it focuses on the ref ieconcept is qualitatively ly social construct, ion Sstudy of the self can be traced to antiquity, carly as the Gth century at Delphi instructed people to “Know ‘Since then, consideration of the self has numerous di B.C, the Temple iplines, ranging from reli- » philosophy. Most recently, psychologists ne the vanguard of self-studies, with a foci including classifying the self’s charac » personality psychology), understand- etional facets of the self (eg clinical gy), and examining how context funda the meaning of the self (egs» cur ‘is unique to the individual, rexample, research has shown that our are integrated in our knowledge ‘Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). ines the benefits and implications of stu: of multiple, ee Enea sete the chapter examines the self as apelin erdaeeneng cir daffects the self, and how loneliness and ostracism are experienced. Third, the chapter jers the self in broader contexts that include its role in guiding self-regulation and goal pur- id its being influenced by contextual factors such as lay theories and culture. In addition to ving our understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of the self, consideration of the repre- tation of self-knowledge allows us to better appreciate the social nature of the self-concept. Words: self-concept, chronicity, sef-complexity, stereotype threat, self-regulation bert kali Rags sober sdying the self from a social cognition Presentation of the self, reviewing classic issues such as istinct in memory ‘onsequeni Petri atc rere ere the consequences of chronic self- id in memory, and how the self is Further, we typically view individuals who are mem- bers of our own social groups relatively favorably and exhibit grearer negativity toward those who are not members of our own social groups (c.g,, Tajfel & Tumer, 1986). Moreover, frequently activated self-knowledge is often a prism through which our perceptions of others are filrered and biased (€.g. Markus, Smith, 8& Moreland, 1985). For example, people who view “honest” as their most central per sonal attribute will evaluate others’ behaviors with respect to their implications for honest conduct. Indeed, the self is very much the hub of our social wheel, with many spokes emanating from ic. ‘Although there have been many treatments of the self in social psychology (e.g,, Baumeister, 1998; Sedikides & Spencer, 2007), our chapter focuses ‘on the advances made by researchers who adope the social cognition perspective, Whereas most psychologists emphasize the selfs content (eg.(1979) adopted the same al, but varied ‘he ope of ame lon pants considered when reading cag that Page partcipants considered whether gah ar criptive of themselves, oF their mo ‘clevision news anchor we. or of « populat Peon eae (Walter Cronkite). Although Bowes Fr ewith the time cuter recall of the ta Beg jilligan observed better its whey Pe distinctions . eae ‘considered themseh =a wha ga Nee an en i evo comidael dae Can ene ader and _ was identical for part Pi hers. In other want Idear-eut dichotomy, Finally, we review orn selves or considere a ‘ i on Forcrconnecting phenomena, suchas sere wep paripants thought of a person they ke Tay theories abour the sl, and cule: their mom), recall was as good asi word was dest very well (ic. J. when considering another well-known individ ‘The Social Cognition of the Self : We begin by describing research thar doce: ‘ments the cognitive representation of the self in aln~the self, From data such as these, views ofthe incerp! Sef shifted from being “special” co being “ordinary & Wy but powerful,” with its detailed, highly claboraed Bargh Ineo Tiseton ois ow scl own cere (more 0 fr the lf and of ac BR eeteecrecnettoourundetanding memoval srucnise (rore oo Ts Ot a igs Beep tiff. ster: noms et or ilvsion news anchors = Beeline igue since ow doc thesclf igi sneodingand rein iformation ee Blerourpezpdons of thes worl). Bocuse Research by Kein and colleagues has urbe 9p es his euch represented socal cognition research- ported the conclusion that information proceing 2 {initial forays into understanding the self, this about the self benefits from the greater organization : ttn provides abistorical account of socal cogni- of xf-knowledge. For example, Klein and Kihlsrin Goris contributions o self-concept research as well (1986) replicared self-reference effects shown in pas eva fas description of how the self is represented in work, observing that participants recalled moreexpt of ¢ memory. imentally presented personality traits when asked ini think about whether each word was descriptive of str Batic Self Special? the self than when asked to consider other aspects au Probably thefirs time thar social cognition began of the words (eg, is the erat word synonytmois ace Hoishape research on the selfinvolved