstrom ausgesetzt. Er
besteht aus direkt erlebten Erfahrungsdaten und aus einem sprachlich oder
durch massenmediale Mittel dargestellten Informationsfluß. Für die Pragma-
tik der Informationsaufnahme gilt allgemein, daß sie nicht nur sachliches
Wissen übermittelt, sondern immer auch eine gewisse emotionale Tönung.
Sie ist daher auch Werteinstellungen formend - implizit oder sogar explizit
beabsichtigt.
Werteinstellungsformend kommen auch kulturelle Tatsachen ins Spiel,
jene Sphäre der Realität, die Karl Popper als Welt drei bezeichnet; soziolo-
gisch betrachtet haben diese Tatsachen und Umstände die Funktion, kollek-
tive Werteinstellung mitzuformen.
Die Welt der Werte und die Wertestandards unterliegen Überlegungen
rationaler und systematisierender Verarbeitung, und sie sind Gegenstand
diskursiver Prozesse. Diese führen zur Etablierung kollektiver Haltungen,
aber auch zu einer Dynamik durch Konsenssuche sowie durch Dissensverar-
beitung.
Die gesellschaftliche Werteeinstellung entsteht durch zweierlei Mechanis-
men, die in gewisser Weise nebeneinander bestehen: (a) das Zusammenbe-
stehen ähnlicher Werteinstellungen bei den Mitgliedern der betrachteten
Gruppe, sozusagen als gesellschaftliche Summation der Wertungen der
Gruppenmitglieder, oder (b) als Schöpfung von Wertideen durch eine gei-
stig-moralische Autorität, deren Wertesystem sozusagen zur Leitidee der
institutionellen Gruppe wird, von deren Mitgliedern sie akzeptiert wird,
indem diese sich mit dieser Werteinstellung identifizieren, sie sich zu eigen
machen (sie internalisieren, wenn man in soziologischer Sprache reden
will). Ich glaube, daß diese Mechanismen ineinander greifen und nur
zusammen den Mechanismus der Genesis von Wertegemeinschaften charak-
terisieren.

VI. Anmerkung

Die Behauptung, daß die gesellschaftlichen Wertestandards und das

gesellschaftliche Werten funktional abhängig sind von der Werteinstellung
der Mitglieder der Gruppe, weist auf die grundlegende Gemeinsamkeit hin,
sowie auf strukturelle Übereinstimmung, welche interpersonales Verstehen
von Wertungen und Wertungsargumentationen ermöglicht; diese These
bietet aber keine Anleitung an, wie aus den Werteinstellungen der einzel-
nen Personen eine Wertungsresultante der Gruppe bestimmt, d.h. rational
errechnet werden kann. Es handelt sich hier nicht um eine einfache Summa-
 Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik 355

tion (von der Art einer Auszählung der Stimmen bei einer Abstimmung),
sondern um einen Prozeß, bei dem Diskurs, Wirken von Autoritäten und
Nachahmung sowie verschiedene emotionale Momente ins Spiel kommen.
Es geht zwar in der Tat oft darum, konsensfähige Wertentscheidungen zu
gewinnen, doch geschieht dies eher in diskursiven Prozessen und durch
Gewinnung von Akzeptanz für Leitideen als durch Berücksichtigung
(„Summation") vager Mehrheitsmeinungen.
Der Prozeß der Gestaltung der gesellschaftlichen Werteinstellung, der
durch diese beiden Typen der Entstehung von Wertegemeinschaften charak-
terisiert wird, muß durch Berücksichtigung des Ideologiebegriffes und insti-
tutionellen Auswirkung ideologischer Systeme und deren Organisationen
modifiziert werden. Denn Ideologien verändern die sozusagen „freie"
Gestaltung des kollektiven Wertbewußsteins.
Ideologien sind Weltbilder, welche die Lebensform und das Werten der
Einzelnen sowie der Gruppen tiefgreifend beeinflussen. Die Quellen und
Gründe der Ideologien sind verschieden: historische Gegebenheiten, theore-
tische Konstruktionen, die gesellschaftliche Strukturen mehr oder weniger
realistisch oder mystisch erklären. Ideologien sind nicht interessensneutral,
sondern von Schichten- oder Gruppeninteressen abhängig; sie pflegen eine
gewisse partielle Rationalbegründung zu haben, überschreiten aber die
begründende Basis und erlangen oft die Funktion von außerrationalen Fixie-
rungen. Sie treten in institutionalisierten und mehr oder weniger organisier-
ten Formen auf, und zwar in religiöser oder weltlicher Form. Sie wirken
soziologisch gesehen als Vor-urteile, aber auch als Mittel der sozialen Sta-
bilisierung. Es ist kaum möglich, eine klare Grenze zwischen Weltanschau-
ung und Ideologie zu definieren. Es geht m.E. vor allem darum, eine
offene diskursive Einstellung der Ideologie und Weltanschauung gegenüber
zu gewinnen, in allen Fällen - auch bei sog. wissenschaftlichen Weltbildern
- ideologisch-interessenhafte Verzerrungen aufzudecken und wegen dieser
Möglichkeit nicht an kritische Prüfung zu vergessen. Man kann sich von
ideologischen Momenten nicht frei machen - die Voraussetzung, man sei
davon frei und rein wissenschaftlich, vertieft die kritiklose Täuschung - ,
sondern man muß sich der kritischen, d. h. auch ideologiekritischen Analyse
stellen.

Nicht nur in verschiedenen Konzeptionen religiöser Systeme - z.B. in

fumdamentalistischen Gottesstaatsideologien - , vielmehr auch in der demo-
kratisch-liberalistischen Theorie gibt es ideologische (durch Gruppeninteres-
sen verzerrte) Interpretationen: z.B. die Meinung, Handeln aufgrund
subjektiver Interessenmaximierung führe immer durch das Wirken der un-
sichtbaren Hand zur gesellschaftlichen Optimierung, vor allem zum gesell-
schaftlichen Wohlstand. Die geniale - eigentlich institutionentheoretische -
Adam Smithsche Erkenntnis, daß dies manchmal der Fall ist, ist als allge-
24*
356 Ota Weinberger

meine These und vorherrschender Maßstab der Politik sicher falsch, es ist
dies eine ideologische Verklärung im Geiste eines liberalistisch-fundamen-
talistischen Kapitalismus. Partial sinnvolle Schlagworte wie das
„Deregulierungspostulat" wird als antisoziales Instrument eingesetzt,
wodurch nicht freies Handeln aller erreicht werden soll aufgrund von relati-
ver Normfreiheit, sondern weil Umverteilung von unten nach oben durch
normative Gestaltung erreicht werden soll. [Das markanteste Beispiel: die
BSE-Katastrophe. Wirtschaftsfreiheit im Konflikt mit den Grundsätzen art-
gerechter Tierhaltung, alleinige Rücksicht auf Gewinnerhöhung trotz ver-
muteter Gefahren für die menschliche Gesundheit, haben die heutige Situa-
tion hervorgerufen. Und auch heute sucht man Gegenmaßnahmen - meiner
Ansicht nach nicht in erster Linie, um das Wohl des Menschen (Konsu-
menten) zu schützen - wie man erklärt - , sondern um die verheerenden
Folgen für den Agrarmarkt abzuwenden. - Wann wird man aus den Kata-
strophen lernen, wo das Übel seine eigentlichen Wurzeln hat: nämlich daß
Humanität, soziales Gewissen neben Wirtschaftlichkeit (Gewinnmaximie-
rung) einen entscheidenden Stellenwert bekommen muß?]

VII. Differenzierende Charakteristik des Wertens

in Moral, Recht und Politik

In diesem abschließenden Abschnitt möchte ich die Verschiedenheit des

gesellschaftlichen Wertediskurses in den drei Bereichen Moral, Rechtsleben
und Politik erörtern.
Werten im Bereich der Moral. Moral betrifft das Verhalten des einzelnen
Subjektes in Relation zu den Mitmenschen und den Gemeinschaften, in
denen der Einzelne lebt. Moral ist nach moderner Auffassung prinzipiell
autonomes Werten und Entscheiden, aber gleichzeitig gemeinschaftlich
orientiert und ausgerichtet auf Kooperation und Solidarität. 2 Kooperatives
und solidarisches Verhalten und die entsprechenden Werteinstellungen sind
grundlegende anthropologische Gegebenheiten, die uns als „Gruppentieren"
eigen sind. Und diese Grundhaltung dient als Basis des Moralischen.

Für die Moral in der modernen Gesellschaft ist die Dualität und Wechsel-
wirkung zwischen persönlichem Ethos (der autonomen moralischen Sicht-
weise des Einzelnen) und des Moralsystems als gemeinschaftlicher Realität
wesentlich. In beiden Bereichen kommen moralische Grundideale zur Gel-

2
Vgl. meine beiden Aufsätze „Moral zwischen Autonomie und Heteronomie"
(in: Öffentliche oder private Moral? Vom Geltungsgrunde und der Legitimität des
Rechts. FS für E. Garçon Valdés, hrsg. von W. Krawietz, G. H. von Wright, Berlin
1992, S. 243 - 258); „Natural Constituents of Justice" (in: Law and Philosophy 13,
1994, S. 1 - 25), wo ich die Fragen ausführlicher behandelt habe.
 Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik 357

tung, die man als Konsequenzen der Solidarität ansehen kann: Autonomes
Entscheiden des Wertens im Einzelfall und des Entscheidens über generelle
Regeln und Prinzipien der Moral; Bereitschaft zur nützlichen Kooperation
und Bereitschaft zum Schutz der Schwachen und Leidenden.
Moral - sowohl in autonomer als auch in gesellschaftlicher Konzeption -
postuliert immer, ausdrückliche sowie implizite Versprechen einzuhalten.
Dies ist aus handlungstheoretischer Perspektive einsichtig: das Handeln und
die Wahl adäquater Handlungsweisen des Mitmenschen hängt von dessen
Orientierung ab, und vor allem von der erwarteten Verhaltensweise des Mit-
menschen; wer ein Versprechen gibt, ist moralisch gebunden, es zu halten,
sonst würde er die Handlungsorientierung des Partners enttäuschen, ihn
schädigen. Analoges gilt für Übereinkünfte (Verträge), die als gegenseitiges
Versprechen (oder Versprechen und dessen Annahme) verstanden werden
können. Verläßliche Erfüllung geleisteter Versprechen ist verbindlich, weil
es für diese Handlungsorientierung des Begünstigten unerläßlich ist.
Manche liberalistischen Denker mißdeuten den autonomen Charakter des
moralischen Sollens. Sie lassen nur selbstbezogene Freiheit jedes Indivi-
duums zu, befürchten überall dort, wo man für einen anderen entscheiden
würde, ihm rät, sein moralisches Verhalten diskursiv prüft, einen moralisch
unzulässigen, die reine Autonomie störenden Eingriff; das führe zu Paterna-
Iismus, der der autonomen Moral widerspreche.
Handeln an Stelle eines anderen, ist in vielen Situationen des Lebens
eine moralische Pflicht, nicht Beschränkung der Freiheit des Betroffenen.
Beratung und Diskurs ist Bestandteil der moralischen Kultur in der hoch-
entwickelten Gesellschaft. Die Pflicht, - wenn erforderlich - für andere zu
handeln, verantwortlich sein für das Wohl des Nächsten, ist eine solidari-
sche Grundaufgabe, eine wichtige Stelle, wo das moralische Sollen das auf
Eigennutzen gerichtete Handeln überschreitet. Wenn man sich für Mitmen-
schen mitverantwortlich fühlt, bedeutet das durchaus nicht, daß man den
Mitmenschen nicht als freies moralisches Subjekt betrachtet. Gedanken an
mitmenschlichen Schutz als Paternalismus tadelnd zu bezeichnen, bedeutet,
den solidarischen Charakter des moralischen Lebens mißverstehen. Wenn
man z.B. gegen Zigaretten-Reklame, gegen Drogen- und Medikamenten-
mißbrauch ankämpft, bevormundet man nicht den freien Bürger, sondern
schützt ihn und behindert nur den verheerenden Einfluß von schädigenden
Aktivitäten, die Wirtschaftsinteressen vor Humanität und mitmenschliche
Sorge setzt.
Werten im Bereich des Rechts. Das Recht ist ein komplexes Normensy-
stem, welches als dynamisches System erfaßt werden muß und uns als
Menge von Institutionen des Regierens, Verwaltens sowie der Rechtsanwen-
dung entgegentritt. Das rechtliche Werten ist einerseits durch das Normen-
system bestimmt und nach neo-institutionalistischer Konzeption durch die
358 Ota Weinberger

Leitideen der Rechtsinstitutionen, andererseits durch die tatsächliche Praxis

der Rechtsanwendung, in der die Werteinstellung des Rechtssystems zum
konkreten Ausdruck kommt. Die Praxis der Rechtsanwendung hat daher
explikative Funktion für das Verständnis des Systems der Rechtsnormen.
Rechtserkenntnis und rechtliches Werten ist also als Zusammenspiel von
hermeneutischer Analyse der Rechtsnormen und der etablierten Entschei-
dungspraxis zu verstehen.

Die institutionalistische Rechtstheorie unterstreicht die Bedeutung rechts-

politisch-funktionalistischer Wertungen. Die Institutionen des Rechtslebens
werden bestimmt durch die ihnen gestellten Aufgaben, sie dienen, wie man
in den institutionalistischen Lehren sagt, der Verwirklichung der Leitideen.
Wenn man von dieser Institutionen konstituierenden Zweckbestimmung der
Einrichtungen ausgeht, gewinnt man rationale Maßstäbe für die Beurteilung
der Funktionalität der Institutionen. Dies scheint mir die Basis für eine rea-
listische und diskursive Rechtspolitik zu sein, und zwar ohne metaphysisch-
naturrechtliche Voraussetzungen. Jedes Rechtssystem hat die Aufgabe, die
Erfüllung gültig gegebener Versprechen und Verträge sicherzustellen,
ebenso wie den Schutz des Schwachen. Insoweit ist die Zielsetzung - man
kann auch sagen die Leitidee des Rechts und der Moral die gleiche. Das
Recht institutionalisiert auch Sorgepflichten gegenüber Mitmenschen nicht
nur als Konsequenzen eingegangener Verpflichtungen, sondern auch im
Geiste der Solidarität. Es wird ein Gleichgewicht zwischen dem Ziel der
freien Lebensgestaltung für jeden Einzelnen und gemeinschaftlicher Solida-
rität gesucht. Wie dieses Gleichgewicht bestimmt ist, hängt von der politi-
schen Konzeption ab.

Wertediskurs in der Politik. Politisches Argumentieren ist auf die begrün-

dete Erstellung politischer Programme und auf die Gewinnung von Akzep-
tanz der Programme durch die Bevölkerung gerichtet. Die politische Argu-
mentation betrifft eine umfassende und äußerst komplexe Realität und ist
außerdem noch differenziert durch die Verschiedenartigkeit der Interessen-
standpunkte sowie andere ideologische Momente (z.B. religiösen Glauben,
philosophisches Menschenbild). Die politische Argumentation ist bestrebt,
durch Informationen und deren Wertung Handlungsbereitschaft im Sinne
des Argumentierenden zu erzeugen. Dies gilt in erhöhtem Maße in demo-
kratischen Systemen - aber nicht nur in diesen - , denn die Argumentation
soll auch das Wahlverhalten der Bürger beeinflussen. Politik ist in wesent-
licher Weise von gesellschaftlicher Kommunikation abhängig und von der
hiedurch vermittelten Sachinformation und praktischer Einstellung. In der
modernen Informationsgesellschaft erlangt der Einfluß der Massenkommu-
nikation neue Dimensionen, und das Studium der Argumentationsprozesse
und motivierender Einwirkungen wird zu einer fundamentalen Problematik
der modernen politischen Theorie, die beide Auswirkungen der modernen
 Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik 359

Massenkommunikation - Erweiterung des Informationshorizonts breiter

Massen und ungeheuere Möglichkeiten der Indoktrination - beachten muß.
Politische Kommunikation bezieht sich nicht nur auf die Bestimmung des
politischen Entscheidens durch Wahl oder Setzen von gesellschaftlich rele-
vanten Maßnahmen, sondern schafft auch ein Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein,
d.h. bewirkt die Identifikation des Individuums mit der Gruppe. Wie dies
zustande kommt und welche Auswirkungen dies hat, ist je nach Umständen
verschieden. Es kommen Wir-Gefühle, Kooperationsbereitschaft und Soli-
daritätseffekte in der Gruppe zustande. Es gibt verschiedene Mittel, die
Wir-Orientierung zu gestalten oder/und zu vertiefen. Ein erprobtes, aber
auch oft gefährliches, weil Unfrieden stiftendes Mittel, ist die Freund-
Feind-Strategie. [Nach C. Schmidt ist das Freund-Feind-Denken das Wesen
des Politischen; optimistischer und fruchtbarer scheint mir die Präferenz für
Kooperations- und Austauschmodelle des politischen Handelns.] Wir-
Bewußtsein zu haben, ist ein immanenter Wunsch des Menschen, der in
gewisser Weise befriedigt werden muß; es geht - wenn man friedlich
gesinnt ist - darum, Wir-Relationen kooperativ in Gruppen überschreiten-
dem Sinne auch interkulturell zu gestalten.

Für das Verständnis des politischen Wertediskurses sind folgende Fragen

essentiell: (a) die Charakteristik der politischen Wertestandards, die (b)
relevanten Ideale Freiheit, Gleichheit, Lebenschance, Macht und Kontrolle
sowie die offene Klasse demokratischer Grundrechte, und schließlich (c)
die Fragen der Methoden der fortschrittlichen oder aber der täuschenden
und den demokratischen Diskurs vernichtenden eristischen Argumentatio-
nen.
Ad (a): Das System der politischen Wertestandards ist im Grunde
geprägt durch die Vorstellungen, was gutes Leben ist, wie die gute Gesell-
schaft, der Staat und das Rechtsleben aussehen sollen. Das Spektrum dieser
Vorstellungen ist vielgestaltig. Vom methodologischen Standpunkt möchte
ich zwei Grundtypen des Menschenbildes und rechtlicher Werteeinstellung
unterscheiden: monofinale und demokratisch-diskursive Wertsysteme. Die
monofinalen Konzeptionen stellen ein Grundpostulat an die Spitze, dem das
Werten und politische Handeln dient - sei es der Gottesstaat, sei es die
Maximierung der Freiheit des Individuums, der proletarische Klassenkampf,
die Weltherrschaft der höheren Rasse oder eine andere „Heilsidee", die das
moralisch Gute und die optimale, d.h. die gerechte Gesellschaft definiert.
Wenn es auch logisch gesehen nicht gelingt - und wie ich meine - nicht
gelingen kann, alle guten Zwecke des Lebens aus einem Prinzip herzulei-
ten, so führen die monofinalen Weltbilder zu dogmatischen Fixierungen
und haben in der Politik starke Tendenzen zur einseitigen Ausrichtung auf
den als absolut konzipierten Grundwert. Der andere Grundtypus der Kon-
zeption des gesellschaftlichen Wertens, der meiner Ansicht nach der condi-
360 Ota Weinberger

tio humana besser entspricht, faßt das politische Wertungssystem als

System von Wertmaßstäben auf, die gleichzeitig nebeneinander bestehen
und bei der Entscheidungswertung jeweils mit unterschiedlichem Gewicht
zur Geltung kommen. Außerdem ist dieses Wertesystem historisch wandel-
bar und kulturell offen: es steht selbst in einem moralisch-sozialen Diskurs. 3
Ad (b): Die Ideale, welche das komplexe Wertesystem der demokra-
tisch-abwägenden Wertekonzeption bilden, treten manchmal auch als mono-
finale Kategorien auf (z.B. Wohlstand, Freiheit u.ä.), doch werden sie im
Kontext des abwägenden Weltbildes einerseits kritisch analysiert und ande-
rerseits stehen sie bloß als Gesichtspunkt der Abwägung da, nicht als ein-
zige und letztinstanzliche Zielsetzungen.
Wohlstand der Gesellschaft ist ein beinahe unbestrittenes Ideal der Poli-
tik; die Frage ist aber, was Wohlstand bedeutet, wie er beurteilt und gemes-
sen werden kann. Meist wird das BIP als Indikator herangezogen. Dies ist
in vieler Hinsicht problematisch (abgesehen von Problemen der Berech-
nungsweise dieses Indikators). Sind nicht Fragen der Verteilung, der
Arbeitszeit, der sozialen Sicherheit, des Status in Bezug auf bürgerliche
Freiheiten wesentliche Momente des gesellschaftlichen Wohlstandes, die
durch diesen Indikator nicht zum Ausdruck kommen? Wohlstand als politi-
sches Ideal müßte wesentlich differenzierter betrachtet werden als es im
einseitig ökonomischen Weltbild geschieht.
Nicht nur im liberalistischen Weltbild ist Freiheit im Sinne der Möglich-
keit einer selbstbestimmten Lebensgestaltung ein wichtiges politisches Desi-
derat. Der kritische Blick auf die Idee der Freiheit muß Typen von Freihei-
ten unterscheiden. Das simplifizierende liberalistische Postulat der Freiheit,
das maximale Freiheit für das Individuum fordert, soweit diese Freiheit mit
der gleichen Freiheit für jeden anderen zusammenbestehen kann, ist begriff-
lich sehr unbestimmt und daher täuschend. Es gibt nicht die Freiheit, son-
dern Arten von Freiheiten: Redefreiheit, Gewissensfreiheit, ökonomische
Freiheit (Vertragsfreiheit) usw. Die Gewährleistung und Ausübung der ver-
schiedenen Freiheiten darf nicht absolut verstanden werden, und die ver-
schiedenen Freiheiten kommen oft miteinander in Konflikt. Der demokra-
tisch-abwägenden Auffassung entspricht die Forderung, für ein ausgewoge-
nes System von Freiheiten einzutreten und Präferenzen zwischen einzelnen
Typen der Freiheit festzulegen und diese Dezision für das erwählte Frei-
heitssystem zu begründen.
Freiheit ist Spielraum als Basis der Handlungsmöglichkeiten; daher ist
Freiheit nicht nur das Nichtvorhandensein von äußeren normativen Schran-

3
Siehe O. Weinberger, Monofinale Ideologien. Die moderne Gesellschaft zwi-
schen Offenheit und Fundamentalismus, in: K. Weinke et al. (Hrsg.), Bedrohte
Demokratie, Graz 1995, S. 223 - 237.
 Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik 361

ken (die sog. negative Freiheit), sondern auch die positive Freiheit mögli-
chen Handelns. Durch normative Maßnahmen kann das Feld des möglichen
Handelns faktisch erweitert werden.
Bei politischen Betrachtungen über die Freiheit des Bürgers müssen zwei
Fragen unterschieden werden, die beide wichtig sind: die formale Freiheit,
z.B. die für jeden Bürger rechtlich offenstehende Freiheit, jede politische
Funktion in der demokratischen Organisation zu erlangen, und die reale
Freiheit, die tatsächliche Freiheit, die mit einer Chance verbunden ist, daß
die Möglichkeit auch realisierbar ist. Freiheit oder Unfreiheit hängt von
Umständen ab, die durch rechtliche Statuierung der Freiheit allein nicht
bestimmt sind. Dies sind Momente, die sich in normativen Bestimmungen
nicht zeigen, nur in soziologischer Betrachtung sichtbar werden. [Z.B.:
Wenn in der Gesellschaft hohe Arbeitslosigkeit besteht, wird die Stellung
des Arbeitnehmers wesentlich unfreier.] Der Neo-Institutionalismus unter-
streicht, daß ein politisch relevanter Zusammenhang besteht zwischen
gesellschaftlicher Freiheit und realen Handlungsmöglichkeiten des Bürgers.
Die politische Philosophie der Gleichheit unterscheidet traditionelle (und
mit Recht) formale und materielle Gleichheitspostulate. Formale Gleichheit
„unter gleichen relevanten Bedingungen sind gleiche rechtliche Wertung
und gleiche Rechtsfolgen zu setzen" bedeutet nichts anderes als die Forde-
rung, nach generellen Regeln zu judizieren. 4
Materielle Gleichheit im strikten Sinne gibt es nicht und wird von den
Egalitaristen nicht gefordert, denn die Lebenspositionen der Menschen sind
verschieden - auch bei maximaler Gleichheitsregulierung. Da das Wün-
schen und Wollen der Menschen unterschiedlich ist, wäre volle Gleichheit
in Konflikt mit dem Postulat der Selbstbestimmung des Lebensplanes. In
Wirklichkeit geht es um ganz andere Probleme, wenn man in der Politik-
theorie von Gleichheitsforderungen spricht.
Man muß Gleichheit in verschiedenen Beziehungen unterscheiden: Chan-
cengleichheit, Gleichheit der bürgerlichen Rechte und der Würde, Gleich-
heit der Startbedingungen, ökonomische Gleichheit, usw. Wirkliche Gleich-
heit - auch in einzelnen Beziehungen - ist nicht erreichbar. Die aktuelle
Frage ist, inwieweit ist ein Ausgleich erstrebenswert und gesellschaftlich
oportun. 5

4
Vgl. hierzu und zu den nachfolgenden Überlegungen: O. Weinberger, Gleich-
heitspostulate. Eine strukturtheoretische und rechtspolitische Betrachtung, ÖZÖR,
1974, S. 146- 163.
5
Vgl. John Rawls' Bedingungen für die Zulässigkeit der Ungleichheit, vor allem
seine Forderung, daß die Ungleichheit auch dem schlechter Gestellten zum Vorteil
sein muß.
362 Ota Weinberger

Nicht nur für das sozialistische Weltbild besteht hier die Frage der Aus-
beutung, der Wirkung von Macht (von Gewalt und ökonomischer Macht)
auf die Gestaltung der gesellschaftlichen und ökonomischen Beziehungen.
Macht bedeutet oft Transfer von der Gesamtheit zu den ökonomisch Star-
ken (nicht Transferleistungen zur Stützung der Schwachen).6 Das Problem
der Ausbeutung bleibt für die rechtspolitische Wertung bestehen ebenso
wie Fragen des Schutzes des ökonomisch Schwächeren in wirtschaftlichen
Beziehungen. Wenn auch keine optimale Lösung erreichbar ist, sollte allen
Menschen wenigstens eine Chance gegeben werden, menschenwürdig zu
leben und Aktivitäten entwickeln zu können, die eine Besserung ihres
sozialen Zustands ermöglichen.
Ad (c): Demokratie ist seit jeher abhängig von gesellschaftlicher Kom-
munikation, und in besonderer Weise gilt dies für die moderne Informa-
tionsgesellschaft. Positiv für die Möglichkeit des demokratischen Lebens
ist die heute allgemein offenstehende Möglichkeit - hauptsächlich über die
Massenmedien - politische Informationen im weiten Umfang zu erhalten.
Viele Politologen jauchzen, daß dies mehr oder weniger automatisch zu
einer neuen Entfaltung des demokratischen Lebens führe. Ich teile diesen
Optimismus nicht. Die Weite der Informationsmittel und Netze impliziert
an und für sich noch nicht, daß die Gesellschaft offen und diskursiv funk-
tionieren wird. Die Informationsgesellschaft bewegt sich zwischen der
Möglichkeit des rationalen und offenen Diskurses und der Möglichkeit, die
Kommunikationsmittel für Indoktrination durch marketingartige Methoden
zu verwenden.
Information ist in pragmatischer Sicht immer eine Kombination von
Sachverhaltsanzeigen und Erzeugung von Emotionen. Die Gefahren und
Schwierigkeiten der Kommunikation für das Funktionieren der Demokratie
entspringen folgenden Momenten:
1. Den Sachinformationen sieht man nicht direkt an, ob sie wahr sind,
ob sie das Wesentliche der behandelten Problematik treffen oder nur täu-
schende Partialwahrheiten sind. Es läßt sich wegen der ungeheueren Kom-
plexität der gesellschaftlichen Strukturen und Vorgänge immer eine Argu-
mentation finden, die in gewisser Weise für das vertretene politische Pro-
gramm spricht. Geschickte Manipulation mit sozialen Indikatoren erzeugen
oft ein tendenziös täuschendes Bild: Außerdem können wir ein bedrohli-
ches Vordringen marketingartiger (d.h. vorwiegend oder nur emotionaler)
Propaganda konstatieren, die den demokratichen Meinungsstreit in Manipu-

6
Ein Beispiel führt Al Gore, der sicherlich nicht sozialismusverdächtig ist, an:
Die Rodung des Regenwaldes führen private Firmen mit Gewinn durch, die erfor-
derlichen Straßen baut die öffentliche Hand, und viele andere Beispiele von Ver-
drängung solcher Momente aus der Utilitätsüberlegung mit Hilfe des Begriffes
„externer Kosten", Al Gore, Wege zum Gleichgewicht, Frankfurt/M. 1992, Kap. 10.
 Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik 363

lation zu verwandeln droht. Ich halte diese Momente nicht für unbedeu-
tende Randphänomene, sondern für entscheidende Momente, und zwar
hauptsächlich aus drei Gründen: 1. In der Theorie der Demokratie wird das
Schumpetersche Eliten-Konkurrenz-Modell als grundlegende Richtlinie der
Politik gehandhabt und so gehandelt, als gehe es beim politischen Wirken
um nichts anderes als für die eigene Partei eine Mehrheit zu erringen -
wozu man hemmungslos täuschende Propaganda, suggestive Abstimmungs-
fragen u.ä. einsetzt.
2. Es werden riesige ökonomische Mittel für politische Propaganda ein-
gesetzt und zwar oft unter der Bezeichnung Informationskampagne, in
Wirklichkeit aber weitgehend im Interesse der eigenen Macht und der För-
derung ökonomisch mächtiger Interessengruppen.
3. Es werden täuschende Theorien über den Charakter des demokrati-
schen Entscheidens lanziert, z.B.:
(a) Das Gewinnstreben des Einzelnen/oder des Unternehmens führe im
Ergebnis zur optimalen gesellschaftlichen Lösung, zur Maximierung des
gesellschaftlichen Wohlstandes. Diese Theorie der „unsichtbaren Hand4' ist
eine Mißdeutung der Adam Smithschen Lehre. Es ist richtig, daß der
gesellschaftliche Effekt der eigennützigen Aktivität des Einzelnen - ohne
eine derartige Absicht - dem Gemeinwohl förderlich sein kann, es ist aber
ganz falsch anzunehmen, daß allgemein ein Automatismus bestehe, daß
jede rein auf Gewinnmaximierung gerichtete Tätigkeit des Einzelnen zu
einem sozialen Optimum führe. Summationsauswirkungen können sehr ver-
schieden sein (z.B. eventuell verheerende Umweltfolgen mit sich bringen).
(b) Wirtschaft kann nur florieren, wenn sie ihre eigenen Gesetze ver-
folge und sozial-moralische Bedenken ausschließe. Soziale Gerechtigkeit
sei nach von Hayek ein Unbegriff, weil nicht exakt definierbar; nur der
freie Markt bringt Wohlstand und die richtige politische Wertung. Richtig
ist, daß soziale Gerechtigkeit nicht exakt bestimmbar ist, doch ist sie des-
wegen kein Unbegriff: im Bereich des Praktischen und Sozialen kann man
vage, nicht exakt meßbare Begriffe nicht vermeiden, sie können dennoch
Wesentliches ausdrücken.
(c) Man nimmt an, der Markt sei ein System des freien Spiels von Ange-
bot und Nachfrage, sowie ein Feld der günstigen Wirkung der Konkurrenz.
Daß das Leben des Marktes auch ein Feld der Macht und ökonomisch-
machtpolitischer Eingriffe ist, wird ignoriert. Das Spiel am Markt ist nicht
ein Feld der Freiheit und Gleichheit der Akteure, sondern ein Zusammen-
treffen von Menschen, die an verschieden langen Hebeln sitzen.
(d) Für die Betrachtung sozialer Phänomene ist eine Unterscheidung der
sozial-ökonomischen Stellung unabdingbar, zwar nicht im Sinne der Marx-
schen Klassentheorie, aber als Beachtung der sozialen Stratifikation. Die
364 Ota Weinberger

rechtspolitische Wertung von rechtlichen Bestimmungen und Institutionen

kann an der Frage „cui prodest?" nicht achtlos vorbeigehen.
(e) Man fordert „Deregulierung", „weniger Staat" u.ä. Nun mag es an
gewissen Stellen zweifellos richtig sein, daß die gesellschaftlichen Bezie-
hungen nicht überall und nicht im Detail rechtlich normiert sein sollen. 7
Bei den Deregulierungsforderungen in unserer Politik geht es aber um
etwas anderes, um Aufhebung der sozialen Schutzbestimmungen. Der
Arbeitnehmer, der Mieter (die schwächere Seite der Rechtsbeziehung)
braucht aber normativen Schutz. Und ohne normative Regulierung gibt es
keinen Umweltschutz, und neue Katastrophen vom Typus des BSE-Skan-
dals sind vorprogrammiert. Bei sozialer Deregulierung wird nicht Freiheit
konstituiert, sondern dem Einfluß ökonomischer Machtstrukturen freier
Lauf gelassen.
(f) Man leugnet die Gefahren der marketingartigen Propaganda, weil der
„mündige Bürger" entscheidet. Man weiß allerdings sehr wohl, daß jeder-
mann - auch der kritische Denker - durch gezielte Informationen und emo-
tionale Einwirkungen beeinflußbar ist, sonst würde man für diese oft täu-
schende Propaganda nicht Millionen ausgeben.
W i l l man das demokratische Rechtssystem wirksam gestalten, muß man
soziale Auswirkungen berücksichtigen und institutionelle Vorkehrungen
treffen, um eine offene Gesellschaft mit effektivem Diskurs sicherzustellen.
Demokratie lebt von geistiger Freiheit und gesellschaftlichem Diskurs in
einer Dynamik von Konsenssuche und Dissens.

7
Das faktische Zusammenleben und die Arbeitsteilung in der Familie kann man
wohl kaum sinnvoll durch Gesetz regulieren, obwohl das in Österreich von einer
Ministerin vorgeschlagen wurde.
VI. Democracy, Legislative Powers
and Ultimate Authority
 DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS:
FOUNDATION AND LIMITS OF THE ROLE
OF MINORITIES

By Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Mainz

I. The Instrumental Value of Democracy

It can be accepted without further argument, I think, that government,

whatever its form, is of an instrumental nature: its purpose is to regulate
social behaviour, through the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence
and the establishment of a political and legal system endowed with the
competence to stipulate sanctions and capable of heteronomously imposing
certain ways of conduct, in order to secure a life in society in which the
advantages of social peace more than compensate the sacrifices required for
maintaining it. This is what could be called a minimal conception of the
function and justification of government. It is, of course, the conception
classically defended by Thomas Hobbes: government exists to prevent the
confrontation of 'wolves' in discord. Government, or a political system, on
this view, is valued insofar as it can guarantee individual security. Later
versions, as that of John Locke and the liberal school, made further
demands on political systems, which culminated in the conception of a wel-
fare state under the rule of law, guaranteeing the fulfillment not only of
negative, but also of positive duties. But in all those versions - the mini-
malist as well as the maximalist - forms of government are evaluated
according to their ability to assure the realization of certain ends and the
respect of certain values. The instrumental nature of political systems is
never questioned.

Now, if we accept this as our starting point, it seems advisable to take a

closer look at what Georg Henrik von Wright has called "instrumental
goodness":

"To attribute istrumental goodness to some thing is primarily to say of this thing
that it serves some purpose well. An attribution of instrumental goodness of its
kind to some thing presupposes that there exists some purpose which is, as I shall
say, essentially associated with the kind and which this thing is thought to serve
well. An attribution of instrumental goodness of its kind to some thing is thus
368 Ernesto Garzón Valdés

secondary in the sense that it logically presupposes a judgment of goodness for

some purpose ," 1

The ability to serve a purpose is a functional characteristic. 2 And it is

perfectly normal that a thing serves well in relation to certain purposes, but
not others. There is, thus, nothing illogical in saying that something is good
and, at the same time, that it is not good - depending on the purpose one is
thinking about.
With respect to the functional means-end relation, we can apply criteria
of truth or falsity to statements about the instrumental goodness of a thing.
In von Wright's words:
"[G]enuine judgments of instrumental goodness are always objectively true or
false judgments." 3

But when we refer to the goodness of instruments that serve to reach

socially relevant ends, usually we also include in the assessment an evalua-
tion of the respective end. That is why we deny the instrumental goodness
of certain forms of government, such as dictatorship, even though they may
be causally efficacious in reaching the ends they pursue. In the last
instance, this connexion with values refers judgments about the goodness or
badness of social institutions to a realm where the truth or falsity of state-
ments about their instrumental goodness cannot serve as a criterion of cor-
rectness anymore. Thus, the two levels - the causal and the evaluative -
must not be confused. The former enables one to issue judgments of truth
or falsity; the latter, judgments of normative correctness. The two aspects
belong to different dimensions, that is, obviously something can perfectly
well be causally efficacious, and still be evaluated as incorrect. That means
that we can construct the following table of possible cases:
causal efficacy valoration
1. + +
2. +
3. +
4. -

If we now look at the specific case of democracy, according to that con-

ception the causal efficacy of democracy depends on the end pursued with
it, and its evaluation depends on the quality of that end. For simplicity's
sake, I will adopt the position of a consistent liberal who attributes essen-
tial importance to the respect of certain basic individual rights, as those to
liberty and equality or, more specificly, to the exercise of personal auton-

1
Georg Henrik von Wright , The Varieties of Goodness, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul 1963, p. 20.
2
Ibid., p. 21.
3
Ibid., p. 29.
 Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities 369

omy under conditions of equality, within the framework of a welfare state

under the rule of law.
Concerning the causal efficacy of democracy, we can say that it is cau-
sally efficacious with respect to the expression of citizens' preferences, at
least in relation to the policies advocated by candidates, and to collective
decisions. But that is not all: the expression of voter preferences also has a
normative element concerning the result of an election or referendum: the
majority's preferences ought to prevail and be accepted. This applies to all
democratic elections and decisions, for citizens as well as for representa-
tives in parliament and judges in collegiate courts.
According to the table presented above, then, we can ask whether the
judgment of the causal efficacy of democracy thus understood is true, as
well as whether its normative claim is correct.
What are the arguments that can be advanced in favour of a positive
answer to the two questions?
In my view, they are basically the following two:
(i) A utilitarian argument: The satisfaction of marjority preferences
guarantees the greatest possible amount of social happiness. On this view,
what is relevant is aggregate want-satisfaction, no matter what the wants or
whose they are. In that sense, the utilitarian version can do without a speci-
fic conception of the good, since everyone counts, individually, as one and
only one. Besides, since priority is given not to people's interests, but to
their wishes, the democratic majority rule is regarded a perfect guarantee
against all possible attempts at paternalism or, what would even be worse,
perfectionism. The majority rule or, if you wish, majoritarian consent, in
that sense is the best antidote against dictatorship, whether of a malevolent
or a benevolent kind.
On this view, the greater the sum of satisfied wants, the better. Majori-
tarian consent, thus, best guarantees overall social happiness.
(ii) An epistemic argument: A majority is less prone to error. If one
accepts that there are political truths, it is said, then one must admit that it
is less likely that the many are wrong about what is politically correct.
That argument was formulated in the 18th century by the Marquis de
Condorcet, and resurrected in our times, e.g., by William N. Nelson, and
even more explicitly by Carlos S. Nino. Let us look at it somewhat more
closely.
For Condorcet, the search for political truth is the reason for action of
homo suffragans. But what is at stake here is the collective search for truth
or, in any case, for what has a good chance of being true. If many people
voice their opinion, Condorcet thought, one can infer that the probability of
25 FS Aarnio
370 Ernesto Garzón Valdés

error is less than the probability of truth. 4 In counterposition to the utilitar-

ian argument, homo suffragans does not express a want or interest, but a
judgment of truth. Laws approved by the majority are thought to be the
best possible formulation of a renewal of the original social contract, and
the most realistic expression of the citizens' unanimous will in that con-
tract. Condorcet can thus come to his often-quoted conclusion:
" A good law must be good for all men, just as a true proposition is true for
everyone." 5

Carlos S. Nino's starting point is what he calls "Condorcet's theorem". 6

Democracy is for him an "institutionalized surrogate" for moral discussion:
"[Democracy can be defined as a process of moral discussion with a time
limit." 7
" [ A ] process of moral discussion with a certain time limit within which a major-
itarian decision must be taken ... has greater epistemic power for providing
access to morally correct decisions than any other collective decision-making pro-
cedure." 8

I think that neither the utilitarian nor the epistemic argument withstands
closer scrutiny.
Concerning the utilitarian argument and the claim that through votes or
referenda we can know the voters' preferences, ever since the formulation
of the so-called "Borda paradox", taken up by Condorcet himself, we know
that generally this is impossible as soon as the choice is between more than
two candidates or policies. Because in that case, it may well be that the
majority of votes falls on a candidate or policy that is nobody's first prefer-
ence. Besides, it is also questionable whether people's desires should be
taken into account unconditionally: it is not always true that everyone is
the best judge of his or her own interests, as John Stuart Mill believed.
And it also cannot be generally accepted that paternalism always necessar-
ily leads to perfectionism or dictatorship, as Robert Nozick maintains.
Besides, it is not true that the satisfaction of majority wants always
means a higher quantum of social happiness; because that depends on their
intensity too:

4
Cf. Gilles-Gaston Granger , La mathématique sociale du marquis de Condorcet,
Paris: Odile Jacob 1989, p. 97: "[T]he act of Homo suffragans will tend to bring to
light the most probable truth in every question submitted to discussion."
5
Quoted from Roshdi Rashed , "Commentaire", in Condorcet, Mathématique et
société, selection and commentary by Roshdi Rashed, Paris: Hermann 1974,
pp. 13 - 87, 66.
6
Carlos S. Nino, The constitution of deliberative democracy, New Haven &
London: Yale University Press 1996, p. 127.
7
Ibid., p. 118.
8
Ibid., p. 119.
 Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities 371

" [ A ] mild preference on the part of a large majority of the population for prevent-
ing a minority from doing something (e.g. engaging in homosexual acts or Pro-
testant forms of worship) might outweigh in the calculus of aggregate want-satis-
faction a more intense preference on the part of the minority for doing i t . " 9

A n d concerning the epistemic value o f majority rule, it should not be

forgotten that in Condorcet as w e l l as in N i n o , the pursuit o f that value is
subject to strong conditions.

I n the case of Condorcet, who in this followed Locke, there was a contin-
uing line o f argument between the idea o f the social contract and the
respect o f "natural rights" and majority rule. That is w h y Condorcet could
say that the laws are not

"the expression of the arbitrary will of the greater number, but like truths
deducted by reason from the principles of natural law and adopted as such by the
majority". 1 0

However, Condorcet knew perfectly w e l l that i n reality:

"In the particular instance of exercizing the right to vote, the voter is exposed to
the interplay of interests, passions, corruption and error ... Even if the effect of
these causes is small, it is in any case enough to make the fundamental hypoth-
esis of the model illusory." 1 1

One must, therefore, distinguish between the vote as an empirical fact,

i.e., the psycho-social phenomenon o f voting, and the normative fact, i.e.,
the ideal conception o f voting as a way o f finding out the truth:

"There is a great number of important questions, that are complicated or subject

to the workings of prejudice and passions, on which an uneducated person is
likely to have a wrong opinion. Hence, there is a great number of points on
which the greater the number of voters, the greater must be the fear that the
majority will reach a wrong decision. A purely democratic constitution will then
be the worst of all for all matters on which the people do not know the truth." 1 2

Thus, for the model to work, the voters' decisions must

"always be taken under certain conditions (or constraints). The number of voters,
the required majority, the way of deliberation, the voter's education and illustration
..., are necessary conditions for the definition of the decision situation. The truth of

9
Brian Barry , Justice as Impartiality, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995, p. 135.
Jeremy Waldron ("Rights and majorities: Rousseau revisited", in: Liberal Rights.
Collected Papers 1981 - 1991, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993,
pp. 392-421, 396f.) expresses a similar opinion: "Moreover, an electoral outcome
can correspond only very roughly to a social utility function. Voting cannot possibly
be made to reflect the intensity of the satisfaction or dissatisfaction anticipated by
individuals with respect to some law."
10
Quoted from Roshdi Rashed, "Commentaire" (note 5), p. 68.
11
Ibid., p. 76.
12
Ibid., p. 74.

25*
372 Ernesto Garzón Valdés

a decision depends not only on the voters, but on the conditions in which the vote is
cast, on the form of assembly ... as well as on its decision-making procedure." 13

In this respect, Condorcet mentioned the following ideal conditions:

"Let us assume, first of all, that the assemblies consist of voters whose minds are
of equal sharpness and who are equally illustrated; and let us assume that none of
the voters has influence over the others' votes, and that all express their opinion
in good faith." 1 4
"[Let us assume that all voters have] equal wisdom, an equal sharpness of the
mind, of which they make equal use, that all are motivated by an equal sense of
justice, and finally that each voted on his own terms, as would be the case if
none had over another's opinion greater influence than that which he has received
himself." 1 5

This is very similar to the conditions Nino lists, for democratic discus-
sion really to be an institutionalized surrogate of moral discussion: prere-
quisites rarely satisfied in real parliamentary debate or in popular elections.
These conditions require
"that all interested parties participate in the discussion and decision; that they
participate on a reasonably equal basis and without any coercion; that they are
able to express their interests and to justify them on the basis of genuine argu-
ments; that the group has a proper size which maximizes the probability of a
correct result; that there are not insular minorities, but the composition of majori-
ties and minorities changes with issues; and that people are not extraordinarily
excited by emotions". 16

Obviously, accepting the constraints mentioned by Condorcet or Nino,

one leaves the realm of mere causal efficacy of a procedure for the aggre-
gation of votes, and enters that of constraints to the very act of casting a
vote. Homo suffragans now becomes a homo suffragans restrictus. With the
model of homo suffragans irrestrictus, neither the purposes of the utilitarian
approach nor that of the epistemic version of democracy are satisfied. And
this, in turn, prevents the realization of the values that form of government
is thought to embody. Thus, here we are confronting case 4 of the table
presented earlier. And that result seems to be somewhat paradoxical: if
democratic procedure permits the unrestricted exercise of individual auton-
omy, we cannot realize the values of liberal democracy. I will come back
to that point latter; right now, I only wish to underscore that in the case of
Condorcet as well as in Nino's case, we are speaking of subjective con-
straints homo suffragans is required to impose on himself.

But first, I wish to emphasize:

13
Ibid., p. 70.
14
Condorcet, Mathématique et société (note 5), p. 152.
15
Quoted from Roshdi Rashed, "Commentaire" (note 5), p. 71.
16
Carlos S. Nino, The constitution of deliberative democracy (note 6), p. 129.
 Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities 373

II. The Irrelevance of Factual Consent and

the Conceptual Uselessness of Hypothetical Consent

Elsewhere, 17 I have tried to show that consent, in its factual version (as
maintained by authors like Niklas Luhmann, James S. Fishkin and Jürgen
Habermas) as well as in its hypothetical version (as, e.g., in James Bucha-
nan, John Rawls or David Gauthier), cannot be the starting point for a
foundation of the political legitimacy of democracy. Very briefly, a merely
factual consent results from the workings of strategic rationality that can
lead to the most perverse outcomes; and hypothetical consent is, at best, an
unnecessary dramatization acted out by individually indistinguishable
beings. It is, therefore, totally consistent that Condorcet summarized the
conditions for reaching political truth, bluntly stating:

"Generally, since there is only one method for finding the truth, the procedures of
a deliberative assembly must approach as closely as possible those followed by
the mind of one single individual when investigating a matter." 1 8

But, if one accepts that majoritarian (or even unanimous) consent cannot
be the criterion for evaluating the moral quality of a decision, one may
think that what matters is

III. Minority Dissent

If we leave aside for a moment the question of what is actually meant be

the term 'minority' (ethnic, religious, ideological, or with respect to sexual
preference, age, education, etc.?), I think it can be accepted that one of the
characteristics of any politically relevant minority is its attitude of dissent
about some measures adopted by majority decision. It is therefore of inter-
est to analyze the political significance of dissent.

First of all, we must ask about the difference between consent and dis-
sent. Since dissent is of a negative nature, it always refers to some prior
consent; its moral quality, then must depend on the moral quality of what
is negated. Here, one can think of the following alternatives:

a) that the consent in question is in accord with basic principles of poli-

tical morality; an example of a factual consent satisfying that condition
could be the case of a constituing assembly that unanimously stipulates a

17
Ernesto Garzón Valdés, "Consenso, racionalidad y legitimidad", in idem, De-
recho, ètica y politica, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales 1993, pp. 455 -
471.
18
Cf. Gilles-Gaston Granger , La mathématique sociale du marquis de Condorcet
(note 4), p. 96.
374 Ernesto Garzón Valdés

catalogue of fundamental rights similar to those contained in constitutions

like the Spanish or the German one;

b) that the consent in question violates those principles, as would be the

case of the consent of the Nazi leadership assembled in 1942, at the shores
of Lake Wann, about the so-called "solution of the Jewish question".

In case a), obviously, dissent would be morally unfounded. In case b),

dissent can be of at least two kinds:

it is not based on morally acceptable reasons, and may even be

based on morally repugnant reasons; that would be the case, for instance,
of a Nazi who, at the Wannsee conference, would have dissented to the
"Auschwitz solution" on the grounds that it would be better to shoot the
Jews;

b 2 ) it is based on moral reasons, on a respect of the condition humaine;

in that case, it becomes obvious that the condition of non-dictatorship stipu-
lated by Kenneth J. Arrow for his famous impossibility theorem is not
always required in moral matters.
In any case, it should be noted that a dissenter's aspiration is that others
come to reach a consent to the effect that he is right with his - previously
- dissenting opinion. In the last instance, that is, what is desired is a con-
sent. In that sense, dissenting is a transitory attitude framed by two con-
sents: the contested one, and the one the dissenter hopes for. In contrast to
consent, dissent is not meant to be lasting. Dissent is intended to be self-
destructive in the sense that it is intended to create the conditions in which
it becomes unnecessary.

But, as case b\ shows, from this it cannot be inferred that dissent is a

remedy for "the" weak point of the theory of consent. Obviously, consent
and dissent differ, insofar as the latter always contains a note of negation.
But what matters can certainly not be negation as such, without regard of
the content of what is negated. In order to avoid the anarchic situation
where everyone plays his own game and refuses to play that of the others
merely for the sake of diversity, it must be determined ex ante which
games are morally admissible.

But then, the question whether a particular dissent is morally relevant or

not can only be answered if one knows against what previous consent it is
directed.

On the other hand, since the aim of any morally justified dissent is to
trigger a new - morally justified - consent, one could think that at the root
of democratic legitimacy, there is always a dissent. Instead of an original
consent, one could then speak of an "original dissent". But in that case, one
 Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities 375

could also take one more step and concede the plausibility of the alterna-
tive of dissent.
One argument in favour of that alternative could be historical experience,
e.g., the achievement of human rights. Dolf Sternberger 19 has illustrated
with vivid examples the role of dissidents for the process of social emanci-
pation and for the formulation of human rights, from the great revolutions of
the 18th century until our days. But history also offers instructive counter-
examples. Thus, it should not be forgotten that Hitler was a "dissident" in
Weimar. History holds examples for everything.
Besides, if one accepts that dissent, as a negation, must always refer to
some prior consent, one could think that it matters what kind of consent
this is: a factual or a hypothetical one. In both cases, however, the insuffi-
ciency, shown above, of a consent as a source of legitimacy is transmitted
to the dissent opposing it.
In summary, it is not a consent or dissent that justifies human rights or
legitimacy, but precisely the other way around. To assert the contrary
would mean to defend some sort of "alchemy of consent" 20 or dissent, that
would make the acts of will of those who consent or dissent morally valu-
able for the simple fact of being consenting or dissenting expressions. But,
obviously, the moral quality neither of a consent nor of a dissent can derive
from the mere fact of being one or the other.

IV. The Insufficiency of a Minimalist Conception

of Democracy for the Regulation of the Basic Principles
of a Morally Valuable Social Organization

The minimalist conception of democracy converts democratic procedures

into an expression of the voters' wants, and attributes moral value to the
results of such votes without any further criterion.
This model of democracy could thus be understood as a case of pure
procedural justice, according to John Rawls' definition:
"[P]ure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the
right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is
likewise correct or fair, provided that the procedure has been properly fol-
lowed." 2 1

19
Cf. Dolf Sternberger , Herrschaft und Vereinbarung, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp
1986, pp. 129 ff.
20
Cf. Brian Barry, Theories of Justice, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of
California Press 1989, p. 361.
21
A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon 1972, p. 86.
376 Ernesto Garzón Valdés

The example Rawls gives of a case of pure procedural justice is a system

of cooperation based on the principle of fair opportunity. The advantage of
pure procedural justice is, in his view, that it frees us of the need to define
principles that take into account the enormous complexities of people's
changing circumstances and relative positions. But, of course, the results
can then be accepted as just only if those circumstances are qualified ex
ante as either irrelevant from the point of view of justice, or as too com-
plex for any conceivable procedure to take them all into account. An exam-
ple of the first case would be the satisfaction of people's relatively unim-
portant secondary wants. In that context, majority rule could be considered
a just procedure for resolving conflicts, always leading to a just result,
whatever its content. And an example of the second kind could be the rule
stipulating the principle of "first come, first serve" for the adjudication of
organs for transplantation. The particular circumstances of each patient
would be so complicated that a thorough analysis could result in a loss of
organs. Or one could think of the case of the sinking ship, where it must
urgently be decided who gets to get into the lifeboat. Perhaps here one can
resort to the procedure of flipping a coin. Here, we have a case where what
is at stake are vital interests (in the strictest sense of the word). If one does
not flip a coin, the consequence could be that the ship sinks before anyone
is saved. That means that on both extremes - on the extreme of trivial
cases, on the one hand, and on the other extreme of the most complex and
serious cases, on the other - pure procedural justice seems to be an ade-
quate notion. In fact, this seems obvious to me: in cases of the first kind,
there is not really any question of justice; and in those of the second kind,
we have cases of tragic choice where the result is always unsatisfactory
from the point of view of justice. In both cases, results elude, so to speak,
a qualification as just or unjust.
From all this, so far we can infer that
(i) neither the consent of a majority nor the dissent of a minority are
sufficient for a transition from case 4 to case 1 of our table;
(ii) neither does the assumption seem to be a good idea that homo suffra-
gans restrictus should be subject to subjective constraints of honesty or sin-
cerity only.
One could therefore think that what is required are external institutional
constraints that are immune to the subjective attitudes or motivations of
homo suffragans. To that effect, I wish to propose:
 Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities 377

V. The Recourse to an "Off Limits"

I have for some time defended the notion of an "off limits", where non-
negotiable basic rights are to be protected, as a necessary condition for
representative democracy. Dissent, negotiation, and tolerance, then, would
be appropriate and admissible only outside of that "restricted area". Anyone
wanting to open the gates to that "restricted area" and convert basic rights
into an object of dissent and negotiation would endanger the possibility that
democracy can satisfy the criteria of moral correctness expected from it. A
dissident may not open all doors. In a representative democracy where the
inviolable core of an "off limits", and with it the "majority principle"
instead of "majority rule" 2 2 is respected, dissidence may only refer to the
area of matters open to negotiation.

That decision-making according to the majority principle implies a

restriction of the freedom of those who belong to the minority is obvious.
But it is just as certain that in societies with a great number of members
democracy is viable only if that kind of restrictions is accepted. Since
direct democracy is impossible, we must necessarily take recourse to a
representative system, i.e., a system with a parliament whose fundamental
function, according to Kelsen, is
"Bildung des maßgeblichen staatlichen Willens durch ein vom Volke auf Grund
des allgemeinen und gleichen Wahlrechtes, also demokratisch gewähltes Kolle-
gialorgan, nach dem Mehrheitsprinzip". 23

For Kelsen, it is precisely the majority principle which prevents the rule
of one class over the other, i.e., the dominion of the majority or of a
"Zufall der Arithmetik". 2 4 Kelsen's argument is directed above all against
the identification of the "majority principle" with "majority rule"; there-
fore, his assertion that the majority principle presupposes the existence of a
minority is not merely a tautology, in the sense that one cannot speak of a
majority if there is no minority. The majority principle requires that some
basic matters are excluded from negotiation in parliament and from the
vote of the people.

As for what those matters should be, and what the criterion of exclusion
is, my proposal is the following:

a) All goods regarded as basic goods for the realization of every plan of
life must be excluded from parliamentary negotiation and compromise.

22
Cf. Hans Kelsen, Das Problem des Parlamentarismus, Vienna/Leipzig: Brau-
müller 1925.
23
Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr
(Paul Siebeck) 1929, p. 28.
24
Ibid., p. 55.
378 Ernesto Garzón Valdés

b) The determination of that area of exclusion must not be left to a

factual consensus - neither of representatives nor of the represented. A fac-
tual consensus can only express the positive morality of a particular collec-
tivity at a particular moment of its history. From the fact that a majority of
members of a collectivity jointly accept certain behavioural regularities,
one cannot infer automatically that they are also permitted from the point
of view of an illustrated morality, or ethics.
c) With respect to the efficacy of the rights contained in the "off limits",
the will or wants of the respective community's members are irrelevant. Here,
a paternalistic attitude is fully justified if those members do not understand
the importance of the corresponding basic goods. The reason for this is that
not to accept the guarantee of one's own basic goods is a clear sign of irra-
tionality, or of ignorance about the elementary causal relationships between
the possession of those goods and the realization of any plan of life. In both
cases, the persons in question can be regarded as "basically incompetent".
d) If one accepts what has been said in the previous paragraph, then one
must also accept that in relation to those who defend basic goods Arrow's
condition of non-dictatorship does not apply.
e) Moreover, if one agrees - as I think one should - that morality has a
tendency of expansion, then it is plausible to think that the "restricted area"
of basic rights also has such a tendency. This can be induced by two kinds
of factors: 1. factors of a cognitive nature, i.e., the insight that hitherto
unrecognized conclusions can be drawn from ethical premises. I think that
is what happens, e.g., when one speaks of different generations of human
rights: what this refers to is not an introduction of new premises, but rather
an inference of new conclusions from already excepted premises. Here, we
can think, for instance, of the relationship between the right to life (a
human right of the so-called "first generation") and the right to an unpol-
luted environment (a "third generation" right), or that between the negative
duty of not harming, and the positive duty of not omitting to help when
harm can thus be prevented. 2. But there are also material factors concern-
ing access to economic, technical or cultural resources that can make it
necessary to expand the limits of the "off limits".

f) With these restrictions in mind, the activities of representatives

include, on the one hand, the guarantee of the effective protection of those
basic goods, i.e., the defence of Rawls' "primary goods" or Habermas'
"universalizable interests". But they also include, on the other hand, nego-
tiation and compromise in the area of what, following the proposal of
James O. Grunebaum, 25 can be called people's "secondary wants", i.e., of

25
James O. Grunebaum, "What ought the representative represent?", in Norman
E. Bowie (ed.), Ethical Issues in Government, Philadelphia 1981.
 Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities 379

wants that do not concern basic goods. Here, the principle of respecting the
will of the represented applies, with the proviso that:
The secondary wants of the represented should be satisfied to the extent that, to
the knowledge of the representative, it does not imply the sacrifice of any basic
good, or the frustration of secondary wants the represented themselves value
higher than the secondary want in question.
The realm of negotiation and compromise is the appropriate field for the
pursuit of secondary interests, on the basis of an assessment of costs and
benefits. Here, representatives have the ethical obligation to see to the
greatest possible satisfaction of the secondary wants of the represented, sub-
ject to the indicated reservations. And their strategies of negotiation and
compromise must be guided by prudence.
But even if one accepts that prudential considerations of benefits and
costs are appropriate in the area of negotiation and compromise, that does
not mean that this area of the prudential does not need to be fenced in by a
bulwark to be constructed on the basis of ethical considerations.
Negotiation and compromise presuppose nearly equal legal and political
means. In that sense, in order to be ethically acceptable, parliamentary
negotiation and the activities of homo suffragans presuppose some degree
of social homogeneity.
Hence, we need a criterion for determining when a society is sufficiently
homogeneous for compromises to be fair and for all social groups to feel
that they have a chance of integration through parlamentary action and
democratic voting. My proposal for such a criterion is the following:
A society is homogeneous when all its members effectively enjoy the rights con-
stituting the 'off limits' of basic goods.
When this is not the case, the majority principle results in majority rule.
That such a background of homogeneity is necessary becomes obvious if
one takes into account that parliamentary representation, as a form of the
division of labour, is the only possible form of democracy in modern mass
society, and that democracy, in turn, is the best candidate for an ethically
justified political system, provided it is not reduced to the application of a
procedure, but also includes the normative ingredient of a respect for lib-
erty and equality. That is why Kelsen can begin his argument for the justi-
fication of democracy with the idea of natural liberty and its contractual
transformation into political liberty.
From the point of view of positive law, the conclusion that the rights
included in the "off limits" of universalizable interests or human rights
cannot be curtailed as a result of parliamentary negotiation is also obvious.
Those rights constitute the non-negotiable core of any liberal-democratic
constitution of a welfare state under the rule of law. To the "off limits"
380 Ernesto Garzón Valdés

area, a prohibition of reform (as stipulated in art. 79,3 of the German Basic
Law) and an obligation to adopt measures that will further their full realiza-
tion applies.
It is that "off limits" which reliably transforms homo suffragans into
homo suffragans restrictus and allows us to locate democracy as an
instance of case 1 of the table presented above.

VI. A Proposal for a Rational Foundation of the Content

and the Limits of the "Off Limits" Area

Of course, there is still the question of how the content of the "off limits"
can be determined and, above all, justified. It must be admitted that whenever
we come to the realm of conceptions of the good, we are walking on shaky
ground, since it is impossible to say precisely what is the good for each and
every person. It is, therefore, advisable to avoid this tricky terrain. Let us,
instead, move on to more secure grounds by taking a detour.
The road I wish to propose is a "negative road", starting with three basic
assumptions. The first is that, within the context of rational ignorance, we
should adopt a conception of human beings as agents whose rules of behav-
iour are not those of a "suicide club", as H. L. A. Hart said:
"We could not substract the general wish to live and leave intact concepts like
danger and safety, harm and benefit, need and function, desease and cure; for
these are ways of simultaneously describing and appraising things by reference to
the contribution they make to survival which is accepted as an aim ... To raise
... any question concerning how we should live together, we must assume that
their aim, generally speaking, is to l i v e . " 2 6

The second assumption is a partial concession to Rawls 2 7 and Brian

Barry: 2 8 let's assume that there is no conception of the good that cannot be
reasonably questioned. But - and that is why the concession is only a par-
tial one - from here it does not automatically follow that there should be a
complete, self-sustained neutrality with respect to the reasonable: just as
tolerance, if it is not to become "mindless tolerance", must be contained
within a sphere of "non-tolerance", the reasonable also must be delimited
from the surrounding sphere of the unreasonable.
The third assumption, finally, takes up an assertion formulated by Barry,
concerning the question why common-sense morality sees a distinction
between avoiding a harm and promoting a good:

26
Herbert L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon 1963, p. 188.
27
Cf. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press
1993.
28
Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (note 9), p. 168.
 Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities 381

"The reason is, I suggest, that there is a great deal of disagreement about what
the good consists in, whereas people with a wide variety of conceptions of the
good can agree on the badness of harm." 2 9

Our negative road can, then, begin with the search for a conception of
the bad, i.e., of what it would be unreasonable to accept. Thus, it starts
from what is absolutely unreasonable, that is, from states of affairs that
would be unanimously rejected, regardless of a person's particular concep-
tion of the good - in other words, states of affairs whose acceptance would
be an "irrational perversion", to say it once again with an expression of
Georg Henrik von Wright. 3 0 Perhaps we could also speak of the "unrea-
sonable par excellence ". Von Wright himself explicitly states what kinds of
states of affairs could be included in that category: those that affect the
very basis of the survival of the human species.

After the barbarism of the holocaust, many authors have taken up the
idea of "radical evil", which Kant has expressed in his Die Religion inner-
halb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. The meaning of the expression has
been changed, however, since it is no longer referred only to that "insur-
mountable wickedness" inhabiting the human heart that cannot be "totally
eradicated" - a secularized version of the original sin - , but to absolute
evil, to the empirical evidence of evil.
The radically evil impedes the realization of any plan of life (plans of
life usually being manifestations of conceptions of the good). Thus, we can
say that for John Stuart M i l l , that great enemy of all kinds of paternalism,
slavery was one of the manifestations of that radical evil, and therefore he
denied the moral permissibility of voluntary slavery, arguing that liberty is
a necessary condition for the realizaton of any plan of life.
The negative road to the "restricted area" of basic rights by way of the
idea of radical evil is similar to that proposed by Partha Dasgupta:
"My idea is that by studying an extreme form of ill-being we can obtain an
understanding of well-being itself." 3 1

With respect to harm, there too seems to be basic agreement, whatever

the particular conception of the good people have. As Brian Barry
remarked on this point:
For justice as impartiality, however, the significance of harm lies in its being
recognized as bad within a wide variety of conceptions of the good ... It is quite

29
Ibid., p. 25.
30
Georg Henrik von Wright, "Science, Reason, and Value", in idem, The Tree of
Knowledge and other essays, Leiden/New York/Cologne: E. J. Brill 1993,
pp. 229 - 248, 247.
31
Partha Dasgupta, An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution, Oxford: Claren-
don 1993, p. 8.
382 Ernesto Garzón Valdés

often claimed in criticism of this move that the concept of harm cannot function
in this way because the content of 'harm' reflects the particular conception of the
good of the person employing the term. I have never, however, seen this assertion
backed up by convincing evidence, and I do not believe it could be. It is worth
noticing, for example, that every society falls back on a quite limited range of
punishment such as deprivation of money or property, physical confinement, loss
of bodily parts, pain, and death. Unless these were regarded by people with a
wide variety of conceptions of the good as evils, they would not function reliably
as punishments. It is also relevant that, even in societies with ideas about causa-
tion of harm that we do not share, the conception of the kinds of thing that con-
stitute harm is familiar." 3 2

That means that different moral conceptions differ less with respect to
what constitutes a harm than with respect to the reasons that justify harm
to be imposed on someone. Obviously, such reasons will be all the more
reasonable, the farther away they are from the context of the unreasonable.
On the basis of these reflexions, one could take the concept of unreason-
ableness as a criterion of incorrectness. Starting from the unreasonable par
excellence and its negation, the march of morality would then consist in
departing more and more from "irrational perversion" or "ill-being". 3 3 Each
step in that process can be said to be reasonable. And the specific steps to
be taken in order to progress in that direction will depend on the respective
situation in each society. This helps to explain why the demands of reason-
ableness may change with time and location. Insofar, A l f Ross was right
when he said that what can be reasonably expected depends on the con-
text. 3 4
In any case, two minimal conditions must be satisfied by the steps to be
taken:
a) They must not go against what, using Thomas Nagel's terminology,
can be called the "reasonable partiality" of all agents. 35 Moral norms do
not prescribe supererogatory behaviour, imposing on their addressees atti-
tudes of self-sacrifice that characterize heroes or saints. Thus, for example,

32
Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (note 9), p. 141.
33
The strategy of going from the extremely bad, over the minimally good, to the
best can be very fruitful. Thus, Dasgupta (note 31) starts from the concept of "ill-
being" in order to come to a better definition of "well-being". In the case of the
discussion about the universality of human rights, that has often been hampered by
the argument that they correspond to a conception of the good particular to Western
societies, the analysis of what is universally regarded as bad or harmful - for in-
stance: death, torture, misery - is also of use.
34
Cf. Alf Ross, "He could have acted otherwise", in Adolf J. Merkl (ed.), Fest-
schrift für Hans Kelsen zum 90. Geburtstag, Vienna: Deuticke 1971, pp. 242 - 261.
35
On this point, and on the "nonrejectability" conditions of moral norms and
their relation to the criterion of reasonableness, cf. Thomas Nagel, Equality and Par-
tiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991, pp. 38ff.
 Foundation and Limits of the Role of Minorities 383

however much human agents, addressees of moral norms, may respect the
life of others, they will give priority to the salvation of their own life.
Thus, it was probably because he did not take this aspect of reasonable
partiality into account that Max Weber thought that
"Das evangelische Gebot ist unbedingt und eindeutig: gib her, was du hast -
alles, schlechthin ... Eine Ethik der Würdelosigkeit - außer: für einen Heiligen.
Das ist es: man muß leben wie Jesus, die Apostel, der heilige Franz und seines-
gleichen, dann ist diese Ethik sinnvoll und Ausdruck einer Würde. Sonst nicht," 36

The criterion of reasonableness does not require that we go through this

world with a permanent cross on our back, nor that we renounce the satis-
faction of our own needs and wants in order to satisfy others' needs or
wants of the same order. The criterion of reasonableness, on the contrary,
prevents the world from becoming a "moral hell".
b) They must not lead to privileges that go beyond reasonable partiality
or even foster parasitic behaviour. While compliance with the first condi-
tion prevents the rise of a moral hell, the second prohibits the establishment
of "paradises of egoism" where the satisfaction of one's needs and wants is
obtained at the expense of the satisfaction of others' needs and wants of the
same order.
The criterion of reasonableness, thus understood, can serve as a guide
and filter for the selection of the rights to be contained in the "off limits"
area of the non-negotiable. Thus, there is no need to rely on consent or
dissent: what matters is the reasonableness of a proposal of inclusion.

VII. Once More: Minority Reaction as a Measure for

the Effective Validity of the "Off Limits"

If one accepts what has been said so far, in the context of a representa-
tive democracy that satisfies the conditions of a welfare state under the rule
of law minority reactions, as manifestations of dissent, are necessary, from
the point of view of political morality, if and only if:
(i) they are an expression of a lack of social homogeneity in the sense
exposed above, i.e., they indicate some relevant discrimination;
(ii) they are directed against a violation of the majority principle;
(iii) they bring to light that the application of some rule has unreasonable
consequences;

36
Max Weher, "Politik als Beruf', in Gesammelte politische Schriften (Johannes
Winckelmann, ed.), Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1958, pp. 505 -560,
550.
384 Ernesto Garzón Valdés

(iv) they give voice to a proposal to expand the "off limits", by way of a
deduction of new basic rights, or a description of a new factual con-
stellation that requires the inclusion of new rights into the "off limits".
They are acceptable from the point of view of political morality if they
are intended to support certain secondary wants, in a process of parliamen-
tary negotiation, or to change the agenda of topics to be discussed in parlia-
ment, in a popular vote.
They are unacceptable from the point of view of political morality if
(i) they are intended to advance claims to special privileges, that is, if
they demand that others sacrifice goods in order for the minority to
satisfy their own wants of the same order;
(ii) they attempt to replace the moral point of view with the exclusive
point of view of a particular culture, ethnic group or sex, i.e., to intro-
duce discriminations prohibited by the "off limits";
(iii) they make claims to collective moral rights allegedly existing indepen-
dently of the moral rights of individuals.
In this light, the role of minorities in a representative democracy satisfy-
ing the conditions of a welfare state under the rule of law (conditions that
should be emphasized once again) consists precisely in guarding against the
subversion of the system. In that sense, minorities have a stabilizing func-
tion: they can help to prevent the tyranny of the majority or, what would
be even worse, the suicide of democracy.
 ON HANS KELSEN'S ROLE I N THE FORMATION
OF THE AUSTRIAN CONSTITUTION AND HIS DEFENSE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

B y Stanley L . Paulson, St. Louis

I. Introduction: The Question of Kelsen's Role

Hans Kelsen (1881 - 1973), we are told, is the "creator o f the Austrian
Federal Constitution o f 1920", 1 but even today we k n o w less than we
w o u l d like to k n o w about exactly how the appellation "creator" is to be
understood. Some aspects o f Kelsen's activities are w e l l k n o w n - for exam-
ple, his crucial role as constitutional draftsman and legal advisor to Chan-
cellor K a r l Renner. 2 A t the same time, however, many o f the ideas and

1
As expressed, for example, in the Austrian Nationalrat or National Council (the
lower house of Parliament) on 30 September 1970; see Parlamentskorrespondenz,
1. Bogen, 30 September 1970, quoted in Felix Ermacora, Österreichs Bundesverfas-
sung und Hans Kelsen, in: Festschrift für Hans Kelsen zum 90. Geburtstag, ed.
Adolf J. Merkl et al. (Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1971), 22 - 54, at 22.
2
See e. g. Georg Froehlich, Hans Kelsen, and Adolf Merkl, Die Verfassungsge-
setze der Republik Österreich (Vienna and Leipzig: Franz Deuticke, 1922), at 53 -
287; Kelsen , Österreichisches Staatsrecht (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923, repr.
Aalen: Scientia, 1970), at 7 4 - 163; Ludwig Adamovich, Die Prüfung der Gesetze
und Verordnungen durch den österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshof (Leipzig and
Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1924). In the recent secondary and documentary literature,
see e.g. Ermacora (FN 1); Quellen zum österreichischen Verfassungsrecht (1920),
ed. Felix Ermacora (Vienna: Ferdinand Berger & Söhne, 1967); Herbert Haller, Die
Prüfung von Gesetzen (Vienna: Springer, 1979); Felix Ermacora, Zur Entstehung,
in: Das österreichische Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und seine Entwicklung, ed. Her-
bert Schambeck (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980), 3 - 31; Georg Schmitz, Die
Vorentwürfe Hans Kelsens für die österreichische Bundesverfassung (Vienna: Manz,
1981); Die österreichische Bundesverfassung und Hans Kelsen. Analysen und Mate-
rialien. Zum 100. Geburtstag von Hans Kelsen, ed. Felix Ermacora and Christiane
Wirth (Vienna: Braumüller, 1982); Robert Walter, Die Entstehung des Bundes-Ver-
fassungsgesetzes 1920 in der Konstituierenden Nationalversammlung (Vienna:
Manz, 1984); Felix Ermacora, Die Entstehung der Bundesverfassung 1920, vols. 1 -
4 and Register (Vienna: Braumüller, 1989 - 93); Christian Neschwara, Zur Entwick-
lung des Verfassungsrechts nach 1918, in: Parlamentarismus und öffentliches Recht
in Österreich. Entwicklung und Gegenwartsprobleme, ed. Herbert Schambeck (Ber-
lin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993), vol. 1 (Erster Teilband), 83-219, at 9 6 - 132;

26 FS Aarnio
386 Stanley L. Paulson

leitmotifs underlying the Austrian Federal Constitution and, in particular,

its Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) are traceable to sources3
that antedate the constitutional developments in Austria immediately fol-
lowing World War I. And it is here, where Kelsen's use of these sources is
concerned, that we know a good bit less than we would like to know. In
these brief remarks, I touch on two aspects of the question of "Kelsen qua
creator" - first, his work as draftsman of the Constitution of 1920, and,
second, the sources of some of the ideas underlying the Constitutional
Court. I then turn to an aspect of his defense of constitutional review.

II. Kelsen as Draftsman

The Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed in October-November of 1918, a

breakup into national divisions that had been anticipated by the Allied
powers in the spring of that year. 4 One of these national divisions was the
post-War Austrian state - "German-Austria" (Deutschösterreich), as it was
known before the Treaty of St. Germain brought to an end the idea, wide-
spread among the Austrians, of joining Germany. A Provisional National
Assembly had already been formed on 21 October, and the Assembly took
a second decision nine days later, declaring that it would assume govern-
mental power in the post-War Austrian state. In a third decision, on
12 November, the Assembly expressly declared that the state would adopt a
republican form of government. The provisional constitution consisted not
of a single document but of these and other fundamental decisions, embod-
ied in statutes.5 The greater effort in constitution-building lay ahead, and in
February of 1919, members were elected to a Constituting National Assem-
bly for the express purpose of framing a new constitution. On 14 March,
this National Assembly brought about political reforms by enacting, in par-
liament, constitutional laws to govern popular representation and to admin-
ister the federal government. With that accomplished, and looking now to a
new constitution, Karl Renner turned to the 36-year-old Hans Kelsen,
außerordentlicher Professor at the University of Vienna and already a

Günther Schefbeck, Verfassungsentwicklung 1918 - 1920, in: 75 Jahre Bundesver-

fassung. Festschrift aus Anlaß des 75. Jahrestages der Beschlußfassung über das
Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, ed. Schefbeck (Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei,
1995), 53 - 107.
3
See generally the sketch in Haller (FN 2), at 4 - 67.
4
See Robert Α. Kann , A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526- 1918 (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), at 497 - 517; Barbara Jela-
vich, Modern Austria. Empire & Republic 1815 - 1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1987), at 130- 143.
5
See generally Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Verfassung der Republik Deutschöster-
reich (Vienna and Leipzig: Franz Deuticke, 1919).
 On Hans Kelsen's Role in the Formation of the Austrian Constitution 387

figure to reckon with in Austrian public law and general legal theory. 6
Kelsen himself, who in addition to his professorial duties was working at
the time in the Chancellor's legal office, recounts what happened. "In May
of 1919," he writes, " I received instructions from the Chancellor to draft a
federal constitution, following up on my earlier preparation of certain pre-
liminary studies. In the course of the summer of 1919, with the help of the
constitutional department in the Chancellor's offices, I completed the draft,
and throughout the fall it was supplemented by several other drafts that
were supposed to represent variations on the basic theme and to take
account of the various political possibilities. My guideline was to preserve
everything usable from the earlier constitution, to maintain as much conti-
nuity of constitutional institutions as possible, to incorporate the principle
of federalism into the existing tried and true, and, in the effort, to lean on
the Swiss but even more on the new German Constitution as far as I could,
considering the differences in the respective historico-political conditions." 7

There are two points of special interest in Kelsen's statement. First, the
reference to various drafts that, inter alia, took account of the various
"political possibilities" suggests the role of political compromise between
and among the major parties in arriving at a constitutional draft acceptable
to all. Kelsen played an absolutely fundamental role here, first as draftsman
and later as negotiator. Although historians and constitutional lawyers had
assumed for decades that Kelsen's own constitutional drafts were lost, in
April of 1977 Georg Schmitz stumbled on to these drafts in the administra-
tive archives in Vienna. The result, thanks to Schmitz's painstaking efforts
in recording his discovery, 8 is a full record of no fewer than five 9 drafts in
Kelsen's own hand. The first of these, which Kelsen refers to as "the draft"

6
Entirely a matter of coincidence, the year 1919 is also of special interest vis-à-
vis Kelsen's work as a legal theorist, for it marks the end of his "first phase" and
the beginnings of his classical period - namely, the Pure Theory of Law, with its
normative dimension supported by Kantian and neo-Kantian doctrines, and its struc-
tural dimension supported by Kelsen's adoption of Merkl's Stufenbaulehre or doc-
trine of hierarchical structure (see on the latter the text at FN 25 below). See gener-
ally Stanley L. Paulson, The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsen's Pure Theory of
Law, in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 12 (1992), 311 - 332; Paulson, Kelsen's
Earliest Legal Theory: Critical Constructivism, in: Modern Law Review, 59 (1996),
797- 812; Carsten Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache (Baden-Baden: Nomos,
1997), 19-20, 23 - 24, 43 - 5 5 , et passim. For a remarkably lucid general statement
on Kelsen's theory, see Raymond Wacks, Jurisprudence, 4th edn. (London: Black-
stone Press, 1995), at 69 - 90, 93.
7
Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht (FN 2), 160-161.
8
See Schmitz (FN 2).
9
There is an actual count of six drafts, but the fourth, inexplicably, is a carbon
copy of the first; see Schmitz (FN 2), at 56, and Ermacora, Die Entstehung der
Bundesverfassung 1920 (FN 2), vol. 1, at 61 - 243.

26*
388 Stanley L. Paulson

in the quotation above, was completed in the summer of 1919, and the
other four were completed by Kelsen by the middle of September. These
drafts spoke to different interests, reflecting Kelsen's keen awareness of the
various "political possibilities" to be considered. For example, the first
draft was distinguished by the particularly favourable treatment it accorded
to the Länder ,10 the second draft, by contrast, marks a strengthening of the
ties of the Länder to the federal unit and contains a supremacy clause,
namely, that Land law yields to federal law (Bundesrecht bricht Landes-
recht), and the fifth draft reflects, more than any of the others, the influ-
ence of the new Weimar Constitution. 11 In addition to his work as drafts-
man, Kelsen played an equally fundamental role as negotiator, when, in the
fall of 1920, he worked out a compromise between the views of the Social
Democratic Party and those of the Christian Social Party, melding their
respective drafts into a single instrument 12 that ultimately won the approval
of the Provisional Assembly and emerged as the Austrian Federal Constitu-
tion of October 1920.
A second point of interest in Kelsen's statement is his reference to his
guideline, namely, preserving all that could be preserved from the earlier
constitution and from the constitutional tradition, and drawing as much as
possible on the Swiss and German constitutions. This suggests the extent to
which Kelsen's enterprise here was derivative.

III. The Ideas Underlying the High Court

Arguably, however, Kelsen's work on the Constitutional Court was differ-

ent. Notwithstanding a significant precursor in the 1867 Court (Reichsge-
richt) of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Constitutional Court set out in
the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920 marked a new beginning. For it
was equipped, unlike its precursor, with a constitutional reviewing power
reaching to federal legislation. What is more, since the Constitutional Court

10
In this respect the first draft reflects Kelsen's earlier Gutachten or expert opi-
nion, published under the title Die Stellung der Länder in der künftigen Verfassung
Deutschösterreichs, in: Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 1 (1919-20), 9 8 - 122,
where he argued that if Austria were not permitted to join the post-War German
state, then a federal constitution along the lines of the Swiss Constitution would be
the best alternative. See Gerald Stourzh, Hans Kelsen, die österreichische Bundes-
verfassung, und die rechtsstaatliche Demokratie, in: Die Reine Rechtslehre in wis-
senschaftlicher Diskussion (Vienna: Manz, 1982), 7 - 29; Schmitz (FN 2), at 49.
11
In particular, its sections on "the administration of the federal government"
and on "basic rights and obligations" reflect the Weimar Constitution's sections on
"the Reich administration" (arts. 78 - 101) and "basic rights and obligations"
(arts. 109 - 165) respectively; see Schmitz (FN 2), at 58.
12
For details see Ermacora (FN 1), at 25 - 48.
 On Hans Kelsen's Role in the Formation of the Austrian Constitution 389

is the only judicial body in the land with such a power, it can be character-
ized in terms of what has come to be known as the "centralized" model, 13
in contradistinction to the "decentralized" model familiar from the United
States, where all courts of general jurisdiction - federal and State courts
alike - exercise a constitutional reviewing power. The centralized model
has proved to be influential. It was adopted after World War I I by Ger-
many, Italy, and, more recently, Spain; and today the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) is seen the world over as
exemplary. 14
What can be said on the question of Kelsen's creativity here? It is well
known that he championed the Constitutional Court and, in his role as
negotiator, argued forcefully for his views; his suggested changes were
adopted without exception by the Constitutional Subcommittee, which is to
say that the "Chapter V I " provisions on the Constitutional Court (arts. 137 -
148) took the form he had defended. 15 In a radio address a half century
later, Kelsen remarked that in his work on the Constitution he had "cared
most deeply of all" about constitutional review, and had regarded it as his
"most personal contribution". 16 To a colleague, Kelsen remarked that con-
stitutional review had been his "dearest child". 1 7

Still, many of the Court's leitmotifs can be traced to earlier writers and
developments. First, there are ideas in the work of Robert von Mohl
(1799- 1875) that point in the direction of constitutional review; 1 8 and 35
years before the Austrian Court was established, Georg Jellinek (1851 -
1911) wrote a short monograph on a "constitutional court for Austria", 1 9
directly anticipating the development of 1920. Moreover, certain ideas

13
See generally the lucid account in Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the
Contemporary World (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), esp. at 45 - 100.
14
Its prestige is recorded, inter alia, in two major works on the German Constitu-
tion and its High Court that were written and published in the United States, a
country not generally known for its interest in other countries' legal systems. See
David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Donald P. Kommers, The Consti-
tutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2nd edn. (Durham and
London: Duke UP, 1997).
15
See Ermacora (FN 1), at 43 - 48.
16
Hans Kelsen, Wiedergabe einer Sendung des Österreichischen Rundfunks,
8 May 1973, in: Walter Antonioiii et al., Hans Kelsen zum Gedenken (Vienna:
Europaverlag, 1974), 47 - 74, at 50.
17
Rudolf Métall, Hans Kelsen - ein österreichisches Schicksal, in: Der Staatsbür-
ger, Beilage der Salzburger Nachrichten, 12 September 1967, page 2.
18
See e.g. Robert von Mohl, Das Staatsrecht des Königreiches Württemberg,
2nd edn. (Tübingen: H. Laupp, 1840), 2 vols.
19
Georg Jellinek, Ein Verfassungsgerichtshof für Österreich (Vienna: Α. Holder,
1885).
390 Stanley L. Paulson

expressed in the constitutional provisions pertaining to the Constitutional

Court appear to stem from Karl Renner - for example, the idea that the
Constitutional Court is to serve as a forum in disputes over the respective
powers of the federal government and the Land governments. 20 And a
little-known prototype of the Austrian Constitutional Court can be found in
the 1918-19 Constitution of Czechoslovakia; the statute of 9 March 1920,
implementing a constitutional provision by setting out the details of a con-
stitutional court, antedates the Austrian Court, marking the Czechoslovak
Court as, stricto sensu, the first of its kind. 2 1 It is of interest here that
Franz Weyr (1879 - 1951) of Brno, himself a legal theorist of considerable
significance and a close friend of Kelsen's, played a key role in the devel-
opments leading to the Czechoslovak Court. Restating the general point, we
know less about the measure of creativity in Kelsen's work on the Austrian
Constitutional Court than we would like to know. Close attention will have
to be paid to Kelsen's predecessors in the field, who have not been criti-
cally examined in the scholarship of our day. The neglect of Georg Jelli-
nek, in particular, is regrettable and surprising. 22

IV. The Defense of Constitutional Review

We know a good bit more about Kelsen's explication and defense of the
idea of constitutional review, thanks to several key papers that he wrote
during the time remaining to him in Vienna and Cologne (1920- 1933). 23

20
See Karl Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer An-
wendung auf Österreich (Leipzig and Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1918), at 291 -294.
(The book first appeared under a pseudonym in 1902.) On Renner see Haller
(FN 2), at 36 - 39.
21
See e.g. Franz Weyr, Das Verfassungsrecht der Tschechoslowakischen Repub-
lik, in: Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 2 (1921), 1 - 38. Haller (FN 2), at 61 - 67,
discusses the Czechoslovak Court. See also Theo Öhlinger, Verfassungsgerichtsbar-
keit und parlamentarische Demokratie, in: Im Dienst an Staat und Recht. Internatio-
nale Festschrift Erwin Melichar zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Heinz Schäffer et al.
(Vienna: Manz, 1983), 125 - 148, at 128; Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review
in Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989), at 190- 191, 195 - 197;
Cappelletti (FN 13), at 50.
22
There is, I hasten to add, a bright spot here. Walter Pauly has undertaken the
work of having Jellinek's writings reprinted, and he has added valuable scholarly
introductions. See e.g. Georg Jellinek , Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungswand-
lung, ed. with an introduction by Walter Pauly (Goldbach: Keip Verlag, 1996); the
work first appeared in 1906.
23
See, in particular, Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit,
in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer [hereafter:
VVDSRL], 5 (1929), 30- 88, repr. in: Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, ed.
Hans Klecatsky et al. (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1968), vol. 2 [hereafter: WS 2],
1813-1871. See also Kelsen, Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein? in: Die
 On Hans Kelsen's Role in the Formation of the Austrian Constitution 391

Constitutional review, he writes, serves as "a judicial guarantee of the con-

stitution"; it is, in other words, one of a number of "juridico-technical meas-
ures whose purpose is to assure the legality" of those functions of the state
that are carried out in the name of the law. 2 4 Filling in the juridico-theoreti-
cal backdrop to Kelsen's theory of constitutional review, I begin with a
brief examination of the doctrine of hierarchical structure and, part and
parcel thereof, Kelsen's idea of the nature of a constitution. I then turn to
Kelsen's replies to a familiar objection raised against constitutional review,
and close with remarks on Kelsen's decidedly sceptical attitude toward the
value-laden provisions found in the modern constitution.

7. Hierarchical Structure and the Nature of the Constitution

Kelsen took over the Stufenbaulehre or doctrine of hierarchical structure

from his gifted colleague Adolf Julius Merkl. 2 5 The doctrine offers a
dynamic characterization of the law - a view of the law "in motion, in the
constantly regenerating process of its self-creation". 26 In the "Foreword" to
the 1923 second printing of his Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre , first
published in 1911, Kelsen explains how he came to adopt Merkl's doc-
trine. 27 He had considered only general legal norms in the Hauptprobleme,
arguing there that individual legal acts - later "individual legal norms" -

Justiz, 6 (1930 - 31), 576 - 628, reprinted with the addition of an introductory para-
graph as a self-contained work (Berlin-Grunewald: Walther Rothschild, 1931); this
latter version is reprinted, in turn, in: WS 2, loc. cit., 1873 - 1922. Finally, one later
work of Kelsen's ought to be mentioned: Judicial Review of Legislation. A Com-
parative Study of the Austrian and the American Constitution, in: Journal of Poli-
tics, 4 (1942), 183 -200.
24
Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung (FN 23), VVDSRL, 30, WS 2, 1813.
25
See e.g. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Springer, 1925, repr. Bad
Homburg v. d. Höhe: Max Gehlen, 1966), at §§ 33 - 36 (pp. 231 - 255), and see
note to § 33 (at p. 402). See also Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal
Theory, trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1992), at §§ 31 - 33 (pp. 63 - 78), § 43 (pp. 91 - 92); the work is a trans-
lation of the First Edition of Kelsen's Reine Rechtslehre (published in 1934).
Merkl's most complete statement of the doctrine appears under the title "Prolego-
mena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues", in: Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht.
Untersuchungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre, ed. Alfred Verdross (Vienna: Springer,
1931) 252 - 294, repr. WS 2 (FN 23), 1311 - 1361. See generally Werner Krawietz,
Recht als Regelsystem (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1984), at 133 - 143.
26
Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (FN 25), § 43 (p. 91).
27
See Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 2nd printing (Tübingen:
J. C. B. Mohr, 1923), ν - xxiii, at xii - xvi; the "Vorrede" to which I allude in the
text appears in English translation in: Normativity and Norms. Critical Perspectives
on Kelsenian Themes, ed. Stanley L. Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press [at the
pressi).
392 Stanley L. Paulson

required no special attention, for they were "already determined" in

abstracto in the general norms and so nothing more need be said about
them. In retrospect, Kelsen sees that to have ignored individual legal acts
was eo ipso to have ignored an entire spectrum of norms between general
statutory provision and concrete legal act. The only way to set things
straight, Kelsen now argues, is to introduce a graduated scheme that exhi-
bits all the levels of legal norm in the legal system, from the most general
constitutional and legislative norms to the most concrete legal acts. Merkl's
Stufenbaulehre , a doctrine of hierarchical structure, filled the bill.
The leitmotif associated with the doctrine is that "the law regulates its
own creation". That is, one legal norm governs the process whereby
another legal norm is created - and the idea applies to the full range of
legal norms in the hierarchical structure. The effect of this dynamic concep-
tion, reaching all the way up and down the hierarchy, is to relativize the
differences between law creation and law application, and thereby to relati-
vize the standing of the different species of law themselves. Legislation in
particular, the standard-bearer of nineteenth-century statutory positivism,
loses its privileged position.
Only from the vantage point of the "theory of hierarchy" is the immanent
meaning of the concept of the constitution accessible, as Kelsen argues in his
important paper on constitutional review. 28 For it is the constitution that is
the fundamental rule - more precisely, the set of fundamental rules - deter-
mining the organs and procedures of legislation. Specifically, Kelsen con-
tinues, this is the "original and narrower concept of the constitution". 29 A
wider concept of the constitution includes, in addition to the norms
addressed to the organs and procedures of legislation, a catalogue of basic
rights. 30 Strictly speaking, Kelsen contends, basic rights and freedoms repre-
sent certain constraints on the scope or manner of exercise of legal powers. 31

2. Objection and Reply

Next, in his paper on constitutional review, Kelsen addresses a familiar

objection to the practice. A constitutional court, it is contended, "cannot be
reconciled with the sovereignty of parliament or - in the case of direct
representation - with the sovereignty of the people." 32 In a more recent

28
Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung (FN 23), VVDSLR, 36, WS 2, 1819.
29
Ibid.
30
Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung (FN 23), VVDSRL, 37, WS 2, 1819.
31
This view of the nature of basic rights and freedoms in the law is also de-
fended by H. L. A. Hart; see The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961),
at 68 et passim.
32
Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung (FN 23), VVDSRL, 53, WS 2, 1836.
 On Hans Kelsen's Role in the Formation of the Austrian Constitution 393

statement of the same sort of objection, Alexander Bickel writes that the
"root difficulty" with constitutional review is that it is "a countermajoritar-
ian force" in the legal system. "[W]hen the Supreme Court declares uncon-
stitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts
the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exer-
cises control, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but against i t . " 3 3

Kelsen argues that the objection has no force. His first counterargument
is this. Sovereignty, if attributable at all, is attributable to the legal system
as a whole. Then, however, the objection to constitutional review vanishes
as soon as one sees that "the constitution determines the procedure of legis-
lation in essentially the same way as statutes determine the procedure of
the courts and administrative authorities". 34 In other words, the requirement
that statutory law conform to the constitution is precisely parallel to the
requirement that judicial decisions and administrative regulations conform
to statutory law. Since these are parallel, and since no objection to the
latter requirement is warranted, no objection to the former requirement is
warranted either.

