LiberalArtsAndScienceAcademy ChHu Aff Tournament of Champions Quarters

1AC – Contractors Aff – LASA
CH
1AC V1
Cyber ADV – 1AC
Contention one is CYBER.
Rising cyberattacks mean NATO is increasing cooperation with

cyber private security contractors (PSCs). BUT lack of oversight
and accountability create grey areas that ensure escalation.
Anstett '14 [Justin; a candidate for the University of Waterloo’s M.A. in Global
Governance at the Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA). He completed his B.A.
at Wilfrid Laurier University in global studies, specializing in peace and conflict studies;
Rebekah Pullen; a candidate for a Master’s of Global Governance at the BSIA, based at
the University of Waterloo, in Waterloo, Ontario; 8-1-2014; Centre for International
Governance Innovation (2014); "CONSULT, COMMAND, CONTROL, CONTRACT:
ADDING A FOURTH ‘C’ TO NATO’S CYBER SECURITY,"
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05216; LASA-SC]
Cyber security covers both defensive and offensive operations conducted in cyberspace. Defensive operations entail
protecting cyber infrastructure, for example through the use of firewalls, encryption and antivirus. Whereas an offensive
operation refers to any attempt to damage or destroy cyber information or infrastructure, for example targeted malware
attacks (such as Stuxnet), espionage (such as APT1) or hacking (see Table 1). International
law does not apply
directly to PSCs, though several states and intergovernmental organizations are
contracting these companies for cyber security , including offensive cyber operations. However,
there is a lack of clarity about accountability , oversight and clear
understanding s of the rules of engagement for PSCs in cyber operations. PSCs and their
employees are not directly accountable or protected when they engage in offensive cyber
operations as contracted by a state.
It is unclear to what degree states are responsible or accountable for the actions of contracted companies engaging in
offensive military operations, and the status of employees as civilians (and therefore protected) is not certain or
guaranteed. The
ambiguity caused by the increasing use and capabilities of PSCs in
offensive cyber operations is a significant threat to a peaceful cyberspace.
NATO’s annual Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence conference met June 3–6, 2014. The themed “Active
Cyber Defence” conference noted the continually changing perceptions of cyberspace, with specific focus on addressing
ambiguities of cyber threats. With the upcoming NATO Information Assurance Symposium in Mons, Belgium, September
16–18, 2014, it is recognized that NATO continues to address contemporary cybersecurity issues. However, this brief
encourages NATO to addressthe difficult questions beyond those of developing and
implementing any necessary cyber defence capabilities. NATO can continue to be a model
of international cooperation by considering the important implications of the
blurred lines between “ civilian ” and “ military ,” precipitated by the unclear status of
PSCs under international law.
The plan ensures accountability in accordance with

international law.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF CYBER SECURITY
The application
of international law to offensive cyber operations against a state requires
clear attribution of the attack to an aggressor. The use of the Internet and other cyber technologies make it
difficult to officially assign responsibility to a state or states. Given the existence of offence dominance in cyberspace,
states increasingly rely on the private sector for their knowledge , innovation and
efficiency in cyber security. However, often excluded from cyber-security contracts are the
conditions for appropriate oversight of the contracted company by the state. This is due to poorly defined
contracts that do not ensure proper transparency and accountability , as a result of the
blurred distinction between private/civilian and public/military. Attributing culpability is therefore further
complicated , obscuring the state’s responsibility for both the company and the attack. It is
difficult to currently determine under what conditions a state has international legal
responsibility for the potential offensive cyber actions of its contractors.
If a cyber attack is fully attributable, it can only be permissible if it conforms to both jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus
in bello (justice in war) requirements. Ad bellum regulations dictate when an attack is permissible and the principal
document for determining this is the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations 1945). According to Article 2 (4),
states are prohibited from threatening or implementing the use of force against another state (ibid.). The only exception is
found in Article 51: should an armed attack against a state be attributable to another state, the attacked state may legally
retaliate in accordance with the right of self-defence (ibid.).
The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols are sources of in bello regulations, dictating what kinds of attacks are
permissible (International Committee of the Red Cross 1977). Included is the degree of protection of individuals, which is
dependent on their classification as civilian, combatant or dual use. The latter applies to objects and locations that are of
both military and civilian significance and their protection is adjusted according to the relationship between the military
and civilian components.
Cyber-security PSCs are not clearly protected under international law. Their dual-use nature
designates them and their employees as non-civilian due to their potential role in offensive
operations. However, these companies are not military entities and their employees are not
combatants. This ambiguity means that these companies, their employees and installations can be
significantly exposed to legitimate attack under international law. Should a company’s
relationship to the state be misinterpreted , any attack or “active defence” directed against contracted
PSCs could lead to war .
Due to a lack of accountability and protection under current international law applicable to contracting for cyber security,
NATO should refrain from contracting private companies for offensive cyber operations. PSCs and their employees must
not be contracted to function as combatants for offensive cyber operations, or engage in active defence.
APPROPRIATE RESPONSE
Due to the speed of attacks in cyberspace, there

are strong incentives to delegate authority to the
private company to decide the appropriate response to the cyber attack, including NATO’s contract with
Finmecannica and Northrop Grumman . Based on current interpretations, an offensive cyber
operation can constitute a response in cyberspace; the private sector refers to these measures as active defence. These
private actors are not required to follow pertinent international law and are not bound
by political allegiance, although they have the authority and discretion to determine how to respond.
Without direct oversight from state-military officials, private companies should not be able to
authorize offensive cyber operations that could lead to military conflict and war . If a cyber-
security contractor caused disproportionate damage to the enemy or a contractor’s actions were perceived as an act of war
it is unclear who is responsible.
Because the right to self-defence permits certain retaliating behaviours, it is highly desirable that any attack against a state
be clearly attributable to the responsible party. Right of self-defence responses also depend on accepted interpretations of
“defence.” Therefore, ambivalence regarding attribution for attacks or “active defence,” under international law, creates
unnecessary risk. Ambiguity may lead to a confusion of responsibility and potentially short circuit
deliberative processes of the attacked state and international community. Consequently, an escalation of
reprisals and further attacks becomes more likely.
Lack of regulation ensures escalation.

Egloff '16 [Florian; a Clarendon Scholar, a D.Phil (PhD) Candidate in Cyber Security
at the Centre for Doctoral Training in Cyber Security at the University of Oxford, and a
Research Affiliate at the Cyber Studies Programme at Oxford University's Department of
Politics and International Relations; 11-17-2016; Lawfare; "Cyber Privateering: A Risky
Policy Choice for the United States," https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-privateering-
risky-policy-choice-united-states; LASA-SC]
Historically , however, privateers were hard to control. They regularly overstepped

their commissions, especially when it was in the interest of their sponsors’ government.
Think of Corporation A in a country being authorized to investigate Corporation X in another country. Corporation A may
just find it convenient to profit from information found about Corporation Y during the investigation authorized against
Corporation X. Will the strict controls applied to privateers hold? Maybe in societies with a strong separation of powers
and a tradition of checks and balances. But in other countries, where power is not kept as much in check, probably not.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the U.S. private sector could perform cyber
operations with the same level of care as governmental agencies (assuming that these agencies are careful)
and stipulate that their corporate sponsors weigh the potential blowback carefully against their business interests, in such
case privateers still constitute a means of engaging in conflict and potentially warfare. Which
countries should
the United States be willing to issue privateering licenses against? We can be sure that such
licensing will be seen as a hostile act.
In addition, once the private sector engages in these limited offensive operations, at some point they
may be discovered . A foreign government will be informed that part of their supply chain suffered an
intrusion. Will the targets recognize the attackers and their intentions ? A capable adversary
may trace the attack back to the United States. Distinguishing between a contractor
working for a corporate partner for evidence-gathering and one working for the U.S. government will be
hard . This can be an advantage for a state that intends to use proxies regularly. However, as this policy would
further cloud the U.S. government’s intent, it would compound problems for cyber
defense. Given the possibility of a worst-case analysis by the defender, privateering
magnifies the risk of unintentionally setting off an escalatory spiral.
They cascade and trigger false readings as leaders are skeptical
of information.
Klare ’19 [Michael; November 19; Professor Emeritus of Peace and World Security
Studies at Hampshire College, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Arms Control Association;
Arms Control Today, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to
Escalation” https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-
outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation]
Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of

cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military
targets. All major powers , along with Iran and North Korea , have developed and deployed
cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such
as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical
grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan
known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands
or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13
The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension
and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital
elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure , producing widespread chaos and
harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets,
risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict . For example, a Russian cyberattack on
the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing
widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such
attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war .”14
These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. Others
include efforts by third parties, such as proxy states or terrorist organization s , to
provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing early-warning systems to generate
false readings (“spoofing”) of missile launches. Yet, they do provide a clear indication of the severity of the
threat. As states’ reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful, the
dangers of unintended or accidental escalation can only grow more severe.
Extinction.
Starr, ’14 Steven Starr, the Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility
and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri.
Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms
Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 11 th,
2014, “There Can be No Winners in a Nuclear War”, Truth Out,
https://truthout.org/articles/there-can-be-no-winners-in-a-nuclear-war/, EO
Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at
Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies
that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war , including baseline
scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They
concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include
catastrophic disruptions of global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s
protective ozone layer. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively
affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. These
peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world
and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or
Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race . In other words, a US-Russian nuclear
war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would
leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war,” begins by stating: “ A
nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START,
could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal,
resulting in self-assured destruction .” In 2009, I wrote “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of
Nuclear Conflicts” for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The article
summarizes the findings of these studies. It
explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions
of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric
smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at
least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing
the UV-B reaching Earth) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age
weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in
the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold
would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown,
leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations.
Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the
integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices, including those in commercial
nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every
nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil
off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and
Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death
anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear
holocaust could be avoided. Theoriesof “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are
unrealistic. In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit
preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this
doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian
military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense
pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear
weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic
missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads, which can be launched with only a few minutes
warning. Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase,”
which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds. Yet top political leaders and
policymakers of both the US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons represent a self-
destruct mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the
New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller,
during their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference). I asked them if they were
familiar with the recent peer-reviewed studies that predicted the detonation of less than 1% of the explosive power
contained in the operational and deployed US and Russian nuclear forces would cause catastrophic changes in the global
climate, and that a nuclear war fought with their strategic nuclear weapons would kill most people on Earth. They both
answered “no.” More recently, on April 20, 2014, I asked the same question and received the same answer from the US
officials sent to brief representatives of the NGOS at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting at the
UN. None of the US officials at the briefing were aware of the studies. Those present included top officials of the National
Security Council. It is frightening that President Obama and his administration appear unaware that the world’s leading
scientists have for years predicted that a nuclear war fought with the US and/or Russian strategic nuclear arsenal means
the end of human history. Do they not know of the existential threat these arsenals pose to the human race . . . or do they
choose to remain silent because this fact doesn’t fit into their official narratives? We hear only about terrorist threats that
could destroy a city with an atomic bomb, while the threat of human extinction from nuclear war is never mentioned –
even when the US and Russia are each running huge nuclear war games in preparation for a US-Russian war. Even more
frightening is the fact that the neocons running US
foreign policy believe that the US has “nuclear
primacy” over Russia; that is, the US could successfully launch a nuclear sneak attack
against Russian (and Chinese) nuclear forces and completely destroy them. This theory was
articulated in 2006 in “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” which was published in Foreign Affairs by the Council on
Foreign Relations. By concluding that the Russians and Chinese would be unable to retaliate, or if some small part of their
forces remained, would not risk a second US attack by retaliating, the article invites nuclear war. Colonel Valery Yarynich
(who was in charge of security of the Soviet/Russian nuclear command and control systems for 7 years) asked me to help
him write a rebuttal, which was titled “ Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy .” Colonel Yarynich, who was on the
Soviet General Staff and did war planning for the USSR, concluded that the “ Primacy” article used
faulty
methodology and erroneous assumptions, thus invalidating its conclusions. My contribution lay in my
knowledge of the recently published (in 2006) studies, which predicted even a “successful” nuclear
first-strike , which destroyed 100% of the opposing side’s nuclear weapons, would
cause the citizens of the side that “won” the nuclear war to perish from nuclear
famine , just as would the rest of humanity.
Allies say yes.

The ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts reflect existing
customary law regarding the “Attribution of Conduct to a State,” among other state responsibilities (International Law
Commission 2008). In particular, it addresses the need for less ambiguity concerning the relationship
between states and organs imbued with state power. An organ of the state refers to a “person or entity” that represents
some facet of state power and decision making, “in accordance with the internal law of the State” (ibid., 40).
Regulations clarifying the responsibility of such organs under international law, as well as what constitutes a
state organ, should be applied to cyber-security contracting.
The Draft
Articles have been endorsed by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) multiple
times, without vote, most recently in 2013 (UNGA 2013). Additionally, various NATO member states
have spoken highly of the Draft Articles. On behalf of the Nordic countries (including NATO members
Denmark and Iceland), NATO member state Norway claimed that “the draft articles have...become the most authoritative
statement available on questions of State responsibility” (UNGA 2007, 3). The United Kingdom described them as “an
authoritative statement of international law,” referencing the Articles numerous times for “guidance on issues of State
responsibility that arise in day-to-day practice” within the state (ibid., 6).
This demonstrates international support for the encompassed standards of the

articles and the support of NATO member states specifically. The organization is in a
position to set an example for the international community by taking steps to implement
these norms and standards, in reference to offensive cyber operations and the contracting of private security
companies. This would inform future policies of states that currently form contracts with PSCs for offensive cyber
operations, as well as for states that may choose to do so in the future as their technological capabilities increase.
As the prevalence of state dependence on cyber technology increases globally, internationally

endorsed regulations could operate as best practices. Concerning state responsibility for private
contractors, classifying PSCs and their employees as combatants or noncombatants would
provide clarification regarding their ambiguous dual-use status. A lack of classification of state
responsibility under international law creates ambiguities regarding state control of PSCs. Without recognized
control over PSCs, NATO may be liable for the damage, destruction, injury and death
done to or caused by the contracted firm and its employees (Schmitt 2012, 288). Moreover, there is
risk of costly attacks against PSCs and their employees because of their roles in NATO cyber defence operations.
It’s NC3A’s responsibility. That’s a NATO AGENCY, NOT a member

state.
NATO’s Consultation, Command and Control Agency ( NC3A ) plays an instrumental role in the
procurement and acquisition of PSCs for technical project management of NATO programs ,
which now includes contracting cyber security . Awarded by the NC3A , NATO’s recent
contract with Finmeccanica and Northrop Grumman for its Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Technical
Centre sets a precedent for contracting PSCs for traditionally military operations. Recognizing the
precedent set by NATO for contracting cyber security, this brief focuses on the necessary fourth “C” in cyber security:
contract.
Standards ADV – 1AC
Contention two is STANDARDS.
Despite Ukraine, US-NATO relations remain volatile.

Permanent, durable signals of commitment are crucial to
quelling fears and enabling effective cooperation.
Bennett ‘22 [Brian; correspondent for TIME covering the White House and current
events; 12-5-2022; Time; "Why NATO Still Eyes the US Warily, Even With Biden in
Charge," https://time.com/6238447/nato-us-relationship-biden-trump-2024/; LASA-
SC]
When Joe Biden flew to the wind-swept coast of Cornwall, England, for his first major meeting with leaders of allied
nations in June 2021, he wanted
to footstomp that the Trumpian era of publicly berating
allies and eschewing international cooperation was over. He later recalled declaring to a meeting of
foreign leaders, “ America is back .” In response, French President Emmanuel Macron and three other
leaders asked him the same question: “ For how long ?”
looming anxiety among European allies hasn’t gone away. Even

A year and a half later, that
after Biden took the lead in corralling a unified response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine and
increased American troop presence in Europe, there’s a lingering sense of unease that the long-term
U.S. commitment to Europe’s security remains too vulnerable to the unpredictable gusts of
American politics.
The midterm campaigns last month were a wakeup call . Several Trump-backed candidates expressed
skepticism over U.S. military involvement in Ukraine. European leaders and diplomats were relieved when that
isolationism didn’t overtake Congress amid a Republican red wave, but some of those candidates did win and many others
came close.
Europe’s leaders are looking nervously at what the 2024 Presidential election cycle may mean for U.S. support for the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which former President Donald Trump has long criticized and wanted to walk away
from. And that’s added to the urgency of efforts to get the U.S. to bolster NATO as much as
possible in the next two years, before a possible shift in the political winds.
The plans signal of consultation and PMC framework prevents

