Monroties in Ukraine History

Ethnic divisions in Ukraine are, to a large extent, a legacy of imperial political geography and
different conceptions of history held by the peoples of the region. Since the thirteenth century,
Ukrainian lands have been at the intersection of shifting empires - the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,
the Ottoman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Crimean Tatar Khanate, Austro-
Hungary and Russia. The prolonged experience of borderland status - Ukraina means borderland
- has produced a society consisting of a variety of religions, cultures, ethnic groups and
languages but little in the way of common institutions to mediate these diverse interests.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet system, which had ensured the primacy of
Russians and Russified regions over other ethnic groups and regions, was challenged by new
political forces, primarily Ukrainian nationalists. The struggle for power that developed from the
late 1980s fostered the emergence of a complex series of interlinked regional and minority
problems.
At the heart of contemporary ethnic relations in Ukraine are the competing historical
interpretations of the region held by different ethno-linguistic groups. The prevailing Ukrainian
historiography, supported particularly by western Ukrainians and the Ukrainian intelligentsia,
identifies the emergence of a Ukrainian people separate from the Russians. It is claimed that this
identity manifested itself on three occasions when something resembling an independent Ukraine
was established: first, the state of Kyivan Rus, which existed from the ninth to the twelfth
centuries and collapsed due to internal unrest and Mongol-Tatar invasion - Kyiv was sacked in
1240; second, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Zaporozhian Cossacks established
a number of autonomous territories within central and eastern Ukraine; finally, in the period 1917-
18 a number of 'Ukraines' came briefly into existence before being crushed by external forces. By
the early 1920s, the territories that constitute modern Ukraine were divided between Romania,
Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.
For Russians, in contrast, Ukraine, in terms of both territory and people, is seen to have been
historically an organic part of Russia. Most Russian historians take Kyivan Rus to be the
forerunner of the modern Russian state. Kyiv occupies a central place in Russia's political
mythology and reclaiming 'Russian' territory lost with the Mongol invasion has been an important
justification for Russian expansion to the west. The territorial vision of the region has been
reinforced by an ethno-cultural theory that links Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians ('three
brotherly peoples') who together constitute 'the Russian people'.
In the past, the Russian interpretation of history has been used to justify the introduction of
Russian institutions into Ukraine, as well as language, culture and Russian settlers. In imperial
Russia, the southern Ukrainian lands were known as Malorossiya (Little Russia) or New Russia,
which with Russia and the lands of Belarus constituted the 'natural' territory of the Russian state.
At the same time, Moscow-inspired policies of modernization fostered a progressive integration of
the Ukrainian borderlands into the political and economic core of the Russian Empire.
In Tsarist Russia Ukrainian was viewed not as a separate language but as a dialect of Russian
and its use as a means of public communication was restricted. The local intelligentsia was also
drawn into the Russian cultural orbit. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was
absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church in the late seventeenth century. Although it was
briefly revived in the 1920s and 1940s, it was not to re-emerge fully until 1990. The western
territories also contained significant numbers of Ukrainians from the Uniate Church.
The Soviet period
While Ukrainian lands remained subordinated to Moscow following the 1917 revolution, Bolshevik
rule did lead to an important change in the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. For the first
time, the view that Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians constituted a single people was officially
repudiated in Moscow. In the years after the civil war, three separate Slavic republics were
established. However, as power was centralized in the Soviet state, pro-Ukrainian policies were
reversed. Russian language became compulsory in all secondary schools throughout the republic
and it became difficult to publish material in Ukrainian.
Along with the establishment of Ukraine as a separate political unit, the most significant change
that took place under Soviet rule was the three-stage territorial annexation along Ukraine's
western border. In 1939, the Red Army occupied the predominately Ukrainian territories of
Poland; in 1940, Soviet Ukraine was extended to include northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia
(from Romania). Finally, in 1945 union with Transcarpathia was effected. In 1954, Nikita
Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation to Ukraine.
Crimea peninsula
In 1944, following liberation from Nazi occupation, the peninsula's populations of Tatars,
Bulgarians, Armenians and Greeks were deported after being accused of collaboration with the
Nazis. In June 1945, the peninsula lost its autonomous status and became part of the Russian
Federation. In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea to the jurisdiction of Ukraine as a
symbol of the friendship between Ukrainians and Russians.
