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Cadre Deployment Policy and its Effects on Performance Management in

South African Local Government: A Critical Review

Article  in  Politeia · November 2018

DOI: 10.25159/0256-8845/3849

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 Article

Cadre Deployment Policy and its Effects on

Performance Management in South African Local
Government: A Critical Review
Elvin Shava
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8721-4666
University of KwaZulu-Natal
shavae@ukzn.ac.za
Shingirayi Florence Chamisa
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5804-583X
University of Fort Hare
rchamisa@gmail.com

Abstract
In South Africa, the transition from a politically-sanctioned, racially segregated
society to a democratically-based administration was, on all levels, an
overwhelming task. The positive policies that were designed to improve the
country’s economy were accompanied with a policy of cadre deployment that
advocated for ANC party loyalists to occupy prominent positions in the public
sector. This political patronage – implemented via state jobs – led to poor
performances in government institutions and in the nation as a whole.

This paper assesses the effects of the cadre deployment policy on performance
management in the public sector by focusing on significant elements of
economic growth and expansion. It presents a proposed framework, based on
control theories that illustrate how aspects of cadre deployment and
performance management contribute to present knowledge of the African
academic and administrative environment. An extensive literature review
incorporated various sources providing information on cadre deployment and
other relevant documents such as various reports on political structures and
performances.

The results of this study confirm that cadre deployment exacerbated problems
related to corruption, poor procurement systems, wasteful expenditure and the
deteriorating state of local government. The article promotes calls for the review
and an overhaul of the authoritative structure that governs local municipalities,
with the goal to supplement Section 152 of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa. The article further recommends the ANC-led government to

Politeia https://doi.org/10.25159/0256-8845/3849
https://upjournals.co.za/index.php/Politeia ISSN 0256-8845 (Online)
Volume 37 | Number 1 | 2018 | #3849 | 18 pages © Unisa Press 2018
 revise its cadre deployment policy to combat the challenges of skills shortages
and poor service deliveries in various municipalities, which have resulted from
ingrained nepotism, overt politicisation and the appointment of unqualified
personnel.

Keywords: Political appointments; performance management; corruption; service

delivery; public sector.

Introduction
South Africa, in the era of democracy, inherited a racially skewed open administration
where black Africans comprised the majority of public servants in lower positions, with
a few middle and senior level open hirelings in the homeland governments (Franks
2014). Mathekga (2015) observes that the shift from an apartheid-era public service to
a vote-based administration was, at all levels, a daunting process. Madumo (2015) and
Maserumule (2016) state that the post-1994 government faced various challenges in the
three administrative levels, namely national, provincial and local. Resultantly, the
reconfiguration process to realign local government structures included tasks such as
reviewing performances of the departments and sectors whose purpose was to manage
all issues related to the economy, infrastructure, justice, equity, security, society, as well
as intergovernmental coordination and constitutional advancement.

Aside from its aim to introduce positive policies to strengthen the country’s economy,
the African National Congress (ANC) government established the cadre deployment
policy that advocates for party loyalists to occupy prominent positions in the public
sector. Kota et al. (2017) argue that this form of political support – through the provision
of state employment opportunities – is a global phenomenon administered by various
ruling political parties; however, this phenomenon in Africa is believed to induce an
inferior institutional quality or to cause poor execution of policies by the state. This
paper evaluates the validity of these statements through a literature review that assesses
the effects of cadre deployment policy on performance management in the government
sector.

The Nature of Cadre Deployment in South Africa

In 1994, the first democratic government established numerous new departments in an
effort to correct past imbalances, which were mainly race-based in terms of access to
public services. After winning the elections, the ANC government had to recompense
the SADTU executives with key positions within government, as the ANC’s Secretary-
General Gwede Mantashe (2011) once admitted in a media conference in 2011. Letseka,
Bantwini and King-McKenzie (2012) confirm that SADTU was a prominent association
within the governing party, which had significant implications for nominations to major
strategic posts in other departments, such as Education. Letseka et al. (2012) further state
that the jostling for positions, as described by Manuel (2011), manifested in “behind the
scenes canvassing by union leaders for their preferred candidates”. Similarly, Franks
2
(2014) and Maimane (2017) deemed the South African public service as being in a
crisis, while Rust (2017) have described it as being “in tatters”.

