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Heyrman 2021
Heyrman 2021
Peter Heyrman
To cite this article: Peter Heyrman (2021): The introduction of self-service and the supermarket in
Belgium (1945–1975). The soft underbelly of Europe?, History of Retailing and Consumption, DOI:
10.1080/2373518X.2021.1893054
Article views: 18
Introduction
The radical transformations in European retailing during the ‘trente glorieuses’ has in
recent years enjoyed growing interest from historians. Concentration trends in the
sector rose and the functions of retail and wholesale were increasingly blurred, as were
the traditional trade branches. Many new distribution forms emerged, shops moved
increasingly from the city centre to the suburbs. Consumer spending as well as the
experience and cultural significance of shopping underwent a fundamental transform-
ation. In this broad and multifaceted process of retail transition two phenomena jump
to the foreground: the introduction of self-service and the spectacular rise of the
super- and hypermarket, i.e. self-service stores with a commercial area of respectively
400–2500m² and more.
Both phenomena are often connected to the broad wave of Americanisation that over-
whelmed the post-war ‘old continent’. Victoria de Grazia’s concept of an ‘irresistible
empire of American consumerism’ links this wave with the economic, political and
especially cultural dominance of the US.1 Western European consumers seem to have
eagerly embraced the ‘American way’, their political leaders dreamed of an economic
growth spiral on the US model, mainly driven by increases in industrial productivity
and household purchasing power. This in turn necessitated a modernisation and ration-
alisation of both agriculture and retail. The transatlantic dialogue on large scale retailing
in the wake of the Technical Assistance Programme of the Marshall Plan must, of course,
also be framed in the context of the Cold War. As Alexander Sedlmaier has convincingly
argued, these transfer processes are key to a better understanding of not only the emer-
gence of consumer society, but also of the transnational commodification of modernity as
a whole.2 The introduction of an intrinsically capitalist but also seemingly egalitarian
consumer society seemed the best antidote to stop the creeping spread of communism.3
The models of the American grocery scene were, of course, not simply transplanted
to Europe.4 Occasionally there is evidence of imitation, but more often than not, pro-
cesses of selective adaption and hybrid innovation can be observed. Also their timeline
differed. As a result, and paraphrasing Peter Hall and David Soskice, post-war Europe
shows remarkable ‘varieties of retailing’.5 Explaining these differences requires a multi-
faceted analysis evaluating not only the significance and path-dependency of the
different retail forms, the role of specific entrepreneurs, companies and their inter-
national networks, but also the resilience of local shopping traditions and the degree
to which the State steered the transition. National retail policies could be ideologically
charged.
Belgium offers an enticing case-study.6 In the late 1950s and 1960s it boasted some of
the most innovative distribution companies in Europe, a time when the number of super-
markets and the share of self-service shops in food sales rose spectacularly.7 Belgian cap-
tains of big distribution played a prominent role in the transatlantic transfer of retail
expertise behind this expansion. In 1961, the first hypermarket on the European conti-
nent opened in Auderghem near Brussels. The country’s diligence in building trans-
Atlantic partnerships even raised some eyebrows. ‘Belgium is the soft underbelly of Euro-
pean retailing": as Business Week commented in 1972 on the growing interests of Amer-
ican companies in the country’s big distribution chains.8 Belgium, it was understood,
provided potential access to lucrative European markets.
Although all this seems to suggest that densely populated and prosperous Belgium
offered a perfect playground for big distribution, reality was somewhat more nuanced.
While the number of self-employed in the commercial sector clearly dropped during
the 1960s and 1970s, family-based shopkeeping retained a dominant position, anchored
as it was in social life and collective mentalities.9 In order to explain this duality, we will
first look at the timing of the introduction of self-service and the supermarket, then
present some of the main actors and sketch their transatlantic experiences. Next, we
will clarify how government tried to mitigate the modernisation process and strive
towards a balanced distribution landscape in which big and small would fulfil comp-
lementary roles. At first this conciliatory approach offered promising results. In the
early 1970s, however, to sooth the growing unrest among shopkeepers, policy was redir-
ected towards regulation.
HISTORY OF RETAILING AND CONSUMPTION 3
beginning of the decade to 4,050 in 1973.17 When comparing the evolution of self-service
in Western European countries in the 1960s the International Association of Self-Service
ascertained that with 7.83%, Belgium showed a growth rate that was well above the Euro-
pean average of 4.09%, preceded only by Spain (34.87%), Austria (15.25), Ireland (12.3%)
and France (12.14%).18 Looking at turnover, the share of self-service shops rose from a
mere 3% in 1959 to over 30% in 1966 and no less than 70% in 1973. Not surprisingly, self-
service gained its first foothold in the major agglomerations of Brussels, Antwerp and
Liège. Although it was clear that the novelty also affected the distribution of hardware,
clothing and other textiles, Belgian self-service stores mainly sold foodstuffs and house-
hold products. In 1973, no less than 3,851 of the 4,050 self-service stores were classified as
grocery stores.
