Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Groundimng
Groundimng
Human Relations
[0018-7267(200308)56:8]
Volume 56(8): 953–981: 036987
Copyright © 2003
The Tavistock Institute ®
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
www.sagepublications.com
953
The assumption within the western tradition ever since Aristotle is that it is
not about the ability to perform a task that really distinguishes a know-
ledgeable person, but one who has grasped the underlying causes of events
and can provide a compelling explanation of the latter.
Such a privileging of explanation over action has meant that the art of
doing has been overshadowed by the art of reasoning, justification and the
corresponding mastery of language required to achieve the latter. The articu-
late individual who is able to express him/herself well and to communicate
effectively is often held up as the exemplar of a knowledgeable person. The
history of progress in the western world has therefore been a history of
rendering articulate and explicit, and frequently in a written alphabetic form
our knowledge and understanding of the underlying causes of phenomena in
the world. The impressive achievements of modern western science testify to
the effectiveness of this approach and it is clear we would not be where we
are today without the outstanding progress that science has made. However,
within the East and within the realm of the arts, and the performing arts in
particular, such a systematized mode of knowledge-acquisition is actively
resisted. Here, instead, a process of sustained apprenticeship, discipleship or
understudy is emphasized. In large measure learning, knowing and perform-
ing in the arts come not so much by way of the detached acquisition of
abstract causes via the written word, but through direct, sustained, experi-
mental practice. Action is perfected through application and often without
the need for intervention by the written word.
Such contrasting priorities and approaches can help us begin to under-
stand the fundamental difference in attitudes between eastern2 and the
dominant western attitudes towards knowledge, action and performance.
This article seeks to develop the argument that knowledge of causes expressed
via the written word is not the only avenue for achieving understanding and
effective performance. In the terms of the Heideggerian philosopher Hubert
Dreyfus, abstract explanations can be helpful in bringing us from a novice
status to one of competence. But proficiency and mastery cannot be attained
without direct unmediated involvement. Such proficiency and mastery seem
to develop only if direct experience is assimilated in an ‘embodied, atheoret-
ical way’ (Dreyfus, 2001: 40, my emphasis). This is the approach favoured
by the arts in general, and the eastern arts in particular. In such artistic activi-
ties, the world is encountered in a non-thematic circumspective mode that
Heidegger (1962) calls ‘being-in-the-world’. Although it is often assumed that
practical activity presupposes a theoretical understanding of the world,
Heidegger, like a number of other philosophers, regards our ways of dealing
with the world as more basic than theoretical. At the heart of Heidegger’s
approach to human behaviour is a phenomenology of ‘mindless’ everyday
coping that forms the basis of all intelligibility. For this reason he coined the
term being-in-the-world to refer to a state of non-reflective absorption in
which the world around us is experienced as so much a part of us that it is
not viewed as an object for us to apprehend. Instead, we ‘dwell’ in it. Such a
view would privilege a directness of experiencing and it is this unmediated
directness that encapsulates what we mean here by the broad term ‘eastern’.
For this reason alone, Heidegger remains an important reference point for
serious eastern intellectuals (Parkes, 1987).
This essay begins by first noting the rise of China and the East Asian
countries in the global economy and its implications for our understanding
of contrasting cultural attitudes towards self, knowledge, action and
performance. We then return to chart the metaphysical traditions shaping
contemporary western thought and the epistemological lines of debate that
have emerged within this western tradition. The core assumptions underlying
the current preoccupation with knowledge-creation and management will
then be examined. An attempt is then made to contrast this preoccupation
with the priorities of an eastern mindset which is essentially pragmatic and
existential in orientation. By revisiting these issues it becomes much clearer
what an alternative practice-oriented attitude can really offer to our under-
standing of the relationship between knowing, action and performance.
Rapid and revolutionary changes in the global political, social and techno-
logical landscapes have transformed the rules of competition for businesses
around the world. Amidst the diversity that economic globalization brings
are multiple shades of capitalism that co-exist uneasily and often in tension
with each other (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1996). To take a
common example, western business people generally refrain from mixing
business with ‘friendship’, but in the East friendship is an important aspect
of doing business because it carries with it a set of implicit obligations which
may be ‘cashed’ in terms of favours at a convenient time. Chu (1995) writes
of the experience of a certain Mr Jones, an American businessman who was
courting a Japanese businessman for a multimillion dollar agricultural
commodity deal amidst stiff competition from one other Midwestern broker.
