Contemporary Security Policy

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Nuclear cooperation with non-NPT member

states? An elite-driven model of norm contestation

Jeffrey S. Lantis

To cite this article: Jeffrey S. Lantis (2018) Nuclear cooperation with non-NPT member states?
An elite-driven model of norm contestation, Contemporary Security Policy, 39:3, 399-418, DOI:
10.1080/13523260.2017.1398367

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1398367

Published online: 30 Jan 2018.

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CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, 2018
VOL. 39, NO. 3, 399–418
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1398367

Nuclear cooperation with non-NPT member states?

An elite-driven model of norm contestation
Jeffrey S. Lantis
Department of Political Science, The College of Wooster, Wooster, OH, USA

ABSTRACT
Supporters of the nuclear nonproliferation regime argue that international
agreements, power politics, and emerging standards of legitimacy have
generated a robust nuclear nonproliferation norm. This optimism is mirrored
in early social constructivist international relations theory, which emphasizes
the constitutive and regulatory power of international norms. Conversely, this
article explores how recent developments in global politics and international
relations theory may show how vested players can change normative
architectures. This project develops a model of elite entrepreneurship in norm
change that includes stages of redefinition and substitution through
contestation. It conducts a plausibility probe of the model in the development
of the 2008 U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, a case of U.S.-
driven norm change. The article concludes that this alternative agency-based
model lends insights on what may be a continuous, and consequential,
evolution of the nuclear nonproliferation norm.

KEYWORDS Nuclear nonproliferation; constructivism; U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement;

norm change

In 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmo-
han Singh announced plans to finalize a U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement (NCA). This news sent shockwaves through the international
community and represented a puzzling development for those committed
to the nuclear non-proliferation norm. India was a non-signatory to the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and a defiant
breakout state: The government detonated its first nuclear test explosion in
1974 and engaged in a series of dueling nuclear tests with Pakistan in 1998.
The international community had responded strongly to these actions in
the past, imposing a battery of sanctions on the two states in an effort to
send a clear message of nuclear restraint. Nevertheless, Bush and Singh
hailed a potential agreement as opening new avenues for civilian nuclear
cooperation and lifting prohibitions and sanctions that had been placed on

CONTACT Jeffrey S. Lantis jlantis@wooster.edu Department of Political Science, The College of

Wooster, 400 E. University Ave, Wooster, OH 44691 USA
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
400 J. S. LANTIS

India for decades. Not only was the United States signaling that it would
engage with a nuclear pariah state, it was also breaching one of the central
understandings of the nonproliferation norm—that states that were signa-
tories to the NPT would not engage in nuclear trade with non-signatories
which operated without international safeguards.
This article explores the puzzle of U.S. willingness to contest the nonpro-
liferation norm and reconsider standards for nuclear cooperation agreements
at the same time it sought to shore-up international security and restrict the
spread of dangerous weapons of mass destruction. It contends that advances
in social constructivist theory offer a powerful lens to explain the puzzle of
U.S. norm contestation regarding the civilian nuclear trade. The article devel-
ops a new model to chart the evolution of policy away from standards of uni-
versal application to revised assessments of “responsible” nuclear partnership.
By redefining its commitment to the nonproliferation norm and pushing for
change in international institutions, the United States appears to have success-
fully practiced constructive norm substitution.
This study proceeds as follows. First, it surveys constructivist theory and its
evolution from a focus on the norm life cycle to contestation. Next, it draws
on insights from contestation theory, international law, and political psychol-
ogy to present a new model of elite-driven norm change. This model argues
that stages of norm contestation can be unpacked and linked to specific policy
behaviors. The article then analyzes the case study of the U.S.–India NCA,
which opened civil cooperation between the United States and a non-NPT
member state, through the lens of the norm change model. It traces key
actors and processes in stages of norm contestation. Finally, the study
draws implications for the evolution, functioning, and effects of norms.

Norm theory: The “life” of norms and their contestation

This article establishes foundations for the investigation of state behavior rela-
tive to norms in nuclear governance. Broadly speaking, international relations
theorists hail norms as important standards of “right” and “wrong” in the
international community that are both regulative and constitutive in their
effect on national interests and identity (Farrell, 2002). Constructivist theories
of norms have evolved significantly over the last few decades. Wendt (1995)
argued that norms are regulative and constitutive—that they help define
“actors in a situation and the nature of their relationships, whether coopera-
tive or conflictual” (pp. 73–74). Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life
cycle model viewed norms as developing up from the grassroots level
through “different social processes and logics of action” (p. 895) which
affect actors’ behaviors. Once norms are developed and cascade through the
international community, they reach a stage of norm internalization and
become robust.
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 401