Of course, not all of these self-service stores were supermarkets. But in the 1960s this
shop format would increase more than tenfold, from 41 units in 1961 to 450 in 1970.
Belgium could also claim the first hypermarket on the European continent. The Grand
Bazar store in Auderghem opened its doors on 15 September 1961, thus clearly preceding
the French Carrefour shop in Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois (1963).19 It provided a sales area
of 9,100m² and 800 parking spaces. Jacques Pictet himself, secretary-general of Paridoc
and director of the French periodical Libre-Service Actualités, compared Cauwe’s ‘distri-
bution factory’ in Auderghem with the big self-service discounts in Ohio.20 At the end of
the decade Belgium counted 16 hypermarkets, often as cornerstones of shopping centres,
offering complementary outlets, restaurants and other services.21
The breakthrough of the self-service shop and the supermarket in Belgium is usually
connected with two major events: the World Fair in Brussels (1958) and the end of pre-
war legal restrictions on big distribution in 1959/1961. The Brussels ‘Expo 58’, visited by
about 18 million people, indeed heralded Belgium’s golden sixties. The country’s indus-
trial and commercial elites, including the main distribution companies, showed off their
potential. In the ‘Palace of Commerce’ visitors could wander around in a state-of-the art
self-service grocery shop (130m²). Just in front of the Atomium, five of the major Belgian
department stores built a pavilion, investing a budget of 12 million francs. There, visitors
could gaze in amazement at the display ‘Life in the Year 2000’, including the model of a
futuristic ‘air-supermarket’, to be accessed only by helicopter and ‘air-tram’.22
The longstanding legal restriction on big distribution are also regularly quoted to
explain the country’s late take-off. Since late 1936, the so-called Padlock Law (Grendel-
wet/Loi de Cadenas) constrained the expansion of department stores by forbidding
them to open up new branches without government permission. Other ‘evolved’ retail
formats such as consumer co-operatives or food chains were not affected. Although
the law was originally designed as a temporary measure, offering self-employed shop-
keepers a time-out during which they could update their businesses, the legal restriction
was time and again extended, not only in the late 1930s and during the war, but also in
the following decade. Although growingly contested, none of the political parties dared to
strike down this highly symbolic piece of legislation, making Belgium in 1959/1961 the
last Western European country to lift its interwar restrictions on big distribution.23
When confronted with Belgium’s low position in Western Europe’s self-service and
supermarket rankings, Belgian department store managers eagerly referred to the
padlock.24 But their argument that until the late 1950s their hands were tied by legal
restrictions, is only partially valid. Violations of the padlock were rarely punished,
HISTORY OF RETAILING AND CONSUMPTION 5
department stores easily circumvented the ban by creating franchise chains, and in both
1947, 1952 and 1954 government considerably loosened the restrictions. In 1947–1957
nearly 200 new department store projects were granted a license. The Padlock did not
even succeed in confining big distribution to the city centres. Already in 1950, Nopri
and Priba opened their first outlets in suburban communities; a phenomenon soon
labelled by the media as the ‘faubourisation’ of big distribution.25
The cooperative movement of course had long provided an alternative to big distri-
bution across Western Europe in different ways. However, compared to other countries,
the UK in particular, the role of Belgium’s long-standing consumer cooperative move-
ment in the country’s post-war retail transition remained surprisingly small. Since the
late nineteenth century both the socialist and Christian labour movement had created
vast networks. Their shops, however, remained very small, with an average clientele of
about 120–250 families.26 Out of fear of upsetting local member groups, the different
cooperatives all hesitated far too long to cut back their store networks and to invest in
the modernisation of the remaining shops. The necessary capital was sometimes
lacking. But several managers also somewhat conceitedly stated that self-service and
the supermarket would not prove to be durable innovations and that workers’ interests
were best served by small, community-based shops. They converted some of them into
‘superettes’, small self-service stores with a commercial surface of 100–400 m2, and
even created a few cooperative supermarkets. But these steps towards innovation
lacked vigour and speed. In the 1960s the Belgian consumer cooperatives saw their
market share decline from 3.13 to 1.8%.27 Only in the early 1970s did they genuinely
start to rationalise their shop networks. By then it was far too late.
Transnational experiences
This brief outline makes it clear that the transition of retailing in Belgium from the late
1950s onwards was clearly driven the country’s major interwar big distribution concerns.
