Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Semantic Network Analysis in Social Sciences.-Routledge (2021)
Semantic Network Analysis in Social Sciences.-Routledge (2021)
SOCIAL SCIENCES
Typeset in Bembo
by Taylor & Francis Books
Access the Support Material: www.routledge.com/9780367636524
To my students
CONTENTS
List of figures ix
List of tables xi
Acknowledgments xii
List of contributors xiii
Introduction 1
Elad Segev
1 How to conduct semantic network analysis 16
Elad Segev
2 The news coverage of threats: Iranian nuclear programs in
Israeli press 32
Noa A. Hatzir, Elad Segev, Kohei Watanabe and Atsushi Tago
3 Provocation narratives in Chinese and US newspapers 53
Yuan Zhou, Sandrine Boudana and Elad Segev
4 Cable news channels’ partisan ideology and market share
growth as predictors of social distancing sentiment during the
COVID-19 pandemic 72
James A. Danowski, Bei Yan and Ken Riopelle
5 Politicizing the Holocaust: A comparative analysis of Israeli and
German speeches 94
Maya Hadar, Regula Miesch and Elad Segev
viii Contents
Glossary 228
Index 231
FIGURES
This book is the result of teaching courses and workshops on network analysis for
more than a decade. It is therefore dedicated to my students in Israel, Switzerland,
England, and Japan. I am grateful to many of them who developed and shared
with me their passion for semantic network analysis. Endless thanks to Regula
Miesch, who, apart from her contribution to the research and writing one of the
chapters, also read and commented on the other book chapters and came up with
brilliant suggestions along the way.
Many thanks also to my dear colleague and contributors of this book: Noa
A. Hatzir, Kohei Watanabe, Atsushi Tago, Sandrine Boudana, Yuan Zhou,
James A. Danowski, Bei Yan, Ken Riopelle, Maya Hadar, Jérôme Chariatte,
Diana Ingenhoff, Saki Mizoroki, Bumsoo Kim, Audrey Addi-Raccah, Tali
Shahrabani, and Nico Pfiffner, many of whom worked with me on related
projects and agreed to share their studies in this book.
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers who commented on the book proposal
and earlier drafts. Thank you for helping to make this book accessible and useful for
readers with no previous background in the field. Finally, I would like to thank the
editors at Routledge Research Methods, Hannah Shakespeare and Matthew
Bickerton, Jashnie Jabson and Martin Pettitt, for their dedication, patience, and
excellent guidance, making the publishing experience efficient and enjoyable.
CONTRIBUTORS
Noa Ana Hatzir is a Junior Research Fellow and PhD student at the Department
of Communication, Tel Aviv University. Her research focuses on the intergenera-
tional communication, connections, and emotions in Israeli families, and how
media usage, which is increasing in our everyday lives, impacts intergenerational
communication. She also studied the reception of Israeli cinema in various cultures.
Kohei Watanabe (PhD, LSE) is an independent data analysis consultant for policy
think tanks and financial companies. He is also a visiting scholar at the London School
of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and Waseda University. He develops pop-
ular R packages for quantitative text analysis that include Quanteda, LSX and News-
map, and studies international flows of political and economic information.
Bei Yan is an Assistant Professor at the School of Business, Stevens Institute of Tech-
nology. She studies collaboration and influence processes of technology-supported
groups applying experiments, social network analysis, text mining. The core question
that underlies her research is how collective intelligence and structures emerge in
groups through computer-mediated communication and interaction with artificial
intelligence.
Tali Shahrabani is a PhD student at the School of Education, Tel Aviv Uni-
versity. Her dissertation focuses on Legitimate strategies of school principals. Since
2017 she is the coordinator of the unit of Sociology, Education and Community at
Tel Aviv University and teaches a course on social inequality.
importantly how these topics relate or connect to each other would be most useful.
Eventually, scholars want to be able to say something meaningful about the infor-
mation they collect, to produce a meta-narrative that would support or challenge a
certain theory, or even generate a new explanation of the world we live in.
In this book, we aim to do exactly this. We focus on words as the building
blocks of content and communication processes and use a network approach to
map the relationships between words. The basic assumption behind this approach is
that our choices and combinations of words construct unique meanings. The
“actors” in the network are the words that frequently appear in the text. The “ties”
between words are their proximity or co-appearances, be it in the same sentence, a
post, tweet, or news item. Networks are therefore a way to translate a one-
dimensional linear text into a two-dimensional visual map. This approach, which is
often called textual or semantic network analysis, is useful in this sense as it enables
researchers to look at large texts from above, map the main themes, and understand
how they relate to each other before conducting more in-depth quantitative or
qualitative analysis. This book therefore focuses on the structure of the text, or
more precisely the network of words appearing together in the text.
The book was written for scholars and students with no previous background in
programming or network analysis. The first chapter provides the basic guidelines
and the publicly available tools to conduct semantic network analysis. The fol-
lowing chapters present the state-of-the-art research that applies semantic network
analysis in various fields. They are organized into three parts based on the type of
text we analyze. First, we demonstrate how semantic network analysis is used in
top-down communication, including the analysis of news media and political
speeches. Then we introduce semantic network analysis in bottom-up commu-
nication, including the analysis of social media and user-generated content. Finally,
we show how semantic network analysis can be used to process research data,
including meta-analysis of academic papers for literature review and the analysis of
interview transcripts to identify reoccurring themes for further qualitative analysis.
much as the meaning of words that signify them, is always processed in relation to
other experiences (Woelfel & Fink, 1980; Barnett, Palmer, & Noor Al-Deen,
1984). In other words, meaning is contextual; meaning is networks.
The idea that language is structured in a network of words that convey meaning
is not new. Throughout history, people have attempted to assess and classify the
functions of words, not only in terms of grammar, but also in terms of their
meanings, and social and political impact. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle describes three
modes of persuasion. Ethos refers to the speaker (being well-spoken and credible),
pathos refers to the hearer, the emotions, empathy, fear, and hope that the message
provokes, and logos refers to the arguments, reasons, and facts, and the ability of
the message to appear truthful. The three modes can overlap and affect each other.
The use of empathy (pathos) and scientific facts (logos), for example, can enhance
the credibility of the speaker (ethos).
Aristotle lived in a period and place where communication was largely oral and
face-to-face. However, his division seems to be very relevant today as well. With
the (growing) development of more mediated means of communication, these
three modes remind us that some of our communication is the attempt to persuade
others in the authenticity and truthfulness of the messages and their creators in
order to facilitate an action. When babies cry, they often need something, and their
parents are called to help. As we get older many of our needs become more
complex and so is our communication. Still, we all want that our needs will be
acknowledged and perceived as authentic or true. The triangular of ethos, pathos
and logos is therefore a very basic and universal way to understand the function of
words in the attempt to generate meaning, relevance, and impact.
Much more recently, the function of language attracted the attention of
anthropologists and linguists. When studying primitive languages, for instance,
Bronisław Malinowski (1923) noted that much of our communication is about
grooming, or what he termed as “phatic communication”. One of the frequent
functions of communication is not to exchange information but rather to signal the
willingness to be part of a community. Greetings, small talk, and body gestures aim
at simply establishing social networks. Still, if we wish to apply the rhetoric prin-
ciples, it is possible to argue that even in greetings and small talk people constantly
assess each other’s authentic intentions, and the wish to be loved and be a part of a
larger social network.
Perhaps one of the most prominent and influential theories of communicative
function is that of the linguist Roman Jacobson. Jakobson (1960) divided commu-
nication into six distinctive functions: referential, aesthetic/poetic, emotive, conative,
phatic, and metalingual. The referential function is related to the question of who
sends a message to whom. It is about the participants of the communication. The
aesthetic/poetic function deals with the form or style of the message. The emotive
function refers to the emotional aspect of communication, while the conative func-
tion refers to the imperative call for action. Finally, the phatic and the metalingual
functions refer to the ties, channels, and flows that connect people together. While
the phatic function focuses on establishing the channels of communication (through
Introduction 5
greetings and small talk), the metalingual function is about the code, establishing a
common language of signs and meanings that are accepted by the participants.
Although Jacobson’s motivation was to describe the various dimensions of com-
munication processes rather than to highlight the art of rhetoric, there is a striking
overlap between the two classifications. Both referential and aesthetic functions focus
on the sender of the message (hence the ethos), their place in the communication
network (referential function), and their style (aesthetic/poetic). The emotive (emo-
tions) and conative (call for action) functions focus on the receiver (hence the pathos).
Although Jacobson’s classification does not emphasize the logo (the facts and reasons
embodied in the message itself), it adds a new dimension, which focuses on the
properties of the ties between people (the phatic and metalingual functions).
In parallel to the attempts to classify the functions of language and the meanings
of words, there were two crucial and inter-related developments in the field: the
use of computers in research and the emergence of network analysis. Since the
18th century, network analysis, also known as the “graph theory”, was mostly a
sub-field of mathematics with some minor applications in physics (Barabasi, 2002).
Yet, in the last few decades, network analysis has penetrated almost every possible
field of study, from biology to sociology, economy, linguistics, communication,
and political studies (Borgatti et al., 2009). The acceleration of globalization pro-
cesses and the increasing use of the internet in the 1990s have certainly contributed
to the realization that networks are an inevitable part of every aspect of our life.
The combination of content analysis and network analysis is relatively new, but
given the importance of both it seems to be indispensable. Scholars have gradually
realized the benefits of translating a linear text into a two-dimensional map, which
offers a fresh look at texts. Suddenly, it is not only the frequency of certain words,
but also the combination of words (also known as n-grams) that matters. But apart
from the relationships between words, networks allow us to scale up our under-
standing and look at the text as a holistic connected structure built from concepts,
ideas, and narratives. This is exactly what sematic network analysis is about.
At the beginning “sematic networks” was mainly a term used by language-
informed studies (Sagerer & Niemann, 2013; Sowa, 2014). During the 1970s and
1980s studies on semantic networks focused on the grammatical or ontological
functions of words and the logic behind their semantic relationships in specific
languages. Toward the end of the 20th century, however, the field of semantic
network analysis became a research paradigm of its own (Doerfel, 1998). It
encompassed not only the grammatical function of words but more broadly the
study of the relationships between words, concepts, and meanings.
In their review of the emerging studies in the field, Monge and Contractor (2001)
identified two different research traditions that develop from semantic networks
originating in two different research methods and approaches. One tradition focuses
on content analysis and therefore the actual words spoken or written and their rela-
tionships (Carley, 1993; Rice & Danowski, 1993). Another tradition is based on
surveys or in-depth interviews and therefore focuses on people’s associations and
interpretations (Monge & Eisenberg, 1987).
6 Elad Segev
In this book the focus is on content analysis. It is not about the interpretations of
ideas but more about the information produced and its social, cultural, and political
meanings. As will be demonstrated in the different chapters, semantic network
analysis is rooted in the social science and communication tradition of content
analysis, and therefore seeks to identify and analyze words within their theoretical,
social, and cultural (rather than grammatical or semantical) context. The combina-
tion of theoretically meaningful words that are frequently mentioned together leads
to the extraction of prevailing topics, frames, and biases in the text.
While social network analysis can potentially unveil the power structures and the
way communities function, semantic network analysis is about revealing the structures,
the meanings, and the biases in the text people produce. In semantic networks the
nodes are the words or concepts, and the ties are their relationships. Central words
often appear in the text either with many other words (higher degree) or with other
specific central words (higher betweenness), and therefore they convey an important
meaning in the text. Similarly, when words are grouped into distinctive clusters, they
often share similar meanings, and thus they help researchers to classify the text into
smaller units of meanings and identify the prevailing themes and topics within the text.
Kathleen Carley and James A. Danowski were among the earlier scholars that
employed network analysis of words mentioned together in a text. During the
1990s, Carley (1993) introduced some fundamental guidelines for semantic net-
work analysis (termed “map analysis”), including the importance of choosing the
prominent words in the text, looking at the relationships between them, and
interpreting the meaning of these relationships based on previous social and cultural
knowledge. She also demonstrated the potential of semantic network analysis of
thesauri, fiction books, and even interview transcripts to highlight various aspects of
American culture (Carley, 1994).
Danowski (1993) further emphasized the main strength of semantic network
analysis compared to traditional content analysis methods. The use of codebooks,
for example, requires researchers to decide a priori what categories to look for in
the text. In semantic network analysis, categories emerge in a bottom-up process
based on the proximity between words (Rice & Danowski, 1993). Additionally, in
line with the “Aristotelian” approach, traditional qualitative and quantitative con-
tent analyses are based on a clear cut classification of content into exclusive cate-
gories. A network of words, on the other hand, would provide a continuous map
in which clusters of words overlap and relate to each other. In this way, researchers
can learn about the relative position of categories within the overall discourse. By
representing words as a continuum, semantic network analysis bridges between
qualitative and quantitative methods.
Semantic network analysis is less expensive and time-consuming than manual
coding with traditional codebooks or qualitative approaches. Researchers are not
required to manually code the text and conduct inter-coding reliability tests. As such
semantic network analysis fits well for Big Data studies and saves a lot of time and
resources. Moreover, even among the computerized methods of text analysis (see
below), semantic network analysis requires only a few resources and is considered
as one of the most straightforward and simple approaches. It is less complicated to
conduct than natural language processing, as it can be applied to any language,
without the need to “teach” the computer or “train” the algorithm with gram-
matical structures, or the semantic role of each word and part of speech.
Although semantic network analysis is a very useful tool to highlight the pre-
valent themes and map their relative positions and relationships, it can certainly not
replace the more in-depth qualitative analysis. Semantic network analysis is less
instrumental to understand the tone and valence, cynical expressions, hidden
8 Elad Segev
documents, and the output would be groups of documents and a unique list of
words that are common to each group. The role of the researcher in such an
unsupervised procedure is to interpret the meaning of those groups of documents
based on the frequent words that are unique to each group.
Semantic network analysis is more of an unsupervised approach. It is similar to
topic modeling, but instead of classifying documents based on common words, it
classifies words within a document based on their proximity or co-occurrences.
The input in this case is a text, and the output is a network of words, clustered
based on their proximity. Semantic network analysis is considered to be an unsu-
pervised approach because there is no need to define in advance the categories, and
the classification of words into categories is done automatically based on their co-
occurrences within the text. Still, as will be explained in the next chapter,
researchers are required to have some idea of the theory or the research question in
mind as they choose relevant words to include in their networks.
is represented as a network, the structure of this network and its clusters can be
automatically obtained. Still, the last and most interesting and important stage of
the construction of meaning and assigning to each cluster theoretical frames is done
manually.
found that the US is by far the most central. Only by removing the US from the
analysis was it possible to detect clear regional clusters of international interactions.
To conclude, the applications of semantic network analysis are numerous. Some
previous studies have applied semantic network analysis to develop theory (Berg-
strom and Holmes, 2000; Klenk and Larson, 2013; Veronese et al., 2018), others
examine a hypothesis (Chung and Park, 2010; Kang et al., 2017; Meraz, 2015;
Segev and Blondheim, 2013), and conduct initial mapping of the main themes and
topics in the text (Carley, 1994; Boudana and Segev, 2017). In this introduction,
the strengths of semantic network analysis were presented, including the ability to
perform a more objective grounded content analysis, in which the text is trans-
lated into a two-dimensional map. Moreover, unlike traditional qualitative and
quantitative content analyses, the emerging themes and topics are positioned in a
continuum with a clear relationship to each other, rather than as discrete units. In
this way, semantic network analysis provides a bridge between quantitative and
qualitative methods (Danowski, 1993).
news with the discourse on Twitter. It uses semantic network analysis to extract
central thematic associations and patterns from large data sets. Their findings
show that paradiplomacy does indeed shape public discourse and that non-state
actors, cities, and regions can significantly contribute to the standing of a country
and its issues.
In Chapter 7, Saki Mizoroki and Bumsoo Kim apply semantic network analysis to
study a large corpus of tweets dealing with two widely publicized rape cases in Japan
and South Korea. While gender-based harassment and feminist hashtag activism have
received scholarly attention, it is relatively limited to Anglophone users or single-
country studies. To compare the tweets in Japanese and Korean, they retroactively
collected data between 2017 and 2020, using the names of female victims and male
assailants. This chapter contributes to the literature on social media and gender,
networked misogyny, fragile masculinity, and personalization of politics.
Finally, the studies presented in the third part of the book focus on the appli-
cations of semantic network analysis in research data. In Chapter 8, Noa Hatzir
studies the perceived and actual role of WhatsApp in the extended family. She
conducts in-depth interviews, analyzes the content of two WhatsApp groups, and
employs semantic network analysis to identify the main themes not only in social
media content but also in interview transcripts. Her findings reveal that within the
extended family in Israel WhatsApp is perceived as a useful and often preferable
channel. This is mainly due to the variety of communication forms that it offers
and the ability of users to control the timing of conversations. It is therefore used
also for checking people’s availability as well as organizing meetings. The actual
WhatsApp conversations among members of the extended family focus primarily
on positive emotions, with an emphasis on celebrating birthdays, holidays, sche-
duling family gatherings, and sharing photos. Hence, it appears that the use of
WhatsApp encourages mostly image management and phatic communication.
In Chapter 9, together with Audrey Addi-Raccah and Tali Shahrabani, we apply
semantic network analysis to review and map the recent academic literature on school
improvement. School improvement research is highly prolific and diverse in the
attempt to understand the processes that lead to effective and successful schooling. We
analyzed more than 200 academic papers published in the last five years dealing with
school improvement, successful, and effective schooling. We then employed semantic
network analysis to identify reoccurring themes and topics. Our findings show that the
main narrative of school improvement research is a conservative one, in which the
responsibility lies in the hands of the teachers and managers, while the students, parents
and other external stakeholders are viewed as more passive in the process. The edu-
cational goals stress improvement over effectiveness. School improvement has been
primarily defined and assessed based on students’ academic abilities and their outcomes
or scores in (particularly math) tests. There is much less emphasis in recent literature on
life skills, social capital, or social and universal values and school collaboration with
external agencies.
In Chapter 10, Nico A. Pfiffner uses a different approach to map the field of
communication research by looking at the keywords in academic papers. To do so,
14 Elad Segev
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1
HOW TO CONDUCT SEMANTIC
NETWORK ANALYSIS
Elad Segev
The process of semantic network analysis generally consists of two main stages: text
preparation and analysis. First, researchers are required to choose the right text and
prepare it for analysis. Some texts, such as instant messages in a chat group, may be
less informative, and the content of this text would therefore be of no interest.
Other texts may not fit the research questions. The corpus should be well defined
and properly prepared for analysis, including the selection of desired words to be part
of the network analysis. In the second stage, the network is constructed, analyzed,
and interpreted. This stage includes simplifying the network structure and identifying
the clusters and the most central words in the network, which represent the main
discourse and narratives appearing in the text. The following steps are recommended
to be taken as part of the semantic analysis:
may be appropriate for semantic network analysis. The next chapters in the book
will demonstrate how to analyze different types of texts and the strengths and
limitations of such an analysis.
In the last two decades various new sources for text analysis have become
available to researchers, such as Factiva and Nexis Uni databases for news, legal,
government, and business information, social media content on Twitter and Face-
book API, blogs and Wikis, search engine results, and so forth. Together with new
sources, social scientists rely also on traditional sources such as transcripts of in-
depth interviews and collections of research articles. As the amount of data
increases, semantic network analysis offers an innovative and fresh approach for
both new and more traditional types of data, as it allows researchers to organize,
visualize, and obtain an initial map of the main topics and themes appearing in
those corpora.
FIGURE 1.1 Frequent words from the first chapter of the Bible.
It is important to note, however, that before constructing a list of the most fre-
quent words the text might need to undergo some initial processing and prepara-
tion. In most languages, words are separated by spaces, which enables algorithms to
automatically detect and count them as separate units. In some languages, such as
Chinese or Japanese, researchers should first use software to separate words from
each other (a process known as “tokenization”, see also the examples in Chapters 3
and 7).
some languages, can be part of the same word, should be merged. Similarly,
common expressions such as “social media” or “united states” should be combined.
One can decide to create several lists, each with a focus on different aspects of the
text. Thus, for example, selecting nouns and expressions could be useful when
attempting to identify the most prevailing topics (Rule et al., 2015). The focus on
adjectives could be particularly useful when the research aim is to study sentiments,
opinions, and views, while verbs are useful to highlight actions.
FIGURE 1.2 Converting frequent words of the first chapter in the Bible into a link list.
20 E. Segev
Another way to link words together would be based on their distance or proxi-
mity, a method also known as k-next-neighborhood (see, for example, Drieger,
2013; Paranyushkin, 2011). Danowski (1993) recommended the construction of
word pairs with a distance of three words in between for optimal identification of
clusters. Finally, another approach suggested by van Ham, Wattenberg, and Viégas
(2009) is to focus on specific grammatical patterns to explore in detail the various
dimensions of the text. They show, for example, that when scanning the Bible for
textual matches to the pattern “X begat Y”, it is possible to identify the network of
family relations, while a pattern such as “X’s Y” (e.g., God’s children) can be used to
reveal power relations.
Sources: General semantic network analysis tools: http://www.eladsegev.com/tools, Count Words: http://
www.countwordsfree.com, Digital Methods Initiative (DMI): https://wiki.digitalmethods.net/Dmi/
ToolDatabase, Mozdeh: http://mozdeh.wlv.ac.uk (Thelwall, 2018), TAGS: https://tags.hawksey.info,
Visone: https://visone.info, Gephi: https://gephi.org, NodeXL: https://nodexl.com, quanteda: https://qua
nteda.io/reference/textplot_network.html (Benoit, 2018), textnets: https://github.com/cbail/textnets (Bail,
2016), Text-Network Analysis: https://github.com/michal-pikusa/text-network-analysis, KH Coder: https://
khcoder.net/en/ (Higuchi, 2001).
How to conduct semantic network analysis 21
matrix of word pairs and translate it into a network of words. Basically, these tools
enable us to visually turn the linear one-dimensional text into a two-dimensional net-
work and make all the necessary calculations (as described below) to identify the most
central words in the network and the clusters of words frequently appearing together.
FIGURE 1.3 Semantic network of frequent words in the first chapter of the Bible.
22 E. Segev
Using Segev’s (2020) set of text analysis tools, Figure 1.3 shows the semantic
network of frequent words in the first chapter of the Bible based on the 50 most
frequent word pairs. This visualization already enables us to identify two main
words: “god” and “earth” as the most central words in the first chapter. The word
“earth” is linked to many words coming from the agriculture tradition such as
“seed”, “tree”, “fruit”, “water”, “beast”, and “cattle”. Interestingly, however, the
word “god” mediates between the lower agricultural world and the upper uni-
verse, which provides the conditions for life and growth, that is “light” vs. “dark-
ness”, “day” vs. “night”, and “morning” vs. “evening”.
a specific issue (the discourse around “fake news”), the second example uses social
media data from Twitter and focuses on the coverage of a specific country (the
discourse on China). In the first example, the analysis unveils the main political
actors and the conflicts of power between politicians, the media, and social media
users. In the second example, the analysis provides a useful starting point to
understand the American-centric views raised by English speaking social media
users, and the potential of Chinese public diplomacy practitioners to alter or at least
provide alternatives to the mainstream discourse.
TABLE 1.2 Identifying the most frequent and relevant words associated with “fake news”
words can be then imported to any available network analysis software to obtain
the network graph. In this example, the network analysis and visualization software
Visone (Brandes & Wagner, 2004) was used to construct the semantic network for
further analyses.
Following the procedures discussed above, the next stage would be to sparsify the
network to make it more readable and clearer for interpretations (Stages 2.1–2.2).
Figure 1.4 portrays the process of network sparsification. At first (point “a”), the net-
work is very dense and hard to interpret as it is based on all possible links between the
chosen words, even if they appear together only once. When removing all word pairs
that appear less than 50 times (about 41% of the links), the network becomes much
sparser (point “b”). Still, there are two central actors (the words “fake” and “news”
in black) that appear more frequently with most other words and thus potentially
overshadow the network structure. Since these two words were also used as the
search query to obtain the news corpus, it is reasonable to expect that they would
co-occur with most other words. If the aim of the study is to reveal the themes
related to the fake news discourse, removing them would allow to focus on other
words apart from “fake” and “news” and obtain a cleaner and more structured
network (point “c”).
26 E. Segev
Following Stage 2.3, using Louvain modularity (Blondel et al., 2008), which is an
available feature of grouping nodes in many network analysis tools, it is possible to iden-
tify several clusters of words that tend to appear together in the same sentence. These
words often construct common meanings, and thus the cluster analysis stage enables us to
reveal the various themes and frames in the text. The network in Figure 1.5 displays four
distinctive clusters as obtained from this analysis. Cluster “a” at the top left is the largest
FIGURE 1.5 Cluster analysis of the “fake news” discourse in elite newspapers.
How to conduct semantic network analysis 27
cluster and contains words such as: “media”, “press”, “reports”, “journalists”, “free”,
“speech”, “public”, and “trust”. It clearly represents the media context of the fake news
story, and particularly the important role of journalists. Cluster “b” at the top-center
contains words such as: “people”, “spread”, “believe”, “false”, “stories”, “real”, and
“fact”. This cluster reflects the context of the people or the users and their tendency to
believe in false stories. Cluster “c” at the top right contains the words: “site”, “website”,
“article”, “advertising”, “ads”, and “share”. This cluster deals with the economic and
technological perspective of the story. Finally, the fourth cluster (“d”) at the bottom
includes the words: “election”, “campaign”, “political”, “presidential”, “influence”,
“vote”, “online”, and “information”. This cluster clearly and predominantly deals with
the political aspect of the fake news story.
Figure 1.5 also represents the size of the words based on their betweenness
centrality (indicated in Stage 2.4). As explained above, there are several possible
ways to measure the centrality of words. In this network the rankings of words,
based on their degree and betweenness centrality, strongly correlate (Spearman r =
0.88, p < 0.001). There is therefore no reason to visually distinguish between the
two measurements in the current analysis. In fact, in most cases betweenness cen-
trality is the most useful measurement to highlight the differences between words.
The distribution of betweenness centrality is often much more unequal than that of
degree centrality. When visualizing the size of the words based on the betweenness
centrality, usually only a few words appear to be much more central than others.
Since betweenness measures to what extent each word is positioned in between
two clusters, in most cases each cluster gets one or two central words that often
help us to interpret and contextualize its general meaning (see also the concluding
chapter). Thus, in the following example, the word “media” appears as the most
central in cluster “a”, representing the role of traditional media in fighting fake
news, the word “people” in cluster “b” represents the naivety of the people who
become victims for false information, the word “site” in cluster “c” represents the
platforms and the economic interests, and the word “election” in cluster “d”
represents the political motives behind the fake news phenomenon.
To summarize, based on the network of word co-occurrences in the study of
Segev and Boudana (2019) the fake news discourse as presented in The New York
Times and The Washington Post evolves around the political and economic conflict
between four core players: the media, people, politicians, and commercial compa-
nies. It is described as the attempt of politicians and companies to spread false
information through social networks. While people tend to believe this informa-
tion, the role of traditional media and its journalists is to fight back, present the real
facts, and strive for the truth. It is important to bear in mind that this narrative is
reported by elite American newspapers that attempt to find and sometimes re-
invent their role and identity in this dynamically changing informational world.
Their underlying assumption is that there is a universal concept of truth, and that
they must struggle to unveil and guard it. A whole tradition of journalism and an
emerging business model of premium and quality content depends on their ability
to convince others in this narrative.
28 E. Segev
Huawei’s CFO by Canadian Authorities at the request of the US for alleged vio-
lations of the sanctions on Iran.
Cluster “b” at the top-middle includes many hashtag countries. Looking back at
the content of tweets, these hashtags appear in various contexts and topics ranging
from cryptocurrency to conservative discourse on US international expansion and
control. Cluster “c” at the top right includes words such as “news”, “moon”,
“spacecraft”, and “rover”. This cluster refers to the news on China’s achievement
to land a rover on the far side of the moon. Finally, the largest cluster “d” at the
bottom includes words such as “#apple”, “#economy”, “#trade”, “#trump”, and
“#tradewar”. In this cluster the hashtag #apple gets the highest betweenness cen-
trality, reflecting the company’s efforts to remain dominant in China by skillfully
complying with Trumps’ trade war policy and the Chinese economic ambitions.
In short, the study of Chariatte et al. (2019) showed that Twitter discourse on
China in English was largely news-related. It focused on the political, technologic,
and economic developments of China, and represented almost exclusively the
American point of view. In particular, the content of tweets was primarily driven by
US concerns over China’s economic and technologic expansion, as well as the
political and economic tensions between the two countries. One of the interesting
findings of this study is that there is no counter-narrative to represent the Chinese
point of view. A possible application of this study is in the field of public diplomacy.
In order to improve its global image, China could employ popular social media
channels such as Twitter and produce English content to present alternative views.
30 E. Segev
Conclusion
Texts are the prime source of analysis in many political, social, and communication
informed studies. This chapter introduced a new emerging approach, semantic network
analysis, to reveal the main themes and biases in any given text. The advantages of this
approach are numerous, particularly today when information is easily available, and data
science is in demand. Still, there are not many studies to date that employed semantic
network analysis in the social sciences and particularly in the field of communication
and politics. Moreover, the few studies that focus on the process of semantic network
analysis tend to be technical and require some previous knowledge of programming and
network analysis principles. The purpose of this chapter was to offer some basic guide-
lines and steps to conduct semantic network analysis, to offer some free available tools,
and to demonstrate how it can be applied without previous knowledge and experience.
The main stages of semantic network analysis include choosing and preparing the
sample for analysis, selecting and refining the list of desired words to be included in
the analysis, converting the list of words into a link list format and importing it to
network software, sparsifying and cleaning the network for analysis, and finally,
identifying clusters and central words. Once the network is readable, the linear text
turns into a two-dimensional descriptive map, which allows to identify the main
themes and even the biases and underlying narratives. Although this process can take
some time, it is still much faster than traditional qualitative and quantitative methods
of content analysis. Moreover, it is fit for small and large texts and therefore ideal for
mapping the content in Big Data studies. The applications of semantic network
analysis as discussed in the introduction to this book are diverse and can support all
stages of the research process, starting from the mapping of literature, developing
theories from the bottom-up, to testing existing theories and hypotheses.
Finally, the potential of semantic network analysis was demonstrated in two previous
studies. The first was a study of Segev and Boudana (2019), who mapped the discourse
around “fake news” in The New York Times and The Washington Post. After identifying
the most relevant frequent words and constructing networks of word co-occurrences,
they found four main clusters, reflecting the main narratives of elite American news-
papers around the fake news discourse. The second example was based on the study of
Chariatte et al. (2019). In their study they employed Twitter API to learn about the
social media discourse around China in English. They showed that news reports about
China tremendously influence the discourse on Twitter. They also found that Amer-
ican views dominate this discourse, reflecting US concern over China’s economic
expansion and the political and economic tensions between the two countries.
To conclude, semantic network analysis is a powerful and promising tool for
researchers to identify patterns in any text, be it books, academic papers, social media,
songs, films, or even interview transcripts. One way to look at it is as an x-ray of text,
as it assists scientists to unveil the structure of content, the relationships between words,
and their overall position. By offering available online tools, simple procedures, and
concrete case studies, this book hopes to encourage more researchers to engage in
semantic network analysis and make it an essential part of the students’ curriculum.
How to conduct semantic network analysis 31
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2
THE NEWS COVERAGE OF THREATS
Iranian nuclear programs in Israeli press
Introduction
International news often deals with conflicts, and global nuclear threats have been
at the top of the international agenda. The news coverage of Iran is particularly
prominent and can roughly be divided into before and after the Islamic revolution
of 1979. In general, Western views on Iran before the revolution were rather
positive due to its pro-Western and secular monarchic system. Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram began in the 1950s with the help of the US and other Western countries as
part of the Atom for Peace program. In 1970 Iran ratified the treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After the revolution and during the war
with Iraq, the Iranian economy struggled, and nuclear development was reduced
until the 1990s. Then, with support from Russia, the nuclear program was taken
up again, and the Bushehr nuclear plant was finished.
In the last two decades there has been an ongoing tension between Iran and the
West as Iran has repeatedly violated its commitments to the NPT. The IAEA (Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency) revealed that Iran’s nuclear program has rapidly
increased, with two sites under construction that were not declared. As a result of
international pressure, the “Teheran Declaration” was introduced in 2003, demanding
Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities. In return, EU3 (UK, France, and
Germany) agreed to recognize the rights of Iran to peaceful use of nuclear energy by
following the NPT guidelines. The negotiations lasted until 2005 but failed, mainly
due to the American administration’s insistence on “zero enrichment” (Parsi, 2013).
This contributed to the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who criticized “weak”
Iranian foreign policy (Kazemzadeh, 2017).