However, a new generation of work on norms has identified and sought to

correct limitations of past scholarship. Broadly speaking, critics suggest that
early norm theory did not account well for norm change, nor did scholars
explain state behaviors that might deviate from normative structures. Past
models focused primarily on norm development and “life” did not capture
dynamics of state challenges to international standards, especially efforts by
traditional norm stewards to change the meaning of a norm or rules within
multilateral frameworks. As a result, popular models appeared to fall short
when trying to account for debates about the validity and applicability of
norm standards (Krook & True, 2012). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998,
p. 894) themselves acknowledged the problem of explaining change.
This article draws inspiration from critical constructivist theory focused on
opposition in norm discourses. Contemporary works embrace the principle of
contestation in international relations—indeed, scholars argue that the very
legitimacy of norms hinges on contestation and dialogue over their viability
(Wiener, 2014). Critical constructivist studies recognize the potential for
what Müller and Wunderlich (2013) call natural “norm dynamics” to shape
their viability, including “the central role of norm contestedness/contestability
for the dynamic evolution of norms and regimes” (p. 4). This approach elev-
ates the role of agents, which may play an important role in norm diffusion
and contestation processes.
Prominent theories of norm contestation have been advanced over the past
two decades. This article accepts Wiener’s (2014, p. 3) definition of contesta-
tion as a “social practice [that] entails objection to specific issues” and the
engagement of a “range of social practices” to reconsider the boundaries of
norms. Such an approach can be differentiated from non-compliance, or a
rejection of regime rules expressly outside the boundaries of acceptability of
international standards. Contestation is understood as a discursive challenge
to normative boundaries and search for new directions in norm development
(Payne, 2001). One of the primary types of challenges, Wiener and Puetter
(2009) argue, is a debate about the meaning and intention of norms currently
in use, probing the validity and social facticity of existing standards.
Critical constructivism has helped advance our understanding of norm
dynamics, but to date there is little consensus on key actors, the exact locus
of contestation practices, or their implications for norm strength. Norm
entrepreneurs are typically thought of as social movements and grassroots
actors, but contemporary studies (Bloomfield & Scott, 2017; Dixon, 2017;
Lantis, 2016b) argue that elites can act to change normative architectures or
resist changes in norm frames through discursive interventions. Not only
do entrepreneurs play a role in norm development, Wiener (2007) says,
they sometimes attempt to change the structural landscape as a function of
their perception of strategic advantages or even their own “principled
beliefs” (p. 7; also Müller & Wunderlich, 2013). Scholars also disagree
402 J. S. LANTIS

about the implications of contestation for norm strength. Some argue that
contestation effectively can lead to the “death” of norms (McKeown, 2009;
Panke & Petersohn, 2012; Rosert & Schirmbeck, 2007). In contrast, Wiener
describes the potential for contestation to positively impact norms. Norm dis-
course is healthy, she argues, it represents a refinement process that is vital for
the continued life of (changed) norm architectures. In some circumstances,
contestation might even help shape political alternatives and revitalize
norms (Bloomfield & Scott, 2017; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2016). These
different perspectives suggest that critical constructivist theory is in an excit-
ing phase of development and offer foundations for further exploration.

An elite-driven model of norm contestation

This article draws insights from critical norm theory to advance an elite-
driven model of norm contestation. It argues that leaders, who are vested
with the authority to allocate government resources, recognize the importance
of normative guidelines but nevertheless may sometimes subjectively deter-
mine they will challenge the definition and prescriptions that flow from estab-
lished normative architectures. In such circumstances, they may engage in
contestation over the validity or justification of the norm or application in
international institutions (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2013, 2016). De
Nevers (2007) and Lantis (2017) argue that norms may change often at the
hands of great powers, and the process of norm change by democratic
regimes can be observable. Leaders of powerful countries sometimes try to
defend normative principles (what Bloomfield [2017] terms as “antipre-
neurs”), but they also engage in entrepreneurship as agents of change.
Specifically, this article advances a model of norm change as a dialectical
process—including phases of redefinition and substitution through contesta-
tion—practiced with the intent to foster new cognitive frames and ways of
understanding problems. It focuses on the agency of executive branch
actors in the United States. While different actors might play roles in contesta-
tion, this article focuses on how presidents and high-ranking administration
officials can interpret, and sometimes contest, the meaning of particular norm
frames in relation to state behavior. Leaders may decide in what situations
they will stake claims of normative traditions; they may also choose to try
to move beyond previous boundaries of acceptability and build coalitions in
support of an alternative, preferred foreign policy path. This process of con-
testation involves two important stages: redefinition of understandings of
norm parameters in the domestic political arena (redefinition) and multilat-
eral diplomacy to grant legitimacy to the new norm frame (constructive norm
substitution). The expected outcome would be international endorsement of
new principles and bandwagoning behavior by a critical mass of states.
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 403