the question of with another word). More important, Klein and la Bihsther sel-knowledge is unique or is qualitatively _Kihlstrom found evidence of more elaborate owt si indistinguishable from other forms of knowledge zation in particip. II when asked to considet ed (Ge Greenwald 6 Bana}, 1989; Kikistom & Kein, each trait with tapect to the cel Specially in fr DPD Aoumberofssciesofthescfrence clit self clone cena. ia tb end the ee se Reet arte scimy lie cei sence conn, they obsened he Be . enone fer cane Nak (99) ene StamouNof clutring in real, such 2 8 4 mamber of self-descriptive words and then rele thatpanicpantsshowed greterateniont,andhet- ing multiple words thar were not selF-descripa™® s ‘er recall of, information that was con nsistent with their selview. And similarly, Roy i instead of recalling words in a random order. Fuss q I te thx prc e. “ed iter when statist ai Controlling for the amoust : aliscoftrats presented themwvhen shay, ‘ll lesteting, the advantage for amount 4 [cer the vis wee ltr selErelevant information, became nonsigailie ny!) than-whenthey proces thera °°, *80 Klein & Lofius, 1988), which pe ‘Alditional evidence that better recall of sele-e¥™ - SOCIAL COGNITION OF rie gu45properties of the static pindeipaniirnliieeesbescilinntiotoctalelale , social niin oats dey tliat teraae cae or might activel : emne 2: ne actively faster to indicate that independence-related adjec- was tives, but not other adjectives, were self-descriptive. In a similar vein, Bargh (1982) demonstrated that slfschemas increase processing efficiency of relevant information. Specifically, people can perform a sec is self-schema relevant than when it is not, showing how the efficiency of selE-schemas frees cognitive resources that can be devoted to other activities. Although the content of selPschemas_ varies er of sources, such as Bruner i that our perceptions are prently accessible knowledge in mem- is, any piece of information in memory inits evel of activation. Items with greater fare more likely to be used in a variety ranging from low-level visual percep- Mo high-level judgment and decision making, Jeopnition research on other topics has shoven : ‘ greatly (eg, traits, age, gender, sexuality; Andersen yenees of activated (eg. prime) knowl. SeCyranowa 194 Markos 197; Malas, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982; Montepare & Clements, 2001), all selfschemas are assumed to be highly HWjer, 1980) to guiding complex behavior (e.g, accessible in memory (e-g., Higgins ct al., 1982). {Ghen, & Burrows, 1996). The consequences As with primes (eg, Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, FFaaivated knowledge can be long-lasting, such 1977), selschemas guide interpretation of ambigu- Marrepeatedly used knowledge becomes chronically ous information (e.g., Markus et al., 1985) even in Wiaastble (cg. Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tor, WY i6. Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982), serving to se-knowledge has important behavioral implica Mit cognition and behavior in the absence of the absence of recent activation. This “always-on! tions, ranging from clinical di FRantactivation (cg,, Bargh & Pratto, 1986), Mathews, 1983) to minority children's anization ihlstrom Hiportantly, accessibility has particular rel- with school (Oyserman, 2008). Later, we return to n in past Pence t se-knowledge. As described above, one our discussion of chronic selF-k to explain re exper ie fectures chat makes the self so consequential how recent social cognition research finds that the asked co information recall is its elaborate representational _ influence of chronic self-knowledge is more cireum- iptive of | suture, Further, sclfrelevant information is fre- scribed rather than being “always on aspects MGedy encountered and processed, increasing. its nymous Gessblity in memory (Bargh, 1982). When this. Construction of Self-Concepts cin and Borated knowledge becomes chronically acces Although self-reference effects and selfschemas organi iiefien referred to as self-schematic knowl focus on the influence » of ~already-exist — (Markus, 1977). Self-schemas are organiz self relevant knowledge, this work does not address mt Seed fom personal experience and _howseleoncepts-are assembled and represented as Election, and they guide perception and action —_selfrelevant information is encountered, Although ule of their heightened stare of activation his & Warf, 1987). From the perspective of lity ant personal its (for similar see Allport, questions such as “how do perceivers process infor mation when forming an impression of a person” hhad been tackled early on in the person memory and stereotype formation literatures (cg Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994, 1997; Srull, 19815 Srull & Wyer, 1989), simi- jestions went unasked