After Ahmadinejad took office, Iran resumed its enrichment program at a few
sites, rejecting IAEA resolutions and postponing international negotiations, arguing
that foreign sanctions do not affect Iran (Mousavian & Mousavian, 2018). This
DOI: 10.4324/9781003120100-3
The news coverage of threats 33
policy lasted until 2013, when Hassan Rouhani, who was a chief negotiator in the
“Teheran Declaration”, was elected as president. Rouhani resumed the negotia-
tions with the West, wishing to continue nuclear development for energy purposes
and preserve Iran’s diplomatic relationships (Mousavian & Mousavian, 2018). This
change in office raised hopes among the Iranians and the outside world to again
achieve a mutual trust (Yazdani, 2019).
In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (Alarqan,
2020; Mousavian & Mahmoudieh, 2017; Pieper, 2019; Yazdani, 2019) with the P5+1
(consisting of the UK, France, Germany, China, Russia, and the US). This agreement,
however, did not last long. In May 2018, the US withdrew from JPCOA upon pres-
sure by Israel and Saudi Arabia, and sanctions were imposed on Iran. Rouhani decided
that Iran would stick to the terms of the agreement with the other signatories, the
European countries, China, and Russia (Alarqan, 2020; Pieper, 2019). Yazdani (2019)
argues that despite the successful conclusion of the nuclear deal, Iran’s political and
economic ties with the world did not recover after the 1979 Islamic revolution.
Klein (2009) compared the coverage of the Iranian nuclear program in Israel and
Iran. He believes that they both attempt to “bridge” their interpretations of events
to their allies. The Israeli newspaper Ynet presented the worst-case scenario for
Israel: the accomplishment of Iranian atomic weaponry. This scenario was pre-
sented as a threat not only to Israel but also to the entire world, thus bridging the
threat to its Western allies. On the other hand, the Iranian newspaper IRNA
underscored the peaceful nuclear activities by encouraging its allies to continue and
support its nuclear program.
In short, nuclear development in Iran has been observed with great suspicion
among Western countries. It is framed as a world threat that can potentially escalate
into a war, blaming the fundamentalist and irresponsible Muslim regime in Iran.
Although the news coverage of this crisis is critical to the stability of the region and
the entire world, there are very few studies to date that looked at the coverage in
Israeli media. Most studies on Israeli media focused on wars and terror attacks
within or along its borders.
It is important to understand the frames offered by the Israeli media for several
reasons. First, unlike terror attacks and other regional conflicts that appear in waves,
the Iranian nuclear threat is an ongoing conflict that influences people’s perceptions
in the long term. Second, even though the threat is not geographically close, it
affects the daily lives of Israeli citizens and is part of the daily discourse. Third, a
war against Iran will have consequences for the entire world. Studying the way one
country perceives and frames the other is often a starting point for dialogue and
peaceful diplomacy.
Methods
Sample
The corpus of our study included all the print news articles in the two leading
Israeli newspapers, Yedioth Ahronoth and Haaretz, that were published between
2008 and 2018 and mentioned the word “Iran” in Hebrew (“)”איראן. In total, we
retrieved N = 8779 items from the archives of Yedioth Ahronoth and N = 15,930
items from Haaretz.
actors (e.g., country names, organizations, and politicians), assessment of the situation
(e.g., threat, crisis, or war vs. security or peace), stand or position (e.g., extreme or
hostile vs. moderate or friendly), intentions or interests, actions (e.g., attack or
bombing vs. negotiation or agreement), resources (e.g., weapon vs. energy), and
finally, outcomes or results (e.g., failure vs. success).
Obviously, the context of the coverage of Iran in Israel is predominantly negative.
Still, a careful inspection of the text also helped us to classify whether some of these
words are related to the threat dimension and the escalation of the conflict (e.g.,
“danger”, “war”, “attack”, “missiles”) or rather to the opportunities for de-escalation
of the conflict and the steps required for regional stability (e.g., “security”, “peace”,
“negotiation”, “diplomacy”). In the final analysis we only included words with a
frequency of 0.01% of the entire corpus and above, resulting in a list of the top 268
frequent words for Haaretz and 224 words for Yedioth Ahronoth. We did not use the
same word list for the comparison as each outlet may have different emphasis or even
different frames. Still, 194 words (72% of the words in the list of Haaretz and 87% of
the words in the list of Yedioth Ahronoth) were identical in both newspapers.
Results
Netanyahu and two heads of two right-wing parties, Naftali Bennett and Avigdor
Lieberman. Further clockwise is the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. The next
cluster on the top-right contains Syria with some links to the Iranian Revolu-
tionary-Guards, Lebanon, and Turkey. On the bottom-right is Egypt, with links to
other Middle Eastern countries, notably Yemen, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.
The largest cluster by far at the bottom-center is that of the US, mentioning the
presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Interestingly, Kim Jong-il, the
North Korean leader, is also mentioned in relation to Trump, marking the con-
nection between the Iranian and the North Korean nuclear threat to the West.
Finally, the cluster on the left shows Russia and its President Putin, with some links
to China, Germany, and France.
What is interesting to observe in Figure 2.1 is the presence of political leaders in
the US, mostly located on the left part of the figure, and, on the contrary, the lack
of personalization in the representation of the Arab states on the right. Another
notable pattern is the strong ties between the leaders of Israel and the US, on the
one hand, and Russia and Syria, on the other. This map clearly presents the
polarity between two global powers with interests in this conflict: the US and
Russia, with Israel, Syria, and Iran being their proxies.
The network of co-occurring words in Haaretz, a left-wing newspaper in
Israel, portrays a clear bias toward the Israeli narrative with some limited
The news coverage of threats 39
Finally, the two clusters on the top and bottom highlight the political and economic
aspects of the story. The top cluster focuses on “election” and “demonstrations”,
which mainly appear in the context of the Iranian public and their disagreement with
their hard-line leaders. The cluster at the bottom focuses on the economic aspect with
the word “oil”, surrounded by words such as “stop”, “prevent”, “sanctions”, and
“succeed”. This cluster provides further support to the notion that the Iranian nuclear
threat is also about economic resources and oil, and therefore sanctions and pressure
from the west may bring about a possible solution.
Overall, the main narrative told by Yedioth Ahronoth seems to be similar. Figure 2.4
presents the network of co-occurring words related to Iran in Yedioth Ahronoth after
excluding actor-related words such as politicians, country names, and organizations.
In line with Haaretz, the threat of war is at the center of the story in Yedioth Ahro-
noth. But unlike Haaretz, in which the word “war” is surrounded by international
relation concepts such as “strategic”, “policy”, “relations”, “economy”, or “alliance”,
in Yedioth Ahronoth the word “war” is surrounded by more words referring to actions
such as “prevent”, “succeed”, “damage”, “harm”. The problem as framed by both
newspapers is therefore similar—the threat of war between Israel and Iran, yet the
solution or outcomes are framed differently in each newspaper.
FIGURE 2.4 Network of co-occurring non-actor words in Yedioth Ahronoth reports on Iran.
Note. Words are translated to English. The size of the nodes reflects their relative
betweenness level, and the width of the ties the number of sentences mentioned each
pair of words together. Triangular nodes reflect threat context, square nodes opportu-
nity context, and circle nodes neutral words. Clusters are based on Louvain modularity
(Blondel et al., 2008). The network layout applies stress minimization to a metric MDS.
Network visualization and calculations were performed with Visone (Brandes &
Wagner, 2004).
42 Hatzir, Segev, Watanabe, and Tago
Lou- Source between- degree (%) Category Sentiment Louvain Source between- degree (%) Category Sentiment
vain ness (%) cluster ness (%)
cluster
1 War 18.42 7.83 situation Neg 4 Peace 12.91 5.22 situation pos
1 Relations 1.96 3.21 position 4 Solution 1.36 1 Result pos
1 Policy 1.72 3.21 Action 4 Settlements 1.26 0.6 Action neg
1 Struggle 1.26 0.6 Action Neg 4 Good 0.39 1.2 situation pos
1 Economy 1.02 2.61 resources 4 Opportunity 0.01 0.6 situation pos
1 Defence 0.03 0.6 Action Pos 4 Enterprise 0 0.2 Action pos
1 Strategic 0.01 1.2 intentions 4 Building 0 0.2 Action neg
1 Trade 0 0.8 Action Pos 4 Negotiation 0 0.2 Action pos
1 Control 0 0.2 Action 4 Occupation 0 0.4 Action neg
1 Fight 0 0.2 Action Neg 4 Chance 0 0.2 Result pos
1 Visit 0 0.2 Action Pos 4 Danger 0 0.2 situation neg
1 Criticism 0 0.8 Action Neg 4 Problem 0 0.2 situation neg
1 Alliance 0 0.4 position 4 Conflict 0 0.4 situation neg
1 Enemy 0 0.2 position Neg 5 Agreement 15.8 7.03 Action pos
1 Fear 0 0.2 position Neg 5 Talks 4.87 2.41 Action pos
1 Future 0 1 Result 5 Nuclear 3.23 3.41 resources neg
1 Crisis 0 0.4 situation Neg 5 Produce 1.49 1.2 Action neg
2 Missiles 4.83 3.61 Resources Neg 5 Exchange 0.54 1.61 Action pos
2 Weapon 3.06 3.21 Resources Neg 5 Nuc.-prog. 0.52 1.2 Action neg
2 Attack 2.71 2.81 Action Neg 5 Reactor 0.08 0.8 resources neg
The news coverage of threats 43
(Continued)
TABLE 2.1 Cont.
Lou- Source between- degree (%) Category Sentiment Louvain Source between- degree (%) Category Sentiment
vain ness (%) cluster ness (%)
cluster
2 Terrorism 2.64 3.01 Action Neg 5 Transaction 0 0.4 Action pos
2 Security 2.58 4.02 Situation Pos 5 Discussion 0 0.2 Action pos
2 Rockets 1.6 1.41 Resources Neg 5 Proposal 0 0.2 Action pos
2 Threat 0.8 2.61 Situation Neg 5 Progress 0 0.4 Action
2 Harm 0.16 1 Result Neg 5 Contacts 0 0.2 Action pos
2 Information 0.07 0.8 Resources 5 Promised 0 0.2 Action pos
2 Planes 0.04 0.6 Resources 5 Reconcilia- 0 0.2 Action pos
44 Hatzir, Segev, Watanabe, and Tago
tion
2 Targets 0 0.8 Action Neg 5 Uran.-enrich. 0 0.2 Action neg
2 Interests 0 0.8 Intentions 5 Confronta- 0 0.4 Action neg
tion
2 Fighting 0 0.4 Action Neg 5 Resistance 0 0.6 Action neg
2 Warned 0 0.4 Action Neg 5 Assistance 0 0.2 Action pos
2 Shooting 0 0.2 Action Neg 5 Appointment 0 0.4 Action pos
2 Damage 0 0.2 Action Neg 5 Uranium 0 0.6 resources neg
2 Battle 0 0.4 Action Neg 5 Bomb 0 0.2 resources neg
2 Reaction 0 0.4 Action Neg 5 Results 0 0.2 Result
2 Operation 0 0.4 Action Neg 6 Opposition 2.58 1 Position
2 Extreme 0 0.2 Position Neg 6 Elections 2.36 2.41 Action
3 Oil 4.01 2.01 Resources 6 lefts 1.52 0.8 Position Pos
Lou- Source between- degree (%) Category Sentiment Louvain Source between- degree (%) Category Sentiment
vain ness (%) cluster ness (%)
cluster
3 Prevent 1.12 1.41 Action Pos 6 Demonstra- 1.26 0.4 Action Neg
tions
3 Sanctions 1.08 2.41 Action Pos 6 Speech 0.16 0.6 Action
3 Convince 0.3 0.6 Action Pos 6 Support 0.11 0.8 Action
3 Price 0.03 0.6 Result Neg 6 Law 0.06 0.8 Action
3 Succeed 0.01 0.4 Result Pos 6 Division 0.04 0.4 Position Neg
3 Stop 0 0.2 Action Pos 6 Protest 0 0.2 Action Neg
3 Million 0 0.2 Resources 6 Protect 0 0.2 Action Pos
3 Dollar 0 0.2 Resources 6 Democracy 0 0.4 Result Pos
The news coverage of threats 45
46 Hatzir, Segev, Watanabe, and Tago
“reduction” of the oil “prices”. This cluster contains words that are mainly related to
the opportunities for Israel.
The words in Cluster 4 are all about seeking for a peaceful solution. As part of
the opportunity dimension, action-related words such as “negotiation” can poten-
tially increase the chances for peace. At the same time, peace in the Israeli context
is always discussed in relation to Palestine as well. Hence, as can be seen in Cluster
4, threat-related words such as the “danger” of escalation of this “conflict” are
linked with “building” in the “settlements” and “occupation”. This point of view
is specific for Haaretz, a left-wing newspaper, and is completely missing in the
peace-related word cluster of Yedioth Ahronoth.
The words in Cluster 5 further deal with the “progress” of “uranium enrich-
ment” and the development of a “nuclear bomb”. Naturally, most of these words
are classified as threat-related actions and resources in the context of Israeli cover-
age. Finally, words in Cluster 6 evolve around “opposition” and “election”. Action
words such as “demonstrations” and “protests” reflect the disagreement of the Ira-
nian public with their government and the strive to achieve “democracy”. As this
cluster deals with an ideological and political conflict, it contains both threat- and
opportunity-related words in the eyes of Israeli readers.
In general, it seems that the seven theoretical functions in the conflict (actors,
resources, situation, position, intentions and interests, actions, and results) are spread
among the thematic clusters. Still, there are certain functions that dominate some
of the themes. Thus, for example, Cluster 2 that focuses on missile attacks and
Cluster 4 that focuses on negotiations and peace talks display significantly more
action-related words. A chi-square test confirms the significant correlation between
the word clusters and their functions, χ2(86) = 57.15, p = .002 in Haaretz, and χ2
(81) = 45.35, p = .036 in Yedioth Ahronoth.
Based on the theme—development of nuclear weapons, international con-
flicts, economic sanctions, or peace negotiations—the tone of the words tends
to be more threat- or opportunity-related from the Israeli point of view.
Naturally, there are more threat-related words when it comes to the coverage
and framing of Iran in the Israeli media. Still, certain clusters (such Cluster 4
dealing with peace talks) contain more opportunity-related words, while
others (such as Cluster 2 dealing with missile attacks) contain more threat-
related words. Here too, we found a significant correlation between the word
clusters and their tone, χ2(86) = 29.89, p = .001 in Haaretz, and χ2(81) =
40.67, p < .001 in Yedioth Ahronoth. The relatively high and significant cor-
relation between the tone of words and their network clusters in the latter
confirms that Yedioth Ahronoth tends to display more polarized views. Hence,
as can be seen in Figure 2.4, the clusters dealing with missile attacks and
nuclear developments in Yedioth Ahronoth contain predominantly threat-related
words, while the cluster dealing with peace talks contains mostly opportunity-
related words.
The news coverage of threats 47
Discussion
In this chapter, we demonstrated the use of semantic network analysis to outline
the threat and opportunities discourse in two leading Israeli newspapers covering
the nuclear developments in Iran over one decade. Our findings reveal similarities
in representing the main narrative told by the leftist newspaper, Haaretz, and the
more centrist newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth. At the same time, the analysis enables us
to identify several differences between the newspapers, as will be detailed below.
One of the remarkable similarities between the two outlets is that both emphasized
the fear of war between Israel and Iran. In both networks the word “war” was at the
center of the discussion with a very high betweenness. Moreover, the main frames
surrounding the fear of war were very much similar across the newspapers. Both fol-
lowed closely the development of nuclear weapons in Iran, on the one hand, and the
importance of ensuring the security of Israel, on the other. They both described the
negotiations and economic sanctions on Iran as important measures to prevent Iran
from developing nuclear weapons and promoting greater stability in the region.
Finally, the two outlets focused on missile attacks on the border of Israel by Hezbollah
as one of the actual manifestations of the Iranian threat, and described the election of
extremist politicians in Iran as a crucial factor in the escalation of the crisis.
Following the literature, the main reason for the overall agreement between the
two outlets is related to the fact that both rely heavily on official governmental and
military sources. In line with previous studies (Bennett, 1990; Farnsworth et al.,
2010; Livio & Cohen-Yechezkely, 2019; Merom, 2017), the existential threat that
is emphasized by many politicians and their skeptical views on any international
attempt to negotiate with Iran, is reflected in the media. The networks of actors in
both Haaretz and Yedioth Ahronoth support this claim as they both frequently
mentioned official sources in Israel and the US, and hardly any sources from the
opposite side of the conflict. Moreover, the clear distinction between Western
actors and Iranian allies demonstrates well the rhetoric of “us” against “them”,
which is typical to the coverage of international conflicts (Amin, 2019; Izadi &
Saghaye-Biria, 2007; Kadkhodaee & Ghasemi Tari, 2019; Khosravinik, 2015b;
Klein, 2009).
Apart from the reliance on similar sources, it has been already found that news
coverage tends to be supportive particularly when it comes to the question of
national threat (Lavie-Dinur et al., 2018; Randahl, 2018; Yarchi et al., 2015). Since
the course of events greatly depends on the Israeli government and its American
ally, national outlets often adopt the authorities’ point of view and uncritically
support their actions (Feinstein, 2016, 2018; Karniel et al., 2017; Yarchi et al.,
2015; Randahl, 2018).
Together with similarities, our semantic network analysis revealed several
differences between Haaretz and Yedioth Ahronoth. These differences can be
observed when looking at two main aspects: who is mentioned in the story and
how the problem is being addressed. First, in terms of who is being mentioned,
the leftist Haaretz features some Arab states and discusses the Palestinian issue in
48 Hatzir, Segev, Watanabe, and Tago
relation to the Iranian threat, whereas the more centrist Yedioth Ahronoth mentioned
the Arab world much less and completely ignored the Palestinian Authority. This
finding indicates, in accordance with previous studies (Lavie-Dinur et al., 2018), that
Haaretz offers a more complex international and national context to the story than
Yedioth Ahronoth.
Second, in terms of how the problem is addressed, Haaretz focuses on the
international pressure and diplomatic strategies to limit uranium enrichment.
Yedioth Ahronoth, on the other hand, emphasizes the right of Israel to defend itself,
and the importance of concrete actions such as sanctions on Iran to prevent nuclear
development and attacking targets across the border to protect Israel’s security.
These differences reflect the general approach of each newspaper. While the leftist
Haaretz attempts to take a “softer” and more balanced approach, the centrist
Yedioth Ahronoth displays “harder” views on the Iranian nuclear threat. This further
corroborates previous findings on the different styles of the leftist and the more
centrist outlets that emphasize the danger of terror attacks and the right of Israel to
secure its borders (Lavie-Dinur et al., 2018).
To conclude, semantic network analysis was found to be instrumental in identifying
the main narrative of Israeli newspapers covering the Iranian nuclear development—
the threat of war. It also helped to deal with large texts when mapping the main
themes in which Iran is mentioned, such as nuclear developments international
agreements and sanctions, international relations, and the economic interests and
political processes in Iran. Finally, it also revealed the more nuanced differences
between the two outlets, reflecting their different ideologies and political inclinations.
This chapter helps to demonstrate the potential of semantic network analysis, and we
hope it will encourage future studies to further develop and use this method when
exploring media discourse on international conflicts.
vs. energy), and finally, outcomes or results (e.g., failure vs. success). It is
crucial to go back and forth to the text and understand the context in
which words are mentioned. Many of these words were also related to
threats or opportunities from the Israeli point of view, allowing us to easily
interpret the network according to the theory of media framing during
crisis and threat.
3. Cleaning the network and making it readable is always about optimizing
and maintaining the balance between two extremes—a dense unreadable
network on the one hand, and a sparse simplistic and non-informative
network on the other. As a rule of thumb, it is desirable to achieve a net-
work of about 50 to 100 words that can be classified into between five to
ten distinctive clusters. This would often result in an informative and
interpretable network with meaningful frames and topics.
4. To sparsify the network, one can carefully delete the less frequent ties.
Additionally, when a word in the network appears at the absolute center
and is part of the issue being studied (in our case “Iran” or “Israel”),
deleting this word will often enable a researcher to observe the structure of
the network more clearly. Finally, it might sometimes be useful to create
separate networks for different word functions. Thus, in our case we created
one network for the actors involved in the story (i.e., countries, organizations,
and politicians), and another for the non-actors (i.e., actions, positions, and
intentions). This enabled us to more clearly see the relationships within words
that serve similar functions.
5. When looking for the most central words in each cluster, the measurement
of betweenness, perhaps more than degree centrality, is often instrumental
in semantic network analysis. It creates a clear distinction between central
and less central words, and once betweenness is visualized it helps
researchers to identify the main and most important context around which
other words are discussed in each cluster.
Acknowledgments
This research is part of Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI). We
would like to thank the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology (MEXT) in Japan for the generous support. Many thanks also to
Regula Miesch, Alon Hatzir, and Lika Hatzir, who proofread and commented on
earlier drafts of this chapter.
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3
PROVOCATION NARRATIVES IN
CHINESE AND US NEWSPAPERS
Yuan Zhou, Sandrine Boudana and Elad Segev
Introduction
Research shows that news media tend to align their coverage of foreign affairs with
their national government’s positions. This means adopting frames that resonate
with the official geopolitical vision and, in case of armed conflicts, attributing
responsibility for the violence accordingly.
As Boudana and Segev (2017a) have demonstrated, provocation narratives
represent one way in which news practitioners may shift blame to the victims
whenever the identity of perpetrators of violent deeds does not match acceptable
storylines. Their examination of news articles containing the word “provocation”
in Western newspapers revealed that North Korea is the most frequently cited
country in those articles and is mostly framed as a provoking country, whereas the
noticeable absence of provoked countries in many of these articles can be inter-
preted as imposing a universal, rather than partisan, perspective. North Korea is
implicitly designated not as the adversary of South Korea and the US, but as the
enemy of all Western countries, if not the whole world.
The story told by Western media about the threat that North Korea poses to the
stability of the region and the entire world is certainly one-sided. As expected as it
may be for the failure of news media in countries supporting North Korea to
provide impartial accounts on the conflict. But how does the reversal of the roles
of victims and perpetrators operate in those supporting countries? Can we observe
symmetrically opposite narratives of provocation from the news media in countries
that support and oppose North Korea? In this chapter, we complete and update the
analyses of the use of provocation narratives in US news coverage of North Korea,
and compare it with the story told by the Chinese press. Given the growing ten-
sion between the US and China, we would expect that the Chinese media would
frame the Korean conflict differently. We conclude on the implications of our
DOI: 10.4324/9781003120100-4
54 Y. Zhou, S. Boudana, and E. Segev
study for the research on foreign news, news frames, press-state relations, and for
the notion and limitations of press freedom.
instance, Iyengar (1990) argues that when frames about poverty focus on indivi-
duals, responsibility for poverty is attributed to specific actors (the poor people),
rather than seen as a social issue calling for policy change.
In the coverage of foreign conflicts, attribution of responsibility is more akin to
this sort of blame game. Indeed, foreign actors involved in a conflict and their
supporters among national elites are mobilized to push narratives that shift the
responsibility for causing or fueling the conflict to the other side (Boudana, 2010).
Such pressure accentuates the trends toward polarization, oversimplification, and
“emotionalization” in news reports (Peters, 2011). Finally, journalists may more
easily propose unsophisticated polarized narratives on foreign conflicts because their
audiences, and sometimes themselves, lack knowledge about these conflicts, their
historical background, and geopolitical implications (Welch, 1972; Paletz &
Entman, 1981). Therefore, foreign conflicts are often framed in terms of blaming
the “bad guys” (Campbell, 1972; Barkin, 1984; Boudana, 2015; Segev, 2016), a
role often cast in accordance with the national government’s position.
Finally, recent evolutions of the diplomatic relations between North Korea and
the Chinese and American governments may account for less clear-cut reporting.
In particular, scholars (Zhan, 2016; Zhang & Zinoviev, 2018) have pointed out
that China’s support for North Korea has waned in the past years. Under interna-
tional pressure, China significantly reduced its exports of food, fuel, and oil
between 2012 and 2015, and has taken more drastic measures since 2017, including
embargos on the import of some basic goods. Those measures have not deterred
North Korea from carrying out more missile tests. Meanwhile, the relations
between North Korea and the US have warmed up, culminating in the historic
encounter between the two countries’ leaders in June 2019. Boudana and Segev’s
(2017a) study of US news was based on a sample of items collected between 2013
and 2016. The news coverage between 2016 and 2019 presented in this chapter
may be more nuanced.
The three factors mentioned—the question of geographic proximity, China’s
complex geopolitical game, and the recent changes in the diplomatic relations
between the actors involved in the conflict—could explain the possible differences
between the American and Chinese news coverage. However, since we are only
interested in news items containing the word “provocation”, it is likely that such
items use more polarized narratives than other news stories. Therefore, we can still
hypothesize that provocation narratives found in the US and Chinese newspapers
will present a reverse polarization: in US newspapers, North Korea will be the
provoking country, South Korea the provoked countries, and the US the accusing
entity; whereas, in Chinese newspapers, North Korea will be the provoked coun-
try and South Korea the provoking country, with China playing the role of the
accusing entity.
The comparison between Chinese and US newspapers will also be instructive
regarding the journalism cultures in those countries. In American newspapers, jour-
nalists rarely take the role of the accusing party. This is not so much because of an
actual critical distance from the provocation frame (since most concur and put North
Korea in the role of the accused, in line with their national government), as because
the standard of objectivity requires the conventions of detachment and neutrality to
be respected. Thus, if and when Chinese journalists endorse their government’s
positions, we expect this to be done in a more straightforward manner.
Methods
Sample
We collected all articles that mentioned the word “provocation” in English from
two American newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, and all
articles that mentioned the word “挑衅” in Chinese from two Chinese news-
papers, People’s Daily and Global Times, over a period of three years between
November 2016 and October 2019.2 We chose those four newspapers because of
their popularity and representativeness in their respective countries.
58 Y. Zhou, S. Boudana, and E. Segev
The New York Times and the Washington Post are among the most influential
elite newspapers in the US. The more liberal views of the New York Times and the
more conservative leaning of the Washington Post may be reflected in different
depictions of the actors in reporting on the Korean conflict. In China, People’s
Daily is one of the most authoritative official media. It is published and directly
controlled by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and its
coverage of political topics is considered to reflect the views of Chinese leadership
(Wu, 1994). Global Times is a daily tabloid, which is famous for its nationalistic
perspective and pro-government tone. The Chinese government has enacted a
series of laws and regulations that prohibit non-official media and foreign media
from producing political news in China.3 Global Times is one of the few commer-
cial media that are allowed by the government to introduce news content from
foreign media to the Chinese domestic audience. It selectively translates and adds
comments to news from mainstream media of other countries (most are negative
news about foreign countries, and some are international praise of China). Com-
pared with People’s Daily, the language of Global Times is more straightforward and
radical. It has considerable influence on Chinese public opinion.
We focus on the period of November 2016 to October 2019, which, as we
pointed out, has been marked by significant geopolitical changes in the Korean
conflict. The semantic network analysis included two main stages. The first stage
consisted of mapping and comparing the countries related to provocation narratives
as presented in US and Chinese news. For this purpose, we constructed networks
of country names mentioned together in the same news item. To detect the
countries mentioned in provocation news, we created a dictionary composed of
the names of the 193 UN member countries both in English and Chinese.4 For
each country name, we calculated the number of articles containing that name in
each newspaper.
The second stage consisted of comparing the provocation narratives based on the
frequent words appearing together in the same sentence. We followed the procedure
discussed in earlier chapters, including identifying the frequent words in English and
Chinese news, removing stop-words and words that did not relate to the provoca-
tion narratives, identifying the central words and prevalent combinations of words,
and finally analyzing the clusters of words that appeared more frequently in each
network. Once we identified the clusters in the network, we tried to better under-
stand the connections between the words by looking at the contexts of their use in
randomly selected articles.
Results
the banner of nationalism and frequently uses sensational rhetoric like provocation
as part of its competition strategy in the Chinese media market (Lu, 2013).
Table 3.1 shows the top ten countries mentioned in relation to provocation in
each newspaper. It appears that in all four newspapers provocation stories are
primarily related to the US, China, Russia, Japan, North Korea, and South
Korea. For each of these top mentioned countries we further investigated the
ratio between the number of news articles that mentioned them together with
the word “provocation” and the total number of articles mentioning them
(Figure 3.2).
As can be seen, North Korea has the highest ratio in both the US and China,
indicating that when North Korea is mentioned it is more likely to be mentioned
in the context of provocation than any other country. In general the figures are
much higher in Chinese than in US newspapers. One possible reason is that we
only retrieved articles containing the word “provocation” from US newspapers,
while the Chinese equivalent “挑衅” can be both noun (provocation) and verb
(provoke). If we added articles containing “provoke” and its variations, the per-
centage in US newspapers would increase, but the context of articles would
become less relevant (as the word “provoke” in English can appear in various
contexts, for example, “provoke a discussion”). Another reason is that Global Times
is notorious for its nationalist narratives and thus has a greater tendency to use
sensationalistic frames, including provocations (see Table 3.1).
60 Y. Zhou, S. Boudana, and E. Segev
All news New York Times Washington Post Global Times People’s Daily
Country % Country % Country % Country % Country %
US 74.8 US 60.6 US 81.4 US 81.9 China 79.7
China 54.6 China 24.2 Russia 37.1 China 72.8 US 65.0
Russia 30.3 Russia 23.1 North 27.4 Japan 36.6 Russia 23.1
Korea
Japan 28.8 France 19.6 China 26.6 Russia 33.3 Japan 21.0
North 26.5 Japan 18.9 South 22.8 North 33.2 Germany 18.9
Korea Korea Korea
South 23.6 North 17.6 Japan 20.3 UK 31.5 UK 15.4
Korea Korea
UK 20.2 Syria 13.4 Syria 13.5 South 30.9 South 11.2
Korea Korea
Germany 17.4 Iran 13.0 Iran 12.7 Germany 21.1 France 11.2
France 14.3 South 12.8 Israel 11.8 France 13.0 Iran 10.5
Korea
India 10.7 Germany 12.7 Iraq 11.0 Australia 11.7 Syria 9.1
N 2006 545 237 1081 143
FIGURE 3.2 The ratio of provocation related news per country in Chinese and US
media.
Provocation narratives 61
In short, it seems that while the US news portrays distinctively regional conflicts
and attempts to give each one a stage, Chinese news focuses predominantly on
China and its relationships or tensions with the US and Russia, occasionally giving
a broader overview of its international rather than regional impact.
The next step is to look more closely at the frames related to the provocation
narratives in the US and China. For this purpose, we conducted a semantic net-
work analysis. The English corpus contained 1,075,289 words, while the Chinese
corpus contained 788,263 words. First, we identified the top 100 frequent words
related to provocation narratives. We omitted stop-words (such as “can” and
“just”) and words with multiple meanings (such as “time” and “part”). The pre-
processing of Chinese text is mostly the same as in English. One major difference
was the need to conduct word segmentation (tokenization) since there are no
spaces between words in Chinese. We used both the quanteda package (Benoit et
al., 2018) and the jiebaR package (Qin & Wu, 2019) to tokenize the Chinese text,
and the jiebaR package produced better segmentation based on our qualitative
validation. Then, for each corpus, we obtained a matrix of frequent words co-
occurring in the same sentence. Figure 3.5 presents the semantic network of the
US corpus.
As can be seen in Figure 3.5, there are five clusters representing five different
themes related to provocation narratives. The largest cluster is around the word
“trump” (on the right), referring to the US President, who has attracted intense media
attention due to his unusual speech style interpreted as provocative. Words in this
cluster include “speech”, “policy”, “Twitter”, “election”, and “campaign”, referring
to his major communication channels and activities. In the middle, there is a second
cluster centered around the US, with words such as “officials”, “White House” as well
as “Russia” and “Iran”. If the previous cluster represented the personal aspect of the
US President, this cluster represents the national aspect and the international tensions
between the US and Russia and Iran. The third and relatively large cluster is related to
the most important provocation story in American media of the North Korean nuclear
plan. It includes words such as “military”, “force”, “weapon”, “nuclear”, “missile”,
and “security”. Two smaller clusters dealt with more specific themes. One semantic
cluster emerged around “black” and “people” (at the bottom), representing national
and international protests and campaigns for race equality. Another cluster of words
appeared around the notion of “art” with the words: “museum”, “artist”, and “exhi-
bition” (on the left), representing a very different type of provocation narratives.
Figure 3.6 portrays the semantic network of provocation narratives in China.