This first counterargument of Kelsen's falls on deaf ears. Today it is

granted by all parties to the debate that structural parallels like these under-
lie justifications of constitutional review in certain areas. The most obvious
area is federalism, where Kelsen is on common ground with Justice Joseph
Story, whose opinion in Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee35 is the locus classicus
on American constitutional review in the context of federalism. Kelsen
writes that "constitutional review reaches its greatest significance in a fed-
eral system"; indeed, the political idea of federalism "is, in terms of the
law, only brought to completion with the institution of the constitutional
court." 3 6 If the federal system had no capacity to settle disputes between a
State or Land and the federal government, not only would the uniformity of
the law be undermined, but the integrity of the federal system might well
be threatened; precisely this risk had been posed, in the name of nullifica-
tion, in early nineteenth-century America.

33
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis and New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), 16- 17.
34
Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung (FN 23), VVDSLR, 53, WS 2, 1837.
35
United States Reports, 14 (1816), 304-382. Story upheld the constitutionality
of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 against a challenge from the Virginia
Court of Appeals. Section 25 had provided for Supreme Court review of the deci-
sions by the highest State courts on questions of federal law where, inter alia, the
validity of a title or right established by federal law is drawn into question by the
State court decision.
36
Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung (FN 23), VVDSRL, 81, WS 2, 1865 (Kelsen's
profuse emphasis omitted).
394 Stanley L. Paulson

To repeat, this issue is not in dispute today. 37 What is disputed is the

judiciary's "usurpation" of popular sovereignty. And this takes us to
Kelsen's second counterargument in the paper on constitutional review. In
so far as constitutional review serves to guarantee "the constitutionality of
both the formation and, especially, the content of statutes", it provides "the
minority with effective protection against the excesses of the majority,
whose rule is tolerable only if conducted legally." 3 8 It would appear that
this reply of Kelsen's to the objection to constitutional review is uncontro-
versial to the extent that the constitutionally protected basic right invoked
on behalf of the minority is uncontroversial.

First appearances, however, can be deceptive. Even in the case of consti-

tutionally protected basic rights that are uncontroversial, Kelsen's argument
on behalf of minorities is less than convincing. For elsewhere in the paper
on constitutional review, he expresses great scepticism about whether "the
ideals of 'justice', 'freedom', 'equality', 'equity', 'morality', and the like"
are legally explicable at all, arguing at one point that these "formulae"
represent nothing "more than a typical political ideology." 3 9 If a constitu-
tional court had the power to apply these formulae, open-ended as they are,
the result would be tantamount to a grant of "absolute power", an alto-
gether "intolerable" state of affairs. 40

Kelsen's concern is understandable, but the source of his concern, an all

but rabid moral scepticism, 41 gives one pause. The difficulties here are best
understood by evaluating Kelsen's project, constitutional review, from the
broader perspective of constitutionalism. In his splendid little book, Consti-
tutionalism. Ancient and Modern, Charles Howard Mcllwain argues that
"constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on gov-
ernment". 42 If, however, one takes constitutionalism further, 43 understand-

37
For the Austrian context, see e.g. Öhlinger (FN 21), at 146 - 147.
38
Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung (FN 23), VVDSRL, 8 0 - 8 1 , WS 2, 1864
(Kelsen's profuse emphasis omitted).
39
Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung (FN 23), VVDSRL, 69, WS 2, 1852.
40
Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung (FN 23), VVDSRL, 70, WS 2, 1853.
41
For effective criticism of Kelsen here, see Peter Koller, Zu einigen Problemen
der Rechtfertigung der Demokratie, in: Ideologiekritik und Demokratietheorie bei
Hans Kelsen (Rechtstheorie Beiheft 4), ed. Werner Krawietz et al. (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1982), 319 - 343, at 323 - 326.
42
Charles Howard Mcllwain, Constitutionalism. Ancient and Modern (Ithaca,
New York: Cornell UP, 1940), 24.
43
See e.g. Ralf Dreier, Konstitutionalismus und Legalismus. Zwei Arten juris-
tischen Denkens im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat, in Konstitutionalismus versus
Legalismus? (ARSP Beiheft Nr. 40), ed. Eugene E. Dias et al. (Stuttgart: Franz
Steiner, 1991), 85 - 9 7 ; Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1985); Thomas C. Grey, Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework, in:
 On Hans Kelsen's Role in the Formation of the Austrian Constitution 395

ing it to represent not just the requirement of legality but also a "constitu-
tionalization" of fundamental values, with an eye to constitutional protec-
tion of fundamental rights, then it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
Kelsen takes back in the name of moral scepticism some of what he has
given us under the rubric of constitutional review.

Constitutionalism (Nomos XX), ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman

(New York: New York UP, 1979), 189 - 209, at 201 - 207.
 NORMATIVE SOCIOLOGY

By Kauko Pietilä, Tampere

I. Social Responsibility

Aulis Aarnio alleges, in his volume The Rational as Reasonable (1987,

10), that the "perspective of legal dogmatics is essentially different from
that which is typical of social science".
With the notions of legal dogmatics and social science, Aarnio gives us a
pair of opposites, a contrast that he happens to embody, through an ironic
turn of fortunes, in his own person and career. As a scientist, Aarnio is
renowned legal dogmatist. Today, he is also the head of an establishment
called the Research Institute for Social Sciences, at the University of Tam-
pere. Given Aarnio's idea of an essential difference between legal and
social sciences and his energetic attempt to mark off the former as opposed
to the latter, the matrimony of the two disciplines in his person seems
rather odd; demarcation in theory, alignment in practice. But even if
Aarnio's theory of legal dogmatics separates legal science from social
science, it gives the former another 'social' associate; another 'social' con-
cept in Aarnio's volume carries the label 'social responsibility'. With this
idea - the social responsibility to give proper justification for decisions -
he burdens interpreters of law, both scholars and judicial and administrative
officials. The problem of societal responsibility is, Aarnio says (p. xv),
"linked ... to the very concept of democracy": Even in a democratic
society, most people have little real influence on the wielding of power,
few effective means to take part in decision-making. Parallel to this aliena-
tion runs the strengthening of the bureaucratic machinery with its legions
of specialists and experts; laypersons' possibilities to control the adminis-
trative and adjudicative activities are meagre. In this situation, Aarnio con-
tinues (p. xvi),
one possibility to open the control and to make it public is to demand a proper
justification for decisions. The reasoning behind the conclusion of the decision
must be opened to public inspection. As an opposite to a closed and undemo-
cratic system we can then speak of "an open society".

Now where does this idea of social responsibility come from? What kind
of argument is it to begin with? It does not derive, not at least directly,
398 Kauko Pietilä

from w i t h i n legal dogmatics itself, w h i c h studies legal norms and attempts

to clarify the content o f valid l a w . 1

I n order to elucidate the nature o f this 'social responsibility', let me

return to the start, to the fundamental difference between legal dogmatics
and social science. W h a t does it mean that the disciplines have essentially
different perspectives? W h a t are their respective perspectives? Are they, all
things considered, primarily different, or have they fundamental points i n
common?

II. Different and Widely Apart?

The normal way i n social science is, Aarnio says (p. 10), to ask, for
instance, 'What happens?' or ' W h a t regularities can we find here?', whereas
legal dogmatics does something else. W e shall learn more o f legal dogmatics
i n a while. B u t w i t h regard to social science, both the things that happen, and
the regularities to be found, refer to people's actions or behaviour; the
principal purpose o f social science is to clarify "regularities (invariances)
i n b e h a v i o r " . 2 I n this endeavour, social scientists represent, to Aarnio, " a
typically external point o f v i e w on the subject o f i n q u i r y " (1987, 10); they
have " a clearly external perspective on society and legal norms" (p. 11).

1
The social responsibility to present proper justifications does not follow from
Aarnio's key regulative principle, which says (p. 227 ; italics KP) that legal dog-
matics "ought to attempt to reach such legal interpretations that could secure the
support of the majority in a rationally reasoning legal community." Aarnio empha-
sises himself the conditionally of statements of legal dogmatics (p. 228; original
italics): " I f the standpoint would be accepted by the majority ... it would be the
most relevant of all rival standpoints concerning [a particular] legal problem." The
theory of rational acceptability is concerned with yardsticks of reasonableness and
criticism (p. 229), not with the actual dialogues in which the yardsticks could or
should be used. An obligation to such dialogues, a social responsibility to present
proper justifications, does not derive from the theory of rational acceptability - nor,
as far as I can see, from any other theory of legal dogmatics. Aarnio says (p. 229),
and I agree, that legal interpretations "can be criticized by means of rational accept-
ability"; but acceptability as a goal does not demand, or oblige anybody to initiate,
discussions about the reasonableness of decisions. We might say that people in gen-
eral demand justifications, and decision-makers comply. But the obligation does not
vanish even if such demands were heard only rarely, or requests were systemati-
cally repressed. The problem remains: Where does the social responsibility come
from?
2
Aarnio says (1993, 698) that the difference between legal dogmatics and sociol-
ogy of law is in that legal dogmatics "is interested in rules, whereas sociology of
law discusses regularities (invariances), that is, the ways in which individuals or
groups behave." The sociology (of law) "describes, explains and predicts individ-
uals', groups' or institutions' action", a problematic which is of no consequence to
legal dogmatics that takes to answering the normative question "What ought to be
done in situation X?".
 Normative Sociology 399

I have no doubt that Aarnio's description of social sciences - that they

adopt an external point of view - corresponds to significant parts of the
social sciences really both in their idiographic (What happens?) and their
nomothetic (What are the regularities?) variants. But other approaches
exist, too, and this does not escape Aarnio's attention. He refers to Peter
Winch's Wittgensteinian comment (1976, 8 6 - 9 1 ) on J. S. Mill's view
(1886) that "understanding a social institution consists in observing regular-
ities in the behaviour of its participants and expressing these regularities in
the form of generalizations". Observing any regularities presupposes, says
Winch, that it can be deemed "that, in two situations, the same thing has
happened"; this judgement requires concepts or criteria. The concepts or
criteria, says Winch, "must be understood in relation to the rules governing
sociological investigation ". At this very point, however, the sociologist
runs up against a difficulty when compared to a natural scientist. The latter
can manage with only one set of rules, "namely those governing the scien-
tist's investigation itself', whereas what the sociologist is studying, as well
as his/her study of it, "is a human activity and is therefore carried on
according to rules". And, concludes Winch, it is the rules governing the
activity under the sociologist's investigation, "rather than those which
govern the sociologist's investigation, which specify what is to count as
'doing the same kind of thing' in relation to that kind of activity". Clearly
a sociologist who takes Winch's advice seriously can no longer retain an
external stand in relation to the subject matter. Due to this, Aarnio makes a
concession: "Not even a social scientist can be a pure representative of the
external point of view."

Aarnio makes his concession, however, reluctantly. Winch and his ideas
notwithstanding, Aarnio thinks (1987, 12) that the social sciences differ "in
a radical way" from what judges or administrative officials are doing with
regard to legal norms . Social scientists (some of them) are studying "how
other subjects are bound by legal norms", whereas a judge's question is
"What legal norms bind me as an authoritative decision-maker in this very
case?". What about legal dogmatists: do they ask the same question as a
judge?

It does not matter here whether it is question of the so-called primary

norms addressed to all citizens (for instance, "Thou shalt not steal"), or
the corresponding secondary norms directed at authorities (for instance,
" I f someone takes the property of another without permission, he shall be
sentenced to X time units of imprisonment", see Aarnio 1987, 62). In
both cases, the legal dogmatist seems at first sight to be considering norms
that are, or ought to be, observed by other people, citizens and/or
authorities; the dogmatist and the judge would not be asking the same
question.
400 Kauko Pietilä

From an epistemological point of view, however, the answer must be in

the affirmative; "when clarifying the content of the legal order the legal
dogmatician and the judge think in a similar way" (Aarnio 1987, 17). This
means that the scholar addresses him/herself essentially to the same ques-
tion as a judge: 'If I were a judge, what legal norms would bind me as an
authoritative decision-maker in this very case?'. It is here that Aarnio
thinks (p. 12) that he finds the decisive difference between a typical social
science, sociology for example, and legal dogmatics: "the research interest
of legal dogmatics is normative in quite another sense than the interest of
sociology" (italics KP; the same point is emphasised by Jyränki 1996, 44). 3
Indeed, Winch's ideas do not lend to the social sciences any normativeness.
Aarnio says himself (p. 13):
Although the social scientist is, in the Winchian sense, "inside" of the (social)
system, he does not have this kind of interest in interpretation [an interest that
aims at finding out the content of valid law]. Hence, compared with the social
scientist, the legal dogmatician sees the problem from a genuine internal point of
view.

The social scientist according to Aarnio's construction has no notion

comparable to the idea of valid law; hence, social science seems to be a
non-normative pursuit. Legal dogmatics dwells in the domain of the
"Ought"; social science in that of the "Is". Legal dogmatics studies legal
norms; and legal norms have a tripartite structure with an element of ought
(1987, 6 2 - 3 ) :
legal fact (F) (e.g., element of ought (O) legal consequence (G)
someone taking property (that someone shall be (X time units of impri-
of another without per- sentenced) sonment)
mission)

Aarnio says (p. 62) that the relation of legal facts to legal consequences
is not the same as the causal relation between facts and consequences in
nature. "The connecting factor 'ought' separates this legal relation from
that of cause and effect. In this sense there is a clear demarcation line
between 'Is' and 'Ought'." (He has recently emphatically reemphasised this
fundamental point, see 1996, 224.) The element of ought obliges authori-
ties, if definite factual conditions are fulfilled, to take specific action with

3
Aarnio' s treatise The Rational as Reasonable was published in 1987. Since
then, particularly after being appointed the head of the Research Institute for Social
Sciences in 1991, he substantially changed his view of the social sciences, regard-
ing social science and legal dogmatics as theoretically similar rather than contrast-
ing ventures (see Aarnio 1993). The idea of social science in The Rational as Rea-
sonable is that of an empirical social science; later, the idea of a theoretical social
science becomes predominant. What remains, however, of the earlier notion is that
the concepts of legal dogmatics are normative, whereas those of social science are
descriptive (p. 710).
 Normative Sociology 401

determined repercussions. In a legal order, authoritative decision-makers

cannot do anything whatsoever but are bound to do the prescribed things;
more generally, legal authorities, as well as legal dogmatists, are bound to
intend legal order.
What about society? Are the relations between societal facts and societal
consequences causal relations, or relations of ought? Now this depends on
how you understand the thing that social science, sociology for instance,
studies. One of your possibilities is to say as Aarnio (ante 1991) that
sociology describes, explains and predicts the actions of individuals, groups
or institutions. Another prospect opens up if you say that it is society that
sociology studies, in this sense (Aarnio post 1991, that is to say 1993,
696):
Society as such is ... not an ontologically empirical object to which statements
could refer. We cannot observe society in itself... Society is a theoretical object ,
which manifests itself in phenomena studied in empirical research. ...Social
science's question is: What kind of society comes into being in people's particu-
lar behaviour, in the interaction between them?

This notion comes close to the idea of legal dogmatics that cannot
observe norms as perceptual entities either, but is bound to study norm
expressions in order to find out what are the (valid) norms. In this activity,
legal dogmatics intends , so to say, valid legal order; it can be thought, ana-
logously, that sociology intends society in its research process - tries to
find out what is, at least, the actual society. If sociologists are able to
intend society, the same opportunity must be open to even other people.
This renders accessible the possibility that society could be, in principle,
established or instituted deliberately in purposeful action. In that case it is
possible that the relations between societal facts and societal consequences
are deontic ones. But then the question arises as to who is or are (to be) the
actor or actors whose purposeful action establishes the thing called society.

III. From the Science of Police to Sociology

"It was the breakdown", says Bauman (1992, 6),

of self-enclosed communities and the ensuing appearance of the 'masterless men'
- vagabonds, vagrants, shifting population nowhere at home, belonging to no spe-
cific community or corporation, at no locality subject to continuous and all-
embracing surveillance - that rendered the issue of social control, and of the
reproduction of social order, problematic. The heretofore invisible, 'natural' flow
of things had been brought abruptly into relief as a 'mechanism' - something to
be designed, administered and monitored, something not functioning, or not func-
tioning properly, unless attended to and operated skilfully. The timeless, yet never
before problematized, control through surveillance, reproduction of order through
disciplining bodily drill, had turned into an object of asymmetrical relationship

27 FS Aarnio
402 Kauko Pietilä

between the subjects and the objects of the supervision. As such, it called for a
support in a supracommunal authority. It needed resources no community could
provide. It required deployment by the state; it rendered the state a systemic pre-
requisite of the reproduction of social order, the mainstay of the perpetuity of
social domination.

Such was the state of affairs in Central Europe in the middle of the
seventeenth century after the ravages of the Thirty Years War. At that time,
the problem of the police (Polizei; today, the thing would be called more
properly, but less vividly, 'policy' as Gordon 1991, 10, remarks) was "to
create a polity, as it were ex nihilo, out of a war-devastated no man's land"
(Gordon, p. 11; Pasquino 1991, 112). The voices that explained what was
to be done in order to do the right things belonged to mercantilism, camera-
lism, and the police science (Polizeiwissenschaft). 4
The science of police accorded the deontic element a most central posi-
tion. If the "sole purpose of police [was] to lead to the utmost happiness in
this life" (Gordon, p. 10), then authorities - the police - were involved
who were bound to norms that entailed a deontic relationship between soci-
etal facts (the wretched state of, say, the existing health conditions) and
societal consequences (utmost happiness under improved health conditions).
Police government, says Gordon (p. 10), did not rule only through the gen-
eral form of laws; it worked "by the means of specific, detailed regulation
and decree." The science of police was a sort of science of legislation, a
political science, no social science proper yet branching out of it. What
happens to the normative element of the science of police when the police
afterwards come under liberalism's attack and sociology begins to take
form?
The idea of a self-organising society without a distinct organising agent
is born a hundred years later in Edinburgh, in Adam Smith's The Wealth of

4
The German science of police was evidently the first version of "what later
came to be called the 'rational government' - a global administration of the society
as a whole aimed at creating and maintaining conditions eliciting 'good' behaviour
and eliminating or preventing the 'bad'." (Bauman, p. 10.) As such it was "a
science of endless lists and classifications; there [was] a police of religion, of cus-
toms, of health, of foods, of highways, of public order, of sciences, commerce, man-
ufactures, servants, poverty..." The police seemed to aspire to constitute "a kind of
omnivorous espousal of governed reality, the sensorium of a Leviathan". (Gordon ,
p. 10; Pasquino, p. 110) - Aarnio and Peczenik have socialism and nationalism and
national socialism in mind when they write (1995, 142) that "[o]nce upon a time,
philosophers, like politicians, were quite ambitious. They claimed to know the an-
swers to such questions as, What are the supreme goals of society? What laws gov-
ern society? What is the right thing to do in politics?", and obliged the individual
to mind "not only ... his own business, but also devote himself to fulfilment of the
supreme goals of society..." Such ambitions appeared, however, long before the
isms.
 Normative Sociology 403

Nations and especially in Adam Ferguson's The History of Civil Society .

Still for John Locke, says Gordon (p. 22), civil society meant the same as
political or juridical society, but towards the end of the eighteenth century
the term begins to take on new meaning. In Ferguson's History of Civil
Society ,
the quality of radical immanence which Smith's thinking attributes to private eco-
nomic interests as the motor of public prosperity is extended to cover the general
constitution of society. For Ferguson, society makes itself. There is no historical
act which founds it: groups of men possess and exercise a capacity to organize
themselves and divide their labour..., no less naturally and spontaneously than in
their exercise of their sense organs and the power of speech. (Gordon, p. 22.)

If Ferguson's essay was the beginning of an independent social science,

this beginning seems to erase the normative element: There is no historical
act of founding society, and accordingly, no historical agent responsible for
it and bound to norms. And yet civil society in itself is, for Ferguson, a
thoroughly normative issue: " ' C i v i l society' means for him a political-
moral norm; he critically takes the chances of materialising the norm in the
most diverse societies as the object of his social scientific 'history'..."
(Batscha and Medick 1986, 2 8 - 9 ; italics KP.) What kind of norm is this
'civil society'? Batscha and Medick call it a political-moral norm; I should
say (without contradicting Batscha and Medick) that it must be a norm
related to the newly born idea of society.

Legal dogmatics is aimed at valid law - at discovering and clarifying the

content of valid law or the norms that bind authoritative decision-makers.
Surely social science, too, is aimed at something. You might say that it is
aimed at discovering that which happens, or regularities of social behav-
iour. But in saying so you miss the Fergusonian point, the normative ele-
ment of modern social science, because no one can be committed - in the
true sense of the word - to things that happen, or to regularities of behaviour
(scientists are committed to truth in their endeavour to discover events and
uniformities). Legal dogmatists do not undertake to discover the content of
valid law just for the sake of sheer knowledge; the purpose of their discov-
eries is to warrant the implementation valid law. To discover that which
happens, or regularities of social behaviour, would be equally pointless as
simple knowledge; the Fergusonian point of such findings is the fact that
incidents and regularities of behaviour are not just events and uniformities
but they are constitutive of society. Just as the legal dogmatist's knowledge
of legal order is aimed at valid law, the social scientist's knowledge of
behavioural events and uniformities is aimed at society - at valid society if
you allow. The idea of society does not belong to the same conceptual
order as incidents and regularities of behaviour that are facts in the realm
of the "Is"; the idea of society is a norm, and you find it in the domain of

27*
404 Kauko Pietilä

the "Ought". Its character as a norm is expressed by Georg Simmel, one

and a half century after Ferguson, in the following way (1908, 44):
Social life as such is therefore predicated on the precondition of a fundamental
harmony between the individual and the social entirety, so little as it can do to
hold back the glaring dissonances of the ethical and the eudaemonic life.

From this principle follows the idea of valid or, as Simmel says, perfect
society (p. 44):
Were social reality constructed according to this fundamental precondition with-
out obstruction and mistake, then we should have perfect society - again not in
the ethical or eudaemonic but in the conceptual sense: not perfect society, so to
say, but perfect society.

This idea of (perfect) society belongs to a conceptual reality of its own

(p. 43):
It is independent of whether it grows to be clear conceptual consciousness, also
independent of whether it will be materialised in the actual course of life ...

The idea of (perfect) society is now sociology's equivalent to the notion

of valid law in legal dogmatics. In so far as legal dogmatists are committed
to valid law, and thus make their science normative, thus are sociologists
concomitantly committed to (perfect) society, and practise a normative
inquiry. Even in the normative respect, then, social science does not funda-
mentally differ from legal dogmatics.

This is the way things are quite generally. Whenever we consider things
made or accomplished by human beings in their practical activities, a nor-
mative standpoint is involved, and I think without reservation. - Aarnio and
Peczenik, in a treatise on values (1996), define (with a reference to Alexy
1985) value "as a certain ideal" that can be "fulfilled to a certain degree,
more or less". Now, Ferguson's and Simmel's society - as well as anything
people do or bring about - can be fulfilled, done or brought about to a
certain degree, more or less. Simmel says (p. 11 ; italics KP) that a "given
number of individuals may be society to a greater or smaller degree more
or less:
With each formation of parties, with each joining for common tasks or in a
common feeling or thought, with each division of positions of submission and
domination, with each common meal, with each self-adornment for others - with
every growth of new synthesising phenomena such as these, the group becomes
more "society" than it was before.

Therefore, society is a value concept already in itself, without further

additions. When Immanuel Wallerstein titles one of his discourses (1996)
as "Social Science: the Quest for a Just Society", he goes one step too far.
It would suffice to write "Social Science: the Quest for just a Society".
Society, nothing more and nothing less.
 Normative Sociology 405

What does it mean to say that there is (more or less) society? Legal dog-
matists try to discover the content of valid legal norms; what do sociolo-
gists do respectively? "To avoid as far as possible all disputes of defini-
tion", says Simmel (p. 5),
I shall start with the widest thinkable idea of society: that society exists wherever
a number of individuals engage in interaction.

Society as interaction is an idea of society in general. The normative

content of it must be defined more strictly. Recall that Simmel's precondi-
tion for (perfect) society was "a fundamental harmony between the individ-
ual and the social entirety", in other words a "thorough correlation of the
individual's singular existence with surrounding circles, the integrating
necessity of that individuality, determined through inner personal life, for
the life of the wholeness"; this is the fundamental a priori for (perfect)
society. "In so far as an individual does not realise this a priori or find it
realised", says Simmel (p. 44),
the individual is not sociated (vergesellschaftet ), and the society is not such
unbroken reciprocal interacting and influencing (lückenlose Wechselwirksamkeit)
between its elements as indicated in its idea.

The idea of society is interaction between individuals; the ideal of

society is unbroken reciprocal interaction and influence between the ele-
ments. Without such reciprocity of interaction and influence, no thorough
correlation of individuals with their surrounding circles, or of elements with
each other, and no perfect society.
What does this imply for sociological practice?

IV. A Case

One of the Finnish government's responses to the economic vicissitudes

at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s was to establish the so-called State Secu-
rities Fund , an organisation designed to throw away public money into the
black holes of society. A man with the name Heikki Rovisto was appointed
the Manager-in-Chief of the Fund. This fellow had formerly been one of
the directors in the Finnish Kansallis-Osake-Pankki [National Equity Bank],
but had been discharged as a result of monetary speculations directed by
him with the effect of producing a loss of 250 million Finnish marks to the
bank. It is because of such speculative games that the Finnish banks were
taken into governmental protection, and rescued with public money poured
into them through the Securities Fund.

Mr. Koivisto was selected for the job by the most authoritative circles. It
was publicly reported that the Minister of State Finances, Mr. Iiro Viinanen,
406 Kauko Pietilä

and the Prime Minister, Mr. Esko Aho, "wanted Koivisto to have the
office" (Ilta-Sanomat [Evening-News], 3 February 1995).

In January 1995, the news media traced a lead about Mr. Koivisto that
was so interesting that even the Ilta-Sanomat tabloid had to spread it across
its front-page (it did this unwillingly and angrily, but had no choice): When
dismissing Mr. Koivisto, a member of its directorate, the Kansallis-Osake-
Pankki committed itself to grant the man severance pay of FIM 30,000 per
month for life (the chap is, in my estimate, in his 40s). The payment is, I
should say, very handsome under Finnish circumstances (my own salary is
less than half of what Koivisto is paid for doing nothing). 5

V. The Legal Dogmatist's Interest

In what sense could the Koivisto case be interesting to a legal dogmatist,

on one hand, and to a sociologist, on the other? 6 It certainly ought to have
some interest for them both. The core of the case is, of course, the fact that
the head of the Securities Fund received a substantial monthly monetary
allowance from a bank that is, at the same time, one of the greatest clients
of the Fund. We know now that the legal dogmatist and the authorities
enforcing law consider such cases in a similar way; their question is, or
ought to be: "What legal norms bind me as an authoritative decision-maker
in this very case?" Law texts contain, no doubt, many norm formulations
that could be thought to be applicable to the case, for instance Chapter 4,
Section 15 of the Civil Servants Act which decrees, as a primary norm, that
" A civil servant is not allowed to demand, accept or receive economic or
other benefit if such action may diminish the civil servant's or the adminis-
trative authority's trustworthiness". The corresponding secondary norm
might read as follows: If a civil servant demands, accepts or receives eco-
nomic or other benefit so that the civil servant's or administrative author-
ity's trustworthiness is endangered, the civil servant shall be cautioned or
given notice (Civil Servants Act, Ch. 6, S. 24; Ch. 7, S. 33).

Mr. Koivisto was never tried in court; the easy way was chosen and the
fellow was persuaded to resign voluntarily. But anyhow, the legal dogma-

5
Mr. Koivisto's KOP allowance came in addition to his salary from the Securi-
ties Fund. He reported that the salary was F I M 38,000. Mr. Koivisto's KOP allow-
ance was agreed upon before he was appointed the head of the Securities Fund. It
never became quite clear whether the appointing authorities had any accurate
knowledge of Koivisto's continued connection to the KOP.
6
It ought to be reminded that I am a sociologist and not a legal scholar. I f I
treat the legal aspects of the case crudely or even erroneously, it is because of my
layman's grasp.
 Normative Sociology 407

tist's and the authoritative decision-maker's question could have been

raised with the task of clarifying the content of valid law in this particular
case: What are the legal facts (has Mr. Koivisto the position of a civil ser-
vant; has he demanded, accepted or received such economic benefit as to
endanger his own or his authority's trustworthiness)? Is there an element of
ought applicable to the case (shall Mr. Koivisto be sentenced in some
way)? What is the legal consequence (shall Mr. Koivisto be acquitted or
cautioned or given notice)?

VI. The Sociologist's Interest

I maintained above that social science does not differ from legal dog-
matics in such a way that the former would be a non-normative and the
latter a normative pursuit. What might be a sociologist's normative interest
in the case? Let us have a look at what actually occurred.

When the news of Mr. Koivisto's monetary connection with the KOP
was published, nothing much happened at first. Only the Minister of Jus-
tice, Ms. Anneli Jäätteenmäki, required that Koivisto leave office immedi-
ately. The Chancellor of Justice, Mr. Jorma S. Aalto, later joined the Minis-
ter of Justice's demand. After a period of pushing and pulling, the decision-
makers announced that Koivisto would retire - but continue in office at
least until the end of May 1995, or for five months after the severance pay-
ment from the bank was publicly disclosed. This also happened; Koivisto
continued as the head of the Securities Fund for the time he wanted, and
left it finally in silence. No formal legal procedure ever took place. The
news-media had lost all their interest in the affair months ago.

What was the force that compelled Mr. Koivisto to withdraw from
office? He himself did not want to give in; the people who chose the
fellow for the job were ready to defend their candidate resolutely. The
mass media did not want his dismissal, even though they could not, in their
competitive situation, suppress the news about the KOP allowance. The
Minister of Justice may have wanted his removal, but the matter was not
hers alone to decide. The Chancellor of Justice may have felt himself com-
pelled to want Koivisto go away but obtained with his feeble moves less
than nothing. What was the force?

It is probable - in other words, quite certain - that Mr. Koivisto would

be the head of the Securities Fund even today had the information of the
severance payment remained concealed, had it not been published. Pub-
licity was the lever that wrenched Mr. Koivisto out of office. What is the
force that lies in mere publicity? To dismiss Mr. Koivisto, it was almost
408 Kauko Pietilä

enough to print one sentence in very bold letters and in a few hundred
thousand copies:

Bank subsidies supervisor receives

30,000 FIM per month of KOP allowance

What the headline of the Ilta-Sanomat tabloid says became public infor-
mation and public knowledge, but it was not the information or the knowl-
edge as such that forced Mr. Koivisto out of office. Rather, the information
constituted a particular societal situation - in other words, it sociated the
parties of the affair in a specific way - so that in the end it was impossible
for Mr. Koivisto to continue as the head of the Fund. The parties involved
were, first, the Manager-in-Chief of the Securities Fund, the Prime Minis-
ter, the Minister of State Finances, the Minister of Justice, the Chancellor
of Justice, their respective organisations, the Kansallis-Osake-Pankki and so
on. Secondly, there were the millions of people who knew now what those
at the top were doing, so that those at the top in their turn knew that mil-
lions knew that they were intriguing. Thirdly, between the managers, minis-
ters, chancellors, banks, organisations etc., on one hand, and the millions of
people, on the other, functioned the journalists, who accomplished the
social bond to the effect that everyone knew that everyone knew what was
happening at the top. In order that the three sets of participants - those at
the top, the journalists, and the millions of people - would make up (per-
fect) society in Simmel's sense, there ought to be unbroken reciprocal inter-
action and influence without apertures, ruptures and gaps between the three
positions, notably between those at the top and the millions at the bottom.
Normally and routinely, a steady and smooth flow of influence - of every-
thing that can be attained with speech acts - is organised in the direction
the top -> the bottom; the tough thing is to arrange the reverse influence of
the millions on those at the top.
Now, the imposing headline of the tabloid paper was not only a piece of
information from the top to the bottom. Rather it activated a set of norms,
related to the norm in the Civil Servants Act forbidding public officials to
demand, accept or receive inappropriate and unlawful benefits, that regulate
relations between public officials and their respective publics. In so doing it
actually not only summoned millions of individuals but constituted a body
public that ought to exist and act - to have a voice, at the least - as the
normal counterpart to all public offices. In short, it constituted a public in
its own right. Those at the top have, as a matter of routine and simply in
consequence of their being at the top, ample means and expedients to influ-
ence all others; the evening-paper's headline complemented, for once, the
figuration with a move that carried the whole of it a bit closer to what the
sociological norm - society as a network of unbroken reciprocal interaction
 Normative Sociology 409

and influence between different positions - presupposes. It should be taken

into account that, from the sociological point of view, the journalists were
not committed, when writing and publishing the headline about Mr. Koi-
visto's KOP allowance, to societal or legal norms which oblige authorities
and authorities of authorities and, in fact, anybody and prohibit public offi-
cials from demanding, accepting or receiving inappropriate and unlawful
benefits (or to some other such norms). They were committed to - at least,
they happened to observe - the sociological norm that obliges the journal-
ists themselves and prescribes them to effect communicative or interac-
tional situations in which the measures and procedures of authorities can be
examined and discussed by all parties involved - that is, to effect an
approximation of (perfect) society.

VII. Normative Sociology

I used above the expression 'sociological norm'. The implication is that

such norms are not the same as legal norms. They are similar to legal
norms in that they are secondary: they define an actor's position in relation
to a relationship between some second and third parties; they differ from
legal norms in that legal norms specify relations of legal facts to legal con-
sequences whereas sociological norms define relations of societal facts to
societal consequences. With these qualifications in mind, what is the con-
tent of sociological norms? What are the societal facts, and what are the
societal consequences, and what is the deontic element that relates the one
to the other? Guided by Simmel's idea of unbroken reciprocal interaction
and influence as the fundamental precondition of (perfect) society, we can
structure one candidate for a sociological norm as follows:
societal facts: If someone is able to make a move in a network of social
relations so that this move influences the condition of
another ,

the element of ought: then, if you are in a position to affect the configuration of
social relations , it is your obligation to see to it that

societal consequences: the other one has a possibility of responding - as Simmel

says (p. 43): "durch seine Qualität von sich aus" - to that

7
We can call this a norm of balancing; other similar norms within the same
family might be formulated for the generation of interaction and influence, for the
maintenance, conservation, augmentation, amplification, stabilisation, re-direction,
termination etc. of interaction. A norm of conservation, for example, might pre-
scribe not to destroy or undermine viable formations of reciprocal interaction if not
substituted for by better functioning arrangements. Such sociological norms would
410 Kauko Pietilä

The starting point of sociological study is the idea that society makes
itself, that is, that groups of human beings organise themselves and make
society among themselves. This is not, and was not even for the original
liberalism of the two Caledonian Adams, Smith and Ferguson, a mere laissez-
faire norm. With regard to the functions of the state, says Gordon (p. 17),
the "permissive meaning of laissez-faire needs to be understood in an activ-
ist, enabling sense no less than in its character of passive abstentionism".8
In the modern condition, the state is only one of the mediating instances
that can function in an activist, enabling sense in human beings organising
themselves and making society among themselves. The State Securities
Fund is a public authority, an actor in a societal game; one of the contest-
ants in the game is the public at large (after all, it is the public that pro-
vides the money with which the Fund performs its function). Millions of
people are not a public if not enabled in some way to be so. Modern jour-
nalism and mass-communication is one of the means to do that.
But if we look at the Koivisto incident from the perspective of the socio-
logical norm of balancing, we can see that the whole process went a bit
astray as it was centred solely on the person of Mr. Koivisto. The fellow
himself, after all, did not make any moves, as a recipient of the KOP allow-
ance, that would have affected (adversely) the condition of others (he just
ran his office, we were told, blamelessly - and we had better to believe it,
too). It was quite different persons who made moves affecting the condition
of others, the persons who appointed, in the first place, Mr. Koivisto the
head of the Securities Fund. He did not elect himself, but the Prime Minis-
ter and the Minister of State Finances, the two strong men of the cabinet,
explicitly wanted the man. I am positive that the circle behind Mr. Koi-
visto's appointment was much wider in reality; the Bank of Finland must

not deviate excessively far from, for instance, Alexy's rules of rational practical
discourse {Alexy 1978, 233 - 257).
8
Hirschman says (1977, 104; quoted according to Gordon, p. 17.) that Smith
seeks "less a state with minimal functions than one whose capacity for folly would
have some ceiling". There are even other early formulations of the activist sense of
laissez-faire. Gordon (p. 23) tells of Foucault's analysis of French eighteenth-cen-
tury economic thinking that attempted to "re-inscribe the institution of assistance
within the element of civil society (in Ferguson's understanding of the term)". The
economists thought that public assistance is "the manifestation of a feeling of com-
passion intrinsic to human nature" which "retains its primacy even in political so-
cieties: the social duty of assistance is understood by the economists as a duty of
man in society, rather than as a duty of society". We see here two different under-
standings of the idea of society. "On one hand," says Simmel (p. 10), "'society' is
the complex of sociated individuals, the societally formatted human material in its
role of composing the whole historical reality. On the other hand, it is the sum of
the forms of relating through which individuals become society in the first sense."
Sociology, sensu strictissimo, is founded upon the second meaning.
 Normative Sociology 411

have been involved, the President of the Republic must have been
involved, the mightiest banks and financial consortiums must have been
involved... The information that uncovered Mr. Koivisto's connection to
the Kansallis-Osake-Pankki would have exposed also the Prime Minister,
the Minister of State Finances, the General Director of the Bank of Finland,
and so on. None of these opportunities were seized by the media. 9
The initial disclosure of Mr. Koivisto's KOP connection opened up a
host of possibilities to present intruding and irritating questions to very
many of those at the top and to insist on proper and exhaustive answers. In
reality, no questions were asked of the high leaders, no insistence for
answers occurred. With the general and widespread indifference, the oppor-
tunity to open up a vigorous normative-ethical discussion between the man-
agers of general affairs and the public was lost. The dismissal of Mr. Koi-
visto can hardly be considered a republican victory; the whole episode is
rather a tale of opportunities deliberately untaken.
From the sociologist's point of view - that is, from the standpoint of
society - it would not have been at all strange, inordinate, impertinent, or
ungrounded to present questions, however suspicious and intrusive, to the
heads and managers of public affairs about the way they are running their
offices - about, in particular, the extraordinary reasons they must have had
for taking Mr. Koivisto to the leadership of the Securities Fund. 1 0 Quite the
other way round; it was strange, inordinate , impertinent, and ungrounded
not to ask such questions because, without the questions, the society gener-
ated by the parties in their interaction in the Koivisto incident remained
vastly imperfect. The fundamental a priori of (perfect) society is, as you
recall, a thorough correlation of the elements with one another, an unbro-
ken reciprocal interaction and influence between the elements. In so far as

9
These opportunities would have been, if vigorously grasped, instances of what
Foucault has called the 'strategic reversibility' of power relations, of ways "in
which the terms of governmental practice can be turned around into focuses of re-
sistance" (Gordon , p. 5). Jyränki says (p. 49; also Gordon, p. 33) that citizens' right
to publicly criticise the holders of political power has replaced their right of insur-
rection: "Public discussion and criticism play, in that sense, an essential role in the
function of the norms of constitutional law. ... - To overlook things without notice
means accepting them. The absence of public objection is, hence, a fact that has
legal consequences." In this argument, legal science and sociology become closely
connected on a common normative basis.
10
In the end, the man was responsible for a financial adventure that ended in a
catastrophe of FIM 250 million that had to be compensated for with public money.
For this, he was not punished but rather rewarded with a lofty monthly allowance
for life, which connected him in an inestimable manner with a bank that formed a
significant part of the monetary system he was supposed to support and restructure
as the head of the Securities Fund. Such hopeless complications ought to have dis-
qualified the man without more ado.
412 Kauko Pietilä

this a priori is not realised, society is not in correspondence with its idea.
In the Koivisto affair, the millions involved, being as such without means
of organising themselves,11 could not have realised the a priori; the jour-
nalists could have, but did not; hence the millions did not find it realised -
and the whole lot remained imperfectly sociated.
Journalists, for one, are in a position to affect the configuration and for-
mation of other people's relations to one another; they are mediators and
arbiters like judges and other authoritative decision-makers. They are
acutely aware, too, of their situation and its obligations even though their
awareness may not have developed into a clear conceptual sociological con-
sciousness. One of the editors of the Heisingin Sanomat [Helsinki News]
newspaper, Mr. Olli Kivinen , used the expression "the strict societal obliga-
tions assumed by the quality papers of our country" (Heisingin Sanomat, 5
November 1983). The journalists were acutely aware that the disclosure of
Mr. Koivisto's KOP connection threatened widely, profoundly and seriously
the established configuration of social relations. What they did was not to
exploit the suddenly opened opportunities in the name of society, but to try
to restore the established order. The editorial of the Ilta-Sanomat tabloid
two weeks after its disclosure of Mr. Koivisto's KOP connection (3 Febru-
ary 1995, editorial titled "Jäätteenmäki plays bank game") reveals the jour-
nalists' understanding of their "strict societal obligations":
The Minister of Justice, Ms. Anneli Jäätteenmäki (Centre Party), has aspired to
public prominence ardently and for a long time with her sharp-tongued statements
about the bank subsidies trying to play to popular sentiment. She has chosen, as
her pretext, the Manager-in-Chief of the State Securities Fund, Mr. Heikki Koi-
visto, whom she has grilled without any relevant reason. - No one has been able
to show that Mr. Koivisto has failed in any sense in the administration of the
bank subsidies; quite to the contrary. We might morally disapprove of his 'lapse'
not to give public statement regarding his KOP allowance; but technically the
matter is Mr. Koivisto's and his former employer's concern, and not the Minis-
ter's.

11
Michael Mann says (1995, 7) that "[t]he few at the top can keep the masses at
the bottom compliant... The masses comply because they lack collective organiza-
tion to do otherwise. ...They are organizationally outflanked ..." Mann's bleak im-
age obtains mellower colours with the idea of a struggle between the few at the top
and the masses at the bottom over the organisational means and instruments. The
mass media can be a means to keep the masses compliant; but in principle, they
can be also used to control the top. The Koivisto incident highlights both opportun-
ities. Mr. Koivisto was dismissed from office, and all that was needed was the Ilta-
Sanomat tabloid's bellow "Bank subsidies supervisor receives FIM 30,000 per
month of KOP allowance". The media were satisfied with that and did not press the
case any further; the masses had to assent, without a word, to the continued rule of
those who originally schemed the whole plot.
 Normative Sociology 413

The editorial reaction is, from the sociological point of view, senseless or
irrational (it may be rational from some other point of view that is
unknown to me) because it disbands the very body public its former disclo-
sure summoned and activated. It undertakes to restore the imbalance of
relations between the top and the bottom; instead of perfecting society it
endeavours to impair it. Its action does not correspond to the journalists'
proud word "the strict societal obligations assumed by the quality papers of
our country". But then, the evening tabloid is not a quality paper - but then
again, the quality paper the Heisingin Sanomat and the tabloid-paper the
Ilta-Sanomat, two papers of the same corporation Sanoma Oy, did not
differ at all in this affair; also the quality paper reacted angrily to the
muckraking related to the whole Finnish banking scandal.
The Koivisto affair was a repulsive matter to the evening-tabloid even
though it could not avoid publishing it. With its commitment to some other
than sociological norms, it was out of question that the paper should have
amplified the row - and consummate its society.

VIII. Sociological Rationality

I can now return to my opening problem, to the question of what kind of

argument Aarnio's idea of a legal functionary's responsibility to give a
proper justification for decisions is. We saw that the obligation does not
derive from within legal dogmatics itself. It is related less to legal order,
more to social order. The obligation has at least two aspects. On one hand,
it is a decision-maker's duty to present the grounds for a resolution in case
anybody concerned should happen to ask for such grounds or inquiries are
expected to occur. On the other hand, it is advice to legal functionaries to
prepare themselves for the eventuality that any inquiries should turn up.
Aarnio's whole theory of the legally rational as legally reasonable both
obliges legal authorities to give their justifications and advises them to pre-
pare themselves for the eventuality of a demand for justifications, and gives
the needed counsel and tools to do that. He says (1987, xvi):
In order to meet these kinds of challenges the scholarly interpretation and the
adjudication must have a theoretical understanding of itself. Here also lies one
kernel of this treatise[:] ...to increase the consciousness of legal scholars, judges
and lawyers in general.

In doing the first of the two things - in obliging legal authorities to pre-
sent their grounds - Aarnio acts, in fact, in the role of a sociologist (he
cannot derive the obligation from within legal dogmatics itself); in working
out his theory of legal justification, he acts in his primary role of legal
dogmatist. We see now that Aarnio takes to all this - to obliging legal
authorities and to advising and preparing them to meet the demands of
414 Kauko Pietilä

other people properly - not merely for the sake of valid law but also for
the sake of (perfect) society. The latter cause, the cause of society does not
have its origin within the law but within society. The reasons for Aarnio's
theory of the reasonable come from two quarters at the same time, from the
law and from society. Both reasons are obligational, that is, normative rea-
sons; this means that both disciplines, legal science and sociology, are nor-
mative and intimately related ventures. They are not different but similar
fields of inquiry - the perspective of sociology is much the same as the one
typical of legal dogmatics. Both of them have to adopt an internal point of
view, both of them are interpretative sciences,12 and - what is the most
substantial point - both of them are normative investigations and entail a
deontic relation. Surely they are not identical ?
They are not. Legal dogmatics and sociology are social sciences, but
they deal with different aspects of the societal scene, one with legal rela-
tions between people and other actors, the other (sociology sensu strictis-
simo) with processes of sociation, of people becoming society. Ultimately,
sociology tries to enable, generate, maintain, and enhance, in the name of
its supreme value society , intercourse and influence between people and
other actors or agents, so that the whole of these interactions and influences
would be unabridged, consummate, thorough, and balanced. This is none of
legal dogmatist's concerns; a legal scholar does not care at all whether
people interact or not (he/she can count on that they do anyway). It is only
in case they interact, and disagreements or conflicts, or suspicions of
offence or misdemeanour, arise that the interest of legal dogmatics awa-
kens: Is the disagreement or conflict, or suspected conduct, subject to legal
regulation? What are the relevant norm expressions and norms? What is
the solution; and how can it be reached? What are the justifications; and
how should they be constructed?
But legal regulation means interfering in people's social relations. Such
interference cannot be - so prescribes the idea of society - unilateral action
by legal authorities. This means that legal dogmatics 13 must be necessarily
complemented by sociological theory about the actual and advisable or
proper interdependences between different positions in that constellation of
actors, relations, and actions, which is mobilised by a legal authority's func-
tion. It is sociologically (and not only legally) advisable and proper - in
other words, sociologically rational and reasonable - for legal authorities to
prepare carefully and to present their grounds to all concerned; it is socio-

12
Sociological interpretation, which is a conditio sine qua non as well for the
so-called quantitative as for the so-called qualitative research, aims at finding out in
which measure a definite number of individuals or other elements of society is so-
ciety, given a particular set of data on their interactions and interdependencies.
13
And I suppose, many other fields of specialised expertise, too.
 Normative Sociology 415

logically advisable and proper for those concerned to ask and to demand
for legal - or more generally, official or public - authorities' reasons for
their decisions, solutions, actions, measures and what not, if the authorities
do not provide such reasons as a matter of custom, or the reasons are want-
ing or suspect in this or that respect.
Sociology in general is concerned with constellations or figurations
(Norbert Elias's central concept, see Elias 1986) of positions in a flow of
interaction and influence; not so much with people's behaviour as with
their interactions and with the measure to which these interactions consti-
tute a (perfect) society of interdependences. In its critical aspect, sociology
detects unwarranted and unnecessary apertures, biases, disproportions,
inequalities and the like in the actual networks of social interaction and
influence - that is, imperfections of sociation. In its constructive aspect, it
tries to imagine, invent, and develop means and procedures of communica-
tion and interaction (a sociological R & D undertaking!) that would bridge
the gaps, straighten the biases, balance the proportions, and level the
inequalities, not of every condition of human beings but of their networks
of intercourse. This concerns primarily, and perhaps exclusively, the
modern organised means of contact and intercourse, the big media.

References

Aarnio , Aulis (1987): The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justifica-

tion. Dordrecht etc., D. Reidel. - Aarnio , Aulis (1993): Onko oikeustiede yhteiskun-
tatiede? [Is Legal Science a Social Science?] Lakimies 91 (5), pp. 695-710. -
Aarnio, Aulis (1996): Oikeustieteeen muuttuminen. Onko sita tai pitäisikö olla?
[Change in Legal Science. Is There, or Should There Be, Such Thing?] Oikeus 25
(3), pp. 223 - 226. - Aarnio, Aulis and Peczenik, Aleksander (1995): Suum Cuique
Tribuere. Some Reflections on Law, Freedom and Justice. Ratio Juris 8 (2),
pp. 142 - 179. - Aarnio, Aulis and Peczenik, Aleksander (1996): On Values. Univer-
sal or Relative? Ratio Juris 9 (4), pp. 321 - 330. - Alexy, Robert (1978): Theorie
der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des rationalen Diskurses als Theorie
der juristischen Begründung. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. - Alexy, Robert
(1985): Theorie der Grundrechte. Baden-Baden, Nomos. - Batscha, Zwi and
Medick, Hans (1986): Einleitung, pp. in Ferguson, Adam. Versuch über die
Geschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. -
Bauman, Zygmunt (1992): Intimations of Postmodernity. London and New York,
Routledge. - Elias, Norbert (1986 [1970]): Was ist Soziologie? 5th ed. Weinheim
and Munich, Juventa. - Gordon, Colin (1991): Governmental Rationality: An Intro-
duction, pp. 1 - 5 1 in Burchell, Graham, Gordon, Colin and Miller, Peter (eds.): The
Foucault Effect. Studies in Govermentality. London, Harvester Wheatsheaf. -
Hirschman , Albert O. (1977): The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments
for Capitalism before its Triumph. Princeton, Princeton University Press. - Jyränki,
Antero (1996): Valtiosääntöoikeudellisesta tutkimuksesta Suomessa. [On the Study
of Constitutional Law in Finland.] Oikeus 25 (1), pp. 4 1 - 4 9 . - Mann, Michael:
416 Kauko Pietilä

The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to
A.D. 1760. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. - Mill, John Stuart (1886): A
System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive. London, Longman & Green. - Pas-
quino, Pasquale (1991): Theatrum politicum: The Genealogy of Capital - Police
and the State of Prosperity, pp. 105 - 118 in Burchell, Graham, Gordon, Colin and
Miller, Peter (eds.): The Foucault Effect. Studies in Govermentality. London, Har-
vester Wheatsheaf. - Simmel, Georg (1908): Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die
Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot. - Wallerstein, Imma-
nuel (1996): Social Science: The Quest for a Just Society. Opening Lecture,
Sociaal-wetenschappelijke Studiedagen, April 11, 1996. Amsterdam, SISWO (Neth-
erlands Universities Institute for Coordination of Research in Social Sciences). -
Winch, Peter (1976 [1958]): The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philo-
sophy. London etc., Routledge & Kegan Paul.
 RECHTSORDNUNG UND SOZIETALE GESETZLICHKEIT

Von Mihâly Samu, Budapest

In jüngster Zeit sind bei der Analyse der spezifischen Merkmale des
Rechts im rcchistheoretischen Schrifttum - vor allem auf internationaler
Ebene - in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit dem Rechtspositivismus die
logischen, semantischen und semiotischen Forschungen in den Vordergrund
gerückt. Dies tritt vor allem in den Forschungen von Aulis Aarnio zutage,
der wie kaum ein anderer in seiner neuen Analytischen Hermeneutik unsere
Kenntnis von der Struktur der Inhalte des Rechts und seiner formalen Ord-
nung bereichert und vertieft hat. Diese Kenntnisse werden ergänzt und in
einen umfassenden Rahmen eingebettet durch die begriffliche Bestimmung
und Definition einer Reihe von spezifischen Elementen und Komponenten,
die jeder Rechtsordnung eigentümlich sind. Zu ihnen gehört auch, daß jede
Rechts Ordnung bestimmte Wertorientierungen zum Ausdruck bringt. Man
kann infolgedessen das gesamte Recht bzw. die Rechtsordnung als eine
Objektivierung ansehen, welche durch ihre inhaltlich regelnde, aber auch
wertstiftende und wertdurchsetzende Funktion die Ordnung der Gesellschaft
maßgebend fördert.
Im folgenden geht es mir darum, in analytisch-begrifflicher und in rechts-
theoretischer Hinsicht die Trennung von Rechtsordnung und Gesetzlichkeit,
aber auch ihre Verbindung eingehend zu untersuchen. Die begriffliche Klä-
rung von Trennung und Verbindung beider erscheint vor allem deswegen
wichtig, weil wir beide Begriffe nur dann zureichend verstehen können,
wenn wir auch in der Lage sind, ihre pragmatische Verwendung und ihre
Wirkungsweise im sozialen Kontext zu erklären. Ich werde dabei die
Rechtsordnung durch die Darstellung der rechtlichen Problemlösungstechni-
ken charakterisieren, die Gesetzlichkeit durch die Hervorhebung der inhalt-
lichen Unterschiede bei der Wertdurchsetzung und Wertverwirklichung.

I.

1. Die Analyse der spezifischen Eigentümlichkeiten der Rechtsordnung

erscheint heute als ein eher nebensächliches Thema des modernen Rechts-
denkens, da diesem Begriff ein allgemeiner, nur schwer bestimmbarer
Inhalt zugeordnet wird. Er erscheint eher verwaschen und abgesondert von
28 FS Aarnio
418 Mihâly Samu

Begriffen wie Recht, Rechtssystem, Rechtsinstitution, Rechtsdogmatik oder

der Gesetzlichkeit. Das hängt auch damit zusammen, daß innerhalb des
Begriffes der Ordnung der Inhalt der gesellschaftlichen, sozialen, wirt-
schaftlichen, kulturellen und politischen Ordnung nicht geklärt ist, obwohl
das Wesen, die Rolle und der Inhalt möglicher Ordnung schon das Denken
der Antike beschäftigte.
a) Die griechischen Philosophen unterschieden spontane Ordnung
(Kosmos) und die vom Menschen geschaffene, organisierte Ordnung
(Taxis). Sie nahmen an, daß im Kosmos eine endogene Selbstregelung statt-
findet und daß die Taxis von der menschlichen Organisation auf exogene
Weise ausgestaltet wird, d.h. die in der Natur auftauchenden Regeln
werden zur Verwirklichung der gesteckten Ziele verwendet. Der innere Ein-
klang, die Harmonie, die Geregeltheit, die Institutionalisierung, die Ord-
nung der Tätigkeiten, die Organisation sowie die Verdichtung der Zusam-
menarbeit in Verfahrensregeln wurden auf jeden Fall als Inhalt der Ordnung
aufgefaßt. Aufgrund der Wahrnehmung des Unterschieds zwischen Natur
und gesellschaftlicher Ordnung gelangte das menschliche Denken bis zur
Analyse der Gesetzmäßigkeiten der Gesellschaft sowie der inneren Spezi-
fika der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung.
b) Die allgemeine Erklärung der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung wird so auf-
gefaßt, daß diese lediglich die Erscheinung und Forderung von Ordnung
und Geregeltheit beinhaltet. Dies wirft folgende Fragen auf: Woraus folgt
die Notwendigkeit der Ordnung? Was ermöglicht bzw. gewährleistet die
Ordnung des gesellschaftlich-menschlichen Zusammenlebens? Wie werden
die menschlichen Beziehungen und Tätigkeiten im alltäglichen Zusammen-
leben institutionalisiert? Auf diese Fragen können vielleicht Antworten
gefunden werden. Es kann hervorgehoben werden, daß Grundlage der Ord-
nung das gemeinschaftliche Wesen des Menschen (zoon politikon) ist, der
Wunsch nach Gesellung (appetitus societatis), das Bedürfnis nach Vervoll-
kommnung oder das Perfektionsgebot, das Gefühl des menschlichen Zusam-
menhalts oder die gesellschaftliche Solidarität und Zusammenarbeit. Wenn
all dies in Betracht gezogen wird, können wir davon ausgehen, daß dem
Zeugnis der historischen Entwicklung zufolge die Ordnung innerhalb der
Gesellschaft von der Macht gewährleistet wird. Die höchste Berufung der
Macht besteht in der Lenkung und Steuerung der Gesellschaft. Sie kommt
zum Ausdruck in der Organisation der Beziehung von Gemeinschaften und
Individuen, in der Regelung des Zusammenlebens und der Zusammenarbeit.
Durch die Institutionalisierung dieser gesonderten Tätigkeiten wird zugleich
die unbedingte Forderung erfüllt, das Bestehen und die Entwicklung der
Gesellschaft - die gesellschaftliche Ordnung - zu gewährleisten.

c) In Annäherung an das Problem der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung kann

in negativer Hinsicht festgestellt werden: Der Mangel an Lenkung, Organi-
 Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit 419

sation und Regelung führt zur Auflösung der Gesellschaft. Er hat Anarchie
(Störung der Lenkung, mangelnde Lenkungsfähigkeit, Desorganisation und
Ungeregeltheit), Desorientierung der Gesellschaft und Zerfall der bestehen-
den Gemeinschaft zur Folge. Die integrierende Rolle der Macht dagegen,
d.h. ihre lenkende und ordnende Tätigkeit, ermöglicht und schafft die Ord-
nung. Die mangelnde gesellschaftliche Geregeltheit, der ungeordnete
Zustand gefährden die Existenz der gesamten Gesellschaft in ihren Grund-
lagen. Nicht von ungefähr entsteht deshalb - früher oder später - irgend-
eine, in dieser Form vielleicht aber gar nicht gewollte Ordnung der men-
schlichen Beziehungen. Wenn irgendeine Gemeinschaft, ein Volk oder ein
Land in ihrem Leben gegenüber den anarchischen Zuständen keine Integra-
tion schaffen, dann werden die bestehenden Zustände von einer neuen oder
fremden Machtlenkung umgestaltet oder gar aufgehoben, und diese schafft
dann Ordnung. Ordnung entfaltet sich somit aufgrund einer Machtorganisa-
tion und durch normative Regelung. Die gesellschaftliche Ordnung ist somit
die Folge und das Ergebnis des Wirkens der Macht.

2. Die vorstehende These muß ergänzt und modifiziert werden in dem

Sinne, daß die die gesellschaftliche Ordnung auslösende, schaffende und
garantierende Rolle der Macht naturgemäß abhängt von dem geschichtli-
chen und gesellschaftlichen Niveau der Machtentfaltung und der jeweiligen
kulturellen Entwicklung. Sie wird realisiert durch die aktive Mitwirkung
der Gemeinschaften und Mitglieder der Gesellschaft. Die gesellschaftliche
Ordnung zeigt wesentliche Unterschiede in archaischen Gesellschaftsfor-
men, den prämodernen und den modernen Gesellschaften, doch wird sie in
jeder Gesellschaftsform bestimmt und beeinflußt durch die Machttätigkeit
und ihre Institutionalisierungen. Hervorzuheben ist, daß im Rahmen der
jeweiligen Lenkung und Steuerung die gesellschaftliche Ordnung vor allem
gewährleistet wird durch unterschiedliche, den jeweiligen Sachbereichen
angepaßte Regelungen und verschiedenartige Regeln. Innerhalb dieser Rege-
lungen spielt das Recht eine besonders wichtige Rolle.

a) Die geschichtliche Entwicklung beweist, daß Regeln bzw. ganze

Regelgruppen deshalb entstehen, um zur Herausbildung und Stabilisierung
der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung beizutragen. Sie werden geschaffen, um die
menschlichen Beziehungen den veränderlichen sozialen Erfordernissen ent-
sprechend zu ordnen. Die normative Ordnung entspricht den Erfordernissen
des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens und erfüllt ihre Rolle in der gesell-
schaftlichen Zusammenarbeit. Paradox formuliert: „Das Recht und die Ord-
nung entstehen geradewegs aus denjenigen Prozessen, die von ihnen gere-
gelt werden. Sie sind aber nicht starr, und ihr Material ist variabel." 1

1
B. Malinowsky, Baloma, Budapest 1972, S. 296.

28*
420 Mihâly Samu

b) Nicht außer acht gelassen werden dürfen die Kraft und das Weiterle-
ben der uralten Bräuche. Wie Malinowsky feststellt, werden die primitiven
Gesellschaften nicht „von den Zufällen geleitet..., sondern von der Tradi-
tion und Ordnung". Und er fügt hinzu: Würde ein Stamm von untereinan-
der nicht zusammenhängenden Bräuchen geleitet, so würde er zerfallen,
d.h. die Bräuche ergeben eine immanent in sich folgerichtige Ordnung von
Verboten und zu befolgenden Handlungen in Form von verbotenen, gestat-
teten und obligatorischen Vorschriften. Verändert hat sich dagegen die
gesellschaftliche Ausgangslage infolge der Herausbildung einer neuen
Machtordnung, so entsteht eine neue gesellschaftliche Ordnung und unter
Umständen auch eine höhere Kultur. Die neue Ordnung des gesellschaft-
lichen Lebens wird in erster Linie durch Umgestaltung der sich aus den
wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Erfordernissen ergebenden gesell-
schaftlichen Lenkung und Steuerung ausgelöst. In deren Rahmen entsteht
eine neue Institutionalisierung von Über- und Unterordnungen (durch Eta-
blierung von Macht, staatlicher Autorität, Gewalt und Zwang bis hin zur
Ausübung physischer Gewalt sowie durch politisch-ideologische-religiöse
Erziehung und Überzeugungsbildung). Ihre Annahme und Befolgung wird
gefördert durch die neu geschaffenen Regelarten, die unterschiedlichen
Normen und die im privaten und öffentlichen Leben erfolgende Sozialisa-
tion auf die Regeln des geltenden Rechts, die eine Selbst- und Fremdsteue-
rung aller Einzelnen im Rechtsalltag gewährleisten.

3. Die gesellschaftliche Ordnung wird - gestützt durch die jeweilige

Macht- und Autoritätsstruktur - unter den sich wandelnden geschichtlichen
Voraussetzungen in den Regelwerken der Gesellschaft institutionalisiert. Sie
kommt in den unterschiedlichen Regelarten zum Ausdruck und zur Geltung
als eine normative Ordnung, welche die unterschiedlichen Bereiche der
Gesellschaft und die jeweiligen Lebensverhältnisse in ihrer Funktion nach
Regeln (und Maximen) umfaßt. Unter den primitiven Verhältnissen einer
archaischen Gesellschaft erschöpfte sich deren normative Ordnung im
wesentlichen in der Ordnung der Bräuche. Im Laufe der Entwicklung bzw.
der Evolution der Gesellschaft kam es jedoch innerhalb der normativen
Ordnung zur Absonderung und Verselbständigung von Religion, Recht und
Moral, von fachlichen, organisatorischen und inhaltlich sich verselbständi-
genden Normen des öffentlichen Lebens. Beim Ausbau und bei der Durchset-
zung der normativen Ordnung spielt heute die Regierung und die staatliche
Gerichtsbarkeit im Rahmen der gesellschaftlichen und autoritativen Macht-
lenkung eine bedeutende Rolle. Diese Tätigkeiten führen zur Absonderung
des Rechts von anderen Normenarten und stärken die Funktion einer selbstän-
digen Objektivierung der Gesetzgebung und der Rechtsanwendung.

a) Innerhalb der normativen Ordnung ist - unter den unterschiedlichen

geschichtlichen und gesellschaftlichen Gegebenheiten - eine gewisse
 Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit 421

Reihen- und Rangfolge der Regelung anzutreffen. Es ist eine historische

Tatsache, daß in einigen Ländern den politischen, militärischen oder reli-
giösen Normen innerhalb der normativen Ordnung eine vorrangige Rolle
zukommt, in anderen wiederum den Bräuchen, Traditionen und insbeson-
dere dem Recht. Infolgedessen steht jeweils eine andere Normenart an der
Spitze der Regelungsordnung - in Abhängigkeit von den jeweiligen Spezi-
fika der Macht- und Lenkungsordnung. In der modernen, vor allem demo-
kratischen normativen Ordnung haben Rechtsordnung und Rechtsregeln den
Vorrang, im Anschluß daran ist die Annahme des Rechts und die freiwillige
Befolgung der rechtlichen Vorschriften grundlegend in jeder Sphäre des
gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens.
b) Innerhalb der normativen Ordnung kommt die hierarchische Vorran-
gigkeit des Rechts darin zum Ausdruck, daß der Wunsch nach allgemeiner
Befolgung der Rechtsregeln im Vordergrund steht. Das war schon anfäng-
lich bei den primären Rechtssystemen der Fall: Die Befolgung des Rechts
war nämlich nicht nur Pflicht der Untertanen. Im Zusammenhang damit
wird im allgemeinen auf einen Hinweis im Gesetzbuch des Hammurabi ver-
wiesen: Die Könige haben das Grundprinzip der Gerechtigkeit in Ehren zu
halten und dürfen die Gesetze des Landes nicht willkürlich verändern. Es
stellt eine grundlegende Errungenschaft der Regelungsordnung jeder Gesell-
schaft dar, daß das geregelte, legalisierte Leben die Anwendungsmöglich-
keiten der Gruppenwillkür und jeder individuellen Willkür verringert. Die
normative Ordnung ist in der Lage, das öffentliche Leben, die Machtbezie-
hungen, die autoritativen Über- und Unterordnungen zu stabilisieren, ja
sogar die Tätigkeit der Lenkenden innerhalb bestimmter normativer Rah-
menvorgaben zu erfassen (und eben dadurch gesellschaftliche Stabilität und
öffentliche Sicherheit zu gewährleisten). Diese Schlußfolgerung können wir
dadurch ergänzen, daß das sich nach den historischen Veränderungen rich-
tende, jeweils geltende Recht bewußt - über die Schaffung der eigenen
inneren Ordnung und die ordnende bzw. regelnde Rolle hinweg - die
umfassende gesellschaftliche Ordnung fördert.
c) Die gesellschaftliche Ordnung setzt sich zusammen aus der Gesamt-
heit der (Teil-)Ordnungen, die sich auf Teilbereiche der Gesellschaft bezie-
hen. Sie wird in der spezifischen Selbstorganisation und Regelung in eige-
nen Gesetzen der unterschiedlichen Bereiche konkretisiert. Infolgedessen
tauchen die wirtschaftliche, die soziale und die kulturelle Ordnung geson-
dert auf, die im Rahmen der gesellschaftlichen Lenkung durch die der
Machtordnung bestimmt und beeinflußt werden (und innerhalb letzterer von
der politischen, der staatlichen und der rechtlichen Ordnung).
422 Mihâly Samu

II.

1. Bezüglich der Rechtsordnung treffen wir im Rechtsdenken gewöhn-

lich eine eigentümliche Vereinfachung an, derzufolge die Bestimmung der
Rechtsordnung in der Durchsetzung der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung zu
erblicken ist. In Verbindung damit sei kritisch bemerkt, daß das Recht an
sich unfähig ist, die umfassende gesellschaftliche Ordnung zu gewährlei-
sten, es kann höchstens zur Durchsetzung der umfassenden Geordnetheit,
hier verstanden im Sinne der Geregeltheit einer gegebenen Gesellschaft bei-
tragen. Aufgrund der konkreten Spezifika der geschichtlichen Entwicklung
kann festgestellt werden, daß das Recht zusammen mit anderen Normen
(religiösen, politischen, moralischen, technischen usw.) und Institutionen
gemeinsam die gesellschaftliche Ordnung gewährleistet.
a) Die mit dem Schutz der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung verbundene Rolle
des Rechts wurde bereits vom gesellschaftstheoretischen Denken der Antike
erschlossen. Nach Aristoteles ist zum Beispiel die Verfassung die unter den
Bewohnern des Stadtstaats herrschende Ordnung. 2 Die mit der Durchset-
zung der rechtlichen Geordnetheit verbundene Forderung tauchte als
Anspruch auch schon unter den primitiven Formen des Rechts auf. So
wurde gegenüber der Anarchie und der Tyrannei nach religiöser oder philo-
sophischer Auffassung ein der geordneten Funktion des öffentlichen Lebens
dienendes Gesetz gefordert. Auch bei den Denkern der Aufklärung treffen
wir diese sich auf die Rechtsordnung bezogene Forderung an, wobei die
vom Despoten gewährte Ordnung, wie beispielsweise bei Hobbes, für
besser gehalten wird als die Anarchie oder die Unsicherheit und Gefahren
eines gesellschaftlichen Umsturzes, die andere Ordnungen mit sich bringen.

b) Umfassend wird die Problematik der Rechtsordnung von Max Weber

behandelt. Seiner Auffassung nach sind die gesellschaftlichen Handlungen
auf Erwartungen, Regeln und Maximen aufgebaut, die als normativ verbind-
liche Muster für das Handeln gelten. Ordnung ist für den Handelnden ein
obligatorisches Muster bzw. ein Gesamtzusammenhang von Mustern, d.h.
die Musterartigkeit und der obligatorische Charakter sind die spezifischen
Eigentümlichkeit jeder sozialen Ordnung. Das Spezifikum der Rechtsord-
nung erblickt er darin, daß diese äußerlich durch die Wahrscheinlichkeit gesi-
chert wird, daß eine von den Menschen für diesen Zweck gesondert geschaf-
fene Körperschaft physischen oder psychischen Zwang zur Einhaltung oder
Erzwingung der Ordnung ausübt bzw. zur Vergeltung des Ungehorsams
anwendet.3 Aus dieser Erklärung ist vor allem die Erkenntnis hervorzuheben,
daß die Rechtsordnung nicht nur der Realisierung von Regeln dient, sondern

2
Aristoteles, Politika, Budapest 1969, S. 153.
3
Max Weber, Gazdasâg és târsadalom (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft), Budapest
1967, S. 61.
 Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit 423

auch die Grundprinzipien und Muster des menschlichen Handelns beinhaltet,

die von den Individuen als geltend anerkannt werden müssen, so daß die
Normenbefolgung oder im Falle von Ungehorsam der Zwang gleichsam
natürlich wird. Ein wesentlicher Aspekt dieser Auffassung ist die Erziehung
zum Recht, die Sozialisation auf und die Internalisierung von Normen und
Werte(n), die Annahme der pro sozialen Forderungen im gesellschaftlichen
Zusammenleben und deren Durchsetzung sowie die Verurteilung und das
Verwerfen (ja sogar die Verfolgung) der arcf/sozialen Verhaltensweisen.
2. Die Rechtsordnung gewährleistet die umfassende Ordnung der Gesell-
schaft mit den Mitteln des Rechts, d.h. mit rechtlichen Formen und Lösun-
gen. Dies geschieht durch die Schaffung kohärenter Regeln und durch die
auf einheitlichen Prinzipien beruhende Entscheidung der konkreten einzel-
nen Angelegenheiten und Rechtsstreitigkeiten. Kelsen hat den Einklang
innerhalb des Rechts bzw. innerhalb der Rechtsordnung dargestellt als ein
Verhältnis der Unter- und Übergeordnetheit. Seiner Meinung nach ist die
Rechtsordnung „kein System von nebengeordneten, ungleichmäßig neben-
einanderstehenden rechtlichen Normen, sondern eine stufenartige Ordnung
der unterschiedlichen Schichten von Rechtsnormen". 4
a) Innerhalb der Rechtsordnung folgt die Unter- und Übergeordnetheit
aus dem Machtcharakter des Rechts und die Erkenntnis dessen durch die
Definition des Rechts als Zwangssystem hauptsächlich durch Kelsen. Diese
Annäherung an den Gegenstand unserer Analysen wird im modernen rechts-
theoretischen Schrifttum auf folgende Weise zusammengefaßt: Die Rechts-
ordnung besteht aus den vom Souverän gegebenen Regeln in der vorge-
schriebenen Ordnung. 5
b) Die Durchsetzung der Rechtsordnung beruht aber nicht nur auf ihrem
obligatorischen Charakter und ihrer zwingenden Rolle, sondern auch auf
ihrer Annahme. Damit die rechtlichen Vorschriften von den Individuen
befolgt werden, ist erforderlich, daß das Recht über ein entsprechendes
Ansehen und eine eigene Kraft verfügt, d.h. daß es nicht nur auf Zwang
aufgebaut ist, sondern auch an sich die Fähigkeit hat, sich durchzusetzen
und seine Berufung zu erfüllen.
c) Die Rechtsordnung erfüllt ihre spezifische Berufung nicht ad hoc und
auf spontane Weise, sondern durch bewußte Regelung. Gerade dieses Spe-
zifikum wird im Schrifttum immer wieder ausdrücklich hervorgehoben. Es
ist in der Tat ein institutionelles Faktum, daß die Rechtsordnung - auf-
gebaut auf der Kohärenz ihrer Regelungen - in besonderem Maße zur Sta-
bilität des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens beitragen kann. Im Hinblick

4
Hans Kelsen, Tiszta jogtan (Reine Rechtslehre), Budapest 1988, S. 41.
5
Siehe Aulis Aarnio , The Significance of the Theoretical Element in Legal
Research, in: On the Utility of Legal Theory, Tampere 1985, S. 18.
424 Mihâly Samu

darauf verstehen wir unter Rechtsordnung die Geordnetheit, Kohärenz und

abgestimmte Durchsetzung der Vorschriften des jeweils geltenden Rechts.
d) Bei einem Überblick über die Entwicklung des Rechts muß auffallen,
daß die Kategorie der Rechtsordnung eine ständige Begleiterscheinung der
Existenz des Rechts darstellt. Jede Rechtsordnung muß dem Charakter der
Macht Rechnung tragen und dem Entwicklungsniveau der jeweiligen gesell-
schaftlich-kulturellen Entwicklung. Dies führt zu der These, daß die Exi-
stenz des Rechts abhängig ist von der Makrostruktur der jeweiligen Rechts-
ordnung und daß ihre Bestimmung darin besteht, das bestehende Establish-
ment über die rechtliche Regelung hinweg zu schützen und zur Ordnung
des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens beizutragen, vor allem zur Stabili-
sierung der gegebenen Gesellschaft. Die Rechtsordnung schafft somit keine
gesellschaftliche Ordnung (da nicht lediglich das Recht die Geordnetheit
des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens gewährleistet), sondern eignet sich
- ihrer Berufung und Bestimmung nach - allenfalls dazu, die normale
Geordnetheit und Existenz der Gesellschaft zu fördern.

III.

1. In den konkreten Rechtssystemen der Gesellschaft hängt die Eigenart

der jeweiligen Rechtsordnung naturgemäß davon ab, in welchem Macht-
milieu sie existiert. Es geht hier vor allem darum, daß die Rechtsordnung
- als eine in die jeweilige Machtordnung eingebettete Institution - in
einer diktatorischen oder einer demokratischen Einrichtung mit abweichen-
dem Inhalt fungiert. Der Aufbau und die Funktion der Rechtsordnung in
Abhängigkeit vom Charakter der Macht gehört zu den ganz grundlegenden
Eigentümlichkeiten, ohne deren Beachtung wir nur mit zu abstrakten, die
konkrete Wirklichkeit nicht berührenden Schlußfolgerungen operieren.
a) Die Machtbindung des Rechts bzw. der Rechtsordnung hat eine wei-
tere wesentliche Folge: Das diktatorische oder demokratische Milieu
bestärkt jeweils andere Regelungserfordernisse, die als rechtliche Erwartung
an den Aufbau und Ausbau der Rechtsordnung und an ihre Durchsetzung
gerichtet werden. Denn es hängt schließlich von den machtmäßigen Voraus-
setzungen der Rechtsordnung ab, an welchen Erwartungen sie sich zu orien-
tieren hat, um ihnen in ihrer Selbstregelung zu entsprechen. So gelangt als
weiterer charakteristischer Zug einer jeden Rechtsordnung die Machterwar-
tung in das Blickfeld und in den Vordergrund, um deren Transformation in
die rechtliche Tätigkeit es im folgenden geht. 6 Die rechtliche Erwartung

6
Siehe auch: Werner Krawietz , Legal Norms as Expectations? - On Redefining
the Concept of Law, in: Aulis Aarnio/Kaarlo Tuori (Hrsg.), Law, Morality, and
Discoursive Rationality, Helsinki 1988, S. 109- 140, 128.
 Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit 425

wird durch die rechtliche Tätigkeit konkretisiert, deren Ordnung, Einklang

und Übereinstimmung mit der Rechtsordnung der Kohärenz einen ganz spe-
zifischen Charakter geben.
b) Die Rechtsordnung setzt die Trennung der juristischen Tätigkeiten
sowie die Ordnung der juristischen Arbeitsteilung voraus. Sie umfaßt auch
die Regelung und Abstimmung der juristischen Kompetenzen und Funktio-
nen. Ansatz- und Ausgangspunkt jeder Durchsetzung der Rechtsordnung ist
die Geregeltheit der rechtlichen Tätigkeit.
2. In der juristischen Arbeitsteilung verfügen die Mitwirkenden - die
Juristen in unterschiedlichen Berufen und unterschiedlichen Rollen bzw.
Ämtern - über eine spezifische Position (Machtberechtigung, Amtsautorität)
und stimmen ihre Tätigkeiten ab. An diese Tätigkeiten schließt sich eine
spezifische Kontrollordnung an, welche eine Selbstkorrektur ermöglicht und
zum Ergebnis hat. Infolgedessen erlangt die Rechtsordnung als Ordnung
einen gewissen Eigenwert, da sie auf hierarchisch hohem Niveau in der
Lage ist, die innere Ordnung anderer gesellschaftlicher Bereiche und Objek-
tivationen zu kontrollieren sowie die umfassende gesellschaftliche Ordnung
zu fördern.
a) Es ist ein grundlegender Zug der Rechtsordnung, daß sie sich inner-
halb der normativen Ordnung absondert und verselbständigt, da sich ius
und non-ius trennen. Auf dem /ws-Gebiet beansprucht die Ordnung gewis-
ser Lebensverhältnisse eine rechtliche Regelung, d.h. diese werden als
rechtlich relevant qualifiziert. So bildet die rechtliche Relevanz die ummit-
telbare Grundlage und den Rahmen der Rechtsordnung.
b) Im Rahmen der rechtlichen Relevanz ist eine weitere Eigentümlich-
keit die Schaffung einer konsequenten inneren Ordnung der rechtlichen
Regelungen (Kohärenz) sowie ihre sich den Änderungen laufend anglei-
chende Aufrechterhaltung. Der Realisierung dienen spezifisch rechtliche
Entscheidungen, die Gewährleistung der Rechtsvereinheitlichung und
Rechtseinheit durch unterschiedliche rechtliche Leitungsorgane sowie unter-
schiedliche rechtliche Mittel (Kompilation, Kodifikation, Fassung der
Rechtsregeln in eine übergreifende, einheitliche Struktur). Deren Verwirkli-
chung besteht im Aufbau, Ausbau und der Durchsetzung einer vorausschau-
enden und berechenbaren rechtlichen Entscheidungsordnung.

c) Ein grundlegendes Problem jeder Rechtsordnung ist die Schaffung

neuer Rechtsregeln. Es geht dabei um den Aufbau einer Teilordnung inner-
halb des Rechts, die aus allgemeinen rechtlichen Vorschriften besteht,
welche der Erzeugung neuen Rechts oder genauer: neuer Rechts Vorschriften
dienen. Zur ihr gehört - unbeschadet der Unterschiedlichkeit von Rechts-
systemen - eine Regelung der spezifischen Verfahren, in denen derartige
Rechtsvorschriften erzeugt werden. Die Schaffung derartiger allgemeiner
426 Mihâly Samu

Vorschriften des Rechts kann auf unterschiedliche Weise erfolgen (ganz

gleich, ob wir an den Herrscher als Gesetzgeber oder an die Richter, an die
rechtschaffende Rolle von Privilegien oder an Bräuche oder Präzedenzien
denken). Ein besonderes Problem ist die Feststellung der Regelmäßigkeit
und Konformität des rechtsbildenden Verfahrens im Hinblick auf die not-
wendige Übereinstimmung mit der Rechtsordnung.
d) In den diversen Rechtssystemen bilden sich eigentümliche Formen,
Institutionen und Verfahrensregeln der Anwendung des Rechts heraus, die
der Beurteilung und Entscheidung der konkreten Rechtsfälle dienen und
eine einheitliche Beurteilung von Rechtsstreitigkeiten und Rechtsverletzun-
gen sicherstellen sollen. Es ist eine wesentliche Forderung, daß keine auf-
fallenden Abweichungen zwischen den Entscheidungen der rechtsanwen-
denden Organe unterschiedlicher Instanz und Kompetenz bestehen. Diesem
Interesse dienen einheitliche Verfahrensformen zur Beurteilung von Rechts-
streitigkeiten. Die Ordnung der Rechtsanwendung umfaßt die unterschiedli-
chen Abschnitte des Verfahrens, die Wege zur Beurteilung der unterschied-
lichen Angelegenheiten, die Formen des Beweises, des Vollzugs, der Beru-
fung usw. Die Geregeltheit der Rechtanwendung dient nicht nur der
einheitlichen Beurteilung der Rechtsfälle, sondern auch der Vermeidung
von rechtswidrigen Entscheidungen. So ist zum Beispiel die Korrektur oder
Ausschaltung einer die Vorschriften des geltenden Rechts verletzenden rich-
terlichen Entscheidung (contra legem) oder die unter Mißverständnis oder
falscher Interpretation der rechtlichen Vorschrift getroffenen Entscheidung
(in fraudem legis) eine unentbehrliche Forderung der Rechtsordnung, die
stets beachtet werden muß.
e) Ein weiteres charakteristisches Merkmal jeder Rechtsordnung ist die
Implementation des jeweils geltenden Rechts, d.h. die Durchsetzung des
Rechts in den Rechtsverhältnissen, den konkreten menschlichen Beziehun-
gen und in den konkreten Fällen des alltäglichen Zusammenlebens. Es
hängt von dem geschichtlich gegebenen Umkreis, dem Umfang und der
Tiefe der Regelung der vom Recht geregelten Verhältnisse ab, welche Ver-
haltensweisen oder Handlungen infolge der rechtlichen Regelung und der
konkreten einzelnen Entscheidungen als Rechtsverhältnis verwirklicht
werden. Der Umfang der rechtlichen Relevanz, der Kreis der rechtlichen
Tatsachen folgt auch aus dem Charakter der gesellschaftlichen Geregeltheit.
An die in den Rechtsverhältnissen erfolgende Durchsetzung schließt sich
- auch auf Wirkung von Faktoren außerhalb des Rechts - die das Recht
weiter entfaltende freiwillige Rechtsbefolgung an.

3. Eine besondere Eigentümlichkeit höher entwickelter Rechtsordnungen

ist die Institutionalisierung und Ausarbeitung der Rechtsdogmatik, die der
Schaffung der Kohärenz innerhalb des geltenden Rechts dient. Besonders
bedeutend sind diejenigen dogmatischen Lösungen, die der Ausmerzung
 Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit 427

von Widersprüchen innerhalb der rechtlichen Regelungen dienen. Es han-

delt sich dabei gleichsam um eingebaute Mechanismen der Selbstreinigung
des Rechtssystems, wie zum Beispiel den Satz lex posterior derogat priori
oder das Verbot der Retroaktivität von Rechtsregeln.

a) Die Lösungen der rechtlichen Dogmatik sind übrigens zum guten Teil
die Ergebnisse der wissenschaftlichen Forschung und Ausarbeitung des gel-
tenden Rechts. Deshalb wird die Rechtsdogmatik von vielen als Wissen-
schaft qualifiziert und behauptet: „Rechtsdogmatik ist die wissenschaftliche
Überprüfung von Rechtsatzbehauptungen innerhalb einer Rechtsordnung
auf der Grundlage geltender Rechtssätze."7 Demgegenüber ist zu betonen,
daß die Rechtsdogmatik auch eine Errungenschaft der die Rechtsinstitutio-
nen entwickelnden praktischen Rechtstätigkeit ist, nicht nur das Ergebnis
der wissenschaftlichen Begriffsentwicklung.

b) Im Hinblick auf die innere Ordnung der Rechtsinstitute treten - trotz

der Notwendigkeit der Kohärenz - Widersprüche auf, zu deren Auflösung
einige sehr wesentliche weitere Ordnungsfaktoren beitragen, vor allem das
in einer gegebenen Epoche herrschende Denken selbst, das Paradigma der
Rechtsanschauung. Als Beispiel kann ich auf die naturrechtliche und die
rechtspositivistische Rechtsanschauung verweisen: Es ist ganz offensicht-
lich, daß diese beiden unterschiedlichen Denkansätze die rechtliche Rele-
vanz, die Rechtsetzung und die Rechtsanwendung abweichend auffassen, da
die eine auch die Rechtsprinzipien als Regel- und Entscheidungsgrundlage
betrachtet, die andere dagegen von den allgemeinen gesetzlichen Vorschrif-
ten ausgeht und lediglich darauf ihre Entscheidungen aufbaut. Wir können
das sich nach den jeweiligen historischen Umständen richtende Paradigma
der Rechtsanschauung als ein Überlegungsgleichgewicht unterschiedlicher
fachlicher Faktoren darstellen, das auch das System der Rechtstätigkeit
bestimmende Prinzipien umfaßt. Die Rechtsanschauung bewegt sich inner-
halb des Rahmens der in einer gegebenen Gesellschaft herrschenden Welt-
anschauung. Sie folgt im allgemeinen als Teil der ideologischen Macht den
herrschenden Glaubensauffassungen und umfaßt auch politische und philo-
sophische Thesen. So konnte beispielsweise im Mittelalter die Rechtsan-
schauung nicht von der herrschenden christlichen oder islamischen religiö-
sen Weltanschauung abweichen, wie auch in den modernen Gesellschaften
die Rechtsanschauung von der herrschenden Machtideologie nicht abwei-
chen kann. Vor allem in Diktaturen haben die faschistischen oder bolsche-
wistischen Ideen das rechtliche Denken bestimmt, in den Demokratien
dagegen ist der Spielraum der Rechtsanschauung größer und schließt sich
dem liberalen, konservativen oder nationalen Ideensystem an. Dadurch wird
freilich auch das in den unterschiedlichen Zweigen der Rechtswissenschaft

7
Günther Jahr, in: Rechtstheorie, Frankfurt a.M. 1971, S. 303.
428 Mihâly Samu

herrschende Paradigma tiefgreifend beeinflußt. Und damit hängt die eigene

Legitimation des Rechts zusammen, das seine Berechtigung und Notwen-
digkeit nachweist. Jedenfalls tritt vor allem in der fachlichen Tätigkeit des
Juristen die Parallele oder der Gegensatz der positivistischen und wertorien-
tierten Rechtsanschauung deutlich zutage.

IV.

1. Im rechtstheoretisehen Schrifttum, aber auch in den positiven Rechts-

wissenschaften wird die Rechtsordnung nicht selten mit der Gesetzlichkeit
identifiziert. Man zieht nicht in Betracht, daß die Rechtsordnung und die
Gesetzlichkeit über einen abweichenden Inhalt verfügen. Er ergibt sich
daraus, daß die Frage nach der Rechtsordnung und die ganz andere nach
der sozietalen Gesetzlichkeit aus höchst unterschiedlichen Erfordernissen
aufgeworfen wurden. Die Rechtsordnung wurde durch die allgemeine Not-
wendigkeit der Geordnetheit des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens erfor-
dert, die Gesetzlichkeit durch den Anspruch auf Ausmerzung des Macht-
mißbrauchs sowie der willkürlichen Rechtsetzung und durch die Menschen-
rechte ausgelöst.
a) Wenn wir den Unterschied von Rechtsordnung und Gesetzlichkeit dar-
stellen wollen, dann müssen wir zuerst die negativen Seiten hervorheben.
Gegensatz der Rechtsordnung ist die Anomie, die Ungeregeltheit, die recht-
liche Regellosigkeit des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens, der rechtliche
Nihilismus. Gegensatz der Gesetzlichkeit ist dagegen die willkürliche und
unmenschliche Rechtsetzung, der Mißbrauch von Macht und Recht. Diese
Charakterisierung der negativen Seite fördert zugleich die Erfassung des
positiven Inhalts: Die Rechtsordnung ist, stark vereinfacht, auf Förderung
und Stabilisierung von rechtlicher und gesellschaftlicher Ordnung gerichtet,
die Gesetzlichkeit beinhaltet den Ausschluß der Willkür, die Rechtssicher-
heit und ist als Ergebnis der Entwicklung der rechtlichen Kultur auf die
Verwirklichung der rechtlichen Werte gerichtet.

b) Im allgemeinen rechtlichen Denken wurde früher als Evidenz aufge-

faßt, daß die Rechtsordnung die Realisierung der Gesetzlichkeit darstellt,
und zwar vor allem in der sowjetischen rechtstheoretischen Literatur. Dies
wurde ergänzt durch die gänzlich unhistorische Erklärung, daß die Rechts-
ordnung und die Gesetzlichkeit zugleich entstanden seien und deshalb als
zwei Seiten eines Zusammenhangs betrachtet werden müßten. Die Gesetz-
lichkeit erscheint hier als Forderung, die Rechtsordnung als deren Verwirk-
lichung.
c) Die Definition des Begriffs der Gesetzlichkeit lautet nach allgemeiner
Auffassung dahingehend, daß es sich um nichts anderes als die Einhaltung
 Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit 429

und das Einhaltenlassen der Gesetze (Rechtsregeln) handelt. Insbesondere

im alltäglichen rechtlichen Denken wird die Gesetzlichkeit mit der Befol-
gung der Gesetze identifiziert. Das folgt auch aus der Richtung und Einstel-
lung des Rechtspositivismus und ist dem Wesen nach eine formelle Erklä-
rung.
aa) Wenn wir die Gesetzlichkeit in historischer Perspektive behandeln,
dann ist festzustellen, daß die Denker, Politiker und Juristen der bürgerlichen
Aufklärung gegen Inquisition, unmenschliche Folter, Bestrafung schuldloser
Menschen, gegen willkürliche Justiz und Justizmorde, gegen Rechtsungleich-
heit und Rechtsmißbrauch gekämpft haben. Im Gegensatz dazu haben sie
eine humane und gerechte Rechtsetzung, also Gesetzlichkeit gefordert.
bb) Eine wesentliche, neue Errungenschaft der nach den bürgerlichen
Revolutionen entstehenden Rechtssysteme ist der den Prinzipien der Gesetz-
lichkeit entsprechende Ausbau der Rechtsinstitutionen. Das kommt in zahl-
reichen rechtlichen Dokumenten der englischen Revolution zum Ausdruck
(Bill of Rights, Habeas Corpus Act), ferner in der amerikanischen Unabhän-
gigkeitserklärung sowie der Deklaration der französischen Revolution über
die Menschen- und Bürgerrechte.
cc) An die Losungen der bürgerlichen Revolution (Freiheit, Gleichheit,
Gerechtigkeit) schlossen sich rechtliche Forderungen an: nach Rechtsgleich-
heit, Freiheitsrechten der Bürger, nach humaner Justiz sowie deren Garantie
in der Rechtsetzung. Im Zusammenhang damit wurden auch Grundfreihei-
ten rechtlich fixiert: die Meinungs- und Gewissensfreiheit, das Versamm-
lungs- und Vereinigungsrecht, das Wahlrecht sowie die richterliche Unab-
hängigkeit.
d) Die allgemeine Forderung nach Gesetzlichkeit war nicht nur eine
revolutionäre Losung, sondern diente der Einbürgerung und Festigung der
bürgerlichen Ordnung. An diese Forderungen Schloß sich die Weiterent-
wicklung und Realisierung der Werte der Rechtskultur an. So kann in Ver-
bindung mit der Rechtsordnung (und dennoch inhaltlich davon abweichend)
festgestellt werden, daß die rechtlichen Werte in den Vordergrund geraten
sind. Deshalb kann die Gesetzlichkeit als Institutionalisierung und Praxis
zur Realisierung der rechtlichen Werte bezeichnet werden.
2. Im Hinblick auf die obigen Feststellungen können die grundlegenden
Charakteristika der Gesetzlichkeit wie folgt festgestellt werden: (a) Primat
des Rechts, Durchsetzung der rechtlichen Gebundenheiten in der Machtord-
nung, (b) Menschenrechte und Rechtsgleichheit, (c) Gewaltenteilung, Aus-
schluß von Willkür, richterliche Unabhängigkeit, (d) Institutionalisierung
der Freiheitsrechte und (e) Durchsetzung der Rechtssicherheit.
a) Hauptsächliche Forderung in den bürgerlichen Demokratien ist die
gesetzliche Einschränkung der Macht, der Vorrang des Rechts gegenüber
430 Mihâly Samu

der Willkür des Absolutismus und der unbeschränkten Diktatur. Dieses

Prinzip der Gesetzlichkeit wurde auch in der Deklaration der Menschen-
und Bürgerrechte formuliert (5. Artikel). Zusammenfassend heißt das, daß
die Institutionen zur Selbsteinschränkung der Macht in der Verfassung
fixiert und im Recht garantiert sind.
b) Eine weitere Forderung ist die Festlegung und Durchsetzung der Men-
schenrechte durch ihre Transformierung ins Recht und ihre rechtliche
Garantie. Ausgangspunkt dafür ist die Rechtsgleichheit, die Beseitigung der
Auslieferung und die Schaffung der Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz. Folgendes
Rechtsprinzip muß deshalb in den Vordergrund gelangen: Die Gesetze
beziehen sich auf jedermann gleichermaßen und sind auf jeden gleichför-
mig anzuwenden. Daran schließt sich im rechtlichen Verfahren die Gleich-
heit vor dem Gesetz und als Konkretisierung die Gleichberechtigung der
Parteien im rechtlichen Verfahren.
c) Der inhaltliche Aspekt der Gesetzlichkeit ist im rechtlichen Ausbau der
demokratischen Einrichtungen zu erblicken und in deren Rahmen im Aus-
schluß des Mißbrauchs von Macht und Recht sowie in der rechtlichen Rege-
lung der Selbstbeschränkung der Macht. Das bedeutet allgemein die Teilung
der Staatsgewalt und ihrer sich gegenseitig kontrollierenden, beschränkenden
und ausgleichenden Zweige in der Verfassung. Im engen Zusammenhang
damit steht die Institutionalisierung der die Regierungsmacht beschränken-
den Rechte, die Abschaffung der Willkür der Justiz sowie der Ausbau und
die Funktion der Institutionen richterlicher Unabhängigkeit.

d) Die Institutionalisierung der humanen Prinzipien taucht auf in der

Schaffung der demokratischen Ordnung der Justiz, in den kontradiktori-
schen Verfahrensformen und dem Ausbau des Rechtsschutzes durch Rechts-
anwälte. Die Gesetzlichkeit ist untrennbar von den die Menschenrechte
sichernden Vorschriften und Gebundenheiten der Rechtsetzung. Vom
Gesichtspunkt des Freiheitsschutzes für alle Staatsbürger ist grundlegend
die radikale Änderung der Strafgesetzgebung und des Strafverfahrens. Die
Unmenschlichkeit der Justiz hat sich vor allem in der willkürlichen Qualifi-
zierung von Strafen und Verbrechen gezeigt. Damit rückte die Definition
der Verbrechen und die Festlegung der Strafzumessung in den Vorder-
grund. Die Forderung der Gesetzlichkeit gelangt vor allem im Prinzip
nullum crimen sine lege zum Ausdruck. Daneben legte man das Prinzip
nulla poena sine lege fest, welches für den Rechtsanwendenden vorschreibt,
daß eine Strafe nur aufgrund des Gesetzes zugemessen werden kann. Die
Festlegung des Strafmaßes hängt also nicht länger ab von der Einsicht oder
gar Willkür des Richters. Zu einem unverletzlichen Grundprinzip wurde der
strafrechtliche Schutz der Freiheit des Einzelnen gegenüber willkürlichen
Verhaftungen (die Freiheit des Einzelnen kann nur aufgrund einer richter-
lichen Entscheidung beschränkt werden).
 Rechtsordnung und sozietale Gesetzlichkeit 431

e) Grundlegende Forderung der Gesetzlichkeit im Alltagsleben und in

der Zusammenarbeit der Staatsbürger ist die Rechtssicherheit. Ihre heutige
Regelung ergab sich hauptsächlich aus der Rechtsunsicherheit der diktatori-
schen Verhältnisse, ist aber auch gegen jedes andere willkürliche Verfahren
gerichtet, indem die rechtlichen Mittel zu deren Abschaffung bereitgestellt
werden. Im Zusammenhang damit wurde das Prinzip ne bis in idem formu-
liert, d.h. die Regel, daß niemand wegen ein- und derselben Handlung
zweimal zur Verantwortung gezogen werden darf. Auch das Verbot des
Rechtsmißbrauchs dient der Rechtssicherheit. Daneben sind zu erwähnen
die rechtliche Sicherheit von Vermögens- und Lebensschutz, der Rechts-
schutz von öffentlicher Sicherheit und Ordnung bzw. deren Unterstützung
als Gebot der Rechtssicherheit.