Norm redefinition refers to a “process of recalculation of a state’s approach

to a traditional norm or its interpretation of the meaning of the norm and
implications for policy behavior” (Lantis, 2016a, p. 16). This typically involves
an individual reassessment of the value of normative principles for state inter-
ests and a public articulation of the redefinition through rhetorical means.
The arena for discourse on redefinition is national politics, and the contesting
actors are policy-makers with the authority to allocate state resources. In prac-
tical terms, this may be observed when traditional enforcers of a norm such as
presidents or prime ministers raise questions of the utility or legitimacy of
norm tenets. As Risse (2000) asserts, actors may critically evaluate normative
guidelines through a “logic of truth-seeking or arguing” (p. 6). Building on
this premise, leaders may be said to reevaluate the effectiveness and appropri-
ateness of international norms relative to their own assessment of interests
and national security. They may question the validity of central principles
and pursue the path of redefinition through discursive rhetoric, policy
actions, and persuasion in national political debates (Nadelmann, 1990). Cri-
tically, this is not a rejection of normative strictures (as might be interpreted
through a rationalist/realist lens), but rather a reevaluation of how a state sees
normative guidelines and opportunities.
This approach is also informed by insights from political psychology, inter-
national law, and the agent-structure debate. For example, Shannon (2000)
suggests a model for elite management of norm commitments grounded in
insights from political psychology “that places human action at the crossroads
of individual and social needs and constraints” (p. 293). He contends leaders
are especially well positioned to identify conflicts between perceived national
interests and existing norms. Recent political psychology treatments of
nuclear proliferation also highlight the role of individual decision-makers in
shaping the direction of nuclear weapons research and development
(Hymans, 2006). Newer approaches in international law also speak to this
question. For instance, Goodman and Jinks (2004, p. 694) call for a second
generation of empirical international legal studies aimed at clarifying the
mechanics of the influence of international law on state behavior, and they
outline processes by which agents relate to structure. The concept of redefini-
tion also recognizes that interactions between agents and structures are criti-
cal to establish and refine the legitimacy of social constructs (Kowert & Legro,
1996). Agents can “reshape, challenge, and undermine the background
knowledge. Change is the fundamental of social life, mediated through com-
munities of practice that can uphold, question, and destroy knowledge and
structures” (Sending & Neumann, 2011, p. 231). These arguments reflect
Wiener’s concept of norm meaning in use and suggest agents may indeed cri-
tically reflect on what elements of norms they will, or will not, recognize as
legitimate in the face of exigent circumstances.
404 J. S. LANTIS

Concerning constructive norm substitution, this article posits that leaders

who redefine state commitments and understandings of norms also often
attempt to persuade their peers in multilateral venues of the legitimacy of
the newly defined norm frame. As Lantis (2017) argues, the actual process
of norm substitution involves concentrated efforts by norm stewards to
foster debate and negotiate new guidelines or standards for international nor-
mative principles and agreements. The arena for this discourse is international
institutions or negotiation processes, and the actors are heads of state, heads
of government, or diplomats with authority to define foreign policies. Again,
at the heart of these debates is contestation. This process typically begins when
leaders or diplomats make direct or indirect statements in multilateral insti-
tutions that the international community should revisit existing standards
in light of new challenges or opportunities. This sometimes generates policy
discourse and debate in the international institution, as leaders consider a
range of possible new or modified solutions to the issue at hand. Once
again, constructive norm substitution represents modification of existing nor-
mative opportunities or strictures, not full-scale rejection of normative stan-
dards (in rationalist terms).
This approach is informed by critical constructivist treatments of norm
contestation. For example, Hoffmann (2007) asserts, “Social norms are con-
tested at every turn … actors subjectively interpret intersubjective notions
of appropriateness, act on that understanding” (p. 2) and in turn, alter
them. He concludes that mutual contestation may allow more analytic scru-
tiny as a mechanism for institutional change. This perspective on norm
change through contestation effectively reverses the causal arrow in prevailing
constructivist scholarship. In this context, “interpretation of the meaning of
norms … cannot be assumed as stable and uncontested. On the contrary, dis-
cursive interventions contribute to challenging the meaning of norms and
subsequently actors are likely to reverse previously supported political pos-
itions” (Wiener, 2004, p. 203). Thus, disputes and contestation flow from
debates over the meaning of norms.
Constructive norm substitution also requires that leaders engage in persua-
sion—attempts through discourse and negotiations in multilateral venues to
gain broader political support for norm substitution. This process is construc-
tive because it is assumed that leaders seldom desire the elimination of entire
norms (perhaps given their marginal constitutive and regulatory effects).
Leaders work within existing boundaries to attempt to socially reframe
norm commitments—to try to bend the will of the international community
toward a new frame of reference or definition of acceptable behavior. In
addition, it is constructive (versus destructive) in that it entails persuasion
as a primary mechanism for norm substitution. This occurs through a
process of negotiation, arm-twisting, and discursive pressure. While construc-
tive, this process also benefits from priming the pump of contestation, or what
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 405

Wiener terms a “necessary condition” to establish and maintain legitimacy for

normative agreements. As Barnett and Finnemore (1999) suggest, “the nor-
mative structure that constitutes and constrains actors also provides the well-
spring for social practices and allows for strategic action” which might be
“designed to rewrite the cultural landscape in order to legitimate foreign
policy change” (p. 701).

