“oO \ BIBLIOTES Cezsti Pouiiog SISTEMA De BIBLIOTECAS PONUFICIa v, ¢, DE CHILE LICY DURING ITI] DECLINE : CHILEAN FOREIGN Po! i TWENTIETH CENTURY, 1902-1972. THE vA EMILIO MENESES C.822 ga SEARCH OF 4 UNIVERSAL 1862-1979,” FOREN Poti, Wi © are not deceived, we deceive Ourselves, Goethe, 1. The Pollties of Independence, 1962-1964, 6.1.1. Chile, the Hemispheric System and Cuba, 1962-1964, in late 1961 Chile's position in the Americas was rather comfortable. She had the respect and consideration of almost all the hemispheric states. Her standing was favoured by Washington's comparative aloofness from Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, The appointment of Carlos Martinez as Foreign Minister led to an ‘gemi-neutral” posture, and —as mentioned earlier— her position and interests grew ‘the Non-Alignment Movement, ; became closer for the first time in ee: a readiness to reaffirmed her in all, Chile: themes ofBag pecember 1961 the ies Coupe os “olomnbig a & seus, th 0 jacking of Washington, The Pet Mane ‘ " MO © tena, This yp rooted at the lage tuhnute It ne Pr b St thie ty ei Ca8tr6)5 Seong. tng % wt ent Was Marxst—Leninig, ; Me8sions ti UT eo conference by 14 to eetin, isl i Heo ang PP OVe4 ia ang " ations (the ABC, plus Bolivia ang ton sn AS. Fepresentatives mot jy OAS. we chile's abstention causeq indignation AMongst, left-wing Pattiog we, and received harsh etticien from the conser, ive preg, at home, had to defend the Rovernment’s positon im the Senate, yortined ‘ned that Chile operated on @SSunption that ie nae declared her Marxis aie System. Thus, there was NO need i mM WOULd leave the intr. 18 call tor her ilsion. After creating a ‘one-party system expul . ‘ cuba had broken the liberal Said Martine Inter-American legal framework based on tacked Socialists and communists for rdly, he emphasised chiles juridical consisteney. In is ‘was merely her traditional324 thus, Chile Was detendin e aiations because it r fupuations: Tt Was in act in tine In the chit © Chilean other seemingly better alternative the effective working of the in ter~ Ameri security and was committed to a “American Syst it It is we che government found Itself for the sixst time in ce noting that story attacked tem for her ervative i py cons and Marxist parties for Pursuing a foreign policy that was very much in accordance to Chile's traditi on. The Chilean government remained silent until the conference with the object of "not deepening divisions anongst chilens Apart from the Minister the Chilean delegation included only career personnel, an evidence of Alessandri's confidence in Martinez. for ndling the meeting. In the early stages Chile tried her best to ain 2 consensus and act as mediator for an agreement. But soon s apparent that the American countries were divided into two One, led by the United States and the smaller states, 4 13 —one vote less than the fourteen necessaries to expel rom the .A.S, The second, group of seven countries, tle, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. The Chilean Foreign fnez attacked some of the spurious liberalism conference and agreed implicitly with the Brazilian jago Dantas that Cuba was not a menace to the Chilean foreign ministers played an of private sessions they was926 tive WLIO OF Lhe AMopte ons, or a nahh: 66 y poacetitl ¢O-oxIatone tone ang annure v vh hands They. oftor yall eee edn bold lan tor 4h Mf Cuba into quan and US. dologations, HNO conside : They eration of WW “soindlandisatton" of Cuba ty PF°Deted the Noutrallonti ion aw : ; Motil IMLERETEY. THO Cuban gyi w ve aneerurowed PY Martino Rvournbte ‘0PMB. MUCH oneouraged by hy ant cnitoan, MINIBECTS. resented the proposay fs a 0 the Seer favo Doan Rusks Martinez and Dantas met peace "fler a fosk expressed MIS confidence thatthe nee Ppa could qatro by economic and political igolation« sng: Much discouraged by their failure, the Chilean delegation yorked hard to stop the United States obtaining the two-thirds yoquired to expel Cuba, Realising that Washington was using all available means to produce defections amongst the seven opposing sountries, they adopted group control tacties, The seven countries’ gates met for consultation in the Chilean headquarters low 46) until the voting time. During this period the most single issue was the continuous