REFERENCE 16-016/MSG-321 - Page 42

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

75 Auto Throttle Servo Mot 305RAA1 GE B737NG 22-32 DAL

305RAA2 Boeing

The problem is the voltage tolerance the ASM will see during engagement and the power band that the voltage is
being received is too tight. If it drops below a certain level, it will disengage the AT system. This usually happens
on TO roll.

GE is going to mod the ASM and come out with a new part, and the new part number will end in a 2. The
modification will open up this window for the low voltage that the ASM will sometimes receive and still allow it to
work. And there will be a modification forthcoming for the original part ending in 1. This mod is being planned to
be a mod level change on the 1 unit and not a manufacture part number change. If they do not roll the part
number, it is near impossible for us to know if a 1 ASM has been modified or not. Both are expected JAN 2017.

We do not like the timeframe on this AND that they are not doing a new part number associated with the 1 mod.
We would request that the 305RAA1 part number be rolled and an earlier availability date because this has
caused aborted take-offs.

Other operator and vendor comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

76 Flap Transmitter 18-1738-12 Honeywell B737 25-58-09 AAL

AAL has requested detailed piece part information (IPL) for a sub assembly synchro (MPN 10-HUG24NB-J123)
installed in the referenced flap transmitter. To date, Honeywell has denied our request.

AAL repairs many similar synchros and maintains that this is commonly considered a repairable subassembly.

Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

77 Flap Position Transmitter 18-1738-12 Honeywell B737-800 27 JAL

JAL had the unscheduled removals (including four aircraft delay events) of Flap Position Transmitters due to
appeared message "T/E FLAP DISAGREE" and Flap Indicator was stuck at some position. In many cases,
Honeywell findings were “confirmed excessive scale error and high friction at cold soak test of the transmitters”.

JAL requested Boeing and Honeywell to investigate root cause and take a corrective action. On Jun 2014,
Honeywell informed that the root cause was “dried and crystalized grease” for the synchros in the Flap Position
Transmitters and the synchro manufacture (Moog) introduced new grease “silicone based grease”. However, JAL
cannot identify in which Transmitter the new grease changed synchros were incorporated.

Because JAL has still experienced this failure, JAL would like to progress the incorporation of the new grease
changed synchros into the transmitters.

Therefore, JAL has the following requests to Boeing and Honeywell.

1. JAL would like Honeywell to investigate grease condition of all removed transmitters from JAL.
2. JAL would like Honeywell and Boeing to release SB for the grease change of the syncros and for
identification (to mark ID label in order to identify whether the new grease synchros are incorporated).

Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

 REFERENCE 16-016/MSG-321 - Page 43

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

78 ELAC B-DL 7028590-901 Honeywell E-Jet 22-11-08 AFR/KLM AFR

AFR supports its regional fleet. That is why AFR developed its own test bench according to the Integrated Test
specification 7028590-901 rev. H included within CMM 22-11-08 rev. 11, dated Sept, 2006.

AFR has found many discrepancies (errors, omissions, ambiguities, typos) whereas testing procedure is certified
“accurate and sufficient by Honeywell (Table Intro-1 from CMM).”

However, from 2006, Honeywell releases GPC still using CMM 22-11-08 rev.11 and IT 7028590-901 rev. K, then
rev. L, then rev. M, since May 2015.

AFR believes Honeywell and Embraer must be responsible for providing checked, certified, and approved CMMs.

Regarding to airworthiness and flight safety, AFR requests from Honeywell and Embraer to provide an accurate
CMM for this component including IT 7028590-901 at the latest revision.

Embraer and Honeywell, other airlines, comments please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

79 Guidance 7028590-901 Honeywell E-Jet 22-11-08 AFR/KLM AFR

Panel
Controller

ELAC new generation with hardware B-dl (Elac B – Data loadable), are validated and compatible on A/C without
dataloadable capability following application of SB A320-27-1243 with AD compliance JUN 2017.

