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Soil Security 6 (2022) 100037

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Soil Security
journal homepage: www.sciencedirect.com/journal/soil-security

International soil governance


Ralph Bodle
Ecologic Institute, Berlin, Germany

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This introductory overview of international soil governance first outlines essential features of international
Soil governance. At the international level, there is no overarching central or superior authority. Rules and other
International governance measures normally do not have direct effect at national level; they need to be implemented by their addressees.
Land degradation neutrality
In contrast to other environmental topics, states have for a long time been reluctant to engage in soil
Soil-climate nexus
governance at the international level. As a result, international soil governance is piecemeal and spread over parts
of different institutions and processes, each of which has limitations. The Sustainable Development Goal “land
degradation neutrality” on its own is not a comprehensive soil policy, but its forward-looking planning element
in particular is a useful starting point for guiding national policies and further work.
While binding rules are not an end in itself, new treaty obligations relating to soil protection could be useful to
address gaps and shortcomings in current governance and focus international commitments. Climate change
provides an opportunity to increase soil protection e.g. through the climate regime, but there are also risks if soil
protection was pursued solely from a climate perspective.

1. Introduction classic state-based international organisation such as the United Nations


as well as a loosely organised "initiative" such as the "4 per 1000′′ for soil.
This article provides an introductory overview of international soil The latter was initiated by the French government but includes a broad
governance.1 It first describes key aspects of international governance range of public and private voluntary stakeholders who voluntarily
generally and then outlines main elements of relating to soil. It concludes commit to put in place measures that increase soil carbon storage.
with overarching observations of main themes and trends. The article International law is a separate legal order, distinct from national legal
draws on results of research funded by the German Environment Agency orders such as German law, or EU law. It addresses mostly states and
(Bodle et al., 2020; see Fowler and Hannam, 2021). international organisations. Binding international law relevant to soil
comprises mainly a few international treaties. Treaties apply only to
2. What is international governance? those states that choose to become party to them. There are also
customary legal obligations relating to the environment that apply to all
International governance may be broadly described as international states, but these are fairly general and have so far not been useful in
cooperation between transnational actors who seek to address issues protecting soil.
that affect more than one state or region and have become too complex In a broader sense, international law also includes elements that are
for a single state to address alone. International governance is a broad not legally binding in the strict sense, but which as so-called “soft law”
term that includes legal rules as well as processes, institutions, initiatives nonetheless influence the conduct of states and other actors. Yet in
and non-binding principles. There is no overarching central or superior practice, such instruments can have strong political force and are often
authority at the international level, although the United Nations tries to referred to as "political" (as opposed to legal) commitments. Examples
provide a political focal point. In terms of actors, international gover­ include resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly or the
nance often involves not just states, the EU and state-based institutions, United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA), as well as decisions
but also the private and civil society sectors. Examples would include a adopted by regular conferences of parties to a treaty.

E-mail address: ralph.bodle@ecologic.eu.


1
This chapter is based on the results of research funded by German Environment Agency: “Improving international soil governance - Analysis and recommen­
dations”, which developed options for the German government (FKZ 3716712100); https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/479/publikat
ionen/texte_75-2020_3716_71_2100_uba_endbericht_internationaler_bodenschutz.pdf

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soisec.2022.100037
Received 1 October 2021; Received in revised form 27 December 2021; Accepted 9 January 2022
Available online 10 January 2022
2667-0062/© 2022 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
R. Bodle Soil Security 6 (2022) 100037

