Belgica v.

Ochoa 37

MODULE 3 45
III. THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM 45
COURTS: WHO INTERPRETS THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW? 45
Lopez v. Roxas 45
Republic v. Sereno 47
Angara v. Electoral Commission 54
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections 56
Firestone Ceramics vs. Court of Appeals 59
Fabian v. Desierto 60
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo 61
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals 63
Republic Act No. 9282 (Third Level Courts: Court of Tax Appeals) 67
Republic Act No. 8249 (Third Level Courts: Sandiganbayan) 67
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan 68
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Second Level Courts: Regional Trial Courts) 69
Republic Act No. 7691 (First Level Courts: Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities) 70
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice 71
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals 72
De Castro v. JBC 74
Jardeleza v. Sereno 76

THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 78

Marbury v. Madison 78
Francisco v. House of Representatives 78
Tanada v. Cuenco 81
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon 84
Ocampo v. Enriquez 85
Page 3 of 169
 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan 91

JUDGES 95
Kilosbayan v. Executive Secretary 95
In Re: Allegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet 95
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Floro 97
People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 99
In Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S.
Ong, Sandiganbayan 100
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua 102
Arts. 27 & 32, Civil Code (Liabilities of a Judge: Civil Liability) 108
Arts. 204 – 206, Revised Penal Code (Liabilities of a Judge: Criminal Liability) 109
Santiago III v. Enriquez 109
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Yu 111
In Re: Charges of Plagiarism against Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo 113
Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen 115

LAWYERS: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS 115

Cayetano v. Monsod 115
Ulep v. Legal Clinic 116
In Re: Cunanan 116
Sebastian v. Calis 118
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma 119
Castaneda v. Ago 120
In Re: Edillon 121
In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” 123
Burbe v. Magulta 124
Pacana, Jr. vs. Pascual-Lopez 125
Regala v. Sandiganbayan 126

Page 4 of 169
 Roxas v. de Zuzuarregui 127

MODULE 4 128
IV. SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE LAW 128
LOST IN TRANSLATION: ORAL ADVOCACY IN A LAND WITHOUT BINDING PRECEDENT by Sabrina DeFabritiis 128
MIXED JURISDICTIONS: COMMON LAW v. CIVIL LAW (CODIFIED AND UNCODIFIED) by William Tetley 133
Discussion by Ruben E. Agpalo (Statutory Construction, 2003 ed.) 148

MODULE 5 153
V. ESSENTIAL LEGAL CONCEPTS 153
STARE DECISIS 153
Fermin v. People 153
Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the 154
Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation 154
Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil. Inc. v. Pagdanganan 156