3. Das hauptsächliche Spezifikum der Gesetzlichkeit ist darin zu erblik-

ken, daß sie einen rechtlichen Wert darstellt. Was bedeutet das? In erster
Linie, daß die inhaltliche Eigentümlichkeit der Gesetzlichkeit darin besteht,
daß es sich um eine Errungenschaft der Rechtskultur handelt. Zugleich
handelt es sich um eine Zusammenfassung der in der Rechtsentwicklung
entstandenen rechtlichen Werte auf hoher Ebene. Die Gesetzlichkeit ist
- selbst als rechtlicher Wert - die Verkörperung verschiedener Rechtswerte,
deren Konzentration und Institutionalisierung, die Wertentscheidung zugun-
sten einer humanen Justiz durch die Humanisierung des Rechts. Freilich
taucht hier auch die Frage auf: Was bedeutet die Humanisierung des
Rechts? Sie bedeutet in erster Linie eine Absage an die der gesellschaft-
lichen Verfremdung verbundenen Rechtsinstitutionen und rechtlichen Ent-
scheidungen, auf der anderen Seite geht sie einher mit der Forderung, daß
in der rechtlichen Regelung der Rechtsschutz der Würde des Menschen,
seiner Freiheit und Gleichheit institutionalisiert und mit rechtlichen Mitteln
gesichert wird.

a) Es gehört bis auf den heutigen Tag leider nicht zu den Selbstverständ-
lichkeiten des öffentlichen Bewußtseins, daß eine der wichtigsten Forderun-
gen des menschlichen Zusammenlebens und der Zusammenarbeit in einem
/7/OSOzialen gemeinschaftlichen Verhalten zu erblicken ist. Genau hier
schließt sich die werteschaffende Rolle des Rechts an. Zu den grundlegen-
den Werten der Entwicklung der rechtlichen Kultur gehören auch die Insti-
tutionalisierung des Prinzips audiatur et altera pars im kontradiktorischen
Verfahren, die Gleichberechtigung der Parteien, die Rechtssicherheit des
Einzelnen, der Rechtsschutz und die Garantie einer unparteiischen richterli-
chen Beurteilung. In organisatorischer Hinsicht entfaltet sich in der Recht-
setzung die richterliche Unabhängigkeit, als fachliche Forderung taucht die
Unvoreingenommenheit sowie die Gleichberechtigung und Trennung der
Rollen von Rechtsanwalt und Staatsanwalt auf. Diese Werte der Rechtskul-
tur sind in verfassungsrechtlichen Garantien verkörpert und werden durch
432 Mihâly Samu

die formellen Regeln des Rechts und die Verfahrensregeln der Rechtsord-
nung mit humanem Inhalt erfüllt.
b) Die Humanisierung des Rechts fordert die unterstützende Tätigkeit
der gesellschaftlichen Umgebung und der staatlichen Organe. Die demokra-
tischen, verfassungsmäßigen Vorschriften orientieren sich in eben dieser
Richtung. Nicht von ungefähr wird deshalb das Thema von Rechtsordnung
und Gesetzlichkeit vor allem von Verfassungsrechtlern mit der Verfassungs-
mäßigkeit verbunden. (Ich bemerke jedoch: Die Verfassungsmäßigkeit und
die Gesetzlichkeit sind zwei nicht zu identifizierende Kategorien, weil die
Verfassungsmäßigkeit in jeder Sphäre der Gesellschaft die Realisierung der
verfassungsmäßigen Postulate bedeutet, auch ohne eine Ordnung rechtlicher
Art, eventuell sogar durch Realisierung von moralischen, wirtschaftlichen,
politischen, kulturellen oder sozialen Normen, während die Gesetzlichkeit
die Durchsetzung der Rechtswerte beinhaltet durch die rechtliche Tätigkeit,
innerhalb der rechtlichen Sphäre und innerhalb der Rahmenvorgaben von
rechtlicher Relevanz.)
c) In Verbindung mit der Verfassungsmäßigkeit beinhaltet die Gesetzlich-
keit die staatsbürgerlichen Rechte, die Anerkennung der Gleichheit vor dem
Gesetz, das Recht des Bürgers auf Schutz vor Übergriffen durch die staat-
lichen Organe, die Vermutung der Unschuld, die öffentliche Justiz, das
Recht auf Rechtsmittel und gerichtlichen Rechtsschutz und das Recht der
Verwendung der eigenen Muttersprache usw. (Dies hat zugleich eine höhere
Qualität der rechtlichen Regelung zur Folge auf den Gebieten der Gesetzge-
bung, der Rechtanwendung und der Rechtsdurchsetzung, d.h. der gesamten
Rechtsordnung.)

Resümee

Die mit der Gesetzlichkeit (und der Humanisierung der rechtlichen Tätig-
keit) verbundenen Einsichten und Thesen mögen auf den ersten Blick ele-
mentar erscheinen. Ihre Hervorhebung ist dennoch wichtig, denn auch in
Diktaturen werden diese Prinzipien auf der Ebene der Propaganda verkün-
det, aber nicht realisiert, so daß ihre Bewußtmachung unumgänglich ist. Ein
weiterer Grund muß darin erblickt werden, daß der Ausbau der Rechtsord-
nung in einer pluralistischen Demokratie durch Institutionalisierung von
Wertforderungen der Gesetzlichkeit erfolgt. Zu ihrer Festlegung als rechts-
politische Forderungen kann auch die Festlegung der Begriffe von Rechts-
ordnung und Gesetzlichkeit beitragen. Natürlich ist damit die Entwicklung
des Verhältnisses von Rechtsordnung und sozietaler Gesetzlichkeit nicht
abgeschlossen, da auch eine Institutionalisierung und Einbürgerung neuer
rechtlicher Werte zu erwarten ist.
 DEMOCRACY AND THE L A W

By Agustin Squella Narducci, Valparaiso

I.

This essay bears the title "Democracy and the law". The sole mention of
these words takes us back to the recent, and in some places, still evolving
time when the nations of the south of Latin America finally recovered, to
their relief and that of their people, the precious gift we call democracy -
the advantages of which to freedom are as evident as its inevitable inade-
quacy in helping resolve the many shortcomings of our societies as
promptly as we would desire. Democracy is a gift we must strive to pre-
serve and strengthen precisely in the name of freedom while wisely assum-
ing the share of disappointment which is of the essence of democracy, a
form of government only capable of small, successive quantitative changes
insofar as its basis - as Bobbio writes - rests upon the reformist principles
of legality and gradualism rather than on the revolutionary ones of violence
and globality.
In keeping with what the title anticipates, we will outline the connection
between democracy and the law and between democracy and rights. The
result should be an explanation of the role of the judiciary in ensuring a
truly democratic regime, and above all, of its importance in the consolida-
tion and stability that such a regime should desirably attain after being rein-
stated following a long hiatus.
The task at hand requires a definition of the meaning ascribed to
"democracy", "law", and "rights". It does not escape us that these terms are
extremely familiar to legal scholars and, in fact, to most average individ-
uals, and may therefore appear to require no further explanation. Yet, a
definition is indeed required.

II.

As to "democracy", as legal scholars we fortunately do not have far to

go to settle on a meaning we can all reasonably share. It is precisely such
legal scholars as Radbruch, Kelsen, Ross, and Bobbio, among others, who
29 FS Aarnio
434 Agustin Squella Narducci

have made some of the century's most significant contributions to the

theory of democracy as a form of government.

We construe democracy as a method which guarantees the direct or indi-

rect participation of the largest possible number of people - all of the adult
population, for example - in making the decisions by which they will be
subsequently bound.

" A l l social groups", Bobbio writes, "need to make decisions which are
binding on its members in order to ensure survival, whether internal or
external". In other words, all social groups need to address the issue of
who is to govern, and how.

Thus, while democracy does provide a means to address the question of

who will govern and how, it does so in a purely procedural manner. That
is, democracy does not determine ahead of time or in perpetuity who is to
make the collective decisions, or what the contents of such decisions will
be.

Democracy is bold. It stands ready to turn power over to whoever is able

to garner a majority. A purely quantitative rule, some will argue, except
that "it is always better to count heads than to cut them off".

III.

As to "the law", we are certainly more than familiar with the twin mean-
ing of the word: both a certain normative arrangement which rules society,
and the knowledge which mankind constitutes and collects about the nor-
mative reality to which the first sense refers.

Let us pause for an instant in search of further clarity. In the first sense -
possibly the best known - "the law" is a certain normative arrangement in
effect in a given society. In legal discourse, this is what we mean when we
speak of "Chilean law", "Argentine law", or of the law of any other coun-
try. What we mean in all of these cases is a certain normative arrangement
which is in valid existence and possesses an effective historical presence;
in other words, a normative reality which both expresses and is contained
in the so-called formal sources of this arrangement.

But the normative reality of which - according to the first meaning - the
law consists can be and is in fact constituted by mankind into the object of
knowledge. This means that a particular class of individuals - i.e., legal
scholars - have formed a body of knowledge about the law as a normative
arrangement. This body of knowledge is often referred to as "the law",
which gives us the second sense of the word.
 Democracy and the Law 435

The two meanings of the word - e.g., the law as a normative arrange-
ment and the law as a body of knowledge about this arrangement which is
capable of being created and transmitted to others - is certainly at the root
of much misunderstanding and confusion. It follows that, in our judgement,
it is preferable to apply only the first meaning to the word; that is, "law"
should only be used to refer to a certain ordering of human conduct. To
refer to the body of knowledge created and transmitted to others by legal
scholars, we should speak of "legal science".
What is then the relationship between democracy and the law - construed
as a normative arrangement - and what, on the other hand, the link
between democracy and the law as knowledge, that is, between democracy
and legal science?

IV.

As to the relationship between democracy and the law as a normative

arrangement, it should be said that, as described above, this form of gov-
ernment significantly lessens the heteronomous nature of the law as norma-
tive arrangement. As is known, it is said that the law is heteronomous in
that it is a system in which the norms are often produced by the actions of
individuals not only different from those bound by such norms, but often in
a position of superiority or authority with respect to those who must obey
them. Heteronomy means subjection to external volition; to the will of
others rather than to one's own. The law is certainly heteronomous in that
the majority of its most important rules are not autonomously produced by
the individuals bound by them.
The heteronomous nature of the law is perhaps one of its most highly
visible differences with individual morality, since morality is, to a great
extent, produced by the individuals themselves rather than by socially-organ-
ized bodies of power on which production of the relevant norms is dele-
gated.
Thus, if may be said that while heteronomy does not entirely disappear
under a democratic system of government, its force does lessen consider-
ably. While the public remains unable to directly produce the norms of the
law, it entrusts their production to certain bodies or branches of govern-
ment in whose appointment it does take direct part.
In a system of representative democracy, while the public does not
directly produce the legal and constitutional regulations which govern its
conduct and define its rights, it does elect those empowered to do so. Thus,
while the public remains subject to an external will, this fact can be more
appropriately described as delegated volition. This arrangement is certainly
29=
436 Agustin Squella Narducci

much more tolerable to the principle of personal freedom - the age-old

human impulse to take no orders other than one's own.
In the case of the judiciary and of the norms it produces in a democratic
society through the rulings of its judges and courts of law, things are some-
what different, since - at least in my country - the members of the judiciary
are not directly chosen by the people. Whenever this is the case; that is,
whenever a branch of government is outside the reach of public influence
and control, while democracy does not necessarily cease to be such, it loses
in latitude. This is not so much a question of proposing that judges be
elected by direct popular balloting as it is one of regulating the manner in
which they will account to society for the important share of public power
vested on them.

V.

Now, what is the relationship between democracy and the law as a body
of knowledge, that is, between democracy and legal science?
Societies not only produce the law as a normative arrangement through
constitutions, laws, administrative regulations, contracts and rulings, but are
also capable of standing before the law for the purposes of knowledge
acquisition. This is what enables the systematic study of the law conducted
since long by law schools. Whether the body of knowledge about the law
which is thus acquired or created should rank as scientific is certainly deba-
table, even if such knowledge is often conventionally presented as "legal
science".
The function of legal science - which is concerned with the study of the
norms of a given legal system - involves ascertaining or identifying such
norms as they become positive and are not formally abrogated. Legal
science also ascertains the various areas subject to legal regulation within
the system in question, helping create as many legal disciplines as areas
subject to legal regulation can be ascertained. Legal science also helps
explain and determine the connection between norms and systematizes their
prescriptive content, all of which entails the task of interpreting the norma-
tive material and its subsequent reconstruction. Lastly, legal science
answers questions related to the application of these norms to legally rele-
vant cases which, by virtue of their being regulated by these norms, must
be resolved through their application.
Legal science intends to account for the law such as it effectively is and
rules at a given time and place. In this sense, legal science is descriptive: it
states what the law actually is, not what it should be. Yet, if legal science
is not to be reduced to the mere identification and exegesis of legal norms
 Democracy and the Law 437

in effect, it must be complemented by legal policy, construed as a critical

attitude toward what is established as the law, and which ought to articulate
how and in what direction the law may be perfected.

Legal policy is not a betrayal of legal science; on the contrary, it broad-

ens and enriches it. And while it is true that the scientific loyalty and call-
ing of jurists compels them to record the law such as it exists at a given
time, their political and moral conscience, on the other hand, should require
them to state what the law, in their judgement, should be.

Scientific calling and political and moral conscience, we say: this is the
double duty jurists must simultaneously fulfill, without sacrificing one for
the other. Whenever a scientific calling becomes subordinate to the endea-
vours and objectives of politics, our understanding of reality is certainly
impoverished. But when jurists invoke the good name of science to avoid
taking a political or moral stand, the result - namely, to diminish their own
standing as individuals and citizens - is perhaps worse.

Thus defined, exactly what does legal science have to do with democ-
racy? Democracy, a form of government which makes a commitment to the
freedoms which ensue from it - including, as a matter of course, freedom
of thought and of expression - and which it is compelled to protect and
enhance, does create objective conditions for a more attentive and critical
legal science. This means something very simple, but highly relevant: if
democracy is of necessity related to tolerance, that is, if it accepts and even
encourages diversity of opinion and the free competition of these within
society; if democracy, in one word, is debate, then this is the form of gov-
ernment which creates the best possible conditions for jurists to formulate -
without undue constraints - a critique of what is given or purported as the
law, and to articulate proposals meant to guide or bring about change or
reform in the direction in which the bodies producing the law and through
which the sovereignty of the people is exercised - including, of course, the
judiciary itself - may eventually choose under the influence of the debate
of opinions.

Succinctly put, because democracy is a good ally of science, scientists

tend to be good friends of democracy. They are aware, arguably better than
others, of how much their endeavours can be hurt and interfered with when
freedom of research is restricted in the name of the official truth. Thus,
when a jurist such as Kelsen writes that he is a proponent of democracy, he
does so in the name of science and does not hesitate to admit that, since
science is the most important thing in his life, his idea of justice is inextric-
ably linked to the conditions under which science - and truth and sincerity
as well - can flourish. " I refer", he writes, "to the justice of democracy, to
the justice of tolerance".
438 Agustin Squella Narducci

VI.

Having reviewed the relationships between democracy and the law and
democracy and legal science, let us now examine the links between democ-
racy and rights.
A "right" is a prerogative accruing to one or more individuals - a "sub-
jective" right; a franchise or justified claim attributed to a subject or class
of subjects of the law by one or more subjects on whom an equivalent obli-
gation or duty is imposed. In other words, to have a subjective right means
to be in a position to demand from others a certain behaviour which
becomes, as it were, the substance of the subjective right at issue.
We will refrain from discussing whether entitlement to a subjective right
requires that it be enshrined in a certain norm of positive law, as the classic
positivist viewpoint would argue; or if, on the contrary, all that entitlement
to a subjective right requires is that it be justified or explained by any nor-
mative system - a moral norm, for example, as the proponents of so-called
"moral rights" would argue in their turn.
What we do want to say is that subjective rights need not only be justi-
fied; in other words, they require more than explicit normative support
within a positive normative or any other system. In addition, they need to
be recognized as such and to be legally reaffirmed each time the right-
holder's claim is not honored.
Even if one were to take a positivist stand, that is, even if certification of
the existence of a subjective right should require identifying with precision
the legal norm which sets out such right within a particular system of law,
the truth is that it does not suffice for positive law to proclaim or enshrine
the relevant right in the constitution or the law. It is also necessary that
such a system of law provide jurisdictional protection; in other words, the
subjective right in question must also be effectively protected. A subjective
right is effectively protected only when the relevant system of law, in addi-
tion to proclaiming it as such, provides adequate means to prevent, to the
extent possible, the violation of the norm by which it is established, and
points out the consequences accruing to violators.
If one is to distinguish between genuine rights and rights on paper, per-
haps the most important distinction is precisely the fact that the former can
be afforded jurisdictional protection, while the latter cannot.
What then of human rights? That is what we, albeit in the framework of
what has been discussed thus far, ultimately want to address. Are these gen-
uine rights, or are they just apparent, fictitious rights; dead letter on a piece
of paper?
A minimal or even perfunctory definition of democracy, such as is pro-
posed at the start, presupposes certain conditions, including the fact that
 Democracy and the Law 439

those who elect must be given true alternatives and placed in a position to
effectively choose from among them. To this end, guaranteeing respect for
freedom of thought, expression, assembly, and the like, is a requisite. These
are the rights, Bobbio writes, upon which "the liberal state was born and
the doctrine of the rule of law was built" - a doctrine which nevertheless
must exercise its power within the constraints arising from international
and constitutional recognition of so-called fundamental rights.

These so-called entitlements to freedom are certainly genuine rights in

the sense shown, namely, that they are not only entrenched in international
treaties signed by nations and in their own charters, but are also under
effective jurisdictional protection.

What is to be said, on the other hand, of other human rights, the so-
called economic and social rights, those based not on the idea of freedom
but on the values of equality and solidarity; entitlements such as the right
to employment, to a living wage, to medical and social assistance in case
of sickness or old age? Does democracy assume as direct and evident a
commitment to these rights as it does to rights relating to freedom? Are
economic and social entitlements genuine rights, in the sense of enjoying
effective jurisdictional protection, or are they merely part of a statement of
principles impossible to fulfill at the present time; simple guidelines point-
ing the way as to the contents of desirable legislation or the sense or direc-
tion which public policy ought to take?

It is true that democracy, more than other forms of government, assumes

a certain commitment to the economic and social rights of the population,
especially when use of the rules of the democratic game allows into power
progressive individuals and political forces which are more attuned to the
values of equality and solidarity. Yet, if one is to look at things with rea-
lism in order to avoid mere declarations of good intentions, economic and
social rights are for now, without a doubt, more of a statement of principles
than genuine rights in an objective sense. Yet, this must not be construed
as an insurmountable hurdle preventing us from doing everything possible
to ensure that these rights move from the status of guidelines to the status
of genuine rights.

In this endeavour, legislators, governments and jurisdictional bodies have

still much ground to cover, particularly in Central and South America. The
societies which uphold democracy must not be too smug about its triumph
if they should prove incapable of preserving freedom and of moving toward
eliminating some of the most offensive and unfair material inequalities. A l l
of this naturally involves reinforcing so-called economic and social rights,
lest the enjoyment of personal freedom turn into a meaningless exercise to
the victims of inequality.
440 Agustin Squella Narducci

VII.

Some have referred to our times as "the era of rights". They refer, no
doubt, to the spectacular expansion of human rights ever since their advent
as such over two centuries ago, at the beginning of modern times. Ever
since then, human rights have been enhanced and become generalized and
international in nature, and have been built into the constitutions and laws
of democratic nations the world over. Yet, let us not forget the discordance
between the literature which exalts human rights and the fact that many are
still without rights.
With things the way they are, if we truly want our times to be the era of
rights, we will have to move faster from merely stating these rights to
effectively upholding them. As we travel the difficult path from solemn
protestation to effective protection, may we point out that while nations,
their constitutions and laws do have a major role to play, no less relevant is
the role of the judges before whom these rights will continue to be
invoked, even if some - such as certain economic and social rights - may
not always be presented as genuine subjective rights.
In fact, the judiciary ought to - without violating the principle of legal-
ity, exercising greater imagination and character, and inspired by a progres-
sive spirit which need not be confused with the political partisanship from
which they are naturally prevented - advance some of these guidelines to
the extent possible, thus turning their rulings into not just an immutable
mirror of the law and the constitution, but into a body of well-reasoned,
dynamic decisions which, in addition to reflecting the existing legislation,
try to fertilize it and to bring forth not just the perceivable fruit of its letter,
but the more elusive, yet more precise fruit ot its spirit.
What we mean by all this should come as no surprise to anyone: that
within a community, the state of the law - and certainly the state of rights -
is not the sole responsibility of those who write our laws and constitutions.
It is also the responsibility of those who, by applying the constitution and
the law, continue the process of legal creation at the level of the particular
petitions and conflicts brought before them for fair and timely settlement.
The extent to which democracy serves the law is therefore not inconse-
quential. Those who value the possibility to influence - however indirectly -
production of the law as an instrument of social harmony; those who
cherish legal science as not just professionally, but also socially important;
and lastly, those who stand truly ready to take their rights and the rights of
others seriously, have all good reason to champion democracy as a form of
government.
 POWER AND FREEDOM

A Comment on the Conception of Felix Oppenheim

By Ruth Zimmerling, Darmstadt

I. Introduction

The concepts of power and freedom 1 undoubtedly belong to the most fun-
damental concepts in the field of political science in general, and political
theory or philosophy, in particular. If - as Julia Barragân (1983, p. 82) once
remarked - the history of a science is, above all, the history of its concepts,
then a good way for measuring the progress made in the past as well as the
distance that still needs to be covered within a discipline may be the critical
examination of the development of its most basic and important concepts.
With respect to the two concepts just mentioned, the abundant political
science literature existing about them gives eloquent testimony of the
remarkable progress achieved in that science, especially in recent decades.
However, its critical examination also reveals that much remains to be done:
In political science, as elsewhere, the 'end of history' is nowhere to be seen.
In other words, the great efforts spent in the past on the analysis of, among
others, the concepts of power and freedom do not seem to have succeeded
in eliminating altogether confusion and inconsistencies. Hence, to the extent
that further progress in political science will depend at least in part on ever
more mature and clear concepts, it is well worth our while to pick up the
thread of conceptual analysis time and again.
In what follows, I wish to contribute to that task, paying special attention
to some aspects of the relationship between power and freedom.

II. An Approach to the Relationship between Power and Freedom

With respect to social power, an attitude of mistrust and suspicion seems

to predominate not only among those who think they have none, or very

1
Here and in what follows, whenever I speak of power or freedom, even if I do
not say so explicitly I always refer to their social variant, i.e., to the power an
agent or group of agents may have over another (or others), or to the freedom an
agent or group of agents may have with respect to another (or others).
442 Ruth Zimmerling

little, of it and, therefore, feel subject to (or vulnerable by) the power held
by others, but also among quite a few social theorists.
In the case of the latter, the intuition that having or exercising power is
something 'bad', something that must be evaluated negatively, probably
contributed in a decisive way to the claim defended by some that agree-
ment about the 'universe of application' of that concept is basically impos-
sible. Because, obviously, the applicability of such a value-loaded concept
to some specific case must necessarily depend, among other things, upon
the evaluation one makes of each particular case. On that conception, then,
since power is something morally bad, in order to determine whether or not
in a certain social situation we are dealing with a phenomenon involving
the existence or exercise of power 2 we must first determine the moral
status of that situation: We can speak of a case of power only when the
situation is morally deficient. As a consequence - always according to that
same conception - , to the extent that different persons reach divergent
moral judgments about some action or state of affairs, their 'descriptive
judgments' about whether or not power is involved will have to differ.
Thus, the assumption that the concept of power is inherently value-loaded
has even led some authors to defend the thesis that power is an 'essentially
contested' concept.3
Others have rejected that thesis - in my view, with good reason. 4 There
are at least two strong arguments in favour of that rejection:
1. On the one hand, we can appeal to the common usage of the term
'power'. It is simply not true that in ordinary language the concept of
power always has a negative connotation. On the contrary, statements like
Ί wish environmental protection groups had the power to prevent the adop-
tion of policies that have harmful consequences for the environment' or
'Fortunately, at that time Gorbachov still had enough power to put an end
to the cold war' or 'Unfortunately, democratic countries do not have the
power to prevent the violation of human rights in Tyrannia' make perfect
sense and are not unusual. Thus, obviously there are situations in which we

2
It is advisable to distinguish clearly between the 'existence' and the 'exercise'
of power. Of course, one can only exercise the power one 'has'; but one can per-
fectly well 'have' power without ever exercising it. Therefore, a manifestation of an
exercise of power is always at the same time a manifestation of the existence of
power, but not the other way round.
3
The notion of an 'essentially contested concept' was introduced by Gallie
1956; cf. also Care 1973; Connolly 1983; Gray 1977; Hurley 1989, ch. 3; Macln-
tyre 1973. Several of these authors expressly mention power as an example of such
a concept. The most elaborate defence of the claim that the concept of power is
'essentially contested', however, is probably Lukes 1974.
4
Cf., e.g., Ball 1993; Barry 1991a, 1991b; Oppenheim 1981.
 Power and Freedom 443

desire or endorse the existence (and even the exercise) of power, or lament
its absence. And this is not only true for the power to avoid or prevent
certain events, as someone could perhaps infer from the examples given. It
also applies to the power to do or promote things ('Would that he had the
power to get me that job!', or 'Fortunately, the UN today has the power to
establish a non-anarchical international system'). 5 We thus have a strong
empirical argument against the thesis that the concept of power inherently
carries an invariably negative evaluation.
2. But there is also a theoretical argument. In the realm of scientific
work, it is generally advisable to avoid as much as possible the use of nor-
mative concepts, i.e., concepts containing evaluative aspects among their
defining characteristics. 6 The only exception to this rule seems to be the
field of normative discourse itself: For logical reasons, one can derive nor-
mative conclusions only from starting points which are themselves norma-
tive. Hence, in such a context it may, for some purposes, be of interest to
restrict the discourse from the start to classes of objects sharing the same
normative status; and in such a case, it may then also be useful to possess
concepts which take that normative aspect into account. But when the pur-
pose is the description and/or explanation of empirical phenomena, the
inclusion of normative elements in the definition of the concepts at best
does not help, and in the worst case, can distort the perception of empirical
reality. This applies to natural phenomena and states of affairs just as to
social ones; in both spheres, nothing prevents, in principle, the distinction
between their description and their evaluation.
Even in the (not very frequent) case that the evaluation of each and
every one of the elements of some category of social phenomena happens
to be negative, it is still possible to define the corresponding concept
simply by its descriptive characteristics. Think, for instance, of acts

5
Although it may seem that the power alluded to in the examples is 'power'
only in the sense of someone's ability to produce certain states of affairs, in all of
them a social power relation is in play in the sense that the states of affairs in ques-
tion can be brought about precisely because of an ability to provoke certain con-
ducts in other agents. - It should be said in passing that I do not, of course, mean
to claim the correctness of the statements used as examples; in fact, the empirical
truth as well as the evaluative connotation of each one of them could probably be
contested on good grounds. But here, I am only interested in showing that this kind
of statements, which imply a positive evaluation of some social power situation,
makes sense and can be understood without any problem.
6
For the distinction between 'defining characteristics' and 'accompanying char-
acteristics' cf., e.g., Hospers 1990, pp. 117-119. This distinction is extremely im-
portant: A statement like ' A l l swans are white' is a mere tautology if the predicate
denotes a defining characteristic; in contrast, it is a synthetic generalization (an em-
pirical hypothesis) if it denotes an accompanying characteristic; cf. on this point,
e.g., Ayer 1936, ch. V.
444 Ruth Zimmerling

regarded as 'crimes' by the criminal law: the acts themselves are defined
by certain descriptive characteristics, whereas the corresponding negative
connotation results from the fact that the act thus described is evaluated as
a crime which deserves to be sanctioned by the state.7 Thus, it is because
of certain descriptive characteristics that a manslaughter is a 'murder', even
though the identification of an act as a 'murder' always implies that it is
evaluated negatively. In other words, the negative evaluation is not a defin-
ing, but an accompanying characteristic of the phenomena falling under the
concept of murder.
Of course, in such a case it may happen, for psychological reasons, that
in the course of time it is 'forgotten' that the uniformly negative evaluation
of all the elements belonging to the extension of some concept was only an
accompanying characteristic in Hosper's sense. In common usage, the con-
ception may then change surreptitiously, now including the evaluative
aspect among the defining characteristics. But in that case, for scientific
use, it is generally desirable not to follow that shift in common usage, and
rather to stick with the merely descriptive, value-neutral concept.
But, as we have seen, in the case of power, which is the concept I am
interested in here, there is no such invariable evaluation.
Still, even if one accepts that it is easy to find examples of an exercise
of power which we would be willing to evaluate positively, some grain of
truth seems to underlie the - as such, mistaken - idea that power is always
bad, or at least under suspicion. I think it is the following: As is well
known, there are acts and states of affairs which seem to be prima facie
morally indifferent (or even praiseworthy) and which therefore call for jus-
tification only under exceptional circumstances; but there are also others
which are assumed to be prima facie morally problematic and therefore
always need to be explicitly justified. With respect to the latter, perhaps
one can say that in each particular case the suspicion that the evaluation
will turn out to be negative holds until the contrary has been show, i.e., a
justification has been given.
Now, social power seems to be a phenomenon of that last kind: prima
facie , its exercise and even its existence seem to be morally problematic.
Therefore, it is assumed that power phenomena need to be justified in each
particular case. But, why is that so? Where does the intuition that power is
something one must prima facie be suspicious about, something basically
negative, acceptable or desirable only in special circumstances, come from?
One fundamental reason for this surely is the strong link often estab-
lished between power and freedom. The relationship between these two

7
This evaluation, in turn, may, but need not, be based on a negative moral eva-
luation.
 Power and Freedom 445

concepts is generally regarded as one of inverse proportion: The more

power an agent A has over another agent B, the less freedom Β is thought
to possess; and inversely, the less power some A has over some B, the
greater the latter's freedom. But freedom, in general, is also conceived as
something positive and desirable, something that counts among a person's
basic rights, or even as the very foundation on which all those rights are
based. The suspicion against power, then, seems to derive to a great extent
from its conception as a phenomenon which is necessarily opposed to, or
harmful for, people's freedom. 8
Given this strong relationship assumed to hold between social freedom
and power, it cannot come as a surprise that the concept of liberty too is
taken by some to be one of the 'essentially contested' concepts mentioned
above (although in this case, of course, with a value-charge of the opposite
sign of the one attributed to the concept of power). 9 But this is a discussion
I do not wish to enter into here. The very notion of an 'essentially CQn-
tested concept' is rather problematic, and it is better to do without it in
what follows. In any case, we do not need that notion in order to formulate
a logical alternative about the relationship between power and freedom, and
the evaluation of the respective phenomena: Either the inversely propor-
tional relationship between power and freedom mentioned above really
holds; in that case, since, as we have seen, power is not always something
negative, freedom cannot always be good. Or else we insist that the value
of freedom is necessarily positive; but then we must give up the idea of
that alleged strong relationship between freedom and power.
In my view, among the contributions of past decades to the elucidation
of the concepts of social power and social freedom, the work of Felix
Oppenheim stands out. For several reasons, I think it deserves close exam-
ination: first of all, because it constitutes a substantial step forward in the
clarification and refining process of those concepts; second, because in
political science literature - at least as far as it has been accessible to me -
Oppenheim's reflexions have not received due attention; and, finally,
because precisely the great clarity and precision of his presentation also

8
Cf. Miller 1983, p. 69, for the position that "our language embodies a presump-
tion that humans should not obstruct one another's activity". An explicit rejection
of that 'presumption' in favour of freedom can be found in Oppenheim's critique of
Miller's paper: cf. Oppenheim 1985, p. 308. - Just as I was finishing the writing of
the present contribution, I received the latest number of the Journal of Theoretical
Politics which contains an essay by Kristjân Kristjânsson discussing, among other
things, that same idea (Kristjânsson 1998, esp. pp. 262 f.). For reasons of time, how-
ever, I have not been able to take into account much of Kristjânsson's thoughts for
the present paper.
9
Cf., e.g., Miller 1983. Oppenheim 1995, p. 403, quotes several authors who
have adopted that position.
446 Ruth Zimmerling

facilitates the perception of some controvertible points the analysis of

which may perhaps help us overcome one or the other of the many concep-
tual obstacles which still hinder progress in political science.

III. Oppenheim's Conception

Only recently, in 1995, Oppenheim published an article about the con-

cept of 'social freedom', based on the analysis he already presented of that
notion, among others, in his 1981 book-length study of Political Concepts
which is truly a pioneering work. 1 0 In view of what has been said before, it
is interesting to note that the explicit purpose of the more recent paper is to
show that, although the "positive valuational connotation of 'freedom'" is
acknowledged (p. 419), the concept of social freedom - as well as the other
concepts of freedom Oppenheim distinguishes from that of social freedom
(among them, above all, that of freedom of choice; cf. pp. 404f.) - can be
reconstructed in purely descriptive terms and that, therefore, it is not an
'essentially contested' concept (p. 403).
Now, let us first see in what exact terms Oppenheim reconstructs that
concept, before moving on to his ideas about the relationship between
social freedom and social power.
The main features of Oppenheim's concept of social freedom are the fol-
lowing:
1. The aspect which distinguishes the concept of social freedom from
any other concept of freedom is that, by definition, it refers to a social rela-
tion, i.e., a relation between at least two interacting agents.11 At a given
time, such a relationship can exist with respect to one single action or some
set of several actions. In the most simple case, we have two agents and one
action. Therefore, the paradigmatic situation of social freedom consists of a
triadic relationship between an agent P, another agent R, and an action x . 1 2
The generic structure of a situation of social freedom thus is as follows:
"Wrt [with respect to] P, R is free to do X or to do Not-X" (p. 404).

10
In the following, unless indicated otherwise, page numbers given in paren-
thesis refer to the 1995 essay.
11
They may, of course, be individual or collective agents.
12
More complex situations involving more than two agents and/or more than
one action can always be analyzed (in the strict sense of the word) as a set of rela-
tions of social freedom of the most simple case. Therefore, here we only need to
consider the concept of social freedom for those simple cases. - It should be noted
that in the cited works Oppenheim always uses the letter 'x' to denote the action
with respect to which an agent is free or unfree, but he oscilates between the capital
and the small letter. In order to avoid confusion, I w i l l always represent it with the
small letter, except in some literal quotes of Oppenheim.
 Power and Freedom 447

2. In order to explicate what 'being free' means in this formula, Oppen-

heim takes recourse to a definition ex negativo:
a) First, he defines that someone is free to the extent that some other
person does not make him or her "unfree": "Wrt P, R is free to do X or to
do Not-X" is equivalent to "P makes R neither unfree to do X nor unfree
to do Not-X" (p. 404).
b) He then stipulates what it means to say that someone makes someone
else unfree to perform an action: "Wrt P..., R ... is unfree to do X if and
only if Ρ makes it either impossible or punishable for R to do X " (p. 404;
cf. also 1985, p. 307).
Taking all this together, we have the following definition of a situation
of social freedom:
With respect to P, R is free to do χ or to do not-x if and only if Ρ makes
it neither impossible nor punishable for R to do χ and Ρ makes it neither
impossible nor punishable for R to do not-x.
It thus becomes clear that the key for determining whether or not in a
given situation we are dealing with a case of social freedom or unfreedom
rests with the concepts of the impossible and the punishable.
3. Now, according to Oppenheim, there are two quite different senses in
which Ρ can make it impossible for R to perform some action x:
a) On the one hand, he can make it "strictly" (pp. 406 ff.) or "literally"
(1985, p. 307) impossible. Although the author does not explain this
further, I think one may savely assume that this means that Ρ succeeds in
eliminating action χ completely from R's menue of choice, that is, that Ρ in
some way brings it about that R loses the ability to do x.
b) On the other, he can make it merely "practically impossible". In that
case, Ρ makes it so difficult for R to perform χ that "any reasonable person
finding himself in R's situation" would consider it "too risky or costly or
difficult" to carry out χ (p. 407). Oppenheim illustrates the concept of
"practical impossibility" with the following example:
" I f Ρ holds a pistol against R's chest and says: 'Your money or your life!' Ρ does
not make it strictly speaking impossible for R to risk his life; but if it is fairly
certain that Ρ 'means business', R has practically no choice but to hand over his
money. ... It seems, therefore, plausible to extend the concept of unfreedom to
include relationships making it practically impossible or ineligible for someone to
act in a certain way." (p. 406)

Thus, while in the case of "strict impossibility" χ is no longer among R's

options for action, in the case of "practical impossibility" χ still is an
option for R - but an option which, as a consequence of P's intervention,
has become so unattractive that any "reasonable" person in R's shoes
448 Ruth Zimmerling

w o u l d consider its choice unsuitable or inappropriate. I n the first case, χ is

" i n e l i g i b l e " i n the strict sense: R cannot choose to perform χ anymore, as
much as he may want to; in the second case, in contrast, χ is " i n e l i g i b l e "
only i n the weaker sense that R no longer wants to choose it - or at least
that it is no longer reasonable for h i m to want to choose it - , even though
he could. I n other words: in the former case, R no longer has the factual
ability for performing x, whereas in the latter, perhaps we could say that
(provided R is a reasonable person) he no longer has the motivational abil-
ity for doing i t . 1 3

The t w o kinds o f impossibility, taken together, constitute what Oppen-

heim calls the category o f " i m p e d i m e n t s " leading to "prevention" (p. 411).

4. Finally, Oppenheim also classifies as situations o f social unfreedom

those cases i n w h i c h P, without making the performance o f χ impossible in
either one o f the t w o senses just presented, makes it "punishable" for R to
perform x. W h i l e i n the case o f impossibility the relationship w i t h unfree-
d o m was rather obvious, the alleged necessary relationship between the
punishability o f an action and an agent's unfreedom does not seem very
clear and deserves a closer look.

First o f all, it is important to note that, contrary to what one may expect,
when Oppenheim speaks o f the punishability o f an action he is not refer-

13
Of course, the interesting question then is to know what the criteria for deter-
mining whether or not in a particular situation we are facing a case of strict or of
practical impossibility are. Although this is a complicated matter which I cannot
treat here in detail, at least that much can be said: While the first obviously is a
purely descriptive concept (that is, for each given case it can, at least in principle,
be empirically established whether or not it falls under that concept), this is not so
in the case of the "practically impossible", since judgements of practical impossibil-
ity presuppose, by definition, not only counterfactual, but hypothetical reflections,
based on some particular interpretation of a notoriously normative concept, namely,
that of reasonableness. In the first case, for a description of a situation as a relation-
ship of unfreedom of R wrt Ρ to do χ to be true it must basically be shown that (i)
at a given time t, R had been able to perform χ (that is, all the necessary conditions
and some set of jointly sufficient conditions were satisfied) and (ii) at a later time
t \ Ρ either eliminated at least one necessary condition or changed the world in such
a way as to create some new necessary condition which was not satisfied. In the
case of "practical impossibility", in turn, one would need to show the following:
(i') the same as (i); (ii') at time t, under the given circumstances, it would have
been reasonable for anyone in R's situation to perform x; (iii') at a later time t', Ρ
brought about some change in R's circumstances of action (but without affecting
the satisfaction of all necessary conditions for x); (iv) that change affected the set
of given circumstances in such a way as to make it unreasonable for anyone in R's
position to perform x. In that last case, everything then depends on what is under-
stood by 'reasonable'. These remarks show that, although the difference between
strict and practical impossibility may at first sight only look gradual, the two condi-
tions are, in fact, of a totally different kind.
 Power and Freedom 449

ring to the kind of situation where Ρ threatens R with a sanction should he

perform χ and by doing so perhaps succeeds in deterring R from doing x.
According to Oppenheim, cases of threatening must be distinguished from
cases of punishability. If Ρ threatens R with a sanction for the performance
of χ, there are two possibilities:

a) Either the threatened sanction is not sufficiently severe and/or cred-

ible to make it practically impossible for R to perform x. In that case, the
threat has exactly the same effect as any other "obstacle" R may have to
face, in the course of choosing and performing x, and which can be "sur-
mounted" (p. 407), 1 4 and therefore it does not at all affect R's freedom.
b) Or the announced 'punishment' is so severe and/or has such a high
probability of application that it does indeed make it practically impossible
for R to perform x. But in that case, we would simply be dealing with one
of the situations of prevention presented above:
"By merely threatening R with punishment if he did Χ, Ρ leaves R free either to
comply or to disregard the threat. P's threat is a means to influence R to comply;
its success depends on its credibility. ... Threats are instances of unfreedom only
if they are 'coercive', i.e. if it is practically certain that a threatened severe pun-
ishment would be carried out." (p. 410)

Hence, a threat either has no effect whatsoever on the social freedom of

the threatened person, or it is a 'common' case of prevention, by making
some action practically impossible. With respect to threats, then, there is no
need for a new category. The fact that Oppenheim nevertheless does give it
a special treatment implies that his conception of the punishability of an
action must be another one. This is also manifested in his explication that
"Punishability, unlike obstacles, no matter how light the penalty, always indicates
unfreedom. The degree of R's unfreedom to do X wrt Ρ depends on the severity
of the penalty as experienced ... by the average person." (p. 412). 1 5

Here, Oppenheim invokes the experience of the "average person" in

order to protect his conception against a possible objection of subjectivity.
Because if one could speak of a "penalty" only when R himself "attaches
negative utility to the sanction or to the opportunity costs to him of per-
forming the punishable action" (p. 409), then Oppenheim could not uphold
the thesis that punishability always implies unfreedom without at the same
time turning unfreedom into a subjective concept the applicability of which

14
The criterion for the distinction between an "impediment" and a "mere obsta-
cle" is, in Oppenheim's words, "whether a normal, rational agent could overcome
the impediment, if he desired to do so" (p. 408).
15
Cf. also 1985, p. 308: "Imposing even a small penalty restricts freedom, but
only an obstacle amounting to practical impossibility does so."

3 0 FS A a r n i o
450 Ruth Zimmerling

would always depend on the evaluations made by the agents involved in a

particular case. Therefore, he insists that
"whether P's action Y constitutes a reward or a punishment does not depend on
R's valuations. R might value a prison sentence positively, and experience being
'rewarded' by being taken to see and hear Die Götterdämmerung as a 'punish-
shment' ... [W]e must refer to the valuations of average rational agents." (p. 410)

So far, we know that for Oppenheim the punishability of an action

always implies unfreedom, even if the affected person regards the penalty
as insignificant or if, instead of experiencing it as a deprivation, she even
enjoys the 'punishment' inflicted on her. But what we still do not know is
in what sense punishability necessarily gives rise to some degree of unfree-
dom. What is the alleged difference between a threat of punishment in case
someone performs a certain action, and the punishability of that same
action? And how must we understand Oppenheim's thesis that in the latter
case, regardless of the quality or quantity of the sanction associated with
the action, we have a situation of unfreedom, whereas in the case of a
threat, this depends on the severity of the penalty as well as on the threat's
credibility?
In order to understand better how Oppenheim conceives that difference,
we must go back to his earlier work (1981, p. 57), where he stipulates that
the punishability of an action means simply that if the action is performed,
the penalty is in fact imposed. Although Oppenheim does not say much
more about it, I think we need to take a closer look at the relationship
between 'punishability' and 'threat of punishment' which derives from this
definition.
First of all, it could be objected that it makes no sense at all to establish
a distinction between 'punishability', as defined by Oppenheim, and 'threat
of punishment' because the two are synonyms: In a certain sense, to say
that an action is 'punishable', that is, that the imposition of a sanction is a
consequence of the performance of that action by a certain agent, is exactly
the same as to say that the action in question is 'under a threat of punish-
ment'. 1 6 Indeed, if that were the only possible conception of the notion of
'threat', Oppenheim's distinction between punishability and threat would be
incomprehensible.
But there is another possibility, which does permit to draw a distinction
between the two concepts. The difference, on that view, seems to be similar
to that existing between a fact (here, the fact that an action and a punish-

16
This is how Hart (1994, p. 34), for example, seems to understand it when,
without further explanation, he identifies a 'sanction' with a 'threatened evil'. - I
am grateful to Ernesto Garzón Valdés for having reminded me of the possibility to
interpret punishability as 'threat of punishment'.
 Power and Freedom 451

ment are connected) and a statement or 'report' about that fact. A threat of
punishment, in that sense, rather than being punishability itself, is an infor-
mation about the fact that a certain action is punishable. The most impor-
tant aspect of that distinction between the punishability of an action and a
threat of punishment is probably that it underlines the fact that the credibil-
ity , and with it the efficacy , of a threat is independent of whether or not the
respective action actually is punishable. In other words, an agent may
wrongly belief a threat - i.e., a 'report of punishability' - to be true or
false. A threat of punishment, thus, can succeed in deterring an agent from
an action that is not punishable, that is, it may be effective even if punish-
ability does not apply. And, vice versa , a threat may be ineffective even
though punishability actually holds; i.e., it is possible that a threat does not
succeed in deterring from the action and that, as a consequence, the agent
suffers the punishment. So there are four possible cases when an agent Ρ
threatens another agent R to punish him should he perform some action x:

punishability

no yes
effective 1) impediment 2) impediment plus
(counterfactual)
punishment
threat of punishment
ineffective 3) full freedom 4) punishment

Case 1: Although the action is not punishable - that is, R actually would
not be punished by Ρ for performing it - the threat succeeds in preventing
the action, and in that sense R is unfree. 17
Case 2: The second case is, so to speak, a case of 'double unfreedom':
by impediment and, according to Oppenheim, also by punishability.
Although the agent does not come to 'suffer' because of the second type of
unfreedom, since he does not perform the action and, therefore, does not
provoke the punishment, his unfreedom by punishability still 'exists'.
Case 3: In the third case, since the threat is not effective, R performs the
action - here, the threat is at the most a "surmountable" obstacle that does
not affect R's freedom; and since the action also is not punishable, R is
perfectly free with respect to Ρ and that action.

17
For the sake of simplification, I assume that the agent in question is a 'reason-
able' person in Oppenheim's sense and, therefore, is 'impressed' by a threat only
when it poses such an enormous obstacle that it makes the action practically impos-
sible.

30*
452 Ruth Zimmerling

Case 4: As in the previous case, in the fourth case P's threat does not
affect R's freedom since it is ineffective; therefore, R performs the action.
But since now that action actually is punishable, R is punished by P. 1 8
I will come back to these cases below. But before that, I must still com-
plete the presentation of Oppenheim's conception. The question that until
now has been left open is how this concept of freedom is related to that of
power.
In his more recent paper on social freedom, that relationship is not expli-
citly discussed. It is, however, presupposed from the very beginning,
through a short phrase in which Oppenheim very casually and surrepti-
tiously, introduces it as if it were a totally uncontroversial, sure fact. In the
definition of a situation of social unfreedom quoted above, I had deliber-
ately left out a short parenthesis; the complete quote says:
"Wrt Ρ (a holder of power), R (a respondent) is unfree to do X if and only if Ρ
makes it either impossible or punishable for R to do X. Wrt P, R is free to do X
or to do Not-X if and only if Ρ makes R neither unfree to do X nor unfree to do
Not-X." (p. 404; emphasis added)

Thus, the author implies that situations in which one agent's social free-
dom is restricted by another agent are always at the same time situations of
social power. Therefore, even the letter by which Oppenheim denotes the
agent who makes the other one unfree is not chosen arbitrarily: it is the 'Ρ'
of 'powerful'. 1 9 It can, thus, not come as a surprise that the example he
uses (p. 406) as an illustration for situations of a restriction of freedom, in
the sense of making some action practically impossible - that of the thug
with the pistol who says 'Your money or your life!' - , is the paradigmatic
example for the illustration of (certain kinds of) social power situations. 20
But in order to see just how closely related power and (the lack of) free-
dom are in Oppenheim's view, we must take recourse to his explicit defini-
tion of 'social power' which stipulates that
"P has power over R wrt his not doing χ iff Ρ has influence over R's not doing χ
or prevents R from doing χ or makes it punishable for R to do x" (1981, p. 21).

18
In addition, one could think of the case in which an action is punishable, but
there is no threat to that end - the case of 'secrete punishability'; this case could be
accomodated in the table by regarding it as a borderline case of 3) (punishability
plus ineffective threat).
19
Note that this is not always so: Norman (1991) and Kristjânsson (1998), e.g.,
use the same letters, but the other way round, and without any indication that they
are thought to stand for some meaning.
20
Oppenheim himself invokes "the typical situation of 'Your money or your
life'" (1981, p. 15) as an example for that specific kind of an exercise of power
performed by way of a "coercive threat".
 Power and Freedom 453

Since, as we have seen, prevention and punishability are the two forms
how, according to Oppenheim, one agent can make another one unfree to
perform some action, this definition of power, reformulated in terms of
freedom, translates into the following:
Ρ has power over R with respect to his not doing χ if and only if Ρ has a
certain influence over R 2 1 or Ρ makes R unfree to do x.
Understood in this way, situations of social power and situations of
social unfreedom between two agents are not completely interdefinable:
there can be situations of power that are not situations of unfreedom. Still,
all relations of unfreedom (conceptually) imply a relation of power. That
means that all the situations presented by Oppenheim of an agent R having
his freedom constrained by another agent Ρ are equivalent to situations in
which Ρ has power over R.
This completes the presentation of the notions of social freedom and
social power and the relationship between them, according to Oppenheim.
Let us now examine some implications of this conception.

IV. Discussion

1. First, an observation about the relationship between power and free-

dom. As we have just seen, from Oppenheim's point of view, there are two
fundamentally different categories of situations in which one can speak of
social power: the category of influence situations, on the one hand, and
that of restrictions of freedom, or unfreedom , on the other. The problem of
the definition of 'influence' is a topic I cannot treat within the confines of
this paper. But elsewhere 22 I have tried to show that it is not advisable to
conceive of social influence situations as a subcategory of social power
situations - among other reasons because this would mean an unnecessary
departure from the common usage of these terms. In ordinary language,
generally, we would not be willing to attribute 'power' to anyone we con-
sider 'influential'. 23 I think it is more plausible to reverse the relationship,

21
A case I am not interested in here.
22
Cf. Zimmerling 1993.
23
Take, for instance, the case of social scientists: Sometimes, some (very few)
of them are said to have political 'influence'; but nobody would say that they are
'powerful'. To mention just one specific example, think of Amitai Etzioni, political
scientist of strongly communitarian inclinations; over the past years, the German
press has repeatedly attributed to him a certain influence over some members of the
Clinton administration as well as over several European social-democratic leaders;
but I do not remember ever having heard or read the assertion that Etzioni therefore
has 'power' over anyone. The same could also be said of political philosophers
454 Ruth Zimmerling

regarding the concept of influence as the broader one, and understanding

power situations as special cases of influence.
In the present context, this is relevant for the following reason: If, from
Oppenheim's conception, we eliminate - as I think we should - influence
situations as one subcategory of power situations, we are left, ceteris pari-
bus, with a concept of social power the extension of which is totally
equivalent to that of the concept of social unfreedom. 24 The only remaining
difference between the two concepts then regards their intensions: they
direct our attention to different sides of the relationship in question: 'unfree-
eedom' is an attribute of some R if and only if (and to the extent that)
'power' is an attribute of some other agent P. 2 5 So, whether we speak of
unfreedom or of power seems to depend on which of the parties to the
corresponding relationship we are (more) interested in.
2. Of course, if power situations are identified with situations of a restric-
tion of freedom, this has consequences for the initial question about the eva-
luation of such situations. On this interpretation, a positive judgment about
some relationship of social freedom necessarily implies a negative judgment
about its negation, and that means: about the corresponding power relation,
and vice versa. But from here, we must proceed carefully, and not draw pre-
mature conclusions. Because it must not be forgotten that the interdepen-
dence of the evaluations of social freedom and social power only applies to
each particular triadic relationship between some P, some R, and some x.
Thus, from this point of view, a negative judgment about a particular power
relation between Ρ and R with respect to χ certainly is equivalent to a nega-
tive judgment about the infringement on the freedom of R implied by that
power relation. But this, of course, in no way predetermines the answer to
the question of whether or not R ought to be free from any constraint to do
or omit χ. And, vice versa, an argument against the freedom of some R with
respect to some action χ is no argument in favour of the power of any Ρ
over R with respect to x. Value-judgments about power or unfreedom rela-
tions, thus, can change with each one of the three elements of these rela-

with a certain degree of public visibility, as, e.g., Jürgen Habermas in Germany or
Ronald Dworkin in the United States. That does not mean, of course, that influence
can never amount to power: in the case of Rasputin, for instance, one could at least
question whether he merely had political 'influence' or 'power'.
24
The thesis that the best way of understanding "the locutions 'R exercises
power over P' and 'R constrains P's freedom'" is to see them as "extensionally
equivalent" is explicitly defended by Kristjànsson (1998, p. 264), who refers to an-
other paper of his for a foundation of that thesis (Kristjànsson 1992, which unfor-
tunately, I have not yet been able to consult).
25
From the descriptive point of view, the two attributes inform us, so to speak,
about different aspects of one and the same relationship: the former about some-
thing R cannot do, and the latter about something Ρ can do.
 Power and Freedom 455

tions, as distinguished by Oppenheim. And that means that, despite their co-
extensionality and interdefinability, the distinction between the concepts of
'social power' and 'social (un)freedom' continues to be important for our
ability to focus on different aspects of such relations.
3. In addition, there is also a fourth element that may become relevant in
the context of the evaluation of a relation of power or unfreedom. I am refer-
ring to the different bases of unfreedom distinguished by Oppenheim in his
definition. Just as it may be of interest for descriptive purposes to distinguish
between a relationship of unfreedom based on an impediment and another one
based on the punishability of an action, this distinction may also be relevent
for normative purposes. Oppenheim's conception of punishability, and above
all its connection with unfreedom, however, seems somewhat obscure. I
therefore now wish to go back to the four cases of possible combinations of
punishability and threat presented in the table above.
One of the differences between the two types of unfreedom can be seen
clearly if one compares the unfreedom in case 1 - effective threat without
punishability - with the unfreedom in case 4, i.e., punishability without an
effective threat: The unfreedom resulting from an effective threat, accord-
ing to Oppenheim, consists in the fact that R cannot perform the respective
action anymore - where that impossibility is a 'practical' impossibility, that
is, R cannot work up the necessary motivation for performing the action. In
contrast, the only thing R cannot do - and, therefore, the only thing in
which Ρ 'makes' R 'unfree' - in the case of the mere punishability of an
action is to avoid that one of the consequencens of that action is the impo-
sition of the respective sanction by P. In Oppenheim's own words: "P, by
making it punishable for R to do x, makes it impossible for R to do χ with-
out being punished ..." (1981, p. 57).
A second important difference can be perceived by comparing case 2
with cases 3 and 4: An ineffective threat does not affect the agent's free-
dom at all. In contrast, although in case 2 the punishability is 'ineffective'
in the sense that the punishment is not inflicted because the action is not
performed (since it is prevented by the threat), it does affect R's freedom in
the sense of having counte rfactual consequences. In other words, punish-
ability (as the word itself indicates 26 ) can be understood as a dispositional
property of an action - a property, that is, which exists even if it is not
manifest, and which becomes manifest only under special circumstances.
According to Oppenheim's conception, unfreedom is linked to punishability
as a dispositional property of an action, and not only to its manifestation in
punishment.

26
As is well-known, words constructed with the morphema '-bility/-ble' usually
express dispositional properties.
456 Ruth Zimmerling

Finally, I think that there is a third relevant difference between the pun-
ishability of an action and a corresponding threat of punishment which is
not mentioned by Oppenheim. It is the fact that the existence of a threat
presupposes a communicative act , whereas the punishability of an action
only presupposes a decision , which may well be taken unilaterally by the
agent who imposes the penality, without any need of communicating it to
the agent who will suffer the punishment. More generally, we can say that
the prevention of an action - that is, the act of making it strictly or practi-
cally impossible - always requires a 'natural act' (which may be a commu-
nicative act, as in the case of a threat, or some other act which, besides,
must not necessarily be intentional as an act of prevention). In contrast,
punishability requires a 'normative act' since the connection of an action
with a punitive consequence is nothing but the creation of a punitive norm
(an action which is inconceivable without the corresponding intention). 27
In view of these three differences, Oppenheim's idea that punishability
always means unfreedom and, therefore, also (the existence of) power has
several questionable consequences which can be seen more easily with the
help of some exemplary cases:
a) Suppose, first, that Ρ makes it punishable for R to do x. The punish-
ability of χ is a fact which does not depend on R knowing about it; there-
fore, also suppose that R does not know that he will be punished by Ρ if he
performs x. On the other hand, punishability, as a dispositional property of
χ, is a fact that is permanently, if only latently, 'there', i.e., it 'exists' even
when R does not perform χ (and, therefore, does not suffer the correspond-
ing penalty). Hence, let us suppose that R's own preferences make him
decide not to do χ every time he has the opportunity and could do x. We
thus have a case in which R
- always does what he wants (he never wants to do x),
- never suffers a punishment by Ρ (since he never does x), and
- does not even know that he would be punished if he did x.

27
For the distinction between natural acts and normative acts, cf., e.g., Redondo
(1996, ch. I). Note, however, that e.g. for von Wright (1963, pp. 116ff.) a norma-
tive act is always a "verbal act". On this conception, then, the creation of a punitive
norm is not complete with a unilateral decision of some norm-giver to make some
action punishable; it also requires the verbal communication of the corresponding
'threat' to the norm's addressee(s). This is plausible if one takes into account that
there are good reasons for the position that regulatory norms of conduct only exist
to the extent that they effectively guide the conduct of people, and that they can
only do so if they are known. In that sense, punishability alone cannot have any
practical relevance at all as long as it remains 'secret'. But that is another topic
which I cannot pursue here.
 Power and Freedom 457

In that respect, for R the world is ideal: He feels perfectly free to do or

not to do x; the fact that χ actually is punishable does not change his life
in any way whatsoever (i.e., it does affect neither his actions nor his
mental or psychic state). And yet, according to Oppenheim, in such a case
R's freedom to do χ or not-x is constrained because of the punishability of
χ by P. 2 8
b) Second, assume now that the case is as before, but that at some
moment, R, unaware of the risk of punishment, decides to do x. He does x,
without any impediment or obstacle , and consequently suffers the penalty
foreseen by Ρ for that case. According to Oppenheim, as for R's freedom to
do χ, this case is no different from the first. He would say that with respect
to P, R is unfree to do χ - although, in fact, R performs χ without any
problem (his 'problems', so to speak, begin only after he has performed x).
c) Third, assume that Ρ now informs R of the fact that χ is punishable,
saying something like Ί just want you to know that if you do χ I will
punish you with y'. Only then, the fact that χ is punishable can begin to
play a role in R's deliberations about how to act, and can perhaps 'con-
onvince' him to give up the performance of it.
From a practical point of view, all this shows that the only way how
punishability may affect the behaviour of a person is through the communi-
cation of its existence, i.e., through a threat (since, as has been observed
before, basically, a threat is nothing but an anticipated information about
the fact that a certain action is punishable). 29 In other words, any effect the
punishability of an action may have on the deliberations and decisions of
an agent is always an indirect effect, deriving only from the threat necessa-
rily implied by the information about the fact of punishability.
d) Finally, assume that R, despite his awareness that χ actually is punish-
able by P, is not impressed by that threat and performs χ anyway whenever
he feels like it. Assume, also, that R cannot - and knows that he cannot -
avoid the punishment, and that, still, he consciously decides to 'accept' it,
perhaps because he regards it as négligeable compared with the joy the per-
formance of χ gives him. Again, Oppenheim would have to say that with

28
Oppenheim explicitly insists that "[a] person who feels free may not be a free
person" (p. 415, n. 7) and rejects those conceptions of freedom (e.g., those of Arne-
son or Gray) according to which in cases where someone "is made unfree to do
only what he does not want to do anyhow" that person's freedom is not restricted
(p. 415).
29
Note that the corresponding 'communicative' act need not be a verbal act: as
is well-known, it is perfectly possible to communicate informations non-verbally,
for instance, by some kind of regular and observable behaviour. The punishability
of an action may thus be communicated - and, indeed, inevitably is communicated
- simply through the consistent public punishment of that action.
458 Ruth Zimmerling

respect to R's freedom nothing has changed in comparison to the previous

cases: R is still unfree to do x, simply because of its punishability, despite
the fact that there is no impediment.
The implication deriving from these four exemplary cases with respect to
R's unfreedom because of the punishability of χ seems to be this: It is a
kind of 'unfreedom' which actually does not have any notable effect on the
relationship between R and his actions, since it exists in total independence
of R's behaviour and, above all, of whether or not his suffering or not suf-
fering the corresponding punishment is triggered by his own conscious
decision. In that sense, the 'unfreedom' allegedly linked with punishability
seems to have much in common with the 'unfreedom' implied by certain
natural causal relationships. In the worst case, the punishability of χ makes
me 'unfree' to avoid the penalty connected with my performance of x,
more or less in the same way as the fact that it is raining makes me
'unfree' to avoid getting wet if I go outside without an umbrella. But in
both cases, the action in question (walking in the rain, or performing a pun-
ishable action) is 'eligible', i.e., the punishability - just like the rain - does
not affect the person as an agent , but only as a passive 'victim' of a conse-
quence. Therefore, if one connects the punishability of an action with the
unfreedom of a person, as Oppenheim does, that means, in the last
instance, that one gives up the idea that a person's freedom basically con-
cerns that person's (factual or motivational ) ability to act. It may well be
that for certain purposes such a conception has its advantage. But in that
case, it would seem advisable also to give up the notion, upheld by Oppen-
heim, of relationships of social freedom or unfreedom as triadic relations
between two agents and an action. 30
Finally, a brief look at the implication of the exemplary cases for the
other side of the alleged relation of social unfreedom, that is, to P's power:
The effective punishability of an action χ by Ρ does, of course, imply a
kind of 'power' of P, in the sense that it means that Ρ really 'can' inflict a
punishment on R should he perform x. That 'power', however, can hardly
be interpreted as 'social power': In none of the cases presented above we
can say that the punishability of χ gives Ρ some 'power over R' in the

30
Cf. Kristjànsson 1998 for a very similar critique of Philip Pettit's idea of free-
dom as "anti-power" or "non-domination" (Pettit 1996; 1997, ch. 2): His main ob-
jection is that Pettit fails to see that the notion of freedom as noninterference, which
Pettit rejects, is a conception of the freedom of actions, whereas Pettit's notion of
freedom as non-domination is a conception of the freedom of persons. In these
terms, one could also say that Oppenheim, on the whole, defends a conception of
freedom of actions, and apparently does not notice that his inclusion of punishabil-
ity as a defining characteristic of social unfreedom brings with it a shift to a con-
ception of the freedom of persons, thus turning his over-all conception into an indi-
gestible concoction.
 Power and Freedom 459

sense that Ρ succeeds in controlling or guiding any of R's actions. With

punishability, instead of an ability to intervene in R's actions or decisions,
Ρ only has an ability to react to them. In case d) we could even say with
some reason that it is R who, because of the punishability of x, has a cer-
tain power over P, because with his decisions to do or not to do χ he can
'control' P's behaviour with respect to the punitive action. Hence, it seems
that from the standpoint of the alleged "holder of power" too, the relation-
ship proposed by Oppenheim between punishability and unfreedom, and
therefore also between punishability and social power, does not contribute
to the clarity and consistency of the concepts under scrutiny.
Because of all this, contrary to what Oppenheim argues for, I think we
would be well advised to eliminate the punishability of an action from the
definitions of social power and social freedom.

V. Conclusion

Despite the critical remarks just presented, I still believe that with his
conceptual proposals Oppenheim has offered a highly valuable contribution
to the social sciences in general and to political science in particular.
Regardless of the remaining perplexities and doubts, his efforts to disentan-
gle the messy 'jungle' around the concepts of freedom and power, his clear
distinction between the social variant and other possible versions of these
concepts, and his observations about the conceptual relationship between
social power and social (un)freedom have increased the maturity of some
key concepts of our discipline. But perhaps even more important than the
progress his own conception provides over earlier ones is the future pro-
gress it has made possible. With his work, Oppenheim not only prepared
the ground for a revision, precision and correction of all existing theories
or approaches that make use of the analyzed concepts. As I hope to have
succeeded in showing, with their exemplary transparency and sistematiza-
tion, his reflexions also constitute a real invitation to their critical examina-
tion, thus providing, so to speak, the 'motor' for the continuation of the
process of conceptual development. In that sense, Felix Oppenheim's con-
ceptual work has doubly enriched the history of political science.

References

Ayer , Alfred J. (1936): Language, Truth and Logic, Oxford: Oxford University
Press. - Ball Terence (1993): Power, in: Robert E. Goodin/Philip Pettit (eds.), A
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 548 -
557. - Barragân, Julia (1983): Hipótesis Metodológicas, Caracas: Editorial Juridica
Venezolana. - Barry, Brian (1991): Democracy and Power. Essays in Political
460 Ruth Zimmerling

Theory 1, Oxford: Clarendon. - Barry, Brian (1991a): Is It Better to be Powerful or

Lucky? In: Barry 1991, pp. 270-302 [first published in: Political Studies 28
(1980), pp. 183 - 194 and pp. 338 - 352]. - Barry , Brian (1991b), The Obscurities
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cepts, in: Ethics 84:1, pp. 10-21. - Connolly, William E. (1983): Essentially Con-
tested Concepts in Politics, in: idem, The Terms of Political Discourse, 2nd ed.
1984, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 9 - 4 4 . - Gallie, W. B. (1956): Essentially
Contested Concepts, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series Vol. 56,
pp. 167- 198. - Gray , John (1977): On the Contestability of Social and Political
Concepts, in: Political Theory 5, pp. 333 - 348. - Hart, H. L. A. (1994): The Con-
cept of Law (1961), 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon. - Hospers, John (1990): An Intro-
duction to Philosophical Analysis, 3rd ed. (1st ed. 1956), London: Routledge. -
Hurley, Susan L. (1989): Natural Reason. Personality and Polity, Oxford: Oxford
University Press. - Kristjânsson, Kristjân (1992): 'Constraining Freedom' and
'Exercising Power Over', in: International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 7,
pp. 127- 138. - Kristjânsson, Kristjân (1998): Is There Something Wrong With
'Free Action'? In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 10:3, pp. 259- 273. - Lukes,
Steven (1974): Power: A Radical View, 15th reprint 1991, Houndmills and London:
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Social Concepts, in: Ethics 84:1, pp. 1 - 9. - Miller , David (1983): Constraints on
Freedom, in: Ethics 94:1 (October), pp. 6 6 - 86. - Miller , David (1985): Reply to
Oppenheim, in: Ethics 95:2 (January), pp. 310-314. - Norman, Wayne J. (1991):
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Oppenheim, Felix E. (1981): Political Concepts. A Reconstruction, Oxford: Basil
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Fontamara.
V I I . On Normative Argumentation
and Justification and the Critique
of Legal Reasoning
 LEGAL INTERPRETATION: A TENTATIVE REPORT

By Paolo Comanducci, Genova

I. Introduction

In contemporary legal theory the question of interpretation is no doubt a

core issue. But this has not always been the case. In the last decade studies
about legal interpretation have multiplied 1 in the wake of a widespread
interest in interpretation. It seems to me that the kind of legal theory pro-
duced in these later decades, if compared to the period of Kelsen, Hart and
Ross is characterised by a keen interest in legal reasoning, 2 and, more spe-
cifically, by its choice of judicial reasoning as the paradigm instance of
legal reasoning. Within the broad field of studies on legal reasoning, the
topic of interpretation has certainly been most frequently dealt with.
My aim in this paper is twofold: in the first part I shall try and outline a
sort of map (calling it a typology would be far too ambitious) of the the-
ories of legal interpretation currently available; in the second part, on the
basis of the results of the previous inquiry, I shall try and sketch a picture
of what the duties of a judge are, or might be, or ought to be with respect
to the interpretation of law.

II. Materials for a Meta-Theoretical Map

In order to draw a map of the theories of interpretation circulating today

in the legal milieu, it is first of all necessary to pinpoint the salient ele-
ments characterising the different theories. What follows is an attempt to
perform exactly this task.

1
Among the first authors who systematically worked on this issue in Europe is
Aulis Aarnio. By him see for instance: On Legal Reasoning, Turun Yliopisto, Tur-
ku, 1977; Legal Point of View. Six Essays on Legal Philosophy, Yleisen oikeustie-
teen laitoksen julkaisuja 3, Helsinki, 1978; Sobre la ambigiiedad semantica en la
interpretation juridica, in "Doxa", 4, 1987, pp. 109- 17.
2
One may date this turn with the publication of A. Aarnio , R. Alexy , A. Pecze-
nik , The Foundation of Legal Reasoning, in "Rechtstheorie", 12, 1981, pp. 133-
158, 2 5 7 - 2 7 9 , 423 -448. Cf. also A. Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, Reidel,
Dordrecht, 1987.
464 Paolo Comanducci

1. Firstly one may distinguish three different uses of the word 'interpreta-
tation': 3 this feature, namely, the different meanings bestowed on 'interpre-
retation', is what characterises the different theories of interpretation.
In its first and broadest meaning, which I shall call the hermeneutic one,
'interpretation' designates the attribution of sense to objects, phenomena,
processes on the part of the knowing subject. According to many contem-
porary philosophical trends, any form of knowledge, not only knowledge of
cultural objects, as some believe, but also knowledge of natural objects, is
constituted by interpretation. It is the knowing subject that, through its con-
ceptual categories, its tools of inquiry, its own hypotheses, its own episte-
mological "spectacles", bestows sense to the objects it looks upon.
Some radical currents of contemporary epistemology, which one may
label as constructivist, would even go as far as denying that talk of objects,
phenomena and processes as entities distinct and independent from the
knowing subject is admissible at all: according to these currents, the exist-
ence of an alleged "reality" is a metaphysical hypothesis which cannot be
proved and which can even be dangerous from a scientific point of view. It
is not so much that every object is necessarily interpreted in order to be
known, as the traditional hermeneutic currents would have it; 4 rather, every
object is the interpretation which someone supplies for it, and nothing more
than this. 5
In its second meaning, which I shall call the semantic one, the term 'inter-
erpretation' designates the attribution of meaning to linguistic entities of
written or spoken form. In the legal context 'interpretation' designates the
attribution of meaning to normative documents (statutes, bylaws, regula-
tions, court rulings, contracts, etc.).
A document is an object constituted by graphic symbols and produced by
an individual (sender) in order to transmit information, directives, evalua-
tions, etc., to other individuals (receivers). Such a document has, to the

3
Such a distinction is borrowed from Wróblewski. Among his works I shall here
only refer to J. Wróblewski, The Judicial Application of Law, Kluwer, Dordrecht,
1992.
4
The most important reference for legal hermeneutics is no doubt J. Esser. By
him see, at least, Precomprensione e scelta del metodo nel processo di individua-
zione del diritto: fondamenti di razionalità nella prassi decisionale del giudice
(1972), Edizioni scientifiche italiane, Napoli, 1983.
5
On legal constructivism see V. Villa, Teorie della scienza giuridica e teorie delle
scienze naturali. Modelli ed analogie, Giuffrè, Milano, 1984; V. Villa, Conoscenza
giuridica e concetto di diritto positivo. Lezioni di filosofia del diritto, Giappichelli,
Torino, 1993. On constructivism in general see: M. Piattelli Palmarini (ed.), Livelli
di realtà, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1984; N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, Harvester
Press, Hassocks, 1978; P. Watzlawick (Hrsg.), Die erfundene Wirklichkeit, R. Piper
& Co. Verlag, München, 1981.
 Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report 465

sender, a given meaning content: it conveys given items of information,

directives, evaluations etc., and it is exactly with a view to conveying those
that the sender produced a document of such a kind. In order to have a reason-
able chance that the receivers receive exactly the message that he/she
intended to convey by means of that text, the sender will have to produce his/
her document following several of the language rules which are socially
shared. In the legal context, moreover, the sender will have to follow the var-
ious linguistic rules of the quasi-technical language of law. By means of these
same linguistic rules, the receivers interpret the document, that is to say, they
re-attribute meaning to it: were there to be no interpretation in the second
meaning of the term, the semantic interpretation, no receiver would be able to
utilize the document; the document could not be applied, evaluated, or com-
plied with. The main warranty that both sender and receiver attribute the
same meaning to a document is that both employ the same linguistic rules
and that such rules are sufficiently determinate and unambiguous. As this is
not always the case, it sometimes happens that the receivers attribute the
document a meaning that is different from the one the sender intended the
document to convey. It is also often the case that different receivers attribute
the document different meanings.

The third and last meaning of 'interpretation', which I shall call the legal
meaning of interpretation, is a more restricted one and designates the attri-
bution of meaning to linguistic entities of written or oral form, in situations
in which there are doubts as to which meaning is to be attributed those
linguistic entities. In the legal context most of the times the term 'interpreta-
tation' is used precisely in this third meaning, namely as attribution of
meaning to normative documents (statutes, bylaws, regulations, court rul-
ings, contracts, etc.) in situations in which the meaning to be attributed to
these documents is a controversial matter.

The second and third meaning of 'interpretation' are, in their turn, based
on the concept of meaning: clarifying which is not an easy task and repre-
sents one of the most challenging philosophical problems. For the very lim-
ited purpose of this paper I shall endorse the definition of 'meaning'
adopted by Tarello, according to which «the meaning of a given item of
language is the communication quantum which is realised, expressed, or
conveyed by the item of language itself». 6

Simplifying somewhat the issue, with the risk of trivialising it, one may
outline two main problems concerning the concept of meaning. One can
view meaning as a quid which says something about the world and says it

6
The original Italian reads as follows: «si intende per 'significato' di un segmen-
to di linguaggio il quantum di comunicazione che in esso si esprime, si realizza, si
trasmette» G. Tarello, Diritto, enunciati, usi, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1974, p. 146.

31 FS A a r n i o
466 Paolo Comanducci

to someone by means of language. Problems about meaning, therefore, fall

into two categories: those with respect to the relationship between world
and language and those with respect to relationships among language users.

a) In the legal context, the first problem amounts to determining whether

prescriptive sentences can have reference at all and, if they do, which one
it is. Descriptive sentences refer to facts, events, and state of affairs 7 and
can be judged true or false. It is not clear what the referent of prescriptive
sentences is as these cannot be judged true or false. 8

In opposition to those that deny prescriptive sentences an autonomous

status (ethical cognitivism), and to those that deny prescriptive sentences
any form of reference whatsoever (early logical positivism), analytic legal
philosophy holds the view that prescriptive sentences have exactly the same
reference as descriptive sentences but perform a different function. In Italy
this position is defended especially by Scarpelli, 9 in the wake of Frege's
ideas, 10 later improved upon by j0rgensen M and Hare. 12 A prescriptive sen-
tence has been seen as constituted by a referential part, which refers to a
fact, an event, a state of affairs (phrastic), which is per se neutral and is
shared by a descriptive sentence as well, and a non-referential part, which
is modal (neustic) and determines the function of the sentence. The neustic
indicates whether the fact, the event, or the state of affairs is thought of as
existing or as such that it ought to be brought about (prescriptive neustic).

7
I do not wish to deny that determining whether descriptive sentences have a
referent (and, if they do, which one it is) can be problematic. What I mean is that if
descriptive sentences were to have a referent, it would still be problematic to work
out whether prescriptive sentences have a referent and which one it is they have. In
other words, even granted that we could determine the denotation of 'facts',
'events' and 'state of affairs', and even granted that this is the referent of descrip-
tive sentences liable to be judged true or false, we still do not know whether this
same one is the referent of prescriptive sentences.
8
If, on the other hand, one concedes that prescriptive sentences are liable to be
judges true or false, then probably there is not a specific problem relative to the
reference of such sentences, as it can be reduced to the problem of reference of
descriptive sentences.
9
Cf. for instance U. Scarpelli, Semantica, morale, diritto, Giappichelli, Torino,
1969, pp. 50 ff.
10
Cf. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift (1879), English translation by P. T. Geach, in
P. T. Geach, M. Black (eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gott-
lob Frege, second ed., Blackwell, Oxford, 1960, pp. 1 - 20, especially pp. 1 - 4.
11
Cf. J. J0rgensen, Imperatives and Logic, in "Erkenntnis", 7, 1937 - 38,
pp. 288 - 96.
12
Cf. R. M. Hare, Practical Inferences, MacMillan, London, 1971; R. M. Hare,
The Language of Morals, reprint of the second ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972,
pp. 17 ss.
 Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report 467

b) The second problem, too, namely, the problem of meaning with

respect to the relationship between sender and receiver, is highly relevant
for the ethical and legal context. Despite the fact that legal language con-
sists in a partially technical section of natural language, it is open tex-
tured, 13 that is to say, it is characterised by vagueness and ambiguity. 14
This often makes interpretation (in the third meaning) necessary and deter-
mines the possibility that the interpreter-receiver might not be faithful to
the meaning attributed by the sender to his/her statement. It is worth men-
tioning that in the legal context communication does not always take place
in a cooperative situation: it is very often the case that it takes place in
conflicting conditions whereby the receiver intentionally tries to attribute
the sender's statements a different meaning from the one originally given
to them by the sender. And the conflicts of interests among the various
receivers as to the interpretation to be attributed to the statutory provisions
are not to be underestimated.

2. Following Wróblewski, one may distinguish three different approaches

to interpretation: a descriptive approach, a prescriptive approach and a
theoretical approach. 15 What follows is more an ideal typology than a clas-
sification of the approaches adopted by various authors in their works on
interpretation. As a matter of fact, in reading these works, one is struck by
a very casual intermingling of descriptive and prescriptive purposes, and
sometimes theoretical ones, too, with seeming unawareness and indifference
on the part of the authors.

I shall call descriptive approach the one consisting in a review of the

actual interpretations and arguments in support of those interpretations,
used by judges (henceforth I shall refer to judicial interpretations only).
According to what it is meant by 'interpretation', one has two different
descriptive approaches and, consequently, two different meanings of
'description'. This, in turn, implies two different methods of inquiry.

13
Cf. among the first ones to discuss the problem H. L. A. Hart , The Concept of
Law (1961), then reprinted, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972, pp. 121-32;
G. R. Carrió, Sobre los limites del lenguaje normativo, Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1973.
14
On the indeterminacy of concrete legal language cf. C. Luzzati, La vaghezza
delle norme. Un'analisi del linguaggio giuridico, Giuffrè, Milano, 1990.
15
Among the many works by Wróblewski relevant to our topic at least the fol-
lowing are to be recalled: J. Wróblewski, Legal Syllogism and Rationality of Judi-
cial Decisions, in "Rechtstheorie", 5, 1974, pp. 33 - 4 6 ; J. Wróblewski, Meaning
and Truth in Judicial Decision, second ed., edited by A. Aarnio, A-TIETO Oy, Hel-
sinki, 1983; J. Wróblewski, Livelli di giustificazione delle decisioni giuridiche, in
L. Gianformaggio, E. Lecaldano (eds.), Etica e diritto. Le vie della giustificazione
razionale, Laterza, Roma - Bari, 1986, pp. 203 - 26; J. Wróblewski, Legal Language
and Legal Institutions, in "International Journal for the Semiotics of Law", II, 4,
1989, pp. 3 - 1 6 ; J. Wróblewski , The Judicial Application of Law, cit.

31
468 Paolo Comanducci

Our descriptive enterprise is twofold: on the one hand we may describe

the mental activities of the judges, on the other hand, we may describe lin-
guistic entities (the ones produced by judges or by other legal actors). In other
words, there is a dichotomy within our inquiry: it contemplates two objects
both of which are called 'interpretation' and both of which are possible
objects of description. This is a very straightforward consequence of the pro-
cess-product ambiguity, intrinsic to all terms such as 'interpretation'. 16
Our first object of description is represented by the complex of mental
activities of the judges concerning the interpretation of a statutory provision
applicable to a case. Here, it is a matter of describing the reasoning which
brought about the decision of the judge and/or which served to justify the
various interpretive decisions deemed relevant in the instant case. The
method of inquiry thus required is therefore psychological and/or sociologi-
cal. Possible tools are questionnaires and interviews, whereby one asks the
judges themselves to describe their own reasoning activity, while, at the
same time, cross-questionnaires could be carried out so as to gouge how
reliable such answers are; one may further investigate the doctrinal and
scientific background of the judges (i.e. their course of studies and their
readings); further still, one may investigate the judges' mentality, biases,
ideologies and evaluate to what extent and in what manner they are mir-
rored in their reasoning activity, and so on.
This kind of descriptive approach is very little used by scholars of legal
theory. This is partly due to the tools required by this research, which are
alien to the average jurist, and partly to the belief that such a line of
enquiry would both be difficult to carry out and scarcely reliable; further,
there is widespread conviction that its practical utility on the legal profes-
sion would be close to none.
Our second object of description is represented by those documents
which judges produce as their written legal justification. This second object
of description is sometimes referred to as the "style" of judicial decisions.

16
Despite the fact that such a distinction is by now commonplace in legal theo-
ry, it is not always taken into account by those who discuss interpretation in gener-
al. It seems to me that those who endorse the hermeneutic tenets in discussing inter-
pretation, are constantly referring to interpretation as an activity and never, or al-
most never, to interpretation as a document. Such a dichotomy, I would like to
stress somewhat polemically, is very often not even made explicit. On the other
hand, those who endorse the analytic-linguistic approach to interpretation, tend to
focus exclusively on interpretation as a document and do not aim at giving an ac-
count of the activity of interpretation. Not everything that can meaningfully be said
about interpretation as activity can be said of interpretation as a document, and
vice-versa. I believe this is the case as, to the best of my knowledge, there is no
argument in favour of the identity between interpretation as activity and interpreta-
tion as product. Cf. G. Tarello, L'interpretazione della legge, Giuffrè, Milano, 1980.
 Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report 469

The method to be employed in this case is one of lexical analysis so as to

trace the argumentative patterns of the judges, and one of logical analysis,
so as to trace a persistent deep structure (if one can be found at all, that is)
shared by legal justification which seem prima facie heterogeneous. The
approach used in this second kind of interpretation can broadly be termed
as "realist", inasmuch those who choose to carve out their object of inquiry
this way are very often more sensitive to what judges effectively do than to
what the legislator prescribes they should do.
It is within this second descriptive approach, possibly more adequately
than within the first one, that one is to place those inquiries which consider
interpretation qua document a relevant clue to interpretation qua activity.
Whatever their object, descriptions are performed at different levels of
generality and abstraction. Extremely abstract descriptions, as the ones
legal theorists tend to offer, are like explicative models. There is, however,
a difference: whereas descriptions start from empirical data and, by way of
abstraction and generalisation, seek an account which covers as many phe-
nomenal data as possible, a model produced by the theoretical approach is
an anàlogon of empirical phenomena, but it is not inductively drawn from
them, nor seeks directly to account for all of them.
Let us now turn to the prescriptive and the theoretical approaches.
I shall call prescriptive approach the one consisting in either evaluations
of the interpretations given by judges, or directives concerning how judges
ought to interpret. In this case, too, we might employ the dichotomy out-
lined above and distinguish the approach which has interpretation qua judi-
cial activity as its object from the approach which has interpretation qua
judicial document as its object.

I shall call theoretical approach the one offering a model of interpretation,

and more specifically of judicial interpretation. Theoretical models can have
two different purposes - explicative or axiological-, and these purposes can in
turn be either alternative or joint purposes. The construction of an explicative
model is a different matter from the description of a set of phenomena; it is
not even necessarily related to it. In a similar fashion, the construction of
axiological models such as the model of a "good" interpretation or of the
"good" interpreter is something other and not necessarily related to the pre-
scription and the evaluation of behaviours. In other words, the verb 'ought',
in the axiological model has anankastic but not deontic meaning. Whereas a
prescriptive approach directly suggests the best interpretive techniques and
the interpretive arguments which should preferably be used, an axiological
model, based on a theoretical approach, is an ideal model, that is to say it
represents the state of affairs to be aimed at within a scenario which is a mere
anàlogon of reality. Incidentally, it is worth mentioning that the prescriptive
470 Paolo Comanducci

approach tends to result in those "methods of interpretation" which Kelsen

bitterly criticised in his Reine Rechtslehre }Ί
3. The distinction between the second and the third meaning of 'interpre-
retation' is helpful to better clarify the conflicts among various theories of
interpretation. I would tentatively label these latter ones neosceptic, neo-
formalist, and eclectic theories. This is a borrowed terminology 18 and is
readily justified: the first label recalls the interpretative scepticism argued
by the American legal realists between the two world wars, and yet differs
from it; the second label reminds us that talk of interpretative formalism
has been ongoing since the last century and refers to early legal positivism;
the third label simply aims at being neutral and indicates a position that is
intermediate between the first two.
The contrast among the various theories of interpretation can be sum-
marised briefly thus:
(a) Neosceptic thesis: interpretation is a volitional activity; the inter-
preter necessarily always chooses the meaning to be given to a document;
meaning is given, not found; defending the idea that there should be
already given meanings before any interpretation is performed and that
there should be texts the meaning of which is clear independently of inter-
pretation, is a mystification. 19
(b) Neoformalist thesis: there are normative documents whose meaning is
obvious and which need not be interpreted; there are at least some clear cases
in which the legal consequences contemplated by the norm apply to the given
event, without any need for the norm to be interpreted; it is not the case that
necessarily a normative document must be interpreted in order to be applied. 20

17
Cf. H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Deuticke, Wien, 1960, § 45 e).
18
It was suggested to me by M. Barberis, Riti di passaggio. In margine a un
libro di Paolo Comanducci, in "Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto", IV
series, L X X I , 1994, pp. 105 - 23.
19
In Italy see especially: G. Tarello, L'interpretazione della legge; cit.; R. Guas-
tini, Dalle fonti alle norme, second ed., Giappichelli, Torino, 1992; R. Guastini, Le
fonti del diritto e l'interpretazione, Giuffrè, Milano, 1993; R. Guastini, Interpreta-
tion (Legal), in The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, ed. by R. E. Asher,
Pergamon Press, Oxford - New York - Seoul - Tokyo, 1994, vol. 4, pp. 1738 -
1744; R. Guastini, Il giudice e la legge, Giappichelli, Torino, 1995; T. Mazzarese,
Forme di razionalità delle decisioni giudiziali, Giappichelli, Torino, 1996. I consider
as neosceptic positions those defended by the Critical Legal Studies, even if they
are supported with different arguments.
20
Cf., in Italy: U. Scarpelli, Contributo alla semantica del linguaggio normativo
(1959), new edition A. Pintore (ed.), Giuffrè, Milano, 1985; M. Jori, Saggi di meta-
giurisprudenza, Giuffrè, Milano, 1985. Among other authors, the one that deserves
mentioning is Bulygin. By this author see, at least, Sull'interpretazione giuridica,
now in E. Bulygin, Norme, validità, sistemi normativi, Giappichelli, Torino, 1995.
 Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report 471

Now, then, if we assume that 'interpretation' has in thesis (a) the second
of the meanings outlined earlier and in thesis (b) the third of the meanings,
then the two theses are not contradictory, despite a prima facie appearance.
The two theses are contradictory only if we assume 'interpretation' to have
the same meaning in both of them, whatever this meaning is.

The claim that the two theses are not contradictory can be succinctly
expressed by reducing (somewhat arbitrarily) the neosceptic thesis and the
neoformalist thesis to the two following statements: "in all cases the judge
operates interpretation" and "in some cases the judge does not operate
interpretation". The two statements are contradictory, i.e., they can be
neither both true nor both false, if we attribute the term 'interpretation' the
same meaning in both of these statements. And this is the case independ-
ently of which meaning we give to it, the neosceptic or the neoformalist. If
we give 'interpretation' a different meaning in each one of the two state-
ments (for instance the neosceptic to the first one and the neoformalist to
the second one) then the two statements are no longer contradictory and
can be both true, both false or only one of them true and the other false.

