/ ***************** + ********«£

: INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH *

I L STUDY OF THE CONQUKST OP MANCHURIA *

* *

* BY TH3 JAPANESE *

i* i

J R. 0. Breene *

» Captain,A.C. *

 INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH STUDY

"A STUDY OF THB CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA BY THB JAPANESE."

3ubmitted by:

ROBERT 0. BRK&NB

Captain, A. 0.

The Command and General Staff School

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1935

 FORBWORP

This study oonslsts of one general situation end three

epeolal situations. Under eaoh speoial situation the ue­

sision cf the Japanese commander la given, followed by:

1st. Requirement: How would the Sohool solve the situation?

8d. Requir<*ment: How was it aotually solred?

8d. Requirement: A dlsousslon of the points of Alfferenoe.

Throughout this paper little mention is maae of easual­

tles on either Aide. This omission is deliberate for the

writer has been unable to find those data whioh ho oonsld­

ered reliable. There are two reasons for the laok of in­
formation: first, the Japanese wished to minimize their losses

and seoond, the Chinese always maintained their losses were

greater than they aotually were.

Although In vhe dlsouflsf.pns there are many points of

dlfferenoe between the Sohool dootrice and the operations of

the Japanese, it should alwuyn be kept In mind that the Jap­

anese operations were suooesuful* MANCHOUKUO was oooupled

at a minimum ooat in men and ;ucn&y.

-1­
 Between 18 September 1931 and 6 Mar oh 105bt the Jap­
anese oonquered MANCHURIA and JEHOL. The Chinese have al­
ways oelled MANCHURIA the "Three Eastern Provinces" and have

maintained the position that JEHOL provinoe waa in no way a

part of MANCHURIA. Japan haa maintained that JEHOL la a

part of MANCHURIA, baaing her olalm on two faota, namely;

first, that In 1929 while UANCHUBIA was still under the

sovereignty of China, that area waa reconstituted to inolude

the Provinoe of JEHOL as well as the three provinces of KIRIN,

FEHGTISN, and HBILTJNGKIANG and MANCHURIA*a designation changed

from the "Three Eastern Provinces" to the "Four Northeastern

Provinces"; and aeoond, that when UANCHUBIA declared its

"independence" of China In March, 193B General Tang Yu-lin,

Governor of JEHOL signed the declaration of independence for

JEHOL, and by this aot automatically incorporated It into the

New State of MANCH0UKU0. The foot at the present time la that

JEHOL la a part of MANCHURIA.

The "Three Eaatern Provinces" oomprise an area ap­

proximately as large as FRANCE and GERMANY combined, esti­
mated at 580,000 square miles. The area of JEHOL Is ap­
proximately 100,000 square miles.

No aoourate census has ever been made of the population

of the Three Eastern Provinoea but It is estimated at 30,000,000

divided as follows:­
Chinese or assimilated Manohus 88,000,000
Koreans 800,000
Russians 150,000
Japanese £30,000

-2­
 There ere two prominent ranges of mountains (see

topographical map} In the "Three Eastern Provinces".

The ORBAT KHINO RANOB lies In the northwestern area and

the CKANGPAI RANGE lies In the south east. Between these

lies the GRKAT UANCHURIAN PLAIN. A low divide crosses

this plain generally from northwest to southeast. The

northern portion of the GREAT PLAIN drains into the SUNOARI

RIVERi the southern portion into the LJ.AO RIVER.

The Province of JEHOL is oharaoterlzed by high pre­

cipitous mountains in the weet* These slope off to the

east until et the eastern border the eountry Is fairly

level and fertile, with ample rain for the cultivation of

the Poppy.

The main rail systems form a greet T. See Map #6.

The Chinese Eastern Railway runs from MANCHOULI through

HARBIN to POGRANICHNAYA and from HARBIN to HSINKINO (CHANGCHUN).

This railroad was built and owned jointly by RUSSIA and CHINA.

It is wide gage as are other Russian roads. The Russians

have sold their Interest to the MANCHUKUO government and

the Chinese Interest has been taken over by that government.

The South Uanohuria Railway* main line runs from HSINXINO

(CHANGCHUN) to DAIRBN. This line was built by the Japanese

and with the concessions whieh went with it, was, prior to

September 1931, her main interest in MANCHURIA. It should

be particularly noted that Japan was granted authority by

the Chinese government to use her (Japan's) troops to police

the Railway zone. This plaoed Japan's Military forees at the

plaoe where they were to be used, not days but years in ad­
vanoft of the date for use.

-3­
 The Peiping-Mukden Hallway, ficenoed by a British

loan, was built and operated by the Chinese. The main

line operates from MUKDRN to PKIPING. This line with

other Chinese ralla running generally west of the South

Uanohurla Railway was, prior to the oooupatlona, able to

compete with the Japanese ralla with considerable auooese.