RES JUDICATA 157

Facura v. Court of Appeals 157
Republic of the Philippines v. Yu 158

LAW OF THE CASE 159

People of the Philippines v. Olarte 159

LANDMARK CASE 161

Santos v. Court of Appeals 161
Ochosa v. Alano 163

LEADING CASE AND ABANDONMENT OF DOCTRINE 165

Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals 165

DURA LEX, SED LEX / CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 168

Corpuz v. People of the Philippines 168

Page 5 of 169
 confer/red personal, lump--sum allocations to legislators from which
they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect,
which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the
sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013
is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release
of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for
all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated,
not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special
Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are
hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this
permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the
funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund
shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes
not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper
substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that
the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on
Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the
availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases.
Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of public
record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited
but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any
valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to
a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the
funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress
as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of
government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the
government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate
and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private
individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular,
improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the
Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
MODULE 3
III. THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM
COURTS: WHO INTERPRETS THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE LAW?
Lopez v. Roxas
G.R. No. L-25716
28 July 1966
Concepcion, C.J.
(Judicial Power Defined)
FACTS:
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders Vice
President in the general elections held on November 9, 1965. By
Resolution No. 2, the two Houses of Congress, in joint session
assembled as the board charged with the duty to canvass the votes then
cast for President and Vice President of the Philippines, proclaimed
petitioner Fernando Lopez elected to the latter office with 3,531,550
votes, or a plurality of 26,724 votes over his closest opponent,
respondent Gerardo M. Roxas, in whose favor 3,504,826 votes had
been tallied, according to said resolution. On January 5, 1966,
Page 45 of 169
respondent filed, with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET), Election
Protest No, 2, contesting the election of petitioner herein as Vice-
President of the Philippines, upon the ground that it was not he, but said
respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes for said
office.
On February 22, 1966, petitioner Lopez instituted in the Supreme Court
the present original action for prohibition which preliminary injunction,
against respondent Roxas, to prevent the PET from hearing and
deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that RA
1793, creating said Tribunal, is “unconstitutional,” and that, “all’
proceedings taken by it are a nullity.”
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not RA1793 is constitutional. (Yes)
(2) Whether or not PET can recount votes. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not RA1793 violates constitutional tenure. (No)
(4) Whether or not Justices of SC can sit as PET members. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
JUDICIAL POWER is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before
the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.
The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1)
defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing
remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first
instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that
“Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts,” subject to the limitations set forth in the
fundamental law.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the judicial branch of
the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but
the entirety or “all” of said power, except, so much as the
Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to
“judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of
members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives,
which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively (Article VI,
Section 11, of the Constitution).
RA 1793, creating the PET, has the effect of giving a defeated candidate
the legal right to contest judicially the election of the President elect or
Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes cast for the
office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring
that he, not the candidate proclaimed elected by Congress, is the one
elected President or Vice-President, as the case may be, and that, as
such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office.
RA 1793 provides that the PET “shall be composed of the Chief Justice
and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court”, it has conferred upon
such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character. It
has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon
the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
The PET is not inferior to the SC, since it is the same Court, although
the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than
those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. It is
like the fact that Courts of First Instance (now RTC) perform the
functions of such ordinary Courts of First Instance, those of courts of
land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile
and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining
when the municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority,
pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were previously
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. In all of these
instances, the court (Court of First Instance or municipal court) is only
one, although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate.
The power to be the judge of contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of any public officer is essentially judicial. As such—
under the very principle of separation of powers—it belongs exclusively
to the judicial department, except only insofar as the Constitution
provides otherwise. This is precisely the reason why said organic law
ordains that “the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members” (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution). In other words,
the purpose of this provision was to exclude the power to decide such
contests relating to Members of Congress—which by nature is judicial—
from the operation of the general grant of judicial power to “the Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law”.
The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for
President and/or VicePresident, has obtained the largest number of
votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the
Page 46 of 169
jurisdiction vested in the PET. Congress merely acts as a national board
of canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make
said declaration, on the basis of the election returns only certified by
provincial and city boards of canvassers. (Article VII, Section 2,
Constitution of the Philippines.) Upon the other hand, PET has the
judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election
returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true
results of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to
recount the ballots cast, and, pass upon the validity of each ballot or
determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in
whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.
The authority of the PET to determine whether or not the protestant has
a better right than the President and/or Vice-President to be declared
elected by Congress would not abridge the constitutional tenure. If the
evidence introduced in the election protest shows that the person really
elected President or Vice-President is the protestant, not the person
declared elected by Congress, then the latter had legally no
constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence, he can claim no
abridgment thereof.
In imposing upon the Supreme Court the additional duty of performing
the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Congress has not,
through Republic Act No. 1793, encroached upon the appointing power
of the Executive. The imposition of new duties constitutes, neither the
creation of an office, nor the appointment of an officer. Said law is
constitutional.
Republic v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428
11 May. 2018
Ponente: Tijam, J.
FACTS:
1. The Office of the Solicitor General initiated the case for quo
warranto asking the court to declare CJ Sereno ineligible to hold
office for failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities, and
net worth, asserting that her failure to make said dicslosures
show that she does not possess “proven integrity” demanded of
every aspirant to the Judiciary.
2. Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the UP College of
Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She also served as legal counsel
for the Republic of the Philippines for several agencies from
1994 until 2009. On July 2010, Respondent submitted her
application for the position of Associate Justice of the SC.
3. Despite the span of 20 years of employment with UP from 1986
to 2006 and despite having been employed as legal counsel of
various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, records from
the UP Human Resources Development Office, Central Records
Division of the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of
Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) show that the only Statements of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) available on record and filed
by Respondent were those for the years 1985, 1989, 1990,
1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002, or only 11
out of 25 SALNs that ought to have been filed. No SALNs were
filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal
counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she
resigned from U.P. College of Law as of 1 June 2006 and when
she supposedly re-entered government service as of 16 August
2010.
4. The Justice Committee conducted several hearings to determine
probable cause. Among the Justices who appeared before the
Committee are (1) Justice Leonardo-De Castro who recounted
(a) CJ Sereno’s bypassing the SC En banc in creating Judiciary
Decentralized Office, (b) the suspicious issuance of the TRO in
the Senior Citizens case, (c) the revocation of the privilege of
Members of the Court to nominate for vacant judicial posts, and
(d) the clustering of the Sandiganabayan nominees; (2) Justice
Peralta who testified as the ex-officio JBC Chairperson of the
Council that nominated CJ Sereno; (3) Justice Bersamin; (4)
Justice Tijam; and, (5) Justice Jardeleza.
5. The OSG (Petitioner) argues that quo warranto is an available
Page 47 of 169
 remedy in questioning the validity of Respondent’s appointment,
and that the one-year bar rule does not apply against the State.
It also argues that the SC has jurisdiction over the petition. The
petition alleges that the failure of Respondent to submit her
SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset,
from being a candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking
the required number of SALNs, Respondent has not proven her
integrity, which is a requirement under the Constitution. The
Republic thus concludes that since Respondent is ineligible for
the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has
no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo
warranto.
6. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice
may only be ousted from office by impeachment on the basis of
the Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence. Alternatively,
she argues that the present petition is time-barred, as it should
have been filed within one year from the cause of ouster, and
not from the discovery of the disqualification.
7. It is likewise the contention of Respondent that public officers
without pay or those who do not receive compensation are not
required to file a SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the
years that she was on official leave without pay, she was
actually not required to file any SALN. She adds that to require
the submission of SALNs as an absolute requirement is to
expand the qualifications provided by the Constitution.
8. Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of
Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., and deem as sufficient and
acceptable her statement that she “maintains that she
consistently filed her SALNs.” Respondent argues that the
Court’s rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily conclude
failure to file SALNs simply because these documents are
missing in the Office of the Court Administrator's files should
likewise be made applicable to her case.
9. Several groups claiming standing as taxpayers and citizens filed
Motions for Leave to Intervene echoing some or all of CJ
Sereno’s arguments. Senators De Lima and Trillanes filed a
similar motion alleging the usurpation of functions of the Court
from the Senate Impeachment Court.
10. CJ Sereno filed Motions for Inhibition against Associate Justices
Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro,
imputing actual bias on said Justices for having testified before
the House Justice Committee; and, against Justice Martires for
his purported insinuations of CJ Sereno’s psychological fitness
during the Oral Arguments. CJ Sereno also prayed that the
Motion for Inhibition be by the SC En banc without the
participation of the Justices who are asked to inhibit.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether the grant of the motions to intervene is proper.
2. Whether the grant of the motions for inhibition against the
Associate Justices on the basis of actual bias is proper.
3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course
to the instant petition for quo warranto against Respondent who
is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of
Representatives;
4. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of
prescription;
5. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:
1. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for
nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC,
and whether such determination partakes of the
character of a political question outside the Court’s
supervisory and review powers;
2. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as
mandated by the Constitution and required by the law
Page 48 of 169
 and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so,
whether the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination
and appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice;
3. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the
submission of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so,
whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids
the nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief
Justice; and
4. In case of a finding that Respondent is ineligible to hold
the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the
President cured such ineligibility.
6. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.
RATIO:
Propriety of Motions for Intervention
1. Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to
enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
that may be affected by those proceedings. It is not a matter of
right but addressed to the sound discretion of the court upon
compliance with the requirements of (a) legal interest, and (b)
that no delay or prejudice should result.
2. The Court noted the IBP’s intervention and resolved to deny the
motions for intervention filed by several other groups. It
observed that intervention is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion; that movant- intervenors have no legal
interest in the case, as required in order to qualify a person to
intervene; and that the remedy of quo warranto is vested in the
people, and not in a particular group.
3. Lastly, such individuals do not claim a right to the questioned
position, which is the only time when an individual
himself/herself may commence an action for quo warranto. In
this case, the movants-intervenors are neither individuals
claiming to be entitled to the questioned position nor are they the
ones charged with the usurpation thereof.
4. The only intervention that could be contemplated under a quo
warranto proceeding, by its nature, is one brought by a person
claiming to be entitled to the usurped office.
Propriety of Motions for Inhibition
5. There is no basis for the Associate Justices to inhibit. Movant
must prove bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence
to disqualify a judge. Justice Tijam’s statement, taken as a
whole, was only to prod the Respondent to observe and respect
the constitutional process of impeachment. It does not appear
that there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary
inhibition, the mere fact that some of the Associate Justices
participated in the hearings of the Committee on Justice
determining probable cause for the impeachment of Respondent
does not disqualify them to hear the instant petition.
6. Their appearance was in deference to the House of
Representatives whose constitutional duty to investigate the
impeachment complaint filed against Respondent could not be
doubted. Their appearance was with the prior consent of the
Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the
parameters that the Court set for the purpose. Their statements
in the hearing should be carefully viewed within this context, and
should not be hastily interpreted as an adverse attack against
Respondent.
7. The second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1, does not give
judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from
hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground
for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. The
Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the
stigma of bias or partiality. Moreover, extrinsic evidence is
required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose,
Page 49 of 169
 in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. The only exception to the rule is when
the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable
inference of bad faith or malice.
8. In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for
compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact
that some of the Associate Justices participated in the hearings
of the Committee on Justice determining probable cause for the
impeachment of respondent does not make them disqualified to
hear the instant petition. Their appearance thereat was in
deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional
duty to investigate the impeachment complaint filed against
respondent could not be doubted. Their appearance was with
the prior consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they
faithfully observed the parameters that the Court set for the
purpose. Their statements in the hearing, should be carefully
viewed within this context, and should not be hastily interpreted
as an adverse attack against respondent.
9. A circumspect reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the
Manila Times article reveals that the manifest intent of the
statements was only to prod respondent to observe and respect
the constitutional process of impeachment, and to exemplify the
ideals of public accountability.
10. Justice Bersamin’s statement that “Ang Supreme Court ay hindi
po maaring mag function kung isa ay diktador,” is clearly a
hypothetical statement, an observation on what would the Court
be if any of its Members were to act dictatorially. Likewise, the
Court cannot ascribe bias in Justice Bersamin’s remark that he
was offended by respondent's attitude in ignoring the collegiality
of the Supreme Court when she withdrew the Justices’
“privilege” to recommend nominees to fill vacancies in the
Supreme Court. It would be presumptuous to equate this
statement to a personal resentment as respondent regards it.
11. Justice Peralta’s testimony before the House Committee on
Justice also contradicts respondent’s allegation that Justice
Peralta’s apparent bias arose from his belief that respondent
caused the exclusion of his wife, Court of Appeals (CA)
Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, from the list of
applications for the position of CA Presiding Justice. Justice
Peralta has made it clear during the February 12, 2018
Congressional hearing that he has already moved on from said
issue and that the purpose of his testimony was merely to
protect prospective applicants to the Judiciary.
12. Absent strong and compelling evidence establishing actual bias
and partiality on the part of the Justices whose recusal was
sought, respondent’s motions for inhibition must perforce fail.
Mere conjectures and speculations cannot justify the inhibition of
a Judge or Justice from a judicial matter. The presumption that
the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in
accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor,
should not be abandoned without clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.
Jurisdiction over Petition for Quo Warranto
13. While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a
direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified
considering that the action for quo warranto questions the
qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue is
of transcendental importance, is one of first impression, and of
paramount public interest.
14. The origin, nature, and purpose of impeachment and quo
warranto are materially different. Impeachment proceedings are
political in nature, while quo warranto is judicial. Impeachment is
a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of
the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the
people in the hands of the public officer by determining the
Page 50 of 169
 public officer’s fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action
for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the
eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public
official based on predetermined rules.
15. Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of
each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction
(2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Thus, there is no forum shopphing
in the instant case as the nature and purpose of the remedies
are different, and there is yet no impeachment trial.
16. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be
removed from office. Article XI, Sec. 2 of the Constitution uses
the permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction,
denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect. To subscribe to the view that appointments or
election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to
cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect
pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which
cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding.
17. The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo
warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from
enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for
impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment,
nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally
committed power of impeachment.
18. An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to
hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is
properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly
appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of
a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may
either be impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.
19. An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that
respondent will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear
abdication of the Court's duty to settle actual controversy
squarely presented before it. Indeed, the easiest way to lose
power is to abdicate it.
Prescription does not lie against the State.
20. The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petitioner is
not a mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but the
government itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing for
public interest. In the three instances enumerated by Rules of
Court, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to
commence the necessary quo warranto petition, as seen in the
use of the word “must.” In Agcaoili v. Suguitan, “As a general
principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil
or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding
brought to enforce a public right.” In effect, when the
government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly
to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of
laches or prescription.
21. Indubitably, the basic principle that “prescription does not lie
against the State” which finds textual basis under Article 1108
(4) of the Civil Code, applies in this case.
22. Further, that prescription does not lie in this case can also be
deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto,
which is to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority
unlawfully asserted. The Republic, then, cannot be faulted for
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 questioning Respondent’s qualification for office only upon
discovery of the cause of ouster.
23. Respondent cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she
should not be required to submit the said documents as she was
considered to be coming from private practice; that it was not
feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe
considering that the same are more than fifteen years old; and
that U.P. already cleared her of “all academic/administrative
responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from
administrative charges”. She has never been clear on whether
she had filed the required SALNs or not. Given the foregoing,
there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on the
part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its
right to seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate public
interest.
24. Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of
the novel issues imbued with public interest presented before Us
than to dismiss the case outright merely on technicality.
Ineligibility as a Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief
Justice
25. The Court's supervisory authority over the JBC includes
ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules. The Court's
supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies
with its own rules and procedures.
26. The SALN requirement is imposed no less than by the
Constitution and made more emphatic by its accompanying laws
and its implementing rules and regulations. In other words, one
who fails to file his or her SALN violates the Constitution and the
laws; and one who violates the Constitution and the laws cannot
rightfully claim to be a person of integrity as such equation is
theoretically and practically antithetical. The obligation of
members of the Judiciary to file their respective SALNs is not
only a statutory requirement but forms part of the mandatory
conduct expected of a judge so that an “honorable competent
and independent Judiciary exists to administer justice and thus
promote the unity of the country, the stability of government, and
the well-being of the people.”
27. To be of proven integrity, as required by qualifications under the
Constitution, means that the applicant must have established a
steadfast adherence to moral and ethical principles. In this line,
failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The
offense is penal in character and is a clear breach of the ethical
standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards
the requirement of transparency as a deterrent to graft and
corruption. For these reasons, a public official who has failed to
comply with the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to
be of proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her
disqualified from holding public office.
28. Respondent’s argument that failure to file SALN does not negate
integrity does not persuade. Whether or not Respondent
accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue at this time, but
whether she, in the first place, complied with the mandatory
requirement of filing of SALNs.
29. That UP HRDO never asked Respondent to comply with the
SALN laws holds no water as the duty to comply with such is
incumbent with the Respondent, and because there was no duty
for the UP HRDO to order compliance under the rules
implemented at that time; 5) That Respondent’s compliance with
the SALN requirement was reflected in the matrix of
requirements and shortlist prepared by the JBC is dispelled by
the fact that the appointment goes into her qualifications which
were mistakenly believed to be present, and that she should
have been disqualified at the outset.
30. The established and undisputed fact is Respondent failed to
submit the required number of SALNs in violation of the rules set
by the JBC itself during the process of nomination. The JBC
determined that she did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to
2006 and that, as remarked by Senator Escudero, the filing
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 thereof during those years was already required. There was no
indication that the JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years
2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted by Respondent for her 20
years as a professor in the U.P. College of Law and two years
as Justice, as substantial compliance. Respondent was
specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants for having
failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in
the U.P. College of Law.
31. In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to require
only the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001-
2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice position. It is clear that
the JBC En Banc did not do away with the requirement of
submission of SALNs, only that substantial compliance
therewith, i.e., the submission of the SALNs for the immediately
preceding 10 years instead of all SALNs, was deemed sufficient.
Records clearly show that the only remaining applicant-
incumbent Justice who was not determined by the JBC En Banc
to have substantially complied was Respondent, who submitted
only three SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after
extensions of the deadline for the submission to do so. Her
justifications do not persuade. Contrary to her argument that the
SALNs are old and are infeasible to retrieve, the Republic was
able to retrieve some of the SALNs dating back to 1985.
32. Respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the
applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for
her years of service in the U.P. College of Law. This is in
obvious contrast with the other shortlisted applicants who
submitted SALNs, or whose years in government service
correspond to the period prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6713.
The clearance issued by UP HRDO hardly suffice as a substitute
for SALNs.
33. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing
respondent of her academic and administrative responsibilities,
money and property accountabilities and from administrative
charges as of the date of her resignation on June 1, 2006. But
such could not, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as
compliance with the SALN requirement. Obviously, an
administrative officer, performing ministerial and administrative
duties, could not have certified respondent's compliance with the
filing of SALNs which is a statutory, and not merely an
administrative, requirement.
34. The failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC
and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the
applicant's fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. Respondent's disposition and propensity to commit
dishonesty and lack of candidness are manifested through her
subsequent acts committed during her incumbency as Chief
Justice, which are now matters of public record and also
determined to be constituting probable cause for impeachment.
Respondent's ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be
cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief
Justice.
De facto Officer
35. The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is
ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will
give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto
officer.
36. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Respondent is ineligible
to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Respondent has never
attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal
from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State
is proper to oust Respondent from the appointive position of
Chief Justice.
37. Upon a finding that Respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully holding and
exercising such public office, the consequent judgment under
Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and
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 exclusion of Respondent from holding and exercising the rights,
functions and duties of the Office of the Chief Justice.
Sub judice Rule
38. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging
the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration
of justice. The sub judice rule finds a more austere application to
members of the Bar and of the Bench as the strict observance
thereof is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
39. It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate
branches of the Government and even men and women learned
in law had succumbed to the tempting affray that tends to divert
the instant quo warranto action from its primary purpose. Even
worse, Respondent and her spokespersons chose to litigate
Respondent's case, apart from her Ad Cautelam submissions to
the Court, before several media-covered engagements. Through
her actuations, Respondent appears to have forgotten that this
is a court action for quo warranto, and as such, the concomitant
rule on sub judice applies.
40. Such actions, indeed, resulted in the obfuscation of the issues
on hand, camouflaging the charges against her with assaults to
judicial independence, and falsely conditioning the public's mind
that this is a fight for democracy. Once and for all, it should be
stated that this is not a fight for democracy nor for judicial
independence. This is an undertaking of the Court's duty, as it is
called for by the Republic, to judicially determine and settle the
uncertainty in the qualification, or otherwise, of Respondent to
occupy the highest position in the Judiciary.
41. It is well-nigh unthinkable for respondent to profess deprivation
of due process when she herself chose to litigate her case
before the media. when aggressive actions are taken against the
Judiciary as an institution and clouds of doubt are casted upon
the people's faith in the administration of justice, especially so
when the same are perpetrated by members of the Bar, this
Court cannot be apathetic to and is not helpless against such
attacks, but the prudent thing to do is to stand and deal with it
head on.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of
UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared
vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the
application and nomination process.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for
casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme
Court.
Angara v. Electoral Commission
G.R. No. 45081
15 July 1936
Laurel, J.
(Separation and Blending of Powers)
FACTS:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, petitioner, Jose A. Angara and
the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly
for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district,
for having received the most number of votes. On November 15, the
petitioner took his oath of office.
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On December 3, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the petitioner,
being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8, and
praying that said respondent be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of
said position be nullified.
On December 9, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution,
paragraph 6 of which provides that it will not consider any election
protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935
On December 20, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests
against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the
aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted
formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period;
On December 27, respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or
constitutionaprovision barring the presentation of a protest against the
election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation.
The case was argued before the Supreme Court on March 13, 1936.
Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the
issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He
contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections
to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative. (Yes)
(2) Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in assuming the cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
(No)
HELD/RATIO:
YES, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related
facts, and in the affirmative
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the
sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments.
The judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in
their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts,
not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set
at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
Page 55 of 169
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
constitution.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional organ, created for a
specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions.
Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion
that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater
of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly."
No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming the cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner
Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot
in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such
time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.” The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. xxx.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei
the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 205728
21 July 2015
Leonen, J.
(Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts)
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to
the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti -RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay”
with an “X” mark.
Team Patay: Juan Edgardo Angara, Teddy Casino, Alan Peter
Cayetano, Jackie Enrile, Francis Escudero, Risa Hontiveros, Loren
Legarda, Partylist Gabriela, Partylist Akbayan, Partylist Bayan Muna,
Partylist Anak Pawis
Page 56 of 169
Team Buhay: JV Estrada, Gregorio Honasan, Mitos Magsaysay, Koko
Pimentel, Antonio Trillanes, Cynthia Villar, Partylist Buhay Partylist Ang
Pamilya
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it
form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor
paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the
tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Court’s power of review. (No)
(2) Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not
brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions. (No)
(3) Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by
private citizens. (No)
(4) Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
expression. (Yes)
(5) Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation. (Content-Based)
(6) Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
(Yes)
(7) Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of
prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted
upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court
through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when
the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual
or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did
have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in
question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether
an issue involves a truly political and non -justiciable question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and
review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to
free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.
SECOND ISSUE:
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear
that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
“prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before
a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and
their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’
speech.
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In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies
as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their
freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE:
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support
their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However,
the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to
any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate
the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised
by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted
against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid
for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included,
while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the tarpaulin is
a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed
and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech
has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of
the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE:
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-
neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and
this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify
the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the
right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in
their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE:
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the
public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their
right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement
of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional
guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where
decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE:
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The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are
not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting
by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such
basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality- With religion looked upon with
benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically
into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into
account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.”
Lemon test
-A regulation is constitutional when:
-It has a secular legislative purpose;
-It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
-It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Firestone Ceramics vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127245
28 June 2000
Purisima, J.
(The Supreme Court: En Banc and Division Cases)
Art. VIII, Sec. 4, Par. 2-3:
(1) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme
Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court
are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon.
(2) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall
be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
FACTS:
99 hectares of land presumptively owned by the Republic of the
Philippines was adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged to
be without jurisdiction. Petitioners submitted these consolidated cases to
the SC Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc.
Under Supreme Court Circular No.2- 89, dated Feb. 7, 1989, amended
by the Resolution of November 18, 1993:
Xxx, the following are considered en banc cases:
1.....Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
2.....Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the
death penalty;
3.....Cases raising novel questions of law;
4.....Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls;
5.....Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on
Audit;
6.....Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a
judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or
either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1)
year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7.....Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc
or in division may be modified or reversed;
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8.....Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least
three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and
are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en
banc; and
9.....All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its
actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention.
When the Motions were first brought to the attention of the Court on
March 7, 2000, it opined that since the Third Division had not yet acted
on subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc, it was premature for
the Court to resolve the motion.
On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4 -1 to deny petitioners
motion to transfer the cases to the Banc. On March 14, 2000, the Court
deliberated on the motion and voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the
banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the cases are of sufficient
importance to merit its attention.
This action of the Court is a legitimate and valid exercise of its
RESIDUAL POWER within within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of
the Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads: "All other
cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may
deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention."
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the nine justices who voted to treat the consolidated
cases as En Banc cases did not have any cogent or compelling reason
for such action. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
The finding by the Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling
enough to warrant the majority ruling that the Court En banc has to act
upon and decide petitioners motions for reconsideration.
It has to be stressed that where the Court En Banc entertains a case for
resolution, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is
incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court
simple means that the nature of the cases calls for an en banc attention
and consideration.
It should also not be concluded that the Court took undue advantage of
sheer voting strength.
It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion
of the majority that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance
meriting the action and decision of the whole Court.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues
raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is
claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of
petitioners that their pending motions for reconsideration should be
resolved by the Court En Banc.
Fabian v. Desierto
G.R. No. 129742
16 September 1998
Regalado, J.
(The Supreme Court: Rule-Making Powers)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in a
business transaction with Nestor Agustin, the incumbent District
Engineer of the First Manila Engineering District (FMED).
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the FMED, and respondent, reportedly
taking advantage of his official position, persuaded the petitioner into
having an amorous relationship with him. Their affair lasted for some
time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for the corporation’s problems.
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Because of some misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents, Fabian
wanted to terminate their relationship but Agustin threatened her not to.
Fabian then filed an administrative case against Agustin with the
Ombudsman, but Agustin was eventually exonerated.
Fabian argues that Sec 27, of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
allows that all decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the SC by filing a petition for certiorari within ten days from
receipt of the written notice. She also argues that the Ombudsman
cannot restrict the right to appeal and cannot limit the power of review of
the SC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Sec. 27 of RA 6670 is unconstitutional. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Sec. 30, Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal
to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The
constitutional prohibition was intended to give this Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court.
The very provision cited by the petitioner does not include quasi-judicial
agencies such as the OMB. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be
brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts. Appeals from judgments and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to
the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Furthermore, the legislative background of RA 6770 shows that the
Conference Committee Report was aware of the provisions of Section
30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo
Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of the bill admitted that
the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the
Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court
on the matter.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906
7 October 2008
Puno, C.J.
(The Supreme Court: Rule-Making Powers)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:
5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
Procedural
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) filed before this Court by herein
respondents to stop herein petitioners and/or their officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Respondents filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo
Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final
Amparo Reliefs. They prayed, among others, that:
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(1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under
Sec. 26 of the Amparo Rule; (2) they be granted the interim reliefs
allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the
petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule;
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007
Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule
Circumstances
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter
referred to as “Raymond”) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to
as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they
were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After
eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on
13 August 2007. On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a
Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a
Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined
them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they
filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as
Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final Amparo Reliefs. While the aforementioned case was pending,
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007.
Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus
motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition. On 25 October
2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition
as a petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise
granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the Court of
Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition. On 26
December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and
the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the
custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official
assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical
reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military
custody. Thus the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff
of the AFP filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is
sufficient for amparo petitions.
(2) Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the
right to security of a person may be invoked.
HELD/RATIO:
ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS Effect of the
nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of
evidence required – With the secret nature of an enforced
disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of
the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of
their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by
other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they
suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation
of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION
Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the right to
security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of
this right. First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In
its “whereas” clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) enunciates that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.” Some
scholars postulate that “freedom from fear” is not only an aspirational
principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the
“right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means “freedom
from fear.” Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to
life, liberty and security of person. xxx Second, the right to security of
person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a
search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical
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disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical
injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal
law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they
are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. xxx Third, the
right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by
the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built
into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section
1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom
from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under
Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is
a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full respect for human
rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection
to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. Freedom from fear
as a right – In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom
from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or
security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction;
threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with
the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character
or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is
more correct to say that the “right to security” is actually the “freedom
from threat.” Viewed in this light, the “threatened with violation” Clause in
the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of
the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be
invoked – While the right to security of person appears in conjunction
with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the
right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty.
In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for
the right to security of person to be invoked.
BRIEF BACKGROUND OF AMPARO:
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in
the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative
Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances
sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was
envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, hence
representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as
well as all the stakeholders in the justice system participated in mapping
out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of
the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances. It was
an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our people’s constitutional rights, which
made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the
Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts
of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means
protection in Spanish.
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 217126-27
10 November 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
(Third Level Courts: Court of Appeals)
FACTS:
Binay JR. and other public employees and officers of Makati were
accused of Plunder and RA 3019 in connection with the Procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The
Ombudsman then conducted fact-finding, submitted an investigation
report and filed a complaint charging Binay JR. with six Administrative
cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and six criminal cases for
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violation of Section e of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds and
Falsification of Public Documents. The Ombudsman then placed Binay
under preventive suspension for not more than six months.
Proceedings before the CA
Binay Jr. then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking a
nullification of the preventive suspension order and praying for the
issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. He also
alleged that he could not be held administratively liable for various
reasons including his opinion that his re-election as Mayor of Makati for
a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability. The TRO
was eventually granted. A petition for contempt was also filed by Binay
against the Ombudsman and various other officials for deliberately
refusing to obey the CA and the CA then gave due to course to the
petition for contempt and directed the Ombudsman to file her comment.
Both parties filed their respective comments and the Ombudsman
pleaded that the Court abandon the Condon action doctrine, the case
was then submitted to the Court for resolution.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the present petition and not motions for
reconsideration of the assailed CA issuance , is the Ombudsman
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. (No)
(2) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition for certiorari. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO
and/or WPI enjoin in the implementation of a preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman. (Yes)
(4) Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
TRO and eventually WPI enjoin in the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine. (No)
(5) Whether or not the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay Jr. petition for contempt is improper and illegal. (Premature
Issue)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
A direct resort to certiorari is allowed in in this case. As a general rule a
motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to
resorting to certiorari since a motion for reconsideration can still be
considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule:
a) Where the order is a patent nudity such as when the court a quo
has no jurisdiction.
b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court.
c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable.
d) Where under the circumstances a motion for reconsideration would
be useless.
e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief.
f) Where in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable
g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullify for lack of due
process.
h) Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had
no opportunity to object.
i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved.
In this case, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and the public interest is involved. The cases involves both
constitutional and statutory limits of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Legislature and the Judiciary and the propriety of the continuous
application of the condonation doctrine thus it involves an issue of
transcendental public importance. Thus the Ombudsman direct resort to
certiorari and prohibition is justified even though no motion for
reconsideration was filed.
SECOND ISSUE:
The CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Ombudsman
argument that the CA lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter is based
on Section 14, RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act. The same states:
Section 14. Restrictions.- No writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima face evidence that the subject
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matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on
pure questions of law.
The general rule is that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
bans the whole range of remedies against issuance of the Ombudsman
by prohibiting both an appeal against any decision or finding of the
Ombudsman and any application of remedy against the same except for
decisions or findings taken to the Supreme Court on pure questions of
law, in other words a Rule 45 petition. A rule 45 appeal can only be
taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts and not against
“findings” of quasi judicial agencies including the Office of the
Ombudsman. The case of Fabian v. Desert provides that increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence is
in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Section 14
of RA 6770 attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court Appellate
Jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, therefore it is concluded
that the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional.
In this case a rule 65 petition for certiorari was filed by Binay Jr before
the CA to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman. Daan v. Office of the Ombudsman stated that while a
special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition
should be initially filed with the CA in observance of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Several cases also ruled that a Rule 65 petition is
the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Since Section 14 of RA 6770 was declared
unconstitutional it is concluded that the CA had subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition.
THIRD ISSUE:
The CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoin
in the implementation of the a preventive suspension order issued by
the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman argued that the first paragraph of
Section 14 of RA 6770 in conjunction with the offices independence
under the 1987 Constitution insulated the said Office from judicial
intervention. The constitution envisions the Ombudsman as an authority
to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses, of the
bureaucracy.
From the case of Gonzales III the concept of the Ombudsman
independence covers three things:
1. Creation by the Constitution which means that the Office cannot be
abolished nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges be removed, altered or modified by law unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made
2. Fiscal Autonomy which entails freedom to use and dispose its funds
for purposes germane to its function.
3. Insulation from executive supervision and control which means that
those within the ranks of the Office can only be disciplined by
internal authority.
However, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked
to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested
unto the courts. This is because the courts are apolitical bodies which
may apply justice to all. Thus the Ombudsman is not exempt from
judicial power.
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the duty of the
courts of justice is to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. This provision vests in the Judiciary particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislative and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because of grave abuse of
discretion.
Also, the Constitution gave the Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. An
example of this is the promulgation of the Rules of Court where the
provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders (TRO) and writs of
preliminary injunction (WPI) were provided.
In this particular case, the Court ruled that when Congress passed the
first paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770, it took away the courts’ power
to issue a TRO or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, the Congress encroached upon the courts’ constitutional
rule-making authority. This same act does not allow a court to exercise
its full functions.
However, the Court considered the policy considerations behind the first
paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus pending deliberation on
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whether or not to adopt the same, The Court under its sole authority
over all matters of procedure, deemed it ineffective the prohibition
against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus with Congress interfering with matters of procedure
without the consent of the Court, the CA had the authority to issue the
injunctive writs.
FOURTH ISSUE:
In this case the condonation doctrine was deemed abandoned thus
the TRO and the WPI of the CA was given no effect. The purpose of
a preventive suspension order is to prevent the official who is being
suspended from using the powers of his office to influence witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him. In this case, the CA issued a injunctive writ to nullify the
preventive suspension order because in its opinion, Binay Jr re-election
in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability
arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building
Project. The CA found it sufficient that the application of the condonation
doctrine was enough to enjoin the implementation of the preventive
suspension order.
The condonation doctrine originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v.
Hon. Provincial Board of Nevada Ecija. The ratio decidendi of the
condonation doctrine has 3 parts:
1. The penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in
which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and
distinct, also offenses committed or acts done during the previous
term are held not to furnish cause for removal.
2. An elective officials re-election serves as a condonation of previous
Misconduct, cutting the right to remove him for these aforesaid acts.
3. The courts may not deprive the electorate who are assumed to
know the life and character of their candidates of their right to elect
officers.
The Court then concluded that condonation was adopted because the
legality of the doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms.
The 1987 Constitution provides that all public officers and employees
must be accountable to the people at all times and that public office is a
public trust. The LGC provides that an elective official may be
disciplined, suspended or removed from office for disloyalty, culpable
violation of the Constitution, Dishonesty, oppression, Misconduct in
office etc. The LGC also provides that those officials removed from office
as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from running for any
elective local office.
Through a reading of the 1987 Constitution and other laws including the
ones cited above, the Çourt concluded that the doctrine of condonation
is bereft of legal basis. Accountability is inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local officials administrative liability for a Misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a
second term or another elective post. There is no support to the
statement in the case of Pascual that the courts would be depriving the
electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to
be sanctioned, in other words there is no legal basis that election implied
condonation. There is also no presumption in any rule of law that the
electorate upon re-election an official, have disregarded or forgave the
officials faults. The electorate rarely has full knowledge of a officials
misdeeds since plenty of corrupt acts are shrouded in secrecy.
Condonation cannot be subscribed to because it implied forgiveness,
which requires knowledge of the acts being forgiven for and in the
absence of knowledge of these acts there can be no condonation.
In conclusion the Court found no legal basis to continue to adopt the
condonation doctrine in our jurisdiction yet this abandonment was
deemed prospective in its application which means that only cases after
this one would be affected by the abandonment. This was also done for
the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution until reversed shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
FIFTH ISSUE:
It is still premature for the Court to rule on this issue. The
Ombudsman’s contention is that as an impeachable officer she cannot
be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt since this penalty is
criminal in nature and will result in her effective removal from office.
However, her being subjected to contempt proceedings in the resolution,
makes it clear that even thought she is still ordered to comment, the CA
has not necessarily given due course to Binay Jr contempt petition. Thus
in this comment, the Ombudsman may raise her objections to the
contempt proceedings and the CA may still opt to not give due course to
the same contempt proceedings. Absent any indication that the
contempt petition has been given due course by the CA it would then be
premature for the Court to rule on the issue.
Page 66 of 169
Republic Act No. 9282 (Third Level Courts: Court of Tax
Appeals)
Under R.A. No. 9282:
The Court of Tax Appeals was elevated to the same level as the Court
of Appeals, possessing all the inherent powers of a Court of Justice.
It shall now consist of one (1) Presiding Justice and five (5) Associate
Justices. They shall have the same qualifications, ranks, category,
salary, emoluments and other privileges, be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirements and
other benefits as those provided for under existing laws for the Presiding
Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. It shall sit en
banc, or in two (2) divisions with three (3) Justices each. A decision of a
division of the CTA may further be appealed by verified petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.
(Due to the enactment of RA 9503 on 12 June 2008 and took effect on 5
July 2008, the organizational structure of the CTA is further enlarged by
the creation of a Third Division which has three (3) additional Justices.
Therefore, CTA is now composed of one (1) Presiding Justice and eight
(8) Associate Justices. The CTA may sit en banc or in three (3) divisions
with each division consisting of three
(3) Justices.)
The CTA’s original appellate jurisdiction was expanded to include the
following:
1. Criminal cases involving violations of the NIRC and the Tariff
and Customs Code;
2. Decisions of the RTC in local tax cases;
3. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA)
in cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property;
and
4. Collection of internal revenue taxes and customs duties the
assessment of which have already become final.
Republic Act No. 8249 (Third Level Courts:
Sandiganbayan)
Under R.A. No. 8249:
Sandiganbayan is a special court, of the same level as the Court of
Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice. It
shall consist of one (1) presiding justice and (14) fourteen associate
justices who shall be appointed by the President.
Before RA 8249 was enacted, the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan was
determined based on the penalty imposable on the offense or offenses
charged on the accused. Under RA 8249 Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction regardless of the penalty, so long as the offense charged
was committed by a public officer.
To determine whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, two (2)
criteria must be taken into consideration, namely: (1) The nature of the
offense and (2) The salary grade of the public official.
Sandiganbayan shall have original exclusive jurisdiction over:
A.) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, (Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices
Act),
B.) Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including:
a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other provincial department
heads;
b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panglungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and
other department heads;
c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
d) Philippine Army and Air force colonels, naval captains
and all officers of higher rank;
e) Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of
Provincial Director and those holding the rank of Senior
Superintendent or higher;
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 f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants;
officials and the prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
g) President, directors or trustees or managers of
government owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
2. Members of Congress and Officials thereof classified as Grade
27 and up under the Compensation and Classification Act of
1989;
3. Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provision of
the Constitution;
4. Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provision of the Constitution;
5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and
higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
C.) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed in relation to their office by the public officials and
employees mentioned above;
D.) Civil and Criminal Cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO
1, 2, 14 & 14-A issued in 1986
Sandiganbayan has Concurrent Jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court in:
Petitions for issuance of Writ of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction; Provided, jurisdiction is not exclusive of the
Supreme Court
The Sandiganbayan is vested with Appellate Jurisdiction in: Final
judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC whether in the exercise of
their original or appellate jurisdiction over crimes and civil cases falling
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but which
were committed by public officers below Salary Grade 27.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in govemment -owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. Therefore, private
individuals can be sued in cases before the Sandiganbayan if they are
alleged to be in conspiracy with the public officer.
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 191894
15 July 2015
Peralta, J.
(Third Level Courts: Sandiganbayan)
Art. XI, Sec. 4:
Section. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan
shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law.
FACTS:
The petitioner in this case Danilo A. Duncano is the Regional Director of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified
under RA No. 6758. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office
of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for the violation of
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
Duncano allegedly willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in
his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for
the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in
Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and
his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol
motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P.
DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of
public interest.
Prior to his arraignment, he filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to
Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, asserting that under
Presidential Decree 1606 as amend by Section 4 (A) (1) of RA 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear a case because he is
an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional
Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary
Grade 27.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed, arguing that he
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of
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the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those
specifically enumerated. This is so since the term “Regional Director”
and “higher” are separated by the conjunction “and,” which signifies that
these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are
conjoined together “relating one to the other” to give effect to the
purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was
specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies
the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position,
regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan Second Division denied the motion, holding that the
position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions where the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade
27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally
provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the
executive branch of the government occupying the position of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher,
of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly enumerated
in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this Court’s
pronouncements in Inding and Binay v. Sandiganbayan were cited.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4
(A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of
27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Petitioner, Duncano is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or
higher. Neither does he hold any position particularly enumerated in
Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on
all fours with Cuyco.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a)
and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by
public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director
and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in
relation to their office. In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though
petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with Salary
Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious
error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling
petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.
Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although
petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as
Director II with Salary Grade 26. There is no merit in the OSP’s
allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Second Level Courts:
Regional Trial Courts)
Under BP Blg. 129:
Section 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch.
– The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of
the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch
concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts over the said branch may exercise appellate
jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised with a view to
making the courts readily accessible to the people of the different parts
of the region and making the attendance of litigants and witnesses as
inexpensive as possible.
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
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 3. In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
4. In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where
such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00);
5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
7. In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and
8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now
falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of
by the latter.
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise original jurisdiction:
1. In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced
in any part of their respective regions; and
2. In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and
consuls.
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin
and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties
or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional
Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to
the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the
petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of
fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or
judgment sought to be reviewed.
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme
Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to
handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases,
agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the
jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other
special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a Regional Trial
Court takes cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation cases and/or
agrarian cases, the special rules of procedure applicable under present
laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless subsequently
amended by law or by rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Republic Act No. 7691 (First Level Courts: Municipal
Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities)
Under R.A. No. 7691:
Section 2. Section 32 od the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. –
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
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 amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,00.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included
in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That
where there are several claims or causes of actions between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different traansactions;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and
3. Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos (20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That
in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of
such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601
19 January 1999
Puno, J.
(Jurisdiction)
FACTS:
The Secretary of Justice filed for Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily
restraining Echegaray’s execution and Supplemental Motion to Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Secretary of Justice claims that the decision of the case having
become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be
construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority. It further
included in its position a copy of the House of Representatives’
resolution which advised the branches of government to immediately
implement the re-imposition of the death penalty.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Has the Court lost jurisdiction of the case at bar and hence can no
longer restrain the execution of Echegaray?
(No)
(2) After a decision has become final and executory, does the execution
enter the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department?
(No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The Court does not lose jurisdiction of case after a decision has become
final and executory.
The important part of a litigation is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties
and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
conformable to law and justice. It bears repeating that what the Court
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restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it
reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
Congress.
In criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the
period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment. But it
does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court
with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included
in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under
the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power
over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the
penalty and to pardon.
SECOND ISSUE:
After a decision has become final and executory, the execution does not
enter the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department. The
Secretary of Justice uses Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution
which reads: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The above provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused
who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral
rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. The
suspension of the death sentence is an exercise of judicial power. It is
not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is
the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death
convict.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114323
23 July 1998
Martinez, J.
(Basis of Decisions)
Art. VIII, Sec. 14:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Oil and Natural Gas Comm. (ONGC) is a foreign corporation
controlled and owned by the Indian government. Respondent, Pacific
Cement Company Inc. (PCCI), is a private corporation organized under
Philippine Law.
On February 26, 1983 respondent agreed to supply the petitioner 4,300
metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the petitioner
paid $477,300.00 through a letter of credit.
The oil well cement was loaded on MV SURUTANA NAVA ship at the
port of Surigao City for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. Due to a
dispute between the ship owner and the respondent, the cargo
remained in Bangkok and failed to reach its destination. Respondent
failed to give the 4,300 metric tons of cement despite petitioner’s
demands. They agreed that the respondent will replace the entire 4,300
metric tons of oil well cement with Class “G” cement cost free at the
petitioner’s designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class “G”
cement did not conform to the petitioner’s specifications.
On July 23, 1988, arbitrator, Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in
petitioner’s favor amounting to $899,603.07, Foreign court issued
notices to the private respondent for filing objections to the petition. The
private respondent complied and sent its objections dated January 16,
1989. Foreign court refused to admit the private respondent’s objections
for failure to pay the required filing fees, and thereafter issued an Order
on February 7, 1990Private respondent refused to pay the amount
adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner. Accordingly,
petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of Surigao City RTC for the
enforcement of the of the foreign court’s judgment.
CLAUSE 15 “All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out
of or in connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the
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exclusive jurisdiction of the court , within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction and the place from which this supply order is situated.”
CLAUSE 16 "All questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the
specification, designs, drawings and instructions herein before
mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship of the items ordered or
as to any other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, but qualified
to "in any way arising or relating to the supply order/contract, design,
drawing, specification, etc.,"
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute under
Clause 16 of the contract. (Yes)
(2) Whether or not the non-delivery of the oil well cement is a dispute
within Clause 16’s purview. (No)
(3) Whether or not the memorandum decisions by inferior tribunals can
be considered as facts and conclusions of law. (Yes)
(4) Whether or not due process was given to the respondent even if
there was no hearing. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The arbitrator has jurisdiction over the dispute clause under Clause 16
of their contract.
ART. 1373 provides: If some stipulation of any contract should admit of
several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is
most adequate to render it effectual.
ART. 1374 provides: The various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which
may result from all of them taken jointly.
This canon of construction states in interpreting a contract as in this
case, care should be taken that every part must be given effect, as it
was enacted by an integrated measure and not as a hodgepodge of
conflicting provisions. The correct interpretation is to give effect to both
stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims or
disputes arising from or relating to the design, drawing, instructions,
specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract, and
for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.
The petitioner states that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is not a
proper subject for arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to
conform to the specifications of the contract is a matter clearly falling
within the ambit of Clause 16. What was referred to arbitration was the
failure of the replacement cargo to conform to the specifications of the
contract (Class “G” cement), a matter clearly within the coverage of
Clause 16.
Hence, arbitrator has jurisdiction over the dispute due to “specification”
in Clause 16 which is supposed to be Class G cement
SECOND ISSUE:
Non-delivery of the oil well cement is a matter properly cognizable by the
regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their contract.
Doctrine of noscitur a sociis, provides that the supply order/contract in
Clause 16 must be construed within its associated words, limited only to
the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the
materials of the supply order/contract. Clause 16 should pertain only to
matters involving the technical aspects of the contract. Non-delivery of
the oil well cement does not fall here but under Clause 15 “All questions,
disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this
supply order”.
THIRD ISSUE:
Memorandum decisions of inferior tribunals can be considered as facts
and conclusions of law.
Article 8, Section 14 of the Constitution provides that no decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
In Francisco v. Permskul , this Court held that the Makati RTC’s
memorandum decision is within the ambit of Article 8 Section 14 of the
Constitution. In this case, the foreign court adopted the arbitrator’s
findings of facts and law in Award Paper No. 3/B -1. It contains an
exhaustive discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the
parties, and the arbitrator’s evaluation of the same.
Procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, state that a valid
judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator’s findings, and the
same must be respected. If the foreign court mandates that an Order of
the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary
docket fees, then Philippine courts cannot invalidate foreign court’s
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order because our rules provide otherwise. Even if Philippine courts
cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules
provide otherwise, (Award Paper No. 3/B-1) can be considered as facts
and conclusions of law.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Due process was given to respondent even if the foreign court did not
answer their concerns.
Due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence in support of one’s defense. Denial of opportunity to be heard
is contrary to due process. There is no violation of due process even if a
hearing did not occur, for the party was given a chance to explain his
side of the controversy and he waived his right to do so.
Respondent does not deny that foreign court informed them to file its
objections and to pay its corresponding legal fees. Instead of paying,
respondent asked the foreign court about the correct amount of fees.
Foreign court rejected the private respondent’s objection and proceeded
to adjudicate upon the petitioner’s claims. Respondent’s claim that the
foreign court violated its right to due process when it failed to reply to its
queries. Also when the foreign court rejected its objections on clearly
meritorious grounds does not violate due process. Due process was not
denied for respondent was afforded sufficient opportunity to be heard.
De Castro v. JBC
G.R. No. 191002
17 March 2010
Bersamin, J.
(The Judicial and Bar Council)
Art. VIII, Sec. 8:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and
the representative of private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of
the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments
as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
FACTS:
Chief Justice Puno’s compulsory retirement on May 17, 2010 will occur
eight days after the presidential election. The JBC began the process for
nominations to the office of the Chief Justice.
On February 8 2010, the JBC announced the names of the following
nominees to the public for any complaint or opposition to their
nomination who were namely: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate
Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice
Leonardo- De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice
Sandoval.
Although the process for filing the position of Chief Justice had begun,
the JBC had not yet submitted to the President its list so that the latter
may appoint the next Chief Justice due to the controversy in this case
being unresolved. Because of these acts of the JBC, seven different
petitions were filed in the Supreme Court which prayed either for: (1) the
JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at
least 3 nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice because the
President has to appoint the next CJ within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy in accordance with Section 4(1), Article 8 of the
Constitution; or (2) prevent the JBC from conducting its search, selection
and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief Justice in
accordance with the prohibition provided in Section 15, Article 7
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi or legal standing.
(Yes)
(2) Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. (Yes)
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(3) Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief
Justice. (Yes)
(4) Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the submission of the
shortlist of nominees by the JBC. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Each of the petitioners in the seven different petitions have locus standi.
Each have demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the
controversy. The issues before us are of transcendental importance to
the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in particular. The issue is
determinative of the authority of the President to appoint not only the
successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who
may serve in the Judiciary. Nevertheless, to dispel any doubt on locus
standi, it should be noted that it is within the wide discretion of the Court
to waive the requirements for legal standing so that it could address and
resolve the serious constitutional questions raised.
SECOND ISSUE:
The controversy is ripe for judicial determination. The JBC already
commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees for the
next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that
the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President,
makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next
steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the
short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as
may be needed.
THIRD ISSUE:
The prohibition under Article 7, Section 15 does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Article 7 refers to the Executive Department while Article 8 refers to the
Judiciary. Had the framers of the Constitution intended to extend the
prohibition to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. They could have easily explicitly written
that the prohibition to be equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court. Since this specification was not done, it
reveals that the prohibition against the President making appointments
within 2 months before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s term does not refer to the Supreme Court.
Sections 14, 15, and 16 of Article 7 are of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Sections
14 and 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
implies that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department as
well. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section
15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments.
Furthermore, the framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary, because the establishment of the JBC
and the process of nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC
ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the
Judiciary.
The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on
October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme
Court within the 90-day period as provided by Article 8, Section 4(1) was
a true mandate for the President due to the usage of the word shall - an
imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced. The failure
by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
Furthermore, there cannot be an Acting Chief Justice and the Court
because the framers of the Constitution intended the position to be
permanent.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. For mandamus to lie,
the following requisites must be present: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal
right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to
perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant
unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the
act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the
Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its
selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be
submitted to the President lies within their discretion. The object of the
petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to
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the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary,
because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an
unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against
the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in
recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to
the President.
Thus, there is no sufficient grounds to grant the mandamus against the
JBC. It is premature because the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the
latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the President.
Jardeleza v. Sereno
G.R No. 213181
Aug. 19. 2014
FACTS:
Prior to Justice Abad's compulsory retirement, the JBC
announced the opening for application or recommendation for
the vacated position. The JBC received a letter from University
of the Philippines' dean nominating petitioner Francis Jardeleza,
the incumbent Solicitor General, for the position.
Sometime in June 2014, Jardeleza received phone calls from an
incumbent member of the JBC, Aurora Lagman. According to
her, Chief Justice Sereno manifested that she would be invoking
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0091 against Jardeleza.
Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and
disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice
Sereno, characterized his integrity as dubious. According to the
JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardeleza's ability to
discharge the duties of his office as shown in a confidential legal
1 Section 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is
challenged. – In every case when the integrity of an applicant who is not
otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote
of all the members ofthe Council must be obtained for the favourable
consideration of his nomination.
memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration
case for the government. In addition, there was also an
accusation about Petitioner's alleged extra-marital affair, and
insider trading.
A newspaper article was later published in the online portal of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Court’s Spokesman,
Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually five (5)
nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee
could not be included because of the invocation of Rule 10,
Section 2 of the JBC rules.
Jardeleza now contends that his lack of knowledge as to the
identity of his accusers (except for the verbal information
conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio testified against
him) and as to the nature of the very accusations against him
caused him to suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and
Chief Justice Sereno.
Additionally, he contends that the Unanimity requirement does
not find application when a member of the JBC raises an
objection to an applicant's integrity. The lone objector could be
completely capable of taking hostage the entire voting process
by the mere expediency of raising an objection.
Chief Justice Sereno’s interpretation of the rule would allow a
situation where all that a member has to do to veto other votes,
including majority votes, would be to object to the qualification of
a candidate, without need for factual basis.
JBC denied that Jardeleza was deprived of due process.
Jardeleza was informed by Lagman and De Lima about the
nature of the accusations; that it relates to his performance
during an international arbitration. It was Jardeleza who refused
to respond to the allegations, when he was given the opportunity
to.
Page 76 of 169
 JBC also contend that the unanimity rule provides that when the
integrity of the applicant is challenged, the applicant must
receive a unanimous vote to be included in the shortlist.
ISSUES: 1. W/N due process was afforded to the petitioner
2. W/N the Unanimity rule is applicable to Jardeleza.
RULING:
1. No. The right to due process is available and is demandable as a
matter of right. The Court does not brush aside the unique and special
nature of JBC proceedings. Indeed, they are distinct from criminal
proceedings where the finding of guilt or innocence of the accused is
sine qua non. The JBC’s constitutional duty to recommend qualified
nominees to the President cannot be compared to the duty of the courts
of law to determine the commission of an offense and ascribe the same
to an accused, consistent with established rules on evidence. Even the
quantum ofevidence required in criminal cases is far from the discretion
accorded to the JBC.
The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an
applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process
neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC
torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in
the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due
process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion.
When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is
afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from
making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought
before it. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged
complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of
discretion must surmount is that of soundness. While the JBC vetting
proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be formal or trial type, they
must meet the minimum requirements of due process. As always, an
applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard
on the charges against him or her, if there are any.
Jardeleza was not afforded due process because he was neither
formally informed of the questions on his integrity (he was only informed
about a general accusation on his legal strategy in the international
arbiration) nor was he provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his
defense.
2. No. The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the
categorical constitutional declaration that"[a] member of the judiciary
must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence." To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every
member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked toscreen aspiring
judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees
submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for
appointment.
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an
applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the "unanimity
rule" only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is
put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially
unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness.
Section 2 does not apply to Jardeleza. Sereno claims that the question
on Jardeleza's integrity arise from the disagreement in legal strategy as
expressed by a group of international lawyers. The invocation of the
"unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots to the exercise ofhis
discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection was established
linking his choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to trounce
upon the country’s interests or to betray the Constitution. Verily,
disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of,
interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has
complete discretion on whatlegal strategy to employ in a case entrusted
to him28provided that he lives up tohis duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect
the interests of his client within the bounds of the law.
A legal strategy has no direct bearing on his moral choices. As shown in
the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their reservations on
whether the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be classified
as a "question of integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. These
reservations were evidently sourced from the factthat there was no clear
indication that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza, as it might have
been a collective idea by the legal team which initially sought a different
manner of presenting the country’s arguments, and there was no
showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part.
Nevertheless, The rule applies due to the alleged accusation that
Jardeleza has an extra-marital affair and has engaged in insider trading.
These acts imputes a weakness in one's values, self-control, and on the
whole, sense of honor because it erodes the public's confidence in the
Judiciary. It falls under the ambit of questions of integrity. Even though
Page 77 of 169
the rule is applicable, it does not apply in this case due to the deprivation
of the petitioner's due process.
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: WHAT IS
CONSTITUTIONAL OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Marbury v. Madison
1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137
(Origins of Judicial Review)
In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court first declared an act of Congress
unconstitutional, thus establishing the doctrine of judicial review.
FACTS:
Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President
Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating
new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in
these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the
Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices
of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the
day before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the
commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when President
Jefferson took office. The new president instructed Secretary of State
James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought
mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver
his commission.
ISSUE/S:
Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court? (No)
HELD/RATIO:
As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation,
the appointment has been made, and Marbury has a right to the
commission.Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the
president to deliver Marbury’s commission, that the
Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when the
executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of
mandamus to direct an officer of the government “to do a particular thing
therein specified,” mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to
the Supreme Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an
original action, which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of
jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.
Francisco v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261
10 November 2003
Carpio-Morales, J.
(Origins of Judicial Review)
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF).
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complain (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court
for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss
the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To
date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella
(Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of
Page 78 of 169
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives. Thus arose the instant
petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of
the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging
that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that
he himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th
Congress, posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint
against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the
capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules
adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9
thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to
comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution,
to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules
which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the
issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate
has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for
Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds
necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment
complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this
Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this
nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG and Chavez v. PEA-Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation, prays in his petition for Injunction
that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as
taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for
Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to
the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De
Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to
the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina
and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the
House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that
only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint
and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that
they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending
of taxpayers money and that they have an obligation to protect the
Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary,
allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as
a class suit and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the
second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating
there from be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the
Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing,
trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ
of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to
desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Page 79 of 169
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both
allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public
interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment
be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen
and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a
taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold
the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the
House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules
be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc.,
et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a
class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran which
was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and
the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional
the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan
Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in
the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for
the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate
from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due
course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges
in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro
at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were
absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without
jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged
abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF).
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector
L. Hofilena, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding
interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue which they are trying to
inculcate in the minds of their students, pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying
the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without
alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment
complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial
Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the
House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that
the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent
House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited
from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of
endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of
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Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that
they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding
with the impeachment trial.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. (No)
(2) Whether or not the case is already ripe for adjudication. (Yes)
(3) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction. (No)
(4) Whether or not the Court should exercise judicial restraint on the
ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the
sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would not
upset the system of checks and balances. The Supreme Court Ruled
that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Art. VIII, Sec 1).
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another. Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution. Thus, there exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
SECOND ISSUE:
The case is already ripe for adjudication. In Tan v. Macapagal, it was
held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture.
Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and
when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. Here,
the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit.
In conclusion, the case is already ripe for adjudication.
THIRD ISSUE:
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The Supreme Court ruled
that political question refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure. Here, the procedure is mostly about the wisdom of the
congress and not by court. Thus, the Court has no jurisdiction over this
case.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The Court should not exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. The Supreme Court ruled that the
power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings. Thus, the court should not restrain
from deciding in cases of impeachment since judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
Tanada v. Cuenco
G.R. No. L-10520
28 February 1957
Concepcion, J.
(Political Question)
FACTS:
Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and
President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal,
a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one
of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the
General elections held in November, 1955, in which several others, were
proclaimed elected in the Senate. Subsequently, the elections of this
Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the
Senate -was contested by petitioner Macapagal et. al, in the said
election. The protest is now pending before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.
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Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the
Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party,
and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Tañada-belonging to
the Citizens Party. The contend that the Committee on Rules for the
Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate,
in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in
clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in
assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the
corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted
absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully,
and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and
exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal”. It
the petitioner’s stand that the appointments of respondents, Cruz,
Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and private
secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado who caused said
appointments to be made as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are
threatening and are about to take cognizance of the electoral case
pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Electoral Case no. 4) , in
nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a
Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the
Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-
protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an
Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen
by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination
of the Party having the second largest number of votes and to be
designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal
packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is
the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado
Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the
said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen
in the manner described above.
Among others, petitioners pray that judgment be rendered ousting
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the
aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the court is without jurisdiction to direct or control the
action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral
Tribunal. (No)
(2) Whether or not the current case is a political question. (No)
(3) Whether or not the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens
Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate
three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly
choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by
the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate OR W/N
whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may
validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista Party, or by the
Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said
Citizens Party. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The courts have jurisdiction. This case is not an action against the
Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or
indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of
said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall
choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET), SET is neither part of Congress nor of the Senate. Moreover,
although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to
choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the
authority shall be exercised. The courts are called upon to say, on the
one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other
hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly
exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon
the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the
determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the
performance of the act. The Legislative power is vested exclusively in
the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the
power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a
litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of
an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which
cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the
way to its eventual destruction.
Page 82 of 169
SECOND ISSUE:
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present
case. Currently, the court is called upon to decide whether the election
of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes
in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal shall be chosen upon nomination of the party having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate, and hence, is null and
void.
THIRD ISSUE:
The main question is whether the election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and
lawful.
No, it is not valid in accordance with the intention and principle provided
by the constitution. The main argument in support of the mandatory
character of the constitutional provision relative to the number of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word “shall” in Sec.
11, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution. The flaw in the position is that, while,
it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall", as regards the
number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the
same term is used with respect to the method prescribed for their
election. Respondents have not even tried to show why "shall" must be
deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each Electoral
Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the procedure
for their selection.The intention behind the provision was to prevent the
abuse of the majority against the minority in Congress. The main
objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the
establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, and then of one
Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the
exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests
affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two
devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest
number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of
votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were
given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission
or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could
not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act
with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in
thesame body the same number of representatives as each one of said
political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and
endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper. The most vital
feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of the
parties. The spirit of the law prevails over its letter. Partisan
considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the
majority party and either one (1) or two
(2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number
of votes in the House concerned.
The defenses of waiver and estoppel by respondents set up against
petitioner Tañada are unmeritorious. Although an individual may waive
constitutional provisions intended for his benefit, particularly those meant
for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending to
secure his personal liberty, the power to waive does not exist when
public policy or public morals are involved. In addition, the rule estoppel
is that whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing
true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of
such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it. In the case at
bar, petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe that
Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado.
The Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties
specified in the Constitution and that the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the
other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral
Tribunal. Neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be
nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative. Lastly, the
Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make
such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by
the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.
Paras, dissenting:
Page 83 of 169
It is the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six
members from the National Assembly that shall be part of the Electoral
Commission.There is clearly no intention for the fluctuations in the total
membership of the Commission. The number of seats then in such
Commission must be fixed since the Constitution must have consistent
application.
As such, when there is a lack of a minority representation in the
Assembly to nominate three minority members, it follows that the only
part in the Assembly may nominate (the other members) to fulfil the
mandate of the Constitution.
LABRADOR, dissenting:
The petition violates Section 2, Article 6 of the Constitution on multiple
grounds. First, it does not fulfil the mandatory provision which fixes the
membership of the SET to nine (9) members. Second, it denies the
Senate the power granted to it by the Constitution of electing its
members to the Electoral Tribunal, specifically due to the refusal of the
minority member (Senator Tanada) to nominate. Third, the petition holds
superior a procedural provision over a substantive one, thus violating the
fixed membership of Electoral Tribunal. Fourth, the majority decision has
likewise inserted a provision that has no justification in law or in reason -
where the failure or refusal from the minority to nominate all three
members would result in the corresponding reduction of membership in
the tribunal.
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon
Heritage Realty Corporation
G.R. Nos. 203754-204418
16 June 2015
Velasco, J.
(Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1993, respondent City of Cebu, passed City Ordinance No.
LXIX otherwise known as the “Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the
City of Cebu". Central to the case at bar are Sections 42 and 43,
Chapter XI thereof which require proprietors, lessees or operators of
theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to thirty
percent (30%) of the gross receipts of admission fees to the Office of the
City Treasurer of Cebu City.
Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to
remit the amusement tax proceeds within the prescribed period shall be
liable to a surcharge equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount due
for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to the Council. Almost
a decade later, or on June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA 9167, creating
the Film Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP) and abolishing
the Film Development Foundation of the Philippines, Inc. and the Film
Rating Board. Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 provided for the tax
treatment of certain graded films as follows:
Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. – Films which have obtained an
“A” or “B” grading from the Council pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 of
this Act shall be entitled to the following privileges:
Amusement tax reward. – A grade “A” or “B” film shall entitle its
producer to an incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed and
collected on the graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila
and other highly urbanized and independent component cities in the
Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 to 151 of Republic Act No. 7160 at
the following rates:
For grade “A” films – 100% of the amusement tax collected on such film;
and
For grade “B” films – 65% of the amusement tax collected on such films.
The remaining thirty-five (35%) shall accrue to the funds of the Council.
Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue
from the amusement tax on the graded film which may otherwise accrue
to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly
urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines pursuant
to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during the period the graded
film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the proprietors,
operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within thirty
(30) days from the termination of the exhibition to the Council which
shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the producers of the
graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
According to petitioner, from the time RA 9167 took effect up to the
present, all the cities and municipalities in Metro Manila, as well as
Page 84 of 169
urbanized and independent component cities, with the sole exception of
Cebu City, have complied with the mandate of said law.
The proprietors and cinema operators, including private respondent
Colon Heritage Realty Corp. (Colon Heritage), operator of the Oriente
theater, were given ten (10) days from receipt thereof to pay the
aforestated amounts to FDCP. The demand, however, fell on deaf ears.
Meanwhile, on March 25, 2009, petitioner received a letter from Regal
Entertainment, Inc., inquiring on the status of its receivables for tax
rebates in Cebu cinemas for all their A and B rate films along with those
which it co-produced with GMA films. This was followed by a letter from
Star Cinema ABS-CBN Film Productions, Inc., requesting the immediate
remittance of its amusement tax rewards for its graded films for the
years 2004-2008.
Because of the persistent refusal of the proprietors and cinema operators to
remit the said amounts as FDCP demanded, on one hand, and Cebu City’s
assertion of a claim on the amounts in question, the city finally filed on May
18, 2009 before the RTC, Branch 14 a petition for declaratory relief with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-35529 (City of Cebu v. FDCP). In said petition, Cebu City sought the
declaration of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the RTC (Branches 5 and 14) gravely erred in declaring
Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 invalid for being unconstitutional. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
Local fiscal autonomy and the constitutionally-delegated power to
tax
The power of taxation, being an essential and inherent attribute of
sovereignty, belongs, as a matter of right, to every independent
government, and needs no express conferment by the people before it
can be exercised. It is purely legislative and, thus, cannot be delegated
to the executive and judicial branches of government without running
afoul to the theory of separation of powers. It, however, can be
delegated to municipal corporations, consistent with the principle that
legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of
matters of local concern.19 The authority of provinces, cities, and
municipalities to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes,
therefore, is not inherent and may be exercised only to the extent that
such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by
statute. ch
RA 9167 violates local fiscal autonomy
It is a basic precept that the inherent legislative powers of Congress,
broad as they may be, are limited and confined within the four walls of
the Constitution. 37 Accordingly, whenever the legislature exercises its
power to enact, amend, and repeal laws, it should do so without going
beyond the parameters wrought by the organic law. In the case at bar,
through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA 9167, the
income from the amusement taxes levied by the covered LGUs did not
and will under no circumstance accrue to them, not even partially,
despite being the taxing authority therefor. Congress, therefore, clearly
overstepped its plenary legislative power, the amendment being violative
of the fundamental law’s guarantee on local autonomy,
Grant of amusement tax reward incentive: not a tax exemption Both
the burden and incidence of the amusement tax are borne by the
proprietors, lessors, and operators, not by the producers of the graded
films. The transfer of the amount to the film producers is actually a
monetary reward given to them for having produced a graded film, the
funding for which was taken by the national government from the coffers
of the covered LGUs. Without a doubt, this is not an exemption from
payment of tax.
Declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the entire RA 9167 as
unconstitutional
It is a basic tenet that courts cannot go beyond the issues in a case,43
which the RTC, Branch 5 did when it declared RA 9167 unconstitutional.
This being the case, and in view of the elementary rule that every statute
is presumed valid,44 the declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the entirety
of RA 9167 as unconstitutional, is improper.
Amounts paid by Colon Heritage need not be returned
Having ruled that the questioned provisions are unconstitutional, the
RTC, Branch 5, in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, ordered the return of all
amounts paid by respondent Colon Heritage to FDCP by way of
amusement tax.
Ocampo v. Enriquez
G.R. No. 225973
8 November 2016
Page 85 of 169
 (Grave Abuse of Discretion)
FACTS:
On 7 August 2016, National Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana
issued a Memorandum to the AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R.
Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, to wit:
Subject: Interment of the late Former President
Ferdinand Marcos at LNMB
Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo Duterte
on July 11, 2016.
In compliance to (sic) the verbal order of the President
to implement his election campaign promise to have the
remains of the late former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani,
kindly undertake all the necessary planning and
preparations to facilitate the coordination of all agencies
concerned specially the provisions for ceremonial and
security requirements. Coordinate closely with the
Marcos family regarding the date of interment and the
transport of the late former President’s remains from
Ilocos Norte to LNMB.
The overall OPR for this activity will [be] the PVAO
since the LNMB is under its supervision and
administration. PVAO shall designate the focal person
for this activity who shall be the overall overseer of the
event.
Submit your Implementing Plan to my office as soon as
possible.
On 9 August 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued
directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General commanding it
to provide services, honors and other courtesies for the late Former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
ISSUE/S:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
(1) Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy. (No)
(2) Whether petitioners have locus standi. (No)
(3) Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts. (Yes)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
(1) Whether the National Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed memorandum and
directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to
implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB. (No)
(2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed
memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic and
international laws. (No)
(3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth
from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of
the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a
soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB. (No)
(4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of
the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they
entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines as to the conditions and procedure by which his
remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines.
(No)
HELD/RATIO:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE:
For a question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act to be heard and decided by the Court, the following
requisites for judicial inquiry must be present:
a. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
b. person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance;
c. question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
d. issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
In this case, the absence of the first 2 requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last 2 superfluous.
Page 86 of 169
President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at
the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his
wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There
being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as
discussed below, President Duterte’s decision on that political question
is outside the ambit of judicial review.
SECOND ISSUE:
Locus Standi is the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question which requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issue upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person has
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of
an act complained of, such proper party has no standing. The
Petitioners have no legal standing to file such petitions because they
failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal
injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally
established as a national military cemetery and declared a national
shrine would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and
other aspects of our national life.
THIRD ISSUE:
Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have
availed first of all the means of administrative processes available. While
there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those
exceptions. Petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek
reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the
Secretary of National Defense. If petitioners would still be dismissed with
the decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the
Office of the President which has control and supervision over the
Department of National Defense.
Petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy courts that
requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not
just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of
its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and
injunction when proven necessary.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE:
There is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and
override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. At bar,
President Duterte, through the public respondents, acted within the
bounds of the law and jurisprudence.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. None is
present in this case.
SECOND ISSUE:
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as people, its
entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just
about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the
proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Consistent with President Duterte’s mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene
R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights law
cited by petitioners.
To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the “decent
and the brave” or “hero” would be violative of public policy as it will put
into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remain
resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers
since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of
authority to the President under existing laws and regulations.
Page 87 of 169
The enforcement of the HRVV’s rights under RA 10368 will surely not
be impaired by the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. The assailed act
has no casual connection and legal relation to the law.
THIRD ISSUE:
National Shrines are governed by NHCP, military shrines are not.
They are governed by PVAO of DND. LNMB is a military shrine.
AFP Regulations G 161-375: Who may be interred
1. Medal of Valor awardee
2. Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief of AFP
3. Secretary of National Defense
4. Chief of Staff of AFP
5. General or Flag Officers of AFP
6. Active and retired military personnel
7. Government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists and others
as long as approved by the C-i-C, Congress or Secretary of
National Defense
8. Widows of former presidents
Those who are not qualified:
1. Personnel who are dishonorably discharged
2. Convicted of final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution nor its exercise be limited by
legislature. As the incumbent President, Duterte is not bound by the
1992 Agreement between Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Ilocos Norte. He is free to amend, revoke
or rescind political agreement entered into by his predecessors, and to
determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and
presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
J. Brion (Separate Concurring)
First, judicial review, even under our Court's expanded jurisdiction, does
not empower the Court to directly pass upon allegations involving
violations of statutes:
The Court's direct authority to exercise its expanded jurisdiction is limited
to the determination of the constitutionality of a governmental act. Grave
abuse of discretion arising from mere violations of statutes cannot, as a
rule, be the subject of the Court's direct exercise of its expanded
jurisdiction. The petitioner’s recourse in this situation lies with other
judicial remedies or proceedings, allowed under the Rules of Court that
may arrive in due course at the Court's portals for review
For these statutory violations, recourse may be made before the courts
through an appeal of the administrative body's ruling, or by filing for a
petition for declaratory relief before the lower court with jurisdiction over
the matter. Only when these lower courts have rendered their decisions
should these matters be elevated to this Court by appeal or certiorari;
even then, the issues the petitioners may present are limited to
questions of law, not to questions of fact.
Second, the Constitution's "faithful execution" clause cannot be made
the basis to question the Executive's manner of implementing our laws:
In the first place, it places the Court in the position to pass upon the
scope and parameters of the vague and not- easily determinable
"faithfulness" standard. Putting the Court in this position (especially
when considered with the Court's expanded jurisdiction) amounts to
placing it in a higher plane from where it can dictate how laws should be
implemented. In fact, it is hard to discern how the Court can apply a
standard for the faithful execution of the laws, without determining how
the law should be implemented in the first place.
Additionally, characterizing the failure to ensure faithful execution of the
laws as a constitutional violation can prove to be an unreasonably
restricting interpretation. It could possibly paralyze executive discretion,
and expose the Executive to constant lawsuits based on acts of grave
abuse of discretion he or she allegedly committed.
Third, the petitioners failed to specify any treaty obligation prohibiting
Marcos' burial at the LNMB;
Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of The Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law (IHRL), for instance, does not create
new international or domestic legal obligations
Page 88 of 169
Without any specific and legally binding prohibition limiting the
President's actions, no basis exists to nullify his order and to disregard
the presumption of regularity that exists in the performance of his duties.
While critical of the Marcos regime hardly amount to a prohibition barring
the interment of his remains in a resting place duly reserved by law for
soldiers; former President Marcos indisputably was a soldier during his
lifetime and was one long before the human rights violations attributed
to him took place. To deny him now, despite the law entitling him to a
LNMB resting place, may only lay the petitioners to the charge that they
are now doing to another what they have accused former President
Marcos of doing -denying another of the rule of law.
Fourth, the Constitution, while built on the ashes of the Marcos regime,
should not be interpreted in a way that would prevent reconciliation and
the country's move towards national unity;
Finally, the necessity of Marcos' burial at the LNMB is a political
question that the President has decided, and is not without support from
the Filipino electorate.
Bersamin, J., separate concurring:
1. The interment of the remains of President Marcos in the LMNB is a
matter that exclusively pertains to the discretion of President Duterte
as the Chief Executive.
The character of the LMNB as the resting place for the war dead and
other military personnel under the care and control of the APP has
placed the LMNB under the control of the President. Plainly enough, the
President thereby exercised such control through the APP Chief of Staff
2. In the context of the LNMB being a military facility, the AFP has
issued AFP Regulations G 161-375 to prescribe guidelines that
enumerate the persons whose remains may be interred therein:
• The exercise by President Duterte of his discretion upon a
matter under his control like the interment of the remains of
President Marcos in the LNMB is beyond review by the Court.
He has not thereby transgressed any legal boundaries.
President Marcos -being a former President of the Philippines, a
Medal of Valor awardee, a veteran of World War II, a former
Senator and Senate President, and a former Congressman -is
one of those whose remains are entitled to be interred in the
LNMB under the terms of AFP Regulations G 161-375.
• President Duterte was far from whimsical or arbitrary in his
exercise of discretion. I believe that interment of any remains in
the LNMB is a political question within the exclusive domain of
the Chief Executive
Carpio, J., dissenting:
1. Marcos is disqualified from being interred at the LNMB:
• AFPR G 161-375, which respondents rely on to justify the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, specifically provides that
"personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service" are not
qualified to be interred at the LNMB. Marcos, who was forcibly
ousted from the Presidency by the sovereign act of the Filipino
people, falls under this disqualification.
• Marcos was focrcibly ousted from Presidency by the Filipino
People (People Power Revolution) which is the strongest form
of dishonorable discharge
• TAKE NOTE: Respondents argue that because Marcos was not
dishonorably discharged in accordance with the procedures and
guidelines prescribed in Administrative Discharge Prior to
Expiration of Term of Enlistment (Circular 17, dated 2 October
1987, Series of 1987, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines),
Marcos was honorably separated from service. ( J. Carpio
disagree)
• Marcos was separated from service with finality, having been
forcibly ousted by the Filipino people on 25 February 1986.
Circular 17, issued more than one year after such separation
from office, cannot be made to apply retroactively to Marcos.
• When Circular 17 was issued, Marcos had already been finally
discharged, terminated, and ousted -as President and
Commander-in-Chief -by the Filipino people. Circular 17
requires certain administrative procedures and guidelines in the
discharge of incumbent or serving military personnel. There is a
physical and legal impossibility to apply to Marcos Circular 17
since it was issued long after Marcos had been separated from
office.
Page 89 of 169
2. There is no substantial distinction between the military and civilian
personnel, for purposes of interment at the LNMB that would warrant
applying the disqualifications to military personnel and not to civilian
personnel.
• To submit to respondents' view that the disqualifications under
AFPR G 161-375 apply only to military personnel, and that the
President, even as Commander-in-Chief, is not a military
personnel subject to such disqualifications, 10 negates the
purpose for which the LNMB was originally established, which is
to honor Filipino soldiers who fought for freedom and democracy
for our country. Indeed, Marcos is
the very anti-thesis of freedom and democracy because he was
a dictator as declared by this Court.
• Applying only to military personnel the disqualifications will
unduly favor non-military personnel who will always be eligible,
regardless of crimes committed against the State or humanity, to
be interred at the LNMB as long as they are included in the list
of those qualified.
• Under the Equal Protection Clause, persons who are in like
circumstances and conditions must be treated alike both as to
the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. In this case, as
those enumerated in the AFPR G 161-375 are all granted the
privilege of being interred at the LNMB, consequently, the
disqualifications must also be made applicable to all of them
1. Marcos is the "very antithesis of freedom and democracy because he
was a dictator as declared by the Supreme Court."
2. Burying Marcos at the national shrine is also contrary to public policy,
based on Republic Act 10368 or the Human Rights Victims
Reparations Act.
Leonen, J., dissenting:
Based on the Constitution, only the Filipino people "can determine a
President's place in history"
Marcos is not a hero or "an exemplary public officer" because of the
human rights atrocities committed under his regime
The orders to bury him at the Libingan ng mga Bayani violate Republic
Act 289, which created the National Pantheon. Section 1 of the law says
that only those "who have led lives worthy of emulation" can be buried at
the heroes' shrine.
Duterte's order to allow the burial contradicts his oath of office "because
they encourage impunity, which is the result of rewarding the person
who presided over human rights violations and who personally
participated in the plunder of public treasury."
The government failed to show factual basis to prove that Marcos' burial
would not violate RA 289 in relation to the findings of the National
Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP). The NHCP earlier
released a study disputing the claims that Marcos was a soldier and war
veteran.
Serreno, C.J., dissenting:
1. The court has the authority to resolve this controversy under the
expanded concept of judicial review in the 1987 Constitution.
• With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, respondents can no
longer utilize the traditional political question doctrine to impede
the power of judicial review.
• In the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court has
decided issues that were traditionally considered political
questions.
• The assertion that the burial is intended to implement an
election renders the matter non-justiciable.
2. The president acted with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of
his duty to faithfully execute the laws when he ordered the burial of
Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
• Statutes and jurisprudence establish a clear policy to condemn
the acts of Marcos and what he represents, which effectively
prohibits the incumbent President from honoring him through a
burial in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
• The AFP does not have the power to determine which persons
are qualified for interment in the Libingan.
• The burial cannot be justified by mere reference to the
President's residual powers; it is not unfettered, and such power
can only be exercised in conformity with the entire Constitution.
Page 90 of 169
3. To allow Marcos to be buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani would
violate international human rights law ad an independent source of
state obligations, and would negate the remedies provided by
Republic Act 10368.
• Under international law, the Philippines is obligated to provide
effective remedies, including holistic reparations, to human
rights victims.
• The burial would contravene the duty of the Philippines to
provide reparations to victims of human rights violations during
the Marcos regime.
• The burial would run counter to the duty of the state to combat
impunity.
1. Public funds and property cannot be used for the burial as it serves
no legitimate public purpose.
• The burial would contravene the purpose of the Libingan ng
mga Bayani.
• Respondents have not explained how the burial would serve the
avowed policy of national unity and healing.
• The burial would promote only the private interest of the Marcos
family
Caguioa, J., dissenting:
The burial of former President Marcos does not raise a political question
beyond the ambit of judicial review.
For the same reasons that the interment serves no legitimate public
purpose, no use of public property or public funds can be made to
support it.
The President may validly order the interment of former President
Marcos in the LNMB pursuant to his power of control and his duty to
faithfully execute laws, provided that no contravention of the
Constitution, laws, executive issuances, public policy, customs and
international obligations arises therefrom or is committed.
The Solicitor General failed to show any contingency for the valid
exercise of the President's residual powers, and likewise failed to
demonstrate sufficient factual basis to justify the interment of former
President Marcos in the LNMB.
The interment of former President Marcos constitutes a violation of the
physical, historical and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national
shrine, which the State has the obligation to conserve.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines
and the Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 220598
19 July 2016
Bersamin, J.
(Grave Abuse of Discretion)
FACTS:
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); PCSO Budgets and
Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice
Chairman Rosario C. Uriate; PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors
Sergio O. Valencia; and Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, etc.
with plunder.
They were able to unlawfully acquire a total amount of
P365,997,915.00. They were able to amass this amount by:
▪ Diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of
PCSO to its Confidential/ Intelligence Fund
▪ Raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several
instances, the above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts.
▪ Taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influences to unjustly enrich
themselves.
Several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for bail.
On June 6, 2013, the Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of
Valenica, Morato, and Roquero upon finding that the evidence of guilt is
not so strong against them. However, in the case of petitioners GMA
and Aguas, the Sandiganbayan, through the resolution dated November
5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on the ground that the evidence of
guilt against them was strong. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail, which is unresolved to
date.
Page 91 of 169
Funds were withdrawn by several members of the board from the CIF
and were approved by President GMA in several occasions each with
different amounts. GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V, Roquero
and Villar separatelyled their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence
of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed the charge against
them. It held that said accused who were members of the PCSO Board
of Directors were not shown to have diverted any PCSO funds to
themselves, or to have raided the public treasury by conveying and
transferring into their possession and control any money or funds from
PCSO account. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of
GMA, Aguas and Valencia, holding that there was sufficient evidence
showing that they had conspired to commit plunder; and that the
Prosecution had sufficiently established a case of malversation against
Valencia, pertinently saying: Demurrer to evidence is an objection by
one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges,
the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court then
ascertains whether there is a competent or sufficient evidence to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. To be considered sufficient
therefore, the evidence must prove (a) the commission of the crime, and
(b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused (Gutib v.
CA, 110 SCAD 743,312 SCRA 365 [1999]).
Hence, these consolidated petitions of certiorari brought to assail and
annul the resolutions April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015, whereby
the Sandiganbayan respectively denied their demurrer to evidence, and
their motions for reconsideration, asserting such
denials to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S:
Procedural Issue:
(1) Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail
the denial of the demurrers to evidence. (Yes)
Substantive Issues:
(1) Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte;
(2) Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of
the crime of plunder:
a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (No)
b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the
information proved by the Prosecution? (No)
HELD/RATIO:
PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction to correct grave abuse of
discretion.
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for
certiorari because the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The special civil action for
certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order
issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave
of court to le demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an
insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the
demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that
did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the
demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction
they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among
the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in
which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts
of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of
capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by
expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII. The exercise of this
power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or
for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court
has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
(1) The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
Page 92 of 169
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. In this
jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere means to
commit a crime. As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law
considers it a crime, and prescribes a penalty for it. The exception is
exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason),
Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or
insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the
Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it
is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the
conspirators, or their community of criminal design must be alleged and
competently shown. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture,
but by positive and conclusive evidence.
In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her
having affixed her unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional
CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act was not even an overt act of
plunder because it had no immediate and necessary relation to plunder
by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or irregular.
It is in this regard that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start with, its
conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly
conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the information did
not aver at all that she had been the mastermind; hence, the
Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily.
In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her
handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was absolutely
unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid
practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the President.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan , the Court recognized two nuances of
appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel
conspiracy and the chain conspiracy. The wheel conspiracy occurs
when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with
two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically
interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that
the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single
conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned
with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists
when there is successive communication and cooperation in much the
same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer
and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer.
The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of
Uriarte's requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of any
design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate
and acquire ill -gotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the
information to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA's approval
of Uriarte's requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any
criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering
that her approval was not by any means irregular or illegal. The
Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command
responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the
superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under
those terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible.
We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and
signatures on the disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to
conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any other
crime. Without GMA's participation, he could not release any money
because there was then no budget available for the additional CIFs.
Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to
plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.
(2a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.
The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict
the petitioners for plunder on the basis that the Prosecution established
all the elements of plunder. After a review of the records, we find and
rule that the Prosecution had no case for plunder against the petitioners.
To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must
allege and establish the following elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in
connivance with members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts:
Page 93 of 169
 a. through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
b. by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer;
c. by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries;
d. by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
e. by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
or
f. by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves
at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill- gotten wealth worth at least
P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that
either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also
no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution
showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had
been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
(2b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the
public treasury.
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A.
No. 7080
Section 1. Definition of Terms. — . . .
xxx. xxx xxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two
(2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury,
the key is to look at the accompanying words: misappropriation,
conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is
conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis,
by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be
made by considering the company of the words in which the word or
phrase is found or with which it is associated.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property
as if it were one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take
something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance,
privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;"
and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common
thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used
the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the
company of the four other terms that require the use of the property
taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use
of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the
forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of
noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use
the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money
went but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally bene
Page 94 of 169
ted from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate
act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
JUDGES
Kilosbayan v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 177721
3 July 2007
Azcuna, J.
(Qualifications)
FACTS:
Gregory S. Ong was appointed as associate justice of the Supreme
Court by the Executive Secretary. However, Petitioner, contested this
appointment by saying that Ong is not a Natural-born citizen of the
Philippines that he is a Chinese citizen, and that his own birth certificate
indicates his Chinese citizenship, thus he is not qualified to be a
member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Petitioners cited Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which provided that "No person shall be appointed Member of the
Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines."
On the other hand, Respondent contended that Ong was appointed from
a list of candidates given by the JBC and that Respondent has referred
back to the JBC to determine the issue of Ong’s citizenship. They cited
SEC. 9 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, “The Members of the
Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation”.
Ong maintains that he is a natural born citizen, following a series of
changes of nationalities with respect to his ancestors which ended with
his mother being a Filipino citizen at birth and his father eventually
becoming naturalized along with him and his siblings. He also
maintained that the petitioners have no standing to file their claim.
ISSUE/S:
(1) W/N the Petitioners have standing. (Yes)
(2) W/N Ong is a natural-born Filipino. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of utmost importance,
the qualification and the citizenship of a person to be appointed as a
member of the Supreme Court.
SECOND ISSUE:
Ong is only a naturalized Filipino citizen. The court took judicial notice of
Ong’s petition to take the Bar. In the petition he alleged that that he is
qualified to be admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen,
and that he became a citizen because his father was a naturalized
Filipino citizen thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As part of his
evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers
of his father. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the
submitted evidence that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a
lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen.
However, according to the case of Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, no
substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be
made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in
citizenship status is a substantial change. Thus the factual assertions
detailing the events and changes of Ong’s ancestors would have to be
proven in a proper action, especially the fact that Respondent Ong’s
mother was a Filipino citizen contrary to what still appears in the records
of the court. Until this fact is proven, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from
doing so.
In Re: Allegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet
A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC
8 August 2008
Reyes, R.T., J.
(Role and Standards: Independence)
FACTS:
The case stemmed from four (4) articles that appeared in the “Business
Circuit” column of Amado Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of
general circulation. The articles contained statements and innuendos
Page 95 of 169
about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court, which came out
in 4 issues of the newspaper on September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007.
September 18, 2007 Article:
▪ Talked about a lady Justice (did not confirm whether from the SC or
the CA) who did not report for a day the week prior to the article.
▪ Stated that the Justice’s secretary received a gift-wrapped box the
size of two-dozen milk cans.
▪ As she thought the contents were perishable, the secretary opened
the box and indeed it was full of cash estimated at P10M.
▪ Said secretary informed the Justice. For doing so, the Justice fired
her.
▪ The writer criticized how the “bribe-giver” should have made sure
that the recipient was at least in the office or that he/she should
have delivered the cash instead to the recipient’s home.
▪ Also criticized how the justice system is dirty.
▪ The identity of the Justice was not disclosed to the writer of the
article.
September 19, 2007 Article:
• Revealed that the bribe money was given by a Fil-Chinese
businessman who has been criminally charged.
• That the said bribe-giver was acquitted as the lady Justice subject of
the previous article was the ponente of the case.
• That apparently, the secretary who was fired made five trips to the
guard house to pick up the boxes. The writer of the article now
corrected his previous statement that there was only 1 box.
• Dropped that the name of the justice’s secretary is Cecilia.
September 20, 2007 Article:
▪ Called for Cecilia to reveal the truth as to the bribery – “to save the
sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.”
September 21, 2007 Article:
▪ The writer now corrected his previous statement as to the time of
the occurrence of the event – The secretary was fired in March
2007, not the week prior to the first article.
▪ Also disclosed the identity of the Justice’s secretary – Cecilia
Munoz-Delis.
▪ The writer also declared that the whereabouts of the said secretary
is unknown and that the Supreme Court should investigate such
case.
Since the first article was published, the attention of Assistant Court
Administrator was already caught. As the information was still vague as
to which court was being referred to, he opted to just note the article.
Cecila Munoz-Delis apparently was part of the staff of Justice Ynares-
Santiago, but as Judicial Staff Officer, not Secretary, as respondent
Macasaet wrote.
An online article was likewise published in Newsbreak containing the
same allegations against Justice Ynares-Santiago. Justice Ynares-
Santiago requested the Chief Justice to have the articles included in the
agenda of the Court En Banc.
The Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution ordering Amado
Macasaet to explain why he should not be cited in Contempt under
Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Macasaet’s explanations
were included in the case records and an Investigation Committee was
formed.
The Investigating Committee found that the articles were groundless and
were declared to be hearsay, and so concluded that there are sufficient
grounds to cite respondent Macasaet for indirect contempt as his articles
tend to indirectly impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice. Respondent Macasaet poses that citing him in contempt for his
published articles would be tantamount to violating the right to freedom
of the press. Respondent Macasaet likewise claims that his right to due
process has been violated as no formal charge has been filed against
him as required under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the articles writing and publishing by the respondent
are to be considered as valid exercise of the rights to freedom of
expression (which includes freedom of the press). (NO).
(2) Whether or not the failure to file a formal charge against respondent
as required by Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is a violation
of his right to due process. (NO).
Page 96 of 169
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Macasaet’s diatribes against the Court generate public distrust in the
administration of Justice by the Supreme Court, instead of promoting
respect for its integrity and honor. They derogate the avowal of the
highest Court of the land. Nowhere in his columns can there be found a
single word of respect for the Court on the integrity and honor of the
Court.
To allow respondent to use freedom of the press as an excuse to
damage the Court would be to make a mockery of such liberty. Without
bases for his publications (he admitted that the articles were products of
his conclusions), he has committed acts that degrade and impede the
orderly administration of justice.
SECOND ISSUE:
Under Section 4 of the same Rule, proceedings for indirect contempt
may be initiated by the Court on its own volition. In the dissenting
opinion of Justice Carpio, he mentioned that the proceedings of the
Investigating Committee were fatally defective for patent denial of due
process because when the witnesses of the Committee testified, the
Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the
witnesses, denying Macasaet of such right. This is not the case based
on 3 reasons:
o. First, that the proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be
regular. The burden to prove otherwise rests on Macasaet.
o. Second, assuming that Macasaet was not able to cross-examine
his witnesses, this does not necessarily mean that his right to due
process of law was violated.
▪ The right of the accused to cross-examine the witness
against him, although an adjunct of the Constitutional right
to meet “face-to-face,” can be waived if not asserted timely.
o. Third, the Court cannot invoke the right to cross-examine on behalf
of Macasaet. Otherwise, the Court would be acting as his counsel,
which is absurd.
Criticism at every level of Government is certainly welcome – as it is part
of the checks and balances in our republican system of government.
However, criticisms should not impede or obstruct an integral
component of our republican institutions from discharging its
constitutionally-mandated duties.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Floro
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460
31 March 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
(Role and Standards: Integrity)
FACTS:
In 1995, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-
requisite psychological evaluation by the Supreme Court Clinic Services
(SC Clinic) revealed "evidence of ego disintegration" and "developing
psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his
application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required
psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood
swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports
concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background the Judicial Bar
Council (JBC) allowed him to get a second opinion from a private
practitioner. The second opinion appeared, hence, Atty. Floro’s
appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73,
Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
An audit was conducted on Judge Floro’s sala, which the audit team
reported the following to the OCA:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements regarding qualifications and for announcing in open
court during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule
36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he
is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of
Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98
pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in
violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which
prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the
Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for
leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
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(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial
prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of
the custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated
homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by
persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of the
accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-
up”;
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which
he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for
frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when
he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice
system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during
court proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Judge Floro is fit to perform the duties and functions of a
judge. (No)
HELD/RATIO:
The court held that Judge Floro is unfit to perform the duties and
functions of a judge.
The court, however, would like to point out that among the 13 charges
against the respondent judge, the court has not found him guilty of gross
misconduct or acts of corruption. But nonetheless, the findings of
psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case
indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence.
For charge “a”: the court found him guilty of simple misconduct in
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but,
from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and
unquenchable thirst for recognition.
For charge “b”: the court found nothing improper in having allowing
another person to rest in his chambers for short periods of time during
office hours.
For charges “c” and “g”: the court three fundamental errors in Judge
Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on
recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor
thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said release.
Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the
probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the
accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on
recognizance was not reduced into writing.
Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be
reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his
failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance
of the law.
For charge “d”: the court found respondent guilty of unbecoming conduct
as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding
the public’s trust in his ability to render justice.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to
apply the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be
impartial, independent and honest" as well.
For charges “h” and “j”: The court pointed out that it was well within the
discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus ruling
and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we
find no basis for the charge of dishonesty under paragraph "j" of the
complaint.
Regarding the charge in “h” that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy
to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385- MN (for
frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case,
by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the same
must likewise fail for lack of basis.
Page 98 of 169
For charge “i”: the court found that it was within the powers of Judge
Floro to order the assessment of the accused’s mental fitness for trial.
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an
accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is
within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by
reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel,
make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the
proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until
his faculties are recovered.
For charges “e” and “f”: “private practice" is more than an isolated court
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to
the public as a lawyer. In this case, the court found that Judge Floro did
not file other pleadings or appeared in any other court proceedings in
connection with his personal cases, except for a “Motion for Entry of
Judgment”. Hence, Judge Floro’s act of filing the motion for entry of
judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise constitute
private practice of law.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge
Floro has been attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing
for leave of absence.
For charges “k” and “l”: the court stated that although there is no direct
proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said,
nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as
well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his
way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of
Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct.
For charge “m”: Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of
Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be
conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course
and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.
Circular No. 13 does not define or punish an offense. It is merely a
guideline to be followed in administering justice.
People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118882
26 September 1996
Melo, J.
(Role and Standards: Impartiality)
FACTS:
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for review with urgent
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to
annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP
31733 in so far as it denied People’s prayer for the inhibition of Judge
Espina in hearing Criminal cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, and enjoining
the judge from conducting further proceedings in such criminal cases,
before the Supreme Court.
On 3 April 1995, the Court resolved to require Cristeta Reyes and Roger
Doctora, Johny Santos and Antonio Alegro, and Jane C. Go to comment
within 10 days from notice, to issue the temporary restraining order
prayed for, and to enjoin Judge Pedro S. Espina from taking further
action in Criminal Cases 93-01-38 and 93-01-39 until further orders from
the Court.
Reyes, Doctora, Santos, Alegro, and Go failed to file their respective
comments within the reglementary period, nor within the second
deadline. As the latter are already in detention and that sanction relating
to delay in the submission of the comments may not amount to much,
and as not to unduly delay the disposition of Criminal Cases 93-01-38
and 93-01 -39, the Court resolved to dispense with the latter's comments
and to proceed with the disposition of the petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the decision of a Judge favorable to the accused in a different
special civil proceeding is enough basis to render the Judge to be partial
or bias in the present criminal case. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial
proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus,
every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. The judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. Due process is intended to insure confidence in the
judiciary by requiring compliance with the rudiments of fair play. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and
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waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. The Judge will reach his conclusions only
after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of
the established facts and the pertinent law. Herein, Judge Pedro Espina
cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an
impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by
the prosecution
and the defense in view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action
92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against Jane Go, the principal
accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go. Judge Espina's
decision in favor of Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis
for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the
criminal cases. It would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to
have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.
In Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee hearing held on September 26, 2013
against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong,
Sandiganbayan
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
23 September 2014
Villarama, J.
(Role and Standards: Propriety)
FACTS:
In the course of the investigations conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee with regard to the PDAF scams, certain names of
government officials where mentioned by “whistle-blowers” who were
former employees of Napoles. One of the officials mentioned was
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory Ong, the respondent in this
case. The whistle blowers were Benhur Luy, a cousin of Napoles who
worked for her for several years, Marina Sula, an employee of Napoles,
and Aries Rufo, a reporter from Rappler. The SC ordered an
investigation to be conducted by Justice Sandoval Gutierrez regarding
the possible transgressions committed by Respondent.
It was found by the investigation that, two criminal cases were filed with
the Sandiganbayan in 20001 for Falsification of Public documents and
AntiGraft Law against officers of the military and civilian employees
including Napoles. These cases were referred to as Kevlar cases since
the subject matter were Kevlar helmets supposedly for the military
purchased from companies owned by Napoles. Napoles was acquitted
in the Kevlar cases since she was found by the court not one of the
dealers/suppliers in the transaction in question.
Benhur Testimony
During the investigation, Benhur Luy testified that Napoles mentioned to
him the Kevlar case and that she had a “connect” in the Sandiganbayan.
When asked who the connect was, Benhur said that it was Respondent.
He further testified that Napoles told him that she “fixed” the case
because of her connect in the Sandiganbayan. Probed further as to the
meaning of “fixed”, Benhur testified that PHP100 million pesos was listed
as an expense in the ledger of the company owned by Napoles and that
such were given to different people during the pendency of the case and
that she also gave money to respondent but the amount was not
mentioned to Benhur. Further, Benhur testified that respondent went to
the office of Napoles twice in Ortigas and gave a check to Napoles
amounting 25.5 million to be placed as a loan to the AFPSLAI and which
would receive a very high interest rate and that respondent received 11
checks in return each amounting to PHP 282K as advanced interest
earned from the loan of his money to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and Police Savings and Loan Association (AFPSLAI) which
Napoles had a personal account paying 13% interest annually.
Sula Testimony
Sula, the long- time employee, corroborated the testimony of Benhur, by
stating that Napoles told her and other employees that she has a contact
with the Sandiganbayan which was Respondent and that they should not
be worried in case a suit was filed against Napoles regarding the PDAF
funds. She also testified that Napoles told them that Justice Ong will
help Napoles in the Kevlar case.
Rufo, the Rappler reporter, procured a picture showing Respondent
beside Napoles and Jinggoy Estrada and he testified that when he saw
the picture, he knew that Respondent was one of the members of the
division that handled the Kevlar case and that he knew that the Justice
should not be seen or be going to a party with Napoles who was a party
in a case under his Division.
Respondent in his defense denied all the imputations against him. He
asserted that he did not meet Napoles during the pendency of the
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Kevlar case, that the Kevlar case was denied based on the merits of the
case, and that the testimonies had no evident proof of what was
asserted. Respondent alleges that the picture was taken at the birthday
party of Jinggoy Estrada in 2012 and that Respondent and Napoles
talked about the Black Nazarene and that Napoles arranged for the
Black Nazarene robe to be put over respondent as he was suffering
from cancer. Then, the arrangement was indeed fulfilled and that he
thanked Napoles for such an opportunity and personally went to her
office twice to thank her.
The investigating Justice, Sandoval -Gutierrez found credence in the
testimonies of Benhur and Sala and that the picture showed
respondent’s disregard of the dictum of propriety essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
ISSUE/S:
WON respondent can be found guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty,
and impropriety. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
The SC adopted the findings and conclusions of the Investigating
Justice.
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the
Kevlar case
2. Respondent fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money form
Napoles prior to the promulgation of the Kevlar case
4. Respondent visited Napoles where he received 11 checks
amounting to PHP 282k each as advanced interest
5. Respondent attended Napoles’ parties and was photographed
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and
corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and
impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after
her acquittal in the said case. He is also charged for dishonesty for
failing to disclose with Chief Justice Serreno that he had actually visited
Napoles in her office as he denied having attended any social event
hosted by her.
In administrative proceedings like this one, the amount of evidence
needed is only of substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence
might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act or
bribery committed by the respondent, we find credible evidence of his
association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the
Kevlar case. The testimonies establish that Napoles had been in contact
with Respondent during the pendency of the Kevlar case. Napoles
revealed to the witnesses that she has a contact with the
Sandiganbayan and that person will help her “fix” the case. The
revelation was further confirmed when she was acquitted in 2010 and
that Respondent was seen visiting her office in 2012. Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez rejected the claim of Respondent that he went twice to the
office of Napoles was merely to say thank you for the Black Nazarene
robe. Justice believed that the meeting was because of the financial
transaction between the two parties with regard to the money loaned to
the AFPSLAI. This financial transaction is supported by the testimony of
Benhur that 100M pesos were used to “fix” the Kevlar case.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on
two occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4
(Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on
June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial
and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public
confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the
appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a
judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
Previous cases have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing
with persons who have pending cases before their court. It does not
mean that judges should live in retirement or seclusion, it but advised
that they be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably
tend to waken the suspicion that the relations or friendship constitute an
element in determining his judicial course.
Page 101 of 169
In the report of Justice Sandoval- Gutierrez the testimonies of the
witnesses were more plausible and believable and corroborate each
other compared to the denials and excuses of Respondent. It is a settled
rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given
great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to
see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. Thus the SC
concurred with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the
credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagreed with respondent's claim that
these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with
Napoles.
Respondent’s conduct of visiting the office and being in social events
with Napoles gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty
and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and undermined the
integrity of the courts of justice.
The SC also found that Respondent was guilty of dishonesty for not
being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint
was filed against him in violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.
The SC found respondent guilty of a serious charge and adjudged him a
penalty of dismissal form service and forfeiture of all benefits.
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ
23 April 2010
Per Curiam
(Role and Standards: Competence and Diligence)
Notes by Digest Author: This is a long case since it is composed of
numerous cases, all targeted at respondent judge Arcaya-Chua, and 1
case at her and her accomplice.
FACTS:
These consolidated cases stemmed from the administrative complaints
filed against respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ: The “Ocampo” Case
Francisco P. Ocampo (Ocampo) charged respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the
law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.
Ocampo's wife, Milan Arceo Ocampo (Milan), filed a petition claiming the
sole custody of their minor daughters, namely, Ma. Francesca P.
Ocampo (Francesca), and Ma. Fatima Patricia A. Ocampo (Fatima).
During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, respondent Judge
issued an Order enjoining Francisco Ocampo from taking their
daughters outside the country without the court's permission and
directing him to allow, Milan visitation rights over their daughters in their
residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss (MTD) on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, alleging that he and Milan were residents and registered
voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Ocampo then served interrogatories to
his wife, and presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove
that his wife was not really a resident of Makati City.
In an Order, respondent Judge denied the MTD. Ocampo questioned
the dismissal of his MTD since Milan never presented any evidence to
controvert the evidence which he submitted in support of his motion to
dismiss. Ocampo thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration (MR),
which was likewise denied by respondent Judge.
Respondent judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO),
requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their
daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence (1211 West
Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City), to refrain from
committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an
unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of their minor
daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support of P50,000.00 to
their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses for medication
and education.
Ocampo faulted the judge in issuing the TPO since the former’s period
to file an answer hasn’t expired yet. Moreover, he was directed to give
financial support to his wife and 2 daughters even if the wife herself
alleged that the kids were not his and without considering his financial
resources/capacity. Ocampo further stated that the judge, in issuing the
TPO, did not take into account the wife’s infidelity. Ocampo also stated
that the sheriff responsible for the TPO’s implementation, was
disrespectful and insensitive. It was
Page 102 of 169
a Maundy Thursday, when the sheriff arrived in Ocampo’s house, woke
everyone up while they slept and demanded that Ocampo pay the P50k
amount for support right then and there.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049: The “Chang/RCBC” Case
In this case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through then
Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed the Office of the Chief
Justice in a Memorandum of the reports about the rampant selling of
TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua.
These reports were confirmed by judges Winlove M. Dumayas, Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen, Tranquil P. Salvador and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-
Delorino, particularly with respect to SP Case No. M-6373, entitled
Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, a child custody
case.
It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent judge issued a TPO,
granting among others the custody of the subject minor Rafi Pulliam
(Rafi), to therein petitioner Albert Chang Tan (Albert), and prohibiting
Stephanie Pulliam (Stephanie) to stay away from the home and office of
Chang Tan as well as from the school of Rafi. As per the sheriff’s return,
said TPO was not properly implemented insofar as Rafi’s custody was
concerned. This irked Albert which led to a heated argument between
him and the OIC of Branch 144. On the same day, respondent judge
issued an Order authorizing the sheriff to enter the premises where Rafi
may be found for the purpose of turning over custody to Albert.
According to the OCA, although it was not shown that respondent judge
received money from Albert in exchange for TPO’s issuance, the facts
clearly indicate that she was remiss in issuing said TPO. The OCA also
stated that this was not the only case where the judge displayed unusual
interest. The judge also displayed the same unusual interest in another
case, RCBC v. Moreno, where she ordered a writ of preliminary
attachment in favor of RCBC. According the OCA, what was highly
suspicious was the judge’s actuation where there was no real urgency in
the application of said writ.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141: The “Judicial Audit” Case
A judicial audit was conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC Makati
Branch 144, which is the sala of respondent judge, following reports of
alleged irregularities committed by her. In a memorandum by the OCA to
CJ Reynato Puno, the Court Administrator Christopher Lock submitted
the initial report of the Judicial Audit Team, informing the Court of an
incident that happened on May 17, 2007 in respondent judge’s sala.
This initial report stated that as early as May 12, 2007 (Saturday), the
Court ordered the padlocking of Branch 144 and assigned guards
thereat on a 24 -hour basis. The members of the audit team made it
clear to OIC Victoria Jamora and court personnel that actions on the
records, including stitching should be held in abeyance and that no
records should be brought outside the court until after the audit.
On May 17, guards Joel Gregorio and Alexander Dayap noticed
Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I of Branch 144, disposing a plastic
bag. The guards followed Indicio, and retrieved the plastic bag from a
trash bin located right outside the court. The plastic bag was
surrendered to the audit team and was found to contain copies of
marriage certificates of marriages solemnized by Judge Chua
numbering to hundreds.
When confronted, Indicio stated that he was disposing the documents
upon respondent Judge's instruction made several days ago. He could
not offer any explanation why he chose to dispose of the documents that
morning despite the ongoing audit. He, nonetheless, disclosed that there
were other bags for disposal still kept inside the room where the
stenographers, particularly OIC Victoria C. Jamora, held office. The
other bags when retrieved, contained more copies of marriage
certificates.
In this case, respondent judge was charged in connection with the 1,975
copies of marriage certificates for marriages she solemnized from
January 2004 to April 2007 for the following acts: (1) for allegedly
ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., to dispose of the said copies of marriage
certificates; (2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization fees of 1,809
marriages as verified from the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office
of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Makati City and the RTC, OCC, Makati City,
thereby depriving the Court of the said fees in the total amount of
P542,700.00 at the rate of Three Hundred Pesos P300.00 per marriage;
and (3) for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report of
Cases.
A.M. No, RTJ-07-2093
Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against Judge
Arcaya-Chua for serious misconduct and dishonesty.
Page 103 of 169