So far so good: this much can be learned from a logic primer: to claim
the "the two theses are not contradictory" is not yet to claim that they are
both true. This latter is an empirical matter, or better a theoretical matter.
What has been said so far has not dissolved the contrast between neo-
sceptics and neoformalists: it is, rather, an attempt at overcoming the opposi-
tion in the wake of the theory which I have termed eclectic. 21 The eclectic
stance maintains that the two theses are both true, provided one gives 'inter-
erpretation' in the first statement, the neosceptic meaning and 'interpreta-
tation' in the second statement, the neoformalist meaning. This is a position
that neither a neosceptic nor a neoformalist would adhere to. But according
to the eclectic position, which I sympathise with, the neosceptic and the
neoformalist are both wrong. In fact:

(aa) there is no reason why neosceptics should persist in denying that, in

given circumstances, there are de facto clear cases in which the judge
bestows on the statutory provision the one and only meaning that the com-
munity of the jurists deems legally and semantically acceptable. There is
no reason why neosceptics should persist in denying that such "clear" cases
can be distinguished from "hard" cases which raise interpretive doubts in
the jurists' community, to the extent that the judge is aware of being
engaged in a choice entailing an act of will.

21
I feel the following authors be so labelled: A. Aarnio , The Rational as Reason-
able, cit.; R. A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision. Toward a Theory of Legal
Justification, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1961; J. Wróblewski, The Judicial
Application of Law, cit.
472 Paolo Comanducci

(bb) there is no reason why neoformalist should persist in denying that,

given a broad meaning of 'interpretation', the judge is always performing
an interpretation, even in "clear" cases. This latter is a sort of preliminary
interpretation which a judge may even perform unintentionally and which
consists in attributing a meaning to a sentence, lead in this by his/her
knowledge of the language and by directives of interpretation, either
semantic or typically legal ones. This is the case, for instance, of an Italian
judge who would not be able to understand a statutory provision expressed
in cyrillic or in ideograms, no matter how "clear" that statutory provision
may appear to a Russian judge or a Chinese one.
According to the eclectic theory one has interpretation, in the third use
of the word, not just every time one attributes meaning to a normative
document, but only when there are doubts about which meaning one is to
give the document. In the legal context this is the situation which arises
when there is no universal consensus over which is the "correct" meaning
to be attributed to a normative document. For instance, whenever two
judges interpret (second meaning) differently the same statutory provision,
then it can be said that such a provision requires interpretation (third mean-
ing). A provision may be thought of as "clear" and as requiring no interpre-
tation (third meaning), until someone offers an interpretation (second mean-
ing) of it which is different from the one given up until then. And, further,
a statutory provision may seem prima facie clear, but when confronted with
the concrete case to be solved, it can be said to require interpretation (third
meaning).
Drawing the argument to a conclusion, it is my contention that in the
legal context 'interpretation' is to be used both in its semantic meaning and
in its legal meaning, jointly, but that the two uses should be kept concep-
tually apart. The second meaning of 'interpretation' mirrors a theoretical
stance which throws into relief those elements of choice and evaluation
involved in any activity of attribution of meaning to documents; such a
stance represents a refutation of those hyperformalist theories of meaning
according to which every word and every sentence has one and only one
"correct" or "proper" meaning. The third meaning of 'interpretation' mir-
rors a theoretical stance which is closest to the uses of traditional legal doc-
trine according to which «in Claris non fit interpretatio» ; in other words,
this third meaning allows a conceptual distinction between cases in which
the attribution of meaning to a document raises problems from cases in
which it does not.

4. What has been outlined so far, however, is not the most interesting
contribution contemporary legal theory has to offer. As I see it, the major
contribution lies in the theories of justification of interpretation : that is to
say not merely in techniques of interpretation ; rather in techniques by
 Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report 473

means of which one justifies interpretations. For the sake of symmetry, in

this case too, I shall group theories under three labels: logicist, rhetorical
and ethical theories of justification.
Logicist theories 22 hold the view that justification can only have logical
nature. There is no other form of acceptable justification outwith a logical
justification. And, in line with the tenets of legal positivism, justification
must start from premisses which are (and cannot but be) legal norms.
Rhetorical theories can be divided into two groups: a) theories according
to which jurists de facto employ rhetorical and not logical arguments in
order to justify their interpretations; 23 b) theories according to which jurists
ought to employ rhetorical and not logical arguments in order to justify
their interpretations. 24 Of course many more distinctions could be drawn
according to which argument ought to be preferred. 25
The third group of theories of justification of interpretation is the one I
have chosen to label as ethical theories. It is the more recent trend and it is
currently gaining momentum. 26 These theories hold that a complete justifi-
cation of a judicial decision, hence of an interpretive decision too, is ulti-
mately a moral-political justification and cannot but be one. As a conse-
quence, legal reasoning is but a sector, a part of practical reasoning. And
effectively, several theories have been constructed which treat legal reason-

22
I refer specifically to the positions expressed by Alchourrón e Bulygin. See A.
Alchourrón , E. Bulygin, Anâlisis lògico y derecho, Centro de Estudios Constitucio-
nales, Madrid, 1991. See also: L. Gianformaggio, Studi sulla giustificazione giuridi-
ca, Giappichelli, Torino, 1986; L. Gianformaggio, In difesa del sillogismo pratico
ovvero alcuni argomenti kelseniani alla prova, Giuffrè, Milano, 1987.
23
I am specifically thinking of the ideas expressed by G. Tarello,
L'interpretazione della legge, cit.
24
To this effect see Ch. Pere Iman, Éthique et droit, Éditions de l'Université de
Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 1990.
25
It is worth noting how the so-called psychological argument, or the argument
from the intention of the legislator, has recently been re-proposed in the Ënglish
legal literature. It is my contention that this same argument had already been amply
criticised by Scandinavian legal realism. Cf. Α. Marmor, Interpretation and Legal
Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992; A. Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation:
Essays in Legal Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995.
26
In the Italian legal milieu, I shall mention only Zagrebelsky (cf. G. Zagrebels-
ky, Il diritto mite. Legge diritti giustizia, Einaudi, Torino, 1992); in the English-
speaking one, Dworkin (cf. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), rev. ed.,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1978; R. Dworkin, Law's Empire,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1986; R. Dworkin, Freedom's Law,
Oxford University Press, Oxford - New York, 1996); in the German one, Alexy (cf.
R. Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1978), Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1989); finally, in the Spanish-speaking world, I shall mention Nino (cf. C. Nino, La
validez del derecho, Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1985; C. Nino, Introducción al anâlisis
del derecho, 2a ed., Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1988).
474 Paolo Comanducci

ing as a subsector of practical reasoning. This seems to fly in the face of

legal positivism, the hegemonic trend in continental European legal culture
for the past two centuries, according to which a complete justification of an
interpretive decision is only then accomplished when the norm applicable
to the case is made known and expressed explicitly.

As a side remark, I would like to point out that the upshot of these the-
ories is tautological: i.e. true by definition. This is so because 'justifica-
tion' is within these theories so defined that ultimately any justification is a
moral justification; hence so are legal justifications.
There is at least one theory which I find interesting and useful in giving
a tentative account of all these theories of interpretation. This is the one
made by Wróblewski in his work. 2 7 His is an integrated theoretical model
for interpretation which makes the best of the logicist, the rhetorical, and
the ethical approach. Wróblewski's thesis is that in the process of 'transfor-
mation' of sources into norms there is a continuous interplay of logical pas-
sages, rhetorical arguments, and political and moral evaluations. More spe-
cifically, Wróblewski has made a conceptual distinction between internal
and external justification in the justification of a decision. This same model
can be applied to the justification of an interpretation. Internal justification
cannot but take a syllogistic form, in accordance with logicist theories, so
that the conclusion depends on premisses. In this sense Wróblewski's
model takes heed of Beccaria's intuition to the effect that a judicial deci-
sion must be justified through a norm, a description of the abstract case
and nothing else. Moreover, according to Wróblewski, both these premisses
must be in turn justified: the justification of the process through which via
interpretation the judges "jump" from sources to norms and the justification
of the process through which the legal description of the concrete case is
arrived at on the basis of factual evidence, do not necessarily make use of
classical logic, or of alethic logic, but they can also make use of rhetorical
arguments, just as the rhetorical theories maintain. Furthermore, this latter
process of justification, always implies passages which call for evaluations
and value choices; and if these latter ones are in their turn to be justified,
they cannot but be grounded on ethical/political values and principles, just
as ethical theories maintain.
5. This sort of map of interpretation theories can be rounded off with the
observation that contemporary theories of interpretation have come to terms
with a past mistake. This is not tantamount to saying that they have effec-
tively amended it. Previous theories tended to be very one-sided about
interpretation: the legal phenomenon was examined from a single view-
point: in turn the citizen's, the legislator's, the judge's. Never has the legal

27
See especially J. Wróblewski, The Judicial Application of Law, cit.
 Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report 475

phenomenon been treated in its complexity; more specifically legal inter-

pretation has never been seen from all possible points of view. As these
points of view are radically different, law cannot be adequately described
from a single perspective.
I shall not dwell at length here on the idea that interpretation should be
analysed from different points of view. 2 8 A l l I have to say is that the view-
point of the "good" citizen or the viewpoint of the "bad" citizen, the one of
a lawyer as a consultant or as a defender, of the legislator or of the social
scientist bear differently on the issue of interpretation. They all differ under
various aspects, but there is one point I would like to draw attention to:
there are some viewpoints according to which interpretation works along an
essentially cooperative model of law. These are the cases in which we may
successfully employ those patterns which linguistics has outlined for the
study of conversation. When a legislator passes a law and the "good" citi-
zen wishes to obey it and the "good" judge wishes to apply it, what is
brought about is a fundamentally cooperative model (the game of intending
and understanding each other, as the hermeneutics would have it). The leg-
islator orders something and the compliant citizen really wants to know
what it is that the legislator wants from him/her, so as to be able to obey;
the good judge really wants to know what the legislator has asked him/her
to do so as to be able to faithfully apply the law in his/her decision. The
conversational model is an essentially cooperative model of linguistic inter-
action among people that do wish to understand each other; as such it can
only account for legal interpretation in situations of this kind. But it cer-
tainly cannot explain interpretation of the "bad" citizen. The "bad" citizen
is not interested in what the legislator wants from him/her; he/she is only
interested in avoiding punishment and achieving his/her own ends. For
instance, he/she will see punishment as only one of the costs of a possible
course of action and will evaluate advantages and disadvantages on the
basis of the probability of being punished for performing a certain action. It
follows quite naturally from this that the cooperative model cannot account
for this kind of interpretative interaction, and cannot even account for the
viewpoint of a lawyer as a defender. If he/she follows his/her own deontol-
ogy, then he/she will have to adopt the "bad" citizen's point of view.
I think there arises the need for an integrated theory of interpretation,
which to this day is not yet available.

28
This is a topic much discussed by Twining and Miers. See W. Twining, D.
Miers, How to Do Things with Rules. A Primer of Interpretation, II. ed., Weiden-
feld and Nicolson, London, 1982. See also C. Nino, Introducción al anâlisis del
derecho, cit.
476 Paolo Comanducci

III. The Judicial Role in the Interpretation of Law

In what follows I shall briefly outline what I think are the most interest-
ing results of contemporary studies on interpretation. I shall take a first
look at them from a theoretical point of view and I shall then focus on
those which have adopted a prescriptive stance, with specific reference to
the role of the judge in the interpretation of law.
1. The first thing to be noted from a theoretical point of view is that the
conventional distinction between rule-based and case-based decision
making, a juxtaposition traditionally employed so as to characterise the dif-
ference between continental and common law systems, has nowadays lost
much of its grip on the concrete reality of law. I can still see it as an inter-
esting conceptual distinction, but nothing more than this. If one is to
ground on this distinction two models, one of which is to embody the cer-
tainty of law ideal allegedly represented by the continental legal systems
and the other one is to embody the justice of the concrete case, allegedly
represented by the common law systems, then the distinction is, to my
mind, not a viable one. In practice, both models combine a "wholesale"
decision-making approach and a decision-making approach "by retail". 2 9 In
other words, the process is one of deep integration of the two models. 30 A l l
contemporary legal systems have settled for a sort of middle course
between the conflicting tension towards certainty and the one towards jus-
tice of the concrete case, which cannot be both realised at the same time.
In order to have legal certainty some justice must be sacrificed and vice
versa. Both continental and common law legal systems seem to me to be
pursuing this road.
That judicial discretion in interpretation is, up to a point, inevitable is, I
would say, a widely acknowledged theoretical stance. Interpretive discretion
is due both to objective and subjective factors, i.e. both to factors which
the judge cannot control and factors which, to a certain extent, he/she can
exert control over. Open texture of natural languages is, of course, one of
the semantic, hence objective, reasons for which norms cannot be formu-
lated in so a precise way as to be uniquely interpretable. Ideologies and

29
This terminology is by M. Jori , Il formalismo giuridico, Giuffrè, Milano, 1980.
30
As a matter of fact, there is a very interesting author, Schauer, who has re-
cently set forth a model for legal decision which I shall term "purely wholesale
decision-making", i.e., a model in which the judge does nothing but apply mechani-
cally the rules posited by the legislator. The interesting feature of this theoretical
model proposed by Schauer is that it does not conceal the very high costs in terms
of justice that such a model may imply. Schauer's claim is that such costs are sim-
ply to be paid, if legal certainty is to be pursued. See F. Schauer, Playing by the
Rules, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991; F. Schauer (ed.), Law and Language, Dart-
mouth, Aldershot - Hong Kong - Singapore - Sydney, 1993.
 Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report All

biases are, conversely, well known subjective factors influencing the deci-
sion-making activity.

The question is whether a theoretical allowance for the fact that judges
de facto create legal norms can be compatible with the separation of
powers, so widely upheld and uncritically acclaimed a value. My answer is
that it is, provided one is aware that the idea of the separation of powers,
to the effect that a judge is to merely apply norms whereas a legislator is
the only one that is to produce them, is the outcome of legal ideologies of
the beginning of the Nineteenth century and that these ideologies have
nothing to share with the ideology of the separation of powers outlined by
Montesquieu. It is only the latter that grounds the liberal idea of the Rule
of law. That there should be separation of powers, as conceived by Montes-
quieu, only means that not all powers are to be held by one person only. 3 1
As such, it is a defence of the idea that power should be fragmented; such
a defence, however, is not equivalent to the claim that each power should
be held exclusively by one organ only. On the theoretical level this
amounts to the defence that the most important and most "dangerous" of
powers, the power to produce norms which are binding for the whole com-
munity is, in modern countries, divided and fragmented. It is not exercised
by the legislator only, but by other organs as well, by the constitutional
court (where there is one), and to a certain extent, by the judges, the gov-
ernment and the officials. I trust all of this is well known and relatively
little controversial. A much more interesting task, however, is determining
what kind of norms are being produced through interpretation. According
to traditional theories the function assigned to the judge was to produce
individual and concrete norms. That this should be the case is very little
controversial but is not the most interesting aspect. As some recent theories
have shown, 32 the most interesting aspect of the matter is that judges also
create general norms (as well as conceptual definitions). This they do in the
written justification of their decisions: in other words, through interpreta-
tion judges create general norms on which the decision of the case is
based. Do these general norms belong to law? the answer to this question
is not an easy one. I do not think the notion of validity is adequate in
answering this question. Validity is a predicate of norms which works
according to binary logic: a norm is either valid or it isn't; it either belongs
to the legal system or it doesn't. In examining general norms as a product
of the interpretative activity of judges the notion of validity is virtually use-
less. The tools to be used in this case are both weaker and fuzzier. One

31
See M. Troper, La séparation des pouvoirs et l'histoire constitutionnelle fran-
çaise, 2ème éd., LGDJ, Paris, 1980.
32
See E. Bulygin, Sentenza giudiziaria e creazione di diritto, now also in E. Bu-
lygin, Norme, validità, sistemi normativi, cit., pp. 1 - 1 8 .
478 Paolo Comanducci

may use, as some authors have already proposed, the notion of "being in
force"; there are general norms which are more "in force", general norms
which are less "in force", and general norms which are not "in force" at
all. The concept of "being in force", as I see it, makes reference to a fore-
cast: the extent to which it is foreseeable that in subsequent decisions the
general norm formulated through interpretation will ground new decisions.
If, as it is the case for some general norms set by judicial lawmaking of the
highest courts of a state, it is highly predictable that these norms will con-
stitute the basis of future decisions, then one may claim that they are "in
force" or sufficiently "in force". If, on the contrary, as is sometimes the
case for a general norm produced by a judge of the lower courts, it is less
predictable that it will be used for future decisions, we shall say that the
norm is scarcely "in force" or that it is not "in force" at all. Whereas
norms produced by the legislator are not merely valid, but also "in force",
those produced by the judge, in the majority of cases, are not "in force".

A theory of this kind, a realist and neosceptic theory, does not offer, nor
aims at doing so, an answer to that other question, that any judge would
ask: "how am I to interpret?". A theory of this kind can only provide an
answer to the question: "how do judges interpret?", but cannot serve as a
guide for the intepretive enterprise. This is a well known objection to inter-
pretative realism or the neosceptic theory of interpretation. The claim that
in order to know which norms are "in force" within a given legal system it
is (also) necessary to be able to foresee which interpretation judges will
give to the normative texts, is an acceptable claim for the legal theorist, but
it certainly is not acceptable for those who are to decide which interpreta-
tion to give a text. Trivially, a judge cannot say: I shall now foresee how I
am going to interpret, and will decide accordingly. From the judge's and
from other institutional interpreters' standpoint the answer to be sought is
different, because the question they pose is different.

2. Precisely for this reason contemporary legal theory has set forward
prescriptive theories and constructed axiological models concerning inter-
pretation and the justification of interpretation.

One may give for granted that as long as the legislator enacts normative
texts which are vague and ambiguous and which make reference to stand-
ards and evaluations, judicial discretion and, above all, discretion in inter-
pretation, is here to stay. 33 If this is the case, and if one wishes to secure

33
A different stance is the one taken by R. Dworkin, with his "one right answer"
thesis, of which a critique is made by A. Aarnio, The Rational As Reasonable, cit.,
pp. 158ss.; A. Aarnio, La tesis de la unica respuesta correcta y el principio regula-
tivo del razonamiento juridico, in "Doxa", 8, 1990, pp. 23 - 38.
 Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report 479

certainty in the law, interpretive decisions are to be justified in a given

way.
I think it can safely be claimed that all contemporary legal theories are
looking for what might be called a rational justification for interpretation.
'Rational' in what sense? There are at least three meanings of rational,
each of increasing strength.

In the first and weakest meaning, one which Michele Taruffo likes to
work with, 3 4 in order to be 'rational', a justification has to be available,
and has to be explicit. Justifications of the interpretive decisions need to be
made manifest, because this is the only way they can be controlled.
Because a judge is not democratically elected to make choices of public
interest, the only route open to him/her to compensate for this lack of legit-
imation is to offer a public justification. Only if a judge reports clearly on
the reasons for his/her interpretive decision, will the public at large exer-
cise some form of control over that same interpretation.

In a second and stronger sense, in order to be rational, an interpretation

has to be consistent. 35 Consistency can in this context take two different
meanings. In the first sense an interpretation will have to be consistent syn-
chronically, i.e. will have to be consistent internally, that is, with itself.
This internal consistency is typically linked with the logicist approaches to
justification of interpretation. Alchourrón and Bulygin, for instance, have
repeatedly defended the idea that what really matters in a justification is
that the piece of reasoning through which one comes to make an interpre-
tive decision, should be consistent. 36 In a second sense interpretation will
have to be consistent dyachronically. This sense of consistency raises a
host of problems because securing consistency in time is not something a
judge can achieve on his/her own. A single judge can be consistent with
his own past decisions, but this, at the end of the day, has little relevance
for the public at large. What really is crucial for people in terms of cer-
tainty and reliability of law is that judges be dyachronically consistent.
Thus, my argument has moved from the predicament of the individual deci-
sion-maker to the practice of a group.

34
See M. Taruffo, La motivazione della sentenza civile, Padova, 1975; M. Taruf-
fo, Aspetti della giustificazione delle decisioni giudiziarie, in L. Gianformaggio, E.
Lecaldano (eds.), Etica e diritto, cit., pp. 271 - 7 5 ; M. Taruffo, La prova dei fatti
giuridici. Nozioni generali, Giuffrè, Milano, 1992.
35
I am not referring here to MacCormick' s "normative coherence" which would,
in this typology of mine, constitute a fourth sense of 'rationality' of the justification
of an interpretation. See N. MacCormick, Coherence in Legal Justification, in A.
Peczenik - L. Lindahl - B. van Roermund (eds.), Theory of Legal Science, Reidel,
Dordrecht, 1984, pp. 235 - 51.
36
See A. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin, Anâlisis lògico y derecho, cit.
480 Paolo Comanducci

Now then, once the judicial class realises it does have responsibilities in
terms of production of norms and does not have political responsibilities as
the legislator has (who may not be re-elected), it will also have to realise
that one of its main responsibilities is to pursue certainty as much as to
pursue the justice of the concrete case. The issue then becomes one of find-
ing ways to secure consistency over time of interpretive decisions of the
judges. Only thus will these be somehow predictable and will make the
decision of the individual case predictable, too.
How is such consistency in time to be obtained? The most interesting
and momentous proposals from this point of view are certainly those
advanced by Dworkin and, in Italy, by Zagrebelsky 37 and Ferrajoli. 38 A
return to principles, 39 to constitutional values, seen as criteria guiding the
interpretation of statutory provisions. I am personally very sceptical about
the possibility that such a proposal might achieve diachronic consistency in
interpretive judicial decision. And this, I believe, for two basic reasons
which I shall briefly outline.
The first reason is that such a proposal involves "weighing", for each
individual case, the constitutional principles to be applied in the interpreta-
tion of law (which, indirectly, amounts to weighing the interests these prin-
ciples are the legal counterpart of). This is how the proposal has been mod-
elled by legal literature and put into practice by some European constitu-
tional courts (e.g. the German one and the Italian one 4 0 ). But if these
constitutional values are weighed in the light of the individual case, i.e., in
such a way as to produce different results in different cases, with no meta-
criteria to guide such an activity uniformly over time, the obvious outcome
is not an increase in certainty of the law; rather in its uncertainty. The con-
flict among constitutional principles and values, there being no fixed cri-
teria for their solution, produces indeterminacy of the legal system for
reasons which are purely logical.
The second reason is that this shortcoming could only be averted by
offering meta-criteria to guide the activity of "weighing" such as a back-

37
See G. Zagrebelsky , Il diritto mite, cit.
38
See L. Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale, Laterza,
Roma - Bari, 1989.
39
On the difference between principles and norms much has been written by
Ronald Dworkin. For a critique of Dworkin's theses, see A. Aarnio, Taking Rules
Seriously, in U. Kangas (ed.), Enlightenment, Rights, Revolution. A collection of
Finnish papers edited for the 14th World Congress of the IVR 17 - 23.8.1989 Edin-
burgh, Publications of the Department of Jurisprudence and Comparative Law 8,
Helsinki, pp. 1 - 1 6 .
40
See G. Parodi, La sentenza additiva a dispositivo generico, Giappichelli, Tori-
no, 1996.
 Legal Interpretation: A Tentative Report 481

ground political philosophy, a kind of shared framework for all legal opera-
tors (as Dworkin 4 1 would have it). But despite the fact that such an ideol-
ogy is frequently evoked and referred to in the philosophical literature, a
framework of this kind does not yet seem to be available in contemporary
societies, ridden by deep political and ideological conflicts as they are. In
the absence of such a shared framework, the equilibrium of constitutional
values is left to the changeable play of majority within constitutional
courts, with the result that uncertainty of the law is increased and not
reduced.
Finally, the third and strongest sense in which one may speak of the
rational justification of an interpretation, is the one introduced by Aarnio
with his idea of rational acceptability. 42 As I have already criticised this
concept elsewhere, 43 I feel I can forgo an in-depth discussion of it here.
But this does not dispense me from the obligation to admit that it certainly
represents a philosophically deep and intellectually stimulating attempt at
grounding the justification of legal interpretation on reasonable bases. Any
new attempt at constructing a legal theory might perhaps dissent from the
concept of rational acceptability of the interpretative standpoint as set for-
ward by Aarnio, but certainly cannot ignore it.

41
See R. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, cit.
42
A. Aarnio, The Rational As Reasonable, cit.; A. Aarnio, On Rational Accept-
ability. Some Remarks on Legal Justification, in P. Nerhot (ed.), Law, Interpreta-
tion and Reality. Essays in Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Jurisprudence, Kluwer,
Dordrecht - Boston - London, 1990, pp. 73 - 83. See also A. Peczenik, On Law and
Reason, Kluwer, Dordrecht - Boston - London, 1989.
43
See P. Comanducci, Aarnio and the Problem of Legal Certainty, in "Rechts-
theorie", 26, 1, 1995, pp. 27 - 44.

3 FS A a r n i o
 DOES T H E DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT
APPLY TO JUDICIAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING
THE DOCTRINE OF SOURCES OF LAW?*

By Svein Eng, Oslo

I. The Question to be Discussed

The question to be discussed in this paper takes its point of departure in

two elements in the language and argumentation of lawyers. 1
On the one hand: in so far as Norwegian lawyers say anything about the
basis of their methodology, the methodology they traditionally designate
"rettskildelaeren" ("the doctrine of sources of law"), they often refer to judicial
practice; and then especially, or only, to the practice of the Supreme Court. 2
On the other hand: as part of the doctrine of sources of law lawyers
operate with a doctrine of judgments as a source of argument, "prejudikat-
laeren" ("the doctrine of precedent"). 3
In this paper I shall look more closely at how these two elements fit
together: at whether, and if so, in what sense, lawyers can use the sentence-
form "judgment χ is a precedent in the source of law question y".
I shall examine the question sketched somewhat more closely. I use the
term "judicial argument " as a common designation for those arguments
which lawyers generate from judgments. Thus, the criterion is not 'who
generate the arguments?' 4 ("judicial" does not denote judges), but 'from

* I would like to thank Patrick N. Chaffey, University of Oslo, for help with the
English language.
1
I use the term "lawyer" as a translation of the Norwegian "jurist", that is, as
denoting persons using their law degree professionally, be it in public or private
positions or as self-employed persons.
2
For further details, see section II. 1. below.
3
In the literature, see especially Per Augdahl, Rettskilder [Sources of Law], 3rd
ed. Oslo 1973, pp. 2 4 4 - 67; Torstein Eckhojf, Rettskildelaere [Sources of Law], 3rd
ed. Oslo 1993, pp. 1 3 0 - 6 0 .
4
I use double quotation marks (" "), in addition to their regular uses otherwise,
to signify that I am talking about linguistic entities (words, phrases, sentences); and
single quotation marks (' ') to signify that I am talking about meaning entities
(criteria, concepts, propositions).

32*
484 Svein Eng

where does one generate the arguments?' ("judicial" denotes judgments qua
Erkenntnis g rund or Erkenntnisquelle). For example the judgment reported
in Rt. 1973/433 5 interprets the formulation "any master of a vessel ... on
duty", in section 422 of the Criminal Code, as also extending to the master
of a cabin-cruiser or other non-commercial craft. Among lawyers the judg-
ment itself becomes an argument for this interpretation and the interpreta-
tion thereby becomes a judicial argument. If we ask "why"?, a lawyer will
point to the doctrine of precedent, i.e. the doctrine of judgments as a
source of argument. - I take as a point of departure the fact that the
doctrine of precedent has been formed in the context of and with reference
to a specific level of argumentation, illustrated by the example just given:
a level where the judicial argument presupposes the doctrine of sources
of law, at the same time as the judicial argument is founded on such
arguments as are relevant according to the doctrine of sources of law,
arguments that Norwegian lawyers today call "source of law factors" (in
particular statutory texts, legislative preparatory materials ( travaux prépara-
toires ), case law, the practice of other authorities, and equitable consider-
ations). In what follows I shall call this level "the paradigmatic level of
the doctrine of precedent".
That lawyers support the doctrine of sources of law on judicial practice,
means that lawyers also use judicial arguments that in respect of their con-
tent lie on a different level from the outlined paradigmatic level. More spe-
cifically one moves one step upwards in relation to the paradigmatic level:
to a level of argumentation that does not presuppose the doctrine of sources
of law, but in contrast permits it to be a possible subject.
The question to be discussed may then also be formulated as whether the
doctrine of precedent applies to judicial arguments concerning the doctrine
of sources of law. - Diagramatically the question may be represented as
shown on the following page.
The question arises and shows itself to a great extent to be answerable
without our having to take a stand on substantive nuances in or the tenabil-
ity of, references to judicial practice as a foundation of the sources of law.
The treatment is descriptive. When above, in the delimitation of the
question to be discussed, I ask how the doctrine of the sources of law and
the doctrine of precedent "fit together", whether lawyers "can" use a parti-
cular sentence-form and whether the doctrine of precedent "applies" to judi-
cial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law - the intended
yardstick is invariably the language and argumentation that actually occurs

5
"Rt." is an abbreviation for "Norsk Retstidende", which is the name of the
leading general law report series in Norway. It contains all, and only, the decisions
of the Supreme Court, either in full or in the form of a short summary.
 Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments 485

among lawyers. I do not wish to introduce any recommendations as to how

lawyers ought to express themselves or how they ought to argue.

The discussion and its conclusion are in some aspects limited to the Nor-
wegian legal system. However the question itself is international; it is logi-
cally possible in all systems of law in which judicial arguments are
invoked at the two levels outlined above and such a two-levelled use of
judgments is fairly widespread. 6 The following discussion may therefore be
of interest also to lawyers and legal theoreticians working in other legal
systems. Partly, the structure of the discussion and the concepts integral to
it, may also be pertinent in relation to other legal systems. Partly, one may
in a comparative perspective see the discussion and its conclusion as a case
study; the discussion and its conclusion illustrate an actually occurring rela-
tionship between the doctrine of precedent and the doctrine of sources of
law.

6
For example, we find the same two-levelled use among English lawyers, see
Svein Eng, The Doctrine of Precedent in English and Norwegian Law - Some Com-
mon and Specific Features, (1994) 38 Scandinavian Studies in Law (forthcoming),
section 2.2.
486 Svein Eng

In addition, the following discussion may shed more direct light on other
legal systems, since also the substance of the discussion is to some extent
international: certain of the features of the language and argumentation of
lawyers that provide evidence for the conclusion I reach here, are features
common across national borders (see e.g. sections II.3. and III. 1. below).
This provides the foundation for a working hypothesis that one will find
the same relationship between the doctrine of precedent and the doctrine of
sources of law in other legal systems in which judicial arguments are
invoked at the two levels outlined above.

Above I have simply presupposed that the application of the doctrine of

precedent on judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law,
does not cause any logical problems - in order not to make more difficult
the presentation of what is of practical importance in an already abstract
problem. At the close of this introductory section I shall briefly clarify the
said presupposition. - The application of the doctrine of precedent on judi-
cial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law obviously presup-
poses a doctrine of precedent. Given this presupposition, then such an
application of the doctrine of precedent, with one proviso (see immediately
below), is logically possible, be it in relation to an established legal system
with a doctrine of precedent, which is the context of the following discus-
sion, or in relation to a legal system in the phase of establishment, when at
least a doctrine of precedent has been established. The proviso is that it
may raise logical problems ("vicious" circle) to imagine the doctrine of
precedent applied more specifically to judicial arguments concerning the
doctrine of precedent (section III. 2. below, at and in footnote 23). How-
ever, in relation to the question to be discussed here, it is not necessary to
take up that side of the matter (loc. cit.).

I I . How Does the Doctrine of Precedent

in Respect of its Content Fit Judicial Arguments Concerning
the Doctrine of Sources of Law?

In respect of its content the doctrine of precedent may be structured as

answers to three main questions: - which judgments count as sources of
authoritative arguments? - how does one generate arguments from these
judgments? - and what weight do these judicial arguments carry? The
question I am asking is to what extent the concepts and norms of the doc-
trine of precedent, viewed as answers to the three main questions men-
tioned, are suited to capturing the way in which lawyers seek support in
judicial practice for the doctrine of sources of law.
 Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments 487

1. The Relevance of Judicial Arguments Concerning

the Doctrine of Sources of Law

It is undoubtedly the case that many lawyers consider judgments as a

relevant source of argument also in relation to the doctrine of sources of
law, not only in relation to the paradigmatic level of the doctrine of prece-
dent. This is shown inter alia through references to judicial practice, as, in
one sense or another, the "basis" of the doctrine of sources of law. Exam-
ples of such references to judicial practice are to be found e. g. in works by
Augdahl, Eckhoff, Andenaes, Krüger, Braekhus, Boe and Fleischer.7 In rela-
tion to other questions there may turn out to be important differences
between these references. However, with respect to the question posed
here, the weight lies on the common feature that these writers in relation to
the question of, in one sense or another, the "basis" of the doctrine of
sources of law, also or only refer to judicial practice. Such references in
the literature are probably both a symptom and a cause of other lawyers'
corresponding ways of expressing themselves.
In order to determine that lawyers seek support for the doctrine of
sources of law in judicial practice, it is not necessary to draw particularly
on the concepts and norms of the doctrine of precedent. It is sufficient to
interpret the texts and actions of lawyers according to more general criteria.

2. Ways of Generating Judicial Arguments Concerning

the Doctrine of Sources of Law

In the doctrine of precedent one mainly distinguishes between three ways

of generating arguments from judgments: One can use arguments which are
explicitly stated in the judgment. One can construct an argument on the
basis of the judgment. Or one can compare the facts of the judgment with
the facts with which one is confronted, to see whether there is a similarity
of facts which supports a similarity in results.8 - In what follows I shall
investigate to what extent the concepts of these ways of generating argu-

7
Augdahl (fn. 3), pp. 3 2 - 33; Eckhojf (fn. 3), p. 16; Johs. Andenœs, Innf0ring i
rettsstudiet [Introduction to the Study of Law], 4th ed. Oslo 1994, p. 57; Kai Krü-
ger, Norsk kontraktsrett [Norwegian Contract Law], Bergen 1989, p. 505; Sjur
Brœkhus, Voldgiftspraksis som rettskilde [Arbitraments as a Source of Law], in:
Homage Volume for Anders Bratholm, Oslo 1990, pp. 447 - 61, at p. 447; Erik Boe,
Innf0ring i juss, bind 1 [Introduction to Law, vol. 1], Oslo 1993, pp. 127- 128;
Innf0ring i juss, Oslo 1996, pp. 146-47; Carl August Fleischer, Rettskilder
[Sources of Law], Oslo 1995, by presupposition e.g. p. 76.
8
Eckhojf (fn. 3), pp. 138 - 44; Carl August Fleischer, Anvendelse og fortolkning
av dommer [Application and Interpretation of Judgments], Oslo 1981, pp. 3 9 - 5 0 ;
(fn. 7), p. 171.
488 Svein Eng

ments are suited to capturing the way in which lawyers seek support in
judicial practice for the doctrine of sources of law.
(1) The concept of 'explicitly stated judicial argument ' barely captures
the way in which lawyers seek support in judicial practice for the doctrine
of sources of law. For, when lawyers refer to judicial practice as a basis for
the doctrine of sources of law, they barely refer to express pronouncements
in judgments. I shall point to two reason for this ((a) - (b)).
(a) Judges thematise the doctrine of sources of law to a very limited extent.
Thus a necessary condition is lacking for reference to be able to be made to
express pronouncements in judgments on the doctrine of sources of law. I
shall examine and illustrate somewhat more closely the fact that judges only
to a very limited extent thematise the doctrine of sources of law.
Firstly: it is unusual for questions of sources of law to be formulated and
discussed at all.
Yet this does happen. An example is the pronouncements in Rt. 1994/
610 on pp. 616 - 17 on standards of clarity which agreements under inter-
national law must satisfy, and on standards of similarity which cases
from international courts must satisfy, if these are to set aside internal
provisions in a case being heard by a Norwegian court.
Another example is pronouncements from the Supreme Court on stand-
ards which statutory provisions must satisfy in areas where statutory
authority is deemed necessary, see e.g. Rt. 1992/1511 on pp. 1517- 18
and Rt. 1995/530 on p. 1537.
Pronouncements in Supreme Court judgments on the relationship
between courts and legislators are not uncommon, but the significance of
such pronouncements for the doctrine of sources of law is often indeter-
minate; this applies inter alia to pronouncements that the establishment
or amendment of certain provisions is a matter for the legislators, see
e.g. pronouncements in Rt. 1956/1323 on p. 1324, Rt. 1964/272 on
p. 274, Rt. 1994/1049 on p. 1051 (dissent 4-1, minority), Rt. 1994/1244
on p. 1253 (dissent 3-2, majority), Rt. 1995/1734 on p. 1737 (dissent
4-1, majority).
Secondly: it is even more unusual for judges explicitly to voice their
agreement with previous judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of
sources of law. This contrasts with the regularity of forming chains of judi-
cial arguments on the paradigmatic level of the doctrine of precedent.
An example from recent years of signs of a chain of judicial arguments
concerning the doctrine of sources of law is provided by the formulation
in Rt. 1978/1072 (Reader's Letter): "Section 135a of the Criminal Code
must be interpreted with Article 100 of the Constitution as a background
 Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments 489

and guiding principle" (p. 1076). Reference is made to the Reader's

Letter Judgment and its formulation in Rt. 1981/1305 on p. 1318 and a
similar formulation is repeated, without reference to the Reader's Letter
Judgment, in Rt. 1995/1903.
An example from earlier practice in the Supreme Court is provided by
pronouncements on criteria for following or departing from previous
decisions of the Supreme Court, see (b) below, at and in footnote 10.
Thirdly: It is most unusual (I have not found any example from recent
years) for judges explicitly to depart from a judicial argument or a chain of
judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law. This contrasts
with the relatively unexceptional practice of judges departing from judicial
arguments or chains of these on the paradigmatic level of the doctrine of
precedent.9
(b) What I have now shown is that the doctrine of precedent concept of
'explicitly stated judicial argument' seldom applies at the level of the doc-
trine of sources of law, because the features of reality that this concept
denotes, explicit judicial pronouncements, are seldom at the level of the
doctrine of sources of law. I shall go on to show that there is a great deal
to suggest that lawyers do not want to apply the doctrine of precedent con-
cept of 'explicitly stated judicial argument', even if the features of reality
that this concept denotes should happen to be realised at the level of the
doctrine of sources of law.
I shall then draw attention to the following point: Particularly in one ear-
lier period the doctrine of sources of law was to a greater extent thematised
in judgments of the Supreme Court, namely in the period before the Act of
1926 governing Plenary Proceedings of the Supreme Court. As a result of,
among other things, the fact that the same question of law was answered
differently by different panels of the Supreme Court, several judges
expressed views on the criteria for following or departing from previous
decisions of the Supreme Court. 10 Under the Plenary Proceedings Act, a
9
On departure from judicial arguments or chains of these on the paradigmatic
level of the doctrine of precedent, see Augdahl (fn. 3), pp. 246 ff.; Eckhojf (fn. 3),
pp. 149 ff .
10
See particularly Rt. 1924/1141 on pp. 1142-43, 1145, 1148; Rt. 1924/18 on
pp. 18 - 20; Rt. 1916/695 on pp. 699 - 700, 702; Rt. 1908/631 on pp. 633, 634 - 35.
On conflicting decisions from the Supreme Court in this period, see Paal Berg, Pre-
judikater [Precedents], Norsk forsikringsjuridisk forenings publikasjoner no. 25,
Oslo 1948, pp. 8 - 2 2 ; Arne Vislie, Om prejudikater i H0yesteretts plenum [On Pre-
cedents in Plenary Sessions of the Supreme Court], Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap
1957, pp. 284 - 304, at pp. 289 - 94; Karsten Gaarder, Domstolene og den alminne-
lige rettsutvikling [The Courts and the Evolution of the Law], in: G. Nissen/F.
Hiorth0y/K. Gaarder (eds.), Den d0mmende makt, Oslo 1967, pp. 225-90, at
pp. 245 - 48.
490 Svein Eng

wish to depart from an understanding of the law previously pronounced by

the Supreme Court, is included in one of three alternative sets of criteria
for plenary proceedings.11 After this alternative was established, it became
less common to thematise the criteria for following or departing from pre-
vious decisions of the Supreme Court.
As far as I can see, the Supreme Court has not in subsequent judgments
drawn on the pronouncements just mentioned from the period before the
Plenary Proceedings Act and used them as authoritative arguments. This is
so, in spite of the fact that these pronouncements satisfy many of the cardi-
nal doctrine of precedent criteria concerning judicial arguments. They are
expressly formulated, they originate from the proceedings of the Supreme
Court, they were certainly often assessed as necessary for reaching a given
legal standpoint, and they are not obsolete on account of developments in
society, changing moral attitudes or subsequent legislation.12
Nor have I found any example of literature on sources of law that bases
its presentation of the doctrine of precedent on the pronouncements men-
tioned - or in more general terms: that bases its presentation of the doc-
trine of sources of law on what might exist in the way of express judicial
pronouncements on questions of sources of law. Quite the reverse. In the
central presentation of sources of law in Norway since 1971, Torstein Eck-
hoff s Rettskildelœre , we find the words: "If on a rare occasion one finds a
principled statement on questions of sources of law in a judgment, one
should not attach too much weight to it." 1 3 This pronouncement is undoubt-
edly aimed first and foremost at principled statements from the Supreme
Court. Thus this pronouncement stands in sharp contrast to Eckhoff' s state-
ments about the weight of principled statements from the Supreme Court at
the paradigmatic level of the doctrine of precedent. With reference to this
level, he says: "No other source of law factors carry such great weight as a
Supreme Court judgment when it directly decides a question of interpreta-
tion". 14 Thus Eckhoff seems to be claiming or having to claim that the doc-
11
Section 1 of the Plenary Proceedings Act. The other two sets of criteria are
connected respectively with the wish to declare a statute, decision of the Storting or
provisional ordinance unconstitutional (section 2) and with the fact that particular
grounds make it desirable to have plenary proceedings (section 3).
12
Nor were these pronouncements made obsolete by the Plenary Proceedings
Act, cf. the fact that the Supreme Court may depart from an understanding of the
law previously pronounced by the Supreme Court, without plenary proceedings, i.e.
in panels of five judges. Only if no fewer than two of the five wish to depart from
an understanding of the law previously pronounced by the Supreme Court, and at
least one of the five demands plenary proceedings, shall there be plenary proceed-
ings, cf. section 1 of the Act.
13
Eckhoff ( fn. 3), p. 16.
14
Op. cit. p. 136.
 Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments 491

trine of precedent does not apply to judicial arguments concerning the doc-
trine of sources of law.
(a) (b) To sum up: Because judges barely thematise questions of
sources of law, and because lawyers, including judges, do not appear in
any event to want to use whatever might be available in the way of judicial
pronouncements on matters of sources of law, the concept of 'an explicitly
stated judicial argument' is not suited to capturing the way in which law-
yers seek support for the doctrine of sources of law in the practice of the
courts.
(2) I shall now turn to what I call "constructed judicial arguments' ' (see
the beginning of the present Section II. .2). This way of generating argu-
ments from judgments plays an important role at the paradigmatic level of
the doctrine of precedent. The concept of 'constructed judicial argument'
has been formed in the context of and with reference to this level. The
question is again whether the doctrine of precedent concept concerned, now
the concept of 'constructed judicial argument', is suited to capturing judi-
cial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law, i.e. the way in
which lawyers seek support in judicial practice for the doctrine of sources
of law.
The concept of 'constructed judicial argument' captures the following
pattern for generating judicial arguments:15 One takes the facts and conclu-
sion of the previous judgment as given, and then searches for other criteria
or another system of criteria than those stated in the judgment, for generat-
ing this constellation of facts and conclusion. One constructs a set of cri-
teria - a judicial argument - and claims that this generates the presupposed
constellation of facts and conclusion. The relevant facts are those that are
quoted in the judgment.
Another and more correct version of the facts that was not known to the
judges, is without interest, since it cannot have had any effect on the
judgment. Another version of the facts that the judges used as a basis
without mentioning this in the publicly stated opinion, is of slight inter-
est in the present context, partly because the publicly stated opinion is
formed with consideration for the facts that are stated in the opinion, and
partly because it will be very much a matter of chance what lawyers in
15
Svein Eng, Dissertation, University of Oslo 1996, section V 2.4. To be pub-
lished as U/enighetsanalyse - med saerlig sikte pâ jus og allmenn rettsteori [Analy-
sis of dis/agreement - with particular reference to law and legal theory], by Univer-
sitetsforlaget, Oslo, in 1997 or 1998. Also to be translated into English and pub-
lished by Kluwer, Dordrecht. - Constructed judicial arguments are one example
from lawyers' language and argumentation of that combination of types of proposi-
tions I call "rekonstruksjon og omdefinering" ("reconstruction and redefining"), see
op. cit. section V in its entirety.
492 Svein Eng

general get to know about any other fact that the judges used as a
basis.16
It is not obvious, either immediately or on closer examination, what on
the level of judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law
would correspond to the elements now outlined: i.e. firstly, correspond to
the (relatively) fixed point of the argumentation, namely the constellation
of facts and conclusion of the previous case; and secondly, correspond to
the (relative) variable of the argumentation, namely criteria for generating
this constellation.
Perhaps one may see things in the following way. At the level of sources
of law the relevant facts are those actions relating to sources of law that
the judgment contains; e.g. reference to a statute, to travaux préparatoires ,
or to a previous judgment, together with the weighing and balancing of
these arguments. Further, the relevant conclusion is the standpoint on a
question of law - the norm - that the judgment arrives at on this basis. The
constructed judicial arguments should then be the doctrine of sources of
law itself.
One problem of this parallelism is the parallelism of on the one hand
judicial actions relating to the sources of law and on the other hand the
facts of the case at the paradigmatic level of the doctrine of precedent.
Since judges barely thematise the doctrine of sources of law (see (1)
above), judicial actions relating to sources of law are not described in the
judgment , in the way that the facts of the case at the paradigmatic level of
the doctrine of precedent are. 17 Thus at the level of judicial actions relating
to sources of law one cannot speak of taking these judicial actions for
granted in the way that one takes the facts of the case for granted at the
paradigmatic level of the doctrine of precedent. At the level of judicial
actions relating to sources of law one first has linguistically to identify and
map the judicial actions. But this is an essential part of the doctrine of
sources of law as it is traditionally perceived and pursued. Thus we are into
the doctrine of sources of law before the conditions for applying the con-
cept of 'constructed judicial argument' are actualized. Thus the concept of
'constructed judicial argument' cannot be suited to capturing the way in
which lawyers support the doctrine of sources of law on judicial practice.

16
On the adjustment of facts as a means to achieve fair and reasonable results,
see Eng (fn. 6), section 4.3.; (fn. 15), section I I I 3.2.3 (3).
17
The description of the facts of the case at the paradigmatic level of the doc-
trine of precedent is in Norwegian law not only a regular feature of the content of
judgments, but a statutory duty imposed upon the judge, cf. section 144(4), cf. sec-
tion 149, of the Civil Procedure Act and section 39, cf. sections 40 and 41 third
paragraph, of the Criminal Procedure Act.
 Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments 493

At least not in the way that is the topic here. It is not necessary to con-
sider whether the concept of 'constructed judicial argument' can be
applied, or whether it is of interest to apply the concept, provided that a
linguistic identification and mapping of actually occurring judicial
actions relating to sources of law has already taken place. It is sufficient
to make the point that in such a case we are on another and more theore-
tical level than where we find the actually occurring judicial arguments
concerning the doctrine of sources of law which is the topic here.
(3) The third way of generating arguments from previous judgments,
comparison of facts, I do not consider to be an independent method of gen-
erating arguments in the present context. A comparison presupposes a yard-
stick. The yardstick may be explicitly stated or constructed (no matter
whether it is what one terms a "rule", "guideline", "principle", "criterion",
"argument" or whatever). Thus one is back to the two ways of generating
arguments discussed above.
(1) (3) The conclusion is that the doctrine of precedent concepts of
ways of generating arguments from judgments are not suited to capturing
the fact that and the way in which, lawyers support the doctrine of sources
of law on judicial practice, i.e. the concepts do not give a descriptively
adequate picture of actually occurring judicial arguments concerning the
doctrine of sources of law.

3. The Weight of Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine

of Sources of Law. Transition to a New Question

Given that judgments are deemed to be a source of argument in relation

to the doctrine of sources of law (cf. section II.l. above) and given that
judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law are generated
in certain ways, albeit different from the ways of generating arguments in
the doctrine of precedent (cf. section II. 2. above). One is then confronted
with the question whether those notions of the weight of judicial arguments
that lawyers have developed in the context of and with reference to the
paradigmatic level of the doctrine of precedent, are applicable to judicial
arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law.
It is well known from the doctrine of precedent that the weight of judi-
cial arguments varies according to features of the judgment from which the
arguments are taken; e.g. according to the level in the hierarchy of the
courts at which the judgment was pronounced (Supreme Court, Court of
Appeal or city/district court) and according to whether there is dissent, and
if so, how strong the dissent is. 18 At first glance these correlations seem to
be applicable to judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of
494 Svein Eng

law as well: If one uses judgments as a source of argument in relation to

the doctrine of sources of law, then there seems at first glance to be just as
much reason in this connection as otherwise, to let the weight of the
judicial argument vary, e.g. according to the level in the hierarchy of the
courts at which the judgment was pronounced, and according to whether
there is dissent, and if so, how strong the dissent is.
However, a deeper discussion of the question of weight forces us to
reflect on the basis of the doctrine of precedent. By "the basis of the doc-
trine of precedent" I mean those arguments for the use of judgments as a
source of argument traditionally cited at the paradigmatic level of the doc-
trine of precedent; I shall return to this in a moment in more detail. Reflec-
tion on this basis shows that it is doubtful whether the doctrine of prece-
dent can in any way justify the use of judgments as a source of argument
in relation to the doctrine of sources of law. The thought thus moves from
whether the doctrine of precedent in respect of its content fits judicial argu-
ments concerning the doctrine of sources of law, cf. the discussions above,
to whether the doctrine of precedent in respect of its foundation is in any
way applicable to judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of
law.

I I I . Is the Doctrine of Precedent in Respect

of its Foundation Applicable to Judicial Arguments
Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law?

At the paradigmatic level of the doctrine of precedent there are mainly

two types of argument that are traditionally cited in support of using judg-
ments as a source of argument, namely policy considerations and case law.

1. Policy Considerations

Traditionally cited considerations are firstly predictabilitiy,19 secondly

formal justice ("equality under the law"), 20 including the desire to avoid
legal change with retroactive effect.
18
On the other hand there is some disagreement about how the correlations be-
tween the weight of judicial arguments and features of the judgment shall be con-
ceptualised descriptively; about whether one must operate with dichotomies or with
a gradual weight dimension; for more detail, see Eng (fn. 6), section 4.1.; (fn. 15),
section I I I 2.2.6 (4)(b). In the same places I give a more exhaustive treatment of
what features of a judgment are typically deemed to have significance for the
weight of the judicial argument.
19
Oscar Ρ lato u, Forelaesninger over Retskildernes Theori [Lectures on the Theo-
ry of Sources of Law], Kristiania 1915, p. 120; Augdahl (fn. 3), p. 265; Eckhojf
(fn. 3), p. 153; Andences (fn. 7), p. 89; Fleischer (fn. 7), p. 166.
20
Platou (fn. 19), p. 120; Augdahl (fn. 3), pp. 263 - 64; Eckhojf ( fn. 3), p. 153.
 Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments 495

Consideration for legal unity is also cited. However, to a greater extent

than in the case of the considerations just mentioned, it is here deemed
to be justified to ask why the consideration has weight (it is deemed to a
lesser extent to have intrinsic value); and in answering this question it is
my impression that lawyers turn to the other considerations I have men-
tioned.
These considerations are cited in relation to the paradigmatic level of the
doctrine of precedent. The question is whether the considerations are also
capable of justifying judgments as a source of argument in relation to the
doctrine of sources of law. To bring out what is specific, I presuppose the
tenability of these considerations at the paradigmatic level of the doctrine
of precedent. This presupposition is also warranted by the fact that the
question here is whether the doctrine of precedent in respect of its founda-
tion, i.e. on its own premises, is applicable to judicial arguments concern-
ing the doctrine of sources of law.
One difference between the levels is the following. Reasoning from pre-
dictability and formal justice is directly applicable at the paradigmatic level
of the doctrine of precedent. For example, one adjusts one's actions to, and
expects equal treatment in relation to, a judicial argument about the border-
line between what is criminal and what is not, when it comes to driving a
pleasure craft under the influence of alchohol. In contrast, reasoning from
predictability and formal justice is only indirectly applicable at the level of
judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law. For example,
adjustment to, and expectation of equal treatment in relation to, a judicial
argument about the relevance and weight of a source of law factor, is not
in itself sufficient ground for adjustment to, and expectation of equal treat-
ment in relation to, any particular legal provision external to the doctrine of
sources of law. For the latter to be the case, it is in addition necessary that
the source of law factor concerned is applied to a concrete question of law,
i.e. in an interplay with other arguments from the doctrine of sources of
law (i.e. other source of law factors).
What is it from a descriptive point of view possible to say in general
about this interplay? In relation to the language and argumentation of Nor-
wegian lawyers, one cannot say that certain source of law factors in general
take precedence over (weigh more than) others. What one can say in gen-
eral is that certain features of the source of law factors are typically
deemed to have significance for the weight of the factors in the individual
case.21 For example, in the case of statutes: whether the wording is vague/
determinate, unambiguous/ambiguous, indicates/does not indicate an eva-

21
Eng (fn. 15), section I I I 2.2.6 (4)(b); (fn. 6), section 4.1.
496 Svein Eng

luation, or is to be applied/not to be applied in the domain of the principle

of legality.
Thus, there is no direct link from a judicial argument concerning the doc-
trine of sources of law to any particular legal provision external to the doc-
trine of sources of law or to any particular subsumption under such a provi-
sion. The adjustment and expectation of equal treatment one might possibly
imagine in relation to the level of judicial arguments concerning the doc-
trine of sources of law, is consequently watered down and distinctive com-
pared with the adjustment and expectation that lawyers otherwise focus on.
So watered down and so distinctive that I believe there is reason to ask
whether the identity in words, cf. "adjustment" and "expectation", here
mostly or only gives an illusion of identity of questions.
As an argument against more specifically viewing judicial arguments
concerning the doctrine of precedent as precedents, Cross says: "They
are ... in no way dependent on the facts of the case, and they can never
be solely determinative of the issue of law on which the parties are liti-
gating."22 What has been quoted gives rise to two comments in the pre-
sent context: (i) Read in isolation it may seem as if what has been
quoted expresses the same point as mentioned in the body of the text
above. However this quotation is part of another context. More specifi-
cally, Cross' argument is that on account of what has been quoted, judi-
cial arguments concerning the doctrine of precedent cannot be ratio deci-
dendi. This argument appears to have to be correspondingly applied to
judicial arguments concerning other sources of law. (ii) Cross' argument
carries little weight, as far as I can see. The argument consists in an
inference from his own normative definition of 'ratio decidendi'. In the
cloak of a definition he simply presupposes what he sets out to justify:
that the expressions "ratio decidendi" and "obiter dicta" cannot be
thought to apply to pronouncements of the courts on matters of sources
of law. If Cross' argument were to have carried any weight, he would
have had to show that lawyers' actual use of the expressions "ratio deci-
dendi" and "obiter dicta" is such that this cannot be thought. That he has
not demonstrated.
The considerations in support of using judgments as a source of argu-
ment that are traditionally cited at the paradigmatic level of the doctrine of
precedent, thus provide only weak support, if any, for the use of judgments
as a source of argument in relation to the doctrine of sources of law.

22
Rupert Cross , The House of Lords and the Rules of Precedent, in: P. M. S.
Hacker/J. Raz (eds.), Law, Morality and Society, Essays in Honour of H. L. A.
Hart, Oxford 1977, pp. 145 - 60, at p. 154.
 Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments 497

2. Case Law

Beside policy considerations it is particularly case law that is cited as a

basis for the doctrine of precedent. In simple terms, lawyers justify their
use of the doctrine of precedent by saying that the courts use the doctrine
of precedent. Our question is whether the aspect of judicial practice that is
referred to here, also tells us something about whether the doctrine of
precedent is applicable to judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of
sources of law.
An immediate problem is how we are to obtain information from the
practice of the courts in this connection. If we apply the doctrine of prece-
dent as the way of reading judgments, we preempt the answer to the ques-
tion we are discussing. Furthermore, circularity (self-reference) comes into
being in that precedents in this case are included in the basis of the doc-
trine of precedent. I do not think it necessary to take a stand on whether
such preemption or circularity is logically unacceptable.23 For, if we ignore
any possible logical problems and use the doctrine of precedent as our way
of reading judgments, then the result will in any case be that the practice of
the courts does not provide guidance. In brief:
In judicial practice it is not common to thematise the doctrine of sources
of law, cf. what has been said about this earlier (section II. 2. (1) above).
This silence also prevails, as far as I know, in relation to the question here,
i.e. whether the doctrine of precedent is applicable to judicial arguments
concerning the doctrine of sources of law. I do not know of any judgments
in which this question has been explicitly discussed, nor do I know of any
opinion from the Supreme Court in which the terminology of precedent has
been used about judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of
law; i.e. as far as I know, there is little guidance to be obtained from expli-
citly stated judicial arguments.

23
The circularity (self-reference) has been discussed among others by Glanville
Williams , Salmond on Jurisprudence, 11th ed. London 1957, pp. 187 - 88; A. W. B.
Simpson , The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in:
A. G. Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford 1961, pp. 148-75, at
pp. 150-55; Roy L. Stone-de Montpensier, Logic and Law: The Precedence of Pre-
cedents, (1967) 51 Minnesota Law Review, pp. 6 5 5 - 7 4 ; J. C. Hicks , The Liar
Paradox in Legal Reasoning, (1971) 29 Cambridge Law Journal, pp. 275 - 9 1 , at
pp. 283 - 84, 287- 89, 2 8 9 - 9 0 ; Cross (fn. 22), pp. 154-55; Rupert Cross/J. W.
Harris, Precedent in English Law, 4th ed. Oxford 1991, pp. 104-05; P. 7. Evans,
The Status of Rules of Precedent, (1982) 41 Cambridge Law Journal, pp. 162 - 79,
at pp. 167, 172-75; Laurence Goldstein, Four Alleged Paradoxes in Legal Reason-
ing, (1979) 38 Cambridge Law Journal, pp. 373 - 91, at pp. 386(382)- 91; Some
Problems about Precedent, (1984) 43 Cambridge Law Journal, pp. 88 - 107, at
pp. 93 - 96.

33 FS Aarnio
498 Svein Eng

In a few opinions from the Supreme Court one may find in discussion of
questions of sources of law, a use of previous judgments which may
evoke the image of a doctrine of precedent, see e.g. Rt. 1908/631 on
p. 634 and Rt. 1924/18 on pp. 18 - 20. But such opinions are too few and
too unspecific for one to be able to draw any conclusion from them in
connection with the question here.
In relation to case law at the paradigmatic level of the doctrine of prece-
dent, lawyers are used to asking for, not only explicitly stated judicial argu-
ments, but also constructed judicial arguments. However, as has previously
been shown, it is problematic to transfer the concept of 'constructed judi-
cial argument' from the paradigmatic level of the doctrine of precedent to
the level of the use of judgments as a source of argument in relation to the
doctrine of sources of law (section II. 2. (2) above). In relation to the pre-
sent question there is therefore not much guidance to be obtained from con-
structed judicial arguments either.
The conclusion is that the practice of the courts seen through the glasses
of the doctrine of precedent does not provide guidance with respect to
whether the doctrine of precedent is applicable to judicial arguments con-
cerning the doctrine of sources of law.
Are there other ways of obtaining arguments from the practice of the
courts? The way most close at hand is to look at policy considerations
which case law cites in support of a doctrine of precedent and to ask
whether these considerations support applicability of the doctrine of prece-
dent to judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law. This,
I have already discussed, and my answer was that the said considerations
provide only weak support, if any, for the use of judgments as a source of
argument in relation to the doctrine of sources of law (section III. 1. above).

IV. Legislation, Particularly Act No. 2 of 25 June 1925

("Plenary Proceedings Act")

In the Norwegian legal system there is, as in many other legal systems,
little legislation that directly or by presupposition says anything about pre-
cedents and that could thus be thought to say something about the question
discussed in this paper. Act No. 2 of 25 June 1925, often called the
" Plenary Proceedings Act", is to the best of my knowledge the only possi-
bly relevant example.
The Plenary Proceedings Act does not belong in the discussion just con-
ducted with respect to the basis of the doctrine of precedent (section III.
above). The Plenary Proceedings Act is namely neither a basis for a duty to
follow nor a basis for competence to depart from, previous judgments. The
 Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments 499

Act presupposes the doctrine of precedent and its basis. The question then
becomes whether the Plenary Proceedings Act by presupposition says any-
thing about whether the doctrine of precedent is applicable to judicial argu-
ments concerning the doctrine of sources of law.
Section 1 of the Plenary Proceedings Act states that a case shall be heard
by the Supreme Court in plenary session if two or more of an ordinary
panel of five judges "wish to decide the case in a way that departs from an
understanding of the law pronounced by the Supreme Court in a previous
decision" (my italics), and if any member of the panel demands plenary
proceedings. It follows from the travaux préparatoires 24 that this provision
was aimed at the Supreme Court's departures from its previous precedents;
there was a wish to preserve legal unity and respect for precedents of the
Supreme Court by preventing any departure from a precedent from resting
upon the composition of the Court in the individual case. - In the present
context it is the expression "understanding of the law" that is the key-
expression in the statute quoted. This expression is not defined, either in
the Act or in ordinary language, in relation to the distinction between the
paradigmatic level of the doctrine of precedent and the doctrine of sources
of law. The travaux préparatoires of the statute do not raise the question,
but appear to take it for granted that section 1 is limited to the paradig-
matic level of the doctrine of precedent, i.e. that neither the expression
"understanding of the law" in the Act nor corresponding expressions in the
travaux préparatoires, 25 extend to pronouncements from the Supreme Court
on the doctrine of sources of law. The same goes for the vast majority of
lawyers; I have not come across statements in the literature or in conversa-
tion that have raised the question, let alone that have applied section 1 to
pronouncements from the Supreme Court on the doctrine of sources of law.
One possible explanation for the now outlined features of the wording of
the Act, the travaux préparatoires and statements from the vast majority of
lawyers, is that one takes for granted that the doctrine of precedent does
not extend to pronouncements from the Supreme Court on the doctrine of
sources of law; if the opposite had been the case, it would indeed have
been natural to pose the question and take a stand on it.
An alternative explanation is that for seventy years the question has lain
outside lawyers' depth of intention, i.e. that they have lacked the concepts
necessary to pose the question. This explanation may at first glance seem
improbable. However, when I now turn to an examination of legal literature

24
Ot.prp. nr. 28 1926; Innst. Ot. X I 1926; Dokument nr. 10 1926.
25
"Rettssetning" ("proposition of law"), "rettssp0rsmâl" ("question of law"),
"rettsoppfatning" ("understanding of the law"), "avgj0relse" ("decision"), "prejudi-
kat" ("precedent").

33=
500 Svein Eng

(legal dogmatics and legal theory), in which one would expect that the dee-
pest reflection takes place, it will become apparent that the doctrine of pre-
cedent has been transferred without question from its paradigmatic level to
judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law.

V. Legal Literature

In relation to the question discussed in this paper, legal literature (legal

dogmatics and legal theory) has relevance in three ways in particular.
Firstly, legal literature may be a symptom and cause of lawyers' notions on
whether the doctrine of precedent is applicable to judicial arguments con-
cerning the doctrine of sources of law (section II. above). Secondly, there
are probably some lawyers who perceive legal literature as part of the basis
of the doctrine of precedent (section III. above). Thirdly, legal literature
may directly discuss the present question: to what extent the doctrine of
precedent is applicable to judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of
sources of law. - In what follows I shall take a look at this latter aspect of
legal literature.
As with judicial practice, legal literature barely thematises whether the
doctrine of precedent applies to judicial arguments concerning the doctrine
of sources of law. I shall briefly mention some examples of statements that
come close to the question; the first example seems to imply that the doc-
trine of precedent is not applicable, and the remaining examples seems to
imply that the doctrine of precedent is applicable. However, both sets of
statements turn out on closer analysis to have little weight in relation to the
question posed here.
I have previously quoted Torstein Eckhoff' s general statement about judi-
cial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law: "If on a rare
occasion one finds a principled statement on questions of sources of law in
a judgment, one should not attach too much weight to it" (section II. 2.
(l)(b) above). I have also quoted his general statement on the weight of the
Supreme Court's pronouncements of principle at the paradigmatic level of
the doctrine of precedent: "No other source of law factors carry such great
weight as a Supreme Court judgment when it directly decides a question of
interpretation" (loc. cit.). I concluded that Eckhoff appears to be claiming or
having to claim that the doctrine of precedent is not applicable to judicial
arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law. - However, Eckhoff
treats the two levels totally independently of each other, and there is noth-
ing in his presentation to suggest any problematising of the relationship
between these levels.
In Carsten Smith's comprehensive investigations of the relationship
between Norwegian law and international law there is also a change of per-
 Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments 501

spective in relation to earlier theory; from a constitutional law perspective

to a sources of law perspective.26 Jan Helgesen has joined in and further
purified this change of perspective.27 Both writers use the terminology of
precedent in their discussion of what weight is to be ascribed to arguments
from international law in the event of conflict with arguments from internal
sources of law. 28
Another writer, Erik Boe, says in general terms: "The Supreme Court ...
may amend the rules relating to sources of law at one stroke ... a prece-
dent".29 Boe says in particular, in connection with Rt. 1990/874: "No
matter what one might think about the role which statements from parlia-
ment concerning the interpretation of statutes already in force ["etterar-
beider"] should be allowed to play, we have through [this] judgment been
given a precedent for their relevance." 30
However, Smith, Helgesen and Boe do not go into the question posed in
this paper. Their statements simply presuppose a specific solution, namely
that the doctrine of precedent can be transferred from the paradigmatic
level of the doctrine of precedent to judicial arguments concerning the doc-
trine of sources of law. 31

V I . Summary

This discussion may be summarised in the following way:

That judgments are deemed to be a source of argument in relation to the
doctrine of sources of law, is a fact which can be ascertained without our
having to distinguish between different sets of criteria for the use of judi-
cial arguments, i.e. without differentiating between the criteria of the doc-
trine of precedent and other criteria (section II. 1. above).

26
Carsten Smith , Folkerettens stilling ved norske domstoler [International Law in
Norwegian Courts], in: Carsten Smith, Statsliv og rettsteori, Oslo 1978, pp. 71 - 89,
at pp. 86- 87; Carsten Smith/Lucy Smith , Norsk rett og folkeretten [Norwegian
Law and International Law], Oslo 1982, pp. 4, 13, 215.
27
Jan Helgesen , Teorier om "Folkerettens stilling i norsk rett" [Theories on the
Position of International Law in Norwegian Law], Oslo 1982, pp. 6, 70 - 72, 106.
28
Smith/Smith (fn. 26), pp. 160, 227 - 229; Helgesen (fn. 27), pp. 46, 51, 52, 97,
103.
29
Boe (fn. 7, 1993), p. 128.
30
Erik Boe, Fusadommen i forvaltningsrettslig og rettsteoretisk perspektiv [The
Fusa Judgment in the Perspectives of Administrative Law and Legal Theory], Lov
og Rett 1991, pp. 323 - 46, at p. 326.
31
I add that, as far as I can see, in his most recent work (fn. 7, 1996), Boe does
not use the terminology of precedent with respect to the level of sources of law, but
nor does he go into the question posed here.
502 S vein Eng

If one then looks at how lawyers more specifically generate judicial argu-
ments concerning the doctrine of sources of law, the conclusion is that the
doctrine of precedent concepts of ways of generating arguments are poorly
suited (section II. 2. above).
When one presupposes that a judicial argument concerning the doctrine
of sources of law has been generated and when one asks whether the doc-
trine of precedent criteria concerning the weight of judicial arguments are
applicable, then one is led to reflection on the basis of the doctrine of pre-
cedent; firstly, on certain traditionally cited considerations in support of a
doctrine of precedent, secondly, on case law (section II. 3. cf. III). Reflec-
tion on this basis sows doubt about whether the doctrine of precedent can
in any way justify the use of judgments as a source of argument in relation
to the doctrine of sources of law (section III).
Finally we saw that legislation does not say anything about, and that
legal literature has barely touched upon, the question of whether the doc-
trine of precedent is applicable to judicial arguments concerning the doc-
trine of sources of law (sections IV - V).
In relation to our question; does the doctrine of precedent apply to judi-
cial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law?; I consider that
we have now been through the most relevant arguments: the doctrine of
precedent in respect of its content, the basis of the doctrine of precedent,
legislation and legal literature. These arguments justify the conclusion that
there is only a weak basis, if any, for applying the doctrine of precedent to
judicial arguments concerning the doctrine of sources of law. This means
that within the framework of the language and argumentation of lawyers
one cannot without provisos say "judgment χ is a precedent in the source
of law question y".
"Not without provisos", in the sense that it is incumbent upon the person
using the quoted sentence-form to define what is meant by "precedent" in
this context. "Incumbent upon", because the discussion has shown that the
word "precedent" has now been taken out of the context in which it is tra-
ditionally used and has a role to play.
By this time many will probably call for a positive determination of how
lawyers seek support for the doctrine of sources of law in judicial practice.
However, for one thing this topic is clearly distinct from what has now
been discussed; for another, the topic is vast and probably more difficult
than it may seem at first glance; and for yet another, I consider that the
negative result at which I have arrived has an interest in itself. In the pre-
sent discussion it turns out, as is often the case elsewhere, that reflection on
how we talk about things may be an important part of our cognition of how
things are.
 COSMOS AND CHAOS IN L A W AND LEGAL THEORY

By Hannu Tapani Klami, Helsinki

I. Cosmos - But How?

The human mind wants to create order in law. The basic ideas of law-
likeness, rationality, objectivity, etc. serve the inherent needs for justice and
legal certainty and, in the last resort, the legitimacy of law, understood both
as law-giving and law-making. This legal theoretical phenomenon, looking
for cosmos instead of chaos - meaning arbitrariness, uncertainty, etc. - has
two faces,
(i) law is understood as an order (the descriptive aspect);
(ii) one is striving to make the law an order (the normative aspect).
Unfortunately the methods employed have more often than not been self-
treacherous. The order has been illusory or in some way biased. Two well-
known examples may suffice, although here my criticism is by no means
innovative.
(1) One has referred to a system that is either inherent in the issues at
stake or constructed to create an order in the sense proper. Already Roman
lawyers tried to defend the scientific nature of their law-making by refer-
ring - as a general legitimation of legal science - to a system of the Aristo-
telian type (διαιρεσις κατα γενη) where concepts are divided into classes
and defined. 1 This systematic idea was refound again after St. Thomas
Aquinas also by the Enlightment legal philosophy. Christian Wolff tried to
employ the axiomatic method for deriving law from a set of superior prin-
ciples.2 But since these principles were of a very general nature, they were
subject to different interpretations amounting to arbitrariness. This method
was rejected by F. C. von Savigny and the Begrijfsjurisprudenz who both
tried to employ the system idea, although in a different manner. Savigny
thought that Roman lawyers could "count", calculate the decision with the

1
See Hannu Tapani Klami, Sacerdotes iustitiae, Turku 1978, passim.
2
Lars Björne, Deutsche Rechtssysteme im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, Ebelsbach
am Main 1984; Hannu Tapani Klami, Sanningen om rätten, Uppsala 1990, p. 97 et
seq.; p. 113 et seq.
504 Hannu Tapani Klami

help of their concepts. The problem about Savigny's system was, however,
that it was based upon too big elements, legal institutions such as marriage,
that simultaneously are institutions of social life. A more sophisticated ver-
sion of this system idea was that employed by Puchta who spoke about the
system of law propositions, Rechtssätze , that included (a) legal principles
(b) legal norms that expressed the legal principles and were justified by
them and therefore (c) were capable of creating new legal norms even for
technical or social innovations, norms that were based upon the pre-existing
higher principles.
Here the problem was that one wanted to leave out legal policy consid-
erations altogether, either since they pertain to legislation , not to legal
science , or for the more mystical reason that justice, equity and expediency
were in some way built-in to the conceptual system (as e.g. Puchta seems
to have thought). For this reason one could say that the objectivity of this
system was an illusion and actually - when at least tacitly assuming the
freedom of contract and will - expressed a disregard of the lacking social
equality among individuals, groups and classes. In short, the system was
already for this reason biased , not to speak about its application to the
actual social problems of the 19th century that were entirely different from
those involved in the Roman slave society.
(2) The two big normativistic constructions of our century, the Kelsenian
norm hierarchy and the Hartian system have failed to solve the problem
about the interpretation element, inherent in all law-making. There is in the
Kelsenian hierarchy no clear place for metanorms that are used to interpret
norms at different levels.3 Even the Grundnorm of Kelsen is subject to
interpretation: What is a constitution? When is it sufficiently effective to be
recognized as the valid constitution of a certain state? And Hart failed to
convince us about the validity of one rule of recognition only: one can
namely say that there are at least three rules of recognition in English law,
one for statutory law, another for judge-made law and the third one for
European law that is nowadays an integral element of English law, too.
(The same objection goes for Kelsen' s norm hierarchy; Kelsen cannot be
blaimed for it, since he could not pay attention to the then non-existing
supranational law of the European law type but only to international law
that was also much less developed than nowadays.)

3
See Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., Vienna 1960. His interpretation
of judicial interprétions is rather empty: they are from his utterly normativistic start-
ing-point mainly "matters of fact", not subject to real legal scientific interest. I
think, however, that his distinction between Rechtsnorm and Rechtssatz is very fruit-
ful indeed. A legal rule is a proposition of las ± interpretation. What this interpreta-
tion means, does not, however, seem to be not especially interesting even in his
dynamics of law.
 Cosmos and Chaos in Law and Legal Theory 505

An attempt to build-in metanorms to the system of the first-order norms

and claim that decisions are based either upon first-order norms or upon
them as applied with the help of the metanorms about their priority and
interpretation would also fail. Metanorms are namely subject to conflicts
and interpretation problems, too. Moreover, it would be an over-simplifica-
tion to say that solutions to hard interpretation problems could be under-
stood merely as application of metanorms. Norms —• metanorms —» meta-
metanorms (cf. Godei's thesis about the in the last resort non-axiomatic
nature of mathematics and logic)?
A third and "softer" version of normativism is to divide the rules about
legal argumentation into two groups (i) strongly normative rules (ii) weakly
normative rules that say - "prima facie" - that an argument A is better
than Β, unless there are countervailing reasons, "all things considered".
This kind of substantive argumentation may express rightness reasons that
refer directly to the evaluative assessment of the different decision alterna-
tives, or instrumental reasons that are based upon the appraisal of these
alternatives from the aspect of means => goals- relationships. As représen-
tants of these neo-normativistic ideas mention should made in the first
place of Aulis Aarnio , Robert Alexy, Aleksander Peczenik and Robert
S. Summers. 4
(3) One might say that modern attempts at creating an order express in
some way the idea of the "monistic" covering law model. There are two
versions of it:
(i) The deductive-nomological explanation model where the event E (here:
a legal decision) follows from a set of conditions and general laws that
cover the (quasi-)causal relationships X\...X n^E\

Conditions C\... Cn
General laws L\...Ln

where E is in the logical sense explained by the combination C & L.

(ii) The inductive-statistical model that is in other respects similar, with the
exception that E only with a certain probability follows from the condi-
4
See e.g. Aulis Aarnio , The Rational as Reasonable, Dordrecht 1987, p. 89 et
seq.; same, Taking Law Seriously, ARSP Beiheft 42, 1990 p. 184 et seq.; Robert
Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, Baden-Baden 1985 p. 88 et seq.; Aleksander Pecze-
nik, Rätten och förnuftet, Lund 1988 p. 92 et seq.; P. C. Atiyah & Robert
S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American law, Oxford 1987 p. 1 et seq.
and passim. But see also Hannu Tapani Klami, A l l Things Not Considered, ARSP
Beiheft 42, 1990, p. 167 et seq.
506 Hannu Tapani Klami

tions and general laws.5 The reasons why we are incapable of present-
ing cause => effect-relationships within the terms of a strict logical
model may be different.
The third version of normativism expresses clearly the inductive-statisti-
cal idea: the decision follows with a greater or smaller probability from the
conditions and general laws (legal norms, including legal principles, meta-
norms, weakly normative rules of juristic reasoning). It seems to me that
one is using (the analysis of) justification at least for three partly inter-
twined purposes:
(i) improving rationality (creating order);
(ii) explaining decisions in some non-causal sense (perhaps of that of neo-
Kantian Understanding);
(iii) prognosticing future decisions.
My two last interpretations of the aims of modern normativism are
admittedly somewhat questionable, since not even the représentants of the
mainstream embrace uniform ideas about explaining, understanding and
prognosticing. The idea is, however that one is taking the law and legal
reasoning seriously and not only as a kind of façade legitimation, although
one admits that the arguments given do not always tell the whole truth
about the actual internal justification process of the decision-maker.

I I . Elements of Chaos

But if and when one admits that justification does not make the decision-
process fully rational but there are ultimate and non-justifiable moral
choices - and for this reason the explanatory or prognostive force of justifi-
cation is far from being complete - this means that there is an element of
chaos in legal decision-making. I am not going to employ here the so-
called chaos theories that, incidentally, started from the observation that
certain phenomena of nuclear physics were incapable of being explained
otherwise that as merely statistical probabilities , i.e. not subject to strict
and covering causal laws.6

5
See e.g. Ilkka Niiniluoto, Tieteellinen päättely ja selittäminen [Scientific Infer-
ence and Explanation], Keuruu 1983 p. 227 et seq.
6
There are those who use this uncertainty as a defence for religion - but Ein-
stein is told to have said that God does not play dices. Lacking knowledge of blind
causality does not mean that there is a decision-maker that is not bound by causality
(cf. the classical medieval discussion about the possibilities and limits of God with
respect to the eternal laws).
 Cosmos and Chaos in Law and Legal Theory 507

That there are in decision-making unjustifiable elements does not as such

mean that they are a "black box" in the meaning that system theory uses to
give to them. Especially morality is not necessarily a matter of chaos, at
least if one speaks about "positive" morality, i.e. more or less generally
accepted evaluations within the judiciary, the scientific community or the
society at large. E.g. precedents give hints about future moral evaluations
in similar cases. Anyway, there have been and are those who stress that the
combination of
legal norms & principles & metanorms & arguments & argumentation rules
does not produce decisions in the positivistic sense of the covering law
model. I do not quote many examples; I am myself of the same opinion:
there is a point where the norms stop and fail to produce acceptable deci-
sions. It is extremely important to realize what the limits of norm-oriented
legal reasoning are.
American realism used to stress the human random element in all judi-
cial decision-making, although it tried in certain cases to explain the irra-
tionality - at least from the normativist point of view - with causal
schemes, too (cf. the well-known "digestion theory" where the physiology
of the judge "produces" a certain outcome). But e. g. Jerome Frank claimed
that prognoses of judicial decisions often amount to mere guessing.7
Another criticism of normativist rationality consists of the use of the so-
called practical syllogism where acts follow from assumptions about condi-
tions, goals and means => goals-relationships.8 This is also connected to
Dray's paradox of historical explanations: In order to explain concrete
events in their entirety we must tell the whole tale. The more we know
about the case, the less explanatory force general laws have. In order to
fully understand legal decisions one should know the background and mind
of the decision-maker and if there is a several-membered court, one should
also know how interaction in camera takes place: who is recognized as an
authority and who not. In this manner one is in the U.S. analysing the deci-
sions by the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to their politi-
cal, educational and other background. As for another court that displays
judicial activism, the European Court of Justice, the situation would

7
Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, New York & London 1949. He
speaks in his writings about actual and probable law calling the latter "guesses",
since he stresses the irrational or at least not norm-bound element in law-making.
What he thinks is irrational is less clear. His Freudian psychological interpretations
of litigation and law-making are to say the least somewhat audacious.
8
See the classical analysis by Georg Henrik von Wright, Explanation and Under-
standing, Oxford 1971.
508 Hannu Tapani Klami

obviously be rather similar, but for the fact that the votings are kept secret
and dissenting opinions are not made public.9
It is hard to reconcile the idea of the goal-oriented practical syllogism
(" Understanding ") with normativism. Aulis Aarnio for example has tried to
do it, especially in his writings from 1970's, but has returned to a more
classical normativism. 10 It is another thing, though, whether one can rescue
legal positivism or even the use of the scientific ideals of the general posi-
tivism proper in this manner. I do'nt think that it is possible.

I I I . Inherent Chaos?

There are - as far as I can see - still two fields of legal decison-making
where one might speak about some kind of a chaos. In both cases the
"cause" - if one can speak about it in this context - is mainly the same:
ignorance about facts. Here I mean in the first place:
(i) ignorance about the socioeconomic effects of the different decision
alternatives;
(ii) evidentiary problems.
Both problems are reflected at the microlevel of a decision and at the
macrolevel of decision practice.
The main reasons are the following.

1. Socioeconomic Effects
It is rather common that one has only a faint idea about the socioeco-
nomic effects of a certain decision: how frequent are the problems
involved? what are the possibilities of the parties to roll over the economic
consequences to prices, secure indemnity by means of insurances or other
legal or practical devices, etc.? This, again, is reflected by reasoning and
the weighting of different arguments. Since opinions may differ, and there
is no certainty, there is a random element in decision-making. On the other
hand, when decisions are made on the basis of legal political considera-

9
See Hannu Tapani Klami , Methodological Problems in European and Compara-
tive Lax, 2nd ed., Helsinki 1997, p. 34 et seq. I think, incidentally, that the system
in EC J is virtually necessary in order to protect the impartiality of the national
judges, when the national interests and opinions of governments are at stake.
10
See Aulis Aarnio , On Legal Reasoning, Turku 1977 p. 157 et seq. and passim,
but, on the other hand, same, The Rational as Reasonable, Dordrecht 1987 p. 180 et
seq. where his attitude towards the practical reasoning as the explanatory scheme
for judicial/interpretational acts has become distinctly more skeptical. But Aarnio
did not even in "On Legal Reasoning" think that the practical syllogism should
cover the structure of legal reasoning in its entirety.
 Cosmos and Chaos in Law and Legal Theory 509

tions, and these considerations may or may not be correct, the resulting
decision-practice is more or less of a random nature.
American realism correctly stressed the nature of law-making as a kind
of social engineering, and it managed to change the reasoning paradigm of
American courts that have openly discussed the legal political merits of the
decisions. This reasoning paradigm has, however, produced a judicial prac-
tice of its own, and cases are within this new framework interpreted in a
normative manner - perhaps less stressing the typical method of interpret-
ing cases as facts => legal consequences - relationships and more empha-
sizing the legal policy arguments that link them together.
But the criticism of the mainstream of American legal science and judi-
cial practice, especially the Critical Legal Studies (CLS), has claimed that
one is not able to foresee the social impact of legal rules. 11 CLS embraces
the indeterminist view of legal regulation; this can be called chaos. I think,
however, that the problems are to a great extent due to the unreliability of
the empirical information, laid as the basis of legal reasoning about the
socioeconomic effects of decisions. Another issue is that CLS also denies
the possibility of just balancing between irreconcilable social conflicts.
Legal principles employed to "solve" these conflicts are as such conflict-
ing, too, and choices and weightings between them are also in a way inde-
terministc, matters of chance. In the last analysis this view reflects the frag-
mentation of our culture. 12
If one assumes that society is not an order but rather a chaos, indetermi-
nistic elements in law-making are not only inevitable but perhaps even
healthy at least in not being illusions of rationality. If one thinks that social
change is only within strict limits foreseeable, one cannot well claim that
legal or judicial response to such change should be foreseeable, either. Judi-
cial creativity - the "free scientific research" of François Gény or even the
good judge who is better than good law (thus Olaus Petri , the Swedish
11
If one can speak about an authority within this extremely heterogeneous and
even confusing movement, mention should be made of R. M. Unger , The Critical
Legal Studies Movement, Harvard 1986. Other représentants - especially in interna-
tional law are David Kennedy and my colleague in Helsinki, Mariti Koskenniemi,
see his From Apology to Utopia, Helsinki 1988 p. 476 et seq.
12
With a certain exaggeration one might say that Scandinavian private law ex-
presses the ideas of CLS about the nature of law: there is an inherent exception
built-in to nearly every rule, allowing for overruling, if there are countervailing rea-
sons strong enough. Rules are in many respects only prima facie rules to be revised
"all (or nearly all) things considered". Contracts may for example be adjusted or
annulled on grounds of unconscionability. It has been said that in the former Soviet
Union the official arbitrators could write the contract between the litigating enter-
prises, even if there was no contract at all; judicial activity was based upon the
official plan. In Scandinavia the judge cannot write the contract, but if there is a
contract, he or she may rewrite it (almost) in its entirety.
510 Hannu Tapani Klami

reformator in his "Judge's Instructions" that are still printed in the Swedish
and Finnish statute-books - and the free law movement) may be envisaged
as desirable or at least tolerable, even if all this is no more capable of
solving the problems than "formalism".
Norms are - generally speaking - based upon the following assumptions:
(1) the phenomena covered by the norms are relatively well-known; (2) the
phenomena will remain relatively stable , or at least (3) there is a certain
continuity in the foreseeable trends of change. In these respects legal norms
are similar to causal laws in nature.
Well, admitting that there are many elements in modern society that at
least seem as indeterministic as to defy attempts at coping with them by
means of legal regulation, one should in my opinion presuppose that law,
law-making and legal science at least do not contribute to uncertainty and
irrationality. E.g. admitting that rioting and war are an indeterministic
folly, is not equivalent to saying that the application of criminal law, mili-
tary law and the international law of warfare should be arbitrary and capri-
cious. In the best case uncertainty may diminish; it is another issue, cui
bono, i.e. who - if anyone - benefits from the predictability and order - in
short, rationality - that legal theory attempts to create.
It is another thing, though, that norms and norm-rational decision-making
are inadequate to cope with indeterministic phenomena; wars for example
cannot be won by issuing general instructions and guide-books. But they
have in war a certain function, too, and although one may disagree on the
just and wise role of norms in social decision-making, the alternative to
norms is by no means irrationality and resignation but rather an attempt to
avoid them.
Law is a method for promoting the achievment of values and goals, and
there is by necessity goal-reasoning behind law-making, although it is not
always made explicit in the reasoning of courts. In this issue Rudolph von
Ihering was right: no law without a goal. But norms are used in order to
avoid direct goal-reasoning that is thought to be individual, short-sighted,
even chaotic. But this is not necessarily the case. It is entirely possible to
take the "indeterministic" element into the decision functions as a para-
meter of uncertainty. And here one applies the theory of goal-oriented deci-
sion-making, not the theory of application of norms.
My basic idea - that I have tried to develop in a previous paper 13 - is
that one is able to reduce the theory of application of norms to decision
theory:

13
Hannu Tapani Klami, Legal Argument and Decision Theory, The American
Journal of Philosophy of Law, 1990 p. 171 et seq.
 Cosmos and Chaos in Law and Legal Theory 511

(1) norms are set forth in order to promote goals;

(2) norms are applied - and in hard cases interpreted - in order to promote
goals that are not necessarily identical with those of (1);
(3) thus, reasoning about norms and typical authority reasons can be trans-
lated to the language of goal-oriented reasoning.
Different decision alternatives/interpretation alternatives may get more or
less support from the same or different sources of law that, again, may be
more or less authoritative in the recognized hierarchy of the sources of law.
The higher the support is, the less evaluative relevance is needed to back
the decision alternative. The clearer the law is, the stronger evaluative rea-
sons are needed in order to reject the solution provided by the text.
The idea is that there are two basic elements concerning the argumenta-
tive weight of the sources of law (a) their hierarchic position (b) fitness,
i.e. the closeness of the text of sources of law to the facts of the case (in a
decision situation) or to the fact descriptions of the interpretation alterna-
tives (in an interpretation situation). Together they constitute the argumen-
tative weight of the different alternatives. The relevance and sufficiency of
argumentative weight is a matter of the evaluative utility and disutility of
the different decision (interpretation) alternatives. This method is analogu-
ous to the assessment of standards and burdens of proof with the help of
the disutility calculus; the evidentiary values (uncertainty, understood as
probability, see below) of the different decision alternatives (e. g. guilty > <
not guilty) are compared to the expected disutilities of possibly wrongful
decisions in either direction.
Normativism tends to decide questions about interpretation with the help
of more or less binding norms . What it is not capable of, is to express or
evaluate the matters of degree involved in a manner that can be gauged
and/or compared. One example. Modern normativism says that legal princi-
ples belong to the sources of law. They are optimization commands:
(a) you should, whenever possible, pursue them;
(b) you should, if possible, achieve all of them, but:
(c) if it is not possible, you should make a choice or weighting between
them.
I think that there is no big discrepancy between normativism and deci-
sion theory. After all, norm-reasoning is capable of being translated to the
language of the decision theory, even if it may involve considerable diffi-
culties to assess argumentative weights, utilities and disutilities numerically
as the theory at least in principle presupposes. Legal principles - under-
stood as evaluative propositions - may also be used for gauging the suffi-
512 Hannu Tapani Klami

ciency of argumentative weight. This might seem puzzling, since legal prin-
ciples are often understood as sources of law proper. Legal principles are,
however, not a unitarian phenomenon. They can be:
(i) heuristic generalizations, expressions of the nature of rules in general,
such as the freedom of contract that is still allegedly the main rule in
spite of numerous exceptions;
(ii) justification rules meaning that overruling a principle calls for especial
justification;
(iii) optimization commands in the sense of Alexy & his kindred but even
here the goals may be different; decisions are, depending on the nature
of the relevant goals either objects for direct evaluative assessment, or
instrumental, i.e. means to achieve certain goals, and in the latter
instance the means => goals - relationships are at least in principle
subject to empirical verification or falsification. But how often are
these empirical "tests" undertaken - apart fro mere speculation?
Atiyah & Summers 14 speak about two conceptions of rules in the U.K.
and U.S. The American rules are more flexible and one tends to apply the
maxim cessante ratione cessât ipsa lex. When rules are conceived essen-
tially as instruments - as means to sound goals - the interpreters will read-
ily "engage in wide-ranging inquiry behind the rules to satisfy themselves
as to what the goals are": the goals are "the very substantive reasons and
rationales of these rules". Here, however, the problem begins. It is much
easier to learn what the goals are than to reach certainty about the actual
means => goals - relationships. "Where the reason stops, stops the rules" -
but where does the reason stop and how to proceed then? If the norms are
understood in this manner, there is no much difference between them and
optimization commands ("principles"): you should do your best to under-
stand and apply the norms/principles in the goal-rational manner - if possi-
ble.

2. Evidentiary Problems

Factfinding is an important element in legal decision-making. It is sub-

ject to uncertainty in individual cases; moreover, uncertainty is also
reflected in judicial practice at the macro-level, since it is possible that
norms do not function in the optimal manner, if there are evidentiary prob-
lems that are "solved" in a manner that involves wrongful decisions. One
possible reason is here the resorting to schematic rules about the burden of
proof.

14
Atiyah & Summers 1987 p. 88 et seq.
 Cosmos and Chaos in Law and Legal Theory 513

For a variety of reasons one does not know for sure in contested cases,
what the truth is. These reasons will not be analysed in this essay. I just
state that they include very different phenomena, starting from the unrelia-
bility of human senses, memory, reproduction - and conscious lying - to
problems about scientific investigation. Access to information is by no
means socially neutral, and for this reason evidentiary problems may make
decision practices biased.

Moreover, the precise content of the truth and the possibility to reveal it
in litigation depend partly upon the interpretations chosen. Factfinding aims
at facts that according to the norms - as they are interpreted - are relevant
as the legal conditions for a certain legal consequence. To take an exam-
ple: X is protected against the vindication of ownership, provided that he
had been in good faith when acquiring the title. If this understood as mean-
ing "pure" good faith, i.e. what X has actually known or not, the decision
depends solely upon the possibility to get information about his mind, and
it is well-known that access to such information is actually by no means
easy. If one, however, interprets the lack of "good faith" so that it
embraces what X knew or should have realized , the situation changes, irre-
spective of what X actually knew, one might - under certain external cir-
cumstances - impose upon him an obligation to know or understand.
Imposing such an obligation is a combination - an intertwinement - of
factfinding and normative reasoning, and the resulting judicial truth is also
normatively coloured and not truth in the scientific, posivistic meaning.

Evidentiary problems may be used as arguments in interpretation prob-

lems, too. A per se possible or even plausible interpretation may be
rejected, because it would involve evidence about facts that cannot be
settled or more generally: an interpretation that leads to factual uncertainty
and the ensuing application of the burden of proof rules is not necessarily
the best one, if there are alternative interpretations that pose less difficult
questions of fact.