allied fears through cooperation.
Kjelstrup ’11 [Christian; University of Oslo, Masters in Political Science; 5-23-2011;
“NATO and Private Military Contractors: Different approaches, and challenges to
internal cohesion and solidarity,”
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/13142/Kjelstrupx2011x_Master.pdf?
sequence=1; LASA-SC]
Evidence indicating US’ potential inclination to hire PMCs over European allies is
already documented. For instance, during the initial intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, the US rejected many
European offers of troop contributions due to differences in levels of technological sophistication. The Bush
Administration also wanted to avoid having allies dictate how the war should be fought, as well as difficulties to gain allied
consensus on strategy similar to those that had developed during NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 (De Nevers, 2007:43;
49). Moreover, especially between the US and other allies there is a huge capabilities gap, and lack of interoperability due
different technological standards. The alliance is further notoriously short on crucial military
functions such as tactical airlift, specialised infantry, and military assistance units that would be
vital for an operation such as Afghanistan. There is also a lack of flexible and mobile combat reserves,
and personnel for military and police training. The reason behind this situation is foremost a matter of
differences in defence-spending among NATO members (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009b:534). Acknowledging these empirical
insights, the
use of PMCs may be an option in order to bypass some of the resource
constrains attached to especially European allies.
Hiring a military function which otherwise would have, or must have been provided by European allies, also relives the
latter’s government from domestic opposition if the US’ actions are not perceived as justified by the European public. For
instance, only six NATOmembers operate without political restrictions in Afghanistan (De Nevers, 2007:51), and four of
them are aligned with the US in the reformist tier20 (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009b:540). For the particular case of
Afghanistan, NATO is politically divided on the issue of whether the core of the operation is counter-insurgency or
stability and reconstruction. This divergence has lead to different regional responsibilities with the result of different
operational realities and sharing of risk and burden. Especially NATO-members who operate in the south of Afghanistan
where the insurgency has proved to be the most resistant, have experienced overproportional losses compared to allies
who operate in the far safer north. For NATO-members in the south of Afghanistan, the ISAF operation over all
demonstrates that not all allies are willing to and prepared to share equal risk (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009b:532).
In order to relieve the strain on NATO-members, the increased use of PMCs could act as a burden-sharing valve. For
instance, realities regarding NATO’s training mission in Iraq in 2004 reflect the potential of this argument. The training
mission was assigned to educate Iraqi officers in military skill and tactics. NATO-members contributed with staff
personnel and instructors, yet not soldiers to guard their facilities in Iraq. Instead, the task was contracted to a PMC
because no NATO-member was willing to accept the risk attached to guarding the camp (CRS Report for Congress,
2007:3). Some NATO-officers assigned to the mission were even unaware until their arrival in Iraq that a PMC was
guarding the camp (Svendsen, 2009).
Although there was consensus to hire the PMC for guarding the facilities in Iraq (CRS Report for Congress, 2007:3),
substituting national contributions with PMCs is however a dangerous path for
NATO to endure, because it does not solve the underlying problems of the alliance. Different perceptions
and understandings of NATO’s role will not change simply by venting out some of the frustration
with the use of PMCs. Although the use of PMCs in the short term may be perceived as a relief, it will arguably in
the long term become a liability rather than an asset, and hence result in an increase of friction among NATO-members.
Two developments are critical in this regard.
First, in order to achieve cohesion , NATO must be consistent with its own principles. A
fragmented approach towards the use of PMCs may severely hurt the legitimacy of the
alliance. NATO is not only a military alliance but to a very large extent also a political alliance. Its political dimension is
reflected in the sense that the alliance promotes democratic values and encourages
consultation and cooperation on defence and security issues to build trust, and in the long
run prevent conflict (NATO, 2011). The requirement for unanimous voting in the North Atlantic Council21,
ensures every member’s sovereignty and the representation of NATO towards the outside as a unified actor. In order to
successfully present itself as such, the alliance
must be consistent and a unified democratic institution
where democratic consistency is represented through all levels of decision-making,
starting with the electorate of member-states.
Hence, at any one time, NATO’s polices and institutions are constrained by beliefs about their legitimacy and
accountability22. Yet, beliefs about NATO’s legitimacy are in turn influenced by how NATO approaches the outside world.
NATO’s external polices impact on outsider’s considerations and perceptions of NATO performance, identity and
accountability. The
success of developing as a legitimate international actor will depend on
how NATO manages this feedback loop in order to maintain consistency with alliance
values. However, the introduction of PMC has in many cases severely challenged democratic
principles, and therefore potentially threatened NATO legitimacy. NATO-members more concerned
with sustaining democratic values will probably therefore feel even more dispatched from the reformist tier, if the
behaviour of the latter through the use of PMCs is severely damaging the legitimacy of the alliance in its pursuit of
protecting democratic values.
Second, an increased reliance on PMCs may lead to a perception of being a “second best choice” among European allies
who lag behind with military modernisation and interoperability. It will be fatal to NATO if such a thought would become
embedded among European members, because it would arguably promote the further evolution of an independent
European security policy in terms of the ESDP. Especially members of the status-quo tier would advocate an EU-
alternative. On the other hand, the status-quo tier members are also very concerned that the US will uproot its
embedment with European security. The ESDP will therefore not substitute NATO in the near future, yet the perception of
“being second best” may however lead to a stronger self-perception and articulation of European interests, thereby
reducing cohesion across the global-regional dimension.
In sum, the
use of PMC within a NATO context, is arguably affecting internal cohesion and
solidarity more negatively than positively. Before final inferences to this argument are drawn, we must
review to what degree the thesis research design has influenced the results of the analysis and the subsequent discussion
of the results. The next section therefore provides an assessment of the study’s overall research design.
Differing standards destroy deterrence.

Fogt '20 [Morten M.; Lieutenant Colonel of the Danish Army, Chief Legal Advisor,
NATO Multinational Division North (MNDN), Latvia/Denmark, Associated Professor in
Civil and International Law, Aarhus University, Denmark; 2020; SOUTHWESTERN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; "LEGAL CHALLENGES OR “GAPS” BY
COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE – BUILDING RESILIENCE IN JUS ANTE
BELLUM," https://www.swlaw.edu/sites/default/files/2021-03/2.%20Fogt%20%5B28-
100%5D%20V2.pdf; Accessed 2-28-2023; LASA-SC]
For any conduct of military exercises, deterrence measures, hybrid counter operations,
clarity on the laws and directives for the handling of weapons and ammunition is vital. In this
regard, military forces are welleducated and trained to be particularly careful and observant.
According to the NATO SOFA, members of a “ force may possess and carry arms” if so
authorized by orders whereby “sympathetic consideration to request” from the host nation shall be made.121 Arguably,
although the wording for the NATO SOFA only mentions “arms” and, hence, strictly speaking “weapons,” an
interpretation in accordance with the context and object and purpose of the provision would include both weapons and
ammunition.122 The possession and carrying of weapons/ammunition will be governed by the sending states’ (TCN’s)
law, military regulations on weapons and ammunition, and the specific directives and orders given to their forces, but still,
due regard shall be had to the host nation regulations as well.123
By multi-national forces stationed in a host nation, different military regulations regarding

weapons and ammunition may apply . Moreover, the national requests may differ in the various
host nations concerned, such as in the Baltic states , Poland , Germany and Denmark . For
a multi-national Headquarters, such as the MNDN, with a distributed “Headquarters East” in Denmark and a
“Headquarters West” in Latvia and ongoing duty travel between the two permanent locations, the host nation’s
legal framework would differ and change constantly . The varying regulations on weapons and
ammunition will create legal complexity and administrative obstacles and, thus, may
hamper timely and effective reactions to a hybrid campaign. There are good legal and operational
reasons to conclude separate multi-national SOFAs on the question of arms and ammunition in peacetime and crisis and
align the legal framework of both sending and receiving nations.124 The “gap” in the NATO SOFA regarding specific
directives for handling arms and ammunition would thereby be closed.
Under Article II of the NATO SOFA, there are two important limitations on the right which state that members of a “force
may possess and carry arms” if so authorized by orders.
Firstly, the granted right under the NATO SOFA that a “force may possess and carry arms” is thus exempted from the host
nation’s public law regulations on weapons and ammunition as it only applies to the forces in their performance of
military duties in accordance with the authorization by orders,125 where the sending states (TCNs), in principle, maintain
primary jurisdiction under the NATO SOFA.126 When not acting on duty, restrictive public rules on weapons and
ammunition in the host nation may apply, such as the Danish prohibition to import, produce, collect, purchase, possess,
carry and use any kinds of weapons, including specific knives, without authorization.127 More flexible and relaxed weapon
regulation for possessing and carrying arms off duty are usually enforced in other NATO alliance countries, inter alia, the
Baltic states and in particular in the U.S. This
is a practical and legal concern in the jus ante bellum
that military personnel in peacetime and crisis will be temporarily off duty, or on leave,
and in that timespan be subject to perhaps unknown, strict weapons regulation in the
host nation, and in principle punishable for any violation thereof under the receiving
state’s (host nation) law and jurisdiction. For foreign troops present in other NATO states, the
determination of when a person is “on duty” or “off duty” may not always be easy. In any case, members of foreign forces
will have to be educated and trained in legal compliance with the host nation’s law and regulations.128 In a hybrid
campaign, foreign troops are a more vulnerable target for provocation, threats, attacks, and media exposure while “off
duty,” and acts in violation of the host nation’s law may be exploited by a hybrid propaganda campaign.
Secondly, the right under the NATO SOFA to “possess and carry arms” only applies to members
of a force and not to civilian components, family members or sending state contractors, including PMSCs.
Again, host nation law applies, and the host nation maintains primary or exclusive jurisdiction. If sending states
employ civilian components and contractors to perform security and other military tasks requiring
them to carry weapons and potential use of force, this should be regulated in a bilateral or multi-lateral
SOFA,129 or in the host nation’s applicable law.130 Moreover, the status of state contractors is not
governed by the NATO SOFA, and a specific permission for entry and stay must be granted. In this connection,
the jurisdiction issue regarding state contractors should be considered.131
That threatens cooperation.