efforts made by the / supported by the U.S. Embassy In Buenos their government to change position. A few hours g, the Haitlan delegate withdrew from the gs of the opposition group. According to some k offered Haiti substantial economic ald in “The resolution to expel Cuba was passed the Argentine Foreign Minister chreamo president Frondizi was: 326 qnitean“US. relations 4p fener; eral jeulat ald NOt Suter much, and dur} ING the cont erence 1 ye Th that they respe ; 1° U8, ro ‘ PCLT Chile'y ngje eae to hn an appeared satisfied with chit lear Position the Chileans dae On the a acbeninism was ; ovis neompatibie with tea Inatter, the in ~ Motton th ® Inter~ Aine . er tem subject. A CUS po: n Syste on the a 8004 proportio sition for ae = B Chile jpat were for tHE exUTsion of gy ¢ credentials, astineton was in a rather Precart n erat ; The Chilean delegati : lon took full advantage that ac ondemnati on the pretext lon of ci made of defending Democracy. ‘Th uba could not be \e Chilean Forel en yinister told Ris audience that he was speaki 1 al representative of a country that had the third ci ences i lest Cor tne world, in which all political tendencies were represent Pes, ii ed and all jan eee te opinions freely expressed. In this respect Chilean "dij reflected Chile's self-consciousness as a political ae et om an essential aspect of Chile's image projection rs rl credibility; the Cuban case was just another opportunity for her leadership to make the message clear. an problem within hemispheric Chile's desire to keep the Cubs In March Cuba again presented oundaries was reiterated in 1962. case to the U.N., asking for the 0.A.S. resolution to be |. The case went to the security Council —Chilean Delegate ing chairman— where Humberto Diaz sald that chile 0.A.8. had only to inform the U.N. about It nment considers that....there has been firmly ‘of the regional nter-American System and of this syste Soeaay ence for the jepend Ne tentonal aye artant (OF DOT LONR Lor ain, to Im We eur nt "FOR 8 ap pproughout 1962 the quinvous INLETMAL ANd ORty cover Sconomnle relations w gcouraned the Administration to qh : st thoy october during an 4 ™. This arly formal moe happened in . ting of fo gasnington, ANd 8 FEW days later during the ee ne it cu ibs gyen in December Alessandri visiteg maul Missile crisis lent Kenne rashington, the latter trled to introduce the preston en, with cuba. Alessandri told Kennedy that this point ove ge w aS not in agenda and that If he insisted upon it he would suspend nis ie visit kennedy withdrew the matter, In order to reaffirm Chile’ position, Alessandri stressed the importance of the principle of on-intervention\iwHen onhisi wayi-Dachiitovchile he met the Mexican President.® In April 1969 the 0.A.S. Council approved the statute of the clal Consultative Commission on Security as one of the commendations of the Punta del Este Conference. Its main aim to "combat Communism’ in the hemisphere. Chile abstained it allowed for adopting measures by simple majority vote “will of the country concerned. ‘The Chilean F paganda was legal in Chile and year, the Council Is dangerously the Juridical precepts’. 1" tative Commission's report: ; by voting against thertina and Bolivia : “ Ausod ¢ ~ by the Independe are : P dent and conse: . “ hange implied a che » A lowering in ch I ; gh she remained as faithful as ever cent fore 8 ary 1964 the Panama cee . C riots, whe: : . where the Us S. police killed anamanian citizens, w ens, were another opportu ortunity f ing inciples. In Fe y S.C princiPl n February the 0.A.S. Council decided decided by 16 votes 1 one (Chile) to make Itself a consultative organi investigate the issue. Chile appeared isolated “ay erter te inexplicable support for the United States policy. Ee, her negative vote by stating that the Rio Treaty as a | aimed at “exceptional....cases of evident disturbance to peace". in his was not the case, and behind this action "was the her opinion t] al treaty" without the consent possibility of revising an internation of one of the interested parties. For Chile respect for treaties was all important, since the foundations of her twentieth-century y relied on this principle. She was ready to forsake der to keep the integrity of her long- 'S. interests, she polic: continental popularity in or