One is often using probabilistic models to cope with evidential uncer-

tainty. This can be justified from the theoretical point of view in different
manners (fictitious betting, etc.), but I think that the problem is utterly prac-
tical: one translates uncertainty - that is not exactly known - to the terms
of calculable risk, thus creating the impression that uncertainty were a cal-
culated risk.

If one knows for sure that there are in the box 50/25/25 black, red and
white balls, respectively, the probability of getting a certain colour can be
exactly calculated before and after each pick-up. If we, however, have only
an estimate about the total and the distribution of the colours, e. g.
34 FS Aarnio
514 Hannu Tapani Klami

total« 100
~40-50ß
«20-25 R
« 20 - 25 W

there are different possibilities open, e.g. (a) to disregard the uncertainty
altogether and operate with the figures 50-25-25 as if they were exactly
known, or (b) to operate with the estimated minimum values 40-20-20 and
leave the residual, i.e. « 20, as the twilight zone of uncertainty whose dis-
tribution between Β, R and W is at least for the time being unknown or (c)
to operate with variances (or fuzzy sets) regarding each colour.
When dealing with evidentiary problems we are - apart from exact scien-
tific evidence of the paternity type where even the error margins are
exactly known - operating with uncertainty, and the probabilistic "risk"-
transformations of this uncertainty are estimates rough indeed. For this
reason it is better to observe caution than to transform the whole uncer-
tainty to probabilities as if it were a risk. 15 On the other hand, operating
with fuzzy sets involves mathematical problems of such a magnitude that it
would hardly be advisable to use any estimates of the variances. Therefore
the best solution to my mind is to operate with the estimated minimum
values and let the residual remain a twilight zone - whose attribution to the
different decision alternatives is in the last analysis a matter of decision
strategy (e. g. the benefit of doubt adopted in most Western legal cultures
for criminal cases).
The normativist answer to questions of evidentiary uncertainty has been
the use of rules about the burden or proof - presumptions are also a spe-
cial type of such rules. Their basic idea is the following:
" I f there is no sufficient certainty about the fact F, you (a) either may conclude
or (b) should conclude: non-F."

There is a teleological reasoning behind these rules, too: one has referred
to the normal course of life and status quo as grounds for the burden of
proof; moreover, one has spoken about the evidentiary possibilities and
resources of the parties as giving rise to an obligation to prove something.
The goals of the substantive law play a certain role, too, but one should not

15
Another reason for observing caution is the following. One cannot always use
the negation axiom of traditional statistics P(T) = 1 — P(non-F), since the uncer-
tainty involved in our defective knowledge about the conditions and general laws,
transformed to the estimated probability of T, does not necessarily entail inferences
as to ηοη-Γ. Weak evidence of guilt is no strong evidence on innocence, although it
is understood in this manner on grounds of the norm about the benefit of doubt. But
this is not an epistemologica! issue.
 Cosmos and Chaos in Law and Legal Theory 515

forget that the burden of proof also involves taking stance into "decision
risk", i. e. the incidence of the socioeconomic costs involved in possibly
faulty decisions in either direction, i.e. decision errors that are due to evi-
dentiary uncertainty.
Here, however, the crucial criterion is that of sufficient certainty, i.e. the
standard of proof Is it solely a matter of the subjective, personal convic-
tion of the factfinder, or are there some objective criteria? If it is only the
personal intuition that counts, the burden of proof rules are rather empty as
rules. "Do what you think is right." This is no longer any norm.
If one, on the other hand, is not satisfied with this kind of subjectivism,
there are hardly any other criteria than the degree of uncertainty - perhaps
transformed into probability (risk) - and its acceptability from the point of
view of decision risk, i.e. the risk for a faulty decision in either direction
and the disutilities involved. But one is then in fact performing goal-rea-
soning (see above) and no longer applying the burden of proof rule. 16 And
I think that it is reasonable to refrain from applying the normativistic
approach to truth - or to uncertainty about truth.

I V . Concluding Remarks

We have seen that norms and norm-reasoning will fail when one is deal-
ing with the chaos element inherent in legal decision-making. But this does
not mean that decision-making becomes utterly irrational, if one admits that
norms have their functional limits and attempts at surpassing these limits
involve illusions - and irrationality, i.e. exactly what one wants to avoid by
resorting to norms. The method to be employed is the application of goal-
reasoning, but it need not be uncontrollable and arbitrary; the application of
probabilistic models and decision-theory provide for criteria for controlling
decisions and interpretations. Admittedly there are leeways but this is not
necessarily a mere chaos instead of the cosmos one is looking for.
My suggestion is that one has at a certain point to change the method, to
reject the law and the norms, and reason - as an experienced Finnish judge
used to say "forget all the norms and reason as reasonable men use to do".
This change of method is well-known in all sciences. In medicine one
moves over from conservative treatment to surgery, i. e. operations with the
more or less calculable risks involved. A famous Finnish surgeon, Professor
Ali Krogius, said, however: "It is far more easy to operate than not to." For
exactly the same reason it is far more easy to recommend at the general

16
See Hannu Tapani Klami & Minna Hatakka & Johanna Kastinen, Burden of
Proof - Law or Truth, Scandinavian Studies in Law 1990 p. 117 et seq.; Minna
Hatakka, Beweismaß und Irrtumsrisiko, Uppsala 1995, esp. p. 196 et seq.

34*
516 Hannu Tapani Klami

level the use of direct goal-reasoning than to say exactly where the limits
of normativism have in casu been surpassed and the underlying goals have
to be tackled with the razor of Occam - or the guillotine of Hume.

Summary

Legal norms do not produce solutions to all problems involved in legal

decision-making. There is much uncertainty left after the application of
norms, even if one should take the legal principles and metanorms about
the application of norms into account and use weakly obligatory norms
about the priority and weight of arguments, since at least the following
problems will remain: (1) problems about the socioeconomic impact of
decisions (decision-alternatives), if the decisions are understood as facts to
be evaluated from the point of view of values and/or means => goals re-
lationships (2) evidence: the application of more or less settled law to facts.
The answer is to depart - at some stage of decision-making - from the
normativistic ideal and to resort to goal-reasoning, involving the use of
probabilistic models to cope with uncertainty and decision-theory to make
goal-reasoning as stringent and rational as possible, even if there are certain
limits.
 VALUES, INTENTIONS, OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES:
SOME FALLACIES ABOUT STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

By Geoffrey Marshall, Oxford

Contested issues in the practice of statutory interpretation are often

described in such terms as "liberal" versus "literal" construction or "pur-
posive" versus "textual" interpretation. Such interpretive practices are often
attacked or defended by appeals to more general underlying values that
appear in political, constitutional or juristic theory. It seems likely that
there will be at least some relationships between theory and practice,
because interpreting statutes is an example of adjudication and an aspect of
judicial behaviour. So theories about the nature of the judicial role in gen-
eral and law in general and adjudication in general seem bound to have
some bearing on interpretive practice. It is a point worth bearing in mind,
though, that interpreting statutes is only one form of adjudication or judi-
cial behaviour. There are many others - for example, common law applica-
tion of precedent, judicial review of legislative or administrative action, ori-
ginal and appellate jurisdiction and constitutional interpretation. The experi-
ence of the United States in particular shows that there may be important
differences between political and judicial approaches to constitutional, as
compared with statutory, interpretation, especially in relation to the uses of
historical, teleological and linguistic arguments. We should perhaps then
ask amongst other things whether there are any general differences between
constitutional law and ordinary statute, and also between primary and sub-
ordinate legislation, or between public and private law, that might justify
different interpretive attitudes. Distinctions between different kinds of law
may be significant and the study of interpretive tasks may need to be
broken up into different categories. There is a danger of considering inter-
pretation at too general or abstract a level. That tendency is already present
because interpretation is a term of wide import and now is a subject of
contention in a number of disciplines besides law - for example, in history,
theology, literary theory, sociology and cultural chatter of all kinds. Some
believe that comparative insights or interpretive inspiration can be obtained
from analogies between the interpretation of literary texts and legal inter-
pretation. But we may wonder if making sense of Dickens or Dostoevsky
or Dworkin is much the same as making sense of the French Assembly or
518 Geoffrey Marshall

The Queen in Parliament. Of course, the whole of life is a text to some

theorists, and it is true that there are some things true of texts that are true
of life. You can turn over a new leaf and you can keep right on to the end.
Some things are different, though. You can't start all over again or read in
either direction. It is just possible that there is some substance in these ana-
logies. Perhaps they contain a little flesh, a lot of fish and some red her-
ring. But for now I leave this kind of theorising to one side.
Philosophical theory about meaning and communication in general is a
more plausible source of useful ideas about the interpretation of legal
instruments. Those who incline to a speaker's intention theory of meaning
may be more disposed to support appeals to the intentions and purposes of
legislators as aids to statutory construction. But a gap remains between the
notion of communication in general and that form of communication that
arises between legislators, adjudicators and citizens. The gap is one that
needs a constitutional theory of some kind to fill it.

I. Theories and Values

The kind of political and constitutional theory that bears most closely on
statutory interpretation is obviously that which describes or prescribes the
powers of, and relationships between, the branches of government and the
sources of, and limitations placed upon, law-making bodies. Nevertheless,
many confusing or false claims have been made about the implications of
such theories. For example, some writers have suggested that a theory of
legislative sovereignty favours or accounts for a literal emphasis on the
words of legislation, on the ground that it implies an obligation to pay heed
to the exact wishes of the sovereign commander or law-maker. The sover-
eignty doctrine on this view implies subordination of adjudicators to law-
makers, whereas a separation of powers system implies a coordinate status
with different obligations. But this argument is unconvincing. Thomas
Hobbes, the father of sovereignty theory, thought that it implied not literal
interpretation but investigation to find the true intendment or intention of
the law-giver1 so perhaps sovereignty doctrine solves nothing. Nor does the
separation of powers notion that the judiciary is a coordinate body. That
body has still to determine for itself what is implied by its coordinate role.
In any event constitutional subordination is itself an unclear idea. When, in
a constitution that embodies an unrestricted legislative power, judges are
subject to the orders of the legislature, they are not thereby made subordi-
nate to legislators or to their unenacted intentions. Nor does political
democracy imply that there is any duty to give effect to the wishes or

1
Leviathan , "It is not the letter but the intendment or meaning ... in which the
nature of the law consistetti". Everyman Edition, p. 146.
 Values, Intentions, Objectives and Purposes 519

intentions of legislators as persons. What democracy in its modern form

implies is an obligation to give effect to what the legislature (acting within
its jurisdictional limits, if any) has enacted. Citizens, in other words, are
entitled to regulate their affairs by what the legislature has said or enacted
into law, rather than by what it meant to say or enact into law - even in
those cases where the legislature intended to enact something in particular.
Where, as in a great many cases, the legislature has no actual intention, or
in using indeterminate words has never contemplated the issue in question
at all, neither democracy nor sovereignty supplies any reason why adjudica-
tors or citizens should be governed by the provisions that the legislators
would have made if they had thought about it. There are, however, conclu-
sions that can be derived from the differences between constitutional sys-
tems and this may give us a reason for thinking that there are no definitve
answers to the classic dilemmas of statutory interpretation (except for those
who believe in a single Imperial or Herculean system of adjudication rather
than a positivist, pluralist luxury of free choice as to interpretive doctrine).
Consider, for example, Interpretation Acts and what can be achieved by
them. Where a constitutional system contains a legislature not subject to
limitations on its powers it can presumably use Interpretation Acts not
merely to give binding definitions to particular words, but also, if it
chooses, to prescribe favoured methods of interpretation or recipes for the
resolution of adjudicative uncertainty. It can say that legislative materials
are admissible or inadmissible. It could say, if it wished, that in a particular
class of case difficulties of interpretation are to be resolved by asking the
opinion of the prime minister. But in political systems that embody consti-
tutional limitations an Interpretation Act passed by the legislature could not
finally determine either the nature of the judicial function or even, in every
case, the definition of words in its own statutes. The British Parliament (at
least in matters falling outside the ambit of European Community legisla-
tion) could define the word "person" to mean "British citizen not subscrib-
ing to the tenets of the Roman Catholic faith". But the American Congress
or the Canadian Parliament could not act in a similar way, since such a
definition would raise issues of due process and equal protection on which
the legislature cannot have the last word.

II. Textualism and Legislative Intention

As an example of the relevance of constitutional arrangements to doc-

trines about interpretation one might take the issue described in recent
times in the United States as "Textualism". Justice Scalia, in particular, has
commended a return to a textual approach as against an undue reliance on
legislative history. Textualism is sometimes attacked as a formalistic or lit-
eralist approach to interpretation. But this is a mistake. Scalia's restrictiv-
520 Geoffrey Marshall

ism is solely that of confining interpretive activity to the text and context
of the statute rather than the history of its making. Consistently with that,
an interpreter may be as informal or creative as he likes with the text. Sup-
porters of textualism might well claim that it is a search for original inten-
tion by the statute's creators that is formalist if anything is.
Some of the constitutional arguments advanced in support of the textual-
ist approach do not, however, seem to carry much conviction. Giving deci-
sive effect to legislative history, Justice Scalia has argued, offends the
separation of powers principle and allows Congress to control the judiciary.
On the other hand, it is argued, reliance upon the text deters the judiciary
from imposing their own values on the legislature and the citizens. These
arguments sound both unpersuasive and potentially contradictory. Legisla-
tive history is simply information about the alleged intention of the legisla-
ture and it can hardly be said to control anybody. Moreover, if imposing
judicial values on the legislature and citizens means judicial adoption of
some personal preference, any interpretive rule or procedure would be suf-
ficient to avoid it and not just textual interpretation.
There may, however, be better arguments that are relevant to the debate
about legislative history. It has been said in the United States that resort to
legislative history must elevate the view of some sub-group of legislators
over the enacted wishes of Congress as a whole. Legislatures, of course,
differ in their structure, being in different cases unicameral, bicameral or
tripartite. There may be both legal and political differences of view about
whose wishes or intentions carry greater authority. In the United States, for
example, legislation cannot be carried without the participation of the Presi-
dent, but his veto may be overruled and Article 1 Section 1 makes it clear
that he is not a part of the legislature. His disagreement with either House
might be thought to leave his view less authoritative than theirs. In the
United Kingdom, on the other hand, Parliament is tripartite. The Queen's
views and assent to legislation are, legally speaking, as authoritative as
those of the members of the two chambers of Parliament. Politically, but
not legally, the views of the upper chamber carry less weight than those of
the lower House (though that is not true in every bicameral legislature).
But how do the views of backbenchers stand in relation to those of the
government? And can anyone's views be decisive when legislation is the
work of all of them?
The strongest argument against reliance on legislative history (apart from
its expense and inconclusiveness) is perhaps a rule of law or constitutional-
ist argument. Generally speaking, legislative history is inaccessible to citi-
zens to whom the law applies. Frequently, it is highly inaccessible and to
be found in the proceedings of legislative committees or inter-governmental
bodies distant in time and place. That may be used to found a presumption
 Values, Intentions, Objectives and Purposes 521

that non-technical words should be assumed to have the meaning that a

competent and instructed user of the language would give them on the
basis of what is in the statute and its immediate context. In a case in the
United Kingdom in 1992 (Adatia v. Air Canada 2) it was necessary to
decide whether a passenger who had just left an aircraft was injured in the
course of disembarking from it. The relevant statute had been passed to
give effect to words in the Warsaw Convention of 1929. But both the Brit-
ish and the American courts3 have said that the words should be given their
ordinary meaning, whatever that turns out to be. Whether someone who is
being conducted through an airport in a wheelchair pushed by an airline
employee is in the course of disembarking from an aircraft is a difficult
question for ordinary language to grapple with, but it seems better to settle
the issue by an appeal to it than by searching the proceedings of a sub-
committee of an international body meeting sixty odd years ago, or even
picking over the dubiously relevant opinions of legislators.
Constitutional principles of many different kinds obviously have a bear-
ing on interpretive results. For example, legislators are presumed not to
have legislated retrospectively, or so as to violate international law or con-
vention, or to give legislation extra-territorial effect, or to reverse the pre-
sumption of innocence in criminal cases. But there is also a presumption
that is generally unstated but constitutionally necessary - namely, the pre-
sumption or principle that the purposes or objects of a statute are to be
implemented by means that fall within the ambit of the terms embodied in
the statute, and (equally important) that its objects are not to be implement-
ed in ways that fall outside the terms of the statute. Thus, every statute,
whatever its other objects or purposes, has the object of giving proper
effect to the language it has chosen to use. By acknowledging this principle
an interpreter may avoid some common forms of misapplication of the
notion of statutory purpose - such, for example, as the supposition, often
made, that because a statute has as its stated objective the suppression of a
particular mischief, a wider or more extensive interpretation of the statute
will promote its purposes to a greater degree than the narrower one. Similar
confusion is often seen in talk about constitutional interpretation, when it is
said that constitutional guarantees should be given a generous or purposive
interpretation that best promotes its objectives. But the interpretation of a
constitution, as of a statute, should be correct not generous. Its object or

2
The Times, 4 June 1992 (Court of Appeal).
3
Day v. TransWorld Airlines Inc. (528 F.2d. 31. (1975)). It is possible that
these cases would now be decided differently in the United Kingdom since the la-
mentable decision of the House of Lords in Pepper v. Hart [1993] A.C. 593, estab-
lishing a restricted admissibility of legislative materials as an aid to construction.
522 Geoffrey Marshall

purpose is to cover what it covers and not to cover what it, properly inter-
preted, does not cover. When the issue is what precisely it does cover, gen-
erosity is not to the point and provides no guideline.

I I I . The Purpose or Object of Legislation

Indeed the proposition that words should be interpreted in the light of stat-
utory purpose is one that needs particularly careful scrutiny. It would be
wrong to say that appeal to purpose could never be of any assistance. If we
accept that it is the presumed object of a statute not to contain inconsistency
or to bring about a state of affairs that is clearly unjust or inequitable, we can
imagine that there might be words in a statute so inconsistent or so unfair in
their impact that they would unequivocally conflict with those purposes and
require some alternative sense to be attributed to them. A statute's preamble
or enacting words might also define its objectives in so precise a way that it
could be clear that the words used in a particular section were inconsistent
with that precisely stated objective. However, in the great majority of cases
the relations between alleged general purposes of the statute and particular
words will not be of this kind. Then the appeal to purpose may be unhelpful
for a number of reasons. Three of them are, first, the possible confusion of
promoters' purpose and legislative purpose; secondly, the co-existence of a
multiplicity of potentially conflicting purposes and thirdly, the possible con-
fusions between general or ultimate legislative purpose and the terms of its
immediate implementation. For example:
(1) Many statutes are enacted as the result of a political contestation in
which there is a conflict of purposes or an overlapping set of wider and
narrower purposes. Disputes may arise because it may be unclear how far
the objectives of the statute's proponents, both in and out of the legislature,
have been embodied in the legislation. This frequently happens in the field
of sex or race discrimination law, or in the regulation of industrial rela-
tions. There may be a strong inclination on the part of the law's original
supporters to argue that judicial decisions in particular cases, when they fail
to find discrimination or to decide in favour of those for whom the legisla-
tion was promoted, have frustrated or ignored the purpose and object of the
legislation. But the general original purpose of the legislation is not conclu-
sive when the issue is whether particular means of furthering it have or
have not been embodied in it, or whether a particular complaint or allega-
tion is justified under the terms of the statute. The purpose of a statute
enacted to prohibit unfair dismissal is not automatically frustrated whenever
a court or tribunal finds dismissal not to have been unfair.
(2) Many acts contain within their provisions obvious compromises
between different purposes - for example, between those of landlords and
 Values, Intentions, Objectives and Purposes 523

tenants, or between debtors and creditors, or between the interests of press

freedom and national security. So the general purpose of the legislation can
only be stated as being to strike a fair balance between the two - to protect
tenants without creating unfairness to property owners, or to avoid censor-
ship but not so as to endanger the public interest. If, as is likely, disputes
arising under the legislation stem from conflicts between the competing
interests, appeal to those statutory purposes will not settle the disputes.
(3) Legislation, particularly of a regulatory or penal kind, may superfi-
cially have a single stated or obvious objective. The purpose of road traffic
regulation is to promote road safety. The object of mine safety laws is to
promote safety in mines. Nevertheless, these are only abbreviated state-
ments of the statutory purpose, which is not to promote the stated objec-
tives in any and every way whatsoever, but to promote them by the means
and through the words set out in the statute and not to promote them in any
other way. It is just as much an object of a penal statute not to convict
those who do not fall within its provisions as to convict those who do. So
if the issue is whether particular persons or circumstances do or do not fall
outside the statute's objects, the statutory purpose will not resolve the issue
and appeal to it is empty or tendentious. The purpose of rules is, amongst
other things, to be applied to whatever the competent informed language
user would apply them to.
The idea that statutes are aimed at and should be interpreted by appeal to
the usage of competent, informed language users is sometimes tagged a
literal or semantic or linguistic or formalistic approach. But linguistic argu-
ment needs to be rescued from an overdose association with merely literal
argument4 - as if linguistic argument were only about grammar or syntax,
rather than about the skilled and appropriate use of language. Competent
language users do not sever language from its context. To quote another
recent English judgement "words derive colour from the act (and therefore
the systemic context) in which they are used". So words such as "posses-
sion of a firearm" might mean something different in a licensing statute
and in a provision about armed robbery. 5 Arguments about statutory inter-
pretation should obviously not operate with an impoverished view of what
an appeal to language entails. But, alas, they frequently do.

4
On the difference between "literal" and "ordinary" meaning see Robert S. Sum-
mers and Geoffrey Marshall , "The Argument from Ordinary Meaning in Statutory
Interpretation". 43, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 213 (1992).
5
See R. v. Paul Licki; R. v. Swindell [1992] 1 W.L.R. 827 (1992). The question
here turned on whether a person charged with armed robbery could be said to "have
with him a firearm" when the gun was not carried on his person, but in a vehicle
fifty yards from the scene of the alleged offence. It was held that the defendant did
have a firearm with him.
 RIGHTS AND TOLERANCE

By Rodolfo Vazquez,1 México

In March 1991, The Criminal Court in Paris sentenced Aramata Keita to a

five year imprisonment. She was a 47-year-old woman from Mali who had
mutilated the clitoris of six very young girls, daughters of Malians. Their
parents were sentenced to a three year imprisonment with stay of penalty
plus two years on probation. According to experts, between 85 and 100 mil-
lion women in Africa and the Middle East are excised. The district attorney
assessed the excision as "premeditated and deliberate crime, which should
be strongly condemned". The defense remarked that "excision, an injurious
act in France, is a beneficial act in Mali and befits a traditional custom ".
In September 1994, a 15-year-old boy died in Zaragoza, Spain, because of
the lack of medical treatment in an accelerated process of leukemia. His
parents, Jehovah's Witnesses, had refused, since the time he showed the
first symptoms, to follow medical advice that pressed for a blood transfu-
sion in order to begin treatment for the disease. The district attorney is
inquiring into the family to determine any criminal responsibility on the part
of the parents regarding the boy's death. The boy's father said he was sure
of the decision made according to his conviction , despite the price paid.2
On the 16th. of December 1984, on assembly convened by Mr. Floren-
tino Diaz Rangel, Mayor of Santa Maria de Taxicaringa, it was agreed to
hang and to burn in firewood Alejandro Barraza Sosa and Matilde Diaz
Rangel, who devoted themselves to the practise of witchcraft. The decision
sought to free the tepehuana community from the witch doctors, pointed
out as pernicious by the people. On December 19, the sentence was carried
out in the terms agreed, with the participation of around ten members of
the parish. The event was reported to the capital city of the state of Dur-
ango and the persons involved, who narrated the facts supporting the deci-
sion of their traditonal authorities , were arrested.3

1
I am very grateful to my good friend Marcela Cinta for the translation of this
paper.
2
I quote both cases from the anthology of texts prepared by Esther Charabati
and Gerardo Mendive edited under the title: De la tolerancia a la convivencia soli-
daria, Mexico, 1995, pp. F - l and F-17.
3
See Walter Beller Taboada et al., Las costumbres juridicas de los indigenas en
México, Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, México, 1994, p. 90.
526 Rodolfo Vazquez

On September 25, 1992, the local Desar rollo Integral de la Familia

(DIF) handed to the Department of the Public Prosecutor the case of a
ten-year-old huichol girl who declared having been raped by her step-
father. The 34-year-old mother assured that she now has another husband
with whom she procreated four children. She denies the raping of her
daughter by her husband, but if that were the case, she is willing to for-
give him because, among "us huicholes, that is common since the parents
may live with their children. Besides, if my husband were imprisoned,
who's going to support my children ...?" In defense, the accused 27-
year-old man claims: "If it were true, as the judicial police act states
(992), since I don't remember whether we were celebrating the New Year
or Mother's Day, I got home with my wife and I hugged the girl and
took off her panties and made love to her (...) and after we made love,
she went into the house crying and my wife was sleeping and my wife is
her mother; the following day I told her what had happened, but I also
told her that when the girl grew up I would marry her so she could be
my wife, and she told me it was O.K. because that is common among us
(...) But I repeat that that is our custom , since we may have one, two or
three wives."4
In these four cases, the common factor is that we are concerned with
minority groups that assert their habits and traditions as a justification to
their conduct. Also, such customs and traditions clash with the ethical and
legal norms of constitutionally democratic States. Most certainly, this con-
flict of values or of rights, whatever we call them, must be settled.

The contemporary debate on what is nowadays known as the problem of

multiculturalism oscillates between two ethically indefensible extremes:
either the indiscriminating integration or the unfailing tolerance of the cus-
toms of minority groups. Luis Villoro has made this antinomy clear, regard-
ing the Mexican case, in the following terms:
.. on the one hand, we have the recognition of political sovereignty to the
native communities, that which would assume the dissolution of the national
State; on the other, the integration by force of minority cultures to the national
hegemonic culture. Both positions tend to the same point: the destruction of
minority cultures; the first one, because it leaves them isolated and defenseless,
the second one, because it disintegrates them.
The solution of the antinomy cannot be found in either extreme. The acceptance
of the multiplicity of peoples, without a common nucleus, implies the destruction
of the State; the imposition of the unity with no respect toward diversity leads to
an oppressive State. The solution can only be found in the form of a synthesis
between unity and multiplicity. Between the breaking of the existing political
association and its upkeeping by coercion, a third means is possible: the transfor-

4
Ibid., p. 92.
 Rights and Tolerance 527

mation of the political association from being the imposition of one of the parts
to being the result of a consensus among autonomous individuals." 5

As a matter of fact, the debate should not be stated in terms of "ethnic

clean-up" or "separation in ghettos" even though, unfortunately, there is no
lack of historical examples close or contemporary to both of them. The
proposals should rather be placed in that intermediate area which assumes
the real recognition of minorities and the possibility of a consensus among
the parts. Stating it in terms of human rights, it is not a question of uphold-
ing an absolute incompatibility between the so-called liberal rights and
cultural rights. Therefore, neither the libertarian positions such as Robert
Nozick' s, which deny, without further ado, the social and cultural rights for
the sake of the negative freedom of the individuals, nor extreme equalitar-
ian positions such as Duncan Kennedy's and the Critical Legal, which,
under the slogan "Right is Politics" demand an anti-normativism in which
impulses and desires, especially those of the oppressed minorities, should
prevail over the presumed universality of liberal rights.
Once the extremes are rejected, the contemporary positions move around
what Paolo Comanducci calls the relative incompatibility among values or
rights according to which there are criteria to solve the antinomies without
needing to deny the acknowledgement of some of them. These positions
suggest a kind of hierarchization among the different kinds of rights that
can be grouped in two great categories: one which builds a hierarchy in
decreasing order going from liberal to cultural rights, and the opposite one
which builds a hierarchy in a rising order. 6 In other words, either the su-
premacy of liberal rights over cultural ones or the supremacy of these ones
over the first ones.
In the following pages I intend: I. to critically review some theoretical
proposals that bestow ethical priority to the cultural community over the
individual; and II. to justify my preference for a liberal conception of the
moral person and to offer a couple of arguments in favor of the primacy of
liberal rights over cultural ones. I shall conclude saying that a multicultural
society is possible if based on the unconditional implementation of the
rights derived from the principle of personal autonomy and that the claim
to impartiality and universality of such rights is the best criterion we have
for a healthy coexistence among cultures.

5
Luis Villoro, "Sobre derechos humanos y derechos de los pueblos" in Isonomia.
Revista de Teoria y Filosofia del Derecho, no. 3, ITAM-Fontamara, Mexico, Octo-
ber 1995, p. 9.
6
See Paolo Comanducci, "Derechos humanos y minorias: un acercamiento anali-
tico neoilustrado" in Isonomia ... Op. cit., p. 29.
528 Rodolfo Vazquez

Ι.

Since the mid-seventies, we have seen the development of the so-called

communitarianism which largely centers its criticism on liberalism and, in
a special way, on the egalitarian liberalism of authors such as John Rawls,
the Rawls of A Theory of Justice . Philosophers such as Charles Taylor,
Michael Sandel, Alasdair Maclntyre and Michael Walzer, who form the
core body of communitarianism, agree in denouncing the crude and non-
historical concept of the individual bestowed with rights considered pre-
vious to his social and political environment. Such liberalism is accused of
being responsible for the destruction of community values - solidarity,
patriotism, fraternity and, in general, civic values - and, therefore, for the
weakening of public life. The change produced by this liberal conception
has been, in the words of Sandel:
"from a public philosophy of common purposes to one of fair procedures, from a
politics of good to a politics of right, from the national republic to the procedural
republic" 7

From an ethical-political point of view, communitarianism adopts an integ-

ristic attitude opposed to the conception of liberal tolerance. In the words
of Dworkin:
"Liberalism, according to many of its critics, presupposes a sharp distinction
between people's own welfare or well being and the well-being of the political
community to which they belong ... It claims that the lines of individual people
and that of their community are integrated, and that the critical success of any
one of their lives is an aspect of, and so is dpendent on, the goodness of the
community as a whole" 8

It is true that this communitarian criticism - which I have no desire to

specifically deal with right now - has found an echo within the liberals
beginning with Dworkin himself but, as Nino states, the defense of the
Kantian standing has been surprisingly weak and, in some cases, has even
made a clear withdrawal.9 This withdrawal by the liberals was started by
Rawls himself and can also be seen in another champion of liberalism,
Thomas Nagel.
In his essay, "The Law of Peoples", John Rawls leans on his concept of
"overlapping consensus" in order to defend the compatibility of a non-lib-
eral society with a liberal one, if the following requirements are met:
7
Michael Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self', in
Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, Communitarianism and Individualism, Oxford
University Press, 1992, pp. 26 - 27.
8
Ronald Dworkin, "Liberal Community", in Shlomo Avineri ... Op. cit., p. 207.
9
See Carlos S. Nino, Etica y derechos humanos, Ed. Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1989
(second edition, lengthened and revised), pp. 142 et.seq.
 Rights and Tolerance 529

1. that it be pacific and not expansionist; 2. that its legal system satisfy
certain requirements of legitimacy in the eyes of its own people; and
3. that, as a result of the above, basic human rights be respected. According
to Rawls, a society that satisfies these requirements is a "well-ordered hier-
archical society". Rawls thinks that in these societies:
" . . . individuals do not have the right of free speech as in a liberal society; but as
members of associations and corporate bodies they have the right at some point
in the process of consultation to express political dissent and the government has
an obligation to take their dissent seriously and to give a conscientious r e p l y " 1 0

It is hard for me to accept the compatibility between both societies, as

Rawls claims, if, on one side, we start from a relativization of the princi-
ples of justice and from a confusion between legitimization and legiti-
macy11 and, on the other, the weakening of the principle of personal auton-
omy limits freedom of expression and gives way to openly corporative
schemes. Rawls' proposal is not far from that of Michael Walzer for whom
the question of social justice has to do with the distribution of goods with
specific social significance for each kind of society. The problem is that the
logic of his arguments leads him to end up with the following conclusion,
also applicable to Rawls:
"There is no doubt that justice is better than tyranny, but I have no way to deter-
mine if one just society is better than another just society. Is there, by any
chance, a specific notion (and with it a specific distribution) of the social goods
that is simply good?" 1 2

As far as he is concerned, in his book Equality and Partiality, Nagel

begins with the idea that there is a constant tension in our lives between
the objective point of view, the perspective from nowhere that means
impartiality and altruism, and the subjective point of view that takes into
account the particular circumstances of the individual. Nagel is skeptical
regarding the possibility of conceiving a morality that includes both agent-
neutral reasons and agent-relative reasons in order to overcome the tension
or conflict. Against the possibility of altruism, Nagel now maintains that:
10
John Rawls, "The Law of Peoples", in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (Ed.),
On Human Rights, Basic Books, New York, 1993, p. 62.
11
For the distinction between both concepts, see Ernesto Garzón Valdés, El con-
cepto de estabilidad de los sistemas politicos, Biblioteca de Ètica, Filosofia del De-
recho y Politica, No. 21, Ed. Fontamara, México, 1992, pp. 15 et. seq. Garzón
Valdés clearly distinguishes between legitimacy as moral justification of a political
system and legitimization which is the generalized acceptance of the system and of
its norms in agreement to what H. Hart calls "the internal point of view on the
norms". Rawls ends up by reducing the problem of legitimacy to a problem of
legitimization.
12
Michael Walzer, Las esferas de la justicia, Fondo de Cultura Econòmica,
Mexico, 1993, p. 322.

35 FS Aarnio
530 Rodolfo Vazquez

"Mere altruism, surprisingly enough, does not provide a common standpoint from
which everyone can reach the same conclusions - and that is the essence of the
contractarian or Kantian idea of legitimacy. Altruism by itself generates as many
conflicting standpoints as there are conceptions of the good". 1 3

Nagel no longer integrates the personal point of view with the perspec-
tive of impartiality because this impartiality is neither capable of becoming
universal nor objective and has little moral relevance if it is only consid-
ered from a procedural angle.
I think that Nagel's mistake, as that of many of the communitarians, is to
consider the autonomy and the dignity of the person, implicit in the idea of
impartiality required by moral discourse, as one more life project - that one
proposed by the democratic liberal societies - among other possible life
projects and not as the underlying and necessary principles for the materia-
lization of any possible life project. That which Kantian liberalism main-
tains is not a descriptionist conception of the moral person but a normativ-
ist one, that is, a conception not worried about the question: how are indi-
viduals themselves and in their communitarian relationships?, but about the
question: how should individuals be treated? To reproach liberals that they
have forgotten the concrete subject is to aim the criticism at a nonexistent
target.
Among those of us who politely criticize Ernesto Garzón Valdés regarding
his conception of social homogeneity, Luis Villoro takes as a starting point
the liberal proposal which says that in every voluntary political association
the conditions which make it possible should be accepted. These are:
"1. respect for the life of others, therefore, the satisfaction of necessary natural
needs for the preservation of that life; 2. acceptance of its autonomy, in the
double sense of acceptance of their capability to choose according to their own
values and their right to practice that choice; 3. acceptance of an equality of con-
ditions in the dialogue that leads to the agreement, which includes the acknowl-
edgement by each individual of the possibility that others make their decisions in
the light of their own goals and values; 4. at last, in order for those circum-
stances to be given, the absence of coercion among the parties is necessary."

It seems that these ideal conditions of the discourse cause no problem as

long as the individuals belong to the same cultural community. The prob-
lem arises when the same basic beliefs about goals and values are not
shared. We should then ask whether we should include, among such other
conditions, respect towards the cultural context precisely in order to guaran-
tee to the different cultural communities the autonomy that makes possible
the election of the individuals. Villoro's response is affirmative:

13
Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 164.
 Rights and Tolerance 531

"Basic rights include the right to the autonomy of the individual. But the person
is not an individual without attributes; he or she includes the conscience of his or
her own identity as a member of a community and this can only be given in a
cultural context. (...) Basic beliefs, which determine valid reasons, eligible goals
and attainable values, vary from one culture to the other. Therefore, respect for
the autonomy of the individuals includes respect for the cultural communities to
which they belong. The 'right of peoples' can only be considered among the fun-
damental human rights insofar as the 'people' is a condition for the autonomy of
the individual .. . " 1 4

The problem that I see in Villoro's proposal is precisely the ethical prior-
ity he grants, in his final analysis, all things considered, to the cultural con-
text over the Kantian principle of autonomy. If the cultural context of
choice is a primary good and is included among those which conform what
Garzón Valdés has called the coto vedado, 15 it would deserve, by that
reason alone, the same respect as the primary good of individual freedom
but then, what would happen if that one comes in conflict with this last
one? Respect for the cultural context of choice would require, for example,
the clitoris mutilation of the girls, the death of the Jehovah Witness boy,
the rape of the huichol girl and the burning of the tepehuan witch doctors.
Of course, Villoro would not accept these outcomes, but if the answer is
that these acts should not be allowed because they violate liberal rights,
then we must accept the supremacy of these ones over cultural rights and
we must settle very clear limits to tolerance.

II.

I believe that the philosophy which best fits the supremacy of liberal
rights over cultural ones is the one known, since Rawls' first writings, as
egalitarian liberalism. This philosophy keeps its distance not only from tra-
ditionalist and communitarian positions, but also within the same liberal
lines, vis à vis utilitarian and libertarian positions. Indeed, regarding these
last ones which also acknowledge the principle of personal autonomy, ega-
litarian liberalism presents itself as a third option that, on one hand, rejects
the holistic liberalism of the utilitarians, positioned toward the "increase of
the global autonomy of a group as if it took into account only one individ-
ual" and, on the other, rejects the conservative liberalism of the libertarians
which claims "that autonomy is shared spontaneously" and "leaves intact
the autonomy that each one seems to have reached (although it is illusory)
by his or her own means". In terms of Carlos Nino, egalitarian liberalism
tries:

14
Luis Villoro , Op. cit., pp. 10 et. seq.
15
See Ernesto Garzón Valdés, "Representación y democracia", in Derecho, Ètica
y Politica, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1993, pp. 641 et. seq.

35*
532 Rodolfo Vazquez

"to maximize the autonomy of each individual separately insofar it does not
imply putting other individuals in a position of less comparative autonomy." 1 6

As we can see, these words are a reformulation of Rawls' principle of

difference and emphasize the value of autonomy and the responsibility of
expanding the autonomy of those whose capacity to choose and to materia-
lize life projects is more restricted. If one begins with this principle in
order to portray liberalism, it becomes clear that it satisfactorily and fully
answers the claims usually made on the basis of egalitarian rights.
The claim against liberalism stating that it offends equality is based on
the idea that, facing the conflict between values of freedom and equality,
liberalism grants priority to the first ones, putting forward that the concept
of individual autonomy is antagonistic toward the demands of unwavering
support for the most needy.
The answer to this claim lies in showing that there is no conflict between
freedom and equality if one is aware that both values respond to different
but complementary structures. Freedom is substantive and its extension
does not depend on how it is distributed among different individuals, nor
does it include a priori a distribution criterion. On the other hand, equality
is in itself an attributive value regarding the distribution of some other
value. Equality is not valuable if it is not predicative of a situation or prop-
erty that is not in itself valuable. This suggests the possibility of a combina-
tion of both values: justice means an egalitarian distribution of freedom. Its
criterion is justifying the differences in autonomy only if the greater auton-
omy of some groups helps to increase the autonomy of the groups which
enjoy less autonomy, and does not produce any negative effect on these
groups.
This reformulation of the principle of difference entails, of course, the
need for special positive duties on the part of the State to favor the auton-
omy of the less autonomous and also the recognition of basic good compa-
tible with personal autonomy as long as it identifies with the state of affairs
and is a prerequisite for the materialization of freely chosen life projects.
If one accepts the above-mentioned position, liberalism shows that, far
from being an opponent of social and cultural rights, (such as the rights to
healthcare, to decent houses and salaries, to education, to access to cultural
heritage, etc.) these are a natural extension of individual rights. Therefore,
it would be inconsistent to acknowledge rights regarding life or physical
integrity and not to admit that they are infringed when the necessary steps
for their enjoyment and exercise are denied. Thus, liberalism opposes those
who maintain that negative rights are the only existing rights. Against this

16
Carlos S. Nino, Op. cit., pp. 344 - 345.
 Rights and Tolerance 533

position, egalitarian liberalism grants the same moral relevance to action as

to non-action in such a way that, according to its conception, rights are
infringed not only by positive actions but also by their omissions.
This general outline of egalitarian liberalism assumes a conception of the
moral person whose characteristics can be inferred from the same practice
of moral debate present in every voluntary political association:
1. Moral persons are made of their capacity to choose goals, to select
interests and to shape desires. It is obvious that, if the purpose of any dis-
course is to attain a consensus, one must assume that each participant is
capable of choosing the normative principles that will guide his or her
actions on the only basis of reasons given in the context of the same dis-
course. But maybe the most important thing to understand from the liberal
perspective is that such a capacity also implies the capacity to review and
finally abandon those goals, interests and desires. This means that the per-
sonal autonomy is not incompatible with community values as long as such
values are not imposed in an authoritarian way. Regarding this, Nino states:
" A liberal may and he really should value personal relationships with parents,
children and spouse, with his or her belonging to any community, with specific
traditions and, above all, with a way of life or life project which integrates all of
the above. But a liberal should value, even more, the freedom to select, modify
and eventually abandon a way of life or life project and all of its specific fea-
tures: in other words, a liberal cannot value all these relationships so much as to
value the imposition forced on them. Thus, a liberal cannot be a fanatic. He
needs to have his mind, in other words, divided between the engagement to speci-
fic projects and their evaluation, in order to determine whether he or she should
go on or abandon them." 1 7

2. Such a capacity to choose goals, select interests and shape desires is

previous to any other goal, interest or desire. This implies that when we
refer to interests or desires, we presume an individual to whom they belong
and that the identity of such an individual, the moral person, does not
change together with his goals, interests or desires.
3. This separation of the person from any goal, interest or desire also
allows to isolate him or her from the causal flow in which, as any empiri-
cal phenomenon, he or she is immersed. I reiterate that the conception of
the person whom liberalism pretends to characterize is not the one of the
empirical person submerged in a certain causal flow and subject to all the
social, historical and political happenings, but of the normative person for
whom the "moral point of view" should be assumed, which is no other
than that of impartiality.
17
Ibid., pp. 194- 195. I take the statement from the five characteristics of the
moral person given by Nino himself. Ibid., p. 172.
534 Rodolfo Vazquez

4. Persons are also separated from one another. This means that they
have separate systems of goals and interests and that they are the nucleus
of choice and decision making. From a moral point of view, philosophers
such as Rawls and Nozick have rightly insisted in the separation and inde-
pendence of the individual, among other things, to criticize utilitarianism,
at least, in its roughest version, which allows the individual to be sacrificed
for the benefit of the maximization of well-being.
5. As a consequence of the above, if a moral person has any meaning,
then anything formed by or from him or her cannot also be a moral person.
Specifically, collective entities are not moral persons. The conceptions that
ethically favor the community on top of the individual end up by accepting
a form of integrism by which the existence and the well-being of the indi-
viduals depend on the existence and well-being of the community to which
they belong. Ronald Dworkin rightly criticizes this form of integration
which he calls "metaphysical" because it ends up by succumbing to anthro-
pomorphism. The mataphysical integration suggests that such an integra-
tion:
"depends on a baroque metaphysics which holds that communities are fundamen-
tal entities in the universe and that individual human beings are onlu abstractions
or illusions". 1 8
That which is implicit in Dworkin's criticism is the idea that collective
entities - community, nation, people, state - do not have the attributes of
individuality, autonomy and dignity which characterize the moral person,
and to extrapolate them arbitrarily to collective entities is clearly an anthro-
pomorphization.
From this conception of the moral person, we can outline at least two argu-
ments which favor the superiority of liberal rights over cultural ones:
The argument of ethical individualism
According to this reasoning, and in a very condensed synthesis, individ-
uals have a higher value than the groups to which they belong. Further-
more, the groups have value only through and thanks to the individuals
who form them. Also regarding cultures: they have value as long as the
individuals who share them have value, and have no intrinsic value which
could allow them to be considered ideal or absolute as it seems to be
meant in the following statement of Bonfil Batalla: "The only civilization,
the only authentic cultures are those disclosed by the native peoples."19

18
Ronald Dworkin , Op. cit., pp. 208 - 210.
19
Guillermo Bonfil Batalla , Introduction to the compilation of documents Utopia
y revolución en el pensamiento politico contemporaneo de los indios en América
Latina, cf. in Ernesto Garzón Valdés , "El problema ètico de las minorias étnicas",
in Op. cit., p. 537.
 Rights and Tolerance 535

Beyond the romanticism implied in this sentence, every culture can and
should be modified or given up if it is no longer valuable for the individ-
uals. In this sense, David Gauthier is right when stating:
'The idea that ways of life have a right to survive - an idea expressed in that
extraordinary conception, cultural genocide - is a recent arrived on the moral
scene. It is also a thoroughly idea. Individuals matter; ways of life matter only as
expressing and nurturing human individuality". 2 0

That is why the best defense for cultural minorities is to overcome cul-
tural relativism and to confirm the individual as a moral agent. This does
not mean that cultural diversity should be ignored for the sake of the
unconditional value of progress, absurd from every point of view. The main
thing is to find principles which, in addition to respecting plurality, can be
shared by all agents. It means that those ones which destroy the moral qual-
ity of agents will not be accepted.21
From this perspective, cultural rights should not be ascribed to groups or
to the minority culture "as an object considered holistically endowed with
an intrinsic value." These rights should be discarded if they come in con-
flict with liberal rights as rights that should be granted to each individual
as a unique and distinct being. That is why I agree with Rodolfo Staven-
hagen when he states that:
"group or collective rights should be considered as human rights as long as their
acknowledgement and exercise foster, in turn, the individual rights of its mem-
bers." 2 2
In this same line of reasoning, Fernando Salmerón has recently proposed
a return to Kant, based on a polite criticism to Charles Taylor.
According to Salmerón's interpretation, to Taylor "the liberal trait of an
organization is not based on its neutrality vis à vis the life ideals of its
members, but on the way it behaves toward minorities and, above all, on
its respect for the fundamental rights of all". Taylor admits, after all, that
"there should be a distinction between fundamental freedom - what we call
human rights - which should not be hindered by any authority and the
immunities and privileges that could be restricted for reasons of public
policy, even though he admits that there is a diversity of goals which are
hard to distinguish, that cause tension and difficulties". However, Salmerón
goes on saying:
" . . . beyond the possible endemic trait of the conflicts accepted by Taylor, what is
at stake here is something more radical from an ethical perspective. To turn to

20
David Gauthier , Morals by Agreement, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 288.
21
See Ernesto Garzón V aidés, Op. cit., p. 538.
22
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Los derechos indigenas: algunos problemas concep-
tuales", in Isonomia ... Op. cit., p. 120.
536 Rodolfo Vazquez

fundamental rights - which are individual rights - as the limit that cannot be
surpassed for the sake of the rights of peoples, is a way of accepting, even if only
by democratic conviction, the negative end mentioned by Kant: the principle of
humanity as an end in itself. That is to say, in the extreme sense of personal
autonomy: of the human being as rational, self-governing will, not in need of the
consensus of humanity." 2 3

The return to Kant proposed by Salmerón means, then, the priority of the
principle of dignity over the priciple of identity; of a policy of equality
over a policy of difference; in short, of liberal rights over cultural ones.

A different problem, and undoubtedly an important one, is the way in

which this superiority of certain rights should assert itself. From a judicial
point of view, the inflexible application of the principle "ignorance of the
law is no defense" and the argument, for example, of inimputability to the
native, are not appropriate except when they can really be supported. At
this moment, the opinion of the work group coordinated by Walter Beller
Taboada seems to me accurate when it recommends as more suitable:
"to turn to the principle of the impossibility to know the extra-judicial status of
conduct presuming defensible or indefensible ignorance of the law. By "ignor-
ance of the law" we understand ignorance of the illegality of a conduct. Indefen-
sible ignorance might extenuate the punishment; defensible ignorance might be
exempt of responsibility". 24

The argument of impartiality

The reasoning of ethical individualism takes us to the second line of rea-
soning: that of impartiality. According to it, a metacriterion is needed in
order to solve the possible intercultural conflicts. If we want to avoid con-
frontation among cultures, it is necessary to assume a "moral point of
view" which, based on the recognition of cultural plurality, guarantees
mutual tolerance. This is the Kantian perspective of liberalism.
Now, the demand for pluralism and impartiality does not mean accepting
a distant and harsh perspective inconsistent with a responsible obligation to
the political and social life of the community. Rather, it demands a consen-
sus regarding the primary values required for the accomplishment of a
worthy human life. As John Kekes states:
" . . . pluralists appeal to the distinction between deep and variable conventions.
Deep conventions protect the minimum requirements of all good lives, however
they are conceived. Variable conventions also protect the requirements of good
lives, but these requirements vary with traditions and conceptions of a good life.

23
Fernando Salmerón, "Ètica y diversidad cultural", written for the volume of
Applied Ethics of the Enciclopedia Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Instituto de Filoso-
fia del CSIC, Madrid, 1996.
24
Walter Beller Taboada, et al., Op. cit., p. 106.
 Rights and Tolerance 537

The pluralistic claim is that the values protected by deep conventions have a con-
text - independent justification, while the values protected by variable conven-
tions may legitimately be prized in some contexts but not in others". 25

Primary goods or basic needs, as well as human rights, require "deep con-
ventions" in contrast to secondary needs or desires which require "variable
conventions". The first ones are not subject to negotiation; the second ones
are. A pluralism, understood this way, excludes the disagreement and the
conflict among individuals and groups; the starting point is a strong consen-
sus regarding basic goods but, at the same time, there is a wide scope for
disagreement, for dialogue and negotiation regarding the values that are sub-
ject to the contingency of the different cultural traditions. I think this dis-
tinction is a fundamental starting point for the debate on the problem of
multiculturalism. This debate takes us no farther if, on the basis of a mis-
understood pluralism, we believe that all cultures have equal value and that
all of them deserve the same respect. This is a false premise. Those cultures
which organize their way of life from a repeated violation of individual
rights do not have the same value than those in which their political organi-
zation and cultural life do not allow such violation or abuse of authority.
If we accept such a distinction and assume that respect toward individual
human rights is the best option to judge the legitimacy of cultural rights
and to guarantee impartiality, we should accept that the limit of tolerance is
set precisely by the respect to such rights. Its scope would then be reduced
to the one of derived conventions: to secondary needs or desires.
If by "tolerant" we understand the person who has the power to try to
suppress or prevent (or, at least, oppose or hinder) what is injurious to his
or her convictions, but refrains from doing so, that is to say, does not
forbid the injurious act, the evaluation not to intercede makes sense only if
it is tacitly allowed in the ruling system of the society in which the indi-
vidual lives. This means that, vis à vis a prohibition, a warrant or an
express permission from the judicial point of view, supported by individual
rights, there is no place for tolerance.26 It makes no sense at all to consider
the possibility of being tolerant toward minority groups which offend the
right to life, for example, of the tepehuan witch doctors or the physical
integrity of the huichol girl. The violation of their rights does not ask for
an abstention but for a firm intervention within the legal framework of a
constitutional democracy.
I thus arrive at an obvious but not insignificant conclusion: the stronger
the society in the validity of its rights and, among them, the superiority of
25
John Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 31.
26
See Annette Schmitt , "Las circunstancias de la tolerancia", in Doxa 11, Univer-
sity of Alicante, Spain, 1992, pp. 80 - 81.
538 Rodolfo Vazquez

individual rights over cultural ones, the less necessary tolerance will be.
Tolerance will move within the scope of the tacitly allowed which has to
do with nothing more or nothing less than private morality, or with public
morality, for example, filial, conjugal or fraternal, as long as no harm is
done to a third party by action or omission. In terms of cultures, a strong
multiculturalism against ethical individualism is unacceptable and a weak
multiculturalism, I agree with Garzón Valdés, ends in reducing the ethically
respectable or, in its case, tolerable peculiarities to three main fields: lan-
guage, art and the secondary needs or desires of the people.27
I finally return to the four cases quoted at the beginning. If I need to
choose between, on one hand, the African girl's concern to go through a
mutilating operation, the Jehovah Witness boy to preserve his life, the hui-
chol girl not to be raped and the tepehuan witch doctors not to be burned
in firewood and, on the other, the option of undergoing a mutilation, put-
ting up with rape or losing one's life for the sake of the intrinsic value of
the cultures to which these individuals belong, I have no doubt whatsoever:
liberal rights should prevail over cultural ones. In these cases and in other
similar ones, the recognition of rights makes tolerance unnecessary.

27
Ernesto Garzón Valdés, "Derechos humanos y minorias", text read at the
Eduardo Garcia Mâynez Seminar on Theory and Philosophy of Law, Instituto Tec-
nològico Autònomo de México - Universidad Iberoamericana - Escuela Libre de
Derecho, Mexico, September 25, 1993. Mimeographed.
 ON COHERENCE AND CONSISTENCY

By Luc J. Wintgens, Brussels

Consistency and coherence in law are often related in terms of a neces-

sary connection. In that respect, consistency is considered a necessary con-
dition for coherence. In this paper, I would like to explore some aspects of
that relation. More specifically, I would like to propose a broader interpre-
tation of the relation between consistency and coherence in legal thinking.
On a general approach, consistency can be defined as a property of a
theory or a set of propositions to be contradiction free. In other words, a
set of propositions or a theory is consistent if and only if the proposition
"p" and "~p" cannot be both true and false according to the system under
consideration. A set of propositions or a theory can be said to be coherent
if it makes sense as a whole.
A theory or a set of propositions is sometimes said to make sense as a
whole if and only if it is contradiction free. The relation between coherence
and consistency is then a matter of necessity. If a system contains a contra-
diction, it is not coherent. Making sense as a whole means at least that the
set of propositions is without contradictions.
It can be noted in this respect that consistency is defined in a negative
way, while coherence, in the approach followed here, is defined in a posi-
tive way. In that sense, a theory in order to be consistent, cannot contain
any contradiction. To be coherent, then, a system cannot contain a contra-
diction, though in order to be coherent, something else is required. The
latter is necessary, if the concept of coherence is considered not to be
synonymous with consistency.
In order to make this point more clear, consider the following hypoth-
esis. Judge J in a geographical circumscription of the legal system convicts
person Ρ for facts F with a punishment according to rule R. In another cir-
cumscription, judge J 1 acquits a person Ρ 2 for essentially similar facts,
according to rule R. When a legal scholar tries to describe and to system-
atise these decisions, he will face a contradiction between two individual
norms of the legal system. The system becomes inconsistent because of
that contradiction.
Most Western legal system contain a mechanism to solve such contradic-
tions. For example, the Belgian Cour de Cassation has as one of its fune-
540 Luc J. Wintgens

tion to safeguard the unity of the legal system1. Notice, however, that
according to the general rules of procedure, any judicial instance can act
only if there is a requisition of one of the parties, i.e. the convicted party
or the public prosecutor. If one of these does not appeal the decision, it
becomes final. Hence, both decisions become part of the legal system.
The reasons for not appealing the decision for both parts can be multiple.
The public prosecutor in a geographical circumscription of the legal system
can, according to his own (discretionary) judgment, decide that there are
too many appeals in order to have a new decision within a reasonable
delay, as required by the ECHR. Or a convicted party can come to the con-
clusion that another decision will cost more, all things considered, than pur-
ging his punishment.
This shows that making decisions within a legal system (including the
decision of the convicted party) is more than a matter of logic alone. From
the perspective of the legal scholar, though, both decisions are inconsistent.
On another level of the legal system, the level of legal rules, modern
legal system contain numbers of contradictions. A familiar example is that
of a rule existing at time 1 that is replaced by another rule on time 2 with-
out being formally abolished. Judicial legal reasoning and doctrinal scholar-
ship deal with this contradiction according to the principle lex posterior
derogat priori. Similar principles are at work in case, e.g., of a conflict
between a general and a more specific rule, where the conflict is solved in
favour of the latter.
Upon the foregoing analysis, the point is that this view on the relation
between consistency and coherence (1) participates in a specific view on
the relation between theoretical and practical reason (2) in which the judi-
cial decision plays the most important role.
If a judicial decision is considered to be a deductive conclusion from a
given premise, any judicial decision starting from the same premise must
lead to the same conclusion. This is true in logic, or, more generally speak-
ing, in a theoretical set of propositions.
It can be noted, however, that a theory in the above mentioned, formal
sense of the word, cannot be proved to be consistent upon its own pre-
mises. If it can, the theory is itself inconsistent.
The specific view on the relation between consistency and coherence
relies on an insufficient clarification of the nature of consistency and, con-
nected to that, of coherence.
Consistency is, as a logical concept, a matter of all or nothing. It is, in
Dworkin's terminology, a dispositive concept. In that respect, on the one
1
Art. 608 ff. Belgian Procedural Code.
 On Coherence and Consistency 541

hand, a set of propositions is consistent or it is not. Coherence, on the other

hand, is not a matter of all or nothing. It is rather a matter of more or less,
a matter of degree. In light of the above analysis, if consistency is a condi-
tion of coherence, the least inconsistency in a set of propositions, makes
the latter also incoherent. As a consequence, the concept of coherence
becomes, counterintuitively, also a dispositive concept.
The above mentioned connection between consistency and coherence
therefore is a strong relation. This is due to a specific idea of law and legal
science.
The idea of constraining coherence of a legal system into a logical fra-
mework can be traced to the work of Kelsen. In his Reine Rechtslehre,
Kelsen overemphasis the requirement of consistency, up to the point of
confusing between legal science on the one side and a set of legal norms
on the other.
Kelsen's basic idea is that legal science is a legal science of the law, i.e.
a means to understand society in a legal way, and not immediately in a
social way. Legal science has as its object positive law, that is described
and systematised according to scientific methodology. For a set of proposi-
tions to be scientific, it is necessary to be non contradictory.
But law in social interaction is not a science, though it can be studied in
a scientific way. Kelsen's approach is then reductive, since he proposes as
the unique mode of study of the law the method of legal dogmatics. As a
consequences, he unduly favours the scientific requirement of consistency
in the description of norms at the cost of the anthropological component of
social interaction according to the law.
In a similar way as Kant, Kelsen's position is to make the law dependent
upon a science, a science to be applied to the praxis of normative behav-
iour. In other words, Kelsen expands the realm of science to a domain that
does not make part of it: the law can be described in scientific terms, but
that description is essentially different from the action according to the law
itself.
Where Kelsen avoids every anthropological element in his account to
law, I propose a somewhat different approach.
A theory is a coherent cluster of propositions about (a part of) reality. 2
In that respect a legal system can be considered a theory. In order to be a
theory, the cluster of propositions need not to be scientific.
2
Cf. Quine, W. V. O., From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge (MA), Harvard
Univ. Press, 1953, 103 ff.; id., Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge (MA), Harvard Univ.
Press, 1993 2 , 20.
542 Luc J. Wintgens

To following analogy can clarify this. A person can be said to be a

theory, i.e. a set of propositions made about himself, reflecting his self
image. The stronger the personality, the more coherent the theory will be.
Among other things, this includes that the propositions a person makes
about himself will fit into a larger framework that precisely constitutes his
personality.
As a consequence, such a person will avoid inconsistencies in his con-
struction and when they appear, he will try to solve them. Would one
require that a person acts consistently, then it would be impossible to
change any element of his theory. However, according to various elements
in personal and social environment, a person and his behaviour can change.
From a purely external point of view, such a change will be irrational since
it can, most of the time, not be explained in scientific terms. His behaviour
according to his earlier theory would be inconsistent.
Without going that far that a person is fully aware of his whole personal-
ity, having driven back all his suppressed feelings, there remain in every
person some hidden contradictions. It can make a lot of sense just to live
daily life with them, under the awareness that they are inherent to his per-
sonality and without trying to explore their roots.
Would his personality become incoherent because of these contradic-
tions? Would, in other words, his theory become incoherent because of
these contradictions? I believe this is not the case. Many, sometimes contra-
dictory elements, can fit together in one system and nevertheless make
sense as a whole or be coherent.
This analogy suggests that there is an anthropological aspect in the idea
of a theory. Persons as theories are not completely free of contradictions
without, for that reason alone, becoming incoherent.
In this approach of a theory, the anthropological component is of course
very strong. But this is only a specific case of my approach to a theory.
Speaking more generally, a scientific theory stands at the other side of
the spectrum. If one takes a logical theory as a paradigm case of a scienti-
fic theory, it follows that consistency is a necessary condition for the
theory to be a theory at all. It is a matter of all or nothing.
The latter position can also be taken from another perspective. Consider-
ing the idea that coherence is a matter of degree, it can be asked, under the
hypothesis that consistency is a necessary condition for coherence, whether
consistency is not also a matter of degree when thinking of a legal system?
The idea then is to reverse the relation between the terms, and to say
that consistency is a specific aspect of coherence. It is a species of the
more general genus called coherence.3 As a consequence, entirely inconsis-
 On Coherence and Consistency 543

tent sets of propositions are not coherent, without consistency being a

necessary condition for that set of propositions to make sense.
Further, a set of propositions can be that much coherent that it becomes
consistent. In that respect it is a specific form of making sense, namely to
be without contradictions.
To impose the requirement of consistency to the legal system as a theory
transforms the latter into a closed set of propositions from which any con-
crete conclusion can be deduced in a logical way. This is, however, an
unsatisfactory account of how a legal system works from day to day.
Aarnio's account of coherence and consistency4, following MacCormick,
Alexy and Peczenik in this, is that consistency is a necessary condidition
for coherence. The field in which this idea is operational is the domain of
justification of judicial decisions. In that domain, Aarnio rightly stresses the
importance of consistency as a necessary condition of coherence, more, he
considers it the core of coherence5.
This is certainly true for what I propose to call separate entities of the
legal system, like separate judicial decisions or tightly connected entities of
rules like the patrimonial rules governing the status of the goods of man
and wife or the rules of inheritance. Inconsistencies within such entities can
be called simultaneous inconsistencies, like a judicial decision containing a
contradiction or a set of rules according to which a good becomes, after the
death of the heir, the full and exclusive property of his surviving spouse
and at the same time of his children. This kind of simultaneous or local
inconsistencies impair the coherence of the legal order as a whole.
This type of inconsistencies can be described from an external point of
view by the legal scientist. His work consists of a description and a systém-
atisation of the legal system or parts of it. Tracing these inconsistencies and
proposing ways of solving them belongs to the field of legal dogmatics.
There is, however, also another type of inconsistencies in the legal order
that do not necessarily impair its coherence.
A practical example to illustrate this is the case of abuse of property
rights. In 1945, defendant had in good faith build his house partly, i.e.
1,2 m 2 , on the surface of plaintiff. 23 years later, plaintiff discovers this
3
Gianformaggio, L., "Legal Certainty, Coherence and Consensus: Variations on
a Theme by MacCormick" in Law, Interpretation and Reality. Essays in Epistemol-
ogy, Hermeneutics and Jurisprudence, Nerhot, P. (ed.), Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1990,
404 - 405.
4
Aarnio , Α., Reason and Authority. A Treatise on the Dynamic Paradigm of
Legal Dogmatics, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997, 200 - 201.
5
Id., ibid., 201.
544 Luc J. Wintgens

fact, and sues defendant in order to have that part of his house, actually
one of the side-façades, removed. Plaintiff argued that article 544 of the
civil code gives him the most absolute right to his property, hence defen-
dant had to remove that part of his premise.
While plaintiff could have foreseen to win his case on that argument, the
Court ruled that the exercise of the property rights by plaintiff was an
abuse of rights in light of article 1382 of the civil code, hence a tort. Plain-
tiff was barred from exercising his property rights, and instead he was
allowed damages for an amount equal to the market value of 1,2 m 2 of
land6.
This case is the endpoint of a long judicial debate in which the question
whether it was possible the abuse an absolute right like property, in such a
way that the exercise of property rights constitutes a tort.
Many decisions before the one commented here were made in the oppo-
site way, i.e. in favour of the plaintiff who had the most absolute right to
do with his property as he pleases, subject to any specific legal restrictions.
The decision then is inconsistent with the earlier decisions in favour of
plaintiff. This type of consistency can be called consecutive inconsistency.
Any legal scientist would notice this, though he would not necessarily con-
clude that the decision is incoherent. More even, the decision was appre-
ciated as making a lot of sense. Would the court have decided for the plain-
tiff and have ordered the demolition of the house, the decision would have
been consistent with previous ones, although it can be doubted whether it
would have been qualified as "coherent".
So, although the legal system can be qualified by a legal scientist as
entirely consistent if he does discover any contradictions between the rules
of the system (including the legal decisions), it can be considered incoher-
ent, since it does not fit with the way people look at the world.
Consistency then is concept of theoretical nature, while coherence is a
matter of practical nature. If consistency is considered a necessary condi-
tion for coherence, theoretical reasoning is preponderant to practical reason-
ing.
This approach gives rise to two different views on legal reasoning, based
on two different ontologies.
The first is that the correct use of the rules of reason, framed according
to the paradigm of scientific reasoning, leads to correct conclusions even in
6
Cour de Cassation, September 19 1971, Pasicrisie, 1971, I, 28 - 38. See on this
case also Wintgens, L. J., "Law and Morality: A Critical Relation,", Ratio Juris,
1991, 177 - 201, esp. 192 - 198.
 On Coherence and Consistency 545

practical matters. The ontology on which this view relies assimilates theore-
tical and practical reasoning, with a preponderance for the former. On that
view, the more geometrico method in legal reasoning is tributary to the
assimilation of legal thinking to a form of scientific reasoning, according to
which not only truth, but the certainty about truth is dominant. As a conse-
quence, consistency in reasoning determinates coherence.

Legal certainty as a practical requirement is, in that view, linked to

formal justice according to which like cases must be treated alike. In that
respect, however, formal justice is not an independent normative require-
ment of practical reasoning. It is a requirement of reasoning with rules
which is as much proper to scientific reasoning as to normative reasoning
according to rules. In normative or practical reasoning, this is an aspect of
legalism which, in my view, is strongly related to the assimilation of theo-
retical and practical reasoning into one pattern.

In the second view, theoretical and practical reason are connected in a

different way. According to that view, consistency is a specific form of
coherence. It is so to say a maximum degree of coherence, up to the point
that a system is entirely free of contradictions.

There are, however, intermediate levels, according to which a set of pro-

positions contains contradictions without loosing its overall sense. This
does of course not work for simultaneous consistency. It is only true for
consecutive consistency. Consecutive consistency is then not a necessary
condition for coherence. On the contrary, an inconsistency in the legal
system can contribute to more coherence of the legal system as a whole as
the above mentioned case of the Cour de Cassation shows.

In light of that view, it can be said that if practical reasoning were only
a matter of rule application, like in logic, the other aspect that, among
others, Aarnio has stressed, namely authority, would become an aspect of
reason that brings some imperfect aspects of reasoning to light. The latter
means that one has to make decisions because reason is yet unable to fully
deduce conclusions from given rules.

Behind that lurks the Modernist desire that a further development of

reason will unfold the proper ways of reasoning according to rules in a
theoretical perspective. The use of authority in legal reasoning then is only
necessary because theoretical reasoning is yet imperfectly developed, hence
not completely rational. This view is again counter intuitive.

The view I present here is that coherence as "making sense as a whole"

has to do with acceptability of decisions. Yet, this view is not limited to
judicial reasoning alone, though this is an important aspect of it.
36 FS Aarnio
546 Luc J. Wintgens

Depending however on the material sources the judge takes into account,
his decisions can change over time. They are, as a matter of logic, consecu-
tively inconsistent or formally unjust. They can make, however, more sense
as a whole, hence be more coherent.
Another case illustrating this is the following. 7 According to a legal rule,
a housewife had a right to a subsidy. A man whose wife had a job was
occupied with the household. The law, according to its plain meaning, is
not applicable to "men" staying home. The court however ruled the other
way around, inconsistent with earlier decisions refusing to assimilate "man"
and "wife" in light of the subsidy given to the wife.
The reasons for the decision referred to the law's obsolete character. The
legal rule had been promulgated in 1963, the court argued, and the social
circumstances (as also reflected in later legislative and judicial ruling both
on the European and the national level) have that much changed that equal-
ity between man and woman is now the predominant view. In other words,
it makes more sense to confer the subsidy to women as well as to men than
to rely only on the plain meaning of the statute.
This decision makes a lot of sense. This can be understood in two ways.
It makes sense as a whole, if one takes into consideration the context the
court refers to. That context is essentially a legal one, since reference is
made mainly to legal rules of both the national and European level. The
court uses in other words a systematic interpretation. So, the "whole"
referred to can be understood the legal system as a whole. Upon that, the
decision fits into the whole of the legal system.
There is a second way to understand the court's reasoning. Legal systems
make no sense as such or for themselves (unless one takes consistency as a
condition for coherence, and then decisions make only sense if they are
consistent. That kind of sense would be sense understood from an external
perspective).
In my view, legal systems make only sense for actors. To speak about
coherence, then, must include the internal perspective of the actors. Making
sense as a whole then does not only mean "to fit within the whole of the
legal system" but also to fit with the view of the actors who accept the
legal rules as norms.
When they act according to the rules of the system, these rules confer
sense to their actions. And when actors act according to rules, as today's
legal systems work, they incorporate the legal rule into their pattern of
behaviour.
7
Arbeidsrechtbank Antwerp, June 26 1979, Rechtskundig Weekblad, 1979 - 80,
1058.
 On Coherence and Consistency 547

But not only rules confer sense to people's action, also actors themselves
do.
Upon that, fully absurd rules can be described and systematised in fully
consistent sets. They will be coherent under the condition that consistency
is a necessary condition of coherence. But they do not make sense as a
whole.
This "whole" can now be articulated in a more specific way. Making
sense is making sense for someone, not only as a legal subject but also if
not mainly as a person. This is the anthropological component of coher-
ence, referred to above.
Making sense as a whole is more than making sense within the legal
system as a whole. In this whole, the concrete acting person must be
included.
Upon that, the "whole" is constituted of the legal system together with
the social context in which free social individuals frame their patterns of
life. Coherence then also includes that legal rules must fit with the social
context in which concrete individuals act with each other.
My view on coherence then is somewhat larger than the perspective of
justification of judicial decisions. The point is that also the legislator when
promulgating legal rules, must respect some form of coherence. This view
is closely related to the one formulated in an earlier article on coherence
from a judicial point of view8.
The idea of coherence underlying legislative activity can be schematised
as follows.
(1) Simultaneous consistency is, as in judicial decisions, an absolute
requirement, in the sense that within a legislative decision, no contradic-
tions are allowed. Rules permitting one to drive when the traffic light is red
while at the same time obliging one to stop do not fulfil this requirement 9.
(2) First level coherence on the part of the legislator requires him, in
analogy with the judge, to be consistent with earlier rulings. Where the
judge's decisions must be in accordance, as much as possible, with prece-
dents (for moral or legal reasons), first level coherence in the domain of
legislation sets negative bounds to it. Although a legislator has a large free-
dom to change the rules he makes, first level coherence requires him not to
change these rules too frequently 10. This can also be considered a prerequi-
site of formal justice, as Campbell rightly states:
8
Wintgens , L. J., "Coherence of the Law", A.R.S.P., 1993, 483 ff.
9
Cfr. Fuller , L. L, The Morality of Law, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1969 2 , 65 - 70.

36*
548 Luc J. Wintgens

" I f it is formally unjust not to apply the same rule to similar cases, then it must
follow that it is formally unjust to change a rule, since this will involve treating
persons who are in essentially the same category differently on the irrelevant
grounds that the cases occurred at different times." 1 1

Although the legislator enjoys a larger freedom than the judge in his rule
setting, his freedom is limited by the first level of coherence, so that he
must give good reasons for changing an existing rule.
(3) Second level coherence in legislation includes the obligation to
respect the existing legal system as far as possible. This means that in the
creation of new rules, the legislator should take care not to make hay of the
legal system. Indeed, some branches of a legal system present a high
degree of systematicity (like Belgian contract law, for example). Any
change in legislation has the potential to impair this systematicity or sys-
temic coherence. If the legal system is to make sense as a whole (on the
intrasystemic level), then second level coherence requires of the legislator
his new rulings fit as well as possible with this whole 12 . This requirement
of systematic legislation is related to the structures within the legal system
as a whole that have to be respected by the legislator 13.
(4) Argumentation on the third level of coherence on the legislator's part
links the legal system to social reality. Indeed, the legislator translates
social data into legal rules and on this level of argumentation, he gives
arguments for his decisions, for example by referring to the actual state of
affairs in the social world. In that respect, the Belgian Court of arbitration
ruled, for example, that the distinction made between workmen and clerks
cannot be justified any more, given the current legislation and given the
actual socio-economic circumstances14.
In light of the foregoing schematic approach of coherence in legislative
activity, coherence as "making sense as a whole" refers to a larger context
then the legal system. It also includes the requirement that legal ruling
10
Cfr. id., ibid., 7 9 - 8 1 .
11
Campbell , Τ. Ζλ, "Formal Jusitce and Rule Change", Analysis, 1973, 113.
12
See Court of Arbitration, May 23 1990, nr. 18/90, Moniteur belge, July 27
1990, 14.767 ff. The court has ruled in this case that the legislator violates the prin-
ciple of equality if his ruling misjudges the basis principles of the Belgian legal
system.
13
See e.g. Court of Arbitration, January 21 1993, nr. 3/93, Moniteur belge, Feb-
ruary 5 1993; Court of Arbitration, December 1 1993, nr. 82/93, Moniteur belge,
December 19 1994; Court of Arbitration, June 16 1994, nr. 46/94, Moniteur belge,
July 6 1994.
14
Court of Arbitration, September 29 1993, nr. 69/93, Moniteur belge, October
27 1993; Court of Arbitration, December 1 1993, nr. 82/93, Moniteur belge, De-
cember 16 1993; Court of Arbitration, June 22 1994, nr. 50/94, Moniteur belge,
July 7 1994.
 On Coherence and Consistency 549

must fit with the social and economic context in which the ruling is
intended to root.
The legislative process then is more than an exercise of sovereign power.
Although the legislator is the supreme actor in a legal system, this power is
not as discretionary as the advocates of the Westminster conception of
sovereignty would like to have it.
The rationality of legislation on the one hand cannot be covered then by
an absolute presumption of rationality of the legislation, which is but
another remniscent of legalism. On the other hand, rationality of legislation
is more than procedural rationality alone which has much in common with
a legalistic approach. In a legalistic approach it is claimed that following
rules is the core of normative behaviour. On a legalistic view on legisla-
tion, following the rules of procedure would be a necessary and a sufficient
condition to create valid rules.
Legisprudence as a theory of rational legislation aims to articulate the
principles of good legislation. Following the procedural rules of the consti-
tution is, as a matter of course, a necessary condition for good legislation.
It is a conditio sine qua non for creating valid legislative rules. From that
perspective, the legislator takes an internal point of view towards the rules
of the constitution. They are norms for him to be followed.
But more than following rules, the legislator creates new rules, while
transforming social data into formally valid normative propositions. His
task is a political one. Would one understand politics as a pure exercise of
power, then it would make no sense to discuss the possibility of rationality
of legislation.
The fact however that the legislator is bound by the rules of the constitu-
tion limits his rule creation activity or legislative freedom in two ways. The
first was mentioned already. Creating valid rules requires following the
meta-rules or the power conferring rules of the legal system. The second
way in which legislative freedom is limited has to do with coherence.
In order to be coherent or to make sense as a whole, legislative ruling
must fit not only with the procedural rules of the system. It must also be
compatible with the existing body of law in which the new rules are inte-
grated. These requirements are expressed in the first three steps of the
above scheme.
The last step, in which the legal system is connected to the social con-
text includes a specific articulation of coherence. Coherence as "making
sense as a whole" from a legislative perspective cannot be limited to an
intrasystemic view, since then, there would be no transformation of social
data at all.
550 Luc J. Wintgens

As a consequence, taking the social context into account as an essential

part of legislative activity includes that "making sense as a whole" refers to
the social structures that are affected by legislative ruling. A strong con-
structivist would claim that these social structures are themselves the pro-
duct of the law. The law steers social interaction up to the point of creating
their meaning. In my view, however, the social space or society belongs to
the social individuals who organise their interaction by themselves. The
reason for this is that social individuals are first of all free social beings.
This includes that they are the first to organise their social interaction,
including the social settings that are the consequences of that. The primacy
of social interaction to law has as a consequence that the law is but a sub-
routine, the function of which is to restore social interaction in case this is
broken. Only in case of failure of social interaction, the law has to inter-
vene in order to restore social interaction.
Coherence from that perspective gets the broader meaning not only of
fitting with the legal system, but fitting with the social context as well. The
"whole" then is the legal system and the social structures in which the
legal system operates.
The first interpreters of these structures are the authors of them, the indi-
vidual social actors. They are the first to decide what makes sense and
what does not. Since they are free social beings, any legislative ruling is to
be understood as a limitation to their freedom.
The social setting as the result of social interaction then has a specific
structure, the meaning of which itself results from social interaction. As a
consequence, any legislative intervention into that structure presupposes
that the legislator investigates this structure and only regulates with respect
to the social structure.
The reason for this can be found in the very idea of law itself. The final-
ity of law being freedom, any intervention of the law - conceptually speak-
ing - limits freedom from outside. The law's function then is essentially
external and negative. The core of freedom however is essentially internal
and positive. It is internal in that it is an attribute of the individual self. It
is positive in that freedom most of all means self determination together
with others.
From this rough account of freedom as the finality of law, it follows
that, in order to make sense, the law must not only satisfy intrasystemic
requirements but most of all it must fit with the social context of which the
social individuals are the creators and the guardians. It is because freedom
is the finality of law that coherence of the law includes both fitting with
the legal system and with the social setting in which the legal system oper-
ates.
V I I I . Jurisprudence, Jurisdictional Power
and Legal Professions
 REASONABLE DOUBT

By Ghita Holmström-Hintikka, Boston and Helsinki

I. Introduction

In this paper I want to focus on the concept of 'reasonable doubt' and

the way it enters the judicial process in a criminal trial. We know that the
task of the prosecutor is to show "beyond reasonable doubt" that the defend-
ant is guilty as charged. The defence in turn tries through the whole trial
to cast doubt in each and every possible circumstance and evidence. The
way a trial is built up I have to guide us through some main steps of the
procedure, albeit short, before we reach the closing arguments and the jury
deliberation. I will present the trial as an interrogative game and give a
brief presentation of the model as well. I shall also give my own analysis
of the concept of 'evidence' to be used later in the discussion about reason-
able doubt.
A trial is always a serious matter, but when a criminal trial with a
murder case is in question, it can become deadly serious. The defendant
can, if found guilty, be sentenced to pay for his transgression with his life.
Under these circumstances it may seem irrespectful to even suggest that a
trial resembles a game. However, this is exactly one of the claims I make
in this paper. The prosecutor represents the plaintiffs' team whereas the
defence leads the team of the defendant. The judge and jury clearly play
the role of the umpires as in a soccer game.
The similarities to a soccer game are, however, not the thought that the
both teams are opposing each other but that they together take the game to
an end result. Both teams are, so to speak, playing on their own part of the
field and against each other but for the sake of winning the game. The
umpire - or team of umpires - is the one who makes sure that the game is
fair and who, in the end declares the winner - or looser. Thus, in a trial
both teams, although opponents, seek to find the truth and to present it as
convincingly as possible. The judge - possibly together with a jury - de-
cides who the winning party is, all things considered.
The way this game named trial is set up, we think of two teams seeking
for truth. The interrogative model for truth seeking in science (Hintikka)
554 Ghita Holmström-Hintikka

will be the fundamental game model both when it comes to the definitory
rules and the strategic rules.
Legal argumentation is the most powerful weapon each team can use.
Elements in this argumentative game are among others the wide range of
evidence that may be presented but also the "players" themselves, mainly
the counsels. As both teams claim to search for the truth the outcome of
this game is that either the defence team or the prosecution has convinced
the jury (or the judge if there is no jury) beyond reasonable doubt about
the truth in their case.

I I . The Interrogative Framework

1. The Dialectic Model

The dialectic method created by Socrates constitutes the foundation for

modern scientific as well as legal inquiry. When Plato with Socrates asks
his "either-or" questions, i.e., questions of the form "When somebody
helps another person would you call him a good person or should we say
that he is cruel?" we can see him create an interrogative tree where at each
node there are two branches. The given answer is put in the end of one
branch and forms the basis for a new question. "Should we say that ...
or is it ...?" Only rarely would Socrates give a summary of what his oppo-
nent has admitted along the way. Thus, although Plato has put it in the
form of a dialogue I suggest that we can also see the Socratic interrogation
presented in the following way

Q,
Q2

Q3
Q4

Figure 1

Being a dialectical method for each question there is an either-or answer.

We could think of it as if the answerer were to express which of two oppo-
site conditions (or states of affairs) are realized ρ or not -p. The given
answers, A b A 2 , ..., are put in the diagram as shown whereas the excluded
option is marked as a broken path. When the Inquirer is satisfied with the
 Reasonable Doubt 555

given set of answers and has no further questions, the end of the path
constitutes the final result.
From time to time Plato lets Socrates go one step further and sum up
what his interlocutor has admitted during the discussion thus performing
some sort of deduction, a dialectic conclusion.
When talking about deductive logic Aristotle is of course the first person
we think of. The syllogisms still play an important role in our reasoning, be
it scientific, legal or just every-mans every-day reasoning. In this paper we
shall not limit ourselves to these classical methods, useful as they are, but
incorporate all available tools from Frege to Hintikka. Thus, for instance,
modal and deontic logic as well as inductive logic and reasoning by ana-
logy turn out to be useful in legal contexts.
Everybody seems to have a sufficiently good picture of a courtroom and
a trial to be able to imagine the initial setting of the game. On each side of
the room are tables, the defence to the left and the prosecution to the right.
The judge presides in the middle and the jury - if present - takes the side-
stage. The clerk often sits between the judge and the lawyers.

2. The Interrogative Model

As we have set the stage, we are ready to explain the foundations of the
interrogative game. This game is nothing but a variant of the interrogative
model for truth seeking - initially in science, a method frequently used by
Socrates in its early form. The basic idea of the modernized version of this
model is as follows: Two players are involved, the Inquirer and the Oracle.
Inquirer is putting questions to the Oracle who is expected to give true
answers. The Inquirer can be one and the same person throughout the inter-
rogation or he can be thought of as a team. Thus, more than one person or
even team can divide the task of questioning. Anyone, who answers the
questions by Inquirer is named the Oracle. Thus, a person, such as a wit-
ness, and Nature in the form of a laboratory test, a measuring process etc.,
can be thought of as being oracles. Question-answer pairs are named inter-
rogative moves (IM), and the answers are listed together with premises and
conclusions in a Beth type table. Premises contain information which
"serves as the basis for an inference step" (Hintikka-Bachman, 1991, p. 9).
Thus, we might think of either Initial Premises (IP), such as laws of nature,
a scientific theory, an established fact e.g., the accident under investigation,
or premises, (P t , P 2 , ...)> such as facts based on observations, testimony or
else received through interrogative moves or logical inferences (LI), or
legal moves (LM). They may also be tacit knowledge which has to be
spelled out.
556 Ghita Holmström-Hintikka

Conclusions (C), drawn from the premises are part of the argument and
it is hoped that, when in the end all conclusions are drawn, we will reach
the final or Ultimate Conclusion , (Cu). It should also be noted that the con-
clusion from a simple argument can always be used as a premise in a new
argument, thus constituting a link in the interrogative chain. In trials under
Common Law, only the jury and the expert witnesses, however, may draw
conclusions. This is differing from e.g. Finnish and Swedish law.

The following is an example of a simple argument:

A l l ravens are black birds (IP)
2. I saw a raven (IM, or: testimony Pj)
3. / I saw a black bird (C, LI, 1, 2)

A legal argument, like most scientific arguments, obviously is more com-

plex in nature than the example above. The construction, however, can
always be broken into simple building blocks, the simple argument. In
scientific as well as in legal investigation the Inquirer frequently asks ques-
tions other than "either-or" i.e., "yes-no" questions. Hintikka names them
"wh-questions" (Hintikka , 1991). Answers to these questions constitute
instantiations of a more general premise. For instance the answer to the
question "who stole my fountain pen?" is an instantiation of the, possibly
tacit, premise that "somebody stole my fountain pen". Yes-no questions on
the other hand cause a split path as is the case when one tries to show
whether ρ or not -p.
Elsewhere I have shown how the Interrogative Model may be applied in
legal reasoning. Be it therefore sufficient to give only a short sketch of it
here. We shall think of our initial stage, the court of law. The opposing
lawyers ask questions from witnesses. The clerk writes down both ques-
tions and answers along the trial so that at any stage thereof you can have
her read back what was asked and answered. We can think of it as being
stored in a computer file, the two lawyers working on the lefthand side of
the table in two separate but quickly branching paths.

The initial premise may be that a brutal rape and murder has taken place.
Maria Dodge was killed (Friedman , 1993). Roberto Morales, the defendant,
is accused of this crime and the defence lawyer tries to show his innocence
whereas the prosecutor has to show his guilt. Thus, the very first branching
point comes from the fact that he is either guilty or not guilty as charged.
As we reach the end of the trial investigating police, medical examiners
and witnesses for and against the defendant have taken the stand and
finally the defendant himself is put up to testify. He tells his story about
how he and Maria met during the day in an apartment and that she wanted
to break their relationship. They had a stormy dispute which ended with an
 Reasonable Doubt 557

act of love. He also tells that they agreed to meet that very Sunday evening
in the office to prepare for the important meeting the next day. When he
arrives he finds her in her office, dead on the couch, lying in her blood, her
throat sliced open.

If we think of the whole trial as being recorded in a computer file his

fragment would show under "defendant". The table showing the whole trial
may then be presented as follows

LEGAL INTERROGATION

Prosecution Defence Jury or Judge

Ultimate conclusion

closing argument closing argument

Figure 2

From here we can read that the defence has introduced a witness which the
prosecution has cross-examined. The same holds for the defendant.

In a table form the interrogation may look as follows:

(Initial premise) P. (IM)

(Initial premise) P2(IM)
(conclusion) c, (LI)
(answers) P.Ì (IM)
(tacit knowledge) P4 (IM)
(ultimate conclusion) c„. ( L I )
Figure 3
558 Ghita Holmström-Hintikka

The division of labor is visible in the following way:

τ c

ι. P, (IP) C, = C,
2. P 2 ( I M , oracle: observation)

3.1 P 3 (IM, or: W l ) ι 3.2 P 3 (IM, or: W l )

4.1 P 5 (IM, or: W2) I 4.2 P 4 (IM, or: W2)
5.1 C, guilty (LI, 3.1, 4.1) 5.2 P 6 (IM, or: W3)
6.2 C 2 not-guilty
(LI, 3.2, 5.2)

Figure 4

The prosecution is operating on the path to the left and the defence on the
right-hand path but both in the left side column.
If we were to open the files under the title "defendant" a fragment
thereof may look as follows:
1. Defence
The defendant testifies as to what took place during the fatal Sunday.
2. Prosecution
Cross-examines the defendant

"You say you could see that her throat was cut and there was a lot of
blood."
"Yes."
"Was that dry blood?"
"I don't know. I suppose not."

"And what did you do to help her?"

"I ... she was dead."
"Did you go near her?"
"No."
"Did you touch her body?"
"No."
 Reasonable Doubt 559

"You say you loved her?"

"Yes."

"But you wouldn't go near enough to make sure she was beyond help. You
just assumed it from what you saw."
"Yes, but ..."
"Despite your lack of medical knowledge."

"That's how moved and concerned you say you were by her injuries."
"I was concerned. I just didn't get close."
"But that isn't the truth is it? You did get close. You got close to her in a
murderous rage and you raped her and you slashed her throat."
"No. No! I didn't."
(Friedman, 1993, pp. 560ff.)

In order to compare the defendant's testimony and answers from the

crossexamination it is practical to read the statements in parallel in a table
as sketched below:

Τ C

DEFENDANT

Maria Dodge is killed [IP]

defence prosecution

3.1 P 3 (or: D) 3.2 P 3 (or: D)

4.1 P 4 (or: D) 4.2 ~ P 4 (or: D)

Figure 5

At this stage of the trial conclusions are not drawn. Nevertheless, as we

have highlighted a fragment where the defendant contradicts himself (4.1)
and (4.2) the jurors are expected to notice.
560 Ghita Holmström-Hintikka

I I I . On Evidence

Along the trial both parties are allowed to present evidence to prove their
case. Not any evidence, however, is permitted. In short the court decides
what material will be allowed as evidence and only thereafter will evidence
become evidence of a fact or of the truth of a statement.
In the trial at hand the prosecutor was able to find a key witness, Juan
Alvaro, in the last minute. This witness, a close friend of the victim, testi-
fied about how they had worked together in the evening of that Sunday
after a comfortable day that included a lunch in a nice restaurant and a
stroll in the park. As they were working Morales came in and Maria and
Roberto started a severe quarrel with name calling and threats. Alvaro was
made to leave the office, Maria thought she could manage, and Roberto
threatened to tell the world about Juan's sexual orientation. Thus, there
were no eye witnesses to the very killing. After the defendant's testimony
word stands against word.
In an attempt to impeach the defendant, nevertheless, the prosecutor calls
his key witness one more time:
Qi: "Were you and Maria Dodge apart at any time that afternoon?"
Ap "No, we weren't."
Q2: "Was there any other person she went to see, for any length of
time?"
A2: "NO."
Q3: "IS it fair to say, that from around two o'clock in the afternoon until
you got to Phoenix Enterprises the two of you were together without
a break?"
A3: "Except when she went to the ladies room", Alvaro answered. "And
she made a couple of phone calls."
Q4: "Could she have had time to visit Roberto Morales in Little Italy
and make love with him?"
A4: "Absolutely not." (Friedman, 1993, p. 568)
With his questions the prosecutor clearly is looking for evidence to the
effect that the defendant is lying, in fact that his whole story is just that, a
story.