These Chinese lines were a oonatant souroe of irritation

to the Japanese and were one of the minor oausea of the

oooupation.

The new line connecting KIR IN to TUMEN is no oom­

pleted. It was in part built by the Chinese but the

eonneoting link between TUNHUA and TIENPAQSBAN was built

by the Japanese. It gives them a short line from Japan

into the heart of MANCHURIA making the long water haul

around KOREA through the YELLOW SEA unnecessary.

All rail lines are single traok exoept the South

Uanohurla Railway which is double traok for praotioally

the entire length of the main line from DARIEN to CHANGCHUN,

There are no railways in the Provinoe of JEHOL.

There are, throughout MANCHURIA) no Improved roade in

the sense in whloh we use that term. Moat of the roads

would be considered trails, here. The roede in JEHOL are

even worse than those of the "Three Eastern Provinces11.

Bridget over tne streams are very few and not to be relied

up en.

The summers are hot and have suriioient rains lor all

orops. There is rain in plenty to make the roads whloh do

exist, almost Impassable to any considerable amount of

wheeled transportation including animal drawn transport*

The winters are extreme, temperatures of 30 degrees below

-4­
zero, Fahrenheit, and lower, being common.

The road situation limited all aotive campaign to the

extremely oold weather during vrhioh time, all rivers beoome

highways and at least animal orawn transport oan move a­

oross oountry.

-5­
 It is not within the provinoe of this *«p0r-to traoe

the oauaes of tne Japanese ooouflation of MANCHURIA, but a

tabulation of some of those whioh are believed to be the

main causes follow:

1. The population pressure in Japan.

3* Lack of raw materials; iron, ooal, oil and precious

minerals in Japan,

9. The neoessity for more agricultural lands.

4. Tho almost fanatioal belief by the Japanese that

they must oontrol Asia*

5. The faot that UANCHPRIA answers all the needs of

Japan stated in 1, 8 and 9 above.

The Japanese listea three hundred incidents whioh they

maintained were tte oause of the oooupation but cone of these

oan be seriously considered when oomparea to those listed

aboTe.

 On 18 September 1931 the stage had been set for the

first step in the oooup&tion of MANCHURIA by the Japanese.

Russia was oooupied with her internal problems. The

other great powers did not, the Japanese belisved, have

sufficient interest in the oountry to fight C'iina's battle.

The Japanese had many decisions to make. A faulty

deoision on this, the time of the beginning of the ooou­

pation, would have been most oostly and might have been

disastrous, not only to the operation but to the Japanese

Empire. The deoision made was perfect. No nation made

any serious effort to stop the oonquest and certainly none

showed any willingness to take up arm* in the struggle to

hold MANCHURIA within the Chinese Republic.

China at this time was in her ohronio state of dis­

order. The BC called Republio of the south, with it's

oapital at CANTON, was holding the gains made In spite of

the efforts of the Central Government to oonquer the terri­

tory held. This struggle was ; 'pping the strength of the

Central Government as it is continuing to do up to this

date. All of North China, though nominally loyal to the

Central Government, was dominated by various war lords.

The oentral policy of eaoh, being power for himself rather

than loyalty to his oountry.

-7­
GKNT5RAL SITUATION. ^

The Conquest of MANCHURIA divided Into three ohron­

ologloal phaaen:­
1. Tho Seizure of MUKDEN and the South.

2. The Capture of KiRBIN and the North.

6, 'me Oooupatlou of JKHOL.

These will be oealt with In the order named.

Main Foroes - Chinese

On 10 September 1932 In MANCHURIA there were between

150,000 and 280,000 Chinese regular Vroops under tho orders

of Marshal Chang Haueh-lieng. There were in North China

(south of THK OB EAT WALL of China) not less than 150,000

additional troops. These troops were armed with modern

rifles and had abundant ammunition. There was little

artillery, few motor vehJoles, no tanks or armored oars

available to these troopr,. There were twelve airplanes

(observation) at the MUKDEN airdrome* The morale proved

to be ao low as to approaoh zero, this was not realized

prior to the first engagement. The leadership may be

considered to have been on the aam level as the morale.

The one great store of supplies was the MUKDEN ar­

senal. This arsenal, buiXt and equipped at a oost of

about #100,000,000 gold, was found by the Japanese, when

oooupied, to have a tremendous store of munitions of all

types, most of which we' *. -. ». The faot that a

large part of the muni^cns of Jap ana a e manufaoture

is an interesting side ligL

-8­
 Main 7oroes - Japanese

The Japanese foroea in MANCHURIA at this time, con­

sisted of a foroe of approximately 10,000 Japanese troops

of all arms including all railway guard battalions.

Locations of troops both Chinese and Japanese were

a& »noun on Map No. 7.