Kjelstrup ’11 [Christian; University of Oslo, Masters in Political Science; 5-23-2011;
“NATO and Private Military Contractors: Different approaches, and challenges to
internal cohesion and solidarity,”
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/13142/Kjelstrupx2011x_Master.pdf?
sequence=1; LASA-SC]
Different policy standards among NATO -members are only sparsely communicated in the
broader research literature focusing on the alliance. Both in terms of the purely empirical aspect concerning how
many and what kind, and to what extent different policy standards can have an impact on NATO’s role in international
relations. The objective of this thesis is to uncover some of these circumstances. Based on a comparative analysis of four
NATOmembers – the US, the UK, Germany and Norway – three diverging patterns in regard to use of
private military contractors are exposed . The results are thereafter discussed in regard to the
contemporary NATO-debate concerning NATO’s role in international relations. If left unanswered , the
different approaches towards the use of private military contractors have the potential of
negatively influencing internal cohesion and solidarity.
Durable US commitment is crucial.

O'Hanlon '22 [Michael E.; senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at
the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of
military force, and American national security policy; 6-21-2022; Brookings;
"Strengthening the US and NATO defense postures in Europe after Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine," https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strengthening-the-us-and-nato-defense-
postures-in-europe-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/; LASA-SC]
American strategists anxious to prioritize China as the “pacing challenge” for U.S.
defense strategy may object to any increase in the resources devoted to European security.
That would be a mistake . Ensuring that Russia does not further destabilize Europe will have to be just as high a
priority in the years to come as the China threat. That is because any scenarios that could involve hostile
threats to NATO territory could raise terrifying questions about possible escalation, even
eventually to the use of nuclear weapons, and could have existential implications . Moreover,
despite the ongoing emphasis on Asia as the most dynamic region on Earth, Europe remains the
region where America’s preponderance of democratic, advanced, prosperous allies is
found — and also the region where the world wars originated in earlier eras. Its strategic significance should never be
doubted. What is more, Europe’s role in addressing the rise of China will be central to any successful effort. Finally, to the
extent China is seen as a major challenge, it is all the more reason that European security must be stabilized as an anchor
of the future global order. The United States and allies do not have the military, economic, or diplomatic bandwidth to
address escalating crises and conflict in both Europe and Asia at the same time. New crises and conflicts in
Europe must be prevented before they begin, to the maximum extent possible.
I argue here that NATO should shift from what has been, in effect, a tripwire defense of the Baltic states and Poland since
2017 to a modest forward defense posture. Russian President Vladimir Putin must know of NATO’s unambiguous
commitment to defend alliance territory and feel no doubt that the United States and its allies would do whatever it took
to prevail in a war that he might initiate against one or more of the alliance’s members.
The United States and allies should build

facilities and position forces with the intent of making this
forward defense enduring . The concept of rotational deployments is no longer appropriate given the scale of
what is now needed, together with the severity and hostility of the Russian actions that have made such changes necessary.
NATO should not adhere to its previous policy, dating to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, that
ruled out permanent stationing of allied combat forces on the territories of new members. Those days are gone. Russia,
with its attack on Ukraine, has now violated the foundational principle of that Act — the
peaceful resolution of disputes. Nor is rotational presence less expensive than permanent basing. Indeed, by placing
upward pressure on the size of the U.S. force posture, it risks being much more expensive, given the large number of units
it inevitably entails.
Thus, what has been termed NATO’s enhanced forward presence (eFP) will need to beef up.
Rather than have small and disparate combat formations from many countries, NATO should establish enough
combat punch in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that it could credibly fight to protect these
countries’ territories in a future war against Russia, while awaiting reinforcement from points further
west. As the alliance’s military and strategic backbone, U.S. military formations must be
an integral part of that NATO mix, to make the alliance’s commitment to successful
defense and military victory absolutely unambiguous . That is the most promising way
to make deterrence robust , given what we now know about Putin and his romanticized,
twisted, dangerous vision of a greater Russia. The force packages need not be particularly large, but they should
be combat capable, positioned in forward locations, and set up for the long term, given the likelihood that Putin or a
similar successor will remain on the scene for many years.
Uncertain perceptions deck effective deterrence.

Deni '21 [John R.; a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic
Studies Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council; 9-24-2021;
Defense News; "America needs a permanent military presence in the Baltics, and here’s
why," https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/09/24/america-
needs-a-permanent-military-presence-in-the-baltics-and-heres-why/; LASA-SC]
With the Defense Department weighing whether and how to change the U.S. military
footprint overseas, it’s time to make the American military presence in the Baltic states
durable . Maintaining merely periodic American boots on the ground, sometimes there and sometimes not —
especially while a more permanent U.S. presence takes shape in nearby Poland — sends the wrong message at the wrong
time to NATO’s most vulnerable allies and to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Particularly in
the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the concerns
generated over American credibility , only a consistent U.S. military presence in each of
the Baltic states can convincingly reassure allies that Washington has their back while
also signaling to Putin the rock-solid American commitment to NATO. The seemingly rushed,
chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has caused some American allies in Europe to question Washington’s
commitment to NATO.
From this side of the Atlantic, linking the failure of the 20-year effort in Afghanistan to American credibility in Europe
sounds absurd. After all, Afghanistan is a country with which the U.S. doesn’t share significant cultural or historical ties, a
treaty-based mutual defense commitment, or serious trade and investment relations. Meanwhile, America’s cultural,
historical, demographic, defense, and trade and investment connections to Europe are second to none. It’s no
exaggeration to say that the American way of life — not to mention the outcome of the great power competition now
unfolding between the United States on one side and China and Russia on the other — depends on a close, secure
relationship with Europe. Not so with Afghanistan.
perception is reality , and the lack of an enduring American presence in the

