Colonel Ted A.
Cimral, US Army
HAT images flash through your
mind when you hear the term “blitz­
krieg”? If you area student ofmilitirybisto­
ry, does it strike terror in your heart? Near­
ly 50 years ago, the Nazi military shocked
the world as it devastated Poland, France,
North Africa and the Soviet Union in cam­
paigns of lightning speed. The rapid move­
ment of heavy Wehrrmxht force+armored
and mechanized-combined with effective
Luftwaffe support to form the first modern
“AirLand Battle” doctrine.
The US Army quickly realized the advan­
tages of maneuver warfare and became pro­
ficient in moving large forc~s (corps, armies
and artny groups) across France, the Low
Countries and into Germany itself. A prime
example of the US “capability to conduct a
blitzkrieg was demonstrated by III (US)
Corps as it rapidly moved 250 kilometers to
relieve Bastogne during the Battle of the
Bulge in December 1944..
The years since the end of World War II
28
have seen the US Army twice enga~d in
large-scale combat, but in neither caee did
we pl’ace a heavy corps on the offensive. We
forgot the lessons and techniques of World
War II. As the Army settled into its postwar
environment, we saw corps in Europe take
up a defensive role and doctrine changed ac­
cordingly.
During Exercise REFORGER 87 in Sep­
tember 1987, the IIf Mobile Armored Corps,
Fort Hood, Texas, had the opportunity tore-
learn and apply the techniques of moving a
heavy corps over long distances on limited
route~a rapid, offensive strike @ the ene­
my’s operational center of gravity.
Background ,,
Past R.EFORGER exercises concentrated
on the deployment to Germany of an Army
division from the Continental United
States, attaching it to either the V or VI~
(US) Corps m Southern Germany, ad exer­
cising the reinforcement of an on-line, in-
Ju]y 19880 MILITARY REVIEW
 PERSPECTIVES

REFORGER 87 broke the mold of reinforcing an in-place, on-line corps

by III Corps, striking to regain the initiative at army group Ieuel. The exercise

scenario called for the movement of 35,000 troops and non-POMCUS (pro­

positioning of materiel configured to unit sets) equipment from Fort Hood and

other active and reserve installations in 30 states to Germany by air and sea.

place corps under a scenario constructed by
Central Army Group, Central Europe
(CENTAG). REFORGER 87 was unique in
every respect.
REFORGER 87 represented the largest
overseas deployment of US Army forces
ever to occur in peacetime, deploying a corps
with its troops to Europe for the first time
since World War II. The operation took
place in Northern Germany, where existing
US facilities and support units are scarce,
exacerbating the previous plug-in, plug-out
concept, and exercised a US corps there for
the first time. REFORGER 87 was planned
and executed by the northern Army group
(NORTHAG) and German Territorial
Northern Command (GTNC) as hosts for the
first time. The REFORGER 87 scenario de­
picted 111 Corps as the NORTHAG opera­
tional reserve, ready to destroy any deepen-
emy penetration into the NORTHAG sector.
It involved all NORTHAG in-place corps
(Dutch, Belgian, British and German) act­
ing as blue or orange forces (and sometimes
as both). Perhaps most important, RE ­
FORGER 87 broke the mold of reinforcing
an in-place, on-line corps by 111Corps, strik­
ing to regain the initiative at army group
level.
The exercise scenario called for the move­
ment of 35,000 troops and non- POMCUS
(pre-positioning of materiel configured to
unit sets) equipment from Fort Hood and
other active and reserve installations in 30
states to Germany by air and sea. Major ex­
ercise participants included the 1st Cavalry
Dwision (augmented by a brigade from the
4th Infantry Division), the 2d Armored Di­
vision, 45th Separate Infantry Ihgade, 6th
Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat), 111Corps Ar­

MILITARY REVIEW * JUIY 1988

29
 ... L’
.,

,.,

The modern day III Corps achieved a signitko mt milestone in demonstrating

the caRabi[it@ to move a heav.q corps rapidly, safe[~ and effectively despite
hau~ng to c~ntend with a peacetime environment, heavy civilian traft7cq
and host-nation restrictions.

tillery, III Corps Combat Support Brigade
and the 13th Support Command (Corps).
Upon’arrival at the airfields in Europe, 111
Corps troops moved to POMCUS sites to
draw pre-positioned equipment or to a Euro­
pean seaport to receive non-POMCUS
equipment or to the corps staging area,
north of the Ruhr Valley in the vicinity of
the cities of Munster and Osnabruck.
After receiving their equipment, 111Corps
units moved to the staging area by road and
rail. The staging area was situated behind
the in-place NORTHAG corps’ rear bounda­
ries, where III Corps prepared for combat-
task organizing umts, receiving Ioglstic
stocks and waiting for the NORTHAG com­
mander’s mission guidance.
The III Corps’ mission was to conduct an
approach march through in-place NORTH.
AG corps, execute a passage of lines, at­
tack to destroy the orange force’s second op­
erational echelon which had penetrated an
in-place corps, and restore the NORTHAG
front.
,
Preparation
Because of the, uniqueness of RE ­
FORGER 87, extensive .pre-exercise plan­
ning and training occurred to ensure all par­
ticipants g-leaned the most value possible
from their exercise experience. Planning
the corps’ approach march was an integral,
and difficult, part of the exer;ise. It received
the personal attention of General$ilir Mar­
tin Farndale (commander, NORTHAG) and
Lieutenant General Crosbie Saint (corn-