The mission of the Japanese foroes was "To Oo~upj

and to Paolfy 1UNCHUBIA".

The first problem from the International viewpoint

was to decide the exact time to begin operations, whloh

has been dlsoussjd previously!

The second problem to be solved was; was September

18,1991 the oorreot time to begin operations to permit

of gains in and around MUKDEN to be consolidated and the

foroe moTed north, in sufficient time to oooupy HARBIN and

the north, while ground and rivers were so frozen as to

permit movement across country*

The answer as will be seen, is that the oooupation of

MUKDEN might have been delayed for approximately one month,

The reason given for the attack of tha North Barracks

at MUKDEN wus that at 10:SO P.M. on September 18, 1931,

Chinese troops set off a oharge of explosive on the rails

of the South Manohuria Railway destroying 31 inches of

main line rail* See UAjffQlD The faots appear to be that

there was an explosion in the vioinity of the rails, whloh

did no demage to the roils* The south bound train duo

at MUKDEN at 10:30 P.M. arrived on time.

-9­
SPECIAL SITUATION

Japanese

Tha mlsslCQ of the Japanese foroes:- to oapturt

North Barracks, (see Map #3) destroy the Chinese foroes

therein and oocupy MUKDKN.

The Japanese foroes available for this operation

were those shown on Map f8, disposed as shown* The

Japanese 0' mmander was familiar srith the disposition*

and strength of the Chinese troop* as shown on Uap #8.

The total Chinese foroes approximated 10,000; the total

Japanese foroes 600* The Japanese Commander was aware

of the low morale, laok of preparation and generally lax

ulsoipllne of the Chinese troops.

-10­
 The Deoislon of Lieutenant General Honjo.

(It i s not possible to give tne ezaot time of the de­

cision but it is evident that lie arrived at hi* deolslon
far in advance of 18 September.)
To attaok, at 10:50 P.M. 16 September, 1931, the
Forth Barraoka from the west, oanturlng the BarraokA ana
Radio Station and driving the tfft £9 therein to the east
and to oeeupy the elty o? MUKDEN and capture the Arsenal
and Airdrone*

-XI­
FIRST RBQUIRElaT&NT:
How Would the Sohool Solve the Requirement?
SOLUTION.
(It must be assumed that this solution is based on the

same complete information of Chinese morale and probable

Intentions as was possessed V' the Japanese•)

To attack the North Barracks, including the Radio

Station; the walled city of MUKDKN, inoluding the Arsenal

and the East Barraokaj and the Avxati^n field at daylight

19 September, oaoupying these localities as rapidly as

possible and with a minimum destruction of life Ipar­

tioularly civilian) and property^

One rogiment of Infantry with one battalion of Field

Artillory (7Cmm) and one platoon light Tanks to oapture

the Aviation i'itld and the equipment thereon and the North

Barracks, the attack on the latter to be from at least two

directions, east and west, simultaneously. One brigade

of Infantry with one regiment of Field Artillery, one troop

of Cavalry and one Tank oompany (leso one platoon) to

attack and oooupy the walled oity of MUKDEN.

All troops to use every effort to preserve seoreoy in

movementa to attack positions.

-1R­
SECOND REQUIREMENT:

How was thle Situation Solved?

SOLUTION.

During the nights of 14-15-16-17 September, the

Japanode had been carrying out night maneuvers a3 *ng

the rails north of MUKDEN and around the North Barraoks.

At 10:80 P.M. 18 September, Lieutenant Kawamoto, with

six men of the 3d Company, was "praotising defense ex­

ercises" about one fifth of a mile from xha explosion

previously disoussed. This patrol then moved as shown

(see Map #8) and Joined No. 3 Company of End Railway

Ouard battalion about fifteen hundred yard to the north.

The battalion ooramander, Lieutenant Colonel Shimamato at

MUKDEN ordered the 1st and 4th Companies at MUKDEN to en­

train at onoe for the LIUTIAOHU station (diatanoe of S 8/3

miles.) These companies arrived shortly after midnight.

The 2nd Company at FUSHUN was aireoted to entrain at onoe

for LIULIAOHU stetion. It arrived at the Barraoka at

about 1:30 A.M. The three companies, 1st, 3rd und 4th,

attacked the west side of the Barraoks pieoemoal, 1st

Company at 11:30 P.M., thu 3rd and 4th at 18:30 A.M.

There was no determined resistanoe offered and little of

any kind. Almost the only firing by the Chinese during

the oapture of the Barraoks was by the Sn^ batalllon of

the 6M0th regiment. This organization only fought it's

way out when the linn of retreat was out off. By daylight

the Barraoks was burning end all of the 10,000 Chinese

troops were in flight, generally to the north east. The

only artillery fired was at the south gate whloh was blown

-13­
in by two shells from a small Chinese oannoii found out­
side the wall*

The Japanese losses in this operation were two

killed and twenty two wounded. The Chinese losses

(Japanese figures) were 320 dead aad 32, known, wounded.