International law is created differently from national or EU law and Doc. A/RES/70/1). The 17 SDGs inter alia cover several issues relevant
has different enforcement mechanisms. It is traditionally based on sov­ for international soil governance (Ehlers, 2017). Notably, with target
ereignty of states, as reflected for instance in the principle of permanent 15.3 states agreed to strive to achieve a land degradation neutral (LDN)
sovereignty of states over their natural resources. International law and world by 2030.
governance often aim at balancing and limiting that sovereignty, based The LDN target leaves open the baseline, and its broad wording
on the interests of other states or matters considered to be in the com­ needs indicators in order to be made operational (Ehlers, 2017; Wunder
mon interest. Outcomes are agreed between peers and many interna­ and Bodle, 2019). There is no universally accepted understanding of
tional processes and bodies such as UNEA take their decisions by "land degradation" in science and the political sphere (Wunder et al.,
consensus. This means that a decision is adopted unless just one state or 2018, at 193–194). For instance, while Article 1(f) of the United Nations
member expressly objects. Convention to Combat Desertification provides a definition of land
Rules and other measures adopted at the international governance degradation, it is worded differently from SDG 15.3 and confined to arid,
level normally do not have direct effect at national level. They need to be semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas. However, degradation of soil is al­
implemented by their addressees in order to fulfil their obligation or ways also degradation of land in the sense of SDG 15.3. The LDN target is
commitment. therefore highly relevant for the international protection of soil. It
should be noted that the target, while implying a priority for avoiding
3. International soil governance degradation, also includes a balancing (or: offsetting) approach, which
in principle allows degradation in specific instances, provided that these
International soil governance is fragmented. Different and in­ instances are balanced or set off within specified temporal and spatial
stitutions, rules, guidance documents and instruments at the interna­ parameters.
tional and regional level cover different aspects of soil protection. It is up to states to implement the SDGs according to their national
circumstances. Several international institutions facilitate and guide
3.1. Main elements implementation: The UN provides a technical and political forum for
exchange in respect of data, implementation and progress review. The
The main international soil governance elements include the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification assists in devel­
following treaties, institutions and non-binding instruments: oping guidance and indicators for measuring progress, and reports data.
The main indicator developed so far is “proportion of land that is
• Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) degraded over total land area”, which involves land cover and land
• United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) cover change, land productivity and carbon stocks in and above the soil.
• United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) These indicators may not be sufficient to reflect soil protection, but they
• Ramsar Convention on wetlands are an important first step. However, follow-up to SDG implementation
• Paris Agreement on climate change is mainly based on voluntary reporting by states and remains weak in
• Soil Conservation Protocol to the Alpine Convention holding them accountable.
• African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Re­ On their own, the SDGs and the LDN target in SDG 15.3 do not
sources (Maputo Convention) amount to a comprehensive soil policy or governance. But at least the
• UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) SDGs and in particular the LDN target provide a global consensus with
• UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Envi­ political weight.
ronmental Assembly (UNEA)
• Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 3.3. UN environment programme (UNEP) and environment assembly
• Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and (UNEA)
Ecosystem Services (IPBES).
UNEP is the main environmental arm of the United Nations. In 2014
None of these instruments and institutions has a mandate specifically the UN Environment Assembly was established as UNEP’s highest-level
for protecting soil or provides an overarching or comprehensive decision-making body. Its political weight derives from its members, the
framework for soil governance. The history and state of existing inter­ ministers for the Environment of UN Member States who meet
national soil governance (see Boer et al., 2017; Bodle et al., 2020) biennially.
suggests that the case for addressing soil at the international level is not While soil is interestingly not listed as an individual major topic,
self-evident. Although the pressure on soil is increasing and the condi­ UNEP addresses soil as part of other topics such as “ecosystems”. These
tion of soil is deteriorating worldwide, so far states apparently saw include, for instance, the Global Environment Outlook report, technical
comparatively little need for addressing soil specifically at the interna­ assistance to member states, support for implementing the SDGs and the
tional level. This is in contrast to many other environmental issues such CCD, and co-funding the Global Soil Partnership (cf. the FAO). Although
as air, climate, biodiversity, water and pollutants. UNEP and UNEA do not create legally binding obligations on UN
The term “soil” is not generally synonymous with “land”. Generally, members, in contrast to many other fora, UNEA has the standing and
the term “land” is used to comprise not only soil-related issues, but more legitimacy of being a high-level UN forum with near universal mem­
dimensions (above ground) and interactions with vegetation (Stavi and bership. In 2017 UNEA adopted a resolution specifically on soil pollu­
Lal, 2015). But, of course, soil protection is often closely linked to and tion - arguably the first international instrument which covers soil
partly overlapping with the use and management of land. This is pollution more broadly and not in relation to specific pollutants (UNEA
particularly relevant with regard to one of the few global and over­ Res. 3/6). It also requested an assessment of soil pollution which
arching governance elements relevant for soil: the land degradation resulted in FAO and UNEP’s “Global assessment of soil pollution” report
neutrality target in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (see at FAO).
(SDG).
3.4. The UN convention to combat desertification
3.2. The SDG process as a global point of reference for international soil
governance The CCD of 1994 is a legally binding multilateral treaty under in­
ternational law with 197 parties that make it basically universal. Its
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are part of Agenda 2030, objective to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought
a political commitment adopted by all UN member states in 2015 (UN makes it the only global treaty specifically addressing land-related