standing. Far from be! rred to sacrifice her image of indepe' ouched her real sources of strength. ing subservient to U ndence and keeping829 net? was no doubt within the Al ssandr eventuall Y comply with thi 1 administrat nould ‘ ‘8 mand; ate, _ made Chile aware of gp, lon that Chile © una AN additional tactop orritorial problem with Argentin, a as encouraging Argentina to not sul arbitration. This was regarded as ; a foreign Policy; the Cuban problem Vital problem to chilean we ould not b a e such once the whether Chile would obey the o.a., . -A.S. resoluti tory resolution came throu, © question was not i y th ‘hrough, h r ‘ion, but when. Bventually, internal conditions brought ab with Cuba. At the end of Alessandri's term a ie. running for presidency: Allende, backed by a a, ie Frei, supported by Christian Democrats and most of the Fone electorate. Jorge Alessandri was aware that in the event of a a wing victory Chile would abandon her traditional posture and side with Cuba, against both the United States and the Inter-American system. Should the Christian Democrats win, the essential elements of Chilean foreign policy would be safe in thelr hands. Alessandri e —under 1960 conditions— it would have e-establishing knew that for Allend impossible price to pay for r He had a deep understanding of Democrats and of the dilemmas his own been almost an diplomatic relations with Cuba. weaknesses of the Christian fests fersre ut ett wine ove" Frei within with Guba meant an Impossible position for & au bonus for an elected ‘Allende and his Bet icticy. The christian Democrats managed ow that they wanted ® decision to and that 4 break would not raise 4 gust the Alessandtl administration330 Ke with Cuba, mue! N to the retie of Fret and to the dismay of | he relio ws el and . to the dismay siossandrl made a publle dectaraty on, seat of FraMBIIESS the reasons for his doeiy oxplaining with a great Slon. He said: As is publicly know n, during m: maintained a clear and aetiieae severmmont 1 have relations with Cuba, not always understate 8 sectors of national opinion, Tyee by some jefended with firmness this policy at the os ie recent Washington Meeting, opposing to sanctioi e regarded ae pace ticy eee as inadequate and inconvenient, but it was According to the Rio Treaty dispositions, once adopted by the necessary quorum, this type of decision is binding even on those countries that voted against. A fundamental principle in Chile's international policy has been faithful and precise compliance with treaties and respect for agreements that are adopted democratically by the required majorities. Non-compllance would imply a grave precedent and would mean, sooner or later, the withdrawal of Chile from the Inter-American juridical system, especially from the Rio Treaty, in whose elaboration and loyal application our country has always taken an outstanding part. The consed ile of such a step could ences for Ch be very serious, e + treaty is an efficacious guarantee of terri tion and of the sovereignty way’ Se a ‘easier for me at the end ry successor to determine ‘this way, 1 could not381 ig the responsibility for 4 ha delicate positions 1!" avo uct 1 plac “4 my country in phe maintenance of relations for the eon fey nave b egarded as normal by mogt W remaining weeks Gh ee forelgn observers, it i s followed atic it ha ed with much consistency and Nd success, "Bi "But Maerupture would have meant to place chit pective of a clash with the nice en aa a jgoue that did not affect the vital interests 7h ri. su yndoubtedly Chile's legalistic position on her jie tests over the pauca River and with Argentina over Palena "od pers peagle channel] had a strong influence on this decision.* Later, a student of Frei's international policy commented that: : ‘The Christian Democratic approach to foreign policy however would not have been possible nor plausible if the Alessandri government had not broken relations with Cuba. It is useful to repeat here that this eleventh-hour measure of Alessandri provided the sine qua non condition that allowed Frei to design @ foreign policy that could claim to be dynamic and forward-looking instead of a mere response to domestic and international pressures.