GERMAN BOMBERS OF WORLD WAR TWO VOLUME TWOGERMAN AIR FORCE BOMBERS OF WORLD WAR TWO VOLUME TWO by Alfred Price illustrated by Harold Jacks John Young[Alfred Price, 1969 Harold Jacks, 1969 John Young, 1969 First published © Hylton Lacy Publishers Li Coburg House, Shes iret, Windsor, Berks, England In the same series R.A, BOMBERS OF WORLD WAR TWO. Volumes One and Two GERMAN BOMBERS OF WORLD WAR TWO GERMAN FIGHTERS OF WORLD WAR TWO AMERICAN FIGHTERS OF WORLD WAR TWO Volume One JAPANESE BOMBERS OF WORLD WAR TWO Prine in pe. Times New Roman 327 by Mears Calivell Hacker Lined, Condon, Eland ‘Monotone and fourcolour plates by Funnel Graphic Co. Lid. Choydon, Surrey sears ago for "something to do" on sandy duty ‘nile serving on a V-bomber squadron. Since then he tus aained toternational sanding as an air warfare historian, and has had work transated lato French, German, alin and Dutch, His fist volume in this Series on German bombers enjoyed wide sales on both Sides of the Atlan ligt Lieutenant Price is currently engaged on a number of projets, including a history of ant Submarine aura and. the ‘weapons they used Married, he lives with his wife Jane and. daughters Fiona and Clare in Tckhil, Yorkshire.Foreword Volume one ofthis series desribod the bombers use by the Lufwae during sta lighting tories of 1939 to 1982: the Dorner Do 17, the Heinkel He I, the Junkers Ju 88 and the Feeke Wull Fw 200, This Second volume is devoted tothe second peneration of German bombers: the Dornier Do 217. the Heinkel He 177 the Junkers Ju 18, the Arado Ar 244 and the Mistletoe” prkeaack acral ach of the types deserted in these pages incor- porated ingenious design features and, when the ometimes during tethingtoubles Rad been over= Come, wa a least a good ts enemy equivalent: in the cane of the Arado Ar 236 jet bomber there was nothing in the world that could even compare with But, quite apart from is quality, the ability of a bomber to destroy its target depends upon two factors fits the number deployed and, secondly. the Sirengih ofthe defences it has to penetrate, Never Swere there more than 180 examples of any of the Seraft described hee availabe for ation at any one ime: And from I942 on to aitempt to attack targets fn Great Britain by day or by night was to court singing loses, as German units discovered when {hey teed i: bythe summer of 1944 the same power ful defences seemed to stand guard over almost every fmportant target the Germans wished to hit ‘None ofthe types described here can be labelled as ‘ret for none of them aesomplished prest things ‘ot greatness and quality are not necessarily Hk fn asthe sucsesors of the bombers which were the terror of Europe in he erly war yeas these sicraft have a well-deserved place in aviation history T should ike to thank Fran Selinger, John Taylor Philip Moyes, Richard Seeley and Eddie Creck for lowing me to use photograph Irom thei super Collections, ako David Tring for help with the text tnd Richard, Smith for chesking the manuscript, ‘Once gain should keto wish “al- nd Bebra to the ex-Lafmutfe members who spared me tele time to recount the stories Fepeated hee: listening 0 {heir experiences has Been almost as exciting alvin "rough them—and certainly less dangerous! Tick, August 1968, surnio PriceContents Junkers Ju 186 The Mistletoe sHite’ Arado Ar 234 inguanty, and win June when Fite re and more of theseJet engines one of the ignitor plugs ad unscrewed {sel and blown out. This allowed the scaring hot bast from the engin’s flame tube to ply" on the Seon contol rune it Burot them through fn 4 Instant, and the aircraft had immediatly rolled onto ie back. Asa result of this dscovery the ignitor pls tree tightened up immediatly before each Might and the accxdets cated IN ACTION ‘The Ar 236 was a small steal, and fully loaded sreihed about as: much as a presentlay Hunter fighter-bomber. The maxima bomb load of 3,30 1S Stas alo comparable with that ofthe modern area ‘The Arado's would attack their targets in a shallow dive, or ele at Tow level or high level while ying horizontally “The form of attack most used was the shallow dive, fn which the plot brought the arate down at an Angle of 30 depres ata speed of 10 mph, and used the pericope mounted on top of his cabin to line himself upon the arse “Thehoriontal low-level attack was also used great deal, ut since there was no low-level bomb sight fitted tothe AF 234 the pilot had 10 aim his bombs ‘hy eae" method which tended to be athe inac sate unleis he could make a straight runcin without ‘nem interference, On March 7, 1945, the Americans Stic the bridge over the Rhine at Reman, and ths breached the last great water barrier and natural Acfence line inthe west. Goering ordered 3 mairnum flor Irom his bombers to smash the bridge. At the time of the atacks the cloud base was down io 1,500 fect, and Kowalewaki was fored t send his Arados ima low lve. Bot in the event the poor weather and the strong defences combined 10 prevent accurate ‘inked the Remagen bee survived the attacks. “The high-level attack was tsed against the More stan target, for at high alte the jet engies were far more effeient than they were low down, and the range of the Arado was thre times a great However, this method dit have the clear disadvantage that i there was ansthing more than the most pathy clowd over, the attack had to be abandoned. I the pilot ‘ted to make shsh-eel homing run his work foad ‘as very high, since he alone had to perform the tasks ‘of pilot, navigator, and bomb aime. Consider {ypkal ighdevel bombing attack, First the pilot ‘Nould ine his aiteraf up on the target, when some 30 les from. He would then engage the threes automo, dconncet the normal control column and Sing it to onesie. This done he Toosened is straps and moved forward wo the bomb aiming position inthetroops inthe Ardennes, solely for this purpose, The U.S" Ai Force's racion was immediate and form 15,000 feet, and when an Arado showed up they Allpounced anit, Even so the bombers prove fic targets, and loses were rare the German bombing ‘cused ile" dame ‘down while fying at high speed was on M 045, when Flight Lcutenant John Reid, fing a Spire patoling near the Nijsezan Bre at 10,00 Tet tren he spotted one of the jet bombers running in at pushed his, nose, The pilot woul then look through the eyepiece taok alma reach the surfice, durin [ofthe Lovfe hombisht, and alin the eatcule onthe which time the jet bomber had target. The bomb sight was connecied tothe sireraft's and was well ear. Asked rece tomatic pilot via an analogue compute, and heact the tanks, Kowalewski smiled Correcting signals to the auo-plot which in turn Whatever form of attack they chose use, so long lw” the aircraft throughout the bombing run, After_as they kept up tei speed the Arado pilots had ite he had released his bombs the pilot would revere theo fear from enemy fighters, For ths reason the jet process and regain hse bombers were used on number of ocesions as bat, ‘Obviously the high level attacks would have been {0 draw Allied fighters away from more profitable quite out of the question f there was any interference ground targets. The commander of IK. 76 from enemy fighter, but forthe Arados ying at Major Hans Georg Ractcher, recalls that his unit made Speeds