With large numbers of Russians living on the peninsula, the majority of whom were recent
migrants, following independence Crimea became the centre for pro-Russian and secessionist
sentiments in Ukraine. Tension in the area stems from a mixture of fear of Ukrainianization and
Crimea's difficult socio-economic position. The region is one of the poorest in Ukraine and is
overpopulated. The increased pressure on resources brought about by the return of the Tatars
from Central Asia has helped to channel social and economic competition into ethno-political
confrontation. Russians, Tatars and Ukrainians, who are largely settled in the north of the
peninsula, have all sought to establish their own ethnically exclusive organisations.

Peoples

Main languages: Ukrainian, Russian.

Main religions: Christianity (Orthodox and Uniate Catholic).
As recorded in the 2001 census, the main minority groups include Russians 8,334,100 (17.3%),
Belarusians 275,800 (0.6%), Moldovans 258,600 (0.5%), Crimean Tatars 248,200 (0.5%) and
Bulgarians 204,600 (0.4%). Ukraine also has smaller populations of Poles, Jews, Romanians,
Armenians, Hungarians and other nationalities.
By 1989, although Russians were only in the majority in Crimea, they formed sizeable minorities
in many of the other regions. The numerical strength of the Russians is reinforced by the
importance of the Russian language in the republic. The 2001 Ukrainian census indicated that
14.8 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians considered Russian their first language. There continues to be
extensive bilingualism in Ukraine and many of those who identified themselves as Ukrainian-
speakers also know Russian very well. The Russian-Ukrainian linguistic boundary is itself fluid,
especially in the central and eastern parts of the country, where a hybrid vernacular known
as surzhik is widely used.
Since the 1989 census a sizeable emigration has severely depleted the Jewish population, which
in 2001 accounted for 103,600 people or 0.2 per cent of the population. At the same time, a lively
Jewish cultural and religious life has developed in many parts of Ukraine. Jews have also
organized a Jewish Congress. Jews are largely settled in Russified urban areas and the majority
of them are Russian-speakers (91 per cent). The Ukrainian government has made significant
efforts to foster good relations with the Jewish community and has also sought close contacts
with Israel. There are, however, numerous anti-Semitic groups active in Ukraine.
There are 151,000 Romanians and 258,600 Moldovans in Ukraine. Determining the exact
number of each group is controversial because of uncertainty about the nature of Moldovan
identity (see Moldova). Northern Bukovyna (Chernivtsi) and southern Bessarabia (parts of the
Odessa Oblast) were transferred from Romania to the UkSSR under the terms of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact (23 August 1939). The Romanian/Moldovan population of Chernivsti has been
active since independence demanding cultural and political concessions from the Ukrainian
Government, particularly special language rights in areas of compact settlement.
In December 1991, some Romanians/Moldovans in Chernivsti are reported to have boycotted the
referendum on Ukrainian independence. The Romanian government declared the referendum
void in the area and has sought to raise the issue of the 1939 territorial transfer in negotiations
with Ukraine. The Ukrainian government has refused to discuss the territorial question or to
repudiate the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement.
Ethnic Bulgarians are concentrated in the Odessa region, around the town of Bolhrad and on the
Zaporizhian coast. As with the Bulgarians in Moldova, the Bulgarian government has sought to
build ties to the Bulgarian minority in Ukraine.
In 1941, 350,000 Germans were exiled from Ukraine. In 1992 Germany and Ukraine agreed that
Ukraine would resettle up to 400,000 Germans from Russia/Kazakhstan in the southern districts
of Ukraine. Settlement has been limited, with most Germans preferring to relocate to Germany
itself. Those Germans who have moved to Ukraine have received some assistance from the
German government.

Governance

The long history of settlement by different peoples in Ukraine has created a set of overlapping
and competitive identities among the population. With the territory of contemporary Ukraine only
unified in the last fifty years and an independent Ukraine an even more recent development,
uniting these diverse peoples within a single state has proved difficult. Following the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, forging a national identity capable of uniting the various
regions and peoples of Ukraine became one of the central tasks facing the Ukrainian leadership.
The range of identities that have emerged in Ukraine over the centuries have since independence
manifested themselves in the form of ethno-regionalist movements. Ukraine's relationship to
Russia has been especially difficult because of the large number of Russians in Ukraine and the
shared history, as well as the close cultural and linguistic ties between Ukrainians and Russians.