Colonel Hirata at MUKDEN was notified by 10:40 P.M.

that Lieutenant Colonel Shimanxoto was about to start the

attaok of the North Barraoks. He, Colonel Hirata, at onoe

assembled the 14th, 29th and 30th regiments of the 2nd

Division for the attaok on MUKDEN and attaoked from the

east at 1:00 A.M. By 6:00 A.M. the eastern wall of the

oity of MUKDEN and the Aroenal was oooupled, the oity

being overrun immediately thereafter. The Aviation Field

was oooupled at about 8:00 A.M. the same day, and with it,

all the airplanes and airplane stores then available to

the Chinese in MANCHURIA were taken. The Japanese losses

in this part of bhe action were, seven wounded, probably

from stray Japanese bullets. No estimate oan be given

of Chinese oasualties but it oan be stated with considerable

oertainty that NWiy Civil Polioe end olviliens were casual­

ties.

-14­
THIRD REQUIREMENT:

A Disoussion of Points of Pifferenoe.

SOLUTION.

The time of attaok of the Korth Barraoks at 11:50

P.M. wee not aooordlng to the teaohlngs of tnis Sjhool.

The attaok at or shortly before daylight would have been

preferable.

The number of troops assigned to the task. It

appears that the Japanese went to great extremes in

eoonomy of foroo einoe only 600 were used In the attaok.

The Sohool would have used a greater number. The oom­

plete suooess of the Japanese doos not alter the faot

that the use of such small foroe was a dangerous opera­

tion*

The attaok on the North Barracks by the Japanese

was made pieoeraeal. Slnoe there were no faotors present

which made a pieoemeol attaok absolutely neoessary, suoh

a form of attaok in this oase is not in agreement with

the Sohool dootrine.

The Japanese used no artillery in this operation

and so far as oan be discovered, did not attaoh or assign

artillery to support the Infantry although artillery was

available in the inmedlate violnity. The Sohool would

not assign a mission of this type to a foroe without giv­

ing ths+ force 6oir« arti'Lcry support.

The JapinQ8r> &i( not use ttrJrr at any time in this

operation. If available, tanks would have been assigned

by the Sohool to support the attaok, particularly to break

into the North Barracks and the WALLED CITY.

-16­
 The fighting on the night of 16-19 September was

not confined to the MUKDEN area. At 12:00 midnight,

the Chinese garrisons of KUANCHENGTZE and NANLINQ at

CHANGCHUN, the northern terminus of the South ilanohuria

Railway, were attacked* The Japanese troops making

the attaok wero the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Division

and the 1st Railway Guard battalion. The estimated

Chinese strength of these garrlbons was 10,000 men and

40 guns of all oalibres. The Chinese offered some

resistance at this plaoe but the results show it to

have been slight sinoe NANLING barraoks was oaptured

at 11:00.A.M. on the 19th and KUANCHENGTZB barracks

at 5:00 P.M. The casualties were small on both sides.

KIRIN wa3 oocupied without reslstanoe on the 21st.

-16­
SECOND SPECIAL SITUATION.
Approximately twenty two miles south of TSITSIHAf,
the Junotion of the Taonan-Angangohi and the Chinese
Saetern Railways, the r a i l s orons the NONNI River. The
NONNI Rlvor and the swamp land etdjaoent to i t i s , at
the railway oroeeing, approximately four and one half
miles wide. The Taonan-Angangohi Railroad makes this
qrosslng on five bridges. See Map (fay CE-­
The Japanese were, in Ootober, supporting the Chinese
General Chang Hai-peng in the vioinity of TAOAN. On
Ootober 5th General Chang Hai-peng started north to oooupy
TSITSIHAR , the oapltel of HEILUNGKIANG Provlnoe and eieze
the Provincial government. He had under his command at
this tiro three regiments of infantry, with no supporting
weapons.
The Chinese General Ma Chan-Shan had, In the v i o i n i t y
of and west of SANCHIENFANG, about £0,000 troops inoludlng
a considerable amount of a r t i l l e r y and one brigade of oavalry*
General Ma Chen-Shan ordered the destruction of the bridges
over the NONNI River. The armies of General Ma Chan-Shan
and General Hai-peng faoed eaoh other from opposite banks
of the NONNI River.
The Jap ariose, on November Snd,1951, delivered an u l ­
timatum to Generals Ua Chan-Shan and Chang Hai-peng demand-
Ing that neither should use the railway for t a o t i o e l pur­
poses, that their foroes should be withdrawn from the river
a minimum dlstenoe of ten kilometers and that the repairs of
the bridges would not be interfered with by the troops of
either. The two Chinese foroes were given u n t i l November

-17­
3rd for compilenoa with the terms.

