China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) presents another area
of concern. The BRI represents one of Xi’s boldest initiatives for boosting China’s global position. It is ostensibly a massive project of investing in infrastructure projects—such as ports, roads and bridges—in other countries as a way of resurrecting the old Silk Road trading routes. In practice, it is a grand strategy for China to increase its geopolitical influence in every world region. One tracker places Chinese investments in, and contracts for, BRI projects at more than $750 billion.16 More than sixty countries have signed on to, or expressed interest in, BRI projects. While infrastructure investments are badly needed in many recipient countries, the investments do not meet global standards for transparency, and the deals sometimes disadvantage recipient countries.18 BRI projects involve unclear bidding processes and financial arrangements kept hidden from the public. This prompts legitimate questions about corruption and accountability among citizens of recipient countries.19 One Chinese company has been accused of bribery in the Philippines, Malaysia, and elsewhere, while in Sri Lanka, the prime minister’s family was allegedly bribed by Chinese companies.20 Projects usually employ Chinese, rather than local, workers, further upsetting residents of recipient nations. In some cases, China has secured its investments with commodities, raising accusations of neo-colonialism. China’s BRI program has also sometimes resulted in debt traps for recipient countries, even if that was not the original intent. For example, when Sri Lanka fell behind on payments for a Chinese- built port, the CCP took control of the port and surrounding territory. Chinese military vessels have visited this port, raising fears that China could use the port to expand its military’s reach in the key connective zone of the Indian Ocean. China’s financial influence in Africa is especially pronounced. Through December 2019, Chinese investment in BRI infrastructure projects in Africa totaled more than $140 billion. Approximately 20 percent of all African government debt— including, but not limited to, BRI projects—is owed to China. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, many African countries have expressed concern about their ability to pay off interest on debts while addressing the crisis. While China has shown a willingness to offer some relief, the CCP faces a dilemma: restructure or forgive debt and stress China’s own debt-burdened economy, or demand payments and hurt China’s global image.China recognizes the importance of trade and investment as diplomatic tools. Between 2005 and 2019, China's outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI) totaled around $1.23 trillion.25 For the Chinese, trade and investment are not viewed only as economic opportunities, but also a way to increase political and diplomatic influence abroad.It is unsurprising, then, that Chinese investment tends to focus on areas of strategic interest. Its trading partners view relations with China as an integral and unavoidable piece of their international position. Utilizing BRI and other investment programs, China has managed to strengthen relationships with nations with historically close ties to the United States, such as Italy and Greece. China also exerts influence over NATO allies and other Eastern European nations in the 17+1 program. The 17+1 group, also known as the China Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC), includes twelve EU member states, six Balkan nations, and fifteen NATO members—roughly half the Alliance. Since 2012, China has contributed more than $15 billion to infrastructure and other projects in member nations. BRI is helping the CCP to increase its influence overseas, but the CCP’s heavy-handed practices are also beginning to provoke a backlash. Coercive foreign aid, debt traps, and a lack of transparency are feeding anti-Chinese sentiment abroad, including recently in places such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where China has invested heavily in infrastructure projects.Many locals view China’s behavior as predatory and corrupt.29 Some BRI recipients have canceled or reduced the scope of projects over cost concerns. In 2018, for example, Myanmar scaled back a port-building project from an estimated $7 billion to just more than $1 billion, and Sierra Leone outright canceled a project to build a new airport.30 Similarly, in 2019, Malaysia’s government permitted a BRI project to continue after renegotiating a significantly reduced price tag.