For a variety of reasons Jones felt that he and the Japanese buyer had devel-
oped a strong rapport and the deal was all but sewn up when the buyer asked
him for a favour. He wanted his son to study in the United States and
wondered if the boy could be put up in the Jones family household during
this period. Mr Jones was, however, unable to do the latter. Soon after, his
Japanese client signed a contract with his Midwestern competitor, who, not
coincidentally, had some room in his house to put up the client’s son. This
is not an uncommon situation that westerners find themselves in when doing
business in the East. Giving a business contract is equated with doing a
favour and such favours require returning at some point in time.
Such significant differences in business attitudes within the broad
umbrella of capitalism are attributable to deep underlying metaphysical
assumptions that shape notions of self and its relationship with others, as
well as the idea of knowledge and its relationship to decision-making and
action. This divergence of attitude signals the necessity for developing
alternative conceptualizations and practical understandings of the strategic
priorities, decisional imperatives and modes of management operating in
diverse geographical locations throughout the world, and in particular within
the emerging economies of the Asia-Pacific countries and China. Although
America and western Europe have registered impressive economic revivals
over the last decade, it is clear that such continued strengthening of the
western economies is inextricably linked to the economic fortunes of other
global trading partners such as Japan, South Korea and the Asia-Pacific coun-
tries. This, together with the immense potential of China as an economic
superpower this century, necessitates an urgent conceptual re-assessment of
the underlying metaphysical outlook and cultural formations shaping mana-
gerial attitudes towards self, knowledge, and performative action in these
East Asian countries. Here, despite their apparent cultural diversities and
ideological differences,3 the invisible, the tacit, the spoken and the implied
are inevitably privileged over the visible, the explicit, the written and the
articulate. The term ‘Sinism’ (a ‘back-hand’ compliment since Sinism derives
from the word ‘sinister’) has been used to accentuate this peculiarly eastern
quality ‘and was formulated to encompass the important aspects of philo-
sophical, religious, and ethical thought of both Japan and Korea as well as
the Chinese language’ (Hwa, 1987: 218).
Unlike most alphabetic-literate cultures, which put a ‘premium on visu-
alist qualities such as sharp outlines and clear-cut sequences (and) is likely
to regard the literal meaning . . . as something altogether wholesome and
altogether desirable’ (Ong, 1967: 47), communication in the East is often
indirect, suggestive and symbolic (Abe, 1990). This is because in non-
alphabetic languages like Chinese, meaning is never literal since the Chinese
writing system:
It is this epistemological reversal and the privileging of the invisible, the tacit
and the unspeakable over the literal, the visible and the articulated that
marks out the East from that dominant in the West. This deeply ingrained
eastern predisposition relates to an ‘unconscious metaphysic’ (Whitehead,
1933) that elevates flux and change over order and stability. For, only if it is
believed that ultimate reality is relatively stable and orderly can there be
confidence of the capacity of language to capture precisely the condition of
things. In a world that believes ultimate reality to be perpetually in flux,
however, linguistic terms are construed as always inadequate to the task.
Hence they are not to be used literally but metaphorically as mere vehicles4
to ‘point to’ an ultimate reality that is inaccessible to language. As a result
of this ‘eastern’ perception of the inadequacy of language, a pragmatic
attitude towards language predominates and hence issues of meaning,
identity, self, knowing, action and performance are conceived in essentially
relational terms. Meaning, action and utterances must be understood not
literally, but always in the context of specific situations.
A heightened awareness of such fundamental differences in meta-
physical attitudes has led to recent attempts by some leading Japanese
management scholars to introduce local notions such as ‘Ba’ to account for
the perceived differences in knowledge-management practices in Japanese
organizations (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). ‘Ba’,
suggests a place or epistemological platform for advancing individual and
collective knowledge. It is a ‘shared space for emerging relationships. It can
be physical, virtual, or mental space’ (Nonaka & Konno, 1998: 40).
Moreover, ‘Ba exists at many levels and these levels may be connected to
form a greater Ba known as a Basho’ (Nonaka & Konno, 1998: 41). In their
important article, Nonaka and Konno also introduce the concept of ‘Pure
Experience’ and have importantly related it to Zen learning although they
have not sufficiently showed how these concepts are existentially connected.