General Chang Hai-peng immediately oomplled with the

terms of the ultimatum, retiring far to the south. General

Ma Chan-Shan at onoe "aooepted the terms 01' the ultimatum

provisioually" but moved none of his troops,

On November 8rd the Japanese had available, Immediate­

ly south of the NONNI River and adjacent to tne railroad,

the following troops:­

16th Infantry

Two Batteries of Field Artillery

One Company of Engineers,

The weather was extremely oold, approximately 80 de­

gress below zero, Fahrenheit* The ground, riv*r and td­
jaoent swamp* were frozen sufficiently to oarvy all loads

with the troops.

(It is evident that the reason for delaying; the repair of

these bridges and re-opening of this railroad approximately

one month was, to wait for a sufficient depth of frost in

the ground and ioe on the river to support all loads of the

Japanese foroe.)

-18

The deoisinn of the Japanese Commander, Colonel Hamamoto,

at 18:00 nooa 3 November:­

To drive the Chinese forces to the north and repair

the bridges, initially advanoing to TAHSINO Station, the

advanoe to start from the south bank of the river at 11:00

A.M. 4 November.

-19­
FIRST REQUIREMENT:- )

How Would the Sohool Solve the Requirement?

SOLUTION. —-"••"

To attaok the position at daylight 5 November with

one reinforced infantry brigade (table 55, referenoe data,

C.&Q.S.S. 1035) making a wide envelopment of the enemy

right (west) flank, driving the enemy to the north and oap­
turing TAHSIN Station,

The 1st. Infantry, with 1st. Battalion 1st. Field

Artillery, Co. A. (smoke) 901st. Chemloal Regiment, one

Platoon let. Tank Company attaohed, moving to oonoealed

attaok positions under oover of darkness, will envelop

the anemy right flank at dawn 5 November, oapturlng the

TAHSINO Station.

The 2nd. Infantry (less one battalion) with one Pla­

toon 1st. Tank Company attaohed will attaok the Chinese

positions making Its prlnolpal effort on its left.

The Brigade Artillery will support the attaok with

partloular attention to the support of the enveloping foroe*

The 1st. Squadron 1st. Cavalry (reinforoed)(less 1/8

troop) to soreei the movement of the enveloping foroe into

position and to furnish security for that foroe. 1/8 A

troop to reoonnoiter on our right flank*

The 3018t. Observation Squadron to perform battle

missions.

The 901s«i. Balloon Squadron to observe for the brigade

paying partioular attention to the needs of the 1st. Battalion

1st. Field Artillery.

A brigade reserve consisting of 1st. Battalion End.

-20­
Infantry and 1st. Tank Company (less two platoons) to be

held oentrally located.

All moroments to attaok positions to be made under

oover of darkness*

-SI­
SECOND

How Was Thia Situation Solved?

SOLUTION.

At 11:00 A.M. 4 November,

One Battalion 16th Infantry,

Two Butteries.of Field Artillery,

One Company of Engineers, (augmented by looel work­

men) all under the oommand of Colonel Hamamoto, started

the eavanoe north to TAHSING Station. The Chinese had

entrenohed along the north bank of the river, their left

flank resting on a low hill whioh oomnanded the surround­

ing country. As soon as this foroe oame within range tae

Chinese opened lire, both small arms and artillery. This,

the first real resistance by the Chinese, apparently sur­

prised Colonel Hamamoto for he immediately stopped his ad­
vanolng troops and deolaed to envelope the Chinese left

flank. He immediately moved his remaining battalions

over the ri\rer well east of the Chinese position and at­
tacked the position from the east, oapturlng the hill on

the left of the Chinese position at 3:30 P.M. During the

night, 4-5 November, one additional battalion was brought

up and the attack was continued at dawn on the bth. A

Chinese foroe oonslatlng of Infantry and oavalry, oounter­

attaoked the flank of the enveloping force two hours after

daylight and stopped the Japanese advanoe. The Japanese

then held the gains made without attempting to advanoe fur­

ther on 5 November. During the night of 5-6Noverober, two

additional battalions were brought forward. On 6 November

the attack was oontinued, the Chinese driven north, TAHSING

Station oaptured and the repair of the bridges begun*

-28­
THIRD

A Uisousaion of Points of Difference.

SOLUTION.

The attaok by the Japanese on thi* position was made

piecemeal. No reason can be found for suoh an attaok In

this situation. The pleoemeal attaok was a failure. A

oo-ordinated attaok would have been made aooording to the

School doctrine*

The Japanese attaok was frontal initially. In this

situation the Sohool doctrine would demand a wide envelop­

ment of one or both flanks.

The Sohool dootrlne approves an attack at daylight

rather than one In midday unleos some pressing reason exists.