30 July 1988. MIL!TARY REVIEW

.,

manderi III Corps) on numerous occasions
at confe ences and in Fort Hood exercises.
f
The difficulty associated with conducting
a corps approach march centered around a
void both in US Army doctrine and recent
experience, and peacetime constraints im­
posed by the host nation. III Corps had to
build from the ground up and at the same
time demonstrate to our allies (and to War­
saw Pact observers) that 111 Corps could
move 11,000 vehicles quickly and safely
from the most densely populated area of
Germany to the most heavily exercised area
of Germany.
Previous Fort Hood field exercises con­
centrated on the movement of battalions
and brigades, often in an administrative en­
vironment, under the direction of a division
headquarters. Command post (CP) exer­
cmes, simulating the movement of a division
or the Corps, tended to “leap frog” the Corps
directly into combat without understanding
how it got there.
Upon receipt of the NORTHAG scenario
for REFORGER 87, Saint recognized that
detailed planning and extensive pre-
exercise training was required to assure HI
Corps could successfully road march hun­
dreds of kilometers (km) across the United
States and Europe. The corps commander’s
planning gnidance included:
@ Each division would use three routes
for movement from staging area to line of
departure (LD).
e A corps order of march specified that
command, control, communications and in­
telligence assets move first.
e Movement from staging area to tactical
assembley area (TAA) would be a tactical
road march with units organized for combat,
under the corps command and control sys­
tem.
e Each division would use a TAA where
divisional combat power would pause to re­
arm and refuel before crossing the LD.
e Selected corps support command ele-
MILITARY REVIEW � JUIY 1988
PERSPECTIVES
ments would precede divisi?)nal combat
units to provide refuel on the move (ROM)
and other logistic support as the divisions
passed through tbe TAAs.
e Convoys would stop at rest halts along
the route at least every hour and 45 min­
utes.
e The corps main CP would monitor the
movement of the corps from staging area to
TAAs. The military police would establish
Previous Fort Hood field exercises
concentrated on the movement of
battalions and brigades, oflen in an
administrative environment, under the
direction of a division headquarters.
Commandpast (CP) exercises, simu­
lating the movement of a division or the
Corps, tended to “leap frog” the Corps
directly into combat without under­
standing how we got there.
trafilc control points along each route and
report unit movement progress. Extensive
use would be made of German military and
civilian police, who would also report move­
ment progress. These reports would flow
into the’ NORTHAG Joint Movement Coor­
dination Center (JMCC), where the corps
MCC would briefly analyze the reports for
problems before passing them to the corps
main CP.
e The corps would minimize its electronic
signature at all times.
e The corps would move on its own march
tables (established in coordination with
GTNC).
e A transportation element from the
corps support command would be located in
the corps tactical and main CPS to provide
current movement data and to plan future
corps moves.
e ADP technology would be used to de­
31
 Figure 1 CERTAINSTRIKE(REFORGER871exemse box
velop a movements network for rapid pro­
duction and distribution of information.
The NORTHAG commander’s guidance
included
e The exercise should be as realistic as
possible, to include the portrayal of Weser
River bridges destroyed by enemy action.
Tactical bridges would be placed across the
Weser by the NORTHAG in-plsce corps.
e III Corps would make maximum use of
Weser River tactical bridges so long as the
corps reached the LD at Il-hour.
s The NORTHAG JMCC would coordi­
nate road usage among the competing re­
quirements of NORTHAG corps.
e The size and location of the exercise
“box.” about 250 km long and 100 km wide
(fig. 1).
Because REFORGER 87 was a peacetime
exercise, the host nation (West Germany)
controlkd ~he roads. It charged the GTNC
with the responsibility to ensure local civil­
ian concerns were addressed. These con­
cerns centered around safety, traffic densi­
ty, rush-hour movements and the time of
day movements would occur. This resulted
in exercise anomalies, such as avoiding 12
cities during their morning and evening
rush hours, a 30-minute serial gap for day-’
32
light moves, extensive use of German milltary
and civilian police m trsfilc control functions
and the Germans’ use of their computer­
geneyated IIEROS-5 march tables.
III Corps continued its normal general de­
fense plan preparatory training program
that included exercwes ROADRUNNER 87
and GOLDEN SABER 14, classes gwen by
GTNC on driving in Germany and how to
complete NATO Standardization Agree­
ment (STANAG ) convoy and transportation
request forms, developmetit of a 111Corps
maneuver booklet and the revision of a Fort
}Iood regulation reqmrmg the same proce­
dures for movement on post as the corps .
would find drwing In Europe. In addition,
the Corps Automated Movement Planning ~
System (CAMPS) was deveioped, using
march table software provided by the TRA­
DOC Analyem Command (’l’RAC), Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Exercise ROADRUNNER 87, held in
January 1987, practiced moving the corps
from Fort Hood to San Angelo, Texas, and
back, thereby approximating the, “stance
the corps would face in REFORG E# Exer-.
cise GOLD~N SABER 14 ,was held at Fort
Hood m May 1987 and practiced the com­
mand and staff procedures the corps would
July t 988 � MILITARY REVIEW
 PERSPECTIVES

use in war. Both exercises were beneficial in

Ill Corps Then and Now
preparing III Corps for its first major Euro­
pean field exercise. 1944 1987
Barfle of the Sulge CERTAIN STRIKE
D1vlslons 3 + 2+
Execution
Veh@es 11,800 11,000
III Corps, nicknamed the “Phantom
Corps” because of its World War II ability tc Distance 250 km 150 km
Wauwrg order 96 hrs 72 hrs
m“ove rapidly and surprise the enemy, is the
Movement beglna H-80 H-60
Army’s only offensively oriented heav~
corps. The III Corps’ approach march in ex. Routes 4 7 down104
Hn restrictions None Several
ercise REFORGER 87 compared favorablj
March umt 30 vehs (nISX.) 24 vehs (max.)
with the corps’ approach march in Decem.
V.?hlCISmtewal 50 m 50 m
ber 1944, when it was ordered to’wheel 9(
March umt gap 3 min 5 min
degrees and relieve Bastogne. Striking sire.
ilarities exist between then and now num Sertal 1-5 march uni!s 1-6 march units
Serial gap O min

ber of vehicles, size of and gap betweer WW,,

march units, serial size, vehicle interva

and rates of march (fig. 2).”The modern da~
111Corps achieved a significant milestone in
demonstrating the capability to move a
heavy corps rapidly, safely and effectively
despite having to contend with a peacetime
environment, heavy civi 1ian traffic and
host-nation restrictions.
Lessons learned
Napoleon once said that”. . . aptitude for
war is aptitude for movement.” RE ­
FORG,ER 87 demonstrated that the Phan­
tom Corps has made considerable progress
in regaining the capability to quickly move
a heavy corps over extended distances. It
also demonstrated that moving a corps
across the open plains of Texas is not the
same as moving a corps across Europe. Sig­
nificant progress has heen made, but much
remains to be done.
Moving a corps tactically in Europe is dif­
ficult, given peacetime constraints, but it is
possible with careful advance planning. A
balance was struck between NORTHAG’S
and HI Corps’ desire for realism with the
host-nation’s concerns about safety and dis­
ruption of the civilian population.
To rapidly move a corps, several factors
come into play. MultipIe routes capable of
‘peed WM&) %ww:%o,
Frgure 2
handling the oversize and overweight vehi­
cles in an armored corps must be identified.
A proper rate of march must be found. 111
Corps differentiated between type-route
military load classifications, not time ofday,
in setting its rates of march. Nonetheless,
the Phantom Corps can move faster, even in
peacetime, than demonstrated in RE­
FORGER.
The use of a 50-meter interval between
vehicles considerably shortened the time to
move the corps and increased the margin of
safety. German civilian drivers, known for
darting in and out of military convoys at
high speed, were reluctant to attempt thw,
knowing they probably could not squeeze
into the convoy without causing an acci­
dent. ffJ Corps placed 24 vehicles per march
unit and a maximum of six march units per se­
rial. The time gap between msrch unite W* 5
mimde~ between serials, 15 to 30 minutes.
This was dictated as much by tbe need to
conduct tactical rest halts and ROM activi­
ties as by.host-nation concerns. Considerable
time could be saved in moving the corps