around 400 mph at 3000 fet there was tle several singlesiteraft nuance raids on” American ‘ne sch high eve attack on Bish eanks at Weyl ne Dortmund. Dropped from sich an alitude the bombs rt he had bitbution down 0 100 yards when he broke away faving the Arado in Rames, The German pilot baled ‘ut and the Jt crashed near Enschede onthe German Dutch border. When Rei landed, his greatly abuse Spitfire was ft only forthe serap heap The Fuselage fas twisted, andthe skinning on the wings: had pled hack and was bucked in places, "The ony time the Arados were realy vulnerable was ‘when they slowed down f land or were actually on the ground: In recognition ofthis the Lafiwafe set up powerful “fak lanes” along the landing. approach paths tothe alas, The single arte 37 mm. and ‘Quadruple arrel 20 mm. weapons proved 3 song ‘icterent 0 fighter attacks within their range. Never theless, om April 25, 1948, thice Thunderbolts did trave the flak as Major Polictin of Stab K.G, 76 was ning in f0 land. The major was shot down and ied "When the Arados returned to base short of fue and that, Bateher alls seed to Be on every sortie the aie of fuel Consunption at lve level as sich that the pilots had to go straight in and Lad as soon as they possibly could On one oesasion he arrived back at Achmer to find Aid and German fighters ‘dogfighting over the tek. and the Nak gunners being neta, firing at everybody” Buetcher had no Tanding AC the very last moment, and while fying a 250 mph, he extended his undercarriage. At mpc he lowered is Maps andat 173 mph he theprotestingaireraf down ont the runway. ASS000 tb ihe wheels were firmly on the ground, Bactcher Streamed his tail Brake parachute. But even s0 this hah tettment proved to be to much for the Synthetic rubber on the port-main ‘wheel, which promptly blew out, The ara lurche to port ff the nwa, and Bactcher was tested to. high sped run sero the erase before man and machine came 1 Fest site shaken, but otherwise ile the wore for the By 1945 the part of Germany remaining under Nazi control ad shrunk to sch an extent that Osnabruck twas threatened and. KG, 36 wae fore to beave Achmer for tases at Lucbeck and Sehlessig. Fro ‘hese aifields the bombers took part ia the final battles om both the Eastern and the Wester Front, notably the pround actions round Belin and the Ru areas, At this stage of the war the average Ar 234 Bombing sorte fasted only about a half an hour typkaly, | minutes out, thee minutes to allack, and 1Siminutes to return NEW DEVELOPMENTS AX the end of the war several developments of the Ar23 werecither fing or about tf The C sub-type, with four BMW jet engines instead the two Jumo units on the Ar 2348, sas in Tull production when the end came and was on the point of Ehering service I was somewbat faster than the By nd later versions were (0 have hada two-man crew The war ended before the 16¢h prototype of the Ar 234 could make its first fight. This machine, which Featured a erescen-shaped wing simula to that later fied to the British Victor BombeDornier Do 217 van 0 fuselage Thereceived its new aircraft in the spring of 194 Dormers operated from Bordcaus Merignac in France inthe anthipping role, and carried out armed resonnassance fights over the Bay of Biscay and fevond. Av the sear progresed IK.G. 40 was {oined in this tak by KG. 2 a8 that ene Gesohwader tecame operational wth the Do 27. ONE WAY TO GET A DORNIER (On the Ostober 12, 1951 the Royal Air Fore got hold of a Domier 217, following one of the more bizarre incidents ofthe war. The aiteraft concerned, which belonged to the Sth Sta of K.G. 2, had been out resonnotring the easter Atlantic onthe evening of the IIth On the way back to his base at Evreux in northern Prance the pilot Lieutenant Dolenga, had Stayed a lie off course: being somewhat 10 the north of where he thought he was, he New up the Bristol Channel instead of the Engish Channel. So then he crossed the noth east of Devon, he reason ably took this to be the north coast of Britany. The frror was an easy one to make, and woul! have been Feadily apparent when the Dornir’s radio compass teas tuned in fo the German raio beacons in France But the two beacons used by the Dommier's crew at Paimpol and Evreux—sere respectively covered BY the Brtish"Meacon’ spoot transmits at Temple fombe and Newbury, ‘The result was. that in the ‘Sarkness Dolenga and his ce crosted the length of southern England, confident that they were over horiher France, When they cime fo the Thames Estuary the crew fook it t0 be the north coast of France, and accordingly headed southwards towards their home base at Evreusor 30 they thought Imagine then the consternation on board the Downie win, afew minutes lster, the crewmen saw 3et nother coastline. dead. aheid! His uel almost Exhausted, the puzzled Dolenga had litle shoice batnot ike this But THE “BAEDECKER™ RAIDS During he wine of 141 192 Ka eit from Hie. On The Fuchrer has ordered th sgainst England isto be given &'mo Samp. Accordinsly when areattacks ofa retaliatory nature ar to be cari out “against towns other than London, Mieliying 10 be scled down in favour of thee attacks “The fit of the new series of attacks was on the evening of the Apri 23, when 43 bombers, forthe ‘most part Do 217 of KG, 2, set ot to bomb Exeter ‘The initial atack was fate Buta second rad, by aircraft on the following night, was more succesful On the next two nights the target was Bath, which as bay hit in the rugs which together totalled 250 But even as the German bombers were pounding Bath, shose ofthe RCAF were wrecking the German town of Rostock in a senes of four destrctve hte raid, Hitler was beside himself with rage when he heard ofthis development. Om the April 26, he made A impassioned spewch in wbich he spoke of faking & ‘Copy of Baedecke’s guidebook, and marking of each Bish city when it was destroyed as a result of this the whole series of reprisal attacks? Became known in Brin asthe "Baedecker Rak Following the Bath atacks Norwich, York, then [Norwich agin were attacked. In both ees incendiary tombs caused serious fies. During the fist of the Norwich attacks early hits by high explosive bombs fon the it's water main ested in an acue shortage fof water wth which to ight te fies: asa result 20 Factories and many other buildings were gutted. AL ‘York salvoes of incendiary bombs el on either side the Minser, and straddled the rikeay ines in the forth and: sorth-vestem quarters of the ety fy tone of high explosive bombs stuck the centre and the northern, quarter. Following a. week of ontingous action, the Lufafe rested for tw dass Ie was preparing for the most devastating Of the reprisal ds ‘On the night of May 3 the weather was fine and the sky almost cloudless. Iwas then that the Germans fetutned ¢o finish the job only il completed. at Exeter ten days earlier, Ths time the target marking teas accurate, and the Bombers struck hard, Fierce fires quickly tok old of the heavily timbered mediaeval buildings and, unhindered by the narrow Street, raged unchecked until large part of the city had teen gutted During the month of May several ter tightly defended. towns and ches were struck, inching Cowes, Hull Poole and Grimsby. On the sist of the month Cantera slfered heavily, if a lil less asastrously