Complainant, an aunt of respondent Judge’s husband, alleged that in the
first week of September 2002, she asked respondents help regarding
the cases of her friend, Emerita Muoz, pending before the Supreme
Court. At that time, respondent was the Presiding Judge of the MeTC of
Makati City, Branch 63. Respondent, a former employee of the Supreme
Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some
Justices of the Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which she would
give to an employee of the Court for the speedy resolution of the said
cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave respondent
P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter’s chamber. When complainant
followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her that there
was a problem, as the other party was offering P10 million to the
Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the P100,000.00;
however, respondent could no longer be contacted.
The Court, in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred this case to
Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.
During the preliminary conference held on September 4, 2007,
complainant manifested her desire to move for the dismissal of her
complaint against respondent. In a Verified Manifestation, complainant
stated that in the latter part of August 2007, she and respondent had a
long and serious discussion about the dispute and bad feelings between
them; that after a sincere exchange of views, it dawned on complainant
that her accusation against respondent was brought about by
misunderstanding, confusion and misapprehension of facts concerning
the incident subject of the present administrative case; that for the sake
of unity and harmonious relations in their family, the complainant and
respondent had reconciled and restored friendly relations with each
other; and that in view of the foregoing, complainant was no longer
interested in pursuing her administrative case against respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of the charges against
her.
HELD/RATIO:
Findings of the Investigating Justice
Findings in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ: The “Ocampo” Case
The investigating Justice in this case was Justice Salazar-Fernando
(JSF, for brevity). Regarding the denial of the MTD, JSF believed that
respondent judge's disposition thereof fell within the ambit of discretion
vested upon her as a judge. Assuming the same was erroneous, no
administrative liability could attach to the judge in the absence of
sufficient evidence that she ruled in a corrupt, dishonest, fraudulent or
malicious manner.
As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO hearing, JSF
found respondent judge’s explanation acceptable. The order setting the
case for hearing on December 13, 2006 was issued on December 8,
2006, and there was an interim of at least five days from the issuance of
the order and the date of the scheduled hearing. It did not appear that
respondent Judge had any hand in the belated service of the notice to
the complainant. JSF held that respondent judge could not be
faulted as to the alleged suddenness of the said hearing, because a
prayer for TPO requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that
respect, no wrong-doing, fraud, bad faith, malice or even arbitrariness
can be attributed to respondent Judge. The actions of respondent judge
is in accord with Sec. 15 of RA 9262: “ x x x The court shall order the
immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the
court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement
agents for the service. x x x x”. Hence, the issuance of said TPO was
neither irregular nor improper.
As to the complaint by Ocampo on the insensitive implementation of the
TPO on a Maundy Thursday, JSF found nothing improper or wayward in
the dispositions made by respondent Judge in the case. There was no
evidence that respondent Judge purposely sought the issuance of the
TPO during Holy Week, as it was Ocampo's counsel himself who,
wittingly or unwittingly, chose the hearing date. Considering the urgency
and immediacy of a TPO, it was not improper or illegal that respondent
Judge caused its immediate implementation. JSF also believed that
respondent Judge could not have been privy to the brazen manner in
which the TPO was served by the designated sheriff, Sheriff Tangangco,
who was administratively charged by Ocampo for the allegedly offensive
manner the TPO was served. As correctly argued by respondent Judge,
such was the personal accountability of Sheriff Tangangco only.
Lastly, JSF found that campo's allegation of bribery against respondent
Judge to be hearsay. During the hearing conducted by JSF on October
Page 104 of 169
24, 2007, Ocampo confirmed that he had no personal knowledge of the
alleged bribery of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
JSF recommended that A.M. OCA IPI No. 07- 2630-RTJ (the Ocampo
Case) should be dismissed. JSF stated that in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.
Findings in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049: The “Chang Tan/RCBC” Case JSF
stated that the OCA primarily asserted that the TPO issued by
respondent Judge could not be legally justified under R.A. No. 9262,
because the said law applies only if the applicant for TPO is a woman.
The Investigating Justice partly agreed with the OCA on that score. R.A.
No. 9262 is known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004. It is specifically applicable to "women and their
children," not to men. Under R.A. No. 9262, a TPO cannot be issued
in favor of a man against his wife. Certainly, such a TPO would be
absurd. Hence, JSF found respondent Judge’s error in this regard to be
gross ignorance of the law.
With respect to the issue of custody, Justice Salazar-Fernando found
respondent Judge’s reasons for granting custody over Rafi to Albert
Chang Tan to be legally tenable. While not exactly conclusive, the
evidence relied upon by respondent Judge in granting custody in favor
of Chang Tan was substantial enough to warrant a prima facie
determination that a TPO in favor of the minor was necessary and would
serve her paramount interest. JSF found nothing improper in respondent
Judge's reliance on the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Sonia
Rodriguez and the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and the subject
minor herself, Rafi Pulliam, which all confirmed that Stephanie has not
been a good influence to her daughter, Rafi. As far as the latter's
paramount interest was concerned, Stephanie was not the ideal person
to whom custody should be awarded. On this premise, respondent
Judge’s award of temporary custody to the father could be justified.
In regard to the alleged bribery and unusual interest which respondent
Judge allegedly displayed in the said case, JSF found no substantial
evidence to support such allegations. The OCA's Memorandum itself
admitted that there was no proof that respondent Judge received money
from Albert. Moreover, not one of the witnesses of OCA confirmed
having personally witnessed the alleged heated argument between
Albert Chang Tan and the OIC of respondent judge’s sala except only
for secondhand accounts that they heard that such incident actually
transpired. JSF stated that respondent Judge appeared to have no
personal or actual participation in that incident, because the "heated
argument" was allegedly between Chang Tan and the OIC, Victoria
Jamora.
As regards respondent Judge’s issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment in the RCBC Case, JSF found no evidence against
respondent of any irregularity or undue interest in the case. Respondent
convincingly elaborated the circumstances surrounding her issuance of
the writ of preliminary attachment, particularly the manner in which she
studied and evaluated the application for the writ.
JSF was convinced that while the order granting the writ was indeed
speedily issued, the ex parte hearing on the application having been
held on a Friday, followed immediately by the issuance of the writ on the
succeeding business day, a Monday there was really nothing impossible
or irregular in such feat. Per respondent’s account, she had been
unofficially reporting for work on Saturdays during that time and she did
not have to evaluate the totality of the evidence for the purpose of ruling
on the propriety of issuing the writ. Further, considering respondent's
habit of immediately disposing pending motions before her court, JSF
found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister significance to the speedy
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. JSF also found
respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the writ of preliminary
attachment to be apt.
JSF found that there is substantial evidence of an anomaly in
respondent Judge’s solemnization of marriages in her court and failure
to reflect the correct number of marriages in her Monthly Reports. JSF
stated that at once, the timing of the disposal of the marriage
certificates, which were said to have been contained in four
(4) plastic bags, is highly suspect, because it occurred during the time
the judicial audit was being conducted.
Respondent Judge admitted the fact that she ordered Indicio, her utility
worker, to dispose of some garbage contained in blue plastic bags.
However, as regards the timing of disposal, she explained that she
ordered Indicio to dispose of her garbage on the second week of May,
days before the judicial audit.
Page 105 of 169
JSF stated that based on the foregoing account, if the order to dispose
of the garbage was indeed made on May 9, 2007, it is perplexing why
such a simple task of throwing away a garbage of barely four plastic
bags, which would take only a couple of minutes to accomplish, could
tarry for several days. The logical implication is that the order to dispose
could not have been made on May 9, 2007, but more likely later when
the judicial audit was already being conducted.
JSF also did not give credence to respondent Judges theory as to why
the plastic bags of marriage certificates were found in the
stenographer's room, causing Indicio to mistake it for the garbage which
she supposedly ordered him to dispose of. Respondent Judge theorized
that a certain Noel Umipig, a casual employee in her staff, who
harbored a deep-seated grudge against her for not being able to borrow
money from her, could have been responsible in transferring the plastic
bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her chambers to the
stenographer's room before her courtroom was padlocked. According to
her, Umipig could have heard of the impending administrative
investigation on her. Hence, to expose the big number of weddings she
had been solemnizing, which, purportedly, through Umipig' s
machinations had not been reflected in her monthly reports, Umipig
could have taken out the plastic bags of marriage certificates from the
small room in her chambers and transferred them to the stenographer's
room, so that once the plastic bags were taken out to the garbage can
along the corridor, the documents would be discovered by the audit
team.
JSF did not believe the reasons of respondent judge. According to JSF,
it was fantastic that respondent Judge attached too much cunning to
Umipig for the latter to have deviously perpetrated all the acts being
attributed to him. If the intention was only to expose the big number of
weddings, it is hard to understand why Umipig would have to go the
difficult way of trespassing on her chambers when all he would have to
do was spread rumors about the weddings, as he had been wont to do,
per respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's own account.
As regards to the non-payment marriage solemnization fees and the
certifications issued by the Clerks of Court of the MeTC and RTC of
Makati City attest to the fact that out of the 1,975 marriages
solemnized by respondent Judge, only 166 marriages were paid the
corresponding solemnization fees. JSF was convinced and found no
reason to doubt the reliability or integrity of said certifications, the
contents of which were confirmed by Arnel Magsombol and Lucila
Ticman, the same persons who personally verified from their records
whether or not the solemnization fees of the marriages solemnized by
respondent Judge were paid.
JSF disbelieved the argument of respondent Judge that the anomaly
attributed to her was the work of Umipig. JSF found it incredible that
since January 2004 up to April 2007 or for a period of more than three
years, Umipig had been silently working on his sinister scheme.
In regard to respondent Court Stenographer Jamora's culpability, JSF
found sufficient reasons to hold her accountable for her
JSF held that in the absence of evidence that she was motivated by any
dishonest or corrupt motive in issuing the writ, respondent Judge is
entitled to the presumption that she regularly performed her duties.
Findings in the Judicial Audit Case Re: Marriage Certificates and
Monthly Reports signatures in the monthly reports. She cannot feign
ignorance as to the correct number of weddings solemnized by
respondent Judge. Jamoras’ justification that “she could not have
questioned respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua” even if there were
erroneous entries in the monthly reports is in itself pregnant with
admission that something anomalous could have indeed been
taking place.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 (Sylvia Santos Case)
Justice Buzon, the investigating justice in this case, recommended the
dismissal of the administrative case in view of paucity of evidence upon
which a conclusion could be drawn, brought about by the withdrawal by
Santos of her complaint and her failure and refusal to prove the
allegations in her Complaint.
The Court, adopting the recommendation of Justice Buzon, dismissed
the complaint against respondent for lack of evidence. The Court, in the
same Resolution, also ordered complainant to show cause why she
should not be held in contempt of Court for filing an unfounded verified
Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against respondent. The Court then
Page 106 of 169
resolved to reprimand complainant with a stern warning that a more
severe penalty would be imposed on her in the event of a repetition of
the same offense.
FINALLY, the Supreme Court’s Ruling:
The SC agrees with the findings of JSF, the investigating justice.
Settled is that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof
required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt,
but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (the solemnization of Marriage case), there is
substantial evidence that respondent Judge did not report in her
Monthly Reports the actual number of marriages she solemnized during
her stint in the MeTC, Makati City, Branch 63 and in the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 144, and that the solemnization fees that were paid did
not correspond to the number of marriages that were solemnized by
her. The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge Arcaya-
Chua reported zero or a lesser number of marriages solemnized by her
compared with the marriage certificates that were seized from her office.
Various court personnel testified that there were indeed numerous
marriages solemnized by respondent judge, but only few had their
payments/fees properly remitted to the court. In the light of the
substantial evidence against her, she cannot shift the blame to Noel
Umipig absent any proof of weight that he forged her signature in the
Monthly Reports.
Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as OIC of Branch
144 from July 2005 to April 2007. It is incredible that Victoria Jamora,
as OIC, was unaware of the big number of weddings solemnized by
respondent Judge from November 5 to March 2007, which totaled 1,068
marriages per the confiscated marriage certificates, but she attested in
the Monthly Reports for the said period that no marriage was ever
solemnized. Thus, the Investigating Justice JSF, correctly stated that
she knew that the figures stated in the Monthly Reports were incorrect,
but she condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature therein, if
she was not actually a willing participant.
The Court sustains the findings of JSF in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 that
respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are guilty of
gross misconduct.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court
upholds the finding of JSF that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner
Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be
issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9292.
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), the Court
sustains the recommendation of JSF that the case be dismissed in the
absence of substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
is liable for the charge of harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 (Sylvia Santos Case)
Respondent contends that the failure of Santos to present Emerita
Muoz, from whom Santos procured the P100,000.00, during the
proceedings before Justice Salvador was fatal to Santos claims against
her, and, on that basis alone, provided a reason to dismiss the present
case. The Court is not persuaded.
Santos was an eyewitness to the procurement of the P100,000.00, and
her testimony alone, found credible in this case, is sufficient to prove the
administrative liability of respondent.
Contrary to the allegations of respondent, the Court, in sustaining the
findings of Investigating Justice Salvador, took into consideration the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented by her.
The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-
08-2141 is violative of the provisions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Administrative Sanctions
Any disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua will be
based on the provisions of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, while
disciplinary action against respondent Victoria Jamora will be based on
Page 107 of 169
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Under Section 8, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, serious charges include gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and gross
ignorance of the law or procedure.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that if the
respondent Judge is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement
appointment to any public office, including government-owned
controlled corporations: Provided, however, That the forfeiture
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
o. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or; A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave
misconduct is classified as a grave offense and punished with dismissal
for the first offense.
The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent
Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
(The Judicial Audit Case).
The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and gross misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (Chang/RCBC case)
and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively. Respondent Judges motion for
reconsideration is denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
To Conclude the Supreme Court’s Rulings:
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, the charges against Judge Evelyn S.
Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is
DISMISSED.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and punished with SUSPENSION from office for six
(6) months without salary and other benefits.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, the motion for reconsideration of Judge
Arcaya-Chua is DENIED for lack of merit. The penalty of
SUSPENSION from office for a period of six (6) months without
salary and other benefits imposed upon her is RETAINED.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service,
with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with
as prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or
or instrumentality.
or
of In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is found GUILTY of
grave misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with
prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality.
Arts. 27 & 32, Civil Code (Liabilities of a Judge: Civil
Liability)
Article 27
Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant
or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against
the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action
that may be taken.
Article 32
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) Right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
Page 108 of 169
 (7) Right to just compensation when private property is taken for
public use;
(8) Right to equal protection of the laws;
(9) Right to be secure in one’s, person, house, paper and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) Liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) Privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) Right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
(13) Right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances;
(14) Right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) Right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) Right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witness face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced
by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution, and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code
or other penal statute.
Arts. 204 – 206, Revised Penal Code (Liabilities of a
Judge: Criminal Liability)
Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment.
Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case
submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
Art. 205. Judgment rendered through negligence.
Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance
shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to
him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary
special disqualification.
Art. 206. Unjust interlocutor order.
Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or
decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period
and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be
manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.
Santiago III v. Enriquez
A.M. No. CA-09-47-J
13 February 2009
Carpio-Morales, J.
(Liabilities of a Judge: Criminal Liability)
FACTS:
Complainant filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City
a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title
No. 56, registered in the name of Pantaleona Santiago and Blas
Fajardo.
Quezon City RTC granted the petition. The Republic of the to the Court
of Appeals and was raffled to Justice Gonzales-Sison.
On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her Report
however the respondent expressed his dissent to the Report
Justice Veloso, who originally concurred in the Report, requested
Justice Gonzales-Sison to take a second look at respondents
Dissenting Opinion, as the reasons [Justice Enriquez] gave are
strong enough to be ignored by plain technicality.
Page 109 of 169