MILITARY REVIEW � JUIY 198S 33


In a European environment,
multiple corps may be using the same
routes for attack, reconstitution and
resupply. It is imperative our units
learn the importance of moving at the
right time, on the right route, at the
right rate of march. Failure to doso
could spell disaster for the corps, for the
army group and for NAK).
by increasing the number of vehicles per
march unit and the number of march units
per serial and decreasing time gaps, but
only if rest baits and ROM activities are de­
leted. The corps’ ability to move rapidly is
necessary to minimize the enemy’s reaction
time to the corps’ movement. Speed en­
hances surprise, deception and security.
Once the NORTHAG commander issues
his waking order, HI Corps has limited
time to negotiate routes, receive convoy re­
quests, and prepare and distribute march
tables. A corps standard order of march
must already be in the CAMPS data base. Of
equal importance is the development of im­
proved march table software that will ~uto~
maticall y “deconflict” movement requqsts.
Currently this is done manually, resulting
in the expenditure of several hour%hours
that may not be available in a crisis. The’
placement of a transportation element at
the corps tactical and main (2Ps has proved
beneficial to the rapid movement of the
corps. Their ability to track corps units from
CAMPS, military police and corps MCC re-,
ports, and to advise the corpi commander
and his staff provides an added dimension to
the decision-making process.
The ability to move a corps does not come
easily. Command emphasis and frequent
practice are necessary to instill strict march
discipline in all units. We tend to forge that
a successful large-scale march depen ks on
communications, traffic control, engineer
support and movement control. In a Europe­
an environment, multiple corps maybe us­
ing the same routes for attackfi reconstitu­
tion and resupply. It is imperative our units
learn the import~nce of moving at the ri~ht
time, on the right route, at the right rate of
march. Failure to do so could spell disaster
for the corpe, for the army group and for
NATO. /
ftEFORG171? 87 proved the III Mobile
Armored Corps couId execute its missi~n
with speed and audacity. It also demon­
strated to friend and foe aiike our capability
to honor the US commitment to NATO ahd
to preserve freedom in Western Europe. %

CotimeZ Ted A. Cimral ~ A.sscstant Chzef of Staff Materiel, 13th .%pport $@’
Command (Corps), Fort Hood, Treas. He is a graduate of the US ArmyCorn
mandand GeneralStaff College, the Arnwd Forces Staff CotIege and the
Army War College. He was the III Corps tmnsportatzmz officer during RE­
FORGER87, and has served m Vwtnam, the Fe&ml Republw of Germny,
~ Japan and wtth Headquarters, Department oflheArmy staff

34 July 19SS �’ MILITARY REVIEW

Colonel L. D. Holder, US Army,
and Major Edwin J. Arnold, US
Army
Marches are war. . . aptitude for war is apti­
tude for mouernent.
NapoleonBonaparte
HEN changes to US Army doctrine
restored maneuver to its traditional
place of importance, officers began to recon­
sider the basics of the subject. With the ad­
vent of AirLand Battle doctrine, the interest
in formations, tactical movement, tire and
movement, and tire and maneuver regained
a significance which had been suppressed
during the time of the Army’s focus on static
defenses. Because it is the basis of other op­
erations, the tactical march, especially as it
pertains to large units, requires renewed at­
tention.
In the recent past, defensive doctrine al­
lowed tacticians to forget about movements
once units reached their sectors. Conse­
quently, the tactical marches of divisions
and corps were largely ignored. Although
detailed plans from garrison to wartime
fighting positions or to starting positions for
MILITARY REVIEW * July 1988
field training exercises were required, these
phases of an operation were usually decen­
tralized and limited in scope. Moreover,
once the division or corps reached its sector,
further tactical movement became a battal­
ion or brigade problem.
By concentrating on “fighting the first
battle,” commanders and their staffs ig­
nored the crucial and difficult tasks of mov­
ing large forces considerable distances in a
timely manner. We are not doing much bet­
ter today.
Historically, the tactical march has been
fundamental to large-unit operations.1 It
has been the means of concentrating for bat­
tle, launching tactical operations and ex­
ploitingthe results of the fight. Marching by
divisions or corps accelerated the tempo of
fighting and determined the nature of the
battle in fluid operations resulting from the
collision of mo.~ing forces.
Mechanization reinforced the importance
of tactical marches. From World War 11 to
35
 the present, commanders of mobile units
have used marches in concentrating forces
for an attack, moving to contact, commit­
ting reserves or follow and support forces,
and exploiting and pnrsuing enemy forces.
. At the operational level,
commanders cannot concentrate
their forces to fight, maneuver to avoid
combat or reap the benefits of success­
ful tactical actions unless their corps
and divisions can move quickl~,
securely and efficiently.
Today, as in the papt, the quality of tactical
marches will determine the outcome of mili­
tary operations. Well-timed attacks, mutu­
ally supportive maneuver, smooth transi­
tions from the attack to the exploitation or
pursuit and skillfully executed counterat­
tacks still depend on a unit’s capacity for
movement. If unable to conduct a well-
organized tactical march, a unit can do
nothing complex on the battlefield. Such a
movement, however, is not a simple opera­
tion.
At the operational level, commanders
cannot concentrate their forces to tight, ma­
neuver $0 avoid combat or reap the benefits
of successful tactical actions unless their
corps and divisions can move quickly, se­
curely and efficiently.z
When considering the requirements for
large-unit maneuver, contemporary mili­
tary wjters have reached different conclu­
sions. While some say the coordinated
movement of divisions in corps maneuver is
still practical, others argue that today’s US
or Soviet division is too cumbersome to ma­
neuver effectively or to support logistically.
Still others recommend reducing the size of
modern heavy divisions or even eliminating
them in favor of more maneuverable sepa­
36“
rate brigades.s Officers in the field, how­
ever, must set aside the larger issue of force
design and train to employ the units in
which they serve.
This article presents a working solution
to the tactical road movement of one modern
US unit, the 2d Armored Division, Fort
Hood, Texas. The assumption at the outset
is that offensive maneuver operations are,
the proper and practical way to employ
armored units, and division-level opera­
tions remain supportable through fiinor
modifications of established movement
techniques. Moreover, it is acknowledged
that divisions must be prepared for other
types of moves within a theater. These may
include road and rail movements from one
part of a theater to another and administra­
tive movements’ from ports or POMCUS
(pre-positioning of materiel configured to
unit sets) sites to staging areas.
This article proposes no radical depar­
tures from doctrinal practices and presents
no new discoveries about tactical move­
ment. Instead, it’ summarizes the current
understanding of the capabilities, require­
ments and preferred organizations for mo­
bile operations in a modern division that
trains primarily for offensive combat. It also
highlights some enduring problems of
movement for heavy forces and ‘offers one
view of their solutions.
Heavy Divi$ion March Characteristics
The engine of a tank is no less a weapbn
than Zts@n.
Heinz Guderian
The basic characteristics of heavy d;vi­
sions appear to contradict the speed, agility
and synchronization required of irLand
Battle doctrine. Although Ml i brains
tanks, M2/M3 Bradley tightingvehlcles and
other new-generation equipment are fast
and provide an edge in small-unit action’s;
they represent only about 15 percent of a
heavy division’s totaI fleet of vehicles.
July 19S8 � MILITARY REVIEW
 The basic characteristics of heavy diuisioas appear to contradict

the speed, agility and synchronization required of AirLandBattle doctrine.

Although MI Abrams tanks, M21M3Bradley fighting vehicles and other new-

generation equipment are fmt and provide an edge in small-unit actions, they

represent onlr.tabout 15 percent of a heavy division’s total fleet of vehicles.