Research design and methodology

This article conducts a plausibility probe of the two-stage model of elite nor-
mative agency focused on discursive interventions that may foster norm
change. Degrees of success of attempts at norm change will be operationalized
as: “unsuccessful,” where leaders are unable to redefine or substitute a norm
frame; “contested,” where leaders may redefine understandings of norms but
not achieve constructive norm substitution in multilateral venues; or “success-
ful,” where both redefinition and constructive norm substitution are changed
and a critical mass of states appears to internalize the new norm frame.
Process tracing is employed to explore the evolution of the story-line related
to redefinition and constructive norm substitution through contestation
(George & Bennett, 2005). The case study of the U.S.–India NCA offers a rep-
resentation of the processes underway in nonproliferation discourse. It high-
lights contemporary debates in international politics. Ultimately, to support
the plausibility of this alternative model of norm change, the article should
produce evidence that U.S. leaders revisited their stewardship of certain norma-
tive principles and pushed for changes within international institutions related
to the pillars of the traditional norm. The expected result would be alterations of
norm structure and rules for multilateral cooperation, as well as the generation
of follow-on dialogues on the evolution of normative architecture.
The case selected for this article is the development of the U.S.–India NCA.
This case study emerged from the puzzle of events that have not fit expec-
tations based on prevailing normative theories. This case seems particularly
suited to demonstrate the utility of the model because it demonstrates how
the United States helped develop and respond to a strategic opportunity
and challenge in the realm of nuclear nonproliferation. It was selected from
a universe of possible cases of decision-making by NPT member states to
provide nuclear assistance to non-signatory states over recent decades (repre-
senting a limited historical record, and one that is sometimes hidden in clan-
destine deals). Because the focus of this case is on the U.S. policy-making
process and deliberations in international institutions, it provides an unu-
sually open record of primary and secondary materials. The research period
of study is 2000 to the present. Data were collected primarily from secondary
accounts of the process, testimony in congressional hearings, and policy
declarations.
406 J. S. LANTIS

Nuclear cooperation agreements and the nonproliferation norm

Western powers played a critical role in the development of the original non-
proliferation regime (or norm cluster) during the Cold War, and the U.S. gov-
ernment championed nuclear restraint and public accountability. As noted
above, the NPT was founded on three basic principles: (1) nonproliferation:
Nuclear weapon states pledged not to provide weapons, materials, or scientific
know-how to non-nuclear weapons states, while non-nuclear weapons states
agreed not to receive or seek to acquire them; (2) peaceful use of nuclear
energy: States would cooperate on civilian uses of the technology under safe-
guards to be monitored by the IAEA; and (3) disarmament: Article VI of the
NPT called for the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons and for nuclear
weapons states to pursue negotiations. These principles, though sometimes
contested, remained at the heart of the nonproliferation norm throughout
the Cold War.
Export controls on nuclear technology became an important part of the
nonproliferation pillar of the norm. U.S. export control policies, first estab-
lished in the Atomic Energy Act and later amended by the 1978 Nuclear Non-
proliferation Act, barred nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapons
states (as defined by the NPT) that do not allow full-scope safeguards (McGol-
drick, Bengelsdorf, & Scheinman, 2005). The United States helped establish
the NSG in the 1970s in response to the challenges posed by India’s nuclear
test and concerns about other nuclear breakouts. The NSG established rules
for conduct to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes did not contrib-
ute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 1992, the NSG established a
guiding principle that all nuclear assistance deals be subject to full-scope safe-
guards. The goal was to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation for NPT
member states—and to prevent the spread of these materials to unsafeguarded
programs run by states or non-state actors (Burr, 2014). It established “trigger
lists” of items that would be prohibited for transfer and set up institutions to
promote physical protection of materials and controls on exports and retrans-
fers. The NSG not only served as an important institutional regulator for trade
standards, it became a respected forum for deliberations on nuclear exchange
because it followed a principle of consensus and equal states of all parties.
Membership of the NSG grew from 7 governments in the 1970s to 48 in
2017. Additional institutional arrangements, including the Zangger Commit-
tee and the Missile Technology Control Regime, also outlined tight regu-
lations on exports of technologies that could be used in nuclear weapons
programs (Schmidt, 1994). In sum, supplier states forged a strong consensus
that civilian nuclear cooperation with non-NPT signatory states would rep-
resent a violation of the grand bargain.
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 407

