International

Encyclopedia of the
SOCIAL
SCIENCES
Volume 18
Complete and Unabridged
fnternational
Encyclopedia of the
SOCIAL
SCIENCES
BIOGRAPHICAL SUPPLEMENT

DAVID L. SILLS EDITOR

VOLUME 18

THE FREE PRESS

A Division ofMacmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
NEW YORK

Collier Macmillan Publishers

LONDON
 COPYRIGHT © 1979 BY THE FREE PRESS
A DIVISION OF MACMILLAN PUBLISHING CO., INC.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NO PART OF THIS BOOK MAY BE REPRODUCED OR

TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS, ELECTRONIC OR
MECHANICAL, INCLUDING PHOTOCOPYING, RECORDING, OR BY ANY
INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, WITHOUT PERMISSION
IN WRITING FROM THE PUBLISHER.

THE FREE PRESS

A DIVISION OF MACMILLAN PUBLISHING CO., INC.
866 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022

COLLIER MACMILLAN CANADA, LTD.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 68-10023

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PRINTING NUMBER
1 2 3 4 56 78 910

ISBN: 0-02-895510-2
To the memory of
TALCOTT PARSONS
1902-1979
Contents

PREFACE: ON THE USES OF BIOGRAPHIES ix

INTRODUCTION xiii

LIST OF ADVISERS xvii

DIRECTORYOFCONTRIBUTORS xxi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS BY CONTRIBUTORS xxix

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF BIOGRAPHIES xxxi

CLASSIFICATION OF BIOGRAPHIES xxxv

BIOGRAPHIES 1

VII
Preface: On the Uses of Biographies

T, he preface to a scholarly work should place the book in

a context by indicating its relationship to other publications. My first
task is thus to relate this biographical supplement both to the 17
volumes of the Encyclopedia published in 1968 and to the 15-volume
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences published by The Macmillan
Company between 1930 and 1935.
Alvin Johnson, the economist who served as associate editor (and
de facto editor) of the 1930-1935 Encyclopaedia, was nearly ninety
years old when I knew him in the early 1960s, but he had forgotten
little of what he had learned as an encyclopedist thirty years earlier.
One of his bits of advice to me in 1962 was not to listen to people who
would say that it is "too early" to produce a new encyclopedia of the
social sciences; some one will always say that, he told me, and such
advice should be ignored. Searching for a way to tell us to "do it now,"
he invoked a bit of country advice he had learned in his youth: "Prune
when your knife is sharp!" I am delighted that The Free Press has
decided that its knife is now sharp, and that this is an appropriate
time to publish a supplementary volume. For reasons given below, I
think it is particularly important that this supplement is devoted to
new biographies.
Another bit of Alvin Johnson's advice which we followed in 1962
was to be more selective than he had been in commissioning bio-
graphical articles. The earlier encyclopedia contains some four thou-
sand biographies; although many are still useful today, it is easy to
imagine that many more have been read by only a handful of scholars
during the last five decades.
Since my colleagues and I were aiming at a conceptual rather
than a descriptive encyclopedia, we at first considered having no biog-
raphies at all. Luckily, we rejected this notion, and in retrospect we
are pleased with our decision to include some six hundred biographies.
This supplementary volume contains an additional 215 biographies.
Barbara A. Chernow served as full-time managing editor for the
duration of the project, and her "Introduction" describes the criteria
for selecting subjects and contributors. In these remarks, I note some
ways in which biographies can be used.
Most obviously, biographies are useful for finding answers to
factual questions about people: when was so-and-so born? where edu-

IX
X PREFACE: ON THE USES OF BIOGRAPHIES

cated? major publications? when was the famous book published?

Information of this kind is often difficult if not impossible to find in
a library, and an encyclopedia that includes biographical articles is
thus an essential reference work.
A second use of biographies of scientists is to help us understand
their ideas and their methods. Particularly in the social sciences, the
substance of scholarly work is to some degree a reflection of the lives
of those who produced it, and the more we know of their lives, the
more we know of their work. This relationship of course varies a great
deal from scientist to scientist, and it is certainly not implied here that
reading biographies is a substitute for reading original sources.
The relationship between a writer's life and his work is the focus
of a continuous argument in the humanities. Some scholars assert
that the publications of a writer should alone be the basis for critical
analysis (the so-called New Criticism), and others object to biograph-
ical analysis on invasion-of-privacy grounds. Telling Lives: The Biog-
raphers Art, edited by Marc Pachter (1979), contains eight useful
essays that describe these and other opinions about biographies as data.
Biographies, and particularly collections of biographies, can
clearly contribute a great deal both to intellectual history and to the
history and sociology of science. Collections of biographies provide
information about the historical and social context in which new ideas
emerge; they provide data useful in determining the sequences of ideas
and what else we need to know about the priority of discovery; they
help us to understand the influence of social and cultural origins and
of generational membership upon scientific development; they tell us
of particularly influential teachers and colleagues; they describe the
"invisible colleges" to which scientists belonged, and thus their net-
works of exchange and influence; and they indicate the ways that ideas
become (or fail to become) institutionalized by their creators or by
succeeding generations, either in terminology or in research institutes.
The present volume joins not only the 17 volumes that preceded it; it
also joins such collections of biographies as Charles C. Gillispie's
15-volume Dictionary of Scientific Biography (1971-1978) and Gard-
ner Lindzey's A History of Psychology in Autobiography (1974), which
is itself an extension of the 5 volumes that preceded it.
An eighteenth century word—prosopography—has been used to
describe the method of systematically studying collections of biogra-
phies, a method that historians have called "collective biography" and
that other social scientists might call "multiple career-line analysis"
(Stone 1971, p. 46). Sociologists and historians of science are now
giving more of their attention to this technique. One example is Steven
Shapin's and Arnold Thackray's (1974) analysis of the British scientific
community from 1700-1900. Another is Harriet Zuckerman's Scien-
tific Elite (1977), an intensive analysis of the careers of 92 Nobel
laureates which informs us about the familial and social origins of
creative scientists in interaction with the system of recognition and
reward in science. Robert K. Merton's review (1979) of new develop-
ments in the sociology of science stresses the usefulness for research
of collections of biographies. Merton also provides a fascinating ac-
count of how Gillispie's Dictionary of Scientific Biography was almost
prepared in such a way as to make systematic prosopographic analysis
possible. It was proposed at one time that all the writers for the
Dictionary would have to provide systematic data about their subjects,
 PREFACE: ON THE USES OF BIOGRAPHIES XI

so that computerized storage, retrieval, and analysis would be possible,

but in the end the idea was judged to be premature (Merton 1979,
pp. 41-47).
The biographies in the International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (including those in this supplementary volume), like those
in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography, are of enormous use indi-
vidually, but they are of uneven utility for prosopographical purposes.
For example, some biographers do not provide sufficient data on em-
ployment and research activities to make systematic career-line analy-
sis possible; others make almost exclusive use of the publications of
their subjects as sources, and thus omit much of the information
about the setting of their subjects' work which a historian or a sociolo-
gist of science would prefer. But they all provide a glimpse of one
member of an important generation of social scientists.
Elsewhere in the front matter of this volume there is a list of
the disciplines represented by the biographies. All of the social sciences
are of course represented. Also represented are disciplines at the mar-
gins of the social sciences: philosophy and legal theory at one margin,
human biology at the other. This selection of persons from the hu-
manities and the natural sciences reflects a current trend within the
social sciences to leaff) from people at the margin, and thus enhances
the usefulness of the volume.
The generation of scholars represented in this volume was edu-
cated between the two World Wars, when there were relatively few
social scientists of any kind. It is the generation whose members were
the teachers of a substantial proportion of contemporary social scien-
tists; it is the generation that came between the nineteenth century
founders of the modern social sciences and the thousands of practicing
social scientists today. For this reason alone, this supplementary vol-
ume of biographies should be a welcome addition to our personal and
institutional libraries.
The volume speaks for itself. I would like only to record here my
appreciation for the intelligence, the diligence, and the diplomacy of
Barbara A. Chernow.
DAVID L. SILLS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. 1930-1935 Edited by Edwin R. A.

Seligman and Alvin Johnson. 15 volumes. New York: Macmillan.
GILLISPIE, CHARLES C. (editor) 1971-1978 Dictionary of Scientific Bi-
ography. 15 volumes. New York: Scribners.
LINDZEY, GARDNER (editor) 1974 A History of Psychology in Auto-
biography. Volume 6. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
MERTON, ROBERT K. 1979 The Sociology of Science: An Episodic Mem-
oir. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Univ. Press. —»
First published in 1977 as chapter 1 of The Sociology of Science in
Europe, edited by Robert K. Merton and Jerry Gaston.
PACHTER, MARC (editor) 1979 Telling Lives: The Biographer's Art.
Washington: New Republic Books/National Portrait Gallery.
xii PREFACE: ON THE USES OF BIOGRAPHIES

SHAPIN, STEVEN; and THACKRAY, ARNOLD 1974 Prosopography as a Re-

search Tool in the History of Science: The British Scientific Community
1700-1900. History of Science 12:1-28.
STONE, LAWRENCE 1971 Prosopography. Daedalus 100, 1:46-79.
ZUCKERMAN, HARRIET 1977 Scientific Elite: Nobel Laureates in the
United States. New York: Free Press.
Introduction

T, his Biographical Supplement to the International En-

cyclopedia of the Social Sciences is the third link in an encyclopedic
chain that began in 1930. Between 1930 and 1935, The Macmillan
Company published the 15-volume Encyclopaedia of the Social Sci-
ences, edited by Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson. Never re-
vised, this classic encyclopedia is now available only in microfiche. In
the 1950s, Alvin Johnson and other members of the social science com-
munity considered the possibility of revising the Encyclopaedia, but
they preferred the idea of publishing an entirely new reference work
that would reflect the expanding and changing nature of the social
sciences. Finally, in the early 1960s, The Macmillan Company and
The Free Press decided to publish a completely new encyclopedia. Pub-
lished in 1968, the 17-volume International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, edited by David L. Sills, is a comprehensive summary of the
state of knowledge in the social sciences. Like its predecessor, the In-
ternational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences has never been revised,
although an unabridged eight-volume edition was published in 1978.
Because an encyclopedia reflects a generation's contributions to
and perspectives on knowledge, it must be revised, updated, or sup-
plemented if it is to maintain its intellectual credibility. In order for
the 1968 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences to remain
a useful reference tool, subsequent developments in the social sciences
have to be incorporated. This supplement is the first step toward meet-
ing that need.
Of the various supplements considered, the favorite, perhaps be-
cause of its manageability, was one composed entirely of biographies
of eminent social scientists who had been too young in the mid-1960s
to qualify for inclusion in the original volumes. The Free Press pre-
pared an initial list of approximately three hundred biographical sub-
jects that was circulated among some fifty social scientists. Their re-
actions to the proposal were largely enthusiastic, and they returned
the lists with suggestions for additions, deletions, and possible biog-
raphers. With this information and this support from the academic
community, work on the supplement began in earnest early in 1977.
Selection of biographical subjects
The editors determined that a one-volume supplement should
contain approximately two hundred biographies. As anticipated, the

Xill
xiv INTRODUCTION

selection of the subjects was the most sensitive phase of the project.
Personal and professional alliances and friendships influenced the
recommendations of all of the scholars who willingly advised the edi-
torial staff. Even after the final list of biographies was established,
the same sensitivities affected the question of the relative importance
of the biographies, and thus the comparative length of the articles.
The criteria for inclusion in the supplement were the same as for
the original 17 volumes, which had included biographies of deceased
social scientists as well as biographies of living social scientists past
the age of 70, that is, who were born prior to 1891. Thus, to be con-
sidered for a biography in the supplement, a social scientist had to
have died since the preparation of the original volumes or to have
been born no later than December 31, 1908. By searching obituary
notices in newspapers and professional journals, and by consulting
more than two hundred social scientists in the United States and
abroad—including all of the associate and field editors who served on
the staff of the encyclopedia in the 1960s—the original list grew to
almost five hundred names. In November 1977, an ad hoc committee
of scholars met with the editors to amend and refine the list. The Free
Press, however, made the final decisions concerning the contents of
the volume, which includes 215 biographies.
The advisers divided the biographies into three categories: major
figures, who made pathbreaking and sustained contributions to the
social sciences; important figures, whose work was essential to the
growth of their disciplines; and influential figures, whose research
offered a representative cross-section of developments in the social
sciences. The third category is particularly subjective, and we cannot
claim that our selections are the only appropriate choices.
In addition, the supplement includes three biographies of social
scientists whose biographies were omitted, for different reasons, from
the earlier volumes. In four other instances, husbands and wives,
whose work overlapped to such a degree that separate biographies
would have been repetitive, received joint biographies. Finally, be-
cause of an error in our initial information search, one scholar who
did not meet the age criterion was included, and the editors judged
it inappropriate to delete the entry after commissioning the biography.

Selection of contributors
The criteria for contributors were knowledge of the biographees'
work, high intellectual standards, and institutional and geographical
representation (the 217 contributors to this volume come from 13
different countries). Based on our advisers' recommendations, we had
ranked lists of biographers for each biography. In reviewing the di-
rectory of contributors and the alphabetical list of biographies for the
supplement, the continuity from the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sci-
ences to the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences to this
supplement is striking. For example, Talcott Parsons, to whose mem-
ory the supplement is dedicated, contributed to all three works and
is also the subject of a biography in the supplement; 18 social
scientists who contributed to both encyclopedias are biographees
in the supplement; 52 contributors to the International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences are biographees in the supplement; and 50
contributors to the supplement were also contributors to the original
17 volumes of the encyclopedia.
As with any project involving so many authors and a tightly
 INTRODUCTION xv

followed schedule, a handful of contributors failed to deliver the

manuscripts they agreed to write. The editors are grateful to those
individuals who accepted these assignments at the last minute so that
deserving biographees would not be omitted.

Preparation of the manuscript

All of the articles in the supplement are original and conform to
the style rules that were developed in the 1960s for the publication
of the encyclopedia. Contributors received specific instructions con-
cerning the tone and organization of the biographies. The editors tried
to maintain a balance between insisting on total uniformity of the
contents of the biographies and on allowing the contributors so much
flexibility that the volume might lose its unity.
In keeping with the encyclopedia's policy, the emphases in the
biographies are the subjects' intellectual development and contribu-
tions to the social sciences. Thus, comparatively little biographical
data is included in many articles. We urged contributors to discuss
the subjects' intellectual surroundings and to analyze the intellectual
climate during their university and professional years. Whose ideas
were dominant during their formative years? Whom have they taught
and influenced? With whom among their colleagues have they col-
laborated? To present a balanced picture, we encouraged contributors
to present any major criticisms of their biographees' work as well as
to analyze any schools of thought that grew up in support of or in
opposition to their findings. Contributors were free to divide their
biographies topically or chronologically if it helped to present the ma-
terial in a more organized format. Each biography was reviewed by
at least one specialist in the biographees' field before it was accepted.
All of the contributors saw the edited versions of their manuscripts
and had the opportunity to read their articles in galley.

Bibliographies
Perhaps the most frequently consulted feature of any reference
work is its bibliographies. The bibliographies in the supplement were
prepared by the contributors, but a staff of three bibliographers veri-
fied each item for accuracy and, where necessary, updated the entry
or added useful information in the annotation. The bibliographies are
divided into works by the biographee, which range from highly selec-
tive to almost complete listings, and supplementary entries, including
readings about the biographee and his or her work.
Following the precedent established in the International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences, the date of first publication is given for
all works, but the publishing information refers, where possible, to
the most recent, readily available, English language edition of each
work. In this way, the historical development of the biographees' in-
tellectual growth is indicated. Where later editions or reprint editions
of works are available, the date of first publication is given in paren-
theses in the bibliography. In the text, the date of first publication is
given for all works cited; if a citation specifically refers to a later edi-
tion, the date of first publication is in brackets. Information concern-
ing translations, changes in titles of publications, and forthcoming
works is available in the annotations.
%vi INTRODUCTION
Acknowledgments
Above all, this volume is a product of the community of social
scientists. During the past two and one-half years, the editors have
incurred special obligations to those individuals named in the list of
advisers.
No such project is successful, however, without a professional
support staff. Their efforts must be well-coordinated, their work accu-
rately and quickly performed, and their patience endless. The staff,
whose specialized knowledge and skills made this volume possible,
includes Evelyn Geller, the copy editor, and Nancy E. Schroeder,
Patricia Maughan, and Susan Copeland, the bibliographers. A more
general debt of gratitude is due to the Columbia University Libraries
and the New York Public Library for use of their facilities.
David L. Sills deserves a special thanks for his constant support
of the idea of a supplementary volume of biographies and for his fre-
quent advice at every stage. He participated in the process of selecting
subjects and contributors; he read all of the articles in galley, search-
ing for substantive and editorial problems; he prepared the "Preface"
to the volume; and he wrote one of the longest articles—on the soci-
ologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld.
BARBARA A. CHERNOW
List
of Advisers

The editors wish to thank the following individuals for their advice
during the various stages of the preparation of the Biographical Sup-
plement to the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.

Charles J. Adams A. K. Bierman

McGill University San Francisco State University

Inker! Anttila Cyril E. Black

Research Institute of Legal Policy (Helsinki) Princeton University
A. Appadorai
Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) W. D. Borrie
Australian National University
Kenneth J. Arrow
Harvard University S. J. Butlin
Roseville, Australia
Kenneth Bailey
University of California, Los Angeles Nils Christie
University of Oslo
Elinor G. Barber
Ford Foundation
Lewis A. Coser
William C. Bark State University of New York, Stony Brook
Stanford, California
V. M. Dandekar
William J. Baumol Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics (Poona)
Princeton University ;
Donald J. Dewey
T. O. Beidelman Columbia University
New York University
Manuel Diegues Junior
Abram Bergson Departmento de Assuntos Culturais (Rio de Janeiro)
Harvard University

H. Russell Bernard Wilton S. Dillon

West Virginia University Smithsonian Institution (Washington, D.C.)

Jagdish N. Bhagwati Leon Dupriez

Massachusetts Institute of Technology University of Louvain

XVII
xviii LIST OF ADVISERS

John Eatwell Alison Jolly

Trinity College (Cambridge) University of Sussex

Paul Edwards Alfred Kadushin

City University of New York, Brooklyn College University of Wisconsin

Heinz Eulau Morton A. Kaplan

Stanford University University of Chicago

Renee C. Fox Peter A. Karsten

University of Pennsylvania University of Pittsburgh

William T. R. Fox Gregory A. Kimble

Columbia University Duke University

Lawrence R. Klein
John A. Garraty University of Pennsylvania
Columbia University
Otto Klineberg
Joseph Goldstein £cole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris)
Yale University
T. S. Krawiec
Albert E. Goss Skidmore College
Rutgers University
William H. Kruskal
Gerald N. Grob University of Chicago
Rutgers University
Paul F. Lazarsfeld
H. A. deS. Gunasekera Columbia University
Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
(Colombo, Sri Lanka) Edmund R. Leach
King's College (Cambridge)
Trygve Haavelmo
University of Oslo Erich L. Lehmann
University of California, Berkeley
John R. Hicks
All Souls College (Oxford) Gardner Lindzey
Center for Advanced Study in the Behaviorial
Sciences (Stanford)
Roger Hood
All Souls College (Oxford)
Seymour M. Lipset
Stanford University
Irving Louis Horowitz
Rutgers University Leon Lipson
Yale University
Bert F. Hoselitz
University of Chicago Martin U. Martel
Brown University
Dell H. Hymes
University of Pennsylvania Bruce Mazlish
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Kenneth Janda
Northwestern University Margaret Mead
American Museum of Natural History (New York)
Morris Janowitz
University of Chicago Robert K. Merton
Columbia University
D. Gale Johnson Ephraim H. Mizruchi
University of Chicago Syracuse University

Harry M. Johnson Ashley Montagu

University of Illinois Princeton, New Jersey
 LIST OF ADVISERS xix
Basil J. Moore James N. Rosenau
Wesleyan University University of Southern California

Richard E. Morgan Jennie-Keith Ross

Bowdoin College Swarthmore College

Henry W. Morton Richard S. Rudner

City University of New York, Queens College Washington University

Irwin T. Sanders
Walter F. Murphy Boston University
Princeton University
Alfred Sauvy
Yash Nandan College de France
Rider College
Stephen Schafer
Jacob Needleman Northeastern University
San Francisco State University
Erich Schneider
University of Kiel
Kazushi Ohkawa
International Development Center of Japan (Tokyo)
Edward Shils
University of Chicago
Marvin E. Olsen
Battelle Memorial Institute (Columbus)
C. G. F. Simkin
University of Sydney
Don Patinkin
Hebrew University of Jerusalem D. Moody Smith
Duke University
William Petersen
The Ohio State University
Robert A. Spivey
Randolph Macon Women's College
David Pilbeam
Yale University M. N. Srinivas
Institute for Social and Economic Change
Helmuth Plessner (Bangalore)
Erlenbach, Germany
George W. Stocking, Jr.
John W. Pratt University of Chicago
Harvard University
Robert H. Strotz
Robert F. Randle Northwestern University
Columbia University
Judith M. Tanur
Albert Rees State University of New York, Stony Brook
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (New York)
Sarah G. Thomason
University of Pittsburgh
W. Michael Reisman
Yale University
Niels Thygesen
University of Copenhagen
David Riesman
Harvard University
Philip Wiener
Temple University
Milton Rokeach
Washington State University Herman Wold
University of Uppsala
Ester M. Ronquillo
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Marvin E. Wolfgang
Organization University of Pennsylvania
Directory
of Contributors
A Benesh-Weiner, Marijana
Altaian, Elizabeth C.
Harvard University
BRINTON, C. CRANE
Arndt, H. W.
Australian National University
CLARK, COLIN
Arrow, Kenneth J.
Harvard University
MARSCHAK, JACOB
Atkinson, A. B.
University College (London)
MEADE, JAMES E.
B Bork, Robert
Barenblatt, Lloyd
New York University
NEWCOMB, THEODORE M.
Barnes, J. A.
Churchill College (Cambridge}
FORTES, MEYER
Baumol, William J.
Princeton University
VINER, JACOB
Beidelman, T. O.
New York University
EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E.
Bell, Daniel
Harvard University
HOOK, SIDNEY
University of California, Los Angeles
HEIDER, FRITZ
Beteille, Andre
University of Delhi
BOSE, N. K.
Bhagwati, Jagdish N.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
JOHNSON, HARRY G.
Bierstedt, Robert
University of Virginia
ABEL, THEODORE
Bixenstine, V. Edwin
Kent State University
MOWRER, O. H.
Blumberg, Albert E.
Rutgers University
CARNAP, RUDOLF
Yale University
BICKEL, ALEXANDER M.
Bos, Henk C.
Erasmus University (Rotterdam)
TlNBERGEN, JAN
Bourgeois-Pichat, Jean
Comite International de Cooperation dais les
Recherches Rationales en Demographie(Paris)
SAUVY, ALFRED
Boyd, Richard W.
Wesleyan University
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E.
Breit, William
University of Virginia
AYRES, CLARENCE E.
XXI
xxii DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS

Buck-Morss, Susan Corden, W. M.

Cornell University Australian National University
ADORNO, T. W. MEADE, JAMES E.
Cranston, Maurice
London School of Economics and Political Science
OAKESHOTT, MICHAEL
Crespi, Irving
Mathematica (Princeton, New Jersey)
ROPER, ELMO
Cain, Glen G.
University of Wisconsin Cropsey, Joseph
DOUGLAS, PAUL H. University of Chicago
STRAUSS, LEO
Cain, Seymour
Chicago, Illinois Crow, James F.
ELIADE, MIRCEA University of Wisconsin
WRIGHT, SEWALL
Caldwell, Bettye M. Curti, Merle
University of Arkansas
MURPHY, Lois B. University of Wisconsin
SHRYOCK, RICHARD H.
Campbell, Angus
University of Michigan
LIKERT, RENSIS

Carneiro, Robert L.
American Museum of Natural History (New York)
D
WHITE, LESLIE ALVIN Davenport, John W.
University of Wisconsin
Catton, William R., Jr. HARLOW, HARRY F.
Washington State University
DODD, STUART C. David, Herbert A.
Iowa State University
Child, Irvin L. PEARSON, E. S.
Yale University
WHITING, JOHN W. M. Davis, Vincent
University of Kentucky
Chipman, John S. SPROUT, HAROLD AND MARGARET
University of Minnesota
MACHLUP, FRITZ Dickson, Harald
University of Goteborg
Chirot, Daniel OHLIN, BERTIL
University of Washington
STAHL, HENRI H. Dofny, Jacques
University of Montreal
Coale, Ansley FHIEDMANN, GEORGES
Princeton University
NOTESTEIN, FRANK W. Douglas, Mary
Russell Sage Foundation (New York)
Cole, Michael FORDE, DARYLL
University of California, San Diego
LURIA, A. R.

Colson, Elizabeth
University of California, Berkeley
GLUCKMAN, MAX E
Comrey, Andrew L. Easterlin, Richard A.
University of California, Los Angeles University of Pennsylvania
GUILFORD, J. P. KUZNETS, SIMON
Conant, Miriam Bernheim Eatwell, John
Sarah Lawrence College Trinity College (Cambridge)
ARON, RAYMOND DOBB, MAURICE H.
 DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS xociii

Eckaus, Richard S. Gay, Peter

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Yale University
ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, PAUL N. HOFSTADTER, RlCHARD

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenaus Germain, Carel R.

Max-Planck-Institut fur Verhaltensphysiologie University of Connecticut
(Seeweisen iiber Starnberg, Germany) DUBOS, RENE
LORENZ, KONRAD
Germino, Dante
Eichner, Alfred University of Virginia
Columbia University VOEGELIN, ERIC
MEANS, GARDINER C.
Gibbs, James Lowell, Jr.
Elzinga, Kenneth G. Stanford University
University of Virginia HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON
COASE, R. H.
Giles, Eugene
Erlich, Alexander University of Illinois
Columbia University HOWELLS, WILLIAM WHITE
GERSCHENKRON, ALEXANDER
Godsey, John D.
Wesley Theological Seminary
NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD

Goodenough, Ward H.
University of Pennsylvania
Fehrenbacher, Don E. MURDOCH, GEORGE P.
Stanford University
POTTER, DAVID M. Goodman, Louis Wolf
Yale University
Feiwel, George R. WINCH, ROBERT F.
University of Tennessee
KALECKI, MICHAL

Feuer, Lewis S.
University of Virginia
LOVE JOY, ARTHUR O. H
Fogelson, Raymond D. Halle, Morris
University of Chicago Massachusetts Institute of Technology
EGGAN, FRED JAKOBSON, ROMAN

Foley, Donald L. Harcourt, G. C.

University of California, Berkeley University of Adelaide
MUMFORD, LEWIS ROBINSON, JOAN
Fox, Renee C. Hare, A. Paul
University of Pennsylvania University of Cape Town
MEAD, MARGARET MORENO, JACOB L.
Frenkel, Jacob A. Hamad, Stevan
University of Chicago The Behavioral and Brain Sciences (Princeton,
JOHNSON, HARRY G. New Jersey)
MONTAGU, ASHLEY
Furth, Hans
Catholic University of America Hassner, Pierre
PIAGET, JEAN Fondation Nationale des Sciences (Paris)
JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE

Hearnshaw, L. S.
University of Liverpool
G BURT, CYRIL

Garvey, Gerald Hertzberg, Arthur

Princeton University Columbia University
COR WIN, EDWARD S. BARON, SALO W.
xxw DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS

Killers, Delbert R. Johnson, Ivan C.

The Johns Hopkins University California State University, Northridge
ALBRIGHT, WILLIAM F. HARROD, ROY F.

Hinde, R. A.
Medical Research Council (Cambridge)
TlNBERGEN, NlKOLAAS

Hinshaw, Robert E. K
Beloit College
TAX, SOL Kahn, Robert L.
University of Michigan
Hood, Roger KATZ, DANIEL
All Souls College (Oxford)
RADZINOWICZ, LEON Kateb, George
Amherst College
Horowitz, Irving Louis ARENDT, HANNAH
Rutgers University
LYND, ROBERT S. AND HELEN MERRELL Kessen, William
Yale University
Howard, J. Woodford, Jr. SEARS, ROBERT R.
The Johns Hopkins University
S WISHER, CARL B. Kimball, Solon T.
University of Florida
Hutchison, Terence W. WARNER, W. LLOYD
University of Birmingham
ROBBINS, LIONEL
Kimber, Robert
Hyman, Herbert H. Temple, Maine
KAHLER, ERICH
Wesleyan University
KLINEBERG, OTTO
Kimble, Gregory A.
Duke University
SCHLOSBERG, HAROLD

Kirk, Dudley
I Stanford University
TAEUBER, IRENE B. AND CONRAD
Ittelson, William H.
University of Arizona Klein, Thomas W.
CANTRIL, HADLEY Kamehameha Early Education Program (Honolulu)
CATTELL, RAYMOND B.

Klopfer, Peter H.
Duke University
BATESON, GREGORY

Kommers, Donald P.
Janowitz, Morris University of Notre Dame
University of Chicago LEIBHOLZ, GERHARD
BETTELHEIM, BRUNO
Koslin, Bertram L.
Jay, Martin Touchstone Applied Science Associates (Elmsford,
University of California, Berkeley New York)
HORKHEIMER, MAX; MARCUS E, HERBERT SHERIF, MUZAFER

Jenness, Arthur Kuhnle, Stein

Palo Alto, California University of Bergen
ALLPORT, GORDON W. MARSHALL, T. H.

Johansen, Leif Kuper, Hilda

University of Oslo University of California, Los Angeles
FRISCH, RAGNAR SCHAPERA, ISAAC

Johnson, D. Gale Kupperstein, Lenore

University of Chicago University of Pennsylvania
SCHULTZ, THEODORE W. SELLIN, THORSTEN
 DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS xxv

Kurland, Philip B. Lindzey, Gardner

University of Chicago Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
FREUND, PAUL A. Sciences (Stanford)
MURRAY, HENRY A.

Lipman-Blumen, Jean
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences (Stanford)
BERNARD, JESSIE
Labov, William
University of Pennsylvania Littleton, C. Scott
WEINREICH, URIEL Occidental College
DUMEZIL, GEORGES
Laidler, David
University of Western Ontario Lowry, Richard
LERNER, ABBA P.
Vassar College
Lancaster, Kelvin MASLOW, ABRAHAM H.
Columbia University
PHILLIPS, A. WILLIAM Lyons, Andrew P.
Wilfrid Laurier University (Waterloo, Ontario)
Landar, Herbert J. BASTIDE, ROGER
California State University, Los Angeles
HOIJER, HARRY
Landau, Genevieve Millet
Hasbro Center for Child Development and Education
(New York)
ERIKSON, ERIK H.
M
Lasswell, Thomas E. McCall, George J.
University of Southern California University of Missouri
BOGARDUS, EMORY S. HEBB, D. O.

Laszlo, Ervin Maccoby, Michael

United Nations Institute for Training and Research Harvard University
(New York) FROMM, ERICH
BERTALANFFY, LUDWIG VON
Machlup, Fritz
Le Cam, Lucien New York University and Princeton University
University of California, Berkeley HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON
NEYMAN, JERZY
McNeill, William H.
Leach, Edmund R. University of Chicago
King's College (Cambridge) TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J.
FIRTH, RAYMOND
Maier, Joseph
Leadbetter, M. R. Rutgers University
University of North Carolina TANNENBAUM, FRANK
HOTELLING, HAROLD

Lee, Everett S. Maranda, Pierre

Laval University
University of Georgia LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE
THOMAS, DOROTHY S.
Leifer, Ronald Markham, Jesse W.
Ithaca, New York Harvard University
BECKER, ERNEST CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD H.

Lerner, Daniel Martel, Martin U.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Brown University
LASSWELL, HAROLD D. PARSONS, TALCOTT

Lewontin, Richard C. Martindale, Don

Harvard University University of Minnesota
DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS ROSE, ARNOLD M.

Lindley, Dennis V. Matarazzo, Joseph D.

University College (London) University of Oregon
SAVAGE, LEONARD JIMMIE WECHSLER, DAVID
xxvi DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS

Mausner, Bernard
Beaver College O
ASCH, SOLOMON E.
Osborne, Richard H.
Miernyk, William H. University of Wisconsin
West Virginia University SHELDON, WILLIAM H.
LEONTIEF, WASSILY

Miller, J. D. B.
St. John's College (Cambridge)
HANCOCK, WILLIAM KEITH
Parker, Harold T.
Miller, J. Hillis Duke University
GOTTSCHALK, LOUIS
Yale University
BURKE, KENNETH
Parsons, Talcott
Miller, Neal E. Harvard University
JASPERS, KARL
The Rockefeller University
DOLLARD, JOHN
Pasinetti, Luigi L.
Moore, Geoffrey H. Catholic University of the Sacred Heart (Milan)
KALDOR, NICHOLAS ; SRAFFA, PIERO
Center for International Business Cycle Research
(Rutgers University)
BURNS, ARTHUR F. Paterson, Thomas G.
University of Connecticut
Morgenbesser, Sidney KENNAN, GEORGE F.
Columbia University
NAGEL, ERNEST Petersen, William
The Ohio State University
Morris, Terence DAVIS, KINGSLEY
London School of Economics and Political Science
MANNHEIM, HERMANN Petrinovich, Lewis
University of California, Riverside
Murphy, Robert F. KRECH, DAVID
Columbia University
STEWARD, JULIAN H. Pfaffmann, Carl
The Rockefeller University
CARMICHAEL, LEONARD

Pfautz, Harold W.
Brown University
N ANGELL, ROBERT COOLEY

Naess, Arne Pfouts, Ralph W.

University of Oslo University of North Carolina
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN HOTELLING, HAROLD

Nakhnikian, George Piers, Maria W.

Indiana University Erikson Institute (Loyola University)
RUSSELL, BERTRAND ERIKSON, ERIK H.

Narain, Dhirendra Porter, Glenn

University of Bombay Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation (Greenville,
GHURYE, G. S. Wilmington, Delaware)
COCHRAN, THOMAS C.
Needham, Rodney Prosch, Harry
All Souls College (Oxford)
HERTZ, ROBERT; HOCART, A. M. Skidmore College
POLANYI, MICHAEL
Newman, Lottie M.
Yale University
FREUD, ANNA Q
Nicholas, H. G. Quinn, Philip L.
New College (Oxford) Brown University
BROGAN, DENIS HEMPEL, CARL G.
 DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS xxvii

Quinton, Anthony Sears, Robert R.

Trinity College (Oxford) Stanford University
POPPER, KARL R. HILGARD, ERNEST R.

Seiler, Ellen Viner

Princeton University
VINER, JACOB

R Sharpe, M. E.
M. E. Sharpe, Incorporated (White Plains,
New York)
Radzinowicz, Leon GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH
Trinity College (Cambridge)
STEPHEN, JAMES F. Sheatsley, Paul B.
University of Chicago
Ranney, Austin GALLUP, GEORGE
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research (Washington, D.C.) Shubik, Martin
HERRING, PENDLETON
Yale University
MORGENSTERN, OSKAR
Raskin, Nathaniel
Northwestern University Sills, David L.
ROGERS, CARL R.
Social Science Research Council (New York)
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
Reid, G. C.
University of Edinburgh Simpson, Richard L.
HICKS, JOHN R.
University of North Carolina
VANCE, RUPERT B.
Reisman, W. Michael
Yale University Smith, Peter H.
McDoucAL, MYRES S.
University of Wisconsin
HANKE, LEWIS U.
Rokkan, Stein
European Consortium for Political Research
(Bergen, Norway) Solley, Charles M.
MARSHALL, T. H. Wayne State University
MURPHY, GARDNER
Rothschild, Fritz A.
Jewish Theological Seminary Spiro, Herbert J.
HESCHEL, ABRAHAM J. Washington, D.C.
FRIEDRICH, CARL J.
Rowen, Herbert H.
Rutgers University Spiro, Melford E.
GEYL, PIETER University of California, La Jolla
HALLOWELL, A. IRVING
Rudner, Richard S.
Washington University Srinivasan, T. N.
GOODMAN, NELSON The World Bank (Washington, D.C.)
MAHALANOBIS, P. C.

Stamper, B. Maxwell
The United Nations (New York)
GLASS, D. V.

Stanley, Walter C.
Schachter, Oscar National Institute of Mental Health (Bethesda,
Columbia University Maryland) and the American University
JESSUP, PHILIP C. SKINNER, B. F.

Schmeidler, Gertrude Stewart, V. Lome

City University of New York, City College University of Toronto
RHINE, J. B. GLUECK, SHELDON AND ELEANOR T.

Schorske, Carl E. Stone, Ronald

Princeton University Pittsburgh Theological Seminary
LANGER, WILLIAM L. NIEBUHR, REINHOLD
xxvin DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS

Streeten, Paul
The World Bank (Washington, D.C.) V
MYRDAL, GUNNAR
Vose, Clement E.
Susman, Warren I. Wesleyan University
Rutgers University FELLMAN, DAVID
CURTI, MERLE

W
Wallerstein, Immanuel
State University of New York, Binghamton
BRAUDEL, FERNAND

Warnock, G. J.
Hertford College (Oxford)
RYLE, GILBERT
Tax, Sol
University of Chicago Watkins, John
LEWIS, OSCAR London School of Economics and Political Science
LAKATOS, IMRE
Taylor, George E.
Washington Council on International Trade (Seattle) Watson, G. S.
FAIRBANK, JOHN K.; WITTFOGEL, KARL A. Princeton University
SCHEFFE, HENRY
Thompson, Kenneth W.
University of Virginia Weiner, Bernard
BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT; CARR, E. H.; MORGENTHAU,
University of California, Los Angeles
HANS J. HEIDER, FRITZ
Tobias, Phillip V. Werbner, Richard P.
University of Witwatersrand University of Manchester
DART, RAYMOND A.; LEAKEY, L. S. B. RICHARDS, AUDREY I.
Trager, Frank N. Wischner, George J.
New York University Cleveland State University
FURNIVALL, JOHN S. SPENCE, KENNETH W.
Travis, Martin B. Wolf, Ken
State University of New York, Stony Brook Murray State University
WRIGHT, QUINCY KOHN, HANS

Wolfe, J. N.
University of Edinburgh
HICKS, JOHN R.

Wolfgang, Marvin E.
U University of Pennsylvania
SELLIN, THORSTEN
Uzgiris, Ina C. Wrong, Dennis H.
Clark University Princeton University
HUNT, J. McVicKER LICHTHEIM, GEORGE
Acknowledgments
by Contributors

The following contributors wish to extend their thanks for the special
assistance they received in the preparation of their biographies for the
supplement:
J. A. Barnes to Meyer Fortes, for his help in writing the biography of
Fortes.
Henk C. Bos to P. de Wolff, whose article "Tinbergen's Contribution to
the Business-cycle Theory and Policy." De Economist March/April 1970:
113—125, was helpful in preparing the section entitled "Economic business
cycle research" in the biography of Jan Tinbergen.
G. C. Harcourt to Tom Asimakopulos, M. C. Bradbrook, John Burbidge,
Jon Cohen, Phyllis Deane, Robert Dixon, John Eatwell, Peter Groenewegen,
Donald Harris, John Hatch, Susan Howson, Bruce McFarlane, Ian McLean,
Donald Moggridge, Mark Permian, Lorie Tarshis, John Vaizey, David Vines,
and Trevor Wilson, for their help and comments on the draft of the biogra-
phy of Joan Robinson.
Steven Hamad to C. L. Brace, R. M. and C. H. Berndt, M. Goldstein,
R. Gorney, W. LaBarre, and A. Lyons, for providing helpful information
for the biography of Ashley Montagu.
J. Woodford Howard, Jr., to Idella Gwatkin Swisher, for information
about Carl B. Swisher's education and bibliography.
Robert Kimber to Alice Kahler and Eva Engel, for biographical and bib-
liographical information on Erich Kahler.
William Labov to Beatrice Silverman-Weinreich, for help in the prepa-
ration of the biography of Uriel Weinreich.
David Laidler to Russell S. Boyer, Thomas Mayer, Lionel Robbins, Don
Patinkin, John R. Hicks, and Abba P. Lerner, for helpful comments on early
drafts of the biography of Lerner
Herbert J. Landar to Dorothy Hoijer, for biographical and bibliographical
details on Harry Hoijer.
Carl Pfaffmann to Pearl Carmichael, for her assistance in providing much
of the material upon which the biography of Leonard Carmichael is based,
and to Leonard C. Mead, for his assistance and particularly helpful bio-
graphical memoir.
Leon Radzinowicz to Mary Lou McGanney, his assistant while he was
visiting distinguished professor of criminal justice at John Jay College,
for assistance in the preparation of the biography of James F. Stephen.
David L. Sills to Richard D. Alba, Elinor G. Barber, Allen H. Barton,
Leo Bogart, Terry N. Clark, James S. Coleman, Albert E. Gollin, Marie
Jahoda, Charles Kadushin, Elihu Katz, Patricia L. Kendall, Herbert Menzel,
Robert K. Merton, Paul M. Neurath, Anthony Oberschall, Ann K. Pasanella,

XXIX
xxx ACKNOWLEDGMENTS BY CONTRIBUTORS

Hanan C. Selvin, Yole G. Sills, Judith M. Tanur, and Hans Zeisel for
bringing their personal knowledge of Paul F. Lazarsfeld to the task of
commenting on various drafts of the Lazarsfeld biography; to Robert A.
Gates, Peter B. Read, David Seidman, and David L. Szanton for their
comments as readers who were previously unacquainted with Lazarsfeld;
and to Leona Cohen, for her careful and patient typing and retyping of
the manuscript.
Herbert J. Spiro to Klaus von Beyme of the University of Heidelberg,
Lenore Friedrich, Paul Friedrich of the University of Chicago, and David
Riesman of Harvard University for their help in preparing the biography
of Carl J. Friedrich.
Walter C. Stanley to the faculty, graduate students, and staff of the
Department of Psychology, the American University, Washington, D.C..
for aid in the final stages of the preparation of his biography of B. F.
Skinner.
Alphabetical List
of Biographies

Carr, E. H. Kenneth W. Thompson

Cattell, Raymond B. Thomas W. Klein
Abel, Theodore Robert Bierstedt Chamberlin, Edward H. Jesse W. Markham
Adorno, T. W. Susan Buck-Morss Clark, Colin H. W. Arndt
Albright, William F. Delbert R. Hillers Coase, R. H. Kenneth G. Elzinga
Allport, Gordon W. Arthur Jenness Cochran, Thomas C. Glenn Porter
Angell, Robert Cooley Harold W. Pfautz Corwin, Edward S. Gerald Garvey
Arendt, Hannah George Kateb Curti, Merle Warren I. Susman
Aron, Raymond Miriam Bernheim Conant
Asch, Solomon E. Bernard Mausner
Ayres, Clarence E. William Breit
D
Dart, Raymond A. Phillip V. Tobias
B Davis, Kingsley William Petersen
Dobb, Maurice H. John Eatwell
Baron, Salo W. Arthur Hertzberg Dobzhansky, Theodosius Richard C. Lewontin
Bastide, Roger Andrew P. Lyons Dodd, Stuart C. William R. Catton, Jr.
Bateson, Gregory Peter H. Klopfer Dollard, John Neal E. Miller
Becker, Ernest Ronald Leifer Douglas, Paul H. Glen G. Cain
Bernard, Jessie Jean Lipman-Blumen Dubos, Rene Carel B. Germain
Bertalanffy, Ludwig von Ervin Laszlo Dumezil, Georges C. Scott Littleton
Bettelheim, Bruno Morris Janowitz
Bickel, Alexander M. Robert Bork
Bogardus, Emory S. Thomas E. Lasswell
Bose, N. K. Andre Beteille
Braudel, Fernand Immanuel Wallerstein Eggan, Fred Raymond D. Fogelson
Brinton, C. Crane Elizabeth C. Altman Eliade, Mircea Seymour Cain
Brogan, Denis H. G. Nicholas Erikson, Erik H. Maria W. Piers and
Burke, Kenneth J. Hillis Miller Genevieve Millet Landau
Burns, Arthur F. Geoffrey H. Moore Evans-Pritchard, E. E. T. O. Beidelman
Burt, Cyril L. S. Hearnshaw
Butterfield, Herbert Kenneth W. Thompson

Fairbank, John K. George E. Taylor

Fellman, David Clement E. Vose
Cantril, Hadley William H. Ittelson Firth, Raymond Edmund R. Leach
Carmichael, Leonard Carl Pfaffmann Forde, Daryll Mary Douglas
Carnap, Rudolf Albert E. Blumberg Fortes, Meyer J. A. Barnes
 xxxtt ALPHABETICAL LIST OF BIOGRAPHIES

Freud, Anna Lottie M. Newman Johnson, Harry G. Jagdish N. Bhagwati a

Freund, Paul A. Philip B. Kurland Jacob A. Fren,
Friedmann, Georges Jacques Dofny Jouvenel, Bertrand de Pierre Hassi
Friedrich, Carl J. Herbert J. Spiro
Frisch, Ragnar Leif Johansen
Fromm, Erich Michael Maccoby K
Furnivall, John S. Frank N. Trager
Kahler, Erich Robert Kim\
Kaldor, Nicholas Luigi L. Pasint
Kalecki, Michal George R. Feii
G Katz, Daniel Robert L. Ka
Galbraith, John Kenneth M. E. Sharpe Kennan, George F. Thomas G. Paten
Gallup, George Paul B. Sheatsley Klineberg, Otto Herbert H. Hyn
Gerschenkron, Alexander Alexander Erlich Kohn, Hans Ken W
Geyl, Pieter Herbert H. Rowen Krech, David Lewis Petrinov
Ghurye, G. S. Dhirendra Narain Kuznets, Simon Richard A. Eastei
Glass, D. V. B. Maxwell Stamper
Gluekman, Max Elizabeth Colson
Glueck, Sheldon and Eleanor T. V. Lome Stewart
Goodman, Nelson Richard S. Rudner
Gottschalk, Louis Harold T. Parker Lakatos, Imre John Watk
Guilford, J. P. Andrew L. Comrey Langer, William L. Carl E. Schor
Lasswell, Harold D. Daniel Ler
Lazarsfeld, Paul F. David L. S
Leakey, L. S. B. Phillip V. Tol
H Leibholz, Gerhard Donald P. Komn
Leontief, Wassily William H. Mier
Hallowell, A. Irving Melford E. Spiro Lerner, Abba P. David Lai(
Hancock, William Keith J.D. B. Miller Levi-Strauss, Claude Pierre Mara
Hanke, Lewis U. Peter H. Smith Lewis, Oscar Sol'
Harlow, Harry F. John W. Davenport Lichtheim, George Dennis H. Wr
Harrod, Roy F. Ivan C. Johnson Likert, Rensis Angus Camp
Hayek, Friedrich A. von Fritz Machlup Lorenz, Konrad Irendus Eibl-Eibesf
Hebb, D. O. George J. McCall Lovejoy, Arthur O. Lewis S. Fe
Heidegger, Martin Arne Naess Luria, A. R. Michael (
Heider, Fritz Marijana Benesh-Weiner and Lynd, Robert S.
Bernard Weiner and Helen Merrell Irving Louis Horoi
Hempel, Carl G. Philip L. Quinn
Herring, Pendleton Austin Ranney
Hertz, Robert Rodney Needham
Heschel, Abraham J. Fritz A. Rothschild M
Hicks, John R. G. C. Reid and J. N. Wolfe McDougal, Myres S. W. Michael Reisi
Hilgard, Ernest R. Robert R. Sears Machlup, Fritz John S. Chipi
Hocart, A. M. Rodney Needham Mahalanobis, P. C. T. N. Srinivc
Hoebel, E. Adamson James Lowell Gibbs, Jr. Mannheim, Hermann Terence Me
Hofstadter, Richard Peter Gay Marcuse, Herbert Martin
Hoijer, Harry Herbert J. Landar Marschak, Jacob Kenneth J. Ai
Hook, Sidney Daniel Bell Marshall, T. H. Stein Kuhnle
Horkheimer, Max Martin Jay Stein Rol
Hotelling, Harold Ralph W. Pfouts and Maslow, Abraham H. Richard Lc
M. R. Leadbetter Mead, Margaret Renee C.
Ho wells, William White Eugene Giles Meade, James E. W. M. Corden
Hunt, J. McVicker Ina C. Uzgiris A. B. Atkit
Means, Gardiner C. Alfred Eic\
Montagu, Ashley Stevan Ha>
Moreno, Jacob L. A. Paul J
Morgenstern, Oskar Martin Sh
Jakobson, Roman Morris Halle Morgenthau, Hans J. Kenneth W. Thorn
Jaspers, Karl Talcott Parsons Mowrer, O. H. V. Edwin Bixem
Jessup, Philip C. Oscar Schachter Mumford, Lewis Donald L. I
 ALPHABETICAL LIST OF BIOGRAPHIES xxxiii

Murdock, George P. Ward H. Goodenough Schapera, Isaac Hilda Kuper

Murphy, Gardner
Murphy, Lois B.
Murray, Henry A.
Myrdal, Gunnar
N Sheldon, William H.
Nagel, Ernest
Newcomb, Theodore M.
Neyman, Jerzy
Niebuhr, H. Richard
Niebuhr, Reinhold
Notestein, Frank W.
o Steward, Julian H.
Oakeshott, Michael
Ohlin, Bertil
Charles M. Solley Schattschneider, E. E. Richard W. Boyd
Bettye M. Caldwell Scheffe, Henry G. S. Watson
Gardner Lindzey Schlosberg, Harold Gregory A. Kimble
Paul Streeten Schultz, Theodore W. D. Gale Johnson
Sears, Robert R. William Kessen
Sellin, Thorsten Marvin E. Wolfgang and
Lenore Kupperstein
Richard H. Osborne
Sidney Morgenbesser Sherif, Muzafer Bertram L. Koslin
Lloyd Barenblatt Shryock, Richard H. Merle Curti
Lucien Le Cam Skinner, B. F. Walter C. Stanley
John D. Godsey Spence, Kenneth W. George J. Wischner
Ronald Stone Sprout, Harold and Margaret Vincent Davis
Ansley Coale Sraffa, Piero Luigi L. Pasinetti
Stahl, Henri H. Daniel Chirot
Stephen, James F. Leon Radzinowicz
Strauss, Leo
Robert F. Murphy
Joseph Cropsey
Maurice Cranston S wisher, Carl B. /. Woodford Howard, Jr.
Harold Dickson

Taeuber, Irene B. and Conrad Dudley Kirk

Parsons, Talcott Martin U. Martel Tannenbaum, Frank Joseph Maier
Pearson, E. S. Herbert A. David Tax, Sol Robert E. Hinshaw
Phillips, A. William Kelvin Lancaster Thomas, Dorothy S. Everett S. Lee
Piaget, Jean Hans Furth Tinbergen, Jan Henk C. Bos
Polanyi, Michael Harry Prosch Tinbergen, Nikolaas R. A. Hinde
Popper, Karl R. Anthony Quinton Toynbee, Arnold J. William H. McNeill
Potter, David M. Don E. Fehrenbacher

R V
Radzinowicz, Leon Roger Hood Vance, Rupert B. Richard L. Simpson
Rhine, J. B. Gertrude Schmeidler Viner, Jacob William J. Baumol and
Richards, Audrey I. Richard P. Werbner Ellen Viner Seller
Robbins, Lionel Terence W. Hutchison Voegelin, Eric Dante Germino
Robinson, Joan G. C. Harcourt
Rogers, Carl R. Nathaniel Raskin
Roper, Elmo Irving Crespi W
Rose, Arnold M. Don Martindale
Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul N. Richard S. Eckaus Warner, W. Lloyd Solon T. Kimball
Russell, Bertrand George Nakhnikian Wechsler, David Joseph D. Matarazzo
Ryle, Gilbert G. J. Warnock Weinreich, Uriel William Labov
White, Leslie Alvin Robert L. Carneiro
Whiting, John W. M. Irvin L. Child
Winch, Robert F. Louis Wolf Goodman
Wittfogel, Karl A. George E. Taylor
Sauvy, Alfred Jean Bourgeois-Pichat Wright, Quincy Martin B. Travis
Savage, Leonard Jimmie Dennis V. Lindley Wright, Sewall James F. Crow
Classification
of Biographies

The classified list of biographies that follows offers readers a survey

of the different fields represented by the social scientists discussed in
the supplement. Every biography in the supplement has been classi-
fied at least once, despite the fact that not every biography fits easily
into the categories listed below. It should be noted that the categories
listed below do not correspond exactly to those listed in the "Classifi-
cation of Articles" on pages 83-108 in volume 17.

Anthropology Philosophy
Criminology Political Science and Legal Theory
Demography Psychiatry
Economics Psychology
History and Philosophy of History Religion
Human Biology Sociology
Linguistics Statistics

tA/i/Vt'V C/
xxxvi CLASSIFICATION OF BIOGRAPHIES

ANTHROPOLOGY
BATE SON, GREGORY LEAKEY, L. S. B.
BECKER, ERNEST LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE
DART, RAYMOND A. LEWIS, OSCAR
DUMEZIL, GEORGES LORENZ, KONRAD
EGGAN, FRED MEAD, MARGARET
EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. MONTAGU, ASHLEY
FIRTH, RAYMOND MURDOCK, GEORGE P.
FORDE, DARYLL RICHARDS, AUDREY I.
FORTES, MEYER SCHAPERA, ISAAC
GLUCKMAN, MAX SHELDON, WILLIAM H.
HALLO WELL, A. IRVING STEWARD, JULIAN H.
HERTZ, ROBERT TAX, SOL
HOCART, A. M. TlNBERGEN, NlKOLAAS
HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON WHITE, LESLIE ALVIN
HOIJER, HARRY WHITING, JOHN W. M.
Ho WELLS, WILLIAM WHITE

CRIMINOLOGY
GLUECK, SHELDON AND ELEANOR T. SELLIN, THORSTEN
MANNHEIM, HERMANN STEPHEN, JAMES F.
RADZINOWICZ, LEON TANNENBAUM, FRANK

DEMOGRAPHY
DAVIS, KlNGSLEY SAUVY, ALFRED
GLASS, D. V. TAEUBER, IRENE B. AND CONRAD
KUZNETS, SIMON THOMAS, DOROTHY S.
MYRDAL, GUNNAR VANCE, RUPERT B.
NOTESTEIN, FRANK W.

ECONOMICS
AYRES, CLARENCE E. LERNER, ABBA P.
BURNS, ARTHUR F. MACHLUP, FRITZ
CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD H. MARSCHAK,JACOB
CLARK, COLIN MEADE, JAMES E.
COASE, R. H. MEANS, GARDINER C.
DOBB, MAURICE H. MORGENSTERN, OSKAR
DOUGLAS, PAUL H. MYRDAL, GUNNAR
FRISCH, RAGNAR NOTESTEIN, FRANK W.
GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH OHLIN, BERTIL
GERSCHENKRON, ALEXANDER PHILLIPS, A. WILLIAM
HARROD, ROY F. ROBBINS, LIONEL
HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON ROBINSON, JOAN
HICKS, JOHN R. ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, PAUL N.
JOHNSON, HARRY G. SAUVY, ALFRED
KALDOR, NICHOLAS SCHULTZ, THEODORE W.
KALECKI, MICHAL SRAFFA, PIERO
KUZNETS, SIMON TlNBERGEN, JAN
LEONTIEF, WASSILY VINER, JACOB

H I S T O R Y A N D P H I L O S O P H Y OF HISTORY
ALBRIGHT, WILLIAM F. BRINTON, C. CRANE
ARENDT, HANNAH BROGAN, DENIS
ARON, RAYMOND BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT
BARON, SALO W. CARR, E. H.
BRAUDEL, FERNAND COCHRAN, THOMAS C.
 CLASSIFICATION OF BIOGRAPHIES xxxvii

CURTI, MERLE LANGER, WILLIAM L.

ELIADE, MIRCEA LICHTHEIM, GEORGE
FAIRSANK, JOHN K. LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O.
GEYL, PIETER OAKESHOTT, MICHAEL
GOTTSCHALK, LOUIS POTTER, DAVID M.
HANCOCK, WILLIAM KEITH SHRYOCK, RICHARD H.
HANKE, LEWIS U. TANNENBAUM, FRANK
HOFSTADTER, RICHARD TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J.
KAHLER, ERICH WITTFOGEL, KARL A.
KOHN,HANS

HUMAN BIOLOGY
BATESON, GREGORY LORENZ, KONRAD
BERTALANFFY, LUDWIG VON MONTAGU, ASHLEY
DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS SHELDON, WILLIAM H.
DUBOS, RENE TlNBERGEN, NlKOLAAS
LEAKEY, L. S. B. WRIGHT, SEWALL

LINGUISTICS
HOIJER, HARRY WEINREICH, URIEL
JAKOB SON, ROMAN

PHILOSOPHY
ADORNO, T. W. LAKATOS, IMRE
ARENDT, HANNAH LICHTHEIM, GEORGE
BURKE, KENNETH MARCUSE, HERBERT
CARNAP, RUDOLF MUMFORD, LEWIS
GOODMAN, NELSON NAGEL, ERNEST
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN POLANYI, MICHAEL
HEMPEL, CARL G. POPPER, KARL R.
HOOK, SIDNEY RUSSELL, BERTRAND
HORKHEIMER, MAX RYLE, GILBERT
JASPERS, KARL

POLITICAL S C I E N C E AND LEGAL THEORY

ARENDT, HANNAH
BICKEL, ALEXANDER M.
COR WIN, EDWARD S.
FELLMAN, DAVID
FREUND, PAUL A.
FRIEDRICH, CARL J.
FURNIVALL, JOHN S.
HERRING, PENDLETON
JESSUP, PHILIP C.
JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE
KENNAN, GEORGE F.
KOHN, HANS
LAS SWELL, HAROLD D.
LEIBHOLZ, GERHARD
McDoucAL, MYRES S.
MORGENTHAU, HANS J.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E.
SPROUT, HAROLD AND MARGARET
STRAUSS, LEO
SWISHER, CARL B.
VOEGELIN, ERIC
WITTFOGEL, KARL A.
WRIGHT, QUINCY

PSYCHIATRY
BETTELHEIM, BRUNO HILGARD, ERNEST R.
ERIKSON, ERIK H. LURIA, A. R.
FREUD, ANNA MASLOW, ABRAHAM H.
FROMM, ERICH MORENO, JACOB L.
HARLOW, HARRY F. PIAGET, JEAN
HEBB, D. O. ROGERS, CARL R.
xxxvin CLASSIFICATION OF BIOGRAPHIES

PSYCHOLOGY
ADORNO, T. W. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
ALLPORT, GORDON W. LIKERT, RENSIS
ASCH, SOLOMON E. LURIA, A. R.
BETTELHEIM, BRUNO MASLOW, ABRAHAM H.
BURT, CYRIL MORENO, JACOB L.
CANTRIL, HADLEY MOWRER, O. H.
CARMICHAEL, LEONARD MURPHY, GARDNER
CATTELL, RAYMOND B. MURPHY, Lois B.
DOLLARD, JOHN MURRAY, HENRY A.
ERIKSON, ERIK H. NEWCOMB, THEODORE M.
FREUD, ANNA PIAGET, JEAN
FROMM, ERICH RHINE, J. B.
GALLUP, GEORGE ROGERS, CARL R.
GUILFORD, J. P. ROPER, ELMO
HARLOW, HARRY F. SCHLOSBERG, HAROLD
HEBB, D. O. SEARS, ROBERT R.
HEIDER, FRITZ SHERIF, MUZAFER
HILGARD, ERNEST R. SKINNER, B. F.
HUNT, J. McVicKER SPENCE, KENNETH W.
KATZ, DANIEL WECHSLER, DAVID
KLINEBERG, OTTO WHITING, JOHN W. M.
KRECH, DAVID WRIGHT, SEWALL

RELIGION
ELIADE, MIRCEA NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD
HESCHEL, ABRAHAM J. NIEBUHR, REINHOLD

SOCIOLOGY
ABEL, THEODORE LYND, ROBERT S. AND HELEN MERRELL
ANGELL, ROBERT COOLEY MARSHALL, T. H.
BASTIDE, ROGER MUMFORD, LEWIS
BERNARD, JESSIE MYRDAL, GUNNAR
BOGARDUS, EMORY S. NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD
BOSE, N. K. PARSONS, TALCOTT
BURKE, KENNETH ROSE, ARNOLD M.
DAVIS, KINGSLEY STAHL, HENRI H.
DODD, STUART C. TAEUBER, IRENE B. AND CONRAD
FRIEDMANN, GEORGES THOMAS, DOROTHY S.
GHURYE, G. S. VANCE, RUPERT B.
HERTZ, ROBERT WARNER, W. LLOYD
JASPERS, KARL WINCH, ROBERT F.
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.

STATISTICS
HOTELLING, HAROLD PEARSON, E. S.
MAHALANOBIS, P. C. SAVAGE, LEONARD JIMMIE
NEYMAN, JERZY SCHEFFE, HENRY
International
Encyclopedia of the
SOCIAL
SCIENCES
 ABEL, THEODORE
Theodore Abel was born in Lodz, Poland, in
1896, to a prominent industrial family. After
completion of his Gymnasium studies in 1914,
he spent four years as a journalist, while also
publishing poetry and philosophical essays. He
served in the Polish Army during the Polish-
Russian War, 1918-1920, and as liaison officer
to the American Young Men's Christian Associa-
tion, 1920, and later director of its activities in
Poland. From 1920 to 1923 he studied law and
philosophy under Leon Petrazycki at the Uni-
versity of Warsaw, and philosophy and sociology
under Florian Znaniecki at the University of
Poznan. He emigrated to the United States in
1923 and, as a Gilder fellow, studied sociology
under Franklin H. Giddings and William Fielding
Ogburn at Columbia University, from which he
received his PH.D. in 1929.
Abel began his academic career at the Uni-
versity of Illinois, where he taught from 1925 to
1929, and then returned to Columbia University,
where he stayed from 1929 to 1951. In the latter
year he became professor and chairman of the
department of sociology at Hunter College of the
City University of New York, a post he retained
until his retirement in 1967. He spent post-
retirement years teaching at the University of
Notre Dame, the University of Waterloo (Can-
ada), and the University of New Mexico. For
many years he was a member of the board of
directors of the Institute of Immigrant Welfare
and served also during World War n as a mem-
ber of the Hoover Commission for Polish Relief.
He was president of the Eastern Sociological
Society during the year 1957/1958, and received
its merit award in 1969.
Although Abel is thought of primarily as a
sociological theorist, he made several contribu-
tions to sociological research. The first of these
was a study of Polish immigrants in a small
New England farming community, in which he
discovered that immigrants to this rural area
were assimilated more rapidly than those who
settled in such urban communities as Chicago
and Detroit, and that they also exhibited, in the
second generation, less delinquency and crime
(1929a).
The second, a study conducted under the
auspices of the Institute of Social and Religious
Research, was entitled Protestant Home Missions
to Catholic Immigrants (1933). Protestant
church leaders (especially Presbyterian, Baptist,
and Methodist) had come to fear that the influx
of immigrants from Catholic countries—Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Russia, and
Mexico—would alter the Protestant character of
American culture. Accordingly, they set up, es-
pecially in the cities where these immigrants
settled in large numbers, more than a thousand
"missions," ostensibly designed for charitable,
social, and civic purposes, but actually concerned
with the conversion of Catholic immigrants to
Protestantism. By means of interview, schedule,
questionnaire, and life history, Abel studied
some 150 of these missions and discovered that
their successes were insignificant. Only one in
three hundred was converted and Abel was able
to explore the reasons for the failure of the
2 ABEL, THEODORE
movement. The ties of the ancestral Church
were too strong, especially because religious af-
filiation also meant loyalty to an ethnic group.
In this study, following the method developed
by W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in their
The Polish Peasant (1918-1920), Abel also ex-
perimented with the life history of mission work-
ers and converts as a source of sociological data,
and published in the book the autobiography of
an immigrant minister. He expanded and refined
this method in Why Hitler Came Into Power
(1938). By offering cash prizes for the best per-
sonal life histories of those who joined the Na-
tional Socialist Party before 1933, he was able
to collect more than six hundred of them and
used them to answer the question posed by his
title. Rejecting both psychoanalytic and Marxist
explanations of the rise of the Hitler movement,
Abel concluded that a combination of factors
was involved, including discontent with the
place of Germany in the world after World War i,
an ideology (including anti-Semitism) which
emphasized the unity of the German Volk, the
organizational skill of the party leaders, and
finally the charisma of Hitler himself. Abel's
six hundred life histories, six of which appear
in the book, were later subjected to statistical
analysis by P. H. Merkl, who discovered that
anti-Marxism was a more important motive for
early members of the party than anti-Semitism
(Merkl 1975).
Abel's doctoral dissertation at Columbia Uni-
versity, Systematic Sociology in Germany
(1929b), undertook to introduce to the English
reader the work of Georg Simmel, Alfred Vier-
kandt, Leopold von Wiese, and Max Weber. More
than an introduction, it was an effort to judge
the success of each of these writers in establish-
ing sociology as an autonomous discipline with
a subject matter of its own. He judged their work
in terms of four criteria of the validity of a
scientific system.- (1) an adequately delimited
subject matter; (2) justifiable tasks of investiga-
tion; (3) a basis for the systematization of the
subject matter; and (4) adequate methods of
investigation. Incidentally, he rejected as unreal
the argument as to whether sociology was a gen-
eral or a special social science on the ground that
it was both.
With respect to Simmel, Abel concludes that
the basic distinction between form and content
was untenable and that Simmel's procedure was
philosophical rather than scientific. Simmel him-
self was unable to treat form in abstraction from
content, and furthermore, adequate analysis of
a social situation requires a consideration of its
historical setting. There is, in fact, an incon-
gruity between his theory and his practice, one
that diminishes the significance of his contribu-
tion to sociology.
Abel was similarly critical of Vierkandt. The
phenomenological method that he proposed does
not advance the establishment of sociology as an
autonomous science. A method that concerns
itself exclusively with mental states and "inner
experiences" can result only in a descriptive
psychology and can have little to do with so-
ciological analysis. In any case, Abel was skep-
tical of the scientific validity of the phenomeno-
logical method. Like Simmel, Vierkandt is lead-
ing sociology in a philosophical and speculative,
not a scientific, direction. Vierkandt has made no
contribution to the methodology of sociology and
his work indicates the way that sociology must
not—need not—go if it is to be a science.
Von Wiese, on the contrary, struck a new note
in German sociology when he abandoned intro-
spective and phenomenological methods and
adopted behavioristic and quantitative ones. Abel
approves of von Wiese's insistence upon associa-
tion and dissociation as the specificum sociologi-
cum. Although von Wiese's efforts at quantifica-
tion did not succeed and although he had mis-
taken views on the nature of measurement, Abel
nevertheless gives him high marks for his con-
tributions to a sociology that can be objective and
scientific.
Weber escapes Abel's strictures and indeed
receives his highest praise. Of the four writers
Abel gives rather higher rank to Weber and von
Wiese than to Simmel and Vierkandt, an evalua-
tion that he was to change. His own preferences
for an objective scientific sociology are clear. His
control—not to say mastery—of the German lit-
erature in both philosophy and sociology, and
his lucid exposition of the ideas of his four
writers, made his dissertation one of the most
useful texts of its time—a time when few of the
German works had been translated into English.
In 1970 Abel published another book on
theory, The Foundation of Sociological Theory.
By "theory" Abel means the concepts used in the
analysis and interpretation of data. These con-
cepts are of two kinds, those that serve to classify
and those that serve as variables in general prop-
ositions. Theories thus are the conceptual
schemes designed to explain sociological laws.
They vary greatly in generality, precision, testa-
bility, elegance, and predictive power, and they
arrange themselves on a continuum with respect

to these attributes. After suggesting that the
founders of the discipline in the nineteenth cen-
tury had been either synthetic or clinical in their
interests, he discovers a new approach, an ana-
lytical approach, in the writings of Durkheim,
Simmel, and Weber, which complement one an-
other. Accordingly, he devotes half of his book
to a treatment of the analytical contributions of
these three writers. He does not, however, treat
the corpus of their work, but only those aspects
of it that contribute to the growth of sociological
theory. Abel contends that historians who con-
sign them to different schools are wrong, and
that, on the contrary, they were "collaborators"
in the development of sociological theory and
provided for it a single foundation. In order to
reach this conclusion, Abel has to minimize the
differences between them and emphasize the
agreements.
Weber's nominalistic view of collective reality,
for example, does not differ greatly from Durk-
heim's realistic view, especially when the more
moderate statements of both authors are closely
examined. Weber's verstehende sociology is not
necessarily incompatible with Durkheim's posi-
tivistic sociology. Weber's Wertfreiheit is almost
a paraphrase of Durkheim's admonition to treat
social facts as things. Durkheim's forms of soli-
darity are Weberian ideal types, as are also his
types of suicide. In the same way, similarities
can be found between Durkheim and Simmel
and between Weber and Simmel. All three thus
shared a community of ideas which became, in
turn, the foundation of modern sociological
theory.
In the latter half of his book Abel returns to
his distinction between the synthetical, the clin-
ical, and the analytical approaches to sociology,
and shows that writers commonly associated
with the first of these—Auguste Comte, Herbert
Spencer, Ferdinand Tonnies, Franklin H. Gid-
dings, and Charles H. Cooley—anticipated, or
made contributions to, the third. He goes on to
offer brief discussions of the analytical contri-
butions of such other writers as Vilfredo Pareto,
Florian Znaniecki, Talcott Parsons, Pitirim A.
Sorokin, George C. Homans, Robert K. Merton,
and Leopold von Wiese, and in a different con-
text, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Stuart Dodd, and Robert
M. Maclver. He is concerned, in a succeeding
section, with the characteristics and types of
sociological laws. In conclusion, he defends the
status of sociology as a science.
Abel's contributions are not limited to his
books. He published a number of separate papers
ABEL, THEODORE 3
on sociological theory, the most influential of
which was his paper on Verstehen (1948).
Steeped in the tradition of German philosophical
and sociological thought, and aware of the
methodological significance of the latter, Abel
was nevertheless attracted by the more objective
and even behavioristic character of American
sociology. Was there any way of reconciling the
two? How are insight and "understanding" re-
lated to the "explanations" of the positive sci-
ences? Abel addressed himself to these questions
on a number of occasions.
In the paper mentioned, Abel first suggests
that Verstehen by no means had its origin in
such German writers as Wilhelm Dilthey and
Weber. Indeed, traces of it are to be found in
Giovanni Battista Vico and in Comte, the first of
whom thought that men have a special kind of
knowledge about themselves, and the second that
we have a knowledge of human nature that is
somehow different from our knowledge of the
nature of the physical world. American writers
too, such as Cooley with his "emphatic" knowl-
edge, Znaniecki with his "humanistic coefficient,"
Sorokin with his "logicomeaningful method," and
Maclver with his "imaginative reconstruction,"
all suggest that some special method or ap-
proach, denied to students of the natural uni-
verse, has been conferred upon those who in-
quire into the social universe. These writers, and
others, have given it different names but all sug-
gest that there is something there that attains
the status of a method.
Unfortunately, these writers failed to specify
in detail the operations to be performed in using
the method, and this is a defect that Abel pro-
poses to remedy. By specifying the operations
involved, as he does with the help of illustra-
tions, he shows how one is able to internalize
observed behaviors and apply behavior maxims
to them derived from general and personal ex-
perience. If statistical technique, for example,
discloses a high correlation between crop yields
and marriage rates, we say we understand the
relationship because we have a behavior maxim
which tells us that when people feel prosperous
they are more willing to make commitments than
when they do not. The "understanding" is the
process of connecting the observation with the
maxim. In other words, Verstehen brings to
awareness and makes explicit the maxim that
intervenes between our perceptions of stimulus
and response. This is especially necessary when
the observed behavior is neither routine nor
commonplace and when the connections are
4 ADORNO, T. W.
other than those we would expect. The steps in-
volved in Verstehen are therefore three: (1) in-
ternalizing the stimulus; (2) internalizing the
response; and (3) applying behavior maxims.
The techniques by which we do this, however,
are not themselves specified. They are matters
of sympathetic imagination and of introducing
our own personal experience into the situation.
This is what happens generally in the imputation
of motives. The source of behavior maxims is
not in science but in personal experience. Thus,
the operation of Verstehen is the application of
personal experience to observed behavior.
The method, however, has certain limitations.
Personal experience is variable and its quality
depends upon the introspective capacity of the
interpreter. The method suggests connections,
but is unable to verify them. Furthermore, the
connection is only possible. To determine its
probability we need to utilize the more positivistic
methods of experiment and comparison. Ver-
stehen may give us an increment of personal
satisfaction, but it adds nothing to the validity
of the propositions we entertain. Abel concludes,
therefore, that Verstehen cannot serve as a
method of scientific analysis and cannot add to
our store of knowledge.
Abel's conclusion was unanticipated. His title
induced one to believe that by "operationalizing"
Verstehen he would also validate it as a method.
Although willing to concede that it relieves us of
a sense of apprehension when confronted by
the unfamiliar, he insisted nevertheless that it
was merely a device for using knowledge that
we have already acquired by personal experience.
Responses by several critics induced Abel, in re-
plies to them, to clarify his position, to distin-
guish between several different meanings of
Verstehen, to emphasize again that the method
was the chief source of hypotheses, and to under-
score its role as an indispensable instrument in
the study of social phenomena.
Although Abel did not himself construct a
systematic sociological theory, his exposition and
criticism of the theories of others—and especially
his work on Verstehen—won him a recognized
place in the history of the discipline.
ROBERT BIERSTEDT
WORKS BY ABEL
1929a Sunderland: A Study of Changes in the Group
Life of Poles in a New England Community. Pages
213—243 in Edmund deS. Brunner (editor), Immi-
grant Farmers and Their Children. New York:
Doubleday.
1965 Systematic Sociology in Germany: A
Critical Analysis of Some Attempts to Establish
Sociology as an Independent Science. Studies in
History, Economics and Public Law, No. 310. New
York: Octagon.
1930 The Significance of the Concept of the Con-
sciousness of Kind. Social Forces 9:1-10.
1933 Protestant Home Missions to Catholic Immi-
grants. New York: Institute of Social and Religious
Research.
1937 The Pattern of a Successful Political Movement.
American Sociological Review 2:347-352.
(1938) 1966 The Nazi Movement. New York: Ather-
ton. —> First published by Prentice-Hall as Why
Hitler Came Into Power: An Answer Based on the
Original Life Stories of Six Hundred of His Fol-
lowers.
1941 The Element of Decision in the Pattern of War.
American Sociological Review 6:853-859.
1945 Is a Psychiatric Interpretation of the German
Enigma Necessary? American Sociological Review
10:457-463.
1948 The Operation Called Verstehen. American Jour-
nal of Sociology 54:211-218.
1952 The Present Status of Social Theory. American
Sociological Review 17:156-164.
1959 The Contribution of Georg Simmel: A Re-
appraisal. American Sociological Review 24:473—
479.
1967 A Reply to Professor [Murray L.] Wax, Sociology
and Social Research 51:334-336.
1970 The Foundation of Sociological Theory. New
York: Random House.
1971 Social Science in Poland. Pages 415-425 in
Damian S. Wandycz (editor), Studies in Polish
Civilization. New York: Institute on East Central
Europe of Columbia University and the Polish In-
stitute of Arts and Sciences in America.
1975 Verstehen I and Verstehen II. Theory and De-
cision 6:99-102.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
MERKL, PETER H. 1975 Political Violence Under the
Swastika: 581 Early Nazis. Princeton Univ. Press.
RITZER, G. 1976 Sociology—Multiple Paradigm Sci-
ence. Sociology and Social Research 60:353-354.
THOMAS, WILLIAM I.; and ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN (1918-
1920) 1958 The Polish Peasant in Europe and
America. 2 vols. 2d ed. New York: Dover. —> Un-
abridged edition of the original five-volume work.
ADORNO, T. W.
Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, Marxist phi-
losopher, social theorist, and aesthetician, was
born in Frankfort am Main, Germany, in 1903.
In the 1930s he joined the Institut fur Sozial-
forschung (Institute for Social Research) which,
under the direction of Max Horkheimer, devel-
oped what became known as the Frankfort
School of Critical Theory. After World War n,
Adorno returned to Frankfort from exile in the
United States, and as codirector and later direc-
tor of the institute, he was a leading theoretician
of the German New Left until his death in 1969.
Adorno was the only child of a Jewish wine
merchant and his Catholic, Corsican wife (nee

Calvelli-Adorno), a professional musician. As a
youth he studied piano with Bernhard Sekles
(who also taught Paul Hindemith) and spent
weekends reading Immanuel Kant with Sieg-
fried Kracauer, his mentor. At 18, already the
author of 2 published articles on musical
criticism, he entered Frankfort's new, liberal
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, receiving a
degree in philosophy 3 years later. His disserta-
tion (Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1) criticized
Edmund Husserl's phenomenology from the po-
sition of his idiosyncratic Kantian professor,
Hans Cornelius, whose assistant, Max Hork-
heimer, became Adorno's lifelong friend.
In 1925 Adorno went to Vienna to study
musical composition with Alban Berg, a disciple
of Arnold Schonberg. The heyday of the Schon-
berg circle was over, but Berg brought Adorno
into contact with Vienna's artistic avant garde.
Adorno wrote (under the name Wiesengrund-
Adorno) for radical aesthetic journals like
Musikblatter des Anbruch (later Anbruch} and
Pult und Taktstock in defense of Schonberg's
atonal music. His early articles were not yet
Marxist. They reflected Schonberg's theory of
composing as a cognitive activity, a search for
"truth" which proceeded by developing the po-
tential of musical material and techniques as
they evolved historically. They were also in-
debted to Gyorgy Lukacs' pre-Marxist study,
Die Theorie des Romans (1920), which argued
that aesthetic developments were closely con-
nected to historical transformations of the struc-
ture of lived experience.
Adorno returned to Frankfort in 1927 to pre-
pare for an academic career in philosophy. He
wrote quickly a Habilitationsschrift (the prere-
quisite) which made an academically daring at-
tempt to legitimate Sigmund Freud's new psy-
choanalytic method on the basis of Cornelius'
Kantianism. The conclusion contained a Marxist
critique of the ideological function of non-
Freudian theories of the unconscious which was
philosophically incompatible with the idealism
of the rest of his analysis. The study was not
accepted.
Adorno needed a new philosophical base that
would support both Freud and Karl Marx, and
his friend Horkheimer shared his problem. They
learned from the psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich's
Marxian argument that the social structure was
reflected in "character structures." They were
aided immensely by the dialectical interpreta-
tion of Marx provided by Lukacs in Geschichte
und Klassenbewusstsein (1923), which stressed
ADORNO, T. W. 5
the relation between consciousness and society.
The new "sociology of knowledge" formulated by
Max Scheler, and by Karl Mannheim, who taught
at Frankfort, dealt with similar concerns, but
because it maintained the bourgeois, idealist
goal of absolute, unchanging truth, the social
relativity of knowledge to which it pointed led
them to cognitive despair. Adorno and Hork-
heimer rejected the idealist goal. Adopting
Luckacs' method of Ideologiekritik (critique of
ideology), they argued that bourgeois idealism
(including Adorno's own earlier Kantianism)
bore the structural flaws of the capitalist mode
of production: the concept of the "object" was
fetishized and reified like a commodity; the pre-
dilection for abstract universals reflected the
abstract formalism of market exchange; the sep-
aration of form from content paralleled the
alienated conditions of wage labor that only
the overthrow of class relations could eliminate.
They considered critical awareness of this con-
nection to be historically specific truth, which
both logically and morally compelled a commit-
ment to the revolutionary transformation of
society.
Adorno and Horkheimer frequented a left-
wing literary circle in Berlin, whose undogmatic
reception of Marx was much like their own. The
group included Walter Benjamin, Bertolt Brecht,
Ernst Bloch, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, and Gretel
Karplus (whom Adorno married in 1937).
Adorno was particularly impressed by Benjamin's
highly original, esoteric, cognitive theories. He
attempted to translate them into a "dialectical,"
"materialist" method of exegesis (Gesammelte
Schriften, vol. 1) which he applied in a study of
Kierkegaard (Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2). As
a critique of the founder of modern existential-
ism (the bourgeois alternative to rational ideal-
ism), this study was an oblique attack on Mar-
tin Heidegger, whose Sein und Zeit (1927) was
hotly debated among Frankfort academicians.
Adorno submitted the Kierkegaard study as a
second Habilitationsschrift. It was accepted by
Paul Tillich, and Adorno joined the philosophy
faculty at Frankfort. The same year (1931)
Horkheimer became head of the Frankfort Insti-
tut fur Sozialforschung, a privately-funded,
Marxist research institute founded in 1923,
bringing to it a more dialectical, "Critical The-
ory." Erich Fromm, Leo Lowenthal, Herbert
Marcuse, and Friedrich Pollock were then mem-
bers; Adorno and Benjamin were closely con-
nected. Scarcely two years later Hitler took
power. In spring 1933, the institute was forced
6 ADORNO, T. W.
into exile, eventually settling in New York.
Adorno emigrated to England the following
year. As a scholar at Merton College, Oxford, he
again launched a major critique of Husserl, this
time using the critical method he had developed
in his Kierkegaard study.
Adorno's focus during the 1930s on the im-
manent critique of philosophy separated his ef-
forts somewhat from the "Critical Theory" of
Horkheimer's institute. The latter was primarily
concerned with exposing the ideological func-
tion of bourgeois theory and replacing it with an
innovative fusion of Marxian sociology and
Freudian psychology. Adorno's articles for the
institute's journal (Zeitschrift fur Sozialfor-
schung ), "Zur Gesellschaf tlichen Lage der Musik"
(1932), "Uber Jazz" (1936, under the pseudonym
Hektor Rottweiler), and "Uber den Fetischcharak-
ter in der Musik und die Regression des Horens"
(1938) demonstrated that he was in full accord
with the goals and assumptions of "Critical
Theory." But his own program was not identical.
His analysis of music as a bourgeois cultural
phenomenon went beyond the critique of its
ideological content. He insisted that bourgeois
artists and thinkers, despite their personal poli-
tics (and against their own intent) expressed in
the form of unresolved tensions in their work a
veiled social criticism and latent Utopian per-
spective which it was the task of the critical
interpreter to uncover and illuminate.
In 1934 Adorno contributed to a pamphlet in
honor of Schonberg's sixtieth birthday. His es-
say, "Der dialektische Kompaxiist" (Gesammelte
Schriften, vol. 16), argued that out of the im-
manent logic of the musical material, Schonberg
had dialectically negated and transcended bour-
geois tonality, and the resulting atonal revolu-
tion not only liberated music from its ideological
social function, but provided a cognitive model
for nondominative social structures. Adorno's
goal was a parallel achievement in philosophy.
His new study of Husserl aimed at transcending
bourgeois idealism once and for all (written in
1934-1937, it was published in 1953 with a new
introduction as Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnis-
theorie [Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5]). He
chose to attack Husserl's phenomenology as the
most advanced stage of bourgeois idealism—in
the sense of advancing decay. His tactic was to
focus on the logical gaps, or "ruptures," of Hus-
serl's phenomenology so that what first appeared
as logical contradiction was seen as a reflection
of social contradiction—not philosophic error,
but material truth. By showing that socially con-
crete, historically specific reality permeated all
Husserl's premises and categories—the auton-
omy of reason, the priority of thought, the ahis-
torical universality of truth—Adorno hoped to
demonstrate as false the fundamental idealist
assumption that such categories were indepen-
dent of social history, and to prove that dialecti-
cal, materialist principles (the priority of matter,
the necessity of a logic of contradictions) needed
to be accepted in their place.
Adorno's debt to Benjamin. Adorno's inter-
pretive method of making the social structure
quite literally appear within the words of bour-
geois texts was indebted to Walter Benjamin.
The latter was inspired by an unlikely combina-
tion of sources: the romantic tradition of Ger-
man literary criticism (Novalis, Schlegel, Jean
Paul), the Jewish mystical tradition of the Kab-
balah (to which he had been exposed by his
close friend Gershom Scholem), a revolutionary
but unorthodox Marxism, and an avant-garde
aesthetics that drew on theories of cinematic
montage, surrealism, and Bertolt Brecht's epic
theater. In Benjamin's theory of cognition the
extreme experiences of critical demystification
and religious revelation converged. He focused
on the seemingly insignificant details of histori-
cally transient, cognitively reified phenomena so
that they provided "profane illumination" by
being read as "ciphers" of social truth.
Neither Brecht nor Scholem appreciated the
fusion of Marxist and mystical motifs. Only
Adorno felt a strong appreciation for the philo-
sophic power of what he called Benjamin's
"negative" or "inverse theology." Yet the very
affinities of their positions led to disagreement.
Exiled in Paris during the period of the popular
front, Benjamin adopted a political position
close to the Communist party. Adorno, whose
initial aversion to party control of intellectuals
was greatly intensified by Stalin's purges, was
dismayed by Benjamin's move, and he blamed
Brecht's influence. They carried on a protracted
debate by correspondence in the 1930s (Adorno
1970) which has come to be considered a major
document of Marxist literary theory. Adorno
argued that Benjamin was falling into philo-
sophic as well as political error when he af-
firmed the actually existing consciousness of the
working class and the mass culture that ap-
pealed to it, claiming it was as truncated as that
of the bourgeoisie. Adorno held stubbornly to a
position of "nicht mit-machen" (nonparticipa-
tion). He argued that because social antagonisms
were embedded within cognitive problems, the

intellectual "labor" which unearthed them was a
form of practice in itself.
Benjamin asserted that the new technologies
of film production and mechanically reproduced
art contained within themselves the power to
transcend bourgeois cultural forms, because they
robbed art of its uniqueness ("aura"), turned
artists into technicians, and transformed the
creation of art into a collective, directly political
activity. Adorno complained that the static
repetition of mechanical reproduction encour-
aged passivity, and stunted active, critical in-
terpretation. He felt Benjamin's celebration of
the new technological forces that liquidated art's
aura was premature, given the distortions of
class society. Art took the side of the oppressed,
not by becoming directly political, but by posit-
ing, through its very autonomous existence, the
possibility of a realm not identical to the given.
When Benjamin imitated the new technique
of film montage in his own writings, juxtapos-
ing literary fragments and historical images
with the barest minimum of interpretive com-
ment, Adorno warned that without the media-
tion of theory, the theological motif of "profane
illumination" degenerated into magic, and the
Marxist motif into positivism. He then turned
his critical method on Benjamin, and claimed
that these theoretical difficulties were them-
selves reflections of social antagonisms: Benja-
min's fragmented style uncritically reproduced
the general fragmentation of experience that
made grasping the interconnectedness of reality
so difficult.
Ultimately, Benjamin heeded Adorno's criti-
cisms, and in fact documented Adorno's thesis
of the disintegration of experience. He used his-
torical evidence gathered for his study of nine-
teenth-century Paris (the Passagenarbeit} to
argue (in ways later developed by Adorno) that
the characteristics of modern urban life and
factory labor (which anticipated the new tech-
nologies of film and arts reproduction)—frag-
mented, abrupt gestures, shocklike bombard-
ment of the senses, collision of visual images,
the disruption of spatial and temporal coher-
ence—needed to be judged negatively because
they weakened people's critical powers (Ben-
jamin [1961] 1969, pp. 155-200).
Exile in the United States. In 1938 Adorno
emigrated to New York, where the institute, de-
spite limited funds, was a haven for German
intellectual refugees. Adorno secured a position
as director of music research for the Princeton
"Office of Radio Research" headed by the Aus-
ADORNO, T. W. 7
trian social scientist Paul F. Lazarsfeld. He be-
gan to analyze the "social physiognomy" of radio
music, characteristically interpreting the antag-
onisms of the social whole from out of this par-
ticular detail of modern experience. It soon
became evident, however, that the critical, theo-
retical nature of his approach was incompatible
with the project's market-research concern for
empirical data, such as the "likes and dislikes"
of the listening audience, and funding for his
work was terminated in 1939.
Adorno then joined Horkheimer in Los
Angeles. The war years were their period of
closest collaboration, and it marked a new, more
pessimistic stage of "Critical Theory." They ac-
cepted the argument of institute economist,
Friedrich Pollock, that "state capitalism" had
developed in Soviet Russia, similar in bureau-
cratic structure to the interventionist state of
Roosevelt's New Deal. They maintained such
structures were inherently authoritarian. If, in
the earlier period, they saw reification as the
main ideological obstacle to critical conscious-
ness and critical reason as the path to overcome
it, now, in the dark years of Auschwitz and
Hiroshima, their far greater concern was passive
submission to authority, and they began to see
reason itself as a form of domination. They saw
their intellectual work not as an anticipation
of social revolution, but as a struggle merely to
keep critical consciousness alive.
Benjamin committed suicide in 1940, when
he was denied exit from France at the Spanish
border. His last text, written after his political
disillusionment over Stalin's pact with Hitler, was
a series of theses on the philosophy of history
(Benjamin [1961] 1969, pp. 253-264) that
argued that history did not equal progress, even
on the level of culture. Instead, progress was
subjective intervention in order to stop the his-
torical course of events, an action that under
current conditions was only a Utopian and
theological hope.
The new pessimism marked a break from the
radical-liberal tradition. Adorno and Horkheimer
worked closely to develop its implications for
social theory. They analyzed the totalitarian ten-
dencies common to political structures of fas-
cism, late capitalism and state capitalism, and
cognitive structures of authoritarianism, anti-
Semitism, and cultural conformism, which, they
argued, resulted in the "extinction of the ego,"
the impotency of subjects in a totally "adminis-
tered world." They wrote a critical history of
reason as a "dialectic of enlightenment." Its
8 ADORNO, T. W.
thesis was that reason, which was meant to
demythify the world and liberate human beings,
had itself turned into myth. Tolerating nothing
outside, or "nonidentical" to itself, it provided a
new tool, not only for social oppression, but for
the domination of nature, including the human
body. It legitimated psychological, sexual, and
physical repression.
As a method of positivist research that ac-
cepted "given" empirical data without question,
but also as the ground for consensus rather than
critical politics, reason had become an instru-
ment of conformism. In this sense, its ideologi-
cal function paralleled that of mass culture.
Dialektik der Aufkldrung (Gesammelte Schriften,
vol. 3) included a theory of the "culture indus-
try" which argued that, as a commodity, modern
culture (high-brow and popular alike) was
caught up in structures of domination and in-
ternalized their authoritarian forms. The new
technologies of mass media were "enlighten-
ment as mass deception": purporting to enter-
tain, they promoted obedience among their
passive audience; purporting to provide perpet-
ual novelty, they supplied a repetition of the
ever-identical. Adorno and Horkheimer argued
that the phenomenon of anti-Semitism was
closely linked to both dominative reason and
mass culture because it manifested the same in-
tolerance and fear of the "nonidentical," the
same lack of imagination, the same inability for
autonomous, critical cognitive experience.
Dialektik der Aufkldrung was a departure from
Marxist social theory. Nonetheless, for Adorno
its very pessimism concerning the historical de-
velopment of culture marked a concession to
Marxist principles, as he no longer attempted
to affirm revolutions in the superstructure which
left the substructure of oppression unchanged.
In a long essay (which provided Thomas Mann
with the aesthetic theory for Doktor Faustus,
Philosophie der neuen Musik [Gesammelte
Schriften, vol. 12]), Adorno interpreted Schon-
berg's twelve-tone system of composing criti-
cally: the narrowness and rigidity of its rules
had reenslaved music, a dialectical reversal of
atonality's temporary liberation from bourgeois
forms. Adorno strove in his own writings to
avoid the systematizing tendency inherent in
conceptual theoretical writing. In Minima
Moralia (Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4), he ex-
pressed social reflections in short, dialectical
fragments.
The Authoritarian Personality. In the late
1940s, Adorno again became involved in a pro-
ject that necessitated translating his method
into empirical social research, a task he com-
pared to squaring a circle. As part of a series,
Studies in Prejudice, edited by Max Horkheimer
and funded by the American Jewish Committee,
he worked in collaboration with social psycholo-
gists R. Nevitt Sanford, Daniel Levinson, and
Else Frenkel-Brunswik (the "Berkeley Public
Opinion Study Group") to develop an experi-
mental method for investigating anti-Semitism.
The results and their interpretation, published
as The Authoritarian Personality (1949), became
highly controversial (see Christie & Jahoda
1954).
The theoretical frame of the study drew
heavily on Dialektik der Aufkldrung, where
Adorno and Horkheimer had argued that anti-
Semitism, which misdirected protest against eco-
nomic injustice by making Jews the scapegoat,
was only one element of an "authoritarian char-
acter structure," and this in turn had its origins
in objective social conditions. The characteris-
tics of this authoritarian type included passivity,
conformism, rigidity of thought, a tendency to
stereotype, lack of critical reflection, sexual
repression, and a fear and abhorence of any-
thing "nonidentical." The research problem was
to design a questionnaire that would reveal the
presence of these traits as an interconnected
structure. The innovative solution bore great
similarities to Adorno's "social physiognomies."
The Berkeley group interpreted out of the details
(in this case, the questionnaire items) the gen-
eral character structure which was unintention-
ally revealed (the latent, rather than manifest
meaning of the responses). The items were
evaluated on an "F-scale," and clusters of high-
scoring responses were read as symptomatic of
"fascist tendencies." The antifascist character
structure, which was critical, nonconformist,
and open, had, predictably, more diverse char-
acteristics, tending to elude the typing procedure
altogether. As a counter to the quantitative re-
sults of the F-scale, some in-depth interviews
were made for "content analysis." Adorno as-
sumed the task of interpreting these interviews,
using the close, textual analysis typical of his
critical exegesis.
Return to Germany. In 1950, the city of
Frankfort invited Horkheimer to reestablish the
institute at the university, and Adorno returned
with him as codirector. For the next two decades
he taught, guided institute research projects,
and wrote prolifically on aspects of social theory,
philosophy, and aesthetics. "Critical Theory"

played a significant role in the intellectual re-
construction of Germany, providing students
with a Freudian-Marxist framework for the
analysis of fascism, and with a critical reread-
ing of the German Enlightenment tradition. The
fact that the institute was anti-Soviet as well as
antifascist allowed it to flourish in the cold war
climate. "Critical Theory" remained committed
to democratic ideals. However, it condemned as
"pseudodemocracy" the superimposition of egal-
itarian forms onto a hierarchical, class-struc-
tured society. Moreover, due largely to Adorno's
American experience, the institute resisted
"market research" methods of social science and
Anglo-Saxon empiricism in philosophy, both of
which were influential in Germany as the intel-
lectual accompaniment to military occupation.
Hence (and because of its critique of mass cul-
ture), "Critical Theory" resisted Allied hegemony
as well.
The positivist dispute. "Critical Theory" re-
mained revolutionary in its orientation no mat-
ter how great its distance from orthodox Marx-
ism. A 1961 debate on method between Adorno
and Karl Popper at the German Sociological As-
sociation meeting in Tubingen hinged precisely
on this point. The debate, which was continued
by Adorno's younger colleague, Jiirgen Haber-
mas, and Popper's German student, Karl Albert,
in 1963, spread to academic circles generally,
where it became known—Popper felt incorrectly
—as the Positivismusstreit ("Positivist Dispute";
see Adorno et al. [1969] 1976). It was essen-
tially a debate between a liberal and a radical
critique of contemporary cognition.
On the surface, Adorno's "Critical Theory"
and Popper's "critical rationalism" had much in
common: both opposed specialization and bu-
reaucratization of scientific inquiry; both criti-
cized closed thought structures and total sys-
tems; both deplored the reduction of reason to
an uncritical technical instrument. Their real
differences were political. Popper felt that a free,
competitive debate by a "community of scien-
tists" was possible within Western society and
would lead to theoretical coherence; Adorno felt
that such debate was inevitably distorted by the
dominant economic and social structures in
which it took place, and theoretical coherence
served an ideological function by masking social
contradictions. Because Adorno considered so-
cial liberation the precondition for a reconcilia-
tion of theoretical contradictions, he believed his
position was allied with the emancipatory inter-
ests of the exploited class. Ironically, Popper, in
ADORNO, T. W. 9
attacking Adorno's esoteric language and the
abstruse Hegelian legacy in "Critical Theory,"
saw himself as championing an antielitist, dem-
ocratic position.
Negative dialectics. For Adorno, the key po-
litical problem was that reason was not applied
critically, against the grain of given reality. In-
stead, thought either dominated reality (ideal-
ism), or reality dominated thought (empiricism),
and when either pole was posited as a
philosophic first principle, thought was led into
complicity with the status quo. The key theoreti-
cal problem was to devise a method of dialectics
without identity, in which the tension between
thought and reality remained unresolved. In
1966, as the title of his major philosophic work,
Adorno named this method negative dialectics,
to distinguish it from Hegel's idealism (Gesam-
melte Schriften, vol. 6). On the one hand, it
was a method of argument based on the non-
identity of concepts to their objective content
(for example, of reason to reality) on several
levels: (a) the object did not live up to its con-
cept ("rationalized" society was irrational); (b)
the concept did violence to the object it identi-
fied (reason grasped reality by dominating it);
(c) only contradictory concepts (reason—myth)
could define the object (reality) which was in
fact contradictory. On the other hand, negative
dialectics was a method of exegesis based on the
nonidentity between the meaning of a text and
the intent of its author: When texts were in-
terpreted by dialectical argument they were
made to bear witness against themselves, so that
subjective, cultural, cognitive products could be
read as ciphers of the objective, social totality.
The unresolved nature of negative dialectics
prohibited "Critical Theory" from becoming a
systematic social theory. Adorno did not, for
example, attempt to reconcile Freud and Marx,
as he believed such a synthesis mitigated the
critical potential of both. Instead, Adorno used
their theories contrapunctually: he interpreted
psychological phenomena as reflections of the
socioeconomic structure, but he analyzed the so-
cioeconomic structure in terms of the mental
phenomena (culture, cognition, character struc-
ture) that maintained it.
Adorno applied the same sophisticated method
in interpreting the phenomena of mass culture.
He has been criticized (Shils 1957) for failing
to appreciate mass culture's democratic charac-
teristics. Yet he took jazz, radio listening, or
newspaper horoscopes with the same philo-
sophic seriousness as a Heideggerian text, and
10 ALBRIGHT, WILLIAM F.
believed that when they were read critically,
they were no less capable of illuminating social
truth.
In order to understand Adorno's "Marxism,"
it is necessary to realize that for him, always,
dialectical materialism was an epistemological
method compelled by the material, independent
of any class viewpoint. Uniformity of critical
insight resulted because of the uniformity of the
social object, not the collective nature of the
cognitive subject.
Adorno's stress on the individual rather than
the class nature of experience, coupled with his
contempt for existing working-class conscious-
ness, brought him criticism from more orthodox
Marxists of his generation. Lukacs accused him
of lamenting the decline of bourgeois culture
from a Grand Hotel abyss replete with bour-
geois comforts; Lucien Goldman protested that
revolutionary art articulated, not domination or
contradiction generally, but class oppression and
class conflict specifically; Hans Eisler claimed
that Adorno's aesthetic theory was metaphysical
and ignored the fact that art was made by and
for people.
Yet Adorno's fear of the authoritarian mo-
ment in collective mentality had historical justi-
fication, and if his language was elitist, his
motive was radically democratic. Adorno's inces-
sant negativity, which Kracauer criticized as
infinite dialectics, aimed at escaping systematiza-
tion for a political as well as a philosophical
purpose. Each of his essays was a unique cogni-
tive experience, a one-time-only configuration of
elements that had a pedagogic goal of showing
people what autonomous thinking was, and of
encouraging them to think for themselves by
frustrating attempts to pigeon-hole knowledge
through easy categorizing and definitions. His
insistence on the historical transiency of truth
meant that interpretation needed constant re-
vision, so that no texts could be treated as
dogma, including his own. The open, nonau-
thoritarian, nonreified structure of negative
dialectics was the antithesis of bourgeois cogni-
tion. It thus provided an anticipatory model for
nondominative relations in a new society.
The German student movement responded to
the events in Paris of May 1968 with a series of
strikes and demonstrations. Adorno was skepti-
cal of the objective possibility of revolution and
maintained his stance of nonparticipation. Stu-
dents disrupted his lectures, challenging him
for not being radical enough. They accused
"Critical Theory" of leading to a dead end, be-
cause it left no space for revolutionary praxis
(Schoeller 1969). Adorno died in August 1969,
at the height of the disturbances, and the in-
stitute dissolved shortly afterwards.
SUSAN BucK-MoRSs
WORKS BY ADORNO
1932 Zur Gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik. Zeit-
schrift fur Sozialforschung 1:103-124, 356-378.
1936 Uber Jazz. Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung 5:235—
257.
1938 Uber den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die
Regression des Horens. Zeitschrift fur Sozialfor-
schung 7:321-355.
1949 ADORNO, T. W. et al. The Authoritarian Person-
ality. American Jewish Committee, Social Studies
Series, No. 3. New York: Harper.
1956 HORKHEIMER, MAX; and ADORNO, T. W. Soziolo-
gische Exkurse. Frankfort (Germany): Europalsche
Verlangsanstalt. —> Volume 4 of the Institut fur
Sozialforschung's Frankfurter Beitrdge zur Soziolo-
gie, edited by Adorno and Walter Dirks.
(1969) 1976 ADORNO, T. W. et al. The Positivist Dis-
pute in German Sociology. Translated by Glyn Adey
and David Frisby. London: Heineman. —> First pub-
lished in German.
1970 Uber Walter Benjamin. Edited by Rolf Tiede-
mann. Frankfort (Germany): Suhrkamp.
Gesammelte Schriften. Edited by Rolf Tiedemann. 23
vols. Frankfort (Germany): Suhrkamp, 1970—.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENJAMIN, WALTER (1961) 1969 Illuminations. Ed-
ited by Hannah Arendt and translated by Harry
Zohn. New York: Schocken. —> First published in
German.
BUCK-MORSS, SUSAN 1977 The Origin of Negative
Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin,
and the Frankfurt Institute. New York: Free Press.
CHRISTIE, RICHARD; and JAHODA, MARIE (editors) 1954
Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authori-
tarian Personality." Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1927) 1962 Being and Time.
New York: Harper. —» First published in German.
JAMESON, FREDERIC 1967 T. W. Adorno, or Historical
Tropes. Salmagundi 2, no. 1:3—43.
JAY, MARTIN 1973 The Dialectical Imagination: A
History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of
Social Research, 1923-1950. Boston: Little, Brown.
LUKACS, GYORGY (1920) 1963 Die Theorie des Ro-
mans. New ed., enl. Neuwied am Rhein (Germany):
Luchterhand.
LUKACS, GYORGY 1923 Geschichte und Klassenbe-
wusstsein. Berlin: Malik. —> Contains essays first
published between 1919 and 1922.
ROSE, GILLIAN 1978 The Melancholy Science: An
Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno.
New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
SHILS, EDWARD 1957 Daydreams and Nightmares:
Reflections on the Criticism of Mass Culture.
Sewanee Review 65:587-608.
SCHOELLER, WILFRIED F. 1969 Die neue Linke nach
Adorno. Munich: Kindler Verlag.
ALBRIGHT, WILLIAM F.
William F. Albright (1891-1971), a scholar
of the twentieth century in ancient Near Eastern

and Biblical studies, was born May 24, 1891, in
Coquimbo, Chile, the son of Methodist mission-
aries. He was handicapped by poor eyesight—a
lifelong burden—and by a hand crippled in an
accident, and suffered the prejudice against
foreign Protestants in a regressively Catholic
environment. When the family returned to the
United States, he attended Upper Iowa Univer-
sity for formal instruction in Latin, Greek, and
mathematics. He taught himself Biblical He-
brew and Akkadian, the language of the ancient
Babylonians and Assyrians.
So far largely self-taught, Albright was able
to undertake graduate study at the Johns Hop-
kins University in 1913. He remained six years,
continuing Semitic languages, ancient history
and Biblical studies, Egyptian, and especially
Akkadian under Paul Haupt, who had come
from Gottingen to teach at the newly-founded
Hopkins in 1883 as the first Assyriologist in the
United States. Haupt, whose later interest
turned more and more to Biblical studies, also
brought from Germany a particularly radical
critical approach to Old Testament studies.
After this exposure to the broadest and most
vigorous training on the German model avail-
able in his time, Albright entered a new phase,
with concentration on field archeology, as fellow
and then director of the new American School
of Oriental Research in Jerusalem (1919-1929;
1933-1934). In the Near East, Albright trav-
eled and explored tirelessly, studied Arabic and
modern Hebrew, and excavated, especially at
Tell Beit Mirsim, Tell el Ful, and Bethel. In
1927 he joined the faculty of the Johns Hopkins
University, and headed its Oriental Seminary
until his retirement in 1958. Under Albright, the
department was a dominating influence, espe-
cially in American Biblical studies and Pales-
tinian archeology. His students came to occupy
posts at numerous American theological semi-
naries and universities, notably Harvard, which
under Frank Moore Cross, Jr., in Old Testament
studies, and G. Ernest Wright in Palestinian
archeology and Biblical theology, together with
other Albright students, colonized what Albright
called the "Baltimore school" at Cambridge.
Although Albright worked throughout his life
at a synthesis of the early history of human
thought and belief, it is perhaps not unfair to
say that his resolute efforts as a philosophical
historian, whatever their ultimate value, had
less to do with his contemporary influence
than did a number of other factors. Albright
impressed people because he knew and achieved
ALBRIGHT, WILLIAM F. 11
so much over so broad a span. His establishment
of the ceramic chronology of ancient Palestine,
the main means for dating archeological re-
mains, survives, with modifications, to this
day and will doubtless remain fundamental in
its essentials. Frank Cross has characterized
Albright as a master of typological method and
has shown how the essentially scientific methods
he used in classifying pottery types into groups
and studying their change in regular fashion
over time were successfully used by him else-
where: in linguistics (e.g., 1934); in paleog-
raphy (his study of the Nash papyrus in the
Journal of Biblical Literature [1937] was a cor-
nerstone in dating the Dead Sea Scrolls); in the
typology of Hebrew poetic forms (1968); and
so on. His memory for detail was fantastic and
his self-confidence boundless. He was quick to
grasp the significance of new discoveries and
their impact on old syntheses. These qualities
of erudition and imagination do more to account
for the eagerness of Jewish and Christian stu-
dents of all sorts to study with him than does
his defined philosophical position. Moreover, his
acquaintance with all kinds and conditions of
men, his eager appreciation of Jewish scholars
and their work, and the conversion of his wife,
in Palestine, to Roman Catholicism, combined
to give him a broad and deep sympathy with
students and scholars of all religious persuasions.
Yet a portion of Albright's influence must be
said to rest on a tendency to conservatism in
religious matters that, in his own account, arose
early in his career, and that is expressed in
From the Stone Age to Christianity (1940) and
History, Archaeology and Christian Humanism
(1964).
Under the influence of his Assyriologist
teacher, Paul Haupt, Albright was early led to
a partial espousal of the "pan-Babylonian" point
of view, according to which much of what is
valuable in ancient and particularly Israelite
civilization had its origin in Mesopotamia. Far
from being led to discredit Israelite religion,
however, Albright turned in a different direc-
tion. Nineteenth-century German Old Testament
studies, culminating in the work of Julius Well-
hausen, had led to a rewriting of Israel's reli-
gious history in which monotheism was held to
have come late into Israelite thought. Albright
felt strongly that Wellhausen had unjustly cut
Israel off from the great civilizations of the an-
cient Near East, and, perhaps unfairly, he
charged Wellhausen with imposing on Israel's
religious development an arbitrary and impos-
12 ALLPORT, GORDON W.
sibly compressed evolutionary scheme. (Note,
however, that Albright described himself, cor-
rectly, as an evolutionist, and, like Wellhausen,
always held to a version of classic source-
criticism of the Pentateuch.) Albright, instead,
came to insist on the substantial historicity of
Mosaic tradition and thus the antiquity of Israel-
ite monotheism.
The epochal change from many gods to the
one God who is over all was due, in Albright's
mind, to the intuitive discovery that the incon-
gruities of polytheism flouted the empirically
recognized unity of nature. In praising the Old
Testament as a masterpiece of "empirical logic,"
Albright was introducing a middle term between
Lucien Levy-Bruhl's "prelogical" and "logical"
thought. Empirical logic, born of experience, Al-
bright believed, enjoys some advantages over for-
mal logical systems, and thus the achievement
of ancient Israel is of permanent human signifi-
cance. Albright's apparent return to conserva-
tive opinions, and his optimism that continued
recovery of the ancient Near East would en-
hance the significance of the Bible, account for
part of his fame and some of the misunder-
standing and abuse of his pronouncements by
fundamentalists. Through his published work
and his many students, he remains an impor-
tant influence, even if the synthesis he sought
remains in the remote distance.
DELBERT R. KILLERS
WORKS BY ALBRIGHT
1932-1943 The Excavation of Tell Beit Mirsim. 4
vols. New Haven: American Schools of Oriental
Research. —> Volume 1 (1932) and Volume 1A
(1933): The Pottery of the First Three Campaigns.
Volume 2 (1938): The Bronze Age. Volume 3
(1943): The Iron Age. Each volume is also num-
bered as an annual publication of the American
Schools of Oriental Research.
1934 The Vocalization of the Egyptian Syllabic Or-
thography. American Oriental Series, Vol. 5. New
Haven: American Oriental Society. —» A paperback
edition was published by Kraus in 1966.
1937 A Biblical Fragment From the Maccabean Age:
The Nash Papyrus. Journal of Biblical Literature
56:145-156.
(1940) 1946 From the Stone Age to Christianity:
Monotheism and the Historical Process. 2d ed.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. —•» A paperback
edition of the second edition, with a new introduc-
tion, was published in 1957. A reprint of the 1940
edition was published in 1970.
(1942) 1968 Archaeology and the Religion of Israel.
5th ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
(1949) 1960 The Archaeology of Palestine. Rev. ed.
Middlesex (England): Penguin.
1963 The Biblical Period from Abraham to Ezra. New
York: Harper.
1964 History, Archaeology and Christian Humanism.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
1966 The Proto-Sinaitic Inscriptions and Their De-
cipherment. Harvard Theological Studies, No. 22.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1968 Yahweh and the Gods of Canaan. Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
FREEDMAN, DAVID NOEL et al. 1975 The Published
Works of William Fox-well Albright: A Compre-
hensive Bibliography. Cambridge, Mass.: American
Schools of Oriental Research.
RUNNING, LEONA G.; and FREEDMAN, DAVID NOEL 1975
William Fox-well Albright. New York: Two Conti-
nents Publishing Group.
ALLPORT, GORDON W.
Gordon Allport is generally recognized as the
chief pioneer in the development of a psychology
of personality that emerged in the United States
after World War i. His brother, Floyd H. Allport,
was earlier acclaimed the founder of modern
social psychology, establishing it as a scientific
discipline distinct from social psychology as a
branch of sociology. Eventually Gordon Allport
also became preeminent in social psychology,
devoting approximately half of his efforts to
that field.
Beginning in the 1920s, the fields of person-
ality and social psychology developed as one
broad academic discipline with vague bound-
aries, rather than as two separate areas of study.
When the American Psychological Association
(APA) created special interest groups, the di-
vision of personality and social psychology soon
became the largest branch. The Allports had
much in common with Gardner Murphy, a third
pioneer in personality and social psychology,
during his early career. Although Murphy at-
tended Harvard University, where the Allports
studied, for only one year, all three were stu-
dents of Hugo Miinsterberg, Herbert S. Lang-
feld, and Edwin B. Holt. All were influenced, in
one way or another, by William McDougall, the
first psychologist after Wilhelm Wundt to write
a major treatise on social psychology. Each
worked first on personality; each was chairman
of the Society for the Psychological Study of So-
cial Issues; and each was awarded the gold
medal of the American Psychological Founda-
tion, which is presented annually to an Ameri-
can psychologist in recognition of an outstand-
ing career.
Gordon Allport was a severe critic of Freudian
theory, radical behaviorism, and theories of per-
sonality based largely on clinical observation of
abnormal behavior. Yet in 1951, when the APA's

division of clinical and abnormal psychology
asked practicing clinical psychologists to name
the personality theorist who had influenced
them most in their daily work, Gordon Allport
was second only to Sigmund Freud (Schafer,
Berg, & McCandless 1951).
Gordon W. Allport, the son of John Edward
Allport and Nellie Wise Allport, was born in
Montezuma, Indiana, November 11, 1897. His
father was a physician, and his mother had been
a schoolteacher. She provided a strong religious
background, as did his maternal grandmother,
who had been a "preacher" in a Free Methodist
church. Gordon and Floyd Allport sometimes
experienced inner conflicts as a result of re-
vivals and religious conversions, but as adults
they showed more interest than most psycholo-
gists in the role of religion in human life. After
attending school in several small towns and
graduating from a Cleveland, Ohio, high school,
Gordon Allport entered Harvard in 1915, where
Floyd Allport had received his bachelor's degree
the previous spring (G. Allport 1967; F. Allport
1974).
Gordon Allport's first course in psychology
was taught by Miinsterberg, who also directed
his brother's doctoral research. Langfeld trained
him in experimental psychology, and Holt intro-
duced him to epistemology and the history of
psychology. James Ford in the department of
social ethics interested him in social service
and secured part-time employment for him
working with foreign students, finding housing
for industrial workers, acting as a probation
officer, and supervising a boy's club. He served
briefly in the Student Army Training Corps, but
returned to his regular studies in time to grad-
uate from Harvard in 1919.
Torn between his interests in teaching and
social service, Allport taught for a year at Robert
College in Constantinople [now Istanbul]. On
the way home, while visiting his brother Fayette
in Vienna, he called on Freud, who failed to
make him a disciple.
At the age of 22, Allport began graduate work
in psychology at Harvard. He received his PH.D.
two years later for a thesis that he believed was
"probably the first American dissertation written
explicitly on the question of component traits of
personality" (Allport 1967). While a graduate
student, he assisted his brother, then an instruc-
tor at Harvard, in editing the Journal of Ab-
normal Psychology, and his first publication was
a product of their joint efforts (Allport & Allport
1921).
ALLPORT, GORDON W. 13
A Sheldon traveling fellowship enabled All-
port to spend two years in Germany and Eng-
land, studying under Carl Stumpf, Max Dessoir,
Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Kohler, Eduard
Spranger, Erich Jaensch, Heinz Werner, and
William Stern. Thus he learned the personal-
istic and gestalt theories that characterized his
later work, and established personal relation-
ships that years later enabled him to assume
leadership in bringing to the United States
many European psychologists no longer able to
pursue careers under the Nazi regime.
In the fall of 1924 he began teaching at Har-
vard, not in psychology proper, but in social
ethics. It was in that department, encouraged
by its chairman, Richard C. Cabot, that he first
taught "Personality: Its Psychological and Social
Aspects," which he claimed was probably the
first course in this subject taught in an Ameri-
can college (Allport 1967). Cabot was also a
professor of cardiology in the medical school
and the principal pioneer in medical social work.
His influence on Allport's life and career was
at least as important as that of any of Allport's
teachers. Since Langfeld had moved to Princeton
University, and his brother, Floyd, to the Uni-
versity of North Carolina, Allport felt isolated
from psychology. Fortunately, he overcame this
handicap by volunteering to assist Edwin G.
Boring, Langfeld's successor, and later Mc-
Dougall, in their respective introductory courses.
In the spring of 1928, Allport married Ada
Lufkin Gould, a graduate student at Radcliffe
College, who became a clinical psychologist. A
year later he accepted an assistant professorship
at Dartmouth College, where he taught courses
in personality and social psychology and made
plans for a book on personality. In 1928, in col-
laboration with his brother, he published the
A-S Reaction Study, an inventory designed to
measure the trait of ascendance-submission.
After that, the brothers seldom collaborated,
though they corresponded frequently on profes-
sional matters.
In 1928, after McDougall had moved to Duke
University, Boring invited Allport to return to
Harvard as assistant professor of psychology, but
it was not until 1930 that he returned to Cam-
bridge. Several of his Dartmouth students came
to Harvard for graduate work. Among them
were Leonard Doob, Hadley Cantril, with whom
he collaborated on The Psychology of Radio
(1935), and Henry S. Odbert, with whom he pub-
lished a list of nearly eighteen thousand terms
used to describe personality and behavioral
14 ALLPORT, GORDON W.
characteristics (1936). Early in the 1930s, he
and Philip E. Vernon designed A Study of
Values (1931), a personality test, and conducted
research that led to Studies in Expressive Move-
ment (1933),
In 1935 Allport joined Cabot and others in
establishing the Cambridge-Somerville youth
study, of which Edwin Powers and P. S. deQ.
Cabot were executive directors. Three hundred
delinquent boys under various kinds of treat-
ment for three to seven years were matched
with an equal number of "control" delinquents
not under treatment in an attempt to discover
which treatments would be most effective in
preventing delinquency. Unfortunately, World
War ii interfered with the project, and the re-.
suits, though encouraging, were not conclusive.
In the mid-1930s, Allport devoted seminars
to the use of personal documents and the ques-
tion of the way life histories should be written.
John Bollard had contended that the individual
should be treated "as a specimen in a cultural
series" (1935), but Allport countered that for
psychological purposes, at least, every person
should be regarded as unique (1942), and he
interested many students in biographical studies.
Allport was also influenced by a study con-
ducted in the late 1920s by Floyd Allport, Daniel
Katz, and Margaret Jenness, in which they car-
ried out the first major systematic program of
research on social attitudes (Katz & Allport
1931). This led Gordon Allport to make attitude
a fundamental concept in his theoretical system.
In a chapter on attitudes in Carl Murchison's
Handbook of Social Psychology (1935), he de-
fined "attitude" as "a mental and neural state
of readiness, organized through experience, ex-
erting a directive or dynamic influence upon the
individual's response to all objects and situations
with which it is related." In discussing the gene-
sis of attitudes, he postulated four common con-
ditions for the formation of attitudes: (1) accre-
tion of experience through the integration of
numerous responses of a similar type; (2) indi-
viduation, differentiation, or segregation of ac-
tion patterns that will supply him with adequate
preparation for the direction of his adaptive
conduct; (3) dramatic experience or trauma-
(4) imitation of parents, teachers, or playmates
(Allport 1935).
Personality: A Psychological Interpretation
(1937), the book Allport had been planning since
he was a graduate student, appeared in the same
year as Ross Stagner's textbook, Psychology of
Personality. With these books available, courses
in personality were introduced in colleges
throughout the country. Allport defined personal-
ity as "the dynamic organization within the in-
dividual of those psychophysical systems that
determine his unique adjustments to his en-
vironment." Though well aware of the general
laws concerning the behavior of all hominids,
he sought principles that would help in under-
standing the uniqueness of individuals (Allport
1968b; Hall & Lindzey 1957). "A general law,"
he wrote, "may be a law that tells how unique-
ness comes about" (Allport 1937, pp. 194, 558).
One of the best examples of such laws occurs in
his treatment of motivation. Beginning with the
motives of infants, he grants that any theory of
motivation must take into account biological
needs and innate patterns of behavior (e.g.,
reflexes). But, he argues, no listing of infantile
behavioral tendencies is adequate to account for
adult behavior: "The dynamic psychology pro-
posed here regards adult motives as infinitely
varied, and as self-sustaining contemporary sys-
tems growing out of antecedent systems, but
functionally independent of them" (Allport
1937, p. 194). In essence, this is his principle
of the functional autonomy of motives. A classi-
cal example concerns a sailor who in early life
works hard to make a living, i.e., to buy food,
shelter, clothing, etc. Thus he comes to love
the sea. Later, after engaging in commerce in a
large city, he returns to the seaside for recrea-
tion. The "biological" drives for food and shelter
are no longer his principal motives. In discuss-
ing motivation, Allport emphasized aims, am-
bitions, and goals rather than postulating innate
drives and their modification through learning
and experience (Allport 1937; 1961; 1968fo).
In his magnum opus (1937) Allport insisted
that a concept such as self or ego was essential
in an adequate theory of personality. Years later
he substituted proprium, a term proposed by
Emanuel Swedenborg two hundred years earlier.
For Allport, the word refers to "the aspects of
personality that seem peculiarly one's own and
make for individuality and inward unity." Kines-
thetic, organic, and proprioceptive sensory
processes are important components. To dis-
criminate propriate from nonpropriate behavior
and awareness, Allport suggested that one first
pay attention to swallowing one's saliva (propri-
ate), and then imagine expectorating saliva into
a tumbler and drinking it, which is nonpropri-
ate (Allport 1955; 1961; 1968k).

Allport saw himself as a social activist. At
times this involved personal risk. During the
depth of the depression of the 1930s, when
many assistant professors were dropped from
the Harvard faculty, Allport, who was being
considered for a tenured appointment, publicly
criticized the president's and fellows' action in
some of the dismissals. He joined the American
Federation of Teachers and actively recruited
members.
During the 48 years when one or both of the
Allports served on its staff, the Journal of Ab-
normal and Social Psychology played an impor-
tant role in the development of personality and
social psychology. Founded in 1906 by Morton
Prince, its title was expanded to include social
psychology while Floyd Allport, who was con-
sulting editor from 1921 to 1949, was acting
editor early in the 1920s. Under Gordon Airport's
editorship (1938-1949), the journal soon be-
came the leading scientific periodical in per-
sonality and social psychology, while still devot-
ing considerable space to abnormal psychology.
During many of the remaining 17 years of his
life, Gordon Allport was its most active consult-
ing editor, aiding and encouraging his former
student, M. Brewster Smith, as well as Arthur
Jenness and Daniel Katz, Floyd Allport's former
students, in their editorial duties.
In 1938, when Gordon Allport became chair-
man of the department of psychology, he carried
a heavy load of administrative responsibility and
social action. He was chairman of the APA's
committee on displaced foreign psychologists,
which helped to bring many European psy-
chologists to North and South America, among
them William Stern, Kurt Lewin, Heinz Werner,
and Egon and Else Brunswik. He was also con-
cerned about "displaced" American psychologists
who opposed the entry of the United States into
World War u. When George Hartmann, vice
chairman of the War Resisters' League, and later
head of the militant Peace Now movement, was
dismissed from Columbia University Teachers
College, Allport arranged to have Hartmann ap-
pointed director of research at the Cambridge-
Somerville youth study and visiting lecturer at
Harvard.
Toward the end of World War n, Allport ed-
ited a statement by himself, Gardner Murphy,
and others, signed by more than two thousand
psychologists and social scientists, suggesting
steps that should be taken to insure a just and
lasting peace. Several of the items in this "Psy-
ALLPORT, GORDON W. 15
chologists' Manifesto" were adopted as official
policy in military government—e.g., "liberated
and enemy peoples must participate in planning
their own destiny" (Allport 1945).
Allport was president of the APA in 1938. He
was also a member of the division of anthro-
pology and psychology of the National Research
Council, as well as of the APA's emergency com-
mittee on psychology. During World War n, he
and Henry A. Murray offered a morale research
seminar. With Robert H. Knapp and Leo Post-
man, Allport conducted a syndicated "Rumor
Clinic," sponsored by the Boston Traveler. The
attempt was not only to "scotch" harmful
rumors, but also to lessen prejudice and antag-
onism that might hinder the war effort and hurt
individuals, particularly those in minority groups.
Allport sponsored a pamphlet, The ABC's of
Scapegoating (1944), that explained some
prejudices as attempts to avoid responsibility for
one's own faults by projecting the blame on
others, particularly in the case of anti-Semitism.
Floyd Allport, who had operated a rumor clinic
at Syracuse University, questioned the impor-
tance of the scapegoat hypothesis, citing experi-
ments by his student, Nancy Morse, that failed
to support it (Morse & F. Allport 1952; F. All-
port 1974).
In The Psychology of Rumor (1947), Allport
and Postman proposed that "the amount of
rumor in circulation will vary with the impor-
tance of the subject to the individuals concerned
times the ambiguity of the evidence pertaining
to the topic at issue." The formula for this is
R ~ i x a. To demonstrate what might happen in
a rumor, though no actual rumor was involved,
they would ask a subject to describe the details
of a picture projected on a screen. A second per-
son, listening but not seeing the picture, would
repeat the details as accurately as he could to a
third person, and so on, until six or seven
subjects had passed the information orally with-
out having seen the picture. Conclusions from
some thirty of these demonstrations were that
the "rumor" tended (1) to become shorter, more
concise, more easily grasped and told (leveling
and sharpening); (2) to be assimilated to the
emotional state of the listener; and (3) to be
elaborated or shifted in theme.
Allport also concluded that prejudice was an
important element in many rumors. Allport
agreed with Thomas Aquinas that the general
nature of prejudice is "thinking ill of others
without sufficient warrant," but he noted that
16 ALLPORT, GORDON W.
prejudice may also be favorable; nevertheless,
it should seldom be condoned. Perhaps the most
important finding of his many publications on
the subject was that prejudice tends to diminish
whenever members of different groups meet in
terms of equal status in the pursuit of common
objectives. Among the strategies and devices for
reducing or eliminating prejudice to which he
called attention were role playing, group retrain-
ing, exhortation, catharsis, and legislation to
control or limit prejudiced behavior.
Later, when Allport realized that the concepts
and techniques of psychology alone were too
limited to provide adequate prediction and un-
derstanding of prejudice, he proposed that the
"causes" be classified as (1) historical; (2) so-
ciocultural; (3) character, personality, and per-
ceptual; and (4) characteristics of the victims
of prejudice (Allport 1950b; 1960Z?, chapters
14, 15; Evans 1970).
During the war, Allport developed closer re-
lationships with sociologists and cultural anthro-
pologists that led the social and clinical psychol-
ogists to leave the department of psychology in
1946 to join the sociologists and cultural an-
thropologists in a new department of social
relations, chaired by Talcott Parsons. Allport
was chairman of the committee on higher de-
grees, and with George C. Romans, he offered
an introductory course on social relations. In
1966, having reached mandatory retirement
age, Allport was appointed the first Richard
Clarke Cabot professor of social ethics. After his
death, many members of the staff retired or
went elsewhere. Eventually, social relations
ceased to exist as a separate department.
In 1956, Allport went to Durban, South Af-
rica, to deliver a memorial lecture sponsored by
the South African Institute of Race Relations in
honor of Alfred Hoernle, who had been his
teacher at Harvard. While in Africa, he and
Thomas F. Pettigrew carried on experiments
that seemed to indicate that social factors were
most effective in perception when the stimulus
was ambiguous. Using the Ames rotating trap-
ezoidal window apparatus, which in our civiliza-
tion usually creates the illusion that a window
frame is swaying back and forth instead of
rotating, they found that Zulu children who
lived in rectangular houses with rectangular
windows responded much as do normal subjects
in the United States. Zulu children who lived in
round houses with no windows in remote areas
did not experience the illusion. Other more
complicated experiments with persons of differ-
ing ethnic characteristics demonstrated subtle
differences in perceiving paired passport photo-
graphs of persons of different ethnic groups ex-
posed briefly in a tachistoscope. Allport said that
these demonstrations convinced him that "he
who knows only his own culture does not know
his own culture" (Allport & Pettigrew 1957;
Allport, Pettigrew, & Barnett 1958).
By the time they were well-established pro-
fessionally, the Allport brothers had overcome
their earlier distaste for religion and were in-
sisting that religion was more important in
human life and civilization than most psycholo-
gists realized. In a widely quoted article, "The
Religion of a Scientist" (1930), Floyd Allport,
himself an agnostic, argued that science and
religion were not antithetical. The real conflict,
he said, was between science and theology. Gor-
don Allport, though concerned about psycholo-
gists' neglect of religion, published little on the
subject until twenty years later. The Individual
and His Religion (1950a) was devoted largely
to "a portrayal of the place of subjective religion
in the structure of personality whenever and
wherever religion has such a place." In the
preface, he wrote: "One underlying value judg-
ment favors my writing. It is a value that to my
mind every supporter of democracy must hold:
the right of each individual to work out his own
philosophy of life, to find his personal niche in
creation as best he can" (pp. vii, viii). In Be-
coming (1955), he urged psychologists and
other readers to approach religious behavior in
terms of what the individual is trying to do,
rather than to depend so much on the study of
his past. "The final truths of religion are un-
known," he said, "but a psychology that impedes
understanding of the religious potentialities of
man scarcely deserves to be called a logos of the
human psyche at all" (p. 98).
Numerous psychologists, realizing that the
study of religious behavior had become respec-
table, began to act as if they remembered that
the two principal founders of the APA, William
James and G. Stanley Hall, were interested in
religion. Allport himself was active in founding
the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
by psychologists, social scientists, and religious
educators. Within five years of his death, the
APA established a division of humanistic psy-
chology, followed a few years later by a division
of psychologists interested in religious issues.
At times, however, it seemed that the excursions
of Allport and others into the psychology of
religion might lead to their own undoing. For

instance, Allport and Kramer (1946) found
that, in general, church attenders were more
intolerant of ethnic minorities than were non-
attenders 'and those who claimed no religious
affiliation. Several significant negative correla-
tions of "religious ideology" or religious value
with "intelligence" or scholastic aptitude were
reported (Dittes 1968). The more research there
was in the psychology of religion, the worse was
the chaos. Shortly before he died, Allport him-
self discovered that criteria of religiosity such
as church attendance and the religious value
score on the Study of Values were not valid mea-
sures of the kind of religiosity he was writing
about. When he employed new scales of in-
trinsic religiosity (the extent to which the per-
son serves his religion) and of extrinsic religi-
osity (the extent to which he uses religious
behavior to further his other needs and values),
the research findings proved to be more orderly
and valid (Allport & Ross 1967; Kahoe 1974).
During most of his career, Allport conducted
an advanced course on the history and methods
of social psychology. Much of the content is
preserved in the Handbook of Social Psychology,
edited by his former student and colleague,
Gardner Lindzey (Allport 1954a).
Though he contributed abundantly to psy-
chological theory, Allport disclaimed leadership
of any particular school or limited system of
psychology. With respect to personality, he
advocated an "open and eclectic system." To be
open, he stipulated, a system must meet four
criteria : ( 1 ) constant intake and output of mat-
ter and energy; (2) maintenance of steady
(homeostatic) states; (3) progressive internal
organization over time, owing to an increase in
complexity and differentiation of parts; (4) cre-
ative transaction with the environment (Allport
1960a). Because he could find no "simple and
sovereign" system that dealt adequately with the
whole field of personality, he maintained that
eclecticism was the only acceptable means of
encompassing the available knowledge about
personality (for Allport's own comprehensive
statement of his point of view, see Allport
Gordon W. Allport died in 1967. Eleven years
later there appeared Waiting for the Lord, a re-
markable series of 33 of Allport's "meditations"
delivered in Appleton Chapel in the Harvard
Yard over a period of 29 years, edited by Peter
Bertocci (Allport 1978).
ARTHUR JENNESS
ALLPORT, GORDON W. 17
WORKS BY ALLPORT
1921 ALLPORT, FLOYD H.; and ALLPORT, GORDON W.
Personality Traits: Their Classification and Mea-
surement. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 16:
3-40.
(1928) 1939 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and ALLPORT,
FLOYD H. A—S Reaction Study. 2d ed., rev. Boston:
Hough ton Miffiin.
(1931) 1960 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; VERNON, PHILIP
E.; and LINDZEY, GARDNER A Study of Values. 3d
ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin —> Allport and Vernon
were the authors of the 1931 edition.
1933 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and VERNON, PHILIP E.
Studies in Expressive Movement. New York: Mac-
millan.
1935 Attitudes. Pages 798-844 in Carl Murchison
(editor), Handbook of Social Psychology. Worcester,
Mass.: Clark Univ. Press.
(1935) 1971 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and CANTRIL, HAD-
LEY The Psychology of Radio. New York: Arno.
1936 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and ODBERT, HENRY S.
Trait-Names: A Psycholexical Study. Psychological
Monographs, Vol. 47: Whole no. 211.
1937 Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New
York: Holt.
1942 The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological
Science. Social Science Research Council Bulletin,
No. 49. New York: The Council.
(1944) 1959 ALLPORT, GORDON W. (editor) The ABC's
of Scapegoating. Rev. ed. New York: Anti-Defama-
tion League.
1945 Human Nature and the Peace. Psychological
Bulletin 42:376-378.
1946 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and KRAMER, BERNARD M.
Some Roots of Prejudice. Journal of Psychology
22:9-39.
1947 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and POSTMAN, LEO The
Psychology of Rumor. New York: Holt.
1950a The Individual and His Religion. New York:
Macmillan. —> A paperback edition was published
in 1971.
1950b Prejudice: A Problem in Psychological and So-
cial Causation. Journal of Social Issues Supplement
Series: Whole no. 4. —» Lewin Memorial lecture.
(1954a) 1968 The Historical Background of Modern
Social Psychology. Volume 1, pages 1-80 in Gard-
ner Lindzey (editor), Handbook of Social Psy-
chology. 2d ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
1954i> The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley. —> An abridged paperback edition
was published in 1958 by Doubleday.
1955 Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology
of Personality. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press.
1957 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and PETTIGREW, THOMAS F.
Cultural Influence in the Perception of Move-
ment in the Trapezoidal Illusion Among Zulus.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 55:
104-113.
1958 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; PETTIGREW, THOMAS F.;
and BARNETT, ERIC O. Binocular Resolution and
Perception of Race in South Africa. British Journal
of Psychology 49:265-278.
1960a The Open System in Personality Theory. Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology 61:301-310.
(1960b) 1964 Personality and Social Encounter: Se-
lected Essays. Boston: Beacon. —» Includes a bibli-
ography of Allport's writings from 1921 to 1963.
1961 Pattern and Growth in Personality. New York:
Holt.
1964 The Fruits of Eclecticism: Bitter or Sweet? Pages
27—44 in International Congress of Psychology,
Seventeenth, Proceedings. Amsterdam: North-Hol-
land.
18 ANGELL, ROBERT COOLEY
1967 Autobiography. Volume 5, pages 3—25 in A His-
tory of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited by
Edwin G. Boring and Gardner Lindzey. New York:
Apple ton.
1967 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and Ross, J. MICHAEL
Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology 5: 432-
443.
1968a The Person in Psychology. Boston: Beacon.
—» Extends Allport's bibliography to the time of his
death.
1968b Personality: Contemporary Viewpoints. Volume
12, pages 1—5 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
1978 Waiting for the Lord: 33 Meditations on God
and Man. Edited by Peter A. Bertocci. New York
and London: Macmillan. —» Published posthu-
mously.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALLPORT, FLOYD H. (1924) 1967 Social Psychology.
New York: Johnson.
ALLPORT, FLOYD H. (1930) 1933 The Religion of a
Scientist. Pages 443—468 in Institutional Behavior:
Essays Toward a Re-interpreting of Contemporary
Social Organization. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press. —> Originally published in the Feb-
ruary 1930 issue of Harper's Magazine.
ALLPORT, FLOYD H. 1974 Autobiography. Volume 6,
pages 1-29 in A History of Psychology in Autobi-
ography. Edited by Gardner Lindzey. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
DITTES, JAMES E. 1968 The Psychology of Religion.
Volume 5, pages 602-659 in Gardner Lindzey and
Elliot Aronson (editors), Handbook of Social Psy-
chology. 2d ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
—» This chapter did not appear in the first edition
of the Handbook.
DOLLARD, JOHN (1935) 1971 Criteria for the Life
History, With Analyses of Six Notable Documents.
Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press.
EVANS, RICHARD I. 1970 Gordon Allport: The Man
and His Ideas. New York: Button.
HALL, CALVIN S.; and LINDZEY, GARDNER (1957) 1978
Theories of Personality. 3d ed. New York: Wiley.
KAHOE, RICHARD D. 1974 Personality and Achieve-
ment Correlates of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious
Orientations. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology 29:812-818.
KATZ, DANIEL L.; and ALLPORT, FLOYD H. 1931 Stu-
dents' Attitudes: A Report of the Syracuse Univer-
sity Reaction Study. Syracuse, N.Y.: Craftsman
Press.
MORSE, NANCY C.; and ALLPORT, FLOYD H. 1952
The Causation of Anti-Semitism: An Investigation
of Seven Hypotheses. Journal of Psychology 34:
197-233.
SCHAFER, ROY; BERG, IRWIN A.; and McCANDLESS,
BOYD R. 1951 Report on Survey of Current Psy-
chological Testing Practices. Washington: American
Psychological Association.
STAGNER, Ross (1937) 1974 Psychology of Person-
ality. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
ANGELL, ROBERT COOLEY
The life and work of Robert Cooley Angell
mirrored, in many respects, the career of so-
ciology from its nouveau and ambiguous status
in American universities during the first quar-
ter of the twentieth century to its firm establish-
ment and rapid expansion in the post-World
War ii era. Angell was born in 1899 in Detroit,
Michigan, into an old and distinguished Ameri-
can family. One grandfather and an uncle had
served as presidents of the University of Michi-
gan and of Yale University, respectively. His
other grandfather, his father, and his brother
were lawyers, and Angell himself spent a semes-
ter at the Harvard Law School following service
in the U.S. Army Air Corps and after graduation
from the University of Michigan in 1921. The
major influence in Angell's decision to do his
graduate work in sociology, however, was his
uncle, Charles Horton Cooley, then one of the
leading American sociologists. It was under
Cooley at the University of Michigan that
Angell received his theoretical and research
training, and in 1924, he received the first
doctorate in sociology awarded by that institu-
tion.
Cooley's emphasis on the fundamentally men-
tal character of social life and on society as a
"moral organism," held together and expanded
by modern means of communication, became
abiding themes in Angell's own life and work.
Cooley's methodological injunction to carve out
an area of study, to examine it intensively and
empathetically, and to explain it on the basis of
such an endeavor was also of influence. Taking
this to heart while still a graduate student, Angell
obtained a part-time appointment as assistant to
the dean of students at Michigan and wrote his
PH.D. dissertation on "The Student Mind." This
led him to focus on the sociology of education
and this research resulted in the publication of
The Campus (1928) and A Study in Under-
graduate Adjustment (1930b). He also devoted
his energies to keeping Cooley's thought alive by
editing a collection of the latter's major papers
in Sociological Theory and Social Research
(1930a) and coauthoring, after Cooley's death,
an introductory text which incorporated large
portions of the latter's previously published work
(Cooley, Angell, & Carr 1933).
Angell was also in touch with the newer em-
pirical and statistical approaches to sociology
that were being developed in the sociology de-
partment at the University of Chicago, many of
whose members were visitors in the Michigan
department. As a result, Angell also attempted
to wed the subjective and sympathetic qualities

of the case study approach to the statistical
analysis of large numbers of cases in an effort to
identify causal factors operating in a social situa-
tion. His programmatic "Memorandum Concern-
ing a Proposed Research Technique" (1931) be-
came the model for his classic methodological
contribution, The Family Encounters the De-
pression (1936). In the latter, on the basis of
student-written protocols, Angell sought to pre-
dict the type of adjustment made by the family
to the impact of the depression through the
measurement of two previously existing family
characteristics, "integration" and "adaptability."
The appendix to this study is generally consid-
ered to be a model of detailed honesty regarding
the actual process of research. Some years later,
Angell cooperated in a critical review of the use
of personal documents in the social sciences. In
connection with the use of such documents in
sociology, he observed "a slow and steady, but
not very impressive advance in method" (Gott-
schalk, Kluckhohn, & Angell 1945, p. 226). He
emphasized (as Cooley might have) the greater
promise they held in comparison to the current
trend of studying "objective" variables in order
"to probe the subtleties of human relationships"
(ibid., p. 232).
As a member of the department at the Uni-
versity of Michigan for 46 years, Angell early
evidenced the cosmopolitan outlook and in-
terests that were later to characterize his
discipline. Before 1940, he had visited Europe
three times, meeting with many of the prom-
inent French and German sociologists. By
this time, he had become more critical of Cooley's
optimism regarding the future of modern demo-
cratic societies. Especially did Angell come to
question Cooley's view of primary groups as the
guarantors of those moral sentiments that would
effectively integrate the larger society. Impressed
by Parsons' (1937) treatment of Durkheim's
concept of mechanical solidarity, Angell turned
his efforts to the investigation of the larger ques-
tion of social integration—an interest he con-
tinued to pursue throughout the rest of his
career.
In The Integration of American Society
(1941), Angell codified the sociological litera-
ture relevant to the question of whether the de-
cline of the neighborhood and the local com-
munity was seriously impairing the integration
of American society. He viewed the proliferation
of "free-standing groups," which functioned be-
yond the family, as failing to assure the existence
ANGELL, ROBERT COOLEY 19
and operation of the common values and insti-
tutions that he saw as the bases of societal social
integration. He noted especially the tendency of
such groups to take on a class character and
thus to emphasize noncommon interests and to
nullify common values. In the context of the
economic depression, Angell concluded that the
main task for American society was to foster
understanding across class lines.
This effort was essentially descriptive and
theoretical. His next step was to engage in a
more analytically pointed study of the problem
in an area where more relevant, empirical data
were available: the large American city. In 1942
appeared the first of a series of papers and mono-
graphs that extended over a thirty year period
in which Angell sought to identify the major
determinants of social integration and to mea-
sure and compare the degree of such integration
among selected samples of cities. Heterogeneity
and horizontal mobility were discovered to ex-
plain 62 per cent of the variance in his initial
effort. His work was interrupted when he became
an officer in the U.S. Army Air Forces for the
second time, during World War n, but another
effort (1947) identified four cities representing
the extremes of the social integration scores, un-
predicted by his previous analyses. This provided
him with an opportunity, in the Cooley tradition,
to engage in four detailed case studies aimed at
the identification of the social psychological de-
terminants of social integration. Moreover, in
the light of his positive and negative empirical
indicators of integration—welfare effort and
crime—he refined his use of the concept of in-
tegration, and in his 1949 study used it to refer
only to the extent that a community constituted
a moral order, apart from the question of the
degree of solidarity in interpersonal relation-
ships. Although an extensive report he published
identified the optimal characteristics of com-
munity leadership groups, it found only the or-
ganizational activities of schools and churches
related to the degree of moral integration of a
city (1951a). In his theoretical statement on
social integration, Angell reiterated his view of
the centrality of the concept to the discipline,
differentiated among three subtypes (normative,
functional, and communicative), yet was forced
to conclude that it was a concept that "so far has
borne little fruit" (1968b, p. 386). Finally, in
his last study, Angell concluded that "the moral
integration of large American communities . . .
was seriously impaired during the period 1940
 to 1970; these communities are becoming more
alike in moral integration; city population size
above 100,000 has become a significant inde-
pendent variable . . .; the difficulties of study-
ing moral integration in such communities have
increased" (1974, p. 628).
Undoubtedly AngelFs second war experience
sensitized him further to the larger problem of
international peace. Although he continued his
work on moral integration in American cities
and on the question of the future of democracy
(1958), his growing interest in international
order was sparked into activity by his selection
in 1949 as director of the Tensions Project for
the Social Science Program of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization. Stationed in Paris for a year, this ex-
perience probably helped lead to his appoint-
ment by President Harry Truman in 1951 as
one of the at-large members of the U.S. National
Commission to UNESCO. His six years of ser-
vice included a stint as chairman of the Com-
mittee on the UNESCO Program.
In the meantime, Angell's contributions and
leadership skills were increasingly recognized by
his peers through his editorship of The American
Sociological Review, his presidency of the Ameri-
can Sociological Society in 1951, and his presi-
dency of the International Sociological Associa-
tion in 1953. As chairman of the department of
sociology at the University of Michigan from
1940 to 1952, he recruited to the faculty Theo-
dore M. Newcomb, Horace M. Miner, Ronald
Freedman, Guy E. Swanson, Morris Janowitz,
and Gerhard E. Lenski. Finally, in line with his
interest in the problem of international order
and world peace, Angell played a major role in
the founding and direction of the Center for Re-
search on Conflict Resolution and The Journal
of Conflict Resolution. In this latter connection
he was drawn into research and consulting roles
with the U.S. Navy and the Institute for Defense
Analysis in the early sixties. His involvement in
the latter led to a month's stay in Russia and
visits to a number of Russian universities; all of
which contributed to the publication of his Peace
on the March (1969), a book that considered
the impact that transnational contacts have on
participants and policy makers.
Just before his retirement in 1968, Angell be-
came the director of the American Sociological
Association's project on "Sociological Resources
for Secondary Schools," which was oriented to
the development of teaching and learning ma-
terials in sociology for high schools. The circle
of his original interest in the sociology of edu-
cation was rounded.
HAROLD W. PFAUTZ
WORKS BY ANGELL
1928 The Campus: A Study of Contemporary Under-
graduate Life in the American University. New
York and London: Apple ton.
(1930a) 1969 Introduction and Notes. In Charles Hor-
ton Cooley, Sociological Theory and Social Research.
Rev. & enl. ed. New York: Kelley.
1930& A Study in Undergraduate Adjustment. Univ.
of Chicago Press.
1931 Memorandum Concerning a Proposed Research
Technique. Social Forces 10:204-208.
1933 COOLEY, CHARLES HORTON; ANGELL, ROBERT
COOLEY; and CARR, LOWELL J. Introductory Soci-
ology. New York: Scribners.
(1936) 1965 The Family Encounters the Depression.
Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith.
(1941) 1975 The Integration of American Society:
A Study of Groups and Institutions. New York:
Russell.
1942 The Social Integration of Selected American
Cities. American Journal of Sociology 47:575—592.
1945 GOTTSCHALK, LOUIS; KLUCKHOHN, CLYDE; and
ANGELL, ROBERT COOLEY The Use of Personal Docu-
ments in History, Anthropology and Sociology.
Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 53. New
York: The Council.
1947 The Social Integration of American Cities of
More than 100,000 Population. American Socio-
logical Review 12:335-342.
1949 Moral Integration and Interpersonal Integration
in American Cities. American Sociological Review
14:245-251.
1951a The Moral Integration of American Cities.
American Journal of Sociology 57, no. 1, part 2:1-
140.
1951k Sociology and the World Crisis. American So-
ciological Review 16:749-757.
1954 Comment on Discussions of the Analytic Induc-
tion Method. American Sociological Review 19:476-
477. —» See pages 477-478 for a response by Ralph
H. Turner.
1956 Introduction. In Two Major Works of Charles
Norton Cooley. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
1958 Free Society and Moral Crisis. Ann Arbor: Univ.
of Michigan Press. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1965.
1964 ANGELL, ROBERT COOLEY; DUNHAM, VERA S.;
and SINGER, J. DAVID Social Values and Foreign
Policy Attitudes of Soviet and American Elites.
Journal of Conflict Resolution 8:329-491.
1966 The Sociology of International Relations: Em-
pirical and Experimental Studies, Volume 1, pages
67-97 in World Congress of Sociology, Sixth, Trans-
actions, fivian (France): International Sociological
Association.
1968a Charles H. Cooley. Volume 3, pages 378-383
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968b Integration: II. Social Integration. Volume 7,
pages 380—386 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
1969 Peace on the March: Transnational Participa-
tion. New York: Van Nostrand.
1972 Sociological Resources for the Social Studies
Project: A Report by the Director. American So-
ciologist 7, no. 5:16-17.

1974 The Moral Integration of American Cities II.
American Journal of Sociology 80:607-629.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
PARSONS, TALCOTT (1937) 1949 The Structure of So-
cial Action: A Study in Social Theory With Special
Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers.
Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
ROBINSON, W. S. 1951 The Logical Structure of An-
alytic Induction. American Sociological Review 16:
812-818.
TURNER, RALPH H. 1953 The Quest for Universals in
Sociological Research. American Sociological Review
18:604-611.
ARENDT, HANNAH
In the preface to The Origins of Totalitarian-
ism, Hannah Arendt, a major political thinker
of the twentieth century, denned her ambition:
"Comprehension, in short, means the unpre-
meditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting
of, reality—whatever it may be" ([1951] 1958,
p. viii). Such comprehension is manifest not
only in this book but in all her work. The phrase
"facing up to" suggests clearly her judgment
that the mind naturally recoils from much of
political reality, which is so complex and so
morally offensive. Courage lies in steady per- tially "from other forms of political oppression
ception, the readiness to endure intellectually
the almost unendurable. Yet she injected resis-
tance to reality in the very definition of "com-
prehension." Holding that the act of comprehen-
sion was incomplete if it lacked an articulation
of moral response—indeed, that without moral
interest, in the first place, the energy required
for comprehension would be deficient—she in-
sisted on giving as adequate a moral response
as possible to political reality. It is this combi-
nation of trying to know the worst while re-
maining unparalyzed by knowledge that is her
defining characteristic. She was fortified in her
comprehension by a certain understanding of po-
litical excellence. In the life of Athenian de-
mocracy, the Roman republic, the New England
towns, and in the experience of modern people
in revolutionary conditions or the circumstances
of organized dissent, she saw a saving reality,
the reality of freedom.
Arendt was born in Hanover on October 14,
1906, of German Jewish parents. She studied at
the universities of Marburg, Freiburg, and Hei-
delberg, and received her doctorate in philos-
ophy in 1928 at Heidelberg for her thesis Der very raw material of totalitarianism would have
Liebesbegriff bei Augustin (1929). Among her
teachers was Karl Jaspers, whose philosophical
interest in human freedom is reflected in
ARENDT, HANNAH 21
Arendt's work. More generally, Arendt's thought
shows a strong resemblance in everything but
doctrine to other German philosophers of the
modern age, including Martin Heidegger. Her
work displays the same intellectual audacity,
passion to interpret and reconstruct, impatience
with conventional opinion, and intimate ac-
quaintance with classical thought and the clas-
sical sources of modern thought. She left Ger-
many in Hitler's first year, 1933, and went to
live in Paris. She moved to New York in 1941
and lived and worked there for the rest of her
life. In 1967, after teaching for a few years at
the University of Chicago, she joined the faculty
of the New School for Social Research, where
she held a university professorship until her
death on December 4, 1975.
Knowing the worst was Arendt's philosoph-
ically first aim. The Origins of Totalitarianism
contains her most extended investigation into
the worst, the phenomenon of totalitarianism.
She was persuaded that the phenomenon had
not been understood. Though she made full use
of an extensive bibliography, her book is domi-
nated by the insistence that totalitarianism is "a
novel form of government" that differs essen-
known to us such as despotism, tyranny, and
dictatorship" ([1951] 1958, p. 460). Her analysis
is basically psychological in nature. She tries to
make an inhuman phenomenon intelligible. Her
categories are "mob," "elite," and "mass"; and
though she means her analysis to apply equally
to Nazism and Stalinism, it is most richly sug-
gestive in the case of the Nazis.
The Origins of Totalitarianism is divided into
three main parts. The first two, "Antisemitism"
and "Imperialism," concern the "shadowy fore-
bodings" of totalitarianism in the nineteenth
century. The decomposition of the old European
order, of its class system and traditional beliefs,
set free social movements that were marked by
an effort to make sense of an increasingly
senseless world or to exploit new opportunities
for action in behalf of indefinite or limitless
purposes. World War I, in its horror, was the
culmination of the unchained tendencies of the
nineteenth century as well as the further im-
petus to totalitarianism. Totalitarianism was
hardly the inevitable outcome of preceding
events and conditions; yet without them the
been lacking. It was thus a phenomenon of the
twentieth century, of the chaos produced by war,
the decline of stable polities, economic disorder,
 22 ARENDT, HANNAH
the transfer of millions of people, and an over-
whelming feeling of lostness. The concentrated
psychological condition of the masses was lone-
liness, "the experience of not belonging to the
world at all, which is among the most radical
and desperate experiences of man" ([1951]
1958, p. 475). This widespread loneliness, re-
lated as it was to feelings of uprootedness and
hence superfluousness, prepared human beings
for totalitarian domination. For the masses, the
totalitarian organization of all life was a "suici-
dal escape" from a reality that was oppressive
in itself and that became all the more oppres-
sive for not being amenable to the understand-
ing of those who suffered. With grimness she
says that totalitarianism became "this century's
curse only because it so terrifyingly took care of
its problems" (1951, p. 430).
But the masses did not spontaneously devise
their own suicidal escape. Their susceptibility
was one thing; quite another was the mentality
of those who created totalitarian movements
and later exercised totalitarian domination.
Arendt mentioned the "hysterical fanaticism" of
Hitler and the "sensual vindictive cruelty" of
Stalin, but her general analysis was not given
over to the rhetoric of demonology; nor, on the
other hand, to the clinical language of any tech-
nical psychology (toward which disciplines, in
any case, she had an invincible antipathy). She
used the Kantian concept of radical or absolute
evil to designate totalitarianism and suggested
that its commission defied even the most pessi-
mistic ordinary understanding. The "evil mo-
tives of self-interest, greed, covetousness, re-
sentment, lust for power, and cowardice" could
not account for totalitarian action ([1951] 1958,
p. 459). What, then, did it take for the totalitar-
ian movements to start and then disclose them-
selves, ever more characteristically, ever more
criminally, until the creation of the death camps,
"the first crime in the long and sinful history
of mankind that is a greater sin than murder
itself?" (1951, p. 434). Or, to ask the question
she was later to borrow from Daniel Ellsberg
and ask in regard to American war makers
in Vietnam, "How could they?" (1972, p. 33).
The Nazi leaders came for the most part from
the mob, which she defined as the "refuse" of all
classes and the "by-product of bourgeois society"
([1951] 1958, p. 155). In her description they
were made up of a driven group of semi-intel-
lectuals in passionate quest of some rectification
of deep personal and spiritual disturbance,
along with an anomic following eager for com-
plete and self-surrendering obedience. At the
same time, the elite, the class of cultivated
leaders of social and intellectual life, contained
some who were fascinated by the mob because
they were fascinated by the possibilities of de-
struction. Their aestheticism was nihilist. As
Arendt's analysis unfolded, her attention focused
ever more sharply on the totalitarian leadership
in power, enabled at last to act out their nature
without significant resistance. They did not rest
until they made the world over to conform to
their initial ideological "supersense" of the way
it should be. Their maxim was "everything is
possible," which meant both that nothing ma-
terial, and that nothing moral, would impede
their determination.
When Arendt said that totalitarianism was a
novel form of government, she meant first that
its mode of governance was novel and second
that its aim—implicit in the mode and unthink-
able without it—was novel. An understanding of
the leaders' mentality was finally an under-
standing of the mode and the aim. The mode
was terror; the aim was to compel the world to
demonstrate the correctness of their ideology.
Her main points were that the terror increased
as the population grew more docile and that the
ideology was not merely a cynical instrument of
action but, essentially, an image of the only ac-
ceptable world. The only acceptable world was
one in which helpless victims were transformed
into noxious, subhuman elements by being
treated as such. In the death camps the world
became what it should be: "the supreme proof
of his [the totalitarian leader's] omnipotence"
(1951, p. 414). That the camps were useless
from the point of view of the war effort, and in-
deed interfered with it, only showed how pro-
foundly antiutilitarian the leadership was. In no
conventional sense were the leaders impelled
by the lust for power or expansion. It would
seem that the motive that Arendt found at the
heart of such crime was an infinite desire for
revenge on life, revenge for feelings of small-
ness and impotence. Only omnipotence sufficed
for an infinite desire of this sort. There are re-
semblances between Arendt's analysis and
Nietzsche's thought on ressentiment and Hei-
degger's on revenge.
Arendt did distinguish various motivations in
leaders. She maintained that Nazism before it
had perished had not yet been taken over ut-
terly by "the authentic mass man" acting with
the "meticulous, calculated correctness" of a
Heinrich Himmler ([1951] 1958, p. 327). She

also contrasted the rough animal brutality of
the Sturmabteilung (SA) concentration camp
guards—"men who really belonged in mental in-
stitutions and prisons"—with the methodical and
passionless murderousness of the Schutzstaffel
(SS)—"perfectly normal men" ([1951] 1958, p.
454). In her brief description of Himmler and
the SS may be seen the incipient statement of
the theme of "the banality of evil," which Arendt
developed in her later, controversial book, Eich-
mann in Jerusalem (1963a). Eichmann, an im-
portant functionary though not in the inner
circle, could have been, she suggested, perfectly
harmless in other circumstances. But with
power his deficiency became lethal: he was un-
able to think. He could not see the world as
someone else might see it, nor could he imagine
himself in the place of another. Without this
capacity, a person interested simply in doing
his job and in getting ahead could commit and
abet crimes on an inconceivable and unforgiva-
ble scale.
There is great stimulus to reflection in Arendt's
work on totalitarianism. One may reject her
principal contentions or find that they need re-
vision in the light of the conventional under-
standing that she strove to shock and overturn;
but her writing on this subject has the ampli-
tude of epic.
If Arendt explored the darkness of the cen-
tury's worst experiences, she also tried to re-
capture the meaning of political greatness. The
horror of absolute political evil did not diminish
her eagerness to theorize about the peculiarly
human excellence that she thought only politi-
cal action could reach. At the same time, she
did not claim that the absence of opportunity
for political action produced the totalitarian
pathology, or that involvement in political ac-
tion would necessarily cure the psychological
tendencies that were the root of totalitarianism.
To be sure, totalitarian leaders and masses alike
shared a sense of superfluousness—and there-
fore found it easier to project total loss of indi-
viduation onto their victims in death camps,
while the greatest prize of political action was
the enhanced individuation that actors came to
have—the feeling of being irreplaceable. There
was thus a strong conceptual link between the
extremes, but no actual interdependence. In
fact, each was, and had to be, historically rare.
The burden of preventing totalitarianism rested
on modern societies and their efforts to dimin-
ish the sense of superfluousness.
Arendt belonged to that small company of
ARENDT, HANNAH 23
thinkers ranging from classical to modern times
for whom political action is intrinsically great—
morally, aesthetically, or existentially—quite
apart from any practical, especially economic,
end it may accomplish. Varying with the philoso-
pher, the form of involvement may be citizenship,
governance, conquest, violent or nonviolent
revolution. Each form has had theoretical vin-
dication as an occasion for acquiring, perfect-
ing, or exhibiting a humanly valuable trait or
capacity. The emphasis may be on the enlist-
ment of practical wisdom, the attainment of
one's autonomy and the acknowledgment of
that of others, the expression of virtue or virtu,
the spontaneous creation of meaning or a mem-
orably beautiful pattern of action, the growth of
self-knowledge or worldly knowledge, the cre-
ation of new bonds between people, the satis-
faction of leaving one's mark on the world, the
exhilaration of overcoming resistance, the dis-
covery of self-respect, or the enjoyment of a
new kind of happiness that rivals private hap-
piness or relieves private woe. Theoretical sug-
gestions or elaborations can be found in Aris-
totle, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Hegel, and Nietz-
sche; and in such diverse twentieth-century
figures as Georges Sorel, John Dewey, Mohan-
das K. Gandhi, Andre Malraux, and the leaders
of the New Left in America and France. To this
accumulation of thought on the intrinsic, non-
instrumental value of political action, Arendt
made a most complex and instructive contribu-
tion. She presented her theory in The Human
Condition (1958), Between Past and Future
(1961), On Revolution (1963Z?), and numerous
essays.
If there is any substantial influence on
Arendt's thought it comes from the Greek poets
and historians Homer, Pindar, Herodotus, and
Thucydides. Although the Aristotelian notion of
praxis obviously provided some guidance,
Arendt worked on the assumption that Greek
philosophers, like most philosophers, were by
nature hostile to the celebration of political ac-
tion, or, when not hostile (as, say, Rousseau
was not), praised action on unacceptable
grounds. Arendt thus distanced herself from
other theorists of action and claimed to have
been either one of the first or one of the few to
have seen what the early Greeks saw in action,
and to be willing to render that vision phil-
osophically.
Her discussion of political action is set
against two other main kinds of human ac-
tivity: the labor of the body to keep itself alive,
24 ARENDT, HANNAH
and the work of the fabricator to furnish the
world with durable and sometimes beautiful
objects. The greatness of political action is that
through it, human beings achieve two things ex-
istentially. They do not necessarily intend either
of them, but political action is the only way to
achieve them. The first is the differentiation of
humanity from nature, and the second is the
differentiation of each human individual from
every other. Arendt had a fundamental aversion
to nature in its species characteristic, its same-
nesses and cycles, its domination by the care to
survive. The shame lies in complete identifica-
tion with, imitation of, or resemblance to, na-
ture; honor lies in collective artifice and in indi-
viduation. A wholly private life does not sponsor
individuation, which has nothing to do with in-
dividuality in John Stuart Mill's sense, an es-
sentially private cultivation of private distinc-
tiveness, a resistance to intellectual and
behavioral conformity. Arendt saw indistinct-
ness and self-delusion in liberal withdrawal
from the public realm, and bondage to the per-
ishable and biological in the apolitical consum-
erist society. Only in political action does the
human individual acquire identity and a group
of individuals their humanity. A person dis-
closes who he is amidst the formalities and dis-
ciplines of appearing and speaking in the public
realm; he can never know himself as others
know him, but he can know others as they know
him. At the same time, the common involve-
ment of all citizens creates the world, the space,
the nonnatural medium in which persons say
great words and do great deeds that escape the
futility of natural repetition by surviving in the
memory of posterity.
Above all, political action is speech: "Without
the accompaniment of speech . . . action would
. . . lose its revelatory character. Speechless ac-
tion would no longer be action because there
would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the
doer of deeds, is possible only if he is at the
same time the speaker of words. The action
. . . becomes relevant only through the spoken
word in which he identifies himself as the actor,
announcing what he does, has done, and in-
tends to do" (1958, pp. 178-179). The content of
speech is the public business, especially the de-
cisions that must be taken to preserve the well-
being and luster of the public realm itself or to
launch great and heroic enterprises. Political
action is not administration or governance.
Arendt's model here is the assembly of the
Athenian city.
In On Revolution she tried to show that there
was a more recent model, that of the commit-
tees, councils, and communes spontaneously
created by people from all classes during the
revolutions of the last two centuries in America,
France, Russia, Germany, and Hungary. These
occurrences were not imitations of each other
but rather the result of the sudden awareness in
each case that some opportunity could be
seized for involvement in the public life of de-
cision making. Arendt acclaimed this public
happiness, the splendid intoxication when pre-
viously private and silent individuals displayed
capacities for concerted action that they had not
known they possessed. By this display, they ac-
quired a genuine identity. These occurrences
were true illustrations of Arendt's dictum: "The
raison d'etre of politics is freedom, and its field of
experience is action" ([1961] 1977, p. 146). The
tragedy was that under the pressure of eco-
nomic advantage (as in America) or of the at-
tempt to abolish material misery (as in France)
or of superior military strength (as in Russia
and Hungary), the space of political action, the
locus of participatory democracy, was destroyed.
The supreme political achievement would be to
devise and maintain a political system in which
all who wished could have the daily experience
of direct democracy. Representative democracy,
though admirable for its liberties and securities,
was a democracy only for the representatives.
Arendt did not think that modern life, except in
extraordinary circumstances (like revolution) or
in episodes (like civil disobedience in the name
of constitutional principles), could accommo-
date or could even understand freedom. Her
main hope was to preserve the memory of free-
dom.
Arendt's writing was not confined to the ex-
tremes of totalitarianism and political freedom.
She thought a great deal about modern culture,
where she saw mostly darkness, though she
looked for glimmers of light, finding them in
exemplary modern lives, in the careers and
fates of worldly writers and political actors. Her
deepest philosophical concerns were expressed
in her occasional pieces on actors and specific
political events, but she could treat the particu-
lar on its own terms and not force it to serve
her own larger theoretical purpose. Men in Dark
Times (1968), with its essays on men and
women whose work showed their love of free-
dom and the world, exhibits perfectly what she
admired most.
In the last years of her life Arendt ventured

from "the relatively safe fields of political sci-
ence and theory" (1978b, vol. 1, p. 3), turning
to an examination of mental life. She tried to
synthesize and expand the suggestions scattered
throughout her earlier writings about the ten-
sions and even the desirable connections be-
tween the life of action and the life of the mind.
By the time of her death she had completed
work on two mental phenomena, thinking and
willing, but had not begun the third part, on
judging. Although her discourse at times is un-
political, her passion for the avoidance of po-
litical horror was the instigation of Thinking,
as her equally intense passion for political free-
dom helps to unify Willing.
GEORGE KATEB
WORKS BY ARENDT
1929 Der Liebe she griff bei Augustin. Berlin: Springer.
(1951) 1958 The Origins of Totalitarianism. 2d ed.,
rev. & enl. New York: Harcourt. —•> A paperback
edition was published in 1973.
(1957) 1974 Rahel Varnhagen. 2d ed., rev. New York:
Harcourt.
(1958) 1959 The Human Condition. Univ. of Chicago
Press.
(1961) 1977 Between Past and Future. Enl. ed. New
York: Penguin.
(1963a) 1964 Eichmann in Jerusalem. 2d ed., enl.
New York: Viking. —> A revised paperback edition
was published in 1977.
19631? On Revolution. New York: Viking. —» A paper-
back edition was published by Penguin in 1977.
1968 Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt. —» A
paperback edition was published in 1970.
1970 On Violence. New York: Harcourt.
1972 Crises of the Republic. New York: Harcourt.
1978a The Jew as Pariah. Edited by Ron H. Feldman.
New York: Grove.
1978b The Life of the Mind. 2 vols. New York: Har-
court. —» Volume 1: Thinking. Volume 2: Willing.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CANOVAN, MARGARET 1974 The Political Thought of
Hannah Arendt. London: Dent; New York: Har-
court.
KATEB, GEORGE 1977 Freedom and Worldliness in the
Thought of Hannah Arendt. Political Theory 5:141-
182.
O'SULLIVAN, NOEL 1975 Hannah Arendt: Hellenic
Nostalgia and Industrial Society. Pages 228-252 in
Anthony de Crespigny and Kenneth Minogue (edi-
tors), Contemporary Political Philosophers. New
York: Dodd Mead.
Social Research 1977 44:1-190. —> The entire issue
is devoted to essays on Hannah Arendt. The con-
tributors are Jurgen Habermas, Hans Jonas,
J. Glenn Gray, Robert Nisbet, Judith N. Shklar,
Sheldon S. Wolin, Bernard Crick, Hans Morgenthau,
Dolf Sternberger, Erich Heller, Ernst Vollrath, and
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl.
STERN, PETER; and YARBROUGH, JEAN 1978 Hannah
Arendt. American Scholar 47:371-381.
VOEGELIN, ERIC 1953 The Origins of Totalitarianism.
Review of Politics 15:68-85.
ARON, RAYMOND 25
ARON, RAYMOND
Raymond Claude Ferdinand Aron was born
in Paris on March 14, 1905. In 1928 he came
out of the Ecole Normale Superieure at the
top of his class, and in 1970 he was named a
professor at the College de France. Aron's early
inclination was toward metaphysical speculation
but his principal teacher, the neo-Kantian and
historian of mathematics and physics, Leon
Brunchschvicg, dampened such interests in the
name of the triumph of science over philosophy,
and encouraged him to think about the biological
sciences. After a year of work in this field, Aron
decided that it was impossible to theorize about
biology without becoming a biologist. He con-
cluded that a philosopher, on the other hand,
could reflect upon either the natural or the moral
and historical sciences. He chose the latter.
Aron then went to Germany, where as a young
Jewish scholar of philosophy, he witnessed the
relentless rise of National Socialism. The ex-
perience imbued him with a degree of pessimism
about human affairs that he was never to lose.
The ahistorical moralism of his French uni-
versity training seemed irremediably bankrupt,
as did his brief allegiance to the Socialist party.
In 1931, he formulated his intellectual goal: to
probe the relations between theory and action.
It is out of this initial query that all of his books
have emerged. In Max Weber he found inspira-
tion and a kindred spirit. During these same
years, he began his lifelong study of Karl Marx,
which has affected all of his works.
Aron returned to Paris before the outbreak of
World War n to complete his Introduction to the
Philosophy of History (1938a). Exiled in London
during the war, he edited the monthly La France
Libre, and developed a taste for journalism that
was in keeping with his desire to be both his-
torian and participant in the events of his times.
For decades he was a regular columnist for the
conservative French paper Le Figaro, from
which he resigned in June 1977. He subse-
quently joined the more progressive Express.
Aron's postwar works follow logically from his
prewar concerns with epistemological and for-
mal problems in the philosophy of history, which
were influenced by, among others, Wilhelm
Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert, Georg Simmel, and
Max Weber. After the war, however, his work
has a different orientation and addresses the
immediate concrete political, economic, social,
and international problems of life in the twen-
tieth century. Because Aron's work is thoroughly
26 ARON, RAYMOND
interdisciplinary, both in method and substance,
and because his contributions to scholarship are
prolific and dispersed, his books can be cate-
gorized in a variety of ways. A rough ordering
would include: analysis of the industrial order;
study of international relations involved in peace
and war; ideological criticism; studies in French
politics; and history and critique of sociological
thought.
Aron's comparative sociological studies of the
industrial order focus on liberal and communist
regimes. While his analysis of class structures
and bureaucratic imperatives has inspired "con-
vergence theory" between "capitalist" and "com-
munist" modes, Aron himself only partially sub-
scribes to such an approach. In the age of indus-
trial society, he believes that the political regime
is the crucial factor that provides the specific
difference between collectivities. In the tradition
of Weber he sets up ideal types—the monopolistic
and the constitutional pluralist—and argues that
they provide social wholes with critical deter-
minants that cannot be modified without affect-
ing the entire order. The existence of a genuine
opposition and the protection of individual
rights are intrinsic to the constitutional pluralist
mode. With this value of freedom comes the risk
of corruption and conflict. Intrinsic to the
monopolistic mode are bureaucratic solidarity
and ideological conformity. The risk of servitude
comes with this ability to centrally plan social
and economic life. Social wholes are unities that
can be reformed only if one understands the
structural realities they imply. There is only a
choice for change at the margin.
Although the nature of hierarchical structures
of production and the impact of new technolo-
gies on all aspects of social life highlight the
similarities of industrial societies whatever the
regime, past values and formal political rules
remain critical to understanding the fundamen-
tal differences between the two forms of indus-
trial society that are well on their way to dividing
the entire world. Both systems loudly proclaim
an egalitarian ethic, but both have to face a
nonegalitarian reality as the most cursory studies
of income distribution, prestige differentiation,
and power concentrations amply demonstrate.
The dialectic between the ethic of equality and
the reality of hierarchy forces some hard choices.
Reconciling human dignity and the imperatives
of modern industry is a problem for whoever
owns the means of production—individuals, cor-
porations, or state planning agencies. While in-
dustrial hierarchies are built on efficiency and
lack the stability of the traditional hierarchies of
the past, Aron denies the possibility of their elim-
ination through socialism; in fact he claims
socialism leads to their proliferation. As the
avowed heir of Montesquieu and Alexis de
Tocqueville, he stresses historical and political
forces and sees them, rather than underlying
social and economic structures, as ultimately
shaping the long-range destinies of collectivities.
Indeed, Aron's distinction between the constitu-
tional pluralist model and the monopolistic one
is a continuation of Tocqueville's insight that the
democratic age could lead to despotism as well
as to regimes of freedom.
Aron's focus on history and politics also char-
acterizes his monumental studies of peace and
war in the twentieth century. He notes that for
a century wracked by wars, war itself seems to
play a singularly small part in scholarly inter-
pretations. Aron approaches the study of war
through theoretical, sociological, and historical
categories. He analyzes the consequences of the
shift from the balance-of-power to the balance-
of-terror. By accumulating data on the space,
resources, and political structures of competing
sovereign states, he demonstrates how, for the
first time in history, a global system of interna-
tional politics is emerging, threatened and
shaped by nuclear arrangements and rent apart
by countless divisions, including the new nation-
alisms and political, economic, religious, and
ideological deadlocks. He studies the evolution
of the Western and communist blocs, the divi-
sions between the rich and the poor, and between
the atomic nations and those excluded from the
atomic club. He analyzes three main diplomatic
strategies in the twentieth century: dissuasion,
subversion, and persuasion. War, to Aron, is
central to understanding human history. Peace
emerges as the effort to limit war—an effort
that the nuclear threat may spur on to some
form of transcendance—through a legal or im-
perial solution.
A traditionalist in international relations,
Aron is skeptical about the explanatory value of
games theory and abstract models. If even eco-
nomic models have a dubious fit with social
reality, how can models in international relations
purport to reduce the cultural and historical
complexities of collectivities competing through
particular political leaders? He has serious
doubts about computer-assisted simulations and
about sophisticated scenarios of wars involving
non-Western peoples, whose history and value
systems become a dangerously ignored dimen-

sion in an attempt to predict the outcome of in-
ternational political struggles. Although search-
ing for general laws in international politics is
probably futile, because the weight of the past
and the clash of unique personalities in the
present usher in an unpredictable future, Aron
has established a wide-ranging framework for
the study of international relations, and his pio-
neering scholarship has influenced the develop-
ment of such fields as "polemology" and peace
studies.
In tireless and ruthless attacks on the myths
of the right and the left, his favorite targets are
left wing French intellectuals, particularly Jean
Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Aron's
analysis of politically emotive words confronts
ideology with reality. He accuses Parisian "left-
bank Marxists" of confusing Marxist goals with
Stalinist practice, deluding themselves on what
the nature of French life would be under com-
munism. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, he
stood quite alone in this respect among the
French intelligentsia. Then, in the late 1970s,
the atmosphere changed abruptly as the "new
philosophers" (particularly Bernard Henri Levy
and Andre Glucksman) criticized the cynical and
bloodthirsty applications of radical revolutionary
ideology and Utopian visions in the twentieth
century. If Aron accuses the left of harboring
terroristic methods in the name of illusory goals,
he also sees terror behind the reactionary who
turns radical in order to block change. He ana-
lyzes the ominous slide from conservative to
fascist positions and tactics. The reactionary
wishes to preserve or return to the past at all
costs and denies change, while the revolutionary
attempts to abolish the past and transcend it.
Neither goal is possible, but supporters of both
will go to inhuman extremes in the name of one
or the other. Aron's complaint that French intel-
lectuals play with words and do not understand
the realities of communal existence has ties with
Simone Weil's critique in the 1930s. It also has
much in common with Albert Camus' onslaught
against revolution and ideology. While Camus
confronts the problem of human cruelty in the
present in the name of the future from a moral
point of view, Aron is repeatedly demon-
strating this phenomenon from the perspective
of history and the social sciences. The accumu-
lated impact of Aron's work in this field influ-
enced the "end of ideology" debate. He does not
discount the impact of ideology on history so
much as he wishes to show the excesses that are
perpetuated in its name.
ARON, RAYMOND 27
Aron's works on French politics are prompted
by circumstances and the rush of events. He
called for Algerian independence long before
many of the thinkers on his left did. Despite
his admiration for Charles de Gaulle, he openly
attacked Gaullist policy toward Israel. In general
he has traced and criticized the centralizing and
statist tendency in French history and politics.
He has not taken a conservative role in French
politics as many have claimed; indeed, he has
argued that both the right and the left reinforce
state power in their plans and practices. Out-
spoken in his preference for economic liberal-
ism as long as it strives for socially responsible
policies, he has consistently argued for strong
economic growth, and claims that the postwar
period has been, in this respect, despite ups and
downs, a real success in France.
Aron's intellectual portraits of Montesquieu,
Comte, Marx, Tocqueville, Emile Durkheim,
Vilfredo Pareto, and Weber are classics that pro-
vide a wealth of balanced analysis; they also
place Aron in the sociological tradition and re-
veal his views on sociology itself. He is critical
of the French sociological tradition of Saint-
Simon, Comte, and Durkheim for relying too
heavily on a deterministic theory of the evolution
of industrial society, and for placing too much
faith in science and in the economic and social
benefits directly deriving from rationality. This
optimistic sociology, and its normative twin,
socialism, ignore the perennial reality of politics.
So does Marxism with its view of economics as
fate. Even if politics is but a subsystem of so-
ciety, Aron reasons that it is a crucial one. From
a different perspective he reaches the same posi-
tion as did Giovanni Sartori on the primacy of
the political. Aron, a classical realist, often
seems closer to the great traditional political
philosophers, Aristotle, Niccolo Machiavelli, and
Thomas Hobbes, than to modern sociologists.
Still, against the deterministic and optimistic
conclusions of the latter, Aron sides with the
liberal, realist, relativistic, and historically ori-
ented views of Montesquieu and Tocqueville, and
with the "value-free" approach of Weber. He
cannot, however, accept Weber's radical dis-
tinction between moral choice and scientific
demonstration. For Aron, commitment to spe-
cific values is an inescapable human necessity.
Science can and does help make alternative value
choices explicit even though it cannot decide the
substance of the choice itself.
What unites all these areas of Aron's work is
his search for the link between theory and ac-
28 ARON, RAYMOND
tion, between the general tendencies of human
collectivities and the unique, the contingent, and
the accidental. Aron focuses on the interaction of
historical experience and political will, and shies
away from historical determinisms, believing
that history is open ended. At the same time, he
rejects extreme historical relativism and an an-
archistic approach to values. Individuals and
people need a perception of themselves, their
past, and their future. Aron explores with insight
and flexibility the many options of human con-
sciousness expressed in history. He argues that
a probabilistic theory of history is the best one,
accounting for the contingent and the necessary,
shedding light on what might have happened as
well as what did, and revealing a past that helps
determine a more open, progressive, and humane
future. Aron's probabilistic theory of history is
imbued with the same spirit as his margin of
choice option in politics, that is the wedding of
the ideal and the real, the working for progres-
sive change without fanaticism or illusions.
Another theme that unites Aron's work is a
concern for the epistemological and methodolog-
ical limits of reason and knowledge. There is an
irreducible subjectivity that no social science can
conquer, particularly since its subjects are en-
dowed with a self-consciousness that modifies
all abstract models set up to understand them.
All sociological theories remain marked by an
ideology, charged with positive and negative
values that cannot be eliminated scientifically.
Sociological theory can only provide concepts,
regularities, and patterns, not scientific laws.
Aron believes this holds true for a Parsonian
theory as well as for a Marxist one.
There are very few secondary sources on
Aron's thought. Criticism focuses on his more
polemic works and on the seemingly endless
repetition of his major themes in lengthy and
overlapping volumes. A more serious challenge,
which Aron is very much aware of, involves
consistency between his critical stance toward
ideology and his own obvious and strongly stated
preference for a liberal view. If the constitu-
tional pluralist model alone permits freedom,
how can one maintain a nonideological attitude
toward it? If the freedom to criticize is a primary
value, superior to the search for equality, how
can differing systems be judged on their own
terms as Aron insists they be, with an objective
appraisal of the successes of each? Furthermore,
in assessing structural realities, which are to be
considered immutable and which transcendable?
A Marxist would focus on economic, not political,
struggles as the key to historical development,
the dignity of individuals, and collective libera-
tion. On the other hand, proponents of a func-
tional, statistically based social science would
challenge the weight Aron gives to the past.
Structural realities and personal values are
viewed as a complex and integrated whole, in-
terdependent and amenable to scientific metho-
dology. Aron's work can be viewed as "old-
fashioned.'*
For Aron there is no alternative to coming to
terms with incompatible visions in politics or
academic disciplines. One must take a stand
through scientific study, and ultimately make a
decision based on conscience. The scientific spirit
can determine the outcome of some, but not all,
debates. Commitments remain precarious be-
cause all regimes are imperfect and betray their
ideals. Twentieth-century regimes, turned to-
ward the future, offer the additional ambiguity
of pleading their cause in the name of what they
will become, not what they are. Perfection in
human affairs can be stated formally only as a
criterion and aspired to only as a goal. A degree
of relativism is the authentic experience of poli-
tics because of the multiplicity of competing
values and inescapable economic and social
servitudes.
Aron's philosophy rests on a belief in the over-
whelming value of freedom, and a perception of
the impact of human reason, however limited,
on history. It also rests on empirical and prag-
matic assumptions and faith in industrial de-
velopment. There are obviously tensions and
difficulties in this constellation of human ob-
jectives. Aron's problem is the problem of liberal-
ism itself, that eclectic and at times ambiguous
commitment to both common-sense compro-
mises and absolute principles. As an observer
and scholar of his times he has done more than
most to give heart to liberals and pause to its
critics. In his work intellectual honesty has been
a form of action, forcing a confrontation be-
tween theorizing and public policy. Aron's unique
contribution to the social sciences lies in the
lucidity and energy with which he has under-
taken to understand the twentieth century as a
whole, and with it the dawn of universal history.
MIRIAM BERNHEIM CONANT
WORKS BY ARON
(1935) 1966 La sociologie allemande contemporaine.
3d ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. —> A
translation of the second edition was published by
both the Free Press and Heinemann in 1957 with
the title German Sociology.

(1938a) 1961 Introduction to the Philosophy of His-
tory: An Essay on the Limits of Historical Objectiv-
ity. Boston: Beacon; London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-
son. —» First published in French.
(1938b) 1970 La philosophic critique de I'histoire:
Essai sur une theorie allemande de I'histoire. Paris:
Editions du Seuil. —» First published with the title
Essai sur la theorie de I'histoire dans I'Allemande
contemporaine: La philosophic critique de I'histoire.
1948 Le grand schisme. Paris: Gallimard.
(1951) 1954 The Century of Total War. Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday. —» First published as Les guerres
en chaine. A paperback edition was published by
Beacon in 1968.
(1955a) 1968 L'opium des intellectuels. Rev. ed. Paris:
Gallimard. —> A translation of the 1955 edition was
published by Doubleday in 1957.
1955b Polemiques. Paris: Gallimard.
1957a Espoir et peur du siecle: Essais non partisans.
Paris: Calmann-Levy. —» One essay from this book
entitled De la guerre was translated and published
separately by Norton in 1968 with the title On War.
1957b La tragedie algerienne. Paris: Plon.
(1959a) 1960 France, Steadfast and Changing: The
Fourth to the Fifth Republic. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press. —» First published as 1m-
muable et changeante: De la IV<' a la V> Republique.
1959t> La societe industrielle et la guerre. Paris: Plon.
1961 Dimensions de la conscience historique. Paris:
Plon.
(1962a) 1967 18 Lectures on Industrial Society.
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. —> First published
in French.
(1962b) 1966 Peace and War: A Theory of Interna-
tional Relations. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson;
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. —» First published
as Paix et guerre entre les nations. An abridged
English edition was published by Anchor Books in
1973.
(1963) 1965 The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear
Strategy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. —> First
published in French.
1964 La lutte de classes: Nouvelles lecons sur les
societes industrielles. Paris: Gallimard.
(1965a) 1969 Democracy and Totalitarianism. New
York: Praeger. —» First published in French.
(1965b) 1970 An Essay on Freedom. New York:
World Books. —» First published in French.
(1965c) 1967 The Industrial Society: Three Essays
on Ideology and Development. New York: Praeger.
—> First published as Trois essais sur I'age industriel.
(1967) 1970 Main Currents in Sociological Thought.
Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books. —» First published
in French.
(1968a) 1969 De Gaulle, Israel, and the Jews. New
York: Praeger; London: Deutsch. —> First published
in French.
(1968b) 1969 The Elusive Revolution: Anatomy of a
Student Revolt. London: Pall Mall Press; New York:
Praeger. —> First published as La Revolution in-
trouvable: Reflexions sur la Revolution de mai.
1969a D'une Sainte Famille a. I'autre: Essai sur les
marxismes imaginaires. Paris: Gallimard.
(1969b) 1968 Progress and Disillusion: The Dialectics
of Modern Society. New York: Praeger. —» First
published in French.
1972 Etudes Politiques. Paris: Gallimard.
(1973a) 1975 History and the Dialectic of Violence:
An Analysis of Sartre's Critique de la raison dia-
lectique. Oxford: Blackwell; New York; Harper.
—•» First published in French.
(1973&) 1974 The Imperial Republic: The United
States and the World, 1945-1973. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall. —> First published in French.
ASCH, SOLOMON E. 29
1976 Penser le guerre, Clausewitz. 2 vols. Paris: Galli-
mard. —* Volume 1: L'age europeen. Volume 2:
L'age planetaire.
1977 Plaidoyer pour I'Europe decadente. Paris: Laf-
font.
1978a Les Elections de Mars et la V" Republique.
Paris: Julliard.
1978fc> Politics and History: Selected Essays by Ray-
mond Aron. Edited and translated by Miriam Bern-
heim Conant. New York: Free Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CASANOVA, JEAN CLAUDE; SHILS, EDWARD; and SPERBER.
MANES (editors) 1971 Science et conscience de
la societe: Melanges en I'honneur de Raymond Aron.
2 vols. Paris: Calmann-Levy. —> See especially the
following articles: "Raymond Aron et 1'autonomie
de 1'ordre politique" by Bertrand de Jouvenel; "Ray-
mond Aron, philosophe de I'histoire et la politique"
by Gaston Fessard; "Raymond Aron and the Study
of International Relations" by Kenneth W. Thomp-
son; and "Raymond Aron" by Manes Sperber.
IONESCU, GHITA 1975 Raymond Aron: A Modern
Classicist. Pages 191-208 in Anthony de Crespigny
and Kenneth Minogue (editors), Contemporary
Political Philosophers. New York: Dodd Mead.
PIERCE, ROY 1966 Raymond Aron: The Sociology of
Politics. Pages 216-249 in Roy Pierce, Contemporary
French Political Thought. Oxford Univ. Press.
ASCH, SOLOMON E.
Solomon E. Asch was born in Warsaw, Po-
land, in 1907. He came to the United States
with his family at the age of 13 and settled in
the lower east side of New York. Shortly after,
he entered an elite high school, Townsend Har-
ris, the preparatory school for the City College
of New York, then did his undergraduate work
at City College, obtaining a B.S. in 1928. His
time at college was a period of search; his stud-
ies ranged from natural science to literature.
During the next four years, he was a graduate
student in the department of psychology at
Columbia University; he received his PH.D. in
1932.
Although Asch was attracted to psychology
because he felt the need for a discipline that
would solve human social problems, he thought
of himself in his graduate school days as pri-
marily a general experimental psychologist. He
studied with Robert S. Woodworth, among
others, and received friendly encouragement
from the young social psychologists in the de-
partment, Gardner Murphy and Otto Klineberg,
but did not work directly with them. His doc-
toral dissertation was an analysis of a problem
in learning.
Asch began his academic career as an in-
structor at Brooklyn College, a newly established
unit of the free system of higher education in
30 ASCH, SOLOMON E.
New York, later to become the City University
of New York. During this early period two ex-
periences turned him toward social psychology.
One was a summer fellowship arranged by
Gardner and Lois B. Murphy through Franz
Boas and Ruth Benedict. It permitted Asch and
his wife to spend the summer of 1936 in obser-
vations of child-rearing practices among the
Hopi Indians, one of the Pueblo peoples of Ari-
zona. The purpose of the study was to test hy-
potheses derived from Benedict's work among
the Zuni, a related group. The summer did not
lead to firm findings; the time was too short and
the language barriers too high. But it did
broaden Asch's perspectives. The second experi-
ence was a collaboration with two colleagues
at Brooklyn College, Max Hertzman and Helen
Block Lewis, on studies of stereotyping and halo
effects in social judgments. At about the same
time, Asch began a study of perceptual and
space orientation based on Max Wertheimer's
early observations of individual differences in
Phi phenomenon. Later, these studies developed
into the work on personality as related to field
dependency, conducted with Herman Witkin.
Wertheimer's influence on Asch during his be-
ginning years at Brooklyn College transformed
his intellectual life. Fleeing the Nazis, Werthei-
mer had gone to New York to teach at the Uni-
versity in Exile, the New School for Social
Research. In his ten-year association with
Wertheimer, Asch was completely absorbed into
the gestalt tradition, and in 1944, upon Werthei-
mer's death, Asch took over his position at the
New School. Three years later he left for
Swarthmore College, where he joined W. C. H.
Prentice, Wolfgang Kohler, and others in a de-
partment with a marked gestalt orientation. He
remained at Swarthmore for the next 19 years,
a fruitful period that saw the publication of his
widely read textbook, Social Psychology (1952),
his studies on conformity (1951; 1955b; 1956),
and, toward the end, the inception of his work
on association (Asch & Prentice 1958).
In 1966 Asch left Swarthmore to become di-
rector of a new Institute for Cognitive Studies at
the Newark campus of Rutgers University. There
he joined a number of psychologists with whom
he had previously worked on problems of mem-
ory, association, and cognition. They included
Irwin Rock, John Ceraso, Dorothy Diner stein,
and Howard Gruber. In 1972 he moved to the
University of Pennsylvania as a professor of
psychology.
His many honors include two Guggenheim
fellowships, two residences at the Institute for
Advanced Study in Princeton, a Nicholas Mur-
ray Butler award from Columbia University,
membership in the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, and the distinguished scientific
contribution award of the American Psychologi-
cal Association.
Fundamental orientation. The basic theme
of Asch's work, constant despite the shifting char-
acter of the particular problems, has been an
examination and critique of widely accepted as-
sumptions about the nature of man. The most
important influence was Wertheimer, though
Kohler's formulations of gestalt principles were
also an important guide. Kurt Koffka's concept
of memory traces and their evolution was a sec-
ondary influence. Unlike his mentors, however,
who tended to use illustrative material whose
"self-evident" character was evidence for the
gestalt laws. Asch carried out a series of tight,
well-designed experiments. In a way, he com-
bined the habits of thought of the gestalt tra-
dition with the experimental approach of Amer-
ican psychologists of his generation. He did not
go past the techniques of the 1930s to the com-
plex multivariate designs characteristic of the
1960s and 1970s in most areas of experimental
study of personality and social psychology. His
work consists of linked series of studies, each of
which explores the influence of one independent
variable on a clearly defined dependent variable.
During his career he has made contributions to
four areas: prestige suggestion, impression for-
mation, "conformity," and association.
Prestige suggestion. A traditional view held
that sources with high status would automati-
cally affect attitudes and beliefs. Thus a state-
ment praising revolution would be viewed posi-
tively by Americans if it were attributed to
Thomas Jefferson, negatively if attributed to
Lenin. Asch demonstrated that the response
was not an irrational change in the value placed
on the statement but a restructuring of its
meaning. Incidentally, in a discussion of the
positive results of an experiment by Muzafer
Sherif on the prestige effects, Asch explained
the findings in terms of the status of the in-
vestigator—a view based on "demand" char-
acteristics not to become a common point of
view for another two decades.
Impression formation. When two people
meet, each forms an impression of the character
and personality of the other. Traditional trait
analyses required that these impressions be
derived from the sum of perceived traits:

P = a-\-b-\-c-\-d...n, where a, b, c are spe-
cific traits. Asch rejected this notion, arguing
that an impression is the product of a totality
created by the interaction of perceptions of
traits where each trait is affected by the context
in which it is imbedded. He demonstrated this
tenet with the well-known experiment in which
subjects were given lists of traits and asked to
describe the person. Identical lists differing only
in the inclusion of "warm" or "cold" led to totally
different impressions. Apparently the change
from "warm" to "cold" was capable of altering
an impression based on many components.
However, "polite" and "blunt" had no such over-
riding effect. But when "warm" and "cold" were
imbedded in inappropriate lists, the interpreta-
tion of those two terms was itself affected by
the context. Most interestingly, subjects given
triads of traits with one inconstant element
(e.g., helpful, quick, skillful vs. helpful, quick,
clumsy) were able to describe a change in the
meaning of "quick" from one triad to the other.
Asch went on to demonstrate the occurrence
of metaphoric uses of trait-defining adjectives,
such as "sweet," in many languages from dif-
ferent language families and cultures, and to
trace the development of such metaphoric
usages in children from age three to adoles-
cence. In the latter study, he demonstrated
something like a Piagetian sequence. Children
did use "sweet" or "warm" to define the personal
characteristics of others at the ages of three to
six, but it was not until the later years that
they could verbalize the nature of the connec-
tion between the physical and psychological at-
tributes denoted by the same word. This ability
may coincide with the occurrence of formal op-
erations, in Piaget's sense of the term. Later
investigators have replicated Asch's "warm—cold"
effect with judgments based on contact with
real people rather than with lists of traits (Kelley
1950) and have studied some of the character-
istics of potentially central traits (Hays 1958).
Conformity. It is ironic that Asch is probably
best known as the inventor of the experiment in
which a hapless subject is exposed to the non-
veridical judgments of a group of supposed fel-
low judges. Asch developed the experiment be-
cause he believed that conformity is not an
arbitrary, inevitable, mechanical reaction to so-
cial pressure. He was sure that even under
extreme pressure some people would maintain
independence; he was actually astonished at the
extent to which many individuals yielded to
group pressure. Nevertheless, he felt that even
ASCH, SOLOMON E. 31
those who "conformed" would be found to have
redefined their ideas of the stimuli being judged
or of the social situation.
In the best-known study, individual college
students asked to judge lengths of lines were
confronted with eight instructed fellow judges
who made obviously incorrect judgments. Asch
found that despite pressures to conform 68 per
cent of the judgments were correct—that is,
counter to those of the instructed majority. Sub-
jects varied widely; about a quarter never
yielded to the majority and a third always
yielded. On postexperimental interviews some
independent subjects were found to be confi-
dent, others were filled with doubt. Some
yielders rationalized their behavior by postulat-
ing an illusion to which the majority were sub-
ject. Others went along because they feared the
social consequences of nonconformity although
they had no doubt of their own covert judg-
ments. Through these reports of internal reac-
tions Asch was able to describe the cognitive
and emotional changes related to either con-
formity or independence. Neither the studies of
conformity that preceded Asch's work nor the
many parametric investigations based on his
paradigm shared his concern for the subjects'
perception of the situation. True, a decade later
a number of social psychologists turned to such
analyses, but the germs of the ideas found in
the work of Herbert C. Kelman, Richard S.
Crutchfield, or Morton Deutsch and Harold B.
Gerard are either explicitly stated or implied in
Asch's original discussions. The theoretical de-
velopments in social psychology of the 1960s
and 1970s, in the work of Kelley and others
(Kelley 1971) on attribution, or in Walster and
her colleagues on equity (Berkowitz & Walster
1976), share with Asch's work an emphasis on
cognitive processes, on the internal restructur-
ing of ideas.
Association. The traditional view of associa-
tion is the mechanical bonding of items pre-
sented contiguously. Students of verbal learning
tend to regard these as stimulus and response
units. During the 1950s this model was ex-
tended by the concept of mediating responses.
These provide central and unobservable re-
sponses as part of the chain that links input to
behavior.
Gestalt psychologists have always rejected
this model. As formulated by Asch, gestalt the-
ory approaches the problem of association as a
part of the general issue of structure. An asso-
ciation is a central process in which units are
32 ASCH, SOLOMON E.
embedded in a structural whole; the association
cannot be viewed as a simple additive conse-
quence of the bonding of invariant individual
units. Learning is restructuring, not the acquisi-
tion of responses. Asch spent a number of years
conducting ingenious experiments to explore the
implications of the gestalt approach. These in-
clude demonstrations of backward association
as evidence that one does not learn responses
to stimuli; of the changes in the character of
errors as a function of the matrix of items; of
the superior acquisition of association between
related rather than unrelated items. This body
of work was summarized in Asch's 1968 address
to the American Psychological Association. One
sentence from this address expresses his ob-
jective most succinctly: "To study the formation
of associations is to study the coherence of ex-
perienced relations."
It is difficult for a nonspecialist to evaluate
these contributions to the study of association.
They address themselves to problems that were
ignored or treated tangentially in the great ex-
plosion of experimentation in verbal learning
and memory that occupied so many American
psychologists from 1945 to 1970. In that body
of work, for example, "meaningfulness" is
linked not to the characteristics of items but to
the number of associations they inspire in sub-
jects (Underwood & Schultz 1960). The models
derived from analogies to the computer require
unchanged units that progress from box to box
in metaphorically labelled storages. But they do
not include the notion of a flexible restructuring
of the "data" of experience or of the importance
of their "intrinsic properties." It is hardly sur-
prising that neither Endel Tulving and Stephen
A. Madigan (1970) nor Leo Postman (1975) in
their attempts at systematic reviews of research
and theory in memory even mention the work of
Asch and his colleagues. Whether their work
will continue to be regarded as irrelevant, or
whether psychologists will turn to the issues
raised by Asch, remains to be seen.
Final comment. A final summary of Asch's
work should stress its underlying unity. Each
contribution strengthens his view of human
beings, first fully presented in the Social Psy-
chology, as rational, creative, structuring, and
initiating organisms—in contrast to the tradition
that views mankind as passive, responding only
to environmental pressures or to variations in
milieu. His search for sources of independence
from social pressure was carried out, not coin-
cidentally, during the height of the McCarthy
era. In fusing his social orientation with his
psychological credo as a gestalt psychologist,
he has provided a model for a generation of
psychologists.
BERNARD MAUSNER
WORKS BY ASCH
1932 An Experimental Study of Variability in Learn-
ing. Archives of Psychology 143:1—55.
1934 ASCH, SOLOMON E.; KLINEBERG, OTTO; and
BLOCK, HELEN. An Experimental Study of Consti-
tutional Types. Genetic Psychology Monographs 16:
141-221.
1936 A Study of Change in Mental Organization.
Archives of Psychology 195:30-79.
1938 ASCH, SOLOMON E.; BLOCK, HELEN; and HERTZ-
MAN, MAX Studies in the Principles of Judgments
and Attitudes: I. Two Basic Principles of Judg-
ment. Journal of Psychology 5:219—251.
1940 Studies in the Principles of Judgments and At-
titudes: Determination of Judgments by Groups
and by Ego Standards. Journal of Social Psychology
12:433-465.
1946a Forming Impressions of Personality. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology 41:258—290.
1946b Max Wertheimer's Contribution to Modern Psy-
chology. Social Research 13:81-102.
1948 ASCH, SOLOMON E.; and WITKIN, HERMAN A.
Studies in Space Orientation. 4 parts. Journal of
Experimental Psychology 38:325-337, 455-477,
603-614, 762-782. -» Part 1: Perception of the
Upright With Displaced Visual Fields. Part 2: Per-
ception of the Upright With Displaced Visual
Fields and With Body Tilted. Part 3: Perception of
the Upright in the Absence of a Visual Field. Part 4:
Further Experiments on Perception of the Upright
With Displaced Visual Fields.
1951 Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification
and Distortion of Judgments. Pages 177—190 in
Harold Guetzkow (editor), Groups, Leadership, and
Men. Pittsburgh, Penn.: Carnegie Press.
(1952) 1959 Social Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
1955a On the Use of Metaphor in the Description of
Persons. Pages 29-38 in H. Werner (editor), On
Expressive Language, Worcester, Mass.: Clark
Univ. Press.
1955b Opinions and Social Pressure. Scientific Amer-
ican 193:31-35.
1956 Studies in Independence and Conformity: I. A
Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority.
Psychological Monographs 70, no. 9: Whole no. 416.
1958 The Metaphor: A Psychological Inquiry. Pages
86-94 in Renato Tagiuri and Luigi Petrullo (edi-
tors), Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior.
Stanford Univ. Press.
1958 ASCH, SOLOMON E.; and PRENTICE, W. C. H.
Paired Association With Related and Unrelated
Pairs of Nonsense Figures. American Journal of
Psychology 71:247-254.
1959a A Perspective on Social Psychology. Volume 3,
pages 363-383 in Sigmund Koch (editor), Psy-
chology: A Study of a Science. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
1959b The Practical Uses of Theory. Social Research
26:127-166.
1960 ASCH, SOLOMON E.; and NERLOVE, HARRIET The
Development of Double Function Terms in Chil-
dren: An Exploratory Study. Pages 47-60 in Sey-
mour Wapner and Bernard Kaplan (editors), Per-

spectives in Psychological Theory. New York:
International Universities Press.
1960 ASCH, SOLOMON E.; CERASO, JOHN; and HEIMER,
WALTER Perceptual Conditions of Association. Psy-
chological Monographs 74, no. 3:1—48.
1960 ASCH, SOLOMON, E.; HAY, JOHN; and DIAMOND,
RHEA MENDOZA Perceptual Organization in Serial
Rote-learning. American Journal of Psychology 73:
177-198.
1961 Issues in the Study of Social Influences on Judg-
ment. Pages 143-158 in Irwin A. Berg and Bernard
Bass (editors), Conformity and Deviation. New
York: Harper.
1962 A Problem in the Theory of Associations. Psy-
chologische Beitrage 6:533-563.
1962a ASCH, SOLOMON E.; and EBENHOLTZ, S. M. The
Principle of Associative Symmetry. American Philo-
sophical Society, Proceedings 106:135-163.
1962b ASCH, SOLOMON E.; and EBENHOLTZ, S. M. The
Process of Free Recall: Evidence for Nonassociative
Factors in Acquisition and Retention. Journal of
Psychology 54:3-31.
1963 ASCH, SOLOMON E.; and LINDNER, M. Note on
"Strength of Association." Journal of Association
55:199-209.
1964 The Process of Free Recall. Pages 79-88 in C.
Scheerer (editor), Cognition: Theory, Research,
Promise. New York: Harper.
1968a The Doctrinal Tyranny of Associationism. Pages
214-228 in T. R. Dixon and D. L. Horton (editors),
Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1968b Gestalt Theory. Volume 6, pages 158-175 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan
and Free Press.
1968c Wolfgang Kohler: 1887-1967. American Jour-
nal of Psychology 81:110-119.
1969 A Reformulation of the Problem of Associations.
American Psychologist 24:92-102.
1970 Perceiving and Thinking. Science 169:361-362.
—» Review of Rudolph Arnheim, Visual Thinking.
1974 Preface. Pages vii—xiii in David Rapaport, The
History of the Concept of the Association of Ideas.
New York: International Universities Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BERKOWITZ, LEONARD; and WALSTER, ELAINE 1976
Advances in Experimental Psychology. Volume 9:
Equity Theory: Toward a General Theory of Social
Interaction. New York: Academic Press.
CRUTCHFIELD, RICHARD S. 1955 Conformity and
Character. American Psychologist 10:191-198.
DEUTSCH, MORTON; and GERARD, HAROLD B. A Study of
Normative and Informational Social Influence Up-
on Individual Judgment. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology 51:629-636.
HAYS, WILLIAM L. 1958 An Approach to the Study
of Trait Implication and Trait Similarity. Pages
289-300 in Renato Tagiuri and Luigi Petrullo
(editors), Person Perception and Interpersonal Be-
havior. Stanford Univ. Press.
KELLEY, HAROLD H. 1950 The Warm-Cold Variable
in First Impressions of Persons. Journal of Person-
ality 18:431-439.
KELLEY, HAROLD H. 1971 Attribution in Social In-
teraction. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning
Press.
KELMAN, HERBERT C. 1958 Compliance, Identifica-
tion, and Internalization: Three Processes of Opin-
ion Change. Journal of Conflict Resolution 2:
51-60.
AYRES, CLARENCE E. 33
POSTMAN, LEO 1975 Verbal Learning and Memory.
Annual Review of Psychology 26:291-336.
SHERIF, MUZAFER 1935 An Experimental Study of
Stereotypes. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy-
chology 29:371-375.
TULVING, ENDEL; and MADIGAN, STEPHEN A. 1970
Memory and Verbal Learning. Annual Review of
Psychology 21:437-484.
UNDERWOOD, BENTON S.; and SCHULTZ, RUDOLPH W.
1960 Meaningfulness and Verbal Learning. Chi-
cago : Lippincott.
AYRES, CLARENCE E.
Clarence Edwin Ayres, American institutional
economist and social philosopher, was born on
May 6, 1891, in Lowell, Massachusetts, and died
on July 25, 1972, in Alamogordo, New Mexico.
After receiving his A.B. degree from Brown
University in 1912, he spent one year at Har-
vard University, returning to Brown for his A.M.
degree in 1914. From Brown he moved to the
University of Chicago to continue graduate work
in philosophy and economics, receiving his
PH.D. degree in philosophy in 1917. He stayed
at Chicago as instructor of philosophy until
1920, when he was appointed associate profes-
sor of philosophy at Amherst College. Resigning
this position in 1923, Ayres was appointed pro-
fessor of philosophy at Reed College. In 1924/
1925 he was associate editor of the New Repub-
lic. In 1930 Ayres was appointed professor of
economics at the University of Texas, a position
he held until his retirement in 1968.
Ayres's intellectual development was affected
powerfully by the stimulating, enriching envi-
ronment of the University of Chicago. Although
John Dewey had left Chicago a decade before
Ayres arrived, his influence survived, and the
young Ayres came under the spell of American
pragmatism in its Deweyian variant. In par-
ticular, Dewey's Studies in Logical Theory
(1903) made a deep impression. Moreover, Chi-
cago's economics department had by this time
given birth to that distinctly American school
of economics, institutionalism. Thorstein Veblen,
Wesley C. Mitchell, Walton H. Hamilton, John
Maurice Clark, and Robert Hoxie had all taught
there in their formative years. Only Clark and
Hoxie were in residence during Ayres's student
days, but the heterodox ideas of Veblen and his
followers that were still in the Chicago air at-
tracted him. This interest was decisively rein-
forced at Amherst by his colleague, Walton H.
Hamilton, one of Veblen's most brilliant disci-
ples. It was Hamilton who coined the term "in-
34 AYRES, CLARENCE E.
stitutionalism" to describe the way of thinking
of which Ayres became the leading representa-
tive in the post-World War n era.
During Ayres's foray into journalism at the
New Republic he read voraciously in numerous
fields and wrote articles on a wide range of
topics: theology, politics, sociology, education,
music, philosophy, psychology, and belles-lettres.
To an impressive degree he was able to in-
tegrate much of what he learned into his own
teaching. Although he generously and correctly
gave credit to Dewey and Veblen as his intellec-
tual progenitors, the social philosophy that
emerged from this mosaic of influences was
highly original.
Ayres developed a theoretical system for in-
stitutionalism in an effort to do for economics
what Dewey had attempted in philosophy: to
bring about a genuine reconstruction. The build-
ing blocks were fashioned over many years, but
the basic elements can be seen in his first two
books, Science: The False Messiah (1927) and
Holier Than Thou: The Way of the Righteous
(1929). In the first book he described how the
rapid growth of technology undermines tradi-
tional values and beliefs, placing emphasis upon
the immense importance of industrial technol-
ogy in transforming the values of civilization.
The connection between science and values,
between machines and morality, intrigued Ayres
and remained the most important single con-
ception that he held of change and progress
throughout his career. In this volume he ex-
plicitly raised the issue of the moral require-
ments of social order by showing how the inter-
action of institutions and technology affects
society's ethical and moral values. In Holier
Than Thou, Ayres was concerned less with the
growth of technology and its potentially devas-
tating effects on social order than with the
structure of the belief systems that were under-
going modification. The book's approach was
strongly influenced by Veblen's dissection of the
folkways and mores of a leisure-class society.
However, it also contained a hint of the trans-
cultural theory of value that Ayres was to de-
velop in later years.
The publication of The Theory of Economic
Progress (1944) established Ayres as the lead-
ing theoretician of institutional economics. The
system he adumbrated in that work was refined
and elaborated in The Industrial Economy
(1952) and in his last book, Toward a Reason-
able Society (1961). All these books exhibit a
unity of method and intention. Ayres saw all
social behavior as capable of being dichotomized
into technological and ceremonial components.
He used the term "technological behavior" to re-
fer to those activities in which mankind ration-
ally applies hand and brain to solve problems
and thereby contribute to the ongoing life
process of the race. This process inevitably in-
volves the use of tools. The tool-using function
is broadly conceived to include all instruments
by which human skills are organized, disparate
artifacts that are related to each other by the
same developmental forces. In Ayres's words:
"The continuity of civilization is the continuity
of tools. All the arts, all the sciences . . . together
owe their existence and derive their substance
from the continuity which links the surrealist's
pigments to the clays in which the Aurignacian
caves were daubed, and in terms of which the
cyclotron is but a continuation of Neanderthal
experiments in chipping flint" ([1944] 1962,
p. 222). It is this process that was responsible
for the enormous changes in the welfare of the
human race over time. Ayres thus identified
technological development as being a cultural
process. The progression by which the arts and
sciences develop results from the fact that ac-
cessible and objective instruments are capable
of combination into new forms. Earlier tools
(including ideas) always make the later ones
possible. The retention and preservation of im-
plements, a function of human memory power,
are what make man a cultural animal and allow
for progress over time in a way impossible for
any other species.
By "ceremonial behavior" Ayres meant those
activities in which emotion rather than reason
holds sway. Accompanying the technological
process are myths and ritualistic fantasies that
define the status and caste system of a social
order. Although the stock of tools, instruments,
skill, and knowledge is constantly growing, a
human element remains constant through the
ages. In this, culture plays a decisive role. The
human animal is given to fantasy making, ob-
sessions, superstitions, and taboos that them-
selves are transmitted by community indoctrina-
tion through emotional conditioning. All tribal
legends thus derive their sanction from the past.
The past-bindingness of ceremonial behavior is
completely contradictory to the ongoingness of
technological behavior. Against the background
of these opposing forces the drama of economic
progress—or its failure—is played out.
The dichotomy of technological-ceremonial
interaction enabled Ayres to make an important

contribution to the understanding of economic
history. By identifying the dynamic and static
elements inherent in the historical situation, he
explained the timing and location of the indus-
trial revolution. His stress on the rigidity of
institutions as inhibitors of development was
highly original and useful in demonstrating the
importance of economic institutions for eco-
nomic change.
One of the distinctive features of Ayres's work
was his development of a theory of value which
eschewed both moral relativism and supernatu-
ral authority. Ayres located the source of value
on the technological side of his dichotomy, in
the way of thinking and conduct that involves
the use of tools. Human progress is made pos-
sible by the continuity of the technological pro-
cess. The values derived from that process are
transcultural, while the values deriving from
superstition and ceremonial behavior are cul-
ture bound. Ayres argued that the values of
freedom, equality, security, abundance, and ex-
cellence are technological values and stand in
a symbiotic relationship to one another. This
approach permitted a full-bodied defense of
Western culture and the industrial way of life.
Although Thorstein Veblen, John R. Com-
mons, and Wesley C. Mitchell laid the founda-
tions for institutional economics, Clarence Ayres
went beyond them in significant ways that ad-
vanced the cause of the movement. He was a
creative social scientist of extraordinary ability,
remarkable for his erudition and exuberance of
style. More than any economist of his genera-
tion, he recognized the importance of philosoph-
ical issues and was competent to make con-
tributions in that arena. He was also among
the first economists to propose what has come
to be called a negative income tax as a method
of redistributing income to prevent the problem
of inadequate demand. Since he rejected the
orthodox theoretical framework of economics,
Ayres's influence, not surprisingly, has been
greater outside that science than within it.
His students have included Talcott Parsons,
C. Wright Mills, and Marion J. Levy, Jr. Among
economists of distinction, John Kenneth Gal-
braith and Joseph Dorfman have acknowledged
their intellectual debt to him. But outside of the
southwestern and western United States, where
AYRES, CLARENCE E. 35
a regional school of institutional economists
claims Ayres as its intellectual forebear, he has
had few literal disciples.
WILLIAM BREIT
WORKS BY AYRES
(1927) 1973 Science: The False Messiah. Clifton,
N.J.: Kelley. —» The 1973 reprint is bound together
with a reprint of Holier Than Thou (1929) and has
a new preface by Ayres.
(1929) 1973 Holier Than Thou: The Way of the
Righteous. Clifton, N.J.: Kelley. -» The 1973 re-
print is bound together with a reprint of Science
(1927) and has a new preface by Ayres.
1932 Huxley. New York: Norton.
1938 The Problem of Economic Order. New York:
Farrar & Rinehart.
(1944) 1978 The Theory of Economic Progress. 3d
ed. Kalamazoo: New Issues Press of Western
Michigan University. —» Includes a new introduc-
tion by Louis Junker and the "Ayres addendum."
The quotation in the text is from the 1962 edition,
which contains a new foreword by Ayres.
1946 The Divine Right of Capital. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
1952 The Industrial Economy: Its Technological Basis
and institutional Destiny. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
1961 Toward a Reasonable Society: The Values of
Industrial Civilization. Austin: Univ. of Texas
Press. —-» A paperback edition was published in
1978.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BREIT, WILLIAM 1973 The Development of Clarence
Ayres's Theoretical Institutionalism. Social Science
Quarterly 54:244-257.
BREIT, WILLIAM; and CULBERTSON, WILLIAM P., JR.
(editors) 1976 Science and Ceremony: The In-
stitutional Economics of C. E. Ayres. Austin: Univ.
of Texas Press. —» Includes essays assessing Ayres's
work and influence by John Kenneth Galbraith,
A. W. Coats, R. M. Hartwell, S. Herbert Frankel,
W. W. Rostow, J. J. Spengler, Gordon Tullock,
Alfred F. Chalk, James M. Buchanan, Talcott Par-
sons, Marion J. Levy, Jr., and the editors. Also
contains a complete bibliography of Ayres's publi-
cations.
CULBERTSON, WILLIAM P., JR. 1978 The Preconcep-
tion of Institutional Economics. Social Science
Journal 15:7-12.
DEWEY, JOHN 1903 Studies in Logical Theory. Univ.
of Chicago Press.
GRUCHY, ALLAN G. 1972 Contemporary Economic
Thought: The Contribution of Neo-institutional Eco-
nomics. Clifton, N.J.: Kelley. —> See especially
chapter 3, pages 89-132, on Ayres.
SAMUELS, WARREN J. 1977 The Knight-Ayres Cor-
respondence: The Grounds of Knowledge and So-
cial Action. Journal of Economic Issues 11:485-525.
WALKER, DONALD A. 1978 The Economic Policy Pro-
posals of Clarence Ayres. Southern Economic Jour-
nal 44:616-628.
 BARON, SALO W.
Salo (Shalom) Wittmayer Baron was born on
May 26, 1895, in Tarnow, Galicia, the southern
region of Poland which then belonged to the
Austro-Hungarian empire. His parents were
Elias and Mina (nee Wittmayer) Baron.
Baron was a middle child and an only son.
His parents belonged, by the right of both an-
cestry and wealth, to the Jewish aristocracy of
Galicia. The Wittmayers had been brokers in
commodities. Elias Baron was a banker, whose
interests included oil fields, lumber yards, mills,
and real estate. The father, though somewhat
"modern," was punctiliously Orthodox in re-
ligion. The mother was much more Western and
stylish. Her manners were Frenchified, and she
was fluent, in addition to Yiddish and Hebrew,
in French, Polish, and German.
As a small child, Baron was entirely in the
charge of a Polish nursemaid, and, thus, in the
very midst of a religiously Orthodox household,
his first language was not Yiddish but Polish.
When he was four years old, his Hebrew studies
began in earnest with a tutor, who started to teach
him the Hebrew Bible translated into Yiddish. He
was thus forced to learn both these languages
at once. When Baron was ten, a new tutor,
Aaron Wrubel (the father of the well-known
Israeli medievalist Zvi Ankori) arrived and re-
mained for the next eight years. During this
period, Baron not only acquired a broad educa-
tion in Jewish religious literature, especially in
the Talmud, but also completed his work in the
local Polish Gymnasium as an "external stu-
dent" who was examined periodically by the
faculty.
Thus, in these formative years, Baron lived
in two cultures. He wrote Hebrew poetry as
a 12-year-old, and was a passionately convinced
Polish nationalist at the age of 15. Although he
wore the traditional dress of Orthodox Jews
into his teens, he changed into Western dress
when the occasion required. All during these
years, from the age of ten on, he was also
trained for his father's business. By his 15th
year, he was occasionally in charge of family
enterprises during his father's absences.
At age 18, Baron decided against business
and for scholarship. By 1917, he had received a
doctorate in philosophy from the University of
Vienna. To this degree he added rabbinic ordi-
nation in 1920 from the city's Jewish Theologi-
cal Seminary, and two more doctorates from
that university—in political science (1922) and
law (1923).
After teaching history at the Jewish Teachers
College (Juedisches Paedagogium) in Vienna
from 1919 to 1926, he was invited by Stephen
S. Wise to teach at the Jewish Institute of Re-
ligion in New York. He remained there from
1927 to 1930, when he was appointed to a
newly-created chair at Columbia University, the
Linda R. Miller professorship in Jewish litera-
ture and institutions. This was the first ap-
pointment in Jewish history to the history
faculty of any American university. The many
such chairs that have since been established
owe much to his example, and nearly the ma-
jority of their present occupants are Baron's
former students.
Baron retired from his Columbia professor-
ship in 1963 but until 1968 remained the direc-
tor of its Center for Israel and Jewish Studies,
37
38 BARON, SALO W.
which he had founded in 1950. Both before and
after his retirement, he lectured and taught in
many universities at home and in foreign coun-
tries, including Israel. Upon his retirement from
Columbia,, the university took the rare steps
of conferring an honorary degree on a member
of its own faculty and of creating a new chair
in Jewish history, named in his honor.
Baron was never a scholarly hermit. He was
the leading spirit of the American Academy for
Jewish Research and its president three times
(from 1940 to 1953; 1958 to 1966; 1968 to
date); president of the American Jewish His-
torical Society from 1953 to 1955; cofounder in
1936 (with Morris Raphael Cohen) of the Con-
ference of Jewish Social Studies, called in its
early years the Conference on Jewish Relations;
and president of that body from 1941 to 1954
and 1963 to 1967. Right after World War n, he
was the founder and president of Jewish Cul-
tural Reconstruction (the executive director
whom he chose was Hannah Arendt), which
worked in identifying and reclaiming libraries
and other cultural treasures despoiled by the
Nazis. In 1952, he became a corresponding
member of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization's Interna-
tional Commission for a Scientific and Cultural
History of Mankind.
The Nazi assault on the Jews was a very per-
sonal matter, for his roots were in Poland. His
parents were killed there by the Nazis in the
spring of 1942. The climactic moment of Baron's
public career came in a Jerusalem courtroom in
1961, when he was called by the prosecution in
the Eichmann trial to deliver a historical account
of anti-Semitism. He spoke for many hours,
with a uniquely individual learning and passion.
Baron's scholarly productivity has been ex-
traordinary, in a class by itself both in breadth
of knowledge and sheer quantity. The most re-
cent bibliography of his writings appeared in
the first of a three-volume jubilee publication
issued in 1974 to celebrate his eightieth birth-
day. It contains five hundred items; most are
articles, but there are dozens of books. Baron has
always regarded himself as primarily a historian
of the modern era, but he undertook several
works of synthesis that cover the range of Jewish
history. The major ones are: The Jewish Com-
munity (1942); A Social and Religious History
of the Jews (1937), which has been revised
through the middle of the seventeenth century.
While engaged in these major tasks, Baron
also wrote such books as Modern Nationalism
and Religion (1947); Russian Jews under Tsars
and Soviets (1964); and edited, together with
Joseph L. Blau, Jews of the United States, 1790-
1940: A Documentary History (1963). His abid-
ing concern in all his work has remained the
problem that he defined for himself in his first
monograph, Die Judenfrage auf dem Wiener
Kongress (1920), in which he discussed the
relationship of Jewish needs and rights to the
Gentile society, as they had been considered on
this scale, for the first time in Western history,
at a meeting of Europe's major powers at the
Congress of Vienna.
Central to Baron's vision of Jewish history
is his view that Jewish experience through the
ages has not occurred in isolation, but in a
larger world within which the Jews have
lived. In some versions of Jewish history this
world was ignored or was perceived as the un-
changing enemy. Jewish history thus became an
account of the inner life of the Jews and of the
ways they could find to resist hostility (Leidens-
und Gelehrtengeschichte). Such an approach re-
quired of the Jewish historian no great insight in-
to the history of the various Gentile worlds, for,
by definition, such knowledge was of little impor-
tance to understanding Jewish history. Baron has
insisted that at no point in the whole of their
experience have the Jews failed to come into
serious encounter with other cultures. The im-
age of a sealed community does not hold for
even the most closed of ghettos. In addition, those
influences have not always been of one kind.
The multinational Austro-Hungarian empire and
the multicultural late Roman empire are con-
texts for Jewish history that differ vastly from
the religious and cultural monism of the genera-
tion of Mohammed. In each of the changing ages
and climes within which Jews have lived, their
history can be understood only as part of human
history.
This view has important consequences. As a
theory it reflects an outlook that refuses to regard
the Jews as pariahs, always in a position of
"otherness" and "over-againstness." Baron is no
Polly anna; he is keenly aware of the tragic di-
mensions of Jewish history. But neither is he a
Cassandra. He has been preeminent in calling
attention to the times of peace and even cooper-
ation between Jews and Gentiles. Rooted as he
also is in classic Jewish thought and feeling,
Baron continues to believe, even in the twenti-
eth century, that man is not irretrievably evil
and that the human past is not a tale of unre-
lieved wickedness.

This view also has important consequences
for defining the field of Jewish historical re-
search. It increases enormously the burden upon
the Jewish historian. To work in the manner of
Baron, one must be a first-class general histo-
rian, who can write with Baron's originality, on
such subjects as Ferdinand Lassalle's political
theory and on the interrelations between modern
nationalism and religion. The task is all the
more onerous if the field of a historian's re-
search is not limited to one period but extends
over the whole of Jewish history.
Having asserted that Jewish history is part of
general history, Baron must inevitably confront
the question: What is different about the Jews?
His answer stands in a line of classic Jewish
thought rooted in the Bible itself. In his view,
the Jews are a peculiar people because they have
been the bearers, from their beginnings, of a
Messianic religion of universal import. The mean-
ing of the career of Jewry in history is to live,
in the dimension of time, as a people who
through a particular way of life, exemplified
universal moral ideas. Other peoples are created
in space, on their lands. Their sense of com-
munity is rooted in geography, and it tends to
die when such a people is exiled. The encounters
of the Jews with Palestine are indeed the his-
torical apexes of Jewish creativity. Still, Baron
sees more to Jewish experience, even in those
periods, than the simple fact of a people living
on its land. Even during the First Common-
wealth, and certainly during the Second, the
Jews were characterized by the presence of an
influential Diaspora. When the complete Exile
began, they were prepared by prior experience
to exist without a base on their own land. This
people yearned always to be restored to Pales-
tine, but it could cope with the fact of landless-
ness.
Baron thus affirms the importance for Jewish
history both of Zion and of the Jewish commu-
nities outside the homeland, and he passes no
judgment on the merit of one against the other.
Indeed, this international people, retaining a
spiritual and communal identity through chang-
ing ages and places, is the harbinger of the
human future, when all identities will be histor-
ical rather than geographical. Nor are scholars
and men of the spirit alone the major bearers of
Judaism. Peddlers, economic innovators, and
factions struggling for the control of Jewish
communal organization—all the people who make
up a society are of consequence in his depiction.
If Israel, the people, is the bearer of its spirit,
BARON, SALO W. 39
Baron's vision is broad enough to recognize that
the spirit has expressed itself in the most mun-
dane social facts.
ARTHUR HERTZBERG
WORKS BY BARON
1920 Die Judenfrage auf dem Wiener Kongress: Auf
Grund von zum Teil ungedruckten Quellen dar-
gestellt. Vienna and Berlin: Lowit.
1922 Die politische Theorie Ferdinand Lassalles. Leip-
zig (Germany): Hirschfeld.
(1937) 1952-1976 A Social and Religious History of
tine Jews. 2d ed., rev. & enl. 16 vols. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press; Philadelphia: Jewish Publi-
cation Society of America. —> These volumes dis-
cuss the history of the Jewish people up to the
mid-seventeenth century; future volumes are in
preparation. The first edition consisted of only three
volumes.
1941 BARON, SALO W. (editor) Bibliography of Jewish
Social Studies, 1938-1939. New York: Conference
on Jewish Relations.
(1942) 1972 The Jewish Community: Its History and
Structure to the American Revolution. 3 vols. West-
port, Conn.: Greenwood.
1943 BARON, SALO W.; and BARON, JEANNETTE M.
Palestinian Messengers in America, 1849—1879: A
Record of Four Journeys. New York: Conference on
Jewish Relations.
1947 Modern Nationalism and Religion. New York:
Harper. —> The Rauschenbusch lectures for 1944
at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School.
1964 History and Jewish Historians: Essays and Ad-
dresses. Compiled with a foreword by Arthur Hertz-
berg and Leon A. Feldman. Philadelphia: Jewish
Publication Society of America.
1971 Steeled by Adversity: Essays and Addresses on
American Jewish Life. Edited by Jeannette M.
Baron. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society
of America.
1972 Ancient and Medieval Jewish History: Essays.
Edited with a foreword by Leon A. Feldman. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAER, YITZHAK 1938 Ha-Historiah Ha-Hevratit Ve-Ha-
datit shel ha-Yehudim (Hearot le-Sifro ha-Hadash
shel S. Baron) (A Social and Religious History of
the Jews: Comments on the New Book by S.
Baron). Zion 3:277-299.
BARZILAY, ISAAC 1957 Yeud ve-Goral: Le-Mahshavto
ve-Shitato ha-Historit shel Prof. Shalom Baron
(Purpose and Destiny: On the Thought and Doc-
trine of Prof. Salo Baron). Sefer Hadoar 35:149-
154.
BLAU, JOSEPH L.; HERTZBERG, ARTHUR; FRIEDMAN,
PHILIP; and MENDELSOHN, ISAAC 1959 Essays in
Jewish Life and Thought. New York: Columbia
Univ. Press.
HERTZBERG, ARTHUR 1964-1965 Salo Wittmayer
Baron on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday. Jew-
ish Book Annual 22:105-108.
HERTZBERG, ARTHUR 1971 Baron, Salo (Shalom)
Wittmayer (1895- ). Volume 4, columns 253-
254 in Encyclopedia Judaica. New York: Keter and
Macmillan.
LlEBERMAN, SAUL; and HYMAN, ARTHUR 1974 Salo
Wittmayer Baron Jubilee Volume on the Occasion
40 BASTIDE, ROGER
of His Eightieth Birthday. 3 vols. Jerusalem: Amer-
ican Academy of Jewish Research.
ROTH, CECIL 1958 Baron, Shalom. Volume 9, col-
umns 519—520 in Encyclopedia Hebraica. Tel Aviv:
Massada.
BASTIDE, ROGER
Roger Marius Cesar Bastide (1898-1974) was
a sociologist and anthropologist whose work re-
flected many personal and academic interests:
mysticism, dreams, trances, madness, Afro-
American cultures, and the comparative study of
race relations. Between the years 1924 and 1938,
Bastide taught at lycees in Cahors, Lorient, Val-
ence, and Versailles. Between 1938 and 1951
he taught at the University of Sao Paulo in Bra-
zil. On his return to France, Bastide served as a
directeur d'etudes at the Ecole Pratique des
Hautes Etudes. In 1958 he became director of
the Centre de Psychiatrie Sociale. Although Bas-
tide retired from the Sorbonne in 1968, he re-
mained an active scholar until his death.
Bastide and the Durkheimians, Bastide was not
a Durkheimian in the strictest sense of the word,
but his early academic work was conducted in a
country in which the influence of Emile Durk-
heim and his nephew Marcel Mauss was still
paramount. The Durkheimians regarded psy-
chology and sociology as separate sciences, each
occupying its own distinct territory. Any expla-
nation of social phenomena in terms of individ-
ual psychology was regarded as suspect. Durk-
heim viewed religion as a product of social
organization, and all attempts to explain it in
terms of its emotional or intellectual value to its
individual inventors were rejected by him as
methodologically unsound. Attempts to relate
variations in the suicide rate of different classes,
as well as ethnic and religious groups to mental
pathology and "race psychology" were rejected.
One clear implication of the Durkheimian posi-
tion was that certain phenomena—e.g., madness,
dreams—were individual rather than social in
nature and were therefore rightly excluded from
the realm of sociology. Bastide's writings from
1930 until his death may be viewed as acts of
loyal rebellion against some of these doctrinal
positions.
In the first place Bastide, in some of his ear-
liest writings on mysticism, was unwilling to
accept the notion that religion is merely the
product of other social phenomena. The mystic
experience, the inexpressible and ineffable sen-
timent of union with the unknown, transcends
cultural boundaries and may even be attainable
by the modern academic who knows no tradi-
tional faith and lives in a secular world (Bastide
1975). Second, Bastide was one of the first
French sociologists seriously to consider the
potential importance of Freudian theory. Al-
though he condemned Freudian reductionism,
he was not inclined to ignore Freudian and neo-
Freudian contributions to the understanding of
the growth of individual personality. Accord-
ingly, he felt (1950) that the heirs of Freud
and Durkheim had much to gain from a cau-
tious interchange of ideas and perspectives.
Third, a logical consequence of the latter posi-
tion was Bastide's belief that sociology could
successfully expand its territory and invade the
psychologist's and psychoanalyst's realm. In an
essay originally published in 1932 (reprinted in
1972£>), "Materials for a Sociology of the
Dream," Bastide claimed that dreams were, in a
sense, social facts. Primitives used the dream
experience as a guide to the cosmos and as a
manual for social action. Furthermore, there
was a relationship between the content of the
dream and the social milieu of the dreamer. In
his later work Bastide supported this argument
with citations from the ethnographic writings of
Peter Lawrence, Kenelm Burridge, and George
Devereux, and with reports of his own in-
terviews with subjects in Sao Paulo and Paris.
In brief, Bastide applied Durkheimian no-
tions to data that sociologists had excluded from
the social realm. He believed that, insofar as
social scientists excluded the Irrational"—e.g.,
dreams, trance, and madness—from their pur-
view, they were the victims of the rationalist
prejudices of contemporary Western man, who
values only aspects of his culture that are of
immediate technological and economic utility.
The extension of the Durkheimian program
is clearly outlined in The Sociology of Mental
Disorder (1965&). In this work Bastide, follow-
ing Henri Ey and Michel Foucault, observes first
that the definition of insanity varies geographi-
cally and historically; second, that the healing
process, whether it involves shaman and suf-
ferer or psychoanalyst and patient, reflects the
expectations, beliefs, and desires of a third party
—society; third, that each society has its own
characteristic form of madness, insofar as the
insane tend to act in the way society deems ap-
propriate for them; and last, that much evi-
dence has accumulated on the relationship
between class, religion, ethnicity, and the inci-
dence of mental disorder.