The remainder of the division’s 5,100 vehi­
cles are slower, older vehicles. To fight as a
combined arms force, however, the com­
mander must move these slower vehicles
along with his more mobile force. The form­
erprovide tire support, combat support (CS),
combat service support (CSS), and com­
mand and control.
Moving at the same rate as older divi­
sions, a modern division in march configu­
ration occupies extensive road space and
consumes vast quantities of supplies. Even
without allowing space for march unit and
serial intervals, a heavy division at an open
interval of 100 meters has a column length of
more than 500 kilometers (km). In actual
operations, with appropriate march spac­
ing, the column expands to 700 km and
when the division’s normal attachments are
added, the march column increases to more
than 900 km. To reduce column length to
reasonable proportions, interval between
the division’s vehicles can be compressed to
50 meters. This reduced interval decreases
the column length to 600 km for the rein­
forced division.4
In addition to taking up a tremendous
amount of space, heavy divisions consume
large amounts of supplies. Their modern
fighting vehicles alone burn 200,000 gal­
lons of diesel fuel for every 10 hours of opera­
tion. This fuel requirement affects the con­
duct of the march and demands detailed
preparation.
In spite of these constraints, heavy divi­
sions can still move effectively. The 2d
Armored Division trains for division-level
moves as part of a US III Corps attack. The
division drills its staff and subordinate
unita to move from assembly areas to attack

MILITARY REVIEW � July 19SS 37

 In an efficient division movement, planners must organize the force into

march units of roughly equal size. A standard march unit of20-to-25 vehicles

is ideal. Corresponding to the size of a maneuver company or team, it matches the

corps’ and division’s rapid refueling capability and represents a manageable

march element for (%’S commanders, movement planners and traffic controllers.

positions on short notice with few pauses be­
tween initial movement and initiation of
the attack. It also trains to react to fluid ene­
my situations while on the march.
Retaining the flexihiIity to execute a vari­
ety of attack plans is the goal of all division
movements and requires simple march
planning. To do this, the division uses a de­
tailed movement SOP (standing operating
procedure), implements standard task orga­
nizations at division and battalion ieveIs
and relies on a field-transportable computer
for the rapid computation of march tables.
The logistic support problem is solved by mod­
ifykg a standard plan for one rapid ret%eling
per 100,km of movement. Using these prac­
tices, division pIAnners strive to preserve
speed, concentration. security and flexibili­
ty—alI key to offensive operations.’
Using a standard division task organiza­
tion pays off in speed and simplicity. While
the practice sacrifices the precision of care­
fully tailored organizations for each contin­
gency, it provides greater responsiveness
and smoother cooperation characteristic of
habitual relationships. In the fluid condi­
tions of mobiIe warfare, a single well-drilled
organization is likely to fight better ~an a
well-designed, but new team.
Standardizing task organizations at bat­
talion level provides the means for transfer­
ring maneuver units bet ween brigades once
an attack is under way. Task forces or
“pure” battalions can be transferred be­
tween brigades if the commander chooses to
alter bis task organization. For example, he
can create a balanced brigade of two or fokr
units by reassigning a single task force. He
can form pure tank or mechanized brigades
almost as easily. &
The division’s task org~ization varies
with the mission, terrain and training sce­
nario. The most common variant estab­
lishes one large attack fore-a brigade of
three tank battalions or task forces and ia
infant~ task force-and two smaI1er bri­
gades, one tank heavy and tbe other mecha­
nized infantry heavy. This flexible arrange­

1.

38 July 1988 � MILITARY REVIEW


ment perrnita any of the brigades to make
the division’s main effort and provides a bri­
gade specially suited to lead under any of
the most common tactical circumstances.
Basic Movement Data
For the apostles of mobility, movement and
ztscontrol are perhaps the most important
capability and technique of land warfare.
RichardE Slmpkm
Although field computers are now avail­
able to produce xharch tables, operations of­
%cers at division and corps levels should car­
ry the size of their units and the related time
and space factors in their heads and in their
notebooks. They ehould know that the divi­
sion, traveling at 30 km per hour, requires
about 5 hours to clear a release point at
night on four routes. Moreover, they should
know the pass times, column lengths and
fuel requirements of the major subordinate
elements of their division or corps. Finally,
they should appreciate the effects of weath­
er on movement and understand the engi­
neer requirements necessary to move their
units over various types of roads.
A modern unit such as the 2d Armored Di­
vision has more than 5,100 vehicles, most of
which move with the main body in a tactical
march. The normal addition of a corps artil­
lery brigade and an engineer group raises
the total to almost 6,000 vehicles, occupying
nearly 600 km of road space when on the
march. Its turbine-powered combat vehicles
consume a load of fuel every 10 hours re­
gardless of march speed. On all but the best
roads, its passage will require a slgniticant
engineer route maintenance effort.
In an efficient division movement, plan­
ners muet organize the force into march
units of roughly equal size. ~ standard
march unit of 20-to-25 vehicles m ideal. Cor­
responding to the size of a maneuver compa­
ny or team, it matches the corps’ and divi­
sion’s rapid refueling capability and repre­
sents a manageable march element for CSS
. MILITARY REVIEW * July 1988
PERSPECTIVES
commanders, movement planners and traf­
tic controller.
Advance parties, including some entire
units (about 600 vehicles), precede the divi­
sion’s main body in a deliberate attack.
Some units, like the military police compa­
ny, assist in movement; others move early
for purely tactical reasons. General support
artillery, military intelligence collection
and jamming teams, and tactical command
post and liaison parties normally move be­
fore the main body to facilitate coordination
of the attack. Because they are not 100 per­
cent mobile, support battalions have to
move in multiple “lifts.” This limits the mo­
bility of the rest of the division. The aviation
brigade’s movement also requires special
consideration because forward arming and
refuel points (FARPs) or support areas
Standardizing task organizatiorw
at battalion level provides the means for
transferring maneuver units between
brigades once an attack is under way.
Task forces or “pure” battalions can be
transferred bet ween brigades if the
commander chooses to alter
his task organization.
should be established prior to tbe commit­
ment of the brigade’s helicopters.
In a corps movement with divisions mov­
ing behind each other on the same routes,
the planning process is considerably more
complicated. Displacing the divisions’ sup­
port areas and coordinating the “’multiple
lifts” required to move support battalions
forward are formidable challenges to the
most experienced commanders and staff of­
tlcere. Critical components of the movement
pIan requiring meticulous care are traffic
control, area responsibilities, air defenses,
communications and fire support.
39
 ,