The transformation of institutions at local and national levels was an immense task,
which had to be hastened to have a discernible effect on the democratisation of South
African society (Etheridge 2013; Twala 2014). Hartley (2011) opines that the ANC felt
that intervention through cadre deployment would safeguard the new government from
any possible sabotage by the opposition parties. The most effective way to neutralise
this threat was to install loyal party members who could, at least, be trusted politically.

Some state department members’ behaviour, however, served to compromise the

legitimacy of the cadre deployment policy as envisaged by the ANC (Twala 2014).
Union representatives had hijacked the redeployment process and turned it into an
instrument for placing their own comrades in promotional posts as soon as they became
vacant. ANC Secretary-General Mantashe (2011) then defended the placement of ANC
and SADTU loyalists in promotional posts on the basis that “it is a correction of what
we inherited in 1994”.

The Minister of Higher Education and Training, Blade Nzimande, however, recognised
that South Africa needed a solid public service that is individually driven and meets
required competence levels. In a similar vein, Gumede (2009), writing on behalf of the
Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), distinguishes between two elementary
components of a formative state. Firstly, at the centre of any formative state is the state
itself, as an organised and effective institution staffed with competent representatives.
Then, the state must display the managerial, specialised and political competency to set
national objectives, utilise the markets and execute the required policies. Besides, a
formative state, which is likely law-based, has to be comprehensively implanted with
their own citizens. Gumede (2009) adds that the democratic-based formative state is
more comprehensive and has more noteworthy citizen interest in basic leadership and
economic decision-making.

Olivier (2016) contends that more qualified officials are often overlooked when
promotions and general appointments occur. Irregular appointments may lead to
commotion, ambiguity and low morale among employees in the public service.
Hoffman (2016) states that the enlistment process is “basically driven by competition
for salary packages”, which is reinforced by the character of enrolled officials. In this
context, Yende (2017) affirms that, through cadre deployment, officials have been
placed in posts for which they were unqualified. The practice of cadre deployment had
been continuing despite stated promises by South African presidents that there would
be no favours in the appointment of government positions.

3
Cadre Deployment and the Deteriorating State of Local Government
Local government parastatals in South Africa are in a state of disarray on account of the
ingrained practice of cadre deployment, as observed in a report released by the
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs in 2009. This report
revealed various challenging situations that affect the governance and management of
local government. Butler (2010) argues that several municipalities across the county are
continually failing to plan their work effectively, manage their projects skilfully, plan
their budgets wisely, and that a lack of qualified experts in technical fields inhibits their
capabilities. According to the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional
Affairs (COGTA) (2009), various governance and service delivery challenges have
resulted from cadre deployment policies that negatively affect the performance of
municipalities. These challenges include a lack of transparency and accountability,
financial mismanagement, corruption, fraud and generally poor performance – as
indicated by service delivery backlogs in the provision of water, housing and sanitation.
This situation of limited skills available to render basic goods and services prompts
service delivery protests against poor governance and related conflicts (COGTA 2009).

By assessing these woes, the alarming degree of deterioration in local government

structures in South Africa becomes apparent. The structural challenges – including
financial mismanagement, lack of strategic planning, poor human resource strategies
and ineffective labour regulations, among others – result from the practice of cadre
deployment and its negative influences on performance management and service
delivery.

Conceptual Issues Underpinning Cadre Deployment

The reviewed literature has identified four primary conceptual issues associated with
cadre deployment in South African local government. These are patronage or cronyism;
skills shortages due to poor training; poor performances in governance and a lack of
transparency and accountability. These issues are discussed in more depth in the
following sections.