than Exeter, Ds tothe heavy losses atthe hands of the steadily improving British fences, the inal fervour of the Bedecker rads fll vay rapidly. The dying spast— thvee attacks on Biemingham and one on Hull at the tnd of July-vcost the Laftwafe 27 bombers and “used ile damage, Some hea of the cumulative fet of the loses may’ be gained from the fat that RUG. 2, which had operated over Britain consistently throughout the spring andthe summer, lost alrat land crews caval to Hs own stengih once in each ‘Stcsessive thre month period. With the faire of the German crew training organisation to make good such Tosis the strength of the i ll 10 ow eB: having stated 192 with 88 crews, i had only 23 Tet by September “The remainder of 1942 was devoted t resting and refiting the badly mauled Baedecker raiding Unis,K.G. 2 included, Ie was at this time that the next important subtypes ofthe Do 217, the K and the almost exactly similar M entered service, Theseversions had completely redesigned forward section, with 8 Founded, unstepped cockpit and a fully glazed nose Tosafeguard gaint the possiblity of engine shortages to diferent types of engine were ited. The Kas fied withthe BMW SO1D, withthe otherwise en faster than the earlier E Early in 1943 IL/K.G. 40, which had operated with the Do 217 alongside K.G. 2 in the west, re-equipped withthe Heinkel 177, ts ‘mit Became the sole operational bomber unit Aying the GUIDED MISSILES From the beginning of the war the Germans had concerned themselves with the problem of increasing the effectiveness of thelr airraft against armoured ‘warships and merchantmen. The longterm answer to the problem, since the iret with sufcient range tere too heary to dive bomb iy in the se of an a Inunched weapon that could be controlled om the patent aircraft during its ght tothe target. In this way the arraft ould say out of range ofthe ant ‘ircaft fire, but sill counter any evasive scion the ‘ship might take. Two German firms the Henschel nd the Rubistahl companies-cach produced a radio ‘vided, ant-shipping weap The Henschel Hs 293 glider bomb was in fact a miniature aeroplane, with ving span of 10 Tee inches Inthe now was ited 1,100 pound warhead, and after release the gui fel rocket motor under the and the mise coasted on in a shallow dive towards the target. The elder bomb's range depended upon the eight at which it was released from the parent fircraft; the maximum was over eight miles Hf twas Inunehed from 22,00 fet. At the reat ofthe weapon war a bright are, to enable the bomb aime in the parent aircraft to follow its progress in Might. The tomb aimer operated a smal joy-sck control, the Imoverent of which fed the appropriate up-down ite Fieht impulses to a radio tansiter which in turn radiated then tothe mise. Thus the bomb aimer had merely to sce the missile’ tracking are until was 7 ? » = superimposed on the target, and hol it there uni the ‘weapon hit. Since the impict velocity was only about 480m ph the warhead ha id penetrate capability and the weapon was intended mainly for se aginst Highly armoured warships, and freighters in escorted The second ofthe German anti-shipping weapons the Rulstahl FritzX guided bomb" was intended for use against heavily armoured target. In appear ance it resembled an ordinary bomb, except for the four stabilizing wings, mounted. mid-way along ody. Like the slier bom, the FrigeX was radio ‘controlled by means of 3 joystick controller in the paren aircraf, and was tracked by means of tal mounted fare. The 3,100 pound bomb was unpowered Teeased fom alitudes between 16,000 and 21/00 fet, ‘accelerated under the free of praviy (0 reach & ‘ed closet that of sound The Frit-X was simed like @ normal bomb using & bomb sight, and the bombsaimer radioed correction sienals'only during the final part of the mises teaectors: The problem of controling such a weapon ‘on fo 8 target now deserves some considerationIN ACTION WITH THE MISSILES (On the afternoon of August 25,1943 12 Do 217s of Captain Molinos. K.G. 100 attacked a Royal Navy [UtBoat hunting group comprising seven ships of the north-western tip of Spain, The stack was Tire many ofthe ger bombs fled 0 function propedy and only supericaldamage was caused 10. the Corvettes, Neverteless sine thi asthe fst guided missle attack in history, a description of Bow appeared tthoxe onthe receiving end may interest the reer The Brith ships were dispersed, and the Driers stacked them separately Irae at 1340 hour onthe th that H.MCS, Landeuard's lookout sighted thrce aireraf, reported as Ju 88, six mies away on the Starbosid side and making towards the escort Eroup. ‘The aireraft spent some time forming up and then shen hey Were ete starboard quarter ata range oF out sc mies, the silors observed “A. pulf of smoke forming into a. steamer appeared from the leading aircraft At the time of fring the sreraft were on reciprocal course to the ships, wel outon the beam, The projectile was en or some time apparently near the aera, But tis ‘was probably de tothe fact that i was coming {Towards the ship ata constant bearing. Flashes were cen coming fom the aircraft at about the time of ihe fring. bu nether smoke nor fame from the projectile during the ltr stages ofits rn. All nal hs i remarkably accurate description, considering the fact tht the watchers had obsoUsl never seen anything dute like this before, The missle {hme towards the ship “ata constant bearing” because itwas fying along the line of ight betveen the area Sand the ship: no smoke was seen coming Trom the missile during the later stages ofthe run Because then the rocket motor ad expended ts foe, and the bom ‘vas ling Towards the fangt. The observers noted that “The projectile then banked exactly Uke an sircraft and st course towards the ship, descending ATTACK WITH FRITZ X GUIDED BOMB Thousands of feet Sou deat en ‘Thousands of yardsan angle of about 15° or 20°. When about two fables" from the starboard. quarter the. bomb speared 1 be pointing straight at the ship. Then it tanked to starboard and los eight rapidly falling in the sea one hundred. sands of Laniguad' at Landguard and curved in gradually towards the Ship, cutting the og line about 130 fet from the stern This bomb made no effort turn towards the ship. sbviouly the rao control system had not functioned Somrects. Five minute Inter same et another stack ‘Landguard steredcourse towards a the bomb was sen approaching It actualy erosed the BOWS From starboard to port and banked very rapidly in towards the ship, appearing to stall due t0 the {vay when pointing atthe ship. Th explosion threw Ua column of water fet high but Gi not shake the ship as moch asa shallow depth charge, Several ‘opened on the projectile with an Oerlikon in the last Stace of fig The observer concluded was noticeable that te projectile approached the ship inthe fist and hid attacks int way that appeared to make a hit inevitable, but tha in each {te they lost pomer and dive int the set short of the tare ‘Other ships inthe escort group were also attacked but only HIALS. Bideford sufered damage, and ths sas the result ofa nea mis, Dring thee attacks the Do 217’ carried only one slider bombs which was fonded on to the starboard ‘ring rack, Gn the port sie a dropank was cared, both o ac asa