Using the key movement data shown

[n a corps movement with
here, the division’s units march at a rate of
divisions moving behind each other on
30 km per hour with 2-minute gaps between
the same routes, the planning process
march units and 5-minute gaps between se­
is considerably more complicated. Dis­
rials. The average serial containa slightly
placing the divisions’ support areas
less than eight march units, aid the aver­
and coordinating the “multiple lifts”
age march unit comprises 22 vehicles.
required to move support battalions
Marching on three routes, ”the column
forward are formidable chaUenges.
length is 225 km and the pass time is 7.5
hours. By marching on four routes, the
column length is,reduced to 170 km and the
pass time to 5.6 hours. Adding spa~e be­
Figure 1, displaying the assigned and nor­ tween the march units of committed M 1
mally attached equipment, illustrates the tank and M2/3 fighting vehicle battahons to
kind of rough computations operations offi­ permit rapid refueling increases column
cers have to make to move an armored divi­ lengths by approximately 10 km per battal­
sion. The task forces are organized as “three ion. Moreover, unit integrity and tacticai
and one” units. Elements of the advance plans will extend column lengths beyond
echelon are not included in the figure. the average shown here.
Regarding tactical march times, an
armored division can move at sust~ined
Movement Wut Vehgcles March Units Ser!als
rates of 30 km per hour in daylight and 25
Iank Battallon “­ ~—
F21 18 2 km per hour at night. These rates of march
Mech Int Batfa[lon “ 220 1 include time for maintenance halts. On a
Iank Heavy IF [;gl ;:1
1.41 4
forced march, the’2d Armored Division and
[2181 1;:1 similar units can move 500 km in a day. Re­
654 30 3
[9]
alistically, however, such moves exceed tac­
FA’ SaiialIon {D~ 11861
[.31 558 27 3 tical or operational needs on the modern
~orwrd Sot Bwfl,on 11611 [71 battlefield. A more practical maximum
p31 483 21 3
Brigade Troops [Kn Chem planning range is about 200 km in a day.
Sw Ml ADAI [:::1 19] Moreover, tactically sound placement of
1.3] ?7 3
Eng,neer Baltal,on
corps assembly areas will further reduce the
[D,v !?SS DS Co s) 127 I distances of approach marches to about 100
Cavalry .suuadron 156 : I
D1!ARTY (HHB, TAB MLRS) 106 5 I
km, leaving the divisions with plenty of
Awat,on Bwde 206 8 I range for offensive actions.
SWal %attal,o. 144 6 1
Ml Battahn 68 3 1
ADA Banlson l-l 131 7 1 Organization for the March w
Chem,cal Baftalion [Corm] 144 1 Ageneralshouldask hzmself frequently in
Eng,neer Ba!talIo” [corps) 170 ;1
510 21 3 the day: “What do ,if the enemy’s
would I
army appeared now in my front, on my right,
comuames) 187 9 1
FA Br$gade(HQ MLRS Bn) ?17 9 1 or on my left? ’’And if he has any difficulty in
DISCOM 250 ; 10 1* answering these questzans, his position is
D$wslonHeadquarters JllJ J_ ~
bad, and he should seek to remedy it. .
TOTALS 5989 269 34
Ji:poleon Bonaparte
‘lIrst half 0.1)
While mo;ing, the division must be pre­
Figure 1 pared to meet enemy threats from any direc­

40 .iuly 1988 * MILITARY REVIEW

 IfMIs and fif2s are to be refueled during the march or in attack positions,
the corps establishes refueling stations in advance, and the diuision plans gaps ­
of 15 to 20 minutes between seriats to allow for refueling operations. At a 30-km
rate of march, such a refueling operation ado%7 to 10 km to each
battalion’s or task force’s column length.

tion and, if necessary, to attack from the
march. To remain flexible enough to meet
these challenges, battalions and Lyigades
employ march formations that allow all-
around and overhead security. CS and CSS
units are interspersed in the column to sup­
port the force without hindering its move­
ment. Because heavy divisions depend on
CS and CSS units for their mobility, protec­
tion of these units is itself a paramount com­
bat task.
Ml and M2 battalion packages are the di­
vision’s basic combat elements and the prin­
cipal building blocks for tactical planning.
Their order of movement, rate of march and
timetables for movement contribute to the
overall security of the division and facilitate
its transition from road march to attack.
Consequently, they are the first elements
considered in movement organization.
To simplify planning, maneuver units—
battalion or task force, tank or fighting
vehicl%march as serials in nearly equal-
size time blocks. Other units are integrated
into the division movement to support the
maneuver battalion packages. Some of the
supporting units precede the main body of
the division to establish refueling points, in­
stall communications and prepare a ba~e of
support in the forward area before the at­
tack. Others march with the main body, but
leave the formation before the combat bat­
talions cross the line of departure (LD).
The refueling requirement of Ml tank

MILITARY REVIEW � Juiy 1988 41

units stretches a division’s march column on
extended moves and when the commander
desires te move through an attack position
without halting. IfMls and M2s are to be re­
fueled during the march or in attack posi­
tions, the corps establishes refueling sta­
tions in advance, and the division plans
gaps of 15 to 20 minutes between serials to
allow for refueling operations. At a 30-km
rate of march, such a refueling operation
adds 7 tQ 10 km to each battalion’s or task
force’s column length. Moreover, it adds at
least 4 hours to the division’s pass time, if
traveling on three routes.
When deploying directly from the march
to the attack, a 2-minute (one-km) gap be­
tween march units and a 5-minute (2.5-km)
gap between serials should be maintained
by lead brigades. As they approach their at­
tack positions, this gives the lead battalions
time to deploy without creating a backlog of
units and ensures that reserve battalions
remain close enough to be available, if need-
Well-rehearsed battle drilts
are the kegs to success in deployment to
and from the column formation.
Because battalions cannot move into an
attack directly horn the column, com­
Well-rehearsed battle drills are the keys ‘
mitted battalions or task forces should
be given at least two routes forward
of their attack positions.
not move into an attack directly from the
ed. Longer columns caused by extended in­
tervala may be necessary for reserve units
once the LD is crossed.
Figure 2 shows typical march arrange­
ments for tank and mechanized infantry
battalions on a single route in a division
road movement. A march interval of 50 me­
ters between vehicles, day or night, is used
to facilitate compact movement. Although
risky, a 50-meter interval eliminates a pro­
42
hibitive pass time and column length that
would otherwise negate tactical responsive­
ness.
In division movements, lead brigades
should move on at least two routes with bat­
talions marching on single routes. To pre­
serve their fighting potential, battalion
Tank Battalion. 180 Vehicles
9 March Umts Colm Length: 18.5 Ktlomet’ers
PST 37 mmutes at 30 Km/Hr
Mechamzed Infantry Task Force 220 Vehicles
10 March Unit$ Colm Lgth: 21,8 Ktometers
PST 44 Minutes at 30 Km/Hr.
I
Figure 2. Battalion-sized Units’ on a SingletRoute.
commanders should adopt a march forma­
tion that allows them to secure their trains
while moving and to rapidly drop them ifor­
deredto attack from the march. Mortars and
scouts must be positioned to allow prompt
support. Other combat units of the battalion
or task force should move in a standard or­
der that permits fast action on contact and
rapid movement onto and off of routes.
to success in deployment to and from the
column formation. Because battalions can­
column, committed battalions or task forces
should be given aj least two routes forward
of their attack positions to facilit&e quick
deployment. As a rule ofthumb, the time al­
lowed for deployment should not be less
than the pass time of the leading companies
or teams that are required f,o deploy their
trail platoons to support the lead units.’ .,
Figure 3 depicts a battalion and task force
moving on ,two routes. Although similar in
march organizations, brigades require a
minimum of two routes from which to de-
July 198s � MILITARY REVIEW
 PERSPECTIVES