Unlike the American news that includes a mixture of personal, national, and
international stories from the political and cultural spheres, provocation narratives
in China evolve solely around international news. It clearly presents the centrality
of three countries: China, the US, and North Korea. Interestingly, the very strong
dyads US–China and US–North Korea suggest that the US rather than China is
represented as the most central country in Chinese provocation narratives. This is
because, in the narratives of Chinese media, the US is usually depicted as a perpe-
trator taking provocative actions all over the world. The cluster of words sur-
rounding China (on the right) includes relatively positive words such as
“important”, “constructive”, “power”, “peace”, “diplomatic”, suggesting that
China portrayed as an important international player in maintaining stability in the
region. This power is mainly achieved through its trade relationships with the US
(the cluster on the left), containing the words “china-us”, “trading” as well as
“hope” and “support”. Like the other most mentioned words, “support” here
refers to the promotion of peace in the region, rather than partisan support that
would polarize the narrative.
The North Korean threat is indeed an important part of the narrative. Here it
seems that China partially adapted the Western narrative as the words surrounding
North Korea include “threat”, “attack”, “sanctions”, and “provocative”. However,
looking at the context in which these words appear in the text, it seems that
Chinese media tell the story from a different perspective. For instance, an article
reporting the US–South Korea military exercises cites the North Korean news-
paper Rodong Sinmun that “the US and South Korean war hawks must be mindful
that the more you provoke, the guiltier you are. The disastrous gunpowder of
revenge will be packed, and the devastating moment will be approaching”. Also, it
quotes the words of the vice-chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on
Defense that “the US–South Korea military exercises near the border of North
Korea is totally a provocative action” (Yanxi, 2017, author’s translation). But
unlike the dichotomous Western narrative, which presents sanctions as the only
way to control the nuclear engagement of North Korea, the Chinese narrative also
includes softer diplomatic measures. A small cluster of words between China and
North Korea (at the top) includes words such as “cooperation”, “international”,
and “relationship”.
Two smaller clusters (at the bottom) refer to international regions in which China
has interests. One cluster contains words such as “interest”, “economic”, “strategic”,
and “development”. It suggests that rather than employing military coercion, China
tends to use economic statecraft to achieve its political and strategic goals. Another
cluster puts “Taiwan” at the center surrounded by words such as “solve”, “problem”,
“South China Sea”, and “cross-strait”. This cluster reflects China’s concern about the
threats to its territory and sovereignty. Specifically, Chinese media framed the foreign
interference in the South China Sea and Taiwan as provocative actions.
In short, the US provocation narratives are thematically diverse as they refer to
personal aspects (focusing on Trump), international relationships between the US
and other countries, in particular North Korea, clearly defined as provocative, and
finally more specific types of provocations around Black protests and the field of
arts. When it comes to the international scene, however, it is more univocal,
66 Y. Zhou, S. Boudana, and E. Segev
positioning North Korea as the provocative side of the story. In contrast, the pro-
vocation narratives in Chinese news focus predominantly on Chinese diplomatic
relations and offer a more balanced perspective. They emphasize China’s role as a
mediator to promote a peaceful solution between the US, a foreign provocateur, and
North Korea. Our semantic network analysis shows that Chinese news refers to the
Western narrative on the North Korean conflict but adds a critical perspective to it.
Discussion
Provocation narratives represent one strategy in which news practitioners frame the
“bad guys” (Segev, 2016) and assign blame. They can be used to shift responsibility for
violent events to the victims, especially when the identity of perpetrators of the deeds
does not match acceptable storylines. In their prior research, Boudana and Segev
(2017a) have demonstrated how North Korea was the most frequently cited country
in provocation narratives from the US mainstream news media, and how such narra-
tives introduced bias in news stories by dispensing the narrators from providing
explanations to North Korea’s actions: those actions were framed as pure provocations,
while the noticeable absence of provoked countries in many of these articles further
stigmatized North Korea as representing a threat to the whole world.
This study aimed to update those findings and extend the analysis to a
comparison with the Chinese news media, asking whether the latter would
propose symmetrically opposite narratives of provocation as the Chinese gov-
ernment is, historically, a supporter of North Korea. It was therefore expected
that the Chinese media would focus on the US military presence in the Korean
peninsula as a provocation on North Korea, and would emphasize the US
responsibility in the escalation of the conflict and the tension.
Findings on provocation narratives in our sample of US newspapers, articles
published during 2016–2019, are very similar to the conclusions drawn from
Boudana and Segev’s (2017a) research on years 2013–2016. They corroborate
other studies on elite American newspapers displaying an anti-North Korea frame
in their news coverage (Choi, 2010; Kim, 2014; Seo & Nah, 2020) in line with US
government official views. Thus, the warming up of the relationships between the
US and North Korean leaders since mid-2019 had not (yet) been translated into
the news coverage, at least as far as provocation narratives are concerned. Nor did
we find significant differences between the New York Times and the Washington
Post, the more liberal and more conservative US newspapers, respectively.
Noteworthy differences were found between the US and Chinese provocation
news stories. First, while US newspapers referred to provocations in a broader
range of contexts, including arts, provocation narratives in Chinese newspapers
dealt almost exclusively with international relations. They were also more cen-
tered on China as a key actor in diplomatic relations, challenging the US role.
However, despite such privileged attention given to their own country, the
Chinese newspapers showed more nuances in casting roles of provoking and
provoked countries.
Provocation narratives 67
They adopted, to some extent, the US rhetoric, and the stories were very much
focused on North Korea as the main provocateur. Yet the assignment of responsi-
bility for the provocative acts, and potential reactions to them, shifted. While in
American news the responsibility is clearly assigned to North Korea, in Chinese news
the responsibility is ultimately attributed to the US, depicted as the stronger power,
in a position to react in a more responsible way to resolve the tension. Chinese
newspapers thus emphasized the competition between the US and China for the role
of mediator in the conflict.
Differences were also apparent between the two Chinese newspapers included in
our sample. The Global Times proved to be more straightforward and radical than
the People’s Daily. The nationalistic positioning of the Global Times may be an
important explanatory factor, but so could be the commercial strategy of the
newspaper, which involves more sensationalism in the tone, writing style, and
types of facts reported.
Thus, contrary to our expectations, we did not find provocation narratives to be
symmetrically opposed in the US and Chinese newspapers. Provocation narratives
in Chinese newspapers were not as Manichean as in the US press. Changes in
recent years in the diplomatic relations between the actors involved in the conflict
and China’s complex geopolitical game are important factors to consider. It is also
likely that proximity, and first geographic proximity, between China and North
Korea, played a key role in this nuanced coverage. This is in line with Segev’s
(2016) emphasis on the importance of geographic, political, and economic proxi-
mity in reporting on foreign countries. In the particular case of North Korea, Seo
and Nah (2020) have also pointed out the importance of proximity, notably
expressed by the fact that North Korea has granted Chinese reporters direct access
to the field, access that has been denied to Western journalists.
Certainly, the results of our comparative analysis are surprising if we consider
that the US press entertains more freedom than Chinese newspapers and thus had
more leeway to propose nuances and diversity in their assignment of praise and
blame to the different actors of the conflict and to deviate from the government’s
official line. Yet it appears that geopolitical complexities and (geographic) proxi-
mity between the reported and reporting countries may have played a more
important role than press freedom in the capacity of news media to offer a nuanced
representation of an international conflict.
Notes
1 Entman (2003) proposes a “cascading activation model”, meant to “supplement(s)
research using the hegemony or indexing approaches”: The model explains how interpretive
frames activate and spread from the top level of a stratified system (the White House) to the network
of non-administration elites, and on to news organizations, their texts, and the public—and how
interpretations feed back from lower to higher levels (p. 415).
2 Articles of the New York Times and Washington Post were downloaded from the Lexis Advance
database, and articles of People’s Daily and Global Times from the WiseNews database.
3 For example, the Provisions for the Administration of Internet News Information Ser-
vices (2017) and the Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (2004).
4 We use regular expressions to reduce ambiguity when matching country names. For
example, Haiti (海地) can match coastal area (沿海地区/沿海地带) in Chinses, so we use
“海地(?![带区])” to exclude the mismatch. Another example in English is that “Congo”
can match both Congo and Democratic Republic of Congo. In this case, we use “(?<!
Democratic Republic of)Congo” to match the former, and “Democratic Republic of
Congo” to match the latter.
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4
CABLE NEWS CHANNELS’ PARTISAN
IDEOLOGY AND MARKET SHARE
GROWTH AS PREDICTORS OF SOCIAL
DISTANCING SENTIMENT DURING
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
James A. Danowski, Bei Yan and Ken Riopelle
DOI: 10.4324/9781003120100-5
Partisan ideology and market share growth 73
FIGURE 4.1 “Partisan Press” mentions in Google books since the 1800s.
Imagine the leper’s distress in being forcefully excluded from the social net-
work with no hope of return, a separation more extreme than experienced
during the recent governmental campaigns, premised on a much shorter time
horizon until returning to normal. Nevertheless, the adverse effects attributed to
social distancing during the pandemic are significant: increased mental health
problems, substance abuse (Panchal et al., 2020), suicide (Thakur & Jain, 2020),
and domestic violence (Campbell, 2020). Moreover, participation in violent
protests during the pandemic may have increased due to social distancing. These
negative effects linked to social distancing offer unique evidence of the social
network’s importance in maintaining normative behavior. When the network is
suppressed, negative consequences soon arise.
The social network’s central role makes it difficult to promote social distan-
cing, even on a short-term basis, so information campaigns require highly per-
suasive messages with many repetitions. The initial warrants in the argument
were that social distancing would protect vulnerable elderly, a more collective
intergenerational appeal. Not until later in the campaign did the rationale shift
toward more individualistic protection of the self, as masks were advocated for
the general public in addition to the medical providers, not only as a means of
protecting others. Once the arguments reached this level, perhaps the altruistic
motive dissipated, as individuals weighed their risks against the somatic limita-
tions of mask-wearing and loss of personal freedom and practiced social dis-
tancing less.
These social distancing information campaign messages are filtered through par-
tisan media biases. When the coronavirus campaign launched, daily press briefings
from the White House were covered by the three cable channels, but by April 1,
2020, CNN and MSNBC ceased broadcasting the briefings (Wemple, 2020), while
Fox News continued coverage until the daily briefings ended on April 26. More-
over, as the media reported on compliance, this likely reinforced the respective
attitudes and behaviors regarding social distancing.
The embracing of social distancing by the liberal press but not the conservative
press may be due to the media channels attention to the base reaction of mem-
bers of the public based on their partisan preferences, where conservatives more
likely see social distancing as limiting personal freedom, while liberals would see
more of the positive collective benefits of social distancing. A more contemporary
current influencing media sentiment may be the fact that President Donald
Trump was portrayed as somewhat negative toward social distancing as the
COVID-19 campaign progressed and more concerned with the economic
implications of the pandemic, while presidential candidate Joe Biden was more
positive toward social distancing. In this immediate partisan election climate, the
cable channels were aligned in apparent support of one candidate over the other.
The fact that the same liberal/conservative stances toward social distancing were
reported in other countries would reduce the likelihood that the social distancing
sentiment was primarily based on election sentiment that media expressed during
the period.
76 J. A. Danowski, B. Yan, and K. Riopelle
The partisan profile of cable news channels suggests the hypothesis that Fox
News would be more negative toward social distancing, while MSNBC and CNN
more positive. An alternative hypothesis is that market share growth predicts social
distancing sentiment better than ideology, which suggests that CNN, with the
largest increase in market share, should have the most sentiment expressed, fol-
lowed by Fox News, and MSNBC.
Methods
Lexicon-based measures
The most simple and common approach for sentiment analysis is using a predefined
lexicon or dictionary containing sentiment words, affective orientations, and some-
times the strength of its orientation. Following the bag-of-words approach, lexicon-
based approaches first break down a body of text into independent words. Then it
counts the frequency of sentiment words (which are defined by the lexicon used)
that appear in the text and computes a sentiment score of the text, usually in the
form of a percentage based on the word count.
Commonly used sentiment lexicons include Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC) (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010), SentiWordNet (Baccianella et al., 2010),
and the Bing lexicon. Whereas some lexicons, such as Bing, contain words in
binary categories, others, like SentiWordNet, provide a ratio indicating the words’
orientation’s strength. Lexicon-based sentiment analysis is an unsupervised method
that is easy to apply and not domain-dependent. It can be highly accurate if used
appropriately (Kundi et al., 2014; Asghar et al., 2014; Khoo & Johnkhan, 2018).
However, a limitation of lexicon-based measures based on the bag-of-word
approach is that it focuses only on the frequency of single, tokenized words. It
omits the words’ contexts based on their co-occurrences in the texts that are critical
to sense-making. In other words, you get one score for an entire text regardless of
the number of persons, organizations, or brands mentioned.
short reviews or tweets so that there are more words to serve as textual features for
classification (Khoo & Johnkhan, 2018). Machine learning classification using a
bag-of-words approach also shares the same limitation with the lexicon-based
approach. It only uses independent words and ignores the contexts in which the
words are embedded.
first step of aspect-based sentiment analysis involves parsing texts into different
linguistic components through automated algorithms such as topic modeling
(Thet et al., 2010). After the texts are broken down, researchers can then
choose to apply the sentiment analysis discussed above to measure the aspect-
specific sentiments. Aspect-based sentiment analysis thus provides more detailed
and accurate information regarding the sentiment in texts, which can be parti-
cularly useful when one needs to understand opinions about specific features.
In summary, existing sentiment analysis methods commonly apply the bag-of-
word approach, breaking texts down to independent words without considering
word contexts. The more recently proposed word embeddings approach is
gaining traction, but machine learning using the method requires a large
amount of data. Using pre-trained word embeddings makes judgments based on
previously collected data rather than the texts being analyzed. Therefore, it risks
missing critical information in the local word context. The semantic network-
based approach to sentiment analysis proposed in the current study comple-
ments the above methods. It overcomes the limitations of the bag-of-words
model by gauging the contexts of words in texts based on word sequence and
co-occurrence. It has an advantage over machine learning approaches as it does
not need a large amount of data and measures sentiments based on the local
information in a given text.
Moreover, the semantic network approach allows fine-grained sentiment analysis
at the aspect or feature level like aspect-based sentiment analysis. Instead of relying
on unsupervised learning algorithms such as topic modeling to identify features in a
text, this approach enables researchers to name the target word or phrase of interest
(person, organization, event, or brand, e.g., iPhone). It generates a score indicating
sentiment toward this specific target. Thus, the sentiment network method can
generate sentiment scores for multiple targets of interest in the same text, enabling
a comparison of the results.
The sentiment network approach measures target-specific sentiment based on
the shortest paths between the semantic network’s target and sentiment words.
The method has three significant advantages over bag-of-words classification
approaches: 1) the network method measures sentiment concerning targets,
which is possible because the basic unit of analysis is the word pair in a sentence,
not a document; 2) the more micro-level word pairs are links in a chain, forming
shortest paths that extend across text units, enabling tracing the closeness of sen-
timent words to a target word or phrase; and 3) the sentiment network approach
can compare multiple targets in the same corpus, which expands the scope of
testable hypotheses.
The software we used to measure sentiment in this fashion, SENET, is described
in greater detail in Appendix B (see eResources), including the code in R. It covers
greater detail on the computational aspects of the current study for those who may
wish to explore the tools further: 1) data acquisition from GDELT, 2) semantic
network analysis using WORDij, 3) group detection and graphing in NodeXL,3
and 4) sentiment network analysis with SENET.
80 J. A. Danowski, B. Yan, and K. Riopelle
Data
Data for this study included 150-character snippets of news content containing the
term social distancing from television transcripts from Fox News, MSNBC, and
CNN from January through September 2020, produced by GDELT (https://
gdeltproject.org). Here are examples of snippets:
TABLE 4.1 Market share and growth for Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN
it, cumulating the counts. With this network, we then use a lexicon of positive and
negative words developed through the compilation of the lexicons of others and
measure the distance to and from each sentiment word to the target word or phrase, in
this case “social distancing”, by tracing the shortest paths linking them. Then we
inverted these values, squared them, and multiplied them by the co-occurrence fre-
quencies along the path. Appendix B (see eResources) describes this in more detail,
including the R code to compute the sentiment scores.
Results
Figure 4.2 shows the volume of coverage of social distancing. Data for January and
February 2020 do not appear because there were fewer than five references. On
March 16, the federal government introduced the first campaign, 15 Days to Slow
the Spread. The mentions of social distancing increased to a peak in April 2020,
followed by a decline toward June 2020. Figure 4.2 further shows that the same
pattern occurs for negative and positive sentiment. CNN has the most negative and
positive sentiment expressed. Comparing the curves for the frequency of coverage
and sentiment suggests an association between the frequency of coverage and sen-
timent, which are consistent with findings of earlier research (Danowski & Rio-
pelle, 2019) that sentiment produces an increase in the volume of coverage. As
well, there appears to be a relationship between positive and negative sentiment. As
one increases so does the other, although the differences between them over time
show considerable variability in this association, particularly as seen for April and
August. Although the coverage of Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN are parallel for
FIGURE 4.2 Social distancing frequencies and sentiment for Fox News, MSNBC, and
CNN.
82 J. A. Danowski, B. Yan, and K. Riopelle
most of the duration. In August there is a deviation where CNN has higher sen-
timent than Fox News and MSNBC, both of which decline, while CNN increases
its expression, particularly of positive sentiment.
The key analysis tests the ideology vs. the market share hypothesis for the overall
expression of sentiment (both positive and negative). Figure 4.3 has the y-axis
normalized for the two variables. It shows evidence for a linear relationship
between market share growth and the amount of sentiment expressed (right), while
for ideology and total market share (left), this is not the case. The lines cross. This
supports the market share growth hypothesis over that of ideology.
The finding that August had the greatest deviation among the cable news channels
motivated our analysis of the word co-occurrences for the outlets. Because MSNBC
did not have coverage above the lower frequency threshold of three co-occurrences,
its network is null, and the comparison is between CNN and Fox News. The bigram
“social distancing” was converted to the unigram “socialdistancing” to create a
semantic target to represent the concept; otherwise, targeting social or distancing
would introduce much measurement error. We examined the data to see the differ-
ences in word pair co-occurrences, shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. The differences
found motivated an analysis of the overall semantic networks for the two channels.
CNN’s co-occurrence frequencies were 5.9 times higher than Fox News’s,
which produced a difficult to comprehend hairball network graphic, so to sparsify
FIGURE 4.3 Ideology, market share, and market share growth vs. social distancing
sentiment.
Partisan ideology and market share growth 83
TABLE 4.3 Higher August word pair frequencies for Fox News
(Continued)
84 J. A. Danowski, B. Yan, and K. Riopelle
Note. The headings in this table are as follows: FRQ is the word co-occurrence frequency, % is the
proportion based on the total number of words for CNN and Fox News, respectively. Only values of p
< .001 are displayed.
the network we set the lower frequency threshold at 10. The size of nodes in the
graphs is based on betweenness centrality (Brandes, 2001). Figure 4.4 shows the
networks of CNN and Fox News. The main substance of the two is seen in Tables
4.4 and 4.5, which show the top ten words in the top seven groups in each. Word
groups were identified using the Clauset-Newman-Moore community detection
algorithm (Clauset et al., 2004). This method identifies communities by finding the
node cluster that produces the largest increase in modularity, or the relative density
of edges within communities to those outside communities. There are other faster
clustering algorithms, such as the Louvain method (Blondel et al., 2008). The
reason we chose the Clauset-Newman-Moore algorithm is that it is available in
NodeXL, which we used to generate the networks.
The word groups in CNN’s August 2020 coverage, containing at least three
words, numbered 24. Table 4.4 lists the seven largest groups, including the top ten
most central words in each. Table 4.5 shows the word groups for Fox News. It had
only seven groups, and they occur at considerably lower frequencies. The order of
groups reflects their size. For comparison purposes, the top seven largest groups are
shown for CNN. Because our interest is not in mapping all the meanings for social
distancing on CNN, but only to contrast the main differences between CNN and
Fox News, we list the top seven largest groups for CNN, rather than all 24.
CNN’s largest word group is about people not wearing masks or social distancing,
while Fox News reinforces guidelines for it. So, while CNN is pointing out violations,
Fox News is promoting social distancing. In downplaying lack of compliance, Fox
News exhibits conservative ideology, yet at the same time encourages social
86 J. A. Danowski, B. Yan, and K. Riopelle
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
possible avoid people Reopening really health day
masks large risk States president dont visit
not gatherings putting Seeing event defying pay
enforced crowds taking new heads state daughter
no socialdistancing sick coronavirus mt officials kids
wearing mandatory trying cases trumps experts back
think steps attend today trump public school
wash practices thousands ways supporters system youre
mask making expected jersey rally care time
wear way gathered yorkers donald safety put
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
socialdistancing people practicing health good safe lot
follow close wearing guidelines extra engaging now
operation together not no sanitizing really inside
allowed coronavirus mask public checks common tech
protocols masks testing ignoring face measures campaigns
concern things wear pandemic coverings
cases think house lives
miss hand sound own
numbers required doesnt way
outbreak covid situation good
distancing, a stance considered more liberal. This is further evidence for the failure of
ideology to explain the coverage of social distancing. More consistent with the data is
marketing motives. By not expressing as much negative sentiment toward lack of
compliance, they avoided risking their audience loyalty for the bulk of its audience,
conservatives. Yet, by encouraging social distancing, they also appeal to more liberal
audience members. Fox did use the slogan “Fair and Balanced”, and during daytime
hours included opposing partisan commentators in panels. Thus, consistent with the
findings from the comparison of ideology vs. market share growth as predictors of
sentiment, here among the whole semantic networks, we found further evidence at
the level of the substantive content showing the failure of ideology to explain media
coverage of social distancing.
In CNN's August coverage, the first word group is about not wearing masks. The
second is about the need to avoid large gatherings. Group 3 is about the Southern
Partisan ideology and market share growth 87
California beach crowds, while Group 4 is about reopening and a surge in cases.
Group 5 is about Trump rallies, while Group 6 is about defying state public health
officials, and Group 7 is about schools.
The top word groups in August for Fox News appear in Table 4.5. Group 1 is
about social distancing protocols and numbers of cases, while Groups 2 and 3 are about
the need to wear masks, Group 4 is about the public ignoring health guidelines, Group
5 is about sanitizing and face coverings, Group 6 is about engaging in safe common
measures, while Group 7 is about tech campaigns.
Table 4.6 shows the top 20 negative and positive sentiment words that appeared in
CNN and Fox News’s coverage in August. The values range between 0 to 8, based on
the frequency weighted inverse square of the shortest paths linking with social distan-
cing, representing the closeness and strength of the target to the sentiment words.
CNN Fox
NEGATIVE POSITIVE NEGATIVE POSITIVE
problem 8.00 celebrate 8.00 no 7.00 good 6.00
difficult 7.00 effective 8.00 not 6.00 engaging 3.00
lose 6.00 working 7.00 concern 4.00 new 3.00
hard 5.00 ready 6.00 disgusting 4.00 safe 3.00
crowded 4.00 yeah 6.00 miss 3.25 thank 3.00
infections 4.00 absolutely 5.00 ignoring 3.00 young 3.00
issue 4.00 big 5.00 outbreak 3.00 open 2.00
nonexistent 4.00 enjoy 5.00 protests 3.00 significant 1.75
nothing 4.00 great 5.00 risk 3.00 recommenda- 1.50
tions
vice 4.00 proper 5.00 cry 2.56 safely 1.50
controversy 3.00 works 5.00 suspect 1.50 rose 1.00
ill 3.00 young 5.00 worried 1.44 safe 5.00
impossible 3.00 care 4.00 no 8.00 totally 3.25
infection 3.00 clear 4.00 refused 4.00 open 2.50
partisan 3.00 early 4.00 cry 3.75 new 2.25
risk 3.00 encour- 4.00 not 1.75 recommenda- 1.50
aged tions
seriously 3.00 hope 4.00 suspect 1.50 engaging 1.22
terrible 3.00 open 4.00 worried 1.22 significant 1.00
worst 3.00 significant 4.00 ignoring 1.00 young 1.00
dangerous 2.75 thank 4.00 disgusting 0.75 good 0.72
88 J. A. Danowski, B. Yan, and K. Riopelle
In summary, the results for August, in which the sentiment differences between
CNN and Fox News became greatest, were further explored with four methods,
comparing: 1) word pair’s relative frequencies, 2) the overall semantic networks for
the two news channels, 3) cluster analysis, and 4) sentiment analysis. The analysis
comparing significant differences in the two outlets’ word pair frequencies found
CNN emphasizing the lack of social distancing and Fox News attending more to the
health implications. CNN’s overall semantic network had about six times more co-
occurrence frequencies, producing a more developed network, with CNN having
24 groups, while Fox News had only seven. CNN focused more on the lack of
enforcement, while Fox News encouraged social distancing. In terms of negative
sentiment, CNN focused on the problems to enforce social distancing. On the
positive side, it was more exuberant in celebrating the benefits of social distancing.
Discussion
This study used semantic network analysis and sentiment analysis to compare the
discourse on social distancing in three television channels: CNN, Fox News, and
MSNBC. We offered two hypotheses to explain those differences: market share
growth and political ideology. Our findings indicate that market share growth is a
better predictor of social distancing sentiment than ideology. This evidence sup-
ports the theory that sentiment engages audiences and accounts for increased
viewership during the pandemic period studied. The market share dynamics are
consistent with the critical theory. The findings suggest that media partisanship may
be only a strategy for market segmentation and that ideology today is not more
than a brand.
The network-based sentiment model performed as expected in quantifying
positivity and negativity, enabling measurement of sentiment toward a particular
target, rather than the cruder bag-of-words model that measures sentiment at the
whole document level only. Previously shown to have internal and external
validity, the finer-grained network approach yielded more meaningful variation
and evidence, enabling testing the ideology vs. the market share growth hypothesis.
In addition to positivity and negativity scores, the procedures also identified the
positive and negative sentiment words that occurred and the shortest weighted
paths linking them. We mapped the full semantic networks underlying sentiment
and identified the significantly different elements.
The analysis shows how semantic network analysis can be used to test hypoth-
eses even when the number of cases is small, in this case, only three news channels.
Often case studies do not take advantage of the quantification and hypothesis-
testing that semantic network analysis affords. Here semantic and sentiment analyses
provide substantial evidence that blends two traditional approaches, qualitative and
quantitative. The multi-level and multi-method semantic analysis enables the gen-
eration of more knowledge per unit of research effort. The energy no longer spent
on manual coding can be directed to theory development.
Partisan ideology and market share growth 89
4. Choosing the time interval for the analysis requires some exploration of the
series. Plotting the frequencies of term occurrence of terms may reveal nat-
ural segments that are not chronological but based on the distributions over
time. For example, over a year, one may observe a surge and subside over
several months, followed by recurrent mini surges over the next year. Perhaps
each of these surges becomes the organic segments for analysis. Otherwise, if
calendar time is used to segment texts, the choice of monthly, weekly, or
daily intervals depends on each text’s distribution. If there is sufficient text
volume, one can choose a daily interval, but we do not recommend this as a
starting slice. We find that it is better to begin with the larger interval, for
example, monthly, and decide whether this provides adequate variation
across the intervals. Then, we may move to a smaller slice, such as weekly or
daily. The natural limits on human processing are that if one relies on visual
interpretation and presentation of results in figures and tables, most
researchers could deal with up to a dozen intervals before overload occurs.
Otherwise, statistically, the daily interval is preferred.
5. For sentiment analysis, the SENET software we developed is target-specific, in
which the user selects a single word for which positive and negative senti-
ment scoring is desired. If the term is not a natural unigram but a string of
words, one can edit the text file accordingly to recode the string as a uni-
gram, for example, changing “social distancing” to “socialdistancing”.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to George Barnett, Ke Jiang, and Aaron van Klyton for
reviewing the manuscript.
Notes
1 https://books.google.com/ngrams
2 This section is extracted from Danowski, Yan, and Riopelle (2020).
3 Smith et al. (2010), see also http://nodexl.codeplex.com from the Social Media
Research Foundation, http://www.smrfoundation.org
4 https://knightfoundation.org/reports/american-views-2020-trust-media-and-democracy/
5 https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
6 https://www.allsides.com/unbiased-balanced-news
7 https://variety.com/2020/tv/news/network-ratings-2020-top-channels-fox-news-cnn-
msnbc-cbs-1234866801/
8 https://blog.gdeltproject.org/now-live-updating-expanded-a-new-dataset-for-exploring-
the-coronavirus-narrative-on-television-news/
9 https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/professional/academic/nexis-uni.page
10 https://blog.gdeltproject.org/now-live-updating-expanded-a-new-dataset-for-exploring-
the-coronavirus-narrative-on-television-news/
Partisan ideology and market share growth 91
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5
POLITICIZING THE HOLOCAUST
A comparative analysis of Israeli and German
speeches
Introduction
The Holocaust plays a major role in the politics and national identity of Israel
and Germany (Meyers & Zandberg, 2002). While 76 years have passed since
the end of the Second World War, and 73 years after the foundation of the
state of Israel, the Holocaust is still a key event in Jewish, Israeli, and German
history. Unsurprisingly, the memory of the Holocaust is repeatedly raised in
various public discourses that extend beyond commemoration, such as in poli-
tical discourses.
The special role of political rhetoric in speeches given by heads of state within
political discourse is widely accepted among scholars. Speeches delivered in official
Holocaust commemoration ceremonies do not typically include deliberative state-
ments; however, and in line with Thomas Mann’s (2009) perception that “everything
is politics”, such speeches do not solely relate to Holocaust memory and com-
memoration. Political leaders utilize this opportunity to rhetorically construct and
maintain distinct social and political narratives. As such, Holocaust-related speeches
constitute valuable material for analysis, such as the current study, aimed to provide
insights into the main themes and narratives prevalent in contemporary Holocaust-
related discourse in Israel and Germany.
The assumption underlying this book chapter is that the Holocaust is one of the
enduring aspects of German and Israeli collective memory. As such, both societies
are motivated to maintain a link to the Holocaust despite changing circumstances
(Brug, 1998). While acknowledging that collective memories are socially con-
structed, historically situated, and continually shaped by agents of memory, such as
the state and the political elite, our goal is two-fold: First, we aim to unravel the
topics and map the narratives comprising Holocaust-related discourse as depicted
by Israeli and German political leadership (Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
DOI: 10.4324/9781003120100-6
Politicizing the Holocaust 95
and Chancellor Angela Merkel). Second, we seek to explore both discourses and
compare them to find how the Holocaust is instrumentalized in contemporary
political discourse.
Simply put, this study examines the way Israeli and German heads of state use
the stage given to them for Holocaust commemoration to rhetorically construct
and maintain non-Holocaust-related narratives such as national identity or defining
the standing of their countries in world politics. Ultimately, the research seeks to
uncover and compare the extent to which the Holocaust and the memory thereof
are instrumentalized for political purposes in both countries.
Scholarship concerning political discourse and rhetoric, politics of memory in
general, and Holocaust memory in particular form the theoretical basis of this
research. We employ semantic network analysis to identify and extract the main
themes from a corpus containing a set of political speeches.
allow politics to enter areas “that are not necessarily political in other societies”
(Horowitz & Lissak, 1990: 198–199).
Nili (2011: 39) argued that “the living influence of the Holocaust as a fixed
analogy in Israeli collective consciousness … has been pervasive throughout Israel’s
history”. Often derived from collective traumas, fixed analogies pertain to the
representation of new issues using the same memory that carries a certain psycho-
logical construct. In this way, collective traumas from the past continue to influ-
ence the present (Nytagodien & Neal, 2004), notwithstanding the role of political
actors and powerful social groups in sustaining this effect (Wood, 1999).
Through the first years of the state of Israel’s existence, the way Israeli society
conceived and remembered the Holocaust mirrored the tendency to view issues
through a political prism (Weitz, 1995). Official voices dominated Israel’s Holocaust-
related public discourse1 and utilized the Holocaust as a political and educational tool
(Weitz, 1993; Zertal, 1998). The dynamics of Holocaust commemoration in Israel’s
first decades echoed a conflict of cultures and ideologies, in what was referred to as a
“functional dynamic of memory” in the state of Israel (Baumel, 1995; Yerushalmi,
1982: 22). Throughout the 1950s, the Holocaust was one of the central sources of
political strife between the National Religious Party and other Israeli political groups
(Bar, 2005); the former sought to attach a religious interpretation to the events of the
Holocaust (Baumel, 1988) and the latter were interested in linking the Holocaust to
the establishment of the state of Israel (Stauber, 2000).
The Holocaust was incorporated into Israel’s fierce political debates concerning
the question of reparations payments from the German Federal Republic. In 1952,
Ben-Gurion’s agreement with West Germany for reparations for Jewish property,
confiscated by the Nazis, alongside personal reparations for Holocaust survivors,
caused an unprecedented public outcry in Israel. It was the first time in which the
tendency for the politicization of Holocaust memory was revealed (Shapira, 1998).
The reparations agreement was instrumentalized by those who opposed the ruling
Labor party. Originating from across the political spectrum, the opposition to the
agreement leveraged the memory of the Holocaust in their rhetoric. This issue
occupied Israeli media and public opinion for months (Shapira, 1998; Weitz, 1995).