Political Aspects of Cronyism in Cadre Deployment

Mkongi (2013) argues that the appointment of politically associated public officials in
districts and public services provides an obstacle to the improvement of public services.
Turok (2011) contends that, despite the increased system of political appointments,
various local municipalities continue to strive for quality service provision in the
communities they serve. In any event, circumstantial evidence points to a reality that
the nation faces a daunting struggle to rid itself from inclinations towards cronyism and
to focus on presenting a high quality of public services instead. This study promotes the
view that cadre deployment contributes to a state of disorder or chaos in local
governments, which some authors refer to as “a national disaster”, such as Bloch (2009).

4
Nuijten (2004) contends that even in chaos there is some form of governance at work.
The governance converts to a unionised structure in the form of site committee members
who are organising resistance against the execution of strategies in an apparent unlawful
manner. The purpose is to provide resources that motivate cadres (Calista and Melitski
2013).

Cadre Deployment’s Influence on Public Service Training

Franks (2014) argues that cadre deployment affects public service training in various
ways. The post-1994 government embarked on a development initiative to train and
equip its public servants with the relevant skills to enhance performance management
in the public sector. However, the deployment of cadres by the ANC and the formation
of the Joint Universities Public Management Education Trust (JUPMET) with European
Union donations marked an improvement in public service operations. Clapper (2007,
38) states that JUPMET’s “dominance in the market of academic consulting to the
public service resulted in them managing to monopolize consultation and training”,
which, in turn, brought about disdain from those scholarly Departments of Public
Administration that were rejected. In Clapper’s opinion (2007, 38), JUPMET collapsed
around 2000, because “the consortium was seen to be rather exclusive and parochial;
contrary to some of the inclusiveness and developmental objectives they subscribed to”.
The main cause of the failures of such training initiatives is cadre deployment, as
practised by political agents who do not value or appreciate the significance of training
and skills development initiatives as means to elevate performances in the public
service.

Cadre Deployment’s Influence on Performance Management

Isaacs (2016) observes that South Africa’s public services are dealing with poor
performance issues as a direct result of the ANC’s culture of cadre deployment. The
author criticises this policy by stating that the “ANC's strategy methodically puts
dependability before legitimacy and even ability, and is in this way a genuine
impediment to a proficient open administration” (Centre for Development and
Enterprise (CDE) 2009, 8). It is perceived as common knowledge among present-day
South Africans that those individuals who are politically well connected occupy senior
positions in public service departments, despite them lacking the expertise and
competency to efficiently manage their public offices (CDE 2009, 24). Hwok-Aun
(2016) asserts that cadre deployment in the public service has become a route to upward
mobility. The policy has been widely abused by politicians and other corrupt public
office bearers when the accumulation of personal wealth became their primary goal,
which is contrary to the policy’s original intentions. Criticism against the policy of cadre
deployment is validated when no formal qualifications are considered in the recruiting
of public servants, and when no assessments to evaluate the capacity or suitability of an
individual for holding a public office are made. Such habits of inefficiency have
contributed to poor performance management in various government departments in
South Africa.
5
Maloba (2015) laments the absence of transparency and accountability mechanisms in
local government structures, especially in relation to the provision of free housing. The
effects of apartheid include general laziness and a reduced spirit of innovation among
many South African citizens. Being supported by the idea of a welfare state and the
policy of cadre deployment, many ANC loyalists have acquired properties through
various corrupt tendencies such as the allocation of houses only to families, friends and
associates, as opposed to earning their property through honest and hard work. At
present, this unfortunate scenario resulted in more suffering for poor communities, who
reacted by staging violent service delivery strikes in the streets, which happened, for
example, in Johannesburg’s Alexandra Township. Related information indicates that
many people were put on waiting lists for RDP houses, but instances of abuse of power
arose once more when the homes were presented to foreign individuals who have paid
vast sums of money to municipal officials. The problem of politicising every single
issue, as indicated in the reviewed literature, is that it cripples the ability of local
governments to deliver services efficiently. Critics, therefore, feel justified in arguing
that the government’s policy of cadre deployment should be revised (Reddy 2016).