ELAC B-dl has only one PN/394512100 but a lot of different software version are possible (Depending on the A/C
types and the future OPS evolutions L97+, L98, etc.). It is instructed by VSB 394512B-27-025 that this different
software loaded are identified by a label on the front face of the equipment (This is informative and the P/N of the
ELAC does not change)

Our background shows that we have received a number of EQT with 2 labels on the front face, none of them
matched the software actually present in the equipment.

We are unable to update the ELAC B-dl Software during installation on A/C without data loadable capability.
This will be a major risk, of delay and maintenance error.

Could AIB/THL propose a technical solution to help airlines integrate the ELAC B-dl in their fleet without the A/C
disruption risk?

Comments from Airbus and OEM, please.

REFERENCE 16-016/MSG-321 - Page 44

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

80 SFCC 065-50000-0509 Diehl A330 26 KLM/AFR KLM

Aerospace
Systeme
FCMC B494AAM0617 Thales 27
Avionics
SDCU RAI2810M0505 SKF Aerospace 28
France

This question is regarding the following LRUs:

 Slat/ Flap Control Computer (SFCC) P/N 065-50000-0509 by Diehl Aerospace Systeme
 Fuel Control and Management Computer (FCMC) P/N B494AAM0617 by Thales Avionics
 Smoke Detection Control Unit (SDCU) P/N RAI2810M0505 by Thales Avionics
 Side Stick Transducer Unit (SSTU) P/N 321000M02 by SKF Aerospace France

In operation of KLM’s A330 fleet, the SFCC, FCMC, and SDCU remain susceptible for power transients. This can
be cured by doing a reset. Technically, this is an easy solution. However, it is far from a practical and feasible
solution:

For SFCC, failure may occur after pushback and engine start. A reset results in Return-To-Gate as the reset
needs to be done in the Avionics Compartment.

For FCMC, failure may occur during fuel refill, after the ground engineer has completed his final controls and is
most probably on his way to another aircraft to dispatch.

Failure of SDCU can occur at any given time and can be resolved with a 2-minute reset or a 20-minute reset. That
last reset will obviously result in at least a (30-minute) delay.

All 4 LRUs may experience failure during power transients and often indeed do experience failure resulting in
delays. KLM has tried to reduce these failures by setting up improved protocols for pushback and better
communication between the aircraft towing department and the ground engineers. But these improved protocols
are not the final solution for this problem.

KLM would like to know:

Operators:
1. Are you experiencing the same problems with the aforementioned LRUs?
2. Are you experiencing the same problems with different LRUs (and which)?

OEMs:
1. Is there a way to make these LRUs less susceptible for power transients?
2. Are there other cures for these failures (i.e. other than resetting the LRU)?
 REFERENCE 16-016/MSG-321 - Page 45

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS
Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

81 APPU 9028A0004-01 Liebherr A320 Fam 27 TAP

TAP has experienced one event due to “F/CTL Flaps Locked” caused by a blocked APPU P/N 9028A0004-01.
We have evaluated the previous removals with operational interruptions and we concluded that all were removed
with TSIs around 30000FH. Therefore, we are considering the introduction of a task (HT) to perform a deep repair
on these units.

On the other hand, the PPU’s on the wing tips are the most affected and introducing this task on all units installed
in the A/C will certainly increase the number of units removed and related maintenance costs. Currently, we are
inspecting on wing if there are any signs of water or moisture inside the unit through the sight glass on each C
check; however, this procedure may not be efficient enough.

Operators’ comments regarding these units’ maintenance procedures would be appreciated.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

82 Mode Control Panel 822-1567-102 Rockwell Collins B737 22-11 SWA

SWA has seen an increase in the removals of the Mode Control Panel, P/N 822-1567-102 with 30% of the units
having less than 10,000 hours. Five of the units are being monitored for poor performance. This is an increased
trend for 2015. SWA has requested Rockwell Collins to be sure all applicable service bulletins are being
accomplished at shop visits. It will take time to see if implementation of the service bulletins will have a positive
effect.

Are other airlines seeing a decline in the MTBUR of this unit?

