—— Logical Forms An Introduction to Philosophical Logic SECOND EDITION Mark Sainsbury BLACKWELL 2 ae eeeLogical Forms An Introduction to Philosophical Logic SECOND EDITION Mark Sainsbury Jp] BLACKWELLCopyiht © Mack Ssbry 1991, 201 “The right of Mai Satu wo be eid m nator of dis won hs Ben sree seconde wih the Copighe, Degas and Pens Ac 78, Fee pb 191 Contents primed 1993, 197, 198, 1999 lc Piss Ld 108 Conley Row Preface to the Fist Editon wi Oxted ORE Preface to the Second Edition vi ioe / chet! Pablten Ine Introduction 1 450, Man Steet j Organization 3 4 usa 1 Validity 5 A sights eed xcept for he ort poms fr the ‘What is logic about? 5 ver cinema p pb ry be 2 Inductive versus deductive logic ° Cpouied sre ma nicl etna any Km by 2 3 Possibly: logical and physi “4 cto men i eng fhe ae filly cessive nepton 9 eecoemisanst de pte 5 Arguments and arguments 2 xcet nthe United Stes of Ameri, hi ok ol bjt the 6 Some important properties of validity 26 (Sh hi al ty ay of ae ot ee ‘ 2 Waliity and wsefulnes: "sound", “relevant, "peruave” 30 wich el we the per pe cnet 3. Sentences and propositions 2 Cnc thr than hen wich tpl sod tnt 9 Valcty and trth: conditions x6 Secon nn ei eng en fae x : 11 The logial constants “1 hit iny Csi Pit Do 12 The projet of formalization 43 {Cit cage cl er te book rae es he Beish Lier aay of Cogs Cag ann Da en pi fr 2 Truth functionality 54 ISDN 9691-25782 had 069121670 (upd) 1 The clasical proportional language 54 2 Truth functional sentence connectives 39 poet 1 on 13 Bebe 3. Formalizing Engish in P 2 Priel in Grew Bria by Bi Coin, Sore 4 Caren Sees Se % 5. The cae against the material implication account of if" 87 Sook i pnd on sie per 6 picture 4Preface to the first edition An ealydraf-of the ise three chapters ofthis book circulated in man- script i 1980: | am very grtefal © the many people ~ colleagues, Fienals and students ~ who commented ypon that drat ‘Most of the final version of the fist edition was writen in Belize, Central Ameria, in the summer months of 1987. 1 am gratefal 13 King’ College London for making tis posible by 2 grant of sabbat- ical leave; and to the Government of Belize for kindly granting, me texempeion fiom import duty on generating equipment required to run my word procesior T would like 1o thank Danial Bonevac, who read the entire man scripe ina near final draft and whose comments led to many improve meats; Marianne Talbot, who provided invaluable help with references and Stephen Read, whore very penetating and knowledgeable cri- isms of what had been intended as the final daft led to sone con Siderable rewriting, and saved me from many mistakes. Preface to the second edition TThe main changes in this edition rete to chapter 3 (on cond retitled “Comttionals and probabibiis’ peer 4.19 (tiled “Pre ieate quantifies and second order logic"), chapter 4.20 (retitled “Free logics"), chapter 8.2 (retitled "Non-indicative ae countetacel com- diionals") and 5.9 (Cownterpare theory). AIL dis material as bees rewritten from scratch. Ekewhere Ihave made many chinges (proba by in most ofthe sentences) to remove blemishes of style and content, The structure of the book remains much the sme (the only signif cant changes t the table of contents concern chapter 3), which L hope will encourage those instctors who have used it in their clases to continue 10 do 0, “The layout ofthe book has been greatly improved: cxercises and foot notes are now on the page with the related tex, For this, and for allow ‘ng me a zecond edition, 1 would bke co thank Blackwell Publishers Tm this edition | have not starred sections as optional. A beginner short posible route through the epic might read chap ters 1,2, AdLs, $.1-5.5, 5.8-5.9 and 6 Tam very grate to Dovothy Edgington and ive me ScoteSeurgeon wh aed comments on the new material on conditional. 1 wish I had been able do better justice o them. 1 would abo lke to thank others who have pointed oi is es small or large in perso n print, im particular; Roderick Batchelor, Stewart Candlish, Max Kolbe, David Lewis, Stephen Neale, Alex Oliver, Thoms Patton ane Yannis Stephanou. To King’ College London 1 owe thanks for a seme ters sabbatical leave, Aucomn 1999. Mark Sainsbury TondorDee 7 10 n 2 B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 “1f":implictute in defence ofthe truth fanetional interpretation "ip": diect arguments for the trath Functional interpretation Non-truth functionality ia English From P-ality wo vabity Bibliographical notes Conditionals and probabiltes Degrees of confidence Conditional probability Probabilsic logic Levit’ proof Conditionals without truth conditions? Bibliographical notes Quantification The clascal quantfcatonal lnguage Invespectations and validity Univeral quantification Existential quantification Aacctives Adverbs Names Identity Namenl adjectives Descriptions Existence ‘Ace names “really” descriptions? Strectual ambiguity in Engish (Quality and decision Formalzing argumens, Atutudes Binary quantifiers Substitution quantifiers Predicate quantifier and second onder logic Free logies Depth * 106, i 6 nt 12 m2 129 43 49 152 153 153 157 161 167 170 175, 178 182 13 188 195 201 206 212 216 mm 2s 21 2s 239 249 Contents 22 From Quality to validity Bibhiographicsl notes 5 Necessity 1 Adding “C" to 2. Non: 3 Adding “C" © Q 4 Necesity de re and de dicto 5. The number of she planets 6 8 Frege’ argument” “Transworld identity “for 9 Counterpact theory 10 Necesity and vagueness LL Metaphysics Bibliognphical notes 6 The project of formalization Logical verse grammatical frm ‘Analysis and the Tractarian vision Proof Formal and structural validity Logical constancy ‘Language, form and structure Conclusion Bibliographical note: Glossary List of symbols Bibliography Index ndcative and counterftwal conditionals 254 287 258 287 288 a 304 318 329 337 339 339 348 355 359 366 380 389 301 392 406 419Introduction Same hind of telly of Inia frm, hgh with moe pple itm ‘Sl imed in ll nding of rte 1: he bins of phils apt lagi 0 exe ths Hovde fo corte ingens, and esp al pr rad Rosell, Our Knol ofthe Extnal Id This book is a8 i soduction to philosophical logic fe & primarily intended for. people who have some acquaintance with deductive tnethods in elementary fortal logic, but who have yet to study 80 Gated philosophical problems. However, de not presuppose know age of deductive methods, 0 the book could be used as a way of ‘embarking on philosophical logic from scratch Russel coined the phrate “philosophical logic” to describe a pro gramme in plilosoply that of tackling philoophical problems by for ‘nuliing problematic sentences in what appeared t0 Rassell to be the Tangage of logic: the formal language of Pricpia Mathemutka. My we tf the texm “philosophical lagic i close to Rass; Most ofthis book {5 devoted to discussions of problems of formalzing English in formal logical languages. T take validity to be the central concept in Toc vee fist chapter 1 rae the question of why ly study this property in connection with atic! languages, which no one speaks, rather than in comnec tion with some natural language like English In chapters 2-5 1 indi- cate some of the posites and problems for formalizing English in three atificial logical languages: that of propositional logic (chapter 2, fof fit order quantifietional logic (chapter 4) an {hapter 3)-The final chapter takes up the purely philosophical discs ‘of modal logic aaa3 Introduction sion, and, using what has been learaed on the way, addreses such ques~ Jone as whether there was any point in cbose efforts at formalizing, that can be meant by the logical form of an English sentence, what Jehe domain of logic, and what % a Jogiel constant Tr ahis approach, one inevitably encourters not only quesions in the philosophy of logic, bat alo questions inthe philesophy of tpg. when one considers how best to formalize English sentences eimreang empey names, or definte descriptions, of adver, or verbs of prgpositional acinude Bihowm preference in teaching logic isto begin with the eemen= tary Broa part, Keeping the suudens’ eyes blinkered philosophical SQssone, which ate dauntingly fond, in ixodacing che philosophical sess ater oa, Tam conscions of the wid of the gap T expect st ‘Kens to eaprtfom the drill of tuth tables and profi, 10 dscusions sete semantics of names or conditional, This i dhe gap this book is ‘esigned to il Tous raises «host of problems that cal for philosophical discussion, ike the ate of truth, the elation between logical rules and prychological procescs, the natwe of logeal knowles, the question BPwhat exits T have turned aside from 1s many of these as I could, Fiming myself co the single theme of the nature of logical form, together with whatever tributanes | seemed absclutely compelled to navigate howe are exercies throughout, and these are required for com: pletenen, Various ists dhat cou! well be regaed as essential co the ips besinen ate aelegated to exces, so that she reader c in effect, Mtribate to the development of che argument. For example, expert fenders of the section on Ruselly theery of descriptions might be “Gast to find thatthe body ofthe text makes no mention of Russells him chat "The present King of France not bald” is ambiguous, and ia way which fesales a certain puzale The reader is invited 10 dis- aver ihe ambiguity, and its eetion to the puzze, in Ex. 4.18. There sr bitliogaphial notes at the end of cach chapter which sugges fonther reading, and provide some information about the sources of some of the points inthe text. The reader wil find i useful to look 2 the section which sme ately follows (*Otgantation’), which explains the system of nam. bering dislayed material, the strangement of glosary emies and related! maters. the book is progresive. The fst chapter i written with the com: plewe novice in mind: the la chapter addresses 2 considerably more Knowledgeable audience. My hope is thatthe intervening material will Ihelp beginners progress om ghe one state (© the other Organization Most displayed material is numbered by s bold numeral followed by right parenthesis, thus 1) This ic how displayed material appears Subsequent references to displayed mater use the numeral enclosed jin parentheses, 10 the above is referred to as (1). Numbering begins afiesh with each section, and a reference like “(1)” refers to the dis played sentence labelled 1)" within the current section ‘Sections and chapters ate abo aumbered. A reference like “(2.3)” refers to the displayed sentence babelled 3)” inthe second Section within the current chapter. A reference Uke “(42.3)” refers to the displayed sentence labeled 3)" in the second section of chapter 4 [Reference to a section within the corrent chapter takes the form: $9. Reference toa section