Performance management serves numerous critical functions in the public sector; some
of which include the assurances of efficiency, adaptation and proficiency. This can be
accomplished on numerous levels, from individual to hierarchical. It is necessary to
concentrate on the utilisation of good performance management tools to ensure its
effectiveness through the use of theories of self-survey frameworks and performance
maintenance benchmarks. Rummler and Brache (1995) listed the variables that
influence the conceptualisation of essential performance management frameworks in
the form of six questions, which are: (a) Is performance quantified? (b) Is there
sufficient job backing? (c) Are effects allied alongside forecasted operation? (d) Is
criticism offered? (e) Do cadres have requisite abilities and understanding? (f) Do cadres
possess the aptitude to function?

Ndevu and Muller (2017) contend that performance measurement is essential to the
delivery of improved services. The expectation on performance management to ensure
that objectives are accomplished is rooted in the fundamental principle that management
structures should rely on their own capacity to unite various individuals within
organisations and arouse them to work together towards the realisation of goals and to
achieve shared targets (Balogun 2003).

Cadre Deployment’s Influence on the Accountability of Public Officials

Performance measurement in the South African government has been largely regarded
as a process of refining the deliveries of public services. Sekgala and Holtzhausen
(2016) emphasise that performance evaluation is obligatory in public affairs. Public
officials must be accountable to their citizens on all issues pertaining to service delivery
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2017).
Furthermore, investigations of public officials’ performances must be the main method

6
for judging their suitability for the positions they occupy and to justify their authority.
Various municipalities in South Africa are failing to prioritise performance
management, leading to a range of serious problems. It seems wiser to utilise
performance management as an on-going process involving techniques such as
continual training, departmental support, and certification and education initiatives. The
goal is to provide resources that motivate cadres (Calista and Melitski 2013).

Fostering mechanisms to curb cadre deployment in the public sector

According to the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) (2007),
various initiatives to address the effects of cadre deployment in the South African public
sector were implemented to enhance performance and service delivery in local
government. The major initiatives that were launched include the Government-Wide
Monitoring and Evaluation System, Single Public Service, Public Service Amendment
Bill, African Peer Review Mechanism Programme of Action, Provincial Growth and
Development Strategies and Integrated Developed Plans (DPSA 2007). Those
programmes were designed to improve the performances of civil servants, which would,
in turn, improve service provision to the public.

In addition, the South African government introduced new reforms in an attempt to curb
cadre deployment in local government. The Reform Agenda was improved by the
legislature through the introduction of the Result Based Management programme. The
goal was to enforce efficient and effective public sector management and to promote
performance and service delivery (Booysen 2011). According to Etheridge (2013),
certain reform strategies employed by the local government to enhance service delivery
benefitted the general population. Korir, Rotich and Bengat (2015) list those strategies
as such: Rapid Results approach, Contracting, Citizen, Transformative Leadership,
Values & Ethics, and Institutional Capacity building.

Furthermore, various open administration changes have been established, with the goal
of elevated public contentment at the core of policy-making and service delivery
projects (Institute of Race Relations (IRR) 2012). Exertions under the monetary
Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) of refining open administration conveyance –
through the establishment of links between recruitment, planning, budgeting and
implementation, and improvement on performance and strategic management – have
been described as only a portion of the current open administration change initiatives
(IRR 2012; Mahlangu 2013). Increasingly, the South African local government – by
acknowledging advances in the country’s motivation to improve, as outlined in the First
Medium Term Plan (2008–2012) and Vision 2030 – understand that an effective,
engaged and well trained public service is one of the pillars of a functioning society
(IRR 2012).

The government is continually intensifying its efforts to accomplish an attitudinal

change in public service, service delivery orientation, aptitudes assessment,

7
performance management, computerization of service delivery, and in additional
training and development (IRR 2012; Mahlangu 2013). Ingrams (2017) observes that
the present strategy to broaden transparency and accountability to showcase their
abilities, validate the future utilisation of resources and renders the use of performance
measurement highly appealing. According to Bolívar and Galera (2016), it is critically
important to guarantee that public officials have enough control on performance
management, and measures should be taken to encourage innovation and rational
experimentation with alternative modes of delivering public service. The Local
Government Sector Education and Training Authority (LGSETA) (2016) postulated
that the development and growth of the twenty-first century public sector will be
progressively dependent not only on the local government’s capabilities of being
efficient and producing competitive outputs, but also on their abilities to understand and
manage the various links between local government processes and the external
environment.