in the sel literature for n, one’s most importa most accessible tra predating, social cognition, Inner, 1957; Kelly, 1955) ly research on self-schema sel knowledge facilitate Processing. For example, lar qu 4 considerable period of time. In person memory experiments, researchers found that_participants established chat 1d guides infor Markus (1977) MCCONNELL, BROWN, SHODA | 499reducing, people by fae conse (hus 24 sok conse for theic wn eben ener : rrenving pareipants te cognitive Tesour : se vyvnetively organize and integrate sl ee, a le during the sy by asking them ty will exhibia relatively 088 yin their behaviors, making “O° tent nine impression 2 reasonabl ing and predicting other’ actions (Harte as ‘Sherman, 1996). Ye, ifa perceiver expects litte oO sistency in the behavior of a target individ Br le seraive wo actively form an impresion of the earget because there is “no esence” of the person fo deduce. Accordingly, when people expect litle onsistency in a target persoris behavior (c.g they fre explicitly told the target persons personality is spontancous and unpredictable), primacy effects are imsinated because the active on-line impression for ‘mation process is averted (McConnell et al., 1997) To understand how selF-concepts are formed, McConnell, Rydell, and Leibold (2002) applied the approaches used in person memory rescarch co ‘eaamine how selFknowledge is processed when one is developing an impression about one’s own char- acteristics. Specifically, McConnell ec al. (2002) ‘give participants bogus feedback about themselves by having them describe a serics of inkblot images, After selecting a description for a particular ima the computer provided experimentally preplanned, noncontingentfedback ro participants, such as sug eet Hicietetponse characterized an ourgoin, individual (eg, “a person who chooses this response Em ebjoy an engaging conversation with another peon!)~Al participants received che sume amount ffiextraversion-consisent statements, but for some participants, they received this feedback carly inthe Sequential presentation of the inkblots (i.e. 10 ime in the fis half of 24 inkblot judgments), wherene Gther participants received this feedback at the coal ofthe sequential presentation ofthe ao 4 cxtravesion pants form online self-conceyrs | bbe especially influenced by the “ahobied report being more extraveced in the 9 than inthe later condition, Inder, THE SOCIAL COGNITION OF tHE 5515 keep 4 long demanding con cases iedocumented for the self encourage the wlpeonecpts. but only when sufficient cog ‘of numbers in- memo string - rent task). i iy dy represents the first ime that the yg Bf self-concept formation were examine, aj thac strong expectations of const ive formation of ole verpureceace available © process selF-rlevant inform, vee, Such highly elaborated representations forthe fredtate better recall (cg. Bower 8¢ Gilligan, 197, Rogers etal 1977) and. more efficient information procening about the sl (eg Bagh, 1982: Maa 197), Later, we will elaborate on how metab about the self such as implicit theories and cual influences can further moderate these processes Early Models of Self-Concept Representation The finding that self-concepts are often abst evaluations formed online through efforfil pre cesses dovetails nicely with some: descriptions of selF-concept representation (c.g, Kihlstrom, Bost Klein, 2003; Kihlstrom &¢ Klein, 1994). Specifically Klein and colleagues proposed that self-knowllge becomes increasingly represented. by traits, rather ins, as more self-relevane inl mation isencountered (c.g, Klein, Lofius, Tafion 8 Fuhrman, 1992; Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996) Using a clever priming paradigm, these researches than by episod pisodic ¢ found that judgments about the novel features the self are made more quickly by first recalling specific behavioral episode relevant to the ju When recall of an instance speeds up subsequstt evaluations of the self along the same dimensioms suggests char at least new self-judgments are bas! on the retrieval of instances in memory. Howeves one’s experiences ina domain grow, Klein and oat a find that self-judgments are no longer * or facilitated by recalling specific exemplars. y specific exemplar Based on this work, Kihlstrom and Kleit Proposed a mixed-model self-concept repre Account that suggests chat initial self-knowledge represented asa collect te ci99) of exemplars buBR iociatve crwork (oe'Fagueelnobenadiieeeees proposal foe overviews, se Kit prpemon pmioeen 0A Pe sete “the cognitive modeleof Neale tp oosar meage borrowing heavily from hierarchical struc. 