1. Basic Features and General Terminology

Evidence needs to be evidence of something, i.e., a condition (state of

affairs) but it also needs to be evidence for somebody, i.e., an agent. Thus,
we shall say that
for agent a, condition e is evidence of condition f.
 Reasonable Doubt 561

This statement seems to hold only in such cases where

a is convinced by e that /.
In a previous paper (Holmström- Hintikka , 1995 b) I have defined the con-
cept of evidence as follows:
(DfB) for agent JC condition e is evidence of condition / if and only if (iff)
the presence of the condition e suffices to convince agent JC about
condition /.
The evidence relation thus defined may be written for short Β (JC, e, f) and the
conviction relation 'χ is convinced by e aboutY we shall write C (JC, e,f).
Notice that agent χ might be convinced about / even without evidence e
or any other evidence for that matter. Therefore, e is a sufficient but not a
necessary condition for the agent to be convinced. Notice also that evi-
dence so defined clearly has to be what is called binding evidence. Further-
more, notice the difference between the two English locutions 'evidence of
and 'evidence for'. In our definition of the evidence relation Β (χ, e, f) this
distinction is visible in that it uses the phrase 'e is evidence of f rather
than 'e is evidence for JC'. Finally, in the sequence, by an agent, a rational
agent is always meant. Rationality is assumed to be characterizable by
means of general conditions, rather like the conditions of rational decision-
making in normative decision theory.
As was mentioned, the evidence relation hinges on whether or not the
agent accepts a state of affairs, the condition e, as evidence of /. This in
turn is related to JCS
' own sphere of knowledge and previous experience.
Thus the evidence relation is rightly connected to the agent's particular cir-
cumstances, so that if C (χ, f) stands for 'χ is convinced about / ' we can
write that:
(B) in JCS
' circumstances: Β (JC, e, f) (e >- C (JC, f))
This is simply another way of saying that in JCS ' circumstances e is evi-
dence of / iff JC is convinced about / if e appears. We need to be aware of
the difficulty in formalizing the right hand side caused by the way in which
evidence is related to the agent's attitude. Rather than being a material
implication we should think of a conditional operator combining the two. If
e occurs it conditions JC to be convinced about / iff e for JC is evidence of f
In our example, the prosecutor has brought in Juan Alvaro's testimony as
an evidence of the defendant's lie.
In legal cases, say courts of law, and criminals, what all amounts to is to
show "beyond reasonable doubt" that the defendant is guilty as charged. In
this context the concept of binding evidence becomes crucial.
37 FS Aarnio
562 Ghita Holmström-Hintikka

2. Language and Basic Assumptions

As it proves useful to bring in some elements of symbolic language, let

us here introduce the following symbols. In what follows we will use a, b,
c, ..., «Ι, a2, ... for agent constants and JC, y, z, ·.·, ··· f° r agent
variables. We shall also use e, f g, ... e\, e2, ..., m, n, r, ..., mx, ra2, ... as
variables for conditions (states of affairs). We also employ the symbols
4
V \ '&', »', the usual Boolean operators, for denial, disjunc-
tion, conjunction, (material) implication, (material) equivalence. In addition
we sometimes also use the symbols '3' and 'V' for the existential and uni-
versal quantifiers. Other operators frequently used are Έ' for the evidence
relation, 'C' for being convinced, i.e., the conviction relation. We might
also introduce other symbols as we proceed. By means of the symbols so
introduced we can construct further conditions (and relations). For instance
B(*. e,f)&B(y, e, f)
B(x, C (*,/),/)> C(*, e9f)
As we shall not discuss higher order relations of evidence or conviction let
us not bring them in here either. One thing worth mentioning though is the
concept of "condition" which may be thought of as a state of affairs. This
notion is best illustrated by some examples:
- the Earth is round
-2+2=4
- the fingerprints are evidence of the fact that the bearer touched the board
- the jury is convinced by evidence that the guy is the thief.
We shall also use the symbol V for the conditioning operator as in for
instance 'p conditions q\ ρ >- q, or more frequently in this paper, the pre-
sence of this or that evidence conditions the jury to be convinced.
Some fundamental logical properties of the evidence relation were dis-
cussed in Holmström-Hintikka (1995 b) but shall not be repeated here.
Imagine now that e is for the jury binding evidence of/and that /neces-
sarily, i.e., logically follows e} then if e occurs the jury is convinced by e
that / This clearly is a way of strengthening the conditioning operator,
mentioned in (B) and to turn it into material implication:
(Bl) [B (*, & Ν (*,/)]

3. What Kind of Evidence ?

This takes us over to our next observation, namely that (i) binding evi-
dence as the term suggests binds evidence and evidendum (the condition
that the piece of evidence is evidence of) together. In contrast, one piece of
 Reasonable Doubt 563

evidence might not tell the whole truth, only a part of it. In such a case we
shall speak about (ii) partial evidence. A different matter then is that, that
which constitutes evidence for me might not be sufficient to convince the
jury. In addition, in criminal trials for instance, evidence is discussed in
terms of (iii) physical evidence, (iv) witness testimony and (v) expert opin-
ion. The last three types of evidence may each of them separately be either
partial or binding evidence. But it may also be the case that the sum of all
available evidence is too vague to constitute binding evidence even when
taken all together, and may not convince the jury to form a verdict.
Although e might represent several different things it is always thought
of as denoting a condition, i.e., that y has received some particular docu-
ments, that ζ knows how to open the safe, that w knows who stole the car,
etc. The same holds for evidendum f.
For a condition to constitute evidence of another condition several things
are presupposed, but one common feature for all evidence is that it in one
way or other is linked to evidendum, either naturally as a cause-effect rela-
tion or logically. For evidence to be evidence for an agent at least a mini-
mum of cognition from his or her part is involved. In this essay I shall take
the cognitive part to be imbedded in the evidence relation so that
e is for χ evidence of /
means that (a) JC knows or has an educated belief that e is present, (b) JC has
at least a minimum of awareness of the relation between evidence and evi-
dendum, namely that if e occurs then / is or has or it is most likely that /
has been present as well. In particular if e constitutes binding evidence for
χ, χ is thereby highly conditioned to be convinced that / occurred. If e con-
stitutes only partial evidence we might rather think that it is possible for JC
that / has occurred. In this context the phrase 'it is possible for JC' means
something to the effect that he could believe that / occurred but is not yet
convinced, or perhaps that it is likely that / occurred. In other words, par-
tial evidence brings in a certain degree of belief that / is probable to some
degree.

4. Binding and Partial Evidence

Let us, at this stage, pay attention to one important distinction between
binding and partial evidence. Binding evidence, I have said (Holmström-
Hintikka , 1995 b, p. 13) has to be the "missing link" which every lawyer,
scientist etc. tries to come up with in order to convince thereby himself or
the other party about the occurrence of a particular condition - or of the
lack thereof. Thus
(B b ) e is binding evidence iff e alone suffices to convince JC about/.
37=
564 Ghita Holmström-Hintikka

Partial evidence is evidence which only tells a part of the whole story
(Bp) e is partial evidence if e is a component of some evidence but e
does not alone suffice to convince * about /.
Several pieces of partial evidence might together suffice to convince an
agent about evidendum.
In a trial a murder weapon, the defendant's fingerprints on it and an eye
witness' testimony seem to be a strong and convincing combination. Juan
Alvaro's testimony could not alone bind evidence to evidendum but was
still a hard piece for the defence to try to tear apart.

5. What Counts as Evidence ?

As was said in the beginning of this chapter, the court alone decides
what counts as evidence and thereby what will be permitted. There are
essentially three types of evidence, physical evidence , witness testimony
and expert witness opinion. In almost any trial we find the combination of
these three. As I have discussed these matters elsewhere I shall not bring it
up here but go to a discussion on "reasonable doubt" and beyond.

IV. Beyond Reasonable Doubt

When a jury has been selected the jurors are instructed to form their
opinion based only on evidence presented in open court. They are also
told not to jump to conclusion and not to form their opinion until they
have heard all the evidence.
By the time when the lawyers have presented their closing arguments the
ball is in the jury's court. Before it sits down for deliberation the judge
provides the jury with his instructions and, among other things, requests the
jurors to consider whether in their mind the prosecution has shown, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty as charged.
The judge will also attempt a definition of the concept of 'reasonable
doubt'. It seems as if no one definition of this concept is available, so what
the trial judge has to do is to explain to the jury what the expression may
mean. A rule of thumb seems to be that the evidence presented should be
such that a rational agent is thereby convinced about the truth of the endight-
ment. The least s/he should be satisfied by is that the evidence has shown
that it is more likely than not that the defendant committed the crime he is
accused of. But "more likely than not" does not yet provide the level of cer-
tainty as does "beyond reasonable doubt". Its role is to set the minimum level
of conviction from which each juror should work her/himself up to the level
of "beyond reasonable doubt". The jury deliberation is meant to be the pro-
cess through which each juror forms her/his final opinion.
 Reasonable Doubt 565

In the Anglo-saxon case law system the requirement of "proven beyond

reasonable doubt" is absolute in the criminal trial. It does not enter the
game of a civil trial. Swedish and Finnish law, which have the old German
law as their foundation, do not require proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, there are tendencies in high profile cases (Palme for instance)
to set the stakes higher.
In their closing argument in the fictional Morales trial, the defence picks
up every testimony and every piece of evidence, so it seems, and tries to
show the jury how other interpretations essentially nullify the prosecution's
case. Some mysterious other person has been in Maria's office, Juan
Alvaro is unreliable, the DNA test is not 100% sure - as testified by an
expert. She gives the jury more than enough possibilities to question any
answer and shows that there are good reasons for doubt in each case.
The prosecutor on the other hand defends his key witness and shows
why he has to tell the truth. He points out that no one else has contradicted
any of his statements. Moreover, he shows how other evidence backs up
Mr. Alvaro's testimony.
Having finished their closing argument, all the operation on the left-hand
side of the interrogative table has come to an end. Typically the opposing
parties have suggested contradicting conclusions to be drawn. Now is the
time for the jury to withdraw carrying in their mind the judge's instruc-
tions.

7. 'Reasonable Doubt '

By 'reasonable doubt' I will mean that sound scepticism towards pre-

sented statements and existing conditions that a rational agent is expected
to show. Thus, we are not thinking of a Cartesian doubt neither are we
accepting a sloppy everything goes attitude. 'Reasonable doubt' is clearly
connected to the cognitive activity of finding competing answers and other
possible solutions. Armed with this attitude the juror is expected to perform
his/her obligation successfully.

2. Deliberation and Bracketing

Throughout the trial the jurors have been listening to evidence. For a
systematic investigation on the part of the juror, s/he should step by step look
at all the given answers. S/he should compare statements in the prosecution's
path with those of the defence. At each move s/he should ask her/himself
which of them is more plausible, i.e., which does s/he find convincing.
If the interrogations are available in computer files it is easier to com-
pare testimonies by different witnesses. For instance when Roberto Morales
566 Ghita Holmström-Hintikka

tells his story , this should be compared in the table with the testimony by
Mr. Alvaro. A simple sketch will show the procedure:

τ C

Defendant Witness Κ

prosecution defence prosecution defence

1.1 ~ P , (or: D) 1.2 ~ P , 1.3 P, (or: W K ) 1.4 P, (or: W K )

2.1 P : (or: D) 2.2 P^ 2.3 ~ P : (or W K ) 2.4 ~ P :
3.1 ~ P 3 (or: D) 3.4 P, (or: W J

Figure 6

On crucial points the juror will find contradictions in the opposing tables.
This is the point where s/he has to go to other evidence if available to seek
support for either of the two contradicting statements. Once this is found
s/he will find that the rest of the argument might be dependent on the,
as s/he decides, false answer. This in turn means that the juror has, not
only to bracket the false answer but everything that depends on it.
In a criminal trial there are two types of interrogations, direct examina-
tion with "what-who-how", i.e., "wh-questions" and cross-examination
with "yes-no" questions. When the two types of hearing have taken place
the judge (or jury) will have to study them both. Operative rules were used
to help perform the investigation and strategic rules are used to do it well.
In general, cross-examination was carried out according to the Socratic
method. "Did you go to the meeting, yes or no?", "Did you see the defend-
ant?", "Did you help the victim?" ... Even if both witnesses and attorneys
have the right to make inferences, as is the case according to both Swedish
and Finnish legislation it is the (jury and) judge who, in the final end, is
put to do this in his deliberation. First he will have to see whether the
proof is valid.
In a less complicated situation, say when we are dealing with the proto-
col of a cross-examination the yes-no answers will follow as in Socratic
dialectic mentioned above. According to the Socratic model one has to
follow the given answers and a) make sure that they are coherent with one
another, b) that they coincide and are coherent to other testimonies, c) that
they coincide with facts collected by other methods (forensic analysis, meas-
urements and calculations on the crime scene, other than physical evi-
dence). In evaluating the truth or falsity of an answer the juror has again to
look at the whole and ask her/himself which sounds more reasonable or
 Reasonable Doubt 567

more probable than not. This way the juror will have to go through the
whole Socratic tree, stopping at each node.

Figure 7

If for some reason a branch which in the beginning looks reliable turns
doubtful the juror will have to not only cut off everything that depends
thereupon but also to investigate the other branch, say Q k , and everything
that follows interrogatively or logically therefrom.
Assume that, in a study of yes-no-questions, some answer leads to unrea-
sonable results or contradictions. Then a particular, specifying question at
the particular node, say Q k , is needed.

Figure 8
568 Ghita Holmström-Hintikka

If it now turns out that the opposite answer, say ~ A k , leads to a more
reasonable result and in addition better corresponds with all the other testi-
monies then it is correct that the judge brackets the obscure answer A k and
everything that follows therefrom.

What has happened so far with the proof is that the judge was not con-
vinced by A k but instead by ~ A k , which has to replace A k in the chain of
evidence - after thorough auxiliary questions which clarify the node k of
course.

If we carefully study the reasoning at Q k we shall see that implicit

additional questions and answers have been added. "Does A k correspond
with ...?", "What is the conclusion if we accept ~A k ?", "What follows if
we exclude A k and then of course A k + k n ? "

These are auxiliary questions asked either by the judge or the jury in
order to be helpful in his/its search for the truthfulness of the evidence,
i.e., whether the evidence is convincing - for him/it. But how does this fit
into the Socratic interrogative model? Not all questions are "yes-no" ques-
tions. This problem we will have to return to, later. Here we shall see how
the new "yes-no" questions fit in.

Schematically the matter may be presented in the following way:

QI

Qic

~A

Figure 9
 Reasonable Doubt 569

In the original scheme we break the path from Q k (actually this happens at
each node, but in case of unproblematic answers A ï - A k _ i this will not
show). At Q k we add some auxiliary questions which are of the type
"either-or".

Figure 10

After this we rise the question Q k again but, since A k had to be excluded,
i.e., bracketed we choose the answer ~ A k . In the end of this answer there
comes the question Q k + 1 already rised before and which was answered
by one of the witnesses by A k + i . But, since A k had to be bracketed so
has A k + 1 . But then, is it so sure that ~ A k + 1 is adequate, actual or even
reasonable anymore? These are the very questions which have to be rised
at the node Q k + i . Depending on the answers one has to either bracket
the answer on Q k + 1 once more and then see what follows from its
denial, or else continue as before. In this manner one has to proceed step
by step until the final answer - or conclusion - is convincing. Each
answer has in principle to fulfil the requirements of evidence, to convince
the agent (judge or jury) about the occurrence of that condition the
answer in question is expected to confirm.
In an interrogative table which contains all questions rised and all
answers given the bracketing happens in an analogous way. Each evidence
or answer can be questioned. We obtain a complex metamodel of second-
570 Ghita Holmström-Hintikka

and higher-order interrogation. This can rapidly become difficult to handle

but we should not forget that this practice is in use as a part of the
researchers' and lawyers' daily life, to find evidence for evidence and to
bracket inadmissible evidence.
Having performed these investigations the jury as a whole has to, in a
criminal case, unanimously reach their verdict, as in Morales' case guilty
as charged.

Bibliography

Friedman , Philip, 1993. Inadmissible Evidence , Ivy Books, New York. - Hin-
tikka, Jaakko and Bachman, James, 1991. What If ...? Towards Excellence in Rea-
soning, Mayfield. - Holmström-Hintikka, Ghita, 1995 a. "Expert Witnesses in Legal
Argumentation", Argumentation 9, 489 - 502, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dor-
drecht, Holland. - Holmström-Hintikka, Ghita, 1995 b. "Evidence, Experts and
Legal Reasoning", in Ghita Holmström-Hintikka (ed.), Legal Argumentation, Com-
munication and Cognition, Vol. 28, Nr. 1, pp. 7 - 36. - Holmström-Hintikka, Ghita,
1995 c. "On the Use of Expert Witnesses in Legal Reasoning and Inquiry", ARSP-
Beiheft 61, Mikael M. Karlsson and Ólafur Pall Jónsson (eds.), Law, Justice and the
State IV. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, pp. 91 - 105.
 AULIS AARNIOS WERTUNGSJURISPRUDENZ
U N D IHRE BEDEUTUNG FÜR EINE
VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSTHEORIE

Von Raul Narits, Tartu

Bei dem Wort und Begriff Rechts Wissenschaft handelt es sich um einen
höchst unterschiedliche Wissenschaftsvorstellungen integrierenden Aus-
druck. Jede Wissenschaft bedient sich bestimmter Methoden und Arten des
Vorgehens, um Antworten auf die von ihr gestellten Fragen zu bieten. For-
schungsgegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft ist das Recht. Es handelt sich -
im Zusammenhang mit der kontinentaleuropäischen Rechtskultur betrachtet
- um das Studium von drei großen Rechtsgebieten. Diese drei, in ihrem
Verhältnis zueinander relativ selbständigen Rechtsgebiete sind (i) das Pri-
vatrecht, (ii) das Strafrecht und (iii) das Öffentliche Recht. Zu diesen
Rechtsgebieten gehören auch die Werte des Rechts unter Einschluß der
Rechtsprinzipien.

I. Über die Arten der Erkenntnis des Rechts

Es muß möglich sein, jede Wissenschaft durch ihren Forschungsgegen-

stand und ihre Forschungsmethoden zu bestimmen, die miteinander korre-
lieren. Lassen wir zunächst einmal die Frage beiseite, ob man für die
inhaltliche (Er-)Kenntnis des Rechts, hier verstanden im Sinne von cognitio
legum, überhaupt irgendeine Wissenschaft braucht. Das feste Ziel jedes
Gesetzgebers sollte die Ausarbeitung klarer und verständlicher Vorschriften
sein. Das Recht ist in diesem Idealfall Teil der Regeln, die jeder Mensch
wie selbstverständlich befolgt. Sie bilden, wie gewöhnlich angenommen
wird, zusammen mit den Geboten der Sittlichkeit (Moral) und den gesell-
schaftlichen Normen (Sitte) einen einfachen und in sich geschlossenen Ver-
haltenskodex.
Mag sein, daß dies früher einmal tatsächlich so war, aber eine derartige
Auffassung entspricht heute nicht mehr den Auffassungen von der sozialen
Wirklichkeit des Rechts. Zur Schaffung von Ordnung und Sicherheit dient
in der heutigen fragmentierten Gesellschaft ein höchst kompliziertes System
von Rechtsnormen. Ein derartiges System von normativen Verhaltensmu-
572 Raul Narits

stern kann und muß in sehr verschiedener Weise und auf verschiedenen
Ebenen identifiziert und eingehend untersucht werden. Es handelt sich um
die Erforschung, Erkenntnis und Erklärung des Rechts, beginnend mit den
innerstaatlichen und abschließend mit den zwischen- und überstaatlichen
Rechtsordnungen (Recht der Europäischen Union, Europarecht). Die gegen-
wärtige Auffassung von Rechtswissenschaft ist eine höchst komplexe Auf-
gabe. Traditionell werden darunter als verhältnismäßig selbständige Diszi-
plinen die Jurisprudenz, hier verstanden im Sinne von Rechtsdogmatik, die
Rechtsgeschichte, Rechtssoziologie und Rechtsphilosophie verstanden.
Im Sinne der Erkenntnis bildet die Philosophie die Grundlage für alle
Wissenschaftsbereiche. Sie ist auf die Gewinnung einer Ich-Erkenntnis in
der Umwelt gerichtet. Die Rechtsphilosophie und die Staatsphilosophie
waren ursprünglich klassische Bereiche der allgemeinen Philosophie. Erst
relativ spät haben sie diese Rolle verloren. Seither befassen sich vor allem
ausgebildete Juristen mit der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, die jedoch
zugleich imstande sein müssen, sich an den Problemen und Methoden der
allgemeinen Philosophie zu orientieren. Die Rechtsphilosophie unterschei-
det sich von anderen Bereichen der Philosophie dadurch, daß in ihr juristi-
sche Fragen in sehr allgemeiner, generalisierender Weise behandelt werden,
die sich an der Frage nach dem Wesen des Rechts orientieren. Bisweilen
wird das Charakteristische des Verhältnisses zwischen der Rechtswissen-
schaft und der Rechtsphilosophie darin erblickt, daß in der Rechtsphiloso-
phie die Frage von einem Juristen gestellt und von einem Philosophen
beantwortet wird. Infolgedessen muß derjenige, der sich mit der Rechtsphi-
losophie befaßt, über systematische Kenntnisse in beiden Fachbereichen
verfügen. Ich erinnere hier nur an die von Rudolf Stammler herrührende
Kennzeichnung eines guten Rechtsphilosophen, der imstande sein müsse,
sich durch einen Haufen von Akten ,durchzugraben'. Diese Kennzeichnung
paßt jedenfalls für einen Rechtsphilosophen, der in der kontinental-euro-
päischen Rechtskultur lebt und in ihr wirkt. Anders gesagt muß der Rechts-
philosoph ein guter Kenner des Rechts selbst sein.
Die Grundfragen der zeitgenössischen Rechtsphilosophie lassen sich in
drei große Problemkreise einteilen:
(1) Ist das Recht Bestandteil des Seins und damit als Objekt der Welt dem
Menschen vorgegeben? Dies ist die Frage nach dem ontologischen/
deontologischen Gegenstand der Rechtsphilosophie. Sie findet ihren
wohl stärksten Ausdruck im Rechtspositivismus.
(2) Kann ich überhaupt etwas wissen und unter welchen Bedingungen kann
ich behaupten, etwas von der Wirklichkeit erkannt zu haben? Es geht
also nicht mehr um die Welt als Objekt, sondern um die Beziehung der
Welt zum Menschen, also um das menschliche Bewußtsein.
 Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz 573

(3) Können wir überhaupt die Erkenntnis zur Frage nach dem Sinn des
menschlichen Daseins machen? Es geht mir hier darum, daß es auch im
Bereich des Rechts existentielle Erschütterungen gibt, wie beispiels-
weise das Versagen unseres irdischen Rechts, gemessen am Maßstab
absoluter Werte. Derjenige, der auf das vom Staat gesetzte Recht blind-
lings vertraut, wird nicht selten, wie wir dies in unserem Jahrhundert
mehrfach erfahren haben, in seinem blinden Vertrauen von politischer
Macht mißbraucht.
Folglich kann man zusammenfassend sagen, daß die Welt als das Sein,
die Erkenntnis und die Existenzart des Rechts (das Recht als Subjekt, als
Prozeß) den Gegenstand der Rechtsphilosophie bilden. Die beiden ersten
Fragenkreise, die einerseits auf den Positivismus und andererseits auf das
Naturrecht zurückführen, können nicht allein auf die Frage nach der Exi-
stenzart antworten, und deshalb umfaßt die Rechtsphilosophie auch den
dritten Fragenkreis. Das Finden von Antworten auf alle drei Fragenkreise
sollte es ermöglichen, die Frage „Was ist Recht?" zu beantworten. Ist es
etwas dem Menschen Vorgegebenes, eine ontologische Kategorie, oder ent-
steht es durch Bewußtsein und mit Hilfe von Bewußtsein (Erkenntnistheo-
rie)? Oder erzielt es seine Effizienz dank seiner Existenz und seiner
Anwendung? Daher stellt die Rechtsphilosophie keinesfalls ein philoso-
phieren' von sich selbst, ein Reflektieren auf sich selbst und über sich
selbst dar, sondern der Rechtsphilosoph erbringt aufgrund der stattfinden-
den Reflexion seinerseits Lösungen für die gerechte Weiterentwicklung
dieser Wirklichkeit.
Die Aufgabe der Rechtsgeschichte sowie anderer Arten der Rechts-
erkenntnis ist die Erweiterung unserer Erkenntnisse über das Recht. Hierbei
- so erscheint es auf den ersten Blick - würde genügen, wenn wir ein hin-
reichendes Wissen über früher existierende Rechtsordnungen gewinnen
könnten. Die Erweiterung der Erkenntnis muß in der Rechtsgeschichte
jedoch von einem Brückenschlag zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart
begleitet werden, dessen Ziel die Überlieferung bzw. Übertragung positiver
und nützlicher Erfahrungen aus dem früher existierenden Recht in die
Gegenwart ist. Die Entstehung des Rechts als einer bestimmten sozialen
Ordnung ist ein Prozeß, der in Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des Rechts
eingeteilt werden kann.1 Grundlage für diese Einteilung bilden das Fehlen
oder Vorhandensein schriftlicher Rechtsquellen. In der Rechtsgeschichte
spielen schriftliche Rechtsquellen eine große Rolle. Ungeachtet der Tatsa-
che, daß die Priorität den Rechtsquellen gehört, darf man nicht vergessen,
daß die Rechtsgeschichte keine wirkliche Rechtsgeschichte wäre, wenn sie
nicht die Genese des Rechts untersuchen würde. Das bedeutet, daß die

1
Raul Narits, Öiguse entsüklopeedia, Tallinn 1995, S. 11-12.
574 Raul Narits

Rechtsgeschichte irgendwo auf Raum und Zeit stößt, wo schriftliche Quel-

len fehlen, und auf Verhältnisse, wo neben den schriftlichen Quellen das
sogenannte ungeschriebene Recht existiert. Die Rechtsgeschichte als eine
Art der Rechtserkenntnis hat ihre wirkliche Bedeutung erst vor kurzem
erlangt. Ich möchte hier an die Rolle der Historischen Rechtsschule erin-
nern.2 Damit die Rechtsgeschichte möglichst umfassend die vor ihr ste-
hende Aufgabe, die Erweiterung der Erkenntnis und des Brückenschlags
zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, erfüllen kann, muß man die wich-
tigsten Funktionen der Rechtsgeschichte berücksichtigen: (i) die philosophi-
sche, (ii) die genetische und (iii) die empirische (Erkenntnis-)Funktion. Die
genaue Kenntnis der Rechtsgeschichte setzt eine Kenntnis dessen voraus,
was der Zweck des früher geltenden Rechts war und welche in Raum und
Zeit allgemein anerkannten Vorstellungen über die Gerechtigkeit gelten.
Hinzu kommt noch die Erkenntnis der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und
sozialen Verhältnisse gemäß den raumzeitlichen Bedingungen des früher
geltenden Rechts. In der Praxis ist das Interesse für die Rechtsgeschichte
mehr genetischer Art. Die genetische Auffassung des Rechts kann bedeu-
ten, daß das früher geltende Recht als Vorstufe des gegenwärtigen Rechts
betrachtet wird. So bildet sich bei der Auffassung des Rechts eine
bestimmte Abstufung, die sich ständig weiterentwickelt. Die genetische
Funktion des Rechts ist traditionell aber von der Vorgeschichte des Rechts
getragen. Es scheint, daß die Rechtsgenese sowohl diese weite Bedeutung
(die Entwicklung des Rechts in Raum und Zeit) als auch die enge Bedeu-
tung (im Sinne der Vorgeschichte des Rechts) in sich einschließt.3 Die Ana-
lysen der Rechtsgeschichte beschränken sich aber nicht nur auf genetische
und philosophische Funktionen. Zu diesen Funktionen kommt noch die
empirische oder (Er-)Kenntnisfunktion hinzu. Einerseits erleichtert die
genaue Kenntnis des Rechts unsere Überlegungen über den Menschen und
sein Vorgehen in der Welt. Der Wert der Erkenntnis besteht aber auch
darin, daß beim Kennenlernen des unterschiedlichen, in Zeit und Raum gel-
tenden Rechts eine Möglichkeit zum Vergleich oder wenigstens zum Sehen
von Alternativen entsteht. Die Funktion der Erkenntnis ist eben dieser
unmittelbare Faktor, der es uns ermöglicht, funktionale Zusammenhänge
zwischen dem Einzelnen und dem Allgemeinen zu sehen.
Im weiteren Sinne ermöglichen derartige Kenntnisse es uns, ein höheres
Niveau zu erreichen und Zusammenhänge und Verhältnisse sowohl zwi-
schen den Normen als auch zwischen den Rechtsordnungen zu sehen. Die
Funktion der Erkenntnis bringt klar zum Ausdruck, daß in der Rechtsge-
schichte die Berücksichtigung des Historismus nicht in gleichem Maße
erforderlich ist wie die Berücksichtigung des empirischen Rationalismus.

2
Savignyana, Texte und Studien, hrsg. v. Joachim Rückert, Frankfurt a.M. 1993.
3
Narits, Öiguse entsüklopeedia (FN 1), S. 13.
 Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz 575

Die Funktion der Erkenntnis - das ist nicht schwer zu bemerken! - kann
niemals auf die Geschichte einer nationalen Rechtsordnung beschränkt
werden. Ich unterstützt nachhaltig die Betrachtungsweise, nach der der
historische Kontext der Rechtskultur als ganzer zu berücksichtigen ist. Zu
den wichtigsten Entwicklungen des einheitlichen Europa gehört der seit
dem Mittelalter in allen mittel- und westeuropäischen Universitäten Euro-
pas verbreitete Unterricht des römischen Rechts (Rezeption). Der Kurs des
römischen Privatrechts bildet bis auf den heutigen Tag eine Grundlage für
das Verständnis der gemeinsamen Züge im europäischen Privatrecht. Der
große Einfluß des römischen Rechts führte in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhun-
dert zur Bildung von zwei wissenschaftlichen Richtungen, wobei die eine
sich mehr mit den Wurzeln des römischen Rechts (Romanisten) und die
zweite mit der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (Germanisten) befaßte.
Ich persönlich finde, daß die Rechtsgeschichte unter den Arten der
Erkenntnis des Rechts die komplizierteste ist, ganz zu schweigen davon,
daß die Rechtsgeschichte ihrem Umfang nach (an Quantität) alle anderen
Forschungsarten des Rechts übersteigt.
So wie die Rechtsphilosophie ein Teil der Philosophie ist, so bildet die
Rechtssoziologie einen Teil der Soziologie. In der soziologischen Untersu-
chung versucht man, die Ursachen und Fakten zu finden, die die zu unter-
suchenden Prozesse beeinflussen. Weil die soziologische Behandlung in
vielem empirisch ist, ist es möglich, die Ergebnisse der Soziologie zu for-
malisieren. Darin liegt auch der Grund, warum allein die Rechtssoziologie
oft als die „wirkliche Rechtswissenschaft" angesehen und als erste wissen-
schaftliche Untersuchungsweise akzeptiert wird. Diese Auffassung ist auch
charakteristisch für die Naturwissenschaften, wo die Exaktheit der For-
schungsergebnisse entsprechender Lebensbereiche ohne Formalisierung gar
nicht möglich wäre. Die Rechtssoziologie gehört zum systematischen
Wissen, das - genetisch gesehen - aus der Sozialphilosophie erwachsen ist,
und bildet einen verhältnismäßig selbständigen Teil der Soziologie, auf die
schon ihre Bezeichnung hindeutet. Gegenstand der Rechtssoziologie ist die
Feststellung der zwischen dem Recht und der Gesellschaft bestehenden
Zusammenhänge. Das sind Fragen darüber, ob und unter welchen Bedin-
gungen das Recht die Lenkung des menschlichen Handelns ermöglicht und
wie das Recht selbst auf soziale Änderungen reagiert. Besonders ausdrück-
lich tritt die rechtssoziologische Untersuchungsweise und ihre Bedeutung
dann hervor, wenn in der Gesellschaft große soziale Änderungen oder gar
Revolutionen stattfinden.
Eine detaillierte Beschreibung der Arten der Rechtserkenntnis ist hier
nicht meine Aufgabe, weil das ein Eindringen in überflüssige Details
bedeuten würde. Die Lenkung der Aufmerksamkeit auf die Behandlungs-
weisen war deswegen notwendig, weil es nicht möglich wäre, sich mit der
576 Raul Narits

zeitgenössischen Rechtswissenschaft auf rationalem Niveau zu befassen,

ohne daß wir uns die Möglichkeit, aber auch die Notwendigkeit der mit
dem Gegenstand der heutigen Rechtswissenschaft verbundenen, verschiede-
nen Arten der Erkenntnis vor Augen führen. Es sei noch hinzugefügt, daß
es neben den gegebenen horizontalen' Arten der Rechtserkenntnis (deren
immanenter Teil natürlich auch die Jurisprudenz ist) hinreichenden Grund
gibt, über den Multi Level Approach 4 bei der Erkenntnis des Rechts zu
sprechen. Die verschiedenen Ebenen des Rechtsdenkens - Levels der Theo-
retisierung - führen nämlich ihrerseits im Ergebnis zu einem gesteigerten
Erkenntnisvermögen. Levelspezifisches Rechtsdenken bringt somit einen
gesteigerten Erkenntnisgewinn.

II. Wertungsjurisprudenz als rechtliche Handlungsform

und Art der Rechtserkenntnis

Im folgenden werde ich die Jurisprudenz, insbesondere die Wertungs-

jurisprudenz (i) als eine rechtliche Handlungsform und (ii) als eine Art der
Erkenntnis des Rechts behandeln, mich jedoch hier dem Schwerpunkt nach
auf die Eigenart der juridischen Erkenntnis des Rechts konzentrieren. Die
rechtstheoretische Denkweise im weiteren Sinne wird heute üblicherweise
in drei Teile eingeteilt. Schon vom Denkansatz her werden (1) rechtliche
Erscheinungen gewöhnlich wie Tatsachen (Fakten) behandelt. Eine norma-
tive Denkweise, die sich konsequent auf das Verhältnis zwischen den
Rechtsnormen und dem menschlichen Handeln (Unterlassen) bezieht, kann
man realistisch nennen. Außerdem wird (2) das Rechtsdenken als analy-
tisch-begriffliches konzipiert, in dessen Rahmen das in Normsätzen bzw.
Normsatzpropositionen formulierte Recht von seiner inneren Ordnung her
betrachtet wird. Ferner wird die juristische Denkweise (3) als ein auf Werte
gestütztes Denken angesehen. Diesem Denkansatz liegen rechtliche Werte
oder genauer: Werte im Recht zugrunde.5
Hier ist anzumerken, daß bei manchen Autoren von der Anerkennung
bzw. der Anerkennungswürdigkeit ,übergesetzlicher' oder ,vorpositiver'
Werte die Rede ist, die den gesetzlichen Regeln voraus- bzw. zugrunde
liegen und zu ihrer Auslegung und Ergänzung unter bestimmten Bedingun-
gen mit herangezogen werden dürfen oder gar müssen.

4
Siehe Werner Krawietz, Recht ohne Staat? Spielregeln des Rechts und Rechts-
system in normen- und systemtheoretischer Perspektive, in: RECHTSTHEORIE 24
(1993), S. 100-114.
5
Zur Analyse der gegenwärtigen rechtstheoretischen Denkweisen s. Juha Tolo-
nen, Grundzüge der Finnischen Rechtstheorie, in: Aulis Aarnio/Ilkka Niinuluoto/
Jyrki Uusitalo (Hrsg.), Methodologie und Erkenntnistheorie der juristischen Argu-
mentation, Berlin 1981, S. 11-33.
 Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz 577

Vielleicht wäre es hier richtiger, die Bezeichnung Wertungsgrundsatz

oder Wertungsmaßstab zu gebrauchen. Auch geht die Wertungsjurisprudenz
davon aus, daß diese Wertungsmaßstäbe der Regelung, Rechtsetzung,
Gesetzgebung und Auslegung zugrunde liegen, aber sie tun dies als Ergeb-
nis von (der Erfahrung und Beobachtung zugänglichen) Wertungen des
Verfassungs- und Gesetzgebers usf.
An dieser Stelle möchte ich einige persönliche Erfahrungen im Umgang
mit dem geltenden Recht hinzufügen. Ich studierte 1971-1976 an der Juri-
stischen Fakultät der Universität Tartu (Estland) und schrieb meine Doktor-
arbeit, die ich 1987 verteidigte, an der Moskauer Lomonossow-Universität.
Dies bedeutete, daß das Recht und die mit ihm befaßte Jurisprudenz sich
für mich besonders unverhüllt als ,Kinder ihrer Zeit4 darstellten. Es handelt
sich in der Tat darum, daß juristische Fachkenntnisse nicht unbedingt
wissenschaftliches (systematisches) Wissen beinhalten. Die Aufgabe der
Rechtswissenschaft ist aber eine allseitige und systematische Untersuchung
des Rechts als eines sozialen Phänomens durch Auslegung und kritische
Interpretation der vertretenen Standpunkte. Ich darf sagen, daß es sich bei
mir (aber auch bei vielen anderen, die Rechtswissenschaft unter den Bedin-
gungen und Verhältnissen einer totalitären gesellschaftlichen Ordnung stu-
diert haben) um eine Situation handelte, wo nur die sogenannte , halbe
Wahrheit4 über das Recht zu uns gelangte. Recht und Rechtswissenschaft
waren aber nicht nur in diesem Falle, sondern sie sind stets geprägt durch
die ideologischen Prämissen und Voraussetzungen, die aller Rechtsbildung
und jedem staatlich organisierten Rechtssystem als Leitideen oder basale
Rechtswerte zugrunde liegen.
Über die Jurisprudenz als solche kann und muß man auch im Zusammen-
hang mit der Bildung der Rechtsordnung des Römischen Reichs der Antike
sprechen. In dieser Periode hat sich die antike Jurisprudenz formiert. Heute
wird der Bezeichnung „die" Jurisprudenz manchmal die gleiche Bedeutung
wie Rechtswissenschaft beigemessen. Im Rechtsunterricht kannte man das
Institut der instructio, was bedeutete, daß das Recht nicht nur im Sinne des
Kennenlernens des geltenden Rechts (Lesen von Rechtsquellen - institutio)
unterrichtet wurde, sondern zusätzlich noch eine sachkundige Erklärung -
Beratung - stattfand. 6 In dem von mir gemeinten Fall handelt es sich dem-
gegenüber um die Erklärung des Rechtsgeschehens im Rechtsunterricht,
ausgehend von einer der möglichen Arten der Rechtserkenntnis, nämlich
vom Standpunkt der Theorie und Soziologie des Rechts. Aber auch dieser
Art der Erkenntnis wurde der Inhalt der sogen. Klassentheorie vorgegeben,
d.h. die Annahme, daß alles Recht durch seinen Klassencharakter geprägt

6
Franz Wieacker, Römische Rechtsgeschichte: Quellenkunde, Rechtsbildung, Ju-
risprudenz und Rechtsliteratur, Bd. 1, München 1988, S. 310.

38 FS Aarnio
578 Raul Narits

wird. Ihr Keim liegt in der Prämisse, daß die weiterführende Kraft der
Gesellschaft hauptsächlich der Klassenkampf ist. Der Wille der wirtschaft-
lich herrschenden Klassen wird zum Gesetz hypostasiert, und die Juristen
müssen diesen präsumtiven Willen der herrschenden Klasse kennen und
anwenden.7 Einerseits vermittelte eine derartige Methodologie Kenntnisse
über das Recht, aber sie machte das äußerst einseitig. Aufgrund solcher
, Kenntnisse4 konnte sich infolgedessen auch nur ein sehr einseitiges Rechts-
denken herausbilden. Andererseits ermöglichte es auch diese Ausbildung
dem Juristen, als Vertreter seines Berufes aufzutreten. Der Grund dafür ist
lapidar und einfach: Der Jurist fragt zuerst, ob die eine oder andere Rechts-
norm gilt, und erst danach, was der Sinn und Zweck des objektiven Rechts
ist. Zugleich wurde im Unterrichtsprozeß viel Aufmerksamkeit auf die
Bekanntmachung des jeweils geltenden, objektiven Rechts verwendet. Sich
mit Jurisprudenz als einem Teil der Rechtswissenschaft zu befassen, bedeu-
tete in vielem die Rechtfertigung des objektiven Rechts. Ein einseitiges
(metaphysisches) Rechtsdenken kann aber keinen zureichenden Grund für
die Erklärung des Rechts auf den diversen Ebenen des rechtspraktischen
Operierens und Entscheidens (Multi-Level-Approach) sowie der Auslegung
des Rechts bieten, sondern nur zur Rechtfertigung der im Recht eingenom-
menen inhaltlichen Meinungen und Standpunkte dienen. So gesehen, hat
sich für mich die gegenwärtige Rechtswissenschaft in ihrem Inhaltsreich-
tum und ihrer Kompliziertheit außerhalb des Jurastudiums entfaltet. Das
wurde in vollem Umfang durch die wiedergewonnene Selbständigkeit und
Souveränität Estlands und die Gestaltung der estnischen Gesellschaft zu
einer offenen demokratischen Gesellschaft möglich.
Die Jurisprudenz des 20. Jahrhunderts ist ihrem Wesen nach unumstritten
Wertungsjurisprudenz. Die Fragen nach den über den Gesetzen stehenden
Wertungsmaßstäben sind jedoch weniger Fragen der Jurisprudenz und der
Souveränität. Mit den Wertungsproblemen befassen sich in dem einen oder
anderen Kontext alle Vertreter der zeitgenössischen Jurisprudenz. Im
Zusammenhang mit den Grundrechten ist diese Problematik schön früh von
Reinhold Zippelius8 behandelt worden. Er interessierte sich dafür, auf wel-
cher Grundlage eine Wertungsentscheidung getroffen wird und wie weit

7
Der Ausgang von Klassenpositionen erklärt das Wesen des Rechts als ein ge-
sellschaftliches Phänomen, das in seinem Bildungsprozeß den Willen der Menschen
durchkreuzt. Das Recht ist nicht bloß Ausdruck eines gesellschaftlichen Willens,
sondern des Klassencharakters der Gesellschaft, der seinerseits seinen Ausdruck in
allgemeinverbindlichen Verhaltensregeln findet, welche die wirtschaftlichen und
ideellen Beziehungen ordnen, festigen und entwickeln. S. Marksistko-leninskaja ob-
saja teorija gosudarstva I prava: Osnovnöe insitutô I ponjatija, Moskau: Juriditseska-
ja literatura 1970, S. 366.
8
Reinhold Zippelius, Wertungsprobleme im System der Grundrechte, München
1962.
 Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz 579

man in der Verfolgung von derartigen Wertungsmaßstäben überhaupt gehen

kann. Jeder von uns gewinnt Wertungserfahrungen, die gutgeheißen oder
gerügt werden. Jedoch erscheint nie endgültig sicher, welche Wertungser-
fahrungen zu identifizieren, nachzuvollziehen und zu erkennen sind. Auch
ist es schwierig, eine breite Basis von übereinstimmenden Wertungserfah-
rungen zu schaffen. In Verbindung mit den Grundrechten ist das in der
Gesellschaft herrschende Rechtsethos im Grundgesetz selbst enthalten. Mit
diesem Gang der Erwägungen muß man einverstanden sein, denn in jeder
Gesellschaft hat es etwas gegeben und gibt es etwas, was sich viele oder
sogar alle zu eigen gemacht, d.h. als Wert anerkannt haben. Erich Hub-
mann9 will zeigen, daß Werte nicht nur im Gefühl gegeben sind, sondern
auch die juridische Rationalität, hier verstanden als Wertrationalität, hat
einen Zugang zu ihnen. Außerdem sind Werte objektiv im Sinne allgemei-
ner, institutionell gestützter Geltung. Das bedeutet, daß sie nicht nur für
einzelne wertvoll sind, sondern auch und gerade dann, wenn sie für uns, für
viele oder gar für alle Befriedigung und Erfüllung bringen (können).10
Daraus ergeben sich für ihn (Grundsatz-)Normen, die vom objektiven Recht
berücksichtigt werden können oder gar müssen und auf die das Recht
immer wieder ausgerichtet werden muß. Helmut Coing11 spricht von über-
zeitlichen, d.h. zeitlos (also in jedem Zeitpunkt) geltenden Wertinhalten,
die sich in Rechtsgrundsätzen manifestieren und demgemäß von einer Art
Naturrecht als einer Summe von Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit ausgehen.12
Franz Bydlinski fragt, woher die Bewertungsmaßstäbe kommen, wenn
solche Maßstäbe dem gesetzten Recht nicht mit hinreichender Deutlichkeit
zu entnehmen sind.13 Diese Frage ist für Bydlinski die Grundfrage der Wer-
tungsjurisprudenz. Ihm genügt nicht der Hinweis auf die in einer bestimm-
ten Rechtsgesellschaft allgemein anerkannten oder überwiegenden Wertvor-
stellungen. Er ist auf der Suche nach grundlegenden Axiomen oder Katego-
rien, die bei der Auswahl von Wertvorstellungen helfen sollen. Als
Kriterien will er auch Rechtsprinzipien und Regelungen des positiven
Rechts heranziehen. Damit gewinnt für Bydlinski die Frage nach dem
Rang Verhältnis juristischer Prinzipien zentrale Bedeutung.
Die vorliegende, zugegebenermaßen kurze, aber alles andere als zufällige
Übersicht über die Probleme, die von Vertretern der Jurisprudenz im
Zusammenhang mit der Wertungsjurisprudenz des 20. Jahrhunderts aufge-
worfen werden, läßt die Annahme zu, daß auch Aulis Aarnio einen Beitrag

9
Erich Hubmann, Wertung und Abwägung im Recht, 1977.
10
Ebd., S. 8, 14.
11
Helmut Coing, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, 4. Aufl. Berlin 1985.
12
Ebd., S. 214.
13
Franz Bydlinski, Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff, Wien/New
York 1982, S. 128.

38*
580 Raul Narits

zur Wertungsjurisprudenz und zur vergleichenden Rechtstheorie geleistet

hat. Das ist keine leere Behauptung, sondern wird durch die Forschungen
und Veröffentlichungen Aarnios vollauf bestätigt.14 Dank der Betrachtun-
gen von Aarnio offenbaren sich auch die Zusammenhänge, die zwischen
der Wertungsjurisprudenz und der vergleichenden Rechtstheorie bestehen.
Das Problem der Wertungsjurisprudenz, so wie es sich heute am Aus-
gang dieses Jahrhunderts stellt, wurde für mich akut, als an meiner Heimat-
universität in Tartu, der einzigen aima mater Estlands, für den Unterricht
an der (gleichfalls einzigen) Rechtsfakultät des Landes eine neue Lösung
gefunden werden mußte. Im Jahre 1991 eröffnete sich für mich eine Fort-
bildungsmöglichkeit an der Universität Helsinki. Hier habe ich - neben
anderer Literatur - erstmals Aulis Aarnios Monographie „Laintulkinnan
teoria" [Theorie der Auslegung des Rechts] aus dem Jahre 1988 gelesen.
Ich hatte in meiner Hand eine Monographie, in der sich nicht nur die
gegenwärtige Jurisprudenz, sondern der ganze Reichtum der vergleichenden
Rechtstheorie widerspiegelte. Deshalb scheint mir die Behauptung von Juha
Tolonen, in der finnischen rechtstheoretischen Diskussion seien eine analy-
tisch-theoretische und eine realistisch-theoretische Richtung gleichermaßen
vertreten, als ein wenig voreilig und zumindest einseitig. Dies gilt jeden-
falls, sofern er behauptet, von den beiden spiele die analytische Richtung
im Rechtsdenken die bedeutendste Rolle.

I I I . Vom Wahrheitswert der Rechtserkenntnis und den

Rechtswahrheiten der Wertungsjurisprudenz

Unter laufender Bezugnahme auf Aarnios „Laintulkinnan teoria" möchte

ich zeigen, (1) warum Aarnio, so wie ich ihn verstehe, ein Vertreter der
Wertungsjurisprudenz ist und (2) welche Bedeutung das für eine verglei-
chende Rechtstheorie hat. Es scheint, daß Aarnio nicht zufällig den folgen-
den Gedanken von Ihering als Motto seiner Arbeit gewählt hat: „Von allen
Gesetzen, mit denen sich die Juristen befassen, kennen sie am schlechtesten
die Gesetze ihrer Wissenschaft." Natürlich handelt es sich hierbei nicht um
Gesetze im materiellen oder formellen Sinn, um die Gesetze, die zum
objektiven Recht gehören oder einmal dazu gehört haben. Es geht vielmehr
um die Erkenntnis von Strukturen und Verfahrensweisen, Grundsätzen,
Arten von Normen u.a.m., die für die systematische Erkenntnis eines Fach-
gebiets benötigt werden. Zugleich bringt Aarnio eine wichtige Ergänzung:

14
Ich weise hier nur hin auf: Aulis Aarnio, Methodologie und Erkenntnistheorie
der juristischen Argumentation, Berlin 1981; ders., Denkweisen der Rechtswissen-
schaft, Wien 1979; ders., Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence, Helsinki
1983; ders., Wegen Recht und Billigkeit, Berlin 1988; ders., Legal Reasoning, Dart-
mouth 1992.
 Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz 581

„Am Anfang ist noch eine Bemerkung notwendig. Es gibt nämlich in der
Rechtstheorie keine absoluten Wahrheiten und Standpunkte, die für alle
Fälle gelten. Verschiedene Auffassungen sind wie auf die Wirklichkeit
gerichtete Lichtbündel, mit deren Hilfe dieses mehrfarbige Gesamtbild ent-
steht, welches Rechtswissenschaft genannt wird." Das ist die im Laufe von
fast 25 Jahren gewonnene Auffassung eines Wissenschaftlers darüber, was
Rechtswissenschaft, ihr Gegenstand und überhaupt das Rechtsdenken ist. 15
Als Strukturen des Rechts und Bereiche der Rechtswissenschaft hebt
Aarnio hervor: (i) die Rechtssoziologie, deren Forschungsgegenstand die
Gesetzmäßigkeiten des Rechtslebens sind und deren Methode die empiri-
sche Methode ist; (ii) die Rechtsdogmatik, deren Forschungsgegenstand die
Rechtsnormen sind und deren Methode die Auslegung und Systematisie-
rung ist, (iii) die Rechtsgeschichte, in der die Entwicklung der Rechtsnor-
men mit Hilfe historischer Methoden untersucht wird, und (iv) die verglei-
chende Rechtswissenschaft, insbesondere die Rechtstheorie, deren For-
schungsgegenstand auch die Rechtsnormen anderer Länder sind und die
Methode der Auslegung zusammen mit dem Gebrauch empirischer und
historischer Methoden. Die rechtswissenschaftliche Forschung stellt aber
ein hierarchisches System dar, das seine Anfänge in der allgemeinen Philo-
sophie hat, d.h. man stellt ab auf die Ebene der Philosophie und gelangt
von dort auf die Ebene der Rechtstheorie. Die Ausflüsse der letzteren sind
Gesetzgebungstheorie, juristische Entscheidungstheorie und die Theorie der
Erkenntnis selbst. Vielleicht wäre es genauer, bei der Bezeichnung des
rechtswissenschaftlichen Bereichs anstatt der Bezeichnung „vergleichende
Rechtswissenschaft" oder vergleichende Rechtstheorie statt dessen die
Bezeichnung Theorie der Rechtsvergleichung zu verwenden. Gemeint ist
jedenfalls, daß die Rechtswissenschaft sich nicht nur für die Formen, son-
dern auch für die Inhalte „fremder" Rechtsordnungen interessiert. Es ist
deswegen durchaus logisch, nicht nur die Anwendung der Gesetze, sondern
auch die Gesetzgebung selbst auf der Ebene der Theorie, d. h. einer Theorie
der Rechtspolitik und/oder Theorie der Gesetzgebung zu behandeln.16
Dabei kann zum Beispiel die Anwendung des Gesetzes als eine Theorie der
Rechtsprechung (Rechtsprechungslehre) oder der Verwaltung (Verwal-
tungslehre) betrachtet werden. Alle diese theoretischen Behandlungsweisen
stellen eine Beschäftigung mit der Rechtstheorie dar, die ihrerseits ein Teil
der Rechtsphilosophie und - auf höherer Ebene - ein Teil der allgemeinen
Philosophie ist. „Zum Beispiel kann die Theorie über die Anwendung des
Gesetzes nichts sagen, was im allgemeinen keine Verbindung mit der Philo-
sophie hätte. Es gibt keine besondere Philosophie des rechtlichen Den-

15
Aulis Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, Yleisen oikustieteen oppikirja Werner
Söderström Osakeyhtio 1988, S. 5.
16
Ebd., S. 52.
582 Raul Narits

kens'. Dies wird bisweilen so dargestellt, und zwar ziemlich oft, aber den
Grund dafür bildet die Anmaßung der Juristen selbst."17
Bei der Charakterisierung der Jurisprudenz verwirft Aarnio die Ansicht,
daß die Jurisprudenz mit der juristischen Praxis gleichzusetzen sei. Er fragt,
ob die Resultate, d.h. die Auslegung von Normen und Fakten durch die
Jurisprudenz in irgendeinem relevanten Sinn ,besser' oder richtiger sein
könne als die Auffassungen und Standpunkte über den Inhalt der Rechtsord-
nung, die in der praktischen juristischen Tätigkeit entstehen. Falls dieser
,Vorteil' nicht zum Ausdruck komme, werde die Stellung der Rechtswis-
senschaft, zum Beispiel als akademisches Unterrichtsfach, fraglich. In
diesem Fall wäre die Rechtswissenschaft nur eine bloße Reproduktion der
reinen Praxis. In Wirklichkeit unterscheidet sich die Jurisprudenz als wis-
senschaftliche Forschungsarbeit erheblich von der praktischen juristischen
Tätigkeit. Diesen Unterschied kann man im allgemeinen dadurch charakte-
risieren, daß die juristische wissenschaftliche Arbeit den Stempel einer wis-
senschaftlichen Verfahrensweise trägt. Eine wissenschaftliche Auffassung
ist etwas anderes als technisch exaktes Erfüllen einer praktischen juristi-
schen Aufgabe. Die Auffassungen der Jurisprudenz sind keine Vermutun-
gen, Meinungen oder das Äußern von Zweifeln. Sie sind kontrollierte
Hypothesen, denn die Rechtswissenschaft traut - wie jede andere Wissen-
schaft - nur einem festen System, der Konsequenz, Unpersönlichkeit,
Objektivität und Sachlichkeit ihrer Einsichten und Erkenntnisse. Zugleich
kann man in der Rechtswissenschaft bildhaft drei Ebenen unterscheiden: (a)
die wissenschaftstheoretische Ebene, (b) die rechtstheoretische Ebene oder
die Ebene der systematisierenden Rechtswissenschaft und (c) die Ebene der
praktischen Rechtswissenschaft. 18 Es ist klar, daß keine Wissenschaftstheo-
rie im leeren Raum wirken kann. Eine Theorie braucht für die Identifika-
tion ihres Gegenstandes Erfahrungen der Praxis, und letztere muß ihrerseits
ihre Resultate auf der Ebene der theoretischen Rechtswissenschaft testen.
Die Rechtswissenschaft wird ihrerseits dann durch die Rechtstheorie (Juris-
prudence) beeinflußt, wenn irgendwelche theoretische Gedankenäußerungen
sich in theoretische Rechtswissenschaft verwandeln. Auf keiner Ebene der
Rechtswissenschaft dürfen das System und die Struktur der Theorie ver-
nachlässigt werden. Anderenfalls würde die Rechtswissenschaft ihre Über-
sichtlichkeit verlieren. Das Resultat wäre eine Lage, in der die Rechtswis-
senschaft nur eine ,Wissenschaft' ist, die einzelne Probleme auf praktischer
Ebene erörtert und nur Einzelerklärungen geben könnte.
Da die Rechtswissenschaft schon seit Jahrhunderten existiert, ist der
Umfang der Rechtsliteratur kolossal gestiegen. Ungeachtet dessen ist die

17
Ebd.
18
Ebd., S. 253.
 Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz 583

zeitgenössische Fachliteratur in Estland schwer zugänglich. Noch weniger

zugänglich ist die muttersprachliche Fachliteratur. Aarnios „Laintulkinnan
teoria" schließt mit Blick auf die estnischen Verhältnissen eine bestehende
Lücke im Schrifttum über die Jurisprudenz. Zugleich möchte ich hervorhe-
ben, daß Aarnio das Recht sowohl von verschiedenen Forschungsarten als
auch von seinem Multi-Level-Approach ausgehend in sehr grundsätzlicher
Weise behandelt und erklärt („horizontale" und „vertikale" Rechtserklä-
rung). Nach der Behandlung, die Aarnio dem Objekt seiner Erkenntnis
widerfahren läßt, ist es nicht möglich, das Recht zu erkennen, ohne zu
fragen, woher die Erkenntnis selbst kommt und welches Verhältnis zwi-
schen Erkenntnis und Wirklichkeit besteht. Die Frage ist durchaus ange-
bracht, denn die Auffassungen über die Möglichkeiten und den Umfang der
wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis des Rechts sind sehr umstritten. Mit Hilfe
von einfachen Mitteln bloßer Abstraktion oder durch Beobachtung allein ist
es nicht möglich, etwas zu beweisen oder systematisch zu begründen. Es
wird eine Theorie benötigt, die eben diese Problemstellungen systematisch
behandelt. Auch im Recht wird eine Sachfrage nicht so behandelt, daß die
Antwort in einem Kodex (Gesetz) nachgeschlagen werden könnte. Das
Leben ist zu komplex, um so leicht eine Antwort auf die Frage nach dem
Inhalt des Rechts zu finden. Man kann erst dann von einer durch Erfahrung
gut bestätigten Erkenntnis sprechen, wenn wiederholt einschlägige Beob-
achtungen gemacht werden konnten. Zugleich muß deren analytisch-begriff-
liche und theoretische Eingliederung einen festen systematischen Charakter
gewinnen.
Das Recht bildet ein bestimmtes, realiter existierendes System von
Normen und Handlungen. Die beiden wichtigsten Eigenschaften jedes
Systems sind (i) das Fehlen von Amorphie und (ii) die Ganzheit. Das
Fehlen der Amorphie bedeutet, daß es im System verschiedene Elemente
geben kann, die untereinander auf eine ganz bestimmte Weise verbunden
sind. Die Ganzheit oder Einheitlichkeit des Systems deutet hin auf die ver-
hältnismäßige Trennung dieses Systems von anderen, mit sich selbst jeweils
identischen Systemen. Daher beruht der Begriff des Systems auf den
Begriffen „Elemente" und „Verhältnis". Die soziale Regelung - zu deren
Elementen als ein Element auch die rechtliche Regelung gehört - funktio-
niert verhältnismäßig autonom.19 Auch Aarnio versucht, in seiner Arbeit
die charakteristischen Züge des Rechts als eines Systems herauszuarbeiten:
Hierarchie, Selbständigkeit, Organisiertheit, Selbstregulierung usw., aber
dies ist bei weitem nicht alles. „Unter welchen Bedingungen können wir
sagen, daß wir etwas über etwas wissen?"20 Hier lenkt Aarnio unsere Auf-

19
Der Systemtheoretiker Niklas Luhmann behandelt auch die ganze Gesellschaft
als ein System, das ähnlich wie ein selbständiger Organismus funktioniert. Niklas
Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren, Neuwied/Berlin 1969.
584 Raul Narits

merksamkeit auf die rationale Begründbarkeit und Begründetheit der

Erkenntnis. Auch die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis ist letzten Endes ein
rational begründeter und insoweit wahrer Glaube an das Wesen der
Dinge.21 Die Geschichte der Philosophie zeige, daß eine Auffassung dann
als wahr angesehen wird, wenn sie der Wirklichkeit entspricht. In dem
einen Fall offenbart sich die Wahrheit der Auffassung dann, wenn sie mit
der Wirklichkeit verglichen wird; im anderen Fall wird die Auffassung für
wahr gehalten, wenn es sich um die gelungene und nützliche Lösung eines
Problems handelt; im dritten Fall wird nur das für wahr gehalten, worüber
sich die Menschen, die die Sache in einem idealen Diskurs erörtern, einig
werden. Getrennt und für sich genommen ist keine dieser Möglichkeiten
allein als Kriterium der Rechtserkenntnis geeignet. Zugleich hat jede von
ihnen ihre Bedeutung im Rechtsdenken. Es handelt sich um einen methodo-
logischen Monismus eigener Art. Das bedeutet, daß es in den Methoden der
Naturwissenschaften, Sozial- und Humanwissenschaften viele Gemeinsam-
keiten und Ähnlichkeiten gibt. Und obwohl nur die Naturwissenschaften
und die ihre Verfahrensweisen befolgenden Sozialwissenschaften eine
Erkenntnis der Dinge bewerkstelligen können, gilt die Forderung, daß es
möglich sein muß, die Sätze aller Wissenschaften auf Sätze zu reduzieren,
die eine unmittelbare Fakten(er)kenntnis äußern. Jedem Satz, der dieser
Reduktionsanforderung nicht entspricht, fehlt der Sinn.
Im Rechtsdenken und in der rechtswissenschaftlichen Forschung handelt
es sich um eine Auffassung, bei der die Unterschiede zwischen der Rechts-
praxis und der praktischen Rechtswissenschaft gesehen werden müssen.
Zugleich muß man einen festen Zusammenhang zwischen den beiden
genannten Ebenen sehen und zugestehen. Im gegenwärtigen Rechtsdenken
offenbart sich dies im Charakter der praktischen juristischen Argumenta-
tion, die sich - hier verstanden im weiten Sinne des Wortes - nach dem
Wortgebrauch und den einschlägigen Begriffsverwendungen einerseits aus
der Rechtspraxis und andererseits aus der praktischen Rechtswissenschaft
(Jurisprudenz) zusammensetzt. Die verschiedenen Auffassungen der Juris-
prudenz über die Rechtspraxis zeugen jedoch davon, daß die Jurisprudenz
im inneren bei weitem nicht einheitlich ist. Bei der Illustration der Einheit
von Theorie und Praxis kann man jetzt dem Rechtsdenken (und der rechts-
wissenschaftlichen Forschung) neue Levels hinzufügen, nämlich (i) die juri-
stische Methodenlehre und (ii) die allgemeine Rechtslehre, die in den letz-
ten Jahrzehnten sich als Theorie des Rechts konstituiert hat. Auch in der
Theorie des Rechts bleibt der primäre Charakter der Rechtspraxis erhalten.
Jede Reflexion auf der rechtstheoretischen Ebene kann sich unter Berück-
sichtigung der Wirklichkeit empirisch und analytisch-begrifflich vollziehen.

20
Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, S. 35.
21
Ebd., S. 36.
 Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz 585

Werner Krawietz bezeichnet die beschriebene Lage als gemäßigten Kon-

struktivismus.22
Unter Berücksichtigung des Werkes von Aarnio „Laintulkinnan teoria"
kann hier auf den Teil der Monographie, hingewiesen werden, in dem die
Begründung der Resultate der Auslegung behandelt wird. 23 Bei der Behand-
lung der rechtlichen Auslegung müssen nämlich die Beschreibung, Erklä-
rung und Rechtfertigung der Tätigkeit auseinandergehalten werden. Die
Beschreibung gibt eine Antwort auf die Frage, was geschah. Die Theorie
des Rechts hat aber kein Interesse an der bloßen Beschreibung. Die in der
Auslegung gegebene Erklärung ist eine Antwort auf die Frage, warum der-
jenige, der die rechtliche Entscheidung getroffen hat, so handelt, wie er
handelt. Bei der Erklärung findet ein Übergang statt von der bloßen
Beschreibung auf die Analyse der Faktoren, die die Entscheidung beein-
flußt haben. In dieser Etappe ist es notwendig, die Gründe der Entschei-
dung (causes) und die Argumente (reasons) voneinander zu trennen. Im
gegebenen Fall ist der Entscheidungsgrund der kausale Faktor, der die Ent-
scheidung bestimmt. Die Rechtfertigung der Auslegung ist am engsten mit
der Begründung verbunden. Jetzt will man eine Antwort auf die Frage
bekommen, was der Grund ist dafür, daß die gegebene Auslegung als rich-
tig angesehen wird. In der Antwort fehlen kausale Begründungen und
Motive. Man muß sich mit der Aufzählung der Tatsachen begnügen, für die
die Auslegung richtig ist. Aarnio fügt hinzu: „Wenn eine Theorie der
Rechtfertigung der Auslegung des Rechts aufgestellt wird, kann das auf
wahren oder verhüllten Begründungen beruhen. Die Theorie über diese
Begründungen kann beschreibend oder normativ sein."24 In dem zuletzt
erwähnten Fall wird versucht, dafür Normen zu schaffen, was nach der
Meinung desjenigen, der sich mit Jurisprudenz befaßt, nämlich des Rechts-
wissenschaftlers, die richtige Begründungsweise ist: der Gebrauch von tat-
sächlichen Gründen oder der Bau von ,Kulissen'? Bei Aarnio handelt es
sich um keine der beiden Verfahrensweisen. Sein Ziel ist die Rekonstruk-
tion der Begründung einer derartigen rechtlichen Auslegung, die man im
Falle der Erfüllung bestimmter Voraussetzungen als dem Ideal am nächsten
ansehen kann. Eine solche Rekonstruktion ist die Norm in ihrer schwachen
Bedeutung. Das Ziel ist nicht das Aufzwingen der Präferenzen des Metho-
dologen. Aarnios Rekonstruktion versucht die Idee der Begründung, die
schon in unseren Bemühungen und Erwartungen vorhanden ist, zu geben.
„Wenn du diese und diese in unserer Rechtskultur (offensichtlich) vorhan-

22
Werner Krawietz/Michael Welker (Hrsg.), Kritik der Theorie sozialer Systeme.
Auseinandersetzungen mit Luhmanns Hauptwerk, Frankfurt am Main 1992, S. 283,
297.
23
Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, S. 144-171.
24
Ebd., S. 151.
586 Raul Narits

denen Forderungen erfüllen willst, dann sollst du deine Auslegung so und

so begründen. Oder ein wenig anders gesagt: ideale Begründungen wären
diese und diese."25
Diese Auffassung weist auf die Verbindungen zwischen der Rechtspraxis
und der praktischen Rechtswissenschaft hin. Begründungsprinzipien können
wirklich wahr oder doch zumindest öffentlich sein. Hier wird nicht darauf
eingegangen, auf welche Standpunkte gestützt sich die Auslegung in der
Wirklichkeit herausgebildet hat. Es ist egal, auf welche Weise die Ausle-
gung gefunden wird, denn der Ausleger will in jedem Fall seine Auslegung
rechtfertigen. Sind die Begründungen vom rechtlichen Standpunkt aus aber
nicht annehmbar, weil mangelhaft, so fängt die Veröffentlichung an, eine
Rolle zu spielen. „Die richtige juristische Auslegung ist eine Auslegung,
bei der der Ausleger seine Argumente der öffentlichen Kontrolle unterwirft
und über die Stärke der Auslegung aufgrund dieser Argumente entschieden
wird. Für die Gesellschaft ist wichtig, ob die Auslegung die öffentliche
Kontrolle erträgt ..." 2 6 Ist die öffentliche Kontrolle aber nicht schon der
Vergleich mit derjenigen Auslegung, die nach den in Zeit und Raum ange-
nommenen Wertmaßstäben vorgenommen wird? Dies ist in der Tat der
Fall. Daher muß die Auslegung unumstößlich mit der Idee der Wertungs-
jurisprudenz verbunden sein. Für mich ist ausschlaggebend, daß eine inhalts-
reiche Verwirklichung der Idee der Wertungsjurisprudenz in wissenschaft-
lichen Untersuchungen ohne den Gebrauch von anderen Arten der Rechts-
erkenntnis gar nicht möglich ist. Davon zeugt auch Aarnios „Laintulkinnan
teoria". Aarnio beschreibt rechtsphilosophisch-geschichtlich drei Blickwin-
kel auf das Recht.27 Das Wesen des Rechtsdenkens kann in Zeit und Raum
nur eines unter vielen sein, vergleichbar mit den sich ständig verzweigen-
den Ästen eines hohen Baumes, dessen Zweige in verschiedene Richtungen
wachsen. Aufgrund eines Astes allein ist es nicht möglich, ein adäquates
Bild zu erhalten, ohne andere Äste und vor allem den Stamm des Baumes
zu kennen.
Aarnio geht auf drei Arten des Rechtsdenkens ein, die in verallgemeiner-
ter Gestalt dargestellt werden. Es handelt sich (i) um ein logisch-deduktives
Vorgehen, (ii) eine empirische Denkweise und (iii) um eine sogenannte
praktische Entscheidung. Der logisch-deduktive Blickwinkel wird vor allem
im vernunftrechtlichen Denken und Argumentieren und in der Begriffsjuris-
prudenz vertreten. Empirisches Denken wird durch soziologische Jurispru-
denz und rechtsrealistische Richtungen vertreten. Mit praktischer Entschei-

25
Ebd.
26
Ebd.
27
Ebd., S. 87-121.
 Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz 587

dung sind Betrachtungsweisen verbunden, die gewöhnlich ein hermeneuti-

sches Vorgehen bevorzugen.
Ich gehe hier nur auf die als skandinavischer Realismus bezeichnete
Richtung ein, weil die Schule von Uppsala besonders durch ihre Wertungs-
theorie bekannt geworden ist. Die Frage nach dem Wert einer Sache erhebt
sich in dem Fall, wenn ein Mensch in bezug auf die Sache eine lobende
oder - umgekehrt - eine rügende Bewertung ausspricht. Obwohl die Werte
(gut/schlecht, richtig/falsch) nicht als objektive Eigenschaften der Sachen
angesehen werden können, haben sie in unserem Leben einen bestimmten
Platz. Im Gang der Sozialisation lernen wir, , Wertschätzung ohne Erkennt-
niswert4 zu erkennen. Deshalb kann diese Schule nicht als wertnihilistisch
betrachtet werden. Umgekehrt - und darüber schreibt auch Aarnio - ist die
erwähnte Theorie für die Rechtswissenschaft vielfach verhängnisvoll gewe-
sen. „Die Wissenschaft muß um eine Wissenschaft zu sein - ernsthafte
Behauptungen aus der Welt der Erfahrung vorbringen. Wenn die Rechtswis-
senschaft eine Wissenschaft sein will, muß ihr Gegenstand zur Erfahrungs-
welt gehören. Nach traditioneller Auffassung untersucht die Rechtswissen-
schaft das geltende Recht. Folglich stellt sich die Frage, ob Behauptungen
über das geltende Recht (wissenschaftliche) Erfahrungssätze sind.4'28 Die
Antwort der Schule ist eigenartig, weil die Geltung der Rechtsnorm mit
ihrer Verbindlichkeit gleichgesetzt wird. Die Geltung ist keine objektive
Eigenschaft und kann deshalb nicht zur Erfahrungswelt gehören. Die rechts-
wissenschaftlichen Texte können also auch nicht zur Erfahrungswelt gehö-
ren. Trotzdem hat die Schule die Rechtswissenschaft in die Welt der Wis-
senschaft gebracht, und zwar durch ihre Bestimmung des Gegenstands der
Rechtswissenschaft. Die Geltung des Rechts bedeutet nämlich, daß die
Behörden wirklich die gesetzten Normen befolgen. Das Recht wird durch
seinen praktischen Gebrauch seitens der Behörden Wirklichkeit.
Der hier vorgebrachte Gedankengang illustriert zugleich die Idee der
Wertungsjurisprudenz, daß diese Tätigkeit durch ihr Operieren mit offenen
Wertungsmaßstäben es ausschließt, daß die mit ihr verbundene juristische
Methodik zu einer bloßen Doktrin oder gar zu einer Verabsolutierung von
Werten entartet. Es gibt keine universalen Grundsätze, die eindeutig bestim-
men, wie das Recht, zu verstehen und auszulegen ist. Zugleich existieren
jedoch bestimmte Standards der Auslegung,29 ohne deren Kenntnis es gar
nicht möglich wäre, sich mit der Methodenlehre der Jurisprudenz, letztere
hier verstanden als Wertungsjurisprudenz, zu befassen.
Das Operieren mit offenen Wertungsmaßstäben und die Berücksichtigung
von Auslegungsstandards schaffen eine Lage, in der eine richtige Lösung

28
Ebd., S. 108.
29
Ebd., S. 198-203.
588 Raul Narits

möglich ist. Diese Lösung braucht nicht die einzige zu sein. Bei der
Lösung von rechtlichen Problemen finden wir die mit diesem Problem ver-
bundenen Werte. Die Wertungsmaßstäbe sind aber den Einflüssen und dem
Ablauf der Zeit unterworfen. Daher kann die Wertung (Lösung) durchaus
objektiv sein, aber sie kann das nur sein in bezug auf einen schon bestimm-
ten oder noch zu bestimmenden Wert im jeweiligen Wertungssystem.
Neben der Behandlung des Wesens, der Verfahrensweisen und der Aus-
legung des Rechts, die auf Wertungsjurisprudenz beruht und andere Arten
der Rechtserkenntnis berücksichtigt, lenkt Aarnio die Aufmerksamkeit des
Lesers auf die sonstigen Gründe der Verschiedenheit juristischer Auslegun-
gen. Die wesentlichen Gründe sind ungenügende Analyse, Ungreifbarkeit
der Nuancen der Gesetzestexte, mangelhafte Quellenlage, Nichtbeachtung
des Rationalitätsprinzips. Beim Auftreten der erwähnten Faktoren entstehen
Zweifel an der Autorität der Entscheidungen. Falls solche irreführenden
Faktoren vorhanden sind, könnte man auf den ersten Blick meinen, daß die
Beseitigung dieser Faktoren etwas Außergewöhnliches fordert. Man muß
aber in Betracht ziehen, daß es sich bei der Auslegung um eine weitgehend
professionalisierte Tätigkeit von Menschen handelt, die eine juristische
Ausbildung genossen haben, so daß es durchaus möglich erscheint, den Ein-
fluß dieser Faktoren zu beseitigen oder doch zumindest zu neutralisieren
(Wertrationalität). Andererseits verlangt dies aber eine bestimmte Willens-
anstrengung. Aarnio schreibt, daß die Meinungsverschiedenheiten oft ein-
fach durch Anwendung der nötigen Sorgfalt beseitigt werden können.
Natürlich kann der Grundsatz der Sorgfalt nur dann verwirklicht werden,
wenn der Ausleger über die erforderliche Basis an Kenntnissen verfügt, die
es ermöglicht, in dem entsprechenden Bereich rational und zielbewußt zu
handeln (Voluntarismus, Intentionalismus).
Die knappe Übersicht über die in Aarnios Werk „Laintulkinnan teoria"
beschriebenen rechtlichen Verfahrensweisen bei der Gewinnung, Erkenntnis
und Erklärung des Rechts brachte mich auf den Gedanken, das Werk für
estnische Leser in ihre Muttersprache zu bringen. Vor einiger Zeit war es
dann soweit mit dem Übersetzen und Redigieren des Buches. Seither liegt
das auf der Wertungsjurisprudenz beruhende und von der Idee einer ver-
gleichenden Rechtstheorie, getragene Werk von Aulis Aarnio „Öiguse töl-
gendamise teooria", Tölkinud V. Jalakas, Toimetanud R. Narits, A/S Juura,
Tallinn 199630 auf dem Tisch estnischer Juristen und Jurastudenten, denen
es einen wissenschaftlich und philosophisch aufgeklärten Zugang zum
Recht eröffnet.

30
Aulis Aarnio, Theorie der Auslegung des Rechts, übersetzt von V. Jalakas,
redigiert von R. Narits, A/S Juura, Tallinn 1996.
 Aulis Aarnios Wertungsjurisprudenz 589

Zum Schluß möchte ich die Aufmerksamkeit darauf lenken, daß der
Gedanke der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit in den Rechtssystemen der moder-
nen Gesellschaft, so wie er heute von Aarnio vertreten wird, auch dazu bei-
trägt, den estnischen Juristen die der kontinentaleuropäischen Kultur eigene
Denkweise zu erklären. Es genügt hier nicht nur das Eingeständnis, daß die
estnische Rechtsordnung stets sehr eng mit dem europäischen Rechtsdenken
verbunden gewesen ist. Die kontinentale Rechtstradition braucht für ihre
Kontinuität eine fortlaufende und ununterbrochene Arbeit an der Erklärung
des Rechts. Nach der Wiederherstellung der Selbständigkeit im Jahre 1991
wurde beim Wiederaufbau und bei der Entwicklung der estnischen Rechts-
ordnung der Grundsatz der Restitution und der rechtlichen Kontinuität
zugrunde gelegt. Dieser Grundsatz ist sehr notwendig, aber man kann ihn
nicht durchsetzen, wenn sich in der Tätigkeit der Gestalter der Rechtsord-
nung, der Juristen, nicht eine vertiefte und mehrstufige Rechtserkenntnis
widerspiegelt. Außerdem muß man den objektiven Integrationsprozeß in
Europa im Auge behalten, der eine gewisse Vereinheitlichung der Rechts-
ordnungen verlangt. Das bedeutet, daß vor allem auch die immanenten
Eigenschaften der gegenwärtig geltenden Rechtsordnungen berücksichtigt
werden müssen. Aarnios Vorgehen bei der Erkenntnis des Rechts erscheint
als der richtige Weg, um das fachsystematisch gesehen heterogene Wissen,
d.h. philosophische, geschichtliche und soziologische Erkenntnisse zu inte-
grieren. Zugleich wird es auf diese Weise ermöglicht, eine - die Grenzen
der staatlich organisierten Rechtssysteme transzendierende - vergleichende
Rechtstheorie zu betreiben, die alles Recht, in methodologischer Hinsicht
einem Multi-Level-Approach folgend, auf mehreren Ebenen zu erforschen
und sodann das gewonnene Wissen systematisch zu erfassen sucht. Das
Operieren mit offengelegten Wertungsmaßstäben, wie es heute in der Wer-
tungsjurisprudenz Aarnios gepflegt wird, erscheint auch für die estnische
Gesellschaft unerläßlich, die erst vor kurzem dem Totalitarismus entgangen
ist und Untersuchungen braucht, wie sie Aarnio eigen sind.
RECHTSBEREINIGUNG ALS GESETZGEBUNGSTECHNISCHES
U N D RECHTSTHEORETISCHES PROBLEM

Von Dieter Wyduckel, Dresden

I. Die Normenflut und Mittel ihrer Bewältigung

Der moderne Staat sieht sich in wachsendem Maße einer rechtlichen

Normenproduktion ausgesetzt, die inzwischen zu einer Gesetzesflut gewor-
den ist, welche alle Grenzen zu sprengen droht. Fragt man nach den Grün-
den, so ist auf die gesteigerte Komplexität moderner Gesellschaften und die
daraus folgende Notwendigkeit zu verweisen, dieser durch eine entspre-
chend erhöhte Gesetzesproduktion gerecht zu werden. Dies gilt in besonde-
rem Maße für den freiheitlichen Rechtsstaat, der ein gewisses Maß an
rechtlichen Regeln voraussetzt, ohne die das staatlich organisierte Zusam-
menleben als eine Vereinigung von Menschen unter Rechtsgesetzen im
kantischen Sinne nur schwerlich möglich oder realisierbar wäre. Es ist
gleichwohl nicht zu leugnen, daß die Normenproduktion inzwischen ein
Maß erreicht hat, in dem der Gewinn an Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Rechtssi-
cherheit in sein Gegenteil umzuschlagen droht, weil der immense Gesetzes-
stoff derart unübersehbar geworden ist, daß selbst Fachleute sich mitunter
kaum mehr darin zurechtfinden. Hinzu kommt eine Beschleunigung der
Gesetzgebung, die dazu geführt hat, daß eine Norm u.U. schon überholt ist,
ehe man Gelegenheit hatte, sich mir ihr vertraut zu machen. Auf diesem
Hintergrund werden zunehmend Zweifel an der staatlichen Steuerungskapa-
zität laut, die sich in der Forderung nach Deregulierung, nach Entstaat-
lichung und Verschlankung, nach Entbürokratisierung, ja nach Entrecht-
lichung niedergeschlagen haben1. So ist es nicht erstaunlich, daß an die
Aktivierung selbstregulierender Mechanismen der Gesellschaft appelliert
wird, die einen höheren Effektivitätsgrad zu gewährleisten scheinen als der
alles imperativ reglementierende Staat2.

1
Vgl. Wolfgang Manti (Hrsg.), Effizienz der Gesetzesproduktion. Abbau der
Regelungsdichte im internationalen Vergleich, Wien 1995; Rolf Stober, Rechtsstaat-
liche Übersteuerung - der Rechtsstaat in der Rechtssetzungsfalle, in: Vier Jahre Deut-
sche Einheit, hrsg. von Klaus Stern, München 1995, S. 65 ff. Siehe demnächst auch
Olaf Gericke, Effektivierung von Gesetzen, Diss. Dresden 1999.
592 Dieter Wyduckel

Fraglich geworden ist vor allem, ob dem enormen Zuwachs an Gesetzen

auch ein Gewinn an Rationalität entspricht3. Die westlichen Gesellschaften
haben sich daran gewöhnt, Max Weber folgend das Recht als das rationale
Mittel schlechthin zu betrachten, in dem der Mensch seine Lebensbedingun-
gen sichert und gestaltet. Damit ist die Frage nach der Rationalität des
Rechts aufgeworfen, mit der sich auch der Jubilar seit langen Jahren immer
wieder auseinandergesetzt hat4. Diese äußerst komplexe Frage ist im vorste-
henden Zusammenhang begreiflicherweise nicht einmal annäherungsweise
auszuloten. Gefragt werden soll vielmehr danach, welche rechtlichen Mittel
zur Verfügung stehen, der gesteigerten Komplexität der Rechtsordnung auf
rationale Weise gerecht zu werden. Eines dieser Mittel ist die Rechtsberei-
nigung, die im folgenden unter gesetzgebungstechnischem und rechtstheore-
tischem Aspekt zu untersuchen sein wird.

I I . Begriff und Funktion der Rechtsbereinigung

Unter Rechtsbereinigung kann sehr Verschiedenes verstanden werden5.

Die unterschiedlichen Aspekte lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen und
typisieren: In einem allgemeinen Sinne sind unter Rechtsbereinigung all jene
Maßnahmen zu verstehen, die auf eine Vereinfachung und Vereinheitlichung
sowie eine Systematisierung der Rechtsordnung abzielen. Die Hauptintention
wird dabei darauf gerichtet sein, als überflüssig Erkanntes wegzunehmen. In
einem bereits spezielleren Verständnis nennt man Rechtsbereinigung das
Sichten des Bestandes an Rechtsnormen dahingehend, daß alles in Geltung
Befindliche nach Art einer Inventur in eine amtliche Sammlung aufgenom-
men wird. Dem kann gesetzlich die Wirkung beigelegt werden, daß von
einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt ab nur noch die in eine Sammlung aufgenom-
menen Normen gelten (Positivwirkung), die nicht darin enthaltenen dagegen
außer Kraft sein sollen (Negativwirkung)6. Rechtsbereinigung kann aber

2
Vgl. etwa Matthias Schmidt- Ρreuß/ Udo di Fabio , Verwaltung und Verwaltungs-
recht zwischen gesellschaftlicher Selbstregulierung und staatlicher Steuerung, in: Ver-
öffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 56 (1997), S. 160ff.,
235 ff.
3
Dazu Heinz Schäffer, Rationalisierung der Rechtssetzung, in: Theorie der Rechts-
setzung, hrsg. von dems., Wien 1988, S. 199 ff.
4
Vgl. Aulis Aarnio, Geist und Buchstabe des Gesetzes, in: ders., Wegen Recht und
Billigkeit, Berlin 1988 (Schriften zur Rechtstheorie, H. 126), S. 11 ff.; ders., Denkwei-
sen der Rechtswissenschaft, Wien 1979 (Forschungen aus Staat und Recht, 48), S. 18 ff.,
51, 172f.; ders., The Rational as Reasonable, Dordrecht 1987, bes. S. 193 ff.
5
Vgl. Hans Schneider, Gesetzgebung. 2. Aufl., Heidelberg 1991, Rdn. 691 ff.;
Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz, Theorie und Praxis parlamentarischer Gesetzgebung, Berlin
1988, S. 20, 94, 199ff.
6
Hanswerner Müller, Handbuch der Gesetzgebungstechnik, 2. Aufl., Köln 1968,
S. 334; Heinz Schäffer, Rechtsbereinigung in Österreich - Entwicklung, Stand und Zu-
 Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches Problem 593

auch sehr viel weiter gehen, indem nicht nur ihre formelle Seite als Außer-
kraftsetzung oder Aufhebung in den Blick genommen, sondern darüber
hinaus auch der inhaltlich-materiale Aspekt einbezogen wird.
Die im einzelnen zu treffenden Maßnahmen können sehr vielfältig sein7.
Es kann einmal um die Angleichung von Gesetzen an die Rechtsentwick-
lung in anderen rechtlichen Teilbereichen gehen; hierbei wird es im allge-
meinen nicht zu wirklichen inhaltlichen Neuerungen bzw. Neuregelungen
kommen. Eine innovative und weitergehende Tendenz wohnt demgegen-
über der kodifikatorischen Rechtsbereinigung inne. Hier soll eine zusam-
menhängende Regelungsmaterie in einem neuen übergreifenden Gesetzge-
bungswerk zusammengefaßt werden. Die Neukodifikation eines ganzen
Rechtsbereichs ist jedoch anders als in früheren Zeiten heute eher die Aus-
nahme und wird vielfach als nahezu undurchführbar angesehen8.
Unter dem Aspekt des Gewinns an Rationalität ist die rechtsklärende
Rechtsbereinigung von besonderer Bedeutung. Ihr Zweck ist eine Art
Gesetzesevaluation. Eine rechtlich verworrene oder sozial nicht mehr
akzeptierte Rechtslage soll durch eine klarere, legislatorisch angemessenere
und effektivere rechtliche Regelung ersetzt werden9. Die genannten Formen
der Rechtsbereinigung sind jedoch nicht scharf voneinander zu trennen,
sondern nur idealtypisch zu unterscheiden und können sich in der Gesetzge-
bungspraxis auch überschneiden.
Rechtsbereinigungen besitzen angesichts ihrer Aufgabe, Rechtsklarheit zu
schaffen und das geltende Recht transparenter zu machen, vorrangig forma-
len Charakter. Es soll für die Normadressaten offensichtlich sein, welche
Norm Geltung beanspruchen kann und welche nicht. Der Rechtsbereinigung
kommt so primär Ordnungs- und Sichtungsfunktion zu 10 . Mit ihrer Hilfe
sollen typische Mängel des Gesetzesstaates beseitigt werden, um den
Zugang zum Recht freizulegen, der durch die Über- und Fehlproduktion an
Gesetzen verschüttet zu werden droht 11.
Rechtsbereinigung ist von der Rechtsvereinfachung zu unterscheiden,
wenn auch nicht ganz zu trennen12. Sie stellt einen vorgeschalteten Prozeß

kunftsperspektiven, in: Für Recht und Staat. Festschrift für Herbert Heimlich, hrsg.
von K. Letzgus u.a., München 1994, S. 831 ff. (831 f.).
7
Hierzu und zum folgenden Schulze- Fielitz (FN 5), S. 51, 199 ff. m.w.N.
8
So Schäffer, Rechtsbereinigung (FN 6), S. 832.
9
Schulze-F ielitz (FN 5), S. 203.
10
Dies betont zu Recht Schulze-F ielitz ebd. S. 51.
11
So Bernd-Christian Funk, Theoretische Grundlagen der Rechtsbereinigung, in:
Rechtsbereinigung in Österreich, hrsg. von der Österreichischen Juristenkommis-
sion, Wien 1995, S. 19ff. (19).
12
Vgl. Funk ebd. S. 22.

39 FS Aarnio
594 Dieter Wyduckel

mit Clearing-Funktion dar, um Geltungsfragen innerhalb eines Rechtskrei-

ses zumindest ansatzweise zu lösen. Damit ist Rechtsbereinigung ein erster
denkbarer Schritt in Richtung auf Rechtsvereinfachung und somit Bestand-
teil einer umfassenden Strategie, selbst wenn Rechtsbereinigungsgesetze für
sich genommen einen Zuwachs an Normen bedeuten.
Entsprechendes gilt für die Rechtsvereinheitlichung sowie vor allem für
die Deregulierung. Zwar ist auch Deregulierung durch Rechtsbereinigung
möglich13, doch zielt sie auf weiteres und auf mehr. Sie unterscheidet sich
von der Rechtsbereinigung dadurch, daß nicht bloß ein für überholt bzw.
überflüssig erachteter Bestand an Rechtsvorschriften aufgehoben, sondern
ein Sachbereich so weit wie möglich entrechtlicht und flexibilisiert wird 14 .
Dabei geht es einmal, namentlich im Hinblick auf die Wirtschaft, um die
Zurückdrängung reglementierenden Staatseinflusses, zum anderen darum,
Alternativen zur Verrechtlichung im Recht selbst zu finden. Verglichen mit
der Rechtsbereinigung dürfte die auf eine Liberalisierung ganzer Lebensbe-
reiche zielende Deregulierung das rechtlich und politisch umfassendere Pro-
blem darstellen15.
Rechtsbereinigung ist nach allem ein legales und legitimes Mittel, dessen
Einsatz der Rechtsvereinfachung, Rechtsklarheit und damit schließlich auch
der Forderung nach einem rationalen, für den Bürger verständlichen und
nachvollziehbaren Recht entgegenkommt.

I I I . Gegenstand der Rechtsbereinigung

Versucht man, den zu bereinigenden Normenbestand formal näher zu

bezeichnen, so kommen in erster Linie formelle und materielle Gesetze
(Rechtsverordnungen) in Betracht. Auch Satzungen autonomer Selbstver-
waltungskörperschaften können bereinigt werden, aufgrund der Selbstver-
waltungsgarantie allerdings nur insoweit, als diese hierbei beteiligt werden.
Staats- und völkerrechtliche Verträge sowie die zu ihrer Inkraftsetzung
ergangenen Rechtsvorschriften sind hingegen nicht ohne weiteres bereini-
gungsfähig, da eine Aufhebung nur in Abstimmung mit dem jeweiligen
Vertragspartner erfolgen kann. Entsprechendes gilt für Verträge zwischen
13
Vgl. Karl Korinek, Staatsrechtliche Ansätze für eine Deregulierung im Wirt-
schaftsrecht, in: Juristische Blätter 113 (1991), S. 409ff., 418 f. Siehe auch Manti,
Neuralgische Zonen von Politik, Staat und Recht (FN 1), S. 186.
14
Zu den Möglichkeiten rechtlicher und politischer Deregulierung im internatio-
nalen Vergleich siehe Markus Lammer, in: Manti (Hrsg.), Effizienz (FN 1), S. 93 ff.
(95 ff.).
15
Vgl. Johannes Müller, Rechtsbereinigung als Aufgabe, Rechtsklarheit als Ziel,
in: Rechtsbereinigung in Österreich (FN 11), S. 47 ff. (55); Manti , Neuralgische Zo-
nen von Politik, Staat und Recht (FN 1), S. 186ff.
 Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches Problem 595

Staat und Kirche, die im allgemeinen von der Rechtsbereinigung ausgenom-

men werden 16.
Auch Richterrecht und Gewohnheitsrecht bleiben als zu den informellen
Rechtsquellen zählend von der Rechtsbereinigung i.d.R. ausgeschlossen;
ersteres aus Gründen der Gewaltenteilung, das letztere, weil es nur in Gren-
zen regelbar ist und sich auf allen Ebenen der Normhierarchie gleichsam
naturwüchsig immer wieder neu ergibt. Hier würde es sich um eine unzu-
lässige „Fremdbereinigung" 17 handeln, deren praktisches Ergebnis zudem
fragwürdig bliebe. Gerichtsentscheidungen, insbesondere von Verfassungs-
gerichten, können aber für die Rechtsbereinigung insoweit durchaus bedeut-
sam sein, als es sich um Nichtigkeits- oder Teilnichtigkeitserklärungen von
Normen handelt. Hier ergeben sich vor allem praktische Probleme, die aber
durch geeignete Formen der Publikation und Kenntlichmachung auszuräu-
men sein dürften 18.
Darüber hinaus ist auch die Bereinigung von Verwaltungsvorschriften in
Betracht zu ziehen. Obwohl ihr Rechtsnormcharakter umstritten und daher
ihre Einbeziehung in eine „Rechts"-bereinigung problematisch ist, wäre
auch hier im Sinne der Durchsichtigkeit und Effizienz innerbehördlicher
Vorgänge, aber auch im Interesse des rechtssuchenden Bürgers, eine Klä-
rung geboten. Der Außenrechtsbereinigung müßte demnach eine Innen-
rechtsbereinigung flankierend zur Seite treten 19.

IV. Methoden der Rechtsbereinigung

Rechtsbereinigung erfolgt nicht spontan, sondern ist Ergebnis wohlzu-

überlegender gesetzgeberischer Entscheidung. Dies geschieht - idealtypisch
- in zwei Stufen: Auf der ersten Stufe wird - zumindest im Grundsatz -
eine Rechtsbestandsfeststellung durchgeführt. Die materielle Durchforstung
des Rechtsbestandes erfolgt darauf in einem zweiten Schritt. Der Schwer-
punkt der Rechtsbereinigung liegt im Vorfeld des eigentlichen Rechtsberei-
nigungsgesetzes. Hier findet eine Beurteilung und Bewertung des Altbestan-
des an Rechtsnormen statt mit dem Ziel, alles Beibehaltenswerte herauszu-
filtern. Dies kann, vor allem bei weit zurückliegenden Normenbeständen,
problematisch sein. Rechtsbereinigungen beschränken sich deshalb im allge-
meinen pragmatisch auf weniger weit zurückliegende Zeiträume, die - was
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland angeht - kaum über das 19. und 20. Jahr-
16
Vgl. hierzu im einzelnen Alexander Konzelmann, Methode landesrechtlicher
Rechtsbereinigung, Stuttgart 1997, S.17ff.
17
Ebd. S. 83 f.
18
Ebd. S. 52ff.
19
Vgl. hierzu im einzelnen ebd. S. 66ff.