counterweight and to extend the range ff the bomber: the tank tas jettisoned at the same Time a8 the slider bomb was released, Even if the tlitance to the target was not rea, there were sound tactical reasons for loading each raft ith only & Single mis. Tn the fist ple, since only one glider tom could be controled from cach svra at atime, two auite separate attacks would have been necessary iT twos were cared and this would mean losing the advantage of the surprise Tacor. Moreover ‘would take some time forthe launching ara to get Into postion again forthe second altack and during this period there would be a grave danger of enemy Fighters arsving om the scene Inthe secon! place, i the attack was succesful and only one missile was needed! the pilot would have to jettnon the second Iss, beciuse i WOuld have been an extemely ‘Eangerous undertaking to atempt to and the smal Do a1? with a bomb under one of the outer wing prnels and no countersecaht on the other ide i Was Undesirable to jettison the missle Because they Were ‘eryexpensive,andat ist were in short supp Two days alter its initia mise attack, on August 27. TLRS. 10 struck again and inthe same place “This time the target was the five sip strong Fist Support Group, and now the Hs 293 drew its fist Blood, The Canadian destoyer dthabaskan and the Bris corvette Egrer both sured hits and the ater Sank; another ship in he group, the corvette Rother, ws damaged by near misses, Flowing this action theRoyal Navy withdrew is antisubmarine patrols rom the Bay of Biscay. 1 postions outside the range ofthe Ise crying Dornier THE ATTACK ON THE ROMA xen a IL/K.G, 100 was operating over the Bay of Biscay the Dovniers of ts er uns I, KG, 100 at ready at their dispersal points around the aired at Marseiles Tses. Each alfratcaried an operational fuel Toad, and onthe wing inboard ofthe starboard engine hung a single, ieh-lue coloured Fritz-X bomb. The reason for this continued high state of ‘eadiess wat unknown tothe rank and crewmen Of the secret German unt; but clearly something big was Inthe wind. Rumours abounded. The favourite was that the Alice were about to invade the Taian main land they ed the FazeX would come as a nasty shock them | The only man at Istres to know the real reason for the alent mas Major Bernhard Jope, Geschwader som ‘ander of K.G. 100. ope ad recently returned from Rome, where he hd teen give atop sere refing on the military. situation by the commander of the Sccond Ait Fors", General Wolfram von Ricoren. Inthe siritest confidence Jope was told of the atest isturbing development in the Mediterranean war the Italians were on the pot of concluding a separate peace with the Alles. And when they did thet Meet ‘tas to sail to Malta and surrender, under the terms of the aemasies, So i came about that atthe end of August 1983, while Germany and Italy were sil oxensibiy ghring vl, dope's irra were sting ready awaiting to srke atthe Taian Nee it should move one ich futsde is main base at La Spezia AC 3 am. on the moming of September 9 the armistice came into effect andthe Tain Net sailed from La Speriathice battleships, sx erusers and Tan Bains Sian sf pice nts ele aes et A Si lle : onan af he Ft World Wr febe ac. a ight destroyers, Almost immediatly the news was flashed to the German headgoarters in Rome, and from there 1 Jope in Tstres Hastly HHL/K.G. 100 was brought immediate readiness, andnove the surprised crsamien Tent that they were about 0 go into action against thet erstwhile ally. If the Hallans were making for Malta they would certainly ster well clear of the German ai tases in southern Hay, and probably pass 0 te west lof Corsica: asthe morning progressed the fist reports From reconnaisaincesicraft came inthe ships were indeed passing 10 the west of Corsica. Thre was 8 hasty briefing, and the aifcews received ther final tack orders, By mideay all wan ready, and shortly alter 2 pam 11 snubnosed Dorniers took of rom Tsies and headed southveastvards out t0 se, During thei slow climb to aude, the German aircraft Rew in an untidy gaggle" since there was hothing to feat form enemy fighters this part ofthe “Mediterranean there was no cll for ight formation, Tevas a beautiful Mediterranean summer's da. and the vsiy was almost unlimited. Inthe nose ofeach Dornier a crewman scanned the horizon through his binoculars. Just after 240 pm. the Germans found ‘shat they were looking forthe telltale wakes of ‘umber of ge ships moving through the water at high Spee. ‘The Domiers ran in to bomb at levels around 20.00 fect. where the aiairralt fie was inaccurate and inefetive. As Jope reals “From 80 high up we could not resognise the individual ships; we ust picked upon the biggest we ‘oul ee, and each ran tm to bom that. Below the Dories, the Italian ships went into tight urns, twisting this waa that in an effort to put the Germans of thet aim. In the face of normal High-level bombing such tactics would e successful 4 bomb takes nearly three-quarters ofa minute to fall from 20,000 feet during which tine a fst ship in fopen water could cover 700 yards forwards oF (0 ther sid, But Jope’s aircraft were loaded with adiocontrolled bombs, and now the manoeuvres afforded the ships line protection. After easing the mise the German pilots pulled thee aircraft up through 1,00 feet. then Tevet out. Now the bom aie in the nose ofeach Dornier concentrated his emi attention onthe missile’ tracking Mare, ab ho carefully stered I over the target and eld there. The fst hit ws on the Telia Mapship the batleship Roma. The bomb steick just to the starboard of the ater mast passed lean through the ship and exploded immediately under- rath it. Seriously damaged, the’ Roma's starboard (am uebinesprouind thal: the his sped fel to Te knots. Tew minutes ater Roma was hit again, this time between the bridge and her" turret. Now the ort steam turbines were also knocked out ad the Etleship wallowed 0 stop. Below decke Ree fire ‘ase, and Roma signalled that she was in" desperate Condition”. A’ minute of 30 later, at 310 panty the Mlames reached her forward mazasine and se of the ammunition stored there. There mas tremendous explosion and the ship foe up ike jackie then she broke into two and stnk, taking most of her crow th er Shortly after the attack on Roma her sister ship, the Ila it on the bos by a FriteX: the battleship ook on some 800 tons of water and her spect sae Feduced to 24 knots, but she was able 10 reach Malta ‘aided Jope and his men were deni the satistiction of secing the Roma Break up, and they returned to Istes able o claim only that they had ssoeed is. To quote Sope ain “We did not see the Roma explode. That happened ater weet, We st the explosions a the ombs hit sure, ut how often ad we seen this and then the ship managed t0 limp back to ‘Only later, when the news was given out on the Allied news Broadcasts dil he men of HK K.G, 100, tear how successol heir atack had been ‘On the same day as the Italian Act set sai, the Allied frees di land on the mainland of Hal at Salemo near Naples. Here again there was large concentration of valuable shipping, Jost the Sor of ‘arget for which the German guided weapons had been Aesianed.Jope's men pres home thelr tacks, and in the week that followed they scored its on the buatleship