Brazil: The candombles. Bastide's work in
the sociology of religion, Afro-American studies,
and race relations benefited greatly from his
stay in Brazil. His earlier observations on re-
ligion in traditional and modernizing societies
had been secondhand at best, and he had
adopted the evolutionist view of religion that
was still acceptable in some quarters. While in
Brazil, Bastide conducted field research on the
candombles of Bahia (1958). The candombles
are cults in which African religious elements
predominate. The gods of the Yoruba and Fon
come down from Africa to take possession of
their "horses" (cult initiates, who are usually
female) in the course of elaborate, strictly regu-
lated ceremonies that involve drumming, danc-
ing, and trance states. Bastide's work on the
candombles reflected his growing interest in the
question of African survivals in the New World.
Melville Herkovits was, of course, the pioneer
in this field, and Bastide was proud to follow in
his footsteps. Bastide's scholarly thoroughness
eventually led him to study Yoruba and Fon
rituals on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.
The most reported or misreported aspect of
the candombles was the trance state. Trances
had traditionally been viewed as a phenomenon
of psychopathology, and researchers had
searched for evidence of insanity amongst mem-
bers of candombles. Bastide observed that, inas-
much as the guests at candomble do not enter
trance, and inasmuch as the possessed individ-
ual is expected to play the role of the deity who
"rides" him while cult priests stand by to ensure
that his actions become neither inappropriate
nor overly frenetic, the trance is a social phe-
nomenon, a rite that reenacts west African cos-
mogony in an alien environment. Furthermore,
many of the cult initiates exhibit no sign of ab-
normality in their daily lives, which are con-
ducted in an urban environment whose Luso-
Hispanic culture and modern technology seem
so remote from the "Africa" of the candombles.
Remarkably, participants in candombles and
other urban rituals of African origin seem able
to dissociate these two aspects of their lives.
Bastide elevated this behavior to the level of a
scientific principle of social action, the principe
de coupure or dissociation principle. Perhaps
candombles act as a compensation mechanism
for the poor and oppressed. Bastide paid partic-
ular attention to the role of black women in
candombles and noted that this was a way in
which they could still hold some power in a
society that, the less African and more Brazilian
BASTIDE, ROGER 41
it became, increased rather than diminished the
level of their subservience.
Bastide: Student of race relations. Bastide
took part in two United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization surveys in
the field of race relations. The first began in
1950 in Brazil, as a result of a suggestion by
L. A. da Costa Pinto, with a number of re-
searchers working in different cities. Bastide
and his student Florestan Fernandes undertook
research in Sao Paulo. The second project was
on African elites in French universities. The
aim of the UNESCO project in Brazil was to at-
tempt an explanation of the relative harmony
of race relations in Catholic Brazil as compared
with the Protestant United States. In his work
on race relations, Bastide noted that miscegena-
tion had been encouraged in Brazil and that a
rich mulatto might well become an honorary
white, whereas in the United States the slightest
evidence of black ancestry relegated the indi-
vidual to a low "caste" status, race in the United
States being defined in social rather than bio-
logical terms. Bastide accepted Pierre L. van
den Berghe's distinction between two ideal types
of racially pluralistic societies, the paternalistic
and the competitive. Brazilian society, being
paternalistic and hierarchical, exhibited "color
prejudice" rather than the virulent prejudice of
"social race" that had been prevalent in the
United States after the Civil War.
However, a more competitive pattern was
emerging in Sao Paulo; as male blacks entered
the proletariat, race prejudice was accordingly
increasing. Noting that Calvinism and the early
development of capitalism had been linked to
the rise of racial separatism in the United States
and elsewhere, Bastide endeavored to search
for the reason why Protestant and Catholic
countries had followed such distinct directions.
He linked Protestant racism to the failure on the
part of the Indians to live up to the unreal ex-
pectations of early settlers in North America
that they should immediately pursue the work
ethic and thereby demonstrate their worthiness
to join the elect. The justification of racial sep-
aration by the Dutch Reformed Church in South
Africa was perhaps a direct consequence of
Calvin's denial of the doctrine of the mystic
body of Christ and his support of the idea of a
national church. There was, perhaps, much of
value, but nothing that was particularly original
in these assertions. Bastide's work on the role
of sexual contact as well as sexual fantasies and
dreams in racial conflict displays a striking origi-
 42 BATESON, GREGORY
nality. On the basis of interviews in Sao Paulo,
Bastide observed that the mere fact of mis-
cegenation was not necessarily the sign of good
race relations. In fact, the reverse was more
often true. In Brazil the young white exploited
the black girl in order to gain his sexual initia-
tion. Once he had slept with her, her social
reputation in her own community declined. In
France, many African students slept with white
girls in order both to enhance their self-image
by "climbing" the social ladder and to exact
revenge for humiliation by whites, whereas
white girls used black men as a symbol of their
rebellion against their parents and conformist
values. Once the African married the white girl,
which he was often loathe to do, he could no
longer return to the colonial environment and
had to remain as a marginal individual in met-
ropolitan France.
Bastide: Social visionary. Bastide's work, both
in race relations and in the sociology of religion,
reveals his staunch belief that sociology is and
should be the reformer's science and should pur-
sue the destiny that its creator Comte intended
for it. He was a social democrat who believed in
a socialism which would incorporate Christian
ethical values. He was a defender of African
traditions who proclaimed that the religions of
west Africa were as beautiful as those of Greece
and Rome. Last, but not least, he stated that his
primary professional commitment was to en-
gage in the most important battle of our times,
the struggle against racism.
ANDREW P. LYONS
WOKKS BY BASTIDE
(1931) 1948 Les problemes de la vie mystique. 2d.
ed., rev. Paris: Colin.
1935 Elements de sociologie religieuse. Paris: Colin.
1941 Psicanalise do Cafune e Estudos de Sociologia
Estetica Brasileira. Curitiba (Brazil): Editora
Guaira limitada.
1943 A poesia Afro-Brasileira. Sao Paulo (Brazil):
Livraria Martins editora.
(1945a) 1971 Arte e sociedade. 2d ed., rev. Sao Paulo
(Brazil): Companhia Editora Nacional, Editora da
Universidade de Sao Paulo.
1945b Imagens do Nordeste Mistico em Branco e
Preto. Rio de Janeiro: Secao de livros da empresa
grafica O. Cruzeiro.
(1950) 1972 Sociologie et psychanalyse. 2d ed. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
(1957) 1973 Bresil: Terre des contrastes. 5th ed. Sao
Paulo (Brazil): Difusao Europeia do Livro.
1958 La Candomble de Bahia (Rite Nago~). Paris:
Mouton.
(1959) 1971 Sociologia do folclore Brasileiro. Sao
Paulo (Brazil): Universidade de Sao Paulo, Escola
de Communicacoes e Artes, Departamento de Jor-
nalismo e Editoracao.
(1960) 1978 The African Religions of Brazil: Toward
a Sociology of the Interpenetration of Civilizations.
Translated by Helen Sebba. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins. —> Introduction by Richard Price. First pub-
lished in French.
(1962) 1972 Sens et usages du terme structure dans
les sciences humaines et sociales, 2d ed. The
Hague: Mouton. —» A collection of essays edited with
an introduction by Bastide.
1965a Reincarnation et vie mystique en Afrique noire.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. —> A collec-
tion of essays edited with an introduction by Bas-
tide.
(1965&) 1972 The Sociology of Mental Disorder. Lon-
don: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: McKay.
—> First published in French.
(1967) 1973 Les Ameriques noires: Les civilisations
africaines dans le nouveau monde. 2d ed. Paris:
Payot. —» A translation of the first edition was pub-
lished by Harper in 1971 with the title African
Civilisations in the New World.
1970 Le Prochain et le lointain. Paris: Cujas. —> A
volume of essays on race relations and millenarian-
ism.
(1971) 1973 Applied Anthropology. New York: Har-
per. —» A paperback edition was published in 1974.
First published in French.
1972a Anatomie d'Andre Gide. Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France.
1972b Le reve, la transe et la folie. Paris: Flam-
marion. — » A collection of Bastide's essays on
dreams, mysticism, and madness.
1972c Les Sciences de la folie. Paris: Mouton.
1974 BASTIDE, ROGER; MORIN, FRANCHISE; and RA-
VEAU, FRANCOIS Les Haitiens en France. Paris:
Mouton. —> A paperback edition was published in
1975.
1975 Le sacre sauvage et autres essais. Paris: Payot.
—» A collection of essays on mysticism and the so-
ciology of religion.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
FAUBLEE, JACQUES 1974 Roger Bastide Sociologue et
Ethnologue. Annee Sociologique 25:27-43.
LALIVE D'£PINAY, CHRISTIAN 1974 Roger Bastide et
la Sociologie des Confins. Annee Sociologique
25:13-26.
BATESON, GREGORY
Testing the fit and stretch of a new idea is not
unlike trying on a garment. Ideas, however, un-
like clothing, are best appreciated when we have
been privy to their development—the cutting
and stitching of the cloth, and all the painful
trials in the testing of the fit. Regrettably, few
among us have that degree of unself-conscious
commitment to ideas that allows us to expose
them (and ourselves) during their growth.
Gregory Bateson is among those few. As a con-
sequence he has achieved unusual influence

upon scholars of widely varying interests and
ages.
Bateson was born May 9, 1904, son of Wil-
liam and Beatrice (Durham) Bateson. His
father was a well-known geneticist and the
Bateson clan generally has always been well
represented in scholarly circles.
Bateson's earliest published work reflected an-
thropological interests, and though much of this
work was of a seminal character, it was, at the
time, largely outshone by the ebullience of the
contributions of his first wife (and colleague),
Margaret Mead. Naven appeared in 1936, and
represented an original application of the com-
parative method of anatomists to anthropology.
A joint photo study with Mead, Balinese Char-
acter, produced a few years later, was a blend
of science and aesthetics that is rarely
achieved. His next major series of scientific
publications were in the field of psychiatry,
followed by analyses of communication in a
variety of animals. This brief list by no means
encompasses all of Bateson's contributions, nor
does it provide more than a suggestion of his
Renaissance mind capable of dealing with a
variety of subjects. Actually, Renaissance men
were more often than not dabblers; although
engrossing, entertaining savants, their contri-
butions were fleeting and insubstantial. There
is nothing of the dilettante in Bateson, nor does
the range of his subjects reflect an absence of
continuity in his attention.
The focus of Bateson's attentions have been
questions and ideas: How do they interact?
What sort of economic order limits their multi-
plicity and survival? He wrote: "In late 1969 I
became fully conscious . . . that in my work
with primitive peoples, schizophrenia, biological
symmetry, and in my discontent with the con-
ventional theories of evolution and learning, I
had identified a widely scattered set of bench
marks or points of reference from which a new
scientific territory could be defined. These bench
marks I have called 'steps' . . ." (1972, p. xvi).
Thus does Bateson himself argue for the con-
tinuity underlying his various scholarly tasks.
But it is not his contributions to the various dis-
ciplines, nor yet the large net into which he
drew students from anthropology to zoology,
that has earned him his influence. It is, rather,
his emphasis on seeking to understand how we
come to understand, and the role of conscious-
ness reflection in adaptation. Or, in his words:
"It is surely true that the content of conscious-
ness is no random sample of reports on events
BATESON, GREGORY 43
occurring in the remainder of mind. Rather, the
content of the screen of consciousness syste-
matically selected from the enormously great
plethora of mental events. But of the rules and
preferences of this selection, very little is
known" (quoted in M. C. Bateson 1972, p. 16).
Bateson's major opus of the 1970s (although
another major work is in preparation) was a col-
lection of essays entitled Steps to an Ecology of
Mind (1972). It is in this volume that he ad-
mitted the world to his dressing room to observe
how he tries the fit of his new garments, a pro-
cedure in which hundreds of his students and
fellow conferees were able to participate di-
rectly. He discussed the relation of principles to
hypotheses, of hypotheses to facts, and the lat-
ter to our perceptions. Implicit throughout is the
view that scientific research entails two dis-
parate kinds of authority: observations cannot
be denied and fundamental principles must be
fitted (or replaced). He rejects a belief in induc-
tion from experience. Such a rejection would
scarcely be novel for a modern philosopher of
science, but is decidedly unusual among prac-
titioners and teachers of sciences. How then to
construct "a bridge between the facts of life and
behavior and what we know today of the nature
of pattern and order" (1972, p. xxvi)? Bateson
has generated enthusiasm and commitment to
the search by allowing witnesses to his struggles
with that construction.
It is unlikely that Bateson's "double-bind"
theory on the cause of schizophrenia will effect
a revolution in the treatment of that disease.
Nor will his analysis of the relation of analogy
to homology in the study of morphology radi-
cally alter views on vertebrate evolution. How-
ever, what has revised the intellectual habits of
his students is Bateson's belief that "such mat-
ters as the bilateral symmetry of an animal, the
patterned arrangement of leaves in a plant, the
escalation of an armaments race, the processes
of courtship, the nature of play, the grammar of
a sentence, the mystery of biological evolution,
and the contemporary crises in man's relation-
ship to his environment, can only be understood
in terms of . . .an ecology of ideas . . ." (ibid.,
p. xv).
Some intellectuals have argued that the com-
plexity of our universe so far exceeds the
complexity of our central nervous system as to
preclude any but the crudest representation of
the one by the other. This despairing counsel
was an altogether expectable response to the
ecological disasters that resulted from reduc-
44 BECKER, ERNEST
tionist simplifications (as chronicled, for ex-
ample, in Commoner 1971). Bateson's greatest
contribution has been not merely to urge rejec-
tion of both extremes, reductionism and "stand-
ing in awe," but to pioneer in the development
of more fruitful epistemologies (quoted from
Bateson 1958, p. 54).
PETER H. KLOPFER
WORKS BY BATESON
(1936) 1958 Navert: A Survey of the Problems Sug-
gested by a Composite Picture of the Culture of a
New Guinea Tribe Drawn From Three Points of
View. Stanford Univ. Press. —> Includes an epilogue.
1942 BATESON, GREGORY; and MEAD, MARGARET Bali-
nese Character: A Photographic Analysis. New York
Academy of Sciences, Special Publications, Vol. 2.
New York: The Academy.
1943 Human Dignity and the Varieties of Civilization.
Pages 245—255 in Conference on Science, Philoso-
phy, and Religion. Edited by Lyman Bryson and
Louis Finkelstein. New York: The Conference. —>
Held in New York on August 27-31, 1942.
1944a Cultural Determinants of Personality. Volume
2, pages 714-735 in J. McVicker Hunt (editor),
Personality and the Behavior Disorders: A Hand-
book Based on Experimental and Clinical Research.
2 vols. New York: Ronald.
1944b Pidgin English and Cross-cultural Communica-
tion. New York Academy of Sciences, Transactions
Series 2 6:137-141.
1944 BATESON, GREGORY; and HOLT, CLAIRE Form
and Function of the Dance in Bali. Pages 46-52 in
The Function of Dance in Human Society: A Sem-
inar Directed by Franziska Boas. New York: The
Boas School.
1946a The Pattern of an Armaments Race, Part I: An
Anthropological Approach. Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 2, nos. 5-6:10-11.
1946b The Pattern of an Armaments Race, Part II: An
Analysis of Nationalism. Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 2, nos. 7-8:26-28.
1947 Sex and Culture. New York Academy of Sciences,
Annals 47:647-660. -> Paper read before the Con-
ference on Physiological and Psychological Factors
in Sex Behavior on March 1, 1946.
1949 BATESON, GREGORY; and RUESCH, JURGEN Struc-
ture and Process in Social Relations. Psychiatry 12:
105-124.
(1951) 1968 RUESCH, JURGEN; and BATESON, GREGORY
Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry.
New York: Norton.
1953 The Position of Humor in Human Communica-
tion. Pages 1—47 in Conference on Cybernetics, Cy-
bernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mecha-
nisms in Biological and Social Sciences. Edited by
Heinz von Foerster. New York: Josiah Macy, Jr.,
Foundation. —» Conference held in New York City
on March 20-21, 1952.
1956 The Message "This is Play." Pages 145-242 in
Conference on Group Processes, Group Processes:
Transactions of the Second Conference. Edited by
Bertram Schaffner. New York: Josiah Macy, Jr.,
Foundation. —» Conference held in Princeton, New
Jersey, on October 9-12, 1955.
1958 Schizophrenic Distortions of Communication.
Pages 31-58 in Sea Island Conference on Psycho-
therapy of Chronic Schizophrenic Patients, Psycho-
therapy of Chronic Schizophrenic Patients. Edited
by Carl A. Whitaker. Boston: Little, Brown. —> Con-
ference held at Sea Island, Georgia on October 15-
17, 1955.
1959 Cultural Problems Posed by a Study of Schizo-
phrenic Process. Pages 125-148 in American Psy-
chiatric Association, Schizophrenia: An Integrated
Approach. Edited by Alfred Auerback. New York:
Ronald. —»Conference held in San Francisco in
1958.
1961 The Biosocial Integration of Behavior in the
Schizophrenic Family. Pages 116-122 in M. Robert
Gomberg Memorial Conference, Exploring the Base
for Family Therapy. Edited by Nathan W. Ackerman
et al. New York: Family Service Association of
America. —•» Conference held at the New York Acad-
emy of Medicine on June 2—3, 1960.
1963a The Role of Somatic Change in Evolution. Evo-
lution 17:529-539.
1963fo A Social Scientist Views the Emotions. Pages
230-236 in Symposium on Expression of the Emo-
tions in Man, Expression of the Emotions in Man.
Edited by Peter H. Knapp. New York: International
Universities Press. —> Symposium held in New York
on December 29-30, 1963.
1966 Problems in Cetacean and Other Mammalian
Communication. Pages 569-579 in International
Symposium on Cetacean Research, Whales, Dol-
phins, and Porpoises. Edited by Kenneth S. Norris.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press.
—> Symposium sponsored by the American Institute
of Biological Sciences in Washington in August
1963.
1967 Cybernetic Explanation. American Behavioral
Scientist 10, no. 8:29-32.
1968a Conscious Purpose Versus Nature. Pages 34-49
in Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation, The Di-
alectics of Liberation. Edited by David Cooper.
Hammonds worth, (England): Pelican. —> Congress
held in London on July 15-30, 1967.
1968b Redundancy and Coding. Pages 614-626 in
Wenner—Gren Conference on Animal Communica-
tion, Animal Communication: Techniques of Study
and Results of Research. Edited by Thomas A. Se-
beok. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. —» Con-
ference held at Burg Wartenstein, Austria, on June
13-22, 1965.
1970 The Message of Reinforcement. Pages 62-72 in
Language Behavior: A Book of Readings. Edited by
Johnnye Akin et al. The Hague: Mouton.
1971 The Cybernetics of "Self": A Theory of Alcohol-
ism. Psychiatry 34:1-18.
1972 Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballan-
tine.
1978 Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. New York:
Dutton.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BATESON, MARY CATHERINE 1972 Our Own Meta-
phor. New York: Knopf.
COMMONER, BARRY 1971 The Closing Circle. New
York: Knopf. —> A paperback edition was published
by Bantam in 1972.
BECKER, ERNEST
Ernest Becker was a rare, panoramic intellec-
tual who dreamed the Enlightenment dream of
a unified, universally accepted science of man
which could serve as the basis for the rational

formulation of human ideals and the means of
achieving them. This intellectual quest gave
him a personal sense of history, purpose, and
meaning. At the same time, it caused him great
disappointment.
Becker was born to Jewish immigrants in
Springfield, Massachusetts, on September 27,
1924. He enlisted in the infantry during World
War ii and served with a second-line unit that
won five campaign ribbons and helped liberate
a Nazi concentration camp. After college at Syr-
acuse University he served as an administrative
officer and occasional intelligence liaison with
the United States embassy in Paris. He loved
France and learned French fluently, but became
bored with his work. At the age of 32, he real-
ized that he wanted to understand the meaning
of his existence and so he decided to study an-
thropology because the term literally signified
"the study of man."
In 1969 he wrote to the Reverend Harvey
Bates: "I have arrived at a definition, finally, of
the human personality that I think accurately
reflects the basic truth: that what we call man's
personality or his life style is really a series of
techniques that he has developed, and that
these techniques have one major end in view—
the denial of the fact that he has no control over
death or over the meaning of his life. If you ex-
pose this denial by undermining or exposing his
techniques, you undermine his whole person-
ality—which is the same thing" (Bates 1977).
This central, fertile insight of his mature work
was not the result of intellectual study alone; it
was also a personal confession—the result of
sober self-reflection on the meaning of his own
life. Becker believed that thought must be un-
derstood in the context of its author's life and
times, and his theory of human nature, de-
signed as it was to guide our understanding of
mankind, was also Becker's guide to under-
standing himself.
As a graduate student in anthropology at Syr-
acuse University, Becker came under the forma-
tive influence of Douglas Haring, who was
trained at Columbia under Franz Boas and
Franklin H. Giddings. Becker's first book, Zen:
A Rational Critique (1961), is an edited version
of his doctoral dissertation, completed in 1960.
It is dedicated to Haring with the motto: "the
teacher imparts the spirit." By this Becker spe-
cifically meant the spirit of free reason as the
guide of human progress. This was his basic
faith and the ideal-critical basis of his science
of man. This faith implies a battle with the anti-
BECKER, ERNEST 45
rational forces of authority, tradition, supersti-
tion, and passion which constrict reason and
freedom and foster instead uncritical obedience,
compliance, and conformity. This antiauthori-
tarian rationalism is the underlying spirit of
Becker's first book which was a critical compari-
son of Zen, psychotherapy, and thought reform.
The mechanism by which the individual sur-
renders his autonomous reason to authority in
each of these methods of personal transforma-
tion is the psychoanalytic concept of transfer-
ence: the submission of the vulnerable individ-
ual to a powerful protective authority. Becker's
first step toward an interdisciplinary theory of
human nature was to claim the concept of
transference from medical psychiatry for the
science of man.
Haring was Becker's ideal social scientist: an
interdisciplinary scholar who could construct a
unified but critical perspective on particular hu-
man problems. Haring was a Japanese special-
ist and served as anthropological adviser to the
Douglas MacArthur occupation in post-World
War ii Japan. This is the model that shaped
Becker's personal ambition. He was never am-
bitious for wealth or power; he wanted the
recognition and self-affirmation he believed
would be rightfully his if he formulated a com-
prehensive and accurate account of the human
condition which could contribute to human hap-
piness. Becker hoped that if his work counted
for something in human history, then he would
count for something.
Becker was awarded his PH.D. in June 1960,
and then joined the department of psychiatry at
the nearby Upstate Medical Center as instructor
in anthropology—essentially the same position
held by Haring. The next three years were idyl-
lic. Becker developed a close relationship with
Thomas Szasz, best known for his critique of
psychiatric authoritarianism and its ideological
correlate, the medical model of psychiatry. He
saw in Szasz a broadly educated, incisively criti-
cal mind and an Enlightenment thinker, a Jef-
fersonian, who shared Becker's basic faith in
individual liberty and the reign of free reason.
Becker agreed with Szasz's critique of medical
psychiatry but he was especially intrigued by his
analysis of hysteria as a problem in communi-
cation, which suggested the possibility of "a re-
assessment of all so called 'mental illness' as
broadly cultural behavior rather than narrowly
medical, phenomenon" (1964, p. 3). As a result
of his association with Szasz at this historical
moment in psychiatry, Becker was empowered
 46 BECKER, ERNEST
to translate and reinterpret the psychiatric syn-
dromes from the language of medicine into the
language of the combined science of man.
Becker learned clinical psychiatry as an insider,
in an open and invigorating intellectual climate.
He attended clinical lectures and conferences
and met frequently with Szasz and a small cir-
cle of intellectuals for informal, wide-ranging,
and detailed discussions of human nature and
mental illness in the context of the history of
ideas. With Szasz's encouragement, Becker in-
terviewed selected psychiatric patients and be-
came a highly skilled clinical diagnostician.
In The Birth and Death of Meaning (1962k),
an edited series of lectures to psychiatric resi-
dents, Becker drew from psychoanalysis and the
social sciences to present his integrated theory
of human behavior, which was the foundation
of his work. The key idea is that self and society
are derivatives of the human capacity for lan-
guage. This means that the evolution of both
the human species and the human individual
are marked by the development of language.
Becker reformulates the concept of the Oedipus
complex from a theory of infantile sexual neu-
rosis to a theory of the development of specifi-
cally human symbolic reactivity. The Oedipal
transition, as Becker renamed it, is the period of
socialization in which the individual learns
techniques for mastering the anxieties of self-
maintenance in the theater of social symbol-
isms. He conceived of personality formation as
the narrowing (fetishization) of consciousness
and performance to a range within which the
individual masters anxiety. This mastery of
anxiety through socially approved command of
performance is self-esteem. Becker regarded
self-esteem as the basic invariant motive of hu-
man action and the central integrative principle
of his science of man. Broaden the theory of
anxiety with the concept of the terror of death
and one has the nucleus of Becker's mature
work.
In his next major work The Revolution in
Psychiatry (1964) Becker analyzed various psy-
chiatric syndromes—schizophrenia, depression,
psychopathy, anxiety, shame, guilt, sadism, and
masochism—from the point of view of his uni-
fied theory of human nature. Heavily influenced
by John Dewey and the American pragmatists
and symbolic interactionists, yet drawing broad-
ly from philosophy and the social sciences,
Becker constructed a theory of mental illness
based on the struggle of the linguistic self to
maintain reflexive significance in the field of
social action. The basic problem for the human
animal is anxiety because he is necessarily con-
stricted by his transferences and fetishizations,
but is constantly confronted by an incomplete
sense of self and an uncertain future. Following
Szasz, Becker viewed mental health and illness
not as specialized medical problems, but as
problems of living. The task of psychiatry there-
fore, as viewed by Szasz, Becker, and their circle,
is the task of education and social reconstruc-
tion. Becker's revolution in psychiatry meant
the absorption of psychiatry by the science of
man.
Psychiatry was quick to react. In November
1962 Szasz received an order from the New
York State Department of Mental Hygiene for-
bidding him to teach psychiatric interns and
residents of the local state hospital, the main
clinical teaching facility of the medical school's
department of psychiatry. The reason given was
that Szasz's concept of the myth of mental ill-
ness was dangerous to mental patients. Szasz,
Becker, and others interpreted this as an in-
fringement of academic freedom. They wanted
the order rescinded or the department of psy-
chiatry to sever its relationship with the state
hospital. They decided as individuals to boycott
the departmental meetings that were held at the
hospital from which Szasz had been expelled.
The members of this group were thus brought
into direct conflict with the chairman of the
department, who was also the director of the
state hospital and was responsible to the com-
missioner of mental hygiene. He was supported
by the ideological adversaries of Szasz and
Becker. This produced an emotionally charged
schism within the department that eventually
engulfed the entire field of psychiatry as it came
under criticism for the coercive tactic of invol-
untary hospitalization. At Syracuse, the result of
this conflict was that Becker and several of his
associates were dismissed and excluded from
academic psychiatry. Becker's theories of men-
tal illness have been ignored by medical psy-
chiatry ever since.
Becker spent the following year in Rome re-
flecting on the historical origins and signifi-
cance of his unified theory of human behavior.
The result was The Structure of Evil: An Essay
on the Unification of the Science of Man (1968).
In this, he oriented his theory in the context of
Western thought from the breakdown of the
medieval world. The key period is the Enlight-
enment in which the problem of evil is trans-
ferred from the dominion of the medieval

church and feudal authority to the dominion of
free reason. Becker believed that the proper
function of the science of man is to replace tra-
ditional religious cosmology with an integrated,
panoramic, and penetrating rational-empirical
understanding of man and his place in the uni-
verse. This understanding could be used as a
practical guide to the solution of life problems
and the realization of human ideals. The urgency
of contemporary human problems implied to
Becker that social scientists must synthesize
what is now known rather than to continually
accumulate disjointed data in the hope of the
future perfection of their science. This attitude,
conveyed with messianic zeal, irritated and
threatened many of his academic colleagues.
Becker firmly believed that he had realized
both the Enlightenment and the Marxist vision
of an ideal-typical science of man, which could
be used as the basis of a critical analysis of both
the individual and society. As Becker conceived
it, mental health is a pseudomedical ideal indi-
vidual type against which personal flaws (men-
tal illness), or "failed heroics" as he called them,
could be measured. Becker recognized that ideal-
typical science was vulnerable to use as crypto-
ideology; it could be used to promote authoritar-
ian values, as in psychiatry in the Soviet Union,
the United States, and elsewhere. But Becker
was clear about his ideal-type individual: a
free, self-reliant person with a flexible library of
competent social performances who approaches
life with an open, ideal—critical intelligence.
This implies that in order to foster the free,
creative energies of the individual, the ideal
society must be an open democratic community,
in the anthropological sense, which guides its
destiny scientifically, by means of an integrated
world view. Becker remained faithful to this
ideal, but he struggled continuously with the ob-
stacles to its achievement. In his early period,
he adopted the Rousseauian position that man
is basically good, or neutral, and becomes evil
as the result of an authoritarian-repressive-
alienated society. Later, he recognized that evil
springs also from the breast of man—from the
ego's restless striving to deny its own finitude by
asserting its own perfection, power, and perpe-
tuity regardless of the cost to humanity.
In the fall of 1964 Becker returned to Syra-
cuse University, where some friends helped him
to arrange a joint appointment for one year in
sociology and education. Although he was ostra-
cized from the medical school, he continued to
refine his theory of mental illness, stimulated by
BECKER, ERNEST 47
frequent, informal discussions with Szasz and
his circle. He also became friendly with a small
group of radical intellectuals at the university,
including Stanley Diamond and Irving Louis
Horowitz. The student rebellion against uni-
versity paternalism was brewing, and the civil
rights struggle was intensifying, led in Syracuse
by George Wiley, Rudy Lombard, and Ron Cor-
win. Becker knew and admired these local
leaders and shared their hope that these move-
ments would catalyze a new era of reason and
freedom in human affairs. In his lectures and
public discussions, Becker presented his unified
theory as the ideology for a radical critique of
the issues raised by the student, civil rights, and
antiwar movements. He focused particularly on
the process of university education as a tech-
nique of socialization. In Beyond Alienation: A
Philosophy of Education for the Crisis in De-
mocracy (1967), Becker argued that the aim of
education should be to develop the ideal type
specified by his science of man: the competent,
intelligent, self-reliant individual. He proposed
as the ideal curriculum for achieving this ideal,
the science of man: an integrated presentation
of current knowledge about the human condi-
tion, the human ideal, and the method of pro-
gressing toward that ideal.
Becker was critical of the alliance of the uni-
versity with patriotic and commercial interests.
He believed this has the effect of constricting
consciousness, fostering uncritical obedience to
authority, and promoting fetishization of com-
modities. Becker was also outspokenly critical of
empirical social science which, he believed,
gave silent assent to evil by pursuing methodo-
logical purity for its own sake. Again, as a re-
sult of his views, Becker was not rehired.
In 1965, with some help from Erving Goff-
man, Becker was appointed visiting lecturer in
sociology at the University of California at
Berkeley for a one-year term. In 1966 he moved
to anthropology on a similar contract. At Berke-
ley, during the period of student protest, Becker
continued to speak boldly to the problems of the
times. He became a favorite of the students who
crowded his lectures. When his second appoint-
ment expired and it became apparent that the
university would not rehire him, 2,000 students
petitioned to retain him. In an unprecedented
act, the student government voted to pay his
salary of $13,000 from their own treasury, but
the administration forbade this. In the fall of
1967 he moved across the bay to San Francisco
State University as professor of social psychology.
48 BECKER, ERNEST
These were years of intense inner contradic-
tion for Becker. On the one hand, he believed
that the war in southeast Asia and the internal
resistance to civil rights were of one piece and
would lead to military—industrial totalitarianism.
The martyred Protestant theologian Friedrich
Bonhoefer was his model and he admired the
heroics of Martin Luther King, Jr., David Miller,
Daniel Berrigan, and others who took positive
moral action. On the other hand, he was aware
that his personal desire for self-affirmation was
a basic flaw.
Becker was haunted by this contradiction and
attempted to resolve it through the Christian
existentialist attitude of positive action against
evil combined with the acceptance of God's will.
However, he discovered that the line between
the heroic strivings of the ego and genuine
Christian courage is ambiguous. Although he
loved San Francisco and could have lived and
worked there for many years, he resigned in
January 1969 from San Francisco State Uni-
versity because he claimed that he could not
teach freedom with the police on campus. This
was a courageous act since he had no prospect
of another job.
Becker wrote two books during his California
period which reflect his inner struggle with the
contradiction between piety and heroism. His
spiritual task of renouncing heroic striving en-
abled him to accept as a social fact the failure
in his time of a unified science of man. He
wrote a historical account of this fact in The
Lost Science of Man (1971). Yet, he retained
his faith in an ideal-typical social science, not
with the naive, Utopian optimism of his youth,
but with the sober hope that it could serve as a
"holding action" against the forces of evil. In
Angel in Armor (1969), a series of short essays,
Becker drew from literature and film to illus-
trate the relevance of his science of man to uni-
versal human experiences.
In the fall of 1969, Becker moved to Simon
Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada, as pro-
fessor in the combined department of sociology,
anthropology, and political science. Here, he
completed his final trilogy. He rewrote The
Birth and Death of Meaning ([1962&] 1971) for
its second edition, integrating the theme of the
denial of death into his basic theory of human
nature. With the added richness of a decade of
life and study, this book is the best introduction
to his mature work. The Denial of Death (1973)
is based on the concept of a basic paradox in
human nature—self-body dualism—which is the
origin of human tragedy. Man is haunted by the
inescapable contradiction that he knows his
body is imperfect and doomed to death, yet can
imagine and desire perfection and immortality.
This contradiction generates anxiety. For man
is plagued both by the desire to expand in the
search for self-validation and by the desire to
constrict in the search for safety from death
and meaninglessness. The terror of death is
mastered through denial, by means of the af-
firmation of its opposite: the "reality" of self
and society. But death cannot be evaded. Hence,
self and society are vital lies, or illusions. They
are vital because meaningful social action de-
pends upon them. But they are lies because they
blind us to our basic creatureliness.
In his third work during these years, the post-
humously published Escape From Evil (1975),
Becker further developed the idea that every-
thing man does is an ultimately futile attempt
to transcend his creatureliness. Everything he
does, therefore, is religious and heroic, but fic-
titious and fallible. The illusory ground of our
immortality mechanisms creates in us a sense
of guilt, which Becker defines as hesitation in
fear that one has expanded too far to be sus-
tained by one's limited powers. To overcome
guilt, man, like other animals, must draw power
from external sources. But for the symbolic ani-
mal, power is symbolic. One mechanism for
drawing self-power from others is transference,
which Becker believed no one could live with-
out. Transferences are loci of safe operation.
But when they are excessively narrow, as they
tend to be under modern conditions of aliena-
tion, they become loci of repression and unfree-
dom in the web of other persons.
Another mechanism for symbolically increas-
ing self-power is sacrifice, a primitive ritual for
increasing the pool of life power in the group.
This same mechanism is the basis for the os-
tensibly secular practices of the vendetta, the
blood feud, scapegoating, and prejudice. It ap-
pears in interpersonal sexual form as sadism—
the ritual increase in one life force at the ex-
pense of another. Money is also an immortality
vehicle. Becker suggests that man's basic
striving for immortality takes the form of a
search for prosperity, the universal ambition of
mankind. Money began as a fetish symbol for
God—giver of prosperity. In modern secular
society our gods and chiefs are still engraved on
our money; and although we have forgotten its
religious significance, money continues as a
symbolic source of personal power which is psy-

chologically equivalent to the denial of crea-
tureliness, the denial of death, and the illusion
of immortality. Indeed, in Becker's view, pat-
terned social behaviors are basically religious
rituals in which individuals heroically play out
their immortality schemes in everyday life.
With this view of the human condition, the
pivotal question for Becker became: "On which
level of illusion should man live?" His answer
is that man should live at the grandest heights
—the religious level. Not through unreflective
compliance with rules and dogma, but in the
primitive Christian sense, through humility—
the acceptance of creatureliness; and through
faith—the transference to the Ultimate Ground
of Being. At this level the psychological ideal of
mental health is merged with the religious ideal
of enlightenment. The ideal—typical individual
is the religious hero, on the model of Buddha,
Moses, and Christ, men with a self-disciplined
awareness of the transient, contradictory, and
fictional qualities of self and society who are
open to the mystery of the cosmic forces which
shape ultimate human destiny.
Many of Becker's colleagues were threatened
by his efforts to merge social science and re-
ligion. By rejecting Becker, they believed they
were protecting the rational-empirical tradition
from possible contamination by irrational and
cultic influences. Ironically, Becker's merger of
the scientific and religious perspectives was for
him a logical imperative of his rational ap-
proach to human nature. Nevertheless, there
seems little possibility of Becker's theories being
integrated into the social sciences until these
sciences are open to a merger with theology.
By the summer of 1972, Becker's major work
was complete. In November, 1972 he developed
an intestinal obstruction which, after emergency
surgery, was diagnosed as cancer. He died on
March 6, 1974, at the age of 49. On May 6,
1974, he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in
nonfiction for The Denial of Death.
RONALD LEIFER
WORKS BY BECKER
1960 Zen Buddhism, "Thought Reform" (Brainwash-
ing) and Various Psychotherapies: A Theoretical
Study in Induced Regression and Cultural Values.
Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse Univ.
1961 Zen: A Rational Critique. New York: Norton.
19620 The Birth and Death of Meaning: A Perspective
in Psychiatry and Anthropology. New York: Free
Press. —•» A paperback edition was published in
1971 by Macmillan.
(1962b) 1971 The Birth and Death of Meaning: An
Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Science of Man.
BERNARD, JESSIE 49
2d ed. New York: Free Press. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1971 by Macmillan.
1964 The Revolution in Psychiatry: The New Under-
standing of Man. New York: Free Press. —> A paper-
back edition was published in 1974 by Free Press.
1967 Beyond Alienation; A Philosophy of Education
for the Crisis in Democracy. New York: Braziller.
1968 The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unifica-
tion of the Science of Man. New York: Braziller.
—» A paperback edition was published in 1976 by
Free Press.
1969 Angel in Armor: A Post-Freudian Perspective on
the Nature of Man. New York: Braziller. —> A
paperback edition was published in 1975 by Free
Press.
1971 The Lost Science of Man. New York: Braziller.
1973 The Denial of Death. New York: Free Press.
1974 Toward the Merger of Animal and Human
Studies. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 4:235-
254.
1975 Escape From Evil. New York: Free Press. —» A
companion volume of The Denial of Death. A paper-
back edition was published in 1976 by Free Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BATES, HARVEY 1977 Letters from Ernest. Christian
Century 94:217-277.
BERNARD, JESSIE
Both Jessie Bernard's life history and her so-
ciological contributions emanate reasonable, but
unyielding, defiance—defiance of family tradi-
tion, life styles, occupational trajectories, socio-
logical paradigms, and popular myths, as well
as age-related patterns. In the 14 solo books, 7
coauthored or edited volumes, 25 chapters for
other authors' or editors' books, and the 60-odd
journal articles, her humane, but unflinching,
examination of the "givens" of sociological, and
often psychological, historical, and political,
phenomena bespeak challenge and critical anal-
ysis of the status quo.
Bernard's unpretentious style, in her written
work as well as in her personal and professional
life, has created a medium in which her often
defiant, even radical, message ultimately is at-
tended without arousing resistance. Her private
history may be read as a contrapuntal theme of
amiable, but undaunted, rebellion against the
expectations that family and society pressed up-
on a female born shortly after the turn of the
century and living through two world wars and
the subsequent societal upheavals that were to
mark the second half of the twentieth century.
Early background. Born in Minneapolis,
June 8,1903, to parents of Romanian Jewish heri-
tage, Jessie Bernard was the third of Bessie
Kanter and David Solomon Ravitch's four chil-
dren. Her maternal grandmother, Bettsy Kanter,
50 BERNARD, JESSIE
set an early model of feminine pioneering (a
topic which later was to concern Bernard in her
own research on academic women, black women,
and early American frontier women) by her
emigration to the United States as a young
widow in the late 1880s. Leaving her two grown
sons behind in Romania, Bettsy Kanter traveled
from Transylvania to New York, accompanied
only by her preadolescent daughter, Bessie.
Bessie Kanter, later the mother of Jessie Ber-
nard, worked as a young girl in the New York
garment district, demonstrating her own pio-
neering mettle by marching for women's suf-
frage and chafing against her mother's refusal
to let her join the union.
Almost six years later, when the brothers in
Romania had arranged a suitable marriage for
their sister, both Bessie Kanter and her mother
returned to their native country, where Bessie
married David Solomon Ravitch, a local candle-
maker. Shortly thereafter, the young couple and
Bettsy Kanter returned to the United States, this
time, as the 1900 census records, settling in
Minneapolis, where the bridegroom's brother
lived (a pattern of immigration Bernard de-
scribes in an anonymously authored article, "An
Analysis of Jewish Culture" [1942J?]). Even after
Bessie and David Ravitch had their own family
of four children, Bettsy Kanter reigned as the
"cheerful, industrious, pious" matriarch of the
family.
Bernard's Jewish cultural heritage, dispensed
—in daily prayers and rituals—by her grand-
mother, was counterpointed by the "American-
ization" practices which her older sister, Clara,
another pioneering influence, brought home
from public school. The acculturation Bernard
experienced through her sister, whom she re-
garded as second generation (compared to her
own second-and-a-half generation status) (1978,
p. 327), served as a firsthand model for under-
standing and empathizing with the American
acculturation experience of black generations in
the postslavery years. It was Clara Ravitch who
"pioneered the way" (1978, p. xix) for Bernard,
not yet 17 years old, to enter the University of
Minnesota, in January 1920, where she was a
student of Pitirim Sorokin, Alvin Hanson, N. S. B.
Gras, and Karl Lashley, all before they left for
teaching posts at Harvard University.
Adulthood, marriage, and social positivism.
In her freshman year, Jessie Bernard audited a
sociology class of another prominent sociology
professor, Luther Lee Bernard, 21 years her
senior, whom she served as a research assistant
and, in 1925, married. The marriage occurred in
defiance of her family's serious objections to age
and religious differences. During the 21 years of
their marriage, L. L. Bernard created a personal
and intellectual milieu infused with social posi-
tivism within which Bernard grew to maturity,
but then ineluctably renounced. L. L. Bernard,
with whom Jessie Bernard, as a graduate student
at Washington University, coauthored Sociology
and the Study of International Relations (1934)
and Origins of American Sociology (1943), was
a sociological heir to Auguste Comte's nineteenth-
century social positivism. She received her PH.D.
from Washington University in 1935.
It was on this intellectual foundation of social
positivism that L. L. Bernard based his belief in
social science's potential—through scientific,
particularly mathematical, methods—for objec-
tively determining "the best way to achieve de-
sired societal ends" (1978, p. 130). Thus, social
positivism was to transfuse Jessie Bernard's per-
sonal and sociological perspective for almost two
decades, from her undergraduate days and early
graduate work at Minnesota through her doc-
toral work at Washington University, where she
was trained "strictly in the measurement tradi-
tion" (personal communication, 1979). Only
the mid-1940s, the shock of the Nazi Holocaust
ultimately evoked her disbelief, denial, and de-
fection—intellectually, from the social positivist
paradigm, and emotionally, from her mentor-
husband, who personified that position.
The death of 69-year-old L. L. Bernard in
1951 left Bernard responsible for their three
young children. Thus, she personally became a
reluctant pioneer in new sociological territory—
the female-headed family, which was to become
a major family pattern of the future, as well as
a focus of her own research. Again, Bernard's
personal life as widow and female family head
provided the experiential background for empa-
thetic and insightful understanding of a major
emerging sociological problem.
The beginnings of an independent career.
Since her arrival with an aging scholar-husband
at Pennsylvania State University in 1947, Jessie
Bernard had been assisted in academia by an-
other sociologist, Seth Russell, the chairman of
the sociology department and later, associate
dean. Under Russell's protective guidance, Ber-
nard "shot . . . up the academic ladder to the
top in record time" (1978, p. 5). During L. L. Ber-
nard's declining days and last illness, Russell
developed a close relationship with the family,
becoming a father surrogate, particularly to the

youngest child. During the ensuing two-and-one-
half years, Bernard relied on Russell for emo-
tional and familial help; however, by the fall
of 1953, with her youngest child in tow, Bernard
had left for Europe to study postwar trends in
sociological research and to mend her emo-
tional wounds.
Before coming to Pennsylvania State, Bernard
published her first solo book, American Family
Behavior (1942a), and in the early years in
College Park, Pennsylvania, she wrote American
Community Behavior (1949a). In both volumes,
there is a "preview of things to come," a fore-
shadowing of later work in the early efforts to
measure how well the American family was per-
forming its several functions, success in mar-
riage, and the degree of "institutionalization" of
marriage and family norms, topics in which Ber-
nard would maintain a lifelong, but expanding,
interest.
Renunciation of social positivism and aca-
demia. Bernard's first major intellectual de-
fiance—against social positivism—had left a
permanent residue of skepticism about social
science's potential for changing the social order
according to any rational plan. The trail of Ber-
nard's disenchantment with the "social-salvation-
through-science creed" is traced in a series of
articles between 1947 and 1950 (1947; 1949i>;
1949c; 1949d; 1949e; 1950a; 1950b). Later, in
Self-portrait of a Family (1978), she recalled
her disillusionment in a "faith" she had not
questioned for more than 25 years: "It took a
catastrophe as overwhelming as the Nazi Holo-
caust to shake that faith. A whole network of
intellectual, emotional, and moral roots were
dug up and exposed in the process. The faith on
which I had built a life was shaken, the nine-
teenth-century faith in the benign nature of
science, a belief that it was intrinsically good"
(p. 131). Although her faith in social science's
capacity to shape the social order was extin-
guished, Bernard's reliance on research findings
as the best, or only available, evidence remained
a hallmark of her scholarly treatises on dating,
marriage, mating, motherhood, divorce, remar-
riage, and female culture.
After Bernard's year in Europe, she returned
to Pennsylvania State, where she continued to
work on two new volumes, the first study of
Remarriage: A Study of Marriage (1957a) and
Social Problems at Midcentury: Role, Status, and
Stress in a Context of Abundance (1957b). A
year as a visiting professor at Princeton Uni-
versity (1959/1960), the first year in which
BERNARD, JESSIE 51
women were allowed to enter the front door of
the university library, proved to be a lonely and
difficult experience. She later recalled smiling
in the faculty club at faces that did not smile
back. The next year, Bernard moved to Wash-
ington, D.C., where she spent her sabbatical
year. From 1962 to 1964, she commuted from
Washington to teach her classes at Pennsylvania
State; however, by 1964, she had decided to
abandon the constraints of academic life, where
she sensed it was necessary to "censor [her]
ideas to fit the pattern of ideas surrounding
[her]" (personal communication, 1979).
Academic women and a new intellectual
thrust. Bernard's break from academia came
almost simultaneously with the publication of
her most significant work to that time, Aca-
demic Women (1964). This study of women in
academia, which received the Pennsylvania
State University Bell award and later the Kappa
Gamma honorary award, heralded a new thrust
in intellectual energy and direction; however, as
Bernard herself perceived, the academic Estab-
lishment responded initially with "a great big
yawn" ([1964] 1974, p. xxvii).
Academic Women explored the condition of
women who taught and conducted research in
academe, dispassionately examining the evi-
dence for and against discrimination. In ad-
dressing the question of discrimination ahead of
the tide, it presaged Bernard's later attempts to
identify and deal with significant social issues-
abortion, battered women, child abuse, the cul-
ture of poverty, female-headed families, and
sexism—before they had become the incendiary
social questions of the day. Among her most in-
fluential works, both despite and because of the
feminist criticism levelled against it, Academic
Women scrutinized the factors—both formal and
informal—that accounted for women's subordi-
nate role in academia, before concluding that
sex was more salient than role as a status deter-
minant. Bernard accounts for women's unequal
condition in terms of their propensity to teach
in colleges rather than universities, to teach
rather than undertake research, to act as bearers
or transmitters of established knowledge rather
than "men of knowledge," to follow patiently
rather than innovate boldly—without tracing the
discriminatory practices that force women into
such "choices."
Bernard recognizes that scientific productivity
is a function of a researcher's position in the
communication system rather than of his or
her sex. And she describes the "stag effect," a
52 BERNARD, JESSIE
subtle process excluding women from the in-
formal communication system along which
emerging scientific knowledge is disseminated.
Although Bernard described the palpable pro-
cedures and processes of sexism (a term not
yet coined), she fell just shy of recognizing
them as the informal underpinnings of dis-
crimination. Despite highlighting the informal
mechanisms by which women in academia were
prevented from developing their natural aca-
demic potential, she concluded that no formal
or structural discrimination existed in the Halls
of Ivy. Bernard's analysis of the "stag effect's"
preclusion of women from the informal aca-
demic communication network and her aware-
ness of the relationship between innovation and
a public of peers did not yet include an un-
equivocal recognition of the underbelly of dis-
crimination. In Academic Women, Bernard
senses the presence, but does not yet perceive,
as she will in her later works, the crippling
relationship between the informal practices and
attitudes of sexism and the formal structural
manifestations of discrimination.
Academic Women touched the beachhead of
concern about women's condition in society just
ahead of the swelling wave of feminism. The
radical feminists railed against Bernard's con-
clusion that no formal discrimination existed
and identified the informal and subtle processes
she had sensed and described—but not recog-
nized—as "sexism." After her own conversion to
a feminist perspective, Bernard would side with
her critics and applaud their deserved critique.
But Academic Women was the beginning of a
new surge of intellectual strength, which even
the male-dominated academic Establishment
could no longer ignore.
Major themes and patterns. Over the next
14 years, Bernard's work gained a new momen-
tum, eventually breaking through the function-
alist (although not Parsonian) paradigm that
had held mainstream sociology in its thrall and
entering the new terrain of the feminist per-
spective. (Parenthetically, it is relevant to note
Bernard's defiance of the mythology about age
and creativity.) Beginning in her sixth decade,
long after conventional wisdom would have us
believe creativity is quelled, she began to mine
a new, related, richer sociological vein that
would prove to be her strongest and most prodi-
gious intellectual contribution.
A chronological review of four decades of
Bernard's work reveals complex recurrent pat-
terns. Themes touched upon in her early work
reemerge later, each time with greater ma-
turity and enlarged understanding. The seeds
of later books can be seen as they are uncon-
sciously planted, often three or four volumes
earlier. Ideas and insights first appear, as grains
of sand in an oyster, then begin to expand,
creating an irritating, insistent presence, finally
culminating in an independent entity—a new
volume.
A case in point is Bernard's treatment of bi-
culturality, first discussed in terms of Jewish
immigrants in America (1942c). She later ex-
pands this theme in Marriage and Family
Among Negroes (1966) by developing the notion
of two black cultures—the externally adapted
and the acculturated—within the larger white
context.
The Sex Game (1968£>), an interactionist ap-
proach to communication between the sexes, re-
turns to the bicultural motif. Here Bernard
elaborates the concept to depict the sexes as two
large, relatively unstructured collectivities living
in sexual apartheid, beset by the difficulties
common to discourse between inhabitants of
different cultures. In Women and the Public In-
terest: An Essay on Policy and Protest (1971), a
variation of the bicultural theme is introduced:
women's sphere. This variation is further ex-
plored the following year in The Future of Mar-
riage (1972), probably her most widely read
published work. Here Bernard conceptualizes
each marital union as composed of two differ-
ent, noncoinciding marriages or worlds, in
which the wife inhabits her own sphere, distinct
and isolated from her husband's marriage.
Later, in The Female World (forthcoming),
the concept depicted in the title is elaborated to
include a complex analysis of women's station,
sphere, social class, and culture. Now not only
do women live in different marriages than their
husbands, but they live in different families,
educational systems, social strata, occupational
structures, political and cultural realms, as well.
In short, from the time they enter their first
"pink world," women live in the female world—a
highly structured society.
Bernard does not deny that women also live
in the world of men, simply that they are not
"of" that male world, in much the same way
that an American living in Paris is not a bona
fide Frenchman. The anatomy of the female
world's unique class structure is probed, and
Bernard suggests that the very subconcepts
underlying the notion of social class (long ac-
cepted in mainstream—read "male"—sociology

and applied to the male world) fail to reflect
the class structure of the complex world within
which women spend much of their lives.
Other major themes weave in and out the
fabric of Bernard's work: formal -us. informal
discrimination; power; women as a subordinate,
dependent group; "stroking" as a fundamental
unit of social action; the conflict between
women's family and work roles; sexism as
power relationships; the deteriorating effect of
housework and total responsibility for child care
on women's mental health; homosociality; sex
differences, including typical vs. characteristic
differences between males and females; biologi-
cal sex roles vs. cultural gender roles; the func-
tion of stereotypes as mechanisms for papering
over the lack of fit between gender roles and
individual differences; tipping points and turn-
ing points; social policy as an instrument for
alleviating the disadvantages women face; the
historical youthfulness of the nuclear family;
and the "cichlid effect."
This recurrent and intensified exploration of
themes, particularly since the appearance of
Academic Women, represents a relentless search
for new understanding, even when that en-
hanced perception would require relinquishing
comfortable metaphors and previous interpreta-
tions. Thus, in Women and the Public Interest:
An Essay on Policy and Protest, Bernard, dis-
cusses the pervasive influence of the "stroking"
or supportive function performed by females.
Although Bernard marshalls evidence that
both males and females are capable of stroking
(or expressive) as well as instrumental behavior,
she notes that women's specialization in strok-
ing in most cultures throughout the world con-
tributes to their subordinate position. Harking
back to the Bales (1950) instrumental—expres-
sive dichotomy, she describes stroking as ex-
pressive, supportive behavior in which the
stroker "shows solidarity, raises the status of
others, gives help, rewards, agrees, concurs,
complies, understands, passively accepts" (1971,
pp. 88-89). Such stroking behavior, Bernard
argues, is incompatible with high level occupa-
tional roles, in which instrumental, aggressive,
and often competitive behavior is required.
Bernard then introduces the "cichlid effect,"
stemming from Lorenz' description (1963) of
cichlid fish, a species in which the male's sexual
drive is extinguished by fear of his partner, and
the female's sexuality is similarly affected by
lack of awe for her male partner. Women, she
argues, are denuded of their aggression, held in
BERNARD, JESSIE 53
awe of males by their assignment to the subordi-
nate stroking or supportive role—all in the name
of sexuality, male and female alike. Bernard
traces the crippling that depriving women of
aggression inflicts on their achievement and
creative potential and suggests that very high
achieving women are the primary victims. Why,
she asks, do all women have to ransom sexuality
by subordination and dependency? Why do
women have to sacrifice achievement vis-a-vis
men with whom they have no sexual relation-
ships? Stroking, the behavior that addresses the
cichlid effect, is not singlehandedly responsible
for women's inequality, according to Bernard;
however, "taken in conjunction with other as-
pects of the 'sphere of women' . . . [stroking] is
a recipe for subservience" (1971, p. 94).
By the very next year, Bernard had moved
beyond the cichlid effect in her explanation of
women's subordination and its link to the strok-
ing function. In The Future of Marriage (1972),
she makes an important distinction between the
physical power of men and the male mystique
which identifies it with sexuality . . . If power is
measured as the ability to conquer a woman and if
masculinity is defined as such power, the subjuga-
tion of women is demanded for potency. And, in
fact, such a definition of masculinity has charac-
terized the male mystique for centuries. From time
immemorial, therefore, sex has meant power to
men . . . The very term impotence betrays the
power component in the male mystique, (pp.
168-69)
Feminist paradigm shift. Replacing the
cichlid effect concept with the equation be-
tween masculine power and subjugation of
women was an insight born of her breakthrough
to a feminist paradigm. As she recounts in the
autobiographical note in The Future of Marriage
(1972, afterword, pp. 329-330), during the
gestation of that work, she had her con-
sciousness painfully and wrenchingly raised to
the feminist perspective. In the late 1960s, a
growing feminist consciousness had begun to in-
fuse the scholarship of radical women, the same
radical scholars and activists who had taken her
to task for failing to take that important next
step in Academic Women.
Just as Bernard had moved agonizingly, but
irrevocably, from the social positivism of her
first two decades of scholarship, now she was
able to make an analogous quantum leap from a
functionalist to a feminist perspective. After this
new paradigmatic shift, she was able to look
54 BERNARD, JESSIE
back at Academic Women, describing it as a
study "conceived, researched, and written in the
old-fashioned scientific and scholarly tradition,
quite well-mannered and subdued" ([1964] 1974,
p. xxvii).
Surveying sociological phenomena through a
feminist prism cast a different, more vivid spec-
trum of colors than Bernard had seen before.
The cool "objectivity" of social science could
now be perceived more objectively as a distor-
tion, a rationalization for remaining emotionally
uninvolved in the fundamental inequities and
moral dilemmas of social life. Value judgments
implicit in the selection of research topics sud-
denly became obvious, and social scientists' re-
sponsibility for helping to redress the gaping
social disparities could no longer be denied—a
new variation on an earlier social positivism, an
integration of previous positions. Social science
now could be diagnosed as part of the problem,
the same social science that, in its scholarly
cool, dispassionate stance simply studied social
problems and implicitly accused, rather than
helped, the victims.
Social science, long the bastion of Establish-
ment male dominance, had possessed only the
male lens through which to study society. Male
and female researchers alike had to view so-
ciety, record its ills, but remain aloof, through
that single distorting lens. Missing, until the
feminist perspective developed, was the female
lens, the second lens essential to complete the
social stereoscope through which the images of
the two worlds could be combined to produce the
realistic depth, compassion, and involvement of
reality.
Since that important paradigmatic shift, Ber-
nard has studied the female world through the
feminist prism, insisting upon showing her
audience, reasonably but firmly, previously un-
seen structures. Deliberately casting only oc-
casional glances toward the male world, Bernard
reports the new feminist historical discoveries,
speaking boldly for the emerging options that
will reduce the loss of women to meaningless
relationships and empty, literally maddening
lives. The Female World is an incisive examina-
tion of the worlds in which women have lived
separated from men—their own world of family,
friendships, education, occupations, childbirth
and illness, politics, art, and death. Bernard con-
cludes the ambience of the female world is
sadness; however, she makes no apologia for
women or for the sex differences whose irreduci-
bility she has insisted upon both before and
after her feminist conversion.
The Female World is a serious, documentary
celebration of women's unique strengths and
differences, on which Bernard rests the chances
for the future salvation of both men and women
in a postindustrial society. Sex role transcen-
dence and shared roles may be the wave of the
future as Bernard predicted (1972; 1974; 1975;
Lipman-Blumen & Bernard 1979), but now the
entire panoply of the female world with its com-
plicated structure and ethos, past and present,
is dealt with in still well-mannered, but this time
unsubdued, tones.
An eclectic perspective ahead of her time.
Earlier in this essay, Bernard's propensity to
move ahead of her time in addressing the key
issues that were to concern scholars and policy
makers was noted. Her research was ground-
breaking, not simply in terms of issues per se,
but also with respect to the strategies by which
she attacked her subject. Here, again, we see her
most salient intellectual characteristic—critical
defiance of conventional beliefs and myths.
A case in point is Marriage and Family Among
Negroes in which she laid bare the fallacies of
the "black matriarchy" and debunked the no-
tion that black family structure was typically
"broken." By careful, scholarly use of census
data, she demonstrated that the modal black
family structure consisted of a marital union
between original spouses living with and caring
for their own offspring. She traces the profound
influence of the history of slavery and racism
on the relationship between black women and
men. Although she perceives the black female
as an unwitting participant in the travail of black
men, she more properly attributes the condition
confronting blacks to urbanization, with its
crowding, mobility, and discontinuities, as well
as to unemployment and poverty. Bernard's
empathetic analysis of black society within a
white environment (echoing her earlier writing
about immigrant Jews)—albeit with some in-
terpretations she would now reject—led a num-
ber of her black readers to conclude that Ber-
nard, herself, was black. She hails the importance
and predicts the rise of black racial pride and
suggests that the self-emancipation of blacks is
the critical treatment for the black male's
wounds.
Another major myth that Bernard explodes is
the fiction that marriage and motherhood are
desirable for women. In The Future of Marriage

and The Future of Motherhood (1974), Bernard,
with Durkheimian precision, carefully demon-
strates that marriage benefits men more than
women and that the Western, postindustrial
structure of marriage, as well as motherhood, is
deleterious to women's mental health.
Analogous to her foresight in identifying
timely substantive issues is Bernard's anticipa-
tion of methodological strategies ahead of the
trends. As early as 1966, she advocated investi-
gations of the differential experiences of groups
born or socialized at different points in history,
a method to be raised to recent prominence
under the label of "cohort analysis." Her early
call for longitudinal studies to offset the distor-
tions of cross-cultural research was ahead of
the vogue. Earlier still, in 1964, Bernard was
using cross-national data to make key compari-
sons among academic women in the Soviet
Union, France, Italy, Britain, and the United
States—again, a methodological approach which
has since gained an impressive following.
Bernard's scholarship is eclectic, spreading
over a wide range of substantive areas and using
a complicated palette of methodologies. Stem-
ming from her training in measurement, Ber-
nard's earliest work, such as American Family
Behavior (1942a), through The Future of Mar-
riage utilizes macrodata, including macrostatis-
tics from census and other government reports,
to compare the patterns of various sociological
groups and to gauge the strength and trends of
sociological phenomena. Later, she turned to
microdata in the form of personal documents,
the letters she and her children exchanged over
more than 25 years, in a courageously self-
revealing effort to chronicle the intimate infra-
structure of family life. In her work on black
marriage and family structure, as well as her
most recent research on the female world, Ber-
nard focuses on blacks and women, respectively,
deliberately giving scant attention to compari-
sons with whites and men. Thus, she intention-
ally eschews measurements of blacks compared
to whites, women compared to men. In defiance
of traditional social science canons, Bernard
makes a conscious attempt to see blacks as
blacks (not as deviants from white patterns)
and women as women (not as would-be males).
In The Sex Game, Bernard moves easily to an
interactionist (although neither a Meadian nor
a Goffman disciple) perspective. And her shift
from social positivism to non-Parsonian func-
tionalism to feminism ultimately seems a hu-
BERNARD, JESSIE 55
manistic integration of the strengths of each
paradigm.
Awards and honors. Recognition of Jessie
Bernard's work as a major contribution to the
discipline, as well as to the education of a gen-
eral audience, has come from every quarter.
Ironically, her ability to speak lucidly and in-
cisively to a larger public, as well as to her social
science colleagues, probably delayed her inevita-
ble professional recognition. (She once face-
tiously warned a colleague whose work had been
cited in the popular press to "shield your co-
workers from this; how good can a sociologist
be if she is worth quoting in a popular maga-
zine?" [personal communication, 1978]).
Amiably defying professional customs and
mores, Bernard declined nomination to the pres-
idency of the American Sociological Association,
as well as to a host of other organizational posi-
tions. Nonetheless, in recent years, she has been
the recipient of the Kurt Lewin award from the
Society for the Psychological Study of Social
Issues (1976); the first emeriti award pre-
sented by Pennsylvania State University (1976);
the outstanding achievement award from the
American Association of University Women
(1976); honorary doctorates from Hood College,
Northwestern University, Washington Univer-
sity, and Radcliffe College; the Stuart A. Rice
merit award from the District of Columbia So-
ciological Association (1974), as well as the
merit award of the Eastern Sociological Society
and the Burgess award from the National Coun-
cil of Family Relations (1973).
Several awards have been established in Ber-
nard's name, awards designed to honor those,
who, like Jessie Bernard herself, have contrib-
uted intellectually, professionally, and humanely
to the world of scholarship and feminism. Thus,
the Jessie Bernard awards, annual prizes estab-
lished by the American Sociological Association
in 1976 and the District of Columbia Sociolo-
gists for Women in Society in 1978, reflect the
esteem in which her contributions—intellectual
eclecticism, personal courage, reasonable defi-
ance, unpretentious humanity, and feminist
sisterhood—are held.
JEAN LIPMAN-BLUMEN
WORKS BY BERNARD
1934 BERNARD, L. L.; and BERNARD, JESSIE Sociology
and the Study of International Relations. St. Louis,
Mo.: Washington University Studies.
(1942a) 1973 American Family Behavior. New York:
Russell. —» Includes a new introduction.
56 BERTALANFFY, LUDWIG VON
1942b An Analysis of Jewish Culture. Pages 243-263
in Isacque Graeber and S. H. Britt (editors), Jews
in a Gentile World. New York: Macmillan. —> Pub-
lished anonymously.
1942c Biculturality: A Study in Social Schizophrenia.
Pages 264-293 in Isacque Graeber and S. H. Britt
(editors), Jews in a Gentile World. New York:
Macmillan.
1943 BERNARD, L. L.; and BERNARD, JESSIE Origins of
American Sociology: The Social Science Movement
in the United States. New York: Crowell.
1947 Social Salvation Through Science. South Atlantic
Quarterly 46:44-55.
(1949a) 1962 American Community Behavior: An
Analysis of Problems Confronting American Com-
munities Today. Rev. ed. New York: Holt.
1949& The Art of Science: A Reply to Redfield. Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 55:1-9.
1949c A Note on Sociological Research as a Factor in
Social Change: The Reception of the Kinsey Report.
Social Forces 28:188-190.
1949d The Power of Science and the Science of
Power. American Sociological Review 14:575—584.
1949e Prescriptions for Peace: Social Science Chi-
mera? Ethics 59:244-256.
1950a Can Science Transcend Culture? Science
Monthly 71:268-273.
1950£> The Validation of Normative Social Theory.
Journal of Philosophy 47:481-493.
(1957a) 1971 Remarriage: A Study of Marriage. New
York: Russell. —> Includes a new introduction.
1957£> Social Problems at Midcentury: Role, Status,
and Stress in a Context of Abundance. New York:
Dry den.
(1964) 1974 Academic Women. New York: Meridian.
1966 Marriage and Family Among Negroes. Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1968a Community: II. Community Disorganization.
Volume 3, pages 163-169 in International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L.
Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1968b The Sex Game: Communication Between the
Sexes. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. —» A
paperback edition was published by Atheneum in
1972.
1971 Women and the Public Interest: An Essay on
Policy and Protest. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
1972 The Future of Marriage. Cleveland and New
York: World Publishing Company. —> A paperback
edition was published by Bantam in 1973.
1973 The Sociology of Community. Glenview, 111.:
Scott-Foresman.
1974 The Future of Motherhood. New York: Dial. —>
A paperback edition was published by Penguin in
1975.
1975 Women, Wives, Mothers: Values and Options.
Chicago: Aldine.
1978 Self-portrait of a Family. Boston: Beacon Press.
1979 LIPMAN-BLUMEN, JEAN; and BERNARD, JESSIE
Sex Roles and Social Policy. Beverly Hills, Calif.:
Sage.
The Female World. New York: Free Press. —» Forth-
coming tide.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BALES, R. F. 1950 Interaction Process Analysis: A
Method for the Study of Small Groups. Cambridge,
- Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
LORENZ, KONRAD 1963 On Aggression. New York:
Harcourt. —> First published as Das sogenannte
Bose: Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression. A paper-
back edition was published in 1970.
BERTALANFFY, LUDWIG VON
Ludwig von Bertalanffy was born in 1901 in
Atzgersdorf near Vienna, and died in 1972 in
Buffalo, New York. His interests developed early
and were always wide ranging. They encom-
passed experimental as well as theoretical bi-
ology, philosophy of science and of man, psy-
chology and psychiatry, theory of symbolism,
history, a broad variety of social problems, and
even a topic as arcane as the origin of the postal
service in the Middle Ages. In most of these
fields he was a true pioneer, with ideas running
ahead of the dominant views of his times. In
many respects he suffered a fate not unusual
for pioneers: the full recognition of the validity
and significance of his theories late in life or
posthumously, and the subsequent reemergence
of his original notions in different fields and
forms, sometimes without reference to his ear-
lier statements.
Bertalanffy received his PH.D. at the Univer-
sity of Vienna in 1926, but his autodidactic
studies ranged far beyond the formal curricu-
lum. While still in his teens he studied Jean B.
Lamarck, Charles Darwin, Ernst Haeckel, Karl
Marx, and Henry T. Buckle; while in his twen-
ties he also felt the influence of such early bio-
logical theorists as Wilhelm Roux, Hans Driesch,
and Julius Schaxel. The "as if" philosophy of
Hans Vaihinger, whom he knew as an elderly
man, also influenced his intellectual develop-
ment. Bertalanffy was named Privatdozent at
the University of Vienna in 1934 under the
aegis of philosophers Robert Reininger and
Moritz Schlick. The latter was a founder of the
famed Vienna Circle of positivism, a mode of
thought that did not attract the young biologist,
who despite his experimental work, believed in
bold theorizing, had profound literary interests,
and leaned toward mysticism. As professor at
the University of Vienna, Bertalanffy belonged
to the philosophical and medical faculties and
lectured at the Zoological Institute. In 1937, he
was awarded a Rockefeller Foundation fellow-
ship to study United States developments in bi-
ology with regard to their applicability to Aus-
trian universities. He traveled extensively in the
United States and held appointments at the Uni-
versity of Chicago and the Marine Biological
Laboratory at Woods Hole. In October 1938 he
returned to Austria, where the outbreak of
World War H the next year cut off further con-
tact with America. His house, library, and lab-
oratory were destroyed in 1945, during the siege

of Vienna, and a number of almost completed
manuscripts were lost. He left Austria defini-
tively in 1948 and, after travels in western
Europe, assumed a position as professor and
director of research at the newly founded medi-
cal faculty of the University of Ottawa. During
the year 1954/1955 he was a fellow at the Stan-
ford Center for Advanced Study in the Behav-
ioral Sciences. While there, at a meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of
Science in San Francisco in December 1954, he
established the Society for the Advancement of
General System Theory (now the Society for
General Systems Research), together with An-
atol Rapoport, Kenneth E. Boulding, and Ralph
W. Gerard. From 1955 to 1958 Bertalanffy was
director of biological research at Mount Sinai
Hospital in Los Angeles and visiting professor
at the University of Southern California. His
subsequent appointments included a term as
Sloan visiting professor and member of the re-
search department at the Menninger Founda-
tion in Topeka, Kansas, an eight-year tenure as
professor of theoretical biology at the University
of Alberta in Edmonton (1961-1969), and
finally an appointment as faculty professor at
the Center for Theoretical Biology of the State
University of New York at Buffalo (1969 until
his death in 1972).
Throughout an adventurous lifetime, Berta-
lanffy combined experimental work in biology
with the broadest range of theoretical interests.
His biological work centered initially on a
quantitative determination of metabolism; the
model derived from his laboratory experiments
in Vienna and Ottawa provided the foundation
for the widely used Bertalanffy growth equa-
tions. He later focused on cytochemistry, devel-
oping in this field the acridine-orange technique
of determining DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
and RNA (ribonucleic acid) by fluorescence
microscopy, important in the early diagnosis of
cancer.
Bertalanffy's enduring interests, however,
were mainly theoretical. He pioneered the "orga-
nismic conception" of biology on the Continent,
publishing papers on this topic as early as
1925-1926, and a major book, Kritische Theorie
der Formbildung (1928a), summarized his
ideas. This conception was to transcend the
dichotomies of a mechanistic vs. a vitalistic ex-
planation of life through consideration of the
organism as an open system endowed with spe-
cific properties capable of scientific investiga-
tion. Together with the related concepts of levels
BERTALANFFY, LUDWIG VON 57
of organization and of the "active" as opposed to
the "passive" (or reactive) organism, it consti-
tuted an early statement of a "holistic" theory
of life and nature. Bertalanffy's organismic con-
ception appeared a few years after Alfred North
Whitehead published his first essays on the phi-
losophy of organism (Whitehead 1920). However,
Bertalanffy was not aware of Whitehead's writ-
ings, which then were little known on the Conti-
nent. Moreover, unlike Whitehead, he attempted
to provide usable hypotheses for working scien-
tists rather than a general philosophy. He elab-
orated the original organismic conception in
Theoretische Biologie (1932-1942), Das Gefiige
des Lebens (1937), and Das biologische Weltbild
(1949a).
The organismic conception found a number
of distinguished adherents, including Joseph H.
Woodger, whose Biological Principles appeared
in 1929, and Joseph Needham, whose conversion
to the organismic concept is documented in
Chemical Embryology (1931), Order and Life
(1936), and Integrative Levels (1937). How-
ever, the conception encountered general resis-
tance among experimental biologists, who
sought to explain the processes of life by inves-
tigating physical and chemical laws on sub-
cellular levels. (For example, the then authorita-
tive textbook by Max Hartmann, Allgemeine
Biologie [1927], contained hardly any reference
to processes above the level of the cell.) The is-
sue reemerged in the 1960s in the debates over
whether life was ultimately explainable in terms
of the properties of DNA and the laws of bio-
physics and biochemistry. Although Bertalanffy
took an active part in these debates on "reduc-
tionism" (cf. Koestler and Smythies 1969), his
original organismic conception was largely ne-
glected in the literature.
The organismic conception of life, elaborated
by Bertalanffy into a general theory of biology,
later became the foundation for the general
theory of systems. The development was logical.
The organismic conception referred to the or-
ganism as an "organized system" and defined
the fundamental task of biology as discovery of
the laws of biological systems at all levels of
organization. The task itself was taken up by
Bertalanffy who, interested in the broadest im-
plications of his conception, went beyond biol-
ogy to consider psychological, social, and his-
torical levels of organization. He conceived of a
general theory capable of elaborating principles
and models that were applicable to all systems,
whatever the nature of their parts and the level
58 BERTALANFFY, LUDWIG VON
of their organization. He outlined the frame-
work for such a theory in a seminar of Charles
Morris at the University of Chicago in 1937 and
later in lectures in Vienna. Unfortunately, the
publication of the manuscript in which this
"general system theory" was first described was
prevented by the general upheaval at the end of
World War n. Bertalanffy first published a
paper on it, entitled "Zu einer allgemeinen Sys-
temlehre," in 1949. It was followed in the next
year by "The Theory of Open Systems in Physics
and Biology" and "An Outline of General System
Theory." The oft reprinted classical formulation
of the principles, scope, and aims of the theory
was given in 1955 in "General System Theory"
and developed in greater detail in 1969 in the
book with that title. Bertalanffy used these prin-
ciples to explore a host of scientific and philo-
sophical issues, including a humanistic concep-
tion of human nature that opposed the
mechanistic "robot" conception of behaviorists
and cyberneticists as failing to do justice to the
spontaneous self-motivated activity of mind and
body; a philosophy of mind and culture that
distinguished human from animal nature in
terms of the ability to use symbols; and the
seeds of a new philosophy of history that re-
vived valid components of Oswald Spengler's
and Arnold J. Toynbee's theories in a perspec-
tive that saw civilizations themselves as systems.
The concept of system and the possibility of
constructing system theories to explain human
behavior and social progress became a major
interest in the social and policy sciences almost
four decades after Bertalanffy first outlined his
organismic conception, and years after he began
to explore the applicability of a general system
theory to diverse psychological and social phe-
nomena. Interest in systems theory was spurred
by several factors, including recognition of the
need for, and the legitimacy of, general theories
in natural and social science, and the coming of
age of modern automated technology with its
concepts of cybernetic control and multichannel
quasi-instantaneous communication. Norbert
Wiener's classic work on cybernetics (1948),
aptly subtitled Control and Communication in
the Animal and the Machine, drew attention to
the similarity between self-guided control pro-
cesses in biology and technology and simultane-
ously encouraged expectation that through
modern technology some living processes might
be simulated and better understood. The study
of systems became acceptable, even fashionable,
among social and policy scientists. A crop of new
specialities emerged—systems analysis; cyber-
netics; information, decision, and game theory;
communication and organization theory; func-
tionalisni; and "systems approaches" to a variety
of problems ranging from urban planning, health
delivery systems, and environmental pollution
control, to international and world affairs. How-
ever, in the 1960s most systems theorizing drew
its inspiration from relatively simple mechanis-
tic cybernetic conceptions derived more from
engineering than from biology (for a critique,
see Hoos 1972). Only a handful of "general sys-
tem theorists" rallied around the ideas originally
proposed by Bertalanffy and elaborated and
paralleled by Kenneth Boulding in economics,
Paul Weiss and Ralph Gerald in biology, Anatol
Rapoport in mathematics, and Karl Deutsch and
David Easton in political science. These few
adherents emphasized the basic concepts of ir-
reducibility or "wholeness" of systems; their
openness to energy, matter, and information;
their "activeness" or spontaneity in coping with
environmental changes and disturbances; and
their evolutionary transformability and hier-
archic organization.
In the 1970s several further developments
lent support to the organismic conception of
systems and credence to the eventual formula-
tion of a fully worked out general theory. They
included the Nobel prize-winning mathematical
definition of Ilya Prigogine and his coworkers of
nonequilibrium systems that offset their entropy
production with entropy transport as they
emerge through processes of alternating fluctu-
ations and stability; the evolutionary perspective
provided by Jacob Bronowski in describing the
progressive buildup of complex systems (1970);
Ervin Laszlo's attempts to provide a philosophi-
cal foundation for a general system theory of
nature, man, and society (1972a); and a host
of occasionally brilliant works in mathematics,
humanistic psychology, psychiatry, manage-
ment science, and policy and "futures" study.
Bertalanffy's original vision of an organismic
conception in biological theory became a foun-
tainhead for a nonreductionist and nonmechan-
istic systems approach, not only to phenomena
of life but to problems of mind, evolution, so-
ciety, and history. If general system theory is
reproached for being vague and qualitative, and
for failing to live up to expectations, it must be
remembered that a fully quantified and experi-
mentally confirmed general theory of systems
would constitute nothing short of a master
theory of evolution and of all that evolution pro-

duced in the way of life, mind, and society. The
general system theory proposed by Berta-
lanffy is at present a "program" or "philosophy"
(as emphasized by Rapoport, Boulding, and
Laszlo, among others) of great vision and scope,
with ample promise of bearing fruit in the bio-
logical as well as in the social sciences. This
promise is demonstrated in the wide-ranging
essays in The Relevance of General Systems The-
ory, papers presented to von Bertalanffy on his
70th birthday (Laszlo 1972£>) and in Unity
Through Diversity (Gray and Rizzo 1973), the
two-volume Festschrift prepared in his honor
by some 63 scholars and scientists from 12
countries.
ERVIN LASZLO
WORKS BY VON BERTALANFFY
(1928a) 1933 Modern Theories of Development. Ox-
ford Univ. Press. —» A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1962 by Harper. First published as Kri-
tische Theorie der Formbildung.
1928& Nikolaus von Kues. Munich: Georg Miiller.
1930 Lebenswissenschaft und Bildung. Erfurt (Ger-
many) : Kurt Stenger.
1932-1942 Theoretische Biologie. 2 vols. Berlin: Born-
trager. —> Volume 1: Allgemeine Theorie, Physiko-
chemie, Aufbau und Entwicklung des Organismus,
1932. Volume 2: Stoffwechsel, Wachstum, 1942; an
enlarged edition was published in Berne by Francke
in 1951.
1937 Das Gefiige des Lebens. Leipzig: Teubner.
(1940) 1949 Vom Molikiil zur Organismenwelt:
Grundfragen der Modernen Biologie. 2d ed. Pots-
dam (Germany): Athenaion.
1942-1971 Handbuch der Biologie. Edited by Ludwig
von Bertalanffy and Fritz Gessner. 14 vols. Frank-
furt (Germany): Athenaion.
1946 Biologie und Medizin. Vienna: Springer.
(1949a) 1952 Problems of Life: An Evaluation of
Modern Biological Thought. New York: Wiley; Lon-
don: Watts. —> A paperback edition was published
by Harper in 1960. First published as Die Stellung
des Lebens in Natur und Wissenschaft, volume 1
of Das biologische Weltbild.
1949& Zu einer allgemeinen Systemlehre. Biologia
Generalis 19:114-129.
1950a An Outline of General System Theory. British
Journal of the Philosophy of Science 1:139—164.
1950b The Theory of Open Systems in Physics and Bi-
ology. Science. 3:23-29.
1951 Auf den Pfaden des Lebens: Ein biologisches
Skizzenbuch. Vienna: Universum.
(1953) 1977 BERTALANFFY, LUDWIG VON; BEIER, W.;
and LAUE, R. Biophysik des Fliessgleichgewichts.
Rev. & enl. ed. Brunswick (Germany): Vieweg.
1955 General System Theory. Main Currents in Mod-
ern Thought 11:75-83.
1956-1972 General Systems: Yearbooks of the Society
for General Systems Research. Edited by Ludwig
von Bertalanffy and Anatol Rapoport. Washington:
The Society.
1967 Robots, Men and Minds: Psychology in the Mod-
ern World. New York: Braziller.
1968 Organismic Psychology and Systems Theory.
Worcester, Mass.: Clark Univ. Press.
BETTELHEIM, BRUNO 59
(1969) 1973 General System Theory: Foundations, De-
velopment, Applications. Rev. ed. New York: Bra-
ziller.
1975 Perspectives on General System Theory. Edited
by Edgar Taschdjian. New York: Braziller. —» In-
cludes forewords by Maria von Bertalanffy and Er-
vin Laszlo.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BRONOWSKI, JACOB 1970 New Concepts in the Evo-
lution of Complexity: Stratified Stability and Un-
bounded Plans. Zygon 5, no. 1:18-35.
GRAY, WILLIAM; and Rizzo, NICHOLAS (editors) 1973
Unity Through Diversity: A Festschrift for Ludwig
von Bertalanffy. 2 vols. New York and London:
Gordon & Breach.
HARTMANN, MAX 1927 Allgemeine Biologie. Jena
(Germany): G. Fischer Verlag.
Hoos, IDA 1972 Systems Analysis in Public Policy.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press.
KOESTLER, ARTHUR; and SMYTHIES, J. R. (1969) 1970
Beyond Reductionism: New Perspectives in the Life
Sciences. New York: Macmillan.
LASZLO, ERVIN 1972a Introduction to Systems Phi-
losophy: Toward a New Paradigm of Contemporary
Thought. New York and London: Gordon & Breach.
LASZLO, ERVIN (editor) 1972& The Relevance of Gen-
eral Systems Theory: Papers Presented to Ludwig
von Bertalanffy on His Seventieth Birthday. New
York: Braziller.
NEEDHAM, JOSEPH 1931 Chemical Embryology. Cam-
bridge Univ. Press.
NEEDHAM, JOSEPH 1936 Order and Life. Cambridge
Univ. Press.
NEEDHAM, JOSEPH 1937 Integrative Levels. Oxford:
Clarendon.
WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1920) 1959 The Con-
cept of Nature. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
WIENER, NORBERT (1948) 1961 Cybernetics: Or,
Control and Communication in the Animal and the
Machine. 2d ed. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
WOODGER, JOSEPH H. (1929) 1967 Biological Princi-
ples. New York: Humanities Press.
BETTELHEIM, BRUNO
On the basis of a lifetime of clinical practice
and academic research, Bruno Bettelheim
emerged as one of the central figures in the re-
formulation and application of psychoanalytic
thought both in the area of psychotherapy and
in the analysis of mass society. The boldness of
his formulations and the immense range of his
interests make him an intellectual of immense
influence. At times, he has been subject to in-
tense debate, but with the passage of time his
contributions have come to be accepted ingre-
dients of clinical practice and of social
science analysis. He was a university professor
who believed in the unity of theory and practice,
and who was deeply concerned with the impact
of ideas on contemporary society and with the
social responsibilities of the social scientist. One
of his outstanding accomplishments was his
60 BETTELHEIM, BRUNO
extraordinary ability to fuse together complex
analytic discourse with clear and literate prose,
which made his writings widely accessible.
Bruno Bettelheim in one lifetime followed
three full careers, in each of which he achieved
an international reputation of the first rank. As
a psychoanalytic psychologist, he prepared a
body of theoretical and empirical research litera-
ture which fundamentally fashioned group and
milieu psychotherapy. As an educator-adminis-
trator, he was director of the famed Orthogenic
School of the University of Chicago for emotion-
ally disturbed children and teacher of genera-
tions of teachers and psychotherapists. In addi-
tion, he had widespread impact on lay audiences
through his lectures and mass media appear-
ances. As a social scientist and humanistic critic,
he authored classic works on collective behavior
in modern society, especially his analysis of the
psychopathology of the Nazi concentration camp
system. These were roles that he pursued con-
currently through an extraordinarily active and
productive career.
He was born in Vienna, Austria, on August
28, 1903. His parents were upper middle-class
Jews who came from Eastern Europe and who
were rapidly assimilated into the urban culture
of Vienna. He was educated at the Reform Real-
gymnasium which was relatively "modern" in
its curriculum and atmosphere, but which of-
fered Bettelheim a classical continental educa-
tion. After matriculating at the University of
Vienna, he received his PH.D. in psychology and
philosophy in 1938. In the course of his studies
he spent considerable time in the humanities,
especially in art history, but he became increas-
ingly concerned with the study of psychoanalysis
and the practice of psychotherapy. His work
led him to an interest in emotionally disturbed
youngsters, and foreshadowed his lifetime com-
mitment to the development of residential treat-
ment. He was influenced by the accomplish-
ments and writings of Anna Freud, August
Aichhorn, and others who were transforming the
procedures of classical psychoanalysis.
Bettelheim's education included not only his
formal academic training, but his exposure to
the intellectual ferment of Vienna during the
interwar years. Although there was a profound
respect for the classics, a self-critical, inquiring,
and innovative attitude was dominant. The re-
markable intellectual figures who were present
in Vienna during that era fashioned Bettelheim's
interdisciplinary outlook and generated his con-
cern with linking dynamic psychology to social
processes and social institutions.
For the time being, the increasing political
tensions hardly demoralized the scholarly com-
munity. But the rise to power of the Nazis in
Austria ended with one blow the Viennese scene,
with deep trauma for all those involved. In 1938,
after the Germans annexed Austria, Bettelheim
was transported to Germany and spent one year
in concentration camps—both in Dachau and
Buchenwald. After his release in 1939, he was
able to make his way to the United States and to
start to rebuild a professional career. While the
bulk of this wave of European, intellectual ref-
ugees settled in New York and on the eastern
seaboard, he found himself relocated in Chicago
and the Midwest, a set of circumstances which
deepened his integration into United States so-
ciety and culture.
From 1940 to 1942 he was employed as a
research associate at the University of Chicago
on a project dealing with the psychology of art
and with art education. He was an associate
professor of psychology at Rockford College,
Illinois from 1942 to 1944. During this period
his health, which had deteriorated during his
internment, gradually improved. In 1944, he was
appointed to the faculty of the University of
Chicago and soon became director of the Ortho-
genic School. He remained uninterruptedly at
the University of Chicago throughout his aca-
demic career until he retired in 1973. Although
he traveled widely throughout the United States
and abroad, and lectured at numerous universi-
ties and therapeutic centers, the management of
the Orthogenic School was a continuous and
consuming task that dominated his work sched-
ule. The diversity of his academic interests is
indicated by the fact that he rose to the position
of distinguished service professor of education,
psychology, and psychiatry, in addition to his
directorship of the Orthogenic School.
The core of his scholarly writings derived from
his work with emotionally disturbed children and
resulted in the publication of a massive series of
theoretical and technical papers which were ac-
companied by a series of widely read books
(1950; 1955; I960; 1967). These books pre-
sented not only his general ideas and strate-
gies, but also were rich in clinical detail. These
studies were particularly noteworthy because
they dealt not only with the young children and
adolescents at the Orthogenic School, but en-
compassed the parents, staff, and social environ-

ment—that is the total lifespace of the school.
Bettelheim opened his school to researchers who
examined its institutional character in depth.
This body of writing was an integral contribu-
tion to the shift in emphasis from classical two-
person treatment systems to the development of
supportive group and milieu therapy. This ap-
proach came to have a profound impact on the
management of mental institutions and in turn
on educational and social work practice.
Bettelheim sought to reach out and treat in-
dividuals who were deeply disturbed and who
were excluded from conventional psychoanalytic
treatment. He believed that such treatment was
a worthy objective per se, and that it would
also supply the basis for modifying family and
educational practice for a free and democratic
society. While he believed in the significance of
psychoanalytic therapy, his long-term goal was
to make dynamic psychology relevant for the
educational process of modern mass society.
The focus of his therapeutic procedures cen-
tered on residential treatment. He believed that
the class of patients with whom he and his staff
were working came from such disorganized fam-
ilies and had suffered such traumas that they
required a new lifespace if they were to be re-
turned to society. In addition, he believed that
treatment could not be limited to brief and
periodic intervention. Instead he relied on on-
going contact between students and staff. His
students had to be exposed to a staff that could
engage extensively in therapeutic intervention
as required by the human circumstance. In its
outward manifestations, the Orthogenic School
made use of a minimum amount of coercive
restraint and a maximum reliance on interper-
sonal support. The logic of the treatment rested
on the pervasive commitment of the staff to meet-
ing the needs of the students as human beings,
needs that were expressed in distorted form be-
cause of their previous traumas.
While many European refugees who special-
ized in psychoanalysis remained wedded to the
analytical perspectives which they imported into
the United States, Bettelheim was one of those
few who displayed a strong sense of self-criti-
cism and a desire to enrich their frame of ref-
erence. In the American scene, psychoanalysis
was placing a greater importance on the cen-
trality of ego functions and on ego psychology
rather than continuing its traditional emphasis
on the analysis and reconstruction of "instinc-
tual" drives.
BETTELHEIM, BRUNO 61
Bettelheim's theoretical writings and his strat-
egy of residential treatment was an essential in-
gredient in this trend. In addition, Bettelheim
himself acknowledged the importance of his ex-
posure to American pragmatic philosophy and
psychology for his work. Although pragmatism
did not admit of the "unconscious," and thus of
unconscious motivation, the parallel formula-
tions of pragmatism and psychoanalysis were
striking. The incorporation of pragmatic psy-
chology into psychoanalysis by writers such as
Bettelheim served to enrich and explicate dy-
namic theories of personality. Of critical impor-
tance was the formulation of human personality
in interactional terms, rather than in conformity
with stimulus response theory, and the emphasis
placed on the continuity of the emotive and the
rational.
The impact of the Nazi seizure of power, the
events of World War n, and his enforced refugee
status were traumatic events which penetrated
his daily consciousness and existence. But Bettel-
heim responded to the opportunity for creative
experimentation that the United States setting
afforded his psychotherapeutic institution after
1945. Moreover, in his new found intellectual
colleagues at the University of Chicago and
throughout the United States, he also found
powerful sources of intellectual stimulation and
support for his core interests.
Bettelheim's application of psychoanalytical
theory to the study of collective behavior was
motivated by the same set of concerns that
were at work in his approach to psychotherapy:
namely, he was preoccupied with the defense of
the individual against the destructive aspects of
contemporary institutions; emotive energy and
personal commitment were required.
After his arrival in the United States, he
achieved widespread recognition with the pub-
lication of his famous paper, "Individual and
Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations" (1943).
The originality of his effort to examine the con-
centration camp in psychological and personality
terms was accepted as a virtuoso performance.
He traced the impact of the German concentra-
tion camp on personality and as a means for
producing changes in prisoners which make
them "more useful subjects" of the Nazi state.
The ability of the Nazi officials to manage the
internal administration of the concentration
camp attracted his attention. The day-to-day ad-
ministration of the concentration camp rested
not merely on force and coercion. Bettelheim
62 BETTELHEIM, BRUNO
focused on the process by which inmates under
the brutal treatment of their captors came to
identify with the camp authorities and to serve
in time actively in support of their captors, the
so-called identification with the aggressor syn-
drome. He underscored that realistic perception
of the camp guards and camp officials assisted
him to survive. As an inmate, his efforts to
understand intellectually how the camp func-
tioned as a social system contributed to his abil-
ity to endure its repressive impact. In his view,
survival in the concentration camp, to the ex-
tent that it was possible, required the person to
mobilize all of the skills and resources he had
before entering the camp and to strain to ap-
proach the immediate reality in a realistic and
unstereotyped fashion.
After this publication about the concentration
camp, there ensued a series of major studies
dealing with the relation between personality
and social institutions in concrete settings. Bet-
telheim never presented his theories of human
behavior without clinical and empirical illustra-
tion. In 1950, with Morris Janowitz, he published
Dynamics of Prejudice, which dealt with the im-
pact of World War n experiences on young
veterans. In contradistinction to the then exist-
ing theories of authoritarian personality, the role
of personal and social controls in containing hos-
tility and prejudice was formulated. It was most
difficult to identify a personality structure linked
to prejudice; the ability of social scientists to de-
scribe personality structure on a group basis or
in statistical terms was indeed limited. Instead
the level of expressed prejudice was a function
of both social and psychological factors; that is
of a person's education, social position, and pat-
tern of social mobility in interaction with his per-
sonal controls, in particular his ego strength.
Out of these studies came a recognition of the
markedly low level of anti-Semitism in the
United States after 1945 and bold explanations
of its decline.
Bettelheim was one of the earliest critics of
the male orientation of psychological analysis as
it was practiced during that period. Male view-
points and the male outlook dominated psycho-
logical theory, including the central elements of
psychoanalysis. Bettelheim's objective was not
to develop a female psychology, but rather to
make personality theories more accurate and
more objective. In Symbolic Wounds: Puberty
Rites and the Envious Male (1954), he used
anthropological materials to reformulate the psy-
chology of the "rite de passage" in order to pre-
sent a balanced analysis of male and female per-
sonality development.
The study of the concentration camp system
supplied the basis for his subsequent book The
Informed Heart (1960), in which he elaborated
his argument about the limits of rationality in
the defense of individuality. Bettelheim's philo-
sophic position and his argument, based on em-
pirical investigation, in no sense represents a
rejection of rationality or rationalistic objectives.
He fully avoided those intellectual trends which
he thought were "scapegoating" science and the
scientific method. Instead he was concerned with
self-defeating limitations of a purely rationalistic
psychology. He did not believe that the modern
world suffered because it rejected and under-
mined the irrational and superstitious, but be-
cause the social institutions in mass society
failed to take into account and satisfy uncon-
scious motivation in a constructive fashion. The
weakening of strong personal commitment,
based on emotional energy, has had disruptive
consequences. The Informed Heart continued
the classic argument of Freud's "Civilization and
Its Discontents" (1930). But because of his lib-
eral social philosophy, Bettelheim left open the
possibility of, and in fact argued for, a personal
and individual solution or at least management
of the dilemmas of mass society.
His continuing interest in the construction of
new and alternative social institutions on behalf
of the individual led him to study communal
childrearing in Israeli kibbutzim, Children of the
Dream (1969). He presented an interpretation
that was highly controversial, because he sought
to assess both the "costs" and "benefits"—the
advantages and disadvantages—of collective
child raising and personality development. He
emphasized that the kibbutzim produced a new
generation committed to group responsibility-
values of high importance in a pioneer nation,
especially in fulfilling the needs of military de-
fense. But the result was to inhibit individuality,
creativity, and individual adaptability to chang-
ing social circumstances.
His search for the psychologically significant
led him to undertake an elaborate analysis of the
changing character of fairy tales (1976). It
represented the epitome of his elegant literary
style, which in part accounted for its acclaim in
humanistic circles. Bettelheim concluded that
fairy tales and nursery stories had a positive
function in assisting the child to master the
realities of the outer world. The child was ex-
posed to a threatening fantasy but the fact that

the parent or familiar household figure would
read the story served to reassure the child. More-
over, the very fact that the fantasy was repeat-
edly read to the child also worked to communi-
cate that the dangers of the external world could
be mastered.
Throughout his university career he never
abandoned his interest in making his theories
and himself available to classroom teachers and
to parents of normal children. He conducted ex-
tensive group discussions with mothers and
parents which led to the publication of Dialogues
With Mothers (1962). He wrote for and ap-
peared in the mass media as part of his commit-
ment to effective modern education. He was a
popular teacher who had a reputation as one
who made effective use of the Socratic method
in order to stimulate independent thinking
among his students.
He emphasized the fundamental debt to
Freud's dynamic psychology to which he never-
theless had a critical stance. At the same time
he acknowledged the impact on his work in the
United States of the thinking of John Dewey, and
remained proud that he was a member of the
department of education that Dewey had helped
to establish. Bettelheim's early youth gave him
the opportunity to observe the ideological move-
ments of the left in Vienna; he never accepted
their political format, but thought of himself
after his transplantation to the United States as
committed to the liberal tradition. His reputation
as a controversial figure rested not only on the
boldness and originality of his writings and for-
mulations, but on his personal opposition to
totalitarianism—political and intellectual—of the
left and of the right.
MORRIS JANOWITZ
WORKS BY BETTELHEIM
1943 Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situa-
tions. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
38:417-452.
1949 BETTELHEIM, BRUNO; and SYLVESTER, EMMY
Milieu Theory: Indications and Illustration. Psycho-
analytic Review 36:54—68.
1950 Love is Not Enough: The Treatment of Emotion-
ally Disturbed Children. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
(1950) 1964 BETTELHEIM, BRUNO; and JANOWITZ,
MORRIS Social Change and Prejudice, Including
Dynamics of Prejudice. New York: Free Press.
—» A reprinting of Dynamics of Prejudice, with a
reassessment of its findings.
1954 Symbolic Wounds: Puberty Rites and the Envious
Male. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
1955 Truants From Life: The Rehabilitation of Emo-
tionally Disturbed Children. Glencoe, 111.: Free
Press.
1960 The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age.
Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
BICKEL, ALEXANDER M. 63
1962 Dialogues With Mothers. Glencoe, 111.: Free
Press.
1967 The Empty Fortress. New York: Free Press.
1969 The Children of the Dream. New York: Macmil-
lan.
1970 What Psychoanalysis Can Do for Education. The
Critic 29, no. 2:12-19.
1974 A Home for the Heart. New York: Knopf.
1976 The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and
Importance of Fairy Tales. New York: Knopf.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
FREUD, SIGMUND (1930) 1961 Civilization and Its
Discontents. Volume 22, pages 64-148 in The
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New
York: Macmillan.
BICKEL, ALEXANDER M.
Alexander Mordecai Bickel (1924-1974), Ster-
ling professor of law at Yale University, was at
the time of his death one of the nation's leading
constitutional authorities. In addition, he was
active as a teacher, scholar, lawyer, journalist,
and adviser to government officials. The range
of his interests, as well as the penetration of his
mind, prompted the columnist George F. Will to
write of him posthumously as the "keenest pub-
lic philosopher of our time."
Born in Bucharest, Romania, Bickel immi-
grated with his family at the age of 14 to the
United States, where his father became a promi-
nent Yiddish journalist in New York City. Bickel,
though he spoke no English upon his arrival,
rapidly acquired an ease and fluency in the lan-
guage that distinguished his speaking and writ-
ing all of his life. He graduated from the City
College of New York in 1947 and from Harvard
Law School in 1949. He served as a clerk to
Calvert Magruder, chief judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
was a law officer in the Office of the U.S. High
Commissioner in Germany, and returned to serve
as law clerk to Felix Frankfurter, then associate
justice of the United States Supreme Court.
Bickel's relationship with Frankfurter was par-
ticularly close, and the older man became a major
intellectual influence upon him. In 1956 Bickel
was appointed to the Yale law faculty, where he
remained until his death 18 years later. During
the brief span of his academic career, he pub-
lished seven books, and two more appeared post-
humously. Few academic lawyers publish as
much in an entire career.
As a scholar, Bickel set for himself, as seri-
ous students of the American Constitution must,
the central question of whether and how the
64 BICKEL, ALEXANDER M.
practice of judicial review—the power of the fed-
eral judiciary to set aside as incongruent with
the Constitution the laws and actions of popularly
elected officials—can be reconciled with the the-
ory and practice of political democracy. An effort
to summarize his intellectual legacy involves
two kinds of distortion. In the first place, his
thought was so rich, his insights in the course
of argument so prolific and often profound,
that a statement of the major features of his
philosophy misses much of his genius. Secondly,
his thought was in continual evolution so that
positions stated, for example, in his first major
work, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Su-
preme Court at the Bar of Politics (1962), were
often expanded, modified, or qualified, explicitly
or implicitly, in later works, including The
Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (1970)
and The Morality of Consent (1975), as well as
in his journalism, teaching, and conversation.
These caveats, however, do not mean that his
general approach was not consistent from first
to last. Perhaps he became, over time, less hope-
ful of the capacity of judges to manage large
political and social affairs, as well as more du-
bious of the legitimacy of their efforts to do so.
He displayed at all times a complex understand-
ing of the ways in which institutions of govern-
ment and of the private order interact and limit
each other's power. His thought owes much of
its complexity to his Burkean insistence that
most principles, in law as well as politics, be
limited, nonabsolute, and depend heavily upon
circumstance and context—that we be governed
not by ultimates but by what he called "prin-
ciples in the middle distance," themselves sub-
ject to continual evolution.
Since the basic premise of American govern-
ment is majoritarian, the power of the federal
judiciary, and particularly of the Supreme Court,
to thwart the expressed will of the peoples' rep-
resentatives requires justification. Bickel lo-
cated that justification in the Court's capacity
to perform a function that the political branches
of government could be expected to perform only
inadequately: the explication of principle, as
distinguished from expediency. "Judges have, or
should have, the leisure, the training, and the
insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in
pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial
in sorting out the enduring values of a so-
ciety . . ." (1962, p. 25). Yet the Court was not
to impose principle everywhere:
No society, certainly not a large and heterogeneous
one, can fail in time to explode if it is deprived of
the arts of compromise, if it knows no ways of
muddling through. No good society can be unprin-
cipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden.
. . . The role of principle, when it cannot be the
immutable governing rule, is to affect the tendency
of the politics of expediency. And it is a potent role.
(1962, p. 64)
It was in that continual tension between prin-
ciple and expediency that he thought the Court
and the function of judicial review must live,
and the key to its ability to maintain itself was
the Court's capacity, through a variety of tech-
nical legal doctrines, usually thought of as tech-
nicalities, to avoid decisions when the evolving
principle had not yet matured sufficiently to be
politically acceptable. The Court could, in a
variety of ways, avoid legitimating what it thought
would one day be unconstitutional, while at the
same time avoid stating its immanent principle
in such a way as to produce a head-on collision
with the body politic. In this process the Court
would certainly attempt to lead society and would
create constitutional law that could not be dis-
covered by traditional modes of interpretation.
Judges were to extract "fundamental presupposi-
tions" not from the document, and not from their
own political sympathies, but "from the evolving
morality of our tradition" (1962, p. 236). They
could anticipate the evolution, and exert their
moral support in one possible direction rather
than another; but the Court could not go too far
ahead of present law. According to Bickel, it
"should declare as law only such principles as
will—in time, but in the rather immediate fore-
seeable future—gain general assent" (1962,
p. 239).
This role of anticipating future law can be
reconciled to the theory of political democracy
because the Court is not, in fact, final. As the
subtitle to The Least Dangerous Branch puts it,
The Supreme Court [must stand] at the Bar of
Politics. Bickel wrote:
The Supreme Court's law could not in our system
prevail—not merely in the very long run, but with-
in the decade—if it ran counter to deeply felt
popular needs or convictions, or even if it was
opposed by a determined and substantial minority
and received with indifference by the rest of the
country. This, in the end, is how and why judicial
review is consistent with the theory and practice
of political democracy. This is why the Supreme
Court is a court of last resort presumptively only.
(1962, p. 258)
Bickel's justification for a Court that departs
from the historic meaning of the Constitution

set the terms of a debate that has increased,
rather than diminished, between those who de-
fend an "activist" Court and those who would
confine the Court to traditional modes of inter-
preting the document. That debate is still unre-
solved. Post-Bickelians have not yet established
the legitimacy of the introduction of judicial
"principle" as opposed to legislative "expediency"
into our political processes; nor is it clear that
the Court is not, in fact, final in more instances
than Bickel thought it is or ought to be. Finally,
there remains the problem whether the Court is
or can be the philosophical and self-conscious
institution that Bickel's theory requires.
Bickel himself was one of the activist Warren
Court's severest critics. He found its opinions
often intellectually incoherent, a failing that he
thought inexcusable even on that Court's own
premise that it sought to do social good, largely
as perceived from an egalitarian viewpoint. In
The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, he
argued that the Court understood the public
good very inadequately. Some of its most assured
pronouncements seemed irrelevant to the ways in
which the society seemed likely to develop, More-
over, though he thought a Court might, perhaps
must, free itself to a large degree from the
written and historical Constitution, it was prop-
erly limited to a slow, evolutionary pace in the
modification of doctrine. Moreover, its choice of
new values had to be explained and justified.
This task the Court had shirked, perhaps be-
cause it had reached results that defied reasoned
justification. Arguing that the Warren Court
was one of the major examples of an attitude
toward law and procedures that too closely re-
sembled those that produced Watergate, Bickel
wrote:
The assault upon the legal order by moral impera-
tives wasn't only or perhaps even the most effec-
tive assault from the outside. It came as well
from within, in the Supreme Court headed for fif-
teen years by Earl Warren. . . . More than once,
and in some of its most important actions, the
Warren Court got over doctrinal difficulties or issues
of the allocation of competences among various in-
stitutions by asking what it viewed as a decisive
practical question: If the Court did not take a cer-
tain action which was right and good, would other
institutions do so, given political realities? (1975,
p. 120)
That, for Bickel, was deeply, profoundly wrong.
"It is," he said, "the premise of our legal order
that its own complicated arrangements, although
subject to evolutionary change, are more im-
BOGARDUS, EMORY S. 65
portant than any momentary objective" (ibid.~).
Perhaps in the long run Bickel's insistence upon
the centrality of process, close reasoning, and
intellectual coherence will come to seem more
important than his justification of a Court that
evolves new constitutional principles. Perhaps,
indeed, those two major strands of his thought
may come to seem in opposition to one another.
Outside of his central work on the theory and
practice of judicial review, Alexander Bickel's
interests and work ranged widely. He was given
a joint appointment in Yale's history department.
At the time of his death he had nearly completed
a volume of the Holmes Devise History of the
Supreme Court of the United States. For 18
years before his death he wrote continually for
the New Republic, contributing articles, reviews,
and unsigned notes. He wrote also for other
magazines, some of his best work appearing in
Commentary, and for scholarly journals. He
testified frequently before congressional com-
mittees, drafted legislation, and advised poli-
ticians of both parties. He was lead counsel for
the New York Times in the Pentagon papers
case, a landmark first amendment controversy.
At the time of his death, shortly before his fifti-
eth birthday, he had turned from concern with
the Court and the Constitution to plan more
wide-ranging work in political philosophy.
ROBERT BORK
WORKS BY BICKEL
1957 The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Bran-
deis: The Supreme Court at Work. Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished by the University of Chicago Press in 1967.
1962 The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics. Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill.
1965 Politics and the Warren Court. New York: Harper.
(1968) 1971 Reform and Continuity: The Electoral
College, the Convention, and the Party System. New
York: Harper. —» First published as The New Age
of Political Reform.
1970 The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress.
New York: Harper. —» A paperback edition was
published by Yale University Press in 1978.
1973 The Caseload of the Supreme Court, and What,
If Anything, to Do About It. Washington: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
1975 The Morality of Consent. New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press.
1979 The Judiciary and Responsible Government,
1910-1921. Part 1. New York: Macmillan. -» Vol-
ume 9 of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
BOGARDUS, EMORY S.
Emory Stephen Bogardus (1882-1973) could
have served as the prototype of the American
66 BOGARDUS, EMORY S.
sociologist for his era. He was a scientist, a
teacher, a philosopher, and an activist. He was
committed to his profession, to his students, to
his family, and to his university and world com-
munities. Born in Belvedere, Illinois, descended
from the earliest Dutch and English settlers in
the New World, he completed his M.A. in phi-
losophy and psychology at Northwestern Uni-
versity in 1909.
Borgardus received a Northwestern Univer-
sity Settlement fellowship in 1908, and during
his year as director of Boys' Clubs at the settle-
ment, he met Edward A. Ross of the University
of Wisconsin, who, through his informal re-
marks at a dinner, introduced Bogardus to the
science of sociology.
Ross had both direct and '"sleeper" effects on
Bogardus' career in sociology. Bagardus had, and
continued to have, a person-centered theory of
the causation of human social conditions. Dur-
ing his work at the settlement, he asked: "Can
these tireless, restless denizens of the street be-
come interested in practical and useful activi-
ties . . . ?" (quoted in 1962, p. 42).
When Ross came to visit the settlement, he
explained to Bogardus "that sociology was en-
gaged in studying the underlying causes of
social problems, social inequalities, social con-
flicts, and how these situations were the result
of social processes" (1970k, p. 120). Bogardus
had found the bridge between his humanitarian
philosophy and his intellectual quest for valid
and reliable information about human behavior.
Inspired by his meeting with Ross and en-
couraged by him, Bogardus called on Albion W.
Small, head of the department of sociology at
the University of Chicago. He was offered and
accepted a scholarship which, when renewed,
provided funds for him to complete his doc-
torate at the University of Chicago in 1911.
Whether Bogardus foresaw the impact that
the University of Chicago would have on him
is perhaps irrelevant. The fact is that Small,
James Rowland Angell, Robert E. Park, George
Herbert Mead, Charles R. Henderson, and W. I.
Thomas produced such ferment through their
interactions as well as their individual achieve-
ments that he could hardly have avoided being
tremendously influenced. From Small, he learned
sociological theory; from Thomas, the technique
and application of the method of gathering life
histories by personal interview in order to learn
more about the development of attitudes; and
from Mead, the sociological aspects of role play-
ing (1962). Park, although never one of
Bogardus' teachers, urged him to develop an
objective instrument for measuring human re-
actions in the field of race relations, and this
proved to be one of Bogardus' most important
contributions to social science (1967, p. 1).
Along with Bogardus, this powerful core of
scholars at Chicago attracted such students and
faculty as Ellsworth Faris, L. L. Bernard, Wil-
liam Fielding Ogburn, Harold D. Lasswell,
Charles E. Merriam, Louis Wirth, Herbert
Blumer, Samuel A. Stouffer, and Robert Red-
field.
Bogardus continued his interest in psychology
at Chicago, and his work under the direction of
Harvey Carr resulted in the publication of "Ex-
periments on Tactual Sensations of the White
Rat" (Henke & Bogardus 1911). Angell and
Henderson were members of his dissertation
committee and his thesis, The Relation of
Fatigue to Industrial Accidents (1912), could
have been in psychology quite as logically as in
sociology. Theory and method were as important
in his studies as findings had been to most of
his predecessors, and the label of the discipline
in which he worked did not seem to present any
kind of barrier to him, although after his Chi-
cago days he consistently identified himself as
a sociologist. Upon completing his dissertation,
Bogardus accepted a position as assistant pro-
fessor at the University of Southern California,
where he remained until his death in 1973.
As a social scientist, Bogardus influenced
both the discipline and the profession of sociol-
ogy. His philosophy that all information is use-
ful if it is placed in a meaningful context
paralleled his philosophy that all persons can
contribute to the common good in some way if
leaders know how to elicit appropriate contribu-
tions from them.
In 1923, Bogardus began working on The
New Social Research (1926Z?), in which he care-
fully organized a sociological methodology that
would procure and process large quantities of
personal data. This approach reflected a com-
bination of the methods of Thomas and Carr,
the motivations of Ross and Park, and the em-
phasis on meaning of Mead. In 1924, he began
work on the operational definition of social and
sociological concepts through the use of uni-
dimensional scales.
In 1926 Bogardus administered a social dis-
tance scale to a nationwide sample of respon-
dents. The original purpose of the scale was to

assign a value to the degree of sympathetic
understanding between members of different
races, but Bogardus and many other behavioral
scientists quickly found it to be useful for
measuring the social distance between persons
and any stereotyped category of human beings-
ethnic, religious, occupational, to name a few.
The Social Distance Scale became so widely
used and attracted so much interest that
Bogardus repeated his surveys in 1946, 1956,
and 1966. It then constituted one of the largest
series of sociological studies ever made using
the same operational definition of the phenom-
enon being observed. The same instrument has
been used in virtually all quarters of the globe,
so that comparisons can be made through both
time and space.
Bogardus observed that the mean measured
reaction to racial categories by United States
respondents had changed slowly over the forty
years of his study, and that the range of mean
distance scores had decreased more remarkably.
From these findings, he concluded that Ameri-
cans in general had become measurably more
accepting of persons of different races. He re-
marked, however, that his findings did not indi-
cate that racial distances would disappear in the
foreseeable future.
Bogardus was the first president of the Amer-
ican Sociological Society to be chosen from a
school west of the Rocky Mountains. He founded
one of the largest departments of sociology in
the world at the time (it became the fifth most
productive of doctorates under his leadership);
he founded the sociological honor society, Alpha
Kappa Delta, and the sociological journal, Soci-
ology and Social Research; he was the first
president of the Pacific Sociological Society; and
he wrote more than three hundred books and
articles during his career.
As president of the American Sociological
Society, Bogardus actively encouraged liaisons
with sociologists throughout the world, greatly
increasing the amount of interchange with non-
European sociologists in particular. Although he
had visited personally many European scholars
and was a close friend to several of them, in-
cluding Leopold von Wiese, Henri Bergson, and
Florian Znaniecki, he also visited sociologists in
the rest of the world, and his students have
taught in many countries in Asia, Africa,
Oceania, and South America as well as in
Europe and North America. He regularly pub-
lished "Foreign Sociological Notes" in Sociology
BOGARDUS, EMORY S. 67
and Social Research, which he had subtitled An
International Journal, with the hope that it
would encourage a world-wide exchange of so-
ciological information.
Among Bogardus' students, who were greatly
influenced by him, were G. Bromley Oxnam,
Meyer F. Nimkoff, Pauline V. Young, J. Max
Bond, and Edward C. McDonagh.
THOMAS E. LASSWELL
WORKS BY BOGARDUS
1911 HENKE, FREDERICK W.; and BOGARDUS, EMORY
S. Experiments on Tactual Sensations of the White
Rat. Journal of Animal Behavior 1:125-137.
1912 The Relation of Fatigue to Industrial Accidents,
Univ. of Chicago Press.
(1913a) 1922 Introduction to the Social Sciences.
2d ed. Los Angeles: Univ. of Southern California
Press.
(1913k) 1931 Introduction to Sociology. 5th ed. Los
Angeles: Miller.
(1918) 1923 Essentials of Social Psychology. 4th ed.
Los Angeles: Miller.
(1919) 1923 Essentials of Americanization. 3d ed.,
rev. Los Angeles: Miller.
(1922) 1928 A History of Social Thought. 2d ed. Los
Angeles: Miller.
(1924) 1950 Fundamentals of Social Psychology. 4th
ed. New York: Appleton. —•» Reprinted in 1976 by
Arno.
1926a The City Boy and His Problems: A Survey of
Boy Life in Los Angeles. Los Angeles: Ralston.
1926i> The New Social Research. Los Angeles: Miller.
—> An account of the methods of social research
used in the Pacific coast race relations survey be-
ginning in 1923 and culminating in a tentative
findings conference in 1925.
(1928) 1971 Immigration and Race Attitudes. New
York: Ozer.
(1931) 1932 Contemporary Sociology. Los Angeles:
Univ. of Southern California Press. —> A com-
panion volume to History of Social Thought (1922).
(1933) 1967 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
Social Problems and Social Processes: Selected
Papers from the Proceedings of the American
Sociological Society, 1932. Edited by Emory S.
Bogardus. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press.
1934a Leaders and Leadership. New York: Appleton.
(1934b) 1970 The Mexican in the United States. The
American Immigration Collection, Ser. 11; Univer-
sity of Southern California, School of Research
Studies, No. 5. New York: Arno.
(1934c) 1964 Sociology. 4th ed. New York: Mac-
millan. —» "In preparing this book liberal use has
been made of material in the five editions appear-
ing under the title of Introduction to Sociology"
(preface, 1934 edition).
1936 Introduction to Social Research. University of
Southern California, School of Research Studies,
No. 14. Los Angeles and New York: Suttonhouse.
(1938) 1940 Southern California, A Center of Cul-
ture. 2d ed., rev. & enl. Los Angeles: Univ. of South-
ern California Press.
(1940) 1960 The Development of Social Thought.
4th ed. New York: Longmans.
(1941) 1952 BOGARDUS, EMORY S.; and BRETHORST,
68 BOSE, N. K.
ALICE B. Sociology Applied to Nursing. 3d ed. Phila-
delphia : S aunders.
1942 Democracy by Discussion. Washington: Ameri-
can Council on Public Affairs.
1942 BOGARDUS, EMORY S.; and LEWIS, R. H. Social
Life and Personality. Morristown, N.J.: Silver
Burdett.
(1943) 1948 Dictionary of Cooperation: (Including
Encyclopedic Materials). 3d ed. Chicago: Coopera-
tive League of the U.S.A.
(1946) 1955 History of Cooperation: For Discussion
Circles. 2d ed., rev. Chicago: Cooperative League
of the U.S.A.
1951 The Making of Public Opinion. New York: As-
sociation Press.
(1952) 1963 Principles of Cooperation. 3d ed. Chi-
cago: Cooperative League of the U.S.A.
1956 The Traveler. Los Angeles: Univ. of Southern
California Press.
1959 Social Distance. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch
Press.
1960 The Eocplorer. Los Angeles: Univ. of Southern
California Press.
1962 Much Have I Learned. Los Angeles: Univ. of
Southern California Press.
1964 Toward a World Community. Los Angeles: Univ.
of Southern California Press.
1967 A Forty Year Racial Distance Study. Los An-
geles: Univ. of Southern California Press.
1969 New Concepts for Sociology. Los Angeles: Univ.
of Southern California Press.
1970a A History of Alpha Kappa Delta, Sociology
Honor Society. Los Angeles: Univ. of Southern
California Press.
1970Z? Personal Tributes to Friends. Los Angeles: Univ.
of Southern California Press.
1972 A History of Sociology at the University of
Southern California. Los Angeles: Univ. of South-
em California Press.
BOSE, N. K.
Nirmal Kumar Bose (1901-1972) belonged
to a generation of Indian intellectuals who com-
bined the pursuit of ideas with active involve-
ment in the process of national transformation.
Despite his wide-ranging intellectual interests,
he was out of step with the professional social
sciences developing in the metropolitan centers
of Europe and America, and his published work
was not generally written in that Western idiom.
Bose saw himself as a cultural anthropologist
and presented his theoretical framework in his
Cultural Anthropology (1929). He excavated
paleolithic sites, studied the material culture of
India's large tribal population, and undertook a
survey of Calcutta, India's1 largest city. His writ-
ings covered other academic subjects, too, in-
cluding temple architecture on which he com-
pleted a definitive work in 1932. For many years
he edited almost singlehandedly India's oldest
anthropological journal, Man in India, contrib-
uted papers to it regularly, and sometimes wrote
half its book reviews.
Bose had a lifelong interest in the ideas of
Mohandas K. Gandhi. He had already started to
edit and interpret Gandhi's writings when he
met him in 1934. Later he became more inti-
mate with Gandhi and for a brief time (1946-
1947), at a crucial point in Gandhi's life and
the life of the nation, was his secretary. It is
impossible to understand Bose's views on society
and culture without a proper appreciation of
Gandhi's influence. Although not a religious
man, Bose admired Gandhi for his tolerance,
freedom from dogma, and radically experimen-
tal attitude toward life.
Bose had a varied career. He studied geology
(B.SC., 1921), then anthropology (M.sc.,
1925), at the University of Calcutta, taught for
some time in the department of anthropology,
and until 1959, was reader in anthropogeog-
raphy in the department of geography. He
served as director of the anthropological survey
of India from 1959 to 1964, and between 1967
and 1970, he held the office of Commissioner
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Concurrent with his academic and professional
career was his involvement in the nationalist
movement, which resulted in his imprisonment,
and his association with the Gandhian move-
ment before and after independence.
Bose saw anthropology as a field science and
was himself an indefatigable field worker,
partly because of his training, partly because of
his long association with a department of geog-
raphy, and partly because of the example of
Gandhi, to whom ideas meant nothing if they
were not tested through experience. However,
Bose's field work did not follow the tradition of
either Franz Boas or Bronislaw Malinowski.
Adapted to the requirements of a man con-
cerned with the study of his own society, it was
extensive rather than intensive. Bose traveled
widely and continually, visiting remote tribal
settlements, multicaste villages, pilgrim centers,
fairs, and India's many towns and cities. He had
something of the restless spirit of the medieval
wanderers whom he so greatly admired.
Bose wrote extensively in English and Ben-
gali. His English prose lacked the finish of the
professional social scientist, but his Bengali was
always clear, direct, and vigorous. Although he
recognized that the pursuit of science had its
own logic, he believed that the fruits of science
should be made widely available, not stored
within narrow professional confines. In his youth
it was a matter of honor to work to develop
indigenous institutions; thus he hardly published

abroad, and his work received little attention in
the international community of anthropologists.
Even in India, he contributed not only to such
professional journals as Man in India, Geograph-
ical Review of India, and Science and Culture,
but to many popular and semipopular periodi-
cals in English and Bengali.
Bose's views on Indian society and culture
are best expressed in his Bengali book The
Structure of Hindu Society (1949), first pub-
lished in serial form in the literary magazine
Desh. In it, he combined the perspectives and
methodologies of field ethnography, classical in-
dology, and social history. In the first part of
the book, he described the tribal communities
of India and their relationship to the wider
civilization on the basis of his own field work
and that of other ethnographers, notably S. C.
Roy. In the second part, he gave an account of
the theory and practice of Hindu social life as
they were set forth in several major classical
texts. The design of Indian civilization as re-
flected in the classical texts closely matched the
one discovered through systematic field work.
According to Bose, the two distinctive fea-
tures of Indian civilization were pluralism and
hierarchy—the equal tolerance of diverse modes
of life and their unequal ranking on a widely
accepted scale. Bose noted the tension between
hierarchy (as represented by the order of
varnas) and equality (as represented in the suc-
cession of bhakti movements) in Hindu civiliza-
tion, as well as the tension between the collec-
tivity (as represented by the sannyasi). The last
part of The Structure of Hindu Society, an exer-
cise in social history, analyzed the way in which
the structure of Hindu society, hardly altered
by several centuries of Moslem rule, was toppled
by the onslaught of British imperialism and
capitalism.
Bose had a special interest in India's forty
million tribal people, and he wrote extensively
on their material culture, religious practices,
and social organization. In a seminal paper
titled "Hindu Method of Tribal Absorption"
(1941), he argued that tribe and civilization
had coexisted in India for several millennia, and
he showed how tribal communities had trans-
formed themselves into castes by carving out
niches for themselves in the larger society.
Hindu civilization recognized both jati (caste)
and jana (tribe). The tribes lived in relatively
isolated areas; their technology was simple and
their division of labor rudimentary. Sometimes,
due to pressure of population, they might aban-
BRAUDEL, FERNAND 69
don their isolation and establish regular eco-
nomic relations, say as basketmakers, rope-
makers, or agricultural laborers, with Hindus
already organized on the basis of caste. They
might then abandon their tribal dialect, adopt
the language of the Hindus among whom they
lived, and in due course emerge as a caste or
subcaste of basketmakers, ropemakers, or agri-
cultural laborers. He also published an impor-
tant paper on Calcutta, showing it to be neither
an "industrial" nor a "preindustrial" city, but the
product of a unique historical process (1965).
Bose had planned an analytical study of the
Gandhian technique of satyagraha (which may
be very broadly described as "nonviolent per-
suasion through the force of truth") based on a
detailed and systematic examination of a series
of cases on which he had collected materials
over the years. He died of cancer on October 15,
1972, before he could put this ambitious project
into effect.
ANDR£ B£TEILLE
WORKS BY BOSE
1927 Spring Festival of India. Man in India 7, no.
2-3:112-185.
(1929) 1961 Cultural Anthropology, Rev. ed. Bombay
and New York: Asia Publishing House.
1932 Canons of Orissan Architecture. Calcutta: Chat-
terjee.
1941 Hindu Method of Tribal Absorption. Science and
Culture 7:188-194.
1948 BOSE, N. K.; and SEN, DHARANI Excavations at
Mayurbhanj. University of Calcutta, Anthropologi-
cal Papers, New Series, No. 10.
(1949) 1975 The Structure of Hindu Society. Delhi:
Orient Longman. —*• Translated from the Bengali by
Andre Beteille, who also prepared the introduction
and notes.
(1953) 1974 My Days with Ghandi. Bombay: Orient
Longman.
1958 Organization of Services in the Temple of
Lingaraj in Bhubaneswar. Asiatic Society, Journal
and Proceedings 24, no. 2:1-45.
1965 Calcutta: A Premature Metropolis. Scientific
American 213, no. 3:90-105.
1967 Culture and Society in India. Bombay and New
York: Asia Publishing House.
1969 Problems of Indian Nationalism. Bombay and
New York: Allied Publishers.
1971 Lectures on Ghandism. Ahmedabad (India):
Navajivan Publishing.
BRAUDEL, FERNAND
Fernand Braudel, born in 1902 in a small
village of eastern France, wrote of himself in
1972: "I was in the beginning and I remain
now a historian of peasant stock" (pp. 448-
449). In the period following World War n he
 70 BRAUDEL, FERNAND
came to incarnate, and represented the culmi-
nation of, the so-called Annales tradition of his-
torical interpretation.
He did not found this tradition. The tradition
is conventionally traced to Henri Berr, who
launched the Revue de synthese historique in
1900. Berr argued that it was not fruitful for
history to be compartmentalized into a multi-
plicity of separate fields; rather, historical syn-
thesis was the essential task of historians. This
view of the unicity or totality of knowledge of
the social world was the first pillar of the An-
nales viewpoint.
In 1903 the economist Francois Simiand pub-
lished a celebrated article in Berr's journal in
which he attacked the then leading figures in
French historical writing for giving no place in
their work to repeatable, quantifiable phenom-
ena. He argued that history was about underly-
ing "structures" and not ephemeral, inevitably
unique, "events." This view was the second
pillar of the Annales viewpoint.
When in 1929 Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch,
young professors at the University of Stras-
bourg, founded the Annales d'histoire econo-
mique et social, they proclaimed by its very title
the third pillar of the Annales viewpoint, the
centrality of economic and social history to the
analysis of underlying structures. Politics was
virtually to be relegated to the sphere of the
event and hence to that which was "dust."
Braudel came to this viewpoint slowly in the
interwar years as a history teacher in a lycee in
Algiers. His decision to write on the Mediter-
ranean "ripened of its own accord" between
1927 and 1933, and even then he still thought
of his study primarily as a history of Philip n of
Spain (1972, p. 452). It was Lucien Febvre who
suggested to him that while Philip 11 and the
Mediterranean was a fine subject, the Mediter-
ranean and Philip n might be a greater one
(Febvre 1950, p. 217). Happily, Braudel took
what Febvre himself called this "imprudent ad-
vice."
After more than a decade in Algiers and sev-
eral years in Sao Paulo, Braudel returned to
Paris just before World War n. He spent most
of the war as a prisoner in the confines of Lii-
beck prison, where he wrote, more or less from
memory, his work on the Mediterranean, ferret-
ing out chapter after chapter to Febvre. The
locus of writing reinforced his attachment to
the Annales viewpoint, as he explained: "All
those occurrences which poured in upon us
from the radio and the newspapers of our ene-
mies, or even the news from London which our
clandestine receivers gave us—I had to outdis-
tance, reject, deny them. Down with occur-
rences, especially vexing ones! I had to believe
that history, destiny, was written at a much
more profound level" (1972, p. 454).
The period following World War n was the
moment of opportunity for the Annales view-
point, and Braudel, more than anyone, was
responsible for seizing fortuna. In 1945, as
in 1929, as in 1900, the Annales viewpoint
stood in opposition to, in "combat" with, "I'his-
toire historisante," "I'histoire evenementielle"-the
viewpoint of the French university as expressed
by the historians of the Sorbonne and their jour-
nal, the Revue historique. French Establishment
history had emerged out of the assimilation
after 1871 of the historical viewpoint of Leopold
von Ranke, of the belief in the existence, pri-
macy, and retrievability of the historical fact.
Febvre called it "history as written by those de-
feated in 1870 . . ." ([1953] 1965, p. vii).
Against the narrative, ideographic history
that was practiced by the vast majority of
French (indeed of world) historians, Annales
championed "structural" history, inspired by an-
other German tradition, that derived from Gus-
tav Schmoller and the Vierteljahrschrift fur
Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, a tradition
"much admired" by Febvre and Bloch, and one
that rejected the universalizing and segmental-
izing premises of British empiricism (Braudel
1972, p. 463). Braudel would himself point out:
"Is it by chance that Henri Berr, Lucien Febvre,
Marc Bloch, and myself all four came from east-
ern France? That the Annales began at Stras-
bourg, next door to Germany and to German
historical thought?" (ibid., p. 467).
If in 1945 Annales still found the university
"hostile" to it—Braudel like Febvre found the
doors of the Sorbonne closed to him—Annales
was suddenly taken up by the "youth of the uni-
versity" (1972, p. 462). All it needed was an
organizational channel. It found this channel in
the construction, beginning in 1948, of the
VIe Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes
Etudes, presided over by Febvre until his death
in 1956, but organized from the beginning by
Braudel. The field of inquiry of the VIe Section
was defined as "social and economic sciences,"
but its presidents have always been historians.
Though it was "outside" the university, it be-
came, nonetheless, in the following two dec-
ades, the center of most of what was creative
and innovative in French history and social sci-

ence. When Braudel disclaimed, overmodestly,
that he had contributed any new idea to those
of Febvre and Bloch, and said that what his
generation had accomplished between 1945 and
1968 was simply that "the program became
reality," it was to the VIe Section—its hundreds
of professors and visiting scholars, its multi-
plicity of published volumes, its international
role—that he was referring (1976, p. 14). Yet,
despite these achievements, "in those years, we
remained, in effect, marginal men and heretics,
still very far from the Establishment" (ibid.).
It is not true, however, that Braudel contrib-
uted no new ideas. In fact, he crystallized three
underlying themes latent in the Annales view-
point and hence introduced them as explicit
guiding concerns of research: the concept of
multiple temporalities, and most particularly
of the longue duree; the view that early modem
times (1450-1750) were intellectually a crucial
nexus of analysis because they were the crucible
of modern capitalism; the concern with the
world-economy as a locus of social action and
hence as a focus of research per se.
All three themes are exemplified in Braudel's
great book The Mediterranean and the Mediter-
ranean World in the Age of Philip II (1949).
Braudel organized The Mediterranean by treat-
ing the subject thrice, according to each of three
social times: structure (or longue duree), con-
joncture, and event. In his essay "History and
the Social Sciences" (1958)—the essential com-
plement of The Mediterranean—Braudel spelled
out the differences in these temporalities and
in the importance, for the analyst, of the con-
sciousness of multiple temporalities.
While defending the importance of the analy-
sis of long time against short time, he simul-
taneously defended long time against very long
(or universal) time. Braudel thus brought to the
fore what had been implicit in the Annales
viewpoint from the beginning. The Annales
viewpoint was conducting a war on two fronts:
against the "historicists," to be sure; but equally
against the transhistorical generalizers (Braudel
cited Claude Levi-Strauss as an example). If the
long organizational battle had meant that An-
nales supporters had emphasized the struggle
against the French historical Establishment,
and preached the necessity of history's learning
from the social sciences, the Annales discovered
in the years of its maturity under Braudel that,
on its other flank, France (and1 the world) was
witnessing a flourishing of an ahistorical variety
of "structuralism," which had nothing to do, in-
BRAUDEL, FERNAND 71
deed was radically different from, the "struc-
tural" history practiced by Braudel.
The combination of the founding of the VIe
Section in 1948 and the publication of The
Mediterranean in 1949 had a profound impact
on both French and world scholarship. Within
France, in the two decades thereafter, a large
number of "regional" monographs were pub-
lished, each emphasizing the total perspective,
the rural majority, and the collection of serial
data, over the longue duree of early modern
times. Similar monographs were written under
Annales influence about other countries, espe-
cially Spain and Italy. In addition, a second set
of monographs and opi magni were written
about trade, banking, and other manifestations
of the operations of the world-economy, whose
locus was sometimes the Mediterranean, some-
times the Atlantic, and even the Pacific. The
ripples outward of this scholarship transformed
in very basic ways the writing both on the Ot-
toman Empire and on Iberian America.
Annales had an international vocation from
the outset, both in terms of its mode of analysis
and of the two-way flow of influence. Braudel,
however, institutionalized this vocation through
the role of the VIe Section and the Maison des
Sciences de l'Homme, which he founded in
1963. The network of their impact spread along
traditional lines of French cultural influence: to
"Latin" Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal), Turkey
(because of The Mediterranean), eastern Europe
(particularly Poland and Hungary), Quebec,
and, with greater difficulty, Germany, England,
and the Low Countries.
The effect was cumulative. In 1969 the cre-
ation of the annual Settimana di Studi in Prato,
Italy, of whose scientific committee Braudel be-
came the president, served as a pan-European
intellectual event stamped by the Annales spirit.
In 1972 and 1973, The Mediterranean was
translated into English, and after years of ne-
glect in the United States, Braudel began to
have the same impact there on the "youth of the
university" that the Annales had achieved in
France in 1945.
Yet at the moment of its greatest success, the
Annales viewpoint entered an intellectual and
organizational crisis. The year 1968 was the
turning point. Braudel, in his eulogy of Febvre,
had written: "I do not believe in ivory towers,
nor in intelligence without passion. Quite the
contrary, I believe . . . in the intellectual value
of passions" (1953, p. 16). Thus for Braudel it
was, as he said, an "irony of fate" that in May
72 BRINTON, C. CRANE
1968 he, the heretic, became the Establishment
(1976, p. 16). Perhaps he had been that already,
but it had not been official.
Soon thereafter, Braudel renounced the ed-
itorship of Annales. Within a few years, he
stepped down as president of the VIe Section,
which would transform itself into a university,
the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.
New winds affected the "new" Annales, and
observers began to speak of emiettement (splin-
tering), some as though it were a good thing,
others to deplore it. Perhaps the correct way to
appreciate it is to perceive that Annales had fi-
nally transcended its French national origins.
It was no longer merely a French school with
an international vocation, but rather a "para-
digm" whose fate was being "played out not only
in France but on a worldwide scale" (1976, p.
17). If so, this may be counted as the most
significant accomplishment of the "historian of
peasant stock" of eastern France, who "loved
the Mediterranean with passion, no doubt be-
cause I am a northerner" (1949, p. 17).
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
WORKS BY BRAUDEL
(1944-1963) 1969 Merits sur I'histoire. Paris: Flam-
Mi arion.
(1949) 1972-1973 The Mediterranean and the Medi-
terranean World in the Age of Philip II. 2 vols. New
York: Harper. —» Translated from the second
French edition, published in 1966. First published
as La Mediterranee et le monde mediterraneen a
I'epoque de Philippe II.
1953 Presence de Lucien Febvre. Volume 1, pages
1-16 in Hommage a, Lucien Febvre. Paris: Colin.
(1958) 1972 History and the Social Sciences. Pages
11-42 in Peter Burke (editor), Economy and So-
ciety in Early Modern Europe: Essays from Annales.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. —» First pub-
lished in French. The French text is reprinted in
£crits sur I'histoire, 1944-1963, pages 41-83.
1961 European Expansion and Capitalism: 1450—
1650. Volume 1, pages 245-288 in Chapters in
Western Civilization. 3d ed. New York: Columbia
Univ. Press.
(1967) 1973 Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-
1800. New York: Harper. —> First published as
Civilisation materielle et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIc
siecle.
1967 BRAUDEL, FERNAND; and SPOONER, FRANK
Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750. Volume 4,
pages 374-486 in The Cambridge Economic History
of Europe. Volume 4: The Economy of Expanding
Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.
Edited by E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson. Cambridge
Univ. Press.
1968a Bloch, Marc. Volume 2, pages 92-95 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968b Febvre, Lucien. Volume 5, pages 348-350 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1972 Personal Testimony. Journal of Modern History
44:448-467.
1976 Foreword. Pages 9-17 in Traian Stoianovich,
French Historical Methods: The Annales Paradigm.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press.
1977 Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capi-
talism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALLEGRA, LUCIANO; and TORRE, ANGELO 1977 La
nascitd della storia sociale in Francia: Dalla
Comune alle "Annales." Torino (Italy): Fondazione
Luigi Einaudi.
FEBVRE, LUCIEN 1950 Un livre qui grandit: La
Mediterranee et le monde mediterraneen a I'epoque
de Philippe II. Revue historique 201:216-224.
FEBVRE, LUCIEN (1953) 1965 Combats pour I'his-
toire. 2d ed. Paris: Colin.
HEXTER, J. H. 1972 Fernand Braudel and the Monde
Braudellien . . . Journal of Modern History 44:480—
539.
The Impact of the Annales School on the Social Sci-
ences. Review 1, no. 3-4, 1978.
Melanges en I'honneur de Fernand Braudel. 2 vols.
Toulouse (France): Privat, Ed, 1973. ->Volume 1:
Histoire economique du monde mediterraneen,
1450-1650. Volume 2: Methodologie de I'histoire et
des sciences humaines. A bibliography of Braudel's
writings from 1927 to 1971, compiled by Bratislava
Tenenti, is on pages 483-509 of volume 2.
TREVOR-ROPER, H. R. 1972 Fernand Braudel, the
Annales, and the Mediterranean. Journal of Modern
History 44:468-479.
BRINTON, C. CRANE
In a rare moment of self-revelation, Clarence
Crane Brinton submitted a short sketch of him-
self for inclusion in the Twenty-fifth Class Re-
port of his Harvard College class of 1919.
Written in the slightly ironic style Brinton often
found congenial to his temperament, he said:
. . . at present there are still a few ragged edges
on my Weltanschauung. The more malicious among
you will no doubt understand if I say that, whereas
in 1919 I thought of myself as a liberal with at
least an initial capital, I now think of myself as a
liberal in inverted commas. As a Harvard freshman
I was an innocent rationalist and Wilsonian demo-
crat. Even while I was an undergraduate, and with
the generous enthusiasm of my tutor, Harold Laski,
to fortify me, the influence of the late Irving
Babbitt began to undermine the foundations of that
belief. In a sense, I have been ever since trying to
reconcile the contrary influences of Laski and
Babbitt. Towards that reconciliation—which would
no doubt be unsatisfactory to both men—I have
been greatly helped by my friendship with the late
Lawrence Henderson. Briefly, my earlier ration-
alism has been tempered by an awareness of the

place of prejudices, sentiments, the unconscious
and the subconscious, in human life. . . . You may
write me down as born in the eighteenth century
and yet not too uncomfortable—not at any rate
schizophrenic—in the mid-twentieth.
Although this is a remarkably candid state-
ment for Brinton to make, it raises as many
questions as it answers. What was the young
student and the lifelong teacher of history at
Harvard like and what were his own special
interests? What kind of influence did Laski, so
different in his passionate concern with politics,
have on the young Brinton who was only five
years his junior? What was the fascination that
Irving Babbitt, Harvard's maverick professor
of French literature who was an intransigent
conservative and rationalist and violently anti-
Rousseauist, held for Brinton? What unlikely
bridge did Lawrence J. Henderson, the biologi-
cal chemist who studied industrial fatigue at
the Harvard Business School, provide between
two such disparate influences?
Clarence Crane Brinton was born in Winsted,
Connecticut, on February 2, 1898, to Clarence
H. and Eva Josephine Crane. He was soon
called by his mother's maiden name, a choice
that was not without significance, for she was a
strong-willed woman who, after divorcing two
husbands, concentrated her emotional attention
on her only surviving son. His father was a
department store manager. His ancestors on
both sides were, however, New England
farmers, and Brinton retained an attachment to
the land and the temperament of an earthy,
skeptical Yankee in spite of his urbane and
scholarly life.
After receiving a classical high school edu-
cation, Brinton entered Harvard. He received a
scholarship each year, won the Bowdoin prize
in his junior year for an essay on "Lord Acton's
Philosophy of history" which he wrote for Irving
Babbitt, and graduated magna cum laude in
1919. Fortified with a Shaw traveling fellow-
ship, he then sailed for France to study art for
a year before going to Oxford University to take
up his Rhodes scholarship. At Oxford he wrote
a dissertation on the "Political Ideas of the En-
glish Romanticists" and (as one of his students
suggests) acquired the Oxonian style of nimbly
and wittily avoiding serious subjects. It was a
style which fitted Brinton, who has been de-
scribed by colleagues, students, and friends as
shy and exceptionally reticent, often appearing
to be "detached, casual, even flippant, some-
BRINTON, C. CRANE 73
times cryptic and baffling" (Ford et al. 1970).
At Oxford, Brinton also acquired his interest in
intellectual history, a new type of history that
he interpreted as the study of the "relations be-
tween the ideas of the philosophers, the intellec-
tuals, the thinkers, and the actual way of living
of the millions who carry the tasks of civiliza-
tion" (1950, p. 7).
Of the nature of the influence of Laski and
Babbitt, Brinton has left tantalizingly little evi-
dence. That he preferred the younger Laski, who
was "rather under the influence of Maitland and
Acton than Marx and Lenin," is suggested by
Brinton's distrust of "unprincipled idealists" (a
phrase he borrowed from A. Lawrence Lowell)
and their abstractionist schemes and his refer-
ring to Laski as "a very bold spirit at least in his
younger days" (Brinton to Carlton J. H. Hayes,
March 13, 1936, Harvard University Archives).
Brinton dedicated what he called his "brick to
the temple of scholarship," The Jacobins: An
Essay in the New History (1930) to Laski. Of-
ten considered his best scholarly writing, the
book is a study of the membership records of
the Jacobin clubs that uses statistical methods
to achieve a dispassionate analysis of the moti-
vations and actions of the Jacobins. The degree
of Laski's influence on the book is not discerni-
ble, but it shows clear evidence of the impact of
his exchanges with Henderson. In his intro-
duction he compared the historian's aspiration
to discover uniformities, or laws, of society to
that of the biologist; in his conclusion he drew
on Vilfredo Pareto (a favorite of Henderson)
and his understanding of the influence of men's
desires and passions on their ideas and actions.
Although Brinton did not often mention Bab-
bitt in his writings, he shared Babbitt's belief in
"New Humanism," an impassioned plea for
moderation, balance, and rationalism and an
attack on sentimentalism. This is most evident
in Brinton's book Nietzsche (1941), which Wil-
liam Langer described as a book about Brinton
rather than Nietzsche. Brinton himself later
recognized its lack of objectivity and came to
dislike it as much as he disliked the man. It was
Nietzsche's contribution to the cult of irration-
ality (or "romanticism" as Brinton called it)
that aroused his ire. In much the same way he
must have disliked Babbitt's cult of rationality
that attracted so many followers. Brinton was
too much of a social scientist and historian
simply to excoriate the passions. He wanted to
study, as objectively as possible and without
74 BRINTON, C. CRANE
doctrinal prejudice, the role they played in the
lives of men and he wanted no blinders to ob-
scure the rich ''diversity of life, the nature of
purposes and cross purposes," as he said in his
Bowdoin prize essay.
Such were the interests he shared with Hen-
derson, who was impressed by Brinton's Bowdoin
prize essay. The older man first discovered Pareto
in 1926 and then shared his enthusiasm with
Brinton. Henderson also aroused Brinton's in-
terest in Talleyrand and advised him on the de-
tails and the conclusion of his book, The Lives
of Talleyrand (1936Z?). Brinton, with great wit
and irony, portrayed this seemingly wily and
opportunistic man as a diplomat who, like
Machiavelli, saw the world as it really was and
was thus able to achieve remarkable diplomatic
successes. He contrasted Talleyrand's realism
with Woodrow Wilson's idealistic and bungling
diplomacy. Brinton wanted to deliver the much
maligned Talleyrand from the distorting pens of
those historians who announce "rather loudly
that the historian is a scientist" while in fact
they are making moral judgments and writing
"violently partisan history" (1936£>, pp. 15, 18).
Brinton's pleasure in his subject and his zeal
for the mission led him, as he admitted later,
to overshoot his mark and be overly flippant.
Although The Lives of Talleyrand is Brinton's
most Hendersonian book, the shadow of Hen-
derson's influence is also evident in his two
books on revolution, A Decade of Revolution
(1934) and The Anatomy of Revolution (1938).
The first is a study of the French Revolution
which, lucidly and engagingly, attempts to por-
tray the forces of change that made the revolu-
tion and the effects of that event on the lives
of ordinary people. The second is an effort to
delineate the stages through which every major
revolution must move. It initiated a scholarly
debate on theories of revolution. In both books
he used an analogy drawn from pathology. He
compares revolution to a fever. First, symptoms
of the coming disturbance appear. Then the
disease fully discloses itself, "and we can say
the fever of revolution has begun." A crisis
follows, often accompanied by delirium (the
Reign of Terror), then convalescence and a
return to equilibrium ([1934] 1963, p. 1;
[1938] 1952, pp. 16-18). It is the kind of physi-
ological metaphor that appealed to Henderson.
Although the books use a conceptual framework
drawn from the natural sciences, they are pri-
marily historical and are an interchange with
such men as R. M. Johnston, with whom Brin-
ton began his study of the French Revolution,
Albert Mathiez, Georges Lefebvre, Brinton's life-
long friend Leo Gershoy, and other historians.
Having seen in the depression, the rise of
fascism, World War n, and the postwar world a
threat to the "good democratic" life that he held
so dear, Brinton's postwar books carry a height-
ened sense of the need for understanding and
knowledge. Many of them are surveys which
draw on Brinton's great wealth of knowledge;
others are addressed to specific political and cul-
tural problems in the postwar world. Aimed at a
larger public than his scholarly studies were,
Brinton called them an attempt at "haute vul-
garization." They indicate that Brinton always
remained a "child of the Enlightenment," as he
frequently called himself, in spite of his skep-
ticism. The books were widely read in the
United States and Europe.
Brinton shared his interests with a wide vari-
ety of scholars and students through his teach-
ing, books, articles, reviews, his voluminous cor-
respondence, speeches, and his membership in
many clubs and societies with such engaging
names as the Chance, Love, and Logic Society,
the Star Chamber, and the venerable Saturday
Club. The most important society for scholarly
exchange of which he was a member was un-
questionably the Society of Fellows at Harvard.
Founded largely through the efforts of President
A. Lawrence Lowell (who anonymously gave the
necessary capital when the Harvard Corporation
turned down his request for funds), Alfred North
Whitehead, and Henderson, the society was de-
signed to avoid what Lowell called the "mass
production of mediocrity," that he felt was char-
acteristic of existing PH.D. programs, by provid-
ing support and encouragement for the "rare
and independent genius." Brinton, a senior fel-
low, was the society's chairman from 1942 to
1964. Its members often discussed problems of
the methodology of the social sciences and revo-
lutionary theory, and there was a remarkable
interplay of ideas among men of very different
backgrounds and disciplines (Brinton, disliking
controversy, refused to raise the question of
admitting women while he was chairman).
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Rev-
olutions (1962) was one of the many fruits of
this intellectual exchange.
Brinton died in 1968 a few months after he
retired as professor emeritus at Harvard. He
was still planning to write the one book he had

never found time to write—a description of the
little known roads and rambles of New England.
ELIZABETH C. ALTMAN
WORKS BY BRINTON
(1926) 1962 Political Ideas of the English Romanti-
cists. New York: Russell.
(1930) 1961 The Jacobins: An Essay in the New His-
tory. New York: Russell.
(1933) 1949 English Political Thought in the Nine-
teenth Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press.
(1934) 1963 A Decade of Revolution: 1789-1799. New
York: Harper. —» Volume 11 of The Rise of Modern
Europe series, edited by William L. Langer.
1936a French Revolutionary Legislation on Illegiti-
macy: 1789-1804. Harvard Historical Monographs,
No. 9. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1936b The Lives of Talleyrand. New York: Norton. ->
A paperback edition was published in 1963.
(1938) 1952 The Anatomy of Revolution. Rev. ed.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. —» A paper-
back edition was published by Random House in
1965.
(1941) 1965 Nietzsche. New York: Harper.
(1945) 1948 The United States and Britain. Rev. ed.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uriiv. Press.
(1948a) 1971 From Many One: The Process of Political
Integration, the Problem of World Government.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
1948b BRINTON, C. CRANE (editor) The Society of
Fellows. Cambridge, Mass.: The Society.
(1950) 1963 Ideas and Men: The Story of Western
Thought. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall. —» The introduction and chapters 7 to 14 were
published in 1950 as The Shaping of the Modern
Mind.
(1953) 1970 The Temper of Western Europe. West-
port, Conn.: Greenwood.
(1955) 1976 BRINTON, C. CRANE et al. A History of
Civilization. 5th ed. 2 vols. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
1956 BRINTON, C. CRANE (editor) The Portable Age of
Reason Reader. New York: Viking. —» A paperback
edition was published by Penguin in 1977.
(1957) 1967 BRINTON, C. CRANE et al. Modern Civil-
ization: A History of the Last Five Centuries. 2d ed.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. —» A new
edition of Brinton et al. 1957.
1959 A History of Western Morals. New York: Har-
court.
1961 BRINTON, C. CRANE (editor) The Fate of Man.
New York: Braziller.
(1964) 1973 BRINTON, C. CRANE et al. Civilization in
the West. 3d ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall.
1968a The Americans and the French. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1968b History: VI. Intellectual History. Volume 6,
pages 462-468 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
1968c Voltaire. Volume 16, pages 355-357 in Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by
David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
FORD, FRANKLIN et al. 1970 Memorial Minute. Har-
vard University Gazette, Jan. 5, 1970.
BROGAN, DENIS 75
HOWE, MARK DEWOLFE (editor) 1953 Holmes-Laski
Letters. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.—*
A paperback edition in two volumes was published
by Atheneum in 1963.
KUHN, THOMAS S. (1962) 1970 The Structure of Sci-
entific Revolutions. 2d ed. Univ. of Chicago Press.
BROGAN, DENIS
Denis William Brogan (1900-1971) was born
in Glasgow, Scotland. His father, who was born
in Ireland, had emigrated briefly to the United
States, but had returned to Britain to settle in
Glasgow as a merchant tailor, and Brogan grew
up in a home where interest in Ireland, Amer-
ica, and Liberal politics was strong.
After early education at a parochial Roman
Catholic primary school, Brogan proceeded, via
Rutherglen Academy, to Glasgow University, in-
tending to study medicine, but soon switching
to history when he found that he lacked the
practical skills necessary for clinical work. After
taking his M.A. in 1923 he proceeded for further
historical study to Balliol College, Oxford. His
principal tutor was Humphrey Sumner, the
Russian historian, subsequently warden of All
Souls College, but Brogan's American interests
were also powerfully stimulated by contact with
Samuel Eliot Morison, then in Oxford as the
first holder of the Harmsworth chair of Amer-
ican history. At Balliol Brogan formed two life-
long and influential friendships, with Darsie
Gillie, later the Manchester Guardian's Paris
correspondent, and Norman Robertson, later
Canadian high commissioner in London. In
1925 he went to Harvard University as a Laura
Spelman Rockefeller fellow for two years of
graduate study. But by now Brogan was es-
sentially an autodidact, and although Harvard
counted a good deal in his development, first-
hand experience of America counted for more.
For the rest of his life Brogan was a kind of in-
tellectual oceanographer, indefatigably record-
ing every shifting current of American life,
public and private.
Returning to Britain in 1922, Brogan worked
briefly on the Times (in him the gifts of the
journalist were as innate as those of the scholar),
before taking up successive appointments in
history and politics at University College Lon-
don, and at the London School of Economics. It
was at the L.S.E. that in 1933 he wrote his first
book, The American Political System. The book
represented a total breakaway from the pre-
76 BROGAN, DENIS
scriptive and theoretical approach to political
science then dominant in Britain, reverting to
the earlier tradition of firsthand observation and
historical elucidation of James Bryce (also a
Glasgow and Balliol man). Brogan's book, in its
vividness, objectivity, and relish for the diversity
of the American political experience, revealed a
new America to British readers, academic and
otherwise, who had been accustomed to view
the country, when they were conscious of it at
all, through the spectacles of the "hands across
the seas" tradition or through the lenses of the
sensational press. The book stressed the dis-
tinctiveness of American politics, its roots in the
American past, and the social and economic
environment that shaped it.
Hardly had The American Political System
appeared than the coming of the New Deal
transformed much of the political scene that it
had described, and in 1954 Brogan revised his
exposition in a work of comparable scale, An
Introduction to American Politics. In one sense
the Introduction was a reworking of the System;
it utilized essentially the same categories of
treatment, placed a comparable emphasis on
the political process, reflected an equivalent be-
lief in the dominance of historical forces and
the same lack of interest in the administrative
side of government. But in its range of material,
its fecundity of illustration, its responsiveness
to all the new factors shaping postwar America,
the Introduction is a new book.
Alongside these major interpretations of
American politics there flowed from Brogan's
pen, during these years and after, a stream of
occasional writing ranging from articles for the
learned journals to what were virtually news-
paper dispatches. To Brogan, the occasion, the
auspices, and the audience made relatively little
difference; neither by diminishing his notorious
allusiveness nor by ballasting his sprightly prose
with pompous periphrases did he seek to de-
marcate his scholarship from his journalism. It
was a rare piece d'occasion of his which did not
contain some arresting idea or novel detail, an
even rarer learned article which contained noth-
ing to entertain or amuse. A selection of these
appeared in American Themes (1947) and
American Aspects (1964); the latter contains
the justly celebrated essay, "The Illusion of
American Omnipotence."
Brogan's devotion to American history is re-
flected in no major work. The American Prob-
lem (1944b) is a wide-ranging series of essays
on the historical factors which have shaped
America's place and America's dilemmas in the
postwar world. The Era of Franklin D. Roose-
velt (1950) has the freshness that comes from
the author's intimate acquaintance with the
period and personalities described, but in scale
and treatment it is a minor work. The accidents
6f Brogan's professional career may provide in
part an explanation of this, in that he never
held an academic appointment specifically in
the American field (there were, in any case, very
few such in the Britain of these years). From
the L.S.E. he returned in 1934 to Oxford, as a
fellow and tutor at Corpus Christi College.
There the nature of his teaching duties invited
him to venture into another area where, in any
case, private circumstances, in the form of his
wife's archeological activities, provided a sup-
plementary stimulus. This was the history and
politics of France. In fact, The Development of
Modern France, 1870-1939 (1940) is easily
Brogan's longest work, more than twice the
length of The American Political System. As a
guide and stimulus to British understanding of
her nearest neighbor, the book merits compari-
son with its American forerunner. For the first
time the tangled and seemingly inconsequential
events of the Third Republic were reduced to a
narrative which, if sometimes too tightly packed,
made sense of the story in terms, once again, of
the legacy of the national past and the con-
straints, physical, social, and economic, of the
present. The same qualities, on a smaller can-
vas, mark The French Nation (1957) and a
volume of essays, French Personalities and
Problems (1946a), which largely deals with the
subsequent France of World War n.
In pre-World War n Britain there was a con-
spicuous lack of academic vacancies suitable
for a man of Brogan's protean capabilities. Con-
sequently, when the chair of political science at
Cambridge fell vacant in 1939 on the retire-
ment of Ernest Barker, Brogan accepted the
offer of the post even though its subject matter
lay at a tangent to his main interests. In fact,
owing to the outbreak of war, Brogan did not
move to Cambridge until he had completed a
characteristically intensive bout of war service
(he served in various capacities, but most nota-
bly as intelligence officer in the British Broad-
casting Corporation's European Service and as
adviser to its North American Service, providing
each with a sustained and apposite flow of
guidance and information derived from his en-
cyclopedic knowledge of France and the United
States).

Assuming his professorial duties at Cam-
bridge after the war, Brogan was, for so notori-
ously allusive an author, unusually explicit and
frank in his inaugural lecture: 'The study of
politics, as seen by me, is first of all and, per-
haps, last of all, the study of the means whereby
liberty and authority may be best combined"
(1946ft). He went on to express his skepticism
about the possibility of a science of politics and
to warn against imposing on the teaching of poli-
tics "a degree of abstractness or bogus neutral-
ity which it cannot stand." Instead, he avowed
his own conviction that the teacher could and
should relate politics to history—"present politics
is always at least half history"—and bring to
bear on contemporary problems "the great
minds of the past." He was frank about his own
approach: "I am by equipment, by temperament
and by limitations, a student of political institu-
tions. I am incapable of changing, of becoming
a political philosopher or a philosophical his-
torian."
Indeed, in the conventional sense, Brogan
was neither a system builder nor even pri-
marily a political theorist. Yet his disclaimer
went a little far. Not only were Brogan's lec-
tures (regrettably unpublished) cogent and of-
ten bravura expositions of the history of politi-
cal theory; he also had contributions to make of
his own at the point where theory and institu-
tions meet. The Price of Revolution (1951) is,
at the very least, a searching examination of the
applicability of political theory to political prac-
tice, an analysis of the effects on political and
social life of the ideas of violent and revolu-
tionary change. Moreover his The American
Problem (1944£>) is essentially a study of the
formative roles in American history of tena-
ciously held American ideas and ideals and their
implications for America's functioning in the
postwar world. Both books are informed by
Brogan's deep and intuitively liberal cast of
thought. Though no doctrinaire laissez-faire-ist,
he stood to one side of the fashionable socialism
of postwar Britain and, although without bigo-
try, was more readily aware of the menace of a
totalitarianism of the left than many of his
scholarly contemporaries on either side of the
Atlantic.
Despite the conscientious discharge of his
professorial duties, it was the United States that
continued to dominate Brogan's interests during
his Cambridge years (a fact by no means to the
university's disadvantage at a time when it
lacked any denominated posts in American his-
BROGAN, DENIS 77
tory or politics). The scholarly products of these
years, mostly listed above, are marked by cer-
tain common characteristics. Brogan's interest
in things American was rooted, in the first
place, in a deep affection and intense relish for
the variety and vitality of the United States. No
one has better captured the sparkle and color of
the American experience. Yet he never mistook
surface appearances for underlying reality. He
wrote as a pluralist and a pragmatist, devoted to
the liberal, suspicious of the conservative, val-
ues of American society, and swift to pounce on
the pompous, the pretentious, and the sham.
Similarly, beneath the gaiety and vivacity of Bro-
gan's almost uniquely wide-ranging depiction of
America's past and present, there always lurks
the stern moralist and the equally severe cul-
tural mentor. To Brogan the observer, nothing is
alien or insignificant; to Brogan the critic, values
do not change when they cross the Atlantic or
don modern dress. If his writings continue to
have significance for the student of American
history and politics, it lies in their distinctive
combination of avidity for all the details of the
American experience with an unsleeping aware-
ness of the relativity of that experience. Not for
nothing was Brogan a scholar of America and
France. Though the points of intersection of the
two cultures are limited and perhaps not cru-
cially significant in themselves, they provide
each other, perhaps for that very reason, with a
set of contrasts and comparisons. Brogan had a
remarkable gift for holding in his extraordi-
narily capacious memory something very like
the total experience of these two societies and
using their resemblances and differences to
sharpen awareness of the distinctive character
of each. As such, he is a constant prophylactic
against parochial historiography, against illu-
sions of American (or French) exceptionalism,
against the latent menace of "un-American" as a
value judgment. Other scholars may reasonably
be judged to be greater authorities on the experi-
ence of either society; none has so effectively
informed his understanding (and ours) of the
one by his engagement with the other.
Brogan retired from his chair in 1968 but
remained in Cambridge active as a writer and
lecturer until his death in 1974.
H. G. NICHOLAS
WORKS BY BROGAN
(1933) 1943 The American Political System. London:
Hamish Hamilton. —» Includes a new preface by
the author. Published in the United States by
78 BURKE, KENNETH
Harper with the title Government of the People:
A Study in the American Political System.
1934 Proudhon. London: Haniish Hamilton.
(1935) 1974 Abraham Lincoln. Rev. ed. London:
Duckworth. —» Part of the Great Lives Series.
(1940) 1967 The Development of Modern France,
1870-1939. Rev. ed. London: Hamish Hamilton.
—* In the United States this book was first published
by Harper with the title France Under the Republic:
The Development of Modern France (1870-1939).
1941 a Is Innocence Enough? Some Reflections on
Foreign Affairs. London: Hamish Hamilton.
lQ41b Politics and Law in the United States. Cam-
bridge Univ. Press. —> Part of the Current Problems
Series.
(1941c) 1947 U.S.A., an Outline. 2d ed. Oxford Univ.
Press. —» Part of the World To-day Series.
1943 The English People: Impressions and Observa-
tions. London: Hamish Hamilton; New York: Knopf.
1944a The American Character. New York: Knopf.
—» A paperback edition was published by Vintage
in 1956.
1944b The American Problem. London: Hamish Hamil-
ton.
1945 The Free State: Some Considerations on Its
Practical Value. London: Hamish Hamilton; New
York: Knopf.
1946a French Personalities and Problems. London:
Hamish Hamilton; New York: Knopf.
1946b The Study of Politics. Cambridge Univ. Press.
—> Inaugural lecture as professor at Cambridge.
(1947) 1969 American Themes. Port Washington,
N.Y.: Kennikat.
1950 The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Chronicle
of the New Deal and Global War. New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press. —» Part of the Chronicle of America
Series. Published in the United Kingdom by Ox-
ford University Press in 1952 with the title Roose-
velt and the New Deal.
(1951) 1952 The Price of Revolution. New York:
Harper.
1954 An Introduction to American Politics. London:
Hamish Hamilton. —> A revised paperback edition
with a new introduction by the author was pub-
lished by Harper in 1969 with the title Politics in
America.
1957 The French Nation: From Napoleon to Petain,
1814-1940. London: Hamish Hamilton; New York:
Harper. —» A paperback edition was published in
1963 by Harper.
1960a America in the Modern World. London: Hamish
Hamilton; New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ.
Press.
1960b Citizenship Today: England-France-the United
States. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press.
(1960) 1971 BROGAN, D. W. et al. France. New York:
Time.
(1963) 1968 BROGAN, D. W.; and VERNEY, DOUG-
LAS V. Political Patterns in Today's World. 2d ed.
New York: Harcourt.
1964 American Aspects. London: Hamish Hamilton;
New York: Harper.
1967 Worlds in Conflict. London: Hamish Hamilton;
New York: Harper.
BURKE, KENNETH
Kenneth Burke, born in 1897, has been influ-
ential in many fields: literary criticism, literary
theory, semiotics, and rhetoric, as well as ap-
plied psychology, sociology, anthropology, phi-
losophy, and religion. His wide influence has
always been somewhat informal and indirect.
Although he has taught and lectured in many
colleges and universities in the United States,
he has always remained somewhat on the mar-
gin of the academic world. He has not produced
a "school" of explicit followers in any of the
disciplines he has worked in, although he has
been a decisive influence on many important
writers and teachers. He has come to be recog-
nized as one of America's most innovative
twentieth-century literary and social theorists.
Although Burke's work may seem character-
istically "American" in being homespun, eclectic,
and miscellaneous, in the tradition of Emerson,
Charles S. Peirce, or William James, it has in
fact a constant focus, a consistent curve of de-
velopment from the beginning on, and a con-
stant set of decisive "sources." The sources in-
clude Aristotle, Coleridge, Bentham, Marx, and
Freud; equally important, however, are the na-
tive American traditions of pragmatism and be-
haviorism. All of Burke's writing is characterized
by a kind of pugnacious flexibility or playfulness,
a desire to see things differently and upset the
applecart of received opinion or institutionalized
assumptions. His focus has always been on
"man as the specifically symbol-using animal."
This focus has meant a primary interest in lan-
guage or signs generally, in relation to nonsym-
bolic bodily motion, in one direction, and to the
realm of manifold social motivations, in the
other. The center of Burke's investigations has
always been language as a form of "symbolic
action." Language for him is always designed to
do something or to work as "a strategy for en-
compassing a situation." A text, he would say,
whether it is a poem, a philosophical treatise, or
a corporation executive's letter to stockholders,
is the "dance of an attitude." The curve of
Burke's development has remained within this
single channel, moving back and forth between
the analysis of a great variety of philosophical,
social, and literary texts, on the one hand, and
wide-ranging theoretical formulations, on the
other.
Kenneth Burke was born in Pittsburgh. He
spent his first years in a lower-class suburb
there. The contrast in Pittsburgh between the
vast smoky concentration of industrial power
and the threatened remnants of an original na-
tural beauty gave him an abiding (and pro-
phetic) insight into the problems of "ecology."
His early life also gave him a permanent sus-

picion of technology. He attended Ohio State
University for a semester in 1916, then, after a
brief time at Columbia University, abandoned a
promising academic career to devote himself to
writing. In 1918 he moved to Greenwich Village
in New York, where he began a long-term asso-
ciation with such avant-garde writers as Mal-
colm Cowley, Matthew Josephson, Hart Crane,
and William Carlos Williams. In 1922 he bought
a farm near Andover, New Jersey, which he has
made his permanent home. He worked as editor
and writer for some of the important "little
magazines" of the time: The Dial, Secession,
and Broom. During this period he published
much short fiction and a novel, as well as his
earliest important criticism.
Burke's first collection of critical essays,
Counter-statement, was published in 1931. He
has worked out the implications of that first
book in the multitude of books and essays that
have followed. Service as a lecturer in criticism
at the New School for Social Research in 1937
was the beginning of a career as university lec-
turer. From 1943 to 1961, with intermissions,
he was professor of criticism at Bennington
College in Vermont. He has taught or been ap-
pointed a research fellow at many universities
and colleges, among them the universities of
Chicago, Harvard, Wesleyan, Princeton, Cali-
fornia (at Santa Barbara and at Irvine), and Pitts-
burgh, the Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavioral Sciences, and the Princeton Institute
for Advanced Study. He has received many
grants, honors, and awards for eminence in hu-
manistic and social studies.
A useful survey by Burke of his own develop-
ment is the "Curriculum Criticum" he prepared
for the 1953 reprinting of Counter-statement,
and then extended further in a 1968 paperback
edition.
Although Counter-statement may seem to
differ from Burke's later books in its "aestheti-
cism" and in its focus on such "art for art's sake"
writers as Flaubert, Pater, Gide, and Remy de
Gourmont, this first book is already character-
istically Burkean in springing, as he says, out
of the notion that dramatic or symbolic action
forms the basis of all literature; in its concern
with the revealing of motives that may be hid-
den under the aesthetic and representational
surface of a work; and in its movement from
the interpretation of particular works toward
formal, rhetorical, or methodological general-
izations. An example is the "Lexicon Rhetoricae"
near the end of Counter-statement.
BURKE, KENNETH 79
Burke's next book, Permanence and Change:
An Anatomy of Purpose (1935), shifts from
"the individualist emphasis of his earlier aes-
theticist period" to "interdependent, social, or
collective aspects of meaning": "communica-
tion, interpretation, orientation, integration, co-
operation, translation, simplification." Burke
introduces in this book one of his most produc-
tive strategies, what he calls "perspective by
incongruity." This is a Nietzschean technique of
viewing a process or relationship through the
lens of an unfamiliar terminology or metaphor.
"Perspective by incongruity" is a codification of
the linguistic nimbleness, the ability to shift
from one code to another, and to translate vo-
cabularies into one another, that has always
characterized Burke's way with words. The
emphasis in Permanence and Change is on the
universals of social organization and communi-
cation in man the symbol-using animal, whereas
the next book, Attitudes Toward History (1937),
tries to "characterize tactics and patterns of
conflict typical of actual human associations."
This book analyzes the way even the most ideal-
istic aims lead to less than ideal results when
they are embodied in institutions or practical
human activities. Burke calls this the "bureau-
cratization of the imaginative."
These two more or less sociological books
were followed by one of Burke's most useful
books for literary study: Philosophy of Literary
Form: Studies in Symbolic Action (1941). This
collection of essays and reviews exemplifies his
notion that the surface patterns of a text will
manifest, with proper translation of its terms, a
cryptic symbolic action taking place behind the
scenes. The theoretical groundwork behind such
practical essays in interpretation was developed
in the two books that followed: A Grammar of
Motives (1945) and A Rhetoric of Motives
(1950). They were to have been completed by
"A Symbolic of Motives," which has never been
published as such, though its outlines are clear
enough from Burke's later books and essays,
such as the large collection of periodical essays,
Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life,
Literature, and Method (1966). The Grammar
works out the five key "dramatist" terms: act,
scene, agent, agency, purpose. This pentad is
based on the assumption that "any complete
statement about motives will offer some kind of
answers to these five questions: what was done
(act), when or where was it done (scene), who
did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why
(purpose)." A Rhetoric of Motives moves, with
80 BURKE, KENNETH
many examples, back into the social realm of
persuasion, but now with a special concern for
pyramidal or hierarchical relations of higher
and lower, up and down, in any bureaucracy,
social order, or institution.
One of Burke's basic insights has always been
into the way any system of language or other
signs, even the most secular, takes on a struc-
ture like that of a metaphysical or religious sys-
tem of terms and has its own "god terms," its
own equivalents of heaven and hell, and the
like. The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logol-
ogy (1961) reverses this perspective. It at-
tempts to show, by way of interpretations of
"Verbal Action in St. Augustine's Confessions"
and of the first three chapters of Genesis, that
"'words about God' (theology) can be applied
to a wholly empirical end, for the light they
throw upon 'words about words' (logology)."
Burke's work will remain seminal for the wide
range of disciplines he has influenced. He is a
powerful model as much for the examples he
provides of how to do things with texts, for his
wonderfully exuberant, daring, and challenging
interpretations, as for the bold but always some-
what incomplete system-building. In this he is
true to his own principles, which are based on a
sense of the constant mobility in any symbol sys-
tem and on the notion that any piece of language
—for example an essay on a particular poem
or philosophical essay—must have a local pur-
pose. Burke's own work has always itself been
a strategy for encompassing a situation. His
work of the 1930s was surprisingly prophetic
of developments in the 1960s and 1970s in the
humanities and social sciences, Parisian "struc-
turalism," for example, or the "paradigm shift"
initiated by linguistics, psychology, and Wittgen-
steinian trends in philosophy. This shift is from
a constative or descriptive to a "performative"
view of language. Burke's view of language has
always been "performative." Nevertheless, he
remains true to his behavioristic bent, to his
sense that nonsymbolic bodily motion underlies
even the most elaborate symbolic system and
can never be happily coordinated with it. This
means the belief that there is always a trust-
worthy referential dimension to words, along
with their participation in elaborate processes
of symbolic action that transcend the body and
can never be reconciled with its sheer motion.
As Burke puts this in an essay exemplifying the
development of his thought in the 1970s: "In
every tribal idiom, however rudimentary, there
is a wholly reliable basic correspondence be-
tween a thing and its name; never the twain
shall meet" (1978). In that "never the twain shall
meet," in Burke's sense of "the unresolvable
polar relationship between symbolicity and the
nonsymbolic realm of motion" (ibid.}, Burke's
thought has remained from the beginning; but
the ever-dissatisfied movement from one pole
to the other has generated his remarkably fecund
series of books and essays. In spite of his exuber-
ance, Burke's sense of the incompatibility of
these two poles has made his work to some
degree somber, even "tragic," appropriately
enough for someone whose orientation has al-
ways been "dramatistic."
J. HILLIS MILLER
WORKS BY BURKE
(1924) 1968 The Complete White Oxen: Collected
Short Fiction. Augmented ed. Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press. —» First published as The White
Oxen and Other Stories.
(1931) 1953 Counter-statement. Los Altos, Calif.:
Hermes. —> A paperback edition was published by
the University of California Press in 1968.
(1932) 1966 Towards a Better Life, Being a Series of
Epistles, or Declamations. Berkeley: Univ. of Cali-
fornia Press.
(1935) 1954 Permanence and Change: An Anatomy
of Purpose. Los Altos, Calif.: Hermes. —> A paper-
back edition was published by Bobbs-Merrill in
1965.
(1937) 1959 Attitudes Toward History. Los Altos,
Calif.: Hermes. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished by Beacon Press in 1961.
1941 Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic
Action. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press.
—> A paperback edition was published by the Uni-
versity of California Press in 1974.
1945 A Grammar of Motives. New York: Prentice-Hall.
—> A paperback edition was published by the Uni-
versity of California Press in 1969.
1950 A Rhetoric of Motives. New York: Prentice-Hall.
—> A paperback edition was published by the Uni-
versity of California Press in 1970.
1955 Book of Moments: Poems, 1915-1954. Los Altos,
Calif.: Hermes.
1961 The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology.
Boston: Beacon. —» A paperback edition was pub-
lished by the University of California Press in 1970.
1966 Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life,
Literature, and Method. Berkeley: Univ. of Cali-
fornia Press. —» A paperback edition was published
in 1968.
1968a Collected Poems, 1915-1967. Berkeley: Univ.
of California Press.
1968& Interaction: III. Dramatism. Volume 7, pages
445—452 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1972 Dramatism and Development. Barre, Mass.:
Clark Univ. Press.
1978 (Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action. Criti-
cal Inquiry 4:809-838.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BROWN, MERLE ELLIOTT 1969 Kenneth Burke. Min-
neapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press.

FRANK, ARMIN PAUL 1969 Kenneth Burke. New
York: Twayne.
RUECKERT, WILLIAM H. 1963 Kenneth Burke and
the Drama of Human Relations. Minneapolis: Univ.
of Minnesota Press.
RUECKERT, WILLIAM H. (editor) 1969 Critical Re-
sponses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966. Minneapolis:
Univ. of Minnesota Press.
BURNS, ARTHUR F.
Many of America's great economists have
come to the United States from other lands.
Arthur F. Burns, born in Austria in 1904, em-
igrated to the United States with his parents in
1914, and became one of America's most prom-
inent economists. He found many opportu-
nities in his chosen profession: a university
professor for many years; an economic re-
searcher; director of research and later presi-
dent of a famous economic research institution;
president of the American Economic Associa-
tion; adviser to several presidents of the United
States; and chairman of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System. At the
same time, through his teaching, guidance
of the economic investigations of others,
thoughtful and expert advice on economic policy,
and role in managing a vital segment of that
policy, he has enhanced the capacity of others
to find their own opportunities.
Burns's professional career has been devoted
largely to the study, and in recent years to the
amelioration, of economic fluctuations. Secular
trends, seasonal variations, cyclical movements-
all have occupied his scholarly attention at one
time or another. During his eight years as chair-
man of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, he became best known as
America's inflation fighter. He was concerned
about this problem because of the hardship he
saw it create for so many people who were not
in a position to adjust to a general, rapid, and
sustained rise in prices. He was concerned also
because inflation jeopardized economic growth,
produced uncertainty about the health of finan-
cial institutions, encouraged speculation, and
rendered ineffective many of the instruments of
economic policy that had been developed to deal
with recession and unemployment. He was in a
position to see at firsthand how the various types
of economic fluctuation interact with one an-
other and how they affect and are affected by
international trade and financial transactions.
He brought to the current problems that he had
to face a broad knowledge: of economic his-
BURNS, ARTHUR F. 81
tory; of economic growth and the factors that
have hastened or retarded it; of construction
activity and other forms of capital investment
and the processes that create it; of the causes
and consequences of financial crises and eco-
nomic depressions as well as the milder reces-
sions; of the role of government, its intervention
in economic life, and the practical political pro-
cess; of statistical data and methods of analysis
and their value and limitations. His scientific
books and papers, his testimony before Congress,
his addresses to public audiences and his inter-
views with the press all reflect this store of know-
ledge and its relevance to matters of present-day
concern.
Burns is meticulous about words and can con-
vey complex ideas in simple language. He rarely
resorts to mathematical symbols, though his
work shows a capacity to use them—in footnotes
or appendixes. Part of his early training in effec-
tive writing was developed when he wrote for
the financial pages of the New York Herald
Tribune in the early 1930s. He benefited also
from the literary skill of his mentor and collabo-
rator, Wesley Mitchell. In his work at the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, his pro-
fessional home for more than thirty years, he
often evaluated manuscripts produced by the
staff and would invariably make editorial as well
as substantive suggestions for their improve-
ment. He likes to write, and even during his
busy life as administrator of the Federal Reserve
System he composed more than a hundred essays
in the form of addresses before university, bank-
ing, business, and congressional audiences that
are marked by his style of expression and knowl-
edge of the subject matter.
Burns's first major research project was his
doctoral dissertation at Columbia University,
Production Trends in the United States Since
1870 (1934). The book displays many of the
qualities of his later work: careful attention to
the factors affecting economic decisions by busi-
ness enterprises; a blend of theoretical reasoning
and empirical investigation; thorough acquain-
tance with the statistics being analyzed and their
relationship to the phenomena they are taken to
represent; and a sophisticated statistical treat-
ment of the problem of measuring the growth
and decline of industries. He found retardation
of growth—that is, slower growth as an industry
matures—to be nearly universal, and he attrib-
uted it largely to the rapid growth of newer
industries that displaced the products of the
older industries. Thus, the phenomenon of retar-
82 BURNS, ARTHUR F.
dation in growth was an inherent consequence
of the competitive process, broadly defined, and
of economic progress. The more vigorous the
competition of new industries, the more evi-
dence of retardation there would be.
Nevertheless, Burns observed, the retardation
of growth in individual industries did not imply
a slowdown in the growth of the total output of
the nation. On the contrary, the rapid develop-
ment of new industries, which produced the
retardation, was essential to the continued rapid
growth of total output. Retardation might, there-
fore, be found everywhere, but not in the aggre-
gate output of the economy as a whole. What
was characteristic of the parts was not charac-
teristic of, or even visible in, the whole. This, too,
was a finding that affected Burns's later thinking
about the conduct of economic research and of
economic policy. It was essential to look beneath
the surface of the aggregates, such as gross
national product, total employment, the general
price level, in order to discover how the economy
really worked. His continued distrust of models
constructed largely from such aggregates stems
in part from his view that the aggregates do not
adequately reflect what goes on in the economy.
His later work on business cycles stressed the
"unseen cycle" in the components of aggregates,
the fact that "corporations do not have a com-
mon pocketbook," and the "cross-currents" that
develop as a turning point in the cycle ap-
proaches. Hence, the factors that are crucial to
growth are often not apparent in such aggre-
gates as the gross national product (GNP).
Burns's first report as chairman of the Council
of Economic Advisers under President Dwight
D. Eisenhower started with the proposition that
one of the powerful forces for economic growth
was the development of mass markets for new
consumer goods, and the first table in the report
was devoted to figures on the output of new pro-
ducts such as television sets, frozen foods, and
room air conditioners.
Burns's early work on production trends led
Frank W. Taussig, then the editor of the Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, to ask him for a
review article on the Brookings Institution's
four-volume study of America's capacity to pro-
duce and consume. The review was published
in May 1936 and faulted the work on both con-
ceptual and empirical grounds. The study's esti-
mates of productive capacity were not developed
with sufficient attention to the economic, as
opposed to the technological, possibilities of in-
creasing production, which led Burns to note
that "an estimate of potential increase in output,
whether high or low, has little meaning unless
it is accompanied by a theoretical analysis which
indicates how the increase may be realized." He
did not attach much significance, therefore, to
the Brookings Institution estimate that in the
boom year 1929 the potential national output
exceeded the actual output by 19 per cent. His
skepticism regarding such estimates came to the
fore again many years later, when estimates of
the GNP gap became an extremely impor-
tant guide to economic policy. In 1967, in diag-
nosing the failure of economic policy makers
in 1964—1965 to recognize the signs of inflation
that had begun to appear and to shift to mea-
sures of restraint rather than continued stim-
ulation, he pointed to the estimates of the gap
and the theoretical apparatus behind them,
which attributed the gap entirely to a shortage
of aggregate demand rather than to obstacles on
the side of supply or to an incomplete adjust-
ment of demand and supply to one another.
Burns's association with the National Bureau
of Economic Research began in 1930, when he
was appointed a research associate. In the same
year he married Helen Bernstein. The bureau,
then only ten years old, was directed by Wesley
C. Mitchell, one of Burns's professors at Co-
lumbia. They became the best of friends and
collaborators. Following the publication of Pro-
duction Trends in 1934, Burns turned his full
attention to business cycles and to the method
of business cycle analysis that Mitchell, Simon
Kuznets, and others had been developing. To-
gether with Mitchell, he set about preparing a
comprehensive description of the method and
an exhaustive test of its properties. A short
paper on the subject, the first of several authored
jointly by Mitchell and Burns, appeared in 1935.
Publication of the full report was delayed during
World War n, but the massive book, entitled
Measuring Business Cycles, finally appeared in
1946. It became the "bible" of the many re-
searchers who have participated in the bureau's
business cycle studies over the years.
In 1937 Mitchell and Burns collaborated in a
study, requested by Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Morgenthau, that utilized the measures
of cyclical behavior as a guide to the selection of
the most useful indicators of cyclical revivals.
They laid down certain principles that should
guide the choice and applied them to the 487
American monthly or quarterly series that had
been analyzed in the research program, select-
ing 71 that had been "tolerably consistent in

their timing in relation to business cycle revivals
and that at the same time are of sufficiently
general interest to warrant some attention by
students of current economic conditions" (Mitch-
ell & Burns 1938, p. 4). They further refined
this list to obtain 21 series that seemed to be the
most trustworthy indicators of revivals. Although
this report was considered by the authors to be a
"minor by-product" of the bureau's studies of
business cycles, it has had a lasting impact.
The sets of "leading, roughly coincident, and
lagging indicators" that are in wide use in
the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and several other countries are the
direct descendants of this work, and many of
the indicators originally selected by Mitchell and
Burns have continued to display the same cycli-
cal properties that they discerned in them.
Measuring Business Cycles provoked a pro-
fessional controversy. Its critics claimed it was
"measurement without theory," the title of a
review by Tjalling Koopmans. Burns and Mitch-
ell had devised a system of measurement with-
out first setting forth the theory of business
cycles that they expected the measurements to
test—an ineffective and inefficient way to pro-
ceed, according to the critics. The more promis-
ing approach was to adopt a provisional theory
(and the one favored by most of the critics was
the one set forth by John Maynard Keynes some
ten years before), create a mathematical model
that expressed the theory, obtain the data on the
variables called for by the model, and see how
well the model fit these facts. During the next
thirty years this became the more popular ap-
proach in academic circles, but the controversy
remained alive, partly because no single theory
or model took the field.
This indeed was the condition that led Burns
and Mitchell to adopt a comprehensive plan of
measurement based upon a descriptive defini-
tion rather than a causal theory of business
cycles. Their plan was to establish what was
typical about these phenomena in terms relevant
to the large number of theories that had already
been excogitated. Knowledge of what was or was
not typical would show what a general theory
had to account for. Too many theories, they
believed, had been based upon an incomplete
knowledge of the facts, and hence either "ex-
plained" phenomena that were not typical or
failed to explain phenomena that were typical.
In the event, certain parts of this measurement
system came to be widely used and kept up to
date, notably the chronology of business cycle
BURNS, ARTHUR F. 83
peaks and troughs, patterns of expansion and
contraction based upon these dates, and char-
acteristic lead-lag sequences. In establishing
a comprehensive measurement system with a
minimal theoretical structure, capable of investi-
gating the current and past behavior of virtually
any economic variable, avoiding arbitrary and
therefore controversial decisions about "causes"
and "consequences," and emphasizing easily
comprehended results, the research strategy that
Burns and Mitchell advocated bore fruit in a
wider public awareness of many of the facts
about business cycles that they thought should
be better known "before making a fresh attempt
to explain them" (Burns & Mitchell 1946, p. 4).
Burns continued to hold the view that the-
orizing on the basis of an incomplete set of
facts posed a serious danger to the develop-
ment of economic science and to its role in
policymaking. Between 1946 and 1952 he
wrote a series of works on this theme: Eco-
nomic Research and the Keynesian Thinking
of Our Times (1946), "Keynesian Economics
Once Again" (1947), Current Research in
Business Cycles (1949), The Instability of Con-
sumer Spending (1952fo), and "Hicks and the
Real Cycle" (1952a). He characterized the
kind of economic analysis stimulated by Keynes
as "bold and vigorous theoretical speculation"
that especially needed to be checked against
the facts because the results of such speculation
were being used to guide economic policy.
"Keynesian Economics Once Again" contains a
strong statement on the responsibility of an
economic adviser:
An economic theorist is justified on many occasions
in oversimplifying facts to clarify in his own mind
what he believes to be significant relationships. He
is likewise justified in bringing the results of his
speculative inquiries before his colleagues, whether
to seek their critical appraisal before going further
or to stimulate them by his work. As long as the
economist moves within these boundaries he may
be excused even for not making a strenuous effort
to discover how seriously he has distorted the facts
by his simplifying assumptions. But when he at-
tempts to give practical advice, he loses his license
to suppose anything he likes and to consider merely
the logical implications of untested assumptions. It
then becomes his duty to examine with scrupulous
care the degree to which his assumptions are fac-
tually valid. If he finds reason to question the close
correspondence between the assumptions and actual
conditions, he should either not undertake to give
any practical advice, or should frankly and fully
disclose the penumbra that surrounds his analysis
 84 BURNS, ARTHUR F.
and the conclusions drawn from it. Better still, he
should rework his assumptions in the light of the
facts and see whether he is justified on this new
basis in telling men in positions of power how they
should act. Economics is a very serious subject
when the economist assumes the role of counselor
to nations. (1947, pp. 264-265)
Some five years after enunciating these prin-
ciples Burns had the opportunity to put them in-
to practice, when he became chairman of Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers. His path to this position was,
however, not a smooth one, because Congress
had become disaffected with the functioning of
the previous council and was not eager to ap-
propriate funds for this purpose under the newly
elected president. After several months of un-
certainty early in 1953 about the status of the
council, a reorganization plan devised by Burns
was adopted, the main feature of which was to
concentrate authority in the hands of the chair-
man and make him directly responsible to the
president. Burns was appointed to the post. He
was immediately faced with the prospect of a
business cycle recession. Indeed, his nomination
and confirmation as chairman of the reconsti-
tuted council came in July 1953, a date he has
reason to remember because that month was
later designated a peak in the National Bureau's
business cycle chronology, the same chronology
that Burns had done so much to establish.
Undaunted by the challenge, he stepped into
the task with authority and boldness. His ac-
count of the years 1953-1954, which is con-
tained in the January 1954 and January 1955
Economic Report of the President, reveals a
wide range of actions taken to offset recession,
encourage growth, and prevent inflation. It also
reveals much of what Burns had learned in his
studies of business cycles, as well as his scholarly
interest in stepping back and setting forth the
principles governing policy actions as well as
the lessons to be learned from the experience.
The January 1954 Report, which expressed
the view—happily correct—that the relatively
"minor readjustment underway since mid-1953
is likely soon to come to a close," states the
principles that would guide the administration
in dealing with the possible threat of a de-
pression :
The first and foremost principle is to take preven-
tive action. . . . The second principle is to avoid
a doctrinaire position, work simultaneously on sev-
eral fronts, and make sure that the actions being
taken harmonize and reinforce one another. The
third basic principle is to pursue measures that will
foster the expansion of private activity, by stimu-
lating consumers to spend more money and busi-
nessmen to create more jobs. . . . The fourth prin-
ciple is to act promptly and vigorously if economic
conditions require it. The government will not hesi-
tate to make greater use of monetary, debt manage-
ment, and credit policy, including liberalized use of
federal insurance of private obligations, or to modify
the tax structure, or to reduce taxes, or to expand
on a large scale the construction of useful public
works, or to take any other steps that may be neces-
sary. . . .
The need for constant vigilance and preparedness
by Government [the Report went on to say] does
not, however, justify constant stirring or meddling.
Minor variations in activity are bound to occur in a
free economy, or for that matter in any type of
economy. The arsenal of stabilizing weapons will be
drawn upon by the government boldly, but not more
frequently than is required to help maintain reason-
able stability. Nor will flexible policies aiming to
minimize economic fluctuations be permitted to
interfere any more than is necessary with the fiscal
objective of bringing down the scale of Federal ex-
penditures, reducing taxes, and arriving at a budge-
tary balance. (Report, January 1954, pp. 113-114)
The January 1955 Report, which could point
to clear evidence that economic recovery was
under way, undertook to draw some lessons
from "this latest encounter with the business
cycle":
First, that wise and early action by government can
stave off serious difficulties later. Second, that con-
traction may be stopped in its tracks even when
governmental expenditures and budget deficits are
declining, provided effective means are taken for
building confidence. Third, that monetary policy can
be a powerful instrument of economic recovery, so
long as the confidence of consumers and business-
men in the future remains high. Fourth, that auto-
matic stabilizers, such as unemployment insurance
and a tax system that is elastic with respect to the
national income, can be of material aid in mod-
erating cyclical fluctuations. Fifth, that a minor
contraction in this country need not produce a
severe depression abroad. Sixth, that an expanding
world economy can facilitate our own readjust-
ments. (Report, January 1955, p. 22)
Although Burns could take some pride in the
essential validity of his diagnosis and prognosis
in 1953-1954, and President Eisenhower could
take pride in his lieutenant's crisp command of
the situation, Burns was ever mindful of the
limitations on economic foresight. The analyses
in the Reports for which he was responsible
frequently referred to the types of economic

indicators that his earlier studies had found use-
ful. They are also filled with warnings like "it is
well to keep in mind the sobering fact that there is
no way of lifting more than a corner of the veil
that separates the present from the future. . . .
The uncertainty of economic predictions requires
that the federal government be prepared to
adjust its policies promptly if economic events
should not bear out current expectations" (Re-
port, January 1955, pp. 24-25). This caution led
him to refuse to incorporate an explicit forecast
of GNP in the Report, despite considerable pres-
sure from Congress to do so.
In 1957 Burns returned to his professorship
at Columbia University and became president of
the National Bureau of Economic Research,
where he remained until called to Washington
by President Richard M. Nixon in 1969. One of
the first essays he wrote during these years was
"Progress Towards Economic Stability," his presi-
dential address before the American Economic
Association in December 1959. Here he traced
some of the changes that had occurred in the
severity and other features of business cycles
over the years. He noted that the cyclical swings
in production had become smaller, and that the
linkages between production, employment, per-
sonal income, and consumption had become
looser. "One of the triumphs of this generation,"
he concluded, "is the progress our nation has
made in reducing economic instability."
Although the progress that had been made was
clear, with the reasons for it lying partly with
changes in the structure of the economy and
partly with defenses erected deliberately to deal
with recession, Burns did not believe the busi-
ness cycle had been conquered. Many economists
disagreed, especially during the long upswing of
the 1960s, which was interrupted only by a mild
recession in 1960-1961 and by slowdowns in
1962-1964 and 1966-1967. In Burns's view,
however, the business cycle was not dead, and
in 1968 he wrote a notable article to explain its
self-generating features and what had been
learned about them. The structure of his analy-
sis is revealed in the headings of four sections of
the essay: "The Cumulative Process of Expan-
sion," "Gathering Forces of Recession," "The
Process of Contraction," and "Forces of Progress
and Recovery." To a historian, what is perhaps
most striking about this explanation of the busi-
ness cycle is its similarity, in main outline, with
the account set forth by Mitchell in 1913. Burns's
familiarity with the theoretical and empirical
researches since then, with the significant
BURNS, ARTHUR F. 85
changes in economic institutions, and with the
practical problems of policymaking at the high-
est level of government had simply reinforced
his view that the Mitchellian approach to diag-
nosis of the swings from prosperity to recession
was essentially valid and eminently useful. His
chief amendment to this approach was to stress
the role of factors making for long-term eco-
nomic growth in the very process of a cyclical
revival.
One of the reasons why, despite the progress
that had been made in countering recession,
Burns believed that business cycles were still to
be reckoned with, was that he did not think
similar progress had been made in dealing with
inflation. Increasingly during the 1950s and
1960s he devoted attention to this problem. In
1957, in an illuminating essay on "The New En-
vironment of Monetary Policy"—illuminating es-
pecially because of Burns's later role as head of
the Federal Reserve—he noted that the great
expansion of government expenditures since the
1920s had "reduced the area over which a re-
strictive credit policy can nowadays be effective,"
because governments are not likely to allow such
policies to thwart their other objectives. He
noted, too, that the Employment Act of 1946
pledges the government to "utilize all its plans,
functions and resources" to foster economic ex-
pansion and to help prevent depressions, that
this embraced the Federal Reserve authorities,
and that they are therefore "fairly bound to
pursue a policy of credit restraint with consider-
able caution, lest the application of restraints
bring on the very decline of aggregate economic
activity which it is the responsibility of the gov-
ernment to try to prevent" (1969, p. 164). In
view of these and other limitations that at-
tached to restrictive Federal Reserve policies,
he concluded that "it would be unwise to depend
on the Federal Reserve System as our sole or
principal guardian of the stability of the dollar"
(p. 174). It was an apt forecast of the situation
he would face later.
Burns's term as chairman of the Federal Re-
serve Board, from 1970 to 1978, began in the
midst of a mild recession and ended in a period
of vigorous expansion. It encompassed the severe
recession of 1973-1975, and it also encompassed
a period of sharp inflation. He held office for 98
months, of which 26 were months of recession,
72 were months of economic expansion. The
general level of prices and wages rose through-
out the period, but the rate of inflation in both
was not very different when he left office from
86 BURT, CYRIL
when he entered it. He presided during a tur-
bulent period, the history of which is still to be
written. Burns himself will surely participate in
writing this history, and he has already provided
some of the documentation in the form of a 475-
page volume, Reflections of an Economic Policy
Maker (1978), containing a selection of his
speeches and testimony during his eight-year
tenure as Federal Reserve chief. But historians'
future appraisal of his role is unlikely to dimin-
ish his reputation as a wise counselor, skillful
administrator, thorough scholar, responsible of-
ficial, and patriotic citizen, a reputation that
was enhanced by his chairmanship, both in his
own country and around the world.
Despite his professional responsibilities and
penchant for hard work, Burns has had a re-
warding family life. One son, David, is a lawyer;
the other, Joseph, is an economist. For many
years the family spent their summers on a farm
in Ely, Vermont, where Burns built a separate
cabin to use as a study. Each summer he takes
some time to paint abstract oils, always in vivid
colors. Occasionally he takes a turn at house
painting, one of the jobs he worked at as a
youth under the guidance of his father.
A few weeks before he left the Federal Re-
serve, Burns recalled that he began his life in
America as a Jewish immigrant. He summed up
his feelings in the following words:
It is clear to me, therefore, as I reflect on my own
life, that whatever success I have been able to
achieve is due fundamentally to the fact that it has
been my good fortune to be a citizen of a country
whose people have had the opportunity to acquire
a decent education, whose people have had the free-
dom to seek truth and to express it as they see fit,
whose people have had the opportunity to put to
work such special talents as they may have and to
utilize those talents for themselves, their families,
and their country.
In short, it has been my great privilege to be an
American. (1978, p. 68)
GEOFFREY H. MOORE
WORKS BY BURNS
(1934) 1950 Production Trends in the United States
Since 1870. New York: Kelley.
1936a The Brookings Inquiry Into Income Distribu-
tion and Progress. Quarterly Journal of Economics
50:476-523.
1936k Construction and Business Cycles. Unpublished
manuscript.
1938 MITCHELL, WESLEY C.; and BURNS, ARTHUR F.
Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals. National
Bureau of Economic Research, Bulletin 69. New
York: The Bureau.
1946 Economic Research and the Keynesian Thinking
of Our Times. New York: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
1946 BURNS, ARTHUR F.; and MITCHELL, WESLEY C.
Measuring Business Cycles. New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
1947 Keynesian Economics Once Again. Review of
Economics and Statistics 29:252-268.
1949 Current Research in Business Cycles. New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
1952a Hicks and the Real Cycle. Journal of Political
Economy 60:1-24.
1952b The Instability of Consumer Spending. New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
(1954) 1975 Frontiers of Economic Knowledge. New
York: Arno.
1957 Prosperity Without Inflation. New York: Ford-
ham Univ. Press.
1959 Progress Towards Economic Stability. American
Economic Review 50: Iff.
1966 The Management of Prosperity. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press.
1967 BURNS, ARTHUR F.; and SAMUELSON, PAUL A.
Full Employment: Guideposts and Economic Sta-
bility. Washington: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research.
1968 Business Cycles: I. General. Volume 2, pages
226-245 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press. —> Reprinted as "The
Nature and Causes of Business Cycles" in Burns
1969, pp. 3-53.
1968 BURNS, ARTHUR F.; JAVITS, JACOB K.; and
HITCH, CHARLES J. The Defense Sector and the
American Economy. New York Univ. Press.
1969 The Business Cycle in a Changing World. Na-
tional Bureau of Economics, Studies in Business
Cycles, No. 17. New York: The Bureau.
1978 Reflections of an Economic Policy Maker. Wash-
ington: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research.
BURT, CYRIL
Cyril Burt (1883-1971) was one of the lead-
ing pioneers in the development of psychology as
an applied scientific discipline. While still a
schoolboy he came into contact with, and under
the influence of, Francis Galton, and his work
can be regarded as essentially an attempt to
uphold the Galtonian tradition of individual
psychology. This tradition stressed the impor-
tance of individual differences in ability and
character, the role of heredity in determining
these differences, and the need to develop quanti-
tative methods in order to study them scien-
tifically. From the publication of his first article
on intelligence in 1909 to his death in 1971 Burt
worked assiduously and single-mindedly within
this Galtonian framework.
Burt's early boyhood was spent in humble cir-
cumstances in London, where his father was a
struggling medical practitioner. Nine years after
his son's birth, Dr. Burt left the capital, and
moved to a rural practice near Stratford-on-Avon,

and it was here that his contacts with Galton
were first established. The Galton family resided
in a nearby village, and Burt senior became their
family physician. Young Cyril would accompany
his father on his rounds during school holidays,
and in this way first met the great Francis
Galton. The meeting was to have a permanent
and decisive influence on his development.
Burt's induction into psychology, however,
was slow and uphill. At the beginning of the
century it had hardly become a recognized sub-
ject of instruction, or a recognized career, in
Great Britain. Since his father was never finan-
cially prosperous Burt's education depended al-
most entirely on his own efforts, and his success
in winning scholarships. He was academically
gifted, intellectually curious, hardworking, and
quick on the uptake. So he made his way first to
the ancient school of Christ's Hospital in Lon-
don, and then to Oxford University. His educa-
tion at school and university was primarily in the
ancient classical languages, and in the literature
of Greece and Rome. His mathematical and. sci-
entific education was acquired almost wholly by
his own efforts after he had left school. At Ox-
ford, however, the classical curriculum was a
broad one, and included a training in ancient
philosophy, logic, and, as an optional extra, psy-
chology. Fortunately for Burt, William Mc-
Dougall had just been appointed to take charge
of psychology at Oxford, and Burt became his
first student. McDougall, after Galton, was the
other major influence shaping Burt's psychologi-
cal development. McDougall confirmed him in his
determination to take up psychology as a career,
and provided him with his first opportunity. In
1902 the British Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, largely as a result of Gallon's
advocacy, had decided to initiate an anthropo-
metric survey of the British people, involving the
measurement of both physical and psychological
characteristics. In 1907 a psychological subcom-
mittee was set up under McDougall's direction
to plan the psychological side of the survey. In
connection with this project, McDougall enlisted
Burt to carry out an investigation into intelli-
gence with the idea of checking some of the ideas
on the existence and nature of general intelli-
gence propounded a few years previously by
C. E. Spearman. Burt carried out the practical
work for this investigation during the 1907/1908
session immediately after graduating, and pub-
lished the results in 1909. It was to set the pat-
tern for the whole of his subsequent life's work.
Meanwhile he had advanced his psychological
BURT, CYRIL 87
education by spending the summer of 1908 in
Oswald Kiilpe's laboratory at the University of
Wiirzburg, and had secured his first post as a
lecturer in psychology attached to C. S. Sher-
rington's department of physiology at the Uni-
versity of Liverpool. He spent five years (1908-
1913) with Sherrington, and although he had
not had the training to take up physiological
research as such, he was undoubtedly much in-
fluenced by Sherrington's general viewpoint on
the integrative function of the nervous system
and on mind-brain relations.
In 1913 Burt returned to his birthplace, Lon-
don, on his appointment as psychologist to the
London County Council. This was a new ap-
pointment, and the first of its kind in Great Brit-
ain. Burt's job was to assist the Council's educa-
tion committee, which was responsible for Lon-
don's schools, in two main tasks: to identify and
assess pupils who required special treatment,
either by reason of mental subnormality or of
behavioral maladjustment, and to assist in the
selection of gifted pupils for entry to secondary
education, which was then, for those who could
not afford to pay for it, highly competitive. In
furtherance of these aims Burt conducted a
systematic survey of the distribution of educa-
tional abilities among London school children,
and compiled and standardized a set of mental
and scholastic tests that remained in use for
more than forty years. Among his tests were one
of the first British versions of the Binet scale,
and a verbal reasoning test, which was impor-
tant in providing the stimulus for Jean Piaget's
early studies on the development of intelligence.
In addition to his psychometric work, Burt ran
what was in effect the first child guidance clinic
in Great Britain. The material he collected in
this clinical work formed the core of his classical
treatises, The Young Delinquent (1925) and The
Backward Child (1937).
Burt's routine duties with the London County
Council occupied only part of his time. The re-
mainder he spent in various ways. During World
War i he was engaged for some time at the Min-
istry of Munitions in statistical work. After the
war he assisted the National Institute of Indus-
trial Psychology, which had been founded in
1921, to establish a vocational guidance service,
and directed a research project into vocational
guidance. In 1924 he became part-time professor
of educational psychology at the London Day
Training College, a teachers' training establish-
ment affiliated with the University of London.
In addition he was encouraged by the London
88 BURT, CYRIL
County Council to undertake his own research,
and it was in this connection that he began to
collect the material on twins, which was pub-
lished many, years later, and which became a
major focus of controversy.
Burt held the post of psychologist to the Lon-
don County Council from 1913 to 1932. During
this period he not only carried out his routine
duties with great energy and competence, but he
collected, with the aid of teachers, social workers,
and research assistants, a large body of data,
both clinical and psychometric—in fact most of
the data he was to make use of in his subsequent
publications. In quantity Burt's data were im-
pressive; qualitatively, however, much of it
lacked the rigor and precision required of re-
search material. It was for the most part col-
lected incidentally to Burt's practical duties as
an educational psychologist; it was collected for
a variety of different purposes; and much of it
was gathered by assistants lacking in adequate
psychological training. Accordingly Burt felt en-
titled to "adjust" test scores in the light of other
evidence, often of a subjective kind. He pos-
sessed considerable skill in deriving conclusions
by statistical reasoning from imperfect data, but
it is questionable whether the elaborate treat-
ment he later accorded it was ever really jus-
tifiable.
Burt's work for the London County Council
soon brought him into public prominence, and
his advice was increasingly in demand. He was
called on to assist the Board of Education in its
plans for the reconstruction of the English edu-
cation system, and his evidence played a con-
siderable part in shaping the scheme of selective
secondary schooling that was incorporated in the
Education Act of 1944. He was, too, largely in-
strumental in the setting up of a Child Guidance
Council in 1926, which, with the help of the
Commonwealth Fund of America, led to the
establishment of the first fully staffed child
guidance clinics in Great Britain.
In 1932 Burt's attachment to the London
County Council terminated with his appoint-
ment to the chair of psychology at University
College London, in succession to Spearman. This
appointment marked the climax of, and at the
same time a turning point in, his career. Until
1932, Burt's energies had been directed primarily
towards applied problems; after 1932, he turned
mainly to theoretical and methodological ques-
tions, chief among which was factor analysis.
Burt's first acquaintance with factorial tech-
niques arose through his contacts with Spearman
while still at Oxford. He employed factor analysis
on a small scale in his early investigation into
intelligence, and a few years later undertook a
factorial study of emotional traits, one of the
first excursions into the statistical analysis of
personality. In London he applied factorial tech-
niques to the analysis of educational abilities,
and developed a method of analysis which an-
ticipated L. L. Thurstone's centroid method. On
his appointment to University College he began
to concentrate on factorial studies. He acquired
a mastery of the mathematics and methodology
of factor analysis, and his conclusions began to
diverge from those of Spearman, though he still
publicly acknowledged Spearman's priority and
preeminence in the field. His views were set out
definitively in The Factors of the Mind (1940),
and developed from 1947 onwards in the pages
of The British Journal of Statistical Psychology,
which he founded with Godfrey H. Thomson,
and edited until 1963. In the statistical journal
and elsewhere, Burt elaborated and amplified his
factorial techniques, and summarized the con-
clusions of his factorial investigations, present-
ing arguments in favor of a hierarchical scheme
of general, group, and specific factors, both of
ability and personality. The most important fac-
tor was the factor at the head of the ability
hierarchy, which, following Spearman, Burt des-
ignated "g" and defined as "innate, general, cog-
nitive ability." This supreme ability he believed
could be accurately assessed by means of intelli-
gence tests. Burt was also much concerned, in
the final phases of his factorial work subsequent
to Spearman's death in 1945, in dethroning
Spearman as the founder of factor analysis, and
asserting his own claims to priority as the first
user of factorial method in psychology. These
claims were wholly unfounded, and led Burt to
falsify the historical record in a way that sug-
gests a morbidly egotistical streak in his per-
sonality.
Burt retired from his chair at University Col-
lege in September 1950, and lived quietly at his
flat near Primrose Hill for the remaining 21 years
of his life. He kept extremely busy, writing ar-
ticles, reviewing books and manuscripts, examin-
ing, editing his journal, and, until 1960, lectur-
ing. Apart from an experimental study of typog-
raphy, based on work carried out before his re-
tirement, most of his publications during this
period were of a theoretical nature—on con-
sciousness, values, psychical research, factor
analysis, and, in particular, the multifactorial
theory of inheritance. After 1940 Burt did not

produce any major, large-scale work. The articles
which flowed unceasingly from his pen were in
the main either restatements of his earlier views,
or rejoinders to attacks, to which he was in-
creasingly subjected from the early 1950s on-
wards. After his retirement he carried out no
research either in the laboratory or in the field.
He became more and more a lonely and isolated
figure, who, though convinced of his own right-
ness, felt the tides of opinion turning against
him.
Things had, in fact, begun to go wrong for
Burt in the early 1940s. At the outbreak of war,
parts of University College, including the psy-
chology department, were evacuated to Abery-
stwyth in Wales. Burt spent five years (1939-
1944) in this remote spot on the Welsh coast,
largely isolated from the center of affairs. This
period of isolation affected him profoundly in
several ways. It precipitated the breakdown of
an unwise marriage he had contracted in 1932
with a student 26 years younger than himself,
while the worries of the war situation led to a
breakdown in his health. In particular, Univer-
sity College suffered serious bomb damage, and
a great many of Burt's papers (his collection of
children's drawings, case reports, and research
data) were destroyed. In 1941, a few months
after this devastating loss, he developed his first
bout of Meniere's disease, a disorder which is
now widely regarded as being precipitated by
stress (Stephens 1975). He was to be handi-
capped by Meniere symptoms for the rest of his
life, suffering severe attacks again in 1966.
Though Burt preserved an outward equanimity
he became more sensitive to criticism and more
on the defensive. Particularly when under attack
he began to display mildly paranoid traits, sus-
picious, devious, and self-aggrandizing. He fell
out with many of his old students and former
colleagues. After his retirement he was ordered,
by the college authorities, to keep out of his old
department, following his attempts to interfere
with its running. In 1963, after long and bitter
arguments with the British Psychological So-
ciety, he was deprived of the editorship of the
statistical journal he had helped to found. These
rebuffs aggravated his psychological condition.
Beneath an apparently unruffled exterior Burt
suffered from a whole range of psychosomatic
symptoms, which he described fully in letters to
his sister. His paranoid tendency became more
marked. He was constantly engaged in contro-
versy, going out of his way to pounce on those
who disputed his views, and he became more
BURT, CYRIL 89
devious in his counterattacks. It is against this
background that some of his later work must be
judged.
Burt was 88 years old when he died on Octo-
ber 10, 1971, from carcinoma of the liver. He
remained active till a few weeks before his death,
and although his powers of concentration had
begun to fall off and he was apt to make careless
mistakes, his mind remained lucid and powerful
up to the end. He was a person of remarkable
erudition, with an extensive knowledge of psy-
chology and its history, philosophy, theology, the
physical and biological sciences, literature, and
the arts. He acquired great technical skill in
statistics and related branches of mathematics.
He could expound his views with dazzling dis-
plays of scholarship and expertise, and as a
critic and controversialist he could be devas-
tating. Though distrusted by many, he managed,
during his lifetime, to hole! the fort against his
attackers, and his reputation was not openly
questioned. He remained until his death an emi-
nent and still widely admired public figure. He
had been knighted in 1946 for his services to
education, and he acquired many honors both
in Great Britain and abroad during the last 25
years of his life.
His downfall occurred not long after his
decease. In May 1973, Leon J. Kamin of Prince-
ton University, who had during the previous
year spoken at various colloquia, delivered a
paper in Washington on heredity and intelli-
gence, which exposed numerous inconsistencies
and contradictions in Burt's twin studies
(Kamin 1973; 1974). Then, a year later, Arthur
R. Jensen, a devoted admirer of Burt, examined
Burt's kinship correlations in detail and was
forced to admit that in spite of his theoretical
mastery, there were serious shortcomings in his
reported results (Jensen 1974). Two years later
the medical correspondent of the British news-
paper The Sunday Times maintained that in
fact Burt "published false data and invented
crucial facts to support his.controversial theory
that intelligence is largely inherited" (Gillie
1976). The matter rapidly became a cause
celebre and a center of controversy; one party
upholding the fraud charge and maintaining that
it seriously undermined the whole hereditarian
position; others admitting that Burt may have
been careless, but certainly not fraudulent, and
arguing that in any case the hereditarian posi-
tion was firmly founded on a mass of other
evidence.
The twin studies, around which the contro-
90 BURT, CYRIL
versy centered, were commenced by Burt soon
after he took up his post as London County
Council psychologist. In particular, he was in-
terested in collecting data on monozygotic (MZ)
twins reared apart, as such twins provide highly
important evidence for assessing the influence
of the genetic component in intelligence. In
his 1955 and 1956 articles (Burt 1955; Burt &
Howard 1956) Burt claimed to have found 21
pairs of separated MZ twins. By 1966 (Burt
1966) the number had increased to 53 such
pairs. Burt subjected this data, together with
other kinship correlations, to an elaborate statis-
tical analysis, using the methods of quantitative
genetics developed originally by R. A. Fisher, and
concluded that genetic factors contributed, in the
case of intelligence, about eighty per cent of the
variance, compared with only twenty per cent
for environmental influences.
It was Kamin, who after a minute analysis of
Burt's figures, revealed in them many strange
anomalies. For example, the group intelligence
test correlation of 0.771 for the separated twins
was identical for the smaller population of 21
and the larger one of 53. And this was only one
of a good many identical correlations with
changed sample sizes. Kamin concluded that the
absence of procedural description in Burt's re-
ports, the frequent arithmetical inconsistencies
and mutually contradictory statements, together
with the improbable consistency of some of his
results, rendered his work scientifically worth-
less. On the other hand, according to Jensen
(1974) Burt had simply been careless in not
reporting his findings more fully and accurately,
but his conclusions were still valid. Even after
the fraud charge had been leveled Jensen
(1978) held that the peculiarities of Burt's kin-
ship correlations were most reasonably attrib-
utable to carelessness rather than to deception.
An examination of Burt's diaries and cor-
respondence, in the archives of the University
of Liverpool, shows conclusively that Jensen's
interpretation is untenable. Burt collected no
twin data between 1955 and 1966; he was not
in touch personally or by correspondence with
the assistants, Miss Howard and Miss Conway,
who were supposed to have helped him during
these years; and he was incapable of collecting
any data himself by reason of deafness and other
infirmities. There was no ongoing research. Such
data as Burt possessed were collected prior to
1950, and most of the original test sheets were
lost during the war. The 1955 report was based
on results abstracted into notebooks together
with a few cases recruited postwar; the 1966
report on data reconstituted from fragmentary
remains, probably supplemented from memory
and guesswork. From a scientific point of view
the 1966 figures were a fabrication, since Burt
no longer had the raw data. Indeed it is not
certain that he had ever collected as many as
53 pairs of separated MZ twins. It was not until
1969 that in response to several requests Burt
produced the table of intelligence quotient scores
and social class ratings for his 53 MZ pairs
reared apart. His diary suggests that he spent
a whole week in concocting these figures, and he
never was able to produce figures for the larger
groups of MZ twins reared together, dizygotic
(DZ) twins, and ordinary siblings. He put off
inquirers by falsely alleging that the data were
kept at college, and he could not provide them
immediately.
Burt's motivation for this deception must be
diagnosed in relation to the pressures to which
he was subjected at the time. His work during
the period of his retirement was mainly of a
defensive kind, designed to uphold the Galtonian
standpoint against mounting environmentalist
and other attacks. These attacks came in two
main waves, in the years 1953 to 1956, and
again in 1963 to 1965. His two principal twin
articles in 1955 and 1966, respectively, were his
rejoinders. He wrote them in haste and anger,
and with a determination to get the better of his
adversaries by fair means or foul. There was a
paranoid weakness in his personality which led
him into these subterfuges.,
These posthumous exposures, though they
do not ipso facto undermine the whole heredi-
tarian case, do largely destroy Burt's own scien-
tific credibility. Burt, in fact, was never at heart
a scientist. He was an able and ambitious man,
who early came to regard the Galtonian tradition
almost as gospel truth and himself as Galton's
heir apparent. He was immensely erudite, in-
dustrious, and accomplished; he was, to those
who were prepared to look up to him, kind and
generous; and in his early years, up to the 1940s,
he did valuable pioneering work in the field of
applied psychology. But he could not take criti-
cism or rebuffs; he could not brook opposition;
and in the last resort he chose to cheat rather
than see his opponents triumph.
L. S. HEARNSHAW
WORKS BY BURT
1909 Experimental Tests of General Intelligence.
British Journal of Psychology 3:94-177.

1917 The Distribution and Relations of Educational
Abilities. London: King.
(1921) 1962 Mental and Scholastic Tests. 4th ed. Lon-
don: Staples.
(1925) 1944 The Young Delinquent. 4th ed., rev.
Univ. of London Press.
(1935) 1955 The Subnormal Mind. Oxford Univ.
Press.
(1937) 1961 The Backward Child. 5th ed. Univ. of
London Press.
1940 The Factors of the Mind: An Introduction to
Factor-analysis in Psychology. Univ. of London
Press.
1952 Autobiography. Volume 4, pages 53-73 in A
History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited by
Edwin G. Boring et al. Worcester, Mass.: Clark
Univ. Press.
1955 The Evidence for the Concept of Intelligence.
British Journal of Educational Psychology 25:158—
177.
1956 BURT, CYRIL; and HOWARD, MARGARET The Mul-
tifactorial Theory of Inheritance and Its Application
to Intelligence. British Journal of Statistical Psy-
chology 9:95-131.
1966 The Genetic Determination of Differences in In-
telligence: A Study of Monozygotic Twins Reared
Together and Apart. British Journal of Psychology
57:137-153.
1975 The Gifted Child. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BANKS, CHARLOTTE; and BROADHURST, P. L. (editors)
1965 Stephanos: Studies in Psychology Presented
to Cyril Burt. Univ. of London Press. —» Includes an
almost complete bibliography of Burt's writings up
to 1965.
GILLIE, OLIVER 1976 Pioneer of IQ Faked His Re-
search Findings. The Sunday Times (London) Oct.
24, p. 1, col. 2ff.
HEARNSHAW, L. S. 1979 Cyril Burt: Psychologist.
London: Hodder & Stoughton.
JENSEN, ARTHUR R. 1974 Kinship Correlations Re-
ported by Sir Cyril Burt. Behavior Genetics 4:1—28.
JENSEN, ARTHUR R. 1978 Burt in Perspective. Amer-
ican Psychologist 33:499-503.
KAMIN, LEON J. 1973 Heredity, Intelligence, Politics
and Psychology. Unpublished manuscript. —^ Ad-
dress to the Eastern Psychological Association in
May 1973, in Washington.
KAMIN, LEON J. 1974 The Science and Politics of
I.Q. Potomac, Md.: Erlbaum.
STEPHENS, S. D. J. 1975 Personality Tests in
Meniere's Disorder. Journal of Laryngology and
Otology 89:479-490.
WADE, NICHOLAS 1978 IQ and Heredity: Suspicion
of Fraud Beclouds Classic Experiment. Science
194:916-919.
BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT
Herbert Butterfield was born into a devout
Methodist family on October 7, 1900, in Oxen-
hope, an industrial revolution village with two
thousand inhabitants at the edge of the moors
and a few miles from the Lancashire-Yorkshire
border. His father left school at ten to work as
a wool sorter in the mill, but through self-edu-
cation trained himself to become a bookkeeper.
BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT 91
He carried with him through life his frustrated
ambition to have been a Methodist minister,
and without pressing his son unduly, made it
clear that he would like him to move in the
same direction. It was partly in the knowledge
of the pleasure it would give his father that
Butterfield, from the age of 16, became a lay
preacher, a step that provoked the impatience
of the man who was his most stimulating teacher
at the local grammar school, a man very out-
spoken in his hostility to Christianity. Later,
when Butterfield was at Cambridge University
working under the famous historian, Harold
Temperley, his growing interest in history, and
his consciousness of being too shy to succeed
in pastoral work, helped to draw him away from
the idea of going into the ministry. But whereas
religious and political thinkers have character-
istically rebelled against the tenets of their
childhood, Butterfield has never wavered from
a fundamental Augustinian theology that in-
cluded belief in the infinite worth of human per-
sonality, the reality of sin, the sovereignty of
God, the limitations of human nature, and the
fragmentary character of human existence. He
never espoused Marxism, as did Reinhold Nie-
buhr and Paul Tillich, two philosophers and
theologians with whom he had some affinity. He
studied Marxist thought, however, and extracted
from it certain insights on conflict in history
and the importance of economic and social
factors in history. A threefold interest in Euro-
pean and British history, in the relations of
Christianity to history, and in the theory of inter-
national relations determined the focus of his
thought.
But for the formative influence of his child-
hood and family life, Butterfield might have re-
mained content with the traditional historical
scholarship expected from a professor of modern
history at Cambridge and the editor of the Cam-
bridge Historical Journal. He was educated at
Cambridge where he earned the degrees of
master of arts and doctor of literature. In 1923,
he became a fellow of Peterhouse at that uni-
versity, and then, in 1955, its master. He served
as president of the Historical Association of
England in the late 1960s and, as a historian,
was invited to take up residence at the Institute
for Advanced Study at Princeton, New Jersey. His
first publication, The Historical Novel (1924),
reflected his early concern with the relation be-
tween literature and history. He demonstrated
the role of literary imagination in furthering the
actual rediscovery of the past. It was an anach-
92 BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT
ronism, he believed, to assume that the events
from another era could be understood in the
context of the present or recent past. Shorter
and more concentrated books in which the his-
torian drew on literary if not poetical skills
might help recreate the past, and this became
the standard for almost all Butterfield's writing.
He followed his first book with a detailed study,
The Peace Tactics of Napoleon, 1806-1808
(1929), an analysis of the relation between mili-
tary and diplomatic tactics of the period, in-
cluding the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. Reviewers
praised his historical portraiture and observed
that he had disproved the claims of German
historians that Czar Alexander of Russia had
conspired to desert Britain; it was the Prussians
who persuaded the Czar to meet with Napoleon
on a raft in the River Nieman. He edited Select
Documents of European History, 1715-1920
(1931fl), and began research on what was to be
a lifelong interest in George in, eventuating in
his George HI, Lord Nortli, and the People,
1779-1780 (1949/7) and George III and the
Historians (1957). His intention to write the
definitive work on Charles James Fox and
George in was sacrificed to a new set of inter-
ests in analytical historical studies, which domi-
nated his research for the next four decades.
The first clear evidence that Butterfield was
to go beyond traditional historical research
came in 1931 with the publication of The Whig
Interpretation of History, a critical analysis of
the Whig and liberal view of inevitable progress
in history. His concern for historiography was
clearly demonstrated in this study, which
earned for him a reputation as an authentic his-
torical genius. Although the book criticized
liberal politics and historical Protestantism,
Butterfield questioned in a more fundamental
way the failure of historians to do justice to the
unique conditions and mentality of bygone ages.
It was evident in this work that Butterfield was
to follow in the steps of J. E. E. D. Acton (even
though he was a chief object of Butterfield's
criticism) and Leopold von Ranke, and not that
of traditional British historians who concen-
trated on what was primarily descriptive his-
tory. His subsequent works. Napoleon (1939),
The Englishman and His History (1944), and
The Statecraft of Machiavelli (1940), carried
him even further along the path of the philoso-
pher of history and the political theorist.
In the late 1930s and 1940s, Butterfield,
whose eminence as a leading British historian
was by then unquestioned, entered a second
phase of historical writing that was inspired by
the world crisis. In 1939 he lectured at four
German universities on the "History of His-
toriography," emphasizing the developments in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He
argued that it was the Whig historians whom he
criticized and not the Whig politicians who had
fostered freedom and moderation from the later
years of Charles n. The lectures enabled him to
say that although he still regarded the Whig
interpretation as fallacious, he believed it had
helped in the development of liberty in England.
It was the Whig historians who had perverted
the story and not the politicians who used po-
litical compromise and political persuasion
rather than coercion and force.
In 1948 he turned to religion and history and
delivered a series of seven lectures at the re-
quest of the Divinity Faculty of Cambridge
University. He expanded these lectures into
six broadcasts presented in April and May 1949
by the British Broadcasting Corporation. He
amplified the major themes of these lectures in-
to a book entitled Christianity and History
(1949<7). Butterfield had hesitated to undertake
these lectures because he doubted that a lay-
man was qualified to prepare them, and he knew
the suspicion that such an enterprise could
generate among his fellow historians. But it be-
came difficult for him to avoid the invitation
when the representatives of the Divinity Faculty
made it clear that they did not feel that it would
be most useful to have a clergyman—the under-
graduates might be more ready to listen to a
man who had made his name as a historian.
His turn to philosophical questions was doubt-
less inspired by the dual crisis confronting the
West: the formidable challenge of the Soviet
Union with its Marxist creed and the position
of the Western countries as "frightened de-
fenders of the status quo, upholding the values
of an ancient civilisation against the encroach-
ments of something new . . ." (1949a, p. 5).
Butterfield warned that the idolatrous worship
of some superperson, "society," "state," or other
large-scale organization could so transform
man's perspective that he would see the world
as comparable to the world of the ants. It was
dangerous to bypass history or to imagine that
the natural sciences could safely be left to
shape human destiny. It was not enough to look
for God or man in nature or to conclude with
Hitler in Mein Kampf that since nature is con-
cerned not with individual human lives but
with the development of the species, history in-

evitably imposes its cruelties, idolatries, and hu-
man sacrifices. This attitude Butterfield de-
scribed as "the facile heresy of the self-educated
in a scientific age" and counseled: "Too easily
we may think of man as merely the last of the
animals and in this way arrive at verdicts which
we are tempted to transpose into the world of
human relations" (1949a, p. 6). Christianity
and History reasserted the author's profound
belief in the central place of human personality
in the historical process. He protested against
the opposing view of certain behavioral social
scientists and naturalists that history is the
story of great collectivities to be studied through
science and mathematics as no more than an-
other chapter in "the great book of biology."
Butterfield elaborated and extended this criti-
cism and restated the Christian perspective in a
succession of writings in which he claimed to
speak not as a theologian but, as had Arnold J.
Toynbee, as a historian. He wrote as an individ-
ual scholar, not interacting, as had Arnold J.
Toynbee, with other historians and theologians
who propounded an elaborate historical scheme.
His aim, as he conceived it, was to challenge
Christians and non-Christians alike to renew
awareness of the place in history of the Christian
view. He added books on Christianity in European
History (1951a); History and Human Relations
(1951b); and Christianity, Diplomacy, and War
(1953). Whatever questions critics raised about
his Christian perspective, Butterfield resolutely
maintained that history seen in its broadest di-
mensions is consonant with a Christian view of
history. He has inveighed against mere "techni-
cal history" which falls short of a subtle com-
prehension of the past. For him history at its
core is a drama, oftentimes tragic in dimension,
of human personalities. The tenets of historical
scholarship require the historian to practice in-
tellectual humility and flexibility of mind. He
must walk alongside the actors in history, plac-
ing himself in their position, seeking to recap-
ture their perceptions of events and to under-
stand the problems with which they had to
cope.
Another facet of Butterfield's contribution
stems from his study of science. Beginning in
1931, he had lectured to Cambridge undergrad-
uates on modern history from 1492, with at-
tention to such larger developments and long-
term movements as the Renaissance, the
Reformation, the French Revolution, and their
interconnections. His approach, which followed
the example of Acton, was intended as a reac-
BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT 93
tion against the overspecialization that had
come to dominate the university study of modern
history with its use of "outlines" and dry text-
book accounts of the external relations of states.
Instead, he focused on the emergence and major
developments of the modern world and modern
thought, devoting, for example, approximately
six lectures to the rise of modern science. These
lectures brought him into contact with promi-
nent Cambridge scientists such as Joseph Need-
ham and the group at the Cavendish Laboratory,
which was in search of an ally among historians.
Under the influence of these people, Cambridge
appointed a history of science committee in
1947, and it was this body which, after a con-
siderable conflict, induced Butterfield to deliver
in the Michaelmas term 1948 a course of lec-
tures on the subject. The lectures led to the
publication of his most successful book, The
Origins of Modern Science (1949c), and to a
reawakening of interest in the subject in En-
gland and America. It brought trained scientists
into touch with serious historical study and
helped produce a new generation of historians
of science.
In 1953, Butterfield was asked to deliver the
Wiles Trust lectures at Queens University, Bel-
fast, and he chose to return to the topic of "His-
tory of Historiography" in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. The subject had been a
preoccupation of German historians and a few
American historians, but despite the efforts of
Acton and his disciple, G. P. Gooch, who wrote
History and Historians in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury (1913), it had not taken root in England.
The Wiles lectureship brought together Butter-
field, who lectured on Man on His Past (1955),
and ten European and British historians who,
as authorities on different aspects of his subject,
criticized and commented on his presentation.
When published in 1955, these lectures led to a
considerable reawakening of interest in his-
toriography among university undergraduates,
research students, and professors. Subsequently,
he wondered if enthusiasm for historiography
had gone too far and urged that universities
limit its study to historians who were equipped
by tempeiament and experience for the task.
Although he was pleased he had been able to
advance the work of Acton and Gooch, he be-
lieved that for the ordinary research student,
training in the processing of evidence and the
main techniques of research must come first.
Ten years later in 1965 and 1966, he was
called on to deliver the famed Gifford lectures
 94 BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT
at the University of Glasgow, a series in which
Americans such as William James, John Dewey,
and Reinhold Niebuhr had participated. Butter-
field chose to address the broad question of how
the human race had come to possess a concept
of "the Past," and how and why mankind had
been interested in its past before historical writ-
ing had begun. He speculated that early religion
might have had some influence, but wondered
if it might also have been the enemy of genuine
history. The historical mentality, he concluded,
had emerged gradually from the conflicting
desire to reconcile both religious and secular
history. He believed that conclusions based on
recent research in Egyptian, Mesopotamian,
and Jewish languages were adaptable to the kind
of questions that Western historians character-
istically studied. The lectures constituted his
boldest historical adventure, for he undertook
to survey the entire "History of Historiography."
His effort inspired interest, particularly in the
United States, but left him uncertain as to
whether he had or could ever acquire the uni-
versal knowledge on which a published treatise
on the subject should be based. Then in the
mid-1960s the focus of Butterfield's interest
shifted and he never returned in a systematic
way to the theme of his Gifford lectures.
In all his historical writings, he has argued
that at one level, historical interpretation calls
for painstaking research and the ability to relive
"the lost life of yesterday" using the accumu-
lated traces of history "to recapture a bygone
age and turn it into something that is at once a
picture and a story" (1924, p. 8). In the pursuit
of this goal, Butterfield was following the tra-
dition he had absorbed from his teacher, the
master historian of diplomacy, Harold Temper-
ley, seeking always to write history of a high
and complicated texture. At another level, the
historian has the obligation to identify with his
subject in order neither to praise nor blame
him but, rather, to understand the circumstances
confronting him. In studying the diplomatic in-
terchanges that accompanied Napoleon's cam-
paigns against the Fourth Coalition, Butterfield
felt compelled to consult major archives in Lon-
don, Paris, and Vienna, the correspondence
drawn from the Prussian and Russian archives,
and the reports of ambassadors, ministers, and
spies to the leading statesmen of that day. His
purpose was to mirror the thoughts of the major
personages of the time and to uncover "the
strange tangle, the hidden undercurrents and
the clash of personalities that lay behind a Na-
poleonic war" (1929, p. vii). Even in the two
studies of Napoleon written early in his career,
the structure of Butterfield's maturing view of
history was discernible. The unfolding story
was for him unpredictable and wayward, based
on the interaction of diverse personalities pro-
ceeding, not in accordance with predetermined
doctrines of a superior people or of inevitable
progress, or with consequences clearly linked
to their intentions, but with goals and actions
whose efforts are deflected by the mysterious
workings of Providence.
Butterfield's essential ideas about historical
studies matured and were well-defined before
he was 31 years old. He had won the LeBas
prize at Cambridge for his first book, The His-
torical Novel, but his third, The Whig Interpre-
tation of History (1931b), established the foun-
dations of his later works, with their underlying
theme of "the complexity of human change and
the unpredictable character of the ultimate con-
sequences of any given act or decision of men"
(I93lb, p. 21). Historical writing must com-
municate the texture of such complexity. His-
torical change for Butterfield necessitated re-
form more than revolution, which inevitably
left a legacy of hatred, human suffering, and
destruction. In his early thirties, Butterfield was
persuaded that the Christian interpreter, more
than other political historians, was safeguarded
against the worst illusions and idolatries, being
prepared by his faith for accidents and sur-
prises in history. By his worship of God, he was
rescued from such distorting influences as a
fanatical worship of the state, the idea of
progress, or an abstract political ideology. By
devotion to the ultimate ends of religion, the
historian was enabled to understand "the web
spun out of the play of time and circumstances
. . ." (1931&, pp. 65-66). Providence held man-
kind under the judgment of God; yet God was
not a tyrannical ruler but the source of grace
in history. Even the clash of human wills re-
flecting man's pride and indestructible egotism
could serve to further God's will and bring good
out of evil. For example, the American Revolu-
tion had led the British to invent a new and
more civilized concept of empire. Man's most
creative achievements were usually born out of
human distress, and inner pressures and politi-
cal systems founded on brigandage, such as
those of ancient Rome and the British Empire,
might evolve in time in the direction of some
tolerable measure of justice and order.
For Butterfield, therefore, historical studies

and theology cohere and reenforce one another,
for both have their center in a concern for hu-
man personalities. His dual emphasis on history
and religion, however, has opened him to criti-
cism from which he might have been spared
had he followed the course of traditional his-
tory. Some critics see in his religious writings a
diversion from the historian's primary task of
producing a large corpus of solid historical
writing, such as might have resulted had he
continued his research on Charles James Fox
and George in. His position as scholar-states-
man in the Cambridge University community,
in which he lived and worked for more than a
half-century, culminating in his appointment as
vice chancellor from 1959 to 1961, was certainly
dependent to some degree upon his recognized
preoccupation with moral values. His positions
at Cambridge and his leadership roles in na-
tional and international educational bodies drew
him away from full-time scholarship, as did the
series of endowed lectures, characteristically on
religious themes, in Germany, the United States,
and the United Kingdom. Peter Geyl and other
historians have questioned his emphasis on
the persistence of evil in man's behavior and of
human cupidity in society and his low estimate
of the capacity of honorable men to effect social
change through actions with certain and pre-
dictable consequences. This criticism of his
questioning of the consequences of the moral
and rational intentions of statesmen overlooks
his debate with such twentieth-century British his-
torians as Lewis Namier and his disciples, who
portrayed politics largely as a struggle for gain
and selfish interests. For Butterfield, ideas, at-
titudes, and rational intentions interact with
self-interest in politics, and historians err when
they reduce politics for all individuals and every
century to the same dull level. The Namier
school, in so often assuming that politicians are
no more than the repository of self-interest, mis-
interprets political movements and political
parties, which do not merely advance group in-
terests but also articulate values and ideals.
A more serious and partly legitimate criticism
of Butterfield's use of the Christian perspective
has been leveled at some of his historical judg-
ments. In Christianity and History, written after
World War n, he appeared to explain the defeat
and destruction of Germany as divine punish-
ment for the sins of the German people. Yet
critics ask: What of the many Germans who at
grave personal risk opposed Hitler's regime?
And what of the Baltic peoples who did not com-
BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT 95
mit the brutalities of the Nazis, yet suffered as
grievously as the Germans? Butterfield has writ-
ten of the need for thinking historically at two
different levels, the level of technical history,
which deals with the limited and the mundane
and takes into account hard and tangible his-
torical evidence, and the level of Providence,
which is beyond the reach of the technical his-
torian. Critics have maintained that Butterfield,
especially when he enters the realm of general
history, smuggles into his interpretations the
Christian points of emphasis and doctrine that
he excludes from his more technical writings in
narrative history, where he is more cautious in
his assessments of individual leaders. Worst of
all, he sometimes appears to speak for the Provi-
dence whose divine words he merely notes and
records. In fairness, those critics who extract
from his writings moral valuations such as his
indictment of the entire German people con-
tained in a wider discussion of militarism will
find him going on to say that "if Germany is
under judgment so are all of us—the whole of
our existing order and the very fabric of our
civilisation" (1949a, p. 52).
Finally, Butterfield's influence on Western
thought is not exhausted in his two major con-
tributions to traditional and Christian history.
In 1958 he founded the British Committee on
the Theory of International Politics and has
served for approximately two decades as its
chairman and honorary chairman. This group
took as its mandate the making of an inquiry
"into the nature of the international states sys-
tem, the assumptions and ideas of diplomacy,
the principles of foreign policy, the ethics of
international relations and war" (Butterfield &
Wight 1966, p. 11). From the start the com-
mittee's approach reflected Butterfield's histori-
cal and religious orientation. The interests of
this group of British thinkers contrasted with
those of American colleagues who formed a
similar committee, and its work expressed
greater concern "with the historical than the
contemporary, with the normative than the sci-
entific, with the philosophical than the method-
ological, with principles than with policy" (ibid.,
p. 12). The themes of the group's first major
publication mirrored Butterfield's own writings
and included "Natural Law," "The New Diplo-
macy and Historical Diplomacy," "Society and
Anarchy in International Relations," "Western
Values in International Relations," and "The
Balance of Power." Butterfield's closest associ-
ate in the venture, Martin Wight, introduced the
96 BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT
volume with a paper entitled: "Why Is There No
International Theory?"
The British approach was the antithesis of
that of flourishing schools in America and Aus-
tralia that dealt with international relations
theory and systems analysis. Its frame of refer-
ence was the conduct of diplomacy, interna-
tional society, and the nation-state system. Its
point of view was historical, empirical, and de-
ductive. Its underlying presuppositions assumed
that historical continuities were more important
than innovations in the international system;
that statecraft provided a historical deposit of
accumulated practical wisdom; that the classi-
cal writers in politics, diplomacy, and law had
not been superseded by recent findings in such
disciplines as psychology and sociology, and
that the corpus of earlier diplomatic and mili-
tary experience was worthy of study and re-
formulation to meet contemporary needs.
Undergirding the committee's work was a per-
vasive moral concern about which Butterfield
wrote: "The underlying aim . . . is to clarify
the principles of prudence and moral obligation
which have held together the international so-
ciety of states throughout its history, and still
hold it together" (ibid., p. 13).
The influence of Butterfield and the British
Committee has been greater in the United States
than in Britain. American interest in the group's
approach coincided with a mounting awareness
in the 1950s and 1960s, first by a handful of
political realists and later by decision makers
and journalists, that the struggle between the
Soviet Union and the United States was too
complex to define as a clash between absolute
right and wrong. The conflict involved a pro-
found moral predicament, for even if the two
powers were approximately equal in strength
and virtue, each could justifiably fear the other.
Each could be sure of its own good intentions
without being able to trust the other. Each could
feel that its rival was withholding the one thing
that could make it feel secure. Each side in a
conflict could pursue its own security through
displays and threats of power, yet overlook the
fact that it could ensure its own security only by
destroying the security of the other. For Butter-
field the security-power dilemma was the most
urgent problem of war and peace, and for him
the only solution was for one or the other great
power to risk something in the name of peace.
The way out of the worst of deadlocks, he
prophesied, was through some kind of marginal
experiment; but for such an experiment, Amer-
ica would need the hard-level judgment of a
hard-boiled Bismarck, not sentimentalists for
whom giving way was always too easy. Butter-
field made his proposal more than a decade be-
fore the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente was
proclaimed. Butterfield approved of this detente
and added that what was needed for accommo-
dation was a leader experienced in power poli-
tics and capable of bold and subtle, yet hard-
headed, acts of political and military judgment.
He doubted that either a conventional moralist
or an ordinary intellectual or idealist in the
White House or in Whitehall could succeed in
formulating and defending a policy of coexis-
tence.
In the United States, the response to Butter-
field's ideas came from political realists. Al-
though he can be viewed as a spokesman for
realism and practical morality, Butterfield's
realism has been tempered by his profession as
a historian and by Britain's ancient tradition in
foreign policy. Like Reinhold Niebuhr, he has
had considerable influence on more thoughtful
leaders in the religious community, and has
quoted the Bible as often as he has historical
texts, applying its wisdom to the realm of
foreign policy. For Butterfield, the enduring
contribution of Christianity to the requirements
of international relations lies not so much in
the choosing of actual policies but in providing
a background of ideas or a more civilized spirit
with which men can work. Christianity can help
the citizen to formulate his ideas on human sin,
to recognize that although extraordinarily evil
men do exist, the most difficult problem in in-
ternational politics is the moderate cupidity of
large numbers of men who hope to realize
through their nations what society denies them
as individuals. Such men exercise vast pres-
sures on governments and make normalized
relations among states more difficult. It is the
main responsibility of religion to check the
sovereign will of the people who want to achieve
their objectives by too great an exercise of
power, instead of by consciously cooperating
with Providence.
In his appeal to American leaders in state-
craft and religion to recognize their limits and
to exercise prudence, Butterfield, writing at the
height of the cold war to a citizenry overanx-
ious about the Soviet threat and imperiled by
the risk of a thermonuclear holocaust, may have
made his most lasting and valuable contribution.
KENNETH W. THOMPSON

WORKS BY BUTTERFIELD
1924 The Historical Novel. Cambridge Univ. Press.
—» A Folcroft Library edition was published in 1971.
(1929) 1972 The Peace Tactics of Napoleon, 1806-
1808. New York: Octagon.
193la BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT (editor) Select Docu-
ments of European History, 1715-1920. Vol. 3. New
York: Holt.
(1931&) 1976 The Whig Interpretation of History.
New York: AMS Press.
1939 Napoleon. London: Duckworth. —> A paperback
edition was published by Collier in 1962.
1940 The Statecraft of Machiavelli. London: Bell.
—*• A paperback edition was published by Collier in
1962.
(1944) 1970 The Englishman and His History. Ham-
den, Conn.: Archon. —» Includes a new preface by
the author.
(1949a) 1961 Christianity and History. New York:
Scribners.
(1949i>) 1968 George HI, Lord North, and the People,
1779-1780. New York: Russell.
(1949c) 1965 The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-
1800. Rev. ed. New York: Free Press. —^ A paper-
back edition was published in 1968.
195la Christianity in European History. Oxford Univ.
Press.
1951& History and Human Relations. London: Collins.
1951c The Reconstruction of an Historical Episode:
The History of the Enquiry Into the Origins of the
Seven Years' War. Glasgow (Scotland): Jackson.
BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT 97
(1953) 1962 Christianity, Diplomacy, and War. 3d
ed. London: Epworth.
(1955) 1969 Man on His Past. Cambridge Univ.
Press. —» A paperback edition with a new preface
by the author was published by Beacon in 1966.
(1957) 1959 George III and the Historians. Rev. ed.
New York: Macmillan.
(1960) 1974 International Conflict in the Twentieth
Century: A Christian View. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
1966 BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT; and WIGHT, MARTIN
(editors) Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the
Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press.
1970 Sir Herbert Butterfield, Cho Yun Hsu and Wil-
liam H. McNeill on Chinese and World History.
Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong .
1972 Sincerity and Insincerity in Charles James Fox.
Oxford Univ. Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GEYL, PIETER (1961) 1963 Encounters in History.
London: Collins.
GOOCH, G. P. 1913 History and Historians in the
Nineteenth Century. London and New York: Long-
mans Green.
Halperin, Samuel William (editor) 1961 Some 20th-
century Historians. Univ. of Chicago Press.
Mclntire, C. G. (editor) 1977 God, History, and His-
torians. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
 CANTRIL, HADLEY
Hadley Cantril (1906-1969), American social
psychologist, received his B.S. in 1928 from
Dartmouth College. After two years of study at
universities in Munich and Berlin (1929/1930),
he received his PH.D. from Harvard in 1931 and
his LL.D. from Washington and Lee University
in 1949. At the time of his death, Cantril was
devoting his full energies to the application of
the social sciences to the highest levels of gov-
ernment policy making. However, his personal
commitment to the betterment of society, his
belief in the social role of science, and his faith
in the democratic process made that effort the
culmination of a lifelong commitment. Of his 19
published books, 10, written during a span of
25 years, directly addressed this issue. His earlier
work was restricted to the use of public opinion
polling data, but his later books, remaining
grounded in empirical research, drew on psycho-
logical concepts as a result of his development of
the transactional approach to human behavior.
The latter endeavor accounts for the remaining
half of his scientific output.
Cantril's place in psychology and the social
sciences grew out of the interplay of these two
related themes. His belief that social science had
value only if it could lead to the betterment of
people's lives was linked to the proposition that
this end could be achieved only by a social sci-
ence that was theoretically and empirically
sound.
Cantril held it "much more important to ana-
lyze crucial questions with whatever methods are
available . . . than . . . to study trivial prob-
lems with precise methods" (1967&, p. 93).
Throughout his career, he moved continually
between applied and theoretical social science.
He saw these not as two separate arenas but as
aspects of a unitary process, and argued against
the conventional separation of basic from applied
research, of theory from practice, or of method
from content.
At no point did Cantril even briefly abandon
one interest for the other, although periods of
different emphases divide his career into well-
defined phases. From 1932 to 1946, his major
efforts, including his dissertation (1932), con-
cerned the development of the potential of poll-
ing techniques, with particular reference to pub-
lic policy. In the years 1946 to 1955, he focused
on the development of the transactional per-
spective in psychology, and the remaining 14
years of his life were devoted to synthesizing
polling practice and transactional thinking into
a comprehensive approach to global social and
political realities.
In 1935, Cantril was invited to Princeton Uni-
versity, where he was to spend the next 34 years.
He soon became a leading figure in the emer-
gence of public opinion polling as a scientific
endeavor of tremendous power. He pioneered in
teaching opinion research as an academic disci-
pline, participating in the establishment of the
Office of Public Opinion Research in 1940, and
four years later published Gauging Public Opin-
ion (1944). In the prewar and war years, he
advised the government on propaganda and
policy matters through the interpretation of
polling data. "Throughout all my Washington
activities, I tried to avoid any publicity" (1967a,
99
100 CANTRIL, HADLEY
p. vii), and most of his direct involvement at the
government policy level at this time and later
remained virtually unknown until the publica-
tion of the semiautobiographical The Human Di-
mension (1967'a).
During this period Cantril also published a
number of social psychological studies, most
notably The Invasion From Mars (1940), The
Psychology of Social Movements (1941), and
The Psychology of Ego-involvements (Sherif &
Cantril 1947). Although his interest in psy-
chological theory is evident throughout these
books, it was not until he coupled his long inter-
est in the work of George Herbert Mead with
the work of Adelbert Ames, Jr., whom he met in
1946, that he found the key to a way of thinking
about psychological processes—the transactional
point of view, which Ames had developed by
combining his research in perception with the
theories of John Dewey. Cantril adapted this
perspective to meet the needs of social science,
maintaining that "we do not 'react to' our en-
vironment . . . but 'transact with' an environ-
ment in which we ourselves play the role of
active agent" (1967a, p. 17). Over the years he
painstakingly elaborated this position into a
comprehensive approach to psychology that re-
ceived its initial expression in The "Why" of
Mans Experience (1950b) and was still being
elaborated in terms of neurology and physiology
at the time of his death.
Cantril's interest in international social psy-
chology remained active during this period, and
was expressed in Tensions That Cause Wars
(1950a) and How Nations See Each Other
(Cantril & Buchanan 1953). In 1955 he estab-
lished the Institute for International Social Re-
search, to which he devoted his full energies
thereafter. By then he believed he had both the
methodological tools and the theoretical frame-
work to permit a significant contribution to inter-
national understanding, a venture he advanced
in a series of published and unpublished reports.
Although always optimistic, he was toward the
end dismayed at the slow acceptance of social
science in government and politics.
Cantril's lifelong interest in large-scale psy-
chological theory and in global social relations
was rooted in his concern for individual well-
being and his belief in the unique potential of
each human being. For him the human condition
was expressed ultimately at the level of indi-
vidual human feeling. His first published paper
was a study of emotion (Cantril & Hunt 1932),
and his last major paper, entitled "Sentio, Ergo
Sum," asserted his conviction that "being is
more reliably indicated by an awareness of
feeling than by any rational thought" (1967i>,
p. 94). The 35 years that elapsed between these
works can be seen as an attempt to systematize
that position and apply it for man's benefit.
It may be too soon to evaluate the success of
that effort. During his life Cantril was occasion-
ally attacked and often ignored by much of es-
tablished social science. His appeal and ultimate
influence were primarily with students and
younger professionals who characteristically
sought new ways of thinking, and for whom
Cantril always had time and words of encourage-
ment. He was fond of quoting Einstein to the
effect that it is futile to try to convince one's
colleagues, and, true to that belief, he func-
tioned largely outside the mainstream of Ameri-
can psychology. Yet psychology increasingly
bears closer resemblance to Cantril's thinking
than to that of his critics. The concept of trans-
action has become commonplace in social sci-
ence writing, although few think to acknowledge
its originators or Cantril's anticipation—prior to
1950—of the intellectual currents of the late
twentieth century.
WILLIAM H. ITTELSON
WORKS BY CANTRIL
1932 General and Specific Attitudes, Psychological
Monographs, Vol. 42: Whole no. 192.
1932 CANTRIL, HADLEY; and HUNT, WILLIAM A. Emo-
tional Effects Produced by the Injection of Adrena-
lin. American Journal of Psychology 44:300-307.
(1935) 1971 ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and CANTRIL,
HADLEY The Psychology of Radio. New York: Arno.
1940 The Invasion From Mars: A Study in the Psychol-
ogy of Panic. Princeton Univ. Press. —•» A paper-
back edition was published by Harper in 1966.
1941 The Psychology of Social Movements. New York:
Wiley; London: Chapman & Hall. —» A paperback
edition was published by Krieger in 1973.
(1944) 1947 CANTRIL, HADLEY (editor) Gauging Pub-
lic Opinion. Princeton Univ. Press.
1947 Understanding Man's Social Behavior: Prelim-
inary Notes. Princeton, N.J.: Office of Public Opin-
ion Research.
1947 SHERIF, MUZAFER; and CANTRIL, HADLEY The
Psychology of Ego-involvements: Social Attitudes
and Identifications. New York: Wiley. —> A paper-
back edition was published in 1966.
1950a CANTRIL, HADLEY (editor) Tensions That Cause
Wars.- Common Statements and Individual Papers
by a Group of Social Scientists Brought Together
by UNESCO. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.
1950b The "Why" of Man's Experience. New York:
Macmillan.
1951 CANTRIL, HADLEY (editor) Public Opinion 1935-
1946. Princeton Univ. Press.
(1953) 1972 CANTRIL, HADLEY; and BUCHANAN, WIL-
LIAM How Nations See Each Other: A Study in
Public Opinion. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
1958 The Politics of Despair. New York: Basic Books.