Nonetheless,
Baltic states looks even worse than it would in the absence of the Afghanistan debacle.
This is particularly the case today in Lithuania, which is literally and figuratively on the front lines of Western efforts
against both Russian and Chinese authoritarianism. Wedged
among the Baltic Sea, a hostile neighbor
in Belarus and the Russian territory of Kaliningrad — the most militarized piece of land in Europe —
this relatively small ally confronts outsized threats.
Over the last several years, Russia has significantly increased the number of offensive
conventional and nuclear weapons in its Kaliningrad exclave, which shares a 185-mile border with
Lithuania. Most recently, the just completed Zapad military exercise involved up to 200,000 Russian
and Belarusian soldiers, sailors and airmen, as well as hundreds of tanks and artillery pieces first defending
against in an imaginary invasion and then simulating a counterattack into Lithuanian (and Polish) territory. Worrisomely,
the exercise may result in a permanent Russian presence in Belarus. Meanwhile, Belarus has
recently weaponized migrants, sending thousands of Iraqis and sub-Saharan Africans across the border into Lithuania
over the last year.
Much farther afield, China has opened a trade embargo against Lithuania and pulled its ambassador from Vilnius. These
moves were in response to Lithuania’s seemingly innocuous decision to allow Taiwan to open a diplomatic post in Vilnius
under the name “Taiwan” as well as Lithuania’s withdrawal from a Chinese-led effort to co-opt Central and Eastern
European countries known as 17+1. Additionally, Lithuania has been subject to extensive cyberattacks attributed to both
Russia and China.
A small but permanent American presence in Lithuania would bolster U.S. and allied security in
northeastern Europe in three ways. First , it would clearly indicate to allies and adversaries
that Lithuanian sovereignty and territorial integrity is a vital American interest.
Second , it could be utilized to fill gaps in Lithuanian defense capabilities today, particularly in terms
of anti-tank, artillery, UAVs and electronic warfare. And finally , it would provide Vilnius the confidence it
needs to invest more in advanced, offensive cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations, better
enabling it to respond to the most likely attacks from Russia and China.
The principal objections to a durable U.S. presence are that it might somehow violate the terms of a 1997 agreement
between NATO and Russia, or that it might intimidate Putin, causing a spiraling counter-reaction. Assuming a carefully
calibrated presence that’s nested within an already persistent NATO commitment to the region, these concerns are
overblown relative to the wide-ranging security benefits.
For example, under NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence initiative, Germany has led a multinational battlegroup of
roughly 1,100 troops in Lithuania since 2017. Adding a company-sized American contingent of about 120 U.S. troops to
this NATO presence as well as to similar Enhanced Forward Presence units in Latvia and Estonia could hardly be
considered destabilizing, but would go far in reassuring allies and deterring Russia.
Lithuania and its Baltic state neighbors are punching above their weight within NATO, consistently bearing more than
their share of the common defense burden. But Washington
needs to fix the holes in NATO’s
deterrent posture in the region and the glaring lack of persistent U.S. presence.
Certainty is key.
Hunter '22 [Robert E.; served as U.S. ambassador to NATO (1993-98) and on the
National Security Council staff throughout the Carter administration, first as Director of
West European Affairs and then as Director of Middle East Affairs; 3-24-2022;
Responsible Statecraft; "NATO has a serious credibility problem,"
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/03/24/natos-credibility-problem/; LASA-SC]
By extension, the failure of NATO, especially its leader , the U nited S tates, at least so far to honor
the full meaning of the “will become members” pledge is creating a deep crisis of credibility for
both NATO and the US . This is not to argue that the United States should have risked major escalation by
Biden’s not declaring at the outset of Russia’s current invasion of Ukraine that the US would not become directly involved
militarily. (He had valid reasons: both because the American people want no new wars where the United States is not itself
attacked; and Biden could see that most allies would take time to step up to the mark, even on imposing sanctions, much
less on providing military aid to Ukraine.)
But even with these plausible arguments, thoughtful European leaders are beginning to ponder
whether the US Article 5 commitment to the security of NATO countries remains
sacrosanct . Reflecting on the war in Ukraine, even though it is not formally a member of NATO, would the
United States really go to war for a European ally if the US itself were not under attack?
Doubts fostered by President Donald Trump, because of his erratic behavior toward
European security and relations with Russia, were supposedly redeemed by Biden’s becoming US
president. But now doubts are reemerging . They have several sources. Most pertinent: if Putin were
to get away with crushing Ukraine, would the three Baltic states feel safe if he moved militarily in
their direction? Everyone knows that they are militarily indefensible , like West Berlin in the Cold War. But
the “correlation of forces” and shared risks of escalation do not this time provide a basis for deterring the Russians as the
Soviet Union was deterred then. Second, if Ukraine from 2008 onward was judged to be sufficiently important
strategically to “will become” a member of NATO, what does that say for countries which, while having formal NATO
membership, have less strategic value? On the Eastern edges of NATO, only Poland has first-line strategic importance.
The European allies are dependent on the role of the U nited S tates in dealing with any challenge
from Russia: this has been clear since the late 1940s. That mostly explains why the European allies invoked NATO’s
Article 5 for the United States the day after 9/11 (Washington didn’t ask for it); and why they sent troops to Afghanistan:
primarily so that the United States would not be heavily distracted from its critical role in dealing with Russia.
No one in the Alliance has yet wondered out loud whether the US commitment to
NATO security is any longer sufficiently credible . But the analysis already exists, based on America’s failing to
understand the geopolitical folly of pressing for a MAP for Ukraine (and Georgia) in 2008 and still being committed to the
“open door” right up to the eve of this year’s war. European doubts about US credibility have also
stemmed from US emphasis on a “ pivot ” to Asia , the muddled withdrawal from
Afghanistan last year (though withdrawing itself gained approval), and what has seemed to many Europeans to
be a lower American priority for several years for relations with Europe, including in security
terms. Restoring US (and hence NATO) credibility to the level it must have is a tall order. (US credibility in
Europe is also important for East Asian allies and partners.) It has to begin at the Brussels NATO summit, beyond actions
against Russia’s invasion that focus on radical increases in military support to Ukraine, plus steps to bolster
security of exposed NATO members and an end to misleading Kyiv that Ukraine will be able to join
NATO. The alliance, and particularly the U nited S tates, must also recognize, if only sotto voce for now, how
serious the credibility problem has become and the need for it to rise to the top of the
long-term US and NATO foreign policy agenda.
Russia has resources –

a. UKRAINE.
Baron '23 [Neil; advised the Securities and Exchange Commission and congressional
staff on rating agency reform. He represented Standard & Poor’s from 1968 to 1989 and
was vice chairman and general counsel of Fitch Ratings from 1989 to 1998. He also
served on the board of Assured Guaranty for a decade; 2-16-2023; Hill; "Biden and
NATO should do what it takes to stop Putin in Ukraine,"
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3861197-biden-and-nato-should-do-
what-it-takes-to-stop-putin-in-ukraine/; Accessed 3-30-2023; LASA-SC]
While Russia’s military hardware is aging , it’s still plentiful . While Ukraine has superior materiel and
competent, motivated fighters, Russia’s expected call-up of 500,000 troops can negate those
advantages. Meanwhile the pipeline of advanced weapons to Ukraine is slowing . The U.S. won’t
send F-16 fighters or missiles and jets that can reach Russian territory.
b. MOTIVATION.
Copp '23 [Tara; senior Pentagon correspondent for Defense One; 2-16-2023; AP
NEWS; "Stop Russia now to prevent a wider conflict, Estonia warns,"
https://apnews.com/article/putin-nato-politics-lloyd-austin-estonia-
5ce15726fbd5eb34d9e083882133dc76; Accessed 3-30-2023; LASA-SC]
TALLINN, Estonia (AP) — With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine nearing the one-year mark, a top Estonian defense leader
warned that if Vladimir Putin
is not stopped now , he could entangle the region in a larger
conflict , perhaps one with even greater security implications for the U.S.
That’s because Russia has shown it will

keep trying to retake territories that were once part of
the Soviet Union and, so far, economic sanctions and its significant military losses in Ukraine have
not changed Putin’s larger goals , said Kristjan Mäe, the head of the Estonian Ministry of Defense’s
NATO and EU department, as U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited the Baltic nation on Thursday.
c. RECENT VICTORIES.
Bronk '23 [Bronk; the Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military
Sciences team at RUSI. He is also Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal; 2-
19-2023; Spectator; "The West shouldn't underestimate Russia in Ukraine,"
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-west-shouldnt-underestimate-russia-in-
ukraine/; Accessed 3-30-2023; LASA-SC]
Meanwhile, a long-running operation by Wagner mercenary troops to take the partially

encircled town of Bakhmut continues, and Russian forces are making probing attacks as far
north as the Russian border near Kharkiv oblast and as far south as Zaporizhzhia oblast.
For the moment Ukrainian defensive lines are broadly holding , and the limited
Russian successes that continue to pile pressure on the almost encircled town of Bakhmut are
coming at the cost of heavy casualties. It would be a mistake though for the West to
underestimate Russia at this stage of the war.
The keyquestion now is whether the Ukrain ian army can hold back Russia’s remaining
winter offensive without committing most of the reserve units it has been building up
since December. That will, in turn, dictate how many trained formations equipped for mobile armoured warfare will
be available for Kyiv’s own counter-offensives in spring and summer.
d. NEW TROOPS.
Bronk '23 [Bronk; the Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military
Sciences team at RUSI. He is also Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal; 2-
19-2023; Spectator; "The West shouldn't underestimate Russia in Ukraine,"
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-west-shouldnt-underestimate-russia-in-
ukraine/; Accessed 3-30-2023; LASA-SC]
Despite the large size of its population, Russia’s decision to only start mass mobilisation in
September last year means that it is currently short of usable troops. In October 2022 around
300,000 conscripts were called up by Russia. About half were sent almost straight to the frontlines to try and stem
Ukrainian advances in Kharkiv and Kherson. Those troops received very limited training, often had poor equipment, and
have spent a miserable winter on the frontlines. The influx of these conscripts did help stabilise Russia’s lines after the
retreat from Kherson, but these units are not capable of large-scale offensive action. The
other 150,000
conscripts called up last year though have been training as fresh units in Russia and
Belarus. They are now being committed to offensive action alongside the convict-bolstered mercenary forces of the
Wagner Group.
Ukraine mobilised around 700,000 people in February last year when it was attacked but
has only been able to field fewer than half that number as usable troops due to equipment and ammunition limitations.
But, thanks to sustained Western support – particularly in terms of artillery and the vast quantities of ammunition and
spare barrels required to use it effectively – Ukrainecurrently has an edge in terms of firepower over
Russia in key areas. Meanwhile, Russian industrial production was only recently put onto a
war footing, so after massive artillery usage over the past year, Russian forces are now suffering from serious
ammunition shortages. In the short term it is, therefore, likely to work to Ukraine’s advantage if Russian forces keep
attacking, because the attacking force almost always has significantly heavier casualties especially in the relatively static,
artillery dominated warfare that currently characterises the fighting in the Donbas.
Unfortunately though, Ukraine is unlikely to be able to simply bleed Russia dry or

force it to retreat through an attrition-based strategy in the medium or long term. The war is now seen as
existential by President Putin and his immediate security elite. After over a year of intensive propaganda, they
have deliberately reframed their ill-judged and unprovoked invasion as a generation-defining confrontation with the West.
This is, after all, the only way they can attempt to justify the huge casualties, overt military aggression, political isolation
and economic hardship involved to the Russian people. Russia’s
leadership is settling down for a long
grinding war and has already primed its population to accept huge casualties
and costs . Furthermore, Moscow’s political demands for any ceasefire have increased, rather than decreased, despite
its setbacks on the battlefield.
While the Russian army has taken appalling casualties and suffered three major retreats since
February last year, it is still fighting and still slowly taking ground back . Well publicised
problems with poor equipment and training for conscripts hide the broader picture of
rearmament at scale and a Russian army that is unfortunately learning and adapting , despite
the force’s dysfunctional structure.
It makes nuclear escalation likely.