H.M.S. Warspte, andthe cuisers HIM, anda tnd USS. Saronna,causing over damage to alles Some idea of the power of the FriteX- may’ be tained from the damage sulted by Warsi when Shewas it by a salvo of three ofthese weapons, One bom scored adie ht which penetrated sic decks 0 explodecon, and blow a hole through, te ship's double botom: the other two bombs gushed the sie com> partments. One bole room was demolished, and fur St her other five were Rooded. Fortunately there was fo fire, for otherwise the consequences could well have toxm disastrous, As it was the ship lost al her steam,she would ot ster, and her radar and armament eased 0 function. Warspte took on 5000 tons of Seater, and her freeboard was Towered by five Tet Perhaps miraculously, in view of the scale of the damage, only nine men were Killed and 14 were ‘sounded The battleship ws towed back to Malta for temporary reais, and uid not see action again unt Sune, 1988 MISSILE COUNTER-MEASURES “The months of August and September, 1943, marked the high-water mark inthe fortunes of the Kampf {teicher 100 misstecartying Doris. The attacks fad indeed come as a nasty surprise othe Ales, and Mr, Churchill rebuked his scientific advisor, Lord Cherwell for_not having provided hin with any ‘warming. On the September 20 Lord Cherwell replied “Even the mos unceasing vigilance and the most ‘ntennive study anor ensure that we should foresee all-the inventions or developments that he tthe nem) may have made. But fand when such novel ‘weapons are used 2 remedy willno doubt be forth Coming” Am interval ofcourse tere may be before Sie have it, Bat nothing willbe Tet undone 10 Shorten the gap, More than this of course we annot promis.” ‘The best way to counter the German guided ‘weapons was fo prevent the Donets from reaching the shipping, forthe effectiveness of a ai-launched ‘weapon not one ounce beter than the ablity oF the paren aicraft to getitto within launching ange ofthe Target. Accordingly the ext landing. at Anco in Sans, 1984 enjoyed lai fgher protection and the misslecarrying alvrat sured heavily. In spite ‘of double the Salern effort with attacks by Do 217° OF KG. 100 and the He 177 of KG. AD, the only major German success was the Sinking ofthe eruset TEMS. Sparan By the early part of 1948 the Allis had taken the technical, aswell a8 the operational, measure of the German guided mises, The radio control stem fied (0 the weapons was a simple one, and easly jammed. Two types of radio countermeasures trans miller were employed. One simply bloted out the prentaieaf's ansmissons altogether: the oer, more subs, radiated full up, down, left or ight Senaon the German conte fequency—t0 ing the Imissil hard offeourse (On June 6 194, the long-awaited Allied invasion of. France took place The strength ofthe day an might fighter cover at the bridgehead exceded anything yet ‘encountered by the Laffwofle and the aneshipping Snd bombing areraf smashed themselves bravely but Inetetvely against this impenerable barrier. The headquarters ship Aufy suffered bomb damage on Sane the gate HUMLS, Lawford was sunk on June ‘tnd'on the night of une T2 the destroyer HLMS. ‘Boaden was hit ad snk by allaunched torpedoes (fF Portland: in addition to these naval loses, one Tanding cat and two merchant ships were sunk by air stack during the fist en days ofthe invasion. Thus, ‘tthe many hundreds of shipsarsea during this period, ‘nly five were lost to diet air attack ‘On the fare ‘coxssons when the German bombers did get through the defences 10 launch theit missles, the ships" own radio jamming Wransmiters successuly neutralized the weapons. Inthe end the Germans abandoned the idea of lire atacks against the sips, and stead devoted thei efforts to mining the narrow sas. Inthe following ‘Sie mesks more than 3,000 mines of various types Were ‘own, including many ofthe ne pressure mines which ‘ould be countered only by retiring all movernent to ‘amis pace wie shallow water. By the end of the month the mining campaign ad caused the loss of ven destroyers, wo. minesweepers, 16 auxiliary ‘ese and merchantmen "andthe Trinity Howse Novel Alero” The mines caused considerable ison ‘emince, but sich losses ere not going to turn away {he reas invasion armada ever asembled Follosrng the collapse of the German aviation fue production in the summer of 194, several bomber Grnchmader were disbanded, incloding KG. 2 and KG. Tod which at that time operated the overhel ing major’ ofthe Do 219 bombers. As a result the {ype sa ery lite action during the remainder ofthe tn, though a few of them were wed, unsuccessfully, In April 1985, to launch glider bombs against the Russan crossings over the Oder River “The Dorner Do 217 was fast modern design well ike by the crews who few i Butt didnot achieve frealnes because lt entered service at tie when the ‘fences in the west an in the Mediterranean were fable to inlet “heavy” Tosses whenever sustained ‘Operations were atempted. Only once, when i was {ted as a mse-luncher during the suinmer of 1983, ‘id the Do217 look like becoming rei menace othe ‘Alles But the menace was s00m contained, and the Stork first guided mises ad Title opportunity ‘ter tha to demonstrate their prowess. [SPECIFICATION Do 2176 SSETEERT a: Lena 6 hn oscar {SsSoimten (2m ty 1.740 man (with asianTHE Heinkel He 177 Grifon® was to have been the Liftwafe equivalent of Lancastrs and Halifnes, the Formesses and Liberatore a long-range hard-iting bomber able to penetrate deeply into an enems's tenitory to strike a his vital Sach were the hopes that were never to be elized Tf Nstorlans are sureed on One thing regarding the ‘e177 ieisthat this aieraft had no elec at all on the cours ofthe Sesond World War. Wellovera thousand Stthese homber were Bl, but is doubtful whether ‘more than 200 of them were ever used on operations, During the later part ofthe war Allis! connaissance sreraft often returned wth photographs of parks ‘Germany Tull of He 177; analysis would later reveal that "Absence of trick activity suggests tht these ‘machines are not being worked on” When the war Heinkel He 177 Griffon ‘ened the 900 or so He 177s remaining, most of them in mint condition, found their way nto scrapyard all over Europe, It'was an ignominious ending not nly tothe sagh ofthe He 77, but also to the sea of German ‘sratesic bomber force to rival those of Great Briain and the USA. 11 was early in 1938 that the German Ai Ministry passed details ofits heavy bomber requirement to the Heinkel company. This specication called Tor an sreraft with a maximum specd of 338 mph able to Carry $400 Ib of bombs out oa radius of 1.600 miles Sr alternative 22900 Tb out 101,800 mies. Al in all this asa formidable specication, calling a di for an aircraft able to oun a fighter, and outperform by a considerable margin any bomber then inservice Serica “Guenther, Heinkes. chit designer, was forced to resort to 8 number of und features ‘Guenther would have like to have used two 2000 hip. engines to power his new bomber. But in 1938 the Germans posesed no motor capable of 2.000 hi ‘and indeed they had not one in large scale service by 1945, In an efor to get the power of four 1000 hp. engines forthe drag penalty ofa twin-engine isa: tion, Guenther decided to use two paired Daimler Bene Db 