In response to these challenges, the Ukrainian political elite has, with important exceptions,
sought to foster a multiethnic and territorial sense of nationhood among the population.
Ukrainianization has been pursued in a perfunctory fashion and has been largely abandoned in
heavily Russified regions. The liberal legislation on minority issues and the moderate reaction of
the Ukrainian Government to ethnic questions, notably the secessionist movement in Crimea,
indicate that the majority of politicians view Ukraine in terms of a melting pot for different peoples
and cultures rather than as an ethnically defined state.
Perestroika
The political liberalization that accompanied Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms led to the emergence of
a variety of nationalist groups. The activity of these groups reinforced the patchwork of ethnic and
linguistic identities that have developed in the region over the past 200 years. Ethno-regionalism
quickly became the primary fault line in Ukrainian society. However, the leading pro-
independence organization was the moderate Rukh. The dominance of Rukh, coupled with the
conversion of much of the Ukrainian communist leadership to the cause of Ukrainian nationhood,
undermined the position of the ethno-nationalists and allowed for a civic definition of an
independent Ukraine. The largely non-ethnic notion of Ukraine was codified in a series of
legislative acts.
The Law on Languages (October 1989) provided for 'the free use of Russian as a language of
interethnic discourse', although Russian was not granted the status of a state language. The law
also stipulated a gradual transition to Ukrainian. The Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty
(July 1990) guaranteed 'all nationalities that reside on the territory of the republic the right to
national-cultural development'. The Law on Citizenship (October 1991) utilized the 'zero'
citizenship principle: granting citizenship to everyone permanently resident in Ukraine at the date
the law came into force in Ukraine prior to independence irrespective of ethnicity. The Declaration
of the Rights of Nationalities (November 1991) established a broad range of minority rights, while
the Law on National Minorities (June 1992) provided state support for the development of
minorities. A Ministry of Nationalities and Migration was set up in spring 1993.
On 28 June 1996 Ukraine's parliament adopted a new constitution. Ukrainian was designated the
official language of the state, but the constitution also allowed for the free development of other
ethnic languages used by Ukrainian citizens. Only a single citizenship is recognized, a blow for
many among the Russian community who had sought a dual citizenship regime. Although the
constitution stipulates that Ukraine is a unitary state, special provisions are made for the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
Crimea
In 20 January 1991, the Crimean Communist Party organized a referendum on the question of
reviving the Crimea's status as an autonomous region within the UkSSR. Of those who voted,
93.26 per cent supported a change of status. In July 1991, Russian became the official language
of the peninsula. In August the Republican Movement of Crimea (RDK), a Russian nationalist
organization led by Yurii Meshkov, was formed. On 4 September 1991, the Crimean Supreme
Soviet voted to declare sovereignty over Crimea. In December 1991, only 54 per cent of the
population of Crimea voted for Ukrainian independence. The RDK reached the height of its
influence in mid-1992. On 5 May 1992, the Crimean Soviet declared independence (although this
was subsequently suspended). By early December 1993, the movement had split into various
factions. Unity was temporarily restored to the nationalists in December 1993 with the
establishment of the 'Russia' bloc to promote Meshkov's presidential campaign.
The election of Meshkov as President of Crimea in January 1994, gaining 70 per cent of the vote,
led to a significant rise in tensions between Kyiv and Simferopol as Crimea seemed to be moving
towards independence. On 27 March, a majority voted in support of the 'consultative' questions
that Meshkov had placed on the ballot for national elections (the creation of dual citizenship
provisions on the peninsula and for relations with Ukraine to be conducted on the basis of
bilateral agreements). The Russia bloc also won a large majority (54 of 94 seats) in the Crimean
Parliament.
While these results appeared to set the stage for a major confrontation between Kyiv and
Simferopol, in fact they were the prelude to a dramatic disintegration of the Russian nationalist
movement on the peninsula. Underlying this political collapse was an increasing dispute about
economic reform and, in particular, a fight to control privatization. In autumn 1994, the growing
dispute about the direction of economic reform came to a head in a bitter confrontation between
the parliament and the president. The pro-Russia political elite in Crimea gradually disintegrated.