outside the current chapter takes the for: ‘hapter 3.2 (tht is, chapter 3 section 2). Tefichand page headings give the current chapeer number and tide: Right-hand page headings give the current section umber and tile, ‘A all understanding of the matters discussed requires further reading, Suggestions wil be found in the bibliographical notes at the tn ofeach of chapters 246, Works ae referred to by the author’ name followed by » date in squace brackets, The bibliography (p. 406) rst bee wed to obtain fill publication detail “Tere is glossary (392) which lists definitions of technical terms alphabetically. Glosaty entries include one or two set-theoretic terms (eg. "sequence”) that are used though not expleined in the txt "There isa st of symbols (p 403), with a bref defnision of each, They ate arranged in onder of occurtence, witha page inlcating where they were fest intoducei eeeeEEEEEE———————————————————————___—_____—________—_______, Thave not been very particular about my use of inverted commas 4 I many cates strict accuracy requires corner quotes (ef Quine [1940] 0), but I decided to dspease with this addtional complexity in the bale that no confision ie likely to result Validity 11 What is logic about? The philosopiy of logic gives an account of what logic is, of the com cept that it uses, and of how it relates to other disciplines and to axe inary thought and tlle Logit is about reaions and reasoning. There are resons for atin wanting to keep thin ie 4 reszon for avoiding fatty foods. There are reasons for beeving: thatthe potatoes have been boiling fr twenty mimites is reason for believing that they are ready to eat. Histor filly logic has primarily concerned itelf with reason for belie We may give a reson for beleving when we ansver the question “Why docs so-and-so believe such-and-aach?". Bue suck a question can be answered in ovo different nds of way. Suppose we ak of an orthodax Hindu: why does he suppose tha ‘one sould Hot ext meat? One kind of answer dis Lelie was insted in hit by his family at an early ag, and has been sustained by a variety of social and personal presures. This kind of answer may explain the fonign of the beef But ic does not give 2 mason for the be seme of reason inthe which logic is concrsned with reasons. Fxplana tions of this kind belong to psychology or sociology They are quite foreign to logic Suppose wo answer the question in a diferent way ying: the Hind boliews that killing, and everything which require killing, is wrong; ane hat eating meat cequies killing This answer may explain the origin ofthe belie. But # abo does, or parports to do, som. ing, ele: i jue ifs the belie. Understood in this way, a attempting to provide a ju fifiction, the answer shows a concern with reasons in the sense in ‘which logic can be aid o be the study of razon6 41 = vay Leg: i nomatve dip. eins to sy what reson ate goed rea 1 dors not msely decebe the rons tht in fact mre fraps iy down standart Irsays what reasons eight © more one Exch sa he sung pont basco be what we gently think of 2 FoSd ean Loge aars.widh an initve commowersil and Beehccctel dacnction benween god and Ba reson, a dsincion eee by people porsung thi rary dal ances. Hom hs the roa Ropes totem an arielte and defensive distinction torte pl ene a bad One would expect age mene of pena Berean the logic tecicl incon andthe com meiprceal one But one shoul tt enc back on the posi igh of efecon Vict ne some examples, an every bind of the commonsen sic dimen work Most people wou gre ht Sac banker anal ake ach ies god resem fr fare i ich by coma st people woul age dha eary i payrigh ad ome pays ae pose is noe» good eon for Heaty is poor ‘There is (or uel recently was) no general agreement about whether [James andl Henry lead pretey sila ives excep that ames is a non smoker and Henry smokes twenty cigarettes a day fs or not a good resson for Henry is more likely to die of heare dlsese than James, 11 What logic about? 7 ‘We can regard a reason asa good reason without having to believe it ourelves, We do not have to belive that all lankers are rich to see that “James isa banker and all bankers ace rich” constitutes a. good reason for “James is ich Taditionally the logician has supposed dat fone cat investigate Whether one thing is oF not 2 goad reason for another without having co form view about whether the suppored ‘or what it is a reason for, ‘When we tlk about reasons, we do not have total about pati lar people and wit they beicre. Even if ma one had ever had the belie’ we atuibuted to the Hindu, we could sill say chat Killing, and evrything which requies killing, i wrong; eating meat requires king ogee form good reasons for (One shoul nat eat meat What one means can be parly undersood in this way: if anyone were (0 belive that killing. and everything which requires killing. ‘wrong, and were also to believe that eating, meat requires killing, he would thereby be right (ational, reasonable, logical, ostifed) abo «0 believe that ene should not eat meat. When we want to consider something. like Kling is wrong, in abstraction fiom whether anyone believes it or not, we sll cali 2 popsion. A proposition tthe sore af thing that con be believed OF ascerted, of denied, bat it does not have to be: it can he diseieved for merely entertained, or not even thought of at all. Perhaps no one believes, or had even until just cis moment supposed or entertained, the proposition dhe Juliss Caesar bult New York singl-aned in 3 dy We shal, nevertheles, sy dha there is such a proposion, “The most general question which conffonts the logician can OW be expres as follows: whut makes one propos propositions) a good reaton for 3 proposition? ‘We shall cll che propositions affred as reasons premises, and the proposition which the premises ave supposed to support the concn n (or collection of8 1 = Validity {When some premises anda conclusion are asemiled togetcr we shall call the reslt an argument, The techoical we of these terms, 2 just introduced, differs in some ways from te ordinary use. In particu, assed in logic the tern “argument” docs not amply any Kind of dis agreement oF dispute ‘We hnve aleady considered varios arguments 1) Prose Killing, and anything which requites kill cating meat requires killing (Conluson: One should wot eat meat 2) Promise James is a banker ad all barkers are sich, (Conclusion: James is sich. 3) Premise: Henry is a playwright and some playwrighs are poor CConlusone Henty is poor 4) Promise: James and Henry lead petty similar lives except that James is non-smoker and Henry stoke twenty cigaetes ady, Conclusion: Henry is more likely than James to die of heart disene. ‘Common sense pronounces that (1) and (2) doe premises consticute {good reasons for the conclusion, that this is definitely not «© for (3) and that (4) isa debatable case. mn () ard @) the conchasion follows om the premise(9)-The branch cof logic with which we shall be mainly concerned ~ deducioe logic — investigates the comrast between arguments in which the concusion follows fiom the premises, and those in which ir does not. One way in which premises can give good rewon for » conclusion is for the ccnchsion to follow fiom the premises, ‘We ask whether an arguments premises consituie good reason for the conclusion, or whesher the conchsion follows fom the premises In cither eae we ae asking about a relation between two lots of propo sixons: on the one hand the premises, on the ether hand the concly- sion, In the case of arguments like (1) and 2) in which the concusion Fallows from the premite, the point iy not thatthe premises make the conclusion true, or even likely to be true. Pethaps the premises them selves are false, or likey to be fae. Rather, if the premises were tru, so would te the conclusion. Tht is why it wou be rational to believe the conclusion if one believed the premises. Whether oF not the cel 2 Inductive versus deductive log 9 ion obtains is something that an fen, though not aways, be detected lpr that i, without any appeal to experience or experiment.” Our inowdge dat the premises in (1) and (2) constitute good reasons for their respective conclisions i quite independent of knewing, whether bonkers ae eich, or whether James isa banker (who i James, anyway, for whether kiling is wrong, or whether eating, meat requis killing Traditionally, logic has been bekd to be wholly apriori, and cis has teen ted ar a mark to distinguish i fom other disciplines, Ths i a controversial view But it would not be tenable even for a moment if the logician was called upon to pronounce on whether of tot the premues of arguments ate tue, o€ probable. The view owes is attra tion to the thought that the ratio! fact ~ whether the premises are fo related to the conclusion that they constitute good reasen for it {an be known apriori even ifthe propositions involved in the relation ‘eannat be known aptior BLAH Suppote that Henry rdeed poor, How woule you show that (13) isnot a good argument. that I, that ts premise does not const {ule geod reason forty coneleson? Would you apeal to any facts heute actual ineome of payerights of ta ary fortes fact about Henry? 2 Inductive versus deductive logic ‘An old dition ls it that thee are two branches of logic: dedcive Joie and inductive logic. More recently, the differences between these disciplines have become so marked that most people nowadays we “logic” to mean deductive Jogi, serving terms like “confirmation theory" for at lest some of what used to be called inducive logic. Shall follow the more recent practice, and shall construe “philosophy Df logic" as “philosophy of deductive logic”, In this section, 1 try to tet out the differences between the two disipines, and co indicate ‘ery briely why some people think that inductive logic is not logic ata. © a aig ier scour fain” i given i he ha wich en ose sone ere wich af ot expe in he kextVality In §1, we sow that one way in which an arguments premises can consiture good resons for is conclusion is for the conclusion 1 fallow fiom the premises. Let es sy thit any argument whose com- clusion follows from its premises is wl Am intial text for valy 1 this. We ask: sie posible forthe premics to be tue, yet the conchi- sion fle? In the case of (1.3), about poverty and playwright, answer is "Yes". Even if some playwrights are poo, itis posible that others, peshaps even the vist majerity are tich, and that Henry is among the rich ones. In genctal, an angiment is valid just on cond tion that i i imposible forthe premises all to be true yet the con clusion fs. Could one hope to diingsish deductive from inductive logic by saying that ehe former, but noe the liter, i concerned with ‘Consider wo arguments which occur in hundreds of text-books 1) All men are moval. Socrates x 4 man. So Socrates is morta. 