No such reason existed in this case.

The Japanese made no use of tanks - the Sohool would

use tanks under these oonditlons.

The Sohool would h£7e delayed the attaok until dawn

5 November*

 The Japanese foroes were rtlnforoed immediately after

th<* capture of the TAHSING Station and continued their ad­

vance north on ANGANGCHI end TSITSIHAR. ANGANGCHI was oo­
oupied with little resistance and TSITSIHAR was occupied on

19 November* The foroes of General Ma Chan-Shan offered

slight resistance delaying the Jepanese one day only.

Oa 6 November 1931, there was some disorder in TIENTSIN.

This was slight aooording to Chinese testimony and quits

serioua aooording to Japanese testimony. This disorder

gave the Japanese an exouse to dispatch additional troops

to TIENTSIN and on 86 November an expedition consisting of

one armored train, one troop train and tro airplanes was

dispatched to TIENTSIN from MUKDEN. The foroe was routed

via the Peiplng-Uulcden Railway. There were, at this time,

large concentrations at CHXNCHOW and CHANHAXKVAN ihioh it

would be neoessary to defeat before the detaohment oould

arrive at TIENTSIN. Upon arrival at a point north of

CTHNCHOW, bombing by two airplanes with the detaohment

started a retreat of these Chinese foroeo. The detaohment

was then reinforoed by additional araiored trains, Infantry,

cavalry and artillery. Meanwhile the situation at TIENTSIN

had beoome q.uiet and the reason glvon for this advance had

ceased to exist. The Japanese foroe withdrew to HSINMIN

on £9 November. This appears to be the one example in the

entire MANCHURIAN occupation of a failure by the Jepanese to

oarry through their plan.

The Japanese started a seoond march on CHINCHOW on 83

December with an atvaok on the 19th Brigade (see Map #10).

This force was routed on the first day after offering only

slight resistance, A rapid march was made by the Japanese,

CHINCHOW oooupied on 3 January. The unopposed advance was

oontlnued to the GRKAT WALL where a junction was made with

the Japanese forces at SHANHAIKUAN.

HARBIN, the junction point of the mainline of the Chinese

Eastern Railway and the southern branch of that line con­

necting with the South Manchurian Railway, remained iu

Chinese possession the firat of January, 1952, The oc­

cupation of this Junotion was neoessary in order that through

aervioe might be resumed. The Japanese second Division was

concentrated in the vicinity of SHUASOCHFWO on 3 February.

An advance was immediately begun on HARBIN. The Chinese

foroes at that pl&oe was estimated at 16,000 and oontained

some artillery. The defense may be considered very weak

for by the 5th of February the Japanese had made the march

of 38 miles and oooupied the oity. The further movements

of Japanese foroos north from HARBIN and east toward the

Russian border were completed before the frost started to

oorae out of the ground early in Maroh, (See Uap $&& ~P-

The oooupation of the Three Eastern Provinces was, then,

oompleted aooording to schedule* No organized Chinese re­

sistanoe remained. There were in March 1938 and still are,

a great number of bandits praying on the country. The sup­

pression of these bandits remains a major problem and one

for whioh a satisfactory solution has not been found.

-84­
THIF.D SPECIAL SITUATION:

On 20 February 1933, there were In JEHOL 135,000

Chinese troops as listed &nd looated:-

VOLUNTffffiS,

In the area KAILU-SUITUNG-CHAOYANG-CHIENPING 50,000

JEHOL PROVINCIAL TROOPS,

in the, area KAILU-CHIENPING-LIKGYUAN­

CHSNGTEH-CKOTENG-LINSHI-TIENSHAN 40,000

REGULAR TROOPS,

in the area PINGCHUAN-LINGYUAN-WAKUNGFU 85,000

C.1AHAR TROOPS.

entering southern JEHOL through the pass

north of YUNGPING 20,000

These foroes had partially organized for defense, the

line KAILU-SUITUNG-PEIPIAO-CHAOYANG-and CHIHHENG-CHIENPING­

LING YUM-CHENGTEH. There wac a laok of transport and sup­
plies so aoute as to doom the foroe to defeat. The main

relianoe was plaoed by the Chinese on oamel trains, A

small number of motor truoks, approximately 100, were oon­

oentrated at CHENGTEH (JEHOL)•

No great reserves had been accumulated though an effort

had been made to build up reserves at CHENGTEH, CHIHFENG,

LINSHI, LINGYUAN and other localities. The same laok of

transport whioh made the aooumulation of large reserves im­

possible made the maintenance of the foroes in the field

impossible.