—> A paperback edition was published by Collier in
1962.
1960 Soviet Leaders and Mastery Over Man. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
1960 CANTRIL, HADLEY; and BUMSTEAD, CHARLES H.
Reflections on the Human Venture. New York Univ.
Press.
1961 Human Nature and Political Systems. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
1966 The Pattern of Human Concerns. New Bruns-
wick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
1967a The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy
Research. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ.
Press.
1967Z? Sentio, Ergo Sum: "Motivation" Reconsidered.
Journal of Psychology 65:91-107.
1967 CANTRIL, HADLEY; and FREE, LLOYD A. The
Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public
Opinion. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
—» A paperback edition was published by Simon &
Schuster in 1968.
CARMICHAEL, LEONARD
Leonard Carmichael was born November 9,
1898, in the Germantown section of Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, and died September 16,
1973, in Washington, at the age of 74. At the
time of his death, he was vice president for re-
search and exploration of the National Geo-
graphic Society. Elected to the National Acad-
emy of Sciences in 1943, he served as chairman
of its section of psychology from 1950 to 1953.
Earlier honors included election to the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1932, and to
the American Philosophical Society in 1942.
A physiological psychologist, Carmichael also
had a flair for administration, serving as chair-
man of the Brown University psychology de-
partment from 1927 to 1936; as chairman of
psychology and dean of faculty at the Univer-
sity of Rochester, 1936-1938; as president of
Tufts University, 1938-1952; as secretary of
the Smithsonian Institution, 1953-1964; and as
vice president of the National Geographic So-
ciety, 1964-1973.
Carmichael was the only child of Thomas
Harrison Carmichael, a successful physician,
and Emily Henrietta Leonard Carmichael, who
was active on many volunteer charitable boards.
At the time of her death, she was chief of the
Philadelphia Bureau of Recreation. His mater-
nal grandfather, Charles Hall Leonard, D.D.,
LL.D., was for many years dean of the Crane
Theological School of Tufts University.
Although his parents were not Quakers, Car-
michael attended the Germantown Friends
School. He entered Tufts University in 1917,
and graduated in 1921 with a B.S. As a senior
CARMICHAEL, LEONARD 101
he carried out a small research problem on the
embryology of the eye muscles of the shark; it
aroused his interest in the significance and evo-
lutionary history of sense organs. His interest
in sensory psychology and physiology as deter-
minants of an organism's behavior was to be-
come the dominant scientific theme of his
career. At Brown, Rochester, and Tufts, he was
director of the laboratory of psychology and
sensory physiology. At Rochester, as professor,
and chairman of the department of psychology
and dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences,
and at Tufts, as president, he maintained an
active and direct involvement in the research
of these laboratories.
The books that influenced him most as an
undergraduate were those of Jacques Loeb, the
biological ultramechanist, and C. Lloyd Morgan,
the proponent of emergent evolution. After
reading Howard C. Warren's Human Psychology
(1919), however, he decided that psychology,
rather than anatomy or physiology, was the
discipline in which he could best study the
senses with a view to their functional role in
behavior as well as in the biological setting.
He entered Harvard University as a graduate
student on a fellowship provided by the educa-
tional psychologist Walter F. Dearborn, with
whom he had an especially close association.
Early in his graduate work, he participated in
rebuilding an improved model of the famous
Dodge—Dearborn eye movement recording cam-
era. Carmichael was encouraged to satisfy his
interest in biology as well as psychology. He
took a number of courses in zoology, and his
first piece of graduate laboratory research was
a quantitative study of the reaction of the meal
worm (Tenebrio molitor~) to light. G. H. Parker,
a professor of zoology, guided this work. Car-
michael regarded Parker's lectures on the ner-
vous system and the sense organs as models of
clarity and scholarship. In psychology his
teachers included E. G. Boring, L. T. Troland,
and William McDougall.
Carmichael's PH.D. thesis, a theoretical and
historical dissertation on the psychology and
biology of human and animal instincts, was
published under the title "Heredity and Envi-
ronment: Are They Antithetical?" (1925a). In
reviewing the literature on this subject, he re-
ported accidentally discovering Wilhelm T.
Preyer's work on signs of life in the fetus. He
saw this approach as the way to study the mor-
phological growth of receptors and the nervous
system in relation to behavior at various stages
102 CARMICHAEL, LEONARD
of early ontogenetic development in mammals
before learning begins or is important.
In 1924, after receiving his PH.D. and com-
pleting a Sheldon Traveling fellowship, he
joined the faculty of Princeton University to
teach physiological psychology and history and
systems of psychology. At Princeton he began
his research on behavior development with lar-
val amblystoma and frog tadpoles. He found
that their physical development proceeded nor-
mally even after they had been immobilized
with a mild concentration of the anesthetic
chloretone. Here was an ideal situation, in
which, presumably, all sensory input was re-
duced and all motor movement, clearly, inhib-
ited, so that no practice (i.e., learning) was
possible. He observed that when the anesthetic
was removed, the experimentally treated or-
ganisms swam vigorously in as coordinated a
manner as did the undrugged controls, who had
been allowed to move throughout development.
As he states in his autobiography: "These
studies supported a hereditary rather than an
environmentalistic theory of the determination
of the growth of organized behavior. At the time,
the results of these experiments surprised and
almost shocked me. They did not support my
then strongly held belief in the determining in-
fluence of the environment at every stage in the
growth of behavior" (1967, p. 37). As a conse-
quence, his reports of these experiments in Psy-
chological Review (1926; 1927; 1928) seemed
to dodge the obvious conclusion with his reitera-
tion of the intimate interrelation of heredity and
environment and the difficulties of disentan-
gling their interaction.
In 1927 Carmichael moved to Brown Univer-
sity. Still in his twenties at the time of his ap-
pointment, he was one of the youngest full
professors on the Brown faculty. Although he
became busily involved in organizing the new
laboratory and department, equipping it for
graduate training and research in experimental
and physiological psychology, at the same time
that he continued his own research, he person-
ally taught undergraduate and graduate courses
and guided the research of undergraduate and
graduate students. Carmichael was a clear and
dynamic lecturer; his elementary course was
extremely popular and students voted him the
most popular teacher a number of times.
At Brown University, Carmichael achieved
his long-cherished goal of studying the develop-
ment of behavior in fetal mammals. His own
preparatory work and that of others had shown
that fetal neural function rapidly deteriorated
if circulation was occluded. He began with the
study of the fetal cat and developed an espe-
cially designed cradle in which the pregnant
mother cat could be supported while a heated
trough filled with saline solution received the
fetus, its fetal circulation intact, after a Caesar-
ean section. In order to prevent the complicating
effects of the anesthesia under which the pre-
liminary surgery was performed, he devised a
way of sectioning the mother's spinal cord in
the cervical region. A kind of spinal anesthesia
without drugs, it rendered her motionless and
kept pain and other sensory input from reach-
ing her brain. The fetus could then be studied
in a nearly normal physiological state. James
Coronius and Harold Schlosberg participated
with Carmichael in the first study of the fetal
cat. Motion pictures were taken and verbal rec-
ords of behavior descriptions were dictated.
After Carmichael's marriage to Pearl L. Kidston
in 1932, she assisted in many early experiments,
especially in transcribing and keeping records.
CarmichaeFs most extensive studies of de-
velopment were performed on fetal guinea pigs,
focusing on responses in more than 100 cuta-
neous pressure reflexogenous zones throughout
the entire active prenatal period of 68 days.
Carmichael remarked that it was not the nature
of the physical stimulus so much as the fact
that it was above the threshold of some skin
receptors in a specific locus that determined the
response. Many typical patterns of behavior re-
mained amazingly constant in the rapidly grow-
ing organism. Yet growth could suddenly alter
responses in such a way that they could easily
be confused with learned responses, especially
if such changes had been seen in postnatal life.
He noted in "The Experimental Embryology of
Mind"'(1941).-
I have never seen any responses in the late fetus
which, in their elements, have not appeared as a
typical patterned reaction to isolated stimuli many
times before. In the late guinea pig fetus the hair
coat is well grown, the teeth are erupted, eyes and
ears are functional, and adaptive integrated be-
havior is well established. At this time such an
animal will, to use the language of teleology, at-
tempt in a most effective and even ingenious way
to deal with a tactual stimulus applied to its lip
First, it may be, it will attempt to remove the
stimulus by curling the lip; then, if the stimulus
remains, it is brushed by the forepaw on the stimu-
lated side. If the stimulus still persists, the head
is turned sharply. Finally, a general struggle is

resorted to which involved movements of all four
limbs and all trunk muscles. In a late fetus this
final maneuver is sometimes so quick and effective
that the experimenter is often thwarted and the
offending stimulus is removed—by a guinea pig
fetus that is having its own willful and annoying
way in spite of anything the experimenter can
do. . . .
Complex patterns of behavior emerge as a result
of maturation. Such behavior is possibly as truly
end-seeking and purposeful as is any behavior in
the world which does not involve the use of lan-
guage. I see no reason to believe that this emergent
purposeful behavior is not as natural a result of the
processes of growth as is the length of the fetal
whiskers, and quite as independent of learning.
(PP. 16, 17)
His findings on the development of sensori-
motor responses in mammalian fetuses brought
home dramatically the natural sequence of
maturation and the role of genetic factors in be-
havioral development. But he was careful to
avoid the broad generalizations about the course
and nature of developmental sequences to which
some workers were prone. The classic work of
W. T. Preyer and G. E. Coghill on the sequence
of motility in the developing amphibian larvae
had shown the first movement to be a C-shaped
or reversed C curvature, followed by an S or
sigmoid form of reaction. Coghill (1929) had
characterized the S reaction as a reversal of
flexure before the earlier C flexure was com-
pleted, thus producing the sinuous behavior of
the total organism. The entire sequence, when
speeded up, was in fact the larval swimming
movement. These movements appeared before
the limbs developed. Although in this organism
the forelimbs developed before the hindlimbs,
both sets of limbs moved only as part of the
larger trunk movement. Gradually, however, in-
dependent limb action began to individuate out
of the dominant trunk movements. First the
forelimbs, then the hindlimbs, showed a certain
autonomy. Trunk movement in walking was
regarded as nothing more or less than swim-
ming movement at a reduced speed. Develop-
ment was a progressive expansion of a perfectly
integrated total pattern from which the parts—
i.e., partial patterns—individuated with various
degrees of discreteness.
Carmichael saw something different in fetal
mammals. He gave more importance to the early
individuation of certain quite specific responses
that later became parts of integrated behaviors.
Rather than debate the issue of holistic vs. par-
ticulate development, Carmichael cautioned that
CARMICHAEL, LEONARD 103
the researcher would do better to record as un-
ambiguously as possible the responses made by
a fetus at any stage, rather than fit all develop-
mental changes into one formula.
Carmichael began his experimental studies at
a time when the American biological and psy-
chological community was not familiar with the
advances in ethology that documented the re-
leaser function of patterned stimuli in eliciting
species-specific responses. The regularity of
these species-specific behaviors, and their oc-
currence in animals reared in environmental
isolation with restricted postnatal experience,
had led Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen
to argue for their instinctual basis. In much
animal behavior occurring under natural cir-
cumstances, such "releaser stimuli" were often
perceptually complex, a characteristic coloring
and size of an egg, particular location and size
of a red bill spot, even a sequence of movements
by another animal.
Psychologists as a group are cautious in at-
tributing behavior patterns to genetically deter-
mined processes or propensities. In the past,
however, some have used this facile explanation
to account for behavior whose full ontogenetic
history and experience had not been adequately
documented. With time, increasing interaction
between students of animal behavior and psy-
chologists has produced a sounder appreciation
of the role of genetic determinants in behavior,
both in their own right and as setting the stage
upon which experience and learning can inter-
act. Carmichael's work on the development of
behavior and its sensory control was in a sense
premonitory of changing views on the heredity-
environment issue. His first two editions of the
Manual of Child Psychology ([1946] 1954), and
a third edition (1970) under Paul H. Mussen's
editorship, are witness to Carmichael's unflag-
ging interest in this subject. He was less able
to devote his energies to such research during
the Tufts years, which overlapped with the
World War n effort. The Laboratory of Sensory
Physiology and Psychology at Tufts turned to
war-related projects that included the improve-
ment and application of new techniques to the
study of eye movements and visual fatigue.
Electronic recording, rather than ocular pho-
tography, proved more suitable for long-time
studies of reading fatigue, an old interest from
his days with Dearborn. To this method of regis-
tration could be added the simultaneous regis-
tration of brain waves, the electrical signs of
oscillatory neural activity in different brain
104 CARNAP, RUDOLF
regions throughout the reading, and other visual
tasks. Earlier, at Brown University and the
Bradley House, he had pioneered with H. H.
Jasper some of the first electroencephalographic
(EEC) registrations of brain waves in humans
and animals in the United States (Carmichael
& Jasper 1935).
With his call to the Smithsonian secretary-
ship, Carmichael not only turned his adminis-
trative talents to modernizing that institution,
which included the new Museum of Sciences
and Technology, but found some opportunity
to pursue his interest in behavioral development.
He informed the superintendent of the Wash-
ington Zoological Park that he wished to be
present whenever a birth was imminent among
any of its exotic animal species. He reveled in
observing the new-born yak or giraffe struggle
to its feet and in relatively short order display
coordinated, though awkward, motor patterns.
He had become extremely interested in devel-
opmental studies of primates, and indeed served
as first president of the Primatological Society.
Later, at National Geographic, he was proud of
its support of Jane Goodall's original and
pathbreaking field studies of chimpanzees in
their natural habitat.
Although Leonard Carmichael was active
also in national affairs and in scientific and
educational domains, this memoir has focused
on his contributions in the study of behavioral
development. His memberships, officerships,
awards, and distinctions, too numerous to re-
count, include 23 honorary degrees, the presi-
dential citation of merit, the public service
medal of the National Academy of Sciences,
orders of merit from four foreign countries,
fellowships, trusteeships, and a legion of re-
sponsibilities and duties of distinction. His
honorary degree citation from Harvard called
him "a psychologist who combines distinction
in his science and success in administration."
CARL PFAFFMANN
WORKS BY CARMICHAEL
1925a Heredity and Environment: Are They Anti-
thetical? Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychol-
ogy 20:245-260.
1925b The Report of a Sheldon Fellow. Harvard
Alumni Bulletin 27, no. 37:1087-1089.
1926 The Development of Behavior in Vertebrates
Experimentally Removed From the Influence of Ex-
ternal Stimulation. Psychological Review 33:51—58.
1927 A Further Study of the Development of Behavior
in Vertebrates Experimentally Removed From the
Influence of External Stimulation. Psychological
Review 34:34-47.
1928 A Further Experimental Study of the Develop-
ment of Behavior. Psychological Review 35:253-269.
1934 An Experimental Study in the Prenatal Guinea-
pig of the Origin and Development of Reflexes and
Patterns of Behavior in Relation to the Stimulation
of Specific Receptor Areas During the Period of
Active Fetal Life. Genetic Psychology Monographs
16:337-491.
1935 CARMICHAEL, LEONARD; and JASPER, H. H. Elec-
trical Potentials From the Intact Human Brain.
Science 81:51-53.
1941 The Experimental Embryology of Mind. Psycho-
logical Bulletin 38:1-28.
(1946) 1970 The Onset and Early Development of
Behavior. Volume 1, pages 447-563 in Manual of
Child Psychology. Edited by Paul H. Mussen. 3d ed.
New York: Wiley.
(1947) 1972 CARMICHAEL, LEONARD; and DEARBORN,
WALTER F. Reading and Visual Fatigue. Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood.
1967 Autobiography. Volume 5, pages 27-56 in A
History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited by
E. G. Boring and Gardner Lindzey. New York:
Apple ton.
1968 Bell, Charles. Volume 2, pages 47-48 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1972 Man and Animal: A New Understanding. Pages
9-16 in Thomas B. Allen (editor), The Marvels of
Animal Behavior. Washington: National Geo-
graphic Society.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
COGHILL, G. E. 1929 Anatomy and the Problem of
Behavior. Cambridge Univ. Press; New York: Mac-
millan.
MCCOLLOM, IVAN N. 1973 Psychological Classics:
Older Journal Articles Frequently Cited Today.
American Psychologist 28:363-365.
MEAD, LEONARD C. 1974 Leonard Carmichael: 1898-
1973. American Journal of Psychology 87:517-525.
WARREN, HOWARD C. 1919 Human Psychology. Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin.
CARNAP, RUDOLF
Rudolf Carnap, the noted philosopher of sci-
ence, logic, and language, was born in 1891 at
Ronsdorf, near Barmen, Germany. He studied
mathematics, physics, and philosophy at the
universities of Jena and Freiburg-im-Breisgau
before and after service in World War i, and re-
ceived his doctorate in philosophy at Jena in
1921. Appointed a lecturer at the University of
Vienna, he soon became, after Moritz Schlick,
the leading exponent of logical positivism (later,
logical empiricism)—the philosophy of the Vi-
enna Circle. With Hitlerism threatening to over-
whelm all Europe, Carnap, a humanist socialist
in his sympathies, emigrated to the United
States in 1936. There he taught philosophy for
many years, first at the University of Chicago

and then at the University of California at Los
Angeles. He died in California on September 14,
1970, at the age of 79.
Education. After having been taught at home
for several years by his mother, a former
teacher, Carnap entered the Gymnasium at
Barmen. Here he was early drawn to mathemat-
ics because of its precise concepts and rigorous
proofs. This concern for concept and proof con-
tinued throughout his life. His university studies
at Jena and Freiburg-im-Breisgau centered first
on mathematics and philosophy, shifting later
to philosophy and physics.
At Jena, Carnap read Kant with Bruno Bauch
and some Hegel with Hermann Nohl. But the
event that most shaped his future career was his
chance enrollment in the fall of 1910 in a semi-
nar conducted by Gottlob Frege. In 1879, Frege
had published a little book, Begriffsschrift,
which founded the modern science of symbolic
or mathematical logic. Now, a generation later,
his great work still virtually unknown, he re-
mained an obscure associate professor of math-
ematics at Jena, lecturing to a handful of stu-
dents. The 1910 seminar, on the Begriffsschrift,
gave Carnap his first view of "real logic"; he
returned for another course with Frege in the
spring of 1913, and again in the spring of 1914.
Meanwhile, in 1913, Carnap had begun doc-
toral work in experimental physics, but progress
was slow ("I was certainly not a good experi-
menter"). When World War i broke out ("for
me an incomprehensible catastrophe"), Carnap,
nonpolitical but vaguely antimilitarist like most
of his associates, nonetheless felt it his duty to
go to the front. He served there until trans-
ferred to Berlin in the summer of 1917 for mili-
tary research in physics. At this time, Carnap
began to study the ideas and theory of the so-
cialist workers' movement. Thus he, with his
friends, was able to welcome the German revolu-
tion, and the Russian revolution before it, as a
"liberation from the old powers." (But "in both
cases, after a few years, we saw that the
promised high ideals were not realized.")
In 1919, Carnap resumed his studies at Jena
and Freiburg, this time in the philosophy of
physics. His doctoral dissertation was a highly
technical essay in conceptual analysis in which
he sought to show that major controversies
about the nature of "space" arise from a failure
to distinguish among three meanings of the
term: the formal or logicomathematical, the
intuitive (here described in semi-Kantian terms),
CARNAP, RUDOLF 705
and the physical. The dissertation was approved
by Bruno Bauch in 1921 and was published a
year later as a supplement to the influential
journal Kantstudien, under the title Der Raum:
Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre.
During this period, Carnap continued to work
in logic. He made a thorough study both of the
massive Principia Mathematica (1910-1913) of
Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell,
to which Frege had referred in his lectures, and
of Frege's own writings. Late in 1921, he turned
to Russell's Our Knowledge of the External
World as a Field for Scientific Method in Phi-
losophy (1914), in which Russell had urged
philosophers to follow Frege's example and use
the "logico-mathematical method of philosophy."
Carnap later wrote: "I felt as if this appeal had
been directed to me personally." He at once set
about an intensive study of all of Russell's writ-
ings on epistemology and scientific methodology.
Soon thereafter he began a major work on the
logical analysis of empirical concepts in the
spirit of Russell's program.
In the early 1920s Carnap, who had been
working in comparative isolation, started to de-
velop relations with other scholars in his field.
Among them was another young physicist
turned philosopher, Hans Reichenbach, with
whom Carnap remained in very close touch
until Reichenbach's death in 1953.
The Vienna Circle years. In 1922, Moritz
Schlick, a widely respected German epistemolo-
gist and philosopher of science, had accepted
the prestigious chair in the philosophy of the
inductive sciences at the University of Vienna.
He quickly gathered around himself a group of
scientists and philosophers, including Hans
Hahn, the mathematician, and Otto Neurath,
the sociologist-economist. In 1924, two of his
students, Herbert Feigl and Friedrich Wais-
mann, suggested that he form a regular discus-
sion group in the philosophy of science. From
these Thursday evenings was born the famed
Vienna Circle.
Carnap had met Schlick through Reichenbach
in 1924 and a year later was asked to lecture to
the Vienna Circle. In 1926, he and Reichenbach
became the leading candidates for appointment
as instructor in philosophy at the University of
Vienna. Schlick and Hahn, facing a difficult
choice, finally recommended Carnap.
Life in the Vienna Circle was ideal for Car-
nap. Here was a spirit of free and undogmatic
inquiry; here philosophy was practiced not in
 106 CARNAP, RUDOLF
the traditional mode of speculative metaphysics
but as the painstaking, informed logical analysis
of the concepts of the sciences; here too was an
atmosphere of cultural and political enlighten-
ment. Years later he recalled the five year in-
structorship as "one of the most stimulating,
enjoyable, and fruitful periods of my life."
And fruitful it was. The manuscript of his
Russell-inspired work, which he brought with
him to Vienna, was discussed avidly and in de-
tail in the circle. In revised form, it appeared in
1928 as Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Exploit-
ing the logical apparatus forged by Frege and
Russell, Carnap offered in the Aufbau a logical
reconstruction of the concepts used in empirical
science in terms of one or two concepts drawn
from immediate experience. But he warned
against construing this as a solipsistic "onto-
logical" reduction of all "reality" to immediate
personal experience. Here, and in a small mono-
graph published the same year, and indeed
throughout his career, he insisted that science
is metaphysically neutral—and philosophy should
be. Moreover, the only genuine issue that lurks
behind such metaphysical pseudoissues as, say,
realism versus idealism, is the problem of choos-
ing a suitable language or conceptual frame-
work for science. And this is a matter to be de-
cided on practical grounds, not theoretical ones.
By 1929, Carnap had become a leader in the
circle second only to Schlick. That year he pub-
lished a text on symbolic logic; coauthored with
Hahn and Neurath the circle's programmatic
declaration Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung-.
Der Wiener Kreis; joined Reichenbach in found-
ing the new journal Erkenntnis; and helped or-
ganize the Prague Conference on the Episte-
mology of the Exact Sciences.
Two years later, Carnap accepted a chair in
natural philosophy at the German University in
Prague. Keeping in touch with the circle through
frequent visits, he now focused his own research
on language*. His initial motivation is reflected
in the title of a 1932 paper, "The Elimination of
Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of
Language." This research led to his second
major work, Die logische Syntax der Sprache
(1934), which laid the foundations for a new
discipline, the study of the logical syntax of
formal or constructed languages. Stimulated by
the ideas of Alfred Tarski, the Polish mathe-
matician, Carnap then extended his studies
from the logical syntax to the semantics of
formal languages.
Meanwhile, the Vienna Circle had begun to
take on the aspect of a movement, "a new move-
ment in European philosophy." Visitors had
come to Vienna from Germany, Poland, Finland,
the United States, and England. In Prague, Car-
nap was sought out by such younger American
philosophers as W. V. Quine of Harvard Uni-
versity and Charles Morris of the University of
Chicago. In 1934, he gave a series of lectures at
London University, which became his first book
published in English, Philosophy and Logical
Syntax (1935). It was on this trip too that he
first met his mentor, Bertrand Russell.
But another movement was also spreading.
Nazism, having come to power in Germany, was
preparing to absorb Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The German University at Prague had become
a center of Nazi agitation. There was no place
on the continent for a German of Carnap's out-
look to live and work. Thus he, like most of his
fellow members of the Vienna Circle, found it
necessary to emigrate. With his wife Ina, he left
Prague at the end of 1935. In September 1936,
through Quine, he was invited to the Harvard
Tercentenary Celebration as a participating
scholar, and was awarded an honorary SC.D. de-
gree. With the help of Morris, he obtained a
teaching post that fall at the University of
Chicago.
Teaching in the United States. Carnap taught
at Chicago from 1936 to 1952, with several
leaves for visiting professorships and for re-
search. He soon had many colleagues, old and
new, with whom to discuss logical and philo-
sophical problems. Feigl had come to the United
States in 1930 and was teaching at Iowa State
University. Reichenbach, after a stay in Turkey,
was appointed to a professorship in 1938 at the
University of California at Los Angeles. Carnap
himself arranged in 1938/1939 for Carl G.
Hempel and Olaf Helmer to join him as
assistants.
There were many memorable experiences.
Russell came to Chicago in the fall of 1939 as a
visiting professor. During Carnap's own visiting
professorship at Harvard in 1940/1941, Russell
delivered the William James lectures the first
semester and Tarski spent the full year there.
Soon a regular discussion group was formed,
with Russell, Tarski, Quine, and Carnap as the
most active participants.
Carnap's books, monographs, papers, and re-
views were now appearing in rapid sequence,
especially from 1942 on. That year he published

his Introduction to Semantics, and a year later
his Formalization of Logic. In 1947, he pub-
lished Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Se-
mantics and Modal Logic.
In the early 1940s, Carnap, prompted by
Feigl, had begun to shift his attention from de-
ductive logic and semantics to the problems of
probability theory and inductive logic. The year
1950 saw the publication of his treatise Logical
Foundations of Probability (as well as his influ-
ential paper, "Empiricism, Semantics, and On-
tology," in which he developed and refined his
1928 thesis of metaphysical neutrality). From
1952 to 1954, he continued his researches on
probability at the Institute for Advanced Study
in Princeton, New Jersey. There he had a num-
ber of lively, enjoyable discussions with Albert
Einstein.
In 1954, Carnap accepted an appointment at
the University of California at Los Angeles,
succeeding his friend Reichenbach. Carnap
taught at the university until 1962, when he
retired, as he wrote Russell, "to devote myself to
the further development of my theory of induc-
tive probability."
Originally, Carnap had intended his 1950
treatise on probability to be the first of a two-
volume work. But his ideas on the subject had
changed materially during the decade that fol-
lowed. Instead of a second volume, he finally
worked out a plan for a large group of papers
to be written by himself and such colleagues
and former students as John Kemeny, Richard
C. Jeffrey, and Chaim Gaifman, and to be pub-
lished from time to time as Studies in Inductive
Logic and Probability. Delays set in, and volume
1 of Studies, edited by Carnap and Jeffrey, did
not appear until 1971, some months after Car-
nap's death. It contained, among other contri-
butions, his 130-page monograph, A Basic Sys-
tem of Inductive Logic: Part I. He was working
on the final revisions for Basic System: Part II
and had almost completed them, when, follow-
ing a short illness, he died in September 1970.
"A towering figure." Carnap was a brilliant,
dedicated scholar, who wrote—and spoke—with
extraordinary lucidity and rigor. So much so,
indeed, that, as Hempel put it:
To observers who did not know him closely, Carnap
may well have appeared as intellect and rationality
incarnate, as a powerful thinker moving in a theore-
tical realm far distant from the domain of human
passions and hopes and fears; but this picture does
not do him justice. Carnap formed very strong human
CARNAP, RUDOLF 107
bonds; he was a warm-hearted and loyal friend, a
most interested and sympathetic listener, and a
broad-minded observer of the human scene. . . .
(1971, p. xviii)
Although not a political activist in the usual
sense of the term, Carnap took a keen, informed
interest in the great issues of the day. In a letter
(1962) congratulating Russell on his ninetieth
birthday and signed "with deep affection and
gratitude," Carnap wrote: "I am in complete
agreement with the aims for which you are
fighting: serious negotiations instead of the cold
war, no bomb-testing, no fallout shelters. But,
not having your wonderful power of words, I
limit myself to participation in public appeals
and petitions initiated by others and to some
private letters to President Kennedy" (Russell
1969, p. 133).
Characteristically, he closed his "Intellectual
Autobiography" (1963) with these lines:
Thus one of the main problems, perhaps the most
important and most difficult one, after the terribly
urgent problem of the avoidance of atomic war, is
the task of finding ways of organizing society which
will reconcile the personal and cultural freedom
of the individual with the development of an effi-
cient organization of state and economy.
It was also in keeping with his character that
in January 1970, just a few months before his
death, he made it a point to visit two Mexican
philosophers, De Gortari and Molina, held as
political prisoners in Mexico City. On his return,
he sent a report to friends and colleagues,
describing his visit and urging support for the
release of the two men—one more expression of
his profound commitment to justice and free-
dom. As W. V. Quine wrote: "Carnap is a tower-
ing figure. I see him as the dominant figure in
philosophy from the 1930s onward, as Russell
had been in the decades before" (1971, p. xxii).
ALBERT E. BLUMBERG
WORKS BY CARNAP
1922 Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre.
Berlin: Reuther & Reichard.
(19280) 1967 The Logical Structure of the World.
Translated by Rolf A. George. Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press. —> First published in German.
(1928b) 1967 Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. Trans-
lated by Rolf A. George. Berkeley: Univ. of Cali-
fornia Press. —» First published in German.
(1929) 1966 CARNAP, RUDOLF; HAHN, HANS; and NEU-
RATH, OTTO The Scientific World View. Translated
by Albert E. Blumberg. Pages 483-494 in Jesse A.
Mann and Gerald F. Kreyche (editors), Perspec-
tives on Reality. New York: Harcourt. —*• First pub-
lished in German.
108 CARR, E. H.
(1934) 1964 The Logical Syntax of Language. Trans-
lated by Amethe Smeaton. New York: Humanities.
—> First published in German.
(1935) 1976 Philosophy and Logical Syntax. New
York: AMS Press.
1942 Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press.
1943 Formalization of Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard Univ. Press.
(1947) 1956 Meaning and Necessity: A Study in
Semantics and Modal Logic. 2d ed., enl. Univ. of
Chicago Press.
(1950a) 1956 Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.
Supplement in Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Neces-
sity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. 2d ed.,
enl. Univ. of Chicago Press.
(1950b) 1962 Logical Foundations of Probability. 2d
ed. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1963 Intellectual Autobiography. Pages 3-84 in Paul
A. Schilpp (editor), The Philosophy of Rudolf Car-
nap. La Salle, 111.: Open Court.
1971a Inductive Logic and Rational Decisions. Volume
1, pages 5-31 in Rudolf Carnap and Richard C.
Jeffrey (editors), Studies in Inductive Logic and
Probability. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
1971i> A Basic System of Inductive Logic, Part I. Vol-
ume 1, pages 33-165 in Rudolf Carnap and Richard
C. Jeffrey (editors), Studies in Inductive Logic and
Probability. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BLUMBERG, ALBERT E.; and FEIGL, HERBERT 1931
Logical Positivism: A New Movement in European
Philosophy. Journal of Philosophy 28:281-296.
FEIGL, HERBERT 1968 The Wiener Kreis in America.
Volume 2, pages 630-673 in Perspectives in Ameri-
can History. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University,
Charles Warren Center for Studies in American
History.
FREGE, GOTTLOB 1879 Begriffsschrift: Eine der arith-
metischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen
Denkens. Halle (Germany): Nebert.
HEMPEL, CARL G. 1971 Homage to Rudolf Carnap.
Pages xvi-xix in Roger C. Buck and Robert S.
Cohen (editors), PSA 1970: In Memory of Rudolf
Carnap. New York: Humanities Press.
QUINE, W. V. 1971 Homage to Rudolf Carnap. Pages
xxii—xxv in Roger C. Buck and Robert S. Cohen
(editors), PSA 1970: In Memory of Rudolf Carnap.
New York: Humanities Press,
RUSSELL, BERTRAND (1914) 1929 Our Knowledge of
the External World as a Field for Scientific Method
in Philosophy. 2d ed. New York: Norton.
RUSSELL, BERTRAND 1969 The Autobiography of
Bertrand Russell. Volume 3. London: Allen & Un-
win; Boston: Little, Brown. —> A paperback edition
was published by Allen & Unwin in 1975.
WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH; and RUSSELL, BERTRAND
(1910-1913) 1957 Principia Mathematica. 2d ed.
Cambridge Univ. Press.
CARR, E. H.
Edward Hallett Carr was born June 28, 1892,
in north London, the son of a small manufac-
turer whom he has described as belonging to "the
middle middle class." He was educated at the
Merchants Taylors' School and in 1911 went on
scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge. His
contacts with Trinity's most celebrated dons,
such as Alfred North Whitehead, A. E. Housman,
James G. Frazer, and Bertrand Russell were
limited, but he earned a first in the Classics
Tripos and university prizes in Latin epigrams,
Latin poems, and Greek translation.
Had World War i not intervened, Carr might
have become a classics don at Cambridge; in-
stead he spent twenty years as a diplomat. Such
accidents were to shape his intellectual journey
for more than sixty years. One year after joining
the Foreign Office, he was, in his words, "shifted
onto the Russian Revolution." By accident he was
present at the Paris Peace Conference and
later served as assistant adviser on League of
Nations affairs in the Foreign Office. These ex-
periences led him to try, in The Twenty Years'
Crisis (1939), to unravel the tangled web of
international politics. During World War n he
was assistant editor of The (London) Times and
its chief leader writer; he exercised quiet in-
fluence in preparing the way for a Labour gov-
ernment in 1945. The Times in this period was
referred to as the "Thrupenny" Daily Worker,
and conservative critics identified Carr as a
member of a band of statist radicals. The two
world wars, perhaps World War I especially, led
to the erosion of his faith in the established
values of liberal England and to his search for
a world different from the conventional one in
which he had been raised. He followed, not the
route common to intellectuals in the 1930s—of
flirtation with Leninism—but one that led to a
discovery of the intellectual world of nineteenth-
century Russia and the writings of F. M. Dostoev-
sky and M. A. Bakunin. Twice he returned to
university life: in 1936 when he became Wilson
professor of international politics at the Uni-
versity College of Wales at Aberystwyth, leaving
the Foreign Office (acknowledging that he had
stayed too long) to have greater freedom to
write about the Russian revolution; and again
in 1953 when he returned to Cambridge to take
up what would be a quarter century of research
on the history of Soviet Russia, an effort cul-
minating in fourteen books arranged in ten
volumes (1950-1977). His return to Cambridge
came not because he was asked to leave The
Times, but because, at age 52, he was deter-
mined to return to writing his history of Soviet
Russia and its dual fascination with "otherworld-
liness" and the capacity for planned social
change. As a journalist, he had been denounced
in the House of Lords as "an active danger," and
Randolph Churchill in 1946 had charged that

Carr "had been mainly responsible for The Times
becoming, apart from the Communist Daily
Worker, the main British apologist for policies
of the Kremlin." Carr had influenced The Times
to support the Beveridge Report and postwar
planning efforts that bore a resemblance to ex-
periments in Soviet Russia. Having been identi-
fied in the United States with "hard line" policies
toward the Soviet Union, he was second secre-
tary from 1925 to 1929. His critics charged that
he led The Times to "soft line" policies, although
Carr has said that this criticism became signif-
icant only in his last year with The Times as the
cold war set in.
Carr's intellectual contribution will ultimately
be judged less by his journalism or his diplomacy
than by his theoretical writings on international
relations and by his History (1950-1977). The
latter, though representing prodigious scholar-
ship, is the more difficult to assess. As a historian
of Russia, Carr represents no clearly identifiable
school of thought. He has written contemporary
history on a highly volatile subject not yet suffi-
ciently removed in time to permit dispassionate
scholarship. He has emphasized the broad eco-
nomic, social, and political aspects of the Russian
revolution without attempting much historical
judgment of its more brutal and controversial
aspects, which recede into his broader perspec-
tive. His volumes, whose publication spread over
28 years, reflect the shifts of British attitudes
toward the Soviet Union. (Carr acknowledged
that he would approach the first volume differ-
ently if he were writing in the late 1970s,
stressing constitutional arrangements less and
emphasizing the social and economic environ-
ment in which the new Soviet state operated.)
Thus his History, written from three to six de-
cades after the revolution, stands as an ambigu-
ous historical classic, marred by its lack of
passion and historical imagination, too cautious
in its moral judgments for some critics and too
defensive of collectivist social change for others,
but accepted by all for its persistent scholarship
on the first ten years of Soviet rule. The genius
of the work is Carr's success in placing himself
in the roles of leading Soviet statesmen, confront-
ing the reader with the choices these men faced
and enabling future generations thereby to walk
alongside Russian policy makers despite the wide
gulf of ideology and culture separating them. No
other historian of the Soviet Union has achieved
quite the same empathy with Soviet leaders
and their tasks. None has made Carr's physical
and intellectual investment in a painstaking
CARR, E. H. 109
survey of a broad sweep of history utterly crit-
ical for understanding the contemporary Soviet
Union.
In his career Carr combined the professions of
political scientist and historian with those of
journalist and man of action. He joined the
Foreign Office as temporary clerk in 1916 and
more than two decades later, while serving as
assistant editor of The Times, wrote anonymous
editorials on the need for a better understand-
ing of Russia and its role in the postwar world.
Although frequently at odds with the prevailing
approach of the British foreign policy establish-
ment, he served on various study commissions.
He held diplomatic posts in Paris and in Riga,
Latvia, was assistant adviser on League of
Nations affairs, and first secretary to the Foreign
Office. He also served as director of foreign pub-
licity in the British Ministry of Information. He
wrote extensively on intellectual and diplomatic
history of the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies and on the philosophy of history. He con-
tributed biographical studies of Bakunin, Dos-
toevsky, A. I. Herzen and Albert Sorel, and
theoretical works on international politics, as
well as the monumental ten-volume history of
Soviet Russia, which is comparable to Theodor
Mommsen's history of Rome.
Carr's major theoretical contribution to inter-
national studies has been to lay the foundations
for what is called "political realism." The Twenty
Years Crisis, 1919-1939 was published in 1939,
as the rise of Hitler and the outbreak of World
War ii shattered the illusions of the interwar
period. Expressing the euphoria of their era,
statesmen like Woodrow Wilson and William
Howard Taft in the United States and David
Cecil in Great Britain had heralded the rise of
new forms of international relationships that
were modifying the ancient and destructive pat-
terns of national rivalries and power politics.
Intellectuals and scholars within and outside
leading universities had dedicated themselves as
much to the reform as to the study of the exist-
ing international system, a trend prompting Carr
to assert that international studies were be-
coming encumbered by utopianism, half truth,
and ignorance. Foreign policies were judged in
terms of categories of good and evil—good na-
tions and bad nations, good internationalism
and bad nationalism. "Heretic and renegade" to
the prevailing establishment view, Carr as the
editor of an Ambassadors at Large series wrote
in an introduction to the volume on France:
"In international politics, few of us have got be-
110 CARR, E. H.
yond the stage of the small child who says,
'You are naughty' to anyone who does something
it doesn't like; for the temptation to impute
moral turpitude to policies which do not suit our
interests is almost irresistible" (Ormesson 1939,
p. iv).
Carr explained that Crisis was written "with
the deliberate aim of counteracting the glaring
and dangerous defect of nearly all thinking,
both academic and popular, about international
politics in English-speaking countries from 1919
to 1939—the almost total neglect of the factor
of power" ([1939] 1946, p. vii). In explaining
this neglect he concluded that the science of in-
ternational politics was still in its infancy. Every
science, Carr said, passes first through a Utopian
phase in which purpose gives to analysis its
initial impulse and direction. In the biological
sciences, the desire for improved health led to
the emergence of medical science, while the ne-
cessity of roads and bridges ushered in the
science of engineering. In this first phase, the
element of wish or purpose is overwhelmingly
strong and that of analysis of facts weak or
even nonexistent. For political science, the im-
pulse in studying war comes from a desire to
cure a profound illness of the body politic, and
whereas the basic scientist in his laboratory
is also often several, or many, steps removed
from the aim of eradicating a disease—e.g.,
cancer—and his emotions are irrelevant to his
research, the political scientist in his research is
never far from the urgent social need his in-
quiry is intended to serve. Indeed the ends
of social research themselves become determin-
ing factors: the student orders and rearranges
the data on which his conclusions are based—
as do economists who seek to preserve or
defend capitalism, or Marxists, however "scien-
tific," whose analysis of capitalism becomes
inseparably joined with the goal of supplanting
or overthrowing that system. The social position
and moral and political purpose of the observer
inevitably shape and affect his research and give
both meaning and direction to analysis and in-
terpretation.
In the second phase, realism in the social and
political sciences succeeds utopianism, and what
is is distinguished from what should be. Realism
demands both the acceptance of facts and a
search for their causes and consequences. By
1932 Winston S. Churchill had observed that
never had "the gap between the kind of words
which statesmen used and what was actually
happening" been so great. Carr undertook to
diagnose and criticize utopianism and found
that its weakness lay in its proponents' attempts
to carry over the principles of nineteenth-century
liberal rationalist thought from homogeneous
national societies to the currently existing
heterogeneous and half-anarchic international
order. The League of Nations and other experi-
ments in collective security were efforts to trans-
late principles and institutions that had achieved
relative success within particular nation-states
into universal principles for the world of inter-
national affairs. Underlying these enterprises
was the belief in a natural harmony of interest
among nations, derived from the doctrines of
laissez-faire economics in the nineteenth cen-
tury. The passionate desire to eliminate war
determined the first phase of international
studies, and criticism of the means proposed to
achieve it was branded mischievous or destruc-
tive. "The advocate of 'collective security,'"
wrote Carr, "replied to the critic . . . by a
statement that it must be made to work . . . or
by a demand for some alternative nostrum"
([1939] 1946, p. 8). The concept of a natural
harmony of interests, fundamental to the idea
of a community among nations, conflicted with
the division of the world into satisfied and un-
satisfied, or have and have not, nations and the
need for hard bargaining on conflicting interests.
Both power and interest remained centered in
independent sovereign nation-states, and con-
flicts resulted not only from a failure of under-
standing of national leaders but from the clash
of incompatible goals and aspirations that could
be accommodated, not by a priori rational prin-
ciples, but only through compromise and diplo-
macy. International politics lacked objective and
disinterested moral or legal standards for re-
solving conflicts.
Thoroughgoing realist that he seemed to be,
Carr nevertheless recognized that realism was
not enough. He observed: "Consistent realism ex-
cludes four things which appear to be essential
ingredients of all effective political thinking: a
finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral
judgment, and a ground for action" ([1939]
1946, p. 89). Utopian and realist thinking were
both needed throughout history, and they existed
in dialectical relationship with one another, the
need for one or the other being greater in a par-
ticular era. Having demolished the cornerstone
of the utopianism of the interwar period, Carr
acknowledged the necessity of a new interna-
tional vision for the future. Such a vision had to
be free of illusions, and he warned a young

assistant lecturer: "I hope you will . . . steer
clear of SUNFED [Special United Nations Fund
for Economic Development], ECOSOC [Economic
and Social Council] and all those other horrors
which have no substance in them" (Abramsky
1974, p. 179). Carr saw the period between the
wars as having called for greater emphasis,
among defenders and foes of the status quo, on
the need for peaceful change, based on what
was just and reasonable, and reflecting shifts in
international power relationships. Carr felt that
those who were the major beneficiaries of a
particular status quo (France and England be-
tween the wars) had to prepare themselves for
sacrifice to the less satisfied powers. A success-
ful foreign policy, therefore, had to oscillate be-
tween the poles of force and appeasement. The
Munich settlement of 1938 had represented
changes in both the distribution of power within
the European balance of power and in the view
of justice expressed in the principle of national
self-determination. Critics noted that Carr's gen-
eral principle calling for relating power and
morality was unexceptionable, but that its ap-
plication to the Munich settlement showed him
surrendering to "the immanence power." He had
himself fallen victim to a relativistic conception
of morality to which he had been led by his con-
cept of values being conditioned by the power
and status of the nations espousing them.
Carr followed his major theoretical work, The
Twenty Years' Crisis, with a more topical analy-
sis of the international crisis, Conditions of
Peace (1942). In it he repeated the warning
that the democracies were trying to meet the
world crisis with ideas and institutions carried
over from the nineteenth century. The book was
already in press when the attack on Pearl Harbor
brought the United States into World War n.
Germany and Japan were at the height of their
power as Carr prepared the manuscript; thus he
added an explanatory note upon its publication,
apologizing for the tentative nature of his policy
conclusions. He had argued that Soviet Russia
and Nazi Germany held the key to the future
because they had virtually eliminated unemploy-
ment by instituting planned economies. The
privileged status quo powers, with the possible
exception of the United States, idealized the past
while minimizing the advantages of a collec-
tivist approach to economic problems. They
suffered from a preoccupation with security and
privilege and clung to laissez-faire capitalism
and national self-determination while the Ger-
mans and the Russians tried to build a world of
CARR, E. H. Ill
larger units under centralized planning and con-
trol. Hitler, whom Carr depicted as a twentieth-
century Napoleon, "consummated the work,
which Marx and Lenin had begun, of overthrow-
ing the nineteenth-century capitalist system"
(1942, p. 9). Carr prophesied that even if Hitler
were overthrown, nineteenth-century German
capitalism could not be restored any more than
the downfall of Napoleon had restored feudal-
ism. The idealists of the English-speaking world
courted disaster by placing themselves "in oppo-
sition to the new world revolution which first
broke through the crust of the existing order in
the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917" (1942, p. 7).
When the peace settlement of 1919 had in-
creased the number of weak and struggling
states in the name of national self-determina-
tion and left the economic order of central and
eastern Europe in an enfeebled state, the vic-
torious Allies by this action had in effect lost
the peace. It was beside the point to argue that
the Versailles treaty had been too vindictive or
not vindictive enough. Soviet Russia and Nazi
Germany had won the peace because their lead-
ers had understood the contemporary revolu-
tion and made giant strides toward recovery
through economic planning, while the victors
had remained helpless spectators and prisoners
to nineteenth-century thinking. Political parties
in the democratic countries represented power-
ful established interests, and the will of the un-
organized majority remained impotent against
the might of organized economic power. Democ-
racy's survival depended on the redefinition and
reinterpretation of the majority's rights and the
discovery of a common moral purpose powerful
enough to generate self-sacrifice by the strong
in the interests of the weak. Communism, much
like Christianity, had discovered its ground for
action and its finite goal in a higher purpose.
Carr prophesied: "The cooperation between the
Western peoples and Soviet Russia in the war
should help to resolve the antithesis, incidental
rather than fundamental, between the secular
ideals of Christianity and those of communism"
(1942, p. 121). He hoped that the democracies
might profit from the lessons of communism's
moral and economic successes.
In Nationalism and After (1945), which
appeared at the end of World War n, Carr
examined the far-reaching changes between
nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism,
principally the extension of political participa-
tion within nations to include new social groups,
the visible reunion of economic and political
112 CARR, E. H.
power, and the beginnings of a vast prolifera-
tion ultimately quadrupling the number of
nation-states following the war. He warned of the
bankruptcy of nationalism resulting from the
carnage of two world wars and the coming ob-
solesence of the nation-state, which could no
longer provide military security or economic
well-being to its citizens on an autonomous basis.
A new international order was necessary to
transcend the destructive consequences of ram-
pant national self-determination, but it could
not be established by constitutional design. It
must rest rather on some new enterprise or com-
mon effort, such as the world-wide quest for
social justice, which comprised for Carr equality
of opportunity, freedom from want, and full
employment. While acknowledging the unlikeli-
hood of world-wide cooperation, he found that
the best means of achieving these goals lay in
large multinational and regional groupings and
joint planning on programs of full employment
or assistance to backward areas. In the after-
math of the age of nationalism, Carr suggested,
European cooperation for social justice, with
Britain participating, might offer an alternative
to the Soviet ideology of state monopoly and the
American ideology of unrestricted cooperation.
In The Soviet Impact on the Western World
(1946), and in his monumental The Bolshevik
Revolution (1950-1977, vols. 1-3) Carr turned
explicitly to a study of the Soviet challenge to
the West. In his biography of Marx he had de-
scribed his subject as "the protagonist and the
forerunner of the whole twentieth-century revo-
lution of thought" (1934, p. 302). Reflecting
certain continuing Marxist presuppositions, he
declared in The Soviet Impact: "The missionary
role which had been filled in the first world war
by American democracy and Woodrow Wilson
had passed in the second world war to Soviet de-
mocracy and Marshal Stalin" ([1946] 1947, p. 3).
Soviet democracy was an outgrowth of Western
democracy; just as the Cromwellian and Jacobin
dictatorships had given birth to political democ-
racy, the Soviet dictatorship of Lenin and Stalin
and the Russian proletariat had created social
democracy. The first impact of Soviet democracy
on the West was to stimulate concern for "the
common man"—a challenge "western democrats
will be well advised to ponder" ([1946] 1947,
p. 19). The achievements of the Soviet planned
economy helped prepare the ground for Keynes-
ian economics in the West. In foreign policy, the
Soviets openly acknowledged the power factor
as the determinant of policy freed of the ideo-
logical disguises of League of Nations statesmen.
They also perfected the use of propaganda as a
normal instrument of foreign policy, but Carr
looked elsewhere in explaining the impact of the
Soviet challenge. He observed, "the gravamen of
the Marxist revolution is ... that it has called
in question the moral authority of the ideals and
principles of western democracy by declaring
them to be a reflexion of the interests of a privi-
leged class" ([1946] 1947, p. 94). The age of indi-
vidualism that had prevailed from 1500 to 1900
was drawing to a close and represented little
more than an oasis between the totalitarianism
of the medieval church and empire and modern
collect!vist societies. Two world wars, revolu-
tions around the globe, and far-reaching social
and economic upheavals had altered the moral
climate and convinced "all but the blind and the
incurable that the forces of individualism have
somehow lost their potency and their relevance
in the contemporary world" ([1946] 1947,
p. 111). The nature of the Soviet threat, therefore,
was predominantly moral, not military, and
"security is and will remain" the primary factor
in the Soviet policy toward Europe. "Nothing in
the Russian tradition supports a policy of mili-
tary action in Europe beyond the eastern zone,
. . . [which is] ... for the Soviet Union today
what the Monroe Doctrine is for the United
States, the Low Countries for Great Britain, or
the Rhine frontier for France" ([1946] 1947,
pp. 107, 108). A far more important and likely
threat is the penetration of the West by ideas
from the East, and he warned that "the danger
for the English-speaking world lies . . . in its
relative lack of flexibility and in its tendency to
rest on the laurels of past achievements," rather
than in its searching "for new forms of social
and economic action in which what is valid in
individualist and democratic tradition can be
applied to the problems of mass civilization"
([1946] 1947, p. 113).
Any assessment of the enduring value of
Carr's contribution to international political the-
ory must be qualified and tentative at this stage.
By demolishing Utopian beliefs in the natural
harmony of interests of states, Carr was among
the first to restructure the study of international
politics in the name of political realism. Making
use of the intellectual tools of the sociology of
knowledge, he demonstrated the relationship
between national values and ideals and the in-
terests and power of states. His claim that inter-
national disputes were more likely to be resolved
through hard bargaining that recognized con-

flicting national interests than through inter-
national processes analogous to national judicial
or legislative actions has survived the test of
time. (Carr's analogy between great power nego-
tiations and collective bargaining in industry is
more debatable, given the lack of moral consen-
sus in international relations.) The defects of
his contribution to these issues stem more from
polemical overstatement than from untruth.
His critical analysis of the limitations of Western
political thought continues to have value. The
legacy of his history of the Bolshevik revolu-
tion helps explain the actions and motives of
Soviet leaders and the wellsprings of Soviet
policy.
The question remains, however, how so major
a thinker could have gone astray so grievously in
his practical judgments in the interwar and
postwar period. He found in Neville Chamber-
lain the exemplar of the moral realist and in the
Munich settlement the paradigm of a political
settlement based on principle and power. He
linked Hitler and Mussolini uncritically with
Mustapha Kemal, Jozef Pilsudski, and Antonio de
Oliveira Salazar as leaders in the revolt against
liberal democracy. He felt no need to make moral
distinctions between Wilson and Stalin or be-
tween the crusade for American and what he
called "Soviet democracy." He could write: "There
is ... no essential incompatibility between de-
mocracy and dictatorship" ([1946] 1947, p. 11).
These errors in judgment appear not accidental
but rooted in a more fundamental weakness in
his political philosophy.
Four explanations are possible for the short-
comings of Carr's philosophy, and all four have
roots in the apparent philosophical weakness of
his approach. First, his Marxist orientation (he
once remarked that he was more truly Marxian
than uncritical and dogmatic Marxists who
asked no questions of their ideology) drove him,
in the spirit of Hegel and Marx, to search for
values within and not outside the historical
process. As a result, he lacks an objective basis
for practical moral judgments. Second, and re-
lated to the first explanation, he appears re-
peatedly to have equated superior morality with
superior power. Moral reasoning is for him not
a weighing of good and evil or of competing
goods, but exclusively the means for "an escape
from the logical consequences of realism" (1939,
p. 118). Critics, with this weakness in mind,
have asked whether he lacks an understanding
of the essential nature of morality. Third, Carr,
who has relied on the inspiration of Reinhold
CARR, E. H. 113
Niebuhr in other respects, says little about
proximate morality and provides few examples
of prudential judgments of contending political
movements. (Niebuhr, by contrast, wrote in the
early 1940s that if men could not make moral
distinctions between democracy and Nazism,
then moral evaluation of any type was in prac-
tice impossible.) Fourth, Carr, having affirmed
the need for a standard of judgment of politics,
has had no transcendent point of view from
which to appraise the phenomenon of power. In
What Is History? (1961) he seeks a philosophy
of history to supply such a viewpoint but con-
cludes there is no possibility of discovering an
objective standard outside history. The closest
approximation for him is to state:
The absolute in history is not something in the past
from which we start; it is not something in the
present, since all present thinking is necessarily
relative. It is something still incomplete and in
process of becoming—something in the future to-
ward which we move, which begins to take shape
only as we move towards it, and in the light of
which, as we move forward, we gradually shape
our interpretation of the past. (1961, pp. 160-161)
If this definition is Carr's clearest formulation
of an objective standard, he must clarify whether
he means that the only basis for judging history
is history itself or that what survives in history
is ipso facto good. It is a question by which
earlier historians have been judged and found
wanting. One critic of Carr concludes: "It is a
dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disas-
trous thing to be a Machiavelli without virtu"
(Morgenthau 1962, p. 43).
To this criticism Carr has responded that
certain moral absolutes do exist: liberty and
equality, justice and democracy, but as broad
categories of thought almost devoid of meaning
or application unless given specific content. They
are blank checks that are valueless unless and
until they specify how much liberty is to be al-
located to whom, and whom we recognize as
equals. How a given people fills in such checks
is a matter of history. The content given these
values in the nineteenth century was under-
mined in World War i. After that war, which re-
vealed the bankruptcy of liberalism, Carr has
argued, only one of two responses was possible:
the establishment of socialism or the establish-
ment of conservatism. He has opted for socialism
in part because he is a man of the left and in
part because socialism represented the optimism
of change; and he has staunchly arrayed him-
 114 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.
self against those who find change menacing
and the source of doubt, gloom, and fear. At the
age of 86 he declared :
When Sir Lewis Namier warns me to eschew pro-
grams and ideals, and Professor [Michael] Oake-
shott tells me that we are going nowhere in par-
ticular, and Professor [Karl] Popper wants to keep
the dear old Model T on the road by dint of a little
piecemeal engineering, and Professor [H. R.] Trevor-
Roper knocks screaming radicals on the nose, I
shall look out on a world in tumult and a world
in travail, and shall answer in the well-worn words
of a great scientist: "And yet—it moves." (Scott
1978, p. 8)
KENNETH W. THOMPSON
WORKS BY CARR
1931 Dostoevsky (1821-1881): A New Biography.
Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin. —> A
paperback edition was published by the Folcroft
Library in 1977.
1933 The Romantic Exiles: A Nineteenth-century
Portrait Gallery. Boston: Beacon Press. —> A paper-
back edition was published by Octagon in 1975.
1934 Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism. London:
Dent.
1937a International Relations Since the Peace Treat-
ies. London: Macmillan.
1937b Michael Bakunin. London: Macmillan.
(1939) 1946 The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An
Introduction to the Study of International Relations.
2d ed. London: Macmillan. —* A paperback edition
was published by Harper in 1964.
(1942) 1967 Conditions of Peace. London: Macmillan.
1945 Nationalism and After. New York: Macmillan.
(1946) 1947 The Soviet Impact on the Western World.
New York: Macmillan.
1948 The Moral Foundations for World Order. Den-
ver: University of Denver, Social Science Founda-
tion.
(1950) 1964 Studies in Revolution. New York: Grosset
& Dunlap.
1950-1977 A History of Soviet Russia. 10 vols. Lon-
don: Macmillan. —» Volumes 1-3: The Bolshevik
Revolution, 1923-1924, 1950-1953. Volume 4: The
Interregnum, 1923-1924, 1954. Volumes 5-7: So-
cialism in One Country, 1924-1926, 1958-1964.
Volumes 8—10: Foundations of a Planned Economy,
1926-1929, 1969-1977; written in collaboration
with R. W. Davies.
1961 What Is History? New York: Knopf. —> A paper-
back edition was published by Random House in
1967.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABRAMSKY, C. (editor) 1974 Essays in Honour of
E. H. Carr. London: Macmillan.
BULL, HEDLEY 1969 The Twenty Years' Crisis Thirty
Years On. International Journal 24:625—638.
DEUTSCHER, ISAAC (1955) 1969 Heretics and Rene-
gades. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
JOHNSTON, WHITTLE 1967 E. H. Carr's Theory of
International Relations: A Critique. Journal of
Politics 29:861-884.
MORGENTHAU, HANS 1962 Politics in the Twentieth
Century. Volume 3: The Restoration of American
Politics. Univ. of Chicago Press.
ORMESSON, WLADIMIR 1939 France. London: Long-
mans, Green. —» Part of the Ambassadors at Large
series, of which Carr was the general editor.
SCOTT, PETER 1978 Revolution Without the Passion:
Peter Scott Talks to E. H. Carr Whose Epic History
of Soviet Russia Will Be Completed This Autumn.
Times Education Supplement July 7:7—8.
CATTELL, RAYMOND B.
Under Sail Through Red Devon (1937ft) may
seem a curious title for a book by a young psychol-
ogist dedicated to the multivariate study of hu-
man personality. Yet it reflects the depth of the
roots of Raymond B. Cattell, born in 1905, in
his British homeland and the Devonshire
countryside. The relative social and economic
homogeneity that he knew as a child was to
stand in marked contrast to the broad range of
conditions that he later found when he entered
the University of London at age 16. The city's
extremes of wealth and poverty reawakened a
social concern that had been incubating since
his days as a young hospital helper during
World War I.
Shortly before receiving his degree in physics
and chemistry three years later, Cattell decided
that psychology would be his life's work. Al-
though he was still registered at King's College,
Cambridge, it was C. E. Spearman, in whose lab-
oratory at University College Cattell spent most of
the next five years, who had the most profound
influence on his professional development. He
saw in Spearman's factor analysis a tool that
could be applied to the study of behavior and
that might yield results with an objectivity and
replicability rivaling those of the physical
sciences.
Cattell received his doctorate in 1929 from
King's College, but the economic climate of
Great Britain offered bleak prospects for a re-
search career in the emerging science of psy-
chology. To support himself, Cattell accepted a
teaching position at Exeter University and there
began formulating his research program. With
Spearman's retirement and emigration to the
United States, he turned to Cyril Burt for criti-
cal discussion of his substantive and methodo-
logical ideas. It was at this time that Cattell
decided to leave academic life in order to gain
clinical experience as the director of school
psychological services for the city of Leicester.
This experience helped to crystallize his views on
issues of personality, and the population of Lei-
cester was the subject of his first major research
effort. Noting a tendency for children of lower

intelligence quotients (IQ's) to come from larger
families, Cattell researched and published The
Fight for Our National Intelligence (1937a).
Although his prediction of a slow decline in the
average intelligence of the population was not
realized in a subsequent investigation, Cattell's
concern with possible dysgenic effects on com-
plex behavioral traits was to remain a primary
social concern reflected in his later work.
Despite his prolific writing, the early years in
England were frustrating because support for
basic research in the behavioral sciences was
practically nonexistent. Thus, he accepted Ed-
ward L. Thorndike's invitation to be a research
associate in his laboratory at Columbia Univer-
sity for a year, although it meant uprooting
himself from his beloved England. At Columbia,
Cattell found an innovative and pioneering style
of attack that he incorporated into his own re-
search strategy. He remained in the United
States, first as G. Stanley Hall professor at
Clark University, later moving to a lectureship
at Harvard University. With the advent of
World War n, he joined the U.S. Adjutant Gen-
eral's Office, where he was offered the opportun-
ity to continue his development of "objective"
measures of personality that might prove useful
in officer selection. Through these experiences
Cattell recognized the efficiency to be gained
when a small group of researchers gathered to
attack a problem of common interest from a
variety of perspectives. This he envisioned as
the optimal research setting.
With the war's end, Cattell accepted a re-
search professorship at the University of Illi-
nois, soon to become preeminent in the area of
multivariate analysis under the leadership of
Herbert Woodrow. There he established his
Laboratory of Personality and Group Analysis,
which was to attract 77 research associates and
numerous other social and behavioral scientists
in its 37-year history.
Cattell considered Spearman's The Abilities
of Man (1927) a definitive work in that area
and had set as his own goal and that of his
laboratory the systematic study of the realm of
human personality. Two considerations defined
the general framework within which the work
of the laboratory would proceed. From his back-
ground in the British school of psychology, with
its greater emphasis on biological influences on
behavior, Cattell viewed behavior as essentially
organic in nature, with an as yet undefined
structure. Further, the complexity of human be-
havior required that the methodology employed
CATTELL, RAYMOND B. 115
allow for the investigation of multiple causa-
tion. Spearman's factor analysis, with its further
development by Godfrey H. Thomson, Cyril
Burt, and L. L. Thurstone, appeared to offer the
only reasonable approach to elucidating this
structure. Thus, first priority was given to the
specification of the relevant underlying dimen-
sions of personality. The development of spe-
cific measures and the establishment of their
reliability and validity, of necessity, assumed a
secondary position.
A limited number of principles, derived from
Cattell's philosophy of the manner in which the
objective investigation of personality should
proceed, may be identified. Each has had a ma-
jor influence on the substantive productivity of
the scientist.
One of Cattell's major contentions was that
theory should derive from research, which in
turn would suggest the appropriate direction for
further empirical investigations. The search for
structure and a theoretical model that would
accommodate the data thus became an iterative
procedure. He recognized that factor analysis
did not lead to a unique solution except under
the most simplistic of conditions, and he saw
the pitfalls of overemphasizing the results ob-
tained from a single sample. Thus, his empirical
efforts required careful cross validation as both
instruments and theories were refined. Re-
searches in personality, motivation, social psy-
chology, and abilities each became program-
matic, with later work building on and extending
what had gone before. As a result, his more
complete and refined statements of theory do
not appear in the literature until the mid-1950s.
A second major principle guiding Cattell's re-
search was that of catholicity. This requirement
expressed itself in two ways. First, if the di-
mensions that were identified as the primary
source traits of personality were indeed the sa-
lient variables, then it should be possible to
demonstrate parallel structure across measuring
instruments. These included peer ratings, al-
ready in wide usage, personality questionnaires,
which were undergoing rapid development, and
objective tests or miniature behavior samples.
Cattell pioneered the development of this latter
approach, with work beginning in England and
culminating in the publication of descriptions
of some four hundred measures (Cattell & War-
burton 1967). The second dimension on which he
expected to be able to demonstrate the universal-
ity of the source traits was across cultures. His
organic conception of personality specified these
116 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.
traits as ingrained characteristics of mankind.
Thus, local populations might differ with regard
to mean values on the dimensions, but the in-
terrelationship of the elements denning the traits
should remain unchanged. Cross-cultural stud-
ies of the structure of personality and of abili-
ties became an essential feature of CattelFs
work and were undertaken as opportunities
arose.
Cattell's commitment to factor analysis grew
from both his desire to identify multiple causa-
tion and the necessity to remove the subjective
element from the determination of structure as
much as possible. This commitment was further
stimulated and enhanced by his association
with Thurstone whose Multiple-factor Analysis
(1947) laid out the principles and procedures
with which Cattell had become so familiar. As
with any research program, theoretical develop-
ment or empirical verification often reached an
impasse because appropriate statistical methods
to answer the most pressing questions were
lacking. At these junctures, Cattell would turn
his attention to the further development of the
factor analytic model or the innovative applica-
tion of existing procedures. These efforts led to
numerous developments, including his "scree"
test for number of factors; the development of
a similarity coefficient for comparing factor an-
alytic solutions; with his wife, Karen Cattell, a
method for the unique rotation of two-factor an-
alytic solutions derived from proportional cor-
relation matrices; the factoring of repeated
measures on single individuals to study fluctu-
ating personality states; and others. His efforts
in the development of a theory of personality
fathered many methodological innovations and
could not have proceeded without them.
Finally, Cattell's interest in ultimate causa-
tion led him into occasional forays into human
behavioral genetics. The result was his develop-
ment of the method of multiple abstract variance
analysis for genetic analysis of sib data, ob-
tained from all combinations of identical and
fraternal twins and full and half sibs, raised
together and apart.
Cattell's pursuit of a comprehensive theory of
behavior through factor analytic methods has
produced a variety of theoretical models and
psychometric instruments. His theoretical de-
velopments in the measurement of personality
by questionnaire are embodied in the 16 PF
(personality factor) (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka
1970), the High School Personality Question-
naire (Cattell & Cattell 1975), and other tests
for different age ranges. The study of person-
ality structure in objective test devices has pro-
duced the Objective-Analytic (O-A) Battery
(Cattell, Hundleby, & Pawlik 1965) and the
High School O-A (Cattell & Schuerger 1978).
Closely related has been the study of state pat-
terns with the subsequent development of mod-
ulation theory to account for short term per-
turbations in measured traits, reflected in his
work with Scheier, Curran, and Nesselrode. Ex-
cursions into the study of motivation led to the
dynamic calculus, developed with Child, the
Motivation Analysis Test (Cattell, Horn, Sweney,
& Radcliffe 1964) and a school version of the
same. Cattell's Culture Fair Intelligence Test
(Cattell 1950a) is a direct descendent of his
theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence, de-
signed to measure the former. His work on the
dimensions of cultures has been picked up and
pursued further by political scientists and most
notably by Rudolf J. Rummell. Finally, his ef-
forts to integrate these areas of behavior into a
comprehensive framework has produced Com-
prehensive Personality and Learning Theory
(1978a).
It is not surprising that such dedication to a
methodological approach, coupled to the devel-
opment of theory, should have generated some
criticism from behavioral and social scientists.
The most persistent have dealt with the psycho-
metric properties of the measuring instruments
and the incomplete mathematical development
of Cattell's methodological innovations. Both
might be more understandable in the context of
the disparate aims of the theoretician and the
psychometrician. For the former, cross valida-
tion through the repeated demonstration of sim-
ilar structural patterns in the developing instru-
ments is the sine qua non of his endeavor.
Although some satisfactory level of reliability
and validity must be present for replicable pat-
terns to be demonstrated, these levels need not
necessarily be those most desired by the applied
behavioral scientist. Given limitations on time
and energy, some degree of compromise is in-
evitable. Whether the course that has been
chosen will affect the utility of the measures
produced remains an empirical question.
It may be decades before Cattell's impact on
the social and behavioral sciences can be ade-
quately determined. Certainly the methods and
directions that he pioneered will continue to be
explored by his colleagues and students, and by
the members of the Society for Multivariate
Experimental Psychology, which he founded. In

the meanwhile, with the increasing methodo-
logical sophistication of social and behavioral
scientists, the familiar refrain of many intro-
ductory texts in personality, that "Cattell's
methods are too complex for presentation here,"
may no longer be necessary.
THOMAS W. KLEIN
WORKS BY CATTELL
1934 Your Mind and Mine: An Account of Psychology
for the Inquiring Layman and the Prospective Stu-
dent. London: Harrap.
(1936) 1953 A Guide to Mental Testing for Psycho-
logical Clinics, Schools, and Industrial Psychologists.
3d ed. Univ. of London Press.
1937a The Fight for Our National Intelligence. Lon-
don: King.
1937i> Under Sail Through Red Devon. London:
Maclehose.
1937 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; TRAVERS, ROBERT M.;
and COHEN, JOHN Human Affairs. London: Mac-
millan.
1938a Crooked Personalities in Childhood and After:
An Introduction to Psychotherapy. New York and
London: Apple ton.
1938b Psychology and the Religious Quest: An Ac-
count of the Psychology of Religion and a Defense
of Individualism. New York: Nelson.
(1941) 1947 General Psychology. 2d ed. Cambridge,
Mass.: Sci-Art.
(1946) 1969 The Description and Measurement of
Personality. New York: Johnson.
1950a Handbook for the Individual or Group Culture
Fair Intelligence Test, Scale I. Champaign, 111.: In-
stitute for Personality and Ability Testing.
1950£> An Introduction to Personality Study. London
and New York: Hutchinson's University Library.
1950c Personality: A Systematic Theoretical and Fac-
tual Study. New York: McGraw-Hill.
(1952) 1973 Factor Analysis. Westport, Conn.-. Green-
wood.
1957 Personality and Motivation Structure and Mea-
surement. Yonkers, N.Y.: World Book.
1960 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and STICE, GLEN F. The
Dimensions of Groups and Their Relations to the
Behavior of Members. Champaign, 111.: Institute for
Personality and Ability Testing.
1963 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; RADCLIFFE, J. A.; and
SWENEY, A. B. The Nature and Measurement of
Components of Motivation. Genetic Psychology
Monographs 68:49-211.
1964 Personality and Social Psychology: Collected
Papers. San Diego, Calif.: Knapp.
1964 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; HORN, J. L.; SWENEY,
A. B.; and RADCLIFFE, J. A. Handbook for the
Motivation Analysis Test "MAT." Champaign, 111. :
Institute for Personality and Ability Testing.
1965 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; HUNDLEBY, JOHN D.;
and PAWLIK, KURT Personality Factors in Objective
Test Devices. San Diego, Calif.: Knapp.
(1965) 1977 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and KLINE, P.
The Scientific Analysis of Personality. 2d ed., rev.
New York: Academic Press. —» Cattell was the sole
author of the first edition.
1966 Handbook of Multivariate Experimental Psychol-
ogy. Chicago: Aldine.
1967 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and WARBURTON,
FRANK W. Objective Personality and Motivation
Tests: A Theoretical Introduction and Practical
Compendium. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.
CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD H. 117
1968a Spearman, C. E. Volume 15, pages 108-111 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968b Traits. Volume 16, pages 123-128 in Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1968 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and BUTCHER, HAROLD J.
The Prediction of Achievement and Creativity. In-
dianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
1970 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; EBER, H. W.; and
TATSUOKA, M. M. Handbook for the Sixteen Per-
sonality Factor Questionnaire. Champaign, 111.: In-
stitute for Personality and Ability Testing.
1971 Abilities: Their Structure, Growth, and Action.
Boston: Hough ton Mifflin.
1972a Real Base, True Zero Factor Analysis. Multi-
variate Behavioral Research Monographs 1:1—162.
1972k A New Morality From Science; Eeyondism. New
York: Pergamon.
1972 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; SCHMIDT, L. R.; and
BJERSTEDT, A. Clinical Diagnosis By the Objective-
Analytic Personality Batteries. Journal of Clinical
Psychology 28:239-312.
1973 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and CATTELL, A. K. S.
Measuring Intelligence With the Culture Fair Tests:
Manual for Scales 2 and 3. Champaign, 111.: Insti-
tute for Personality and Ability Testing.
1974 Autobiography. Volume 6, pages 59-100 in A
History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited by
Gardner Lindzey. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall.
1975 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and CATTELL, M. D. L.
Handbook for the Jr.-Sr. High School Personality
Questionnaire "HSPQ." Champaign, 111.: Institute
for Personality and Ability Testing.
1975 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and CHILD, DENNIS
Motivation and Dynamic Structure. New York:
Wiley.
1977 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and DRAGER, RALPH M.
(editors) Handbook of Modern Personality Theory.
Washington: Hemisphere; New York: Wiley.
1978a Comprehensive Personality and Learning The-
ory. New York: Springer.
1978b The Scientific Use of Factor Analysis. New
York: Plenum.
1978 CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and SCHUERGER, J. M.
Personality Theory in Action: Handbook for the
Objective-Analytic Test Kit. Champaign, 111.: Insti-
tute for Personality and Ability Testing.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CHILD, DENNIS (1970) 1973 The Essentials of Fac-
tor Analysis. New York: Holt.
SPEARMAN, C. E. 1927 The Abilities of Man: Their
Nature and Measurement. London: Macmillan.
THURSTONE, L. L. 1947 Multiple-factor Analysis: A
Development and Expansion of The Vectors of Mind.
Univ. of Chicago Press.
CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD H.
Edward Hastings Chamberlin (1899-1967)
was born in La Conner, Washington, May 18,
1899, the second son of Fred Hastings and Irene
(Dagan) Chamberlin. His father, a minister of
the Methodist Episcopal Church, died while he
 118 CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD H.
was still in grammar school. Soon afterwards
his mother moved to Iowa City, Iowa, where she
worked to put the two Chamberlin boys through
high school and the University of Iowa. While
at the university, young Chamberlin contributed
to his and his family's support by writing for the
Iowa City Citizen as well as for the university's
student newspaper.
On graduating from the University of Iowa,
Chamberlin began graduate study in economics
at the University of Michigan. His interest in
economics had no doubt been sparked at the
University of Iowa by the distinguished Ameri-
can economist Frank H. Knight, who was later
to move to the University of Chicago and be-
come recognized as the precursor of what is
popularly identified as the "Chicago School" of
economic thought, known for its contributions
to the theory of the firm and the operative
mechanics of market economies. It is likely that
Knight's forceful writings and teachings, to
which members of the school are said to owe
their parentage, also shaped Chamberlin's in-
terests. At Michigan, Chamberlin also studied
under Leo Sharfman and Fred Taylor. Sharf-
man was an authority on railroad rate struc-
tures and Taylor a distinguished analytical
economist concerned with the functioning of
firms in a socialistic economy. After taking his
M.A. degree at Michigan in 1922, Chamberlin
moved on to Harvard University, where he com-
pleted his doctoral thesis in 1927. Except for a
year as distinguished visiting professor at the
University of Paris (1950/1951) and wartime
service with the Office of Strategic Services
(1943-1945), he was to spend the rest of his
life at Harvard. In 1924 he married Lucienne
Foubert; they had one daughter.
While at Harvard he wrote his thesis under
the well-known economist Allyn Young, who at
Cornell University had had Frank Knight among
his students. Both Young and Knight had writ-
ten and lectured widely on the theory of the
firm and the relationship among rival firms in
the market place. Chamberlin's intimate col-
leagues have observed: "It is now possible with
hindsight to see that Chamberlin's thought may
have emerged from reflections on these ideas
and problems—but only if hindsight is very
acute" (Harvard University Gazette, March 23,
1968).
Chamberlin wrote many articles and several
books in the broad area of inquiry known as
microeconomics, but the single work that clearly
defines his distinction among the economists of
the world is his seminal The Theory of Monop-
olistic Competition (1933), an outgrowth of
his doctoral thesis. Although the writings of a
few economists published shortly before the
publication of Monopolistic Competition had, at
least in some sense, anticipated fragments of
Chamberlin's essential theory, the work clearly
represented an innovation of impressive magni-
tude. Classical and neoclassical microeconomic
theories had been erected on the proposition
that markets were either monopolistic or com-
petitive. Accordingly, the received economic
wisdom consisted of a theory of perfect mo-
nopoly and a theory of perfect competition. The
essential thrust of Chamberlin's work was that
since neither of these theoretical conditions was
often found in the real world, prevailing theories
of the firm and markets were largely irrelevant.
The mission of the theory of monopolistic com-
petition was to bring microeconomic theory into
conformity with the conditions of the business
world to which it pertained.
As a general proposition, Chamberlin con-
tended, each individual business firm had some
control over its price. In fact, the attainment of
this control was the obvious objective of such
familiar firm activities as advertising, product
differentiation, the search for superior business
locations, and so on. In most cases, however,
these business strategies fell far short of estab-
lishing the degree of control over price that con-
ventional microeconomic theory ascribed to
monopoly. Rival firms, it must be borne in mind,
were engaging in similar strategies. Hence, while
each firm's limited control over its market be-
stowed on it some finite element of monopoly,
the strategies of its many rivals limiting this
control bore a strong resemblance to the norma-
tive models of competition. The resulting Cham-
berlinian model of monopolistic competition,
though built upon elements of the existing
models of monopoly and competition, emerged
as a new explanatory hypothesis of the firm
that was more in keeping with the observable
conditions of the real business world.
In his systematic and meticulous analysis of
the shortcomings of existing models of the firm
leading up to the full-blown development of his
own model (chapters 1-3), Chamberlin pre-
sented a searching review of the theories of
markets in which firms were few in number
and found them equally wanting. Antoine Au-
gustin Cournot, the early nineteenth-century
French economist and mathematician, had de-
veloped a model of a two-firm industry (duopoly)

in which a determinate equilibrium solution
rested on the condition that each firm assumed
its rival's output to be fixed (1838). The model
was readily adaptable to the few-firm case
(oligopoly). While other scholars, notably Bert-
rand (1883) and Edgeworth (1881), had
pointed out the lack of realism in the Cournot
model, only Chamberlin sought to develop a
new model overcoming its logical flaws.
The essence of Chamberlin's oligopoly model
(chapter 3) springs from his observation that,
when a firm makes a move that affects the
fortunes of its rivals, that firm is obviously re-
fusing to look beyond its nose if it assumes its
rivals will not react. For example, if firm A re-
duces its price to obtain larger sales, and the
market consists of only a small number of firms,
this move will obviously reduce the sales of its
rival B, forcing it to react—to take the counter-
measure of reducing its price. Since A should
reason beforehand that B will retaliate, it will
make the initial move only if both A and B
would be better off after B reacted. In time, a
determinate equilibrium solution to oligopoly
must postulate that all firms will take into ac-
count the indirect as well as the direct effect of
their actions. In the special case where the
number of firms is quite small, the final equilib-
rium solution would be very close to that of
monopoly.
Chamberlin's new theories had immediate im-
pact on both the formal structure of microeco-
nomic science and its implications for public
policy. College textbooks, at least those of the
more discerning authors, were quickly enlarged
to accommodate chapters on monopolistic com-
petition. This impact would have been explicitly
attributed exclusively to Chamberlin had it not
been for the appearance of Joan Robinson's The
Economies of Imperfect Competition (1933)
shortly after the publication of Monopolistic
Competition. For some years, in spite of the
vast differences in substantive content of the
two volumes, members of the economics pro-
fession tended to lump them together as the
joint foundations of the new microeconomics.
Although their substantive difference came grad-
ually to be recognized, the profession's tendency
at first to treat them as quite similar theories
was an obvious source of injury to Chamberlin's
professional pride, and prompted him to devote
much scholarly energy to distinguishing be-
tween them. In the preface to the fifth edition
he lamented that "it has been unfortunate that
two theories as divergent in their interpretation
CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD H. 119
of economic phenomena as Mrs. Robinson's
and my own should have been identified in the
minds of so many." To clarify the differences he
added a new chapter in that edition, "The Dif-
ference Between Monopolistic and 'Imperfect'
Competition." In all, the book went through
eight editions, each of which improved the
orderliness of the presentation and refined the
theoretical construction.
There are eminent scholars whose fame rests
on a major contribution and whose professional
lives are devoted to elaborating and perfecting
it. There are also those who explore most salient
aspects of their discipline. Chamberlin belongs
in the first group (see Harvard University Ga-
zette, March 23, 1968). The eminence of his
contribution is attested to by the many empiri-
cal studies of firm behavior and markets that it
inspired, most designed in one way or another
to test some tenet of Chamberlin's theory, and
by the honors bestowed upon him. He received
honorary degrees from the Universita Cattolica
del Sacro Cuore in Milan (1949), from the Sor-
bonne, University of Paris (1951), and from
Boston College (1954). He was vice president
of the American Economic Association and a
member of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences and the Real Academia de Ciencias
Economicas y Financieras of Barcelona. When
the International Economic Association devoted
a conference to monopoly and competition in
1952, it called upon Chamberlin to give one of
the principal papers and to edit the resulting
volume, Monopoly and Competition and Their
Regulation (1954). At Harvard he occupied the
prestigious David A. Wells chair in political
economy, was chairman of the department of
economics from 1939 to 1943, and was editor
of the Quarterly Journal of Economics from
1948 to 1958. The capstone to this stream of
honors came with his election in 1965 as dis-
tinguished fellow of the American Economic
Association and the publication in 1967 of
Monopolistic Competition Theory: Studies in
Impact; Essays in Honor of Edward H. Cham-
berlin, under the editorship of Robert E. Kuenne.
The central theme of that volume of essays
was anticipated in the citation that accompa-
nied his election as AEA fellow—which singled
out the immense impact that Monopolistic Com-
petition had on economic thought in the author's
lifetime: "It is not given to many scientists to
reach into the minds of all their fellows and to
influence the work of a whole generation, but
the author of The Theory of Monopolistic Com-
120 CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD H.
petition did so. The nature of products, the
character of interproduct competition, the
accommodation of selling costs in price theory,
and the theory of oligopoly have all undergone
major change because of Chamberlin's great
work."
The volume of essays appeared, unfortunately,
almost exactly at the time of Chamberlin's
death, and the manuscripts made available to
him reached him while he was in the final
stages of a complete paralysis that had gradu-
ally set in after a cruel stroke in 1961. The
authors, perhaps as distinguished a group of
economists as were ever represented in a single
volume, weighed Chamberlin's impact on micro-
economic theory in the United States and
abroad. Kuenne summarized the results of their
assessments as follows: "[The book] bears wit-
ness to the revolutionary impact of the complex
of concepts and analytical frameworks intro-
duced by Edward H. Chamberlin thirty-three
years ago, and to the correctness of his decision
to devote his career to the perfection and de-
velopment of that theory."
Although Chamberlin was preoccupied al-
most exclusively with the elegance of his theory
and paid scant attention to its public policy
implications, its relevance to the practical issues
of policy soon became evident. National anti-
monopoly policies, especially those expressed in
the antitrust laws of the United States, are
based on assumptions about the interrelation-
ship between market structure, business behav-
ior, and business performance. The more ardent
proponents of an aggressive antitrust policy
found in Chamberlin's determinate oligopoly
model a highly respectable raison d'etre for
breaking up large corporations with substantial
shares of relevant markets and for the preven-
tion of mergers that substantially increased
firms' market shares. Since in markets where a
few firms controlled the entire output each firm
would, by taking into account the indirect as
well as the direct effect of a price move, even-
tually charge the monopoly price, the obvious
antitrust remedy was to make all firms so small
in relation to the market that they would ignore
the indirect effect, thereby bringing about the
structural conditions conducive to competitive
pricing. In this sense it can be said that Cham-
berlin is a silent expert witness in virtually
every important monopoly case prosecuted un-
der various nations' antitrust and cartel policies.
Beyond this, those who propose that these poli-
cies be strengthened by new legislation often
appeal to the Chamberlinian solution as their
authority.
Chamberlin's great impact on economic
thought during his lifetime, an impact that obvi-
ously endures, is all the more impressive when as-
sessed in the light of the time frame in which
Monopolistic Competition was born and ma-
tured. The great depression of 1929-1933 had
diverted the attention of economists from the
market allocative problem with which Chamber-
lin was concerned and toward the macroeco-
nomic problems of unemployment, general price
levels, and economic growth. The appearance
in 1936 of John Maynard Keynes's General The-
ory of Employment, Interest and Money pro-
vided a theoretical framework for analyzing and
prescribing remedies for these new and pressing
problems. The Keynesian model quickly became
the "new" economics, absorbing the intellectual
energies of the vast majority of the economics
profession. It is a signal tribute to Chamberlin's
dedication to refining his own theories that he
did not succumb to the immensely popular
trend. It is an equally high tribute to the results
of his tenacity that Monopolistic Competition
and the General Theory are often identified as
the two most influential economic treatises of
the twentieth century.
In contrast with his professional concerns,
Chamberlin's personal life was enriched by a
variety of interests, including music, painting,
the theater, and literature. He spoke French with
the fluency of a Parisian and lectured widely in
French when visiting universities in France, a
country he came to love dearly as the birthplace
of his wife, Lucienne. Throughout his unin-
terrupted career at Harvard, often characterized
as the "Golden Age" of Harvard's economics de-
partment, consisting as it did of such interna-
tionally known economists as Frank W. Taussig,
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Sumner H. Schlicter,
Edward S. Mason, Alvin Hansen, Wassily Leon-
tief, and, of course, Chamberlin himself, his
reputation was of a cultivated man with a circle
of friends drawn from all parts of the univer-
sity. He was in every sense a cultured gentle-
man and a courageous and tenacious scholar.
JESSE W. MARKHAM
WORKS BY CHAMBERLIN
1929 Duopoly Value Where Sellers Are Few. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 44:63-100.
(1933) 1962 The Theory of Monopolistic Competition.
8th ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1934a Imperfect Competition. American Economic As-
sociation, Papers and Proceedings 24:21-32.

1934b The Influence of Marginal Buyers on Monopo-
listic Competition: Comments. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 41:135-137.
1937 Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 51:557-580. —» See the er-
ratum, volume 52, page 185.
1945 Advertising Costs and Equilibrium: A Correction.
Review of Economic Studies 12, no. 2:16-20.
1946 New Frontiers in Economic Thought: Discussion.
American Economic Association, Papers and Pro-
ceedings 36:139-153.
1948a An Experimental Imperfect Market. Journal of
Political Economy 56:95-108.
1948b Proportionality, Divisibility and Economies of
Scale. Quarterly Journal of Economics 62:229-262.
1948c A Supplementary Bibliography on Monopolistic
Competition. Quarterly Journal of Economics 62:
629-638.
1949a Proportionality, Divisibility and Economies of
Scale: Reply. Quarterly Journal of Economics 63:
137-143.
19492? Various Views on the Monopoly Problem: Some
Final Comments. Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 31:123-129.
1950a Advertising Costs and Equilibrium: A Rejoinder.
Review of Economic Studies 17:226-230.
1950£> Capitalism and Monopolistic Competition: II.
Can the American Economy Be Made More Com-
petitive? Discussion. American Economic Associa-
tion, Papers and Proceeedings 40:100—104.
1950c Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy. Ameri-
can Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings.
40:85-92.
1951a The Impact of Recent Monopoly Theory on the
Schumpeterian System. Review of Economic Studies
33:133-138.
1951Z? Monopolistic Competition Revisited. Economica
New Series 18:343-362.
(1951c) 1966 The Monopoly Power of Labor. Pages
168-186 in Institute on the Structure of the Labor
Market, The Impact of the Union: Eight Economic
Theorists Evaluate the Labor Union Movement. New
York: Kelley.
1952 "Full Cost" and Monopolistic Competition. Eco-
nomic Journal 62:318-325.
1953a Elasticities, Cross-elasticities, and Market Rela-
tionships: Comment. American Economic Review
43:910-916.
1953b The Product as an Economic Variable. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 67:1—29.
1954 CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD H. (editor) Monopoly and
Competition and Their Regulation: Papers and Pro-
ceedings of a Conference Held by the International
Economic Association. London: Macmillan; New
York: St. Martins.
1956a Professor Wright on the Pluralist Economy. Re-
view of Social Economy 14:61—65.
1956b A Second Supplementary Bibliography on Mo-
nopolistic Competition. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 70:613-643.
1957a On the Origin of "Oligopoly." Economic Journal
67:211-218.
1957£> Towards a More General Theory of Value. New
York: Oxford Univ. Press.
(1958a) 1963 The Economic Analysis of Labor Union
Power. Rev. ed. Washington: American Enterprise
Association.
1958b Selected Papers, A.E.A. Competition: Discussion.
American Economic Association, Papers and Pro-
ceedings 48:598-600.
1959a Labor Union Power and the Public Interest.
Pages 3-20 in Philip D. Bradley (editor), The Pub-
CLARK, COLIN 121
lic Stake in Union Power. Charlottesville: Univ. of
Virginia Press.
1959b Power Blocs and Economic Forces: Discussion.
American Economic Association, Papers and Pro-
ceedings 49:416-418.
1961 The Origin and Early Development of Monopo-
listic Competition Theory. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 75:515-543.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAUMOL, WILLIAM J. 1958 On the Theory of Oligop-
oly. Economica New Series 25:187-198.
BERTRAND, J. 1883 Review of Cournot, "Recherches."
Journal des Savants 1883:499-504.
BISHOP, ROBERT L. 1960 Duopoly: Collusion or War-
fare? American Economic Review 50:933-961.
CLARK, JOHN M. 1940 Toward a Concept of Work-
able Competition. American Economic Review 30:
241-256.
COURNOT, ANTOINE AUGUSTIN (1838) 1960 Re-
searches Into the Mathematical Principles of the
Theory of Wealth. New York: Kelley. —> First pub-
lished in French. See especially chapter 7.
EDGEWORTH, FRANCIS Y. (1881) 1953 Mathematical
Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathe-
matics to the Moral Sciences. New York: Kelley.
FELLNER, WILLIAM J. (1949) 1965 Competition
Among the Few: Oligopoly and Similar Market
Structures. New York: Knopf.
Harvard University Gazette March 23, 1968. —» Faculty
minute on Chamberlin.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmil-
lan. —» A paperback edition was published by Har-
court in 1965.
KUENNE, ROBERT E. (editor) 1967 Monopolistic Com-
petition Theory: Studies in Impact; Essays in Honor
of Edward H. Chamberlin. New York: Wiley.
MARKHAM, JESSE W. 1951 The Nature and Signifi-
cance of Price Leadership. American Economic Re-
view 4:891-903.
MARKHAM, JESSE W. 1968 Oligopoly. Volume 11,
pages 283-290 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
NICHOLLS, WILLIAM H. 1949 The Tobacco Case of
1946. American Economic Association, Papers and
Proceedings. 39:284-296.
ROBINSON, JOAN (1933) 1969 The Economies of Im-
perfect Competition. 2d ed. London: Macmillan.
SHUBIK, MARTIN 1959 Strategy and Market Struc-
ture: Competition, Oligopoly, and the Theory of
Games. New York: Wiley.
TRIFFIN, ROBERT 1940 Monopolistic Competition and
General Equilibrium Theory. Harvard Economic
Studies, Vol. 67. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press.
CLARK, COLIN
Colin Clark, one of the most fertile minds in
twentieth-century applied economics, was born
in London in 1905. After graduating in chem-
istry at Oxford University in 1924, he worked
as assistant to William H. Beveridge, Allyn
Young, and A. M. Carr-Saunders, stood unsuc-
cessfully as a Labour candidate in the May 1929
122 CLARK, COLIN
general elections, then joined the staff of the
Economic Advisory Council which had recently
been formed by the Ramsay MacDonald govern-
ment and which included among its members
John Maynard Keynes, G. D. H. Cole, Josiah C.
Stamp, and R. H. Tawney. Having declined an
invitation by MacDonald to help him prepare a
protectionist manifesto, he was glad to receive
an appointment in 1931 as lecturer in statistics
at Cambridge University (Clark 1977). In 1937,
he accepted an invitation to spend two terms as
visiting lecturer at the universities of Melbourne
and Sydney, but remained in Australia for four-
teen years, from 1938 as director of the Bureau
of Industry and economic adviser to the govern-
ment of Queensland. When, in 1952, after in-
creasing divergence of opinion, there remained
no policies of the government with which he
could agree, he resigned and spent a year, first
as a freelance writer and business consultant,
then as visiting professor at the University of
Chicago. From 1953 until 1968 he was director
of the Institute of Agricultural Economics at Ox-
ford University, then he returned to Australia,
as research fellow at Monash University (1969-
1977) and since 1977 as research consultant in
economics at the University of Queensland.
In the first decade of an astonishingly prolific
half century of research and writing, Colin
Clark established himself as one of the pioneers
of national income estimates. His first two books
(1932; 1937) greatly improved on existing esti-
mates for the United Kingdom and extended
them for additional years; the next two (Clark &
Crawford 1938; Clark 1939) did the same for
Australia and the Soviet Union. In these books
and several major papers he made methodologi-
cal contributions so fundamental that he has
justly been described as coauthor, with Simon
Kuznets, of the "statistical revolution" that ac-
companied the revolution in macroeconomic
theory of the 1930s (Patinkin 1976). He was
the first to use the gross national product (GNP)
rather than national income—he may reason-
ably be regarded as the inventor of GNP—and
among other innovations made the first quar-
terly estimates of national product and devised
time series of labor productivity and fixed capi-
tal formation. An early Keynesian, he made
some of the earliest attempts to estimate the size
of the multiplier from national income data
(Clark & Crawford 1938; Patinkin 1976, pp.
1100-1104) and was among the first to present
estimates in the framework of the main compo-
nents of aggregate demand, C + I + G (Patinkin
1976), and to develop a multisector multiplier
analysis (Samuelson 1966). By 1940, he had
gone a long way towards justifying in his pub-
lished work Keynes's discovery in 1931: "Indeed,
Clark is, I think, a bit of a genius: almost the
only economic statistician I have ever met who
seems to me quite first-class" (letter to Daniel
Macmillan, December 1931, quoted in Patinkin
1976). He had an international reputation for
posing important questions and answering them
by ingenious use of inadequate statistics. In the
words of another fellow of King's College: "Mr.
Clark is a famous maker of bricks without
straw" (Giblin 1941).
In 1940 appeared Clark's most important
work, The Conditions of Economic Progress.
The idea of drawing on all available national
income and other data for an international
comparative study of the problem which Adam
Smith had called that of the origin of the
wealth of nations came to Clark in 1935
and he worked on it intermittently and single-
handedly but with incomparable energy, verve,
and imagination for four years. The book is a
seminal work in at least three respects. First, it
was one of the first systematic attempts to use
national accounts data for a wide range of
countries to test macroeconomic hypotheses and
in this sense a pioneering contribution to mod-
ern macroeconomic econometrics. Second, it
was the first major work, after decades of al-
most exclusive preoccupation of the Western
economic profession with static problems of
resource allocation and latterly with economic
fluctuations, that turned attention back to the
classical problem of economic growth and was
thus a starting point of modern development
economics. Third, by supplying the first sub-
stantial statistical evidence of the gulf in living
standards between rich and poor countries, it
helped awaken Western opinion to the problems
of underdevelopment. Clark may be regarded as
the discoverer of the "Gap." Well into the post-
war years, until United Nations data became
available, almost every writer on development
economics quoted his estimates.
Among many specific novel ideas in the book,
three deserve special mention because each
gave rise to a later literature of its own. One
was the technique he devised for international
comparisons of the purchasing power of na-
tional currencies, and thus of real national pro-
duct, his so-called IU (international unit) (Stu-

denski 1958). The second was his thesis that,
in the course of economic growth, a country's
occupational structure shifts, in the terminology
he took over from A. G. B. Fisher, from primary
to secondary and tertiary industries (Hoselitz
1960). The third was the use of a Cobb-Douglas
production function for macroeconomic esti-
mates of the marginal productivity of capital.
In the following years, Clark revised and de-
veloped all parts of the book; indeed for some
years he published a monthly journal, Review of
Economic Progress (1949-1952), which con-
sisted entirely of revisions and new studies subse-
quently incorporated in the third edition of the
book. But the most notable development was the
publication of The Economics of 1960 (1942),
a daring (to use no stronger word) attempt at
an econometric forecasting model for the world
economy. The most surprising forecast was that
the terms of trade would move by ninety per
cent in favor of primary products, mainly be-
cause of massive industrialization of China and
India. "The prediction was not fulfilled," as he
has since conceded in a personal communica-
tion, "but, as [Bertrand] de Jouvenel pointed out,
the book performed a service, in showing on
how many points the estimates can go wrong"
(1978). It was useful also as a counterweight
to arguments soon to become fashionable that
the terms of trade must inevitably move against
primary products (Higgins 1959).
So important and original was Clark's work of
the 1930s that one wonders why his name is not
universally recognized as among the half dozen
great economists of the twentieth century. Part
of the answer is suggested in two brilliant re-
views of The Conditions of Economic Progress
(Rothbarth 1941; Giblin 1941). One reads in
part:
It is difficult to know what to admire most in this
book: the boldness of the underlying scheme or the
energy and labour that went into its execution, the
avoidance of unnecessary subtleties or the width of
observation and experience that made this avoidance
easy. And yet it is in many ways a very annoying
book. . . . Mr. Clark has such a wealth of material
to work on that it seems to matter very little what
he does with it; he does not grade it sufficiently ac-
cording to quality; he frequently throws it before
the reader in the raw state and equally frequently
he works on it with primitive and inappropriate
tools. . . . He never reaches that highest level of
achievement—the product of close theoretical
penetration of complex facts—where one perceives
CLARK, COLIN 723
suddenly with a feeling of its inevitability a new
unity and a new simplicity amongst the mass of
accidental material. (Rothbarth 1941)
Since the end of World War u, while continu-
ing to make contributions to applied economics
on all manner of subjects—from the declining
importance of capital (compared with knowl-
edge) as a determinant of economic growth,
trade cycles in the United States, the causes of
inflation, the economics of beef cattle, irrigation,
and housework, to estimation of net capital
stock and the marginal utility of income-
Clark's work has been dominated by an event
that preceded the war, his conversion to Roman
Catholicism. Whether, as his critics claim, he
has subordinated his own thinking to the tenets
of the Church or whether, as he would probably
see it, he has been attracted to Catholic social
thought because it has corresponded most closely
to his own values, most of his writings in the
last thirty years explicitly or implicitly support
the social teachings of the Catholic Church, and
he has been one of its most effective lay pro-
tagonists. Two themes stand out.
One is opposition to neo-Malthusianism. As
the most influential lay member of the Pope's
Commission on Population (1964-1966), Clark
is believed to have provided much of the eco-
nomic rationale for the hard line against birth
control by contraceptive devices of the papal
encyclical Humanae Vitae. In essence, his case,
expounded in numerous books, pamphlets, and
articles, has been that the world's resources,
rationally used, are sufficient to provide ade-
quate food for any foreseeable population
growth and that; generally speaking, growth of
population and per capita real income are posi-
tively, not negatively, correlated (1951; 1967;
1970). The former part of the case stimulated
nearly two decades of specialization on agricul-
tural economics and drew on the empirical evi-
dence yielded by this work; the latter part, with
its belief in increasing returns, went back for
its inspiration in part to his earliest professional
work as assistant to Allyn Young and editor of
G. T. Jones's study (1933).
The second theme has been opposition to
totalitarianism and increasingly to big govern-
ment of any kind. In 1945, Colin Clark amazed
the economic profession by arguing in an article
in the Economic Journal the thesis (for
which he gave credit to a "brilliant insight" by
Keynes 20 years earlier) that there is a
124 CLARK, COLIN
limit of about 25 per cent to the ratio of tax-
ation to national income, the limit being set by
resistances to higher taxation which cause infla-
tion and thus bring the ratio back to about 25
per cent. In 1954, he created an even greater
stir by arguing, in a pamphlet on Welfare and
Taxation that, if the welfare state were
dismantled, so that people had to obtain their
social welfare requirements through voluntary
organizations, but having at the same time the
major part of what they now pay in taxation re-
funded, they might in the end be better off. Both
theses were distinctly unfashionable when they
were first expounded, and the coat-trailing as-
sertiveness with which they were put forward
did not help win them adherents. Now, almost
a generation later, they may be recognized as
anticipating the reaction to welfare statism
associated especially with the University of
Chicago, Virginia Polytechnic, and proposition
13, but by no means confined to the United
States.
Clark has always relished being provokingly
unfashionable :
He supported Keynes long before he became fashion-
able, and questioned Keynes when he was fashion-
able. He opposed the protection of agriculture in
Britain and of manufactures in Australia. Long
before others he questioned the high rate of eco-
nomic growth in Soviet Russia. In Growthmanship
. . . he argued, against the fashion, that economic
growth could not be accelerated artificially by cap-
ital investment . . . and now [he argues] that the
way to reduce [taxation] from 40 to 25 per cent is
to dismantle many state welfare services and return
to the average family a large part of the income
taken from it so that it can make better provision
for itself. (Editor's preface 1964)
This, too, may be a view less unfashionable
in the 1980s than it was in the 1950s.
Like George Bernard Shaw and Bertrand Rus-
sell, Colin Clark has often written and spoken
pour epater le bourgeois, not just for the fun of
it but to startle his audience out of the errors of
its ways. Even more than a first-rate quantita-
tive economist, he has been a prophet. How far
his has been a voice crying in the wilderness is
for a later generation to judge.
H. W. ARNDT
WORKS BY CLARK
1931 Statistical Studies Relating to the Present Eco-
nomic Position of Great Britain. Economic Journal
41:343—369
(1932) 1965 The National Income 1924-1931. New
York: Kelley.
1933 JONES, G. T. Increasing Return. Edited by Colin
Clark. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1934 Investment in Fixed Capital in Great Britain.
Special Memorandum, No. 38. London and Cam-
bridge Economic Service.
(1937) 1965 National Income and Outlay. 2d ed. Lon-
don: Cass.
1938 Determination of the Multiplier From National
Income Statistics. Economic Journal 48:435-448.
1938 CLARK, COLIN; and CRAWFORD, J. G. The National
Income of Australia. Sydney (Australia): Angus &
Robertson.
1939 A Critique of Russian Statistics. London: Mac-
millan.
(1940) 1957 The Conditions of Economic Progress. 3d
ed. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martins.
1942 The Economics of 1960. London: Macmillan.
1945 Public Finance and Changes in the Value of
Money. Economic Journal 55:371—389.
1947 Russian Income and Production Statistics. Re-
view of Economic Statistics 29:215-217.
1949 A System of Equations Explaining the United
States Trade Cycle, 1921-41. Econometrica 17:93-
124.
1949-1952 Review of Economic Progress. 4 vols. Bris-
bane (Australia): Government Printer.
1951 World Resources and World Population. Econo-
mia Internazionale 4:15—40.
1954 Welfare and Taxation. Oxford Univ. Press.
(1958) 1963 Australian Hopes and Fears. Philadel-
phia: Dufour.
(1961a) 1970 Economics of Irrigation in Dry Climates.
2d ed. Oxford and New York: Pergamon.
(1961b) 1962 Growthmanship: A Study in the Myth-
ology of Invesment. Hobart Papers, No. 10. London:
Institute of Economic Affairs.
(1962) 1963 CLARK, COLIN; and FRANKEL, HENRYK
The Common Market and British Trade. New York:
Praeger. —» First published in London with the title
British Trade in the Common Market.
(1964) 1970 Taxmanship. Hobart Papers, No. 26. 2d
ed. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
(1964) 1970 CLARK, COLIN; and HAS WELL, MARGARET
R. The Economics of Subsistence Agriculture. 4th
ed. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martins.
(1967) 1977 Population Growth and Land Use. 2d ed.
London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martins.
1970 Starvation or Plenty. London: Seeker & Warburg;
New York: Taplinger.
1977 The "Golden" Age of the Great Economists. En-
counter 48:80-90.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GIBLIN, L. F. 1941 Economic Progress (review arti-
cle). Economic Record 17:262-269.
HIGGINS, BENJAMIN (1959) 1968 Economic Develop-
ment: Principles, Problems, and Policies. Rev. ed.
New York: Norton.
HOSELITZ, BERT 1960 Theories of Economic Growth.
Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1965.
PATINKIN, DON 1976 Keynes and Econometrics: On
the Interaction Between the Macroeconomic Revolu-
tions of the Interwar Period. Econometrica 44:1091—
1123.
ROTHBARTH, ERWIN 1941 Review of The Conditions
of Economic Progress. Economic Journal 51:120—
124.
SAMUELSON, PAUL A. 1966 Collected Scientific Pa-
pers. Vol. 3. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
STUDENSKI, PAUL 1958 The Income of Nations. New
York Univ. Press.

COASE, R. H.
Ronald Harry Coase was born in Willesden,
England, on December 29, 1910, and was edu-
cated at the London School of Economics
(B.COM., 1932; D.SC., 1951). There he enrolled
in the industry and trade curriculum, which ex-
posed him to both economic theory and the
detailed study of business and legal institutions.
Apart from wartime service with the British
government, Coase has spent his career in the
world of books and ideas. In Britain he served
on the faculties of the Dundee School of Eco-
nomics and Commerce, the University of Liver-
pool, and his alma mater. In 1951 he moved to
the United States, where he has held appoint-
ments at the University of Buffalo, the Univer-
sity of Virginia, and the University of Chicago.
In 1964 Coase assumed the editorship of the
Journal of Law and Economics, the outlet for
some of his most important contributions.
The theory of the firm. In Coase's first ma-
jor work, "The Nature of the Firm" (1937a),
he resolved several difficulties in the economic
theory of the firm. Coase began by contrasting
economic activity between firms, where re-
sources are allocated in response to market-
determined relative prices and economic activity
within firms, where inputs are assigned to vari-
ous jobs according to managerial directives. He
sought to explain why production was some-
times coordinated centrally within firms, but
determined at other times by decentralized mar-
ket forces. In short, why did firms exist?
The answer pivoted on Coase's recognition of
the costs of making market transactions. Real
resources are required to learn prices and make
contracts governing every productive activity
of each input. Whenever the coordination of
resources can be accomplished more economic-
ally by central organization, firms will be estab-
lished. But the costliness of coordinating many
inputs limits the firm's size. Beyond that size,
resources will be allocated more economically
by market forces.
Coase's theory of the firm is an important
breakthrough. It eliminates relying upon legal
requirements, residual income claimants, or the
division of labor as reasons for the existence of
firms. The theory explains a firm's size: If the
cost of organizing an additional transaction is
less within a firm than accomplishing the same
activity through market exchange, a firm will
expand (an explanation that neatly fits the
Marshallian framework of substitution at the
COASE, R. H. 125
margin). Coase's focus on the cost of using the
market became an integral component of the
economic theory of property rights.
Cost and pricing behavior. In economic an-
alysis, the cost of something is the highest
valued alternative given up in order to get it.
Early in his career Coase clarified the kind of
cost figures businessmen would need to operate
economically. He demonstrated the logic and
relevance of data based on opportunity costs,
contrasting these with the statistics traditionally
gathered by accountants. By this time Coase
was intimately acquainted with the decision-
making methods of the business world; yet he
defended the adequacy of the marginal analysis
of firm behavior used by economists. When
managers purported to use a nonmarginal rule
in decision-making, such as full cost pricing, he
viewed this as reconcilable with orthodox eco-
nomic theory because the implementation of
such rules implicitly takes some account of de-
mand forces or incremental costs of output
variations.
Since the 1930s, many economists have ad-
vocated that public utilities price their output at
marginal cost. Coase has been a critic of this
proposal, ascribing its appeal to "blackboard
economics"—analysis with diagrammatic allure
that nevertheless overlooks a policy's opera-
tional requirements. While not denying the sig-
nificance of marginal cost, Coase argued that
the total economic effect of a policy must be as-
sessed, including the behavior of the social in-
stitutions that will implement it. He proposed
a multipart pricing structure, giving appropriate
weight to marginal cost while avoiding diffi-
culties perceived in proposals based strictly on
marginal cost pricing.
The economics of communication. Coase's
interest in public utilities focused primarily on
institutions of communication, notably radio,
television, and the post office. On one level his
work was historical. The account of the mo-
nopoly origins of radio and television in Great
Britain, the operation of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission in the United States, and
the response of the British post office to rival
enterprise required exhaustive examination of
newspaper clippings, corporate archives, and
government documents. Yet Coase viewed this
material through economist's spectacles, and
from it also came important analytical con-
tributions.
Coase explained how radio broadcasting
could be organized by the market system, meet-
126 COASE, R. H.
ing head-on the conventional argument that
without government control or monopoly there
would be interference as stations transmitted
simultaneously on the same frequency. He dem-
onstrated that such congestion was not an ex-
ample of market failure, but rather of a situa-
tion where one of the preconditions for the
proper functioning of a market had not been
met: the existence of private property in the
electromagnetic spectrum. If individuals could,
by virtue of ownership rights, exclude others
from particular frequencies, there was nothing
to prevent a free market in broadcast frequen-
cies; and in testimony before the Federal Com-
munications Commission in 1959, Coase recom-
mended that the agency auction broadcast
frequencies to the highest bidder, the proceeds
going to the Treasury, and the media then be-
ing subject to the discipline of competition.
Coase's scholarly interest in broadcasting led to
his seminal article, "The Problem of Social
Cost" (1960), the rudiments of which appear in
his article on the Federal Communications
Commission (1959).
In addition, Coase took the arguments in sup-
port of freedom of speech, religion, and the
press and showed how, conceptually, these ar-
guments favored a free market in radio and
television as well. Expanding upon the work of
Aaron Director, he later advanced the broader
proposition that, from both an economic and a
libertarian perspective, there is no distinction
between the market for ideas and the market
for goods; economic freedom serves the same
ends in each sphere.
The concept of social cost. Before Coase's so-
cial cost paper was published in 1960, external
economies and diseconomies were catalogued by
economists as market failure. For example, it
was argued that polluting firms would choose
outputs based on private costs of operation,
ignoring spillover costs imposed upon others;
inefficiency in resource allocation would be the
result; a tax on the pollutor was usually recom-
mended to remedy the market's defect. Coase
challenged this view in tripartite fashion.
First, he showed that if property rights are
established for all inputs, and transaction costs
are negligible, external effects will be mitigated
efficiently through voluntary agreement, sans
government action. Then he proved that under
these conditions, the locus of liability (or fault)
for any external diseconomy does not alter the
composition or value of total output. In the case
of a polluting firm, resources will be allocated
efficiently by private negotiation, no matter who
is technically liable for the pollution. This prop-
osition is now called the Coase theorem. Coase
then focused on a world of nonnegligible trans-
action costs, demonstrating that here rules of
liability did affect resource allocation but that
no a priori assignment was efficient; instead,
the total costs and benefits of alternative rules
had to be estimated.
The article has proved rich in theoretical im-
plication and institutional detail, receiving
great attention and generating a literature all
its own. It has provided a framework for the
discussion of externality policy, such as pollu-
tion and accident control. So germinative has
Coase's analysis proved that it has served for
the tackling of such diverse topics as antitrust,
share tenancy, blood delivery systems, and the
baseball reserve clause as well.
Other work. Coase's scholarly interests have
been diversified. In addition to the contributions
reviewed, Coase has authored papers on duopoly
and monopoly pricing, the pig-cycle, consumer's
surplus, the pricing of North Sea gas, advertis-
ing, the financing of public goods, antitrust en-
forcement, and the proper scope of economic
inquiry. His paragons are Adam Smith and Al-
fred Marshall, about whom he has astonishing
knowledge, and he also has written about the
lives and work of these economists.
Assessment. It is no easy task to trace out the
direct influence of other scholars upon Coase. A
case could be made for his teacher, Arnold
Plant, and for Edwin Cannan (Plant's mentor).
Frank H. Knight, Philip Henry Wicksteed,
Friedrich A. von Hayek, Aaron Director, and Leo
Herzel made contributions from which Coase
has drawn. But basically he must be seen as his
own man, an archetype of the self-contained
scholar. Not unlike Adam Smith, Coase has
worked productively alone, drawing ideas from
his reading and reflection, classifying facts
through his grasp of economic theory. Indeed,
his work is a testimony to the power of induc-
tive reasoning, since Coase uses his extraordi-
nary interest in the commonplace facts of eco-
nomic behavior to generate ideas with far-flung
consequences.
Coase's scholarly influence has been selective,
for the methodology and interests of his re-
search have commonly run against the grain.
His enthusiasm for abstract theory without
practical application has always been restrained;

he eschews advanced mathematical and statisti-
cal techniques; and he considers the history of
ideas to be consequential. The theme of his
work has been to preserve and expand the scope
of market processes. His influence, accordingly,
has been most notable in the United States
where there is greater interest in the market
system than elsewhere.
It is too early for an unqualified evaluation of
Coase's work, in part because he continues to
produce. But to rank him as one of the principal
founders of the modern discipline of law and
economics is not premature. He has altered
fundamentally the way many legal scholars
view torts, contracts, and property law. His
editorship of the Journal of Law and Economics
has contributed significantly to the intellectual
growth of this area of study. In economics
Coase's work has greatly advanced the property
rights paradigm and appreciably altered the
way economists view business firms, externali-
ties, public goods, and the case for an economy
organized by market exchange.
KENNETH G. ELZINGA
WORKS BY COASE
1937a The Nature of the Firm. Economica New Series
4:386-405. -» Reprinted on pages 331-351 in
American Economic Association, Readings in Price
Theory. Edited by George J. Stigler and Kenneth E.
Boulding. Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, 1952.
1937b Some Notes on Monopoly Price. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 5:17-31.
1937 COASE, RONALD H.; and FOWLER, RONALD F. The
Pig-cycle in Great Britain: An Explanation. Eco-
nomica New Series 4:55—82.
1938 Business Organisation and the Accountant. The
Accountant. Oct.-Dec.: 470-472, 505-507, 537-
538, 559-560, 607-608, 631-632, 665-666, 705-
707, 737-739, 775-777, 814-815, 834-835. -» Re-
printed on pages 105—158 in David Solomons
(editor), Studies in Costing. London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1952.
1946 The Marginal Cost Controversy. Economica New
Series 13:169-182.
1950 British Broadcasting: A Study in Monopoly.
London; Longmans Green; Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard Univ. Press.
1954 The Development of the British Television Ser-
vice. Land Economics 30:207-222.
1959 The Federal Communications Commission. Jour-
nal of Law and Economics 2:1—40.
1960 The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and
Economics 3:1-44.
1961 The British Post Office and the Messenger Com-
panies. Journal of Law and Economics 4:12—65.
1964 Discussion of "Direct Regulation and Market
Performance in the American Economy" by R. E.
Caves and "The Effectiveness of Economic Regu-
lation: A Legal View" by Roger C. Cramp ton. Amer-
ican Economic Review 54:194—197.
1968a Consumer's Surplus. Volume 3, pages 354-358
COCHRAN, THOMAS C. 127
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968b Educational TV: Who Should Pay? Washing-
ton: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research. —> Debate with Edward W. Barrett.
1970 The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and Its Ap-
plication. Bell Journal of Economics and Manage-
ment Science 1:113-128.
1972 Durability and Monopoly. Journal of Law and
Economics 15:143-149.
1974a The Lighthouse in Economics. Journal of Law
and Economics 17:357-376.
1974b The Market for Goods and the Market for
Ideas. American Economic Review 64:384-391.
1975 Marshall on Method. Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics 18:25-31.
1976 Adam Smith's View of Man. Journal of Law and
Economics 19:529-546.
1977 Economics and Contiguous Disciplines. Pages
481-491 in Mark Perlman (editor), The Organiza-
tion and Retrieval of Economic Knowledge. London:
Macmillan.
COCHRAN, THOMAS C.
Thomas Childs Cochran, born in 1902, was a
pioneer in the introduction of the behavioral
sciences into history and the concomitant effort
to shift scholarly focus away from the study of
national political and military events toward
social history. Believing that business and eco-
nomic changes were the most distinctive and
dynamic elements in the American past, he
concentrated his research and publications on
business history. He was the best-known and
most widely respected analyst of our "business
civilization" in the middle decades of the twen-
tieth century.
Educated at Adelphi Academy, New York
University (B.S., 1923; M.A., 1925), and the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania (PH.D., 1930), Cochran
was a "late bloomer" as a scholar. He began his
undergraduate studies at N.Y.U. with the inten-
tion of becoming a chemical engineer, but de-
cided late in his junior year that his real inter-
ests lay in history. Through his mid-thirties,
relative financial security and a wide range of
interests made his academic job at N.Y.U. and
his scholarship virtually avocations. As he later
wrote in a typescript autobiography, he initially
pursued these avocations "chiefly because I had
a Calvinistic urge to be purposefully occupied"
(1977a). His doctoral dissertation, written under
the direction of St. George L. Sioussat, was pub-
lished in 1932 as New York in the Confedera-
tion. Cochran later worked sporadically on a set
of ideas concerning what he saw as the central
role of business in the American past. In 1938
 128 COCHRAN, THOMAS C.
he married his third wife, Rosamond Beebe
Cochran, and, he wrote many years after, "be-
came, for the first time, a real scholar." By the
close of the depression decade, both his personal
and professional lives had become more settled
and purposive; his marriage to his helpmate and
his intellectual interest in the role of business
in shaping culture would occupy his attention
and energies for the following four decades.
In his developing career Cochran sought to
disseminate some of his emerging ideas about
the need for a "cultural approach" to history,
employing concepts from such disciplines as
anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Many
of these notions were apparent in the book he
published in 1942 with William Miller, The Age
of Enterprise: A Social History of Industrial
America. That study sought to reinterpret the
broad contours of nineteenth- and twentieth-
century America in terms of the impact of busi-
ness enterprise; the quest for "economic op-
portunities and economic freedom," they as-
serted, "has been most powerful in determining
the nature of our culture." Cochran expanded
and drove home these arguments in a highly
influential essay entitled "The 'Presidential Syn-
thesis' in American History" (1948Z?). There he
denounced as a failure "the old skeleton of wars,
presidential administrations, and the westward
movement" which still held the edifice of Amer-
ican history together despite "fifty years of rapid
growth in the social sciences." History as prac-
ticed in academe was virtually irrelevant; it
lacked "social realism." Cochran called for a new
"social science synthesis" explicating the "ma-
terial or psychological" changes that most af-
fected "such human conditioning factors as
family life, physical living conditions, choice of
occupations, sources of prestige, and social be-
liefs." In the next three decades, many histo-
rians in the United States came to accept this
emphasis on underlying social structures and
processes rather than on superficial political
history. Relatively few, however, would follow
Cochran in stressing business as the central
element influencing the evolution of our society.
Cochran raised the analysis of American
business history far above the dominant cate-
gories of case studies of individuals or firms and
the shallow, moralistic interpretations of busi-
ness leaders, whether as "robber barons" or as
"industrial statesmen." In Railroad Leaders,
1845-1890 (1953), written during his stay at
Arthur H. Cole's Research Center in Entrepre-
neurial History at Harvard University, he sought
to explicate the "business mind." Influenced by
historian-sociologist Leland Jenks, he employed
hypotheses from sociology and social psychology
in that study. Throughout his work, and espe-
cially in Business in American Life (1972a), he
explored the interrelationships between business
and other social institutions such as the family,
religion, education, the law, and politics. More
than any other historian, he succeeded in an-
alyzing business in its wider social context.
From the late 1940s on, Cochran enjoyed a
varied and highly successful professional career,
teaching and writing at N.Y.U. and then at the
University of Pennsylvania, sitting on influential
committees of historical associations, serving
briefly as a director of the National Bureau of
Economic Research (1950-1952) and later of
the Social Science Research Council (1960-
1964), editing professional journals, and receiv-
ing many honors, including the presidency of
both the Organization of American Historians
and the American Historical Association, as well
as honorary degrees and prestigious lectureships.
He wrote prodigiously, primarily but not ex-
clusively, on the history of business in the
United States.
Ironically, although Cochran was widely
identified with the use of social science in his-
tory, he always remained the inductive his-
torian, refusing to allow any body of theory to
determine his view of the past. And, despite
his emphasis on business and economic history,
he made little use of perhaps the most powerful
of social science theories, economics. He pre-
ferred the "softer" behavioral sciences, and he
took no part in the move toward highly mathe-
matical and theoretical "cliometrics" that be-
came so popular in economic history in the
1960s. Moreover, he persisted in defining him-
self as a business and social historian, not an
economic historian. In his 1977 memoir he de-
clared, "I have always held abstract ideas tenta-
tively, trying to weigh them against evidence,
and ready to discard generalizations that seemed
no longer tenable." His role was to broaden his-
torians' acquaintance with other disciplines, to
encourage the use of other methodologies when
they seemed helpful, and to push historians to-
ward a focus on new topics. The social sciences
were for Cochran never more than another as-
sortment of tools for the eclectic historian's
toolbox. Hugh Aitken in Explorations in Enter-
prise (1965) offered a wise assessment of
Cochran's use of sociological and psychosocial
notions in his days at Cole's center: "Cochran

. . . took much of the heat out of the contro-
versies and misunderstandings that were . . .
developing, demonstrating by his work—the only
way that could'carry conviction—that there was
nothing in the new concepts and hypotheses
that need divert an honest craftsman from do-
ing an honest job" (p. 13). That assessment
could well have been written of his work as a
whole.
GLENN PORTER
WORKS BY COCHRAN
(1932) 1972 New York in the Confederation: An Eco-
nomic Study. New York: Kelley.
1942 COCHRAN, THOMAS C.; and MILLER, WILLIAM
The Age of Enterprise: A Social History of Indus-
trial America. New York: Macmillan. —» A revised
paperback edition was published by Harper in 1961.
(1948a) 1976 The Pabst Brewing Company: The His-
tory of an American Business. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
1948i» The "Presidential Synthesis" in American His-
tory. American Historical Review 53:748—759.
(1953) 1966 Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890: The Busi-
ness Mind in Action. New York: Russell.
(1957) 1972 American Business in the Twentieth Cen-
tury. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. —»
First published as The American Business System:
A Historical Perspective, 1900-1955.
1959a Basic History of American Business. Princeton,
N.J.: Van Nostrand.
1959& The Puerto Rican Businessman: A Study in
Cultural Change. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsyl-
vania Press.
1962 COCHRAN, THOMAS C.; and REINA, REUBEN D.
Entrepreneurship in Argentine Culture. Philadel-
phia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press.
1964 The Inner Revolution: Essays on the Social Sci-
ences in History. New York: Harper.
1968a Entrepreneurship. Volume 5, pages 87-91 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan
and Free Press.
1968b The Great Depression and World War II: 1929-
1945. Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman.
1972a Business in American Life: A History. New
York: McGraw-Hill. —•» A paperback edition was
published in 1974.
1972b Social Change in America: The Twentieth Cen-
tury. New York: Harper.
1977a A Memoir. Unpublished manuscript. —» On de-
posit in the Eleutherian Mills Historical Library,
Greenville, Wilmington, Delaware.
1977b 200 Years of American Business. New York:
Basic Books.
1978 Pennsylvania: A Bicentennial History. New
York: Norton.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
AITKEN, HUGH G. J. (editor) 1965 Explorations in
Enterprise. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
GALAMBOS, Louis 1967 American Business History.
Washington: Service Center for Teachers of History.
HICHAM, JOHN; KRIEGER, LEONARD; and GILBERT, FELIX
1965 History. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall.
CORWIN, EDWARD S. 129
CORWIN, EDWARD S.
Edward Samuel Corwin was born, as he used
to emphasize, "of Old English stock" on a farm
near Plymouth, Michigan, in 1878. As an un-
dergraduate at the University of Michigan (B.A.,
1900), he concentrated on the study of Ameri-
can history under the tutelage of Andrew C.
McLaughlin. He went on for graduate work to
the University of Pennsylvania (PH.D., 1905)
where, under John Bach McMasters, he special-
ized in the history of the American colonial and
revolutionary periods. In 1905 Woodrow Wil-
son, then president of Princeton University,
appointed him one of the original fifty-five "pre-
ceptors" at the university with which Corwin's
name would be associated throughout his
scholarly career.
Princeton's new preceptorial system, regarded
at the time as a radical innovation in under-
graduate teaching methods, combined lectures
with intensive small group discussion of as-
signed readings. The faculty preceptor in each
such group, which typically covered several hun-
dreds of pages each week from "standard" works
(e.g., Holland's Jurisprudence, Maine's Ancient
Law}, was expected to work closely and on a
personal, even a social, basis with his students.
Hence, Wilson required that preceptors be
"clubbable," a term referring to the personality
traits especially valued by the members of
Princeton's somewhat snobbish eating clubs. In
an instructional system that put heavy demands
on the faculty member, Corwin rapidly estab-
lished a reputation as a tough teacher. A bit of
a martinet in the classroom, he retained among
students and colleagues alike the nickname "the
General" throughout his career at Princeton.
Corwin's vocation as a commentator on Amer-
ican public law spanned an eventful half cen-
tury that saw the U.S. Supreme Court reach the
apogee of "constitutionalized laissez-faire," then
retreat to a position of relative neutrality on
economic issues during the "constitutional revo-
lution" of the New Deal years. Throughout the
first three decades of the twentieth century,
Corwin was widely considered to be one of the
two or three most influential students and critics
of the Court. He served as president of the
American Political Science Association in 1931.
In the 1940s Corwin shifted his interest some-
what, from the Supreme Court to a focus on the
office and powers of the American presidency
(1940b). During the 1950s Corwin authored,
coauthored, or edited five books, one of them
130 CORWIN, EDWARD S.
the magisterial Constitution of the United States
of America: Analysis and Interpretation (1953),
the result of a major research effort sponsored
by the Library of Congress. He continued to
publish major articles, reviews, and letters to
the editor, many of them severely critical of the
post-1940s trend of constitutional decision
(1947; 1949). Active almost to the end, Corwin
died in Princeton in 1963.
Corwin began to specialize in constitutional
history and interpretation soon after he assumed
his preceptorial duties at Princeton, in what was
then the department of history (which in 1937
would see the "secession," under Corwin's lead-
ership, of a new department of politics). Corwin
once told a student that the mentor of his under-
graduate days, "Andy Mac" McLaughlin, had
been the leading influence on his scholarly and
pedagogical approach. McLaughlin, however,
had kept his courses in American constitutional
history and constitutional law in more or less
separate compartments—a not unusual approach
in those days. On the one hand, McLaughlin
dealt in his lectures and books with personal,
political, and social forces that had influenced
the authors of the constitutional document. But
he treated the interpretation of this document
as the product of pure judicial reasoning from
agreed premises that were largely beyond the
give and take of politics.
Along with Charles A. Beard of Columbia
University and Thomas Reed Powell of Harvard
University, Corwin attained leadership in the
development of a broader conception of public
law. Rejecting McLaughlin's dualistic approach,
Corwin in his classes and his scholarship
stressed the connection between legal doctrines
and larger philosophical, political, and socio-
economic issues. Corwin's emphasis on the his-
torical context of constitutional development,
rather than merely the internal logic of exfoliat-
ing legal doctrines and rules, probably represents
his most significant contribution to scholarship.
The fruits of the first phase of Corwin's
scholarship were probably the most important
and enduring of his career. This phase stretched
from the earliest years of his preceptorship
through the late 1920s. During this period, Cor-
win produced what he himself regarded as his
most creative work: his studies of such founda-
tional doctrines as "due process of law," "vested
rights," and "higher law" (see, for example,
1909; 1911; 1914a; 1914b; 1914c; 1925&;
1928-1929). Most particularly, Corwin directed
his attention to the doctrinal underpinnings of
the keystone institution of the American consti-
tutional system, judicial review itself.
Corwin's concern with the philosophical basis
of judicial review was altogether natural, in
view of the fact that the first two decades of the
twentieth century saw the reopening—and even-
tually, the settling—of a great debate over the
role of the federal appellate courts in American
politics. Some progressive politicians (such as
Wisconsin Senator Robert M. LaFollette), some
labor leaders (such as Eugene V. Debs), and
some scholars, who objected to the probusiness
orientation of an increasingly active federal
judiciary, either denied the validity of judicial
review or proposed its repudiation by constitu-
tional amendment. Other observers of the Amer-
ican political scene (such as Beard, whose The
Supreme Court and the Constitution [1912] and
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution
[1913] touched off a flood of controversy) con-
ceded the legitimacy of judicial review. But the
supporters of the institution offered a variety of
theories on which to base the distinctive judicial
authority. All contributors to the debate had to
contend with the framers' failure explicitly to
provide for any power of review.
In contrast to Beard (whose most famous
book, the Economic Interpretation, Corwin
seems not to have particularly admired; see
1914c), Corwin regarded judicial review not as
a device to secure certain economic privileges
for the propertied class, but as a product of pre-
vailing political-legal philosophy at the time of
the framing. A proper understanding of the
basis for judicial review, Corwin argued, must
begin with an appreciation of the framers' as-
sumptions. The founding fathers, most of them
lawyers, were heirs to the British tradition of a
fundamental law. Since the time of Edward
Coke, this tradition had implied the existence
of a vaguely defined "higher law" capable of con-
trolling acts of the legislature. From this seven-
teenth-century conception, it was but a short
step to the concept of higher law in the sense
of a body of principles that possess intrinsic
validity. In relation to such principles, positive
enactments of legislatures are not exertions of
human will, but rather acts of discovery or
declaration (1928-1929). The framers, Corwin
argued, regarded the written Constitution as the
embodiment of such higher law principles. This
view would automatically have yielded a jus-
tification of some power, somewhere in govern-
ment, to review positive legislation.
But how did this power become the peculiar

province of the courts? In the higher law tradi-
tion, judges, who were the defenders of rule of
law against royal prerogative, had occasionally
been willing to invoke natural law—always de-
fined in light of common law precedents (1914a,
p. 255). The common law tradition carried the
further implication that judges possessed a spe-
cial competence. As the adepts in what Coke
had called the "artificial reason of the law,"
judges were the only persons competent to dis-
charge the task of comparing legislative enact-
ments with superior law. In this way, Corwin
argued, "law had become a professional, nay an
official mystery" (1934, p. 109) rather than
man's universal inheritance, attesting his par-
ticipation in the reason and order of the uni-
verse and, indeed, in the Godhead itself. Ac-
cording to Corwin, then, judicial review rested
on general principles implicit in the jurispru-
dential assumptions of an age, and hence
needed no express indication of the intent of
the framers, registered in a written line of the
Constitution.
But Corwin also argued that judicial review
must keep pace with change over time if it were
to survive as an institution in a democracy. Just
as its initial validity (in the sense of the his-
toricity of the framers' intent) depended on the
"public opinion" of the earlier generation, the
continuing vitality of judicial review (in
the sense of widespread popular acceptance and
hence legitimacy) required decisions capable of
eliciting broad public support. Laissez-faire de-
cisions by the Supreme Court had begun to
erode public confidence in the judiciary. Begin-
ning in the late 1920s and running to the eve
of World War n, Corwin turned his attention
from historical and jurisprudential questions to
the economic and political issues of the times
(1925a; 1932; 1934).
Underpinning the attacks that Corwin directed
with increasing frequency (and vehemence)
against the Supreme Court under Chief Justice
William Howard Taft and later, under Charles
Evans Hughes, was a distinctive conception of
the judicial process. In a paper for the American
Political Science Review (1925a), Corwin as-
serted that constitutional interpretation depends
not only on "constitutional law" in the strict
sense of a set of rules whose logical application
to the facts of a case will yield a decision. Inter-
penetrating constitutional law as thus defined is
"constitutional theory," a less coherent corpus
of doctrine rooted in contending ideas of some
historical standing about the meaning of the
CORWIN, EDWARD S. 131
Constitution. Constitutional theory inevitably
presented itself in the form of mutually contra-
dictory ideas: strict vs. loose construction; dual
federalism vs. national supremacy; Chief Justice
John Marshall's conception of an adaptive, ex-
pansible constitution vs. Roger B. Taney's (pro-
fessed) strictness of adherence to the views of
the framers.
Because constitutional law consists of a set
of rules for decision, it should logically compel
a judge to reach a unique decision in any given
case at the bar. The hallmark of law, in other
words, must be mutual consistency of each de-
cision with decisions on the same point that
went before it.
Corwin's argument against judicial supremacy
turned on his charge that the Supreme Court
had gradually ceased to function as a court in
the strict sense of a panel applying "law." The
justices had acquired freedom to choose from
competing lines of precedents so as to endow
themselves with the liberty to reach politically
predetermined results under the guise of draw-
ing conclusions compelled by law. In short, they
had substituted their own preferred version of
constitutional theory for constitutional law. For
example, as against state laws regulating wages
and hours or the quality of merchandise, the
Court could apply the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment on the ground that such
laws interfered with employees' "liberty" or with
the entrepreneurs' "property." Or again, the
Court could strike down such laws—provided
that the enterprise involved was not strictly
local—on the ground that states lacked consti-
tutional authority to regulate interstate com-
merce. On the other hand, the Court could
overturn congressional laws regulating industry,
citing the "reserved powers" clause of the tenth
amendment as a restriction on national power.
"And the total result of this kind of reasoning,"
Corwin wrote at the height of the New Deal
court battle, "was the appearance of a no-man's
land in which interests organized on a national
scale at all times escape all regulation" (1936,
p. 153).
The Supreme Court retreat during the years
1937-1941 to positions consistent with the
needs of a unitary national economy subject to
active legislative regulation (and, when Con-
gress deemed it desirable, active stimulation
too) represented a victory for those identified
with Franklin D. Roosevelt (1941). Corwin, in
the forefront of scholars who championed the
New Deal, had been selected by Roosevelt's
 132 CURTI, MERLE
attorney general, Homer S. Cummings, as the
first academic figure—indeed, as the first witness
who was not a member of the administration—
to testify before the Senate on behalf of the even-
tually unsuccessful "court-packing bill" (1937).
There is evidence that Corwin had been led to
expect a reward of some sort—perhaps even a
seat on the high bench itself (Garvey 1969)—
if the "court-packing bill" passed. However, the
judicial "switch in time that saved nine" helped
to defeat Roosevelt's disingenuous plan for judi-
cial reorganization. Corwin, his reputation for
independence now damaged by the example of
his serviceability to political figures, never heard
the call that might have taken him from Prince-
ton to power and place in Washington. For
whatever reason, following the "constitutional
revolution," Corwin's enthusiasm for Roosevelt's
expansive view of executive power waned, and
several important titles during the years of
World War n challenged the basis of broad
powers being exercised by the president (1940a;
1940k; 1947).
GERALD GARVEY
WORKS BY CORWIN
1906 The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Acts
of Congress. Michigan Law Review 4:616-630.
1909 The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Michigan Law Review 7:643-672. —» Re-
printed in Corwin 1964, pp. 67-98.
1910-1911 The Establishment of Judicial Review.
Michigan Law Review 9:102-125, 283-316.
1911 Due Process of Law Before the Civil War.
Harvard Law Review 24:366-385, 460-479. —» Re-
printed in Corwin 1964, pp. 46-66.
1914a The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional
Law. Michigan Law Review 12:247-276. —» Re-
printed in Corwin 1964, pp. 25-45.
(1914fo) 1963 The Doctrine of Judicial Review, Its
Legal and Historical Bases, and Other Essays.
Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith.
1914c Book Review of An Economic Interpretation of
the Constitution by Charles A. Beard. History
Teacher's Magazine 5:65 only.
1914c£ Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judi-
cial Review. Michigan Law Review 12:538-572.
—» Reprinted in Corwin 1914Jb, pp. 1-77.
(1920) 1973 The Constitution and What It Means
Today. Princeton Univ. Press. —> A supplement to
this book is published annually.
1925a Constitution v. Constitutional Theory: The
Question of the States v. the Nation. American
Political Science Review 19:290-304. —> Reprinted
in Corwin 1964, pp. 99-108.
1925b The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between
the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting
of the Philadelphia Convention. American His-
torical Review 30:511-536. —» Reprinted in Corwin
1964, pp. 1-24.
1928-1929 The "Higher Law" Background of Ameri-
can Constitutional Law. Harvard Law Review
42:149-185, 365-409. -» A paperback edition was
published in 1965 by Cornell University Press.
1932 Social Planning Under the Constitution—A Study
in Perspectives. American Political Science Review
26:1-27. —> Reprinted in Corwin 1964, pp. 109-
125.
1933 Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce—A Cru-
cial Constitutional Issue. Cornell Law Quarterly
18:477-506.
(1934) 1970 The Twilight of the Supreme Court:
A History of Our Constitutional Theory. Hamden,
Conn.: Archon.
(1936) 1959 The Commerce Power Versus States
Rights: Back to the Constitution. Gloucester, Mass. :
Peter Smith.
1937 U.S. CONGRESS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY. Hearings: Reorganization of the Federal
Judiciary. 75th Congress, 1st Session. Washington:
Government Printing Office.
1940a Executive Authority Held Exceeded in De-
stroyer Deal. New York Times Oct. 13, p. 6, col. 5 ff;
p. 7, col. 4 ff. —> A criticism of the attorney gen-
eral's opinion of August 28, 1940.
(1940b) 1957 The President: Office and Powers. 4th
rev. ed. New York Univ. Press. —» A paperback
edition was published in 1974.
(1941) 1977 Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. West-
port, Conn.; Greenwood.
(1947) 1970 Total War and the Constitution. New
York: Arno.
1949 The Supreme Court as National School Board.
Law and Contemporary Problems 14:3-22.
(1949) 1976 CORWIN, EDWARD S.; and PELTASON,
JACK W. Corwin and Peltason's Understanding the
Constitution. 7th ed. Hinsdale, 111.: Dryden Press.
—» First published as Understanding the Constitu-
tion.
1953 The Constitution of the United States of Amer-
ica: Analysis and Interpretation. Edited by Edward
S. Corwin. Washington: General Printing Office.
1956 CORWIN, EDWARD S.; and KOENIG, Louis W.
The Presidency Today. New York Univ. Press.
1964 American Constitutional History: Essays by Ed-
ward S. Corwin. Edited by Alpheus T. Mason and
Gerald Garvey. New York: Harper.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BEARD, CHARLES A. (1912) 1962 The Supreme Court
and the Constitution. With an introduction and
bibliographies by Alan F. Westin. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
BEARD, CHARLES A. (1913) 1935 An Economic In-
terpretation of the Constitution of the United States.
New York: Macmillan. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1962.
GARVEY, GERALD 1969 Scholar in Politics: Edwin S.
Corwin and the Court-Packing Battle. Princeton
University Library Chronicle 31:1—11.
CURTI, MERLE
Merle Eugene Curti, dean of American intel-
lectual historians working in the Progressive
tradition, has himself summed up the major
theme and approach of a lifetime of scholarship
and service: he "emphasized the functional role
of democratic ideas and forces in the history of
American thought and put that history in a so-
cial setting which includes tussles between com-

peting interests and values" (1952, quoted in
1955, p. 23).
For well over two decades, Curti played a
special and even unparalleled role. From at least
1935 to 1955 he was not only a major contrib-
utor to the literature of historical scholarship,
but he was moreover a recognized and honored
leader of his profession in its educational and
organizational work. In 1952 a survey of more
than one hundred American historians revealed
that his Pulitzer Prize winning book, The Growth
of American Thought (1943), was, judged on
the basis of accuracy and contributions to knowl-
edge, the "most preferred" of all works in Amer-
ican history or biography published between
1936 and 1950, "best for reference or for read-
ing or for both purposes" (Caughey 1952, pp.
289-302). He had served as president of both
the Mississippi Valley Historical Association
(1951/1952) and the American Historical Asso-
ciation (1953/1954). In 1955 he published a
collection of his essays that originally appeared
between 1926 and 1953, demonstrating not only
the wide range of his interests, the depth of his
research, and the breadth of source materials
with which he worked, but also a rich interpre-
tive ability sufficient to produce significant syn-
thesis as well. By the close of that period he had
already trained a remarkable number of gradu-
ate students now teaching in leading depart-
ments of history in every section of the country.
While he never became especially well known
to a wider public or a figure of general political
importance as other historians have, few in the
history of American history have had such a
career of professional and scholarly achieve-
ment.
Born in Nebraska in 1897, he remained proud
of his Swiss heritage that he always associated
with the love of liberty. He received his under-
graduate and graduate training at Harvard Uni-
versity where he found himself especially drawn
to the teaching of another middle-westerner,
Frederick Jackson Turner. In Turner's seminar
he developed a series of essays that were to be
among his first publications. Often studies of
the role of ideals in history in mid-nineteenth-
century America, these early works show a par-
ticular fascination with the role of reformers
and reform movements, idealists and social
critics in the optimistic America of that era. They
also indicate an interest in the question of na-
tional self-consciousness and patriotism. Per-
haps the best known of these pieces is the study
of the "Young America" movement, his first
CURTI, MERLE 133
publication in the American Historical Review
in 1926. When Turner retired from Harvard in
1924 he was replaced by another middle-west-
erner, Arthur M. Schlesinger, under whom Curti
completed his PH.D. work in 1927. For his dis-
sertation he elected to expand one of his earlier
essays on the American peace movement into a
full-length and more definitive study. This work
was published in 1929.
Curti had taught at several smaller colleges
before moving in 1925 to Smith College, where
he remained until 1937, advancing rapidly in
rank. The same year he came to Smith he mar-
ried Margaret Wooster, an active child psychol-
ogist with a publishing career of her own. About
this same time, Curti accepted a commission to
prepare a paper that reflected his own develop-
ing interests. From the start of his career he
showed a special concern for the social sciences
in general, and more specifically, an interest in
the relationship between these areas of inquiry
and historical study. When the Committee on
Scientific Method in the Social Sciences of the
Social Science Research Council asked Curti to
contribute to a large and important project, he
accepted. It began for him a lifelong association
with the SSRC. The committee was organizing
a major collection of interpretations of scientific
methods employed by authors of significant con-
tributions to social science. Curti provided an
analysis of the methodological concepts of Fred-
erick Jackson Turner (1928, in 1931 b, pp. 353-
367). He showed that Turner, far from being
simply a historian of the American frontier, also
made important contributions to social, intellec-
tual, and diplomatic history—indeed to all aspects
of American development—as well as to explain-
ing the importance of the role of economic group
conflicts in United States history. The essay
clearly demonstrated Curti's deep commitment to
applying research from all of the social sciences
to history, and the volume itself is a landmark
effort to deal with the methods and nature of
the social sciences.
Before he left Smith, Curti accepted another
assignment of importance, this time for the
Commission on the Social Studies of the Amer-
ican Historical Association. Established to rec-
ommend improvements in the teaching of his-
tory and the social sciences, it commissioned a
series of studies on which its proposals might be
more solidly based. Curti prepared part ten of
that report, The Social Ideas of American Edu-
cators (1935). The result was a book of major
impact in the history of education and in the
134 CURTI, MERLE
history of American social thought as well. Argu-
ing that ideas about education always reflected
more fundamental social ideas and attitudes,
existing social problems and conflicts, Curti pro-
duced a work of historical scholarship based on
careful and detailed research. It was sound but
not disinterested. As Curti made clear in his
preface, he believed that his historical analysis
might prove "useful in the work of clarifying the
purposes of social studies in this time of rapid
social change."
Thus, by the time Curti accepted a post at Co-
lumbia's Teachers College, in 1937, he was not
only a scholar with several major publications on
his record, but also a professional, seriously in-
volved with the work of national professional as-
sociations in history and the social sciences, and
most especially concerned with the quality of
teaching in these fields. He had already commit-
ted himself to the Progressive vision of the New
History that had officially announced itself in
1912 (he insisted correctly that Turner was a
charter member of the new history group that
included James Harvey Robinson, Charles A.
Beard, and Carl Becker). He might well have
associated Columbia University with this school
of historians as well as with one of the philoso-
phers who helped inspire it. For John Dewey, a
hero of his book on American educators, was
perhaps the living philosopher with whom Curti
felt most comfortable. He had come to accept
as his own Dewey's belief that "ideas are plans
for action," and had in his own work increas-
ingly stressed not only the functional nature of
ideas in history but also the view that historical
understanding was itself the function of time
and place, of social forces and social needs.
Curti soon had occasion to develop further
his own strong interest in the interrelationship
between history and the other social sciences.
He served on the program committee planning
the American Historical Association national
convention for 1939. That committee decided
to focus on three areas: techniques of cultural
analysis and synthesis; the cultural role of ideas;
and cultural conflict and nationality groups.
These are precisely the areas to which Curti had
devoted himself from the start of his career. As
a member of the committee, he was responsible
for sessions on psychology and history. He also
presented a paper at a session discussing the
so-called "flowering of New England" in the
middle of the nineteenth century. Curti's com-
ments, in the form of a statistical analysis of
the background of the participants in the "flower-
ing," suggested that the roots of the movement
might be found in the intellectualistic tradition
of Puritanism and in the nature of the middle
class.
The 1939 program was an event of importance
professionally; for Curti it was a prologue to his
greatest work, already in progress. In 1942 he
accepted a position at Turner's old school, the
University of Wisconsin, where he remained
until his retirement in 1968. (In 1947 he was
fittingly given a chair bearing the name of his
own great teacher, Frederick Jackson Turner.)
But before this event, Curti published a work of
such remarkable scholarship, organization, and
synthesis that he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize
in 1943. It is a difficult work to discuss. An
enormous contribution to knowledge just in
terms of its research base and the new data un-
earthed, it is often so thorough that some readers
are overwhelmed by its encyclopedic nature and
by Curti's persistence in grounding the entire
discussion in some meaningful social or socio-
economic context. Curti sought such contexts to
prove the broader significance of the thoughts he
presented, but the book offers no general theory
or interpretation, no particular view of social
change. In this sense, its viewpoint is eclectic.
"Social" and even "socioeconomic" are terms
Curti used, but refused to define with precision.
Yet this is a work of greatness. Curti insisted on
the widest possible definition of "thought." Thus
the work deals with formal ideas and systematic
philosophical positions: ideas about politics, the
state, society, human nature. But Curti also con-
sidered attitudes and beliefs important aspects of
thought; thus he dealt with attitudes toward
children and child rearing, the family, women,
Indians, blacks, workers, the poor, classes, patrio-
tism, and national self-consciousness—revealed
not only by philosophers or self-conscious think-
ers, but rather in ordinary social behavior and
action, in the popular culture and literature, in
the songs and folklore. There is still another
kind of thought important in the work: knowl-
edge. For The Growth of American Thought is
also in many ways a historical sociology of
knowledge, dealing with how knowledge is devel-
oped and used; how knowledge is diffused more
widely and democratically over time; how it is
organized and institutionalized. Thus, he devoted
considerable attention to a wide range of educa-
tional and intellectual institutions and to the
social role of scholars, scientists, and intellec-
tuals.
The importance of this book is not in its

general view of social relations or the functional
nature of ideas. It is rather the total vision of the
nature of thought in America—its broad defini-
tion—and the remarkable revelation of the avail-
ability of sources previously largely untapped.
The book was thus a basic document of, and a
significant influence in the shaping of, the rap-
idly growing American Studies movement of the
period. (Curti was, with others, a founder of
the most important journal of that movement,
the American Quarterly, which began publica-
tion in 1949. He served as the historian on a
board of editors that included distinguished
scholars in American art, literature, philosophy,
economics, and sociology.)
During the 1940s, Curti undertook one more
major professional responsibility with which he
will always be associated. He assumed the chair-
manship of another important SSRC commit-
tee—the Committee on Historiography. Its final
report, Theory and Practice in Historical Study,
the famous Bulletin No. 54 (1946Z?), was a series
of essays and bibliographies for the clarification
of key historiographic issues. Especially ad-
dressed to graduate students, it was one of the
finest statements in defense of historical rela-
tivism, and often a brilliant extension of the
vision of Beard, who as a member of the com-
mittee wrote parts of the report.
The 1940s was a fruitful decade for Curti. In
addition to his professional work, he further de-
veloped his earlier interests. His Roots of Amer-
ican Loyalty (1946#) probed some of the ideas
that had fascinated him from the time of his
early essays. In this slim but impressive work
Curti perhaps pushed closer to the kind of in-
ternal analysis of ideas his critics generally
faulted him for failing to do. This charge was
never quite just—Curti had to understand ideas
before he could relate them to the social world in
which he was especially interested—but there are
passages in this work that show how effectively
Curti can present such analysis. The second
work was the huge history of the University of
Wisconsin that he coauthored with his colleague
and friend, Vernon Carstensen (1949). Curti
was always interested in education, particularly
in the sociology, organization, and diffusion of
knowledge. Thus, the university was a fitting
subject and the work itself one of a handful of
good university or college histories.
While the 1950s represented a period of per-
sonal triumph, it also marked a time of signifi-
cant rebuff to many ideas that Curti valued. In
the historical profession itself, there was a major
CURTI, MERLE 135
assault on the bastions of historical relativism
and the theories of Dewey, Beard, Becker, Turner,
and therefore Curti. He found himself increas-
ingly on the defensive in these debates in histori-
cal journals and at professional meetings. He
spoke out vigorously against what he regarded as
the voices of unreason that denied the possibility
of rational action and planning. The newer vision
of irrational and existential man troubled his old
Progressive orientation, and it was during this
period that he began his detailed study of various
ideas of human nature in American thought, a
study completed in the late 1970s. It was difficult
to be a Progressive in the face of the challenge
of a new pessimism. As early as the concluding
words of his Pultizer Prize volume, Curti could
announce, in the midst of war and totalitarian
challenge, that "hope, if not optimism, still
lived." Yet in later revisions in 1951 and 1964,
Curti's tone seemed increasingly uncertain about
the future. During the remainder of his teaching
career at Wisconsin in the 1950s and 1960s,
he devoted more of his own efforts to the study
of American influence abroad (again a subject
that had interested him since his first essays)
and the history of American philanthropy. Both
of these efforts produced a series of creditable
books and articles marking an honorable con-
tribution to knowledge, but offering little in the
way of new interpretation of our national past
that could capture the professional interest ac-
corded his previous writings.
There was, however, one exception. In 1959
Curti, with the aid of several of his graduate
students, published a work of singular impor-
tance—a book, in a sense that Curti had spent a
lifetime preparing to write. The Making of an
American Community is a landmark volume.
In it, Curti brought to bear all his knowledge and
interest in social science. Using all available data
—quantifiable data as well as the more traditional
sources—he projected a two-fold strategy. In
the wake of the historiographic debates of three
decades could there really be an objective or
more objective history? Was quantification a
way out of total relativism? And, second, could
Curti's own interpretation of Turner's frontier
thesis actually be tested scientifically with the
data from one frontier county in Wisconsin?
The aims are within the tradition Curti had
established for himself from the start of
his career and were a fulfillment of Turner's
own dreams. The results are fascinating and im-
portant. The full significance of this achieve-
ment in reconstructing the social structure and
136 CURTI, MERLE
operation of an American community has yet to
be fully appreciated. Too many dismissed it in
the recent impatience with the old debate about
Turner and his frontier, missing its larger im-
plications.
Merle Curti is no historian of the frontier but
he is most profoundly one of Frederick Jackson
Turner's major students. Like his own teacher,
he has opened many new directions in historical
study. Like Turner, he had encouraged his vast
number of graduate students to undertake work
developing their own interests. He urged no
particular methodology but was rather open to
all ways of understanding. He provided no sin-
gular interpretation of history, but instead pro-
posed a theme and an approach most significant
for his own times. He struggled to retain a
Progressive vision in an era when precisely that
vision was under assault. Always one to doubt
the possibility of one truth or of an objective
history, he nonetheless pressed the use of vari-
ous social science approaches in an effort to
move closer to the impossible goal. In all of this
lies his strength, rather than his weakness, his
greatness as a man, a teacher, and a historian.
WARREN I. SUSMAN
WORKS BY CURTI
1926a Austria and the United States, 1848-1852.
Smith College Studies in History, Vol. 11. North-
ampton, Mass.: Smith College, Department of His-
tory. —> A study in diplomatic relations.
1926i> Young America. American Historical Review
32:34-55.
(1929) 1965 The American Peace Crusade, 1815-
1860. New York: Octagon. —» Originally Curti's
doctoral thesis at Harvard University.
(1931a) 1969 Bryan and World Peace. New York-
Octagon.
1931Z? The* Section and the Frontier in American His-
tory: The Methodological Concepts of Frederick
Jackson Turner. Pages 353-367 in Social Science
Research Council, Committee on Scientific Method
in the Social Sciences, Methods in Social Science: A
Case Book. Univ. of Chicago Press.
(1935) 1959 The Social Ideas of American Educators.
Rev. ed. Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield.
1936a Learning for Ladies (1508-1895). San Marino,
Calif.: Huntington Library.
(1936k) 1972 Peace or War: The American Struggle,
1636-1936. Englewood, N.J.: Ozer.
(1937) 1972 CURTI, MERLE E. (editor) The Learned
Blacksmith: The Letters and Journals of Elihu
Burritt. Englewood, N.J.: Ozer.
(1941) 1960 CURTI, MERLE E. et al. (editors) Amer-
ican Issues. 2 vols. 4th ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
(1943) 1964 The Growth of American Thought. 3d ed.
New York: Harper. —> Translated into German
(1947) and Italian (1959).
1944 CURTI, MERLE E.; and Cox, LA WANDA F. Intro-
duction to America. Washington: Government
Printing Office. —> An interpretation of American
democracy for use in the public schools by candi-
dates for naturalization.
(1946a) 1967 The Roots of American Loyalty. New
York: Russell. —» A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1968 by Atheneum.
1946b Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A
Report of the Committee on Historiography. Social
Science Research Council, Bulletin 54. New York:
The Council.
(1949) 1961 Frederick Jackson Turner. Pages 175-
204 in Wisconsin State Historical Society, Wiscon-
sin Witness to Frederick Jackson Turner: A Col-
lection of Essays on the Historian and the Thesis.
Madison: The Society.
1949 CURTI, MERLE E.; and CARSTENSEN, VERNON
The University of Wisconsin: A History, 1848—
1925. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. —> In
commemoration of the university's one hundredth
anniversary.
1950a CURTI, MERLE E. et al. An American History.
New York: Harper.
1950k CURTI, MERLE E. et al. America's History. New
York: Harcourt.
(1953) 1967 CURTI, MERLE E. (editor) American
Scholarship in the Twentieth Century. New York:
Russell.
1953 CURTI, MERLE E. et al. A History of American
Civilization. New York: Harper.
1954 CURTI, MERLE E.; and BIRR, KENDALL Prelude
to Point Four: American Technical Missions Over-
seas, 1838-1938. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin
Press.
(1955) 1959 Probing Our Past. New York: Peter Smith.
1956 American Paradox: The Conflict of Thought and
Action. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
1959 CURTI, MERLE E. et al. The Making of an Amer-
ican Community: A Case Study of Democracy in a
Frontier Community. Stanford Univ. Press.
(1961) 1966 CURTI, MERLE E.; and TODD, LEWIS PAUL
Rise of the American Nation. 2d ed. New York:
Harcourt.
1963 American Philanthropy Abroad: A History. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
1965 CURTI, MERLE E.; and NASH, RODERICK Philan-
thropy in the Shaping of American Higher Educa-
tion. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
-» Translated into Spanish (1967).
1966 The 1920's in Historical Perspective. Cotton Me-
morial Papers, No. 2. El Paso: Texas Western
College.
1968 Human Nature in American Historical Thought.
Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press. —> The Paul
Anthony Brick lectures, seventh series.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CAUGHEY, JOHN W. 1952 Historians' Choice: Re-
sults of a Poll on Recently Published American
History and Biography. Mississippi Valley Histori-
cal Review 39:289-302.
SKOTHEIM, ROBERT A. 1966 American Intellectual
Histories and Historians. Princeton Univ. Press,
 DART, RAYMOND A.
Raymond Arthur Dart was born to Samuel
Dart and Eliza Anne Brimblecombe in Brisbane,
Australia, on February 4, 1893. He was educated
at schools in Queensland and at the universities
of Queensland and Sydney. After receiving a
B.SC. (Hons.) in 1913, he became a medical
student at the University of Sydney. In 1915 he
was awarded the M.SC. and in 1917 the M.B.,
CH.M. (Hons.) from the same university. The
latter year saw him a demonstrator of anatomy
under James T. Wilson, who was, as Dart him-
self would be, a "maker of men": he left a long
record of distinguished proteges rather than an
outstanding research record. Dart was to prove
a "maker of men" as well as a brilliant, intuitive
researcher. Enlisted in the Australian Army
Medical Corps, he served in England and France
(1918-1919). On demobilization he became
senior demonstrator in anatomy under Grafton
Elliot Smith at University College London. El-
liot Smith, with his strong emphasis on the
nervous system and its role in primate evolu-
tion, was another major influence in Dart's life.
When the Rockefeller Foundation established
its fellowships program, Dart and his fellow
Australian anatomist, Joseph Shellshear, were
the first two Rockefeller fellows (1920-1921).
Dart spent most of his American visit under
Robert J. Terry in the anatomy department of
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri.
Within a year of returning to University Col-
lege, he accepted the chair of anatomy at the
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg,
succeeding the first incumbent, Edward P.
Stibbe. Dart held the chair from 1923 to 1958,
a period of 36 years. He piloted the growth of
the infant medical school (founded in 1919),
serving as dean of the medical faculty for 18
years. During his stewardship, a dental school
was established and courses in physiotherapy,
occupational therapy, and nursing came into
being. He gave much time to the needs of the
school and to public service.
Some years after he retired from the chair, he
was appointed a visiting professor in the Insti-
tutes for the Achievement of Human Potential
at Philadelphia and spent 6 months a year there
between the ages of 70 and 86.
Dart's initial research contributions were in
comparative neuroanatomy and neuroembry-
ology, and a generation of proteges followed his
work. He was interested in the peoples of Africa
and originated the concept that the Khoisan
peoples of southern Africa were descended from
an earlier population he called the "Boskop
race" (after the fossil human cranium found at
Boskop near Potchefstroom, Transvaal, in
1913). This concept was supplanted by newer,
nontypological approaches focused on the his-
tory of southern African peoples.
Dart's name will always be associated with
the discovery of the Taung skull and his pre-
scient recognition of its significance. At a time
when discoveries in Java and China had led to
the view that Asia had cradled mankind, there
fell into Dart's hands in November 1924 a cache
of fossil bones encased in hard calcified breccia.
They had been recovered from a dolomitic lime-
stone cave between Kimberley and Mafeking, on
the edge of the great Kalahari desert. At that
137
138 DART, RAYMOND A.
stage the only fossilized apes found in Africa
had come from much further north. Dart spent
six weeks working on one of the specimens,
whose partly-exposed, natural endocranial cast
had immediately struck him as being too large
to be a baboon's (it was a fossilized baboon
skull that had originally drawn Dart's attention
to Taung). He laid bare the superbly preserved
skull and "brain-cast" of a child of perhaps five
years old. Although the endocranial cast was no
bigger than that of an ape of comparable age,
it showed a number of man-like features, as did
the teeth, especially the small canines. Dart
(1925a) published an account of the skull and
proposed to make the creature the type-speci-
men of a new genus and species, Australopithe-
cus africanus ("southern ape of Africa"). He
recognized it as a higher primate that was not a
pongid (or member of the zoological family of
the apes): in its departures from the ape's struc-
ture, it had moved decidedly in a human direc-
tion, despite its ape-sized brain. He even demon-
strated that the head must have been held on a
virtually upright spine.
The 32-year-old Dart's claims met with al-
most universal hostility. Nor did it help for him
to remind his colleagues that Charles Darwin in
1871 had predicted that such ancestral forms
were more likely to be found in Africa than any-
where else. For a quarter of a century the place
of Australopithecus was in dispute, but Dart
maintained his position. Later adult specimens
were found by Robert Broom at Sterkfontein
and Wilfrid E. Le Gros Clark of Oxford Univer-
sity showed not merely that the South African
higher primates were not apes, but that they
were members of the hominids or family of
men, a view later to become widely accepted.
Dart and his students and staff were respon-
sible for finding another cave site containing
australopithecine fossils—Makapansgat in the
northern Transvaal. Long before such finds of
very early hominids had started to emerge from
east Africa, Dart had been responsible for a re-
markable series of fresh advances:
(1) He had corroborated Darwin's old predic-
tion that Africa would prove to have cradled
mankind;
(2) He had forced upon a reluctant world the
realization that a creature with a brain no larger
than that of a modern ape (recent man's brain
size is three times that of an ape) could nonethe-
less show signs of moving in the human direc-
tion;
(3) He had shown that the principle of mo-
saic evolution had applied to these early claim-
ants to human ancestry—that is, that some
parts of the body (e.g., the teeth and the postu-
ral mechanism) had hominized in advance of
other parts;
(4) He had shown that the particular pattern
of mosaicism evinced by Australopithecus was
totally at variance with that prognosticated by
his old mentor, Elliot Smith, who had held that
brain enlargement must have been in the van-
guard of hominization. Instead, brain enlarge-
ment was not evident in Australopithecus,
whereas dental and postural hominization were!
Dart's appreciation and interpretation of the
hominoid traits of Australopithecus were the
most important breakthroughs in paleoan-
thropology of the twentieth century; next to it,
all the other African discoveries represented a
mere filling-in of details. Dart lived to see his
early claims vindicated. His claim that the aus-
tralopithecines had used as tools the bones,
horns, and teeth of the animals they are pre-
sumed to have eaten was, however, strenuously
resisted by most paleoanthropologists. Some be-
lieve that in this concept Dart made another
seminal contribution to the understanding of
early stages in the hominization process.
Considerable recognition was accorded Dart
in many parts of the world; in his honor the
Institute for the Study of Man in Africa was
founded at the Witwatersrand University to
foster the study of man in Africa, past and
present, in health and disease. A Raymond Dart
lectureship was also established by that institute.
PHILLIP V. TOBIAS
WORKS BY DART
1920 A Contribution to the Morphology of the Corpus
Striatum. Journal of Anatomy 55:1—26.
1923 Boskop Remains From the South-east African
Coast. Nature 112:623-625.
1925a Australopithecus africanus: The Man-Ape of
South Africa. Nature 115:195-199.
1925b Note on Makapansgat: A Site of Early Human
Occupation. South African Journal of Science
22:454 only.
1926 Taungs and Its Significance. Natural History
26:315-327.
1929 Notes on the Taungs Skull. South African Jour-
nal of Science 26:648-658.
1934 Dentition of Australopithecus africanus. Folia
anatomica japonica 12:207-221.
1937a The Hut Distribution: Genealogy and Homo-
geneity of the Auni-Khomani Bushmen. Pages 101-
116 in J. D. Rheinallt Jones and Clement M. Doke
(editors), Bushmen of the Southern Kalahari.
Johannesburg (South Africa): Univ. of the Wit-
watersrand Press.
1937Z? The Physical Characters of the Auni-Khomani
Bushmen. Pages 117-188 in J. D. Rheinallt Jones
and Clement M. Doke (editors), Bushmen of the

Southern Kalahari. Johannesburg (South Africa):
Univ. of the Witwatersrand Press.
1937c Racial Origins. Pages 1-31 in Isaac Schapera
(editor), The Bantu Speaking Tribes of Southern
Africa. London: Routledge.
1938 Fundamental Human Facial Types in Africa.
South African Journal of Science 35:341-348.
1940a Recent Discoveries Bearing on Human History
in Southern Africa. Journal of the Royal Anthro-
pological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
70:13-27.
1940i> The Status of Australopithecus. American Jour-
nal of Physical Anthropology 26:167-186.
1948 The Makapansgat Proto-human Australopithecus
prometheus. American Journal of Physical Anthro-
pology New Series 6:259-283.
1949 The Predatory Implemental Technique of Aus-
tralopithecus. American Journal of Physical Anthro-
pology New Series 7:1-38.
1951 African Serological Patterns and Human Migra-
tions. Cape Town: South African Archaeological
Society. —» Presidential address.
1953 The Predatory Transition From Ape to Man. In-
ternational Anthropological and Linguistic Review
1:201-218.
1954a Africa's Place in the Human Story. Johannes-
burg: South African Broadcasting Corporation.
1954b The Oriental Horizons of Africa. Johannesburg:
South African Broadcasting Corporation. —» Series
of eight talks.
1954c The Significance of Makapansgat. Zeitschrift
fur Morphologic und Anthropologie 46:119—123.
1955 Australopithecus prometheus and Telanthropus
capensis. American Journal of Physical Anthro-
pology New Series 13:67-96.
1956 The Relationships of Brain Size and Brain Pat-
tern to Human Status. South African Journal of
Medical Science 21:23-45.
1957 The Osteodontokeratic Culture of Australopithecus
prometheus. Transvaal Museum Memoirs, No. 10.
Pretoria (South Africa): The Museum.
1959 DART, RAYMOND A.; and CRAIG, DENNIS Adven-
tures with the Missing Link. New York: Harper;
London: Hamish Hamilton. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1967. This book was translated
into Japanese (1960), Polish (1961), Spanish
(1962), and Czechoslovakian (1963).
1960 Africa's Place in the Emergence of Civilisation.
Johannesburg: South African Broadcasting Corpo-
ration. —» Inaugural Van Riebeeck lectures.
1962 The Gradual Appraisal of Australopithecus.
Pages 141-156 in Gottfried Kurth (editor), Evolu-
tion and Hominisation. Stuttgart (Germany):
Fischer.
1973 Recollections of a Reluctant Anthropologist.
Journal of Human Evolution 2:417-427.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
JACKSON, S. P. (proposer) 1964 Citation for Degree
of D.Sc. honoris causa. University of the Wit-
watersrand Gazette 6:12-14.
Professor Dart at 80. 1973 South. African Journal of
Science 69:36 only.
South African Journal of Medical Sciences 1958
23:111-288. -» Volume in honor of Dart.
TOBIAS, P. V. 1964 Dart and Taung Forty Years
After. South African Journal of Science 60:325-
329.
TOBIAS, P. V. (editor) 1973 Journal of Human Evolu-
tion 2:417-577. -» Festschrift for Dart's eightieth
birthday.
TOBIAS, P. V. 1975 Star Scoop That Shook the World.
The Star (Johannesburg) Feb. 3:p.24.
DAVIS, KINGSLEY 139
TOBIAS, P. V. and PLOTKIN, REUBEN (editors) 1958
Raymond A. Dart: Commemorative Number. The
Leech 28:85-155.
DAVIS, KINGSLEY
Born in 1908, Kingsley Davis, demographer,
sociologist, educator, analyst of urban phenom-
ena, and Latin American specialist, can be best
described as a social demographer. Once the rela-
tively narrow field of formal demography was
thoroughly explored, it was inevitable that its
range would be expanded to include the causes
and consequences of population phenomena in
their full economic, social, and cultural contexts.
The credit for setting this broader perspective
cannot be assigned to any one person or nation,
but in a list of pioneers Davis would be close to
the top. The Population of India and Pakistan
(1951b) contains all the analysis of fertility,
mortality, and migration that its title would lead
one to expect, but also well-rounded chapters on
caste, religion, education and literacy, the char-
acteristics of cities, and population policy. In
his words, the book attempted an "analysis of
social organization and social change . . . a
contribution to the sociology and economics as
well as to the demography" of the two countries.
The nondemographic elements, far from being
diversions from the main theme, are fully in-
tegrated parts of a book conceived in a spirit of
what might be deemed a new discipline—social
demography.
Others who have tried to combine social with
demographic analysis typically started with pop-
ulation and found the murky field of sociology
difficult to master. Davis moved in the opposite
direction. His undergraduate major at the Uni-
versity of Texas was English; he took avidly to
the study of literature, joined the Scribblers Club,
and edited two of the campus literary magazines.
He mastered a clear style uncluttered with jar-
gon, the means of communication on a wide
range of subjects to both professional peers and
the general public. It was he who coined such
terms as "the population explosion," "the demo-
graphic transition," and "zero population growth"
—so graphic and felicitous that they have become
commonplace in analyses at all levels.
After receiving an A.B. (1930), Davis con-
tinued graduate work at the University of Texas
in philosophy, economics (under Everett Hale
and Clarence E. Ayres), and sociology (under
Carl Rosenquist and Warner Gettys). With a
140 DAVIS, KINGSLEY
master's degree in philosophy (1932), he en-
tered Harvard University and initially concen-
trated on sociological theory under Talcott Par-
sons and the study of the family under W. Lloyd
Warner. Both as a graduate student and sub-
sequently as a junior member of the faculties at
Smith College and Clark University, he partici-
pated in Talcott Parsons' famous discussion
group, joining there such later prominent so-
ciologists as Emile Benoit-Smullyan, Robert
Bierstedt, Edward Devereaux, Robert K. Merton,
and Logan Wilson. When Parsons' The Struc-
ture of Social Action appeared in 1937, Davis
had already received his doctoral degree (1936),
but he used the book in graduate seminars and
thus improved his grasp of social theory. After
joining, as chairman, the sociology department
at Pennsylvania State University (1937-1944),
Davis received a postdoctoral fellowship from
the Social Science Research Council to study
statistics, mathematics, and demography, partly
under Samuel A. Stouffer at the University of
Chicago, partly at the Bureau of the Census. He
also did field work in the region surrounding the
mountain town of Lares in Puerto Rico.
With this rich and diverse preparation, Davis
went to Princeton University, first with the Office
of Population Research, then half-time in the
Wilson School of Public Affairs, ultimately in the
economics department as associate professor of
anthropology and sociology, charged with start-
ing a program in those two fields. He brought to
Princeton Wilbert E. Moore, Paul K. Hatt, Mel-
vin Tumin, Edward Devereaux, Marion J. Levy,
Jr., and Harry Bredemeier—men who soon made
the department one of America's best. There, and
subsequently at Columbia University (1948-
1955) and the University of California at Berke-
ley (1955-1977), the wide perspective of social
demography characterized his classroom teach-
ing. For instance, nearly two decades before
ecology became a fad, Davis was devoting a tenth
of the assigned reading in his basic course to a
highly sophisticated treatment of ecological re-
lations as these affect the quality of life. In his
teaching no less than in his writing, Davis'
demographic inquiry was a means to a fuller
understanding of human behavior and social
structure, as well as a criterion with which to
assess policies designed to improve human
welfare.
The subjects of Davis' first published papers
were sexual behavior, the family, parent-child
relations, and thus (but almost incidentally) fer-
tility—all analyzed in a neo-Parsonian manner.
That is, he took topics ordinarily discussed emo-
tionally and moralistically and tried to show why
certain all but universally condemned practices
persist. One "function" of prostitutes, for exam-
ple, is to provide a sexual outlet for men lacking
a legitimate one. Illegitimacy, similarly, is not
merely a "social problem" but the absence of
legitimacy, the principle that (following Bron-
islaw Malinowski) he defined as the function-
ally necessary bond linking father and child into
a socializing agency, the complete family. Col-
leagues found these pieces stimulating and often
amusing, but some of them reacted differently to
a piece that Davis and Wilbert Moore wrote on
stratification, for in this case it was the conven-
tional beliefs of academic liberals that were sub-
jected to the same astringent analysis. In spite
of repeated invocations over the centuries to so-
cial equality, why is it that a class structure per-
sists? It survives all efforts to erase it, Davis and
Moore wrote, because the persons carrying out
tasks most important to "societal survival," es-
pecially if these tasks demand high intelligence
and long training, must be rewarded with "great
prestige, high salary, ample leisure, and the like"
(Davis & Moore 1945). In the seemingly endless
debate, opponents challenged whether in real
societies values were in fact distributed accord-
ing to this principle of justice, but the more
acerbic reaction was to the authors' irreverent
dismissal of the dogma of equality.
The high point of this early phase was a first-
rate text, Human Society (1949), which drew
heavily on ethnographic data to illustrate gen-
eral principles of societal analysis. Davis' skill
in exposition was—as it should be—almost in-
visible, and the functional theory that set the
volume's content was also beneath the surface.
As he developed skills in statistical and demo-
graphic analysis, Davis became less enamored
of purely verbal theory, less confident that cul-
tural patterns determine behavior, and more in-
terested in social-economic and demographic
theories that can be exemplified, documented, or
tested with numerical data.
One of Davis' enduring interests was cities.
In 1946, he wrote, with Ana Casis, "Urbanization
in Latin America." At Berkeley he organized the
International Population and Urban Research
Unit, which sponsored international conferences
—for example, the set of papers later published
as India's Urban Future (Seminar . . . 1962)
—and published a series of 17 monographs. Most
importantly, Davis and his associates issued a
remarkable set of statistics on the world's cities,

a considerable improvement over those pub-
lished by the somewhat larger and wealthier
United Nations, and in a second volume used the
figures to analyze World Urbanization, 1950-
1970 (1969-1972). In 1971, he became Ford
professor of sociology and comparative studies
at the University of California at Berkeley, and
in 1977, the distinguished professor of sociology
at the University of Southern California.
While producing a long list of notable publica-
tions and teaching many students indebted to
his meticulous pedagogy, Davis found time to
advance his profession in time-consuming func-
tions. He was a member and then chairman of
the Division of Behavioral Sciences of the Na-
tional Research Council when the NRC was be-
ginning to extend its range from physical to so-
cial sciences. As the first sociologist elected to
the National Academy of Sciences, he took pains
to see that he was not the last. He was president
of both the American Sociological Association
and the Population Association of America, and
he worked in comfortable tandem with anthro-
pologists and economists. His frequent efforts to
explain social trends to the lay public culminated
in a very fruitful relation with the publishers of
Scientific American.
Kingsley Davis has had several overlapping
careers. His works on India, even years after
their publication, are still cited in India as au-
thoritative. From the first field work in Puerto
Rico, he developed an increasing knowledge of
Latin America. Several of his books and articles
were translated into Spanish, and two of his
better papers were in that language—"Aprecia-
cion critica de Mai thus" (195 la) and "Las
causas y efectos del fenomeno de primacia ur-
bana" (1962). He had competence in every
social discipline except psychology. Yet his life's
work was not dispersed; it shows a remarkable
unity with a clear line of development, linked
by persistent interests and a clear-sighted search
for consistent excellence.
WILLIAM PETERSEN
WORKS BY DAVIS
1937a Reproductive Institutions and the Pressure for
Population. Sociological Review 29:1—18.
1937b The Sociology of Prostitution. American So-
ciological Review. 2:744-755.
1939 Illegitimacy and the Social Structure. American
Journal of Sociology 45:215-233.
1940 Extreme Social Isolation of a Child. American
Journal of Sociology 45:554-565.
1941 Intermarriage in Caste Societies. American An-
thropologist 43:376-395.
DAVIS, KINGSLEY 141
1942 A Conceptual Analysis of Stratification. American
Sociological Review 7:309-321.
1944 Children of Divorced Parents: A Sociological and
Statistical Analysis. Law and Contemporary Prob-
lems 10:700-720.
1945 DAVIS, KINGSLEY; and MOORE, WILBERT E. Some
Principles of Stratification. American Sociological
Review 10:242-249.
1945 'AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE, PHILADELPHIA. World Population in Tran-
sition. Edited by Kingsley Davis. Philadelphia: The
Academy. —» Its Annals, volume 237.
1946 DAVIS, KINGSLEY; and CASIS, ANA Urbanization
in Latin America. Milbank Memorial Fund Quar-
terly 24:186-207, 292-314.
1947 Final Note on a Case of Extreme Isolation.
American Journal of Sociology 52:432-437.
1949 Human Society. New York: Macmillan.
1951a Apreciacion critica de Malthus. Introduction to
T. R. Malthus, Ensayo sobre el Principio de la Pobla-
cion. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economia.
(1951b) 1968 The Population of India and Pakistan.
New York: Russell.
1955 The Origin and Growth of Urbanization in the
World. American Journal of Sociology 60:429-437.
1956 The Amazing Decline of Mortality in Under-
developed Areas. American Economic Review 46:
305-318.
1956 DAVIS, KINGSLEY; and BLAKE, JUDITH Social
Structure and Fertility: An Analytic Framework.
Economic Development and Cultural Change 4:211-
235.
1959 The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special
Method in Sociology and Anthropology. American
Sociological Review 24:757-772.
1962 Las causas y efectos del fenomeno de primacia
urbana con referencia especial a America Latina.
Berkeley: University of California, Institute of In-
ternational Studies, Reprint 144:361-379.
1963 DAVIS, KINGSLEY; and LANGLOIS, ELEANOR The
Future Demographic Growth in the San Francisco
Bay Area. Berkeley: University of California, In-
stitute of Governmental Studies.
1967 Population Policy: Will Current Programs Suc-
ceed? Science 158:730-739.
1969-1972 World Urbanization: 1950-1970. 2 vols.
Berkeley: University of California, Institute of In-
ternational Studies. —> Volume 1: Basic Data for
Cities, Countries, and Regions. Volume 2: Analysis
of Trends, Relationships, and Development.
1975 Asia's Cities: Problems and Options. Population
and Development Review 1:71-86.
1976 Population Policy and the Theory of Reproduc-
tive Motivation. Economic Development and Cul-
tural Change 24, Special Supplement.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
KUMAR, JOGINDER 1973 Population and Land in
World Agriculture: Recent Trends and Relation-
ships. Berkeley: University of California, Institute
of International Studies. —> Companion study to the
two-volume work, World Urbanization (1969-1972)
by Kingsley Davis.
PARSONS, TALCOTT (1937) 1949 The Structure of
Social Action: A Study in Social Theory With Spe-
cial Reference to a Group of Recent European
Writers. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
SEMINAR ON URBANIZATION IN INDIA, BERKELEY, CALI-
FORNIA. 1960 1962 India's Urban Future. Edited
by Roy Turner. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
—^Selected studies from an international conference
sponsored by Kingsley Davis et al.
142 DOBB, MAURICE H.
DOBB, MAURICE H.
Maurice Dobb, one of the foremost Marxist
economists of the twentieth century, was born in
1900, at a time when the main flow of innovative
Marxist thought was moving away from eco-
nomic analysis toward cultural theory, phi-
losophy, and aesthetics. At the time of his death
in 1976 the tide had turned, and once again
political economy was attracting widespread at-
tention, not only in Marxian studies per se, but
also in economics in general, where the obvious
failure of neoclassical orthodoxy to explain ma-
jor economic problems, and the exposure of
logical fallacies in its analytical framework, led reality of the process of production (1937).
many to turn to classical and Marxian ideas. In
this process Dobb had played a central role as
both scholar and publicist. For many years he
was, with Paul M. Sweezy, the only significant
Marxist economist writing in the West. Their
work in difficult periods, such as the late 1940s
and the 1950s, was a guide and inspiration to
later generations.
Dobb was attracted to the political left, to
Marxism, and to the study of economics as a
reaction against the mindless chauvinism of the
World War i era, and by the contrast between
Western economic failure in the aftermath of
the war and the hopes inspired by the 1917
Soviet revolution. He studied economics at Cam-
bridge University and at the London School of
Economics, where he received a PH.D. in 1924 of Value and Distribution (1973), the emphasis
for a thesis on the history and theory of capital- is on the logical structure of the surplus ap-
ist enterprise. He returned to Cambridge at the
end of 1924 as a lecturer in the faculty of eco-
nomics and politics, from which he retired, as a
reader, in 1967. While in London Dobb had
joined, in 1922, the recently formed Communist
party of Great Britain. The dominant elements
in his life's work were to be a profound intellec- was somewhat equivocal. Although not unaware
tual grasp of orthodox economic theory, a com-
mitment to the over-all development of Marxian
thought in the social sciences in general and in
economics in particular, and a belief in the
necessity of social revolution in the interests of allied with a satisfactory theory of value (Gareg-
economic welfare and human dignity.
A major part of Dobb's work was devoted to
the construction of a satisfactory theoretical
framework, built on Marxian foundations, for
the analysis of capitalism. Since a theory of
value must stand at the core of any theory of
capitalism, Dobb devoted much of his career to
the study of contemporary theories and their
historical development. The unusual combina-
tion of a deep understanding both of Marxian
analysis and of orthodox ideas was to lead to a
curious ambivalence in Dobb's early writings,
for while he regarded Marxian theory as a su-
perior system of social thought, he apparently
still believed the neoclassical orthodoxy to be
logically sound. Thus his rejection of the neo-
classical theory of value was based on its failure
to comprehend the anarchy of an individualistic
system (1925), its inadequate representation of
the institutional structure of capitalism (1928b),
and the essentially vacuous character of a sub-
jectivist theory of the sphere of circulation—in
contrast to an objective theory grounded in the
Some uncertainty may also be found in his dis-
cussion of the logical foundations of Marxian
analysis (see Bharadwaj 1978). However, fol-
lowing his collaboration with Piero Sraffa on the
Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo
(Sraffa 1951-1973), and the publication of
Sraffa's Production of Commodities by Means of
Commodities (1960), Dobb's position changed.
For not only was the "Ricardo—Marx tradition in
economics" rehabilitated on a sound logical
footing; but also the neoclassical orthodoxy was
shown to be incapable of providing a logically
sound theory of the determination of the rate of
profit, and hence incapable of analyzing capital-
ist markets. Although a methodological critique
remains an important part of Dobb's Theories
proach to the theory of value and distribution,
exemplified by the works of Ricardo, Marx, and
Sraffa.
Dobb's attitude to the other major theoretical
innovation in twentieth-century economics, John
Maynard Keynes's theory of effective demand,
of the significance of Keynes's ideas Dobb re-
garded them to be of fundamentally less impor-
tance than the rehabilitation of the Marxian ap-
proach; indeed, they were incomplete unless
nani 1978-1979). Dobb was not involved in the
Cambridge debates that surrounded the con-
struction of Keynes's General Theory of Employ-
ment, Interest and Money (1936) in the 1930s,
being heavily committed to the antifascist move-
ment and similar political work.
While the theory of value was a major theo-
retical concern, Dobb also developed other as-
pects of Marxian theory, notably the theory of

crises, and made important contributions to the
history of economic thought in which he
stressed the historically relativist character of
economic thought, both in the choice of prob-
lems analyzed and in the social "vision" em-
bodied in the formal framework of theory.
Early in his career, Dobb's political interest
dictated an attempt to understand and interpret
the new Soviet society. In 1927 he completed
Russian Economic Development Since the Rev-
olution (1928a), working with a translator,
since he did not then read Russian. In this and
successive revised editions, Dobb charted the
path of Soviet development and analyzed the
theoretical approach adopted by Soviet planners.
The book has subsequently been criticized for
ignoring the harsher realities of the Soviet ex-
perience, but at the time it was well received.
Keynes wrote to Dobb in 1927 that it was "a
most valuable and original work. . . . It gives
a picture of what has really been happening in
Russia such as has not been available before to
English readers." Dobb emphasized the advan-
tages of centralized planning over the anarchy
of the market, a basic theoretical position he
was to maintain against the seductive charms
of so-called "market socialism." But he became
increasingly aware of the institutional problems
inherent in a centralized state: "The centralised
system will itself have bred attitudes and habits
of work of its own, together with a structure of
relationships between administrative levels that
may exercise a strongly conservative resistance
to change and to the adoption and cultivation of
new attitudes, relationships, and methods"
(1970, p. 62). Nonetheless, he was confident
that "even if there be signs of a freezing of bu-
reaucratic structure . . . it is hardly likely that
the new technological age and higher living
standards can be contained within the old ad-
ministrative mould inherited from Stalin's day"
(ibid., pp. 68-69).
Dobb's interpretation of the Soviet experience
was to be of major importance in his analysis of
development in the Third World. In his famous
Delhi lectures (1951), in which he identified
economic development with industrialization, he
advanced the then novel propositions that in a
surplus labor economy investment can be in-
creased without depressing average consump-
tion, and that decisions on investment must in-
volve both the structure of investment as between
sectors and the time pattern of production. In
the more complete statement of his views (1960),
DOBB, MAURICE H. 143
he concentrated on what he felt to be the central
issue—the relationship between the generation of
surplus, the structure of the labor force, and the
choice of technique. The problem was analyzed
in an essentially static framework, with a focus
on the choice of the optimum capital-labor ratio
in a model with a (paradoxically) neoclassical
flavor. While today emphasis would be placed
more on the dynamics of development and the
relationship between technological and social
change, Dobb's emphasis on industrialization
points to the key to the attainment of economic
independence in the Third World.
Dobb's interest in development was not con-
fined to analysis of socialism and of the Third
World. Perhaps his most innovative and influen-
tial application of Marxian analysis was in an
area in which he was a self-confessed amateur.
In his Studies in the Development of Capitalism
(1946), he not only analyzed the history of
capitalist development but also posed the vital
question of the nature of the transition from
feudalism to capitalism. He utilized Marx's no-
tion of a mode of production as a combination
of social relations (in particular property rela-
tions) and technical forces to provide an in-
terpretation of the "organic" collapse of feudal-
ism. The interaction between material and social
forces in feudal society had led to crises in East
and West, producing in the East, greater repres-
sion, and in the West, the irreversible develop-
ment of capitalism. This analysis emphasized
the role of class struggle in the development and
overthrow of the feudal mode of production, in
opposition to Marxist and other arguments de-
pendent on technological determinism or the
role of "external forces." Dobb's position has
been the basis for a continuing debate (see
Hilton 1976).
Dobb's career was devoted to the development
of Marxian analysis as a political tool. A con-
firmed opponent of dogma in both intellectual
and political affairs, he gained world-wide influ-
ence through his care and consideration as a
teacher, the wide range of his writings, and his
unique position as a Communist prominent in
the Western economics profession. He was,
however, a quiet and modest man. His intellec-
tual commitment and personal modesty are
illustrated by his work with Sraffa on Ricardo's
Works and Correspondence. Given Sraffa's well-
known reluctance to set pen to paper, the neces-
sary editorial introduction was accommodated by
a procedure in which Dobb and Sraffa discussed
 144 DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS
each paragraph, Dobb wrote it up, Sraffa re-
vised it, Dobb rewrote it, and so on. The edi-
torial introduction to Ricardo's Principles proved
a vital step in the development of understand-
ing of the role of the labor theory of value in
classical analysis, and in the provision of logi-
cally sound foundations for the Marxian theory
of value and distribution.
The breadth and penetration of Dobb's con-
tributions could, perhaps, have been made only
by an innovative thinker using the Marxian tra-
dition of social thought, a tradition of which
Dobb's work now forms an important part.
JOHN EATWELL
WORKS BY DOBB
1925 Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress. Lon-
don: Routledge.
(1928a) 1966 Soviet Economic Development Since
1917. 6th ed., rev. & enl. London: Routledge & Ke-
gan Paul. —•> First published as Russian Economic
Development Since the Revolution.
(1928b) 1956 Wages. London: Nisbet.
1937 Political Economy and Capitalism: Some Essays
in Economic Tradition. London: Routledge.
(1943) 1975 Marx as an Economist. London: Law-
rence & Wishart.
1946 Studies in the Development of Capitalism. Lon-
don: Routledge.
1951 Some Aspects of Economic Development: Three
Lectures. Delhi School of Economics, Occasional
Papers, No. 3. Delhi: Ran jit.
(1955) 1965 On Economic Theory and Socialism: Col-
lected Papers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(1958) 1962 Capitalism Yesterday and Today. New
York: Monthly Review Press. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1958 by Beekman publications.
(I960) 1969 An Essay on Economic Growth and Plan-
ning. 2d ed. New York: Monthly Review Press.
1963 Economic Growth and Underdeveloped Countries.
London: Lawrence & Wishart.
1966 Argument on Socialism. London: Lawrence &
Wishart.
1967 Papers on Capitalism, Development and Plan-
ning. London: Routledge Be Kegan Paul.
1968 Economic Thought: IV. Socialist Thought. Vol-
ume 4, pages 446-454 in International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills.
New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1969 Welfare Economics and the Economics of Social-
ism: Towards a Commonsense Critique. Cambridge
Univ. Press.
1970 Socialist Planning: Some Problems. London:
Lawrence fit Wishart.
1973 Theories of Value and Distribution Since Adam
Smith: Ideology and Economic Theory. Cambridge
Univ. Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BH-ARADWAJ, KRISHNA 1978 Maurice Dobb's Critique
of Theories of Value and Distribution. Cambridge
Journal of Economics 2:153-174.
Cambridge Journal of Economics 1978, 2, no. 2. -» Mau-
rice Dobb Memorial issue.
FEINSTEIN, CHARLES H. (editor) 1967 Socialism,
Capitalism and Economic Growth: Essays Presented
to Maurice Dobb. Cambridge Univ. Press. —> In-
cludes a bibliography of Dobb's works, academic
and popular, up to 1967.
GAREGNANI, PIERANGELO 1978-1979 Notes on Con-
sumption, Investment and Effective Demand. Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics 2:335-353; 3:63-82.
HILTON, RODNEY (editor) 1976 The Transition From
Feudalism to Capitalism. London: New Left Books.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —»A paperback edition was published by
Harcourt in 1965.
Marxism Today 1967 Aug.:225-356.
SRAFFA, PIERO (editor) 1951-1973 Works and Cor-
respondence of David Ricardo. With the collabora-
tion of Maurice Dobb. 11 vols. Published for the
Royal Economic Society. Cambridge Univ. Press.
SRAFFA, PIERO 1960 Production of Commodities by
Means of Commodities: Prelude to a Critique of Eco-
nomic Theory. Cambridge Univ. Press. —> A paper-
back edition was published in 1975.
DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS
The modern understanding of the evolution-
ary significance of genetic variation within and
between human groups rests almost entirely on
the work of Theodosius Grigorievich Dobzhan-
sky. Although his research was devoted chiefly
to other species, particularly natural popula-
tions of Drosophila, the views he developed on
genetic variability in natural populations, and
on the evolution of geographical races, had a
profound effect on physical anthropology.
Theodosius Dobzhansky was born in Nemirov,
Russia, on January 25, 1900. He was the son of
a high school teacher, the grandson of a Rus-
sian Orthodox priest. After his university train-
ing at Kiev (his only doctorates were honorary
degrees), Dobzhansky began an extensive study
of variation in natural populations of Cocci-
nellid beetles distributed across Europe and
Asia. His first contribution to the study of
genetic variation, published in 1924, described
the polymorphism of color patterns in these in-
sects. This work was important for Dobzhansky's
own development and generally for the modern
view of genetic variation. In the study, some
species showed the same frequencies of genetic
variants over their entire range, while others
showed marked geographical variation in fre-
quencies of different phenotypes. Instead of
taking the conventional view—naming mor-
phological races and subspecies and describ-
ing the geographical range of each—Dobzhansky
maintained that there was in each instance a
single polymorphic species, and that the prob-
lem was to understand the pattern of geo-
graphic variation in terms of various evolution-

ary forces. The change from viewing each
phenotype as a "race," to be named and mapped,
to viewing the species as a genetically segregat-
ing population, or series of populations, with
no single "wild-type," was fundamental. It led to
Dobzhansky's concept of the Mendelian popula-
tion, a geographically coherent group of indi-
viduals exchanging genes, which is now the
fundamental concept of evolutionary genetics.
This was a major departure from the typological
view that a species could be broken into a few
well-defined races on a purely phenotypic basis,
with no reference to the breeding structure or
genetics of the species.
Like most middle-class intellectuals of the
time, Dobzhansky supported the February revo-
lution but opposed the Bolsheviks, and in 1927
he left the Soviet Union never to return. He
joined T. H. Morgan's group at Columbia Uni-
versity, which had for some years been the
center of development of classical genetics, and
began his studies of the cytogenetics of Dro-
sophila and of the causes of sterility in species
hybrids. When Dobzhansky began his work on
the genetic differences between species, the
species concept was primarily a typological and
taxonomic one. Using chiefly morphological
characters, taxonomists tried to define the stage
of differentiation at which races should be re-
garded as species. At the same time it was un-
derstood that there were a variety of barriers to
crossing between species. They included failure
to mate; in viability of hybrid embryos if mating
did occur; or sterility of hybrid adults if develop-
ment of hybrids succeeded. Yet there was no
understanding of the relationship between these
observations and the problem of differentiation
of races and species, because the problem of
species definition was seen from a static, rather
than a dynamic, viewpoint. It was Dobzhansky
who saw, from the geneticist's standpoint, that
the critical issue was the passage of genes from
one population to another. In 1935 he provided
the biological definition of species that remains
the underlying concept of species formulation
at present. Dobzhansky defined the species as
"that stage of evolutionary divergence at which
the once actually or potentially interbreeding
array of forms becomes segregated into two or
more separate arrays which are physiologically
incapable of interbreeding" (1935, p. 354).
The essence of this concept is that a continu-
ous process of genetic differentiation between
geographically separated populations finally
results in a stage of total genetic isolation. This
DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS 145
stage is a critical one, however, and is qualita-
tively different from mere race formation, be-
cause after the point of speciation the units are
genetically and evolutionarily independent.
Dobzhansky's work on cytogenetics, species
hybrid sterility, and his studies of genetic poly-
morphism in natural populations converged in
the production of a synthetic theory of evolu-
tionary genetics published in 1937 as Genetics
and the Origin of Species. His most influential
work, it is the point of departure for all subse-
quent synthetic treatments of the evolutionary
process. Genetics and the Origin of Species be-
gins with the observations of classical genetics:
the production of genetic variation by mutation
and chromosomal rearrangements. These types
of variation are then related to the variation ob-
served within and between natural populations.
The dynamics of the variation is explained in
terms of theoretical population genetics, espe-
cially the stochastic theory of Sewall Wright.
For the first time evidence is brought together
from a variety of sources that natural selection
actually operates to mold the genetic composi-
tion of populations. Dobzhansky's successful
melding of the stochastic theory of gene fre-
quency change with the observed facts of genetic
variation was the first real synthesis in biology
of a complex theoretical structure with a large
body of observation and experiment.
The second half of Genetics and the Origin of
Species concerns the development of species
differences by the acquisition of genetic barriers
to gene exchange. As a basis for the speciation
process, there is a large amount of genetic and
cytological variation within populations. The
variable populations then become spatially dif-
ferentiated either through natural selection,
which favors different genes in different en-
vironments, or through the interaction of selec-
tive forces with random processes of accidental
differentiation. Genetic differentiation in space
results in geographical races which are incipient
species. Whether or not these geographical races
continue to diverge to the stage of speciation
when they can no longer exchange genes de-
pends upon the balance between selection for
divergence and the homogenizing effect on all
populations of migration and of common selec-
tive pressures. Human populations, for ex-
ample, have diverged from each other in the
past to form a large number of genetically dif-
ferentiated local populations which can, more
or less arbitrarily, be grouped into major "races."
But this differentiation has not and cannot lead
 146 DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS
to speciation because of greatly increased migra-
tion, because selective forces have become in-
creasingly homogenized spatially, and because
populations have become so large that random
differentiation is very weak.
Beginning in 1935, and until his death in
1975, Dobzhansky devoted his scientific work to
the study of genetic variation within natural pop-
ulations, chiefly of Drosophila, but also of hu-
mans. His studies of chromosomal polymorphism
in Drosophila populations convinced him that
sexually reproducing species were highly poly-
morphic genetically and that the typical individ-
ual in such a species was heterozygous for most
of its genes. He regarded the main causes of this
genetic variation to be the balancing forces of
natural selection, in particular the superior fit-
ness of heterozygous individuals. The central
core of this theory was developed in a series of 43
papers on "The Genetics of Natural Populations,"
which attempted to document the genetic poly-
morphism of Drosophila, to measure the force
of natural selection maintaining the polymorph-
ism, and to apply the full apparatus of popula-
tion genetic theory to the study of natural popu-
lations. Dobzhansky stood at the center of an
international school of evolutionary geneticists
devoted to his view of the genetic structure of
species. This "balance school," as Dobzhansky
called it, was opposed by the "classical school"
of H. J. Muller who believed that species were
chiefly monomorphic genetically, except for a
"load of mutations" that were deleterious and
that were constantly being swept out of the pop-
ulation by natural selection. Muller regarded
the load of mutations as limiting the repro-
ductive potential of a species; he feared, for
example, that the human species might be ex-
tinguished if radiation-induced mutations in-
creased the genetic load. Dobzhansky, to sup-
port his position, attempted to show metabolic
polymorphism in humans by studying patterns
of excretion of amino acids, but this technique
proved too crude for the purpose. In fact, no
technique available during most of Dobzhan-
sky's lifetime was capable of deciding the issue,
and an acrimonious debate on the meaning of a
series of ambiguous experiments marked popu-
lation genetics for many years. Recent work on
the polymorphism of enzymes has shown that
Dobzhansky was correct in his assertion that
most organisms, including the human species,
are highly polymorphic genetically. Whether or
not this polymorphism is maintained by hetero-
sis and other forms of balancing selection is yet
to be determined.
Dobzhansky and Muller both agreed that dif-
ferent human abilities were largely genetically
determined. For Muller these abilities were on a
graded scale from bad to good, and he promoted
a program of selective breeding through artificial
insemination that would eliminate the inferior
genotypes and increase the superior ones.
Dobzhansky's general view on polymorphism
and heterosis led him to the conclusion that
genetic variation in ability was advantageous to
the species as a whole, that polymorphism was
adaptive. Moreover, since he believed that het-
erozygotes were the superior genotypes, no pro-
gram of eugenics could concentrate these types.
These views, together with the argument that
differences in ability should not be differentially
rewarded, are summed up in Dobzhansky's ma-
jor statement on human polymorphism, Genetic
Diversity and Human Equality (1973). It is
ironic that the struggle between Dobzhansky
and Muller was based upon a common assump-
tion for which neither had any evidence. It is
still not known whether differences in human
skills, abilities, and temperaments have any
genetic basis at all, or whether they are the con-
sequences of developmental accidents and cul-
tural conditioning.
Dobzhansky's theory of race and species for-
mation and his study of polymorphism led to a
complete reorientation of physical anthropology.
Like the rest of biology, physical anthropology
had long been typological and taxonomic in its
approach. Using morphology, anthropologists
described and classified human racial types, the
number of "races" varying from five to more
than one hundred, depending upon the preju-
dices of the observer. Catalogs of photographs
of racial types were produced, and even Dobz-
hansky, in Mankind Evolving (1962), gave ser-
ious consideration to these classifications. Al-
though it was recognized that migration and
interbreeding had produced mixed groups, even
these hybrid entities were implicitly regarded as
stable types to which typical descriptions could
be applied. If any evolutionary dynamic was as-
sumed, it was a branching process by which one
racial type gave rise to another in a phylogenetic
tree like the phylogenetic trees of species.
With the destruction of typological systemat-
ics in biology, a reorientation in anthropology
began. Morphological traits were progressively
deemphasized because their genetic basis was

complex and uncertain. Instead, anthropologists
began to measure the frequencies of simple
Mendelian genetic characters—e.g., blood groups
and other biochemical traits. But the character-
ization of a local human population in terms of
gene frequencies rather than morphological
traits changes the entire emphasis of descrip-
tion. Frequency is a characteristic of an en-
semble rather than an individual, so that it be-
comes impossible to pick a "typical" individual
to represent the group. Local populations are
observed to be mixtures of different genotypes,
and what characterizes the differences between
populations is differences in relative frequencies
of the different genotypes. The concept of pure
race also becomes untenable. Since, for any of
the genes studied, two human populations do
not differ absolutely, but only in relative fre-
quency, no "pure" types exist. It also becomes
impossible to delineate major races, since it is
purely arbitrary which level of frequency dif-
ference is to be regarded as denning race. In-
deed the concept of race has virtually disap-
peared from modern anthropology.
A second effect of Dobzhansky's view of the
polymorphic species was a change in the prob-
lematic of anthropology. From a purely descrip-
tive and taxonomic science, physical anthro-
pology became a branch of population genetics.
The problem of physical anthropology came to
be an explanation of the causes of human poly-
morphism. The entire apparatus of theoretical
population genetics has been brought to bear
on the explanation of genetic differentiation
between groups. It has become important to
characterize the actual breeding structure of a
village or tribe; thus, data from cultural anthro-
pology on kinship systems and marriage pat-
terns are now important to physical anthro-
pology. The study of genetic differentiation at
the level of neighboring villages, as for example
among the Yanomamo and Makritare, is now the
mode for anthropology. As a consequence, physi-
cal anthropology has passed from being a simple
consumer of evolutionary genetic theory to a pri-
mary producer of it. A major justification of the
study of primitive peoples and cultural isolates
at the present time is that they are expected to
provide tests of general evolutionary and popula-
tion genetic theories.
What is so remarkable about the revolution-
izing influence of Dobzhansky on the study of
human variation is that it is based entirely upon
the extension of ideas developed outside of an-
DODD, STUART C. 147
thropology. Except for the ill-fated attempt to
study excretory patterns of amino acids in the
early 1950s, Dobzhansky never made any at-
tempt to study human genetic variation directly;
and the Institute for the Study of Human Varia-
tion, which he founded together with L. C. Dunn
in 1951, was short-lived and unproductive. Dobz-
hansky recognized, however, the significance of
population genetics for the study of the human
species and carried out an active campaign of
propaganda among anthropologists and stu-
dents. Anthropologists, in their turn, seized on
population genetics as a way to break out of the
sterile taxonomy of classical studies, and to re-
generate the study of human evolution.
RICHARD C. LEWONTIN
WORKS BY DOBZHANSKY
1924 Die Geographische und Individuelle Variabilitat
von Harmonica axyridis Pall, in ihren Wechselbezie-
hungen. Biologisches Zentralblatt 44:401—421.
1935 A Critique of the Species Concept in Biology.
Philosophy of Science 2:344-355.
(1937) 1951 Genetics and the Origin of Species. 3d.
ed., rev. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
1946 DUNN, L. C.; and DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS
Heredity, Race and Society. New York: Penguin.
1955 Evolution, Genetics and Man. New York: Wiley.
1962 Mankind Evolving. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1968 Evolution: VI. Evolution and Behavior. Volume
5, pages 234—238 in International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New
York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1970 The Genetics of the Evolutionary Process. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press.
1973 Genetic Diversity and Human Equality. New
York: Basic Books. —» The John Dewey Society lec-
ture, no. 13. A paperback edition was published in
1976.
DODD, STUART C.
From the time Stuart Carter Dodd began col-
laborative efforts with George Lundberg until
the time of Dodd's death at the end of 1975, he
symbolized for many sociologists the pursuit of
an elusive Holy Grail: social science modeled
on physical science and approaching the latter's
precision and predictive power.
The son of a medical missionary, Dodd was
born in 1900 in Talas, Turkey. After serving as
a psychologist at the State Home for Boys in
Jamesburg, New Jersey, and earning a B.S.
magna cum laude in 1922, an M.A. in 1924, and
a PH.D. in psychology in 1926, all at Princeton
University, he received a postdoctoral fellow-
ship from the National Research Council and
studied in London. From 1927 to 1947 he was
 148 DODD, STUART C.
affiliated as a sociologist with the American
University of Beirut, where he developed and
directed that university's Social Science Re-
search Section. His teaching there was inter-
rupted when he and his family were evacuated
during World War n, and he served for a time
as director of surveys with the U.S. Army in
Sicily. He was decorated by the Republic of
Lebanon "for Humanitarian Services," and his
eldest son subsequently taught sociology at
Beirut.
From 1947 on, as research professor of so-
ciology at the University of Washington, Dodd
directed the Washington Public Opinion Labora-
tory (1947-1961), and was a dedicated teacher
of methodologically oriented seminars until he
became professor emeritus in 1971. During his
four years of retirement, he continued to ex-
press in writing his vision of science. Over his
lifetime he published some 150 papers in a wide
array of journals.
The major theme of Dodd's academic career
was a lifelong effort to promote a system of
symbols and to contribute to a pattern of lan-
guage use that he believed would make the so-
cial sciences more scientific. In addition, he
also pursued a range of other causes, all, in his
view, related to his major objective. In the final
year of World War n, he proposed the establish-
ment of an international polling agency to pro-
vide a "barometer of international security"
that could facilitate efforts by the United Na-
tions to preserve peace and foster human prog-
ress. In pursuit of this goal he helped organize
the World Association of Public Opinion Re-
search. As president of the Pacific Sociological
Association in 1953, he advocated applied social
research in a presidential address entitled "Can
the Social Scientist Serve Two Masters?" In
1960/1961 he served as vice president of the
American Humanist Association, after pro-
claiming in a mimeographed circular to its
membership the importance of an "emerging
science of Axiology" and affirming his belief
that "measuring man's pursuit of goals helps
make evolution more purposive." In 1966 he
took time to give enthusiastic assistance to a
group of students who were devising measure-
ment techniques for a campuswide course
critique.
Dodd came to the attention of Lundberg
through publication of A Controlled Experiment
on Rural Hygiene in Syria (1934), which Lund-
berg cited in the second edition of his textbook
on research methods ([1929] 1942), calling the
first 38 pages of Dodd's monograph a "model of
clear orderly statement of the methods of a re-
search project." The two men met when Lundberg
visited the Middle East, and, as a result of their
discussions, Lundberg's Foundations of Sociol-
ogy (1939) and Dodd's Dimensions of Society
(1942) were published as "companion volumes,"
although publication of the latter was delayed
by the war.
Two papers by Dodd, effectively previewing
Dimensions of Society, appeared in 1939. The
first, "A Tension Theory of Societal Action," re-
mains one of the best examples of Dodd's con-
tribution to useful reconceptualization in soci-
ology. It provided a unique clarification of the
nature and interrelations of such processes as
conflict, competition, and accommodation, an
unusually lucid analysis of Malthusian theory,
and a perceptive comparison of Nietzschean,
Buddhist, and Western philosophies. Except for
the use of presubscripts (in addition to the more
conventional postsubscripts) in Dodd's equa-
tions, nothing in the first three-fifths of the
article was particularly unconventional or diffi-
cult to follow, and even the more difficult
section on "second order processes" was illumi-
nating. The second paper, "A System of Oper-
ationally Defined Concepts for Sociology,"
moved farther from customary sociological
thoughtways. It succinctly outlined the "S-the-
ory" that he elaborated subsequently in Dimen-
sions, and it remains the most palatable first-
hand overview of Dodd's ambitious attempt to
rebuild the sociologist's vocabulary.
Dodd sought to synthesize the description and
analysis of all social situations by an equation,
S = T;L; P; /, where S stood for situation, T
for time, L for linear distance, P for population,
and / for indicators of the innumerable charac-
teristics of people and their environments. The
semicolon could stand for any of the mathe-
matical operators—addition, multiplication, and
so on. Further, each "dimension" in the formula
could be modified by an exponent. In the case
of L, for example, if the exponent were 1, then
the base letter designated a length; if the ex-
ponent were 2, it designated an area; if it were
3, a volume. Thus, a population density—a ratio
of people per unit area—was PVL2, which could
also be written P1L~2. Each base letter or dimen-
sion could also be modified by three other cor-
ner scripts, the postsubscript designating a class,
the presubscript designating class intervals,
and the presuperscript designating a case.
The exponents, however, were the most im-

portant of the corner scripts. A process—involv-
ing a characteristic changing in time—could be
represented as JPT1-1. Different processes would
involve different amounts of different character-
istics, but all would share the — 1 exponent on T,
showing they all were a kind of "velocity." Simi-
larly, a rate of natural increase in a population
would be recognized as a velocity when written
P'T1-1. A change in a rate of natural increase
would be P^T--—the time period increment in
the rate of population increase per time period.
Thus, any formula containing T~2 represented
an acceleration.
Dodd believed that sociologists would find
their efforts to classify social phenomena be-
came more scientific if they categorized situa-
tions according to whether or not the formulas
for those situations shared the same sequence
of exponents. He even took qualitative variables
into account by assigning them a zero exponent
(so that their quantity—taken as 1—did not
modify any product in which they entered as a
factor).
Reviews of Dodd's work were mixed but gen-
erally negative. Not all criticisms were cogent;
of those that were, the one that most affected
his subsequent writings was the charge that
what matters most to sociologists was left to his
residual category, I. Several reviewers warned
that it would be inadvisable for sociologists gen-
erally to emulate Dodd or adopt his notation.
One critic noted that Lundberg's valuable natu-
ral science approach for sociology might be
neglected if it were identified with Dodd's S-
theory (Calhoun 1942, p. 504). Others denied
that the S-system accomplished what Dodd
claimed for it (Parsons 1942; Shanas 1942).
One reviewer, however, wrote that it was more
likely than any alternative to make sociology
scientific (Robinson 1942, p. 454), and another
held that it would be profitable for any sociolo-
gist to read and evaluate Dimensions (Calhoun
1942, p. 504). A mathematician who reviewed
the book called S-theory "a feeble mathematical
pun" (Bell 1942, p. 709), and one author of a
textbook on sociological theory later called
Dodd's work "almost unreadable" but credited
him with "a tour de force" in his use of the zero
exponent (Timasheff 1955, pp. 308, 309). An-
other theory text cited Dimensions as "an ex-
ample of the danger always facing pure posi-
tivism of degenerating into an empty formula"
(Martindale 1960, p. 119). Howard B. Woolston,
reviewing the book in the Annals of the Ameri-
can Academy, suggested that "perhaps a brief
DODD, STUART C. 149
handbook presenting typical problems and solu-
tions might be more useful for students, and
offer a definite basis for trial by investigators"
(1942). Dodd's approximation to such a hand-
book was entitled Systematic Social Science
(1947), a typescript volume reproduced by offset
in a "temporary edition" as a publication of the
Faculty of Arts and Science of the American
University of Beirut.
Convinced that his scientific language would
become rriore widely adopted if offered in more
piecemeal form, Dodd intended, when he went
to the University of Washington, to spend the
next twenty years publishing segments of his
system in journal articles. At the University of
Washington, he also directed a series of team
research projects, the largest and most notable
being Project Revere, a three-year study for the
U.S. Air Force during the Korean War that ex-
plored various aspects of communication
through airborne leaflets. A number of able
graduate students were trained under Dodd's
direction, and many research papers by him
and by them were published, but his hope that
a multivolume "definitive treatise" would even-
tually be published setting forth sociologically
fundamental findings from Project Revere
(comparable in his mind to the World War n
series by Samuel A. Stouffer and others on The
American Soldier [1950]) remained unfulfilled.
In 1961 the Washington Public Opinion Lab-
oratory became the Institute for Sociological Re-
search, and Dodd relinquished the directorship.
His efforts turned increasingly to the develop-
ment of a set of ideas that had fascinated him
earlier (1944; 1950b). By now he had broad-
ened his interests beyond the boundaries of the
behavioral sciences, and began to apply his
symbolic analyses to cosmological questions in
an endeavor he called "Project Epicosm." In an
unpublished memorandum written in 1967,
Dodd spoke of all research as "the search for
. . . optimal symbolizing," and alluded to
"formulas which so describe as to explain and
predict" all parts of the cosmos.
Dodd's style of thought and his approach to
science derived in part from his bilingual child-
hood in Turkey. A fascination with classifica-
tion, with categorical distinctions, and espe-
cially with logical products, arose from his early
acquaintance with contrasts between a highly
agglutinative and a highly analytic language.
This fascination was nurtured further by his
pleasure in studying French and Latin in
school, and by modest encounters with Greek,
150 BOLLARD, JOHN
German, Italian, Arabic, and Esperanto. Later,
as a psychology student, he readily embraced
Karl Pearson's conception of statistics as the
"grammar of science" and easily viewed all of
mathematics as a language.
His worldview emphasized sets of elements
interacting in random combinations. It was
doubtless influenced by his efforts as a young
man to combine C. E. Spearman's and Godfrey
H. Thomson's different approaches to the factor
analysis of human intelligence. Dodd's essen-
tially religious approach to science, rooted in his
missionary heritage, drew also from the ideas
of Henry Nelson Wieman and was reinforced
by his exposure to the cosmological writing of
Harlow Shapley. The work of Percy W. Bridg-
man provided a basis for Dodd's devotion to
operational definitions. His conviction that
physical science offered promising models for
social science drew support from admired works
by J. Q. Stewart and George K. Zipf. The writing
and counsel of George Lundberg was the chief
sociological influence upon Dodd's thought,
and Lundberg remained until the end of his life
Dodd's staunch defender, close friend, and
sternly constructive critic.
WILLIAM R. CATTON, JR.
"WORKS BY DODD
1934 A Controlled Experiment on Rural Hygiene in
Syria: A Study in the Measurement of Rural Cul-
ture Patterns and of Social Forces. Beirut: American
University of Beirut.
1936 A Theory for the Measurement of Some Social
Forces. Scientific Monthly 43:58-62.
1939a A Tension Theory of Societal Action. American
Sociological Review 4:56-77.
1939b A System of Operationally Defined Concepts
for Sociology. American Sociological Review 4:619-
634.
1942 Dimensions of Society: A Quantitative System-
atics for the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan.
1943 Of What Use Is Dimensional Sociology? A Re-
port of Further Research Upon the Utility, Preci-
sion and Parsimony of Dimensional Analysis. Social
Forces 22:169-182.
1944 A Mass—Time Triangle. Philosophy of Science
11:233-244.
1947 Systematic Social Science. American University
of Beirut, Social Science Series, No. 16. Seattle:
University of Washington Bookstore.
1950a The Interactance Hypothesis: A Gravity Model
Fitting Physical Masses and Human Groups. Amer-
ican Sociological Review 15:245-256.
1950b An Isosceles Distribution of Material Entities.
Main Currents in Modern Thought 7:122-126.
1951 The Religion of a Social Scientist. Educational
Theory 1:87-96.
1953 Can the Social Scientist Serve Two Masters?—
An Answer Through Experimental Sociology. Re-
search Studies of the State College of Washington
21:195-213.
1954 The Scientific Measurement of Fitness for Self-
government. Scientific Monthly 78:94—99.
1955a Diffusion is Predictable: Testing Probability
Models for Laws of Interaction. American Sociolog-
ical Review 20:392-401.
1955b The Transact Model: A Predictable and Test-
able Theory of Social Action, Interaction and Role-
action. Sociometry 18:432-447.
1957 The Counteractance Model. American Journal of
Sociology 63:273-284.
1959 An Alphabet of Meanings for the Oncoming
Revolution in Man's Thinking. Educational Theory
9:174-192.
1962 How Momental Laws Can Be Developed in So-
ciology by Deducing Testable and Predictive "Ac-
tance" Models From Transacts. Synthese 14:277—
299.
1968 DODD, STUART C.; and CHRISTOPHER, STEFAN G.
The Reactants Models. Pages 143-179 in Alfred
de Grazia, Rollo Handy, E. C. Harwood, and Paul
Kurtz (editors), The Behavioral Sciences: Essays in
Honor of George A. Lundberg. Great Barrington,
Mass.: The Behavioral Research Council.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BELL, E. T. 1942 Review of Dodd's Dimensions of
Society. American Sociological Review 7:707-709.
CALHOUN, DONALD W. 1942 With the Operationalists.
Social Forces 20:498-504.
CATTON, WILLIAM R., JR. 1966 From Animistic to
Naturalistic Sociology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
DEFLEUR, MELVIN L.; and LARSEN, OTTO N. 1958
The Flow of Information: An Experiment in Mass
Communication. New York: Harper.
LUNDBERG, GEORGE A. (1929) 1942 Social Research:
A Study in Methods of Gathering Data. 2d ed. New
York: Longmans, Green.
LUNDBERG, GEORGE A. 1939 Foundations of Sociol-
ogy. New York: Macmillan.
MARTINDALE, DON 1960 The Nature and Types of
Sociological Theory. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
PARSONS, TALCOTT 1942 Review of Dodd's Dimen-
sions of Society. American Sociological Review
7:709-714.
ROBINSON, WILLIAM S. 1942 Review of Dodd's
Dimensions of Society. Political Science Quarterly
57:453-455.
SHANAS, ETHEL 1942 A Critique of Dodd's Dimen-
sions of Society. American Journal of Sociology
48:214-230.
STOUFFER, SAMUEL A.; GUTTMAN, Louis; SUCHMAN,
EDWARD A.; LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; STAR, SHIRLEY
A.; and CLAUSEN, JOHN A. 1950 Measurement
and Prediction. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press. —» Volume 4 of Studies in Social Psychology
in World War II.
TIMASHEFF, NICHOLAS S. (1955) 1967 Sociological
Theory: Its Nature and Growth. 3d ed. New York:
Random House.
WOOLSTON, HOWARD B. 1942 Review of Dodd's Di-
mensions of Society. American Academy of Political
and Social Science, Annals 221:230-231.
DOLLARD, JOHN
John Dollard's training in sociology, anthro-
pology, psychoanalysis, and behavior theory has
enabled him to integrate psychoanalytic and
learning principles with concepts relating to

society and its culture. Displaying an excep-
tional concern for the wholeness of knowledge,
he has derided the "ologies" that describe man
from many different and segmented perspec-
tives, thus creating a "sociological" or an "eco-
nomic" man. In Bollard's view, there is just
one man and there should be one science that
deals with all of him, flesh, blood, and culture.
Thus he has been a pioneer in the interdisci-
plinary integration in behavioral science.
Born in Wisconsin in 1900, John Dollard was
the eldest son of the seven children of James E.
and Ellen Brady Dollard, of third generation
Irish stock. After graduation from the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin in 1922, Dollard became a
fund raiser for the Wisconsin Memorial Union.
Work for the union brought Dollard into contact
with Max Mason, the physicist and inventor,
who became his model.
When Mason was appointed president of the
University of Chicago, Dollard joined his staff
as an assistant. The University of Chicago was
an exciting place, and Dollard enjoyed the sense
of being at the forefront of intellectual change.
Mason introduced Dollard to William Fielding
Ogburn, who gave him his first scientific train-
ing and became his thesis sponsor in sociology.
The subject of Dollard's dissertation was "The
Form and Functions of the Early American
Family" (1931). Both at Wisconsin and Chi-
cago, Dollard took mathematics courses that
served him well in learning statistics and the
use of experimental methods.
After receiving a PH.D from Chicago, Dollard
was awarded a Social Science Research Council
fellowship to study psychoanalysis in Germany.
His analyst was Hans Sachs, one of the "seven
rings" of Freud's circle.
When Dollard returned from Berlin, his
friend Edward Sapir brought him to Yale Univer-
sity to assist in the direction of a one-year inter-
national seminar on the impact of culture on
personality. After the seminar, Dollard was hired
by Mark A. May, director of the Institute of
Human Relations at Yale. This was a teaching
as well as a research institution, and thus ap-
propriate for a person with Dollard's broad
training. Nevertheless, he paid a price for cross-
ing traditional disciplinary boundaries, being a
peripheral member of two other departments
before he was belatedly accepted into full mem-
bership in the department of psychology.
At the institute, Dollard had a stimulating
relationship with the psychoanalyst Earl F.
Zinn, and with social scientists such as George
BOLLARD, JOHN 151
P. Murdock and Allen Gregg, who worked for
the Rockefeller Foundation. He also met Neal
E. Miller, a young psychologist who had studied
psychoanalysis. Miller taught Dollard the prin-
ciples of reinforcement learning theory based
on Clark L. Hull's synthesis of the thinking of
Edward L. Thorndike and Ivan P. Pavlov. Com-
bining research and theory on learning with
social science observation, Dollard and Miller
developed the conditions-principles thesis—that
human learning occurs according to certain bio-
psychological principles under conditions ar-
ranged by society. This theory disregards dis-
ciplines and centers on how man's habits are
established and changed by social conditions.
Dollard's first book, Criteria for the Life His-
tory (1935), was a call for unity in the life his-
tory field. The goal was to show how the
biological substratum of an individual, with all
its innate urges and potentialities, was trans-
formed into the observed social and cultural
being. It established seven criteria for the effec-
tive life history and judged a number of docu-
ments according to them. None met the test of
the seven criteria because they neglected either
biological or cultural factors. Margaret Mead
described this book as "a landmark in the study
of personality and culture" (Mead 1936).
Of all of Dollard's books, Caste and Class in
a Southern Town (1937) is the most widely
read. It was a six-month study of the color-based
caste system that barred children of a black-
white union from legitimate descent and locked
blacks into a lower social and economic class.
In his research in "Southerntown," Dollard
noted prejudice and hostility along caste lines,
overt in whites and latent in blacks. He con-
cluded that the system was designed for the
benefit of the white population and that it con-
ferred certain prestige, as well as economic and
social gains, on the white caste. When it was
first published, this book aroused considerable
hostility among many whites, including scholars,
and at one time it was banned in Georgia and
in South Africa. The changes in the legal and
social status of blacks are due in part to the
long-term effects of the early insights provided
by this courageous, pioneering study.
Dollard's second book relating to the problem
of race relations, Children of Bondage (1940),
was coauthored by the social anthropologist
Allison Davis. This work analyzed seven life his-
tories of black youths in New Orleans and
Natchez in an effort to discern the psychological
and social variables in the lives of black chil-
 152 BOLLARD, JOHN
dren. Although the authors discovered internal
class and color lines within the black caste, all
types of personality variables seemed to be rep-
resented and no evidence appeared of genetic
differences between the castes. The research for
this book gave Dollard the opportunity to use
social class analysis as developed by W. Lloyd
Warner.
During the 1930s, Dollard and his colleagues
at the Institute of Human Relations began inter-
disciplinary research into the problems of frus-
tration and aggression (Dollard et al. 1939).
Dollard had already formulated the hypothesis
that "the usual human response to frustration
is aggression against the frustrating object"
(1937, p. 267). The institute encouraged fur-
ther work on this theme because it helped to
explain a wide range of psychological, socio-
logical, and cultural observations.
Dollard's special interest, however, was in
learning theory and analysis. He and Miller
stressed the importance of the principles and
social conditions of human learning and inves-
tigated the orderly way in which human culture
is learned in the more than five thousand differ-
ent cultures on record (Miller & Dollard 1941).
To understand human behavior, one must know
both the principles of learning (including the
nature and demands of the organism) and the
conditions of culture and society. This view is a
point of departure for a unified social science.
Miller and Dollard supported their thesis with
experiments on children and animals, and they
discussed the economy of imitation as a way of
hitting on the "right response" in an early trial.
This work has encouraged others to study social
learning and to study aspects of imitation, such
as the importance of the prestige of the model.
With the outbreak of World War n, Dollard
pursued a project that he and Miller had devel-
oped for a book on fear in battle. Dollard con-
ducted a questionnaire study of veterans of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil
War to gather information that might be of use
in training servicemen in World War n. The
salient point of the book (1943) was that every-
one is afraid, and that differences in behavior
result from more or less successful ways of
learning to cope with fear in combat.
Dollard considers his best book to be Person-
ality and Psychotherapy (Dollard & Miller 1950).
It attempted to synthesize knowledge about the
principles of learning derived from experiments
in the laboratory with knowledge about the so-
cial conditions of learning derived from studies
of culture, and to use this knowledge to explain
natural-history observations of human behavior
in psychotherapy. The book also analyzed the
ways in which different aspects of neuroses can
be learned, repression can interfere with reason-
ing and thought, and psychotherapy can teach
the patient to discriminate between real and
imaginary dangers, recover the use of higher
mental processes, and learn more adaptive so-
cial behavior. By demonstrating in concrete
detail that psychotherapy is a process of social
learning and emotional reeducation, this book
helped to lay a scientific foundation for the par-
ticipation of psychologists in psychotherapy.
Although it did not establish any school of psy-
chotherapy, it strongly influenced generations
of psychotherapists.
In Scoring Human Motives (Dollard & Auld
1959), the authors constructed a system to corre-
late and code the content of psychotherapeutic
interviews with a score for each sentence based
on symbols for components in the patient's
speech and the therapist's comments in tran-
scripts of recorded interviews. Such emotions as
anxiety, hostility, and resistance are scored, as
are interpretations by the therapist. Conscious
and unconscious events are identified sepa-
rately, and reliability of scoring is reported.
Dollard strongly believes that this type of study
is the only way to bring recorded therapy inter-
views into the domain of science.
In the period from 1960 until his retirement
in 1969, Dollard and his research associate,
Alice M. White, waged a long and stubborn
battle with the problem of coding psychotherapy
content. They tested both the reliability and
validity of their coding system and published a
number of papers related to the measurement
of psychotherapy content.
Throughout his career, Dollard's research has
creatively integrated contributions from four
separate disciplines. If this no longer seems to
be a daring and novel enterprise, it is a measure
of his long-term influence on the field of be-
havioral science.
NEAL E. MILLER
WORKS BY DOLLARD
1931 The Form and Functions of the Early American
Family. PH.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago.
(1935) 1971 Criteria for the Life History, With Anal-
yses of Six Notable Documents. Freeport, N.Y.:
Books for Libraries Press.
(1937) 1957 Caste and Class in a Southern Town.
3d ed. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
1939 DOLLARD, JOHN; DOOB, LEONARD W.; MILLER,

NEAL E.; MOWRER, O. HOBART; and SEARS, ROBERT
R. Frustration and Aggression. New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press.
1940 DAVIS, ALLISON; and BOLLARD, JOHN Children
of Bondage: The Personality Development of Negro
Youth in the Urban South. Washington: American
Council on Education. —> Prepared for the Ameri-
can Youth Commission.
1941 MILLER, NEAL E.; and BOLLARD, JOHN Social
Learning and Imitation. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press. —> A paperback edition was published in
1964.
1942 Victory Over Fear. New York: Reynal and Hitch-
cock.
(1943) 1976 Fear in Battle. New York: AMS Press.
1950 BOLLARD, JOHN; and MILLER, NEAL E. Person-
ality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis in Terms of
Learning, Thinking, and Culture. New Yoik:
McGraw-Hill. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1965.
1953 BOLLARD, JOHN; AULD, FRANK, JR.; and WHITE,
ALICE M. Steps in Psychotherapy: Study of a Case
of Sex-Fear Conflict. New York: Macmillan.
1959 BOLLARD, JOHN; and AULD, FRANK, JR. Scoring
Human Motives: A Manual. New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
MEAD, MARGARET 1936 Review of Criteria for the
Life History. The Nation 142, May 6:590 only.
DOUGLAS, PAUL H.
Paul H. Douglas (1892-1976) made lasting
contributions to labor economics during his
academic career, 1916-1948 and 1966-1969,
and he achieved greater distinction in his politi-
cal career, most notably as a United States Sen-
ator, 1948-1966, than any academic economist
in American history. Douglas began his career
as a labor economist at a time when economics
was sharply divided between the deductive
methods of neoclassical theory and the induc-
tive methods of the historical and institutional
schools. He became a leading figure in the
transformation of economics into an empirical
science based on econometric testing of micro-
and macroeconomic theories.
The transformation of economics occurred
between 1920 and 1950, and Douglas' contribu-
tions to measurement and econometric estima-
tion in labor economics were unmatched. His
research on the theory and measurement of in-
come distribution, the labor demand function,
the labor supply function, and on the measure-
ment of wages and unemployment inspired
several generations of labor economists and is
still cited today.
In addition, Douglas contributed significantly
to the scholarship on many institutional aspects
of labor markets. This work was enriched by the
DOUGLAS, PAULH. 153
knowledge he gained from his activities in so-
cial reform causes, campaigns for economic and
welfare legislation, and arbitration in collective
bargaining.
The academic, public, and personal sides of
Douglas were closely interwoven. He merged his
economic research with his interests in public
policies, and imbued both with his personal
feelings. His life was remarkably diversified.
Biographical sketch
Douglas was born in Salem, Massachusetts,
on March 26, 1892, but his childhood home was
in Maine. He grew up in frontier conditions,
and less than a year and a half of his elemen-
tary education was spent in a classroom.
In 1913 Douglas graduated from Bowdoin
College with honors in economics. About his
college studies he wrote: "John Stuart Mill be-
came an inspiration, and has remained so
throughout my life" (1972, p. 24). Indeed,
their lives had interesting similarities. Both
were famous economists who engaged in social
reform movements and who, late in their ca-
reers, were elected to their nation's highest leg-
islative office. Douglas, like Mill, attempted a
difficult task for a superior neoclassical econo-
mist : namely, that of advocating and rationaliz-
ing a liberal and quasisocialistic role for govern-
mental intervention in the economy.
Douglas took his graduate work at Columbia
University. There, John Bates Clark, one of the
founders of the marginal productivity theory,
provided Douglas with the training in neoclassi-
cal economic theory that became the basis for
Douglas' later work in production theory. Doug-
las was, however, repelled by the strain of social
Darwinism that was then so much a part of
neoclassical economics. He was sympathetic to
trade unionism and protective labor legislation.
His mentor at Columbia in these interests was
Henry R. Seager, whose work in labor legislation
in New York paralleled the work by John R.
Commons and his followers in Wisconsin. In
1915/1916 Douglas spent a year in graduate
studies at Harvard University, where Frank W.
Taussig strengthened his training in neoclassi-
cal economics. Douglas received his doctorate
in 1921. His dissertation was published with the
title, American Apprenticeship and Industrial
Education (1921).
Douglas was an instructor in economics at
the University of Illinois, Reed College, and the
University of Washington before joining the
University of Chicago in 1920, where he re-
154 DOUGLAS, PAUL H.
mained until 1948. During a three-year leave
of absence at Amherst College, 1924-1927, he
collaborated with a mathematician, Charles W.
Cobb, on work oh production functions. After
his third term in the U.S. Senate ended in 1966,
Douglas taught at the New School for Social Re-
search in New York (1966-1969). He was 77
years old when poor health forced his retirement.
Douglas married Dorothy Wolff in 1915. She
was the daughter of a prominent New York
banker, and she became an academic sociologist
and an activist in social reform movements.
After their divorce in 1930, he married Emily
Taft, the daughter of the famous sculptor,
Lorado Taft. Her active life included careers as
an actress, a social activist—particularly in civil
rights causes, a congresswoman representing
Chicago (1944—1946), and an author of several
books on the feminist movement.
Douglas' life as a social reformer began in his
student days. At Bowdoin he opposed the fra-
ternity caste system, and while at Columbia he
was arrested once for participating in a union
organizing campaign among retail clerks. After
his conversion to the Quaker religion and his
move to Chicago in the 1920s, Douglas was so
frequently and deeply involved in reform causes
that his scholarly achievements during these
same years became all the more impressive. He
worked with Jane Addams, the American
Friends Service Committee, and, in 1928, with
a national citizens committee for the socialist
candidate for president of the United States.
From the late 1920s to 1940, Douglas partici-
pated in the advocacy, and often the subsequent
drafting, of legislative proposals for social wel-
fare: a family allowance plan (which he pre-
ferred as an antipoverty measure to minimum
wage laws), the Illinois State Utilities Act of
1933 (following his work in exposing the cor-
rupt practices of Samuel Insull), the Illinois Old
Age Pension Act of 1935, and the Illinois Unem-
ployment Insurance Act of 1937. At the federal
level he served on commissions on consumer
protection and the social security system.
Douglas won his first political election in
1939 when he became alderman from Chicago's
famous maverick fifth ward. Although a Demo-
crat, Douglas fought against the notorious cor-
ruption in the Democratic city administration as
vigorously as he had opposed corruption in the
Republican city administrations during the
1920s. However, on rare occasions, he could
work with the Democratic political machine,
and in a strategy that was prophetic of his
future political career, he was actually sup-
ported by the Democratic machine in his 1939
victory. In 1942, on the other hand, the ma-
chine candidate defeated him in the primary
for the U.S. Senate.
Although he was fifty years old, Douglas
joined the marines as a private and served in
combat in the South Pacific in World War n.
He received the Bronze Star for heroism and
was twice wounded.
In 1946, he returned to the University of Chi-
cago, where he remained until his election to
the U.S. Senate in 1948. He was dissatisfied
with the department of economics during his
last two years, partly because the laissez-faire
orientation of the department clashed with his
political liberalism. Douglas was considered the
underdog in the Senate general election in 1948,
but that was the year of the political upset. He
won second and third terms easily in 1954 and
1960, but in 1966 he was defeated in his last
political campaign by Charles H. Percy.
As a senator, Douglas was often characterized
as a champion of lost causes, who was fre-
quently at odds with Senate leaders in his own
party. In an article in The New York Times,
Charles Kaiser referred to the paradox of his
combination of the "moral rectitude of New
England . . . with crusading liberalism," and
the article quotes Newton Minnow, who said:
"Douglas was a liberal who was also simultane-
ously concerned about what things cost—that
was a rare combination" (Kaiser 1976). But it
should not be rare for a first-rate economist,
even a liberal, to apply the cost-benefit calculus
to government policies. In fact, Douglas as a
senator was an enemy of waste in government
and of pork-barrel legislation generally (see
Douglas 1952a; 1952b). His professional skills
as an economist were also evident in his battles,
mostly futile, for tax reform, but also when he
was on the winning side of free trade, conserva-
tion, and truth-in-lending legislation. On the
other hand, most economists would question his
legislative efforts on behalf of two per cent
interest rates for the Rural Electrification Ag-
ency, large federal subsidies to housing, restric-
tions on branch banking, and price regulation
of natural gas.
Douglas as an economist
Two principal themes stand out in Douglas'
economic research. One was his desire to use
economics for understanding and dealing with
social problems. The second was his goal of

bridging the large chasm between textbook
theory and real world data. In his generation he
ranks with Wesley C. Mitchell and Henry
Schultz in this important accomplishment.
Production theory and the demand for labor.
Douglas is most renowned in the literature of eco-
nomics for his work on production theory. His
outstanding contribution was not so much the
"discovery" of the famous Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, but his pioneering estimation
and application of it to major issues. Douglas
reconciled two important real world phe-
nomena : the estimated shares of labor and cap-
ital in national production and the observed
shares of labor and capital in national income.
His methodological technique is still widely
used, and even his numerical estimates of these
shares, 30 to 35 per cent for capital and 65 to
70 per cent for labor, have held up over time in
innumerable applications (see Douglas 1948;
Tobin 1973, p. 439).
It is difficult to determine what standards are
appropriate for examining the robustness (or
stability) of Douglas' parameter estimates, how-
ever. The estimation consisted simply of a linear
function (in logarithms) in which indexes of
output were regressed on indexes of labor and
capital inputs. The functions for separate indus-
tries within countries often had widely varying
parameter estimates, and these did not always
correspond closely to earnings shares. With
national aggregates as the units of observation
and with variables measured in physical quan-
tities, the aggregation and measurement prob-
lems are overwhelming. Crude data are often
fit as well by linear functions as by more com-
plicated functions. When the variables are in
monetary units, the variation in prices on both
sides of the equation introduces simultaneity
in the relation, and estimation by least squares
is probably inappropriate. The regression func-
tion loses the simple interpretation of one-way
causality it had when the variables were physi-
cal quantities.
Douglas' first paper on the Cobb-Douglas
production function was presented at the Amer-
ican Economic Association meetings in 1927.
In his presidential address to the AEA in 1947,
he surveyed the work done in the field during
the preceding twenty years (Douglas 1948).
Approximately 25 years later, when Douglas
was an emeritus professor at the New School,
he returned to empirical research on production
functions. His work on production functions
therefore spanned 45 years.
DOUGLAS, PAUL H. 155
The main body of Douglas' early work is in
his classic book, The Theory of Wages (1934).
James Tobin (1973) described it as a "major
vindication of the marginal productivity theory,"
which carried the following ironical implication.
The correspondence between the production and
income shares of labor seemed to imply that not
much could be done by minimum wage laws,
unions, or other interventions in production to
change the distribution of earnings. Yet, Doug-
las became an ardent champion of minimum
wage laws, unions, and various governmental
interventionist strategies. The tensions between
a neoclassical analysis of the workings of the
economy—Douglas the economist—and an advo-
cacy of an interventionist strategy—Douglas the
reformer and politician—were never thoroughly
discussed or analyzed in Douglas' writings. Al-
bert Rees (1979) suggests that Douglas saw
business monopoly and monopsony, along with
prevailing unemployment, as impediments to a
reliance on laissez-faire policies.
Two additional ironies concerning Douglas
and the Cobb-Douglas production function are
worth noting. One stems from the development
of the function in the hands of mathematical
economists and econometricians, who discov-
ered all sorts of convenient and illuminating
mathematical properties in it and extended it
to applications in utility theory. However, there
is not the slightest indication that Douglas un-
derstood or even cared about the substance of
any of this work. Until the late 1960s Douglas
was unaware of the popularity of the Cobb-
Douglas production function in economics liter-
ature, and then he expressed surprise and grati-
fication, and remarked: "A seedling that I had
planted long ago, but left untended, had been
cared for by younger men and in the fullness of
time became a sturdy tree" (Douglas 1972,
pp. 614-615). The other irony is that although
the function carries Douglas' name, it was prob-
ably discovered or invented much earlier by
Knut Wicksell of Sweden and by Phillip H.
Wicksteed of England.
Labor supply. Douglas' work on production
functions was his contribution to the theory of
the demand for labor. His work on the supply
of labor was also influential and laid the foun-
dation for the important modern work by Clar-
ence D. Long, H. Gregg Lewis, and Jacob Mincer.
Douglas' supply research first appeared in The
Th&ory of Wages. In the best-known part of
this research on labor supply, Douglas and his
co-workers regressed labor force participation
 156 DOUGLAS, PAUL H.
rates for a large number of age-sex groups on
real wages for a number of large cities, using
data from the 1920 and 1930 censuses.
There are several notable points about this
work: (1) Relatively stable negatively sloped
supply curves of labor were estimated. The
cross-section relationships were reconciled,
therefore, with the observed time series negative
relationship between the labor supply and real
wages. (2) For men, the elasticities of labor
supply with respect to real wages were low—
— 0.1 to — 0.2—numerical estimates that have
held up for the last 40 years. (3) For women,
two lasting insights that emerged were the im-
portance of the industrial structure in the labor
market and the effect that the dual role of
women in both home and market production
had in increasing the elasticity of the female
labor supply function. However, the most seri-
ous flaw in Douglas' labor supply research con-
cerned women. The primary fact about the fe-
male labor supply function emerging from
modern research is its large positive wage
elasticity, whereas Douglas found a large nega-
tive elasticity. Douglas' mistake was his failure
to separate income effects (as measured by
male earnings) from wage effects (as measured
by female wage rates) in the function. The posi-
tive wage effect has been found to be dominant,
and, in fact, this effect is a major explanation
for the increase in market work by women over
time (see Mincer 1962). Douglas' female labor
supply function was both theoretically misspeci-
fied and inherently an unstable empirical rela-
tion. (4) Perhaps the most methodologically
profound aspect of Douglas' work was his grasp
of the distinction between the abstract labor
supply model of price theory and the various
labor supply models that apply to varying cir-
cumstances in the real world (Douglas &
Schoenberg 1937, pp. 78-79).
The measurement of wages and unemploy-
ment. The empirical testing by Douglas of eco-
nomic theories of the labor market had to await
the construction of an appropriate data base, and
the chief architect of this was Douglas himself.
Wage series were not compiled by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in the first part of the century,
and cost-of-living indexes were nearly nonexis-
tent. Douglas examined real wage trends and
real wage differentials from 1890 to 1926, a
period of rapid economic growth, huge waves of
immigration, and sporadic spurts of union
growth. His book, Real Wages in the United
States: 1890-1926 (1930), was a major work
in its own right, and it established the founda-
tion for The Theory of Wages, published four
years later.
Douglas' contributions to the study of unem-
ployment are several. In his scholarly works in
support of unemployment insurance programs,
the role of unemployment benefits as an auto-
matic stabilizer over the business cycle is de-
veloped. While a senator and member of the
Joint Economic Committee he developed an un-
employment measure that was an alternative
to the conventional unemployment rate; spe-
cifically, a measure that included part-time
workers who want full-time jobs. The measure
has appeared regularly in the "economic indi-
cator" series of the Joint Economic Committee,
and it is a forerunner of the current emphasis
on multiple measures of unemployment (see
Shiskin 1976). Douglas wrote several books on
unemployment and depressions, but his macro-
economic theories are not well developed. De-
spite his interventionist position regarding the
role of government and his advocacy of public
employment programs to combat unemploy-
ment, Douglas was more a monetarist than a
Keynesian. He was one of the first senators to
invite testimony from Milton Friedman, and
there is an ironical note to Douglas' indirect role
in the resurgence of the monetarist position in
the federal government.
Paul H. Douglas had many careers—econo-
mist, reformer, soldier, and politician. Each was
marked by superlative achievements. Tobin's
tribute (1973 p. 438) is fitting: "Any one
[career] alone would fill with distinction the
lifetime of a man of unusually prodigious talent
and energy. Men of Paul Douglas' range, in-
tensity, and dedication are not just unusual;
they stride across the national scene only once
or twice a generation."
GLEN G. CAIN
WORKS BY DOUGLAS
1921 American Apprenticeship and Industrial Educa-
tion. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
(1930) 1966 Real Wages in the United States: 1890-
1926. New York: Kelley.
(1934) 1964 The Theory of Wages. New York: Kelley.
1937 DOUGLAS, PAUL H.; and SCHOENBERG, ERIKA H.
Studies in the Supply Curve of Labor: The Relation
in 1929 Between Average Earnings in American
Cities and the Proportions Seeking Employment.
Journal of Political Economy 45:45—79.
1948 Are There Laws of Production? American Eco-
nomic Review 38:1—41.
1952a Economy in the National Government. Univ. of
Chicago Press.
1972 Ethics in Government. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.