‘® appropriately reco! /_—and maybe still is gnised by Eduardo s—— characteristicNg, vin way the Alons 6 term, .o Andel Adiminiatration ended lon ended ite ten "ile the Bow position In the tnter=n Or-Amorican System to » profilin: from 118 pant achievement nts, ‘The Cuban Cuban case od to Chiloan polley-makers that th here was room for Independence from the United States within the within the workable Inter-American Security System In 8 co with Chile's Intere ; eco" Mleronts, Chile consistently kept the vy within Wemlaphorte Tits and ac Le prove " ‘copted and complied with mult his allowed her to Isolate her disputes with Bolivia and Argen att tina from the continental discussion and to have a fre e pane at ee United Nations for promoting cooperation and mutual support wien the Latin American, Asian and African countries. ere the options open to a small and respected country such tent strategies at different afowing different but mutually consist of the International system: neighbouring, continental and she was not only temporarily successful in doing this, but fo take the appropriate decisions to allow the to extend her international policy on the same Jovels global jp was even able ti next administration bas the Christian Democratic they did not need to form & ¢ ave themoa9 og chite's Intornational rg vit pute poll yoyo! particularly: tayo Md FOUFEH, during an hMMIS period Pablo " i" yew ocononle I Mlornationnl trad 6 condition prot’s forete Polley has be Hon rogard pardod an th 00 second World War, it Ideologienl 7 + though au ; ; ; uN surpadne yo nat of Ideology on foreign poliey of od Intor by Allondo's ates thsening ‘bat leday 1964-1970 porlod was co the St jolt was an Intellectual who jy believed in the value of th he Christian Democratic sl f reality, both national ai onal, sec e tion of reality, y national and International, second, 7 ond, jverrel ively and in «activelY terested In foreign polley-making during hi his term. Two characteristic Chilean Christian Democratic concepts the ideas that Chile and Latin America were part of the be _-with an Buropean emphasis— and that nationalisin could not help the interests of chile. She had to find her réle in a world where pitateral, regional and global levels of cooperation were necessary derdevelopment. Nationalism was perceived as das essential for to overcome UM compromising peace, and peace was regarde eration.1® untries deserved bigger voice In the ‘order "to avold the frustrations that ‘a reaction”. Thus, the christian “req with current world Dower yfiez ten years pefore, with the , mainly. nationalistic 1" their and nationalism of the in Frets view small co334 tries in ord van count? ie to one re °Velo a limited sot (e vstem in general °t of demands on th and on aioular Thus, antl-status quo ang he United states in anti-nath z Fret's governmen lonalistic con ers I t foreign policy, calling tor cepts juicat and cconomle Integration, with y cooperation, cl lew to achieving @ new mee would be better protected and promoted.t” an understanding with the weak African and Asian nations in pre's view did not entail rivalry with the West. on the contrary, gutonomous Chile was seen as being part of the West but avoiding an acceptance of the United States as dominant leader. what the christian Democrats feared most was leading a country relegated to vassal status. The Frei government did not criticise Castro's Cuba pecause it was Marxist but because it was not independent of the pss... In order to obtain autonomy two important pre-requisites qere development and political democracy. Development would permit complete integration with the West. Political democracy would become meaningful —to the majority— once development a Democracy was valuable per sé and in the Christian Bs ss is had been obtained in Chile and now needed to iia a is logical approach to foreign policy were | ; ‘problems with Argentina and to the mocratic view this preserved.