Aslan ‘22 [Murat; graduated from the War College in 1991 and assumed varying tasks
in the Turkish Armed Forces. Aslan holds a PhD in International Relations from the
Middle Eastern Technical University. His areas of interest cover intelligence,
propaganda, defence, and security studies; 3-18-2022; "The Urge to Kill to Survive:
Russia’s Imperialist Expansionism Explained," https://politicstoday.org/russia-putin-
imperialist-expansionism-ukraine-war/; LASA-SC]
Russian Nuclear Threat
Putin’s order to activate the Strategic Nuclear Forces escalated the military and political tension with the West. Russia
regularly updated its nuclear doctrine after 1993 so as to be able to use nuclear weapons
if it was not the first to do so. In this sense, Russia challenged the concepts of deterrence and mutually assured
destruction (MAD) for atomic warfare. The reason for such a preference would be the following.
Russia knows that its conventional military inventory is aged and cannot win a a full-
scale traditional war despite its numeric superiority. Modern warfare, including proxy, hybrid, and
asymmetric, defy the Russian conventional capabilities, but the West, or NATO, may hesitate to respond
to a nuclear threat.
Nuclear warfare includes tactical and operational assets other than strategic assets. The
slow pace of the Russian advance may need a tactical nuclear attack to create a gap in the
defense lines of the weaker but stubborn Ukrainian forces. Urban warfare is costly for
the Russian conventional forces.
Extinction.
Farquhar et al. '17 [Sebastian; research scientist at Deep Mind; John Halstead;
professor at the University of New Hampshire; Owen Cotton-Barratt; PhD in Pure
Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford and Research Associate at the
Future of Humanity Institute; Stefan Schubert; researcher at the Centre for Philosophy
of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science; Haydn
Belfield; Research Associate and Academic Project Manager at the University of
Cambridge's Centre for the Study of Existential Risk; Andrew Snyder-Beattie;
Department of Mathematics at the University of Mary Washington; Global Priorities
Project; "Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance," https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf; LASA-SC]
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons.
However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the U nited S tates and Russia, despite horrific
casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct
effects of the blast , fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse : the burning
of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which
would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss , and agricultural disruption – a
nuclear winter .
According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global
temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years .
This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very
precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be
great . An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who
have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons , with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each,
although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war
involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion
people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic .13 Wars on this scale
are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction , but this does suggest that conflicts which are
around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large
uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic
research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to
cope and adapt, would have high returns.
It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear
war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the
most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the
relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly
greater from a conflict between the U nited S tates and Russia. Tensions between these countries
have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.
Deterrence works.
Snegovaya et al. '22 [Maria; a postdoctoral fellow in political science at Virginia
Tech; Brian Whitmore; a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia
Center; 7-8-2022; Foreign Policy; "Vladimir Putin Often Backs Down,"
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/08/vladimir-putin-backs-down-russia-ukraine/;
Accessed 3-30-2023; LASA-SC]
problem with the assumption that Putin never backs down. It’s
There is just one
incorrect —part of the myth-making that the Russian president has successfully
constructed around himself and has been all-too-easily swallowed by many Western politicians. Contrary to the
commonly held belief, when faced with strength and resolve , Putin often backs down instead
of responding with more escalatory steps.
One stark example of this came in November 2015 when Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 fighter jet
near the Turkey-Syria border. At the time, there were widespread fears that this could escalate into a direct
conflict between Russia and a NATO member. Instead, Putin’s response was mild . Moscow imposed
insignificant trade sanctions on Turkish imports and suspended Russian package tours to Turkey. And even those small
measures were lifted several months later after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent an apology to the Kremlin.
Several recent clashes between Russia and Turkey also took place in Libya , where Erdogan and Putin backed
opposing sides in a protracted civil war. For example, Turkish forces attacked the strategic military base of al-Watiya in
2020, where mercenaries of the Russian Wagner Group were based, forcing them to flee and leave their equipment and
weapons behind. One Russian mercenary was allegedly captured. Losing al-Watiya was a key step in the Libyan National
Army (LNA)/Wagner retreat. It meant that taking Tripoli by force was no longer feasible, at least as long as the Turks were
present. As result of that defeat, the Wagner Group retreated to the positions it held before the Tripoli campaign. The LNA
has not made another attempt to advance on Tripoli since.
Several direct clashes also took place between the U.S. military and Russia- backed
Wagner forces that did not provoke a serious escalation from Putin. For example, a 2018 U.S.
airstrike in northern Syria killed several Russian Wagner mercenaries. Around the same time, a direct clash between
Russian mercenaries and U.S. troops took place in the Battle of Khasham in February 2018, which had a number of
Russian military contractors (also linked to the Wagner Group) killed. Not
only did Putin not retaliate, but
there wasn’t even a rhetorical response from the Kremlin. Despite his bluster about
confronting the U nited S tates, when it actually came to deadly conflict between Russian and U.S.
forces, there was barely a hint of a rhetorical response from Putin.
The most recent evidence on the ground in Ukraine also goes against the persistence of a perpetually resolute Putin. When
realizing the catastrophic failure of the initial ambitious goal of regime change in Ukraine, the Kremlin revised its plans
and adopted much less ambitious goals. Instead of escalating and doubling down, the Kremlin announced a much
humbler objective of “concentrating” its “main efforts” on “liberating” the Donbas. It’s an easy way to declare victory; just
change what you claim winning is.
When faced with strong enough resistance , Putin has even backed down in Russian
domestic politics, where his dominance is nearly absolute. The most famous example came in 2005 when Putin attempted
to replace benefits like free public transportation and subsidies for housing and prescription drugs for senior citizens with
monthly cash payments. When faced with mass protests over the move, Putin quickly backed down. A more recent
example is one of Russian journalist Ivan Golunov, who was accused of drug offenses but was subsequently released
following an outbreak of public protests in Moscow in 2019. The release of the journalist allegedly took place when, in the
aftermath of the protests, Putin was briefed on the case and gave his permission to “resolve” it.
The widespreadassumption that Putin never backs down is, therefore, simply wrong . The
misguided belief often pushed by Putin’s stooges has led to Western leadership self-deterring
and backing down when faced with Russian aggression. The most glaring example of this came in
2014 when the United States, fearing Russian escalation, advised Ukraine not to resist the annexation of Crimea. Putin’s
persistent implicit threats of nuclear escalation are expressly designed to leverage Western fears of the war in Ukraine
from metastasizing. Such fears have done damage, delaying the delivery of offensive weapons to Ukraine.
AND is crucial.
Aslan '22 [Murat; graduated from the War College in 1991 and assumed varying tasks
in the Turkish Armed Forces. Aslan holds a PhD in International Relations from the
Middle Eastern Technical University. His areas of interest cover intelligence,
propaganda, defence, and security studies. Dr. Aslan is currently a faculty member of
Hasan Kalyoncu University and Researcher in Security Studies Directorate at SETA
Foundation; 3-18-2022; Politics Today ; "The Urge to Kill to Survive: Russia’s
Imperialist Expansionism Explained," https://politicstoday.org/russia-putin-
imperialist-expansionism-ukraine-war/; Accessed 3-31-2023; LASA-SC]
Russian political thinking praises Russian pride, but it is also concerned with survival .
Russia needs a story to keep its continent-sized territory functioning and to make its multiethnic
yet Russified demography resilient. The danger for the Russian leadership is to experience a further retreat that could
make Russia a loose state on the path of collapse. Such a concern makes Putin more assertive and expansionist, mainly
across Russia’s perceived sphere of influence.
For instance, Russia gained leverage after the Second Karabakh War by asserting its military presence at the heart of
Karabakh for an extendable five-year period. The Kazakhstan stalemate at the beginning of 2022 presented another
chance where Russia intervened in the Central Asian states in order to maintain stability. Furthermore, these regions have
energy reserves satisfying the appetite of energy seekers as Russia indirectly prepared itself to challenge the energy
demand of the broader globe.
Putin’s statements indicate a “ nationalist imperialism ,” which could have