The introduction of novel concepts such as ‘Ba’ into a predominantly
western-inspired management discourse is to be much welcomed. However,
it is argued here that a full appreciation of their implications for under-
standing action and performance can only be grasped against the backdrop
of what is clearly an alternative set of ontological priorities (Heidegger, 1971;
Needham, 1962; Nishitani, 1982). By rendering these metaphysical assump-
tions more transparent, it becomes more possible to demonstrate how radi-
cally they differ from the dominant western mindset of knowledge-creation,
. . . it is not only with a view to action but also when we have no inten-
tion to do anything that we choose . . . . sight rather than all the others
. . . sight is the sense that especially produces cognition in us and
reveals many distinguishing features of things.
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Alpha 1, trans. Lawson-Tancred,
1998: 4)
that only the fixed within the flow of living experience and the universal
aspects of the individual are given a valid ontological status. For, that which
is fluxing and changing, by definition cannot be given a stable identity, and
hence cannot be named, differentiated and compared for their universal
qualities. Flux, change, process and the individual particularities of event-
happenings are thereby relegated to an epi-phenomenal status in the Aris-
totelian scheme of things. There is ‘no place for the flow to be known as
flow, nor the individual as individual’ (Carter, 1990: 26). Aristotle’s emphasis
on fixity, ‘simple location’ (Whitehead, 1985) and universality can be attrib-
uted to his Parmenidean ‘thirst’ for the eternal and the unchanging as essen-
tial features of ultimate reality. This Aristotelian metaphysics underpins the
enterprise of modern knowledge-creation and management. Its three key
philosophical assumptions are that:
What is not recorded, not identified and given a causal explanation, and
hence not subsequently published in established journals or books is not
considered proper knowledge.
Unsurprisingly, many of these academic concepts and causal expla-
nations often appear abstract and remote from the lived experiences of the
practitioner world. For, within the world of the latter, it is not so much the
ability to name phenomena and establish their causal relations that matters,
but how they can be manipulated so as to generate the desired response that
forms the primary concern. What works is more important that what is true.
Pragmatism is the natural orientation of the practitioner world. The result is
a typical epistemological rupture between academic tendencies and prac-
titioner priorities. On the one hand, academic theories purport to explain
retrospectively ‘why’ things are as they are and how they have come to be
and, on the other hand, practitioners are more concerned with ‘what’ needs
to be done prospectively to ensure a desired outcome.
This has led to the creation of an epistemological gap between what is
commonly called ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. It is probably more useful in this
context to refer to this gap as the difference between what Argyris and Schon
(1974) perceptively called ‘espoused theory’ and ‘theory-in-use’. But,
contrary to Argyris and Schon’s contention that the former and the latter
ought to be more consistent and aligned with each other, the gap between
these two is never bridgeable as they serve rather different functions.
‘Espoused theories’ and explanations are part of the retrospective sense-
making process that is infused with justificatory overtones. They enable us
to lay out a logically consistent pathway between the past and the future;
between what has happened and what will happen. This is important. For
within the context of the western mindset, the transparency and account-
ability of actions and intentions are major concerns and preoccupations in
their own right. Actions, intentions and outcomes have to be rendered
explicit and made accountable in order to appease the various stakeholders
involved.
‘Theories-in-use’, however, are essentially embodied, performative
actions. They are inarticulate and often inarticulatable forms of tacit know-
ledge (Dreyfus, 1999; Heidegger, 1962; Polanyi, 1962). Or better still they
are a kind of knowing-in-action. In the former, little is done in terms of
performative action but much is said by way of justification. In the latter,
nothing is said but many things are done!!! This is the real meaning of the
quote at the beginning of this paper from Lao Tzu:
The ability to perform and the ability to explain persuasively are two entirely
different skills. In an alphabetic-literate culture the ability to do the latter is
privileged over the former, whereas in non-alphabetic cultures, it is direct
performative action not elaborate explanations that is valued. This priori-
tizing of action over words is deeply ingrained in the eastern mindset.
Radical empiricism is based upon the insistence that proper knowing, spon-
taneous action, and hence inspired performances, issue from being open and
in touch with the ground of ‘pure experience’ (James, 1912/1996; Nishida,
1921/1990), ‘pure duration’ (Bergson, 1913) or ‘pure intuition’ (Chang,
1963). For James, as for Bergson, Nishida and Chang, what we generally
call empiricism is actually a kind of ‘false empiricism’ as it relies on pre-
established linguistic categories as the starting point for recording obser-
vations and not on direct lived experience itself. James criticized this
‘orthodox’ empiricism for a priori reducing experience to a succession of
stable, distinct elements – ideas, images, percepts, sensations, etc., that can
be held before the mind and introspectively examined. For him, ‘this punc-
tuate, discontinuous, view of experience’ overlooks immense tracts of our
inner life. They ‘falsify as well as omit’ (James, 1911/1996: 79). They are
like maps and as with maps display only the surfaces of things that in them-
selves are ‘concrete bits of experience’ (p. 74). Orthodox empiricism
attempts to substitute static cuts in place of the fullness of experience and
this is misleading since: ‘All real units of experience overlap . . . you falsify
if you treat it conceptually, or by the law of dots’ (James, 1909/1996: 287–8,
emphasis in original). To be truly radical and to know in its pristine sense,
therefore, we must begin from the flux of experience and encounter reality
before conscious thought intervenes, and before the separation of subject
from object.