On 21 March 1995, President Kuchma issued a decree placing the Crimean government directly
under Kyiv's control. Friction between Kyiv and the Crimean parliament continued to cause
instability amongst the Crimean political elite. In early summer 1995 Yevhen Suprunik, a less
confrontational figure, was elected leader of the Crimean parliament. Suprunik was himself
replaced as Crimean parliamentary speaker in the autumn of 1996 by Vasyl Kyselyov. At the end
of February 1996 a new Crimean prime minister, Arkadii Demydenko, was appointed in place of
Anatolii Franchuk, who was dismissed in December 1995 because of his alleged support for
Kyiv's politics towards the peninsula.
Despite the collapse of the Russian nationalist movement, minority questions remained acute in
Crimea. The presence of the Russian military in Sevastopol offers hope to Russian nationalists
that the peninsula may eventually be unified with Russia. The dominance of the Russian
language in the region has meant that local Ukrainians have found it extremely difficult to
organize the teaching of Ukrainian in schools.
In 1989 the total population of the Crimean peninsula (area 27,000 sq km) stood at 2,430,495, of
whom 1,629,542 (67 per cent) were Russians, 625,919 (25.8 per cent) Ukrainians, of whom 47
per cent were Russian-speakers, 38,365 (1.6 per cent) were Crimean Tatars, and 136,669 (5.6
per cent) other nationalities.
The 2001 census shows that the overall population of Crimea has declined slightly, by 1 per cent,
from 2,063,600 in 1989 to 2,033,700. The proportion of ethnic Russians in the Crimean
population has declined from 65.6 per cent in 1989 to 58.3 per cent in the 2001 census. Of the
total, 1,180,400 are Russians, 492,200 are Ukrainians (a decline from 26.7 per cent in 1989 to
24.3 per cent in 2001), and 243,400 are Crimean Tatars - a dramatic increase from 1.9 per cent
in 1989 to 12 per cent in 2001. It should be noted that the numbers of returning Crimean Tatars
peaked, at 41,400 in 1991, and have been rapidly falling in each year since. It is believed that if
these trends continue, then by the next census in 2011 Crimea will have lost its position as the
only Ukrainian region with an ethnic Russian majority.
The return of Crimean Tatars continued to cause friction. Although supported by the authorities in
Kyiv, not least because they opposed the Russian nationalists on the peninsula, Tatars received
insufficient financial assistance to support their repatriation programme. Unemployment among
Tatars was extremely high. The intense competition for land means that Tatars have been forced
to settle in the least fertile parts of Crimea. In summer 1995, frustration at the economic situation
led to confrontation with an allegedly criminal group that developed into a major confrontation
with the police. A number of Tatars were killed.
Tatars also achieved important political successes with Tatar representatives playing a prominent
role in the regional parliament.
Russian-Ukrainian relations
Minority issues have been at the heart of relations between Moscow and Kyiv since 1991. A
variety of radical nationalist groups in Russian sought to provoke conflict over the question of
Russian-speakers in Ukraine. With the destruction of the Russian Supreme Soviet, a centre for
these groups, in October 1993, such activity diminished considerably. The Russian Government
has, however, promoted its own minority-based agenda at interstate negotiations. Since early
1994, Russia has sought dual citizenship for Russians living in Ukraine, a move fiercely resisted
by Kyiv.
The question of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet, which is largely staffed by ethnic Russians,
has also been important. Sevastopol is seen as a symbol of the Russian identity of Crimea. A
decision to examine the status of the city was taken at the Seventh Congress of People's
Deputies. In 1995, members of the Russian Duma again sought to raise the question of
Sevastopol through the Russian Supreme Court. In June 1993, Russia and Ukraine agreed to
divide the fleet, causing a rise of tension in the region. Subsequently, however, the agreement
was not implemented and disagreement about ownership of the fleet and where it should be
based, along with the question of dual citizenship, became the main stumbling blocks to the
conclusion of a treaty of friendship between Kyiv and Moscow.
The Orange Revolution and after
Ukrainian politics changed radically as a result of the 21 November 2004 presidential election.
Peaceful protests against widespread fraud and the alleged victory of Leonid Kuchma's chosen
'successor' Viktor Yanukovych resulted in the annulling of the election result by the Supreme
Court. In a repeat election on 26 December, Viktor Yushchenko, a former minister with an overtly
pro-Western orientation, was elected president with 52% of the vote. This relatively small margin
of victory compared to most presidential elections in the post-Soviet region reflected the reality of
what some analysts have called 'the two Ukraines' - a nationalist Ukraine, concentrated in the
west of the country and Kyiv, oriented towards a Ukrainian identity, the Ukrainian language,
Europe and the West, and Russian-oriented Ukraine, comprising both some russophone
Ukrainians and the substantial Russian population living in the east and south, oriented towards
Russia and the Russian language.