destructive consequences for regional and global orders —let alone Russia itself. Putin’s
inclination is nationalist since Russia is at the core of his argument. On the other hand, nationalism in Russian thinking
carries the risks of provoking ultranationalism or Slavophobia once a success story is concluded by tangible gains.
The revisionism and irredentism of Russia reveal the limits of expansion over the borders of
former USSR states, with minor alterations. The first group of states are the ones that became NATO members
after 1997, that were once the former “Allies of the Soviet Union” and that proceeded with their democratic transition.
The second group are still struggling for a stable regime, like Belarus. Russia coerces these countries to have pro-Russian
regimes. The final group are countries squeezed between NATO and Russia, and not yet NATO member states, mainly
Ukraine and Georgia.
Putin has employed strategies to destabilize these states through smart moves, which rest on five political and military
strategies. Russia successfully achieves these strategies by being more discreet in terms of international law, at least, until
the aggression against Ukraine, and exploiting strategic gaps and vulnerabilities in those countries.
First, Russia
does not hesitate to intervene militarily and support a pro-Russian
regime through political and military means, such as the case of Syria .
Second, Russian
p rivate m ilitary c ompanie s such as the Wagner Group are sent to war
zones to support pro-Russian figures such as Khalifa Haftar of Libya and attempt to encircle NATO
for strategic leverage such as the Russian military presence in Africa.
Third, mediation has become a primary effort to obtain political and military initiative ,
as was the case in the Karabakh war and Syria .
Fourth, the Collective Security Treaty Organization has become the platform to
inject Russian interests and military presence.
Last, Russia
has kept third parties silent through defense sales and military cooperation
such as the cases of China , India , and Egypt .
Plan – 1AC
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially
increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization in the area of cyber defense regarding private
security contractors.
Solvency – 1AC
Contention three is SOLVENCY.
The plan solves.

NATO can lead the way for cyber-security contracting by considering the risks
associated with blurred lines between private contractors (non-combatants) and
military personnel (combatants) engaging in offensive operations. The following recommendations are based
on the assumption that once implemented into NATO’s cyber defence policy, all of its member states would independently
adopt and implement these recommendations into their own national cyber strategies.
NATO should develop a classification protocol for cyber-security contracts that

delineates the roles and functions of contracted private security companies, as related to
the responsibility of the contracted firm(s), NATO and its member states.
 The N orth A tlantic C ouncil could create this protocol to classify cyber-security operations into
four categories: offensive operations, defensive operations, defensive support and IT support (see Figure 2).
Offensive operations should only be carried out by those considered combatants within the military, while
defensive and support operations can be carried out by either military or civilian units. To eliminate the
dual-use ambiguities, PSCs and their employees should be operationally defined as
noncombatants . This scale should clearly define which employees, companies and NATO units should
be afforded appropriate protections, in addition to clear accountability in reference to their status under
international law as combatants or non-combatants, and as military or civilian objects.
NATO should submit all cyber-security contracts to a third-party monitoring and verification
organization for review and assessment of the adherence to the classification protocol.
 There should be an oversight mechanism that involves a third-party

international organization , ensuring all NATO’s cyber-security contracts adhere to the
classification protocol. This organization would receive, review and assess the development and
implementation of cyber-security contracts, ensuring they were fair, well defined and consistent. It would have
the ability to strongly encourage NATO to reassess the classification parameters of a contract. If NATO chooses
not to assent to such a recommendation, the organization could publicize its concerns.
 The United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has experience in oversight, transparency and
confidence-building mechanisms for international security and armed conflict. The UNODA has done research
on creating dialogue on the norms, rules, principles and responsible behaviour of states for their actions in
cyberspace. It works to develop possible cooperative measures to address and examine the existing and
potential threats in cyberspace, and is an example of a possible third-party organization (UNODA 2013).
 The costs associated with establishing a new thirdparty international oversight organization would be
significant. Utilizing
a previously established oversight mechanism saves time and
resources , as well as increasing greater cooperation across
intergovernmental organizations. Oversight mechanisms are often not factored into defence
contracting, so NATO
should define the costs of oversight within the contract,
appropriately balanced between itself and the contracted company .

Consensus is easy and the plan spills out.

Skaluba et al. '22 [Christopher; expert lecturer and writer on international
relations, national security, and defense policy; Conor Rodihan; Scowcroft Center for
Strategy and Security; 1-18-2022; Atlantic Council; "No consensus? No problem. Why
NATO is still effective.," https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/no-
consensus-no-problem-why-nato-is-still-effective/; LASA-SC]
First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue
is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any
democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it’s astounding how often NATO
does reach consensus about issues big and small, creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will. The
opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously
into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda.
Second, a belief that NATO’s value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane
(and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its abilityto build a
common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of
consultation and information sharing , buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence
sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is
to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront
them is immensely valuable in its own right.
Third, these habitsof cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the
Alliance’s frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its missions in the Baltic
states—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form
separate coalitions for action . This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State.
Such flexibility should be a point in NATO’s favor, not evidence of its ineptitude.
In the case of military support for Ukraine, policymakers will find more attractive alternatives for
dealing with Moscow’s aggression outside of the auspices of the Alliance. Up to and including its recent dialogue
with Russia, it has taken a host of consensus actions to support Ukraine —from condemning Kremlin
aggression and standing up for Kyiv politically to reaffirming its open-door policy with an expectation that Ukraine will
eventually become a member. It might even share intelligence and develop training and advisory programs for the
Ukrainian military.
NATO is inevitable.
Savage ‘17 [Pat; Master’s Student in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown
University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. His concentration is in U.S.
National Security Policy, and his research focuses primarily on Russia, Eastern and
Central Europe, and the former-Soviet Union; 3-14-2017; Georgetown Security Studies
Review; "NATO Without America: A Grim Prognosis,"
https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2017/03/14/nato-without-america-a-
grim-prognosis/, sac]
Statements made by candidate and now-President Donald Trump on the US commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) have caused much consternation throughout the alliance over the past year.
President Trump has previously suggested that US support for NATO should be conditional on
nations paying their fair share, with former-President Obama assuring the world after the election that Mr.
Trump would be fully committed to the alliance.[i] Since taking office, President Trump has vacillated on support for
NATO. He contradicted Defense Secretary James Mattis by stating NATO is obsolete, but then made an about-face to
declare support for the alliance.[ii] NATO has
weathered its share of crises over its nearly 70
years of existence. While unlikely in the short term, it is worth considering whether the
alliance could survive without the unconditional backing of the U nited S tates given President Trump’s
unclear intentions.
On paper, NATO has the potential to be viable as a collective security organization without the United
States. Remove the U nited S tates from the equation and NATO retains 27 member states with nearly
600 million people[iii] and a combined nominal GDP of almost $ 20 trillion .[iv] This should be more than
adequate to build a self-sufficient military infrastructure. A majority of NATO’s members are also
deeply connected both politically and economically through the European Union.[v] In the long term, a NATO without the
However , these rosy structural facts belie a more
United States may not only be feasible, but desirable.
troublingly reality in NATO’s immediate future.
When looking at NATO’s short-term viability, the picture is far less positive without the substantial
commitment of the United States. The most obvious item of concern if the US were to leave or moderate its
commitment to NATO in the short term would be sheer manpower . In 2016, the alliance had a
combined troop strength of around 3.1 million active duty personnel. Without the United States, that
immediately drops by nearly half to somewhere below 1.9 million personnel.[vi] This ignores
thousands of pieces of military equipment that would no longer support NATO, including
armored vehicles, aircraft, and ships. Granted, Russia—the most prominent threat to NATO—has
significantly cut down its active duty forces in recent years, estimated at just over 900,000 active duty personnel in 2016.
[vii] However, the exact number of reservists Russia has at its disposal is unknown, and could be
anywhere from 2 to 20 million personnel depending on the scale of a call up.[viii] While NATO forces may have
an advantage in training, equipment, and organization, past a certain point quantity surpasses quality. Russia
has also been increasing efforts to update its military arsenal , purchasing new weapons and
equipment to close that gap as well.[ix]
The more important question, however, may be who would assume the burden of leadership for the
alliance in the absence of the United States. Among the most influential of NATO’s members, there is no
obvious candidate to take the lead if the United States were to step aside, and all the
obvious candidates face their own significant political issues at home and abroad. The United Kingdom’s
relationship with continental Europe has been strained in the aftermath of its vote to leave the EU. Its
relationship will be further tested in the months and years to come as that process plays out.[x] Germany’s President-
elect, former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has broken with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s governing
coalition with a more conciliatory tone towards Russia . He has criticized NATO policies on
sanctions and military exercises.[xi] Meanwhile, France remains in a constant state of high alert
following a string of terrorist attacks over the past several years—a threat it is not alone in facing—with new plots
being uncovered and thwarted in February and troops remaining deployed on the streets.[xii]
These existing political issues are aggravated by the fact that the UK, Germany, and France all face populist or nationalist
surges in their domestic politics, a trend seen across Europe. The UK Independence Party played an instrumental role in
Britain’s decision to leave the EU. National Front candidate Marine Le Pen is highly likely to make it to the second round
of the French presidential election this year. The Alternative for Germany party of Frauke Petry and Jorg Meuthen seems
poised to gain its first seats in the Bundestag following elections this fall. Among a laundry list of controversial policy
positions, these parties have tended to either have highly critical views of NATO, close ties to Russia, or both.[xiii] While
the United States is obviously not without its own domestic political issues, the relative size, power, and strength of its
institutions all put it in a better position to simultaneously deal with such issues and wrangle NATO at the same time. It is
questionable if Britain , France , or Germany would be able to do the same if the
mantle of leadership fell upon them.
If the United States were to leave NATO in the next four years, even if the alliance were not to
collapse immediately, the ensuring vacuum would call into question its short-term
survivability . But even if President Trump does not truly plan to leave NATO, the longer the doubt over
continued US participation, the greater damage this uncertainty creates. It encourages
political forces within member states not consistent with NATO’s values and it may
encourage potential adversaries to undertake provocative and aggressive actions. It is
critical that President Trump be more consistent and clear in voicing his desire to remain in
the alliance, and frame whatever criticisms he has of NATO—which are not baseless—in the context of improving
the alliance. It is also critically important that the President strive to set a better domestic political example for NATO
allies as they face increasing levels of political instability and uncertainty of their own. More than his own approval ratings
may be riding on his ability to be a unifying political figure.
Nuclear scenario planning is good – it’s not fear it’s proactivity.