1972 In the Fullness of Time: The Memoirs of Paul H.
Douglas. New York: Harcourt.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
KAISER, CHARLES 1976 Former Sen; Paul H. Douglas
Dies: Liberal Illinois Democrat was 84. The New
York Times, Sept. 25, p. 22, col. 1.
MINCER, JACOB (1962) 1975 Labor Force Participa-
tion of Married Women:A Study of Labor Supply.
Pages 63-97 in Aspects of Labor Economics: A Con-
ference of the Universities-National Bureau Com-
mittee for Economic Research. Edited by H. Gregg
Lewis. National Bureau of Economic Research, Spe-
cial Conference Series, No. 14. New York: Arno. —»
Conference held in Princeton, New Jersey, in 1960.
REES, ALBERT 1979 Douglas on Wages and the Sup-
ply of Labor. Journal of Political Economy. —» Forth-
coming.
SAMUELSON, PAUL A. 1979 Paul Douglas' Measure-
ment of Production Functions and Marginal Produc-
tivities. Journal of Political Economy. —> Forthcom-
ing.
SHISKIN, JULIUS 1976 Employment and Unemploy-
ment: The Doughnut or the Hole? Monthly Labor
Review 9, Feb.:3-10.
TOBIN, JAMES 1973 The Careers of Paul Douglas.
Yale Review 62:438-443. -> A review of In the
Fullness of Time, 1972.
DUBOS, RENE
Rene Dubos, biological scientist and social
philosopher, was born in France in 1901. He
emigrated to the United States in 1924 and be-
came a citizen in 1938. He has been associated
with the Rockefeller University for more than
fifty years, and since 1971 has been emeritus
professor of environmental biomedicine.
Raised in small farming villages of the lie
de France, Dubos moved with his family in 1913
to Paris. In 1919 he won a scholarship to the
College Chaptal where he became interested in
human geography and social history. Despite a
professor's encouragement to pursue a career
in social history, Dubos decided upon agron-
omy as a more secure livelihood. He received a
degree in agronomical sciences at the Institut
National Agronomique in 1921, and soon ob-
tained a post as a research reviewer for the
International Institute of Agriculture in Rome.
Two years later on board a ship bound for
the United States, he chanced to meet for the
second time Selman A. Waksman, an agricul-
tural bacteriologist at Rutgers University. As a
result of the re-encounter Dubos enrolled at
Rutgers, and earned a doctorate in agricultural
chemistry and bacteriology in 1927. Almost im-
mediately thereafter he began his long affiliation
with the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Re-
search, later the Rockefeller University. For 14
DUBOS, RENE 157
years he worked in the laboratory of Oswald
T. Avery, best known for his chemical identi-
fication of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). In The
Professor, the Institute, and DNA (1976),
Dubos writes not only of Avery but of the
intellectual and scientific stimulation of the
institute as environment—its genius loci. His
own professional development was influenced
by Avery, Alexis Carrel, Alfred E. Cohn, Thomas
M. Rivers, and others through the ease of col-
laboration with a variety of biomedical disci-
plines. Early in his affiliation, Dubos won inter-
national acclaim for his discoveries related to
the successful use of soil microbes in the treat-
ment of disease.
After a two-year leave as George Fabyan pro-
fessor of comparative pathology and professor
of tropical medicine at the Harvard University
School of Medicine, Dubos returned to the in-
stitute in 1944 to direct his own laboratory. He
has written more than 200 scientific papers,
numerous articles for specialists and lay per-
sons, and 21 books. He holds 39 honorary de-
grees, including 3 honorary medical degrees.
In addition to many scientific honors, Dubos
won the Pulitzer Prize in 1969 for So Human
an Animal (1968b). Since his retirement, Dubos
has continued an active career as writer, lec-
turer, and educator. As author, he is best known
for his books on the relations between the
environment and health/disease, science in so-
ciety, and an evolutionary, adaptive perspective
on the social problems and opportunities of
contemporary life. Dubos' contributions to social
thought are characterized by three major in-
tellectual themes: an interest in the relations
between things rather than in things as inde-
pendent entities, an emphasis on human choice
and free will, and a concern for the humanizing
of science.
Relations between human beings and environ-
ments. Dubos' earliest work in soil microbiology
was already ecological. His doctoral work was
shaped by his interest not in the microbe alone,
but in the soil as milieu for the microbe and in
how its nutriments and acidity affect the nature
of its microbic population. Later, his medical re-
search was rooted in the relations among
microbe, individual host, and the population in
which the host is embedded. A personal tragedy
led to further development of Dubos' systemic
ideas. After his first wife died of tuberculosis
in 1942, Dubos' interests turned to studying the
relations between social conditions and suscep-
tibility to tuberculosis. His subsequent work
158 DUBOS, RENE
reflects Dubos' growing environmentalism as
first he explored the relations between environ-
ment and infectious disease, then between en-
vironment and disease in general, and finally,
the environmental influences at work in all as-
pects of human life.
For Dubos, the environment comprises the
natural, the built, and the social worlds. It is
anything that evokes an active response in the
human being (passive reactions to environmen-
tal conditions occur, of course, at the physico-
chemical level). People's active, and often
creative, responses to the environment change
it to conform to human needs and goals, some-
times enhancing and sometimes degrading the
environment in the process. In either event,
humans must then adapt to the very changes
they have created, as well as to the constant
changes occurring in the environment as the
result of nonhuman forces. The extreme adapt-
ability of humans poses a danger in that some
environmental changes induced by human ac-
tivity have negative consequences for the quality
of human life and for human biological and
psychological functioning, based as it is on a
high degree of genetic stability since the Stone
Age.
Because human beings have remarkable bio-
logical plasticity and a low degree of biological
specialization, Dubos gives more weight to the
role of the environment in the nature-nurture
interplay. For him, it is not so much that en-
vironment determines behavior as it is that past
responses condition subsequent responses to the
environment. More importantly, the environ-
ment offers options to humankind: men and
women are shaped by the selections they make
among many possible physical and social envi-
ronments. In general, Dubos' position is that over
evolutionary time, certain features have been
built into the human genome. These programs
of potentialities, however, must be activated by
appropriate environmental stimuli at the appro-
priate time if they are to become functional
attributes. Hence, Dubos' major humanistic
thesis calls for the creation and sustainment of
environmental diversity so that the multiple
potentialities in human children and adults may
be released.
Free will. Dubos' convictions concerning hu-
man choice and purpose distinguishes his posi-
tion from the environmental emphasis of B. F.
Skinner and the genetic emphasis of the socio-
biologist Edward O. Wilson. He abjures behav-
iorism on the basis that willful actions influence
environmental conditioning, and sociobiology on
the grounds that social factors are more impor-
tant than genetic factors in history and in indi-
vidual lives. Human beings are not merely reac-
tive to environmental conditions or merely
impelled by genetically programmed behaviors.
Human development and functioning is the out-
come of the dynamic interplay between both,
plus the exercise of free will and deliberate
choice based on values, knowledge, and ex-
perience.
Dubos views the acceptance of two seemingly
incompatible notions—determinism (genetic-
environmental interplay) and free,will—within
Niels Bohr's conception of complementarity.
Both determinism and free will are needed to
understand the richness and complexity of
human life. While obeying the laws of genetic-
environmental determinism, humans at the
same time transcend them. By virtue of the great
complexity of the information programs in their
DNA, humans are the most teleonomic of all
organisms. Within the constraints of a given
culture, they make choices and take action
guided by awareness of past experience, aspira-
tions for the future, and value judgments. Thus
human beings have influenced the course of
their evolution as well as their individual de-
velopment. Human freedom arises in good mea-
sure from social evolution (culture) which,
though different in kind, is itself the result of
organic evolution. Like Paul Tillich, Dubos sees
humans as most human at the moment of
choice.
Although Dubos, like other biologists, does
not address the traditional philosophical issues
in free will, he does recognize the presence of
the unconscious and irrationality in human af-
fairs. And, more explicitly, he is deeply con-
cerned about the constraints on human freedom
imposed by the social forces of poverty, racism,
malnutrition, poor housing, and all forms of
social injustice that stifle the expression of in-
dividual potentiality. Yet, for Dubos, the very ex-
istence of free will "makes it possible to envisage
a future world in which human society, despite
the genetic stability of the species, can be im-
proved by changing environmental forces and
ways of life" (1974a, p. 32). Thus the Prome-
thean capacity for deliberate choice carries re-
sponsibility for creative stewardship of the
earth, including the design of social environ-
ments that will foster the realization of human
and environmental potential. Admittedly, this is
an anthropocentric position, but ecological

values are necessarily anthropocentric: what is
"really" good for human beings is good for the
rest of nature.
Science in society. Dubos' concerns about sci-
ence arise inevitably from his holistic perspec-
tive on human-environment relations and his
emphasis on free will. In his judgment, the bio-
logical sciences have continued for too long their
analytic focus on elementary structures and
processes, and have failed to study human life
in its wholeness. Without discounting the re-
markable achievements of biology, Dubos be-
lieves that to continue solely to study the human
being as a fragmented and isolated object will
limit science's contributions to human welfare.
He advocates, instead, studies of the nonlinear,
closed-loop feedback systems that maintain and
those that undermine the goodness-of-fit be-
tween human beings and environments. Such
studies are likely to uncover the multiple and
so far unexpressed potentialities of both, and will
therefore complement the more mechanistic
studies that are limited to the predictive aspects
of the human organism. They can lead toward
the anticipation and then prevention of short-
and long-term consequences of technological in-
novations and to an understanding of free will.
Science will then have extended the rational
basis for the exercise of human purpose, choice,
and action.
The social philosophy of Dubos is best
summed up in the title of his regular column in
The American Scholar, "The Despairing Op-
timist." Once pessimistic about humanity's abil-
ity to stave off ecological disaster, Dubos has
taken comfort from the growing public concern,
a spreading commitment to social values among
scientists, world-wide efforts to develop alter-
native sources of energy, new social designs and
life styles, and plans to conserve the wilderness
and improve rural and urban land use. His own
manifold contributions to each of these develop-
ments have helped point to new directions in
the life sciences and the social sciences, and
have helped shape new objectives and methods
in such diverse professions as architecture, en-
gineering, medicine, social work, and urban
planning.
CAREL B. GERMAIN
WORKS BY DUBOS
1945 The Bacterial Cell. Cambridge, Mass.: Harva^
Univ. Press.
(1948) 1965 DUBOS, RENE; and HIRSCH, JAMES G.
(editors) Bacterial and Mycotic Infections of Man.
DUMfiZIL, GEORGES 159
4th ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott. —» Dubos was the
sole editor of the first three editions.
(1950) 1976 Louis Pasteur—Free Lance of Science.
New York: Scribners.
1952 DUBOS, RENE; and DUBOS, JEAN The White
Plague: Tuberculosis, Man, and Society. Boston:
Little, Brown.
1954 Biochemical Determinants of Microbial Disease.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1959 Mirage of Health: Utopias, Progress, and. Bio-
logical Change. New York: Harper. —*• A paperback
edition was published in 1971.
1960 Pasteur and Modern Science. Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday.
1961 The Dreams of Reason: Science and Utopias.
New York: Columbia Univ. Press. —» A paperback
edition was published in 1963.
1962a The Torch of Life: Continuity in Living Ex-
perience. New York: Simon & Schuster.
1962£> The Unseen World. New York: Rockefeller In-
stitute Press; Oxford Univ. Press.
1963 The Cultural Roots and the Social Fruits of Sci-
ence. Eugene: Oregon State System of Higher Edu-
cation.
1965 Man Adapting. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
(1965) 1970 DUBOS, RENE; and PINES, MAYA Health
and Disease. Rev. ed. New Yo~k: Time-Life.
1968a Man, Medicine, and Environment. New York:
Praeger.
1968b So Human an Animal. New York: Scribners.
1970 Reason Awake: Science for Man. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press.
1972 A God Within. New York: Scribners.
1972 WARD, BARBARA; and DUBOS, RENE Only One
Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small
Planet. New York: Norton; London: Deutsch.
—» An unofficial report commissioned by the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, Conference on
the Human Environment, and prepared with the
assistance of a 152 member Committee of Cor-
responding Consultants in 58 countries.
1974a Beast or Angel?: Choices That Make Us Human.
New York: Scribners. —» First published in 1974
in French with the title Choisir d'etre humain:
Essai.
1974b Of Human Diversity. New York: Crown.
1976 The Professor, the Institute, and DNA. New
York: Rockefeller Univ. Press.
DUMfiZIL, GEORGES
In the early decades of the present century,
as a result of the eclipse of Max Miiller's "solar
mythology" (see Dorson 1955), the science of
comparative mythology—especially comparative
Indo-European mythology—reached a low ebb.
Narrowly focused research into the specific
Indo-European traditions—Greek, Italic, Celtic,
Indie, and the like—became the order of the day.
Yet the basic questions to which Miiller and his
adherents had addressed themselves remained
unresolved, and in 1920 a young Indo-Europe-
anist, Georges Dumezil, set out to find a new
and viable framework in terms of which these
problems might once again be approached;
160 DUMEZIL, GEORGES
problems posed by the obvious thematic, if not
etymological, parallels among a great many
ancient Indo-European gods and heroes.
Born in Paris in 1898, Dumezil had attended
the Lycee Louis-le-Grand and later the presti-
gious Ecole Normale Superieure. After serving
as an artillery officer from 1917 to 1918, he re-
turned to his studies at the University of Paris
where, in 1924, under the direction of the
eminent Indo-Europeanist Antoine Meillet, he
completed his doctoral thesis. Entitled Le festin
d'immortalite: Etude de mythologie comparee
indo-europeenne (1924), it marked the begin-
ning of one of the most distinguished scholarly
careers the twentieth century has yet witnessed.
Dumezil's initial attempts (e.g., 1924; 1929)
to develop a "new comparative mythology,"
grounded as they were in James G. Frazer's (e.g.,
1890) now largely discredited theory that re-
ligion everywhere reflects an attempt to renew
the world by periodically killing and replacing
kings and other persons symbolic of divine be-
ings, ultimately proved unsuccessful (see Lit-
tleton [1966] 1973, p. 56). By 1938, however,
he had made a major discovery and had begun
to draw upon a wholly different theoretical base.
The discovery was that several ancient Indo-
European speaking communities were charac-
terized, at least in their earliest periods, by a
tripartite social class system that broadly re-
sembled the three Aryan or "twice-born" castes
of classical and later Indian society (Dumezil
1930). The new theoretical base was the soci-
ology of Emile Durkheim and his followers, to
which Dumezil was introduced by Marcel
Granet. Although it is unfair to characterize
Dumezil as a full-fledged Durkheimian (his
fundamental training was in philology and the
history of religions), he nevertheless came to
adopt one of Durkheim's most important axioms:
that important social and cultural realities are
"collectively represented" by supernatural beings
and concepts (see Durkheim 1912).
In a remarkable series of books and essays
written during the course of the next decade
(1938-1948), Dumezil successfully combined
the newly discovered evidence for social tripar-
tition, Durkheimian sociology, and the tradi-
tional techniques of comparative philology, and
arrived at a comprehensive model of the com-
mon Indo-European ideology—that is, the cog-
nitive structure in terms of which the ancient
Indo-European speakers ordered their social and
supernatural universes. As presently under-
stood, the salient features of this ideology are
threefold: (1) the maintenance of juridical and
sacerdotal sovereignty; (2) the exercise of
physical prowess; and (3) the promotion of
physical well-being, fertility, wealth, etc. Each
of these three principles forms the basis of what
Dumezil calls a fonction, or "function"—a com-
plex whole that includes both the ideological
principle itself and its numerous social and
supernatural manifestations.
The clearest example, perhaps, can be seen
in Vedic India, where the "first function" (sov-
ereignty) was manifested in the Brahman caste
and its two primary collective representations,
Mitra (the juridical aspect) and Varuna (the
sacerdotal aspect). The "second function"
(physical prowess) was manifested in the
Kshatriya caste (the military/ruling elite) and
its primary representation, the great war god
Indra. The "third function" was reflected at the
social level by the Vaishyas (the herder-culti-
vator caste) and at the divine level by the twin
Ashvins, or "Divine Horsemen," as well as by
the goddess Sarasvatl, all of whom were prin-
cipally concerned with physical well-being, fer-
tility, etc.
At least some evidence for the presence of
similar social and supernatural triads can be
found in almost every other ancient Indo-
European speaking tradition from Italy to Ice-
land. Moreover, it eventually became clear that
the three functions are reflected in an extremely
wide variety of cultural phenomena, including
triads of epic heroes (see Wikander 1947; Little-
ton 1970), threefold categories of diseases (see
Puhvel 1970), and even tripartite conceptions
of physical space (see Mole 1952; Dumezil
1968-1973, vol. 1).
At first glance, Dumezil's approach might ap-
pear similar to that espoused by his fellow coun-
tryman Claude Levi-Strauss (see, for example,
Levi-Strauss 1964). However, there are some
important—indeed fundamental—differences be-
tween them. Unlike Levi-Strauss, Dumezil does
not suggest that the tripartite cognitive structure
he has discovered is a universal feature of the
human psyche. On the contrary, the ideology
in question is, in the Old World at least,
uniquely Indo-European, and is therefore nec-
essarily bounded in time and space. Thus, the
two French scholars are working at wholly dif-
ferent levels of abstraction (see Littleton 1974).
However, if the specific structural phenom-
ena that Dumezil has brought to light are by
definition limited to the Indo-European domain,
the method he has developed does have some

general implications for social research. It may
be that most if not all of the world's major lan-
guage families, such as the Uto-Aztecan, the
Malayo-Polynesian, the Bantu, the Hamito-
Semitic, etc., are, or were at some point in their
histories, characterized by analogous genetically
related ideologies, each with its own unique set
of "functions" (see Littleton [1966] 1973, pp.
232-233).
To be sure, Dumezil's theories and methods
have not met with universal approval, and
there are those who suggest that on occasion he
has imposed the tripartite model on data that
are perhaps amenable to other interpretations
(see Littleton [1966] 1973, pp. 186-202). But
despite these criticisms, Dumezil, who, until his
retirement in 1968, was professeur de civilisa-
tion indo-europeenne at the College de France
(the position was created for him in 1948), has
been eminently successful in his lifelong effort
to develop a "new comparative mythology," and
the implications of what he has achieved are
profound indeed for the social sciences as a
whole.
In November 1978, in the autumn of his
eightieth year, Dumezil was elected to the
Academic francaise.
C. SCOTT LITTLETON
WORKS BY DUMEZIL
1924 Le fesfin d'immortalite: Etude de mythologie
comparee indo-europeenne. Annales du Musee
Guimet, Bibliotheque d'etudes, Vol. 34. Paris:
Geuthner.
1929 Le probleme des Centaures: Etude de mythologie
comparee indo-europeenne. Annales du Musee
Guimet, Bibliotheque d'etudes, Vol. 41. Paris:
Geuthner.
1930 La prehistoire indo-iranienne des castes. Journal
asiatique 216:109-130.
1934 Ouranos-Varuna: Etude de mythologie comparee
indo-europeenne. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve.
1935 Fldmen-Brahman. Annales du Musee Guimet,
Bibliotheque de vulgarisation, Vol. 51. Paris:
Geuthner.
1939 Mythes et dieux des Germains: Essai d'inter-
pretation comparative. Paris: Leroux.
(1940) 1948 Mitra-Varuna: Essai sur deux repre-
sentations indo-europeennes de la souverainete.
2d ed. Paris: Gallimard.
1941 Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus: Essai sur la conception
indo-europeenne de la societe et sur les origines
de Rome. Paris: Gallimard.
1942 Horace et les Curiaces. Paris: Gallimard.
1944 Naissance de Rome: Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus II.
Paris: Gallimard.
1945 Naissance d'archanges, Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus
III: Essai sur la formation de la theologie zoroas-
trienne. Paris: Gallimard.
1947 La tripartition indo-europeenne. Psyche: Revue
Internationale de psychoanalyse et des sciences de
I'homme 2:1348-1356.
1948 Loki. Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve.
DUMEZIL, GEORGES 161
1949a L'heritage indo-europeen a Rome. Paris: Galli-
mard.
1949k Le troiseme souverain: Essai sur le dieu indo-
iranien Aryaman et sur la formation de I'histoire
mythique d'Irlande. Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve.
1952 Les dieux des Indo-Europeens. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France.
1953 Les trois fonctions dans quelques traditions
grecques. Volume 2, pages 25-32 in Hommage a
Lucien Febvre. Paris: Colin.
1954 Rituels indo-europeens a Rome. Paris: Klinck-
sieck.
1956a Aspects de la fonction guerriere chez les Indo-
Europeens. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
1956b Deesses latines et mythes vediques. Brussels:
Collection Latomus, Vol. 24.
1958 L'ideologie tripartie des Indo-Europeens. Brussels:
Collection Latomus, Vol. 3.
1959 Les dieux des Germains: Essai sur la formation
de la religion scandinave. Paris: Presses Univer-
sitaires de France. —> Translated in Gods of the
Ancient Northmen, 1973.
(1966) 1970 Archaic Roman Religion. Univ. of Chi-
cago Press. —» First published in French.
1968-1973 Mythe et epopee. 3 vols. Paris: Gallimard.
—*• A translation of the third part of the second
volume was published by the University of Chicago
Press in 1973 with the title The Destiny of a King.
(1969) 1970 Heur et malheur de guerrier. 2d ed.,
rev. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. —> A
translation of the first edition was published by
the University of Chicago Press in 1970 with the
title The Destiny of the Warrior.
(1970) 1973 From Myth to Fiction. Univ. of Chicago
Press. —* First published in French.
1973 Gods of the Ancient Northmen. Berkeley and
Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. —> Includes
a translation of Les dieux des Germains, 1959, and
four other articles written between 1952 and 1959.
1978 Romans de Scythie et d'alentour. Paris: Payot.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
DORSON, RICHARD 1955 The Eclipse of Solar Mythol-
ogy. Journal of American Folklore 68:393-416.
DURKHEIM, EMILE (1912) 1976 The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life. 2d ed. London: Allen
& Unwin. —> First published as Les formes ele-
mentaires de la vie religieuse, le systeme totemique
en Australie. A paperback edition was published in
1961 by Collier.
FRAZER, JAMES G. (1890) 1955 The Golden Bough:
A Study in Magic and Religion. 3d ed., rev. & enl.
13 vols. New York: St. Martins; London: Macmil-
lan. —^ A one-volume abridged edition was pub-
lished in 1922, and reprinted in 1955.
GERSCHEL, LUCIEN 1957 Georges Dumezil's Com-
parative Studies in Tales and Traditions. Midwest
Folklore 7:141-148.
LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE (1964) 1969 The Raw and
the Cooked: Introduction to a Science of Mythology.
New York: Harper. —> First published in French.
LITTLETON, C. SCOTT (1966) 1973 The New Com-
parative Mythology: An Anthropological Assessment
of the Theories of Georges Dumezil. Rev. ed.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California
Press.
LITTLETON, C. SCOTT 1970 Some Possible Indo-
European Themes in the Iliad. Pages 229-246 in
Jaan Puhvel (editor), Myth and Law Among the
Indo-Europeans. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ.
of California Press.
LITTLETON, C. SCOTT 1974 "Je ne suis pas . . . struc-
162 DUMEZIL, GEORGES
turaliste": Some Fundamental Differences Between
Dumezil and Levi-Strauss. Journal of Asian Studies
34:151-158.
MOLE, M. 1952 Le partage du monde dans la tradi-
tion iranienne. Journal asiatique 240:455—463.
PUHVEL, JAAN 1970 Mythological Reflections of
Indo-European Medicine. Pages 369-382 in George
Cardona et al. (editors), Indo-European and Indo-
Europeans. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania
Press. —» Papers presented at the third Indo-
European conference held in 1966 at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania.
WIKANDER, STIG 1947 Pandava-sagen och Mahab-
haratas mytiska forutsattningar (The Pandava Sagas
and Some Mythological Persistences in the Mahab-
hSrata). Religion och Bibel 6:27-39.
 EGGAN, FRED
Frederick Russell Eggan has been a centrip-
etal force in mid-twentieth century anthropology.
His scholarly work fuses the structural—func-
tional approach developed in British social
anthropology with the concern for cultural his-
torical processes characteristic of mainstream
American anthropology. His synthesis avoids
both the narrowness and ahistoricity inherent
in the British position and the fragmentary and
diffuse problem focus of much American work.
He has played a strategic role as a teacher, ad-
ministrator, and spokesman, consistently advo-
cating an integrated, holistic approach to an-
thropological understanding.
Born in Seattle in 1906, Eggan grew up in the
Chicago area, attended public schools, where
he displayed an aptitude for science and mathe-
matics, and enrolled in the College of the Uni-
versity of Chicago. He majored in psychology,
but exposure to courses in geography rekindled
his childhood interests in distant places and
peoples. He took his first anthropology course
with Fay-Cooper Cole. Cole, a Boas-trained
ethnologist who later devoted himself to Mid-
western archeology, was in the process of build-
ing a major anthropology department at Chicago.
As an undergraduate and beginning graduate
student, Eggan also took courses with the bril-
liant Edward Sapir. Although his aptitude for
linguistic transcription was limited, Eggan re-
tained from Sapir's teachings certain conceptual
models of long-range cultural process and an
appreciation of the psychological dimensions of
culture.
Eggan completed his undergraduate work in
1927 and continued as a graduate student in
psychology but took many of his credits in an-
thropology. Under the supervision of L. L. Thur-
stone, the eminent psychometrician, he pro-
duced a master's thesis, "An Experimental Study
of Attitudes Toward Race and Nationality"
(1928), that combined his psychological and an-
thropological interests. However, survey data,
numbers, and calculators proved less exciting
than archeology and ethnology, so Eggan de-
cided to pursue a career in anthropology. Lack-
ing funds, he taught psychology, sociology, and
history for two years at Wentworth Junior Col-
lege and Military Academy in Missouri. During
the summers he worked on Cole's archeological
field projects.
Eggan returned to Chicago in 1930 as a full-
time graduate student in anthropology. Courses
with Leslie Spier aroused his interest in kinship
studies and southwestern ethnology. He planned
to write a dissertation on the relationships be-
tween ethnological and archeological cultures.
The topic was premature, but Eggan later did
produce a perceptive paper (1952) on this sub-
ject when more reliable archeological data be-
came available. In 1931 Cole hired A. R. Rad-
cliffe-Brown to replace Sapir, who had departed
for Yale University. Eggan attended Radcliffe-
Brown's course on family, kin, and clan, and
was impressed by the Englishman's erudition
and fresh theoretical orientation. RadclifFe-
Brown was highly critical of most work done
by American anthropologists and advocated the
synchronic study of social structures as systems
of action and meaning. Social structures, he
163
164 EGGAN, FRED
maintained, could be studied as functioning
wholes, and nomothetic principles of organiza-
tion could be deduced. Radcliffe-Brown came to
America with a program for reanalyzing the so-
cial structures of North American Indians along
the lines that he had recently developed in his
Australian work (1931). Eggan became Rad-
cliffe-Brown's research assistant and pored
through the literature on North American kin-
ship to produce extensive summaries of what
was known and what remained to be done. In
the summer of 1932 Eggan participated in a
summer field school directed by Leslie A. White
and began his lifelong association with the
Hopi. Material from that field trip provided the
basis of his 1933 doctoral dissertation, a struc-
tural-functional analysis of Pueblo social or-
ganization.
Eggan remained affiliated with the University
of Chicago as a postdoctoral research associate.
He returned to the southwest to collect addi-
tional material and also did brief field work with
the Mississippi Choctaw and with the Cheyenne
and Arapaho in Oklahoma. These latter experi-
ences led to the publication of "Historical
Changes in the Choctaw Kinship System" (1937k),
which utilized ethnohistorical data to demon-
strate the systematic influence of acculturation in
modifying kinship behavior and terminology. Hy-
potheses about similar systematic changes among
other southwestern tribes were substantially con-
firmed in later work by Eggan's student Alex-
ander Spoehr (1947). Results of the Cheyenne
and Arapaho research appeared in a sweeping
essay prepared for the Social Anthropology of
North American Tribes (1955), a Festschrift
for Radcliffe-Brown that Eggan edited. Here the
kinship systems were related to other features
of social organization, and comparative analysis
suggested broader interpretations about the de-
velopment of the Plains' social systems. This
essay clearly anticipated the relevance of what
Eggan was later to label "the method of con-
trolled comparison."
In 1934-1935 Eggan was sent by Cole and
Robert Redfield to investigate problems of cul-
ture change in the northern Philippines. The
Tinguian area was chosen, since Cole had done
extensive ethnographic work there twenty years
earlier; Redfield wanted to see if some of the
general processes of change that he had recently
discerned in Yucatan could be replicated in an-
other area of Spanish contact. Aided by Cole's
practical ethnographic knowledge of the area,
Eggan made a rapid adjustment to field work
and collected voluminous material on social or-
ganization, ceremonialism, and dreams. How-
ever, he had difficulty applying Redfield's model
of the folk—urban continuum to the northern
Philippine situation. Although European contact
had made significant inroads into the area,
Eggan emphasized the effect of internal struc-
tural dynamics in prefiguring the degree and di-
rection of social change (1941; 1963). He
argued that only after the functional integration
of the native cultures and social structures had
been analyzed, compared, and placed in his-
torical perspective could European influences
be properly assessed. Eggan's rich Philippine
data have only partially been published.
On his return from the Philippines, Eggan
received an academic appointment at Chicago.
Much of his energy during this period was de-
voted to teaching. Earlier interests in historical
problems resurfaced, since, as he notes, "with
both Radcliffe-Brown and W. Lloyd Warner
[and one might add Redfield] on the depart-
mental staff, most of my teaching in the 1930s
centered on ethnology and culture history, and
I gave ethnographic courses on all the major
regions of the world, except for Europe" ([1934-
1972] 1975, p. ix). When not in residence, he
continued his southwestern field research.
Eggan held a variety of research and admin-
istrative posts during World War n. He was a
consultant to the Board of Economic Warfare in
1942, after which he became chief of research
for the Philippine government-in-exile. Next he
was assigned to the School for Military Govern-
ment. In 1943 he was sent back to Chicago to
establish the Civil Affairs Training School for
the Far East. Near the end of the war he served
briefly as a cultural relations officer for the
State Department. These wartime experiences
broadened his administrative skills and his
range of national and international contacts.
Eggan's academic career flourished in the
postwar period. He was promoted to full pro-
fessor in 1948 and served as departmental chair-
man from 1948 to 1952 and again from 1961
to 1963. He continued to publish the results
of his southwestern and Philippine research. In
1950 a much-revised and expanded version of
his doctoral dissertation appeared as Social Or-
ganization of the Western Pueblos. In this, his
most important work, he elegantly summarized
the social organization of the Hopi and com-
pared it with four other western Pueblo groups.
From this structural-functional analysis he
showed a basic uniformity among the western

Pueblos in which matrilineal clans, matrilocal
households, and Crow-type kinship systems pre-
dominated. This pattern contrasted with that of
the eastern Pueblos, whose social organizations
featured dual divisions, bilateral kinship sys-
tems, and an emphasis on relative age. Forming
a bridge between these two types, both struc-
turally and geographically, were the Keresan
Pueblos. Thus Eggan demonstrated that under-
lying the apparent homogeneity of Pueblo cul-
ture were distinct types of social structure. He
offered historical hypotheses about the way
these variations could have evolved from a com-
mon type. His reconstruction has been chal-
lenged by Robin Fox (1967), who did field work
with Keresan groups, but the issues remain un-
resolved. Eggan's description and analysis of
western Pueblo social systems remain a land-
mark in Americanist studies. In his postretire-
ment years Eggan has sought the ancestral
forms of Hopi social organization among lin-
guistically related groups in the Great Basin.
Eggan's 1953 presidential address to the
American Anthropological Association, "Social
Anthropology and the Method of Controlled
Comparison" (1954), articulated the particular
synthesis that he effected between British social
anthropology and the American historical tra-
dition. In it he called for comparative syn-
chronic studies of geographically proximal, his-
torically related, or typologically similar societies.
Such focused comparisons could then be utilized
for cultural reconstruction and the discovery of
regularities in diachronic process. In the ex-
panded edition of Social Anthropology of North
American Tribes ([1937c] 1955), Eggan con-
tributed a state-of-the-art essay in which the
methods and results of controlled comparison of
American Indian societies were masterfully
demonstrated.
By the 1960s Eggan had become a senior
statesman in anthropology. He continued to
publish important articles on the southwest and
Philippines, but he was increasingly called upon
to write forewords to the work of others, to con-
tribute articles to Festschriften of distinguished
colleagues, and to serve as a convener, con-
tributor, and commentator on important sym-
posia. Eggan's interests also turned more toward
the history of anthropology. He established in-
tellectual kinship with that pioneering student
of social organization and the American Indian,
Lewis Henry Morgan. A series of articles culmi-
nated in his published University of Rochester
lectures, The American Indian: Perspectives for
EGGAN, FRED 165
the Study of Social Change (1966). This book
not only surveyed Morgan's contributions but
evaluated his legacy through a selective review
of subsequent work on North American social
organization.
Eggan epitomized the excellence of anthro-
pology at the University of Chicago during the
middle decades of the twentieth century. High
standards set by his teaching for two genera-
tions of graduate students; quiet diplomacy and
administrative talents that help provide an en-
vironment for creative anthropological research;
service on many scholarly committees; and ac-
tive membership in honorary societies brought
national and international distinction to him-
self and to Chicago.
Eggan's greatest impact, however, derives
from his writings. His clarity of vision, ability
to reduce complex phenomena to their essen-
tials with minimal distortion, and capacity to
demonstrate productive connections between
hitherto disparate approaches and theories have
earned him an enduring reputation in the social
sciences.
RAYMOND D. FOGELSON
WORKS BY EGGAN
1928 An Experimental Study of Attitudes Toward Race
and Nationality. Master's thesis, Univ. of Chicago.
1933 The Kinship System and Social Organization of
the Western Pueblos With Special Reference to the
Hopi Indians. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago.
(1934-1972) 1975 Essays in Social Anthropology and
Ethnology. University of Chicago, Studies in Anthro-
pology, Series in Social, Cultural, and Linguistic An-
thropology, No. 1. Department of Anthropology,
University of Chicago.
(1937a) 1962 The Cheyenne and Arapaho Kinship
System. Pages 35-95 in Fred Eggan (editor), Social
Anthropology of North American Tribes. 2d ed., enl.
Univ. of Chicago Press. —» An enlarged paperback
edition was published in 1972.
1937b Historical Changes in the Choctaw Kinship Sys-
tem. American Anthropologist New Series 39:34—52.
(1937c) 1955 EGGAN, FRED (editor) Social Anthro-
pology of North American Tribes. 2d ed., enl. Univ.
of Chicago Press. —> An enlarged paperback edition
was published in 1972.
1941 Some Aspects of Cultural Change in the Northern
Philippines. American Anthropologist New Series
43:11-18.
1950 Social Organization of the Western Pueblos.
Univ. of Chicago Press. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1973.
1952 The Ethnological Cultures and Their Archeo-
logical Backgrounds. Pages 35-45 in James B. Grif-
fin (editor), Archeology of Eastern United States.
Univ. of Chicago Press.
1954 Social Anthropology and the Method of Con-
trolled Comparison. American Anthropologist New
Series 56:743-763.
1955 Social Anthropology: Methods and Results. Pages
485-551 in Fred Eggan (editor), Social Anthropol-
ogy of North American Tribes. 2d ed., enl. Univ. of
 166 ELIADE, MIRCEA
Chicago Press. —> This article did not appear in the
1937 edition of Social Anthropology. An enlarged
paperback edition was published in 1972.
1963 Cultural Drift and Social Change. Current An-
thropology 4:347-355. —> Papers in honor of Mel-
ville J. Herskovits.
1966 The American Indian: Perspectives for the Study
of Social Change. Chicago: Aldine.
1968a Indians, North American. Volume 7, pages
180-200 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1968k Kinship: I. Introduction. Volume 8, pages 390-
401 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1974 Among the Anthropologists. Volume 3, pages 1-
20 in Bernard J. Siegel (editor), Annual Review of
Anthropology. Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BRUZEWICZ, LIZA 1976 The Theoretical Sequelae of
Eggan's Philippine Fieldwork. Unpublished manu-
script.
Fox, ROBIN 1967 The Keresan Bridge: A Problem in
Pueblo Ethnology. London School of Economics,
Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 35. Lon-
don: Athlone; New York: Humanities Press.
RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. (1931) 1948 The Social
Organization of Australian Tribes. Glencoe, 111.:
Free Press.
SPOEHR, ALEXANDER 1947 Changing Kinship Sys-
tems: A Study in the Acculturation of the Creeks,
Cherokee and Choctaw. Field Museum of Natural
History, Anthropological Series, Vol. 33, No. 4. Chi-
cago: The Museum.
STOCKING, GEORGE W. 1978 History of the Depart-
ment of Anthropology, University of Chicago. Un-
published manuscript.
ELIADE, MIRCEA
Mircea Eliade, historian of religions, oriental-
ist, and man of letters, is noted for his interpre-
tation of archaic and primitive modes of religious
experience and expression. His scholarly work
manifests an "unusual combination of philologi-
cal-historical research with an intuitive-imagi-
native approach, perhaps reflecting his double
career as scholar and litterateur. In the post-
World War ii era, he attained a predominant
position among historians of religion and won
a wide audience for his works.
Life and works. Eliade was born in Bucha-
rest, Romania, March 9, 1907. He began his lit-
erary career at 14 with a piece on the silkworm
in a popular science review, and followed with
articles on entomology, alchemy, history of re-
ligions, travel, and literature in various Roman-
ian journals. During his student days at the
University of Bucharest he founded a short-lived
literary journal and regularly contributed pro-
files, book reviews, and travel pieces to a local
newspaper. At the same time, he pursued his
academic career in philosophy and oriental
studies, earning his licentiate in philosophy
(1928) with a thesis on the Italian Renaissance
thinkers, Marsilio Ficino and Giordano Bruno.
Inspired by reading the first volume of Suren-
dranath Dasgupta's History of Indian Philos-
ophy (1922-1955), he journeyed to India to
study under the eminent Indian scholar, aided
by a scholarship from the Maharajah of Kassim-
bar. Arduous textual and linguistic studies at
the University of Calcutta and the Asiatic So-
ciety of Bengal were interspersed with travels
throughout India and a six-month period of in-
tensive Yoga practice and meditation at a Hima-
layan ashram (retreat). Eliade had decided to
devote his doctoral dissertation to a comparative
history of Yoga, a decision that was to mark
the beginning of his illustrious career as a his-
torian of religions. The Indian experience was
to have a lasting effect on his work and thought,
but, as he noted later, for a complete view of
man he would also require what he had learned
from the Italian Renaissance, plus an under-
standing of "primitive" man and popular Euro-
pean folklore. Conversely, he found that what
he had learned in India provided insight into
peasant cultures generally and into Romanian
folk culture in particular.
Back in Bucharest in late 1931, his double
career as scholar and writer flourished. After
translating his dissertation on Yoga from the
original English into Romanian, he received his
PH.D. in 1933, and became an assistant to his
master Nae lonescu, the eminent Romanian
philosopher, at the University of Bucharest,
where he taught philosophy and history of re-
ligions until 1940. His novel Maitreyi, an in-
tense erotic-spiritual tale, set in Calcutta and
based on his own experience, won first prize in
a contest for unpublished novels (1933) and
gained him instant literary fame in Romania.
He also published other novels, a book on his
travels in India, and numerous scholarly articles
and books on folklore, alchemy, and the history
of religions. His work on Yoga was translated into
French (1936) and many of his articles were
written in French, English, and Italian, gaining
him a wider, non-Romanian scholarly audience.
He founded and edited (1938-1942) Zalmoxis,
a distinguished international journal of religious
studies. (Eliade was also later cofounder and
coeditor of the journals Antaios [1960-1972],
and History of Religions [1961—].) During
World War n, he served as cultural attache at
the Romanian legations in London (1940-1941)

and Lisbon (1941-1945). After the war, when
the new Communist regime was established in
Romania, he emigrated to Paris rather than re-
turn to his own country.
The Paris years (1945-1956) were a period
of both great difficulties and great triumphs for
Eliade. His personal journal reveals the depres-
sion, frustration, and sometimes despair of the
exile compelled to write and lecture in a foreign
tongue, unable to fulfill his vocation as a Ro-
manian writer, and seeking a place in a strange
new environment. However, Eliade's work on
Yoga and his scholarly articles were well known
and respected by eminent French orientalists
and historians of religions. Under the sponsor-
ship of Georges Dumezil, he lectured at the
prestigious Ecole des Hautes Etudes on subjects
that were the themes of two key works that
would later establish his scholarly reputation:
the Traite d'histoire des religions (1949£>) and
Le mythe de I'eternel retour (1949a). In the
early 1950s, he published a series of works that
further solidified his position as a leading his-
torian of religions: Le chamanisme (1951),
Images et symboles (1952), an improved, ex-
panded version of Yoga (1954), and Forgerons
et alchimistes (1956a). In a creative rebirth of
his fictional powers he also brought forth Foret
interdite (1955), regarded as his literary
masterpiece.
In 1956, Eliade came to the United States as
visiting professor of the history of religions at
the University of Chicago, where he delivered
the Haskell lectures, later published as Birth
and Rebirth (1958). In 1957, he became pro-
fessor and chairman of the history of re-
ligions and professor of the committee on
social thought at Chicago, where in 1964
he became the Sewell L. Avery distinguished
service professor. During the late 1950s and
subsequently, his scholarly work, most of
which appeared in English translation, became
the subject of intense interest in the United
States, not only among university scholars, but
among circles far removed from academic dis-
ciplines. The vigorous critiques of his approach
that began to appear in the 1960s apparently
did not diminish his self-confidence and cer-
tainly not his productivity. In 1976 he published
the first volume of Histoire des croyances et des
idees religieuses, a historical work covering all
the major developments in man's religions from
the Stone Age to modern times, purposely writ-
ten after decades of work on the basic cross-
cultural, transhistorical patterns of religious
ELIADE, MIRCEA 167
experience and expression, thus perhaps refut-
ing the accusation that he was "an anti-historian
of religions" (Dudley 1976; 1977).
Basic concepts and approaches. Eliade saw
the task of the historian of religions as the under-
standing of homo religiosus, man as a religious
being, intended toward a transcendent, infinite,
absolute realm. Although this intentionality is a
universal human structure, it is most evident
in archaic and primitive cultures and has
tended to be repressed in modern, urbanized so-
cieties. Hence the attention devoted by the his-
torian of religions to archaic and primitive phe-
nomena is not aimed merely at providing
interesting exotica, but rather at arriving at an
understanding of how premodern man has seen
his situation in the cosmos and the means of
coping with it—at basic matters of being, mean-
ing, and truth. In doing this the historian of
religions accomplishes not only a cognitive mis-
sion, but also a transformative one: the recup-
eration of lost or forgotten areas of the essen-
tially human for the modern inquirer and his
audience. Thus at the end of his quest self-
understanding, as well as other-understanding,
and the makings of a complete philosophical
anthropology are promised.
While not claiming that the mind and life of
archaic and primitive man are confined to the
spiritual aspect, Eliade concentrated on the lat-
ter as the one that most needed exploration and
illumination, an aspect that had been relatively
neglected, misunderstood, and traduced (there
is also no doubt that he considered it the es-
sentially human aspect), He insisted emphati-
cally that it was not to be understood in socio-
logical, psychological, economic, or any other
nonreligious terms, but nonreductively, as some-
thing absolutely sui generis. Religion, or the re-
ligious man, was to be understood on its own
terms—i.e., in terms of the sacred and its mani-
festations.
Here Eliade had recourse to a concept that
had been highlighted by two generations of an-
thropologists and historians of religions: Robert
R. Marett, Emile Durkheim, Arnold van Gennep,
Nathan Soderblom, Rudolf Otto, Gerardus van
der Leeuw, and Roger Caillois. Like the latter
he simply defined the sacred as the opposite of
the profane: The sacred is utterly other than
the ordinary, the usual, the mundane. Archaic
and primitive man has experienced the world
in these two contrasting aspects in what Eliade
called "the dialectic of the sacred and profane."
Anything may be selected as bearer of the
 168 ELIADE, MIRCEA
sacred—a place, a man, a stone, a tree, nutri-
tion, excretion, coition—and the bearer both re-
mains itself, a "natural" object, person, or pro-
cess, and at the same time becomes (is revealed
as) something absolutely other, acquiring a
transcendent character. The locus of the sacred
may change, desacralization, as well as sacra-
lization, occurring in this paradoxical dialectic.
Eliade coined the term "hierophany" to indicate
the character of the particular objects or actions
as manifestations of the sacred. And it is to the
systematic elucidation of the hierophanies that
he devoted his work.
In this quest for the "morphology of the
sacred," Eliade sought the general structures,
the typical patterns, underlying the specific phe-
nomena. For instance, an examination of the
multitudinous varieties of plant hierophanies
among the ages and peoples of the world, from
the archetypal symbol of the Cosmic Tree to the
popular custom of "bringing home the May,"
indicates a coherent system of meanings, cen-
tered on the recurrent rhythm of birth and re-
birth, the eternal cycle of vegetative life, and,
beyond that, the eternal renewal of the cosmos.
The meaning of each particular plant hiero-
phany, therefore, is fully understandable only
in terms of the whole system, a "whole" that is
constructed intuitively. Hence, when discussing
such topics as sky gods, water symbolism, or
moon mystique, Eliade brought together ma-
terials from widely separated places and ages,
and sought their basic, underlying, common
structure, apart from the specific, local contexts
and meanings. His essential concern was for
the typical, the general, the universal.
Although, in this view, the inquirer must be-
gin with concrete historical data, acquired
through his own research or that of others,
philological, historical, or ethnological descrip-
tion and analysis are not enough. The historian
of religions must also possess understanding.
He must seek to attain the depth meanings un-
derlying the data, through a discernment of the
basic patterns in a much larger context and
through an interpretation that deciphers their
transhistorical intentionality. Thus in his noted
work Shamanism, Eliade not only extended the
term to a far wider geographical area than had
been customary, but also saw it as a primitive
mode of the ecstatic type of mysticism, usually
regarded as a speciality of the "higher religions."
He placed shamanism solidly in the general his-
tory of religions. In his conception, the historian
of religions is not primarily a historian or
philologian (e.g., a Sinologist or Indologist),
but a comparativist, phenomenologist, and "her-
meneut" (practitioner of the art of interpreta-
tion). He proceeds by an intuitive act resembling
the eidetic vision of the philosophical phenom-
enologist, but exercises it on empirical historical
phenomena.
For Eliade, all religious facts have a symbolic
character, which must be deciphered by the his-
torian of religions. The fullness of religious
meanings (particularly the paradoxical coinci-
dence of opposites) is not convey able in rational
concepts. Hence, the interpretation of myth and
symbol plays a central role in his work. This in-
volves not only sympathetic participation in the
thought world of the (usually archaic or primi-
tive) homo religiosus, but also a significant em-
phasis on the objectivity of the interpreter's
perception. Interpretation is not merely a matter
of the replication of what the subjects may have
in their consciousness. The historian of religions
must go down beneath all the elaborations, ac-
cretions, distortions, and amnesias to the es-
sential meaning of a particular religious phe-
nomenon. He does this on the basis of his
systematic construction of the general struc-
tures of hierophanies. For example, people who
bring home tree branches at the beginning of
spring may have no idea of the sacral signifi-
cance of their act. Here the historian of religions
resembles the literary critic who claims to un-
derstand the writer better than he understands
himself or the psychoanalyst who claims to
discern unconscious motivations in the patient's
mind.
Another important element in Eliade's synop-
tic vision of man's religiousness is the central role
of archetypes and repetition. There are univer-
sal archetypes of human intentionality, which,
when discerned by the inquirer, signal the
meaning of all kinds of phenomena, a meaning
which is not always or usually immediately ap-
parent. Through the repetition of these arche-
types in mythical narratives and ritual perfor-
mances, premodern man finds the ground of
value and meaning for his daily activities and
the pathway to a transcendent realm. Thus rites
of initiation are not fully understandable merely
in biological or societal terms; essentially they
involve a transformation to a higher mode of
being in a repetition of the basic archetype of
death and rebirth (conversely, death is an initia-
tion into a higher realm). Archaic and primitive
man finds the meaning and value of his exis-
tence in the archetypes that serve as models

and thus provide ontological rootage for his
works and days. The central model, myth, and
rite is that representing the Creation, the emer-
gence of cosmos out of chaos, periodically re-
peated in a renewal of the world and time.
Traditional man seeks to attain the original time
of beginnings by reactualizing it in ritual repeti-
tion. This is the basic model for all actions, be-
ginnings, productions, and constructions in
everyday life. Its ultimate expression is "the
myth of the eternal return," which is acted out
in everything from New Year's festivals to
housewarming celebrations. Man seeks release
from the serial progression of historical time
in the cyclical rhythms of the cosmos.
There are some obvious similarities between
Eliade's approach and that of depth psychology,
particularly Jungianism, with its notion of
archetypes of the collective unconscious. Al-
though Eliade saw a certain corroboration and
encouragement in this pursuit, his concern and
emphasis were rather to discern and decipher
what is expressed in overt, concrete, historical
phenomena—in the lore, ritual, and myths of
peoples—not in the individual psyche and its pro-
cesses. He stressed the transhistoric and "trans-
conscious" orientation of man's religiousness,
the nisus toward being, the avid aspiration for
ontological reality, within a cosmic and meta-
cosmic framework. He projected his Myth of
the Eternal Return as a study of "archaic on-
tology" and once expressed the desire to con-
struct a metaphysics and ethics based solely on
archaic and primitive phenomena. Indeed, he
claimed Plato as "the outstanding philosopher
of 'primitive mentality,'" because Plato, like
primitive man, views essence as preceding
existence. For Eliade, myth, ritual, and symbol
are concerned with being and its attainment by
man, who has fallen into a profane condition
and become prey to "the terror of history." It
may be said, that paraphrasing Freud's dictum
on the id and the ego, Eliade would have his
homo religiosus proclaim, "Where there profane
is, there shall sacred be." In a sense, Eliade was
pursuing philosophy of the metaphysical (and
salvific) variety, not through abstract specula-
tion, but by considering in depth the concrete
materials of the history of religions. In so doing,
he may have made a noteworthy contribution
to philosophical anthropology.
Critiques. As the main lines of Eliade's work
and thought emerged, negative criticisms of his
methods and conclusions increased. Historically
minded historians of religions (e.g., Raffaele
ELIADE, MIRCEA 169
Pettazoni and the European comparative-histor-
ical school generally) objected to what they
considered sweeping generalizations and ingeni-
ous reconstructions based on fragmentary data,
and the juxtaposition of instances widely sepa-
rated in space and time under some general
structural category arrived at in an a priori man-
ner. They preferred more cautious conclu-
sions derived methodically from documentary
sources. American critics, such as Hans H.
Penner and Robert D. Baird, complained that
his was an intuitive method, never clearly ex-
plicated and not subject to ordinary, consensual
verification or falsification; moreover, that
definitely ontological assertions were being hid-
den under a phenomenological manner. They
insisted that Eliade was not only describing
archaic man's religious stance, but vigorously
espousing it, and that he was asserting the
supreme value and meaning of the sacred (never
established in any logical or empirical way), not
merely presenting it as a phenomenological
referent. Although he signed the 1960 Marburg
manifesto of the International Congress for the
History of Religions, which proclaimed the field
an empirical, nonnormative discipline, he was
trenchantly criticized as having normative, parti
pris stances: proreligious, proarchaic, and even
pro-Christian (e.g., his position that the incarna-
tion of God in Christ may be viewed as the
supreme hierophany). His refusal to define re-
ligion beforehand, except to say that it has to do
with man's experience of the sacred (also unde-
fined), was assailed as irrational and unscien-
tific; his antireductionist stance, his insistence
that religion is something sui generis, was at-
tacked as a theoretically inadmissible position
that would make a "science of religions" impos-
sible (Penner & Yonan 1972; Baird 1970; 1971).
It was also charged that his approach to and
appreciation of religious phenomena was
skewed by his intimate study and experience of
Indian Yoga. (Excellent presentations of his-
torical critiques are in Dudley 1977; Bianchi
1975).
Anthropological critiques followed along
much the same lines as those by historians of
religions: inadequate or sloppily handled data,
precariously supported grand generalizations,
one-factor universals, glaring errors of fact, the
ascription of a specific cast of mind to primi-
tive—archaic man, proceeding deductively from
a priori metaphysical postulates, providing no
explicit method of verification and correction,
abstracting religion from its sociocultural con-
170 ELIADE, MIRCEA
text, deemphasizing actual primitive-archaic
views to bring out the scholar's pet interpreta-
tions, and armchair scholarship with outdated
sources and theories. Adverse judgments on
Eliade's works from an anthropological view-
point were expressed in reviews and books by
Lord Raglan, Peter Lienhardt, William Lessa,
Anthony F. C. Wallace, Annemaire de Waal
Malefijt, Weston La Barre, Edmund Leach, John
A. Saliba, and many others. Dudley (1977) and
Mac Linscott Ricketts (1973) summarize the
significant negative views. A few approving
views were expressed (e.g., Hudson 1968).
Despite his alleged pro-Christian bias, Eliade
was also forcefully criticized by some Christian
scholars as depreciative of Christianity and the
biblical tradition (Hamilton 1965), or at least
as illegitimately trying to subsume them under
his archaic, cosmocentric, ahistoric paradigm
(Altizer 1962; 1963). Where Eliade saw mo-
dernity as a Fall into meaningless, historical
time, these critics saw it rather as an ascent to
a new and fuller mode of existence. Altizer, a
devoted but critical disciple of Eliade, viewed
him as untrue to his dialectic in not heralding
the emptying out of the sacred into the profane,
signaled by the Death of God in Christ; in not
welcoming, instead of rejecting, the godless,
profane, modern age.
Whatever the cogency of some of these criti-
cisms—historical, anthropological, or theological
—Eliade's work as a whole was not necessarily
vitiated by them. A closer consideration of the
careful qualifications expressed in his works—
sometimes obscured by Eliade's sonorous, poetic
style—may have modified some of the critiques.
Besides, many of the latter came from theoreti-
cal and methodological positions that were
themselves being vigorously questioned as naive
or historically false—e.g., the empirical data-
hypothesis-verification (or falsification) pattern,
both in the natural and human sciences (see,
for example, the attacks by Thomas Kuhn and
Paul Feyerabend on the conventional views of
scientific method). Meanwhile, the creative role
of intuition and a priori elements in human
knowledge was being more positively evaluated,
and scholars like Ian C. Jarvie (1964) were
calling for broad generalizations and syntheses
to rejuvenate the social sciences. The safer,
more obvious, more manageable methods ad-
vocated by some of his critics contrasted with
Eliade's grand vision and adventurous risks, but
perhaps promised to provide more security than
insight. To see Eliade as a shaman in scholar's
garb, whether disapprovingly (Leach 1966) or
approvingly (Altizer 1963), is, of course, fla-
grant hyperbole, but still may indicate a spe-
cial kind of scholarship and science, more in
the spirit of Vico than of Comte.
SEYMOUR CAIN
WORKS BY ELIADE
1938 Metallurgy, Magic and Alchemy. Zalmoxis; revue
des etudes religieuses 1:85—129.
(1940) 1970 Two Tales of the Occult. New York:
Herder. —> First published in Romanian as Secretul
Doctorului Honigberger.
(1949a) 1969 The Myth of the Eternal Return. New
ed. New York: Pantheon. —»First published in
French. A paperback edition was published in 1971.
(1949b) 1958 Patterns in Comparative Religion. New
York: Sheed & Ward. —> First published in a French
translation of the Romanian manuscript, as Traite
d'histoire des religions. A paperback edition was
published by the New American Library in 1963.
(1951) 1970 Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ec-
stasy. Rev. & enl. ed. New York: Pantheon. —» First
published in French. A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1972.
(1952) 1961 Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious
Symbolism. New York: Sheed & Ward. —> First pub-
lished in French. A paperback edition was published
in 1969.
(1954) 1969 Yoga: Immortality and Freedom. 2d ed.
Princeton Univ. Press. —» First published in French.
A paperback edition was published in 1970.
(1955) 1978 The Forbidden Forest. Univ. of Notre
Dame Press. —> First published in a French trans-
lation of the Romanian manuscript.
(1956a) 1978 The Forge and the Crucible. 2d ed.
Univ. of Chicago Press. —> First published as Forge-
rons et alchimistes. A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1978.
(1956b) 1959 The Sacred and the Profane: The Na-
ture of Religion. New York: Harcourt. —» First pub-
lished in French. A paperback edition was pub-
lished by Harper in 1968.
(1957) 1961 Myths, Dreams and Mysteries. New York:
Harper. —> First published in French. A paperback
edition was published in 1967.
1958 Birth and Rebirth: The Religious Meanings of
Initiation in Human Culture. New York: Harper. —>
A paperback edition was published in 1965 with the
title Rites and Symbols of Initiation.
(1959) 1966 ELIADE, MIRCEA; and KITAGAWA, JOSEPH M.
(editors) The History of Religions: Essays in
Methodology. Univ. of Chicago Press. —» Includes
Eliade's "Methodological Remarks on the Study of
Religious Symbolism." A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1975.
(1962a) 1965 Mephistopheles and the Androgyne:
Studies in Religious Myth and Symbol. New York:
Sheed & Ward. —> First published in French. A
paperback edition was published by Harper in 1969
with the title The Two and the One.
(1962b) 1969 Patanjali and Yoga. New York: Funk &
Wagnalls. —> First published in French. A paperback
edition was published by Schocken in 1975.
1967 From Primitives to Zen: A Thematic Sourcebook
of the History of Religions. New York: Harper. —>
A paperback edition was published in 1978.
1969 The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion.
Univ. of Chicago Press. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1975.

(1970) 1972 Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God: Compara-
tive Studies in the Religions and Folklore of Dacia
and Eastern Europe. Univ. of Chicago Press. —> First
published in French as De Zalmoxis a Gengis-Khan.
A paperback edition was published in 1978.
(1972) 1973 Australian Religions: An Introduction.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. —> First published
as separate articles in The History of Religions,
1959.
(1973) 1977 No Souvenirs: Journal, 1957-1969. New
York: Harper. —» First published in a French
translation of the Romanian manuscript, as Frag-
ments d'un journal. The English edition omits the
crucial entries from 1945 to 1956.
1976a Myths, Rites, Symbols: A Mircea Eliade Reader.
Edited by Wendell C. Beane and William G. Doty.
2 vols. New York: Harper.
1976b Occultism, Witchcraft and Cultural Fashions:
Essays in Comparative Religions. Univ. of Chicago
Press. —> A paperback edition was published in 1978.
1976-1978 Histoire des croyances et des idees relig-
ieuses. 2 vols. Paris: Payot. —> Volume 1 is sub-
titled: De I'age de la pierre aux mysteres d'Eleusis.
Volume 2 is subtitled: De Gautama Bouddha au
triomphe de Christianisme. A translation of volume
1 was published by the University of Chicago Press
in 1978 as A History of Religious Ideas. A transla-
tion of volume 2 is in preparation. A third volume,
entitled De Mohammed aux theologies atheistes
contemporaines, is in preparation.
1978a UEpreuve du labyrinthe: Entretiens avec Claude-
Henri Rocquet. Paris: Belfond.
1978b Les cahiers de I'Herne. No. 33. Paris: Editions
de I'Herne. —» Includes many short writings of
Eliade not previously published in a non-Romanian
language.
WORKS ABOUT ELIADE
ALLEN, DOUGLAS 1972 Mircea Eliade's Phenomeno-
logical Analysis of Religious Experience. Journal of
Religion 52:170-186.
ALLEN, DOUGLAS 1978 Structure and Creativity in
Religion: Mircea Eliade's Phenomenology and New
Direction. The Hague: Mouton.
ALLEN, DOUGLAS; and DOEING, DENNIS 1979 Mircea
Eliade: An Annotated Bibliography. New York: Gar-
land.
ALTIZER, THOMAS 1962 Mircea Eliade and the Re-
covery of the Sacred. Christian Scholar 45:267-289.
ALTIZER, THOMAS 1963 Mircea Eliade and the Dialec-
tic of the Sacred. Philadelphia: Westminster.
BAIRD, ROBERT D. 1970 Normative Elements in Eli-
ade's Phenomenology of Symbolism. Union Semi-
nary Quarterly Review 25:505-516.
BAIRD, ROBERT D. 1971 Phenomenological Under-
standing: Mircea Eliade. Pages 74-91 in Robert D.
Baird, Category Formation and the History of Re-
ligions. The Hague: Mouton.
CALINESCU, MATEI 1977 Imagination and Meaning:
Aesthetic Attitudes and Ideas in Mircea Eliade's
Thought. Journal of Religion 57:1-15.
DUDLEY, GUILFORD 1976 Mircea Eliade as the "Anti-
historian" of Religions. Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 44:345-359.
DUDLEY, GUILFORD 1977 Religion on Trial: Mircea
Eliade and His Critics. Philadelphia: Temple Univ.
Press.
HAMILTON, KENNETH 1965 Homo Religiosus and His-
torical Faith. Journal of Bible and Religion 33:213-
222.
HUDSON, WILSON M. 1968 Eliade's Contribution to
the Study of Myth. Pages 218-241 in Wilson M.
ELIADE, MIRCEA 171
Hudson (editor), Tire Shrinker to Dragster. Austin:
Encino Press.
KITAGAWA, JOSEPH M.; and LONG, CHARLES H. (editors)
1969 Myths and Symbols: Studies in Honor of
Mircea Eliade. Univ. of Chicago Press.
LEACH, EDMUND 1966 Sermons by a Man on a Lad-
der. New York Review of Books Oct. 20:28-31.
RASMUSSEN, DAVID 1968 Mircea Eliade: Structural
Hermeneutics and Philosophy. Philosophy Today
12:138-147.
RENO, STEPHAN J. 1972 Eliade's Progressional View
of Hierophanies. Religious Studies 8:153-160.
RICKETTS, MAC LINSCOTT 1967 Mircea Eliade and
the Death of God. Religion in Life 31:40-52.
RICKETTS, MAC LINSCOTT 1970 The Nature and Ex-
tent of Eliade's "Jungianism." Union Seminary
Quarterly Review 25:211-234.
RICKETTS, MAC LINSCOTT 1973 In Defence of Eliade.
Religion: A Journal of Religion and Religions 3:13—
34.
RICOEUR, PAUL 1976 Review of volume 1 of Histoire
des croyances et des idees religieuses. Religious
Studies Review 2:1—4.
SALIBA, JOHN A. 1976 "Homo Religiosus." In Mircea
Eliade: An Anthropological Evaluation. Leiden
(Netherlands): Brill.
SMITH, JONATHAN Z. 1972 The Wobbling Pivot. Jour-
nal of Religion 52:134-149.
WELBON, G. RICHARD 1964 Some Remarks on the
Work of Mircea Eliade. Acta Philosophica e't Theo-
logica 2:465-492.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAIRD, ROBERT D. 1971 Category Formation and the
History of Religions. The Hague: Mouton.
BAIRD, ROBERT D. 1976 Methodological Issues in Re-
ligious Studies. Chico, Calif.: New Horizons.
BIANCHI, UGO 1975 The History of Religions. Leiden
(Netherlands): Brill.
BIANCHI, UGO; BLEEKER, C. J.; and BAUSANI, ALLESAN-
DRO (editors) 1972 Problems and Methods of the
History of Religions. Leiden (Netherlands): Brill.
—» Study conference on the Problems and Methods
of the History of Religions, 1959-1969, held in Rome
in 1969.
CAILLOIS, ROGER 1960 Man and the Sacred. Glencoe,
111.: Free Press.
DASGUPTA, SURENDRANATH 1922-1955 A History of
Indian Philosophy. 5 vols. Cambridge Univ. Press.
DURKHEIM, EMILE (1912) 1976 The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life. London: Allen & Un-
win. —» First published in French.
FENTON, JOHN Y. 1970 Reductionism in the Study of
Religions. Soundings 53:61-76.
FEYERABEND, PAUL 1975 Against Method. London:
Verso.
HELFER, JAMES S. (editor) 1968 On Method in the
History of Religions. History and Theory: Studies in
the Philosophy of History, Beiheft 8. Middletown,
Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press.
JAR VIE, IAN C. (1964) 1967 The Revolution in An-
thropology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
KITAGAWA, JOSEPH M. (editor) 1967 The History of
Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding.
Prepared with the collaboration of Mircea Eliade and
Charles H. Long. Univ. of Chicago Press. —» Includes
Eliade's "Cultural Fashions and the History of Re-
ligions."
KRISTENSEN, W. BREDE (1960) 1971 The Meaning
of Religion: Lectures in the Phenomenology of Re-
ligion. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
LEEUW, GERARDUS VAN DER (1933) 1938 Religion in
Essence and Manifestation: A Study in Phenom-
172 ERIKSON, ERIK H.
enology. New York: Harper. —> First published as
Phdnomenologie der Religion. A two-volume paper-
back edition was published in 1963.
OTTO, RUDOLF (1923) 1950 The Idea of the Holy.
2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1960.
OXTOBY, WILLARD G. 1968 Religionswissenschaft Re-
visited. Pages 590-608 in Jacob Neusner (editor),
Religions in Antiquity. Leiden (Netherlands): Brill.
PENNER, HANS H.; and YONAN, EDWARD A. 1972 Is a
Science of Religions Possible? Journal of Religion
52:107-133.
SHARPE, ERIC J. 1971 Some Problems of Method in
the Study of Religion. Religion: A Journal of Re-
ligion and Religions 1:1-14.
SHARPE, ERIC J. 1975 Comparative Religion: A His-
tory. London: Duckworth; New York: Scribners.
SODERBLOM, NATHAN 1913 Holiness (General and
Primitive). Volume 6, pages 731 ff. in Encyclo-
paedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by James
Hastings. New York: Scribners.
SODERBLOM, NATHAN 1933 The Living God: Basal
Forms of Personal Religion. Oxford Univ. Press.
WACH, JOACHIM 1958 The Comparative Study of Re-
ligions. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. —•» A
paperback edition was published in 1961.
ERIKSON, ERIK H.
Erik H. Erikson was born on June 15, 1902,
in Frankfort am Main, Germany. Winner of
both the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book
Award, Erikson is one of the most eminent and
influential psychoanalysts of the twentieth cen-
tury. His theories concerning the biologically-
determined stages of human development as
shaped by environment have been widely ac-
cepted by, and have profoundly changed, such
seemingly diverse theoretical and practical fields
as clinical psychoanalysis, ethics, history, liter-
ature, politics, the social sciences, child care,
and family relations. The multifaceted applica-
tion of Eriksonian theory has made his contri-
butions difficult to define and categorize. The
difficulty in evaluating Erikson's work is a con-
sequence of its scope as an all-embracing and
rational explanation of the psychosocial develop-
ment of humans in any given environment. Erik-
son views every person as a biological entity
produced, and ineluctably guided by, both genetic
and environmental factors, who also changes his
own culture and, therefore, history as a whole.
Thus, everyone becomes a strand in the tapestry
of humanity, acted upon while acting, observ-
ing and altering his environment and himself,
motivated and motivating. Erikson's son Kai, a
sociologist, has observed of his father: "He's
got his own discipline. Like most original people
he places greater faith in the furniture in his
own head than in any particular discipline,"
Erikson's contributions to an understanding
of mankind in society began introspectively,
with the insight provided by his analysis with
Anna Freud. Erik Erikson is, in a sense, the
son of two fathers. His natural father, a
Dane, abandoned his mother, an artist, before
their child was born. For some time, in keeping
with the practices of his day, the child, Erik,
was kept unaware of the existence of his natural
father. The father he knew, in whose house he
grew up, was a German-Jewish pediatrician,
Theodor Homburger, whom Erikson's mother
married. Homburger not only fully accepted the
stepson but expected him to follow his own pro-
fession. After some occupational detours, Erik-
son did so, in a sense, becoming a healer of
children's emotional and mental disturbances
and not infrequently, thereby, also of their
physical malfunctions.
Erikson has acknowledged both his fathers,
first publishing under the name of Homburger
and later under the name of Erik H. (Hom-
burger) Erikson. His ambiguous personal back-
ground was formed in the also ambiguous his-
torical and geographical setting in which he
lived. As a young man Erikson lived in Schleswig-
Holstein, an area claimed by both Germany and
Denmark. This territorial dispute was very much
in focus while Erikson attended the Gymnasium
in Karlsruhe, and Erikson, a partisan for the
German claim, soon found himself rebuffed by
his classmates. The implication was that, as a
Jew, he was unsuited to embrace a German
cause. Yet he found himself equally a stranger
in his father's synagogue, where he was dubbed
"the goy" because of his fair Scandinavian ap-
pearance and perhaps, as well, because of his
mixed parentage. Erikson's exploration of the
effects on the individual of ambiguous back-
ground and the resulting uncertainty about one's
identity, which originated in his personal con-
flict—and which is an acute problem in contem-
porary Western civilization—is one of his main
contributions to the understanding of individual
psychology. Among his many other theoretical
and clinical contributions to an understanding
of humans in society are his complete "scaffold-
ing" for human development in the eight stages
of the human life cycle, and the coalescence or
clash of individual history and the historical
setting (the time and place in which a person
happens to live).
On finishing high school, Erikson, following

his mother's profession, sketched his way as a
budding artist through Europe, thus experi-
encing (according to his later postulations about
the stages of the life cycle) a kind of "morato-
rium" between childhood and adulthood. This
interim period gives a young person an oppor-
tunity to explore his potentials and limits, to
shed, in however a painful way, that part of
his childhood which seems useless or obsolete,
to shape his conscience and, if not his destiny,
at least his destination.
In 1927, on the suggestion of his friend Peter
Bios, Erikson went to Vienna, where both men
taught in the Burlingham School, a small pri-
vate school with a psychoanalytic orientation.
The logical sequel of this affiliation was Erik-
son's contact with the Vienna Psychoanalytic
Institute, where, lacking medical training, he
found himself a kind of odd man. Erikson, him-
self, describes his role there and elsewhere as
having a "favored stepson identity, that made
me take for granted that I should be accepted
where I didn't belong." This identity of favored
stepson has been Erikson's fate. An eminent
scholar without academic credentials; a psycho-
analyst who pioneered in exploring the ego
rather than, as has usually been the case, the
drives or the id; a wide-ranging theorist who
explored the lifelong interplay and influence of
a person's genetic endowment and biological
ancestry, his environment, his chance fate, Erik-
son reaches across borders into other experts'
territories.
In keeping with his role as favored stepson,
Erikson first found far greater response and ap-
preciation among such outstanding anthropolo-
gists as Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, A. L.
Kroeber, and S. Mekeel than among his col-
leagues at Harvard Medical School. He, in turn,
benefited from anthropological methods and
arenas of exploration, drawing on the experi-
ences of other cultures (Sioux, Yurok) in addi-
tion to his own, in order to test his life-cycle
theory. The study of other "simple" cultures also
helped him to gain understanding of the ever
present organic system, culture-family-child.
According to Erikson's life-cycle theory, the
sequence of developmental stages has always
been the same for the entire human race. In
brief, the life cycle comprises an inescapable
succession of eight developmental stages. Each
stage has its specific conflict, the resolution of
which, with a positive feeling dominating, leads
to the next stage. The developmental conflicts
characteristic of each stage are: trust versus
ERIKSON, ERIK H. 173
mistrust in the first stage of infancy; as trust
is reinforced and becomes dominant, the second
stage, autonomy versus shame and doubt, is
attained during the toddler years; with the
dominance of autonomy over shame and doubt,
the next, third stage, initiative versus guilt,
occurs during the preschool years; this leads
to the fourth stage, industriousness versus in-
feriority during the school years, which, in turn,
leads to the fifth stage, identity versus role
confusion during adolescence, to be followed
by intimacy versus isolation, the sixth stage,
during young adulthood, then the seventh stage,
generativity versus stagnation during mature
adulthood, and finally, in the eighth stage, ego
integrity versus despair during old age. The
life style of, say, the Sioux, the French Cana-
dian, the Zulu, or any definable subgroup de-
pends on "what a culture makes" of a given
developmental phase.
Thus, for instance, the second stage, which
roughly coincides with the so-called toddler
years, is characterized by the conflict between
wanting to be autonomous and the doubt that
one will ever be able to. This conflict is accom-
panied by shame whenever the child feels that
he is not succeeding in mastering such bodily
functions as urination, defecation, walking at
will. He is equally perturbed about having the
adult's standards forcefully imposed upon him.
The battle between the parent who must put
limits on the child's behavior, and the young-
ster's determination to have his own way, leads
to any number of possible conflict resolutions,
or compromises. For further healthy develop-
ment it is necessary that the sense of autonomy
prevail over the shame and doubt which, though
mastered, is nonetheless potentially ever-present.
The main characteristic of the next, third,
stage is initiative, which must, however, be
tempered by a consideration for fellow men,
especially parents and siblings. Thus, the
child feels torn between his urge to action,
curiosity, intrusiveness, and a sense of guilt
when he "goes too far." Going too far may be
differently defined in different civilizations. In-
deed, each stage of the life cycle takes on a
different hue, depending on "what a culture
makes" of it, and specifically, how flexible the
relevant adults in a child's life are about their
hoped-for-gains in his or her socialization. The
life-cycle theory thus takes cognizance of the
variable aspects, as well as those which are bio-
logically fixed and invariant, in each person's
progressive adaptation from birth to old age.
 174 ERIKSON, ERIK H.
Men's and women's development to adulthood
(generativity) and old age safeguards the sur-
vival of our species. The life cycle's phylogenetic
implications are in the function of older people
as the concerned guardians of the young.
The resolution of each conflict, in the eight
stages of the life cycle, also supplies the devel-
oping person with a measure of mastery over
his own environment, as well as a measure of
insight into and mastery of his inner self. Or, to
relate this theory to a much discussed issue, con-
flict changes a person's view of himself and,
thereby, changes his identity.
In 1942, Erikson joined the University of
California at Berkeley as professor of psychol-
ogy, an appointment which afforded him a great
deal of clinical observation. It was during his
Berkeley years that he was able to consolidate
the mutual connection, the biological web, as it
were, of culture—family-child as laid down in
his first major work, Childhood and Society
(1950). From this first work, and continuing to
the present, Erikson's wife, Joan, has been an
able editor, collaborator, and supporter of his
efforts. Herself, a lucid author as well as a pro-
fessional dancer and artist, Joan Erikson has
confirmed and enhanced Erikson's clinical un-
derstanding and clarity of style.
The life-cycle theory developed during Erik-
son's Berkeley period, was completed in 1950
during the political "witch-hunting" period in
the United States known as the McCarthy era.
Refusing to sign the loyalty oath then demanded
by the Board of Regents of the University of
California, Erikson became part of an exodus
of faculty members, moving to the Austin Riggs
Center in Stockbridge, Massachusetts. There,
the Eriksons' work with young, so-called border-
line patients led them to an appreciation of a
phenomenon which Erikson termed "identity
crisis." This conflict or crisis is perceived by him
as an exacerbation of the normal developmental
problems characteristic of adolescence and
young adulthood. The concept of identity crisis
(the notion for which Erikson is most widely
known in the general population), is now em-
bedded in psychoanalytic theory and practice.
The concept was first explicated in Erikson's
book, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psycho-
analysis and History (1958). Erikson traces the
coming into being of this kind of crisis as a
widespread phenomenon to the sixteenth-century
upheaval of European culture and the birth of
the passionate and powerful reformer, Luther.
The mutual influence of an exceptional man
(the greater the man the more powerful his own
identity crisis) and the times in which he lives
is quite possibly nowhere else as well described
as in this book. Erikson followed this book with
another historical-biographical study: Gandhis
Truth (1969), in which Gandhi is also revealed
as a great man who altered the course of history
by changing himself. To put it simply, just as
Erikson termed the policy of nonviolence (civil
disobedience) to effect social change, Gandhis
Truth, so, the internalized conscience might be
termed Luther's contribution to Western civiliza-
tion, or Luther's truth.
By the time he worked on the Gandhi book in
1960, Erikson had returned to Harvard, "in
order to learn how to teach my whole conception
of the life cycle—including the identity crisis—to
people normatively very much in it." Not that
the identity crisis is limited to adolescence or
young adulthood; like all developmental crises,
it is often re-experienced from time to time
throughout life, though usually in a less dra-
matic form.
In 1975 the Eriksons left Harvard and "re-
tired" to Tiburon, California, where, as genera-
tive people, they are dealing with a number of
theoretical problems and their applications. One
of their main interests is play: its biological
function, its role in inventiveness, its healing
and integrative functions, and its practical and
artistic uses in the framework of community
centers. The Eriksons' joint community ventures
are designed to break down the segregation of
people according to social class, age, and sex,
as well as between the "mentally disturbed" and
"normal people."
In sum, the three Eriksonian concepts gen-
erally regarded as most influential and impor-
tant are the life-cycle theory, the identity theory,
and the relationship between individual history
and the historical period in which one lives.
As a young clinician, Erikson found that the
psychological problems his patients complained
of were frequently the very ones he felt himself.
The "I don't know who I am" feeling reported by
his patients was sometimes experienced by them
as a persistent, vague malaise, at other times as
an outright confusion, sometimes as a frighten-
ing discrepancy between self-perception and the
way others perceived one.
However, identity, as Erikson sees it, is by
no means the exclusive estate of humans or
higher animals, but, of all living things. Every
creature, be it centipede or oak tree, is a mem-
ber of a species with which he shares a number

of characteristics; yet every creature is also
different from all others, identifiably unique,
and, therefore, has an identity.
The uniqueness of each living being is, in a
seemingly paradoxical way, what all have in
common. What they also share—people, plants,
and animals, alike—is a life cycle, evolving in
predictable stages. Even very primitive creatures
live through a stage of childhood (however brief
or long), a mature and in some way reproduc-
tive or generative period, and a time of decline
ultimately leading to death—of the individual,
but not of the species as a whole. Not for a long
time. Thus each individual identity constitutes
a link in the phylogenetic chain. How well this
living link supports the viability of the links to
come depends on (1) its unique genetic endow-
ment; (2) the care and nourishment it has re-
ceived from the environment; and (3) chance.
It might happen that an apple tree descending
from a long and healthy line is hit by lightning,
while all neighboring trees are spared. Identity
thus comprises genetic endowment, shaped by
environment throughout life, and mitigated by
chance events. What distinguishes human iden-
tity from all others is our superior ability to
other living beings to cope with our environment
and ourselves in ingenious and flexible ways,
and to observe ourselves, reflecting on our obser-
vations. By means of these abilities we have
become, probably, the only creatures who can
assume a measure of responsibility for our own
and our fellow men's fate. Other living things
have an identity, but only we have a sense of
identity, and an awareness that we can, up to a
point, change this identity at will. As already
indicated, the gains in individual mastery (or
the failure to achieve such gains) accomplished
through the resolution of developmental con-
flicts, add to a person's growing sense of iden-
tity. Since these gains are largely due to identifi-
cation with meaningful adults, and occur within
the framework of a cultural setting, they differ
according to the groups to which the parents-
caretakers—educators belong. Adult models may
be Japanese, Norwegian, or Maori, members of
a nation, tribe, church, labor union, multina-
tional corporation, or, indeed, a Christmas Club.
The fact that they "belong" shapes their own
and their children's identities and constitutes
the element referred to as a person's group
identity.
Erikson also distinguishes between this learned
and culturally differentiated ego identity, on the
one hand, and the universal or species-related
ERIKSON, ERIK H. 175
capacity to look at oneself as a creature who
changes unceasingly in time (and often in space
as well) from infancy through old age, yet ex-
periences self-sameness, in spite of all changes.
The most frequently discussed, and frequently
misunderstood, element of Erikson's identity
theory is the identity crisis, occurring during the
fifth stage of the life cycle, typically in late
adolescence or young adulthood. Because our
culture changes so rapidly, parental values fre-
quently are or seem to be outdated or inconsis-
tent to young persons. Because our culture lacks
definite, universally accepted rites of passage to
delineate developmental stages, young persons
are frightened by the thought that it is up to
them to decide when and how to make the leap
into adulthood. Also, because everyone in con-
temporary Western culture is exposed to so
many different faiths, life styles, ways of mak-
ing a living, there are many directions in which
one may leap. Added to this is geographic mo-
bility, which can widen horizons and our ac-
ceptance of cultural variation, but also can add
confusion and uncertainty about where one
belongs.
It is for these reasons that the identity crisis
has proliferated in the twentieth century. Every
developmental stage is accompanied by conflict,
but the one we call identity crisis can be so
especially painful, that it has caused us to rede-
fine our concept of mental illness; the inability
to align oneself with any life style can be so
painful and disruptive that the condition be-
comes indistinguishable from severe psychologi-
cal disturbance. Yet the prognosis for adoles-
cents and young adults suffering an identity
crisis as part of their developmental stage of
life is far more auspicious than a deep depres-
sion or schizophrenia (which the crisis may
resemble) would be at a much earlier or later
time in life.
For some, an identity crisis is evidenced by no
more than somewhat erratic, highly charged
behavior, say, exaggerated antagonism against
parental standards or customs, or by a prolonged
period of seeming inactivity. Erikson calls this
kind of inactivity the "moratorium," a time dur-
ing which a person's self-image, his more or less
realistic appraisal of his potentialities, limits,
and allegiances, and, therefore, the way he
should live as an adult, all slowly consolidate.
Erikson's holistic approach to the question of
individual identity has contributed immeasur-
ably not only to the understanding of this com-
plex time of life, but also to the understanding
176 EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E.
of humankind in the context of whatever time
and space they inhabit. Philosophically, his ap-
proach to the unfolding of the future of man-
kind runs parallel to the model of his develop-
mental conflicts in individuals. Erik H. Erikson
is fully aware of the global dangers should mis-
trust prevail over trust, as in wars and other
inhumane actions, but even so he hopes that
the prevalence of trust over mistrust will help
mankind, as it does the individual, toward ma-
turity and survival.
MARIA W. PIERS AND
GENEVIEVE MILLET LANDAU
WORKS BY ERIKSON
(1950) 1964 Childhood and Society. 2d ed., rev. & enl.
New York: Norton.
(1958) 1962 Young Man Luther: A Study in Psycho-
analysis and History. New York: Norton.
(1959) 1967 Identity and the Life Cycle: Selected
Papers. Psychological Issues, Vol. 1, No. 1. New
York: International Universities Press.
1964 Insight and Responsibility. New York: Norton.
1968a Identity, Psychosocial. Volume 7, pages 61-65
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
ences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1968t> Identity: Youth and Crisis. New York: Norton.
1968c Life Cycle. Volume 9, pages 286-292 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1969 Ghandi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Non-
violence. New York: Norton.
1973 ERIKSON, ERIK H.; and NEWTON, HUEY P. In
Search of Common Ground. Edited by Kai T. Erik-
son. New York: Norton.
1974a ERIKSON, ERIK H. (editor) Challenge of Youth.
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
1974b Dimensions of the New Identity. New York:
Norton.
1975 Life History and the Historical Moment. New
York: Norton. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1977.
1977 Toys and Reasons: Stages in the Ritualization of
Experience. New York: Norton.
1978 ERIKSON, ERIK H. (editor) Adulthood. New
York: Norton.
1979 Elements of a Psychoanalytic Theory of Psycho-
sical Development. In Stanley I. Greenspan and
George H. Pollock (editors), The Course of Human
Life: Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Human Per-
sonality Development Throughout the Life Cycle.
Washington: National Institute of Mental Health.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
COLES, ROBERT 1970 Erik H. Erikson: The Growth
of His Work. Boston: Little, Brown.
DILLON, WILTON S. 1979 Coded Messages for Erik
Homburger Erikson and Joan Mowat Erikson on the
Eve of Their Presiding Over the Rituals of the In-
ternational Year of the Child at the Smithsonian
Colloquium, "Play and Inventiveness," May 23-24,
1979. Unpublished manuscript.
PIERS, MARIA W. (editor) 1972 Play and Develop-
ment: A Symposium. New York: Norton.
EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E.
Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard (1902-1973)
is a major figure in British social anthropology
who, along with Raymond Firth, Edmund Leach,
and Max Gluckman, dominated the immensely
productive and influential period of British field
work and theorization following World War n.
Evans-Pritchard was born in Crowborough,
Sussex, the son of John Evan Evans-Pritchard, a
clergyman of the Church of England, and his
wife, the former Dorothea Edwards. He attended
Winchester College (1916-1921) and Exeter
College (1921-1924), Oxford University, where
he took a B.A. in modern history. He did graduate
studies in anthropology at the London School of
Economics, where he received his PH.D. in 1927
and where he taught from 1928 to 1936.
Evans-Pritchard's thesis was based on his
field work among the Azande of the southern
Sudan, and he continued his work in this region
intermittently through 1938. In 1930 he made
his first visit to the Nuer, also of the southern
Sudan, and worked off and on with that people
until 1936. In 1935 he also prepared an
ethnographic survey of the Anuak of the south-
ern Sudan, and in 1937 a survey of the Luo of
Kenya. In 1932, while studying the Nuer, Evans-
Pritchard accepted the professorship of sociol-
ogy at Fuad i University of Cairo. Two years later
he resigned this post to become research lec-
turer in African sociology at Oxford Univer-
sity, a position he held from 1935 to 1940, dur-
ing the time when Oxford anthropology was
dominated by A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. In 1940
Evans-Pritchard enlisted in the army serving
first in Ethiopia and the Sudan, and later in the
Near East and north Africa, mainly in Cyrenaica,
Libya, leaving military service a major. During
his military duties he collected ethnographic
data, the most important being a study of the
Sanusi religious order among the bedouin of
Cyrenaica. While in Libya, Evans-Pritchard was
converted to Roman Catholicism, a decision
which some contend influenced his later work.
In 1945 Evans-Pritchard returned to England
to become reader in anthropology at Cambridge
University. In 1946 he became professor of so-
cial anthropology at Oxford University upon
Radcliffe-Brown's retirement. In 1970 he retired
from the chair at Oxford and was knighted the
following year.
Evans-Pritchard's own acknowledged teachers
were C. G. and B. Z. Seligman, to whom he
owed his initial interest in the peoples of the

Sudan. As a graduate student, he also took
courses with Bronislaw Malinowski and knew
and liked A. M. Hocart. He rejected Radcliffe-
Brown's quest for a science of society and his
somewhat simplistic functionalism, although he
may have owed to him some of his interest in
the French sociological tradition. While rarely
citing Malinowski in later life, Evans-Pritchard
may have in part derived from him his initial
interest in the nature of magic and his profound
commitment to an empiricism demanding pro-
longed field work. Evans-Pritchard's study of the
Azande was the first intensive study of an Afri-
can people by a trained social anthropologist.
Evans-Pritchard's intellectual roots lay in the
classic tradition: the interdependent influences
of the Scottish rationalists and their descendant,
William Robertson Smith, and those of the
French sociologists, such as Emile Durkheim and
his school. Evans-Pritchard's immensely influ-
ential writings on magic, witchcraft, and religion
derived from /kn enduring concern with ques-
tions about rationality and belief raised by James
George Frazer, Edward Burnett Tylor, Lucien
Levy-JBnml, Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, and Vil-
Pare to. Aside from the French school and
Pareto, Evans-Pritchard made few references to
other sociological classics or to American or con-
tinental anthropologists, and he rarely cited his
contemporaries. Much to his loss analytically,
Evans-Pritchard virtually ignored Max Weber
throughout his career, despite their common con-
cern with religious and political institutions or
their interest in history.
For Evans-Pritchard, ethnography was the
true measure of one's worth as an anthropologist.
He produced rich ethnographic accounts of two
African societies, the Azande and Nuer; an in-
novative historical study of an Islamic brother-
hood (Sanusi); a study of the Anuak; and nu-
merous briefer surveys and essays on other peo-
ples. Unlike many other anthropologists, Evans-
Pritchard never approached theory through the
parochial path of only one society.
Evans-Pritchard believed that the key problem
in cultural anthropology is translation (1965k).
This involves two complex, interrelated issues:
the difficulty of entering into the mental world
of an alien, exotic culture, and the problem of
making that world understandable and thereby
comparable to that of other societies, especially
in terms of modern Western thought. This prob-
lem occupied him throughout his career.
His first book on the Azande (1937) is one of
the most profoundly original and influential
EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. 777
studies in all social anthropology. Its value lies
in its uncommonly acute employment of rich
ethnographic data towards a usefully narrow,
yet profoundly important, set of sociological
ends. The questions had been raised before, but
no one had previously gone to the field to confirm
or refute the points involved. These issues re-
volved around the question of whether preliterate
peoples think as literate people do. Evans-
Pritchard's predecessors provided various an-
swers, but none did field work or utilized suffi-
cient data to sustain the arguments. Evans-
Pritchard's research provides a clear and ex-
tended exposition of the ideas behind Zande be-
liefs in witchcraft, magic, and sorcery. While
supplementary concepts such as those involving
gestation, kinship, and causation are also
brought in, Evans-Pritchard centers his attention
upon beliefs in the supernatural, precisely be-
cause such notions had elicited the greatest dis-
dain and misunderstanding from his predeces-
sors. He indicates the systematic, enclosed, and
self-perpetuating qualities of these ideas and
demonstrates how such views are consistent with
rational, workable, everyday experience. He fur-
ther indicates that these are no more open to
the onslaughts of alien criticism than are other
philosophical beliefs and religious faiths easily
vulnerable to the attacks of opposing believers
and atheists. In the course of his exposition,
Evans-Pritchard indicates how such notions sus-
tain and confirm the forms of authority and
power within a society. Not only does he main-
tain that allegedly irrational, exotic beliefs make
sense within the experience of a particular so-
ciety, but, conversely, that all societies hold
existential beliefs nearly impervious to the de-
mands of logic and consistency, as these are
more rigorously defined by the supposedly scien-
tifically minded. His study begins by presenting
the thought of one society; it proceeds to use
these data to re-evaluate and correct earlier an-
thropological conceptions about the nature of
thought in all preliterate societies; it ends by
implying that common features of rationality,
nonrationality, existential assumptions, and con-
ventional compartmentalization characterize all
thought systems everywhere. Never before had
the beliefs of a preliterate society been consid-
ered so carefully or with such empathy, yet
Winch (1964) has convincingly shown that
even this study reveals traces of ethnocen-
trism. For example, Evans-Pritchard denies that
witches exist, even though there is no way within
Zande thought that such existence can be dis-
 178 EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E.
proved, while his own disbelief requires a com-
mitment to our own Western assumptions, which
are different, but by no means necessarily more
rational than those of the Azande.
In his next important work, Evans-Pritchard
approached the problem of the sociology of
knowledge from a different perspective. His
study of Nuer time-reckoning (1939) provides
an account of the subtle and complex relations
between perceptions of time and space and their
connection with various aspects of social ex-
perience and needs. In part this is shown to be
the result of aspects of lineal and cyclical time
connected to seasonal events and personal ca-
reers. Such notions are demonstrated to extend
no further than their social utility requires for
providing a coherent mode for thinking about
both social solidarity and difference as required
by features of demography, economy, and politi-
cal affairs. For Evans-Pritchard, cosmologies are
thus bounded by the needs of society and extend
no further than are socially necessary in time
and space. Evans-Pritchard's data sustain a
Durkheimian view of knowledge, even though
he elsewhere wrote somewhat disparagingly of
both Durkheim's and Mauss's propositions on
such issues (1965&).
The Nuer (1940a) is undoubtedly Evans-
Pritchard's best-known book. It appeared in the
same year as his analysis of Anuak political in-
stitutions and African Political Systems (Fortes
& Evans-Pritchard 1940). These three works
revolutionized social anthropological research in
Africa and had a deep, although not entirely
beneficial, impact on the discipline. The Nuer
remains the classic exposition of a segmentary
system of acephalous lineages. Evans-Pritchard
opens the book by asking how a society can have
law and order without the conventional institu-
tions of government, such as chiefs, courts, and
police. The key again lies in an overarching sys-
tem of beliefs and values. The work subtly em-
phasizes the integrative aspects of conflict
(peace in the feud) and the changing relativity
of meaningful social alliances (fission and fu-
sion) expressed in terms of lineal affiliations.
Evans-Pritchard conceded (though never in
print) that the model derived largely from W.
Robertson Smith's Kinship and Marriage in Early
Arabia (1885). Although the work enabled many
subsequent fieldworkers to make sense out of the
social life of lineage based societies, it is un-
fortunate that the very brilliance of the model
seduced many into an oversimplification of
material which was sometimes forced into seg-
mentary schemes. While such models may have
proved useful, at least initially, for digesting
much of the African material, where kin and
political institutions are often closely connected,
these models obstructed insights into most soci-
eties in the Pacific and New World, where other
organizing principles are often at work. Such a
view even obscured some aspects of the actual
workings of societies in Africa, even among
pastoralists. Peters has produced the most telling
critique of such segmentary models (1967). The
best features of Evans-Pritchard's analysis of the
interconnections between political, kin, and re-
ligious beliefs are incisively combined in his
Frazer Lecture of 1948 on the Shilluk (1948,
in 1962).
In his second Nuer volume (1951a) Evans-
Pritchard examines Nuer kinship and marriage *
Although the weakest of the Nuer trilogy, it con-
tains extremely interesting expositions of Nuer
practices which were initially disarming to many
analysts: ghost marriage, woman-woman mar-
riage, and the levirate. The manner of exposition
derives much from Henry Sumner Maine, but is
considerably weakened by a restriction to nor-
mative, ideological explanations and a failure to
fit social actions within the varying details of
property, demography, and personal manipula-
tion. Women's roles in social life also receive
remarkably poor attention (Beidelman 1971),
nor are the complex relations between Nuer and
the neighboring Dinka adequately drawn (South-
all 1976).
Evans-Pritchard's final work on the Nuer
(1956) was the first scholarly study to present
the religious beliefs of a preliterate people in a
manner suggesting that these bear theological
significance and profundity comparable to the
religious thought of more complex societies.
Various aspects of Nuer religious beliefs—totem-
ism, classification, sacrifice, body symbolism-
are examined in many of their dimensions.
Evans-Pritchard's mastery of the French so-
ciological classics and his appreciation of Semitic
and biblical studies provide a useful framework
for his exposition of a system of normative ideas
and YaJues so that sophisticated theologians and
philosophers can cite this with relevance (Mac-
Intyre 1964). Despite its implicitly Durkheimian
position of presenting religious and cosmological
awareness as a refraction of social experience,
the monograph ends on a note of deferring to
theologians, an inconsistent position which some
have ascribed to Evans-Pritchard's own religious
sentiments. Nowhere in such later work is there

any substantial discussion of how religious or
other beliefs provide avenues of power and co-
ercion for certain groups or individuals, even
though Evans-Pritchard's own data and that of
other writers on the Nuer, including Paul Howell,
B. A. Lewis, and Father Crazzolara, suggest
otherwise (Beidelman 1971). Nor is there much
attempt to examine ritual or symbolism beyond
their manifest content (Levi-Strauss 1962;
Beidelman 1966; Beidelman 1968). In his later
survey of various sociological interpretations of
religion (1965&), Evans-Pritchard appears to re-
ject even those moderate sociological methods
he himself had put to such brilliant use in his
previous work.
Probably as an outcome of his earlier his-
torical training, Evans-Pritchard promoted the
historical perspective in British social anthro-
pology. Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski had left
British social anthropology preoccupied with
functional analysis and unable to appreciate
fully the advantages that historical material may
provide both for understanding contemporary
societies and for analyzing social change. Evans-
Pritchard's contribution to historical anthropol-
ogy has three aspects: (a) he revived interest
in oral history, his publications on Zande history
extending over his lifetime and culminating in
his penultimate book (1971); (Jb) his study of
the Sanusi (1949) combines the social percep-
tions of a social anthropologist trained in the
analysis of religion and politics in a pastoral
society with the study of events temporally using
oral and archival sources; (c) Evans-Pritchard
appreciated, as did increasingly some historians,
that epistemological problems posed by historical
studies closely resemble those confronting a com-
parative sociologist or anthropologist. Here,
again, his indifference to Weber as well as to
Marx is perplexing.
Few British anthropologists since Malinowski
have done more than Evans-Pritchard to elevate
the study of oral literature from neglect by social
anthropologists, who are preoccupied with social
structure. Evans-Pritchard stressed that texts be
studied as literature, his view being epitomized
in his analysis of ambiguity in Zande proverbs
(1956, c.f., 1962). Evans-Pritchard published a
large collection of Zande texts (e.g., 1967) and
in 1964 helped found the Oxford Library of Afri-
can Literature which has published many mono-
graphs by an international group of scholars.
Evans-Pritchard excelled in drawing attention
to topics for the most part ignored by his col-
leagues. He was the first to provide a truly
EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. 179
sociological analysis of the dance among primi-
tive societies (1928, in 1965a) and to write
thoughtfully about the social functions of ritual
obscenity (1929, in 1965a). He pioneered the
reconception of the functions of marriage pay-
ments and stressed the need for replacing the
term brideprice with bridewealth. He presented
the most searching and complex exposition of
concepts of marriage and paternity since Maine
and wrote the first sensible and detailed analysis
of the practice of blood brotherhood (1933, in
1962). Few anthropologists have displayed such
a wide range of interests combined with such a
wealth of rich and dependable ethnography.
Consider, for example, such diverse and unlikely
topics as how children are socialized into using
kin terms, rituals for twins, terms of address,
naming, deviant sexual behavior, iron working,
string games, onomatopoeia, and cannibalism
and its relation to nutrition.
It has often been remarked that it was Rad-
cliffe-Brown who resuscitated the French socio-
logical classics for social anthropologists; Evans-
Pritchard continued and extended this mission
not only by lecturing, but also by encouraging
the translation and publication in English of the
works of Durkheim, Mauss, Henri Hubert, Celes-
tine Bougie, Levy-Bruhl, Arnold van Gennep, and
others. It is to him initially that we owe a re-
newed appreciation of Robert Hertz, whose semi-
nal essays on death and body imagery exerted a
deep influence on Evans-Pritchard's own work.
Much can be learned by considering the man-
ner in which Evans-Pritchard presented his
work, both in terms of his style of writing and in
the strategy behind the forms, places, and sched-
ules of his publications. He published in an im-
mensely varied number of journals, from major
periodicals to obscure serials. This reflects his
own deep commitment to the catholicity of an-
thropological scholarship. His schedule of publi-
cations suggests a carefully considered plan
whereby each of his books was preceded by an
extended series of essays, sometimes over a dec-
ade, which presented either theoretical consider-
ations of a fairly narrow set of problems or ex-
position of valuable yet cumbersome supple-
mentary ethnography. When the book ultimately
appeared, the arguments initially advanced ac-
quired a polished, condensed form, and much
ethnographic detail, essential yet distracting
from the main thrust of the arguments, would
have been recorded elsewhere. This procedure
produced proportioned monographs, but ones
whose full significance requires considerable lit-
180 EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E.
erary and intellectual backtracking by scholarly
readers. Evans-Pritchard's style also merits con-
sideration, for while the prose is forceful, it is
also deceptively lucid, terms often being preg-
nant with ambiguities. His works rarely contain
summaries or conclusions indicating his points;
instead, his theories and reasoning flow modestly
within the narrative, and the analyses and con-
clusions must be searched out from the exposi-
tion. In this, his works conceal values which are
revealed only through intensive and repeated
consideration.
T. O. BEIDELMAN
WORKS BY EVANS-PRITCHARD
1937 Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the
Azande. Oxford: Clarendon. —» Foreword by C. G.
Seligman. An abridged paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1976.
1939 Nuer Time-reckoning. Africa 3:189-216. —> Re-
printed by Bobbs-Merrill as part of a reprint series
in 1966.
(1940a) 1963 The Nuer: A Description of the Modes
of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic
People. Oxford: Clarendon. —» A paperback edition
was published in 1968 by Oxford University Press.
1940b The Political System of the Anuak of the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan. London: Lund, Humphries. —> Pub-
lished for the London School of Economics and
Political Science. Reprinted by AMS in 1977.
(1940) 1958 FORTES, MEYER; and EVANS-PRITCHARD,
E. E. (editors) African Political Systems. Oxford
Univ. Press. —» Published for the International In-
stitute of African Languages & Cultures. A paper-
back edition was published in 1970.
(1949) 1954 The Sanusi of Cyrenaica. Oxford: Clar-
endon.
1951a Kinship and Marriage Among the Nuer. Oxford:
Clarendon.
1951b Social Anthropology. London: Cohen & West.
—> Reprinted with Essays in Social Anthropology
as a paperback by the Free Press in 1964.
1956 Nuer Religion. Oxford: Clarendon.
1962 Essays in Social Anthropology. London: Faber.
—> Reprinted with Social Anthropology as a paper-
back by the Free Press in 1964. Includes essays on
the divine king of the Shilluk, blood-brotherhood,
and Zande proverbs.
1965a The Position of Women in Primitive Societies,
and Other Essays in Social Anthropology. London:
Faber. —» Includes essays on obscenity and on the
dance.
1965b Theories of Primitive Religion. Oxford: Claren-
don. —> A paperback edition was published in 1966.
1967 EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. (editor) The Zande
Trickster. Oxford: Clarendon.
1971 The Azande: History and Political Institutions.
Oxford: Clarendon.
1974a EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. (compiler) A Bibli-
ography of the Writings of E. E. Evans-Pritchard.
Amended & corrected by T. O. Beidelman. London:
Tavistock.
1974b Man and Woman Among the Azande. London:
Faber.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BEATTIE, J. H. M.; and LIENHARDT, R. G. (editors)
1975 Studies in Social Anthropology: Essays in
Memory of E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Oxford: Claren-
don. —> See especially Louis Dumont's essay on the
Nuer.
BEIDELMAN, T. O. 1966 The Ox and Nuer Sacrifice.
Man New Series 1:453-467.
BEIDELMAN, T. O. 1968 Some Nuer Notions of Naked-
ness, Nudity, and Sexuality. Africa 38:113-132.
BEIDELMAN, T. O. (editor) 1971 The Translation of
Culture: Essays to E. E. Evans-Pritchard. London:
Tavistock. —> See especially the essays on Nuer kin-
ship by Kathleen Gough and on Nuer political lead-
ership by the editor.
BEIDELMAN, T. O. 1974 Sir Edward Evan Evans-
Pritchard (1902-1973): An Appreciation. Anthro-
pos 59:553-567.
GLUCKMAN, MAX 1955 Custom and Conflict in Af-
rica. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. —> Lucid populariza-
tion of some of Evans-Pritchard's ideas.
LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE 1962 Le totemisme aujourd'hui.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. —> An
English translation by Rodney Needham, Totemism,
was published as a paperback by Beacon in 1963.
LEVY-BRUHL, LUCIEN 1952 A Letter to E. E. Evans-
Pritchard. British Journal of Sociology 3:117-123.
LIENHARDT, R. G. 1974 E-P: A Personal View. Man
New Series 9:299-304.
MAC!NTYRE, ALASDAIR 1964 Is Understanding Re-
ligion Compatible with Believing? Pages 119—133 in
John Hick (editor), Faith and the Philosophers.
London: Macmillan.
PETERS, E. L. 1967 Some Structural Aspects of the
Feud among the Camel-herding Bedouin of Cy-
renaica. Africa 37:261-282.
SINGER, ANDRE,- and STREET, BRIAN V. (editors) 1972
Zande Themes: Essays Presented to Sir Edward
Evan Evans-Pritchard. Oxford: Blackwell.
SOUTHALL, AIDAN 1976 Nuer and Dinka are People:
Ecology, Ethnicity and Logical Possibility. Man
New Series 11:463-491.
WINCH, PETER 1964 Understanding a Primitive So-
ciety. American Philosophical Quarterly 1:307-324.
 FAIRBANK, JOHN K.
John K. Fairbank was born in South Dakota
in 1907 and educated at Phillips Exeter Acad-
emy, the University of Wisconsin, and Harvard
University. He received his Harvard A.B. in
1929, summa cum laude, in history. By this time,
he had already decided to pursue a scholarly
career and study the Chinese language and
Chinese-Western relations. The turn to scholar-
ship was based soundly on a brilliant academic
career, but the turn to China was at that time an
almost unilateral aberration for a professional
historian. Certainly most academics in 1929
would have considered an investment in Chinese
language and history a hazardous undertaking
for anyone interested in a university professor-
ship. That Fairbank used his Rhodes scholarship
first at Balliol College, Oxford, and then in
Peking, China, to study nineteenth-century Chi-
nese relations with the West was at least in part
a response to intellectual trends of that time.
Fairbank's professional interest in China was
aroused by C. K. Webster, who suggested to a
Harvard audience in 1929 that new documenta-
tion on China's foreign relations would presum-
ably throw light on the "ominous problem of
east Asia." The idea fell on fertile soil. Fairbank
was one of the first to take advantage of China's
decision to publish the 130 volumes of docu-
ments on its foreign relations from 1836 to
1874—the Ch'ou Pan I Wu Shih Mo. At the same
time Webster was clearly reacting to stirrings
in American intellectual life.
American neglect of east Asian studies had
been pointed out by Paul S. Reinsch when he
was president of the American Political Science
Association just after World War i. However,
little was done until 1928, when the American
Oriental Society came out in favor of promoting
scientific Sinological research, and the Library
of Congress initiated a division of Chinese liter-
ature, of which Arthur Hummel became di-
rector. About the same time Harvard announced
the establishment of the Harvard-Yenching In-
stitute. Very active in helping to create a favor-
able climate for American scholarship on Asia
were Edward C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific
Relations and Mortimer Graves and Waldo G.
Leland of the American Council of Learned
Societies (ACLS).
The foundations for an independent Ameri-
can approach to east Asian studies were being
laid, therefore, during Fairbank's Harvard years.
Several universities had for some time offered
serious courses on China. American missionary
Sinologues and officials such as Elijah Coleman
Bridgman, Samuel Wells Williams, W. A. P. Mar-
tin, Arthur H. Smith, Justus Doolittle, William
W. Rickhill, and Edward T. Williams had made
substantial contributions to scholarship; some
had held chairs in leading universities. But
there was no professional academic standing
for studies of China or Japan in any of the
disciplines. Surveys made in 1928 showed that
east Asia was far from being neglected as far as
curriculum was concerned, but there were no
American professionals in the field. In 1929 the
ACLS set up standing committees for the pro-
motion of Chinese and Japanese studies. The
committees took on the task of stimulating the
production of research tools and the provision
181
 182 FAIRBANK, JOHN K.
of fellowships to train scholars in these fields.
At the same time the nationalist revolution in
China, which brought Chiang Kai-shek to power,
increased interest in that land. The age of
American scholarship on east Asia had begun.
Fairbank's interest in China at this time was
well within the framework of conventional dip-
lomatic history. It was not political. At Oxford
University he met Hosea B. Morse, who had
been with the Chinese Maritime Customs Ser-
vice and was author of The International Rela-
tions of the Chinese Empire (1910-1918). Fair-
bank found a thesis subject that combined
Chinese with Western sources—a study of Brit-
ish policy in relation to the origin of the Chinese
Imperial Maritime Customs Service, later to be-
come his Trade and Diplomacy on the China
Coast (1953). The influence of Morse was that
of a scholar, as Fairbank put it, devoted to the
ideal of scrupulous, impartial, and accurate
presentation of the facts. T. F. Tsiang, the Chi-
nese scholar who in a sense had launched all
this activity by telling Webster about the new
Chinese documentation, was a man of the same
qualities as Morse in the field of scholarship. He
was generous in his help to any scholar of what-
ever nationality who wished to work with Chinese
materials. For Fairbank's needs while he lived
in Peking, Tsiang had no equal. By the time Fair-
bank was appointed to the Harvard faculty in
1936, he had produced a study that was a model
of Anglo-American historical scholarship. The
pattern had been set.
Fairbank was one of the first to be aware that
China must be analyzed as a society in its own
right and that it was a society different in kind,
rather than in degree, from our own. He was
aware of the insights of German scholarship, of
Max Weber and Karl A. Wittfogel in particular,
and of the large theoretical concepts that these
scholars produced. He acknowledged the debt,
but he was cautious of Germanic world views.
Bodies of theory, he said, are not magic formu-
las, but are broad avenues of approach that af-
ford new insights into Chinese social behavior.
In his view it was fundamental that all such
theories assume that the record of events is
basic to our understanding; conceptual schemes
can inspire and guide research but are not
meant to substitute for it. The moral? Our un-
derstanding of China must await painstaking
monographic research. Exactly, but research
without concepts?
Such a view of historical method and theory
was common among American historians of the
period. It was not an area in which Fairbank
came up with innovative ideas, in spite of his
effort to identify new categories, such as "syn-
archy"—joint rule by two or more parties. His
main intellectual contribution to the discipline
of history was to overcome its ethnocentricity,
to push it in the direction of absorbing the great
independent self-regenerating civilization of
China and eventually the whole non-Western
world. He helped change the course of American
scholarship on China with his illumination,
through the use of Chinese documentation, of
the role of the imperial court in the institutional
development of the maritime customs.
In drawing attention to the urgency of under-
standing Chinese society, Fairbank pressed for
the participation of the social sciences in that
task. He was hospitable to theories of Chinese
society, whatever their origin, but was not al-
ways quite sure where to place them. His insis-
tence that the historian must proceed with his
monographic work, steadily inscribing the rec-
ord of events, was sound enough as far as it
went. But the conventional training of the his-
torian could not fully cope with the new pres-
sures arising from the study of non-Western
societies and the urgency of enlisting the aid of
other disciplines, some of which were reluctant
to give up their ethnocentrism. Some, in fact,
held the view that ethnocentrism was the nec-
essary basis of their theoretical position. Fair-
bank was aware of the theoretical stirrings in
the social sciences as well as in the discipline
of history, but this was not an area in which
he felt obligated to contribute. He stayed with
the muse of history as he knew her, took her to
China, brought her home, and settled himself
down with that grand old mother of the disci-
plines. That is sufficient for one lifetime.
The growth of serious academic interest in
the non-Western world other than the Near East
took a great deal of time, money, and power.
Considerable forces in the American academic
world were moving in this direction by 1928,
and Fairbank benefited from their support
during the 1930s. But important traditional aca-
demic forces were also indifferent or antago-
nistic to the new intellectual trends. The devel-
opment of east Asian studies in particular and
non-Western studies in general was neither easy
nor inevitable. It is a matter of record that Fair-
bank, on the local scene at Harvard, on the
national and eventually on the international

scene, made a forceful and distinguished con-
tribution to this development.
In evaluating the contribution that Fairbank
and others made to American scholarship, one
must remember that interest in east Asia had
for long been limited to the colonial and com-
mercial interests of the major powers. It was
the object, not the subject of academic interest.
These attitudes were certainly changing, even in
the 1920s, but there was not yet an independent
American tradition; European influence was still
strong. The French school, represented by Serge
Elissieff, emphasized the textual approach to
Sinology and Japanology and commanded the
prestige and resources of the Harvard—Yenching
Institute.
Many thought the institute was dead weight
as far as the growth of modern Asian studies
was concerned. The school of history to which
Fairbank belonged, still strongly Europe-cen-
tered and Anglophile (e.g., Webster and William
L. Langer), stressed the "scientific" use of docu-
mentation and was as suspicious of recent his-
tory as it was of other disciplines. But it pro-
vided the bridge, as it were, over which Fairbank
made a professionally acceptable transition first
to the inclusion of societies as independent en-
tities, and finally to academic respectability for
the contemporary scene. While the battle had
to be won at Harvard if Fairbank were to have
credibility elsewhere, it is to his credit that he
put so much energy into the development of the
field nationally, realizing presumably that the
one strengthened the other. It is amazing that so
much was achieved before 1941, when Fairbank
moved to Washington, where he worked with
the Office of Strategic Services and later with
the Office of War Information during World
War ii.
The war took most of the country's Asian ex-
perts away from their universities, but the
ACLS, with Fairbank always in the wings,
plugged away with plans for the future. By the
time the war was over it was obvious, of course,
that the United States had to be serious about
the study of the non-Western world. It was now
possible to take advantage of the advances that
had been made in the teaching of foreign lan-
guages, especially the contemporary colloquial.
The climate for language and area studies was
so propitious as a result of wartime training that
it was possible to establish a Far Eastern Asso-
ciation (later to become the Association of Asian
Studies) to promote the study of non-Western
FAIRBANK, JOHN K. 183
societies and to keep together the many dis-
ciplines that had become involved in that enter-
prise. Fairbank played his part in establishing
and fostering this mass organization.
Right after the war, the Social Science Re-
search Council took the leadership in the crucial
task of defining the academic role of area stud-
ies. An SSRC committee on world area studies,
chaired by Robert Hall, the Michigan geogra-
pher, recommended that language and area
studies be included in M.A. degree requirements,
that there be at least five disciplines represented
(with one of them to be stressed), and that all
PH.D. degrees were to be given in the discipline
departments. Area studies were not to be sepa-
rate disciplines. Fairbank played no particular
role in this activity, but accepted, as did the rest
of the field and the foundations, the SSRC guide-
lines. The American academic world, with the
help first of the Rockefeller and Carnegie and
later the Ford foundations was now on its way;
today the sun does not set on American scholar-
ship.
It is not surprising that when the challenge to
become better acquainted with mainland China
arose in 1959 Fairbank was in the front ranks
of those who wanted to face it head on. He
turned first to the Association for Asian Studies,
a body that had been an appropriate instrument
for many purposes, but when it became clear
that not everyone thought it best for this par-
ticular goal, he turned to the SSRC, which set
up, with the ACLS, a joint committee on con-
temporary China on which Fairbank served for
several years.
Fairbank's contribution to American scholar-
ship has been substantial. Intellectually he stood
out among historians in his grasp of the signifi-
cance of east Asian societies and among social
scientists for his understanding of the need for
interdisciplinary cooperation. He was active,
with others, in helping to formulate the ways
and means to shift academic attention on a
national rather than a single institutional basis;
thus he helped to prepare the way for the major
foundations to participate in the development
of area studies after World War n. He was
active on all fronts, including the political, the
most controversial of all and the most difficult
to interpret. There was a debt perhaps to the
La Follette Progressive movement in his champi-
onship of civil liberties and his strong anti-imperi-
alism and more than a dash of populism in his
interpretation of the Communist takeover of
184 FELLMAN, DAVID
China as a case of the Kuomintang betraying
the "revolution." He tended to believe that the
Communist party had inherited the leadership
of the "revolution" because it was closer to the
"people," a view that never commanded unani-
mous support. It explains both why the govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China thought
of him as a friend and why its leaders did not
quite understand the roots of his intellectual
and political composition. Their alleged interest
in the "people" is instrumental, whereas Fair-
bank's was as genuine as it was inappropriate
to the analysis of international affairs.
GEORGE E. TAYLOR
WORKS BY FAIRBANK
1942 WILSON, HOWARD E.; BORG, DOROTHY; FAHS,
CHARLES B.; and FAIRBANK, JOHN K. American Ed-
ucation and the Far East. Educational Record 23:
5-14.
1946 Our Chances in China. Atlantic Monthly 178,
no. 3:37-42.
1950 FAIRBANK, JOHN K.; and Liu, KWANG-CHING
(editors) Modern China: A Bibliographic Guide to
Chinese Works, 1898-1937. Harvard-Yenching In-
stitute Studies, No. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press.
(1952) 1970 FAIRBANK, JOHN K. (editor) Ch'ing Docu-
ments: An Introductory Syllabus. 3d ed. 2 vols.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. —» Volume
1: Introductory Notes and Appendices. Volume 2:
Chinese Texts.
1952 BRANDT, CONRAD; SCHWARTZ, BENJAMIN I.; and
FAIRBANK, JOHN K. A Documentary History of
Chinese Communism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press; London: Allen & Unwin.
1953 Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The
Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854. 2 vols.
Harvard Historical Studies, Nos. 62-63. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1954a TENG, SSU-YU; and FAIRBANK, JOHN K. China's
Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-
1923. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1954& TENG, SSU-YU; and FAIRBANK, JOHN K. Research
Guide for "China's Response to the West: A Docu-
mentary Survey, 1839-1923." Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press.
1954 FAIRBANK, JOHN K.; and BANNO, MASATAKA
Japanese Studies of Modern China: A Bibliographi-
cal Guide to Historical and Social Science Re-
search on the Nineteenth and Tzventieth Centuries.
Tokyo and Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle. —» A paperback
edition was published by Harvard University Press
in 1970.
1957 FAIRBANK, JOHN K. (editor) Chinese Thought
and Institutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. —» A
volume in the series Comparative Studies in Cul-
tures and Civilizations. A paperback edition was
published in 1967.
1960 REISCHAUER, EDWIN O.; and FAIRBANK, JOHN K.
East Asia.- The Great Tradition. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin. —> Volume 1 of A History of East Asian
Civilization.
1965 FAIRBANK, JOHN K.; REISCHAUER, EDWIN O.; and
CRAIG, ALBERT M. East Asia: The Modern Trans-
formation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. —> Volume
two of A History of East Asian Civilization.
1967 China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the
U.S.A. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap. —•» See espe-
cially Fairbank's preface "On the Uses of China
Specialists."
1968 FAIRBANK, JOHN K. (editor) The Chinese World
Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations. Har-
vard East Asian Series, No. 32. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press.
1969 FAIRBANK, JOHN K.; and WIDMER, ELLEN An
Unauthorized Digest of L. A. Bereznii, A Critique of
American Bourgeois Historiography on China:
Problems of Social Development in the Nineteenth
and Early Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge: East
Asian Research Center, Harvard University.
(1973) 1977 FAIRBANK, JOHN K.; REISCHAUER, EDWIN
O.; and CRAIG, ALBERT M. East Asia: Tradition and
Transformation. 2d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BEREZNII, L. A. 1968 A Critique of American Bour-
geois Historiography on China: Problems of Social
Development in the Nineteenth and Early Twen-
tieth Centuries. Leningrad Univ. Press. —» For a
digest of this volume, see Fairbank & Widmer 1969.
BETHELL, JOHN 1972 China Revisited: Mr. Fairbank
Tells About His Trip. Harvard Bulletin 75, no. 1:
17-18.
Cogitations of a Spy 1950 New Times 3, Jan. 18:23
only.
FEUERWERKER, ALBERT; MURPHEY, RHOADS; and WRIGHT,
MARY C. (editors) 1967 Approaches to Modern
Chinese History. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ.
of California Press.
GORDON, LEONARD H. D.; and CHANG, SIDNEY 1970
John K. Fairbank and His Critics in the Republic
of China. Journal of Asian Studies 30:137-149.
GORDON, LEONARD H. D.; and CHANG, SIDNEY 1970
Notes on People: Dr. John K. Fairbank. New York
Times, May 24, p. 60.
KRIVTSOV, V. A. 1973 Influences of Confucianism
on Current Maoism. Problems of the Far East 3:
73-86.
LUKIN, V. P. 1973 Current China: How It Is Seen in
the United States. Questions of Philosophy 2:130
only.
MORSE, HOSEA B. (1910-1918) 1964 The Interna-
tional Relations of the Chinese Empire. 3 vols.
New York: Paragon.
FELLMAN, DAVID
David Fellrnan, born in Omaha, Nebraska, in
1907, retired in 1978 from 45 years of teaching
public law at the universities of Nebraska and
Wisconsin. A political scientist, Fellman carried
forward established traditions of public law by
emphasizing authoritative rulings of appellate
courts to elucidate his concerns for civil rights
and liberties. He advanced these substantive in-
terests through graduate and undergraduate
teaching, as an adviser to public officials, par-
ticularly in Wisconsin, activity in the Wisconsin
Civil Liberties Union, and dedication to the work
of the American Association of University Pro-
fessors. He was Vilas professor of political sci-

ence at the University of Wisconsin at Madison
when he retired from active teaching.
Fellman's teaching and writing, his profes-
sional and public careers, grew out of a thought-
ful commitment to principles of constitutional
democracy. Treasuring a humane and liberal
polity, he believed democracy "a method for ar-
riving at decisions in the area of governmental
activity" rather than a set of solutions. In sum,
"democracy is thus mainly a method of avoiding
violence by arriving at essentially tentative so-
lutions to social conflicts through argument,
persuasion, compromise and votes" (1966Z?).
The fact that his writings were concerned
chiefly with case law should not obscure his
dedication to and interest in political parties,
majority rule, and elected leaders like Senator
Norris (1946). More than his younger con-
temporaries in the field of public law in political
science after 1950, Fellman relied upon the
liberal political theory of the utilitarians and the
judicial opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Louis D. Brandeis, Harlan F. Stone, Robert H.
Jackson, and Felix Frankfurter in taking stands.
He assumed constitutional law
must take chances because the best it can do is to
discover points of equilibrium or balance between
competing ideas, desires, needs or interests. This
has been a central theme of American constitutional
law. Our political system is a democracy, and our
constitutional law is therefore an instrument of
our democracy. Our democracy is basically a collec-
tive bargaining society and the judicial branch of
government is one of the great instruments through
which agreement is reached. It follows that our con-
stitutional law rejects fanaticism or extremism and
tends to move to the middle of the road. (1966b)
Many of Fellman's detailed studies of case
law were aimed at understanding and urging
the protection of the disadvantaged. In one of
his earliest published studies, he deplored the
tendency in American law to narrow the alien's
right to work, believing it contradicted the aspi-
ration of a truly modern civilization (1938).
This impulse led him to make several of the
most searching studies of the rights of defen-
dants in his time ([1958] 1976; 19660). Yet
Fellman saw these rights in terms of the broad
aims of a civilized society, and thus he wrote
that "due process of law is not, primarily, the
right of the accused. It is basically the com-
munity's assurance that prosecutors, judges,
and juries will behave properly within rules
distilled from long centuries of concrete ex-
perience. For procedural safeguards are abso-
FELLMAN, DAVID 185
lutely essential for justice. In fact, in large
measure justice is fair procedure" ([1958] 1976,
p. 6).
Fellman's innovations and receptivity to novel
approaches by others are important attributes
assessing his career in political science. He
was among the first to see how the business of
the Supreme Court after World War n would be
dominated by issues of civil liberties and civil
rights. At the University of Wisconsin, he was
a pioneer in introducing these subjects in the
late 1940s, both in the undergraduate curricu-
lum and in graduate seminars designed to ex-
plore narrower topics among these issues. In
guiding graduate students, Fellman set high
standards of style, rigor, and craftsmanship
while leaving open subjects to be addressed and
methods to be employed. Beginning in 1950
several of his students made in-depth studies
of interest groups in particular litigation, con-
tributing to the burgeoning interest in the
judicial process (Cortner 1964; Manwaring
1962; Vose 1959). His support for eclecticism
in the discipline was also exemplified by his
acceptance for publication of many articles with
a behaviorist orientation while he was the
founding editor of the Midwest Journal of Politi-
cal Science.
Although Fellman's methods of analysis in
public law have been consistent, the subjects
he has addressed include all aspects of free ex-
pression, religious and academic freedom, racial
equality, and freedom of association, as well as
the rights of defendants. His many publications
on decided cases in state supreme courts, as
well as the Supreme Court of the United States,
extended the style, quality, and approach of
such scholars as Ernst Freund, Thomas Reed
Powell, and Edward S. Corwin. Fellman also
brought to his craft a deep knowledge of Amer-
ican political thought derived in part from his
teacher at Yale University, Francis W. Coker.
Fellman's expressed concern for academic
freedom resulted in his appointments as chair-
man of committee A of the American Associa-
tion of University Professors for five years
(1960-1964), national president (1964-1966),
and chairman of the AAUP Legal Defense Fund
(1975-1976). Applying his view of public law
to this subject, Fellman believed the indepen-
dence of scholars from college trustees and ad-
ministrators was parallel to that of judges from
those who appoint them. Concerned with the
humblest, most provincial campuses in Ameri-
can higher education, Fellman exerted himself
186 FIRTH, RAYMOND
and the AAUP to protect individual scholars
through written rules of tenure and procedure,
grievance procedures, and public censorship of
wayward institutions.
Fellman's scholarship on a range of civil
liberties conflicts continues since his retirement
from the classroom.
CLEMENT E. VOSE
WORKS BY FELLMAN
1938 The Alien's Right to Work. Minnesota Law Re-
view 22:137-176.
1942 Property in Colonial Political Theory. Temple
University Law Quarterly 16:388-406.
1944 Some Consequences of Increased Federal Activity
in Law Enforcement. Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 35, May-June: 16-33.
1945 What Is Liberalism? Prairie Schooner 19:204-
218.
1946 The Liberalism of Senator Norris. American Po-
litical Science Review 40:27-51.
1947 Federalism. American Political Science Review
41:1142-1160. —> Part of a symposium, consisting
of six articles, entitled "Ten Years of the Supreme
Court: 1937-1947."
1949-1961 Constitutional Law. American Political
Science Review. —* Eleven annual reviews of eleven
terms of the Supreme Court of the United States in
volumes 43, 47-55 of the American Political Science
Review.
1950a Negroes and Federal Courts. Prairie Schooner
24:409-421.
1950& Separation of Church and State in the United
States: A Summary Review. Wisconsin Law Review
1950:427-478.
1951 The Supreme Court as Protector of Civil Rights:
Freedom of Expression. American Academy of Po-
litical and Social Science, Annals 275:61-74.
1952 Disloyalty: Who Shall Decide? Virginia Quarterly
Review 28:277-282.
1957 The Censorship of Books. Madison: Univ. of Wis-
consin Press.
(1958) 1976 The Defendant's Rights Today. Rev. ed.
Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. —>First pub-
lished as The Defendant's Rights.
(1959) 1973 The Limits of Freedom. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
1960-1964 Report of Committee A. American Associa-
tion of University Professors, Bulletin. —> Five re-
ports by Fellman as chairman of committee A on
academic freedom and tenure.
196la Academic Freedom in American Law. Wisconsin
Law Review 1961:3 only.
1961b Constitutional Rights of Association. Supreme
Court Review 1961:74 only.
1963 The Constitutional Right of Association. Univ. of
Chicago Press.
1965 Religion in American Public Law. Boston Univ.
Press.
1966a The Defendant's Rights Under English Law.
Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press.
1966& The Essential Nature of Constitutional Law.
Pages 525-557 in Morris D. Forkosch (editor), Es-
says in Legal History in Honor of Felix Frankfurter.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
1968 Adjudication: I. Domestic Adjudication. Volume
1, pages 43-49 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
1973 Academic Freedom. Volume 1, pages 9-17 in
Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Se-
lected Pivotal Ideas. Edited by Philip P. Wiener.
New York: Scribners.
1975 The Separation of Powers and the Judiciary. Re-
view of Politics 37:357-376.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CORTNER, RICHARD C. 1964 The Wagner Act Cases.
Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press.
MANWARING, DAVID R. 1962 Render Unto Caesar:
The Flag-salute Controversy. Univ. of Chicago Press.
VOSE, CLEMENT E. 1959 Caucasians Only: The Su-
preme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Coven-
ant Cases. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
FIRTH, RAYMOND
Raymond William Firth was born in 1901
near Auckland, New Zealand; he was educated
at Auckland Grammar School and Auckland Uni-
versity College. Since 1932 he has resided in
England, but he preserves his links with New
Zealand relatives. The unpretentious style of
living and the no-nonsense rationalism which
have been characteristic of Firth throughout his
academic life have their roots in the modest
simplicity of his colonial background.
At Auckland University College Firth special-
ized in economics, and his first publication was a
short monograph on the economics of the kauri-
gum industry (1924). In 1924, he came to
England to work for a higher degree in econom-
ics at the London School of Economics (L.S.E.);
his planned field of research was the frozen
meat industry of New Zealand. At that time,
Bronislaw Malinowski had just been appointed
to a readership at the University of London, ten-
able at the L.S.E. Malinowski's various writings
on the kula exchange system prevailing in the
archipelagoes of eastern New Guinea had been
published between 1920 and 1922, and had
aroused great interest among economic histori-
ans, notably R. H. Tawney, who was at that time
an influential member of the L.S.E. academic
staff. It was probably a combination of Tawney's
breadth of vision concerning the scope of eco-
nomics, Malinowski's personal magnetism, and
Firth's long standing interest in the ethnography
and archeology of the New Zealand Maori which
led Firth to change the topic of his PH.D. disser-
tation to The Primitive Economics of the New
Zealand Maori. It was completed in 1927 and
published as a book in 1929.
This thesis, written under Malinowski's super-
vision, is based on bookwork rather than field

work—that is to say, the facts of Maori ethnog-
raphy derive from published records concerning
the "traditional" society rather than from first-
hand inquiry among present-day Maori. Malin-
owski's influence on Firth's general reading in
anthropology can be seen from the bibliography,
where more than three-quarters of the entries in
the general non-Maori section are in German
and refer to authors of whom Malinowski ap-
proved. The extension to this bibliography which
appears in the substantially revised edition pub-
lished in 1959 reflects not only the expansion
of the field of economic anthropology, largely as
a response to Firth's own activities, but also the
extent to which Firth's anthropological vision
had broadened out once he was free of the re-
stricting influence of Malinowski.
During the decade 1925 to 1935, Malinow-
ski's celebrated graduate seminar became a mag-
net for young scholars of the most diverse back-
grounds. Embryo anthropologists who were ei-
ther regular or occasional participants included
E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Raymond W. Firth, Isaac
Schapera, Audrey I. Richards, Meyer Fortes, Reo
F. Fortune, Ian Hogbin, and Gregory Bateson.
From the start, Firth stood closest to Malinowski,
and his subsequent achievements reflect most
clearly the goals that Malinowski presented to
his students. The memorial volume to Malinow-
ski which Firth edited is an enduring expression
of Firth's indebtedness to his mentor (1957).
After obtaining his PH.D. Firth returned to
New Zealand, where he prepared his thesis for
publication and planned what proved to be one
of the most important anthropological field trips
ever undertaken. This was his 1928 visit to the
tiny island of Tikopia, which is geographically
located within the Solomon Islands, though its
population, then numbering approximately thir-
teen hundred, are of Polynesian race and cul-
ture. Firth made further, briefer visits in 1952
and 1966.
Firth's first three publications concerning
Tikopia were a general field report and a paper
on "Totemism in Polynesia" which appeared in
the first volume of Oceania (1930-1931, re-
printed in [1930-1931] 1967, chapters 1, 11),
and a paper entitled "Marriage and the Classi-
ficatory System of Relationship" which first ap-
peared in the Journal of the Royal Anthropolog-
ical Institute (1930, in 1964, chapter 4). The
first major monograph, We, the Tikopia (1936k),
was concerned with kinship organization. Since
then Tikopia has been the subject of five further
monographs (1939; 1940; 1959b; 1961; 1970),
FIRTH, RAYMOND 187
an essay collection (1967), and a score of un-
collected articles.
Although these writings add up to a truly for-
midable achievement, Firth's Tikopia studies
have had less impact on the development of an-
thropological thinking than their bulk might
suggest. Firth's written style is sometimes florid,
but seldom elegant. His closely packed para-
graphs make no concessions to the novice reader.
He hardly ever resorts to diagrammatic simpli-
fication of the argument; indeed he is opposed
in principle to model building or reductionism in
any form. Firth's general view of the nature of
culture remains close to that of Malinowski, but
whereas the latter, while stressing the involuted
complexity of the "system as a whole," implied
that the functional implications of cultural con-
ventions are mutually consistent, Firth's em-
phasis is on the inconsistencies. He presents his
individual Tikopian as faced with a dense mesh
of alternative avenues of cultural expression.
Faced with such choices the individual makes de-
cisions and it is this process of decision making
within a cultural matrix that Firth claims to be
able to analyze in his numerous writings on the
theme of social organization. But Firth's reader
has to work hard to understand what is being
said.
On returning from the field, Firth joined the
staff of the department of anthropology at the
University of Sydney, which was then headed by
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. Firth was active as edi-
torial promoter of the newly established journal
Oceania, which was based in the Sydney depart-
ment. He was acting head of the department in
1931/1932.
Firth then returned to London to take up a
post under Malinowski at the L.S.E. He had the
status of lecturer from 1932 to 1935, and reader
from 1935 to 1944. Malinowski died in the
United States in 1942 and Firth was appointed
to a full professorship in his stead in 1944.
In the immediate prewar period, Firth was a
particularly active member of the Royal Anthro-
pological Institute of which he was honorary sec-
retary from 1936 to 1939. He was president
from 1953 to 1955 and has played a prominent
role in the institute's affairs ever since.
In 1938, Firth completed the text of Primitive
Polynesian Economy (1939), which is wholly
devoted to Tikopia. Firth describes it as "in a
sense a supplement to my Primitive Economics
of the New Zealand Maori (1929)," and his next
enterprise was designed as a further supple-
ment. The idea was to study the economics of a
188 FIRTH, RAYMOND
community still relatively "primitive" in terms of
technological organization, but which was
caught up in the world-wide monetary system
and international trade in a way that the "tradi-
tional" Maori and the Tikopia were not.
In late 1939, Firth and his wife Rosemary
Upcott, daughter of Sir Gilbert Upcott, embarked
on field research in a fishing community in
Trengganu on the northeast coast of the Malay
Peninsula. The research was partially frustrated
by the outbreak of World War n, but it resulted
in a major monograph by Firth, Malay Fisher-
men: Their Peasant Economy (1946), and an
additional volume, Housekeeping Among Malay
Peasants (1943), written by his wife. Firth
made brief return visits to Malaya in 1947
and 1963, and the 1966 revision of his book is
substantially enlarged.
During the war, the L.S.E. was evacuated to
Cambridge, where Firth was also posted in a
subcenter of the Naval Intelligence Division of
the British Admiralty, which was run by the
geographer H. C. Darby and which was respon-
sible for the production of a series of geograph-
ical handbooks designed as tools for the con-
tingency planning of naval operations through-
out the world. Firth was the principal compiler
and editor of the four volumes of this series
which relate to the Pacific islands. Originally is-
sued as internal Admiralty documents in 1943,
1944, and 1945, they became more generally
available ten years later. Much of the informa-
tion which they contain would still be hard to
obtain from any other source (Great Britain
. . . 1943-1945).
As the war progressed, the British authorities
began to consider the effects that the war would
have on the far-flung British colonial empire.
While few people foresaw the rapidity of post-
war colonial dissolution, there was a widespread
appreciation that radical changes were impend-
ing. Yet it was apparent that in many of the
colonial dependencies sensible planning for the
future was hopelessly prejudiced by a basic lack
of information concerning fundamental social
and economic facts. Through his work on the
Admiralty handbooks, Firth understood the
seriousness of these gaps in information and he
actively promoted a consciousness of this situa-
tion in government circles. The outcome was the
formation in 1944 of the Colonial Social Science
Research Council, of which Firth was the first
secretary. In the immediate postwar period an
immense amount of really first-class anthropo-
logical research was carried out under the aus-
pices of the British Colonial Office on the recom-
mendations of this body. Its successor, the cen-
trally financed Social Science Research Council,
of which Firth was again a founding member,
continues to be the principal agency for funding
the field research of British social anthro-
pologists.
By the end of 1945, the L.S.E. had been re-
established in London, and Firth took on the full
responsibility for running Malinowski's former
department, which he chaired until his retire-
ment in 1968. During much of this period he
was the guide and sponsor of an ambitious long-
term project to study, by the methods of social
anthropology, the operations of kinship in urban
settings in London. The publications which have
resulted from this enterprise were disappointing
(1956; Firth, Hubert, & Forge 1969).
Firth has subsequently been a visiting pro-
fessor at universities in the United States, Can-
ada, and New Zealand. Earlier in his career, he
was a visitor at the Australian National Univer-
sity at Canberra, where he played a leading part
in the discussions that led to the establishment
of the important chair of anthropology and so-
ciology in the Research School of Pacific Studies.
Since 1965, Firth has accumulated a notable
string of honorary degrees, has been a fellow of
the British Academy since 1949, and was
awarded a knighthood in 1973.
In postwar Britain, the number of graduate
students working for research degrees in social
anthropology grew rapidly, and before long a
vigorous rivalry developed between the two lead-
ing centers, Firth's department at the L.S.E.,
which became the stronghold of a slightly modi-
fied Malinowskian orthodoxy, and the Institute
of Social Anthropology at Oxford, which was first
directed by Radcliffe-Brown, Malinowski's long
standing rival, and later by Evans-Pritchard. At
a later date, the preeminence of the L.S.E. was
challenged by the creation of a vigorous new
department at the University of Manchester,
under the leadership of Max Gluckman, and by
the success of Meyer Fortes in reviving the for-
tunes of the long established, but languishing,
department at Cambridge University. There was
also a veritable mushroom growth of lesser in-
stitutions. By the early 1960s, social anthropol-
ogy, which had been virtually an L.S.E. monop-
oly as late as 1939, was being taught in at least
18 different universities in the British Isles.
In intellectual terms, Firth responded nega-
tively to the new styles of anthropological pre-
sentation represented in the work of Evans-

Pritchard, Fortes, Gluckman, and their students,
but he recognized, more clearly than some of
his senior colleagues, that despite their different
approaches to the Durkheimian notion of the
functional interdependence of institutions, the
various emergent cliques of social anthropolo-
gists all had a great deal in common. Moreover
he saw very clearly that, in the new postwar
circumstances, the miniscule private trust funds
through which most British anthropological re-
search had been funded prior to 1939 would
prove wholly inadequate. He also recognized that
if social anthropologists were to gain access to
the much more substantial resources at the dis-
posal of the government research councils, they
would have to demonstrate some degree of cor-
porate identity. The point was not lost on his
Oxford opponents and in 1946 all of the profes-
sional social anthropologists in the country—still
numbering fewer than a score—met together at
the L.S.E. to form the Association of Social An-
thropologists of the Commonwealth, with Rad-
cliffe-Brown as its first chairman. In 1962,
Firth, then chairman of the association, took the
initiative that led to the important international
conference of social anthropologists held in
Cambridge in 1963. As a result of this confer-
ence, a distinctive series of symposia publica-
tions known as the A.S.A. Monographs (subse-
quently A.S.A. Series, A.S.A. Essays) first ap-
peared. This collection, in its variety and homo-
geneity, provides a specification of what British
social anthropology is all about. Appropriately
Firth is the life president of the association.
All of this might give the impression that
Firth's principal historical significance for the
history of the social sciences is that he showed
the entrepreneurial and organizational flair that
converted British social anthropology from being
the brand name of a rather quirkish style of
anthropological practice peculiar to a handful of
individuals—which was the state of affairs in the
1930s—into an internationally accepted, widely
practiced, and highly respected branch of study,
which ranks high in the generally accepted hier-
archy of the various social sciences.
Certainly this side of Firth's work deserves
emphasis and is of sociological interest in itself.
In the dialectical development of British social
anthropology, the ancestral doctrine of Malinow-
ski generated the rival creeds of Radcliffe-Brown,
Evans-Pritchard, Fortes, and Gluckman. In this
melee, Firth was from the start a peacemaker
among the f actionalists, a leader who was more
concerned with the future of social anthropology
FIRTH, RAYMOND 189
as an academic discipline than with his own
academic reputation. But precisely because Firth
chose to be a leader without disciples, it is
difficult to spell out with any clarity just where
he stands in the spectrum of anthropological
opinion. He has not been the founder of a
"school"; he has no immediate imitators.
The extraordinary detail of his description of
Tikopia culture and society has been mentioned
already and is a lasting monument. But though
the Tikopia can be cited as examples (or perhaps
counterexamples) of all kinds of generalizing
anthropological theories, Firth's Tikopia studies
did not in themselves serve to break new theo-
retical ground.
The succession of monographs, essays, and
editorial initiatives relating to economic anthro-
pology (1929; 1939; 1946; Conference. . .1967;
Firth & Yamey 1964), and their revisions, are
another matter. In the ongoing debate between
the "formal theorists" and the "substantivists,"
Firth has consistently adopted a "formal theo-
rist" stance—that is to say he has maintained
that economics is a unified science containing
basic principles that have world-wide applica-
tion. Any persisting mode of human organiza-
tion, whether primitive or sophisticated, mon-
etary or nonmonetary, market-oriented or sub-
sistence-oriented, capitalist or socialist, has an
economic aspect, and general principles relating
to such factors as production, distribution, and
exchange, the ownership of goods, and command
over the means of production are comparable
right across the board. In particular, Firth holds
that economics is the study of the allocation of
scarce resources among alternative ends and
that the concept of scarcity is essential to any
meaningful study of economics. Firth has viewed
with persistent skepticism the various contrary
opinions, many of which have their roots in
Marxist ideology, which argue that scarcity is
simply a product of the particular social forma-
tion with which we are most familiar—that of
the world-wide, capitalist, market economy—and
that there are different types of economy which
differ as do species.
The formidable corpus of Firth's writings in-
cludes contributions to almost every aspect of
social anthropology. Apart from economics, the
most prominent themes are social change and
religion. A crucial element in his treatment of
these topics is the special meaning that he at-
tributes to the concept of social organization.
Firth began to use this expression as early as
1930, but in the period from 1949 to 1960, he
190 FIRTH, RAYMOND
employed it as a polemical weapon of attack
against "the rigidity and limitations of a simple
structuralism" alleged to be propounded by the
Oxford followers of Radcliffe-Brown (Firth 1964,
chapters 4, 5, 6). If viewed in its historical con-
text, this phase of Firth's writings was an at-
tempt to rescue from oblivion certain under-
valued individualist aspects of Malinowski's
functionalism, and in this regard it must be
rated a failure. Admittedly structuralism in so-
cial anthropology has now become the brand
name of the anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss
rather than that of Radcliffe-Brown, but this
transformation was not brought about by the
empiricist criticisms that Firth leveled against
the latter. But the importance of the concept of
social organization for an understanding of the
distinctive characteristics of Firth's personal
brand of anthropological argument may be in-
ferred from the fact that the expression appears
not only in the title of his textbook (1951), but
also in that of the Festschrift offered to him by
his former pupils shortly before his retirement
(Freedman 1967).
Two quotations may serve to introduce our
discussion of this key concept.
(1) A theoretical framework for the analysis of
social change must be concerned largely with what
happens to social structures. But to be truly dynamic
it must allow for individual action. . . . (1951,
p. 83)
(2) ... so far from the religion of the Tikopia
merely reflecting or maintaining the social struc-
ture, in some of its aspects it offers avenues of es-
cape from society, into personal fantasy, which is
then allowed social recognition and credited with
social functions. (1964, p. 254)
These are both typical examples of what Firth
means by social organization. It is a concept
which has a binary relationship with Radcliffe-
Brown's social structure. Structure is here con-
ceived of as a stable, inflexible system of jural
rules; organization is the set of cultural conven-
tions which allows individuals to interpret the
rules with sufficient flexibility to make the sys-
tem of structural rules viable at the level of em-
pirical behavior. Changes in these conventions
over time provide Firth with his principal tool
for the analysis of social change both in the sec-
ular and religious spheres of practical activity.
Firth, like Malinowski, has consistently as-
sumed that the core of every serious piece of
anthropological research must consist of the
detailed field study of a particular culture con-
sidered as a total system. The task of the an-
thropologist is to show not only how the system
fits together but how it works. Most of Firth's
younger colleagues now interpret the "how it
works" component of this doctrine very loosely.
The mechanistic notion that particular social in-
stitutions have particular identifiable functions
which can be shown to serve the egocentric needs
of the individual (Malinowski) or the sociocen-
tric needs of society (Radcliffe-Brown) have
been abandoned. Indeed, the word function sel-
dom appears in any of their writings. Firth's posi-
tion, on the other hand, is a compromise between
the two earlier standpoints, with "social orga-
nization" serving as the mediating term.
Closely linked with this special brand of func-
tionalism, which puts so much emphasis on the
individual as decision maker, is Firth's consistent
empiricist bias, which is reflected in an equally
consistent antipathy towards psychoanalytic and
structuralist (i.e., Levi-Straussian) explanations
of symbolic action, which emphasize uncon-
scious rather than conscious motivations on the
part of the individual. The weakness of such
arguments from Firth's point of view is that they
evade the guiding principle that speculation
must always be tested against the fieldworker's
direct and detailed observations.
This empiricist commitment has proved in-
hibiting. Thus, Firth's restudies of Tikopia and
Trengganu culture, after an interval of years, are
contributions to the particular histories of these
two societies, but they have not led to con-
clusions about the general processes of cultural
change which are other than commonplace. It
should be noted, however, that Firth has en-
tered into direct and well-informed debate with
the Marxists over their treatment of anthro-
pological data (1972).
Much the same applies to Firth's writings on
primitive religion, which are based on Tikopia
data. As an atheist, Firth assumes that any hon-
est anthropological fieldworker must start out
from the premise that in "real" terms, all religious
belief is illusion. The task of the functional an-
thropologist is therefore to discover utility (or
disutility) in the social consequences of re-
ligious performance.
Firth is very far from being insensitive to the
aesthetic nuances of religion, but he has re-
peatedly attempted to separate aesthetic activity
from religious activity, apparently because, while
he approves of the former he views all forms of
the latter as a kind of self-deception (Firth 1964,
pp. 138-139).
Here is a paradox. Although Firth is clearly

fascinated by the relationship between art and
religion, he remains deeply skeptical about all
discussions of intangible reality. The overall
point of his most recent major monograph,
Symbols (1973), is that because there have been
a plethora of general anthropological theories
about symbolism (both religious and other), and
because it is easy to find ethnographic counter-
examples to any scheme which postulates a gen-
eral systemic ordering of human symbols, the
anthropologist's proper role should be to demon-
strate the nonlogical inconsistency rather than
the logical consistency of this major aspect of
human self-expression, which "not only blurs
relationships in the orders of reality; [but] it also
has historically been a potent trigger of social
conflict" (1973, pp. 427-428). Sometimes one
has the impression that Firth looks upon current
structuralist fashions of the Levi-Straussian sort
as manifestations of religious superstition, and
evil at that!
Finally, there remains for consideration Firth's
role as a teacher. Here his influence has been
very great indeed. Firth is not at his best in the
setting of a formal lecture. He has too many
facts at his disposal and his empiricist honesty
drives him to put too many of them on show at
the same time. But, as the chairman of a seminar
discussion, his performance is superb. During
his years at the L.S.E., it was above all through
the medium of the academic seminar that Firth
made his influence felt. In this setting, he treats
the contributors to a debate as if they were in-
formants in an unstructured session of Tikopia
field work. He manages to extract sense from the
ramblings of even the most uninteresting in-
formants. Over and over again, as scores of par-
ticipants can bear witness, Firth's summing up
of a long discursive argument has had the
magical effect of converting what had seemed
to be a tediously pointless discussion into an in-
novating discovery procedure of real significance.
If he had done nothing else, and he has of course
done a very great deal, Firth would by this com-
petence alone have demonstrated that he was a
thoroughly worthy successor to the formidable
Malinowski.
EDMUND R. LEACH
WORKS BY FIRTH
1924 The Kauri-Gum Industry: Some Economic As-
pects. Wellington (New Zealand) : Skinner.
(1929) 1959 Economics of the New Zealand Maori.
2d ed. Wellington (New Zealand): Owen; New
York: Humanities Press. —» First published as The
FIRTH, RAYMOND 191
Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori
by Routledge. A paperback edition was published in
1975 by Norton.
(1930) 1967 Outline of Tikopia Culture. Chapter 1 in
Raymond Firth, Tikopia Ritual and Belief. London:
Allen & Unwin; Boston: Beacon. —» First published
in volume 1 of Oceania.
(1930-1931) 1967 Totemism in Polynesia. Chapter
11 in Raymond Firth, Tikopia Ritual and Belief.
London: Allen & Unwin; Boston: Beacon. —» First
published in volume 1 of Oceania.
(1936a) 1976 Art and Life in New Guinea. New York:
AMS Press.
(1936b) 1961 We, the Tikopia: A Sociological Study
of Kinship in Primitive Polynesia. 2d ed. London:
Allen & Unwin; New York: Barnes & Noble. —» A
paperback edition was published in 1966 by Beacon.
(1938) 1975 Human Types: An Introduction to Social
Anthropology. Rev. ed. London: Sphere; New York:
Norton.
(1939) 1965 Primitive Polynesian Economy. 2d ed.
London: Routledge; Hamden, Conn.: Archon.
(1940) 1967 The Work of the Gods in Tikopia. 2d
ed. 2 vols. in one. London School of Economics and
Political Science, Monographs on Social Anthropol-
ogy, Nos. 1-2. London: Athlone Press; New York:
Humanities Press.
(1946) 1966 Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Econ-
omy. 2d ed., rev. & enl. London: Routledge; Ham-
den, Conn.: Archon. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1975 by Norton.
(1951) 1971 Elements of Social Organization. Rev.
ed. London: Watts.
1956 FIRTH, RAYMOND (editor) Two Studies of Kin-
ship in London. London School of Economics and
Political Science, Monographs on Social Anthro-
pology, No. 15. London: Athlone Press.
(1957) 1970 FIRTH, RAYMOND (editor) Man and Cul-
ture: An Evaluation of the Work of Bronislaw Malin-
owski. London: Routledge; New York: Humanities
Press.
(1959a) 1964 Problem and Assumption in an An-
thropological Study of Religion. Chapter 10 in Ray-
mond Firth, Essays on Social Organization and
Values. London School of Economics and Political
Science, Monographs on Social Anthropology, No.
28. London: Athlone Press; New York: Humanities
Press. —» The Royal Anthropological Institute of
Great Britain and Ireland Huxley memorial lecture
for 1959.
1959t> Social Change in Tikopia: Re-study of a Poly-
nesian Community After a Generation. London:
Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan.
1961 History and Traditions of Tikopia. Polynesian
Society, Memoir, No. 32. Wellington (New Zea-
land): The Society.
(1964) 1969 Essays on Social Organization and
Values. London School of Economics and Political
Science, Monographs on Social Anthropology, No.
28. London: Athlone Press; New York: Humanities
Press.
1964 FIRTH, RAYMOND; and YAMEY, B. S. (editors)
Capital, Savings and Credit in Peasant Societies:
Studies from Asia, Oceania, the Caribbean and
Middle America. London: Allen & Unwin; Chicago:
Aldine.
1967 Tikopia Ritual and Belief. London: Allen &
Unwin; Boston: Beacon.
1967 CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY,
OXFORD, 1965 Themes in Economic Anthropology.
Edited by Raymond Firth. Association of Social An-
thropologists, Monographs, No. 6. London: Tavis-
tock: New York: Barnes & Noble.
192 FORDE, DARYLL
1968 Anthropology: III. Social Anthropology. Volume
1, pages 320-324 in International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New
York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1968 HUBERT, JANE; FORGE, ANTHONY; and FIRTH,
RAYMOND Methods of Study of Middle Class Kin-
ship in London: A Working-paper on the History of
an Anthropological Project 1960-65. Occasional
Paper of the Department of Anthropology, London
School of Economics and Political Science. London:
The School.
(1969) 1970 FIRTH, RAYMOND; HUBERT, JANE; and
FORGE, ANTHONY Families and Their Relatives; Kin-
ship in a Middle-class Sector of London: An An-
thropological Study. London: Routledge; New York:
Humanities Press.
1970 Rank and Religion in Tikopia: A Study in Poly-
nesian Paganism and Conversion to Christianity.
London: Allen & Unwin; Boston: Beacon.
1972 The Sceptical Anthropologist?: Social Anthro-
pology and Marxist Views on Society. British Acad-
emy, London, Proceedings 58:177-213. —» Inaugu-
ral Radcliffe-Brown lecture in social anthropology.
1973 Symbols: Public and Private. London: Allen &
Unwin; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. —» A
paperback edition was published in 1975 by Cor-
nell Univ. Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
FIRTH, ROSEMARY (1943)1966 Housekeeping Among
Malay Peasants. 2d ed. London School of Economics
and Social Science, Monographs on Social Anthro-
pology, No. 7. London: Athlone Press; New York:
Humanities Press.
FRANKENBERG, RONALD 1967 Economic Anthropol-
ogy: One Anthropologist's View. Pages 47-89 in
Conference on Economic Anthropology, Oxford,
1965, Themes in Economic Anthropology. Edited
by Raymond Firth. Association of Social Anthro-
pologists, Monographs, No. 6. London: Tavistock;
New York: Barnes & Noble.
FREEDMAN, MAURICE (editor) 1967 Social Organiza-
tion: Essays Presented to Raymond Firth. Chicago:
Aldine.
GREAT BRITAIN, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 1943—
1945 Pacific Islands. 4 vols. Geographical Hand-
book Series B.R. 519A-C. London: The Division.
—> Volume 1: General Survey. Volume 2: Eastern
Pacific. Volume 3: Western Pacific (Tonga to the
Solomon Islands). Volume 4: Western Pacific (New
Guinea and Islands Northward).
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW 1920 Kula: The Circulat-
ing Exchange of Valuables in the Archipelagoes of
Eastern New Guinea. Man 20:97-105.
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW 1921 The Primitive Eco-
nomics of the Trobriand Islanders. Economic Jour-
nal 31:1-16.
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1922) 1960 Argonauts of
the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enter-
prise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Mela-
nesian New Guinea. London School of Economics
and Political Science, Studies No. 65. London:
Routledge; New York: Dutton. —> A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1961 by Dutton.
FORDE, DARYLL
Daryll Forde, who died in 1973, exerted a
profound influence on social anthropology in
England. Throughout its period of expansion,
he counteracted the tendency to insularity and
narrowness with a broader, more international
vision of the subject, made possible partly be-
cause of his close relations with American an-
thropology. He always tried to maintain the
initial ties between physical anthropology,
archeology, and the cultural and sociological
studies of man; to preserve the tradition of wide-
ranging inquiry; and to keep abreast of new
work in many related disciplines. His early
training in geography gave him the bias towards
ecological analysis that became the hallmark of
his thought, making him a pioneer in a field
whose importance is only now being recognized.
Daryll Forde was born in 1902 in England.
His first degree was in geography at University
College London, where he later wrote his doc-
toral thesis on prehistoric archeology and, from
1923 to 1928, held the post of lecturer in geog-
raphy. He received his doctorate in 1928. For
the next two years he was a Commonwealth
fellow at the University of California, and then,
in 1930, he was appointed to the Gregynog
chair of geography and anthropology at the
University of Wales, the youngest full professor
in the United Kingdom. His particular theoreti-
cal interests and his association with American
studies were evident in his early publications,
which stress the balance between human geog-
raphy and archeology. Ancient Mariners (1927)
was followed by articles on megaliths and pre-
historic metallurgy, and reports on excavations
in England, Scotland, Wales, and Brittany.
In the career of any anthropologist, the im-
portant benchmarks are the field expeditions.
Forde worked in Arizona and New Mexico be-
tween 1928 and 1929, and returned to New
Mexico later in 1929. In 1934 he published
Habitat, Economy and Society, an exercise in
comparative human geography that instantly
became a classic. As the title suggests, the book
pays special attention to the interaction of tech-
nology with environment. If at this point he
had decided to stay in America, his work would
probably have continued to combine the anti-
quarian and contemporary perspectives in
American field work. However, his 1935 field
trip to southeastern Nigeria was a watershed.
There he started the intensive field work among
the Yako of the Cross River that he followed up
with another expedition in 1939. The rich data
he gathered resulted in many publications on
Yako studies. This field work also led him away
from a sustained archeological approach. He

welcomed the full impact of modern Africa.
Although always interested in basic theoretical
issues, he enjoyed the opportunity to broaden
the scope of his academic work that this pro-
gram of African research provided. Just at that
point World War n imposed a moratorium on
anthropological field work. But opportunities
reappeared as soon as the end of the war was
in sight.
In 1944 Forde was appointed administrative
director of the International African Institute.
A year later he returned to University College
London to a newly founded chair of anthro-
pology. The first of these appointments led to
the most comprehensive program of publishing
and organizing research that any one British
anthropologist has ever achieved. The other in-
volved the teaching and reflection by which he
worked out his own intellectual position.
Some impression should be recorded of
Forde's personal style. Roguish wit, iconoclasm,
and abounding joy in life are not surprising in
a clever young professor in a provincial univer-
sity. Normally they would be modified through
the years to the austere presence expected of the
head of internationally renowned institutions.
But in Daryll Forde those very qualities of youth
were joined with vision, intellectual power, and
warm human concern. Little of his personal
magnetism was reflected in his written work.
There his style was always correct and imper-
sonal. He became increasingly concerned with
covering all aspects of whatever subject he was
treating, leaving no careless loopholes in his
argument and making no concessions to the
poorly educated reader.
His publications on the Yako came out in
specialized articles, starting with "Land and
Labour on the Cross River" (1936). Gradually,
over the next thirty years, he covered kinship,
descent, marriage, local politics, and religion in
essays that were republished in one volume,
Yako Studies (1964). By then he had published
and edited so much of other people's work that
his own writing had evidently taken second
place. Yet his field studies represent a distinct
contribution. He described the complex system
of double unilineal inheritance, which has sub-
sequently been reported in other parts of west
Africa with interesting variations. He described
an oligarchical system of government in which
various ties of cult and descent affiliation cut
across each other. This work antedated the many
analyses of African descent systems and cross-
cutting political influences that appeared in the
FORDE, DARYLL 193
two decades after the war. The features that
distinguished his more comprehensive studies of
west Africa also marked his Yako studies: careful
measurement, an eye for internal adaptations,
and a fervent belief that anthropological anal-
ysis could not be made in a vacuum, but must
include the effects of environmental or external
political pressures.
One of the most impressive of these large-
scale studies was his lecture to the New York
Academy of Sciences in March 1953, "The Cul-
tural Map of West Africa," a superb example of
his wide synoptic view, mastery of detail, and
controlled argument.
Interestingly, his later writings on west Africa
showed a slight relaxing of his restrained im-
personal style. The Yako came to life as com-
petitive, wealth-seeking individualists in his
1960 lecture "Death and Succession" (1962).
Whereas his first study of Yako ritual (1951)
emphasized its socially integrative aspects, his
lectures on The Context of Belief (1958a) and
"Spirits, Witches and Sorcerers in the Super-
natural Economy of the Yako" (1958b) were
concerned with bringing out the elements of
individual choice and calculation which he felt
were neglected by contemporary accounts of re-
ligion. Again, in his introduction to West African
Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Forde &
Kaberry 1967), he emphasized the scope for
entrepreneurial talents and leadership as well
as the incentives to accumulate riches. In a way,
his work can be seen as contrapuntal to the
structural functionalism of his day. At many
points ahead of his contemporaries and at others
correcting their bias, the more they left reality
for the sake of elegant abstract models, the more
he doubted their fundamental assumptions and
questioned their data base.
In each decade he summed up his position
in a major statement reiterating his principles.
In 1947 "The Anthropological Approach in the
Social Sciences" was delivered as his presiden-
tial address to the Association for the Advance-
ment of Science. In 1957 a magisterial review
article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica gave a
summary of the whole history of the subject.
In 1967 his lecture on "Anthropology and the
Development of African Studies" repeated, in
the specialized context of Africa, his con-
cern that anthropology keep its broad per-
spective, remain concerned with biological and
historical evolution, and focus always on adap-
tative processes. He cited approvingly the
studies of John Barnes on the Ngoni, Michael
194 FORDE, DARYLL
G. Smith on Hausa-Fulani, Jan Vansina on the
Kuba, G. I. Jones on the Oil Rivers States, and
Igor de Garine on the Massa. This impressive
list of younger Africanists, each with his train
of students, testifies to the growth of the sub-
ject as well as to Daryll Forde's influence. For
years no scholar would think of going to Africa
for the first time without calling in London to
pay respects to Forde and receive his advice. By
the 1950s African anthropology had grown
enormously in volume, but it grew as an un-
usually coherent body of communications. It
flourished so well largely because of Forde's
tireless leadership as director of the African
Institute.
When Forde was appointed the institute's
director in 1944 and succeeded Edwin Smith as
editor of the quarterly journal Africa, both the
organization and the journal had suffered
eclipse and suspension during the war. His task
was to build up an international fellowship of
Africanist scholars versed in linguistic and eth-
nographic skills. Frans Olbrechts from Brussels,
Vinigi L. Grottanelli from Rome, Germaine
Dieterlen from France, together with Portuguese,
Spanish, and German scholars, acted together
with Max Gluckman as council members in an
amity and purposefulness that achieved much.
Publishing in French and English, the circula-
tion of Africa grew to 2,300 by 1970. At the
same time other vehicles of African scholarship
also grew. African Abstracts, founded to keep
track of new information, contained more than
one thousand abstracts in its 1969 volume. It
was closed then because the sheer scale of opera-
tions had grown beyond the scope of the insti-
tute. In the same period the Ethnographic Sur-
vey of Africa published 82 monographs, 8
handbooks of African languages, and 10 mono-
graphs on African languages. Overcoming the
tendency for colonial boundaries to circum-
scribe the range of scholarship, the International
African Institute developed international re-
search: The North Bantu language survey was
a partnership of British, French, and Belgian
linguists, the Africa marriage survey was con-
ducted by a team of anthropologists from the
same countries, the Fulani research project was
the product of Franco-British collaboration.
With the growth of African studies in the world,
the International African Institute saw new
tasks for itself. One was to help the new African
universities by keeping research and teaching
staff in touch with each other over the conti-
nent. For ten years beginning in 1959, with the
support of the Ford Foundation, it organized in-
ternational seminars in Africa and published an
important series of books on issues of common
African interest.
These bare figures and dates suggest the pro-
ductive energy that Daryll Forde poured into
his work. Accordingly, African anthropology
held a dominant place in British and world an-
thropology through its volume and high theoret-
ical initiatives, both nourished by Forde's entre-
preneurial talents and scholarship.
MARY DOUGLAS
WORKS BY FORDE
(1927) 1928 Ancient Mariners: The Story of Ships
and Sea Routes. New York: Morrow.
(1934) 1967 Habitat, Economy and Society: A Geo-
graphical Introduction to Ethnology. 12th ed. Lon-
don: Methuen.
1936 Land and Labour on the Cross River: The Eco-
nomic Organization of a Yako Village, Nigeria.
Man 36:97 only.
(1941) 1951 Marriage and the Family Among the
Yako in South-eastern Nigeria. Published for the
International African Institute. London: Lund,
Humphries.
1946 FORDE, DARYLL; and SCOTT, RICHENDA The
Native Economies of Nigeria. London: Faber.
1947 The Anthropological Approach in the Social
Sciences. Advancement of Science 4:213-224.
—» Forde's presidential address to the Association
for the Advancement of Science.
1950 The Ibo- and Ibibio-speaking Peoples of South-
eastern Nigeria. Published for the International
African Institute. Oxford Univ. Press.
1951 Integrative Aspects of Yako First Fruits Rituals.
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of
Great Britain and Ireland 79:1-10. —» Forde's 1949
presidential address to the Royal Anthropological
Institute.
1953 The Cultural Map of West Africa: Successive
Adaptations to Tropical Forests and Grasslands.
New York Academy of Sciences, Transactions
Series 2 15:206-219.
1958a The Context of Belief: A Consideration of
Fetishism Among the Yako. Liverpool Univ. Press.
—> Frazer lecture, 1958.
1958b Spirits, Witches and Sorcerers in the Super-
natural Economy of the Yako. Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ire-
land 88, part 2:165-178.
(1962) 1966 Death and Succession: An Analysis of
Yako Mortuary Ceremonial. Pages 89-123 in Max
Gluckman (editor), Essays on the Ritual of Social
Relations. Manchester Univ. Press. —> Simon lec-
ture, Manchester University, 1960.
1964 Yako Studies. Oxford Univ. Press.
1967 Anthropology and the Development of African
Studies, Africa 37:389-406. -» The tenth Lugard
memorial lecture.
1967 FORDE, DARYLL; and KABERRY, PHYLLIS M.
(editors) West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth
Century. Published for the International African
Institute. Oxford Univ. Press.

FORTES, MEYER
Meyer Fortes, who was William Wyse pro-
fessor of social anthropology at Cambridge
University from' 1950 to 1973, is best known
for his work on kinship and religion in nonin-
dustrial societies. He has also written on anthro-
pological aspects of psychoanalysis. His field
research has been conducted largely in Ghana,
among the Tallensi and Ashanti peoples, and
ethnographic data from his research formed the
starting point for most of his discussions. His
theorizing, however, has extended beyond these
research sites to include all societies.
Born in 1906 in South Africa to immigrant
Jewish parents, Fortes was exposed to consider-
able cultural diversity. As a university student in
Cape Town, he became interested in the educa-
tion of Cape Coloured adolescents, and that con-
cern led to his choice of a doctoral dissertation
theme in psychology at University College Lon-
don: the cross-cultural testing of intelligence.
He also did research relating juvenile delin-
quency in the east end of London to sibling rank,
under the sponsorship of psychoanalyst Emanuel
Miller (1933).
Bronislaw Malinowski then invited Fortes to
join the anthropological seminar at the London
School of Economics as a psychologist, and it
was in this capacity that C. G. Seligman ar-
ranged for him to undertake field work in Africa.
One of his earliest ethnographic publications
was in developmental and educational psychol-
ogy (1938). However, stimulated by E. E. Evans-
Pritchard, Raymond Firth, and other members
of the seminar, Fortes expanded his professional
interests to social and cultural institutions. His
commitment to anthropology was strengthened
by his friendship with Isaac Schapera and by
his meeting in 1931 with A. R. Radcliffe-Brown,
whose exponent he became after Radcliffe-
Brown died in 1955.
Fortes' interest in the connections between
political and domestic relations, first exhibited
in his two works on the Tallensi, The Dynamics
of Clanship (1945) and The Web of Kinship
(1949), persisted through many, often contro-
versial, articles to culminate in the book based
on his Lewis Henry Morgan lectures, Kinship
and the Social Order (1969). Although one of
his earliest articles was on Tallensi ritual (1936)
it was not until 1959 that he published Oedipus
and Job in West African Religion, setting Tal-
lensi beliefs and practices in a broad regional
FORTES, MEYER 195
and comparative context. His various analyses of
social institutions, cultural norms, and religious
beliefs were all based on principles that are
basically psychological, and in his later writings
Fortes began to focus more directly on psycho-
logical processes. His early studies of sibling
rank in the east end of London, his personal
experience as a first-born son, and his lifelong
association with the theory and practice of psy-
choanalysis were synthesized in his papers on
"The First Born" (1974) and "Custom and Con-
science in Anthropological Perspective" (1977).
Fortes said that his instinct was "to shy away
from methodological discussion" (1961, p. 211),
but this preference displayed itself in a distinc-
tive style of exposition rather than in an effort to
avoid using or generating anthropological theory.
His achievements as a descriptive ethnographer
are manifold; he has made a substantial con-
tribution to the ethnographic mapping of west
Africa. But the categories used for description,
though derived largely from the cultures them-
selves, are also partly of Fortes' own devising,
and his analysis is innovative rather than con-
ventional, reflecting his own theoretical interests
and convictions. His theoretical pronouncements
are presented as if they had been arrived at in-
ductively from his field data and are given no
explicit abstract formulation; hence his general
theoretical position must be reconstituted piece-
meal. Indeed, Fortes has stressed the continuous
interplay between observation and analysis, be-
tween field work and theory, as basic to the scien-
tific status of social anthropology.
Fortes' studies of kinship and political insti-
tutions are firmly rooted in the main structural-
functional tradition of British social anthro-
pology. Both the societies he studied in detail,
the Tallensi and the Ashanti, had political sys-
tems described by their members largely in the
language of kinship. Appropriately, therefore,
Fortes paid close attention to the similarities and
differences between what he called the domain
of the domestic group and the politico-jural do-
main. The domain of kinship, extending in these
societies well beyond the domestic family, is
characterized by a rule of amity or prescriptive
altruism, but this rule operates with greatest
moral force in domestic relations, while in the
politico-jural domain more emphasis is placed
on rights and duties. This contrast applies even
in societies, like that of aboriginal Australia, in
which the widest political order is a kinship
polity.
196 FORTES, MEYER
In all domains, a key concept is that of com-
plementary opposition. It is realized in the op-
position between patrilateral and matrilateral
kin relations or in complementary filiation,
whereby a patrilineage is differentiated inter-
nally and linked externally by matrilateral con-
nections. Domestically, there is complementarity
in the socialized roles of men and women. Fortes
also distinguished between descent, a jural con-
cept whereby a person may be linked to others
through specific types of genealogical ties, and
filiation, the familial linking of a person to a
parent by virtue of birth under socially accepted
conditions. The two contrasting domains of the
family, with its moral imperatives, and of the
polity, with its jural imperatives, work together
to produce some kind of balance, and in many
nonindustrial societies, are united by a polyseg-
mented lineage structure.
Fortes' analysis was typically neither strictly
static nor strictly diachronic. He paid relatively
little attention to long-term trends but pioneered
the analysis of what came to be called the de-
velopmental cycle of the domestic group. The
various forms of household found in a com-
munity at any point of time are categorized as
different phases in a repetitive cycle of forma-
tion, expansion, and dispersion. Filiation, which
unites individuals in this cycle, also divides them
into opposed generations.
The opposition and unity generated by filia-
tion, as well as by sex and sibling rank, are reg-
ulated in customary practice and belief. Here
Fortes stressed particularly the relation between
a man and his eldest son, crucial because the
birth of his first child makes a man irrevocably
a father and hence, in many societies, a poten-
tial ancestor. The ultimate source of the rivalry
between a man and his son is, however, the Oedi-
pus conflict postulated by Freud, for the founda-
tion of every kinship system is the culturally
recognized physical bond between a woman and
her child. This constitutes the value for which
men in successive generations compete, father
against son, brother against brother, and hus-
band against wife's brother.
Fortes has maintained that he has only modest
theoretical aims, that he has sought merely "to
seek out directly observable mechanisms that
play a formative part in social structure" (1969,
p. 73). But he has often written as if he were
enunciating general propositions, and he has
been criticized by Rodney Needham, not so much
for trying prematurely to construct grand theory
as for giving the impression that he had already
done so while asserting merely vague, common-
place generalizations (Needham 1971). Louis
Dumont has accused him of reifying descent
groups and of treating them as logically prior to
the interpersonal kin relations that sustain them
(1971). Edmund Leach, less convincingly, has
bracketed him with other structuralists who have
overemphasized institutional forms and ne-
glected the importance of the decisions of social
actors (1961).
Fortes' influence on the development of social
anthropology has been direct, through the work
of his students at Cambridge, and indirect,
through his publications. The introduction that
he wrote with Evans-Pritchard for African Po-
litical Systems (1940) established the analytic
categories used by British social anthropologists
for the next two decades. His cyclical model of
domestic development has been adopted in many
branches of social science, and his emphasis on
the distinctive features of various interdependent
domains has been incorporated into many sub-
sequent analyses of nonindustrial societies. His
readiness to use explanatory mechanisms taken
from psychoanalysis, and to look at clinical evi-
dence on mental illness, has encouraged many
younger social anthropologists to look beyond
narrowly circumscribed social limits of data and
analysis. Oedipus and Job has appeared in sev-
eral translations and, along with Fortes' other
writings on religion, has had considerable in-
fluence on the study of religion, particularly with
reference to ancestor cults.
J. A. BARNES
WORKS BY FORTES
1933 The Influence of Position in Sibship on Juvenile
Delinquency. Economica 13:301-328.
1936 Ritual Festivals and Social Cohesion in the Hin-
terland of the Gold Coast. American Anthropologist
38:590-604.
1938 Social and Psychological Aspects of Education in
Taleland. Africa 11, no. 4 (Supplement): 1-64.
-» Reprinted in Fortes 1970.
(1940) 1958 FORTES, MEYER; and EVANS-PRITCHARD,
E. E. (editors) African Political Systems. Oxford
Univ. Press.
1945 The Dynamics of Clanship Among the Tallensi.
Oxford Univ. Press.
(1949) 1967 The Web of Kinship Among the Tallensi.
Oxford Univ. Press.
1958 Introduction. Pages 1-14 in Jack Goody (editor),
The Developmental Cycle in Domestic Groups.
Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology, No. 1.
Cambridge Univ. Press.
1959 Oedipus and Job in West African Religion. Cam-
bridge Univ. Press.
1961 Comment. Current Anthropology 2:211-212.
—» Comment on S. N. Eisenstadt, "Anthropological
Studies of Complex Societies" on pages 201-210 of
the same issue of Current Anthropology.

1968 SELIGMAN, C. G. Volume 14, pages 159-162 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1969 Kinship and the Social Order: The Legacy of
Lewis Henry Morgan. Chicago: Aldine.
1970 Time and Social Structure and Other Essays.
London: Athlone Press.
1973 On the Concept of the Person Among the Tal-
lensi. Pages 283—319 in Germaine Dieterlen (ed-
itor), Collogue international sur la notion de per-
sonne en Afrigue. Paris: Centre national de la
recherche scientifique. —> Symposium held in 1971.
1974 The First Born. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines 15:81—104.
1977 Custom and Conscience in Anthropological Per-
spective. International Review of Psycho-analysis
4:127-154.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARNES, J. A. 1971 Three Styles in the Study of Kin-
ship. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
DUMONT, Louis 1971 Introduction a deux theories
d'anthropologie sociale: Groupes de filiation et alli-
ance de mariage. Paris: Mouton. —> A paperback
edition was published in 1976.
LEACH, EDMUND R. (1961)1968 Rethinking Anthro-
pology. New York: Humanities Press.
LOMBARD, JACQUES 1972 L'anthropologie britannique
contemporaine. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France.
NEEDHAM, RODNEY (editor) 1971 Rethinking Kin-
ship and Marriage. London: Tavistock. —» See es-
pecially the introduction.
FREUD, ANNA
Anna Freud was born in Vienna, Austria, on
December 3, 1895. The youngest daughter of
Sigmund Freud, she is the only one of his six
children to take up psychoanalysis as a profes-
sion. She is trained as an elementary school
teacher and psychoanalyst and became a mem-
ber of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1922.
She has practiced and taught psychoanalysis
since that time and has also actively participated
in the affairs of the International Psycho-ana-
lytical Association, of which she is an honorary
president.
Anna Freud's education as a teacher was in-
spired by the methods advocated by Maria Mon-
tessori. Her psychoanalytic training during those
early years in Vienna, however, was unorthodox.
In fact, she herself has described her "apprentice-
ship" as "a haphazard affair" (Writings of Anna
Freud, vol. 5, p. 511; hereafter cited as Writ-
ings). She functioned as Sigmund Freud's com-
panion, nurse, and secretary during his pro-
longed illnesses, and as his confidante and even
collaborator in all matters of psychoanalysis. He
was not only her father but also her scientific
mentor, who watched over her progress with
FREUD, ANNA 197
obvious delight (see Letters . . . 1968; Sig-
mund Freud . . . 1966). As an active partici-
pant in the early psychoanalytic movement,
Anna Freud was exposed to its struggles as well
as its pioneering exponents, many of whom, es-
pecially Lou Andreas-Salome, also influenced
her work, as did Dorothy Burlingham, her life-
long friend and co-worker.
Having acquired much of her knowledge in
the clinical practice of psychoanalysis, Anna
Freud helped to initiate the more formal train-
ing of others. In 1926 and 1927 she presented
her lectures on the technique of child analysis
(Writings, vol. 1, pp. 3-69) at the newly
founded Vienna Institute of Psychoanalysis and
soon thereafter established and participated in
the first seminar on child analysis, a regular
meeting in which cases were presented, technical
innovations described, and theoretical conclu-
sions put up for discussion. In this group, such
well-known analysts as Erik H. Erikson and
Margaret S. Mahler had their first analytic learn-
ing experiences.
Even in these formative years she showed her
lifelong interest in applying the findings of psy-
choanalysis to other fields in the hope of prevent-
ing unnecessary suffering and future mental
illness in growing children. In 1929, at the
invitation of the Board of Education of the City
of Vienna, she presented a series of lectures for
educators and parents in which she "translated"
the complex psychoanalytic hypotheses concern-
ing the role of the unconscious, the child's sex-
uality, the stages of instinctual development, the
Oedipus complex, infantile amnesia, and the be-
ginnings of the superego into ordinary language
(ibid., vol. 1, pp. 73-133). In 1937 she organized
what is probably the first day care nursery for
underprivileged children, run on analytic prin-
ciples. Here, she and Dorothy Burlingham cared
for one-year-old to two-year-old infants who
came from families living in the worst slums of
Vienna.
In 1938 Anna Freud left Austria for London,
where she still resides. During World War n,
she established and directed, together with Bur-
lingham, the Hampstead War Nurseries, a resi-
dential center for homeless and evacuated chil-
dren. The daily care of more than two hundred
children throughout the war years posed a series
of practical and administrative problems—such
as the procurement of food, housing, and med-
ical care, and the special training of the staff—
all of which Anna Freud undertook. But it also
provided her with a unique opportunity to make
 198 FREUD, ANNA
new observations, which she recorded (on nights
when the German bombers were over London
and she could not get much sleep in any event)
in monthly reports (ibid., vol. 3). In this set-
ting, she and Burlingham grasped the overriding
importance of the role of the mother in the men-
tal life of the developing child. They observed
that children can withstand the most gruesome
experiences so long as they are with their
mothers and the mothers do not show fear.
Separated from their mothers, however, children
receiving even the best physical care and benign
treatment by substitute caretakers will show pro-
found developmental lags.
After the war, Anna Freud founded the
Hampstead Child-Therapy Course and Clinic,
of which she has remained the director. The
organization of the clinic reflects her humani-
tarian and scientific concerns. It began as a
training program for child therapists, and in
1952, the central clinical facilities that provide
diagnostic services and analytic therapy to chil-
dren and adolescents were added. There is, fur-
thermore, a well-baby clinic where at any one
time sixty children receive pediatric care and
their mothers practical and psychological guid-
ance during the infants' first two years of life.
The children then progress to a nursery school
for normal children, but the educational de-
partment also includes classes for the under-
privileged and handicapped children and a spe-
cial group for the blind.
In this setting both trainees and staff are ex-
posed to a great variety of children at different
stages of their development, for Anna Freud
believes that "no analyst can consider himself
fully trained so long as his clinical experience
and technical skill are confined to only one age
or stage of development" (ibid., vol. 7, p. 217).
All of the staff members, in addition to providing
services and training, are encouraged to record
their findings, pool the knowledge they have
gained in such systematic endeavors as the Con-
cept Groups or the Psychoanalytic Index, re-
ferred to as "a collective analytic memory" (ibid.,
vol. 5, p. 484), and participate in the extensive
research projects carried out at the clinic.
In addition to her activities at the Hampstead
Clinic, Anna Freud has lectured to professional
and lay audiences throughout Europe and the
United States. For several extended periods of
time during 1963, 1964, 1969, and 1970, she
was visiting professor at the Yale Law School
and Child Study Center. She has received hon-
orary degrees from many universities, including
Clark, Chicago, Columbia, Jefferson, Yale, Shef-
field, and Vienna. She was also honored by the
White House with the first Dolly Madison award,
and in England, she received the award of the
Commander of the British Empire.
Anna Freud is the author of several books
and more than one hundred papers, which are
collected in the seven volumes of her Writings
(see also Bergman & Freud 1965; Goldstein
et al. 1973). Apart from her own writings, she
collaborated with Strachey in the preparation of
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psycholog-
ical Works of Sigmund Freud (1886-1939) and
has been an editor of The Psychoanalytic Study
of the Child since its inception in 1945.
It is characteristic of Anna Freud's entire
scientific career that she not only provided
needed services for children and training for
child care personnel and child analysts, but also
used every opportunity to make new observa-
tions, reflect on them, raise new questions, and
propose new conceptualizations. Firmly rooted
in the traditions of classical analysis, she has
always sought and accepted data derived from
the direct observation of children in a great
variety of settings. She applied what she learned
in the treatment room to child rearing and edu-
cation, the care of the physically ill, handi-
capped, and orphans, and the child who is sub-
ject to legal disputes. In turn, she brought what
she learned from these settings back to the psy-
choanalytic situation. In her own words, she has
used every "opportunity to maintain a close con-
nection between theory and practice, to check
constantly on theoretical ideas by practical ap-
plication, and to widen practical handling and
practical measures with the growth of theoretical
knowledge" (Writings, vol. 7, p. 227).
As a consequence of this basic attitude, her
work has had a wide influence both inside and
outside of the field of psychoanalysis. Its impact
was no doubt enhanced by her style of writing—
her clarity and lucidity, the felicitous phrase, and
the ease with which she can express complex
thoughts in simple and generally intelligible
language. She always cuts through to the central
issue, and she invariably throws new light even
on familiar problems. Moreover, Anna Freud
writes like the great educator she is, leading the
readers from what they can personally observe
and know into the previously unknown.
Contributions to psychoanalysis. Anna Freud's
work has influenced psychoanalytic theory and
technique as well as psychoanalytic research. Her
slim book on The Ego and the Mechanisms of

Defense (ibid., vol. 2) has had the most profound
and far-reaching impact of all of her writings.
It is required reading in a great variety of under-
graduate and graduate programs in medical and
law schools and courses on child development,
psychology, and social studies. Translated into
many languages, it is read all over the world
and is one of those rare books in the history of
science that for more than forty years has re-
mained of fundamental importance to the basic
understanding of the specific area with which
it deals.
Building primarily on Sigmund Freud's re-
visions of psychoanalytic theory, made between
1920 and 1926, Anna Freud scrutinizes the ego's
ways of dealing with the conflicting demands of
the instinctual drives, the superego, and reality.
She concludes that the defense mechanisms
chosen by a person depend on the source of
danger and on the developmental level he or she
has reached. Thus, the little boy who is afraid
of being scolded by his parents begins to berate
his puppets and soldiers for their misdeeds (iden-
tification with the aggressor). As the child de-
velops, the source and the nature of the danger
change, and so do the ego's capacities for deal-
ing with it. For example, the immature ego of
the child will simply deny what it fears in action,
fantasy, or word. The older child's ego will ward
off dangers by restricting its own activities and
avoiding anxiety-producing situations—tenden-
cies that are most frequently seen in learning
difficulties and the common childhood phobias
and fears. The adolescent, who is confronted
with an intensification of instinctual impulses,
will resort to asceticism and intellectualization.
With this book Anna Freud introduced a new
developmental perspective on one of man's basic
mental operations that are in part observable in
his behavior. She thus opened the way to the
following novel findings and approaches:
(1) In studying the general tendencies of
the ego at different developmental periods, well-
marked mental mechanisms and their exaggera-
tions come into view. While some may produce
morbid distortions of character, inhibitions, or
neurotic symptoms, others are essentially normal
means of dealing with phase-appropriate con-
flicts. She demonstrated that what is appropriate
and normal behavior at a particular stage of de-
velopment no longer can be so considered a few
years later. Conversely, some of the most patho-
logical behavior of the adult not only originates,
but has a normal counterpart, in the life of the
child. Her book thus provided a bridge from
FREUD, ANNA 199
pathology to the study of normality, a major con-
tribution toward establishing psychoanalysis as
a general theory of psychology.
(2) Viewing observable behavior against the
background of normal developmental processes,
Anna Freud provided a new classification of the
mechanisms of defense and new insights into
their varieties and combinations. In altruism,
for example, she described the positive and valu-
able aspects of displacement and projection
which enable people to form attachments. Hav-
ing repressed and repudiated their own wishes,
such persons can nevertheless gratify them by
employing projection and identification and by
actively seeking to fulfill such wishes in others.
(3) By postulating that "the proper field for
our observation [in the psychoanalytic situation]
is always the ego" (ibid., vol. 2, p. 6), Anna
Freud opened the way to a whole series of inno-
vations in psychoanalytic technique.
These advances in the technique of adult anal-
ysis were preceded by the particular technique of
child analysis that Anna Freud introduced in
1927 and which she and her followers have con-
tinued to practice and to refine. More than most
analysts, she has remained concerned with de-
fining the proper field in which analytic therapy
is applicable. She has some doubts about "the
widening scope of psychoanalysis" (Symposium
. . . 1954, p. 608), and still insists that analytic
therapy is most usefully applied to what it orig-
inally was designed for—the treatment of neu-
roses in children and adults. In her repeated dis-
cussions of the indications and contraindications
of child analysis, she has questioned many of the
generally accepted criteria and instead offered
one essential consideration: children need treat-
ment when their development in one or several
areas has come to a halt, and they need analytic
treatment when the lack of progressive develop-
ment is due to an "internalized" conflict, which
by definition is inaccessible to external manipu-
lations.
The determination of what an individual child
is suffering from requires diagnostic considera-
tions, to which Anna Freud devoted a large part
of her second major book Normality and Pa-
thology in Childhood (Writings, vol. 6). She
found that the usual classification of disorders
derived from adult psychopathology is not ap-
plicable to the child, and a mere listing of symp-
toms does not give the diagnostician helpful
clues since the same symptom—for example, a
sleep disturbance—has very different meanings
at different developmental levels, while the same
200 FREUD, ANNA
basic disturbance may be expressed by diverse
symptoms. She has therefore introduced a new
method of developmental assessment, the diag-
nostic profile. Based on all aspects of psycho-
analytic theory, and giving attention to all con-
stituent parts of the child's personality, the pro-
file is far more than a mere diagnostic aid. It is
a practical "instrument which imposes balance,
completeness, and comparability—not only com-
parability in assessment of factors within an in-
dividual case and between individual cases, but
comparability of reliable assessment between
analysts, with each other and in time. This is an
instrument with many potential uses. These in-
clude assessment of change over time, compila-
tion of similar cases, comparison of differing
conditions, and as a training aid" (Lustman
1967, pp. 821-822).
The comprehensive assessments that the pro-
file permits led to a new classification of child-
hood phenomena—from the normal developmen-
tal processes and the typical developmental dif-
ficulties to the various manifestations of child-
hood pathology. These in turn opened up a new
view of the relationship between childhood and
adult disturbances, as well as an emphasis on
the "variations of normality."
These methodological innovations reflect
Anna Freud's continuing commitment to em-
pirical research. She always advocated the use
of "experiments provided by nature and fate"
(e.g., Writings, vol. 4, pp. 141, 224-229, 510-
523, 623-624). Thus she highlighted the role
of the mother in the young child's development
by conceptualizing the observations made in the
Hampstead War Nurseries, where children were
separated from their parents. She and Dorothy
Burlingham studied the role of vision in normal
development by investigating blind children ( see
ibid., vol. 5, part 1, for the research projects in-
spired by her).
Her own major theoretical contribution, de-
riving in part from empirical research, is the
concept of developmental lines, a central or-
ganizing concept that attempts to integrate the
various constituent elements of the personality
that previously had been studied in isolation.
While she herself has worked out only some of
the prototypical developmental lines, the full
impact of her concept has not yet made itself
felt. Its importance was grasped by Seymour L.
Lustman who, stressing the scientific leadership
of Anna Freud, stated that the concept gave a
new direction to theory building and research
(1967). Yet this concept, too, has direct prac-
tical applications. It can provide answers to
such questions as when is a child ready for school,
and point to specific areas in which teachers can
be helpful. In order to arrive at an answer one
will look at the lines leading from full psycho-
logical dependence on others to emotional self-
reliance; from full physical dependence in mat-
ters of eating and sphincter control toward re-
sponsible management of the body; from ego-
centricity to companionship; and from play with
the mother's body to play with toys and from
constructive play to work. Each of these lines
is influenced by the instinctual drives, the ego,
and the superego, as well as by the external so-
cial reality as represented primarily by the im-
portant persons in a child's life. Viewing regres-
sion as a principle in normal development, Anna
Freud would also examine the child's regression
rate, the specific circumstances, such as fatigue,
frustration, in which a child's behavior tends to
fall apart, and how rapidly he or she will do so
and regain the previously achieved level of
functioning. This overall view of children high-
lights whether or not they have reached the
status required for a particular activity, such as
entry into school, and discloses harmonies and
disharmonies in their development that would
often be less visible without an integrative per-
spective.
Contributions to other fields. Anna Freud's
efforts to apply psychoanalytic thought to the
practical problems of child rearing and child
care go back to her early days in the experi-
mental day care center for underprivileged chil-
dren. Subsequently she seized the opportunity
provided by World War n to extend psycho-
analytic principles to the group care of children.
When Anna Freud found that the children's de-
velopment lagged, that they were slow in over-
coming reverses, she "attributed these difficulties
to the lack of a stable mother relationship"
(Writings, vol. 3, p. 220) and accordingly in-
troduced small "family groups," in which about
four children were assigned to specific workers
who, as substitute mothers, were solely respon-
sible for the physical care of these children. Ac-
cording to Anna Freud:
The result of this arrangement was astonishing in
its force and immediacy. The need for individual
attachment with the feelings which had been lying
dormant came out in a rush and in the course of one
week all six families were completely and firmly
established. But the reactions in the beginning were
far from being exclusively happy ones.
Since all these children have already undergone a

painful separation from their own mothers, their
mother relationship is naturally burdened with all
the effects of this experience. To have a mother
means to them equally the possibility of losing a
mother; the love for the mother being thus closely
accompanied by the hate and resentment produced
by her supposed desertion, (ibid., vol. 3, p. 220)
The children showed all the signs of posses-
siveness, anxiety, and jealousy that arise when
attention has to be shared, and the "formerly
peaceful nursery reverberated with the weeping
of children whose 'mother' has left the room, for
instance, to get something from the next room,
and whose absence was mourned as if she would
never return. Fights among the children multi-
plied in frequency and intensity" (ibid., vol. 3,
p. 221).
Under these conditions few workers would
have had the courage to persist in their convic-
tion, but Anna Freud did. Gradually the children
realized that their new "mothers" really belonged
to them and the frenzy subsided. "At the same
time the children began to develop in leaps and
bounds" (ibid.).
This example has been given in detail because
it demonstrates her capacity to make observa-
tions, conceptualize what she observed in terms
of her previous knowledge, and not only to find
a remedy applicable to the specific situation but
at the same time to test her conclusions. In addi-
tion, this example illustrates an essential, but
frequently overlooked, step in the application of
psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic theory is a com-
plex and large body of propositions. In order to
apply it to a particular concrete situation, the
overridingly important proposition that fits this
situation must be singled out. Anna Freud's sim-
ple statement, "we attributed the children's lag-
ging development to the lack of a stable mother
relationship," represents the selection of the
essential element from a vast body of psycho-
analytic knowledge, which would readily lend
itself to suggest a variety of courses. Her ability
to choose that which is most relevant and ap-
propriate has been characteristic of all her en-
deavors to translate psychoanalytic theory into
actual practice outside of the psychoanalytic
situation.
She has lectured to, and written for, medical
students, pediatricians, teachers, child care
workers, nurses, lawyers, and judges. In each
instance, her choice of what psychoanalysis can
contribute is deceptively simple. For example,
in working out guidelines for legally contested
child placements, she put the emphasis on "the
FREUP, ANNA 201
child's need for continuity of relationships," and
on "the child's sense of time," which differs
radically from that of adults. Her collaboration
with Joseph Goldstein, a professor of law at
Yale University, and Albert J. Solnit, professor
of pediatrics and psychiatry and an analyst,
who is the director of the Child Study Center
at Yale University, resulted in the small book,
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973),
which in a very brief time has had an enormous
impact. The concepts introduced in this book,
such as "the psychological parent" or "the least
detrimental alternative," have only a few years
after its publication become part of the legal
language used by courts and legislators in widely
scattered countries, many of which are in the
process of changing their laws governing adop-
tion and custody assignments.
Her lifelong efforts with pediatricians and
nurses, however, have been less successful. Re-
peatedly she has stressed the physician's readi-
ness to accept the idea that emotional factors
influence physical processes and their reluctance
to realize that bodily pain and discomfort and
medical and surgical interventions have a pro-
found impact on the emotional development of
children.
All of her teachings to allied professions have
been guided by one basic assumption: the unity
of the growing child's personality. Repeatedly
she has stressed that physicians and nurses see
only the sick child, teachers deal only with the
well child, nursery school teachers have contact
only with the young child, while high school
teachers know little about toddlers. Repeatedly
she has questioned the existing divisions along
age lines, between education and upbringing,
theory and practice—in brief, the specialization
of training in the children's field. To remedy this
situation she has proposed the establishment of
a new profession of child experts, who would be
knowledgeable in all aspects of child develop-
ment and care.
Summary. In her long productive life as an
analyst, Anna Freud has made vital contribu-
tions to psychoanalysis and allied fields. She
pioneered in the development of child analysis
and in ushering in psychoanalytic ego psychol-
ogy. She contributed to the development of psy-
choanalytic theory and to putting that theory
into practice. She has trained several generations
of analysts and exerted a direct influence on the
far larger number of people to whom she has
lectured. For she combines in her own person a
unique blend of secure knowledge, a relentless
202 FREUND, PAUL A.
quest to learn from whatever life has to offer,
boundless energy, an independent mind, a will-
ingness to look at facts, and an unyielding com-
mitment to put these into practical efforts to
help all children. Her personal impact as an
inspiring model has been so great because "she
is a benevolent, humanitarian scientist and a
scientific humanitarian" (Lustman 1967, p. 814).
LOTTIE M. NEWMAN
WORKS BY FREUD
1965 BERGMAN, THESI; and FREUD, ANNA Children in
the Hospital. New York: International Universities the entire personnel of the tribunal, he had the
Press.
1973 GOLDSTEIN, JOSEPH; FREUD, ANNA; and SOLNIT,
ALBERT J. Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.
New York: Free Press.
The Writings of Anna Freud. 7 vols. New York: Inter-
national Universities Press, 1966-1974. —•» Volume
1: Introduction to Psychoanalysis: Lectures for
Child Analysts and Teachers (1922-1935) 1974.
Volume 2: The Ego and the Mechanisms of De-
fense (1936) 1966; first published as Das Ich und
die Abwehrmechanismen. Volume 3: Infants With-
out Families: Reports on the Hampstead Nurseries
(1939-1945) 1973; written in collaboration with ministration; young men responding to the
Dorothy Burlingham. Volume 4: Indications for
Child Analysis and Other Papers (1945-1956) 1968. needs for creativity and ingenuity that this
Volume 5: Research at the Hampstead Child-
therapy Clinic and Other Papers (1956-1965)
1969. Volume 6: Normality and Pathology in Child-
hood: Assessments of Development (1965) 1970.
Volume 7: Problems of Psychoanalytic Training,
Diagnosis, and the Technique of Therapy (1966—
1970) 1971.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Arnold Zweig, 1927-
1939. Edited by Ernst L. Freud (1968) 1970
New York: Harcourt.
LUSTMAN, SEYMOUR L. 1967 The Scientific Leader-
ship of Anna Freud. Journal of the American Psy-
choanalytic Association 15:810-827.
Sigmund Freud and Lou Andreas-Salome: Letters.
Edited by Ernst Pfeiffer (1966)1972 New York:
Harcourt.
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud (1886-1939) 1953-
1964 24 vols. London: Hogarth; New York: Mac-
millan. —•> Translated from the German under the
general editorship of James Strachey, in collabora-
tion with Anna Freud.
SYMPOSIUM ON THE WIDENING SCOPE OF INDICATIONS
FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS, 1954 1954 The Widening
Scope of Indications for Psychoanalysis. Journal of
the American Psychoanalytic Association 2:567-
620. —> Participants were Leo Stone, Edith Jacob-
son, and Anna Freud.
WALLERSTEIN, ROBERT S. (reporter) 1967 Develop-
ment and Metapsychology of the Defense Organiza-
tion of the Ego. Journal of the American Psycho- tional meaning and a constitutional theory to
analytic Association 15:130—149.
FREUND, PAUL A.
Paul Abraham Freund was born in St. Louis,
Missouri, on February 16, 1908. He received his later a willing, Supreme Court to bring about
A.B. from Washington University in that city in
1928. In 1938 he graduated from Harvard Law
School, where he was president of the Harvard
Law Review, the zenith of student achievement.
After graduation, he stayed on for a year as a
graduate assistant to Felix Frankfurter, while
he earned his S.J.D. degree.
When he left Harvard, Freund went to Wash-
ington as a law clerk to Justice Louis D. Bran-
deis. As Owen J. Roberts, a member of the
Court when Freund was there, said: "In his
intimate relation to one of the Justices and to
opportunity to appraise the effect of judicial
judgment on varying policies and values, politi-
cal and economic." That was the beginning of
Freund's unbroken commitment to study and
analysis of the role of the Court and the con-
stitution in American life.
Following his clerkship at the Court, Freund
joined the cadre of bright young men invited to
participate in the first Franklin D. Roosevelt ad-
novel American exercise in national power de-
manded. There, he served as counselor and
advocate, first on the legal staffs of the Treasury
Department and the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, from 1933 to 1935, and then as
special assistant to the Attorney General, in the
Office of the Solicitor General, from 1935 to
1939. He returned to the Solicitor General's of-
fice for another tour of duty during World War
n, from 1942 to 1946, on leave from the Har-
vard Law School, where he had been appointed
a lecturer in 1939 and a professor in 1940.
The primary business of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's office is to assert and protect the interests
of the United States in litigation before the
Supreme Court. In the Solicitor General's office,
Freund had a command post among those en-
gaged in the making of a constitutional revolu-
tion, bringing to fruition the conception of na-
tional hegemony first judicially conceived by
Chief Justice John Marshall, but thereafter
thwarted by decades of states' rights and laissez-
faire jurisprudence. The great depression and
World War n required flexibility in constitu-
match the needs for power to meet and resolve
successfully both cataclysms. The Solicitor Gen-
eral's office, with Freund as an intellectual
leader, proffered the necessary arguments and
convinced what was at first a reluctant, but

the necessary constitutional changes. As advo-
cate before the Court, Freund had the opportun-
ity to argue to jurists who had had experience
in taking his counsel. Brandeis was still a justice
when Freund first appeared before the Court.
And during Freund's career at the Department
of Justice, Felix Frankfurter, his teacher, and
Stanley Reed and Robert H. Jackson, under
whom Freund served in the Solicitor General's
office, became Supreme Court justices.
Freund participated in oral argument or in
writing briefs in a multitude of cases, some of
which still find their way into the law school case-
books and which provided a background of ex-
perience that surely enhanced his teaching of
them: United States v. Carolene Products (304
U.S. 144, 1938), where Justice Harlan F. Stone
first adumbrated the distinction between eco-
nomic legislation, which the Court should treat
with great deference to the legislative will, and
alleged infringements on civil liberties, which
calls for a good deal less obeisance to legislative
or executive discretion; Electric Bond &• Share
Co. v. S.E.C. (303 U.S. 419, 1938), in which
the government outmaneuvered the public utili-
ties in securing Supreme Court sanction for the
Public Utility Holding Company Act; Coleman
v. Miller (307 U.S. 433, 1939), defined, at least
temporarily, a need for judicial abstention from
"political questions"; Tennessee Power Co. v.
T.V.A. (306 U.S. 118, 1939), established the
validity of the national government's Tennessee
Valley Authority experiment. The cases estab-
lishing the constitutionality of the wartime
regulation of prices and wages and the validity
of the procedures for their effectuation were
Bowles v. Willingham (321 U.S. 498, 1944);
Dairies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles (321 U.S. 144,
1944); Yakus v. United States (321 U.S. 414,
1944). These are but a few examples of a very
long list of important Supreme Court decisions
in the shaping of which Freund played a role as
advocate.
The range of cases revealed a catholicity that
has always typified Freund's legal interests. Not
all the cases in which he participated, of course,
were so fundamental. What may have been his
first argument before the Court concerned the
question whether a jigsaw puzzle was a game
within the meaning of a provision of the tax
law. Freund contended that it was and lost
(White v. Aronson [302 U.S. 16, 1937]).
After the war, Freund abandoned the career
of barrister and returned to his role as teacher
at the Harvard Law School, where he remained,
FREUND, PAUL A. 203
except for occasional leaves, until his retirement
in 1976. He was appointed Fairchild professor
in 1950 and Royall professor in 1957. In 1958,
he received the accolade of a university profes-
sorship, the Carl M. Loeb chair. This gave him
the opportunity to expand his student audience
beyond the law school to the undergraduates of
Harvard College. This was a recognition by the
university that while the law was Freund's pro-
fession, he infused its content with insights
from wide learning in literature and poetry,
philosophy and art, and even from the sciences.
His mission, however, was more to bring an
understanding of the role of law in a democratic
society to undergraduates and graduates alike,
than to bring these other subjects to the atten-
tion of students of law. From 1946 through
1976, Freund was, in the phrase so frequently
invoked by his faculty brethren, the "quintessen-
tial teacher." Even during his teaching days he
was described by Time as a "legend" among law
teachers.
Twice he left the classrooms of Harvard dur-
ing his tenure there: Once to serve as Pitt pro-
fessor of American history and institutions at
Cambridge University (1957/1958); once to be
a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in
the Behavioral Sciences, in Palo Alto, California
(1969/1970). He also became the director of
the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies,
where American jurists and scholars taught
seminars in American law to European stu-
dents, during summer sessions. He was a par-
ticularly appropriate director for such studies
since, at the Harvard Law School, he served for
many years as chairman of its program of
graduate studies.
In the fall of 1971, Chief Justice Warren
Burger, as chairman of the Federal Judicial
Center, appointed a committee to study the case
load of the Supreme Court and to make recom-
mendations as to what steps should be taken in
light of its discoveries. Not unnaturally, as the
nation's leading scholar on the Supreme Court,
Paul Freund was appointed chairman of the
study group, which reported in 1972 that the
Court's process of selecting cases for adjudica-
tion was swamping it and seriously detracting
from its capacities to render judgments and
opinions in the cases that it undertook to decide.
The Report of the Study Group on the Case Load
of the Supreme Court (1972) recommended the
creation of an intermediate court to pass on
petitions for review and to undertake resolution
of some of the cases appropriate for additional
204 FREUND, PAUL A.
review but not calling for Supreme Court judg-
ment. Instead of calming the surprising furor
over this fairly technical subject, the Report
exacerbated it. The report was never effectu-
ated, but the issue it addressed and the resolu-
tion of it remained a matter of controversy, with
justices of the Court frequently taking to the
hustings to defend or attack the study group's
proposals.
Like two of his predecessors and mentors at
the Harvard Law School, Thomas Reed Powell
and Frankfurter, Freund's commitments to legal
scholarship largely invoked the oral tradition,
outside the classroom as well as within it. He
has written no treatises and but a single mono-
graph. His subjects, the Supreme Court and the
Constitution, do not lend themselves to encapsu-
lation in one or two volumes. For one who had,
what he once described in another as, "a dialec-
tical mind—recognizing principles in collision,"
it was not possible to write a pseudodefinitive
elucidation of the ever-changing constitution and
the everchanging causes of the changes. Even
his myriad articles have been largely derived
from the spoken word. Three of his books—a
fourth is a constitutional law casebook which he
coedited with colleagues—The Supreme Court of
the United States (1961), On Understanding the
Supreme Court (1948), and Religion and the
Public Schools (1965)—all derive from lectures.
He was also the editor of Experimentation With
Human Subjects (1970).
Freund was in demand everywhere that there
was a gathering to discuss and analyze the in-
tellectual issues of the law, and particularly
where the subject was the Constitution, the
Supreme Court, or its justices. And he re-
sponded to these demands with a generosity that
has marked no other constitutionalist. His talks
ranged from the Jefferson lecture, delivered at
the instance of the National Endowment for the
Humanities to a prestigious audience of Wash-
ington dignitaries, to conversations with small
groups of students at the almost infinite number
of law schools where he was making his sub-
stantial contributions to their extracurricular
programs. Freund was a professor at Harvard,
but he in fact served as teacher to law students
everywhere.
Nor was his service to the life of the mind
limited to his classroom teaching or his dis-
courses on important subjects in lecture halls
all over the nation. Thus, he was, inter alia,
president of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences; vice president of the Massachusetts
Historical Society; a member of the Council of
the American Law Institute; a member and
chairman of the Harvard Society of Fellows.
Like the other truly great legal essayist of our
times, Judge Learned Hand, his name came to
the forefront as a nominee for the Supreme
Court every time a vacancy on that Court oc-
curred. It has been said that President John F.
Kennedy, among whose campaign advisers he
was numbered, failed to appoint him as suc-
cessor to Felix Frankfurter because Freund had
declined Kennedy's tendered appointment as
Solicitor General of the United States. That
Freund was never nominated to the Court
should come as no surprise. Justices of the Su-
preme Court get there largely because of their
political contributions or as reward for services
on lower courts. Scholarship has never been a
qualification for that high office. The only two
justices to be appointed directly from an aca-
demic chair to the Supreme Court have been
Felix Frankfurter and William Howard Taft,
the first a close political adviser to Franklin
Roosevelt and the latter a former president of
the United States. The failure to appoint Freund
has proved a great loss to the nation, for the
Supreme Court has suffered during the Warren
and Burger years primarily from the absence of
just such scholarly credentials as Freund would
have brought to it.
The great bulk of Freund's work has been all
but buried in law reviews and in many volumes
of collected papers and speeches where it tends
to escape the study of many scholars and jurists
because his name is not to be found on the
spines of the printed volumes or in the cata-
logues of the libraries that contain them. The
Freund canon will someday be collected and
published so that future generations are not
denied the wisdom and counsel he offered his
contemporaries.
On retirement from the Harvard Law School
faculty in 1976, Freund turned to completion
of a volume of the history of the Supreme Court,
the volume devoted to the period of the Hughes
Court. Freund, at the time of the creation of the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise project—the writ-
ing of a history of the Supreme Court—was ap-
pointed editor in chief of the multivolume ser-
ies. As with all his work, Freund has been
conscientious about the task, a real editor not
merely a titular one. Here, as elsewhere, he has
raised the quality of the writings of others, to
which he has contributed without stint. When
brought to fruition, the history will be a re-

markable tribute not only to Oliver Wendell
Holmes, but to Paul Freund as well.
Law professors, even the greatest of them,
are not the stuff of history, unless like Joseph
Story they are both jurist and professor at the
same time, or like Justices Holmes, Stone, Frank-
furter, and William O. Douglas, they move di-
rectly or indirectly from the chair to the bench.
It is not that law professors do not affect the
course of legal history as much as their legal
colleagues on courts, in legislatures, and as ex-
ecutive officials. It is rather that their effects
are more subtle and less palpable. As Frank-
furter once put it: "The ultimate accomplish-
ment of a thinker is found not in his books nor
in his opinions but in the minds of men." Cer-
tainly the accomplishments of Paul Freund are
to be found in the minds of many men. His is
a life of teaching: at Harvard University, where
thousands of the brightest and best students
were exposed to his wisdom; to Supreme Court
justices, governors, cabinet officers, senators,
and congressmen; and, not least, to his profes-
sorial colleagues, who came to Freund for ad-
vice and counseling. And his writings afford
light to thousands whom he has never met. As
a teacher, however, he left no cult, he taught no
dogma. His faith was compassion; his formula
was intelligence; his profession was honesty; his
weapon was wit; his goal was civility.
PHILIP B. KURLAND
WORKS BY FREUND
(1948) 1977 On Understanding the Supreme Court.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
1961 The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Busi-
ness, Purposes, and Performance. Cleveland: World.
1965 Religion and the Public Schools. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1967 Freund, Paul A. et al. (editors) Constitutional
Law: Cases and Other Problems. Boston: Little,
Brown. —> A supplement was published in 1975.
1968 On Law and Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press.
1970 Freund, Paul A. (editor) Experimentation With
Human Subjects. Daedalus Library Series. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sci-
ences.
1972 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER Report of the Study
Group on the Case Load of the Supreme Court.
Washington: Federal Judicial Center.
FRIEDMANN, GEORGES
At the time he entered the Ecole Normale
Superieure in 1923, Georges Freidmann (1902-
1977) was 21 years old. Not long before, in
1921, the French Socialist party had undergone
its split at the Congress of Tours. The two par-
FRIEDMANN, GEORGES 205
ties, one socialist, the other communist, did not
attempt an alliance until fifty years later, and
at the time Friedmann died there was every
indication that the alliance of these parties
would form the next government of France.
During those fifty years, communism ran its
course in the Soviet Union. Its destiny would
first enrapture and later disenchant the Euro-
pean intelligentsia of which Friedmann was an
eminent member.
At the Ecole Normale, he played the older
brother to Jean-Paul Sartre and Claude Levi-
Strauss, and in her book The Mandarins., Simone
de Beauvoir evokes this wary, uneasy figure.
The first temptation for this scion of solid
middle-class Jewish parents was literature, and
in three years (1930—1932) he published three
novels (which he never allowed to be reprinted)
which traced the portrait of an adolescent in
search of his own way. He had learned how to
write, and all of his sociological works were
marked by a quality and clarity of expression
rare among sociologists. Having passed his ad-
vanced examination in philosophy, he taught at
the lycee of Bourges during 1929/1930. Then
he became a research assistant at the Center for
Social Documentation of the Ecole Normale
Superieure, an early version of the social sci-
ence sections of the Centre National de la Re-
cherche Scientifique (CNRS).
This was the epoch when three currents
marked French thought: surrealism, existential-
ism, and Marxism. Friedmann's allegiances
were with the last. He collaborated on the re-
views Clarete, Europe, and L'Esprit (1926/
1927) with Pierre Morhange, Norbert Guter-
man, Henri Lefebvre, and Georges Politzer. This
tiny group initiated the intellectual debate on
Marxism in France—a debate that had not yet
been widely disseminated. Two highly polemical
books came out of this period: Problemes du
machinisme en U.R.S.S. et dans les pays
capitalistes (1934) and La crise du progres
(1936). These two books laid the foundation
for all of Friedmann's thinking.
In the first, he showed the consequences of
the division and mechanization of labor for the
life of workers. The Soviet Union, by proposing
five-year plans that were debated in factories
and collective farms, permitted laborers to over-
come the disastrous effects of the parceling out
of specific tasks. The standard of living in-
creased. For the intelligentsia of the West, there
appeared to be few shadows on the far side of
Europe, while all seemed gloomy in the capital-
206 FRIEDMANN, GEORGES
1st countries, which were immersed in great
crises. In 1930 a translation of Henry Ford's
Progress was published in France; it justified
Frederick W. Taylor's system of time and mo-
tion efficiency studies, promoted "scientific man-
agement," and offered a vision of a brilliant
future for free enterprise societies. To this book
and to others of a similar philosophy, Fried-
mann responded with his virulent La crise du
progres, a severe, well-documented depiction
of the seven plagues besetting the kingdom of
silver. Here the author took on not only labor
as such, but the entire economic and financial
structure of capitalism.
In the meantime, Friedmann was offered the
position of instructor at a vocational school
where trades such as carpentry and cabinet-
making were taught, and for a start, he appren-
ticed himself to learn machine tools. At the
same time, he conducted investigations on the
evolution of labor, learned Russian, and traveled
several times to the Soviet Union. Based on
these travels, he wrote a book that quickly ac-
quired notoriety, De la Sainte Russie a I'U.R.S.S.
(1938). Here he set himself at a distance from
the Soviet Union, while etching a picture of rare
precision and discernment. His criticisms of the
Soviet Union, intermingled with high praise,
were not accepted by his French Marxist
friends; Politzer and Lefebvre would not spare
him, as he himself recalled in a footnote to his
final book, La puissance et la sagesse (1970).
Then came the war. Mobilized as an officer
in 1939/1940, he returned after the Armistice
to the region of Toulouse, where he joined an
underground network of the resistance. Of this
period, when he saw many friends (notably
Marc Bloch and Maurice Halbwachs) tragically
die, he wrote:
The War and the Occupation, shattering the orderly
confines of my bourgeois existence as an acade-
mician, stirring a new life in insecurity and some-
times in danger, at the low point of a frightful
period, were marked by the worst degradation and
depravity; but they also caused me to discover in
people I did not know, through unforgettable
experiences, courage, modesty, benevolence, the
active love of my neighbor. During halts for retreat
and meditation, the flame was suddenly rekindled.
The four "dark years" were, I daresay, great years in
my life, in the absence of which what was least me-
diocre in me might perhaps have been lost for
good. . . . (1970, p. 363)
After the liberation of France, he was named
inspector general of technical instruction. In
1946, he published his major work, Problemes
humaines du machinisme industriel. In this
compendium, published close to twenty years
before the pathbreaking Work in America (Spe-
cial Task Force . . . 1973), Friedmann raised
what would constitute, for two decades, the
problematics of the sociology of work. He re-
sumed his discussion of Taylorism and of Ford-
ism, a discussion enriched and deepened by
twenty years of reflection and observation, and
by intimate acquaintance with what was being
done and published in all the industrial coun-
tries. In this book, he also introduced Europeans
to the most recent works in American social
psychology, adding to them a critique that is
always subtle in its nuances. To some, he re-
called that "human relations" and "industrial
relations" always played their part inside global
social structures; to others, for whom all that
mattered were changes in the macrostructure,
he emphasized that these would be swallowed
up if the microorganisms of change were not
brought into play.
From 1946 to 1960, he occupied the chair of
history of labor at the Conservatoire des Arts et
Metiers in Paris, a celebrated engineering
school, where he taught evening courses, thus
permitting workers and technicians to become
familiar not only with history, but with contem-
porary sociology. From 1949 to 1951, he was
also director of the Center for Sociological Stud-
ies, a section of the CNRS. He appealed to
young scholars, to whom he never stopped offer-
ing advice and support, and in this position he
was one of the great sponsors of sociology in
France. Under the common rubric of investi-
gating the problems of industrial society, he en-
listed among his collaborators V. and F. Isam-
bert, J. R. Treanton, J. D. Reynaud, R. Pages,
A. Touraine, M. Crozier, E. and V. Morin,
J. Dumazedier, S. Moscovici, B. Mottez, J. Frisch-
Gauthier, L. Brams, H. Mendras, R. Barthes,
Marie Therese Basse, and Jacques Dofny. They
went with Friedmann first to the Center for So-
ciological Studies, and later to the Ecole Pratique
des Hautes Etudes, a graduate research center,
of which he became a director in 1948. He also
formed, with Fernand Braudel and Charles
Moraze, the editorial board of the celebrated
journal Les Annales.
During his career, he published two more
books on the problems of industry, Ou va le
travail humain? (1950) and Le travail en
miettes (1956), in which he continued to ex-
plore the same themes. From 1950 on, he placed

his emphasis on the rotation of workers to dif-
ferent places on the assembly line, on the multi-
valence of machine workers, and on the enlarge-
ment of their tasks. Friedmann regarded all of
his experiences—whether in a factory, a restau-
rant, or an office—with an inquisitive, enthusias-
tic eye. His books were translated into English,
Italian, German, Spanish, Polish, Serbo-Croa-
tian, Czech, Slovakian, Dutch, Portuguese, and
Japanese. It therefore was no surprise when the
International Sociological Association, of which
he had been a charter member, elected him its
third president at the time of the Amsterdam
Congress (1956). Shortly afterward, the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization named him president of the Latin
American faculty of social sciences in Santiago.
In 1959 and 1961, he published two volumes of
his Problemes d'Amerique latine.
Then, in 1961 and 1962, he published Traite
de sociologie du travail with the assistance of
Pierre Naville and Jean Rene Treanton. It in-
volved the collective efforts of students who had
sat in on his graduate seminars for ten years
and had become his friends. The book was a
compendium of research and it traced the out-
lines of French industrial society in particular,
but with reference to other industrial societies.
In the same period, he presided over the found-
ing of the journal Sociologie du travail (1959).
After 1960, he abandoned the field of work
and helped establish a Center of Studies of Mass
Communications, with E. and V. Morin and
R. Barthes as his principal collaborators. The
center undertook to publish a journal, Communi-
cations, which % rapidly became authoritative in
this field.
Georges Friedmann was Jewish in his origins
and an agnostic in practice, but he wrote a
penetrating book on Israel, Fin du peuple Juif?
(1965). In the preface, he wrote:
In 1940, I received a first shock on discovering the
unsettling importance which the fact of being
labeled "Jewish" could have for me. I have kept the
paper with the letterhead of the Secretariat for
Public Education of the Vichy government, inform-
ing me that from now on I would be relieved under
particular laws. Unless, they suggested to me, I
were to beg to be granted special treatment, I
could not go on exercising my trade as a professor.
I had up to that time been one of those whom the
Jewish faithful call "marginal" or "peripheral" Jews.
Born in Paris into a family detached from traditional
observances, in which "mixed" marriages created
no problem, profoundly assimilated to France, to its
FRIEDMANN, GEORGES 207
styles of life, its culture, I had been surrounded by
friends and colleagues, not one of whom raised
questions about my "ethnic" origins or my religious
beliefs. I had never, though designated as Jewish by
my name, suffered from antisemitism. I had never
felt, even in school, discriminated against in French
society. I had never participated in a rite at a syna-
gogue and, I honestly believe, never met a rabbi.
The theme of the book is a questioning of the
history of the Jewish people and the creation of
a modern state. Did the history of that state,
which was just beginning, put an end to the his-
tory of the people of the Diaspora? Those who
knew Friedmann knew that he felt solidarity
with the destiny of these people. He concluded
his preface by underlining: "I have felt all that
I owe and wished to pay a part of my debt."
In 1970, he finished his last book, a kind of
testament, entitled La puissance et la sagesse.
It is a curiously composed book, with biographi-
cal passages and restatements of such essential
themes in his work as the concept of technologi-
cal civilization, the destruction of the natural
milieu, science, and the spiritual revolution.
This is followed by a long reflection on Christi-
anity, Judaism, Hindu spiritualism, Marx, and
subsequent varieties of Marxism and Commu-
nism. He repeated what he never stopped say-
ing, that no revolution in structures would suc-
ceed unless it was accompanied by what he
called true education: "man taking himself in
hand."
Friedmann died suddenly. He was in his
home, rereading the maxims of Chamfort, a
French moralist of the eighteenth century, that
century of Enlightenment to which Friedmann
was greatly indebted (he was similarly indebted
to Leibniz and Spinoza, to whom he had devoted
his doctoral thesis [1946b]).
In the foreword to a collection of essays en-
titled Une nouvelle civilisation (1973), which
constitutes an homage to Friedmann, these
words can be read: "The school of Durkheim
had withered during the period between the
wars and, after World War n, there was a kind
of sociological 'no man's land.' . . . After the
Center for Sociological Studies was created, it
achieved its high point with G. Friedmann."
Friedmann had been a forerunner. Well in
advance of a large part of the sociologists and
economists, he had rejected every doctrinal
orthodoxy that would exclusively connect the
human problems of industrial work to one or
other of the great economic and political sys-
tems of his time. He had spoken since before
 208 FRIEDRICH, CARL J.
the war of "technological civilization." Long be-
fore the phrase came into use, he discovered the
ecological problem that was posed by the "tech-
nological milieu" and the degradation of the
"natural milieu."
His works have also been denned as the as-
sociation of the observations of a historian of
the present with the queries of the moralist of
all times. Rarely have we seen a mind so ample
in its breadth, never ceasing until the last day
to question, to place in question all over again,
his own values, the results of his labors, his
ideals. He probed the boundaries of old and new
societies, discarded the vague and the conven-
tional, and was always happy to see those who
followed him undertake new research with the
spirit that always animated his own.
JACQUES DOFNY
(Translated by Richard Koffler)
WORKS BY FRIEDMANN
1930 Votre tour viendra. Paris: Gallimard.
1931 Ville qui n'a pas de fin! Paris: Gallimard.
1932 L'adieu. Paris: Gallimard.
1934 Problemes du machinisme en U.R.S.S. et dans les
pays capitalistes. Paris: Editions sociales Interna-
tionales.
1936 La crise du progres. Paris: Gallimard.
1938 De la Sainte Russie a I'U.R.S.S. Paris: Gallimard.
(1946a) 1961 Problemes humaines du machinisme
industriel. New ed. Paris: Gallimard. —» A transla-
tion of the first edition was published by the Free
Press in 1955 with the title Industrial Society.
(1946b) 1975 Leibniz et Spinoza. New ed. Paris: Gal-
limard.
(1950) 1963 Oii va le travail humain? New ed. Paris:
Gallimard.
(1953) 1971 Villes et campagnes: Civilisation urbaine
et civilisation rurale en France. Prepared under the
direction of and with an introduction by Georges
Friedmann. New ed. Paris: Colin.
(1956) 1961 Anatomy of Work. Glencoe, 111.: Free
Press. —» First published in French.
1959—1961 Problemes d'Amerique latine. 2 vcls. Paris:
Gallimard.
1961-1962 Traite de sociologie du travail. 2 vols.
Paris: Colin. —> With the collaboration of Pierre
Naville and the advice of Jean Rene Treanton.
(1965) 1967 End of the Jewish People? New York:
Doubleday. —> First published in French.
1966 7 etudes sur I'homme et la technique. Paris:
Gonthier.
1968 Halbwachs, Maurice. Volume 6, pages 304-306
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1970 La puissance et la sagesse. Paris: Gallimard.
1979 Ces merveilleux instruments. Paris: Denoel/Gon-
thier.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Une nouvelle civilisation: Hommage a Georges Fried-
mann. Paris: Gallimard, 1973.
SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 1973 Work in Amer-
ica. Washington: Government Printing Office.
FRIEDRICH, CARL J.
The story is told of a colloquium at Harvard
University in the early 1940s, at which one
scholar after another told his colleagues what
the "Unity of Science" meant to him. Finally,
Carl Joachim Friedrich, who was to succeed
Charles H. Mcllwain as Eaton professor of the
science of government at Harvard, answered by
reading the entries appearing in the library card
catalogue under his name. Even then, Friedrich's
works comprised efforts in the disciplines of
history, philosophy, jurisprudence, economics,
and communications, in addition to political
science proper, which he conceived in Aristotle's
terms as "the master science." During the next
three decades of his very active life, he deepened
his scholarship in all these areas, extended it to
aesthetics, and applied it successfully to the
practical concerns of constitution building at all
levels—e.g., winning, together with Talcott Par-
sons and others, the greater Boston contest, and
helping to design constitutions for the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and the European Community. Carl
Friedrich was a man of enormous, almost over-
whelming erudition, whose keen awareness of
the problems of communication (he always as-
signed Aristotle's Rhetoric in his course on the
history of political theory) kept him from being
obscure or arcane.
Friedrich was born in 1901 in Leipzig. His
father, a distinguished professor of surgery, had
pioneered a technique for the excision of the
lung, and during the Balkan Wars, he developed
a new method for cutting out wounds. His
mother was the daughter of a president of the
highest judicial court of the second German
Empire. Friedrich considered this background
an important factor in his intellectual develop-
ment. He attended the universities of Marburg,
Frankfort, and Vienna, where he studied medi-
cine and heard a course of lectures by Sigmund
Freud. The experience of studying medicine led
him later to denigrate the alleged methodologi-
cal advantages of the natural over the social
sciences. At the university in Heidelberg he
turned to the social sciences and studied under
Edgar Salin. He also worked with Alfred Weber;
his first published book was a translation of and
introduction to Weber's Standortlehre der In-
dustrie (1929). It was characteristic of his
loyalty to persons and institutions that, in
Weber's lifetime, he returned to Heidelberg and
participated in the Alfred Weber Institute of

Economics, and also organized and financed the
Institute of Political Science, over which he pre-
sided for several years.
Friedrich's most important contributions to
political science were made in the fields of com-
parative politics and political theory. He was
among the first to write comprehensively about
both constitutional democracy and totalitarian-
ism, and his elaborations, refinements, and ap-
plications of both concepts were systematic
without being procrustean. He thought of these
two forms of government as opposed to one an-
other, as suggested by the parallelism of the
titles of the two influential books, Constitutional
Government and Democracy (Friedrich 1937) and
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Fried-
rich & Brzezinski 1956) suggest. Never doc-
trinaire, he adjusted his teachings to changes
in the real world and his understanding of it, as
reflected in the successive titles of his basic
book in this area, from Constitutional Govern-
ment and Politics: Nature and Development
(1937) to Constitutional Government and De-
mocracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and
America (1950; 1968). Similarly, he revised his
earlier, pioneering views of totalitarianism, in
Totalitarianism in Perspective (Barber, Fried-
rich, & Curtis [1963] 1969).
Friedrich's catholicity of spirit, breadth and
depth of knowledge, and ability to communicate
with his students both actively and passively—in
the sense that they understood him and he un-
derstood them—prevented the growth around
him of the kind of discipleship that emerged
with later European immigrant scholars in the
United States, several of whom Friedrich, who
had arrived in 1922, helped with their immi-
gration. His influence was widespread, not be-
cause he taught a single method or a particular
set of substantive views, but because his scholar-
ship and teachings, oral and written, were re-
spected by his colleagues and students. (He
liked to address his student audiences as "my
fellow students.") His profound yet compre-
hensible scholarship combined with consider-
able organizational and political talents resulted
in his elections to the presidencies of the Ameri-
can and international political science associa-
tions, the Institut de Philosophic Politique, and
the American Society for Political and Legal
Philosophy, which he founded to bring together
scholars of politics, philosophy, and the law.
Friedrich understood theory to mean "valid
generalizations upon observed matter of fact,"
and he taught political theory in this sense.
FRIEDRICH, CARL J. 209
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, Althu-
sius, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel all had arrived
at certain generalizations based upon the politi-
cal "facts" that they had observed, and it was
up to the student of political theory and the
political practitioner to test or to apply these
theories anew. It must have been this under-
standing of theory that made Friedrich so useful
to as diverse a group of practitioners as the
creators of the West German constitution and
their American military government sponsors
after World War ii; Governor Munoz Marin and
his associates, who created Puerto Rico's com-
monwealth status; and the founding fathers of
the European communities. He always thought
that the plan for greater Boston, which he origi-
nated and worked out with the help of Parsons,
Walter Bogner, Charles Cherington, and George
Walker, was too original to be implemented, al-
though some of its components, like an under-
ground garage, were constructed many years
later.
Friedrich, as constitutional consultant, self-
consciously placed himself in a tradition that
goes back at least to Aristotle. He told his stu-
dents that as an adviser to the United States
military governor of Germany (1946-1949) he
was doing exactly what Aristotle and his disci-
ples in the academy had done for the Greek
rulers who consulted them. He treated his gov-
ernment clients much as he treated his "fellow"
students. He refused to tell them what to do,
preferring instead to lay out a number of options
and suggesting the probable consequences of
each. The choice—whether it was a particular
constitution device, a policy, or a course of
study—was the responsibility of the client,
whether he was a chief of government or a
graduate student.
Because he had the gifts of listening and
speaking persuasively, he was able to generate
innovation in the deliberative groups to which
he belonged. Friedrich has been given credit for
inventing article 67 of the Basic Law of Bonn,
the constitution of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, which provides for the "constructive vote
of no confidence," according to which parlia-
ment cannot dismiss a chancellor unless it first
agrees by a majority of its votes upon his suc-
cessor. This original idea could not have been
enacted into constitutional law had he not been
as authoritative and persuasive as he was, in
German, English, French, and Italian, both in
small groups and to large audiences, as well as
with the readers of his publications. Similarly,
 210 FRIEDRICH, CARL J.
his many contributions to the constitutional con-
struction of the European community, starting
with Studies in Federalism (Bowie & Friedrich
1954), in which a number of scholars extrapo-
lated from the range of possible federal func-
tions exhibited in five historic federal systems
(Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Australia,
United States), and concluded with Europe: An
Emergent Nation? (1969). In this as in his
other works on federalism, he was able to draw
on his profound historical knowledge, going back
at least to his second published book, which in-
cluded a one hundred page introduction on the
"consociational" theory of Johannes Althusius of
the early seventeenth century (1932). Like his
predecessor as Eaton professor, Charles H. Mc-
Ilwain, Friedrich helped to reintroduce historical
considerations into American political science,
which had developed an ahistorical or even anti-
historical bent after World War i. At the same
time, he took full intellectual advantage of con-
temporaneous concerns, for example, in his
works on bureaucracy, which helped provide a
foundation for later scholarship on bureaucratic
politics and organization theory.
To his work as a practical consultant—an ad-
viser to practical men of affairs—Friedrich
brought not only his profound historical knowl-
edge, but also philosophical depth and convic-
tion. He was firmly grounded in the Greek and
Roman classics, and in his courses he always
included lectures on the political theory of the
Old and New Testaments. He approached every
practical problem of government with a careful,
indeed a cautious, weighing of normative con-
cerns. Thus, his writings on foreign policy and
on problems of war and peace were informed by
his Kantian preferences, as expressed in Inevita-
ble Peace (1948). But in this as in all things
scholarly, he was scrupulously fair to other
philosophical persuasions, e.g., producing one
of the clearest English editions not only of read-
ings in The Philosophy of Kant (1949), but also
of its counterpiece, The Philosophy of Hegel
(1953), in the introduction to which he declared
his own lack of philosophical sympathy with
Hegel.
Because of the enormous scope of his work,
Friedrich's influence is hard to measure—a
circumstance that might have pleased him, be-
cause he remained skeptical, in the Aristotelian
sense, about measurable precision in politics,
and was therefore a critic of quantitavism in
the social sciences. He wrote more than forty
books, edited more than thirty, and was the
author or coauthor of more than two hundred
articles, not counting book reviews. During 45
years at Harvard and 15 at Heidelberg, he
taught thousands of students, including future
prime ministers, secretaries of state, diplomats,
leaders of major political parties in Europe and
North America, and other leading public ser-
vants, in addition to scores of prominent schol-
ars of successive generations. He was too learned
and too wise to be either monocausal or mono-
thematic in his teachings. His influence was
exerted more generally through his thorough,
impeccable scholarship, the critical brilliance
with which he could apply his knowledge to
novel problems in original ways, and his lasting
commitment to what he called the "humanist
core of constitutionalism." Its "detailed formula-
tion," he wrote,
will vary from community to community . . . [but
will] contain . . . a common core: the recogni-
tion of man's self as a person possessing intrinsic
dignity and hence entitled to an opportunity for
fulfilling the potentiality of his being. The emphasis
may shift from self-preserving to self-asserting and
again to self-developing manifestations of the in-
dividual human being. Independence, participation,
and creativity are universally valued, but their
rank order is not fixed nor based on settled, abso-
lute knowledge. Political communities will, there-
fore, differ in the degree to which they will leave
each man alone in the pursuit of his happiness,
allow him to participate in the government or un-
dertake in free association with fellow men what is
needed for man's self-development. . . . The battle
for human rights is a never-ending struggle; we
need not hope in order to act, nor need we to suc-
ceed in order to persevere. It can be carried for-
ward, if the belief in man which a transcendent
justice calls for is maintained as part of the West-
ern heritage. (1964, pp. 115-116)
HERBERT J. SPIRO
WORKS BY FRIEDRICH
(1929) 1971 FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (editor and translator)
Alfred Weber's Theory of the Location of Industries.
New York: Russell.
1930-1934 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. 15
vols. New York: Macmillan. —> Friedrich contribu-
ted the following articles: "Johannes Althusius,"
vol. 2, pp. 13-14; "Charles V," vol. 3, pp. 346-347;
"Confiscation," vol. 4, pp. 183-187; "Oliver Crom-
well," vol. 4, pp. 605-606; "Otto von Gierke," vol.
6, pp. 655-656; "Monarchy," vol. 10, pp. 579-584,
with Frederick M. Watkins; "Naturalization," vol.
11, pp. 305-309; "Oligarchy," vol. 11, pp. 462-465;
"Plutocracy," vol. 12, pp. 175-177; "Prerogative,"
vol. 12, pp. 318-320; "Reason of State," vol. 13,
pp. 143-144; "Separation of Powers," vol. 13, pp.
663-667.
1932 FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (editor) Politica Methodice