2 gh 1975), production systems (Anderson fand distinctions berwcen declarative and Kknowledge (Tulving, 1972). More pnnectionist approaches have becn used to Geet the self For example, the cognitive-affecive Multiple Selves Early Perspectives Although conceptions of the self have evolved considerably from a static structure to an’ online construction, and then to 2 mixed composition of Competitve quiet at Family reunion thy a mos pasty SELF cured record profit at work € often abstract allied Honest landed new cen at work descriptions of strom, Beer, & : 4). Specifically se! self-knowledge ; “ed F traits, rather Others Alone pelevant infor re us, Trafton, & Acqua Loftus, 1996). we se researchers Family Friends el features of st recalling, @ he judgment » subsequent : fimension, ic ; - are based Cooked dinner ances Clients 5 Mother spouse { . . i SELF Husband 9! & a Likes ica Hot sepresenaton, ching mixed-modl (op pane Wierrchical (idle Hl Examples of different approaches cose multiple selves (McConnell, 2011). Prediction rood, selfestem) are based on the evaluation of mu qhese are not possible using perspective the fase desi ly consider the organization of one's self-concepr tach selEaspece weighted by its evel of activation in eal Bie Aarclevesthec bus asa whole (og on) plexity cise, | bering a mee Te jor should become less caring and more intense and pour chronically accesible lew P our earlier discussion ab ee ECorpany CEO” sclfaspect constructs (8 His ns et al., 1982), which res ( Re Geena than! ber “Wie” from sel knowledge being, activated so frequen b Selfaspect Once at-work, her general mood and that it becomes “always on,” consequently shaping t reed etccrthe evalcciveimpli- perceptionsof the selfand others. Ifwe Auge { example of Anne, itis likely that she would be mos ‘ations primarily derived from her business identity chronic for “honest” given that this trait is aso instead of her spousal role. Tradllidontpacenentng fortheimpaccofshifs ated with most of her self-aspects. Clasic woken Fh context more globally, the MSF considers how chronicity or selF-schemariciry would assume that accessible, constant the interconnections among self-aspects have more “honest” would always be focal effects? For example, landing an impor- guiding Anne's bchavior (Higgins, 1996). Howes MSE, only attributes fant business contract at work will not influence from the perspective of the a \\g \ oy vaal Saxe [este ae ea ae an individ’ slf» COGNITION OF THE sELYIn other words, chronici obal in its impact (Cognition of the Self fezamined how social cognition research fy the organization of self-knowledge in Sve now turn to how social life influences ation of one's self-concept. Specifically. mine the inclusion of meaningful others Joved ones, ingroups) into the self and the fonsequences of such included identi. mimicry, stereotype threat ; Aferward, we fon issues such as disidentification, loneliness Tlostacism 0 consider how the self-concept is 1 tld be most it is associ. Whereas the first section of our chapre fie work on @ trek across the history of social cogni- ssume thar Peeploration of the nature of the self-concept ‘constantly Mediirent section demonstrates how self-concept However, Hpeetiation is central to some of the more recent attributes MM eiciting developments in social psychology ore broadly on of Others in the Self Binteresting that although people are free to Giclisively on themselves when describing ee MFconcepis, they frequently discuss others ple; McConnell (2011) found that when Were asked to spontancously describe thei 5, 17% of their reported self-aspects important interpersonal relationships th my boyfriend). ‘The closeness of others Hed in common, everyday metaphors, when OF friends as “having a connection,” new feally being into cach other,” and fam individuals active sel- aspects and ¢ "iptv of their spouse (Aton, Arch, & Nelson, 1991). Indeed, highly included others are often represented as self-aspects in éne cown self-concept descriptions (MeConnell, 2011), ‘uRgesting that key people such as spouses, fatally pore, friends, and lovers are integrated. into one’s self-representation. Returning to the example Of Anne (see Figure 24.2), iis likely that her hus band searted out as a friend and thus + behavior toward him was initially governed by her “With friends” sel-aspect, but that his growing importance in hee life led to the development of a self-aspect tuniquely associated with him. Relaredly, the disso- self-concept. For example, Slot Finkel (2010) found that followin Gardner, and romantic break- Ups, participants re ied reduced self-concept cla ity (eg. “I have a clear sense of who Tam and what Tam”), which statistically accounted for the increase in emotional distress experienced by their partici pants following theie breakups. Similarly, work on relational selves (ie sel-identities associated with significant others; see Andersen, Chen, & Miranda, 2002) shows that often people's perceptions of themselves and close others can become blurred, resulting in transference