Holocaust rhetoric appeared in Ben-Gurion and other Israeli leaders’ speeches even
prior to the founding of the state, e.g., Ben-Gurion’s speech at the Zionist World
Conference in London on August 2, 1945. The Holocaust was used as evidence to
prove the justice of the Zionist concept, galvanized American Jewry into a political
force that played a central role in the struggle for the Jewish state, and possibly swayed
members of the United Nations who voted in favor of Israel’s establishment (Shapira,
1998). As the need to end the homelessness of the Jewish people was the focus of the
political debate for the establishment of a Jewish state, the Holocaust constitutes one of
the sources of legitimacy for the state of Israel—both internally and externally (Shapira,
1998).2 Consequently, Israel has been widely acknowledged as the spiritual and prac-
tical heir to all Holocaust victims (Baumel, 1995).
The psychological presence of the Holocaust, ingrained in Israeli collective
memory, was not abandoned even despite military victories, diplomatic successes, and
Politicizing the Holocaust 97
peace agreements Israel signed with neighbors and former belligerents like
Egypt and Jordan. Such presence is typically illustrated in genuine fear of a
national catastrophe, genocidal threat perception, and the framing of external
threats in Holocaust-laden terms (Nili, 2011).3 Manifestations of the psycholo-
gical presence of the Holocaust can be found both within the Israeli public4
and the Israeli political leadership.
Holocaust-driven Israeli sense of threat and discourse is also evident in the
context of the Israeli Arab conflict. Prime Minister Begin justified the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon (1982) by comparing the Palestine Liberation Organization
to the Nazis and added that besieging Arafat in Beirut felt as though he were
going after “Hitler in his bunker” (Friedman, 1990). The second Intifada, a
period of heightened terrorism, was perceived by many in Israel as “a challenge
to the very fabric of its society” (Freilich, 2006: 636). Palestinian threats, which
cannot objectively be conceived as existential due to the disparity in military
capabilities, were nevertheless perceived and framed as such. Consequently, the
Holocaust played a significant role in explaining Israel’s position in the Arab-
Israeli/Palestinian conflict and contributed to the perception that threats against
Jews should not be underestimated (Shapira, 1998).
The Holocaust also stands at the heart of Israel’s security policy and heavily
affects its formation (Freilich, 2006). The psychological presence of the Holocaust,
and Nilli’s (2011) fixed Holocaust analogy also govern the discourse pertaining to
what Israel perceives as its greatest contemporary security threat—the Iranian
nuclear project and sponsorship of militant Muslim groups.
The official Israeli approach to the Iranian nuclear project is mainly derived from
Iran’s belligerent and potentially genocidal posture toward Israel. Fierce anti-Israeli,
anti-Zionist, and anti-Semitic5 rhetoric repeatedly voiced by Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad plays into the all too familiar narrative of enemies of the
Jews, be them Nazis, Palestinians, or Iranians, who seek the obliteration of the
Jewish state. Consequently, it is no wonder that the public discourse of the Iranian
nuclear project includes Holocaust-related rhetoric. Across the political spectrum,
Israeli leaders portrayed Iran as an existential threat and often referenced the
Holocaust in their condemnation of Ahmadinejad’s radical regime.
Yet, no Israeli leader has ever framed the Iranian nuclear threat in Holocaust terms
to the extent of Binyamin Netanyahu, who served for many years as Prime Minister.
On many occasions, Netanyahu drew parallels between Iran and Nazi Germany and
between Europe’s appeasement of Hitler and the Iranian nuclear agreement, formally
known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015). A partial list includes his
speech in the annual United Jewish Communities General Assembly,6 his 2009 speech
to the UN General Assembly, his speech on International Holocaust Remembrance
Day (2013) in front of the Israeli cabinet, and his remarks at the Saban Forum in 2017.
The many references made by Israeli political leadership to the Holocaust or to a
“Second Holocaust” as stated above, express the entrenchment of the collective sense
of existential threat, alongside the prevalence of the Holocaust in contemporary poli-
tical discourse.
98 M. Hadar, R. Miesch, and E. Segev
and a “normal” nation, Israel did so to constitute the newly formed Israeli society
(Zuckermann, 1999). Our goal in this chapter is to demonstrate the use of semantic
networks to highlight and compare those different narratives in the current political
discourse.
Methods
Semantic network analysis has been increasingly utilized in the study of political
discourse in general (Baden, 2010; Jung & Park, 2015), on social media (Breslin et
al., 2020; Eddington, 2018; Liu et al., 2018; Park et al., 2019), and when focusing
on political speeches and rhetorical presidency, often in a comparative analysis
(Chung & Park, 2010; Ghazal Aswad, 2019; Kuehl, 2012; Shim et al., 2015). In
the current study, Semantic network analysis is utilized in order to identify central
themes and underlying concepts governing the political discourse pertaining to the
Holocaust. It is a comparative study of speeches given within an identical time-
frame (2009–2020) by Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, and Merkel, the
German Chancellor.
Sample
We searched for Netanyahu’s speeches that mention the word “Holocaust”
between 2009 and 2020 on the Prime Minister’s Office website and the Gov-
ernment Services and Information website. Out of about 500 search results, we
manually selected 51 public speeches in which the Holocaust was mentioned and
discussed. Similarly, we searched for Merkel’s speeches that mentioned the terms
“Holocaust”, “Shoah”, and “Shoa” between 2010 and 2020 on the Chancellor’s
office website (https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles). We manu-
ally selected 31 relevant public speeches in which the Holocaust was mentioned
and discussed.
Procedure
We generated a list of the most frequent words that appeared more than 0.02%
(out of 57,159 words in Netanyahu’s speeches and 47,866 words in Merkel’s
speeches). We then inspected each word and cleaned the list from stop-words and
words that were too ambiguous or general. After cleaning the list we ended up
with a total of 147 words in Hebrew (from Netanyahu’s speeches), and 164 words
in German (from Merkel’s speeches). For each list we calculated the frequency
each pair of words appeared together in the same sentences and thus constructed
semantic networks. Finally, we used Visone (Brandes & Wagner, 2004) to calculate
the degree and betweenness centrality of words as well as to identify the clusters
(based on Louvain modularity, see also Blondel et al., 2008 and a more detailed
explanation of this procedure in Chapter 1).
102 M. Hadar, R. Miesch, and E. Segev
Results
Figure 5.1 portrays the semantic network of Netanyahu’s speeches mentioning the
word “Holocaust”. The word “Israel” was removed from the analysis as it appeared
at the absolute center and obscured the overall structure of the network. The clean
network includes pairs of words that appeared together in at least seven sentences
(0.12% of the total number of sentences). Following the procedure described in
Chapter 1, we conducted cluster analysis using the Louvain method to identify the
reoccurring themes in those speeches.
As can be seen the network portrays well the pathos–logos–ethos rhetoric of
Netanyahu, which appears in four clusters. The first very large cluster (labeled as
“them” at the bottom-center) defines the problem. It is the pathos, or what
Netanyahu perceives as the main present enemy of Israel—Iran. Apart from “Iran”
it includes the words “nuclear”, “missiles”, “weapon”, “develop”, “war”, and
“terror”. These words have mostly negative connotations, aiming to trigger the
emotions of the audience. The semantic network reveals that the Holocaust nar-
rative as presented by Netanyahu focuses on the constantly pending threat by Iran.
The pathos provides a proper justification for the logos. The upper cluster in the
middle is related to the main Zionist narrative (labeled as “us” at the top-center). It
includes the very central words “state” and “Jewish”, as well as “Herzl”, “army”,
“strong”, and “protect”. It reflects the reasons for the establishment of Israel as a
Jewish state, as a direct result of the Holocaust. Its very existence as Netanyahu
claims depends on a strong army that can protect the Jewish people from their
enemies to never experience such trauma again.
In between the pathos and the logos, which consist of the main narrative of “us”
against “them”, Netanyahu’s speeches also include the ethos aspect of rhetoric
through two parallel narratives of “me” and “you”. The ego narrative (labeled as
“me” on the right) includes the very central word “I” surrounded by words such as
“believe”, “negotiation”, “hope”, “achieve”, “peace”, “security”, and “truth”.
Thus, conveying that he is the only figure that ensures peace and security for the
state of Israel and stressing his personal achievements. The word “believe” is par-
ticularly important in this cluster, as it helps Netanyahu to associate himself with
those achievements. The combination of words “I believe” frequently appears in
Netanyahu’s speeches, and in Hebrew it can also be translated as “I trust”. It is
often connected with a process of negotiations for peace in the region and the
stability of Israel as a Jewish state.
Another important word in this cluster is “Begin”, which refers to Menahem
Begin, one of the main characters that Netanyahu repeatedly mentions in his
speeches. A leader of a Zionist militant group in the 1940s and the founder of the
right-wing party “Likud”, Begin is portrayed as the ideological father in Netanya-
hu’s conservative narrative. The centrality of the word “Begin” in Netanyahu’s
speeches is no coincidence. Similar to Begin, Netanyahu grew up in a revisionist
family, with the ideology developed by Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who supported territorial
maximalism and the establishment of a strong independent army to protect the
borders of Israel. Much of Begin’s fierce ideology is rooted in the Holocaust, and
when first meeting President Carter, he used the word “tertiated” to describe how
one in three Jews were murdered (JTA, 1977). Begin therefore used the Holocaust
to obtain political goals, a strategy that Bibi repeats. At the same time Begin is also
known for his significant achievement as a Prime Minister when signing the first
peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. Interestingly, Netanyahu’s settlement policy in
the West Bank, on the one hand, and his recent attempts to normalize the rela-
tionships of Israel with the Arab world, on the other, reflect a very similar pattern.
The fourth cluster (labeled as “you” on the left) includes many of the speech
addressees with names of official actors such as “President”, “Holocaust survivors”,
and other community members to whom the speech is targeted.
In short, Netanyahu’s Holocaust-related speeches predominantly focus on the pre-
sent (rather than the past) threat, and his political ambitions to strengthen the Zionist
narrative. Interestingly, the Holocaust in its historic dimensions is marginalized in his
speeches and is mainly told through the political lenses of international relations and
the ongoing threat on the existence of Israel. Words such as “history”, “remember”,
or “lesson” were frequent but still did not connect to other words in the network.
This means that general historical references were mentioned in Netanyahu’s speeches,
but they were not coherent enough to be part of the main narrative that he attempted
to promote.
For the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, we analyzed 31 speeches that men-
tioned the words “Holocaust”, “Shoa”, or “Shoah” for the time period between
104 M. Hadar, R. Miesch, and E. Segev
March 2010 and September 2020. Merkel talks about the Holocaust mainly during
memorial ceremonies for victims of the Nazi regime or when she is given awards for
her efforts to fight anti-Semitism and promote human rights. The German Chancel-
lor, however, does not speak at the official Holocaust Memorial Hour in the German
Parliament. These speeches are given by the President of the Parliament and were not
included in this study. Figure 5.2 portrays the semantic network of Merkel’s speeches
mentioning the Holocaust.
Unlike Benjamin Netanyahu, Angela Merkel focuses on the country speaking in
the name of “Germany” and not herself. This reflects the effort to convey neu-
trality and modesty in regard to the issue and avoid the impression of pursuing
personal interests. The clusters in Figure 5.2 offer a chronological overview of
Germany’s role over history: the dominating cluster in the middle and center of
the network refers to Germany’s role in the past, naming the crimes committed
during the period of National Socialism. Merkel evolves her speeches around the
historic facts and the responsibility of Germany for the past atrocities. The word
“people” is given a prominent place at the center of the cluster. Together with
words describing the events such as: “persecution”, “murdered”, “suffering”, and
“survivors”, this cluster presents the emotionality underlying her speeches. It can be
seen as the core pathos, or emotional, part of the discourse, from which the
remaining clusters (the logos, or the reason) are developed. These clusters represent
the present and the future that grow out of the historical events.
The cluster at the bottom represents the moral aspects with which Germany deals
until up to today: guilt and responsibility. The guilt of the Holocaust is the under-
lying driving force that shapes the present and future policies of Germany. Terms
like “consciousness”, “remember”, and “everlasting” stress that this historic guilt
constitutes an eternal and unchangeable part of the German collective memory.
“Responsibility” is the central term of the cluster which refers to the eternal
responsibility that Merkel imposes on the German people for the crimes committed
in the past, but also underlining her promise not to let anything similar happen again.
Her speeches can clearly be attributed to the Holocaust-centered memory.
The cluster on the top represents the relations with the Jewish people in Ger-
many and the German–Israeli relations. Merkel stresses the promise of the present
government to guarantee security to the Jewish people and the state of Israel. This
represents another irrevocable element in the cluster and can be seen as the moral
counterpart of the underlying guilt. It can be interpreted as the overshadowing
oath of “never again”. Israel is usually mentioned together with positive words in
her speeches like “relations”, “connection”, or “safety”. By using the adjective
“German-Israeli”, Merkel underlines the close ties between the countries. Her
statements are usually pro-Israeli, and any criticism of Israeli politics (e.g., settle-
ment building) seems to be off-limits. When referring to “Jews” or “Jewish” she
often refers to anti-Semitism in Germany today and her dedicated stance against it.
The cluster on the left represents Germany as it perceives its own role in the
present. Angela Merkel portrays her country as a major partner and guarantor of
democracy, stability, and peace in Europe and the world. This is consistent with
Merkel’s and her party’s strong pro-European Union position, her party claiming
to be “the German EU party”.12 She as well often mentions the importance to
continue to fight anti-Semitism, thus depicting herself as the “watchdog” against
hate crimes. In this part of her speeches she stresses the transition of Germany from
“evil” to “good”. She illustrates Germany as a purged state that takes a morally
superior role in the concert of nations.
Finally, on the right we see the cluster referring to Germany’s responsibility for
the future. Merkel concentrates on the duty to defend values core to the German
government, such as “justice”, “democracy”, “tolerance”, and “freedom”, which
occupies a dominant place. “Freedom” is the core value that Merkel puts at the
center when talking about the present and future Germany. The values in this
cluster vastly correspond to the liberal-conservative values of Merkel’s center-right
party, the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union
Deutschlands, CDU)—the title of the party program being “Freedom and Secur-
ity” (Freiheit und Sicherheit).13 She equally promotes her immigration policy during
the last years for which she has been heavily criticized by her political opponents
and which is believed to be one reason for the strengthening of the right-wing
populist party, Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD).14 By
connecting her party values and immigration policies to the “holy cow” of the
Holocaust, Merkel justifies her policies by the untouchable historical and moral
duty. By doing so, any criticism may be seen as devoid of morality.
106 M. Hadar, R. Miesch, and E. Segev
Conclusion
Against the backdrop of a dual process of collective memory preservation and con-
struction, depicted in the analysis, we explored the instrumentalization of the Holocaust
in contemporary political discourses. We extracted and compared the political speeches
of the Israeli Prime, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel,
mentioning the Holocaust over the last decade between 2009 and 2020. Using semantic
network analysis we identified the main themes and narratives of each.
Our findings show that both leaders use the Holocaust narrative to promote their
core values and their party values, yet each one of them focuses on a totally different
story and rhetoric strategy. Holocaust-related discourse as manifested in Netanyahu’s
speeches includes four distinct clusters: “us” (the state of Israel) and “them” (the ene-
mies of the state, currently Iran), “me” (the leader and the peace advocate) and “you”
(the audience). Netanyahu’s speeches demonstrate well the different rhetoric elements:
the pathos (which is related to the emotions and particularly fear), the logos (which is
related to the reason for establishing a Jewish state with a strong army), and the ethos
(the credibility of a strong leader). His speeches predominantly focus on the present
(rather than the past) threat, and his political ambitions to strengthen the Zionist nar-
rative. The current Iranian threat alongside other enemies of the state and the aspira-
tion for peace are framed as Netanyahu’s personal achievement.
The recurring linkage between the Holocaust, an event that occurred over 70
years ago and current security threats and enemies made by Netanyahu indicates
not only the enduring dominance of the memory of the Holocaust in 21st-century
Israeli consciousness but also its instrumentalization in political discourse. Such
instrumentalization is not the sole creation of Netanyahu but follows a tradition
that stretches back to before the establishment of the Jewish state.
In line with Van Dijk (1997: 11) approach to the study of political discourse,15 this
research also points to the practical results of the incorporation of the Holocaust in
contemporary political debate; Israeli Holocaust-fueled sense of threat leads to the
perception that similar to Hitler, the Iranian leader is, using the words of Netanyahu,
a fanatic (Netanyahu’s Remarks at the Saban Forum, 2017), and thus will not be
deterred by classic realist solutions to a potential nuclear contest (Nili, 2011). This
discourse may lay the foundations, legitimation, and even domestic and international
support for future Israeli military actions against the Ayatollah’s nuclearizing regime.
The inclusion of contemporary politics and political messages (e.g., concerning
domestic politics and current challenges such as the Iranian nuclear threat) in speeches
given by Netanyahu on Israel’s Holocaust Memorial Day reflects the existence of “the
present in the past” (Meyers & Zandberg, 2002: 390): It enables the political leadership
to take advantage of one of the most enduring aspects of Israeli collective memory and
to further construct this memory within a process of retelling.
Unlike Netanyahu, Merkel keeps a very limited use of the ethos element and does
not emphasize her own role as much. She rather tends to talk about (and in the name
of) Germany and the German people. While she uses the historical events of the
Holocaust themselves as the starting point of her argument, she emphasizes the changes
Politicizing the Holocaust 107
in Germany from the past to the present and future and its international responsibility and
role to promote freedom, democracy, and tolerance. By stressing feelings of guilt and
the resulting obligation for compensation she promotes her party’s and her own lib-
eral-conservative ideas, with a strong pro-European and pro-Israel standing. Merkel’s
discourse of the Holocaust reflects Germany’s responsibility and international role to
prevent human suffering when refugees are concerned. This narrative further con-
tributes to our understanding of some of the motives that stood in the backdrop of the
“refugees welcome” migration policy.
In short, while Netanyahu uses the Holocaust to tell a story about the present and
the regional threat to Israel, Merkel is also looking at the past and the future, stres-
sing the changes in Germany, not only in the region but also in the global sphere. It
is important to note, however, that Netanyahu finds himself in a more or less
constant election campaign since 2009. With six elections between 2009 and 2020,
one can clearly see that the Holocaust–Iran nexus is a major aspect of his election
campaigns. It is his strategy to constantly mention the pending threat to the state of
Israel and him being the only candidate to save “his people” from doom. Merkel,
on the other hand, was elected and re-elected in three regular and relatively
uncontested elections since 2009.
Through an analysis of the Holocaust-related political discourse in both Israel
and Germany, we have illustrated that the past continuously interacts with the
present and is instrumentalized to pursue political goals. Consequently, our analysis
does not only constitute a contribution to discourse studies, but also to the study of
politics of memory, namely the way the political elite uses history and collective
narratives in order to promote political goals and shape national identity.
Notes
1 The extension of politics into all aspects of life may be seen as a desire to accumulate political
power, alongside an expression of politics as a way of influencing society (Don-Yehiya,
1993; Weitz, 1995).
2 An expression of this attitude can be found in the fact that all visiting heads of state are
taken to visit the Holocaust museum, Yad Vashem, upon arrival in Israel.
3 For example, Prime Minister Begin’s decision to launch an air-strike against the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in Osirak (June 1981) was “a clear and equivocal consequence of the
Holocaust” (Naor, 2003; Ne’eman, 2003). This statement was confirmed by Aviezer
Ya’ari, Chief of the Research Division of the IDF’s Intelligence Branch during the
Osirak strike and by Begin himself, who stated that he would “not be the man in whose
time there will be a second Holocaust” (Ya’ari, 2003: 31).
4 Such as the sense of impending doom, felt by the Israeli public during the three weeks
prior to the Six-Day War (the “Waiting Period”), the post-1973 largescale protests
against Israel’s political and military leadership due to a public discourse dominated by
the feeling that “an irrevocable disaster was only marginally avoided” (Ben-Porat et al.,
2008; Nili, 2011: 40; Ram, 2000), and wide public support pertaining to the Israeli
nuclear program (Cohen, 1998: 237).
5 Ahmadinejad exclaimed that Zionists dominate many of the world’s centres of power,
wealth, and media (MEMRI, 2009).
6 In Netanyahu’s words: “It’s 1938 and Iran is Germany. And Iran is racing to arm itself
with atomic bombs … he [the Iranian president] is preparing for another Holocaust for
the Jewish state” (Hirschberg, 2006).
7 They posited that any other position would imply an acknowledgment of collective
guilt. The Israeli Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion, insisted on such acknowledgment against
the backdrop of the reparation agreement, yet Adenauer declined (Deutschkron, 1991).
8 Whereas this is an understandable tactic when past events pose constrains on present or future
actions of the policy, Olick and Levy suggest that “deeper issues involved with identity for-
mation and the problematics of self-understanding” were also at play (1997: 928).
9 For example, in 1985, the Helmut Kohl government passed a law that simultaneously
criminalized Holocaust denial and denial of the expulsion (Langenbacher, 2003).
10 According to the narrator in Grass’ novel: “Never should we have kept silent about all
that suffering simply because our own guilt was overpowering” (“Another Taboo
Broken”, Grass, 2002).
11 Translated as “Two kinds of Holocaust: The Holocaust in the political cultures of Israel
and Germany”.
12 Freiheit und Sicherheit. Grundsätze für Deutschland. https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/m
edia/dokumente/080215-grundsatzprogramm-kurz_0.pdf?file=1&type=field_collection_
item&id=1919
Politicizing the Holocaust 109
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6
NETWORK OF CLEAVAGES?
British paradiplomacy in the (digital) international
discourse around Brexit
Introduction
The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union has shaken
Europe like an earthquake. In a world that is increasingly characterized by inter-
connectedness and globalization, an EU-member country for 47 years, decided to step
back and isolate itself from the European political arena. However, this development
does not come out of nowhere. Over the last few years, Euroscepticism has been
observed in many different European countries, resulting in the strengthening of the
so-called populist parties (Brack & Startin, 2015; FitzGibbon et al., 2017). Indeed, the
optimism that surrounded the rise of a “global society” starts to crack. According to
Flew (2020), one reason for the new interest in nationalist ideas is that citizens have
lost confidence in international politics and organizations, as they feel their domestic
needs are left behind. Indeed, international politics and public diplomacy sometimes
failed to consider the importance of domestic issues and national identity (Zaharna,
2020). It is crucial to take into account national identities as they influence interna-
tional politics and are an essential dimension of public diplomacy (Huijgh, 2019).
National identity is a complex phenomenon. Indeed, countries can show many
different identities and attitudes, as we can see in the British case: On June 23,
2016, 51.9% of the British people voted to leave the European Union (BBC,
2016a). This narrow gap can be explained by the diverse national identities in the
United Kingdom. In Northern Ireland, for example, a majority of 55.8% voted
to stay and in Scotland 62% of the electorates. As a consequence, Scotland con-
siders becoming an independent country. In England, in which 53.4% voted in
favor of dropping out, there was a “gap” between rural and urban areas. For
instance, across all boroughs of London, 59.9% voted against leaving the Eur-
opean Union. Regions and cities differ in their attitude toward international
politics and start to communicate their own agenda (BBC, 2016b).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003120100-7
Network of cleavages? 113
In this chapter, we will employ semantic network analysis to analyze how the dis-
course around Brexit is shaped by sub-national actors. We hope to contribute to the
research on paradiplomacy and city diplomacy by illuminating it from a communica-
tion perspective. In what follows, we discuss the interplay between populism, national
identity, and different media platforms, and show the implications of issue framing on
country image formation and international communication strategies.
climate change without taking into consideration how state governors and mayors
endorsed the United States Climate Alliance through their paradiplomatic city
diplomacy activities (Asdourian & Ingenhoff, 2020).
In the context of Brexit, many British cities started information campaigns, as
they felt that their voices and interests were not considered and represented prop-
erly by the national government and, according to prognoses, they would feel
Brexit’s consequences particularly strongly (Szpak et al., 2020). The most recent
example is London’s handling of the Brexit issue. Shortly after the referendum,
London’s Mayor Sadiq Khan started his #LondonIsOpen campaign to reassure the
European citizens of London that they are still welcome, and to maintain rela-
tionships with international investors and visitors. Indeed, city diplomacy and city
branding campaigns are intended for domestic and international audiences as well
(Dinnie & Sevin, 2020; Duncombe, 2019).
Hence, the British capital holds on to its European identity and opposes itself to
the isolationist tendency of the British government. Starting with a concert of
Stevie Wonder in Hyde Park on July 10, 2016, the campaign was extended to
various communication channels, from posters in the London underground to
online advertising videos and social media postings. The success and unique char-
acter of the campaign was due to its collaborative orientation, as it specifically
invited social media users to co-create the message of London’s diversity and
openness on a large scale (Blay Arráez et al., 2019). It was not only related to the
volume of engagement but also to the long duration the campaign lasted. This was
due to the exceptional and explicit demand for co-creation, as previous studies
have shown that city campaigns on social media are rather one-way-directed,
short-termed, and focused on specific events (Sevin, 2016). Collaborative cam-
paigns can be particularly useful for the international communication of cities: In
early 2020, several mayors of European cities shared the slogan #LondonIsOpen in
their respective languages on Twitter to show their ongoing relationship with the
British capital.
Yet, in general, very little is known about how sub-national actors are being
perceived and discussed in the international sphere. In the context of Brexit, we
therefore intend to analyze (RQ1) How do paradiplomatic actors such as sub-states or
cities shape the Brexit discourse? In the next step, we would like to delve into the
extent to which digital media offerings enable (non-)political actors to shape
international communication, as co-creative campaigns might have great potential
for diplomacy.
such as cities (Mendes, 2013; O’Boyle, 2019), they also allow all kinds of users to
be involved in the communication and image building process (Sevin &
Ingenhoff, 2018). Therefore, the concept of digital diplomacy has gained a lot of
attention in recent years and changed the understanding of international relations
and diplomacy, meaning “a strategy of managing change through digital tools and
virtual collaboration” (Holmes, 2015: 15). Digital communication has also chan-
ged the patterns of international information flow, which can influence the
construction of the country image and place branding (Golan & Himelboim,
2016; Segev, 2018).
As highlighted by Manor and Segev (2015), the concepts of place branding and
digital diplomacy can overlap. Especially in times of crisis, digital diplomacy uses
branding strategies in order to mend or correct a country’s image after a crisis such
as Brexit for the United Kingdom. Thereby, promoting the country’s own identity
plays an important role, as nation branding can help a nation “to articulate a more
coherent and cohesive national identity, to animate the spirit of its citizens … and
maintain loyalty to the territory within its borders” (Aronczyk, 2013: 3).
In place branding literature, citizens and user-generated content in the communica-
tion process has become an important issue (Compte-Pujol et al., 2018; Dinnie & Sevin,
2020). This is mainly because citizens often do not feel that their identities are repre-
sented in international campaigns (Casais & Monteiro, 2019; Insch & Walters, 2018). At
the same time, the inclusion of citizens is essential, as they can give authenticity to
communication campaigns (Casais & Monteiro, 2019; Rickly-Boyd, 2012), a major
resource in times of fake news and institutional distrust. Further, by including more
actors in the campaign building, the campaign will gain more spread (Bjola et al., 2020).
One famous example was the Curators of Sweden project, which gave the official Twitter
channel @Sweden to citizens (Christensen, 2013). Despite this, current international
branding campaigns are still strongly based on a top-down approach and fail to make use
of the dialogic nature of social media sites (Kampf et al., 2015). Also, in the academic
literature, studies often analyze how governmental actors communicate on the social
web but do not consider the importance of non-governmental actors’ content in
country image formation in the digital sphere (Collins et al., 2019; Strauß et al., 2015).
Attention must also be given to the fact that in the digital sphere, both interna-
tional and national players are co-creating the image of a country (Melissen, 2011).
National and international actors have different identities and relationships with a
country, which can impact their communication patterns. For instance, Šimunjak
and Caliandro (2020) analyzed how and if the diplomats from the 27 European
countries reacted differently to the Brexit on Twitter. Results indicate that, even if
diplomats tried to communicate with neutral and consistent communication with the
other EU countries, there are some differences we can notice. Countries which are
traditionally British allies such as the Netherlands, Sweden, or Denmark were more
critical, whereas countries having big diasporas in Great Britain like France, Poland,
or Germany were more positive and focusing on the future bilateral relationships.
Finally, when analyzing digital content, it is also important to consider the spe-
cificities of the media channels (Andéhn et al., 2014). Country images on social
Network of cleavages? 117
media sites are not only built through functional information, such as political or
economic news, but also strongly through cultural and natural aspects, such as the
country’s traditions and landscapes (Chariatte et al., 2019; Sevin & Ingenhoff,
2018). But more importantly, the discourse on social media sites such as Twitter or
Facebook is very immediate, dynamic, and short. In order to attract attention users
tend to keep their posts simple, provocative, and emotional. As proposed by
Duncombe (2019), we need to pay “greater attention to the interaction of social
media, emotion and identity, when analyzing today’s and future digital diplo-
macy”. Indeed, very few studies have analyzed the content shared on social net-
working sites and how it influences the country and place image and its related
issues (Ingenhoff et al., 2021). Our second research question would be therefore
(RQ2) How is Brexit discussed on Twitter?
decision-makers, Oppermann et al. (2020) conclude that, despite the British desire
for independence, the United Kingdom’s role is strongly dependent on the Eur-
opean Union. Already, at the beginning of the Brexit negotiations, many countries
made it clear that their relationship with the EU is more important to them in
economic and political affairs, and they did not want to jeopardize their relations
by negotiating new trade deals with the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom’s
desire to become even more global after Brexit by making new international trade
deals may result in an isolated position.
This dependency on external partners goes along with the assumption of role
theory (see Biddle, 1986; Harnisch et al., 2011). It states that the roles of actors arise
from their own ideas, but also strongly from the expectations of others. “Britain’s
foreign policy after Brexit will not be defined simply by what role Britain wants to
play, but equally by what role other states let Britain play” (Oppermann et al.,
2020: 134). This highlights the relevance of listening to these international voices
about Brexit, as they may have an impact on the United Kingdom’s future strategic
communication. Therefore, we examine (RQ3) How is Brexit depicted in interna-
tional mass media?
Methods
In the present study, we adopt a listening approach. This means that although we
disclose our theoretical assumptions and ideas regarding the different actors in the
international discourse, we would like to pay attention to and understand the
diversity of opinions and stakeholders in an explorative way. For this purpose, the
method of semantic network analysis seems very appropriate, as it combines quanti-
tative and qualitative methodologies. Although researchers select and quantify several
key words based on their theoretical foundation, it is only by their links to each
other that the meaning of the text becomes apparent (Segev, 2020). Therefore, the
method allows to confirm pre-existing ideas but also to explore and get new insights.
Based on our theoretical assumptions grounded in the network agenda-setting approach
and associative network theory, we are interested in what associations and topics arise
with respect to an (inter)national issue. Further, semantic network analysis is well
suited for the analysis of big data sets, as we are planning to do in this study.
We study international public opinion by looking at two high-reach newspapers
in three countries, namely Germany, France, and Ireland. The selection of these
countries is motivated by different reasons. First, these countries are among the top
five trading partners of the United Kingdom (Fleming, 2019) and are particularly
affected by the consequences of Brexit. Second, they differ from each other in
terms of their geopolitical proximity to Britain. France and Germany in their role
as EU founding countries are known as the driving forces of the European Union
and Ireland as the country with the highest geographic and cultural proximity to
the United Kingdom among the three. Indeed, Ireland may be directly affected: In
the last months, the Brexit referendum sparked, for instance, many discussions
around Northern Ireland’s borders.
Network of cleavages? 119
The selected newspapers were chosen based on their reach and included the Irish
Independent and the Irish Times for Ireland, the Süddeutsche Zeitung and Bild Zeitung
for Germany, and Le Figaro and Le Monde for France. The news articles were
retrieved with the database Factiva. The sample included all articles published from
January 31 to February 1, 2020 (official UK exit date from the EU), which con-
tained the word Brexit in the title or the lead paragraph. This included 47 Irish
articles, 21 German articles, and 21 French articles. For the French sample, only
one of the two newspapers (Figaro) reported on the issue.
To study the social media discourse, we looked at posts that mentioned Brexit
on Twitter. Twitter is the most used micro-blogging website for public diplomacy
activities, which also explains why some authors speak of “Twiplomacy” when it
comes to digital diplomatic relations (Sotiriu, 2015). Further, Twitter is very well
suited for semantic network analysis and the study of user-generated content, as
posts are mainly made of texts in comparison to other social media like Instagram
or YouTube and users can interact without having to establish a following/fol-
lower/friend relationship.
The data were collected using the free extension for Google spreadsheets TAGS
v6.1, which connects to the Twitter API and enables the retrieval of large data sets
from Twitter with hashtags or specific Twitter profiles (Hawksey, 2019). As pro-
posed by Bjola et al. (2020: 409), Big Data analysis “may be used to examine the
words most commonly associated online with another country”. For this, hashtags
are a useful tool, as they tag and organize content on social media. By looking at the
co-occurrences of hashtags and words in the same tweet scholars can get insights on
public issues (Bjola et al., 2020; Chang, 2010; Sevin & Ingenhoff, 2018).