Digesta of Johannes Althusius (Althaus). Harvard
Political Classics, Vol. 2. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard Univ. Press. —> Reprinted from the third
edition of 1614. Includes the preface from the first
edition of 1603 and a series of 21 previously un-
published letters by the author.
(1932) 1967 FRIEDRICH, CARL J.; and COLE, TAYLOR
Responsible Bureaucracy: A Study of the Swiss
Civil Service. New York: Russell.
(1937) 1968 Constitutional Government and Democ-
racy: Theory and Practice in Europe and Amer-
ica. 4th ed. Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdale. —» First
published as Constitutional Government and Poli-
tics: Nature and Development.
(1942) 1950 The New Image of the Common Man.
Enl. ed. Boston: Beacon. —» First published as The
New Belief in the Common Man.
(1948) 1969 Inevitable Peace. New York: Greenwood.
1949 FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (editor) The Philosophy of
Kant: Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writ-
ings. New York: Modern Library.
1952 The Age of the Baroque: 1610-1660. New York:
Harper. —> Volume 5 of The Rise of Modern Europe
series.
1953 FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (editor) The Philosophy of
Hegel. New York: Modern Library.
1953 FRIEDRICH, CARL J.; and SPIRO, HERBERT J. Con-
stitution of the German Federal Republic. Pages
117-151 in Edward H. Litchfield et al. (editors),
Governing Postwar Germany. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Univ. Press.
1954 BOWIE, ROBERT R.; and FRIEDRICH, CARL J.
(editors) Studies in Federalism. Boston: Little,
Brown. —» This book was translated into Italian
in 1965, French in 1960-1962, and Arabic in 1965.
1954 FRIEDRICH, CARL J.; and MCCLOSKEY, ROBERT R.
(editors) From the Declaration of Independence to
the Constitution: The Roots of American Constitu-
tionalism. New York: Liberal Arts Press.
(1956) 1965 FRIEDRICH, CARL J.; and BRZEZINSKI,
ZBIGNIEW K. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autoc-
racy. 2d ed., rev. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press. —•> A paperback edition was published
by Praeger in 1961.
1957 FRIEDRICH, CARL J.; and BLITZER, CHARLES The
Age of Power. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press.
1958-1966 FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (editor) Nomos. 8 vols.
New York: Atherton. —» Volume 1: Authority,
1958. Volume 2: Community, 1959. Volume 3: Re-
sponsibility, 1960. Volume 4: Liberty, 1962. Vol-
ume 5: The Public Interest, 1962. Volume 6:
Justice, 1974. Volume 7: Rational Decision, 1964.
Volume 8: Revolution, 1966. Nomos is the yearbook
of the American Society for Political and Legal
Philosophy.
1959 Puerto Rico: Middle Road to Freedom. New York:
Rinehart.
1963 Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory
of Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
(1963) 1969 BARBER, BENJAMIN R.; FRIEDRICH, CARL
J.; and CURTIS, MICHAEL R. Totalitarianism in Per-
spective: Three Views. New York: Praeger.
1964 Transcendent Justice: The Religious Dimension
of Constitutionalism. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ.
Press.
1967a The Impact of American Constitutionalism
Abroad. Boston Univ. Press.
1967t» An Introduction to Political Theory. New York:
Harper.
1968a Constitutions and Constitutionalism. Volume 3,
pages 318-326 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
FRISCH, RAGNAR 211
1968b Monarchy. Volume 10, pages 412-415 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1968c Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice.
New York: Praeger.
1969 Europe: An Emergent Nation? New York:
Harper. ^
1972 The Pathology of Politics: Violence, Betrayal,
Corruption, Secrecy, and Propaganda. New York:
Harper.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BEYME, KLAUS VON 1971 Theorie und Politik: Fest-
schrift zum 70. Geburtstag fur Carl Joachim Fried-
rich. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
PENNOCK, J. ROLAND; and CHAPMAN, JOHN W. (editors)
1979 Nomos. Volume 20: Constitutionalism. New
York Univ. Press. —» Yearbook of the American So-
ciety for Political and Legal Philosophy.
FRISCH, RAGNAR
Ragnar Frisch was born in Oslo in 1895. His
father was the owner of a gold- and silverwork
firm in Oslo, and it was assumed that Frisch
would follow the family tradition. He started as
an apprentice in a gold- and silverwork shop in
Oslo, completing his probation work and receiv-
ing a certificate as a goldsmith in 1920. At the
same time, he also attended the University of
Oslo, where, according to his own description,
he studied economics because it seemed the
shortest and easiest subject. He graduated in
economics in 1919. In the 1920s, he went
abroad to study economics and mathematics
more earnestly, spending nearly three years in
France. In 1926 he received his PH.D. from the
University of Oslo on a mathematical-statistical
subject, semi-invariants and moments used in
the study of statistical distributions. He lectured
at several foreign universities, including Yale,
having established himself as a pioneer in the
application of mathematical and statistical
methods to economic research—i.e., the trend
that Frisch named "econometrics." In an effort
by members of the Norwegian Parliament and
others to bring him back to Norway, a new pro-
fessorship was established at the University of
Oslo to which Frisch was appointed in 1931.
He held the chair until his retirement in 1965,
and continued his research and writing up to
his death in 1973. His position as a leading eco-
nomist of the world was symbolized in 1969
when, jointly with Jan Tinbergen, he was the
first to receive the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize
in economic science.
Frisch's publications are not fully representa-
272 FRISCH, RAGNAR
tive of his activities or of his influence on the
development of economics. He has published
only a few books and a number of scientific
papers. Some represented significant advances
in the application of mathematical and statisti-
cal methods to economic research and have be-
come "classics" in the literature. However, he
probably influenced research trends just as
much through his lectures at various universi-
ties, through the circulation of research memo-
randa, lecture notes, and various drafts that
he more often than not did not trouble to polish
and publish in conventional form. (When he
had clarified a problem for himself, he was
more interested in taking up new problems than
in preparing final versions of preliminary man-
uscripts.) Through his organizational activities,
too, he greatly stimulated the development of
econometrics. A founder and driving force in
the organization of the Econometric Society,
which has become one of the most important
scientific organizations in economics, he was
also, for a long period, the editor of the journal
Econometrica.
When Frisch became a student at the Uni-
versity of Oslo, economics was not a well-devel-
oped subject in Norwegian academic teaching.
However, he studied some of the old masters
very carefully, especially David Ricardo, Alfred
Marshall, and Knut Wicksell, and continued to
hold them in high esteem. In his teaching he
prepared notes on Marshall's Principles (1890)
that were based on a very close reading of Mar-
shall's work and that were used for decades in
teaching in Norway. He also wrote one of the
most penetrating analyses of Wicksell's the-
ories. Nevertheless, he soon felt that a new start
was necessary in economics to free it from
vagueness and obscure reasoning and to estab-
lish it as a science more similar to the natural
sciences. The main instruments would be the
use of mathematical methods and statistics.
After his appointment at the University of Oslo,
economics became quite different; the introduc-
tion of methods, created largely by Frisch him-
self, soon destroyed the notion that economics
was the shortest and easiest course of study.
Through his teaching and research, Frisch
strongly influenced all economists educated at
the university. Several of his students have held
central positions in government and public ad-
ministration. At times, Frisch also took an ac-
tive part in the public discussions of economic
policy and—particularly in the later years—from
a radical position. After World War n he also
served as an adviser to governments in develop-
ing countries, especially India and Egypt.
When Frisch started to study economics, the
theory of consumer behavior was characterized
by obscure reasoning and concepts devoid of
operational content. At the same time, quantifi-
cation based on various kinds of empirical data
seemed feasible and attractive. This is probably
why Frisch turned to this field in his first im-
portant work, "Sur une probleme d'economie
pure" (1926). Attempting to establish a new
and firm basis for the theory and empirical
work, he constructed a system of basic axioms
from which the other parts of the theoretical
structure could be derived by means of strict
logical and mathematical deductions. For in-
stance, the existence of a utility function was
derived as a consequence of the axioms rather
than being directly postulated, and its proper-
ties, including its degree of determinateness,
were also derived from the axioms. In this way
one could rid the theory of much of its earlier
obscurity. Frisch was the first to use the axi-
omatic approach in this field, and though his
article was long ignored in the literature, today
it must be seen as an early model of a "modern"
approach to economic theory. Consistent with
his aim of turning economics into a science
based on measurement and quantification,
Frisch did not rest with an abstract formulation
of the theory. Even in this early work, he linked
the theory to empirical studies aimed at measur-
ing the main characteristics of the utility struc-
ture of consumers. There is a logical thread
from this early work through his New Methods
of Measuring Marginal Utility (1932), to his
well-known article "A Complete Scheme for
Computing All Direct and Cross-demand Elasti-
cities in a Model With Many Sectors" (1959).
This article proposed a method for estimating all
the elasticities in a complete system of demand
functions—a very large practical task because of
the many cross-influences of some commodity
prices on the demand for other commodities.
Frisch's ideas in this field have formed the basis
for numerous practical applications in connec-
tion with large-scale planning and forecasting
models.
Frisch also contributed to the other main
branch of microeconomics, production theory.
In his lecture notes from the 1920s on, he im-
proved and expanded production theory by
carefully distinguishing between technological

and economic concepts. The main part of his
text was published in English in 1965 and is
now a standard reference work. Had it been
published in an international language when it
was first presented in Norwegian, it would have
had a much greater impact upon the develop-
ment of production theory. As early as the
1930s, Frisch included in his Norwegian lecture
notes several aspects of dynamic production
theory and of the theory of production with sev-
eral outputs. His approach in the latter field
pointed in the direction of what has later come
to be known as mathematical programming—i.e.,
a mathematical approach to optimization for
problems in which there are side conditions not
only in the form of equations, but also in the
form of inequalities.
Influenced by the economic crisis of the
1930s, Frisch turned toward macroeconomic
problems. The first prerequisite to the construc-
tion of consistent and quantifiable theories in
this field is a well-developed national account-
ing system, and Frisch contributed greatly to
this field in the 1930s and 1940s, with regard
to both basic principles and to detail. On the
basis of macroeconomic conceptions, he soon
developed fully dynamic, determinate trade
cycle models, the most famous of which was
presented in "Propagation Problems and Im-
pulse Problems in Dynamic Economics" (1933).
He also took an active part in discussions of
economic policy in the 1930s. In several ways
his ideas resembled the "Keynesian" ideas de-
veloped in England and other countries. Direct-
ly, and through some of his students and as-
sociates, he influenced Labour party policy, first
its policy on the depression after the Labour
party government was formed in 1936, then its
reconstruction policy in the first years after
World War n. Throughout there was a close
interaction between his theoretical ideas and
his contributions to economic policy.
From a methodological point of view Frisch's
analysis of trade cycles led to two innovations
as well as to a general approach to studying de-
velopment in terms of a determinate dynamic
system. The first was a clarification of the con-
cepts of equilibrium and disequilibrium, statics
and dynamics, and other related concepts.
Frisch had worked on these problems for several
years, but his ideas became internationally known
through his brief article "On the Notion of
Equilibrium and Disequilibrium" (1936fo),
which has contributed much to methodology
FRISCH, RAGNAR 213
and terminology in dynamic economics. The
other innovation was to combine dynamic struc-
tural equations with random shocks in explain-
ing the trade cycles (inspired by, and parallel
with, works by Eugen Slutsky and G. Udny
Yule). Frisch showed mathematically and by
simulations how the structural equations of the
dynamic system would act as a system of
weights, transforming random shocks into
wavelike movements very similar to business
cycles. Both the theoretical idea and the analyti-
cal methods used by Frisch in this regard have
become standard elements of modern trade
cycle analysis.
Frisch's Nobel Prize citation made specific
reference to his "having developed and applied
dynamic models for the analysis of economic
processes." After World War n much of Frisch's
work was related, directly or indirectly, to prob-
lems of economic planning. His interest in the
field had started, however, in the 1930s, and in
1934 he published an article on "Circulation
Planning" that contained many elements of
modern planning theory, pointing toward input-
output analysis and mathematical program-
ming. The article, however, was concerned
more directly with methods of organizing a sort
of exchange system outside the ordinary market
system, so as to revive economic activity and
use the potential production capacities left idle
by the depression. The article did not draw in-
terest at the time, partly because of its unfamil-
iar mathematics, probably also because its the-
oretical ideas were presented in the context of
proposals for practical and institutional ar-
rangements that were artificial, and that could
hardly have seemed attractive either to theorists
or politicians at that time.
In the 1940s and early 1950s, Frisch developed
the methodology of what he called "decision
models" for economic policy—fairly large, em-
pirically specified, mathematical models relating
economic variables that are the main concern
of economic policy, and for which government
may have certain targets, with variables that
are used directly as instruments to influence
economic development (see especially his paper
1950b). Later his planning models took a new
form, based more on input-output analysis and
mathematical programming, with explicit ob-
jective functions or preference functions for
optimization. His models started a development
that has led to practical applications of large-
scale models based on input-output systems,
 214 FRISCH, RAGNAR
and supplemented with demand functions,
equations representing the structure of taxation,
and so on, to national budgeting in Norway. He
also developed models especially intended for
developing countries, and he took a keen inter-
est in the development of planning methodology
in the socialist countries in eastern Europe. (In
the latter context it is interesting to observe
that a long paper by Frisch on an economic
planning model was included, in Russian trans-
lation, in the second volume of an important
series of books on mathematics in economic re-
search and planning which was published in the
Soviet Union in 1961.) Much of Frisch's writing
on planning models has never been published
in final versions, but there exist a couple of
volumes with selected papers (I960; 1976). An
important aspect of Frisch's writing on eco-
nomic planning was his emphasis on optimiza-
tion. As a consequence, he had to tackle the
problem of establishing preference functions.
For this purpose, he devised various interview
techniques. Used for experimental purposes,
they have not yet been put to serious practical
use. However, similar methods are now used
increasingly in various branches of management
science (for a survey and for references to
Frisch's work in this field, see Johansen 1974).
Quantification, and, in the end, practical ap-
plications were constant goals of Frisch's re-
search program. This emphasis had several
consequences for the direction of his research.
In the first place, he was concerned with statis-
tical and econometric methodology. He was not
satisfied with taking over classical statistical
methods, which were designed more or less for
experimental situations and for measurements
of natural phenomena. He soon perceived the
complications stemming from the fact that most
economic processes were determined by the
simultaneous operation of several equations, so
that it was difficult to trace the cause-effect
direction in an unequivocal manner. In this con-
nection he emphasized the concept of autonomy
of economic relationships—i.e., whether a spe-
cific relationship in an economic system con-
tinues to hold even when other components of
the system change. He also pointed out the
identification problem in economic relation-
ships—i.e., whether an economic relationship
can be detected and estimated on the basis of
observations generated by means of sets of
more than one relationship. In his Statistical
Confluence Analysis (1934£>), Frisch proposed
methods of solving some of the statistical prob-
lems raised by the simultaneous operation of
several relationships (and at the same time the
existence of measurement errors or "errors in
variables"). Although his methods have been
superseded by others, his perception of the spe-
cial statistical problems raised by the interac-
tions in an economic system and his approaches
to solving the problems, have had fundamental
importance for the development of modern
econometric methodology.
Frisch's concern for quantification and appli-
cations also led him into the field of computa-
tional methods. Methods of computations were
always part of his statistical and econometric
studies, but he became particularly absorbed in
computational problems in connection with his
mathematical planning models. Since he em-
phasized optimization, mathematical program-
ming was his main concern. At the time he
started constructing large-scale mathematical
planning models, mathematical programming
methods and computations equipment were not
well developed, and he felt that economists
themselves would have to tackle many of the
technical problems in the field. He developed
methods of optimization for quite general situ-
ations, involving many sorts of awkward curva-
tures of functions and forms of feasible sets.
His works in this field contain many interesting
ideas and insights, but the methods he devel-
oped tended to be complicated and unsuitable
to full mechanization, and they have seen only
limited application.
This survey of Frisch's work has stressed as-
pects that absorbed his energies over longer
periods of time. The resultant picture is neces-
sarily incomplete, for Frisch's important work
ranged over many other fields, including, for
example, economic welfare theory, index num-
ber theory, oligopoly theory, international trade,
and population theory. His scientific produc-
tivity was great, although only a fraction was
ever published. (His best collection of papers
was published in Hungary in 1974.) Some of
his publications are hard to read and digest,
partly because of his preoccupation with com-
putational aspects, a certain tendency to pursue
analytically challenging, but economically less
interesting, sidetracks, but also because his
development of these ideas was outside the
main currents or fashions in economics, and
moreover, employed his own terminology. The
latter fact was, however, partly the result of his
great originality. His enthusiasm and ambition
in research were almost always far beyond what

could be humanly accomplished in limited time;
thus his research career was full of uncom-
pleted projects. Nevertheless, his ideas pro-
foundly influenced the direction of modern
economic science and contributed greatly to its
great leap forward in the last several decades.
LEIF JOHANSEN
WORKS BY FRISCH
(1926) 1957 Sur une probleme d'economie pure. Met-
roeconomica 9:79-111. —> First published as num-
ber 16 of the first series of Norsk Matematisk
Forenings Skrifter.
1932 New Methods of Measuring Marginal Utility.
Tubingen (Germany): Mohr.
(1933) 1965 Propagation Problems and Impulse Prob-
lems in Dynamic Economics. Pages 155—185 in
American Economic Association, Readings in Busi-
ness Cycles. Homewood, 111.: Irwin. —> First pub-
lished on pages 171-205 of Economic Essays in
Honor of Gustav Cassel published by Allen and Un-
win.
1934a Circulation Planning. Econometrica 2:258-336,
422-435.
1934b Statistical Confluence Analysis by Means of
Complete Regression Systems. University of Oslo,
Institute of Economics, Publication No. 5. Oslo:
The University.
1936a Annual Survey of General Economic Theory:
The Problem of Index Numbers. Econometrica
4:1-38.
1936b On the Notion of Equilibrium and Disequilib-
rium. Review of Economic Studies 3, no. 2:1-38.
1950a Alfred Marshall's Theory of Value. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 64:495-524.
1950fo L'emploi des modeles pour 1'elaboration d'une
politique economique rationelle. Revue d'Economie
Politique 1950:474-499, 601-635.
1952 Frisch on Wicksell. Pages 652-699 in Henry W.
Smegel (editor), The Development of Economic
Thought: Great Economists in Perspective. New
York: Wiley.
1959 A Complete Scheme for Computing All Direct
and Cross-demand Elasticities in a Model With
Many Sectors. Econometrica 27:177-196.
1960 Planning for India: Selected Explorations in
Methodology. New York: Asia Publishing House. —*
Published under the auspices of the Indian Statis-
tical Institute.
1961 Basic Features of the Oslo Channel Model. Vol-
ume 2, pages 429-531 in V. S. Nemchinov (editor),
Primenenie matematiki v ekonomicheskikh issle-
dovaniiakh (Applications of Mathematics to Eco-
nomics Research). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'
no-ekonomicheskoi literatury.
1962 Preface to the Oslo Channel Model. Pages 248-
286 in R. C. Geary (editor), Europe's Future in Fig-
ures. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
1965 Theory of Production. Dordrecht (Netherlands):
Reidel; Chicago: Rand McNally.
1970 From Utopian Theory to Practical Applications:
The Case of Econometrics. Pages 213-243 in Les
Prix Nobel en 1969. Stockholm: The Nobel Founda-
tion. —» Includes biographical notes .
1974 Kvantitativ es dinamikus kozgazdasdgtan. Buda-
pest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado.
1976 Economic Planning Studies: A Collection of Es-
says. Dordrecht (Netherlands): Reidel.
FROMM, ERICH 215
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARROW, KENNETH J. I960 The Work of Ragnar
Frisch, Econometrician. Econometrica 28:175-192.
EVARDSEN, KARE 1970 A Survey of Ragnar Frisch's
Contribution to the Science of Economics. De
Economist 118:174-196.
HAAVELMO, TRYGVE 1974 Ragnar A. K. Frisch. Pages
176-181 in American Philosophical Society, Year
Book. Philadelphia: The Society.
JOHANSEN, LEIF 1969 Ragnar Frisch's Contributions
to Economics. Swedish Journal of Economics
71:302-324.
JOHANSEN, LEIF 1974 Establishing Preference Func-
tions for Macroeconomic Decision Models: Some
Observations on Ragnar Frisch's Contributions.
European Economic Review 5:41—66.
SAMUELSON, PAUL A. 1974 Remembrances of Frisch.
European Economic Review 5: 7-23.
TINBERGEN, JAN 1974 Ragnar Frisch's Role in Econo-
metrics: A Sketch. European Economic Review
5:3-6.
FROMM, ERICH
Erich Fromm, psychoanalyst, has developed
his widely read ideas on man and society by
integrating psychoanalysis with the humanistic
tradition in philosophy, social science, and re-
ligion. Throughout his career, he has also been
concerned with translating theory into practice
as a psychoanalyst, social scientist, and political
activist in the prophetic mode. Born in Frank-
furt, Germany, on March 23, 1900, he studied
psychology, sociology, and philosophy at the
universities of Frankfort and Heidelberg, re-
ceiving his PH.D. from Frankfort in 1922, and
was trained in psychoanalysis at the Berlin In-
stitute. In 1932 he published his first articles
on social character, proposing the integration
of Freud's theory of character with Marx's
theory of social forces, thus explaining how
people develop the motivation required by a
particular economic system and why they are
attracted to particular ideas, ideals, and
ideologies.
From 1928 to 1938 Fromm was associated
with the Institute for Social Research, first at
the University of Frankfort, then at its resi-
dence in exile, Columbia University. In 1934
Fromm emigrated to the United States to escape
the Nazis and lectured at the New School for
Social Research, Yale University, Columbia Uni-
versity, and Bennington College. He later served
as chairman of the faculty of the William Alan-
son White Institute of Psychiatry, Psycho-
analysis, and Psychology, which trains psychol-
ogists as well as psychiatrists in psychoanalysis.
Fromm first gained a large general reader-
ship with Escape From Freedom (1941), which
explained man's unconscious fear of freedom
216 FROMM, ERICH
and the appeal of authoritarian political sys-
tems. This book influenced generations of col-
lege students and helped to shape intellectual
consciousness in America. He became identified
as a leading neo-Freudian, together with Karen
Homey and Harry Stack Sullivan. Fromm has
written that although the three differ consider-
ably among themselves, they share an emphasis
on social and cultural factors and a critical at-
titude to Freud's theory of the primacy of the
sexual instinct.
In 1951 Fromm became a professor at the
National University of Mexico, where he
founded the Mexican Institute of Psychoanal-
ysis. His main reason for moving to Mexico was
his response to a group of socially committed
psychiatrists who sought psychoanalytic train-
ing from him. For the next twenty years, he spent
most of his time in Mexico, traveling regularly
to the United States to lecture and give semi-
nars. In 1971 he moved to Switzerland where
he has continued research and writing.
Over the years Fromm has developed several
key themes, progressively elaborating and refin-
ing his ideas. His work may be grouped into
four general areas. The first is social character,
probably his most original concept, which re-
lates the psychoanalytic theory of dynamic moti-
vation to socioeconomic factors. The second is
his revision of Freud's theory of psychoanalysis
and psychopathology, with particular attention
to the issues of aggression and destructiveness.
The third includes his critique of industrial so-
ciety. The fourth is his analysis of religion and
its relation to human development.
Social character. Fromm builds his theory on
Freud's concept of the dynamic nature of char-
acter traits. Character structure explains ac-
tions, thoughts, and ideas; it determines what
motivates the individual, what he finds most
satisfying or frustrating. Although Fromm ac-
cepts Freud's clinical description of character
orientations—e.g., the anal or the oral-receptive
character, he rejects libido theory as explaining
character development.
Fromm holds that, although physiological
needs must be satisfied, they are not the basic
inner forces that determine man's actions, feel-
ings, and thoughts. He wrote:
Only by considering the specific conditions of
human existence, and its inherent contradictions,
can we understand the basic human forces and
passions. Man is a "freak of nature"; lacking the
instinctive equipment which regulates the life of all
animals, but gifted instead with reason, imagina-
tion and self-awareness, life becomes for him a
problem which must be solved. He has to relate
himself to others, to find a new rootedness to re-
place those roots in nature which other animals
have; he must acquire a sense of identity (self)
and a system of orientation and an object of de-
votion. (1955a, p. 379)
Character, for Fromm, is the equivalent of the
animal's instinctive determinism, which hu-
mans have lost. It is the (relatively permanent)
way in which human energy is channeled and
structured in the process of assimilation and so-
cialization, to satisfy needs for physical survival
—the need to acquire and assimilate things, and
for emotional survival—the need to be emotion-
ally related to others for defense, work, material
possessions, sexual satisfaction, play, the up-
bringing of the young, and the transmission of
knowledge.
The social character is the nucleus of the
character structure and is shared by most mem-
bers of a culture or a social group. It is not a
statistical measure or the traits shared by a ma-
jority; rather, it is a functional concept to be
understood in relationship to the socioeconomic
system, particularly the dominant methods of
production. According to Fromm, it is the func-
tion of the social character to shape the energies
of the members of the society in such a way
that their behavior is not a matter of conscious
decision whether or not to follow the social pat-
tern, but one of wanting to act as they have to
act and at the same time finding gratification in
acting according to the requirements of the cul-
ture. In other words, the concept of social char-
acter describes the molding and channeling of
human energy within a society for the purpose
of the continued functioning of this society.
For Fromm the family is the "psychic agency
of society," the institution with the function of
transmitting the requirements of society to the
growing child.
As an example of social character, Fromm
(1951) has revised Freud's concept of the anal
character, which he calls the "hoarding orien-
tation." This syndrome of traits includes inner
drives for orderliness, saving, punctuality, and
respect for authority that meet the economic
needs of the middle class in the nineteenth cen-
tury. In the twentieth century in advanced capi-
talistic societies, this social character is being re-
placed by another type oriented to consumption
and to fitting into bureaucratic structures
through easy adaptation to their rules and regu-
lations. Such a "marketing personality," accord-

ing to Fromm, reduces the capacity for genuine
and profound feeling and thought.
The concept of social character helps explain
social conflict as well as adaptation. As condi-
tions change, a social character may no longer fit,
and the resulting resentment and frustration
transform social cement into an explosive
force. Moreover, Fromm holds, social needs can,
and often do, conflict with needs stemming
from the nature of man and its inherent need
for love, human solidarity, and the development
of reason and creative talents. Fromm has
maintained that insofar as a given society does
not satisfy these human needs it will cause a
"socially patterned defect."
Fromm first experimented with a new
method of studying social character in 1931 at
the Institute for Social Research at the Univers-
ity of Frankfort. His immediate interest was
knowing how many German workers and em-
ployees were reliable fighters against Nazism. In
their political opinions respondents were all
anti-Nazis. However, a different picture emerged
when Fromm and his co-workers distinguished
opinions from convictions rooted in the char-
acter structure. Their main interest was not so-
cial character in its broad sense, but that aspect
most relevant to the Nazi challenge: the au-
thoritarian as against the democratic character.
To explore character, Fromm developed an in-
terpretive questionnaire using open-ended ques-
tions. These were analyzed and coded as a
psychoanalyst examines a patient's communi-
cations, seeking the unconscious or unintended
meanings that reveal character structure.
That study was never published, but the con-
cept of the authoritarian personality was later
made the basis of a study carried out by Theo-
dor W. Adorno and his colleagues (1950) that
was influential in social research. In Fromm's
point of view, that study did not sufficiently
distinguish between convictions rooted in the
sadomasochistic authoritarian character and
conventional conservative or ethnocentric ide-
ology rooted in a different character structure.
In Mexico, with the collaboration of his stu-
dents, Fromm initiated a study of social char-
acter using a more developed version of the
interpretive questionnaire (Fromm & Maccoby
1970). All the adults and half the children
in a rural village were interviewed. The re-
searchers explored relationships between char-
acter structure and such socioeconomic factors
as work, methods of farming, and family rela-
tionships. Fromm and Maccoby concluded the
FROMM, ERICH 217
analysis of the data by describing a process of
"social selection" by which certain character
types, in this case the more entrepreneurial,
"productive-exploitive" villagers, were better
adapted to modern agriculture and the develop-
ing capitalistic society; their ascendency to
power, however, was at the expense of other
character types less able to adapt. The result
was the emergence of negative character traits
and behavior (including alcoholism and vio-
lence) in those whose character did not fit. The
village study also included experiments in
change that demonstrated the importance of
taking account of character. This methodology
was later used in a study of corporate managers
in the United States (Maccoby 1976).
Psychoanalysis and psychopathology. Much
of Fromm's professional life has been devoted to
the clinical practice of psychoanalysis and the
supervision of psychoanalysts. A gifted clinician
and teacher, he has inspired generations of
students with his combination of penetrating un-
derstanding of the unconscious, demystification
of concepts, and tough-minded compassion.
Fromm stresses the importance of understand-
ing the patient's experience and of using lan-
guage that expresses experience. He demon-
strates this approach to dream interpretation in
The Forgotten Language (1951), where he de-
scribes analysis as liberating creativity and criti-
cal knowledge about self and others as well as
uncovering psychopathology.
Fromm's relationship to Freud and his work
is complex. For ten years he practiced as an
orthodox Freudian and was a member of the
International Psychoanalytic Association. His
criticism of Freud includes both Freud's theory
and his tendency to turn psychoanalysis into a
semipolitical movement demanding ideological
purity (1959). However, Fromm's aim in both
his teaching and his critique of psychoanalytic
theory has been to preserve and develop what
he considers to be the essential elements in
Freud's discoveries: the art of making the un-
conscious conscious and the science of the ir-
rational. Despite his critique of Freud, he be-
lieves that many of Freud's orthodox followers
have diluted the more critical elements of psy-
choanalysis, transforming the radical explora-
tion of the unconscious into an overly cognitive
"ego psychology."
Fromm (1970) criticizes Freud's model of
man as overly determined by his social views,
including his belief in patriarchy and his bour-
geois view of man as basically egoistic. Because
218 FROMM, ERICH
he limited his criticism of social norms to the
area of sexuality, Freud was handicapped in de-
veloping the full implication of his discoveries.
In reexamining the case history of "Little Hans,"
Fromm argues that Freud's model of man
caused him to misinterpret clinical evidence,
and especially to underestimate the importance
of the child's pre-Oedipal relationship to the
mother. Fromm's view of personality was influ-
enced by Johann J. Bachofen's nineteenth-cen-
tury work on mother right and the war between
the sexes (1849). Unlike Freud, Fromm sees
mature love as requiring equality between the
sexes.
In rejecting Freud's instinct theories, Fromm
conceives of psychopathology as rooted in char-
acter. In Escape from Freedom he describes
sadism and masochism as outcomes of a
basic need for relatedness, "springing from the
inability to bear the isolation and weakness of
one's own self. I suggest calling the aim which
is at the basis of both sadism and masochism:
symbiosis. . . . People are not sadistic or mas-
ochistic, but there is a constant oscillation be-
tween the active and the passive side of the
symbiotic complex. . . . In both cases individu-
ality and freedom are lost" (1941, pp. 158-159).
For Fromm, man's inability to endure feel-
ings of powerlessness, uncertainty, and sepa-
rateness lead to psychopathology. In The Heart
of Man (1964), he describes the three main
pathological forces of the psyche. Two of them,
incestuous fixation and narcissism, are elabora-
tions of Freudian concepts, though presented in
a new context of relatedness. The third, necro-
philia, is Fromm's own discovery, elaborated in
The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973).
In contrast to Freud's view, presented in his
later years, that man's destructiveness is innate
and rooted in a death instinct necessarily di-
rected either against the self or against others,
Fromm sees destructiveness as a result of un-
favorable conditions in the child's development
leading to sadism or necrophilia. Sadism is the
passion for total control over a living being, in-
cluding the desire to hurt and torture. Necro-
philia is the malignant form of the character
structure of which Freud's anal character is the
more benign form. It is the ultimate perversion,
just as its opposite, biophilia or love of life,
represents the orientation to unification and in-
tegrated growth: "Necrophilia in the charac-
terological sense can be described as the pas-
sionate attraction to all that is dead, decayed,
putrid, sickly; it is the passion to transform that
which is alive into something unalive; to destroy
for the sake of destruction; the exclusive inter-
est in all that is purely mechanical. It is the pas-
sion to tear apart living structures" (1973,
p. 332; italics in original).
For Fromm, mental health is rooted in bio-
philous development and a productive orienta-
tion. Few people are pure necrophiles or bjo-
philes: "The pure necrophile is insane; the pure
biophile is saintly. Most people are a particular
blend of the necrophilous and biophilous orien-
tations, and what matters is which of the two
trends is dominant" (1964, p. 48).
Critique of industrial society. Fromm evalu-
ates society according to whether or not its in-
stitutions stimulate healthy character develop-
ment. From this point of view the normal is not
the ideal, since normality may describe a social
character with pathological elements. In a num-
ber of his books, especially The Sane Society
(1955Z?), Fromm analyzes modern industrial so-
ciety—both its capitalistic and socialistic ver-
sions, and concludes that bureaucratic-mech-
anistic institutions cause dehumanization and
alienation from self.
For Fromm the total practice of life—at work,
in the family, as a citizen, and in cultural ac-
tivity—influences character development. Hu-
man development requires above all a society
that satisfies needs for security, justice, and
freedom—freedom not only from exploitation
and tyranny, but freedom also to participate
actively and responsibly, to create and construct.
In 1959 Fromm wrote a manifesto for the
Socialist party of the United States, and in 1965
he edited a collection of papers by sociologists
and philosophers on socialist humanism. Here
and in his essay on Marx (196la), Fromm sees
"authentic Marxism" as "perhaps the strongest
spiritual movement of a broad, nontheistic na-
ture in nineteenth-century Europe." He views
Marx as a humanist whose ideal was "a man
productively related to other men and to nature,
who would respond to the world in an alive
manner, and who would be rich not because he
had much but because he was much" (1965, p.
ix). He believes that Marx's concept of man and
society has been misinterpreted both by those
who felt threatened by his program, and by
many socialists, led by those in the Soviet Union,
who believed that his goal was exclusively mate-
rial affluence for all and that Marxism differed
from capitalism only in its methods, which were
economically more efficient and could be initi-
ated by the working class. Fromm's view of

Marx has been endorsed by a group of eastern
European philosophers, especially in Yugoslavia,
with whom he has been in correspondence.
Along with criticizing the industrial-bureau-
cratic systems in both the West and the Com-
munist world, Fromm has been active as a
leader of the peace movement. In the early
1960s he spoke out for arms control and dis-
armament and opposed the war in Vietnam. An
advocate of detente, he disagrees with the cold
war view of the Soviets as a revolutionary so-
ciety, arguing that since Stalin the Russians
have been supporters of the status quo. In May
Man Prevail? (1961£>), he debated the leading
American theorists of military and foreign
policy, challenging their view of human motiva-
tion and their understanding of social change:
Our present thinking is a symptom of a deep-seated,
though unconscious defeatism, of a lack of faith in
the very values which we proclaim. We only cover
up this defeatism by concentrating on the evil of
communism and by promoting hate. If we continue
with our policy of the deterrent and with our unholy
alliances with dictatorial states in the name of free-
dom, we shall defeat the very values we hope to
defend. We shall lose our freedom and probably
also our lives. (1961£>, p. 252)
Fromm has been criticized (Schaar 1961) as
a Utopian whose view of human nature is overly
benign and who does not take sufficient account
of the realities of power. In fact, while optimis-
tic about human nature and its capacity for
creative growth, Fromm, as much or more than
any other psychologist of his time, focuses on
destructiveness and the potential for ending
human life on this planet. Although his concept
of health is demanding and his view of the good
society seems sketchy at times, Fromm supports
positive moves in the direction of health and
sanity, particularly reforms in work and educa-
tion that stimulate active participation. How-
ever, he believes that today, in an age of nu-
clear weapons and dehumanizing bureaucratic
organizations, the danger of destruction from
detached and overintellectualized leaders is
great. Preserving the world will ultimately re-
quire radical changes in the social system to
increase economic democracy and affirm a hu-
man ideal based on "being" rather than "having."
Religion. As a youth Fromm was a devout
Orthodox Jew. When he gave up religious ritual
and practice in his late twenties, he did not lose
his faith in the truth of religious teachings about
the nature of man. Unlike Freud, who saw
FROMM, ERICH 219
religion only as an illusion, a wish for an all-
powerful protecting father, Fromm (1950) dis-
tinguishes between the authoritarian, infantaliz-
ing and the humanistic, liberating aspects of
religion. Fromm's view of human development
is essentially that of the great humanistic re-
ligions: to overcome greed, hate, arrogance,
and egocentrism; to develop a strong, courage-
ous, and compassionate heart; to experience the
fullest truth, including one's deepest despair,
in order to love life more fully.
He wrote:
Mental health, in the humanistic sense, is charac-
terized by the ability to love and to create, by the
emergence from the incestuous ties to family and
nature, by a sense of identity based on one's experi-
ence of self as the subject and agent of one's
powers, by the grasp of reality inside and outside
of ourselves—that is, by the development of objec-
tivity and reason. The aim of life is to live it in-
tensely, to be fully born, to be fully awake. To
emerge from the ideas of infantile grandiosity
into the conviction of one's real though limited
strength; to be able to accept the paradox that
everyone of us is the most important thing there is
in the universe—and at the same time no more
important than a fly or a blade of grass. (1955Z?,
p. 203)
In You Shall Be as Gods (1966), he interprets
the development of Biblical concepts as a strug-
gle toward humanistic awakening and the over-
coming of idolatry. In an open letter to human-
istic Christians (1975), he wrote:
Idolatry is not the worship of certain gods instead
of others, or of one God instead of many. It is a
human attitude, that of the reification of all that
is alive. It is a man's submission to things, his self-
negation as a living, open, ego-transcending be-
ing. . . . The modern concept of alienation expresses
the same idea as the traditional concept of idolatry.
The alienated man bows down to the work of his
own hands and the circumstances of his own do-
ing. . . . Today's idols are the objects of a systemat-
ically cultivated greed: for money, power, lust,
glory, food and drink. Man worships the means
and ends of this greed: production, consumption,
military might, business, the state. The stronger he
makes his idol, the poorer he becomes, the emptier
he feels. Instead of joy he seeks thrills, instead of
life, he loves a mechanized world of gadgets, in-
stead of growth he seeks wealth, instead of being
he is interested in having and using.
Fromm believes that these religious state-
ments are truths that would be experienced by
anyone who challenged illusions and was willing
220 FURNIVALL, JOHN S.
to face the roots of his anxiety, depression, and
hopelessness. For him the ideal of liberation, of
being rather than having as expressed in the
Old Testament prophets, in Master Eckhardt,
in Zen Buddhism, and in the humanist philos-
ophers, points to a development of character
and practice of life that is not only more hu-
manly rewarding but is also the only direction
toward human survival in a world of limited
resources and unlimited possibilities of de-
struction.
MICHAEL MACCOBY
WORKS BY FROMM
(1932a) 1970 The Method and Function of an Ana-
lytic Social Psychology. Pages 110-134 in Erich
Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis. New York:
Holt. —» A paperback edition was published by
Fawcettin 1977.
(1932k) 1970 Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its
Relevance for Social Psychology. Pages 135-159 in
Eiich Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis. New
York: Holt. —» A paperback edition was published
by Fawcettin 1977.
(1941) 1960 Escape From Freedom. New York: Holt.
1947 Man for Hin, self: An Inquiry Into the Psychology
of Ethics. New York: Rinehart. —> A paperback edi-
tion was published by Fawcett in 1977.
1950 Psychoanalysis and Religion. New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press. —> A paperback edition was published
by Ban tarn in 1967.
(1951) 1962 The Forgotten Language: An Introduc-
tion to the Understanding of Dreams, Fairy Tales
and Myths. New York: Holt.
(1955a) 1961 Psychoanalysis. Pages 362-385 in
James R. Newman (editor), What Is Science? New
York: Washington Square Press.
(1955b) 1962 The Sane Society. New York: Holt.
—» A paperback edition was published by Fawcett
in 1977.
1956 The Art of Loving. New York: Harper. —» A
paperback edition was published in 1974.
(1959) 1972 Sigmund Freud's Mission. New York:
Harper.
(1960) FROMM, ERICH; SUZUKI, D. T.; and DE MAR-
TINO, RICHARD Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis.
New York: Harper. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1970.
(196la) 1966 FROMM, ERICH (editor) Marx's Concept
of Man. New York: Ungar.
1961b May Man Prevail? An Inquiry Into the Facts
and Fictions of Foreign Policy. Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday.
1962 Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter
with Marx and Freud. New York: Simon & Schuster.
1963 The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays on Reli-
gion, Psychology and Culture. New York: Holt.
1964 The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil.
New York: Harper. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1971.
1965 FROMM, ERICH (editor) Socialist Humanism: An
International Symposium. Garden City, N.Y.: Double-
day. —> A paperback edition was published in 1966.
1966 You Shall Be as Gods: A Radical Interpretation
of the Old Testament and Its Tradition. New York:
Holt. —> A paperback edition was published by Faw-
cett in 1977.
1968 The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized
Technology. New York: Harper.
1968 FROMM, ERICH; and XIRAU, RAMON The Nature
of Man. New York: Macmillan.
1970 The Crisis of Psychoanalysis. New York: Holt.
—» A paperback edition was published by Fawcett
in 1977.
1970 FROMM, ERICH; and MACCOBY, MICHAEL Social
Character in a Mexican Village: A Sociopsychoana-
lytic Study. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1973 The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. New
York: Holt. —» A paperback edition was published
by Fawcettin 1977.
1975 A Non-Christian Humanist Addresses Himself to
Humanist Christians on the Common Struggle
Against Idolatry. Cuernavaca (Mexico): CIDOC.
1976 To Have or To Be? New York: Harper.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADORNO, THEODOR W. et al. (1950) The Authoritarian
Personality. American Jewish Committee, Social
Studies Series, No. 3. New York: Harper.
BACHOFEN, JOHANN J. (1849) 1948 Das Mutter-
recht. Basel (Switzerland): Schwabe. —> Volumes 2
and 3 of Bachofen's Gesammelte Werke.
LANDIS, BERNARD; and TAUBER, EDWARD (editors)
1971 In the Name of Life: Essays in Honor of
Erich Fromm. New York: Holt.
MACCOBY, MICHAEL 1976 The Gamesman: The New
Corporate Leaders. New York: Simon & Schuster.
SCHAAR, JOHN H. 1961 Escape From Authority: The
Perspectives of Erich Fromm. New York: Basic
Books.
FURNIVALL, JOHN S.
John Sydenham Furnivall (1875-1960) com-
pleted the natural science tripos at Cambridge
University in 1899; passed the relevant exami-
nations to enter upon probationer's training for
the vaunted British Indian Civil Service (ICS);
and in December 1902 arrived in British Burma
still under training. For the next twenty years,
he went up the ladder of that extraordinary
bureaucracy. From subdivisional officer to dis-
trict commissioner to settlement officer and
finally to district commissioner (i.e., chief
magistrate of a "state" or "province"), Furnivall,
completely bilingual, traveled throughout Burma
and studied the country's history from the be-
ginning of the British connection in the 1820s.
Upon his formal retirement from the ICS in
1923, he briefly returned to England, but almost
immediately, in 1924, he decided to return to
Burma as a lecturer at several colleges, later
amalgamated as the University of Rangoon, and
as the founder and organizer of book clubs, mag-
azines, and adult educational enterprises. In
1931, he again returned to England to embark
on a series of studies in Holland and Dutch In-
donesia; to serve as ICS lecturer on Burmese
language, history and law at Cambridge; and
to undertake research for the British Burma Gov-
ernment during World War n. After Burma's

independence was formally declared on January
4, 1948, the newly independent regime invited
him to return to serve the Prime Minister's office,
chiefly as advisor on planning. There he re-
mained until the spring of 1960 when once again
he retired to Cambridge. Although he planned to
return to Burma as a special professor of eco-
nomics, he died later that year.
Throughout his official career, Furnivall
wrote a large, and to some extent unknown,
number of official and classified papers. His
published writings, begun in 1909, in the Eco-
nomic Journal (London), continued indefati-
gably until 1959. At his death, he left a con-
siderable body of unpublished manuscripts, chief
of which is "A Study of the Social and Economic
History of Burma" (1959).
The corpus of Furnivall's writing has two
main foci: the history, culture, and political and
economic administration of British and Inde-
pendent Burma, and an intensive and extensive
examination of the roles and missions of the
colonial systems in southeast Asia. He started
with the British colonial system in Burma, and
to a lesser extent with that in Malaya, worked
on the Dutch system in Indonesia, and had
begun to examine the United States colonial ex-
perience in the Philippines as well as the French
system in Indochina. This effort became part of
a "grand design" of which he completed and
published two major components (1939; 1948).
Although his social philosophy appears to
have been an amalgam of nineteenth-century
British liberalism and Fabian socialism, Furni-
vall was never concerned with sociopolitical
labels. Social science concepts of efficiency,
progress, plural society, welfare, social justice,
and cultural integration dominate his writings
and served him as tools of inquiry and norms for
judgment. He found that colonial powers fre-
quently brought some progress and efficiency to
their colonial empires, but at the expense of cul-
tural disintegration and alienation. Alien domi-
nation—political, economic, and cultural—gave
rise to nationalist movements seeking to oust
the colonial power. Frequently, in colonial em-
pires, different groups of individuals live to-
gether geographically, but maintain separate
cultures and organizations. Thus, its members
have difficulty developing common values and
institutions. Anticolonial success, he indicated,
is therefore followed by the difficult search for
both the individual and collective autonomy that
is necessary to reintegrate the formerly alienated
or plural colonial society. How to rid the inde-
FURNIVALL, JOHN S. 221
pendent society of the ill-effects of the forces set
in train by the colonial past, and how to bring
about freedom and cultural integration were, he
insisted, the essential tasks for the emergent in-
dependent regimes.
Furnivall was profoundly aware of the fact
that independence alone could not bridge the
gap between the precolonial and colonial ex-
periences. Tirelessly he reiterated his liberal,
non-Marxist, social democratic prescription:
The task of the new government was to weld the
component peoples into a united nation; to re-
integrate social life from the village upwards in an
organic national society; to instill into Burmans
[and the nationals of other emergent states] the
discipline of social and economic life in the modern
world; and to equip Burma [and other states] with
the political and economic institutions of a modern
[democratic] state. The process was certain to im-
pose irksome restrictions, arouse resentment and
engender resistance; yet . . . [the regime] could
not enforce the restrictions without the consent of
the people, even when these did not appreciate the
need for restrictions. ([1958] 1960, pp. 130-131)
Thirty years after independence took root in
the states of southeast Asia, after incessant years
of insurrection and civil and international wars,
after years of analysis and prescription by
others, the basic Furnivall analysis and prescrip-
tion are still valid. What more could one ask of
any single scholar-activist?
FRANK N. TRACER
WORKS BY FURNIVALL
(1939) 1944 Netherlands India: A Study of a Plural
Economy. Cambridge Univ. Press. —> Applies and
broadens J. H. Boeke's theory of the dual economy.
1942 The Political Economy of the Tropical Far East.
Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 29:195-
210.
(1948) 1956 Colonial Policy and Practice: A Com-
parative Study of Burma and Netherlands India.
New York Univ. Press.
(1958) 1960 The Governance of Modern Burma. 2d
ed., rev. & enl. New York: Institute of Pacific
Relations.
1959 A Study of the Social and Economic History
of Burma. Unpublished manuscript. —» Furnivall
worked on this study for the Office of the Prime
Minister of Burma from 1953 to 1959. It deals with
Burma under the British from the 1820s to the
1940s.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
TRACER, FRANK N. (editor) 1963 Furnivall of
Burma: An Annotated Bibliography of the Works
of John S. Furnivall. Southeast Asia Studies, Bibli-
ography Series, No. 8. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press. —> Includes 220 published and unpublished
entries.
TRACER, FRANK N. (editor) 1974 J. S. Furnivall,
Experiment in Independence: The Philippines.
Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House.
 GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH
He is among the preeminent gadflies of the
Western world and can claim more readers than
most other economists put together. He is the
leading antitheoretical theorist of our time, who
has attacked conventional economic abstractions
as empty, but who has not hesitated to propose
bold generalizations to describe the workings of
technological society. He is, consequently, the
only contemporary economist whose words are
followed by squads of critics prepared on a
moment's notice to write lengthy refutations.
John Kenneth Galbraith was born in 1908
near lona Station, Ontario, in a Scotch farming
community. He survived an indifferent rural
education, went to the Ontario College of Agri-
culture at Guelph, then to the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley for a PH.D in agricultural eco-
nomics (1934). He arrived at Harvard Univer-
sity as an instructor the following year, in time
for the intellectual fireworks ignited by the pub-
lication of John Maynard Keynes's The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(1936). Between 1941 and 1943 Galbraith pre-
sided in Washington as the country's chief price
fixer (deputy administrator) at the Office of
Price Administration. In 1945 he was a director
of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, set up to
determine the effectiveness of Allied air raids on
Germany and Japan. He returned to Harvard
as Paul M. Warburg professor of economics
until his retirement in 1975.
Intellectual influences. At Berkeley, Gal-
braith found the free-wheeling discussions con-
ducted by Leo Rogen, Robert A. Brady, and Ewald
Grether a revelation. Berkeley in the 1930s
abounded with radical ideas, Marxist in par-
ticular, but it was the new heresies then being
propounded by authors with legitimate pedigrees
that Galbraith found persuasive. A. A. Berle and
Gardiner C. Means came out with their cele-
brated book, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property (1933), which documented the
control of more than half the industrial economy
by two hundred nonfinancial corporations. Joan
Robinson and Edward H. Chamberlin began to
build the theoretical apparatus to study the
much neglected phenomenon of market power.
At Harvard Galbraith encountered Alvin Hansen
and Seymour Harris, evangelists of the new
Keynesian activism. In reading he found kindred
spirits in such disparate personalities as Thor-
stein Veblen and Evelyn Waugh, both detached
and acid.
Principal writings. The evolution of Gal-
braith's leading ideas can be traced in four books
conceived over a period of twenty-odd years.
American Capitalism: The Concept of Counter-
vailing Power (1952a) was written in the flush
of postwar prosperity and, not implausibly, the
author set himself the task of explaining why
the system worked. Characteristically, he began
by attacking the conventional explanation. The
system did not work, as adherents of the com-
petitive model proclaimed, through the rough
and tumble of many small buyers and sellers
trading in the marketplace. The days of laissez-
faire had ended with the great depression. De-
cisive parts of industry, trade, and banking were
now concentrated in the hands of a small num-
ber of large corporations. Prevailing theory had
223
224 GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH
simply become irrelevant. In the spirit of Joseph
A. Schumpeter, Galbraith recognized concentra-
tion as inevitable. The development of modern
technology required huge masses of capital. That
capital had to be protected from the vagaries
of the market. Size protects. The antitrust view—
and this was a theme to which Galbraith would
return again and again—was hopelessly archaic.
No serious person could contemplate the dis-
establishment of half the economy.
Since reference to the invisible hand did not
explain the operation of a modern economy,
another explanation had to be sought. Here
Galbraith introduced the theory of countervail-
ing power. Large organizations, such as the giant
firm, begat large counterorganizations, such as
the industry-wide union. Private economic power
was held in check by the countervailing power
that arose on the other side of the market. Where
countervailing power did not arise on its own,
it was the duty of government to nurture it.
Government had, in fact, done this in the case
of farmers. The same could be done for others.
Countervailing power belongs to the genus of
the self-regulating mechanism. It was—and was
explicitly offered as—a new rationale for non-
intervention in corporate life. Galbraith noted
one flaw, of no small consequence in light of
subsequent events. The mechanism does not
work in times of inflation. Then, businesses and
unions form a coalition and mutually exploit the
public through price and wage increases.
The next title, The Affluent Society (1958a),
was an ironic comment on a nation that pro-
duced an increasing abundance of goods, but
in which cities declined; transportation deterior-
ated; education, housing, and medical services
sank into crisis; and the poor remained poor
despite annual increases in the gross national
product. By 1958, the so-called beneficial effects
of the Korean War had worn off. By that time
Galbraith had set aside his preoccupation with
countervailing power and had taken a stance
that was to remain typical for the rest of his
career: that of mocking critic of a system that
is out of balance. The criticism extended liberally
to defenders of that system, particularly teach-
ers of economics.
Orthodox Keynesian policy bore the brunt of
Galbraith's attack. It was wrong to assume that
government merely had to ensure full employ-
ment and that the allocation of resources would
then take place automatically in optimal re-
sponse to consumer demand. It was also wrong
to assume that economic growth would solve all
problems. The composition of increasing output
was distorted by imbalances, impossible for
very long in the classical world of the sovereign
consumer, inevitable in the Galbraithian world
of the large corporation which engaged in want
creation through the devious arts of advertising
and salesmanship. The result of this shift Gal-
braith emphasized as the dependence effect: con-
sumer demand was not independent; it was de-
pendent on the blandishments of the producer.
The quest for social balance, he concluded, lay
in increasing public expenditures for deficient
social services. A large part of the funds could
come from cuts in excessive military budgets.
The New Class of the educated and affluent, as
Galbraith saw it, was the prime candidate to
lead the fight. It was simply in their own interest
to do so.
After serving as ambassador to India (1961-
1963) during the Kennedy administration, Gal-
braith completed a detailed examination of the
mature corporation, the archetype for several
hundred firms which make up the concentrated,
and dominant, part of the economy. The results
appeared in The New Industrial State (1967fc>).
The mature corporation has no inherent upper
limit in size, since size is an advantage in the
deployment of technology, the amassing of cap-
ital, and the mastery of the market. The en-
trepreneurial corporation was run by a single
individual, often the founder or one of his heirs,
but the mature corporation is too complex for
such management and requires direction by an
interdependent group of upper and middle level
administrators and technicians who collectively
command an enormous range of knowledge.
This group Galbraith called the technostructure.
The technostructure plans the firm's sources of
supply, internal operations, the sale of products,
and, in fact, seeks by all means within its power
to replace the market with planning. Above all,
the technostructure works for its own survival
and decision-making autonomy. This manifestly
includes freedom from stockholder intrusions.
Survival and autonomy are served by growth,
and growth replaces profit maximization as the
chief goal in the industrial system.
In this system, the producer manages the con-
sumer, albeit imperfectly. But the point is cru-
cial, for it reverses a basic sequence in economic
reasoning: the origination of instructions with
the consumer; their transmission through the
market; compliance by the producer. The re-
verse, or revised sequence (compare the depen-
dence effect), engineered through advertising

and salesmanship, plainly means that no opti-
mum consumer satisfaction is possible. The
larger implication is that the system of mature
corporations sells not only goods but a way of
life—one that increases the revenues of sellers,
but not necessarily the well-being of consumers.
The industrial system is closely dependent on
the state for: regulation of aggregate demand;
support of research and development; and con-
trol of unemployment and inflation. The logic
of Galbraith's model leads to policies he has
frequently advocated, namely, wage-price con-
trols and state action to fill planning lacunae,
as in housing and health. It also leads to a pro-
foundly skeptical attitude toward the military es-
tablishment which, as part of the industrial
system, also seeks growth and finds all the
necessary rationalizations to justify it. In com-
menting, Galbraith offers the hope that the
monopoly of the industrial system on social pur-
pose can be broken; that the industrial system
will become a diminishing part of life; that
aesthetic goals will command increasing atten-
tion. "The danger to liberty lies in the subor-
dination of belief to the needs of the industrial
system," not in the association of corporations
and government ([1967b] 1971, p. 401). That
association is a fait accompli and must be ac-
cepted as the inevitable outcome of sophisticated
technology and large-scale organization.
Galbraith's political activities led him to the
chairmanship of Americans for Democratic Ac-
tion from 1967 to 1969. Despite widespread dis-
comfort among economists, they extended due
recognition in electing him president of the
American Economic Association in 1972. Gal-
braith's next major work, Economics and the
Public Purpose (1973£>), is the definitive state-
ment of his mature views. He now uses the term
planning system instead of industrial system to
call attention to the problems of coordination
characteristic of a modern economy. The plan-
ning system has about 1000 firms; the market
system 12 million. The 1000 produce more than
the 12 million combined. Power resides in the
planning system: the power to plan prices and
outputs; to dispose of modern technology and
to grow; to sway consumers and the state; and
to extract favorable terms of trade from the
market system. The two systems develop un-
evenly. The strong go to the state and get the
services they need. The weak do without. Hence
the highly uneven development of public ser-
vices. Power and uneven development have no
place in neoclassical, or textbook, economics but
GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH 225
are central features of present-day reality. "Left
to themselves"—and this statement epitomizes
the difference between Galbraithian and neo-
classical views—"economic forces do not work
out for the best except perhaps for the power-
ful" (1973b, p. xiii).
Galbraith's theory of reform turns on the
emancipation of belief from the thralldom of the
planning system. That system can deliver more
and more commodities but cannot deliver us
from the pain caused by uneven development,
grossly unequal incomes, environmental disrup-
tion, inflation, inadequate public services—the
well-known social ailments. Pain, aided by per-
suasion, can produce public cognizance, which
is awareness that the needs of the public are
not the same as those of the planning system.
The job is to pry the state loose from the grip
of the planning system and place it at the dis-
posal of the public. This is the central issue
facing the electorate.
An adequate program would have to include
elements of what Galbraith calls democratic
socialism. We must, he argues: (1) run the
weak parts of the market economy—housing,
urban transportation, health care—by public au-
thority; (2) encourage small and weak firms to
merge and equalize their terms of trade with
the planning system; (3) nationalize the mili-
tary contractors; (4) replace the stock of the
largest corporations with public bonds; and (5)
plan the planning system—supply the coordina-
tion needed in the absence of a self-regulating
mechanism.
Galbraith's influence. By the time Economics
and the Public Purpose was written, a marked
split had taken place in the economics profes-
sion. The neoclassical majority continued to be-
lieve, with suitable qualifications, that the con-
cept of a self-regulating market was still a suffi-
cient description of reality. The post-Keynesians,
as they came to be called, still a minority, held
that the task of economists was to chart the de-
cline of the market and the passage of power to
large organizations—in short, to devise theories
and policies in conformity with the current re-
ality. Galbraith must be regarded as one of the
chief formulators of the post-Keynesian point of
view, and one of the most telling critics of or-
thodoxy.
Galbraith's position can be contrasted with
that of Keynes. Keynes believed in managing the
level of effective demand but otherwise in letting
the market alone. Galbraith believes in managing
the market itself and replacing parts of it with
226 GALLUP, GEORGE
planning. Galbraith's wit and derisive style, to-
gether with a deep abhorrence of technical jar-
gon, have won him a vast public—not to men-
tion professional—audience, to whom he has
brought home the fact that textbook economics
is beyond doubt in a sorry state and that, as he
would have it, a greatly improved alternative
exists.
M. E. SHARPE
WORKS BY GALBRAITH
1938 DENNISON, HENRY S.; and GALBRAITH, JOHN
KENNETH Modern Competition and Business Policy.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
(1952a) 1956 American Capitalism: The Concept of
Countervailing Power. Rev. ed. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin. —> A paperback edition was published in
1962.
1952b A Theory of Price Control. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press.
(1954) 1972 The Great Crash, 1929. 3d ed. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin. —» A paperback edition with a
new introduction was published in 1961. The third
edition has a new foreword by the author.
1955 Economics and the Art of Controversy. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press. —» A paper-
back edition was published by Vintage in 1959.
(1958a) 1976 The Affluent Society. 3d ed. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin. —•» A paperback edition of ths
second edition was published in 1971.
1958b Journey to Poland and Yugoslavia. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1960 The Liberal Hour. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
—> A paperback edition was published by New
American Library in 1964.
1962 Economic Development in Perspective. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1963 The McLandress Dimension, by Mark Epernay
[pseud.]. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. —» A revised
paperback edition was published in 1968 by New
American Library.
1964 The Scotch. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. —» A
memoir of Galbraith's youth in Canada. A paper-
back edition was published in 1970 by New Ameri-
can Library.
1967a How to Get Out of Vietnam. New York: New
American Library.
(1967fo) 1978 The New Industrial State. 3d ed. Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1968 by New American Library; a
revised paperback edition was published in 1972.
Pages cited in the text refer to the second edition,
which was published in 1971.
1968 The Triumph: A Novel of Modern Diplomacy.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1969 by New American Library.
1968 RANDHAWA, MOHINDAR SINGH; and GALBRAITH,
JOHN KENNETH Indian Painting: The Scene, Themes
and Legends. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
1969a Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of
the Kennedy Years. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
1969b How to Control the Military. Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday. —> A paperback edition was published in
1969 by New American Library.
1970 Who Needs the Democrats and What It Takes
to Be Needed. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
1971 A Contemporary Guide to Economics, Peace and
Laughter. Edited by Andrea D. Williams. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin. —> A collection of Galbraith's
essays. A paperback edition was published in 1972
by New American Library.
1973a A China Passage. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
—> A paperback edition was published in 1973 by
New American Library.
1973b Economics and the Public Purpose. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1975 by New American Library.
1975 Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went. Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1976 by Bantam.
1977a The Age of Uncertainty. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin. —» A history of economic ideas and their
consequences. A British Broadcasting Corporation
television series was based on the text.
lQ77b The Galbraith Reader. Selected and arranged
with narrative comment by the editors of Gambit.
Ipswich, Mass.: Gambit.
1978 GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH; and SALINGER,
NICOLE Almost Everyone's Guide to Economics.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BERLE, ADOLPH; and MEANS, GARDINER C. (1933)
1968 The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty. Rev. ed. New York: Harcourt. —> A paperback
edition was published in 1969.
GAMES, JOHN S. 1975 John Kenneth Galbraith. Bos-
ton : Twayne.
HESSION, CHARLES H. 1972 John Kenneth Galbraith
and His Critics. New York: New American Library.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —> A paperback edition was published in
1965 by Harcourt.
MONRO, C. LYNN 1977 The Galbraithian Vision: The
Cultural Criticism of John Kenneth Galbraith. Wash-
ington: Univ. Press of America.
SHARPE, M. E. (1973) 1974 John Kenneth Galbraith
and the Lower Economics. 2d ed., rev. White
Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
SILK, LEONARD 1976 John Kenneth Galbraith: Social-
ism Without Tears. Pages 95-148 in Leonard Silk,
The Economists. New York: Basic Books.
GALLUP, GEORGE
The man whose name is most closely iden-
tified with public opinion research once de-
scribed his life as a series of happy accidents.
George Horace Gallup has always considered
himself a pragmatist and technician rather than
a scientist or theoretician. He built his career
by asking such questions as: What data are
needed to solve the problem? How can one best
obtain these data? The Gallup Poll came about
through the coupling of his lifelong interest in
politics and democracy with his working experi-
ence in journalism and marketing.
Born in 1901 in the small town of Jefferson,
Iowa, Gallup attended the local high school and
the University of Iowa, where he pursued his
interests in psychology and journalism. He was
introduced to the world of surveys as an under-

graduate, when he was hired to interview
readers of a St. Louis newspaper. In the custom
of the time, the survey asked: "Do you read the
editorials? . . . the international news? . . . the
classified ads?" To Gallup this technique seemed
a faulty means of measuring readership. Re-
flecting on the matter, he decided that a better
measure of actual readership would be to show
the reader yesterday's paper and go through it
with him column by column. As a graduate stu-
dent he persuaded the Des Moines Register &
Tribune to sponsor such a survey, and he used
this survey for his doctoral dissertation. His
findings were sharply different from those ob-
tained by the earlier method. Editorials, for in-
stance, had low readership; advice to the love-
lorn and obituary columns were surprisingly
high. Gallup's method of measuring newspaper
and magazine readership became widely adopted
and was still in use more than fifty years later.
After earning his doctorate at Iowa in 1928,
Gallup spent two years on the faculty of Drake
University and a year at the Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Journalism. During these years
he continued his experiments in measuring
newspaper, magazine, and radio audiences by
means of sample surveys, and his work earned
him the attention of national advertising agen-
cies. In 1932 he was persuaded to abandon his
academic career and go to New York as director
of research and marketing for Young & Rubicam.
His interest in politics had been whetted as
a result of his marriage. His mother-in-law's
narrow election as secretary of state in Iowa
prompted Gallup to think of applying his survey
methods to politics. Although many newspapers
conducted local "straw polls" at the time, the
only generally accepted forecast of national
elections was that in The Literary Digest. This
magazine had successfully predicted every pres-
idential election winner from 1916 through
1932 by means of mass mailings of ballots to
millions of telephone subscribers and automo-
bile owners throughout the country.
Gallup was well aware of the potential bias
that could result from the relatively affluent
sample provided by telephone and automobile
listings in the 1930s and from the differential
response rate among various categories of re-
spondents that the Digest would receive. He
was convinced that accurate results could be
achieved by systematic selection of much
smaller samples and by expanded questioning
through a longer questionnaire. He found sup-
port at this time from a newspaper syndicate
GALLUP, GEORGE 227
that agreed to test his ideas in the 1934 con-
gressional elections. On the basis of past voting
records, a few "barometer areas" were selected
and mail questionnaires addressed to a quota
sample of households. These were supplemented
by personal interviews where response rates
from particular income groups were dispropor-
tionately low. The experiment was successful,
and on the basis of a contract to provide the
syndicate with a weekly column, Gallup estab-
lished the American Institute of Public Opinion.
Its first release appeared October 20, 1935.
Though other market researchers had also
begun to take political surveys at about this
time, Gallup's regular exposure in newspapers
around the country made his name better
known. When the November vote was in and it
was clear that Gallup had correctly forecast the
Roosevelt landslide, while the Digest had pre-
dicted a Landon victory, the new sample survey
methods were vindicated and the American In-
stitute of Public Opinion, now referred to in-
creasingly as the Gallup Poll, became a national
institution.
In 1939 Gallup sent a colleague, Harry H.
Field, to Europe to establish institutes of public
opinion in Great Britain and France. Though
interrupted by World War n, both resumed
operation after the war and continued to thrive.
In the postwar years, similar institutes were
established in other countries and the Gallup
organization became world-wide in scope. In
the United States, Gallup's reputation brought
him many contracts for marketing and audience
research surveys.
The 1948 presidential election, in which
Gallup, in common with other major polls, in-
correctly forecast victory for Thomas E. Dewey,
provided a sharp setback to the success story.
Gallup steadfastly upheld the validity of his
methods and systematically began to search for
what had gone wrong. The major reasons soon
became clear. First, quota sampling methods
had resulted in a slight Republican bias. Then,
polling had stopped too soon to catch a last-
minute tide toward Truman. The polls had over-
confidently predicted an outcome that was, in
hindsight, far from certain. Applying these
lessons to his future work, Gallup improved and
refined his procedures, and the 1948 election
mistake, far from signaling the end of polling,
became a mere incident in its continued
progress.
Gallup has been a strong publicist for his
methods and his views of their importance. He
228 GERSCHENKRON, ALEXANDER
sees polls as "The Pulse of Democracy" (his title
for a 1940 book)—a source of enlightenment
that presents an alternative to the clamor of
contending pressure groups claiming to repre-
sent public opinion. Although he accepts his
role of election prognosticator as an opportunity
to demonstrate the reliability of his techniques,
he feels that the real value of polls lies in their
ability to provide a vehicle for popular expres-
sion: a means of measuring and publicizing
public satisfactions, concerns, fears, knowledge,
beliefs, wants, and intentions. He was among
the first to discern the value of asking the same
question repeatedly over time to gain informa-
tion about trends in opinions. Opinions on "the
biggest problem facing the country" and ap-
proval of presidential performance, for exam-
ple, have been regularly monitored since 1940
or earlier and provide a rich source of historical
data.
Both the man and the poll have been subjects
of criticism ever since 1935. Those who oppose
majority opinion as revealed by Gallup are quick
to attack the wording of his questions and other
aspects of his methodology. Some have sus-
pected him of latent Republican or Democratic
bias. Academic critics consider his approach to
social research to be simplistic and his poll mere
journalism. Others argue that public opinion is
more (or less) than the mere summation of in-
dividual responses to a question. But the fre-
quency and fervor of these attacks has dimin-
ished over the years, as Gallup has steadfastly
continued to do just what he set out to do.
The enormous growth of sample surveys
since 1935 would of course have occurred with-
out Gallup. Market researchers, behavioral sci-
entists, and others were all developing sampling
and questionnaire techniques at the same time,
and the pressing need for fast, economical data
collection in a rapidly expanding society would
have guaranteed the same result. But Gallup, as
the earliest and most articulate spokesman for
public opinion polls, and the Gallup Poll, as the
first and most widely circulated continuing
survey, became identified with the industry, and
the industry with Gallup. This role he has played
with eloquence and honor.
PAUL B. SHEATSLEY
WORKS BY GALLUP
(1940) 1968 GALLUP, GEORGE; and RAE, SAUL The
Pulse of Democracy. New York: Greenwood.
1972a The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971.
3 vols. New York: Random House.
(1972b) 1976 The Sophisticated Poll Watcher's Guide.
Rev. ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Opinion Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOGART, LEO 1972 Silent Politics: Polls and the
Awareness of Public Opinion. New York: Wiley—
Interscience.
OPPENHEIM, ABRAHAM N. 1966 Questionnaire De-
sign and Attitude Measurement. New York: Basic
Books.
WHEELER, MICHAEL 1976 Lies, Damn Lies, and
Statistics: The Manipulation of Public Opinion in
America. New York: Liveright.
GERSCHENKRON, ALEXANDER
Alexander Gerschenkron (1904-1978), Har-
vard University economic historian and social
scientist of encyclopedic range, was born in
Odessa, Russia. Shortly after the Bolshevik rev-
olution of 1917 his family moved to Vienna,
where Gerschenkron completed his secondary
and academic education. The University of Vi-
enna, at which he received his doctor's degree
in 1928, was one of the major strongholds of
neoclassical economics on the European conti-
nent, with the spirit of the famous "Austrian
School" very much alive. Yet, Vienna was also
the cradle of "Austro-Marxism," the most vi-
brant and sparkling variety of all European
socialist thought. The sensitive young academic
could not remain untouched by these intellec-
tual crosscurrents and by the unique cultural
ambience of the central European "City of
Light."
At the time of Hitler's invasion of Austria in
March 1938, Gerschenkron was an associate of
the Austrian Institute of Business Cycle Re-
search. He managed to escape and to make his
way to the United States. He spent six years at
the University of California at Berkeley, at first
as research assistant and subsequently as
lecturer in economics. In 1944 he accepted a
position on the research staff of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System in
Washington; he became chief of the foreign
area section two years later. In 1948 Gerschen-
kron joined the faculty of Harvard University.
He taught European economic history and So-
viet economics, and was director of the eco-
nomics division of Harvard's Russian Research
Center until 1956 when he gave up this position
and withdrew from teaching in the Soviet area.
At the time of his retirement in 1974, Gerschen-
kron held the title of Walter S. Barker professor
of economics, and was director of the Economic
History Workshop. In the same year he was

awarded an honorary D.LITT. degree at Oxford
University.
Early work. Gerschenkron's first two mono-
graphs, which dealt with major issues of post-
war policies, gave some premonition of his
enduring scholastic concerns. Bread and De-
mocracy in Germany (1943) was an eloquent
plea for breaking the economic power of the
Prussian Junkers as an indispensable precon-
dition for the democratic development of post-
war Germany and for a peaceful Europe. In his
work on Economic Relations With the U.S.S.R.
(1945), Gerschenkron was guardedly optimistic
about the prospects of cooperation between the
wartime allies after their victory over Nazi Ger-
many. In both cases events did not develop as
expected, yet this did not affect in the slightest
the soundness of Gerschenkron's basic diag-
nosis. Bread and Democracy in Germany re-
mains to this day a most reliable and lucid
account of a crucially important episode in
modern European history. The slim booklet on
problems of Soviet—American economic rela-
tions stated with hitherto unprecedented clarity
the basic institutional and economic facts defin-
ing the foreign trade potential of the Soviet
Union, and laid a groundwork for all later work
in the field.
The "Gerschenkron effect." The rise of the
Soviet Union to the position of one of the two
superpowers brought an upsurge of interest in
its economic growth. The problem of measure-
ment was among the first on the agenda. In
view of the wartime performance of the Soviet
Union, it was hard to maintain the view that
the economic expansion of the late 1920s and
the 1930s had been a mirage. Yet the rates of
over-all growth as depicted by official Soviet sta-
tistics seemed to be much too high and incon-
sistent with some data on physical outputs to be
accepted at face value, although there were
good reasons to assume that, in Abram Berg-
son's words, no "double book-keeping" was
involved.
Gerschenkron, along with Bergson, led the
efforts to resolve this difficult problem. His con-
tribution to the 1947 symposium in the Reviexv
of Economic Statistics constituted an important
step in this direction; yet the major breakthrough
came with A Dollar Index of Soviet Machinery
Output, 1927-28 to 1937 (1951). Gerschenkron
took as his point of departure two propositions,
which had been adumbrated in some earlier
writings on the subject but had never been fully
explored. He pointed out that the Soviet index
GERSCHENKRON, ALEXANDER 229
of industrial production, which was based on
the preindustrialization prices of 1926/1927 as
its weights, was bound to yield a higher rate of
growth than an index based on prices of a later
year marking a more advanced stage of indus-
trialization: the fastest growing items, whose
costs would show a relatively stronger decline
over the period in question, would be affecting
the total index more powerfully when measured
in prices of the early year. (It would be the
other way round, one might add, if the period
under consideration had been short enough to
make the increase in output come from a more
intensive utilization of existing capacity rather
than from new plant.) This difference, known
to statisticians as a Laspeyre—Paasche discrep-
ancy, is compounded whenever goods that
had not been produced during the base year are
allowed to enter the index at prices which are
set at the (relatively high) cost of the first year
of their mass production and which reflect a
powerful inflation that took place during the
period under consideration. Gerschenkron next
tested these propositions. He focused on per-
formance of Soviet machine building, which
was the fastest growing branch of the rapidly
expanding Soviet industry and which under-
went the most drastic change in its output com-
position during the first decade of Stalinist in-
dustrialization; more particularly, it showed the
highest incidence of new goods introduced after
the base year. In setting up his alternative
"Paasche"-type index, Gerschenkron chose 1939
dollar prices as weights; this was, he explained,
analytically equivalent to using Soviet late
period prices. The results were striking; while
the official Soviet index showed a fourteenfold
increase in machinery output during the years
1927/1928-1937, Gerschenkron's "dollar index"
showed a slightly more than five-fold increase.
The point was reinforced when Gerschenkron
used American machine building in the years
1899—1939 as a control group and found the
same high sensitivity of the index to the change
of weights from early year prices to the late
year prices for the whole period as well as for
particular subperiods (in one particular in-
stance such a change of weights resulted in a
difference between pronounced growth and
marked decline). His subsequent application of
the same approach to the Soviet iron and steel
industry and to the oil industry brought confir-
mation of the "Gerschenkron effect" from the
opposite end: indices of industries, which were
well-established on the eve of the industrializa-
230 GERSCHENKRON, ALEXANDER
tion drive, and showed a less spectacular growth
as well as a smaller incidence of entirely new
products, proved much less sensitive to change
in price weights. The same was true, to a lesser
extent, of the index of electrical power output
which grew very rapidly but was relatively
homogeneous. No doubt, the rate of Soviet in-
dustrial growth during the period under consid-
eration would remain impressively high also un-
der the Paasche regimen. But its edge over
Western growth rates which were likewise de-
rived from indices based on late year prices
would be markedly reduced.
"Advantages of backwardness." The Dollar
Index whose findings quickly gained acceptance
among students of the Soviet economy was fol-
lowed within a year by a pathbreaking effort in
a larger problem area. In his "Economic Back-
wardness in Historical Perspective" (1952, in
1962), Gerschenkron argued that backward
countries of late nineteenth-century Europe
had the ability as well as the incentive to grow
faster than older industrial countries have done
in the past and in the present because the late-
comers could make a shortcut to levels of tech-
nology that early arrivals had attained through
a sequence of intermediate stages. This implied
that new members of the club had yet another
advantage over their seniors: the capital stock
of their rapidly expanding modern sector would
tend to be, on average, younger and more up-to-
date. Besides, while the new and largely capital
intensive technology was superior to the old
over a range of scarcity relationships, its at-
tractiveness was enhanced by the fact that, con-
trary to conventional assumptions, labor in the
sense of a seasoned industrial work force was
scarce rather than abundant in underdeveloped
areas. Gerschenkron credited Thorstein Veblen
for having recognized the role of borrowed tech-
nology. He pushed the argument a step further
by setting up a "gradation of backwardness"
and by arguing that the ability to grow rapidly
was positively correlated to the size of the gap
between the average level of technology of the
country in question and the best-practice tech-
nology of advanced countries. Yet he pointed
to a grave dilemma when he noted the presence
of significant indivisibilities and complementa-
rities which made the great spurt both crucially
important and exceedingly difficult to carry out.
The situation called for a catalyst that would
spark the industrialization process and—in
Gerschenkron's terms—act as a substitute for
such "normal" prerequisites as adequate private
funds and ample domestic markets. At medium
levels of backwardness this role was performed
by investment banks as in France, Germany,
and Austria; in Russia and Hungary, which
were further behind the English front runner,
active intervention of the state had to do the
job. (In the case of Russia, the state interven-
tion showed an added twist: retrogressive insti-
tutional arrangements which existed in agricul-
ture were utilized, and even tightened, in order
to promote the accelerated modernization in the
urban sector.) Another characteristic trait of
the catching-up processes was a stronger stress
on producers' goods than on consumers' goods
as compared with the English prototype; this
was due, in Gerschenkron's view, to the fact
that technological progress in the second part
of the last century had been more rapid in the
first group than in the second. Eventually, and
true to the best form of Marxian—Hegelian
dialectics, the drastic "substitute" strategies
would eventually outlive their usefulness as a
result of their successes, and give way to more
moderate ones.
The ingredients of this ingenious construct
had multiple origins. There had been increasing
stirrings within the established theory, with
strong attempts to upgrade the importance of
the concepts of economies of scale and of ex-
ternalities and to use them in the analysis of
economic development. Another major influ-
ence stemmed from Gerschenkron's early ex-
posure to Marxism in its most refined Austrian
version. He had high praise for Marx's sense of
discontinuities in technological progress and in
capital accumulation as well as for the empha-
sis on the active role played by the state in
breaking the logjams in development, although
he felt that the insights of the last mentioned
category did not fit well into the standard "basis-
superstructure" scheme. Naturally enough, such
ideas were resisted. The concept of "advantages
of backwardness" and of "substitute" strategies
went strongly against the grain of the natura
non facit saltum approach based on assump-
tions of smooth interaction between steady ex-
tension of scientific knowledge and gradually
shifting factor proportions. Hence, while Ger-
schenkron's breadth of vision, originality, and
elegance of presentation were widely acclaimed,
his argument was often misunderstood. Al-
though he emphasized the significance of dif-
ferences in natural endowments, and noted the
role of foreign trade in promoting transfer of
technology, he was reproached for ignoring both.

Nor did Gerschenkron ever deny, Stephen L.
Barsby's (1969) and Richard L. Rudolph's (1973)
allegations to the contrary notwithstanding, that
"a leisurely growth" was possible, but he did
insist that a failure to exploit advantages of
backwardness to the full was bound to let the
sluggish country fall more and more behind
others which had risen to the challenge. More-
over, Gerschenkron never implied that the "ten-
sion between potentialities and actualities" was
bound to trigger rapid growth in a quasiauto-
matic way. He expected it to provide opportuni-
ties which could be used or mishandled; and in
essays on Austria, Bulgaria, and Italy, he con-
vincingly portrayed several spurts which never
got off the ground because of halfhearted and
misguided governmental policies.
Comments by economists who were in sym-
pathy with the major thrust of Gerschenkron's
reasoning had more substance. Ronald Findlay
(1978) pointed out that the notion of advan-
tages of backwardness held true only within a
certain range of development: it could not pos-
sibly apply to primitive societies. Gerschenkron
would undoubtedly agree; he was careful not to
claim validity for his construct beyond the limits
of Europe at the turn of the century. Indeed, he
also made it clear that in a country like Russia
the possibility of developing a modern machine
tool industry was severely restricted by a shortage
of requisite skills. Henry Rosovsky (1961), who
tested the Gerschenkron model against the re-
alities of Japanese development and found the
concept of the state-promoted industrialization
spurt fully applicable, argued that the shortage of
industrial labor did not exist in Japan or in
western and central Europe, for that matter;
moreover, Japan's high comparative advantages
in textile production, coupled with a deliberate
policy of fostering small-scale technology when-
ever feasible, postponed the shift toward pro-
ducers' goods until another round of big spurts
at a later stage of industrialization. (Interest-
ingly, a strong support for the concept of "grada-
tion of backwardness" with all its implications
came from a writer who was evidently unaware
of Gerschenkron's work when he first stated his
own position [Gomulka 1971].) A few additional
remarks may be in order. It is arguable that the
leading role of producers' goods in the Russian
industrialization of the 1880s and 1890s was
not so much a result of particularly great ad-
vances of foreign technology in that area as a
natural response to a steep increase of demand
for these goods that was generated by the
GERSCHENKRON, ALEXANDER 231
massive state-directed program of railroad con-
struction; it was this upsurge in investment
activity that provided a vehicle for the large-
scale infusion of modern technology into the
Russian iron and steel industry. (No one de-
scribed this more illuminatingly than did Ger-
schenkron.) Moreover, a faster rate of indus-
trial growth is bound to go with a greater share
of producers' goods in total output unless there
is a decline in the capital-output ratio—a point
that Gerschenkron readily recognized with re-
gard to the world as a whole, but which would
also have validity for individual countries with
a modicum of appropriate natural resources
and with a nonnegligible capacity in the pro-
ducers' goods sector at the beginning of their
great spurts. Lastly, some of Gerschenkron's
initial formulations could be somewhat relaxed.
"Development blocks" might come in smaller
and larger sizes; complementarities could be
loosened in spots by less than complete synchro-
nization in investment programs, with foreign
trade and varying capacity utilization playing
their part; the cutting edge of the economies of
scale is not equally sharp everywhere—a circum-
stance that allows for a measure of economic
dualism. Actually, Gerschenkron took note of
most of these qualifications whenever he dis-
cussed specific cases; and none of them could
invalidate the thesis about the importance of
discontinuities in industrialization, particularly
when the indivisibility-cnra-complementarity
argument is linked with the notion of wide tech-
nological gaps and of the crucial role of invest-
ment in filling them.
The stability of dictatorship. Gerschenkron's
treatment of Soviet economic development after
1928 was another variation on the general
theme of backwardness. He viewed the Stalinist
industrialization drive as the most striking ex-
ample of the great spurt, both in its unprece-
dented rapidity and in the extent of coercion
used to effect it. Yet he expected the post-Stalin
relaxation to be much more limited than that
which had followed earlier great spurts in Rus-
sian history. The reasons for it were political.
The new revolutionary regime, as distinguished
from its age-old Tsarist predecessor, was in dire
need of legitimation; the call for discipline and
sacrifices in order to catch up with the advanced
and fundamentally hostile capitalist West would
serve the purpose. Under such conditions, to
slow down would be asking for trouble. Here
was another paradox that seemed to fly in the
face of common sense. The notion that greater
232 GEYL, PIETER
deprivations could mean more stability seemed
odd; yet it was profoundly true. One might
argue that countervailing tendencies should
have received more emphasis. As was repeatedly
pointed out, the costs of the brutal and crude
methods of Stalin's "initial socialist accumula-
tion" were bound to become intolerably high as
the reserve of the unutilized peasant manpower
was approaching exhaustion, pressures for
higher living standards coming from the in-
creasingly urbanized population were gaining
strength, and economic burdens of the "compe-
tition of two systems" in the nuclear age were
mounting. The vested interest in tension and
in ordering people around as much as possible
still persisted. Yet neither considerations of
static and dynamic efficiency, nor consumers'
demands could be relegated to the back seat
much longer without pushing stresses and
strains beyond safety limits and without in-
hibiting the attempts to narrow the gap in tech-
nology. Gerschenkron did not deny that conces-
sions to consumers had been made and that
there was a modicum of over-all decompression.
Yet he viewed it as a harbinger of growing in-
stability—although in the introduction to his
Continuity in History (1968) he noted that un-
settling effects have not yet materialized.
A brief sketch cannot conceivably provide
more than an inkling of the richness of Ger-
schenkron's work. Only a few salient points
have been discussed. The finely chiseled details
had to be left out, although, in this particular
case, great spurts of innovative thought must
certainly not be allowed to overshadow the ex-
tensions, refinements, and explorations in
depth; suffice to mention the learned essay on
philosophical foundations of the continuity con-
cept, the fascinating debate with Rosario Romeo
on problems of Italian industrial development,
or the seminal paper on the agrarian policies
of prerevolutionary Russia. Gerschenkron's
scholarly interests ranged across the whole
spectrum of social sciences and beyond: the
beautiful essay on Doctor Zhivago and the
devastatingly erudite review of Nabokov's trans-
lation of Evgenii Onegin have become classics.
He will be remembered as one of the great poly-
histors of our time.
ALEXANDER ERLICH
WORKS BY GERSCHENKRON
(1943) 1966 Bread and Democracy in Germany. New
York: Fertig.
1945 Economic Relations With the U.S.S.R. New
York: Committee on International Economic Policy.
1947 The Soviet Indices of Industrial Production. Re-
view of Economic Statistics 29:217-226.
1951 A Dollar Index of Soviet Machinery Output.
1927-28 to 1937. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Cor-
poration.
1962 Economic Backiuardness in Historical Perspec-
tive. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. —> A
paperback edition was published by Praeger in 1965.
1968 Continuity in History and Other Essays. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1970 Europe in the Russian Mirror. Cambridge Univ.
Press.
1977 An Economic Spurt That Failed. Princeton Univ.
Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARSBY, STEPHEN L. 1969 Economic Backwardness
and the Characteristics of Development. Journal of
Economic History 29:449-472.
BERGSON, ABRAM 1961 The Real National Income of
Soviet Russia Since 1928. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard Univ. Press.
FINDLAY, RONALD 1978 Relative Backwardness, Di-
rect Foreign Investment and the Transfer of Tech-
nology: A Simple Dynamic Model. Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 92:1-16.
GOMULKA, STANISLAW 1971 Inventive Activity, Dif-
fusion, and the Stages of Economic Growth. Arhus
University, Institute of Economics, Monograph No.
21. Arhus (Denmark): The University.
HIRSCHMAN, ALBERT O. 1958 The Strategy of Eco-
nomic Development. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
—> A paperback edition was published in 1962.
ROSOVSKY, HENRY 1961 Capital Formation in Japan,
1868-1940. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
ROSOVSKY, HENRY (editor) 1966 Industrialization in
Two Systems: Essays in Honor of Alexander Ger-
schenkron by a Group of His Students. New York:
Wiley.
RUDOLPH, RICHARD L. 1973 Austrian Industrializa-
tion: A Case Study in Leisurely Economic Growth.
Pages 249—262 in Sozialismus, Geschichte und Wirt-
schaft: Festschrift fur Eduard Mdrz. Vienna: Euro-
paverlag.
GEYL, PIETER
The career of Pieter Catharinus Arie Geyl
(1887-1966), one of the most outstanding
Dutch historians of the twentieth century, em-
bodied a deep paradox. When in 1940 he was
interned as a hostage by the Germans, he had
already transformed the understanding of the
history of the Low Countries, yet he was vir-
tually unknown outside the Netherlands except
to a handful of specialists. Only his activity as
a Dutch supporter of the Flemish movement in
Belgium during the 1920s and 1930s had
brought him local notoriety, especially when he
was expelled by the Belgian government. After
World War n, he quickly gained international
recognition as a historical critic and essayist,
while at home his innovative ideas, which a few
decades before had been attacked by traditional

historians, became part of the generally ac-
cepted historical picture.
Geyl was of mixed German and Dutch origin.
His father was a medical doctor in Dordrecht,
and his early retirement, due to mental illness,
created emotional and financial hardship dur-
ing Geyl's youth. The family moved to the
Hague, where he attended a Gymnasium. In 1906
he entered the University of Leiden as a student
of Dutch language and literature, but he was
drawn to history by C. H. T. Bussemaker, and
turned to this field after a novel he wrote was
devastatingly faulted by the distinguished critic
Albert Verwey. He completed his doctorate in
1913 under the guidance of P. J. Blok, a sound
and somewhat dreary scholar, but probably the
best Dutch historian of his generation. His dis-
sertation on Christofforo Suriano, the Venetian
resident at the Hague from 1616 to 1623, was
a traditional work, a study in political history
drawn directly from the sources, but it was al-
ready notable for the swiftness of its research
and writing.
Geyl then gave up his embryonic career as a
Gymnasium teacher and in 1914 moved to Lon-
don as correspondent for the Nieuwe Rotter-
damsche Courant, the preeminent daily news-
paper of the Netherlands. This post gave him
direct contact with outstanding political leaders
in Britain and a reputation as a quick, lively
writer. As a result, he was soon well known
among intellectual and political circles in
England. A year after the end of World War I,
a chair in Dutch studies was created for him at
the University of London, with the support of
the Dutch government. His salary was not mu-
nificent and he supplemented it with work as an
unofficial press attache for the Netherlands em-
bassy. Insecurity, however, did not keep him
from taking up the controversial Flemish ques-
tion in Belgium, to the annoyance and some-
times dismay of the Dutch government.
The Flemish issue provided Geyl with the
theme of his early writings. Viewing the Flem-
ings as brothers of the Dutch, he soon chal-
lenged the interpretation of Low Countries his-
tory that had been most clearly expressed in
the Histoire de Belgique (1900-1932) by that
country's most eminent historian, Henri Pirenne.
According to this view, Belgium since its earliest
history had been essentially a separate country
from Holland, and the implication followed that
the Netherlands had no fundamental ties to Bel-
gium and therefore to the Dutch-speaking
Flemings in Belgium. In this interpretation, the
GEYL, PIETER 233
separation of the northern and southern Nether-
lands into distinct countries and peoples during
the late sixteenth-century revolt of the Low
Countries is seen as the culmination of their
historical development over many centuries; by
contrast, their unity under the Burgundian
dukes in the fifteenth and early sixteenth cen-
turies had been a historical accident. Pirenne's
view, which most historians in Holland accepted
and adapted to their own national history, was
to Geyl essentially inaccurate. He had publicly
rejected it in lectures at University College
London in 1920, and he published various ar-
ticles and lectures expanding his argument in
De Groot-Nederlandsche Gedachte ("The Great
Netherlands Idea"; 1925). Geyl then began a
monumental project based upon this idea that
resulted in the publication of the three-volume
Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Stam
("History of the Dutch Nation"; 1930-1937).
The "Great Netherlands" of these works was
a nation in a special sense of the term: a lin-
guistic community possessing or seeking politi-
cal form and expression in its own state. Geyl
therefore excluded from the "Great Nether-
lands" the Walloon provinces that had been part
of the Burgundian Low Countries and that had
become the culturally and politically dominant
part of independent Belgium in the nineteenth
century. He dismissed or disregarded other
theories of the nation, both the view of the
nation as the creation by states of a historic
community of shared institutions and senti-
ments, and the anthropological view, which saw
it as a community sharing an entire range of
customs and attitudes, not merely language.
What he did see, vividly and clearly, was that
the speakers of Flemish in nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century Belgium, where French was
the language of culture and the chief language
of government, suffered many deprivations and
hardships. He failed to keep in mind, however,
his own repeated warnings about anachronism—
specifically, that before the modern age of mass
politics and culture, those who spoke Dutch-
Flemish in the southern Netherlands had suf-
fered little or no disadvantage. His strong
political commitment to at least the federal re-
organization of the Belgian state—if not its ac-
tual breakup, with the Flemish provinces joining
the Netherlands—is strongly reflected in his es-
says on Dutch-Belgian relations.
In his political activity, Geyl favored the
Flemish activists, but the flirtation of extrem-
ists, some of whom were his close friends, with
234 GEYL, PIETER
theories of violence and with German racism
led him to emphasize democracy as well as
nationalism. The rise of the Nazi movement in
Germany moved him to a passionate advocacy
of political freedom and thus to an estrange-
ment from those Flemish separatists who did
not share this commitment.
Geyl's Great Netherlands idea was extensively
developed in his strictly historical works. He
demonstrated, with a wealth of evidence and
argument, that the formation of separate states
in the northern and southern Netherlands dur-
ing the sixteenth-century revolt was not the re-
sult of profound cultural, religious, or political
differences. Rather, it stemmed directly from
the outcome of military events. Neither Cathol-
icism nor Calvinism had been characteristically
indigenous to south or north; each section had
been consolidated by political and military vic-
tory—by the Spanish Habsburgs in the former
case, and by the forces of independence in the
latter. Geyl recognized that the two regions had
grown apart over the next two centuries, and
he deeply regretted that the experiment in unity
under King William I had failed.
In all these studies, Geyl neglected the ques-
tion of the status of the French-speaking prov-
inces in a polity committed to predominance of
Dutch-Flemish speakers. Although his views
on the Flemish question in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries won anything but universal
acclaim, his reinterpretation of the sixteenth-
century revolt was so persuasive that within two
or three decades it replaced the older picture.
While Geyl was working on his Great Nether-
lands theme in London, he began studies that
became fundamental for a new understanding
of the place in Dutch history of the House of
Orange. Where it had been taken for granted,
except by the minority of Dutch Catholics, that
the country was essentially Protestant in char-
acter and that the Orange stadholders under the
Republic and the kings after 1813 were the pure
embodiment of Dutch nationhood, Geyl called
attention to the dynastic interests pursued
by the stadholders, from Frederick Henry to
William v, in their relations with England and,
to a lesser degree, Prussia. The republican
("States") party, far from being narrowly pro-
vincial and unnational, had performed a neces-
sary national task in opposing Orange dynas-
ticism, which fostered dependence upon the
stadholders' foreign relatives (see 1924; 1939).
The impact of Geyl's works on this theme upon
Dutch historical writing was not as dramatic as
that of the Great Netherlands idea, but narrow
Orangism was displaced by more balanced un-
derstanding of all the parties in the history of
the Republic.
In 1936 Geyl was appointed professor of his-
tory at the University of Utrecht, despite the
difficulties that stemmed from his reputation as
a stormy petrel lacking the sedate dignity char-
acteristic of the Dutch academic world and
from his connections with the Flemish move-
ment in Belgium. He did not become the
founder of a school of disciples, partly because
he favored in his students (of whom the best
known are J. C. Boogman, A. J. Veenendaal,
J. W. Smit, and D. J. Roorda) the same kind of
independence of spirit that he himself possessed.
He continued his warnings of the Nazi menace
right up to the German invasion on May 10,
1940, and did not keep silent even afterwards.
On October 7, he and approximately one hundred
other eminent Dutchmen were arrested and sent
to Buchenwald, where they were held as hos-
tages in retaliation for the internment of Ger-
mans in the Netherlands West Indies. Thirteen
months later, along with most of his fellow hos-
tages, he was sent back to the Netherlands for
continued internment. After several months'
hospitalization during 1943 and 1944, he was
released and permitted to return home in Feb-
ruary 1944. He provided hiding places for re-
sistance fighters in his home, barely escaping
detection and arrest. At the same time he
worked at his writing, although he had been
dismissed from his professorship by the Ger-
man authorities in 1942. After the liberation of
Holland in 1945, he was restored to his chair.
Geyl's writing now largely change'd character.
His energy for primary research flagged, but he
turned his attention to historical criticism, the
philosophy of history (although he insisted that
he was no philosopher), and comment on public
events. At the same time he broadened the area
of his writing from his native Netherlands to
all of Europe as well as America. He wrote fre-
quently for the weekly newspaper Vrij Neder-
land, using new books for the themes of essays
on a great variety of subjects. Always concerned
with the influence of contemporary events upon
a historian's choice of subject and his inter-
pretations, he began to look into the past for
greater understanding of the turbulent era
through which he was living. At the same time
he drew upon his own experiences for deeper
insight into the past. During the last months of
the occupation, he had written a book on the

changing picture of Napoleon—an obvious
parallel to Hitler—in French historical writing
(1946/0- To show, as he did, that French his-
torians' views of Napoleon had changed over
the decades, depending on their political and
ideological commitments, was hardly novel; but
to draw the conclusion that the understanding
of Napoleon had been enriched by these differ-
ent interpretations was to take up the cudgel
against historical relativism, veering over into
outright skepticism, which had characterized
historical thought in the 1930s. History, he pro-
claimed, was "an argument without end" and
was the better for it. This book was followed a
year later by a short study (1947), which re-
habilitated the democratic movement in the
final decades of the republic of the United
Provinces against the contention of H. T. Colen-
brander that the Patriots had been no more than
puppets in the hands of the French. He also
carefully distinguished the leaders of the Bata-
vian Republic, who put the Patriot principles
into practice with the support of a French army
of occupation, from the NSB'ers, the Dutch
Nazis, noting that the Batavian leaders had
sought to rebuild their country upon democratic
principles and sought its welfare under complex
and trying conditions, none of which could be
said of the NSB'ers, traitors to their country
and its historical traditions.
Geyl first began to receive wide attention in
other countries, however, when he attacked the
historical views of Arnold J. Toynbee as pre-
sented in A Study of History (1934-1961). He
accused the English historian of twisting facts
to fit his grandiose system, defended the legit-
imacy of nations and nationalism against Toyn-
bee's universalism, and rejected the judgment
that Christianity was the only true religion and
the only salvation of mankind. Although ac-
cused of himself indulging in system making in
his Great Netherlands historical writing, he as-
serted that he had been trying to take account
of facts and to make his historical picture cor-
respond to them, rather than twisting them to
fit his preconceptions.
Geyl defined himself by argument with other
historians, especially of the Netherlands. He
had few strictly historical arguments with his
greatest contemporary Johan Huizinga, who
died in 1945, although his method of work and
style of writing were very different from that
of the subtle esthete Huizinga. Where Huizinga's
view of the contemporary world was deeply pes-
simistic, Geyl defended against him what he
GEYL, PIETER 235
called in his own final lecture on the occasion
of his retirement "the vitality of Western civili-
zation." Although himself as much a man of
high culture as Huizinga, he was far readier to
accept the coarse vigor of the common man,
and he felt that the problems of Western civili-
zation did not arise from democracy in govern-
ment or society. He saw totalitarian barbarity
not as an exaggeration of faults within democ-
racy itself, but as an attack upon the central
spirit of democracy. He was even more critical,
therefore, of Jan Romein, a highly influential
and respected Marxist at the University of Am-
sterdam, because his historical vision rested not
upon evidence and argument but upon his
strongly felt subjective convictions. Geyl had no
sympathy for Marxism, accusing it of combin-
ing Utopian dreaming with Machiavellian prac-
tice of power politics in the present. He only
joined the postwar Labor party (the former
Social-Democratic party) after it abandoned its
prior Marxist doctrines, feeling that it had be-
come the best defender of liberal democracy.
Although he has sometimes been described as a
socialist because of this membership, there is
no sign that he believed in socialism as a pat-
tern for the future organization of society; in-
deed, he continued to proclaim himself a liberal,
but not a defender of the capitalist status quo.
In the polemical and journalistic essays of
the last two decades of his life, he reaffirmed
his own vision of history and life. Even as death
neared, he did not fall back on either traditional
religion or the mysticism with which many in-
tellectuals replaced it; he accepted the rational
structure of the universe and the ability of man's
rational mind to comprehend it, and he saw
rationality as the basis for a healthy emotional
life. His vision of the world was this-worldly.
Quite unreligious himself, he defended the
rights of Catholics and other non-Calvinists to
full membership in the Dutch community. His
belief in liberal democracy, separated from the
tie established in classical liberalism between
political democracy and free-enterprise capi-
talism, was only intensified by the attacks
upon it from right and left. He was not as sen-
sitive as many others to the social and economic
problems faced by democracy, but he thought
all totalitarian alternatives were false solutions.
These ideas were never brought together into a
full-scale exposition and therefore hardly pre-
sent a neatly coherent picture. His significance
lies not in the originality of his beliefs, which
cannot be asserted, but in the extraordinary
236 GHURYE, G. S.
vigor with which he defended them at a time
when advocates of the middle way seemed to
have lost their certitudes and their self-
confidence.
His primary impact, however, remained his
revisions in Dutch history and his historiograph-
ical and critical writings. As these became
known in the Western world, he was invited to
visiting professorships and lectureships in the
United States, England, and other countries, and
he became the best-known Dutch scholar in the
postwar world. He died at his home in Utrecht
on the last day of December 1966.
HERBERT H. ROWEN
WORKS BY GEYL
1913 Christofforo Suriano, resident van de Serenis-
sirae Republiek van Venetie in Den Haag, 1616—
1623 (Christofforo Suriano, Resident of the Most
Serene Republic of Venice in The Hague, 1616-
1623). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
1924 Willem IV en Engeland tot 1748 (Vrede van
Aken) (William IV and England Until 1748 [The
Peace of Aachen]). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
1925 De Groot-Nederlandsche Gedachte (The Great
Netherlands Idea). Vol. 1. Haarlem (Netherlands):
Tjeenk Willink.
1930 De Groot-Nederlandsche Gedachte (The Great
Netherlands Idea). Vol. 2. Antwerp (Belgium): De
Sikkel.
(1930-1937) 1948-1958 Geschiedenis van de Neder-
landsche Stam (History of the Dutch Nation).
3 vols. Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek. —> Revised
and reprinted in six volumes in a paperback edition
in 1961-1962. Volume 1 was translated as The
Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555-1609, 2d ed., rev.
& enl., published by Barnes & Noble, New York,
1966 (the first edition was published in 1932 in Lon-
don by Williams & Norgate). The translation of the
second volume was published as two volumes:
The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, part
one, 1609-1648, published by Benn in London, and
Barnes & Noble in New York, 1966 (first published
as The Netherlands Divided, 1609-1648 in 1936
in London by Williams & Norgate), and The
Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, part two,
1648-1715, published by Benn in London, and
Barnes & Noble in New York, 1964.
1936 Revolutiedagen te Amsterdam, Augustus-Sep-
tember 1748 (Revolutionary Days in Amsterdam,
August-September 1748). The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff.
1937 Kernproblemen van onze geschiedenis (Central
Problems of Our History). Utrecht (Netherlands):
Oosthoek.
(1939) 1970 Orange and Stuart, 1641-1672. New
York: Scribners. —» First published in Dutch.
1946a Eenheid en tweeheid in de Nederlanden (Unity
and Duality in the Netherlands). Lochem (Nether-
lands): De Tijdstroom.
(1946&) 1963 Napoleon, For and Against. New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press. —> First published as
Napoleon. Voor en tegen in de Franse geschied-
schrijving.
1946c Patriotten en N.S.B.ers (Patriots and N.S.B.ers).
Amsterdam: J. van Campen.
1947 De Patriottenbeweging, 1780-1787 (The Patriot
Movement, 1780-1787). Amsterdam: P. N. van
Kampen.
1948 GEYL, PIETER; and TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. Can
We Know the Pattern of the Past? Discussion . . .
concerning Toynbee's book "A Study of History."
Bussum (Netherlands): F. G. Kroonder.
(1949) 1968 GEYL, PIETER; TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J.;
and SOROKIN, PITIRIM The Pattern of the Past: Can
We Determine It? New York: Greenwood.
1950 Tochten en toernooien (Campaigns and Tour-
neys). Utrecht (Netherlands): Oosthoek.
1952a From Ranke to Toynbee: Five Lectures on His-
torians and Historiographical Problems. Northamp-
ton, Mass.: Smith College, Department of History.
1952b Reacties (Reactions). Utrecht (Netherlands):
Oosthoek.
1954 Historicus in de tijd (A Historian in His Own
Time). Utrecht (Netherlands): W. de Haan.
(1955a) 1964 Debates with Historians. Cleveland,
Ohio: World Publishing.
(1955b) 1970 Use and Abuse of History. Hamden,
Conn.: Archon.
1958 Studies en strijdschriften (Studies and Polemical
Writings). Groningen (Netherlands): J. B. Wolters.
1959 Geschiedenis als medespeler (History as a Fellow
Player). Utrecht (Netherlands): Spectrum.
(1961) 1963 Encounters in History. London: Collins.
1963 Van Bilderdijk tot Huizinga: Historische toet-
singen (From Bilderdijk to Huizinga: Historical
Evaluations). Utrecht (Netherlands): Spectrum.
1964 History of the Low Countries: Episodes and
Problems. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Mar-
tins.
1971 Pennestrijd over staat en historic. Opstellen
over de vaderlandse geschiedenis aangevuld met
Geyl's levensverhaal (tot 1945) (A Pen-and-ink War
Over the State and History. Articles on National
History Together With an Account of Geyl's Life
[to 1945]). Groningen (Netherlands): Wolters-
Noordhoff.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARK, WILLIAM 1964-1965 Book Review of Geyl's
Encounters in History. History and Theory 4:107-
123.
BOOGMAN, J. C. 1966-1967 Pieter Geyl, 1887-1966.
Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden
21:269-277.
MEHTA, VED (1962) 1963 Fly and the Fly-Bottle:
Encounters with British Intellectuals. London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
PIRENNE, HENRI 1900-1932 Histoire de Belgique.
1 vols. Brussels: Lamertin.
ROGIER, L. J. 1967 Herdenktng van P. Geyl (In
Commemoration of P. Geyl). Mededelingen van de
Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Weten-
schappen, Afdeling Letterkunde, N. R. 30: Whole
no. 12.
ROWEN, HERBERT H. 1965 The Historical Work of
Pieter Geyl. Journal of Modern History 37:35-49.
TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. 1934-1961 A Study of History.
12 vols. Oxford Univ. Press.
GHURYE, G. S.
Govind Sadashiv Ghurye was born into a Sara-
swat Brahmin family in Malvan, India, in 1893.
He completed his high school and college educa-
tion in Bombay, where he studied English and

Sanskrit. Ghurye was throughout a brilliant stu-
dent and he won the coveted Chancellor's gold
medal as the best student at the M.A. examina-
tion in 1918. After reading Ghurye's unpub-
lished essay on "Bombay as an Urban Centre,"
Patrick Geddes, who had started the sociology
department at the University of Bombay, recom-
mended him for a foreign scholarship, and
Ghurye went to London. Dissatisfied with the
atmosphere at the London School of Economics,
and uninspired by L. T. Hobhouse, Ghurye reg-
istered for the PH.D. program at Cambridge
University, where he planned to study with
W. H. R. Rivers. Unfortunately, Rivers, for
whom Ghurye developed an enormous regard,
died in 1922, and he completed his work under
Alfred Cort Haddon. He returned home in 1923.
Appointed reader and head of the sociology de-
partment at the University of Bombay in 1924,
he became a full professor in 1934, and at his
retirement at the age of 65, he was named the
first professor emeritus of the university.
Ghurye's first book, Caste and Race in India
(1932), in which he skillfully combined histori-
cal (Indological), anthropological, and socio-
logical approaches, established his reputation.
He was as much concerned with the historical
origin and the geographical spread of the caste
system as with its contemporary features, in-
cluding the impact of British rule. He recorded
insightfully the persisting, the changing, and
the emerging features of this complex system.
Though firmly opposed to the caste system and
hopeful that it will weaken in the urban en-
vironment, he also regretfully noted the growth
of caste consciousness and the transformation
of the caste into a community. In subsequent
editions, Ghurye fully developed such themes as
the role of the caste in politics. This book will
rank as Ghurye's most lasting contribution to
Indian sociology.
Though at the height of his intellectual
powers, Ghurye did not publish another major
work for ten years. Then, he published The
Aborigines—'So-called"—and Their Future (1943)
to refute Verrier Elwin's thesis that the separate
identity of tribal groups should be maintained
by enforcing their continued isolation. Ghurye
argued in favor of their assimilation into the
larger community. Essentially, Ghurye was di-
recting his attention to the critical problem of
nation building in a heterogeneous society, a
theme to which he has returned repeatedly in
his later writings. In Social Tensions in India
, he examined, in a historical context,
GHURYE, G. S. 237
the deeply divisive role of culture, language,
and religion in India. Concerned about the bleak
prospect of national solidarity, he expressed his
dissatisfaction with the gradual amoral, manip-
ulative drift in Indian politics in Whither India?
(1974). In India Recreates Democracy (1978),
however, he celebrated the restoration of de-
mocracy to India in 1977. These works show
Ghurye's abiding concern with the problems of
his society.
During these years, more general themes and
a cosmopolitan approach to sociology were ex-
hibited in Ghurye's broader works on culture.
In Culture and Society (1947), he dealt with a
universal theme—what makes a culture great?—
and assigned universities a major role in pre-
serving, enhancing, and disseminating culture
in society. In a subsequent work, Occidental
Civilization (1948), he focused on the reasons
for peaks and clusters of creative energy.
Ghurye's lifelong intellectual fascination with
cities found detailed expression in Cities and
Civilization (1962a). These works show his inti-
mate knowledge of Western literature.
In his remaining works, Indian themes have
predominated. Ghurye tried, in Indian Costume
(1951), through a historical survey, to arrive at
a position on the question of national dress; a
hopeless undertaking for a country as vast and
varied as India. Again, the effort was aimed at
finding homogeneity in extreme heterogeneity.
His deep interest in urbanization was expressed
in many writings. For example, he discussed
the impact of the urbanization process on a
given rural hinterland (1963a). Taking an 1819
monograph on an Indian village as his base,
Ghurye restudied the area and analyzed its de-
velopment (1960a). He also examined literary
sources to produce evidence of social change in
his home state (1952b; 1954a).
The sociology of religion has been another of
his major intellectual concerns. His Indian Sad-
hus (1953£>) traced the role of ascetic organiza-
tion. He wrote two studies of Indian gods
(1962b; 1977), and prepared an analysis of the
role of religion in the historical civilizations of
Mesopotamia, Egypt, and India (1965a). He
wrote an authoritative study of kinship (1955).
His papers are many and varied, covering such
subjects as dual organization in India, cross-
cousin marriage, age at the time of marriage,
marriage and widowhood, Egyptian affinities of
Indian funerary practices, disposal of the hu-
man placenta, salary and working conditions
of clerks, friendship, megalith remains in India,
238 GHURYE, G. S.
population growth, sex habits of the Bombay
middle class, birth control in Bombay, untouch-
ability, explorations in pre- and protohistoric
Sindh culture, and so on. A minor work deserv-
ing consideration is Vidyas (1957b*), in which
Ghurye paid homage to Comte on the centenary
of his death. That an Indian sociologist was
mindful of this event is itself remarkable; that
Ghurye recognized Comte as a sociologist of
knowledge is more so. Ghurye, doubtless imitat-
ing Comte, suggested a new name for sociology—
humanics, a term borrowed from Roger Wil-
liams, on his own admission.
In addition to his research, Ghurye has found
time to be a successful teacher. Approximately
80 dissertations (25 for the M.A.; 55 for the
PH.D.) have been completed under his guidance
(1973) and his former students still teach in
various Indian universities. Although he taught
at a time when doctoral fellowships and fund-
ing organizations were scarce and professional
employment prospects dim (Srinivas 1973),
Ghurye attracted many students and inspired
them, by his scholarly stature, to pursue the
painstaking process of sociological research.
His students often tackled new topics, including
village studies, urban studies, kinship studies,
community studies, regional studies, and na-
tionalism. He allowed each student to pursue
his or her own interest and showed great toler-
ance. One could do almost any kind of research,
subjectwise and methodwise, provided stan-
dards set by Ghurye were met. Ghurye was an
exacting adviser but did not impose his views.
Few have equalled him and none has surpassed
him in India in this respect.
In 1952, Ghurye founded the Indian Socio-
logical Society and launched its journal, Socio-
logical Bulletin. He served as the society's first
president until 1966. Though there were other
pioneers, no single person has done as much
for sociology in India as Ghurye.
As a student of Rivers, Ghurye was influ-
enced by diffusionist ideas that are reflected in
many of his early works. K. M. Kapadia (1954)
and M. N. Srinivas (1973), both PH.D. students
of Ghurye, refer to it. In later life, he either
outgrew or rejected these ideas. Did he use the
ten "fallow" years to secure his intellectual inde-
pendence? If so, Ghurye has never surrendered
it again and has been his own mentor. Deeply
rooted in Indian culture, he has not allowed
anything to deflect him. Ghurye has chosen to
be a recluse in order to preserve his freedom
to do what he thinks best. The one abiding les-
son he learned at Cambridge, and sought to
transmit to his students, was respect for facts.
When he began his career, very little work had
been done in sociology in India, and it was
salutary to insist on facts. Ghurye's commit-
ment to facts has both a positive and a negative
side. Positively, it has given him and his stu-
dents a firm empirical base, curbing the specu-
lative tendencies that are especially tempting
in the absence of concrete information. Srinivas
(1973) rightly compliments Ghurye for conduct-
ing a one-man ethnographic survey of India
from his chair in Bombay. Negatively, Ghurye's
prolonged neglect of all theoretical positions,
however tentatively, has deprived his writings
of a powerful thrust. It is puzzling that a mind
so vital and aware should have remained in-
different to the fierce controversies in the West.
Was this indifference (it was not ignorance) a
mechanism to protect himself from an inter-
minable and seemingly profitless exercise? If
so, his accomplishments may attest to the value
of his strategy.
DHIRENDRA NARAIN
WORKS BY GHURYE
(1932) 1969 Class, Caste and Occupation. 5th ed.
Bombay: Popular Prakashan. —» First published as
Caste and Race in India.
(1943) 1963 The Scheduled Tribes. 3d ed. Bombay:
Popular Prakashan. —> First published as The Ab-
origines— "So-called"—and Their Future.
1947 Culture and Society. Oxford Univ. Press.
1948 Occidental Civilization. Indian Institute for Edu-
cational and Cultural Co-operation, Publications,
No. 1. Bombay: The Institute.
(1951) 1966 Indian Costume. 2d ed. Bombay: Popular
Prakashan.
1952a Race Relations in Negro Africa. Bombay: Asia
Publishing House.
1952b Social Change in Maharashtra (I). Sociological
Bulletin I , no. 1:71-86.
1952c Ascetic Origins. Sociological Bulletin 1, no.
2:162-184.
1953a Cities of India. Sociological Bulletin 2, no.
1:47-80.
(1953b) 1964 Indian Sadhus. 2d ed. Bombay: Popu-
lar Prakashan; New York: Humanities Press.
1954a Social Change in Maharashtra (II). Sociological
Bulletin 3, no. 1:42-60.
1954fo Sexual Behaviour of the American Female.
Sociological Bulletin 3, no. 2:158-183.
(1955) 1962 Family and Kin in Indo-European Cul-
ture. 2d ed. Bombay: Popular Prakashan; New
York: Humanities Press.
1956a Cities: Their Natural History. Sociological Bul-
letin 5, no. 1:51-78.
1956b Sexual Behaviour of the American Female.
Bombay: Current Book House.
1957a The Mahadev Kolis. Bombay: Popular Book
Depot.
I957b Vidyas: A Homage to Comte and a Contribution
to Sociology of Knowledge. Bombay: Indian Socio-
logical Society.

1958 Bharatanatya and Its Costume. Bombay: Popular
Book Depot.
1960a After a Century and a Quarter: Lonikand Then
and Now. Bombay: Popular Book Depot.
1960b Prolegomena to Town and Country Planning.
Sociological Bulletin 9, no. 2:73-91.
1962a Cities and Civilization. Bombay: Popular Praka-
shan.
1962k Gods and Men. Bombay: Popular Book Depot.
1963a Anatomy of a Rururban Community. Bombay:
Popular Prakashan.
1963£> Anthropo-sociological Papers. Bombay: Popular
Prakashan.
1964 Bombay Suburbanites: Some Aspects of Their
Working Life. Sociological Bulletin 13, no. 2:73-83.
1965a Religious Consciousness. Bombay: Popular
Prakashan.
1965b Shakespeare on Conscience and Justice. Bom-
bay : Popular Prakashan.
1965c Bombay Suburbanites: Some Aspects of Their
Working Life (II). Sociological Bulletin 14, no.
2:1-8.
1968a Rajput Architecture. Bombay: Popular Praka-
shan.
1968Z? Social Tensions in India. Bombay: Popular
Prakashan.
1972 Two Brahminical Institutions: Gotra and Cha-
rana. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
1973 I and Other Explorations. Bombay: Popular
Prakashan.
1974 Whither India? Bombay: Popular Prakashan,
1977 Indian Acculturation. Bombay: Popular Praka-
shan.
1978 India Recreates Democracy. Bombay: Popular
Prakashan.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
KAPADIA, K. M. (editor) 1954 Professor Ghurye
Felicitation Volume. Bombay: Popular Book Depot.
KARVE, IRAWATI 1960 Anthropology and Sociology.
Volume 2, pages 125-127 in G. B. Sardar (editor),
Maharastra jivan: Parampara, pragati ani samasya
(Life in Maharashtra: Tradition, Progress and Prob-
lems). Poona (India): Joshi & Lokhande Praka-
shan.
MUKHERJEE, RAMKRISHNA 1977 Trends in Indian So-
ciology. Current Sociology 25, no. 3: 31, 37, 39-41.
PILLAI, S. DEVADAS (editor) 1976 Aspects of Chang-
ing India: Studies in Honour of Prof. G. S. Ghurye.
Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
SRINIVAS, M. N. 1973 Itineraries of an Indian Social
Anthropologist. International Social Science Journal
25, nos. 1-2: 129-148.
GLASS, D. V.
David V. Glass (1911-1978) was a pioneer
in the study of population, population policy,
demography, social mobility, demographic his-
tory, and historical demography. For fifty years
he was associated with the London School of
Economics (L.S.E.) as a student and an influ-
ential teacher.
David Victor Glass, a tailor's son, was born in
London's East End in 1911 and was thus by
birthplace a true cockney, though few would
GLASS, D. V. 239
recognize this later. He attended a state ele-
mentary school and Raine's Foundation School
before enrolling at the L.S.E. in 1928.
The L.S.E. was founded as, and has re-
mained, a place of heightened political aware-
ness; in the 1930s, politics was an obsession.
The Houghton Street that Glass walked daily
was a marketplace of socialist ideas and ideals.
Among those who contributed to the intellectual
climate of the time were Beatrice and Sidney
Webb, the founders of L.S.E. and early advo-
cates of pragmatic socialism; the sociologist and
philosopher, L. T. Hobhouse; the social and
economic historian, Richard H. Tawney; the so-
cial anthropologist, Bronislaw Malinowski; the
sociologist, Karl Mannheim; and the legendary
political activist, Harold Laski. Although politics
did not figure in Glass's later professional work,
he did continue to hold strong convictions on
social justice and inequality and on indepen-
dence and self-sufficiency for the Third World.
Throughout his life he remained a socialist, re-
fusing a knighthood on this principle.
While a student, Glass was active in leftist
student politics and, after graduation, he nearly
became a regional organizer for the Workers'
Educational Association. William Beveridge
wrote in 1932: "As a student Glass was regarded
as one of the most promising men of his year";
and if he only received an upper second it was
"because he occupied himself too much with the
activities of the Student Union" (The [London]
Times, Sept. 27, 1978, p. 16).
In 1931 Glass graduated with a B.SC. in eco-
nomics and then worked as a research assistant
to Beveridge, who years later would be the
architect of Britain's national insurance system
—the basis for Britain's welfare state providing
coverage "from the womb to the tomb." During
this time Glass also worked with the statistician
Arthur Bowley.
In 1935 Glass wrote The Town and a Chang-
ing Civilization, an analysis of the historical de-
velopment of towns as social institutions from
Sumer to modern times. The work traced the
origins of urban problems in an attempt to es-
tablish a precursor for a system of town plan-
ning. The book concluded that there was little
value to "using economics to achieve more effi-
cient production if the bulk of the production is
to go to a minority among those individuals.
In the face of such problems and such aims,
there is only one way of obtaining the society
we need—by building a Socialist State" (p. 141).
The work was published in a series edited by
240 GLASS, D. V.
Krishna Menon, later India's Minister of De-
fense and Glass's lifelong friend.
In the same year, Glass joined the department
of social biology to work with Lancelot Hogben.
Hogben's work, and especially his edited book
Political Arithmetic (1938) to which Glass con-
tributed, combined empirical social research
with a wide-ranging social investigation. "My
own approach to social research," wrote Glass,
"was very considerably affected by discussions
with Professor Hogben" (1973b, p. 175). Glass
retained this broad but empirically based in-
tellectual style throughout his life, at a time
when many others in his field adopted a more
narrow, specialized approach. His work showed
superb skill in the analysis of new facts within
a comprehensive framework while avoiding
trends toward either blind empiricism or grand
theorism. Years later, in his landmark study on
Social Mobility in Britain (1954), he acknowl-
edged that the "approach to the study of social
selection and differentiation has clearly been in-
fluenced by the investigations which [Hogben]
promoted before World War n" (p. vi).
Glass's development in demography and sta-
tistics was also influenced by Robert R. Kuczyn-
ski, then also working in the department, who
had earlier helped to develop and apply indices
of population replacement (net and gross repro-
duction rates). These indices were important in
that they showed the potential implications of a
sustained fertility decline upon the size and age
structure of the population. Because Kuczynski's
indices were widely publicized and adopted by
the League of Nations' Statistical Yearbook, con-
siderable attention was drawn to the falling
birth rates. The technical appendices of some of
Glass's later work made extensive use of Kuczyn-
ski's methods.
In 1936 Glass was appointed research secre-
tary of the newly formed Population Investiga-
tion Committee, which included Alexander M.
Carr-Saunders as chairman, as well as Carlos P.
Blacker, Juliet E. Rhys-Williams, and Grace
Leybourhe. As more attention was focused on
Europe's falling birth rates, the committee asked
Glass to study the family allowance system in
France and Belgium as well as other pro-natalist
policies in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. This
work was summarized in his second book, The
Struggle for Population. It was published in
1936 along with Carr-Saunders' World Popula-
tion: Past Growth and Present Trends, and
Kuczynski's Population Movements. The three
books, reviewed together in The (London)
Times, drew considerable attention in the press
and in Parliament to the declining birth rates.
The research findings and the resulting public
discussion contributed directly to the passage of
the Population (Statistics) Act of 1938, which
greatly expanded the scope of vital registration
in Britain by including background questions on
age and other characteristics of the mother. This
information enabled the precise calculation of
reproduction rates and allowed an analysis of
current changes of fertility.
Concern over the possibility of a declining
population was heightened by the spreading war
in Europe and by Nazi Germany's purported
success in raising marriage and birth rates.
Glass undertook a major study of the formulation
and implementation of government policies af-
fecting marriage and fertility in England and
Wales, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, and
Scandinavia. The family allowance systems
were studied in great detail because they were
increasingly being used as a pro-natalist popu-
lation policy. "The record of governmental
attempts to stimulate fertility shows one signifi-
cant and constant fact," wrote Glass, that
"however urgently governments may have de-
clared their desire to increase the supply of
births, they have nevertheless persistently tried
to buy babies at bargain prices" (1940, p. 371).
The study, which was also his PH.D. thesis, was
published in 1940 in a single volume, Popula-
tion Policies and Movements in Europe, and
was regarded as the definitive work on popula-
tion policy. Nearly thirty years later, when there
was concern that population was growing too
rapidly, the book was republished; it remains a
major classic in the study of population.
Glass went to the United States in 1940 as a
Rockefeller fellow; but because of the war he
was recruited as deputy director of the British
Petroleum Mission in Washington. At the end of
the war, Glass was appointed director of the
Family Sample Census of the Royal Commission
on Population, established at a time when there
was still concern about low fertility. Glass di-
rected the largest population survey conducted
in Britain. It included a ten per cent sample of
ever-married women who were asked complete
fertility and marriage history questions (Glass
& Grebenik 1954). This was one of the first
large-scale studies of fertility which employed
the methods of cohort analysis.
The Royal Commission found that family size
had remained relatively stable at around 2.2
children per married couple and, though this

was close to the level of replacement, population
was likely to increase for some time. It recom-
mended a number of governmental social poli-
cies to reduce the cost burden on large families
while also suggesting that the National Health
Service distribute contraceptives. Most of the
recommendations were ignored by later govern-
ments, but the reports did influence the public
discussions and subsequent investigations of
population changes. By the mid-1950s, fertility
dramatically increased in Britain and popula-
tion projections had to be revised upward.
In 1945 Glass replaced R. R. Kuczynski as a
reader in demography at the L.S.E., and by
1948 he became professor of sociology, a posi-
tion he retained for the rest of his life. He also
served in the late 1940s as the United Kingdom
representative to the United Nations Population
Commission and to the United Nations Ed-
ucational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion. In 1947 Glass founded and coedited with
E. Grebenik what became the leading journal in
the population field, Population Studies. These
two personally reviewed all the submitted manu-
scripts until Glass's death in 1978.
During these years, Glass worked increasingly
in sociology and history because, as he said in
the Introduction to Malthus (1953), "population
is not itself an independent variable." In the
1950s a number of Malthusian arguments were
proposed by different writers. In response, Glass
wrote and edited some of the most incisive work
ever done on Malthus, relating that theorist to
his times and analyzing the relevance of Mal-
thusian arguments to the contemporary world.
In the 1950s and 1960s many historians be-
came increasingly interested in the role of popu-
lation growth in economic and social change,
and at the same time many demographers be-
came interested in history. In an attempt to
integrate work in the two disciplines, and em-
ploying their combined approaches, Glass con-
tributed to and edited two landmark books on
demographic history. The first, Population in
History (1965), was coedited with D. E. C.
Eversley, and the second, coedited with Roger
Revelle, was Population and Social Change
(1972). These books contributed greatly to our
knowledge about the demographic transition in
preindustrial and industrializing Europe, and
perhaps shed some light on the relevance of
these experiences to other countries.
Glass was interested not only in demographic
history but also in the history of demography,
particularly in Britain. He wrote papers on
GLASS, D. V. 241
Gregory King's estimate of the population of
England and Wales in 1695 and on John
Graunt's development of the life table. Published
with two companion volumes of historical re-
prints, The Population Controversy (1973c) and
The Development of Population Statistics
(1973a), Numbering the People (1973b) was
one of his major works in this area. It analyzed
in great detail the eighteenth-century population
controversies and the development of the census
and vital statistics in Britain.
Perhaps his most important work, inspired
partly by Hogben, Marshall, and Ginsberg, was
his study on Social Mobility in Britain (1954),
conducted with J. R. Hall and others. This was
a pioneering investigation of intergenerational
mobility; it was the first national study under-
taken anywhere to examine systematically social
mobility over the entire community, and its
methodology remains a model on which studies
are still based. After first establishing a scale of
occupations by social status on the basis of
empirical research, the investigators then ob-
tained life histories of a random sample of ten
thousand adults representing Great Britain. An
Index of Association was employed to measure
the extent to which mobility between two oc-
cupational groups went beyond that of "chance."
A value greater than unity indicated that more
subjects were found in their fathers' status cate-
gory than would be expected assuming statisti-
cal independence. A wide range of analysis was
then undertaken by a number of colleagues,
while Glass himself examined the relations be-
tween social origins and education; changes in
social status between fathers and sons; and the
way in which education affects the social mo-
bility of individuals of different social origins.
Much greater social mobility was found in
Britain than many, including Glass, had ex-
pected, in what was thought to be a more rigid
class structure. Glass took a leading role within
the International Sociological Association to pro-
mote similar studies in other countries, all de-
signed for international comparability, and he
strongly influenced Gosta Carlsson's study of
Sweden and Kaare Svalastoga's study of Den-
mark. A remarkable similarity was eventually
found in the general pattern of social mobility
of Western industrialized countries.
Glass participated in many other special study
groups and helped found the British Society of
Population Studies. He was elected president of
the International Union for the Scientific Study
of Population (1963-1965); fellow of the British
242 GLUCKMAN, MAX
Academy (1964); fellow of the Royal Society
(1971); foreign honorary member of the Amer-
ican Academy of Arts and Sciences (1971); and
foreign associate of the National Academy of
Sciences (1973). He also received honorary
doctoral degrees from the universities of Mich-
igan and Edinburgh, and from Queen's Uni-
versity Belfast.
Despite his public activities, Glass was, in
many ways, a lone scholar, trying not to be dis-
tracted by the popularity of his field. Yet in
1965 he created one of the world's leading pop-
ulation training centers which combined an
orientation to the Third World, a study of popu-
lation within a broad social context, and the
most sophisticated of demographic techniques.
He demanded the highest standards of scholar-
ship from himself and his students. His superbly
substantive and witty lectures were always
crowded, with every continent well represented.
Glass encouraged his students to return to their
own countries, where many have moved into
key governmental and university positions; thus
his influence as a teacher and a scholar have
extended far beyond the shores of the British
Isles.
B. MAXWELL STAMPER
WORKS BY GLASS
1935 The Town and a Changing Civilization. London:
Lane.
1936 The Struggle for Population. Oxford: Clarendon.
—» With an introduction by Alexander M. Carr-
Saunders.
1938 GLASS, D. V.; and GRAY, J. L. Opportunity and
the Older Universities: A Study of the Oxford and
Cambridge Scholarship System. Pages 418-470 in
Lancelot Hogben (editor), Political Arithmetic.
London: Allen & Unwin.
(1940) 1967 Population Policies and Movements in
Europe. 2d ed. London: Cass. —» Includes a new
introduction.
1950a Graunt's Life Table. Journal of the Institute of
Actuaries (London) 76:60-64.
1950k Gregory King's Estimate of the Population of
England and Wales, 1695. Population Studies 3:
338-374.
(1953) 1966 GLASS, D. V. (editor) Introduction to
Malthus. London: Cass.
(1954) 1963 GLASS, D. V. (editor) Social Mobility in
Britain. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press.
1954 GLASS, D. V.; and GREBENIK, E. The Trend and
Pattern of Fertility in Great Britain: A Report on
the Family Census of 1946. London: H.M. Sta-
tionery Office.
1956 Education and Social Mobility in Industrial So-
cieties: Introductory Remarks. In volume 5, World
Congress of Sociology, Third, Transactions. Lon-
don: International Sociological Association.
1963 John Graunt and His Natural Political Observa-
tions. Royal Society of London, Proceedings Series
B 159:1-38. —•» Includes six pages of discussion.
1965 GLASS, D. V.; CARLSSON, GOSTA; and SVALAS-
TOGA, KAARE Social Stratification and Mobility.
Acta Sociologica 11, parts 1-2.
1965 GLASS, D. V.; and EVERSLEY, D. E. C. (editors)
Population in History: Essays in Historical Demog-
raphy. London: Arnold.
1967 Demographic Prediction. Royal Society of Lon-
don, Proceedings Series B 168:119-147. —> The
third Royal Society Nuffield lecture.
1972 GLASS, D. V.; and REVELLE, ROGER (editors)
Population and Social Change. London: Arnold.
1973a The Development of Population Statistics.
Edited by D. V. Glass. Farnborough (England):
Gregg International.
1973Z? Numbering the People. Farnborough (England):
Heath.
1973c The Population Controversy. Farnborough (En-
gland): Gregg International.
1976 Recent and Prospective Trends in Fertility in
Developed Countries. Royal Society of London, Philo-
sophical Transactions 274:1-52.
1976 GLASS, D. V. ; and TAYLOR, P. A. M. Population
and Emigration. Dublin and London: Irish Aca-
demic Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CARLSSON, GOSTA 1958 Social Mobility and Class
Structure. Lund (Sweden): Gleerup.
CARR-SAUNDERS, ALEXANDER M. (1936) 1965 World
Population: Past Growth and Present Trends. New
York: Barnes & Noble.
GREBENIK, E. 1979 D. V. Glass. Population Studies
39. —» Forthcoming publication.
HOBCRAFT, JOHN 1978 David Victor Glass. Popula-
tion Index 44, no. 4.
HOGBEN, LANCELOT (editor) 1938 Political Arithme-
tic. London: Allen & Unwin.
KUCZYNSKI, R. R. 1936 Population Movements. Ox-
ford Univ. Press.
Professor David Glass: Pioneer Studies on Population.
1978 The (London) Times, Sept. 27, p. 16.
GLUCKMAN, MAX
Max Gluckman, a major figure in social an-
thropology, was born in Johannesburg, South
Africa, on January 26, 1911. He died in Jeru-
salem, Israel, on April 13, 1975, while serving
as the Lady Davis distinguished visiting scholar
at the Hebrew University.
Career. Gluckman's South African youth was
decisive in determining his view of anthro-
pology, although most of his research and his
entire teaching career postdated his departure
from South Africa in 1938. He was to visit that
country only for brief periods afterwards, and
he became increasingly critical of its political
development. He opted for British rather than
South African citizenship and spoke out pub-
licly against the deepening shadow of apartheid.
It was the South African experience that molded
him into a firm champion of black Africans
throughout the continent, a championship that
led to his exclusion for many years from field

work in south or central Africa. He returned to
the latter area only after northern Rhodesia be-
came independent Zambia in 1964.
Gluckman also felt a deep emotional commit-
ment to Israel. This devotion, too, went back to
his childhood. Although his parents did not prac-
tice the Jewish religion, they were prominent
members of the South African Jewish commu-
nity and strong Zionists. They and most of their
children ultimately emigrated to Israel. Gluck-
man never carried out intensive field research
in Israel as he did in south and central Africa,
but in his later years the majority of his stu-
dents were sent to work in Israel, as earlier the
majority of them had gone to work in central
Africa. Much of this later work was carried out
as part of the Bernstein Israel Research Project,
which was initiated through the University of
Manchester in 1963 under Gluckman's direc-
tion. That project has been called "the first con-
certed effort by a group of social anthropologists
to explore an industrialized state since Warner's
Yankee City studies" (Marx 1975, p. 131).
Although Gluckman spent much of his work-
ing life in England and encouraged his students
to do research on its factories, shops, and hous-
ing estates, he himself did little research in that
country except on the subject of sport. A fine
athlete from boyhood, Gluckman turned natu-
rally to the examination of the role of football
and other sports within the context of contem-
porary life.
Gluckman was educated at Witwatersrand
University (B.A., 1934) and at Oxford Univer-
sity, where he went in 1934 as a Transvaal
Rhodes scholar. He received his D.PHIL, in an-
thropology at Oxford in 1938. From 1936 to
1938 he carried out field work in Zululand, and
then, in 1939, he went to northern Rhodesia
(now Zambia) as a research officer of the
Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. He immediately
began field work among the Lozi of Barotse-
land, that work being interrupted when he be-
came director of the institute in 1941. There-
after he was able to return to Barotseland twice
for short periods during which he concentrated
on the working of Lozi courts. He also spent a
few weeks in research among the Tonga and
Lamba peoples before he gave up the director-
ship in 1947. In that year he became university
lecturer in social anthropology at Oxford, a post
he left in 1949 when appointed the first profes-
sor of social anthropology at the University of
Manchester.
Leaving the institute did not end Gluckman's
GLUCKMAN, MAX 243
close involvement with its development. For
many years he continued to train the majority
of those appointed as research officers, and he
gave them an academic home at Manchester
when they returned from central Africa. The
first reports of their research were usually given
in his famous Manchester seminar, which was
devoted to the analysis of field data.
At Manchester, Gluckman founded a school
of social anthropology stamped with his own
standards of excellence and his characteristic
research interests. These emphasized the neces-
sity of relating what happened in particular
situations to the context of the total system
within which the situations developed. They
focused upon action guided by a concern for
reputation and social values rather than upon
such subjects as cognitive systems. Situational
analysis, the extended case method, and the
social drama were all terms used to express the
essence of his method with its focus upon
human interaction. F. G. Bailey, Victor Turner,
Ronald Frankenberg, Arnold L. Epstein, Scarlet
Epstein, William Watson, and Jaap Van Velsen
were among the first of the stream of distin-
guished anthropologists whom he trained.
When Gluckman became a special fellow of
the Nuffield Foundation in 1971, he handed over
the chairmanship of the Manchester depart-
ment, but continued to teach. Part of his
strength as a teacher depended on his deep in-
terest in his students and in their work. He gave
time and intellectual energy to helping them
develop the theoretical implications of their
data, and delighted in their discoveries, which
he saw as an extension of his own work. Al-
though primarily associated with the University
of Manchester in his later years, Gluckman also
traveled widely and frequently served as visit-
ing professor at universities throughout the
world. He returned most consistently to the
Yale University Law School, where he was
honored for his work in comparative law and
found congenial companions who shared with
him his interest in jurisprudence. His colleagues
recognized him by awarding him most of the
honors that can come to an anthropologist.
Intellectual development. Although Gluck-
man's youthful experiences influenced his later
career profoundly, his theoretical development
was determined by experiences at Witwatersrand
and Oxford. When Gluckman entered Wit-
watersrand in 1928, he expected to study law
and become a lawyer like his father. A lecture
course in anthropology taught by Winifred
 244 GLUCKMAN, MAX
Hoernle, however, turned him away to social
anthropology. Hoernle's theoretical approach
was strongly influenced by Emile Durkheim and
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, but she was also one of
the founders of the South African Institute for
Race Relations, created to provide factual in-
formation on the multiethnic population of
South Africa. She and Isaac Schapera, who also
taught at Witwatersrand for a year, saw anthro-
pology as involved with living people. They be-
lieved that anthropologists in South Africa had
an obligation to study the impact of the social
conditions under which Africans were being
forced to live in the reserves, on farms, and in
towns and cities. Reconstructing cultural prac-
tices of the African past was a legitimate an-
thropological enterprise, but it was of less cru-
cial concern than documenting and analyzing
the contemporary multiethnic scene. Hoernle
and Schapera, and the young men and women
drawn by them into anthropology, translated the
functional doctrines then dominating social an-
thropology under the influence of Bronislaw
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown into a state-
ment about the interrelationships between
such phenomena as the high standard of living
of South African whites, pass laws, low wages
for Africans, malnutrition in the reserves,
dilemmas of chieftainship, eroding agriculture
in the reserves, and so on. Taking a stand by
no means acceptable to most white South Afri-
cans, who thought in terms of separate cultural
universes, they described Africans and Euro-
peans as belonging to a single social system.
Gluckman was strongly drawn to this view
of anthropology. Beginning with his first pro-
fessional writing, he examined interethnic situ-
ations within which blacks and whites encoun-
tered each other (1940), and he encouraged
colleagues and later students to study contem-
porary industrial society, which he saw as
including the rural areas of Africa. When in
1943 he drew up a seven-year research plan for
the Rhodes—Livingstone Institute, he took in-
dustrialization and labor migration as the focus
for the work of all research officers to be ap-
pointed by the institute to work in northern
Rhodesia (Zambia), southern Rhodesia (Zim-
babwe), and Nyasaland (Malawi). He saw these
two forces as both disruptive of old patterns
and providing the basis for regrouping, and he
wrote: "as part of this study we shall analyse
the formation of new groups and relationships,
in both urban and rural areas . . ." (1945, p. 9).
For him, anthropology thrust forward from the
present into the future. In much the same terms
some twenty years later, in 1963, he planned
the Bernstein Israel Research Project, but this
time the focus was to be upon industrialization
and immigration.
At Oxford Gluckman studied under Robert R.
Marett, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, and later Rad-
cliffe-Brown. In the 1930s the latter two were
closely associated intellectually and it was to
them that Gluckman gave his allegiance. Their
ideas about social structure, functional relation-
ships, social cohesion, and political order were
congenial to him, since they referred back to
Durkheimian formulations already familiar to
him from Hoernle's teaching. Gluckman agreed
with Radcliffe-Brown and Durkheim that society
is a moral order that manages to maintain itself
despite conflict among its members who follow
their competing interests and sometimes rebel
against whatever symbolizes social constraints.
However, he departed from Radcliffe-Brown in-
creasingly as he came to emphasize the per-
vasiveness and bitterness of the conflicts with
which society has to contend. He looked to law
and ritual as the great upholders of the social
order, seeing in them the mediating mechanisms
that permit harmony to be restored after
breaches of the peace have occurred or when
people have shown themselves to be fundamen-
tally at odds. He was to make major contribu-
tions to the study of both law and ritual.
Gluckman published two influential books
based upon his field study of Lozi courts, The
Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern
Rhodesia (1955b) and The Ideas in Barotse
Jurisprudence (1965a). Critics in his own dis-
cipline were later to accuse Gluckman of having
imposed English and Roman Dutch legal cate-
gories upon the Lozi judges. He defended him-
self against his accusers, maintaining that he
had the obligation to explicate Lozi ideas in
terms comprehensible to the legal scholar as
well as to the anthropologist, but that he was
translating concepts familiar enough to Lozi
litigants and judges. It was the Lozi who used
the standard of "the reasonable man" in weigh-
ing the evidence; he had only the pleasure of
recognizing a familiar legal concept in an un-
familiar setting. In these books, and in various
articles dealing with Lozi courts and legal pro-
cedures, he dealt with technicalities of law in a
fashion that suggests his early legal training.
But his over-all concern with the courts was
with their role as moral agents.
Gluckman's doctoral dissertation for Oxford

was entitled "The Realm of the Supernatural
among the Southeastern Bantu." It was based
on library research and at first glance seems an
uncongenial subject for a man who as a pro-
fessed agnostic admitted that he found religious
belief difficult to understand. Gluckman never
published the dissertation, but he mined from
it a number of articles on ritual that relate to
his primary interests. They examine what for
him were to be perennial questions, how ritual
reflects the social order and in symbolizing it
reaffirms its rightness. He was to write of ritual
again and again in these terms, describing the
ceremony of the opening of a bridge in Zululand
as symbolizing both the divergent and the com-
mon interests of those who attended (1940);
of the war between the sexes during Wiko cir-
cumcision ceremonies as leading to a reaffirma-
tion of social continuities (1949); and of rituals
of rebellion in Swaziland and elsewhere as
maintaining the state (1954). His final state-
ment on the subject was made in the last article
he published: "In ritual . . . the ultimate em-
phasis is that harmony among people can be
achieved despite the conflicts, and that social
institutions and values are in fact harmonious-
ultimate statements that are belied to some ex-
tent by the ritualization itself. Ritual can do
this since each ritual selects to some extent
from the gamut of moods, of cooperative links,
and of conflicts" (Gluckman & Gluckman
1977, p. 236).
In the late 1930s, Gluckman was closely as-
sociated with E. E. Evans-Pritchard and Meyer
Fortes. At that time they were laying the
groundwork for the study of political anthro-
pology in the discussions that gave rise to the
volume African Political Systems (Fortes &
Evans-Pritchard 1940), which was to initiate a
spate of studies of segmentation and balanced
opposition. Gluckman was strongly influenced
by this volume, to which he was a contributor,
and also by Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer which
appeared in the same year. He thought of him-
self as developing the implications of these vol-
umes in such books as Custom and Conflict in
Africa (1955a) and Politics, Law and Ritual in
Tribal Society (1965b). He may have been un-
aware of how far he had moved in other direc-
tions in his own analysis of conflict and order.
Where Evans-Pritchard and Fortes emphasized
the existence of stable cognitive structures and
balanced opposition of social units, Gluckman
looked to the individual and recognized that the
rules by which people are expected to live are
GLUCKMAN, MAX 245
themselves often contradictory or ambiguous:
people therefore are in conflict with themselves
as well as with their fellows and society. The
different roles they fill make conflicting and
equally valid demands upon them and right
behavior in one role leads to bad behavior in
another. In his thought the moral dilemmas
were likely to be more complex in less complex
societies, for in such societies each individual
must simultaneously enact a variety of roles
and face the various expectations of the other
members of society. He described such societies
as multiplex and believed that it was within them
that ritual functioned most effectively, both to
mark the roles and to persuade people that de-
spite all conflicts, they shared overriding values
of fertility and harmony.
In more complex societies, he looked to legal
rather than to ritual solutions, for he saw them
as mobilized in terms of class or sectional inter-
ests that did not bow to some greater value
placed upon the larger society. The playing out
of conflict in ritual was no longer effective and
could not be permitted, because there were no
ritual symbols that could override the conflict.
At one time Gluckman had read much of Karl
Marx, and he saw the sweep of history in Marx-
ian terms. The influence of Marx upon him later
waned, and he never showed much interest in
the dialectical method, but his view of the role
of ritual in contemporary industrial society de-
rives from his earlier thinking.
Other interests were spin-offs from his cen-
tral concerns. He lectured and wrote on the
functions of gossip (1963a), where again he
faced the criticism of younger anthropologists
who looked at gossip as a system of communica-
tion. Gluckman's own interest was more re-
stricted, for he was concerned with the way in
which social standards were enunciated through
gossip and the way in which gossip served as a
means of social control. His controversial article
on the sources of marital stability (1950) led
to a great deal of research on divorce rates and
the various social factors that might correlate
with them. It was more peripheral to his central
interests, but derived from his concern to dis-
cover the conditions under which frequent mari-
tal break-ups can occur without endangering
the stability of the encompassing social system.
The thread that runs through Gluckman's
work is the study of conflict contained within
some higher order, though threatened by the
unwillingness of men and women to accept
compromises that injure their immediate de-
 246 GLUECK, SHELDON AND ELEiNOR T.
sires. Because of this emphasis on conflict an]
his focus on situations, Gluckman has beei
seen as following in the footsteps of Geor*
Simmel, but he developed his ideas indeper-
dently before reading Simmel. Although he was
adamant that as a social anthropologist he dil
not deal in psychological explanations, his debt
to Sigmund Freud appears to have been sig-
nificant in that he placed conflict within as wel
as between individuals. He himself, after iht
early interest in Marxism, held that he belonged
in the camp of Durkheim and those who believt
that societies are moral systems, rather thai
simply collectivities of competing, calculating
individuals.
ELIZABETH
WORKS BY GLUCKMAN
(1940) 1958 The Zulu of South Africa. Pages 22-5!
in Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (edi
tors), African Political Systems. Oxford Univ. Press
—> A paperback edition was published in 1970.
1941 a Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zulu
land. Bantu Studies 14:1-30, 147-174.
1941b Economy of the Central Barotse Plain. Rhodes-
Livingstone Papers, No. 7. Oxford Univ. Press.
1945 The Seven-year Research Plan of the Rhodes-
Livingstone Institute. Human Problems in Britisl
Central Africa 4:1-32.
1949 The Role of the Sexes in Wiko Circumcisior
Ceremonies. Pages 145-167 in Meyer Fortes (edi
tor), Social Structure: Essays Presented to A. R
Radcliffe-Brown. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1950 Kinship and Marriage Among the Lozi of North
ern Rhodesia and the Zulu of Natal. Pages 166-
206 in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde
(editors), African Systems of Kinship and Mar-
riage. Oxford Univ. Press.
(1951) 1959 The Lozi of Barotseland in North-
western Rhodesia. Pages 1-93 in Elizabeth Colson
and Max Gluckman (editors), Seven Tribes of
British Central Africa. Manchester (England) Univ.
Press.
1954 Rituals of Rebellion in South-east Africa. Man-
chester (England) Univ. Press.
(1955a) 1959 Custom and Conflict in Africa. Glen-
coe, 111.: Free Press. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1967 by Barnes & Noble.
(1955l>) 1967 The Judicial Process Among the
Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. 2d ed. Manchester
(England) Univ. Press.
1963a Gossip and Scandal. Current Anthropology
4:307-316.
1963£> Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa: Collected
Essays With an Autobiographical Introduction.
London: Cohen & West.
(1965a) 1972 The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence.
Manchester (England) Univ. Press. —> Includes a
new preface.
1965b Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society. Ox-
ford: Blackwell; Chicago: Aldine.
1968 Judicial Process: II. Comparative Aspects. Vol-
ume 8, pages 291-297 in International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L.
Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1972 Moral Crisis: Magical and Secular Solutions.
Pages 1-50 in Max Gluckman (editor), The Allo-
cation of Responsibility. Manchester (England)
Univ. Press.
1975 Anthropologists and Apartheid: The Work of
South African Anthropologists. Pages 21-40 in
Meyer Fortes and Sheila Patterson (editors), Studies
in African Social Anthropology. London: Academic
Press.
1977 GLUCKMAN, MAX; and GLUCKMAN, MARY On
Drama, and Games and Athletic Contests. Pages
227-243 in Sally Falk Moore and Barbara Meyerhoff
(editors), Secular Ritual. Assen & Amsterdam
(Netherlands): van Gorcum.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
COLSON, ELIZABETH 1977 The Institute under Max
Gluckman, 1942-47. African Social Research
24:285-295.
EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. (1940) 1963 The Nuer: A
Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political
Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Clarendon.
—» A paperback edition was published in 1968 by
Oxford University Press.
FIRTH, RAYMOND 1975 Max Gluckman. Proceed-
ings of the British Academy 61:479-496.
FORTES, MEYER; and EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. (1940)
1958 African Political Systems. Oxford Univ.
Press. —» A paperback edition was published in
1970.
GLUCKMAN, MARY (compiler) 1976 H. M. Gluck-
man: Biography and Publications, Education and
Posts. Pages 169-179 in Myron J. Aronoff (editor),
Freedom and Constraint: A Memorial Tribute to
Max Gluckman. Assen & Amsterdam (Nether-
lands): van Gorcum.
KUPER, ADAM 1973 Anthropologists and Anthropol-
ogy: The British School 1922-1972. London: Allen
Lane; New York: Pica Press. —> Gluckman is dis-
cussed on pages 175-190.
MARX, EMANUEL 1975 Anthropological Studies in a
Centralized State: Max Gluckman and the Bern-
stein Israel Research Project. Jewish Journal of
Sociology 17:131-150.
GLUECK, SHELDON
AND ELEANOR T.
Sheldon Glueck was born in Warsaw, Poland,
on August 15, 1896. He came to the United
States in 1903 and became a naturalized citizen
in 1920. He attended Georgetown Law School,
George Washington University, the National
Law School, and Harvard University, and earned
the degrees of A.B., A.M., LL.B., LL.M., S.S.D.,
PH.D., and SC.D. In 1948 the University of
Thessalonika (Greece) made him an honorary
doctor of laws. During his long and distin-
guished career Glueck taught at Harvard Uni-
versity. In 1950 he was appointed Roscoe Pound
professor of law, an honor that he prized
greatly because of his close association with
Pound, whose influence is seen in much of
Glueck's writings. In 1963 Glueck retired to be-
come professor emeritus.
 GLUECK, SHELDON AND ELEANOR T. 247
Glueck's interests ranged from the develop-
ment of modern research in delinquency pre-
diction to the practical world of delinquency
prevention. He was invited to advise govern-
ments on a wide variety of matters relating to
the prevention and eradication of these impor-
tant social problems. So respected was his schol-
arship and judgment that on the occasion of
the Nuremberg trials he was appointed adviser
to Justice Robert H. Jackson on law governing
war crime criminals. In recognition of his many
outstanding contributions to criminal justice he
received numerous honors including the Isaac
Ray award of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion in 1961; the August Volmer award of the
American Society of Criminology in 1961 (with
Eleanor Glueck); the gold medal of the Institute
of Anthropology, University of Rome in 1964;
and the Beccaria gold medal of the German
Society of Criminology in 1964. The Sellin-
Glueck award of the American Society of
Criminology was established in 1972 to honor,
inter alia, Glueck's contributions to criminal
justice.
Eleanor T. Glueck (1898-1972) was born on
April 12, 1898, in New York. She studied at
Barnard College, the New York School of Social
Work, and Harvard University, where in 1925
she received a doctor of education degree. She
met Sheldon Glueck when both were graduate
students at Harvard and they were married on
April 16, 1922. From 1925 to 1928 they both
taught at the Harvard department of social
ethics and then moved to Harvard Law School.
There they staked a claim and established a
sound base from which to conduct a lifelong
study of crime and delinquency. Eleanor Glueck
was research associate in criminology for 36
years until her retirement in 1964. Her work did
not stop here and she worked along with her
husband until her untimely death in 1972.
The Gluecks of Harvard, as they grew to be
known by their friends, operated on the growing
edge of knowledge. They were pioneers and they
examined the social indicators hoping to bring
sense and solution to the problems of crimi-
nology. Each brought a special type of knowl-
edge and unique skills to the joint effort. They
studied "the fog-enshrouded borderland of psy-
chiatry and law" and it was inevitable that
through them the social sciences should help to
redirect the law and in its turn the law should
issue its caution when intrusions into the sensi-
tive and private affairs of men and women
seemed necessary. The Gluecks looked to all of
the disciplines in their search for answers in the
highly controversial areas of etiology, predic-
tion, prevention, punishment, correction, and
the individualization of justice. Their studies
reflect a pragmatic determination to relate the-
ory to practice. Some critics have claimed that
on occasion they have rushed too early to con-
clusions, particularly with respect to causation
and in their creation of a prognostic device to
foretell probable delinquency and crime.
In an attempt to trace the roots of delin-
quency and crime the Gluecks examined the
home and school in a number of studies and
wrote widely about their findings. The titles of
some of their publications indicate the direction
taken in this early research: "Working Mothers
and Delinquency" (Glueck & Glueck 1957),
"Role of the Family in the Etiology of Delin-
quency" (E. Glueck 1960), and "Family Envi-
ronment and Delinquency in the Perspective of
Etiologic Research" (Glueck & Glueck 1963).
However, as they studied the puzzle of causa-
tion their data led them to the conclusion that
the specific influences in home and school could
only be understood in the context of broader
social factors.
The Glueck studies coincided with the focus
upon the uniqueness of the individual during
the first part of this century. In the United
States William Healy had written The Individ-
ual Delinquent (1915), while in England Cyril
Burt had brought forth his definitive psychologi-
cal analysis of delinquency in The Young Delin-
quent (1925). The juvenile court was attempt-
ing to apply its parens patriae philosophy to
troubled children one at a time. The Gluecks
were eager to know how well this approach was
faring. In Boston the court was regularly refer-
ring cases to the prestigious Judge Baker Guid-
ance Center for diagnosis and advice. The
Gluecks made a careful examination of a large
number of delinquent boys who had been
treated in this way. The results were published
in One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents (1934i>).
They showed that 88 per cent committed
further delinquencies during a 5 year follow up
period. Notwithstanding the debate that ensued
the Gluecks took a realistic position and argued
in favor of the court pointing out that it was a
clearing house for many of the unresolved prob-
lems of society. In their own inimitable way
they described the situation in these words:
The juvenile court stands at the converging point
of many of the unwholesome trends in society. The
248 GLUECK, SHELDON AND ELEANOR T.
delinquent is a microcosm in whom is reflected a
tangle of vicious circles of poverty, alcoholism, in-
adequate education, mental deficiency, and other
unhealthy conditions. However efficient a juvenile
court and clinic may be in their day to day activi-
ties, they are fighting . . . conditions which may
and do very easily counteract their efforts. . . . A
judge cannot complaisantly regard his court as an
ivory tower of aloofness, nor his particular job as an
end in itself. Whether he recognizes it or not, he and
his work are but elements in the intricate texture
of socio-economic, biologic, and psychologic condi-
tions. Many of these conditions he can of course
not affect in any fundamental sense; a few are
capable of some control, and hence it is the judge's
duty to galvanize the community into action look-
ing to their amelioration. ([1934k] 1939, pp. 273-
274)
The Gluecks saw the experimentation of the
juvenile justice system as providing answers
that might ultimately be emulated in the adult
courts. The individualization of justice was the
goal. They felt that professional disciplines such
as psychiatry, psychology, social work, and ed-
ucation should become integrated components
of the criminal justice system. The Gluecks en-
visioned a board of qualified practitioners sup-
plementing the judiciary in writing prescrip-
tions for crime and delinquency. The principle
of flexibility would prevail and the rights of the
individual offender would be safeguarded.
The Gluecks were early pioneers in the field
of prediction. They saw teachers equipped with
prognostic information as being in a unique
position to recognize the early signs of delin-
quency and thus able to establish preventive
action while time was still on the side of the
young person. The Gluecks also saw prediction
tables as valuable to judges. Dispositions could
be more wisely made based upon open knowl-
edge of prevailing negative factors. In 1950 the
Glueck social prediction tables were presented
in Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency. Five pre-
dictive factors of social background all focused
within the home were presented. These were as
follows: discipline of the boy by the father;
supervision of the boy by the mother; affection
of the father for the boy; affection of the boy
by the mother; and the cohesiveness of the boy's
family. A number of scholars criticized and
challenged the tables. The Gluecks proceeded
to replicate their research and verify their re-
sults in such places as Australia, India, Europe,
and Japan. It cannot be denied that the Gluecks
with steadfast purpose, sincere scholarship, and
sense of social purpose pursued a course of ac-
tion that put them in the forefront of crimi-
nological pioneers, who recognizing a need to
extend our intellectual foresight did not capit-
ulate under the pressure of intellectual contest.
It was appropriate that Harvard University
created the Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck class-
room in the Law School's Pound building. In it
are housed many of the Gluecks' books, papers,
photographs, and memorabilia. The school's
archives contain the full creative product of
these two profilic careers. There are approxi-
mately three hundred books, articles, and mis-
cellanea available for study and research across
the full range of the Gluecks' interests. They
cover the continuum that leads from the child
in distress to the adult confined.
In addition to his research, Sheldon Glueck
wrote several plays. While at George Washing-
ton University he was director of the University
Players Dramatic Club and was offered a lead
role with a professional company that was
about to produce Disraeli. The Harvard Law
School Bulletin published a condensation of his
musical play Mister Littlefellow in 1972.
The Gluecks of Harvard, sometimes contro-
versial, often provocative, always ahead of the
times, will be remembered as leading crimino-
logists, great humanitarians, and inspired
teachers.
V. LORNE STEWART
WORKS BY THE GLUECKS
WORKS BY SHELDON GLUECK
(1925) 1966 Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law.
New York: Kraus.
(1936) 1966 Crime and Justice. New York: Kraus.
(1946) 1966 The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive
War. New York: Kraus.
1952 Crime and Correction: Selected Papers. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
1962 Law and Psychiatry: Cold War or Entente Cor-
diale? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins; London: Tavi-
stock. —» A paperback edition was published by
Johns Hopkins in 1966.
1965 GLUECK, SHELDON (editor) Roscoe Pound and
Criminal Justice. New York: Oceania.
WORKS BY ELEANOR T. GLUECK
1927 The Community Use of Schools. Baltimore: Wil-
liams & Wilkins.
1936 Evaluative Research in Social Work. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press.
(1960) 1964 Role of the Family in the Etiology of
Delinquency. Pages 60-70 in Sheldon and Eleanor
T. Glueck, Ventures in Criminology: Selected Recent
Papers. London: Tavistock; Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press. —» First published in volume
13 of the Bulletin of the Societe Internationale de
Criminologie.
1962 The Gluecks' Adventure in Japan, May 28-July
3, 1960, From a Diary Kept by Eleanor Glueck.
Tokyo: Ooun.

WORKS BY SHELDON AND ELEANOR T. GLUECK
(1930) 1965 500 Criminal Careers. New York: Kraus.
(1934a) 1965 Five Hundred Delinquent Women. New
York: Kraus.
(1934&) 1965 One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents:
Their Treatment by Court and Clinic. 2d ed. New
York: Kraus. —» The quotation in the text is from
the 1939 edition.
(1937) 1966 Later Criminal Careers. New York:
Kraus.
(1940) 1966 Juvenile Delinquents Grown Up. New
York: Kraus.
(1943) 1966 Criminal Careers in Retrospect. New
York: Kraus.
1950 Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency. New York:
Commonwealth Fund.
(1956) 1965 Physique and Delinquency. New York:
Harper.
1957 Working Mothers and Delinquency. Mental Hy-
giene 41:327-352.
1963 Family Environment and Delinquency in the Per-
spective of Etiologic Research. International Annals
of Criminology 1963:211-218.
1964 Ventures in Criminology: Selected Recent Papers.
London: Tavistock; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press.
1968 Delinquents and Nondelinquents. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1970 Toward a Typology of Juvenile Offenders: Impli-
cations for Therapy and Prevention. New York:
Grune & Stratton.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BURT, CYRIL (1925) 1944 The Young Delinquent.
4th ed. rev. Univ. of London Press.
HEALY, WILLIAM 1915 The Individual Delinquent:
A Text-book of Diagnosis and Prognosis for All Con-
cerned in Understanding Offenders. Boston: Little,
Brown.
GOODMAN, NELSON
Henry Nelson Goodman is an American phi-
losopher whose work has fundamental impor-
tance for social and other human sciences and
for the philosophy of social science. The refer-
ence to other human sciences is intended to
mark the fact that his work has been important
for the psychology of cognition and the psychol-
ogy of perception, as well as for social and
cultural anthropology and sociology. The foun-
dational importance of his work in these areas
stems from the fact that his works have con-
stituted classic contributions to basic issues in
the philosophy of science, the philosophy of
language and the theory of symbols, and the
theory of conceptual systems and theory con-
struction. They have thus borne on the central
problems of the theory of knowledge. His con-
tributions are classic in the precise sense that
no subsequent work claiming significance can
be reasonably expected to be adequate unless it
takes account of Goodman's achievements.
GOODMAN, NELSON 249
More specifically, Goodman's contributions
are to areas that include aspects of inductive
logic involving the justification of hypotheses
and theory acceptance. Those contributions per-
tain also to the analysis of causal and, more
broadly, nomological regularity, dispositionality,
possibility, resemblance, and similarity, as well
as to the theory of psychological (especially
sensory or phenomenal) orderings. Of similar
importance have been his contributions to the
theory of definition and explication, to construc-
tional methods for systematic theorizing in sci-
ence and philosophy, and to the theory of con-
ceptual systematization in its most general
aspects. One contribution, especially noteworthy
because of its prospects for relatively direct ap-
plicability to the social sciences (e.g., see Rudner
1966, pp. 40-53), is his provision of a rigorous
theory of the measurement of the formal, struc-
tural simplicity of conceptual systems (a theory
which may be applicable to the assessment of
the relative simplicity of rival conceptual sys-
tems ). His theory of reference in various modes
of symbolization (and particularly in the arts),
developed in his later writings, has particular
significance for problems of relativism and ob-
jectivity in the social sciences, including prob-
lems of the scientific penetrability of alien
symbol systems.
An aspect of Goodman's work, which has
kept him very much a philosopher's philoso-
pher and relatively unstudied outside of a small
(but, in his later career as may now be seen,
widening) circle of philosophers, scientists, and
critics, has been his remarkable combination of
rigor, precision, and clarity in presenting in-
sights and arguments—typically, counterexam-
ples—that, while complex and subtle, are pro-
foundly radical. The effect of such results, once
their radical import is understood, is to force
other philosophers, scholars, or scientists con-
cerned with the subject matter to reevaluate
basic conceptions of the field; and it has some-
times led to a major restructuring of the field
or its problems. The publication and subsequent
discussions of his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast
(1954) and Languages of Art (1968<2) provide
two examples for the fields of inductive theory
and the theory of symbol systems respectively
of just such effects.
Goodman was born in Massachusetts in 1906,
received a B.S. from Harvard University in 1928,
and a PH.D. in philosophy of science in 1941.
His doctoral dissertation, "A Study of Qualities,"
became the substantial basis for his first pub-
250 GOODMAN, NELSON
lished book The Structure of Appearance (1951).
An indication of the importance of this work is
the fact that several years before it was pub-
lished, the dissertation was cited in a survey
essay by Herbert Feigl (1943). During the more
than ten years that "A Study of Qualities" was
in preparation, Goodman worked as an art
dealer and operated an art gallery in Boston.
His strong professional ties with the art world
have been a pervasive part of his life as well as
of his philosophic thought. These ties have not
been confined to the world of painting. During
the early 1970s, for example, he conceived,
staged, and directed multimedia productions at
the Dance Center at Harvard.
Among the philosophers who have been pri-
mary influences—and whom, it must be added,
Goodman reciprocally influenced—have been
Henry S. Leonard, W. V. Qiiine, Rudolf Carnap,
and Carl G. Hempel. (C. I. Lewis, one of Good-
man's teachers who influenced his concern with
inductive theory, was perhaps more impervious
to such reciprocal influence.) Although Good-
man has had important substantive differences
with all of these philosophers (including Quine,
to whom he is closest philosophically) and has
written penetrating, sometimes devastating,
critiques of their views, he has shared with
them a dedication to clarity and rigor in analysis
and a conviction of the efficacy of constructional
methods in philosophy and science.
Among Goodman's earliest published works
in philosophy, "The Calculus of Individuals and
Its Uses" (Leonard & Goodman 1940) and
"Elimination of Extea-logical Postulates" (Quine
& Goodman 1940) sound themes and exhibit
concerns that are enduring and pervasive in his
work.
Several generations of distinguished students,
collaborators, or colleagues have been inter-
preters, extenders, or even critics of Goodman's
work. The group includes, but is not exhausted
by, Robert Ackermann, Jerome S. Bruner, Noam
Chomsky, Lawrence Foster, E. Galanter, E. H.
Gombrich, Vernon Howard, Paul Kolers, How-
ard Kahane, Sidney Morgenbesser, Hilary Put-
nam, Beverly Bobbins, Robert Schwartz, Wolf-
gang Stegmiiller, and Morton G. White. Three
persons who also belong here could be singled
out: first, Geoffrey Hellman, whose introduction
to the third edition of The Structure of Appear-
ance ([1951] 1977) provides both a helpful in-
terpretation of that work and also points out
the unity of Goodman's philosophy; second,
Israel Scheffler, who has provided illuminating
explications and extensions of Goodman's work
(especially Scheffler 1963; Rudner & Scheffler
1972) and who has collaborated with Goodman
on important advances (Goodman et al. 1970);
third, Joseph Ullian, who has coauthored with
Goodman (1977) an important article that,
among other things, integrates Goodman's earl-
ier results on recalcitrant semantical concepts
with Goodman's later work on the philosophy of
symbolism.
In the course of his career, Goodman's honors
have included invitations to visit and to deliver
special lectureships (e.g., the Sherman lectures
at the University of London in 1953 which
formed the basis for Fact, Fiction, and Forecast;
the A. N. Whitehead lecture at Harvard in 1962;
the John Locke lectures at Oxford University in
1962 which formed the basis for Languages of
Art; and the Immanuel Kant lectures at Stan-
ford University in 1976 which furnished a sub-
stantial part of Ways of Worldmaking [1978&]).
Recognition of his work was also signaled by a
Guggenheim fellowship in 1946, his elections as
vice president of the Association for Symbolic
Logic (1950-1952) and as president of the
eastern division of the American Philosophical
Association (1967). His academic posts include
an instructorship at Tufts College (1945-1946)
and an associate professorship (1946—1951) and
professorship (1951-1964) at the University of
Pennsylvania. In 1964 he accepted the Harry
Austryn Wolfson professorship at Brandeis Uni-
versity and remained its incumbent until 1967,
when he organized and became director of "Pro-
ject Zero," whose locus was Harvard's Graduate
School of Education and whose aims involved
basic studies in education for the arts. He re-
mained director of "Project Zero" until 1971.
In 1968 he accepted the position of professor of
philosbphy at Harvard, with joint membership
in the departments of philosophy and psy-
chology.
Goodman's philosophical, methodological, and
scientific views are complex, far reaching, and
insightful. In Problems and Projects (1972)
and Ways of Worldmaking, Goodman reflects
on his own work—particularly in the latter,
which shows self-consciousness of its span to
date. These reflections clarify the interconnec-
tions of themes and results in the entire body of
his work. Secondary sources of commentary, ex-
plication, and criticism are copious, but few
commentaries have dealt with comprehensive
stretches of Goodman's work, and even fewer
have seriously explored its unity.

The study of Goodman's comprehensive phi-
losophy involves attention to at least three of its
major aspects: his inductive theory, his con-
structionalism, g,nd his radical epistemological
relativism.
Inductive theory. The core of Goodman's in-
ductive theory is presented in Fact, Fiction, and
Forecast. It embodies three achievements: (1) a
brilliant analysis and dissolution of the "old"
problem of induction; (2) a radical critique of
the concepts of confirmation and confirming in-
stance of a hypothesis, which shows that extant
theories of confirmation or evidential support of
general hypothesis by instances are profoundly
vulnerable to classes of devastating counterex-
amples; (3) the foundation for a positive theory of
projection. (The notion of projection is more gen-
eral than that of prediction.) Where scientific
prediction may be construed as an inference,
from examined cases in the past or present, to
future unexamined cases, a scientific projection
would be an inference to any unexamined cases
from any examined instances. The theory in-
cludes, pivotally, his analyses of the concepts of
similarity and of natural kind; these analyses
are given important refinement and articulation
in the "Seven Structures on Similarity" (1970,
reprinted in [1972] 1977), The Structure of Ap-
pearance, and Languages of Art.
Constructionalism. This aspect of Goodman's
philosophy is often held to be methodological, as
distinguished, presumably, from substantive.
Goodman himself holds that the techniques and
principles for the construction of conceptual sys-
tems, systems of definitions, and constructions
of theory are, in a certain sense, neutral. That
is, they can be neutrally employed by widely
divergent, or otherwise conflicting, philosophical
positions. On the other hand, Goodman would
not hold that his constructionalism was merely
"methodological" in the sense that it was neutral
among all philosophical positions. More char-
acteristically, he would reject the method-sub-
stance distinction as an untenable dichotomy
and look, rather, for the specific reasons why
some techniques of theory construction remain
neutrally applicable across disciplines and posi-
tions while others do not. Goodman's construc-
tionalism places him in a tradition that not only
includes Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein,
and Rudolf Carnap, but also, along with them,
in a tradition that includes Gottfried W. von
Leibnitz, George Berkeley, David Hume, Imman-
uel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, and surely
stretches back to the Eleatics and Pythagoreans,
GOODMAN, NELSON 251
and surely embraces Plato, Aristotle, and the
Stoics. This is the tradition concerned with con-
ceptual systematization—system building—while
not eschewing the resources of formal logic (in
contemporary times, the resources of the first-
order predicate calculus) in fashioning systems
of definitions and systematically related prin-
ciples or statements, Goodman's results in pro-
viding principles and methods of systematiza-
tion and in furnishing varieties of systems, are
powerful and far reaching. They are presented
in The Structure of Appearance and in a set of
important auxiliary essays including "Steps To-
ward a Constructive Nominalism" (1947), "A
World of Individuals" (1956), and "On the Way
the World Is" (1960), all reprinted in Problems
and Projects ([1972] 1977). Intimately con-
nected with these essays is the brief but pivotal
"On Relations That Generate" (1958) and a later
comprehensive and daring essay that breaks
much new ground, "Words, Works, Worlds"
(1975£>). These essays contribute greatly both to
Goodman's theory of system building and to the
final aspect of Goodman's philosophy considered
here.- his epistemological relativism. Another
landmark contribution stemming from Good-
man's concern with the theory of systems, how-
ever, is his theory of the formal or structural
simplicity of theories. The calculus of simplicity
presented in The Structure of Appearance un-
derwent considerable refinement (for a tracing
of the subsequent discussions and criticisms in
the literature, see chapter 7 of Goodman 1972)
and appears in an improved version in the third
edition. Here Goodman develops a rigorous
technique for measuring the relative simplicity
of explicitly formulated conceptual systems (e.g.,
systems of definitions or constructional systems
which effect systematic analyses of concepts)—a
measure permitting judgments of the degree of
systematicity or the degree of systematization
of such systems.
Epistemological relativism. A striking fea-
ture of Goodman's first book is its epistemological
antiabsolutism. Although Goodman shares a
long tradition of constructionalist penchant for
systematizing through the use of the techniques
of formal logic, he breaks radically with much
of that tradition by denying that there are any
empirical or rational (incorrigible) "givens." He
has sometimes erroneously been assimilated to
the camp of the early logical positivists because
the central system he constructs in The Struc-
ture of Appearance is (not accidentally) like the
phenomenalist system of Carnap's Logische
252 GOODMAN, NELSON
Aufbau (see Carnap 1928). But Goodman makes
it abundantly clear that the choice of a phe-
nomenalist basis—i.e., the choice of phenomenal
predicates as systematically primitive—carries
no commitment to a doctrine of the epistemo-
logical primacy of the phenomenal. Any infer-
ence to such a conclusion is at the least a non
sequitur. The Structure in fact furnishes a lucid
analysis of the difficulties that must beset at-
tempts to found any systematic theory of knowl-
edge on any foundations claimed to be epis-
temologically uniquely incorrigible or uniquely
warranted. But Goodman's radical relativism
goes beyond epistemological relativism—at least
of the sort that deals just with phenomenal or
physical or other systematic theories of the
world. For theories are linguistic systematiza-
tions, and in Languages of Art, Goodman, at-
tempting to fashion a general theory of symbol
systems which will govern nonlinguistic and
nonverbal, as well as verbal or linguistic, sys-
tems of symbols, addresses problems connected
with symbolic processes that are referential
without thereby describing. These are symbolic
processes that, like paintings or diagrams, may
(still systematically) show the way the world is
rather than describe it. The penetrating analyses
and creative verve of Languages of Art provi.de
Goodman with precise and rigorous means for
presenting, in Ways of Worldmaking, the theses
that make up his radical relativism. In this view,
truth can be neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for the acceptability of accounts of the
world. Truth is not sufficient because many
other criteria, like simplicity or systematicity,
must be satisfied for an account to be accept-
able. Nor is it necessary, since truth—a criterion
applicable to linguistic symbols—cannot be char-
acteristic of nonverbal symbolic accounts of the
world. A central tenet of his position is that
there is no uniquely correct way of "rendering"
the world ("constructing a world"). Goodman
holds that even two incompatible, or otherwise
conflicting, accounts or versions may both be
acceptable. But his radical relativism is "under
rigorous restraints"; thus he is at consider-
able pains to point out that it is not the case
that "anything goes." Not every version of the
world—or, more precisely, not every world-ver-
sion—or some aspect of it is as acceptable as
every other world-version. He meticulously de-
velops criteria that permit rejection for good
cause. Although there can be no uniquely ac-
ceptable version, many versions are rationally
rejectable as inadequate.
Ways of Worldmaking puts together a daring
philosophical system, which is likely to have
profound effects on the work and thought of
intellectuals who encounter it. It by no means
solves all the problems it poses, which are at
least as numerous as the "answers" it provides.
Goodman continues to work on these problems.
RICHARD S. RUDNER
WORKS BY GOODMAN
1940 LEONARD, HENRY S.; and GOODMAN, NELSON
The Calculus of Individuals and Its Uses. Journal
of Symbolic Logic 5:45-55.
1940 QUINE, W. V.; and GOODMAN, NELSON Elimina-
tion of Extra-logical Postulates. Journal of Symbolic
Logic 5:104-109. —> Reprinted in Goodman (1972)
1977, pages 325-333.
1941 A Study of Qualities. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
Univ. —> Substantial portions of this dissertation
are incorporated in The Structure of Appearance,
1951.
1943 On the Simplicity of Ideas. Journal of Symbolic
Logic 8:107-121.
(1951) 1977 The Structure of Appearance. 3d ed.
Dodrecht (Netherlands) and Boston: Reidel.
(1954) 1977 Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. 3d ed., rev.
Indianapolis: Hackett.
1956 A Study of Methods of Evaluating Information
Processing Systems of Weapons Systems. Philadel-
phia: Institute for Cooperative Research.
1957 Determination of Deficiencies in Information
Processing. Philadelphia: Institute for Cooperative
Research.
1958 On Relations That Generate. Philosophical Stud-
ies 9:65-66.
(1968a) 1976 Languages of Art: An Approach to a
Theory of Symbols. 2d ed., rev. Indianapolis:
Hackett.
1968& Reality Remade. L'age de la science 1:19-40.
1969 Memorial Note on Henry Leonard. Pages ix-x in
Karel Lambert (editor), The Logical Way of Doing
Things. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1970 GOODMAN, NELSON; SCHWARTZ, ROBERT; and
SCHEFFLER, ISRAEL An Improvement in the Theory
of Projectibility. Journal of Philosophy 67:605-
608. -» Reprinted in Goodman (1972) 1977, pages
389-393.
(1972) 1977 Problems and Projects. Indianapolis:
Hackett. —> A collection of many of Goodman's
previously published articles and some excerpts
from his earlier books.
1975a The Status of Style. Critical Inquiry 1:799-
811. —» The second chapter of Goodman 1978.
1975b Words, Works, Worlds. Erkenntnis 9:57-73.
—> The first chapter of Goodman 1978.
1975 ULLIAN, JOSEPH; and GOODMAN, NELSON Bad
Company: A Reply to Mr. Zabludowski and Others.
Journal of Philosophy 72:142-145.
1977 ULLIAN, JOSEPH; and GOODMAN, NELSON Truth
About Jones. Journal of Philosophy 74:317-338.
1978a Replies. Erkenntnis 12:153-175, 281-291.
1978b Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett.
—> Includes previously published essays and four
chapters based on Goodman's inaugural Immanuel
Kant lectures at Stanford University in 1976.
WORKS ABOUT GOODMAN
Journal of Philosophy 1966 63:281-331. —» This
issue includes three discussions of Goodman's

inductive theory and his replies. Goodman's replies
were reprinted as "Three Replies" in Goodman
(1972) 1977, pages 405-410.
Journal of Philosophy 1970 67:531-573. -» This
issue includes three discussions of Goodman's Lan-
guages of Art, 1968a, and his replies. Goodman's
replies are reprinted as "Some Notes on Languages
of Art" in Goodman (1972) 1977, pages 122-132.
Monist 1974 58:172-342. —> Issue devoted to Good-
man's Languages of Art, 1968a. Contains articles
by 19 contributors, including Goodman.
The Philosophy of Nelson Goodman. Erkenntnis 1978
12, nos. 1 & 2. —» These issues contain essays by
14 commentators and Goodman's replies.
RUDNER, RICHARD S.; and SCHEFFLER, ISRAEL (editors)
1972 Logic and Art: Essays in Honor of Nelson
Goodman. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ACKERMANN, ROBERT 1960 Simplicity and the Ac-
ceptability of Scientific Theories. Ph.D. dissertation,
Michigan State Univ. —» A detailed analysis of
theories of simplicity.
BACH, K. 1970 Part of What a Picture Is. British
Journal of Aesthetics 10:119-137. —> Discussion of
aspects of Goodman's Languages of Art, 1968a.
BARKER, S. F.; and ACHINSTEIN, PETER 1960 On the
New Riddle of Induction. Philosophical Review 69:
511-522. —» See Goodman's reply on pages 371-388
of Problems and Projects, 1972.
BLACK, MAX 1975 Caveats and Critiques: Philosophi-
cal Essays in Language, Logic, and Art. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press.
CARNAP, RUDOLF (1928) 1967 The Logical Struc-
ture of the World and Pseudo Problems in Phi-
losophy. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. —»
Both works were first published separately in Ger-
man.
CARNAP, RUDOLF 1947 Reply to Nelson Goodman's
"On Infirmities of Confirmation Theory." Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research 8:461-462.
CARNAP, RUDOLF 1963 Replies and Systematic Ex-
positions. Numbers 25—31 in Paul A. Schilpp
(editor), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle,
111.: Open Court.
FEIGL, HERBERT (1943) 1949 Logical Empiricism.
Pages 3-26 in Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellers
(editors), Readings in Philosophical Analysis. New
York: Appleton.
HANEN, MARSHA 1967 Goodman, Wallace, and the
Equivalence Condition. Journal of Philosophy 64:
271-280.
HANEN, MARSHA 1970 An Examination of Adequacy
Conditions for Confirmation. Ph.D. dissertation,
Brandeis Univ.
HEMPEL, CARL G. 1945 Studies in the Logic of Con-
firmation. Mind 54:1-26, 97-121.
HEMPEL, CARL G.; and OPPENHEIM, PAUL 1948 Stud-
ies in the Logic of Explanation. Philosophy of Sci-
ence 15:135-175.
HESSE, MARY 1969 Ramifications of "Grue." British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20:12-25.
HOWARD, VERNON A. 1970 Harvard Project Zero: A
Fresh Look at Art Education. American Council for
Research in Music Education, Bulletin 21:1-14. —»
A revised reprint is in the 1971 issue of the Journal
of Aesthetic Education 5:61-74.
LINCICOME, DAVID 1971 Evaluative Semantics. Ph.D.
dissertation, Washington Univ. —> Contains a de-
tailed analysis of Goodman's theories of meaning,
reference, and symbol systems.
PUTNAM, HILARY 1963 "Degree of Confirmation" and
Inductive Logic. Pages 761-783 in Paul A. Schilpp
GOTTSCHALK, LOUIS 253
(editor), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle,
111.: Open Court.
QUINE, W. V. 1960 Word and Object. Cambridge,
Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
QUINE, W. V. 1969 Ontological Relativity and Other
Essays. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
QUINE, W. V. 1973 The Roots of Reference. La Salle,
111.: Open Court.
RUDNER, RICHARD S. 1961 An Introduction to Sim-
plicity. Philosophy of Science 28:109-119.
RUDNER, RICHARD S. 1963 What Do Symbols Sym-
bolize?: Nominalism. Pages 159-176 in Bernard
Baumrin (editor), The Delaware Seminar in the
Philoscphy of Science. New York: Interscience Pub-
lishers.
RUDNER, RICHARD S. 1966 Philosophy of Social Sci-
ence. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. —> In-
cludes expositions of some of Goodman's views on
simplicity and systematization.
RUDNER, RICHARD S. 1967 Nelson Goodman. Volume
3, pages 370-374 in The Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy. Edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Macmil-
lan and Free Press.
SCHEFFLER, ISRAEL 1952 On Quotation. Ph.D. disser-
tation. Univ. of Pennsylvania.
SCHEFFLER, ISRAEL 1963 The Anatomy of Inquiry:
Philosophical Studies in the Theory of Science.
New York: Knopf. —> Includes an exposition of
Goodman's inductive theory.
SCHEFFLER, ISRAEL 1967 Science and Subjectivity.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
STEGMULLER, WOLFGANG (1952) 1971 Main Cur-
rents in Contemporary German, British and Ameri-
can Philosophy. Translated by Albert E. Blumberg.
Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. —> First pub
lished in German. Translated from the fourth Ger-
man edition (1969).
ULLIAN, JOSEPH S. 1975 On Projectibility. Nous 9:
329-339.
GOTTSCHALK, LOUIS
Born in 1899 in Brooklyn, New York, Louis R.
Gottschalk graduated from Cornell University
with an A.B. in 1919 and a PH.D. in history in
1921. After teaching briefly at the universities
of Illinois and Louisville, he became associate
professor of history at the University of Chicago
in 1927, chairman of its history department for
a five-year tour of duty in 1937, and president
of the American Historical Association in 1953.
At his retirement from the University of Chicago
in 1964 he was Gustavus F. and Ann Swift dis-
tinguished service professor. After his retire-
ment he taught full time for several years, and
then part time, at the University of Illinois at
Chicago Circle. He died in Chicago on June 23,
1975.
Methodologically, he was a transition figure
from the "Rankean" tradition of writing narrative
history of the political elite from critically ana-
lyzed documents to the social scientific history of
a moving synthesis of social forces. At Cornell,
Gottschalk had been taught in the Rankean
254 GOTTSCHALK, LOUIS
tradition by several professors, but chiefly by
Charles Hull, whose historical seminar empha-
sized the intense, critical scrutiny of the evi-
dence. "I learned historical method from Hull,"
Gottschalk later remarked, using the term "his-
torical method" in a very special sense. In his
view historians endeavor to recreate only so
much of the past as "can be meaningfully recon-
structed" (1950b, p. 48). That means that they
(1) seek out the records and survivals of man-
kind's past; (2) critically examine those records
and survivals; (3) from the information the
records and survivals provide endeavor to
imagine what the past was like; and (4) present
the results of their imaginative reconstruction
of that past in ways that do no violence either
to the records or to the canons of scientific
imagination. According to Gottschalk: "The
process of critically examining the records and
survivals of the past is called historical method.
The imaginative reconstruction of the past from
the data derived by that process is called histori-
ography (the writing of history)" (ibid., p.
48). Historical method, then, included the an-
alytical procedures for testing the authenticity
of documents, restoring the text, identifying the
author, establishing the approximate date and
place of composition, and determining the au-
thor's general credibility. Those procedures
Gottschalk learned in Hull's seminar, and he
applied them and taught them throughout his
scholarly career.
At Cornell, Gottschalk also absorbed ideas
about historiography: that is, about historical
interpretation, synthesis, and writing. Here the
major influence was Carl Becker, who was in-
terested in all sorts of ideas, from the formal
ideas of abstract speculation to the images,
common prejudices, and half-spoken notions of
everyday life. However, he was not interested
in ideas apart from the individuals who held
them. In these years he was also conducting
another crusade against the nai've assumption
that there was a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the statement of the historian and what
had actually occurred. Becker crusaded in addi-
tion for excellent writing—for a perfect match-
ing of each word with the image in the histor-
ian's mind, for a perfect fusion of form and
content, of sound and sense, in a composition
that flowed.
Anyone who attended Becker's seminar in
those years could not fail to emerge with a last-
ing interest in the role of ideas in history and
in writing well. Anyone who had the seminars
of both Hull and Becker could not fail to have
an abiding concern with the practical and theo-
retical aspects of historical method. The two
teachers gave Gottschalk questions to ask of
history, and some of the means for answering
them. They endowed him with an initial phi-
losophy to exploit, before he developed one of
his own.
Gottschalk began his first two studies of Jean-
Paul Marat and of the Marquis de Lafayette
while he was still under the dominating influ-
ence of the Cornell experience. His biography,
Jean-Paul Marat: A Study in Radicalism (1927),
was distinguished by its nonpartisan tone, the
cool, competent appraisal of contradictory evi-
dence, and lucid exposition. It was in essence a
discriminating delineation of the interplay of
temperament, events, and ideas in the evolving
career of a popular leader. In this evolution,
temperament and circumstances counted for
somewhat more than ideas. A successful one-
volume biographical study of radicalism in the
person of Marat suggested to Gottschalk the
preparation of a similar one-volume biographi-
cal study of liberalism in the person of Lafa-
yette. However, events involving this hero of two
worlds were so numerous and the sources so
voluminous that a one-volume essay burgeoned
into a monumental multitomed enterprise. Gott-
schalk published six volumes, carrying Lafa-
yette from 1754 to July 1790. One or two
additional volumes covering his career to July
1792 are scheduled to appear posthumously.
Although the book on Marat, when necessary,
displayed the skill in handling sources that
Gottschalk had learned from Charles Hull, its
dominant interests were Becker's—the interrela-
tions of personality, formal ideas, and events.
The Lafayette series smoothly fused the thor-
oughness and techniques of technical historical
method with the interests of Becker. The Lafa-
yette story presented several technical historical
problems—the authenticity of documents, the
dating of letters, the accuracy of memoirs, the
question of intent, the reliability of oral tradi-
tion. These problems were solved in the Lafa-
yette volumes with professional assurance and
proficiency, in the best traditions of the Ran-
kean school. One reviewer observed that the
manner in which Gottschalk managed to gather
his material and sift it "by the most enlightened
processes is a model fcr all research historians."
However, the verity of historical statements was
not established simply from delight in establish-
ing verities. The statements were used to pre-

sent a full-bodied biographical narrative of an
elite figure and to define delicately and subtly
the moving interrelations of ideas, characters,
and events in the evolving destiny of a historical
personality.
While Gottschalk was working on the Marat
and Lafayette volumes, he was as a scholar
having a series of maturing experiences that
led him to become a leader in the comparative
study of revolutions, and methodologically, a
specialist on generalizations in history. When he
entered the academic world in the 1920s the
predominant mode of historical understanding,
old as Herodotus, was still the narrative story
of events, of persons and their motivations and
actions, considered in their unique aspects and
assumed to be connected. In this world of per-
sons, contingency, and accident, the narrative
explained as it described and had its own dig-
nity and importance. It did not need the aid of
the social sciences. This was the establishment
view, and a young scholar who affronted it was
considered bold, daring, and perhaps suspect.
However, from 1923 to 1926 Gottschalk pre-
pared six booklets on the history of the French
Revolution, which were later expanded into a
textbook, The Era of the French Revolution
(1929). Preparation of this general work, along
with his own research and teaching, led him to
reflect on the causation of the French Revolu-
tion. The results of these reflections were pub-
lished, notably, in four works: "The French
Revolution: Conspiracy or Circumstance?"
(1931), "Some Recent Countersocialistic Litera-
ture" (1945), "Philippe Sagnac and the Causes
of the French Revolution" (1948a), and The
Place of the American Revolution in the Causal
Pattern of the French Revolution (1948fe). Re-
flections on the comparative study of revolutions
and the generalizations that might be derived
therefrom were scattered throughout his writ-
ings but appeared notably in four articles, "Rev-
olutionary Analogies" (1926), "Leon Trotsky
and the Natural History of Revolutions" (1938),
"Revolutionary Traditions and Analogies"
(1939c), and "The Causes of Revolutions" (1944).
In 1933 he began to collaborate with several
colleagues at the University of Chicago in teach-
ing a "Laboratory Course in Historical Method."
Several years later he took over a course in
modern European historiography. In the 1940s
and 1950s he became associated with the Social
Science Research Council in various capacities.
He was present at the charter conference of
November 8, 1942, when a group of historians
GOTTSCHALK, LOUIS 255
met with members of the SSRC's Committee on
Problems and Policy to consider some of the
relations between historical studies and other
fields in the social science area. He was also a
member of the SSRC's first Committee on His-
toriography which grew out of the conference.
Other members of the committee included Merle
Curti, chairman, Charles A. Beard, Shepard
Clough, Thomas C. Cochran, Jeanette Nichols,
Richard H. Shryock, and Alfred Vagts. For the
SSRC Committee on the Appraisal of Research,
he helped to prepare Bulletin 53 on The Use of
Personal Documents in History, Anthropology,
and Sociology (1945). As member of the Com-
mittee on Historiography he participated in the
preparation of Bulletin 54, Theory and Practice
in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee
on Historiography (1946). Later, as chairman
of the Committee on Historical Analysis, he
edited a report on Generalization in the Writing
of History (1963). The fruits of this teaching
and committee discussion appeared in the above
publications and also in remarks at a round-table
discussion on "Generalization in the Social Sci-
ences" (1940), in a manual for apprentice his-
torians, Understanding History (1950£>), in his
presidential address to the American Historical
Association, "A Professor of History in a
Quandary" (1954), and in three articles, "The
Scope and Subject Matter of History" (1941),
"The Historian's Use of Generalization" (1956),
and "Categories of Historiographical Generaliza-
tion" (1963).
So far as can be judged from the published
evidence, Gottschalk played a mediating role in
this ongoing methodological discussion. During
the 1940s, 1950s, and the early 1960s, his-
torians who were interested in the social sci-
ence approach to history felt it important to
define their terms, to define their approach, and
to crusade for their point of view, against the
narrative-establishment school. This they did,
most notably in SSRC Bulletin 54 (1946). In
this movement to social science history, Gott-
schalk insisted that social science historians in-
corporate into their approach what seemed most
useful in the Ranke tradition: the intense
scrutiny and validation by well-tested proce-
dures of each source and statement. Much of
his essay in Bulletin 53 on the use of personal
documents in history as well as much of his
manual on understanding history is devoted to
these procedures for testing authenticity and
credibility. On the other hand, to the establish-
ment-narrative-of-unique-events school, he led a
256 GOTTSCHALK, LOUIS
personal crusade in behalf of generalization in
historical study. In the use of generalization
Gottschalk divided "historians" into six cate-
gories: "the school of the unique," the narrative-
descriptive historians of very limited generaliza-
tion, the "school of generalizations on the bases
of trends," the comparative historians, the
nomothetic historians, and the cosmic "philos-
ophers of history" (1963, pp. 113-114). Gott-
schalk's favorite tactics showed that even his-
torians of the unique inevitably generalize if
they use language, while other types and levels
of generalizations, if analytically tested, are use-
ful for the insights they yield. "The world has
room and the profession has need for all kinds
of historians" (1963, p. 129). He himself had
operated in all categories except the last. By
1963, when Generalization in the Writing of
History appeared, the double crusade for incor-
poration of the best traditions of critical anal-
yses of documents into the social science ap-
proach and for an ever-widening hospitality to
generalizing historians in the profession had
been won, and to younger historians Gottschalk's
remarks seemed platitudinous. To a degree the
reputations of Gottschalk and his associates as
methodologists were the victims of their success.
Once their battles had been won, people forgot
there had ever been any enemies to fight.
Gottschalk was aware of this; his crusading
stances and phrases had become familiar, but
as he once remarked: "the familiar is not always
contemptible."
By the 1950s and 1960s Gottschalk was artic-
ulating the working eclecticism of the American
research historian of those decades. In so doing
he altered some of the questions that had been
traditionally asked of historical writing. Instead
of asking, "Is history an art or a science?," he
assumed that writing history is now a profession
and inquired, "How can historians maintain
high professional standards?" With apologies
to the Dutch historian, Johan Huizinga, he
offered another definition of history as an intel-
lectual form whereby each individual renders
unto himself an account of his past, including
the past of his civilization. Some accounts will
be better than others. To assure that a historical
account was the best possible and met the high-
est professional standards, Gottschalk recom-
mended the Ranke-like critical evaluation of
evidence. He also adopted the fundamental ob-
servation of Becker and other relativists that the
historian writes in the present, and that in se-
lecting and arranging his validated statements
he is necessarily affected by present conditions,
including his own biases. However, according to
Gottschalk, to minimize the distorting effect of
the present, the professional historian "will try
to give to each piece of testimony in his col-
lected data its full and no more than its full
weight"; he "will also make a conscious effort
to lean over backward against his own national,
religious, racial, party, class, professional, or
other biases"; "in cases where the testimony is
unavailable or, if available, inadequate for a
definite conclusion, he will be careful . . . to
suspend judgment"; "finally, he will studiously
avoid gratuitous assumptions or inferences and
will endeavor to present only such conclusions
as logically proceed from the evidence." Gott-
schalk also adopted the view of Frederick Jackson
Turner, James Harvey Robinson, and others
that history is not only past politics and past
economics, but also past literature and past re-
ligion, in fact, past everything. In reconstructing
this comprehensive past, the historian will seek
the aid of social scientists. He will check their
generalizations against his data and utilize them
when they seem valid and relevant. Indeed, he
himself will "attempt contrasts and compari-
sons of historical episodes, situations, and insti-
tutions and advance generalizations of his own."
A comparison of the major revolutions in West-
ern civilization would seem to reveal that back
of each one lay a class or classes that were dis-
satisfied with the existing order, ideas about
what a new order might be like, and a govern-
ment incompetent for discipline or reform.
Gottschalk would contend that of the three
conditions, formal ideas are the least important:
"Though intellectuals usually have a role to play
in causing revolutions, it is seldom decisive."
They are primarily critics. They do not "father
new intellectual attitudes but work upon the
raw material of independent hostility" around
them. They stimulate, energize, verbalize, and
organize this material, and only secondarily add
to it. The American Revolution obviously ag-
gravated all three basic conditions in France.
The example of a freer society intensified dis-
satisfaction with the Old Regime; the state con-
stitutions suggested measures of reform; the
expenses of French participation in the war
rendered unmanageable the recurring deficit
and the royal debt, and this weakened the royal
government.
If in his mediating role between the old his-
toriography and the new, Gottschalk in the
methodological statements of his middle years
may have sown seeds for the new, in his later
years he may have tended to return to the faith

of his scholarly fathers. In the preface to the
1967 reprint of his biography of Marat, he re-
ferred to his "increasing conviction that the in-
determinables (perhaps indescribables) which
for want of a better name we call chance and
choice or free will play roles—sometimes large,
sometimes small, but rarely negligible—in his-
torical and particularly in biographical develop-
ments." Of all his works, perhaps those that will
endure longest will be the most old-fashioned:
the narrative volumes on Lafayette. They may
have errors or disputed judgments, but because
of their vast and intelligently critical erudition,
scholars will have to refer to them for years to
come. If there is a lesson in this, let others
figure it out.
HAROLD T. PARKER
WORKS BY GOTTSCHALK
1923 The Life of Jean Paul Marat. Girard, Kan.:
Haldeman-Julius.
1924a The Ancient Regime (France Before the Revo-
lution). Girard, Kan.: Haldeman-Julius.
1924k The Fall of Louis XVI. Girard, Kan.: Haldeman-
Julius.
1925a The Consulate of Napoleon. Girard, Kan.:
Haldem an-Julius.
1925k The Empire of Napoleon. Girard, Kan.: Halde-
man-Julius.
1925c Restoration and Reaction in France, 1814-
1815. Girard, Kan.: Haldeman-Julius.
1926 Revolutionary Analogies. History Quarterly (of
the Filson Club and the University of Louisville)
1:8-23.
(1927) 1967 Jean-Paul Marat: A Study in Radicalism.
New York: Greenberg. —» Translated into French
(1929) and Italian (1961).
1929 The Era of the French Revolution (1715-1815).
Boston: Hough ton Mifflin.
1931 The French Revolution: Conspiracy or Circum-
stance? Pages 445-472 in Persecution and Liberty:
Essays in Honor of George Lincoln Burr. New York:
Century.
1935 Lafayette Comes to America. Univ. of Chicago
Press. —> A paperback edition was published in
1974.
1937 Lafayette Joins the American Army. Univ. of
Chicago Press. —» A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1974.
1938 Leon Trotsky and the Natural History of Revo-
lutions. American Journal of Sociology 44:339-354.
1939fl Franklin and Lafayette. Washington: Institut
Francais de Washington.
19391? Lady-in-Waiting: The Romance of Lafayette
and Aglae de Honolstein. Baltimore: John Hopkins.
1939c Revolutionary Traditions and Analogies. Uni-
versity (of Kansas City) Review 6:19-25.
1940 Generalization in the Social Sciences. In Louis
A. Wirth (editor), 1126: A Decade of Social Sci-
ence Research. Univ. of Chicago Press. —> A round-
table discussion.
1941 The Scope and Subject Matter of History. Uni-
versity (of Kansas City) Review 8:75-83.
1942 Lafayette and the Close of the American Revo-
lution. Univ. of Chicago Press. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1974.
GOTTSCHALK, LOUIS 257
1944 The Causes of Revolutions. American Journal of
Sociology 50:1-8.
1944 GOTTSCHALK, Louis; and BILL, SHIRLEY (editors)
The Letters of Lafayette to Washington, 1777-1799.
2d rev. ed. Philadelphia: American Philosophical
Society.
1945 Some Recent Countersocialistic Literature. Jour-
nal of Modern History 17:221-225.
1945 GOTTSCHALK, Louis; KLUCKHOHN, CLYDE; and
ANGELL, ROBERT The Use of Personal Documents
in History, Anthropology, and Sociology. Social Sci-
ence Research Council, Bulletin 53. New York: The
Council.
1946 Propositions. Pages 131-140 in Theory and Prac-
tice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee
on Historiography. Social Science Research Council,
Bulletin 54. New York: The Council.
1948a Philippe Sagnac and the Causes of the French
Revolution. Journal of Modern History 20:137-148.
1948£> The Place of the American Revolution in the
Causal Pattern of the French Revolution. Easton,
Penn.: American Friends of Lafayette.
1950a Lafayette Between the American and French
Revolution (1783-1789). Univ. of Chicago Press. —»
A paperback edition was published in 1974.
1950b Understanding History: A Primer of Historical
Method. New York: Knopf.
1951-1954 GOTTSCHALK, Louis; and LACK, DONALD F.
Europe and the Modern World. 2 vols. Chicago:
Scott, Foresman.
1954 A Professor of History in a Quandary. American
Historical Review 59:273-286.
1956 The Historian's Use of Generalization. Pages
436-450 in Leonard D. White (editor), State of the
Social Sciences. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1958 The United States and Lafayette. Les Etats-Unis
et Lafayette. Augustana Library Publications, Oc-
casional Paper, No. 3. Rock Island, 111.: The
Library.
1963 Categories of Historiographical Generalization.
Pages 113-129 in Louis Gottschalk (editor), General-
ization in the Writing of History: A Report of the
Committee on Historical Analysis of the Social
Science Research Council. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1969 GOTTSCHALK, Louis; MACKINNEY, LOREN C.; and
PRITCHARD, EARL H. The Foundations of the Mod-
ern World. New York: Harper; London: Allen &
Unwin. —> Volume 4 of United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization's His-
tory of Mankind: Cultural and Scientific Develop-
ment.
1969 GOTTSCHALK, Louis; and MADDOX, MARGARET
Lafayette in the French Revolution: Through the
October Days. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1973 GOTTSCHALK, Louis; and LACK, DONALD F. To-
ward the French Revolution: Europe and America
in the Eighteenth-century World. New York:
Scribners.
1973 GOTTSCHALK, Louis; and MADDOX, MARGARET
Lafayette in the French Revolution: From the Oc-
tober Days Through the Federation. Univ. of Chi-
cago Press.
1975 GOTTSCHALK, Louis; PESTIEAU, PHYLLIS S.; and
PIKE, LINDA J. Lafayette: A Guide to the Letters,
Documents, and Manuscripts in the United States.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
HERR, RICHARD; and PARKER, HAROLD T. 1965 Ideas
in History: Essays Presented to Louis Gottschalk
by His Former Students. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ.
Press.
258 GUILFORD, J. P.
GUILFORD, J. P.
Joy Paul Guilford was born on March 7, 1897,
on a farm in Nebraska. After teaching in public
schools and serving a stint in the U.S. Army
during World War i, he completed his B.A. (1922)
and his M.A. (1924) at the University of Ne-
braska. In 1927, he received his doctorate in
psychology from Cornell University, where he
studied psychology with Edward B. Titchener
and Kurt Koffka. He taught briefly at the Uni-
versity of Illinois and the University of Kansas
before returning to his alma mater, the Univer-
sity of Nebraska, where he headed the psychol-
ogy department until 1940. In that year, he
moved to the University of California and re-
mained there, except for his service in the U.S.
Army Air Force during World War n, until his
official retirement in 1969.
Guilford has dedicated his life to making
psychology a quantitative, rational science. Not
only has he made numerous contributions to
experimental psychology, psychometric and sta-
tistical methodology, the measurement of human
abilities, and the assessment of personality, he
has also written two classic texts, Psychometric
Methods (1936) and Fundamental Statistics in
Psychology and Education (Guilford & Fruchter
1942) and influenced generations of students.
Early in his career, the emphasis in Guilford's
research was on experimental psychology and
psychophysics, and the publication of Psycho-
metric Methods culminated this period. He also
reviewed previous investigations and carried out
experimental studies on the fluctuation of atten-
tion, working with weak visual stimuli, eye move-
ments, and apparent motion phenomena, point-
ing out the implications of his findings for cur-
rent theories. Other experiments during this
period concerned visual perception, reaction
time, color preferences, facial expression, mem-
ory, and experimental aesthetics.
Then, in 1940, he began to gradually shift the
emphasis of his work toward the measurement
of personality traits and mental abilities, mental
testing, statistics, and factor analysis. This trend
was accelerated, and perhaps in part motivated,
by his assignment during World War n to direct
a psychological research unit of the U.S. Army
Air Force in the development of group aptitude
tests for the classification of cadets (1947). In
this historic test development research program,
Guilford put to large-scale practical test, often
for the first time, the best available psychometric
techniques, theories, and procedures of the day.
In addition, he developed innovative procedures,
statistical techniques, and research methods. For
example, he showed that after determining the
criterion necessary successfully to complete a
specific task, factor analysis could be used to de-
termine the components of that criterion, and
test batteries could then be developed that would
mirror the factor structure of the criterion under
consideration. These procedures substantially
improved the chances of finding the best test
measures for predicting the degree to which an
individual met any particular criterion.
After the war, Guilford continued his work
with aptitude tests and factor analysis. Many of
these later studies were published by the Psycho-
logical Laboratory of the University of Southern
California (e.g., Guilford et al. 1960) and were
supported in part by a series of contracts with
the Office of Naval Research. These postwar
studies increased psychologists' knowledge of
human abilities in the areas of spatial percep-
tion, reasoning, evaluation, planning, problem
solving, and creativity. Guilford's approach to
human abilities, like that of L. L. Thurstone,
contrasted sharply with that of Alfred Binet,
C. E. Spearman, Lewis M. Terman, David
Wechsler, and Raymond B. Cattell. The latter
have emphasized the importance of general in-
telligence as the dominant concept in the mea-
surement of human abilities. Although they
acknowledge the need to divide intelligence into
its component parts to some extent—e.g., verbal
versus quantitative, fluid versus crystallized—
only a few scores are deemed necessary to de-
scribe the intellectual status of an individual.
Although recognizing the possibility of a gen-
eral factor of intelligence, Guilford has preferred
to break down intelligence into finer constitu-
ents, as well as to measure variables not covered
by intelligence quotient tests. He maintains
that an adequate description of human intellec-
tual capacity requires the measurement of more
than one hundred variables. To provide a theo-
retical framework for his findings, Guilford has
constructed his famous structure of intellect
model (1959), which does for human abilities
something analogous to what the periodic table
does for the chemical elements. Any given fac-
tor occupies a cell within a box representing a
three-dimensional classification of factors. Each
factor deals with a certain type of material,
called "contents": visual, auditory, symbolic,
semantic, and behavioral; deals with a certain
type of operation: evaluation, convergent pro-
duction, divergent production, memory, and cog-

nition; and involves a certain type of product:
units, classes, relations, systems, transforma-
tions, and implications. This box allows for 150
factors. A good deal of work since the middle
of the 1950s has been devoted to developing
measures that would define relevant factors that
should exist in the model, but that have not yet
been identified in empirical research studies.
Guilford's views on abilities and intelligence, as
well as summaries of his and his collaborators'
work in these areas, are summarized in The
Nature of Human Intelligence (1967Z?), The
Analysis of Intelligence (Guilford & Hoepfner
1971), and Way Beyond the LQ. (1977). In the
1970s, Guilford has also turned his attention to
using the structure of intellect model in the de-
velopment of an operational-informational point
of view for understanding many important phe-
nomena in cognitive psychology. He has shown
the relationship between many traditional points
of view in psychology and his more comprehen-
sive theoretical system (1974).
Although Guilford has devoted less of his
energy to the study of the nonintellectual aspects
of human personality than he has to the study
of abilities, his work in the former area began in
the early 1930s. He first proved that the then
popular concept of extraversion-introversion
could be broken down into several distinct and
relatively independent component factors. This
work was followed by the research and test de-
velopment that led to the Guilford-Zimmerman
Temperament Survey (Guilford & Zimmerman
1949) and the personality taxonomy upon which
it was based. Again, factor analytic procedures
were used to develop these tests, just as in the
area of human abilities. His work in personality
and that of other investigators is presented in
his book Personality (1959). Guilford's multiple-
factor personality taxonomy contrasts markedly
with Cattell's 16 factor taxonomy (1950) and
with Hans J. Eysenck's 2 factors of person-
ality, extraversion-introversion and neuroticism
(1953). The differences in these competing
taxonomies result at least in part from different
factor analytic philosophies in research and test
development. Eysenck extracts few factors in
his analyses, whereas Guilford and Cattell ex-
tract many; Cattell relies on blind rotation to
oblique simple structure, whereas Guilford leans
toward orthogonal constructs and uses simple
structure as a guide only when it does not con-
tradict other knowledge he has about the test
variables. The test of time alone will determine
GUILFORD, J. P. 259
which of these competing typologies will ul-
timately prove to be the most useful.
During his long career, Guilford has authored
more than three hundred books, monographs,
and articles on a wide variety of scientific topics
in psychology and related fields. Although he has
never been inclined to seek recognition for him-
self, wide appreciation of his outstanding con-
tributions has resulted in his being honored
again and again. He has been president of the
Psychometric Society, the Midwestern Psycho-
logical Association, the Western Psychological
Association, the California Color Society, and
the American Psychological Association. He is
one of the comparatively few psychologists
elected to the National Academy of Sciences and
is the first president of the International Society
for Intelligence Education.
ANDREW L. COMREY
WORKS BY GUILFORD
(1936) 1954 Psychometric Methods. 2d ed. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
(1942) 1978 GUILFORD, J. P.; and FRUCHTER, BEN-
JAMIN Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and
Education. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. —» Guil-
ford was the sole author of the first edition.
1947 GUILFORD, J. P. (editor) Printed Classification
Tests. Army Air Forces Aviation Psychology Re-
search Program Reports, No. 5. Washington: Gov-
ernment Printing Office.
(1949) 1955 GUILFORD, J. P.; and ZIMMERMAN,
WAYNE S. The Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament
Survey: Manual of Instructions and Interpretations.
Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sheridan.
1959 Personality. New York: McGraw-Hill.
1960 GUILFORD, J. P., et al. An Investigation of Sym-
bolic Factors of Cognition and Convergent Produc-
tion. Los Angeles: University of Southern Cali-
fornia, Reports from the Psychological Laboratory,
No. 23.
1967a Autobiography. Volume 5, pages 167-191 in
A History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited
by Edwin G. Boring and Gardner Lindzey. New
York: Appleton.
1967b The Nature of Human Intelligence. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
1971 GUILFORD, J. P.; and HOEPFNER, RALPH. The
Analysis of Intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.
1974 A Psychology with Act, Content, and Form.
Journal of General Psychology 90:87-100.
1977 Way Beyond the I.Q. Buffalo: Creative Educa-
tion Foundation.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CATTELL, RAYMOND B. 1950 The Main Personality
Factors in Questionnaire, Self-estimate Material.
Journal of Social Psychology 31:3-38.
EYSENCK, HANS J. (1953) 1970 The Structure of
Human Personality. 3d ed. London: Methuen.
MICHAEL, WILLIAM B.; COMREY, ANDREW L.; and FRUCH-
TER, BENJAMIN 1963 J. P. Guilford: Psycholo-
gist and Teacher. Psychological Bulletin 60:1-34.
—» A bibliography of Guilford's writings is on pages
27-34.
 HALLOWELL, A. IRVING
Although the bulk of Alfred Irving Hallowell's
scholarly career was devoted to the study of the
Northern Ojibwa, a people whose society, cul-
ture, and thought he described and analyzed in
meticulous detail, his primary concern in this
ethnographic effort was to discover and display
the general through the particular. When one
also considers the remarkable array of theoreti-
cal issues to which he made original and pio-
neering contributions—social organization, cul-
ture and personality, acculturation, behavioral
evolution, law, religion, myth, world-view, cul-
tural ecology, and the history of anthropology,
among others—it becomes clear why his influ-
ence has been felt in disciplines beyond his
chosen field of cultural anthropology.
Hallowell was born in Philadelphia in 1892,
an only child in an old Philadelphia family, and
he died in that city in 1974. His early education
did not augur the pursuit of a scientific career.
After graduating from a manual training high
school, he enrolled in the Wharton School of
Finance and Commerce of the University of
Pennsylvania, and upon receiving his degree he
became a social worker in the Family Society in
Philadelphia. While employed as a social
worker, Hallowell took graduate courses in soci-
ology and anthropology. Under the influence of
Frank G. Speck, his teacher in anthropology
(and a distinguished American Indianist), Hallo-
well developed his interest in American Indians
and decided to become an anthropologist. From
Speck and from Franz Boas (the leading anthro-
pologist of his time, whose weekly seminar
Hallowell attended at Columbia University),
Hallowell acquired his lifelong view of anthro-
pology as a holistic discipline, embracing ethnol-
ogy, archeology, physical anthropology, and
linguistics.
Hallowell's work can be chronologically di-
vided into three phases: an early ethnological
phase; a middle "culture and personality" phase;
and (toward the end of his career) a "historical"
phase centering on the history of anthropology
and on behavioral evolution. Although the
achievements of each phase were both original
and (especially in the cases of the last two)
pioneering, those of the middle phase were per-
haps the most significant. His delineation of
the relationships between culture and person-
ality—in particular, his analysis of the inter-
penetration of the "inner world" of social actors
with the "outer world" of the social order—con-
stitutes a signal contribution to the understand-
ing of the cultural dimension of human experi-
ence and the psychological dimension of human
culture.
In a period in which behaviorism was a dom-
inant intellectual mode in the social and be-
havioral sciences, Hallowell was attempting to
show, using Ojibwa data as his vehicle, that
social action is not so much a function of the
properties of the physical and social environ-
ments, as objectively described by natural and
social scientists, as of the meanings these proper-
ties have for the social actors. Taking his point
of departure from the gestaltist notion of the
"behavioral environment," Hallowell went be-
yond the gestaltists in his demonstration that
perceptions are mediated not through perceptors
261
262 HANCOCK, WILLIAM KEITH
alone, but through cognitive orientations that
organize and shape them, and that these latter
orientations are acquired in large part from cul-
tural symbol systems. From this demonstration
it then followed that the human behavioral
environment was (as he put it) "culturally con-
stituted." In demonstrating how the various
members of a social group, each initially en-
capsulated in the privacy of his own inner
world, nevertheless come to share a common
behavioral environment, Hallowell identified
and described the process by which an aggrega-
tion of private individuals becomes a group of
social actors. In brief: through the explication
of his concept of a culturally constituted be-
havioral environment, he also demonstrated, in
part, how a human social order becomes possi-
ble (1955).
Unlike many social scientists, however, for
whom the social order is a given, Hallowell al-
ways saw it as problematic. While stressing that
regularities in social behavior are made possible
by culture, Hallowell (who had early discerned
the importance of Freud for anthropology) also
stressed that there are dimensions of the inner
world of social actors—impulse, affect, imagina-
tion, fantasy, and the like—that are not derived
from (and that indeed elude the influence of)
the outer world of culture. These dimensions
are a potentially disruptive threat to the social
order, for even when they do not lead to the
construction of private behavioral environments
(as they do in mental illness), they may lead
to contemplated action that violates the norma-
tive requirements of the social order. To cope
with this problem, Hallowell elaborated his
seminal concept of the "self," a concept cor-
relative to, and as important as that of, the
behavioral environment (ibid.).
Calling again upon his detailed knowledge of
the Ojibwa, Hallowell argued that the self, a
cognitive structure unique to man, develops by
means of a set of basic orientations acquired
from cultural symbol systems. Lying at the in-
tersection of the inner and outer worlds, and
mediating between them, the self protects the
social order from the potentially disruptive
threat of the former world in two ways. First, as
a result of achieving self-awareness, and there-
by the ability to distinguish inner and outer
stimuli, social actors can both adapt their per-
ceptions to culturally constituted cognitions and
monitor their behavior by reference to cultural
norms. Second, when the demands of inner
urges give evidence of becoming more powerful
than those of outer norms, the attendant moral
threat to the actor's self-conception typically
assures the enactment of norm-governed action.
Although Hallowell was a prolific scholar, the
bulk of his work consisted of research papers
and theoretical essays rather than of books and
monographs. This work is typically marked by
a bifocal perspective because even when focus-
ing on a specialized topic, Hallowell is aware
of the widest focus of anthropological inquiry,
the nature of man. Hence, although much of his
writing dealt with specific enthnographic con-
texts, his concern with the uniquely contextual
was based on and informed by an interest in
the generically human; and the latter interest
projected a vision of what anthropology at its
best, as "the study of man," could be.
MELFORD E. SPIRO
WORKS BY HALLOWELL
(1942) 1970 The Role of Conjuring in Saulteaux So-
ciety. New York: Octagon.
(1955) 1974 Culture and Experience. Philadelphia:
Univ. of Pennsylvania Press.
1968 Speck, Frank G. Volume 15, pages 115-117 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1976 Contributions to Anthropology: Selected Papers
of A. Irving Hallowell. With introductions by Ray-
mond D. Fogelson, Fred Eggan, Melford E. Spiro,
George W. Stocking, Anthony F. C. Wallace, and
Wilcomb E. Washburn. Univ. of Chicago Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ethos 5, no. 1, 1977. —» Special issue entitled Essays in
Subjective Culture: An Appreciation of A. Irving
Hallowell, edited by Dennison Nash.
SPIRO, MELFORD E. (editor) 1965 Context and Mean-
ing in Cultural Anthropology. New York: Free Press.
—» In honor of A. Irving Hallowell.
HANCOCK, WILLIAM KEITH
William Keith Hancock, known for his re-
search and teaching in Australian and Common-
wealth history, was born in Melbourne on June
26, 1898, the son of an Anglican clergyman.
He studied at the University of Melbourne,
where Ernest Scott and Harrison Moore were
among his most influential teachers. After a
brief period as assistant lecturer at the Univer-
sity of Western Australia under Edward Shann,
he received a Rhodes scholarship that took him
to Balliol College, Oxford. Soon afterwards he
became the first Australian fellow of All Souls
College, where he wrote his first book, Ricasoli
(1926), a study of the Risorgimento in Tuscany.

In 1924, ho returned to his native country as
professor of history at the University of Ade-
laide, where his seminal work Australia was pub-
lished in 1930. He returned to Britain in 1934
as professor of history at the University of
Birmingham, where he began a massive Survey
of British Commonwealth Affairs (1937-1942)
for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
In 1941 he began editing the Civil Series of the
official History of the Second World War, con-
tributing an initial volume on the British War
Economy (Hancock & Cowing 1949). In 1949, af-
ter five years as Chichele professor of economic
history at Oxford, he became the first professor
of British Commonwealth affairs in the Univer-
sity of London, and director of the newly
founded Institute of Commonwealth Studies.
He returned again to Australia in 1957 as
director and professor of history of the Research
School of Social Sciences at the Australian
National University. Before his retirement he
completed a two-volume biography of Smuts
(1962-1968), and he later published Discover-
ing Monaro (1972), a new departure into eco-
logical history. He also published two volumes
of memoirs and reflections, Country and Call-
ing (1954) and Professing History (1976), and
selected essays in Politics in Pitcairn (1947).
His 1960 Wiles lectures at Queen's University
Belfast were published as Four Studies of War
and Peace in this Century (1961). He was
knighted in 1953, being known as Sir Keith
Hancock.
Hancock's one excursion into policymaking,
outside of his work on the official war histories,
took place in 1954, when he accepted an in-
vitation from the governor of Uganda to medi-
ate in a crisis that had arisen over the governor's
withdrawal of recognition of the Kabaka of
Buganda. In effect, Hancock's role was that of
a constitutional expert who would persuade the
leaders of Buganda to agree to constitutional
revision and to reconciliation with the governor's
hopes for self-government for Uganda as a
whole. Hancock was successful in this enter-
prise, but later developments in both Britain
and Uganda rendered his work futile.
Such a long, varied, and productive career
gave Hancock a reputation in more than one
field, based not only on his ideas, but also on
his pioneering achievements in Australian and
Commonwealth history. To this research, he
brought a fresh eye, a rigorous method, a special
concern for economic influences, a wide range
of allusion, and a determination not to be fet-
HANCOCK, WILLIAM KEITH 263
tered by conventional wisdom. His treatment of
the springs of action of contemporary Austra-
lian society contrasted sharply with earlier nar-
ratives of discovery, settlement, and constitu-
tional change. Forty years later, Discovering
Monaro gave Australians a new insight into
their impact on the land. His Survey had a pro-
found effect on the study of the dominions and
colonies and their relations with Britain. He
wrote with a firm underpinning of economic
fact, shrewdly analyzed prevailing political
trends, and placed constitutional issues in a per-
spective that had been previously lacking.
Hancock's ideas, from his thirties to his sev-
enties, show remarkable consistency. They can
be summarized in terms of his doctrines about
history, his dominant themes, and his sense of
morality, all of which are united in his writings.
Three cardinal virtues, in Hancock's view,
distinguish the great historian. They are attach-
ment, justice, and span. Attachment is "getting
close to people, getting inside situations." Jus-
tice is fairness—"fairly to report each point of
view . . . ; fairly to relate this point of view to
the situation in which it arose; fairly to measure
its effect upon the new situation that was aris-
ing." Span is remoteness; it involves a full
awareness of backgrounds and the capacity to
extricate oneself from the particular and see it
in relation to other things: "Getting inside the
situation is the opening movement; getting out-
side it is the concluding one" (1954, pp. 220-
221). These three virtues are antecedent to
moral judgment, which Hancock sees as a nec-
essary function of the moral sense, but as ap-
plied to men, not to situations. The historian's
job is first to establish a situation by using at-
tachment, justice, and span, and then to decide
how to judge it in terms of approval or con-
demnation. The situation is analyzed in terms
of what is; the men involved in terms of what
ought to be. Thus Hancock introduces morality,
but not at the expense of realism. Once we know
what happened, we can judge it, but we should
not exercise judgment in ways that prevent us
from discovering the true situation.
In the writing of history, Hancock distrusts
reliance solely upon documents. He is fond of
quoting R. H. Tawney's remark in the 1930s
that "what historians need is not more docu-
ments but stronger boots"—i.e., that they should
see things and people, and not confine them-
selves to libraries. He exemplified this maxim
in his many travels to Commonwealth countries
before writing his Survey, and in his frequent
 264 HANCOCK, WILLIAM KEITH
trips over the ground surveyed in Discovering
Monaro. He respects documents and is glad that
he was properly schooled in their use, but "the
historian needs also a lust for life" (1954,
p. 95). Moreover, the historian should remember
his obligation to see every situation in its en-
tirety. He may, for example, be a more useful
person in some situations than the economist,
"because he is rather less of a scientist, rather
more of a humanist; his concern is not with
economic man but with men and women in the
round" (1976, p. 91). He may use the material
and sometimes the language of the social sci-
ences, but he should concentrate upon sim-
plicity in his own narrative exposition: "to split
the ism demands clarity of thought and con-
stant watchfulness" (1954, p. 227).
Although Hancock's writing is always about
concrete matters—colonial policy, economic de-
velopment, nationalist urges, constitutional is-
sues—in quite specific situations, two broad
themes animate most of it: that of man for and
against his environment, and that of man for
and against himself. The environmental theme
did not become dominant in Hancock's work
until comparatively late in his career with Dis-
covering Monaro, but it appeared much earlier
in his life and writings. In Tuscany, he wrote
about Ricasoli's agricultural innovations as well
as his political leadership. And, although the
first volume of his Survey was almost exclu-
sively political in its focus, Hancock in the sec-
ond volume wrote as much on economic prob-
lems from an ecological perspective, and this
enriched his discussion of such issues as soil
erosion in South Africa and swollen shoot dis-
ease in the Gold Coast. When, after retirement,
he studied the land use in a small highland area
of his own country, he thus had many bases of
comparison as well as a deep belief in ecological
preservation. Putting his ideas to practical ef-
fect, he led a campaign to prevent the Austra-
lian government from erecting a vast tower on
Black Mountain, overlooking Canberra, where
he lived. Significantly The Battle of Black Moun-
tain (1974) is the most passionate of his works.
A more important theme, however, is Han-
cock's concern with man for and against him-
self, especially in a national context. Here his
starting point is Machiavelli, on whom he wrote
essays in the 1930s—essays that anticipated the
later debate about "idealism" and "realism" in
the study of international relations (1947, pp.
18-50). Although recognizing the force of
Machiavelli's explanations of international con-
duct in terms of necessity and interest, Hancock
repudiated the notion that might should be re-
garded as right and pointed out the contradic-
tions in Machiavelli's own formulation, particu-
larly Machiavelli's need to abandon his own
compelling analysis in designing his ideal com-
monwealth. Force and fraud were powerful but
not the whole of the story. The Hobbesian situa-
tion "exists, and it deserves far more rigorous
study than it usually gets; but it is never the
whole historical situation, which contains from
one historical moment to another a varying
blend of force and idea, of interest and obliga-
tion, of predestination and free will" (1954,
p. 208).
Hancock saw the theme of man for and
against himself in the political arrangements of
the British Empire—particularly where the Brit-
ish had striven to establish liberty under law in
their dependencies; but he found the doctrines
of self-government and racial impartiality diffi-
cult if not impossible to combine in so many
different situations. Communalism was a fea-
ture of many of the British dominions and
colonies, subdued in some, but a constant
danger in others. Especially in situations like
those of Palestine and southern Africa, Hancock
accurately predicted in the 1930s the dilemmas
that would continue to be disturbing in the
1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, he saw British
rule as broadly beneficent. Britain had ruled, but
in most cases it had not divided: the divisions
were there to begin with. The Commonwealth,
as "a group of sovereign nations whose members
have developed to an unusual degree the habit
of mutual consultation" (1961, p. 113), pro-
vided an opportunity for amelioration of other-
wise troublesome divisions, but it was no cure-
all.
Hancock once wrote: "I cannot rid myself,
I do not wish to rid myself of my very British
preoccupation with right conduct. After all, I be-
long to a people which by Machiavelli's own
tests remains 'uncorrupted', a people which lives
in liberty under the law, and for all its conflicts
of material interest is capable of passionate re-
sponse to the call of civic duty" (1947, p. v).
The preoccupation with right conduct is funda-
mental to his basically Christian approach to
moral issues, but it is always informed by
awareness of the intricacies of politics and the
compelling force of economics. Moral judgment
is confined to the actions of individuals, espe-
cially those in authority. Situations at large,
especially those involving large bodies of people

driven by what they conceive to be necessity,
are analyzed with compassion and understand-
ing. Hancock balances moral, scientific, and
aesthetic concerns more firmly and effectively
than do most historians. This balance is aided
by Hancock's style. He moves from plain state-
ment to quirky allusiveness, but persistently
writes with lucidity, delicacy, and imagination.
J. D. B. MILLER
WORKS BY HANCOCK
(1926) 1969 Ricasoli and the Risorgimento in Tus-
cany. New Yoik: Fertig.
1930 Australia. London: Benn.
1937-1942 Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs.
Oxford Univ. Press. -> Volume 1 (1937): Prob-
lems of Nationality, 1918-1936. Volume 2, part 1
(1940) and part 2 (1942): Problems of Economic
Policy, 1918-1939.
1947 Politics in Pitcairn and Other Essays. London:
Macmillan.
1949 HANCOCK, KEITH; and COWING, MARGARET M.
British War Economy. London: H.M. Stationery
Office.
1954 Country and Calling. London: Faber.
1961 Four Studies of War and Peace in this Century.
Cambridge Univ. Press. —> The 1960 Wiles lectures
at Queen's University Belfast.
1962-1968 Smuts. Cambridge Univ. Press. —> Volume
1 (1962): The Sanguine Years 1870-1919. Volume
2 (1968): The Fields of Force 1919-1950.
1972 Discovering Monaro: A Study of Man's Impact
on His Environment. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1974 The Battle of Black Mountain: An Episode in
Canberra's Environmental History. Canberra: De-
partment of Economic History, Research School of
Social Sciences, Australian National University.
1976 Professing History. Univ. of Sydney Press.
—» Sequel to Hancock 1954.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Historical Studies 13: Whole no. 51 1968. -» This
issue, subtitled Australia and New Zealand, is de- prompted
voted to articles on Hancock's life and work. A
select bibliography appears on pages 436-443.
HANKE, LEWIS U.
Lewis U. Hanke possesses a fundamental be-
lief in the contemporary importance of historical
inquiry. By his actions and his statements, he
has expressed the conviction that knowledge of
the past represents a basic key to human self-
awareness and global understanding and can
help in the formulation of messages with pro- versy, and he has remained a dominant figure
found and practical meaning for the present. He
has remarked on more than one occasion: "All
history is contemporary history," and he sees
the social role of the historian as one of grave
responsibility.
Hanke has revealed this commitment through-
out his scholarly work, most conspicuously in
HANKE, LEWIS U. 265
his writings on Spanish attitudes and behavior
toward Indians in colonial Latin America. In
his best-known work, The Spanish Struggle
for Justice in the Conquest of America (1949),
he stressed the efforts of Spanish theologians
to define and defend the humanity of the in-
digenous population. Central to his theme was
the description of a debate in 1550-1551 be-
tween Juan Gines de Sepulveda and Bartolome
de Las Casas, a subject to which Hanke fre-
quently returned in subsequent work. Drawing
upon the Aristotelian notion of "natural slavery,"
Sepulveda had argued that the Indians were
naturally inferior and therefore subject to out-
right domination and enslavement by Spaniards.
Emphasizing the ideal of a universal Christian
community, Las Casas insisted that Indians were
rational beings, capable of persuasion, and that
they should consequently be converted peace-
fully.
The mere occurrence of such a debate sharply
modifies the stereotypical "Black Legend" about
Spanish cruelty, and the contradiction between
Sepulveda and Las Casas helps explain the
evolution (and vacillation) of sixteenth-century
royal policy toward the Indians. But Hanke
does more than refine our comprehension of the
past. Sometimes citing present-day instances of
neocolonial domination, racial turmoil, and
ethnic discrimination, he openly expresses his
admiration for Las Casas' vision, courage, and
tenacity. He has taken a quotation from the
friar as the title of a recent monograph (1974):
"All Mankind Is One."
Hanke's writings on this subject have
excitement, research, and dispute.
Some critics have charged that he has replaced
the "Black Legend" with an equally simplistic
"White Legend" of Hispanic benevolence, where
in reality Indians languished in misery. Ochers
have claimed that his focus on ideas and the-
ology has ignored base human motives and the
clash of material interests. Still others have al-
leged that his textual interpretations have over-
looked some critical distinctions, specifically the
difference between "serfs" and "slaves." But
Hanke seems to have thrived on such contro-
in the area of colonial Latin American history.
A prolific researcher and writer, Hanke has
published on other topics as well. He made ex-
tensive investigations into the urban history of
Potosi, the colonial mining center of what is
now Bolivia, anticipating and precipitating the
modern analysis of social history in Latin Amer-
266 HANKE, LEWIS U.
ica. Recently he coedited a massive, multivol-
ume series of Spanish viceregal reports on the
Indies. These documents provide rich, detailed,
and thorough information on political institu-
tions and everyday life, on individuals and col-
lectivities, and their publication will greatly
facilitate historical investigation. The project
also reflects Hanke's reverence for primary
sources and his insistence that students of the
past work, whenever possible, with complete
and original records.
Throughout his professional life Hanke has
striven to Develop Latin American history as a
legitimate field of serious scholarship, some-
times in the face of collegia! condescension and
institutional reluctance. He has served as editor
of the Hispanic American Historical Review,
written a college text, supervised the Alfred A.
Knopf Borzoi series on Latin America, and
brought together two large anthologies. He has
also trained scores of Latin American historians,
many of them now prominent scholars in their
own right, and has expressed continuing interest
in methods of undergraduate teaching.
Hanke was born in 1905, received B.S. and
M.A. degrees from Northwestern University,
taught for three years at the American Univer-
sity in Beirut, and earned his PH.D. from Har-
vard University in 1936. After two years of post-
doctoral study he was appointed director of the
Hispanic Foundation at the Library of Congress
in 1939. In 1951 he assumed a professorship at
the University of Texas, in 1961 moved to Co-
lumbia University, in 1967 went to the Uni-
versity of California at Irvine, and in 1969 be-
came the Clarence and Helen Haring professor
of history at the University of Massachusetts—a
position from which he retired in 1975. He has
received many awards and distinctions, includ-
ing honorary degrees from the University of
Bahia, Brazil (1965); the Tomas Frias Univer-
sity of Potosi, Bolivia (1965); and the University
of Seville (1966). In 1965 he was decorated by
the Bolivian government with the Orden del
Condor de los Andes and was made a corres-
ponding member of the Royal Historical Society
in London.
In 1974 he served as president of the Ameri-
can Historical Association. In his presidential
address, he pronounced apprehension about the
writing of self-centered "tribal" history and
urged his professional colleagues to develop in-
tellectual perspectives and working relationships
on a wide international scale. As an example he
cited the case of Bernardino de Sahagun, a six-
teenth-century Franciscan whose careful investi-
gations of Aztec customs have left a faithful
and sensitive account of precolombian indige-
nous civilization. There is an urgent need for
United States historians to broaden their knowl-
edge of other cultures, Hanke declared, for
foreign historians to learn more about the
United States, and for all to see that no single
history can be properly understood in isolation.
"Americans will then be ready for an even more
difficult step," he concluded,
the initiation of fundamental revisions in their own
views of the world, man, and the future, which be-
gan in the century of the great discoveries and for
which Bernardino de Sahagun showed the way by
his studies of Aztec culture. If American historians
are fully aware of their opportunities and responsi-
bilities in the world today, they can exert a power-
ful influence by their teaching and research to the
end that we are able to appreciate the history of
other peoples without losing allegiance to our own.
By studying the history of their own tribes and
other tribes as well, historians should be in the
forefront of all those who would seek to understand
the common elements in all cultures. (1975, p. 20)
In keeping with his own counsel, Hanke would
later formulate a proposal for the compilation
of a bibliographical guide to the writings of
foreign historians on the history of the United
States.
In a time when many historians feel unsure
of their role and vague about their sense of
social purpose, Lewis Hanke remains optimistic
and enthusiastic. He is a man of humor as well
as fervor. In his mind history lives.
PETER H. SMITH
WORKS BY HANKE
1949 The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest
of America. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania
Press. —•» Won the 1947 Albert J. Beveridge award
of the American Historical Association. A paper-
back edition was published by Little, Brown in
1966.
1951 Bartolome de Las Casas: An Interpretation of
His Life and Writings. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff.
1954a Bartolome de Las Casas, 1474-1566: Bibliog-
rafia critica y cuerpo de materiales para el estudio
de su vida, escritos, actuacion y polemicas que
suscitaron durante cuatro siglos. Prepared in col-
laboration with Manuel Gimenez Fernandez. San-
tiago: Fondo Historico y Bibliografico Jose Toribo
Medina.
(1954k) 1956 The Imperial City of Potosi: An Unwrit-
ten Chapter in the History of Spanish America. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. —» First published in
Spanish.