It is this concern for starting from the ground of pure experience that
unites the concerns of Bergson, James and Nishida. Thus for James, pure
experience is a ‘plain, unqualified actuality . . . a simple that’ (James,
1912/1996: 23, emphasis in original). Likewise, for Nishida to experience
truly is ‘to know facts just as they are . . . by completely relinquishing one’s
own fabrications. What we usually refer to as experience is adulterated with
some sort of thought’ (Nishida, 1921/1990: 3). Although there are signifi-
cant differences in the approach taken by these philosophers, it is the insist-
ence on the primacy of immediate experience as the starting point for genuine
knowing that unites their philosophical concerns. To know and to be able to
act in harmony, in its deepest, richest sense, therefore, is to experience reality
– directly, immediately and purely. Pure experience is the only reliable empiri-
cal basis for a genuine empiricism and in proposing radical empiricism as an
alternative approach to knowledge, James was merely giving voice to what
was already well understood by western poets, artists and literary critics as
well as by much of eastern thought.
The art critic John Ruskin, for instance, understood the importance of
starting from pure experience when he insisted that developing the ability to
see clearly was what was quintessential to any form of training or education
in the arts and crafts.
To be taught to read – what is the use of that, if you know not whether
what you read is false or true? To be taught to write or to speak – but
what is the use of speaking, if you have nothing to say? To be taught
to think – nay, what is the use of being able to think, if you have
nothing to think of? But to be taught to see is to gain word and thought
at once, and both true.
(Ruskin, Works, 1927, Vol. XVI: 180)
The idea that there can actually be too much culture, too many layers of
representations that generate ideological pluralism and hence too many
confusing views and opinions in the West is an interesting insight. For it
suggests how easily those who live in the West can be seduced and distracted
by the regimes of signifiers generated by the media on a daily basis. They
serve to clutter up the minds and to prevent the ability to see with an
‘innocent eye’ what is actually going on. For Ruskin, however, it is only
through regaining this purity of sight that we can really begin truly to
produce great works in every field of endeavour:
For this reason, proper teaching in any art or craft must fundamentally
emphasize the powers of observation.
For Ruskin, as for James, Bergson and Nishida, to arrive at the ability to see
and experience directly and purely in an unmediated manner is a vital
precondition for the ultimate mastery of one’s art. And, it is only on the basis
of this clarity of vision that great works of art, outstanding action and the
flawless performances that we instinctively recognize as special, can be
attained.
The need to attain such a clear and uncluttered vision in the conduct
of business is also emphasized in the philosophical outlook of Konosuke
Matsushita, one of the most outstanding industrialists and businessmen of
the 20th century. For Matsushita a vital quality for good management is the
possession of a sunao mind. Sunao is a Japanese word that is used to denote
meekness, tractability or an open-hearted innocence and naivety; an
untrapped mind that is free to adapt itself effectively to new circumstances.
As Matsushita (1978) writes:
A person with this mind looks at things as they are at that moment
and colours them with no special bias, emotionalism, or preconception
. . . when a person looks at things with the sunao mind he is open to
experience them as they are. . . . Zen training with its austere life-style
and stress on meditation, seeks to free the mind from material concerns
and prejudices, and in this sense the Zen mind bears a certain resem-
blance to the sunao mind.
(pp. 63–5)
In his seminal work An inquiry into the good, Nishida Kitaro, arguably the
foremost modern eastern philosopher, sought to develop a unique philo-
sophical system synthesizing both eastern and western forms of logic and
understanding beginning from the primacy of lived experience. Nishida was
acutely aware of James’s work and also wrote approvingly of Bergson’s
attempts at starting from the immediacy of experience:
From the first there were those whose philosophies took their start
from reason and those who took their start from experience. Bergson
belongs to the latter. But while those who claim to be starting from
experience (i.e., orthodox empiricism) do not usually mean true pure
experience. . . . Bergson strove to eliminate everything dogmatic and to
penetrate deeply to the true form of experience itself.