We decided to collect data around the hashtag #brexit, as this is actually the
main issue connected nowadays with the United Kingdom and challenging inter-
national relations. We analyzed tweets in the same timeframe as in the traditional
media analysis to make comparisons between the media channels possible. Further,
Twitter content is changing rapidly and is very event-driven (Andéhn et al., 2014).
Therefore, it is important to focus on a date that has a special significance, and we
hypothesize that this special point in time will bring up the different positions
about Brexit during the last months.
In total, 83,611 tweets were collected between January 31 and February 1. In
order to clean the data from retweets and bots, we deleted 55,696 duplicates. Out
of the remaining 27,913 tweets, we took a sample of 2000 tweets, which were
chosen randomly. We decided to analyze a smaller sample of tweets to make our
networks more readable and because previous studies have shown that smaller
Twitter samples are representative enough in highlighting the main topics discussed
(Chariatte et al., 2019).
Unlike newspaper articles, tweets were not examined separately by the country
of origin. The reason for this is that digital platforms cross national borders, and
opinions from a wide range of countries appear together. This is particularly true
for the hashtag “#brexit”, which is international and is used in many languages by
a wide range of users around the world.
120 J. Chariatte and D. Ingenhoff
After the sample was determined, its content was prepared for semantic network
analysis. The first step was to find out which words occur most frequently in the
text, while excluding irrelevant words and stop-words. Stop-words are recurring
words such as pronouns, adverbs, and prepositions, which differ for each language
and do not provide relevant meaning for the analysis. For the analysis of the media,
background information such as the author’s name and the newspaper section was
excluded, whereas on Twitter data, links, images, or profile information were not
considered.
In order to choose relevant words or actors in the frequency list, we looked
at their context and meaning in the original news articles and tweets. In total,
we selected 82 German words, 85 French words, and 100 Irish words. For the
Twitter data, we identified 92 relevant words. With these words, we built
networks of word pairs depending on their co-appearance in the same sentence
(for the news media) or in the same tweet (for Twitter, as tweets are often
short). The construction of the networks was done with Visone network ana-
lysis and visualization software (Brandes & Wagner, 2004). The analysis was
made in the respective language and then translated into English for the visua-
lization of the networks. Further, the size of the nodes was adapted according
to their degree centrality, whereas the number of links between pairs of words
(their co-occurrences in sentences or tweets) was shown by the thickness of
their links.
“Germany”, “France”). Calls for similar votes in Europe can be found across the
network (“#Frexit”, “#Italexit”, “#Nexit”, “#Polexit”)
At the same time, very critical comments on Brexit can be found in the clusters
presented. For example, the vote is assessed as a “shame”, a “blame”, a “disaster”, or
renamed as “Brexshit”. In Cluster 4, the topic of migration is addressed for the first
time by judging Brexit as a racist vote. Especially in Cluster 5, protests against the
Brexit vote are evident through the use of numerous hashtags (“#notmybrexit”,
“#stilleuropean”, and “#Iameuropean”. Particularly interesting is the fact that slogans
promoted by cities or regions are actually used in general Twitter usage. For exam-
ple, the Scottish Government’s statement “#leavealighton” but also Sadiq Khan’s
“#LondonIsOpen” are used by Twitter users, indicating a successful co-creation of
the place brand. The fact that London is in the middle of this pro-European bubble,
not only associated with business but also with values such as “respect”, suggests that
the capital has been able to position itself in the digital space as a political actor and
defender of values in its own right.
In line with the paradiplomacy thesis, another central sub-state actor is Scotland.
Cluster 6 reflects the discussion on the economic and political consequences for
nations of the United Kingdom but also for associated territories such as Gibraltar.
Also, the conflict arising around the Irish border is addressed. This is one of the few
clusters that is more informative than emotional.
The last cluster, Cluster 7, summarizes well the central ideas of the network.
The online discourse around Brexit shows a divided and polarized society
(“UK”–“divided”). While some celebrated Brexit as a victory for populism and
122 J. Chariatte and D. Ingenhoff
focus is on the financial consequences for Irish companies and workers in pro-
European Northern Ireland or in the border area. For example, farmers who pre-
viously received financial support from the EU are now demanding compensation
from the British government. Other issues include immigration and, above all, the
domestic security of the Irish Republic.
This is mainly taken up in Cluster 2: Around the central term “border”, fears are
raised from a hard frontier between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and the resur-
gence of riots that could endanger the Belfast Agreement. The word “border” is
further associated with the term “sea” and the central word “trade”. This points to
a potential border down the Irish Sea, which Dublin, or the Irish government, tries
to prevent by starting talks regarding future economic relations and tariffs.
This theme is further connected to Cluster 3, which deals with the negotiation
talks between Irish Finance Minister Donohoe and British Prime Minister Johnson
regarding new business deals and the numerous (northern) Irish jobs, which are put
at risk by the British referendum. These issues also influence the Irish elections,
which were taking place in Ireland at the time and are described in Cluster 4.
Campaigns of different political parties around the unity of Ireland, the “Border
Communities”, and the relations to the EU are addressed.
In total, we can observe that four of seven clusters deal only with consequences of
Brexit for (Northern) Ireland. The three remaining clusters focus on the international
sphere, the United Kingdom, and its different nations. In Cluster 5, the two central
terms “people” and “UK” can be identified. As in the Twitter network, the word
“people” may refer to the populist meaning of this vote. The terms associated with
“UK” show the dividedness of the nation and the fragility of the British identity:
While some promise Brexit as a sign of democracy, civil rights, and a sign of change,
others consider it as a crisis that would create damage and should be protested against.
Indeed, the commitment of politicians (McGuiness against Farage) but also of
cities to the European idea becomes apparent in Cluster 6. Thus London, which is
also the seat of the British government, is perceived as a world city that positions
itself as separate from England. Other cities and research centers such as Cambridge
similarly voted against the referendum. In Cluster 7, it becomes clear that Scotland
rejects the Brexit decision and is already making the case for an independence
referendum.
In general, we can observe that the whole Irish network depicts Brexit in a
negative way. When looking at the German and the French network, we can
observe a similar framing. Yet, unlike the Irish network, they are more concerned
about the consequences of Brexit for Europe and the United Kingdom than for
their own country.
In the German network (see Figure 6.3), we can observe seven clusters, and only
one specifically addresses the consequences for Germany. In Cluster 1, the
immense economic losses and difficulties of German (and especially Bavarian)
companies are addressed (“Germany”—“euro”—“billions”). However, it is inter-
esting to observe that the word “Germany” is nevertheless not the center of
attention, but rather the word “Great Britain”, which has many links to other
124 J. Chariatte and D. Ingenhoff
words (such as “French”, “England”, “British Currency”). This shows that more
than the national issue, German news is concerned by the international economic
consequences. In general, a lot of coverage is dedicated to economic and financial
topics, which is also evident from the fact that three other clusters deal with them.
For instance, Cluster 2 deals with monetary policy aspects, i.e., the handling of
central banks and national currencies, whereas Cluster 3 focuses on the stock
market and future economic relations. Interestingly, we can observe here that also
other rising issues such as the coronavirus come into play.
In Cluster 3, two central words are “London” and “Brussels”, which might be
explained by two reasons. First, cities play an important role in international relations
and serve as important trade centers (both London and Brussels are strongly connected
to “free trade agreements”). Second, capital city names are often used in the mass
media as synonyms for their respective national governments, which in times of Brexit
need to renegotiate their agreements during the insecure transition period.
Cluster 4 not only focuses on the economic but also political key issues Prime
Minister Johnson will have to handle. As the size of the nodes indicates, Johnson’s
main opponent will be the EU, with which he needs to discuss the exit deal and the
customs clearances in Dover. However, potential points of conflicts with Scotland,
the Irish government, or French Minister Barnier regarding fishing rights are also
visible. Finally, the connection between words like “contracts” and “USA” indicate
Johnson’s intention to reorientate and make new non-European trade agreements.
Cluster 5 is built around the central word “British”, which indicates that a strong
focus lies here on national identity. Brexit is interpreted as a way for Britons to
rediscover their national identity and regain control and sovereignty over their own
Network of cleavages? 125
country, which they miss through supranational institutions like the EU. The
yearning for historical power like during the British Empire are voiced, and the
country’s distinctiveness as an island is also discussed. When looking at the news
articles, the term “island” is connotated more negatively, as it is pointed out that
today’s nations can no longer function as islands but are very dependent on other
states in times of globalization. Indeed, British public opinion is not exclusively
positive about Brexit; the population is divided. This division is considered as
“dark”, and there are concerns about hard borders, even talk of “trench warfare”.
This context also explains the relevance of the word “cohesion”, which is faltering
on the British side, while EU countries explicitly position themselves as one.
The position of the EU in the upcoming discussions becomes clear in Cluster 6.
German media covers how Europe will defend fundamental freedoms such as
freedom of movement and prevent the UK from cherry-picking. The word
“battle” indicates that the year of negotiations will be marked by tough talks.
Finally, pro-European actors in the UK appear in Cluster 7, who mourn the exit as
a mistake and try to correct it.
As said in the beginning, it can be observed that Brexit has numerous negative asso-
ciations (“mistake”, “fatal”, “farewell tear”, “damage”, “dark”, “getting drunk”,
“grieve”) in the German news. A similar picture can also be observed in the French news.
The French network (Figure 6.4) is made of six clusters according to Louvain and
is globally negative toward the British withdrawal referendum (“regret”, “shock”,
“disaster”, “pain”, “being wrong”). In Cluster 1, the position of Great Britain after
Brexit is critically examined. It is doubted that Great Britain will gain power through
Brexit, but rather will be weakened as a nation. For example, the British economy is
still dependent on European decision-makers, as the connection between the words
“economy” and “Von der Leyen” suggests. The United Kingdom is also isolated as a
research location, and there is talk of recruiting British researchers to France. The fate
of foreign citizens and workers in Britain is discussed.
Sub-national actors are quite present in the French network. First and foremost
is Scotland, which dominates the Cluster 2. The connection between the words
“Scottish”, “Sturgeon”, “stay”, and “nationality” point to the efforts of the Scottish
First Minister to make Scotland an independent nation. Also visible are the former
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who wants to maintain links with Brussels. The
rejection of Brexit is evident through terms like “rejection”, “battle”, or “protest”.
Sub-national actors are also visible in the Cluster 3, which discusses new European
partnerships. “Paris” and “Berlin” refer to the respective national governments,
who want to get closer to trading partners that used to cooperate with the UK,
such as Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands. This shows that Europe wants to
maintain its dense trade network and may develop independently of the United
Kingdom. Still, paradiplomatic activities from the UK seem to pay off: links to
pro-European cities such as Edinburgh and London, which are clearly identified as
partners, will continue to be shown. The impact of city actors can be further
observed in Cluster 4. Here, French city mayors have their say, emphasizing their
friendship and solidarity with the British people sharing the idea of a united
Europe.
In fact, values play a big role in this cluster. France, for example, is associated
with the defense of European values (“values”, “continent”, “war”), and is por-
trayed as a country that stands up against populist and nationalist decisions
(“people”, “regret”, “decision”, “Thatcher”). Cluster 5 also shows that Brexit is
not just a termination agreement, but also a symbol of the crisis of trust and
democracy.
Topics such as populism are also found in the last Cluster 6, as we can find
words like “populism” and “victory”. Further in the cluster, we can observe a
personalization of the Brexit discourse, with associations to Prime Minister Johnson
and Donald Trump. As an antithesis to this, one finds the term “European”, which
is connected to the words “Germany” and “agreement”. This relates to the
upcoming economic negotiation talks and that Germany’s influence will be
decisive.
In summary, compared to the Twitter discourse, the media coverage in all the
countries studied has fewer emotional and positive associations with Brexit. Fur-
thermore, as the first entries in the summary Table 6.1 also show, the countries
have different priorities in their reporting: While the immediate UK neighbor,
Ireland, reports mainly on the direct political and economic consequences for its
own country, France and Germany discuss the consequences for European and
British identity and for the EU’s political and economic relations.
Network of cleavages? 127
TABLE 6.1 Top 20 words with the highest degree centrality in all four analyzed units
them with previous research. This kind of analysis allows us to draw conclusions
and develop new communication strategies.
First, the present research clearly shows how important it is to consider the needs
of the population in international relations, which is well illustrated by the example
of Twitter. In line with Flew (2020), it is evident that citizens feel lost in times of
globalization and want to regain control, and therefore seek to emphasize their
national identity. The British referendum and its social media presence is only one
example of a more general trend: Hashtags such as #Frexit or #Italexit support a
general Eurosceptic discourse as described by FitzGibbon et al. (2017). Consistent
with the findings of Engesser et al. (2017), our results support the notion that
digital spaces are well suited for the spread of populist discourses. As Dolea et al.
(2020) highlight, the presence of populism in the public sphere does not have to be
ignored, as it might have a great impact on the country image, but also on the
national identity. Cooper (2019) even goes a step further, suggesting traditional
public diplomacy has failed to look at domestic concerns and needs, which play an
important role in the context of international relations.
Interestingly, we found that social media discourse is much less about informa-
tion or facts, but more about feelings, personalization, and values. There is also
increased distrust in traditional media, as indicated by the discourse around fake
news. But above all, our findings are in line with the results of Duncombe (2019),
who highlights the relevance of emotions and identity on social media. In order to
improve their international communication, public diplomacy officials need to
consider more the domestic needs and opinions.
Indeed, Brexit has challenged the idea of British identity. The cluster analysis
shows that the United Kingdom is not perceived as a unity, but as a divided country
that does not support Brexit unanimously. Through expressing their opinions on
Brexit, people at the same time constantly debate the country image across varied
platforms. As Zaharna (2020) highlights, it is essential to look more closely at the
domestic public.
In terms of the “New Public Diplomacy” and paradiplomatic activities, such as
city diplomacy, the international communication of countries is shaped by a variety
of actors, including cities. London is clearly associated with pro-European values
through the use of numerous hashtags, such as “#LondonIsOpen”. The rise of city
diplomacy has several implications. First, cities are indeed acting as so-called value
defenders, as described by Leffel (2018). Second, London’s branding strategy is
further adopted and used by Twitter users. This in turn confirms the potential of
social media for the co-creation of place brands (Compte-Pujol et al., 2018; Dinnie
& Sevin, 2020). Indeed, citizens use social media platforms to communicate their
place identity if they feel misrepresented by national authorities (Casais & Mon-
teiro, 2019; Insch & Walters, 2018).
This is an important finding: As Rickly-Boyd (2012) describes, sub-state actors
are perceived as particularly credible and must therefore be taken into account by
public diplomacy actors in their communication campaigns. Paradiplomatic actors
not only help to shape the digital arena, but also attract the attention of the news
Network of cleavages? 129
media: In all three countries studied, both cities and regional sub-state actors are
present: Scotland’s pro-European stance and its slogan “#leavealighton” are dis-
cussed, and London is also described, albeit to a lesser extent, as a global and open
city, distinct from the UK. It is interesting that “open” is often mentioned in the
context of trade, as this was also the original meaning of the #LondonIsOpen cam-
paign. Still, we need to be aware that capital city names can also serve as a synonym
for their respective governments in the mass media. Therefore, one should also
consider the peculiarities of each medium.
By means of semantic network analysis, it becomes clear that the discourse around
Brexit differs greatly in the social media and mass media arenas. While social media
discourse was emotionally charged and allowed negative but also many positive
voices on the referendum to be heard, the news coverage described the background
and consequences of the referendum and framed it in all analyzed countries critically.
It should be noted here that, although the present study was conducted with a lim-
ited number of outlets, and their political orientation was not considered, the results
are coherent with previous findings. Shortly after the referendum, the European
Journalism Observatory also found that Brexit was covered negatively in the inter-
national media, regardless of political orientation (Lees, 2016). Further, our results
indicate a certain consistency in media coverage over time.
This negative framing proves interesting as it confirms but also extends the
findings of Bijsmans et al. (2018). The study shows that the international mass
media supports the opinion of pro-European decision makers about Brexit. Word
associations such as “cohesion” and “prevent cherry-picking” make it clear that EU
countries present themselves in the upcoming Brexit negotiations as a solid entity,
fighting steadfastly for its values and interests. This is intended to discourage other
EU countries with similar movements to follow the British example. But this
makes it more difficult for the UK to assert its interests. This is an example that
illustrates well the assumptions of role theory and Oppermann et al. (2020), that
one’s role and actions are strongly influenced by others. As can also be read from
the network, states can no longer function as islands in today’s network society
(Castells, 2011).
In addition to this, the semantic network analysis also revealed differences in
media coverage. For example, the centrality measures showed that while France and
especially Germany focused on the consequences of the British decision for Europe
(which emphasize their role as the founding fathers of the EU), Ireland focused
mainly on itself. This is in line with Wanta (2018), who pointed out that the rele-
vance of an issue depends strongly on its significance for the country and its policies.
But above all, it highlights the need to look at cultural differences and their proxi-
mity to the United Kingdom. With high geographic and cultural proximity, Ireland
pays careful attention to the political and economic consequences around the Irish
border. In France, consequences for democracy and European values are discussed,
while in Germany economic and financial topics dominate. The topic of migration,
which can, for instance, be found in the social media sphere, is almost absent in
international news. Also, by means of the network analysis, topics have emerged
130 J. Chariatte and D. Ingenhoff
throughout the different countries, such as fishing rights, which have turned out to
be important in the subsequent negotiations.
In the context of network agenda-setting theory, this different setting and association
of issues are of primary importance, since it is on this media basis that public opi-
nion about a country and its related issues is significantly formed (McCombs &
Shaw, 1972; Zhang & Meadows III, 2012). For public diplomacy officials, it can be
important for future international talks and communication campaigns to know
which issues a country places particular emphasis on.
To conclude, it can be drawn that semantic network analysis is well suited for
listening processes. As described by numerous scholars (Cull, 2019; Di Martino,
2019), it is absolutely necessary for public diplomacy actors to identify and under-
stand relevant publics, their interests and current problems at an early stage. Using
the Brexit example, the relevance and perception of sub-states and actors and their
political attitudes could be shown, highlighting the multi-faceted image of a
country. The relevance of contextual factors such as culture, national identity,
media type, or social movements such as populism were shown, which are essential
for understanding the public.
study period, especially for long-term issues such as Brexit. Thus, changes and
developments of an issue could be observed. As it is common for hashtags to be
linked to each other on Twitter, it would also be interesting to observe spillover
effects regarding their content.
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7
SEXUAL ASSAULTS BLINDSIDED BY
POLITICS ON TWITTER
Semantic Network analysis of symbolic #MeToo
cases in Japan and South Korea
Introduction
What happens when women accuse powerful men of sexual abuse: feminist soli-
darity or misogynistic victim-blaming? This chapter explores Twitter narratives
after two major sexual abuse allegations made public in Japan and South Korea
(hereafter Korea). While an emerging body of literature investigates feminist online
activism and expressions, they are relatively limited to Anglo-American cultural
context or single-country studies. This chapter compares the two cases in East Asia
which share striking similarities: (1) the two women were allegedly sexually abused
by their seniors who hold powerful positions; (2) the criminal justice system failed
them; and (3) while they were featured as a symbol of the #MeToo movement in
mainstream media, they faced fervent backlash for publicly speaking up in 2017
and 2018, respectively. Semantic network analysis of the reaction displayed on
Twitter to the two cases revealed quite a similar pattern—namely, the politicization
of the issue—and also a stark difference—the lack of feminist solidarity in Japan.
We begin with an overview of the two cases.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003120100-8
Sexual assaults and politics on Twitter 137
years older than her. The accused, Noriyuki Yamaguchi (hereafter Yamaguchi), is a
veteran journalist and then the Washington DC bureau chief for Tokyo Broad-
casting System (TBS), a major television media conglomerate in Tokyo. He has
been well known for his political connection with the administration at the time
and published biographies of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (Ueda et al., 2017).
Ito- explained in detail what happened that night with Yamaguchi. According
to her, Yamaguchi asked her out, then 26 years old aspiring journalist, to a dinner
in Tokyo to discuss a job opportunity. After having a couple of drinks, she lost
consciousness, only to wake up in a hotel room with a sharp pain the next
morning around 5 am. He was on top of her (Ueda et al., 2017).
Ito- turned to the criminal justice system to accuse Yamaguchi. Later that month,
she filed a criminal complaint with the police, and the police obtained a warrant of
arrest on the charge of incapacitated rape. Yet, Yamaguchi got away at the last
minute in June 2015 thanks to Itaru Nakamura, the head of the criminal investi-
gation division at the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, who intervened to
suspend the arrest (“Higai jose- ga kokuhatsu!”, 2017). In August 2015, the police
eventually sent papers to the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office on Yama-
guchi; However, the case was dropped on the grounds of insufficient evidence a
year later in July 2016 (Ueda et al., 2017).
Ito- did not give up. In May 2017, in an effort to reopen the case, she filed a
complaint with the Committee for the Inquest of Prosecution. She then held the
aforementioned first press conference, where she came public. In September 2017,
the committee concluded that the prosecutors’ decision not to charge Yamaguchi
was appropriate (“Bo-ko- higai uttaeru”, 2017). Doors closed to accuse him in the
criminal justice system.
Ito- persisted. To hold him accountable, a week later, she launched a civil lawsuit
with the Tokyo District Court against Yamaguchi, seeking 11 million yen in
compensation (Seya, 2019). In October 2017, the same month when the Harvey
Weinstein story broke, a major publishing company Bungeishunju- announced that
her book “Black Box” (Ito-, 2017), which recounts the violence, would release and
made her full name public for the first time (“Bo-ko- higai uttaeru”, 2017). She,
herself, then gave a second press conference. Her story attracted huge media
attention in many countries and was featured as the Japanese #MeToo movement.
Among all, the BBC aired her one-hour documentary “Japan’s Secret Shame” in
2018, which was partially translated into Japanese online (Jenkin & Woods, 2018;
“‘Nihon no himerareta haji’ Ito-”, 2018).
After providing occasional short counter comments, Yamaguchi made his posi-
tion clear publicly. Two days after her second press conference, he published a
long counterargument denying her allegations in a monthly magazine Hanada
(Yamaguchi, 2017). In February 2019, he went on to file a 130-million-yen
counter-suit against Ito- for defamation with the Tokyo District Court (The court
decided to consolidate the two cases) (Seya, 2019).
Ito- won the case. In December 2019, the court ordered Yamaguchi to pay 3.3
million yen in damages to Ito- and dismissed Yamaguchi’s counter appeal. “[She
138 S. Mizoroki and B. Kim
Central District Court overturned the original ruling and acquitted him of the
charges of abuse of power (Choon, 2020).
Literature review
This ideological mechanism of sexism can explain rape culture (Herman, 1984), for
example: One sexist idea in the belief system is that “aggressive male sexuality is ero-
ticized” and perceived as healthy and therefore encouraged (Keller et al., 2018). This
idea can easily lead to a more troubling idea that sexual assault is a natural part of sexual
relationships and even desirable, which allows the norm adherers to get away with it.
Victim-blaming is the flip side of the same coin. The normalization of aggressive
male sexuality naturalizes victim-blaming and vice versa. Keller et al. (2018) discuss:
Gendertrolling
Scholars have named a barrage of hostility, harassment, abuse, and violence directed
toward women in cyberspace many terms such as “gendertrolling” (Mantilla, 2013),
“e-bile” (Jane, 2014a, 2014b), “technology-facilitated sexual violence and harass-
ment” (Henry & Powell, 2015), “networked misogyny” (Banet-Weiser & Miltner,
2016), and “gendered cyberhate” (Jane, 2020). New cyber communication plat-
forms—namely, blogs and social media—spurred a massive flow of user-generated
content with constant interaction. Unfortunately, they also provided sexist moral
defenders and adherers with opportunities to practice sexist ideas online with mini-
mal cost and even access to much wider audiences who appreciate and support their
sexist practices beyond their immediate social circles. The new technology, indeed,
increases the visibility and engagement of online aggressions and, thus, aids their
collective effort to achieve a systemic goal, i.e., sustaining sexism.
Gender-based aggression toward women, however, is nothing new in nature. It
is just an articulation of traditional sexism in society adapted to this new cyber
platform. Banet-Weiser and Miltner (2016) cogently argue that this online aggres-
sion is still a product of the widespread, entrenched, and naturalized misogyny in
the Western culture itself. The literature in this orientation tends to illustrate,
categorize, or theorize changing aspects of sexist practices enabled by connective
technology while referring to existing research on sexism in society in general.
Sexual assaults and politics on Twitter 141
Hashtag feminism
The other growing body of research examines a range of social media tactics—
hashtag activism—which make visible, problematize, and challenge sexism (see, for
instance, Baer, 2016; Clark, 2016; Keller et al., 2018; J. Kim, 2017; Mendes et al.,
2018). Social media, especially Twitter, gave rise to an entirely new mode of digital
engagement in activism. Users can post their personal stories, experiences, and
opinions, anonymously if they prefer, from anywhere in the world with a minimal
communication cost. Those voices hold the potential to be heard beyond their
existing networks and propagate across the platform further as they acquire more
engagements—reactions, comments, and shares—among users. Through this
interactive amplifying process, individual voices can grow into a larger collective
chorus and become highly visible as collaborative events—often with a catchy and
relatable hashtag—which spurs more users to jump onto the bandwagon. Primarily,
engagement characterizes this digital activism with its massive amplifying power.
Digital activism against sexism is known as hashtag feminism or feminist hashtag
activism (e.g., Clark, 2016). This novel digital engagement is worth scholarly ana-
lysis in four critical ways. First, it can unearth women’s collective voice, which
potentially serves to dismantle sexism. Those voices have not been taken seriously
in the mainstream media, historically marginalized and oppressed under the sexist
ideology (Benedict, 1992; Meyers, 1997). The sheer visibility of oft-silenced voices
gives users the courage to speak up, share their own experience, and join this
solidarity action of calling out sexist practices, or “feminist meme event” (Thrift,
2014). As in the case of #BeenRapedNeverReported, #YesAllWomen, and
#MeToo, the torrents of mediated voices dominated Twitter and subsequently
were reported by traditional media to the wider general public. This collective
storytelling successfully made visible persistent sexist practices in everyday life.
Thus, it serves to expose dominant sexism and implement alternative discourse that
is equal and fair.
Second, a hashtag, the key to digital engagement, acts as a reference point to
connect personal testimonials. It serves as an “interpretive frame” (Bonilla & Rosa,
2015) or a narrative frame of reference which people use to highlight and con-
ceptualize the specific aspects of their deeply personal experiences and to share
them. In other words, those testimonials, situationally diverse yet structurally simi-
lar, are customized to fit the frame. “[E]asy-to-personalize action themes” (Bennett
& Segerberg, 2012) mediate the feminist meme events.
Third, digital engagement fosters “affective solidarity” (Hemmings, 2012) that
connects participants in the hashtag feminism. Hemmings contends that it rises
from dissonance; the dissonance emerges between what sexist ideas instruct you
(not) to be or do and what you may be or act outside the dominance of ideol-
ogy—alternate possibilities. She goes on to say that the dissonance evokes affects
such as frustration, disgust, resentment, and rage. Twitter is quite handy and suited
for documenting the personal dissonance-driven affects in everyday life. Indeed,
the personal dissonance-driven affects, due to their very nature, are relatable and
142 S. Mizoroki and B. Kim
sticky and thus easy to spark engagement, connect participants, and build solidarity.
Collectively, people become more cognizant of alternate possibilities, and more-
over they become aware of the systemic and structural nature of what they thought
personal struggle, triggering a sense of injustice in society. Twitter acts as a platform
that builds affective solidarity among hashtag participants.
Forth, digital engagement is effective in calling out sexist practices and provide
counter-narratives to rectify the hegemonic system (Mendes et al., 2018). Pre-
dicated on a clear understanding of the structural nature of oppression, participants
use Twitter to call out people when they engage in sexist practices, or brandish
their gendered norms, expectations, moral codes, and sense of social order. More-
over, Twitter provides participants with “sites for collectively constructing counter-
narratives” (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015). Once the escalation cycle kicks in—visibility,
conceptualization, dissonance, affects, and solidarity—a call for change and a
counter-narrative to dominant sexism keep snowballing on digital platforms. News
coverage on this movement by online and traditional media accelerates the cycle,
spreading awareness among the general public beyond social media.
Research questions
The abovementioned literature indeed gives a strong argument behind the rise of
the digital phenomenon. However, they tend to focus on Western society except
for a few (e.g., Hassan et al., 2019; J. Kim, 2017; J. Kim, 2018; O’Mochain, 2020)
even though Japan has developed into the second biggest market for Twitter after
the US (Twitter, 2021) and has 45 million monthly active users (MAU) (Twitter
Japan, 2017). Twitter, which 38.7% of the population uses, is more popular than
Facebook in Japan and indeed the second largest social media in Japan after LINE
(Fujii & Hinuma, 2019; LINE, 2021; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Commu-
nications Japan, 2020).2 The use of social media has reached 87% in South Korea,
and Facebook was most favored by younger generations (1.9 million) and Twitter
with 0.8 million. The average amount of time spent on Twitter reached 594
minutes each month, followed by Facebook with 567 minutes and Instagram with
441 minutes (Shim, 2020). Moreover, most research pertains to the #MeToo
movement in Japan or Korea focus on media portray of the movement (e.g.,
Hasunuma & Shin, 2019; Lee, 2019; Lee, 2020; Starkey et al., 2019) rather than
qualitative or quantitative analysis of narrative on Twitter. Thus, by comparing
Twitter discourses on sexual violence in two languages, this chapter contributes to
the existing academic work on online personal expressions and feminist collective
action. To guide our analysis, the following research questions were posed:
RQ1: What specific patterns emerged in the Twitter discourse after the public
exposure of sexual violence allegations that gained notoriety in light of the
#MeToo movement?
RQ2: How did the support for the survivors and collective women’s voices
develop?
Sexual assaults and politics on Twitter 143
Methods
Sample
To understand how personal expressions were displayed on Twitter after the two
major sexual allegations were made public, we gathered tweets by using the names
of survivors and assailants: Shiori Ito- (“伊藤詩織”) and Noriyuki Yamaguchi (“山
口敬之”) for the Japanese tweets; Jihyeon Seo (“서지현”) and Taekeun Ahn
(“안태근”) for the Korean tweets.
The data collection period for this study was set as follows: Japan (May 29,
2017–January 18, 2020) and Korea (January 29, 2018–January 18, 2020).3 Based on
the literature that collects prior tweets retroactively (Jungherr, 2016; Norheim et
al., 2018), we used a Python Script labeled GetOldTweets (https://github.com/Jef
ferson-Henrique/GetOldTweets-python) that is operated via the Twitter API to
collect tweets, and then we cleaned four datasets by deleting duplicates. This sam-
pling process yielded four datasets of tweets: 145,830 tweets mentioning Shiori Ito-,
129,960 tweets mentioning Noriyuki Yamaguchi, 17,838 tweets mentioning
Jihyeon Seo, and 5147 tweets mentioning Taekeun Ahn.
Furthermore, we filtered the datasets by deleting all tweets that contain URLs in
order to examine what users tweet with their own words as clearly as possible.
Approximately 60% of the tweets in Japanese and 65% in Korean included links to
other websites, i.e., news outlets, non-profit organizations, and political advocacy
groups. Those tweets usually have the autogenerated titles of the online articles that
automatically appear when you click the share button on the news website, which
can skew the results. Since it was not feasible to inspect tweets manually, we used
the presence of a URL as a proxy and deleted them altogether. The number of
tweets without URLs is 60,100 for tweets mentioning Ito-, 50,707 for Yamaguchi,
6531 for Seo, and 1550 for Ahn. The cleaned network maps better reflect user-
generated content because they actually tweet on their own or at least proactively
retweet other user-generated tweets.
Hence, a network that includes all tweets may reflect the general frames of news
organizations, and not only the personal opinions and comments of users. Deleting
all tweets with URLs is an efficient way to further focus on users’ personal tweets
written in their own words.
one Chinese character sexual (“性”) is central to our analysis, we pulled a combi-
nation of sexual and its frequently associated words such as violence (“暴力”),
damage (“被害”), and crime (“犯罪”) as one term. The documentary featured Ito-,
“Japan’s Secret Shame” (“日本の秘められた恥”), and her book, Black Box, were
also extracted as one term as well as personal names. Second, from the top of the
frequency list, we deleted less meaningful words for analysis, such as negative
auxiliary verbs and POS that consist of only hiragana (Higuchi, 2016, 2017). Third,
we manually searched within the top 1000 words and added to the list the syno-
nyms of the top 100 keywords. Moreover, the same words that were scripted dif-
ferently with Chinese character kanji topography and katakana syllabary, and the
same words with and without a hashtag were also added to the list. Examples
include Abe [安倍–アベ] and [#metoo–metoo]. The resulting number of the
keywords in the Ito- and Yamaguchi data were 107 and 116, respectively. We cal-
culated the number of co-occurrence of those keywords in the same tweet using R
script (using the quanteda package, see also Benoit et al., 2018).