This reality shaped the subsequent course of the Orange Revolution in ways very different to the
former Soviet Union's other 'colour revolutions'. Internal divisions within the leadership of the
Orange Revolution, compounded by the failure of the administration to successfully gain the
support of the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) for its reformist agenda, led to
President Yushchenko's dismissal in September 2004 of the Cabinet formed by his former ally
Yuliya Tymoshenko. The Yushchenko-Tymoshenko split further compromised chances of
sufficient unity in parliament to pass new legislation, contributing to political paralysis in the
legislature. Following a national crisis over Ukraine's gas supply, in which Russia briefly severed
gas supplies to the country, the Verkhovna Rada voted to dismiss the government in January
2006, further weakening Yushchenko in the run-up to the March 2006 parliamentary elections.
Yushchenko's authority was further compromised by poor economic performance in the aftermath
of the Orange revolution (GDP fell from 12.5 per cent in 2004 to just 2.5 per cent for 2005)
The March 2006 parliamentary elections inaugurated a new period of political crisis. The
elections saw the political return of Yanukovych as leader of the Party of the regions, a party
ostensibly representing the interests of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, including demands for
Russian to be instated as an official language in the republic. While international observers and
the European parliament praised the conduct of the elections, the results revealed the
devastating diminution of President Yushchenko's standing in the republic. His party came third
with 13.9 per cent of the vote, trailing Yuliya Tymoshenko's bloc (22.3 per cent) and the victorious
Party of the Regions (32.1 per cent). A prolonged period of crisis ensued as the three leading
parties attempted to strike coalition deals satisfying their respective ambitions. After three months
of negotiations Yushchenko and Tymoshenko agreed to form a coalition government with the
additional participation of the Socialist party. This deal later broke down, giving Yanukovych the
chance to emerge as prime-minister. But in an extraordinary twist, parliamentary elections in
2007, saw Tymoshenko and Yushchenko forge an alliance again, and after a prolonged period of
horse-trading and wrangling, Tymoshenko emerged as prime-minister for the second time - albeit
with a narrow majority, and at the price of a fragile multi-party coalition.
While the 2004 presidential campaign in the Ukraine had a strong impact on the ethnic sphere of
Ukrainian society, the present Ukrainian government has yet to approve any relevant
comprehensive legislative documents to improve the current legislative framework on minorities.
Unlike the 1990s, which witnessed a proliferation of legislation on minorities, 2004 and 2005 did
not meet the expectations of many Ukrainian citizens, who hoped for drastic positive changes in
the sphere of ethnic policy. Of 16 projects registered at the Parliamentary Committee on Human
Rights, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations, only three dealt with ethno-political issues.
One of these projects, on the renewal of the rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds, had
been considered by the Ukrainian parliament and approved at the second reading but was vetoed
by the former president.
On acceding to the Council of Europe in 1995, Ukraine committed itself to a long list of
commitments, including ratification of the main CoE treaties. The Framework Convention was
ratified by the Verkhovna Rada on 9 December 1997, and entered into force on 1 May 1998.
Ukraine signed the European Languages Charter on 2 May 1996, and on 24 December 1999 the
Verkhovna Rada enacted a law to ratify it. However, on 12 July 2000 the constitution court
declared unconstitutional the law on ratification of the Charter. On 15 May 2003, the Ukrainian
Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) once again voted to ratify the Charter. Ukraine's Instrument of
Ratification was only deposited in Strasbourg on 19 September 2005, and the Charter came into
force on 1 January 2006. However, the Instrument has not yet been placed on the Council of
Europe's web- site. The Charter has proved enormously controversial, with a number of regions
declaring Russian to be the 'regional language', supposedly on the basis of the Charter.