F~gure 4 dlustrates march columns for

brigades with three and four battalions. Of
course, every brigade will organize some­
what differently. For instance, field artil­
lery battalions may march on separate
Tank Battahon, 180 Vehicles
routes even during approach marches. Inso­
12 Kilometers, longer column, PST 25 Minutes
far as possible, however, internal arrange­
II
ments should be standardized within divi­
sions to simplify planning, make coordina­
tion routine and speed up movements.
-
None of the schematic shows the crucial­
la@2j@!31m&El ly important division troops. To facilitate
movement of the division, military police,
,Mechamzed Infantry Task Force 220 Veh!cles
signal troops, engineers, fuel sections and
13 Kilometers,longercolumn,PST 27 m!nutes
cavalrymen precede the main body in sepa­
Figure 3. Battalion & Task Force on Two Routes rate scheduled movements. They Identify
problems in advance, control march units,
provide communications, clear and repair
ploy and fight, even when marching in the roads, and ensure smooth movement m and
rear area. In other words, a division on the out of positions at either end of the route.
move needs a minimum of four routes (two Staging command and control forward from
brigades with two battalions each marching assembly areas *O attack positions, refuel­
on a single route) for security and rapid de­ ing on the move and employing the21 mili­
ployment at its destination. tary police squads of the divisional 1require
meticulous planning and close supervision.

Tactical Applications ‘
a “tank force” is about being and mou­
ing, not about flghtzng It mostly Just
moues but carries wzth it a formidable fight­
ingpotentlal.
m msmmmmn mmmmmm. m Em’=m=mu.. --mmmm
1)25 7,170 8,157 6/ 144 9/180 Richard E. Sunpkm
4 BA11AL1ON BRIGADE 1425 Veh,ct,, 66 march ““(t, 10,,,$81$

Noromrn Route 1749 wh,cIw35 mmm .n,t$l Cm Lgm 775 Km PST 235

In combat, US, Soviet, C,erman and Israe­

Southern Route (676 wh,des131 march .n,tsl calm Lgm 698 mm PSI 218
li reserve divisions have responded to tacti­
cal emergencies quickly over long dwtances.
We must train to do so again. In a crisis, a re­
serve division—unencumbered with forces
in contact or other missione-+an stage its

dmplalla
m .mmmmmm m.c+mmm mmmmmmma. mmmmmmmmm
units forward from assembly areas to attack
positions in a matter of hours. Even on short
!/25 7,161 6/144 7/169 91180 notice, the division can deliver a coordi­
3 W17AL,0N L%
RIGbD[ 1224 Wh,cte, 58 ma,ch .“>1, 9 $,,<,1s
Nmt?w. %.te f611 wh,c!es/25 march WXIS) Cd. !Etn 59 Km PST 15T
nated attack by pre-positiomng some criti­
So”th,rn Rote (679 VWCIW30 march ,“!,s) Cd. L@ 69 Km PSI 215 cal command and control elements and CS
PaWch U“ll [20 25 “eh.cl,sl 2 marcn v;; :;,: send 080
units ahead of its combat forces.
1125- march ,mt$lveh,cles

In a deliberate attack, a division com­

Figure 4. Brigade March Orgamzatlon,2 Routes, mander can expect 24 to 48 hours advance

MILITARY REVIEW � Jldy 1988 43

 notice of his commitment. With this much
lead time, he can send coordinating brigade
command posts forward in advance.
Moreover, he can position division-
controlled artillery and crucial CS and CSS
e 1ements before moving his brigades, main
support forces and command posts forward.
In a deliberate commitment such as a
counterattack operation, the division would
Military intelligence units,
artillery battalions and command posts
would collocate with like units of defend­
ing divisions to establish a firm base
of intelligence collection, tire support and
command and control in advance.
probably have two periods of darkness in
which to concentrate its forces in attack po­
eitions. On the first night, after receiving
the corps warning, order, tbe division can
move units forward from reserve locations
to supporting positions near the designated
LD. Priority tasks in this first movement of
troops include the establishment of refuel­
ing points short of the attack positions, de­
ployment of military police units to critical
points and, if necessary, the assignment of
engineer forces to road and bridge mainte­
nance along the assigned routes.
Military intelligence units, artillery bat­
talions and command posts would collocate
with like units of defending divisions to es­
tablish a firm base of intelligence collection,
tire support and command and control in ad­
vance. Military intelligence elements
would start developing intelligence on tbe
zone of attack through coordination with de­
fending units and initiation of their own
passive collection efforts. Nondivisional ar­
tillery battalions would occupy hide posi­
tions near the LD.’ Tactical command posts
from the division and its principal subordi­
44
nate units would start the detailed coordi­
nation required to pass through a defending
unit on the ground and in the air.
Finally, on the night preceding the at.
tack, .he division’s fighting el~ments and
their support units would move forward. De­
pending on the corps commander’s concept
of operations, these units would either occu­
py their attack positions and wait for the as-”
signed LD time or deploy directly from the
assembly areas into the attack. The defision
concerning the amount of time to halt m for­
ward assembly areas is a critical one. .Pre­
mature occupation of the attack positions
can expose the force to disruptive tires and
warn the enemy of the impending attack.
On the other”hand, a minimal halt pr~ to
moving to the LD assumes perfect execution
of the march plan, supposes a complete ab­
sence of enemy interference and ,compli­
catei coordinated execution of the attack by
requiring brigadei to deploy hurriedly to*
cross tbe LD exa@ly on time. Regardless of
the commander’s options, a minimum of
three routes is required to move an attack­
ing division from an assembly area to its at­
tack positions with acceptable speed and
security—four routes are preferable.
In planning the move from attack posi­
tions to the LD, operations officers must
consider t,ravel time from assembly areas to
attack positions, deployment times and
movement times from attack positions to
the LD. No less than six routes are requir~d II
to move the lead battalions from their at­
tack positions to the LDs. If four battalions
are leading, eight routes are needed.
Specific instructions are es$ential for bri­
gades moving from assembly areas through
attack positions to the LD. Controlling bat­
tle statTs must provide locatibns of all con­
tact points, routes, passage lanes and posi­
tions available for occupation. Addition­
ally, they must provide information concern­
ing the support to be provided by defending
units whose rear areas will be traversed
July 1988. MILITARY REVIEW
 PERSPECTIVES

I& kin
7/161 10/220
d3JJ@
10/220 9/210
tit da B&,b+
9/180 9/ 186 10/220 1/20

p-) a I&X(-) b+, a a Eq h(-)

9/210 9/182 7/161 9/220 9/ 182 9/186 9/182 2/35

Q(-)&J-ql(-@J
*j* Q $$/Q-)
E&la-) A &
6/144 7/131 7/170
(+(-)
la(-)
q9/210 7/161
& ‘C21
9/182 1/10

150 Km 120 90 60 30

5 Hours 4 3 2 1
Note. ‘J Series Armored DIvIsIon organized as mam attack,
‘ Duwon marches5483vehicles,DSAoperates from Rear Assembly Area
‘DIvIsion IS preceded to LD by GS artdlery EW elements, Tac CPS, and refueling teams