1959 Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in
Race Prejudice in the Modern World. London:
Hollis & Carter. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished by Indiana University Press in 1970.
1959 HANKE, LEWIS; and REAL DIAZ, JOSE J. (editors)
Relaciones historico-literarias de la America merid-
ional: Relacion general de la Villa Imperial de
Potosi por Luis Capoche. Madrid: Atlas.
1965 Bartolorrie Arzdns de Orsua y Vela's History of
Potosi. Providence: Brown Univ. Press.
1974 All Mankind Is One: A Study of the Disputation
Between Bartolome de Las Casas and Juan Gines
de Sepiilveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Re-
ligious Capacity of the American Indians. De Kalb:
Northern Illinois Univ. Press.
1975 American Historians and the World Today.
American Historical Review 80:1—20.
1976-1978 HANKE, LEWIS; and RODRIGUEZ, CELSO
(editors) Los virreyes espanoles en America durante
el gobierno de la Casa de Austria: Mexico. 5 vols.
Madrid: Atlas.
1978-1979 HANKE, LEWIS; and RODRIGUEZ, CELSO
(editors) Los virreyes espanoles en America durante
el gobierno de la Casa de Austria: Peru. Madrid:
Atlas.
HARLOW, HARRY F.
Harry F. Harlow was born in 1905 in Fair-
field, Iowa. Most of his undergraduate and all of
his graduate education was at Stanford Univer-
sity, where he received his PH.D degree in psy-
chology in 1930. His chief mentors there were
Calvin P. Stone, a comparative psychologist, and
Lewis M. Terman, who is best known for his
development of the Stanford-Binet intelligence
test and his studies of gifted children. Neither
figure, however, seems to have exerted a domi-
nating influence on Harlow. Indeed, although
Harlow (1977) credits Stone with teaching him
scientific techniques, many of Harlow's own stu-
dents will recall his own reaction against Stone's
methodological biases. The latter emphasized the
systematic but slow process of pushing back the
frontiers of science "step by step and stone by
stone," whereas Harlow, noting that progress in
science has often come in quantum jumps, ve-
hemently downgraded parametric research and
tried to instill in his students the knack of sim-
ply identifying and attacking important prob-
lems in behavioral research. Harlow credits Ter-
man as his primary tutor in scientific theory,
but since Harlow has never displayed a strong
appetite for formal theorizing, Terman's influ-
ence seems to have been mainly on Harlow's
choice of topics to study, best represented by his
lifelong interest in primate intellectual capac-
ities.
Harlow spent his entire academic career up
to his semiretirement in 1974 at the University
HARLOW, HARRY F. 267
of Wisconsin in Madison. He taught the intro-
ductory psychology course during most of those
years, and it seems likely that this constant con-
tact with diverse areas of human psychology
eventually had a greater effect than did his
graduate training upon his choices of subjects in
the latter part of his research career. Although
his doctoral dissertation dealt with social facili-
tation in rats, and a few studies with cats and
even goldfish can be found among his more than
three hundred articles, virtually all his research
has been conducted with rhesus monkeys. In an
informal autobiography, Harlow (1977) recalls
that the lack of facilities for rodent research
when he arrived in Madison prompted his initial
primate studies at the local zoo. Soon afterwards,
in 1932, the Primate Laboratory was established
on the campus. In the course of thirty years, the
laboratory was transformed into a large and
interdisciplinary research complex that included
the Wisconsin Regional Primate Research Cen-
ter as well as the psychology department's Pri-
mate Laboratory; from 1961 to 1971 Harlow
directed the entire complex.
In his first two decades of research Harlow
carried out more than fifty studies of learning
and cortical lesions in rhesus monkeys. This
work laid down many of the standard procedures
of laboratory primate learning research, later
applied by researchers to species ranging from
rats to children. During these years, Harlow and
his students also produced many valuable em-
pirical findings that shed light on the nature and
limits of rhesus monkey intelligence; their ani-
mals performed impressively on high-order mul-
tiple-sign learning problems that had been
thought to be beyond the learning capabilities of
rhesus monkeys (e.g., Harlow 1943).
By far the most significant discovery of this
period was the formation of learning sets (Har-
low 1949). Departing from the usual procedure
in research on rodent learning, of testing many
animals on only one or two learning problems,
Harlow trained each of a few monkeys on liter-
ally hundreds of visual discrimination problems
and found that each monkey "learned to learn"
new problems of the same type in a single trial.
This learning set principle helped bridge the gap
between slow, trial-and-error learning and rapid,
insightful learning, a dichotomy that had been
puzzling learning theorists for some time. Char-
acteristically, Harlow called attention to the
probable operation of this principle in everyday
learning by humans in the socialization process,
268 HARLOW, HARRY F.
suggesting that the achievement of high social
intelligence may require the acquisition of mul-
tiple learning sets relating to classes of social
stimuli and social-emotional reactions.
The learning set phenomenon itself presented
a challenge to the formal stimulus-response
theories that were being developed out of simple
conditioning principles at the time by Clark L.
Hull, Kenneth W. Spence, and others: Could the
extremely rapid learning exhibited by learning-
set-experienced animals be derived from the
postulates of such theories? Not satisfactorily,
according to impartial referees (e.g., Mackin-
tosh 1974), and in fact it was not until condi-
tioning-based theories shifted to more explicitly
cognitive assumptions in the early 1970s that
they could begin to handle the learning set
phenomenon, which many theorists have come
to believe requires a concept of strategy-learning
for its explication. Harlow himself was led to
some quasiformal theorizing on what he called
"error factor theory" (Harlow 1959b), which was
extended by others (e.g., Levine 1965) to
strategy-learning conceptions (e.g., the monkey
acquires and generalizes a "win-stay, lose-shift"
strategy in ordinary discriminations) in mathe-
matical form; however, empirical applications
were probably more important.
Species comparisons in many different labora-
tories showed that learning sets were acquired
with great difficulty, at best, in most subprimate
species, in contrast to the relative ease of their
formation by macaques, apes, and children.
When Harlow established a breeding program
in his laboratory in the 1950s, work on the on-
togeny of learning capacities (Harlow 1959a)
became possible, and it quickly demonstrated
that learning set formation is possible in the
rhesus only after a certain age (one to two years,
depending on testing procedures). Thus, after
similar species and age comparisons were made
with respect to other learning tasks, it was only
natural for Harlow to construct a battery of tests
for monkey intelligence measurement in which
discrimination learning set was a major in-
gredient. This test battery proved useful in his
work on the effects of early brain lesions (Har-
low, Thompson, Blomquist, & Schiltz 1970) and
of enriched versus impoverished social rearing
conditions (Gluck, Harlow, & Schiltz 1973),
and in his collaboration with Harry Waisman, a
biochemist and pediatrician, on studies of simu-
lated phenylketonuria in rhesus monkeys (Wais-
man & Harlow 1965). The array of tasks, known
as the Wisconsin General Test Apparatus stan-
dard battery, is probably the nearest thing to
human intelligence quotient testing that exists
in animal behavior research.
Harlow added another line of work, on curios-
ity and manipulation motives (Harlow 1953),
soon after the learning set discovery. His col-
laborative studies with Robert A. Butler showing
the extreme persistence with which monkeys
will work on mechanical puzzles or open win-
dows to observe other animals, without the con-
ventional food or water incentives, presented a
challenge to adherents of the homeostatic model
of motivation, and gave Harlow another oppor-
tunity to polemicize against the myopic views
of learning and motivation that were emerging
from rat psychologists' work. As significant as
the curiosity—exploration—manipulation research
was, it now appears as a relatively small point
against the homeostatic model compared to Har-
low's voluminous contributions in the area of
affectional systems, undoubtedly his best-known
work.
The latter began with the surrogate mother
studies (Harlow 1958). With little ambiguity,
these showed that an infant monkey's strong
attachment to its mother is based much more
upon tactile sensations ("contact comfort") pro-
vided by the mother than upon the association
of the mother with the reduction of such pri-
mary drives as hunger or pain. This conclusion
probably came as no surprise to human mothers
around the world who, through countless maga-
zine articles and television presentations, became
acquainted with Harlow's wire-and-terry-cloth
mother surrogates, but it clearly ran counter to
the position held by many psychologists and
sociologists at a time when both Hullian learn-
ing theory and Freudian psychoanalytic notions
were predominant.
For Harlow, the main significance of the sur-
rogate studies was that they opened up the whole
realm of primate affectional (love) systems to
experimental dissection in laboratory settings.
His wife, Margaret Kuenne Harlow, who was
highly respected for her work at the University
of Iowa, where she tested Spence's transposition
theory in children (Kuenne 1946), and who
had occasionally shared authorship with her
husband in reports from the Wisconsin Primate
Laboratory (e.g., Harlow & Harlow 1949),
joined him fully in these social behavior studies.
Until her death in 1971, she contributed im-
mensely to the planning and execution, as well
as the publication, of the affection studies. The
direction of these researches was clearly given

by the Harlows' classification of the affectional
systems into mother—infant, maternal, peer,
heterosexual, and paternal types.
Inevitably, artificial and real monkey mothers
had to be compared in their effects upon infant
monkeys' social development, and from this
work came detailed analyses of maternal love
and of infant love for its mother ( Harlow 1963 ).
Besides demonstrating the superiority of the real
monkey mother for the healthy social develop-
ment of the offspring, and indicating several
reasons for this, the studies articulated a crucial
role of the real mother in regulating her infant's
early play activities so as to foster effective peer
interactions. The all-importance of play in the
socialization process generally was emphasized
in further studies concentrating on peer attach-
ments (Harlow 1969). These studies also yielded
the conclusion that peer interactions were more
important than mother-infant interactions in
terms of the monkey's whole life span, because
of the role of social interactions with agemates
in determining basic social roles, inhibiting ag-
gression, and sexual maturation. The Harlows
also described the heterosexual affectional sys-
tem in adolescent and adult monkeys (Harlow
1962; Harlow & Harlow 1965), detailing its
dependence on prepubescent peer interactions.
The paternal love system was studied in a "nu-
clear family" setting designed by Margaret Har-
low (1971). With the usual degree of planned
serendipity that characterized the Harlows' social
researches, this setting provided fringe benefits
in the form of novel data on sibling interactions,
the influence of offspring upon parental sexual
motivation, and the effects of an unusually en-
riched social rearing environment upon learning
capacities, social adjustment, and heterosexual
maturation in offspring.
Certainly more dramatic than the normal so-
cial interactions described in the love researches
were the forms of maladjustment discovered
when social deprivation conditions were im-
posed. It is here that the Harlows exploited most
effectively the laboratory control of antecedent
conditions in psychosocial development. Reared
for the first 6 or 12 months in total social isola-
tion, and thus unable to form normal infant-
mother or peer attachments, monkeys displayed
severe and permanent social impairments, in-
cluding stereotypes resembling autism, extreme
fear, inappropriate aggression, and sexual inept-
ness (Harlow & Harlow 1965). Even partial iso-
lation, in which the monkeys were reared alone
in wire cages but allowed to see and hear other
HARLOW, HARRY F. 260
monkeys nearby, was found to be deleterious in
many of the same ways. "Motherless mothers"—
that is, isolation-reared females forcibly impreg-
nated in adulthood—proved to be grossly defi-
cient in maternal care of their first-born infants,
usually ignoring and often abusing them.
Harlow's social isolation studies ended on a
happier note—successful psychotherapy. After
some years of assuming that isolation-reared
monkeys were hopelessly incurable, and after
some fruitless attempts at rehabilitation by
others, the Harlows and their students Melinda
A. Novak and Stephen J. Suomi devised a pro-
cedure in which monkeys isolated from birth to
six months were exposed, immediately after the
isolation period, to socially normal monkeys only
half their age. The younger "therapist" monkeys
were still at an age of persistent contact clinging,
in the early developmental stage of play, yet too
young to display aggression. Over another six-
month therapeutic period, these attributes, plus,
probably, the smaller size of the therapists, grad-
ually converted the isolates from fearful retreat
and stereotyped rock-and-huddle to nearly nor-
mal agemate attachment behaviors, vigorous and
mutual play, and essentially complete and last-
ing rehabilitation (Suomi, Harlow, & Novak
1974).
Related to the isolation studies was a re-
search program on depression that occupied
most of Harlow's attention in his last five years
at Wisconsin, but that had really begun with the
earlier mother-infant separation studies (e.g.,
Seay, Hansen, & Harlow 1962). The separation
studies had disclosed a characteristic pattern of
reactions by infant rhesus monkeys after re-
moval from their mothers that consisted of a
highly vocal, agitated protest phase followed by
withdrawal and despair. In the despair phase,
the infants became less active, and their social
interactions, including play with agemates, de-
clined sharply. The behavioral depression in
these animals closely resembled the "anaclitic
depression" described by Rene Spitz (1946) and
others in human infants separated from their
mothers. In the later depression studies, severe
protest-and-despair reactions were observed in
peer-reared infant monkeys when they were
separated for four days from their playmates,
and these reactions persisted over twenty weekly
separations (Suomi, Harlow, & Domek 1970);
long-lasting depressions were also produced in
young monkeys when they were housed in stain-
less steel chambers that severely limited their
visual exploration and vertical locomotion
270 HARLOW, HARRY F.
(Suomi & Harlow 1969). By the time of Harlow's
departure from Wisconsin in 1974, the research
on depression was well advanced, with possible
monkey models of human depression being ex-
amined in terms of neurochemical correlates and
effects of antidepressant drugs, and of behav-
ioral variables (McKinney, Suomi, & Harlow
1971).
Harlow's over-all research accomplishments
exhibit not so much a theory or a "school," but a
series of empirical discoveries, descriptions, and
generalizations that are remarkable in number,
scope, and impact. His greatest discovery, in a
sense, may have been the rhesus monkey itself
as an experimental subject, for he showed that
virtually any topic of human behavior that might
appear in an introductory psychology textbook
could be profitably researched with monkeys,
often producing results of seemingly undeniable
applicability to humans. Here, of course, is
where the main impact of Harlow's work lies—
his findings demand the attention of anthro-
pologists, sociologists, and psychiatrists, as well
as psychologists—and where much controversy
is centered. In hundreds of speeches and articles,
Harlow has boldly generalized from monkey to
man (or vice versa; see Harlow, Gluck, & Suomi
1972), and at times, as when he has presented
evidence that sex-typing of behavior in monkeys
has a genetic rather than a learned-imitational
basis, he has not exactly endeared himself to
certain groups. (On at least two occasions,
feminist groups demonstrated at his public lec-
tures on this topic.) He has, however, indicated
where limits to generalization from nonhuman
to human animals may lie, and how these limits
may differ from one behavioral category to an-
other (Harlow, Gluck, & Suomi 1972).
Professional recognition and honors came to
Harlow well before his researches on the affec-
tional systems. In 1951 he was named to a twelve-
year term as editor of the Journal of Compara-
tive and Physiological Psychology. In the 1950s
he was also awarded the Howard Crosby Warren
medal by the Society of Experimental Psycholo-
gists, and was elected president of the American
Psychological Association. Shortly thereafter he
received that organization's distinguished scien-
tific contribution award, was elected to the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and the National
Academy of Arts and Sciences, and was twice
named Sigma Xi National lecturer. In later
years he was awarded the national medal of
science (1967), the gold medal award of the
American Psychological Foundation (1973),
and the International Kittay Scientific Founda-
tion award (1975).
JOHN W. DAVENPORT
WORKS BY HARLOW
1943 Solution by Rhesus Monkeys of a Problem In-
volving the Weigl Principle Using the Matching-
from-Sample Method. Journal of Comparative Psy-
chology 36:217-227.
1949 The Formation of Learning Sets. Psychological
Review 56:51-65.
1949 HARLOW, HARRY F.; and HARLOW, MARGARET K.
Learning to Think. Scientific American 181:36-39.
1953 Mice, Monkeys, Men, and Motives. Psychological
Review 60:23-32.
1958 The Nature of Love. American Psychologist
13:673-685.
1959a The Development of Learning in the Rhesus
Monkey. American Scientist 47:459—479.
1959b Learning Set and Error Factor Theory. Volume 2,
pages 492-537 in Sigmund Koch (editor), Psy-
chology: A Study of a Science. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
1962 The Heterosexual Affectional System in Monkeys.
American Psychologist 17:1-9.
1962 SEAY, BILLY; HANSEN, ERNST; and HARLOW,
HARRY F. Mother-Infant Separation in Monkeys.
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 3:123-
132.
1963 The Maternal Affectional System of Rhesus
Monkeys. Pages 254—281 in Harriet L. Rheingold
(editor), Maternal Behavior in Mammals. New
York: Wiley.
1965 HARLOW, HARRY F.; and HARLOW, MARGARET K.
The Affectional Systems. Volume 2, pages 287—
334 in Allan M. Schrier, Harry F. Harlow, and Fred
Stollnitz (editors), Behavior of Nonhuman Pri-
mates: Modern Research Trends. New York: Aca-
demic Press.
1965 WAISMAN, HARRY A.; and HARLOW, HARRY F.
Experimental Phenylketonuria in Infant Monkeys.
Science 147:685-695. —» A letter on the article, by
Rathe Karrer, with a reply from the authors, is on
page 579 of volume 148.
1968 Yerkes, Robert M. Volume 16, pages 587-589
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmilka and
Free Press.
1969 Age-mate or Peer Affectional System. Volume 2,
pages 333-383 in Daniel S. Lehrman, Robert A.
Hinde, and Evelyn Shaw (editors), Advances in
the Study of Behavior. New York: Academic Press.
1969 SUOMI, STEPHEN J.; and HARLOW, HARRY F. Ap-
paratus Conceptualization for Psychopathological
Research in Monkeys. Behavior Research Methods
and Instrumentation 1:247-250.
1970 HARLOW, HARRY F.; THOMPSON, C. L; BLOM-
QUIST, A. J.; and SCHILTZ, KENNETH A. Learning in
Rhesus Monkeys After Varying Amounts of Pre-
frontal Lobe Destruction During Infancy and Ado-
lescence. Brain Research 18:343-353.
1970 SUOMI, STEPHEN J.; HARLOW, HARRY F., and
DOMEK, CAROL J. Effect of Repetitive Infant-Infant
Separation of Young Monkeys. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 76:161-172.
1971 McKiNNEV, WILLIAM T., JR.; SUOMI, STEPHEN
J.; and HARLOW, HARRY F. Depression in Primates.
American Journal of Psychiatry 127:1313-1320.
1972 HARLOW, HARRY F.; GLUCK, JOHN P.; and SUOMI,
STEPHEN J. Generalization of Behavioral Data Be-
tween Nonhuman and Human Animals. American
Psychologist 27:709-716.

1973 GLUCK, JOHN P.; HARLOW, HARRY F.; and
SCHILTZ, KENNETH A. Differential Effect of Early
Enrichment and Deprivation on Learning in the
Rhesus Monkey (Macaco, mulatta). Journal of Com-
parative and Physiological Psychology 84:598-604.
1974 SUOMI, STEPHEN J.; HARLOW, HARRY F.; and
NOVAK, MELINDA A. Reversal of Social Deficits Pro-
duced by Isolation Rearing in Monkeys. Journal of
Human Evolution 3:527-534.
1977 Birth of the Surrogate Mother. Pages 133-150 in
W. R. Klemm (editor), Discovery Processes in
Modern Biology: People and Processes in Biological
Discovery. Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
HARLOW, MARGARET K. 1971 Nuclear Family Ap-
paratus. Behavior Research Methods and Instru-
mentation 3:301-304.
KUENNE, MARGARET R. 1946 Experimental Investi-
gation of the Relation of Language to Transposition chose to spend some time studying economics
Behavior in Young Children. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology 36:471-490.
LEVINE, M. 1965 Hypothesis Behavior. Volume 1,
pages 97-127 in Allan M. Schrier, Harry F. Harlow, King's College, Cambridge, under the tutelage
and Fred Stollnitz (editors), Behavior of Nonhuman of John Maynard Keynes. At Cambridge he
Primates: Modern Research Trends. New York:
Academic Press.
MACKINTOSH, NICHOLAS J. 1974 The Psychology of
Animal Learning. London: Academic Press.
SPITZ, RENE A. 1946 Anaclitic Depression: An In-
quiry Into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in
Early Childhood, II. Psychoanalytic Study of the
Child 2:313-342.
HARROD, ROY F.
Roy Forbes Harrod was born in Norfolk,
England, on February 13, 1900, and died there
on March 8, 1978. He considered himself best pragmatism as a philosophy for action, he re-
qualified as an economist in the workings of the
international monetary system; his most im-
portant contributions to economics, however,
have been in the development of the theory
of imperfect competition, the promulgation of
Keynesian economic thought, and the formula-
tion of a theory of macrodynamics. Despite his
acknowledged expertise in the theory and prac-
tice of economics, Harrod maintained that his
most important achievement was a contribution
to philosophy—his attempt, in the Foundations of
Inductive Logic (1956), to refute the skepticism
of David Hume.
Born into a literary and artistic home in
which good conversation was deemed a noble
pursuit, Harrod found college life appealing. By
the time he was thirty he had become a uni-
versity lecturer, a member of the governing body
of Oxford University (the Hebdomadal Council),
and, effectively, the head of his college (senior
censor of Christ Church). Eschewing the belief
that universities were solely the providers of
courses and examinations, he displayed a pen- but he played the role with the same energy he
HARROD, ROY F. 271
chant for the company of aesthetes who could
discourse knowledgeably in the fields of arts and
letters. In his early days at Christ Church he
associated extensively with the undergraduate
"Oxford Set" surrounding Harold Acton, and by
dining regularly at the Cranium Club he main-
tained contacts with the "Bloomsbury Set" quite
apart from his association with Keynes.
Although his education at Westminster
School and New College, Oxford, had been in
classics, philosophy, and modern history, Har-
rod, at age 22, was appointed to a lectureship in
economics and modern history at Christ Church,
Oxford. Before taking up this post, however, he
and, through a fortuitous introduction by Wal-
ter Runciman, was able to spend one term at
came into contact with a brilliant circle of stu-
dents (including Frank P. Ramsey, Richard
Braithwaite, Adrian Bishop, and Steven Runci-
man) and also with Keynes's flourishing Political
Economy Club. Apart from a few months spent
studying in Germany in 1923, this was his only
formal education in economics, but it made a
lasting impression on him. Greatly impressed by
the theoretical knowledge and practical exper-
tise of the members of the Political Economy
Club, Harrod determined never to retreat from
the problems of the world. Though he rejected
mained a realist, and all his economic theories
had to be tested for the realism of their as-
sumptions.
His acadmic output was immense. In one
nine-year period (1951-1959) when his "stamp
collector's urge to be inclusive" allowed a count
of his publications, Harrod published seven
books and 349 signed articles—a count that did
not include the numerous unsigned memoranda
he submitted to the European League for Eco-
nomic Cooperation, his anonymous book re-
views for The Times Literary Supplement, and
his monthly letters circulated by a firm of stock-
brokers. Somehow this prodigious output left
time for him to be coeditor of the Economic
Journal and an economic adviser at both the
national and international level.
Harrod was a Keynesian economist who be-
lieved in free trade, but his loyalty to Keynes
came first, and he strongly opposed what he
termed "Cobdenite laissez-faire." These beliefs
often placed him in the role of a political gadfly,
 272 HARROD, ROY F.
applied to his academic work. For most of his
life he was a member of the Liberal party (being
in the Liberal Shadow Cabinet and running, un-
successfully, for Parliament in 1945). In the
1930s he spoke on Labor party platforms
(against the deflationist policies of the National
government), and ultimately he joined the Con-
servative party. During World War n he served
under Lord Cherwell on Winston Churchill's
private statistical staff, at first in the Admiralty
and later in the Prime Minister's office.
Imperfect competition. Harrod's interest in
imperfect competition stemmed from his con-
cern for the macroeconomic aspects of the ex-
pansionist policies proposed by Keynes in the
1920s. Keynes was advocating public works as
a solution to unemployment, but a strong op-
position developed based on the notion that any
such increase in demand would lead to in-
creased prices. This view was greatly bolstered
by the publication of Piero Sraffa's famous arti-
cle (1926) claiming that only in the presence of
monopoly was equilibrium compatible with de-
creasing costs of production. This conclusion
seemed wrong in the light of Harrod's practical
knowledge of industry. Conducting his own sur-
vey of business, he found that even business-
men in competitive industries believed that in-
creases in demand might lead to reductions in
prices. Harrod's findings led him into a research
of the pricing policies of industry, a research
that resulted in many significant contributions
to the theory of imperfect competition, the draw-
ing of the marginal cost curve, the correct
drawing of the long-run average cost curve as
the envelope of the short-run average cost
curves, and a solution of the duopoly problem.
It is common to attribute the discovery of the
marginal revenue curve to several people work-
ing independently in the 1930s (see Robinson
1933), but Harrod could claim some priority in
the matter, inasmuch as the publication of his
article "Notes on Supply" (1930) had been de-
layed for two years because of a misunderstand-
ing by the referee, Frank Ramsey. Harrod had
originally called the curve "the increment of
aggregate demand," but it was later renamed at
the suggestion of Austin Robinson. The mathe-
matical concept had been known to at least
Antoine Augustin Cournot and to Alfred Mar-
shall before him (see Shackle 1967), but it was
Harrod who first drew the familiar textbook
diagram that locates profit-maximizing output
at the intersection of the marginal revenue and
marginal cost curves.
The marginal revenue curve and the long-run
average cost curve were the basic tools used in
the discussion of imperfect and monopolistic
competition, and Harrod was at first optimistic
of the uses to which the concepts had been put
(1934). He was greatly impressed by the way
it could be shown that with free entry under
conditions of imperfect competition, equilibrium
output would be at the point of tangency of the
demand curve and the short-run and long-run
average cost curves. At this point the plant
would be at less than optimum size, and would
not be used to optimum capacity. In addition, if
optimum conditions of production were achieved
under imperfect competition, profits would have
to be above the standard level.
Harrod's optimism, however, gave way to a
feeling that there was something wrong with a
theory that had much of modern industry oper-
ating either under conditions of supernormal
profit or under a tendency to build up an ex-
cessive number of businesses. In what Edward H.
Chamberlin chose to call a "recantation," but
Harrod preferred to call an extension of the
theory ("Theory of Imperfect Competition Re-
vised," in 1952a), Harrod proceeded to revise the
basic concepts of imperfect competition, under
the influence of the famous "Oxford Interviews"
of businessmen in which he had participated.
Harrod thought it would be irrational for firms
to charge prices high enough to attract others
into the industry to compete away their future
profit. When maximizing profit, a firm would
therefore take into account the present value of
future receipts, so that output would be deter-
mined where the average cost curve was tan-
gential to what he called the "average net pro-
ceeds curve." At this output the demand curve
would intersect the average cost curve from
above, and marginal revenue would be below
marginal cost (see "Increasing Returns," in
Kuenne 1967).
Keynes's General Theory. In 1935 the first
draft of Keynes's General Theory of Employ-
ment, Interest and Money (1936), which had
been written with "the constant advice and con-
structive criticism" of R. F. Kahn and Joan Rob-
inson, was circulated for comments to Ralph G.
Hawtrey, Dennis H. Robertson, and Harrod. Har-
rod immediately recognized the book as an impor-
tant contribution but tried to temper Keynes's
attack on classical economics. To his dismay,
Keynes replied that Harrod must be "preoccu-
pied with the old beliefs" and "only half shifted
away from (the Classical School)." However,
Harrod's response, stating what he thought to
be the essentials of the General Theory, so im-

pressed Keynes that he absolved Harrod from
all misunderstanding. Harrod became an official
exponent of Keynes's thought. A diagram used
by Harrod was appropriated by Keynes and
stands as the only diagram in the final version
of the General Theory. With Keynes's blessing,
Harrod published "Mr. Keynes and Traditional
Theory" (1937), a clear exposition of the dif-
ferences between classical and Keynesian doc-
trine, and he also received the imprimatur of
the master on his own extensions into dynam-
ics. For the next ten years Harrod became so
identified with Keynes and Keynesian thought
that, even though an Oxford man, he was
chosen as Keynes's biographer (1951Z?).
Macrodynamics. Even before the General
Theory was published, Harrod recognized Keynes
as the master of macrostatics—the investigation
of the way the components of aggregate demand
affect the utilization of productive resources.
He realized from the beginning, however, that
Keynes had no systematic theory of macro-
dynamics—the investigation of the determinants
of the rates of change of the components of ag-
gregate demand. Harrod's earliest attempts to
fill the lacuna resulted in a theory of the trade
cycle (1936) derived from a combination of
J. M. Clark's acceleration principle (1917), re-
ferred to by Harrod as "the relation," and
Keynes's multiplier. This same concept was
later to be elaborated and refined by Paul Sam-
uelson (1939) and J. R. Hicks (1950).
Within three years Harrod's views on the mat-
ter had matured considerably, and he presented
a paper on the fundamental equations of eco-
nomic growth (1939). These relationships were
independently discovered much later by Evsey
Domar (1946) and, as the Harrod-Domar rela-
tionships, laid the foundation for modern
growth theory.
Harrod defined the rate of growth of income
(G = AY/Y) as equal to the saving ratio (s = S/Y)
divided by the incremental capital output ratio
(C = AK/AY). Thus G = s/C is the dynamic
version of the familiar static equality of saving
(S) and investment (I = AK). From this basic
equation Harrod derived two normative growth
rates: the warranted rate (G w ) and the natural
rate (G,,):
(1) TW S(J/C,-
(2)
The warranted rate is derived when the saving
ratio is s,,, the fraction of income that people
currently wish to save, and the incremental
HARROD, ROY F. 273
capital output ratio is C,, the amount of addi-
tions to fixed capital and inventories that sup-
pliers consider convenient in relation to the cur-
rent or projected change in output. The saving
ratio necessarily includes government saving,
but the government's saving must be counted
net of any saving or dissaving that is done to
regulate the economy's output level. Given that
this equation has savers content with their sav-
ing and investors content with their investing,
the warranted rate of growth would obtain in a
regime of laissez-faire capitalism.
Though there has been some argument as to
whether the warranted rate can be called an
equilibrium (see Alexander 1950), Harrod
maintained only that, without some manage-
ment the warranted rate would be unstable and
that this instability was the fundamental ex-
planation of the business cycle. The instability
is clear from the definitions of G and Gw. If
G > G,,, then s > s,,, C < Cr, or both, and the
actual growth rate will move further away from
the warranted rate. However, Harrod protested
the notion that the instability was so extreme
that the term "knife-edge" could be used. He
believed that the instability principle would
come into play only in cases of extreme devia-
tions in s and C.
The natural rate of growth (G n ) is the social
optimum rate of growth derived from the rate
of increase in the working population (assuming
full employment) and the rate of improvement
in available technology. Thus equation (2) may
be used to derive the socially optimal rate of
savings (S<r) to be brought about by monetary
and fiscal policy. Emphasis was placed, how-
ever, on a combination of monetary and fiscal
policy, inasmuch as large changes in private
saving could be achieved only through monetary
policy if there were excessive changes in the
interest rate.
Once the place of the incremental capital out-
put ratio in the fundamental growth equations
is established, the relationship of technological
progress to growth becomes clear. Using this re-
lationship, Harrod was able to define a neutral
stream of inventions as one that, for a given
rate of interest, requires a rate of increase of
capital equal to the rate of increase of the in-
come to which it gives rise. If a stream of in-
ventions requires capital to grow faster than
income, then that stream is labor-saving or
capital-requiring. If a stream of inventions re-
quires capital to grow slower than income, then
it is capital-saving or labor-requiring.
These definitions differ from those proposed
274 HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON
by Hicks (1932), where neutrality is defined as
a stream of inventions that changes the margi-
nal productivity of labor and capital in equal
proportions. The differences in categorization
may not be great, but Harrod claimed superi-
ority for his method on the grounds that his
classifications depended on the intrinsic char-
acter of the invention, whereas Hicks's de-
pended on circumstances unrelated to the in-
vention itself.
IVAN C. JOHNSON
"WORKS BY HARROD
1930 Notes on Supply. Economic Journal 40:232-241.
(1933) 1975 International Economics. Rev. 5th ed.
London: Nisbet.
1934 Doctrines of Imperfect Competition. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 48:442-470.
(1936) 1965 The Trade Cycle: An Essay. New York:
Kelley.
1937 Mr. Keynes and Traditional Theory. Economet-
rica 5:74-86.
1939 An Essay in Dynamic Theory. Economic Journal
49:14-33.
1943 Britain's Future Population. Oxford Pamphlets on
Home Affairs, No. 4. Oxford Univ. Press.
1946 A Page of British Folly. London: Macmillan. —>
An indictment of the Anglo-American Loan Agree-
ment.
1947 Are These Hardships Necessary1? London: Hart-
Davis.
(1948) 1956 Towards a Dynamic Economics: Some
Recent Developments of Economic Theory and Their
Application to Policy. London: Macmillan; New
York: St. Martins.
1951a And So It Goes On: Further Thoughts on Present
Mismanagement. London: Hart-Davis.
(1951b) 1969 The Life of John Maynard Keynes. New
York: Kelley. —> A paperback edition was published
by Penguin in 1972.
(1952a) 1972 Economic Essays. 2d ed. London: Mac-
millan; New York: St. Martins.
1952& The Pound Sterling. International Finance Sec-
tion, Department of Economics and Social Institu-
tions, Princeton University, Essays in International
Finance, No. 13. Princeton, N.J.: The University.
(1953) 1963 The Dollar. 2d ed. New York: No-ton.
(1956) 1974 Foundations of Inductive Logic. London:
Macmillan.
1958a Policy Against Inflation. London: Macmillan;
New York: S*. Martins.
1958b The Pound Sterling, 1951-58. International Fi-
nance Section. Department of Economics and So-
ciology, Princeton University, Essays in Interna-
tional Finance, No. 30. Princeton, N.J.: The
University.
1959 The Prof.: A Personal Memoir of Lord Cherwell.
London: Macmillan.
1961 Topical Comment: Essays in Dynamic Economics
Applied. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Mar-
tins.
(1963) 1977 The British Economy. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
1965 Reforming the World's Money. London: Macmil-
lan; New York: St. Martins.
1967 Towards a New Economic Policy: Lectures Given
in the University of Manchester. Manchester (Eng-
land) Univ. Press.
1968a Dollar-Sterling Collaboration: Basis for Initia-
tive. London: Atlantic Trade Study.
1968b Keynes, John Maynard: I. Contributions to Eco-
nomics. Volume 8, pages 368—375 in International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David
L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1969 Money. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Mar-
tins.
1971 Sociology, Morals and Mystery: The Chichele Lec-
tures Delivered in Oxford Under the Auspices of All
Souls College, 1970. London: Macmillan; New York:
St. Martins.
1973 Economic Dynamics. London: Macmillan; New
York: St. Martins.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALEXANDER, SIDNEY S. 1950 Mr. Harrod's Dynamic
Model. Economic Journal 60:724-739.
CLARK, J. M. 1917 Business Acceleration and the
Law of Demand. Journal of Political Economy 25:
217-235.
DOMAR, EVSEY 1946 Capital Expansion, Rate of
Growth and Employment. Econometrica 14:137—
147.
HICKS, J. R. (1932) 1968 The Theory of Wages.
London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martins.
HICKS, J. R. 1950 A Contribution to the Theory of the
Trade Cycle. Oxford: Clarendon.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —» A paperback edition was published in
1965 by Harcourt.
KUENNE, ROBERT (editor) 1967 Monopolistic Com-
petition Theory: Studies in Impact, Essays in Honor
of Edward H. Chamberlin. New York: Wiley.
ROBINSON, JOAN (1933) 1969 The Economics of Im-
perfect Competition. 2d ed. London: Macmillan;
New York: St. Martins.
SAMUELSON, PAUL A. 1939 Interactions Between the
Multiplier Analysis and the Principle of Accelera-
tion. Review of Economic Statistics 21:75-78.
SHACKLE, G. L. S. 1967 The Years of High Theory:
Invention and Tradition in Economic Thought,
1926-1939. Cambridge Univ. Press.
SRAFFA, PIERO 1926 The Laws of Returns Under
Competitive Conditions. Economic Journal 36:535-
550.
HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON
Friedrich August von Hayek's work encom-
passes, besides economic theory and policy,
the methodology of science; social, legal, and
political philosophy; psychology; and the history
of ideas. He has been a main protagonist of
liberalism in the sense now called libertarian-
ism, and a leader of the fourth generation of the
Austrian school of economics.
Family background and education. Hayek
was born on May 8, 1899, in Vienna, Austria, the
son of August von Hayek, a senior municipal
health officer who also taught biology (plant
geography) at the University of Vienna, and of
Felicitas, nee von Juraschek, a daughter of a

professor of public law at the university who
also was president of the Austrian Central Sta-
tistical Authority. In March 1917, Hayek was
called to military service and became an artil-
lery officer on the Italian front. In November
1918 he returned to Vienna and registered at
the university to study law.
At that time, economics was taught only as
part of the law curriculum. Hayek had earlier
developed some interest in this field, had for a
while been attracted by some moderate socialists
(Karl Renner, Walter Rathenau), and even read
a textbook on economics while in the army. At
the university, he attended the lectures of Fried-
rich von Wieser and Othmar Spann but was
more interested in methodology—inspired by
reading Ernst Mach and Max Weber—and in
psychology; indeed, in 1920 Hayek wrote a draft
of a paper on psychology to which he returned
32 years later with a book on The Sensory Order
(1952k).
Upon his return to civilian life, Hayek founded,
together with some friends, the Association of
Democratic Students—his first action in his life-
long battle against the forces of nationalism and
socialism. In November 1921, he obtained the
degree of DR. JURIS and started to work in the
war-claims settlement office, directed by Ludwig
von Mises. At the same time, he continued to
study at the university for a second doctorate,
in economics. He wrote a dissertation on the
theory of imputation and in March 1923 ob-
tained the degree of DR. RERUM POLITIC ARUM.
Immediately afterwards Hayek took a leave
of absence from his job in order to continue his
studies of economics in the United States. He
worked as a research assistant to Jeremiah W.
Jenks of New York University, audited lectures
and seminars of Wesley C. Mitchell and John
Bates Clark at Columbia University, and as-
sisted Willard Thorp with material for Business
Annals. He returned to Vienna in May 1924,
resumed his government work, finished articles
on the incompatibility of stable price levels and
fixed exchange rates (1924), American mone-
tary policy (1925), and imputation (1926a),
and worked on the concept of neutral money.
In 1926 he married Helene von Fritsch; the
couple had two children, Christine and Lorenz.
Vienna, 1924-1931. In 1921, still before his
first university degree, Hayek had helped to
found a circle of young scholars, whose influ-
ence on his thinking he often acknowledged.
The group included not only economists (such
as Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup, Oskar
HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON 275
Morgenstern) but also social philosophers (such
as Alfred Schutz), some members of the "Vienna
Circle" of logical positivists, sociologists, histor-
ians, art historians, musicologists, literary critics,
and lawyers (including Herbert Fiirth, cofounder
of the group). Of the twenty-odd members of
the circle, many emigrated later to the United
States and some of them exerted a strong in-
fluence on social science and philosophy.
In 1924, von Mises invited Hayek to join his
private seminar, probably the most important
center of economic discussion in Austria. It was
a selected group of postdoctoral economists and
methodologists, including many members of
Hayek's "circle," all of them engaged in profes-
sional or avocational research. Its members
later formed the core of the Nationalokono-
mische Gesellschaft (Economic Society), which
was founded in 1927 at the initiative of von
Mises and Hayek. The society met two or three
times a month and many foreign visitors pre-
sented important papers.
Both Hayek and von Mises had seen, on their
visits to the United States, the new empirical
research programs on industrial fluctuations.
Von Mises persuaded Austrian financial, indus-
trial, and labor organizations as well as the
government to join in the establishment and
funding of the Austrian Institute for Business
Cycle Research, with Hayek as its director. It
started its monthly reports in 1927; after three
years, with the help of an American grant,
Hayek obtained Oskar Morgenstern as collabora-
tor.
Von Mises, as Hayek's patron and superior-
first in the government office, then in the re-
search institute—as his fellow officer in the
Economic Society, and as discussion partner in
the von Mises circle, could not help influencing
Hayek's thought and work. But far beyond these
institutionalized associations go the intellectual
ties of shared interests in specific economic and
philosophical issues: the theory of money and
the trade cycle, the problem of economic calcu-
lation under socialism, and the foundations of
classical liberalism. These had been the major
subjects of von Mises' research and they became
the foci of Hayek's work. Three other econo-
mists were among Hayek's closest associates in
his Vienna period: Haberler, Morgenstern, and
Machlup.
In 1929 Hayek submitted his book, Geldtheorie
und Konjunkturtheorie as habilitation to the
University of Vienna and was admitted as
Privatdozent (lecturer). His trial lecture on "The
276 HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON
Paradox of Saving" (1929c) came to the atten-
tion of Lionel Robbins, who invited Hayek to
present four lectures at the London School of
Economics. These lectures on Prices and Pro-
duction (1931k) led to the offer of a visiting
professorship, which was followed by a regular
appointment to the Tooke professorship of eco-
nomic science and statistics at the University
of London.
London, 1932-1950. Hayek's tenure at Lon-
don began with a dramatic controversy with
John Maynard Keynes. Hayek had been asked
by Robbins to review Keynes's Treatise on Money
(1930) for Economica (1931-1932), and Keynes
had asked Piero Sraffa to review Hayek's Prices
and Production for the Economic Journal
(1932a). Keynes replied (1931) to Hayek's re-
view, Hayek wrote a rejoinder to Keynes (1931c)
and a reply to Sraffa (1932c), and Sraffa wrote
a rejoinder to Hayek (1932b). The controversy
was joined by Ralph G. Hawtrey, Arthur C.
Pigou, Dennis H. Robertson, Arthur Mar get,
Alvin Hansen, and others in notes, reviews, and
replies. In addition, Hayek published, between
1932 and 1937, ten articles on such controver-
sial issues as the pure theory of money, the rela-
tion between saving and investment, the forma-
tion and maintenance of capital, and the causes
of industrial fluctuations. The "drama," as John
Hicks called it (1967), ended with a majority
decision of the profession in favor of the modi-
fied expansionist views of Keynes, as expressed
in his General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money (1936), which fitted the times of
deflation and mass unemployment better than
Hayek's monetary temperance did.
Although Hayek continued to work on the
theory of capital, leading to his books on
Profits, Interest and Investment (1939c) and
The Pure Theory of Capital (1941b), he devoted
increasing amounts of effort to philosophical
problems and intellectual history. In 1935 he
edited a volume on Collectivist Economic Plan-
ning for which he wrote two essays. In 1937
appeared his presidential address to the London
Economic Club on "Economics and Knowledge";
in 1940, "Socialist Calculation: The Competitive
'Solution'"; in 1941, "The Counter-revolution of
Science," largely an analysis of the teachings
of Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte; in 1942-
1944, in three parts, "Scientism and the Study
of Society"; and in 1943, "The Facts of the So-
cial Sciences." In 1944 Hayek published his
bestseller, The Road to Serfdom, a severe con-
demnation of socialism in all its forms. The
book, dedicated to "the socialists of all parties,"
was lavishly praised and roundly panned, and
often distorted by admirers as well as critics.
In October 1940, the London School of Eco-
nomics (L.S.E.) was evacuated to Cambridge,
which afforded Hayek closer relationships with
economists at Cambridge—including Keynes—
when they were not involved in wartime duties.
In 1941 Hayek was awarded the degree of
D.SC. (Econ.) of the University of London. His
closest associates at the London School of
Economics were Lionel Robbins, Arnold Plant,
and Karl R. Popper. Robbins was a faithful
friend, an invaluable critic, and a treasure
house of knowledge on the history of doctrines.
Popper, the Austrian-born philosopher, was help-
ful in destroying the myth of the so-called scien-
tific method in empirical disciplines. Plant earned
Hayek's gratitude as the man who guided him
towards rediscovering David Hume, who "not
only laid . . . the foundation of the liberal the-
ory of law, but . . . also provided an interpreta-
tion of English history as the gradual emergence
of the Rule of Law" (Hayek 1978a, p. 124). Be-
sides Hume, the voices of the past that seem to
have had the most profound influence on Hayek's
thinking on society, law, and liberty were John
Locke, Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, Ed-
mund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, Lord Acton,
and Albert Venn Dicey.
In 1945 Hayek published an article on "The
Use of Knowledge in Society," another funda-
mental disquisition on the division of knowledge
in society. In a pamphlet on Individualism: True
and False (1946a) he contrasted a voluntaristic,
spontaneous, undesigned order of freedom of
the individual with a rationalistically designed
and constructed system. "True" was the unde-
signed individualism described and esteemed by
Hume, Smith, Burke, Acton, and de Tocqueville;
"false" the individualism designed and promoted
by the encyclopedists, Jean Jacques Rousseau,
and the Physiocrats. Most of Hayek's essays
completed in these years were collected in a
volume on Individualism and Economic Order
(1948a).
In his last five years at the L.S.E., Hayek
made several foreign trips, mostly to the United
States. The success of The Road to Serfdom-
led to a lecture tour in the spring of 1945.
He came again in 1946, to lecture at the Uni-
versity of Chicago in April and May and at
Stanford and in Mexico during the summer. In

April 1947, Hayek convened a group of 39 lib-
eral thinkers in a conference on Mont Pelerin,
near Vevey, Switzerland. (The participants-
economists, philosophers, jurists, historians,
political scientists, literary critics, and publi-
cists—founded the Mont Pelerin Society. Hayek
served as president for more than 12 years, and
as honorary president since 1960. This exclusive
society has admitted some 400 members from
33 countries.) In 1948 Hayek spent the spring
in Chicago and the summer at the University of
Vienna; in 1950, January to March in Chicago
and April at the University of Arkansas in
Fayetteville. It was then that he obtained a
divorce from his first wife to marry his Viennese
cousin and childhood sweetheart, Helene War-
hanek, nee Bitterlich, and resigned from the
L.S.E. to assume a professorship at the Univer-
sity of Chicago.
Chicago, 1950-1962. At the University of Chi-
cago Hayek was professor of social and moral
sciences and a member of the committee on
social thought. He offered courses in the de-
partment of economics, but his major function
was to conduct a seminar, mostly on intellectual
history. It was attended by senior specialists in
various fields, including physics, classical and
modern literature, art, archeology, history, so-
ciology, as well as economics (Letwin 1976). His
closest associates were John V. Nef, Frank H.
Knight, Aaron Director, George Stigler, and Mil-
ton Friedman. The first book Hayek published
in this period was the product of research done
previously in England and in America, John
Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor: Their Friendship
and Subsequent Marriage (1951b). It was an
"impartial presentation of documents," virtually
all letters they exchanged during the first 18
years of their friendship and some after her first
husband's death in 1849 and their marriage in
1851. Hayek had himself followed Mill's itiner-
ary on a journey through Italy and Greece, as
described in Mill's letters. Three other books
followed in quick succession: The Counter-
revolution of Science (1952a) containing his
earlier articles; The Sensory Order (1952&), his
tract in psychology elaborating his draft paper
of 1920; and Capitalism and the Historians
(1954), a collection, edited and introduced by
Hayek, of essays by economic historians expos-
ing the anticapitalist bias of much historical
research. Important new articles and papers in
epistemology, methodology, and political phi-
losophy were completed in subsequent years
HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON 277
(1955a; 1956; 1958; 1963c). The chief work of
Hayek's Chicago period was The Constitution of
Liberty (1960), an ambitious "restatement
of the basic principles of a philosophy of free-
dom" (p. 3).
After 12 productive years in Chicago, Hayek
returned to Europe in 1962 as professor of
economic policy at the University of Freiburg
im Breisgau, in Western Germany.
Freiburg, 1962-1968. Hayek's inaugural lec-
ture at Freiburg, on "The Economy, Science and
Politics" (1963a), was a very personal statement
of his scientific and political philosophy. He paid
his respects to the late Walter Eucken, the emi-
nent representative of libertarian economics,
who had taught at Freiburg for many years, and
to Max Weber, the influential social scientist
who had forcefully explained the role of value
judgments in academic teaching.
During his 6 years at Freiburg, Hayek pub-
lished 2 books, 5 pamphlets, and 24 articles,
not counting numerous reproductions and trans-
lations. Of the articles, 17 were collected in a
volume of Freiburger Studien (1969a), and
6 of these were also included in an English
volume of 29 collected papers, Studies in Phi-
losophy, Politics and Economics (1967J?).
In Freiburg, the Austrian Erich Streissler
(later at Vienna) was Hayek's closest associate.
Both the university and the Walter Eucken In-
stitute gave technical assistance to Hayek's pub-
lishing activities.
Salzburg, 1968-1977. Professor emeritus of
Freiburg University in 1968, Hayek accepted an
invitation to the University of Salzburg. His
inaugural lecture, on "The Errors of Construc-
tivism," was published (1970). The move to
Salzburg proved rather unsatisfactory. The uni-
versity had no degree program in economics,
and few law students had serious interests in
either economics or political philosophy. Thus
he was cut off from the scholars who had every-
where been his stimulating and sympathetic
discussion partners. This, combined with ill
health, delayed completion of his ambitious
three-volume work on Law, Legislation and Lib-
erty. The first volume, Rules and Order, ap-
peared in 1973, the second, The Mirage of Social
Justice, in 1976; and the third, The Political
Order of a Free Society, is expected in 1979.
The biggest event during Hayek's Salzburg
period was the award of the Nobel Prize for
economic science, shared with Gunnar Myrdal.
His Nobel lecture on "The Pretence of Knowl-
278 HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON
edge" (1975) was a fervent condemnation of
the propensity of economists to predict on the
basis of too limited knowledge macroeconomic
results of expansionary policies. Hayek's pre-
scription for ending the ongoing inflations of
moneys and prices was to terminate the govern-
ments' monopolies in the creation of money, a
Denationalisation of Money (1976). The Nobel
award led to such a flood of invitations that
even selective acceptances put Hayek "on the
road" for large portions of the years, traveling
to all continents.
Back to Freiburg, 1977. Disappointed with
his working conditions in Salzburg, Hayek re-
turned to live in Freiburg. Another volume of col-
lected essays, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics,
Economics and the History of Ideas (1978a), con-
tains six pieces previously published in Ger-
man in the Freiburger Studien (1969a), and
other papers, including his Salzburg inaugural
lecture and several contributions to intellectual
history. In 1978, he also completed the third
and last volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty
with an epilogue on "The Three Sources of Hu-
man Values," which he regards as his intellec-
tual last will and testament.
Honors and awards. Besides his three earned
doctorates, Hayek received honorary doctorates
from Rikkyo University (Tokyo, 1964), Uni-
versity of Salzburg (1974), University of Dallas
(1975), Marroquin University (Guatemala,
1977), Santa Maria University of Valparaiso
(Chile, 1977), and University of Buenos Aires
(Argentina, 1977); he also was made honorary
senator of the University of Vienna (1971). He
became fellow of the British Academy (1945),
honorary member of the Austrian Academy of
Sciences (1976), honorary fellow of the London
School of Economics (1976), fellow of the
Econometric Society (1947), foreign honorary
member of the American Economic Association
(1976), and honorary fellow of the Argentine
Academy of Economic Science (1977) and of the
Academia Sinica (Taipei, 1969). After receiving
the Nobel Prize in economic science in 1974, he
was decorated with the Austrian medal of honor
for science and art (1976) and the German
order pour le merite for science and arts (1977).
Highlights of Hayek's work
With a publication record of 185 titles—18
volumes of sole authorship, 10 volumes edited
and/or introduced, 15 pamphlets, and 142 arti-
cles in journals and chapters in collective books
(not counting new editions and translations)—it
would be impossible to give a digest of Hayek's
ideas in a short space. Some highlights, how-
ever, may be noted.
Money, prices, investments, and fluctuations.
Preoccupation with price levels and disregard of
relative prices obscure the effects of money cre-
ation upon investment and the structure of pro-
duction. Stability of the price level does not
prevent credit expansion from "distorting" prices
and production (1925; 1929b; 1931b). A rate
of investment accelerated through monetary
stimulus is not sustainable and the inevitable
retrenchment generates unemployment of both
labor and specific capital goods. Thus, monetary
causes can lead to structural disturbances
(1929k). The natural rate of interest (Wicksell
1898) is not the same as the rate that stabilizes
the price level when physical output increases
and increased demand for credit is met by a
supply of loanable and investible funds in ex-
cess of voluntary saving (1931b). Changes in
the ratio of demand for investment goods and
consumer goods can cause prosperity and de-
pression. Since the depression is usually asso-
ciated with an induced reduction in investment,
an additional extension of consumption is not
the appropriate remedy; it may reduce employ-
ment even further (1931b).
Capital theory. Internal rates of interest are
reflected in the margins between the costs of in-
puts and the prices of (intermediate) outputs
in various stages of production. An increase in
interest rates will be indicative of a need to
widen the margins between costs and prices,
and the production stages requiring relatively
much capital become unprofitable (193 Ib).
This is equivalent to a "shortening" of the period
of production or investment (Bohm-Bawerk).
Hayek's Pure Theory of Capital (1941b) pro-
vides lucid expositions of his notions of "inter-
temporal equilibrium," the "physical produc-
tivity of investment," and the "vertical or
successive division of labor" (pp. 72-73). Al-
though Hayek rejects the concept of a "supply
of capital" as a measurable quantity (p. 147),
he derives a meaningful "marginal productivity
of investment" (p. 179).
The popular notion that an expansion of con-
sumer demand will always increase demand for
and production of investment goods is shown to
be a fallacy. Under conditions of full employ-
ment it is obvious that either of the two de-
partments of production can increase only at
the expense of the other. However, when wage
rates behave as if there were full employment—

i.e., when they are raised whenever total de-
mand is expanded—the same condition holds:
an increase in consumption will reduce real
investment (1969c, pp. 264-285).
Socialism, planning, and competitive capital-
ism. Hayek added important arguments to the
problem of the possibility of rational economic
calculation in socialist central planning (1935a;
1940). Although he had in 1935 anticipated the
so called "competitive solution," or "market so-
cialism," Oskar Lange and Henry D. Dickinson
actually proposed this "solution" in 1937 and
1939. This prompted Hayek to explain why the
required decentralization of decision making
would be too complicated, and too unorthodox
to be acceptable to hard-line socialists (1940).
(One may hold that the Czechoslovakian events
of 1968 proved this hypothesis.)
More fundamental was Hayek's realization of
the role of the "division of knowledge" in eco-
nomic society (1937a; 1945i>), not of scientific
or technological knowledge but of the unorga-
nized "knowledge of the particular circumstances
of time and place." Practically every individual
"possesses unique information of which bene-
ficial use might be made" (1945b, p. 521) but
which "cannot be conveyed to any central au-
thority in statistical form"; decisions based on
such knowledge must be "left to the 'man on
the spot'" (p. 524). The problem is not that a
unique rational solution could be derived from
a complete set of data but "how a solution is
produced by the interaction of people each of
whom possesses only partial knowledge" (p. 530).
The price system is the "mechanism for com-
municating information."
As to the organization of competitive capital-
ism, Hayek is not impressed with the modern
theories of imperfect and oligopolistic competi-
tion. Important are only the institutional and
contractual obstacles to competition as a dyna-
mic process, restrictions on entry and on at-
tempts -to "discover new ways of doing things
better than they have been done before" (1948a,
p. 101). He condemns the "mechanical exten-
sion of the property concept by lawyers" to non-
tangible things such as inventions (p. 114). In
a lecture on "Competition as a Discovery Pro-
cedure" (1968b), Hayek holds that competition
is important "as a process of exploration in
which prospectors search for unused opportuni-
ties that, when discovered, can also be used by
others" (p. 188). Competition produces "a kind
of impersonal compulsion . . . for numerous
individuals to adjust their way of life in a man-
HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON 279
ner that no deliberate instructions or commands
could bring about" (p. 189).
Liberty and the law. Hayek showed the con-
ceptual and empirical links between an eco-
nomic system based on free markets and a
political system based on "liberty under law."
The latter rules out coercion and arbitrariness;
the former, i.e., the impersonal mechanism of
market prices, communicates dispersed knowl-
edge to masses of free individuals acting and
reacting to it without commands. These ideas
were gradually refined, starting from the essays
on the division of knowledge in society (1937&;
1945£>) and a pamphlet on Freedom and the
Economic System (1939a), continuing with
the books Road to Serfdom (1944k) and Con-
stitution of Liberty (1960), and culminating in
Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973-1979).
There he showed the fundamental contradiction
between the idea of constitutionalism—"limited
government"—and the [misjconception of a de-
mocracy "where the will of the majority on any
particular matter is unlimited" (1973-1979, vol.
1, p. 1); he emphasized the difference between
the rules of a spontaneous order and the rules
of organization (p. 48), i.e., between cosmos
("the law of liberty") and taxis ("the law of
legislation").
Of all of Hayek's pronouncements the one
that most flagrantly negates the tenets of domi-
nant schools of social philosophy is his claim
that in a free society the concept of "social
justice" is void of meaning. It may have mean-
ing in a "command economy"; but where people
are free, guided only "by rules of just individual
conduct," the notion of social justice—epito-
mized by a call for equality of incomes—is mean-
ingless (1973-1979, vol. 2, pp. 62-100).
Philosophy of science. Hayek's condemnation
of "scientism" (1942-1944) was originally a
protest against the fallacy of regarding certain
procedures of the natural sciences as the only
"scientific method." Later he learned from Pop-
per ([1935] 1959) "that natural scientists did
not really do what most of them not only told us
that they did but also urged the representatives
of other disciplines to imitate" (1967i>, p. viii).
Hayek emphasized the differences between the
kinds of "facts" observed, described, and ex-
plained by the physical and the social sciences.
The facts of the social sciences are "opinions—
not opinions of the student of social phenom-
ena, of course, but opinions of those whose
actions produce his 'object'"; moreover, we can-
not "observe" these opinions directly "in the
280 HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON
minds of the people but [only] recognize [them]
from what they do and say merely because we
have ourselves a mind similar to theirs" (1942-
1944, p. 279).
In his essay on "Degrees of Explanation"
(1955a), Hayek distinguished positive and nega-
tive predictions, with those of disjunctive al-
ternatives between the two. He stressed the
difficulty, in as complex situations as in eco-
nomics, of ascertaining "by observation the
presence and specific arrangement of the multi-
plicity of factors which form the starting point
of our deductive reasoning" (1955a, p. 216). He
did not, however, deny the possibility of testing
and falsifying propositions about such complex
situations. Yet he stressed the importance of
"orientation" where prediction is not possible,
and of "cultivation" where control is beyond
our capacity (p. 225).
Hayek warned of the consequences of exces-
sive specialization:
The physicist who is only a physicist can still be a
first-class physicist. . . . But . . . the economist
who is only an economist is likely to become a
nuisance if not a positive danger. The degree of
abstraction which the theoretical disciplines in our
field requires makes them at least as theoretical,
if not more so, than any in the natural sciences.
This, however is precisely the source of our diffi-
culty. Not only is the individual concrete instance
much more important to us than it is in the natural
sciences, but the way from the theoretical con-
struction to the explanation of the particular is
also much longer. (1956, pp. 463-464)
In an important paper on "Rules, Perception
and Intelligibility" (1963c) Hayek pointed to
"rule-guided perception" and "rule-guided ac-
tion," neither of which presupposes that we can
state or describe the guiding rules. He elab-
orated the existence of subconscious rules that
guide perception and defended the proposition
that perception of the concrete presupposes an
organizing capacity of the mind. Against the
numerous believers in the primacy of the con-
crete, Hayek went back to the tenet of major
philosophers and psychologists who recognized
the primacy of the abstract (1969&).
History of ideas
As a dedicated historian of ideas Hayek pre-
sented the descendancy of virtually every major
issue that figured in the development of his
thoughts. Besides such incidental intellectual
history, he wrote about the lives and works of
Mandeville (1961; 1966), Cantillon (1931a),
Thornton (1939V), Ricardo (1950), John Stuart
Mill (1942; 1943b; 19450; 1951b), Macleod
(1934d), Gossen (1932a), Carl Menger (1934b;
1934c; 1968d; 1972), Wieser (1926b; 1929a;
1968e), and Philippevich (1934f); also obitu-
aries for Cannan (1935b), Strigl (1944a),
Mitchell (1948k), and Leoni (1968a); he ap-
praised schools of thought such as the Ecole
Politechnique (1941a), the L.S.E. (1946b), and
the Austrian School (1965; 1968c); noted some
parallelisms in Comte and Hegel (195la); ex-
amined the methodological position of Mach
(1967a) and the philosophical and historical
ideas of Hume (1955fo; I960; 1963fc; 1967a).
Hayek's writings on intellectual history are testi-
monies to his profound and assiduous scholar-
ship.
Memorable traits noticeable in almost all of
his writings are Hayek's chivalry and tolerance
in criticism and polemics, and his modesty and
humility not only in acknowledging the contri-
butions of his intellectual forebears but also in
arguing against the views of his intellectual
opponents.
FRITZ MACHLUP
WORKS BY HAYEK
1924 Das Stabilisierungsproblem in Goldwahrungs-
landern. Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Sozial-
politik New Series 4:365-390.
1925 Die Wahrungspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten
seit der Uberwindung der Krise von 1920. Zeit-
schrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Sozialpolitik New
Series 5:23-63, 254-317.
1926a Bemerkungen zum Zurechungsproblem. Jahr-
bucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik 124:
1-18.
1926b Friedrich Freiherr von Wieser. Jahrbiicher
fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik 125:513—530.
1927 Introduction. In Hermann Heinrich Gossen,
Entwicklung der Gesetze des menschlichen Verkehrs
und der daraus fliessenden Regeln fur menschliches
Handeln. 3d ed. Berlin: Prager.
1929a Introduction. In Friedrich Freiherr von Wieser,
Gesammelte Abhandlungen. Tubingen ( Germany ):
Mohr.
(1929J?) 1978 Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle.
New York: Kelley. —» First published as Geldtheorie
und Konjunkturtheorie.
(1929c) 1931 The Paradox of Saving. Economica
11:125-169. —> First published as "Gibt es einen
Widersinn des Sparens."
1931a Introduction. In Richard Cantillon, Abhandlung
iiber die Natur des Handelns im Allgemeinen. Jena
(Germany): Gustav Fischer.
(1931k) 1978 Prices and Production. New York: Kelley.
1931c The Pure Theory of Money: A Rejoinder to Mr.
Keynes. Economica 11:398-403.
1931-1932 Reflections on the Pure Theory of Money
of Mr. J. M. Keynes. 2 Parts. Economica 11:270-
295; 12:22-44.
1932a Gossen, Hermann Heinrich. Volume 6, page 3
in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York:
Macmillan.

1932& Kapitalauf/ehrung. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
36:86-108.
1932c Money and Capital: A Reply to Mr. Sraffa.
Economic Journal 42:237-249.
1932d A Note on the Development of the Doctrine of
"Forced Saving." Quarterly Journal of Economics
47:183-198.
1933 Uber "Neutrales Geld." Zeitschrift fur National-
okonomie 4:659-661.
1934a Capital and Industrial Fluctuations. Economet-
rica 2:152-167.
1934k Carl Menger. Economica New Series 1:393-420.
1934c Introduction. In Carl Menger, The Collected
Works of Carl Menger. London: Routledge.
1934d Macleod, Henry D. Volume 10, page 30 in
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York:
Macmillan.
1934e On the Relationship Between Investment and
Output. Economic Journal 44:207-231.
1934f Philippovich von Philippsberg, Eugen. Volume
12, page 116 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sci-
ences. New York: Macmillan.
1934gr Saving. Volume 13, pages 548-552 in Encyclo-
paedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Mac-
millan.
(1935a) 1978 HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON (editor) CoZ-
lectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the
Possibilities of Socialism. New York: Kelley.
1935b Edwin Cannan (obituary). Zeitschrift fur
Nationalokonomie 6:246-250.
1935c The Maintenance of Capital. Economica New
Series 2:241-276.
(1935d) 1939 Price Expectations, Monetary Distur-
bances and Malinvestments. Pages 135-156 in
Friedrich A. von Hayek, Profits, Interest and In-
vestment. London: Routledge. —> First published in
German.
1936a The Mythology of Capital. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 50:199-228.
1936b Utility Analysis and Interest. Economic Journal
46:44-60.
1937a Economics and Knowledge. Economica New
Series 4:33-54.
1937b Investment That Raises the Demand for Cap-
ital. Review of Economic Statistics 19:174-177.
1939a Freedom and the Economic System. Univ. of
Chicago Press.
1939£> Introduction. In Henry Thornton, An Inquiry
Into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of
Great Britain. London: Allen & Unwin.
(1939c) 1978 Profits, Interest and Investment. New
York: Kelley.
1940 Socialist Calculation: The Competitive "Solu-
tion." Economica New Series 7:125-149.
1941a The Counter-revolution of Science. 3 Parts.
Economica New Series 8:9-36, 119-150, 281-320.
1941b The Pure Theory of Capital. London: Macmil-
lan. —>A paperback edition was published in 1975
by the University of Chicago Press.
1942 Introduction. In John Stuart Mill, The Spirit of
the Age. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1942-1944 Scientism and the Study of Society. 3
Parts. Economica New Series 9:267-291; 10:34-
63; 11:27-39.
1943a The Facts of the Social Sciences. Ethics 54:
1-13.
1943b HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON (editor) John Rae
and John Stuart Mill: A Correspondence. Econom-
ica New Series 10:253-255.
1944a Richard von Strigl (obituary). Economic Jour-
nal 54:284-286.
1944b The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge;
Univ. of Chicago Press. —> A paperback edition was
HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON 281
published in 1956 by the University of Chicago
Press.
1945a HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON (editor) Notes on
N. W. Senior's Political Economy by John Stuart
Mill. Economica New Series 12:134-139.
1945b The Use of Knowledge in Society. American
Economic Review 35:519-530.
1946a Individualism: True and False. Dublin: Hodges,
Figgis. —» The twelfth Finlay lecture, 1945. Re-
printed in Hayek 1948a.
1946b The London School of Economics 1895-1945.
Economica New Series 13:1-31.
1948a Individualism and Economic Order. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul; Univ. of Chicago Press.
1948b Wesley Clair Mitchell 1874-1948 (obituary).
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 111: 254-
255.
1950 Ricardo, David. Volume 11, pages 680-681 in
Chambers' Encyclopedia. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press.
1951a Comte and Hegel. Measure (Chicago) 2:324—
342.
(1951b) 1978 John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor:
Their Friendship and Subsequent Marriage. New
York: Kelley.
1952a The Counter-revolution of Science. Glencoe, 111.:
Free Press.
1952b The Sensory Order: An Inquiry Into the Foun-
dations of Theoretical Psychology. London: Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1976 by the University of Chicago
Press.
1954 Introduction. In Friedrich A. von Hayek (editor),
Capitalism and the Historians. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul; Univ. of Chicago Press.
1955a Degrees of Explanation. British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 6:209-225.
1955i> The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law. Cairo:
National Bank of Egypt. —> Partially reprinted as
The Rule of Law. Menlo Park, Calif.: Institute for
Humane Studies, 1975.
1956 The Dilemma of Specialization. Pages 462-473
in Leonard D. White (editor), The State of the
Social Sciences. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1958 Freedom, Reason, and Tradition. Ethics 68:229-
245.
1960 The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul.
1961 Mandeville, Bernard. Volume 7, pages 116-117
in H andworterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften.
Stuttgart (Germany): Fischer.
(1963a) 1967 The Economy, Science and Politics. Pages
251—269 in Friedrich A. von Hayek, Studies in
Philosophy, Politics and Economics. London: Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul; Univ. of Chicago Press. —>
First published in German.
1963b The Legal and Political Philosophy of David
Hume. II Politico (Univ. of Pavia, Italy) 28:691-
704.
1963c Rules, Perception and Intelligibility. British
Academy, Proceedings 48:321—344.
1965 Wiener Schule. Volume 12, pages 68-71 in
H andworterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften. Stutt-
gart (Germany): Fischer.
1966 Dr. Bernard Mandeville. British Academy, Pro-
ceedings 52:125-141.
1967a Diskussionsbemerkung iiber "Ernst Mach und
das sozialwissenschaftliche Denken in Wien." In
Ernst Mach Institut, Symposium aus Anlass des 50.
Todestages von Ernst Mach. Freiburg (Germany):
The Institute.
1967fo Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Univ. of Chicago
282 HEBB, D. O.
Press. —> A paperback edition was published in
1969 by Simon & Schuster.
1968a Bruno Leoni, the Scholar. II Politico (Univ. of
Pavia, Italy) 33:23-27.
(1968b) 1978 Competition as a Discovery Procedure.
Chapter 12 in Friedrich A. von Hayek, New Studies
in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History
of Ideas. Univ. of Chicago Press. —» First published
in German.
1968c Economic Thought: VI. Austrian School. Vol-
ume 4, pages 458—462 in International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L.
Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1968d Menger, Carl. Volume 10, pages 124-127 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968e Wieser, Friedrich von. Volume 16, pages 549—
550 in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
ences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1969a Freiburger Studien: Gesammelte Aufsdtze.
Tubingen (Germany): Mohr.
1969b The Primacy of the Abstract. Pages 309-323 in
Arthur Koestler and J. R. Smythies (editors), Be-
yond Reductionism. London: Hutchinson.
1969c Three Elucidations of the "Ricardo Effect."
Journal of Political Economy 77:274-285.
(1970) 1978 The Errors of Constructivism. Chapter 1
in Friedrich A. von Hayek (editor), New Studies
in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History
of Ideas. Univ. of Chicago Press. —» First published
as Die Irrtiimer des Konstruktivismus und die
Grundlagen legitimer Kritik gesellschaftlicher
Gebilde.
(1972) 1978 The Place of Menger's Grundsdtze in the
History of Economic Thought. Chapter 17 in Fried-
rich A. von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy,
Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. Univ.
of Chicago Press. —» First published in German.
(1973) 1978 Liberalism. Chapter 9 in Friedrich A. von
Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Eco-
nomics and the History of Ideas. Univ. of Chicago
Press. —» First written for the Italian Enciclopedia
del Novicento.
1973-1979 Law, Legislation and Liberty. 3 vols. Lon-
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Univ. of Chicago
Press. —» Volume 1: Rules and Order, 1973. Volume
2: The Mirage of Social Justice, 1976. Volume 3:
The Political Order of a Free Society, 1979.
(1975) 1978 The Pretence of Knowledge. Chapter 2 in
Friedrich A. von Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy,
Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. Univ.
of Chicago Press. —» First published in Les Prix
Nobel en 1974, Nobel Foundation.
(1976) 1978 Denationalisation of Money: An Analysis
of the Theory and Practice of Concurrent Cur-
rencies. 2d ed., enl. London: Institute of Economic
Affairs. —» Hobart Special Paper, No. 70.
1978a New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics
and the History of Ideas. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1978b The Three Sources of Human Values. London:
London School of Economics and Political Science.
—> L. T. Hobhouse memorial trust lecture, No. 44.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOHM-BAWERK, EUGEN VON (1884-1912) 1959 Capi-
tal and Interest. 3 vols. South Holland, 111.: Liber-
tarian Press. —» First published as Kapital und
Kapitalzins. Volume 1: History and Critique of In-
terest Theories, 1884. Volume 2: The Positive The-
ory of Capital, 1889; an earlier translation by Wil-
liam Smart, published in 1891, has been reprinted
many times. Volume 3: Further Essays on Capital
and Interest was first published as appendixes to
volume 2 of the 1909-1912 edition, and was
printed in a separate volume in 1921.
DICKINSON, HENRY D. 1939 The Economics of So-
cialism. Oxford Univ. Press.
HANSEN, ALVIN H.; and TOUT, HERBERT 1933 An-
nual Survey of Business Cycle Theory: Investment
and Saving in Business Cycle Theory. Econometrica
1:119-147.
HAWTREY, RALPH G. 1932 Review of Friedrich A.
von Hayek, Prices and Production. Economica
12:119-125.
HAWTREY, RALPH G. 1933 Review of Friedrich A.
von Hayek, Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle.
Economic Journal 43:669-672.
HICKS, JOHN 1967 The Hayek Story. In John Hicks,
Critical Essays in Monetary Theory. Oxford:
Clarendon.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD (1930) 1958-1960 A Trea-
tise on Money. 2 vols. London: Macmillan. —» Vol-
ume 1: The Pure Theory of Money. Volume 2: The
Applied Theory of Money.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1931 The Pure Theory of
Money: A Reply to Dr. Hayek. Economica 11:387-
397.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —» A paperback edition was published in
1965 by Harcourt.
LANGE, OSKAR 1936-1937 On the Economic Theory
of Socialism. 2 Parts. Review of Economic Studies
4:53-71, 123-142.
LETWIN, SHIRLEY R. 1976 The Achievement of Fried-
rich A. Hayek. Pages 147-167 in Fritz Machlup
(editor), Essays on Hayek. New York Univ. Press;
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
MARGET, ARTHUR 1932 Review of Friedrich A. von
Hayek, Prices and Production. Journal of Political
Economy 40:261-266.
PIGOU, ARTHUR C. 1935 Economics in Practice. Lon-
don: Macmillan. —> See especially pages 23—24.
POPPER, KARL R. (1935) 1959 The Logic of Scien-
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Basic Books. —> First published as Logik der For-
schung and translated by Karl Popper, Julius Freed,
and Lan Freed.
ROBERTSON, DENNIS H. 1933 Saving and Hoarding.
Economic Journal 43:399-413.
SRAFFA, PIERO 1932a Dr. Hayek on Money and Cap-
ital. Economic Journal 42:42-53.
SRAFFA, PIERO 1932b A Rejoinder [to Hayek]. Eco-
nomic Journal 42:249—251.
WICKSELL, KNUT (1898) 1936 Interest and Prices.
Translated by R. F. Kahn. London: Macmillan. —>
First published in German. Contains an introduc-
tion by Bertil Ohlin.
HEBB, D. O.
Donald Olding Hebb, the Canadian psycholo-
gist who spurred the mid-century resurgence of
neuropsychological theory, was born in Chester,
Nova Scotia, in 1904. He received his B.A. de-
gree from Dalhousie University in 1925 and
worked for several years as a teacher in Canada.
Having developed an interest in psychology
through reading Sigmund Freud, he completed

an M.A. degree (1932) as a part-time student
at McGill University, where he was influenced
by the works of Ivan Pavlov, Wolfgang Kohler,
and Karl S. Lashley. Deciding at the age of
thirty on a career in physiological psychology,
Hebb chose to study with Lashley, first at the
University of Chicago, then at Harvard Uni-
versity, where he received his PH.D. in 1936.
Hebb's dissertation on the innate organization
of visual perception included a comparison of
rats partially blinded at maturity (through
Lashley's cortical excision method) with rats
reared in darkness. In its concerns and methods
this study prefigured his later work.
Hebb's general orientation toward psychology
has echoed that of his mentor, Lashley. Its main
tenets are that psychology (including social
psychology) is a biological science; that while
psychological functions cannot be reduced to
physiological functions, psychological ideas
must demonstrably be compatible with physio-
logical mechanisms; that the integration of
functions is a more critical question than the
localization of functions; and that organismic
functions must be understood as shaped by both
heredity and environment, both nature and
nurture. However, new, distinctive problems
and data that were to prove vital to Hebb's
mature scholarship arose during two subsequent
research appointments.
In 1937 Hebb became a research fellow at
the Montreal Neurological Institute, where one
of his tasks was to assess the effects of the ex-
cision of cortical tissue (by neurologist Wilder
Penfield) on measured intelligence in human
subjects. To his surprise, he discovered that re-
moval of extensive portions of the frontal lobes
of adult patients produced no decrease in Binet-
type intelligence. Although this finding created
little stir among psychologists, Hebb remained
deeply puzzled by the fact that mature intelli-
gence did not seem to depend closely on the
amount of brain tissue.
This line of investigation also led Hebb into
extensive psychometric research on the mea-
surement of specific intellectual abilities. While
serving as lecturer at Queen's University in
Kingston, Ontario (1939-1942), he and N. W.
Morton completed the development of the Mc-
Gill Adult Comprehension Examination.
In 1942 Lashley became director of the Yerkes
Laboratories of Primate Biology and recruited
Hebb as a research fellow to undertake natural-
istic studies of intelligence and temperament
among captive chimpanzees. During this period
HEBB, D. O. 283
Hebb published a number of influential papers
on the nature and study of emotions and intelli-
gence in man and animal, a second enduring
theme in his works.
Hebb's rise to eminence followed his appoint-
ment in 1947 as professor of psychology at
McGill, where he assumed departmental chair-
manship the following year and created a major
research laboratory.
In 1949 his bold and creative magnum opus,
The Organization of Behavior, appeared and
immediately stimulated widespread scholarly
interest. This work presented a comprehensive
theory of behavior that was based as far as
possible on the physiology of the nervous sys-
tem; its central distinctive feature was a novel
"physiological theory of thought." To Hebb,
thought is psychologically a type of process that
is not fully controlled by environmental stimula-
tion, yet cooperates closely with that stimula-
tion. Physiologically it is the transmission of
excitation from sensory to motor cortex via as-
sociation cortex.
The key concept in Hebb's theory of thought
is the cell assembly, a closed system of recruited
neurons within which neural activity can "re-
verberate" and thus continue after the initiating
sensory event has ended. Such assembly ac-
tivity is the simplest case of an image or idea.
Any cell assembly will form neural connections
with other assemblies through the mechanism
of association, and may thus be activated by an
associated assembly in the total absence of ade-
quate sensory stimulus. Moreover, these repre-
sentational activities of cell assemblies (each
corresponding to some very specific property of
environmental stimulation) will similarly form
connecting links with, and tend to produce,
particular motor activities.
Hebb's theory invokes a postulate of synaptic
resistance to explain the formation of neural
connections within and between cell assem-
blies: When an axon of cell A is near enough
to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently
takes part in firing it, some growth process or
metabolic change takes place in one or both
cells such that A's efficiency as one of the cells
firing B is increased. As applied to the formation
of a cell assembly (involving recruitment of a
fairly large number of neurons), this postulate
clearly implies that building up such numerous
and complex interconnections is a very slow
process, requiring many repetitions of the stim-
ulating conditions. These conditions are quite
specific and molecular, corresponding to dis-
 284 HEBB, D. O.
crete perceptual elements, relations, and prop-
erties.
The very simple kinds of images or ideas
constituted by cell assembly activity do not
themselves go far toward explaining thought
or behavior. Accordingly, a second key concept
in Hebb's theory is the phase sequence,
a temporally integrated series of assembly activi-
ties [amounting] to one current in the stream of
thought. Each assembly activity in the series might
be aroused (1) sensorily, (2) by excitation from
other assemblies, or (3) in both ways. It is assumed
that the last, (3), is what usually happens in an
organized flow of behavior. Each assembly must
establish connections with a number of other assem-
blies, at different times; which of these others it
will arouse on any specific occasion will depend on
what other activity, and especially what sensory
activity, is going on at that moment. Assembly A,
tends to excite B, C, and D; sensory activity tends
to excite D only, so A is followed by D. At each point
in time, behavior would thus tend to be steered both
sensorily and centrally, jointly controlled by the
present sensory input and the immediately prior
central activity. (1959, p. 629)
In Hebb's theory, attention (set, attitude, ex-
pectancy) is, physiologically, this influence of
the preexisting central activity on the next link
in the phase sequence. The motor response of
an animal presented with a stimulus is in part
selectively determined by excitation from cell
assemblies already active.
Perception—of even a simple pattern—is the
activation of a phase sequence integrating the
perceptual elements, or cell assemblies, that
correspond to the several parts of the pattern,
through sequencing of the motor components of
these assemblies into scanning behavior.
Hebb proposes that an animal's early learn-
ing involves a period of establishing perceptual
elements, or cell assemblies, and a subsequent
period of establishing perceptual and conceptual
sequences, or phase sequences. The establish-
ment of such neural structures, as noted above,
is presumed to require many experiences of a
particular, or of a closely similar, stimulus.
Hebb regards this stage of primary learning as
the period of establishing a first environmental
control over the association areas of the cerebral
cortex and thus, indirectly, over behavior.
Among those animals in which the association
areas are large, absolutely and relatively, pri-
mary learning will thus require a long period.
The characteristic learning of the mature
animal, on the other hand, is rapid and con-
ceptual, seeming always to involve a recombi-
nation of familiar perceptions and familiar pat-
terns of movement. Prompt learning—including
insight—is possible only when stimulation sets
off two or more well-organized phase sequences.
Being organized, these phase sequences are
capable of continued existence after stimulation
ceases, thus providing time for the structural
changes of permanent learning to take place.
Further, the prompt learning of maturity does
not involve the establishment of new connec-
tions but a selective reinforcement of con-
nections already capable of functioning, based
on association by conceptual similarity.
To Hebb, this contrast between types of learn-
ing has profound implications for the growth
and decline of intelligence. He first distin-
guishes two meanings of "intelligence." The first
is an innate potential, the capacity for behav-
ioral development that resides in possession of
a good brain and neural metabolism. The sec-
ond meaning refers to the functioning of a
brain already developing, hence in turn the
average level of performance or comprehension
of the partly grown or mature animal. Hebb
then infers that an intact brain is vital to the
first sense of intelligence but not necessarily to
the second. The highly organized cell assemblies
and, even more, the phase sequences of the
adult are characterized by such levels of re-
dundancy and overdetermination that a loss of
neurons—for example through aging or brain
damage—may not be seriously or permanently
disruptive of familiar activities. The formation
of new neural structures, however, is impor-
tantly a function of the number of potential
connections, so that loss of cells does affect the
capacity for development, or further develop-
ment.
Motivation, in Hebb's theory, refers to (1) the
existence of an organized phase sequence; (2)
its direction or content; and (3) its persistence
in a given direction—that is, its stability of con-
tent. Items (1) and (2) imply that the waking,
normal adult animal always has some motiva-
tion, although its persistence in any one direc-
tion (3) is not always great. Pleasure is funda-
mentally a directed growth or development of a
phase sequence, "a transient state of affairs in
which a conflict is being reduced, an incipient
disorganization being dissipated, or a new syn-
thesis in assembly action being achieved" (1949,
p. 232). Pain, on the other hand, is a cortically

disruptive activity, capable of channeling moti-
vation by disrupting some phase sequences
while facilitating others.
Emotional disturbance, too, is a disorganiza-
tion of integrated central activities. Two or more
phase sequences that are concurrently active
may conflict in the sense that they may produce
incoordinated behavior. For example, motor
components belonging to one sequence may al-
ternate randomly with those belonging to the
other. Or one may inhibit the other, with the
result that all motor outflow may be nullified in
a paralysis of emotion.
Hebb's book marshalled an encyclopedic ar-
ray of physiological and psychological data to
lend impressive plausibility to his key concep-
tions and to the various theoretical implications
drawn from them. Hebb's insistence on the cen-
tral role of concepts in the behavior of animals
(from rats to men), persuasively grounded in
contemporary physiology, gave timely support
to the growing interest in cognitive psychology
and, among more traditional learning theorists,
in mediating processes.
Almost immediately, however, new physio-
logical data, particularly the discovery of the
diffuse arousal system, and new psychological
data, particularly the findings of sensory de-
privation experiments conducted by Hebb's own
laboratory, dictated significant reformulations of
the theory with respect to specific relations
among thought, motivation, and emotion. Over
the next 25 years Hebb contributed heavily to
reformulations of neuropsychological theory in
a series of major papers and in successive re-
visions of his Textbook of Psychology, drawing
particularly on the directed program of research
of the McGill laboratory.
During this period, Hebb was increasingly
concerned with the dependence of higher cogni-
tive activities on a varied sensory environment.
Animals reared in restricted environments dur-
ing the primary learning stage were shown to
be socially, motivationally, intellectually, and
emotionally abnormal in adulthood. Normal ma-
ture animals subjected to short-term sensory
deprivation were shown to develop temporary
abnormalities in the same functional spheres.
Hebb's interpretations of such findings con-
tributed importantly to social psychology as well
as to developmental and clinical psychology.
Hebb was elected president of the Canadian
Psychological Association (1952) and the Amer-
ican Psychological Association (1959), and in
HEBB, D. O. 285
1961, received the APA's award for distinguished
scientific contribution. He has received many
scholarly honors from several nations.
After serving as chancellor at McGill from
1970-1974, Hebb retired near his birthplace in
Nova Scotia, remaining professionally active
after his formal retirement.
GEORGE J. McCALL
WORKS BY HEBB
1940 HEBB, D. O.; and PENFIELD, WILDER Human Be-
havior After Extensive Bilateral Removal From the
Frontal Lobes. Archives of Neurology and Psychia-
try, Chicago 43:421-438.
1942 The Effect of Early and Late Brain Injury Upon
Test Scores and the Nature of Normal Adult Intel-
ligence. American Philosophical Society, Proceed-
ings 85:275-292.
1943 HEBB, D. O.; and RIESEN, A. H. The Genesis of
Irrational Fears. Canadian Psychological Associa-
tion, Bulletin 3:49-50.
1946a Emotion in Man and Animal: An Analysis of
the Intuitive Processes of Recognition. Psychological
Review 53:88-106.
1946b On the Nature of Fear. Psychological Review
53:259-276.
1949 The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsycho-
logical Theory. New York: Wiley.
(1954) 1968 HEBB, D. O.; and THOMPSON, W. R. The
Social Significance of Animal Studies. Volume 2,
pages 729-774 in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aron-
son (editors), Handbook of Social Psychology. 2d
ed. Volume 2: Research Methods. Cambridge,
Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
1955a Drives and the CNS (conceptual nervous sys-
tem). Psychological Review 62:243-254.
1955b The Mammal and His Environment. American
Journal of Psychiatry 111:826-831.
1958a The Motivating Effects of Exteroceptive Stimu-
lation. American Psychologist 13:109-113.
(1958k) 1972 Textbook of Psychology. 3d ed. Philadel-
phia: Saunders.
1959 A Neuropsychological Theory. Volume 1, pages
622-643 in Sigmund Koch (editor), Psychology: A
Study of a Science. New York: McGraw-Hill. —> Vol-
ume 1: Sensory, Perceptual and Physiological Form-
ulations.
1960 The American Revolution. American Psychologist
15:735-745.
1963 The Semiautonomous Process: Its Nature and
Nurture. American Psychologist 18:16-27.
1968 Concerning Imagery. Psychological Review 75:
466-477.
1971 HEBB, D. O.; LAMBERT, W. E.; and TUCKER, G. R.
Language, Thought and Experience. Modern Lan-
guage Journal 55:212-222.
1978 On Watching Myself Get Old. Psychology Today
12, no. 6:15, 20-23.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
COMMITTEE ON SCIENIIFIC AWARDS 1961 Donald
Olding Hebb. American Psychologist 16:802-804. —»
Contains a complete bibliography of Hebb's writings
through 1961.
GOOD, I. J. 1965 Speculations Concerning the First
Ultraintelligent Machine. Advances in Computers
6:31-88.
MILNER, P. M. 1957 The Cell Assembly: Mark II.
Psychological Review 64:242-252.
 286 HEIDEGGER, MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN
Martin Heidegger was born in 1889 in Mess-
kirch, southwest Germany. He showed an early
religious inclination and studied Catholic the-
ology and philosophy at the University of Frei-
burg, where he was deeply influenced by the
eminent psychologist and Catholic philosopher
Franz Brentano. After earning his doctorate,
Heidegger was for many years closely associated
with Edmund Husserl. He adapted Husserl's
phenomenological method for his own purposes,
but retained Husserl's sharp distinction between
a purely phenomenological and a psychological
or sociological study of man. He published his
main work Sein und Zeit (Eng. trans. Being and
Time) in 1927, but continued to write and
publish all his life.
From his close study of the pre-Socratic philos-
ophers, including Parmenides, Heraclitus, and
others, Heidegger concluded that they had a
profound insight into the special features of
human existence, an insight that he attributed
in part to the fact that their thinking did not
yet basically separate poetry, religion, philos-
ophy, and science from each other. If man were
to regain an adequate understanding of himself
and his situation in the world, this separation
would somehow have to be overcome.
As a consequence, Heidegger largely rejected
the terminology of professional philosophy,
adopting an original style that requires special
efforts to understand. Heidegger deplored this,
but thought it necessary in order to erase pre-
conceptions and avoid misinterpretation on the
part of his readers.
He felt that Western man, in order to regain
self-understanding and eliminate his profound
alienation, had to seek deeper than did the
political programs of liberalism and Marxism.
Somehow the rebirth had to proceed through an
awakening of the people ("das Volk") conceived
along Germanic lines. This conviction explains
in part why Heidegger in 1933-1934 gave
speeches in favor of Hitler. He was, however,
soon led to reject the possibility of cultural re-
birth through National Socialism.
In 1945 Heidegger's association with National
Socialism was investigated by a specially ap-
pointed tribunal. Not classed as an "activist,"
he was categorized among the "less responsible"
and the "sympathizers," and he was permitted
to retain his professional rights. He declared
later that Hitlerism was a poison whose effect
would require a difficult and lengthy process to
eliminate, and that it revealed a structural
weakness in mankind as a whole.
Heidegger continued his work after the war
until shortly before his death in 1976. He influ-
enced European thinking profoundly, especially
in the years of existentialism. In his later works
his thought was deeply inspired by the German
romantic poet Friedrich Holderlin, the Danish
existentialist S0ren Kierkegaard, and by the
critical genius of European culture, Friedrich
Nietzsche.
The following formulations, written in part
in his own kind of terminology, may offer some
idea of Heidegger's philosophy: Man ex-ists,
stands out from things, in a sense pro-jects, but
he is nothing apart, he is no-thing. He finds
himself thrown into the world as a being-there
(Da-seiri), always on the verge of being com-
pletely absorbed and of falling away (Verfall,
Aufgehen in). Being absorbed, he is no one par-
ticular, nothing authentic, but "the they," das
Man. However, through a mood of existential
dread (Angst), an authentic, free way of being
is disclosed (dis-closed) as a possibility. Man's
finite existence is grasped as a continuous pre-
paredness for his own death. All every-dayness
disappears when he faces death and no-thing-ness
(das Nichts). He understands that as ex-isting
he is nowhere at home (Un-heimlichkeit, Un-
zu-hause). But anxiety also reveals Being itself,
as the light and the joyful (das Heitere). Man
has the possibility of an active, knowing joy
(das wissende Heiterkeit), a possibility of being
the shepherd of Being (das Hirt des Seins).
Fundamentally Heidegger's basic question is
what it means to be a human being. He tries to
bring to light something that is so fundamental
that it escapes notice and is hidden from both
everyday and scientific consciousness. He in-
vites the reader to ask with maximum engage-
ment, and he does not intend to provide
answers.
In his last writings, Heidegger's style is more
poetic and oracular, retaining only traces of sci-
entific phenomenology. He now presents him-
self as an interpreter of modern industrial so-
ciety : Modern life relates to one and is only one
way through which Being reveals itself. Man
has at least temporarily lost contact with other
possibilities and consequently suffers a pro-
found estrangement from Being, as the source
of those possibilities. The revealed world now is
one of objects exploited technologically by sub-

jects. Nature has lost its dignity. Because man
is basically the "shepherd of Being," his es-
trangement (alienation) is self-estrangement.
The "path into the next world era" can be
pointed out only by those who in the present
"worldnight" are capable of seeing alternatives.
Nature will reveal itself, with "earth, sky, mor-
tals and gods" in an original unity. Poets like
Holderlin are best able to assist mankind in its
present crisis.
Heidegger's interpretive approach, critical of
Freud and stressing meaning relations, inspired
philosophical anthropology and theological and
psychiatric thinking. In psychiatry, Ludwig
Binswanger used Heidegger's hermeneutic phe-
nomenology in shaping an original conceptual
and therapeutic approach. Ronald D. Laing and
his school have been influenced through the
mediation of Jean-Paul Sartre.
Hermeneutical approaches in cultural and so-
cial studies have been generally influenced by
Heidegger, in part indirectly through his former
students, notably Hans-Georg Gadamer. In the
English-speaking world, his influence has, on
the whole, been indirect, partly because of diffi-
culties of translation. It can, however, be traced
through the works of writers on the borderlines
between philosophy and social science. One ex-
ample is Herbert Marcuse's idea that "rational-
ization" in Max Weber's sense is also rational-
ization in Freud's sense of the term, and that
scientific rationality is a historical phenomenon
peculiar to technological society.
ARNE NAESS
WORKS BY HEIDEGGER
(1927) 1962 Being and Time. New York: Harper.
—> Fiist published in German.
(1929a) 1969 The Essence of Reasons. Evanston, 111.:
Northwestern Univ. Press. —•> First published in
German.
(19291?) 1968 What Is Metaphysics? In Werner Brock
(editor), Existence and Being. 3d ed. London:
Vision. —» First published in German.
(1947) 1962 Letter on Humanism. Volume 2, pages
270-302 in Willam Barrett and Henry D. Aiken
(editors), Philosophy in the Twentieth Century.
New York: Random House. —> First published in
German.
(1953a) 1956 Der Feldweg. 2d ed. Frankfort (Ger-
many): Klostermann.
(1953k) 1959 An Introduction to Metaphysics. Ox-
ford Univ. Press. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1974 by Yale Univ. Press. First published
in German.
(1959) 1971 On the Way to Language. New York:
Harper. —> First published in German.
1967 Der europdische Nihilismus. Pfiilingen (Ger-
many) : Neske.
1971 Poetry, Language, Thought. New York: Harper.
HEIDER, FRITZ 287
—» Translation by A. Hofstadter of a group of post-
war works.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALBERT, HANS 1968 Traktat iiber kritische Vernunft.
Tubingen (Germany): Mohr. —» Critical account
from a point of view related to that of Karl R.
Popper.
BINSWANGER, LUDWIG 1975 Being-in-the-World: Se-
lected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger. Translated by
Jacob Needleman. London: Souvenir Press. —» Clari-
fies Heidegger's relevance to social problems of our
time.
FEICK, HILDEGARD 1961 Index zu Heideggers Sein
und Zeit. Tubingen (Germany): Niemeyer. —» Use-
ful terminological survey.
LUKACS, GYORGY 1949 Heidegger redivivus. Sinn und
Form 1, no. 3:33-62. -> An influential Marxist
critique.
NAESS, ARNE 1968 Four Modern Philosophers: Car-
nap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre. Univ. of Chi-
cago Press.
RICHARDSON, WILLIAM J. 1963 Heidegger: Through
Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague: Nijhoff.
—*• Includes a preface by Heidegger.
SCHULZ, WALTER 1953-1954 Uber den philosophic ge-
schichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers. Philosophische
Rundschau 1953/1954:65-93, 211-232. -» Careful
historical localization of Heidegger.
SEIDEL, GEORGE J. (1964) 1974 Martin Heidegger
and the Pre-Socratics: An Introduction to His
Thought. 3d ed. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press.
HEIDER, FRITZ
Fritz Heider was born in Vienna in 1896,
spent his childhood in Graz, and received a
classical education at the official state Gymna-
sium. Unable to serve in the army during World
War i because of a childhood eye injury, he en-
tered the University of Graz. He did not have a
professional goal in mind, and in the European
tradition, he attended a wide range of lectures
open to all university students. His interests
eventually centered on the study of philosophy
and psychology.
As a student, Heider met Alexius Meinong,
a widely influential and dominant figure in
European philosophy, who suggested the topic
of Heider's doctoral thesis with the question:
Why do we say, we see the house and do not
say, we see the sun? (The reflected rays of the
sunlight are the stimuli which actually strike
the eye.) In discussing this problem Heider dis-
tinguished between the "thing" or object and
the "medium" or that in the environment which
provides the information about the object, i.e.,
the mediators (1927). He carried this distinc-
tion into his later analysis of person perception.
In Graz, Heider was also influenced by the psy-
chologist Vittorio Benussi, who was one of the
288 HEIDER, FRITZ
first to conduct and publish experiments in the
field of gestalt perception.
After Heider finished his dissertation, written
during the winter months of 1919, he worked
for a year as an applied psychologist, but soon
became restless. He decided to go to Berlin
where his uncle was a zoologist. Benussi sug-
gested that while there Heider make contact
with psychologists at the University of Berlin.
An air of excitement permeated the Berlin
department of psychology. The lectures in per-
ception, especially those of Max Wertheimer,
were very popular among students and intellec-
tuals from widely differing fields. There was a
definite feeling that gestalt research and theory
would have an important influence on the de-
velopment of psychology. Heider attended the
lectures of Wertheimer, as well as those of
Wolfgang Kohler, and found many gestalt con-
cepts, for instance laws governing "unit forma-
tion," useful in his later work on the perception
of interpersonal relations. He also formed a last-
ing friendship with Kurt Lewin, a younger mem-
ber of the Berlin faculty.
After Berlin came the Wanderjahren, a
period when Heider spent a good deal of time
reading philosophy, especially Spinoza and
Nietzche; psychology; and literature. Then, in
1927 he became assistant to William Stern at
the University of Hamburg, and during this
time came to know Heinz Werner and Ernst
Cassirer; he learned a great deal from his con-
tacts with all three. In 1930, he published "Die
Leistung des Wahrnehmungs-systems," and
took leave from Hamburg to accept what
he thought of as a one-year position with the
gestalt psychologist Kurt Koffka at Smith Col-
lege in Northampton, Massachusetts. There his
principal work was at the Clarke School for the
Deaf, where Grace Moore, also a member of
Koffka's research group, was working. They were
married shortly after and Heider remained in
the United States. In the years that followed he
combined research at the school for the deaf
with teaching at Smith College and published
jointly with Grace Heider two monographs on
the psychology of the deaf (1940; 1941). Ob-
servations that Heider made in attempting to
understand the thought processes of children
who were just beginning to learn speech in-
spired the film he later made with Marianne
Simmel; findings based on this film were sub-
sequently incorporated into his work on per-
ception of personal causality. In his last year
at Smith College, Heider was awarded a Gug-
genheim fellowship to continue work on what
was to become his widely read book on inter-
personal relations.
In 1947 Heider went to the University of
Kansas. Roger G. Barker, the new chairman of
the psychology department, brought with him a
group of people who, like himself, had been
closely associated with Kurt Lewin. In the fol-
lowing years, Heider spent a semester at Cornell
University, a year at the University of Oslo as
Fulbright professor, and a year at Duke Univer-
sity as William Preston Few distinguished profes-
sor. In 1951 he received a second Guggenheim
fellowship and in 1956 received a grant from the
Ford Foundation which allowed him to complete
his book The Psychology of Interpersonal Rela-
tions (1958). In 1959 he received the Lewin
memorial award given by the Society for the
Psychological Study of Social Issues; in 1963
he shared the Byron Caldwell Smith award
given by the University of Kansas; and in 1965
he was also given the distinguished scientific
contribution award by the American Psycho-
logical Assocation.
Heider's most influential contribution is The
Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. In this
work Heider applied the laws of perception of
physical objects, developed by gestalt psycholo-
gists, to the perception and motivations of social
"objects," or persons. Synthesizing object and
person perception is one of Heider's important
scientific achievements.
Two central and associated concerns that
have been influential in the development of psy-
chology were also articulated in The Psychology
of Interpersonal Relations. One of these relates
to the concept of balance. Heider reasoned that
object configurations, including social objects,
could be classified into those which are in a
balanced (steady) or in an imbalanced (un-
steady) state. Since balanced states are concep-
tually preferable to imbalanced states, new
relations formed according to the principle of
balance must be applied to any imbalanced
structure. Furthermore, if an imbalanced state
exists, there is a force to change it in the direc-
tion of balance. For example, in a two-person
system, if a likes b and b likes a, the system is
in balance. But if a likes b and b does not like a,
there is disequilibrium. A force then exists in a
to change the attitude of b, misperceive b's sen-
timents in a biased way, or change the attitude
toward b. Configurations with three entities such
as those involving two persons and an object
are more complex. If, for example, a likes b and

object x (e.g., the elected president), then if b
does not like x, the situation is imbalanced and
a force will be created to bring the system into
a state of equilibrium. In Heider's characteristic
manner of integrating everyday observations,
literary examples, and scientific analysis, he
noted that many literary tragedies make use of
balance principles (e.g., Romeo loves Juliet,
Juliet loves and obeys her parents, but her
parents do not accept Romeo). An example of
"latent" imbalance which contributes to dra-
matic tension in Ibsen's Wild Duck occurs when
a scrupulous husband loves his wife who, unbe-
knownst to him, has engaged in a dishonest act
for his benefit.
Causal attributions, the second major focus
of The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations,
pertain to perceptions of causality, particularly
the relations between actions or behavior and the
motives and intentions of others. In a precur-
sory experiment, Heider and Simmel showed
experimental subjects three moving objects on
a screen (a large and small triangle and a
circle). They reported that interpretations of the
film were almost always made in terms of inter-
actions between persons with feelings, for in-
stance impacts were interpreted as fights gen-
erated by jealousy, joint movements as evidence
of liking and "belonging together," and so on.
Thus, perceived causality organized perceptions
and eliminated the distinction between physical
and person perception.
Heider postulated that people are motivated
to understand and to master their environment,
partly because understanding is adaptive and
instrumental to future behavior, but also be-
cause of a basic curiosity and desire "to know."
Pursuing the distinction intimated in his thesis
and in "Ding und Medium" (1927), Heider stated
that we are often only in contact with immediate
facts or raw data, but we search for the under-
lying core processes or dispositional properties
to explain these facts. These more basic facts
are the generally enduring aspects of the world.
Heider suggested that in "naive analysis of ac-
tion" the main causes of events are perceived
as either internal to the person (ability and
effort) or as external factors (particularly task
characteristics). Attributions of causality to
these disparate factors have far-reaching con-
sequences. For example, if a person is enjoying
his meal at a restaurant, it may make great
differences in our behavior (e.g., deciding to
dine at the restaurant) if the enjoyment is as-
cribed to his hunger or to the quality of the meal.
HEIDER, FRITZ 289
Scientific method. The sources of Heider's
ideas were largely observational and literary;
his method was often to begin by making "men-
tal experiments" in which interpersonal situa-
tions were conceived and altered in a systematic
manner (e.g., Romeo does not like Juliet, or
Juliet does not care about her parents), and in-
ferring the psychological consequences. The
ideas generated in this way have led to further
experiments, some by Heider himself, more by
others, which in turn have stimulated him to
further theorizing.
Scientific heritage. Since 1955, there have
been two dominant paradigms in social psy-
chology. The first was cognitive dissonance, a
theory of cognitive dynamics proposed by Leon
Festinger that was part of the general principle
of balance. The second was (and remains)
attribution theory, which received its impetus
from the writings of Heider. Attribution appears
to be the more robust of these paradigms. It
dominates, social psychology and has made in-
roads into the fields of motivation, personality,
and clinical psychology. Part of the richness of
attribution theory is to be attributed to Heider's
personality. He has encouraged new directions
and alternative paths, rather than dogmatically
enforcing or insisting upon one particular set
of ideas.
MARIJANA BENESH-WEINER
AND BERNARD WEINER
WORKS BY HEIDER
1927 Ding und Medium. Symposion, philosophische
Zeitschrift fur Forschung und Aussprache 1:109-
157.
1930 Die Leistung des Wahrnehmungs-systerns. Zeit-
schrift filr Psychologic 114:391-394.
1940 HEIDER, FRITZ; and HEIDER, GRACE M. A Com-
parison of the Sentence Structure of Deaf and
Hearing Children. Psychological Monographs 52,
no. I : Whole no. 232. —» First volume of Studies
in the Psychology of the Deaf.
1941 HEIDER, FRITZ; and HEIDER, GRACE M. The Ad-
justment of the Adult Deaf. Psychological Mono-
graphs 53, no. 5: Whole no. 242. —> Second volume
of Studies in the Psychology of the Deaf.
1944 Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality.
Psychological Review 51:358-374.
1944 HEIDER, FRITZ; and SIMMEL, MARIANNE An Ex-
perimental Study of Apparent Behavior. American
Journal of Psychology 57:243-259.
1946 Attitudes and Cognitive Organization. Journal
of Psychology 21:107-112.
1958 The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New
York: Wiley.
1959 On Perception and Event Structure, and the
Psychological Environment. Psychological Issues 1,
no. 3:1-123. —> A collection of previously published
papers, translated into English, including "Thing
and Medium" ("Ding und Medium," 1927) and
290 HEMPEL, CARL G.
"The Function of the Perceptual System" ("Die
Leistung des Wahrnehmungs-systems," 1930).
1960 The Gestalt Theory of Motivation. Pages 145-
172 in Marshall R. Jones (editor), The Nebraska
Symposium on Motivation: 1960. Lincoln: Univ.
of Nebraska Press.
1968 Stern, William. Volume 15, pages 262-265 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
HARVEY, JOHN H.; ICKES, WILLIAM; and KIDD, ROB-
ERT F. (editors) 1976-1978 New Directions in
Attribution Research. 2 vols. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erl- ical details of this physicalistic program. Al-
baum.
JONES, EDWARD S. et al. 1972 Attribution: Perceiv-
ing the Causes of Behavior. Morristown, N.J.: Gen- tific terms were fully definable by means of
eral Learning Press.
HEMPEL, CARL G.
Carl Gustav Hempel was born in 1905 in
Oranienburg, Germany. After studying mathe-
matics and physics, he turned to philosophy and
was associated with the logical empiricist move-
ment then centered in Vienna and Berlin. He
studied at the universities of Gottingen, Heidel-
berg, and Berlin, where he received his PH.D.
in 1934. Hempel then left Germany, did re-
search in Belgium until 1937, and then came or by logical derivation.
to the United States, where he taught at Yale
University from 1948 to 1955 and then at
Princeton University. Since 1977 he has been methodological unity of the empirical sciences.
a university professor at the University of Pitts-
burgh. He has made contributions to logic,
philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of
science; in the latter area, he has done impor-
tant work on concept formation, confirmation,
and explanation. His own views, worked out
with characteristic precision and attention to
detail, lie within the tradition of logical em-
piricism, but he has also been one of that tradi-
tion's most perceptive internal critics. On many
points his views are similar to those of Ernest
Nagel (1961), whose intellectual roots lie closer
to American pragmatism.
The logical empiricists are so-called because
they share an empiricist attitude toward epis-
temological problems and the belief that modern
mathematical logic is a tool which can be em-
ployed to good effect in the analysis of philo-
sophical problems. Apart from Hempel himself,
some prominent figures in this movement have
been Rudolf Carnap, Richard von Mises, Otto
Neurath, Karl Popper, and Moritz Schlick. The
scientific interests of most of these philosophers
centered on logic, mathematics, and the physi-
cal sciences.
Neurath, who was trained in economics and
sociology, was the only one among them who
had specialized knowledge of the social sciences.
He believed that human individuals and societies
were nothing more than complex physical sys-
tems, and for this reason, he envisaged a refor-
mulation of all of empirical science in a unitary
physicalistic language.
Carnap, in turn, tried to work out the analyt-
though he began by maintaining that all scien-
physical, observational terms, he soon discov-
ered that it was impossible to construct such a
definition for each scientific term. So he pro-
posed that many scientific terms should be re-
garded as theoretical. Carnap eventually came
to believe that all laws of nature, including those
which hold for people and their societies, are
logical consequences of the physical laws which
explain inorganic processes. He has always
tended to stress the logical unity of empirical
science, and the main thrust of his physicalism
has been that all empirical science is in prin-
ciple reducible to physics, either by translation
By contrast, Hempel's work in the philosophy
of science has consistently emphasized the
He is acutely aware of the diversity of subject
matters that are amenable to scientific study,
and he does not insist that all empirical sciences
can be reduced to, or will eventually be replaced
by, one fundamental discipline such as a per-
fected physics. He does hold, however, that all
empirical sciences have important similarities of
method. His studies of the logic of scientific
explanation are attempts to formulate general
models of explanation that will reveal some of
these similarities. The use of these models to
answer certain much disputed questions about
methods of explanation in social science con-
stitutes Hempel's main contribution to the phi-
losophy of social science.
The concept of explanation outside of science
is vague. Broadly speaking, to explain some-
thing to someone is to make it plain or under-
standable to that person. So explanations are
person-relative in the sense that what counts as
a satisfactory explanation for one person will
not do so for another. A satisfactory explanation
for a given person will depend upon his antece-

dent beliefs, intelligence, and other personal
idiosyncrasies. But scientific explanations are
supposed to be independent of such personal
factors. So Hempel proposes to explicate the
notion of scientific explanation by replacing the
ordinary notion with one more precisely charac-
terized. Whether or not such an explication is
successful depends upon whether the more pre-
cise notion accounts for cases which are gener-
ally agreed to be paradigmatic instances of sci-
entific explanation and also provides a useful
tool for analyzing the logical and methodological
procedures actually used in science. In Hempel's
view, a condition of adequacy for a scientific
explanation of a particular event is that it pro-
vides information which shows objectively (i.e.,
in a person-independent manner) that the event
in question was to be expected. Like other phi-
losophers in the empiricist tradition, Hempel
holds that such information has been provided
only when the event to be explained has been
subsumed under general laws.
Since laws may be either strictly universal or
statistical, there will be two basic patterns of ex-
planation for particular events. The first,
worked out by Hempel (1948) in collaboration
with Paul Oppenheim, is Deductive—Nomological
(D-N) explanation. In a D-N explanation, the
explanandum is a sentence which describes the
event to be explained. The explanans consists
of two kinds of sentences. Some state specific
antecedent or initial conditions; others express
universal laws. Many explanations in classical
physics exemplify this pattern perfectly. An
adequate D-N explanation must satisfy four
conditions: (1) the explanans must be true;
(2) the explanandum must be logically deduc-
ible from it; (3) at least one law in the ex-
planans must be required for the deduction;
and (4) the explanans must in principle be
capable of being empirically tested. The first
two adequacy conditions insure that the ex-
planans provides information which shows that
the explanandum-event was to be expected;
this is because a valid deductive argument with
true premisses guarantees the truth of its con-
clusion. The third condition insures that the
explanandum-event has really been subsumed
under a law, and the fourth guarantees that the
explanans is subject to confirmation or discon-
firmation by observational evidence.
The second pattern, which Hempel (19620;
1965) elaborated later, is Indicative-Statistical
(I-S) explanation. In an I-S explanation, the
HEMPEL, CARL G. 291
explanandum is a sentence which attributes
to a particular thing a certain characteristic A.
The explanans comprises both a sentence ex-
pressing a statistical law to the effect that the
probability that a thing has A, given that it has
some other characteristic B, is close to one, and
a sentence stating that the thing in question
has B. Some explanations in genetics, for ex-
ample, conform well to this pattern. In an ade-
quate I-S explanation, the explanans must be
testable and true. Moreover, because each of
two incompatible explananda can be rendered
highly probable by different true I-S explana-
tions if these are cleverly selective, an adequate
I—S explanation must be based on all available
information of potential explanatory relevance
to the explanandum. Hence, the adequacy of an
I-S explanation is epistemically relative and
may alter as the available information alters.
Because the relation between explanandum and
explanans in an I-S explanation is not one of
logical deducibility, the truth of the explanans
does not guarantee the truth of the explanan-
dum. But the explanans does provide strong in-
ductive support for the explanandum and,
thereby, shows that the explanandum-event
was to be expected.
In addition to explanations of particular
events, scientists also explain laws. A universal
law may often be deduced from the basic prin-
ciples of an even more general theory. Some-
times such deductions succeed in showing that
the original lawlike sentence was only an ap-
proximation. On the other hand, a statistical law
may be deduced from others by means of the
mathematical theory of statistical probability.
Hempel has applied this general philosophical
analysis of scientific explanation to four topics
that concern social scientists: (1) the function
of laws in historical explanation; (2) the func-
tion of ideal types in sociological explanation;
(3) the role of reasons in the explanation of
human action; and (4) the problem of func-
tional explanation in sociology and anthropol-
ogy. In each case he argues that proposed
scientific explanations are successful only to
the extent that they can be understood as con-
forming to one of the patterns he has described.
Hempel (1942) holds that explanation in his-
tory must, as elsewhere in the empirical sci-
ences, involve subsumption under laws. To be
sure, historians do other things besides explain-
ing events. Such activities as description, classi-
fication, and simple narration are the legitimate
292 HEMPEL, CARL G.
province of historians, but they differ in logical
structure from explanation. Hempel is not com-
mitted to the view that there are sweeping laws
of historical development as proposed by Oswald
Spengler or Arnold J. Toynbee. He recognizes
that the laws explaining historical events are
usually borrowed from such disciplines as eco-
nomics, psychology, and sociology, or are
common-sense generalizations based on every-
day experience. Obviously, historical explana-
tions are seldom, if ever, proposed in a form
that fits one of the patterns Hempel has de-
scribed, because, he suggests, historians usually
set forth only sketches of explanations, which
provide no more than vague indications of the
laws and initial conditions considered relevant
to the explanandum. Such sketches would have
to be expanded before Hempel would regard
them as full-fledged explanations. Hempel also
argues that empathetic understanding of events
and people is not a method of historical expla-
nation; rather it is a heuristic device for sug-
gesting psychological hypotheses which might
serve as explanatory principles.
According to Hempel (1965), the intent of
constructions of ideal types is to provide ex-
planatory theories. When fully elaborated, they
should consist of both a list of characteristics
with which the theory proposes to deal and a
set of sentences which purport to express laws,
universal or statistical, connecting these charac-
teristics. Such connections by means of laws are
nomological connections. Hempel carefully
shows that his interpretation is consistent with
much of what Max Weber and Howard Becker
have said about ideal types. But he explicitly
rejects Weber's claim that the nomological con-
nections in such a theory must be subjectively
meaningful because many events of interest to
social scientists can only be explained by refer-
ence to factors that have no subjective meaning.
Hempel suggests that such ideal constructs
might eventually be incorporated, as idealized
approximations, into a comprehensive theory of
social action, if and when one is constructed.
In addition, he warns that if the requirement of
testability is to be satisfied by the nomological
sentences of such a construct, their empirical
domain of applicability must be clearly specified.
Explanation of action in terms of reasons
must refer to at least the following factors:
(1) the agent's goals; (2) the agent's beliefs
about the means available for attaining those
goals; and (3) the agent's commitments to nor-
mative constraints on actions. Suppose all such
factors are put together and thought of as mak-
ing up the agent's situation. Some philosophers
have held that a rational explanation for an ac-
tion shows why the action was the appropriate
one for the agent to take in his particular situa-
tion. Hempel (1962c; 1965) argues that this
is not sufficient for scientific explanation be-
cause it provides no grounds for thinking that
the agent did, in fact, do what was appropriate.
He construes the explanans of a full-fledged ex-
planation in terms of reasons as consisting of
two parts: (1) a sentence expressing a nomo-
logical connection between, on the one hand,
being rational and in a certain type of situation
and, on the other, performing a certain kind of
action; and (2) sentences stating that the agent
was rational and was in a situation of the speci-
fied sort. In this interpretation, explaining ac-
tions by reasons also involves subsumption
under laws. Hempel notes that the characteristic
of being rational must in such explanations be
understood, not normatively but descriptively,
as a broadly dispositional trait. Otherwise the
testability requirement cannot be satisfied. He
distinguishes between actions that can be ex-
plained in terms of the specific aspects of the
situation that the agent consciously considers
in his deliberations and actions that can only
be explained by reference to unconscious moti-
vational factors. But he emphasizes that attribu-
tions of unconscious motives must be subject
to control by empirical testing, and so he takes
such motives to be linked to behavioral disposi-
tions. For example, attributions of unconscious
motives of the Freudian sort are subject to em-
pirical testing just insofar as they are related
to such behavior as slips of the tongue and re-
ports of dreams in a fairly precise manner.
Hempel (1959) takes the object of a func-
tional analysis to be some item which is a rela-
tively persistent trait or disposition occurring in
a larger system. For example, the beating of the
heart is a persistent trait of the body of a living
vertebrate. Hempel argues that the analysis
aims to show that the system is such that under
specified conditions the item in question has
effects which satisfy a condition necessary for
the system to remain in adequate or proper
working order. For instance, when the body of
a living vertebrate is in normal conditions, the
beating of the heart has the effect of circulating
the blood, and this contributes to the satisfac-
tion of certain conditions, such as supply of
nutriment and removal of waste, which are
necessary for the proper working of the or-

ganism. This is the content of the claim that
the beating of the heart in vertebrates has the
function of circulating the blood. Hempel notes
that an item may have many effects that are
not among its functions. For example, the pro-
duction of throbbing sounds is an effect of the
beating of the heart in vertebrates that is not a
function because it normally contributes nothing
to keeping vertebrates in adequate working
order.
Anthropologists such as Bronislaw Malinow-
ski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown have supposed
functional analyses to have explanatory import.
Hempel shows that although functional anal-
yses do presuppose nomological connections,
they typically do not explain the presence of an
item in a system because the presence of the
item under analysis is sufficient but usually not
necessary for maintaining the system in work-
ing order. In most cases there are other items
functionally equivalent to the one under anal-
ysis which might have been present instead.
Hempel also points out that unless precise em-
pirical criteria for the application of terms such
as "adequate or proper working order" are laid
down, functional analyses will not be testable.
For this reason, he suspects that what Robert
K. Merton has called the postulate of universal
functionalism—the view that every item in a
culture has a function—may be empirically
vacuous rather than merely premature. Hempel
cautiously interprets functional analysis in so-
cial science as a research program aimed at
determining the respects and degrees to which
various systems are self-regulating and takes
the pursuit of this aim to require the formula-
tion of precise and empirically testable hypoth-
eses about specific functional relationships.
Hempel's work on explanation has inspired
an enormous body of philosophical literature
and has also been taken seriously by social
scientists, such as Paul F. Lazarsfeld, who are
concerned with methodological problems. Some
of the more instructive philosophical criticism
of Hempel's views has come from William Dray
(1957), Wesley C. Salmon (1971), and
Michael Scriven (1959; 1962). The favored
strategy of most critics has been to elaborate
examples of explanations in some empirical
discipline such as history or evolutionary biology
that seem to be perfectly respectable and yet do
not appear to conform to either Hempelian pat-
tern of explanation. Adolf Griinbaum (1963)
and John Passmore (1958) have defended some
of the leading Hempelian ideas against such
HEMPEL, CARL G. 293
objections. Hempel (1965) himself has re-
sponded to many of his critics. Nicholas Rescher
(1970) has edited a volume of essays in Hem-
pel's honor in which prominent philosophers
discuss several facets of his work. Over the
years, it has become increasingly clear that
Hempel's work is a major contribution to the
philosophical treatment of the logical and meth-
odological problems of the empirical sciences.
PHILIP L. QUINN
WORKS BY HEMPEL
1936 HEMPEL, CARL G.; and OPPENHEIM, PAUL Der
Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik: Wissen-
schaftstheoretische Untersuchungen zur Konstitu-
tionsforschung und Psychologic. Leiden (Nether-
lands): Sijthoff.
1942 The Function of General Laws in History.
Journal of Philosophy 39:35-48. —> Reprinted with
slight modifications in Hempel 1965.
1948 HEMPEL, CARL G.; and OPPENHEIM, PAUL
Studies in the Logic of Explanation. Philosophy of
Science 15:135-175. —» Reprinted with some
changes and a new postcript in Hempel 1965.
1952 Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Em-
pirical Science. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1954 A Logical Appraisal of Operationism. Scientific
Monthly 79:215-220. -» Reprinted with slight
modifications in Hempel 1965.
1959 The Logic of Functional Analysis. Pages 271-
307 in Llewellyn Gross (editor), Symposium on
Sociological Theory. Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson;
New York: Harper. —» Reprinted with some changes
in Hempel 1965.
1962a Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explana-
tion. Volume 3, pages 98—169 in Minnesota Studies
in the Philosophy of Science. Edited by Herbert
Feigl and Grover Maxwell. Minneapolis: Univ. of
Minnesota Press. —» Some passages from this paper
are included in the title essay of Hempel 1965.
1962& Explanation in Science and in History. Pages
7-33 in Robert G. Colodny (editor), Frontiers of
Science and Philosophy. University of Pittsburgh
Series in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1. Univ.
of Pittsburgh Press.
1962c Rational Action. American Philosophical So-
ciety, Proceedings and Addresses 35:5-23. —> Some
passages from this paper are included in the title
essay of Hempel 1965.
1965 Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Es-
says in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free
Press.
1966 Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1969 Logical Positivism and the Social Sciences.
Pages 163-194 in Peter Achinstein and Stephen F.
Barker (editors), The Legacy of Logical Positivism:
Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
DRAY, WILLIAM 1957 Laws and Explanation in His-
tory. Oxford Univ. Press.
GRUNBAUM, ADOLF 1963 Philosophical Problems of
Space and Time. New York: Knopf.
NAGEL, ERNEST 1961 The Structure of Science:
Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation.
New York: Harcourt.
294 HERRING, PENDLETON
PASSMORE, JOHN A. 1958 Law and Explanation in
History. Australian Journal of Politics and History
4:269-276.
RESCHER, NICHOLAS (editor) 1970 Essays in Honor
of Carl G. Hempel: A Tribute on the Occasion of
His Sixty-fifth Birthday. Dordrecht (Netherlands):
Reidel. —> Contains a full bibliography, consisting
of 65 items, of Hempel's publications from 1934
to 1969.
SALMON, WESLEY C. 1971 Statistical Explanation
and Statistical Relevance. Univ. of Pittsburgh Press.
SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1959 Truisms as the Grounds for
Historical Explanations. Pages 443-475 in Patrick
Gardiner (editor), Theories of History: Readings
from Classical and Contemporary Sources. New
York: Free Press.
SCRIVEN, MICHAEL 1962 Explanations, Predictions,
and Laws. Volume 3, pages 170-230 in Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Edited by
Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell. Minneapolis:
Univ. of Minnesota Press.
HERRING, PENDLETON
(Edward) Pendleton Herring had two suc-
cessive careers, first as an influential political
scientist, then, after 1948, as head of the Social
Science Research Council (SSRC), one of the
leading research organizations in the United
States.
Born in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1903, Her-
ring received his A.B. (1925) and PH.D. (1928)
in political science from the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. He served as a member of Harvard Uni-
versity's department of government from 1928 to
1947, and as secretary of its Graduate School of
Public Administration from 1936 to 1947. In
the latter capacity he developed the "case
method" of teaching public administration,
which grew into the Inter-University Case Pro-
gram in Public Administration.
During his 18 mainly academic years (1928-
1946) Herring published 6 books, 5 of which
have remained in print long after their publica-
tion. Group Representation Before Congress
(1929) took its place alongside Peter Odegard's
Pressure Politics (1928) and E. E. Schattschnei-
der's Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (1935) as
the foundation of the study of pressure groups
as a new field of political science. Public Admin-
istration and the Public Interest (1936b) was
one of the first and most influential analyses of
the interactions among government agencies and
their organized and unorganized clienteles. Fed-
eral Commissioners: A Study of Their Careers
and Qualifications (1936a) pioneered studies of
the relationships between administrators' back-
grounds and their behavior in office.
Herring's next two works were more general
in scope and impact. Presidential Leadership
(1940k) was the first major study of the politics
of presidential leadership written since Wood-
row Wilson's Constitutional Government in the
United States (1908). Perhaps his most im-
portant work, The Politics of Democracy
(1940a) has remained a principal source of
ideas and inspiration for political scientists who,
like Jeane Jordan Kirkpatrick, Seymour Martin
Lipset, Nelson Polsby, Aaron Wildavsky, and
Austin Ranney, believe that America needs a
politics of moderation and consensus more than
one of sharp choice between irreconcilable al-
ternatives, and that the decentralized, pragmatic
parties of American tradition are more likely to
meet that need than are the disciplined British-
style parties so admired by advocates of "respon-
sible party government." His last book, The Im-
pact of War (1941), was an analysis of American
war mobilization.
In 1953 Herring was elected president of the
American Political Science Association. But,
when he took office he was already well launched
on his second career.
After serving from 1942 to 1947 in a variety
of administrative positions in the national gov-
ernment and the United Nations, Herring in
1948 became president of the Social Science Re-
search Council, which had been founded in 1923
to promote the organization and funding of so-
cial science research. Herring held the presi-
dency from 1948 to 1968, and in those twenty
years the council became the prime organization
shaping the nature of research in most of the
social sciences.
At the beginning of Herring's presidency the
SSRC's annual budget was under $500,000; when
he left office it was nearly $2 million. Under his
leadership the council's growing resources were
used to pursue two main goals. The first was to
improve the quality of social science knowledge
by encouraging researchers to acquire more and
better data, analyze them by more rigorous
quantitative methods, and develop more general
and systematic theories with predictive power.
The second goal was to focus and report research
in ways that would make it more accessible and
useful for the makers of public policy. The coun-
cil worked mainly through its committees of
scholars, chosen and encouraged by Herring and
his staff. Among the more noteworthy may be
mentioned the committees on mathematics in
social science research, on economic stability,
and on biological bases of social behavior. In
Herring's own discipline the committee on polit-

ical behavior and its derivative committees on
comparative politics and on governmental and
legal processes played key roles in the "behav-
ioral revolution" that transformed political sci-
ence from the 1950s to the 1970s.
In the postwar era, Herring succeeded in at-
tracting the country's leading social scientists to
serve on the SSRC's committees, conferences,
and board of directors. To mention only a small
sample: in economics, R. A. Gordon, Lawrence
R. Klein, Simon Kuznets, and James Tobin; in
history, Philip Curtin, Louis Gottschalk, Roy F.
Nichols, and Edwin Reischauer; in law, Willard
Hurst, Edward H. Levi, and Leon Lipson; in
political science, Gabriel A. Almond, Robert A.
Dahl, V. O. Key, Jr., David B. Truman, and
Robert Ward; in psychology, Angus Campbell,
Lee J. Cronbach, Leon Festinger, Gardner Lind-
zey, Charles E. Osgood, and Herbert A. Simon;
in sociology, James S. Coleman, Paul F. Lazars-
feld, and Robert K. Merton; and in statistics,
Otis Dudley Duncan and Frederick Mosteller.
Herring retired from the SSRC in 1968 and
became director of the Foreign Area Fellowship
Program, which administered programs of
training and research in foreign countries or-
ganized in close cooperation with scholars in
the host countries. As president of the Woodrow
Wilson Foundation after 1962, he played a
major role in persuading Congress to establish
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars in Washington.
Probably no one in his generation had as great
and as varied an impact on social science as
Herring. Postwar studies of political parties,
pressure groups, and public administration took
their departure from his prewar books. Postwar
research in all the social sciences owes much of
the broadening of its objectives, the refinement
of its working methods, and the greater utility
of its products to the work of the SSRC under
his direction. Those who seek his monuments
will find many in the other pages of this ency-
clopedia.
AUSTIN RANNEY
WORKS BY HERRING
(1929) 1967 Group Representation Before Congress.
New York: Russell.
1936a Federal Commissioners: A Study of Their Ca-
reers and Qualifications. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard Univ. Press.
(1936b) 1967 Public Administration and the Public
Interest. New York: Russell.
(1940a) 1966 The Politics of Democracy: American
Parties in Action. New York: Norton.
1971 Presidential Leadership: The Political
HERTZ, ROBERT 295
Relations of Congress and the Chief Executive.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
(1941) 1971 The Impact of War: Our American Dem-
ocracy Under Arms. Port Washington, N.Y.: Ken-
nikat.
1968 Public Interest. Volume 13, pages 170-175 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
DAHL, ROBERT A. 1961 The Behavioral Approach in
Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a
Successful Protest. American Political Science Re-
view 55:763-772.
ODEGARD, PETER 1928 Pressure Politics: The Story of
the Anti-saloon League. New York: Columbia Univ.
Press.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E. (1935) 1963 Politics, Pres-
sures and the Tariff. Hamden, Conn.: Anchor Books.
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL 1971 A Report
on the Activities of the Committee on Comparative
Politics, 1954-1970. New York: The Council.
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL 1973a A Report
on the Activities of the Committee on Govern-
mental and Legal Processes, 1964-1972. New York:
The Council.
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL 1973b A Report
of the Activities of the Committee on Political Be-
havior, 1949-1963. New York: The Council.
SOMIT, ALBERT 1975 Reports of Two Key SSRC Com-
mittees: Back to the Drafting Board? Political Sci-
ence 8:22-24. —» Discusses Social Science Research
Council 1973a and 1973&.
WILSON, WOODROW (1908) 1917 Constitutional Gov-
ernment in the United States. New York: Columbia
Univ. Press.
HERTZ, ROBERT
Robert Hertz (1881-1915) was one of the
most brilliant and promising members of the
younger generation of Emile Durkheim's L'annee
sociologique school—a group of scholars that was
to be devastated by World War i (Mauss 1925).
Born at St. Cloud, France, Hertz was edu-
cated at the Ecole Normale Superieure, from
which he graduated in first place as agrege de
philosophic in 1904. In the two succeeding years
he did research in the library of the British Mu-
seum in London, and in 1906/1907 was philoso-
phy master at the Lycee de Douai. In 1907 he
was appointed to the Ecole Pratique des Hautes
fitudes in Paris, where he remained until the
war, in which he was commissioned as a second
lieutenant of infantry. He was killed by German
machine guns, at the age of thirty-three, leading
his men in an attack on Marcheville.
In his lifetime Hertz had published essays on
death (1907), the preeminence of the right hand
(1909), and the cult of St. Besse (1913), and a
pamphlet on socialism (1910). At the front, he
296 HERTZ, ROBERT
had collected from his soldiers a number of
country sayings, and these were later printed
(1917). The introduction to a major work on
sin and expiation was edited by Marcel Mauss
(1922), and a long review on Russian ecstatic
sects was included in a volume of his collected
writings also brought out by Mauss (1928).
Hertz also left a study, the product of two years'
work, of the myth of Athena. This was complete
(Mauss 1925, pp. 24-25), and Mauss an-
nounced his intention to publish it (in Hertz
1922, p. 4), but it did not appear and the manu-
script has never been traced. In addition Hertz
had embarked on another investigation, similarly
inspired by the case of St. Besse, of legends and
cults of rocks, mountains, and springs, but he
had not the time to carry it out before the war
took him (A. Hertz, in R. Hertz 1928, pp. xii-
xiii).
In his published works Hertz exhibited a mas-
terly command of the sources, an acute sense of
problem, and a sure style of analysis; he wrote
with clarity and remarkable authority. Never-
theless, and in spite of the courses of lectures
based on his study of sin which Mauss delivered
at the College de France between 1932 and 1937,
as well as more sporadic attention by others
(cf., Needham 1973, p. xiii), Hertz remained
largely unknown until after World War u. His
contributions were then brought to the notice of
social anthropologists in lectures given at Oxford
University by E. E. Evans-Pritchard, and at the
latter's suggestion the essays on death and the
right hand were brought out in an English edi-
tion (Hertz 1960). These led directly to a re-
surgence of interest in symbolic classification,
especially that concerned with lateral values. In
1973 a substantial volume of studies of the sym-
bolism of right and left was published (Need-
ham 1973), inspired by Hertz's essay on the
topic and dedicated to his memory.
During his university years Hertz long hesi-
tated between committing himself to religious
or economic sociology on the one hand, or else
to ethics and politics on the other, but he made
no decided choice (Mauss, in Hertz 1922, p. 2)
and his publications eventually covered a range
of apparently disparate subjects. His essay on
the collective representation of death, an anal-
ysis of secondary burial with special reference to
the Dayak peoples of southeastern Borneo, was
a singularly accomplished piece of work for a
man in his twenties. His argument was that in
primitive societies death was not a unique event
but an initiation; secondary burial, as a rite of
transition, was thus comparable with rites of
birth and marriage. This was essentially the ar-
gument that Arnold van Gennep generalized,
with acknowledgment to Hertz, in his global
survey of rites of passage (1909). In the paper
on the right hand, Hertz argued that the univer-
sal preeminence of the right over the left was a
particular case and a consequence of the dual-
ism inherent in primitive thought, a religious
polarity that symbolically partitioned the uni-
verse and with it the human body. The study of
the alpine cult of St. Besse, an enigmatic figure
armed as a Roman legionary and associated with
an isolated rock high in the mountains, was a
profound combination of local inquiry, historical
research, and sociological speculation. Finally,
the projected work on sin and expiation was an
attempt, by means of comparative ethnography,
to define a form of religious experience. Starting
from the domination of Christian Europe by the
ideas of the sin of the first man and the redemp-
tive passion of Christ, Hertz sought parallels in
less advanced civilizations, especially among the
Maori, and he intended to prove that the Poly-
nesian ideas, while not strictly primitive, were in
a sense antecedent to the Jewish, Greek, and
Roman ideologies from which the modern Eu-
ropean concepts emerged.
Hertz was more fundamentally concerned,
however, to detect certain abstract features of
collective representations and social conduct
underlying these particular institutions: transi-
tion, opposition, the symbolic power of rocks,
and the puzzle of how society could both casti-
gate sin and absolve the sinner as if the offense
could be effaced. In this focusing of analysis
Hertz was a methodological successor to his
teachers Durkheim and Mauss. To some extent
also he shared their weaknesses—for example,
an excessive reliance on the opposition of sacred
and profane, and a metaphoric tendency to hy-
postasize society. In other respects, by contrast,
he was in advance of his seniors, not least in ab-
staining from Durkheim's typical vices of petitio
principii and the explaining away of contrary
evidences by resort to conjectured changes, and
from Mauss's inclination to derive complex so-
cial facts from a single causal factor; also, he
got his references right.
Hertz's characteristic method was to explicate
the interconnections among various aspects of
an institution, to press his analysis in progres-
sively more fundamental terms, and finally to
relate the social facts to a specific ground or
occasion. Thus the physical phenomena of death

do not determine the collective representations
and emotions, but they contribute to the form of
the latter and lend them material support; the
superior agility of the right hand is not the cause
of lateral values and religious polarity, but it
provides the occasion and a paradigmatic case
of opposition; the significance of the rock of
St. Besse is not its anecdotal association with the
cult, but its value as an emblem of the collective
existence and continuity of the community of
the faithful. An especially important feature
of this style of interpretation is that Hertz makes
no doctrinaire disjunction between social facts
and inner states: thus the institution of secon-
dary burial helps to overcome grief and to bring
the survivors gradually to terms with the reality
of the separation; the ideology of dualism, as an
essential source and pattern of order, is pro-
tected by individual reactions of contempt for
the left and aversion from what it symbolizes;
and the social organization of a saint's cult de-
rives from the adherents' wish to endure and
from their imaginative response to the local em-
blem (the rock) of their persistence and unity;
the regulation of mystical crime has to do with
a distinct form of experience.
Connected with this approach, perhaps, was
Hertz's attitude toward ethnographic research.
Whereas neither Durkheim nor Mauss had made
studies in the field, Hertz at least based his study
of St. Besse on six weeks spent in the alpine
hamlet of Cogne. He took part in a pilgrimage
to the rock, and in September 1914 he was to
have made a journey to the mountainous regions
of Greece in order to learn directly, not merely
through books, the background to the myth of
Athena and to cults of rocks in general (A.
Hertz, in R. Hertz 1928, p. xiii). He urged hagi-
ographers not to neglect two "precious instru-
ments of research": a pair of good boots and
an iron-tipped walking stick (1928, p. 188). In
many respects Hertz was a direct precursor,
theoretically and practically, of much that is
best in modern social anthropology. Mauss (in
Hertz 1922, p. 1) found that time only confirmed
and perpetuated Hertz's methods, the directive
value of his analyses, and his style of exposition:
"They enter the serene sphere of the classical."
RODNEY NEEDHAM
WORKS BY HERTZ
1907 Contribution a une etude sur la representation
collective de la mort. Annee sociologique 10:48-137.
—» Translation in Hertz 1960.
1909 La preeminence de la main droite: Etude sur Ja
polarite religieuse. Revue philosophique de la France
HESCHEL, ABRAHAM J. 297
et de I'etranger 68:553-80. -» Translation in Hertz
1960; revised translation in Needham 1973.
1910 Socialisme et depopulation. Les Cahiers du So-
cialiste, No. 10, Paris.
1913 Saint Besse: Etude d'un culte alpestre. Revue
de I'histoire des religions 67:115-180.
1917 Contes et dictons receuillis sur le front parmi les
poilus de la Mayenne et d'ailleurs (campagne de
1915). Revue des traditions pppulaires 32:31—45,
74-91. -H> Reprinted in Hertz 1928.
1922 Le peche et 1'expiation dans les societes primi-
tives. Revue de I'histoire des religions 86:1-60.
—» Includes biographical details and an estimation
of Hertz's major concerns by Mauss on pages 1-4.
1928 (1970) Sociologie religieuse et folklore. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France. —> Preface by
Georges Balandier. First issued under the title
Melanges de sociologie religieuse et folklore, edited
by Marcel Mauss, with a preface by Alice Hertz.
1960 Death and the Right Hand. Translated by Rod-
ney Needham and Claudia Needham. London:
Cohen & West; Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. —» Intro-
duction by E. E. Evans-Pritchard.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GENNEP, ARNOLD VAN (1909) 1960 The Rites of
Passage. London: Routledge; Univ. of Chicago
Press. —> First published in French.
MAUSS, MARCEL 1925 In Memoriam: L'oeuvre in-
edite de Durkheim et de ses collaborateurs. Annee
sociologique New Series 1:7-29. —» For Hertz's
works, see pages 23-25.
NEEDHAM, RODNEY (editor) 1973 Right & Left: Es-
says on Dual Symbolic Classification. Univ. of Chi-
cago Press. -> Foreword by E. E. Evans-Pritchard.
The editor's introduction expatiates on the value
of Hertz's ideas. A paperback edition was published
in 1978.
HESCHEL, ABRAHAM J.
Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907-1972) was
born and raised in Warsaw, acquired his aca-
demic training in Berlin, and wrote most of his
mature works in the United States, to which he
emigrated in 1940. From 1945 until his death
he held the position of professor of ethics and
mysticism at the Jewish Theological Seminary
of America in New York. His work as a phi-
losopher of religion and a theologian is best un-
derstood as an attempt to achieve a creative
synthesis between the two different worlds in
which he lived before he came to the United
States. Born into an intensely traditional Hasidic
milieu, he counted among his paternal ancestors
Rabbi Dob Ber of Mezeritch, "the Great Maggid,"
successor to the Ba'al Shem Tov, founder of the
Hasidic movement that swept across eastern
European Jewry in the eighteenth century, and
Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, known as "the
Apter rebbe." On his mother's side he was also
descended from rabbis. Growing up in the world
of piety and learning, he acquired a thorough
training in the study of the Talmud as well as a
298 HESCHEL, ABRAHAM J.
knowledge of the world of Jewish mysticism, the
Kabbalah. Determined to receive a modern
Western education, he spent time at a secular
Yiddish Realgymnasium in Vilna, and in 1927,
moved to Berlin, where he attended the
Hochschule fur die Wissenschaft des Judentums
and the University of Berlin. In February 1933
the university awarded him a doctorate for his
dissertation on prophetic consciousness (1936).
Arriving in Germany with an impressive ac-
cumulation of rabbinical learning, he was con-
fronted at the University of Berlin with the
critical methods of modern philology and source
criticism, while his ancestral piety was chal-
lenged by the approaches of modern secular
philosophy, science, and psychology. Heschel
was especially impressed by the works of the
neo-Kantian philosophers and by such phenom-
enologists as Eduard Husserl and Max Scheler.
Against the neo-Kantians he defended the
claims of Biblical and rabbinical Judaism that
God is more than an idea, a postulate of reason,
or a logical possibility. From the phenomenolo-
gists he learned to analyze the constitutive traits
and structures of experienced reality in their
essential purity, without reducing them to alien
categories that distort their uniqueness. Thus,
in his doctoral dissertation, he refused to force
the phenomena of Biblical prophecy into the
fixed categories of Aristotelian metaphysics, as
the medieval scholastics had done, or to "ex-
plain" them in terms of modern psychological
or sociological notions. As a result of his attempt
to analyze the prophetic consciousness of the
Bible he developed a novel conceptual frame-
work that became the nucleus of his later phi-
losophy of Judaism.
Heschel saw the task of the philosopher of
religion neither in the construction of a "religion
of reason," such as the neo-Kantian philosopher
Hermann Cohen had done, nor in the analysis
of "religious experience," such as Rudolf Otto had
achieved in The Idea of the Holy (1917). The
first substitutes philosophy for religion; the
second tends to replace it with the psychology of
religion. If religion is sui generis, it must be
studied in its own terms, and the interpreter,
while making full use of the tools of philosophy,
must never forget that the main task is to un-
derstand and illumine the reality underlying re-
ligion, the living and dynamic relationship be-
tween God and man disclosed in the classical
documents of Judaism and the lives and ex-
periences of pious men.
Heschel therefore pursued two parallel, com-
plementary tasks: he did research in the sources
of classical Judaism to gain valid and objective
knowledge of that tradition, and he formulated
his own philosophy of religion based on the re-
sults of his specialized studies. These, in ad-
dition to his work on prophecy (later expanded
into his English book The Prophets [1962]), in-
cluded a biography of Maimonides (1935), arti-
cles on medieval philosophy, Kabbalah, and
Hasidism, as well as a major work on the doc-
trines of revelation in talmudic thought written
in Hebrew (1962-1965). A two-volume work on
the thought of Rabbi Menahem Mendel of Kotzk
(1973a), written in Yiddish, and an English vol-
ume on the Kotzker and Kierkegaard (1973Z?)
appeared posthumously.
Heschel used the results of these researches
to construct his own philosophy of religion,
which is developed in Man Is Not Alone (1951a)
and its successor volume, God in Search of Man
(1955). In these books, Heschel defined religion
as an answer to man's ultimate questions. Since
modern man is often alienated from the reality
that informs genuine faith, Heschel thought it
inadequate to present traditional answers to
these questions. Instead, he tried to recover the
significant existential questions to which Juda-
ism offers answers. Delving beneath the surface
phenomena of modern doubt and rootlessness,
he confronted his readers with the living God of
the Bible. This God is not "proved" as is the
conclusion of a syllogism; to the religiously
sensitive man God is an "ontological presup-
position," the ultimate reality, which is then
crystallized by discursive thinking into the con-
cept of a power, a principle, or a structure.
Heschel described three ways in which man
could reach an awareness of God. The first is by
going through wonder beyond the mere givenness
of the facts to an awareness of the grandeur and
mystery of reality. Such wonder can take differ-
ent forms: as curiosity it becomes the starting
point of science, which looks beyond the given
facts (data) to the laws they exemplify; as radi-
cal amazement it points to the ground and
power that stand behind all facts and percep-
tions of facts. This evocative approach yields a
panentheistic outlook: through created things
man reaches an awareness of the God who is
within, but is also beyond all finite existence.
In the second way, man reaches an awareness
of God by delving into the recesses of his own
being, thus realizing that the self is not a dis-
crete, independent, and self-sufficient entity, but
part of something greater and more encompas-

sing than one's individual ego. This second way
tends to a quasi-mystical world view, but it stops
short of the danger of mystical absorption and
annihilation in the Godhead by articulating God
as the subject of all reality and man as the
object whose dignity and worth derive from his
consciousness of being the goal of divine con-
cern and expectation.
In the third way, man becomes aware of the
voice of God. The "holy dimension" discovered
by listening to the voice and acting responsively
and responsibly characterizes the Biblical view
of man as the recipient of divine revelation. In
facing the transcendent God and his demands
one becomes a moral agent. By observing the
commandments the Jew enters this holy di-
mension of God's challenge and guidance, and
by obediently responding to the divine impera-
tive he experiences himself as the object of
God's address and concern.
Heschel's emphasis that faith is not so much
assent to a proposition as an attitude of the
whole person, a response and an attachment to
God's demands, is not only important for his
understanding of the significance of halakhah
(law). It is also crucial for his interpretation of
God as personal outgoing ("transitive") concern
and for his critique of the main trends of phi-
losophical theology that have tried to assimilate
the living God of the Bible to impersonal cate-
gories of Greek metaphysics or to some types of
modern process philosophy. To raise the concept
of God from the level of crude anthropomor-
phism, the medievals defined him as Being Itself,
while the modern inclination is to describe the
Deity as the power that makes for goodness, the
underlying structure or the nisus of the universe
or the moral dimension of reality. This however
is not only detrimental to religious life, watering
down the "religious availability" of God, but in
direct conflict with the Biblical and rabbinic out-
look. Therefore Heschel emphasized the divine
concern of the personal God as essential to any
adequate Biblical theoldgy. He developed the con-
cept of the "divine pathos," which he had first
presented in his doctoral thesis, and made it the
cornerstone of his later thought. In fact, the
concept of personal concern can be considered
the key to Heschel's whole system: The Ultimate
is not Being but concern or directed attention.
Few of Heschel's readers realize that he pro-
pounded a doctrine that ran counter to the
whole venerable tradition of Jewish and Chris-
tian metaphysical theology from Philo Judaeus,
Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas to Hermann
HESCHEL, ABRAHAM J. 299
Cohen, Etienne Gilson, and Paul Tillich. He
declared that the Greek category of "being" and
eternally frozen perfection is inadequate to
Judaism and must be replaced by a new set of
categories derived from Biblical thinking. Aris-
totle's Unmoved Mover must give way to the
Bible's Most Moved Mover, the God of pathos and
transitive concern who stands in a dynamic and
reciprocal relationship to his creation. "Being
through creation," through the divine act of
freedom, expresses in symbolic form that reality
is not a self-sufficient, fixed, mechanical order.
It is a process in which responsible man freely
reacts to the challenges of life and in which
surprise, novelty, and unexpected creative possi-
bilities always occur. Through sympathy, com-
passion, and sensitivity to the divine demands,
man can overcome his egocentric predicament
and fulfill his true potential.
Man as created in the image of God must find
his goal in imitatio Dei. Heschel's teachings on
the nature and worth of man are perhaps his
most important contribution to the social sci-
ences. Animate is distinguished from inanimate
existence by reflexive concern: every living or-
ganism abhors its own destruction. God, who
faces no threat to his being, is free of reflexive
concern and is characterized by transitive or
outgoing concern for others. Man, who as a
living creature shares reflexive concern and
anxiety for his own future with the animals, is
distinguished by sharing transitive concern with
God, a regard for others. "Man cannot even be
in accord with his own self unless he serves
something beyond himself." In ethics the idea
of concern helps to explain the ideal of caring
for the fellow creature. Animals are content
when their needs are satisfied; man cannot find
true happiness unless he is also able to satisfy,
to be a need, not only to have needs.
In exploring basic human attitudes the idea
of active concern enables us to overcome routine
dullness and alienation by reminding us that
man is a self-surpassing creature, the being who
is always beyond himself, in ek-stasis, trans-
cending his loneliness and isolation in knowl-
edge, action, art, and worship. Space and time
take on a new meaning in Heschel's Biblical
thinking: things are merely frozen processes;
life itself is a process gathering the past into
itself, reaching out into the future. Reality is
not like a stone sculpture, but like a symphony.
The Sabbath, whose celebration is the weekly re-
newal of the divine-human covenant, is an edi-
fice in time, a cathedral of the spirit.
 300 HICKS, JOHN R.
For the student of the social sciences the most
challenging and significant aspect of Heschel's
thought may lie in his frankly theocentric view-
point. Where naturalists have tried to under-
stand religion in terms of human interests,
categories, and needs, he maintained the tradi-
tional Jewish doctrine that man cannot under-
stand his own nature, his needs and fulfillment,
in isolation from God. He once remarked that
the Bible is not man's theology but rather God's
anthropology. His philosophy of religion ex-
pounding the thesis that God needs man and
that man finds his deepest fulfillment in shar-
ing in the divine concern, was an attempt to
work out the implications of this Judaic world
view for modern man.
FRITZ A. ROTHSCHILD
WORKS BY HESCHEL
1935 Maimonides: Eine Biographic. Berlin: Erich
Reiss Verlag.
1936 Die Prophetie. Krakow: Polish Academy of Sci-
ences.
1950 The Earth Is the Lord's: The Inner Life of the
Jews in East Europe. New York: Schuman. —>
Published, together with The Sabbath, in a paper-
back edition in 1966 by Harper.
(1951a) 1972 Man Is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Re-
ligion. New York: Octagon. —» A paperback edition
was published in 1976 by Farrar, Straus.
1951b The Sabbath: Its Meaning for Modern Man.
New York: Farrar, Straus. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1975. Also published, together
with The Earth Is the Lord's, in a paperback edition
in 1966 by Harper.
1954 Man's Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and
Symbolism. New York: Scribners.
(1955) 1972 God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of
Judaism. New York: Octagon. —•> A paperback
edition was published in 1976 by Farrar, Straus.
(1959) 1976 Between God and Man: An Interpretation
of Judaism From the Writings of Abraham J.
Heschel. Selected, edited, and introduced by Fritz
A. Rothschild. With a revised introduction and a
complete bibliography. New York: Free Press.
1962 The Prophets. New York: Harper. —> A paper-
back edition was published in two volumes in 1969
and 1971.
1962-1965 Torah min ha-shamayim ba-ispaqlaryah
shel ha-dorot (Theology of Ancient Judaism).
2 vols. London and New York: Soncino Press.
1965 Who Is Man? Stanford Univ. Press.
1966 The Insecurity of Freedom: Essays on Human
Existence. New York: Farrar, Straus. —» A paper-
back edition was published in 1972 by Schocken.
1969 Israel: An Echo of Eternity. New York: Farrar,
Straus.
1973d Kotzk: In gerdngl far emesdikeit (Kotzk: The
Struggle for Integrity). 2 vols. Tel Aviv; Hamenora.
1973b A Passion for Truth. New York: Farrar, Straus.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
OTTti, RUDOLF (1917) 1950 The Idea of ihe Holy:
An Inquiry Into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea
of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational. 2d
ed. Oxford Univ. Press. —» First published as Das
Heilige.
HICKS, JOHN R.
John Hicks was born in Leamington Spa,
England, in 1904. He was an undergraduate at
Balliol College, Oxford, from 1922 to 1926, and
studied mathematics for a year, then philosophy,
politics, and economics. He was Jevons professor
of political economy, Manchester (1938-1946),
fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford (1946-1952),
and Drummond professor of political economy,
Oxford (1952-1965).
Hicks is one of the leading economic theorists
of the twentieth century. He was created Knight
Bachelor in 1964. In 1972 he was awarded the
Nobel Prize in economics (jointly with Kenneth
J. Arrow) for his work on "general equilibrium
and welfare economics." His Value and Capital
(1939b) is an economic classic. His major writ-
ings have become thoroughly absorbed into
teaching at the university level, most notably
those on indifference curve analysis, and on the
IS—LM curve presentation of the Keynesian
system.
In his early years as a junior lecturer at the
London School of Economics (L.S.E.), Hicks
had intended to specialize in labor economics,
and his earliest publications were on institutional
aspects of the labor market. However, by 1929
he had begun to explore economic theory and
to read Gustav Cassel, Leon Walras, Vilfredo
Pareto, Francis Y. Edgeworth, Knut Wicksell,
and the Austrians. At the same time, he was
lecturing on general equilibrium theory, in the
tradition of Walras and Pareto, and on risk. The
influence on Hicks of Friedrich A. von Hayek
(who arrived at the L.S.E. in 1931) was strong
and may be detected in varying degrees in all
his major works. By 1934, Hicks was indepen-
dently writing on money in a distinctly Keynes-
ian vein. He subsequently became a noted
expositor and developer of Keynesian ideas.
Starting from Hicks's first book on wages, D. H.
Robertson was an important private influence,
something which is perhaps most obvious in
Hicks's trade cycle volume.
Hicks's first book, The Theory of Wages
(1932), is not typical of his total work, adopting,
as it does, the assumption of "neutral" money.
Even so, it has been influential in a number of
respects, including its discussion of inventions,
and its introduction of a new measure of the
substitutability of factors, the "elasticity of sub-
stitution." Various generalizations of the elas-
ticity of substitution have since been developed;
by Hicks himself and by Paul A. Samuelson
(Wolfe 1968).

It was Hicks's second book, Value and Cap-
ital, which established his reputation as a
theorist of the first water. Its major contribu-
tions are the elaboration and development of
Paretian value theory and Walrasian general
equilibrium theory. The early chapters build on
the work jointly developed with R. G. D. Allen
in the article "A Reconsideration of the Theory
of Value" (1934). This paper abandoned the
concept of measurable utility, and showed that
to derive many operational results of demand
analysis, it was sufficient to assume simply that
consumers were able to rank bundles of goods
in order of preference. Although the apparent
novelty of the Hicks—Allen theory was dimin-
ished by the discovery of an earlier mathemati-
cal version developed by Eugen Slutsky, the
clear literary way in which it was developed in
Value and Capital, and the skill with which it
was used to illuminate such concepts as comple-
mentarity and substitutability, made it essen-
tially a Hicksian theory. In A Revision of De-
mand Theory (1956), Hicks revised the first
three chapters of Value and Capital in terms of
the "revealed preference" theory of Samuelson.
In the 1950s, Hicks was one of a group of
economists who were concerned with develop-
ing compensation criteria in welfare economics.
The theoretical underpinnings of this work are
contained in the previously mentioned two
books. His approach was much criticized by
theorists. It has been, at least partly, replaced
by the more concrete policy approach of Jan
Tinbergen; the social welfare function approach
of Abram Bergson and Samuelson; and the ap-
proach by I. M. D. Little and others giving dis-
tribution effects paramount place. Nevertheless,
the compensation approach may remain the best
rationale for modern work in cost-benefit and
cost—effectiveness analyses.
Another accomplishment of Value and Cap-
ital was to investigate the stability of Walrasian
general equilibrium. Hicks went beyond the
"equation counting" approach of Walras, to in-
vestigate how the system would react to changes
in tastes and resources. However, the stability
criteria he developed failed to provide a satis-
factory theory of behavior out of equilibrium.
This deficiency was noted by Samuelson who
was able to demonstrate that Hicks's conditions
were neither necessary nor sufficient for
dynamic stability. There followed a period of
intense research into the properties of general
equilibrium models by economists such as Lloyd
A. Metzler, J. L. Mosak, and P. K. Newman (a
student of Hicks), culminating in the important
HICKS, JOHN R. 301
works of G. Debreu, Arrow, and F. H. Hahn.
On the whole, this research has reconfirmed the
value of the Hicksian contribution. For example,
the work of D. McFadden (Wolfe 1968) has
shown that certain processes which are stable,
in the sense of Samuelson, are "close to" the
sequential adjustments to temporary equilibria
described by Hicks.
The work of Hicks on value and risk led him
to develop an early version of portfolio selection
theory in the paper "A Suggestion for Simplify-
ing the Theory of Money" (1935). This theory
has flourished in the hands of James Tobin,
H. Markowitz, and others, though elements of it
were already present in Keynes's writings. Per-
haps as a result of this 1935 paper, Hicks was
asked to review Keynes's General Theory (1936)
for the Economic Journal in 1936. This review
was very much a first impression, but it led on to
what is essentially a second review, "Mr. Keynes
and the 'Classics'" (1937), in which Hicks in-
troduced the IS-LM curve diagram which has
come to be regarded as the essence of the
Keynesian theory. Useful though this model has
been as an expository device, it had the unde-
sirable effect, recognized by Hicks himself, of
causing Keynesian analysis to relapse into
statics. Don Patinkin maintained that the
Keynesian model was best viewed in a frame-
work of disequilibrium dynamics, and this is
the view that has prevailed, largely through the
intellectual leadership of Robert W. Glower, a
former student of Hicks.
The first major attempt by Hicks at disequi-
librium dynamics was his Contribution to the
Theory of the Trade Cycle (1950), which built
on the multiplier-accelerator framework estab-
lished by Samuelson, and the growth model of
Roy F. Harrod. In the Hicksian model, two ef-
fects mitigated the instability which the acceler-
ator induces in a Harrod-type model of equilib-
rium growth. Firstly, the accelerator was
assumed to work with a lag, and secondly, a
part of investment was assumed to be autono-
mous. The path that the cycle took was con-
strained from below by a "floor" caused by
autonomous investment and its consequential
consumption, and was constrained from above
by a full capacity "ceiling." R. M. Goodwin
(1951) simultaneously published a theory of the
cycle which may have been more satisfactory,
from a technical point of view than that of
Hicks, but since that time, relatively less interest
has been shown in theoretical models of this
kind, although cycles remain a major field of
interest for the econometrician.
302 HICKS, JOHN R.
Hicks's next major investigation of dynamics
was Capital and Growth (1965), a book which
he himself described as "critical and expository,
rather than constructive." Even so, the early
chapters have become influential as a method-
ological study of the "microfoundations of
macroeconomics." The book made a simple, but
fruitful, distinction between "fixprice" and "flex-
price" markets: a distinction which was used to
great effect in Hicks's analysis of The Crisis in
Keynesian Economics (1974). Paradoxically,
the most important aspect of Capital and
Growth was a flaw in the second part of the
book which dealt with a steady-state growth
model. It was pointed out by C. M. Kennedy
(Wolfe 1968), that Hicks had assumed that
capital goods which were being made in a given
period were also used to produce output. This
criticism led to the writing of Capital and Time
(1973a) in which Hicks developed a model
which was based on the Austrian tradition of
Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, Wicksell, and Hayek.
Hicks regarded each production process as a
time profile of inputs and outputs. The model
was one of complete vertical integration in
which, at no point, were intermediate products
referred back to the market. This model was
shown by E. Burmeister to be a particular case
of a John von Neumann model in which input
and output matrices have a special form. If this
were the only point, the main advantage of the
neo-Austrian approach would be pedagogic.
However, the deeper purpose of Capital and
Time was to provide a theory of the effects of
I innovation. Such a theory was implicit in Hicks's
A Theory of Economic History (1969) and was
discussed again in the guise of "impulse"
(1973k) in Hicks's Nobel lecture in 1972.
For many years, Hicks contributed to policy
discussion—not always with unanimous agree-
ment. One must note, however, his important
applied work on taxation, much of it in collabora-
tion with his wife, Ursula Hicks. Since 1965, his
work on policies toward wage inflation has
commended itself widely, even in political cir-
cles. Much of this discussion has been particu-
larly concerned with taxation policies toward
excessive wage claims.
The range of activity of Hicks has been im-
mense, and is not easily summarized. His own
subtitle to Value and Capital provides perhaps
the best description of his life's work: An In-
quiry Into Some Fundamental Principles of Eco-
nomic Theory.
G. C. REID AND J. N. WOLFE
"WORKS BY HICKS
(1932) 1963 The Theory of Wages. 2d ed. London:
Macmillan.
1934 HICKS, JOHN R.; and ALLEN, R. G. D. A Recon-
sideration of the Theory of Value. 2 parts. Eco-
nomica New Series 1:52-76, 196-219.
(1935) 1951 A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory
of Money. Pages 13-32 in American Economic As-
sociation, Readings in Monetary Theory. Philadel-
phia: Blakiston.
1936 Review of J. M. Keynes's The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money. Economic Jour-
nal 46:238-258.
1937 Mr. Keynes and the "Classics": A Suggested
Interpretation. Econometrica 5:147-159.
1939a The Foundations of Welfare Economics. Eco-
nomic Journal 49:696-712.
(1939&) 1953 Value and Capital: An Inquiry Into
Some Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory.
2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon.
(1941) 1942 HICKS, JOHN R. ; HICKS, URSULA; and
ROSTAS, L. Taxation of War Wealth. 2d ed. Oxford:
Clarendon.
(1942) 1971 The Social Framework: An Introduction
to Economics. 4th ed. Oxford: Clarendon.
1943 HICKS, JOHN R.; and HICKS, URSULA Standards
of Local Expenditure: A Problem of the Inequality
of Incomes. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1944 HICKS, JOHN R.; HICKS, URSULA; and LESER,
C. E. V. The Problem of Valuation for Rating.
Cambridge Univ. Press.
1945 HICKS, JOHN R.; and HICKS, URSULA The Inci-
dence of Local Rates in Great Britain. Cambridge
Univ. Press.
1950 A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle.
Oxford: Clarendon.
1951 Report of Revenue Allocation Commission (Part
II). Nigeria: Government Printer.
1955 HICKS, JOHN R.; and HICKS, URSULA Report on
Finance and Taxation in Jamaica. Kingston: Gov-
ernment Printer.
(1956) 1959 A Revision of Demand Theory. 2d ed.
Oxford: Clarendon.
1959 Essays in World Economics. Oxford: Clarendon.
(1965) 1972 Capital and Growth. Oxford Univ. Press.
1967 Critical Essays in Monetary Theory. Oxford:
Clarendon.
1969 A Theory of Economic History. Oxford: Claren-
don.
1973a Capital and Time: A New-Austrian Theory. Ox-
ford : Clarendon.
1973fc The Mainspring of Economic Growth. Swedish
Journal of Economics 75:336-348.
1974 The Crisis in Keynesian Economics. Oxford:
Blackwell.
1977 Economic Perspectives: Further Essays on Money
and Growth. Oxford: Clarendon.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAUMOL, WILLIAM J. 1972 John R. Hicks' Contri-
bution to Economics. Swedish Journal of Eco-
nomics 74:503-527.
GOODWIN, R. M. 1951 The Nonlinear Accelerator
and the Persistence of Business Cycles. Econo-
metrica 19:1-17.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —» A paperback edition was published in
1965 by Harcourt.
WOLFE, J. N. (editor) 1968 Value, Capital and
Growth: Papers in Honour of Sir John Hicks. Ed-
inburgh Univ. Press.

HILGARD, ERNEST R.
Ernest Ropiequet Hilgard is best known
among his scientific colleagues as an experi-
mental psychologist who has worked deeply in
two very different fields, human learning and
hypnosis. In a much wider circle he is equally
well known as an educator and a scientific states-
man. Through his authoritative textbooks he has
become the leading generalist—and possibly one
of the last—in the gradually fragmenting psy-
chology of the latter half of the twentieth century.
Hilgard was born in Belleville, Illinois, on July
25, 1904. His father was a physician and his
earliest vocational thoughts were toward medi-
cine; his father died in France in early 1918
while on army medical service, however, destroy-
ing the possibility of a normal family succession
in practice. Medicine lost its appeal to him, but
his scientific orientation was reflected some
years later when he chose chemical engineering
as his undergraduate major at the University of
Illinois.
A second decision, soon after graduation, re-
vealed an underlying conflict between science
and humanitarianism that characterized Hil-
gard's career from then on. He chose to spend
a year as a Young Men's Christian Association
counselor rather than to go immediately to grad-
uate school. The following year he enrolled in
the Yale Divinity School, strongly attracted to
the study of social ethics. So far as his educa-
tion was concerned, the conflict was resolved a
year later, when he transferred to psychology at
Yale University, a compromise between hard
science and liberal humanitarianism. The latter
remained a clear part of his life, however, and
in later years he participated in a succession of
social betterment activities such as work with
a consumers' cooperative, and support of labor
schools and of the American Civil Liberties
Union. Indeed, because of these interests he
briefly became a victim of McCarthyism in the
early 1950s.
Hilgard was attracted to both vocational and
experimental psychology, but the latter field was
Yale's strength. His dissertation on eyelid con-
ditioning, performed under the direction of Ray-
mond Dodge, was the first major study of the
differences between reflexes, conditioned re-
flexes, and voluntary action. After receiving his
PH.D. (1930), he remained at Yale as an in-
structor for three years, completing a number of
studies on occipitally decorticated dogs with his
colleague, Donald G. Marquis. This collaboration
HILGARD, ERNEST R. 303
led eventually to their classic volume on Con-
ditioning and Learning (1940), an exhaustive
and perceptive review that set the stage for the
vigorous development of that field during the
postwar decade.
In 1933, Hilgard was offered an assistant pro-
fessorship at Stanford University. He hesitated
to leave the eastern academic scene, but on being
advised by his department chairman that only
a man with private means should remain at Yale,
he accepted the invitation. With the exception of
a sabbatical year at the University of Chicago
and a three-year stint in Washington during
World War n, he remained at Stanford through-
out his career. During the first few years he
studied the problems of learning as these related
to the conditioning process, examining the rela-
tion between principles of learning revealed by
conditioning and by more conventional methods
such as rote learning. In 1940 the Society of Ex-
perimental Psychologists awarded him its War-
ren medal for his research.
At the same time, Hilgard's interest in the re-
lationship between learning and education was
renewed. Since the beginning of his Stanford
career he had been a courtesy member of the
education faculty. In 1940, he was invited to the
University of Chicago to participate in a one-
year study of the application of knowledge about
child development and learning to the educa-
tion of young children. This year marked a sig-
nificant change of direction and broadening of
Hilgard's career. Several factors were respon-
sible. His wife, Josephine Hilgard, a Gesell-
trained PH.D. in developmental psychology, had
secured a medical degree at Stanford in prepa-
ration for a career in child psychiatry. During
the year at the University of Chicago she began
her training at the Psychoanalytic Institute, thus
bringing her husband into contact with a kind
of psychology entirely new to him. Likewise, the
work with Daniel Prescott's child development
group opened another new scene to him. A third
important influence soon followed; with the out-
break of World War 11 he went to Washington
to participate in a program of civilian surveys,
first working with Rensis Likert and successively
in other agencies with many other leading social
psychologists. These were the experiences—psy-
choanalysis, child development, and applied
social psychology—that converted Hilgard, the
conditioned reflexer, to Hilgard, the generalist,
whose introductory textbook on psychology
would become the leader in its field less than a
decade later (Hilgard 1953).
304 HILGARD, ERNEST R.
During the war years, Lewis M. Terman had
retired and Hilgard was appointed, in absentia,
executive head of the psychology department.
On his return to Stanford, he began enlarging
the faculty in order to cope with the tremendous
influx of returned war veterans in the graduate
program. Not surprisingly, his expansion was
in the direction of child and clinical psychology.
There was one remaining job for him to do in
the field of learning, however, and he largely put
aside further experimentation to complete a
critical treatise comparing the many divergent
learning theories that had grown up during the
previous two decades. Theories of Learning (Hil-
gard 1948) became the definitive statement on
theories that Conditioning and Learning had
been on empirics.
Hilgard was appointed dean of graduate
studies in 1951, but found time to complete his
introductory text (Hilgard 1953) while guid-
ing the university's increasing participation
in externally funded research and strengthening
the faculty in the social sciences. The textbook
was notable for a return to a more Jamesian
style than had been customary in the texts of
the 1930s and 1940s. Particularly in the areas
of developmental, social, and motivational psy-
chology it provided a broader and somewhat
more applied—or real life—emphasis, avoiding
the limitations that would have been imposed by
a close reliance on purely experimental data.
It was during the war years that Hilgard began
his role as a national statesman for science. He
was a key member of the committee that re-
organized the American Psychological Associa-
tion (APA) to bring together the academic and
applied psychologists. He was elected to the APA
council soon thereafter, and to the presidency
in 1949. In the meantime he served on Harvard
University's review committee designed to make
recommendations for the future of the psychol-
ogy department. In the subsequent two decades
he served on the National Advisory Mental
Health Council, was an advisor to the Ford
Foundation, and was an APA representative on
both the Social Science and National Research
Councils. From 1967 to 1969 he was chairman
of the joint committee of the National Academy
of Sciences and the Social Science Research
Council that appraised (in nine volumes) the
current status and future needs of the social
and behavioral sciences. He was also elected to
membership in the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, the National Academy of Educa-
tion, and the American Philosophical Society.
In 1969, he was given the APA's distinguished
scientific contribution award.
Fifteen years of national service, university
administration, and book writing had left Hil-
gard with a strong desire to resume his research
career. In 1955 he resigned the graduate dean-
ship, and with initial funding from the Ford
Foundation, established a laboratory for hypno-
sis research. During the first six years, he and
his collaborators—graduate students and junior
faculty—explored thoroughly the phenomena of
hypnosis and constructed reliable scales for
measuring a subject's susceptibility to hypnotic
induction. A major finding was that hypnotiza-
bility is a highly stable personality quality, even
over a ten year period. He published a full review
of this work under the title Hypnotic Susceptibil-
ity (1965).
By this time Josephine Hilgard had joined him
in the developmental study of hypnotizability,
and her psychodynamic investigations paralleled
and enriched his more experimental researches.
Again Hilgard's abiding interest in application
gave direction to his work; during the next dec-
ade the Hilgards examined intensively the use
of hypnosis in alleviating both chronic and ex-
perimentally induced pain (Hilgard & Hil-
gard 1975). From this work has come a sub-
stantial theoretical contribution to the problem
of pain itself, a sorting out of the independent
contributions of anxiety and of direct sensory
perception. The former source can be reduced
by both hypnosis and placebos, but only hypnotic
analgesia can reduce the latter, and then only in
highly hypnotizable persons. These findings,
coupled with many others from the laboratory's
two productive decades, led Hilgard to construct
a neodissociation theory of the divided conscious
and unconscious processes represented by the
classical phenomena of amnesia, analgesia,
fugues, multiple personalities, and induced hal-
lucinations. The theory rests on a distinction
between monitoring and executive functions in
mental operations, the tripartite fractionation of
the former allowing for independent occurrence
of mental processing (1977, chapter 11).
In his autobiography (1974), Hilgard referred
to himself as an eclectic with respect to psy-
chological theories. In support of this assertion
is the fact that Theories of Learning contained
no definitive chapter that could be called Hil-
gard's theory. Likewise, one of the significant
qualities of the Introduction was its easy move-
ment back and forth between the languages of
consciousness and of behavior, a point of view

anticipated in his 1949 APA presidential address,
in which he discussed the importance of the self-
concept in psychology. This quality of eclecti-
cism—a common sense empiricism that draws
on whatever is needed to construct a useful
psychology—has made his introductory text
widely influential in its field. Curiously enough,
it also provided the essential ingredient needed
to permit Hilgard to develop a theory in his
second research area, hypnosis. Neodissociation
theory does succeed in integrating the many
complex findings that stem from studies in three
parallel realms: consciousness, overt behavior,
and physiology.
ROBERT R. SEARS
"WORKS BY HILGARD
1931 Conditioned Eyelid Reactions to a Light Stimulus
Based on the Reflex Wink to Sound. Psychological
Monographs 41: Whole no. 184.
(1940) 1961 HILGARD, ERNEST R.; and MARQUIS, DON-
ALD G. Conditioning and Learning. 2d ed. New
York: Apple ton.
(1948) 1975 HILGARD, ERNEST R.; and BOWER, GOR-
DON H. Theories of Learning. 4th ed. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. —> Hilgard was the sole
author of the first three editions published by
Apple ton.
1949 Human Motives and the Concept of the Self.
American Psychologist 4:374—382.
(1953) 1975 HILGARD, ERNEST R.; ATKINSON, RICH-
ARD C.; and ATKINSON, RITA Introduction to Psy-
chology. 6th ed. New York: Harcourt.
1965 Hypnotic Susceptibility. New York: Harcourt.
—> An abridged paperback edition was published in
1968 with the title The Experience of Hypnosis.
1968 Psychoanalysis: IV. Experimental Studies. Vol-
ume 13, pages 37-45 in International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills.
New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1974 Autobiography. Volume 6, pages 129-160 in A
History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited by
Gardner Lindzey. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall.
1975 HILGARD, ERNEST R.; and HILGARD, JOSEPHINE R.
Hypnosis in the Relief of Pain. Los Altos, Calif.:
Kaufmann.
1977 Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in
Human Thought and Action. New York: Wiley.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ernest Ropiequet Hilgard 1967 American Psycholo-
gist 22:1130-1135. -» A bibliography of Hilgard's
writings is on pages 1131-1135.
HOCART, A. M.
Arthur Maurice Hocart (1883-1939), a Brit-
ish anthropologist of French descent, was born
in Belgium and attended Exeter College, Oxford.
After receiving his degree in classics and ancient
history, he went to the Solomon Islands to carry
out ethnographic research with W. H. R. Rivers
HOCART, A. M. 305
as a member of the Percy Sladen Trust Expedi-
tion (1908/1909). Alfred C. Haddon, professor
of anthropology at Cambridge University, then
recommended Hocart for the post of headmaster
of a school in the Lau Islands, Fiji, where he re-
mained for three years (1909-1912) and ac-
quired a profound knowledge of Fijian civiliza-
tion. There followed investigations on Rotuma,
Wallis Island, Samoa, and Tonga before he re-
turned in 1914 to Oxford, where in the succeed-
ing year he lectured on psychology and anthro-
pology. From 1915 to 1919 he served in the
light infantry, fought in France, and rose to
the rank of captain. After the war, in 1921, he
was appointed archeological commissioner for
Ceylon, a post he retained until 1929, when poor
health forced him to retire. For the next four or
five years he was honorary lecturer in ethnology
at University College London, and librarian and
a member of the Council of the Royal Anthropo-
logical Institute. In 1934, at the instance of E. E.
Evans-Pritchard, he was elected professor of
sociology at Fuad I University, Cairo, a post he
held until he died in 1939 of an infection con-
tracted during field work in upper Egypt.
Although for most of his life Hocart held no
academic position, he engaged the professional
respect of many prominent figures in anthro-
pology, including Rivers, Haddon, Grafton Elliot
Smith, William J. Perry, Evans-Pritchard, Lord
Raglan, and also Marcel Mauss. He published
five books and nearly two hundred lesser items
(Needham 1967). In spite of Hocart's scholar-
ship and numerous achievements, he made little
contemporary impression on an academic an-
thropology dominated by Bronislaw Malinowski
and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, and in the subse-
quent development of the discipline he was ac-
corded no prominent recognition. His main
theoretical concern was with the history of cul-
ture, studied by the comparative and inferential
methods of philology, and this was not fashion-
able in a period when academic efforts were
most committed to the prosecution of intense
functionalist studies of single societies. Religion
and symbolism, his chief forms of evidence, were
set at a discount against the sociological analy-
sis of kinship, segmentary organization, and
political systems. In later decades, however, his
work and style of thought attracted greater at-
tention. The Life-giving Myth (1952a) was re-
issued in 1970, and in the same year there ap-
peared a critical edition of Kings and Councillors
(1936), his major monograph. With the develop-
ment of a less doctrinaire conception of anthro-
 306 HOCART, A. M.
pology came a revival of interest in cultural
origins and ritual, as well as in speculation about
the foundations of culture, that gave Hocart's
ideas a new relevance.
Hocart's thought was quick and kaleidoscopic,
his method of advancing an argument was disci-
plined but unpredictable (like a fencer in at-
tack), and he did not often work out a theory
by way of a lengthy sequence of validated
grounds. The vehicle that best suited his pur-
poses was a brief essay or even a letter to a
journal, and his argumentation was often terse
and unconventional to the point of seeming er-
ratic. His subjects varied extraordinarily, rang-
ing over monotheism and money; snobbery and
saviors; baptism, covenants, and decadence; kin-
ship, sacrifice, and taxation. In whatever matter
he took up, he was guided by the habit of "taking
all beliefs seriously" and also of "taking nothing
for granted"; he methodically distrusted the
generalizations of anthropology and the defini-
tions concocted by academics; and he relied on
the precept to assume "nothing which we do not
know actually to occur." His questions could
sound simple or even naive—"why should a cus-
tom . . . not stay as it is?" "once man has come
to believe in gods, why should he ever cut their
number down to one?" "how did men first con-
ceive the idea of melting stone?"—but they were
provocative and fundamental. His conclusions
could sound blunt and implausible, but they sel-
dom failed to challenge accepted ideas and to
stimulate thought about topics of enduring in-
terest. If his evidence was adduced sporadically,
from India, Fiji, or anywhere at all in the
world, it nevertheless was intended to establish
principles: for example, "the first kings must
have been dead kings," "a single family of rituals
has spread to the remotest parts of the world,"
"myths and miracles are reliable history, not of
events but of customs."
Hocart propounded no general theory, and it
is hardly possible to systematize his disparate
ventures, but he was constantly inspired by the
intention to "reconstruct the history of thought"
and the "development of human institutions."
He had no dogmatic method for achieving these
ends, but urged that anthropologists could not
afford to neglect any possibly fruitful hypothesis:
"We shall adopt the obvious hypothesis of a com-
mon origin and see where it will lead us." The
form of thought that he tried to discern was a
religion, the main features of which could be
traced across a considerable part of the world.
In his longest and most integrated argument,
Kings and Councillors, he contended that the
common origin of government itself, and of its
various specialized offices, resided in an ancient
organization not of the utilitarian management
of social affairs but of a symbolic quest of life.
Although this book was not likely to supplant
the theories of historians and political philoso-
phers, it made a novel and arresting case that
was admirable in itself, and it pointed to a meta-
physical aspect of social life that surely had
some part in the development of society and its
proliferating apparatus of administration. It
stands, moreover, as the foremost example of
Hocart's ambition to formulate "a theory that
will explain all the variations in the simplest pos-
sible way without invoking any processes that
have not been observed" (1952a, p. 170).
In many regards Hocart's qualities are those
of a maverick, and his writings make a special
appeal to a particular type of intellectual tem-
perament for which sound method and sober
conclusions can be secondary to provocative
changes of aspect and the adventures of ideas.
Yet for some, Hocart was also the ideal type of
scholar; as Evans-Pritchard described him
(1939): "He did not acquire knowledge to ad-
vance himself, but because he had the true
scientist's craving to understand the causes of
things."
RODNEY NEEDHAM
WORKS BY HOCART
1927 (1969) Kingship. Oxford Univ. Press.
1929 The Lau Islands, Fiji. Bernice P. Bishop Museum
Bulletin, No. 62. Honolulu: The Museum. —» Lord
Raglan reported that when this work was published
"considerable alterations were made without ref-
erence to the author" (Hocart 1952b, p. v). A
paperback edition was published in 1971 by Kraus.
1931 The Temple of the Tooth in Kandy. Memoirs of
the Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Vol. 4. London:
Luzac.
1933 The Progress of Man: A Short Survey of His
Evolution, His Customs, and His Works. London:
Methuen.
(1936) 1970 Kings and Councillors: An Essay in the
Comparative Anatomy of Human Society. Univ. of
Chicago Press. —» Includes a foreword by E. E.
Evans-Pritchard and an introduction by Rodney
Needham, in which Needham gives a critique of
Hocart's theory of the origin of government and an
estimation of his career and the value of his ideas.
A paperback edition was published in 1972.
(1938) 1968 Caste: A Comparative Study. Edited by
Lord Raglan. New York: Russell. —» First published
in French.
1952a The Life-giving Myth, and Other Essays. Edited
by Lord Raglan. London: Methuen. —> A paper-
back edition, edited with a foreword by Rodney
Needham, was published in 1970.
1952& The Northern States of Fiji. Edited by Lord
Raglan. Royal Anthropological Institute of Great

Britain and Ireland, Occasional Publication No. 11.
London: The Institute.
1954 Social Origins. Edited by Lord Raglan. London:
Watts.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. 1939 Arthur Maurice Ho-
cart, 1884 [stc]-March 1939. Man 39:131 only.
NEEDHAM, RODNEY 1967 A Bibliography of Arthur
Maurice Hocart (1883-1939). Oxford: Blackwell.
—» Foreword by E. E. Evans-Pritchard.
HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON
E. Adamson Hoebel, born in 1906, is a major
figure in the anthropology of law, having
pointed the rediscovery of law as a valid and
significant topic for anthropological study after
decades of almost total neglect. His theoretical
and methodological contributions have moved
that area of study far enough for it to drop the
label "primitive law," and, saliently, to see itself
as "the ethnography of law" or "the anthropology
of law." In his work with the famed jurist, Karl
N. Llewellyn, Hoebel established a model for
collaboration between lawyers and anthropolo-
gists and the utilization of analytical and meth-
odological concepts from both disciplines. Partly
because of this collaborative, interdisciplinary
approach, his work also has seized the attention
of lawyers and led them to recognize the legal
systems of nonliterate societies as law and as a
source of insight into Western legal systems.
Hoebel is also well known as an ethnographer,
especially of the Cheyenne, although he has
done field work in and published on four other
cultures, especially Comanche, Shoshone, Kere-
san Pueblo, and Pakistan. As an anthropological
educator he has had an impact primarily
through his nonlegal books, his administrative
roles, and his teaching.
Hoebel was born and raised in Madison, Wis-
consin. His father was a traveling salesman for
a harness manufacturing company founded by
his grandfather and his mother was state civil
service commissioner for Wisconsin. He re-
ceived his Bachelor's degree from the University
of Wisconsin in 1928 where he majored in
sociology and was strongly influenced by E. A.
Ross, who whetted his interest in law and social
control. As a Wisconsin undergraduate he was a
contemporary of anthropologists-to-be John
Gillin, Lauriston Sharp, Sol Tax, and Clyde
Kluckhohn. Like the latter, Hoebel's work mir-
rors a deep orientation to both the social science
and humanistic dimensions of anthropology.
HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON 307
Hoebel's major writings reflect this in that, to a
greater degree than those of most anthropolo-
gists, they are simultaneously analytic and
poetic. His exposure to these two strains of the
anthropological ethos continued in his graduate
training at Columbia University where, after
completing an M.A. in sociology, he turned to
anthropology and was a student of Franz Boas
and Ruth Benedict.
In 1933, when Hoebel expressed an interest
in doing his doctoral research on a field study
of a Plains Indian legal system, Boas professed
disbelief that those cultures had legal institu-
tions and Benedict indicated both disinterest
and ignorance. But Boas arranged for Karl
Llewellyn, who was then holder of the Betts
professorship at the Columbia University Law
School and well known as a leading figure in the
jurisprudential school of "legal realism" and
for the breadth of his outlook on law, to serve
as Hoebel's thesis advisor. The dissertation on
law of the Comanche was later published as
The Political Organization and Law-ways of the
Comanche Indians (1940). Hoebel received his
PH.D. in 1934. Llewellyn also advised Hoebel in
his early studies of the Shoshone and, later, he
and Hoebel collaborated in the study of Chey-
enne law that was published as The Cheyenne
Way (1941), which became a germinal work in
both anthropology and jurisprudence. Although
Llewellyn was the senior author, the book was
truly collaborative.
Many of E. Adamson Hoebel's major ideas
were developed in the collaboration with Llewel-
lyn. They must be viewed in the context of the
position of the law in anthropology in 1933
when the two men first met. Not only Boas, but
many other prominent anthropologists (e.g.,
Ralph Linton) gave short shrift to the notion
that tribal peoples had anything that, in the
formal sense, could be called "law." And in the
forty years since the heyday of the evolutionary
school there had been virtually no anthropologi-
cal publications on tribal law and hardly more
by nonanthropologists. An exception was Bronis-
law Malinowski's Crime and Custom in Savage
Society (1926), which Llewellyn thought was
analytically careless, but which suggested to him
that a collaboration between anthropology and
law might be fruitful.
The most germinal concept of the Comanche
law monograph, of The Cheyenne Way, and of
all of Hoebel's other legal writing is the "trouble
case method." The method, which has become
the hallmark of all modern anthropological
 308 HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON
studies of legal systems, focuses on actual dis-
putes as the heart of the law and the key to the
rules or normative aspects of any legal system
and its procedures. Hoebel (1964) acknowledges
the origins of the method in Llewellyn's legal
realism, but it is also rooted in Hoebel's training
in the meticulous ethnography of Boas. It has
been discussed and refined by Epstein (1967),
Gulliver (1969), Twining (1973a; 1973b), Abel
(1969), and Gluckman (1973).
The second major idea that grew out of the
collaboration with Llewellyn was the concept of
the functions of the law, the "law jobs" as
Llewellyn called them. These functions, Llewel-
lyn and Hoebel argued, were shared by both
"advanced" and "primitive" legal systems. They
go beyond dispute settlement to include the
"functional prerequisites of a society specifically
shouldered by law." Although the major role in
articulating the law functions was Llewellyn's,
Hoebel's acceptance of the concept was rooted
in his own knowledge of Malinowski's and Rad-
cliffe-Brown's then current work.
Throughout the collaboration Llewellyn and
Hoebel viewed law in its cultural matrix, an idea
that Hoebel refined later in his postulational
analysis. Viewing law in its cultural matrix of-
ten is attributed to Llewellyn's legal realism
which, in turn, has intellectual roots in his ex-
posure to William Graham Sumner and Edward
S. Corwin, who emphasized the importance of
folkways and mores and the cultural depen-
dence of law. But to view law in its cultural
matrix was, of course, completely in line with
all of Hoebel's anthropological training, and he
helped Llewellyn to see cultural roots of law
that he would have overlooked.
As an anthropologist, Hoebel subjected the
juristic generalizations of Western law to com-
parative testing on the Plains and Shoshone ma-
terial, and Llewellyn was enough of a compara-
tivist, a skeptic, and, of course, a realist, to con-
cur. This dimension of the collaborators' work
has had an especially important impact in
juristic studies, by extending the scope of what
is considered a relevant comparison in law.
The last phase of the Hoebel-Llewellyn col-
laboration involved a study of the law of the
Keresan-speaking pueblos which began in 1944
and was unfinished at the time of Llewellyn's
death in 1962. The bulk of that material re-
mains unpublished, although Hoebel has pub-
lished alone several papers on Keresan pueblo
law (e.g., 1969).
Hoebel has made major contributions to the
anthropology of law in his own right that go sig-
nificantly beyond those developed in collabora-
tion with Llewellyn. He has laid the groundwork
for a science of law by the comparative study of
a range of non-Western legal systems in order to
derive empirical generalizations about law and
to refine analytical concepts. So, although The
Cheyenne Way contains no definition of law,
Hoebel's second major work, The Law of Primi-
tive Man (1954), does. Focusing on norms,
Hoebel's much quoted definition ties law clearly
to its cultural and social context. It also focuses
on process, both hallmarks of Hoebel's think-
ing. But it has been criticized for limiting sanc-
tions to physical ones.
Hoebel (1954) demonstrates that cultural
norms can be derived from "postulates, broadly
generalized propositions held by the members of
a society as to the nature of things and as to
what is qualitatively desirable and undesirable."
Law, then, functions to give expression to and
uphold some of the postulates of a society. This
postulational approach is one of Hoebel's major
contributions to comparative law and he has used
it in his ethnographic writings as well, most not-
ably his short general monograph on the Chey-
enne. This approach has intellectual roots in the
work of Ruth Benedict and the concept is simi-
lar to one postulated by Morris Opler, "themes."
The approach is documented in The Law of
Primitive Man with brilliantly pithic profiles of
the "primitive" legal systems of five non-literate
societies. The methodology for inferring postu-
lates is somewhat intuitive and difficult to repli-
cate, so the concept has not been as widely
adopted by legal anthropologists as that of the
trouble case method.
The Law of Primitive Man offers an evolu-
tionary analysis of what Hoebel calls the "trend
of the law," empirical covariations of the subsis-
tence mode of a society with the content of
legally-sanctioned norms—or the rules of law—
and legal procedures. This schema, which has
been widely accepted, complements Hoebel's
insightful survey of the universals—as opposed
to the variations—in the content of law found in
the same volume. The Law of Primitive Man
refines the statement of the functions of law
first developed in The Cheyenne Way but still
concludes that the major functions of law are
universal and that "primitive" law is primitive
only in procedure. That impact of the mono-
graph has been extended by its translation into
German and Italian.
The young Hoebel had enough ego strength

and knowledge of his discipline to be comforta-
ble in the collaboration with Llewellyn. That
partnership became a prototype for later rela-
tionships and Hoebel has collaborated with a
series of other scholars (Jesse D. Jennings,
Michael G. Smith, A. A. Schiller, Ernest Wal-
lace, EveretteL. Frost, Shirley Holt, and Thomas
Weaver), some of them peers; and others, younger
scholars for whom he was the Llewellyn.
Hoebel's impact in the anthropology of law
has been less through his students than through
his influence on peers and younger colleagues.
In spite of the very general acknowledgment of
the role of his works, he is not intellectually
imperialistic. Having been a student of the au-
thoritarian Boas and, initially, a student of the
forceful Llewellyn, he was, perhaps, wary of
imposing his ideas on his students too strongly.
They are not disciples. The inherent significance
of his ideas more than his own advocacy of them
has significantly influenced in acknowledged
ways the work of a generation of legal anthro-
pologists, including Max Gluckman, Philip Gul-
liver, Paul Bohannan, Laura Nader, Leopold
Pospisil, William Twining, James Lowell Gibbs,
Jr., and others.
As an ethnographer, Hoebel is a careful field-
worker, but he is particularly gifted in the other
portion of the ethnographer's role—describing a
culture in a written portrait. He writes about
a culture with conceptual veracity but, at the
same time, conveys a sense of the reality of
culture. He has a gift for anecdote, for the apt
example, and for a poetic turn of phrase, all of
which characterize The Cheyenne Way and the
later, more general monograph on that culture
which he authored alone, The Cheyennes: Indi-
ans of the Great Plains (1960). This was an
inaugural volume and an immediate best-seller
in a series of short ethnographic monographs
published in the 1960s. The flair for ethno-
graphic writing marks Hoebel's more conceptual
works also, e.g., The Law of Primitive Man.
E. Adamson Hoebel has had notable impact
as an educator. Wide reading in ethnography
and early fieldwork in three cultures equipped
him to write Man in the Primitive World (1949),
designed as a textbook for the undergraduate
students who flocked to anthropology after
World War n. As The Cheyenne Way stimulated
a new generation of anthropologists to turn to
the anthropology of law, so the textbook spawned
a host of imitations and stimulated young an-
thropologists to think self-consciously about the
role of anthropology as a vehicle for liberal
HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON 309
education in the general education model domi-
nant in undergraduate education of the time
and in the variations that have followed since.
The volume has gone through four editions, the
third and fourth as Anthropology: The Study of
Man, and it has been translated into Spanish
and Finnish. A fifth reworking with Thomas
Weaver as coauthor was published in 1979 as
Anthropology and the Human Experience.
Concern with education per se, both liberal
education and graduate education, led Hoebel to
accept administrative positions as head of the
department of anthropology and dean of Uni-
versity College at the University of Utah, and as
chairman of the department of anthropology at
the University of Minnesota where in 1969 he
was named to a distinguished professorship,
regents professor in anthropology. He has been
regents professor emeritus of anthropology since
1972 and adjunct professor of law since 1969.
JAMES LOWELL GIBBS, JR.
WRITINGS BY HOEBEL
1940 The Political Organization and Law-ways of the
Comanche Indians. Menasha, Wise.: American An-
thropological Association.
(1941) 1973 LLEWELLYN, KARL N.; and HOEBEL, E.
ADAMSON The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case
Law in Primitive Jurisprudence. Norman: Univ. of
Oklahoma Press.
1948 TER HAAR, B. Adat Law in Indonesia. Trans-
lated and edited by E. Adamson Hoebel and A. A.
Schiller. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations.
—> First published in Dutch as Beginselen en Stel-
sen van het Adatrecht.
(1949) 1979 HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON; and WEAVER,
THOMAS Anthropology and Human Experience. 5th
ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. —> Hoebel was the sole
author of the first four editions. The first and sec-
ond editions were entitled Man in the Primitive
World: An Introduction to Anthropology. The third
and fourth editions were entitled Anthropology: The
Study of Man.
1952 WALLACE, ERNEST; and HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON
The Comanches: Lords of the South Plains. Nor-
man: Univ. of Oklahoma Press.
1954 The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Compara-
tive Legal Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press. —> A paperback edition was published
in 1969 by Atheneum.
(1955) 1972 JENNINGS, JESSE D.; and HOEBEL, E.
ADAMSON Readings in Anthropology. 3d ed. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
(1960) 1978 The Cheyennes: Indians of the Great
Plains. 2d ed. New York: Holt.
1964 Karl Llewellyn: Anthropological Jurisprude.
Rutgers Law Review 18:735-744.
1965 Fundamental Cultural Postulates and Judicial
Law-making in Pakistan. American Anthropologist
67:43-56.
1968 Maine, Henry Sumner. Volume 9, pages 530-533
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
ences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1969 Keresan Pueblo Law. Pages 92-116 in Laura
310 HOFSTADTER, RICHARD
Nader (editor), Law in Culture and Society. Chi-
cago: Aldine.
1976 HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON; and FROST, EVERETTE L.
Cultural and Social Anthropology. New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill. —» Abridged version of the third edition
of Hoebel & Weaver (1949) 1979.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABEL, RICHARD L. 1969 Customary Law of Wrongs
in Kenya: An Essay in Research Method. American
Journal of Comparative Law 17.
BOHANNAN, PAUL 1957 Judgment and Justice Among
the Tiv. Oxford Univ. Press.
COHEN, FAY G.; and FREES, JOSEPH (editors) 1973
Law and Society Review 7, no. 4. —> Special issue
dedicated to Hoebel.
EPSTEIN, A. L. 1967 The Case Method in the Field
of Law. In A. L. Epstein (editor), Social Anthro-
pology. London: Tavistock.
GIBBS, JAMES L., JR. 1963 The Kpelle Moot: A Thera-
peutic Model for the Informal Settlement of Dis-
putes. Africa 33:1-111.
GLUCKMAN, MAX (1955) 1967 The Judicial Process
Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. 2d ed.
Manchester (England) Univ. Press.
GLUCKMAN, MAX 1973 Limitations of the Case-
method in the Study of Tribal Law. Law and So-
ciety Review 7:611-641.
GULLIVER, PHILIP 1963 Social Control in an African
Society; a Study of the Arusha: Agricultural Masai
of Northern Tanganyika. Boston University, Afri-
can Research Studies, No. 3. Boston Univ. Press;
London: Routledge.
GULLIVER, PHILIP 1969 Case Studies in Non-Western
Societies. Pages 11-23 in Laura Nader (editor), Law
in Culture and Society. Chicago: Aldine.
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1926) 1961 Crime and
Custom in Savage Society. London: Routledge.
NADER, LAURA (editor) 1965 The Ethnography of
Law. Special issue of the American Anthropologist
67, no. 6, part 2.
NADER, LAURA (editor) 1969 Law in Culture and
Society. Chicago: Aldine.
POSPISIL, LEOPOLD (1971) 1974 Anthropology of
Law: A Comparative Theory. New Haven: Human
Relations Area File Press.
POSPISIL, LOEPOLD 1973 E. Adamson Hoebel and the
Anthropology of Law. Law and Society Review
7:537-559.
TWINING, WILLIAM 1973a Karl Llewellyn and the
Realist Movement. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
TWINING, WILLIAM 1973t> Law and Anthropology: A
Case Study of Interdisciplinary Collaboration. Law
and Society Review 7:561-583.
HOFSTADTER, RICHARD
When Richard Hofstadter died in October
1970 at the age of 54, he was at the height of
his powers but not of his influence. His rare
combination of qualities—literary elegance, play-
ful intelligence, and a civilized perception of
politics—was less than welcome at the end of a
decade overheated by the frustrations of the
civil rights movement and of an unpopular war,
when many intellectuals and professors, guar-
dians of reason, called its values into question.
It was not a decade for subtle discrimination or
inconvenient self-appraisal, let alone humor. But
while the dominant passions and the mood of
the 1960s have faded, Hofstadter's writings
have retained their pertinence. Some of them,
notably The Age of Reform: From Bryan to
F.D.R, (1955), which won a Pulitzer Prize in
1956 and spawned a sizable controversy, bid fair
to become classics of American historical
writing.
Hofstadter's work was pervaded by two pairs
of tensions: he was at once writer and scholar,
engaged polemicist and detached professional.
As critics have not failed to point out, he spent
less time in the archives than other historians.
This is why, though intensely receptive and im-
pressively well read—few historians have studied
Sigmund Freud and Karl Mannheim to greater
advantage, or learned more from fellow intel-
lectuals, like his colleagues Lionel Trilling and
C. Wright Mills at Columbia University—he,
sometimes questioned his place in the ranks of
historians, wondering whether he was not,
rather, a publicist. He had undertaken The
American Political Tradition (1948), which
made his national reputation, preparing to enter
a journalistic career.
These tensions expressed themselves in a cer-
tain ambivalence toward the issues of his day.
Though not an activist, he had an impressive
fund of civic courage: in spring 1968, when
Columbia University was engulfed by student
unrest and the traditional commencement cere-
monies had to be moved, Hofstadter, defying the
anxious warnings of his friends, delivered the
commencement address, a sturdy defense of free
inquiry in an academic setting. He wrote oc-
casional pieces, like his article on Catholic
presidential candidates during John F. Kennedy's
campaign for the Democratic nomination
(I960); and his celebrated dissections of the
McCarthy phenomenon are thoughtful interven-
tions in public matters that gravely concerned
him (1953; Hofstadter & Metzger 1955).
Practically the last thing he published was an
anthology on American Violence (Hofstadter &
Wallace 1970). Certainly several of his most im-
portant books, notably The Age of Reform and
Anti-intellectualism in American Life (1963),
which won him a second Pulitzer Prize, bear the
visible imprint of the decade in which he wrote
them. Yet they are far from being frantic for
relevance; they are, rather, sober historical re-
examinations of aspects of the American past
which (like the Progressive era) had been much,

if superficially, studied, or (like the pervasive
hostility to high culture and science) had not
been studied at all. If Hofstadter drew the im-
pulse for his writing from his turbulent present,
he scrupulously tried to see the past as past.
Some of Hofstadter's critics in the 1960s ac-
cused him of "neo-Conservatism," of betraying
the progressive forces in America; they objected
to his discovery of what united Americans rather
than that which divided them and called him a
"consensus historian." They also criticized him
for venturing psychological and sociological ex-
planations for—and hence presumably denigrat-
ing the cause of—American radicals (see Wil-
liams 1956; Pollack 1960). These charges puz-
zled and irritated Hofstadter, who rightly
thought himself a liberal historian-critic, "criti-
cal" of the Progressive tradition, as he had written,
"but not hostile, for I am criticizing largely from
within" (Hofstadter 1955, p. 12), and free of
its easy optimism and facile generalizations of
that tradition. In The American Political Tradi-
tion, he had deftly thrown darts at the com-
placency, the unwearied self-congratulation en-
demic in the official version of America, em-
ploying a wit that, though it owed something to
H. L. Mencken, was his own. In turn, and with
far more benevolent intent, he questioned some
of the righteous and simplistic images that most
previous historians had drawn of the American
Populists' and Progressives' passion for reform.
Part of the revisionist, rather sardonic, portrait
that Hofstadter drew of the Populists' nativism
and anti-Semitism may need to be revised in
turn (Woodward 1959-1960), but as a correc-
tive and as a deep reading of an important
American epoch, The Age of Reform stands.
Later, in The Progressive Historians (1968), an
intensive study of Frederick Jackson Turner,
Charles A. Beard, and Vernon L. Parrington,
Hofstadter gently rejected the charge of being a
"consensus historian" by noting that the Pro-
gressive historians, long dominant in the pro-
fession, had sharply overemphasized the element
of conflict in American society, and that at the
same time conflict was hardly absent from his
own historical thinking. Hofstadter was above
all the historian of complexity.
Richard Hofstadter was born in Buffalo in
1916, graduated from the University of Buffalo
in 1937, and went to New York that year to do
graduate work in history at Columbia University,
where he received his PH.D. in 1942. Except for a
four-year stint (1942-1946) at the University
of Maryland, he lived in New York from then
HOFSTADTER, RICHARD 311
on, and soon became part of the New York cul-
tural scene; his origins in upstate New York
generated another of the fertile tensions in
which his life abounded. He was at home among
New Yorkers yet distant from their parochial
cosmopolitanism. His dissertation (and first
book), Social Darwinism in American Thought
(1944), was still a traditional exercise, but it
showed something of the energy and control
that would characterize all his later work. The
book was, as Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick
have noted, "a spirited account of the life, move-
ment and interpenetration of ideas; it also showed
an extraordinary adeptness at setting forth lucid
and compact expositions of ponderous bodies of
thought" (1974, p. 304). And it showed Hof-
stadter able at the beginning of his career to
distill first-rate history from second-rate minds—
a capacity he would demonstrate over and over
again with minds like those of Senator Joseph
McCarthy or popular preachers and charismatic
demagogues.
His second book differed from Social Darwin-
ism not merely in tone but in substance; it was
far more mordant and far more political. For
while his published thesis was rooted in the
familiar soil of orthodox intellectual history,
The American Political Tradition was highly
unconventional political history: it gathered a
collection of a dozen portraits, ranging across
almost two centuries, of the men who had gen-
erated the political style in which Americans
were still working late in the 1940s. From this
book onward, his unique blending of two special-
ties would define the area in which Hofstadter
was most at home. Reflecting on his work, he
described his historical interests as "marginal to
both political historians and to practitioners of
the history of ideas" and situated himself "be-
tween the two fields, at the intersection of their
perimeters."
This self-chosen marginality gave Hofstadter
the intellectual scope he needed. All his mature
work—and he matured early—gives evidence for
his abiding interest in the nonrational side of
social, especially of political, life; he was as sen-
sitive to the cultural matrix as to the private
dimensions of ideas. He had an unwavering re-
spect for the life of the mind; when in 1953 he
defined the intellectual, in Weberian terms, as a
man who lives for, rather than off, ideas, he was
defining himself. Intensely at home with ideas,
he still could not treat them as abstractions,
mere counters in a lofty debate among philoso-
phers. His debt to Freud and Mannheim (already
312 HOIJER, HARRY
noted ) and to contemporary political sociologists
was extensive, though lightly borne. When in
1963 he lectured on "The Paranoid Style in
American Politics," he protected this technical
word drawn from psychiatry with an elaborate
disclaimer: he was not speaking, he wrote, "in
a clinical sense, but borrowing a clinical term
for other purposes" (1965, p. 3). Yet, while his
most famous and most controversial thesis,
"status politics," pays its respects to man's irra-
tional drives by stressing the projection, into the
political arena, of private anxieties generated by
fears of social decline or worries about social
ascent, Hofstadter never questioned the potency
of rational self-interest in human decisions:
"We have, at all times, two kinds of processes
going on in inextricable connection with each
other: interest politics, the clash of material
aims and needs among various groups and blocs;
and status politics, the clash of various projective
rationalizations arising from status aspirations
and other personal motives" (1963, p. 53). His
concentration on psychological strategies and so-
ciological mechanisms did not prevent him from
alternating his analytical pages with explicit
and powerful narrative passages, or from writing
straightforward institutional history, such as his
volumes on The Development and Scope of
Higher Education in the United States (Hof-
stadter & Hardy 1952), and The Development of
Academic Freedom in the United States (Hof-
stadter & Metzger 1955). Still, his first and con-
trolling interest was the human comedy, prin-
cipally as it played itself out in the United States,
an interest to which he brought a measure of
irony and sympathy unsurpassed in his genera-
tion. His intellectual style was too personal to
permit a Hofstadter school to form, and so his
work continues to exercise its influence largely
by example and as a demonstration of how
deeply a civilized mind, disciplined stylist, and
skeptical observer can penetrate the human past.
PETER GAY
WORKS BY HOFSTADTER
(1944) 1955 Social Darwinism in American Thought,
1860-1915. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon.
(1948) 1973 The American Political Tradition and
the Men Who Made It. 2d ed. New York: Knopf.
—» Includes an introduction by Christopher Lasch.
A paperback edition was published in 1974 by
Vintage.
1952 HOFSTADTER, RICHARD; and HARDY, C. DEWITT
The Development and Scope of Higher Education
in the United States. New York: Columbia Univ.
Press.
1953 Democracy and Anti-intellectualism in America.
Michigan Alumnus Quarterly Review 59:281—295.
1955 The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New
York: Knopf. —> A paperback edition was published
in 1961 by Vintage.
1955 HOFSTADTER, RICHARD; and METZGER, WALTER
P. The Development of Academic Freedom in the
United States. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
—» Hofstadter's portion was reissued in 1961 as
Academic Freedom in the Age of the College.
1960 Could a Protestant Have Beaten Hoover in 1928?
Reporter 22, March 17:31-33.
1963 Anti-intellectualism in American Life. New York:
Knopf. —> A paperback edition was published in
1966 by Vintage.
1965 The Paranoid Style in American Politics and
Other Essays. New York: Knopf. —•» A paperback
edition was published in 1967 by Vintage.
1968 The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Par-
rington. New York: Knopf. —» A paperback edition
was published in 1970 by Vintage.
1969 The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legiti-
mate Opposition in the United States, 1780—1850.
Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. —» A paperback
edition was published in 1969.
1970 HOFSTADTER, RICHARD; and WALLACE, MICHAEL
(editors) American Violence: A Documentary His-
tory. New York: Knopf.
1971 America at 1750: A Social Portrait. New York:
Knopf. —» A paperback edition was published in
1973 by Vintage.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CREMIN, LAWRENCE 1972 Richard Hofstadter (1916-
1970): A Biographical Memoir. Washington: Na-
tional Academy of Education.
ELKINS, STANLEY; and MCKITRICK, ERIC (editors)
1974 The Hofstadter Aegis: A Memorial. New
York: Knopf. —» Includes "Richard Hofstadter: A
Progress" by the editors on pages 300—367, and a
bibliography by Paula S. Pass on pages 368—381.
HICHAM, JOHN 1959 The Cult of the "American Con-
sensus": Homogenizing Our History. Commentary
27:93-100.
NUGENT, WALTER T. K. 1963 The Tolerant Populists:
Kansas Populism and Nativism. Univ. of Chicago
Press.
POLLACK, NORMAN 1960 Hofstadter on Populism:
A Critique of The Age of Reform. Journal of South-
ern History 26:478-500.
SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR, JR. 1969 Richard Hofstadter.
Pages 278-315 in Marcus Cunliffe and Robin Winks
(editors), Pastmasters: Some Essays on American
Historians. New York: Harper.
WILLIAMS, WILIAM A. 1956 The Age of Re-forming
History. Nation 182:554 only.
WOODWARD, C. VANN 1959-1960 The Populist Heri-
tage and the Intellectual. American Scholar
29:55-72.
HOIJER, HARRY
Harry Hoijer (1904-1976) was the son of
John Oscar and Agnes Sophia (Peterson) Hoijer.
Hoijer received his A.B. (1927), A.M. (1929),
and PH.D. (1931) from the University of Chi-
cago. During his Chicago period, Hoijer bene-
fited from the training and friendship of two
distinguished pioneers in anthropological lin-
guistics, Edward Sapir and Leonard Bloomfield,

as well as from collaboration with Morris E.
Opler, an anthropologist central in Apachean
studies.
After 1929 Sapir's research concentrated on
Indian languages. In collaboration with Sapir,
Hoijer, from 1930 on, studied Navajo as well as
Chiricahua Apache and other Apache dialects,
all closely related to Navajo. Although Hoijer's
dissertation project was the rescue of Tonkawa
(1933), an Indian language of Texas now ex-
tinct, the focus of his research during most of
his career was the Athapaskan language family,
part of Nadene, with Apachean languages at
the center.
Hoijer taught anthropology at the University
of Chicago from 1931 to 1940, when he left to
enjoy thirty years (1940-1970) of productive
scholarship at the University of California at
Los Angeles. He was chairman of the anthro-
pology department from 1948 to 1951. He
served as memoirs editor of the American An-
thropological Association (1948-1952), as well
as vice president of that association (1949),
president of its western states branch (1950),
and its national president (1958); he then be-
came president of the Linguistic Society of
America (1959). Hoijer was book review editor
of the International Journal of American Lin-
guistics and associate editor of the Journal from
1964.
In private he had a mordant, hearty sense of
humor; in public his stance was conservative
and guarded. His name became an anthro-
pological household word, partly through his
coauthorship of a best-selling text, An Introduc-
tion to Anthropology (Beals & Hoijer 1953). In
this text, he proved a descriptive and historical
linguist and comparative grammarian. Less con-
strained and more intuitive was his enthusi-
asm for problems and solutions in the field of
language and culture. If, like Bloomfield, Hoijer
was cautious in interpreting linguistic data and
inflexibly dedicated to productive drudgery, he
was also, like Sapir, willing to speculate about
the influence on perception and cognition of
grammatical categories, especially those of the
Navajo. He became the perfect referee on mat-
ters Athapaskan, as well as the prime target of
Athapaskanists and others who failed to under-
stand his principles of scholarship. In his life-
time he achieved the status of a scholar who
cannot be ignored, whose work future perspec-
tives on prehistoric Athapaskans, no matter how
different, would have to consider.
Hoijer extended confidentiality to his infor-
HOIJER, HARRY 313
mants, and did not document his many field
trips. Asked in a questionnaire to name three
publications that reflected his basic interests,
he chose six: a sketch of anthropological lin-
guistics, 1930-1960 (196la), a study of Ath-
apaskan kinship systems (1956a), an article
on language in relation to culture (1953a), and
three contributions to Linguistic Structures of
Native America (1946c; 1946d; 1946e). The
categories he selected as his special provinces
in linguistics were theory and method, descrip-
tive linguistics, historical and comparative lin-
guistics and linguistic reconstruction, language
and culture, language typology, lexicography
and lexicons, linguistic change and language
acculturation, phonetics, phonemics, morpho-
phonemics, phonology, semantics, structural
linguistics, and syntax. His special provinces in
anthropology were kinship and marriage, oral
literature, and change (acculturation). Hoijer
left a manuscript bibliography of published
works, published with additions and annota-
tions and a technical review of his linguistic
contributions. His collection of manuscripts
went after his death to the library of the Amer-
ican Philosophical Society in Philadelphia (see
Kendall & Landar 1977).
Empiricism and structuralism. Among Hoi-
jer's contributions to anthropological linguistics
are studious caution, organization, and clarity. He
reminds us constantly that his conclusions are
"tentative." At the same time he beggars the
adjective because his conclusions were reflec-
tions of enormous care in assembling, inspect-
ing, and revising linguistic data.
Quality was to his taste. He mistrusted
Athapaskan vocabularies of anthropologists or
missionaries unexposed, or poorly exposed, to
classroom instruction in linguistics. The Ta-
naina vocabularies of Cornelius Osgood (1937),
for example, failed to please him. He preferred
not to speculate about spellings, wearing philo-
logical glasses; excellent phonetic and phonemic
transcriptions were his metier. He defended his
standards and theoretical orientation in 66 re-
views between 1941 and 1973. Typical are three
reviews of contributions to Navajo linguistics.
Hoijer (1945k) criticized Gladys Reichard for
disorganization in her 1944 essay on the hail
chant, evoking a scarcely cordial reply; he dev-
astated her for the ineptness of her Navajo
grammar (1951), leaving no room for a reply
(1953b). He also found Berard Haile's Navajo
dictionary poorly organized and difficult for
students to use (1952).
 314 HOIJER, HARRY
Pragmatism in empirical research was insti-
tutionalized in anthropology as the discipline
developed in America. Hoijer's theoretical orien-
tation was nourished on this tradition, struc-
tured largely by Sapir, Bloomfield, Franz Boas,
and Alfred L. Kroeber. All were dedicated to the
collection of data and the assessment of pat-
terns. Bloomfield, especially, tried to axiomatize
procedures and to exploit structural principles
developed by such European scholars as Ferdi-
nand de Saussure and Nikolai S. Trubetzkoy.
Boas, one of the great teachers of American
anthropologists, particularly during his profes-
sorship at Columbia University (1899-1937),
taught the importance of a model of grammati-
cal description involving base forms and pro-
cesses that transformed them. Some students
of Bloomfield, however—Zellig Harris, C. F.
Hockett, and Floyd G. Lounsbury—for example,
explored a model limited to items and arrange-
ments, in which structure was defined by mean-
ingful contrasts, of phonemes with phonemes
on the phonological level of analysis, of mor-
phemes with morphemes on the morphological
level. Items were classified in terms of shared
criterial properties on the one hand and noncon-
trastive distribution on the other. Transforma-
tional processes were not permitted in this
model. Bloomfieldian structural analysis in the
item-and-arrangement mold stimulated Clyde
Kluckhohn, Claude Levi-Strauss, and others to
seek implications for anthropology in general.
If linguists could group alternants, variations of
a structurally distinctive sound into phonemic
classes, variations of semantically similar ut-
terance-fractions into morphemic classes, why
could anthropologists not do likewise? In myth,
ritual, and kinship, explorations were under-
taken that were patterned on the principles of
distribution and classification of some of Hoijer's
linguistic contemporaries.
Against this background one can understand
Hoijer's cordial disagreements with Harris
(Hoijer 1945d) and Lounsbury (Hoijer 1954a).
Hoijer followed Boas and Sapir and favored an
item-and-process model. He refused to accept
Harris' revision of his inventory of phonemes in
Navaho Phonology (1945d), in which, for ex-
ample, aspiration was transcribed as [h], pitches
were reduced from four tones to two, high and
low, and unitary phonemes were respelled as
clusters (Hoijer's /c/ became /tsh/ and so on).
Hoijer used various spellings for Athapaskan
forms, but he insisted on the unitary nature of
phonemes in his inventories; he held to the
position inherited from Sapir that Proto-
Athapaskan could be reconstructed with mor-
phophonemic pitch notation and ideal analogues
of morphemes, instead of with lists of al-
lomorphs of morphemes and the environments
of those allomorphs (Hoijer 1943; Hoijer
1954a).
Hoijer's conservatism manifested itself also
in historical and comparative grammar. Against
the fashion of scholars like Sapir, Morris Swa-
desh, Paul Radin, and Joseph Greenberg in
America, and Paul Rivet in France, Hoijer aimed
at caution, refusing to accept rash assignments
of language families into ever-larger assem-
blages. For the contrast between Sapir and
Hoijer, see Sapir's list of American language
families in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929),
Hoijer's enumeration in Linguistic Structures of
Native America (1946c), and Hoijer's revision
of Sapir's Britannica presentation (1961b;
1961c; 1961d). Hoijer emphasized the tenta-
tive nature of Sapir's six groups for all lan-
guages north of Mexico: Eskimo—Aleut, Nadene,
Aztec-Tanoan, Algonkin-Wakashan, Penutian,
Hokan-Siouan. Hoijer accepted Eskimo-Aleut,
Nadene, and Aztec—Tanoan, leaving it for fu-
ture determination, after scientific comparative
work, whether Sapir's reductions would survive.
Theories, models, and paradigms. Hoijer ad-
mired Bloomfield and Kroeber, who character-
ized data, described patterns, and worked from
demonstrable bodies of detail. Hoijer's gram-
mars came from records, not intuitions. In the
1950s Noam Chomsky and other pioneers in
generative transformational grammar brought
to the linguistic scene two claims, among others,
observing that some models in social sciences
played upon patterns behind observable data,
patterns not directly demonstrable: (1) all—
and only—the sentences of a language can and
should be characterized by mathematical logic,
by semigroup theory as distinguished from
Carnapian use of metalanguages; and (2)
phrase-structure grammarians (among whom
Hoijer was exemplary) did not go far enough.
They could parse a sentence, naming parts of
speech, labeling phrases and clauses, and tally-
ing types of constructions, but they failed in not
recognizing transformations, additions, dele-
tions, and permutations in sentence derivation
and amalgamation. They failed in not positing
"deep structures," engrams whose composition
by the mind resulted in the sentences that
found their way into the anthropological lin-
guist's corpus.