601 motors: inthis coupled installations, ‘Known as the DB 406, the two DB fs were conected to deve a single atsrew by means ofa clutch rangement, This double engine, two of which were power the He 177 developed 40h p. for take-a To reduce dag sll further, Guenther plumped for the revolutionary evaporatise-cooling method. The DD GD ran very hot, and was Bult t0 do so. 19 the proposed arrangement the soolnt liquidate with En tntsteezeadditive—was pressurized. Thus ft a possible t0 heat the water t0 110°C before se Formed in the engine, The superheated water was then ‘ducted away and depresurzes, at which point seam {did form. Then the water ss separated off and eturned tothe motor, while the steam was condensed by feeding Wt through pipes inthe wing cooled by the fiflow. Atercondenstion the water formed from the ‘eam wae alo fe hack into the engine Since dk trvay withthe need for the dragproducing external fadhator, the system promised to make possible an fxtemsly clean aerodynamic. yout, ight tests Showed tha the method worked quite well on the sll txperimental He TOD single sat fighter: Buti soon became clear that evaporative cooling would not spate scent heat fied Yo the He 177 and the ‘eu was dropped before the first prototype few “The decision 10 install conventional radiators started vious cle, forthe resultant extra dag ‘edt thatthe bomber would fy slower forthe same [ower acting: Thus more fuel was aed in covering & eon ng Me 7 parr a te Heel aks ven distance, and more had to be cari if the bomber wast meets range specication. Additional tanks had to be fie fato the wings, and the wings had tobe stengthened to take the ena wight, with ‘he result chat the allup weight roe and dhe Speed el suforthe The next problem came when the Lajtwafe decided that it wanted the He 177 to be able to ive-bomb, CCeetnly there were seat advantages tobe waned in fccuragy, i it could, However the dive bombing manoouvee, and especially the pullout afterwards, placed a great sran onthe airframe. As a result the Sera structure had tobe stengthene, which gave a further twist to the Welghtdrag-speed-range-more ‘eee spiral “The He 177 made is ist fight on November 19 10939. piloted. by the hea! of Rechin's Aight test section, Dipl, Ing Francke, Aer ony’ 12 minutes Airborne Prancke was forced t Bring the aitcraft back to. Rostock Marinche, when the engines began (0 ‘Show signs of overheating: he also complained of a ‘eran lack of sabi, nd a Tendency 10 elevator ater The second protoype ew shortly after the fst and swat generally similar. Another Reshin plot, Rickert, hed thi machine forthe diving tals during the st test de developed a severe contol fer and the treat broke up in thea Following this incident the first third, fourth and fith prototypes of the new bomber were sven larger til surfaces. ‘When the diving trials were resumed the fourth peotspe fae 0 pull out ofa dive and crashed ito the Balt: the cause vas pu down toa malfunction of the aserew pitch mechanism. Soon afterwards, early jn 104, the Ath prototype sufered an engine fre tthileaitborn and cashed "Ths thre out of the fs ve prototypes ofthe He 171 had crashed during testing. The contol ter problem was soon cured, ut that of the engine es Mas to dag the bomber for most of ts fe, The causes tere many and varie. niall the Tubecation to the ‘Sgnes was poor with the result hat the conaecting fod bearings would seize 1 cause the Fods 10 smash throush the crank ease and spill ilove the red-hot exhaust manifolds, Moreover, ithe tyotls were Fandled roughly the fuel injectors would leak and Allow neat fuel to run down inf the bottom of the Engine bay; the aircraft was yng aa high angle of Stack, for example if twas landing or Ang at high “tte, the uel would run tothe reat of he compart tment and driponto thehot engine exhaustplace forthe complicated and largely untried He 1 DOr the 40 orsacxamplessent to Saporoschje only ven swore servos forthe ist it ato the it Major Scheede fed this fast operation, but his Heinkel rashed and he sas killed. Following tis poor start the He 177'swhich had in any case proved to be Inetvient transport aiera’ because there was Tile oom for stoning supplies—reveried to the bomber role but with no areater sossese The old problem of engine fies had sil not boen solved completely, and Seven aircraft were lost to this cause alone with no faction on the part of the Russians. As soon a8 the Stalingrad pocket fel in February, 1943, the surviving He 177s were flown back to Germany ‘One hundred and seventy He T77-AYs were built before proton shifted to the A'S. Thi subtype was ited with two DB 610 motors, which developed 3 Maximum of 3100 hp: but lke the earlier DB 606 this was a coupled engine, and many of the old problems remained. However the Lifwafle despe ely needed Long-range bomber and the He 774-5 Was ordered int large scale production, By the end of 1943 a total of 261 examples of this subsiype had issued from the Heinkel factory at Oranienburg and the Arad factory at Warnemucnde. Tht the bomber ‘il adits faults as acknowledged, bit the German Ac Ministry judged i stable for sue in quanti t0 frontline units, ANTISHIPPING OPERATIONS From the beginning ofthe war Konpeschwader 40 had been earmarked to receive the Me 177 to replace its frail Fw 200%", Now, in the summer of 1983, ten wth peta eo aircraft and trained antishipping crews began to ferive atthe unit's operational aields in France ‘These machines were equipped to cart ether H5 293 slider bombs, Frit euided bombs or torpedoes on the outer ningexternal Yacks ‘The He 17 first went into action in the anti shipping role onthe afternoon of November 2, 1983, Major Mons ld 2 glider bomb carving He 177 of TLK.G. 40 aginst the 73 ship strong. convoy SL IS9IMKS 30¢ when it was ta poston 420 miles horth east of Cape Finistere, The Germans concen fated their attentions on the merchant ships Marsa and Delius, which were straggling a lite way behind therm formation, and sank the forme and damaged the latter. They abo launched glider Bombs at 660 frigates, Calder and Drary of the First Escort Group, swthout success: the ships evaded the bombs BY 181-Sira Lene Ban; MAS—Nordh Act tan ‘combination of high speed manoeuvring firing atthe missiles themselves, and eting off Very fares 10 ‘Confuse the sider bomb contolers, Thee He 177 Sldlnot return from this tack. ive days later, at dusk-om the 26th, 1L/K.G. 40 strock again, This time Mons led 14 He 17's against, comay KME 26 a5 it passed Cape Bougie on the ‘Agerian cst The unit pressed home is attack with treat clan, undeterred by the convoy’s strong defences, nd. scored pider bomb ils on the liner Rolna, Whishsank, The rks and the heavy sel ipeded rescue work, and more than 4 thousand American Soldiers “more than half those embarkedost thei Ties, Buton the German sie the loses were propor- tional tothe sucess achieved: Tour ofthe Bombers tree shot down, and thee more crashed on landing back at Bordeaux Merignac. Mons himself was killed ‘ring this operation, shih with the erie one had ‘ont KG. a0 neatly hal ts strength, "After his KG 40 restricted elf tote less etve‘ut aso less costly night attacks, and kept up a steady pressure on Allied convoys passing. through. the Meiteranean, The ‘He 177 sill atacked