effects whereby one perceives close other's qualities in themselves (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996; see also, Gabriel, Carvallo, Dean, Tippin, & Renaud, 2005; Smith et al, 1999). In addition to seeing shifts in content that draw from highly included others, research suggests that structural shifts can oceur for lose others as well. For example, Brown, Young, and McConnell (2009) found chat as people are more included in the self, the structural complexiey of peoples representations of others becomes more similar to the complexity of their own selfeoneepe In other words, being MCCONNELL, BROWN, SHODA (ies, self-complexity)es band si luded in her self-concep's ‘qualities (cg his ativudes, physical mannerisms) ‘will be included in her self-concept as well. Thus, ‘when she interacts with him around the houses the activation of her “Wife” selfaspect may result fn her exhibiting behavioral mimicry. Mimicry esearch has shown that people ofien reveal behav- Foral similarities o those around them, such as mir~ toring others’ body posture or speaking in similar vocal accents. Research shows that this mimicry ofien reflects mutual affinity between people, and thar this mirrored behavior serves to coordinate actions with others (eg. Bargh 8 Chartrand, 1999; Bavclas, Blac, Lemery, 8 Mullet, 1986; Cheng & Charerand, 2003). Incerestingly, mimicry effects are offen context dependent (eg, van Baaren, Horgan, ‘Chartrand, 8 Dijkmans, 2004). When considered from the perspective ofthe MSF, this context depe ddence may reflect the integration of others’ manner- isms into one's se-aspects to the extent that context activates a domain-specific self aspect. ‘Thus, being on a dare may activate Anne’ “Wife” self-aspect, which in turn clicits mimicking behaviors and beliefs derived from her husband. However, other contexts unassociated with this sel-aspect would resule in these husband-derived atributes not be Aétivated. As a result, including others in the self should promote a convergence of its, emotions, and behaviors with meaningful others Groups Tn addition to close people being integrated into jones self-concept, important social groups. may become incorporated into the self as well (Correll ‘& Park, 2005). Returning to the ex: her being a Texan is so important self that this social group has is own fin her selFconcept. The attributes associated wish these group-specific identities should clic not on} p-relevaneirats (cg. funiny) and behaviors (c ) but also. group-relevant emotion, Correll ample of Anne, to her sense of n representation BRB S0cIAL COGNITION OF THE sy4p others ate i can ‘flees, mimicry). For Seal. 4999) found hae participants i pat members when they were self ireihen they were not sel-descrptn, vain aroverlap between: one’ ingroups and = a remony Gee also, Smith 8 Flenry, 1996) gp rexpect 1 beharoral consequences ‘one ing sep baved identities (©. attorney ata pry Feenfam) can lead people to exhibit behavion, dioplay symbols associated with their self (espe akways carry Tegal pad), encouraging tye eid them to act in ways that reinforce th ag pure associated with their selF-aspects (Wicking & Gollwiczer, 1982). Stereotype Threat Triggers and Inbibitors Sometimes groups a self-concept can have negative implications, Fy example, stereotype threat research inves integrated into ates how people's membership in stigmatized groups lal to suboptimal performance in contexts in whidh negative group stereotypes exist. That is, just haviag knowledge of a negative stereotype associated wid one’s own social group can have deleterious conse ‘quences for academic achievement (e.g, Stede & Aronson, 1995), social interactions (eg., Richeson & Shelton, 2003), and even athletic performance (c.g, Beilock, Jellison, Rydell, McConnell, &¢ Car, 2006). Women, for example, underperform on chal: lenging math problems because of an association between their ingroup and. pejorative stereotype that “women are poor at math,” with poorer petfor mance revealed for women whose gender identityis more central to the self (Schmader, 2002) In essence, stereotype threat is a sel-fuliling Prophecy that is criggered by “the self” rather than by others’ expectations. Thus, we would com tend that the accessibility of one’s group identity is at the heart of understanding stereotype thea effects. For instance, although women’ petlit tance on math tests falrers to a greater ext n their gender identity is more central a neept, the view that the sel is compose! ‘multiple selé-aspects. suggests a remedy for hse fcing Stereotype threat. Indeed, any. individual n be categorized based on multiple identi 8» Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 19954 stereo¥P simply ceducatio (an iden ied the perform 2009). Ambad that a¢ led to | their g In sun mult most behav Disic St Afric from who