Many anthropologists of Hoijer's generation
saw in Chomsky's approach a reversion to the
mentalism decried by Bloomfield. Since it was
impossible to correlate claims about "deep struc-
tures" with neurobiological mechanisms, some
disagreements of generative grammarians ex-
posed anti-empirical bias and true decadence in
theory construction. Other anthropologists saw
in the best of transformational research an im-
portant stimulus to developing models, relating
old data to new perspectives in ways that made
discoveries significant, and providing "paradig-
matic" quality in the sense—or one of the senses
—popularized by Thomas Kuhn (1962). Hoijer's
response to this dramatic, controversial new
paradigm lay primarily in continued dedication
to the Bloomfieldian paradigm. Hoijer worked
with his hands, not with computers.
Language and culture. Sapir said that one is
"at the mercy" of his language. Each language
represents its own social reality and defines ex-
perience. Benjamin L. Whorf claimed that when
grammars differ radically, speakers who use
those grammars systematically observe and eval-
uate experience differently. Hoijer tried to inte-
grate both views under the rubric of the "Sapir-
Whorf Hypothesis."
Hoijer's aim in ethnolinguistic research was,
in part, to show correlations between grammati-
cal categories and nonverbal cultural sensitivi-
ties—e.g., sensitivities of Navajos, for whom
motionful activity is salient, in consonance with
a grammatical system of verbs of motion (1951).
He outlined his approach thus: (1) determine
the structural patterns of a language; (2) de-
termine the semantic patterns "that attach to
structural patterns"; (3) isolate active structu-
ral categories with "definable semantic corre-
lates"; (4) isolate "fashions of speaking," through
comparison of "active structural-semantic pat-
terns," to get a partial description of the
"thought world" of a speaker; (5) identify indi-
rect connections between the ethnolinguistically
derived thought world and other cultural areas.
Hoijer illustrated his approach by analyzing
Navajo verbs to show that "the Navaho speaks
of 'actors' and 'goals' . . . not as performers of
actions or as ones upon whom actions are per-
formed, as in English, but as entities linked to
actions already defined in part as pertaining es-
pecially to classes of beings" (1954&, p. 102).
He tied this manner of speaking to the Navajo
religious motif of compromising with nature,
rather than trying to control it.
Hoijer qualified his view by calling for em-
HOIJER, HARRY 315
pirical tests. Generalizations about "the" Navajo,
however, oversimplify; there are difficulties in
cross-cultural testing of claims about differ-
ential perception and cognition. Ironic contrast
inheres in Hoijer's impressionistic efforts to fol-
low Sapir and Whorf while refusing to accept
"meaning as a primary guide to analysis," which
is "analysis by fiat" when used in descriptive
linguistics (1953fo, pp. 80, 83).
Lasting impact. Hoijer's impact on anthro-
pological linguistics was strongest where he was
most dedicated to framing scientific statements
founded on carefully prepared data of high
quality. He recognized that any subgrouping of
Athapaskan languages, considering present im-
perfections in our knowledge, could only be ten-
tative. He experimented with lexicostatistic sub-
grouping and subgrouping by criterial sound
laws. Also tentative was his work with Athapas-
kan kinship systems, stimulated by Kroeber
(Hoijer 1960b, p. 32). Hoijer contributed to the
reconstruction of 73 Proto-Athapaskan kin
terms, using 14 subgroups. But he had misgiv-
ings about lexicostatistics in subgrouping or in
dating separations of tribes (1956a; 1956b;
1956c; 1962a; 1962b; 1974a).
Hoijer's most durable contributions lie, per-
haps, where his emulation of Bloomfield is most
apparent. Like Bloomfield, he strove to show
regularity of sound change for Apachean (1938);
Pacific Coast Athapaskan (1960a); and all Atha-
paskan (1963; 1971c). Sound laws that he estab-
lished permitted the reconstruction of hypotheti-
cal prehistoric forms—e.g., kinship systems
(1956a) and morphological systems (1971a).
Just as Bloomfield was a founder of Algonquian
studies, so Hoijer was a founder of Athapaskan
studies on a scientific basis, with texts (Hoijer
& Opler 1938; Hoijer & Sapir 1942), grammatical
sketches (1946d; 1966a; 1966b; 1973; Hoijer &
Joel 1963), and signal contributions to Navajo
grammar (1945a; 1945c; 1945d; 1946a; 1946b;
1948; 1949b; 1967; 197lb- Hoijer & Sapir
1967). He pioneered also in the study of Atha-
paskan classificatory verbs (Davidson et al.
1963). With Edward P. Dozier (like William
Bittle, who worked on Kiowa Apache, one of
Hoijer's distinguished students), he published
on Santa Clara Tewa phonemes (1949). In
Tonkawan studies Hoijer is unique, having res-
cued the language with a grammar (1933), a
sketch (1946e), a dictionary (1949a), a study
of suffixes and particles (1949c), and a collec-
tion of texts (1972). His most polished work,
perhaps, a pattern and guide for all future
 316 HOIJER, HARRY
Athapaskan lexicography is Navajo Lexicon
(1974b).
HERBERT LANDAR
WORKS BY HOIJER
1933 Tonkawa: An Indian Language of Texas. Volume
3, pages 1-148 in Franz Boas (editor), Handbook
of American Indian Languages. New York: Colum-
bia Univ. Press.
1938 The Southern Athapaskan Languages. American
Anthropologist 40:75-87.
1938 HOIJER, HARRY; and OPLER, MORRIS E. Chiri-
cahua and Mescalero Apache Texts. Univ. of Chi-
cago Press.
1942 HOIJER, HARRY; and SAPIR, EDWARD Navaho
Texts. Iowa City: Linguistic Society of America.
1943 Pitch Accent in the Apachean Languages. Lan-
guage 19:38-41.
1945a Classificatory Verb Stems in the Apachean Lan-
guages. International Journal of American Linguis-
tics 11:13-23.
1945b Review of The Story of the Navaho Hail Chant
by Gladys A. Reichard. International Journal of
American Linguistics 11:123-125.
1945c The Apachean Verb, Part I: Verb Structure and
Pronominal Prefixes. International Journal of Amer-
ican Linguistics 11:193-203.
1945d Navaho Phonology. University of New Mexico,
Publications in Anthropology, No. 1. Albuquerque:
Univ. of New Mexico Press.
1946a The Apachean Verb, Part II: The Prefixes for
Mode and Tense. International Journal of American
Linguistics 12:1-13.
1946b The Apachean Verb, Part III: The Classifiers.
International Journal of American Linguistics 12:
51-59.
1946c Introduction. Volume 6, pages 9-29 in Linguis-
tic Structures of Native America. Edited by Corne-
lius Osgood. Viking Fund Publications in Anthro-
pology. New York: Wenner—Gren Foundation.
1946d Chiricahua Apache. Volume 6, pages 55-84 in
Linguistic Structures of Native America. Edited by
Cornelius Osgood. Viking Fund Publications in An-
thropology. New York: Wenner-Gren Foundation.
1946e Tonkawa. Volume 6, pages 289-311 in Linguis-
tic Structures of Native America. Edited by Corne-
lius Osgood. Viking Publications in Anthropology.
New York: Wenner—Gren Foundation.
1948 The Apachean Verb, Part IV: Major Form
Classes. International Journal of American Linguis-
tics 14:247-259.
1949a An Analytical Dictionary of the Tonkawa Lan-
guage. University of California Publications in Lin-
guistics, Vol. 5, no. 1. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Univ. of California Press.
1949b The Apachean Verb, Part V: The Theme and
Prefix Complex. International Journal of American
Linguistics 15:12—22.
1949c Tonkawa Syntactic Suffixes and Anaphoric Par-
ticles. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 5:37-
55.
1949 HOIJER, HARRY; and DOZIER, EDWARD P. Pho-
nemes of Tewa, Santa Clara Dialect. International
Journal of American Linguistics 15:139-144.
1951 Cultural Implications of Some Navaho Linguistic
Categories. Language 27:111-120.
1952 Review of A Stem Vocabulary of the Navaho
Language by Berard Haile. International Journal of
American Linguistics 18:106-108.
1953a The Relation of Language to Culture. Pages
554—573 in Alfred L. Kroeber (editor), Anthropology
Today. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1953b Review of Navaho Grammar by Gladys Reich-
ard. International Journal of American Linguistics
19:78-83.
(1953) 1971 BEALS, RALPH LEON; and HOIJER, HARRY
An Introduction to Anthropology. 4th ed. New York:
Macmillan.
1954a Review of Oneida Verb Morphology by Floyd G.
Lounsbury. Language 30:182-185.
1954b The Sapir—Whorf Hypothesis. American Anthro-
pological Association, Memoirs 79:92-105. —> This
volume, edited by Hoijer, is entitled Language in
Culture: Proceedings of a Conference on the Inter-
relations of Language and Other Aspects of Culture.
1956a Athapaskan Kinship Systems. American Anthro-
pologist 58:309-333.
1956Z? The Chronology of the Athapaskan Languages.
International Journal of American Linguistics 22:
219-232.
1956c Lexicostatistics: A Critique. Language 32:49-60.
1960a Athapaskan Languages of the Pacific Coast.
Pages 960-976 in Stanley Diamond (editor), Cul-
ture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin. New
York: Published for Brandeis University by Colum-
bia Univ. Press.
1960Z? Alfred L. Kroeber, 1876-1960. Anthropological
Linguistics 2, no. 8:31-32.
1961a Anthropological Linguistics. Pages 110-127 in
Christine Mohrmann et al. (editors), Trends in
European and American Linguistics: 1930-1960.
Utrecht (Netherlands): Spectrum.
196lib American Aboriginal Languages. Volume 1,
pages 750-753 in Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chi-
cago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.
1961c Central and North American Languages. Vol-
ume 5, pages 141—141B in Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.
1961d South American Languages. Volume 21, pages
79-80 in Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chicago: En-
cyclopaedia Britannica.
1962a Comments on "On the Validity of Glottochronol-
ogy" by Knut Bergsland and Hans Vogt. Current
Anthropology 3:135 only.
1962b Linguistic Subgroupings by Glottochronology
and by the Comparative Method: The Athapaskan
Languages. Lingua 11:192-198.
1963 The Athapaskan Languages. Pages 1-29 in Harry
Hoijer (editor), Studies in Athapaskan Languages.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press.
1963 HOIJER, HARRY; and JOEL, JANET Sarsi Nouns.
Pages 62—75 in Harry Hoijer (editor), Studies in the
Athapaskan Languages. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Univ. of California Press.
1963 DAVIDSON, WILLIAM; HOIJER, HARRY; and EL-
FORD, L. W. Athapaskan Classificatory Verbs. Pages
30—41 in Harry Hoijer (editor), Studies in the
Athapaskan Languages. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Univ. of California Press.
1966a Galice Athapaskan: A Grammatical Sketch. In-
ternational Journal of American Linguistics 32:320—
327.
1966b Hare Phonology: An Historical Study. Lan-
guage 42:499-507.
1967 Navaho [Word Classes]. Lingua 17:88-102.
1967 HOIJER, HARRY; and SAPIR, EDWARD The Phonol-
ogy and Morphology of the Navaho Language.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press.
1971a Athapaskan Morphology. Volume 65, pages 113—
147 in University of California Publications in Lin-

guistics. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of Cali-
fornia Press.
1971b Patterns of Meaning in Navaho. Pages 227-237
in Mario D. Zamora et al. (editors), Themes in Cul-
ture: Essays in Honor of Morris Opler. Quezon City
(Philippines): Kayumanggi Publishers.
1971c The Position of the Apachean Languages in the
Athapaskan Stock. University of Arizona, Anthro-
pological Papers 21:3-6.
1972 Tonkawa Texts. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ.
of California Press.
1973 Galice Noun and Verb Stems. Linguistics: An In-
ternational Review 104:49-73.
1974a Foreword. Pages xi-xii in I. Dyen and D. Aberle,
Lexical Reconstruction: The Case of the Proto-Atha-
paskan Kinship System. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1974b A Navajo Lexicon. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Univ. of California Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
HYMES, D. H.; and BITTLE, W. E. (editors) 1967
Studies in Southwestern Ethnolinguistics: Meaning
and History in the Languages of the American
Southwest. The Hague and Paris: Mouton.
KENDALL, DAYTHAL L.; and LANDAR, HERBERT 1977
The Hoijer Papers. International Journal of Ameri-
can Linguistics 43:355 only.
KUHN, THOMAS (1962) 1970 The Structure of Sci-
entific Revolutions. 2d ed. Univ. of Chicago Press.
OSGOOD, CORNELIUS 1937 Comparative Tanaina Vo-
cabulary. Pages 208—221 in Cornelius Osgood, The
Ethnology of the Tanaina. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press.
HOOK, SIDNEY
In the Handbook to his lectures on logic, Im-
manuel Kant distinguished between a philosophy
in the scholastic sense (making, and sometimes
endlessly multiplying, distinctions) and a phi-
losophy in the universal sense (in sensu cos-
mico), which is "the knowledge of the ultimate
aims of human reason," or the "knowledge of
the highest maxims of the use of our reason."
In this cosmopolitan sense, the field of philos-
ophy, according to Kant, may be divided by four
questions: What can I know? What ought I to
do? What may I hope? What is man? Meta-
physics deals with the first, ethics the second,
religion the third, and philosophical anthro-
pology the fourth. Kant added: "Fundamentally
all this could be reckoned as anthropology, since
the first three questions are related to the last."
Except for the phrases "the ultimate aims"
and "highest maxims," Kant's program for phi-
losophy can be said to describe Sidney Hook's
intentions and concerns. "Philosophies," John
Dewey declared, "are different ways of constru-
ing life. . . . " A s Hook elaborated this state-
ment, in Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of
HOOK, SIDNEY 317
Life (1974), his 1960 presidential address to
the eastern section of the American Philosophi-
cal Association:
Here lies the important task for the philosopher. To
be wise he must immerse himself in the actual
subject matters (not necessarily experiences) out
of which life's problems arise. To be wise about
economic affairs he must study economics, to be
wise about the problems of law he must study law,
to be wise about politics he must study history,
sociology and other disciplines. . . . It is philoso-
phy not as a quest for salvation but as a pursuit of
understanding of great cultural issues and their
possible upshot. It does not start with a complete
stock of philosophical wisdom . . . but with an
initial sense of concern to meet the challenges of
the great unresolved problems of our time, offering
analyses of these problems which will win the re-
spect of the specialist and yet command the atten-
tion of everyman. . . . It is philosophy as norma-
tive social inquiry. (1974, pp. 7-8)
This willingness—more, eagerness—to enter
into the fray of mundane affairs has distin-
guished Hook's career, for he believes that sci-
ence is on a continuum with common sense, and
that knowledge, as an instrumental activity,
emerges from the confrontation of problems,
rather than being derived from first principles.
As Paul Kurtz, who edited a Festschrift for
Hook's 65th birthday, remarked in his preface:
Hook speaks to the actual conditions of contem-
porary life; and he has persistently attempted to
apply pragmatic intelligence to concrete issues of
practical concern. The breadth of his critical analy-
sis has been very wide, and includes education, poli-
tics, Marxism, morality, metaphysics, religion, civil
disobedience, democracy, science, psychology, art,
economics, law, nuclear weapons, racial segrega-
tion, the Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights, and in-
ternational affairs. . . . Sidney Hook, virtually
alone among contemporary American philosophers,
has not abandoned ethical, political or social phi-
losophy, in the original sense of these disciplines.
(1968, pp. 11-12)
To a considerable extent this is true, though
the hint of anti-intellectualism (in the guise of
anti-scholasticism) in Kurtz's remarks mini-
mizes the enduring contributions to the linguis-
tic clarification of truth and empirical inquiry
of more technical philosophers such as Alfred
Tarski, Rudolf Carnap, and Hans Reichenbach,
or of pragmatists such as C. I. Lewis, and the
somewhat younger generation of W. V. Quine,
Nelson Goodman, and Ernest Nagel. A useful
distinction is made by one of Hook's students,
 318 HOOK, SIDNEY
Raziel Abelson, who wrote: "Philosophy, for
Hook, is primarily concerned with 'value facts'
rather than linguistic facts, and it mainly clari-
fies and criticizes values, although on occasion
it may clarify and criticize meanings" (Kurtz
1968, pp. 203-204).
Sidney Hook was born on December 20, 1902,
of immigrant Jewish parents, and grew up in
the working-class neighborhood of Williams-
burg, in Brooklyn, graduating in 1919 from
Boys' High School, which was then, along with
Stuyvesant High School, one of the incubators
of young New York intellectual Jews and radi-
cals. World War i roused a sympathy for social-
ism in Hook, and the reading of W. E. H. Lecky,
H. C. Lea, John W. Draper, and other rational-
ists who counterposed science to religion made
him an agnostic; Hook has retained this double
stance all his life.
As a student at the City College of New York,
he encountered Morris Raphael Cohen, whom
he admired, as he wrote in a memoir fifty years
later, not only because of his tough-minded,
relentless questioning, and sharp wit (a typical
Cohen story: "Professor Cohen, prove to me I
should study logic." "How will you know it is a
good proof?") but also because Cohen was the
first teacher to respect Hook's questioning of
America's entry into the war "with anything
other than the ferocious antipathy of my high
school and City College teachers." (Hook's class-
mate was Ernest Nagel, with whom he formed a
lifelong friendship.) Following graduation in
1923 (he won the Ward medal for logic), Hook
began teaching in the public schools of the city
while attending Columbia University, part-time,
as a graduate student in philosophy. After ob-
taining his M.A. in 1926, he was awarded a
university fellowship and finished his PH.D. a
year later.
At Columbia, Hook came under the influence
of John Dewey and became his friend and fore-
most expositor. Yet Hook, who believes that
there is an ascertainable connection between
temperament and philosophy, has written, in a
memoir of Dewey: "Temperamentally, I have
found Russell and Cohen more congenial than
Dewey. They are philosophers of the clean line,
incisive, witty, rarely hesitant about sacrificing
the dull or exact truth for the sake of a bon mot"
(1974, p. 113). In 1927 he became an instructor
in philosophy at New York University, where he
remained for the rest of his academic life, re-
tiring in 1972. There, he achieved the legendary
qualities of his first teacher, a wit and sharp-
ness as quick as Cohen's tempered by com-
passion.
Hook's great passion has been radical politics,
and his involvement first with Marxism and
later as the intellectual leader of the anticom-
munist left has given him his largest public
prominence. In the early 1930s, Hook was close
to the Communist party, and was instrumental
in gaining a large degree of intellectual support
for the Communist presidential candidate in
1932. But his philosophical views on Marx,
which were at variance with party orthodoxy,
and his dismay at the communist theory of "so-
cial fascism," which in Germany labelled the
Social Democrats, not the Nazis, as the prime
enemy, and which brought the Communist
party into practical alliance with the Nazis at
key points in opposing the Weimar Republic,
turned Hook against the communists, and to-
ward an appreciation of the need for democracy
as an integral aspect of socialist belief.
In the mid-1930s, Hook was close to the
Trotskyites, and in 1934, together with James
Burnham, a fellow instructor in philosophy at
N.Y.U., he was instrumental in the formation
of the short-lived American Worker's party, an
effort at an indigenous American radicalism;
but the party was captured by orthodox Trots-
kyites and soon dissolved. Hook, however, then
took the initiative in setting up the John Dewey
commission of inquiry, which, following the
Moscow trials, in the course of which many of
the original leaders of the Russian revolution
were shot by Stalin, examined the charge that
Trotsky was a Nazi agent, through a series of
hearings held in Mexico, where Trotsky then
lived. These hearings resulted in a two-volume
report demonstrating the Moscow trials to be a
frame-up. By 1940 Hook had broken with all
variants of Bolshevism, though, out of respect
for Trotsky, he dedicated his Reason, Social
Myths and Democracy (1940) "to the memory
of a Great Adversary."
Within the milieu of the New York Jewish
intelligentsia, a remarkable group of men and
women rising to prominence in American cul-
tural life (for example, Ernest Nagel, Meyer
Schapiro, Lionel Trilling, William Phillips, Her-
bert Solow, Elliot Cohen), Hook became a lead-
ing figure. He was for many years the political
mentor of Partisan Review, which became the
dominant cultural periodical in the United
States. In 1939 Hook took the lead in organizing
the Committee for Cultural Freedom, headed by
John Dewey, to combat all varieties of totalitar-

ianism and to oppose a larger communist intel-
lectual front, headed by Franz Boas, which ex-
pired on August 23, 1939, a week after many of
its leading members signed a statement denounc-
ing the charges that the Soviet Union was a totali-
tarian society. Ten years later, during the cold
war, Hook again was instrumental in helping
form the American Committee for Cultural
Freedom. In 1950, with Arthur Koestler, Ignazio
Silone, Raymond Aron, Michael Polanyi, and
other European and American intellectuals, he
helped found the world-wide Congress for Cul-
tural Freedom (C.C.F.), to oppose totalitarian-
ism and communist influences in intellectual
life. In 1967 it was revealed that the C.C.F. had
received funds from the CIA, though there was
little question of its intellectual independence.
Hook has made no apology for his activities in
that period. In an article, "What the Cold War
Was About" (1975), Hook, who called himself
an "unreconstructed 'Cold Warrior,'" stated that
when asked to justify his position, the shortest
answer he gives is "Read Solzhenitsyn's The
Gulag Archipelago."
Despite his intense activism, Hook has been
remarkably prolific. A bibliography in the 1968
Festschrift listed 21 books by Hook, 13 edited or
coedited by Hook, 62 books to which he has con-
tributed (excluding encyclopedia articles), 516
articles in various periodicals, and 107 "se-
lected" book reviews, in a period beginning with
his first essay, "Philosophy of Non-resistance"
(1922). Since that bibliography appeared, Hook
has published, as of 1978, six more books. A
large number of his articles have appeared in
general intellectual periodicals, such as The
New Leader, Partisan Review, Commentary,
and Encounter, and Hook's relish for intellectual
battle has often led to polemics in which an
article is countered by a reply and a riposte by
Hook, a counterreply and a counterriposte—all
of which becomes a robust way of adding to a
bibliography. Yet an extraordinary number of
the essays, particularly in the books to which
Hook has contributed, are serious philosophical
articles on the value questions with which he
has been concerned all his life.
What is most remarkable, however, is the
consistency of his philosophical viewpoint. Hook
has been described, variously, as a pragmatist,
a naturalist, an experimentalist, an instrumen-
talist, even an "epistemological activist" (Arthur
O. Lovejoy once said that there were 13 varieties
of pragmatism). What unifies these positions is
the persistent attack on metaphysical absolutes,
HOOK, SIDNEY 319
"ultimates of human reason," first principles or
final causes, because they provide no guides to
cognitive validity or practical conduct, and are
incapable of being tested or disproved in ex-
perience, but are only given some counterlogical
formulation. Hook has argued, for example, that
it is possible and not unusual for individuals to
agree on matters involving values while disa-
greeing on metaphysical doctrines, or to agree
on metaphysics and disagree on values; so
nothing immediately follows from metaphysics
(Kurtz 1968, p. 183).
Central to his thinking is the attack on the idea
of "Being," as such, or on a priori categories.
This argument is the leitmotif of Hook's first
book, his PH.D. thesis, The Metaphysics of Prag-
matism (1927), which unites Charles Pierce's
"fallabilism" with Dewey's "instrumentalism,"
and whose target is Kant. It is reiterated in the
paper "The Quest for Being" (1953; written for
the llth International Congress of Philosophy,
in Brussels, and reprinted in the book of that
title, in 1961), whose target is Martin Heideg-
ger. In his first book, in a chapter on "categori-
cal analysis," Hook wrote:
Categories are bound up with distinctions we make
in analysis. Analysis starts from something given
and with something taken. . . . It follows, there-
fore, that Being is not a category and Experience is
not a category. Neither is Space-Time nor subsis-
tence nor any other denotative indication of the sum
total of actual and possible existents. A fundamen-
tal term which has no intelligible opposite describes
nothing because its apparent import is to describe
everything. (1927, p. 116)
In renewing his attack on the revived interest
in such metaphysics, Hook wrote:
In ordinary discourse every significant word has an
intelligible opposite. Being, however, as an all-in-
clusive category does not seem to possess an intelli-
gible opposite. Not-Being is not the opposite of
Being, because when it is taken as equivalent in
meaning to Nothing, and Nothing is interpreted as
a substantival entity, then Nothing is a Something
. . . and hence possesses Being too. . . .
Precisely for this reason the question originally
asked by Schelling and repeated in our time by
Heidegger: "Why is there something: why is there
not nothing?" is devoid of sense except as a sign of
emotional anxiety.
For Hook, as for Dewey, an idea is an instrument,
a sign or a tool, a "mental blue-print which di-
rects its exercise and interprets its effects"
(1927, p. 18), ideas are "implicit guides to ac-
320 HOOK, SIDNEY
tivity and behavior, and knowledge is dependent
on the experiment and reconstructive activity"
(1974, p. 21), philosophy is an empirical disci-
pline, its methods of inquiry continuous with
those of the natural and social sciences (1961,
p. 50).
The emphasis, then, is almost entirely on
method—not Cartesian method, in which, from
axioms of undoubted doubt, knowledge is de-
rived by rationalist deduction, or the phenom-
enological method of Husserl, a logical tech-
nique for the "bracketing" of experience, but the
scientific method, as the one reliable method.
In fact, at one point Hook says, in an italicized
statement, "All knowledge that men have is sci-
entific knowledge" (1961, p. 214).
What is less clear, however, is the meaning
of scientific method and scientific knowledge.
Hook has distinguished between the "scientific
method as the procedures pursued in the study
of nature"—in particular, physics, with its
search for quantitative and mathematical pre-
cision—from the "scientific method as a general
pattern of inquiry whenever we seek knowl-
edge." The latter does require "the recognition
and formulation of a problem, the formulation
of an hypothesis, the elaboration of its logical
implications, the performance of an experi-
mental act, and the observation of its conse-
quences" ([1946] 1963, pp. 174-176).
But when Hook also states that the "experi-
mental act" may be "just looking," and that the
consequences of a hypothesis may include
"logical consequences," and that "there is no
opposition between common sense knowledge
and scientific knowledge as knowledge, but only
a difference in their objects and problems"
(1961, p. 214), then the initial precision seems
to have dissolved into a defense of any syste-
matic empiricism that begins with some hy-
pothesis and looks for some consequences. It is
striking that Hook, for all his defense of the
scientific method, has rarely engaged in the
contemporary discussions of the philosophy of
science (e.g., those initiated by Karl Popper),
perhaps preferring to leave this to his friend
and colleague Ernest Nagel (Nagel 1961; 1968).
Hook's forte has been the exposition of ideas,
and nowhere is this more evident than in his
works on Marx and Dewey, works that have
rendered two ambiguous and opaque writers
lucid and comprehensible. His first book on
Marx, Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx
(1933) is a tour de force. Having spent an aca-
demic year (1928/1929) in Berlin and Moscow
working through the Marx-Engels archives,
Hook was among the first to read the newly
"discovered" early philosophical writings of
Marx, and he pointed out that the "young Marx"
had an activity theory of knowledge that made
intelligible the emphasis on praxis running like
a thread through Marx's writings. At the time,
Hook was accused of reading Dewey into Marx,
for the received notion of that period was the
epistemology proposed by Engels in Anti-Duhring
(1878)—that sensations and knowledge are "mir-
ror reflections" of a material world, a view which
Lenin took over in his attack on Mach in the
Materialism and Empirio-criticism (1909) and
which had become the orthodox Soviet position.
Yet the view first propounded by Hook is now
widely accepted, though it remains an intellec-
tual mystery why Marx, who had read and even
contributed to a section of Anti-Duhring, al-
lowed this idea to be proposed if it in fact con-
tradicted the views he had come to hold. One
answer may be that Marx had changed his
mind somewhat, since Das Kapital (1867-1879),
is written in a determinist mode, in which the
"laws of motion" operate and tendencies are
"inevitable."
Hook's second book, From Hegel to Marx
(1936), is still unsurpassed in its meticulous
tracing of the relation of Marx to Hegel, and
to the group of young Hegelians with whom he
jousted so bitterly. What is striking in the book
is Hook's neglect of the idea of alienation, which
after 1950 became so fashionable that for some
writers "alienation" was the master key to all of
Marx's thought. In an introduction written for
the 1962 edition, Hook pointed out that the con-
cept of alienation was foreign to Marx's thought
because its origins were religious; that it implies
an essence to man from which man would be
alienated and that the term, when used, as it is
in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
(1844), was completely Feuerbachian. In fact,
Marx abandoned the term, and later mocked it,
as in The Communist Manifesto (Marx & Engels
1848), because he had found in economics the
material embodiment of philosophy, and "alien-
ation" had been replaced by "exploitation." In
two subsequent works, the long essay "What Is
Living and Dead in Marxism" (printed in 1940,
pp. 105-142) and The Hero in History (1943),
Hook evaluates and refutes the thesis of social
determinism, and provides, through the case
study of the Russian revolution, a fruitful anal-
ysis of the interplay of structural constraints,
contingency, and personality, as the way in
which social events can be understood.
Hook's book John Dewey: An Intellectual Por-

trait (1939) is a comprehensive survey of
Dewey's ideas. The heart of the book is the de-
fense of the argument that values are open to
scrutiny and empirical testing, like any other
mode of empirical knowledge. What Hook seeks
to show is that all values, even those claimed as
"ultimate ones," can be judged (evaluated, not
just described) on the basis of relevant conse-
quences, for there is no Good in the large any
more than there is Truth in the large; and that
all statements of value exist in determinate con-
texts whose claims can be tested. The second
theme central to Hook's discussion—and it be-
comes relevant time and again in his subsequent
judgments on Bolshevism and all its variants-
is the interconnectedness of ends and means.
The notion that the end justifies the means
often overlooks the fact that the means used
become ends in themselves, or, in different situ-
ations, an emphasis on a single end overrides
the "irreducibly plural ends" of human beings
and distorts the quest that initiated the desire
for change in the first place.
This theme is expanded with great sensi-
tivity and poignance in the book that serves as
Hook's credo, Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense
of Life (1974). Rejecting the existential and
mystical views that define a tragic sense of life
as the ineluctable intrusion of evil into human
affairs, or the role of death in defeating the
aspirations of men, Hook defines the tragic
sense as "a very simple thing which is rooted
in the very nature of moral experience and the
phenomenon of moral choice." Every such ex-
perience, Hook argues, takes place in a situation
in which good conflicts with good, and any reso-
lution involves some surrender of a moral posi-
tion: "No matter how we choose, we must either
betray the ideal of the greater good or the ideal
of right or justice. In this lies the agony of the
choice." The tragic sense of life is the realization
of the guilt inherent in making a choice: "In
its starkest form [this] is the theme of Sopho-
clean tragedy, but the primary locus of the
tragic situation is not in a play but in life, in
law and in history."
DANIEL BELL
WORKS BY HOOK
1927 The Metaphysics of Pragmatism. Chicago: Open
Court. —> This was Hook's Ph.D. thesis at Columbia
University. Includes an introductory word by John
Dewey.
1933 Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx. New
York: John Day.
1936 From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual
Development of Karl Marx. New York: Reynal &
Hitchcock. —> A paperback edition, with a new
HORKHEIMER, MAX 327
introduction by Hook, was published in 1962 by
the University of Michigan Press.
1939 John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait. New York:
John Day.
(1940) 1950 Reason, Social Myths and Democracy.
New York: Humanities Press.
1943 The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and
Possibility. New York: John Day.
(1946) 1963 Education for Modern Man: A New Per-
spective. 2d ed. New York: Knopf.
1961 The Quest for Being, and Other Studies in Nat-
uralism and Humanism. New York: St. Martins.
1974 Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life. New
York: Basic Books.
1975 What the Cold War Was About. Encounter
(London) 44:62-67.
1976 Morris Cohen—Fifty Years Later. American
Scholar 45:426-436.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ENGELS, FRIEDRICH (1878) 1959 Anti-Duhring: Herr
Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science. Moscow:
Foreign Languages Publishing House. —> First pub-
lished as "Herrn Eugen Diihrings Umwalzung der
Wissenschaft" in Vorwarts (Leipzig).
KURTZ, PAUL W. (editor) 1968 Sidney Hook and the
Contemporary WorZd: Essays on the Pragmatic In-
telligence. New York-. John Day. —> A Festschrift for
Hook on his 65th birthday. Contains essays on
diverse aspects of Hook's work, including a 749-
item bibliography of books, essays, and reviews by
Hook, and a 198-item bibliography of reviews of
Hook's books, and books and articles about Hook.
LENIN, VLADIMIR I. (1909) 1970 Materialism and
Empiric-criticism. New York: International Pub-
lishers.
MARX, KARL (1844) 1964 Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844. New York: International
Publishers; London: Lawrence & Wishart. —> Writ-
ten in 1844 but first published posthumously in
German in 1932. Sometimes referred to as the
"Paris Manuscripts of 1844."
MARX, KARL (1867-1879) 1925-1926 Capital: A
Critique of Political Economy. 3 vols. Chicago:
Kerr. —» Volume 1: The Process of Capitalist Pro-
duction. Volume 2: The Process of Circulation of
Capital. Volume 3: The Process of Capitalist Pro-
duction as a Whole. The first volume was pub-
lished in 1867. The manuscripts of volumes 2 and
3 were written between 1867 and 1879. They were
first published posthumously in German in 1885
and 1894.
MARX, KARL and ENGELS, FRIEDRICH (1848) 1964
The Communist Manifesto. New York: Washington
Square Press. —> First published in German.
NAGEL, ERNEST 1961 The Structure of Science:
Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation.
New York: Harcourt.
NAGEL, ERNEST 1968 The Quest for Uncertainty.
Pages 407-426 in Paul W. Kurtz (editor), Sidney
Hook and the Contemporary World: Essays on the
Pragmatic Intelligence. New York: John Day.
HORKHEIMER, MAX
Insofar as the members of the Institute for
Social Research constituted a coherent "Frank-
fort School," their acknowledged "master" was
the philosopher and social theorist Max Hork-
heimer. Although less widely known than sev-
322 HORKHEIMER, MAX
eral of his junior institute colleagues, in particu-
lar Theodor W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse,
Horkheimer was the major organizer of the in-
stitute's intellectual life and the chief promul-
gator of its common theoretical perspective,
known as "Critical Theory." Although by the
time of his death in 1973 Horkheimer had re-
pudiated many of "Critical Theory's" more radical
dimensions, his reputation as one of the found-
ing fathers of the tradition of Western Marxism
has remained intact.
In common with many other contributors to
that tradition, Horkheimer came from a non-
proletarian background. He was born in Zuffen-
hausen near Stuttgart, Germany, in 1895, the
son of a wealthy Jewish textile manufacturer,
Moriz Horkheimer. His father insisted on his
entering the family business, and after graduat-
ing from a Gymnasium in 1910, the young Hork-
heimer reluctantly agreed. But like another son
of a successful businessman, Arthur Schopen-
hauer, to whose ideas Horkheimer was particu-
larly drawn, he entertained hopes of pursuing
a less mundane career. In a series of novellas
and extended diary entries (1974), he expressed
his adolescent yearnings and Utopian hopes. His
tone was similar to that of the expressionists,
whose moral idealism he would come to scorn
after drawing closer to Marxism.
His interest in Marxism matured slowly over
the next decade. Emboldened by his friendship
with Friedrich Pollock, another restless son of a
bourgeois household, and made more indepen-
dent by a year of army service during World
War i, Horkheimer left his father's factory for
academic life. From 1919 to 1925 he studied in
Munich, Freiburg, and Frankfort, earning his
doctorate in 1922 and Habilitation in 1925 at
the last of these universities. Written under the
direction of Hans Cornelius, his dissertation
dealt with Kant's Critique of Judgment and its
implications for overcoming the contradictions
of bourgeois life and thought (1925). Although
never joining any of the Weimar Republic's
radical parties, Horkheimer was drawn increas-
ingly to the left during his student days. Among
his friends were a group of similarly inclined
intellectuals, including Theodor W. Adorno, Leo
Lowenthal, and Felix Weil, who were all excited
by the new stimulus to Marxist thinking in the
work of Georg Lukacs and Karl Korsch. In 1923,
supported by Weil's wealthy father, Horkheimer,
Pollock, and Weil founded the Institute for So-
cial Research to provide an independent schol-
arly setting for the pursuit of their radical goals.
Lowenthal soon joined them, as did the econo-
mist Henryk Grossmann and the Sinologist Karl
A. Wittfogel. Although loosely associated with
the University of Frankfort and maintaining
informal ties with several of the leftist parties,
the institute was able to achieve an autonomy
that it maintained throughout its history.
Horkheimer was too young to become the in-
stitute's first director, a post that went to the
Austrian Marxist Carl Griinberg, because the
director also had to have a chair at the univer-
sity. But in 1930, when Griinberg's health had
deteriorated, Horkheimer had completed An-
fdnge der bilrgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie
(1930) and was thus able to assume a profes-
sorship in social philosophy, and with it, the
institute's leadership. From that date the history
of the Frankfort School may be properly traced.
In his first three years as director, the institute
started a new journal, the Zeitschrift fur Sozial-
forschung ("Journal for Social Research"), opened
branch offices in Geneva and London, and wel-
comed several new members, most notably the
psychoanalyst Erich Fromm and the philos-
opher Herbert Marcuse. It began as well to
gather materials for its first collective project,
a study of the relations between authority and
family in the modern world, which was designed
in part to explain the proletariat's inability to
assume the revolutionary role assigned it by
orthodox Marxism.
By the time the Studien iiber Autoritat und
Familie (1936) appeared, the institute itself
had been victimized by that inability. With the
Nazi seizure of power in January 1933, Hork-
heimer and his colleagues, most of whom were
Jewish as well as socialists, were forced to flee.
After a year in Geneva they went to New York,
where they established a loose affiliation with
Columbia University. In that same year, a col-
lection of Horkheimer's aphorisms appeared
pseudonymously under the pointedly ambiguous
title Dammerung (1934), the German word for
both dawn and twilight. Written when the fate
of the Weimar Republic was still uncertain, they
expressed a militancy that would wane in his
later writings.
In New York the institute was able to resume
a large part of its earlier work. The Zeitschrift
continued to be published in Paris until 1939,
and then for two more years in the United States
under the title Studies in Philosophy and Social
Science. New members joined the institute's
ranks, most notably Franz L. Neumann, Otto
Kirchheimer, and, still in his Paris exile, Walter

Benjamin. Although the late 1930s saw the de-
parture of Fromm and the loosening of ties with
Grossmann and Wittfogel, Adorno joined the in-
stitute officially in 1938. For Horkheimer, his
collaboration was to be of particular impor-
tance; in later years, they would be more closely
identified with the Frankfort School than would
any other institute members.
During the institute's first years in exile,
Horkheimer spelled out the tenets of Critical
Theory in a series of articles in the Zeitschrift,
later collected in book form (1968). Drawing
on the Hegelianized Marxism introduced by
Lukacs and Korsch, but hostile to its inherent
identity theory, loyal to the classical German
idealist notion of reason, but wary of its disdain
for concrete human happiness, open to insights
from psychoanalysis, but disturbed by its ten-
dency to naturalize the contradictions of bour-
geois society, "Critical Theory" opposed itself to
what Horkheimer called "Traditional Theory."
Most important, it claimed that the goal of
theory was social emancipation, not abstract
truth, and thus that the theorist could not be
detached and "objective," as traditional theory
contended he should. Although reluctant to en-
dorse conventional metaphysics, Horkheimer
was particularly scornful of positivism, which
he accused of accepting the reified "facts" of the
status quo as eternal and immutable. Instead,
"Critical Theory" stressed their historical and
therefore changeable nature.
By the 1940s, however, Horkheimer and his
colleagues had grown more cautious about the
possibilities of significant change. In two books
written after he left New York for California in
1940, Dialectic of Enlightenment, coauthored
by Adorno (1947), and Eclipse of Reason
(1947), Horkheimer voiced his increasing pes-
simism about the current situation. Moving
beyond a strictly class analysis, he stressed the
importance of instrumental rationality and the
domination of nature as central elements of
Western culture from its beginning. Fascism
could be explained in part as a revolt of domi-
nated nature against its subjugation. Even tra-
ditional Marxism, Horkheimer suggested, had
not entirely escaped the Enlightenment's am-
biguous dialectic.
As his hope in the proletariat's ability to re-
verse this unprogressive progress of domination
waned, Horkheimer increasingly stressed the
importance of rescuing and nurturing critical,
negative, and Utopian impulses wherever they
might be found. In an increasingly bleak anal-
HORKHEIMER, MAX 323
ysis of what he called our "administered world,"
Horkheimer came to identify these impulses
more with artistic and philosophical than with
directly political phenomena. Most art, to be
sure, was manufactured by what he and Adorno
called the "culture industry," and most philos-
ophy was a variant of positivism or idealism,
but there were certain counterexamples that
allowed some hope for the ultimate emancipa-
tion of mankind from the sinister dialectic of
the Enlightenment. Ironically, they were most
likely to be those cultural phenomena, such as
modernist art and "Critical Theory" itself, that
eschewed any direct and immediate political
efficacy. For Horkheimer and the Frankfort
School in general, there was no viable political
practice that could lead to qualitative change,
at least for the foreseeable future.
In their empirical work, Horkheimer and his
colleagues probed the reasons for this pessimis-
tic prognosis. Using methods they had first
employed in their studies of fascism in Europe,
institute members joined with American re-
searchers to explore the potential for a similar
disaster in America. Under the auspices of the
American Jewish Committee, whose director for
scientific studies Horkheimer became in 1943,
the institute helped write a five-volume series,
Studies in Prejudice (1949-1950). The central
volume was The Authoritarian Personality, Co-
authored with the Berkeley Public Opinion
Study Group, which quickly became a contro-
versial classic of social scientific research. Al-
though the institute's more radical impulses
seemed to be submerged in the predominantly
psychological methodology of the work, the so-
cial origins of the phenomena under discussion
were not slighted in the sections of the volume
written by Adorno and inspired by "Critical
Theory." Read in conjunction with the more
theoretical writings of the late 1940s, The Au-
thoritarian Personality did little to dispel the
sense of mounting despair that ran through the
Frankfort School's work. Although the study did
spell out the components of a nonauthoritarian
personality syndrome, it never ventured an esti-
mate of the relative prevalence of each. Even
with the defeat of fascism, Horkheimer and his
colleagues were not sanguine about the direction
in which the world was moving. What Marcuse
was later to make famous as "one-dimensional"
society meant that even in the seemingly liberal
democracies of the West, true emancipatory
impulses were suppressed.
Although Horkheimer had felt grateful to his
324 HORKHEIMER, MAX
American hosts, he recognized that "Critical
Theory" had little chance of breaking through
the prevailing philosophical and cultural dis-
course of this country after the war. He was
thus willing to consider, and finally accept, the
blandishments of the city of Frankfurt to return
with his institute and begin where he had left
off in 1933. Accompanied by Pollock and
Adorno, he reestablished the institute in its
original home in 1950. From 1951 to 1953 he
served as rector of the university. Although re-
turning to America sporadically for the next five
years to act as guest professor at the University
of Chicago, Horkheimer quickly established
himself as a leading intellectual presence in the
Federal Republic. In 1959 he became professor
emeritus and moved in the following year to
Montagnola, Switzerland, where he lived until
his death in 1973.
The last decade of Horkheimer's life was per-
haps his most controversial. While many of the
institute's students were rediscovering his earlier
and more radical works, he was becoming in-
creasingly concerned with the totalitarian threat
to individualism. His lifelong interest in Schopen-
hauer came to the surface and pessimistically
colored his later writings, collected in Gesell-
schaft im Vbergang (1972a), Sozialphiloso-
phische Studien (1972b), and the posthumously
published edition of Dawn and Decline ([1934]
1978). A new concern for religious issues, in
particular for Jewish questions, also emerged in
ways confusing to his more politically minded
disciples in the German New Left. Although he
was spared the direct harassment suffered by
Adorno and their younger colleague Jiirgen
Habermas, Horkheimer was accused of betray-
ing the link between theory and practice that
"Critical Theory" had originally stressed. Ironi-
cally, conservative elements in German society
soon afterwards berated the Frankfort School
for fomenting the student unrest that led to the
terrorism of the 1970s.
In neither case was the subtlety of Hork-
heimer's position fully appreciated. For although
he condemned the instrumentalization of theory
in a way that seemed to preclude virtually any
political activism, he never abandoned his hope
for a future practice that might satisfy his
yearnings for what he called "the entirely other"
(das ganze Andere). He was thus never as re-
signed as his students claimed, nor as irrespon-
sible as his establishment detractors charged.
And yet both were correct in sensing the im-
passe at which his version of "Critical Theory"
had ultimately arrived. Schopenhauer and Marx
were not, after all, very compatible bedfellows.
It is, however, the special good fortune of mas-
ters of intellectual schools to have students who
develop their ideas in new and creative ways.
In the work of Jiirgen Habermas and other still
younger "Critical" theorists in Europe and Amer-
ica, Horkheimer's influence remains very much
alive.
MARTIN JAY
WORKS BY HORKHEIMER
1925 Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als Bindeglied
zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Philosophic.
Stuttgart (Germany): Kohlhammer.
1930 Anftinge der biirgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie.
Stuttgart (Germany): Kohlhammer.
(1934) 1978 Dawn and Decline: Notes 1926-1931 &
1950-1969. New York: Seabury. —> Earlier notes were
first published as Dammerung: Notizen in Deutsch-
land under the pseudonym Heinrich Regius.
1936 INSTITUT FUR SOZIALFORSCHUNG Studien uber
Autoritat und Familie. Edited by Max Horkheimer.
Paris: Alcan.
(1947) 1974 Eclipse of Reason. New York: Seabury.
(1947) 1972 HORKHEIMER, MAX; and ADORNO, THEO-
DOR W. Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York:
Herder. —> First published in German.
1949-1950 HORKHEIMER, MAX; and FLOWERMAN,
SAMUEL H. (editors) Studies in Prejudice. 5 vols.
New York: Harper.
(1967) 1974 Critique of Instrumental Reason. New
York: Seabury. —» First published in German. Part
one of the 1967 edition is a German translation of
Eclipse of Reason, 1947.
1968 Kritische Theorie: Eine Dokumentation. Edited
by Alfred Schmidt. 2 vols. Frankfort (Germany):
S. Fischer. —> A partial translation, with the
title Critical Theory: Selected Essays, was published
by Herder in 1972.
1970a Traditionelle und Kritische Theorie: Vier Auf-
satze. Frankfort (Germany): Fischer Biicherei.
1970b Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung [1942]. Frankfort
(Germany): S. Fischer.
1972a Gesellschaft im Ubergang: Aufsdtze, Reden und
Vortrdge, 1942-1970. Edited by Werner Brede.
Frankfort (Germany): Athenaum Fischer Taschen-
buch.
1972& Sozialphilosophische Studien: Aufsatze, Reden
und Vortrdge, 1930-1972. Edited by Werner Brede.
Frankfort (Germany): Athenaum Fischer Taschen-
buch.
1974 Aws der Puberttit: Novellen und Tagebuch-
blatter. Munich: Kosel.
1976 Die Gesellschaftliche Funktion der Philosophic:
Ausgewahlte Essays. Frankfort (Germany): Suhr-
kamp.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
APERGI, FRANCESCO 1977 Marxismo e ricerca sociale
nella scuola di Francoforte. Florence (Italy): La
Nuova Italia Editrice.
BEYER, WILHELM RAIMUND 1971 Die Siinden der
Frankfurter Schule: Ein Beitrag zur Kritik der
"Kritischen theorie." Frankfort (Germany: Marx
istische Blatter.
BUCK-MORSS, SUSAN 1977 The Origin of Negative
Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin,
and the Frankfurt Institute. New York: Free Press.

DUBIEL, HELMUT 1978 Wissenschaftsorganisation und
politische Erfahrung: Studien zur friihen Kritischen
Theorie. Frankfort (Germany): Suhrkamp.
GUMNIOR, HELMUT; and RlNGGUTH, RUDOLF 1973
Max Horkheimer in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddoku-
menten. Hamburg (Germany): Rowohlt.
HEISELER, JOHANNES HEINRICH VON et al. (editors)
1970 Die "Frankfurter Schule" im Lichte des
Marxismus: Zur Kritik der Philosophic und
Soziologie von Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse,
Habermas. Frankfort (Germany): Marxistische
Blatter.
JAY, MARTIN 1973 The Dialectical Imagination: A
History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute
of Social Research, 1923-1950. Boston: Little,
Brown.
LEISS, WILLIAM 1972 The Domination of Nature.
New York: Braziller.
O'NEILL, JOHN (editor) 1976 On Critical Theory.
New York: Seabury.
POST, WERNER 1971 Kritische Theorie und meta-
physicher Pessimismus—Zum Spdtwerk Max Hork-
heimer s. Munich: Kosel.
ROHRMOSER, GUNTER 1970 Das Elend der Kritischen
Theorie: Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse,
Jiirgen Habermas. Freiburg (Germany): Rombach.
RUSCONI, GIAN E. 1968 La teorie critica della societa.
Bologna (Italy): II Mulino.
SCHMIDT, ALFRED 1970 Die Zeitschrift fur Sozial-
forschung: Geschichte und gegenwdrtige Bedeutung.
Munich: Kosel.
SCHMIDT, ALFRED; and RUSCONI, GIAN E. 1972 La
Scuola di Francoforte: Origini e significato attuale.
Bari (Italy): de Donate.
SKUHRA, ANSELM 1974 Max Horkheimer: Eine Ein-
fiihrung in Sein Denken. Stuttgart (Germany):
Kohlhammer.
SLATER, PHIL 1977 Origin and Significance of the
Frankfurt School: A Marxist Perspective. London
and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
TAR, ZOLTAN 1977 The Frankfurt School: The Criti-
cal Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W.
Adorno. New York: Wiley.
THEUNISSEN, MICHAEL 1968 Geschichte und Gesell-
schaft—Zur Kritik der Kritischen Theorie. Berlin:
de Gruyter.
WELLMER, ALBRECHT (1969) 1971 Critical Theory
of Society. New York: Herder. —> First published
as Kritische Gesellschaftstheorie und Positivismus.
HOTELLING, HAROLD
Harold Retelling (1895-1973), a pioneer in
statistical theory and mathematical economics,
began his career as a journalist. After complet-
ing high school in Seattle, he worked on small
weekly newspapers in the state of Washington
in 1915-1916, then took up journalism as an
undergraduate at the University of Washington,
where he earned a bachelor's degree in 1919.
While completing that program he took several
mathematics courses with Eric Temple Bell.
Under Bell's influence, he undertook graduate
study in mathematics, obtaining an M.A. degree
at Washington in 1921. He went to Princeton
HOTELLING, HAROLD 325
University from Seattle and completed a doc-
torate in mathematics in 1924.
From the beginning of his study of mathe-
matics, Hotelling was interested in its applica-
tions. He once said that he had hoped to study
both statistics and mathematical economics in
his doctoral program and was surprised to find
that extensive offerings in these subjects were
not available in the United States in 1921. His
own career both as a researcher and as a
teacher did much to overcome those deficiencies.
After completing his doctorate at Princeton,
Hotelling went to Stanford University's Food
Research Institute, where he remained until
1927. It was here that he published the first of
the many scholarly papers that brought him
international recognition. His early interests in
the application of mathematics included the
fields of journalism and political science, popu-
lation, and food supply; he then turned to math-
ematical economics while simultaneously pro-
ducing fundamental research in the developing
theory of statistics.
Hotelling was associate professor of mathe-
matics at Stanford University from 1927 to
1931. During this period he spent six months
with R. A. Fisher, then the dominant figure in
mathematical statistics, at the Rothamsted Agri-
cultural Experiment Station in England. This
visit reinforced and further developed Hotel-
ling's interest in mathematical statistics. In
1931 he moved to Columbia University as pro-
fessor of economics, remaining for 15 extremely
productive years during which he became an
internationally recognized authority in both
mathematical economics and statistics. In 1946
he moved to the University of North Carolina,
founding the department of statistics on the
Chapel Hill campus, where his uncanny ability
to recognize talent in others led him to attract
an outstanding faculty. He later became also
professor of economics, Kenan professor of sta-
tistics, and was Kenan professor emeritus from
his retirement in 1966 until his death in 1973.
Although Hotelling published a few papers
in theoretical mathematics (1925c; 1926), the
bulk of his teaching and research efforts was
devoted to statistics and mathematical eco-
nomics. Even in economics he published a rela-
tively small number of papers, but they had a
major impact. Hotelling's contributions to eco-
nomics may be classified under five headings:
optimization over time, imperfect competition
and location theory, the incidence of taxation,
demand theory, and welfare economics.
326 HOTELLING, HAROLD
One of Retelling's first papers (1925£>) dealt
with the problem of finding a logical basis for
methods of depreciation. The problem was
solved by relating depreciation methods to profit
maximization. The paper also suggested that
the calculus of variations could be applied to
problems of temporal optimization in economics
including the problem of depreciation, but this
suggestion was not acted on in this paper. A
later paper (193la) dealt with the economics
of exhaustible natural resources. In this paper
the calculus of variations was used to obtain the
socially optimal rate of exploitation of irreplace-
able natural resources. After decades of neglect,
this paper has received a good deal of attention
since the petroleum crisis of 1973.
A single paper (1929&) made contributions
to the theory of imperfect competition and to
the theory of the location of economic activity.
Some earlier economists had argued that oli-
gopoly situations were inherently unstable—that
is, that an equilibrium could not be reached and
maintained. Ho telling developed an oligopoly
case that attained a stable equilibrium, thus
showing that oligopoly equilibrium was possible
although it need not hold in every oligopoly sit-
uation. The case that was developed involved
two competing firms connected by a linear thor-
oughfare (main street in a small town or a
transcontinental railroad). Ho telling demon-
strated that profit maximization would cause
the two firms to locate near each other on the
thoroughfare, rather than at the quartile points,
which would minimize transportation costs for
the customers. This aspect of the paper has
made it interesting to scholars of the locations
of economic activity. This tendency of competi-
tors to draw near each other was generalized by
Hotelling to explain similarity of competing
products and of the platforms of political parties.
Hotelling then studied Edgeworth's (1897)
argument that an excise tax on one of two re-
lated goods may result in a lowering of the
prices of both goods. This thesis had produced a
seemingly consistent and reasonable numerical
example in which price reduction for both goods
followed the levying of an excise on one of them.
Edgeworth regarded this as a mere "curiosum,"
Hotelling investigated this phenomenon and
found that it could occur if the two goods were
substitutes in both consumption and produc-
tion; he thus raised the phenomenon above the
category of a curiosity (1932). In this paper he
also developed a measure of the social loss due
to the levying of an excise tax. The measure
was to be developed further in his work on wel-
fare economics.
Hotelling also worked out the mathematical
characteristics of demand functions under the
assumption that the consumer maximizes satis-
faction subject to a budget constraint (1935).
This work was in the same general area as that
of J. R. Hicks and R. G. D. Allen, and it
came at about the same time as their work and
the discovery of Eugen Slutsky's work. Since the
1950s this type of material has been taught to
virtually all first-year graduate students in eco-
nomics, but in 1935 it was considered advanced
economics.
Perhaps Hotelling's most noteworthy contri-
bution to economics was in welfare economics
(1938). For some time economists had been
aware that pricing at marginal cost was ad-
vantageous from the social viewpoint. Hotelling
provided a mathematical demonstration of the
validity of the principle of pricing at marginal
cost. This principle, together with its variations
and limitations developed by others, forms an
important part of the theory of welfare eco-
nomics. Hotelling also refined the concept, first
developed in 1932, of the social loss due to
levying an excise tax.
When Hotelling began his career, mathe-
matical economics was regarded as a recondite
specialty. He lived to see economic theory es-
tablished on a firm mathematical basis.
Through his teaching and research efforts he
contributed a great deal to this reformation of
economic theory.
His role in the dramatic development of
mathematical statistics in the United States
since 1930 was also a most significant one, in-
volving important contributions in diverse
areas. For example, his early work on differ-
ential equations subject to error (1927fo) pio-
neered in a field of great subsequent, and in-
deed current, research interest. His work in the
nonparametric area involving rank correlations
(Hotelling & Pabst 1936) stimulated much later
research, as did that on statistical prediction
(1940a) and on experimental determination of
the maximum of a function (1941).
The work for which Hotelling will be espe-
cially remembered, however, is in the field of
multivariate analysis, an area in which he be-
came the acknowledged leader. He was respon-
sible for a number of fundamental develop-
ments in this specialty, which is concerned with
the treatment of the simultaneous measurement
of multiple characteristics (vector random varia-

bles). His first major contribution involved a
"measure of deviation" now known as "Retelling's
T2," by which two populations may be compared
by the simultaneous comparison of a number of
their characteristics. This generalized the "Stu-
dent-t-statistic" introduced earlier to compare
single characteristics of two populations.
In 1933 Hotelling developed the idea of
"principal components analysis" (a concept
introduced originally by Karl Pearson). Basically
this method describes the dispersion of n points
in a k-dimensional space by a convenient trans-
formation giving new orthogonal axes and is
now a widely used method of multivariate anal-
ysis,
Canonical correlation analysis developed by
Hotelling (1936a) provides another method for
describing associations between two sets of ran-
dom variables. In this method, the two linear
combinations of the variables of each set are
found for which the correlation is maximum.
Then the process is repeated among the linear
combinations that are orthogonal to those al-
ready considered, and so on. In this way a set of
"canonical variates" may be formed and natural
measures of association obtained.
Hotelling's contributions to the teaching of
statistics were also noteworthy. His generous
manner extended to all situations, including the
classroom, where his students became genu-
inely involved in the subject. His informal style,
encouragement of class discussion, and his
clear authority as a leader in the field instilled
in students a keen desire to perform at their
best.
Hotelling's influence on the teaching of statis-
tics reached far beyond his personal classroom
involvement. He gave deep consideration to the
general issues surrounding the teaching of the
subject, being especially concerned about the
qualification of instructors, balance between
theory and practice, and the organization of
statistics instruction on a university campus.
Many of his views on these subjects are con-
tained in a famous paper (1940£>) delivered first
as an address at the 1940 annual meeting of
the Institute of Mathematical Statistics. It is
indicative of Hotelling's almost prophetic nature
that many of the issues he raised are still
discussed.
Hotelling was a member of the National
Academy of Sciences and of the Accademia
Nazionale dei Lincei, an honorary fellow of the
Royal Statistical Society, a distinguished fellow
of the American Economic Association, and a
HOTELLING, HAROLD 327
fellow of the Econometric Society, the Institute
of Mathematical Statistics, and the Royal Eco-
nomic Society. He served as president of the
Econometric Society in 1936/1937 and of the
Institute of Mathematical Statistics in 1941. He
received an honorary LL.D. degree from the
University of Chicago in 1955, an honorary
D.SC. degree from the University of Rochester
in 1963, and, in 1972, the North Carolina
award for science.
RALPH W. PFOUTS AND M. R. LEADBETTER
WORKS BY HOTELLING
1925a The Distribution of Correlation Ratios Calcu-
lated From Random Data. National Academy of
Science, Proceedings 11:657-662.
1925b A General Mathematical Theory of Deprecia-
tion. Journal of the American Statistical Association
20:340-353.
1925c Three-dimensional Manifolds of States of Mo-
tion. American Mathematical Society, Transactions
27:329-344.
1926 Multiple-sheeted Spaces and Manifolds of States
of Motion. American Mathematical Society, Trans-
actions 28:479-490.
1927a An Application of Analysis Situs to Statistics.
American Mathematical Society, Bulletin 33:467—
476.
1927& Differential Equations Subject to Error, and
Population Estimates. Journal of the American Sta-
tistical Association 22:283-314.
1928 Spaces of Statistics and Their Metrization. Sci-
ence 67:149-150.
1928 HOTELLING, HAROLD; BAAS BEEKING, L. G. M.;
and SANDE BAKHUYSEN, HENRIETTE V.D. The Physi-
cal State of Protoplasm. Verhandelingen der Konin-
klijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam,
Afdeeling, Natuurkinde (Tweede Sectie) 25:28-31.
1929a A Determinant Game. American Mathematical
Monthly 36:285 only.
1929b Stability in Competition. Economic Journal
39:41-57.
1929 WORKING, HOLBROOK; and HOTELLING, HAROLD
Applications of the Theory of Error to the Inter-
pretation of Trends. Journal of the American Sta-
tistical Association 24 (March supplement): 73-85.
1930 The Consistency and Ultimate Distribution of
Optimum Statistics. American Mathematical So-
ciety, Transactions 32:847-859.
1931a The Economics of Exhaustible Resources. Jour-
nal of Political Economy 39:137-175.
1931& The Generalization of Student's Ratio. Annals
of Mathematical Statistics 2:360-378.
1932 Edgeworth's Taxation Paradox and the Nature
of Demand and Supply Functions. Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 40:577-616.
1933 Analysis of a Complex of Statistical Variables
Into Principal Components. Journal of Educational
Psychology 24:417-441, 498-520.
1935 Demand Functions With Limited Budgets. Econo-
metrica3:66-78.
1936a Relations Between Two Sets of Variates. Bio-
metrika 28:321-377.
1936b Simplified Calculations of Principal Compo-
nents. Psychometrika 1:27-35.
1936 HOTELLING, HAROLD; and HOWELLS, WILLIAM W.
Measurements and Correlations on Pelves of In-
dians of the Southwest. American Journal of Physi-
cal Anthropology 21 -.91-106.
328 HOWELLS, WILLIAM W.
1936 HOTELLING, HAROLD; and PABST, MARGARET
RICHARDS Rank Correlation and Tests of Signifi-
cance Involving No Assumption of Normality. An-
nals of Mathematical Statistics 7:29-43.
1938 The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of
Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates. Econo-
metrica 6:242-269.
1940a The Selection of Variates for Use in Prediction
With Some Comments on the General Problem of
Nuisance Parameters. Annals of Mathematical Sta-
tistics 11:271-283.
1940k The Teaching of Statistics. Annals of Mathe-
matical Statistics 11:457-470.
1941 Experimental Determination of the Maximum of
a Function. Annals of Mathematical Statistics
12:20-45.
1942 Problems of Prediction. American Journal of So-
ciology 48:61-76.
1968 Multivariate Analysis: IJI. Correlation (2). Vol-
ume 10, pages 545-55,3 in International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L.
Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ANDERSON, THEODORE W. 1960 Harold Hotelling's
Research in Statistics. American Statistician 14, no.
3:17-21.
EDGEWORTH, F. Y. 1897 La Teoria Pura del Monop-
olio. Giornale degli Economisti 15:307-320.
MADOW, WILLIAM G. 1960 Harold Hotelling as a
Teacher. American Statistician 14, no. 3:15-17.
OLKIN, INGRAM et al. (editors) 1960 Contributions to
Probability and Statistics: Essays in Honor of
Harold Hotelling. Stanford Univ. Press.
PFOUTS, RALPH W. (editor) 1960 Essays in Eco-
nomics and Econometrics: A Volume in Honor of
Harold Hotelling. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Caro-
lina Press.
SAMUELSON, PAUL A. 1960 Harold Hotelling as
Mathematical Economist. American Statistician 14,
no. 3:21-25.
HOWELLS, WILLIAM W.
Characteristically in America, the anthropo-
logical view of Homo sapiens is one incorporat-
ing prehistory and physical (biological) anthro-
pology as well as cultural and social anthropology.
William White Howells exemplifies that tradi-
tion from the perspective of physical anthro-
pology. He was born in New York City in 1908,
the son of John Mead and Abby Macdougall
White Howells and the grandson of the novelist
William Dean Howells. He married Muriel Gur-
don Seabury in his senior year at Harvard Col-
lege. His concentration as an undergraduate was
anthropology, and this focus continued on
through his PH.D. at Harvard University in 1934.
Earnest A. Hooton had made Harvard the United
States center for academic training in physical
anthropology after World War i, and Howells'
entry into the field was attributable to Hooton's
stimulating presentations of anthropology to
undergraduates and to the public. Some of
Howells' professional interests in physical an-
thropology, for example quantitative methods in
dealing with morphological variation in popula-
tions, derive from the approaches that Hooton
pioneered at that time.
Apart from three years of wartime service in
Washington in the U.S. Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, Howells has held only three professional
positions. The first was in the American Museum
of Natural History in New York City, where
he, along with Hooton's first doctoral student,
Harry L. Shapiro, investigated racial variation in
Pacific island populations. In 1939 he accepted
a teaching position at the University of Wiscon-
son at Madison, where he remained until he re-
turned to Harvard on the death of Hooton in
1954. He retired in 1974. At both Wisconsin and
Harvard, Howells excelled in undergraduate in-
struction. At the former institution he was a
leader in the development of the integrated lib-
eral studies curriculum, and in the latter uni-
versity he originated one of the most popular
courses in the natural sciences division of the
general education program. In doctoral training
at Harvard, he has produced more than a score
of physical anthropologists whose strong meth-
odological training under him is displayed in the
diverse subject matter in physical anthropology
that they have pursued in their research (Giles
& Friedlaender 1976).
An engaging lecture style has carried over to
his popular books, which cover primitive religion
in The Heathens (1948), world archeology in
Back of History (1954), and physical anthro-
pology, with an emphasis on fossil man, in Man-
kind So Far (1944), followed by a book along
similar lines, Mankind in the Making (1959).
These books, widely used as texts, have received
extensive critical praise in the profession. Their
translations, variously, into French, German,
Spanish, Japanese, Dutch, and Arabic, have
made Howells the most diverse and accessible
American physical anthropologist explicating the
discipline.
Howells was elected to the National Academy
of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, and, in 1954 received the Viking
Fund medal in physical anthropology. He was
editor of the American Journal of Physical An-
thropology from 1950 to 1954, and in 1951 was
president of the American Anthropological Asso-
ciation, a position reflecting his esteem in the
general anthropological community.
Howells' early research was spread among

topics common to physical anthropologists: tech-
nical reports on modern human skeletal popula-
tions recovered by archeologists, refinements of
measurement techniques in osteology, and the
use of anthropometry, blood groups, and other
traits to determine racial groups and their his-
tory and interrelations. The main themes that
characterize his research developed out of these
interests. The studies perhaps most clearly as-
sociated with him in physical anthropology are
innovative elaboration and application of multi-
variate statistical techniques to problems of mor-
phology: understanding individuals in terms of
physique, living populations in terms of anthro-
pometric measurements, fossil specimens in
terms of affinities, and world populations in
terms of cranial variation.
Howells' involvement in primary description
of fossil material has been minor but significant
(e.g., the Kanapoi humerus fragment from east
Africa); his syntheses and reviews in paleo-
anthropology have been acclaimed as authori-
tative and even-handed. His research has been
most extensive and influential in the examina-
tion of human cranial variation, culminating in
"Cranial Variation in Man: A Study by Multi-
variate Analysis of Patterns of Difference Among
Recent Human Populations" (1973a). For this
analysis, Howells first collected data from 17
well-defined populations representing all regions
of the world. This required him personally to
take more than 100,000 measurements in vari-
ous museum collections. His thorough multivari-
ate discriminant analysis of these cranial dimen-
sions convincingly demonstrated that such varia-
tion is not, as he once put it, merely a taffy-pull
with the skeleton of the head. Howells' work
provides at least as appropriate a base for assess-
ing the relationships among the world's popula-
tions as any other means, and is a major con-
tribution to studies of prehistory as well as to
physical anthropology. Cranial variation has
been the subject of attention, often inconclusive
or at worst irresponsible, in physical anthropol-
ogy for more than a century. No one has suc-
ceeded like Howells in bringing credibility and
modern evolutionary thinking into such inves-
tigations.
From his earliest papers, Howells has evinced
a particular interest in the populations and pre-
history of Oceania. He has visited almost all of
the major Oceanic groups and conducted re-
search in the Solomon Islands and elsewhere as
part of a medical-human biology research team
organized by Albert Damon. Among the
HOWELLS, WILLIAM W. 329
modern populations of this region, Howells hag
emphasized the concept of biological distance, a
measure of interpopulation affinity in a re-
stricted area based upon multivariate analysis
of similarities and differences in single-gene
traits (e.g., blood groups) and polygenic ones
(e.g., finger- and handprints). Such studies can
be complementary to, or include, similar investi-
gations of linguistic, geographic, and other mea-
sures of relationship in determining patterns of
colonization and the dynamics of population in-
teraction in more recent periods.
In The Pacific Islanders (1974), Howells has
synthesized an immense amount of diverse and
sometimes conflicting evidence from linguistics,
social anthropology, prehistory, and physical
anthropology to present a comprehensive pic-
ture of the indigenous people of the major re-
gions of this area: Melanesia, Polynesia, Micro-
nesia, and Australia. The evidence suggests to
Howells two ancient population complexes: that
of what he calls old Melanesia, extending into
the Philippines as well as Australia, New Guinea,
and other modern-day Melanesian islands, and
the Proto-Mongoloids, diversifying later into all
the island groups. Despite the great diversity of
physical types in Oceania, Howells sees the ul-
timate derivation of these peoples from eastern
Asia. In this volume as well as others, Howells
is characteristically modest about his own sub-
stantial contributions of data and synthesis, pre-
ferring to emphasize the work of others and the
problems that remain.
EUGENE GILES
WORKS BY HOWELLS
1937 Anthropometry of the Natives of Arnhem Land
and the Australian Race Problem: Analysis and Dis-
cussion. Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Eth-
nology Papers 16, no. 1:1-97.
1941 The Early Christian Irish: The Skeletons at Gal-
len Priory. Royal Irish Academy, Proceedings
46, section C, no. 3:103-219.
1944 Mankind So Far. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
1948 The Heathens: Primitive Man and His Religions.
New York: Doubleday. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1962.
(1954) 1963 Back of History: The Story of Our Own
Origins. Rev. ed. New York: Doubleday.
(1959) 1967 Mankind in the Making: The Story of
Human Evolution. Rev. ed. New York: Doubleday.
1970 Hutterite Age Differences in Body Measurements.
Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology
Papers 57, no. 2:1-123.
1973a Cranial Variation in Man: A Study by Multi-
variate Analysis of Patterns of Difference Among
Recent Human Populations. Peabody Museum of
Archaeology and Ethnology Papers 67:1-259.
1973b Evolution of the Genus Homo. Reading, Mass.;
Addison-Wesley.
1974 The Pacific Islanders. New York: Scribners.
330 HUNT, J. McVICKER
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GILES, EUGENE; and FRIEDLAENDER, JONATHAN S. (edi-
tors) 1976 The Measures of Man: Methodologies
in Biological Anthropology. Cambridge, Mass.: Pea-
body Museum Press. —> A volume "published to
honor William Howells." Contains a complete bibli-
ography and additional biographical information.
HUNT, J. McVICKER
Joseph McVicker Hunt, American psycholo-
gist, has contributed to education and public
policy as well as to his own field. He has influ-
enced psychology primarily through syntheses
of a wide range of ideas and data suggesting
new directions for theory and practice. His work
has been characterized by broad scholarship, in-
novative integration of ideas, and a concern with
the application of knowledge to practical social
problems.
Hunt was born in 1906 on a farm in Scotts-
bluff, Nebraska, and attended local public
schools. As an undergraduate at the University
of Nebraska in Lincoln, he sampled many
courses, including biology, sociology, and eco-
nomics, but without a clear focus of interests or
a career goal. Psychology was not then promi-
nent at Nebraska, although the philosophy de-
partment since 1899 had had a laboratory of
psychology. In 1928, when Hunt was a senior,
J. P. Guilford returned to direct the laboratory
and to teach the general psychology course.
Hunt enrolled in it and his interest in psychol-
ogy, sparked by the course, was solidified by
Guilford's invitation to pursue graduate study
in psychology as his assistant. Although Hunt's
later work in psychology does not reflect Guil-
ford's direct influence, a concern for measure-
ment and empirical verification may derive from
the two years of graduate work under him.
To complete his studies, Hunt went to Cornell
University in 1931 to work with Madison Bentley
and, two years later, received his PH.D. for re-
search on characteristics of the process of ob-
serving. Bentley's theoretical orientation did not
have a long-lasting influence on Hunt's thinking,
but their encounter may have sustained Hunt's
interest in the problem of the determinants of
both adaptive and disorganized human behavior.
A quest for factors affecting behavior, partic-
ularly in the long term, is reflected in most of
Hunt's work. At Cornell he also enrolled in sev-
eral courses in neuroanatomy and physiology.
These courses gave him the background neces-
sary to follow neurophysiological literature,
which he continuously attempted to integrate
with theoretical formulations stemming from
observation of behavior.
Hunt made his first major contribution to psy-
chology while teaching at Brown University. He
organized and edited a handbook in the field of
personality psychology that was published as
Personality and the Behavior Disorders (1944).
This two-volume compendium brought together
psychoanalytic understandings of human func-
tioning with behavioristic formulations, research
on experimentally-induced disorders in animals
with interpretations derived from clinical work
in psychiatric settings, and discussion of bio-
logical, organic determinants of personality with
cultural and experiential determinants in an
effort to forge a cross-disciplinary, scientific ap-
proach to the study of personality. The impact
of this work resulted from the counterpositioning
of topics and viewpoints within the covers of one
book, not from any integrating section written
by the editor. As a whole, the work embodied the
view that human personality is amenable to
systematic assessment, rigorous study, and de-
terministic understanding.
Hunt brought to this undertaking considerable
experience beyond his graduate training. He had
been a postdoctoral fellow at the New York
Psychiatric Institute, where he had learned of
different approaches to the study of personal-
ity, and at the Worcester State Hospital, where
he had been exposed to a lively group of profes-
sionals who had recently emigrated from Eu-
rope. There he had expanded his knowledge of
psychoanalytic theory, gestalt psychology, and
the Rorschach technique. At St. Elizabeth Hos-
pital in Washington, he had pursued his interest
in various methods of psychiatric treatment and
had continued his study of Sigmund Freud's
writings. Most important, he had been influenced
by the group at Yale University led by Clark L.
Hull, and including John Bollard, Neal E. Miller,
O. Hobart Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears, and
had adopted their conviction that clinical in-
sights into personality dynamics could be trans-
lated into propositions consonant with the drive-
reduction theory of behavior and rigorously
tested. Personality and the Behavior Disorders
managed to convey this view.
The book was widely used in the growing
field of clinical psychology and brought Hunt
recognition within the profession. He was elected'
president of the Eastern Psychological Associa-
tion for the 1947/1948 term and of the Ameri-
can Psychological Association (APA) in 1950.
He served as the editor of the important Journal

of Abnormal and Social Psychology from 1949
to 1955, and later was accorded various posts
and honors in professional organizations. He
received the distinguished contribution award
of the APA's division of clinical psychology in
1973 and the G. Stanley Hall award of its divi-
sion of developmental psychology in 1976.
In 1946 Hunt left the academic world to be-
come director of the Institute of Welfare Re-
search in New York. Believing sound evidence
to be the best guide for policy, he proceeded
rapidly to develop methods for assessing condi-
tions under which social casework is effective
(Hunt, Blenkner, & Kogan 1950; Hunt & Kogan
1950). It was one of the first attempts to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of social intervention. In
the process he discovered and disapproved of the
political nature of social policy decisions and he
began to look again to academia, moving in 1951
to the University of Illinois as professor of psy-
chology. In later years his interest in the psy-
chology of personality was expressed in collab-
orative work with Norman S. Endler on the con-
ceptualization and measurement of personality
traits (1968), but his main effort was directed
elsewhere.
While still at Brown University, Hunt had
begun work in the second area to which he has
made significant contributions. He saw the pos-
sibility of using laboratory animals to investigate
the effects of experience on behavior. With the
collaboration of Harold Schlosberg and others,
he carried out a series of studies on the effects
of feeding frustration in infant rats on their
later hoarding and eating behavior (Hunt
1941). The studies were designed with the im-
plications of psychoanalytic theory clearly in
mind. Although this research was interrupted
by World War n and Hunt went on to pursue
this issue through other means, the method of
controlling the life histories of animals in order
to study the effects of rearing conditions on later
functioning became the mainstay of a lively area
of research.
Hunt pursued the question of the role of ex-
perience in ontogenesis through a critical exami-
nation of the existing literature and through field
research. In 1961 he published Intelligence and
Experience, in which he marshalled evidence
against the twin assumptions that the level of
adult intelligence as measured by the intelligence
quotient is fixed at birth and that intelligence
develops at a predetermined rate. In doing
so, he brought together Donald O. Hebb's (1949)
theorizing on the neurophysiological correlates
HUNT, J. McVICKER 331
of information processing and problem solving
with Jean Piaget's (1947) views on the course
of cognitive development. From the evidence,
Hunt argued for accepting the significance of
continuous interaction between environmental
demands and the problem-solving capacities of
the organism, with optimal growth attributable
to some degree of discrepancy between them.
He suggested that intelligence might be usefully
conceived as a hierarchically organized system
of central processes involved in problem solving,
processes that were constructed in the course
of interaction with the environment. Since the
optimal range and sequence of interactions for
the development of intelligence has not been
determined, he claimed that the potential level
of average adult intelligence also remains un-
known.
The viewpoint expressed in Intelligence and
Experience differed considerably from the Hul-
lian position on the attainment of competencies,
but it did not merge with genetic structuralism
either. Hunt seemed to be groping for a position
giving greater importance to specific interactions
with the environment than was acknowledged
by structuralists, and one giving more initiative
to the organism than was granted by learning
theorists.
While reviewing the literature on the effects
of experience, Hunt concluded that the prevalent
conception of motivation needed revision as
well. He came to recognize the limitations of the
drive-reduction position, even though it meant
a basic change in his own theoretical orientation.
He tried to unite cognition and motivation
through the concept of intrinsic motivation—that
is, motivation inherent in information processing
and action, independent of external reward. This
conception was first sketched in 1960 and was
elaborated in a Nebraska Symposium paper
(1965) and in chapters of books published later.
Hunt's concept of an active comparison process
between input and internal standards resembles
the notions of dissonance, discrepancy, and in-
congruity that became current around the same
time. However, his developmental perspective
encouraged him to consider the epigenesis of
intrinsic motivation and permitted him to find
a way to reconcile a feedback mechanism with
hierarchically ordered change.
The study of the literature on the effects of
experience led Hunt to make a major commit-
ment to the field of developmental psychology.
From his base at the University of Illinois, he
began with students and collaborators a program
332 HUNT, J. McVICKER
of research into cognitive and motivational de-
velopment during infancy and early childhood.
The search for 'opportunities to introduce de-
velopment-fostering experiences experimentally
led him to undertake a research project at an
orphanage in Iran, where sequential groups of in-
fants could be provided with progressively
modified living regimes. The progress made by
children growing up under different conditions
was assessed not by psychometric tests, but by a
set of ordinal scales constructed to permit evalu-
ation of development in different domains of
functioning (Uigiris & Hunt 1975). The re-
sults obtained in these studies convinced Hunt
of the plasticity of early development, not only
in terms of over-all rate but also in terms of a
selective effect on specific aspects of competence
(Hunt et al. 1976). He explicitly rejected Arnold
Gesell's (1946) stress on maturational control
of behavioral development and implicitly ques-
tioned Piaget's notion of holistic stages in early
functioning.
On the basis of the evidence for behavioral
plasticity, Hunt suggested that the concept of a
"norm of reaction" used in genetics was of much
greater potential value to psychologists than the
concept of heritability. Not only did he reject
Arthur R. Jensen's (1969) conclusion that in-
dividual differences in intellectual functioning
are largely genetically determined, but he also
argued that psychology lacks knowledge about
the range of achievements open to particular
human genotypes. In 1967, as a result of his
increasing concern with the educational aspects
of child rearing, he changed his position at the
University of Illinois to become professor of
psychology and early education.
Intelligence and Experience was perhaps
Hunt's most influential work. It acted as a cata-
lyst on research concerning intellectual develop-
ment, in shifting the orientation from psychomet-
ric to Piagetian. Moreover, it indicated the need
for an educational psychology of infancy and
early childhood, apparently the period of the
most rapid intellectual development. Its impli-
cations matched the national inclination in the
1960s to do more for the poor and the under-
privileged. When Project Head Start was
launched, Hunt was drawn into the national ad-
visory network for early education. In 1966 he
was invited to chair President Lyndon B. John-
son's Task Force on Early Childhood, which in
its report "A Bill of Rights for Children" recom-
mended such subsequently implemented pro-
grams as neighborhood parent and child centers
and Follow Through classrooms (White House
Task Force 1967). In 1967/1968, he served as di-
rector of the National Laboratory for Early Child-
hood Education Coordination Center. He con-
tinued to write and lecture on the relation of
experience to development and educational
achievement in school. A selection of these pa-
pers was published as The Challenge of Incom-
petence and Poverty (1969).
Throughout Hunt's career, theory and prac-
tice were intimately related. He used incidental
observations to confront theoretical beliefs,
and he was mindful of the practical implica-
tions of theoretical ideas. When he was working
on the psychology of personality, he was
also involved in devising ways to assess the out-
come of the interventions that constituted psy-
chotherapy and social casework. When con-
cerned with the study of intellectual develop-
ment, he was also involved in the evaluation of
educational programs for infants and young
children. His influence comes largely from
breadth of perspective, a willingness to modify
his beliefs on the basis of evidence, an ability to
integrate and reformulate existing information
to suggest new paths for the field, and, not the
least, from enthusiasm about the value of psy-
chological knowledge.
INA C. UZGIRIS
WORKS BY HUNT
1941 The Effects of Infant Feeding-frustration Upon
Adult Hoarding in the Albino Rat. Journal of Ab-
normal and Social Psychology 36:338-360.
1944 HUNT, J. MCVICKER (editor) Personality and the
Behavior Disorders: A Handbook Based on Experi-
mental and Clinical Research. 2 vols. New York:
Ronald.
1950 HUNT, J. MCVICKER; BLENKNER, MARGARET; and
KOGAN, LEONARD S. Testing Results in Social Case-
work: A Field-test of the Movement Scale. New
York: Family Service Association of America.
(1950) 1952 HUNT, J. MCVICKER; and KOGAN, LEON-
ARD S. Measuring Results in Social Casework: A
Manual on Judging Movement. Rev. ed. New York:
Family Service Association of America.
1961 Intelligence and Experience. New York: Ronald.
1965 Intrinsic Motivation and Its Role in Psychological
Development. Volume 13, pages 189-282 in David
Levine (editor), Nebraska Symposium on Motiva-
vation. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press.
1968 ENDLER, NORMAN S.; and HUNT, J. MCVICKER
S-R Inventories of Hostility and Comparisons of the
Proportions of Variance From Persons, Responses,
arid Situations for Hostility and Anxiousness. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology 9:309-315.
1969 The Challenge of Incompetence and Poverty: Pa-
pers on the Role of Early Education. Urbana: Univ,
of Illinois Press.
1972 HUNT, J. MCVICKER (editor) Human Intelligence.
New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction.

1974 A Professional Odyssey. Volume 2, pages 135-
202 in T. S. Krawiec (editor), The Psychologists.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
1975 U&GIRIS, INA C.; and HUNT, J. McViCKER Assess-
ment in Infancy: Ordinal Scales of Psychological De-
velopment. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.
1976 HUNT, J. McViCKER et al. The Psychological De-
velopment of Orphanage-reared Infants: Interven-
tions With Outcomes (Tehran). Genetic Psychology
Monographs 94:177-226.
1977 Learning From Compensatory, Preschool Educa-
tion. Unpublished manuscript. —» Manuscript con-
sists of lectures given for the International Seminar
on Developmental Psychology in Trier, West Ger-
many.
1979 Early Psychological Development and Experience.
Worcester, Mass.: Clark Univ. Press. —> The tenth
in the Heinz Werner lecture series.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GESELL, ARNOLD (1946) 1954 The Ontogenesis of In-
fant Behavior. Pages 335-373 in Leonard Car-
HUNT, J. McVICKER 333
michael (editor), Manual of Child Psychology. 2d
ed. New York: Wiley.
HEBB, DONALD O. 1949 The Organization of Behav-
ior: A Neuropsychological Theory. New York: Wiley.
JENSEN, ARTHUR R. 1969 How Much Can We Boost
IQ and Scholastic Achievement? Harvard Educa-
tional Review 39:1-123, 449-483.
PIAGET, JEAN (1947)1971 The Psychology of Intelli-
gence. London: Routledge. —> Originally published
in French.
WEIZMANN, FREDRIC 1977 Praxis and Interaction:
The Psychology of J. McVicker Hunt. Pages 1-23 in
Ina C. Uzgiris and Fredric Weizmann (editors),
The Structuring of Experience. New York and Lon-
don: Plenum.
WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE 1967 A Bill of Rights for
Children. Unpublished manuscript. —» This report
was prepared by the White House Task Force of
which Hunt was chairman. It is in the Lyndon B.
Johnson Library and is available through the Edu-
cational Resources Information Center at the Uni-
versity of Illinois, Urbana.
 JAKOBSON, ROMAN
Roman Jakobson was born in Moscow on Oc-
tober 11, 1896. In 1914, he enrolled in the philo-
logical faculty of Moscow University, where he
joined a number of fellow students in founding
the Moscow Linguistic Circle, of which he was
president from 1915 to 1920. The circle in-
cluded among its members persons from a vari-
ety of backgrounds: linguists, philosophers, stu-
dents of literature, and several poets. Its purpose
was "the elucidation of linguistic problems of
both practical and poetic language as well as
questions of folklore and ethnology" (Selected
Writings, vol. 2, p. 531; hereafter cited as Writ-
ings). In the 1920s, the circle's interests became
more literary, and together with the Society for
the Study of Poetic Language in Leningrad, it
was instrumental in the development of the
important school of literary criticism known as
Russian Formalism (Erlich 1955, pp. 44 ff.).
With regard to linguistics, the circle repre-
sented a reaction to the then dominant neogram-
marian school, which had come into being in the
late 1870s in the wake of a number of spectac-
ular breakthroughs that clarified many obscure
points in the phonological evolution of the Indo-
European family of languages. These advances
so deeply impressed workers in the field that for
close to half a century the majority of linguists
devoted most of their energies to the search for
sound correspondences among cognate lan-
guages and to the reconstruction of forms in
temporally ever more remote protolanguages.
With the passage of time, attention naturally
began to shift to those many other aspects of
language that had been slighted during the pre-
ceding period. Jakobson and his colleagues in
the Moscow Linguistic Circle were among the
scholars to whom the questions left unanswered
by their teachers and their predecessors ap-
peared more interesting than what was already
known. Looking back in 1962 to this early period,
Jakobson wrote: "Though the linguistic text-
books of our college years used to define lan-
guage as an instrument of communication, chief
attention in these manuals was paid to the pedi-
gree [historical origins] of its disjecta membra.
No answer appeared to the crucial questions:
how do the diverse components of this tool
operate? What is the multiform relationship and
interplay between the two sides of any verbal
sign—its sensuous, perceptible aspect . . . sig-
nans . . . and the intelligible or, properly,
translatable aspect . . . signatum . . .?" (Writ-
ings, vol. 1, p. 631). Since the linguistic litera-
ture was silent on these questions, the young re-
searchers were forced to look elsewhere, and it
was the experimental procedures of the avant-
garde artists of the 1900s that provided Jakob-
son with a clue to the answers to these questions.
He was particularly impressed "by the pictorial
theory and practice of cubism, where everything
is based on relationship and interaction between
parts and wholes, between color and shape, be-
tween the representation and the represented"
(ibid., vol. 1, p. 632). And it was in the study
of the productions of the Russian poets, es-
pecially those of Velemir Khlebnikov and Vladi-
mir Mayakovsky, whose bold linguistic experi-
ments were the counterparts of the cubists' ex-
periments with visual forms, that the new
335
336 JAKOBSON, ROMAN
methods were first developed and tested. Ac-
cording to Jakobson, "poetic language, disre-
garded by neogrammarian doctrine but present-
ing the most patently deliberate, goal-directed,
and integrated linguistic species, was a field that
called for a new type of analysis and particularly
required us to study the interplay between sound
and meaning" (ibid., vol. 1, p. 633).
What attracted Jakobson's immediate atten-
tion in the linguistic experiments of the poets
was that not all phonetic components were
treated on a par, but that a special status ap-
peared to be assigned to those sounds and sound
qualities which by themselves were capable of
signaling that two utterances represented dif-
ferent words. (Ferdinand de Saussure had made
similar observations in his lectures in the early
1900s. Jakobson became acquainted with Saus-
sure's ideas in 1917 through the reports of the
linguist Sergei Karcevsky^ who had studied in
Geneva.) This distinction among phonetic en-
tities provided Jakobson with the means to over-
come the apparently endless accumulation of
facts without rime or reason that characterized
the study of the sounds of speech (phonetics)
during much of this period. It directly led to the
recognition that each language had its own sys-
tem of distinctive sounds, its own system of
phonemes. It was these insights that led Jakob-
son, in his essays on Khlebnikov, to suggest that
"phonetic texture does not deal with sounds but
with phonemes" and "to examine the basic
prosodic elements (of Czech and Russian verse)
from a phonological angle" (ibid., vol. 1, p. 633).
In 1920 Jakobson moved to Czechoslovakia,
where he remained until 1939. These years saw
the full development of his scientific genius. The
134 items in Jakobson's bibliography that were
published between 1920 and 1939 include
studies on all of the major topics that have oc-
cupied Jakobson during his entire career. They
include studies on the theory of linguistics, es-
pecially phonology and linguistic geography, con-
tributions to the historical phonology of various
Slavic languages, synchronic descriptions of
phonological phenomena in different languages,
including also their prosody, inquiries into mor-
phology, investigations of medieval Slavic cul-
ture and literatures, especially Old Church Slavo-
nic and medieval Czech, studies in folklore,
sociolinguistics, poetics (especially metrics), lit-
erary criticism, and essays on the film, painting,
and the theater. In addition, Jakobson was in-
strumental in the founding of the Prague Lin-
guistic Circle in 1926, of which he was vice
president for the first 13 years. Many of the most
important theoretical papers of the period are to
be found in the eight volumes of Travaux, pub-
lished by the circle. Among them, a considerable
number were by Jakobson. During this period, he
was in close contact with Nikolaj S. Trubetzkoy,
professor of Slavic philology in Vienna, who also
participated actively in the activities of the
Prague Circle. As the correspondence between
Trubetzkoy and Jakobson shows, the two schol-
ars exercised a profound influence on each other,
especially in the area where both were to make
their most significant contributions: the develop-
ment of the modern study of the sounds of
speech, phonology (Jakobson 1975).
Having tested the usefulness of the phoneme
concept for the description of various poetic
devices (rime, alliteration, meter), the natural
next step was "to attack . . . that aspect of
language, which had been traditionally monopo-
lized by the neogrammarians," the phonological
evolution of a language. The monograph Re-
marques sur devolution phonologique du russe
comparee a celles des autres langues slaves
(1929, in Writings, vol. 1, pp. 7-116) represents
such an attempt. Rather than follow the pro-
cedure that since the neogrammarian days has
been used in almost all studies of historical
phonology and enumerate the reflexes of each
sound of the protolanguage in its (more) mod-
ern descendants, Jakobson presents the phono-
logical system of proto-Slavic and discusses each
of the steps (and intermediate systems) through
which the protosystem has evolved into that
found in modern Russian, for what is most im-
portant in Jakobson's view is not the sounds
themselves but the structure of their inter-
relation.
The idea that the sounds of a language are
not just an arbitrary aggregate of entities, but
constitute a system with its own imminent struc-
ture appears to have first been suggested by the
American linguist, Edward Sapir, in his 1925
essay, "Sound Patterns in Language" (Selected
Writings . . . 1949, pp. 33-45). Jakobson and
Trubetzkoy read this paper in 1928 and were
much impressed with it (Jakobson 1975, p. 144).
Like Sapir, they insisted on the importance
of the patterns that were constituted by the
phonemes of different languages. In a 1930
monograph, Jakobson wrote that phonemes con-
stitute a system, and that even though a pho-
neme of one language may be physically iden-
tical with the phoneme of another language, the
place that the two phonemes occupy in their

respective systems may be different (Writings,
vol. 1, p. 151). While in Sapir the nature of the
properties that made up the different patterns
remained somewhat obscure, Jakobson and Tru-
betzkoy saw that the relationships between pho-
nemes in different languages reflected well-
known phonetic properties. For example, the
consonant [d] as in chew differs from [j] as in
Jew by the property of voicing, whereas [£] dif-
fers from [§] as in shoe by the property of affri-
cation. They correctly pointed out that the same
distinctive properties were to be found among
other pairs of phonemes: e.g., [£] : [j] = [§] :
[z] = [s] : [z] = [f] : (v). It was noted that
languages differed from one another with regard
to the extent to which they illustrated particular
contrasts. Thus, Russian differs from English in
that it lacks the phoneme [j] and thus provides
no illustration of the contrast [£] : [j]. Hence
the position of [£] in the Russian consonant sys-
tem is quite different from that of [C] in the
English system. It was said in the 1920s and
1930s that the structure of the phonemic system
of every language was determined by the oppo-
sitions (the distinctive contrasts) that its pho-
nemes entered into. It was believed then that the
oppositions themselves exhibited marked struc-
tural differences. Some, like voicing and affrica-
tion (the two contrasts illustrated above), were
binary in that they admitted only two values:
voiced : voiceless and affricate : fricative. Others
like the so-called point of articulation, the place
where the vocal tract is maximally narrowed in
the production of the sound in question, could
assume a multiplicity of values. The former
(binary) oppositions were termed by Jakobson
and other Prague school phonologists, correla-
tive, whereas the latter (multivalued) opposi-
tions were called disjoint.
While this relational model of the phonolog-
ical system represented substantial progress over
the traditional phonetic doctrines embodied, for
example, in the international phonetic alphabet,
it had a number of flaws. In particular, the oppo-
sitions utilized in the characterization of vowels
were separate and distinct from those utilized
in the characterization of consonants. There ap-
pears to be little motivation for this since both
classes of speech sounds are produced and per-
ceived by the same organs. Moreover, the dis-
tinction between disjoint and correlative oppo-
sitions, which has been introduced into phonol-
ogy by Jakobson and Trubetzkoy, was more of a
formalization of traditional practice than a move
justified on its own grounds. In addition, Jakob-
JAKOBSON, ROMAN 337
son's studies of the utilization of phonetic fea-
tures by the poets (meter, assonance, rime) had
strongly suggested to him that binary features
(i.e., correlative oppositions) occupied a special,
privileged status. He, therefore, attempted to re-
duce all oppositions to a single binary type.
These efforts resulted in Jakobson's communi-
cation to the 1938 International Congress of
Phonetic Sciences (ibid., vol. 1, pp. 272-279),
which breaks with an important tenet of almost
all previous phonetic research that speech
sounds are further undecomposable entities
which can be characterized with the help of
phonetic properties, much as chemical elements
were once characterized with the help of such
properties as valence, atomic weight, etc. In-
stead, Jakobson proposed that phonemes are
nothing but complexes of features, much as
chemical atoms are now seen as specific con-
figurations of protons, electrons, etc. And just
as the behavior of chemical atoms is directly
determined by their subatomic structure, Jakob-
son shows that it is the feature composition of
the different phonemes that determines their
behavior in individual languages. Moreover, he
uses the latter to make inferences about feature
composition and about the nature of the features
themselves where direct phonetic evidence is not
unequivocal. Jakobson also shows that the multi-
valued dimension of points of articulations—the
points of maximal constriction in the vocal tract
—by means of which consonants have been tra-
ditionally classified can and must be replaced by
a number of binary features and that this re-
placement results in a notable gain of explora-
tory power. Finally, he describes the hierarchical
interrelations among features and directs atten-
tion to the need for a search for the invariant
properties of the signal.
Although Jakobson's ideas, writings, and ac-
tivities in connection with the Prague Linguistic
Circle won him considerable international rec-
ognition, they also aroused noticeable opposition
from older professional colleagues and adminis-
trators both inside and outside of Czechoslo-
vakia. Because of this opposition it was only in
1937 that Jakobson received a tenure appoint-
ment in the Masaryk University in Brno (Jakob-
son 1975, p. 293, note 1). Jakobson was not
fated to remain long in this position; the Nazi
take-over of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939
forced him to flee to Scandinavia. He worked
some months in Denmark, then proceeded to
Norway, where he was warmly received by the
local linguists and remained until the Nazi in-
338 JAKOBSON, ROMAN
vasion in April 1940, from which he escaped
by walking across the border into Sweden.
It was in Sweden that Jakobson published
Kindersprache, Aphasie und allgemeine Laut-
gesetze (1940, in Writings, vol. 1, pp. 328-401),
his most popular and influential study. In this
book, he attempts to justify further his concep-
tion of phonemes as complexes of binary distinc-
tive features. In addition to the evidence pre-
viously adduced, Jakobson puts forth facts from
the acquisition of language by children and its
loss in aphasia. Jakobson argues that the facts
of aphasia and language learning are governed
by certain broad principles that imply that pho-
nemes are complexes of binary distinctive fea-
tures and that the same principles also account
for the distribution of phonemes among the
languages of the world. Kindersprache was not
only an important step in the development of
the theory of distinctive features, it was also one
of the earliest linguistic studies of language
pathology and in many of its insights anticipated
the development of what now is known as neu-
rolinguistics. Moreover, it continues to exercise
a profound influence on studies of language
acquisition by children, being widely quoted and
discussed to this day (Luria 1977).
In June 1941, Jakobson came to the United
States. Although structural linguistics had
gained a firm position in the United States as a
result of the work of Sapir and Leonard Bloom-
field, the narrowly empiricist approach that be-
came predominant in American linguistics in the
1940s contrasted sharply with Jakobson's flexible
and far-ranging perspective, which excluded
nothing from its purview on a priori grounds.
These differences account in part for the rather
inhospitable reception that was accorded Jakob-
son by some American linguists. An equally sig-
nificant role was played by their concern—as one
of them was to describe it years later—lest "posi-
tions (for which they had been trained and were
eminently qualified) be snatched from under
their noses and given to European refugees"
(Hall 1969, p. 194, note 3). These "chauvinistic
protectionists who launched quasi-ideological
arguments in order to repress competition"
(Jakobson 1973a, p. 17) contributed materially
to the difficulties that Jakobson experienced all
through the war years in obtaining a regular uni-
versity appointment in linguistics.
Like several other European academicians
who had taken refuge in the United States,
Jakobson became a faculty member of the "uni-
versity in exile," Ecole libre des hautes etudes.
Here, together with the Belgian Byzantinist,
Henri Gregoire, Jakobson conducted a working
seminar on the Russian medieval epic, the Igor
Tale. This poem, which recounts a military disas-
ter of a minor Russian prince of the end of the
twelfth century, has come down to us in two
late eighteenth-century copies of a single six-
teenth-century manuscript which was burned in
the Moscow fire of 1812. Certain contradictions
and obscure statements in the account of the
discovery of the burned manuscript prompted
the French Slavist, Andre Mazon, to question the
authenticity of the poem. Mazon suggested that
like the Ossian poems published by James Mac-
Pherson and the archaic Bohemian poems pub-
lished by Vaclav Hanka, the Igor Tale was a
modern forgery. These doubts seemed unjus-
tified to Gregoire and Jakobson, and their semi-
nars at the Ecole libre were devoted to a detailed
examination of the questions raised by Mazon.
These seminars showed that in the grammar
and vocabulary of the poem, in its historical and
geographical references, in its poetic conven-
tions, in the customs and traditional beliefs re-
flected in it, and in its utilization of contem-
porary literary sources, there was nothing that
was implausible or that conflicted with informa-
tion available to us from documents of un-
impeachable authenticity. Since much of this
information was totally unknown in 1800, and
since, moreover, there were serious flaws in
Mazon's own argumentation, the seminar con-
firmed the authenticity of this masterpiece
(Writings, vol. 4, p. 294; Gregoire, Jakobson,
&Szeftel 1948).
The rapid expansion of Slavic studies in the
United States that took place immediately after
the end of World War n enabled Jakobson to ob-
tain a regular professorship at an American uni-
versity. In the fall of 1946 he became T. G.
Masaryk professor of Czechoslovak studies at
Columbia University. The cold war period of
the late 1940s did not fail to affect him. He was
denounced as an individual of doubtful loyalty
by supporters of right-wing causes in America,
whereas in the Soviet Union, where culture and
education were suffering through the Zhdanov
period, his activities were described in the fol-
lowing terms: "One of the founders of the struc-
turalist direction in linguistics, R. Jakobson was
in the beginning of the 1920s closely connected
with the 'Moscow Circle,' which . . . was a
fortress of formalism, that most reactionary

bourgeois movement which during the NEP
years was attempting to poison the conscious-
ness of the Soviet intelligentsia. It is significant
that at present Jakobson has migrated to the
USA, the stronghold of bourgeois reaction, the
chief source of imperialist aggression" (Des-
nickaja 1949, p. 342).
In 1949, Jakobson left Columbia for Harvard
University, where he taught until his retirement
in 1967. From 1957 on, he held a concurrent
appointment at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. An immediate result of this move,
which included most of Jakobson's graduate
students at Columbia, was to give Harvard the
leading Slavic department in the country. A large
percentage of American Slavic scholars of the
last quarter century were trained by Jakobson
at Harvard, as well as a fair number of impor-
tant linguists. What attracted students to him
was not only his extraordinary knowledge, scien-
tific imagination, and his dramatic lecture style;
much more important were the close personal
relationship into which he involved almost every
one of his many students, the genuine interest
he took in their scholarly efforts, no matter how
elementary, and the assistance and encourage-
ment he gave to all who came.
During the Cambridge period, he again took
up work on several topics that had attracted his
attention earlier. He extended his inquiries into
Slavic mythology and folklore, and uncovered
in this domain previously unnoticed relation-
ships between the Slavs and other Indo-European
peoples (Writings, vol. 4; Jakobson 1969).
Of even greater interest, though perhaps
somewhat overlooked by the wider public, are
Jakobson's contributions to sociolinguistics.
These concern primarily the activities of the
ninth-century Byzantine apostles to the Slavs,
Cyril and Methodius. Jakobson showed that the
apostles developed Old Church Slavonic as a
separate liturgical language and fought success-
fully to have it recognized as the equal, for ritual
purposes, of the three traditional languages of
the Church, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. This
struggle, which anticipated by many centuries
the linguistic battles of the Reformation, had
enormous historical consequences, and furthered
the religious, cultural, and political self-determi-
nation of Slavic peoples (Jakobson 1965).
Since the beginning of the 1960s, Jakobson
has been publishing a series of analyses of poetic
texts composed in a great many languages in
different countries and time periods. The pur-
JAKOBSON, ROMAN 339
pose of these is to illustrate the crucial role that
is played by the grammatic structure of the texts.
These original analyses have elicited lively re-
actions from many quarters, from linguists and
literary scholars as well as from writers and
journalists. They have been especially influen-
tial in France, where a collection of these arti-
cles, plus a number of his earlier pieces on
poetry, were published in translation in 1973
(Jakobson 1973b; Writings, vol. 5).
In the early years at Cambridge a very major
part of Jakobson's research efforts were directed
towards further development of the distinctive
feature model that had formed the core of Kin-
dersprache. What absorbed his particular inter-
est in those days was the acoustic facet of the
different features and the relationship between
the acoustic signal and the motor events in the
human vocal tract which produced the signal.
Much of this information was being developed
by Gunnar j^ant, who at that time was working
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Fant worked out in great detail the systematic
interrelationships between the articulatory ges-
tures involved in the production of different
speech sounds and the acoustical signal that
these gestures elicit. In a special monograph
Jakobson, Fant, and Halle (1952) catalogued
for the first time these systematic interrelation-
ships for all known phonetic features. The mono-
graph also showed that the number of features
that were required to characterize the sounds of
all languages was quite small and that this same
set of features was also fully adequate for char-
acterizing the various rules in which speech
sounds are involved. The last insight was of
great importance for the subsequent develop-
ment of generative phonology by Noam Chom-
sky, Halle, and others. Generative phonology was
directly influenced by Jakobson in yet another
respect. His 1948 account of the Russian con-
jugation (Writings, vol. 2, pp. 119-129), with
its explicit recognition of the distinction between
surface and underlying forms of words that are
related to each other by means of a set of syn-
chronic sound laws, provided an essential model
for much subsequent work (Halle 1959; Chom-
sky & Halle 1968).
In the early 1950s there was great interest in
the Boston scientific community in the ideas de-
veloped by the mathematician Norbert Wiener
in his book Cybernetics, and in the formalization
by Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver of
the concept of information. Jakobson found in
340 JAKOBSON, ROMAN
these ideas much that was congenial. "I am con-
vinced," he wrote in 1960, "that methods newly
developed in structural linguistics and in com-
munication theory, when applied to verse analy-
sis, and to many other provinces of language,
are capable of opening up wide perspectives for
further coordinated efforts of both disciplines"
(Writings, vol. 2, p. 579). Jakobson employed
concepts of information theory in a description
of the phonological pattern of modern Russian
(ibid., vol. 1, pp. 449-463), and he adapted the
terms "code" and "message," and utilized them
in discussion of linguistic phenomena (ibid., vol.
2, pp. 130-148).
Communication is for Jakobson the nexus of
all social phenomena, and with Claude Levi-
Strauss, he takes this insight quite literally: "One
cannot but follow Levi-Strauss's triadic concep-
tion that in society communication operates on
three different levels: exchange of messages,
exchange of commodities (namely goods and
services), and exchange of women (or, perhaps,
a more generalizing formulation, exchange of
mates). Therefore linguistics (jointly with other
semiotic disciplines), economics, and finally kin-
ship and marriage studies 'approach the same
kinds of problems on different strategic levels
and really pertain to the same field'" (ibid., vol.
2, p. 663). In Jakobson's scheme, linguistics oc-
cupies the central core because it deals with lan-
guage, the human communicative medium par
excellence. The science of semiotics deals with
the communication of messages of all kinds, not
only verbal messages, and thus includes linguis-
tics as a special case; while the general theory
of communication, the basis of all social science,
studies exchanges of all kinds, not only that of
messages, and includes, therefore, also anthro-
pology and economics. Moreover, Jakobson sees
important parallels between the genetic code and
human language: "among all the information-
carrying systems, the genetic code and the verbal
code are the only ones based upon the use of
discrete components which, by themselves, are
devoid of inherent meaning but serve to consti-
tute the minimal senseful units; i.e., the entities
endowed with their own intrinsic meaning in
the given code" (Jakobson 1973a, p. 50). He
draws attention to a series of other similarities
between the genetic code and the entities of
phonology that lead him to the even more basic
question: "whether the isomorphism exhibited
by these two different codes, genetic and verbal,
results from a mere convergence induced by
similar needs, or whether, perhaps, the founda-
tions of the overt linguistic patterns superim-
posed upon molecular communication have been
modelled directly upon its structural principles"
(ibid., p. 53).
MORRIS HALLE
WORKS BY JAKOBSON
1948 GREGOIRE, HENRI; JAKOBSON, ROMAN; and SZEF-
TEL, M. La geste du Prince Igor: JLpopee russe du
douzieme siecle. Annuire de 1'Institut de Philologie
et d'Histoire Orientates et Slaves de 1'Universite
Libre de Bruxelles, Vol. 8. New York: Rausen.
1952 JAKOBSON, ROMAN; FANT, C. GUNNAR M.; and
HALLE, MORRIS Preliminaries to Speech Analysis:
The Distinctive Features and Their Correlates. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
1965 The Byzantine Mission to the Slavs. Dumbarton
Oaks Papers 19:257-265.
1969 The Slavic God Veles" and His Indo-European
Cognates. Studi linguistici in onore di Vittore Pisani
2:579-599.
1971 A Bibliography of His Writings. The Hague: Mou-
ton.
1973a Main Trends in the Science of Language. New
York: Harper.
1973b Questions de poetique. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
1975 N. S. Trubetzkoy's Letters and Notes. The Hague:
Mouton.
Selected Writings. 5 vols. The Hague: Mouton, 1962-
1978. —» Volume 1: Phonological Studies, 1962;
second expanded edition, 1971. Volume 2: Word
and Language, 1971. Volume 3: The Grammar of
Poetry and the Poetry of Grammar, 1978 (forth-
coming). Volume 4: Slavic Epic Studies, 1966. Vol-
ume 5: Verse: Its Masters and Explorers, 1978
(forthcoming).
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARMSTRONG, D.; and SCHOONEVELD, C. H. VAN (editors)
1977 Roman Jakobson: Echoes of His Scholarship.
Lisse (Holland): Peter de Ridder Press.
CHOMSKY, NOAM; and HALLE, MORRIS 1968 The
Sound Pattern of English. New York: Harper.
DESNICKAJA, A. V. 1949 Protiv formalizma v ucenii
o zvukax reci (Against Formalism in the Theory of
Speech Sounds). Izvestij Akademii Nauk SSSR. Ot-
delenie literatury i jazyka 8:337-342.
ERLICH, VICTOR 1955 Russian Formalism. The Hague:
Mouton.
HALL, ROBERT A. 1969 Some Recent Developments in
American Linguistics. Neuphilologische Mitteilun-
gen 70:192-227.
HALLE, MORRIS 1959 The Sound Pattern of Russian.
The Hague: Mouton.
HALLE, MORRIS 1976 Roman Jakobson's Contribution
to the Modem Study of Speech Sounds. Pages 79-
100 in Ladislav Matejka (editor), Sound, Sign and
Meaning: Quinquagenary of the Prague Linguistic
Circle. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press. —> Re-
printed in Armstrong and Schooneveld 1977.
HOLENSTEIN, E. (1975) 1976 Roman Jakobson's Ap-
proach to Language: Phenomenological Structural-
ism. Translated by Catherine Shelbert and Tarcisius
Shelbert. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. —>
First published as Roman Jakobson's phdnomeno-
logischer Strukturalismus.
LURIA, A. R. 1977 The Contribution of Linguistics to
the Theory of Aphasia. Pages 237-251 in D. Arm-
strong and C. H. van Schooneveld (editors), Roman

Jakobson: Echoes of His Scholarship. Lisso (Hol-
land) : Peter de Ridder Press.
Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture,
and Personality. 1949 Edited by David G. Man-
delbaum. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. —> In-
cludes a chronologically arranged bibliography of
Sapir's writings.
WAUGH, LINDA R. 1976 Roman Jakobson's Science of
Language. Lisse (Holland): Peter de Ridder Press.
JASPERS, KARL
Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), a German philos-
opher, was, for most of his career, professor of
philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. Af-
ter the end of World War n and the collapse of
the Nazi regime, he accepted a professorship at
the University of Basel in Switzerland, where
he completed his career. He was a special target
of the Nazis, largely because his wife was Jew-
ish. They were, however, allowed to live in se-
clusion in Heidelberg throughout the period of
the Nazi rule.
It is interesting that Jaspers came to philos-
ophy from medicine and psychiatry. Before
medicine, he had studied law at the universities
of Heidelberg and Munich in 1901 and 1902.
For the next six years, he studied medicine at
the universities of Berlin, Gottingen, and Heidel-
berg. In 1908, he passed the state exam to
practice medicine and in February 1909, he was
registered as a doctor.
Jaspers could very well have made his career
in psychiatry. As it was he wrote a general book,
Allgemeine Psychopathologie (1913), which
went through several editions and was impor-
tantly influential. This background is surely
significant for the nature of his first major phi-
losophical work, namely the Psychologic der
Weltanschauungen (1919), which, however,
was not a clinical study of personalities, al-
though he did this for such figures as Strind-
berg, Van Gogh, and Nietzsche, but was rather
a typological study of possible kinds of world
view. One unsolved problem for the researcher
is to define Jaspers' relation to Freud. In his
writings, Jaspers makes relatively sparse refer-
ences to Freud's work, and most of them are on
the derogatory side. It seems likely that Jaspers
never made a careful study of Freud and was
not attracted to his ideas. Perhaps Freud struck
him as too biologically oriented.
In the 1920s, Jaspers was one of the few most
prominent personalities in the University of
Heidelberg community. He particularly inter-
ested sociologists because he was a special ad-
JASPERS, KARL 341
mirer and had been a close personal friend of
Max Weber.
Jaspers' place in philosophy is linked to the
concept of existentialism. Perhaps his best-
known book is Reason and Existenz (1935), It
is notable that the translator and publisher re-
tained the German form of the word Existenz,
which Jaspers treated as definitely a technical
term. The usual German translation of "exis-
tence" would be Dasein, which for Jaspers was
quite different.
In terms of most classifications of "schools" of
philosophy, Jaspers belongs in the German
"idealist" tradition, but this statement needs
careful interpretation. Basically he was a Kan-
tian, and in that role he attempted further to
develop some of Kant's most important philo-
sophical approaches and leads. In any case he
was clearly not a Hegelian idealist; indeed he
speaks of Hegel as having "built a tower of
Babel where everything was absorbed into a rea-
son which now had a sense far beyond that of
Kant. This reason is 'mysticism for the under-
standing'; . . . its philosophizing wanted to
be the absolute knowledge of an evolving ra-
tionality of all Being, the unity of the rational
and the irrational" ([1935] 1955, p. 154). He
also repudiates the other two "classical" ideal-
ists, J. G. Fichte and F. W. J. von Schelling.
Central to Jaspers' position was his treatment
of the subject-object relation and his attempt
to maintain a very careful balance between
them. Indeed his conception of mysticism,
whose possible authenticity he does not dispute,
is of a state, if it can be attained, in which the
distinction disappears. Indeed he insisted that
such states could not be objectively proven be-
yond the assertions of those who claimed to
have experienced them—surely a Kantian posi-
tion.
In connection with this problem, Jaspers pre-
sented an illuminating discussion of the rela-
tionship between positivism and idealism. He
speaks of both as closed systems of thought
which squeeze out the element of freedom that
was so essential to Kant. He treats positivism as
the attempt to "absolutize" the objective, and
idealism as the attempt to absolutize the sub-
jective, sphere. Jaspers explicitly repudiates both
attempts at "closure" and assumes a definitely
pluralistic position, leaving open many possi-
bilities, but at the same time being careful not
to undermine the centrality of the subject-object
relation.
Jaspers' underlying position here seems es-
 342 JASPERS, KARL
sentially correct and exceedingly important. To
a social theorist, however, his treatment of these
issues is in some respects disappointing, as in his
identification of positivism with "materialism"
and mechanism. Surely the object world in the
context of the sciences includes a much wider
range of object types than the "mechanistic."
Surely such scientific objects as organic systems,
including human organisms, are not now pro-
perly called "mechanistic," and certainly what
we call action systems are also capable of ob-
jectification.
Then there is a particular difficulty in the
status of what are often called "cultural" objects,
such as documents with meanings or works of
art. Cultural objects are always the products of
human action, but they may exist both as ob-
jects external to individual selves—that is, they
are "externalized"—and can be "internalized,"
becoming parts of the personalities of human
individuals. Thus Jaspers' writings are cultural
objects that can be found and observed in books,
but as studied and understood, they become part
of the student's personality and hence "subjec-
tive" to him. Of course this problem area, which
includes "motives" as well as cultural objects,
involves the problem of subjective Verstehen,
which was so important to Weber, and which
is also discussed in a variety of ways by Jaspers.
When from the purely "mechanistic" level
through that of organic systems we reach the
level of action, which is in principle Verstehbar,
there is a double involvement of the category
"subjective." This is to say that what are,
epistemologically speaking, members of a class
of objects must, to be understood in the cogni-
tive sense, be treated as having "meanings" to
concrete human actors, meanings that can be
grasped only through processes of Verstehen.
It is this complication that makes it so essential,
in the analysis of action phenomena, to distin-
guish clearly between the "point of view of the
actor" and that of an "observer." This of course
should not be interpreted to preclude self-obser-
vation and self-understanding by any given
actor. Jaspers treats the latter problem area
quite extensively. It would be illuminating to
compare his treatment of this complex with
that of George Herbert Mead on the one hand
and Freud on the other.
In order to avoid the misunderstandings that
may arise in this field, it is necessary to supple-
ment the underlying conception of subject and
object and their relationships with a classifica-
tion of levels of empirically existent reality or
being, which can, through human cognitive
processes, in Kantian terms, come to be treated
as objects. Such a classification would have a
hierarchical structure, starting with the world of
physical objects and going on to the organic
world. Then, with the level of action, "con-
sciousness" emerges, and with it a "subjective"
point of view. Furthermore, as Kant so clearly
worked out, this classification implies a dual
structure of the components, not only of empiri-
cal knowledge, but of "orientation" more gener-
ally—in the cognitive case the combination of
sense data and what Kant called the "transcen-
dental" component, here the categories of the
understanding.
Although even Weber did not work out a
satisfactory hierarchical scheme of the organiza-
tion of the object world in this sense, both he
and Jaspers, leaning on Kant, did think in
closely related terms that can be readily linked
with such a scheme (most fully presented in
Parsons 1978, chapter 15). In Jaspers' version
it involves three components that in turn are
related to "levels" in the above sense. The two
limiting categories are directly related to the
distinction between positivism and idealism
mentioned above. They are "empirical existence"
(Dasein*) and "spirit" (Geist). The intermediate,
and in an important sense mediating, category
is "consciousness as such" (Bewusstsein uber-
haupt), which was a famous category of Kant's.
In this three-fold schema, consciousness as
such comes to focus in the category of cognitive
function. It is the point at which "motivational"
factors, which are in a special sense "psycho-
logical," meet with cultural factors, which are
clearly transpsychological. Since Jaspers wrote,
much has come to be understood about these re-
lationships, especially through improved knowl-
edge of language. In particular, there is one
German word that is translated as "reason" or,
sometimes, "understanding"—namely Verstand.
This is the reference of Kant's categories and
also of Weber's very central concept of Ver-
stehen. In most German literature, Verstand is
explicitly contrasted with the term translated as
"reason" in Jaspers' title, namely Vemunft.
There is an important sense in which this con-
cept is the key to Jaspers' extension of his con-
sideration beyond the object world, in the sense
in which we have used that term.
This extension Jaspers works out through the
use of the striking concept that he calls "the

Encompassing" (das Umgreifende). The central
concept is that any formed or "structured" ex-
perience of Being (Sein), whether of objects
external to the self or of subjective experience,
implies that there are limits bounding the range
of that "structuring," and the concept of a limit
implies that what is beyond the limit is not
simply "nonbeing," to use the current philo-
sophical term. Jaspers' exploration of the impli-
cations of the limit and what can conceivably lie
beyond it constitutes his most distinctive con-
tribution.
In developing these themes Jaspers used a
basically Kantian strategy, "relativizing" without
losing anchorage in firm philosophical commit-
ments. In this connection Jaspers' statement
(some would say "outburst,") against Hegel,
quoted above, is a major key to understanding
him. He objected above all to Absolutizing. But
his extended discussion of skepticism and
nihilism makes it quite clear that his relativizing
did not go over to a totally "relativistic" position.
On both the subjective and the objective sides
he held firmly to the view that structured—in-
deed we may say "institutionalized"—orienta-
tions could in principle be regarded as fully
"authentic"; they should not—for example, in
the case of scientific theory—be treated as "fic-
tional," as these were treated by Alfred Schutz.
Indeed, there is a notable section in Philoso-
phic (Jaspers 1932b, vol. 1, chapter 7) in which
he discusses the relationships of philosophy to
religion, the intellectual disciplines (Wissen-
schaften), and art. Here he carefully distin-
guishes philosophy from theology. The latter is
part of a religious system, whereas philosophy
should be regarded as independent. Similarly,
philosophy is not the summary integration of
our intellectual knowledge of the objective
world, but is distinguished by a distinctive ap-
proach or "orientation." A philosophy, finally, is
not a "work of art," though some philosophers
have attempted to achieve that status for the
discipline.
Jaspers' central formula for the distinctive-
ness of philosophy is its concern with reflection
about the meaning of human experience, both
of objects of the various meaningful categories,
and of the subject—the philosopher himself as
a human person. It is in this context that the
concept Existenz fits. Thus reason as Vernunft
is the boundary concept for reflection about the
object side of the subject-object distinction,
whereas Existenz is the boundary concept on
JASPERS, KARL 343
the subjective side. It is most definitely not con-
fined to treatment of the self as object but
transcends that. Indeed, Jaspers introduces the
concept of transcendence to denote the "final"
boundary in what can be called the "telic"
direction, which synthesizes the objective and
the subjective. It is as the summit of whatever
is conceived to be transcendent in this sense
that Jaspers treats the concept of God.
Jaspers considered the need for reflection in
the above sense to be the most distinctive fea-
ture of philosophy in his time. He devoted the
first chapter of Reason and Existenz to S0ren
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, stressing that they
had in common the relentless pursuit of reflec-
tive exploration of the human condition. He en-
dorsed, however, not the final positions at which
either one arrived, but, rather, approved the
example they both set in their reflections on the
meaning of experience.
Jaspers seems to have been consistent in
maintaining that the problem of analyzing the
"encompassing" arose at all of the limiting
boundaries of human experience. Thus physical
science faces the boundary problems of "cosmol-
ogy," touching the origins, scope, and nature of
the physical "universe," which are actively dis-
cussed in astronomical and philosophical cir-
cles. In biology similar problems have arisen
and been actively discussed about the origins
and nature of organic life, ranging from the
most primitive microorganisms to the status of
man as organic species and to the possibilities
of organic evolution beyond the human level.
Then man, as conscious being with knowl-
edge not only of the outside world but also of
self, becomes the focus of the reflective en-
deavor. After all, his awareness both of himself
and of the world external to him, which in-
cludes other human individuals, can be mean-
ingful only from the "perspective" of the human
condition, and indeed, "in the last analysis," of
particular individual human beings. Relative to
the positivistic components of our cultural back-
ground this is perhaps the predominant note,
brought in with German idealism but greatly
sophisticated in Jaspers' work. The "world" is
not simply "given" to the human observer and
experiencer but must be "processed" and in-
terpreted in complex ways if it is to "make
sense." Indeed many, like the nihilists whom
Jaspers discusses, have come to the conclusion
that the world is "absurd" and have abandoned
the attempt to make sense of it.
344 JASPERS, KARL
This is by no means Jaspers' position. It is not
fortuitous that in his important title "Reason"
is placed first, before Existenz. Again in some-
thing like the Kantian sense, Jaspers was a "ra-
tionalist." However, he qualified his position in
this respect very carefully. He definitely did not
share in a variety of movements of this century
that might be called "anti-intellectual"—for ex-
ample some branches of phenomenology (refer-
ence has been made to Schutz on the fictional
character of scientific theory.) Indeed, for him
it was only through reason, as integrated with
Existenz, that another phenomenon, which he
called Kommunikation, was conceivable. This
integration of course occurred in the individual,
who in one sense and at one level was con-
ceived to be unique and "alone," being at the
same time in a position to relate to others—
potentially not only other humans but other
"sentient" beings. This potential for relating in-
volved both levels of the English concept "rea-
son," which are differentiated in German termi-
nology, namely Verstand and Vernunft, and
some kind of synthesis between them.
In other words, to Jaspers, the other, with
whom one communicates, must be object as
well as subject, and he who communicates must
also be an object to others and to himself. Their
common and mutual "objectness" is, precisely
in the Kantian sense, an essential ground or
condition on which they can communicate
with each other. But the possibility implies an
integration, not only through the categories of
understanding, that is Verstand, but also as re-
lated to "transcendental" considerations, as
Vernunft, and mutual awareness of each other
at the level of Existenz.
Jaspers also holds that the boundaries be-
tween areas known and experienced and the
encompassing which lies beyond them should
not be regarded as fixed. They may shift with
a wide variety of changes in human society or
culture, including the "advancement of knowl-
edge," and with new forms of subjective experi-
ence that would not ordinarily be called knowl-
edge, such as philosophical reflection of the sort
that Jaspers practiced. Such reflection, however,
can also help men adjust to the many changes
in significant aspects of culture and of the hu-
man condition that are continually occurring in
complex societies.
Thus Jaspers maintained a careful and ju-
dicious balance in at least two related fields.
The first was the very central relation between
subject and object. The second was that be-
tween rationality and those aspects of the hu-
manly significant world that must be classed
as non- or irrational. This balance of course
includes that between reason and Existenz.
Still another was the balance between open-
ness and flexibility on the one hand and rigidity
of crystallization on the other. The latter is in
particular a danger of rationalistic theories, as
in philosophy, and also of institutions. It is
notable that Jaspers, in discussing such ration-
alisms on both the positivistic and the idealistic
sides, refers to them as producing Gehduse. This
is the same word used by Weber at the end of
his study of the Protestant ethic, which Parsons
translated as "cage" and which has come into
the English-language discussion in the term
the "iron cage." Jaspers' warning about the
dangers of rationalistic Gehduse, however,
should not be interpreted to mean that he ad-
vocated a Heraclitean doctrine that "all is flux"
and that such concepts as structure should be
abolished.
Finally, another balance Jaspers was careful
to maintain in subtle and delicate ways was
that between individuality and the collective
aspects of the human condition, which in turn
involves a balance between the "historically"
unique, bound to particular times and places,
and the universal or general, independent of
such particularities. Only particular individuals
can practice the art of philosophical thinking,
though philosophical tradition has become a
major component of human culture more
generally.
A particularly striking expression of this
theme of both individuality and historical tem-
porality was Jaspers' statement that, from one
perspective, thinking philosophically could be
considered "a way of learning how to die."
In the years following World War n, Jaspers
wrote a number of relatively public statements
on the moral and existential aspects of that
grandiose historic episode and the involvement
of Germany in it. His writings in this vein at-
tracted widespread attention, including in the
English-language world through translations. His
voice was a voice of sanity which was unhesitat-
ing in its condemnation of this episode not only
in German but in world history. At the same
time his was one of the most serious attempts
to understand what had gone wrong and why.
In his career as a philosopher, rather than a
psychiatrist, Jaspers was the author of two
major works. The first, Psychologic der Weltan-
schauungen, may be regarded as marking the

transition between the two phases of Jaspers'
career. The use of the term "psychology" in the
title is not particularly felicitous. In any usual
sense it is not a psychological study, but rather
one at the "general action" level of possible types
of "orientation" in the human situation to what,
following Weber, jaspers called problems of the
"meaning" of being human.
The second major work was his three-volume
Philosophic, the first volume of which was pub-
lished in 1932, just on the eve of the Nazi take-
over. As the most systematic statement of his
mature work, it may be noted that the main as-
pects were incorporated in the subtitles of the
three volumes: Philosophical Orientation to the
World, The Clarification of Existenz, and Meta-
physics-, the latter deals mainly with his concept
of transcendence. For purposes of general in-
terpretation, Jaspers' one short book, translated
as Reason and Existenz, is particularly useful.
It is appropriate, perhaps, to conclude with
the remark that Jaspers has a special place as a
social scientist's philosopher. He was very care-
ful not to merge the philosophical and the sci-
entific enterprises, yet at the same time to treat
them as intimately interdependent. A good sci-
entist, then, especially at the level of general
theory, must be aware of, and acutely sensitive
to, the philosophical order or problems that lie
on the boundaries of his field and intertwine
with it.
A further word is in order concerning the de-
scription of Jaspers as a "social scientist's phi-
losopher." Jaspers' grounding of his position in
the Kantian tradition has become the focus of
a major "metatheoretical" controversy in the so-
cial sciences. The controversy centers on the
challenge from phenomenology to what may be
regarded as the "main line" of sociological
theorizing associated with the heritage of Emile
Durkheim and Weber. This challenge concerns
above all the status of the "subjective point of
view" in relation to what Weber called the
Verstehen ("understanding") of the intentions
of human actors. This was a central problem
area in the German intellectual world of
Weber's day and had a substantial influence on
Jaspers' thinking. For example, Jaspers gave
special attention to the subject-object relation-
ship. Concern for the philosophical side of the
"subjective" aspect underlay Jaspers' emphasis
on the concept Existenz and its complicated
context. This can be regarded as an attempt
to provide a further philosophical grounding
for Weber's position on Verstehen and its
JESSUP, PHILIP C. 345
many ramifications. Specifically, in relation to
the phenomenological challenge, theoretically
minded social scientists would do well to give
careful consideration to Jaspers' writings.
TALCOTT PARSONS
WORKS BY JASPERS
(1913) 1965 Allgemeine Psychopathologie. 8th ed.
Berlin: Springer-Verlag. —> An English edition was
published by the University of Chicago Press in
1963.
(1919) 1960 Psychologic der Weltanschauung en. 5th
ed. Berlin: Springer.
(1921) 1926 Max Weber: Rede bei der von der Heidel-
berger Studentenschaft am 17. Juli 1920 veranstal-
teten Trauerfeir. Tubingen (Germany): J. C. B.
Mohr.
(1923) 1959 The Idea of the University. Edited by
Karl W. Deutsch. Boston: Beacon. —> First published
in German.
(1931) 1959 Man in the Modern Age. New ed. Lon-
don: Routledge. —» First published as Die geistige
Situation der Zeit.
(1932a) 1948 Max Weber: Politiker, Forscher, Philo-
soph. 3d ed. Bremen (Germany): Storm. —» First
published as Max Weber, deutsches wesen in poli-
tischen Denken, im Forschen und Philosophieren.
(1932fo) 1969-1971 Philosophy. 3 vols. Univ. of Chi-
cago Press. —> First published in German.
(1935) 1955 Reason and Existenz. New York: Noon-
day Press. —> A paperback edition was published in
1959. Translated from the third German edition pub-
lished by Storm in 1949.
(1954) 1958 Myth and Christianity: An Inquiry Into
the Possibility of Religion Without Myth. New York:
Noonday Press. —> First published as Die Frage der
Entmythologisierung.
1963 Gesammelte Schriften zur Psychopathologie. Ber-
lin: Springer.
(1966) 1967 The Future of Germany. Translated and
edited by E. B. Ashton. Univ. of Chicago Press. —»
First published in German as the third part of
Wohin treibt de Bundesrepublik?
1968 Aneignung und Polemik. Munich: Piper.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
PARSONS, TALCOTT 1978 Action Theory and the Hu-
man Condition. New York: Free Press.
SCHILPP, PAUL A. 1957 The Philosophy of Karl Jas-
pers. New York: Tudor. —> Published in 1957 in
German by Kohlhammer with the title Karl Jaspers.
JESSUP, PHILIP C.
Philip Caryl Jessup, born in 1897, has been
one of the most esteemed and influential inter-
national lawyers of this century. As a professor
of international law, a prolific writer, and a
judge on the International Court of Justice in
the Hague, he has produced studies and opin-
ions on virtually all of the major issues in the
international legal field. He has combined
scholarship with active participation in public
affairs, serving as a United States delegate to
346 JESSUP, PHILIP C.
the United Nations, as an ambassador-at-large,
and as a prominent advocate of stronger in-
ternational institutions based on law.
Jessup has not been a proponent of any grand
theory; rather, in the common law tradition, he
has addressed himself mainly to specific prob-
lems of current concern. In his writing and
lectures, he characteristically relies on particu-
lar cases and on concrete facts to illuminate
principles and procedures. He discusses cases
with a relish for the odd fact and personal idio-
syncrasies, conveying amid the abstractions and
sonorities of legal doctrine, a sense of the
strange ways of individuals. As a judge he went
deeply into the facts of the case before him and
into the origins and social function of the legal
rules at issue. His presentation of concrete facts
has often been accompanied by an emphasis on
historical trends in law and society. He tends to
perceive specific legal events in terms of evolu-
tionary developments responsive to changing
social needs and moral ideals. In this respect, a
distinct teleological element is evident in his
thought. The trends of international law are
seen largely as a progressive development to-
ward a more comprehensive and effective world
legal order. The significant features of that
world order include: recognition of the interest
of the international community, protection of
the basic rights of individuals, greater re-
course to judicial procedures for resolving con-
flicts, the strict prohibition of the use of force
except in self-defense, and the extension of in-
ternational regulation in areas of interdepen-
dence. These social ends are virtually axiomatic
for Jessup; he assumes their desirability and he
is, on the whole, optimistic about their eventual
adoption (Jessup 1948; 1959a).
Jessup's evolutionary optimism may be linked
to the early influences in his career and to his
personal involvement in the dramatic expansion
of international institutions and international
law in the period following World War n. Jes-
sup's choice of a career in international law was
suggested to him in 1918 by Elihu Root, Amer-
ica's most eminent international lawyer, a
former secretary of state and a fervent advocate
of international judicial settlement. Jessup was
then a college senior, having returned to Ham-
ilton College in upper New York state after
service in the infantry in World War I. His war
experience left him with a strong desire to take
part in efforts to end wars. Root, then in resi-
dence on the Hamilton College campus, stimu-
lated his interest in international law and put
him in touch with James Brown Scott, then
editor in chief of the American Journal of In-
ternational Law and an active proponent of
international legal institutions. Jessup also con-
sulted John Bassett Moore, the professor of in-
ternational law at Columbia University Law
School. Thus, even before entering Columbia
Law School, Jessup received guidance and in-
spiration from the three acknowledged leaders
of the field. These leaders shared a belief in the
evolution of international society to a stage in
which international law, and judicial and arbi-
tral institutions in particular, would have the
principal role in preventing war and settling
disputes. At Columbia Jessup studied interna-
tional law with Moore and Edwin M. Borchard,
who was both scholar and practitioner, special-
izing in international claims. Jessup produced
his first written piece, a note for the Columbia
Law Review on maritime jurisdiction in regard
to rum smuggling. That note led him later to se-
lect the subject of the law of territorial waters for
a doctoral dissertation and his first book (1927).
Thus begun, his interest in the law of the sea
and related questions of resource exploitation
remained with him throughout his career. After
receiving a law degree in 1924 from Yale Law
School (to which he had transferred for his
third year), Jessup served as an assistant solici-
tor in the State Department under Charles
Cheney Hyde. When Hyde returned to Columbia
Law School in 1925, Jessup accompanied him
and began teaching international law and doing
graduate work toward a PH.D. In 1927 he be-
came a member of a New York law firm, an as-
sociation that continued until 1943, although
his activity in practice was sporadic. In 1929
he served as an aide to Root at the con-
ference of jurists in Geneva on the revision of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice. That same year he delivered lec-
tures at the Hague Academy of International
Law—an unusual distinction then for one 32
years old—on the exploitation of ocean resources
(1929a). While on the Columbia faculty, he
took leave in 1930 to serve as legal adviser to
the United States ambassador in Cuba and later,
during World War 11, to work in the State De-
partment and the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) on
postwar relief (Jessup 1944a; 1944£>). Even
earlier, Joseph Chamberlain of the Columbia
faculty had stimulated his interest in interna-
tional organizations. Jessup was an assistant to
the United States delegation at the 1945 San

Francisco Conference on the UN charter. In
1946 he was named the Hamilton Fish pro-
fessor of international law and diplomacy at
Columbia University, a chair he held until 1960
when he became an "associate" of the Rocke-
feller Foundation. In 1947 he was appointed
United States representative on the UN Com-
mittee on the Progressive Development of Inter-
national Law and Its Codification, which drafted
the plan for the International Law Commission.
From 1948 to 1953, he also served as a United
States representative at several sessions of the
UN Security Council and General Assembly and
as an ambassador-at-large (Acheson 1972). In
1960 he was elected by the UN to serve as a
judge on the International Court for the period
1961-1970. After retirement from the Inter-
national Court in 1970, he devoted himself
to lectures, research, and writings; from time
to time he gave legal advice to governments and
private clients. He continued to play an active
role in professional and scholarly societies, par-
ticularly in the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, of which he had been president
(1954/1955), the curatorium of the Hague
Academy of International Law, and the Institut
de droit international, of which he was a vice
president. Numerous honorary awards were be-
stowed on Jessup, and he delivered several
series of lectures under distinguished auspices.
These honors confirmed his long-standing pre-
eminence in the community of American inter-
national lawyers (Kennedy 1962).
No account of Jessup's career would be ade-
quate without mention of his extraordinary per-
sonal qualities. Endowed with a commanding
presence, a resonant voice, a gift for direct and
lucid expression, a lively mind, and human
warmth, Jessup was a natural leader in con-
ferences and organizations: "His wit, gay and
ready, and his irrepressible humor would sur-
vive the longest and dullest meetings" (Acheson
1972, p. 6). He was much admired for speaking
out on behalf of his ideals irrespective of gov-
ernmental or popular attitudes. Within his wide
circle of friends, professional colleagues, and
students, he was known for generosity and in-
numerable kindnesses; he was always ready to
devote time and effort to those who sought his
help and counsel, and one must regard this as
a significant part of his contribution to inter-
national law.
Jessup's intellectual contributions to interna-
tional law fall into three categories. One cate-
gory includes his ideas about the role of
JESSUP, PHILIP C. 347
international law, its aims, values, and histor-
ical trends. A second category contains his opin-
ions on the content and interpretation of exist-
ing legal principles, rules, and concepts. In the
third category are his ideas on measures and
policies that should be taken to enhance the
effectiveness of international law.
Within the first category, the most prominent
ideas are those relating to the reality and social
ends of international law, the application of the
international "community interest," and the con-
cept of transnational law. Jessup's concern with
the reality of international law had a strong
practical dimension. He felt that those who de-
nied the reality of international law lacked
practical knowledge of the workings of foreign
offices and international bodies in numerous
areas of interstate relations. Quoting Moore,
Jessup observed that international law was as
well observed as national law (Jessup 1948,
p. 7), but he recognized that the absence of
compulsory judicial settlement and the deep at-
tachment to national sovereignty limited the use
of law in international disputes. Although hopes
for an early achievement of world rule of law
were unrealistic, this did not mean that one
should minimize the role of treaties and inter-
national custom in the conduct of the world's
business in orderly and predictable fashion
(Jessup 1959a).
Jessup's treatment of values in international
law exhibits a sophisticated blend of positivism,
idealism, and pragmatism. He is careful to dis-
tinguish positive law—the lex lata—fiom recom-
mended or future law. In many of his writings,
notably in A Modern Law of Nations (1948),
Jessup was concerned primarily with indicating
desirable future legal developments, making it
clear that he was writing de lege ferenda. But it
is noteworthy that he generally linked future
law to concepts and ideals that had been ac-
cepted in existing law. Thus in advocating new
rules and procedures, he related them to the
principles and purposes of the UN Charter,
especially those principles recognizing the
equal rights of states and peoples, respect for
the dignity of the individual, and the obliga-
tions of peaceful settlement and collective se-
curity. There was, therefore, no sharp break
between existing and proposed law. Existing
law was itself an authoritative source of the
ideals that had been validated by international
consensus and that therefore served as a basis
for new law. Jessup also turned to those ideals
for guidance in interpreting existing law, thus
 348 JESSUP, PHILIP C.
transcending strict positivism. He did so with
lawyerlike caution, aware that broad principles
of social ends cannot be pressed too far without
losing the consensus on which their authority
rests. He was also conscious that in many
cases conflicting principles had to be satisfied.
These essentially pragmatic concerns led him,
especially in his judicial opinions, to devote con-
siderable attention to the particular facts of the
case at issue and to the social function of rules
in that and similar cases. Instructive examples
of Jessup's treatment of the facts and of his
functional approach can be found in his indi-
vidual opinions in the International Court cases
on the North Sea continental shelf (Interna-
tional Court of Justice 1969, pp. 67-84) and
on Barcelona Traction (International Court of
Justice 1970, pp. 162-221).
Illustrative of Jessup's careful value-oriented
approach is his advocacy and use of the notion
of the international community interest. In pre-
senting the concept he observes that the basic
idea was expressed in 1915 by Root, who
called for a change in the legal theory that an
international wrong could be redressed only at
the instance of the nation injured. Root had
argued that the maintenance of the interna-
tional order was a community interest and that
law violations that threaten peace and order
should be treated as injuries to all on the anal-
ogy of domestic criminal law. Jessup suggested
that Root's projected idea of community interest
was adopted in some degree in the UN Charter,
which allows all states to take up threats to
peace and security (Jessup 1948, p. 11). He
noted, however, that the application and limits
of the international community interest remain
uncertain, dependent on future decisions by
states and international tribunals. Later, as a
judge in the International Court of Justice, Jes-
sup traced the notion of community interest to
Article 11 of the League of Nations Covenant
and on that basis supported the right of mem-
bers of the League to invoke the jurisdiction of
the Court even though their own interests or
their nationals were not affected (International
Court of Justice 1962, pp. 387-436). In the sub-
sequent phase of the same case on southwest
Africa, Jessup concluded (in a dissenting opin-
ion) that the condemnation of apartheid by the
General Assembly was decisive proof of contem-
porary international community standards
which the Court had to take into account in
deciding whether South Africa met its obligation
under the mandate to promote the well-being of
the inhabitants of southwest Africa (Interna-
tional Court of Justice 1966, p. 441). Jessup was
careful to avoid the thesis that the General As-
sembly may create new law by majority resolu-
tions; his view was that the repeated resolutions
of the General Assembly (adopted by near una-
nimity) expressed the international commun-
ity's attitudes, and that such contemporary com-
munity attitudes were relevant in applying a
legal standard, such as well-being, laid down in
an earlier treaty. Jessup thus sought to give
legal effect to the strong views against apartheid
held by nearly all states without endowing the
General Assembly resolutions with general leg-
islative character.
The importance attached by Jessup to the
idea of the interest of the international com-
munity did not mean that he regarded all inter-
national communities as universal. Particularly
in his later writings, he took note of nonuni-
versal "selective" communities, joined by com-
mon interest, geography, or shared values.
These diverse communities have been and are
increasingly the basis of new legal arrange-
ments; notable examples are the European Eco-
nomic Community and the functional groupings
concerned with maritime and economic ar-
rangements (Jessup 1964; 1973a). Though
Jessup recognizes the expanding role of non-
universal communities, he has continued to
stress the universal character of the basic prin-
ciples of the Charter and of general interna-
tional law. Thus he argues for the universal
application of the rule against the use of force
(except in self-defense) and against the idea
that armed force may be used in wars of libera-
tion or by third parties in civil wars (Jessup
1973a, pp. 423-429). He also considers that
the law of state responsibility for injuries to
aliens has—and should have—universal applica-
tion in its essential aspects, noting that abuses
by powerful states typified by "gunboat diplo-
macy" have now been eliminated (International
Court of Justice 1969, p. 164; Jessup 1973a, pp.
420-421). In regard to the law of the sea, he
asserts the need for general rules to safeguard
navigation, fishing, and environmental protec-
tion, but he accepts the necessity of nonuni-
versal arrangements to manage resources in
particular regions. His general approach is
strongly value-oriented, underlining what he
considers to be universally accepted ideas of
order, responsibility, and justice, yet recogniz-
ing that diversity and special conditions create
many different kinds of international communi-

ties that must have their own interests and
legal arrangements.
Jessup is also commonly credited with the
concept of "transnational law," a term he did
not invent but developed and popularized in his
Storrs lectures at Yale in 1956 (Jessup 1956b;
1973£>). Through that conception, Jessup sought
to show that the international legal realm could
no longer be compartmentalized into its two
classic divisions of public international law, ap-
plicable only to relations among states, and
private international law, governing choice of
law and enforcement of national judgments in
cases involving nationals of two or more states.
The legal rules and processes applicable to situ-
ations that cut across national lines must now
be sought in both public and private interna-
tional law and to a significant degree, in new
bodies of law that do not fit into either traditional
division. As examples of the latter, Jessup cited
the growing areas of European community law,
maritime law, international administrative law,
international law on war crimes, the law of
economic development, and the emerging law
applicable to multinational enterprises. Jessup's
aim was not merely to chart the new fields of
law but to underline the extent to which these
new fields involve law directly applicable to the
individual. Outmoded conceptions of interna-
tional law as law applicable to states alone had
to be modified, and the "mysteries" of the dis-
tinction between public and private law could
not be allowed to determine the rights of parties
(Jessup 1973fr, p. 343). One significant conse-
quence of increased recognition of "transna-
tional law" has been the growth of law school
courses and research concerned with interna-
tional transactions, human rights, international
economic law, and other subjects that are much
broader in scope than the traditional law of
state-to-state relations.
Jessup's interest in the widening scope of in-
ternational law included particular emphasis on
recognition of the rights of individuals. True to
his evolutionary perspective, he saw the gradual
progression of such rights as proceeding from
relatively isolated cases of humanitarian inter-
vention, through the adoptions of special
treaties (as those on minorities) to the Charter
obligation to respect and promote human rights,
and eventually the more detailed covenants with
provision for complaints by individuals. He
maintained that the Charter articles 55 and 56
imposed obligations in regard to human rights
and removed human rights from the exclusive
JESSUP, PHILIP C. 349
sphere of domestic jurisdiction (Jessup 1948,
pp. 87-89). But he also foresaw difficulties in
universalizing national practices, and he cau-
tioned against efforts to extend American con-
cepts to the rest of the world: "The human
rights to be defined and protected must be con-
sidered not in a vacuum of theory but in terms
of the constitutions and laws and practices" of
all the states of the world (Jessup 1948, p. 92).
Throughout his active career, Jessup was an
outspoken advocate of a wider use of judicial
settlement by governments. No single subject
occupied him more than the International Court
of Justice. In addresses, editorials, and books,
he explained why the Court should be used and
he cited the many instances in which third-
party settlement through the Court or other
tribunals had been successful. He strongly
criticized the United States for adhering to the
self-judging reservation of the Connolly amend-
ment (Jessup 1945). While there was at times
almost an evangelical flavor to his advocacy of
judicial settlement, he recognized that many
disputes are best left to negotiation or media-
tion. His practical and specific approach led him
to propose several measures to enhance the use
of the International Court to a modest degree.
He advocated the use of small special chambers
by the Court to speed decisions and to accommo-
date regional or functional interests, for ex-
ample, a chamber for African disputes or one
for environmental issues (Jessup 1971,
pp. 61-70). Knowing that governments are re-
luctant to submit to binding judgments, he pro-
posed to increase the nonbinding advisory
opinions of the Court by extending the right to
request such opinions to the UN Secretary-
General, the International Law Commission,
and a small committee of the General Assembly.
He supported a proposal under which the high-
est national courts would be able to seek ad-
visory opinions from the International Court on
questions of international law before such na-
tional courts (Jessup 1970, pp. 5-20). Although
these proposals won favor in academic and pro-
fessional circles, they have received little sup-
port from the major governments. They remain
on the international agenda to await a more
propitious climate for international judicial
settlement.
Jessup's advocacy of international coopera-
tion has also extended to proposals for interna-
tional regulation and, in some degree, adminis-
tration of areas outside of national jurisdiction.
He sees the vast area of outer space as a res
350 JESSUP, PHILIP C.
communis requiring international administra-
tion to avoid national conflict and has advanced
a similar conception for Antarctica (Jessup &
Taubenfeld 1959). These proposals represent
for Jessup an evolutionary advance from a de-
centralized system based on reciprocity to more
centralized regulation on matters "which escape
the old territorial realm of national sovereignty"
(Jessup 1959a, pp. 140-153). Science and tech-
nology are seen as the moving forces in expand-
ing the area of community interests and re-
quiring international administration to serve the
needs of all. Jessup does not attempt to demon-
strate why or how the recognition of the com-
mon interest will prevail over conflicts of
ideology or national interest. He rests his case
on an assumption of rationality rather than a
theory of historical causation. Whether or not
his hopes are realized, his eloquent espousal of
the "practical necessity" for international ad-
ministration in the common interest may itself
be a factor in influencing future decisions.
OSCAR SCHACHTER
WORKS BY JESSUP
(1927) 1970 The Law of Territorial Waters and Mari-
time Jurisdiction. New York: Kraus.
1928a American Neutrality and International Police.
World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. 2, no. 3.
Boston: The Foundation.
1928b The United States and Treaties for the Avoid-
ance of War. International Conciliation no. 239:
181ff.
1929a L'exploitation des richesses de la mer. Paris:
Hachette.
1929& The Permanent Court of International Justice:
American Accession and Amendments to the Statute.
International Conciliation no. 254:527ff.
(1929c) 1972 The United States and the World Court.
New York: Garland.
1930 The International Protection of Whales. Ameri-
can Journal^of International Law 24:751-752.
1931 The Acceptance of the Senate Reservations: Ad-
dress Delivered Before the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, February 19, 1931. Inter-
national Conciliation no. 273:593ff.
1934 National Sanctions for International Tribunals.
American Bar Association, Journal 20:55-57.
1935a The Generalization of the Monroe Doctrine.
American Journal of International Law 29:105—109.
(1935b) 1975 International Security: The American
Role in Collective Action for Peace. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood. —» First published as The United States
and the Stabilization of Peace: A Study of Collective
Security.
1935 JESSUP, PHILIP C.; and DEAK, FRANCIS Neutral-
ity: Its History, Economics and Law. Vol. 1: The
Origins. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
1936 Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law. Vol.
4: Today and Tomorrow. New York: Columbia
Univ. Press.
1937 JESSUP, PHILIP C.; and DEAK, FRANCIS Treaty
Provisions Defining Neutral Rights and Duties,
1778-1936. Washington: Government Printing Of-
fice.
(1938) 1964 Elihu Root. 2 vols. Hamden, Conn.:
Archon.
1939 The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Ap-
plied to International Law. American Journal of
International Law 33:740-743.
(1939) 1976 JESSUP, PHILIP C.; and DEAK, FRANCIS
(editors) A Collection of Neutrality Laws, Regula-
tions and Treaties of Various Countries. New York:
Kraus.
1940 The Reality of International Law. Foreign Affairs
22:244-253.
1944a The First Session of the Council of UNRRA.
American Journal of International Law 38:101-106.
1944£> UNRRA: Sample of World Organization. For-
eign Affairs 22:362-373.
1945 Acceptance by the United States of the Optional
Clause of the International Court of Justice. Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 39:745—751.
1946a Enforcing Human Rights Internationally: A
Good Start. Commentary 1, Jan.: 56—58.
194Gb Force Under a Modern Law of Nations. Foreign
Affairs 25:90-105.
1946c Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its
Functions? American Journal of International Law
40:168-172.
1946d Responsibility of States for Injuries to Indi-
viduals. Columbia Law Review 46:903-928.
1947a The International Problem of Governing Man-
kind. Claremont, Calif.: Published by Claremont
College for the Four Associated Colleges at Clare-
mont.
1947Z? Sovereignty in Antarctica. American Journal of
International Law 41:117-119.
1947c Modernization of the Law of International Con-
tractual Agreements. American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 41:378-405.
(1948) 1968 A Modern Law of Nations. Hamden,
Conn.: Archon.
1953 The Role of International Law in Statecraft. Acta
Scandinavica Juris Gentium 23:33ff.
1954 Should International Law Recognize an Inter-
mediate Status Between Peace and War? American
Journal of International Law 48:98-103.
1955a Enemy Property. American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 49:57-62.
1955i> The International Civil Servant and His Loyal-
ties. Journal of International Affairs 9:55ff.
(1955) 1978 JESSUP, PHILIP C.; LANDE, ADOLF; and
LISSITZYN, OLIVER International Regulation of Eco-
nomic and Social Questions. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
1956a Parliamentary Diplomacy: An Examination of
the Legal Quality of the Rules of Procedure of Or-
gans of the United Nations. Leiden (Netherlands):
A. W. Sijthoff.
1956b Transnational Law. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press.
1957a International Parliamentary Law. American
Journal of International Law 51:396-402.
1957t> Self-determination Today in Principle and in
Practice. Virginia Quarterly Review 33:174-188.
1957c Toward an Arab-Israeli Settlement. Foreign
Policy Bulletin 37:1-3.
1958a The Future of International Lawmaking. Pages
208-230 in Columbia University, School of Law,
Centennial Conference, Legal Institutions Today
and Tomorrow. Edited by Monrad G. Paulsen. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press.
1958i» The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea:

A Study in International Lawmaking. American
Journal of International Law 52:730—733.
(1959a) 1972 The Use of International Law. New
York: Da Capo. —» Five lectures delivered at the
University of Michigan in February and March
1958.
1959b The United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea. Columbia Law Review 59:234ff.
1959 JESSUP, PHILIP C.; and TAUBENFELD, HOWARD J.
Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy.
New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
1960 A Half-century of Efforts to Substitute Law for
War. The Hague, Academy of International Law,
Recueil des Cours 99:1-20.
1961 The Law of the Sea Around Us. American Jour-
nal of International Law 55:104-109.
1961 JESSUP, PHILIP C.; and BAXTER, R. R. The Con-
tribution of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht to the Develop-
ment of International Law. American Journal of
International Law 55:97-103.
1964 Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations.
American Journal of International Law 58:341-358.
1970 To Form a More Perfect United Nations. Hague
Academy of International Law, Recueil des Cours
129:1-23.
1971 The Price of International Justice. New York: Co-
lumbia Univ. Press.
1973a Non-universal International Law. Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 12:415—429.
1973b The Present State of Transnational Law. Pages
339-344 in M. Bos (editor). The Present State of
International Law and Other Essays. Deventer
(Netherlands): KLUWER.
1974 The Birth of Nations. New York: Columbia Univ.
Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ACHESON, DEAN 1972 Philip C. Jessup: Diplomatist.
Pages 3-13 in Wolfgang Friedmann, Louis Henkin,
and Oliver Lissitzyn (editors), Transnational Law
in a Changing Society: Essays in Honor of Philip C.
Jessup. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
FRIEDMANN, WOLFGANG; HENKIN, Louis; and LISSIT-
ZYN, OLIVER (editors) 1972 Transnational Law
in a Changing Society: Essays in Honor of Philip C.
Jessup. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THE HAGUE Reports
of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders. Leiden
(Netherlands): Sijthoff. —» Published since 1947.
KENNEDY, JOHN 1962 Dedication. In Columbia Law
Review 62, Nov. —» Issue in honor of Jessup.
OLIVER, COVEY 1962 Philip C. Jessup's Continuing
Contribution to International Law. Columbia Law
Review 62:1132-1137.
JOHNSON, HARRY G.
Harry Gordon Johnson was born in Toronto,
Canada, on May 26, 1923, and died in Geneva,
Switzerland, on May 9, 1977. During this rela-
tively short life, he wrote prodigiously: 526 pro-
fessional articles, 35 books and pamphlets, and
more than 150 book reviews straddling a num-
ber of corners of intellectual concern in the
theory and policy of economics. In addition, he
edited 27 books and wrote for popular and in-
JOHNSON, HARRY G. 351
tellectual magazines. He had an immense im-
pact on the economics profession, for this vast
outpouring of publications was characterized
not merely by creative insights, but also by the
unique capacity to synthesize apparently untidy
and unyielding masses of unrelated and abstruse
contributions. Then again, his impact was en-
hanced by his ceaseless travels to conferences
around the world, picking up and adding to the
development of new knowledge and disseminat-
ing it in improved form, and by his willingness
to lecture at the smallest campus or institute,
for he perceived this as a professional obliga-
tion, no matter what the personal cost in time
and health.
Johnson was a cosmopolitan economist, re-
flecting the richness of his own education and
teaching career. He graduated from the Uni-
versity of Toronto in 1943, then spent a year at
St. Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia as
acting professor of economics (at the age of
twenty), to proceed, after military service in the
Canadian infantry, to Cambridge, England, to
take his B.A. in 1946. He taught the ensuing
year at the University of Toronto, where he also
earned his M.A., specializing in economic his-
tory, and then spent 1947/1948 at Harvard
University. This was followed by a year at Jesus
College, Cambridge, after which he was elected
to a Berry-Ramsey fellowship at King's College,
Cambridge, in 1949. He remained a fellow of
King's, teaching also at the London School of
Economics (L.S.E.), until he left for the Uni-
versity of Manchester as professor of economic
theory in 1956. In 1959, he joined the Univer-
sity of Chicago as professor of economics; he
later became the Charles F. Grey distinguished
service professor of economics, remaining at
Chicago until his death. However, he was soon
to combine this with a chair at the L.S.E. (1966-
1974) and then with teaching at the Graduate
Institute for International Studies in Geneva
(1976/1977).
These shifts in location and the associated
changes in intellectual environment inevitably
proved important in shaping Johnson's educa-
tion as an economist. In particular, the years in
Cambridge and Chicago were the most signifi-
cant. For both campuses had, in addition
to Johnson himself, remarkable figures in eco-
nomics: Dennis H. Robertson, R. F. Kami,
Nicholas Kaldor, and Joan Robinson at Cam-
bridge; Milton Friedman, George J. Stigler, and
Theodore W. Schultz at Chicago. The strong pro-
 352 JOHNSON, HARRY G.
fessional and political views and interests of
these major economists undoubtedly deepened
Johnson's interest in developing theory as a tool
of policymaking as well as his disdain for
logically imposing but irrelevant theoretical
constructs. At the same time, they certainly in-
fluenced the evolution of his own views and
attitudes toward the various approaches to eco-
nomics, resulting in his eventual antipathy to
Marxist viewpoints and to the economics of the
New Left.
How does one present in a few pages a set of
writings whose major characteristic is the extra-
ordinarily broad scope of its topics? Topics that
range from the history of economic doctrines to
the economics of the price of gold; from the
theory of international commodity agreements
to the theory of preferences and consumption;
from an analysis of Keynesian economics to the
theory of income distribution. They cover, too,
the economics of reparations, public goods, com-
mon markets, monetary reform, basic and ap-
plied research, the brain drain, poverty and
opulence, bank mergers, the North—South rela-
tionship, student protest, the multinational cor-
poration, universities, libraries, the interna-
tional monetary union, dumping, smuggling,
speculation, bluffing, patents, licenses, innova-
tions, and reversed welfare and revised transfers;
the theories of growing productivity and balance
of payments, tariffs, excise taxes, inflation, in-
dex numbers, nationalism, advertising, the de-
mand for money, distortions, money and eco-
nomic growth, effective protection, and human
capital; analyses of the efficiency of monetary
management, minimum wages, the infant-in-
dustry argument for protection, the role of un-
certainty, income policy, mercantilism, equal pay
for men and women, monetarism, buffer stocks,
and legal and illegal migration; economic poli-
cies for Canada, Britain, the United States, and
developing countries; the state of international
liquidity; the relationship between planning and
free enterprise; the choice between fixed and
floating exchange rates; and the monetary ap-
proach to the balance of payments and the ex-
change rate.
Four areas of interest and impact, clearly the
most important, deserve to be highlighted: the
pure theory of international trade, macroeco-
nomics, international monetary theory, and
writings on economic policies and issues of
political economy.
Johnson's work on the pure theory of interna-
tional trade constitutes perhaps his most im-
portant scientific contribution. That trade theory
clearly established him as a leading theorist is
evident from his papers in International Trade
and Economic Growth (1958). Characteristically,
his work in this area revealed an uncanny and
quick perception of the importance of a new
idea, and a remarkable ability to shape it into a
major contribution of his own that would catch
everyone's imagination. Thus, for example, he
saw early on the significance of the idea of
effective protection (1965b). In the theory
of optimal policy intervention, he discerned the
apparent discrepancy between the use of a pro-
duction tax-cum-subsidy and the use of a tariff.
He showed perceptively (1965a) that the former
was suited to a production-augmenting objective
and the latter to a trade-restraining objective.
Again, when the theoretical literature on incor-
porating illegal transactions into general equi-
librium theory began in the early 1970s, John-
son immediately developed interesting extensions
of the current analysis into such questions as
the effect of smuggling on the optimal- and
maximal-revenue tariffs. Moreover, his impor-
tant and highly original papers on the theory of
trade and growth (1953<2; 1954), written at the
time of the dollar shortage after the war, ad-
dressed the issues from the viewpoint of differ-
ential growth of productivity among trading
countries, and put the entire theoretical discus-
sion into a form that dominated the work of
trade theorists for years.
His writings on the general equilibrium
analysis of international trade include two in-
fluential companion articles on income distri-
bution (1959b; 1960b). Among his best writings
on the theory of trade, however, are those that
belong to what James E. Meade called the theory
of trade and welfare. Here, mention must be
made of at least four analytically basic contri-
butions which, at the same time, have had con-
siderable impact on policy discussions. These
are his papers on optimum tariffs and retalia-
tion (1953b); the cost of protection and the
scientific tariff (1960a), building on his earlier
work measuring the gains from trade; optimal
trade interventions in the presence of domestic
distortions (1965a); and the possibility of in-
come losses from economic growth of a small,
tariff-distorted economy (1967c).
Written in the first flush of his youth, the
paper on optimum tariffs and retaliation is a
splendid piece of theorizing: subtle, elegant, eco-
nomical, and addressed to an important policy
problem. Basically, Johnson analyzed whether a

large country could "get away with" exercising
its monopoly power. If a foreign country retali-
ated, would any gain be left for the large coun-
try from its departure from free trade? If the
country was worse off as a result of the retalia-
tion than under free trade, the case for first-best
departures from free trade would collapse com-
pletely: John Stuart Mill's celebrated exception
to the case for free trade for a large country
would no longer be tenable. What was at stake,
therefore, was a truly significant cornerstone of
the theory of trade policy. Tibor Scitovsky had
argued, following on earlier writers, that retalia-
tion would indeed leave everyone worse off than
they were under free trade. Johnson used a
Cournot-type of retaliation mechanism, in which
each country imposed an optimal tariff in turn
to show that a country could benefit more from
imposing an optimal tariff than from free trade.
From the perspective of Johnson's evolution as
an economist, two things are notable: (1) This
early vintage Johnson was clearly intrigued by
analytical complexities that he found less in-
teresting later: thus, he discussed at great length
how the retaliation process could lead to a tariff
cycle. (2) More interestingly, the policy impli-
cation of this early analysis is to resurrect the
classic case for the exercise of monopoly power
by a large country; Johnson's later writings
leaned in the opposite direction, highlighting the
great potential cost of departing from free trade.
This shift in Johnson's emphasis to the ad-
vantages of free trade is seen most directly in
his work on the theory of optimal policy inter-
vention in the presence of distortions and his
work on the theory of immiserizing growth. In
both instances, Johnson opposed the use of
tariffs, utilizing the insights of the theory of
second-best as applied to the problems of trade
and welfare. His 1965 paper on distortions was
built squarely on two propositions: (1) The only
first-best case for tariffs was the Mill argument
for exercise of monopoly power by a large coun-
try; and (2) The second-best use of a tariff
to offset the distortion caused domestically need
not be welfare-improving. This paper became a
classic reference in support of free trade, re-
ducing the argument for tariffs to a second-best
case in the presence of all distortions other than
that implied by the presence of monopoly power.
The later article on immiserizing growth
(1967c) presented yet another influential and
novel argument against protection. Johnson
showed that if a small country grew subject to a
distortionary tariff, it could experience real in-
JOHNSON, HARRY G. 353
come losses. He linked it to the case for an
infant industry tariff, which often rested on
protection-induced gains in technical efficiency
in the industry, and concluded that the case was
weak. If technical change in the protected in-
dustry was in fact the source of growth, the
likelihood of immiserizing growth was enlarged.
Equally important have been the subsequent ap-
plications of this contribution to (1) the ques-
tion of measuring growth at world, rather than
domestic, prices in trade-distorted economies
and (2) the question whether tariff-induced
capital flows would be welfare-improving.
Finally, Johnson wrote a paper on the scien-
tific tariff (1960a), whose impact was in two
areas: (1) the measurement of protection and
(2) analytical propositions regarding optimal
tariff structures. Johnson's influence on empiri-
cal work, on measuring the cost of protection,
and on measuring the gains or losses to Britain
from joining the European Economic Commu-
nity was important, and he took pains to make
his theoretical work in this area directly usable
by econometricians. Thus, the Johnson who was
interested in alternative measures of the gains
from trade corresponding to the different Hick-
sian concepts of compensating and equivalent
variation and their relationship to the historic
Marshallian measure, was also successful in
translating this into practical guides for mea-
surement of the cost of protection and indeed
carried out some of these empirical applications
himself. Many of Johnson's contributions to the
theory of tariffs and commercial policy are re-
printed in his Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs
(1971a).
Johnson's early contributions to macroeco-
nomics were made during his tenure at Cam-
bridge. In "Some Cambridge Controversies in
Monetary Theory" (1951a), he clarified the es-
sence of the controversy between the Keynesian
and the Robertsonian approaches to such key
issues as loanable funds versus liquidity prefer-
ence, the saving-investment identity, and the
Gibson paradox, and distilled and integrated
complex issues into a coherent framework. His
major contributions during that period, how-
ever, were his study of the implications of secu-
lar changes in United Kingdom banks' assets
and liabilities as a result of the replacement of
private by public debt (1951fr), and his active
participation in the discussion surrounding
Britain's revival of monetary policy. Johnson
was critical of the quality of British monetary
statistics and argued that improved monetary
354 JOHNSON, HARRY G.
statistics were essential for a well-managed
monetary policy. In "British Monetary Statistics"
(1959a) he published his own laboriously con-
structed monetary aggregates for the period
1930-1957, which stimulated further research.
Johnson's move to the University of Chicago
(to which he was invited as a "Keynesian"
economist) marked an increased research in-
terest in monetary theory. In the early 1960s,
he wrote "The 'General Theory' After Twenty-five
Years" (1961), the survey article "Monetary
Theory and Policy" (1962&), and "Recent De-
velopments in Monetary Theory" (1963b). These
three articles, classics in the field of monetary
economics, established Johnson's reputation as
a mature scholar with broad scientific and his-
torical perspectives. Johnson's survey suggested
a list of issues that would benefit from further
research and, in retrospect, this list served in-
deed as the agenda for research in the following
fifteen years. One of the notable issues on the
list was his early skepticism about the stability
of the Phillips curve in the face of macroeconomic
policies. His evaluations of the major develop-
ments in monetary economics (as of the early
1960s) have been influential and perceptive.
These developments include the application of
capital theory to monetary theory and the shift
from a static to a dynamic analysis (1962c;
1967£>). Following the pioneering analysis by
James Tobin, Johnson's analysis of money and
economic growth extended Robert Solow's neo-
classical barter growth model to a monetary
economy by considering the effect of changes in
the rate of monetary expansion on the steady-
state stock of capital and consumption per head
when money is viewed as a consumer's and
producer's good.
The dynamic context for the monetary anal-
ysis led Johnson to analyze the optimal rate of
growth of the money supply (1969b; 1970). He
noted that the typical analysis rests on the as-
sumption that money does not bear interest and
that the issue of the optimal money supply can
be analyzed in terms of the efficiency of the
monetary and banking organization.
As a result of his interest in the Keynesian
revolution and his deep historical perspective,
Johnson wrote his controversial article "The
Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist
Counter-revolution" (197Ib), which was first
presented as the prestigious Richard E. Ely lec-
ture in 1970 and was reprinted in Further Es-
says in Monetary Economics (1972a). This
article is an exercise in the history of economic
thought and scientific evolution. Following Axel
Leijonhufvud, he drew a sharp distinction be-
tween Keynes and the Keynesians, sharply
criticizing the latter but not sparing the former.
His continuing interest in the various aspects of
Keynes and his economic thought resulted in a
series of provocative articles, some of which ap-
peared posthumously in his joint book with
Elizabeth Johnson, The Shadow of Keynes
(Johnson & Johnson 1978).
Johnson's major criticism of the Keynesian
model was its failure to deal with the problem
of inflation at the level of both economic theory
and economic policy. He was extremely critical
of the "sociological" noneconomic theories of in-
flation, as well as of price controls and income
policy as the proposed remedies to inflation. His
analysis of inflation was approached from the
perspective of an international economist who
views inflation (under a fixed exchange rate
regime) as a global phenomenon, a proper anal-
ysis of which requires a shift of focus from the
concept of monetary developments in individual
countries to the concept of the aggregate world
money supply (1972fc>).
Throughout his professional life, Johnson
continued his research on international mone-
tary economics. Three articles in 1950 set the
stage for what later became the typical char-
acteristics of his style of research: courage to
take positions not always popular with others,
the application of relatively simple economic
techniques to a new range of problems with
resultant important insights, and an unabashed
love for geometry as a tool of analysis. He took
an early stand against raising the price of gold
in terms of all other currencies (1950a), ana-
lyzed the destabilizing effect of international
commodity agreements on the prices of primary
products (1950£>), and produced an early dia-
grammatic analysis of income variations and
the balance of payments (1950c)—an analysis
that was conducted within the then typical
Keynesian framework.
In his writings on the theory of the transfer
problem, originally developed in the context of
the postwar reparations, Johnson synthesized
the earlier work of Paul A. Samuelson, Lloyd A.
Metzler, Fritz Machlup, and James E. Meade,
and demonstrated his philosophy that individual
research effort is most productive when it
utilizes the work of previous theorists as a foun-
dation for new construction. Johnson's theme
was that of "continuity and multiplicity of ef-
fort." In "The Transfer Problem and Exchange

Stability" (1956fc), he proved that the problems
of transfers and exchange stability are formally
the same, and that all possible methods of cor-
recting balance-of-payments disequilibrium can
be analyzed effectively with the apparatus of
the transfer problem. Almost two decades later
(1974), he returned to the analysis of reversed
transfers with greater emphasis on the mone-
tary aspects of the problem.
Johnson's most important contribution to the
understanding of international monetary eco-
nomics is "Towards a General Theory of the
Balance of Payments" (printed in 1958). His key
insight here was his emphasis on the monetary
nature of balance-of-payments surplus or deficit:
"[A] balance-of-payments deficit implies either
dishoarding by residents, or credit creation by
the monetary authorities"; the former is inher-
ently transitory and the latter has the obvious
policy implication. As for policy, Johnson distin-
guished between "expenditure reducing" policies
and "expenditure switching" policies. The origi-
nality of this article is all the more remarkable
considering the intellectual environment in the
mid-1950s, when to a large extent, the balance
of payments was viewed as a "real" (in contrast
with "monetary") phenomenon. This article may
be considered the intellectual precursor of what
15 years later would be termed "the monetary
approach to the balance of payments."
Over the years, Johnson focused increasingly
on issues, with special reference to Canada
(1962a; 1963«; 1965c). Johnson was a supporter
of flexible exchange rates as revealed in "The
Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969" (1969a),
which builds on Friedman's classic contribution
but incorporates the important lessons from the
literature on optimum currency areas. Thus,
while he supported the move to a flexible ex-
change rate regime, he recognized circumstances
under which a small country (like Panama)
might be better off maintaining fixed parities.
His analysis of the international monetary
system revealed his strength as a realistic politi-
cal scientist. Monetary reform is not carried out
in a vacuum; it is implemented or frustrated
by representatives of independent nation-states,
to whom international commitments are likely
to be secondary to national commitments. This
realization is reflected in his numerous com-
mentaries on current international monetary
crises, his doubts about the prospects of a stable
European monetary union, his appraisal of the
Bretton Woods system, and his article "Political
Economy Aspects of International Monetary Re-
JOHNSON, HARRY G. 355
form" (1972d). He took a hard line on schemes
designed to solve the international monetary
problems by methods that would channel re-
sources to less developed countries. Although
he was aware of the unpopularity of such a
stance, integrity and courage always dominated
his position: "My reason for refusing to endorse
such schemes is not that I am opposed to the
less developed countries receiving more develop-
ment assistance but that I think that no useful
purpose is served by misapplying economic anal-
ysis for political ends" (1967b, p. 8).
As world inflation accelerated in the 1960s,
Johnson recognized that in a world integrated
through international trade in goods and assets,
national rates of inflation cannot be fully ana-
lyzed without a global perspective: "I have be-
come increasingly impressed in recent years
with the conviction that the traditional division
between closed-economy and open-economy
monetary theory is a barrier to clear thought,
and that domestic monetary phenomena for
most of the countries with which most econo-
mists are concerned can only be understood in
an international monetary context" (1972a,
p. 11). This perception of world inflation, along
with the analytical insights from his earlier
work "Towards a General Theory of the Balance
of Payments" (printed in 1958), paved the way
for his work on the monetary approach to the
balance of payments, which he viewed as the
crowning achievement of his career. The intel-
lectual roots of the monetary approach run back
to the classic writers (David Hume and David
Ricardo), and its early developments can be
found in the work of economists associated with
the International Monetary Fund (e.g., Jacques
Polak). Johnson, however, along with Robert A.
Mundell and other members of the International
Trade Workshop at the University of Chicago,
introduced new and significant dimensions to
the approach. He was the most prolific writer
and the most devoted contributor to the new
approach, having been quick to understand the
fundamental policy implications of the simple
key proposition that the balance of payments is
essentially a monetary phenomenon. Among
these is the implication that balance-of-payments
policies will not produce an inflow of interna-
tional reserves unless they increase the quantity
of money demanded or unless domestic credit
policy forces the resident population to acquire
the extra money wanted through the balance of
payments via an excess of receipts over pay-
ments. He saw himself as a missionary, and he
356 JOHNSON, HARRY G.
took the lead in developing and disseminating
this approach by encouraging and guiding theo-
retical and empirical research in this field in
Chicago, London, and Geneva (Frenkel & John-
son 1976).
The evolution of the international monetary
system into a regime of flexible exchange rates
led to further extensions of the monetary ap-
proach and resulted in a new direction of theo-
retical and empirical research on the economics
of exchange rates. Johnson stimulated much of
the early research in the area and coedited The
Economics of Exchange Rates (Frenkel & John-
son 1978), which contains some of the result-
ing work.
While the foregoing review of Johnson's major
theoretical contributions amply shows the strong
policy relevance of his best work, he also wrote
directly on policy. He reacted quickly to major
policy issues, as well as to theoretical develop-
ments. Thus, when the question of responding
to the needs of the less developed countries be-
came important during the 1960s, he published
Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Coun-
tries (1967a), a comprehensive and masterly
study for the Brookings Institution of foreign
economic policy issues facing the United States
in regard to the less developed countries. He
analyzed such proposals as commodity schemes
and preferential entry for manufactured exports
of the less developed countries. The originality
and independence of his thinking were further
evident in many of his policy analyses, where
he often departed from the conventional view.
This is best illustrated by his work on the brain
drain, where he was most influential, through
his own writings (1964; 1967c) and those of his
associates, in propounding the view that the
brain drain might be welfare improving for the
countries from which it occurred. This is one
example of how, in his later years, his analyses
increasingly questioned interventionist policies.
Thus, the brain drain was beneficial rather than
harmful; the multinational corporations were
part of a non-zero-sum game, and so on. The
United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment, which addresses the less developed
countries' problems and demands, and which he
viewed benignly in the early 1960s, came under
his withering criticism as he came to feel that
professional economists, influenced by their
sympathies for the poor countries, had been led
into empathetic and nonscientific research on
trade and development.
Three additional aspects of Johnson's work
deserve mention. He was a humane social sci-
entist, interested not merely in understanding
social phenomena, but also in contributing to
the improvement of well-being (1975a; 1975b).
Moreover, he was a gifted teacher with a deep
sense of mission and responsibility. He devoted
great effort to the preparation of his lectures
and always accepted a heavy teaching load.
Some of his lucid and insightful lectures are
published in Macroeconomics and Monetary
Theory (1972c) and The Theory of Income
Distribution (1973). Then again, he was widely
respected as an editor, who demonstrated con-
siderable judgment and a talent for recognizing
and encouraging the development of original
lines of thought. In addition, he was devoted to
his sustained role as an editor of the Journal of
Political Economy. He also served on the edi-
torial boards of Economica, the Journal of Inter-
national Economics, the Review of Economic
Studies, and the Manchester School.
Many honors came Johnson's way. His com-
bination of sociological insights with profes-
sional economic expertise, and the elegance of
his style, made him a popular lecturer, and he
was invited to deliver many of the prestigious
public lectures in economics: the Ely lecture,
the Wicksell lectures, the de Vries lecture, the
Ramaswami lecture, the Johansen lectures, and
the Horowitz lectures. He was president of the
Canadian Political Science Association (1965/
1966) and the Eastern Economic Association
(1976/1977), chairman of the (British) Asso-
ciation of University Teachers in Economics
(1968-1971), and vice president of the Ameri-
can Economic Association (1976). He was also
a fellow of the Econometric Society, the British
Academy, the Royal Society of Canada, a distin-
guished fellow of the American Economic As-
sociation and of the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences. He was the holder of honorary
degrees from St. Francis Xavier University, Uni-
versity of Windsor, Queen's University, Carleton
University, University of Western Ontario, Shef-
field University, and the University of Man-
chester, and was awarded the Innis-Gerin medal
of the Royal Society of Canada, the prix mon-
dial Messim Habif by the University of Geneva,
and the Bernhard Harms prize by the University
of Kiel (Germany) just prior to his untimely
death. The Canadian government named him
an officer of the Order of Canada in December
1976, a fitting tribute from his native country

for a fully internationalist economist who had
brought great distinction to his discipline.
JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI AND
JACOB A. FRENKEL
WORKS BY JOHNSON
1950a The Case for Increasing the Price of Gold in
Terms of All Currencies: A Contrary View. Cana-
dian Journal of Economics & Political Science 16:
199-209.
1950b The De-stabilizing Effect of International Com-
modity Agreements on the Prices of Primary Pro-
ducts. Economic Journal 60:626-629.
1950c Diagrammatic Analysis of Income Variations
and the Balance of Payments. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 64:623-632.
195la Some Cambridge Controversies in Monetary
Theory. Review of Economic Studies 19:90—104.
1951i> Some Implications of Secular Changes in Bank
Assets and Liabilities in Great Britain. Economic
Journal 61:544-561.
1953a Equilibrium Growth in an International Econ-
omy. Canadian Journal of Economics &- Political
Science 19:478-500. -> Reprinted in Johnson 1958,
pp. 120-149.
1953b Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation. Review of
Economic Studies 21:142-153. —> Reprinted in
Johnson 1958, pp. 31-55.
1954 Increasing Productivity, Income-Price Trends
and the Trade Balance. Economic Journal 64:462-
485. —» Reprinted in Johnson 1958, pp. 94-115.
1956a Sketch of Generalisation of Keynesian Balance-
of-Payments Theory. Indian Journal of Economics
37:49-56.
1956b The Transfer Problem and Exchange Stability.
Journal of Political Economy 64:212-225. —> Re-
printed in Johnson 1958, pp. 169-195.
(1958) 1967 International Trade and Economic
Growth: Studies in Pure Theory. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press. —» Translated into Japanese
(I960), Spanish (1970), Portuguese (1973), and
Italian (1976).
1959a British Monetary Statistics. Economica New
Series 26:1-17.
1959b International Trade, Income Distribution, and
the Offer Curve. Manchester School 27:241-260. —»
Reprinted in Johnson 1971a, pp. 3—40, as "Inter-
national Trade, Income Distribution, the Offer
Curve, and the Effects of Tariffs."
1960a The Cost of Protection and the Scientific Tariff.
Journal of Political Economy 68:327-345.
1960& Income Distribution, the Offer Curve, and the
Effects of Tariffs. Manchester School 28:215-242.
1960 BHAGWATI, JAGDISH N.; and JOHNSON, HARRY G.
Notes on Some Controversies in the Theory of In-
ternational Trade. Economic Journal 70:74-93.
1961 The "General Theory" After Twenty-five Years.
American Economic Review 51:1—17. —* Reprinted
in Johnson 1962c, pp. 126-147; 1975a, pp. 61-76.
Also reprinted, with notes, under the title "Keynes'
'General Theory' After Twenty-five Years," in
N. Marshall (editor), Keynes: Updated or Out-
dated1? Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1970, pp. 31-43.
1962a Canada in a Changing World Economy. Univ.
of Toronto Press. —* The Alan B. Plaunt memorial
lectures.
1962& Monetary Theory and Policy. American Eco-
nomic Review 52:335-384. —» Reprinted in John-
son 1967b, pp. 15-72.
JOHNSON, HARRY G. 357
1962c Money, Trade and Economic Growth: Survey
Lectures in Economic Theory. London: Allen &
Unwin; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. —>
Also published in Japanese (1964) and Spanish
(1965).
1963a The Canadian Quandary: Economic Problems
and Policies. Toronto and New York: McGraw-Hill.
—> A paperback edition was published by Carleton
Library in 1977.
1963b Recent Developments in Monetary Theory.
Indian Economic Review 6, no. 3:29-69, no. 4:1-28.
1964 The Economics of Brain Drain. Pages 37-50 in
Annual Seminar on Canadian-American Relations,
Sixth, Papers. Ontario: Univ. of Windsor Press.
1965a Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of
Domestic Distortions. Pages 3-34 in R. E. Caves
et al. (editors), Trade, Growth and the Balance of
Payments: Essays in Honor of Gottfried Haberler.
Chicago: Rand-McNally; Amsterdam: North-Holland.
1965& The Theory of Tariff Structure, With Special
Reference to World Trade and Development. Etudes
et Travaux de ITnstitut Universitaire de Hautes
Etudes Internationales de Geneve 4:9-29.
(1965c) 1968 The World Economy at the Crossroads.
Oxford: Clarendon. —> Includes a new preface.
Translated into Danish (1969), Spanish (1968),
Swedish (1967), and Japanese (1967).
1967a Economic Policies Toward Less Developed
Countries. Washington: Brookings Institution; Lon-
don: Allen & Unwin. —> Translated into Spanish
(1970) and Japanese (1972).
(1967&) 1969 Essays in Monetary Economics. London:
Allen & Unwin. —> Translated into German (1969)
and Spanish (1971).
1967c The Possibility of Income Losses From
Increased Efficiency or Factor Accumulation in
the Presence of Tariffs. Economic Journal 77:
151-154.
1967d Some Economic Aspects of Brain Drain. Pakis-
tan Development Review 7:379—411. —> An ap-
pendix to Notes on the Effects of Emigration of
Professional People on the Welfare of Those Re-
maining Behind.
1968 International Trade: I. Theory. Volume 8, pages
83-96 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1969a The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969.
Pages 9-37 in Harry G. Johnson and J. E. Nash (edi-
tors), U.K. and Floating Exchanges. Hobart Papers,
No. 46. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. —»
Reprinted in Johnson 1972a, pp. 198-222.
1969k Inside Money, Outside Money, Income, Wealth
and Welfare in Monetary Theory. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 1:30-45. —» Reprinted in
Johnson 1972a, pp. 113-136.
1970 Is There an Optimal Money Supply. Journal of
Finance 25:435-442. —> Reprinted in Johnson
1972a, pp. 137-147.
1971a Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs. London: Allen
& Unwin; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1971b The Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist
Counter-revolution. American Economic Review
61:1-14. —> Reprinted in Johnson 1972a, pp. 50-
69; 1975a, pp. 91-106.
(1972a) 1973 Further Essays in Monetary Economics.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. —> Trans-
lated into German (1976).
(1972k) 1976 Inflation and the Monetarist Contro-
versy. Amsterdam and London: North-Holland. —>
The de Vries lectures.
1972c Macroeconomics and Monetary Theory. Lon-
 358 JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE
don: Gray-Mills. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1972 by Aldine.
1972d Political Economy Aspects of International
Monetary Reform. Journal of International Eco-
nomics 2:•'$01-423. —> Reprinted in Johnson 1975a,
pp. 248-266.
1973 The Theory of Income Distribution. London:
Gray-Mills.
1974 The Welfare Economics of Reversed Interna-
tional Transfers. Pages 79-110 in G. Horwich and
P. Samuelson (editors), Trade, Stability and Macro-
economics: Essays in Honor of Lloyd A. Metzler.
New York and London: Academic Press.
1975a On Economics and Society. Univ. of Chicago
Press. —» Translated into Chinese (1976).
(1975fo) 1976 Technology and Economic Interdepen-
dence. New York: St. Martins. —» A Spanish trans-
lation is forthcoming.
1976 FRENKEL, JACOB A.; and JOHNSON, HARRY G.
(editors) The Monetary Approach to the Balance
of Payments. London: Allen & Unwin; Univ. of
Toronto Press.
1978 FRENKEL, JACOB A.; and JOHNSON, HARRY G.
(editors) The Economics of Exchange Rates. Read-
ing, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
1978 JOHNSON, ELIZABETH S.; and JOHNSON, HARRY G.
The Shadow of Keynes: Understanding Keynes,
Cambridge, & Keynesian Economics. Univ. of Chi-
cago Press; Oxford: Blackwell.
JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE
For assessing Bertrand de Jouvenel's life and
works, and the intimate relationship between
them, the best tools are provided by the French
writer himself. His major works of the 1960s
and 1970s have the double merit of being
future oriented and opening new avenues on
the one hand, yet, on the other hand, referring
explicitly to questions raised twenty, thirty, and
sometimes fifty years before. Three books con-
stitute a particularly useful introduction to his
thinking, since they are collections of essays
written from the 1950s to the 1970s, grouped
according to themes: Arcadie: Essais sur le
mieux-vivre (1968) deals with the quality of
life, environment, and the nonquantifiable di-
mensions of economic life; Du principat (1972)
deals, in a more classical vein, with problems
of political philosophy, particularly the growth
of governmental power in modern societies; La
civilisation de puissance (1976a) deals essen-
tially with the growth of technological power
and man's mastery over nature.
Each of these three books contains a pref-
ace which, almost apologetically, acknowledges
their lack of systematic character, but maintains
their unity of inspiration. In the preface to La
civilisation de puissance, Jouvenel wrote:
In the course of a long life, I was never capable of
devoting myself to a particular "intellectual dis-
cipline": I was always fascinated by the phe-
nomena of my time and the most diverse ones. Out
of this dispersion of my attention, a certain idea of
the civilization within which my life was unfolding
tended to take shape in my mind. To present a
synthetic view of it, would be an ambition beyond
my reach. Besides, a mind which would be power-
ful enough to provide such a vision would risk
imprisoning other minds within it: this is the
drawback of large syntheses. This is why I do not
regret my limits.
What I am inclined to do is simply to shed light
on certain features of our civilization, features
which became printed in my mind through suc-
cessive encounters. (1976a, p. ii)
And in the preface to Arcadie, he wrote:
I speak here not as someone who aspires to the
position of guide to the human caravan, but as a
traveler among others, who signals pot-holes here
and attractive panoramas there to his companions
as they spring to his eyes, and without forgetting
that his view is partial and selective. Perhaps a
certain indiscipline qualified me for this role of
explorer. This does not mean that my mind is re-
pelled by rigorous modes of thought; to the con-
trary, I like these beautiful nets cast upon reality,
but we all know that part of reality escapes every
net, that there is no formulated knowledge which is
not incomplete by definition. It follows, it seems to
me, that the vision obtained through a system of
definitions and measures must always be completed
by views taken from outside the system. (1968,
pp. 7-8)
The metaphor of the traveler exploring un-
charted roads, announcing opportunities and
dangers ahead, and looking back to assess
whether directions chosen were the good ones,
is indeed appropriate for characterizing Jou-
venel's approach and experience. His life coin-
cides almost exactly with that of the century;
his social background, his literary style, and his
personal experience all help make his intellec-
tual approach and his published work highly
unconventional by academic standards, yet all
the more able to reflect the contradictions of an
epoch.
Jouvenel was born in 1903, the son of Henry
de Jouvenel des Ursins, a well-known French
public figure who was an ambassador, a senator,
an editor of a major Parisian daily, and, above
all, a constant fighter for liberal causes, from
the Dreyfus affair to the League of Nations,
where he inspired the Protocol for the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes, which was ultimately
to be rejected. Jouvenel's mother, Claire Boas,
was the daughter of a Jewish industrialist. The

entire Jouvenel family was aristocratic, politi-
cal, and literary. Jouvenel's uncle, Robert de
Jouvenel, was the author of a well-known politi-
cal pamphlet, "La Republique des Camarades,"
and his stepmother was the great novelist Col-
lette. The idea of a Czechoslovak republic is
presumed to have been spread in French circles
through his mother's "salon," at which Thomas'
G. Masaryk, who was to become president of
Czechoslovakia, was a frequent visitor.
Jouvenel's early studies showed the eclecti-
cism that would characterize his interests. He
graduated in law and mathematics from the
Sorbonne, but his interest soon turned to social
and economic matters, particularly in the
United States. His first important book, L'eco-
nomie dirigee (1928), coined the term adopted
in French usage for economic planning. The
work starts with an insistence on the importance
of the technological revolution for changing the
nature of social life and ends with a discussion
of the inevitable and desirable increase in the
economic role of the state and its power to as-
sess economic trends. Perhaps his most forma-
tive experience in social and economic matters
was the great depression in the United States,
which shaped Jouvenel's permanent horror of
the human costs of unemployment and his
preference for growth-oriented economic poli-
cies, and which produced, as well, La crise du
capitalisme americain (1933), one of the major
books interpreting the depression.
Much of Jouvenel's political thinking and ac-
tivities in the 1930s revolved around the search
for some kind of a French and European New
Deal, capable of overcoming both the economic,
political, and ultimately, the spiritual crisis, by
calling the state to fundamental reform, and,
above all, by uniting and mobilizing popular
energies, particularly those of the young. This
quest involved him in such efforts as the found-
ing of a short-lived weekly, significantly entitled
La Lutte des Jeunes in 1934, the support of
Gaston Bergery, a precursor of Mendes-France,
and even of Jacques Doriot, the former com-
munist and future collaborationist leader. Al-
though these activities seemed to fluctuate in
direction, all had in common an attempt to
overcome the rigidities of classic right and left
thinking and to learn from new experiences, in-
cluding those of the fascist states. This last as-
pect is particularly apparent in Le reveil de
TEurope (1938), as it was to be in Apres la
defaite (1941).
Jouvenel's main activity during that period,
JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE 359
however, was as a journalist specializing in inter-
national affairs; he was both one of the most
influential diplomatic commentators and one of
the most famous special envoys of the time. His
interview with Hitler in 1935 was a world scoop.
His books of the time—for example, D'une
guerre a I'autre (1940-1941)—are based essen-
tially on his newspaper chronicles.
The outbreak of World War n brought about
a fundamental change. Dropping his journal-
istic activities, Jouvenel enlisted as a volunteer.
He published still another political tract, Apres
la defaite, which was widely—and rather er-
roneously—interpreted as a call to France to
learn the lesson of its victors, but then withdrew
into scholarship. He published two studies of
economic history, Napoleon et I'economie dirigee
(1942) and L'or au temps de Charles-Quint
(1943). At the same time, he engaged in resis-
tance activities that soon forced him to quickly
go into hiding in France and then to take refuge
in Switzerland, where he remained for the first
years after the war ended. This period seems
to have marked the turning point of his career.
He did resume writing political columns, this
time in the Swiss press, dealing particularly
with the fate of Europe in the postwar world,
calling for moderation and hard work and warn-
ing against the excesses of left-wing ideologies
that were prevalent in France at the time and
that he felt could lead to the repetition of the
evils of fascism (1947c). He also continued to
write books evaluating current political, social,
and economic experiences. Examples are his
analysis of the Labour experience in England in
Problemes de I'Angleterre socialiste (19471?) and
of the Marshall Plan in L'Amerique en Europe
(1948). However, his major work shifted from
journalism and concrete economic history to
political philosophy.
Jouvenel's most voluminous and best-known
work, Du pouvoir: Historic naturelle de sa
croissance (1945), was followed by De la sou-
verainete: A la recherche du bien politique
(1955) and by The Pure Theory of Politics
(1963). Despite their great separation in time,
the three volumes follow each other logically.
The second and least-known work, De la sou-
verainete, holds the key to the passage from the
historical approach of the first to the analytical
perspective of the third. The collection of arti-
cles entitled Du principat offers a further key to
Jouvenel's thought on the nature and evolution
of politics, as does his work on Rousseau
(1947d- 1965).
 360 JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE
Besides those of the youthful socioeconomic
observer, glamorous international correspondent,
and meditative political philosopher, two other
roles established Jouvenel's position and influ-
ence in French and international cultural life.
The first was that of social and economic expert
and adviser. As a founder and chairman of the
SEDEIS (Societe d'Etudes et de Documentation
Economiques Industrielles et Sociales) he may
have helped more than any other man, through
innumerable meetings, round tables, and publi-
cations, to acquaint French elites both with
modern, particularly Anglo-American, economic
discussion and with the broader social im-
plications of economic policies. For years the
SEDEIS bulletin combined extremely close cov-
erage of economic events and trends with
longer-range or theoretical speculations. Later
these two orientations gave rise to two different
publications: the Chroniques SEDEIS, continu-
ing the running coverage of trends and events,
and Analyse et Prevision. The latter is the fruit
of still another pioneering initiative of Bertrand
de Jouvenel: the encouragement and, to a great
extent, the launching in France and in the West,
of future studies as an organized intellectual
enterprise. Jouvenel coined the term "futuribles"
which provided the title, first of a series of
studies published by the Bulletin SEDEIS, next
of an international association, and then of a
series of books, of which the most rigorous
methodologically is probably Jouvenel's own
L'art de la conjecture (1963-1965). His twin
preoccupatiops—with broadening the scope of
economics to the quality of life, and with posi-
tive Utopias and visions of the future—led to
Arcadie, based on essays written as early as
1957.
Jouvenel's last role has been that of the
academic. During the early postwar period he
was a frequent visiting professor, largely to Brit-
ish and American universities. In the 1960s, he
was appointed an associate professor at the
Faculty of Law and Economic Sciences of the
University of Paris, where he was given the
chair of social forecasting. He also taught the
history of political thought, however, and from
this teaching has emerged Les debuts de I'etat
moderne: Une histoire des idees politiques au
XIXe siecle (1976£>), which, in a way, returns
to the themes studied thirty years earlier in Du
pouvoir.
This alone would show that Jouvenel's intel-
lectual travels, if they have often carried him
away from well-charted roads, have been far
from rambling. What, then, is their logic and
what is his basic contribution?
First, as has been said of Charles de Gaulle,
Bertrand de Jouvenel is a man "d'avant-hier et
d'apres-demain," of the day before yesterday and
the day after tomorrow. Although he follows
and analyzes the present, his peculiar mark is to
see it in the light of the past and of the future.
Jouvenel's background, style of writing, and, to
some degree, themes point toward the past,
when the power of the state was more limited
and man's contact with nature more satisfying;
yet his best-known contribution, along with Du
pouvoir, may be the impulsion he gave to future
studies and his constant preoccupation with the
consequences of our present activities for the
future of our planet.
Second, his contradictions, while reflecting
different facets of his personality and different
phases of his life (emphasis on dynamism and
mobilization in his youth and on prudence and
procedure more recently) express above all the
contradictory or complementary features of re-
ality itself. One of Jouvenel's greatest contribu-
tions is his warning about the necessity for
countervailing measures to trends he considers
inevitable or to policies he favors. As an econo-
mist, he is for increasing salaries rather than
reducing prices, yet he warns against the
dangers of the inflationary society. He has
warned, successively, against insufficient and
excessive quantification. He thinks that growth
and the satisfaction of the consumer are the im-
peratives upon which our society is built, but that
they risk destroying both nature and individual
responsibility. He warns that politics cannot be
reduced to institutions, that power lies above all
in the initiative of men moving other men; but
this reality, in his eyes, justifies all the more
the advocacy of new institutions better able to
contain abuses of personal power from above
or the rise of personal power from below.
To Jouvenel, the theme of the development of
power is a guiding theme in his thinking. He
cites the development of the state as the theme
of Du pouvoir and the increase in the forces
used by human societies as the theme of La
civilisation de puissance.
For his political thought, the important point
is to recognize both the generality of the phe-
nomenon and the crucial theoretical and prac-
tical importance of distinguishing between its
various levels or dimensions. Du pouvoir is a

generalization of Alexis de Tocqueville's idea that
the French Revolution, rather than breaking the
absolutism of the state, further concentrated
power in the hands of the state—a work that the
French kings had undertaken and that would be
pushed even further by Napoleon. In this monu-
mental book, Jouvenel considers power as a
living being, whose growth he examines through
the ages, along with the justifications, revolu-
tionary or other, which have accompanied its
concentration. He shows how modernity does
away with the moral, legal, and social restraints
that traditional regimes put in the way of the
concentration of power. However, Jouvenel does
make a distinction—which he makes even
clearer in further works—between the growth in
the functions of the state, the growth in its
power over men, and the concentration of this
power in the hands of one man. This is why
twenty years later, in Du principal, one of his
most impressive essays, he insists that the
broader the scope of power, the more it must
be controlled, and the more inevitable the growth
of the executive at the expense of the legislative
and the judiciary, the more one must find,
within the executive itself, new checks and bal-
ances that can come only from the bureaucracy.
This would be embodied in what Jouvenel calls
"a new constitutionalism," a policy needed to
check the growth of personal power, given the
decline of traditional forms of representation.
The reason why this new constitutionalism
has not been forthcoming is the change in the
legitimation of power. Instead of being justified
by the way it is used, power, Jouvenel claims in
Du pouvoir and in De la souverainete, has been
justified in terms of its origins: popular sov-
ereignty or ideological orthodoxy are assumed
to legitimate any use of power. An even more
telling aspect of the decline in the notion of
the rule of law is what Jouvenel calls the change
from nomocracy (rule of law) to telocracy (rule
of goals). Modern governments are justified by
the expectations they fulfill or the goods they
deliver. This is what gives the state, which has
the initiative of planning for growth and wel-
fare, the edge over parliament and the judiciary,
which enunciate universal laws or are the
guardians of a permanent constitution.
Much of this change in the functions and
power of government is due to the change in the
nature of society. In this aspect of his analysis,
the unity of Jouvenel's thought, despite its ap-
parent dispersion, becomes apparent. Much of
JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE 361
it consists in drawing the consequences from
three characteristics of our societies: they are
complex, open, and moving. These tenets are
what renders unfeasible a Platonic republic; so-
cialism; a fascist or anarchist society based on
the model of the small community; and any con-
ception of the common good based on a blue-
print pretending to regulate the whole of so-
ciety. Moreover, any attempt to achieve perfect
justice through the redistribution of resources
or perfect community through common enthu-
siasm is conducive to tyranny. Only through the
just behavior of individuals, through the recon-
ciliation of initiative and procedure, of action
and negotiation, can progress toward freedom
and justice be hoped for.
An analogous duality between power and
moderation characterizes Jouvenel's thought on
economic and social matters. Here too, the basic
question is that of the human consequences and
the metaphysical implications of the technologi-
cal revolution. In La civilisation de puissance,
Jouvenel suggests calling our time "the era of
Watt," for of the three great events of the mid-
1770s—the invention of the steam engine by
James Watt in 1774, the publication of Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776, and the
American Declaration of Independence—the
most important is the first one. It signaled the
passage from biological to physical force as the
latter was harnessed to extend man's power
over nature and society. This increased enor-
mously man's ability to achieve goals he had
always desired, but it also led him to become a
prisoner of his own power rather than to use
technology and economic efficiency to achieve
consciously chosen aims for the improvement
of the quality of life.
This theme may not be Jouvenel's most origi-
nal. His peculiar contribution, beyond a general
critique of man's enslavement by his own ma-
chines, is fourfold. First is his great attention
to the role of the organization of labor, of re-
search and development, and, more generally,
of the conditions of efficiency in modern indus-
trial economies. Second is his insistance on the
sometimes voluntary, sometimes unconscious,
narrowing of the horizon implied by the very
methods that produce this efficiency. In particu-
lar, Jouvenel may have been the first to point
out the misleading aspects of the notion of gross
national product, which includes only quantifi-
able data and ignores whether they are produc-
tive or destructive; to criticize the monetary bias
362 JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE
of economic science and its ignorance of physi-
cal data; and to point out the necessity of in-
cluding political economy in a broadly conceived
political ecology.
Third, the latter preoccupation, which Jou-
venel expressed as far back as 1957, leads
substahtively to a concern with the deterioration
of man's environment, and tp a call to people
to become "gardeners of the earth." Finally, it
also leads to a call for conscious Utopias and to
the importance of alternative models of the
future, or "futuribles."
Jouvenel's two most abstract and general
books are Fututibles: L'art de la conjecture and
The Pure Theory of Politics. The unifying con-
cept of the two works is probably that of de-
cisions. What worries Jouvehel in both the
growth of the state and the growth of tech-
nology is the progressive constriction of the
area of choice for the individual. The only area
in which modern man exercises his choice is as
a consumer. But he cannot fulfill himself unless
he participates in social and political life as well.
And he cannot dp that unless he coordinates his
preferences and expectations with those of other
men.
This is why a preoccupation with the future
is so important. Society is a system of decisions;
the problem is to make these decisions compati-
ble with each other and thus to reconcile free-
dom, which means individuality, and predicta-
bility, which implies coordination. It is at this
point that Jouvenel's practical preoccupation
with making social, economic, and political de-
cisions as transparent as possible, and his
theoretical one, with showing the preinstitu-
tional bases of politics, coincide.
Jouvenel identifies the basic political phe-
nomenon, power, as "man moving man." But
there are two distinct sources of power of men
over men: what he calls "potestas," or power
based on institutional authority, and "potentia,"
or power based on interpersonal influence, And
there are two different styles and tasks of
power: that of moving or mobilizing, that of the
"dux," of the charismatic leader or that of the
team, and that of regulating or reconciling, that
of the "rex," the wise and benevolent judge, or
the committee.
Ever since his youth, Jouvenel has been sensi-
tive to the appeals and dangers of the former,
and his Pure Theory of Politics reads like a
prophetic message to established elites that
more dynamic and less controllable forces are
again afoot. Increasingly, however, his prefer-
ences go to those who define their task as main-
taining the fragile consensus on which liberal
institutions are based, as well as man's fragile
coexistence with his planet. But for both tasks,
a reawakening of personal responsibility and a
restoring of the affectionate respect of individ-
uals for each other, their institutions, and their
natural environment are the ultimate precon-
ditions of legitimacy.
PIERRE HASSNER
WORKS BY JOUVENEL
1928 L'economie dirigee: Le programme de la nouvelle
generation. Paris: Librairie Valois.
1930 Vers les Etats-Unis d'Europe. Paris: Librairie
Valois.
1931 Vie de Zola. Paris: Librairie Valois.
1933 La crise du capitalisme americain. Paris: Gal-
limard.
1938 Le reveil de VEurope. Paris: Gallimard.
1940-1941 D'une guerre a. I'autre. Paris: Calmann-
Levy. —> Volume 1: De Versailles a Locarno. Vol-
ume 2: Le decomposition de I'Europe liberale
(Octobre 1925-Janvier 1932).
1941 Apres la defaite. Paris: Plon.
1942 Napoleon et Veconomie dirigee: Le Blocus con-
tinental. Paris: La Toison d'Or.
1943 L'or au temps de Charles-Quint et de Philippe II.
Paris: SeqUana.
1944 L'economie mondiale au XXe siecle: Cours pro-
fesse a I'ecole superieure d'organisation profession-
nelle. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
1945 Du pouvoir: Histoire naturelle de sa croissance.
Geneva: Edition du Cheval aile.
1947a La derniere annee: Chases vues de Munich a
la guerre. Brussels: La Diffusion du Livre.
I947b Problemes de I'Angleterre socialiste ou I'echec
d'une experience. Paris: La Table Ronde.
1947c Raisons de craindre, raisons d'esperer, 2 vols.
Paris: Portulan. —» Volume 1: Quelle Europe"?
Volume 2: Les passions en marche.
1947d Rousseau, du contrat social: Precede d'un
essai sur la politique de Rousseau. Geneva:
Bourquin.
1948 L'Amerique en Europe: Le Plan Marshall et la
cooperation intercontinentale. Paris: Plon.
1951 The Ethics of Redistribution. Cambridge Univ.
Press.
(1955) 1963 Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into the Political
Good. Translated by J. F. Huntington. Univ. of
Chicago Press. —> First published in French.
1956 L'epargne. Paris; Les Editions de 1'Epargne.
1960 JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE (editor) Problemes
poses par la repartition de I'accroissement de la
productivite. Paris: Conseil Economique et Social.
1963-1965 JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE (editor) Futuri-
bles: Studies in Conjecture. 2 vols. Geneva: Droz.
—> The first volume was published in French in
1964.
(1963) 1977 The Pure Theory of Politics. Enl. & rev.
ed. Cambridge Univ. Press. —» Also published in
French in 1963 by Calmann-Levy.
1965 Rousseau: Discours sur Vorigine et les fonde-
ments de Vinegalite parmi les hommes. Paris:
Gallimard.
1966a Cours d'introduction d la sociologie politique.
Paris: Cours de Droit.

1966t» Le role de la prevision dans les affaires pub-
liques. Paris: Cours de Droit.
1966 JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE et al. Problemes eco-
nomiques de noire temps. Paris: Librairie Generate
de Droit et de Jurisprudence.
1967 Cours d'histoire des idees politiques a partir du
XIXe siecle. Paris: Cours de Droit.
1968 Arcadie: Essais sur le mieux-vivre. Paris: Societe
d'fitudes et de Documentation ficonomiques Indus-
trielles et Sociales.
JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE 363
1972 Du principal et autres reflexions politiques.
Paris: Hachette.
1976a La civilisation de puissance. Paris: Fayard.
1976i> Les debuts de I'etat moderne: Une histoire des
idees politiques au XJXe siecle. Paris: Fayard.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
PISIER, EVELYNE 1967 Autorite et liberte dans les
ecrits politiques de Bertrand de Jouvenel, Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
 KAHLER, ERICH
Erich Kahler (1885-1970) can be described
as a historian, a philosopher, a sociologist, and
a literary scholar. His work embraced all these
fields, and whether he wrote a historical anal-
ysis of the Prussian state or a literary analysis
on the changing form of the novel in the twen-
tieth century, he was always studying the role
of the phenomena at hand in the evolution of
humanity and of human consciousness. As a
philosopher of history, he deplored the com-
partmentalization and specialization of scholar-
ship in the twentieth century, and insisted that
the intellectual's role was to synthesize the re-
lationships between all facets of human experi-
ence.
Kahler's holistic and humanistic perspectives
are best reflected in Man the Measure (1943),
one of his major studies in the philosophy of
history. In it, he surveys the development of the
Western world, a development he sees as "rep-
resentative of human evolution as a whole"
([1943] 1967, pp. 24-25). In the course of this
survey, he attempted to define what is specifically
human about human beings, to uncover the
roots of the crisis he saw facing the world in
1943, and to use the knowledge so derived for
creating the future of man.
Kahler defined man's exclusively human qual-
ity as the "faculty of going beyond himself, of
transcending the limits of his own physical
being" (ibid., p. 11). The transcending process
involves two major acts:
the establishment of these limits by detaching and
discerning a non-self from a self, and the establish-
ment of a new and conscious relationship with the
clearly conceived non-self by transcending self
toward the non-self.
History as the evolution of the human quality,
then, is the successive development of these two
acts or faculties of man. In its early periods, human
history is mainly the formation of the faculty of
detaching and discerning. The later part of human
history is the genesis and perfection of the quality
of transcending, (ibid., pp. 18-19)
In this perspective, human history breaks down
into three major phases. In the first period,
which reaches from man's primitive state to the
end of antiquity, man completes the separation
of the inner and outer worlds. In so doing, he
leaves behind both his unity with the physical
universe and his membership in what Kahler
called the "pre-individual" community of tribe
and species. As a fully formed human individ-
ual, man enters the second evolutionary phase,
extending from the end of antiquity to the
Renaissance, in which the intellect is completely
liberated and the human individual completely
freed from superhuman rule. The third phase,
the modern era, is characterized by man's strug-
gle toward a collective order, a "post-individual
community," and toward "reintegration in a
clearly conceived universe" (ibid., p. 21).
Under the impact of capitalism and capitalis-
tic means of production, the development of
modern man has been toward ever greater col-
lectivization and loss of individuality. Paradox-
ically, the human being no sooner reached the
height of his individuality at the end of the
Renaissance than he was forced to collectivize,
economically and politically, to protect that in-
365
 366 KALDOR, NICHOLAS
dividuality. The result—and a major cause for
the crises of the twentieth century—was the
formation of "private collectives," which pit in-
terest groups against each other and are gov-
erned by things for the welfare of things.
Kahler called instead for "public collectives"
governed by man for the welfare of man.
The intellectual's job is a revolutionary one.
He must determine what the future demands
and help to bring it about. "We cannot go back,
we can only go forward; historical processes
are irreversible. We cannot preserve, we can
only conquer, and, in the face of change, re-
conquer what is worth preserving, thereby mak-
ing it new" (1969, p. 13). The idea of revitaliz-
ing what is worth preserving is crucial, for in
Kahler's view of history nothing is ever left be-
hind. History is neither linear nor cyclical; it
proceeds like a spiral, expanding and advancing
yet also circling back on itself. Kahler's alle-
giance to the guiding ideas of the classical and
Judeo—Christian traditions was deep and abid-
ing, but his conception of the ideas of universal
peace, justice, democracy, and brotherhood of
man was not static or absolute. These ideas al-
ways had to be "made new." In The True, the
Good, and the Beautiful (1960), he wrote that
"there is a certain constancy of basic values
which, at a certain point of maturity, emerged
into human consciousness, and subsequently,
in the process of history, blended with changing
forms according to changing circumstances"
(1960, p. 11).
Given Kahler's background and education, it
is not surprising that these ideas were part of
his very nature and that his work represents a
lifelong effort to realize them in thought and
action. The son of a Prague industrialist,
Kahler grew up in intellectual and artistic circles.
He studied in Vienna, Berlin, Munich, and
Heidelberg, receiving his doctorate from the
University of Vienna in 1910. During his resi-
dence in Germany from 1912 to 1933 he was
in touch with the Max Weber circle and was a
close friend of Friedrich Gundolf. Later, in his
emigrant years in Switzerland and the United
States, he formed close friendships with Thomas
Mann, and especially, with Hermann Broch.
Broch and Kahler shared both a strong moral
impulse and a "striving toward unity" that has
been attributed to the Judaic tradition.
Humanity's need for unity in its thinking and
institutions pervaded Kahler's life and work.
Man has to understand himself, his past, and
his present as a whole if he is to shape his
future in a humane way. The "public" and "post-
individual" collective that Kahler projected for
this future would have to be a product of all the
intellectual disciplines working together and
would have to be based on the idea of man as a
constantly evolving, historically created entity.
ROBERT KIMBER
WORKS BY KAHLER
1903 Syrinx. Leipzig-Reudnitz (Germany): Hegner.
1905 Die Briicke der Iris. Berlin: Schuster & Loeffler.
1911 Uber Recht und Moral. Brno (Czechoslovakia):
Self-publication. —> Kahler's dissertation, written at
the University of Vienna from 1908-1910.
1916 Weltgesicht und Politik. Heidelberg (Germany):
Weiss.
1919 Das Geschlecht Habsburg. Munich: Verlag Der
neue Merkur.
1920 Der Beruf der Wissenschaft. Berlin: Bondi.
—» A response to Max Weber's Wissenschaft als
Beruf.
1936 Israel unter den Volkern. Zurich: Humanitas
Verlag.
1937 Der deutsche Charakter in der Geschichte
Europas. Zurich: Europa Verlag.
1943 Man the Measure: A New Approach to History.
New York: Pantheon. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1967 by Meridian.
1952 Die Verantwortung des Geistes: Gesammelte
Aufsatze. Frankfort (Germany): S. Fischer.
1957 The Tower and the Abyss: An Inquiry Into the
Transformation of the Individual. New York:
Braziller.
1960 The True, the Good, and the Beautiful. Colum-
bus: Ohio State Univ. Press. —» First presented as
a lecture at Ohio State University on December 10,
1959.
1962 Die Philosophic von Hermann Broch. Tubingen
( Germ any ) : Mohr.
1964 The Meaning of History. New York: Braziller.
1967a The Jews Among the Nations. New York:
Ungar.
19G7b Out of the Labyrinth: Essays in Clarification.
New York: Braziller.
1968 The Disintegration of Form in the Arts. New
York: Braziller.
1969 The Orbit of Thomas Mann. Princeton Univ.
Press.
1970 Untergang und Ubergang: Essays. Munich:
Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag.
1973 The Inward Turn of Narrative. Translated by
Richard and Clara Winston. Princeton Univ. Press.
—» Translation of a revised version of "Die Verin-
nerung des Erzahlens," which first appeared in the
Neue Rundschau in 1957 and 1959.
1974 The Germans. Edited by Robert and Rita Kimber.
Princeton Univ. Press.
1975 An Exceptional Friendship: The Correspondence
of Thomas Mann and Erich Kahler. Translated by
Richard and Clara Winston. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Univ. Press.
KALDOR, NICHOLAS
Nicholas Kaldor is probably one of the most
original and provocative theoretical economists
of the twentieth century, as well as one of the
most radical advisers on taxation policies to

many governments. His contributions to eco-
nomic theory range over a wide field: from the
theory of the firm to welfare economics, from
capital theory, international trade, and tariff
policy to trade cycle and economic growth theory
and monetary and taxation policy. But he prob-
ably will be most remembered for his theory of
income distribution and his advocacy of an "ex-
penditure tax."
Nicholas Kaldor was born in Budapest, the
son of a barrister, on May 12, 1908. His parents,
Dr. Julius and Joan Kaldor, very much wel-
comed this son, as two elder sons had died in
infancy. They brought him up in a relatively
well-to-do Jewish family in one of the major
capitals of central European culture during the
splendid last stage of the Austro-Hungarian
empire. This privileged childhood affected Kal-
dor's attitudes throughout his life and may help
explain his exuberant, egocentric, and undisci-
plined character. In 1934, Kaldor married Cla-
rissa Goldschmidt, who graduated in history
from Sommerville College, Oxford. They had
four daughters.
Kaldor's education was elitist in nature. He
attended the famous "Model Gimnasium" in
Budapest (from 1918 to 1924). Then, in 1925/
1926, he attended lectures at the University of
Berlin, but soon moved to London. In 1927-
1930, he was at the London School of Economics
(L.S.E.), where he graduated with a brilliant
record in 1930. In those years the chair of eco-
nomics was occupied by Allyn Young, an Amer-
ican from Harvard University, who had a great
influence on Kaldor. Young died in the winter
of 1928/1929 and his place was taken by the
active, flamboyant Lionel Robbins, well known
for his efforts to build up contacts with conti-
nental Europe, especially with the Viennese
circle of Ludwig von Mises.
In the very early 1930s, the L.S.E. teaching
staff was joined by the Austrian Friedrich A.
von Hayek. These surroundings could not help
but to enhance Kaldor's career. He returned, for
short periods, to Budapest, where he met and
became a friend of John von Neumann. In
1932, he was appointed to an assistant lecturer-
ship at the L.S.E. Among his colleagues were
J. R. Hicks and Tibor Scitovsky. He remained at
L.S.E., as a lecturer, and then as a reader of
economics, until 1947.
The early L.S.E. years were for Kaldor a
period of strict orthodoxy in the marginal eco-
nomics tradition. His 1930s writings are on the
problems that were under discussion at the time
—mainly the theories of imperfect and monop-
KALDOR, NICHOLAS 367
olistic competition and the theory of capital.
They immediately revealed distinct originality.
It was Kaldor (1933) who gave the name "cob-
web theorem" to the theorem, by now well
known, concerning the conditions of market
stability in terms of relative elasticities of de-
mand and supply. Later, he proposed (1939) a
"compensation of the loser's test," in the hypo-
thetical event of personal income redistribution;
it has since become known as "Kaldor's compen-
sation test" in the literature on welfare economics.
The crucial turning point came with the pub-
lication of Keynes's General Theory (1936). Kal-
dor's reaction was slow, but it went very deep.
It materialized at first in a change of interest,
mainly from micro- to macroeconomic problems,
then as a complete and radical change in think-
ing on all of economic theory. He first wrote a
series of articles on macroeconomic problems,
the most remarkable of which is "A Model of the
Trade Cycle" (1940), that relies on nonlinear
investment and savings functions to produce
"limit cycles." The idea turned out to be very
fruitful and was further developed by Hicks
(1950) and Goodwin (1951). Later, the break
with tradition became wider, and a parting with
the L.S.E.—the major center of opposition to
Cambridge University—was finally inevitable.
Kaldor had definitely moved "into the opposite
(Cambridge) camp."
Kaldor's contacts with Cambridge had begun
in 1940, when the L.S.E. had moved there physi-
cally because of the war. But the favorable op-
portunity arose only after World War n. Kaldor
spent two years in Geneva as a director of re-
search at the Economic Commission for Europe,
and had to leave the L.S.E. On his return to
academic life in 1949, he joined the eco-
nomics faculty of Cambridge University, where
he was appointed a fellow of King's College
(Keynes's own college). He then became a
reader of economics and, in 1966, a professor
of economics, a position he held until his re-
tirement in 1975. During this period he also be-
came economic and taxation adviser to an
extremely large number of governments (India,
Ceylon, Mexico, Ghana, British Guyana, Turkey,
Iran, Venezuela), to some central banks, and to
the Economic Commission for Latin America.
But, most important was his position as special
adviser to the chancellor of the exchequer of
the British Labour governments during the
eventful years 1964-1968 and 1974-1976. He
was elevated to the House of Lords as a life
peer in 1974, when he took the name Baron
Kaldor of Newnham in the City of Cambridge.
 368 KALDOR, NICHOLAS
At Cambridge, Kaldor did most of his mature
work. He was one of the major authors—along
with Richard Kahn, Joan Robinson, and Piero
Sraffa—of what has become known as the post-
Keynesian school of economic theory (see Eich-
ner & Kregel 1975). Kaldor's original contri-
butions, which are numerous, can be found in a
series of polemical papers and in his three ver-
sions of a model of economic growth (1957;
1961; Kaldor & Mirrlees 1962). His major origi-
nal contribution, however, is in a 1956 article,
in which he proposes a "Keynesian" theory of
income distribution. The theory is in fact dis-
tinctly Kaldor's, and has correctly been so-called
since.
Kaldor's theory of income distribution is based
on the idea that profit receivers have a much
higher propensity to save than wage earners.
Therefore, in an economic system in which entre-
preneurs carry out investments that correspond
to full employment, there exists a distribution
of income between profits and wages that—ow-
ing to the differentiated propensities to save—
will generate precisely that share of profits
into national income that is necessary to sustain
the predetermined investments. This macroeco-
nomic theoretical conception of income distri-
bution is reminiscent of David Ricardo's. But
Kaldor reverses Ricardo's chain of causation.
For Ricardo, wages were the exogenous magni-
tude (determined by the sheer necessity of
workers' subsistence), and profits were a resid-
ual, or rather a "surplus." For Kaldor, profits
take up the character of an exogenous magni-
tude (determined by the necessity of capital
accumulation), while wages become a residual.
The consequences are far reaching, both on a
theoretical level—for a critique of the marginal
theory of income distribution—and also on a
practical level, because of its implications for
taxation policy. It can be no surprise that Kal-
dor's theory was immediately the target of bitter
attacks. There is by now an enormous literature
on the subject, which developed further after
the publication of a related' article by Pasinetti
(1962), concerning a long-run theory of the rate
of profit.
Along lines parallel to those on income distri-
bution, Kaldor developed his idea of an "ex-
penditure tax," proposed in a book (1955), which
has become a classic and has served as the basis
for other major works on the subject (for ex-
ample, Meade et al. 1978). Kaldor points out
that the present tax system, based on personal
income, is inequitable in many respects. People
who inherit private fortunes have enormous
spending power without contributing to the
state's needs. On the other hand, thrifty people
are taxed twice—once on the income they save
and a second time on the income they derive
from accumulated savings. Kaldor proposes a
radical change in the system so that people
would be taxed not on their incomes but on their
actual expenditures.
In the latter part of his life, Kaldor was in-
creasingly involved in British politics. His posi-
tion as special adviser to the chancellor of the
exchequer brought him into contact with practi-
cally the entire economic policy of the Labour
government. He was surprisingly successful in
this capacity, especially on matters concerning
taxation. He devised ways to reform in detail
British tax policies—to detect loopholes and
eliminate them. He also invented new taxes,
such as the selective employment tax.
Not surprisingly, this activity made Kaldor
unpopular with the British establishment, but
he did not mind. He was firmly convinced of the
inequitable and unjust distribution of income
prevailing in capitalist societies, and he wanted
to have the rich pay more and the poor less.
Being in the fortunate position of belonging to a
family with considerable private means, he was
often hit, sometimes rather badly, by the very
taxes that he had helped to devise.
Kaldor took a keen interest in the economic
problems of less developed countries. He wrote
at length on economic development, as well as
on the reform of the international monetary
system.
His involvement with practical economic
policy led him, in the late 1960s, to look more
and more at empirically observed correlations
among economic phenomena, trying to discover
theoretical hypotheses that might explain them.
His inaugural lecture (1966) is an example of
this effort. But he also attempted a new theoret-
ical construction based on the idea that the
"Keynesian" features of an economy apply only
to its industrial sector, which enjoys increasing
returns to scale, while alongside that sector,
another sector, the primary sector, which pro-
vides food and raw materials, operates with
"non-Keynesian" features and decreasing re-
turns. These ideas are clearly reminiscent of
Allyn Young's, whose lifelong influence is ex-
plicitly brought out, especially in Kaldor's 1975
article.
As will appear, even from this brief survey,
Kaldor's original ideas are numerous. They are

scattered in a remarkably large number of arti-
cles, papers, notes, memoranda, and reports. For-
tunately, at the end of his career, Kaldor was
persuaded to .collect his writings into a series of
eight volumes (1960-1979). To read these
books is extremely rewarding for any economist.
Unexpected clever insights, unorthodox re-
marks, original ideas are disseminated every-
where, even in the most "applied" writings; they
will remain a rich source of ideas for years to
N
come.
Kaldor's attitude was much like that of such
great economists as Ricardo and Keynes. He
was an innovator in economic theory, with his
mind always intent on concrete situations and
actual applications. Like Ricardo and Keynes,
he was not a revolutionary. But he was a great
believer in reforms. He believed in the possi-
bility of even single persons to modify situations
and influence events. And he actually did influ-
ence events, or acted always as if he had a deep
conviction that he did and could.
LUIGI L. PASINETTI
WORKS BY KALDOR
1934 A Classificatory Note on the Determinateness of
Equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies 1:122-
136. -> Reprinted in Kaldor 1960-1979, volume 1,
pages 13-33.
1939 Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-
personal Comparisons of Utility. Economic Journal
49:549-554. -» Reprinted in Kaldor 1960-1979,
volume 1, pages 143-146, with the title "Welfare
Propositions in Economics."
1940 A Model of the Trade Cycle. Economic Journal
50:78-92. —» Reprinted in Kaldor 1960-1979, vol-
ume 2, pages 177-192.
(1955) 1965 An Expenditure Tax. London: Allen &
Unwin.
1956 Alternative Theories of Distribution. Review of
Economic Studies 22:83-100. —> Reprinted in Kal-
dor 1960-1979, volume 1, pages 209-236.
1957 A Model of Economic Growth. Economic Journal
67:591-624. -» Reprinted in Kaldor 1960-1979,
volume 2, pages 259-300.
1960-1979 Collected Economic Essays. 8 volumes.
London: Duckworth. —* Volume 1: Essays on Value
and Distribution, 1960. Volume 2: Essays on Eco- 1933, Kalecki had already discovered the basic
nomic Stability and Growth, 1960. Volume 3: Es- components of Keynes's analytical system. He
says on Economic Policy, I, 1964. Volume 4: Essays avoided the distinction between macro- and
on Economic Policy, II, 1964. Volume 5: Further
Essays on Economic Theory, 1978. Volume 6:
Further Essays on Applied Economics, 1978. Vol- macroeconomic model on the basis of a more
ume 7: Reports on Taxation, I: Papers Relating to
the United Kingdom, 1979. Volume 8: Reports on realistic theory of the firm that incorporated
Taxation, II: Reports to Foreign Governments, 1979. imperfect competition and income distribution
1961 Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth.
Pages 177-222 in Douglas C. Hague and Friedrich
Lutz (editors), The Theory of Capital. London:
Macmillan. —» Reprinted in Kaldor 1960-1979,
volume 5, pages 1-53.
1962 KALDOR, NICHOLAS; and MIRRLEES, J. A. A New
Model of Economic Growth. Review of Economic
Studies 29:174-192. -> Reprinted in Kaldor 1960-
1979, volume 5, pages 54-80.
KALECKI, MICHAL 369
1966 Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth of
the United Kingdom. Cambridge Univ. Press. —> Re-
printed in Kaldor 1960-1979, volume 5, pages
100-138.
1975 What is Wrong With Economic Theory. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 89:347-357. —> Re-
printed in Kaldor 1960-1979, volume 5, pages
202-213.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
EICHNER, ALFRED S.; and KREGEL, J. A. 1975 An
Essay on Post-Keynesian Theory: A New Paradigm
in Economics. Journal of Economic Literature 13:
1293-1314.
GOODWIN, RICHARD M. 1951 The Nonlinear Ac-
celerator and the Persistence of Business Cycles.
Econometrica 19:1—17.
HICKS, J. R. 1950 A Contribution to the Theory of
the Trade Cycle. Oxford: Clarendon.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —> A paperback edition was published in
1965 by Harcourt.
MEADE, JAMES E. et al. 1978 The Structure and Re-
form of Direct Taxation: Report of a Committee
Chaired by James E. Meade. London: Allen & Un-
win.
PASINETTI, LUIGI L. 1962 Rate of Profit and Income
Distribution in Relation to the Rate of Economic
Growth. Review of Economic Studies 29:267-279.
KALECKI, MICHAL
Michat Kalecki (1899-1970) earned an im-
portant place in the history of economic analysis
by his anticipation of the Keynesian revolution
and by his original contributions to the theory
of economic dynamics. His ideas (even if some-
times not directly identified with him) have had
a lasting imprint on diverse branches of modern
economics. His theory of dynamics and fluctu-
ations of national income and its partition be-
tween profits and wages is more general than
the Keynesian system and more relevant to the
contemporary scene.
John Maynard Keynes's epoch making Gen-
eral Theory was published in 1936. But, in
microeconomic theories. He constructed his
as integral parts of his analysis. He elucidated
the dynamic properties of the economic process
and dealt with an open economy. His model
provides a starting point for understanding the
contemporary problem of simultaneous occur-
rence of inflation and recession.
Kalecki studied engineering at Warsaw Poly-
370 KALECKI, MICHAL
technic and at Gdansk Polytechnic, but never
received his degree. In economics, he was self-
taught. He worked independently and outside
the mainstream of economic theory. His pre-
1936 writings were mainly in Polish and those
in English and French were highly technical.
Soon after the publication of the General
Theory, Kalecki visited Cambridge University
and met Keynes and his group. Although Ka-
lecki had informed Keynes's younger colleagues
of his own prior publication, he never men-
tioned it to Keynes. In fact, Kalecki's precedence
was publicly acknowledged only after Keynes's
death.
Kalecki's contributions are of particular im-
portance because of modern assaults on the
Keynesian revolution. They include:
(1) The model of perfect competition used
by Keynes was foreign to Kalecki, who dealt
with imperfect competition and oligopoly. Ka-
lecki's macro model in this respect has a more
useful microeconomic account. To build a rea-
listic theory, Kalecki explained how industrial
prices are formed by markups on costs and dis-
tinguished between "cost-determined" and "de-
mand-determined" prices. The markups depend
on the relative strength of market imperfection
and oligopoly, which he termed the "degree of
monopoly." The intensity of the "degree of mo-
nopoly," together with other distributional fac-
tors, is a key for the determination of macro-
distribution. The distributional factors are
essentially pertinent to effective demand and to
fluctuations in aggregate output and utilization
of resources.
(2) Kalecki's theory of profits was based on
the principle that wage earners do not save, but
spend what they get, and that entrepreneurs get
what they spend. Thus entrepreneurs' profits
are governed by their propensity to invest and
consume and not the other way round. Kalecki's
treatment of the consumption function is at-
tractive because his analysis is based on be-
havior patterns of classes rather than on a
"fundamental psychological law."
(3) Kalecki's model not only described a
wide range of economic phenomena, but it pre-
sented the economic process in motion—i.e.,
how one sequence develops from the preceding
ones. The model encompassed long-run dy-
namics and. the capacity effects of investments
and some other supply considerations.
(4) Kalecki did not approach the theory of
effective demand through the multiplier, but
through the theory of the business cycle, which
established two basic relations: (a) the impact
of effective demand generated by investment on
profits and national income and (b) the invest-
ment decision function, where the rate of in-
vestment decisions at a given time is roughly
determined by the level and the rate of change
in economic activity at some earlier time.
Kalecki's model is distinguished by his clear
separation between investment decision and ac-
tual implementation. He used the investment
realization lag to explain the cumulative char-
acter of expansionary and contractionary
processes.
According to Kalecki, if the current rate of
investment surpasses that of the preceding
period, the level of current profit will rise, profit
expectations will improve, investment demand
will increase, and more orders will be placed.
This will be followed by an increased rate of
investment activity and enlarged income. The
income generating capacity of investment is the
source of prosperity and encourages a further
rise in investment. But investment has also a
capacity creating effect; every completed invest-
ment adds to productive capacity, competes with
the stock of equipment of older vintage, and
discourages further investment. Sooner or later
investment stops rising and so does the level of
current profit. The rate of profit falls. The rise
in investment is transitory and the boom cannot
endure. A process of cumulative contraction
takes place. Thus the growth of national wealth
contains the seeds of retardation.
Kalecki modified, reformulated, and improved
his business cycle model many times, seeking to
bring it closer to reality. While his earlier writ-
ings were clearly influenced by the severity of
the depression of the 1930s, his subsequent de-
velopment of the argument made allowances for
the relatively weak impact of the capital destruc-
tion effect. He introduced a certain "corrective"—
a trend factor that shifts investment upward as
the cycle continues. In a growing economy in-
vestment fluctuates along the long-run trend
line. Innovations raise the prospects for profit,
thus stimulating investment and engendering
an ascending trend. Innovation becomes an-
other weighty factor in the determination of the
investment function, together with the change
in the rate of profit, the rate of change in the
stock of capital, and the "internal" gross savings
(depreciation and undistributed profits) of firms.
In recasting the argument Kalecki continued
his search for a more satisfactory formulation
of the investment function, allowing for reper-

cussions of technical progress on the dynamic
process as a whole. He sought to develop a
theory integrating growth and cyclical processes.
While he never reached a fully satisfactory so-
lution, the investment function he initially pro-
pounded, and his analysis of the capital stock
adjustment mechanism, provided the basis for
modern business cycle theory and closely fore-
shadowed many contemporary developments in
econometrics.
(5) To Kalecki the key prerequisite for be-
coming an entrepreneur was the ownership of
capital which determined the amount of outside
finance that could be secured. Moreover, entre-
preneurs tend to be unwilling to use their full
borrowing potential because the risk increases
with the amount invested. In the case of a bad
investment, the higher the ratio of borrowing to
the entrepreneur's own capital, the greater is
the decrease of the entrepreneur's income or the
risk of wiping out his equity. These considera-
tions cannot be ignored in the theory of invest-
ment decisions and in the analysis of factors
circumscribing the size of the firm. Such de-
cisions are related to the firm's "internal" ac-
cumulation of gross savings. These savings allow
the firm to make new investments without fac-
ing the problems of the limited capital market,
or "increasing risk."
(6) Kalecki dealt with an open system. He
treated the rate of export surplus as a promoter
of prosperity and the balance-of-payments diffi-
culties that tend to accompany an upswing as
a factor limiting expansion.
( 7 ) Whatever the rationale of the economics
of full employment, the political problems are
formidable. Kalecki realized that full-employ-
ment policies could be used to reform the capi-
talist system toward beneficial welfare-oriented
growth, whose fruits would be directed to the
advancement of living standards of the lower in-
come groups. He saw the opportunity, but was
mindful of the grave political problems and, in
1943, predicted the emergence of the political
business cycle. He argued that opposition by the
"leaders of industry" to full employment stimu-
lated by government spending may be expected
because of the inherent fear of government in-
terference (especially opposition to deficit spend-
ing), opposition to the objects of government
spending (particularly to public investments
and the subsidizing of consumption), fear of
inflationary pressures, opposition to sustained
full employment (as against mere prevention of
deep depressions), and the dislike of the social
KALECKI, MICHAL 371
and economic changes resulting from the main-
tenance of full employment (including laxity of
workers' discipline). He felt that business cycles
in milder form would continue and result in a
sort of stop-go economy. The government would
stimulate business activity, then in the upswing
it would withdraw under the clamor of an "un-
sound" financial situation (and even undertake
deflationary policies near the peak) only to re-
emerge as a stimulating agent when unemploy-
ment again rose above an "acceptable level."
Because of his silence about his priority of
publication and, in general, his distaste for
"promoting" or "advertising" his ideas, Kalecki
has always been regarded as a very modest man.
But he was totally free of false modesty. He was
a stern moralist whose sense of rectitude, forth-
rightness, and integrity permeated his personal
and intellectual life. While in personal dealings
he was careful not to offend, in economics he
was stubborn and merciless when discussing his
economic theories. His ready wit could be de-
structive, thereby antagonizing many who were
offended by his polemics. He courted contro-
versy and was well known for courageously
voicing unpopular views.
On the surface Kalecki's economic writings
were dispassionate exercises in economic anal-
yses of a highly technical nature. All of his
major contributions, however, have their social
and ethical underpinnings. The main concerns
of his life's work were full employment, its com-
position and distributional equity. He was not
impressed with huge sacrifices made by the
present generation for future ones. He was out-
raged at high employment contrived by means
of armaments buildup. He was disturbed by the
blunders of socialist planners at the cost of
the worker-consumer.
Kalecki spent the war years at the Oxford
Institute of Statistics, where he developed the
subtle device of general (expenditure) rationing
to expand the range of economic choice under
the trying conditions of a war economy. His
proposal was designed to allow the consumer
the widest possible choice under restrictive con-
ditions; it would divert real resources from
consumption to the war effort while keeping
down inflationary pressures and reducing in-
equalities of distribution. In addition to his work
on the war economy, he produced during this
period a number of papers including a major
essay on ways to full employment, modified the
Gibrat distribution, and pursued his theoretical
work on economic dynamics.
 372 KATZ, DANIEL
Until his return to Poland in 1955 he was an
international civil servant mainly at the UN.
During the remaining years of his life he served
as economic adviser, preparing what is probably
the most exemplary perspective plan (1961-
1975) ever devised for a socialist economy. This
plan, like the other constructive alternative
plans suggested by Kalecki in later years, was
rejected by the Polish leadership. At the same
time he pursued an active career as teacher and
researcher. He laid the foundations for a theory
of growth under central planning, contributed
to advances in planning methodology and in-
vestment and foreign trade efficiency calcula-
tions, wrote about the Third World, and ad-
vanced his theory of modern capitalism. He also
resumed his interest in pure mathematics and
made a significant contribution to the theory of
numbers.
Despite many disappointments, until 1968
Kalecki led a relatively happy life, sustained by
the general esteem of colleagues and students.
He died on April 17, 1970, a deeply saddened
man whose pessimistic views of humanity and
its frailties were reinforced by the 1968 wave of
repression in Poland and the cowardly behavior
of many of his colleagues. It is unfortunate that
the life of so productive a man should have been
plagued by so many crises and bitter disappoint-
ments. He simply would not compromise his
principles, and looking back over his troubled
years, Kalecki observed that his life could be
compressed into a series of resignations in pro-
test—against tyranny, prejudice, and oppression.
GEORGE R. FEIWEL
WORKS BY KALECKI
(1933) 1966 Studies in the Theory of Business Cycles:
1933-1939. Oxford: Blackwell. -» Contains an in-
troduction by Joan Robinson. First published as
Proba teorji konjunktury.
1935a Essai d'une theorie du mouvement cyclique des
affaires. Revue d'Economie Politique 2:285—305.
1935i> A Macrodynamic Theory of Business Cycles.
Econometrica 3:327-344.
(1939) 1972 Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluc-
tuations. New York: Russell.
1943a Political Aspects of Full Employment. Political
Quarterly 4:322-331.
1943b Studies in Economic Dynamics. London: Allen
& Unwin.
(1944) 1967 Three Ways to Full Employment. Pages
39-58 in Institute of Economics and Statistics, The
Economics of Full Employment: Six Studies in
Applied Economics, Prepared at the Oxford Uni-
versity Institute of Statistics. New York: Kelley.
1945 On the Gibrat Distribution. Econometrica 13:
161-170.
(1954) 1965 Theory of Economics Dynamics: An Es-
say on Cyclical and Long-run Changes in Capitalist
Economy. 2d rev. ed. London: Allen & Unwin.
(1963) 1974 Zarys teorii wzrostu gospodarki socjalis-
tycznej. 3d ed. Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo
Naukowe. —» A translation was published in 1969
by Blackwell with the title Introduction to the
Theory of Growth in a Socialist Economy.
1968 Trend and Business Cycles Reconsidered. Eco-
nomic Journal 78:263-276.
1971 Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capital-
ist Economy: 1933-1970. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1972 Selected Essays on the Economic Growth of the
Socialist and the Mixed Economy. Cambridge Univ.
Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Another Keynes. 1976 Economist June 26:87 only.
DOBB, MAURICE 1974 Theories of Value and Distri-
bution Since Adam Smith. Cambridge Univ. Press.
FEIWEL, GEORGE R. 1975 The Intellectual Capital of
Michal Kalecki: A Study in Economical Theory and
Policy. Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press. —>
Contains an introduction by Lawrence R. Klein, a
comprehensive bibliography of Kalecki's works on
pages 527—554, and a general bibliography of re-
lated works on pp. 555-574.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —* A paperback edition was published in
1965 by Harcourt.
KLEIN, LAWRENCE R. 1951 Review of The Life of
John Maynard Keynes. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 59:443-451.
KLEIN, LAWRENCE R. (1948) 1966 The Keynesian
Revolution. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan.
KLEIN, LAWRENCE R. (1964) 1966 The Role of Econo-
metrics in Socialist Economics. Pages 181—191 in
Problems of Economic Dynamics and Planning:
Essays in Honour of Michal Kalecki. Oxford and
New York: Pergamon.
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 1976 39:
Whole no. 1. —» Contains eight separate articles and
a bibliography.
ROBINSON, JOAN (1964) 1966 Kalecki and Keynes.
Pages 335-341 in Problems of Economic Dynamics
and Planning: Essays in Honour of Michal Kalecki.
Oxford and New York: Pergamon.
ROBINSON, JOAN 1976 Michal Kalecki: A Neglected
Prophet. New York Review of Books 23, no. 3:28-30.
SOLOW, ROBERT 1975 Review of The Intellectual
Capital of Michal Kalecki. Journal of Economic Lit-
erature 13:1331-1335.
WORSWICK, G. D. N. 1976 Review of The Intellec-
tual Capital of Michal Kalecki. Challenge 18,
no. 5:48-49.
KATZ, DANIEL
The career of Daniel Katz spans the develop-
ment of social psychology as an empirical disci-
pline, and his work has been of major impor-
tance in that development. He was among the
earliest users of survey methods to study social
psychological problems, and he improved the
methods with which he worked. His early
studies of racial stereotypes illuminated the
nature of prejudice as his later research clarified
the different forms of nationalism. His theoret-

ical work on attitude formation and change has
provided a framework for relating methods of
change to the different motivational bases of
attitudes. His work on formal organizations has
brought to social psychology a level of phenom-
ena typically neglected by psychologists. One of
the unifying characteristics of his varied work
is a concern for the interplay of social structure
and social process, the explanation of human
behavior in terms of the structure of events in
which it occurs. This emphasis reflects the
theoretical views of Katz's influential teacher,
Floyd H. Allport, and is explicit in Katz's own
development of open-system theory.
Daniel Katz was born in Trenton, New Jersey,
on July 19, 1903. The family later moved to
Buffalo, New York, and Katz graduated from the
University of Buffalo in 1925. His first published
research dates from this undergraduate period;
it is a study of the acculturation of Polish im-
migrants and their children (Katz & Carpenter
1927). Katz conducted this research jointly with
Niles Carpenter, chairman of the sociology de-
partment, who had studied at Harvard Univer-
sity and was committed to empirical research in
a field still predominantly social—philosophical.
The findings of this intergenerational study
show a complex familial pattern: the Polish-
born parents retained their stereotypic values
and attitudes about parental authority, but their
American-born children were more expert about
the new society. The children acted on their ex-
pertise, and the parents adjusted to their doing
so, accepting in pragmatic terms what they
could not acknowledge ideologically. Apart from
being an undergraduate publication, the work is
of interest in forecasting several of Katz's en-
during research concerns: the quantitative
measurement of values and attitudes, the ex-
planation of group differences in terms of dif-
fering external influences, and the conduct of
social research in real-life settings.
In 1925 Katz went from Buffalo to Syracuse
University to start his doctoral work on a fel-
lowship that the chancellor of the University of
Buffalo had helped to arrange. Syracuse was in
many ways a fortunate choice. Floyd H. Allport
had moved there a year earlier to take a chair
in the university's new social science enterprise,
the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs. Allport's pioneering Social Psy-
chology had been published that year, and he
was already launched on a lifelong effort in the
theoretical integration of individual and social
phenomena. Katz committed himself to social
KATZ, DANIEL 373
psychology and became Allport's first doctoral
student at Syracuse. His dissertation, published
jointly with Allport under the title Students' At-
titudes: A Report of the Syracuse University Re-
action Study (1931), was a quantitative de-
scription of the student culture of that university
and its several component subcultures.
On completion of his doctorate in 1928, Katz
moved to Princeton University, where he re-
mained for 15 years. His publications during
those years range widely in psychology and so-
cial psychology—experiments on eye movement
and the Phi phenomenon, reviews of psychology
for annual volumes of the Britannica, and ar-
ticles on aesthetics and epistemology in the
social sciences. His work on attitudes and on
attitude measurement, especially by means of
survey methods, continued during these years,
and he became recognized as a survey method-
ologist.
The best known work of his Princeton years
may well be the experiments on racial prejudices
and racial stereotypes he conducted with Ken-
neth W. Braly (1935). The authors showed that
students agreed among themselves in their
preferential ranking of ethnic groups, that their
attribution of characteristics to these groups
was consistent with these rankings, and that
this pattern (stereotypy) could not be plausibly
explained in terms of the students' actual con-
tact with or direct knowledge of the groups in
question. During this period Katz published So-
cial Psychology (1938), coauthored with an-
other of Allport's early students, Richard L.
Schanck. The book was characterized by a
strong emphasis on research data and by an
attempt to deal with different levels of social
phenomena without such familiar reifications as
"group mind" or "collective conscience."
In the early 1940s many social scientists were
leaving their universities to take on work more
directly related to the war effort. Several groups
of quantitatively oriented sociologists and psy-
chologists were forming .in government agen-
cies. Katz joined one such group that had been
founded at the U.S. Department of Agriculture
by Rensis Likert, and he maintained close ties
with it after moving to the Office of War Infor-
mation. Katz's research in organizational set-
tings dates from this period and is well exempli-
fied by a study of worker morale in wartime,
conducted jointly with Herbert H. Hyman
(1947). This research was ahead of its time in
using a multiorganizational design (five ship-
yards), a representative sample of workers
 374 KATZ, DANIEL
within organizations, and a combination of self-
reported and independent measures of the major
variables. The findings emphasized the objective
organizational'determinants of worker satisfac-
tion and morale (earnings, supervisory behav-
ior, promotional opportunities, and the like),
and the complex reciprocal relations between
worker attitudes and productivity.
At the end of World War n, Katz went to
Brooklyn College as the first chairman of its de-
partment of psychology, an appointment that he
had accepted in 1943 while still in government
service. That service had ended with an over-
seas assignment as senior analyst on the U.S.
Strategic Bombing Survey, a set of studies of
the effects of bombing on civilian attitudes and
morale. The time at Brooklyn was successful in
creating a strong department and training stu-
dents who went on to prominence as social
psychologists. It was, however, a brief period;
in 1947 Katz went to the University of Michi-
gan, where he has remained.
The move to Michigan was something of a
reunion. The group of social psychologists led
by Rensis Likert at the U.S. Department of
Agriculture had just established the Survey Re-
search Center at the University of Michigan; the
department of psychology at Michigan had be-
gun an extended development; and an interdis-
ciplinary doctoral program in social psychology
had been created under the direction of Theo-
dore M. Newcomb.
Katz entered into all these activities, concen-
trating initially on the development within the
Survey Research Center of a research program
on social-psychological aspects of large-scale
organizations. He was the first director of this
program of research, which has continued and
grown, and along with Likert he set its initial
theoretical and methodological orientations.
After he left the formal direction of the pro-
gram in order to give more time to teaching and
departmental activities, his commitment to or-
ganizational research continued. He was instru-
mental also in establishing organizational psy-
chology as a field of doctoral study that stressed
the interaction of organizational structure and
individual behavior rather than the more con-
ventional problems of selection, testing, and the
like.
Katz's career spans more than fifty years. His
writings are unusual in range, responsiveness
to large social issues, and choice of problems
at the boundary of psychology and other fields
of social science; nevertheless, certain themes
and commitments persist. Especially since 1947,
three substantive concerns are dominant:
(1) organizational life and its ramifications,
including the nature of leadership, the deter-
minants of organizational effectiveness, and the
nature of satisfactions and deprivations at work;
(2) political structure and process, espe-
cially the phenomenon of nationalism, the reso-
lution of conflict, and the nature of identification
with political parties;
(3) attitude formation and change, includ-
ing specific studies of prejudice and the devel-
opment of a general theory of attitude change.
These areas of research are linked by two
other persistent emphases:
(4) a concern for the Improvement of re-
search methods; and
(5) the use and development of open-system
theory as a framework within which more spe-
cific substantive interests could be expressed.
For example, in each of his substantive areas
of work—organizational life, political behavior,
and attitude change—we also find methodolog-
ical articles. The book on research methods in
the behavioral sciences, edited jointly with Leon
Festinger (1953), set research standards for a
generation of graduate students and research
workers.
Katz's development of open-system theory is
stated in The Social Psychology of Organizations
(Katz & Kahn 1966). It owes much to other field
theories and most, perhaps, to Airport's general
theory of event-systems (never fully published).
Katz's use of the open-system framework, how-
ever, is specific to the social psychological level.
In his view, social psychologists had taken too
little account of social structure and had been
especially neglectful of organizational influences
on human behavior. He proposed the open-
system approach as a means of overcoming
these limitations and created a social psychology
concerned with social structure. The second
edition of The Social Psychology of Organiza-
tions, published in Katz's seventy-fifth year, ex-
presses this theoretical position most fully.
Katz's main efforts have been original rather
than critical, but he has been influential as edi-
tor and critic. As editor of the Journal of Abnor-
mal and Social Psychology from 1962 to 1964,
and of the Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology from 1964 to 1967, he played a
leading editorial role during a transitional
period in which the main journal for
social psychologists was separated from the
field of abnormal psychology and established in

its own right. He wrote several essays on the
state of social psychology as a discipline, two
of them undertaken as reviews of editions of
the Handbook of Social Psychology (Lindzey
1954). His earlier articles on survey methods
had appeared when standards were first sought
in that rapidly expanding field.
Academic biographies are notoriously imper-
sonal, but accurate description of Katz's place
in social science requires some mention of his
personal qualities. Colleagues know and stu-
dents quickly recognize his absolute integrity,
commitment to the intellectual life, and unfail-
ing consideration for others. The example of
high character may not be a requirement for
scientific contribution, but it enriches those who
encounter it.
ROBERT L. KAHN
WORKS BY KATZ
1927 KATZ, DANIEL; and CARPENTER, NILES The
Cultural Adjustment of the Polish Group of the
City of Buffalo: An Experiment in the Technique
of Social Investigation. Social Forces 6:76-85.
1931 KATZ, DANIEL; and ALLPORT, FLOYD H. Stu-
dents' Attitudes: A Report of the Syracuse Univer-
sity Reaction Study. Syracuse, N.Y.: Craftsman
Press.
1935 KATZ, DANIEL; and BRALY, KENNETH W. Racial
Prejudice and Racial Stereotypes. Journal of Ab-
normal and Social Psychology 30:175-193.
1938 KATZ, DANIEL; and SCHANCK, RICHARD L. Social
Psychology. New York: Wiley.
1947 HYMAN, HERBERT H.; and KATZ, DANIEL
Morale in War Industries. Pages 437-447 in Theo-
dore M. Newcomb and Eugene Hartley (editors),
Readings in Social Psychology. New York: Holt.
1953 KATZ, DANIEL; and FESTINGER, LEON (edi-
tors) Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences.
New York: Dryden Press. —» Katz contributed an
article to this volume on pages 56-97.
1954 Satisfactions and Deprivations in Industrial Life.
Pages 86-106 in Arthur Komhauser et al. (editors),
Industrial Conflict. New York: McGraw-Hill.
1956 KATZ, DANIEL; SARNOFF, IRVING; and McCLiN-
TOCK, CHARLES Ego-defense and Attitude Change.
Human Relations 9:27-45.
1964 VALEN, HENRY; and KATZ, DANIEL Political
Parties in Norway: A Community Study. Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget; London: Tavistock.
1965 Nationalism and Strategies of International
Conflict Resolution. Pages 354-390 in Herbert C.
Kelman (editor), International Behavior. New
York: Holt.
1965 KATZ, DANIEL; and WITHEY, STEPHEN The
Social Psychology of Human Conflict. Pages 64-90
in Elton B. McNeil (editor), The Nature of Human
Conflict. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1966 Attitude Formation and Public Opinion. Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science,
Annals 367:150-162.
(1966) 1978 KATZ, DANIEL; and KAHN, ROBERT L.
The Social Psychology of Organizations. 2d ed. New
York: Wiley.
1967 The Practice and Potential of Survey Methods
in Psychological Research. Pages 145-215 in
KENNAN, GEORGE F. 375
Charles Y. Clock (editor), Survey Research in the
Social Sciences. New York: Russell Sage Founda-
tion.
1968 Allport, Floyd H. Volume 1, pages 271-274 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1969 KATZ, DANIEL; DELAMATER, JOHN; and KEL-
MAN, HERBERT C. On the Nature of National In-
volvement: A Preliminary Study. Journal of Con-
flict Resolution 13:320-357.
1971 Social Psychology: Comprehensive and Massive.
Contemporary Psychology 16:273-282. —> Review
of Lindzey (1954) 1968.
1975 KATZ, DANIEL; GUTEK, B.; KAHN, ROBERT L.;
and BARTON, E. Bureaucratic Encounters: A Pilot
Study in the Evaluation of Government Services.
Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, Institute for
Social Research, University of Michigan.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALLPORT, FLOYD H. 1924 Social Psychology. Boston:
Hough ton Mifflin.
LINDZEY, GARDNER (editor) (1954) 1968 Handbook
of Social Psychology. 5 vols. Rev. ed. Cambridge,
Mass.: Addison-Wesley. —> Volume 1: Systematic
Positions. Volume 2: Research Methods. Volume 3:
The Individual in a Social Context. Volume 4:
Group Psychology and Phenomena of Interaction.
Volume 5: Applied Social Psychology.
KENNAN, GEORGE F.
As diplomat, historian, foreign affairs analyst,
and publicist, George Frost Kennan enjoyed a
varied and controversial career. Whether as
practitioner or intellectual, bureaucrat or critic,
he has demonstrated enviable traits: brilliant
analysis, elegant language, introspective ability
to adjust his ideas to the changing times, cour-
age to speak out, and a studied, mannered style
bespeaking reflection and authority. These
qualities often propelled him after World War n
to the center of national debates on the goals
and methods of American foreign policy and
prompted America's political leaders to enter-
tain, if not always heed, his counsel. He has
been widely recognized as the father of the "con-
tainment doctrine" formulated in the 1940s, the
foiled advocate of "disengagement" in the
1950s, an eloquent spokesman for detente and
"neoisolationism" and against global interven-
tionism in the 1960s-1970s, the steady critic of
the inner decay and mediocrity of American
society—and its consequent flawed diplomacy—
and the Cassandra who warned against the
"cloud of danger" hovering over a world bur-
dened with a nuclear arms buildup, the spolia-
tion of the environment, and short-sighted
leadership.
Career. Born in 1904 to a middle-income
family in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Kennan grad-
 376 KENNAN, GEORGE F.
uated from Princeton University and entered
the Foreign Service in 1926. He became an area
specialist, concentrating on Soviet Russia, and
mastered the German, French, and Russian lan-
guages. He served a short stint in Riga, Latvia,
where he interviewed anti-Soviet emigres from
Russia, and went on to the University of Berlin
to study Russian history, literature, and lan-
guage. Always impatient with routine bureau-
cratic chores and the insufficient attention he
thought superior officers paid to his work, Ken-
nan spent the depression decade at posts in
Riga, Moscow, Washington, and Prague, and
World War n in Portugal, Germany, and En-
gland. In 1944 U.S. Ambassador W. Averell
Harriman selected him to be a key adviser in
the Moscow embassy. Until 1946 Kennan made
no appreciable impact upon American foreign
policy, although he himself developed a pro-
found pessimism about Soviet-American rela-
tions and plucked the sleeves of all who would
listen. But with a February 22, 1946 "long tele-
gram" to Washington on the wellsprings of
Soviet behavior, Kennan emerged from relative
obscurity to join the American diplomatic
hierarchy. "My reputation was made," Kennan
recalled. "My voice now carried" (1967, p. 295).
He was soon assigned to the National War Col-
lege in Washington, D.C.
In 1947 Kennan was ordered to create and
direct the policy planning staff, an in-house
"think tank" designed to provide the secretary
of state with the long-range perspective and
policy recommendations. An essay Kennan had
written earlier for Secretary of the Navy (later
Defense) James V. Forrestal appeared in the
July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine
anonymously under the name "X." This highly
influential article on "The Sources of Soviet
Conduct," urging a policy of containment of
communism for the United States, created a
public sensation, and Kennan was soon revealed
as its author, establishing him as the most
prominent American expert on contemporary
Soviet affairs. Until 1950 he and his staff
turned out numerous secret reports on cold war
crises and helped launch the Marshall Plan.
But Kennan fell out with Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, who, to Kennan's seldom con-
cealed chagrin, increasingly implemented con-
tainment through military means and seemed
to abandon diplomacy itself. Kennan moved
from Washington to the scholarly quietude of
the Princeton-based Institute for Advanced
Study. He soon lectured Americans that they
were too emotional and simple-minded in their
responses to the complexities of world politics
and published these views in American Diplo-
macy, 1900-1950 (1951), a book whose sales
numbered more than a million copies by the
early 1970s when its message was still being
read by countless college students. In 1952 he
served briefly as ambassador to the Soviet
Union. That tour of duty was cut short when
the Kremlin declared him persona non grata
for his uncharacteristically undiplomatic re-
mark to newsmen that living conditions for
foreigners in Moscow were not unlike those for
diplomats trapped in central Europe by the
Nazis at the start of World War n.
Kennan again retreated to the institute,
turned enthusiastically to historical research,
and wrote two well-respected volumes on So-
viet-American Relations, 1917-1920 (1956-
1958). In November-December 1957, Kennan
brought himself once again to the center of pub-
lic discussion on two continents with his Reith
lectures broadcast over British Broadcasting
Corporation radio and published as Russia,
the Atom and the West (1958fc>). Therein Ken-
nan advised American and European officials
to seek a mutual disengagement of Soviet and
American forces from the heart of Europe and
to defuse the cold war. Senator John F. Kennedy
was impressed by Kennan's reasoning and upon
becoming president in 1961 appointed him am-
bassador to Yugoslavia. Kennan resigned in
quiet protest two years later because the United
States, still gripped by the cold war mentality
which did not distinguish among different types
of communist governments, attempted to punish
Tito's Yugoslavia by cancelling the "most fa-
vored nation" provision in trade relations. Dur-
ing the troubled 1960s, when the nation was
mired in tortuous war in Indochina, Kennan
once again became headline news when he de-
clared that the containment doctrine, meant for
a European context, did not fit Asia. "I find my-
self," he said, "in many respects sort of a neo-
isolationist" (quoted in Paterson 1973, p. 160).
His prolific writing and lecturing thereafter ex-
pressed that sentiment. His summing up, The
Cloud of Danger (1977), was a plea for restraint
in foreign policy, for minding one's own busi-
ness in a world of complex problems for which
the United States had few answers.
The containment doctrine. By the mid-1940s
George F. Kennan had come to intensely held
ideas about the Soviet Union and American
policy toward it. "Never," Kennan has written.