The U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

The 2005 Bush administration announcement that the United States would
negotiate a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India represented a
bold challenge to prevailing standards. The Bush administration outlined
an ambitious proposal: The United States would end the moratorium on
sales of nuclear fuel and reactor components to India. India would remain
a non-signatory to the NPT, but agreed to separate its civilian and military
nuclear programs. It would open 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors to international
inspections. In addition, India pledged to contain its nuclear program and
avoid exporting technology to third parties (Levi & Ferguson, 2006).
Despite the administration’s optimism, critics immediately condemned the
idea as a fundamental reversal of decades of nonproliferation policies. Generat-
ing political support for the deal would be no small undertaking, especially given
the history of relations between the two countries: India was viewed by past U.S.
presidential administrations as a nuclear rogue state. The Indian government
had established a nuclear program in 1948, guided by Homi Bhabha and an
Atomic Energy Commission under the direct authority of the prime minister.
India also pursued a complicated strategic path in South Asia. During the
Cold War, it received substantial economic and military aid from the Soviet
Union (Carranza, 2007). The government developed a missile program, includ-
ing ballistic missiles that could be used for delivery of nuclear warheads (or civi-
lian satellites) (Tellis, 2006). India’s government was known to be conducting
research on nuclear weapons and refused to sign the NPT. Following its test
in 1974, the country faced intense international criticism and became the
target of export controls, including bans on western country exports of all civi-
lian nuclear fuel and reactor components to India. Tensions escalated again
with the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998; the Clinton administration assailed
the government for its actions and imposed even tighter export sanctions
(Weiss, 2007, p. 431). Given the circumstances, many believed that actually
achieving the deal proposed by President George W. Bush and Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005 could be impossible.
Norm redefinition: The Bush administration sought to redefine the govern-
ment’s understanding of the meaning of the nonproliferation norm through
extensive discussions with Congress and interest groups about nuclear
cooperation with India. The White House had to garner congressional
approval in the form of a legislated exception to Section 123 of the 1954
Atomic Energy Act and the 1978 Nonproliferation Act. These statutes
barred civilian nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapons states (as
defined by the NPT) that did not allow safeguards. Evidence shows that
this new strategy was orchestrated on the authority of the president by a
tight circle of advisors in the executive branch. Internal dialogues on policy
change reportedly began as early as 2003 (McGoldrick et al., 2005). Their
408 J. S. LANTIS

objectives at the time appeared to be to strengthen ties between the United

States and India, particularly economic relations, and to counterbalance
China’s rising economic power in the region. White House efforts were
later aided by a strong Indian-American lobby, allowing it to tap into substan-
tial grassroots support (Kirk, 2008).
Direct efforts to redefine the norm appeared to take two forms. First, U.S.
officials stressed to Congress in 2005 and 2006 that India had become a true
friend to the United States through its responsibility as the world’s largest
democracy and an economic power. The president began praising the
country as “an excellent partner in non-proliferation over the past decades”
(Bumiller & Sengupta, 2006). Officials emphasized the value of the strategic
partnership with India, describing it as a responsible member of the inter-
national community. At the same time, the Bush administration tipped its
hand on evolving strategy, arguing “the non-proliferation policies of other
countries would be judged more in terms of whether they constituted a
threat to U.S. national security than whether they contributed to strengthen-
ing the international regime” (Weiss, 2007, p. 3).
Second, the Bush administration attempted to change the narrative by
arguing that the India deal would actually strengthen the nonproliferation
norm. Officials in the president’s inner circle viewed the NPT as flawed,
arguing it was “predicated on rules that do not sufficiently discriminate
between bad actors and good actors” (Perkovich, 2006, p. 356). They believed
the objective of nonproliferation policy “should not be to constrain or burden
good actors, including the United States and India, but rather to concentrate
power on removing or nullifying bad actors” (Perkovich, 2006, p. 356). They
maintained that counterbalancing Chinese ambitions in the region and
strengthening ties with an emerging democratic nuclear power could
enhance international security. Secretary of State Rice (2006) described the
proposed agreement as “a net gain for global non-proliferation efforts … a
strategic achievement.”
Congress became the primary forum for debates about redefinition of the
U.S. commitment to NSG principles and safeguards. Prime Minister Singh
gave an address to a joint session of Congress in July 2005, a rare honor for
foreign leaders, in which he articulated the shared strategic interests of the
two countries and pledged future cooperation. Following the visit, President
Bush said he would “seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and
policies” and work with “friends and allies to adjust international regimes”
for cooperation and trade with India (as cited in Joshi, 2007). Nevertheless,
early congressional hearings on advantages and disadvantages of the plan
saw critics trying to pose roadblocks to the White House and stall on
further consideration of the deal (Boese, 2005, p.42). They charged that grant-
ing nuclear cooperation to India would lead to an “erosion” of NSG guidelines
and characterized voluntary safeguards as “purely symbolic.” The proposed
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 409