Respondent requested the Raffle Committee of the Court of Appeals to
designate two associate justices to complete the composition of a
Special Division of five. The Raffle Committee designated Justices
Edgardo P. Cruz and Lucas P. Bersaminas additional members of the
Special Division.
Justice Veloso soon expressed his concurrence with respondents
Dissenting Opinion. Justice Bersamin expressed his concurrence with
the Report of Justice Gonzales-Sison, while Justice Cruz expressed his
concurrence with respondents Dissenting Opinion.
Respondents Dissenting Opinion thus became the majority opinion of
the Special Division and the Report-opinion of Justice Gonzales-Sison
with which Justice Bersamin concurred became the Dissenting Opinion.
The Decision of the Special Division reversed the decision of the
Quezon City RTC.
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
In the present Complaint, complainant alleges that Associate Justice
Enriquez deliberately twisted the law and existing jurisprudence to grant
the appeal, to the extreme prejudice of complainant. For this reason, this
administrative charge of GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW/GROSS
INCOMPETENCE is now being filed against respondent.
Respondent contends that the administrative complaint was filed
prematurely considering that complainants motion for reconsideration of
the Decision was pending.
Respondent also contends that the administrative complaint is not the
proper forum for the determination of whether the Decision is erroneous
or contrary to law and jurisprudence.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not Associate Justice Enriquez is Guilty of ignorance of
the law or gross incompetence. (NO)
(2) Whether or not Filing of charges against a single member of a
division of the appellate court is appropriate. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
The principle of judicial immunity insulates judges, and even Justices of
superior courts, from being held to account criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.To hold
otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No one called upon to
try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice
could be infallible in his judgment.
Assuming arguendo that respondent’s citation of cases in support of the
Decision, since there is no showing that the Decision is tainted with
fraud, malice or dishonesty or was rendered with deliberate intent to
cause injustice, the complaint must be dismissed.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative
complaint against the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or order
to the higher court for review and correction. An administrative complaint
is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available,
such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for
certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud,
malice, or dishonesty.
In the words of Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson, it is a general principle of
the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to
act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon
consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity
and independence of the judiciary. This principle is of universal
application and applies to all grades of judicial officers from the highest
judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a court.
SECOND ISSUE:
According to Bautista v. Abdulwahid:
It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31, 2004 was
not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his individual capacity. The
Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their
conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a
collective decision is unjust cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of
charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is
inappropriate.
Page 110 of 169