2) The sun hus risen every morning, so fr: so (probabl) i will ‘The fist a standaed example of an argument clsiied as valid by deductive logic. The second is an argument which is not cas fied as valid by deductive logic. However, the inductive logician is supposed to accond it some reasonably favourable statis. Cerin, the reasons which the premises of 2) gire for is conchision ate better by far than those given by the same premises for the opposite conclusion 3) The sum has risen every morning so fr; so (probabl) i will This may seem a ally argument, buc apparently something quite like it moves some gamblers. The “Monte Carl fillacy” comists in the belief tha if there las been a long nun of reds on the roulette wheel itis more likely to come up blck aexe dine ‘Bxi4.2) Whit i he stati ro whi the! None Cia flac, Aan UES ea ee eae “The deductive logician contrasts (1) and () by saying that the first tbat not the second is valid, The inductive logician will make a con trast between (2) and @) ~ probably noc by using the word “valid tau pethaps by saying tat @2), une @), is “inductively song” The premises of (2), but not those of (3), provide strong. reasons for the «onchusion "The premises of (1) abo provide strong, reasons for its conclusion, How are we to distinguish song deductive reasons fom strong iue five ones? We havea sggeston before ws: the cru ofthe premises of valid deductive argument makes the falsty of conclusion impossible, but this not so an the ease of inductively strong arguments: Another ‘my of putting this ithe reasons given by a deductvely valid argent Ire conde the trath ofthe premises grantees the truth ofthe con clusion. This way of making the contrast its (1) and (2). The truth ofthe premises of (2) may take the conchasion tha the sun will ie tomorrow probalie, bot i does not guarantee tit does noc make it ertin Tndacive logic, a6 the terminology of inductive strength sugges, must be concerned with a reation which holds to 2 greater or lester degree. Some non-conchuive reasons are stronger than others. So fe deductive logie, which will make a sharp dichotomy berween valid and invalid arguments, induedve logic will discern a contin ‘of cases, along, which (2), perhaps, regizers Hey high, whereas (3) tea- iners very low indeed Deductve validity a8 Togicians sy, monoton. That is af you start with a dedctively raid argument, then, no mater what you ald 10 the premises, you will end up with a deductvely valid argument Inductive srenge is not monotonic: ding premises to an inductively strong argument cau turn i into an iadueuvely weak one. Consider @), which is supposed to be a paradigm of inductive strength. Suppose we ad the premises thee iva very large meteor traveling rowan ws, by tonight it will have entered the solar system and will be in stable forbie around the sun; wil he between he sn and dhe earth, so that the earth will be in permanent shadow When these premises are add, the resulting argument i fir fom strong (I ave assumed one partici br inerpretation of wht cis fr the sun to "vise". However one res this phrase, it easy enough to fd premises adding which would ‘weaken the argument) ‘Much everydiy resioning i non-monotonic and there ae endless, ‘much simpler and more realistic eases chan the one jest given. At the2 1 = vavany Wiha Soe teuoing renin Thuth of premises gives good rewon foreuth of v ‘oneltion| ‘Tuth of premises makes fisiy of concksion ¥ x imporsble Premises are conchave reaons ¥ x Monotonic y x Degrees of godess of restos start of the investigation, Robinson's confessing to the crime gives you 1 powerful reason for believing him gity But you may righ change Your ind about his gut, without changing your mind about whether hhe confesed, when a doren independent witness testify to his being a hundred miles away atthe time of the cxime.This is 2 typical cise in which adding information can weaken reasons which, on their own, were song : Table 1.1 summarizes the differences berween deductive tive logic that we hive #0 for mbgeioned T sid thar not everyone would yee chat there is any such thing as inductive logic A famous proponent of an extreme version of this view is Karl Popper (1989), ch. 1, $1). He has argued thatthe only sort of fpood reason 8 4 deductiely valid cue. A. consequence of his view is that there is nothing to choose between (2) and (3), considered simply as arguments: both are equally tad, being alike deductive invalid. He ‘would therefore reject the ticks in the first and hst rows ofthe tight- hand column of table 1.1. For Poppe, there is no such subjct mater as the one I have tried to demureate by the phrase “inductive logic’ inductive argument giver a good resion; and there is no difference fof degree among the goodness of “inductive reasons all being equally bad, Accordingly, Popper sees the main activity of scence not as 4 search for supporting evidence for Iypotheses, but as an effort 10 weed fout fabe hypotheses by showing by experiment that they have false ductive consequences inde Ales radial sce about inductive lgic nay allow that there are good resons which ate not dedutively valid, but deny that there is ny systematic disciphne worthy of the name “inductive logic” Reflec tion on the role of background knowiedge in what are called in huctively strong at nts, ike (2), may ground such a scepticism. ‘we have seen noti-monotonic. Hence an ay rent cannot be asesed as inductively rong, abc: some posible background information wood grealy weaken the conclusion. This means tit every asessment of inductive strength mst be reativized toa body of background knowledge. It fa from obvious how the Inductive strength, project of inductive logic should attempt to accommodate this point for itis quite unclear how the background krowidge could be speci fied in a way which is neither question-begging (for example, sing that such-and-such an acgament is inductively strong, relative to any bodies of background knowledge not containing any information which would weaken the conclusion), nor quite unsystematic (for ‘example listing various bodies of background knowledge) There is hus 2 genuine (Udo not say lective) ground for doubting whether induc- tie logic could aspire to the kind of system and generality tained by ductive loge 'A sil less radial scepticism about the possibilty of inductive logic takes the form: there is such a subject mater, but it does not deserxe to be ailed logic. Here is one reaton why a person might hold this view: I may be aid that anything, worthy of the mame of logic must be Formal: the property of arguments with which it i concerned must arise wholly from te form oF pattern of stricture of the propositions involved. Whatever exactly “formal” means (e below, 510), it certainly seems 0 be the ease that no formal question sat isue between thore who do, and those who do not, think thar the evidence shows that smoking increacs the risk of heart disease? "Another form ofthis kind of scepticism iss follows. Logic is apron, bout inductive “logic” isnot, soit isnot really logic. Consider the ase iment of (1.4), the argument abost smoking and heart discase. No doubt the interpretation of statistical evidence woald be important, and evap there i an apriosi discipline of statistics. But even conceding 2 The view tat mdaine “ogi” ne frma cpg ha em gen ps ly famous dacasion by Geran (1955, at I Fr gene iodution to Probleme of icon ee Skye 1965, chs 1-3.™ “Table 1.2 Deductve lage Inuctive ‘Th of romies gins good ean for tach of eanchsion Zz > Apron ¢ > this, it seems at least arguable that some non-apriori material is involved. If so, if, chat is, itis noe a purely aprons matter whether or not some argument is inductively ston, then inductive “logic” would not be an apiori discipline and this would make it very unlike ded tive logic ee ‘Table 1.2 summarises the vatious kinds of scepticism about the pos sibility of inductive logic: 1 offer no assesment of the sceptical caine, However, fom aow 0 I shall discus: only deductive logic = toxic, for short ~ and deductive validity ~ validity, for shor. // 3 Possibility: logical and physical Consider the following, so arguments: 1) This young comato plan has all the moist, nutrients, warmth and light tha i needs; 0 i¢ will grow good tomatoes 2) This person is an ad male and has never married; 40 he ie 4 bichelor. “Tradition has ic that che frst i invalid (Le. aot vid) and the second is valid. We suggested in §2 tha a valid argument is one whose premises cannot be true without the conclusion being ere ako. But ic there not 2 sense of “imposible” in which itis impossible for the premises of {a} co be true without the conchsion aio being tue? Perhaps But there is also a sense of “possible” in which ehis does not hol. The plant might be attacked by wireworms or destoyed by 2 meteorite before the tomatoes grow, even though ic has ll the mois rue etc. that it needs, “The fallowing two claims will help ws distinguish ewo kinds of pos sity: physica posiility and logical possiblity” 3) Iisimposible for an internal combustion engine, used on level roads on the cath’ surface, co return 5,000mpx 4) tis impossible for there to be a car which, at a given time both has exacly three and excdly four wheel 8) is probably true if the kind of impossibility involved is physical: the laws of mature being, whar they are, no ICE could be as eflici 2 that. But ics not tue if the kind af impossibility involed is logical: What is logically impossible involves some kind of contradiction or inconsistency, a iltated in (4), Logical impossbiiey ypealy issues from the very nature of che concepts involved, and is not beholden to the laws of nature, I ¢ logically posible for che laws of nature to be very diferent from what they actally ae = Wy a enn aro nab py ca, possibilty? o ee ere es ot inte tex of states of afis which are loa posse but phy ent posse {© ‘Give three sxampes, notin the text, of states of afars which are logically iors. (@)_Arany stats of aa’ egeally impossible but physically possbe? {© Ace the folowng logealy imosible, physically posse, oF nether? Don't kiow= may be the best response in some cases! > Fora god discuson, ee Png (197) By mney wa belt -bosly log pony” 3) Perey(Me Stamina as at at eProcted i piepelal motor taching (i) Mary has precisa twice as many chidfen as lane: she bas the rin de a te ilar ; (Jock the Hes) Mevte tan be rile under 3.5 ines, (0) | The fotaious sider. Siva Malgavany, whe died in 1880 inthe sums of one of his many mistresses, wis reincamated In 1987 as ‘smal ish terres owned by Mrs Fertescue-trown of Exham, Surrey. i (0) On $5 Mare 1998, De Chtonowsti sapped into his tine finn sd sped out sei tof Ns present at he alle of