Theoretical Frameworks
Coalition Theory
This theory is centred on government development, which basically explains how a
governing political party enter, build and combine a particular government personality
(Brehm and Scott 1997; Furlong 1998; Wood 1998). The model assumes that one
approach to doing precisely that is through the apportioning of support legislative issues
– by means of state employment – whereby political principals circulate and oversee
state institutions and job opportunities, while keeping in mind the goal to bargain over
policy output. An aligned view is that a politically arranged framework is a
"characteristic" component of representative parties in governments worldwide, and
that there is no issue with administering the framework by any means. In any event,
some schools of thought suggest that there are variations among nations regarding the
quality and reliability of designated officials, in relation to political support instead of
legitimacy.

Critics argue that all representative political parties generally apply this political
instrument to tame, control and manage the conduct of the state operators as they may
not be altogether trusted, particularly as they bargain daily with public finance and other
state assets. Furthermore, nations perceived as formative states, such as Malaysia,
Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea and others, apply the framework to a different degree.
Du Gay (2000, 115) reasons that political principals administer political support by
means of state occupations to weaken the energy of organisational authorities and to
upgrade their (legislators) claim to positions inside government. In summary, the theory
claims that political support by means of state employment isn't merely about
maintaining control, but that it is also to guarantee that the state operators stay true to
their principles and reach their targets; thereby, overcoming the resistance of rival
political parties that have the capacity to derail the representing political party’s policies,

8
visions and objectives. Even so, and in the context of this study and according to this
theory, the policy of political patronage or cadre deployment is – as a matter of necessity
– to be applied in state institutions for reasons that will be further discussed below.

The system provides motivation for the governing political party or their pioneering
members to maintain party associations through conveying particular motivators to
party activists and elites in return for organisational loyalty. The system prompts
political gatherings to create clientele systems that will secure party appointive help.
This claim is confirmed by different investigations: powerful political support from
party activists serves to moderate the dangers of intra-party disobedience, despite
constituent thrashing or unpopular decisions made by the administering political party
or parties in government. Patronage representatives act as eyes and ears of the political
principals by continually monitoring the level of support for the principal's strategies
and objectives inside the government. Patronage, hence, provides a collaboration
between political principals and state drivers.

Practical Implications of the Coalition Theory

This model, in many ways, explains the prevalence of cadre deployment in the South
African public sector since it emphasises that coalitions provide a means of political
control by political parties. In South Africa, the ANC government deploy its cadres as
a way of controlling public institutions, although this has severely compromised service
delivery in local government. Though still relevant, this theory works to a lesser degree
in the review, while the following control theory speaks directly to better ways of
solving cadre deployment in South Africa’s public service. However, this theory can, to
a greater extent, be regarded as a complementary theory since it contains some elements
that assist in understanding the policy of cadre deployment in the public service in South
Africa.

Control Theory
The control theory – often referred to as feedback or cybernetics – involves self-
regulation, which means a perpetual comparative procedure is applied, with the
objective to minimise inconsistencies between principles for behaviour and the
observed effects of actual behaviour (Carver and Scheier 1981). The control theory’s
primary focus is on feedback as a primary behaviour regulatory device.

Carver and Scheier (1998) illustrated how control theory explains the shaping of
behaviour through feedback. At the model’s centre is a sensor that continuously
compares current behaviour to some standard or goal set for that behaviour. Public
officials can be self-regulating in the same way that a thermostat continuously regulates
a home’s temperature. The regulation of cadre employees entails a cognitive process.
Control theory asserts that cadre employees and fellow public officials monitor their
behaviour and their effects relative to behavioural standards (Perrewe and Rosen 2017).
To a certain extent, they match their performance, education and experience with the
9
set goals or predefined objectives in order to render service delivery effectively
(Cossettea and Hess 2015). When actual-standard discrepancies are minimal, then it
means that no change in behaviour is required. When discrepancies between standards
and current behaviours are wide, then behavioural changes become necessitated.
Control theory states that cadre employees need to change their behaviours to overcome
any negative gaps (Carver and Scheier 1981).