We applied a parallel process to extract the top-100 keywords for Korean data-
sets using the same R script (Benoit et al., 2018). The network analysis procedure
was carried out as follows. First, we excluded prepositions, conjunction, and pro-
nouns from the selected keywords (e.g., “나 [I], “그래서 [so]”, 또한 [also]”).
Second, we combined synonyms from the list (e.g., 고맙습니다 [thank you] and
고마워 [thanks]) and then, we finalized 100 keywords, and these keywords were
used to generate two network maps.
We employed the network software Visone4 to generate network maps. Since each
initial network map was dense and hard to interpret, we merged synonyms and different
spellings associated with the central 100 keywords based on prior methods that show a
map simplification (Segev, 2020). For the Japanese datasets, we included nodes (key-
words) with at least 1100 links or more from both the female and male datasets. For the
Korean datasets, we included nodes with at least 18 links or more from the male dataset,
and nodes with 14 links or more from the female dataset. We also deleted isolated nodes
that were disconnected from the keyword networks as well as the most central key-
words that were used as the search terms themselves: Shiori Ito- (伊藤詩織) and Nor-
iyuki Yamaguchi (山口敬之) from the Japanese two datasets, Jihyeon Seo (서지현)
from the Korean female dataset, and Taeguen Ahn (안태근) from the Korean male
dataset. Louvain modularity was employed to generate clusters in a network map.
Results
FIGURE 7.1 Network of co-occurring words in Japanese tweets using the search term
“Shiori Ito-”.
Note. The size of a node indicates its betweenness centrality. The width of the ties indi-
cates the number of sentences in the corpus that mentioned each pair of words. The
grouping of the nodes are based on a cluster analysis using Louvain modularity. Network
visualization and calculations were performed with Visone (Brandes & Wagner, 2004).
First, the central node rape (レイプ, 強姦),5 bottom-left, is connected surprisingly
not to the sexual assault itself but a prominent political figure, Prime Minister, and thus
here constructs the Political cluster. It encompasses Abe (安倍), Shinzo (晋三), and
administration (政権) with which Yamaguchi reportedly holds a personal relationship (関
係). They are also mentioned together with media-related terms such as media (メ
ディア), its derogatory term mass media (マスコミ), and its report (報道).
A smaller, less central cluster at the bottom contains a couple of small nodes. In
an interview with BBC in the documentary—“Japan’s Secret Shame”—Diet (国
会) Member (議員) Mio Sugita (杉田) blamed Ito- for drinking a lot in front of a
man and losing her memory, and her statement (発言) was highly criticized as
victim-blaming (Jenkin & Woods, 2018).
A third cluster on the upper left corner represents the Judiciary theme with the
words trial (裁判) and litigation (訴訟) process. This cluster is quite descriptive;
Yamaguchi was not arrest[ed] (逮捕) because Nakamura (中村), who was the director
of criminal (刑事) investigations of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department,
reportedly intervened. Prosecutor (検察) also drop[ped] charge (不起訴) on the criminal
146 S. Mizoroki and B. Kim
(刑事) case. Ito- moved on to file a civil (民事) case, and court ruling (判決) judged that
she w[on] the case (勝訴).
The fourth cluster on the upper right encompasses her press conference (会見).
Most nodes are, again, descriptive and related to what she stated in her two press
conferences; she alleged that she received damage (被害)—sexual violence (性暴力)—
and moved on to accuse (告発) to pursue justice through the legal system.
A few exceptions are the word second (セカンド) and the feminist hashtag
#MeToo. Victim-blaming is called Sekando reipu (coined from a transliteration of
“second rape”, meaning a verbal repeated attack on a survivor) in Japanese, and this
term demonstrates concern about problematic abusive comments made on her.
#MeToo indeed appears in this cluster, but it does not accompany any terms that
indicate feminist solidarity, personal testimony, or call out.
The last cluster, the Mixed cluster, on the right, contains diverse terms, but two
frames were found: (1) regionality that contrasts world (世界) and Japan (日本) or
Japanese (日本人) and (2) gender that contrasts man (男性, 男) and woman (女性,
女). BBC refers to the channel on which the documentary was aired and it suggests
people’s concern about how foreign media portray Japan or Japanese in this
context.
This cluster shows the burgeon of a feminist chorus. Two words—human rights
(人権) and voice (声)—insinuate that users are more prone to mention the survi-
vor’s rights and the significance of breaking silence. Yet, these two words did not
appear to be central.
FIGURE 7.2 Network of co-occurring words in Japanese tweets using the search term
“Noriyuki Yamaguchi”.
principal, at a price that was way cheaper than the market price (Yoshimura & Ījima,
2017). Facing this political scandal, the MOF falsely announced that all related official
documents were already discarded and secretly forged internal documents to cover it
up. After the Asahi newspaper again exposed this cover-up (“Moritomo bunsho”,
2018), the MOF later publicly apologized for the forgery, and admitted that they kept
the original records, including the one that mentions the name of the Prime Minister’s
wife (“Zaimusho-, kakikae”, 2018).
The other political scandal also involves a school; Kake school, whose president
is a long-term friend (友) of Abe, was granted permission in 2017 to open a uni-
versity veterinarian department for the first time in 52 years in Japan. While Abe
denied all the allegations, the media exposed several internal documents suggesting
Abe’s political involvement in the permission process (“Shin gakubu”, 2017).
While Yamaguchi was not involved in those scandals, it is likely that Yamaguchi’s
widely publicized close connection with the Abe administration invoked close
association with those national political scandals.
Second, the Judicial cluster on the right includes scandals Yamaguchi reportedly
got benefited from. We see here two names: Nakamura (中村)—then the director
(部長) of criminal investigations of the metropolitan police department (MPD) (警視
庁), which is a police (警察) organization in Tokyo—who intervened to stop his
arrest (逮捕) on the charge of incapacitated rape, and Suga—then head chief (長官) of
cabinet secretariat (官房)—who was Nakamura’s former boss and reportedly helped
148 S. Mizoroki and B. Kim
Yamaguchi to get a job after Yamaguchi quit his job at TBS (“‘Jungo-kan taihojo-’ ga
nigiri tsubusare”, 2019).
Third, the Prime Minister cluster, which was built around Abe (安倍) recording
the highest score in-betweenness, also indicated that the focus of the attention
shifted toward politics: Diet (国会), Diet Member (議員), and ruling Liberal Demo-
cratic Party (LDP) (自民党) whose president was Abe. Attached to this cluster are
weekly (週刊) magazine Shincho- (新潮), which kept publishing hard-hitting article
(記事)-s on the political connection of Yamaguchi.
In addition to those clusters, we find another cluster at the bottom: the press
conference. This cluster mostly overlaps with the same cluster in the previous Ito-
network map but lacks #MeToo.
FIGURE 7.3 Network of co-occurring words in tweets in Korean using search term
“Jihyeon Seo”.
Sexual assaults and politics on Twitter 149
In addition, the left cluster reflects the theme that Seo is not alone in fighting
against the misogynistic culture of the prosecution service (검찰). One of the central
nodes is the name of another female prosecutor, Eunjeong Lim (임은정), who
published a Facebook post to accuse the institution of its male-centered culture in
July 2017 (I. Jang, 2018). Calls for fairness (공정) and reformation of the public prose-
cution (검찰개혁) emerged on the map.
Finally, the sexual harassment case was clearly politicized. Kyoil Choi (최교일) is
Ahn’s former boss who held a position of the prosecutor’s chief of the Ministry of
Justice in 2010 and became a politician of a right-leaning Liberty Korea Party
(자유한국당)—now renamed People Power Party (국민의 힘). After the TV
interview, numerous people talked about Choi because when he was working in
the legal office of the attorney general, he reprimanded the sexual harassment
investigator (Eunjeong Lim, 임은정) and tried to close the investigation as soon as
possible (J. Jang, 2018). Also, the investigator Lim officially mentioned: “that the
prosecution service is a train with the ruptured braking system, and that the system
has to be reformed with eliminating the abusing authority inside the prosecution
service” (Cha, 2018). This triggered people to talk about the director of the prosecu-
tion service (검찰총장) and its culture and system. In contrast, some of the politi-
cians who are in liberal parties applauded her and mentioned, “[h]er courage will
be a valuable asset that advances our society of women’s dignity and gender
equality” (Jeong, 2018). The current Korean president Jaein Moon (문재인) was
among them and officially announced that “we should take the #MeToo move-
ment seriously, and the judicial authorities should actively investigate the case in
order to respond to the courage of the victims” (S. Kim, 2018).
Still, similar to the Japanese network map, the Twitter narrative was drawn into
a political scandal: After she spoke up, another female prosecutor Mihyun Ahn
(안미현), who worked at Chunchun branch office (춘천지검) revealed that she was
investigating the Kangwon land[’s] (강원랜드) employment corruption but was
pressured by the director of the prosecution service (검찰총장) and other politicians to
slow down (Heo, 2018). The sexual harassment and the political scandal triggered
Koreans to talk about the reformation of prosecution service (검찰개혁), which was
shown in the top left of the network map.
FIGURE 7.4 Network of co-occurring words in tweets in Korean using search term
“Taeguen Ahn”.
had served as the Minister of Justice at a funeral home on October 30, 2010. I was
promised to receive an apology from him, but I have not”. Specifically, she
revealed that “Ahn wrapped my waist and stroked my ass” (dongA.com, 2018). He
denied the accusation and told the reporters that he had made a confession to God
in church (교회).
Moreover, criticism for Ahn and his colleague is more rampant. Seo’s dis-
advantages (불이익) were related to his abusing authority (직권남용) and his personal
reprisal (개인 보복). Criticism was also targeted at ruined journalists (Gi-re-gi,
기레기). Journalism researchers are concerned that the practice of reporting sexual
harassment focused merely on the exposure of the case itself rather than scrutiniz-
ing and verifying it (Roh, 2018). The reason why people referred to ruined jour-
nalists in Korea is that even though there are journalists who strive to keep the
media fair and reliable, their efforts are often obstructed by media company owners
or managers. In Korea, the political partisanship of media outlets often invites cri-
ticism and leads to untrustworthiness in general, which drives people to call jour-
nalists who do not provide trustworthy reports, ruined journalists (Lim, 2014).
The map illustrates the attention to Seo’s TV interview. She appeared in JTBC
Newsroom on January 29 in 2018, which was hosted by Sukhee Son (손석희), a
famous TV anchor at that time in Korea. She said that “I came out to the TV
news show because I wanted to tell other sexual harassment victims that it was
not your fault. It took me eight years to realize it” (Park, 2018b). Support for Seo
can be found in terms such as brave (용기) and I support you (응원합니다) in this
map as well.
Sexual assaults and politics on Twitter 151
Finally, the three clusters on the top of the network reflect the highly politicized
nature of the discourse. It features one conservative politician Kyoil Choi (최교일)
from the right-leaning Liberty Korea Party (자유한국당). Several political scandals
involving other former prosecutors were underway at the time the sexual harass-
ment case was revealed in 2010. The trial of the former senior secretary for civil
affairs and former prosecutor, Byoungwoo Woo (우병우), and the Kangwon land[’s]
(강원랜드) recruitment corruption (채용비리) occurred in 2012 and 2013. This
corruption case was closely associated with a congressman and a former prosecutor,
Sungdong Kweon (권성동) (Jung, 2017).
Discussion
In this chapter, we looked at how Twitter users discussed the widely publicized
sexual abuse allegations of two women in Japan and South Korea. Using semantic
network analysis, we identified three unique patterns in the Japanese network maps.
First, the most significant finding was the highly politicized nature of the Twitter
discourse. While the comparison between the networks showed a difference in
quantity, the political scandal indeed took over the focus of this rape allegation.
Second, the flip side of the dominance of politics was the absence of visible
women’s collective voice and action against sexism. While problematization of
victim-blaming was found, in contrast to #YesAllWomen (Thrift, 2014), #WhyIS-
tayed (Clark, 2016), or #Metoo (Mendes et al., 2018), the Ito-’s call for change did
not lead to a feminist meme event nor evoke an outpouring of affective solidarity
from survivors and supporters, let alone deconstruct sexist culture and initiate social
change. No prominent counter-narrative to sexual violence was developed (RQ2).
#MeToo appeared in the Political cluster but was not developed into a reference
point to produce its own cluster. The lack of meaningful feminist discussion among
Japanese Twitter users proved the points made by Bennett and Segerberg (2012):
“Personal action frames do not spread automatically. People must show each other
how they can appropriate, shape, and share themes”. Beyond this book chapter,
further research could examine why affective solidarity did not materialize.
Third, the mass media coverage played a significant role in shaping the Twitter
discourse, either on television (BBC) or in a weekly magazine (Shincho-), even
though this influence was much clearer in the network before filtering out tweets
with URLs, where news and news commentary were cited to add opinions and
feelings. Those reactions were directed toward not only what was reported but also
how the media portrayed the case. Commentary over mass media overshadowed
the women’s testimonials.
What do the silence of women, lack of personal story sharing, and absence of
online collective action mean? Feminist scholars have stressed, “hashtag feminism’s
discursive power is vital for activism surrounding violence against women, given
the ways in which popular discourse enables a culture in which sexual violence is
accepted as part of the norm” (Clark, 2016). Our research shows a darker picture
of discursive reality in current Japanese society.
152 S. Mizoroki and B. Kim
Compared to the Japanese networks, the Korean networks revealed both similarities
and differences in the digital discursive landscape. A striking resemblance was its poli-
ticization of the issue. Irrelevant political scandals and controversial political figures
were mentioned together, partially shifting the agenda from gender-based violence to
political debate. Still, the vital difference was that the Korean discourse included an
appreciation of and solidarity for Seo’s bravery, which did not emerge in the Japanese
case. Chandra and Erlingsdóttir (2020) claim that the courage was “contagious” and
“one of the most encouraging features” of the movement. We need to closely inspect
each tweet, of course, to see if it only shows appreciation for her courage or that her
courage inspired others to speak up. However, we can safely say our analysis illustrates
the very flint needed to spark the movement in the Korean case.
Moreover, the absence of nodes was telling in both cases. First, #Metoo did not
function as a narrative frame of reference to conceptualize and share personal
stories among Twitter users. Chandra and Erlingsdóttir (2020) contend that the
#MeToo movement was propelled by “individual appropriations of the hashtag”
and “the power of stories and personal narrative”. Although the two brave women
have been credited with being the key figures to spread the #MeToo movement,
our analysis showed that the hashtag failed to serve as “an easily personalized
storytelling prompt” (Clark, 2016) that mediated the feminist meme event.
Second, while value-laden words such as “cover-up” and “abusing authority” were
identified, most terms were quite descriptive, and no terms signified affects such as
resentment and rage. We cannot know what affects were expressed, if any, without
closely examining each tweet, but at least we contend that people did not use patterned
language to show their affects against sexist practices. The two cases did not produce “a
forum where anger and sorrow could be expressed in survivors’ own words and be
heard” (Chandra and Erlingsdóttir, 2020), which the #MeToo movement has achieved.
Why did the cases in Korea and Japan not inspire the #MeToo movement to the same
magnitude as in the Anglophone sphere? Was the “decades of collective work against
sexual abuse by groups and individuals” (MacKinnon, 2020) on which the movement
can spring out not enough? Are the “thresholds” of social support that people require to
“rebel or say what they actually think” too high (Sunstein, 2020)? Answering this ques-
tion is beyond the scope of this chapter, but this chapter demonstrates the lacuna of cas-
cading voices from the oppressed in Japan and Korea, to say the least.
Limitation
First, our analysis did not reveal how gender trolling played out over these issues.
While this research only used the formal names of four people, it is well known
that online users tend to deploy derogatory denominations to attack and blame the
targets in order to avoid consequences (Hamada, 2020). Additional data collection,
including these abusive pseudonyms, can reveal how people engaged in cyberbul-
lying and threw hateful comments on the targets.
Second, the engagement metrics, such as the number of likes and retweets without
comment, were not considered in this research. If we weighted the engagement, we
Sexual assaults and politics on Twitter 153
would have shown a different landscape of how Twitter users reacted to these cases
and also interacted with each other. Further research can address this matter.
Finally, we only focused on the Twitter feed. While Twitter is one of the largest
social media platforms both in Korea and Japan, other social media platforms, such
as Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, news curation websites such as Yahoo!
JAPAN, and blogging platforms such as Ameba blog and Note, are also widely
used by people to express their own opinions. Further research can include those
platforms to conduct a more comprehensive discourse analysis on the issue.
Acknowledgments
We would like to express our deepest gratitude to Professor Limor Shifman at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who devoted her expertise and insight leading the
DigitalValues research project, from which this book chapter originated. Many thanks
also to Professor Kaori Hayashi at the University of Tokyo, who helped to develop this
study and whose mentorship profoundly enriched the process of writing this chapter.
Notes
1 Translation of Korean names is based on English spellings that appear on major news
outlets (i.e., The Korea Times).
2 Started as messaging app, LINE now provides news and digital money among other ser-
vices and counted as social media by the ministry of internal affairs and communications.
154 S. Mizoroki and B. Kim
LINE is used by 86.9% of the population (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Japan, 2020).
3 The data collection started on the date when the two cases were made public: Ito- held
her first press conference on May 29, 2017. Seo appeared on TV news program on Jan-
uary 29, 2018, and gave testimony. Data collection was terminated after the civil case
ruling in Japan and the supreme court ruling in Korea.
4 Available at: https://visone.info/
5 Throughout this chapter, we italicize the names of the nodes in the network maps and
put in parenthesis the names in original language for clarity.
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Evening edition, 1.
8
TIME TO BE HAPPY
WhatsApp and phatic communication within the
extended family
Noa A. Hatzir
Introduction
Communication between family members is the building block of the family unit, and
the basis for understanding individual experiences as well as sharing values, beliefs, and
perceptions (Galvin et al., 2015). It enables family members to share social reality and
cooperate as a unit (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002). Within the family we learn what
communication is and how to communicate (Bruner, 1990). In recent years there is a
growing research on the extended family due to the increasing life expectancy and its
importance to individuals’ wellbeing (Bengtson, 2001; LaFave & Thomas, 2017; Trilar
et al., 2018), support, care, and treatment (Halperin, 2015).
Although face-to-face communication is quite common among family members,
mediated communication means increasingly make up an important part. In the last
two decades various online communication technologies have emerged, facilitating
and maintaining extended family connections (Chambers, 2017; Miller, 2016;
Seufert et al., 2016). In order to understand how online communication within
families is used, we should therefore look at the perceptions of digital technologies
as well as the cultural and social norms surrounding them (Madianou, 2015;
Madianou & Miller, 2013, 2018; Sinanan, 2016).
The present study focuses on family communication through the Mobile Instant
Messaging (MIM) app, WhatsApp. WhatsApp was chosen to be studied for several
reasons. First, it is the most popular communication application today, mostly used
in America, Asia, the Middle East, and South Africa (Newman et al., 2019; Sevitt,
2017). In Israel 91% of the adult population are using the app (Bezeq, 2020).
Second, communication with WhatsApp is perceived as “natural” (Church & De
Oliveira, 2013), or in other words it is seen as the closest to face-to-face commu-
nication compared to other online platforms, such as emails or Facebook (Chan,
2018). This is mainly due to the versatility of expressions through its interface that
DOI: 10.4324/9781003120100-9
160 N. A. Hatzir
Morgade Salgado, 2020; Waterloo et al., 2018) and experiences, and even document
everyday life, a process called “lifelogging” (Karapanos et al., 2016). In addition, What-
sApp has been perceived as a facilitator of social support (Chan, 2018), enhancing the
quality of relationships, and contributing to intimacy, closeness (Knop et al., 2016;
Mendoza Pérez & Morgade Salgado, 2020; Sinanan, 2016), and personal wellbeing
(Kaye & Quinn, 2019). Moreover, WhatsApp is effective in maintaining the connections
between loved ones, in which the sense of “togetherness” can be experienced from a
distance (Aharony & Gazit, 2016; Karapanos et al., 2016; Mendoza Pérez & Morgade
Salgado, 2020; O’Hara et al., 2014; Taipale, 2019). The sense of togetherness goes hand-
in-hand with the principles of phatic communication (Vanden Abeele et al., 2018).
Phatic communication was first defined by Malinowski (1923) as an utterance
whose function is not to inform and share information, but rather to build social
bonds (Malinowski, 1923). Jacobson (1960) developed the linguistic model that
presents six functions of language, including the phatic function. According to him,
this function maintains the connection, physical and phycological, between the
speakers (Jacobson, 1960). Phatic communication includes “small talk”, such as the
exchange of general greetings and metacommentary, which emphasize positive
feelings (Schandorf, 2012). Nowadays, researchers show that in social network
websites and instant massages applications, phatic communication is dramatically
increased (Maíz-Arévalo, 2017; Miller, 2008; Schandorf, 2012; Wang et al., 2011,
2012), particularly in WhatsApp (Wang et al., 2011; Yus, 2017).
Phatic communication, sometimes compared to “grooming” among primates, is
beneficial for social coherence. From the functional perspective, it provides the basic
human need for connection and relatedness (Vanden Abeele et al., 2018; Wang et al.,
2011, 2012). It helps to “establish and maintain social connections together with
opening up to others and recognizing them as potential communication partners”
(Maíz-Arévalo, 2017: 433), and to promote a sense of belonging and community
identification (Parks, 2010). As a result, it promotes social harmony and avoids conflict
(Miller, 2017). Furthermore, phatic communication was found significant in order to
collaborate as a group through mediated communication (Maíz-Arévalo, 2017), and
to replace the nonverbal cues of signaling attention (Kulkarni, 2014). The technology
answers those basic needs (Wang et al., 2011, 2012), and constitutes an extension of
the face-to-face communication (Schandorf, 2012).
From a critical point of view, however, it can be argued that phatic messages
produce “shallow” communication because of the obligation to keep the social
links “alive” through text (Miller, 2008) or photos (Lobinger, 2016). Users are
measured by the number of their friends or followers, and there is a demand to
expand the network (Miller, 2008). Following this view, the sense of being con-
nected has become more critical, sometimes even more than the substantive con-
tent of communication (Miller, 2008, 2017). Yet, it is important to note that
Miller refers to social network websites, characterized by antonymous (forums and
blogs) or pseudo-antonymous (such as Twitter or Facebook) identities, and does
not emphasize the basic human need for connection and relatedness (Vanden
Abeele et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2011, 2012).
162 N. A. Hatzir
link-list was then imported into the Visone network analysis and visualization software
(Brandes & Wagner, 2004). We ended up with two networks of frequent words, one
for each WhatsApp group. In each network, we conducted cluster analysis using
Louvain modularity and identified the betweenness centrality of the words.
Similarly, the discourse in the WhatsApp group of the extended family B (right)
evolved mostly around events. In fact, the greeting “happy birthday” was so dominant
and central in this group that it overshadowed the rest of the network structure. To
understand the patterns and relationships between the other topics, those two words
were removed. In this network grandparents are not active in the network, and the
most central role was played by one of the mothers (labeled as “Mom3”). Prominent
words such as “love”, “health”, “hugs”, and “kisses” were all related to birthday greet-
ings. Another prominent use of WhatsApp, as seen in the previous group, was sharing
photos, as indicated once again by the high centrality of the “media”.
In both WhatsApp groups the most prominent and central words represented
positive experiences such as “happiness” and “fun”. The topics of discussion revolved
mainly around happy events such as the celebration of birthdays and holidays.
Interestingly, in both groups the most prominent emoji that was shared by many
family members was of the kissing face , indicating that one of the important
functions of the group was sharing positive emotions of affection and love.
birthdays in Israel are central social events that contribute to strengthening family tradi-
tion and culture as well as an opportunity to celebrate and sanctify the value of life.
including video and pictures, and the ease of using the WhatsApp’s interface. One of
the interviewees from the second generation (mothers), explained why she prefers to
share the good news through her WhatsApp family group and not by other platforms:
Because with WhatsApp I can post it [the good news] directly to everyone,
because I will not start making 20 phone calls.
(Mother, 53 years)
Another woman explained that she likes to celebrate good news with the family, parti-
cularly when she believes that it will be interesting for them. She first writes or sends
photos on WhatsApp, and only then talks about it on the phone with her family members:
I have diabetes, and because I started a new diet the sugar went down won-
derfully, so I told everyone about that. They were all very happy. And now
they ask me how my sugar rates are, every day.INTERVIEWER: All this happens
through WhatsApp?
168 N. A. Hatzir
Cluster B on the right evolves around the word “know”, which connects the words
“mother” and “daughter”. The main idea presented by the interviewees was that the
usage of WhatsApp depends on the quality of the personal relationship between the
family members, and particularly the mother–daughter relationship. Knowing their
daughter’s personality and schedule, mothers choose how and when to use different
types of communication channels. They also emphasized the importance of WhatsApp
in maintaining good relationships, particularly between grandparents and their grand-
children, or when the children move away from their parent’s home.
Considering the personal relationship, one of the women said that the nice part of
WhatsApp is that it helps her and her daughter to feel close, although they live apart.
Really, there is a desire to feel that we are … even if we are far from each
other, we’re still close. I will even send her pictures of things I want to buy so
that we can feel together on a daily basis.
(Mother, 49 years)
Most women mentioned that they would prefer phone conversations over
WhatsApp messages, but this is not always possible. Sending WhatsApp messages
allows them to communicate with minimal interference:
During the day, I know she is busy, she told me that. I would like to make a
phone call, but she told me that she is in meetings, and can’t answer. So, it is
better to send her a WhatsApp [message] and she will see it later.
(Grandmother, 76 years)
The fear of disturbing was mentioned in other contexts. One mother explained
that she was mindful of her daughter’s moods, and respected her preference for
communicating through WhatsApp rather than over the phone:
Sometimes she prefers to chat and not to talk. It’s like she does not feel like talking.
Especially if she is depressed about something, she prefers to write and not talk. I go
with it. Even if I call her, she won’t pick up, so I know that and therefore send her a
message. I know she is not in the mood for talking; she just doesn’t feel like it.
(Mother, 58 years)
Finally, clusters C and D on the top and bottom are related to the time dimension, with
words such as “time”, “available”, and “convenient”. This theme is related to the ability
(with the keywords “able”, “available”), and willingness (with the keywords “want” and
“prefer”) of the family members to engage in synchronous communication such as
talking and making phone calls or asynchronous communication: writing and sending
Time to be happy 169
messages. The variety of features available through the WhatsApp interface allows both
synchronous and asynchronous communication. Yet respondents often empha-
sized its semi-a-synchronous qualities, such as the ability to send a message, see
whether someone saw it, and learn about her/his availability and willingness before
committing to time-consuming synchronous conversation over the phone.
One mother emphasized the importance of her independence after all her children
left the house. WhatsApp enabled her to put limits and determine her availability.
She wants something; I am not available right now to hear what she wants.
She writes to me; I can only send her an icon, which symbolizes—I under-
stand, I am on it. Just not at this moment, because now I study.
(Mother, 59 years)
A young interviewee explained that she is often very busy. She expressed frus-
tration about her family’s expectation to communicate immediately, and said that
she tends to answer a few days after everyone:
They [the family members] already know. If I send someone “happy birthday”
on the accurate day, it is as if something happened. They already know I am
not available. I just do everything retrospectively. Sometimes I am in the
middle of something, like work, and then I forget … the conversation on
WhatsApp is endless, sometimes I prefer to just call and finish with it.
(Daughter, 28 years)
Discussion
Due to its diversity and unique features, WhatsApp has become a crucial part of
our media environment. It has been embraced as one of the prime channels for
communication within the family around the world (Madianou, 2015; Madianou
& Miller, 2013, 2018; Sinanan, 2016), and particularly among family members in
Israel (Bezeq, 2020). In this study we looked at the perception and actual uses of
WhatsApp groups among the extended family in Israel. The findings highlight the
perceived benefits of WhatsApp to maintain the relationships among the extended
family members thanks to its versatility, allowing the use of different communica-
tion forms (text, audio, image, and video), and more importantly the integration of
synchronous and asynchronous communication.
We utilized semantic network analysis of two corpora: actual WhatsApp con-
versations and interview transcripts. This enabled us to present two complementary
approaches to the understanding of the relationship between technology and its
users. On the one hand, we showed how the unique features of WhatsApp con-
tributed to the communication among the extended family communication. Its
perceived benefits are evident: a variety of synchronous and asynchronous forms of
communication, the transmission of messages in a variety of ways (e.g., text,
image, audio, video), and the ability to create groups that include a large number
of participants, free of charge based on the contact persons stored on the mobile
phone. In practice, family members use WhatsApp mainly to send positive mes-
sages and share images of daily events that contribute to strengthening the sense
of “unity” (Aharony & Gazit, 2016; Karapanos et al., 2016; O’Hara et al., 2014;
Taipale, 2019).
When analyzing the content of conversations within the extended family, we found
mainly a positivity bias around photo sharing and family rituals (birthdays, holidays,
and weekend greetings or gatherings), where content involved fun experiences and
affectionate feelings. This provides evidence for the dominance of phatic commu-
nication in WhatsApp. Supporting this view, many of the interviewees claimed that
WhatsApp is less suitable for serious interpersonal communication, intimate discus-
sions, and resolution of conflicts. They indicated that in those cases a phone con-
versation is preferable, as it allows a higher degree of synchrony and involvement, and
more privacy. Yet with the growing use of WhatsApp and other mediated means of
communication within the family, it may be that phatic communication will become
the norm, as people are increasingly busy in being connected and maintaining their
positive image (Miller, 2008, 2017).
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9
SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT
Semantic network analysis of the literature
Introduction
School Improvement (SI) is crucial for policymakers with different educational
systems across countries (OECD, 2019; Greatbatch & Tate, 2019). In many
Western countries SI is associated with neo-liberal policies (Wrigley, 2008) that
emphasize decentralization (e.g., Nurkolis & Sulisworo, 2018) and embrace a
quasi-market logic in the educational systems by opening schools to competition,
privatization, and accountability. These measures demand educators strive to find
and employ practices that are significant for improving students’ achievements
(Azkiyah, 2017; Hallinger, 2018; Pashiardis & Brauckmann, 2019). It should be
noted that these efforts have been ongoing since the well-known Coleman Report
(Coleman et al., 1966). Nowadays the research literature on SI is highly prolific,
comprehensive, and addresses various actors (e.g., school principals, teachers,
students, policymakers), processes, and outcomes situated within diverse social
and organizational contexts.
The diverse literature reviews in the field (Kovačević & Hallinger, 2019, biblio-
metric analysis; Gumus et al., 2018; Tian & Huber, 2019, bibliometric and content
analyses) show that SI is one of the themes that has preoccupied research. Yet the
focus of these studies has been mainly in the forms of leadership in schools. In the
present study, we focus specifically on SI, attempting to identify and map the general
themes in the current literature (during the five years between 2014 and 2018) that
cover issues beyond leadership. Particularly, we look at whether the current literature
addresses the need for reforms and calls for educational response to the changes of
the 21st century, including the growing globalization and international competition,
and the development of digital technologies (Cheng, 2011).
In this chapter, we first introduce the conceptual relationship between school
effectiveness (SE) and SI. As the literature in the field is extensive, we further
DOI: 10.4324/9781003120100-10
176 A. Addi-Raccah, T. Shahrabani and E. Segev
employ the semantic network analysis to identify reoccurring themes and topics
related to SI as emerging in current research articles. Semantic network analysis
(Segev, 2020) enables to map the relationships and identify patterns within the
knowledge regarding SI in scientific publications. We collected 215 research
articles that mentioned both terms (SE and SI) from the last five years, produced
a list of relevant frequent words, and conducted semantic network analysis to
identify the main clusters and themes discussed in the literature. While semantic
network analysis enables us to map the overall topics and their relationships, we
further “dive-in” and employ a thematic qualitative analysis of a sample articles to
better understand the context and inter-connectedness between topics. To con-
clude, we identify gaps in the literature and suggest some directions for future
research.
century. Thus, there was a paradigm shift in learning and teaching to ensure their
relevance for the future in the context of multiple intelligence, globalization,
localization, and individualization. Further, schools are perceived not as indepen-
dent units (Keddie, 2014), but rather as part of a broader education system. They
are required to develop a more flexible and heterarchical structure based on
establishing extended social networks and collaboration with diverse internal and
external school stakeholders (e.g., parents, NGOs, teachers, Local Educational
Authorities, students, school networks) (Addi-Raccah et al., 2018; Hallinger, 2018;
Ni et al., 2017) in order to maximize learning opportunities for students (Hopkins
et al., 2014; Cheng, 2011).