The vast majority of the 41 Belgian supermarkets listed in December 1961 belonged to
four chains, three of them rooted in in (popular) department stores (14 to Grand
Bazar, 9 to Priba and 4 to Sarma-Nopri) and one multiple grocer (9 to Delhaize).28
The leading role of these companies can to a large extent be explained by the remark-
able involvement of their managers in the transcontinental transfer of retail expertise. It
needs to be stressed that their experience with US retailing went back to the interwar
period. Emile Bernheim (1886–1985), managing director of Innovation and later co-
owner of Priba, made his first trip to the United States in 1927, where he was particularly
impressed by Edward Filene (1860–1937).29 On his return to Brussels Bernheim immedi-
ately implemented a new budgetary control system, created a commercial research unit
and reorganised the training of the Innovation-staff. Georges Delhaize, the manager of
the food chain Docks du Nord, visited the States in 1930. His report would also instigate
fundamental changes within Delhaize Le Lion, which had already sent two of its man-
agers to the US and Canada in 1919.30 In 1937, Octave Vieujant (1890–1963), a later
vice-president of Delhaize, decided to undertake a study trip to the States himself,
with particular focus on chain store innovations, one of them being self-service.31
Those first contacts with their US colleagues filled the Belgian retailers with awe,
admiration and a remarkable sense of urgency. They not only considered that updating
6 P. HEYRMAN
the methods and organisation of their firms following American examples would better
arm them against domestic competition, but were also apprehensive about a possible
expansion of their much admired US colleagues into the old continent. The popular
department store Priba (1934), for instance, the already quoted joint venture of Bernheim
and his competitor François Vaxelaire (1921–1990), not only aimed at countering the
rising success of Sarma (1928) but also a possible project by Woolworth in Brussels.32
The fear of an American intrusion on the European retail market even prompted Bern-
heim to create a European consortium of big distributors, the International Association
of Department Stores (AIGM), supported by a Bureau International pour l’Etude de la
Distribution, linked to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).33
All this helps us to understand why in 1945 the captains of Belgian big distribution
were more than ready to incorporate American expertise in their businesses. They
would all visit the States in the late 1940s. Emile Pirmez, the director-general of Priba,
spent nearly six months in the US before in October 1948 opening the first self-service
department store of his company. The Antwerp Grand Bazar offers another fine
example. As a young Innovation employee in 1926–1932, Maurice Cauwe had eagerly lis-
tened to Bernheim’s stories on US retailing. But due to the war, it was only in March 1948
that he himself first set foot on American soil for a tour of New York, Boston, Syracuse,
Buffalo, Chicago and Houston.34 The next year and on his advice, a delegation of the
Brussels Galeries Anspach studied shop design, lighting and escalators at Macy’s and
Filene’s. In September 1950, a group of GB executives returned to the US to study the
supermarket format.35 In April-May 1953, yet another GB-delegation explored retail
innovations in New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Richmond, Columbus, Fort
Wayne and Detroit.36 From that year onwards, staff-members of Grand Bazar would
travel to the States on a more or less yearly basis. Cauwe gladly shared his experiences
with his Belgian and European colleagues. In 1950 he headed a large Belgian delegation
to the first conference of the International Association of Food Distribution (AIDA) in
Paris.37 He also attended the conferences of Georg Duttweiler’s Pré Vert Foundation
(1945) in Ruschlikon in 1952 and 1953.38 That last year, he again presented a paper at
the second AIDA conference in Ostend.
In planning his first trip to the US in 1948, Cauwe had already been assisted by the
National Cash Register Company (NCR). But it was only in January 1956, when he
and Vaxelaire were invited to attend a conference of the National Dry Goods Association
(NDGA) in New York, that he met Bernardo Trujillo (1920–1971).39 Six months later he
received a telegram. ‘Regarding your coming trip to America’, Trujillo wrote, ‘we feel [it
is] essential for you to attend Dayton May 20 through 24; will show you amazing new
things’. Accepting this very concise invitation, Cauwe would be one of the 15 participants
of the first Modern Merchandising Methods seminar in Dayton in May 1957.40 Five
months later the managers of Delhaize had a similar experience when they met Trujillo
at the International Congress of Food Chain Stores in Washington.41 Even senior expert
Emile Bernheim was impressed by his talents and travelled several times to Dayton
(Ohio) and McAllen (Texas). It was also through the MMM seminars that the main
Belgian distribution companies got in contact with Paul K. Halstead (1917–2003), who
would not only act as a consultant for the first Delhaize supermarket in Ixelles (1957),
but was also contracted by Cauwe to co-design the Luchtbal-supermarket in Antwerp
(1958). Three years later, in order to manage and co-finance both Grand Bazar’s new
HISTORY OF RETAILING AND CONSUMPTION 7
super- and hypermarket networks Cauwe partnered up with the Chicago Jewel Tea
Company.