Pelopidas '17 [Benoît; junior chair of excellence in security studies at Sciences Po.
He is also an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at
Stanford University; 5-30-2017; Cambridge Core; "The unbearable lightness of luck:
Three sources of overconfidence in the manageability of nuclear crises,"
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-
security/article/unbearable-lightness-of-luck-three-sources-of-overconfidence-in-the-
manageability-of-nuclear-crises/BDE95895C04E7E7988D15DB4F217D1E4; LASA-SC]
Full awareness of the limits of knowledge of and control over nuclear weapons is crucial
for historical accuracy, for nuclear learning, and as a starting for a fruitful nuclear weapons policy
debate that would include strategic , ethical, and political concerns .
This awareness is all the more important as overconfidence has been shown to be a
cause of increased danger . Therefore, learning from the Cuban Missile Crisis is essential given
that, over the last thirty years, analysts have discovered and confirmed that it was one of the most dangerous events in the
history of the nuclear age, the peaceful outcome of which was partly due to luck, and that in the preceding three decades
they had been overconfident in the ability of good management to explain its peaceful outcome. In order to understand the
construction of such overconfidence, I have accepted the idea that learning occurred mostly at the national level and
focused on the French case, in comparative perspective. I have first shown how those scholarly findings have not been
adequately refuted and argued that those who do not take these elements seriously have done so via epistemological or
practical inconsistencies. The rejection of counterfactual thinking as a legitimate scholarly practice is another way of
rendering these findings invisible without having to refute them. Finally, I have used the French example to show that an
experience and official memory of the Crisis that is not based on fear does over time fuel
overconfidence in the safety, controllability, and predictability of nuclear crises.
American and British elites and populations did not grasp the full extent of the dangers at the
time but, unlike the French, they certainly experienced fear. These ideational and disciplinary factors would
be sufficient to prevent the problem from emerging as an issue of public concern in France; they also call for
responsible nuclear scholarship to address them without waiting for structural or
policy change . This opens up three avenues for research.
First, social
scientists cannot let Fidel Castro take the unbearable lightness of luck with him to
the grave. Following from the efforts of cognitive psychologists to uncover our tendencies to deny luck
retrospectively, further exploration of the politics of luck and how the distinction between risk and uncertainty (as
uncontrollability and unknowability even of the boundaries of the possible) has been blurred would be a first critical step
towards a reconceptualisation of nuclear controllability, a reconceptualisation that would place luck at the heart of
political and ethical action, power and responsibility over time.Footnote 126 At the empirical level, this approach
would involve treating the question of ‘ how
close did we come to nuclear disaster ’ as a
starting point, and focusing on pathways towards disasters rather than patterns identified in
the past and expected to bind possible futures.
Second, cases of near-nuclear use need to be requalified as events worth investigating .Footnote 127
Diplomatic historians and security studies scholars could fruitfully join forces independently of their views on the value of
counterfactuals. Indeed, we need further investigations into the history of nuclear-armed states both to unearth primary
documentation about the past security and safety record of nuclear arsenals and to allow for rigorous counterfactual
thinking, going beyond risk thinking.Footnote 128 Comparative critical oral histories of nuclear close calls would likewise
help recover the limits of control over nuclear weapons as a legitimate object of scholarly interest. Such an approach
would also tackle directly the scholarly problem of uncritical reliance on accounts from former officials, while at the same
time addressing the policy problems that result from misguided assumptions of a shared experience and interpretation of
events like the Crisis.Footnote 129 The empirical dimension of this article is only a first step in this direction.Footnote 130
Thisresearch programme allows analysts to start working against overconfidence
without waiting for structural or institutional reforms and suggests that they have a
responsibility to do so.
Third, in security studies , it is crucial to reassert the socially and historically constructed
process of valuation of nuclear weapons instead of perpetuating the widespread assumption that
the destructive capability of nuclear weapons triggers adequate fear, which in turn initiates a
learning process that is sufficient for existential deterrence to work everywhere. If the
relevant French decision-makers were indeed adequately afraid at the time but did not leave any evidence of it, the
contentions of this article would remain valid: that absence of evidence would only be additional evidence of the scholarly
blinders entailed by a rejection of counterfactual thinking; in any case, and whatever the unspoken thoughts of decision-
makers at the time, their public display of fearlessness would be consequential for future generations of leaders. Evidence
of private doubts on the part of statesmen would only bring to the fore the need to reconnect nuclear weapons scholarship
with democratic theorising and the issue of citizens’ right to know. Identifying the effects of rejecting counterfactual
nuclear danger as components of a
thinking and documenting the diverse experiences and memorialisations of
process of valuation of nuclear weapons are ways to understand and counter overconfidence in their
controllability. This is crucial for policy-relevant learning because the coexistence of this diversity of
memories with the retrospective illusions of unanimity and control gives an unsettling resonance to Peter Sloterdijk’s
claim: ‘the only catastrophe that seems clear to all is the catastrophe which no one survives’.Footnote 131

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1AC – Contractors Aff – LASA

Rising cyberattacks mean NATO is increasing cooperation with

The plan ensures accountability in accordance with

Due to the speed of attacks in cyberspace, there

Lack of regulation ensures escalation.

Historically , however, privateers were hard to control. They regularly overstepped

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of

Allies say yes.

This demonstrates international support for the encompassed standards of the

As the prevalence of state dependence on cyber technology increases globally, internationally

It’s NC3A’s responsibility. That’s a NATO AGENCY, NOT a member

Despite Ukraine, US-NATO relations remain volatile.

looming anxiety among European allies hasn’t gone away. Even

The plans signal of consultation and PMC framework prevents

Differing standards destroy deterrence.

By multi-national forces stationed in a host nation, different military regulations regarding

That threatens cooperation.

Durable US commitment is crucial.

The United States and allies should build

Uncertain perceptions deck effective deterrence.

perception is reality , and the lack of an enduring American presence in the

Russia has resources –

That’s because Russia has shown it will

Meanwhile, a long-running operation by Wagner mercenary troops to take the partially

Unfortunately though, Ukraine is unlikely to be able to simply bleed Russia dry or

It makes nuclear escalation likely.

Russian Nuclear Threat

Putin’s statements indicate a “ nationalist imperialism ,” which could have

The plan solves.

NATO should develop a classification protocol for cyber-security contracts that

 There should be an oversight mechanism that involves a third-party

Consensus is easy and the plan spills out.

Nuclear scenario planning is good – it’s not fear it’s proactivity.

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