Other operator and Rockwell Collins comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

83 Mode Control Panel 822-1494-101 Rockwell Collins B777-300 22-11-0 EVA

EVA has experienced at least two B777-300ER Autopilot MCP uncommanded changes to selected altitude. It
happened on new (2014/2015 year) delivery B777-300ER (registry number B-16719/Serial number 42103 and B-
16722/serial number 42107).

1st case: The HDG bug offset 40 degrees to the left, altitude window changed to FL315. At this moment, autopilot
was still engaged, but all control mode could not be changed, all the numbers in MCP window were frozen too.
Without trigger, the altitude alerted the A/C to continue to climb through FL330 while we still fighting to regain the
control of MCP. Autopilot was disengaged at FL335 and manual flight back to FL330. The MCP mode could be
changed and reset when autopilot was off. When level at FL330, autopilot was engaged again, the flight was
continued without further abnormality. EVA removed MCP P/N 822-1494-101 S/N 845 to LTK on December 1,
2015.

2nd case: Around 5 hours after T/O cruising at FL320, the MCP heading changed 90 degrees and altitude
became 30500 without pilot input. FMA was unchanged, aircraft maintained on route and level. EVA did not
replace MCP. Refer to Boeing FTS: 22-12004, SB 777-22-0034 and Rockwell Collins SB MCP-770C-22-501
(H/W and S/W Mod) will be released to address this issue.

1. Are other operators seeing similar issues?

2. Can the Component OEM provide seed unit for fleet retrofit?
3. Any other comments?

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

REFERENCE 16-016/MSG-321 - Page 46

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

84 FMGC C13042AA07 Thales A321 22-70-0 EVA

Honeywell

EVA plans to incorporate Airbus SB A320-22-1472 rev 04 to activate AP/FD TCAS function on CFM A/C. This SB
has concurrent requirement of Airbus SB A320-22-1523 to installs FMGC H2C-C14 (P/N C13042AA07). SB Page
6 calls out Thales SB C13042A-22-017. Unfortunately, Thales SB is not available for EVA. OBRM P/N is not
available, either.

1. Does Thales know about this issue?

2. When will Thales SB C13042A-22-017 be published?

Thales and other operator comments please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

85 FMGC C13043BA04 Thales A320 22-83-56 BAW

C13043BA05

Thales, FMGC, Part No. C13043BA04 (BA05), Tables 24 and 25 of CMM 22-83-54 shows the composition of the
FMGC. Against each sub-assembly it lists the applicable SRU CMM. Thales is refusing to provide us with CMM
22-83-56 which is applicable to the FM Card Set Part No. E13206BA.

British Airways requires this CMM to develop an understanding of some of the faults we are seeing with the
FMGC. Why are Thales not providing British Airways with this CMM?

OEM and other airline comments please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

86 FMGEC C13200HA03 Thales A330 22-84 HAL

Honeywell

Some soft faults not cleared by simple reset causing delays.

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

 REFERENCE 16-016/MSG-321 - Page 47

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

87 THSA 47145-* Lucas France A320 27 LHT DLH

SA DIV
Aerospace

EASA requires full back to birth history for all parts that are specified as Life Limited Parts, in case the specified
Life Limit has been reached the part has to be scrapped.

In some cases, a Life Limit is valid on an LRU (nameplate) or SRU itself although the critical part is another
element inside. Referring the a.m. example, the Life Limit acc. MRB-Report is 67500 FH and specified for the
whole THSA-Assy. The critical element is the Screw/Screw Jack where no Limit is defined on its specific part
number acc. to the Airworthiness Limitation Section.

LHT understands that the philosophy of an airworthiness life limitation is to remove and discard LRUs from
service and not to maintain the unit by replacing elements inside - based on technical expertise - unless otherwise
noted.

Q1: Do all participants agree that LLP’s are not to be maintained after reaching their defined Life Limit irrespective
of one’s expertise that it would be maintainable?

Q2: In words referring this example: Is it a common understanding that there is no way to put an expired THSA
back to service by replacing the Screw/Screw Jack?

Airbus, Boeing and other, please comment