Waterton, A definition of valiéty needs to draw upon the notion of logical, rather than physical poss if itis t0 give a correct account of the any usage. Consider the following example 5) This erature has the form of a finch 90 it will not discourse inteligently about Virginia Wool As the word “valid” is stadanlly used in logic, this & not a valid argument. This classification mighe be challenged: intelligent di course requites suitable muxevltire and thorax, and stable comp lesicy of brain; but itis imponitie chat a creature having the form ‘of 3 finch should have such thorax etc, and a sufficiently lange bain. So it & impossible for the premise of the argument to be true without the contusion ako being true, So the argument is valid This objection uses the notion of physical rather than logical po sibiligy The laws of nature that we actually have rule out there being 2 brain of wificient complexity for discourse in a finch-sized skull So its physically impossibe foe the premise of() tobe true yet ts con clusion fake. But it is not logically iomposable, We orght have had diferent laws of nature, There i no legal guaranice that discourse requires a larger than finch-sized bran, So it # logkally posible for the premise of (5) to be tar yet the conchison false, So the argument is nt valid. We can now set out our prelininary definition of validity EL Y)5 "Ua te) “nevertheless loductively’ strong? Compare’ its ‘ductive seenath wih that of Gt), jusifying your compariscn 10) Would it make a alference io the vat ofthe arguent in (2.5) ‘ifthe fiat premise were “Ths creature i a finch"? [An argument is VALID if and oly if is logically impossible for all the premises to be tre yet the conclusion fe (§BR AUS reach dah tv cases Say wheter the argument ir deductvely val, induictoaly strong. or reithes usbly your answers 10) Tell yo t adel more pepper it you thou the stew was toe bland You added more pepper ever though you did't think the steiv was to0 bland, $0 you disobeyed me, i)! You must know owe fo make a sing, f you are really a qualifies ‘ure. But evidenily you don’t know how to make a sing. Sa you ‘are ot 4 qualified nurse, 14) ‘He has couhed up ateral blood, so his lunes must be exten +» sively damaged: lw My father was born in London, yours in Pars. So we cart be brothers W)The plant grew fFom a seed produtad by a tomato plant So 1, too, a tomato plant. oi) Frank Whittle died in poverty. Therefore, the inventor of the jet tngine died in poverty. (Historical note: Frank While invented the jet engined (Gi The satelite picture shows cold Front sweeping in from the Aflantic, and it shoud reach our shoees by moming. So it will probably rain tomorrow, (i) The explanatot of any fact fin ters of ther facts. So i ary facts can be explained there ate facts which cannot be explaibed he) IF you know anything, you can’t be mistaken. So any proposiion that could be falze # one which you do rot know. (2) The proposton "All propositions ae false” is false. Forif it were live It would be false, fn ordinary English, the conclusion of an “lgument tye presented before the premises. (a0. Geraniums ate not frost hafdy. There. are: frequent frosts in |. lesland. So geraniuns are not native to Iceland, ‘Gin. iether the CIA agent or the KGB agent killed the President, he ised a. gun. But the President died of cyanide poisoning, 90 neither the CIA agent nar the KGB agent killed hin“This definition tas some méfits, For one thing, it suggess an answer to why we should use valid argumense valid arguments ae necessr~ ily muth-preserving So long. you start out with tuth, you wil never ‘depart foe the truth i you keep to valid arguments. Moreover, iti rather surprising how nich can be extacted about she natute of vad ity fiom even this preliminary definition (ec $6) However, ihe definition has many defecs. We characterized logic as the study of validity But now, in defining validity, we have wed the roti of lagi impossiiity,I'e flly uverstood what lpi! impos- sibily i, presumably we would aleady know what lei isl? i. So four chancterizations have run in a cic, ‘We mentioned a connection beeween logical imposibily and conradictorines, But these terns themselves were left unenplained. This unsatisfactory state of airs will ave t persist for some time (One feature of definitions of validity forthe formal languages to be vanity, neoasstency ann negasnn . considered in later chapters that they can entirely avoid each notions as logical posabilty and incorsistency (inthe ordinary sense). For the rmoment, we shall ee how fir the ontinary notions can tke ws 4. Validity, inconsistency and negation ‘A collection of propositions is imonsiten if and only if it is logically imposible for all of them to be tre. Here logical imposiity is wied to explin inconsistency, whereas in §3 inconsistency was used (0 explain logical ispossibliey This shows thatthe wo notion are closely felnted. It also shows that we could reasomably hope for a further lucidation of both notions, one which takes ws out ofthe circle. For the moment, we shall simply take for granted the notion of logical impossibly. ‘Consider the propositions 4) The exth it spheroid 2) The earth i not spheroid Ie islogially ampossble for both these propositons to be cue and log- ‘eily impossible for both of them to be Fike. Is shor, (2) and (2) are ‘ontiris: each isa contrdiczory ofthe other. Moreover, (2) is neiton of (4).You get the negation of 2 propostion if you insert “not (or some equivalent expression) to tin such a way aso form 3 con tnadictory oft. ing the negation of 2 proposition is one way, but ast the only way of being a contradictory of ic Being contadictorcs ome wry, ‘bat not the only way, for wo propositions to be inne. 1 shall amplify these pomes, and then connect che notions of contraictory, inconszency and negation with that of validityoxe proposition isthe negation of another, follows trivially from the definition chat dhe ewo proportions are coutradictories. The con verse does not hold. Two propositions can be contradictories without either being the negation of the other. For example: 3) oln is more thin sx feet tll and 4) Jolin is either exactly six fot tll or else less than sx fet ell ei “nono ipnton esx say el he eg Consider: ia 7 5) Some men ate happy. 6) Some men are not h The second ress fom the frst by inserting a “not”, but the two Propotiions are not conteadietories, since both could be — and pre sumably actually are ~ tre. So (6) isnot the negation of (3). Sinulaly 7) Reagan believes that Shakespeare was a genius 8) Reagan believes that Shakespeste wat not a genius are not contradctoies, since both could be fae They would be fae af Reagan had no view one way or the other about Shakespeares ‘quali. Fence (8) is not the negation of (7) tha 1a ee ‘you wil come. (iar pleaded nth your brozres tam not at al pleased with your progess ) ven who oes to see Mick the Fx i satised with hs han- ing of thei problem. ‘Gerore who goes t0\sce Mick the Fin isnot aa sated with | is handing: of tel problem, (You must not wak on the gras. “You mist walk-on the gras Any collection of propositions containing contradictory pair is inconsistent. Is imposible for both of two contradictory prop te be true, 30 i impossible forall the propos containing a contradictory pai to be erve. The converse does ot hol there are inconsistent collections containing no contradictory pai. For example: 9) John i over six fee al John ie under sx fot ell isan inconsistent collection, frit cannot be that both propositions re tue Since both could be false (and would be, if John were exactly six fee tall), they are not contradictories. (BID Gide tte! bles (nok inthe test) Of kolections of propo ‘ions vitich are inconsistent, but where no member of the collection {a contraiclory oF any other member Figwe 11 summarizes the rebtionships mentioned. AIL pairs of propositions of which one is a negation of the other sre contradict fies, and all contra istent. However, there ate incon Sitencies which are not conteadctoies, and contndicories of which neither is 4 negation of the othe Part ofthe link between validity and in notion of contracictorines, conse in the following ft: 10) Ian argument is valid collection of propositions consisting of ts premises togethes with + contradictory of is conclasonBra Figue Lt ‘Toilsrate, comer the following angumert: 11) Anyone who drives a car risks death, Anyone who risks death is brave. So all car drivers ste brave en i (44)va 's the eonelton ee? 1 folowing collection contains the premises of (11) a8 @) and (i) and che negation ofits conclsion a Gi 12) (Anyone who drives a car risks death (3) Anyone who risks death is brave Gi) Noe all car dewers are brave ‘Take any oo of these propositions. We cin sce that, if these 190 are tue, then the third cannot be. So the collection is incon: "We can argue quite generally for (10), using the definition of valid ity given in §3, Take any valid argument, By definition, itis logically jmposile for its premises to be true ye its conclusion fae. fn other ‘work, 8 logically necesary hut if all the premises are tee, 80 the ‘conchision, Bus ithe conelasion is te, then, necessarily, ny contr = arguments ai angunern-tano os dlisory of i file. So, necestily if the premises sre tue, any con traictory of the conclusion is be So tis logically impossible forthe premises and a contradiciory of the conchaion all 19 be true. So this fall The li between validity and incorsistency alo runs in the other 13) Ia collection of propositions is inconsistent, any argument wwhoie premises consist ofall but one of the collection, and whote conclusion i a contradictory of the remaining propo- son, is valid “The argument for thi is rather like the one just given for (10), ‘Taking (10) and (13) together shows that we could have defined validity in terms of inconsistency, rather than in terme of logical imposbiliny ‘Ba bos "BL 4:12) (Give a definibin of valdlty in terns of inconsistency. 