Another law on the concept of minority rights policy is still under consideration, but the absence of
a comprehensive minority rights law creates contradictions in Ukrainian legislation and difficulties
in the exercise of human rights. While there is a political will to establish a comprehensive
legislative framework on minorities, there is a lack of consensus among the main authorities over
the key terms and concepts to be included. There is also a disagreement on what type of nation
the Ukraine should be, poly-ethnic, multicultural or both. The new president of the Ukraine, Viktor
Yushchenko has expressed a desire to overhaul the Ukrainian legislation on minorities in order to
bring it up to European standards, including the existing law on national minorities adopted in
1992 which does not contain any provisions on the Crimean Tatars. This affected those Crimean
Tatars who returned to their homeland after 1991 and found that they were denied citizenship
rights, access to education, employment and housing.
In May 2006 Ukraine was elected to the new United Nations Human Rights Council, raising the
profile of its international commitments in different fields, including minority rights.
Sources and further reading
General
Bowring, Bill 'The Crimean autonomy: innovation or anomaly?' in Marc Weller and Stefan
Wolff Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution: Innovative approaches to institutional
design in divided societies (Routledge, 2005) pp.75-97
Bowring, Bill 'Between a (Russian) rock and a (Crimean Tatar) hard place? Ethnic, linguistic and
minority issues' in Ann Lewis (ed) Ukraine and the EU: Neighbours, Friends, Partners? (The
Federal Trust, 2002)
Bowring, Bill 'New Nations and National Minorities: Ukraine and the Question of Citizenship' in
Peter Cumper and Steven Wheatley (eds) Minority Rights in the 'New' Europe (Kluwer Law
International 1999)
Kuzio, Taras. 'From Kuchma to Yushchenko. 'Ukraine's Presidential Elections and the Orange
Revolution'. Problems of Post-Communism 52, no.2 (March-April 2005).
Motyl, A.J., Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism, New York, Council of
Foreign Relations, 1993.
MRG (ed.), Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, London, MRG report, 1993.
Sasse, Gwendolyn. 'Conflict-Prevention in a Transition State: The Crimean Issue in Post-Soviet
Ukraine'. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 8, no.2 (2002): 1-26.
The 'New' Ukraine: A State of Regions'. Regional and Federal Studies 11, Special Issue No.3
(2001).
Subtelny, O., Ukraine: a History, 2nd edn, London, Macmillan, 1994.
Wilson, A., The Crimean Tatars, London, International Alert, 1994.
Wilson, A. A Minority Faith: Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997.
Russians and Russian-speakers
Barrington, Lowell W. and Erik S. Herron. 'One Ukraine or many? Regionalism in Ukraine and its
political consequences'. Nationalities Papers 32, No.1 (March 2004).
Laitin, David D. Identity in Formation. The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad.
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998).
Minorities at Risk, Assessment for Crimean Russians in
Ukraine: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=36905
Minorities at Risk, Assessment for Russians of
Ukraine: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=36902
Rodgers, Peter. 'Understanding Regionalism and the Politics of Identity in Ukraine's Eastern
Borderlands'. Nationalities Papers 34, No.2 (May 2006)
Russians
Profile

According to the 2001 census, there are 8,334,100 Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine.
recorded in the 2001 census Russians dominate industry, administration and education in the
urban areas of the east and south. By 1989, although Russians were only in the majority in
Crimea, they formed sizeable minorities in many of the other regions - Donets'k (43.6 per cent),
Luhans'k (44.8 per cent), Kharkiv (33.2 per cent), Dnipropetrovs'k (24.2 per cent), Zaporozhia (32
per cent) and Odesa (27.4 per cent). The post-independence period saw a reduction in the
numbers of Russians in Ukraine, who accounted for 17.3 per cent of the republic's population
according to the 2001 census.
The numerical strength of the Russians is reinforced by the importance of the Russian language
in the public. The 2001 census indicated that 14.8 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians considered
Russian their first language; in Crimea more than two-thirds of the population claimed Russian as
its native language. There continues to be extensive bilingualism in Ukraine and many of those
who identified themselves as Ukrainian-speakers also know Russian very well. The linguistic
boundary between Russian and Ukrainian is in any case fluid, with a hybrid vernacular combining
vocabulary and syntax from both languages, known as surzhik, widely spoken in the east and
south of the country.

Historical context

Significant Russian settlement in the region occurred towards the end of the eighteenth century
when the northern Black Sea littoral region was officially opened up to Russian settlement. The
Russian conquest of Crimea from the Ottomans in 1783 brought new opportunities for Russian
settlement in southern lands. With rapid industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, significant numbers of Russians moved to urban centres in Ukraine. Between 1890 and
1930, 2 million Russians settled in Ukraine, primarily in the east. In the 1930s, a further million
Russians moved to Ukraine. The Russian community also absorbed other national groups and
minorities, notably Serbs, Greeks and Jews.