with ler bombs, ther attacks being ynhronized wih those of torpedoatying Ju 88's and Mare-dropping airatt "The lull ended om January 2, 944, when Allied forces landed at Anvi, jst tthe south of Rome. The He 177s of HKG, a0 operated songsise the Iissilecarrying Do 217% of KG. 100, and sulfered zvordingy; Following a few wetks infensive oper sagas the Anzio bridgehead, MK.G.4O resumed its harassing operations asst the Mediterranean OPERATION STEINBOCK uring Operation Stinock, the renewed. German night stack upon London, the He 177 operated To the frst time aginst the Bath capita. Two Gruppen of them, 1 KG. 40 and 1K.0, 10D, witha total of $6 craft operated topsther from the ald st Rhine and Chateau, Daaing the very fs of the new attacks, onthe night ‘of January 21, 1984, Flying Ofer H. Kemp of No. 131 Squadron “bagged the fist He 177 t0 be shot down ove the United Kingdom. Kemp was Ming his “Mosquito to investigate a searchlight cone when his Fada operator, Flight Sergcant J. Maidment, observed ‘contact on the ra dead ahead ata range of 180 mies. Kemp closed in and caught sight of is quar but wae himself seen and the bomber went Into 3 Violent evasive manoeuvre. The Mosquito crewmen act, but were abl fo regain st s00n ale. ‘wards: Kemp closed in and opened up with his four 30 mm. cannon; he saw hits onthe port wing then & iargeexplosion, inthe light of which hecould make oot the large swastika onthe fail of the bomber. The target, an He 177 1 KG. 40, Went into a steep dive And crashed ner Haslemere in Surrey "Typical ofthe Steihock attacks was that on London fon April 18. The target was the city sl, anda total fof 128 bombers ofall pes set oUt. Amongst those {king part were fixe He 177 of Captain von Kale Kreuths 1/R-G, 100, After taking off from Rhine, fear Musser, the cews climbed as high a8 they possibly sould wile over friendly terry, For the shar fmt so of e177 amo eal actual penetration of the defences they few in a Shallow’ dive at high speed, tactics which made it “iicul for even the superiative Mosquitoes (0 inter ‘cept effectively. After releasing thei bombs the crews ‘sithdee at fv level, But inspite ofthese unorthodox Imethods one of the He I77s, piloted by Warrant Oricer Heine Reis failed vo rein Potentially the He 177s represented a formidable clement ia Pet's attacking force, but this potential ‘wae not relied As Pele now real ‘mas tue thatthe He 177 carried the greatest bmi Toad of any ofthe types under my command, but technically she was very complicate, Because ff this the proportion of ara available for any 8ttack was ow in comparison wih the other types BOMBER DESTROYER ‘An interesting idea mooted inthe summer of 1944 was fhe use of He 177 with airtonir rocket armaments to counter the powerful American “Fortress ahd Literator formation, Five of the He 177s were(OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONT The He France opera“ attempt to beat off the Allied invasion of France, bu we hae seen they were able to achieve ite ut the Failure of the antvinvason attacks dg nt see the end the He 7's operational career for now. last Even as the He 177° of 1/K.G. 40 and I/K.G, 100 were striking at the Brith capital a full Geschnader sas converting tothe heavy bomber in Germany. The tenant Colonel Horst von Riese. In May the fst Gruppe was ready for action, and unde the greatest Secrecy the unit moved out oi East Psi the bases wee in the Koenigsbey centred on Prowehten and Seerappen. Before the end ‘ofthe month the second and thind Gruppen srived and He 177s, represented the most powerful step striking Force ponsessd by either she onthe Eastem The He 177° of K.G. | went ino ation as soon as they areived in East russ srking at Russian supply ents and troop assembly ares. Stage targets were within the rane the heyy bombers but K Summer offensive could not now be ons delayed; and he Geeman solders needed al he help they could During these atacks, usually carried out from Russian Ait Force, equipped mains forthe lw level intereption and ground atack roles, couk! do litle to di claw themscles up 4020000 fect to the He T77's stack level showed the greet respect forthe defen sive armament ofthe bombers un tacks were rarely ‘Over Russia KG. 1 made several patern-bombing msl Jed. formation of 87 He 177s aginst the west of Moncow: The force must hive made anclosely spaced “V" shaped waves, ach wave compris: ing a Grupe of some 3 He 177 unfortunately no ‘hotogapis ofthese massed attacks scem to have urived. Prior tothe patere-bombing attack the Spacing of individual irra in the waves, and the Interval between the waves, had ben carefully cl Tn the lead aircraft von Riesen traversed the cente of the target and as bis bom aimer sate fa sie ofthe ‘Objective slide under his bomb sight von Riese broad ‘asthe bomb-releae gna to his Geshe During these intesive operations von Riesen's unit ‘experience tle rouble with overheating engines, BY the summer of 1544 the various modifications ad {reat reduced the ir rik, Moreover the rot cause fof the fies—overrough use of the theotles when fing the eusoes up 0 full power and bolting this Setting, for 100 Tong—vas well known, All von Rice's pilots had teen warhed of the danger and insracted in avoiding it, and when engine fires id ‘ccurin K.G. I they were generally the esl of engine mmis-handlingby inexperienced pilots. waited offensive, on the central front. The powerful ci isteal to hep stem the floods but allwas in vain as the Russian tanks continued to rll westards, In tlsperation Goering personal telephoned von Ri Xi him to Send his Geschwader into action aint the advancing tanks. Iwasa reckless wa (0 (se bigaircraft ike the He 177, Yor to hitsuch small fast moving target the bombers would have to attack at very low altitdes: But when von Rieton raed 8 festioning woke Goering woul! not iste, and sisted thatthe operation be mounted. In an ater make the Dest ofa djl on Risen sent out is He'177 after the tanks in pairs, inthe hope that the Combined firepower from sucha pat would provide treater degree of protection from the fighters, But in Spite ofthis the operation was fiasco, The Geschwader t nearly a quarier of the 40 or 40 He 1778 con imited, mainly to How-Oying Russian fighters: ii doubt whether any tanks were destroyed. The dangerous lowevel tactics were not repeated, and KG. I resumed ite high lve pattern bombing sacs, strengh, the individual Gruppen atacking se targets from high lve. Af sual whem aieraf form Up info a large formation, the He 177% of K.G. botbited a prominent geographical feature thiscise tne of te Gitincive Masury lakes in East Prosi Just tothe west ofthe lakes was a heavily wooded ates over which the crews were pecially ordered not {oy this was Rastenburg. Miller's war headquarters ‘What happened that day is bes fold by von Rese himset At mid-day we assembled over ane corner ofthe ake othe east of the Rastenburg prohibited area semble 80 aircraft into thre formations takes fof time, and as lick woul have i couple of he aircraft developed engine res. My crews had teen previouly briofed that inthis vent they were to release their bombs “safe” (ue set s0 tat they td not go off when they bit he surface) and aimed ito the lake. This the crews di, and Tse OfF fastwards with one of my