Practical Implications of the Control Theory

Control theories regulate performances in the public sector. In South Africa, local
governments are established as channels for the provision of effective service delivery
(Basheka 2008). Due to the complex environment, accountability – in the form of
performance management – is demanded from cadre employees and other public
officials (Madumo 2014). The deployment of cadres and cadre conduct at work are
perceived to have become major challenges. The control theory offers a guideline for
performance management as an evaluation process on set standards and actual
performance. According to Ambe and Badenhorst-Weiss (2012), the South African
public sector has undergone transformation through the introduction of performance
management processes. In that aspect, cadre employees go through the same processes
of performance management like other public officials in the endeavour to improve
service delivery (Bizana, Naude and Ambe 2015).

Methodology
The paper incorporated an extensive literature review that included various sources of
information on cadre deployment, and documents such as Auditor-General reports and
various annual reports. The abundance of literature on the subject motivated the
researchers, while the analysis of new data versus existing literature is fundamental for
any response to the research problem as outlined in this paper. The data acquired from
documents were analysed qualitatively using content analysis, whereupon various
themes were identified and presented. Since documents are not usually designed for a
research study, their levels of reliability were assessed by means of the peer-reviewed
articles that provided the basis for this paper.

Results and Discussion

How Cadre Deployment Elevates Corruption in Local Government
The increasing deployment of politically connected individuals in local municipalities
and other public entities has a serious effect on levels of corruption in government. In
South Africa, ever since the inception of the cadre deployment policy, numerous cases
of corruption such as the abuse of public funds and poor development of local
communities have been documented. In October’s opinion (2015), cadre deployment
has exacerbated corruption and has proved to be a threat in realising the goals and
objectives of a developmental state in all spheres of the economy. The Public Service

10
Commission (2010) recorded 7 766 cases of corruption in 2010 that were later referred
to the national anti-corruption hotline. The most unfortunate aspect is that 63% of those
cases were neglected due to poor feedback and cooperation from the departments that
were assigned to investigate the cases. The report reveals further that almost two-thirds
of the departments lack the capacity to conduct investigations on cases of corruption.
Usually, very lenient punishments – such as written warnings – are imposed on guilty
officials, while only a few cases are reported to the police (Soreide and Rose-Ackerman
2017). Such cover-up strategies for the transgressions of comrades are practised by
deployed ANC cadres in several municipalities, which have caused unmanageable
service delivery backlogs that expose communities to persistent states of poverty.

The Effects of Cadre Deployment on Accountability and Transparency

Wherever corruption thrives, accountability and transparency disappear – this
circumstance appears to be a common occurrence in South African local government.
The PSC Report of 2010 testified that corruption manifests itself in the forms of bribery
and fraud (approximately 1 511 instances), mismanagement of government funds (870),
procurement irregularities (720) and appointment irregularities (627). Transgressions
related to financial abuse have been rampant in the three spheres of government
(national, provincial, local). A typical example is provided by the KwaZulu-Natal
Provincial Health Department, where 76 disciplinary cases involving fraudulent activity
resulted in 17 dismissals, 13 resignations and 14 written warnings.

These statistics clearly illustrate that corruption has become an accepted mode of
operations in government circles, forsaking the Batho Pele principles of good
governance. Nevertheless, public officials are still caught crossing ethical lines by their
failures in transparency, honesty, integrity and accountability. Recent publications
suggest that the inability of various municipalities to train public officials prior to their
appointment to public offices exposes them to high levels of bureaucratic corruption in
local government. Such practices of corruption relate to the policy of cadre deployment,
since the recruitment processes are tainted by the nepotism and political patronage that,
in the final analysis, demotivate all the public officials in the execution of their duties
to society.