5 Arguments and argument-claims We use “argument” to refer t0 any collection of propositions, one of ‘which i singel out asthe conclusion. Ie sefol to have a standard pattern for writing out arguments We apt the convention dhc where there is no contraty indication, the coxchaion ofan argument is che lan proposition ina list, and i marked off fiom i predecesiors by Ising preceded by a semicolon Ths ifan argument has two premises, A and B, and a conchsion, C, we shall wre it A,B: C [More generaly, where the argument has remiscsand its conclusion 1G, we write Ai Aa= vary ( may be equil to or greater than zero, For the eae in which w= 0 (here are no premises) see $6.) ‘A wefil abbreviation is", short for “is valid, works like this DAs. Ay b © abbrevistes “Ay... Ag Cis vali Aso AL fC abbreviates “Ay... A Ci not valid The symbol “Pi pronounced “(oubl) tate Aw angumer (yA) ms be dstingted fonn what shal calla anument-ain: Ayes» Goof Anes F Ce ae co ‘wef mot sifcany besid tobe re ox ke-One concen son fase fran amen wher lo ana ' wheter ts erase o nob th and Echond da no gee 2 pooper dimesion of scum By cons at mpumene eae te pone sien lan an the ‘the argument in question is not valid; and otherwise fase " tn an argument," appears inthe ery pce which, a an caresin of he argent i ordnry Engl, se would ted ead lke "so",“heeore"or"bene”s wot ted shoe ate to the conclusion aoe, ‘Ths gies ties a tendency to confise these tp" de conjunctions ike therefore” Bute ols re resy vey eee _, Fist" and “therefore” belong offen prune coegores isa predicts the so ofexpesion which en be al to ane 2 property to meting "Therein" i noe a pede bg ake Son wed oss topes. cee fn af tht po omer the fit that we cn teninglly sy “Sons sere Sal eho ae nt” eng mn therefore, but some are not”. = Secondly something of the form “Ay. Ay dherfine angunet, about which the qseton ass whee srt By contrast, something like "A, a FP abbrevits “is “Some arguments ae ‘Third in orinary circumstance, me wh v ves Av thesfine Ci thereby commiting, hin tthe OF lof ig, Bat one who aes the hin ta A, + C makes no such commitment, since there ae valid arguments wove premises are not tuc.* 13 @)| Whats the ration between *:*, a5 used here in setting fut arguments, and "hence" of “therefore? 18). Foresch of the following pieces of discourse, sate what argument, *f ay, you thik the speaker intending to propound. Ifyou think he Jsinendng to propoun one, say what is premises and conclusion ate: {My opinion, for what ifs worth, is that you should take to robbing banks. Ths is a demanding caret, requiing’ a high degree of responsibilty, but offering greater than average finan- ial ewards Moxeover, gives yo the opporturity to be your ‘ym boss and to develo yout talents of leadership and initiative || Aa ele fast proves you nth free board, lodging and pro "tein atthe expense of Her Majesty's Government 1G) Mf Joh and Mary are godparents of the same child, as indeed they ae, they cannot be marned according 19 Chvistan ites i), Sines John and. Mary are godparents of the same chi, they | anol be maried according to Chstian ris. “Iw)_ John and Mary ae godparents ofthe same child. Therefore, they cannot bee maried according to Christian rts (\) Tesson doth never prosper. What’ the reason? "Why, ft doth then none dare cll it teasen, (w)No contomporary poliéan understands the French as well as de “Gaul di, Mitterrand is at home with the mtellectual Left, and + isang knows the arstocacy and the haute bourgeoisie. But de Gaulle knew something about the tradtonal peasant class, which i what sets him apart ror our contemporates Athos of sentimental novels were nok beng, s0 rituous as they dopeaced to later generations when they described so many abductions, adders, miskelers and escapes from convents. All © these exciting events actualy took place, and frequent, too. It + vas part of the current vogue for aggresive Spanish manners (Gi Wehas late and | was tred, So | took a tax. ai ih be comet taney eer ka let fm cles he ext woul sugges Ts howd Be 20 Cr she om Dyk [772 6 Some important properties of validity Alhough our definition of valid in §3 i not a¥ illuminating 3 one right with, it none the Iss enables us to dicover some imporant ‘general features of valid. he key property of validity i that logically guorances the presr vation of trith IFyou start with eruth and argue validly then you are bound to end ap with truth, Tht is why iti + good thing. to argve validly But valdiy does not always generate uuth (See )), nor does cath always generate validey (ee 3) Sn al gumens with ile plemice ea fan sz, and er, well known tobe tre, or fae 5 eh ike Bott fon iat CGI AN sited unk dha ales etc al es Senet ame lipeel Sood patos au ke 1) There are valid anguments with false conclusions Example 2) All heavenly bodies revolve around che earth. The sun is 2 heavenly boy. Therefore the sin revolves around the earth Moreover: 3) There are invalid arguments with rus premises and oe conclusions. Example: {6 Some important properties of ality 7 4) Petroleum can be used 262 fuel. More people live in Pars tha Boston. Thetefore the fst man on the moon w an American, We have steady seen that deductive vaidty is monotonic. Using the notation of §5, this can be exprened: 5) WIA, then [Ay Ab, Au B} Ch whatever Bi may be* In other words, you ean wen a valid argument into an invalid one by adding tothe premises. This borates what i aeant by saying that, deductive logic sims to pick out angunient in which the premises give ‘ondusivereatons fat the conclusion, Another important property of validity ay clasicily conceived, and 2 defined in §3, 8 Kind of aunty. Chaining arguments together wil preserve validity 6) lay ALF Can then [A.- Ay By (By... Ba C FD RF DI ‘The intermediate conclusion, C, can be cut out, since the premises which establsh it can establish anyehig ican establish, L418 “eke saved detonate en of, ‘aw that (5) tue. Valiicy has a property akin to eflexiety nD WC wg the Aly Athen {4 -dy F C. G4, 1:46 Using the gpiayed detfition of validity near the end of!53, Show thet (87) & fue “This shows thas Jrcule arguments are valid, (OF course, they are not normally nf ee (74) below]28 1 = vali A new piece of terminology: we shall expres the chai that 4 co lection of propositions (4j,... A.) i inconsistent by writings (dy Ad b The terminology is justified by the Fics that if an argument’ premises are inconsistent, it valid; and this is suggested by the bank afer the tmnt, accepting any completion. More formally Ad) Hlathen [Ay..-Ay F Wj whatever Bb may be Ex. 4.47. Use thie notation to euprate the claim: “if & collection of propositions is inconsistent, remains inconsttent whatever propostion Igadded to it? Now: argu for the truth of tis dain Like al the other properties of validity described in thi section chit cone Fallows fram the definition given in 63. I premises ate incon tent, they cannot all be ue. If premises cannot all be true, then, in particu, the following ese cannot aie: chavall the premises ate t and als some atbitary proposition, B, fake So i is impos all the premise to be te yee B fae, So an argument with inconsis- tent premises is vad, sehatever its conchsion (8) showlel not be read at saying that you ca infer anything fom an inconsisency. As we normslly speak of infrence, one ean infor something ftom one of more premiscs only if those premises are tue A detective can draw inferences, correct oF incorrect, fom the foot prints but if chee were no Footprints, and he were merely halhcint ing. we woulds’e normally alow that he could ao any infercing because we would not normally allow that there was anything fom which to infer. Given this conception of inference, (8) does not license inferences fom inconsistencies, for no inconsiseicies ate true ‘A farther piece of terminology Let us write Fa to abbreviate: "tis logically impossible for A to be false". The term nology is justified by the fat that if an arguments conclusion cannot 1 — dome smporant proper oF vauany e be fk, then i is valid and this is suggested by the blank before the turnstile, accepting any competion. ‘This claim can be expressed as follows 9) WEL Aly then [Bhs 8 F Al, whatever B, ... By may be This shows how we can extend the notion of an argument «include oes not reflect any are ve premises. T but i convenient for logic the ease in swhich the thing in ordiney usa x, 4.8! (at) “Show that: MRL 81 then Wi Ay PCHifandoniy TAs, A FC ‘This shots that necessary truths are fedundant as premises. You may, how wish to think back to your answer to Bx. 6a). 1). Show that: H(A then (Ay. A 9 Cl, whatever Ay, ..--Ay C may be. ‘Could “if here be strengthened to “if and only if"? Justify your answer. The propeties of validity mentioned in this section are properties of the thditional notion. In various ways, some of which we shall tiscus in §7, she traditional notion may seem to fll short of what we ‘want This hay prompted the development of various “non-classical conceptions of vay. Our concern is confined tothe classeal notion £4.49" (a) Say'whetheror not you think that: Ti Ask Dif and only 1) IF Ay and, Gietiy jusity Your view. (b) Show that: A} fi and onlyif Its not the case that ©. Igittue that A) Hf and only if (YA? Jisty your answer and Ay then Cl= vanaty 7 Validity and usefuiness: “sound”, “relevant”, “persuasive” Even ifan argument is valid it may not be weft may not be a good ‘one co ise, either to discover wht i re or to persuade a audience (of something. Fer example, consid 1) Some cirdes are square, Therefore shee will be no third world Since iis logialy imposible for any circles to be squate, (1) 6 valid Ges valiity follows fiom (6.8) But the argoment would not bea good fone to use for any purpase, and cerainly not r© convince someone that chere will be no thiad world war. Normally a good argument is not merely vad, Is addition, ie has se premises An argment which has true premises and is valid is called sown The lst rematk is quafied by “normaly” since there ist least one samstance im which i is wieful to propound 2 valid argument wid a file premise. This is when one hopes that ones hearer will recom nize that the conclusion is flbe and thatthe arguptent is valid, and 20 will be persuaded that atleast once premise ie. This mo ment ie elled reducto ad abuardun Suppose yous hearer believes that Harry isa merchant seaman, but you dlagree. Suppose alo that you both know that Hsry’s arms ae not attooed. Then you might sy of a 2) Suppose Harry isa merchant seaman. All merchant seamen have tattoos on these arms, So Harry nist have tattoos on his arms. ‘One intends one’ hearer t0 tecogniae the validity of the argument, and, persisting in his belief thatthe conclusion is fle, to came to infer «har a last one premise is fake, One has to hope that he will be more Srmnly persuaded ofthe truth of “All merchant seamen have tattacs on theie arms" than of“ the former belief and abandon the isa merchant seaman” so that he will tsi ‘A sound argument may fal to persuade an audience ifthe audicnce does nor realize that the premines are rue, or doet mot realize thatthe argument is valid Here the ful fes with the audience, ot with the | argument, Bue a round argument can sill be defective in chat it may | not be wef, Consider ' 1 = vavaty ana useraness ” 3) Washington isthe capital of the USA. Therefore al dogs ae gs. Since i is logically impossible for “All dogs are dogs” to be fils (8) i wld ts validity fllows fom (6.9). Since ehe premise i rae tho sound, But the argoment is not asefil Part ofthe reason i that fo argument is needed in order to persuade someone of something 50 tuvil as the conclusion of (3). Another part of the weason is that the For an argument premize has no proper relevance ta the conclusio to be useful ¢ must, normally, be sound, and mus, always, be relevant Logicians have tied to devise special logics to reflect the concept of rclemance, Bot this is one more topie we shall ot pursue (ee Ander fon and Belnap [1975], Read [1988). Consider: 4 The whale will become extinct unless active measures ave taken to protect it, Therefore the whale will become estinet unless setive measures ae taken to preserve it “Thies walié (its validity follows fiom (6.7). It is sound, since its premise is ume (if you direc, selece your own example). Te is Tuidvely relevant, for whatever precise account we give of tis notion jx appeas that nothing could be more weevane to whether 4 propos tion is true than whether dha very prpeston is tue, Bar the argument ‘spaily useless. Ie could not persuade anyone of anything, andi could not help in he discovery of wth or an argument to be persasive for 2 person be must be willing © accept each of the premises but, before the argument is propouniled to him, be unwilling to accept the conclusion. When the premise # the conclasion, he cannot be in this sate. This isthe general reason for the welesneis of circubr arguments. BX, 1.20 (a) Could there be invalid arguments which are: sound? 