This leads to new modes of governance and bottom-up perceptions that focus
on school processes through teachers’ professional learning communities, lateral
collaboration within schools, and networking (Hargreaves, 2012). As indicated by
Muijs (2010), there is an association between networking and collaboration for
school improvement. Apparently, at the present time the field of SI is situated in
multi-dimensional contexts, attempting to facilitate collaboration and networking
within schools and between schools and other institutions, and navigating between
the axis of local and global trends and between bottom-up and top-down approa-
ches. Further, while the research focused mainly on students’ achievement, there is
a consensus upon the need to measure diverse educational outcomes (e.g., the
dynamic model). This direction is further enhanced with the emphasis on 21st-
century skills, and the efforts to advance soft skills and socio-emotional learning
(Chernyshenko et al., 2018). This goes along with Hill and Guthrie’s (1999) notion
that on the eve of the 21st century, there is a need to develop a new school
paradigm that is based on school productivity and improvement (Louis et al.,
1999). If so, in view of the current trends of SI, our aims are to explore what is the
narrative emerging from the current SI literature by revealing the central players
(actors) who are involved in the process of SI and the domains and themes that
underline SI research.
Methods
Sample
Our analysis is based on peer-reviewed articles. The process of obtaining the
sample of articles included several stages. First, we used Clarivate Analytics JCR
journal citation reports to obtain a list of all the journals in the field of education
with any impact factors. Out of all these journals, we chose only those in the top
two quarters of the list. Second, we defined relevant search queries that could be
used to retrieve articles that delt with school improvement. The chosen search
queries that yielded relevant results were: “effective schools” or “effective school
research” or (school and success), “School effectiveness”, and “school improve-
ment”. Searches were conducted in four databases (PsycNET, Education Source,
ERIC, and Web of Science) in the fields of title, summary, and keywords for each
School improvement 179
of the chosen journals that we defined for the five years between 2014 and 2018.
To conclude, we manually scanned all the articles for relevancy. Out of more than
300 articles retrieved, we omitted those focusing on special education schools,
psychological learning disorders, physical disabilities, and duplication of articles. In
total, this search process returned 215 relevant articles that explicitly delt with
school improvement.
Procedure
Our analysis was conducted in two stages. We employed semantic network analysis
to identify the main themes around which the academic discussion on success in
schools revolved. Once we identified central terms and clusters of words related to
the field, we conducted a qualitative analysis to better understand the context in
which these words and themes were discussed in the literature.
For the semantic network analysis, we first constructed a list of the most fre-
quent words in the text with a frequency of at least 0.01% of the total number of
words (N = 2,299,185). We then manually inspected this list, removed stop-words
and irrelevant words, and merged words with a similar derivation (such as singular
and plural). We ended up with a list of 229 frequent words that appeared at least
139 times in the corpus. We also identified frequent phrases in the literature (such
as “professional development” and “transformational leadership”), which were
crucial in the context of our study. Next, we constructed an undirected weighted
network of words that co-occurred in the same sentence. We also explored the
option of looking at words appearing together in the same paragraph but found
that the window of one sentence was more accurate in our corpus, keeping the
tight proximity between words (see also Danowski, 1993). Finally, we conducted
several analyses, including measuring the network centrality of words, a cluster
analysis to extract the main themes and topics, and, based on the semantic map, an
in-depth qualitative analysis to better understand the context of SI research.
For the following analysis, due to the high density of the network, we focused
on two network resolutions: a network of word pairs that were mentioned in at
least 200 sentences (for visualizing the network’s overall structure and main themes
in Figures 9.1), and another network of word pairs that appeared in at least 100
sentences (around one of the particular keywords in Figures 9.2). In addition,
articles that were selected for further qualitative analysis were based on a propor-
tional stratified sampling of about a quarter (23%; N = 50) of the articles published
in each year (2014 to 2018) (e.g., for an example of a random selection of articles
in conducting a literature review, see McInerney et al., 2004). These articles were
randomly selected from all the articles that emerged from our search in order to
provide a diverse scope of articles, and not necessarily an influential one (prior
reviews conducted content analyses of the most cited articles; Tian & Huber,
2019). For each article, two of the researchers conducted a content analysis gen-
erated by the following codes: research main topic or aims, participants, research
methods, main findings, and conclusion based on the findings. For the current
180 A. Addi-Raccah, T. Shahrabani and E. Segev
study that deploys the dominant players and themes emerging in the current SI
literature, we concentrated on two codings: the participants in each study and its
central topic or issue.
Results
Figure 9.1 presents the results of a cluster analysis based on Louvain’s modularity
(Blondel et al., 2008, see also Chapter 1). The size of the nodes reflects their
betweenness centrality. The width of the ties reflects the number of sentences in
which each pair of words was mentioned.
Figure 9.1 portrays four clusters that revolve around four central words: on the
left “teachers”, on the right “students”, and in between “improve” (bottom) and
“leadership” (top). In more detail, Figure 9.1 shows that the articles dealing with
school improvement emphasize three significant players. The word “teacher”,
which is prominent, is surrounded by prominent words related to professional
development and prospective learning, suggesting that SI involves investment in
human resources in the workplace. The word “student” is surrounded by words that
focus mainly on educational products and academic achievements (such as “tests”,
“scores”, and “assessments”). The word “leaders” focus on three dimensions of lea-
dership: “distributive”, “transformational”, and “instructional” leadership. As this
cluster is located in between the teacher and student clusters, it seems that leaders and
managers are responsible for enabling the work of teachers and students, and more
generally to SI. Moreover, the three players connect to the cluster of school
improvement that includes the words “capacity”, “networks”, and “policies”.
The link of all these words to improvement is not surprising as our search was
initially focused on school improvement as a keyword. Yet, although the initial
search included the word “effective”, it was more marginal in the network. Hence,
the research literature seems to emphasize the school processes—of improvement—
rather than its outcomes. Moreover, the narrative that emerges from the analysis
revealed two important foci: one is the triangle between teachers, school leaders,
and school improvement. The other is on the triangle of teachers, students, and
school improvement. Leadership seems to be indirectly linked to students through
teachers and through school improvement processes. Interestingly, the parents,
who are significant actors in the field of education, appeared to be minor in the SI/
SE literature, as parents are mostly mentioned in relation to the students, with no
prominent ties to the teachers or school leadership.
Based on our sample of 50 articles, we found that there was indeed a centrality to
teachers (as mentioned above); 27 articles examined teachers or teachers with other
participants (see below for more details). Further, students were dominant in Figure
9.1 and most of the articles addressed the implications of the educational process for
improving students’ outcomes, but in practice only five articles examined students as
their primary subject. Four of these studies referred to efforts and programs for
improving students’ achievements (in math or literacy) (Gorard et al., 2015, 2017;
Kelcey & Shen, 2016, Valenzuela et al., 2016; Bellei et al., 2016), and one for
decreasing school bullying (Kyriakides et al., 2014). It was also found that seven of the
articles addressed schools’ leadership specifically. These studies reflected a wide range
of topics: school leaders’ strategies and practices for improving schools under
accountability demands and competition (Jabbar, 2015; Galdames et al., 2018; Ehren
& Shackleton, 2016); leadership and practices for school improvement in different
school contexts (Hallinger, 2018; Reed & Swaminathan, 2016); school leaders and
inclusive values for improving schools (Reed & Swaminathan, 2016), or a critical view
regarding low performing schools that change rapidly, known as “quick win” schools
(Meyers & Hitt, 2018).
The research on SI is linked not only to students, teachers, and leaders, but also to
their interactions and collaboration with diverse external agencies. Articles focused
on the relations between school leaders and policymakers (Daly et al., 2014; Dun-
away et al., 2014) and examined leaders’ responses and challenges in facing diverse
policies (Frankenberg, 2015; Gaertner et al., 2014; Liou, 2016) or professionals from
out of school (Swaffield, 2015). Other articles focused on promoting effective part-
nership between schools for school improvement as between high and low achieving
schools (Muijs, 2015), collaboration between schools in a divided society in Ireland
(Duffy & Gallagher, 2015), and collaboration between schools, which is a challenge
under policies that favor accountability and competition between schools (Ehren &
Perryman, 2018; Frankenberg et al., 2015). Armstrong and Ainscow (2018), stressed
trust as an essential factor for between schools’ collaborations. An additional two
182 A. Addi-Raccah, T. Shahrabani and E. Segev
The other focus is related to their relationship with the school leadership or the
management. It refers to school principals who enhance teachers’ role in schools by
means of transformational or distributive leadership and capacity to manage change,
as found in prior studies (Leithwood & Jantzi, 2006). The relations between the
different enabling factors were found to be weak, indicating that studies often
choose only one of these foci, and do not offer a comprehensive analysis of the
different elements that support teachers’ work.
On the top-left, labeled “teachers’ practices”, is a cluster of general school
practices and processes of SI, including words such as “learning”, “teaching”,
“support”, and “development”. This cluster reflects teachers’ practices that are
related to students’ learning processes. At the bottom of the network, the cluster
labeled “students’ outcomes” focuses on cognitive outcomes such as “achieve-
ment”, “scores”, “test”, and “assessment”. Here too, the relations between the
terms in this cluster are relatively weak, indicating that studies employed different
factors to examine students’ outcomes. Apparently, the narrative emerging from
Figure 9.2 reflects the view that teachers are responsible for students’ outcomes, as
confirmed by numerous studies (e.g., Kyriakides & Creemers, 2009). Further, as
already indicated, the relationship between school leaders and students is indirectly
mediated through the teachers. Here too, parents seem to be a marginal factor in
schools, associated mainly with students.
Discussion
In this chapter, we employed semantic network analysis to map the literature on SI
during the five years between 2014 and 2018. We found that the main narrative
on SI is a conservative one. The responsibility for school improvement lies in the
hands of the school staff: teachers, and school leaders, through the process of
development, learning, or teaching. The students are presented as more passive in
this process with emphasis on their academic achievements or test scores. Still, it
appears that schools do not operate as independent units but are rather presented as
part of a larger network that is composed of diverse agencies. Further, a relatively
weak relationship exists between leaders and students compared to teachers and
leaders or teachers and students. These findings corroborate with prior studies showing
that the impact of school leaders on students’ outcomes (mainly achievements) is
mediated through teachers (Tian & Huber, 2019) and their improvement’s practices.
More specifically, when looking at the sub-network of teachers, we identify three
dimensions as responsible for SI (see also Mincu, 2015).
which emphasized teaching and learning standards, Hadfield and Jopling (2016)
refer to professional learning processes for improving students’ achievements. Other
studies addressed the importance of professional learning communities and collabora-
tion between teachers as a core component that contributes to school improvement,
enables pedagogical discussions, avoids hierarchical relations (Jäppinen et al., 2016),
and decreases bullying (Kyriakides et al., 2014). Even though Watson (2014) criticized
the role of professional learning communities, Voelkel and Chrispeels (2017) found
that it helped teachers’ collective efficacy and further improved students’ achieve-
ments. Similarly, Mitchell and Sackney (2016) examined teachers’ practices in a “living
system”, which were found to support authentic teaching and learning for students’
wellbeing. Studies also emphasized practices such as data use to understand students’
needs within the context of accountability demands (Beaver & Weinbaum, 2015; van
Geel et al., 2016; Schildkamp et al., 2017). This goes along with Lancer (2015), who
stressed the importance of basing professional development and learning on design
principles and theory in contrast to relying on conventional wisdom.
the diverse practices. Further, in the studies included in our sample, only a few stu-
dies actually measured students’ educational outcomes, and when doing so they
mainly focused on achievements. More importantly, there is hardly any emphasis on
life skills, social capital, or social and universal values. While achievements are sig-
nificant, there is also a need to address the students’ wellbeing, social, and emotional
outcomes, which are essential for their future success (Alzahrani et al., 2019;
Kanopka et al., 2020). Apparently, new directions of research on SI may be needed
in order to encompass the changes occurring in schools and in teachers’ work. Future
studies should take into account more broadly the relations between teachers and
school principals, expand the investigation of external actors, including parents, and
address diverse cognitive and non-cognitive students’ outcomes.
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10
IDENTIFYING PATTERNS IN
COMMUNICATION SCIENCE
Mapping knowledge structures using semantic
network analysis of keywords
Nico Pfiffner
DOI: 10.4324/9781003120100-11
Patterns in communication science 193
Thematic divisions
A starting point to identify the core areas of communication science are the thematic
divisions of communication associations. Currently, both the ICA and the European
Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA) list 24 (ECREA,
2020; ICA, 2020) and the Asociación de Investigatores de la Comunicaión (ALAIC)
19 different thematic divisions (ALAIC, 2020). An overview of the thematic topics
across these three associations already shows the diversity of communication science
as the associations diverge notably in the definition of their core divisions. A study
examining joint division memberships in the ICA found three underlying dimensions
196 N. Pfiffner
differentiating the ICA’s divisions: The first one separates mass media and inter-
personal communication, the second differentiates the humanities from the social
sciences, and the third showed a separation between theoretical and applied research
(Barnett & Danowski, 1992).
A more recent investigation of the structure of the division co-memberships of
scholars in the ICA and a Korean communication association (KSJCS) showed that
in both cases mass media and new media are the core thematical divisions along with
divisions focusing on political and international or intercultural issues. Furthermore, a
dichotomy between interpersonal and mass media communication can still be
observed in the membership structures of both associations (Chung et al., 2009).
Content characteristics
A second approach is to examine the content of communication publications. Studies
in this vein often attempt to classify communication studies based on their different
methods, theories, types of media under investigation, and their various themes.
Applied methods. A meta-analysis of articles published between 1980 and 1999 in
major mass communication journals found that (mass) communication science is
dominated by quantitative studies, with survey and content analyses being the most
prominent methods (Kamhawi & Weaver, 2003). The same study estimated that
qualitative methods were applied in approximately 30% of the published articles
(Kamhawi & Weaver, 2003), while another study covering the same period esti-
mated the ratio of quantitative to qualitative studies at about 60:40 (Trumbo,
2004). More recent analyses estimate the ratio to be closer to 50:50 (Borah, 2017;
Lee et al., 2016) or even in favor of qualitative studies, although this depends on
the sub-area under investigation. In summary, qualitative methods seem to have
gained popularity over the last years compared to the end of the 20th century.
Theories in communication science. Many authors have found that often there are no
explicit theories referenced in communication publications (Kamhawi & Weaver,
2003; Potter & Riddle, 2007). Nevertheless, based on an examination of four major
communication journals, Chung et al. (2013) identified five broader groups of
communication theories: Mass communication theories (e.g., framing, agenda-setting, uses
and gratifications, or cultivation theory), theories related to communication technologies (e.g.,
diffusion of innovation), interpersonal communication theories (e.g., social presence theory,
or uncertainty reduction theory), persuasion theories (e.g., social cognitive theory, theory
of planned behavior, or the elaboration likelihood model), and organizational commu-
nication theories (e.g., system theory).
In a study investigating mentions of communication theories in Google web
search results, Khan et al. (2016) identified nine theoretical sub-strands of com-
munication science: Interpersonal and relationship theories, mass media theories, commu-
nication process theories, language and linguistics theories, public relations, advertising,
marketing and consumer behavior theories, organizational communication theories, commu-
nication and information technology theories, health communication theories, and media,
culture, and society theories (Khan et al., 2016). Overall, framing seems to be the most
Patterns in communication science 197
Co-citation patterns
Investigating co-citation patterns is often done through network analysis and
usually examines citation patterns between disciplines, journals, or authors.
Earlier studies looking at citation structures among communication journals did
not identify general communication journals that were frequently cited across
sub-disciplines, thus bridging different communication areas. Instead, it was
found that communication journals were rather leaning toward one area of
specialization, leaving the field in a relatively fragmented state (So, 1988). In
these studies, psychology was often identified as the most influential discipline
that was most often cited by communication publications (Park & Leydesdorff,
2009; So, 1988). However, a more comprehensive study found that journals
exclusively listed as communication journals tend to be more central in the citation
network than interdisciplinary journals that are also connected to different other
disciplines (Barnett et al., 2011). This could indicate that there is a core or
common understanding of communication science that different sub-disciplines rely
on. Furthermore, the main non-communication journals referenced by commu-
nication studies can be divided into three clusters: psychology, socio-politics, and
gender studies.
Research questions
Naturally, the previous overview does not cover all the attempts to investigate
and map communication science. However, synthesizing the presented results,
communication science still seems to span across many sub-fields that are
characterized by their own thematic foci. At the same time, some aspects of
communication, such as the uses and implications of digital communication
seem to be relevant across many sub-fields, possibly building the bridging
backbone of the domain. Still, there is no clear answer to how the field is
currently structured, how much sub-domains overlap, and what their common
denominators are. Therefore, this study seeks to address the following research
questions:
Method
Sample
Based on the research questions, as well as the considerations stated above, the
following selection criteria were defined: The sample must include (a) peer-
reviewed communication journals with (b) different thematic foci, and these jour-
nals must (c) provide author or editor keywords for their published articles.
Lists of top communication journals according to the h5-index as reported by
Google Scholar metrics and the InCites Journal Citation Report by Clarivate were
used as a starting point. Next, journals that did not satisfy one or more of the defined
sample criteria consequently excluded. In the end, a total of eight communication
journals were included in the sample, with one journal being a general commu-
nication journal (Communication Research) and the other seven each covering a specific
200 N. Pfiffner
(e.g., “é” to “e”), punctuations contained in words were removed (e.g., “non-
binary” becomes “nonbinary”), keywords that contained multiple words separated
by a space were split into separate keywords (e.g., “quantitative methods” becomes
“quantitative” and “methods”), keywords existing in a defined list of stop-words
were excluded from the analysis,1 lemmatization was applied to reduce the inflec-
tional forms of a word to its root form (Ignatow & Mihalcea, 2017; e.g., “is” or
“am” become “be”, “transcripts” becomes “transcript”),2 and keywords categorized
as pronouns were excluded from the analysis.
Finally, the link list was created based on the clean list of keywords. A tie was
formed between two keywords if they appeared together in the same publication.
This link list was then used to construct an undirected network with the ties
weighted according to the number of articles a keyword pair appeared in the
sample. The complete unweighted keyword network, including all journals and
covering all articles published from 2008 to 2019, included 6040 nodes (keywords)
connected by 116,089 ties. Additionally, separate networks are constructed for each
journal.
Results
The result section is divided into two parts. First, a descriptive overview of the
structural unweighted network characteristics is presented and compared among
the different networks to identify structural similarities and differences (RQ1). The
second part focuses on the thematic structure of the networks, identifying the
actual keywords that are at the core of the aggregated communication science
network as well as at the core of the different sub-discipline networks (RQ2).
Note. The measures are based on the unweighted networks and were computed using the NetworkX
package for Python (NetworkX, 2020—v2.5).
Patterns in communication science 203
degree and the clustering coefficients of the nodes in a network can be investigated
(Choi et al., 2011). If a network is hierarchically structured, nodes with a lower degree
will have a higher clustering coefficient, resulting in a linear asymptotic distribution
connecting the upper end of the clustering scale with the upper end of the degree scale
(Ravasz & Barabási, 2003). In Figure 10.1, the degree-clustering distributions for all
networks are displayed. All networks follow the expected distribution for hierarchical
networks, which implies that there are some more important keywords that serve as
hub-nodes and connect otherwise distant sub-clusters (Choi et al., 2011). This means
that all networks contain some overarching keywords that play an important role in
uniting the keyword networks and that this is true for the complete aggregated net-
work as well as the journal networks covering separate sub-domains.
To investigate similarities between the networks from a thematic perspective, the
proportion of shared nodes and shared edges, which are reported in Table 10.3 can
be analyzed. Each row reports the overlap regarding the nodes and edges of one
journal with the other journals listed in the columns. The number reported at the
top of each cell is the proportion of shared nodes or edges between journals with
the actual number of overlapping nodes or edges in brackets.
The upper part of Table 10.3 shows significant overlaps in terms of the key-
words in all journals, indicating the existence of common topics among sub-areas
of communication science. Journal networks with many overlaps are potentially
important in serving as a platform to bring different thematical sub-areas together.
As was indicated in Table 10.2, New Media & Society seems particularly relevant, as
all the other journals share a large part of their node-sets with it. This could either
mean that NMS generally covers a large variety of different topics or it could
indicate that topics such as new (digital) media and societal implications are relevant
aspects across all sub-disciplines. Interestingly, although still showing high overlaps
with the other networks, the network for Communication Research (CR), a journal
that has labeled itself as an outlet covering all areas within the field of commu-
nication, is less overlapped by the other networks compared to NMS.
While focusing on the nodes can help to understand the similarities with regards
to individual thematic components, it does not contribute to the understanding of
the composition of these topics. Looking at the shared edges, on the other hand,
can give insights into the distribution of concept relationships among the networks,
and in this regard all networks show a particularly large overlap with the NMS
network, just on a smaller scale. This shows that the sub-domains of communica-
tion science are not distinct from each other; there are common topics shared by
more than one discipline that are then investigated in different constellations
according to sub-field-specific interests.
Furthermore, the overlap measures show some possible hierarchical patterns:
Topics concerning new media technologies and society seem to be present across
all networks, possibly placing these topics at the center of communication science
as a whole. The area of management communication and organizational commu-
nication represented by MCQ, on the other hand, seems to be less important for
other disciplines, while itself incorporates many concepts and structures from other
sub-disciplines. But this should not be overinterpreted because the number of
articles and keywords in the networks is not equally distributed, and the probability
of large networks containing more nodes of other node-sets is most likely higher
than in the case of smaller networks. Still, these findings add to the expectation that
there exists a set of unifying core topics among the journal networks.
TABLE 10.3 Similarities of unweighted journal networks
Node overlap
CR NMS JS PC JMP PRR MCQ SC Avg.
CR 1.0 (1449) 0.551 (798) 0.386 (560) 0.284 (412) 0.312 (452) 0.406 (588) 0.239 (346) 0.276 (400) 0.351 (508)
NMS 0.270 (798) 1.0 (2953) 0.338 (997) 0.166 (489) 0.158 (468) 0.294 (867) 0.148 (438) 0.173 (510) 0.221 (652)
JS 0.273 (560) 0.486 (997) 1.0 (2052) 0.208 (426) 0.160 (329) 0.363 (744) 0.170 (349) 0.205 (420) 0.266 (545)
PC 0.544 (412) 0.645 (489) 0.562 (426) 1.0 (758) 0.323 (245) 0.503 (381) 0.257 (195) 0.334 (253) 0.453 (343)
JMP 0.599 (452) 0.620 (468) 0.436 (329) 0.325 (245) 1.0 (755) 0.433 (327) 0.269 (203) 0.331 (250) 0.430 (324)
PRR 0.315 (588) 0.464 (867) 0.399 (744) 0.204 (381) 0.175 (327) 1.0 (1867) 0.216 (403) 0.238 (444) 0.287 (535)
MCQ 0.454 (346) 0.575 (438) 0.458 (349) 0.256 (195) 0.266 (203) 0.529 (403) 1.0 (762) 0.290 (221) 0.404 (307)
SC 0.446 (400) 0.569 (510) 0.469 (420) 0.282 (253) 0.279 (250) 0.496 (444) 0.247 (221) 1.0 (896) 0.398 (356)
Avg. 0.414 (508) 0.559 (652) 0.435 (545) 0.246 (343) 0.239 (324) 0.432 (535) 0.221 (307) 0.264 (356) —
Edge overlap
CR NMS JS PC JMP PRR MCQ SC Avg.
CR 1.0 (16,102) 0.166 (2670) 0.083 (1330) 0.073 (1182) 0.063 (1017) 0.088 (1409) 0.034 (546) 0.056 (896) 0.080 (1288)
NMS 0.059 (2670) 1.0 (45,063) 0.077 (3453) 0.032 (1453) 0.022 (1010) 0.052 (2331) 0.015 (692) 0.027 (1210) 0.041 (1847)
JS 0.052 (1330) 0.135 (3453) 1.0 (25,580) 0.048 (1217) 0.018 (468) 0.076 (1935) 0.016 (406) 0.038 (981) 0.055 (1406)
PC 0.167 (1182) 0.206 (1453) 0.172 (1217) 1 (7064) 0.049 (343) 0.111 (786) 0.027 (193) 0.068 (481) 0.114 (805)
JMP 0.186 (1017) 0.185 (1010) 0.086 (468) 0.063 (343) 1 (5466) 0.088 (483) 0.029 (156) 0.064 (348) 0.100 (546)
PRR 0.065 (1409) 0.108 (2331) 0.089 (1935) 0.036 (786) 0.022 (483) 1.0 (21628) 0.038 (825) 0.045 (967) 0.058 (1254)
MCQ 0.091 (546) 0.115 (692) 0.068 (406) 0.032 (193) 0.026 (156) 0.138 (825) 1 (5997) 0.048 (289) 0.074 (443)
SC 0.110 (896) 0.148 (1210) 0.120 (981) 0.059 (481) 0.043 (348) 0.118 (967) 0.035 (289) 1 (8165) 0.090 (734)
Avg. 0.104 (1288) 0.152 (1847) 0.099 (1406) 0.049 (805) 0.035 (546) 0.096 (1254) 0.027 (443) 0.049 (734) —
Note. The rows present the fraction of overlap of one journal with the journals mentioned in the columns. For example, the first row of the node overlap shows that 55.1%
Patterns in communication science 205
of the nodes (keywords) of the journal Communication Research (CR) are also part of the node-set of New Media & Society (NMS). The number in brackets represents the
actual number of overlapping nodes or edges. Proportions of 50% overlap or more are marked in bold. The average is computed by summing the row/columns values,
excluding the self-referencing cell, and dividing by 7.
206 N. Pfiffner
The overlap measures in Table 10.3 show the commonalities between pairs of
sub-fields. To further investigate the core commonalities of communication science,
the intersection of the node- and edge-sets of all thematic networks is created. This
results in 77 keywords that are present in all networks, which is less than 1.3% of all
6040 keywords in the complete network. Regarding commonly shared edges, only
27 keyword pairs appear across all the networks. These edges form three isolated
networks, one consisting of 18 nodes and two consisting of 2 nodes each.
Overall, these numbers show that some shared concepts exist that are important
across all analyzed sub-disciplines, although the commonalities might be based on only
a few articles. Furthermore, there are only a few shared edges, which implies that the
common topics are investigated in different constellations across the sub-disciplines.
These observations suggest that the common core is rather weak.
frame
public
perception
effect identity
communication knowledge
model
online social network
participation
influence crisis
Note. Degrees were weighted by dividing node degree by the maximum degree in the network.
dominate one field but are less important for all the others. For example, crisis has a very
central position in the public relations network, while its centrality scores are quite low
in all other networks.
Lastly, these observations can further be compared with the list of the most
important keywords in the networks. Table 10.5 lists the 15 most important key-
words for each network according to their weighted degree centrality. This over-
view shows that although in all networks some of the core structure’s keywords
appear among the most central ones (highlighted in bold) they represent rather
general concepts. Furthermore, it becomes obvious that each sub-field is char-
acterized by its unique set of important concepts. In summary, it can therefore be
concluded that, based on this analysis, there is a common core structure that
appears in all sub-disciplines that consists of general concepts and that each sub-
discipline can be further characterized based on its unique set of central keywords.
Discussion
The objective of this study was to investigate what the structural commonalities
among communication science sub-domains are (RQ1), and to identify the most
TABLE 10.5 Top keywords with the highest weighted degree centrality per network
Medium 0.43 commu- 0.39 medium 0.51 journalism 0.58 medium 0.54 medium 0.30 public 0.64 organiza- 0.46 science 0.49
nication tional
Social 0.37 Social 0.34 social 0.49 news 0.48 political 0.50 social 0.24 relation 0.59 commu- 0.41 commu- 0.49
nication nication
commu- 0.33 Medium 0.33 digital 0.35 medium 0.44 news 0.33 effect 0.19 commu- 0.41 theory 0.22 public 0.34
nication nication
Public 0.28 Theory 0.24 online 0.30 analysis 0.25 social 0.24 theory 0.18 social 0.34 organization 0.22 medium 0.29
News 0.23 Effect 0.24 internet 0.29 newspaper 0.21 commu- 0.23 video 0.17 medium 0.32 social 0.21 climate 0.25
nication
Journalism 0.23 News 0.21 commu- 0.25 public 0.19 campaign 0.22 game 0.17 crisis 0.25 manage- 0.19 change 0.24
nication ment
Theory 0.21 Model 0.18 technol- 0.21 journalistic 0.16 analysis 0.22 commu- 0.17 theory 0.19 identity 0.17 analysis 0.21
ogy nication
Analysis 0.21 Information 0.17 network 0.20 social 0.16 election 0.20 online 0.15 management 0.19 work 0.15 social 0.19
Relation 0.20 Political 0.15 analysis 0.17 political 0.16 effect 0.18 emotion 0.14 corporate 0.18 employee 0.13 engagement 0.19
Digital 0.20 Analysis 0.15 mobile 0.16 content 0.16 frame 0.16 news 0.13 relationship 0.16 discourse 0.13 risk 0.18
Online 0.20 Message 0.14 theory 0.15 theory 0.15 politic 0.16 enjoyment 0.12 strategy 0.14 leadership 0.13 frame 0.16
Political 0.17 Online 0.13 political 0.15 press 0.15 information 0.16 use 0.11 analysis 0.14 relationship 0.11 perception 0.16
Internet 0.16 computer- 0.13 game 0.15 discourse 0.14 public 0.16 identity 0.10 pr 0.14 medium 0.09 environ- 0.15
mediate mental
Network 0.14 Attitude 0.12 culture 0.15 online 0.13 experiment 0.15 entertainment 0.10 responsibility 0.12 analysis 0.09 research 0.14
Informa- 0.14 Exposure 0.12 commu- 0.14 ethic 0.13 opinion 0.14 motivation 0.08 image 0.12 rhetoric 0.09 knowledge 0.14
tion nity
Model 0.14 Processing 0.12 facebook 0.14 journalist 0.12 content 0.13 model 0.08 model 0.11 technology 0.09 theory 0.13
Patterns in communication science 209
210 N. Pfiffner
important topics across all sub-domains (RQ2) based on a semantic network ana-
lysis of keywords in research articles published between 2008 and 2019 in eight
communication journals, each devoted to a specific sub-domain of the field.
Communication science is often characterized as a fragmented research field
(Waisbord, 2019) that lacks a common identity and is split into sub-domains that show
little interconnections among and interest in each other (Craig, 1999; Donsbach,
2006). Empirical studies investigating the structural commonalities in communication
science are rare and the focus often lies on differences rather than commonalities
among disciplines. In the study at hand, the aim was therefore to detect commonalities
among the sub-disciplines of communication science. It was found that among the
journals included, the overlap in terms of keyword edges (pairs) was relatively low,
ranging from 1.5% to about 16%. This reflects the fragmentation within the discipline.
New Media & Society, which is the leading journal of communication in terms of its
impact factor, was identified as the journal that shares the most nodes and edges with
the other journals, followed by Communication Research. Both journals cover a rela-
tively wide thematic spectrum. This finding is in line with the observations by Barnett
et al. (2011), who found that general communication journals unite the field by
having ties to many other (sub-)disciplines. Similarly, Günther and Domahidi (2017)
also found that general communication journals cover a wide variety of topics.
With regards to the common core of communication science (RQ1), the cur-
rent study found that 77 keywords of 6040 keywords in the complete network are
shared among all journals. These keywords display the still important division
between macro- and micro-level studies of communication, as well as the growing
focus on the online media and its implications on changes in the public sphere as
well as in the formation of individual identity. The centrality of the word theory in
this context is particularly interesting as it seems that communication scholars are
still in search of relevant theories to explain those transformations.
These common structures then served as the basis to investigate the most important
topics across all sub-domains (RQ2). Three larger thematical sub-clusters that appear in
all journal networks were identified: Online communication, psychological aspects (in parti-
cular media influence and media effects), and social relationships and interpersonal processes.
Other studies have also recognized the importance of online communication as an
important driver of communication science that has, on the one hand, become a central
part of the research field (Günther & Domahidi, 2017; Montero-Díaz et al., 2018;
Tomasello et al., 2010), and on the other hand has brought together the formerly often
distinct fields of mass and interpersonal communication (O’Sullivan & Carr, 2018).
Relating to this, the shared interest in social relationships and interpersonal processes
might be linked to the common interest in online communication, since these two
clusters are directly connected in the core structure. Furthermore, the interest in the
psychological aspects of communication and the influence of psychology as a discipline
has long been acknowledged (Barnett et al., 2011; Park & Leydesdorff, 2009; So, 1988).
Next to these three larger thematic clusters, framing theory as well as the keyword triad
of social–network–analysis appeared across all studied networks. Framing theory has
been identified before as the most prominent theoretical approach in communication
Patterns in communication science 211
science (Chung et al., 2013; Khan et al., 2016), and the prominence of social network
analysis is most likely linked to the growing interest in online communication and in
new methods to understand it. Overall, the thematic commonalities identified here are
therefore in line with previous findings and hold no surprises.