(Nishida, in Nishitani, 1991: 83)
For Nishida, however, most attempts to theorize the idea of pure experience,
including those of William James (see especially Nishida, 1921/1990: 13, 33,
52), are predicated upon the common-sense assumption that experience is
something that an individual possesses rather than something that transcends
individual identity. Such an assumption, Nishida argues, does not, however,
truly reflect our direct experience since experience, in its real form, is not
such that first the self exists and then it experiences something as an object.
Rather the self itself is only realized through the act of experiencing. The
individual is not an a prior entity but an emergent property of experience
itself. True pure experience is therefore ‘trans-individual’ rather than a
property of individuals.
For the East, however, it is quite easily acceptable to think that the individual
is only a secondary effect of social relations and not the basic unit of society.
For this reason, the term ‘collectivism’ has been popularly used to describe
such a ‘trans-individualistic’ orientation in cross-cultural studies (Hofstede,
1980). What such studies fail to do, however, is to excavate and render more
transparent the underlying metaphysical attitudes shaping this view of self,
identity and the world. For, if experience is more fundamental than the indi-
vidual and if such experience is one of flux and transformation, then it
follows that the identity of the individual is the effect of the arresting and
abstracting of experience. The individual self is only a by-product of per-
petually shifting constellations of relations, never a fundamental stable unity
in its own right.
In presenting the individual as an ‘effect’ of experience and hence
relationships, Nishida was expressing a deeply held eastern assumption that
the individual self is a secondary social construction and not a primary unity
of reality. What is primary is pure experience. This eastern formulation of
pure experience harbours three essential characteristics. First, pure experi-
ence is realized prior to self-awareness and the subject/object distinctions.
Second, pure experience is active and constructive not passive, discrete and
static as is generally understood in ordinary empiricism. Such experience
grasped from within is systematically self-developing and self-unfolding – the
self in ceaseless construction and reconstruction. Third, in pure experience,
knowledge, feeling and volition remain undifferentiated. Ultimate reality is
not merely registered cognitively but also felt emotionally and volitionally.
These three propositions provide the necessary philosophical grounding for
understanding the kind of intuitive metaphysics that underpins the eastern
system of self, knowing and performance.
Nishida identifies three progressively more encompassing fields of
reflexive awareness or Basho that through sustained meditation ultimately
returns us from our everyday encounters with popular representations to this
aboriginal ground of pure experience as the genuine basis for knowing and
insight. First, there is the everyday Basho of Being. In this Basho, ordinary
empirical judgements are made unreflectively. For instance, we may make an
observation that ‘this table is brown’. Such a statement seems to express pure
objectivity because the observer making this judgement has been so neutral-
ized in that statement that he/she is not even aware of his/her presence
entering into the judgement itself. It assumes an unproblematic subject/object
distinction. Statements only refer to the object of observation and not the
observer him/herself. These are statements of what ‘is’ and what ‘is not’ that
form the basis of Aristotelian logic. However, as Nishida points out to
neutralize the role of the observer in this way is to implicitly say something
about the observer – that his/her role can be ignored. This is actually an arbi-
trary judgement to make, because what is really being said is ‘I see a brown
table and since what I see is real and external to my self, I can ignore any
reference to myself’. This arbitrary denial of a subjective presence allows a
seemingly objective statement to be made. Nishida points out that this Basho
of Being, within which such common-sense empirical judgements are made,
itself stands implicitly within a wider field of judgement about the signifi-
cance and role of the self. This is the Basho of Relative Nothingness in which
the act of exclusion of self-involvement is progressively raised into our
awareness.
From the standpoint of this Basho of Relative Nothingness the self is
very much something. In fact the very thing that orthodox empiricism
ignores. This insight, when taken literally, becomes the basis for idealism and
subjectivism where the self is now given an exaggerated prominence. The ‘I’
is now deemed to pre-exist any existential encounter hence ‘experience’ is
thought of as something individuals ‘have’. Such a form of thinking resides
in this Basho of Relative Nothingness and is characteristic of western indi-
vidualism. Thus, Sartre’s ‘nothingness’ (in Being and nothingness, 1966) is
is the overarching goal of life and that this is only attainable once the
distractions and material trappings of everyday life have been peeled away
is an underlying presupposition of East Asian people. The reasoning is
simple. If you believe that ultimately reality is in flux and that encounter
with this ultimate flux represents a complete re-unification and hence disso-
lution of your fabricated self and a rediscovery of your true self, then all
forms of human endeavour are implicitly or explicitly directed towards this
ultimate goal. Life is seen as an interminable search for a glimpse of that
ultimate moment of pure encounter. In this regard, the irresistible urge to
return to that primordial state of being drives all human activities and it is
an attitude well exemplified in the practice of eastern arts including the art
of archery.