legislation was too lax. The ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) said during one hearing: “The admin-
istration must show Congress it will make us more secure by bringing India
into closer compliance with international non-proliferation norms” (“For
Bush,” 2006). Democratic Representative Ed Markey (D-MA) called the
idea an “historic nuclear failure” that would endanger U.S. national security.
He argued, “With one simple move, the president has blown a hole in the
nuclear rules that the entire world has been playing by” (“For Bush,” 2006).
A battery of experts who testified on the pending deal in hearings on
Capitol Hill warned that it would lead to an “erosion” of NSG guidelines.
Not only were the nonproliferation benefits of the deal “vastly overstated,”
they argued, “the supply of nuclear fuel to India would free up its existing
stockpile and capacity to produce HEU and plutonium for weapons” (Ben-
gelsdorf et al., 2005). Meanwhile, others maintained that in 2006 that while
they might be open to considering a change in the normative architecture,
the White House had done a bad job promoting redefinition. Representative
Gary Ackerman (D-NY) urged Bush to “get to work and make the case to
Congress or else the nuclear deal will blow up in his face” (Ackerman, 2006).
The Bush administration continued to lobby Congress in 2006 to reframe
attitudes toward India, and a substantial Indian-American lobby that favored
cooperation helped aid in this effort. Indian-American lobbies worked along-
side major corporations to help pressure the government to complete and
ratify the nuclear deal. The U.S.–India Political Action Committee
(USINPAC) was one of most active of the lobbying organizations with the
goal of promoting a broad vision for improvement in relations (Anderson,
2006a, p. A10). In the 2000s, USINPAC hosted a series of events and spon-
sored websites providing the economic and political rationale for the deal.
In Washington, Indian-Americans hired high profile lobbying groups
included Barbour, Griffith, and Rogers (headed by Robert Blackwill, former
U.S. ambassador to India) and Patton Boggs. A wide range of interest
groups came together for the cause, including the U.S.–India Business
Council, the Confederation of Indian Industries, and USINPAC, and the
U.S.–India Friendship Council, and the American Association of Physicians
of Indian Origin—collaborated in earnest for the first time to promote the
NCA (Kirk, 2008). One close observer, noted: the proposed U.S.–India
NCA “galvanized the usually fractured Indian American community into
united action like no previous issue … [Indian-Americans] played hard ball
politics and used sophisticated lobbying tactics to focus community attention
on the proposed legislation” (Anderson, 2006b, p. A12; Kirk, 2008).
With the backing of powerful lobbies and the support of sympathetic
members of the congressional India Caucus, including Senators Hillary
Clinton (D-NY) and John Cornyn (R-TX), the administration was able to
begin redefining public and legislative views of engagement. Over time,
410 J. S. LANTIS

officials were able to build bipartisan consensus for the deal. House Speaker
Pelosi (D-CA), argued: “It furthers our countries’ strategic relationship
while balancing nuclear non-proliferation concerns and India’s growing
energy needs” (CNN Politics, September 28, 2008). In March 2006, the
administration redrafted legislation to exempt India from certain restrictions
on nuclear exports under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. And in December
2006, Congress formalized legal exemptions that authorized the agreement,
but also allowed Congress a role in oversight of implementation of the
agreement.
Constructive norm substitution: Bush administration officials knew that
they would need international support for implementation of any new civilian
agreement with India, and they practiced constructive norm substitution in
multilateral forums. Their efforts focused on gaining endorsement from the
international community in the form of NSG and IAEA votes to allow the
U.S.–India deal before the agreement could go into effect. Because the NSG
operated on a principle of consensus, U.S. officials had to secure a unanimous
vote of support.
The Bush administration made the case to its international partners that it
had extracted major concessions from India: The government would accept
international inspections of nuclear facilities where they had never occurred
before, and it would close one of two breeder reactors dedicated to the pro-
duction of weapons-grade plutonium. India also promised to maintain its
moratorium on nuclear testing imposed after 1998, and support negotiations
on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (Mistry & Ganguly, 2006). Given that
experts believed India had produced enough plutonium sufficient for 65–
110 nuclear weapons prior to the deal, they argued that this could stabilize
the regional nuclear standoff with Pakistan and China by putting India on
a glide path to “only” about 100–150 nuclear weapons.
The United States and key allies also called for revisiting institutional pol-
icies to deal with 21st-century realities. Officials argued that the old ways of
nonproliferation simply were not effective and that the international commu-
nity needed to consider alternatives in a broader marketplace of ideas. For
example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (2006) maintained, “our past
non-proliferation policies toward India had not achieved their purposes
[and] left us with a more dangerous energy future.” The agreement would
“advance energy security, further environmental protection, foster economic
and technological development in both our countries, bolster international
security, and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime” (Rice, 2006).
Between the lines, officials argued that new approaches—including the nor-
malization of nuclear cooperation with NPT non-signatories—had to be con-
sidered viable for 21st-century security. Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Burns posed a rhetorical diplomatic question to allies: “Are we better off con-
tinuing to implement an ineffective and ultimately self-defeating proliferation
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 411