All these contacts and exchanges can be labelled as private initiatives. But soon also
official structures were created to facilitate such experiences. In January 1951, a
Belgian Service for the Increase of Productivity (BDOP/OBAP) was founded, partly
funded in the framework of the Marshall Plan.42 At first its conferences, publications,
training initiatives and productivity missions, carrying executives and technicians to
other European countries and to the US, were primarily concerned with industrial enter-
prise. But gradually, BDOP/OBAP also focused on the modernisation of distribution.43
In May-June 1952, the first Belgian productivity mission travelled to the States to
study (self-service) food-distribution.44 Other trips were dedicated to textiles and confec-
tion, meat, marketing, sales techniques and electric appliances. American experts also
offered conferences to groups of Belgian retailers and wholesalers. And, documentary
films and exhibitions showed how self-service grocery stores in the US were designed
and organised.45
After the Belgian Joint Declaration on Productivity of May 1954, the role of the
BDOP/OBAP was considerably strengthened; two years later it gained official status.
Bernheim, however, still considered the Service as too explicitly focused on industrial
productivity. In November 1954, he and some of his colleagues created a Belgian Com-
mittee of Distribution (BCD/CBD).46 Generously endowed by the liberal Minister of
Economic Affairs Jean Rey (1902–1983), it quickly became the main promoter of
modern distribution in Belgium. The BCD/CBD gathered, researched and distributed
statistical and technical information. It offered a forum where the big concerns could
exchange their ideas and experiences, this in an ever more intense process of cross-ferti-
lisation with university research units.47 Bernheim’s Committee also hoped to involve
independent retail in its activities. The main shopkeepers associations, however,
remained somewhat reluctant, mainly because Belgian government in 1947 had
already created a separate research institute devoted to their cause, the Economic and
Social Institute for the Middle Classes (ESIM/IESCM).48 Nonetheless, the BCD/CBD
offered consultancy, organised courses and seminars, particularly targeting small or
medium-sized grocers. From 1959 onwards Bernheim’s Committee also organised ‘pro-
ductivity missions’. In October-November 1960 for instance, a particularly large Belgian
delegation headed by Cauwe visited the United States to study shopping centres. It com-
prised both technicians and managers of department stores, several academics and public
officials, including the private secretary of Paul Vanden Boeynants (1919–2001), the
Belgian Minister of the Middle Class (Middenstand/Classes Moyennes).49
striking all interwar restrictions was clearly spurred by the country’s big department
stores. They contended that the interests of big distribution were neglected by the
media, fixated as they were on the societal significance of independent retailers and arti-
sans. Bernheim’s BCD/CBD clearly wanted to remedy this. In order to inform public
opinion on recent developments in distribution, the Committee published dozens of bro-
chures, periodicals and even lists of firms that had embraced self-service.51
With the opening of the Delhaize supermarket in Ixelles at the end of 1957 and the
attention given to the new store format at ‘Expo ‘58’, the debate on retail productivity
and innovation definitively gained momentum. The rhetoric of big distribution increas-
ingly found its way to the popular press. The new formula was described as ‘cheaper’,
‘easier’, ‘cleaner’, ‘quicker’ and above all ‘modern’. Other dominating concepts were
‘freedom’ and ‘convenience’. The promoters of the supermarket even used the attribute
‘democratic’ and highlighted how the new store format offered an emancipatory space to
women, its main target audience.
Nonetheless, self-service and the supermarket were seldom portrayed as fundamental
retail innovations. They only constituted a next phase in the continuing modernisation of
distribution, a process which had already manifested itself in the emergence of depart-
ment stores in the second half of the nineteenth century. In essence, so it was argued
in the popular media, self-service and the supermarket merely entailed a more prominent
visualisation of distribution and a further rationalisation of shop organisation. As heralds
of mass distribution, they not only allowed the cost of distribution to be reduced, leading
to lower prices and more spending power, but above all permitted the consumer to be
more efficient and quicker in shopping for larger amounts of goods. The analogy with
industry was often made. ‘Mass-production requires mass-distribution’, Cauwe regularly
stated. For him, self-service and the supermarket were manifestations of the inevitable
‘industrialisation of distribution".52
Although Belgian media recognised the immense and growing popularity of self-
service, several voices also expressed hesitation. Those critics argued that, given local tra-
ditions and the peculiarity of the Belgian consumer, not all American innovations looked
eligible for transfer. They questioned the lower prices of the supermarket and warned
that, without the intervention of shop assistants, it would be far more difficult to judge
and compare the quality of products. The enticing presentation of the merchandise
would lead to impulse spending and an increase in shoplifting.53 Critics, dreading a
social massacre amongst retailers, craftsmen and even farmers, questioned who in the
long term would profit from all these cost-eliminating innovations. Those voices often
referred ironically to the somewhat faulty Dutch translation of self-service as zelfbedie-
ning, a word which could also be understood as self-availing.
The Belgian public debate on retail had always been ideologically polarised. Forging a
compromise policy on the issue, that both facilitated the further expansion of big distri-
bution and secured a durable future for family enterprise, proved to be quite a challenge.