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R. Bodle Soil Security 6 (2022) 100037

issues. However, there are important constraints on its role in interna­ of ecosystem services (Bodle et al., 2020, p. 106). This shift in perception
tional governance: has led to the Revised World Soil Charter in 2015 and new guiding
The CCD is in principle limited to drylands through an intricate documents such as the Voluntary Guidelines for Sustainable Soil Man­
mixture of geographical and subject-related parameters in the CCD’s agement (VGSSM). FAO also established and hosts the Global Soil
text. There is no list of drylands. In addition, the content of the CCD’s Partnership (GSP), a multi-stakeholder partnership which promotes
obligations are structured along different complex categories of parties. sustainable soil management through, for instance, establishing the
As a result, it can be a matter of scientific as well as legal and political Intergovernmental Technical Panel on Soils, and publishing the “Global
debate how the CCD applies to individual countries. assessment of soil pollution” report of 2021. FAO appears to have firmly
In addition, despite their value for guiding affected countries to­ established its role in global soil governance with regard to dissemi­
wards general good governance, the obligations are rather general and nating knowledge and developing non-binding technical guidance.
toothless. The core obligation under the CCD that requires specific ac­
tion is to prepare, publish and implement National Action Programmes. 3.7. The Paris Agreement and the climate regime
However, there is little review and follow-up with regard to aligning the
aligning these plans with the CCD’s strategic framework and The international climate regime is relevant for soil governance:
implementation. Land-based ecosystems absorb and store CO2 and are amongst the most
Despite these limitations, the CCD can be credited for laying the significant sinks of greenhouse gases, while land use and land use
groundwork for developing and establishing the concept of the LDN change accounts for one of the most important sources of anthropogenic
target long before its adoption as one of the SDGs (Bodle et al., 2020, at greenhouse gas emissions (Rumpel et al., 2019). The Paris Agreement of
46–49). The CCD also decided to formally integrate LDN in its work, 2015 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
financial support and other processes, and has engaged in various ac­ Change is also almost universal with its currently 191 parties. It does not
tivities such as a target setting programme and elaborating guidance replace but supplements the existing 1992 Climate Change Convention
material. In particular, the CCD published a Scientific Conceptual and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.
Framework that is intended to apply to all land and guide all parties in The Paris Agreement sets out the goal of holding global warming well
implementing LDN (Orr et al., 2017). Like several multilateral envi­ below 2 ◦ Cand pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5 ◦ C. The core obligations
ronmental treaties, the CCD contains provisions and institutional ar­ to achieve these overarching objectives is that parties have to prepare
rangements with regard to financial and other support. and present individual climate plans (nationally-determined contribu­
On this basis, the CCD could continue to pursue a leading role in tions, NDCs) every 5 years that set out how the party intends to
implementing the LDN target and serve as forum for discussing soil- contribute to the collective objectives. Parties have to take and report
related issues between developing and developed countries. Specif­ measures with the aim of achieving these NDCs, but the climate regime
ically with regard to LDN, the CCD has potential because it can integrate does not require specific measures from individual parties. There are
it into its basically universal regime with an institutional setup. In any rules on reporting and accounting for emissions from land use, land use
event, the CCD does not claim, and is unlikely to be suitable for, sole change and forestry (LULUCF), on rewards for reducing emissions from
leadership on soil governance. deforestation in developing countries, on adaptation and on financial
and other support for developing countries. But the Paris Agreement
3.5. UN convention on biological diversity (CBD) does not contain specific soil or land-related obligations.
Yet science indicates that reaching the Paris Agreement’s tempera­
Other relevant treaties include the 1992 Convention on Biological ture goals will most likely require addressing soil and land use, given
Diversity (CBD) with 196 parties. Soil biodiversity is one aspect of their important role as sinks as well as emissions sources. In 2018, the
biodiversity and the CBD’s work. The CBD is loosely linked to the more Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC), the United Na­
recently established Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and tions’ independent scientific body for assessing the science related to
Ecosystem Services (IPBES), an independent scientific body mandated climate change, published a special report on achieving the 1.5 ◦ C goal.
with the preparation of assessments on biodiversity and ecosystem ser­ It includes afforestation and reforestation, land restoration and soil
vices at both regional and global level. The Thematic Assessment on carbon sequestration in the options for carbon dioxide removal mea­
Land Degradation and Restoration, and the Global Assessment Report on sures that it considers necessary to achieve this goal. In 2019, the IPCC
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services provides valuable and compre­ published a special report on climate change, desertification, land
hensive scientific data. degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and green­
The CBD called upon parties to integrate the conservation and sus­ house gas fluxes.
tainable use of soil biodiversity into their national biodiversity strate­ These scientific insights underpin part of the discussion of the “net-
gies. However, these calls are not mandatory and parties have, for the zero” objective in Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement and so-called
most part, failed to follow through and implementation at national level “negative emissions” that are to offset remaining emissions. There is
with regard to soil biodiversity remains weak. Overall, soil is only one of an increasing number of countries and companies setting climate
the many biodiversity issues within the CBD’s remit and the CBD ad­ neutrality goals, where restoring and increasing natural carbon sinks is a
dresses it mostly indirectly. mechanism to compensate for remaining emissions. While this provides
an opportunity to increase soil protection through the climate regime,
3.6. Food and agricultural organisation (FAO) there are also risks if soil protection was pursued solely from a climate
perspective. Rules on obtaining offsetting credits need to be robust in
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation has engaged particular with regard to the permanence of soil measures.
in technical work on soils since the 1950s, both globally and bilaterally,
and today describes itself as “the lead United Nations agency concerned 3.8. Other elements of international soil governance
with soils”.
Membership in the FAO does not entail legally binding obligations. The 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands is a treaty that provides a
In practice, the FAO can be considered a central hub for soil-related comprehensive and sophisticated policy framework for the management
activities. It initiated the development of the non-binding World Soil of wetland areas in general. Parties are required to formulate and
Charter as early as 1981 and implemented numerous soil-related pro­ implement plans to promote the conservation of those wetlands that
jects world-wide. In recent years, the FAO made efforts to shift focus they included in the Ramsar List. Although the Ramsar Convention has
from agricultural soils to a more holistic approach on soils as a provider been criticised for its weak and vague obligations, it triggered the