Figure 5 DwslonTact!calRoadMarch

by the attacking forces. dlvlsion is to move efficiently over minimal

Staffs of maneuver and aviation brigades routes in a compressed time. Moving the di­

and division artillery must refine the initial vision’s fighting forces from a reserve posi­

coordinating instructions by arranging the tion to an LD is a challenging task. If you

final details of their movement from attack consider that a division has a paes time of 5

positions to the LD with the units in place. hours and a normal march time of 3 houra

Since tank and mechanized infantry battal- from its rear assembly areas to forward as-

ions and task forces are similar in size, dwi- sembly areas, you can begin to appreciate

sions may use nonspecific movement time the magnitude of the problem.

blocks to cover the short distances from at- Even under the most ideal conditions, it

tack positions to LDs. This procedure en- takes about 10 houre to move forward, re­

ables brigade commanders to move their fuel, deploy and move committed brigades

battalions in the order required by the con- to the LD. During several months of the

cepts of operation. year, the time required will exceed the

Because road space and support areas will hours of darknees available. Improved

be at a premium around the LD, the divi- chances for surpriee in the attack, however,

sion’s forces must move strictly in compli- outweigh any risks incurred by moving over

ance with precise march tables. Strong or- multiple routes at night. Moreover, a well­

ganization, thorough training and iron dis- executed move, followed by a surprise at­

cipline in small units are eseential if the tack, will greatly impair the enemy’s ability

MILITARY REVIEW � Jldy 19e8 45

 Even under the most ideal conditions, it takes about IOhours fo move

forward, refuel, deploy and move committed brigades to the LD. Du>ing several

months of the year, the time required will exceed the hours of darkness avail­

able. Improved chances for surprise in the attack, however, outweigh any risks

incurred bu moving over multiple routes at night.

46. .klly 1988 � MILITARY REVIEW


to interdict trailing friendly units.
The schematic at figure 5 depicts the size,
road space and principal time factors associ­
ated with a division move. The division is
marching with two brigades abreast, with
each brigade moving on two routes. The
third brigade (minus) follows the topmost
brigade and the division main command
post and support unita follow the bottom bri­
gade. The numbers under each unit symbol
show the number of march units and vehi­
cles in that unit. The units on the four routes
are preceded by scouts.
Notice that the column length of the divi­
sion in this graphic is approximately 150
km. This means that in a typical approach
march of around 100 km or less, the divi­
sion’s lead elemente will be halted in attack
positions or crossing the LD before its trail
urrits have left their assembly areas. Very
rarely will a division be in motion every­
where at the same time.
Ifa division is not initially committed, its
movement beyond the LD continues as a
tactical road march. Reserve divisions con­
sisting of 4,000-to-5,000 vehicles require
three or four routes to be reasonably avail­
able to support leading divisions. They com­
monly move with two brigades leading,
halting periodically to maintain the space
necessary for freedom of action for themsel­
ves and the committed forces to their front.
Because of the increased air threat for­
ward of the LD, reserve divisions should
open their march interval for greater secu­
rity. Moreover, they must be prepared to al­
ter their speed and direction of movement to
meet contingencies. Consequently, their
march planning will be more complex than
that for an approach march.
When called for, reserve divisions require
additional routes so they can deploy their
battalions as they approach the LD. As a
minimum, each committed battalion will
need two routes or cross-country avenues.
Deploying on short notice over several
MILITARY REVIEW � July 1988
. PERSPECTIVES
In planning the move tkom
attack positions to the LD, operations
ofiicers must consider travel time horn
assembly areas to attack positions, de­
ployment times and movement times
from attack positions to the LD. No less
than six routes are required to move the
lead battalions tkom their attack posi­
tions to the LDs. If four battalions are
leading, eight routes are needed.
routes is a critical task for battalions and
brigades. Unfortunately, it receives little
training emphasis.
One of the most difficult tasks of division
maneuver is reassembling a deployed bri­
gade or battalion to initiate tactical road
movement. This operation is necessary
when a formerly committed unit is with­
drawn into reserve or when a defending unit
is moved laterally or to a position forward of
or behind its current location. Likewise, re.
assembly is required when brigades or divi­
sions pass into exploitation or pursuit. Re­
forming a unit for movement after it has
been fighting requires strong leadership,
sound training and a wide understanding of
the unit’s movement SOP. The physical sep­
aration of units, the confusion of combat and
the presence of casualties all complicate the
re-forming process and the resumption of
movement.
The ~,ghting power of heavy formations
depend< fu@amentally on their ability to
move. I$they can move fast and concentrate
quickly in fluid situations, heavy corps, di­
v]sions and brigades will be powerful weap­
ons. To realize their potential, they must
have the space to march and maneuver on
multiple routes and avenues of approach.
Their method of employment requires ade­
quate road nets and cross-country condi­
tions. If these are not available, the forma-
47

tions should not be employed.
In theaters where long-range sensors can
expose dispositions at great distances and
where self-directing. antiarmor munitions
and air maneuver can alter circumstances
rapidly, fluid movement will be the real es-
Because of the increased air
threat forward of the LD, reserve
divisions should open their march in­
terval for greater security. Moreover, !
they must be prepared to alter their
speed and direction of movement to meet
contingencies. Consequently, their
march planning will be more complex
than that for an approach march.
sence of “agility.” Under these conditions,
division movement will have to be support­
ed by well-executed deception operations
and effective air and missile defenses. Also,
well-planned logistic support a~d route
maintenance are essential to maneuver.
Corps, divisions and brigades must train,
plan and refine their movement capabilities
in peace if they are to tight effectively in
war. Their staffs should train routinely and
repetitively to produce complete march or­
ders on short notice and to adjust road move­
mentsiin progress. Neither good staff work
nor innovative commanders, however, can
offset inadequacies in small-unit march dis­
clpline and training. Standards for tactical
marchmg are almost uniquely stringent. If
the division is to move well, the ability to
march-must extend all the way down into
the companies. Ifasingle battalion cannot
conform to the march table, its failure will
throw off the movement of the brigade and
the entire division.
During operations, movement planning
must be continuous in division and corps
tactical operations centers because some
48 “
I
units m-e always in motion and variations
from the current direction are always likely.
Because tactical marches are inseparable
from operations, the operations oftlcer must
}ake the lead in their planning. However,
other staff oflicers such as the division or
corps transportation officer, engineer, prO­
vost marshal, air defense oficer and signal
officer will be heavily involved.
Although simplified by computer support”
and solid SOPS, mqrch planning wIII only go
smoothly if the staff anticipates require­
mentsduring tbe planning process. Antici­
patory reconnaissance of routes and ai-eas,
prompt dispatch of competent liaison teams
to other headquarters and implementation
of standing teams of communicators, traffic
controllers and quartering elements facili­
tate fast reaction to orders and effective use
of available time.
Executing the movement plan calls for
aggressive supervision and deliberate ef.
forts to gain information. Just ascom­
manders observe named areas of interest in
other operations, they must make special ef­
forts to watch key points or areas during a
march, Enemy interference, engineer prob­
lems on the route and glitches in movement
at critical points must be promptly reported
by officers or units specifically detailed to
monitor critical points.
When rerouting ofunits become~nekes­
sary, alternate routes must be available and
confirmed as sultableby timely reconnais­
sance. Although at times unavoid~ble, re­
routing affects arrival times in forwarder­
eas and usually changes the order of march
into attack positions oraseembly areas. Al­
teration of the movement plan should be of
immediate interest to commanders because
they may have to reconsider timing or dispo­
sitions of forces.
Guderian’s exploitations, the fire brigade
actions of Erich von Manstein’s armies on
the Easterti Front, George S. Patton Jr.’s
thrust across France, the diversion of III
July 19S8 * MILITARY REVIEW
 PERSPECTIVES

