FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1433. February 21, 2003]

TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO G. SUPNET, in

his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasay City, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner Tomas R. Leonidas charges respondent Judge Francisco G.

Supnet of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 47, with gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice, for citing petitioner in contempt
of court.

The Facts

On April 13, 1998, Union Bank of the Philippines (“Union Bank” for brevity),
with petitioner Atty. Tomas R. Leonidas (“petitioner” for brevity) as counsel, filed
a complaint against the spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza Tamondong
(“Tamondong Spouses” for brevity) to collect the latter’s unpaid loan secured
from Union Bank to buy a motor vehicle. Union Bank prayed for the issuance of
a writ of replevin. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717 before
Branch 109 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (“Pasay RTC” for brevity).
On June 29, 1998, for lack of interest to prosecute, the Pasay RTC
dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Thereafter, Union Bank filed a motion
for reconsideration. On September 11, 1998, the Pasay RTC reinstated the
case. Because Union Bank did not take any steps to prosecute the case, on
June 23, 1999, the Pasay RTC issued an order dismissing again the case. 1[1]

On March 15, 2000, Union Bank, with petitioner again as counsel, filed
against the Tamondong Spouses another complaint to collect the same unpaid

1 [1]
Rollo, p. 8.
loan with a prayer for a writ of replevin. This case, docketed as Civil Case No.
342-00, was filed with Branch 47 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City
(“Pasay MTC” for brevity) presided by respondent Judge Francisco G. Supnet
(“respondent judge” for brevity). On March 29, 2000, the Pasay MTC issued a
writ of replevin.
On April 12, 2000, the Tamondong Spouses, in response to Union Bank’s
action, filed a pleading captioned “Urgent Motions” wherein they prayed for the
following reliefs: (1) to dismiss the case docketed as Civil Case No. 342-00; (2) to
set aside the writ of replevin; (3) to order the immediate return of the replevied
vehicle and (4) to cite Union Bank and its counsel for contempt of court for forum
shopping and for misleading the court.
In an Order dated May 9, 2000, the Pasay MTC promptly acted on the
Tamondong Spouses’ Urgent Motions. The Pasay MTC dismissed Civil Case
No. 342-00, recalled the order of the writ of replevin, and ordered Union Bank
to return immediately the motor vehicle to the Tamondong Spouses.
Moreover, for violating the rule against forum shopping and for making a false
certification against forum shopping, the Pasay MTC cited Union Bank, its
2[2]

collection officer Desi Tomas and petitioner in contempt of court. The Pasay
MTC ordered each of them to pay a fine of P5,000.00 without prejudice to civil,
criminal or administrative actions. This is the first of two contempt orders issued
by respondent judge in Civil Case No. 342-00.
On May 16, 2000, Union Bank filed a motion to reconsider the Pasay MTC’s
Order of May 9, 2000. Pending resolution of this motion, on June 5, 2000, Union
Bank filed a notice of dismissal under Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. In its Order of June 6, 2000, the Pasay MTC denied the motion
for reconsideration but made no mention of Union Bank’s notice of dismissal.
Moreover, in its Order of June 6, 2000, the Pasay MTC ordered Union Bank
to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for failing to return
the vehicle of the Tamondong Spouses as earlier directed by the court.
However, in its Compliance dated June 20, 2000, Union Bank questioned the
manner in which the Tamondong Spouses commenced the contempt charge for
it supposedly did not conform to the proper procedure. Admitting that it ignored
the Order of May 9, 2000, Union Bank explained that a provision in the chattel
mortgage contract granted Union Bank the right to take possession of the motor
vehicle upon breach of the obligation. Union Bank prayed that the Tamondong
3[3]

Spouses’ motion dated May 17, 2000 to cite the bank in contempt be denied due
course and dismissed.
On July 20, 2000, the Pasay MTC issued a writ of execution to enforce
payment of the original contempt fine imposed upon Union Bank’s collection
officer Tomas and petitioner. The Pasay MTC also ordered Union Bank again to
immediately return the replevied motor vehicle. For Union Bank’s failure to

2 [2]
Ibid., p. 24.
3 [3]
Ibid., p. 32.
comply with its Order of May 9, 2000, the Pasay MTC again cited collection
officer Tomas and petitioner in contempt and ordered them to pay another fine of
P5,000.00 each. This is the second contempt order issued by respondent judge.
On August 1, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
of July 20, 2000 which included the second contempt order. Petitioner also
prayed that the notice of dismissal Union Bank earlier filed on June 6, 2000 be
confirmed and all orders issued in the case be set aside. 4[4]