regime against India or bringing India in?” (as cited in Brookings Institution,
2008).
Deliberations in the NSG on the question began in 2006, and chief diplo-
mats continued to debate the issue for two years. In August 2008, delegates at
the conference could not agree on an exemption for India, nor on the need to
restructure its existing restrictions for the modern age of nuclear commerce.
Several governments at the time, including Norway, Ireland, Austria, and New
Zealand, were reluctant to support the deal because of a lack of conditions in
the proposed exemption. That launched a period of intense U.S. diplomacy to
persuade its allies that the existing standards were ill-fitting for the contem-
porary proliferation scene and that an exemption and reconsideration of
standing principles was in order. By September 2008, the United States had
secured support for a consensus agreement to exempt India from its existing
rules. But the group extracted conditions from India in the form of a pledge to
the NSG that it would not share sensitive nuclear technology or material with
others and would not test weapons.
Outcome: Following extensive efforts to redefine its commitment to nuclear
cooperation, President Bush signed the Henry J. Hyde United States and India
Nuclear Cooperation and Promotion Act into law in December 2006. This
cleared the way to negotiate terms of the NCA with India. In 2008, with
the support of both the U.S. and Indian legislatures, the issue was then
taken up by the IAEA Board of Governors for review of the safeguards agree-
ment and the Nuclear Suppliers Group for approval of an exemption to its
rules (Ramesh, 2008). In August, the IAEA adopted an inspection plan
crucial to the India nuclear cooperation agreement. Under pressure from
U.S. diplomats, Director General Mohammed El Baradei said that while the
agreement was not comprehensive or full in scope, “[i]t satisfies India’s
needs while maintaining all of the agency’s legal requirements” (as cited in
Shanahan, 2008). Three weeks later, the U.S. brought the issue to the NSG
for consideration of the waiver, further underscoring the depth of the com-
mitment by determined leaders on both sides to see this norm change
through to its completion. Bush officials again lobbied their fellow diplomats
for months, and the NSG agreed to a “clean waiver” exemption for India in
September 2008.

The evolution of normative standards?

The U.S.–India case reveals the dynamics of redefinition and substitution that
have fueled contestation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm in the 21st
century. In fact, deliberations about the evolving normative architecture
have continued. The India question has generated substantial dialogue
inside the U.S. government on its commitment to nuclear cooperation agree-
ments and international standards. The India deal was only one of more than
412 J. S. LANTIS

a dozen NCAs under consideration by Congress between 2005 and 2015, and
some of these agreements became a source of friction between the White
House and Capitol during the Bush and Obama administrations. Redefinition
debates emerged over deals that apply shifting standards regarding enrich-
ment and reprocessing (ENR) technology restrictions. Given the risks of
diversion of materials or technology from civilian to military use, NCAs
often include such restrictions consistent with multilateral nonproliferation
controls and full-scope safeguards programs. The United States typically
does not export this technology and does not allow the reprocessing of
U.S.-origin spent fuel without prior consent. However, this issue became con-
tentious again in relation to establishment of terms for the India deal, as well
as NCAs with the United Arab Emirates and South Korea (a renewal), and
requests from other governments for technology waivers in the 2010s (Kerr,
Nikitin, & Holt, 2014).
Once again, President Bush helped launch the reconsideration of some of
these standards, arguing that he was ready “to think differently” about foreign
policy. He advocated a new approach in which “the non-proliferation policies
of other countries would be judged more in terms of whether they constituted
a threat to U.S. national security than whether they contributed to strength-
ening the international regime” (McGoldrick et al., 2005). The president first
announced that the United States should require that all new NCAs include a
clause banning ENR, and it attempted to force such technology bans in its
dealings with countries in the Middle East. Officials signed a series of
MoUs with countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Bahrain, that carried the clause. In 2009, it fina-
lized the first deal of this kind with the United Arab Emirates, in which the
United Arab Emirates pledged not to conduct enrichment or reprocessing.
The Obama administration, which inherited the agreement from its predeces-
sor, hailed this new restriction as setting a “gold standard” for future NCAs.
However, the U.S. declaration of new standards regarding ENR technology
turned out to be surprisingly short-lived. The Obama administration
opened negotiations on civilian NCAs with the Kingdom of Jordan,
Vietnam, and South Korean renewal that forced U.S. concessions on these
questions.
At the same time, the NSG continued to debate standards for NCAs and
technology transfers. These debates intensified in the past two decades as
the demand for nuclear technology assistance grew. In 2010 and 2011, the
NSG continued to debate the future of standards for nuclear cooperation.
In June 2011, members agreed on new global terms of trade for ENR technol-
ogies. But the deal once again represented a broad compromise—a patchwork
of agreements and stipulations to try to regulate the trade. Standing NSG
guidelines to “exercise restraint” in decisions about exports did not impose
specific conditions on sensitive trade. But new 2011 guidelines established a
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 413

set of stringent conditions for countries considering ENR trade (such as full
compliance with the NPT and comprehensive safeguards). These changes
were designed to reduce some of the “subjectivity” of past criteria, and
instead focus on responsibility—a “credible and coherent rationale for pursu-
ing enrichment and reprocessing capability” (Hibbs, 2010). The net result was
that more states could be considered eligible for sensitive nuclear trade and
strategic partnerships.
Finally, this debate about the evolution of standards for NCAs took a new
turn in 2016, when the Obama administration began actively lobbying for
Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. That move provoked
objections from a number of NSG participating governments concerned
that, once India were a full member of the group, it would seek to block
efforts to tighten the rules, including on ENR. China expressed its opposition
to Indian membership on a number of grounds, including concerns about its
implementation of safeguards restrictions. At the same time, China supported
Pakistan’s formal application for membership in the NSG. Both countries
were effectively seeking validation as responsible members of the nuclear
club who also happened to be non-signatories to the NPT. Meetings of the
NSG in 2016 and 2017 ended inconclusively on the controversial question
of participation by India and Pakistan.