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Yu
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813
22 November 2016
Per Curiam
(Liabilities of a Judge: Discipline of Members of the
Bench)
FACTS:
1st complaint:
CJ Corono issued A.O. No. 19-2011 assigning night courts in the city of
Pasay and Manila. Judge Yu was assigned to be the judge every Friday
to which she opposed and sent multiple letters demanding the
establishment of night courts be abolished for lack of research,
compensation, security, and its alleged illegality due to the violation of
the Rules on Summary Procedure.
OCA submitted a memorandum recommending the Judge Yu’s
insubordination, gross misconduct and violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct be docketed as an administrative complaint against
her.
Judge Yu argued that there was no insubordination because she was
merely expressing her opinion to the matter and that she has a
constitutional right to freedom of speech.
2nd complaint:
Lopez’ appointment
Judge Yu requested for the position of Clerk of Court III in her sala to be
filled. There were three applicants, Serrano, Lopez, and Bernardo.
Judge Yu wanted Bernardo to be her clerk but the Selection and
Promotion board assigned Lopez to be the clerk. Judge Yu still
requested for Bernardo to be temporarily assigned and she claims that
Lopez is not qualified because Lopez does not have the needed
indorsement from the court where she will be assigned.
Still, Lopez was eventually appointed Clerk of Court III. Because of this,
Judge Yu filed her formal protest to the Supreme Court, but the court
dismissed the case.
Lagman’s appointment
Judge Yu filed a complaint against Lagman, the legal researcher of
MTC-Pasay branch 47, for grave misconduct, falsification, usurpation of
judicial functions and dishonesty.
Lagman requested to be transferred to another court pending the
hearing of her case. Later on, Lagman was appointed as the Clerk III of
RTC-Pasay branch 108.
Lagman’s appointment was assailed by Judge Yu claiming that it was a
“fast appointment”, hence, Judge Yu threatened to file formal charges
against the members of the OCA-SPBLC.
The OCA filed a memorandum denouncing Judge Yu’s conduct.
The court required Judge Yu to show cause and explain why she should
not be disciplined for her actions.
Judge Yu claims that she was merely expressing herself and that her
letters are privileged communication and could not be used against her,
pursuant to her constitutional right against self-incrimination.
3rd complaint:
4 MeTC judges and 70 MeTC personnel filed 2 affidavit- complaints
accusing Judge Yu with: (1) gross insubordination; (2) refusal to perform
official duty; (3) gross ignorance of the law or procedure; (4) serious and
grave misconduct constituting violations of Canon 3, Rules 3.0 and 3.08
of the Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to Canon 6 of The New Code
of Judicial Conduct of the Philippine Judiciary; Sections 1 and 2, Canon
2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct; and Sections 1 and 2, Canon 4
of the Code of Judicial Conduct; (5) violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives and circulars; (6) violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; (7) violation of the Lawyer's Oath and her
oath of office as judge; (8) oppressive conduct; and (9) violation of
Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code
1) The common issue in the three complaints concerned the conduct of
Judge Yu in relation to her staff, fellow Judges and other officers of
the Supreme Court, her disobedience of the Court's issuances, and
her manner of disposing cases.
2) Judge Yu issued a show cause order against the judges and
personnel, requiring them to explain why they should not be cited in
contempt for using court documents as attachments in their
complaint.
Page 111 of 169
4th complaint:
Judge Emily San Gaspar filed a complaint against Judge Yu for sending
her lewd messaged on facebook and her yahoo account. In their
correspondence, Judge Yu kept on referring to a MEAL STUB and that it
entailed to a “69” meal. A few months later, Judge Yu discovered that
the meal stub message she received from Judge Emily was just a
facebook scam. Judge Yu then apologized and requested that her
emails and messages be deleted. Judge Emily then deactivated her
account, to which Judge Yu was relieved. When Judge Emily reactivated
her account, Judge Yu was alarmed by her reactivation and kept
messaging Judge Emily about her previous emails. Judge Emily finally
filed the complaint when she discovered that Judge Yu created a fake
facebook account of Judge Emily and when Judge Yu messaged Judge
Emily’s bestfriend.
The OCA recommended for the court to find Judge Yu guilty of GUILTY
of INSUBORDINATION, GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW,
REFUSAL TO PERFORM OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, GROSS
MISCONDUCT AMOUNTING TO VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY,
OPPRESSION, and CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, and be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any Public office including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
The OCA agreed with the recommendation and findings of Justice
Abdulwahid to consider Judge Yu's actuations towards Judge San
Gaspar- Gito as conduct unbecoming of a judge, but clarified that Judge
Yu's use of the official letterhead of her court in summoning the brother
of Judge San Gaspar-Gito to a conference demonstrated her abuse of
power, and constituted a violation of Section 8, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Judge Yu is guilty of the charges against her. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Judge Yu is guilty of the charges against her.
Non-compliance with A.O. No. 19-2011
The court ruled that Judge Yu resisted the implementation of A.O. No.
19-2011 because of her unresolved protest against the issuance. Her
unresolved protest was not a sufficient justification for her to resist the
implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011. She was quite aware that A.O. No.
19-2011 was issued pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which confers to the Court the power of administrative
supervision over all courts, and was for that reason an issuance to be
immediately implemented and unquestioningly obeyed by the affected
Judges.
According to Himalin v. Balderian, the refusal of a Judge to comply with
any resolution or directive of the Court constituted insubordination and
gross misconduct, viz.:
A judge who deliberately and continuously failed and refused to comply
with a resolution of this Court was held guilty of gross misconduct and
insubordination, the Supreme Court being the agency exclusively vested
by our Constitution with administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. The Court can hardly discharge such
constitutional mandate of overseeing judges and court personnel and
taking proper administrative sanction against them if the judge or
personnel concerned does not even recognize its administrative
authority.
Refusal to honor the appointments of court personnels The
court ruled that Judge Yu’s opposition was unwarranted.
First, the Selection and Promotion Board explained to Judge Yu the
selection process that had resulted in the appointment of Ms. Lopez.
She could not impose her recommendee on the SPB which was legally
mandated to maintain fairness and impartiality in its assessment of the
applicants based on performance, eligibility,
education and training, experience and outstanding accomplishments,
psycho-social attributes and personality traits, and potentials.
Also, Judge Yu's rejection of the appointment of Ms. Lagman was just
as unwarranted.
Under Section 34, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, a pending administrative complaint shall not
disqualify an employee from promotion.
Issuing a show-cause order against fellow Judges and court
personnel
Page 112 of 169
The court said that respondent Judge Yu acted as if she was the
investigating authority instead of being the respondent. She took undue
advantage of her position as a judge and used the judicial process for
her own benefit. Such action clearly depicts an abusive character which
has no place in the judiciary.
By insisting on her inherent authority to punish her fellow Judges for
contempt of court, Judge Yu wielded a power that she did not hold.
Hence, she was guilty of gross misconduct.
Sending of inappropriate messages was conduct unbecoming of a
judicial officer Judge Yu denied sending the messages to Judge San
Gaspar -Gito, and countered that it was the latter who first sent the
"meal stub" message. She maintained that the messages were
confidential and inadmissible as evidence under the exclusionary rule.
Judge Yu's reliance on the exclusionary rule fails.
The exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
presupposes a violation of law on the part of the agents of the
Govemment, and bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures expressly defined
under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The exclusionary rule
under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution refers to the prohibition
against the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers
to go on fishing expeditions.
Moreover, the barrage of messages, most of which were sent within the
same day, makes us believe that they had all come from Judge Yu.
Although she insisted that Judge San Gaspar-Gito had sent the "meal
stub," Judge Yu did not offer any plausible explanation on the other
messages containing sexual innuendos.
The court ruled that Judge Yu is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judicial officer for sending inappropriate messages with sexual
undertones to a fellow female Judge, and for using the official letterhead
of her judicial office in summoning a lawyer to a conference.
In Re: Charges of Plagiarism against Associate Justice
Mariano C. del Castillo
A.M. No. 10-7-17
8 February 2011
Per Curiam
(Liabilities of a Judge: Misconduct)
FACTS:
Members of the Malaya Lolas Organization sought reconsideration of
the decision of the Court that dismissed the charges of plagiarism,
twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano
Del Castillo in connection with the decision he wrote in Vinuya v.
Romulo (GR 162230, April 28, 2010).
To be precise, Justice Del Castillo was charged of copying without
acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan
Fox-Descent , Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark
Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
(2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams,
Cambridge University Press (2005)
Petitioners claimed that the Court has, by its decision, legalized or
approved of the commission of plagiarism in the Philippines.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the “deliberate and
knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or creative
expressions as one’s own.” The presentation of another person’s ideas
as one’s own must be deliberate or premeditated – a taking with ill
intent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not plagiarism is applicable to decisions promulgated by the
Supreme Court. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
While the academic publishing model is based on the originality of the
writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare
decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data,
procedures, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength
Page 113 of 169
of a decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the
precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.
In contrast to academic or scholarly writing, decisions of courts are not
written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an original piece of work or
art. The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are
originally crafted, but that they are fair and correct in the context of the
particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality, form, and style, is
the object of every decision of a court of law.
Joyce C. George observed in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
• A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is
exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words, or
phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a
legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used without
giving attribution. Judges are free to use whatever sources they
deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear
of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to
decide cases for two reasons: (1) The judge is not writing a
literary work and, (2) The purpose of the writing is to resolve a
dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to
a claim of legal plagiarism.
Although Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors
materials that he lifted from their works and used in writing the decision
for the Court in the Vinuya case, the evidence, as found by the Court’s
Ethics Committee, showed that the attribution to these authors appeared
in the beginning drafts of the decision.
Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly qualified and experienced court-
employed researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the time she
was cleaning up the final draft.
The passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed
on their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo,
but to others. He did not pass them off as his own.
Carpio, dissenting:
The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to decide in an administrative
case whether a sitting Justice of this Court has committed misconduct in
office as this power belongs exclusively to Congress.
Under the Constitution, the sole disciplining authority of all impeachable
officers, including Justices of this Court, is Congress. In writing judicial
decisions, a judge must comply with the Law on Copyright, as the judge
has no power to exempt himself from the mandatory requirements of the
law.
Sereno, dissenting:
Judges need not strain themselves to meet inapplicable standards of
research and attribution of sources in their judicial opinions, not seek to
achieve the scholarly rigidity or thoroughness observed in academic
work. They need to answer to only two standards - diligence and
honesty.
On the use of the excerpt from Joyce C. George’s Judicial Opinion
Writing Handbook quoted in the majority Resolution: In no wise does
George imply that the judicial function confers upon judges the implicit
right to use the writing of others without attribution. Neither does George
conflate the possible lack of sanctions for plagiarism with the issue of
whether a determination of judicial plagiarism can be made. Rather,
George is careful to make the distinction between the issue of whether
judicial plagiarism was committed and the issue of whether a sanction
can be imposed for an act of judicial plagiarism. In George’s
terminology, the latter issue may also be framed as a question of
whether judicial plagiarism is “subject to a claim of legal (that is,
sanctionable) plagiarism”, and it has no bearing whatsoever on the
former issue.
Carpio Morales, separate dissenting:
Justice Carpio Morales joins Justice Carpio’s thesis in his Dissenting
Opinion on the commission of plagiarism or violation of intellectual
property rights in the Vinuya decision, as well as with his other thesis
that the Court has no jurisdiction to decide an administrative case where
a sitting Justice of this Court has committed misconduct in office, with
qualification.
The Court may wield its administrative power against its incumbent
members on grounds other than culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust, and provided the offense or misbehavior does not carry with
it a penalty, the service of which would amount to removal from office
either on a permanent or temporary basis such as suspension.
Page 114 of 169
 Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119
30 June 2008
Carpio-Morales, J.
(Liabilities of a Judge: Misconduct)
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel
Arnaldo B. Belen of ―demeaning, humilating, and beratingǁ him during
a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue Malabanan, et al.
where Mane was counsel for the plaintiff. During the proceedings, Belen
asked Mane about the latter’s law school. When Mane answered that he
came from Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him:
―Then you’re not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me
because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are
created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are
created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created
equal in His form and substance.
Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on the latter’s person,
seemingly disregarding the case at hand. Subsequently, the OCA, upon
evaluation, found that Belen’s insulting remarks were unwarranted and
inexcusable and recommended a reprimand of Belen.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during
the hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law school has no
monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations
which the Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of
the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to
discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia an officer of the court,
irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to
determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on his alma
mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not the person of the
counsel. If Judge Belen felt that his integrity and dignity were being
―assaulted,ǁ he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain
why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds,
however, when he engaged on a supercilious legal and personal
discourse.
The Court reminded members of the bench that even on the face of
boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct
themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the
court.
LAWYERS: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113
3 September 1991
Paras, J.
(Nature and Scope of the Legal Profession)
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed
the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be
a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural- born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
Page 115 of 169
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry,
a lawyer -negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and
the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic
B.M. No. 553
17 June 1993
Regalado, J.
(Nature and Scope of the Legal Profession)
FACTS:
The petitioner complained the 2 advertisements made by the Legal
Clinic. The respondent entity is staffed purely by paralegals.
One advertisement shows P 560 for a valid marriage and info on
Divorce, Absence, Annulment and VISA.
The other advertisement shows Guam Divorce, an Attorney in Guam, is
giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic.
Services include info on Guam divorce, annulment, immigration problem,
VISA extension and among others.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the services advertised by the respondent
constitutes practice of law. (YES)
(2) Whether or not the services advertised can properly be subject of
the advertisement. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law. In our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the court.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. The canon of the profession tell us that the
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct.
There are two exceptions of advertising or solicitation. One is the
publication or reputable law list and the second is the ordinary
professional card.
In Re: Cunanan
18 March 1954
Diokno, J.
(Admission to the Practice of Law)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:
Page 116 of 169
FACTS:
The case is related to the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”
To pass the Bar, a candidate must obtain a general average of 75% in
all subjects, without falling below 50% in any subject.
Due to varying degrees of difficulties of the exams, the court adjusted
the passing average per year, with 74% being the passing average
needed in 1949.
In 1950-53, the passing average needed was 75%. Bar candidates who
failed sought the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which will reduce the
passing grade needed to 70%, to be effective since 1946. Senate Bill
No. 12 was eventually vetoed by the President. Nevertheless, Senate
Bill No. 371, which embodied substantially the provisions of Senate Bill
No. 12, passed into law due to the President’s inaction and became
Republic Act No. 972 (RA 972).
RA 972 adjusted the passing rate as follows:
• 1946-51: 70%
• 1952: 71%
• 1953: 72%
• 1954: 73%
• 1955: 74%
Several postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking RA 972, some of them claiming that they suffered from
“insufficiency of reading materials” and of “inadequacy of preparation.”
(Note: The years affected is right after World War 2)
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RA 972 is constitutional. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
RA 972 is unconstitutional.
The law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies law graduates
who had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
reflected by the results of their exams.
• Public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem
evolved by the times become more difficult.
• Insufficiency of legal reading materials is exaggerated, citing
mimeographed copies of Supreme Court decisions, continuous
publication of the Official Gazette, unrestricted entry of imported
books and magazines since 1945, law books being printed
locally during the affected time period,
and a new set of Philippine Reports that started publication on
1946.
The law has no precedent in its favor.
• Similar laws in other countries have been immediately
declared without force or effect by the judiciary.
The case of Cooper cited is inapplicable.
• The law of New York does not require a candidate who failed
the exams to be admitted to the bar.
• The law of New York does not decree the admission of any
lawyer.
• Constitution of New York at that time and of the Philippines are
different regarding matters of admission to the practice of law.
Admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers, as
well as their supervision, are judicial functions and responsibilities.
• The function requires (1) previously established rules, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles, in
effect making it a judicial function of the highest degree.
US Cases:
• Admission to practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function,
and is an inherent power of the court.
The disputed law is not a legislation, it is a judgment revoking those
promulgated by the Supreme Court during the affected time period.
Only this court may revoke such judgment, not the legislative nor
executive department.
Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of judicial functions, as in the case of the law in question.
Page 117 of 169