On September 7, 2000, the Pasay MTC denied the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration of the Order of July 20, 2000. The Pasay MTC stated that the
motion was without merit because there was deliberate and willful failure by
collection officer Tomas and petitioner to comply with the May 9, 2000 Order
which ordered the return of the replevied vehicle.
Hence, petitioner filed the present administrative case for gross ignorance of
the law, grave abuse of authority, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice. Petitioner states that respondent judge cited him
in contempt for refusing to return the replevied motor vehicle to the Tamondong
Spouses. Petitioner, however, claims that it was erroneous for respondent judge
to have done so since the Order of May 9, 2000 was addressed to Union Bank
alone. The May 9, 2000 Order did not direct petitioner, but rather Union Bank
alone, to return the replevied vehicle.
Petitioner further maintains that he should not be held responsible for
submitting a false certificate against forum shopping for the simple reason that he
did not sign the certification. As gleaned from the pleadings, it is Union Bank
5[5]

collection officer Tomas whose signature appears on the certification against

forum shopping. 6[6]

Petitioner also accuses respondent judge of ignoring the procedure that must
first be observed before citing one in indirect contempt, invoking Section 4, Rule
71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that the contempt
7[7]

4 [4]
Ibid., p. 43.
5 [5]
Ibid., p. 6.
6 [6]
Ibid., p. 14.
7 [7]
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order
or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges
arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided
separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis supplied)
charge initiated by the Tamondong Spouses did not comply with the
requirements prescribed in Section 4. Therefore, by giving due course to these
motions, respondent judge improperly issued his contempt order. For
respondent judge’s error, petitioner prays for nothing less than his dismissal from
the service and the forfeiture of all privileges appurtenant to his office. 8[8]

In his Comment filed on January 10, 2001, respondent judge insists that he
9[9]

duly observed the procedural requirements for declaring petitioner in indirect

contempt. Respondent judge even gave a chronological account of the
proceedings that took place prior to the issuance of the contempt order. He
points out that judges are not infallible and cites that the Court has ruled that to
hold a judge accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision would be nothing
short of harassment and would make his job unbearable. Averring that he
10[10]

faithfully conformed to the procedure laid down by the law, respondent judge
implores the Court to dismiss the administrative case filed against him.

OCA’s Report and Recommendation

The Office of the Court Administrator (“OCA” for brevity) opined that
respondent judge was correct in stating that the petitioner should have appealed
the Pasay RTC’s orders of dismissal instead of filing the case before the Pasay
MTC. The OCA’s primary concern is the procedure adopted by respondent
judge in issuing the contested orders.
On the first order which declared petitioner in direct contempt of court, the
OCA found no reason to hold respondent judge administratively liable. Although
the wording of the dispositive portion of the order is imprecise, the order clearly
sought to punish two acts. The first act being punished is the violation of the rule
against forum shopping, and the second act is the submission of a false
certificate against forum shopping. Respondent judge cited petitioner in
contempt for the first act, that is, for filing Civil Case No. 342-00, which was
exactly the same case as Civil Case No. 98-0717 which the Pasay RTC had
already dismissed. Thus, the OCA opined that petitioner’s act constitutes direct
contempt which respondent judge may punish summarily pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 11[11]

8 [8]
Rollo, p. 7.
9 [9]
Ibid., pp. 58-63.
10
Flores v. Sumaljag, 290 SCRA 569 (1998) citing Arcenio v. Pagorogon, 224 SCRA 246
[10]

(1993).
11
SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. --- A person guilty of misbehavior in the
[11]

presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the

same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court
and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
 It is on the second order declaring petitioner guilty of indirect contempt that
the OCA found respondent judge remiss in his duties.
Unlike the first contempt, the second contempt is governed by Section 4,
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that proceedings
for indirect contempt must be initiated either motu proprio by the court, or by
verified petition. Here, petitioner clearly committed an act constituting indirect
12[12]

contempt. However, the OCA found that the Tamondong Spouses initiated the
contempt proceedings by mere motion, and not by a verified petition as required
by the Rules. The OCA stated that respondent judge took cognizance of the
13[13]

contempt action through the Tamondong Spouses’ Urgent Motions and Motion 14[14]

to Cite Plaintiff For Contempt of Court, neither of which were verified petitions.
15[15]

Therefore, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge Francisco G.

Supnet be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law with a
warning that a similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts the conclusions and recommendation of the Court

Administrator but disagrees with its findings as to how the second contempt
proceeding was initiated.
Courts are vested with the power to penalize a party for filing an action
raising the same basic issues as one still pending or already disposed of which
the same party has filed in another court. Such an act is deemed an abuse of
the processes of the court. To curb and punish such abuses, courts are vested
with the power to declare the guilty party in contempt. A counsel who
participates in such abuse of court processes can also be held in contempt. The
contempt power is a means by which the court exercises its authority over those
within its jurisdiction, as well as enables the court to enforce its decisions
effectively.

exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day or both, if it be
a lower court.
12
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. --- Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
[12]

initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order
or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, xxx (Emphasis supplied)
13 [13]
Rollo, p. 5.
14 [14]
Ibid., p. 18.
15 [15]
Ibid., p. 48, Annex “N”.
 The rule is well-settled that a court should be informed of the pendency of a
similar proceeding a party has filed. The responsibility cannot be taken lightly
because of the harsh penalties the law prescribes for non-compliance. As
provided in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, failure to comply with the
16[16]

requirements prescribed in Section 5 may cause one to be declared in indirect

contempt of court. Moreover, if the non-compliance is willful and deliberate, then
such person may even be declared guilty of direct contempt of court.
Neither Union Bank nor petitioner as its counsel bothered to inform the
Pasay MTC that the Pasay RTC had previously dismissed a case of the same
nature and involving the same parties. The Tamondong Spouses were the ones
who brought it to the attention of the Pasay MTC.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court specifically mandates that either
the “plaintiff or principal party filing the initiatory pleading” must disclose to
the court the pendency of another proceeding concerning the same case.
Obviously, since Union Bank initiated the case, it was its duty to make such
disclosure. In this case, Union Bank failed to discharge such obligation – an
action tantamount to contempt of court.
Moreover, petitioner argues that respondent judge’s order citing him in
contempt for executing a false certification against forum shopping is erroneous.
Petitioner claims that it was Union Bank’s collection officer Tomas who signed
the certificate. Petitioner argues that the certification should be signed by a
Union Bank officer and not by counsel. A certification by counsel is a defective
certification and is clearly equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement in

16
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. --- The plaintiff or principal party shall
[16]

certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief,
or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42, 17[17]
in relation to Section 4, Rule 45, 18

warranting the dismissal of the petition.

[18] 19[19]

As stated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, “if the acts of the party
or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.” This shows
that even if the petitioner did not sign the certification, if from the circumstances
one can infer a willful and deliberate attempt to mislead the courts, he can still be
held in direct contempt.
Both Union Bank and petitioner were aware of the consequences that came
with the submission of a false certification. Strangely, Union Bank collection
officer Tomas signed the certification against forum shopping – an act which is
normally outside the scope of her assigned tasks. The execution of such
certification is a rather serious responsibility assigned to a member of the bank’s
Board of Directors or one of its higher-ranking officers. Normally, a collection
20[20]

officer is not privy to legal matters of the corporation, and for the corporation to
hide behind a person who is without such knowledge arouses one’s suspicions.
The reason for requiring the plaintiff himself to sign the certification is that only
the plaintiff has actual knowledge of whether he has initiated similar actions or
proceedings in different courts or agencies. In the case of a corporation, a
21[21]

duly authorized Board member or a senior ranking officer must sign the
certification. A mere collection officer is not expected to know the court cases in
which the corporation is a party litigant.
Thus, the first order issued by respondent judge declaring petitioner in direct
contempt was issued to punish his act of forum shopping as well as for his
participation in the submission of a false certification against forum shopping.
The order of respondent judge suffers no legal defect contrary to the stance
taken by petitioner.
On the second order which declared petitioner in indirect contempt of court,
respondent judge also followed the correct procedure.

17
SEC. 2. xxx the petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification
[17]

under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status thereof, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the
aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
18
SEC. 4. Contents of petition. --- The petition shall xxx contain a sworn certification
[18]

against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42.
19 [19]
Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals, et al., 297 SCRA 30 (1998).
20 [20]
Digital Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 286 (2000).
21 [21]
Ibid.
 Petitioner was under the mistaken belief that the order declaring him in
indirect contempt was improper for not having been issued in accordance with
the procedure laid down by the Rules. Petitioner claims that an order of indirect
contempt can only be issued after the proceedings therefor have been initiated
either by verified petition or by the court motu proprio. In his petition, petitioner
states:
“x x x Firstly, the respondent took cognizance of the contempt charges
were embodied in ordinary motions, and not formulated in a separate verified
petitions (sic)…All charges of contempt were initiated by Tamondong and not
by the court, so that the requirements mentioned above should have been
complied with.”22[22]
Petitioner alleges that the contempt proceedings were not initiated by a
verified petition or by the court motu proprio. He asserts that respondent judge
premised the contempt order on the various motions filed by the Tamondong
23[23]