Manipulation of Procurement Systems and Wasteful Expenditure

Local government corruption, as emanating from cadre deployment, is rampant,
especially in the procurement systems. In their study Ambe & Badenhorst Weiss (2012)
observe that the effects of corruption as a result of cadre deployment are causing
inconsistencies in the procurement systems and pave the way towards wasteful
expenditure in local municipalities. It must be noted that procurement underpins the
capacity of local municipalities to render goods and services to communities; the
systems, however, have been hijacked by corrupt officials who have manipulated it in
the act of approving inflated payments to service providers (Moeti, 2014).

11
The weaknesses in the control mechanisms in local municipalities have opened the gates
to corruption, since there is no authoritative person or mechanism to hold the officials
accountable or penalise them for their actions (Pillay 2016). Critical scholars (Hoffman
2016; Ingrams 2017; Pillay 2016) tend to blame this situation on cadre deployment since
the majority of municipal officials will be obliged to serve the political wishes of their
masters, which is a hindrance to performance management and local economic
development.

The Effects of Patronage and Cadre Deployment on Municipal Performance

Management
Political patronage has obstructed human resources management in the public sector in
South Africa. Recruitment processes are often marred by inconsistencies that affect the
performance of handpicked cadres. Moloi (2012) claims that South Africa, in contrast
to other democracies, possesses a unique political and management public service. One
unique characteristic is the policy of cadre deployment whereby political leaders are
tasked with the administrative functions of governance and management. It is
imperative to note that most senior positions in government are appointed on political
rather than academic merits (Schoburgh and Ryan 2017; Viljoen 2017). Those elected
officials implement government policies as a means of delivering services. Critics often
question this type of recruitment as being obstructive to performance management and
service delivery in various municipalities.

Political convictions seem to occupy a central position in the matter of public

appointments, resulting in poor performances and accountability problems in state
institutions (Edwards 2017). Police formulation is also affected as the appointed cadres
often wrestle to implement the decisions of their masters, which may be in direct conflict
with the direction a municipality intends to take.

Corruption usually thrives when conflicts, resulting from cadre deployment, exist
between municipal administrations and political office bearers (Munzhedzi 2016). Such
conflicts and inconsistencies in municipal operations feed corrupt activities during the
scramble for municipal resources and power (Ayeko-Kummeth 2015). Helao (2015)
criticises the lack of clarity on legislation in relation to who should instigate progress in
a municipality. At the same time, Kanyane and Sausi (2015) attempt to distinguish
between political executive authorities and administration officials. Overlapping,
however, is rife on account of cadre deployment, which affects the capacity of a
municipality to deliver essential services. This means that communities often suffer the
consequences of cadre deployment, since service delivery is often poor in municipal
areas where incompetence and corruption have settled in (Brunette 2017; Naidoo 2017).

Conclusions
The article argues that, whereas the policy of cadre deployment is justifiable for
maintaining party interests in public entities, it has ruined the capacity of human
12
resources departments to function effectively due to political manipulation and
interferences with the hiring and firing of public officials. The increasing levels of
corruption in local municipalities – under the supervision of the ANC – hamper the
ability of municipalities to deliver services. It has further become evident that the policy
of cadre deployment initiated declining standards in performance management of
municipalities, because of the incompetence of public officials. Government
programmes, such as Local Economic Development, often become ineffective as the
deployed cadres lack the vision and skills needed to implement development
programmes, worsened by their unwillingness to exercise transparency and
accountability.

The existing legal frameworks attempt to curb corruption; hence the policy of cadre
deployment needs to be revisited to enable municipalities to fulfil their obligations to
society without political interference, even though, in reality, it may be difficult to
separate politics from administrative routines. In any circumstance, the ANC-led
government needs to revise the cadre deployment policy that has caused severe skills
shortages and poor service deliveries in various municipalities across the country – a
situation that has been caused by overt politicization, nepotism and the hiring of
unqualified labour.

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