In his introduction to Eugene Herrigel’s Zen in the art of archery, D.T. Suzuki
writes: ‘One of the most significant features we notice in all the arts as they
are studied in Japan and probably also in other Far Eastern countries, is that
they are not intended for utilitarian purposes only or for purely aesthetic
enjoyment, but are meant to train the mind . . . to bring it into contact with
the ultimate reality’ (Suzuki, in Herrigel, 1953/1985: 5). One could extend
this observation by maintaining that all productive activities in eastern life,
including the conduct of business, are means intended for this same purpose
of making contact with ultimate reality. Winning, personal success and
profits, important though they be, are secondary matters.
The widespread practice of rigorous training and the perfecting of
action in all the arts, whether it be calligraphy, martial arts, flower arrange-
ment, origami or the art of tea pouring are all viewed as alternative means
that could potentially lead to a Zen-like encounter with reality. To be a
master of any eastern art, including the art of management, one has to tran-
scend technique and arrive at that Tao or Basho of Absolute Nothingness
where art becomes seemingly effortless: an ‘artless art’.
Thus, in the case of archery, for example, the relentless perfecting of
action through practice and repetition is aimed at attaining that moment
when the archer and the target are no longer experienced as two opposing
objects, but form one reality. ‘Bow, arrow, goal and the ego, all melt into one
another, so that I can no longer separate them. And even the need to separate
has gone. For as soon as I take the bow and shoot, everything becomes so
clear and straightforward and so ridiculously simple’ (Herrigel, 1953/1985:
86). As the Zen Master advised Herrigel, it is not ‘I’ the archer that shoots,
rather ‘it’ shoots!!! The ‘it’ signifies that moment of trans-individuality when
performance is no longer conscious or purposeful but directed by a spon-
taneous outpouring of unthought action.
This example in Zen archery illustrates the underlying motivation,
discipline and training involved in perfecting the arts and in seeking directly
that moment of pure encounter. Here, ‘Even the thought of emptiness is no
longer there’ and from whence ‘comes the most wonderous unfoldment of
doing’ (Takuan, in Herrigel, 1953/1985: 101). For the eastern world, attain-
ment of that moment of pure absolute encounter which conjoins us with a
fecund and pro-generative reality constitutes the ultimate aspiration of any
and all human activity. It is believed that great works of art, flawless perform-
ances and timeless events take place in this moment of encounter where all
mediation of words and knowledge are rendered irrelevant and the immer-
sion of the self in a seamless flow of actions is all there is.
Contrary to the widely held view that better decisions and enhanced
performances can only be achieved by the acquisition of more and more
knowledge, information and conceptual understanding, within the eastern
tradition it is the purging of all such mediated forms of knowing that consti-
tutes the ultimate aim of learning. Indeed, it is unlearning that is elevated as
the highest form of learning. As Lao Tzu in the Tao Te Ching says:
T.S. Eliot understood this need for de-cluttering our minds well when he
lamented about the condition of our modern world:
actor and the acted upon are fused in a process of mutual transformation
well exemplified in Chuang Tzu’s vivid description of the master butcher.
The very primary motive which we set about the business, makes the
business impossible. The first and absolute condition of the thing’s ever
becoming saleable is, that we shall make it without wanting to sell it;
nay, rather with a determination not to sell it at any price, if once we
get hold of it. Try make your Art popular, cheap – a fair article for
your foreign trade; and the foreign market will always show something
better. But make it only to please yourselves, and ever be resolved that
you won’t let anybody else have any; and forthwith you will find every-
body else wants it. . . . Art has only been produced by nations who
rejoice in it; fed themselves with it, as if it were bread; basked in it, as
if it were sunshine; shouted at the sight of it; danced with the delight
of it; quarrelled for it; fought for it; starved for it; did, in fact precisely
the opposite with it of what we want to do with it.
(Ruskin, Works, 1927, Vol. XVI: 184)
It is this uncompromising attitude of perfecting action for its own sake and
not for its consequences that encapsulates the eastern approach towards
knowledge, action and performance.
Concluding remarks
Notes
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