Based on these findings we can conclude that there exists a common core of com-
munication science, but at the same time it must be noted that the identified core might
be rather volatile as each node and edge only had to appear at least once in all networks
to be included. Furthermore, the common keywords with the highest centrality among
all sub-disciplines such as communication, social, or medium are rather general and do not
convey much meaning by themselves. Consequently, the core or identity of commu-
nication science must be characterized as vague and leaves room for much interpreta-
tion. At the same time, a conclusive interpretation of the presented findings in this
regard is difficult, because what qualifies as a strong or weak common keyword or
knowledge structure in the case of a scientific domain remains an open question. To be
able to interpret the results more accurately, one strategy would therefore be to integrate
non-communication journals into future analyses to explicitly assess if the links and
commonalities between communication sub-disciplines are unique.
Lastly, some limitations of this study must be acknowledged. First, the selection of
journals representing the different sub-disciplines was limited by the availability of
article keywords and therefore some of the larger communication journals were not
included in the analysis. Although the focus of this study was not to identify the gen-
eral structure of communication science but rather uncover the commonalities across
sub-disciplines, it would have still been interesting to incorporate other major com-
munication journals in the analysis. Furthermore, journals focusing explicitly on other
sub-disciplines such as interpersonal communication would have been interesting to
include but have been left out due to missing article keywords. Future studies could
therefore focus on identifying the commonalities across communication science sub-
disciplines using other publication features such as the title, or automatically extracted
topics based on the abstracts or the full texts to be more flexible in the sample com-
position and avoid relying on the availability of keywords.
2. In the study at hand, the compared networks did not show large variations
with regards to these measures, which indicates that they are structurally
similar. This does not come as a surprise, as the networks were derived from
the same institutionalized settings (journals) that all essentially follow the
same logic. Still, with regards to the density we could already see that the
journal Political Communication had a narrower thematic focus than New
Media & Society, as the latter had a significantly lower density. This observa-
tion was later supported by the examination of overlapping edges among
the journals reported in Table 10.3.
3. If the journal networks would have shown significantly different structural
parameters, it would have been appropriate to take a step back and
examine these differences more closely before moving to the interpreta-
tion of the concepts underlying the network nodes.
4. It is often useful to compare different structural network measures. For
example, in this chapter we looked at the distribution of node degrees,
conditional on their clustering coefficient. This comparison helped to
uncover the hierarchical structures of the investigated networks. A variety
of measurements limits the biases of misinterpretation and opens new
possibilities for additional insights into the network structure.
5. It is important to consider the nature of the words analyzed in the context of a
semantic network analysis. Keywords chosen by domain experts convey a
different meaning than those extracted through automatic content analysis.
Their link to each other is not based on their co-occurrence in the same sen-
tence, but rather their association with the article itself and the extent to
which these keywords appeal to the academic community. With the choice of
keywords, authors of academic papers attempt, among other things, to pro-
mote their articles and make them accessible. In a way, keywords function as
hashtags, tags to images, or other folksonomies in social media. The inter-
pretation of the networks should therefore take this context into account.
6. When assessing the similarities or differences of networks, it is often hard to
interpret the findings on their own. Therefore, it is helpful to look for similar
studies and use their results as a benchmark to compare your own results to
and get some indications about the magnitude of your findings. Of course,
sometimes it is hard to find related studies that are suitable for comparison,
but even distantly related findings can serve as an interpretation aid.
Notes
1 This list included: “”, “a”, “all”, “an”, “and”, “as”, “at”, “for”, “in”, “of”, “on”, “or”,
“than”, “that”, “the”, “then”, “this”, and “to”.
2 For the lemmatization, the lemmatizer implemented in the spaCy package (spaCy 2020—
v2.3.4) for Python was used.
3 Note that the node “medium” also stands for “media” as during the lemmatization pro-
cess “media” was converted to “medium”.
Patterns in communication science 213
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11
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Elad Segev
Words are the building blocks of communication, and communication is the basis
of our society. Throughout history we have put together words to communicate
our needs, coordinate our actions, and craft our stories, in order to organize
increasingly larger groups, support each other, compete for resources, and more
generally survive and leave our mark on humanity. Thus, words entail a lot of
power. Yet words are also a fantastic resource for scholars, historians, sociologists,
political, and communication scientists, who attempt to trace back the nature of
people, their cultures, beliefs, histories, and power structures.
The tremendous value of text was acknowledged by researchers over the years
who proposed different methods and approaches to analyze it, from the studies on
sacred texts and the development of logic and rhetoric in ancient times to the more
recent methods of discourse analysis, framing, structuralism, and post-structuralism.
What is common to all these methods is the need to break the text into smaller
analytical units and then decompose it again to extract its meanings and purposes.
Semantic network analysis is a relatively new approach in the field. It uses
computational and visualization methods and enables big data analyses that were
not possible before. The growing amount of information available today makes this
method even more appealing and crucial for researchers.
In this book we first introduced the idea behind semantic network analysis, its
premises, historical development, and current place, among other computational
research methods. We then explained in detail the stages and tools used to conduct
semantic network analysis. Finally, much of the book focused on the applications
of semantic network analysis in different types of texts, research settings, and dis-
ciplines. This was divided into three parts: semantic network analysis in a top-
down text (such as news articles or political speeches), in bottom-up texts (such as
social media messages), and in research data (such as academic papers and interview
transcripts).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003120100-12
Summary and conclusion 217
The book first presented the applications of semantic network analysis from top-
down texts. Noa Hatzir, Kohei Watanabe, Atsushi Tago, and I (Elad Segev) in
Chapter 2 analyzed Israeli news related to nuclear threats. The method in this case
helped us to identify the main actors in the story and the common topics and
issues. We could even draw on the meta-narrative presented in the Israeli media—
the fear from war, which appeared at the center of all network maps. At the same
time, semantic network analysis also revealed the differences between news outlets
with different political inclinations. The news was also the primary source for the
study in Chapter 3, in which Yuan Zhou and Sandrine Boudana and I focused on
the mentions of the word provocation to explore provocation narratives and their
political biases. In this research, semantic networks allowed us, in line with the
post-structuralist approach, to show the hidden power structures in international
news. As we compared American and Chinese news, we identified major differ-
ences between the two. To our great surprise English and Chinese news did not
contradict one another. It appeared that Chinese news adopted the American nar-
rative about the problematic role of North Korea, but sophisticatedly managed to
shift the responsibility toward the US.
A different kind of news was utilized in the study of James A. Danowski, Bei
Yang, and Ken Riopelle in Chapter 4. Instead of newspapers, their study utilized
television transcripts. They compared how three television channels: CNN, Fox
News, and MSNBC covered the topic of “social distancing” during the COVID-19
pandemic. Semantic network analysis enabled them to examine more closely and
accurately the sentiment related to social distancing and its relation to the market
share growth and the political ideology of each channel. They found that more than
ideology, the market share growth of the channels was a better predictor of the
extent of positive and negative coverage around social distancing.
Chapter 5 demonstrated the use of semantic network analysis in political spee-
ches. Maya Hadar, Regula Miesch and I compared political speeches in Israel and
Germany that mentioned the Holocaust over the last decade. The clusters of words
in each network clearly represented the national narratives and the important
identities of Israel as a country that needs to protect itself from the surrounding
enemies, and of Germany as a country that promotes freedom, tolerance, and
democracy around the world. In this study, semantic network analysis helped to
unveil the political rhetoric and the main narratives of prominent leaders in Israel
and Germany, and to show how the Holocaust is used as an instrument to promote
political goals. This chapter neatly corresponded with the second chapter on the
Israeli coverage of nuclear threats. Holocaust was a prominent word in the Iranian
nuclear map based on news, while the Iranian nuclear plan was one of the main
clusters and themes of the Holocaust map based on political speeches.
The focus on bottom-up texts such a social media content was demonstrated
first in Chapter 6. Jérôme Chariatte and Diana Ingenhoff applied semantic network
analysis to investigate the discourse around Brexit on Twitter and compared it with
the same discourse in international news. They stressed the importance of sub-state
actors such as cities (e.g., London) or countries (e.g., Scotland) in producing the
218 E. Segev
social media discourse, which is known as “paradiplomacy”. They found that this
discourse was much more emotional and polarized for and against Brexit. International
news, on the other hand, was mainly critical\more informative, and focused on the
national goals of the reporting countries. Semantic network analysis in this unique
comparison enabled the mapping of the discourse, highlighting the function and
characteristic of each medium (social media vs. traditional news), and displaying the
rising influence of paradiplomacy and sub-state actors. Their findings have various
applications for politicians and public diplomacy practitioners who wish to commu-
nicate their messages effectively and engage with an increasingly diverse audience.
Another study that used tweets as the source of text was presented in Chapter 7
by Saki Mizoroki and Bumsoo Kim. They utilized semantic networks to compare
the discourse on two widely publicized rape cases of women in Japan and South
Korea. They found that the discourse on Twitter hardly focused on gender-based
violence, but rather quickly diverted into a political debate on national scandals.
While South Korean users demonstrated some female solidarity, it was completely
missing in Japan. Hence, semantic network analysis was found to contribute also to
the literature on feminist activism and textual analysis of tweets.
The last part of the book focused on research data. Noa Hatzir showed in Chapter
8 how to use semantic network analysis to structure and extract reoccurring themes
in interviews transcripts. She studied the perceived and actual role of WhatsApp as a
tool among women in the family. She also compared these perceptions with the
actual content that users post in WhatsApp groups. Her findings highlighted the
advantages of WhatsApp as an asynchronous channel, which helps people to control
their time and facilitate meetings or phone conversations. The actual content of
WhatsApp conversations revealed the importance of phatic communication with its
positivity bias. Hence, semantic network analysis was useful also in comparing dif-
ferent types of texts to get a more complete picture of the phenomenon.
Another application of semantic network analysis in research data was shown in
Chapter 9. Audrey Addi-Raccah, Tali Shahrabani, and I reviewed and mapped the
recent literature on school improvement. We found that the studies of success in
education are influenced by management scholarship. Most studies emphasize the
responsibility of the teachers and school principals, while the students, parents, and
other external stakeholders are viewed as more passive in the process. School
improvement was primarily defined and assessed based on students’ academic abilities
and their outcomes or scores in (particularly math) tests. Here semantic network
analysis helped us to map a sub-field of research and show its lacuna.
Finally, a similar but more general attempt to map the field was done in Chapter
10. Instead of the entire text of the papers, Nico A. Pfiffner focused on author
assigned keywords in the broad field of communication science. Semantic net-
works in this case helped him to explore what topics are studied today in the field
of communication, what the common issues are among all topics, and to what
extent each topic is coherent and unique. Here too, this approach was found to be
powerful in mapping an entire field of study, and in showing its core agendas and
the most important sub-fields.
Summary and conclusion 219
The network figure on the book cover represents the semantic network of this
book, including all chapters, even the very last one that you read now.1 The colors
of words are obtained based on a cluster analysis (Louvain modularity), indicating
that most of the chapters have a unique focus, but some share a similar scope.
Obviously, at the absolute center of the network are the words “semantic network
analysis”, which correspond to the book title and are common to all studies
included in the book. Connected to the word “analysis” are several words related
to methods such as “qualitative”, “data”, “text”, and “articles”, which are discussed
in all chapters, but particularly in the introduction and conclusion.
Some general disciplinary words, such as “news”, “social media”, “communica-
tion”, and “political”, are still very central in the network, being common to several
studies. News is the basic corpus for the studies in the first part of the book, such as the
study on provocation narratives in US and Chinese news (Chapter 3), or the social
distancing discourse on CNN and Fox news (Chapter 4). Social media is the common
ground for the Twitter studies on Brexit (Chapter 6) and sexual abuse discourse
(Chapter 7). Communication is the central concept in the study of WhatsApp use in
the family (Chapter 8) and, of course, the attempt to map the field of communication
(Chapter 10). Finally, the word “political” is the common ground for the studies on
the coverage of the Iranian nuclear program (Chapter 2) and the Holocaust speeches
of political leaders (Chapter 5).
Hence, without actually “knowing” this book’s structure, the semantic network of
words appearing together in the same sentence allows us to get an overview, a
descriptive map of the content, and the thematic relationships between the chapters.
texts. In addition, texts in any given language can be analyzed. At the same time,
most of the studies mentioned the importance of carefully considering the selection
of words to include, the need to sparsify the network to make it readable and
interpretable, and the significance of contextualizing the words.
The power to analyze large texts. In most of the studies presented in the book the
amount of text used for the analysis was relatively large: Tens of hours of interview
transcripts, a few hundreds or thousands of academic papers, tens of thousands of
news items, and hundreds of thousands of tweets. In many cases, rather than a
sample, these data represented the entire text in question (e.g., all the news items
that mentioned a specific country or concept, all the tweets that mentioned a
specific person, all the academic papers in a specific journal). They might not
strictly adhere to the definition of Big Data studies (Kitchin & McArdle, 2016);
nonetheless, these data cannot be processed and analyzed entirely using traditional
manual methods such as codebooks or qualitative methods alone. Semantic network
analysis works well with larger datasets and Big Data studies. In a world of informa-
tion overload, the biggest advantage of semantic networks is that they offer a
descriptive map: Where to start the analysis and what issues to focus on. Still, when it
comes to understanding the main themes in the text, Big Data studies are not always
necessary, and often rather consume unnecessary computational resources and
advanced computation skills. A large text and even a random sample of the text that
contains a few thousand units would often be sufficient (Segev, 2020). For smaller
texts, that include less than a few thousand words, sentiment network analysis might
be less useful, as there are not enough co-occurrences of word pairs to generate
meaningful networks. In those cases, the more traditional content analysis methods
would be more appropriate.
Appropriate for all languages. Semantic network analysis is a suitable approach for any
language. Still, some languages may require more preparation than others. The need
to tokenize the text into words is not always easy. Some languages such as Chinese,
Japanese, or Korean have no spaces between words and therefore require special text
segmentation software to properly identify single words. The studies presented in the
book used the jiebaR algorithm (Qin & Wu, 2019) for Chinese, and KH Coder
(Higuchi, 2016; Higuchi, 2017) for Japanese and Korean. Further, when looking at
the list of the most frequent words, some words might need to be merged as they
convey a very similar or even identical meaning. Thus, in some languages, such as
Hebrew or Arabic, the forms of the words may slightly change depending on the
pronouns and prepositions. The processes of merging similar words into one entity
are called stemming and lemmatization, and they make the network analysis and
interpretation much easier if done at the early stages of text processing.
Careful selection of words. Although semantic network analysis is relatively
straightforward, there are a few stages where researchers’ involvement is critical.
This is particularly important when choosing what text to analyze and what words
to look at when constructing the networks. Many of the studies in the book
pointed at the importance of choosing the search term to use when retrieving the
text and focusing on specific sources. Some even recommended looking only at
Summary and conclusion 221
sentences that mentioned the desired search term. In some cases, this can be rela-
tively simple, such as when looking at the way news reports on a certain country
(Chapter 2) or the way Twitter users write about a certain person (Chapter 7). In
other cases, for example, when looking at the issue of success in school (Chapter
9), researchers are required to think carefully about the possible search terms that
can best reflect the topic in question. Once the text is defined, another critical
stage is to come up with a meaningful list of words to include in the network.
Here many studies chose to look at frequent words, but some further focused on
names of specific actors, country names, or even keywords of academic papers.
When choosing appropriate words among a list of frequent words, it is often useful
to have a discussion among researchers and look at the context of the words in the
text itself, in order to make sure that they are distinctive and relevant for the study.
Finally, in the networks itself, some studies found it useful to visually separate
between different types of words, such as the actors and their actions in the study
on the Iranian nuclear threat (Chapter 2), or the involving users and the actual
words that they post in WhatsApp groups (Chapter 8).
Sparsifying the network. The first semantic networks produced based on the list of
chosen words are almost always very dense. Another challenge that all studies had
to deal with was the need to sparsify the networks to see their structure and iden-
tify their clusters. In this book we presented common techniques to sparsify the
network, most importantly to remove links that are less frequent as well as to
delete the most central words that were used as search terms to obtain the data. For
example, when looking at news that mentioned the word “provocation” (Chapter
3) the word “provocation” appeared at the absolute center, making it difficult to
identify clusters in the network. Since the word “provocation” was linked to most
other words and the network itself tells the story of provocation narratives in the
news, it is safe to remove this word. The process of sparsification requires keeping a
good balance. When removing too little the network can still be very messy and
the interpretation would be challenging. When removing too much, on the other
hand, the network becomes very dull and hardly offers meaningful information.
Contextualizing the words. The art of network interpretation is the most important
and innovative stage. All studies indicated that it is crucial for the researchers to
have a good knowledge of the text so that the central words and clusters in the
network could be properly contextualized. For this purpose, researchers need to go
back to the text and see the context in which these words and clusters appear, offer
quotes of relevant sentences or posts, and even complement the semantic networks
with qualitative analysis to offer a richer and deeper layer of meaning.
Inspect the most central words in the network. In this book we suggested looking at
two key centrality measurements: Degree centrality and betweenness. Degree
centrality reflects the number of ties a word has with other words. It can indicate
how much a word is popular in general. Stop-words (for example, pronouns such
as “I”) may be frequently used in various contexts and thus be linked to many
different words. Once we remove stop-words, the words with the highest degree
are often also those that tell us what the text is mainly about. Yet more than
degree, the various studies presented in this book looked at another useful cen-
trality measurement—betweenness. Betweenness reflects the extent that a certain
word is positioned in between any other pair of words as a mediator. The meaning
of this in a semantic network is twofold: It is a word that is located in between
many words within a cluster as well as between clusters. A word located in between
many words within a cluster is often the word that summarizes best the main theme
around which other relevant words evolve. A word located in between different
clusters often also conveys a broader meaning and enables researchers to explore
the meta-narrative of the entire corpus.
Thus, for example, when looking at the Japanese and Korean discourse on Twitter
on sexual abuse in Chapter 7, Mizoroki and Kim found the word “book” to have a
significantly higher betweenness. The cluster of words surrounding the word “book”
included words such as “media”, “BBC”, “documentary”, “news article”, and “TV
program”. Obviously, all these words have one similar meaning in common—the
media channels in which the story of Shiori Ito-, the journalist who was sexually
abused, was told to the public. Yet the network shows that the word “book” is par-
ticularly central in terms of betweenness, indicating that the book Black Box was per-
haps one of the most important pieces of documentation of the story as it contained all
the details of the event and made the victim’s full name public for the first time. In
fact, the other media channels always referred to the book as a reference. The word
book was not only in between media-related words within the media cluster, but also
in between central words of other clusters, such as “rape”, “damage”, and “Abe” (the
former Japanese Prime Minister). It is therefore through the overarching link between
words with the highest betweenness that researchers can identify and extract the meta-
narrative of Twitter users in Japan, who mainly referred to Ito-’s media appearance, the
details of the lawsuit, and its connections to the corruption of the political elite, rather
than to the more significant social problem of gender inequality in Japan.
Look at the composition of clusters. In all the networks presented in the book,
regardless of the type of text in question, it was possible to divide words into
clusters, where each cluster represents distinctive themes and frames. Although
there are many ways to cluster words in semantic networks, most of the studies
here used the Louvain modularity (Blondel et al., 2008). The advantage of this
method is that it compares the relative density and cohesion of sub-networks and
often identifies clusters of words that tend to appear together more frequently in
the same sentence. After inspecting the central words and their context, researchers
should look carefully at the composition of words in each cluster and see what they
have in common and in what context these words appear together in the text.
Summary and conclusion 223
aspires to territorial maximalism on the one hand and his attempt to project an
image of peace negotiator on the other.
book we presented the basic principles for you to conduct semantic network ana-
lysis and to use this map to navigate in the text and produce meaningful analyses.
There are numerous directions to develop this method further, including looking
not only at the visualization of networks and their structure based on the centrality
of words and their clusters, but also based on the various measurements that the
network analysis offers.
Distribution of word frequencies and centrality. One of the first indications for the
structure and content is the variety of words in the chosen corpus. A great variety
of words may reflect richer vocabulary and higher language proficiency, but more
importantly, it could also reflect a greater variety of topics and frames in the text.
The distribution of word centrality is even more informative, as it reflects to what
extent words are connected to each other, and how the various topics are formed
to tell one coherent story or parallel stories. In very ideological texts, it is reason-
able to expect a high hierarchy in terms of the frequency distribution and centrality
of words. Most of the words would link to the main central idea, whether it is to
the word “god” in the Quran or a few central concepts such as “class”, “society”,
“proletariat”, and “bourgeois” in the Communist Manifesto (Paranyushkin, 2018).
The different distribution of word frequency and centrality and the way it reflects
the different types of text should be explored more systematically in future studies.
In Chapter 10, Nico Pfiffner made such an attempt to understand the structure
of the text by examining several measurements, including the network density, its
average shortest path length, and its average clustering coefficient. He compared
the scope of several academic journals in the field of communication by looking at
author assigned keywords in academic papers. In many ways, those different mea-
surements tell a similar story about the level of topic coherence in each journal. In
particular, the density of the keyword network in academic journals was a good
predictor of their focus and scope. Journals with higher density were also more
specialized (e.g., Political Communication) than journals with lower density (e.g., New
Media & Society). It seems, however, that due to the great similarity between those
academic journals, there was no significant difference among the other measure-
ments. Future studies should continue and explore the nature and meanings of
these measurements in other settings.
Word centrality measurements. In this book we particularly stressed the importance
of betweenness centrality, as it helps to identify words that connect other words in
the same cluster and thus convey the shared context or meaning of each cluster. At
the same time, words with higher betweenness are located in between clusters and
are therefore useful to consider when trying to extract the overall narrative of the
text. Another advantage of betweenness centrality is that it is unequally distributed
among the words, helping researchers to visually identify the important themes
based on a handful of central words. Yet, apart from betweenness, there are plenty
of other centrality measurements. Future studies should continue and investigate
the unique function of each centrality measurement, and its contribution to
unveiling the meaning of the text.
226 E. Segev
Prevailing path as the main narrative. One of the fundamental principles and biggest
advantages behind semantic networks analysis is its ability to extract and highlight the
association between words. The meaning of words lies exactly in their unique com-
binations. When constructing a semantic network based on large texts, the most fre-
quent word occurrences are the backbone or the meta-narrative of the entire discourse
on the topic in question. Thus, for example, when looking at the coverage of Iran in
Israeli news (Chapter 2), the very prominent link between the words: “sanctions”—
“nuclear”—“weapon”—“peace”—“agreement” summarizes extremely well the
entire idea behind more than 20,000 news items. Similarly, when looking at the social
media discourse around Brexit (Chapter 6), the prominent links between “people”—
“happy”—“#brexitcelebration”—“freedom” on one side of the network, and
between “EU”—“London”—“Scotland”—“Irish”—“sad”—“mistake” on the other
side, brilliantly reflects the polarized discourse in thousands of tweets. In many exam-
ples along the book the prevailing path between central words in the network helps us
to extract and even crystallize the main narrative. Future studies should continue to
explore this technique, which could be particularly useful, for example, in artificial
intelligence applications for an automatic summary of large texts.
Epilogue
Communication is the fabric of society and stories are the essence of communica-
tion. We tell stories to one another by putting words together. The meaning of
words is therefore the meaning of our social being. As social scientists we are
interested not only in one particular story, but in unveiling the patterns behind
many similar stories. We could easily read and make sense of one or a few news
items, but it would be much less feasible to read thousands of them or more. On
the other end, it would be difficult to get the hidden story behind one tweet.
Information nowadays becomes shorter with microblogging and instant messaging
services, and its volume gets much bigger (Segev, 2019). It is therefore much more
challenging for researchers to make sense of the vast amount of information avail-
able. Semantic network analysis as demonstrated in each part of the book is one of
the most powerful and useful methods available to navigate in different types of
texts and unveil their meanings.
But what are all the stories about? Perhaps the DNA of all social science research
could be summarized in one word: Identities. We tell each other stories from the
minute we are born to construct and shape our identities as belonging to one
family, social group, nation, religion, race, and gender, yet not to the other. The
meaning of words, as demonstrated in each chapter of this book, is mostly an
attempt to represent those abstract identities and to add our normative judgement
to them as good and desirable or bad or undesirable.
While some of the chapters focused on abstract identities such as “good” and
“bad” countries and their role and responsibility to the international community,
other chapters paid closer attention to the behavior of different social groups (based
on gender and social role such as students, children, and parents, or even
Summary and conclusion 227
Note
1 As for most figures in this book, the network analysis and visualization software Visone
(Brandes & Wagner, 2004) was used to construct the semantic network for the book
cover.
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GLOSSARY
API (Application Programming Interface) is the interface that facilitates the com-
munication between applications. In the studies presented in this book API was
used to get access to the Twitter database to collect tweets (Chapters 1, 6, and
7) and to the Crossref database to collect academic papers (Chapter 10).
Betweenness centrality measures the number of the shortest paths in a network
that pass through a node. In other words, it reflects the extent to which a node
is in-between all other pairs of nodes in a network. In semantic networks, this
measurement allows identifying the most central words in each cluster and
words that are located in-between clusters. These words often help to con-
textualize the network maps and understand their meanings (see also Chapter 1
and the concluding chapter for a detailed discussion on betweenness centrality
in semantic networks).
Brexit is a portmanteau of “British exit”, referring to the withdrawal of the UK
from the EU in January 2020. Chapter 6 focuses on #Brexit in Twitter to study
the discourse in social media and compare it to the news coverage of Brexit in
different countries.
City diplomacy refers to the discussion between city officials and the interna-
tional public. Chapter 6 shows that cities, particularly London, are prominent
actors in Twitter in relation to the Brexit discourse. With the growing use of
social media, cities increasingly play an important role in public diplomacy, and
may sometimes depart from the official views and agendas of the government in
their country.
Cluster analysis is a process of grouping data into discrete groups (clusters), in
which the objects of each group share similar traits. In network analysis, clusters
are often determined based on greater connectivity (more links) between certain
nodes. In this book, cluster analysis refers to the process of identifying groups of
Glossary 229
words that tend to appear together, and thus form a reoccurring theme in the
text.
Clustering coefficient is the degree to which nodes tend to cluster together. In a
sematic network, a high clustering coefficient indicates that words are tightly
connected in clusters, and clusters are distinctive from each other. Chapter 10
uses this measurement to compare the composition of distinctive topics in dif-
ferent communication journals.
Degree centrality measures the number of links a node has with other nodes.
Together with betweenness centrality, it is a useful measurement to identify the
central words in the text and their connection to other words (see also Chapter
1 and the concluding chapter).
Density refers to the actual number of links a network has divided by all possible
links it could have. A dense network contains many links, while a sparse net-
work contains a few links. When preparing semantic networks for analysis there
is a need to find a balance between too dense networks that are difficult to
interpret and read, and too sparse networks that offer only a little information
about the text in question.
Lemmatization is the process of unifying different forms of a word into a single
form. This includes, for example, conjugations (e.g., “believe” and “believing”),
single and plural forms (e.g., “president” and “presidents”), or prepositions that
in some languages are part of the same word. In sematic networks merging these
words is important, as it reduces the complexity of the network and allows to
form more coherent clusters (see also Chapter 1).
Louvain modularity is one of the methods for cluster analysis (see above). In
semantic networks this is a useful way to cluster words together, as it considers
how dense words are connected to each other, that is, how frequently they
appear together. This clustering method often yields a small number of mean-
ingful clusters or themes.
Paradiplomacy refers to the interactions between sub-national entities, such as
cities, regions, or sub-state actors, and the international public. City diplomacy
(see above) is one form of paradiplomacy. Chapter 6 shows that paradiplomacy
is very prominent in the social media discourse on Brexit.
Partisan media refers to media that is systematically influenced and sometimes
affiliated with the government and its parties. Chapter 4 examines to what
extent different television news channels in the US reflect partisanship in their
coverage of social distancing.
Phatic communication refers to communication that does not intend to inform
or share information, but rather to build social bonds. It is often described as
“small talk”, such as greetings or the exchange of general positive gestures.
Chapter 8 shows that WhatsApp groups in the family mainly use phatic com-
munication among its members.
Scientometrics is a research area devoted to the quantitative study of science,
aiming to map and understand the structures of scientific domains. Chapter 10
230 Glossary
makes such an attempt to map the field of communication based on the net-
work of keywords appearing in thousands of academic papers.
Sentiment analysis measures the extent of positivity or negativity expressed in a
text. Chapter 4 shows that semantic networks are particularly useful when
conducting sentiment analysis, as they allow researchers to focus on small seg-
ments of the text and identify the combination of words or the context in
which positive or negative sentiments appear.
Social distancing refers to the physical distance between people as a way to limit
the spread of a contagious disease. During the COVID-19 pandemic, social
distancing has become a common practice, but also a heavily connotated poli-
tical term. Chapter 10 explores the sentiments related to social distancing cov-
erage in different television news channels.
Sparsification is a process in which the density (see above) of a network is
reduced to detect its structure and make it more readable and easier to interpret.
Chapter 1 discusses several ways to sparsify semantic networks, including delet-
ing less frequent links between words and sometimes removing the most central
word that was used as the search term to retrieve the text.
Stemming is the process of reducing words to their word stem form (see also
Lemmatization above). This is a crucial stage in producing readable networks
with more coherent clusters (see also Chapter 1).
Stop-words are commonly used pronouns, prepositions, and conjunctions, such as
“the”, “that”, or “of”. When constructing semantic networks based on frequent
words, stop-words should be removed from the analysis. These words tend to
connect to most other words and usually disturb to detect the network structure
and identify meaningful clusters.
Synchronous/asynchronous communication refers to the real-time exchange
of messages, such as in face-to-face, telephone, or video conversations. Asyn-
chronous communication, on the other hand, involves sending and receiving
messages through mediated means that do not require the real-time presence of
the communicating parties (e.g., sending emails and instant messages or posting
messages in social media). Chapter 8 explores the specific role of WhatsApp as a
channel that allows both synchronous and asynchronous communication, and
therefore has become a popular channel to signal connectedness and express
phatic communication (see above).
Tokenization is the process of word segmentation. In most languages, space is
used to divide between words. In some languages, such as Japanese, tokeniza-
tion is more challenging, and requires the use of specific software. Chapter 7
demonstrates the use of semantic network analysis in Asian languages.
INDEX
#metoo 136–138, 141–142, 144, 146, Facebook 16–17, 25, 117, 142, 149, 153,
148–149, 151–153 159, 162, 166, 209, 223
ahn 138, 143–144, 149–150, 153 Factiva 17, 20, 119, 131
API 17, 28, 30, 119, 143, 200 fake news 1, 24–27, 30, 116
family 13, 20, 103, 159–171, 197, 218–219,
Begin, M. 97, 103, 108n3, 223 223, 226
betweenness 6–7, 23, 27–29, 37–45, 47, 49, FOX News 12, 73–76, 80–89, 217, 219
61, 63, 84, 101–102, 104, 145, 148, 164, France 32–33, 38, 60–62, 116–119,
166–167, 180, 207, 222–223, 225 121–122, 126–127, 129–130
bible 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 74
Bild Zeitung 119 Gephi 20
brexit 12, 112–131, 217–219, 226 Germany 12, 32–33, 38, 60, 62, 94,
British 12, 35, 55, 112, 115–116, 118, 120, 96–100, 104–108, 116–119, 121–123,
123–129 126–127, 129–130, 184, 217
Global Times 57–60, 67, 68n2
China 24, 28–30, 33, 35, 38–39, 53, 56–67
city diplomacy 12, 113–115, 128, 131 Haaretz 34, 36–43, 46–68
cluster analysis 22, 26, 28–29, 37, 61–62, 88, hashtag 13, 29, 119, 121, 128, 130–131,
102, 128, 145, 164, 179–180, 219, 223 140–142, 144, 146, 151–152, 212
clustering coefficient 201–203, 211–212, 225 holocaust 12, 33, 42, 94–108, 217, 219, 223
CNN 12, 73–76, 80–89, 217, 219
co-citation 194–195, 198 Iran 11, 29, 32–33, 35–42, 46–49, 60–62,
country image 12, 113, 116–117, 128 64, 97, 102, 106–108, 217, 219, 221, 226
CSV 20 Ireland 112, 118–119, 122–123, 126–127,
129–130, 181
density 22, 179, 201, 202, 211–212, 222, 225 Irish Times 119
digital diplomacy 28, 115–117 Israel 11–13, 32–42, 46–49, 60–62, 94–103,
diplomacy 12–13, 24, 28–29, 36–37, 42, 105–108, 159, 162, 165–166, 170, 217,
112–117, 119, 121, 127–128, 130–131, 219, 226
218 Japan 13, 18, 49, 56, 59–62, 136–137, 139,
142–149, 151–153, 218–220, 222
emoji 9, 165
ethos 4–5, 102–103, 106, 184 KH coder 20, 143, 220
232 Index