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R. Bodle Soil Security 6 (2022) 100037

development of wetland policies and legislation worldwide. Its current particular is a useful starting point for guiding national policies and
strategic plan links to the LDN target in SDG 15.3. The Ramsar further work relevant to soil. Apart from the SDGs, and perhaps recently
Convention with its mandate for wetlands and the CCD with its mandate the FAO, there is no general mandate or central point of reference for
for drylands are complementary, but cooperation between the two is soil governance at the international level, either in political or norma­
rudimentary and could be improved. tive terms.
The 1998 Soil Conservation Protocol has few parties, but it is the only While binding rules are not an end in itself, some argue that a new
legally binding international treaty regulating exclusively soil protec­ treaty on soil protection (or amending an existing treaty) could be useful
tion, albeit at a regional level: the Alps.61 Its largely preventive pro­ to address gaps and shortcomings in current governance and focus in­
visions addresses specific drivers of land degradation, such as mineral ternational commitments (Fowler and Hannam, 2021). Although
extraction, and certain soil threats such as erosion. Besides, it provides various initiatives over the years that promoted this idea were not
for measures of more cross-cutting nature. The Protocol It is tailored for picked up by the international political agenda, this could change. For
the Alpine region and cannot—at least not in content—be applied to instance, the European Parliament has called on the EU to include soil
other regions. protection in its external policy and in particular in international trade
The Maputo Convention was adopted in 2003 as an African regional agreements (EP Doc. P9_TA(2021)0143, 28.04.2021 para 63–64).
treaty. It took until 2016 to enter into force and currently has 17 parties. One important aspect is the more recent recognition of how impor­
Its text is based on a proposal developed and submitted by the Inter­ tant soil is in addressing climate change. While this provides an oppor­
national Union for Conservation of Nature. The Convention has one tunity to increase soil protection e.g. through the climate regime, there
article dedicated to land degradation and soil conservation and requires are also risks if soil protection was pursued solely from a climate
parties to establish long-term integrated strategies for land resources perspective. For instance, many climate neutrality targets include
and land-use plans. It also specifically addresses the facilitating role of restoring and increasing natural carbon sinks as a mechanism to
land tenure policies. Besides prevention, the Convention also parties compensate for remaining emissions. Incentives for soil organic carbon
have to plan and implement mitigation and rehabilitation measures for sequestration as a climate mitigation option need to include safeguards
areas affected by land degradation. The Maputo Convention could to ensure that this does not become a driver for soil contamination.
become an important regional instrument for soil protection, but it re­ Safeguards should include e.g. requirements for the permanence of
mains to be seen to what extent the parties will identify with it, as carbon storage in soil.
implementation has been slow so far.
Declaration of Competing Interest
3.9. Financial and other support
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
Capacity building as well as technical and financial support for interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
developing countries has been a recurrent issue in all international the work reported in this paper.
environmental governance. Many treaties, non-binding instruments and
international institutions call for, or establish, such support References
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