The dominant Christian Democrat party (CVP/PSC) in particular had built up a loyal
electorate among shopkeepers and craftsmen and explicitly incorporated the interests
of this middenstand/classes moyennes in its electoral platforms. Since the end of the nine-
teenth century, the Belgian State fostered the modernisation of small business by finan-
cially supporting its associations, training initiatives, social insurance and credit unions.
The efficacy of this parastatal support network can be questioned. Especially since the
HISTORY OF RETAILING AND CONSUMPTION 9
1930s the overpopulation of Belgium’s retail sector raised growing concerns. In the 1950s
and 1960s, however, surveys also pointed to the durable impact of SME’s on the country’s
GNI, employment and export figures. Small and medium-sized family enterprises suc-
cessfully forged business relations with the large (often American) industrial companies
that settled in the country. Such a differentiated business landscape with large and small
enterprises fulfilling complementary roles could also be imagined in retail.54
In January 1959, Minister Vanden Boeynants negotiated a so-called ‘gentlemen’s
agreement’ with the major distribution companies. They vowed not to open any new
shops in the following two years. In return, Vanden Boeynants promised that the
Padlock Law would be lifted in January 1961.55 Those two years were portrayed as a
final time-out, allowing family-shops to prepare themselves for the transition. The min-
ister persuasively communicated his plans in the media, but, nonetheless, delivered a
tough and challenging message to his Christian democrat voters. Big distribution was
here to stay, its market share would increase significantly. The number of family shops
would decline, but government would provide guidance and assistance to the remain-
ders, and create levers that would help to sculpt a new generation of independent shop-
keepers, able to occupy and hold the important niches still offered by the expanding
markets.
Belgium’s so-called ‘middle class policy’ of the 1960s and 1970s looked quite impress-
ive. In December 1958 the Belgian parliament voted a neo-corporatist law enabling the
main professional small business associations to self-regulate the ‘access to artisanal,
small and medium-sized commercial and industrial enterprises’, long considered as
key to safeguard the quality of small business.56 Because commercial banks were hesitant
to grant investment loans to family businesses, the State also considerably strengthened
the so-called crédit professionnel, the parastatal SME credit provision network in which
the shopkeepers’ associations played a crucial role. Belgium also created a specific and
autonomous social security system for the self-employed.57 Another important social
compensation for abolishing the Padlock Law was the law of June 1960, introducing
an obligatory day of rest. At the instigation of the Christian Democrats Belgian govern-
ment also took decisive steps to incorporate retailing in its policies of economic expan-
sion and social programming.58
Meanwhile Vanden Boeynants and his successors expanded public support for the
vocational training of shopkeepers and artisans. During the 1960s, not only the Ministry
of the Middle Class, the BDOP/OBAP, the BCD/CBD, the ESIM/IECM, but also many
other official and private agencies in Belgium offered specialised courses and consultancy
services, for instance demonstrating how independent retailers could scale up and mod-
ernise their shops, implement self-service and/or apply new sales and marketing
methods. Some public consultants even supported the modernisation of entire shopping
districts and helped to plan the first urban shopping centres. The main small business
federations created specialised services assisting their local membership to study and
plan the future commercial infrastructure of their neighbourhoods and towns. All
these instances also continuously argued that shopkeepers and artisans could strengthen
their competitive position by working more closely together. This discourse was of course
much older. But during the 1950s and 1960s creating an ‘’independent but associated
retail sector’ was more than ever proposed as a miracle solution. Collaborative networks,
interlinking the advantages of scale to the flexibility of independent enterprise, would
10 P. HEYRMAN
allow shopkeepers to cut back their prices, reach higher turnovers, enhance their com-
mercial publicity and implement many other innovations.59
Belgian retailers seem to have readily accepted this message. Although the country
witnessed some marginal surges of shopkeeper radicalism linked to French Poujadism,
the pragmatic path to which Vanden Boeynants guided them, was hardly contested.
Belgium being a predominantly Catholic country, it was of great significance that also
the Church embraced this message. Given its deep roots in Thomist philosophy, Catholic
social doctrine had always judged family enterprises as morally superior. A strong middle
class, with independent shopkeepers and artisans as its central constituent, was seen as
the backbone of society, a buffer securing the stability and balance of the social fabric.
These ‘metaphors of the middle’, as Geoffrey Crossick called them, and the underlying
traditionalist agenda’s, still resonated strongly after 1945.60 Yet, from the late 1940s
onwards the Church’s message to small business underwent a remarkable make-over.