Following the Second World War, significant numbers of Russians settled in connection with
postwar reconstruction, especially in the eastern industrial regions. In the 1960s there was a
surge in Russian immigration. Between 1959 and 1989, the number of Russians as a percentage
of the Ukrainian population rose from 16.9 per cent to 22.1 per cent (7.1 million to 11.36 million).
In this period, the largest numbers of Russians went to Crimea.
Following independence, fears of separatist activity by Russians caused considerable alarm in
Kyiv. The geographical proximity of the heavily Russified east and Crimea to the Russian
Federation prompted fears of a possible unification of these areas with Russia. Growing divisions
in Ukrainian society were clearly apparent when, in June 1992, the formation of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church divided the orthodox religious community, with many remaining loyal to the
Moscow Patriarchate.
In general with the exception of Crimea, the main thrust of Russian/Russian-speakers' demands
has been towards increased autonomy and protection of the Russian language rather than
secession from Ukraine. In a referendum in December 1991, large numbers of Russians voted for
independence. The electoral success of representatives from the east and south of Ukraine -
including President Kuchma - in 1994 also helped to weaken demands for secession or
unification with Russia. However, important divisions remain in Ukrainian society; the most
explosive issue is that of Crimea.
Current issues

The Russian-Ukrainian axis in Ukraine emerged as a prominent division in the events known as
the Orange Revolution in 2004. The political agendas of presidential candidates Viktor
Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych reflected contrasting pro-European and pro-Russian
orientations, which served to further politicize the Ukrainian-Russian axis in Ukraine. This trend
was certainly exacerbated by media representations both in Ukraine and in the international
arena portraying the presidential contest in terms of Ukrainian-Russian divides. Russia's
involvement in the form of two visits to Kyiv by President Vladimir Putin during the campaign and
two public congratulations on Yanukovych's initial victory further served to polarize the electorate.
In the immediate aftermath of Yushchenko's victory in the repeat elections speculation ensued
regarding the possible division of Ukraine or secessions of Russian-dominated areas. This was
certainly exaggerated conjecture, over-emphasizing Russians' desires for separateness rather
than the extent to which ukrainophone and russophone populations imagine Ukrainian identity in
different ways. The adoption of raising the Russian language's status to that of official language
as a platform by Yanukovych's Party of the Regions reflected both desires among Russians for
raising the profile of Russian culture as a component of Ukrainian politics and an effective
campaigning strategy for the Party of the Regions. Following the March 2006 parliamentary
elections, numerous regions in the east and south of the country, including Kharkiv and the
Crimean capital Sevastopol, attempted to unilaterally raise Russian's status to that of an official
language at the regional level. In February 2006 the Crimean chapter of the Party of the Regions
also collected signatures in support of a referendum on raising the status of Russian in Crimea.
Kyiv resisted these attempts, labelling them unconstitutional as the constitution recognizes only
Ukrainian as a state language.
While prime minister, however, Yanukovych opted for a softer line on the Russian language
issue. In August 2006 he stated that while he still saw the need for the Russian language to
acquire official status, this would involve either a complex legislative process or a referendum,
neither of which - in his view - were feasible at present. He suggested instead a law regulating the
use of Russian and enforcement of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages.
This change of tack suggests that promoting Russian was seen as an effective electoral platform
rather than an actual policy imperative. Moreover, it may also reflect the fact that the Ukrainian-
Russian divide is not as politically decisive as many media representations would predict.
According to some analysts, the schematic division of Ukraine as a country divided between east
and west along a Ukrainian-Russian axis is overstated. For instance, it has been pointed out that
support for Yushchenko within eastern Ukraine in the 2004 election varied significantly. In his
native city of Sumy he garnered 79.5 per cent of the vote; in Kharkiv he gained 26.4 per cent and
in Luhans'k only 6.2 per cent. Yet all three cities lie close to the Russian-Ukrainian border,
suggesting that a monolithic view of eastern Ukraine may be misplaced and may, indeed, support
political agendas emanating from the western parts of the country. Critics of the 'two Ukraines'
argument suggest instead that ethnic and regional cleavages are cross-cutting rather than
mutually reinforcing.