®outer ted li ns ft jons- itt thus Wdeology helped rounvent the dilemma betw uninspiring policy, and a mo; noftectlve one. Ideology "Io, i ees it 00 general preferences and Ba desirable: policy. aa The ideas of Weste nationalism, as well as eases He relaghionlgor atin American development, were se oH eae otween the concrete but relatively rig ee ee a boundary dispute and of relations with etl i states on one hand, and the preference: eats identifications of the Chilean Christian TRE ak is other.2° the Bovernment leader rs to 8 but probably Policy by tink Any aluesnsplring a phe claim that foreign policy under Frei suffered a ficult to substantiate. Valdés tried in in January 1965 to give that impression: icy with new revolutionary change is dil his speech to the Senate careful analysis shows that This does not mean thi it was merely old po at the vision and policies presented deep impression on Chile's the Bast-West dressing. Valdés were not going to make @ e His main points were: first, sereiporsiany mom thes important source of North-South relations. second, Pan= mnited States —andNg | Wott OHOH Toy Wotomagye ml aN \ AN PeHoeR 01) anne tot POT watatigy Ma Mrvetiong “ eon yout MroVoraiog Sixty, WON Chiter, apark Mon Mrely Dolloy of ro Nia ; : ont’ yatlon of past ae U's BLONAL gg, Intogration, MI ec anc iinl nist lon SEALOT sovor aint a yesouth Aviston wag his cortatnly: Wionary proposi Md 1960's, but it was same enitioksnt of the Inter-Amertean, System, Sand perhaps still iy the Not new to ‘an be sald about Valdés! Which was brought up by yates Wt the 1960's, though in a toss articulate manner, ‘The problent of arms control and disarmament has along —and aisappoluting— history in Chile's foreign affairs. And the opening to other diplomatic "azimuths" is part of a long tradition in chile, witness the improvement of numbers of diplomatic relations immediately after the two world wars, The multiple contacts tablished at the U.N. during the Alessandri’s administration point the same direction. Finally, collaboration and peaceful eatin cts with neighbours was a continuation " fates : ae which the Fret government even soug eaite's forelyn Athiindo, phe foreign policy under Frei was different: in ‘This can foreign minister aise Weer sn, administrative e ne of Sts successes can b 01997 quote without taking int ‘ bo or jong term of eeoy ail ding, confid Mee stands ENCE, conty, 1 second, the tiem ae oro? in foreign pottey durin jon bY the Foreign Service 7 pi 0 wl in cot d ' 7 jeerent and the stability that the sition would be impaired by The Andea he Venezuelan feared that their competitive P monetary instability of “the other partners venezuelan that there Wa5 still ample room for internal Peru's new justrialists believed for bigger markets les for a stort time.me peonsve — Balance of power conaldorations Tuner, CHIE’ enthusinnw for th Wore not absent ne Andean Teonnected With her dltticultios dean Pact was not WIth Argent gical hos! 1 ting and her art sgeotoetonl Hostility towards Brazil. On the oth 4 her certy me he other hand, Venenuel and Peruvian FeslAtance was caused by fear of 4, Yonesuelan oar of an increased Chil lean ana colomblan dominance In reglonal affairs The Andean Pact treaty was signed In 1969, In April 1970 all customs duties were lowered and a common external serie a adopted regarding the first section of the LAPTA common list of products. Progress was also made in creating a common statute for foreign investment, to be adopted later. In this way what Frei and Lieras foresaw in 1966 as an emerging community of interests amongst the Andean countries came to fruition at the end of the christian Democratic term.% ‘The reconstitution of Frel’s foreign polley In the second half of his government was ® partial return to the more pragmatic policies of the past and on the whole gave better results than362 coppers had gr a greatly tinproved Chile! Jhie's Internaty atonal Q gtandine ae 63 he politics of Realignment, 1971-1973. g.a.1. A Fablan Stratesy for a Radical Polley lvador Allende supported by the Popular politics and foreign ties headed by The election of Sa (up) meant radical The .UP was @ coal munists. 1 change in Chilean Jition of jeft-wing par the minor fore! union policy: alists and Com! 4 Radical party, This left-wint tive Joree es were the Amongs xy (PADENA), the Democratic Part} d won Wi The christian As the UP t aimed at starting soci much diminishe and the MAPU- x the conserva adomiro ‘Tomi the new gove edented Way» g alliance ha ith a small Alessandri. ie came third. margin ove! rnmen' ¢ candidate Ri e had stated, pemocrati international programm changing chile's foreign from a Marxist view of what What has fail not correspond to capitalist country: and dominated pre!