Catholic theologians and social scientists increasingly depicted independent entrepre-
neurship primarily as a vocation, a precious professional gateway towards human self-
realisation, combining business initiative, work, family and property. The main
‘calling’ of family shopkeeping, so they argued, lay in providing optimal services to
clients and local communities, valorising the traditional strong points of self-employed
retailing: proximity and availability, sociability and quality.61
That shopkeepers needed to accept the inevitability of modern retailing and should
find their societal significance in providing optimal services to the modern consumer,
was also the leitmotif of the opening speech of Pope Pius XII at the third AIDA confer-
ence in Rome in June 1956. ‘It is the constant objective of the distributor’, so declared the
pontiff, ‘to reduce prices, guarantee quality, and multiply conveniences to the buyer’. But
he also pleaded for more cooperation between wholesalers and retailers and even propa-
gated the formulas of the voluntary chain and the shopping centre. Explicitly referring to
the model supermarket that had recently opened in Rome’s EUR district, Pius XII
assessed that ‘self-service, already very popular in the United States, especially in the
supermarkets, invites the consumer to play a more active part and thus save himself
some of the price of the merchandise".62 Four months later, when receiving the inter-
national union of Catholic small business interest associations, the Pope communicated
a similar message, stressing that their members needed to embrace innovation while
jointly and harmoniously striving towards the common good.63
The ‘independent associated retail sector’ would indeed play an important role in the
promulgation, one might even say democratisation of self-service and the supermarket
format in Belgium during the 1960s. Amongst the different networks we can distinguish
three types: (1) joint purchasing cooperatives, (2) voluntary chains and the (3) franchise
chains of the main big distribution concerns. The success of the cooperative formula
amongst Belgian retailers had always remained limited. Of the joint purchasing networks
founded since the late nineteenth century, only a few dozen survived the Second World
War. In 1964–1971, their number fell from about 20–15, their total membership
declined. But the remaining ones expanded remarkably while particularly promoting
the superette-format amongst their members.64 The formula of voluntary chains,
however, enjoyed a far greater success. The main networks (Spar, Végé, Centra and
Vivo) were all rooted in the Netherlands. In 1963, the 8 largest voluntary food chains
on the Belgian market counted about 17.000 affiliated shops. Their role in the
HISTORY OF RETAILING AND CONSUMPTION 11
promulgation of self-service and other retail innovations was often stressed but still
remains under-researched. We do know that their impact in Belgium began to decline
on the eve of the 1970s, when their total membership had already weakened to about
11.000 shops.65
The third segment of the ‘independent associated retail sector’, the franchise chains of
big distribution, were largely committed to the grocery trade. Delhaize-Le Lion still had
about 280 concessionnaires in the early 1970s, the related group of Leopold Delhaize
counted 222 affiliated shops. The Nopri network of Sarma, with about 300 shops in
1963, held a particularly strong position in Wallonia. Priba boasted a network of 280
affiliated Unic stores in 1972, particularly in Flanders. In addition, we also need to
mention the growing success of the wholesale firm (1928/1950) of the Colruyt family
and its franchise-chain Boni. Although heavily investing in a proper network of super-
markets and cash-and-carry stores and petrol stations, Colruyt still counted 210 fran-
chised superettes and grocery stores in 1970.66 All these firms contended that they
wanted to durably incorporate independent retail in joint commercial projects, and
claimed that their consultancy and training programmes effectively assisted independent
entrepreneurs to acquaint themselves with modern sales methods, self-service in
particular.
The sale of the Brussels Galeries Anspach to ‘Sears, Roebuck & Co.’ in 1971 and the
arrival, one year earlier, of the Dutch Makro concern on the Belgian market caused
much unrest too.72 But it was above-all Sarma’s expansive policy that triggered a
response from the other concerns and brought the concentration of Belgian big distri-
bution to its climax. Bernheim, to whom the disastrous fire of the Brussels Innovation
store in May 1967 had dealt a severe blow73, intensified his collaboration with his neigh-
bour and longstanding competitor Vaxelaire, leading to the creation of the Inno-BM
concern in October 1969. Priba was incorporated in this group in 1971. Three years it
even joined forces with Grand Bazar and Maurice Cauwe, leading to the creation of
the GB-Inno-BM or GIB-Group in March-June 1974.74 This new ‘mastodon’ of
Belgian big distribution reported a total commercial surface of 839,000 m², a net profit
of 603 million francs and a turnover of 893 billion Belgian francs. Not only was it the
country’s biggest private employer, it even claimed to be the eleventh largest distribution
firm in Europe according to turnover.
Independent retail observed all this with increasing anxiety. The introduction of the
Value Added Tax (VAT) in 1971 darkened the atmosphere even more. Somewhat in
the slipstream of the anti-VAT protests, several shopkeeper associations also started
to mobilise against the hypermarkets, using radical discourses comparable to those
of Gérard Nicoud (°1947) in France.75 On 18 February 1971, Belgian retailers and arti-
sans declared a general strike and organised a protest march through Brussels. During
the next year several ‘shop strikes’ were declared. This wave of retailer protest, the first
one of significance since March 1956, was a clear political wake-up-call. The Belgian
government developed several compensatory measures to calm the febrile atmosphere.