39*
596 Dieter Wyduckel

hundert hinausreichen. Der Gesetzgeber kann selbstverständlich nur den

Bestand an alten Rechtsvorschriften bereinigen und ggfs. aufheben, der
jeweils in seine gesetzgeberische Kompetenz fällt. Dies ist vor allem in
Bundesstaaten bedeutsam, in denen die Rechtsetzung sich auf verschiede-
nen Normebenen vollzieht.
Im Rahmen der Funktionen heutiger Gesetzgebung ist die rechtsklärende
Funktion der Rechtsbereinigung von besonderem Interesse. Rechtsbereini-
gungsgesetze stellen insofern eine Steigerungsform der rechtsklärenden
Gesetzgebungsfunktion dar, als sie zum Ziel haben, u.U. den gesamten
Gesetzesbestand eines Landes zu erheben20. Hierbei ist der normative Alt-
bestand zu sichten, zu systematisieren und ggfs. neu zu publizieren. Beab-
sichtigt ist, daß nur die auf diese Weise registrierten Gesetze für die
Zukunft gelten sollen. Dies kann als Neukodifikation, als Neupublikation
(Neubekanntmachung, in Österreich: Wiederverlautbarung) sowie als Kom-
pilation geschehen21.
Die Neukodifikation, die ein umfassendes rechtssystematisches Ziel ver-
folgt, ist von der bloßen Neupublikation oder Neubekanntmachung zu
unterscheiden. Bei der Neupublikation wird der Gesetzesbestand, der wei-
tergelten soll, lediglich nochmals durch einen gesetzgeberischen Akt oder
doch auf der Grundlage eines solchen als Volltext veröffentlicht 22. Die
Bekanntmachung der Neufassung ist im allgemeinen kein konstitutiver Akt
des Gesetzgebers, sondern nur deklaratorische Klarstellung des Gesetzestex-
tes23. Soweit staatliche Rechtsordnungen sich für eine Neukodifikation oder
Neupublikation entscheiden, wird die Frage diskutiert, in welcher Form
dies zu geschehen habe. In Betracht kommen die Publikation als herkömm-
liche Loseblatt-Sammlung oder als gebundenes Werk, inzwischen auch als
CD-Rom oder künftig als elektronisches Gesetzblatt unter Einsatz modern-
ster Daten- und Informationstechnik 24
Weniger aufwendig ist die Kompilation als listenmäßige Erfassung des
weitergeltenden Rechtsmaterials25. Auch hier ist zwischen Positiv- und
Negativlisten zu unterscheiden. Während Positivlisten die Vorschriften auf-
führen, die beibehalten werden sollen, stellen Negativlisten auf die Auf-

20
Schulze-Fielitz (FN 5), S. 203.
21
Zur - nicht ganz trennscharfen - Abgrenzung der Begriffe siehe Schäffer,
Rechtsbereinigung (FN 6), S. 831 ff. (832); Gerhart Holzinger, Die Kundmachung
von Rechtsvorschriften in Österreich, in: Schäffer (Hrsg.), Theorie (FN 3), S. 321 ff.
22
Näher Schneider (FN 5), Rdn. 680ff.
23
Siehe hierzu auch Maximilian Herberger, Noch einmal: Die Sorge um den rech-
ten Text des Gesetzes, in: Jur-PC 1993, S. 2256ff.; Konzelmann (FN 16), S. 56f.
24
Vgl. Jens Mönkemeyer, Zurück zu den Ursprüngen - Ein elektronisches Bun-
desgesetzblatt?, in: Jur-PC 1993, S. 2175 ff.; Herberger (FN 23), S. 2256ff.
25
Schäffer, Rechtsbereinigung (FN 6), S. 832.
 Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches Problem 597

hebung der in ihnen genannten Bestimmungen ab. Damit ist jedoch noch
keine Aussage darüber getroffen, welche rechtliche Wirkung der Aufnahme
einer Norm in eine Positivliste zukommt26. Hierbei können schwierige
Rechtsgeltungsprobleme auftreten. Im Sinne der Klarheit sollten Rechts-
bereinigungen als gesetzgeberische Akte erfolgen. Rechtsbereinigung zielt
somit letztlich auf die verbindliche Veröffentlichung des aktuell gelten-
den Normenbestandes unter Berücksichtigung wirksam erfolgter Berichti-
gungen27.
Den an ihn gerichteten Anforderungen wird der rechtsbereinigende
Gesetzgeber i.d.R. genügen, wenn er von Zeit zu Zeit, besser: ständig den
Bestand an Rechtsvorschriften durchforstet und sichtet28. Sofern die
„Geschäftsgrundlage" eines Gesetzes entfällt, wird eine Anpassungsver-
pflichtung aktiviert, die zumindest dazu führen sollte, die Beibehaltung des
betreffenden Gesetzes zu prüfen. Rechtsbereinigung wird so zur ständig
wahrzunehmenden Aufgabe.

V. Rechtsbereinigung als Problem intertemporaler Rechtsgeltung

Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgeberische Aufgabe wäre überflüssig, wenn

der aktuell geltende Normenbestand sich allein aufgrund allgemein aner-
kannter Vorrangregeln und Rechtsgrundsätze gleichsam von selbst ergeben
würde. Zu denken ist hier vor allem an die Lex-posterior-Regel als Grund-
lage intertemporaler Rechtsgeltung29. Wäre es möglich, mit ihrer Hilfe zu
eindeutigen Ergebnissen zu gelangen, dann wäre Rechtsbereinigung als
gesetzgeberische Aufgabe gegenstandslos, weil die Normaufhebung implizit
erfolgen würde. Dem stehen jedoch sowohl Gründe der Praktikabilität als
auch solche der Rechtsklarheit entgegen. Es fragt sich nämlich, ob das Vor-
rangprinzip überhaupt zu brauchbaren, eine klare Zuordnung ermöglichen-
den Ergebnissen führt 30.
Dieses Problem kann der Gesetzgeber nicht einfach Wissenschaft und
Rechtsprechung überlassen31. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Bekanntma-
chung (Kundmachung) der Rechtsvorschriften. Diese erschöpft sich nicht in
einem Formalakt chronologischer Publikation, sondern sollte aus einem
authentischen Publikationsorgan erkennbar sein. Andernfalls würde der

26
Schneider (FN 5), Rdn.709.
27
Vgl. Konzelmann (FN 16), S. 86.
28
Dazu Erhard Mock , Plädoyer für eine ständige Rechtsbereinigung, in: Günther
Winkler/Bernd Schilcher (Hrsg.), Gesetzgebung, Wien 1981, S. 167 ff. (169).
29
Vgl. Konzelmann (FN 16), S. 211 ff.
30
Ebd. S. 215.
31
Ebd. S. 120.
598 Dieter Wyduckel

Gesetzgeber das vorhandene Informationsproblem auf den Adressaten

abwälzen32.
Aber auch dann, wenn hinreichend bestimmte intertemporale Geltungs-
regeln bestünden, wäre das Rechtsgeltungsproblem nicht ausgeräumt.
Rechtsbereinigung schließt, insoweit sie auf die Aufhebung von Rechtsvor-
schriften gerichtet ist, stets eine Normenderogation ein. Eine derartige Auf-
hebung kann ausdrücklich (formelle Derogation) oder konkludent erfolgen
(materielle Derogation) 33. Während bei der formellen Derogation ein
Gesetz bzw. Teile eines Gesetzes durch actus contrarius oder durch Neu-
erlaß bzw. Änderung ausdrücklich aufgehoben werden, erfolgt bei der mate-
riellen Derogation keine Angabe über das Verhältnis zur jeweils früheren
Norm. Ob eine Norm wirklich außer Geltung ist oder nicht, kann deshalb
problematisch sein. Hier ist dann ergänzend die - der materiellen Deroga-
tion zuzurechende - Lex-posterior-Regel heranzuziehen, ggfs. - um dem
Gedanken des Normstufenbaus gerecht zu werden - in Verbindung mit dem
Grundsatz vom Vorrang höheren Rechts (sogen. Lex-Superior-Regel). Die
Bedeutung der Lex-Specialis-Regel dürfte in diesem Zusammenhang dem-
gegenüber zurücktreten 34. Letzte Klarheit wird im Falle der Normenkolli-
sion ohnehin nur durch eine (verfassungs)gerichtliche Entscheidung zu
erzielen sein.
Abgesehen von der Möglichkeit, Gesetze durch neuere gesetzliche Rege-
lungen abzulösen bzw. aufzuheben, wären aber auch noch außergewöhn-
liche Grenzen der Normgeltung in Erwägung zu ziehen. Hier ist etwa an
derogierendes Gewohnheitsrecht oder z.B. an den Geltungswegfall einer
Norm infolge völliger Veränderung der zugrunde liegenden Verhältnisse zu
denken. Beides wird freilich nur in eng begrenzten Fällen in Betracht
kommen35. Es dürfte im übrigen nicht zweifelhaft sein, daß Rechtsbereini-
gungsgesetze der Kategorie der formellen Derogation zuzurechnen sind.
All dies zeigt, daß Rechtsbereinigungsgesetze das Problem intertempora-
ler Rechtsgeltung allein nicht lösen können, wohl aber zur Klärung des in
Geltung befindlichen Rechtsbestandes beizutragen vermögen. Derogations-
regeln, die flankierend hinzutreten, führen nicht schon automatisch zur
Geltungsbeendigung, können aber vor allem im Rahmen Rechtsanwendung

32
Vgl. Peter Noll, Gesetzgebungslehre, Reinbek 1973, S. 240f.
33
Vgl. Günther Winkler, Zeit und Recht, Wien 1995, S. 218ff.
34
Peter Baumeister, Das Rechts widrig werden von Normen, Berlin 1996, S. 273 ff.
m.w.N. sowie Theodor Schilling, Rang und Geltung von Normen in gestuften
Rechtsordnungen, Berlin 1994, S. 401 ff., 447 f.
35
Vgl. Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, Außerkrafttreten von Gesetzen wegen „völliger
Veränderung der Verhältnisse"?, in: Rechtstheorie 12 (1981), S. 395ff.; kritisch
Baumeister (FN 34), S. 277 f., 308 ff., 320.
 Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches Problem 599

zur Entschärfung von Normenkonflikten beitragen36. Rechtsbereinigungsge-

setze und Vorrangregeln wirken so im Sinne der Durchsichtigkeit und Klar-
heit des Rechts zusammen.

V I . Rechtswirkung der Rechtsbereinigung

und rechtsdogmatische Folgeprobleme

Wie alles staatliches Handeln so müssen sich im Rechtsstaat auch

Rechtsbereinigungsmaßnahmen im Rahmen der verfassungsmäßigen Ord-
nung halten und an ihr messen lassen. Es ist daher im Hinblick auf die
Zusammengehörigkeit von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Normenpublikation bzw.
Normenpublizität die Rechtsgültigkeit von Rechtsbereinigungen (z.B. Ver-
einbarkeit mit Verfassungsrecht, sonstigem höherrangigen Recht) eigens zu
prüfen.
Maßgeblich als Element des Rechtsstaatsprinzips ist vor allem der rechts-
staatliche Handlungsmaßstab der Rechtssicherheit37. Dieser wiederum läßt
sich in die Kategorien der Rechtsklarheit (Normenklarheit), den Bestimmt-
heitsgrundsatz und das Rückwirkungsverbot ausdifferenzieren. Rechtsstaat-
lichkeit in diesem Sinne erfordert die Erkennbarkeit und Klarheit der
Rechtslage (insbesondere: Gesetzeslage). Vor allem das Anhäufen von
gesetzlichen Bestimmungen kann im Laufe der Zeit zu bedenklichen
Rechtsunsicherheiten führen, deren Beseitigung im öffentlichen Interesse
geboten ist.
Angesichts vielfältiger, durchaus erforderlicher Gesetzesänderungen ist es
in hohem Maße schwierig, einen authentischen Gesetzestext zu ermitteln.
Für den Rechtsstaat wiederum ist grundlegend, daß Klarheit über den
Bestand rechtswirksamer Staatsakte besteht. Rechtsbereinigung stellt sich
insoweit als ständig geforderte rechtsstaatliche Aufgabe, ja für den der
Rationalität und Nachvollziehbarkeit des Rechts verpflichteten Gesetzgeber
als ein der rechtsstaatlichen Verfassung immanentes Gebot dar 38.
Andererseits unterliegt der Gesetzgeber bei seiner legislativen Tätigkeit
auch dem Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz. Die von ihm getroffenen Regelungen
müssen ein hinreichendes Maß an inhaltlicher Präzision aufweisen. Insbe-
sondere kann sich die Eigenart eines zu regelnden Sachverhalts auf die
Bestimmtheitsanforderungen auswirken. In diesem Sinne ist der Gesetzge-
36
Vgl. Dirk Heckmann, Geltungskraft und Geltungsverlust von Rechtsnormen,
Tübingen 1997, S. 170ff.
37
Philip Kunig, Das Rechtsstaatsprinzip, Tübingen 1986, S. 396 ff.
38
Vgl. Funk, Theoretische Grundlagen der Rechtsbereinigung (FN 11), S. 24ff.
Siehe auch Fred Brande, Die Rechtsbereinigung - ein verfassungsimmanentes Ge-
bot, in: Winkler/Schilcher (Hrsg.), Gesetzgebung (FN 28), S. 173 ff.
600 Dieter Wyduckel

ber angehalten, seine Regelungen so bestimmt zu fassen, wie dies nach der
Eigenart des zu ordnenden Lebenssachverhalts und mit Rücksicht auf den
Normzweck möglich ist 39 .
Das Bestimmtheitsgebot erweist sich insofern nicht als absoluter, sondern
als relativer Maßstab40. Es besagt lediglich, daß Gesetze hinreichend
bestimmt sein müssen, enthält für sich genommen aber keine Aussagen
über die hierfür maßgeblichen Kriterien. Angesichts der Relativität des
Bestimmtheitsgebots fragt es sich, welchen Anforderungen der Typus des
Rechtsbereinigungsgesetzes im einzelnen gerecht werden muß. Unzweifel-
haft dürfte angesichts des Gesagten sein, daß jedenfalls der besonderen Pro-
blematik und Aufgabe gesetzgeberischer Rechtsbereinigung Rechnung zu
tragen ist. Rechtsbereinigungsgesetze dienen der rechtsstaatlich gebotenen
Rechtsklarheit und sollten, um dem Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz zu genügen,
möglichst zielgenau angeben, welche Normen aufgehoben werden sollen.
Dieses Vorgehen dient der Schaffung einer klaren Gesetzeslage, die einen
zweifelsfreien Schluß darauf ermöglichen muß, welche Rechtsvorschriften
künftig in Geltung sind und welche nicht. Es bleibt dem Gesetzgeber, auf
dessen Autorität die Gesetzesgeltung zurückzuführen ist, im Rahmen des
ihm zukommenden Beurteilungs- und Einschätzungsspielraums grundsätz-
lich überlassen, im Sinne geordneter Veränderungen 41 auszuwählen, wel-
chen Weg er bei der Rechtsbereinigung einschlagen will, insbesondere, wie
die aufgehäuften Normenbestände jeweils erfaßt werden sollen und welche
Zeiträume hierbei in Betracht zu ziehen sind.
Rechtsbereinigungen müssen aber auch und vor allem vor den Grund-
und Menschenrechten Bestand haben. Ein rechtsbereinigender Eingriff ist
keineswegs von vornherein ausgeschlossen, müßte jedoch verfassungsrecht-
lich gerechtfertigt sein. Um schon einem Eingriff in derart geschützte
Rechtspositionen vorzubeugen, sehen Rechtsbereinigungsgesetze nicht
durchgängig, aber überwiegend entsprechende Regelungen (sogen. Unbe-
rührtheitsklauseln) vor, die die - inzidente - Weitergeltung des Altbestands-
rechts hinsichtlich bereits begründeter Rechtsverhältnisse anordnen. Auf
diese Weise soll - unabhängig von möglichen Bestands- und Vertrauens-
schutzgesichtspunkten - eine Entwertung subjektiver Rechte verhindert
werden. Derartige Regelungen verschaffen dem um Rechtsbereinigung
bemühten Gesetzgeber Entlastung. Er gewährt a priori Bestandsschutz im
Sinne eines Schutzes vor Rechtsänderung, sofern es sich um alte, bereits
vor dem Stichtag bestehende Rechtsverhältnisse handelt. In die aus einem
konkreten Sachverhalt aufgrund einer Rechtsnorm sich ergebenden rechtli-

39
So das Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfGE 49, 168 [181]) u.ö. in st. Rspr.
40
Kunig (FN 37), S. 401 f.
41
Noll, Gesetzgebungslehre (FN 32), S. 234.
 Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches Problem 601

chen Beziehungen würde demnach nicht eingegriffen. Zugleich kann damit

dem Problem einer möglichen Rückwirkung rechtsbereinigender Gesetz-
gebung vorgebeugt werden. Der einzelne Inhaber einer Rechtsposition wird
in seinem Kontinuitätsvertrauen hinsichtlich seines Rechts weder ge- noch
enttäuscht, da die Stetigkeit begründet bestehender Rechtsverhältnisse und
damit zugleich deren Fortdauer nicht in Frage gestellt ist 42 .
Hinsichtlich ihrer Auswirkungen auf bestehende Rechtsverhältnisse knüp-
fen Rechtsbereinigungsgesetze an tradierte Vorstellungen des ausgehenden
18. und beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts an, denen zufolge in wohlerworbene
Rechte (iura quaesita) im Zweifel nicht eingegriffen werden sollte43. Einen
absoluten Schutz wohlerworbener Rechte vor jeglicher Rechtsänderung gab
es damals und gibt es auch heute im Zeichen des freiheitlichen und demo-
kratischen Verfassungsstaates nicht. Ein rechtsbereinigender Gesetzgeber
wäre und ist grundsätzlich nicht gehindert, wohlerworbene Rechte unter
Beachtung grundrechtlicher und rechtsstaatlicher Vertrauensschutzpositio-
nen eventuell sogar ersatzlos zu streichen.
Virulent wird diese Frage vor allem bei Vermögenswerten Rechten.
Soweit der Gesetzgeber rechtsbereinigend in derart geschützte Rechte ein-
greift, hätte dies ggfs. eine Entschädigungspflicht zur Folge. Eine derartige
Konstellation soll mit Hilfe von Unberührtheitsklauseln aber gerade vermie-
den werden, so daß die Frage einer möglichen verfassungswidrigen Eigen-
tumsverletzung sich gar nicht erst stellt. Der Gesetzgeber gewährleistet auf
diese Weise den Fortbestand von Rechtsverhältnissen, die unbeschadet der
Aufhebung der jeweils zugrunde liegende Rechtsnorm weiterhin Rechts-
wirkungen entfalten können, ein Grundrechtseingriff also vermieden wird.
Das Rechtsstaatsprinzip gilt in Gestalt der Rechtssicherheit auch für das
Verkündungswesen, d.h. die Normenpublikation. Problematisch ist dies vor
allem dann, wenn der Staat den Volltext der aktuellen Fassung einer Norm
nicht verfügbar hält und so die Voraussehbarkeit künftiger und die Transpa-
renz gefällter Entscheidungen in Frage gestellt sein kann44. Die herkömm-
42
Vgl. zum Kontinuitätsvertrauen Walter Leisner, Das Gesetzesvertrauen des
Bürgers. Zur Theorie der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und der Rückwirkung der Gesetze, in:
Festschrift für Friedrich Berber, hrsg. von Dieter Blumenwitz und Albrecht Ran-
delzhofer, München 1973, S. 273ff. (280f.).
43
Vgl. Dietrich Pirson, Artikel „iura quaesita", Handwörterbuch zur deutschen
Rechtsgeschichte Bd. 2 (1978), Sp. 472 ff. Siehe auch Klaus Vogel, Rechtssicherheit
und Rückwirkung zwischen Vernunftrecht und Verfassungsrecht, in: Juristenzeitung
1988, S. 833 ff. unter Bezugnahme auf den preußischen Justizreformer Carl Gottlieb
Svarez und sein Wort aus den Kronprinzen vorträgen: „Wenn der Staat alte Gesetze
abschafft, so darf er dennoch iura iam quaesita nicht aufheben." (Vorträge über
Recht und Staat, hrsg. von Hermann Conrad und Gerd Kleinheyer, Köln/Opladen
1960, S. 16).
44
Konzelmann (FN 16), S. 122.
602 Dieter Wyduckel

lichen Formen der Normenpublikation sind inzwischen an Leistungsgrenzen

gelangt, weil Änderungen naturgemäß nur mehr oder minder nacheilend
dokumentiert werden. Auch wenn skeptische Stimmen vor der Gefahr einer
Überinformation warnen, so dürfte doch kaum zu bestreiten sein, daß die
moderne Informationstechnologie zur Klärung des geltenden Normenbestan-
des einen bedeutenden Beitrag leisten kann45. Konsolidierte authentische
Texte wären jederzeit verfügbar, eine Volltextsuche im Gesamtbestand
ebenso möglich wie der Abgleich mit höherrangigem und bisherigem
Recht. Auch könnten sogen. Hypertextverknüpfungen 46, z.B. zwischen
Bundes- und Landesrecht oder zwischen nationalem und europäischem
Recht wesentlich dazu beitragen, nicht nur den Rechtsstab, sondern auch
den Bürger verläßlich zu informieren und damit Rechtsunsicherheiten zu
vermeiden oder doch zu verringern. Die Frage der rechtlichen Umsetzung
und Absicherung einer rechnerunterstützten Rechtsbereinigung ist zur Zeit
noch im Fluß. Klärungsbedürftig ist vor allem, ob ein elektronisches juristi-
sches Informationssystem notwendigerweise öffentlichrechtlichen, d. h.
hoheitlichen Charakter tragen muß (wofür manches spricht) oder auch pri-
vatrechtlich betrieben werden kann und welche Folgen dies jeweils hätte.
Schritte auf diesem Weg sind in ganz unterschiedlicher Form inzwischen in
verschiedenen europäischen Ländern, darunter in Österreich, der Schweiz,
in Norwegen, Finnland und ansatzweise auch in Deutschland unternommen
worden 47. Dies zeigt, daß ein ständig verfügbarer authentischer Normenbe-
stand für notwendig erachtet und damit eine rechtsklärende Rechtsbereini-
gung als dauernde rechtsstaatliche Aufgabe grundsätzlich bejaht wird.

V I I . Rechtsbereinigung als rechtliches und

politisches Problem in Umbruchzeiten

Zu einem Großteil ist Rechtsbereinigung Evaluation des vorhandenen,

aufgelaufenen Rechtsbestandes. Politische Wertungsentscheidungen spielen
hierbei eine nicht unerhebliche Rolle. Es bleibt letztlich dem Gesetzgeber
überlassen, welche Gesetze beibehalten werden sollen und welche nicht.
Rechtsbereinigung ist somit vom Entscheidungswillen des Gesetzgebers zur
Änderung bzw. Aufhebung überholter Vorschriften und Regelungen abhän-
gig. Dies kann vor allem und gerade in Umbruchzeiten zum drängenden
Problem werden, insbesondere dann, wenn altes und neues Recht, alte und
neue politische und gesellschaftliche Ordnung in Kollision geraten. Es han-

45
Vgl. Jon Bing, Information Technology and Law, Oslo 1993 sowie Konzel-
mann (FN 16), S. 265 ff.
46
Vgl. Konzelmann (FN 16), S. 259.
47
Hierzu näher Konzelmann (FN 16), S. 279ff. Siehe auch Markus Blümel/
Erwin Soldo , Online-Einstieg leicht gemacht, Köln 1998, S. 269 ff.
 Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches Problem 603

delt sich hierbei nicht um eine spezifisch deutsche Frage, doch sind in
diesem Jahrhundert Rechtsbereinigungen aufgrund der Verwerfungen im
Zuge von Krieg und Kriegsfolgen gerade in Deutschland aus naheliegenden
Gründen in besonderer Weise zum Problem geworden.
Von der Aufhebung und Bereinigung typischen NS-Rechts einmal abge-
sehen, die vor allem durch die Besatzungsmächte vorgenommen worden ist,
hat es Rechtsbereinigungen nach der Reorganisation deutscher Staatlichkeit
sowohl auf Bundes- als auch auf Länderebene gegeben48. Eine Rechtsberei-
nigung des Bundesrechts wurde Mitte der 50er Jahre in Angriff genommen.
Ziel der Bereinigung war es, den Bestand an bundesrechtlichen Normen zu
überprüfen und später nach Sachgruppen geordnet in einem besonderen
Teil des Bundesgesetzblatts zu veröffentlichen. Die Bereinigungsarbeiten
erstreckten sich zunächst bis zum Jahre 1968, kamen dann nicht mehr so
recht voran, um in der zweiten Hälfte der 80er Jahre wieder aufgenommen
zu werden 49.
Auf Länderebene erfolgten seit etwa Mitte der 50er Jahre bis Ende der
60er Jahre Rechtsbereinigungen, die im wesentlichen parallel zu den Bemü-
hungen des Bundes liefen. Diese Rechtsbereinigungen wurden in den 70er
und 80er Jahren fortgesetzt. Kennzeichnend für die alten Bundesländer ist,
daß die Rechtsbereinigung zunächst jeweils auf bestimmte Zeiträume
beschränkt blieb, wobei nur ausnahmsweise vor das 19. Jahrhundert zurück-
gegriffen wurde. Die meisten Bundesländer sahen bei der Bereinigung ihres
Landesrechts zudem eine ausdrückliche, im übrigen rechtsstaatlich gebotene
Auffangregelung vor, die anordnete, daß die jeweils aufgehobenen Rechts-
vorschriften auf Rechtsverhältnisse und Tatbestände anwendbar blieben, die
während der Geltung dieser Rechtsnormen ganz oder teilweise bestanden
hatten oder entstanden waren. Auch in der DDR hat die Frage der Rechts-
bereinigung eine Rolle gespielt, freilich in der erklärten Absicht, die sozia-
listische Rechtsordnung „planmäßig auszubauen"50.
Seit der Wiedervereinigung stellt sich das Problem auch für die neuen
Bundesländer, und zwar in doppelter Weise: Einmal im Hinblick auf das
Recht der DDR, das gem. Einigungsvertrag (Art. 9) teilweise fortgilt und
entsprechend der grundgesetzlichen Kompetenzverteilung in Bundes- bzw.
Landesrecht aufgegliedert wurde. Darüber hinaus ergab sich nach dem Bei-
tritt wie schon in den alten Bundesländern nunmehr die weitergehende
Frage, ob und inwieweit auch das vorkonstitutionelle, d.h. das vor der
48
Vgl. hierzu und zum folgenden die Aufstellung bei Schneider (FN 5),
Rdn. 691 ff.
49
Siehe Schneider (FN 5), Rdn. 693 ff., 697 f.
50
Ulrich Georg Schaarschmidt, Die Rechtsbereinigung als eine Methode zum
planmäßigen Ausbau der sozialistischen Rechtsordnung in der DDR, Potsdam-
Babelsberg 1976, bes. S. 11 ff.
604 Dieter Wyduckel

Gründung der beiden deutschen Teilstaaten geltende alte Landesrecht

rechtsbereinigend erfaßt werden sollte. Inzwischen sind in fast allen neuen
Bundesländern Rechtsbereinigungsgesetze ergangen. Im allgemeinen ist
hierbei nur das DDR-Recht bereinigt worden. Weiter gegangen ist aller-
dings der Freistaat Sachsen, der das gesamte in seine Kompetenz fallende
Recht in eine umfassende Rechtsbereinigung einbezogen hat 51 . Dies ist
angesichts der in Jahrhunderten angewachsenen Menge überkommener
Rechtsbestände, zu denen beispielsweise auch der berühmte Sachsenspiegel
gehört, nicht ganz risikolos, doch dürfte es sich hierbei um ein kalkuliertes
gesetzgeberisches Risiko handeln, zumal herkömmliche Rechtspositionen
auch hier ausdrücklich unberührt bleiben sollen. Gerade das sächsische Bei-
spiel zeigt aber, daß Rechtsbereinigungen stets auch historisch-politische
Befindlichkeiten berühren, und dies ganz besonders, wenn man in Rech-
nung stellt, daß der sächsische Staat, wie Otto Mayer in seinem „Staats-
recht des Königreichs Sachsen" bemerkt, „von jeher eine gewisse pietät-
volle Neigung" gegenüber überkommenen Rechtstraditionen gezeigt habe
mit dem Ziel, diese dann auch in Geltung zu halten52. Rechtsbereinigung
erweist sich von daher auch als eine soziokulturelle Frage, die in die
gesetzgeberischen Bemühungen einzubeziehen und jedenfalls dann von
Belang ist, wenn man Gesetz und Recht nicht auf ihre gewiß bedeutsamen
positiv-formalen Aspekte reduziert.

V I I I . Rationalität und Vernünftigkeit als Maßstab

der Rechtsbereinigung

Rechtsbereinigung dient der Optimierung und Effizienzsteigerung der

Gesetzesproduktion. Sie würde jedoch zu eng gefaßt, wenn man sie nur in
diesem Sinne verstehen würde. Rechtsbereinigung wird um so erfolgreicher
sein, je mehr sie in den größeren Rahmen einer umfassenderen Rechts-
reform eingebracht wird, die auch das politisch-administrative System ein-
bezieht53. Daß dies nicht ohne weiteres zu bewerkstelligen ist, liegt auf der
Hand. Jedoch liefe eine bloß gesetzestechnisch verstandene Rechtsbereini-
gung, für sich genommen, auf ein Kurieren an Symptomen hinaus.
Aber auch dann, wenn man die Rechtsbereinigung in diesen größeren
Zusammenhang einstellt, bliebe die Frage, in welchem Maße die an sie
gerichteten Anforderungen einlösbar sind. Mit ihrer Hilfe wird ein bestimm-
ter Bestand an Rechtsvorschriften evaluiert und anschließend ggfs. aufgeho-
51
Vgl. Wyduckel, Verfassungsrechtliche und verfassungsgeschichtliche Über-
legungen zur Rechtsbereinigung am Beispiel Sachsens, in: Sächsische Verwaltungs-
blätter 5 (1997), S. 285 ff.
52
Otto Mayer, Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs Sachsen, Tübingen 1909, S. 25.
53
Manti , Neuralgische Zonen von Politik, Staat und Recht (FN 1), S. 176.
 Rechtsbereinigung als gesetzgebungstechnisches Problem 605

ben. Auf diese Weise können formale und inhaltliche Widersprüche geklärt
werden, eine sachbereichsadäquate Regelung ist damit aber noch nicht
getroffen. Rechtsbereinigung wird in der Regel eine Verringerung des gege-
benen Normenbestandes erreichen, auch wenn man bedenkt, daß der berei-
nigte Normenbestand infolge der rechtsstaatlich gebotenen Unberührtheits-
klauseln insofern fiktiv fortbesteht, als die Berufung auf eine aufgehobene
Norm im Einzelfall weiter möglich bleibt. Daß auf diese Weise gleichwohl
ein Gewinn an Rechtsklarheit und Rechtssicherheit erzielt wird, dürfte aber
außer Frage stehen.
Eine ganz andere Frage ist, ob so zugleich ein Mehr auch in inhaltlich-
materialer Hinsicht erreicht wird. Gewiß stellen Rechtsbereinigungsgesetze,
formal betrachtet, ein Mittel zur Rationalitätssteigerung des Rechts dar.
Dem kann ein Rationalitätsgewinn auch in materiellem Sinne entsprechen,
ohne daß dies allerdings zwingend der Fall sein müßte. Gerade die deut-
sche Wiedervereinigung läßt die Rechtsbereinigungen größeren Stils eigene
Ambivalenz erkennen, wie sie gerade in Umbruchzeiten hervortritt. Einer-
seits hat die rechtliche Aufarbeitung der „vor-rechtsstaatlichen Vergangen-
heit" zweifellos einen beträchtlichen Zuwachs nicht nur an formeller, son-
dern auch an materieller Rechtsstaatlichkeit gebracht54. Andererseits zeigt
die in den neuen Bundesländern vielzitierte Wendung, man habe Gerechtig-
keit erwartet, aber den Rechtsstaat bekommen55, daß hier noch ein Nach-
holbedarf besteht, die große Aufgabe der inneren Bewältigung der Einheit
also noch keineswegs abgeschlossen ist.
Auch Rechtsbereinigung kann und muß sich nach allem an inhaltlichen
Maßstäben messen lassen. Es wäre von daher verfehlt, allein durch geset-
zestechnische Rechtsbereinigung mehr Gerechtigkeit erwarten zu wollen.
Vor allem bietet ein Gewinn an formaler Rationalität für sich allein noch
keine Gewähr dafür, daß auch ein Zuwachs an Vernünftigkeit erreicht wird.
Gewiß ist dies möglich, doch wird stets ein Rest bleiben, der nicht völlig
aufgeht, wenn nicht zusätzliche Kriterien herangezogen werden. In diesem
Sinne stellt sich die Frage, ob und wie Rechtsbereinigung Rationalität und
Vernünftigkeit miteinander verbinden und aufeinander beziehen kann. Eine
der Voraussetzungen hierfür ist, daß nicht nur formal-rechtsstaatlicher
Gehorsam eingefordert wird, sondern auch die darüber hinausweisenden
Kriterien der Akzeptanz und vor allem der Akzeptabilität in die diesbezüg-
lichen Überlegungen eingebracht werden. Welcher Art diese im einzelnen

54
Vgl. Christian Starck, Wilfried Berg, Bodo Pieroth, Der Rechtsstaat und die
Aufarbeitung der vor-rechtsstaatlichen Vergangenheit, in: Veröffentlichungen der
Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 51 (1992), S. 9 ff.
55
Vgl. hierzu Josef Isensee, Rechtsstaat - Vorgabe und Aufgabe der Einung
Deutschlands, in: Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Bd. 7, Heidelberg 1997, S. 3 ff. (18 ff.,
Rdn. 22 ff.).
606 Dieter Wyduckel

sein können, ist im vorstehenden Zusammenhang nicht näher darzulegen.

Wichtig wäre allerdings, daß überhaupt solche Erwägungen angestellt
werden. Aulis Aarnio hat einen Weg gezeigt, wie Rationalität und Vernünf-
tigkeit des Rechts im Zeichen der Akzeptabilität miteinander vereinbart
werden können56. Dies wäre eine der Möglichkeiten, die auch eine wohl-
verstandene Rechtsbereinigung für sich nutzen könnte, wenn sie nicht nur
legal, sondern in einem tieferen Sinne auch legitim sein will.

56
Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable (FN 4), S. 229.
 R A T I O N A L I T Y OF L E G A L DISCOURSE
IN RELATION TO LEGAL ETHICS

By Marek Zirk-Sadowski, Lodz

1. One of the main functions of the theory of law is to demythycise legal

thinking. This role, attributed to the most general reflection on the law, is
nowadays more important than any new conceptual structures, which theor-
ists of law were once expected to propose.
A researcher of the Polish legal culture will readily note an opinion, held
by politicians and lawyers, that the law, like other natural objects, is cog-
nizable. Most frequently this opinion manifests itself in the thesis that one
should strictly distinguish the cognition of the law itself from the attitudes
towards it, particularly moral ones. It is believed that the knowledge of law
is a relation which stems from strict separation of a researcher and the
object of his study. It is assumed that in the law, like in natural sciences, in
which impartiality of reception is ensured by the separation of these two
elements of the cognitive relation, it is possible to distinguish the moment
of apprehension of the law from the action of a lawyer studying it. Recep-
tive impartiality of legal analysis should be ensured by the reduction of law
to a legal text - a set of regulations existing independently of a lawyer
reading the text. Naturally, one can perceive differences in the interpreta-
tion of a text by different readers, but it is commonly believed that those
differences result from methodological mistakes or from deficiencies in
education with regard to jurisprudence. In this context, lawyers seem to
have acquired special knowledge, enabling them to penetrate an "objective"
meaning of a legal text, the one existing independently of them.
2. Therefore, with regard to the cognition of the law, legal culture is
characterized by strong identification of the process of interpretation with
the process of understanding. In other words, as far as law is concerned,
there is no difference between the problems of reception of natural objects
and of the objects of culture1. The reduction of the status of law to the role
of a natural object has many causes, a full presentation of which would go
beyond the scope of this paper. Undoubtedly, legal culture reflects a prob-
1
See A. Aarnio , On So-called Hermeneutical Trend in Finnish Legal Theory, in:
Legal Point of View, Helsinki 1978, p. 82.
608 Marek Zirk-Sadowski

lem of a more general nature - the tendency for the instrumentalization of

language used as a tool, separated from a discourse, for influencing or even
imposing opinions, a clear manifestation of which - before 1989 - was the
prevalence of propaganda over public debate; today the most spectacular
and the newest manifestation of this phenomenon is advertising.
The mechanism of the "objectivization" of law is also embedded in legal
culture itself, precisely speaking - it stems from the development of the
legal European tradition and from the relations between the law and a
bureaucratic state. Special attention here should be paid to the phenomenon
of the reception of the Roman law, which is an element of the common
tradition from which the so-called civic law, including Polish law, origi-
nated. On the basis of the ancient Roman law, a common notional frame-
work for this family of laws has been established. Owing to this frame-
work, a lawyer educated, for example, in Germany is able to cooperate
with French or Italian lawyers, because they all analyze law using the same
or very similar systems of concepts. Specific norms binding in their respec-
tive countries may differ, but they still consist of elements known to all
lawyers.
In the continental system, the main source of law is a statute, i.e. a leg-
ally binding act passed by the legislature. As we remember, Montesquieu
distinguished three sorts of power in the state: legislative, executive, and
judicial. The most important statement for our present considerations is that
each of those three powers should be wielded by a separate state organ.
Legislation lies with the parliament, the executive power with the govern-
ment and - at times - with the head of state, while the judicial power is
the domain of independent courts of law.
What is characteristic of the continental system is the exclusive power of
the legislation in the law-making, the main source of the law being a parlia-
mentary act which contains general norms, addressed to all citizens and sol-
ving problems in abstract terms, i.e. without referring to a specific case.
Judges cannot make the law; they only bring in verdicts based on the gen-
eral norms introduced by the parliament, creating an individual norm, e.g.
settling a controversy that arose from a specific case.
Such mutual relation between the legislative and the judicial powers is
characteristic of the civic law, whereas in the Anglo-Saxon system of
common law, the law originates from rules established by judges deciding
particular cases.
Therefore, in the civic law systems, the norms established by the legisla-
ture do not stem from a single controversy. The parliament introduces gen-
eral norms, because its members identify a need for solving some social or
economic problem or a necessity to define somebody's subjective right.
 Rationality of Legal Discourse in Relation to Legal Ethics 609

And only in the process of the application of law are these norms as if
"matched" to a specific case. This feature makes civic law very abstract; it
contains general patterns for solving problems which may never occur in
practice. We have already stated that the reception of the Roman law pro-
vided continental lawyers with a set of legal concepts. Independence of
these concepts is similar to the autonomy of the conceptual framework of
economics or sociology. Using these concepts, jurisprudence is able to reg-
ulate - in abstraction, so to say - interpersonal relations, relating rights and
obligations of individuals to a particular situation. Owing to such knowl-
edge, in civic law there has always been a tendency for comprehensive
legal regulations, for the establishment of "ideal" legal codes.

Separation of the conceptual system of jurisprudence, which to a large

extent stemed from the reception of the Roman law, enabled, in its turn,
the establishment of such features of the legal system as the generality of
legal rules, the possibility to introduce new normative patterns or entire
legal institutions, the repeatability of verdicts in similar cases, and the abil-
ity to establish a uniform practice for the application of law. These features
of law made it possible to influence, through law, social and economic life
in a way similar to steering socio-economic processes.

3. The alliance of a legal system developed in such a way with beauro-

cratic state systems, established mainly in the era of industrial societies,
began a new stage in the process of the above-mentioned "objectivization"
of the law. We can trace this process back mainly thanks to the analyses
contained in the works of Weber and Habermas.

Bureaucracy here is not a pejorative term, referring to the overformaliza-

tion of procedures and the inefficiency of officials. It refers to the organiza-
tion of the state apparatus which enables making rational decisions.
Roughly speaking, the organization of a feudal state could have been justi-
fied by tradition. A ruler's legitimization to wield power stemed from the
tradition of wielding power, e.g. by the family he was born in. Usually,
such tradition was supported by a myth on the origins of power. The orga-
nization of the state apparatus, too, was based on historical tradition. The
structure of positions in the state reflected the structure of positions at a
king's court, and was not a result of rational decisions or views on rational
decision-making in governing the state.

The so-called modern state is based on a concept of rational decisions

made by the state apparatus. This apparatus must be capable of identifying
the needs of a particular society, and then of pointing to at least some of
these needs as goals to be achieved by the state. The last moment is the
selection by the state of the most adequate means of achieving these goals,
40 FS Aarnio
610 Marek Zirk-Sadowski

the selection being based mainly on the knowledge of experts and on cost
analyses.

The essence of such rationality is therefore to select instrumentally of the

best means for achieving the goals. That is why it is called - after Weber
and Habermas - instrumental rationality.

What is the role of the law in a state organized in such a way? The state
apparatus comes to be the main factor influencing the law-making. The law
becomes an instrument for governing the society. While in the traditional
state the law was a result of spontaneous social processes, in a modern
state law stems from the actions of a rational state apparatus. Law is no
longer dominated by norms established in the process of the formation of
social customs. These norms are replaced by rationally established legal
institutions.

Of course, in such models of law and state, the legality of decisions of

the state organs increases. The hierarchy of legal norms corresponds to the
hierarchy of the state organs. Consequently, an organ of a lower grade is
not authorized to introduce legal norms or decisions of a rank appropriate
to a superordinate organ. In this way institutional mechanisms for eliminat-
ing inconsistencies in the law are created, because the presence of such
inconsistencies would be a negation of rationality.

All this means that the law became independent of other areas of culture.
In the traditional state and society, formal separation of the law from mor-
ality was practically impossible. Usually, tradition was the dominant source
of all sorts of norms, both moral and legal, which guided the society. In a
new model of state and society, law is created differently so that all the
social goals can be achieved. In a way, the law designs the future society.
The practice of passing verdicts and reaching decisions based on legal
norms is also separate. Those verdicts and decisions are, to a large extent,
enforced by the state. While in the traditional society also physical persons
would use force to secure their interests (e.g. private revenge), in the new
model, law enforcement is monopolized by state organs.

That institutional independence of the law from other norms applied by

the society and, most of all, from morality, became one of the main factors
in establishing the modern method of studying the law, called legal posi-
tivism.

In its original version positivism assumed that a lawyer studies the law
as an objective contents of a ruler's act of will, and so he has at his dispo-
sal an object of analysis independent of evaluating reflection. Positivism
defined the method of studying this kind of objects as formal-dogmatic.
 Rationality of Legal Discourse in Relation to Legal Ethics 611

Dogmatism here means acknowledging a ruler's act of will as the law. In

his professional activity a lawyer does not evaluate the law; he regards the
ascertained acts of a rulers's will as unquestionable, and in this sense the
law is a dogmat for him. Formalism, in turn, confines legal analysis to the
systematizing of law, to seeking and arranging notions embedded in its con-
tents, to determining logical consequences of legal norms. Therefore, it
never introduces new substance and contents to the law, never adds norma-
tive novelty.
Also, the process of the application of law, i.e. passing verdicts based on
the law, was perceived by positivists only as a sequence of logical opera-
tions. They believed that the application of law could be reduced to logical
reasoning, called legal syllogism.
4. In consequence of the above-mentioned process of the isolation of law
as an area studied "objectively", in order to understand the law it is enough
to take a position of an external observer. In the line of reasoning, in which
the law gives grounds for action, legal norms do not have to be treated
autonomously. Therefore, in the case of positive law, the object of legal
cognition is an observable set of social reactions which can be studied
objectively, without the observer's getting engaged in the object of his
study. Such engagement is even forbidden, as it disturbs the cognitive pro-
cesses by the introduction of subjective elements.
If such a concept of law is accepted, the professional ethics of lawyers
do not play any significant role in the study of law. Like the ethics of other
professional corporations, legal ethics comprises three types of regulations2:
those concerned with various technical aspects of pursuing a particular pro-
fession, those determining the relation between a professional group and
the society in general, and the attitude of a representative of the profession
to his clients in particular, as well as regulations defining the relations
between members of that profession. Such sets of regulations aspire in fact
to the role of a legal normative act, which makes it possible to resolve con-
flicts within a particular professional group, and allows the society to con-
trol behaviours of members of the corporation 3. Professional ethics is
simply an element of the instrumental use of law, the main function of
which is to steer the society and to dominate it. Professional ethics is only
a means of evaluation of the competence of lawyers taking part in this
process.
5. What gave grounds for questioning the above vision of law and legal
ethics was the analysis of the role of language and communication in legal
2
Cf. R. Sarkowicz/J. Stelmach, Teoria Prawa (Legal Theory), Wydawnictwo UJ,
Krakow 1996, p. 206.
3
Ibid, ps. 208 and 209.

40*
612 Marek Zirk-Sadowski

culture. The authority in democracy is realized through language and

speech. Therefore, the word creates the state and the civic order. The law,
too, is constituted by the language in which it is made, proclaimed, taught,
and applied, and this language is not a technical but an ethnic one. In a
democratic state each citizen should be able to understand legal norms.
Speech acts and the argumentations concerning the law can be grouped in
two discourses. One is concerned with the law-making. Parliamentary
debate leads to the formulation of a legal text. The law-making as a com-
munication does not occur freely but according to certain rules that govern
every rational discussion, and which are primarily defined and regulated by
the statute of parliamentary debates. As a result of a parliamentary debate a
text is created, a text formulated in a natural language and containing gen-
eral norms only, in compliance with the principle of the division of power.
The text is then published, and in that very moment it becomes detached
from its maker, i.e. from the legislative body. It is worth pointing out that
communicating a legal text in a natural language and in the form of general
norms makes its direct application in deciding a particular case difficult,
because the properties of the language of law as a register of a natural lan-
guage are in contradiction to the functions of the legal language in social
activities of lawyers. Using this language, lawyers are expected to precisely
motivate their decisions, and to prove that those decisions stem directly
from legal texts. Meanwhile, the instability of grammatical rules, the impre-
cision of meanings and the ambiguity of words, the dependence of the
meanings of expressions on the context they appear in, lead to a constant
openness of meanings of those expressions. Being an element of the natural
language, legal language inherits these features, and thereby disables law-
yers from achieving social goals.
Therefore, although communicating a legal text in the natural language is
an act closing discourse connected with the law-making, at the same time it
constitutes the moment in which this text starts to be worked on in the
second discourse, the discourse of the application of law. In a democratic
state this discourse is entrusted to a separate power - courts of law. While
each decision made by this power has to be based on a legal text issued by
the legislature, attention should be paid to the relative autonomy of the dis-
course on the application of law from the law-maker, as legal acts are real-
ized through interpretations. Although interpreting texts is not an activity
specific for lawyers - it is the task of each humanist - legal interpretation
has its specific function. The interpretation of law is concerned with texts
specifying obligations and rights of citizens as well as the range within
which the state operates. The competence of a binding interpretation deter-
mining the meanings of words means that lawyers possess power. Legal
culture originating from the Roman tradition created certain procedures for
discussion and argumentation (legal discourse), which, to a large extent,
 Rationality of Legal Discourse in Relation to Legal Ethics 613

enable lawyers to unify their activities, although the humanistic factor

cannot be avoided here.
Legal hermeneutics thus points to a hermeneutic circle included in the
legal cognition. A legal norm is as if prior to its interpreter, but it comes
into force in the interpreted form. It follows that the law is an interpretative
fact for hermeneutics, and becomes effective simultaneously with its inter-
pretation. From theoretical point of view, there is no clear border between
the statement that there "exists" a specific norm, and the statement that that
norm has been interpreted.
A legal text formulated in the natural language and containing general
norms separates two relatively autonomous discourses: a discourse of the
law-making, and a discourse of the application of the law. Only participa-
tion in a language communication so outlined allows full reception (under-
standing) of the law.
6. A vision of law reduced to a natural object mutilates legal culture as it
is important to distinguish between two types of actions J. Habermas
pointed to recently: goal-rational and communicative4.
In the group of goal-rational actions, we can distinguish the instrumental
and the strategic ones. A model of the instrumental action is work. Charac-
teristic of such actions is their being based on technical principles that ori-
ginate from empirical knowledge. Actions of this kind consist in achieving
goals in particular conditions. While instrumental actions consist in acquir-
ing means adequate for achieving the goals, strategic actions consist in ana-
lytical evaluation of alternative procedures, on the basis of an order of
values defined beforehand. A strategic action, the essence of which is the
selection of adequate procedures from among potential alternatives, is
based on analytical knowledge. This knowledge, being a source of rule of
preference and of general maxims of procedure, makes it possible to
choose from among potential alternatives.
Generally speaking, goal-rational actions are a means of dominating and
steering objects; they become exhausted in the subject-object relation. The
properties of communicative actions are different. Those actions consist in
interacting through symbols. Such interaction is possible thanks to the
norms accepted by the participants of communication; those norms consti-
tute the competence of an articulate subject, so they must be recognized
and accepted by at least two actors. The norms are valid not because they
reflect the interdependence of two natural objects, as is the case with tech-
4
Cf. Fundamental works by Habermas: Erkenntnis und Interesse, Frankfurt am
M. 1968; Theorie und Praxis, Frankfurt a.M. 1971; Sprachpragmatik und Philoso-
phie, Frankfurt a.M. 1976; Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Frank-
furt a.M. 1983.
614 Marek Zirk-Sadowski

nical principles, but because of intersubjective communication. While goal-

rational actions are a means of dominating and steering objects, actions of
this type serve as tools for shaping personality structures of particular sub-
jects, as well as for integrating the society. We can see how this distinction
works when we pass on to studying problems of rationality, characteristic
of each of these two types of actions. Two types of rationality, correspond-
ing to two dimensions of social life, can be distinguished: one is the dimen-
sion of contacts with nature; the other dimension is intersubjective. The
actions called goal-rational correspond to technical rationality. The essence
of this rationality is a requirement for the proper selection of means for
achieving the set goals, and for making the selection on the basis of the
maxims of actions which we characterized while discussing strategic
actions. Consequently, he acts in this dimension, who is able to set himself
a goal and choose the best means, from among those known to him or
being at his disposal, to achieve it. This type of rationality is based on an
assumption that, while acting in the natural order, we can formulate instru-
mental directives based on anancastic sentences. Therefore, this rationality
relates exclusively to an explanatory attitude.
Communicative actions correspond to communicative rationality. Within
the given language, this rationality is composed of, most generally speak-
ing, universal conditions enabling communication. Speaking precisely, this
means conditions which make up the validity of speech acts, treated as a
realization of a particular language. The basic medium of communication is
speech, and as we know from the general theory of speech acts, we can
analyse the illocutionary aspect of each speech act. Since we can say that
every speech act "is binding" owing to its illocutionary aspect, the problem
of claims can always arise, to which claims - within a particular language
- speech acts are subordinated. This opens a possibility for analyzing the
problems of rational actions, the essence of which is the realization of
speech acts.

Putting the philosophical aspect aside, and focusing on the semiotic one,
we can say that the general theory of speech acts should define the basic
system of rules every adult individual is familiar with to such an extent
that he can use it for successful building of sentences in a statement. There-
fore, the ideal language user's competence must contain not only the ability
to generate and understand grammatically correct expressions (linguistic
competence), but also to establish and understand the communicative
modes, and the relations with the external world which make speech possi-
ble. The existence of these aspects in every speech act determines the con-
tents of conditions (claims) which pragmatics reconstructs. Roughly speak-
ing, their fulfillment decides whether a grammatically correct statement is
successfully "placed" in each of the three above-mentioned "worlds". An
 Rationality of Legal Discourse in Relation to Legal Ethics 615

ideal communicative situation occurs when the speaker's intention is to

communicate true sentences so that the listener receives certain knowledge;
the speaker must express his intentions truthfully so that the listener can
believe him. And finally - the speaker must choose a relevant (legitimate)
statement so that the listener can accept it, which in turn means that both
the speaker and the listener can accept that utterance in relation to a par-
ticular normative background.
The result of a communicative action should be an understanding based
on truthfulness, sincerity and relevance. It can be easily observed that these
conditions are not axiologically indifferent.
Communication so understood is not a formal category. After all, it con-
sists - among other things - in showing sincerity of one's intentions, or in
relating a statement to a particular normative background. As we have
already pointed out, the choice of communicative conditions (demands) is
based on values, but it is always conditioned culturally.
It thus appears that the questions: why we should not use violence in
discussion or restrict the freedom of any of its participants cannot be
answered by any axiologically neutral scientific theory, because this would
mean declaring for a particular ethics of discussion. Such requirements as
freedom of speech or an obligation to respond to arguments originate from
specific systems of ethics. They naturally do not exhaust all the require-
ments that must be fulfilled by communication. Such requirements as the
prohibition to formulate contradictory statements are of a logical nature.
There are also praxeological requirements, e.g. the prohibition to repeat
arguments without any particular need. Nonetheless, ethical requirements
are basic in that no discourse makes sense without them. In our culture
such a basic requirement is freedom of speech. So it appears that rationality
of communicative actions is a complex set of values, in which ethical eva-
luations play a key role.
7. In the hermeneutic vision of legal culture, discussed in point 5, law is
a kind of communicative action. The law is studied not only within the
framework of legislative and judicial discourses, but also within civic dis-
course which cannot, however, be strictly separated from the legal dis-
courses. Therefore, the law is never a complete object, to be studied like
other natural objects around. The law "comes into being" through dis-
course, i.e. through communicative actions. The efficiency of this discourse
depends on whether certain ethical requirements are met; only then can we
consider its results as rationally achieved and acceptable. In the case of
legal discourse, most of these requirements are defined by legal ethics.
Norms applied to regulate such issues as the possibility of setting out cer-
tain arguments, the limitations resulting from professional confidentiality,
616 Marek Zirk-Sadowski

respect for the court, and professional competence, formulate ethical

requirements which must be fulfilled in legal discourse so that its outcome
can be accepted.
Of course, legal discourse is the superstructure above practical discourse
whose rationality is defined by the pattern of an ideal communicative situa-
tion. Therefore, quite frequently the requirements contained in the legal
ethics only particularize the general requirements. It is important, however,
that the fulfillment of those requirements makes it possible to receive
(understand) the law as a specific cultural object; this understanding is
achieved through communicative actions whose criteria of rationality con-
tain ethical requirements, as was demonstrated above. Legal ethics thus
makes it possible, to a large extent, to understand the law as an interpreta-
tive fact. Within the positivistic vision of law, the lawyer that meets the
requirements of legal ethics deserves only to be called an honest jurist. The
hermeneutic vision of legal culture, blurring the lines between morality and
cognition, allows us to put forward a thesis that only an honest lawyer can
gain the knowledge of (understand) the law.
8. Our considerations hitherto allow a statement that the two visions of
law - positivistic and hermeneutic - define the role of legal ethics differ-
ently. In the positivistic approach, marked by semantic sting (Dworkin),
ethics does not play any significant role in the cognition of law. In fact, it
is only a means of controlling and repressing lawyers in order to make
them perform their social functions properly.
In the hermeneutic vision, professional ethics takes a much higher posi-
tion. It advances the cognition of law, and is a basis for the correct legal
discourse. Collective creating of meanings in communicative actions con-
nected with law requires the equalization of the hierarchy of power, the
structures and hierarchical interdependence of acting subjects, thus making
the coercion-free exchange of arguments possible. Therefore, independence
in the legal professions, and particularly in the profession of a judge, is
substantial. Against a background of these theoretical and philosophical
considerations a practical problem arises. Mutual recognition of the legal
professions must be an integral element of the membership of the European
Union. However, legal practice is usually a national phenomenon, and it is
in the interest of the state to regulate it strictly in order to ensure the
proper application of law. For constitutional reasons, lawyers participate in
the third branch of power in the state - the judicial power - not only as
judges, but also as defense counsels and prosecutors. This intra-state char-
acter of legal practice is in contrast to the transnational character of eco-
nomics which requires lawyers' support. Briefly speaking, the national,
internal character of legal practice increases the costs of international busi-
ness as it makes it necessary to employ staff with local professional
 Rationality of Legal Discourse in Relation to Legal Ethics 617

licenses, and to create special ways of maintaining communication between

local professional markets. Therefore, every change of location incurs new
expenses; it also exposes the entrepreneur to errors, at least at the initial
stage of his activity in a given country. Hence the proposal for the mutual
recognition of titles and licenses in order to reduce the costs of such under-
takings, and to increase the effectiveness of economic ventures. The Euro-
pean Community has solved this problem by introducing a number of reg-
ulations which aim at creating a pan-European legal practice. So there
appears a new type of lawyer whose sophisticated legal knowledge allows
him to run legal practice on a European scale. We may say that with the
creation of a common market of goods and services Europe began to create
a pan-European legal practice connected with this market. This, in turn,
brought about the necessity to harmonize the methods of educating lawyers
at law schools, which problem, however, goes beyond the scope of this
introduction.
Appendix
 AULIS AARNIO - ANALYTISCHE JURISPRUDENZ
U N D N E U E H E R M E N E U T I K I M DIENSTE DES RECHTS

Von Werner Krawietz, Münster

Sehr verehrter Herr Professor Aarnio,

meine sehr geehrten Damen und Herren!
Rektor und Dekan haben soeben sehr treffend eine Reihe von guten Gründen
benannt, die für unsere Universität Anlaß bieten, die Übergabe des Forschungs-
preises durch die Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung in dieser Form für Sie aus-
zurichten1. Jeder der hier anwesenden Fachkollegen aus der Rechtswissen-
schaftlichen und der Philosophischen Fakultät könnte weitere Gründe hinzufü-
gen, die insgesamt Grund genug sind, Sie in einem universitätsöffentlichen
Festakt hier und heute zu ehren. Die bestehenden deutsch-finnischen Kontakte,
die an unserer Universität seit mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten mit Ihnen und Ihren
Schülern unterhalten und gepflegt wurden, existieren ohne einen formellen Part-
nerschaftsvertrag, ohne den heutzutage manches ja gar nicht mehr zu gehen
scheint.
I.

1. Sie sind, verehrter Herr Kollege Aarnio, an unserer Universität und in

der Rechtswissenschaftlichen wie in der Philosophischen Fakultät kein
Unbekannter. Wir erinnern uns sehr gern daran, daß Sie im Jahre 1986 -
anläßlich der Verleihung des Humboldt-Forschungspreises an den zu den
Erfindern und Begründern der modernen Normenlogik gehörenden Profes-
sor Georg Henrik von Wright, den weltberühmten Philosophen und seiner-
zeitigen Nachfolger von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Cambridge - , also heute
vor fast genau 11 Jahren hier von dieser Stelle aus in der Aula des Mün-
ster'sehen Schlosses die Laudatio auf Ihren akademischen Lehrer hielten.
Ihr damaliger Vortrag „Am Wanderstab des Zweifels", in dem Sie ein nicht
unkritisches, eher skeptisches Bild analytischer Theorie und Philosophie
entwarfen, erschien 1988 in Band 1 der vom Rektor der Universität Mün-
ster herausgegebenen Akademischen Reden und Beiträge. Diese Abhand-

1
Geringfügig gekürzter Text der Laudatio auf Professor Aarnio, gehalten vor der
Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Münster, zuerst abgedruckt in:
Aulis Aarnio, Theorie der Rechtsgemeinschaften und der Rechtserfahrung in Otto
Brusiins Allgemeiner Rechtslehre. Münsterische Juristische Vorträge, Bd. 3, 1999,
S. 17 - 24.
622 Werner Krawietz

lung gehört heute, zusammen mit dem seinerzeitigen Festvortrag von

Wrights über „Wissenschaft und Vernunft", zur Pflichtlektüre derjenigen
Studierenden, die sich mit rechtswissenschaftlicher Grundlagenforschung
befassen, insbesondere mit Rechtstheorie und Rechtsphilosophie.
2. Die laufenden inter- und multidisziplinären Kontakte der Universität
Münster mit finnischen Universitäten erstreckten sich im Bereich des
Rechts anfangs hauptsächlich auf die Universitäten Helsinki und Turku, seit
geraumer Zeit - nach dem Universitätswechsel von Professor Aarnio im
Jahre 1991 - auch auf die Universität Tampere, wo er seit seinem Weg-
gang von Helsinki als Professor und Direktor des Forschungsinstituts für
Sozialwissenschaften die in ganz Skandinavien größte Forschungseinrich-
tung dieser Art leitet, an der heute empirische Sozialforschung betrieben
wird. Als Editor in Chief der seit 1997 in Tampere redigierten und edier-
ten, in Berlin bei Duncker & Humblot veröffentlichten, internationalen
Zeitschrift Associations beeinflussen Sie auch die sozialwissenschaftliche
Theoriebildung in der zeitgenössischen Rechts- und Gesellschaftstheorie.
Wir freuen uns, daß die bestehenden Arbeitskontakte mit unserer Universi-
tät auf finnischer Seite nun durch zwei weltbekannte Forscherpersönlichkei-
ten getragen und repräsentiert werden, nämlich durch Georg Henrik von
Wright und durch Sie, lieber Herr Aarnio, die nun beide zu den Trägern
des Humboldt-Forschungspreises an unserer Universität gehören.
3. Sie stehen heute, lieber Herr Aarnio, in einer Reihe mit weltbekannten
Forschern und Gelehrten, die sämtlich der von Ihnen gepflegten For-
schungsrichtung der Analytischen Theorie und Sprachphilosophie angehö-
ren, die Sie selbst so fruchtbringend auf das Verhältnis von Normen und
Handeln, insbesondere auf das Rechtshandeln angewandt haben. Ich meine
jene Spitzengruppe von international wohlbekannten Humboldt-Forschungs-
preisträgern der Fachrichtung Rechtstheorie und Philosophie, insbesondere
der Rechts-, Staats- und Sozialphilosophie, die unsere Universität zu ihren
Preisträgern zählen darf, weil sie von Münster aus vorgeschlagen und
betreut wurden und mit Münster'sehen Gelehrten eng zusammengearbeitet
haben und dies weitgehend auch heute noch tun. Diese Gruppe von Gelehr-
ten, zu der Sie mit dem heutigen Tag hinzugekommen sind, gehören an
ihren Heimatuniversitäten zum Teil der Rechtswissenschaftlichen, zum Teil
der Philosophischen Fakultät an, doch erscheinen diese Zuordnungen im
Hinblick auf die fachsystematisch heterogenen Problemstellungen, die von
der normativen Struktur des Rechts und der zeitgenössischen rechtswissen-
schaftlichen Grundlagenforschung aufgeworfen werden, eher zufällig.
a) Es handelte sich seit 1980 um die folgenden Preisträger:
- Michael Dummett, Oxford (1980)
- Elisabeth Anscombe, Cambridge (1983)
 Analytische Jurisprudenz und Neue Hermeneutik 623

- Georg Henrik von Wright, Helsinki (1986)

- Ota Weinberger, Graz (1989)
- Eugenio Bulygin, Buenos Aires (1996)
- Aulis Aarnio, Tampere (1997).
b) Während die ersten beiden Preisträger von Kollegen der hiesigen Phi-
losophischen Fakultät vorgeschlagen wurden, aber durch ihr Werk auch zur
Entwicklung der Normen- bzw. Institutionentheorie beigetragen haben,
wurden die übrigen aus der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät nominiert. Es
ist kein Zufall, daß sich in der ,ewigen4 Liste von Trägern des Forschungs-
preises für ausländische Geisteswissenschaftler der Fachrichtung Philoso-
phie, die bei der A. v. H.-Stiftung geführt wird, zusammen mit Ihnen, Herr
Aarnio, auch Juristen und Rechtstheoretiker befinden. Sie alle sind wie Sie
dem Forschungs- und Wissenschaftsprogramm der Analytischen Jurispru-
denz, Rechtstheorie und Sprachphilosophie verpflichtet. In der Tat hat diese
Forschungsrichtung im Rechtsdenken der Gegenwart wie kaum eine andere
in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts zu Neuerungen geführt, die auch
das Gesicht der rechtswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung geprägt und
verändert haben.
c) Die Universität Münster weiß die bahnbrechenden Erkenntnisse, die
von den soeben genannten Gelehrten seit den 50er Jahren auf der Basis
logischer und sprachphilosophischer Forschungen auf den Gebieten der for-
malen Logik und der Normenlogik bzw. der Deontischen Logik, aber auch
einer Neuen Hermeneutik erbracht wurden, ganz besonders zu schätzen. Ich
sage dies nicht ohne Stolz, denn gerade unsere Universität hat den moder-
nen formallogischen und sprachphilosophischen Fragestellungen und For-
schungen seit jeher sehr nahe gestanden. Sie gehören an der Universität
Münster gleichsam zu einer Tradition, die seinerzeit auch zur Begründung
des hiesigen Instituts für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung
und später zur Begründung einer Leibniz-Forschungsstelle geführt hat.
Diese Neuorientierung verdankte sich dem auch heute noch international
bekannten Philosophen und Logiker Heinrich Scholz, der im Jahre 1984
hundert Jahre alt geworden wäre. 1928 auf einen Lehrstuhl für Philosophie
nach Münster berufen, wurde er - nach dessen Umwandlung - im Jahre
1943 Inhaber des ersten deutschen Lehrstuhls für Mathematische Logik und
Grundlagenforschung. Scholz erblickte in der mathematischen Logik
zugleich eine Mathesis universalis, eine exakte Philosophie, die in allen
Wissenschaften wirksam werden kann. In der Philosophie führte dies in der
Nachkriegszeit zu der von Joachim Ritter (1903 - 1974) begründeten,
sprachphilosophisch fundierten Theorie der Begriffsgeschichte, welche die
Einflüsse der modernen Sprachwissenschaften und der sprachanalytischen
Philosophie unter Einschluß der durch die neue (formale) Logik gesetzten
Genauigkeitsanforderungen in sich aufnahm, zu neuartigen, am jeweiligen
624 Werner Krawietz

Gebrauch der bislang verwendeten Begriffe und Termini orientierten philo-

sophischen Forschungen. Die begriffsgeschichtlichen Studien, die sich in
dem von J. Ritter herausgegebenen Historischen Wörterbuch der Philoso-
phie bislang in neun Bänden niedergeschlagen haben, sowie die von ihm
entwickelte, auf die Maßgeblichkeit der jeweiligen sprachlichen Bedeutun-
gen und Begriffsverwendungen abstellende Methodik und Hermeneutik
erstreckten sich auch auf das grundbegriffliche Verhältnis von Philosophie
und Wissenschaften. Was die vormals Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche
Fakultät angeht, so war eine auf die formale Logik gestützte Sozialfor-
schung in der Zeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg vor allem verknüpft und
verbunden mit der Person von Jürgen von Kempski, der ihre Anwendung
auf die Sozialwissenschaften betrieb. Wer hätte damals gedacht, daß diese
Denkweise analytisch-logischer Argumentation und Begründung, übertragen
auf das Verhältnis von Normen und Handeln, insbesondere auf das Rechts-
handeln, auch die praktische Argumentation in den sozialen Hand-
lungswissenschaften - unter Einschluß der Wirtschaftswissenschaften und
der Jurisprudenz - beeinflussen und verändern würde.

II.

1. Auf ausdrückliche Bitte von Herrn Aarnio beschränke ich mich im

folgenden - nach Rücksprache mit Rektor und Dekan - auf eine knappe
Vorstellung von Person, Leben und Werk des Preisträgers. Ich werde also
keine Laudatio im übliche Sinne halten, geschweige denn eine detaillierte
Würdigung seines Werks auch nur versuchen. Dies geschieht übrigens auch
aus Gründen, die Sie, meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren, sogleich
sehr viel besser verstehen werden. Gewöhnlich glaubt man, einigermaßen
genau zu wissen, was die im eigenen Fachgebiet wirklich führenden Kolle-
gen und Freunde wissenschaftlich erarbeitet, gedacht und publiziert haben.
Zumindest nahm ich dies im Hinblick auf das mir ziemlich genau bekannte,
sehr vielschichtige Werk von Herrn Aarnio an, mit dem ich seit Jahrzehn-
ten befreundet bin. Man kann sich aber täuschen, wie ich unlängst erfahren
mußte. Als ich nämlich vor einiger Zeit in der Auseinandersetzung mit Aar-
nios Schriften den Überblick zu verlieren drohte, gab ich meinen Mitarbei-
tern den Auftrag, die verschiedenen Arten und Typen von Herrn Aarnios
Veröffentlichungen mengenmäßig zu identifizieren, den einzelnen Fachge-
bieten des Rechts zuzuordnen, sie inhaltlich zu strukturieren und durchzu-
zählen. Es dauerte verdächtig lange, bis sie diesen Auftrag - nach wieder-
holtem Anmahnen - endlich ausgeführt hatten und mir das Ergebnis vorle-
gen konnten. Herr Kollege Aarnio hat, wie wir feststellten, seit der Mitte
der 60er Jahre insgesamt 26 Bücher und 9 von ihm selbst herausgegebene
Bände mit seinen wichtigsten Essays veröffentlicht. Ich lasse im folgenden
seine Veröffentlichungen im Zivilrecht außer Betracht, obwohl mir bekannt
 Analytische Jurisprudenz und Neue Hermeneutik 625

ist, daß Herr Aarnio im Familien-, Kindschafts- und Erbrecht - auch nach
Meinung finnischer Fachkollegen - ganz unangefochten zu den führenden
Autoren seines Landes zählt.
a) Zu den wichtigsten Werken Aarnios, die hauptsächlich der rechtswis-
senschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung gewidmet sind und sich - ihren
Schwerpunkten nach - auf Probleme der Analytischen Jurisprudenz, insbe-
sondere der juristischen Begriffs- und Systembildung, sowie der Juristi-
schen Methodenlehre, der Allgemeinen Rechtslehre, sprich: Rechtstheorie
und Rechtsphilosophie, konzentrieren, gehören: „On Legal Reasoning"
(1976), „Legal Point of View" (1977), „Philosophical Perspectives in Juris-
prudence" (1983) und sein neuestes, auf das Verhältnis von Macht und
Recht gerichtetes Werk „Reason and Authority" (1997).
b) Sein 1987 veröffentlichtes Hauptwerk „The Rational as Reasonable.
A Treatise on Legal Justification" ist bislang nicht ins Deutsche übertragen.
Mit ihm befaßt sich jedoch die fast gleichnamige Festschrift unter dem
Titel „The Reasonable as Rational? On Legal Argumentation and Justifi-
cation", die Herrn Aarnio zu seinem 60. Geburtstag in Form eines hand-
gebundenen Exemplars der Druckfahnen in Tampere überreicht wurde und
im Verlag Duncker & Humblot in Berlin gedruckt wurde. Ich begrüße
an dieser Stelle sehr herzlich den Inhaber des Verlags, Herrn Professor
Dr. h.c. Simon, der heute morgen aus Berlin eingeflogen ist, um an
dieser Ehrung teilzunehmen und Sie, lieber Herr Aarnio, zu beglückwün-
schen. Was wären wir, sehr verehrter Herr Kollege Simon, in der rechtswis-
senschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung ohne die jahrzehntelange Förderung
durch Sie und Ihren potenten Verlag!
c) Besonders hervorheben möchte ich zwei in deutscher Sprache verfaßte
Werke, nämlich „Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft" (1978) und „Wegen
Recht und Billigkeit. Vorträge und Aufsätze aus 10 Jahren" (1988). Sie
sind mit all diesen Veröffentlichungen, lieber Herr Aarnio, nicht nur was
Finnland und Skandinavien angeht, in der Tat zum Vater neuer Denkweisen
in der Rechtswissenschaft avanciert, wie es in einer bekannten deutschen
Tageszeitung heißt.
2. Was meine Mitarbeiter - neben Ihren Büchern - zutage förderten, hat
mich wirklich überrascht:
a) Die unselbständigen Abhandlungen und Artikel zur Theorie und Philo-
sophie des Rechts, die in Übertragung in 12 andere, international gebräuch-
liche und verbreitete Sprache erschienen und von Ihnen zum Teil in Fin-
nisch, zumeist jedoch unmittelbar in Englisch verfaßt wurden, umfassen
allein insgesamt 230 Beiträge. Sie erstrecken sich unter Berücksichtigung
der von mir bereits genannten Schwerpunkte nahezu auf den gesamten
Gegenstandsbereich der zeitgenössischen Rechtstheorie und Rechtsphiloso-
phie, doch muß ich mir hier eine nähere Charakterisierung versagen.
41 FS Aarnio
626 Werner Krawietz

b) Eine dritte Menge Ihrer Veröffentlichungen besteht aus rund 280 Bei-
trägen in Zeitungen, Zeitschriften u.a. Sie behandeln Themen und Pro-
bleme aus dem Bereich von Politik, Kultur und Gesellschaft.
c) Hinzu kommen als vierte Teilmenge Kommentare, Rezensionen, Inter-
views u.a.m.
Das sind alles in allem 594 Veröffentlichungen, wie mir meine Mitarbei-
ter mitteilten. Ich erinnere mich dunkel, wohl etwas geschluckt zu haben
und weiß auch noch, daß ich murmelte: „Aha, sehr interessant!" Da meine
eigene Produktion gegenwärtig bei schlappen 350 Titeln stagniert und bei
Fortführung meines bisher müßigen Lebenswandels auch keine Chance
besteht, diese vergleichsweise eher defizitäre Bilanz auszugleichen, versu-
che ich seither, morgens etwas früher aufzustehen, um meinen eigenen wis-
senschaftlichen Output zu optimieren. Es lebt sich aber nicht sehr ange-
nehm, wenn man nach der Devise „Publish or perish!" verfährt. Dies alles
gilt freilich nicht für Herrn Kollegen Aarnio. Durch seine diversen Aktivi-
täten kaum ausgelastet, hat er noch Zeit gefunden, zwei historische Romane
zu schreiben, die 1992 bzw. 1995 erschienen, jeweils im Umfang von mehr
als 400 Seiten. Außerdem schrieb er zwei Theaterstücke, die am 9. Juni
1996 bzw. am 15. Juni 1997 im Ramppi Theater in seiner Heimatstadt Kan-
gasala ihre Premiere hatten.
3. Wir alle stützen uns in Wissenschaft und Philosophie auf die Schul-
tern von Größeren, die durch ihr Vorbild und ihre Anregungen unsere
eigene wissenschaftliche Arbeit beeinflussen.
a) In Anlehnung an die Spätphilosophie von Ludwig Wittgenstein und
im Anschluß an die zeitgenössische Analytische Sprachtheorie und Sprach-
philosophie, vor allem an diejenige seines berühmten Lehrers Georg Henrik
von Wright, hat Aarnio deren Denkansätze und Methodik sowie bestimmte
Aspekte der Neuen Rhetorik von Chaïm Perelman in höchst originärer
Weise auf das Verhältnis von Normen und Handeln, insbesondere auf das
Rechtshandeln übertragen.
b) Ein anderer wichtiger Aspekt seiner Forschungen sind die Auseinan-
dersetzungen und vergleichenden Untersuchungen, die er - vom Standpunkt
des finnischen Rechtssystems und seiner Theorie und Philosophie des
Rechts - im Hinblick auf das zeitgenössische Rechtsdenken in Deutschland,
Österreich, Frankreich, Polen, Ungarn, Großbritannien, Spanien und vielen
anderen Rechtssystemen in aller Welt angestellt hat. Diese internationalen
und interdisziplinären Aktivitäten, die - über Europa hinausgehend - auch
die Entwicklung der Rechtstheorie in den USA und Kanada, in einigen
Staaten in Lateinamerika, wie Argentinien und Brasilien, aber auch in
Japan und Korea berührten, brachten ihn rasch an die Spitze der Internatio-
nalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR), der heute 45
 Analytische Jurisprudenz und Neue Hermeneutik 627

nationale Sektionen angehören. Von 1983-87 amtierte Herr Aarnio als Prä-
sident der Welt-IVR, von 1987-95 als deren Vize-Präsident.
c) Auch an wissenschaftlichen Ehrungen hat es ihm nicht gefehlt. Die
Akademie der Wissenschaften der Russischen Föderation hat Professor
Aarnio, der selber Mitglied der Finnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
ist und seit 1991 als Präsident der Sektion ,Recht4 amtiert, im Jahre 1995
zum Vollmitglied der Russischen Akademie ernannt, eine seltene Ehrung
für einen westlichen Gelehrten. Die Universität Lund verlieh ihm 1997 das
Ehrendoktorat.
Resümee. Wenn etwas das Rechtsdenken in diesem Jahrhundert, das in
Kürze zu Ende geht, von Grund auf erneuert und verändert hat, dann ist
das die Analytische Theorie und Sprachphilosophie, verbunden mit den
Errungenschaften der formalen Logik und deren Anwendungen auf das
Recht. Ich erinnere in diesem Zusammenhang nur an Automation, elektro-
nische Datenverarbeitung und Rechtsinformatik sowie an das Recht der
neuen Kommunikationsmedien. Es macht deshalb durchaus Sinn, sich beim
Aufbau einer Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, zu dem Sie so viel
beigetragen haben, auch der formalen Logik, insbesondere einer Normenlo-
gik zu bedienen, wie von Wright , Weinberger und Bulygin dies tun - sie
alle Träger des Humboldt-Forschungspreises an der Universität Münster! Es
wäre jedoch verfehlt, die Auslegung und Interpretation sowie das Verstehen
des Rechts als eine bloße Anwendung der formalen Logik aufzufassen.
Genau hier setzen Ihre Bemühungen an, die praktische juristische Argumen-
tation mit den Mitteln der Wissenschaft zu durchleuchten, um sie - soweit
irgend möglich - zu rationalisieren. Wegen dieser Leistungen, die ich hier
nicht näher charakterisieren kann, gelten Sie, Herr Kollege Aarnio, mit
Grund als einer der Begründer einer Neuen Analytischen Jurisprudenz und
Hermeneutik im Dienste des Rechts, dessen originären Leistungen die zeit-
genössische Jurisprudenz - über die Grenzen Skandinaviens und Europas
hinaus - so viel verdankt.
Ich überbringe Ihnen, lieber Herr Aarnio, im Hinblick auf die Preisüber-
gabe durch die A. v. H.-Stiftung auch die Glückwünsche des amtierenden
Präsidenten der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphiloso-
phie (IVR), Herrn Professor Dr. Enrico Pattaro, Universität Bologna. Er hat
mich beauftragt, Ihnen diese Botschaft hier und heute auszurichten. Auch
übermittle ich Ihnen die herzlichen Glückwünsche des internationalen Exe-
kutivkomitees dieser Vereinigung, dem anzugehören ich die Ehre habe.
Wir alle wünschen Ihnen viel Erfolg bei Ihrer weiteren wissenschaft-
lichen Arbeit und freuen uns auf die Fortsetzung der Zusammenarbeit mit
Ihnen.

41*
 BIBLIOGRAPHY AULIS AARNIO

A. Books and Monographs

B. Books edited
C. Articles, Review Articles
D. Book Reviews
E. Commentaries, Brief Essays, Notes, and Tributes
F. Interviews
G. Novels and Plays
H. Newspaper Articles and Columns

A. Books and Monographs

1. Perillisen oikeusasemasta (On the Legal Status of Heirs). Porvoo 1967. X X I X ,

448 pp. + Zusammenfassung + lists
2. Kysymyksiä testamenttioikeuden alalia (Questions on the Law of Inheritance).
Vammala 1969. X X I I I , 184 pp. + Zusammenfassung
3. Luentoja perintöoikeudesta I (Lectures on the Law of Inheritance I). Vammala
1970. XII, 233 pp.
4. Oikeudellisen ajattelun perusteista (On the Bases of Legal Thinking). Vammala
1971. X V I , 205 pp.
5. Luentoja perintöoikeudesta II (Lectures on Inheritance Law II). Vammala 1971.
IX, 263 pp.
6. Jälkisäädökset (Last W i l l and Testament). Vammala 1972. X V I , 382 pp.
7. Perintöoikeus (Law of Inheritance). Vammala 1974. X I X , 481 pp.
8. Laki, teko ja tavoite (Law, Act and Goal). Forssa 1975. 388, 20 pp.
9. Jälkisäädökset (Last W i l l and Testament). 2. revised ed. Vammala 1975. 392,
25 pp.
10. On Legal Reasoning. Loimaa 1976. XIII, 355 pp.
11. Aviovarallisuusjärjestelmät (Matrimonial Property Systems). Helsinki 1978. XI,
155 pp.
12. Mitä lainoppi on? (What is Legal Science?). Helsinki 1978. 284 pp.
13. Legal Point of View. Helsinki 1978. V, 261 pp.
14. Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft. Vienna 1979. X V I , 246 pp.
German , supplemented edition of number 12
630 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

15. Oikeussäännösten tulkinnasta (On the Interpretation of Statutes). Helsinki 1982.

215 pp.
16. Suomen avioliitto-oikeus (Finnish Matrimonial Law) (with Sami Mahkonen).
Jyväskylä 1983. 272, 27 pp.
17. Maatilan sukupolvenvaihdos (The Transfer of a Farm to a Descendent) (with
Ahti Saarenpää and Pekka Santala). Jyväskylä 1983. 197 pp.

18. Suomen jäämistöoikeus I (Finnish Law of Inheritance I) (with Urpo Kangas).

Jyväskylä 1983. 502 pp.
2nd ed. Tampere 1989. X X V I , 548, 42 pp.
3rd ed. Jyväskylä 1991. X V I I , 655 pp.
19. Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence. Helsinki 1983. 270, 18 pp.
20. Suomen jäämistöoikeus I I (Finnish Law of Inheritance II). Jyväskylä 1984.
445 pp.
2nd completely revised ed. Jyväskylä 1991. X X X I I , 429 pp.

21. Suomen avioliitto-oikeus (Finnish Matrimonial Law). 2nd ed. (with Markku
Helin and Sami Mahkonen). Tampere 1985. 363, 44 pp.
3rd revised ed. (with Markku Helin). Jyväskylä 1992. X X I I , 317 pp.
22. Murusia matkan varrelta (Bits and Pieces Along the Way). Tampere 1985.
156 pp.

23. Sankarit vailla siipiä (Heroes Without Wings). Tampere 1985. 94 pp.
24. Lain ja kohtuuden tähden (For Law and Reasonableness). Juva/Porvoo 1986.
190, 6 pp.
German version: Wegen Recht und Billigkeit. Vorträge und Aufsätze. Berlin
1988. 166 pp.

25. The Rational as Reasonable. Dordrecht 1987. X I X , 276 pp.

Spanish version: Lo racional corno razonable. Translated by Ernesto Garzón
V aidés. Madrid 1991. 313 pp.
French version: Le rationnel comme raisonnable. Translated by Geneviève
Warland. Brussels /Paris 1992. XX, 303 pp.

26. Hämärässä laulaa punakylkirastas (Redwing Sings in the Twilight). Tampere

1987. 95 pp.
27. Avioliittolain muutetut säännökset (The Revised Statutes of Marriage Act)
(with Markku Helin). Tampere 1988. 147 pp.

28. Laintulkinnan teoria (The Theory of Legal Interpretation). Juva 1989. 315 pp.

29. Silmäyksiä (Glances). Tampere 1989. 145 pp.

30. Perunkirjoitusopas (A Guide to the Inventory of the Deceased's Estate) (with
Urpo Kangas and Pertti Puronen). Jyväskylä 1990. 224 pp.
3rd revised ed. Jyväskylä 1994. 285 pp.
4th revised ed. Jyväskylä 1996. 316 pp.
31. Juridisk argumentation (Legal Argumentation) (Aleksander Peczenik with Aulis
Aarnio and Gunnar Bergholtz). Stockholm 1990. 224 pp.
 Β. Books edited 631

32. Avioliitto, perintö ja testamenti (Marriage, Inheritance and Last W i l l and Tes-
tament) (with Urpo Kangas). Jyväskylä 1994. X V I , 290 pp.
Swedish edition: Äktenskap, arv och testamente. Jyväskylä 1995. XV, 302 pp.

33. Järki ja auktoriteetti. Puhuttua ja kirjoitettua vuosilta 1988 - 1994 (Reason and
Authority. Words and Thoughts from 1988 - 1994). Tampere 1994. 145 pp.
34. Derecho, racionalidad y comunicación social. Ensayos sobre filosofia del dere-
cho. Mexico D. F. 1995. 115 pp.
35. Kohtaamisia. Lehtikirjoituksia vuosilta 1994-95 (Encounters. Newspaper arti-
cles from 1994 - 95). Tampere 1995. 64 pp.
36. Reason and Authority. A Treatise on the Dynamic Paradigm of Legal Dog-
matics. Aldershot 1997. XII, 306 pp.

B. Books edited

37. R. A. Wrede: Perintökaaren selityksiä (A Commentary on Inheritance Code). A

revised and abridged edition for educational purposes. Ed. by Aulis Aarnio and
Simo Zitting. Helsinki 1962. 11, 120 pp.

38. Korkeimman oikeuden lausunto esitysehdotuksesta perintölaiksi 1941 (The

Statement of the Supreme Court on the Motion for the Law of Inheritance in
1941). An edited version of the original of the Supreme Court. Ed. by Aulis
Aarnio. Helsinki 1965. 212 pp.
39. Suomen oikeus (1) - 2. (Finnish Law). Ed. by Aulis Aarnio/Olavi Heinonen
and Kaarlo Tuori. Helsinki 1975. 446, 11 pp.
40. Jerzy Wróblewski: Meaning and Truth. Ed. by Aulis Aarnio. Helsinki 1979. V,
197 pp.
41. Methodologie und Erkenntnistheorie der juristischen Argumentation. Ed. by
Aulis Aarnio/Ilkka Niiniluoto and Jyrki Uusitalo. Berlin 1981 (RECHTS-
THEORIE Beiheft 2). 362 pp.

42. Zum Fortschritt von Theorie und Technik in Recht und Ethik. Ed. by limar
Tammelo and Aulis Aarnio. Berlin 1981 (RECHTSTHEORIE Beiheft 3). 350 pp.

43. Jerzy Wróblewski: Meaning and Truth. Ed. by Aulis Aarnio. 2nd ed. Helsinki
1983. VI, 215 pp.
44. Roberto J. Vernengo: Suomalainen ja argentiinalainen oikeusteoria. Näkökohtia
kahden kulttuurin kohtaamisesta (Finnish and Argentinian Legal Theory.
Aspects of the Encounter of Two Cultures). In: Lakimies 82 (1984), pp. 544-
566
Translated and edited from English by Aulis Aarnio
45. On the Utility of Legal Theory. Ed. by Aulis Aarnio and Mark Van Hoecke.
Tampere 1985. 192 pp.
46. Legal Philosophical Library. Finland: A Bibliography. Ed. by Carla Faralli/
Enrico Pattaro/Aulis Aarnio and Juha Pöyhönen. Milano 1985. 257 pp.
632 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

47. Legal Reasoning. Vol I - II. Ed. by Aulis Aarnio and Neil MacCormick.
Aldershot 1992. Vol I: X V I I , 517 pp.; Vol II: X V I I , 501 pp.
48. Rechtsnorm und Rechts Wirklichkeit. Festschrift für Werner Krawietz zum
60. Geburtstag. Ed. by Aulis Aarnio/Stanley L. Paulson /Ota Weinberger/
Georg Henrik von Wright and Dieter Wyduckel. Berlin 1993. XIII, 834 pp.
49. Interests, Morality and the Law. Ed. by Aulis Aarnio/Kauko Pietilä and Jyrki
Uusitalo. Tampere 1996. 211 pp.