The Japanese had decided that the oooupation of JEHOL

should be accomplished without delay. There oan be little

doubt that this provinoe would have been oooupled simul­

taneously with the ocoupation of the Three Eastern Provinces,

had the Japanese appreciated the almost total laok of re­

sistanoe whioh they would enoounter. Since, however, this

-25­
error had been wade In estimating the Chinese oapabilitlew

the original plan w 9 adhered to.

The Japanese forces on 23 February, available for the

JBHOL oampaign were those as looatad and as shown on Qv»*­

-JLty Koi 5T The total available Japanese troops for the

operation were £4,000, consisting of two Infantry divisions,

one Cavalry brigade, one separate Infaatry brigade, about

nine Squadrons of air service (observation planes equipped

for dropping light bombs) and a Tank detaohment of 35 tanks

and some armored oars.

The Japanese units in this oampaign were motorized to

a muoh greater extent than was usual in those forces. Ford

and Chevrolet lfc ton truoka were used. Tho ?-4th Infantry

brigade was almost oompletely motorized and had attaohed a

motorized battery and a detaohment of armored oara. Tanks

were attaohed to eaoh of the division- but were plaoed in

the rear whon no occasion for use was found*

Transport oolumns composed of one and two horse oarts,

paok trains and motor oolumns were us J for the movement of

all supplies. The main relianoe was plaoed on the carts

whioh, with drivers, were hired looelly, These oarts op­

erated successfully but the Japanese state that it would

have been preferable to use enlisted men *• drivers.

To assist in the supply and evacuation of the fast

moving cavalry and motorized (in part) advance elements

of the moving oolumns, ten (10) Fokker 6-8 pabsenger com­

mercial monoplanes were used. These planes were formed

into a transport squadron and plaoed *uuer the oommand of

Lieutenant Colonel Ryuiohi Torita. The unit wea based at

-26­
LIENS1UN, fifty miles south of CHINCHOW, on the l/.ukden-

Peiping Railroad. Between 24 February and 9 Meroh these

planes transported;

Rations and Ammunition 100 tons

Wounded (eraouated)
350

Staff officers, messengers, special agents,

soouts and observ6rs 400

Total hours flown 400

There were also available for the operation, a total

of 60,000 Manohoukuoan troops. The Japanese however,

plaoed no reliance in these untried troops. They were

moved to the vicinity of the JEHOL border but none were

moved into that Province until the oooupation was complete.

-87­
The Deolsion of Field Marshal Nubuyoshi Muto on 23 >'*b­
ruary 1933.

(Note: It le evident that the deolsion waa-made far in ad­

venoe of the date here given, but"tne writer nas oeen unable

to find any reoord 6ikjtJii8 point.) -y^ * ccvt> ••'

^n a broad front ^woupying- JEHOL

Provlnoe and"A
disperaitt^-all Chinese loroea in tne Provinoe.

-28­
FIRST REQUIREMENT:

How Would the School Solve this Situation?

SOLUTION.

There are two possible solutions of the oooupation

in this situation.

1. A maroh on a broad front driving all Chinese forces

generally southwest to the south of the Great Well.

8. A maroh on a comparatively narrow front from the

vioinlty of SHANHAIKUAN to the west outting the enemy lines

of supply and communication.

If the Chinese foroes had been an organized, modern,

well equipped army, there oan be little doubt that the

second solution would be oorreot. By this method the oo­

oupation oould have been accomplished by maneuver and with

little risk of defeat in detail. The Chinese foroes were

not however, either well organized or well equippeu. At

no time was there a responsible head commanding these forces*

To have out their lines of supply and communication would

have left these forces in the area, probably to beoome so-

called bandit bands to prey on the province. The suppres­

sion of these bands woula probably have been at least as

diffioult as It has turned out to be in northern MANCHURIA.

For this reason the maroh on the broad front would have been

the solution adopted by the 3ohool. The date of the beginn­

ing of the maroh would have been not-later than 1 February

for even this date would leave only two months of frozen

roaas and trails. No transport (wheeled) oould have been

moved ezoept when the roads were frozen. The dally marohes

would, aooording to the School dootrlne, have been limited

-29­
to from twelve to fifteen miles per day end even this

length would probably have been considerably reduoed by

the steep grades, extreme oold, high altitude and poor

roads. The advanoe guara of all oolximna would have

made a maximum use of motorized and mechanized foroes.

-30­
SECOND REQUIREMENT:

How Was It Aotually Solved? _)

In this situation, as in all the -rest of the Manohurian

oampaign, the selootion of the time of the start was the most

important decision to be made. Two factors, other than the

Japanese situation had to be oonsldered:­

1. Would any other florid Power or Powers intervene?

The time selected was proper as proved by the non-intervention

of any other power.

£. Could the oampaign be oompleted during extreme oold

weather? This was necessary for all roads would beoome im­
passable for wheeled transport after the thaw. The thawing

of the rivers begins early in April, the oooupation had to be

oompleted prior to that time. The Japanese plan oailed for

the oapture of CHENGTEH by 9 Mar oh.