The most disputed elements of the VAT law were toned down. In July 1971, after no
less than 15 years of deliberations, Parliament approved a law regulating commercial
practices.76 The law of 1973, introducing strict closing hours in distribution, can
also be seen as a compensation for shopkeeper disgruntlement. It was strenuously
attacked by big distribution.77
Belgium’s political elites, however, realised that to appease middle class protest they
had to stop, or at least slow down the expansion of the hypermarkets. Although they
at first hesitated to intervene and entrusted the licencing of new hypermarkets to a
special mixed commission, the need for a new legal framework became manifest. The
law on retail establishment of 29 June 1975 advocated a balanced and moderate
growth of large-scale distribution, in harmony with self-employed retail. All projects
for building new or enlarging existing retail enterprises with a net commercial surface
of more than 1500 square metres (750 in rural areas) now required a permit from
local authorities. Although clearly influenced by the French Royer-Law (1973), its com-
plicated consultation and evaluation procedures made the law quite ‘Belgian’.78 While it
didn’t block big distribution, it was able to considerably slow down the expansion of its
large store networks. In balance, the new law on retail establishment particularly
favoured the establishment of medium-sized shops. Already in 1976, Nielsen ascertained
that, in terms of the concentration of turnover in food retail, Belgium had lost its leading
position.79 Over the next years the number of Belgian hypermarkets would only increase
moderately, reaching a maximum of 92 in 1990. Although the share of big distribution in
food retailing continued to grow accordingly, from 24.8% in 1975 to 42% in 2000, its
market impact remained considerably lower than previously predicted.
HISTORY OF RETAILING AND CONSUMPTION 13
Some conclusions
Self-service and the supermarket were introduced rather late in Belgium. Notwithstand-
ing some earlier experiments, the first supermarkets opened their doors only at the end of
the 1950s. The main pioneers were the country’s major big distribution companies: three
popular department stores and the country’s major multiple grocer. Building on interwar
networks and experiences, their executives actively scouted retail innovations in the
United States and implemented them in a bold way. The (financial) partnerships they
forged led some contemporaries to describe Belgium as the ‘soft underbelly’ of European
retail offering American actors easy ideas access to European markets. However, our pre-
liminary and maybe even somewhat superficial analysis of the evolutions in postwar
retailing leads us to a different understanding of the country’s ‘softness’. Although, as
in other Western European national context, several mechanisms were set in motion
that would fundamentally transform the Belgian retail landscape in the 1960s, this tran-
sition remained remarkably restrained. Family-based retailing held its ground, mainly
because government facilitated its modernisation by offering training and consultancy,
investment loans and different social benefits. Government also promoted franchising
and other sorts of collaborative networks, interlinking the advantages of scale to the flexi-
bility of independent enterprise. The pursuit of Belgian policy for a balanced distribution
landscape in which big and small would fulfil complementary roles, was fully in line with
the country’s consensual political culture. It also reflected the particular concerns of the
dominant Christian-democrat family and its great respect for the interests of the entre-
preneurial middle class, anchored down in Catholic social theory. At first, this policy
relied on the voluntary commitment of all parties. However, when in the early 1970s
the country’s big distribution concerns initiated a new expansive phase, it became
clear that durably balancing the retail landscape required a legal framework. To soothe
the growing unrest among shopkeepers, a law on commercial establishment was
drawn up, once again restricting big distribution but also advocating a negotiated plan-
ning of commercial infrastructure.
We are well aware that our contribution was mainly written from a macro perspective.
It deserves to be refined and deepened through further research. Many different aspects
of post-war retailing and consumption in Belgium remain understudied or have been
completely neglected by academic research. Postwar consumer society in Belgium is
still largely a terra incognita, particularly in its cultural and spatial aspects. When
merely looking at the transformation of the shop landscape there, the academic disinter-
est is particularly alarming. Further studies are needed on the history of the main big dis-
tribution companies, the post-war development of consumer cooperatives, the different
franchise chains and especially on the transformation of independent, family-based
retailing, both in the food and non-food sectors.
Notes
1. De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 376–415; Lundin et al., The Making.
2. Sedlmaier, From Department Store, 11.
3. See for instance the strong anti-communist rhetoric at the international conferences of
European big distribution organised by the Swiss big distribution pioneer Gottlieb Duttwei-
ler (1888–1962) in Rüschlikon, e.g. the minutes of the 3ième congrès international d’Etudes
14 P. HEYRMAN
de la Fondation Institut Coopératif ’Le Pré Vert’ in Ruschlikon on 3 July 1953, in Archives
de l’ULB: Fonds GIB 1157–58.
4. Shaw et al., “Selling Self-service”; Shaw et al., “The Coming of the Supermarket”; Scott et al.,
“New Perspectives”.
5. Hall et al., Varieties of Capitalism.
6. Coupain, La Distribution.
7. Michel and Vander Eycken, La distribution, 19.
8. Business Week, 15 April 1972: 56.
9. Michel and Vander Eycken, La distribution, 19; Weekberichten Kredietbank, 1 February
1980.