Conclusion
This article has highlighted the special role that elite norm entrepreneurs play
in the (surprisingly delicate) balance of international norms cooperation. In
the case of the U.S.–India NCA, the Bush administration appeared to orches-
trate a “successful” norm change. The international community embraced
India’s newfound status as a responsible nuclear power, and the Obama
administration maintained and expanded areas of policy coordination. This
and related developments in the past decade suggests that the nonprolifera-
tion network can evolve over time in response to special combinations of
actors, events, and circumstances.
The U.S.–India NCA case demonstrates how elites can revisit normative
commitments in light of new circumstances and opportunities. It highlights
the contested nature of international norms, as well as the need to better
understand the scope conditions associated with norm contestation. Recent
advancements in critical constructivist international relations theory have
begun to explore such factors, including work by Bloomfield on norm
“anti-preneurs,” studies of contestation through discourse (Dixon, 2017),
and analyses of norm development without great powers (Bower, 2017).
The argument that redefinition can occur in domestic settings seems manifest
in ongoing dialogues among policy-makers regarding commitments to inter-
national norms. This also sometimes translates to meaningful debate about
414 J. S. LANTIS

the relevance of normative constraints in international institutions. Theoreti-

cal frames that try to capture the push-and-pull of norm contestation offer
promise for advancement of constructivism, as well as potentially bridging
to neoliberalism.
This study also has implications for understanding foreign policy. For
example, it raises an interesting prospect that the United States may be
reshaping its approach to the original “three pillars” of the NPT (nonproli-
feration, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and disarmament) and related com-
mitments in the face of contemporary challenges. For example, the United
States and its allies appear to have moved well beyond Article III of the
NPT in creating an elaborate system for enforcing international nonprolifera-
tion regime requirements, including more rigorous inspections of nuclear
facilities worldwide (through the IAEA Additional Protocol), tightened
export requirements for civilian and sensitive nuclear technologies (Nuclear
Supplier Group action in 2011), greater oversight and controls to prevent ter-
rorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction technologies or materials
(through United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540), and even force-
ful interdiction of suspected transfers of dangerous materials (i.e., the Prolifer-
ation Security Initiative).
The United States also led the way in widening interpretation of Article II
and IV restrictions of the NPT regarding who is allowed to possess nuclear
weapons and how they are maintained. In the face of “rogue state” actions
and clandestine proliferation rings, the Bush administration pushed for accep-
tance of India into the community of responsible nuclear nations, in spite of
the fact that India would remain a non-signatory of the treaty. In essence, the
president and his advisors advocated for changing conceptions of how and
when states could be trusted to participate in strengthening the nonprolifera-
tion norm. India would be allowed to trade with the west; Pakistan would not.
Israel would be respected as a non-NPT nuclear weapons-state; Iran would be
targeted with intense economic sanctions. In other areas where there might be
questions about nuclear trade, such as new nuclear cooperation agreements
with countries like the United Arab Emirates or Jordan, U.S. administrations
have demanded client states sign pledges that they would not seek to enrich-
ment or reprocessing technologies. The Obama and Trump administration
postures toward broadening the circle of “responsible” nuclear powers
beyond those declared nuclear powers in the NPT also suggests reinforces
this idea of an evolution of a new proliferation security posture.

Acknowledgements
This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Nuclear Norms in Global Govern-
ance Project in Monterey, CA, March 2014. He received valuable comments on the
manuscript from Maria Rost Rublee, Avner Cohen, Jeffrey Knopf, Nina Tannenwald,
 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 415

Scott Sagan, Carmen Wunderlich, William Walker, Steven Lee, Lyndon Burford, and
the anonymous reviewers for Contemporary Security Policy.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This article has benefited from funding under U.S. Institute of Peace Annual Grant,
Nuclear Norms in Global Governance #160-12F, Australian National University,
and the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Notes on contributor
Jeffrey S. Lantis is Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Global & Inter-
national Studies Program at The College of Wooster. His teaching and research
specializations include international security, norms, strategic culture, nuclear non-
proliferation, and foreign policy analysis. A former Fulbright Senior Scholar in Aus-
tralia, Lantis is author of recent books, including Arms and Influence: Technology
Innovations and the Evolution of International Security Norms (Stanford University
Press, 2016) and United States Foreign Policy in Action (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013),
and editor of Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific (Routledge,
2016). In addition, Lantis has published numerous book chapters and articles in aca-
demic journals including Foreign Policy Analysis, International Security, and Inter-
national Studies Perspectives.

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