The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the Supreme Court
equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law, it
continues to reside solely in the Supreme Court.
The law in question has also been found to suffer from the fatal defect of
being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
If there is no motive given of the nature indicated for the classification,
then it is fatally defective. The law is not curative, its purpose being to
attempt to amend and correct the will or judgment of the Court, by
means of simply taking its place.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
(1) They are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact,
or Congress has exceeded its powers.
(2) They create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles.
(3) Their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles.
The contested law suffers from the above stated fatal defects.
Part of the law referring to exams from 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 are
unconstitutional.
Part of the law referring to subsequent examinations after its approval,
from 1953 to 1955 is valid.
Labrador, J., concurring and dissenting:
Right to admit members to the Bar is exclusive privilege of the Supreme
Court.
Power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its
exercise.
Rules on the holding of exams, the qualifications of applicants, the
passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power, but the
power to determine has or has not made the required grade is judicial.
Votes to declare the whole law as unconstitutional for not being
embraced within the rule making power of Congress, for being an undue
interference with the power of the Supreme Court to admit members
thereof, and for discriminating against those who failed in the time
periods not embraced by the law.
Paras, C.J., dissenting:
Under Art. VII, Section 13 of the Constitution, the Congress has the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court concerning the admission of attorneys to the practice of
law.
Sebastian v. Calis
A.C. No. 5118
9 September 1999
Per Curiam
(Nature of the Lawyer’s Oath)
FACTS:
Petitioner Sebastian alleged that sometime in November 1992, she was
referred to the respondent who promised to process all the necessary
documents for Sebastian's trip to the USA for a fee of 150k Php. A
partial payment was done on December 1, 1992 in the amount of 20k
Php which was given to the wife of Calis, Ester, for which a receipt was
issued.
On June 20, 1994, too expedite the processing of her travel documents
complainant issued Planters Development Check No 12026524 in the
amount of 65k Php in favor of Calis who issued a receipt. However it
turns out that the documents that Calis planned to give Sebastian were
spurious. The complainant demanded the return of her money, however
she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about
for he has been engaged in the business for quite sometime; with
promise that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
Complainant was given a passport and visa issued in the name of
Lizette R. Ferrer. Upon arrival at the Singaporean International Airport
though, she was apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for
carrying spurious travel documents: Complainant contacted the
respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by her
predicament. Complainant was deported back to the Philippines where
respondent fetcher her from the airport. The respondent took
Page 118 of 169
Sebastian's documents with a promise that he will secure new
documents for her. Complainant opted not to pursue with her travel and
demanded for the return of her money in the amount of 150k Php.
Partial refunds were given by Attorney Calis but in the end the petitioner
found out that respondent had transferred to an unknown residence in
order to evade responsibility.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Calis is guilty of committing gross misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Yes)
HELD/RATIO:
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the
complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel
documents: that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would
happen: that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to
refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something went
wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and
dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are
unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness, and candor.
This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and
keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires the he
should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We
have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in
his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious
doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law.
Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of the complainant
when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are respondents
acts illegal, they are detestable from a moral point of view. His utter lack
of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the
administration of justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We
must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good
behavior .He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained
and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to
be heard.
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply
with the orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued
by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct.
Thus, we find no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from
the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable
conduct toward complainant.
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma
A.C. No. 2474
15 September 2004
Per Curiam
(Qualifications)
FACTS:
Eduard Cojuanco, Jr (complainant) was a client for Angara Concepcion
Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and Atty. Leo J. Palma
(respondent) was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases.
Atty. Palma developed a close relationship with the complainant’s
family. Travelling and dining with them abroad. He frequented their
house and even tutored complainant’s 22 year old daughter Maria Luisa
Cojuanco (Lisa).
On June 22, 1982, Atty Palma would marry Lisa in hongkong.
Respondent would only inform the family the following day adding that
everything was legal.
Complainant came to know that respondent represent himself as a
bachelor to the Hong Kong authorities and that respondent was married
to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children.
Page 119 of 169
The complaint filed a petition for the declarion of nullity of the marriage
with the CFI. CFI declared the marriage void ab initio. Complainant
would subsequently file a case for disbarment.
The CFI decision was set aside and remanded to the CFI and has not
reached an outcome at this point.
Respondent motions to dismiss the disbarment proceeding to lack of
cause of action. He likewise would argue a suspension of the
proceeding since the final outcome of the Civil case has not reached a
final outcome posing a prejudicial question.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the respondent’s actions constitute grossly immoral
conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. (YES)
(2) Whether or not the pending decision in the Civil Case concerning the
validity of the marriage poses a prejudicial question. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE
There is no distinction as to whether a transgression is committed in the
lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time
and a mere citizen at another.
Thus, even the private life of a lawyer may reflect upon his good name
and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the
subject of inquiry.
Complainant admits that respondent is a good lawyer, however,
professional competency does not make a lawyer a worthy member of
the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement.
Undoubtedly, his actions constitute grossly immoral conduct under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He contracted a
marriage while his marriage with Elizabeth was still valid. He made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. His actions in contracting the second marriage are contrary
to honesty, justice, decency, and morality.
Immorality as defined by the court is that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
Respondent’s action is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a
bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
He used his complainants trust in him to initiate a relationship with Lisa.
Instead of his legal affairs, he would court Lisa behind his back. He even
used complainant’s resources to get a plane ticket.
He justifies the marriage since he really loves Lisa. This shows a
distorted mind with disregard to the sanctity of marriage. How could he
observe mutual respect and fidelity when he was still married to
Elizabeth.
SECOND ISSUE
The judgement of annulment of marriage has no bearing on the instant
disbarment proceeding. In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis
for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. The result of the
case would not affect current proceedings as long as there is a clear
preponderance of evidence.
Castaneda v. Ago
G.R. No. L-28546
30 July 1975
Castro, J.
(The Lawyer and Society)
FACTS:
In 1955, the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a
replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila
to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). Ago failed to redeem,
and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor
of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of
First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes
Yu Ago, as his co -plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale.
Page 120 of 169