Spouses. He contends that respondent judge should not have entertained the
motions as they do not meet the requirements prescribed by the Rules.
Moreover, he asserts that mere motions cannot be considered verified petitions
for purposes of initiating proceedings for indirect contempt. Thus he concludes
that respondent judge’s order declaring him in indirect contempt originated from
the motions filed by the Tamondong Spouses, and prays that this contempt order
be set aside for being procedurally defective.
Contrary to the findings of the Court Administrator, we find that the Pasay
MTC did initiate the contempt proceedings motu proprio. Disobedience to the
May 9, 2000 Order issued by the Pasay MTC, which required Union Bank to
return the replevied vehicle, qualifies as indirect contempt for which the Pasay
MTC properly issued a show cause order to Union Bank. This Order dated June
6, 2000, which directed Union Bank to show cause why it should not be held in
contempt, was a legitimate exercise of the Pasay MTC’s judicial discretion to
determine whether Union Bank should be sanctioned for disregarding its
previous orders. Thus, independently of the motions filed by the Tamondong
Spouses, it was the Pasay MTC which commenced the contempt proceedings
motu proprio. No verified petition is required if proceedings for indirect contempt
are initiated in this manner, and the absence of a verified petition does not affect
the procedure adopted.
It is true that the Tamondong Spouses did file a Motion To Cite Plaintiff For
Contempt Of Court, dated May 17, 2000. In this pleading they prayed that
24[24]

Union Bank be declared in indirect contempt of court for its disobedience to the
Pasay MTC’s Order dated May 9, 2000. This Order dated May 9, 2000
specifically directed Union Bank to “return immediately to the defendants the

22 [22]
Rollo, p. 5.
23
Rollo, p. 18, Urgent Motions dated April 12, 2000; Rollo, p. 48, Motion To Cite Plaintiff
[23]

For Contempt Of Court dated May 17, 2000.

24 [24]
Rollo, p. 48.
replevied motor vehicle.” However, the Tamondong Spouses’ unverified
25[25]

motion dated May 17, 2000 cannot invalidate the contempt proceedings because
these proceedings were initiated by respondent judge motu proprio in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, respondent judge should have been more circumspect in issuing
the second contempt order. Petitioner accuses respondent judge of exceeding
his authority in punishing him for not complying with the May 9, 2000 Order which
was directed at Union Bank alone. True enough, the order makes no mention of
petitioner’s name. Moreover, in respondent judge’s Order of June 6, 2000, he
gave Union Bank, not petitioner, five days to show cause why it should not
be held in contempt for failing to return the replevied vehicle as earlier
directed.
A party cannot be held in indirect contempt for disobeying a court order
which is not addressed to him. Petitioner should therefore not be punished for
26[26]

disregarding an order that he was never meant to comply with in the first place.
On this point, respondent judge clearly committed a mistake. He should have
been mindful that he never ordered petitioner to return the replevied vehicle.
There was also no evidence that petitioner was ever in possession of the
replevied vehicle.
Courts are not powerless to compel obedience to their orders, writs and
processes. The power to punish persons for contempt is inherent in all courts
and is essential to the preservation of order in all judicial proceedings and to the
reinforcement of their lawful orders and decisions. Without the power to
27[27]

punish for contempt, courts would become impotent to maintain the orderly
administration of justice and to compel observance to their lawful mandates.
However, there is a limitation to this power, as it must be used sparingly. It
should be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. 28[28]

Judges cannot be disciplined for every erroneous order or decision rendered

in the absence of a clear showing of ill motive, malice or bad faith. As we held in
Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, - 29[29]

“x x x good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper

consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with
ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held
accountable for errors of judgment on the premise that no one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible.”
However, the absence of bad faith or malice will not totally exculpate them from
25 [25]
Ibid.
26 [26]
Cañas v. Castigador, 348 SCRA 425 (2000).
27 [27]
In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
28 [28]
Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, 313 SCRA 739 (1999).
29 [29]
190 SCRA 834 (1990).
charges of incompetence and ignorance of the law if they render decisions that
are totally bereft of factual and legal bases.
Finally, the issue of the alleged inaction of respondent judge on the Notice of
Dismissal filed by petitioner deserves scant consideration. Union Bank filed the
Notice of Dismissal dated June 5, 2000 after the case was already dismissed
30[30]

on May 9, 2000. Obviously, petitioner filed the Notice of Dismissal only to

31[31]

evade the effects of the Order of May 9, 2000 citing him in contempt for forum
shopping. 32[32]

In another administrative case docketed as A.M. No. 02-2-12-SC, the 33[33]

Court en banc found respondent Judge Francisco G. Supnet guilty of serious

misconduct. The Court ordered his dismissal from the service and the forfeiture
of all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits. Although respondent
judge has been dismissed from the service, he can still be fined for gross
ignorance of the law committed while in office. However, the fine recommended
by the Court Administrator should be reduced to P3,000.00 considering that
respondent judge actually followed the proper procedure in issuing both
contempt orders.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to adopt the recommendation of the
Court Administrator with modification. Judge Francisco G. Supnet is FINED in
the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) for gross ignorance of
the law. This fine may be deducted from his accrued leave credits.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

dtSearch 6.40 (6482)

30 [30]
Rollo, p. 29.
31 [31]
Ibid., pp. 22-24.
32 [32]
Ibid., p. 5.
33 [33]
Dr. Cora J. Virata v. Judge Francisco G. Supnet, November 27, 2002.