Gruppen to make the tack Ie was about five o'lock in the ater ny adjutant, who TooKed very serious. He ushered ‘me inioan empty office and said tebe thing as happened. One of our machines obviously did not drop ts bombs “safe they landed onthe Fuchrers headquarters and caused an explosion would be the end. Then we beard a special buletin ‘on the radios news ah stated tht there had bee, nko deta red to get i touch with the t had dropped the bombs into the lake fnd nobody had any idea where they wee. Then I elehoned the Corps headguartrs, and Sending a legal officer to collect evidense for interviews, before von’ Riesn's Corps Hite’ if, but von Risen was in no way responsible, This wasthe famous July 20h Bomb Pot But one hadTHE FUEL FAMINE Within a few days of the Rastenburg. explosion KG. ceased operations, at time when the German sies were crying ou orl he hep they could set Tt was nothing odo with the Russian air defences, this had been a negligible factor 30 long a the bombers remained at high level, nor was it ve to any Shortcomings on the part of the He 177. The cause was farmore serious, and was to have farveaching effets ‘om the German conduct of the war from then onthe bout a creeping paralysis within the German armed forces. smedium range operation. Supplies had always been {enuous sofa a KG. Twas concerned, There allocated fuel trains arrived the bombers were refuelled train and nota drop of fuel arrived: as result the ‘perations planned forthe folowing day had 10 be ‘ancsled In the spring of 1944 the Britsh and production of high octane aviation petrol fel from uel, which equalled an average day's output from the There could be no arguing with the simple athe. ic! there just was no fuel to Keep the heavy bombers fights were limited, and fighter-bomber support was bomber units were disbanded, Thus fate dealt inal sn most roc low othe He 17, a the very moment when twas achieving the sucess which had. eluded it ombers-except the jet propelled types—was cut back in favour ofthe Emergency Fighter Programe The heay piston engined bombers were wheced into he alrcraft parks, where they collected rst and birds ness until the end came and they were sapped. Their SPECIFICATION HE177 8-5THE Junkers Ju 188 was a progressive dew the highly suecessul Ju Surfaces to improve stability. The Hist Jr 188 few early in. 1943- Development priority unl the autumn jeonlredthe ype into production In ictory at Berry neat Desa The German Air Ministry had intended that two subsppes of the Ju 188 should be produced simul {ancouslp, the "A" powered by the 1 313, and the othervise identi irelohp. BMW 801 This move was intended to allow baits While this bomber never part of thestriking force ofthe L er England on many oocasions ‘of 1983 andthe summer nd oso peva ineres tothe Bish reader. 1 188 as essentially a reworked Ju 88 with longer, plated wing for beter high alte perfor nice, and more powerful BMW 801 mc Junkers Ju 188 Ju I88E's, Later this keway was made wp, and many Tusa’ were ui received a numberof init began service tras. The following August the "pe appeared over the Brish Iss Tor the fst time. On the T8th of that month Second: Liewtenant Hans Of 1K.G. 66 few one of three Ju 188 ok prt in an 88 aera stack onthe Ruston jormby works at Lincoln: the unsuccessful rid pe Germans 11 bombers, though ll dhe 188 urned safely In the months that followed Ju 18's took a regular puttin attacks on targets in Britain, and in minelaying the later were 7 Sossterbers i Test Flight 189° edition J 188 and foe other aircraft eneaze in mining the Humber between the Mosquito and the Ju 188 Fesulled in confusion between the wo types, especialduring night engagements. Akrogge reals that when he fist operated over Brian in the Junkers ia 1943, Searchlight. would sometimes urinate him then fxtingush, night fighters would close in then break Sivay without fring. As the 1 IRR became beter Known this immunity evaporited, but ow the time-was shen the commander of No, 488 Squadron Royal Air Fore, Wing Commander RC. Haine as shot down while Ring a Monguito, in mistake for 8 Ju 188. During the subsequent inquiry the American 6 Biack Walow plot wa asked why he had opened fre; had no been bred that the Ju 8 as much larger than the Mosquito? "Wel." the American solemnly replied in hit Texas dra) “Ah guess A MARKING LONDON, ‘bomber counter-offensive agains Britain Operation Sreinock began. Two Grappen with Ju 188s took part in these atacks 1. K.G. 66" an IL K.G. 2 During Steinbock Major Helnut Schmid’ 1/K.G. 6 operated in the pathfindsr role. Typically, Ju Ts8's would carry two 1,100, high explosive bombs, plus 18 1015. LC 50 marker bom: the ater burned {sith a dstinctve white, green oF yellow Mame for ‘bout four minutes The fist marking aircraft would arrive over the a ‘ue, and release Mares Two mines later further fircaft-would go in at low level and plant their markers accurately in the light ofthe Rares; this Miah Tow prosedure would continue unt ere-hour for the main atack, more and more fares being dropped (0 tue inthe bomber following, Daring the attacks onthe British capital 1./K.G. 66, in common with other unis, sled heavy Tosses ‘TARGET BRISTOL The operations agtnst London continued until the spring of 1944, wen the weight of the attacks shifted‘aids looked from the German se if one of them is ‘described by on ofthe participants Pilot was Sergeant Hans Engelke and thelr sircaft Bore the Meniication eypher US DP. Early the ‘morning of May 14,1944, 91 German aifralt set ut To bomb Bristol: US DP vas onc ofthem, The brieing for the I, K.G. 2 ces took place in the operations room at Vannes on the evening of the Lith The room resembled smal enema, with oling benches on which the navignors had spread thet charts; on the wall hung large map of England, Prases recall The weather mant gives the known poston Trerite all down, note the wind, and work out my Sehuocder expisin the operational orders: “Co ‘ordinaed attack on Brstol on May Hy atack tine (185 10.0150 hous. The fst Ste if take ofa (010 hours, Crews ae to take oso that they ative atthe target ate ive mines before the attack time K.G., 66 will do the target marking: double green sky'markers, with fll target dumination, Alla {raft of our Gruppe have Been loaded with bish ‘explosive homie, Attack height 20,000 feet. And row the target, lease Me Boe He moves io-one side and the room s darkened ‘On the canvas screen fahed an aerial photograph ‘of Bristol. Captain Schroeder poins out with his ‘tik the various tages: an industrial work, a ar baracks and the port area Thad been over Bristol once before, and knew ‘that with those defences i would not be ey 10 there could be litle doubt that the nigh Fighters ‘would be out in fore.” Engcke and his crew tthe brifing room shortly after 2100 hours, and changed into their fing kit Then they made their way to the Junkers parked nis dispersal oat onthe aii Toaded with to 2200 nd two 110, bombs, US so DP ook off at 0030 hours, "With its heavy Toad! the machine was unwicky During the take-ofTT gripped the red emersency bomb jettnon lever tightly forthe airield was sal and the obsiucton lights were getting steaiy loser” However Engetke managed t if the heavily-aden bomber of the ground in good tne, andthe Junkers