C. Articles, Review Articles

50. Perinnönjaon moitteesta muotovirheen perusteella (The Action for Annulment

on Formal Defects in Cases Concerning the Division of Inheritance). In: Laki-
mies 61 (1963), pp. 447 - 460
51. Holhoojan kelpoisuudesta lahjoittaa holhottinsa irtainta omaisuutta (On the
Competence of a Guardian to Dispose of the Personal Property of His/Her
Ward). In: Defensor Legis 45 (1964), pp. 85 - 96
52. Uudet perinnönjakosäännökset (The New Statutes on Law of Inheritance). In:
Suomen lakimiesliiton X V I lakimiespäivien pöytäkirja (The Record of the X V I
Lawyers Meeting). Helsinki 1965, pp. 32 - 41
53. Avio-oikeuden käsitteestä (On the Concept of Marital Right to Property). In:
Lakimies 63 (1965), pp. 590 - 605
54. Voidaanko lahjanlupaukseen perustuva saaminen valvoa lahjanlupauksen anta-
jan konkurssissa? (Is it Possible to File a Gift Promise in a Bankruptcy of a
Pledger of a Gift?). In: Lakimies 64 (1966), pp. 393 - 397
55. Einige Gesichtspunkte über Schenkungsversprechen. In: lus humanum. Studia
in honorem Otto Brusiin. Turku 1966, pp. 1 - 1 1
56. Ennakkoperintö (Advancement). In: Suomen lakimiesliiton X V I I I lakimiespäi-
vien pöytäkirja (The Record of the X V I I I Lawyers Meeting). Helsinki 1967,
pp. 1 8 - 2 9
57. Erään selitysteoksen herättämiä perintökaaren tulkintaongelmia (Inheritance
Code and Interpretation Problems Raised by a Commentary) (with Matti Savo-
lainen). In: Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i Finland 104 (1968),
pp. 214-256
58. Nâgra tankar om oskiftat dödsbo som juridisk person (Some Thoughts on Undi-
vided Estate as a Legal Person). In: Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i
Finland 104 (1968), pp. 342 - 368
59. Käyttöoikeustestamenttiin oikeutensa perustavan lesken asemasta (On the Status
of a Widow Basing Her Right on Testamentary Usufruct). In: Suomen lakimie-
sliiton X I X lakimiespäivien pöytäkirja (The Record of the X I X Lawyers Meet-
ing). Lahti 1968, pp. 18 - 34
60. Bestridande av fordran och urarvaförmän (The Contest of a Claim and the Ben-
efit of Renouncing A l l Claims on an Estate). In: Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska
föreningen i Finland 1968 (Jubileumshäfte), pp. 15 - 36
 C. Articles, Review Articles 633

61, Muutamia perinnön jakamiseen liityviä seikkoja (Notes on the Distribution of

an Estate). In: Defensor Legis 49 (1968), pp. 362 - 378

62, Havaintoja perintöosuuden luovutuksesta (Notes on the Transfer of Share of

Estate). In: Defensor Legis 50 (1969), pp. 73 - 112

63, Nâgra tankar om oskiftat dödsbo som juridisk person I I (Some Thoughts on
Undivided Estate as a Legal Person II). In: Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska före-
ningen i Finland 105 (1969), pp. 228 - 243

64, Juridisen tutkimuksen näköaloja (Perspectives of Legal Research). In: Tidskrift

utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i Finland 105 (1969), pp. 371 - 406

65, Perunkirjoitusjärjestelmämme arviointia (Review of the Finnish Estate Inven-

tory System). In: Lakimies 67 (1969), pp. 745 - 769

66, I vilken ordning skall dödsbodelägare höras dà försordande för boutrednings-

eller skiftesman sokes? (In What Order Should Beneficiaries to an Estate be
Heard When the Adminstrator of an Estate is Sought?). In: Tidskrift utgiven av
Juridiska föreningen i Finland 105 (1969), pp. 475 - 788

67. Om rättvetenskapens satser (On Propositions of Legal Science). In: Tidskrift

utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i Finland 105 (1969), pp. 554 - 572

68. Muutama oikaisu oikeushistorioitsijan mietteisiin (A Few Corrections to the

Thoughts of a Legal Historian). In: Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i
Finland 105 (1969), pp. 573 - 578

69. Testamenttiasiain käytäntöä (Testamentary Practices) (with Ahti E. Saarenpää).

In: Defensor Legis 50 (1969), pp. 432 - 460

70. Sananen 'lakipositivismista' (A Few Words on 'Legal Positivism'). In: Laki-

mies 68 (1970), pp. 276-288

71. Ulosmittauksesta kuolinpesässä (On Distraint from an Estate). In: Lakimies 68

(1970), pp. 329- 362

72. Ulosmittauksen kohteesta (On the Object of Distraint). In: Lakimies 69 (1971),
pp. 299 - 300

73. Pesänjakajan määräämisestä ja tehtävistä (On the Appointment and Duties of a

Distributor of an Estate). In: Säästöpankkien Keskus-Osake-Pankin jatkokoulu-
tuspäivien pöytäkirja (The Record of Further Education of the Central Bank of
Finland's Savings Bank). Helsinki 1971, pp. 1 - 1 8

74. Oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan tutkintouudistuksen perusteista (On the Bases of

the Degree Reform of the Faculty of Law). In: Suomen lakimiesliiton 22. laki-
miespäivien pöytäkirja (The Record of the Lawyers Meeting 1971). Helsinki
1971, pp. 130- 144

75. Oikeustieteen vieraantuminen (The Alienation of Legal Science). In: Lakimies

69 (1971), pp. 4 5 6 - 4 8 4

76. Formal Incorrectness and the Invalidity of a Legal Transaction. In: Scandina-
vian Studies in Law 15 (1971), pp. 1 3 - 2 7
634 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

77. Yhden huoltajan varassa elävät perheet (Single Parent Families). In: Suomen
akatemian vuosikirja (The Yearbook of the Academy of Finland). Helsinki
1971, pp. 2 0 - 2 8
78. Perhelainsäädäntö ja yhteiskunnan rakennemuutos (Family Law and the Struc-
tural Change of Society). In: Oikeus ja politiikka (Law and Politics). Ed. by
Per Lindholm and Heikki Seppänen. Jyväskylä 1971, pp. 123-129
79. Ei ainoastaan muodoista ... (Not Merely on Forms ...). In: Lakimiesuutiset
(Lawyers News) 27 (1971), 2, pp. 30 - 36
80. Kritiikin kritiikkiä (Critique on Critique). In: Lakimiesuutiset (Lawyers News)
27 (1971), 3, pp. 9 - 12
81. Juridisen ratkaisutoiminnan ongelmia (Problems in Juridicial Decision Making).
In: Lakimies 70 (1972), pp. 218 - 236
82. Muodon merkitys oikeudellisessä käyttäytymisessä (The Significance of Form
in Legal Conduct). In: Oikeustiede-Jurisprudentia vuosikirja (Legal Science-
Jurisprudentia Yearbook) 1 (1972), pp. 185-212
83. Oikeuslaitostoimikunnan "historialliset erehdykset" (The "Historical Mistakes"
of the Reform Committee for the Judicial System). In: Defensor Legis 53
(1972), pp. 246-258
84. Lisiä oppiin oikeuslaitoksen uudistamisesta (Appendices to the Study of the
Reform of the Judicial System) (with Olavi Heinonen). In: Lakimies 70 (1972),
pp. 447 - 462
85. Tutkimus ja lainvalmistelu (Research and Law Drafting). In: Oikeusministeriön
lainsäädäntöosaston julkaisu (Publication of the Ministry of Justice, Law Draft-
ing Department) 1972, 2, pp. 1 - 1 8
86. Tieteen vapaus ja kokonaisvaltainen tutkimuspolitiikka (The Freedom of
Science and Overall Research Policy). In: Oikeus 1 (1972), 1, pp. 8 - 15
87. Oikeustiede ja "oikeustiede" (Legal Science and "Legal Science"). In: Oikeus 2
(1973), 2, pp. 9 - 13
88. Suomalaisen oikeusteorian kehityspiirteitä (Aspects of the Development of Fin-
nish Legal Theory). In: Lakimies 71 (1973), pp. 339 - 371
89. Väestöpolitiikka, perhepolitiikka ja avioliittolaki (Population Policy, Family
Policy and Matrimonial Law). In: Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys 75 vuotta (The
Finnish Lawyers Association 75 Years). Ed. by Suhani Wirilander. Helsinki
1973, pp. 35 - 48
90. Justifiointi ja selittäminen (Justification and Explanation). In: Lakimies 72
(1974), pp. 305 - 339
91. Oikeustiede muuttuvassa yhteiskunnassa (Legal Science in Changing Society).
In: Hämäläis-osakunnan juristikerho 1935 - 1975 (The Häme Law Students'
Society 1935 - 1975). Ed. by Risto Airikkala et al. Hämeenlinna 1975, pp. 32 - 43
92. Pitäisikö tohtoriksikin kouluttaa? (Should Doctors, too, be Trained?). In: Laki-
mies 73 (1975), pp. 4 - 18
93. On the Role Played by Social Values in Jurisprudence. In: Tidskrift utgiven av
Juridiska föreningen i Finland 111 (1975), pp. 34 - 50
 C. Articles, Review Articles 635

94. Mitä oikeuspoliittinen tutkimus on? (What is Legal Policy Research?) In:
Oikeuspoliittisen tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisuja (Publications of the National
Research Institute of Legal Policy) 1975, 5, Helsinki, pp. 7 - 31
95. Vad är rättspolitisk forskning? (What is Legal Policy Research?) In: Tidskrift
utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i Finland 111 (1975), pp. 122 - 140
96. Ikuinen ja muuttuva oikeus (Eternal and Changing Law). In: Juhlajulkaisu
Urho Kale va Kekkonen. (Festschrift for Urho Kale va Kekkonen). Ed. by Esko
Hoppu et al. Helsinki 1975, pp. 229 - 246
97. "Laki, teko ja tavoite". Tutkimus positivistisen ja ei-positivistisen oikeusteor-
ian mahdollisuuksista ("Law, Act and Goal". A Study on the Possibilities of
Positivist and Non-Positivist Legal Theory). In: Katsaus 3 (1975), 6, pp. 11 -
14
98. Om den finska rättsfilosofin under 1900-talet (On Finnish Philosophy of Law
in the 20th Century). In: Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i Finland
112 (1976), pp. 3 0 - 6 7
99. Onko avioliitto purettava, kun perhe rikkoutuu? (Must a Marriage be Dis-
solved When a Family Breaks up?). In: Katsaus 4 (1976), 2, pp. 23 - 25
100. Tilastollisten todennäköisyyksien käytön vaaroista (On the Dangers on Refer-
ring to Statistical Probabilities). In: Defensor Legis 57 (1976), 3 - 4 , pp. 126 -
127
101. Arvsrätten i stöpsleven. Huvuddraggen av arvrâttskomitténs förslag (Law of
Inheritance in the Melting Pot. The Outlines of the Inheritance Committee's
Proposition). In: Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i Finland 112
(1976), pp. 235-265
102. Perimyssäännösten taustaa erityisesti maa- ja väestöpolitiikan kannalta (The
Background of Inheritance Statutes from the Land and Population Policy Point
of View). In: Lakimies 74 (1976), pp. 2 9 0 - 3 1 9
103. Teoreettisen tutkimuksen merkityksestä oikeustieteelle (On the Significance of
Theoretical Study to Legal Science). In: Lakimies 74 (1976), pp. 547 - 581
104. Tiede todellisuuden selvittäjänä (Science in Explaining the Reality). In: Tiede
työväenluokan palvelukseen (Science to the Service of the Working Class).
Helsinki 1976, pp. 6 - 13
105. Testamentin tiedoksianto, moiteoikeudesta luopuminen ja testamentin hyväksy-
minen (The Service of a Last W i l l and Testament, Renouncement of Contest
and Approval of a Last W i l l and Testament) (with Urpo Kangas). In: Defen-
sor Legis 57 (1976), pp. 434 - 439
106. Voiko perittävä testamentissa antaa lakiosaperillistä sitovia perinnönjako-
ohjeita (Can a Testator Give Binding Rules to a Forced Heir on the Distribu-
tion of an Estate). In: Defensor Legis 58 (1977), pp. 4 - 17
107. Linie Rozwojowe Finskiej Filosofii Prawa. In: Studia Prawnicze 17 (1976),
pp. I l l - 121
108. Oikeusteorian nk. hermeneuttisesta suuntauksesta (On Legal Theory and What
is Called the Hermeneutic Approach). In: Lakimies 75 (1977), pp. 318 - 355
636 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

109. Some Remarks on the Concept of Scientific Community. Comments on Dr.

Mulkay's paper from the point of view of legal research. In: Suomen Akate-
mian julkaisuja (Publications of the Academy of Finland) 1977, 4, Helsinki,
pp. 77 - 83

110. Oikeuden muoto ja sisältö. Näkökohtia oikeuspositivismista (The Form and

Content of Law. Aspects on Legal Positivism). In: Juhlajulkaisu Paavo Kastari
(Festschrift for Paavo Kastari). Ed. by Mikael Hidén et al. Vammala 1976,
pp. 8 - 23

111. Kan ett pâstâende om en rättsregels innehâll vara riktig? (Can a Contention on
the Content of a Statute be Correct?) In: Uppsalaskolan - och efterât (Uppsala
School - and After). Uppsala 1978, pp. 143 - 159

112. Lakiosa ja testamentti (Legal Portion and a Last W i l l and Testament). In:
Uusinta jäämistöoikeutta (The Latest in Law of Inheritance). Helsinki 1978,
pp. 1 6 - 3 1

113. Perinnöstä luopuminen (Renouncement of Inheritance). In: Uusinta jäämistöoi-

keutta (The Latest in Law of Inheritance). Helsinki 1978, pp. 40 - 67

114. Testamenttiehdoista (On Testament Clauses). In: Uusinta jäämistöoikeutta

(The Latest in Law of Inheritance). Helsinki 1978, pp. 177 - 193

115. The Family Law Research in Finland during the 1970s. In: Heisingin yliopis-
ton yksityisoikeuden laitoksen julkaisuja (Publications of the University of
Helsinki, Department of Private Law) 1978, pp. 1 - 30

116. Die finnische Ehegesetzgebung heute und morgen. In: Zeitschrift für
Rechtsvergleichung 19 (1978), pp. 9 8 - 1 0 9

117. Leonard Nelson - unohdettu klassikko (Leonard Nelson - a Forgotten Clas-

sic). In: Oikeus 7 (1978), pp. 22 - 25

118. Tulkintalauseen varmuuden ehdoista (On the Certainty Conditions of an Inter-

pretation Clause). In: Lakimies 76 (1978), pp. 733 - 746

119. Mitä tiedämme menneistä ajoista? (What Do We Know About the Past?). In:
Katsaus 6 (1978), 4, p. 25

120. "Sufficient Maintenance" in the Finnish Law of Support. In: The Child and
the Courts. Ed. by Ian F. G. Baxter and Mary A. Eberts. London 1978,
pp. 169- 178

121. On Legal Policy Research. In: RECHTSTHEORIE 9 (1978), pp. 301 - 316

122. Lainoppi - tiedettä vai tekniikkaa (Legal Dogmatics - Science or Technique).

In: Academia scientiarum Fennica. Yearbook 1978, pp. 143 - 151

123. On the Ideological Nature of Legal Reasoning. In: Vernunft, Erkenntnis, Sitt-
lichkeit. Internationales philosophisches Symposion, Göttingen, vom 27. -
29. Oktober 1977 aus Anlaß des 50. Todestages von Leonard Nelson. Ed. by
Peter Schröder. Hamburg 1979, pp. 229 - 314

124. Lapin Korkeakoulu (The University of Lapland). In: Lakimies 77 (1979),

pp. 357 - 370
 C. Articles, Review Articles 637

125. Tottelisinko? Luonto, oikeus ja luonnonoikeus (Should I Obey? Nature, Law

and Natural Law). In: Hälläpyörä 1979, 4, pp. 29 - 35

126. The Grounding Structure of Law. In: RECHTSTHEORIE 10 (1979), pp. 281 -
290

127. Tieteellisen edistyksen kysymyksiä oikeustieteessä (Questions of Scientific

Progress in Legal Science). In: Suomen Akatemian julkaisuja (Publications of
the Academy of Finland) 1979, 6, Helsinki, pp. 17 - 39

128. Le ricerche del campo del diritto di famiglia e le riforme legislative in Finlan-
dia negli anni settanda (with Urpo Kangas). In: Famiglia, diritto, mutamanto
sociale in Europa. Ed. by Valerio Pocar and Paola Ronfani. Milano 1979,
pp. 8 5 - 1 0 7
See number 115

129. Linguistic Philosophy and Legal Theory. In: Argumentation und Hermeneutik
in der Jurisprudenz. Ed. by Werner Krawietz/Kazimierz Opalek/Aleksander
Peczenik and Alfred Schramm. Berlin 1979, pp. 1 7 - 4 1 (RECHTSTHEORIE
Beiheft 1)

130. Tutkijainkoulutus - onko sitä ja pitäisikö sitä olla? (Post-Graduate Education

- What Is It and Why?). In: Oikeus 8 (1979), pp. 68 - 72

131. Kasvakaa terveeseen kriittisyyteen (Towards a Healthy Criticism). In: Hällä-

pyörä 1979, 1, pp. 4 0 - 4 1

132. The Change of the Conceptions of the Family Institution and the Reform of
Family Law. In: Indian Socio-legal Journal 1980, pp. 130- 143
See number 137

133. Testamentin suunnittelusta (On Planning of a Last W i l l and Testament). In:

Perintö-ja vero-oikeutta (On Laws of Inheritance and Taxation). Helsinki
1980, pp. 7 - 2 8

134. Testamentin selvittäminen (The Administration of a Last W i l l and Testament).

In: Perintö-ja vero-oikeutta. (On Laws of Inheritance and Taxation). Helsinki
1980, pp. 29 - 49

135. En analys av arvinges rättsliga ställning (An Analysis of the Legal Status of
Heirs). In: Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i Finland 116 (1980),
pp. 363 - 378

136. Luentojen sisältösuunnittelusta (On Planning Contents of Lectures). In: Pykä-

län uutiset 13 (1980), 2, pp. 24 - 29

137. Changing Concepts of the Family and the Reform of Family Law in Finland.
In: Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies: Areas of Legal,
Social and Ethical Change. Ed. by John M. Eekelaar. Toronto 1980, pp. 21 -
31
See number 132

138. The Form and the Content of Law. Aspects of Legal Positivism. In: Archivum
juridicum cracoviense X I I (1980), pp. 17 - 36
English, supplemented edition of number 110
638 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

139. Voiko oikeustiede edistyä? (Can Legal Science Make Progress?). In: Tieteen
edistyminen ja yhteiskuntatieteet (The Progress of Science and the Social
Sciences). Ed. by Yrjö Littunen/Kauko Pietilä/Veikko Pietilä and Aino Saari-
nen. Tampere 1980, pp. 199-216

140. Perhekäsityksen muuttuminen ja perhelainsäädännön uudistus (The Changing

Concepts of Family and the Reform of Family Law). In: Lapsi - yhteiskunta -
lainsäädäntö (Child - Society - Legislation). Ed. by Ritva Mitchell. Helsinki
1980, pp. 136- 154
See numbers 132 and 137

141. Ο pojociu audytorium w argumentacji prawniczej filozoficzny punkt widzenia.

(The Concept of Auditory in Legal Argumentation). In: Acta universitatis
Lodziensis 26 (1981), 6, pp. 3 - 25

142. Asiantuntijat ja valta - asiantuntijavalta (Experts and Power - the Power of

Experts). In: Kanava 79 (1981), pp. 200 - 205

143. Lakeja vai lainomaisuuksia? Näkökohtia vaihtoehtoisen lainopin perusteista

(Laws or Regularities? Aspects on the Basis of Alternative Jurisprudence). In:
Oikeus 10 (1981), pp. 9 9 - 111

144. Laki ja oikeudenmukaisuus (Law and Reasonableness). In: Katsaus 9 (1981),

3, pp. 8 - 13

145. On Truth and the Acceptability of Interpretative Propositions in Legal Dog-

matics. In: Methodologie und Erkenntnistheorie der juristischen Argumenta-
tion. Ed. by Aulis Aarnio/Ilkka Niiniluoto and Jyrki Uusitalo. Berlin 1981,
pp. 3 3 - 5 1 (RECHTSTHEORIE Beiheft 2)

146. On the Paradigm Articulation in Legal Research. In: Zum Fortschritt von
Theorie und Technik in Recht und Ethik. Ed. by limar Tammelo and Aulis
Aarnio. Berlin 1981, pp. 45 - 56 (RECHTSTHEORIE Beiheft 3)

147. Tiedepolitiikan kriteereistä (On the Criteria of Science Policy). In: Oikeus 10
(1981), 4, pp. 171 - 182

148. Ottakaamme oikeustiede vakavasti (Let Us Take Legal Science Seriously). In:
Lakimies 79 (1981), pp. 751 - 763

149. 150 anni di filosofia del diritto in Finlandia. In: Rivista trimestrale di diritto e
procedura civile 35 (1981), 3, pp. 809 - 830

150. Analyyttisestä ja hermeneuttisesta oikeustieteestä (On Analytic and Hermeneu-

tic Legal Science). In: Studia Juridica 1981: Oikeustieteen perusteet, menetel-
mät ja tavoitteet (The Bases, Methods and Goals of Legal Science). Ed. by
Jukka Kekkonen. Helsinki 1981, pp. 1 - 1 6

151. The Foundations of Legal Reasoning. Collaboration of Aulis Aarnio, Robert

Alexy and Aleksander Peczenik. In: RECHTSTHEORIE 12 (1981), pp. 133ff.,
pp. 357ff., pp. 423 - 448 (Aarnio)

152. Tieteen tila (The State of Science). In: KTTS:n julkaisuja (Publications of
KTTS) 1981, 9, pp. 1 1 - 2 9
 C. Articles, Review Articles 639

153. Oikeusteoria salakuljetettava lakimiesten tietoisuuteen (Jurisprudence Must Be

Smuggled into the Consciousness of Lawyers). In: Lakimiesuutiset 37 (1981),
6, pp. 1 0 - 1 1

154. Oikeussäännösten pätevyydestä, tehokkuudesta ja hyväksyttävyydestä (On the

Validity, Efficacy and Acceptability of Legal Norms). In: Juhlajulkaisu Aarne
Nuorvala (Festschrift for Aarne Nuorvala). Ed. by Toivo Holopaineu/Pekka
Hallberg and Mikale Hidén. Helsinki 1982, pp. 6 - 16

155. Lingvistisk filosofi och rättsteori. Nâgra problem inom den rättsliga argumen-
teringen (Linguistic Philosophy and Legal Theory. Some Problems in Legal
Argumentation). In: Tolkning och tolkningsteorier (Interpretation and Interpre-
tation Theories). Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets akademien. Kon-
ferensen 7. Stockholm 1982, pp. 235 - 252
See number 129

156. Experterna och makten. Expertmakten? (Experts and Power. The Power of
Experts?). In: Nordisk administrativt tidskrift 63 (1982), 1, pp. 50 - 58

157. Tiedesuunnittelun mahdollisuuksista ja keinoista (On the Possibilities and

Methods of Science Planning). In: Suomen tieteen tila. Raportti (The State of
Finnish Science. A Report). Helsinki 1982, pp. 5 - 10

158. Puolisoiden omistussuhteista (On Ownerships in a Marriage). In: Avioliiton

varallisuusoikeudellisia kysymyksiä (Questions Concerning Marital Property).
Helsinki 1982, pp. 37 - 57

159. Arvot ja tuomarinohjeet (Values and the Judge's Rules). In: Studia Juridica
1982: Oikeudenmukaisuudesta (Studia Juridica 1982: On Justice). Ed. by
Jukka Kekkonen. Helsinki 1982, pp. 1 - 20

160. On the Theory of Societal Change - General Remarks. In: Proceedings of X

World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Mexico 1982,
vol. VII, pp. 119-128

161. El significado del elemento teorico en la investiga juridica. In: Anuario de

filosofia juridica y social 1982, 2, pp. 223 - 239
See number 103

162. Oikeustieteellinen koulutus ja lakimiesmoraali (Education in Legal Science

and Lawyer Morals). In: Lakimies 80 (1982), pp. 513 - 523

163. Tuomarin vastuu on perusteluvastuuta (A Judge's Responsibility is Responsi-

bility for Reasoning). In: Lakimiesuutiset 38 (1982), 11, pp. 16 - 18

164. On the Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics - Problems of Scientific Progress in

Legal Research. In: Contemporary Conceptions of Law. 9th World Congress
in Basel 1979. Ed. by Paul Trappe. Stuttgart 1982, pp. 135 - 145 (Archiv für
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Supplementa. Vol. I, Part 1)

165. Rättspraxis i äktenskapsrätt I - I I (The Legal Practice in Matrimonial Law

I - II) (with Ahti Saarenpää). In: Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i
Finland 119 (1983), pp. 57 - 79 and pp. 174 - 193
640 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

166. Oikeustieteen tutkimustraditiosta (On the Research Tradition of Legal

Science). In: Perinteet ja tulevaisuus (Traditions and Future). Ed. by Paavo
Hohti. Porvoo 1983, pp. 181 - 183

167. Man and the Changing Society. Some Thoughts on Leo Tolstoy's Conception
of History. In: Essays in Legal Theory in Honour of Kaarle Makkonen.
Oikeustiede - Jurisprudentia X V I (1983), pp. 3 - 15

168. Grundlagen der juristischen Argumentation (Aulis Aarnio, Robert Alexy und
Aleksander Peczenik). In: Metatheorie juristischer Argumentation. Ed. by
Werner Krawietz and Robert Alexy. Berlin 1983, pp. 9 - 87
German version of number 151

169. Julkiset, yleiset ja yksityiset asiat. Ajatuksia SDP:η periaateohjelman uudista-

misesta ja uudistamiseksi (Public and Private Affairs. Thoughts on Reforming
the Platform of the Social Democratic Party of Finland). In: Sosialistinen aika-
kauslehti 1983, 1, pp. 28 - 33

170. Argumentation Theory - and Beyond. Some Remarks on the Rationality of

Legal Justification. In: RECHTSTHEORIE 14 (1983), pp. 385 - 4 0 0

171. On the Sources of Law. A Justificatory Point of View. In: RECHTSTHEORIE

15 (1984), pp. 393 - 4 0 1

172. Mahdollisuudesta puuttua j o toimitettuun tai toimitetuksi ilmoitettuun osituk-

seen (On a Possibility of Contesting the Distribution of Community Property
Already Implemented or Notified as Implemented) (with Ahti Saarenpää). In:
Puolisoiden omaisuuden ositus ja jako (The Distribution of Community Prop-
erty). Ed. by Juha Pöyhönen. Helsinki 1984, pp. 169-187

173. Problemas abiertos en la filofofia del derecho. In: Doxa 1 (1984), pp. 11 - 14

174. Sobre la racionalidad de la racionalidad. Algunas observaciones sobre la justi-

ficación juridica. In: Anales de la Catedra Francisco Suarez 23 - 24 (1983 -
84), Granada, pp. 1 - 1 7
See number 170

175. SDP:n periaateohjelma ja yhteiskunnan haasteet (The Platform of the Social

Democratic Party of Finland and the Challenge of Society). In: Sosialistinen
aikakauslehti 1984, 3, pp. 43 - 48

176. Värdena och domarregler. Tankar om förhällandet mellan rätt och moral
(Values and the Judge's Rules. Reflections on the Relation Between Law and
Morals). In: Festskrift till Jan Hellner (Festschrift for Jan Hellner). Ed. by U l f
Bernitz et al. Stockholm 1984, pp. 7 - 21
See number 159

111. Nehmen wir die Rechtswissenschaft ernst. Aspekte der Bedeutung der
Rechtswissenschaft für die Juristenausbildung. In: Theorie der Normen. Fest-
gabe für Ota Weinberger zum 65. Geburtstag. Ed. by Werner Krawietz/
Helmut Schelsky/Günther Winkler and Alfred Schramm. Berlin 1984, pp. 3 -
15
See number 148
 C. Articles, Review Articles 641

178. On the Validity, Efficacy and Acceptability of Legal Norms. In: Objektivie-
rung des Rechtsdenkens. Gedächtnisschrift für limar Tammelo. Ed. by Werner
Krawietz/Theo Mayer-Maly and Ota Weinberger. Berlin 1984, pp. 427 - 437

179. Paradigms in Legal Dogmatics. Towards a Theory of Change and Progress in

Legal Science. In: Theory of Legal Science. Proceedings of the Conference on
Legal Theory and Philosophy of Science, Lund, Sweden, Dec. 11 -14, 1983.
Ed. by Aleksander Peczenik/Lars Lindahl and Bert von Roermund. Dordrecht
1984, pp. 25 - 37

180. Oikeudellisen päätöksenteon rajaehtojen muuttumisesta (On the Change of the

Border Conditions of Legal Decision Making). In: Suomen lakimiesliiton
X X V I I I lakimiespäivän pöytäkirja (The Record of the Lawyer Meeting)
(2.12.1983). Helsinki 1984, pp. 29 - 39

181. Mas alla del realismo: Una critica de la reconstrucción de la dogmatica juri-
dica por A l f Ross (with Aleksander Peczenik). In: Revistas de ciencias
sociales (Universidad de Valparaiso) 25 (1984), pp. 127 - 151

182. Paradigm i rättsdogmatiken. Mot en teori om förändring och framsteg inom

rättsvetenskapen (Paradigms in Legal Dogmatics. Towards a Theory of
Change and Progress in Legal Science) (with Jyrki Uusitalo). In: Tidskrift for
rättssociologi 1 (1983/84), 4, pp. 264 - 275
Based on the article number 179

183. On the Justification of Legal Justification. In: Revue de Synthèse 118- 119
(1985), pp. 269-283

184. Oikeusfilosofia valinkauhassa (Philosophy of Law in the Melting Pot). In:

Hämäläis-osakunnan juristikerho 1935 - 1985 (Häme Law Students' Society
1935 - 1985). Ed. by Jukka-Pekka Alanen. Helsinki 1985, pp. 44 - 58

185. Oikeudellisen käsitteenmuodostuksen ongelmia. Näkökohtia soveltamistilanne-

systeemin ja normatiivisen systeemin suhteesta (Problems in Legal Concept
Formation. Aspects of the Relation Between ad hoc Application System and
Normative System). In: Juhlajulkaisu Simo Zitting (Festschrift for Simo Zit-
ting). Ed. by Leena Kartio/Jarno Tepora and Juhani Wirilander. Helsinki
1985, pp. 12-23

186. Simo Zitting - tutkija ja opettaja (Simo Zitting - Researcher and Tutor). In:
Juhlajulkaisu Simo Zitting (Festschrift for Simo Zitting). Ed. by Leena
Kartio/Jarno Tepora and Juhani Wirilander. Helsinki 1985, pp. 9 - 11

187. Etat et avenir de la théorie du droit dans les pays nordiques. In: Archives de
philosophie du droit 30 (1985), Paris, pp. 377 - 380

188. One Hundred and Fifty Years of Finnish Philosophy of Law. In: Legal Philo-
sophical Library. Finland: A Bibliography. Ed. by Carla Faralli/Enrico Pat-
taro/Aulis Aarnio and Juha Pöyhönen. Milano 1985, pp. 17 - 44

189. Yhteiskunnan muutos ja politiikan tulevaisuus (The Change of Society and the
Future of Politics) (with Kari Karjalainen/Risto Sänkiaho/Juha Tolonen/
Tapani Turkka and Veikko Ο. Veilahti). In: Sosialistinen aikakauslehti 1985,
3, pp. 18-27

42 FS Aarnio
642 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

190. Rintaperillisen lakiosa, testamentinsaaja ja eloonjäänyt puoliso (Legal Portion

of a Direct Heir, Beneficiary and a Surviving Spouse) (with Urpo Kangas). In:
Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i Finland 121 (1985), 4 - 5, pp. 375 -
389
191. La filosofia del derecho en Finlandia. In: Boletin Asociacion Argentina de
Filosofia del Derecho 22 (1985), pp. 1 - 3
192. Vapaus, veljeys, tasa-arvoisuus. Näkökohtia perusarvoista ohjelmallisina lähtö-
kohtina (Liberty, Fraternity, Equality. Aspects of Basic Values as a Program-
matic Point of Departure). In: Sosialistinen politiikka 1985, 3, pp. 48 - 54
193. Sobre el paradigma de la dogmatica juridica. In: Anuario de filosofia juridica
y social 1985, 5, pp. 163-181
194. Sanomatta jätetty ja sanomatta jäänyt (What was Left Unsaid and What was
Forgotten). In: Liber amicorum Carolo Makkonen deditus. Ed. by Urpo
Kangas and Kaarlo Tuori. Helsinki 1986, pp. 2 - 1 2

195. Luottamus, vieraantuminen ja legitimiteetti (Trust, Alienation and Legiti-

macy). In: Oikeus 15 (1986), 3, pp. 260 - 265

196. On the Change in the Systematics of Law. In: Vernunft und Erfahrung im
Rechtsdenken der Gegenwart. Ed. by Torstein Eckhoff/Lawrence M. Fried-
man and Jyrki Uusitalo. Berlin 1986, pp. 161-170 (RECHTSTHEORIE Bei-
heft 10)
197. Inledning i Aleksander Peczeniks "Rätten och förnuftet" (Foreword to "Law
and Reason" by Aleksander Peczenik). Stockholm 1986, pp. 13 - 27

198. Law and World Peace. In: Law and Peace. Ed. by Stavros Panou. Athens
1986, pp. 11 - 13

199. Tuomioistuinratkaisujen ennustamisesta (On Predicting Court Decisions). In:

Tulevaisuus. Juhlakirja akateemikko Georg Henrik von Wrightin 70-vuotispäi-
vän 14.6.1986 kunniaksi (The Future. Festschrift for Academian Georg
Henrik von Wright on his 70-Year Anniversary 14 June, 1986). Ed. by Ilkka
Niiniluoto and Heikki Nyman. Helsinki 1986, pp. 244 - 264
200. Persona juridica, una ficción? In: Doxa 3 (1986), pp. 85 - 92
201. Oikeuden legitimaatio (The Legitimation of Law). In: Lapin korkeakoulun
oikeustieteiden osaston juhlakirja (Commemorative Publication for the Univer-
sity of Lapland, Department of Legal Sciences). Ed. by Terttu Utriainen. Hel-
sinki 1986, pp. 9 - 2 5
202. A m Wanderstab des Zweifels. In: RECHTSTHEORIE 18 (1987), pp. 8 - 15

203. Family Law and the Law of Succession. In: The Finnish Legal System. Ed. by
Jaakko Uotila. 2nd, completely revised ed. Helsinki 1987, pp. 164-181
204. Testamentin tulkintasäännöistä. Tulkintaperiaatteiden ja -ohjeiden teoreettista
tarkastelua (On Interpreting Last Wills and Testaments. A Theoretical Review
of Interpretation Principles and Rules). In: Juhlajulkaisu Matti Ylöstalo (Fest-
schrift for Matti Ylöstalo). Ed. by Juhani Wirilander et al. Helsinki 1987,
pp. 5 - 15
 C. Articles, Review Articles 643

205. Philosophy of Law at Crossroads? In: Formalismus und Phänomenologie im

Rechtsdenken der Gegenwart. Festgabe für Alois Troller. Ed. by Werner Kra-
wietz and Walter Ott. Berlin 1987, pp. 301-312

206. Gijutsu no mêrê to hô no sêtôsê. In: Law in the Changing World. Ed. by Mit-
sukuni Yasaki/Hiroshi Noguchi and Setsuko Sato. Tokyo 1987, pp. 23 - 32

207. Onko kohtuus oikeusperiaatteena syrjäyttämässä sekä sopimusvapauden että

sopimusten sitovuuden periaatteen? (Is Reasonableness as a Legal Principle
Replacing both Freedom of Contract and the Validity of Contract?). In: Laki-
mies 85 (1987), pp. 4 0 0 - 4 1 4

208. Datsukôgyôkashakai ni oderu sêtôsê no kiki. In: Hô No Riron 8. Ed. by José

Llompart and Yoshiomi Mishima. Tokyo 1987, pp. 29 - 49

209. Ο Obowiazywaniu, skutecznosci i akceptowalnosci norm prawnych. In: Acta

universitas Lodziensis 32 (1987), pp. 3 - 15

210. Pitäisikö tuomiot perustellakin? (Should Court Decisions Be Reasoned, too?).

In: Juhlajulkaisu Pertti Juhani Muukkonen (Festschrift for Pertti Juhani Muuk-
konen). Ed. by Risto Nuolimaa/Juha Tolonen and Kauko Wikström. Turku
1987, pp. 7 - 18

211. On the Closed Nature of Legal Systems and the Problems of Gap Filling. In:
EUI Colloquium papers. DOC IUE 259 (1988) (EUI. 48), Florence 1988,
pp. 1 - 14

212. Pitäisikö filosofienkin vaieta? Näkökulma tieteelliseen keskusteluun yhteiskun-

nallisen keskustelun peilinä (Should Philosophers Be Quiet, too? A View on
Scientific Discussion as a Mirror of Social Discussion). In: Tieteen kirot ja
siunaukset (The Curses and Blessings of Science). Helsinki 1988, pp. 75 - 92

213. Järki ja auktoriteetti. Piirteitä juridisen ajattelUn kehityksestä (Reason and

Authority. Aspects of the Development of Legal Thinking). In: Lakimies 87
(1989), pp. 934- 956

214. Entry "Dogmatique Juridique". In: Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et

de sociologie du droit. Ed. by André-Jean Arnaud. Paris 1988, p. 88

215. Sobre la amibiguedad semantica en la interpretacion juridica. In: Doxa 5

(1988), pp. 109-117

216. Finlande. In: L'obligation alimentaire. Étude de droit interne comparé

IV. Collection des travaux de l'institut de recherches juridiques comparatives.
Paris 1988, pp. 51 - 123
Finnish report with Ahti Saarenpää

217. Ottakaamme oikeussäännöt vakavasti (Taking Rules Seriously). In: Oikeus 18

(1989), pp. 112- 122

218. Oikeustieteen ja oikeusajattelun merkityksestä yhteiskunnassa (On the Signifi-

cance of Legal Science and Legal Thinking in Society). In: Korkeakouluneu-
voston julkaisuja (Publications of the University Council) 1989, 3, pp. 10- 14

219. Zur Legitimität des Rechts. In: RECHTSTHEORIE 20 (1989), pp. 143-151
42*
644 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

220. Moraalista keskusteleminen ja keskustelun moraali (The Discussion of Morals

and the Morals of Discussion). In: Ajan lyhyt moraali (A Brief History of
Morals). Ed. by Hannu Tarmio. Jyväskylä 1989, pp. 3 9 - 5 1

221. Das regulative Prinzip der Gesetzesauslegung. Überlegungen zum Problem der
Möglichkeit der einzigen richtigen Entscheidung. In: RECHTSTHEORIE 20
(1989), pp. 4 0 9 - 4 2 1

222. On the Legitimacy of Law. A Conceptual Point of View. In: Ratio Juris 2
(1989), pp. 2 0 2 - 2 1 0

223. A racionâlis elfogadhatósagról - Néhâny megjegyzés a jogi igazolasról. In:

Jogtudomânyi Közlöny X L I V (1989), 10, pp. 542-545

224. Laintulkinnan regulatiivinen periaate. Pohdintaa yhden oikean ratkaisun mah-

dollisuudesta (The Regulative Principle of Statutory Interpretation. Some
Remarks on the Possibility of One Right Decision). In: Lakimies 87 (1989),
pp. 594-617
See number 221

225. Tuomioiden perustelemisesta (On the Reasoning of Legal Decisions). In:

Rovaniemen hovioikeuspiirin V I I I tuomaripäivät (The V I I I Judge Meeting of
Rovaniemi Court of Appeal) 1 9 - 2 0 Oct 1989. Rovaniemi 1989, pp. 1 - 1 8

226. Suomalaisen oikeusjärjestelmän ja -ajattelun kehityksestä (On the Develop-

ment of the Finnish Legal System and Legal Thinking). In: Suomi 2017 (Fin-
land 2017). Ed. by Olavi Riihinen. Helsinki 1990, pp. 399 - 416

227. "Juridifiering" och ADB ("Justification" and ADB) (with Ahti Saarenpää). In:
ADB, lagstifningen och juristens roll (ADB, Legislation and the Role of Law-
yers). Ed. by Peter Blume/Ritva Juntunen/Erik Mosesson and Olav Torvand.
Stockholm 1990, pp. 8 - 31

228. Iz knjige: "O Pravnom Rasudivajn". In: Dijalog. Ed. by Zdravko Grebo et al.
Zagreb 1990, pp. 66 - 82

229. Taking Rules Seriously. In: Law and the State in Modern Times. Proceedings
of the 14th World Congress in Edinburgh, August 1989. Ed. by Werner Mai-
hofer and Gerhard Sprenger. Stuttgart 1990, pp. 180- 192 (Archiv für Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 42)
See number 217

230. Oikeuskielen tulkinta ja ymmärtäminen. Näkökulma Wittgensteinin myöhäis-

filosofiaan (The Interpretation and Understanding of Legal Language. A View
on Wittgenstein's Late Philosophy). In: Oikeus, kieli ja kritiikki (Law, Lan-
guage and Critique). Ed. by Ari Hirvonen and Kaarlo Tuori. Helsinki 1990,
pp. 91 - 127

231. Law and Society. In: Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy: East and
West. Festschrift for Dr. Ton-Kak Suh's 70th Birthday. Seoul 1990, pp. 3 - 16
The same in Korean in 199J

232. On Law and Morality. A Dialogue of Georg Henrik von Wright and Aulis
Aarnio. In: Ratio Juris 3 (1990), pp. 321 - 330
 C. Articles, Review Articles 645

233. La tesis de la unica repuesta correcta y el principio regulativo del razona-

miento juridico. In: Doxa 7 (1990), pp. 23 - 38
234. Espanjalais-suomalaista keskustelua oikeusteoriasta (Finnish-Spanish Discus-
sion on Legal Theory) (with Raimo Siltala and Jyrki Uusitalo). In: Oikeus 19
(1990), pp. 4 8 - 5 0
235. Vallasta ja vallan oikeutuksesta (On Power and Its Justification). In: Kanava
89 (1991), 1, pp. 1 8 - 2 1
236. Myytti ja todellisuus (Myth and Reality). In: Yliopisto 39 (1991), 2, pp. 4 - 7
237. Tuomioiden perustelemisesta (On the Reasoning of Legal Decisions). In:
Turun hovioikeuden V tuomaripäivät (The V Judge Meeting of Turku Court
of Appeal) 6. Nov 1990. Turku 1990, pp. 28 - 45
See number 225
238. Kansainvälinen yhdentyminen ja oikeuslähdeoppi (International Integration
and the Doctrine of Source of Law). In: Euroopan integraatio ja Suomen
oikeus (The Integration of Europe and the Finnish Law). Ed. by Seppo
Laakso. Tampere 1991, pp. 73 - 90
239. Moraalista keskusteleminen ja keskustelun moraali (The Discussion of Morals
and the Morals of Discussion). In: Tampereen keskustan muutos ja Tampella
(The Change of the Tampere City Centre and Tampella Industrial Area). Ed.
by Paavo Isaksson and Seija Virkkala. Tampere 1991, pp. 73 - 80
240. Oikeudesta ja oikeudenmukaisuudesta (On Law and Reasonableness). In:
Humanisti 3 (1991), 3, pp. 11 - 15
241. Tiedettä on - kriitikoita puuttuu (Plenty of Science - Shortage of Critics). In:
Tiede ja sivistys 1991, 2, pp. 39 - 41
242. Statutory Interpretation in Finland (The National Report). In: Interpreting Sta-
tutes. Ed. by Neil MacCormick and Robert S. Summers. Aldershot 1991,
pp. 123-170
243. Perimysjärjestys maanomistusolojen kannalta (The Inheritance Order from the
Conditions of Landownership Point of View). In: Suomen oikeushistorian pää-
piirteet (The Main Lines of the Finnish History of Law). Ed. by Pia Letto-
Vanamo. Jyväskylä 1991, pp. 43 - 65
244. Onko tutkimuspolitiikka mahdollista? (Is Research Policy Possible?). In:
Oikeus 21 (1992), pp. 5 3 - 5 5
245. Pärimiskorvaldus maaomandisuhetes. In: Soome oigusajaloo pohijooned. Ed.
by Pia Letto-Vanamo. Tartu 1992, pp. 43 - 78
Estonian version of number 243
246. Oikeuslähteet, ennakkopäätökset, hovioikeusratkaisut (Sources of Law, Prece-
dents, Decisions of the Court of Appeal). In: Hovioikeuskäytäntö oikeusläh-
teenä (The Practice of the Court of Appeal as a Source of Law). Ed. by A k i
Rasilainen. Turku 1992, pp. 6 - 19
247. Oikeusjärjestelmä yhteiskunnan muutospaineessa (The Legal System under
Pressure in the Change of Society). In: Suomi suosta (Rescuing Finland). Acta
universitatis Tamperensis ser B, vol 39 (1992), pp. 46 - 53
646 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

248. Mitä mieltä maailmasta? (Opinions on the World). In: Oikeus 21 (1992),
pp. 309- 311
249. Legal Actions and the Problem of Institutional Facts. In: Öffentliche oder pri-
vate Moral? Vom Geltungsgrunde und der Legitimität des Rechts. Festschrift
für Ernesto Garzón Valdés. Ed. by Werner Krawietz and Georg Henrik von
Wright. Berlin 1992, pp. 3 - 15
250. Äktenskapet som avtal (Marriage as a Contract). In: Utvecklingslinjer inom
avtalsrätten (Development of Law of Contract). Ed. by Claes Sandgren. Stock-
holm 1993, pp. 1 - 18
251. Introduction. In: An Introduction to Finnish Law. Ed. by Juha Pöyhönen. Hel-
sinki 1993, pp. 5 - 2 5
252. Reasoning Juridicial Decisions. In: Rechtsnorm und Rechtswirklichkeit. Fest-
schrift für Werner Krawietz zum 60. Geburtstag. Ed. by Aulis Aarnio/Stanley
L. Paulson /Ota Weinberger/Georg Henrik von Wright and Dieter Wyduckel.
Berlin 1993, pp. 643 - 654
253. On the Knowledge of Legal Facts Through Norms. In: Sprache, Performanz
und Ontologie des Rechts. Festgabe für Kazimierz Opalek zum 75. Geburtstag.
Ed. by Werner Krawietz and Jerzy Wróblewski. Berlin 1993, pp. 3 - 8
254. "Oikeussäännöksiä tulkitsemassa". Interpreting Statutes. A Comparative Study.
In: Korkein oikeus 75 vuotta (The Supreme Court 75 Years). Ed. by Anja
Tulenheimo-Takki. Helsinki 1993, pp. 253 - 274
255. Antti Kasvion kirjoituksen johdosta (With Reference to Antti Kasvio's Article)
(with Kauko Pietilä). In: Sosiologia 30 (1993), 1, pp. 48 - 49
256. Olemmeko kadottaneet valistuksen perinnön? (Have We Lost the Heritage of
the Enlightenment?). In: Itsenäisyyspäivän puhe (Independence Day Speech).
Pirkkala 6. Dec 1993, pp. 1 - 2 1
257. Demokratia ja moraali (Democracy and Morals). In: Kanava 91 (1993), 8,
pp. 492 - 494
258. Onko oikeustiede yhteiskuntatiede? (Is Legal Science a Social Science?) In:
Lakimies 91 (1993), pp. 695 -710
259. Ennakkopäätöksistä ja niiden sitovuudesta (On Precedents and Their Legal
Validity). In: Oikeus 22 (1993), pp. 254 - 272
260. Muodon uusi tuleminen? (The Rebirth of Form?). In: Lakimies 92 (1994),
pp. 273 - 286
261. Is Legal Science a Social Science? In: Prescriptive Formality and Normative
Rationality in Modern Legal Systems. Festschrift for Robert S. Summers. Ed.
by Werner Krawietz/Neil MacCormick and Georg Henrik von Wright. Berlin
1994, pp. 3 - 17
262. Kenellä on valta? Tuomareillako? (Who Has the Authority? The Judges?). In:
Suomen lakimiesliiton X X X I I I lakimiespäivä ( X X X I I I Lawyers Meeting)
15. Oct 1993. Helsinki 1994, pp. 74 - 80
263. Minun oikeusteoriani (My Legal Theory). In: Oikeus 23 (1994), pp. 167 - 171
 C. Articles, Review Articles 647

264, One Right Answer and the Majority Principle. In: Law and the Public Interest.
Proceedings of the 1992 ALSP Conference. Ed. by Roger Brownsword. Stutt-
gart 1994, pp. 36 - 48 (Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 55)

265, Yhteiskuntatieteisiin pikatohtoreita? (Instant Doctors to the Social Sciences?).

In: Kanava 92 (1994), 6, pp. 21 - 31

Mikä on historiallinen romaani? (What Is a Historical Novel?). In: Hämäläis-

266
osakunnan juristikerho 1935 - 1995 (The Häme Law Students' Society 1935 -
1995). Ed. by Mikko Räsänen und Mikko Paavola. Helsinki 1995, pp. 4 2 - 5 1

Vallali kaavat (The Formulae of Power). In: Vallan verkot ja hengen neuvok-
267,
kuus (The Webs of Power and the Resourcefulness of Spirit). Ed. by Markku
Ihonen and Jaan Undusk. Helsinki 1995, pp. 165 - 172

Kahden kulttuurin ongelma (The Problem of Two Cultures). In: Parnasso 45

268,
(1995), 1, pp. 174- 181

Suum critique tribuere. Some Reflections on Law, Freedom and Justice (with
269, Aleksander Peczenik). In: Ratio Juris 8 (1995), pp. 142 - 179

On the Interpretation of Facts. A Justificatory Point of View in the Case of

270, Gaps in Law. In: Communication & Cognition 28 (1995), 1, pp. 77 - 86

Keksintö suviyössä (An Invention in the Summer Night). In: Suomen kulttuur-
271. irahasto. Vuosikirja (The Finnish Cultural Foundation. Yearbook) 56. Helsinki
1995, pp. 15- 17

272. Oikeus, kohtuus ja koulutus (Law, Reasonableness and Education). In: Uusi
kriminaalihuolto (The New Criminal Aftercare) 3 (1996), 2, pp. 1 4 - 2 1

273. I presedenti e la loro validità. In: Ragion pratica 4 (1996), 6, pp. 9 - 18

274. On Values. Universal or Relative? (with Aleksander Peczenik) In: Ratio Juris
9 (1996), pp. 321 - 330

275. Yksilö ja yhteisö. Oikeusfilosofin näkökulma (The Individual and Community.

A Legal Philosopher's Point of View). In: Mutta missä on yhteiskunta? Juhla-
kirja Kauko Pietilälle (But Where Is Society? Festschrift for Kauko Pietilä).
Ed. by Sinikka Hakala/Klaus Sondermann and Timo Uusitupa. Tampere 1996,
pp. 109- 124

276. Tiede, valta ja kansalaisyhteiskunta (Science, Power and Civil Society). In:
Oikeus 26 (1997), pp. 4 - 11

277. "Zum Ehescheidungsproblem". Esimerkki Otto Brusiinin tuotannon kypsästä

keskivaiheesta (An Example of Mature Middle Phase of Otto Brusiin's Work).
In: Lakimies 95 (1997), pp. 182-194

278. Tuomioistuimet ja demokratia (Courts of Law and Democracy). In: Lakimies

95 (1997), pp. 419-428

279. Entries to the section "Testament". In: Encyclopaedia Iuridica Fennica (forth-
coming in 1997)
648 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

D. Book Reviews

280. Festskrift till professor, dr. juris O. A. Borum (Festschrift for Professor O. A.
Borum, LL.D.) 30. July 1964. Copenhagen 1964
In: Lakimies 63 (1965), pp. 366 - 368
281. Mariti Rautiala: Pesänselvitys ja perinnönjako (Estate Administration and Dis-
tribution of an Estate). Helsinki 1965
In: Lakimies 64 (1966), pp. 971 - 974
282. Mariti Rautiala: Uusi perintökaari pääpiirteittäin (The Principles of the New
Inheritance Code). Helsinki 1965
In: Lakimies 64 (1966), p. 974
283. Paavo Kastari: Valtiojärjestyksemme oikeudelliset perusteet (The Legal Bases
of the Finnish Constitutional System). Porvoo 1969
In: Lakimies 68 (1970), pp. 433 - 438
284. Carlos E. Alchourrón/Eugenio Bulygin: Normative Systems. Wien/New York
1971.
In: Lakimies 71 (1973), pp. 331 - 336
285. Pirkko-Liisa Aro: Ennakkokäyttöoikeus patentinhaltijan yksinoikeuden rajoi-
tuksena (Advance Access as a Limitation to Patent Holder's Monopoly). Vam-
mala 1972
In: Lakimies 71 (1973), pp. 534 - 537
286. Gunnar Adler-Karlsson: Kuuba - voitto vai tappio (Cuba - Victory or
Defeat). Helsinki 1973
In: Oikeus 2 (1973), pp. 4 9 - 5 0
287. Y. J. Hakulinen: Uusi lakikielen sanakirja (The New Dictionary of Legal Ter-
minology). Porvoo 1974
In: Oikeus 3 (1974), pp. 4 2 - 4 4
288. Juha Pentii Tolonen : Der allgemeine Erklärungshintergrund der wirtschaft-
lichen Ordnung und seine Anwendung auf das Aktiengesellschaftsrecht. Hel-
sinki 1974
In: Lakimies 73 (1975), pp. 367 - 382
Statement of an Official Opponent
289. Aleksander Peczenik: Juridikens metodproblem (The Method Problem of
Legal Science). Stockholm 1974
In: Lakimies 73 (1975), pp. 469 - 472
290. Hannu Tapani Klami: 1. "Suum cuique". Roomalaisten oikeustieteellisestä
ajattelusta (On the Legal Thinking of the Romans). Turku 1976. 2. Tieteelli-
sen ajattelutavan ja roomalaisen oikeuden vaikutuksesta Ruotsi-Suomen
oikeuskehitykseen (On the Influence of Scientific Thinking and Roman Law
on the Legal Development of Sweden-Finland). Turku 1976
In: Lakimies 74 (1976), pp. 264 - 268
291. Reijo Wilenius/Pellervo Oksala/ Lauri Mehtonen/Matti Juntunen: Filosofian
kysymyksiä - johdatusta filosofiseen ajatteluun (Questions of Philosophy - an
Introduction to Philosophical Thinking). Jyräskylä 1976
In: Lakimies 74 (1976), pp. 665 - 667
 D. Book Reviews 649

292. Helmut Coing: Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie. 3rd ed. Berlin 1976
In: Lakimies 75 (1977), pp. 608-616
293. limar Tammelo: Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Freiburg 1977
In: Lakimies 75 (1977), pp. 212 - 214
294. Arthur Kaufmann /Winfried Hassemer (Hrsg.): Einführung in Rechtsphiloso-
phie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart. Heidelberg 1977
In: Lakimies 75 (1977), pp. 291 - 294
295. Heikki E. S. Mattila: Les successions agricoles et la structure de la société.
Helsinki 1979
In: Lakimies 78 (1980), pp. 290 - 300
296. Kauko Wikström: Oikeuskäytännön tulkinnasta (On the Interpretation of Legal
Praxis). Helsinki 1979
In: Lakimies 78 (1980), pp. All - 506
297. Urpo Kangas: Lesken oikeudellinen asema. Oikeusdogmaattinen tutkimus
lesken sosiaaliturvan laajuudesta (The Legal Status of Widowed Persons. A
Legal Dogmatic Study on the Extension of the Social Security for Widowed
Persons). Helsinki 1982
In: Lakimies 80 (1982), pp. 249 - 260
298. Stig Strömholm: Rätt, rättskällor och rättstillämpning. En lärobok i allmän rätt-
slära. (Law, Sources of Law and Application of Law. A Study Book of Juris-
prudence). Stockholm 1981
In: Svensk juristtidning 69 (1984), pp. 462 - 464
299. Urpo Kangas: Kansallissosialistinen oikeusajattelu ja sen herättämät reaktiot
Suomessa (National Socialist Legal Thinking and Reactions It Stirred up in
Finland). Turku 1985
In: Aamulehti 1986
300. Pekka Kuusi: This World of Man. Oxford 1985
In: RECHTSTHEORIE 17 (1986), pp. 511 - 512
301. Markku Helin: Lainoppi ja metafysiikka. Tutkimus skandinaavisen oikeusrea-
lismin tieteenkuvasta ja sen vaikutuksesta Suomen siviilioikeuden tutkimuk-
sessa vuosina 1920 - 1960 (Legal Dogmatics and Metaphysics. A Study on the
Scientific Image of Scandinavian Legal Realism and Its Effects in Research
on Finnish Civil Law 1920- 1960). Helsinki 1988
In: Lakimies 86 (1988), pp. 541 - 569
302. Jukka Kultalahti: Omaisuudensuoja ympäristönsuojelussa (The Protection of
Property in Environmental Protection). Tampere 1990
In: Lakimies 89 (1991), pp. 445 - 458 (with Esko Riepula)
303. Jukka Kemppinen: Tätä kaikki asianomaiset noudattakoot (This Shall Be Duly
Observed by All Parties). Helsinki 1992
In: Lakimies 91 (1993), pp. 262 - 270
304. Rauno Halttunen: Oikeudellisesta ratkaisusta joustavien oikeusnormilauseiden
soveltamisalueella (On Legal Decisions in the Field of Flexible Legal Norms).
Rovaniemi 1993
In: Lakimies 92 (1994), pp. 385 - 398
650 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

305. G. F. W. Hegel : Oikeusfilosofia (Philosophy of Right). Finnish translation by

Markus Wahlberg. Oulu 1994
In: Aamulehti 1994
306. Kauko Pietilä/ Klaus Sondermann: Sanomalehden yhteiskunta (Society in a
Newspaper). Tampere 1994
In: Aamulehti 1994
307. Risto Alapuro: Suomen synty paikallisena ilmiönä 1890- 1933 (The Birth of
Finland as a Local Phenomenon 1890- 1933). Helsinki 1994
In: Aamulehti 1994
308. Periti Välimäki: Osituksen sovittelu avioeroon perustuvassa toimitusosituk-
sessa (The Arbitration of the Division of Matrimonial Property). Helsinki 1995
In: Lakimies 94 (1996), pp. 513 - 539
309. Pelkkää retoriikkaa (Pure Rhetoric). Ed. by Kari Palonen and Hilkka Summa.
Tampere 1996
In: Aamulehti 1996
310. Sebastiân Urbina: Reason, Democracy, Society. A Study on the Basis of
Legal Thinking. Dordrecht 1996
In: Associations 1 (1997), pp. 164-165
311. Matti Ilmari Niemi: Päämäärien valtakunta (The Kingdom of Goals). Helsinki
1996
In: Lakimies 95 (1997), pp. 703 -712

E. Commentaries, Columns, Brief Essays, Notes, and Tributes

312. Oikeus-lehdestä (On the Oikeus Journal). In: Oikeus 1 (1972), 1, pp. 3 - 4
313. Lainvalmistelunäkymiä (Prospects for Law Drafting). In: Oikeus 1 (1972), 2,
pp. 3 - 4
314. Häiriintyneisyys oikeussuhteissa (The Miscarriage of Legal Relations). In:
Katsaus 1 (1973), 3, pp. 28 - 29
315. Otto Brusiin. In: Oikeus 2 (1973), 4, pp. 3 - 4
316. Toimituksen vaihtuessa (On the Change of Editorial Staff). In: Oikeus 3
(1974), 4, pp. 3 - 4
317. Syventävien opintojen suunnittelusta (On Planning Advanced Studies). In:
Pykälän uutiset 11 (1978), 5, p. 3
318. Kasvakaa terveeseen kriittisyyteen (Towards Healthy Criticism) (an interview).
In: Hälläpyörä 1979, 1, pp. 40 - 41
319. Päteviä lakimiehiä Lapista (Competent Lawyers from Lapland) (an interview).
In: Digesta 1980, 1, pp. 8 - 9
320. Vorwort. In: Methodologie und Erkenntnistheorie der juristischen Argumenta-
tion. Ed. by Aulis Aarnio/Ilkka Niiniluoto and Jyrki Uusitalo. Berlin 1981,
pp. 5 - 7 (RECHTSTHEORIE Beiheft 2)
 E. Commentaries, Columns, Brief Essays, Notes, and Tributes 651

321. Editor's Foreword. In: Zum Fortschritt von Theorie und Technik in Recht und
Ethik. Ed. by limar Tammelo and Aulis Aarnio. Berlin 1981, pp. 9 - 1 0
(RECHTSTHEORIE Beiheft 3)
322. Asioihin menevä yhteiskunnallinen keskustelu näivettyy (Social Debate on
Specific Issues Is Drying up). In: Suomen Kuvalehti 82 (1982), 4, pp. 38 - 39
323. Yksiulotteinen koulu jakaa tietoa ei viisautta (An One-Dimensional School
Administers Knowledge, Not Wisdom) (with Aira Kilpi). In: Suomen Kuva-
lehti 82 (1982), 13, pp. 3 3 - 3 5
324. Tieteestä, tieteellisyydestä ja vertailevasta taiteentutkimuksesta (On Science,
Scientific Approach and Comparative Art Study). In: Taide 23 (1984), 3, p. 63
325. Mitä miettisitte Montesquieu? (What Would You Say, Montesquieu?). In:
Turun Sanomat 30. December 1983
326. Opening Address for the 11th World Congress on Philosophy of Law and
Social Philosophy 1983. Speeches in the Inauguration of the 11th Congress on
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Helsinki 1983, pp. 5 - 7
Spanish translation in: Anuario de filosofia juridica y social. Buenos Aires
1984, pp. 331 - 333
327. IVR Today. In: IVR Newsletter 1984, 1, p. 1
328. The Challenges Facing the IVR. In: IVR Newsletter 1984, 2, p. 1
329. Law and World Peace. In: IVR Newsletter 1985, p. 1
330. Opening Address. X I I World Congress of IVR. Athens 1. Aug - 24. Aug 1985.
In: IVR Newsletter Spring 1986, p. 1
331. Report of the President of the IVR. In: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphiloso-
phie 74 (1988), pp. 240-261
332. Informe del presidente de la IVR. In: Anuario de filosofia juridica y social
1988, Santiago de Chile, pp. 463 - 469
See number 331
333. Aate ja valta (Ideology and Power). In: Aikamerkki 62 (1989), 4 - 5, pp. 6 - 7
334. Demokratian tila (The State of Democracy). In: Kansanvaali 94 (published by
Kansan Lehti) (1994), p. 8
335. Aika ennen lamaa (The Time Before the Recession). In: Kangasalan Joulu
1994, p. 10
336. Herra päätoimittaja (Letter to the Editor). In: Niin & Näin 1 (1994), 3, p. 4
337. Kirjallisuutta ajan ehdoilla? (Literature on the Terms of Today?). In: Pentin-
kulman päivät 1995, p. 3
338. Kilvoittelun kulta-aika (The Golden Age of Competition). In: Kangasalan
Joulu 1995, p. 10
339. Vielä tulosrahoista (Further Comments on Productivity Money). In: Yliopis-
touutiset 35 (1996), 13, p. 5
340. Veikko Sinisalo ja Sokrateen puolustuspuhe (Veikko Sinisalo and Socrates'
Apologia). In: Pikku Aitio 1996, p. 1
652 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

341. Veikko Sinisalo - näyttelijä, lausuja (Veikko Sinisalo - Actor and Elocution-
ist). In: The Programme of Socrates' Apologia. Tampere Theatre 1996, pp. 3 -
4
342. A Letter from Aulis Aarnio. In: IVR Newsletter 18/19 (1996), p. 1
343. Oikeusvaltio vahvistuu (The Constitutional State Is Growing Stronger). In:
Suomen Kuvalehti 80 (1996), 22, p. 5
344. Hekin elivät kerran (They, too, Once Lived). In: Kangasalan Joulu 1996, p. 10
345. Editorial: To the Reader/Verehrte Leserinnen und Leser. In: Associations 1
(1997), pp. 3 - 9

F. Interviews

346. Interview with the President of the Republic of Finland Urho Kekkonen. Kan-
sanvallasta ja sen toteutumisesta lainkäytössä (On the Rule of People and Its
Realization in Legal Practice) (with Matti Savolainen and Ilmari Ojanen). In:
Lakimies 68 (1970), 6, pp. I - X X I
347. Interview with Carlos Santiago Nino. Argentiinan vaikea paluu demokratiaan
(Argentina's Difficult Road Back to Democracy). In: Kansan Lehti 1.11.1984,
pp. 8 - 9

G. Novels and Plays

348. Kostian pappi (The Priest of Kostia) (novel). Juva 1992. 436 pp.
349. Kettu ja leijona (The Fox and the Lion) (novel). Juva 1995. 450 pp.
350. Kostianvirta (The Stream of Kostia) (play). 1996.
Premier on 9. June 1996, Ramppi Theatre. Kangasala
351. Kostian pappi (The Priest of Kostia) (play). 1996.
Premier on 15. June 1997, Ramppi Theatre. Kangasala

H. Newspaper Articles and Columns

I. In Aamulehti

352. Ei laillisuusongelma, vaan yhteiskunnan arvokriisi (Not a Legal Quibble but a

Crisis in Values of Society) (an interview). Aamulehti 1981
353. Topeliaaninen maailmankuva - mennyttä aikaa vai nykypäivää (The World
According to Topelius - an Ancient Idyll or a Fact of Today's World?).
Aamulehti 1983
354. Tiede, valta ja vastuu (Science, Power and Responsibility). Aamulehti 1987
355. Keskustelua ei ole käyty loppuun (The Matter Is Not Dealt With Yet). Aamu-
lehti 1987
 H. Newspaper Articles and Columns 653

356. Peili murenee siruiksi (The Mirror Breaks Into Pieces). Aamulehti 1987

357. Hiljainen kulttuurityö on yhtä arvokasta kuin mäkihypyt (Cultural Work Is as

Worthy as Ski Jumps). Aamulehti 1988

358. Sirpalemyllyn tuote (A Product of the Chip Mill). Aamulehti 1988

Olaus Petrin viesti nykyajalle (Olaus Petri's Message to Today's People).

359. Aamulehti 1988

Pitäisikö filosofienkin vaieta? (Should Philosophers, too, Be Quiet?). Aamu-

360. lehti 1988

Järjen kahleet (The Fetters of Reason). Aamulehti 1988

361.
Oikeus muuttuu, muuttuuko lainkäyttö (The Law Changes: What About the
Administration of Law). Aamulehti 1989
362.
Demokratia, moraali ja demokratian moraali (Democracy, Morals and the
Morals of Democracy). Aamulehti 1989
363.
Onko Tampereesta Viipuriksi? (Could Tampere Be Viipuri?). Aamulehti 1990

364. Oikeustieteen kansallinen luonne on myytti (The National Character of Juris-

prudence Is a Myth). Aamulehti 1990

365. Eurooppaoikeudesta ylin tuomioistuin (European Law to Become the Supreme

Court). Aamulehti 1990

366. Ihmisoikeussopimus on osa Suomen oikeutta (The Agreement on Human

Rights Is a Part of Finnish Law). Aamulehti 1991

367. Onko pöytä nyt puhdas? (Is Everything out in the Open Now?). Aamulehti
1993

368. Ymmärrämme aikakautta vasta kun se alkaa lähetä loppuaan (We Understand
an Era Only When It Is Coming to an End). Kohtaamispaikka (a conversation
with G. H. von Wright). Aamulehti 1994
369.
Älköön järki ohittako viisautta edes geeniteknologiassa (Let Not Reason Over-
take Wisdom Even in Genetic Technology). Kohtaamispaikka (a conversation
with Nils Oker-Bolom). Aamulehti 1994
370.
Etruskien salaperäinen hymy taipuu tulkintoihin (The Mysterious Smile of the
Etruscan Allows Many Interpretations). Kohtaamispaikka (a conversation with
371. Jorma Kaimio). Aamulehti 1994

Tieteen huippuja ei voi tehtailla (The Very Best Achievements of Science

Cannot Be Manufactured). Kohtaamispaikka (a conversation with Mikko
Niemi). Aamulehti 1994
372.
Intohimojen tutkija (The Researcher of Passions). Kohtaamispaikka (a conver-
sation with Elina Haavio-Mannila). Aamulehti 1994
373. EU-kansanäänestys on gallupien gallup (The EC Referendum Is the Gallup of
374. A l l Gallups). Aamulehti 1994
375. Suomi vain vaikenee (Finland Remains Silent). Aamulehti 1994
654 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

376. Ei Ahtisaari parlamentarismia koetellut (Ahtisaari Did Not Put Parliamentar-

ism to the Test). Aamulehti 1994

377. Tampere on sisä-Suomen pääkaupunki (Tampere Is the Capital of Inland Fin-

land). Aamulehti 1995

378. Tapaus Öhman on nolo juttu Tampereen kannalta (The Öhman Affair Is
Embarrassing to Tampere). Aamulehti 1995

379. Perustuslakituomioistuin ei sovi meille (A Constitutional Court Is Not Suitable

for Finland). Aamulehti 1995

380. Laiskat professorit eivät ole lainkaan yliopiston ongelma (Lazy Professors Are
Not the Real Problem of the University). Aamulehti 1995

381. Oikeuskanslerilla avaimet edustuskiistaan (The Chancellor of Justice Holds the

Key to the Debate on Representation). Aamulehti 1995

382. Kangasalan kunta torjui nuoret (The Municipality of Kangasala Rejected the
Youth). Aamulehti 1995

383. Latelle olin vain lankkupoika (For Larry I Was Nothing but a Builder's Mate).
Kohtaamispaikka (a conversation with Pertti Paloheimo). Aamulehti 1995

384. Helsinki-Tampere jännite säilyköön (Let the Tension Between Helsinki and
Tampere Persist). Kohtaamispaikka (a conversation with Jaakko Syrjä). Aamu-
lehti 1995
385. Huippuyksiköt ovat populismia (Centres of Excellence Are Mere Populism).
Kohtaamispaikka (a conversation with Lauri Saxén). Aamulehti 1995
386. Näkijä vallan huipulla (A Visionary on the Top of Power). Kohtaamispaikka
(a conversation with Pirkko K. Koskinen). Aamulehti 1995
387. Suomalainen, Euroopan kosmopoliitti (Finns, the Cosmopolitans of Europe).
Kohtaamispaikka (a conversation with Johannes Salminen). Aamulehti 1995
388. Hämärän tullessa filosofi kantaa soihtua (When the Dusk Falls Down the Phi-
losopher Bears the Torch). Aamulehti 1996
389. Lipponen ja Niinistö ruoskivat eduskuntaa (Lipponen and Niinistö Giving the
Parliament a Rough Time). Aamulehti 1996
390. Tohtorisuma - entä sitten? (A Shoal of Doctors - What Next?). Aamulehti
1996
391. Tuomioistuinten uskottavuus koetuksella (The Credibility of the Courts of
Law Is at Test). Aamulehti 1997

II. In Heisingin sanomat

392. Voidaanko tiedettä ohjata valtiovallan keinoin? (Can Science Be Guided by

the Means of Governmental Power?) Heisingin Sanomat 1979
393. Tiedeyhteisö ja poliittiset päättäjät aitoon vuoropuheluun (A Real Dialogue
Between the Scientific Community and Political Decision Makers Is Needed).
Heisingin Sanomat 1982
 H. Newspaper Articles and Columns 655

394. Vallan sisältö informaatioyhteiskunnan keskeinen kysymys (The Content of

Power Is an Essential Question in the Information Society). Heisingin Sano-
mat 1983
395. Vaatiiko yksilön oikeusturva asianajo-oikeuden rajaamista? (Does Legal Pro-
tection of an Individual Require Restrictions in Practice of Advocacy?). Hel-
singin Sanomat 1983
396. Sissiretki suomalaiseen laillisuuteen (A Guerilla Expedition into Finnish Legal
Matters). Heisingin Sanomat 1990

III. In Dentari

397. Yhteiskuntakeskustelun alennustila (The Degradation of Social Debate).

Demari 1987
398. Mitä postmodernin jälkeen? (What Comes After Post-Modern?). Demari 1995
399. Pääministeri anteeksipyynnön velkaa (The Prime Minister Owes an Apology).
Demari 1996

IV. In Kansan Lehti

400. Vaihtoehtoliikkeet, demokratia (Alternative Movements, Democracy). Kansan

Lehti 1982
401. Sosialismi, utopia vai keino (Socialism: Utopia or a Means to an End).
Kansan Lehti 1982
402. Koulu uudistetaan, oppilas unohdetaan (School Reform Forgets the Student).
Kansan Lehti 1982
403. Demokratian syvä ote (The Profound Grasp of Democracy). Kansan Lehti
1982
404. Omat ja yhteiset asiat (Private and Common Matters). Kansan Lehti 1982
405. Valtio valtiossa (The State Within the State). Kansan Lehti 1982
406. Tavallisen kansan perintöoikeutta (Law of Inheritance for the Common
People). Kansan Lehti 1982
407. Konservatiivisuuden kolmet kasvot (The Three Faces of Conservatism).
Kansan Lehti 1982
408. Sodasta ja syyllisistä (On War and the Guilty Parties). Kansan Lehti 1982
409. Kilpailukykyä automaatiolla (Competitiveness Through Automation). Kansan
Lehti 1982
410. Kuka tukeekaan Beginiä? (Who Supports Begin, After All?) Kansan Lehti
1982
411. Muuttuiko sittenkin jokin? (Did Something Change, Anyhow?) Kansan Lehti
1982
656 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

412. Talousrikollisuus oikeusvaltiossa (Economic Crimes in a Constitutional State).

Kansan Lehti 1982
413. Tiede ja kansanvalta (Science and Democracy). Kansan Lehti 1982
414. Teoreettisuusko kouluopetuksen painolasti? (Is It Really Theory That is Extra
Burden in School Teaching). Kansan Lehti 1982
415. Politiikan pimeät rahat (The Shady Money of Politics). Kansan Lehti 1982
Matkakirje Argentiinasta (A Traveller's Tales from Argentina). Kansan Lehti
416. 1982

Takautuvaa lainkäyttöä (Retrospective Administration of Law). Kansan Lehti

417. 1983

Oikeuskanslerin valta ja vastuu (The Power and Responsibility of the Chancel-

418. lor of Justice). Kansan Lehti 1983

Yhteiskunnan tutkijoita vai povarieukkoja (Social Researchers or Palmists).

419. Kansan Lehti 1983

Perustuslakivaliokunta vai perustuslakituomioistuin? (The Constitutional Com-

420. mittee or the Constitutional Court). Kansan Lehti 1983

Kansainvälisistä ja kansallisista ongelmista (On National and International

421. Problems). Kansan Lehti 1983

Yhteiskuntaluokat ja luokkataistelu (Social Classes and Class Struggle).

422. Kansan Lehti 1983

Rötösherrajahti johtaa monen syyhyttä saunaan (The Hunt for the White
423. Collar Offenders Which Went Wrong). Kansan Lehti 1983

Tusinatohtoreita vai tiedemiehiä? (Doctors by the Dozen or Scientists?).

424. Kansan Lehti 1983

Hyvinvoinnin tuolla puolen (Beyond Welfare). Kansan Lehti 1983

425.
Suomen Sosiaalidemokraattinen Puolue, vaiko Suomen Puolue - entäpä pel-
426.
kästään Puolue? (The Social Democratic Party of Finland or Party of Fin-
land - or What About Just a Party?). Kansan Lehti 1983
427. Vihreätkö vaihtoehto? (Are the Greens an Alternative?). Kansan Lehti 1983
428. Tangon taikaa (The Magic of the Tango). Kansan Lehti 1983
429. Työstä ja joutilaisuudesta (On Work and Idleness). Kansan Lehti 1983
430. Byrokratian rautainen laki (The Tough Law of Bureaucracy). Kansan Lehti
1983
431. Liipaisinsormi herkässä? (Trigger Happy?). Kansan Lehti 1983
432. Rötösherroja? (White Collar Offenders?). Kansan Lehti 1983
433. Taskusta toiseen (From One Pocket to Another). Kansan Lehti 1983
434. Mikä meihin on mennyt? (What Has Gotten into Us?). Kansan Lehti 1983
435. Vallankäyttöä (Exercising Power). Kansan Lehti 1983
436. Malka silmässä (The Mote in the Eye). Kansan Lehti 1984
 H. Newspaper Articles and Columns 657

437. Mielipidevankeja? (Political Prisoners?). Kansan Lehti 1984

438. Omituista demokratiaa (Strange Democracy). Kansan Lehti 1984
439. Ottakaamme periaatteet vakavasti (Let Us Take Principles Seriously). Kansan
Lehti 1984
440. Kuka työttömän asialla? (Who Speaks for the Unemployed?). Kansan Lehti
1984
441. Kell' valta on se valtaa käyttäköön (Let He Who Has Power Use It). Kansan
Lehti 1984
442. Oikeus, moraali ja moralisointi (Law, Morals and Moralizing). Kansan Lehti
1984
443. Anna heille anteeksi (Grant Them Forgiveness). Kansan Lehti 1984
444. Ministeriöiden demokratisoinnista (On Democratizing the Ministries). Kansan
Lehti 1984
445. Vaihtoehdoton koulujärjestelmä (A School System Without Alternatives).
Kansan Lehti 1984
446. Politiikkaa oikeuden valepuvussa (Politics in the Disguise of Justice). Kansan
Lehti 1984
447. Politiikan moraali ja tarkoituksenmukaisuus (The Morals of Politics and Its
Expediency). Kansan Lehti 1984
448. Liike ja päämäärä (Movement and Goal). Kansan Lehti 1984
449. Demokraattinen sosialismi (Democratic Socialism). Kansan Lehti 1984
450. Kahdenlaista demokratiaa (Two Kinds of Democracy). Kansan Lehti 1984
451. Muutoksen mahdollisuuteen luottaminen (Trust in the Possibility of Change).
Kansan Lehti 1984
452. Omituista itsekritiikkiä (Strange Self Criticism). Kansan Lehti 1984
453. Aikamme ilmiöitä (Phenomena of Our Times). Kansan Lehti 1984
454. Professorit norsunluutornissa (Professors in an Ivory Tower). Kansan Lehti
1984
455. Monenlaisia totuuksia (A Variety of Truths). Kansan Lehti 1984
456. Käsi sydämellä (Hand on Heart). Kansan Lehti 1984
457. Soraa, enemmän soraa (Gravel, More Gravel). Kansan Lehti 1984
458. Niinkuin suuret linnut ... (Like Great Birds ...). Kansan Lehti 1984
459. Amatsonien yhteiskuntaan? (Towards a Society of Amazons?). Kansan Lehti
1984
460. Luulo ei ole tiedon väärtti (Thinking Is Not Knowing). Kansan Lehti 1984
461. Hyvää huomenta rouva Thatcher (Good Morning, Mrs. Thatcher). Kansan
Lehti 1984
462. Kenraalien maa (The Land of Generals). Kansan Lehti 1984

43 FS Aarnio
658 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

463. Mihin menet Oikeusvaltio Suomi? (Where Are You Going, Constitutional
State Finland?). Kansan Lehti 1984
464. Katolisen kirkon kahdet kasvot (The Two Faces of the Catholic Church).
Kansan Lehti 1984
465. Vihreää, niin vihreää. (Green, So Green). Kansan Lehti 1984
466. Pari sanaa virkamiesmoraalista (A Few Words on Civil Servant Morals).
Kansan Lehti 1984
467. Demokratian kriisi? (The Crisis of Democracy?). Kansan Lehti 1984
468. Tehotutkimusta (Effective Research). Kansan Lehti 1984
469. Hiljainen vallankumous (The Silent Revolution). Kansan Lehti 1984
470. Okalintuja ja sydänsarjoja (The Thorn Birds and Other Romances). Kansan
Lehti 1985
471. Aidosta ja epäaidosta kriittisyydestä (On True and False Criticism). Kansan
Lehti 1985
472. Kunniaa työmiehelle (All Honour to the Working Man). Kansan Lehti 1985
473. Ihminen on ihminen (Man Is Man). Kansan Lehti 1985
474. Esivallan kriisi (The Crisis of Authority). Kansan Lehti 1985
475. Varmaa tietoa (Reliable Information). Kansan Lehti 1985
476. Vallan vankkurit vierivät (The Wheels of Power Keep on Turning). Kansan
Lehti 1985
477. Tähtien sota (Star Wars). Kansan Lehti 1985
478. Robotit tulevat (The Robots Are Coming). Kansan Lehti 1985
479. Urheilun arvostamisesta (On the Appreciation of Sports). Kansan Lehti 1985
480. " . . . ja voitettu yksimielellä" ( " . . . and Overcome as of One Mind"). Kansan
Lehti 1985
481. Mihin menet yliopisto? (Where Are You Going, University?). Kansan Lehti
1985
482. Mätäkuun tiedepolitiikkaa (Science Policy in Hot August). Kansan Lehti 1985
483. Eiks' Esa ookaan täällä? (Isn't Esa Here?). Kansan Lehti 1985
484. Tampereen eepos (The Epic of Tampere). Kansan Lehti 1985
485. Vaihtoehtoista politiikka (Alternative Politics). Kansan Lehti 1985
486. Nykyisyydessä tulevan siemenet (The Future Springs from Today). Kansan
Lehti 1985
487. Tärkeä linjanveto (An Important Definition of Policy). Kansan Lehti 1985
488. Kurinpitoa (The Maintenance of Discipline). Kansan Lehti 1986
489. Kauppamiesten moraali (The Morals of Salesmen). Kansan Lehti 1986
490. Palstanikkarin totuus (The Truth of a Columnist). Kansan Lehti 1986
 H. Newspaper Articles and Columns 659

491. Vaaleja vai karnevaaleja (Election or Entertainment). Kansan Lehti/Demari

1986
492. Päälauseita (Main Clauses). Kansan Lehti/Demari 1986
493. Eduskunnan valta (The Power of the Parliament). Kansan Lehti/Demari 1986
494. Mielipideterroristeja (Opinion Terrorists). Kansan Lehti/Demari 1986
495. Penni sinulle, toinen minulle (One Penny for You, Another for Me). Kansan
Lehti/Demari 1986
496. Tunnustatko uskoa - tunnistatko aatteita? (Do You Profess a Religion, Do
You Recognize Ideologies?). Kansan Lehti 1986
497. Anekauppaa (Pardoner's Tale). Kansan Lehti 1986
498. Ei käskijält' työ lopu (No End to Giving Orders). Kansan Lehti /Demari 1986
499. Omituinen farssi (A Strange Farce). Kansan Lehti 1986
500. Kerro, kerro kuvastin (Mirror, Mirror on the Wall). Kansan Lehti 1986
501. Palkanansaitsijain puolue (The Party for Wage and Salary Earners). Kansan
Lehti/Demari 1986
502. Yhteiskunnan valtiollistuminen (The Governmentalization of Society). Kansan
Lehti/Demari 1986
503. Kutistettu ihminen, paisutettu valta (Deflated People, Inflated Power). Kansan
Lehti/Demari 1986
504. Terveisiä Savulahdesta (A Letter from Savulahti). Kansan Lehti/Demari 1986
505. Rahan valta (The Power of Money). Kansan Lehti 1986
506. Hyvinvointi-ihmisen omakuva (A Self-Portrait of a Man in the Welfare State).
Kansan Lehti/Demari 1986
507. Kenelle kirjoittaisi? (To Whom Should I Write?). Kansan Lehti 1986
508. Korkeakoulujen luvattu maa (The Promised Land of Universities). Kansan
Lehti/Demari 1986
509. Itselliset Veikko ja Antti (Veikko and Antti: Autonomous Persons). In:
Kansan Lehti /Demari 1986
510. Yksityistämällä kansa kahtia (Privatization Is Dividing the People in Two).
Kansan Lehti/Demari 1986
511. Jääkiekkoa ja Aku Ankkaa (Ice Hockey and Donald Duck). Kansan Lehti
1986
512. Kuria ja järjestystä (Law and Order). Kansan Lehti/Demari 1986
513. Selka edellä tulevaisuuteen (Backside Foremost Into the Future). Kansan
Lehti/Demari 1986
514. Kaupankäyntiä sairauksilla (Trading With Diseases). Kansan Lehti/Demari
1986
515. Vihreätä ja punaista (Green and Red). Kansan Lehti 1986

43*
660 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

516. Pitkääsiltaa pitkin (Along the Long Bridge). Kansan Lehti/Demari 1986
517. Vaikea demokratia (A Difficult Democracy). Kansan Lehti 1986
518. Työttömyyden kahdet kasvot (The Two Faces of Unemployment). Kansan
Lehti 1986
519. Kahdenlaista todellisuutta (Two Faces of Reality). Kansan Lehti /Demari 1986
520. Kekripuheita (Talks of the A l l Saints' Day). Kansan Lehti/Demari 1986
521. Tulevaisuuden tutkimisesta (On the Study of the Future). Kansan Lehti/
Demari 1986
522. Vieraantumisesta (On Alienation). Kansan Lehti/Demari 1986
523. Kullakin on kohtalonsa (Each Has His Own Destiny). Kansan Lehti 1987
524. Itseys on ihanin mahti (Be Autonomous). Kansan Lehti 1987
525. Sydän on vasemmalla puolella (The Heart Is on the Left Side). Kansan Lehti
1987
526. Lainkäyttäjillä on mieltymyksensä (Juridiciary Has Its Own Fancies). Kansan
Lehti 1987
527. Kulttuuria ja kulttuuri-ihmisiä (Culture and Cultural People). Kansan Lehti
1987
528. Voimattoman uskomisen ihme (The Miracle of Powerless Belief). Kansan
Lehti 1987
529. Tulosvastuun harha (The Delusion of the Accountability of Productivity).
Kansan Lehti 1987
530. Hämärässä laulaa punakylkirastas (Redwing Sings in the Twilight). Kansan
Lehti 1987
531. Tieteestäkö tuotantovoima? (Science to Become a Force of Production?).
Kansan Lehti 1987
532. Mustaa ja punaista (Black and Red). Kansan Lehti 1987
533. Jokainen tulkoon toimeen omillaan (Let Each Stand on His Own Feet).
Kansan Lehti 1987
534. Päiväntasaajan lotuskukka (The Lotus Flower of the Equator). Kansan Lehti
1987
535. Made in Hong Kong. Kansan Lehti 1987
536. 397 päivää olympiakisoihin (397 Days to the Olympics). Kansan Lehti 1987
537. Jos aurinko ei nouse niinkuin ennen (If the Sun Does Not Rise the Way It
Used To). Kansan Lehti 1987
538. Juostaanko Suomi maailmankartalle? (Will the Flying Finns Run Their Way
onto the World Map?). Kansan Lehti 1987
539. Mikä oikein meni pieleen? (What Went Wrong?). Kansan Lehti 1987
540. Suuri illuusio (The Grand Illusion). Kansan Lehti 1987
 H. Newspaper Articles and Columns 661

541. Älyllinen seikkailu (An Intellectual Adventure). Kansan Lehti 1987

542. Oy Valtio Ab (The State, Ltd.). Kansan Lehti 1987
543. Olisiko armahduksetkin perusteltava? (Should Pardons Be Reasoned, too?).
Kansan Lehti 1987
544. Tasa-arvoa peruskouluun (Equality Is Needed in the Comprehensive Schools).
Kansan Lehti 1987
545. Mielipideterroristeja (Opinion Terrorists). Kansan Lehti 1987
546. Metallin lakko (The Strike of the Metal Union). Kansan Lehti 1988
547. Tuliko politiikka takaisin? (Has Politics Come Back?). Kansan Lehti 1988
548. Unelma uudesta ihmisestä (The Dream of the New Man). Kansan Lehti 1988
549. Rinnastuksia (Comparisons). Kansan Lehti 1988
550. Muinainen monitoimitalo (An Old Time A l l Purpose Building). Kansan Lehti
1988
551. Angelo. Kansan Lehti 1988
Miksi "Ghetto" ei vetänyt? (Why Didn't the "Ghetto" Work?). Kansan Lehti
552. 1988

Eduskunnasta politiikan keskipiste (Parliament to Become the Centre of Poli-

553. tics). Kansan Lehti 1988

Päällään seisova pyramidi (The Upturned Pyramid). Kansan Lehti 1988

554.
Onko sosiaalidemokratialla tulevaisuutta? (Does Social Democracy Have a
555.
Future?). Kansan Lehti 1988
556. Periaatteet puntarissa (Principles in the Balance). Kansan Lehti 1988
Tutkijan ja poliitikon vastuu (The Responsibility of a Researcher and a Politi-
557. cian). Kansan Lehti 1988

Sanoja on, tekoja puuttuu (Plenty of Words, a Shortage of Deeds). Kansan

558. Lehti 1988

Kuka on tupakoitsijan puolella? (Who Speaks for the Smoker?). Kansan Lehti
559. 1988

Vastakohtia (Opposites). Kansan Lehti 1988

560.

V. In Kangasalan sanomat

561. Pitäjänlehti on yhdysside (The Local Community Paper Is a Link). Kangasalan

Sanomat 1978
562. Uudistuva avioliittolaki I (Reforms to Marriage Act I). Kangasalan Sanomat
1987
563. Uudistuva avioliittolaki I I (Reforms to Marriage Act II). Kangasalan Sanomat
1987
662 Bibliography Aulis Aarnio

564. Urheilua, kulttuuria vai molempia (Sports, Culture, or Both). Kangasalan

Sanomat 1988
565. Uinuvatko vallanhaltijat? (Are the Authorities Asleep?). Kangasalan Sanomat
1989
566, Mitä he tietävät meistä? Matkakirje Minnesotasta (What Do They Know
About Us? A Letter from Minnesota). Kangasalan Sanomat 1992
567. Älkää syyttäkö pöllöä (Blame Not the Owl). Kangasalan Sanomat 1992
568, Mikä on Minnesota? (I) (What is Minnesota? (I)). Kangasalan Sanomat 1992
569, Mikä on Minnesota? (II) (What is Minnesota? (II)). Kangasalan Sanomat 1992
570, EU-jäsenyys ei uhkaa kansallista identiteettiä (EC Membership Is Not a Threat
to National Identity). Kangasalan Sanomat 1994
571, Mihin menet Huutijärvi? (Where Are You Going, Huutijärvi?). Kangasalan
Sanomat 1995
572, Kiitos ja kumarrus poliisille (Thanks and Praise to the Police). Kangasalan
Sanomat 1995
573. Voimia yhteen? (Join Forces?). Kangasalan Sanomat 1995
Kangasalan kirkonkyläkö ruma? (They Say the Village of Kangasala Is
574. Ugly?). Kangasalan Sanomat 1995
Kaavoista ja kaavoittamisesta (On Plans and Making Plans). Kangasalan Sano-
575. mat 1995
Vaalit lähestyvät (The Election Is Approaching). Kangasalan Sanomat 1995
576.
Kas, Längelmävesi tuolla (Over There, Lake Längelmävesi). Kangasalan Sano-
mat 1995
577.
Joulu on kirjojen aikaa (Christmas Is a Time for Books). Kangasalan Sanomat
1995
578.
Kangasalakin EU:n rahakirstulle? (Kangasala to the Treasure Chest of the
EC?). Kangasalan Sanomat 1996
579.
Vielä kerran luontoarvoista (Once More on Nature Values). Kangasalan Sano-
mat 1996
580.
Tieasiaa (On Road Matters). Kangasalan Sanomat 1996
Outoa piittaamattomuutta (A Strange Indifference). Kangasalan Sanomat 1996
581.
582. Kiitos Kangasalan kesälle (Thanks to Summer in Kangasala). Kangasalan
Sanomat 1996
583. Muistattehan Myllymaan Joukon? (Do You Still Remember Jouko Mylly-
maa?). Kangasalan Sanomat 1996
584. Vuoden varrella mieleen tullutta (Thoughts Along the Year). Kangasalan
Sanomat 1996
585. Koulusta pitäisi keskustella (We Should Discuss School). Kangasalan Sanomat
1997
586. Vaikenevat virkamiehet (The Silent Civil Servants). Kangasalan Sanomat 1997

587.
 H. Newspaper Articles and Columns 663

VI. In Lalli
588. "Broilerisukupolvesta" ei löydy vastuunkantajia? (Does Not Anyone Bear
Responsibility?). Lalli 1994
589. Kolmekymmentäseitsemän vuotta (Thirty Seven Years). Lalli 1996
590. Valtaa kansalle? (Power to the People?). Lalli 1996
591. Politiikkaa politiikan vuoksi (Politics for Polities' Sake). Lalli 1996
592. Urheiluko puhdasta? (Is Sports Clean?). Lalli 1996
593. Eikö kukaan kuuntele? (Isn't Anybody Listening?). Lalli 1996
594. Taantuva Eurooppa - taantuva Suomi (Recession in Europe - Recession in
Finland). Lalli 1996
 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Alexy , Robert, Prof. Dr., Universität Kiel, Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht und
Rechtsphilosophie, Olshausenstraße 40, 24118 Kiel
Bankowski, Zenon, Prof. Dr., Dept. of Public Law, University, Old College,
UK-EH8 9YL Edinburgh
Bergholtz, Gunnar, Prof. Dr., Faculty of Law, University of Lund, P. Ο. Box 207,
S-22100 Lund
Bjarup , Jes, Prof. Dr., Faculty of Law, University of Stockholm, S-10691 Stock-
holm
Bulygin , Eugenio, Prof. Dr., Arroyo 963, 1007 Buenos Aires, Argentina
Comanducci , Paolo, Prof. Dr., Dipartimento di cultura giuridica „Giovanni Tarello",
Università di Genova, Via Balbi 30, 1-16126 Genova
Dalberg-Larsen , J0rgen, Prof. Dr., Juridisk Institut, Bygning 340, Aarhus Universi-
tet, DK-8000 Ârhus C.
Eng , Svein, Dr., Institutt for Offentlig Rett, Universitetet i Oslo, Karl Johansgate
47, N-0162 Oslo
Frändberg , Àke, Prof. Dr., Faculty of Law, University of Uppsala, P. Ο. Box 512,
S-75120 Uppsala
Garzón Valdés , Ernesto, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult., Rolandstraße 56, 53179 Bonn
Gizbert-Studnicki , Tomasz, Prof. Dr., Instytut Nauk Plityczyck, Uniwersytet Jagiel-
lonski, ul. Ziai 5, PL-31-114 Krakow
Guibourg, Ricardo, Prof. Dr., Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias
Sociales, Departamento de Filosofia del Derecho, Av. Da Figueroa Alcort 2263,
1425 Buenos Aires, Argentina
Holmström-Hintikka , Ghita, Prof Dr., Boston University and University of Helsinki,
Department of Philosophy, Pb 24 (Unionsgatan 40 B), SF-00014 Helsinki
Klami , Hannu Tapani, Prof. Dr., Keinutie 11 I 49, SF-00940 Helsinki
Klenner, Hermann, Prof. Dr., Gubitzstraße 40, 10409 Berlin
Krawietz , Werner, Prof. Dr. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult., Lehrstuhl für Rechtssoziologie,
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Universität Münster, Bispinghof 24/25, 48143
Münster
Leiser, Burton M., Prof. Dr., Pace University, 105 Dow Hall, Briarcliff Manor, New
York 10510-1131, USA
MacCormick, Neil, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult., University of Edinburgh, Faculty of
Law, Old College, South Bridge, UK-Edinburgh EH8 9YL
666 List of Contributors

Marshall , Geoffrey, M.A., Ph.D., F.B.A., The Queen's College, UK-Oxford 0 X 1

4AW
Martin , Rex, Prof. Dr., The University of Kansas, Dept. of Philosophy, Lawrence,
Kansas 66045, USA
Narits , Raul, Prof. Dr., University of Tartu, Faculty of Law, Institute of Public
Law, Ülikooli 18, EE2400 Tartu, Estonia
Niiniluoto , Ilkka, Prof. Dr., Department of Philosophy, P. O. Box 24, Unioninkatu
40, SF-00014 University of Helsinki
Ollila , Maija-Riitta, Dr., Soukansalmentie 18 A, SF-02360 Espoo
Pattaro , Enrico, Prof. Dr., CIRFID, Università degli Studi di Bologna, Via Zamboni
27/29, 1-40126 Bologna
Paulson , Stanley L., Prof. Dr., School of Law, Washington University, Campus Box
1120, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, Missouri 63130-4899, USA
Peczenik , Aleksander, Prof. Dr., Faculty of Law, University of Lund, P. Ο. Box 207,
S-221 00 Lund
Petev , Valentin, Prof. Dr., Rechts wissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Münster,
Universitätsstr. 14-16, 48143 Münster
Pietilä, Kauko, Dr., Research Institute for Social Sciences, University of Tampere,
P. Ο. Box 607, Tullikatu 6, SF-33100 Tampere
Samu, Mihâly, Prof. Dr., ELTE Allam-ès Jogtudomânyi Kar, Egyetem tér 1-3,
H-1053 Budapest
Schulte, Martin, Prof. Dr., Technische Universität Dresden, Juristische Fakultät,
Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von
Umwelt- und Technikrecht, Bergstraße 53, 01062 Dresden
Sintonen , Matti, Prof. Dr., Department of Philosophy, Ρ. Ο. Box 24, SF-00014 Uni-
versity of Helsinki
Squella Narducci , Agustin, Prof. Dr., Rektor, Universidad de Valparaiso, Avda.
Errazuriz 2190, Valparaiso, Chile
Strömholm , Stig, Prof. Dr. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult., Uppsala Universität, Box 256,
S-751 05 Uppsala
Summers , Robert S., Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult., Cornell Law School, Myron Taylor
Hall, Ithaca, New York 14853, U.S.A.
Troper , Michel, Prof. Dr., Université de Paris X - Nanterre, Sciences Juridiques, 9,
Villa de Fontenay, F-75019 Paris
Tuori , Kaarlo, Prof. Dr., University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law, P. O. Box 4, Ylio-
pistonkatu 3, SF-00014 Helsinki
Urbina , Sebastian, Prof. Dr., Facultad de Derecho, Universität de les Illes Balears,
F. Borja Moll, 7-3.° -l.a, E-07003 Palma de Mallorca

Vàzquez, Rodolfo, Prof. Dr., Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, Rio

Hondo 1, San Angel, C. P. 01000 México, Mexiko
 List of Contributors

Weinberger , Ota, Prof. DDr. Dr. h.c., Institut für Rechtsphilosophie, Rechtssoziolo-
gie und Rechtsinformatik, Universität Graz, Universitätsstraße 15, A-8010 Graz
Wintgens, Luc J., Prof. Dr., Rechtsfaculteit, Katholieke Universiteit Brüssel, Vrij-
heidslaan 17, B-1080 Bruxelles
Wright , Georg Henrik von, Prof. Dr. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult., 4 Skeppasegatan, SF-00150
Helsinki
Wyduckel, Dieter, Prof. Dr., Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, Verfassungs-
geschichte, Allgemeine Rechts- und Staatslehre, Staatskirchenrecht, Juristische
Fakultät, Technische Universität Dresden, Mommsenstr. 13, 01062 Dresden
Zimmerling, Ruth, Dr., A m Gonsenheimer Spieß 8, 55122 Mainz
Zirk-Sadowski, Marek, Prof. Dr., Faculty of Law, University of Lodz, Uniwersy-
tecka 3, PL-09131 Lodz