Throughout the maroh little resistance was encountered.

Systamatio air reoonnaissanoe was oarried out ahead of the

columns.

Prior to the oooupation of some of the oltlea in which

troops were looated, aerial bombardment was oarried out. This

method of attaok was resorted to with considerable suooess at

CHAOYANG. c^.t1

The movements of the Japanese foroes were as ahown on

Overlays 1, 8, 3, 4, 5 and on Overlay "The Japanese Advance

Into JEHOL**

All the prinoipal towns in the Provinoe were oooupled

by 5 Maroh, thereby antedating by five days the date set by

the Japanese for the oapture of CHENGTEH.

The JSHOL oampaign may be oonsldered oomplete on 8 Maroh,

the date on whloh the 14th brigade oooupled HSIFENOKOW Pass.

 No organized Chinese foroea remained ia JEHOL after

0 Mar oh but bandits remained and the suppression of them

is still a problem.

There were several remarkable marches made by the Jap­

anese In this campaign under the worst possible oonditions of

extremely oold weather, terrein, supply and oommunioations.

The 6th Infantry division marohed from KAILU on 24 February

to the oooupation of CHIHFENG on 1 Meroh, a distance of 150

miles, averaging SO miles per day for five oonseoutive days.

The 4th Cavalry brigade prooaeding by a route between the

two oities £25 miles in length, made the maroh in the same

time, an average of 45 miles per day.

-32­
THIRD REQUIREMENT:

A Disouasion of Points of Lifferenoe.

1, The length of the merohos.

The marche• by the Japanese, many of 30 miles per day by

Infantry and of 45 mileo per day by oavalry for many oon*

saoutire days, are far in axoess of the School doctrine.

3. The advanoe guards.

The advenoe guards of each oolumn would have made a maxi­

mum use of motorized and meohanized foroes in this sit­
uation aooording to School dootrlne. The Japanese made

little use of meohanized foroes, generally mar oh ing tn<im

near the rear of the oolumns.

-33­
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Great Wall Crumbles

New York - The UaoUlllen Company,

1935

Grover Clark,

Reoent Operations in Manohurla.

Journal of the Royal United Service Institution

Volume LXXIX, No, 516, NOTember 1934.

Capt, J. V. Davldson~Hou3ton

Royal Engineers.

Ifanohoukuo: Child of Confllot.

New York - The MaoUillen Company.

1933

K, £, Kawakaml,

Far Eastern Front,

New York - Harrison Smith k Robert Haas.

1933

Edgar Snow.

Japan and Uanohoukuo.

Foreign Polioy Report, June 88, 1932.

New York - The Foreign Polioy AssooiaUon,

The League and the Slno-Japanese Dispute*

Foreign Polioy Reports, July SO, 1938.

New York - The Foreign Polioy Assooiation,

Appeal by the Chinese QoYernment.

Report of the Commission of Enquiry.

Series of League of Nations Publications

VII Politioal

1932 VII 12.

The Manohurlan Muddle.

Fortune Magazine

New York - February 1935.

The Japanese Campaign in Jehol - 193S.

The Coast Artillery Journal, July - August 1934.

John 0. Stipler.

The Beginning of the Manohurian Campaign,

Canadian Defense Quarterly, April 1933.

A. U. Nikolaieff.

-34­
South Manchuria Railroad.

Fortun© Magazine.

New York - February 1932*

The Taltalhar Operations.

Canadian Defense Quarterly, April 1933.

A. M. Nikolaieff.

The Truth about the Mukden Inoldent of September 18th.

Peiping - The Northeastern Affairs Researoh Sooiety.

China - The Jehol Campaign*

War Department - Intelligence Summary,

7 April, 1955.

Military Intelligenoe Reports (Japan)

No. 6718 £8 Maroh 1933

No. 6(188 9 Mar oh 1953
No. 7008 5 Ootobtr 1903
No. 6398 80 July 1955
No. 6997 87 September 1933
No. 6206 1 April 1932.

-35­
 MAPS & OVSUJLYS.

1. Topographic Ifap of Menohuria 1:800000

1934

S. Jehol Provinoe

0-2, General Staff, U. S. A., 1933,

S. China and Japan*

4. A. Politloal Map of Uanohurla.

5. Relief Uap of Memohuria.

6. Railway Map of Uanohurla.

7. Military Situation in Manohurla prior to

18 September, 1958.

8. Chart of the Mukden Incident.

18-19 September 1931.

9. Military Situation.

SO September, 1931,

10. Military Situation.

10 Deoember 1931.

11. Military Situation,

1 May 1938.

18. Military Situation,

80 August 1938.

Oterlaya to Topographioal Map of Manchuria NOB. 1 to 5*

-36­