10. Collet, Supermarkt. Collet, Delhaize Le Lion, 92–5. On the complex prewar history of the
Delhaize family’s food chains, Delhaize Frères et Co/Le Lion (1867), Louis Delhaize
(1870) and Adolphe Delhaize (1874), see the contributions of Serge Jaumain in Kurgan-
van Hentenryk et al., Dictionnaire des patrons, 190–2; Teughels, “Succursales”; Teughels,
Mag het iets meer zijn.
11. Thinnes, “Origine et évolution”; Kurgan et al., Dictionnaire, 621–622.
12. Kurgan et al., Dictionnaire, 98–100; Burstin, Maurice Cauwe; Burstin, “Cauwe, Maurice”.
13. Dopchie, GB: La rage; Deslandes, Historique, 39–42 and 269–298; BCD/CBD, “35 ans”.
14. Jessen and Langer, “Introduction”, 9.
15. Archives de l’ULB: Fonds GIB 1157–58.
16. Michel, La distribution, 141, quoting OEEC, Le libre-service, 24–5.
17. BCD/CBD. Belgisch Distributie Tijdschrift/Revue Belge de la Distribution, July-August
1961 : 41; Michel, La distribution, 140–5; Michel and Vander Eycken, La distribution, 174.
18. Association Internationale du Libre Service, Libre-Service 1971, 28–34.
19. Grimmeau, “A Forgotten Anniversary”; Soulabail, La genèse. See also Dopchie, GB: La rage,
50–60 and Cauwe, “Genèse”; Daumas, “L’invention”.
20. Grimmeau, “A forgotten anniversary”, 3. See also Uhrich, Super-Marchés, 202–3.
21. Mérenne-Schoumaker, “L’évolution”, 127, table 2.
22. Vandermosten, “De supermarkt”, 49.
23. Jeanneney, Les commerces; Evalenko and Michel, La structure; Jefferys et al., La productivité;
CRISP, “Les grands magasins”; ESIM/IECM, Bijdrage.
24. See for instance Burstin, Maurice Cauwe, 57–66.
25. Heyrman, “Unlocking the Padlock”.
26. Kwanten, “De christelijke coöperatieve bedrijven”; Defoort, Werklieden; CRISP, “La distri-
bution en Belgique (II)”.
27. Michel and Vander Eycken, La distribution, 146–8 and 255. A more optimistic picture by De
Meyer, “Marktaandeel”. See also: BCD/CBD, Belgisch Distributie Tijdschrift/ Revue belge de
la distribution, 15.
28. Michel, La distribution, 146, table 79. BCD/CBD (Belgisch Distributie Tijdschrift/ Revue belge
de la distribution, February 1963: 27–8) reported 58 supermarkets at that date, with some
smaller outlets (400–700 m2) making the difference.
29. De Bie and Lacrosse, Emile Bernheim; Kurgan et al., Dictionnaire, 46–9; Jaumain, “Jalons”.
30. Collet, Delhaize, 237–40; Daumas, Dictionnaire, 243.
31. Vieujant, Visite.
32. De Leener, La distribution, 222.
33. Bernheim, L’organisation; Bernheim, Les groupements; Bernheim, La distribution.
34. Archives de l’ULB: Fonds GIB 1125. Cauwe, “Le commerce de détail”.
35. Archives de l’ULB: Fonds GIB 1126; Sermeus, Le supermarket.
36. Archives de l’ULB: Fonds GIB 1122.
37. AIDA, Premier Congrè.
38. Archives de l’ULB: Fonds GIB 1155 and 1156.
39. Archives de l’ULB: Fonds GIB 1119–1120; Cauwe, Les USA.
40. Archives de l’ULB: Fonds GIB 1118 and 1133.
41. Collet, Delhaize, 92–3.
HISTORY OF RETAILING AND CONSUMPTION 15
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
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18 P. HEYRMAN
Acronyms
AIDA: Association International de la Distribution des Produits Alimentaires.
AIGM: Association International des Grands Magasins.
BCD/CBD: Belgisch Comité van de Distributie/Comité Belge de la Distribution.
BDOP/OBAP: Belgische Dienst voor de Opvoering van de Productiviteit/Office Belge pour
l’Accroissement de la Productivité.
CEPESS: Centrum voor Politieke, Economische en Sociale Studies.
CNBOS: Comité National de l’Organisation Scientifique.
CRISP: Centre de Recherche et d’Information Socio-Politique.
ESIM/IESCM: Economisch en Sociaal Instituut van de Middenstand /Institut Economique et
Social des Classes Moyennes.
NCMV: Nationaal Christelijk Middenstandsverbond.
NCR: National Cash Register Co.
OEEC: Organisation for European Economic Cooperation.
ULB: Université Libre de Bruxelles.