0 relevant? i) pesuaive? fsa, ve examples I ot ay why ot (b) An argument can be sound and relevant, yet fail to be persuasive through beng toe elit. Give an exampleHow could 2 valid argument ever be persuasive? It is posible becauie we do not always acknowledge or take explicit note ofall the logical consequences of our belie. IF we did explicitly hold before our ‘minds all the logical consequences of cur belik sei Sequences, we would already have accepted the conchasion of any val anguinent whose premises we have accepted. Hetice no vid argument ‘could be persuasive. This how things would be with a perleety a- | tional being. The utility of valid arguanens is a mono fiaity: co the fact that we are not completely rational be oes “To sum up this section: validity ¢ not the only desiable property in an argument. But it i the only one which normally concerns | logician 8 Sentences and propositions An argument cots of pston A proposition i what is bleed 2st, deni, and soon. Thi section elborates thi ea ‘We can srt withthe rail stigtrward le of 2 mean fl sentence A sentence i series of ons ated in accordance wih the grammatical rks ofthe langage ives in such tha team be wed to ay someting orto ak something oe net something) "The cat sat othe ma {oy that the ea om the mat, “at sat ma onthe the though emp of jot the sme wor, not tsemence Proper Speak ing, we should sy: not an Engl sentence, fora sence is defined reitive toa languge. The same sees of mow con be a semence in oe language but notin another Ths sa sentence which can be used 1) Phas Rober court, pls Juete change fs mot an English sentence, despite being composed only of English ‘words. But itt (or s0 Tam told) a French sentence ‘is disputed both whether every grammatical sentence is mean- infil, and whether every meaningfl sentence is grammatical. On the later point, most people occasionally speak ungrammaically, yee they are understood; and if the sentence they use can be understood, it baad to justify counting its not meaningful. On the fie point, stan tac example of grammatical sentences which are not meaning 2) Gren ideas sleep furiouly together ‘Arguably dhs conforms with the rules of gratumar, yet is wot mean ingfll The notion that will be important in this book ie that of being meaning, usable to say something (or to ask something or to order ig.To che extent that being grammatial not a wsetul guide nfl t shouldbe set aide ary definition of « proposition might ran as Fallows to being mea A prin 3) A proposition is what i exptesed, in a given context by 2 caning, declarative, indicative sentence rious aspect ofthis deGiniion require commcit. A. dete senteme is one that could be wed to make an asertion, to affirm thit some thing iso is aot the ease. Thus: 4) The King i in his counting, howe isa declarative sentence, By contrast 5) Is the King in his coansing howe? isuot a declanive sentence, but rather an intermgative one es typical ue isnot t0 ffm how thisgs are, but to ask how cigs a. ©) Pur the King in is counting howe is not a declarative sentence, but rather an imeratve one. Its typical ue is not to affirm that things are so-and-so, but co order that they be ro-and-, An invative serene, one in what grammarians call the indicative mood, contrats with a subjunctive sentence. Corresponding to the indicative (4) i the subjunctive: 7) Were the King in bis counting house Subjunctive sentences are not used by themselves to affirm anything ‘but they may oceur in senterces usable to air things. One common ue i in subjunctive conditionss, for example:3a 1 = valdity 8) Were the King in his counting howe, the Queen would be “Two distinct sentences can expres the sme proposition The Engl 9) Snow is white | xpreses the cme proposition asthe French 10) La neige ext bhneh ven within a single language, dtnct sentences can express the sme proposition i te have the sime meaning 11) Blackie © poppy expresses the same proposition as 12) Blackie is 2 young dog Two sentences with diferent meanings can express the same paopos tion i they ate used in different contexts, which is why the definition | (3) mentions contexts, Suppose you ate may only audience, and T address the following remark t you 13), You are bunge Suppose that you then utter the sentence: 44) Cam hungry. We both expres the same proposition. The fst sentence, in the context of being drected at you, expreies the rame proposition 3s the second, in the context of being uttered by you. Had yoo uttered dhe same sen tence as me, (13), you would not have expressed the same proposition, ‘This shows that die same sentence can, with respect to different con texts, express fferent propositions | Sentences ana propostuors a “Ex, 421) @) “Suppose Tom ites the following sentence, directed at {Yous "tke kissing you" Give an example ofa sentence you could utter and thereby express the same proposition as Tom expressed {) Suppose Tom yesterday: in Lindon uttered the sentence "ft ip tating ere", Glve an example of a senterce you could utter today” in Paris and thereby express the same propostion as Tom apres (c) Suppose Tom, walking in the woods yesterday, dimly perceived | [What wish fast abou constictor (hough he dl not know IE was) “and, refrin Re Warcbged dive TALE be coorgg aking Tabb ef sew", Give an exinle of sentence that you could ter, led, in the comfort and secunty of your own home, and thereby ‘express the same propesition as Tom expressed, “There is another way in which this can occur A enee say be ambiguous, For example, “There® that crane agin” ry reer to 9 Iiling-devie or a bird. There is no such thing in general asthe propo- sition such 2 semtence express. T have simply stipubced certain fearures of propositions, and their relations to sentences, What mikes this an appropriate definition adopt i logic? A standard answer this validity 18 defined in terms fof truth conditions, and 40 one should identify » proporiion by truth Conditions. This anower relies on ideas that wil be introduced in §9 However, we can see a the fotion of proposiion, as axed by logician CComider the argument: once something of the mocivtion 15) Lam hungry; therefore {am hungry. Incite this should count as valid. Bue suppose we thought of the ‘components of arguments 36 sen context siting between the ces, and suppose we imagine the terance of the premike and che ut ice ofthe conchiion, Suppose you are hungry snd utter the premie, ane Tama not hungry and uiter the conchasion, Then we would have 3 true premite and 3 false conchision, so the argument could not be valid Cleary we need 9 avoid such problems, an innroducing the nos 1 proposition, inthe se ofthis section, is one way of doing soi = vanany ‘We sill auld have defined an argument a collection of sentences, but we would hive had t say something about che coatext being held constant overall the sentences oF an argument-The upshot would have been the same. On some occasions, tis easiest to think of arguments 1s composed of propositions, on ethers it i easiest 10 thnk of thers 28 composed of sentence, with a background asumption oF eonancy of context. We will help ourselves to both notions, a convenient. 9. Validity and truth conditions A csentence like “Snow is white” is true in some but not all logically peaitle cimirstinces. There ste logially posible cimumeam, | inclading those which actually obtain, in which the sentence is true, and logically posible ctcomstances (in which, say, ow ie black) ‘which the sentence is fake, A circumstance is one fn which a sentence is true just on condition that ifthe circumstance actualy obtained, then the sentence would be ts Some sentences, for example, "Snow is snow”, de true in all og cally possible circumstances. Some sentences, for e€ample “7 is es tha 5°, are true in no logically possible circumstances, ‘We shall sy that a sentence’ inh condos are the circumstances in which it is tus, We can think of these cicumsances as bundled together in 2 collection oF st 2 set with 20 members, in the case ‘of sentences like "7 isles than 5". Using this notion, yet another definition of validity © can 1) [aj dy b C)ifand only ifthe teuh conditions of € include those of (Ai. Ay) We could put it another way: very ctcamstince in which all of A A, is true is one in which C is trae. Equivalently the truth con ‘ition of Ay... A, ate included in those of C. (1) and chese variants define the ssme notion as that defined in §3 ‘61/422 sie hat an raiment vad aor GO) ake Yai orn te den of aay ply ea the oof ere as ecotaes Ou gr ee ———————————————————————————————————————_—————, The importance of this definition i that it shows cha only the truth conditions of a sentence matter 10 the validity or atherwie of any frgument in whose expresion it occurs. consequence is that ia sen fence occurs in the expresion of an argument and you replace it by ‘one having the same uth condions, the argument will remain valid, if war walid before, or invalid fi wa italic before This will bea portatly on questions of formalizatoa, to be considered ter 40 Formal validity Logie, or at any rate formal logis, # Hot primary concerned merely with the very genera notion of validity which we have so fir dis- assed. ti concerned with a particular species ommel slit. Formal ality, being a kind of validity, has all dhe properties of