Corps to Ffastogne and the Israelis’ shi fting action Keytoboth operational andtacticai
of forces between theaters ofoperatlons In success, this critical combat skill existed
their wars are landmarks m the history of long before the internal combustion engine
mobile armored warfare. Such short-notice revolutionized warfare With the increased
repositioning of large forces and reactions to pace of modern combat, however, this skill
emergency situations characterized mobile has become more vital to warfighting. If the
combat of the past and will no doubt be a commanders of modern corps, divisions and
part ofheavy-force operations in the future. brigades recognize the importance of tacti­
In the past, decisive and dramatic actions cal movement, organize their CS and CSS
were the work ofdaring tacticians and su­ assets to support this movement and sustain
perbly trained units. Their basis for success thelrabillty to march, they, Iikethepremier
was mastery of the tactical march linked to battle captains of the past, will reap the
the fastest possihletransltion into tactical maximum combat potential of their forces.

NOTES
1 E.rll,r COmma"dem alSOu5e0tati,C,l mar,hes,o gan Operational and ofro.d,paLe l.ra.,.,ston ona.,nq,e route m,r., ngataloo me,e,,ntewa,
l.Cl,Cal.dVa”tage, OfCO”rSe M.,ibOr.ugh and Frederick orobab,”emDloyeti wI!ho.lgaD$ belwee” march uPtsanOser, al, we3 4 The,ex, no,estha!
taC1rC.l mar.he, b,h.rtha” a”, oflhe other e.rl, ”oder”ae”eral, ol E. a"O,"er 100"! 10me,ers.lll bedddeO (Othe!o,a, colum",enq,h when g,P, are
mm Mar, borough smarc"lrom"the NetOerl."Os I:slIll sludIe: a$a Gla,,Icol ,“cluded 1!6.,, ”0, ?,0.,.,, .om,utethe add,t Onal SD,Cereq.,reO byre,”
.ammlgn,ng FredencK smo.ementolforces on,nter,or lnesd.r,.glhe se.. tOrC,”g .”d S”DD0n,”9tr..D% Fgure,$ orthe 3X8 l,elda”>leqb a~al,o”s
en Years Wa, wa,le,qe,y reswns,ble fo, h,. d”.as,”s,uw!”al Thew.!e, arerrom lhe,,v,s,on ir.ns,ofia!,o)l o,l”er 2dArr”or,d Dlv!s0n
,h.dbeWeen modern antie.r,y motiernoPe,a,, On, howeve,. c.mewlh the 5 Ov?rats..$nlan.er$ .Ot,og,stm”s sho.ldmove lhedlvls$on .a.y
mmblned armsdl.,slons andcoms ol!he Fre.ch8e.ol.t,on Those o,llerea t.ct,ca$~er<~ The Germa”.rmy o, WOr!d Warl!went e,.”1.flbe, l,lorm,m
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es the nwciwnlzw wn,esdn.r.d fromlbe loot arrrmsor Napoleon d8Sta”Ce mOveme”!s af,lSOv9,0ns See DeDatime”t Of,he&,my PavPh>e,
2 Pe!er S K,”os”.Iw, An APPre,,at,on lor Mo.,ngthe Heavy CoTs Z& -242 H,sl.”caf5t”0, German A,m.red TraR,c Co”tr.)D.nn.,he R.s
.np.blmwdi?wer School of AGva.ced M,ltlaw Studies, us Army Command Srancampa qntwasn,ngton DC Ce.terfor M!l!taq H,3toV 195~1
ana General Slaff College Fort Lea.enworih, Ks 19s8 6 5mWI 111 Oflemasa r.!eol,h.mb that Iilet!m erc’s,byoep(n”
3 R$cham E S,mPk,”, RacG!O1he Swrfi Thought.onTwe”iy F,r,, Cem men! .,lloe,rom o...nde hal, tond..nd aha,, iIme51he .0rmaIDa5Silmeor
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Amy War College, Carlr5te Barracw PA, M.Y 1985 Seealsom. st.oe.t 7 D,e<!S"DDOfl batialIOns ea"also be Po$,l(oned foWarO early To P,.
,walesol the mane..er orte.teddtvfs,on do.eatme Arrnv Warcol!eqe SeW. t”. fle.!bll y,o/eSPO”dt o’ha”geSl ”t”e, f,ua,,On how,.,, ,“,0,”,
and the Naltonal War College ,)o”commander should reta. n hI, d,rec,,uDDoti bs,t8!,ons w,mh,s,m,nbod,
4 SIUti.”, T.tilO@- 3, B, Hl, BOOk C,.,, rlO, A,mYT.Ct8C$ uS Arm” and 90$1,0” ,hemto ,.000.. scro,,l”gol !“. LD.s 10. br!gedes move 10;
Command a.a General S1alt College Fo.Leave.writ! I(S, &w! 1986 ,s ward N!ghl""bemen, ofier. (es. ,ecJr,!y aq.,"s! del.ctO",h." .ton,ed,d
thesourm torun,t .,.est” Amydlv1510n. !l.f!ersthe f,gureof 5t3k,lome1er9 b,ca..e ol(mD>”\ea,er)5”r. <?,t,(l oro.t6e,,ome,ec”, b1r”me!ra?eck

>
f- Colonel L i) Ho![ier tsdlrector, SrhoolofAdcanc,.d,l fzlztaryStudze\ L’S
Army Command and Gwwrai Staff College ( USA C(XC1, Fort Leaven worth,
Kansas Hereceu,eda BA from Texas A&hi Untuer5ttv. u,t MA fmmfiar.
.a.d Unwerszty and u a gradzuztr? of the USA CGSC, tie has sc rural m G3 pio us
andoperatLons offzcer. 2dArmored Duwlon, F’utt Hood, Tewz.. asdocmme
tnrzt?r, I)epartment of Taclzcs. llSACGSC; andasc,,rlzrl?” ??,!?r, lhr Squmf! on.
3d Armored Caualry Regmzent, Fort i31LM, TPWM
\ /

/ \
Ma]orEduwzJ Arno/dch SGS(Secreta!yof the Gen,r[~l.7taffl,2 dArn>ored
Dmzslon, Fort ffood, Texa. Hcrccezued hLabarhelo,’s u,tdmu.te>,’~ d?grcr.
from the Uruuerscty of Texas, and L$a graduate of lb< Command and General
Staff Officw Course and the School of Adwznced ,tfdllaq .’hd[ e., L’S Army
Command and Genemi Staff College, Fort Leawnu,orth, Kansas HP has
served U<zth G3phwm 2dArmored Lhutszon, Fo, t Homi T~xas. and as S3.
company commcmder ami S4, ?99th EngzneerBattah on,
Fort S!ll, OIdahomu

MILITARY REVIEW � JUIY 19S8 49