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds
and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of
sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new
ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the
restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of
May 26, 1966.
The Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it. The Court of
Appeals also
dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court.
The Court dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8,
1967. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals
where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson
filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process
to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted
by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and
prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment,
to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the
assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly
resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one
court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). The Court condemn the
attitude of the respondents and their counsel who, far from viewing
courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them
to subvert the very ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of
a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice.
In Re: Edillon
A.M. No. 1928
03 August 1978
Castro, C.J.
(The Lawyer and the Legal Profession)
FACTS:
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in
the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 recommending to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws
of the IBP.
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike
his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is
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not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not compelling him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. (NO)
(2) Whether or not the court may compel him to pay the corresponding
dues to be a member of the IBP. (YES)
(3) Whether or not enforcement of the penalty provisions amounts to a
deprivation of his right to property. (NO)
(4) Whether or not the court has the power/ jurisdiction to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative
of his constitutional freedom to associate.
• Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of the
Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for
the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is a ready a member.
• Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
lawyers.
• Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel
a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion
is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
SECOND ISSUE:
We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration.
THIRD ISSUE:
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do
not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
•
(1) But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
FOURTH ISSUE:
Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment
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and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A
and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained
of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
Atty. Edillion is hereby disbarred.
In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring
Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of
the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court”
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
8 March 2011
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
(The Lawyer and the Courts)
FACTS:
The Ponencia of Justice Mariano Del Castillo in the case of Vinuya, et
al. v. Executive Secretary was promulgated April 28, 2010. On May 31,
2010, the counsel for Vinuya, et al filed a motion for reconsideration on
the said decision raising two issues:
(1)Jurisprudence and the Constitution reject the Court’s decision that the
executive’s foreign policy are unlimited, and
(2) that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
responsibility of states to protect the human rights of citizens.
Thereafter, Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares, counsel for Vinuya, et al.
filed a supplemental MR alleging that the decision on the said case
plagiarised 3 sources namely:
(3) an article by Evan Criddle and Even Fox-Decent entitled “A
fiduciary theory of jus cogens,”
(4) a book by Christian Tam entitled “Enforcing erga omnes
obligations in international law,” and
(5) an article by Mark Ellis entitled “Breaking the silence: on rape as
an international crime.”
On August 9 2010, Atty. Marivic Leonen and 36 other lawyers, all
members of the UP College of Law, published a statement on the
allegations of plagiarism relative to the Court’s decision in the Vinuya, et
al. v. Exec. Sec case. Essentially, they call for the resignation of Justice
Del Castillo in the face of the allegations of plagiarism in his work.
The Court then directed Atty. Leonen and the 36 other lawyers to show
cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violating Canons 1, 11, and 13 and rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents
their freedom of expression. (NO)
2. Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’
academic freedom as law professors. (NO)
3. Whether or not the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain
why they should not be disciplined as members of the bar under the
Canons 1, 11, and 13 and rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the CPR. (YES
and NO)
4. Whether or not the separate compliance of Dean Leonen
satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a member
of the bar under canon 10, rules 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03. (NO)
5. Whether or not respondents entitled to have the Show Cause
Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing, whether
respondents are entitled to require the production or presentation of
evidence bearing on the plagiarism issues in the Vinuya case and
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo and to have access to
the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence
presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Misconception that the Court is denying them the right to criticize the
Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they characterize as
a "legitimate public issue.”
It was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that
Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of
that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth" when it was
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"[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely
to determine the truth of such allegations." The Show Cause Resolution
made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement
that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked
respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no
stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive.
SECOND ISSUE
There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary
action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing
proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
The constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar
may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due
respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal
profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom
of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with
greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not
teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical
standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their
being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.
THIRD ISSUE:
Only the Compliance of Professor Lynch, as a visiting professor, and
Professor Vasquez, for his candor and honesty and conceding to the
wisdom of the Court were satisfactory.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The Court said that they were surprised that someone like Dean Leonen,
with his reputation for perfection and stringent standards of intellectual
honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no
misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated
as having actually signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal
communication of an intent to sign.
The Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory.
However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in
judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his
objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good
intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for
failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court
as required under Canon 10.
FIFTH ISSUE
Disciplinary proceedings are neither criminal nor civil but administrative,
and the essence of administrative due process is only the right to be
heard, not a full trial.
The Court said that it should be clarified that this is not an indirect
contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no
application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause
Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter. As
respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do
not require a trial type hearing. We have held that: The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be
heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had
been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process,
the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
Burbe v. Magulta
A.C. No. 99-634
10 June 2002
Panganiban, J:
(The Lawyer and the Client: Attorney-Client
Relationship)
FACTS:
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a
claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters
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for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated
that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer
his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any
feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups
in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case
has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the
Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait
for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the
Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the
petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the
office of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case.
Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the
excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and
only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed
the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his
own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to
reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5,
1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited
by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the
Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the
Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent
was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time
frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this
obligation due to his misuse of the
filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this
misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional
damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by
complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds.”
Pacana, Jr. vs. Pascual-Lopez
A.C. No. 8243
24 July 2009
Per Curiam
(The Lawyer and the Client: Conflict of Interest)
FACTS:
Rolando Pacana, Jr. (complainant) filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez (respondent) for the violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant worked for Multitel and earned the ire of investors after
becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent
and after being appointed as trustee deposited at Real Bank.
Complainant sought the advice of the Respondent and a lawyer-client
relationship was established.
Complainant found out that the respondent have clients in Multitel after
receiving a demand letter from the latter.
Respondent continued to help the complainant with the latter paying an
amount and transferring properties to the former to settle liabilities when
he went to the US.
Upon returning, complainant was informed by the respondent that he
has been cleared by the NBI and the BID. Respondent also said that
she was willing to return the amount given after all the legal fees has
been deducted. Complainant accepted.
However, Complainant noticed that respondent has been avoiding him.
He sent a letter to the latter asking for a full accounting of all the money,
documents and properties given but the respondent failed to provide a
clear audited financial report.
Complainant filed a complaint against respondent before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) seeking the disbarment of the respondent.
ISSUE/S:
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Whether or not respondent violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility representing conflict of interest. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
The respondent violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Respondent is DISBARRED for representing conflicting interest and
for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 provides that “A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after full disclosure of the facts.”
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste and,
more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s
case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given
to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer.
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by
arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services was
ever forged. However, the absence of a written contract will not preclude
the finding that there was a professional relationship between the
parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 105938
20 September 1996
KAPUNAN, J.:
(The Lawyer and the Client: Attorney-Client Privilege)
FACTS:
Members of ACCRA law firm acting attorneys delivered to their client
documents representing financial transactions regarding shares,
dealings and deeds of trusts, assignments and information relative to
their clients personal and business circumstances
On July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants,
for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in the named corporations, He was one of the clients of ACCRA
law firm mentioned above
The PCGG’s case included ACCRA law firm however they wanted to cut
a deal that they would be excluded from the corruption case if they just
revealed the identity of their client
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the PCGG Is allowed to violate attorney-client privilege In
pursuit of their mandate to crack down on ill-gotten wealth by revealing
the identity of their client. (NO)
HELD/RATIO:
The Rules of Court provide that the attorney-client privilege is defined as
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can
an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
The following is the General rule and exception regarding Attorney client
privilege
1) The court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
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 2) The privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client
relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege
does not attach until there is a client.
3) Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship.
4) Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party
should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however
qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists
that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2) Client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if
it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on
which the client seeks legal assistant.
3) Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the
identity which is intended to be confidential
Disclosure would therefore reveal client confidences ,revelation of the
client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link
that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
the client of a crime.
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG
of the petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG
Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
Roxas v. de Zuzuarregui
G.R. No. 152072
31 January 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
(The Lawyer and the Client: Attorney’s Fees)
FACTS:
The instant cases had their beginnings in 1977 when the National
Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the
Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152104, for parcels of land
belonging to the latter situated in Antipolo, Rizal, with a total land area of
1,790,570.36 square meters, more or less.
Eventually, the NHA Legal Department, through Atty. Jose B. H.
Pedrosa, released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, in behalf of the
Zuzuarreguis, the amount of P20,000,000.00 in NHA Bearer Bonds as
"partial payment for several parcels of land with a total area of
1,790,570. 36 square meters located in Antipolo, Rizal." On even date,
Atty. Romeo G. Roxas delivered NHA Bonds to Antonio De Zuzuarregui
in the amount of P15,000,000.00. On 04 February 1986, the amount of
P34,500,000.00 in Bearer Bonds was again released by the NHA to
Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis. On 14 February
1986, the Zuzuarreguis issued a receipt for receiving the amount of
P30,070,000.00. This receipt included the P15,000,000.00 given to them
last 27 December 1985. Again on 17 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis,
through Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes, issued another receipt for
the amount of P450,000.00 in NHA bonds. The total amount in NHA
bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis
amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that
the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to
P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel,
Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter
deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the
NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of
administrative, civil and/or criminal action.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered via a letter dated 21 September 1987
explaining their side of the story. They stated therein, among other
things, that the amount that they got seems huge from the surface, but it
just actually passed their hands, as it did not really go to them.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the lawyer's fee is excessive and unconscionable. (YES)
HELD/RATIO:
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk
and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to
the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
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Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz:
CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in
determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or
required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule
of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the
same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable
fees.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable
fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if
the same is excessive and unconscionable. Thus, Section 24, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court partly states:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.
– An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefore unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice,
decency or reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power
to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of
attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the
regulatory prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which
was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid
(including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an
amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00.
Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation
case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is,
undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its
reduction is, therefore, in order. This is in accordance with our ruling in
the earlier case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo, where we reduced the
amount of attorney’s fees from sixty percent (60%) to fifteen percent
(15%), for being excessive and unreasonable.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and
Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield
that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the
P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be
returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
MODULE 4
IV. SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE LAW
LOST IN TRANSLATION: ORAL ADVOCACY IN A LAND
WITHOUT BINDING PRECEDENT by Sabrina DeFabritiis
How is the focus on cases in a common law jurisdiction designed?
The focus on cases in a common law jurisdiction is designed to allow
the judges in that system to be the primary lawmakers with previously
decided cases as their source of law.
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