walty; bt ithas some additional distinctive feats We could try to define formal vay by saying that an argument rally yal and ony x1 8 vakd invite of is form oe patter "This captures part of what ie intended, chough it will need supple mentation. Hete i pair of anguments which are sad to have the same form: 1) Frank will marry Mary only if she loves him. But Mary does not love Frank. So he will not marry hee 2) The whale will be sived from extinction only if acive mea sues ae taken. But active mesures will not be taken. So the whale will ot be saved from extinction, These have A common form oF patter, which we could distil out 3s follows: 3) only if — fe is not the case that—. So itis nor the ease “The dts ate meant to be fled on both occurrences by the si tence, and likewise the dash, 1s more convenient to ose leters, eather than dots ane dashes, chu: 4) Acnly iH. eis not the case that B, So itis not the case the Aorm of cach of | ational expresions lke “loves” and “is bigger by... han". "Ta mark 3 gap hata predicate can fil, we shall use eapital eters start ‘we shal write ou the argumen-form: “This can be called am aumento, His a a (A) and @), since these both real from i by making suitable replace- ments for A and Bt | eens eRe URN URRRRSNGE TN AABNNSPASANTGA| DAU Fe GAN Gare H1 Therefor al Fare HL you find any invalid instances? : |) Assuming that thi is valid argument-form, i follows chat (6 i not | merely valid, but ako formally valid The logician wants ta say that (1) and (2) ae valid in view of thie | pattern oF form, the same in eich case. This repretentt among, other 4185) Give a further instance [pat in the text) of 40.2). Can you things an atempt co tain generale would be pees ry ging ; : i fn any val stances? though each argument in turn, picking our the said ones. Buc if we umnent-form we ean sy: tony i this are grand the idea of an specific angument va so are all of the sme form 8) Tan is Sconth. Al Seo are prudent. So ln is prdent ‘ne ws} to caborate ths 2 hile i to define + notion of vity fr argument-forms This i an instanceof the argument form: exh ofis) 9) gis RAN Fae G.S0.ais G 5) An argument-form is valid if and enlyif, neces instances i vad Here we use “a and if neede which a name can occupy. As valid "BSP... 3) 20 anatk the position ing that (9) valid () ie frenally LARA Wy is the qualifeation necessary" Heeded in (1035)? | So (4) isan example of 3 vad angumentform* An argument is vad | im viueof is fores jst condition that san ance a vad | BATE ae np ex ld Cin “ypu tind ary invalid instances? (8) Speofy valid atgument-frms for any ofthe following which ae formaly val {)_ Some poltcans are lars and al lars ae charming. So some pol: Garg ae curming sue posit, Therefine |, Some plians ae la. Vere isa pallician. So Vereil a la argument form, “This goes some way towards saying, what formal validity is, and we can reinforee the ides with two more examples befor showing, that an important ingredisn i missing, | Consider: | 6) All cameb are herbivores. A her all camels ate paifc (i). 1F you die going to dle by drowning, then there no paint in ‘This is an instance of che argument-form: “All. . are alae Jearning to swim. If you are not going to die by drowning, then ‘ethereal ne "Canel an“ aeadonay | | ng arin tn, Meet, he ro pot Claaied as nouns, “pail” as an adjective. We sal el both of thee, | a MUU whey acorn () pir. shal sl ace song pecs | DQM fs og oie Sook an a rg | |= met wher he sees one. You havent studied opi, So’ you ee ce could howe ts by apn the p aif me wo wing wf “not able to spot an invatd argument when you see one. fron shut he winoniptewee th ager od Engh | ahi PR pam Pes a2. eae? & pinens ~ 1 way (yi Te afl ot reno deve bela the rnc Invasion olf ‘Moicon, and the batts of Waterloo cane fer that So he bale of Marengo occumed before the battle of Waterloo, vid, He Wi de unless he is given a blood transfusion. But-he wal not be ven Blood transfusion, Sovhewit die, This discussion has aeady begun to inclule some controversial ele ‘ments. Highlighting these must wait fo Inter chaprers For the morent, {vant to bring out what is missing from the account so far: 4 gap which mnakes it inadequate asa presentation of the taditional idea 0 formal valiy The idea was formal validivy should be x special kind of vay But as presented so Gr, othing his been said to rule out formal validity coinciding with validity. For nothing. has beca said which Prevents an argument iself counting as an argument-form. Ths is no aceident of the particule way in which Vhave csented the idea | ‘The general problem is this: what i the/dfference between pattern ‘or form, and what fills it: substance of coment? In (4, for example, the senaining, English words correspond 10 the pattern ot fotm, the lewers A and B to the places where one cond inser content subtance t yield a gerwine argument. But what isthe bass for this distinction? To bring owt the problem, consider the sort of example that would standardly be given in a logic text of an argument which is val! bat | 15 not formally valid 10) ‘Tom is a bachelor Therefor, Tom is unsarie. This certainly valid (teding “bachelor” in 3 fais way). A case for | i ight sare by pointing out tha (10) | nent-for. | 11) aris F. Therefore a is G. 5 4 7 1 iy tal OA) il ng Bo Mu nacled kas terion sh cumin on h evousy te promis and ebony abe eteusen) nO) ‘by example that each, of (10.1), (10.2) and (10.6) are he i al ines) a. Go tal evey gone an instance fat es oe va peer How could the cae be presed frthee? What i needed for formal valli is hat there be sme valid Trent a instance So Co exalt fare of formal validity it not st intace (e Bx 1.27). You have t0 show tha € not aN insane Stamp eid argunet-form Bee who to sy that (10) sce is noe Sh aumeneforn? IE it then, since (10) elf 5 ts only instance, a Zomentform, and so foro val, gament-forin of which the arg Tig ny to tock this dicly by 3 re hunt have some gps ark by ts ad dae So every argument-foris will have more than one insane. Bot (Qo) would still come out as formally valid, iz vinue of being, an instanceof the valid 12) eis a bachelor Tei, aad 1 once i ay 0 rr Sn i ig atthe litem inten, te conespt of form wil have to be mae So stn Te kin wl pte dh 9 gees the ony expresions we ay ther tha Terr nbide mak the gas fr the “conten ae thelial tas “tach” and “nar hich oct (2), ae not oil con tte (12) mot an pment aod 0 dos nor table " ‘The logical constants I shall begin by giving a lit of expressions that are generally held co be lpi!SS OO EEE 4a 1) itis nor the ease thar and it chen sf and only if everything al is the same as {plus any expression definable just in terms of the above} Te & a mater for philosophical debate whether the list should be extended to include for example wed in set theory). The debat cena" or" nember a ; he des oe fh teem A list like the above fails co speak t0 thi ise, = Historia, ogi! conan ate soe cae they ae given 2 constant inerpetion within sli sem. Cartcponing se wont Me "Socrates" and man” by ona, thete are rable erp tons. This gies argo who expenions a went lei Constants by 3 Tope sper, bat des ot explo jon te selection of he logeal conta ny expesion cul in pei be AA widely held view, which certainly capres part of the euth, i that an essential fexure of a logical constant is that it introduces no special subject mattert should be “topie-neutral” This is because, in logic, we are concerned with reasoning in general, and not with thi (or that special area of knowledge eis all very well for an anthropol, ‘gst concerned with kindhip «a take a particular interest in what is ‘Smified by such words 4s “bachelot” and ried". The logician aims at greater generality: He will concern hime’ only with expressions which can occar in an argument on. any subject whatsoever. The ‘xpcesions inthe lst, but not expression like “hacbelor, satay this requirement Bearing in mind the suggestion tha agument-forms should conti apart fom cevices for marking gaps, only logical constants, we. can veriy that (10.4), (10.7), (10.9) are argumnent-foras, but (10.12) is not ‘one-This is consistent withthe formal validity of (10-1), (10.2), (106) and (10.8), buc is hostile © che forma validhy of (10.10), 1 owe Es Of logical constants can be astumed 10 be complete, or at least t0 exclude expressions lke “bachelor” and“ unmaried” then i seems that no argument-forms for (10.10) would be more apt to reveal 3 8 foe tmally valid ehan either the valid (10.11) or the equally invalid 2 AB 150, (10.10) i not formally valid In chapter 6.5 we will axk whether there any illuminating and ienenl account of logical constancy. IFthere 8 then e can use fave an account of formal validity: it will amoune to valicity in vistve ofthe meaning ofthe Togical consants and in abstraction fom other than smuctual features of premises and conchaon, By areal fous mean fies about the recurrence of errtain non-logical clement, for example the fact that “camels” occurs in the ewo plces it does in (10.6) For the moment, we will make do with a relaivized nosion: fiven some list of constans, we will sy that an arguinent i Formally valid if and oaly i itis vd in virtue of the meanings of the cox stants onthe Tit and in abstraction ftom other chan stractural Features fof premise and conclusion. ‘The investigation of formal valdity has in practice proceeded by turning avay from ordinary English and studying artifical, “logical” languages like che lnguage of the propestona cla, and the language ofthe predate ‘alos. What the rationale for intoducing these unk nile languages? The standard answer isn tern of theie “laity”, but iis not clear that ordinary English is other thin cleat. In the follow ing section, I consier some suppored defects of natural languages like English, considered from a logical poine of view 12 The project of formalization IE logins really aim to study validity as it occurs in our everydiy thought and elk, why do they study arhficial languages, which no one speaks? Why not stick t0 English, or French, of some other mitwal Iinguage?—————————————————EESEee eS eA ‘An argument i collection of propositions. But, according to a tr! liom: justification ofthe turn towards formal languages, the senlona ‘of natural Language lke Englch do aot adequately reflect the logic properties of the propositions they express. Fort logic a concernal with the very arguments we use i daly life, but has to expres the arguments in a diferect way. This itroduees the crucial idea of the lei form of a sentence. A sentence’ logical form is supposed © lay bare the logical features the proposition which it expreses, This logical form, its si, is often hidden by ordinary language ‘A eaditional hope i that logic should provide 4 mechanical meu of testing for validity.” But how could you preseat a machine wih argument? If arguments ate composed of propexitions, then you] Cannot present a machine with erguments i diet way foe propo Sons te to abtact What you would have to ed into the mache arc scrtenecs Ifthe machine isto ey the salty ofthe argument he featencer express, every logically sdevant fextte of the proposition ist ke corelted with some pipe ofthe physical makeup of the Te hss een hel chat sach 2 corteltion does act abuso at ket docs ot obtain in any realy saat Eshion, between scatenes a trl Languages and Ue propstion they expres. Hence the nell for aici language. The ides is hat these wl sspply the logic fous of sentences in natural hngoages. By taniating 4 natal er tence into an ariel on, the hidden logical festtes ofthe propos tion expened willbe brought to dhe sure | Tet us now comider some ways in which natural sertences may te | suppored inadequae for loge purposes inadequate 2s vehicle fr| Trmging out the gil atures of argument (1) Lexical ambiguity AAs a special cate of (6.7) it holds quite generally that cre Th hope hi ong i orig back lent te Leb 1 mee made reste fy esting tp ec Belang (HP pe HEA oF Rian 7 This holds what proposition C may be, Bat, as wes iN COO, nection with (8-13), t does aot hold for arbitrary sentences of eatun a ore than ome mei ide othe sentence containing a word with more than one meaning, ‘ve shal all dhe ambiguity ewizl ev One rena sha many serene ae ambiguus ey are texprest more than one proposition When 4) John cut she painter. Therefore John cur the painter not vai i we interpet ; : : ry be tee while primer inthe fist sentence to mean an Gi secure boat for thon the ft Seence the second is fae "An obvious way to deal with this problem is to di wordy say “painter,” and "painter", one foreach of che meanings, and nor anny the ambiguous word. Then the proposed interpretation of (A) would Took Hke this 22) John eut the painter, Therefore Joln ent the printer and no one woul be particularly tempted to tink tht this expresed ah apument of the form: C, C. (No doubt one would ako have t0 stings "eat ) The stategy of cbisnating ambiguous words azeady involves departing fiom natural languages in_ which Gnnbigwous wont ae rife But the proponent of arifical languages and “eat triage altogether more fadial departures 2) Structural ambiguity Some sentences are ambiguous, yet the ambiguity cannot be attributed to dhe ambigeity of one or more words in the sentence: the amibigu- ty is ot lexical but sructul. Here ‘Atacurlly ubiguous sentences, wih alternative interpetations alded wre some examples of allegedly in brackets ex.) Harry isa dty cleaner of dnty windows. 3) Harry 4 diy window clea cof windows; (b) Harry isa clea 4) Tou and Mary are visting fr Tome people, and they ate tends with these peoples bla) Tom and Mary are(0) Tom and Mary are fiends with one another, and they ae some’ pepe) Tom and Marya vaang Pate Pron and tise people ae iva wih os mea 5) Receipts fom thi sours are noe lie to ince round secon prgraph 1, [) Secon papa 1, bene tee om heute eae eas im patgagh 1, docs nor pores ht ence an seeps foe ths Soe] | 0 Sev os wo ne de (9 ne ae someone ete ha the pen you tet a) tage You ware omeone who h nor Sea os Meee) 1) nt pater“ ob t send Hewes” Seon ese "Ns you cog not” UG) You are to wer an sign to tend for; (you sever wn olga mips Sad eee} 8 ‘Nichols has writen a beh abot everthing (6) Nichols ha writen a book, adit eas every agece OF Ee eee eon Nichol har dvd ale one whe host eee mn none of these cases ean the alleged ambiguicy be ateibuted iguliy be asibuted to any word, One way to test for this sto verify that each of the words cay | occu im a varity of vertences lacking the cortesponing ambigitis, | ad hs snot eo be expected if the won es | 1.28 | Considerthe' flow Gbjéction ta the tet gntion Cee me iain adres «Despite the fac that “cut te ambiguus, “cbt the string with my 1 beset ie” not Hence te fc tt ewer ke Hime Lee UT Ee The exisence of structural ambiguity shows thatthe eli shows that the cimination of lexical ambiguity is not enough. Some more radiel approach. is required. Scruetural ambiguity seems to affect even logical constants, for example “not” in (7) and "2" and “everything” in (8) On one readin 9 () we think of “not” as dominating the sentence, ¢0 form its negar ‘ion, a reading which we might write ae “Not you ought to send lovers", On the other reading, we think of “not as governing ust the description of the action, a reading, which we might “You ought to do this: not send flowers". On ene reading of (8) we think of "4" ax dominacing the sentence, 2 reading which we might write aA book by Nichobs is like his: it is aboue everything”. In the other reading, we think of “everything” at dominating the sen- tence, reading which we might wete as: "Everything has this prop- cy: Nicholas has written 2 book abour ie”. The logical constants deermine forza validity (ee §40 and §11). If seucual ambiguity ‘in affect the logical constns, then the hope of giving a general chat acerizaton of formal validity for English as i stands i uadermined Consider 9) Logi, epistemology and metaphysice ate all che philosophical subjects thee are. Nicholas has written a book about logic Nichols his written a book about epistemology. Nicholas has writen 2 book about metaphysics. Therefore, Nicholis hat writen 4 book about every philosophical subject. 1 (9) is valid che standard view is dat it Formally valid. But there ino sraightforward answor 19 the question whether i i vali eal Akepends on how we understand the conclusion, which i aructarally ambiguous in the same fashion 25 The problem forthe accoun of formal validity i a8 fllows, We sid that a formally vad argument is valid in vietue of is form, and that this in turn isa mater of it being an insance of a form all of whose instances ae valid. However, (9), read 25 invalid, i an instance of every asgument form of whick (0), read as valid, is © (9) 8 tot an insance of a yabdl argument-form. The problem of structural ambighity threatens to deprive even the apparently formally valid reading of (9) of is forma validity. 28" Vay a the fohing Sinbiguoes, eve wlambigiouspaa- “oe he alternative interpretations: Udy bam going buy 3 book “A Betyone as a probien. “(W)“In be whoe wide Deautfel word, Aldo Cassidy wae the only || person who knew where he was" (be Caré 1971), p. 8) [IW) SMiost of al | would ike to thank my students, who have taught ‘me move than they know” (Bach 11974, pw)8 = valiity Ie is theoretically posible chat structural ambigaty could be out of natural languages. In 3)-(8) unambiguous praphrasesn were given: perhapy structurally unambiguous paraphrase ate alway svailable. But i is unclear whether precse rules can be given which f ‘would effec thie fering. One can see way logiciane might prefer er ficial languages: they are constructed ffom the ground op in such 1 sway that structural ambigsity i impose @) Syntactic inegulaity “The syntax oF gninmar of a language is act of rles which detrn how sentences are constructed from the linguage’ vocabulary. A sy tactic distinction is one which we have to make in order to devise such ‘As we have seen.there are ewo posible answers to the question: wh fought to be picked out as sentences? One answer is jas the series of ‘words which constitute grammatical seperces, where i supposed tht swe have some antecedent grasp o9?%what it i fr 4 series of words te be a grammatical sentence. The other awer i: jus the series of work hich constitute meauigfil sentences, (CE (8.2) and related discussion) ‘Withous prejudice to this debate, I shall in this section mean by syn tactic rules ones which dettrmine the dss of meaningfil sentences. ‘We have already been obliged to make various syntactic distinctions in English, for example, bewwren sentences, predicates and nas. We wed dy, Ay By Cas leters marking the set of position that ea be occupied by a sentence; F, G, Has letters marking the sort of pos: tion that can be occupied ly’ predicate and eras a letter marking the tort of position that can be occupied by a name. We have attempted no definition of these categories. Rather, we hive simply picked ome samples, and gestured towards the category as 2 whole. "The gesure i supposed to determine the category fom the example in ee folowing, way. Anything belongs the category fit can replace the example (t lest in the context under consideration) without turning sease into nonsense, Given that “Tom” belongs tothe catego fof names, we can infer that "Harry" does too, since it can replace “Tomi” without taming sense into nonsense. But neither “herbivores” or "2 +2=4" ate naines by this text sce replacing “Tou” in “Tom ia bachelor” yields the nonsensical “Herbivors is bachelor” and 42 = 4 is a bachelor" Tall this way of determining syntactic ext sss 12 ~ tne proyecto vormanauen ss gories the sive syntactic tet, The taxonomy the test produces is Inadequate forthe study of validity Ie ples expressions with similar logical powers in diferent categories; and it phces expressions wih éis- similis logical powers in the same catego "The expresions “Mount Everest” and “Ronald Reagan” have log cally sinlar powers. Each serves to pick out an object Yet itis at least arguable that ceplacing the liter by the former in "Reonald Foeagan is thinking of Vienna thee names fall into diferent categories, according to the mive syntactic test. The uncertainty reves the vagueness of the distinction between sense and Here are some examples which suggest thatthe xonomy prodaced by the nave syotactic text places expresions with disimilar logical powers in the same categories By the naive syntactic tex it wold seen tures sense into nonsense IF50, that the category of names would contain not only expressions like Clinton” and "Harry" but ako what logician cll quar plas ike “everyone”, "no one”, souncone”, For example, he esas oF replacing “Clintoa” in “Clinton isa bachelor” by ary of"everyone”."no onc” o¢ “someone” make perfectly good sense. But the logical powers of “"Clinto” and“no one” are very diferent, a brought out by the fact tha (10 i valid but (41) 4 not 18) Clinton is 2 bucheloc So someone isa bachelor. 11) No one is a bachelor, So someone i a bachelor 136|/AlGugh ad theyGeduh in| sents fhe a0) and 4, ine rece one" can be interchanged withéut tuning sense into | eres piace ae os Toya tak ths teu tha they, be evantre a ISBNs vei Beale! NG ofa aor , se oe "elton ever empl et aceptable in contend tee ish). Can you thik of other, pethaps more dedsive, cases? (Ct 11999), (9p. 253-4) r The contrast is exploited by Lewis Carvol [1872 12) “Who did you pas om the road?” the King went on, holding ‘out his hand to the Messenger for some more hay