"did I consider the Soviet Union a fit ally or
associate, actual or potential, for this country"
(1967, p. 57). He judged Joseph Stalin a ruth-
less realist and Marxism a "pseudo-science, re-
plete with artificial heroes and villains." "I felt,"
Kennan explained, "that it [communism] must
some day be punished as all ignorant presump-
tion and egotism must be punished" (quoted in
Paterson 1974, pp. 252, 256). Having witnessed
the ghastly purges and repression of the Soviet
system in the 1930s, he considered it morally
repugnant. As for Soviet diplomats, they were
blunt and rude, violating Kennan's sense of the
gentlemanly profession he himself practiced
with such devotion and pride. The Soviet Union
could not be trusted; it seemed bent on global
preeminence; it posed a supreme threat to the
United States.
Kennan summarized his thoughts in an 8,000-
word telegram he dispatched from Moscow on
February 22, 1946. Marxist—Leninist ideology,
Kennan advised, was a driving force behind
Soviet foreign policy. The Soviets foresaw in-
exorable capitalist-socialist conflict. Yet at the
bottom of the Kremlin's "neurotic view of world
affairs is [the] traditional and instinctive Rus-
sian sense of insecurity." Communist dogma,
Kennan wrote, was the new vehicle for perpetu-
ating this very Russian tradition necessitating
geographical expansion. "In summary, we have
here a political force committed fanatically to
the belief that with [the] U.S. there can be no
permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable
and necessary that the internal harmony of our
society be disrupted . . . if Soviet power is to
be secure" (1967, pp. 549, 557). Kennan's alarm-
ist language was tempered by his conclusion,
which received far less attention, that Russia
would not unleash war because it was too weak.
In Washington, high-level officials relished
Kennan's message, for it captured their moods
and fears after Soviet-American diplomatic
clashes over eastern Europe and Iran. It was
embraced, too, because Kennan seemed to ab-
solve Americans of any responsibility for the
cascading cold war. The "long telegram," Ken-
nan admitted later, read "exactly like one of
those primers put out by alarmed Congressional
committees or by the Daughters of the Ameri-
can Revolution, designed to arouse the citizenry
to the dangers of the Communist conspiracy"
(1967, p. 294). Indeed, at the time, in 1946, it
contributed to the "get tough" posture of the
Truman administration.
Kennan's widely read and reprinted "X" ar-
KENNAN, GEORGE F. 377
ticle in Foreign Affairs the following year re-
peated many of the themes of the earlier cable,
highlighting implacable communist hostility,
Stalinist totalitarianism, and the duplicity and
suspiciousness of Soviet conduct. And the essay
recommended, in language that would hence-
forth become an American cold war liturgy, that
"the main element of any United States policy
toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-
term, patient but firm and vigilant containment
of Russian expansive tendencies." Indeed, Amer-
ican "counter-force" had to be applied to "con-
stantly shifting geographical and political
points" to curb Russia and to create strains in
the Soviet system which might weaken or break
it up (1947, pp. 575, 576).
Kennan's analysis of Soviet behavior and his
prescription of containment met with wide ap-
proval at the time. One of the few critics was
Walter Lippmann, who, in The Cold War
(1947), found Kennan's containment doctrine a
"strategic monstrosity," because it did not, at
least as spelled out in the "X" article, discrimi-
nate between areas vital and peripheral to
American national security. Containment, the
venerable journalist and political commentator
predicted, would test American resources and
patience without end or limit. Lippmann also
observed that the policy would probably have to
be implemented distastefully through American
coddling of "satellites, clients, dependents and
puppets" (Lippmann 1947, pp. 18, 21). In 1952,
during the presidential campaign, the Republi-
cans, led by John Foster Dulles' attack, scored
the containment doctrine for being too defen-
sive, too negative, leaving the initiative to the
Soviets. Dulles said he would substitute "libera-
tion" for Kennan's vague formula.
In the years after, some scholars found Ken-
nan's explanations of Soviet behavior too specu-
lative, placing too much stress on communist
ideology and thereby positing a mechanistic
view of Soviet foreign policy: it flowed not from
interaction with other nations but from internal
imperatives. Doubted was his conclusion in the
"X" article that Soviet power "moves inexorably
along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy
automobile wound up and headed in a given
direction, stopping only when it meets with
some unanswerable force" (1947, p. 574).
Rarely did Kennan suggest that the actions of
noncommunist, or anticommunist, countries,
such as the allied military intervention in the
Russian civil war beginning in 1918, influenced
Soviet decisions. He glaringly ignored American
378 KENNAN, GEORGE F.
power and expansionism as contributing factors
to Soviet-American tension. Most important
for the long-term application of containment,
Kennan used words like "force" without precise
meaning, thus inviting a host of methods for
implementing his recommendation of "counter-
force." Again and again after the 1940s, and
especially in Kennan's memoirs, he claimed that
lie never meant that the United States should
emphasize military over economic or political
means or that crusading globalism and knee-
jerk anticommunism should distinguish Ameri-
can diplomacy. Contemporary documents sug-
gest that Kennan entertained a variety of
methods, including military, but that, applying
a pragmatic yardstick, he largely excluded Asia
from the purview of containment. Yet Kennan's
ideas and policy prescriptions, cast as they were
in imprecise language and based on the as-
sumption that because the threat was global,
the effort to curb it had logically to be likewise
universal, lent themselves to American de-
cisions that the diplomat himself opposed, such
as military aid to the French in their war at
midcentury to shore up their crumbling colonial
empire in Indochina. The father of containment
would spend much of his life defining the pur-
poses of his own offspring. As he wrote in his
memoirs, he felt "like one who has inadvertently
loosened a large boulder from the top of the
cliff and now helplessly witnesses its path of
destruction in the valley below, shuddering and
wincing at each successive glimpse of disaster"
(1967, p. 356).
Disengagement. After Stalin's death in 1953
and an apparent thaw in the cold war suggested
by the peace settlement over Austria, the Soviet
appeal for "peaceful coexistence," and Nikita
Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" program, a
number of European leaders called for a reduc-
tion of armaments and troops on the continent.
Other events at the same time, however, heated
up the cold war: West Germany's entry into the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Soviet
crushing of the Hungarian rebellion, the Suez
crisis, and the firing of the missile Sputnik.
Fearful that the United States might undertake
feverish military missile development and an
enlargement of NATO, and believing that the
United States should undertake negotiations
leading to the withdrawal of American troops
from West Germany and a Soviet military with-
drawal from eastern Europe, George F. Kennan
spoke out in late 1957 in six Reith lectures. The
architect of containment, read the headlines,
seemed to be abandoning his creation in favor
of "disengagement." Kennan urged upon his lis-
teners and readers a unified, nonaligned Ger-
many, withdrawal of foreign troops from east-
ern Europe and Germany, and restrictions on
the deployment of atomic weapons there. He
was critical of strengthening NATO and pled
that diplomacy replace an apparent American
military fixation. The Stalinist Russia he had
sketched in the "X" article was not the Russia
of Khrushchev. The time was pregnant for
tempering the cold war, Kennan argued.
A flurry of speeches, serial articles in such
opinion magazines as The New Republic and
Foreign Affairs, and stinging comments from
Harry S Truman and Dean Acheson jolted Ken-
nan. The counterattack was formidable: Russia
was still a military threat; American troops
should remain in Germany as a deterrent; Russia
could not be trusted in any agreement; Soviet
political control of eastern Europe would not
end with the removal of military control; if the
eastern Europeans tried to throw off the Soviet
yoke, Moscow's soldiers would fight back; a
united Germany might become a new and
threatening empire that would arouse fear in
the Soviets or might even, as in 1939, join Rus-
sia in a menacing anti-American pact. Kennan
fought back, finding his detractors too attached
to a hardened cold war mentality. "Nothing, for
example, in Mr. Acheson's attack on the lectures
would suggest that he sees the faintest differ-
ence between the Soviet government as it is to-
day and the same government as it was eight
years ago" (January 18, 1958, Kennan Papers,
Princeton University Library). One of Kennan's
allies now was a former critic, Walter Lippman.
They agreed that military disengagement was
a necessity and that the time was ripe for diplo-
macy. Anyway, said Kennan, the West could
not know Russian intentions and could not
know whether his suggestions would work un-
less officials sat down at the negotiating table
to find out. In those days of intense cold war
passions, however, the weight of opinion went
against Kennan.
The conduct of American foreign policy and
neoisolationism. In 1951, in a set of lectures
published as American Diplomacy, 1900-1950,
Kennan expressed views to which he would re-
turn time and time again: Americans were too
emotional, too afflicted with a "legalistic-moral-
istic approach" (1951, p. 95), too susceptible to
stampedes of opinion, too tolerant of narrow
special-interest lobbyists, too easily swayed by

simple answers. During the era of McCarthyism
Kennan vigorously inveighed against mindless
anticommunism. Later he deplored the "con-
genital subjectivity of the American perception
of the outside world" (1976, p. 678). The con-
gress and the president, people of mediocre tal-
ent, played politics with foreign policy, creating
a misleading bogeyman image of the Soviet
Union as a military monster. Russia, Kennan
always insisted, did not pose a military threat
to United States security. In 1951 and after,
he appealed for a professional foreign service,
an elite corps of bright, imaginative people un-
disturbed by the buffeting winds of public opin-
ion and democratic politics. In 1976 he set the
reformist tasks for American statesmanship:
It will have to overcome that subjectivity that
caused Americans to be strongly pro-Soviet at the
height of the Stalin era and equally anti-Soviet in
the days of Khrushchev, and to acquire a greater
steadiness and realism of vision before the phe-
nomenon of Soviet power. It will have to make
greater progress than it has made to date in con-
trolling the compulsions of the military-industrial
complex and in addressing itself seriously to the
diminution, whether by agreement or by unilateral
restraint or both, of the scope and intensity of the
weapons race.
American politicians will have to learn to resist
the urge to exploit, as a target for rhetorical demon-
strations of belligerent vigilance, the image of a
formidable external rival in world affairs. And
American diplomacy will have to overcome, in
greater measure than it has done to date, those
problems of privacy of decision and long-term con-
sistency of behavior which, as Tocqueville once
pointed out, were bound to burden American de-
mocracy when the country rose to the stature of a
great power. In all of this, American statesmanship
will need the support of a press and communica-
tions media more serious, and less inclined to over-
simplify and dramatize in their coverage of Ameri-
can foreign policy, than what we have known in
the recent past. (1976, p. 689)
Kennan was also a persistent critic of Ameri-
can life, finding it by the 1970s ill suited as a
model for other nations to imitate. "Foreign
policy, like a great many other things," he wrote
in The Cloud of Danger, "begins at home"
(1977, p. 26). Only if America reformed itself,
attended to its myriad internal problems of en-
vironmental pollution, commercialism, waste of
natural resources, rampant pornography, urban
disintegration, and political disunity and medi-
ocrity, could it influence other peoples. During
the 1960s and 1970s, a very pessimistic Kennan
KENNAN, GEORGE F. 379
spoke and wrote against American interventions
in the Third World (especially in Indochina),
foreign aid programs, the continued militariza-
tion of the cold war, and the sad neglect of
diplomacy as a means to reduce crises. He com-
plained that the United States had assumed
the role of world policeman, thrusting itself into
regions and problems where it inevitably stum-
bled because it lacked the necessary power, in-
telligence, inner strength, and cultural affinity
to provide solutions.
The label "isolationist," a term often used
pejoratively after the 1930s, attracted Kennan.
He took it to mean, in a constructive sense, a
reduction of the military establishment, more
serious attention to domestic ills, and a frank
recognition that Washington had neither the
duty nor the capability to serve as mankind's
guardian and savior. As for the global economic
crisis—energy and food shortages, overpopula-
tion, monetary disorder, and trade wars—
Kennan argued against interdependence. He ad-
vised that the United States deal with other
states individually, eschewing the multilateral
arrangements that limited America's freedom
of action. The United States had few vital inter-
ests abroad; only western Europe and Japan war-
ranted a protective American shield. "The first
requirement for getting on with most foreign
peoples," Kennan concluded, "is to demonstrate
that you are quite capable of getting on without
them" (1977, p. 70). The emergence of Soviet-
American detente in the early 1970s met with
Kennan's approval, yet he thought the Nixon
administration had oversold it, causing Ameri-
cans to expect too much and then to suffer
disappointment, if not anger, over the slow
movement toward diplomatic accommodation.
And in the later years of the decade he criticized
President Jimmy Carter for attempting the im-
possible: reform of the Soviet system through
a vocal "human rights" policy.
Kennan, as always, had his critics in the
1970s. Many commentators found him too
gloomy, futilely trying to recover a simpler,
rural life of the past. They thought him too
elitist, too out of touch with the ways of a demo-
cratic society. Some analysts argued that the
United States, whether it wished it or not, was
profoundly intertwined in the world's problems,
ensnared in interdependence, incapable of sig-
nificant retrenchment. Others believed, unlike
Kennan, that the United States had a humane
responsibility as a wealthy nation to meet the
needs of less fortunate peoples, especially for
380 KENNAN, GEORGE F.
food. Russia was still a threat, other analysts
intoned, and they quoted Kennan's 1947 "X"
article back at him. Kennan, the realist of the
1940s, had become, it seemed to his detractors,
the dreamer of the 1970s. Still, Kennan's cry
for restraint and humility in foreign policy, for
neoisolationism, met a sympathetic reception in
an America sobered by its bloody and costly
failure in Indochina and beleaguered by a rash
of domestic troubles long ignored. Yet Kennan,
indulging his habit of self-anguish, was sure
he had aroused no followers. He was wrong, of
course, but from his Olympian perch, so far re-
moved from the many people who admired his
wisdom and his eloquence, he underestimated
his influence upon a generation of Americans.
THOMAS G. PATERSON
BIBLIOGRAPHY
George F. Kennan's private papers—diary, correspon-
dence, and lectures—are housed at the Princeton Uni-
versity Library. Unpublished oral history transcripts of
interviews with Kennan are available at the Princeton
University Library (John Foster Dulles Project) and the
John F. Kennedy Library.
WORKS BY KENNAN
1947 The Sources of Soviet Conduct. Foreign Affairs
25:566-582. -» The "X" article.
1949 The International Situation. Department of State,
Bulletin 21:323-324.
1950 Is War With Russia Inevitable? Department of
State, Bulletin 22:267-271.
1951 American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. Univ. of Chi-
cago Press. —» A paperback edition was published
in 1970. Includes the "X" article.
1953 Training for Statesmanship. Atlantic 191, May:
40-43.
1954a Realities of American Foreign Policy. Princeton
Univ. Press. —> A paperback edition was published
by Norton in 1966.
(1954k) 1966 Totalitarianism in the Modern World.
Pages 17-36 in American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, Totalitarianism. Edited by Carl J. Fried-
rich. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.
1956 History and Diplomacy as Viewed by a Diplo-
matist. Review of Politics 18:170-177.
1956-1958 Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920. 2
vols. Princeton Univ. Press. —> Volume 1: Russia
Leaves the War, 1956; winner of the Pulitzer Prize.
Volume 2: The Decision to Intervene, 1958.
1958a Disengagement Revisited. Foreign Affairs 37:
187-210.
1958b Russia, the Atom and the West. New York:
Harper. —» The Reith lectures broadcast over British
Broadcasting Corporation radio in November and
December 1957.
1960a The Experience of Writing History. Virginia
Quarterly Review 36:205-214.
1960b Peaceful Coexistence: A Western View. Foreign
Affairs 38:171-190.
1960c Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941. Princeton:
Van Nostrand. —> Documents with commentary.
196la Diplomacy as a Profession. Foreign Service
Journal 38, May:23-26.
1961& Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin.
Boston: Little, Brown. —> A paperback edition was
published by Mentor in 1962.
1964 On Dealing With the Communist World. New
York: Harper.
1967 Memoirs, 1925-1950. Boston: Little, Brown.
—> Reprints excerpts of Kennan's "long telegram."
1968a Democracy and the Student Left. Boston: Little,
Brown.
1968& From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers,
1938-1940. Princeton Univ. Press.
1970 To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal.
Foreign Affairs 48:401-413. —> On the control of
pollution.
1971 a Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa. Foreign
Affairs 49:218-236.
1971i> The Marquis de Custine and His "Russia in
J839."Princeton Univ. Press.
1972a After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy
in the 1970s. Foreign Affairs 51:210-227.
1972b Memoirs, 1950-1963. Boston: Little, Brown.
1974a Europe's Problems, Europe's Choices. Foreign
Policy No. 14:3-16.
1974b The Realities of Detente. Washington Post Dec.
18, p. A 14, cols. 3-4.
1975 World War II, 30 Years After: Comment. Survey
21, Winter-Spring: 29-36.
1976 The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-
1976. Foreign Affairs 54:670-690.
1977 The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of Amer-
ican Foreign Policy. Boston: Little, Brown.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ACHESON, DEAN G. 1958 The Illusion of Disengage-
ment. Foreign Affairs 36:371-382.
BERGER, MARILYN 1978 An Appeal for Thought. New
York Times Magazine May 7:43ff. —> Based on an
interview with Kennan.
GADDIS, JOHN L. 1977 Containment: A Reassessment.
Foreign Affairs 55:873-887. -H> Volume 56 of For-
eign Affairs includes a rebuttal by Eduard Mark on
pages 430-440, a reply by Gaddis on pages 440—
441, and Kennan's comments on the debate and
Mark's reply in the form of letters to the editor on
pages 643-647.
GARDNER, LLOYD C. 1970 Architects of Illusion. Chi-
cago: Quadrangle. —» See chapter 10 on Kennan.
GATI, CHARLES (editor) 1974 Caging the Bear: Con-
tainment and the Cold War. Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill. —» Especially noteworthy are the articles
by John Spanier and William Zimmerman.
HALLE, Louis J. 1969 George Kennan and the Com-
mon Mind. Virginia Quarterly Review 45:46-57.
HOFFMANN, STANLEY 1973 After the Creation, or the
Watch and the Arrow. International Journal
28:175-184. —» Comparison of Kennan and Ache-
son.
KATEB, GEORGE 1968 George F. Kennan: The Heart
of a Diplomat. Commentary 45, Jan.:21-26.
KNIGHT, JONATHAN 1967 George Frost Kennan and
the Study of American Foreign Policy: Some Criti-
cal Comments. Western Political Quarterly 20:149—
160.
LIPPMANN, WALTER 1947 The Cold War. New York:
Harper. —> A critical study of the "X" article. A
paperback edition with an introduction by Ronald
Steel was published in 1972.
LIPPMANN, WALTER 1958 Mr. Kennan and Reap-
praisal in Europe. Atlantic 201, Apr.: 33-37.
MCWILLIAMS, WILSON C. 1968 George Kennan—The
Myth Contained. Commonweal 88, Mar.: 25—29.
PATERSON, THOMAS G. (editor) 1973 Containment and

the Cold War. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
—> Includes representative works by Kennan, com-
ments by critics, and an extensive bibliography.
PATERSON, THOMAS G. 1974 The Search for Mean-
ing: George F. Kennan and American Foreign Pol-
icy. Volume 2, pages 249-284 in Frank Merli and
Theodore A. Wilson (editors), Makers of American
Diplomacy. New York: Scribners.
PERKINS, DEXTER 1954 American Foreign Policy and
Its Critics. Pages 65-88 in Alfred H. Kelly (editor),
American Foreign Policy and American Democracy.
Detroit: Wayne Univ. Press.
PODLESNY, P. 1969 History Calls to Account. Inter-
national Affairs (Moscow) No. 2, Feb.:96-98. -» A
Soviet review of Kennan's memoirs.
POWERS, RICHARD J. 1967 Kennan Against Himself?
Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School.
SETON-WATSON, HUGH 1976 George Kennan's Illu-
sions: A Reply. Encounter 47, Nov. -.24-35. —» A
critique of Kennan's comments in the latter's inter-
view with George Urban, cited below.
SIMPSON, DWIGHT J. 1957 New Trends in Foreign
Policy: A Criticism of the "Kennan Thesis." World
Affairs Quarterly 27:327-343.
ULAM, ADAM B. 1973 The Cold War According to
Kennan. Commentary 55, Jan.:66-69.
ULLMAN, RICHARD H. 1977 The "Realities" of George
F. Kennan. Foreign Policy No. 28:139-155. —» A
discussion of Kennan's views as expressed in The
Cloud of Danger, 1977.
URBAN, GEORGE 1976 From Containment to ... Self-
containment: A Conversation With George F.
Kennan. Encounter 47, Sept.: 10-43. —> A wide-
ranging interview.
U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 1957
Hearings: Control and Reduction of Armaments.
85th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office. —» Kennan's testimony is on
pages 997-1026.
U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 1959
Hearings: Informal Meeting with George F. Kennan.
86th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office.
U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 1966
Hearings: Supplemental Foreign Assistance Fiscal
Year 1966—Vietnam. 89th Congress, 2d Session.
Washington: Government Printing Office. —> Ken-
nan's testimony is on pages 331-430.
U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 1967
Hearings: The Communist World in 1967. 90th
Congress, 1st Session. Washington: Government
Printing Office. —> A session with Kennan.
U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 1974
Hearings: Detente. 93d Congress, 2d Session. Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office. —» Kennan's re-
marks are on pages 59-89.
WELCH, WILLIAM 1970 American Images of Soviet
Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
WHELAN, JOSEPH G. 1959 George Kennan and His
Influence on American Foreign Policy. Virginia
Quarterly Review 35:196-220.
WILLIAMS, WILLIAM A. 1956 Irony of Containment.
The Nation 182:376-379 .
WRIGHT, C. BEN 1972 George F. Kennan, Scholar
and Diplomat: 1926-1946. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ.
of Wisconsin.
WRIGHT, C. BEN 1976 Mr. "X" and Containment.
Slavic Review 35:1-31. —> See also Kennan's reply
on pages 32—36 and Wright's counterresponse on
pages 318-320.
"X" Plus 25 1972 Foreign Policy No. 7:5-53. -» In-
cludes articles by Charles Gati and Chalmers M.
Roberts and an interview with Kennan.
KLINEBERG, OTTO 381
KLINEBERG, OTTO
Otto Klineberg, born in 1899, is, understand-
ably, best known as an American social psy-
chologist because of the many contributions he
made to that field during his 37 years of resi-
dence in the United States, first as a member
of the Columbia University department of psy-
chology, and toward the end, as the first chair-
man of a separate department of social psychol-
ogy. Equally well, he could be labelled a
Canadian psychologist, having been born in the
city of Quebec and having done his undergradu-
ate studies in philosophy and psychology at
McGill University (B.A., 1919). Equally, he de-
serves the title physician, having completed the
M.D. at McGill in 1925, two years before receiv-
ing his PH.D. from Columbia. He also deserves
the label anthropologist, having been a student
and then, from 1929 to 1931, a research asso-
ciate of Franz Boas in the Columbia department
of anthropology. He did his first field work with
Yakima Indian children at a reservation in the
northwestern United States and with students
from 36 Indian tribes enrolled at the Haskell
Institute in Kansas (1926-1927). At the urging
of Ruth Benedict, his later field work was in
Mexico among the Huichol Indians (1974,
p. 172).
In 1973, he referred to himself as "an inter-
national psychologist of Canadian origin," and
this surely describes the global course of his
career: from 1927 to 1929 research in Italy,
France, and Germany under a National Re-
search Council fellowship; from 1935 to 1936
research in China under a Guggenheim fellow-
ship; from 1945 to 1947 in Brazil at the Univer-
sity of Sao Paulo as the first professor of psy-
chology; from 1948 to 1949 and again from
1953 to 1955 in Paris as director of various
international research projects and activities of
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Upon retiring
from Columbia University in 1962, he became
visiting professor in social psychology at the
University of Paris, the Sorbonne, where, as of
1979, he still held a chair in ethnic psychology
as well as the directorship of the International
Center for the Study of Intergroup Relations.
From Paris, he commuted monthly for many
years to Rome as the visiting lecturer in inter-
group relations at the Universita Internazionale
degli Studi Pro Deo.
His multidisciplinary training and multicul-
tural experiences influenced the style and
 382 KLINEBERG, OTTO
themes of his work. This, however, is not to
suggest a doctrine of crude geographical deter-
minism, that Klineberg happened to be blessed
by birth and growth in two cultures and the
gift of a ticket around the world, complete with
admission to lectures by Boas, Edward Sapir,
Floyd Allport, and Robert S. Wood worth, and
simply reaped the benefits of his good fortune.
Others sat in these same lecture halls and have
never been heard from since; others got a ticket
to travel the world and never came back to
science.
Although Klineberg does see chance as having
played an important part in his career, he al-
ways made the most of his opportunities. By
graduating from McGill University with first
class honors and the Prince of Wales gold
medal, he was able to obtain a scholarship to
Harvard University, where he received his M.A.
in 1920. Although he planned to study for the
PH.D. and then pursue a career in Canada in
academic psychology, his former professors dis-
couraged him because of the lack of job oppor-
tunities and urged him to obtain a professional
degree. He thus decided to study psychiatry at
the Medical School at McGill. By the time he
became a physician, he knew that in spite of
the scarcity of jobs he really wanted to teach
psychology. So, he immediately enrolled in the
Columbia University department of psychology
as a doctoral candidate. In the process, how-
ever, he discovered anthropology courses by
Sapir and Boas, and became as deeply involved
in that discipline as in psychology.
Studies of race differences. In 1926, Klineberg
began his work in the field of race, which con-
tinued throughout his life, and deservedly,
brought him great recognition. His own studies
plus his comprehensive reviews of the evidence
led him to conclude "that psychological research
gives no justification for the belief in a racial
hierarchy of abilities" (1974, p. 167). Actually,
his studies of race began accidentally when he
was invited to ride with a graduate student in an-
thropology to the West coast, where Klineberg
hoped to do research among the Indians. When
Klineberg requested research funds for this
purpose, Woodworth agreed to secure him a
small sum if he used the research as the basis
of his doctoral dissertation. Klineberg accepted
this condition and thus shifted the emphasis of
his work from abnormal psychology to race
(ibid., pp. 166-167).
The money and the free ride to the Yakima
reservation in the state of Washington was the
source of his work. Klineberg began to admin-
ister performance tests of intelligence to Indian
children selected at random, and to white chil-
dren, also chosen at random, who lived in the
town of Toppenish in the heart of the reserva-
tion. All of the children attended the same
school. An unanticipated finding—that Indian
children performed tasks much more slowly
than did white children, but made fewer mis-
takes (1928, pp. 27-31 )-led Klineberg to focus
"on the factor of speed in group comparisons."
Other observers, less acute and less sensitive
to the role of culture, might have neglected the
finding. As he later noted in Race Differences
(1935£>), many intelligence tests depend to
some extent on speed and the scores are af-
fected by the speed at which the questions are
answered (p. 159). This leads to the unwar-
ranted inference of racial or innate inferiority
in intelligence among groups whose cultures
have not taught speed and who therefore are
unfairly penalized by such tests.
The test performances of the white and In-
dian children were indeed congruent with the
respective patterns of their cultures: the hustle
and bustle of American life and the slow tempo
of Yakima life, the proverbial American value
that the race is to the swift and the Indian pre-
cept to think carefully before one acts. But
Klineberg did not rest his case solely on the
ground of congruence. He carefully examined
the possibility that the differences in tempo
might in fact be racial, rather than cultural, in
origin. As a trained physician, he could analyze
competently the literature on group differences
in basal metabolism and other physiological
processes, and concluded that environmental
factors also had considerable influence on the
very tempo of the body. His direct approach to
the cause of the differences was a research de-
sign in which groups of the same race, but liv-
ing in contrasting environments, were tested
and compared. He found that Indian children
at the Haskell Institute, where white teachers
encouraged them to work as quickly as possible,
performed much more quickly on his tests than
did the Yakima children.
Thus, the study of race differences, begun as
a chance encounter, became a lifelong passion
for Klineberg. But the style he displayed then,
as in his later works, involved the careful pre-
sentation of alternative hypotheses, however un-
congenial. He invented ingenious quasi-experi-
mental designs, rendered judgment only after
scrutiny of substantial and varied evidence, and

kept a sharp watch for artifacts that might re-
sult in misleading findings. One particular de-
sign proved to be the archetype of his later
studies. Just as he compared the scores of In-
dian children contrasted in length of time at
Haskell, he also tested a group of black children
in Harlem and related their scores to their
length of residence in New York City. By this
design he tried to establish the claims of a
theory of cultural determination as opposed to
a theory of selective migration.
In 1927, after completing his dissertation,
Klineberg was offered an instructorship at the
City College of New York. Although jobs were
still difficult to find, he decided instead to ac-
cept a National Research Council fellowship to
study in Europe.
His research in Europe was a test of the
theory or myth of Nordic superiority (1931).
Later, in Race Differences, Klineberg specifi-
cally reviewed the long history of that myth and
similar racial theories. It is perhaps a bitter
lesson for scientists to recall that Klineberg's
refutation of the theory during 1928 and 1929
occurred so shortly before Hitler resurrected the
myth. More generally, he tested whether dif-
ferences in the intelligence of racial groups
were innate in origin or caused by the environ-
ments and cultures in which they were reared,
and the design he employed was a more elab-
orate version of the basic design of the first
study.
Earlier, he had compared members of the
same racial group, the American Indian, living
under contrasting conditions. Now, the size and
heterogeneity of France, Germany, and Italy
permitted him to locate and compare children
from the same racial group—Nordic, Alpine, or
Mediterranean—who were living in the con-
trasting environments of those three nations,
and also to compare the test scores of the dif-
ferent racial groups when they were living in
the same national environment. All the children
in this quasi-experimental design, however, had
in common the characteristics that they were
boys aged 10 to 12, living in small communities
in rural areas, and attending school. Most were
from peasant or farm families. Since these
factors were held constant, and since the tests
were performance tests, always administered
individually in the native language by Kline-
berg, methodological variables could not invali-
date the comparisons or unfairly handicap any
group.
A fair test of the theory also required that the
KLINEBERG, OTTO 383
groups not be selected in an arbitrary or inac-
curate fashion, and that the children be as
representative as possible of "pure" racial types.
Klineberg's medical and anthropological train-
ing again aided him. Boas had created a revolu-
tion in physical anthropology by rejecting sub-
jective classification of races and by his further
objection to the use of a single, arbitrarily
chosen physical characteristic as the basis for
the classification. Klineberg, correspondingly,
chose his sites by reference to anthropological
maps of the distribution of the various racial
types, and then, within the most typical rural
areas, chose his subjects by the combination of
hair and eye color, cephalic index computed by
head measurements, and by the inclusion of
only those children who had been born there
and whose parents had been born there.
Klineberg concluded that "the concept of
'race' is quite incapable of explaining the re-
sults, since on 3 and the same racial group will
show up very differently depending on which
national sample is taken as representative"
(1931, p. 29). When he compared the different
racial groups within the same nation, the Nor-
dics were in no instance superior. In one nation,
the differences were not statistically significant;
in one, the Alpines scored the highest; in an-
other, the Mediterranean group scored the best.
"As far as these results go, they offer no sub-
stantiation of a definite racial hierarchy"
(ibid., p. 35).
In 1935, Klineberg published Negro Intelli-
gence and Selective Migration, which was a
large-scale, crucial test of his theory. In his
first study, the fact that the Indian pupils at the
Haskell Institute were quicker than those on the
reservation led Klineberg to conclude that the
environment accounted for the pattern of be-
havior. In his European study, his analysis of
the intelligence of the various racial groups led
him again to the same conclusion. The many
earlier studies of the comparative intelligence
of blacks and whites, which found that Northern
blacks scored higher than Southern blacks and
higher than whites from some Southern states,
also suggested to Klineberg that environment
and not innate endowment accounts for the
relative intelligence of racial groups.
Since none of these studies, however, are
true experiments in which groups are assigned
at random to live in various environments, the
alternative explanation has been advanced that
the smart families migrate selectively to the
better environments of the city or the North or
384 KLINEBERG, OTTO
the favored region of a country, and their chil-
dren correspondingly inherit that innate supe-
riority. So, too, the critic might assert that the
smart Indian senses the advantage of sending
his child to the Haskell Institute. Although
Klineberg notes that it is equally plausible that
those who are not intelligent enough to succeed
in harsh environments are the ones who se-
lectively migrate, it is clear that "nothing of
any scientific value can be obtained from this
type of subjective" speculation (1935a, p. 5).
Anticipating the susceptibility of his basic de-
sign to this alternative argument of selective
migration, Klineberg had devised in his first
study the more refined design of comparing sub-
groups varying in the length of exposure to the
better environment. If the scores show an im-
provement with increments of exposure, the
alternative explanation becomes dubious, be-
cause their innate endowment should have
made all the migrant children smart to start
with, no matter how long they had been there.
Klineberg therefore decided to use this refined
design on a grand scale in a study of the intelli-
gence of black children. The monograph, based
on 9 comparable master's theses, presents
findings on more than 3,000 black boys and
girls in New York City between the ages of 10
and 12, whose intelligence (as measured by
various verbal and performance tests) and
school grades were examined in relation to their
length of residence in the North. In general, the
findings were that the "rise in intelligence is
roughly proportional to length of residence in
the more favorable environment" (ibid., p. 59).
Klineberg realized, however, that his con-
clusions could still be attacked on the ground
that selective migration, in a more subtle form,
was the explanation. The smarter the family,
the sooner they might sense the wisdom of
moving. Correspondingly, the children of the
earliest migrants could have been the smartest
right from the start, and not because they had
been in the better environment longer. Kline-
berg therefore used three supplementary de-
signs to buttress his conclusions. The reasons
for migration to the North were examined his-
torically by an analysis of old newspapers and
by data from interviews with migrant families.
The analysis suggested that the move was
mainly the result of coercive or accidental fac-
tors rather than a rational decision made on the
basis of intelligence.
In a more direct approach to the problem,
Klineberg examined school records in three
Southern cities of approximately six hundred
black children, all of whom had migrated to the
North, to see if they differed in ability from
their classmates who had remained in the
South. After the raw scores were transformed
to provide a proper index of class standing, the
average score of the migrants was almost ex-
actly the same as that of the nonmigrants. The
evidence, refined to see whether the earliest
movers were the smartest, indicated that there
had been a gradual improvement in the intel-
lectual level (relative class standing in the
South) of the migrants during the 15-year per-
iod examined. Klineberg's earlier conclusion
about the gradual influence of environment was
thus more compelling.
The third approach involved a variation on
the basic design. Two of the master's theses
which studied the relation of intelligence to
years of residence in New York, were replica-
tions of each other, except that one was con-
ducted in 1931 and the other a year later. Thus,
in the second study, a child with any given
length of residence was always a later migrant
than the child with the same length of residence
in the first study. The differences observed were
nonsignificant, but the fact that the earlier mi-
grant children tended to be inferior to their
later counterparts made the environmental ex-
planation even more compelling.
In 1935, Klineberg also published a compre-
hensive review of the literature in medicine,
physical and cultural anthropology, and psy-
chology, which dealt with the general problem
of racial differences. Two chapters deal with the
question he had already examined in his earlier
researches of "the inherent intellectual supe-
riority of certain races over others" (1935b,
p. 152). As he lists the many factors that affect
such test scores and that remain uncontrolled
in comparisons between racial groups, it be-
comes obviously hasty to attribute such ob-
served group differences to innate endowment.
Klineberg also reviews the questions of race
differences in personality, mental abnormality,
crime, patterns of growth, bodily functioning,
and physical endowment. He analyzes the many
factors other than race that have been found to
affect such observed differences, shows that in-
vidious conclusions drawn from such studies
are often arbitrary, and introduces proper cau-
tions on hasty inferences from the physical to
the psychological.
In the first two sections of the work, Kline-
berg uses mainly what one might call a "method

of negation," undermining the claims for ra-
cially determined psychological differences by a
critical analysis of the evidence that had pre-
viously been used in support of such a theory.
But the fact that races do differ in their be-
havior cries for an explanation. If it is not
physical type or innate endowment, then what
causes the differences? The final section of the
book is, in effect, a brief, systematic text—trail-
blazing for its time—in social psychology and
reveals the dramatic cultural patterning of the
most basic psychological entities: motivation,
emotion, cognition, mental organization, and
personality. Understandably, the book leads to
the conclusions "that there is no adequate proof
of fundamental race differences in mentality,
and that those differences which are found are
in all probability due to culture and the social
environment" (ibid., vii). Klineberg, the physi-
cian-psychologist-anthropologist, had just the
right combination of technical skills for the
task, and he used his firsthand knowledge of
many cultures tellingly in the book.
At least three more times in the course of his
later life Klineberg reviewed the accumulated
literature on race. Probably no one has ex-
amined the literature as often and as carefully
as he has. Under the auspices of the Carnegie
Corporation, he edited a volume, Characteristics
of the American Negro (1944a), containing
chapters by various authorities on mental dis-
orders among blacks, stereotypes and attitudes
about race, and his own chapters on black in-
telligence and personality. This book was pre-
pared as essential background and documenta-
tion for Gunnar Myrdal's An American Di-
lemma (1944). Then, as director of the project
on "Tensions Affecting International Under-
standing" for UNESCO, Klineberg proposed a
series of publications by biologists and social
scientists on race and science, and later wrote
the book in the series on Race and Psychology
(1951). Later, at the suggestion of the Society
for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
(SPSSI) of the American Psychological Associa-
tion, he again reviewed the literature and wrote
an article, "Negro-White Differences in Intelli-
gence Test Performance" (1963). When he had
finished this review of the long and confusing
literature, he concluded that there was still "no
scientifically acceptable evidence for the view
that ethnic groups differ in innate abilities"
(1963, p. 202).
Klineberg's contributions in the field of race
have not been limited to research and scholar-
KLINEBERG, OTTO 385
ship. Although the nature of his writings did
have some ultimate influence on race relations,
his impact may be seen more directly in the part
he played in the events that led to the United
States Supreme Court's 1954 decision on deseg-
regation. In one of the five major cases in which
the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People made a frontal attack on state
laws requiring racially segregated schools, and
which were later argued before the Supreme
Court, Klineberg acted as an expert witness. In
the Delaware case, his testimony went unchal-
lenged and served to establish that "racial clas-
sification for the purposes of educational segre-
gation was arbitrary and irrelevant since the
available scientific evidence indicates that there
are no innate racial differences in intelligence
or other psychological characteristics" (Clark
1953a). Then in connection with the reargu-
ment before the Supreme Court, Klineberg and
Robert K. Merton, in consultation with Kenneth
B. Clark, planned the early work preparatory to
the statements presented to the Court by social
scientists in answer to the questions it had
posed. In recognition of this and his other con-
tributions to race relations, Howard University
gave Klineberg an honorary degree.
Studies in the relations of groups and nations.
In his textbook, Social Psychology (1940),
Klineberg completed the formulation he had be-
gun in the final section of Race Differences. He
established the ways in which the fundamental
psychological features of the individual are in-
fluenced by others as well as by his group and
culture, using mainly a comparative method
and drawing upon a wealth of anthropological
evidence on cultural patterning of behavior. His
first contact with anthropology had affected him
"somewhat like a religious conversion" and had
made him muse philosophically: "How could
psychologists speak of human attributes and
human behavior when they knew only one kind
of human being?" (1974, p. 166). Now he had
answered that question on the basis of knowing
many kinds of human beings, and had provided
what was perhaps the most powerful of justifi-
cations for social psychology by showing the
force of culture upon even such apparently in-
dividualistic, rudimentary processes as the per-
ception of size or color or time.
A different and more obvious agenda for so-
cial psychologists is the study of what is mani-
festly social, the specific ways in which individ-
uals orient themselves and act toward others.
Klineberg treats these topics in a long section
 386 KLINEBERG, OTTO
on "Social Interaction," using as specific ve-
hicles the examples of racial stereotypes and
prejudiced attitudes, and their modification. In
this sense, the book is the bridge between his
earlier and his later work: The interest in
"alleged genetic psychological differences be-
tween ethnic groups led directly to a concern
with intergroup relations . . . and from this it
was an easy step to the study of relations be-
tween nations" (1973, p. 43). In some respects,
the book is also a bridge between the old and
new eras in social psychology. When one notes
that some of the most fashionable topics of the
1970s—sex differences, psycho- and sociolin-
guistics, social behavior among animals—are the
topics of chapters Klineberg wrote almost forty
years ago, and that emotional expression—in-
deed a form of body language or communica-
tion—is also treated extensively in the text and
was the problem he examined in his field work
in China more than forty years ago, one can
advise the young to cross that bridge and re-
read this now ancient text.
During World War n, despite his duties in
various United States government posts, Kline-
berg began his studies in the relations of groups
and nations. In "A Science of National Char-
acter" (1944b), his address as the retiring pres-
ident of the SPSSI, he focused on the character
of contemporary nations. No matter that the
origins are complex and cultural, and not racial,
the character of nations as well as the false
stereotypes about national character influence
the course of their relations. These phenomena
require scientific description, and Klineberg
tried to build a framework for further studies.
In the quarter of a century since 1950, Kline-
berg has made many more contributions to the
study of group and international relations. Only
a few can be mentioned and briefly sum-
marized. Tensions Affecting International Un-
derstanding (1950), a monograph prepared
under the auspices of the Social Science Re-
search Council, deals at length with approaches
to the measurement of national character, with
racial and national stereotypes and their origin
and modification, and with factors making for
aggression. This latter theme has been a recur-
rent concern of Klineberg's through the years
(1970; 1972). In "The Role of the Psychologist
in International Affairs" (1956), his address
when the SPSSI gave him the Kurt Lewin me-
morial award, he reviewed ways that the action-
oriented social psychologist could contribute to
the improvement of international relations, and
some of the barriers impeding performance of
that role. The Human Dimension in Interna-
tional Relations (1964) is a brief, semipopular
textbook covering the various sources of tension
reviewed in the earlier monograph, and also the
contributions psychology can make to the effec-
tive operation of technical assistance programs
and their evaluation. Two monographs deal
specifically with cultural exchange programs.
International Exchanges in Education, Science
and Culture: Suggestions for Research (1966)
is a critical survey of the literature, containing
an interesting section on the discrimination
nonwhites may experience in host countries
with a tradition of race prejudice. Etudiants du
tiers-monde en Europe (Klineberg & Brika
1972) reports research among students exclu-
sively from developing countries attending
European universities.
In Religione e Pregiudizio (1968), Klineberg
and three Italian colleagues report the results of
a content analysis of Catholic texts used in
Italian and Spanish schools. References to Jews
and Protestants in the period brought under
study were predominantly negative, a finding
having obvious implications for tensions be-
tween ethnic groups. In a brief paper, written
in 1971, "Black and White in International Per-
spective," Klineberg returns to his earlier con-
cerns with race relations, but looks at such
patterns within other countries as well as within
the United States, and treats their implications
for international relations. In "The Multi-na-
tional Society: Some Research Problems"
(1967), Klineberg examines societies that are
heterogeneous in other respects than race to ex-
plore such sources of conflict and their reduc-
tion.
Two research monographs that may be seen
as contributions to the improvement of relations
between nations also have a special importance
for methodologists concerned with cross-na-
tional surveys and for theorists concerned with
problems of identity, reference group processes,
and the developmental processes underlying
national stereotypes. In Nationalism and Tri-
balism Among African Students (1969), Kline-
berg and Marisa Zavalloni explore the relative
importance of tribal, national, and pan-African
reference groups among students at African
universities from six nations: Ethiopia, Ghana,
Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, and Zaire. By com-
paring the responses of such students resident
in France, factors affecting the relative saliency
of reference groups are established. In Chil-
dren's Views of Foreign Peoples (1967), Kline-
berg and Wallace E. Lambert report findings

from a cross-national survey of an urban sample
of more than 3,000 children at 3 developmental
stages, ages 6, 10, and 14, in 11 nations. Self-
conceptions, reference groups, feelings of simi-
larity and difference from people of other
countries, and stereotypes and attitudes toward
people of other nationalities are examined with-
in the comparative developmental framework of
the design. Apart from the substantive impor-
tance of the findings both for theory and appli-
cation, the problems of organizing and operat-
ing such a world-wide enterprise, the methodo-
logical problems involved in standardizing the
open-ended interviewing technique, and the
coding of data in so many languages are care-
fully reviewed and ingeniously handled.
In action as well as in scholarship, Klineberg
has sought to foster international cooperation.
He helped organize the World Federation for
Mental Health, and later served as its president.
He served for a long period as an officer of the
International Union of Psychological Science.
As a researcher and teacher in so many coun-
tries, he has personally transmitted a message
of good will around the world and sown the
seeds of social psychology over thousands of
miles. The vocation he had chosen in his early
days, to teach psychology, which he has pursued
for almost fifty years, is perhaps what he
cherishes most. The social psychologists whom
he taught or whose researches he guided, in-
cluding Solomon E. Asch, Robert Chin, Kenneth
B. Clark, E. L. Hartley, Herbert H. Hyman,
H. N. Schoenfeld, Muzafer Sherif, and many
others, have carried those seeds of a scientific
and relevant social psychology to other places.
Klineberg has received many honors: The
Butler medal of Columbia University, honorary
degrees from Drew University and the Uni-
versity of Brazil, as well as from Howard Uni-
versity and his alma mater, McGill University.
Gardner Murphy, in conferring the Kurt Lewin
memorial award on Klineberg, described him as
having "seen the intricacies, the triumphs, and
the tragedies of human relationships as a chal-
lenge not only to the possibilities of a greater
human brotherhood, but to the possibilities of a
rigorous scientific method," and as being hon-
ored by "a permanent and illustrious place in
the development of social psychology."
HERBERT H. HYMAN
WORKS BY KLINEBERG
1928 An Experimental Study of Speed and Other
Factors in "Racial" Differences. Archives of Psy-
chology, No. 93.
KLINEBERG, OTTO 387
1931 A Study of Psychological Differences Between
"Racial" and National Groups in Europe. Archives
of Psychology, No. 132.
1934 Notes on the Huichol. American Anthropologist
36:446-460.
(1935a) 1975 Negro Intelligence and Selective Migra-
tion. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
(1935&) 1974 Race Differences. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
(1940) 1954 Social Psychology. Rev. ed. New York:
Holt.
(1944a) 1969 Characteristics of the American Negro.
New York: Harper.
1944k A Science of National Character. Journal of
Social Psychology 19:147-162.
1950 Tensions Affecting International Understanding:
A Survey of Research. Social Science Research
Council, Bulletin No. 62. New York: The Council.
1951 Race and Psychology. Paris: UNESCO.
1956 The Role of the Psychologist in International
Affairs. Journal of Social Issues 9 (Supplement):
3-18.
1963 Negro-White Differences in Intelligence Test
Performance: A New Look at an Old Problem.
American Psychologist 18:198-203.
1964 The Human Dimension in International Rela-
tions. New York: Holt.
1966 International Exchanges in Education, Science
and Culture: Suggestions for Research. Paris:
Mouton.
1967 The Multi-national Society: Some Research
Problems. Social Science Information/Information
sur les sciences sociales 6:81-99.
1967 KLINEBERG, OTTO; and LAMBERT, WALLACE E.
Children's Views of Foreign Peoples: A Cross-
national Study. New York: Appleton.
1968 Prejudice: I. The Concept. Volume 12, pages
439-448 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1968 KLINEBERG, OTTO et al. Religione e Pregiudizio:
Analisi di contenuto dei libri cattolici di insegna-
mento religioso in Italia e in Spagna. Bologna:
Cappelli.
1969 KLINEBERG, OTTO; and ZAVALLONI, MARISA
Nationalism and Tribalism Among African Stu-
dents: A Study of Social Identity. Paris: Mouton.
1970 Alternatives to Violence: The Need for a New
Way of Thinking About International Relations.
Pages 229-240 in A. Tiselius and S. Nilsson (edi-
tors), The Place of Value in a World of Facts.
Nobel Symposium No. 14. New York: Wiley.
1971 Black and White in International Perspective.
American Psychologist 26:119-128.
1972 Aggression: A Social-Psychological Approach.
Pages 56-66 in Helmut E. Ehrhardt (editor),
Agressivitdt, Dissozialitdt, Psychohygiene. Berne:
Hans Huber.
1972 KLINEBERG, OTTO; and BRIKA, J. BEN Etudiants
du tiers-monde en Europe. Paris: Mouton.
1973 Reflections of an International Psychologist of
Canadian Origin. International Social Science
Journal 25:39-54.
1974 Autobiography. Volume 6, pages 161-182 in
A History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited
by Gardner Lindzey. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren-
tice-Hall.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CLARK, KENNETH B. 1953a Desegregation: An Ap-
praisal of the Evidence. Journal of Social Issues 9,
no. 4:2-12.
CLARK, KENNETH B. 1953k The Social Scientist as
388 KOHN, HANS
an Expert Witness in Civil Rights Litigation. Social
Problems 1, no. 1:5-10.
MYRDAL, GUNNAR (1944) 1962 An American Di-
lemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democ-
racy. New York: Harper. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1964 by McGraw-Hill.
KOHN, HANS
From the publication of The Idea of National-
ism (1944) until his death, Hans Kohn (1891-
1971) was the most prolific and influential stu-
dent of this subject in the United States. The
fifty books he authored or edited since 1913, and
published in German, French, and Hebrew as
well as English, measure his energy and erudi-
tion. Kohn's 45 reviews in the American His-
torical Review from 1944 to 1965, his 150 re-
views in the New York Times Review of Books
during the same period, and his dozens of arti-
cles in the Britannica, including the articles on
"Communism," "Fascism," and "Democracy" in
the Britannica yearbooks from 1942 to 1948, in-
dicate his significance as an opinion molder
and publicist (see Wolf 1976, p. 651).
Kohn's later works, especially those in which
he discusses Germany, are notable for the dicho-
tomy that he made between a liberal, rational,
enlightened "Western" variety of nationalism
and an illiberal, nonrational or romantic "East-
ern" European variety. His historical thesis (see
1942; 1946; 1949; 1953; 1956; I960; 1962;
Snyder 1954, pp. 117-122) views the national-
ist movements in England, France, Switzerland,
and the United States as "forward-looking" and
progressive because they maintained certain
characteristic beliefs of the eighteenth-century
European Enlightenment, which based human
progress on individual liberty and held that the
power of the state ought to be limited to protect
this freedom. Thinkers and statesmen in "East-
ern" nations, primarily in Germany and Russia
during the nineteenth century, reacted against
the Enlightenment, glorified state power and the
collective unit as the agency of progress. Na-
tionalists such as Heinrich von Treitschke in
Germany and the Pan-Slav Fyodor Dostoevsky
in Russia were both "statist" and "romantic":
they favored a strong state government that
could base its claim to greatness on appeals to a
supposedly "heroic" past. That reactionary vari-
ety of nationalism grew up in countries with a
weak middle class; it was narrow and egocentric
and unlike its liberal counterpart, offered no
"universal message" to mankind.
For all its imprecision, Kohn's dichotomy was
popular because it helped explain how men as
ideologically diverse as Johann G. von Herder,
Otto von Bismarck, and Adolf Hitler could all be
accounted German nationalists. It was simply a
matter of noting how nationalism had, pro-
gressively and detrimentally, separated itself
from liberalism. Indeed, Kohn's famous book
The Mind of Germany (1960) is an excellent
analysis of why and how German thinkers
moved chronologically and ideologically from
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe to Josef Goebbels.
The divisiveness that Kohn saw among German
intellectuals reflected his own preoccupation
with "unity in diversity" throughout his intellec-
tual life. Kohn's interpretation of nationalism
cannot be understood without a prior apprecia-
tion of the tension between "the one and the
many" in Kohn's thought.
Paradoxical as it may seem, nationalism was
always associated in Kohn's works with the
movement toward world unity. During his early
years, Kohn, like Herder, understood nationalism
to be primarily a cultural and only secondarily
a political force. The title essay in Nationalismus
(1922) argued that nationalism could be de-
politicized in the wake of the World War just as
religion had been depoliticized at the end of the
Thirty Years War. As his early studies on nation-
alism in the Middle East make clear, Kohn soon
accepted the inevitability of political national-
ism. He remained convinced throughout his life,
however, that nation-states should not be based
upon what divided men from each other, such as
language, religion, common traditions, or other
so-called "objective" criteria of nationality.
Rather, nations should be united around moral
and political principles that not only make it
possible for people to cooperate with each other
but leave room also for cooperation with others
outside the national unit. The nation-state was
only the means to the end of international co-
operation and harmony. Kohn was an avid sup-
porter of world federalism in the 1940s, and in
the 1960s he spoke of the age of "pan-national-
ism" that was "merging into the age of pan-
humanism" (1962, p. 166). As men, organized
into nation-states, came to understand how
much they had in common with each other, they
could move into the next stage of "global his-
tory," an era of international cooperation in
which men might yet "outgrow" nationalism
([1949] 1966, p. 235).
Of course, for nations to become—even poten-
tially—a unifying world historical force, they

would have to be established on the basis of lib-
eral principles. Such principles Kohn saw grow-
ing directly out of the "three great revolutions"
of 1688, 1776, and 1789-the English, American,
and French—each, to one degree or another, in-
fluenced by the social, intellectual, and political
ideals of the Western European Enlightenment.
The liberal beliefs in tolerance, the civil and
political rights of individuals, and some form of
representative government were founded upon
the eighteenth-century assumption that man was
fundamentally rational. Only this "faith in rea-
son" could serve as an adequate basis for nation-
alist movements that would allow people to find
meaning for themselves as members of a group
without denying members of other, different
groups that same right. Only a liberal could allow
many different national flowers to bloom.
Kohn's often-used phrase, "unity in diversity,"
described for him the ideal political and cultural
situation among nations as well as the best con-
dition within a given national state. His concern
for unity with freedom developed out of the ex-
periences of Kohn's early years; he spent the first
25 in the multinational Austrian Empire. Follow-
ing five years of grammar school education,
Kohn entered the Altstadter Gymnasium in
Prague in 1902, graduating in 1910 at the head
of his class. Although he spent the years from
1910 to 1914 as a law student at Charles Uni-
versity in Prague, during these years his "chief
interests were philosophy, literature and theol-
ogy." Kohn's study for the bar examination was
interrupted by World War i but his education as
a "world citizen" was furthered by service in the
Austro-Hungarian army, several years spent as
a prisoner of war in Russia, and a period of time
(after the 1917 revolution) serving with the
Czech Legion. It was 1923 before Kohn finally
returned to Prague to acquire his J.D. degree.
In 1908, while still a Gymnasium student,
Kohn had joined the Zionist movement, and later
traveled to Jerusalem. He remained an active
member until 1929, when he left Jerusalem to
begin a trek westward that ended with his ap-
pointment as a history professor at Smith Col-
lege in 1934. In the decade before he settled per-
manently in the United States, Kohn traveled
extensively in the Middle East, Russia, and
Western Europe (Kohn 1964).
The most lasting influence upon his thought,
however, was provided by a number of men
whom Kohn later loosely described as "cultural"
or "ethical" Zionists. One of Kohn's major works
during this early period was an intellectual bi-
KOHN, HANS 389
ography (1930) of Martin Buber, the most emi-
nent of this group and a man whose version of
Zionist nationalism and vision of human com-
munity strongly influenced Kohn (Wolf 1976,
pp. 652ff.). The cultural Zionists, who also in-
cluded Ahad Ha'am, Asher Ginzberg, Gustav
Landauer, and A. D. Gordon, differed from Theo-
dor Herzl and the political Zionists in empha-
sizing cultural and spiritual renewal within Juda-
ism as a precondition for the establishment of a
"national home" in Palestine. Though each ap-
proached the question slightly differently, all
agreed that cooperation with the Palestinian
Arabs was important for ethical as well as eco-
nomic and political reasons. The Jews had the
responsibility to show the world how to live by
establishing a "true community" and a binational
state in Palestine.
The cultural Zionists served as a "prophetic"
force within the larger Zionist movement during
the first two decades of the twentieth century.
They not only challenged their more "practical"
or "priestly" contemporaries, but Buber, at least,
tried to synthesize in his writings and addresses
during this period a concern for individual spiri-
tual development with the growth of community;
he also tried to link ethics and politics, mysticism
and rationalism. In a similar fashion, Kohn,
whose early essays were never specifically re-
ligious, tried to show that the "prophetic ethics"
of the Old Testament were really very similar to
the moral ideals of the eighteenth-century En-
lightenment : he spoke of the "fusion of Jew and
European" and compared the "universalism" or
"universal messianism" of Isaiah with that of the
eighteenth-century French philosophes (see
1924; 193la). The Old Testament prophets from
Amos to Jeremiah preached ideals of justice,
equality, and community, making it clear that
these were universal, not merely national, ideals.
By linking this prophetic tradition to the secu-
larized (but also universalist) rational ideals of
justice and liberty "preached" by the eighteenth-
century reformers, Kohn could synthesize na-
tionalism and liberalism. More importantly, he
could maintain his cultural Zionist conviction
that nationalism could be a force promoting
liberty and world unity.
By the late 1930s, Kohn's transition from a
Zionist to a defender of the Western Enlighten-
ment was complete. The dichotomy between
"good" and "bad" nationalism that he began to
develop by this period first appeared clearly in
an essay on "Democracy: The Way of Man" in
World Order in Historical Perspective (1942).
390 KOHN, HANS
Kohn here saw American liberalism and fascism
as contrasting prototypes. The American political
system and values were an outgrowth of the
eighteenth-century revolutions, while Nazism
was, significantly, "the most audacious counter-
revolution ever undertaken, not only against the
last three revolutionary centuries, but against
the whole development from Socrates and the
Hebrew prophets to the present" (1942, p. 57).
By drawing upon both English and French ideas,
the Americans had devised a political system
that rationally combined concern for the indi-
vidual with necessary attention to the need for
security for all members of the community. This
was a national community at its best, a form of
nationalism that could be copied by others to the
benefit of all (see 1957, chapter 1). Nazism,
by contrast, was an outgrowth of an anti-intel-
lectual tradition that specifically despised En-
lightenment nationalism and universalism. Fas-
cism, Kohn wrote, generally "rejects all absolute
standards of ethics and law and . . . the one-
ness of the human spirit. . . . Fascism believes
in the immutable status of man . . . it denies
the perfectibility of man" (1942, p. 37).
Hans Kohn remained committed to "liberal na-
tionalism" and the dichotomy (of good and bad
nationalism) in all his post-World War n works,
despite charges from critics that he oversimpli-
fied a complicated subject. By the end of World
War n, no other major student of nationalism
was as willing to defend the indiscriminate com-
bining of these two terms. The approach of the
other major American historian of the subject,
Carlton Hayes, for example, was quite different
(Hayes 1931).
Kohn could not and would not admit that
"liberal nationalism" was an oxymoron because,
throughout most of his life and certainly for
his last 35 years, it was not primarily national-
ism that he was defending, but liberalism. This
was clear at least as early as his first major
American work; in the concluding pages of The
Idea of Nationalism, he wrote: "In the word
liberty' vibrates the message which pervades all
human history and makes it human: the promise
of the dignity of man, of his rights as an indi-
vidual, of his duties to his fellow man. . . .
Compared with it, nationalism is only a passing
form of integration, beneficial and vitalizing yet
by its own exaggeration and dynamism easily
destructive of human liberty" (1944, pp. 575-
576).
It was this "integration," call it world unity or
"pan-humanism" or world community, that re-
mained the goal of Kohn's life and this goal gave
unity to his many diverse works. "The individual
liberty of man has to be organized today on a
supra-national basis. Democracy and industrial-
ism, the two forces which rose simultaneously
with nationalism and spread with it over the
world, have both today outgrown the national
connection," he argued in the introduction to
The Idea of Nationalism (1944, pp. 22-23).
Thus, in both the opening and closing pages of
Kohn's magnum opus, the work that, more than
any other, made his reputation as a scholar, he
proclaimed that a dispassionate study of nation-
alism was not his only aim. He made no secret
of the fact that he wished to see (and would do
what he could to encourage) a world where both
individual freedom and human community were
protected, a world that promoted both the free-
dom of the one and the security of the many, a
world that manifested "unity in diversity," a
world that could accommodate, by that name or
by some other, "liberal nationalism."
While Hans Kohn's work was less a detailed
study of nationalism than it was a protest
against the way the term "nationalist" was used
by many students of the subject, especially
Americans, his appeal to many Americans in the
post-World War n generation may reveal that he
was saying what his cold war audience wished to
hear, about themselves and about the Eastern
"others" who were so unlike them. Kohn, like
many of the other cultural Zionists of the early
years of this century, was a Utopian reformer.
He found his audience, not among the Jews or
Europeans, but, finally, among the Americans,
who for him had come to typify the "liberal
West."
KEN WOLF
"WORKS BY KOHN
1922 Nationalismus: Uber die Bedeutung des National-
ismus in Judentum und in der Gegenwart. Vienna:
Lowit Verlag.
1924 Die Politische Idee des Judentums. Munich:
Meyer & Jessen.
(1928) 1929 A History of Nationalism in the East.
London: Routledge; New York: Harcourt. —> First
published in German.
(1930) 1961 Martin Buber: Sein Werk und seine Zeit.
2d ed. Cologne: Melzer.—> Includes an epilogue, cov-
ering the years 1930-1960, by Robert Weltsch.
1931a L'humanisme Juif: Quinze essais sur le Juif, le
monde et Dieu. Paris: Editions Rieder.
(1931b) 1932 Nationalism and Imperialism in the
Hither East. London: Routledge; New York: Har-
court. —> First published in German.
(1932) 1933 Nationalism in the Soviet Union. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press; London: Routledge. —>
First published in German.

1942 World Order in Historical Perspective. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
(1944) 1960 The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its
Origins and Background. New York: Macmillan. —>
A paperback edition was published in 1961.
(1946) 1957 Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nine-
teenth Century Nationalism. New York: Macmillan.
—> A paperback edition was published by Collier in
1961.
(1949) 1966 Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Cen-
tury. 3d ed., rev. New York: Harper. —> First pub-
lished by Macmillan under the title The Twenti-
eth Century: A Mid-way Account of the Western
World. Some of the essays in this volume appeared
as early as 1937; all have appeared elsewhere, and
the volume as a whole offers a convenient summary
of Kohn's interpretation of modern history.
(1953) 1960 Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology.
2d ed., rev. New York: Vintage.
1955 Nationalism: Its Meaning and History. Princeton,
N.J.: Van Nostrand. —> A revised paperback edition
was published in 1965.
1956 Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example.
New York: Macmillan; London: Allen & Unwin.
1957 American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay.
New York: Macmillan. —» A paperback edition was
published by Collier in 1961.
(1960) 1962 The Mind of Germany: The Education of
a Nation. New York: Scribners.
1962 The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global
History. New York: Harper.
1963 Reflections on Modern History: The Historian and
Human Responsibility. Princeton, N.J.: Van No-
strand.
1964 Living in a World Revolution: My Encounters
With History. New York: Trident. —» A paperback
edition was published by Simon and Schuster in
1970.
1968a Masaryk, Thomas G. Volume 10, pages 53-54
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968Z> Nationalism. Volume 11, pages 63-70 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BUBER, MARTIN (1948) 1963 Nationalism. Pages
214—226 in Israel and the World: Essays in a Time
of Crisis. 2d ed. New York: Schocken.
DEUTSCH, KARL (1953) 1966 Nationalism and Social
Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations
of Nationality. 2d ed. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.
Press.
HAYES, CARLTON J. H. (1931) 1968 The Historical
Evolution of Modern Nationalism. New York: Rus-
sell.
KEDOURIE, ELIE (1960) 1966 Nationalism. 3d ed.
London: Hutchinson.
Orbis: A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs 10:1003-
1343 1967 —> A special issue dedicated to Hans
Kohn. Includes a bibliography of Kohn's books from
1922 to 1967.
SNYDER, Louis 1954 The Meaning of Nationalism.
New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
SHAFER, BOYD 1972 Faces of Nationalism: New Real-
ities and Old Myths. New York: Harcourt.
WOLF, KEN 1976 Hans Kohn's Liberal Nationalism:
The Historian as Prophet. Journal of the History of
Ideas 37:651-672.
KRECH, DAVID 391
KRECH, DAVID
David Krech was born Isadore Krechevsky in
1909. In 1913 his family moved from Russia to
New England where he received his early edu-
cation : an education that led to the development
of a set of strong moral, social, and political
values that influenced much of his later per-
sonal and professional life. He enrolled at New
York University, where he became interested in
psychology, partly through the influence of
T. C. Schneirla. Near the end of his undergrad-
uate studies he read Karl S. Lashley's just pub-
lished Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence
(1929), and this influenced him to conduct a
series of experiments that demonstrated the ex-
istence of "hypotheses" in rats. Following the
completion of his M.A. (1931) at New York
University, he entered the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley in 1931 and studied with
Edward C. Tolman, who was just completing
the final draft of his Purposive Behavior in Ani-
mals and Men (1932). At this same time Robert
Tryon was performing his classic experiments
on rats selectively bred to run mazes. Tolman's
insistence that behavior could be understood
best as dynamic and purposive (even when ap-
plied to the laboratory rat), and Tryon's concern
for the importance of individual differences,
influenced Krech's subsequent career.
Following the completion of his PH.D. in 1933,
Krech spent four years with Lashley at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, in the company of such
people as Robert Leeper, Donald O. Hebb, and
Frank A. Beach. As a result of his growing
political awareness, he was one of the organizers
of the Society for the Psychological Study of
Social Issues. He then taught briefly at Swarth-
more College, where he came under the influ-
ence of Wolfgang Kohler.
In 1942 he was drafted into the U.S. Army
and assigned to the Office of Strategic Services'
assessment station under the command of
Henry A. Murray. During this period he married
Hilda Sidney Gruenberg and changed his name
to David Krech. He returned to Swarthmore
after the war as a social psychologist and, with
Richard Crutchfield, wrote Theory and Problems
of Social Psychology (1948). In 1947 he joined
the faculty at Berkeley, where he remained
through his early retirement in 1972 and until
his death in 1977. In 1970 he received one of
the highest honors awarded by the American
Psychological Association, the distinguished
scientific contribution award.
 392 KRECH, DAVID
Krech's professional contributions were multi-
faceted. He began with a search for the princi-
ples of learning in rats. This search gave way to
an intensive period during which he was con-
cerned with social psychology, political activity,
and the application of gestalt psychological
principles to the understanding of behavior.
Finally, he focused on biological questions and
developed a research program based on the re-
lationships between brain chemistry and be-
havior. This latter pursuit was coupled with a
concern for the ethical and moral implications
of "mind control" through chemical intervention.
Four major threads run through all three
phases of Krech's development. First, he had a
strong concern for individual differences. Rather
than characterize behavior on the basis of group
trends he analyzed in detail the performance of
each animal as it negotiated the "hypothesis
box"—an unsolvable maze. In this way he was
able to detect and characterize the strategies
used by each animal in its attempts to solve the
maze. He moved from this level to the formula-
tion of an over-all schema that related behavior
styles to genetic factors and to alterations in
the nervous system. In his later work on brain
chemistry, he again adopted this approach in
order to relate brain chemistry to rat hypotheses.
Second, he insisted on the primacy of broad-
ranging theoretical concerns. He realized that
data are only as good as the schema by which
they can be organized. He scorned those scien-
tists who engaged primarily in amassing ex-
perimental facts—"pebble-pickers" as he called
them. In all of his writing, research, and teach-
ing, he emphasized the bearing of particular
data on larger conceptions of behavioral signifi-
cance.
Third, Krech strongly believed that molar be-
havioral concerns could be understood by mo-
lecular reduction. He thought that the smaller
the unit of analysis, the greater the generality
of the findings. This conviction led to his early
studies of the behavior of selectively bred rat
strains, of the effects of brain lesions on the
nature of hypotheses, and of the effects of
experience on the structural and chemical con-
stitution of different parts of the brain.
Finally, he maintained an overriding commit-
ment to the essential views of gestalt psychol-
ogy. He accepted the gestalt emphasis on the
organized unity of behavior and resisted at-
tempts to fractionate this unity into static,
molecular pieces. Even his physiological studies
of the brain and behavior had a molar emphasis
that respected the inherent complexity of be-
havior.
Krech's contributions to psychology can be
divided into four areas. The first is his concern
for general behavior theory. He rejected the
traditional behavioristic notions of John B. Wat-
son, E. L. Thorndike, and Clark L. Hull that
an organism approached a problem with a
formless, random array of responses that were
forged into a successful set of habits by reward
and punishment on the anvil of trial and error.
Krech demonstrated that rats attempted syste-
matic solutions to problems, rejecting one after
another until the correct response was selected.
The organism's past experience and biological
heritage affected the nature of the attempted
solutions. This view of learning as a noncontin-
uous process provoked a great deal of contro-
versy (especially with Kenneth W. Spence of the
University of Iowa) and stimulated valuable
research.
Krech also made major contributions to the
field of social psychology, including the textbook
he coauthored with Crutchfield (1948) and his
political activities. Stressing phenomenology
and cognitive organization, the theoretical orien-
tation of the text helped to unify the subject
matter and theory of what was then a frag-
mented field. In addition to providing a scientific
framework for social psychology, the authors
argued that a theoretically sound social psychol-
ogy is also practically valid and immediately
useful. Toward this end they presented intensive
treatments of measurement techniques, public
opinion survey methods, sampling problems,
and action programs designed to minimize in-
dustrial conflict, racial prejudice, and inter-
national tensions.
His political involvement ranged from early
membership in socialist organizations to a lead-
ership role in the organization of the Society
for the Psychological Study of Social Issues;
now a formal division of the American Psy-
chological Association. He also testified against
the separate but equal doctrine in a 1951 suit
brought by the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People on behalf of par-
ents of black children in Clarendon County,
South Carolina. This was the first time a federal
court allowed social psychologists to testify as
expert witnesses.
The third topical area, to which Krech de-
voted much of the last two decades of his life,
was the relation of brain chemistry to behavior.
This work began with the encouragement of the

biochemist Melvin Calvin. A research team con-
sisting of Krech, the biochemist E. L. Bennett,
and the physiological psychologist M. R. Rosen-
zweig began to study the effects of experience
on the anatomy and chemistry of the rat brain.
Later, they were joined by the neuroanatomist
Marian Diamond and produced an extensive
series of empirical and theoretical papers—some
of which were greeted by a critical storm. The
research indicated that the environmental con-
ditions under which rats are housed produce
differences in brain cholinesterases, weight of
brain sections, and thickness of cerebral cortex.
They demonstrated that the brain grows with
use and that brain nerve cells can increase or
decrease in size depending on whether or not
the environment is stimulating. The provocative
nature of these findings and their potential
value in promoting an understanding of the sub-
strates of behavior resulted in a flurry of re-
search activity throughout the world. Within a
few years of the inception of the project a large
number of laboratories were actively inquiring
into the relations between brain chemistry and
behavior.
Above all, however, Krech was an educator.
He had an extraordinary ability to teach. He was
a brilliant, exciting, and exacting leader of a
graduate seminar, a challenging teacher of ad-
vanced psychology classes, and an inspired lec-
turer in introductory psychology. His commit-
ment to education is attested to by three major
textbooks: the previously mentioned Theory and
Problems of Social Psychology; an introductory
psychology text, Elements of Psychology (Krech
& Crutchfield 1958); and an introductory statis-
tics package, Statlab (Hodges, Krech, & Crutch-
field 1975). He was concerned with the quality
of education and the quality of academic life at
the university and took an active role to help
the university steer a reasoned course through
the social turmoil that embroiled the Berkeley
campus in the 1960s.
LEWIS PETRINOVICH
WORKS BY KRECH
1932 "Hypotheses" in Rats. Psychological Review 39:
516-532.
1935 Brain Mechanisms and "Hypotheses." Journal of
Comparative Psychology 19:425-462.
(1948) 1962 KRECH, DAVID; and CRUTCHFIELD, RICH-
ARD S. Individual in Society: A Textbook of Social
Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. —> First pub-
lished as Theory and Problems of Social Psychology.
1950 Dynamic Systems as Open Neurological Systems.
Psychological Review 57:345-361.
1954 KRECH, DAVID et al. Enzyme Concentrations in
KUZNETS, SIMON 393
Brain and Adjustive Behavior-patterns. Science
120:994-996.
1958 KRECH, DAVID; and CRUTCHFIELD, RICHARD S.
Elements of Psychology. New York: Knopf.
1960 KRECH, DAVID et al. Effects of Environmental
Complexity and Training on Brain Chemistry.
Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psy-
chology 53:509-519.
1968 Tolman, Edward C. Volume 16, pages 95-98 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan
and Free Press.
1969 Does Behavior Really Need a Brain? Pages 1-11
in Robert B. MacLeod (editor), William James: Un-
finished Business. Washington: American Psycho-
logical Association.
1974 Autobiography. Volume 6, pages 219-250 in A
History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited by
Gardner Lindzey. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall.
1975 HODGES, J. L., JR.; KRECH, DAVID,- and CRUTCH-
FIELD, RICHARD S. Statlab. New York: McGraw-Hill.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
LASHLEY, KARL S. 1929 Brain Mechanisms and In-
telligence: A Quantitative Study of Injuries to the
Brain. Univ. of Chicago Press.
TOLMAN, EDWARD C. (1932) 1951 Purposive Behav-
ior in Animals and Men. Los Angeles: Univ. of
California Press.
KUZNETS, SIMON
An economist, statistician, and economic his-
torian, Simon Kuznets' foremost contribution,
for which he won the 1971 Nobel prize in eco-
nomic science is the comparative study of the
economic growth of nations. Kuznets' work was
the fruit of a carefully designed and imagina-
tively conceived research program involving
scholars throughout the world and extending
over the three decades since World War n. The
program centered on the quantitative measure-
ment of the rate of economic growth and of as-
sociated shifts in internal conditions and ex-
ternal relations for as many nations as possible.
It encompassed also exploratory studies of un-
derlying causes. The culmination of these ef-
forts appear in volumes written by Kuznets in
the 1960s and 1970s. Here one may find most
of what is known today about rates of economic
growth; how they vary among nations and how
they differ from premodern growth rates; the
systematic changes in internal economic, social,
and political structure that have accompanied
modern economic growth; and the international
economic and political ramifications of the
spread of modern economic growth (for a brief
summary, see Easterlin 1968).
This work is a logical outcome of a long
record of distinguished scholarship. Kuznets'
 394 KUZNETS, SIMON
first contributions in the late 1920s and early
1930s were in the analysis of economic time
series movements—seasonal fluctuations, cycli-
cal changes, and secular movements. From this
he moved on to the measurement of the national
income and product of the United States. This
research is a landmark in the evolution of eco-
nomic science. Today, figures of gross national
product (GNP) are taken for granted, but be-
fore World War i there was almost total ignor-
ance of such elementary data on the economy's
size and structure. Kuznets was not the first to
seek to close this gap, but his work on national
income and product was so distinctive that it
became the benchmark in the field. It encom-
passed estimates of total output and income by
final product, industry of origin, and type of
income; of capital formation and savings; and
of the distribution of income between rich and
poor. This work, coinciding with the new de-
mands for economic information generated first
by the depression of the 1930s, and then, by the
mobilization requirements of World War n, laid
the foundation for the establishment of official
estimates of total GNP and its components by
the federal government, a task in which Kuznets
played a leading role. It provided, too, the basis
for Kuznets' subsequent program of research on
economic growth, which was built upon his-
torical series of national income and product
for as many countries as possible.
Kuznets' work on national income played a
crucial role in the transition of economics from
a deductive to a quantitative science. This transi-
tion required a union of theory, economic
measurement, and statistical methodology. In
the 1930s the new macroeconomic theories of
John Maynard Keynes had aroused much in-
terest because of their relevance to the world-
wide economic crisis. Kuznets' concurrent and
independent effort to develop measures of the
consumption, savings, and investment compo-
nents of national income provided the empirical
counterparts of the Keynesian concepts. This
advance in economic measurement and its con-
cordance with new theoretical formulations was
a key step in the development of econometrics,
the systematic quantitative modeling of the eco-
nomic system pioneered by Ragnar Frisch and
Jan Tinbergen.
In his early work on secular movements,
Kuznets identified fluctuations of 15 to 25 years'
duration in a number of economic time series
in the United States. Subsequently he returned
to this subject several times, widening the range
of observation to other developed countries and
incorporating demographic as well as economic
time series. These movements, although still
somewhat controversial, are today commonly
referred to as "Kuznets cycles" in recognition
of his pioneering contribution.
Kuznets was born in Kharkov, Russia, in
1901 and emigrated to the United States in
1922, where he took up studies at Columbia
University, receiving his B.A. in 1923, his M.A.
in 1924, and his PH.D. in economics in 1926. In
1927 he became a member of the research staff
of the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) where his work on national income
was conducted. Although he remained an active
member of the NBER staff until 1960, the pri-
mary base for his research effort from the
1950s was the committee on economic growth
of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC).
Kuznets rose to the position of professor of
economics and statistics at the University of
Pennsylvania during his tenure there from 1930
to 1954, and subsequently held professorial ap-
pointments at The Johns Hopkins University
from 1954 to 1960, and Harvard University
from 1960 until his retirement in 1971. His
primary teaching areas followed the develop-
ment of his interests: economic statistics (espe-
cially time series analysis), business cycles, eco-
nomic development, and economic-demographic
interrelations. His influence as a teacher ex-
tended beyond formal course work and the
many dissertations that he supervised. Kuznets
was teaching by example in the research pro-
jects that he directed as well as through the
many professional conferences in which he par-
ticipated throughout his career, particularly the
NBER Conference on Research in Income and
Wealth and its offshoot, the International As-
sociation for Research in Income and Wealth,
both of which he helped found; and the many
conferences organized under the auspices of
the SSRC committee on economic growth.
Kuznets served two periods in government.
Before his emigration to the United States, he
was the youthful head of a statistical office in
the Ukraine during the early chaotic post-Czarist
years. During World War n he was associate
director from 1942 to 1944 of the Bureau of
Planning and Statistics of the War Production
Board. Kuznets served as president of the Amer-
ican Economic Association (1954) and the
American Statistical Association (1949). Since

retiring in 1971, his research efforts and publi-
cations have shifted increasingly to the field of
population.
Kuznets' convictions about the importance of
economic and quantitative measurement as the
basis for understanding social problems ante-
dated his emigration to the United States, but
they received strong reinforcement from his
mentor at Columbia, Wesley C. Mitchell. Mit-
chell's skepticism about the reliance of eco-
nomics on deductive economic theory and his
belief in the need for quantitative facts had been
instrumental in the establishment in 1920 of the
NBER, which was a nonprofit research or-
ganization devoted to the study of basic eco-
nomic science and the first of its kind in Amer-
ica. Mitchell brought Kuznets into the NBER,
where before long he came to head the bureau's
program of national income studies. This project,
along with the study on business cycles, headed
by Mitchell and Arthur F. Burns, were the central
pillars of the bureau's work, and the basis for
the national and international reputation that
the bureau established in the 1930s and 1940s.
A crucial opportunity for maintaining the
NBER's leadership was lost after World War n
when the bureau rejected Kuznets' proposal to
undertake the comparative study of economic
growth of nations. As a result, Kuznets' primary
research commitment was eventually shifted to
the SSRC committee on economic growth.
In the development of American economics,
the NBER is an offshoot of institutional eco-
nomics. The leading features of Kuznets' ap-
proach to economic research are best appreci-
ated in terms of this intellectual heritage. Two
themes of the NBER's work—expressed in titles
of the bureau's annual reports, "A Respect for
Facts" (1960) and "The Cumulation of Eco-
nomic Knowledge" (1948)—form key ingredi-
ents in Kuznets' research style. In Kuznets'
work, as more generally in that of the NBER,
economic science starts with measurement
based on careful definition and classification.
The underlying philosophy, in Kuznets' words,
is that "statistical data are susceptible of cumu-
lation to the highest degree. As statisticians so
well know, a series that is twice as long
possesses more than twice the analytical value
—provided continuity and comparability are pre-
served. It is this advantage of statistical mea-
surement and research that assures its fruit-
fulness . . ." (1947, p. 34).
The quintessential criticism of the NBER ap-
KUZNETS, SIMON 395
proach was captured in the title of T. C. Koop-
man's famed "Measurement Without Theory"
review (1947) of the Burns-Mitchell treatise
on business cycles. In Kuznets' view, however,
measurement can never be divorced from eco-
nomic theory and is necessarily guided by
theory: "A major task is involved in the attempt
to pass from the scattered incomplete, primary
data, affected by all the peculiarities of both the
country's economy and its data gathering insti-
tutions, to measures that reflect as clearly as
possible the rigorously defined concepts of eco-
nomic analysis" (1957, p. 553). Indeed, in the
late 1940s Kuznets broke with the official esti-
mators of GNP because he held that their in-
creasing emphasis on "social accounting" was
an abandonment of the fundamental Marshal-
lian and Pigovian theoretical concept of national
income as a measure of economic welfare.
Throughout his career, Kuznets' monographs,
although structured around tables of data, have
been infused with "tentative" interpretations
and explanations based on economic analysis.
Admittedly, Kuznets is reserved in his use of
economic theory and skeptical of formal mathe-
matical and econometric models. This stems,
however, not from a rejection of theory, but
from the notion of the historical relativity of
economics. He applied this feature of his ap-
proach both to measurement and theory. To
Kuznets, "much economic writing and theoriz-
ing . . . [is] geared to the current conditions and
oversimplified to the point of yielding a determi-
nate answer. . . . Such theories . . . tend to
claim validity far beyond the limits that would
be revealed by an empirical test" (1955, p. 76).
Even "quantitative measures may lose part of
their value because the object they measure may
seem, in the light of objective changes and
changes in theory, less strategic than it seemed
before" (1947, p. 33). Kuznets' view of the his-
torical relativity of economics partly explains
why, aside from his periods of wartime service,
he remained aloof from work on public policy,
though recognizing its necessity.
Kuznets' reservations about economics stem
too from what he feels is its limited coverage of
social reality: " [EJither [economics] must admit
that none of its results have validity until they
are supplemented by findings of other disciplines
on the processes impounded . . . in ceteris
paribus; or it must state where, in real life,
ceteris paribus begins and ends . . ." (1955,
p. 73). Particularly in the study of economic
396 KUZNETS, SIMON
growth is an expansion of disciplinary bound-
aries necessary: "Much as one may regret leav-
ing the shelters of the accustomed discipline, it
does seem as if an economic theory of economic
growth is an impossibility, if by 'economic' we
mean staying within the limits set by the tools
of the economic discipline proper . . ." (ibid.,
p. 73).
Writing of Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kuznets
once observed that "strong minds are guided by
their own interests," a statement that applies
equally to him. In a discipline where deductive
analysis is the hallmark of accomplishment,
Kuznets, though himself a creative and original
thinker—witness his sweeping program for the
study of economic growth—is notable for his in-
sistence on facts and measurement. In a field
that prides itself as "queen of the social sci-
ences," Kuznets has reached out to other disci-
plines both in teaching and in research. And in
a subject in which sweeping ideological pre-
scriptions for reform abound, Kuznets has been,
both in words and in example, a passionate be-
liever in the ultimate value of science, as evi-
denced in his 1949 presidential address to the
American Statistical Association:
Under the shock of the catastrophic events of re-
cent decades, belief in the possibility and usefulness
of scientific study of human society has grown per-
ceptibly weaker. There are, and will be, many to
doubt that the search for objectively found patterns
of stability and change is likely to yield significant
knowledge in the field and who will turn to other
ways in which men may reconcile themselves to the
apparently capricious turbulence of human history.
We can easily understand and sympathize with
such doubts. But it is difficult for me to see how there
can be any guide for scientific work and development
other than a belief in the existence of some order
in the seemingly chaotic jumble of history; in the
demonstrability of such order in empirical terms;
and in the ultimate social usefulness of the re-
sulting body of tested theory. These three basic
beliefs warrant examination of conditions of statis-
tical research . . . in the spirit of setting a task for
the future rather than of apology for the past and
for failure to go on; in terms of hope rather than of
despair.
RICHARD A. EASTERLIN
WORKS BY KUZNETS
1926 Cyclical Fluctuations: Retail and Wholesale
Trade, United States, 1919-1925. New York: Adel-
phi. —> Kuznets' Ph.D. thesis. Prefatory note by Wes-
ley C. Mitchell.
1930a Secular Movements in Production and Prices:
Their Nature and Their Bearing Upon Cyclical Fluc-
tuations. Boston: Hough ton Mifflin.
1930b Wesen und Bedeutung des Trends: Zur Theorie
der Sadkularen Bewegungen. Veroffentlichungen
der Frankfurter Gesellschaft fur Konjunkturfor-
schung, Vol. 7. Bonn: Schroeder.
1933 Seasonal Variations in Industry and Trade. Pub-
lications of the National Bureau of Economic Re-,
search, No. 22. New York: The Bureau.
1934 National Income, 1929-1932. National Bureau
of Economic Research, Bulletin No. 49. New York:
The Bureau.
1937 National Income and Capital Formation, 1919-
1935: A Preliminary Report. New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
1938 Commodity Flow and Capital Formation. Publi-
cations of the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, No. 34. New York: The Bureau.
1941 National Income and Its Composition, 1919-
1938. 2 vols. Publications of the National Bureau of
Economic Research, No. 40. New York: The Bureau.
—» Prepared with the assistance of Lillian Epstein
and Elizabeth Jenks.
1945 National Product in Wartime. Publications of the
National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 44.
New York: The Bureau.
1945 FRIEDMAN, MILTON; and KU/NETS, SIMON In-
come From Independent Professional Practice. New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
1946a National Income: A Summary of Findings. New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
1946£> National Product Since 1869. Publications of
the National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 46.
New York: The Bureau. —» Prepared with the assis-
tance of Lillian Epstein and Elizabeth Jenks.
1947 Measurement of Economic Growth. Journal of
Economic History 7 (Supplement) : 10-34.
1950 Conditions of Statistical Research. Journal of the
American Statistical Association 45:1-14.
1953a Economic Change: Selected Essays in Business
Cycles, National Income, and Economic Growth.
New York: Norton.
1953b Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and
Savings. Publications of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, No. 55. New York: The Bureau. —»
Prepared with the assistance of Elizabeth Jenks.
1955 Toward a Theory of Economic Growth. Pages 12-
77 in Robert Lekachman (editor). National Policy
for Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad. Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
1957 Summary of Discussion and Postscript. Journal
of Economic History 17:545—553.
1957-1964 KUZNETS, SIMON; and THOMAS, DOROTHY S.
(editors) Population Redistribution and Economic
Growth: United States, 1870-1950. 3 vols. Philadel-
phia: American Philosophical Society.—> Volumes
45, 51, and 61 of the Memoirs of the American
Philosophical Society.
(1958) 1959 Six Lectures on Economic Growth. Glen-
coe, 111.: Free Press.
1961 Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation
and Financing. National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Studies in Capital Formation and Financing,
No. 9. Princeton Univ. Press. —» Prepared with the
assistance of Elizabeth Jenks.
1964 Postwar Economic Growth: Four Lectures. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Belknap.
1965 Economic Growth and Structure: Selected Essays.
New York: Norton.
1966 Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and
Spread. Studies in Comparative Economics, No. 7.
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1971 Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and
Production Structure. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap.

1972 Quantitative Economic Research: Trends and
Problems. New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
1973 Population, Capital, and Growth: Selected Essays.
New York: Norton.
1979 Essays in Growth, Population, and Income Distri-
bution. New York: Norton.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABRAMOVITZ, MOSES 1971 Nobel Prize for Econom-
ics: Kuznets and Economic Growth. Science 174:
481-483.
KUZNETS, SIMON 397
EASTERLIN, RICHARD A. 1968 Economic Growth: I.
Overview. Volume 4, pages 395—408 in International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David
L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
FLOERSHEIM, RACHEL 1961 Bibliography of the
Works of Simon Kuznets. Economic Development
and Cultural Change 9:550-560.
KOOPMANS, T. C. 1947 Measurement Without Theory.
Review of Economic Statistics 29:161-172.
LUNDBERG, ERIK 1971 Simon Kuznets' Contribution
to Economics. Swedish Journal of Economics 4:444-
461.
 LAKATOS, IMRE
At the time of his death Imre Lakatos (1922-
1974), who had been professor of logic at the
London School of Economics since 1969, was a
foremost philosopher of mathematics and of
science. He had a vivid personality and had led
a turbulent life.
He was born in Hungary of Jewish descent;
the family name was Lipsitz. His father was a
wine merchant in Budapest, but as a result of
anti-Semitism, his mother took him to live with
her mother in Debrecen, where he entered the
Gymnasium. He attended the University of
Debrecen and graduated in 1944. During the
Nazi occupation of Hungary he changed his
Jewish name to Molnar (= Miller) and joined
the underground resistance. After the war, he
changed his name again—this time to Lakatos.
At the end of the war, he became a research
student under Gyorgy Lukacs at Budapest Uni-
versity. A convinced communist, he was also
very active in party politics. In 1947 he was
made a secretary in the Ministry of Education
and put in virtual charge of the democratic re-
form of higher education in Hungary. He also
wrote a doctoral thesis on concept formation in
science and received his degree in 1948.
In 1949 he spent a year at Moscow University.
In June of that year the terror campaign under
the Stalinist Rakosi against Rajk and the "Hun-
garian-Tito-ists" began. Soon after his return to
Hungary in the spring of 1950, Lakatos was ar-
rested and imprisoned for nearly four years. He
later attributed his survival to two things. First,
his communist faith never wavered (though
this was also true of many who did perish);
second, though willing to confess any moral
view which his interrogators might require of
him, he absolutely refused to fabricate evidence
for them.
When he was released in late 1953, he found
that as an ex-political prisoner he was virtually
unemployable. However, in 1954 the mathema-
tician Alfred Renyi obtained a position for him
in the Mathematical Research Institute of the
Hungarian Academy of Science in which he
could use his linguistic skills; he spoke German
and Russian and read English and French. His
job was to translate important mathematical
works into Hungarian. For the first time since
his early days at university Lakatos was in a
state of undistracted academic seclusion. His
concentrated study during the ensuing two
years provided a basis for the highly original
work he did later in the philosophy of mathe-
matics. One of the works he translated, Gyorgy
Polya's great book on mathematical heuristic,
How to Solve It (1945), had a great impact on
him. In his preface Polya had said: "Mathe-
matics presented in the Euclidean way appears
as a systematic, deductive science; but mathe-
matics in the making appears as an experi-
mental, inductive science" (1945 [1957], p. vii).
This contrast between a formalized mathemati-
cal system and its informal prehistory was to
become a motif of Lakatos' "quasi-empirical"
philosophy of mathematics. His period in the
institute had another important result. Hitherto
he had regarded Marxism as the only scientific
theory of society; but he now had access to a
library containing Western books and journals
399
 400 LAKATOS, IMRE
not generally available in Hungary; arid he dis-
covered works that shook that idea. In particu-
lar, he found in the works of Karl Popper both a
clear understanding of the nature of scientific
theory and a devastating criticism of Marxist
historicism as hopelessly unscientific. His com-
munist certainties, having withstood four years
of communist imprisonment, began to crumble.
In November 1956, after the Soviet suppres-
sion of the Hungarian uprising, Lakatos, along
with many other Hungarian intellectuals, fled
the country. First he went to Vienna; then he
was awarded a three-year Rockefeller fellowship
and went to King's College, Cambridge, to re-
search under R. B. Braithwaite. In 1958 he met
Polya, who advised him to prepare a case study
of the history of the Descartes-Euler conjecture
that for all polyhedra V - E + F = 2, where V,
E, and F are the number of vertices, edges, and
faces respectively. His PH.D thesis was devoted
largely to this problem. He presented part of it
at Popper's seminar at the London School of
Economics in 1959 and joined Popper's depart-
ment in 1960. His Proofs and Refutations
(1976a) presents a view of mathematics very
different from the "Euclidean" view in which
theorems are infallibly proved by deduction
from axioms that are certainly true, the whole
deductive system containing only terms that are
either perfectly clear and undefined or else are
exactly defined by such undefined terms. In
Lakatos' rational reconstruction, presented as a
fast-moving, incisive, and occasionally hilarious
classroom dialogue of the history of the Des-
cartes-Euler conjecture, refutations play a
decisive role. Moreover, the refutations, for the
most part, are not discovered by accident but
as a result of the "proof." Very briefly, the pat-
tern is this. A "naive" conjecture C is proposed,
and a proof is sought for it. The proof consists
of a thought experiment in which C is decom-
posed into a number of lemmas that jointly en-
tail C. This process prompts and guides the
search for counterexamples. Some counterex-
amples are only "local": they hit one of the
lemmas without hitting C itself; others are
"global": they are cases in which C itself, as
well as at least one of the lemmas, is refuted.
(The "guilty" lemma may have been a hidden
one, brought into the open as a result of the
refutation.) Various responses are made to
the counterexamples produced. One response,
"monster-barring," is to reject the alleged coun-
terexample as not being a genuine instance of
C's antecedent clause. Thus if C says, "All poly-
hedra satisfy V — E + F = 2," and it is found
that for a cube with a hollow cube inside it we
have V - E + F = 4, the latter may be rejected
as not being a genuine polyhedron ("A woman
with a child in her womb is not a counterex-
ample to the thesis that human beings have one
head"). A more sophisticated version of this re-
sponse, "monster-adjustment," is the claim that
the apparent monster, when properly seen with
mathematically trained eyes, is no monster
after all. Thus the hollowed cube is really two
cubes, one inside the other; and for two poly-
hedra C of course gives a value of 4 instead of 2.
Another response, "exception-barring," is to con-
cede the genuineness of the counterexamples
and try to restrict C to a safe domain with all
exceptions outside it. One may try to achieve
this in one step by looking for a set of charac-
teristics shared by all instances and no counter-
instances of C, and then reformulate C so that
it applies just to the thus characterized poly-
hedra. Or one may proceed step by step by a
process of "lemma-incorporation." Suppose that a
global counterexample to C has been found and
that the guilty lemma (perhaps a hidden one) has
been identified. This lemma will say that all poly-
hedra have a certain property P (for instance,
that if made of stretchable rubber they can be
pumped into a ball). One now incorporates P
into a modified version of C which now says that
all P-type polyhedra satisfy V — E -+- F =: 2.
All these responses reduce the content of the
original conjecture; yet there seems to be no
guarantee either (a) that there are not still
counterexamples within the shrunken domain,
or (b) that there are no examples outside it. In-
deed, the further one goes in trying to achieve
(a), the greater the likelihood that one fails to
achieve (b). So there is now a move in the op-
posite direction, an attempt to replace the origi-
nal naive conjecture C with a deeper, more
comprehensive, and more sophisticated conjec-
ture that, instead of giving a fixed value to
V — E + F, predicts its values for all varieties of
polyhedra according to certain parameters, say
n and e, where n and e stand for the number of
certain abstract properties that any given poly-
hedron has. If this can be done, the domain of
the original C may be reconquered, perhaps
even extended.
In this dialectical development, the process of
"proving" ideas is really a process of improving
them. The concepts of "polyhedron," etc., are
continually stretched and modified. Lakatos
complained that when the end product of all

this mathematical endeavor appears in a
mathematics textbook as a formally proven theo-
rem with its exciting informal prehistory sup-
pressed, it will be practically unintelligible; the
proof will be preceded by laborious definitions
(he mentioned a 1962 definition of "ordinary
polyhedron" which fills 45 lines!) which cannot
be grasped intuitively and the historical ra-
tionale for which is not given, but which trivi-
ally guarantee the validity of the theorem.
The Descartes-Euler conjecture was an ex-
cellent vehicle for Lakatos' philosophical ideas
because its subject matter is relatively concrete
(mineralogy suggested some of the counterex-
amples) and easily visualizable, and the non-
mathematician can follow the story through
most of its stages. Critics, however, have sug-
gested that this case study was not a representa-
tive piece of mathematics, and that Lakatos
placed too general an interpretation upon it.
But he did not confine himself to this one case.
He exhibited a similar pattern in the history of
an abstract mathematical idea, namely that the
limit of any convergent series of continuous
functions is itself continuous, an idea that was
proved by Augustin L. Cauchy and refuted by
Charles Fourier. In his "A Renaissance of Em-
piricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathe-
matics?" (1976Z?) he claimed, with supporting
quotations from Bertrand Russell, A. A. Fraen-
kel, Rudolf Carnap, Haskell B. Curry, Willard
Quine, J. B. Rosser, Alonzo Church, Kurt Godel,
Hermann Weyl, John von Neumann, Paul Ber-
nays, Andrzej Mostowski, L. Kalmar, and others,
that David Hilbert's program of establishing
"once and for all" the certitude of mathematics
has broken down irretrievably, and that mathe-
matics as a whole must now be regarded as
quasi-empirical: its axioms are hypotheses
whose truth, and even consistency, are not guar-
anteed. Truth-values are injected not at the top
but at the bottom of the system, as in the em-
pirical sciences.
Having extended Popperian conjecturalism
from empirical science to a field to which Pop-
per himself had not ventured to extend it, La-
katos began to shift his philosophical interests
back from mathematics to empirical science. In
1965 he organized a remarkable colloquium at
Bedford College, London. As well as including
many of the world's leading mathematical logi-
cians, it brought together in an amicable con-
frontation, for the first time since the far-off
days of the Vienna Circle, the inductivist and
anti-inductivist methodologies of Carnap and
LAKATOS, IMRE 401
Popper. Thomas Kuhn was also there, a third
pole in the discussion. The proceedings of this
colloquium, published in four volumes edited by
Lakatos in cooperation with Alan Musgrave
(1967-1970), were valuable for, among other
things, their critical exchanges of opposing
viewpoints. The last, Criticism and the Growth
of Knowledge, became a best seller. It included
a long essay by Lakatos in which he developed
his "methodology of scientific research pro-
grammes." Although still in the Popperian tra-
dition of critical rationalism and fiercely op-
posed to Kuhn's psychosocial approach to
science, it involved a move towards Kuhn's gov-
erning idea of a scientific paradigm: "my con-
cept of a 'research programme' may be viewed
as an objective, 'third world' reconstruction of
Kuhn's socio-psychological concept of 'para-
digm' " (p. 179, note 1). In Lakatos' methodology
the basic unit and object of appraisal in science
is no longer a scientific theory, as it stands at a
given time, but rather a research program that
results in a sequence of theories over a period
of time. What gives a research program its
identity is its "hard core," a set of tenaciously
retained fundamental ideas, and its "heuristic,"
which advises how the "protective belt" of sub-
sidiary assumptions round the hard core should
be progressively modified in response to recal-
citrant evidence. A research program is progres-
sive so long as such modifications are not ad
hoc but content increasing, resulting in predic-
tions of novel facts at least some of which are
verified (falsifications being put on the agenda
to be dealt with later). The program is degener-
ating if the modifications are content decreasing
or yield no successful novel predictions. Where
Popper had seen the basic choice as between
rival theories, perhaps decidable by crucial ex-
periments, Lakatos saw it as between rival re-
search programs; and no quick decision be-
tween them is possible, since a degenerating
program may stage a comeback; a "crucial
experiment" is not crucial at the time; at most
it confronts one of the programs with one more
anomaly. However, if it constitutes no anomaly
for the other program, and if this one continues
to progress while the other degenerates, then
that experiment may subsequently, "with long
hindsight," come to be regarded as crucial.
This methodology leads to a new, more ex-
acting, and more revealing historiography of
science. It requires that many new questions be
answered. For instance, it is no longer enough
for a historian to ascertain that a certain pre-
402 LANGER, WILLIAM L.
diction, made on the basis of a theory, was veri-
fied on a given date. He must investigate
whether the prediction was made only after cer-
tain modifications in the theory, whether these
modifications had been in some way ad hoc,
whether the fact predicted was novel or already
known, whether it was or could have been pre-
dicted by the rival program, and so on. Lakatos,
who relished case studies, inaugurated this new
historiography. His example was infectious and
he inspired many of his students and colleagues,
including Peter Clark, John Worrall, Alan Mus-
grave, and Elie Zahar, to develop it further.
Both as a supervisor and as editor of the British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, he de-
voted hours of patient criticism to younger
people's work.
Although he disparaged much of what was
being done in sociology and social psychology,
he regarded some developments in the social
sciences, especially economics, as promising;
and he claimed that his methodology would not
have the destructive effect of Popper's less toler-
ant methodology on budding research programs
in this field. His methodological ideas have been
applied to the IQ (intelligence quotient) debate
by Peter Urbach (1974) and to theoretical de-
velopments in economics by Spiro Latsis (1976)
and Axel Leijonhufvud.
A lecture by Lakatos was always an occasion:
the room crowded, the atmosphere electric, and
from time to time a gale of laughter. From 1964
on he often lectured in the United States. He
had friends all over the world with whom he
corresponded indefatigably. He also had ene-
mies; for his sharp wit could be biting and he
was sometimes a ruthless campaigner. A rift
opened between him and Karl Popper (see the
exchange between them in Schilpp 1974). The
political issues that most exercised Lakatos were
either geopolitical (especially the vulnerability
of the Western world to the forces threatening
it) or academic (especially threats to academic
autonomy, whether from governments or from
student militants). During his life in England
his political views veered from left of center to-
wards the right; but he always retained a demo-
cratic informality in his personal relations.
JOHN WATKINS
WORKS BY LAKATOS
1967-1970 International Colloquium in the Philos-
ophy of Science, Proceedings. Edited by Imre
Lakatos et al. Colloquium held at Bedford College.
London, 1965. 4 vols. Vols. 1-3: Amsterdam: North-
Holland; Vol. 4: Cambridge Univ. Press. —> Volume 1.
Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics.
Volume 2: The Problem of Inductive Logic. Volume
3: Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Volume
4: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.
1976a Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathe-
matical Discovery. Edited by John Worrall and Elie
Zahar. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
1976b A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent
Philosophy of Mathematics? British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 27:201-223. -» Published
for the first time posthumously.
1978 Philosophical Papers. Edited by John Worrall
and Gregory Currie. 2 vols. Cambridge Univ. Press.
—» Volume 1: The Methodology of Scientific Re-
search Programmes. Volume 2: Mathematics, Sci-
ence and Epistemology.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
COHEN, R. S.; FEYERABEND, P. K.; and WARTOFSKY,
M. W. (editors) 1976 Essays in Memory of
Imre Lakatos. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, Vol. 39. Dordrecht (Netherlands) and
Boston: Reidel.
HOWSON, COLIN (editor) 1976 Method and Appraisal
in the Physical Sciences. New York: Cambridge
Univ. Press.
LATSIS, SPIRO (editor) 1976 Method and Appraisal
in Economics. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
POLYA, GYORGY (1945) 1957 How to Solve It. 2d ed.
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
SCHILPP, PAUL A. (editor) 1974 The Philosophy of
Karl Popper. 2 vols. La Salle, 111.: Open Court.
URBACH, PETER 1974 Progress and Degeneration in
the "I.Q. Debate." British Journal for the Philos-
ophy of Science 25:99-135, 235-259.
LANGER, WILLIAM L.
William L. Langer (1896-1977) was a leader
in a generation of scholars who established
European international history as a professional
discipline in the United States. In a series of
classic works, he brought to the highest level
of systematic illumination the traditional nar-
rative realism of diplomatic historiography. At
the same time, his sense of the limitations of
diplomatic history as an autonomous field led
him to break open new areas and methods of
historical inquiry.
The second of three sons of a struggling Ger-
man widow, Langer grew up in South Boston
under conditions of poverty and ascetic disci-
pline. A discerning grammar school teacher sent
him to the Boston Latin School, from which he
entered Harvard University. Though his real in-
terests had become history and the classics, the
German-speaking boy, compelled by iron eco-
nomic necessity to be practical, concentrated in
modern languages with an eye to schoolteaching
as a career. The rigors of his experience as
child and youth gave Langer a vivid sense of
reality: delight in its variety, respect for its

power, alertness to its unexpected transforma-
tions, and strong empathy for men trying to
cope with it.
Enlistment in the U.S. Army in World War I
liberated Langer from a confining career as a
preparatory school teacher. At the same time,
the great issues of war and peace turned him
definitively to history as the center of his in-
tellectual life.
Even before he entered graduate school at
Harvard in 1919, Langer had published his first
work of history, that of his army company
(1919). In reintroducing this youthful work, re-
issued in 1965, Langer recreated with charming
self-irony the naive cultural climate in which,
as actor and as author, he had produced it. The
defeat of Wilsonian hopes in the early 1920s,
however, darkened Langer's initiation to the
study of modern European history. His two
principal teachers, Archibald Coolidge and Rob-
ert Lord, gave Langer more than a solid training
in the scholar's craft. Having actively partici-
pated as historical experts in Wilson's "Inquiry,"
which prepared the United States for its role in
peacemaking, they showed Langer by their ex-
ample that a historian could lead a life both
"in and out of the ivory tower," as he was later
to say of himself. As editor of Foreign Affairs,
Coolidge enlisted his young disciple as bibli-
ographer, beginning his lifelong association
with the Council on Foreign Relations, a forum
where the business, academic, and govern-
mental elites met to explore international issues.
Scholarship, government service, and participa-
tion in shaping political opinion thus combined
early as the constituents of Langer's vocation
as historian.
The burning issues of the 1920s—the Treaty
of Versailles, the League of Nations, and respon-
sibility for the European war—attracted to diplo-
matic history many of the most vital young
minds in the profession. Where most students
of European diplomatic relations before 1914
became involved in the more immediate origins
of the war and in the war guilt question, Langer
raised more fundamental questions, those con-
cerning the structure of international politics.
In the introduction to his pathbreaking Euro-
pean Alliances and Alignments (1931), he
wrote: "I have written this book not with the
outbreak of the World War especially in mind,
but as a study in the evolution of the European
states system." This emphasis had two conse-
quences for the character of his work. First, by
eliminating diplomatic events not germane to
LANGER, WILLIAM L. 403
the changing configurations and power group-
ings, Langer achieved both empirical compres-
sion and structural clarity. Thus he could effec-
tively employ diagrams of power alignments to
conceptualize the yield of his narrative. Second,
his approach allowed him to identify readily
with the statesmen operating within the system,
regardless of what states they served.
In the conviction that "a just appreciation of
the past can be gained only if the events of the
past are viewed with the eyes of the actors," he
analyzed the international system essentially as
the product of men playing a game whose rules
were known, but whose stakes became fully
evident only in the course of events. Within
Langer's cool analytic concentration on the
power system, the diplomatic actors could be
shown in all their concreteness as they uncon-
sciously prepared the destruction of the interna-
tional order and their own security. Where the
more moralistic historians of his generation
asked of their recent history, "Who played
foul?," Langer pursued a deeper question:
"What happened to this game, that it should
destroy its players?"
Langer devoted three major works to the Eu-
ropean international system. In the second of
these, European Alliances and Alignments, is
found the touchstone of his interpretation: the
international system at its Bismarckian apogee
(1871-1890). By an exemplary playing off of
international tensions, Bismarck, once his Ger-
man aims were accomplished, is shown by
Langer to have established a multilateral equi-
librium, absorbing new pressures into old order.
Bismarck emerges not only as a diplomatic
virtuoso, but as a statesman who knew how to
actualize the positive potentialities of a politics
of national interest for general European sta-
bility.
The slow disintegration of this system occu-
pied Langer's attention in two other works: The
Franco-Russian Alliance (1929) and The Di-
plomacy of Imperialism (1935). The first of
these analyzed the removal of the Russian key-
stone of Bismarck's edifice of peace. The second,
The Diplomacy of Imperialism, Langer con-
ceived as a direct sequel to European Alliances
and Alignments. He pursued the dynamics of
the breakdown of the European system into the
wider world. Here Langer dissolved the simple
picture of the incipient polarization of Europe
into two camps, current among historians
whose vision was fixed on the alignments of
World War i, into a series of eccentric criss-
 404 LANGER, WILLIAM L.
crosses of imperialist power partnerships as the
measured allemande of the Bismarckian era
turned into a danse macabre.
Even as he deftly articulated the new com-
plexities of the international system, bringing
Rankean realism to a kind of Ptolemaic perfec-
tion, Langer developed doubts about the efficacy
of diplomatic history as an autonomous field,
and a sense of uneasiness about his own
achievement in it. How could one account for
the extraordinary aggressivity of the European
great powers, at once so predatory and so self-
destructive, as they fanned out into the hapless
world of weaker societies? Within The Diplo-
macy of Imperialism, Langer devoted a chapter
to the internal social and cultural dynamics of
imperialism, using British society as a testing
ground. It was the first but not the last time
that Langer, speaking with all the authority of
a master-consolidator of a historiographical tra-
dition, pointed beyond his own work to new
questions and new approaches.
The ink on The Diplomacy of Imperialism
was scarcely dry when its chronicler found him-
self confronting new outbreaks of the disease
in Italy, Germany, and Japan. For almost two
decades thereafter Langer devoted much of his
life and writing to the contemporary interna-
tional crisis, bringing his historical perspective
to questions of American international policy,
first in the public arena, later as public official.
As chief of the Research and Analysis Branch of
the Office of Strategic Services (1941-1946)
Langer effectively organized scholars of the
most diverse intellectual skills and social out-
looks for political and economic intelligence
work.
His wartime service reactivated Langer's in-
terest in diplomatic history, this time with a
contemporary focus on American foreign policy.
At the initiative of the Department of State, he
produced Our Vichy Gamble (1947), a work
much attacked both because it justified a con-
troversial American policy toward France and
because of the questions it raised concerning
privileged access to documents not open to the
historical profession at large. At the request of
the Council on Foreign Relations, Langer wrote,
in collaboration with S. Everett Gleason, two
basic works on the shaping of American foreign
policy in the final pre-war years: The Challenge
to Isolation, 1937-1940 (1952) and The Unde-
clared War, 1940-1941 (1953).
With government service and the attendant
reengagement in diplomatic history behind him,
Langer took up again the more universal his-
torical problems upon which he had embarked
before the world crisis absorbed his energies.
He brought to completion Political and Social
Upheaval, 1832-1852 (1969b), his own contri-
bution to the influential series which he had
launched in 1931 under the title, The Rise of
Modern Europe. In his own volume and as
editor of the series, Langer sought to reinvigo-
rate the tradition of European universal history
by comparative analysis of European national
societies. Using synchronic cross-sections for
each volume, Langer defined a new scale of
time and social space which made possible a
textual treatment of European culture beyond
the prevailing limitations of political narrative.
Langer devoted the last two decades of his
life to the intellectual explorations that one
normally associates with youth, opening one
door after another into the historiographical
future. His pioneering papers, collected in Part
4 of Explorations in Crisis (1969a), entered
such disparate fields as the historical uses of
psychoanalysis, epidemiological history, and
demographic history.
A few days before his death, Langer received
the first copy of his last book, an autobiography,
In and Out of the Ivory Tower (1977). Its title
expressed well Langer's conception of the his-
torian's vocation, one centering on the reciprocal
illumination of past and present, scholarship
and politics.
CARL E. SCHORSKE
WORKS BY LANGER
(1919) 1965 Gas and Flame in World War I. New
York: Knopf. —» First published as With "E" of the
First Gas, with a chapter by Robert B. MacMullin.
1929 The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
(1931) 1950 European Alliances and Alignments,
1871-1890. 2d ed. New York: Knopf. -> Includes
a supplementary bibliography. A paperback edition
was published by Vintage in 1964.
(1935) 1951 The Diplomacy of Imperialism. 2 vols.
2d ed. New York: Knopf. —> Includes a supplemen-
tary bibliography.
(1940) 1972 LANGER, WILLIAM L. (editor) An En-
cyclopedia of World History. 5th ed., rev. & enl.
New York: Macmillan.
1947 Our Vichy Gamble. New York: Knopf. -» A
paperback edition was published by Norton in 1966.
1952 LANGER, WILLIAM L.; and GLEASON, S. EVERETT
The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940. New York:
Harper. —» A two-volume paperback edition was
published in 1964.
1953 LANGER, WILLIAM L.; and GLEASON, S. EVERETT
The Undeclared War, 1940-1941. New York:
Harper.
1969a Explorations in Crisis: Papers on International

History. Edited with an analytical introduction by
Carl E. Schorske and Elizabeth Schorske. Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap. —» A "Chronological List of Wil-
liam L. Langer's Publications" is on pages 497-500.
1969b Political and Social Upheaval, 1832-1852. New
York: Harper. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1969.
1977 In and Out of the Ivory Tower: The Autobiog-
raphy of William L. Longer. New York: Watson.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
SCHORSKE, CARL E. 1969 Introduction. Pages ix-xliv
in William L. Langer, Explorations in Crisis: Papers community. At the university, Lasswell was at
on International History. Edited with an analytical
introduction by Carl E. Schorske and Elizabeth
Schorske. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap.
WOLFF, ROBERT LEE 1977 William Leonard Langer.
Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings 89:
187-195.
LASSWELL, HAROLD D.
Harold D. Lasswell's voluminous writings
may be described as "prose mathematics."
Throughout his career, Lasswell's guiding pur- and Europe. Lasswell was deeply impressed by
pose has been to develop a theory about man
in society that is comprehensive and that draws
on all of the social sciences. Accordingly, one
looks first for those key terms that are the basic
components of Lasswell's system of thinking,
for his lifework has produced just that—a sys-
tem of thinking about the private and public
lives of Homo sapiens. The key terms are spelled
out explicitly by Lasswell himself.
How did Lasswell, a many-faceted, perfectly
polished gem emerge from the rich but rough-
cut ores of the Middle West? For, Lasswell, who
was born in 1902 and died in 1978, had no
doubts about the importance of his Middle
Western childhood to his subsequent develop-
ment. His father was a Presbyterian minister
and his mother a schoolteacher. Because his
father's ministry kept changing, the family often
moved from one small town to another in Indi-
ana and southern Illinois. As a result, Lasswell
acquired a vivid sense and a deep knowledge
of the whole Ohio River valley, especially of its
small mining and farming communities.
During his early years, the Middle West was
an extraordinary mix of diverse peoples and
cultures, who, in order to live together construc- second-class citizens in the commonwealth of
tively, had to develop an open society—a series
of communities receptive to all other cultural
ways and eager to find similar values in belief
and behavior. This experience was one of the
factors that enabled Lasswell to realize that the
priority task of social science should be to make
explicit the theory of human interaction.
LASSWELL, HAROLD D. 405
When Lasswell entered the University of Chi-
cago at the age of 16, he had already read
deeply in modern philosophy. He had mastered
Kant as well as the works of Freud, which his
uncle had acquired to seek guidance with some
difficult cases in his medical practice. Lasswell
found nothing especially odd about these books
and was surprised to learn of the furor that
Freud's writings were causing in the academic
the core of the intellectual ferment that existed
during the decade following World War I. He
studied a variety of disciplines, ranging from
medicine and the life sciences to economics and
the social sciences. His dissertation, Propaganda
Technique in the World War (1927), became
a major work in the development of communi-
cations research.
It is worth noting particularly how Lasswell
handled the philosophy of "logical positivism,"
which was then ascendant in the United States
the application of mathematical (symbolic)
analysis to complex propositions. How early and
well he restricted their ideology by partial in-
corporation of their insights into his own sys-
tematics is illustrated by his famous (and
deliberately insoluble) protomathematical equa-
tion : p } d } r = P. This signifies that when pri-
vate motives (p) are displaced (d) in public
rationale (r), the product is political man (P).
Lasswell's intention, in using the inoperative
symbol } to mean "transformed into," was to
focus attention on the complex process by which
subjective events enter the arena of public
policy.
This illustrates the important Lasswellian
concept of "restriction by partial incorporation."
The work of Rudolf Carnap, Alfred Tarski, and
Hans Reichenbach (who, later, contributed an
important paper to The Policy Sciences [Lerner
& Lasswell 1951]) certainly figured in Lasswell's
subsequent development of quantitative seman-
tics. Yet, since he was already moving toward
his own systematics, young Lasswell rejected
the "ism" associated with this philosophical
school "because it treated subjective events as
scientific inquiry."
When one compares the published work of
all these thinkers with Lasswell's, one finds
little evidence of direct influence as revealed by
"borrowings." Even his use of Freudian ideas
involved transformations, not transfers. Al-
though scrupulous in his footnote references,
 406 LASSWELL, HAROLD D.
Lasswell always used them mainly to share his
intellectual discoveries with less voracious and
wide-ranging readers. The use of thoughts
formed by others has always involved, for
Lasswell, a "transformation" of their ideas
into his own terminology and systematics. Thus
his transformation of Charles E. Merriam's
"credenda and miranda," and of Karl Mann-
heim's "ideology, Utopia, and myth." Thus, su-
premely, his transformation of logical positivism
into content analysis and of Alfred North White-
head's "manifold of events" into the Lasswellian
system of "configurative analysis."
At a time when many people thought that
values were God-given and enshrined in patris-
tic texts, and many others were embroiled in
such controversies as nature z;s. nurture, Lass-
well's incisive formulation pointed to the path
that social scientists have followed to their
benefit ever since. In his years at the University
of Chicago as a teacher (1924-1938), he
worked mainly with the three basic value cate-
gories of "income, safety, and respect." In his
later years at Yale University (1945-1975), he
developed an apparently simple, but richly pro-
ductive matrix of eight values that endlessly
interacted upon each other. These values were
power, wealth, well-being, enlightenment, skill,
affection, respect, and rectitude.
Although reticent about his own develop-
ment, Lasswell could be generous in evaluating
the intellectual contributions of other scholars.
Thus, in recalling his years at Chicago, he
spoke warmly of his many great teachers, class-
mates, and colleagues—notably such figures as
George Herbert Mead, Robert E. Park, Frank H.
Knight, Charles E. Merriam, and T. V. Smith.
In speaking of his early Wanderjahre in Europe,
he gave high praise to Graham Wallas, the "cre-
ative evolution" thinkers around Henri Bergson,
and the vigorous investigators activated by
Sigmund Freud. In his travels between Chicago
and Europe, Lasswell developed serious intellec-
tual interactions with scholars on the East
coast, notably with Elton Mayo, Karen Horney,
and Harry Stack Sullivan.
Of Las swell's many contributions to twentieth-
century thought, a number have earned perma-
nent places in the development of the social
sciences. In an effort to describe Lasswell's in-
tellectual history, Bruce L. Smith, his long-time
collaborator, divided his major contributions
into seven categories: (1) organization of the
research field now known as communication;
(2) qualitative and quantitative content analy-
sis; (3) developmental constructs of world elites
and social orders; (4) specification of a theory
of values; (5) linkage of classical political
thought with empirical research; (6) studies in
legal theory; (7) collection of world trend data
(Rogow 1969).
Using pragmatic philosophy, as expounded
by George Herbert Mead and John Dewey,
Lasswell began to evolve the mode of thinking
which, over the next sixty years, he developed
into his own systematics, known as "configura-
tive analysis." Central to his analytic system
has been the clarification of values as a motivat-
ing force in human life. Building his own sys-
tematics during the decades when scientism
dominated each of the social sciences in turn,
Lasswell always stressed the importance of
normative functions in human enterprises. Al-
though a behaviorist, he never became an addict
of behaviorism (or of any other ideological "ism").
His role as a founding father of behavioral sci-
ence was certified from the moment in his youth
when he defined values as "objects of desire—
what people want."
A central term in Lasswell's system is "con-
text." In his perspective, any detail of human
behavior became significant only when it was
located in an appropriate time-space configura-
tion. Within such a context, analysis becomes
possible, for then behavioral details can be de-
scribed and interpreted in terms of a natural
and historical "manifold of events"—a concept
that struck Lasswell as particularly productive
in his reading of Whitehead, because it required
researchers to amplify as fully as possible the
context of all relationships under study.
Working with complex patterns of behavior,
then handled separately in different academic
departments, Lasswell's first priority was to lo-
cate diverse items that could be studied and
observed under a unifying context. Once a con-
figuration was established, he searched for intel-
lectual tools that would permit valid comparison
with other configurations developed according
to different terminologies and referring to dif-
ferent time-space frames. The tools that served
this purpose grew out of Lasswell's concept of
"functional equivalence." Through the idea of
"equivalencies," Lasswell had, by 1935, in World
Politics and Personal Insecurity, developed his
own rich configurative version of structural-
functional analysis long before this phrase be-
came commonplace in the postwar social
sciences.
An example of the research tools that

Lasswell invented to bring scientific exactness
into the empirical study of equivalencies is con-
tent analysis, alternatively known as quantita-
tive semantics. Lasswell was one of the first
social scientists to use content analysis to ex-
amine the formation of public opinion. His
famous definition of communication as "who
says what to whom with what effect" is still used
as a basis for research in the field.
During the decade before World War n, he
used content analysis to study political propa-
ganda. After providing the key ideas of propa-
ganda analysis (1927), he was later to invent
the research tools of content analysis in the
1930s and perfect them during World War n,
when the United States government, out of ne-
cessity, encouraged such research. Lasswell
served as director of a wartime project at the
Library of Congress, which produced the un-
precedented studies published as Language of
Politics (Lasswell et al. 1949). In the immediate
postwar years, he was the intellectual mentor
of the research project on "the world revolution
of our time" at Stanford, which compared the
political symbols used in the editorials of the
major newspapers of five countries from 1890
to 1950. Lasswell devised the symbol code that
was instrumental in the search for equivalen-
cies across these many nations and decades.
Originally published at Stanford as separate
monographs, these studies have since been re-
published in a single volume as The Prestige
Press (Pool, Lerner, & Lasswell 1970).
In the course of his studies in communica-
tions and international relations, Lasswell con-
cluded that only a small group of elites in any
country is aware of developments or pays atten-
tion to changes in foreign policy, and this find-
ing is still supported by the results of more
recent research (1935; Lasswell, Lerner, &
Rothwell 1952).
As indicated, the core of Lasswell's system
is the philosophical analysis of the time-space
configuration which shapes every "manifold of
events" in terms that make them amenable to
empirical inquiry. For Lasswell, the world was
the appropriate spatial unit for political analy-
sis. Long before it became fashionable to speak
of a "global village," Lasswell perceived that
both the centripetal and centrifugal trends of
current history (what he has called the "zigs"
and "zags") were operating on a worldwide
basis. His earliest published paper was entitled
"Political Policies and the International Invest-
ment Market." His most famous political fore-
LASSWELL, HAROLD D. 407
cast—that the postwar world would be bipolar-
ized in a cold war led by the two superpowers-
was presented in World Politics Faces Eco-
nomics (1945).
To understand the global texture of Lasswell's
thinking, we must take into account his multi-
versal personality and culture. As a contem-
porary Renaissance man, he was at home in every
region of the world, was a gifted amateur of all
the arts, and was a systematic student of archi-
tecture. While Lasswell's place in intellectual
history is assured by his prose mathematics—
his rigorous logical analysis of empirical
propositions in a contextual framework—it is
doubtful that a person of less global interests
could have conceived so richly textured a sys-
tematics as configurative thinking. Witness his
creation of "plain language" radio shows, such
as the National Broadcasting Company's series
on "Human Nature in Action" in the late 1930s.
Witness also his Politics: Who Gets What,
When, How (1936), possibly the best selling
book among comprehensive treatises of politi-
cal science in the twentieth century. Both the high
standards of scholarship in his professional
writings and his capacity for "plain talk" are
essential in understanding why Lasswell, when
World War n erupted, was equipped to turn
his attention to any type of problem that he
thought was significant for the future of the
world.
After World War n, Lasswell decided to con-
centrate on law, and at Yale University, he be-
gan his famous collaboration with Myres S.
McDougal, which reshaped much of current
legal thinking and education in terms of a con-
tinuing concern with "law, science, and policy."
They produced, among other books during the
past three decades, the landmark Law and Pub-
lic Order in Space (McDougal, Vlasio, &
Lasswell 1963). At no point did Lasswell lessen
his concern with systematizing the world arena
as the appropriate observational unit for all the
social sciences, as is indicated by the publica-
tion of the World Handbook of Political and
Social Indicators (Russett, Lasswell et al. 1964)
and his World Revolutionary Elites (Lasswell
& Lerner 1965). This theme is continued in his
three-volume work entitled Propaganda and
Communication in World History (Lasswell,
Lerner, & Speier 1979).
Lasswell's idea of context required systema-
tization of time as well as space. For space,
"the world" would do until some larger and
more useful observational unit became apparent
 408 LASSWELL, HAROLD D.
to him (as in projecting the characteristics of
"outer space"). For time, the mechanical units
of year, decade, and century really did not suit
Lass well at all. In the pragmatic tradition, he
saw time as a continuous process which could
be periodized meaningfully only in relation to
an appropriate "manifold of events." Some such
time units may be short, as in dealing with the
phases of world revolutionary communism initi-
ated in Russia by the Bolshevik revolution of
1918. Other time units may be very long, as in
characterizing the equivalencies that developed
over centuries among the valley empires along
the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, and Ganges rivers.
Once the appropriate time-space dimensions
were brought into configuration, Lasswell was
ready to test all systems for readiness and to
arrange all technical details for the planned
empirical exploration. Lasswell always kept the
human factor in the center of configurational
analysis. Since the appearance of Psychopath-
ology and Politics (1930), so much has been
written about Lasswell's pioneering integration
of psychoanalytic insights with political analy-
sis that one need here only refer to the vast
literature by and about Lasswell in this area
(Lasswell 1948£>; 19720). How Lasswell trans-
formed Freudian concepts to serve political
analysis is most clearly illustrated in his paper
on "The Triple Appeal Principle" (reprinted in
Lasswell 1948a). Here Lasswell transforms
Freud's triad of id-ego-superego into instru-
ments of content analysis for the policy sciences.
Let us note, in now turning to the policy science
dimension of Lasswell's systematics, that he
early developed a hominocentric-contextual
definition of the policy process: "Man acting
upon resources through institutions to achieve
goals." The policy sciences seek to integrate all
of the behavioral sciences in behalf of human
values and social goals, and to evaluate the ap-
plicability of our current knowledge for the solu-
tion of specific problems.
As the creator of the policy sciences, Lasswell
achieved his own goal of integrating knowledge
and action—the goal that Plato set in The Re-
public as the one that could be achieved, in the
simpler context of democracy at Athens, by uni-
fying a single class of "philosopher-kings."
Lasswell, deeply aware of the modern division
of labor and committed to the values of plural-
ism, early perceived that the Platonic solution
was no solution at all for his time-space con-
figuration. Nor was Marx, who read all signs
portending revolution—of ten in the wrong places
at the wrong times—able to think of alternatives
to his own prediction (a key phrase in Lasswell's
policy sciences). Lasswell could think beyond
Marx's time-space limits, while respecting
Marx's scholarship and acumen, because he per-
ceived them as a transient historical configura-
tion. Lasswell, well versed in the Streit um Marx,
therefore had to create alternative ways of look-
ing at the world-in-progress. The impact of
Marx upon intellectuals in our century has been
great, but Lasswell was not abashed.
Lasswell's conception of the policy sciences
brought together the main strands of his earlier
thinking that we have sketched above and which
was foreshadowed in his great, perhaps great-
est, book, World Politics and Personal Insecurity
(1935). This major work set forth precepts of
configurational analysis and illustrated them in
a series of brilliant chapters that have taken
social scientists nearly half a century to absorb.
Known as his most difficult book, this volume
exemplifies his skill as a master of prose mathe-
matics. Actually, the vocabulary employed is
very simple—words such as income, safety, and
respect—but there are two features of the style
that were virtually unknown in the social sci-
ences : (1) the use of simple terms from and
across many different fields of knowledge; (2)
the use of these terms in a rigorous manner, so
that each meant the same thing at all times.
Lasswell's key terms were presented most
fully in Power and Society (Lasswell & Kaplan
1950), and most recently and compactly in a
Pre-view of Policy Sciences (1971). According
to Lasswell, the five main components of policy
thinking were (1) setting the goals; (2) identi-
fying the major trends; (3) studying the prevail-
ing conditions; (4) projecting future changes;
and (5) considering alternatives. He also de-
fined the seven main phases of every decision
making process as (1) intelligence (explaining
the problem); (2) promotion (discussion of al-
ternatives); (3) prescription (choosing one of
the alternatives); (4) invocation of the alterna-
tive; (5) application of the alternative; (6)
appraisal of the results; and (7) termination of
the decision process. In every configurative
analysis, special attention must be given to iden-
tification, expectation, and demand, which are
the three principal components of individual
and public opinion.
Since the appearance of World Politics and
Personal Insecurity more than forty years ago,
Lasswell has articulated and explicated its many
meanings. In an article, "Sino-Japanese Crisis:

The Garrison State vs. the Civilian State,"
(1937), he presented his major formulation of
a "developmental construct"—a basic concept
for the policy sciences since it brings together
the five essentials of configurative analysis:
goals, trends, conditions, projections, and alterna-
tives. Hardly a year went by without Lasswell's
contributing some further elaboration and re-
finement of the basic concepts and techniques
of policy thinking. All of his wartime work in
developing content analysis demonstrated em-
pirically a systematic way of handling the daily
flow of world verbiage for the rigorous analysis
of policy processes.
During World War n social scientists from
many disciplines were pressed into wartime
service under circumstances that obliged them
to blend policy relevance with scientific rigor.
During the years following the war, Lasswell
undertook to integrate these wartime efforts
across the full range of the social sciences, from
anthropology through psychology to zoology.
Following Lasswell's preoccupation with spa-
tial units of observation, he brought together a
volume entitled The Policy Sciences: Recent De-
velopments in Scope and Method (Lerner &
Lasswell 1951). The contents ranged from the
person (Ernest R. Hilgard) through the group
(Edward Shils), the nation (Mead), culture
(Clyde Kluckhohn) to the world (Lasswell).
Devoted as always to the integration of concept
and method, Lasswell designed the second half
of the book to make explicit the methodological
advances achieved during the preceding decade.
These papers were often written by younger
scholars—many of them barely known outside
of their own disciplines at the time—such as
Kenneth J. Arrow, Alex Bavelas, and Herbert
H. Hyman. With the publication of this book,
Lasswell's system of thinking was baptized—or
at least named.
After the publication of The Policy Sciences
and his commitment to the term policy sciences,
Lasswell developed a strategy of collaborating
with outstanding specialists in many disciplines.
Himself a master of many fields of knowledge,
and always a reliable collaborator with people
working on problems he considered important,
Lasswell's production over the past 25 years
may be considered as one man's demonstra-
tion of the effectiveness of multidisciplinary
efforts. His many books foresaw and subsumed
virtually all of the major intellectual currents
that have recently emerged in the social sciences
around the world.
LASSWELL, HAROLD D. 409
One example is "development." As the first
flush of enthusiasm over American aid faded,
Lasswell spelled out the inadequacies of a policy
based on transfers of technical assistance. In
World Politics, he published a masterful review
of the literature of the development of the policy
sciences, which provided a framework for devel-
opment thinking. Always concerned with inter-
weaving broad concepts with empirical details,
Lasswell also summarized the highly innovative
studies he was making in the Andes Mountains
of Peru with anthropologist Allen Holmberg
(1965).
A second example is "futurology." This had
long ago been articulated in Lasswell's idea of
the "developmental construct" and exemplified
in his own projections of the "garrison-prison
state" and the "bipolar world arena." Scholars
will long remember Lasswell's presidential ad-
dress about the future to the American Political
Science Association, which he expounded further
in The Future of Political Science (1963). The
futurological emphasis has continued through-
out his more recent writings, such as The Fu-
ture of World Communication (1972a) and
"The Future of Government and Politics in the
United States" (1975).
This brief essay has given only the barest
sketch of an intellectual giant. Lasswell was the
American of our century about whom it can be
said as truly as the Renaissance said of its great-
est thinkers: "Nothing human is alien to him."
What Lasswell accomplished went even beyond
the erudition of the great men of the Renais-
sance, who sought to encompass all knowledge
within a single cerebrum. Lasswell did this at a
time when knowledge had expanded by several
orders of magnitude and when the information
explosion had weakened many lesser spirits. The
conclusion is borne upon us that, in Lasswell,
we are dealing with a true original in the classic
sense.
DANIEL LERNER
WORKS BY LASSWELL
1924 ATKINS, WILLARD EARL; and LASSWELL, HAROLD
D. Labor Attitudes and Problems. New York:
Prentice-Hall.
(1927) 1971 Propaganda Technique in World War I.
Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. —> This was Lass-
well's Ph.D. dissertation. First published with the
title Propaganda Technique in the World War.
(1930) 1960 Psychopathology and Politics. New ed.
New York: Viking. —» A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1977.
1935 World Politics and Personal Insecurity. New
York: McGraw-Hill. —» A paperback edition was
published by the Free Press in 1965.
410 LASS WELL, HAROLD D.
(1935) 1969 LASS WELL, HAROLD D.; CASEY, RALPH D.;
and SMITH, BRUCE L. Propaganda and Promotional
Activities: An Annotated Bibliography. Univ. of
Chicago Press. —> Includes a new introduction by
Lasswell.
(1936) 1950 Politics: Who Gets What, When, How.
New York: Peter Smith.
1937 Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State vs. the
Civilian State. China Quarterly 2:643-649.
(1939) 1970 LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; and JONES, DOR-
OTHY BLUMENSTOCK World Revolutionary Propa-
ganda: A Chicago Study. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for
Libraries Press.
1941 Democracy Through Public Opinion. Menasha,
Wis.: George Banta.
1945 World Politics Faces Economics. New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill.
1946 LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; CASEY, RALPH D.; and
SMITH, BRUCE L. (editors) Propaganda, Communi-
cation, and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Refer-
ence Guide. Princeton Univ. Press.
(1948a) 1966 The Analysis of Political Behavior: An
Empirical Approach. Hamden, Conn.: Archon.
(1948fc) 1976 Power and Personality. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
(1949) 1965 LASSWELL, HAROLD D. et al. Language of
Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
(1950) 1971 National Security and Individual Free-
dom. New York: Da Capo.
1950 LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; and KAPLAN, ABRAHAM
Power and Society. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
-» A paperback edition was published in 1963.
1951 The World Revolution of Our Time: A Frame-
work for Basic Policy Research. Hoover Institute
Studies, Series A: General Studies, No. 1. Stanford
Univ. Press.
(1951) 1968 LERNER, DANIEL; and LASSWELL, HAR-
OLD D. (editors) The Policy Sciences: Recent Devel-
opments in Scope and Method. Stanford Univ. Press.
1952 LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; LERNER, DANIEL; and
ROTHWELL, E. EASTON The Comparative Study of
Elites. Stanford Univ. Press.
1960 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; LASSWELL, HAROLD D.
et al. Studies in World Public Order. New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press.
1961 ARENS, RICHARD; and LASSWELL, HAROLD D. In
Defense of Public Order: The Emerging Field of
Sanction Law. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
(1963) 1974 The Future of Political Science. West-
port, Conn.: Greenwood.
1963 LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; and ROGOW, ARNOLD A.
Power, Corruption, and Rectitude. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1963 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; VLASIO, IVAN A; and
LASSWELL, HAROLD D. Law and Public Order in
Space. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1964 RUSSETT, BRUCE M.; LASSWELL, HAROLD D. et al.
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1965 The Emerging Policy Sciences of Development:
The Vicos Case. American Behavioral Scientist 7,
no. 7, March: 28-33.
1965 LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; and LERNER, DANIEL
World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive
Ideological Movements. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.
Press. —> A paperback edition was published in
1967.
1966 RUBENSTEIN, ROBERT; and LASSWELL, HAROLD D.
The Sharing of Power in a Psychiatric Hospital.
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1967 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; MILLER, JAMES C.; and
LASSWELL, HAROLD D. The Interpretation of Agree-
ments and World Public Order: Principles of Con-
tent and Procedure. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1968 Policy Sciences. Volume 12, pages 181-189 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1970 NAMENWIRTH, J. Zvi; and LASSWELL, HAROLD D.
The Changing Language of American Values: A
Computer Study of Selected Party Platforms. Sage
Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, Vol. 1.
Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
1970 POOL, ITHIEL DE SOLA; LERNER, DANIEL; and
LASSWELL, HAROLD D. The Prestige Press. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
1971 Pre-view of Policy Sciences. New York: Ameri-
can Elsevier.
1971 DOBYNS, HENRY F.; DOUGHTY, PAUL L.; and
LASSWELL, HAROLD D. Peasants, Power and Applied
Social Change: Vicos as a Model. Beverly Hills,
Calif.: Sage.
1972a The Future of World Communication: Quality
and Style of Life. Papers of the East-West Com-
munications Institute, Vol. 4 (September). Hono-
lulu: East-West Center, University of Hawaii.
1972fr Future Systems of Identity in the World Com-
munity. Volume 4, pages 3-31 in C. Black and
R. Falk (editors), The Future of the International
Legal Order. Volume 4: The Structure of the Inter-
national Environment. Princeton Univ. Press.
1975 The Future of Government and Politics in the
United States. Pages 1-21 in Louis Rubin (editor),
The Future of Education: Perspectives on Tomor-
row's Schooling. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
1975 LASSWELL, HAROLD D. et al. Policy Sciences and
Population. Edited by Warren F. Ilchman et al. Lex-
ington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
1976 LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; LERNER, DANIEL; and
MONTGOMERY, JOHN D. (editors) Values and De-
velopment: Appraising Asian Experience. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
1979 LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; LERNER, DANIEL; and
SPEIER, HANS Propaganda and Communication in
World History. Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ROGOW, ARNOLD A. (editor) 1969 Politics, Personal-
ity, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century:
Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell. Univ. of
Chicago Press. —> Includes a "Preface" by Arnold A.
Rogow, pp. vii-X; "Harold Lasswell: A Memoir" by
Leo Rosten, pp. 1-13; "The Maddening Methods of
Harold D. Lasswell" by Heinz Eulau, pp. 15-40; "The
Mystifying Intellectual History of Harold D. Lass-
well" by Bruce Lannes Smith, pp. 41-105; "Psycho-
analysis and the Study of Autonomic Behavior" by
Roy R. Grinker, Sr., pp. 107-122; "Toward a Psychi-
atry of Politics" by Arnold A. Rogow, pp. 123-145;
"The Study of Political Processes in Psychiatric Ill-
ness and Treatment" by Robert Rubenstein, pp. 147-
154; "Content Analysis and the Study of the 'Sym-
bolic Environment'" by Morris Janowitz, pp. 155-
170; "Managing Communication for Modernization:
A Developmental Construct" by Daniel Lerner, pp.
171-196; "Content Analysis and the Intelligence
Function" by Ithiel de Sola Pool, pp. 197-223; "Sci-
entific Heroism From a Standpoint Within Social
Psychology" by Arthur J. Brodbeck, pp. 225-259;
"Dynamic Functionalism" by Allan R. Holmberg,
pp. 261-295; "Reflections on Deference" by Edward
Shils, pp. 297-345; "Some Quantitative Constraints
on Value Allocations in Society and Politics" by Karl
W. Deutsch, pp. 347-365; "Harold D. Lasswell and

the Study of World Politics: Configurative Analysis,
Garrison State, and World Commonwealth" by Wil-
liam T. R. Fox, pp. 367-381; "Legal Education for a
Free Society: Our Collective Responsibility" by Myres
S. McDougal, pp. 383-405; "Bibliography of World
by Harold D. Lasswell" compiled by Jerry Gaston,
pp. 407-443.
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
Paul Felix Lazarsfeld was born in Vienna on
February 13, 1901. In 1933, he went to the
United States as a Rockefeller Foundation fel-
low. He remained in America after the end of
his fellowship; became a naturalized citizen;
and for three decades was a professor of so-
ciology at Columbia University. He died in New
York City on August 30, 1976.
Trained as a mathematician, Lazarsfeld first
thought of himself as a psychologist; only in
midlife did he become identified as a sociologist.
His major interests were the methodology of
social research and the development of insti-
tutes for training and research in the social
sciences. Because of the originality and diversity
of his ideas, his energy and personal magnetism,
his unique style of collaboration with students
and colleagues, and the productivity of the re-
search institutes he established, his influence
upon sociology and social research—both in the
United States and in Europe—has been extra-
ordinary.
The Vienna years
Lazarsfeld came from a professional family
active in the musical, cultural, and political life
of turn-of-the-century Vienna. His father, Rob-
ert, was a lawyer in private practice who, in
1908, published a book on jurisprudence; it is
reported that he often defended young political
activists without fee. His mother, Sofie, was
trained in analytic psychology by Alfred Adler.
She wrote a book on the emancipation of women
and practiced Adlerian individual psychology
much of her life, still seeing patients up to her
death in her early nineties in New York City, a
few weeks after the death of her son. Lazars-
feld's father died in Paris in 1940; his sister
Elizabeth moved to Paris when the Nazis came
to power in Austria and was awarded French
citizenship for her work with the Maquis.
Lazarsfeld had three successive marriages: to
Marie Jahoda, Herta Herzog, and Patricia L.
Kendall—all his students, all his co-workers, and
all accomplished social scientists. His daughter
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 411
Lottie Bailyn is a social psychologist; his son
Robert, a mathematician.
Socialist youth. Sofie Lazarsfeld's association
with another, unrelated, Adler—Friedrich—had
more of an impact upon her son than did her
association with Alfred Adler. Friedrich was a
mathematician and physicist. During the war
years, Sofie Lazarsfeld's home became a social
center for the socialist leaders of Vienna, and
Friedrich Adler became a close friend of the
Lazarsfeld family and something of a hero and
surrogate father to Lazarsfeld, whose father was
at the front. (It was Adler who was largely re-
sponsible for Lazarsfeld's lifelong interest in
mathematics.) Adler was the leader of the anti-
war faction of the socialist party. When the par-
liament was suspended, and heavy censorship
prevented access to public opinion, Adler assas-
sinated the prime minister, Count Karl Stiirghk,
in August 1916, in order to be able to voice his
concerns at the trial. Lazarsfeld both visited him
and corresponded with him while he was in
prison awaiting trial. Later he attended the trial,
and was arrested for taking part in a courtroom
demonstration when Adler was convicted.
Austrian socialism in those years was not just
another political movement, particularly for the
Lazarsfeld family and its friends. Recalling that
time and place, Lazarsfeld's boyhood friend
Hans Zeisel has noted that "for a brief moment
in history, the humanist ideals of democratic
socialism attained reality in the city of Vienna
and gave new dignity and pride to the working
class and the intellectuals who had won it"
(1979b). Socialism was the familial, social, in-
tellectual, and political environment of Lazars-
feld's early years; he once said that he was a
socialist the way he was a Viennese: by birth,
and without much reflection. He was active as a
leader in socialist student organizations, he cre-
ated a monthly newspaper for socialist students,
and he helped found what Zeisel recalls as "a
political cabaret that was to play a seminal role
in the development of both the political and
theater history of Vienna" (1979b). Lazarsfeld's
first publication, coauthored with Ludwig Wag-
ner and published when he was 23, is a report
on a children's summer camp they had estab-
lished, based on socialist principles.
Although Lazarsfeld often stressed the im-
portance of his early immersion in the socialist
movement, his political activism did not survive
his move to the United States. In later life he
used to say that he was still a socialist "in my
heart," and he once remarked that his intense
412 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
interest in the organization of social research is
"a kind of a sublimation of my frustrated politi-
cal instincts—as I can't run for office, I run
institutes" (1962i>, p. 56). His American stu-
dents and colleagues found him to be essentially
apolitical, with the significant exception that he
felt very strongly that politics and scholarship
should be kept apart. In his memoir he recalls
that his academic supervisor at the University
of Vienna, Charlotte Biihler, objected to the
compassionate tone used in the draft of one of
his contributions to Jugend und Beruf (Lazars-
feld et al. 1931)—a tone that reflected his belief
that social research should be used to improve
the conditions of the working class and to
achieve other socialist ends. Years later he re-
called that this criticism led to his subsequent
insistence that professional and political roles
should be kept separate (1968a, p. 285). For ex-
ample, while he was at Columbia University he
found the political ideas of his colleague
C. Wright Mills intellectually acceptable, some-
times stimulating, but he abhorred the way that
Mills injected them into his teaching and socio-
logical writings (1962b, pp. 149-150).
The Wirtschaftpsychologische Forschungs-
stelle. Lazarsfeld received his PH.D. in applied
mathematics from the University of Vienna in
1925. While a student, he had studied and worked
with the psychologists Karl and Charlotte Biihler,
who had been invited to come from Germany to
Vienna in 1922. Lazarsfeld studied with Karl
Biihler, who influenced his ideas about research
on individual actions, and he worked at the
Biihlers' Psychological Institute as Charlotte
Biihler's assistant in her studies of early child-
hood and youth development. In 1925, he es-
tablished a division of the Psychological Insti-
tute dedicated to the application of psychology
to social and economic problems—the Wirtschaft-
psychologische Forschungsstelle. Years later,
Lazarsfeld recalled (1968a, p. 272) that at the
time he established the Forschungsstelle he also
created a formula to explain his interest in ap-
plied psychology: "a fighting revolution requires
economics (Marx); a victorious revolution re-
quires engineers (Russia); a defeated revolu-
tion calls for psychology (Vienna)."
Karl Biihler became the Forschungsstelle's
first president; a board consisting largely of
prominent citizens was recruited; Lazarsfeld be-
came the research director; and scores of small
research projects were carried out—chiefly for
business firms, but some for trade unions and
city agencies. "[The Forschungsstelle] came to
life in 1925," Zeisel later recalled, "and sus-
tained itself mainly on ideas, all of them more
or less Paul's, on the unabated enthusiasm of
its members, and on no money worth talking
about" (1979£>). As in the case of most of Lazars-
feld's projects, the participants never forgot the
experience. Use Zeisel (Hans's sister, who had
been an employee of the Forschungsstelle in the
1930s) remarked at the time of Lazarsfeld's
death in 1976 that "in the end it is to the
Forschungsstelle and to Paul that we owe our
existence if not more" (quoted in Zeisel 1979&).
The Forschungsstelle was the first of four
university-related applied social research insti-
tutes founded by Lazarsfeld; the others were the
Research Center at the University of Newark,
the Office of Radio Research at Princeton Uni-
versity, and finally the Bureau of Applied Social
Research at Columbia University. (The Office
of Radio Research was transferred to Columbia
in 1939, and the Bureau always cited 1937 as
the year it was founded, since this was the year
that the Princeton Office was established.) "Uni-
versity-related" is an integral part of the concep-
tion, since Lazarsfeld considered such institutes
to be essential for the proper teaching and study
of the social sciences (1962c). Because these
four institutes were the embodiment of his in-
tense interest in the institutionalization of so-
cial research, more attention is given here to
their history and activities than is normally the
case in the biography of a scholar and institute
director. "The formula of the Viennese For-
schungsstelle," Lazarsfeld said years later, "re-
mained absolutely the same whatever I have
done since" (quoted in Morrison 1976, p. 94). The
formula is still in use in universities through-
out the United States and Europe; Clock (1979)
presents a list of the major ones. (For accounts
of the Forschungsstelle and its activities, see
Lazarsfeld 1971; Rosenmayr 1962; and Zeisel
1968; 1969; 1979&.)
The Marienthal study. The Forschungsstelle's
most ambitious project resulted from Lazars-
feld's interest in undertaking a community
study. In order to get started, Lazarsfeld and his
associates sought the advice of Otto Bauer, a
family friend who was both an eminent histor-
ian and the leader of the Social Democratic
party. The Austrian trade unions had managed
to eliminate the ten-hour working day, and
Lazarsfeld told Bauer that they intended to
study community leisure patterns. Bauer thought
it was ridiculous to study leisure when so much
of the population was unemployed; that is the

leisure to study, he said, the social and psy-
chological effects of unemployment. He sug-
gested that they study Marienthal, a nearly
totally unemployed one-industry village 24 kilo-
meters southeast of Vienna (Lazarsfeld 1968fl,
p. 275; Zeisel 1979&).
The Marienthal study was directed by Marie
Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel. The
methods used were both imaginative and eclec-
tic: participant observation, life history analysis,
and a variety of unobtrusive measures. In order
to obtain measures of the effects of unemploy-
ment, for example, the researchers calculated
the speed at which people walked, finding that
men walked more slowly on the average than
did women, since they had more time to kill.
They noted that the circulation of the socialist
party newspaper declined more during the years
of widespread unemployment than did the circu-
lation of a sports and entertainment newspaper
—interpreted as a measure of withdrawal from
participation in political affairs. The circulation
of books from the workers' library was also ex-
amined; although the borrowing fee was abol-
ished during the years 1929—1931, the circula-
tion declined by almost half—a decline that was
interpreted as an indication of apathy.
The Forschungsstelle was "a sequence of
improvisations" (Lazarsfeld 1968a, p. 287), but
it carried out a great deal of innovative con-
sumer research and it contributed importantly
to the development of this field by making the
study of consumer decisions academically re-
spectable. However, it is Marienthal, a slim,
clearly-written volume, that remains the For-
schungsstelle's most memorable product (Jahoda,
Lazarsfeld, & Zeisel 1933). The study has im-
pressed generations of social scientists by its
integrated use of quantitative and qualitative
observations; the Lynds, for example, in their
Middletown in Transition (1937), repeatedly
refer to the methods and findings of Marienthal.
It contributed substantially to the methodology
of community studies (see the review of the
history of what the authors called "sociography"
in Zeisel's "Afterword" to Marienthaiy, and its
major finding—that prolonged unemployment of
workers leads to apathy rather than to revolu-
tion—foreshadowed the lack of resistance to
Hitler (Zeisel 1979a). Marienthal was banned
by the Nazis soon after it was published, but by
1978 it had become part of the sociology cur-
ricula in Austrian universities. In 1979, a group
of young Europeans began a restudy of the
village, which is now defunct as a political
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 413
entity, using as far as possible the original
methods, plus a new one—video recording
(Freund 1978).
Career in America
Lazarsfeld first went to the United States in
September 1933 as a Rockefeller fellow; the
Marienthal study had brought him to the atten-
tion of the foundation. He spent the academic
year 1933/1934 visiting universities where he
had been told that social research was being
done: Columbia, Harvard, Pittsburgh, Ohio
State, Rochester, Chicago—the itinerary is listed
by Morrison (1976, appendix A). In most places,
he tried to learn by attaching himself to one or
more of their research projects. With the enthu-
siasm, energy, and imagination that character-
ized his entire career, he sent a questionnaire
to the eight other European fellows in his group
in order to study their adjustment to America
(1968a, p. 299).
Lazarsfeld's fellowship was extended for a
second year, at the end of which he decided
to remain in America. The political situation in
Austria following the defeat of the Social Dem-
ocrats in the civil war of February 1934 had
made his return to the University of Vienna im-
possible. The Forschungsstelle was in the same
deficit state he had left it in two years earlier;
and his marriage to Marie Jahoda—who had re-
mained in Vienna with their daughter—had
ended. So he accepted a position, for which
Robert S. Lynd of Columbia University had
recommended him because of the Marienthal
study, studying unemployment—analyzing some
ten thousand questionnaires from young people
that had been collected by the New Jersey Relief
Administration. Lazarsfeld soon transformed
the project into the University of Newark Re-
search Center, whose director he became. At the
Center, as well as at its successor institutes,
Lazarsfeld employed a large number of refugee
social scientists, often giving them their first
job in the United States.
The Newark Center survived its first year by
carrying out studies for the public school sys-
tem, the Works Progress Administration, and
the Frankfort Institute for Social Research—then
in exile in Paris. Located on the fringes of a
small university, with only a handful of staff
members, the abiding meaning of the Center is
that it was for Lazarsfeld the American rebirth
of the Forschungsstelle.
The Princeton radio project. In 1937, the
Rockefeller Foundation approved a proposal by
414 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
Hadley Cantril, the Princeton psychologist, for
a large-scale study of the social effects of radio.
At that time, radio seemed to many observers to
be an enormous source of social, cultural, and
political change; in the 1930s, both Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Adolf Hitler were using the radio
as a direct means of communicating with the
public. Again on the recommendation of Lynd,
Lazarsfeld became director of the study. An
Office of Radio Research was established at
Princeton, with a two-year grant of $67,000, but
the project itself was located at the Newark
Center. Cantril and Frank Stan ton, then the
research director, later the president, of the
Columbia Broadcasting System, were appointed
associate directed, and a broad study of radio
programming,''radio audiences, and the prefer-
ences of radio listeners was begun. The empha-
sis was on the secondary analysis of existing
survey data, the content analysis of programs,
and the Lazarsfeld-Stanton Program Analyzer
(a jointly-developed device for recording the
expressed likes and dislikes of experimental
audiences). Many journal articles and a series
of monographs were published (see especially
Lazarsfeld 1940c; Lazarsfeld & Stan ton 1941;
1944); numerous students were given on-the-job
training; and the new field of mass communi-
cations research became greatly enriched. Wil-
bur Schramm dedicated his influential reader,
Mass Communications (1949), to Lazarsfeld
for what he had done "perhaps more than any
other man toward bringing the social sciences to
bear on the problems of communications."
If Harold D. Lasswell may be said to have
created the agenda for the field of communica-
tions research with his question "Who says what
to whom with what effect?" (1932), Lazarsfeld
extended the agenda in important ways by ask-
ing why messages are introduced into the media
and why people attend to them, that is, what
gratifications, what rewards, people get from the
media and what functions the media serve in
their lives. Herta Herzog's studies of the audi-
ences of daytime radio "soap operas" and of the
radio listeners who believed the famous 1938
Orson Welles broadcast about an invasion from
Mars (Herzog 1938; 1943), are examples of this
extension, as are the studies of Edward A.
Suchman (1941) and T. W. Adorno (1941a;
1941b) on the social roles of popular and ser-
ious music. Other research projects carried out
by Lazarsfeld's associates are Bernard Berelson's
study of "What 'Missing the Newspaper' Means"
(1949), which used the occasion of a newspaper
strike in New York City to ascertain the func-
tions that newspapers serve in the lives of their
readers, and Leo Lowenthal's (1944) study of
the functions served by biographies of contem-
porary persons in popular magazines. Lazars-
feld's own research on comparing the effects of
radio listening and reading (1940c) was the
first serious examination of this important
question.
Some of the conclusions of this research were
summarized in an essay by Lazarsfeld and his
Columbia University colleague Robert K. Mer-
ton, "Mass Communication, Popular Taste and
Organized Social Action" (1948), that discusses
the social functions performed by the media,
noting that they both confer status upon people
and enforce social norms, while at the same
time serving a "narcotizing dysfunction." The
essay concludes that the effect of the media is
largely confined to peripheral social concerns
and that the media do not exhibit the degree of
social power, the capacity to change social atti-
tudes, that is often attributed to them.
The "Princeton radio project" was a misno-
mer; it was neither located at Princeton nor con-
fined to radio ("I use just everything on which
I have worked for the past years and call it
radio now," Lazarsfeld wrote in a 1938 memo-
randum to Cantril and Stan ton; quoted in
1968a, p. 308). Its work greatly enlarged
Lazarsfeld's stature in the world of applied
social research and led directly to his appoint-
ment at Columbia.
The Bureau of Applied Social Research. The
Office of Radio Research soon acquired what
Lazarsfeld later called "an institutional life of
its own" (1968a, p. 309), but the University of
Newark's depressed financial straits forced the
Research Center to move to rented space in New
York City in 1938. In 1939, the Rockefeller
grant was renewed but transferred from Prince-
ton to Columbia University, where Lazarsfeld
was appointed a lecturer and soon thereafter an
associate professor of sociology. In 1944, the
Office of Radio Research was renamed the Bu-
reau of Applied Social Research, and in 1949
the offices were moved to one building, and in
1957 to another building, both adjacent to the
Columbia campus. During the 1950s and 1960s,
the Bureau expanded its program and grew
steadily in terms of both income and staff; by
the mid-1970s, its gross annual income was
more than a million dollars and it employed at
any one time more than a hundred people, half
of them full time (A. H. Barton 1979). How-

ever, in 1977, a year after Lazarsfeld's death,
the Bureau was closed and its legacy and library
were transferred to a new Center for the Social
Sciences, located on the Columbia campus.
The Bureau's offices were temporary and
makeshift throughout its entire life span. In
1938 it had moved from an abandoned brewery
in Newark to an old office building on Union
Square in New York City and in 1940 to a build-
ing that was formerly part of the Columbia
medical school; in 1949 it moved to a former
faculty residence and in 1957 to a former
women's dormitory. The physical locations are
indicative of the Bureau's never quite becoming
the established university-based social research
institute that Lazarsfeld had first dreamed of
in Vienna. Although it was extremely produc-
tive, it was destined to remain, like its founder,
somewhat marginal to the mainstream of Amer-
ican academic life (Lazarsfeld 1968a, p. 302).
It survived for forty years, generally amidst
administrative chaos, and with conspicuously
little financial support from the university. But
the research ideas it created, the leading social
scientists that it trained, the innovative research
it carried out, and its distinctive organizational
structure have greatly influenced the social sci-
ences throughout the world. (For historical ac-
counts of the Bureau, see A. H. Barton 1979
and Clock 1979; for a bibliography of its pub-
lications, see J. S. Barton 1977).
Lazarsfeld remained at Columbia from 1940
until his retirement in 1969; after 1962, he held
the chair of Quetelet professor of social sci-
ences. This chair was created specially for him
at the suggestion of his colleague, Robert K.
Merton—and was so named because Lazarsfeld
believed that the Belgian statistician Adolphe
Quetelet was the originator of empirical social
research (see Lazarsfeld I961b, pp. 164-181;
Landau & Lazarsfeld 1968). Unwilling to give
up teaching after his retirement, he traveled al-
most weekly to the University of Pittsburgh,
where he served from 1969 until his death as
distinguished professor of social sciences.
The interaction of theory and method
During his 52 years of active professional life,
Lazarsfeld contributed importantly to 4 sub-
stantive areas in the social sciences: the social
effects of unemployment, mass communications,
voting behavior, and higher education. These
contributions were not the result of a grand
design, but of historical accidents. Lazarsfeld
studied the effects of unemployment in an Aus-
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 415
trian village in the early 1930s because Otto
Bauer ridiculed his plan to study leisure; he
studied the impact of radio in the late 1930s be-
cause he was an immigrant in need of a job;
and his study of the 1940 U.S. presidential elec-
tion grew out of a planned evaluation of U.S.
Department of Agriculture radio programs di-
rected at farmers. All his life he was interested
in university organization, but his major study
of higher education—a study of how college and
university teachers reacted to "McCarthyism" in
the early 1950s—came about because Robert M.
Hutchins, then president of the Fund for the
Republic, asked him to undertake it.
It is incorrect to say that Lazarsfeld was not
interested in substance; rather, for him method
was inseparable from substance. Accordingly, it
is also incorrect to call him a "mere" methodolo-
gist. In the first place, there is nothing "mere"
about methodology (Jahoda 1979) and Lazars-
feld's effort to combine quantitative and qualita-
tive methods constitutes one of the most am-
bitious of all undertakings in the social sciences.
In the second place, methodology for Lazarsfeld
was far broader than method, and he believed
that the methodologist does much more than in-
troduce quantification into a research project.
Rather, a methodologist is a person who "tells
other scholars what they have done, or might
do, rather than what they should do" (Lazars-
feld & Rosenberg 1955, p. 4). And in the third
place, Lazarsfeld's students were often shocked
to learn through their association with him that
theory and method are not two branches of
sociology but often much the same thing.
Methods of survey research. When Lazarsfeld
undertook his major study of the impact of
radio in 1937, he realized that since radio listen-
ing left no public records, such as circulation
data, it needed new methods of study. He took
the opinion poll—at that time used largely for
descriptive purposes, for example, to measure
popularity or audience size—and by the multi-
variate analysis of responses developed ways to
identify causal relationships. This transforma-
tion of the opinion poll into "survey research"
constitutes one of Lazarsfeld's major accom-
plishments. For this reason, Charles Y. Clock's
Survey Research in the Social Sciences (1967)
is dedicated to Lazarsfeld.
Several important procedures to follow in the
analysis of survey data are described in "Prob-
lems of Survey Analysis" (Lazarsfeld & Kendall
1950), a classic article that codifies and clarifies
some of the techniques first developed in The
 416 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
American Soldier volumes. The article is in ef-
fect a manual on how to avoid spurious rela-
tionships in survey analysis and how to make
causal attributions by straightening out the time
sequence of the variables involved. Herbert Hy-
man's Survey Design and Analysis (1955) is an
extended codification of these principles. Years
later, Lazarsfeld developed algebraic ways of
expressing many of these ideas; see, for ex-
ample, "The Analysis of Attribute Data" (1968b).
In studying radio audiences, Lazarsfeld en-
couraged the use of open-ended, detailed inter-
views to uncover the subjective experiences and
motivations of the persons interviewed (see
Merton, Fiske, & Kendall 1956), just as he
urged the use of content analysis to provide a
more precise measure of the nature of the stim-
ulus. His procedure was essentially sequential:
his interest in methods influenced his choice of
research topics; the substantive findings of his
research generated more theoretical findings;
and these findings often pointed out the need
to develop still other methods (see A. H. Barton
1979 for an illustration of this process).
The panel method for the study of change. A
major finding of Lazarsfeld's research on radio
audiences is the tendency of audiences to be
self-selected (see, for example, Lazarsfeld,
Berelson, & Gaudet [1944] 1968, pp. 120-136;
Suchman 1941). Accordingly, in order to sort
out the causal sequences of such problems as
the effect of listening upon attitudes versus the
effect of attitudes upon patterns of listening, a
method of studying the time order of variables
was required. Drawing upon his research in
Vienna with the Biihlers, in which repeated ob-
servations were made of the same children over
time, as well as on the earlier research of Stuart
A. Rice among Dartmouth College students and
Theodore M. Newcomb among Bennington Col-
lege students, Lazarsfeld developed what he
called the panel method, in which a sample of
respondents is reinterviewed at intervals of time
(Kendall 1954; Lazarsfeld & Fiske 1938; Leven-
son 1968).
The panel method is essentially a field experi-
ment in which a "natural" rather than an ex-
perimental population is studied. Although
Lazarsfeld cannot be said to have invented the
panel method, it was his use of it, and particu-
larly his innovative ways of analyzing data de-
rived from panel studies, that made him its
earliest and most effective exponent.
The study of interpersonal influence. Lazars-
feld used the opportunity of his famous study
of the 1940 U.S. presidential election, The Peo-
ple's Choice, another slim, elegant volume
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet 1944), to test
and extend the panel method as a field tech-
nique. The substantive findings of the study are
also important. First, a great deal was learned
about the psychological and social processes that
delay, inhibit, reinforce, activate, and change
voting decisions; people subject to cross pres-
sures, for example, delay making a decision.
Second, the study revealed a great deal about
the phenomenon called opinion leadership: it
was found that opinion leadership is horizontal
as well as vertical in a community and that
there is a flow of opinion from the mass media
to persons who serve as opinion leaders and
then to the public. This process was termed the
"two-step flow of communication."
Traditional methods of sampling populations
are inadequate to study interpersonal influence,
since their design makes it nearly impossible for
people who know each other to turn up in the
sample (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet [1944]
1968, pp. 49-50). Accordingly, new methods of
sampling had to be developed. The first method
used was called "snowball" sampling, in which
informants from different strata in the com-
munity are asked to name people who have
influenced their decisions in concrete ways. (The
sample thus grows the way a snowball does,
incrementally.) The persons who are cited re-
peatedly are termed opinion leaders, and a sam-
ple is selected from this group and then inter-
viewed (see Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955; Merton
1949).
"Snowball" sampling locates opinion leaders,
not networks of individuals, so new methods of
finding networks by the use of sociometric-type
nominating questions ("Who have you talked to
about this recently?") were developed. These
techniques (which were influenced by Jacob L.
Moreno's use of the sociogram; see Borgatta
1968) were further developed in a study, di-
rected by three of Lazarsfeld's students and as-
sociates, of the networks of influence among
physicians in a community that determine the
diffusion of the prescribing of new drugs (Cole-
man, Katz, & Menzel 1966).
These techniques for measuring interpersonal
influence, opinion leadership, and networks
of influence stimulated a wide variety of studies
by Lazarsfeld's students and their students, each
of whom developed a variant of the method and
a new field of substantive application. Examples
are Peter H. Rossi on interpersonal environ-

ments (1966); Rossi's student W. L. Wallace
on the student culture of a liberal arts college
(1966); Richard Alba and Charles Kadushin on
social circles (Alba & Kadushin 1976; Kadushin
1968a); Kadushin on intellectual elites (1974);
and Alba and Gwen Moore on elite social circles
(1978).
The empirical study of action. Throughout
his long professional life, Lazarsfeld was in-
trigued by the problem of how to study "action"
from the point of view of the actor. (He contended
that "action" was a correct translation of the
German Handlung, a concept that had stimu-
lated a great deal of psychological research in
the Europe of his youth.) In 1958, he wrote a
long essay on the problem, "Historical Notes on
the Empirical Study of Action: An Intellectual
Odyssey" ([1958] 1972); although well known
to many of his students and colleagues, the
essay was not published for 14 years, ostensibly
because it was "too long for an article, too short
for a book" ([1958] 1972, p. viii). In the essay,
he traced some of the ideas on action that had
influenced him, from Karl and Charlotte Biihler's
work on goals to Kurt Lewin's study of inten-
tions to his own work on the analysis of con-
sumer behavior. The discontinuity between
these ideas and empirical research in his
adopted country became one of his major pre-
occupations.
Much of the research done by Lazarsfeld and
his students on this problem concerned the
study of the "reasons" people give for their
behavior—a research procedure that came to be
known as "reason analysis." At the heart of the
procedure is the development of what is called
an "accounting scheme"—a model of the action
being studied that incorporates the various di-
mensions of the act on which data are needed
(see Zeisel [1947] 1968, pp. 153-170). Many of
the data in an accounting scheme are obtained
by personal interviews, and in a crucial part of
the interview the interviewer asks the questions
necessary for the analyst to do what Lazarsfeld
(1940a) called "discerning": determining not
only that a person was exposed to a given influ-
ence, but that he or she acted in a certain way
because of that exposure (see Lazarsfeld 1942;
Smith [Lazarsfeld] & Suchman 1940).
Lazarsfeld's classic article on reason analysis,
"The Art of Asking Why" (1935), was published
shortly after he arrived in the United States,
and is based largely on consumer studies that
he had carried out at the Forschungsstelle in
Vienna. The basic premise of the article is that
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 417
there are three types of data that need to be ob-
tained by asking "why" questions in studying
consumer purchases: data that report on (1) in-
fluences that lead toward action, (2) relevant
attributes of the product, and (3) acted-upon
impulses of the purchaser. This formulation
has a generality that goes far beyond consumer
research, and has been used—with adaptations
and extensions—by Lazarsfeld, his students, and
others not only for the study of consumer pur-
chases (Kornhauser & Lazarsfeld 1935) but also
for studies of changes in vote intentions (Gaudet
1939), choosing or not choosing trial by jury
(Zeisel [1947] 1968, pp. 161-164), choosing an
occupation (Lazarsfeld et al. 1931), getting
married or divorced (Goode 1956), going to a
psychiatrist (Kadushin 1958), joining a volun-
tary association (Sills 1957; 1960), moving
from one house to another (Rossi 1955), and
not practicing contraception (Sills 1961a). Sum-
maries of these research procedures are provided
by Kadushin (1968k), Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg
(1955, pp. 387-391), and Zeisel ([1947] 1968,
chapters 6, 7).
The intensity of Lazarsfeld's interest in the
study of action is indicated not only by his
1958 historical essay but also by the attention
given to it in his methods reader, The Language
of Social Research (Lazarsfeld & Rosenberg
1955), in his autobiographical memoir (1968a),
and in his essay "Working With Merton" (1975).
Since he viewed the analysis of action as a way
of merging the study of individuals with the study
of the aggregate effects of individual actions,
and thus as a way of merging psychology and
sociology, the centrality of the problem to his
intellectual career is evident.
The relationship between individual and col-
lective properties. Techniques for relating the
characteristics of individuals to those of collec-
tivities were termed by Lazarsfeld "contextual
analysis." They involve characterizing individ-
uals by some characteristic of the group to
which they belong (the context), and then not-
ing how individuals who are similar in other
ways differ in their opinions or behavior in ac-
cordance with the group context in which they
are located (Sills 1961b). The characteristic of
the group may be an aggregate of individual
characteristics (as in "climate of opinion" stud-
ies) or it may be a so-called "global" character-
istic that describes the collectivity as a whole.
Contextual analysis was used at Columbia in a
study of the membership of the International
Typographical Union (Lipset, Trow, & Coleman
 418 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
1956); Lazarsfeld at first resisted applying it to
his own work, but was forced to give in at the
insistence of his students. He first made sys-
tematic use of the procedure in a 1955 study of
social science faculty members in American col-
leges and universities (Lazarsfeld & Thielens
1958).
The 2,451 faculty members who were inter-
viewed in the study constitute a probability
sample of all American college teachers. Lazars-
feld was interested not only in the opinions of
these faculty members but in the institutional
determinants of their opinions. Accordingly, the
sample was designed so that interviewing took
place at only 165 colleges and universities, at
each of which at least half of the social science
faculty was interviewed. It thus was possible to
examine variations in faculty opinions and be-
havior according to variations in individual
characteristics; according to variations in the
"climate of opinion" of different institutions;
and according to variations in the "global char-
acteristics" of institutions—or by various combi-
nations of these variations.
The classic analytic paper on the study of
collective properties is Lazarsfeld and Menzel
(1961); a section of Continuities in the Lan-
guage of Social Research (Lazarsfeld, Pasanella,
& Rosenberg 1972, pp. 219-320) contains ten
selections that describe the study of collectivities
and refers the reader to many other examples
of research.
Mathematics in the social sciences. Lazars-
feld never abandoned his early interest and train-
ing in mathematics, and he sought for many years
to introduce improved mathematical methods
into the social sciences. His own work was
primarily in mathematical psychology, since he
sought to model processes within the individual.
His impact on mathematical sociology was of a
different kind: he posed problems, he raised
questions, and he organized the efforts of others.
The papers by T. W. Anderson, James S. Cole-
man, Leo A. Goodman, R. Duncan Luce, and
Herbert A. Simon in the Lazarsfeld Festschrift
(Merton, Coleman, & Rossi 1979) demonstrate
his influence on the use of mathematics by this
generation of social scientists; see also Lazars-
feld (1954Z?) and Lazarsfeld & Henry (1966).
Coleman (1972) provides a useful overview of
Lazarsfeld's mathematical work.
Latent structure analysis. One aspect of Laz-
arsfeld's mathematical work had its origins in
his wartime association with Samuel A. Stouffer
on studies of the American army. He invented
at that time an analytical procedure he called
latent structure analysis, a procedure that is
designed to ascertain the structure of attitudes
or other unobservable entities that can only be
observed through their probabalistic connection
with observed data. Stated differently, Lazars-
feld's starting point in developing latent struc-
ture analysis was "the problem of how concepts
may be inferred from indicators" (Lazarsfeld &
Henry 1968, p. 3). Although he spent decades
developing the procedure (rather than the long
weekend that at one point he thought it would
take), the complex computational procedures
required initially discouraged the use of latent
structure analysis in research. More recently,
the development of high-speed computers has
reawakened interest in this type of analysis (see,
for example, Henry 1973; for examples of
earlier work, see Lazarsfeld 1950a; 1959; Laz-
arsfeld & Henry 1968; Madansky 1968).
Other interests
The history of empirical social research. As
early as the Marienthal study, Lazarsfeld was
fascinated by the history and development of
research methods. But he did little systematic
work on the topic until a 1959 interdisciplinary
conference led him to prepare a paper (1961k)
in which he traced the history of quantification
in sociology. In 1962/1963, he gave courses
and led seminars at the Sorbonne and at Colum-
bia on the history of quantification; the topic,
originally sketched out under Lazarsfeld's
prompting by Zeisel in his "Afterword" to
Marienthal, became one of his major interests
during the remainder of his life. Under his di-
rection, original research was carried out on the
history of quantification in Germany (Lazars-
feld & Oberschall 1965; Oberschall 1965; Schad
1972); France (Clark 1965; 1967); Belgium
(Landau & Lazarsfeld 1968); the United King-
dom (Cole 1972; Elesh 1972); and Europe gen-
erally (Lecuyer & Oberschall 1968; Oberschall
1978). Lazarsfeld's interest in the topic made
him into something of a reverse missionary dur-
ing the last 15 years of his life, attempting to
convince Europeans that "American-style" em-
pirical social research was strongly influenced
by a European empirical tradition. He was pri-
marily responsible for—or exerted a strong in-
fluence on—the establishment of research insti-
tutes in Oslo, Vienna, and Jerusalem, and his
visits to Paris and Warsaw greatly altered the
nature of social research in these cities. He
visited Paris frequently, and Reid Hall at the

Sorbonne became almost his second home. He
invited a number of Europeans to spend a year
at Columbia, and in this way enriched sociology
on both sides of the Atlantic. When he died,
Raymond Boudon and Jean Stoetzel wrote
memorial articles for the Paris press, and almost
every sociological journal in Western Europe
published an obituary.
The utilization of social research. Lazarsfeld's
career began with his founding of an institute
for applied social research in 1925, and he never
lost his interest in the practical applications of
research. For him, clients with problems to be
solved were more than a source of funds; they
were a source of real problems and new meth-
ods. Most of his research was sponsored by
an organization that had a problem and he did
extensive consulting work with a number of
industries, firms, and advertising agencies—not
only because he needed the money but also be-
cause he appreciated the intellectual stimula-
tion. When as president of the American Socio-
logical Association he had the opportunity to
set the theme of the annual meeting in 1962, he
chose "the uses of sociology." Many of the
papers given were subsequently published in a
volume with that title (Lazarsfeld, Sewell, &
Wilensky 1967).
The Uses of Sociology contains 31 chapters
on an enormous range of applications—from
social work, to law, to public health, to desegre-
gation, and its "Introduction" by the editors is a
manual on the nature, the problems, and the
prospects for the application of sociology to real-
life problems. The book was a publishing suc-
cess, but Lazarsfeld was not satisfied that it had
captured what he thought was most important
about applied research. He continued to work on
the problem for the rest of his life, and his last
book was An Introduction to Applied Sociology
(Lazarsfeld & Reitz 1975).
Influence on the social sciences
Students, colleagues , and other associates.
Throughout his life, Lazarsfeld worked inten-
sively with students and colleagues, and a full-
scale intellectual biography of him would of
necessity also be a biography of his associates.
As he freely admitted, his early years as an or-
ganizer of socialist youth activities established a
pattern of leadership that he never fully aban-
doned : he was skilled at telling others what they
should do, and then helping them do it. Most of
his major writings are coauthored, and much
of his work day consisted of listening to, talking
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 419
to, and instructing his students, colleagues, and
co-workers: in class, in his office, in taxicabs, in
his apartment, in a succession of summer
houses in New Hampshire; at breakfast, at
lunch, and at dinner; at the blackboard, or pac-
ing his office with a cigar, or seated in the
faculty club with a double Manhattan cocktail
in hand, Lazarsfeld seldom was or worked alone,
and he was always working. What Allen H.
Barton termed "the hectic Lazarsfeldian life
style" (1979) went on to midnight or later; only
then did he work for hours alone. (For another
description of this life style, see Bailyn 1979, in
which a visit by Lazarsfeld to his daughter's and
son-in-law's house is compared to a "wonderfully
benign hurricane.")
Lazarsfeld's need for so many close associates
was a consequence of his massive research
agenda, which was so long (and grew ever
longer) that he could not possibly carry it out
by himself. Accordingly, he was continually in
search of new associates, and whenever he found
a person who had skills and what he called a
"latent interest" in one of his problems (1964Z?,
p. 19), he sought to draw him or her into his
orbit. These scores of individuals may be said to
have been exploited in the sense that they were
persuaded to work on Lazarsfeld's problems, but
in the process they found problems for them-
selves and learned how to work on them: the
subsequent publications of the persons "ex-
ploited" by Lazarsfeld testify to the two-way
nature of the relationship. The "Supplementary
Bibliography" of this article, kept to a manage-
able length only by exercising strict discipline,
is a testament to the influence of Lazarsfeld's
ideas upon the publications of others. His char-
acteristic method of teaching a graduate so-
ciology course was not to lecture at all, but to
describe a series of problems to which he did
not know the answer. The problems were di-
vided up among the students, and the purpose
of the course was to help the students and Laz-
arsfeld at least to clarify the problems.
Coleman (1979) presents an inventory of
some of Lazarsfeld's major associates and what
they contributed to his work and he to theirs;
here only a few can be mentioned. Hans Zeisel,
now emeritus professor of law at the University
of Chicago, worked with Lazarsfeld in Vienna
at the Forschungsstelle, with Jahoda and Laz-
arsfeld on the study of Marienthal, and later
with Lazarsfeld at the Bureau of Applied Social
Research; his Say It With Figures (1947), which
is a textbook that is more than a textbook, a
 420 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
manual that is more than a manual, and has
now been translated into six languages, is a
product of their long collaboration. Zeisel's es-
say, "The Vienna Years" (1979£>), in the Lazars-
feld Festschrift, is both a record of and a tribute
to their association.
Robert S. Lynd, then professor of sociology at
Columbia, befriended Lazarsfeld from the time
of his first visit in 1933; for decades, the Lazars-
felds went to the Lynds' apartment each Novem-
ber for Thanksgiving Day dinner. Bernard Berel-
son, Frank N. Stanton, and Edward A. Suchman
were early collaborators in his work on mass
communications. Allen H. Barton, professor of
sociology at Columbia, first studied with Lazars-
feld in 1947 and accompanied him to Oslo in
1948 to help establish a research institute at
the university. They coauthored an important
article on qualitative measurement (1951) and
Barton was director of the Columbia Bureau
from 1962 to 1977. Other important students at
Columbia during the productive decade of the
1950s were James S. Coleman, Charles Y. Clock,
Elihu Katz, William N. McPhee, Peter H. Rossi,
Hanan C. Selvin, and Lee M. Wiggins. Seymour
M. Lipset was at Columbia during the 1950s,
and has provided a personal account (1979) of
the complexities of being a junior colleague of
Lazarsfeld.
In Paris (and for one year in New York) Laz-
arsfeld worked closely with Raymond Boudon
(see Boudon 1976); in Warsaw, where he was
fascinated by the social research that was being
done in the late 1950s in order to test the
efficacy of various socialist programs, he worked
particularly with Stefan Nowak. His collabora-
tive relationship with his three wives has been
mentioned previously. For years, he and the
Columbia philosopher Ernest Nagel taught a
successful graduate seminar on the logic of
various methods of social research. He had in-
tense and complex relationships with two so-
ciologists whose approaches to scholarly work
were totally different from his: T. W. Adorno
(see Lazarsfeld 1968a, pp. 322-326; Morrison
1978) and C. Wright Mills (see Lazarsfeld
1962k, pp. 352-375; Mills 1959). Both were
critical of him, and he of them, but he went to
great lengths to try to find common ground.
But more important than any of the individuals
named above in their impact upon Lazarsfeld
and in his impact upon them are two eminent
sociologists—Samuel A. Stouffer and Robert K.
Merton.
Samuel A. Stouffer was a 36-year-old Uni-
versity of Chicago professor when Lazarsfeld
first met him in 1936; at that first meeting they
agreed to collaborate on a book on the family
in the depression that was a part of a Social
Science Research Council inquiry into the de-
pression directed by Stouffer (Stouffer & Lazars-
feld 1937). They established at that time what
Lazarsfeld called "an alliance" that lasted until
Stouffer's death in 1960. Their most notable
collaboration was on the wartime research on
the U.S. Army that led to the four-volume series
that included the two volumes called The Amer-
ican Soldier, published in 1949 and 1950; Laz-
arsfeld wrote the introduction (1962a) to a
posthumously published selection of Stouffer's
papers.
It was Stouffer who first introduced Lazars-
feld to the four-fold table—a concise way of
demonstrating the cross-tabulation of two di-
chotomous variables—by drawing one on a
luncheon table cloth one day in Newark in 1937
(Lazarsfeld 1962k, p. 145); Mirra Komarovsky
was a witness. Later, during the war, Lazars-
feld's ideas on latent structure analysis (1950)
and the use of surveys for causal analysis (Laz-
arsfeld & Kendall 1950) were worked out in
discussions with Stouffer. Their personal and re-
search styles were totally different. Lazarsfeld
was the somewhat flamboyant, cultured Euro-
pean, Stouffer the homespun, modest Midwest-
erner; Lazarsfeld the leader of research teams,
Stouffer more the loner, famous for creating his
own statistical tables on the IBM counter—sorter
outside his office door. Both were totally ab-
sorbed in obtaining ideas and findings not from
speculation but the hard way, from data. Per-
haps because he saw in Stouffer a more disci-
plined and self-effacing reflection of himself,
Lazarsfeld considered Stouffer "the most impor-
tant man of all of us . . .an outstanding mind
in our generation" (1962fc>, pp. 174-175), and
Stouffer's effect upon his thinking, although
difficult to specify, was enormous.
Merton joined the Columbia faculty at the
same time as Lazarsfeld. In fact, the Merton and
Lazarsfeld appointments were designed to re-
solve an internal dispute over whether the next
major appointment to the Columbia sociology
faculty was to be a theorist or a methodologist:
with Merton and Lazarsfeld, Columbia thought
to get both. It did get both, and more, but in a
complex way. Lazarsfeld pulled Merton into
many of his research projects during their thirty

years together in the department, and Merton
encouraged Lazarsfeld to develop methods as a
way of building theory.
The relationship between Lazarsfeld and
Merton was intense, personal, and deeply mean-
ingful both to each other and to their students.
Speaking for generations of graduate students
at Columbia, Selvin wrote that "we were satel-
lites, not of one sun, but of two, for Robert K.
Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld so dominated
sociology at Columbia during these three de-
cades that no lesser figure of speech would do"
(1975, p. 339).
Although they worked closely together for
years, Lazarsfeld and Merton were seldom coau-
thors—that is, in print. In fact, many of Lazars-
feld's writings during the Columbia years were
written in close collaboration with Merton. On
the title page of the copy he gave Merton of a
long chapter of his on latent structure analysis
(1959), Lazarsfeld wrote: "Bob, this is the first
item in 20 years you did not have to work on. P."
And each of their six published collaborative ef-
forts reveals something important about their re-
lationship. They coedited Continuities in Social
Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of
"The American Soldier" (1950), a brilliant at-
tempt to enrich social theory by reanalyzing the
attitude surveys that Stouffer had conducted dur-
ing the war. Their three coauthored articles on
mass communications (1943; 1944; 1948) are on
the social and cultural meaning of the radio re-
search that Lazarsfeld carried out for a decade.
In their "Friendship as Social Process" (1954),
Lazarsfeld recast a number of Merton's socio-
logical propositions about friendship into formal,
deductive mathematical terms and indicated
their research relevance. And in "A Professional
School for Training in Social Research" (1950),
they reviewed plans for a new educational in-
stitution that they talked about to each other
and to others for many years but never man-
aged to create.
Each of these publications is important, but
none is as important as the 35-year-long conver-
sation they carried on with each other. They re-
spected each other's judgment, they tested ideas
with each other, and they reviewed, often in great
detail, the ideas of their colleagues and students.
In his article in the Merton Festschrift, "Work-
ing With Merton" (1975), Lazarsfeld has pro-
vided a uniquely detailed recollection of their
close relationship during these three decades;
in the Lazarsfeld Festschrift, Merton refers to
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 421
him as a "brother" (1979); but their students
and colleagues know that these words only hint
at the depth and complexity of their working
relationship and their intellectual companion-
ship.
Recognition. Lazarsfeld received many ac-
knowledgments of his accomplishments during
his lifetime. He was president of both the Amer-
ican Association for Public Opinion Research
(1949/1950) and the American Sociological
Association (1961/1962), and he was elected
a member of both the National Academy of
Education and the National Academy of Sciences.
He received honorary degrees from Chicago and
Yeshiva universities in 1966, from Columbia in
1970, from Vienna in 1971, and from the Sor-
bonne in 1972, the first American sociologist
ever so honored. In 1955 he was the first re-
cipient of the Julian L. Woodward memorial
award of the American Association for Public
Opinion Research, and in 1969 the Austrian
Republic awarded him its great golden cross,
largely for his help in establishing the Institute
for Advanced Studies in Vienna in 1963. He was
a much sought-after consultant, speaker, and
teacher. Shortly after his death, a memorial
service was held in St. Paul's Chapel, Columbia
University, attended by hundreds of his students
and associates: Bernard Bailyn, William J.
McGill, Robert K. Merton, Ernest Nagel, and
Hans Zeisel were the speakers. His students
and colleagues have established a Paul F. Lazars-
feld memorial fund in order to sponsor a series
of lectures in his honor. Hans Zeisel gave the
first lecture in October 1978.
Lazarsfeld's innovations in consumer re-
search, and his impact upon the business and
advertising community, were influential; he was
a major academic model for the generation of
advertising and market researchers that matured
in New York City in the decades following World
War n. His work in communications research
helped create it as a field of scholarship, and
through his analyses of propaganda during
World War n (Lazarsfeld & Merton 1943) and
his influence upon the research activities of the
Voice of America (exerted largely through his
colleague Leo Lowenthal and such students as
Marjorie Fiske and Joseph T. Klapper), he helped
create the field of international communications
research (1952). His ideas about the institu-
tionalization of training and research in the
social sciences (1962c; 1964b; Clock 1979;
Lazarsfeld & Merton 1950) are embodied in
 422 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
dozens of thriving research organizations around
the world. (He was one of the founders of the
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences in Stanford, California, but he failed
in his efforts to make it a training institution at
which junior people would study with senior
professors.) His use of the sample survey as a
tool for causal analysis (see especially Lazars-
feld & Kendall 1950) helped transform opinion
polling into a scientific method; and his develop-
ment and use of the panel method ( see Levenson
1968) has enormously influenced the currently
active field of evaluation research (the study of
the impact of educational or social reform
programs).
In spite of these achievements, Lazarsfeld felt
that he was somehow an outsider in America,
a marginal person. Why did he feel this way? In
his oral history statement, he mentioned such
factors as his Jewishness, his foreignness, his
heavy accent, and his interest in such a low-
status activity as market research, but these
reasons are not fully convincing. He believed
that his marginality fed on itself: "I think any
new situation forces you again to do something
marginal, because you are in some degree hand-
icapped by the past up to this moment. In order
to overcome the handicap, you have again to do
something which is somewhat different. . . . So
you get into a new marginal situation, and that
forces you, at every moment, into new ones"
(1962b, p. 171). He lived his life, as he once
put it, like a bicycle rider, always compensating
so as not to fall off. He left his marginal position
at the University of Vienna for marginal posi-
tions at Newark, Princeton, and (initially) Co-
lumbia; he "was a mathematician who never
quite believed that life had fully transformed
him into a sociologist; he approached every new
research topic from a startling new direction;
and he took pride in the originality of Bureau
studies in contrast to the more traditional re-
search carried out at centers such as those at the
universities of Chicago and Michigan. Like an
expert skier, who knows that the best snow is
generally at the edge of the trail, his genius
kept him carefully away from the accepted
center of most topics. "But look," he would say
with his hand raised, and then proceed to out-
line a highly original plan of action.
Lazarsfeld's self-perception of marginality
led to his conception of his own role in the
social sciences: to be on the margin is also to be
on the frontier. It can also be argued that his
marginality encouraged the intellectual traffic
between ideas and methods that made him a
singularly influential figure in the recent history
of social research. In a memorial article pub-
lished in Le Monde shortly after Lazarsfeld's
death, Raymond Boudon noted that "his work
has attained the most noble form of marginality:
many of the ideas which he introduced have be-
come so familiar that hardly anyone bothers to
attribute their paternity to him" (1976, p. 7).
The search for convergences. One conse-
quence of Lazarsfeld's sense of marginality for
his intellectual activity was his never-ending
search for convergences between different intel-
lectual traditions—convergences that could serve
to enrich both traditions. (His search for conver-
gences was undoubtedly also a result of his being
Viennese: syntheses are characteristic intellec-
tual products of Vienna.) His collaboration with
the theorist Merton is the most obvious of these
convergences. Other convergences that he en-
couraged were between social sciences: psychol-
ogy and sociology (1964a); mathematics and
sociology (1954b); anthropology and media re-
search (1952); and sociometry and survey re-
search (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955). He sought
both a convergence and a mutual understand-
ing between the critical sociology of the Frank-
fort school (see especially the writings of T. W.
Adorno, Jiirgen Habermas, and Max Hork-
heimer) and the dominant positivistic trends in
American sociology (194la; 1970Z?); as well as
between Marxist sociology and European-Amer-
ican sociology (1970b, pp. 94-103).
Other convergences he sought were between
the social sciences and the humanities. He used
his early studies of radio to build bridges be-
tween the social sciences and such fields as
literary analysis (Arnheim 1944) and music
(Adorno 1941 a-, 1941k); he sought to relate the
philosophy of science and empirical social re-
search (1962c); historical analysis and opinion
research (1950b; 1957; 1964k; 1970a); and
logic and concept formation (1966). While
some of his critics were accusing him of mind-
less quantification, he was spending time read-
ing and talking with humanists, historians, and
philosophers.
Finally, he sought convergences between
different research traditions and methods. He
made connections between small group research
and the use of sample surveys to study inter-
personal influence (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955) and
between the use of multiple-choice questions in
surveys and so-called open-ended interviewing
(1944). His work on concept formation (1966)

and index construction (see Lazarsfeld, Pasa-
nella, & Rosenberg 1972, pp. 9-118) is a monu-
ment to interdisciplinary relationships and
connections. With Barton, he took a polemic of
C. Wright Mills against the decline of "crafts-
manship" and developed it into a scheme for
studying the man-job relationship (Barton &
Lazarsfeld 1955, pp. 339-340). And he encour-
aged the foremost qualitative researcher of the
1950s—David Riesman—to join him in the in-
terviewing and analysis phases of his study of
American social scientists (Lazarsfeld & Thie-
lens 1958; Riesman 1979). A volume of inter-
disciplinary essays edited by Mirra Komarovsky,
Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences (1957),
was inspired by him and was prepared under
his general direction.
The convergence in the social sciences that
Lazarsfeld tried hardest to make is that between
quantitative and qualitative research. In almost
every field in which he worked he tried to relate
these two modes (see 1972fc>; Barton & Lazars-
feld 1955; Lazarsfeld & Barton 1951); it was
the theme with which he ended his presidential
address to the American Sociological Associa-
tion (1962c); the journal Quality and Quantity
was founded in 1967 under his direct influence
(Capecchi 1978); and for all these reasons the
Festschrift in his memory is entitled Qualitative
and Quantitative Social Research (Merton, Cole-
man, & Rossi 1979).
DAVID L. SILLS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Neurath 1979 is a topical bibliography of the writings
of Lazarsfeld. J. S. Barton 1977 is a bibliography of the
Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University,
listing hundreds of published and unpublished reports
by Lazarsfeld and his students and associates during
the years 1937-1977. Sills 1979 lists publications about
Lazarsfeld. The Bureau's archives, containing much .un-
published material, are located in the Lehman Library
of the School of International Affairs, Columbia Uni-
versity.
WORKS BY LAZARSFELD
1931 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. et al. Jugend und Beruf:
Kritik und Material. Jena (Germany): Gustav
Fischer.
(1933) 1971 JAHODA, MARIE; LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.;
and ZEISEL, HANS Marienthal: The Sociography of
an Unemployed Community. Chicago: Aldine. —>
First published as Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal.
The 1971 edition contains a new foreword by
Lazarsfeld and an afterword by Zeisel entitled "To-
ward a History of Sociography."
1935 The Art of Asking Why. National Marketing Re-
view 1:32-43. -» Reprinted in Lazarsfeld 1972b.
(1935) 1955 KORNHAUSER, ARTHUR; and LAZARSFELD,
PAUL F. The Analysis of Consumer Actions. Pages
392—404 in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosen-
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 423
berg (editors), The Language of Social Research: A
Reader in the Methodology of Social Research.
Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
(1937) 1971 STOUFFER, SAMUEL A.; and LAZARSFELD,
PAUL F. Research Memorandum on the Family in
the Depression. New York: Arno. —> First published
by the Social Science Research Council as one of a
series of monographs on the depression edited by
Stouffer. The Arno reprint is part of the series,
Studies in the Social Aspects of the Depression.
1938 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and FISKE, MARJORIE The
"Panel" as a New Tool for Measuring Opinion.
Public Opinion Quarterly 2:596-612.
1939 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. (editor), Radio Research
and Applied Psychology. Special issue of the Jour-
nal of Applied Psychology 23:1-219.
(1940a) 1971 Description of Discerning. Pages 135-
146 in Mirra Komarovsky, The Unemployed Man
and His Family. New York: Farrar, Straus.
1940k "Panel" Studies. Public Opinion Quarterly
4:122-128.
(1940c) 1971 Radio and the Printed Page: An Intro-
duction to the Study of Radio and Its Role in the
Communication of Ideas. New York: Arno.
1940 SMITH, ELIAS; and SUCHMAN, EDWARD A. Do
People Know Why They Buy? Journal of Applied
Psychology 24:673-684. -» Elias Smith is a pseu-
donym used by Lazarsfeld in order to limit the
number of his publications. Reprinted in Lazars-
feld & Rosenberg 1955.
(1941a) 1972 Administrative and Critical Communi-
cations Research. Pages 155—167 in Paul F. Lazars-
feld, Qualitative Analysis: Historical and Critical
Essays. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. —* First published
in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science.
1941b Repeated Interviews as a Tool for Studying
Changes in Opinion and Their Causes. American
Statistical Association, Bulletin 2:3—7.
1941 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and STANTON, FRANK N.
(editors), Radio Research 1941. New York: Essential
Books.
1942 The Statistical Analysis of Reasons as Research
Operation. Sociometry 5:29—47.
1943 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and MERTON, ROBERT K.
Studies in Radio and Film Propaganda. New York
Academy of Sciences, Transactions Series 2 6:58-79.
1944 The Controversy Over Detailed Interviews—An
Offer for Negotiation. Public Opinion Quarterly
8:38-60.
(1944) 1968 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; BERELSON, BER-
NARD; and GAUDET, HAZEL The People's Choice:
How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential
Campaign. 3d ed. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
—> Also published in German and Spanish.
1944 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and MERTON, ROBERT K.
The Psychological Analysis of Propaganda. Pages
362-380 in Proceedings of Writers' Congress Con-
ference. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of Cali-
fornia Press.
1944 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and STANTON, FRANK N.
(editors) Radio Research 1942-1943. New York:
Duell.
1948a The Role of Criticism in the Management of
Mass Media. Journalism Quarterly 25:115-126.
1948b The Use of Panels in Social Research. Ameri-
can Philosophical Society, Proceedings 92:405-410.
—> Reprinted in Lazarsfeld, Pasanella, & Rosenberg
1972.
1948 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and MERTON, ROBERT K.
Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized
Social Action. Pages 95-118 in Lyman Bryson (edi-
tor), Problems in the Communication of Ideas. New
York: Harper.
 424 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
1950a The Logical and Mathematical Foundations of
Latent Structure Analysis. Pages 362-412 in Sam-
uel A. Stouffer et al. (editors), Measurement and
Prediction. Studies in Social Psychology in World
War II, Vol. 4. Princeton Univ. Press.
(1950b) 1972 The Obligations of the 1950 Pollster to
the 1984 Historian. Pages 278-299 in Paul F. Laz-
arsfeld, Qualitative Analysis: Historical and Critical
Essays. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. —» Presidential
address to the American Association for Public
Opinion Research. First published in the Public
Opinion Quarterly.
(1950) 1974 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and KENDALL, PA-
TRICIA L. Problems of Survey Analysis. Pages 133-
196 in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton
(editors), Continuities in Social Research: Studies
in the Scope and Method of "The American Sol-
dier." New York: Arno.
(1950) 1972 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and MERTON, ROB-
ERT K. (editors) Continuities in Social Research:
Research. Pages 361-391 in Paul F. Lazarsfeld,
Qualitative Analysis: Historical and Critical Essays.
Boston: Allyn & Bacon. —» First distributed in
mimeographic form.
(1950) 1974 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and MERTON, ROB-
ERT K. (editors) Continuities in Social Research:
Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American
Soldier." New York: Arno.
1951 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and BARTON, ALLEN H.
Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences:
Classification, Typologies and Indices. Pages 155-
193 in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (edi-
tors), The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in
Scope and Method. Stanford Univ. Press. —> Re-
printed in part in Lazarsfeld & Rosenberg 1955 and
in Lazarsfeld 1972&.
1952 The Prognosis for International Communications
Research. Public Opinion Quarterly 16:481-490. —»
The introduction to a special issue on international
communications research.
(1954a) 1969 A Conceptual Introduction to Latent
Structure Analysis. Pages 349-387 in Paul F. Laz-
arsfeld (editor), Mathematical Thinking in the So-
cial Sciences. 2d ed., rev. New York: Russell.
(1954b) 1969 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. (editor), Mathe-
matical Thinking in the Social Sciences. 2d ed., rev.
New York: Russell.
1954 BERELSON, BERNARD; LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and
McPHEE, WILLIAM N. Voting: A Study of Opinion
Formation in a Presidential Campaign. Univ. of
Chicago Press.
1954 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and MERTON, ROBERT K.
Friendship as Social Process: A Substantive and
Methodological Analysis. Pages 18-66 in Morroe
Berger, Theodore Abel, and Charles Page (editors),
Freedom and Control in Modern Society. New York:
Van Nostrand.
1955 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and ROSENBERG, MORRIS
(editors) The Language of Social Research: A Reader
in the Methodology of Social Research. Glencoe, 111.:
Free Press. —» A paperback edition was published
in 1965.
1955 BARTON, ALLEN H.; and LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
Some Functions of Qualitative Analysis in Social
Research. Frankfurter Beitrage zur Soziologie
1:321-361.
1955 KATZ, ELIHU; and LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. Personal
Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow
of Mass Communications. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
—» Includes a foreword by Elmo Roper. A paper-
back edition was published in 1964. Also published
in German, Italian, and Japanese.
(1957) 1978 The Historian and the Pollster. Pages
242-262 in Mirra Komarovsky (editor), Common
Frontiers of the Social Sciences. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
(1958) 1972 Historical Notes on the Empirical Study
of Action: An Intellectual Odyssey. Pages 53-105
in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Qualitative Analysis: His-
torical and Critical Essays. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
—> First distributed in mimeographic form.
(1958) 1977 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and THIELENS,
WAGNER, JR. The Academic Mind: Social Scientists
in a Time of Crisis. New York: Arno. —» With a
field report by David Riesman.
1959 Latent Structure Analysis. Volume 3, pages 476-
543 in Sigmund Koch (editor), Psychology: A Study
of a Science. Volume 3: Formulations of the Person
and the Social Context. New York: McGraw-Hill.
1961a The Algebra of Dichotomous Systems. Pages
111-157 in Herbert Solomon (editor), Studies in
Item Analysis and Prediction. Stanford Univ. Press.
—» Reprinted in Lazarsfeld, Pasanella, & Rosenberg
1972.
1961b Notes on the History of Quantification in So-
ciology—Trends, Sources and Problems. Pages 147—
203 in Harry Wolf (editor), Quantification: A His-
tory of the Meaning of Measurement in the Natural
and Social Sciences. Indianapolis and New York:
Bobbs-Merrill. —» Also published in 1961 in Isis,
the journal of the History of Science Society. These
papers were first presented at a conference held in
1959 under the auspices of the Social Science
Research Council.
(1961) 1972 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and MENZEL, HER-
BERT On the Relation Between Individual and Col-
lective Properties. Pages 225-237 in Paul F. Lazars-
feld, Ann K. Pasanella, and Morris Rosenberg
(editors), Continuities in the Language of Social
Research. New York: Free Press.
1962a Introduction. Pages xv-xxxi in Samuel A.
Stouffer, Social Research to Test Ideas. New York:
Free Press.
1962b Interviews with Paul F. Lazarsfeld. Oral His-
tory. —> A transcript of interviews on file at, the
office of the Oral History Project, Columbia Uni-
versity.
1962c The Sociology of Empirical Social Research.
American Sociological Review 27:757-767. —>
Presidential address to the American Sociological
Association. Reprinted in Lazarsfeld 1972fr.
1964a A Note on Empirical Social Research and In-
terdisciplinary Relationships. International Social
Science Journal 16:529-533.
1964i> Some Problems of Organized Social Research.
Pages 9-19 in Ozzie G. Simmons (editor), The Be-
havioral Sciences: Problems and Prospects. Boulder:
Institute of Behavioral Sciences, University of Col-
orado.
1965 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and HENRY, NEIL W. The
Application of Latent Structure Analysis to Quanti-
tative Ecological Data. Pages 333-348 in Fred Mas-
sarik and Philburn Ratoosh (editors), Mathemati-
cal Explorations in Behavioral Science. Homewood,
111.: Dorsey.
1965 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and OBERSCHALL, AN-
THONY Max Weber and Empirical Social Research.
American Sociological Review 30:185-199.
(1966) 1972 Notes on the History of Concept Forma-
tion. Pages 5-52 in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Qualitative
Analysis: Historical and Critical Essays. Boston:
Allyn & Bacon.
1966 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and HENRY, NEIL W.
(editors) Readings in Mathematical Social Science.
Chicago: Science Research Associates.
(1967) 1968 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; SEWELL, WILLIAM H.;

and WILENSKY, HAROLD L. (editors) The Uses
of Sociology. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
1968a An Episode in the History of Social Research:
A Memoir. Perspectives in American History 2:270—
337. -» Reprinted in Lazarsfeld 1972b. This issue
of Perspectives in American History was also pub-
lished in 1969 as Donald Fleming and Bernard
Bailyn (editors), The Intellectual Migration: Europe
and America, 1930-1960. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard Univ. Press.
1968b Survey Analysis: The Analysis of Attribute
Data. Volume 15, pages 419-429 in International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by
David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1968 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and HENRY, NEIL W.
Latent Structure Analysis. Boston: Hough ton Mif-
flin.
1968 LANDAU, DAVID; and LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. Que-
telet, Adolphe. Volume 13, pages 247-257 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1970a A Sociologist Looks at Historians. Pages 39-59
in Melvin Small (editor), Public Opinion and His-
torians: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Detroit:
Wayne State Univ. Press.
1970£> Sociology. Pages 61-165 in Main Trends of Re-
search in the Social and Human Sciences. Paris and
The Hague: Mouton/United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization. —» Reprinted
in part in Lazarsfeld 1972b.
1971 Foreword to the American Edition: Forty Years
Later. Pages vii—xvi in Marie Jahoda, Paul F. Laz-
arsfeld, and Hans Zeisel, Marienthal: The Sociogra-
phy of an Unemployed Community. Chicago: Al-
dine.
1972a Foreword. Pages vi—xvi in Anthony Oberschall
(editor), The Establishment of Empirical Sociology:
Studies in Continuity, Discontinuity, and Institu-
tionalization. New York: Harper.
1972Z? LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. Qualitative Analysis: His-
torical and Critical Essays. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
—» Contains essays first published between 1935
and 1972.
1972 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; PASANELLA, ANN K.; and
ROSENBERG, MORRIS (editors) Continuities in the
Language of Social Research. New York: Free Press.
1975 Working With Merton. Pages 35-66 in Lewis A.
Coser (editor), The Idea of Social Structure: Papers
in Honor of Robert K. Merton. New York: Harcourt.
1975 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and REITZ, JEFFREY G. An
Introduction to Applied Sociology. New York: Else-
vier. —» Written with the collaboration of Ann K.
Pasanella.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADORNO, T. W. 1941a On Popular Music. Studies in
Philosophy and Social Science 9:17-48.
ADORNO, T. W. 1941& The Radio Symphony. Pages
110-139 in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton
(editors), Radio Research 1941. New York: Duell.
ALBA, RICHARD; and KADUSHIN, CHARLES 1976 The
Intersection of Social Circles: A New Measure of
Social Proximity in Networks. Sociological Methods
&• Research 5, no. 1:77-102.
ALBA, RICHARD; and MOORE, GWEN 1978 Elite So-
cial Circles. Sociological Methods &- Research 7,
no. 2:167-188.
ARNHEIM, RUDOLF (1944) 1949 The World of the
Daytime Serial. Pages 360-380 in Wilbur Schramm
(editor), Mass Communications. Urbana: Univ. of
LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 425
Illinois Press. —» First published in Lazarsfeld &
Stanton 1944.
BAILYN, BERNARD 1979 Recollections of PFL. Chap-
ter 3 in Robert K. Merton, James S. Coleman, and
Peter H. Rossi (editors), Qualitative and Quantita-
tive Social Research: Papers in Honor of Paul F.
Lazarsfeld. New York: Free Press.
BARTON, ALLEN H. 1976 Paul F. Lazarsfeld: 1901-
1976. The Bureau Reporter 23, no. 1:1-2. —» The
newsletter of the Bureau of Applied Social Re-
search, Columbia University.
BARTON, ALLEN H. 1979 Paul Lazarsfeld and the
Invention of the University Applied Social Research
Institute. Unpublished manuscript. —» Scheduled
for publication by Schenckman in a book edited
by Burkart Holzner and Jiri Nehnevajsa, tenta-
tively entitled Organizing for Social Research.
BARTON, JUDITH S. (compiler) 1977 Bureau of Ap-
plied Social Research, Columbia University: Bibliog-
raphy From Its Founding in 1937 to Its Closing in
1977. Mimeo. New York: The Bureau. -» To be
published by Clearwater Publishing Company. Based
upon the Bureau's files in the Lehman Library of
the School of International Affairs, Columbia Uni-
versity. The bibliography includes hundreds of un-
published reports and publications by Lazarsfeld's
students and associates, many of which were written
under his direction or influenced by his ideas. In-
cluded is a list of 128 Columbia University doctoral
dissertations that were completed during the years
1943-1977, a majority of them by Lazarsf eld's stu-
dents. The unpublished research reports of the
Bureau were published in microfiche by Clearwater
in 1979.
BERELSON, BERNARD 1949 What "Missing the News-
paper" Means. Pages 111-129 in Paul F. Lazarsfeld
and Frank N. Stanton (editors), Communications
Research 1948-1949. New York: Harper. —» Based
on interviews conducted in New York City during a
newspaper strike.
BORGATTA, EDGAR F. 1968 Sociometry. Volume 15,
pages 53-57 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New
York: Macmillan and Free Press.
BOUDON, RAYMOND (1970) 1972 An Introduction to
Lazarsfeld's Philosophical Papers. Pages 411-427
in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Qualitative Analysis: Histori-
cal and Critical Essays. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. —>
First published in French as the introduction to
Lazarsfeld's Philosophic des sciences sociales.
BOUDON, RAYMOND 1976 Un marginal devenu un
classique: Paul Lazarsfeld. Societe frangaise de
sociologie, Bulletin 3 8:5-7. —> Originally published
in Le Monde. The translation of the excerpt in the
text was made by Yole G. Sills.
CAPECCHI, VITTORIO 1978 Paul F. Lazarsfeld: A
Link Between American and European Methodology.
Quality and Quantity 12:239-254.
CLARK, TERRY N. 1965 Empirical Social Research in
France: 1850-1914. Unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Columbia Univ.
CLARK, TERRY N. 1967 Discontinuities in Social Re-
search: The Case of the "Cours Elementaire de
Statistique Administrative." Journal of the History
of the Behavioral Sciences 3, no. 1:3-16.
COLE, STEPHEN 1972 Continuity and Instinational-
ization in Science: A Case Study of Failure. Pages
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lishment of Empirical Sociology: Studies in Con-
tinuity, Discontinuity, and Institutionalization. New
York: Harper.
COLEMAN, JAMES S. 1972 Paul F. Lazarsfeld's Work
in Survey Research and Mathematical Sociology.
426 LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.
Pages 395-409 in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Qualitative
Analysis: Historical and Critical Essays. Boston:
Allyn & Bacon.
COLEMAN, JAMES S. 1978 Lazarsfeld, Paul F. Vol-
ume 1, pages 505-507 in International Encyclo-
pedia of Statistics. Edited by William H. Kruskal
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COLEMAN, JAMES S. 1979 Paul F. Lazarsfeld: The
Substance and Style of His Work. Unpublished
manuscript. —» Presented at the meetings of the
Eastern Sociological Society in New York City in
March 1979. Scheduled for publication in a book on
eight of the makers of American sociology, edited by
Matilda White Riley and Robert K. Merton, Socio-
logical Traditions From Generation to Generation,
Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing.
COLEMAN, JAMES S.; KATZ, ELIHU; and MENZEL, HER-
BERT 1966 Medical Innovation: A Diffusion
Study. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
ELESH, DAVID 1972 The Manchester Statistical So-
ciety: A Case Study of Discontinuity in the History
of Empirical Social Research. Pages 31-72 in An-
thony Oberschall (editor), The Establishment of
Empirical Sociology: Studies in Continuity, Discon-
tinuity, and Institutionalization. New York: Harper.
FREUND, MICHAEL 1978 Sociography: The Mari-
enthal Story. Austria Today 3:55—57. —> A discus-
sion of the research that led to the publication in
1933 of Marienthal, by Marie Jahoda, Paul F.
Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel, including a brief de-
scription of plans for a restudy of Marienthal.
Includes photographs of Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and
the village of Marienthal.
GAUDET, HAZEL (1939) 1955 A Model for Assessing
Changes in Voting Intentions. Pages 428-438 in
Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (editors),
The Language of Social Research: A Reader in the
Methodology of Social Research. Glencoe, 111.: Free
Press.
CLOCK, CHARLES Y. (editor) 1967 Survey Research in
the Social Sciences. New York: Russell Sage.
CLOCK, CHARLES Y. 1979 Organizational Innovation
for Social Science Research and Training. Chapter
5 in Robert K. Merton, James S. Coleman, and
Peter H. Rossi (editors), Qualitative and Quantita-
tive Social Research: Papers in Honor of Paul F.
Lazarsfeld. New York: Free Press.
GOODE, WILLIAM J. 1956 After Divorce. Glencoe,
111.: Free Press.
HENRY, NEIL W. 1973 Measurement Models for Con-
tinuous and Discrete Variables. Pages 51—67 in
A. S. Goldberger and O. D. Duncan (editors),
Structural Equation Models in the Social Sciences.
New York: Seminar Press.
HERZOG, HERTA (1938) 1955 Why Did People Be-
lieve in the "Invasion From Mars"? Pages 420—428 in
Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (editors),
The Language of Social Research. Glencoe, 111.:
Free Press. —> Written as a memorandum to Frank
Stanton soon after the Orson Welles broadcast.
HERZOG, HERTA (1943) 1950 What Do We Really
Know About Day-time Serial Listeners? Pages 352—
365 in Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz
(editors), Reader in Public Opinion and Communi-
cation. Enl. ed. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
HYMAN, HERBERT H. 1955 Survey Design and Anal-
ysis. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
JAHODA, MARIE 1979 PFL: Hedgehog or Fox? Chap-
ter 1 in Robert K. Merton, James S. Coleman, and
Peter H. Rossi (editors), Qualitative and Quantita-
tive Social Research: Papers in Honor of Paul F.
Lazarsfeld. New York: Free Press.
KADUSHIN, CHARLES 1958 Individual Decisions to
Undertake Psychotherapy. Administrative Science
Quarterly 3:379-411.
KADUSHIN, CHARLES 1968a Power, Influence and So-
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ion Makers. American Sociological Review 33:685-
699.
KADUSHIN, CHARLES 1968b Reason Analysis. Vol-
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KADUSHIN, CHARLES 1974 The American Intellectual
Elite. Boston: Little, Brown.
KENDALL, PATRICIA 1954 Conflict and Mood: Factors
Affecting the Stability of Response. Glencoe, 111.:
Free Press.
KOMAROVSKY, MIRRA (editor) (1957) 1978 Common
Frontiers of the Social Sciences. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood. —» A report of a project directed by
Lazarsfeld on the relation between the humanities
and the social sciences.
LASS WELL, HAROLD D. 1932 The Triple-appeal Prin-
ciple: A Contribution of Psychoanalysis to Political
and Social Science. American Journal of Sociology
37:523-538.
LECUYER, BERNARD; and OBERSCHALL, ANTHONY
1968 Sociology: The Early History of Social Re-
search. Volume 15, pages 36-53 in International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by
David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
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LEVENSON, BERNARD 1968 Panel Studies. Volume 11,
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LIPSET, SEYMOUR M. 1979 Some Personal Notes for
a History of the Department of Sociology of Colum-
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book edited by Robert B. Smith and Peter K. Man-
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LIPSET, SEYMOUR M.; TROW, MARTIN A.; and COLEMAN,
JAMES S. 1956 Union Democracy. Glencoe, 111.:
Free Press.
LOWENTHAL, LEO 1944 Biographies in Popular Mag-
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LYND, ROBERT S.; and LYND, HELEN MERRILL 1937
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flict. New York: Harcourt. —» A paperback edition
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MADANSKY, ALBERT 1968 Latent Structure. Volume
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MERTON, ROBERT K. 1949 Patterns of Influence: A
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in a Local Community. Pages 180-219 in Paul F.
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MILLS, C. WRIGHT (1959) 1972 Abstract Empiricism.
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The Sociological Imagination, 1959.
MORRISON, DAVID E. 1976 Paul Lazarsfeld: The Bi-
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MORRISON, DAVID E. 1978 Kultur and Culture: The
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the Radio. Pages 140-188 in Paul F. Lazarsfeld
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1941. New York: Essential Books.
WALLACE, W. L. 1966 Student Culture: Social Struc-
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cago: Aldine.
ZEISEL, HANS (1947) 1968 Say It With Figures. 5th
ed. New York: Harper. —» Contains an introduc-
tion by Paul F. Lazarsfeld.
ZEISEL, HANS 1968 L'ecole viennoise des recherches
de motivation. Revue francaise de sociologie 9,
no. 1, 1:3-12.
ZEISEL, HANS 1969 Der Anfang moderner Sozialfor-
schung in Osterreich: Die Wirtschaftspsychologische
Forschungsstelle, 1925-1938. Pages 43-46 in Leo-
pold Rosenmayr and Sigurd Hollinger (editors), So-
ziologie in Osterreich. Vienna: Verlag Hermann
Bohlaus.
ZEISEL, HANS 1971 Afterword: Toward a History of
Sociography. Pages 99-125 in Marie Jahoda, Paul
F. Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel, Marienthal: The
Sociography of an Unemployed Community. Chi-
cago: Aldine. —> Written in the early 1930s.
ZEISEL, HANS 1979a Personal Communication to
David L. Sills.
ZEISEL, HANS 1979b The Vienna Years. Chapter 2
in Robert K. Merton, James S. Coleman, and Peter
H. Rossi (editors), Qualitative and Quantitative So-
cial Research: Papers in Honor of Paul F. Lazars-
feld. New York: Free Press.
LEAKEY, L. S. B.
Louis Seymour Bazett Leakey was born in
Kabete near Nairobi, Kenya, on August 7, 1903,
and died of a heart attack in London on October
1, 1972. In his career he devoted nearly half a
century to paleontology, archeology, and anthro-
pology, pioneering in the uncovering of man's
past in Africa.
Biographical sketch. Louis Leakey was a son
of Kenya. His parents were missionaries who
left England in 1901 to set up a station for the
Church Missionary Society at Kabete. Leakey
was nurtured among Kikuyu neighbors with
whom the family was closely associated and
whose language they all mastered. With the ex-
ception of one year in England, he received most
of his schooling at home from his father and
tutors. He also learned a great deal from his
Kikuyu playmates and mission adherents, and
from a Ndorobo hunter who taught him to track
patiently, stalk wild animals, and make traps.
The outbreak of World War i prevented
 428 LEAKEY, L. S. B.
Leakey from resuming schooling in England.
He later mused in his autobiography, White
African (1937), that if the war had not broken
out, he would have become a typical product of
the English public school system, "and this book
would never have been written." The title of his
autobiography comes from something said of
him by Kikuyu chief Koinange: "We call him
the black man with a white face, because he is
more of an African than a European, and we
regard him as one of ourselves." Years later
Leakey wrote: "I have always considered my-
self more of a Kikuyu than an Englishman in
many ways. I still often think in Kikuyu, dream
in Kikuyu."
From 1913 to 1919, Leakey's education con-
tinued informally at Kabete. In these years he
developed a passion for natural history and
especially ornithology, though he hoped to be-
come a missionary. In 1915, he received as a
gift a book called Days Before History by H. R.
Hall. This account of late Stone Age people
sparked a new enthusiasm in him. He soon
found that the area around his home was teem-
ing with evidences of the African Stone Age, and
he amassed a large collection of artifacts. He
collected animal bones and was encouraged and
helped by Arthur Loveridge, curator of the first
Kenyan Museum.
After the war Leakey resumed his formal ed-
ucation at Weymouth College in England. In
1922 he gained entry into St. John's College,
Cambridge. For part i of his tripos he decided
to take modern languages. He was proficient in
French, but it came as a surprise to that insti-
tution when, for his second language, he chose
Kikuyu. His tutor, W. A. Crabtree of St. Cath-
arine's College, knew Luganda, another east
African language, so Leakey had to instruct his
instructor in Kikuyu.
After head injuries sustained in a rugby
match in 1923, Leakey was advised to take a
year's leave. So it happened that in 1924 he
assisted the Canadian paleontologist W. E. Cutler
on an expedition to collect dinosaur bones in
Tanganyika. This gave Leakey the chance to
learn Ki Swahili (the lingua franca of east
Africa) and to gain experience in the handling
of fossils and in the logistics of field work.
Leakey's lifelong battle against time is evident
in his account of this first expedition.
Leakey returned to Cambridge to take a first
in languages and, in May 1926, a first in arche-
ology and anthropology in the second part of
the tripos. Subsequently he led east African
archeological research expeditions in 1926-
1927, 1928-1929, 1931-1932, and 1934-1935.
These ventures in a geographical zone that till
then had been virtually unknown in prehistory
laid the foundations for much that has later
been learned of the archeological and paleon-
tological sequence in east Africa.
In 1929, on his second expedition, he drove
from Nairobi to Johannesburg to attend the
joint meeting of the British and South African
Associations for the Advancement of Science.
On the road south he visited Broken Hill (now
Kabwe in Zambia) where, eight years earlier, a
fossil human cranium had been found. This was
the famous Homo rhodesiensis, later known as
Homo sapiens rhodesiensis. Leakey collected
stone implements in old river gravels below the
Victoria Falls; in caves in the Matopo Hills
south of Bulawayo where A. L. Armstrong was
excavating; at Hope Fountain where Neville
Jones had done much archeological work; and
he visited Zimbabwe where Gertrude Caton-
Thompson was excavating.
From 1929 to 1934 Leakey held a fellowship
at St. John's College, Cambridge, and in 1934
he was Jane Ellen Harrison memorial lecturer
there. He was a Leverhulme research fellow
from 1933 to 1935. In February 1936 he was
Munro lecturer at Edinburgh University; the
ten lectures formed the substance of Stone Age
Africa (1936b). In later years, he was Herbert
Spencer lecturer at Oxford (February 10, 1961)
and Thomas Huxley lecturer at the University
of Birmingham (March 3, 1961). These lectures
were published under the title The Progress and
Evolution of Man in Africa (1961). Subse-
quently, Leakey was regents' lecturer at the Uni-
versity of California (1963), Silliman lecturer
at Yale University (1963/1964), George R.
Miller professor at the University of Illinois at
Urbana (1965), Andrew R. White professor-at-
large of Cornell University (1968), and honorary
professor of anatomy at Nairobi University Col-
lege (1969).
His first marriage was to Henrietta Wilfrida
Avern (1928), by whom he had two children.
After the dissolution of this marriage, he mar-
ried Mary Douglas Nicol, an archeologist, and
his partner in life and work until his death.
They had three sons: Jonathan, who discovered
at Olduvai the type specimen of Homo habilis
and became a snake farmer at Lake Baringo,
central Kenya; Richard, on whose shoulders

Leakey's mantle descended and who, as director
of the national museum of Kenya, had scientific
control of the rich fossil hominid areas east of
Lake Turkana, the potential of which he dis-
covered and systematically laid bare; and Philip.
Leakey identified himself with Africa and its
peoples. His knowledge of Kikuyu ways led the
Kenyan government to enlist his aid during the
years of the emergency and the Mau Mau move-
ment. These experiences were reflected in Mau
Mau and the Kikuyu (1952), Defeating Mau
Mau (1954), First Lessons in Kikuyu (1959),
and Kenya: Contrasts and Problems (1936a).
Following independence of the republic of
Kenya in 1963, he became a Kenyan citizen and
was a staunch supporter of the state.
During World War n, Leakey was officer-in-
charge of Special Branch 6 of the Nairobi Crimi-
nal Investigation Department. He took up
calligraphy and became a consultant on hand-
writing. Leakey was a founder trustee of the
Kenya National Parks, trustee and executive
member of the East African Wildlife Society,
and council member of the East African and
Uganda Natural History Society.
From 1941 to 1961 he served as honorary
curator, then as full-time curator, of the Coryn-
don Memorial Museum, Nairobi (later the Na-
tional Museums of Kenya). He initiated, and
served as secretary-general of, the Pan-African
Congresses on Prehistory and Pleistocene Stud-
ies; the first was held in Nairobi in 1947.
In 1962 Leakey set up the Centre for Prehis-
tory and Palaeontology under the trustees of the
Kenya National Museums and was its director
until 1972. In ten years the center, housed in
old buildings and temporary structures, became
a base for paleoanthropologists from many
areas and an important repository of hominid
fossils.
Within his lifetime, Leakey saw his center
grow until it was bursting at its seams. After his
death, Richard Leakey and the trustees of the
National Museums established in Nairobi, as
successor to the center, an International Louis
Leakey Memorial Institute for African Prehis-
tory. The institute was opened on September 3,
1977, and the first director was Beth well Alan
Ogot, former professor of history at the Univer-
sity of Nairobi.
Leakey's contributions were recognized by
many awards and honors including the Cuth-
bert Peek prize of the Royal Geographical So-
ciety (1933); the Andree medal of the Swedish
LEAKEY, L. S. B. 429
Geographical Society (1933); the Henry Stopes
memorial medal of the Geologists' Association,
London (1962); the Hubbard medal of the Na-
tional Geographic Society, Washington, jointly
with Mary Leakey (1962); the Richard Hopper
Day memorial medal of the Philadelphia Acad-
emy of Natural Sciences (1964); the Viking
Fund medal of the Wenner-Gren Foundation
for Anthropological Research (1961-1965); the
Haile Selassie award (1968); the Welcome
medal of the Royal African Society (1968); the
science medal of th6 Academy of Biological Sci-
ences, Italy (1968); and the Prestwich medal
of the Geological Society of London, jointly with
Mary Leakey (1969). Honorary doctorates were
conferred on him by the Universities of Oxford
(1958), California (1963), East Africa (1965),
and Guelph (1969). The L. S. B. Leakey Foun-
dation for Research Related to Man's Origin,
Behavior, and Survival was established in the
United States in 1968; a European chapter of
the foundation was opened in London in 1977.
Personality. Three abiding impressions of
Leakey are of his singular energy, enthusiasm,
and vision. The energy is reflected not only in
the tally of his excavations and discoveries, or in
the 20-odd books and more than 150 articles
he wrote. On safari he walked hurriedly and
worked indefatigably and singlemindedly. His
enthusiasm repelled some, but inspired many
more people to take an interest in man's past
and to support his efforts.
Leakey's farsightedness lent direction to his
energy. His almost visionary perspective gave
purpose to the efforts of the family team. His
mind comprehended detail, but could also grasp
the larger scheme. His syntheses were not al-
ways correct, but then, in this discipline as in
others, he who never makes a mistake never
makes a major contribution. Romantic and
imaginative, he was the kind of scientist who
could balance and lend perspective to the pur-
suit of the detail in the scientific community.
He was sometimes criticized for seeking pub-
licity. Yet his finds and his concepts were always
news. If he was quick to publicize his discov-
eries, it may be argued that this was a necessary
means of arousing interest and of eliciting fi-
nancial support. Funding of his research was
always a problem in a field whose practical
applications are not readily apparent. This was
a prime motive for his exacting lecture tours
of America, which undoubtedly shortened his
life, but which were necessary fund raisers.
 430 LEAKEY, L. S. B.
Leakey's public appeal was greatly enhanced
by his skill in communication. In speech and in
writing he was fluent, impressive, and per-
suasive.
His strong will, positive personality, and often
dogmatic manner brought him into conflict with
fellow scientists. Those who judged him hastily
missed the substance of the man. Those willing
to look beneath the surface dispassionately, to
explore his thoughts and claims and not rest
with their first expressions, found wisdom, some-
times genius, and often an inspired and in-
spiring element to be discerned.
Ethnology. Fluent in Ki Swahili and Kikuyu,
Leakey was a lifelong observer of the east Afri-
can peoples with whom he came into close con-
tact: the Kikuyu, Masai, and Luo. In 1929, he
served on a government committee that reported
on Kikuyu land tenure. From 1937 to 1939 he
investigated Kikuyu social organization and cul-
ture. His thousand-page report, prepared for the
Rhodes trustees and unpublished in Leakey's
lifetime, provided a comprehensive record of the
ways of the Kikuyu people before and during the
period of European influence in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. His manu-
script, edited and published posthumously as a
three-volume work entitled The Southern
Kikuyu Before 1903 (1977-1978), is an im-
portant primary source for social scientists.
Younger Kikuyu often complained that Leakey's
knowledge of the people and their ways was out
of date. Indeed, the knowledge they spoke of was
that of older days, before their earlier social
and cultural system had been transformed un-
der the influence of colonization.
Primatology. Leakey's zoological interests
were not confined to fossilized animals. He be-
lieved that much could be learned about the
probable behavior of early hominids through
the detailed study of living chimpanzees and
gorillas in the wild. Accordingly, he initiated
studies of free-ranging African primates, espe-
cially anthropoid apes. Preliminary studies of
the mountain gorilla were undertaken by Rosa-
lie Osborn and Jill Donisthorpe in Uganda, and
a definitive study was completed by Dian Fossey
in Rwanda. He initiated the long-term researches
on chimpanzees conducted by Jane Goodall in
Tanzania. At Tigoni near Nairobi, he estab-
lished a National Primate Research Center.
Prehistoric archeology. Leakey's early re-
searches in east Africa opened up archeological
deposits now known to have spanned the entire
Pleistocene period. In most of his excavations
after the four early expeditions, Mary Leakey
played a large part; often they became her field
projects, while he turned his attention else-
where.
From the earliest expeditions Leakey started
to piece together an archeological sequence for
east Africa. His "Outline of the Stone Age in
Kenya" was published in 1929. It was later ex-
panded into his first book, The Stone Age Cul-
tures of Kenya Colony (1931), followed by The
Stone Age Races of Kenya (1935). He classified
the stone industries he had excavated into the
hand-axe culture (the African Acheulean), a
flake culture, a blade-and-burin culture, and
mesolithic and neolithic industries. Later ex-
cavations at Kanjera, Olorgesailie, Olduvai, and
other sites were to add new evidence on the Afri-
can Acheulean and to uncover an earlier cul-
ture, the Oldowan.
Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania. The gorge was a
cornucopia of fossils and implements discovered
in 1911 by the entomologist Kattwinkel. Before
World War i, Hans Reck of Berlin had collected
fossilized bones there; since they included ex-
tinct forms, they aroused considerable excite-
ment that was heightened by Reek's discovery
of a human skeleton. At first the skeleton was
thought to belong to the middle Pleistocene, but
it was later shown to be a relatively recent
burial into older deposits. The outbreak of war
and the transfer of Tanganyika to Britain as a
mandated territory put to rest any further plans
by Reck to explore the gorge.
On his third east African expedition in 1931-
1932, Leakey was accompanied by Reck, as well
as by A. T. Hopwood, D. Maclnnes, and Vivian
Fuchs. Reck had previously found only faunal
remains; stone artifacts had eluded him. Shortly
after arriving at Olduvai, they found a fine
hand-axe. This was the forerunner of thousands
excavated in the gorge; so many, in fact, that
in Olduvai Gorge (1951), Leakey could recog-
nize 11 stages in the evolution of the hand-axe
culture.
The excavations in the gorge by Louis and
Mary Leakey, their sons, and their assistants,
including their African aides, exposed in the
walls nearly two million years of human history.
Within the lowest layers were sandwiched im-
plements of one of the earliest stone cultures,
the Oldowan. Then followed African Acheulean
handaxe industries, and finally more advanced
cultures. Entombed within the same beds were
the fossilized remains of more than 150 differ-
ent species of animals.

Leakey's 1965 volume, Olduvai Gorge 1951-
1961, inaugurated a series of monographs to
chronicle the new discoveries. The work at
Olduvai remained for a number of years in the
hands of Mary Leakey, while he gave his full
attention to Fort Ternan in Kenya and to the
raising of funds abroad.
Hominid evolution. An early chapter on the
higher primates was written through Leakey's
discoveries. In 1923 Koru in western Kenya had
yielded the first known fossil apes from east
Africa. On Rusinga Island in Lake Victoria
Nyanza, Leakey found a Miocene fossil ape,
Proconsul, on his 1931 expedition. Other finds
of Miocene pongids came from Rusinga, Koru,
Songhor, Fort Ternan, and elsewhere. Another
early hominoid was found by Leakey on a farm
at Fort Ternan. Leakey called it Kenyapithecus
wickeri, but it became widely accepted that it
was not different generically from Ramapithecus
of India. The work of Leakey, amplified by that
of Elwyn Simons and David Pilbeam, suggested
that Ramapithecus was an early genus of the
hominid family. Ramapithecus it was thought,
might well be the Miocene ancestor of Aus-
tralopithecus.
Among Leakey's earliest discoveries of fossil
hominids were the crania of Kanjera and the
mandible of Kanam, both discovered in 1932.
Leakey shocked the scientific world by claiming
that they were respectively middle and lower
Pleistocene members of the species Homo
sapiens, or at least of a form of man close to
Homo sapiens. They were found on the Gulf of
Kavtrondo, northeast of Lake Victoria. The
Kanam jaw turned out to be more primitive than
Leakey had supposed; its features were reminis-
cent of Homo erectus, and it appeared also that
it was not as old as the fauna among which it
was found. The Kanjera crania, with surpris-
ingly "modern" brows, for long remained an
enigma; then Kenneth P. Oakley in 1974 dis-
proved Leakey's claim that they were contem-
porary with the middle Pleistocene fauna. How-
ever, throughout his life, Leakey accepted them
as evidence for the early appearance of a sapient
kind of man. Indeed, for him, the brutish-look-
ing Homo erectus was a side branch of human
evolution. So was Neanderthal man, with his
flat-topped, heavy-browed, and large skull.
It sometimes seems that for Leakey, sapient
man had always, or almost always, looked like
modern man. That is why he welcomed the ap-
parently modern-looking Kanam and Kanjera
men as direct ancestors, and the miniaturized
LEAKEY, L. S. B. 431
though modern-looking Homo habilis as another
direct ancestor.
Among the fossil mammals recovered at Ol-
duvai were at least three extinct species of
hominids. From the earlier layers, between 1.8
and about 1.6 million years before the present,
the Leakeys recovered two kinds of synchronic
hominids. One was a big-toothed, heavy-jawed,
robustly built creature that Mary Leakey dis-
covered in July 1959; he called it Zinjanthropus
(man of east Africa, for which "Zinj" is an old
name). It was an australopithecine, bigger and
heavier than the specimens that Robert Broom
and John T. Robinson had found in the Trans-
vaal. Today it is known as Australopithecus
boisei.
The second earlier hominid was called Homo
habilis by Leakey, P. V. Tobias, and J. R. Napier
(1964). It was a bigger-brained, smaller-toothed
miniature of a man, who lived in Africa from
just over 2 million to about 1.6 million years
ago. This species is represented by specimens
from Olduvai, Koobi Fora, and Ileret in northern
Kenya, Omo in Ethiopia, and probably, too, from
an upper member of Sterkfontein in the Trans-
vaal. Homo erectus, the third hominid, ap-
peared at Olduvai somewhat later.
Leakey was obsessed with the prospect of
finding the earliest true man. Shortly before he
left for London on his last journey in September
1972, he was shown a big-brained cranium
(1470 man) that his son Richard had found
east of Lake Turkana. It had weathered out of a
deposit that was at first dated to about 2.9 mil-
lion years, though more recently it has been
shown to be probably up to 1 million years more
recent than its earlier claimed age. Leakey was
delighted with the discovery, for it seemed to
provide further evidence for the very early
emergence of the genus Homo. Later investiga-
tions indicated that the earliest fossils classi-
fiable as members of Homo are probably no older
than 2.2 or 2.3 million years before the present.
Paleoecology. From his first expedition in
1926-1927, Leakey was impressed by old raised
lake levels, well above the present-day levels of
neighboring lakes. The gravels deposited on
these high-level terraces contained identifiable
stone implements. To explain the formerly
greater extent of the lakes, Leakey had recourse
to past climatic changes. Building on the work
of J. W. Gregory, E. Nilsson, and E. J. Wayland,
Leakey proposed that the Pleistocene of east
Africa be subdivided into two moister pluvial
phases, the Kamasian and Gamblian, separated
 432 LEAKEY, L. S. B.
by a drier, interpluvial phase. The Kamasian
was named after the Kamasia Hills west of Lake
Baringo and the Gamblian after former lake
levels evidenced at Gamble's Cave and Gamble's
Drift.
The use of the terms Kamasian and Gam-
blian, and the addition of a third term, Kageran,
based on the Kagera River valley in Uganda,
were ratified by the first Pan-African Congress
on Prehistory at Nairobi in 1947. The use of
the 3 terms was ratified, too, by the 18th
International Geological Congress in London in
1948, though it rejected Leakey's proposal that
the Kamasian be subdivided into an earlier
Kamasian and a later Kanjeran Pluvial (after
Kanjera). Nevertheless, Leakey's proposed four-
fold subdivision of the Pleistocene came for a
time into widespread use. Indeed, the term
"Kanjeran" was formally ratified by the third
Pan-African Congress on Prehistory at Living-
stone in 1955, apparently under the erroneous
impression that "Kanjeran" had been accepted
by the Geological Congress in London! Yet,
critics pointed out, these proposed subdivisions
were not based on strati graphic units, such as
those on which geologists usually base subdi-
visions. The concept has been much criticized
by geologists (e.g., J. D. Solomon, H. B. S.
Cooke, R. Pickering, R. F. Flint, and W. W.
Bishop ).
In sum, Leakey's proposal to subdivide the
Pleistocene into climatic phases was abandoned
by most geologists, who were unanimous in
recommending that his scheme be replaced by
one founded on rock sequences or stratigraphic
units. That some stratigraphic units do have a
climatic explanation seems undoubted in the
light of newer work. Indeed, Leakey's notion of
some past climatic changes in the African Plio-
Pleistocene has stood the test of time, even
though his detailed scheme has not. In another
respect, Leakey's claims were heuristically
valuable: they provoked a search for newer geo-
chronological and paleoecological techniques
and a reappraisal of the concepts of paleocli-
matology and paleoecology.
PHILLIP V. TOBIAS
WORKS BY LEAKEY
1929 An Outline of the Stone Age in Kenya. South
African Journal of Science 26:749-757.
(1931) 1971 The Stone Age Cultures of Kenya Colony.
London: Cass. —> Includes a new introductory note
by the author.
(1934) 1960 Adam's Ancestors. 4th ed. London: Meth-
uen. —» Reprint of the 1953 fourth edition with a
new prologue. A paperback edition was published
by Harper in 1960.
(1935) 1970 The Stone Age Races of Kenya. 2d ed.
Oosterhout (Netherlands): Anthropological Publica-
tions. —> Includes a new introduction by the author.
(1936a) 1966 Kenya: Contrasts and Problems. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Schenkman. —> Includes a new pref-
ace by the author.
(1936b) 1970 Stone Age Africa: An Outline of Prehis-
tory in Africa. New York: Negro Universities Press.
(1937) 1966 White African. Cambridge, Mass.:
Schenkman. —> Includes a new preface by the
author. A paperback edition was published by Bal-
lantine in 1973.
1949 Tentative Study of the Pleistocene Climatic
Changes and Stone Age Culture Sequence in North-
eastern Angola. Publicacoes Culturais No. 4. Lisbon:
Museu do Dundo.
1949 LEAKEY, L. S. B.; and LEAKEY, M. D. Some String
Figures From North East Angola. Publicacoes Cul-
turais No. 4a. Lisbon: Museu do Dundo.
1950 LEAKEY, M. D.; and LEAKEY, L. S. B. Excavations
at the Njoro River Cave: Stone Age Cremated Bur-
ials in Kenya Colony. Oxford: Clarendon.
1951 Olduvai Gorge: A Report on the Evolution of the
Hand-axe Culture in Beds I-IV. Cambridge Univ.
Press.
1952 Mau Mau and the Kikuyu. London: Metheun.
1952 LEAKEY, L. S. B.; and COLE, SONIA (editors) Pan-
African Congress on Prehistory, First, Proceedings.
Oxford: Blackwell.
1953 YLLA; and LEAKEY, L. S. B. Animals in Africa.
London: Harvill. —» Ylla is the pseudonym for Ca-
milla Koffler.
(1954) 1977 Defeating Mau Mau. New York: AMS
Press.
1958 Some East African Pleistocene Suidae. Fossil
Mammals of Africa, No. 14. London: British Mu-
seum.
1959 First Lessons in Kikuyu. Nairobi: East African
Literature Bureau.
1961 The Progress and Evolution of Man in Africa.
Oxford Univ. Press.
1964 LEAKEY, L. S. B.; TOBIAS, P. V.; and NAPIER, J. R.
A New Species of the Genus Homo from Olduvai
Gorge. Nature 202:7-9.
1965 Olduvai Gorge 1951-1961. Vol. 1: A Preliminary
Report on the Geology and Fauna. Cambridge Univ.
Press.
1969a Animals of East Africa. Washington: National
Geographic Society.
1969b LEAKEY, L. S. B. (editor) Fossil Vertebrates of
Africa. Vol. 1. London and New York: Academic
Press.
1969 LEAKEY, L. S. B.; and GOODALL, VANNE MORRIS
Unveiling Man's Origins. London: Methuen; New
York: Schenkman.
1970 LEAKEY, L. S. B.; and SAVAGE, R. J. G. (editors)
Fossil Vertebrates of Africa. Vol. 2. London: Aca-
demic Press.
1970 LEAKEY, L. S. B.; SAVAGE, R. J. G.; and CORYN-
DON, S. C. (editors) Fossil Vertebrates of Africa.
Vol. 3. London: Academic Press.
1970 PROST, JACK; PROST, STEPHANIE; and LEAKEY,
L. S. B. (editors) Adam, or Ape. Cambridge, Mass.:
Schenkman.
1971 LEAKEY, L. S. B.; and ARDREY, ROBERT Aggres-
sion and Violence in Man: A Dialogue. Munger
Africana Library Notes 9:1-24.
1974 By the Evidence: Memoirs, 1932-1951. New
York and London: Harcourt. —» A paperback edition
was published in 1976.

1977-1978 The Southern Kikuyu Before 1903. 3 vols.
London: Academic Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CLARK, J. DESMOND 1976 Louis Seymour Bazett
Leakey, 1903-1972. Pages 520-541 in G. L. Isaac
and E. R. McCown (editors), Human Origins: Louis
Leakey and the East African Evidence. Menlo Park,
Calif.: Benjamin. —» Includes a bibliography of
Leakey's work compiled by Shirley C. Coryndon on
pages 542-564.
COLE, SONIA 1976 Leakey's Luck: The Life of Louis
Seymour Bazett Leakey, 1903-1972. London: Col-
lina.
DANIEL, GLYN; and BROWNE, PETER 1974 Unforget-
table Louis Leakey. Reader's Digest 105, no. 630:
69-74.
HALL, HENRY RUSHTON (1907) 1908 Days Before
History. 2d ed. London: Harrap.
TOBIAS, P. V. 1973a Louis Seymour Bazett Leakey,
1903-1972. South African Archaeological Bulletin
28:3-12.
TOBIAS, P. V. 1973k Obituary: Dr. L. S. B. Leakey.
South African Journal of Science 69:123 only.
TOBIAS, P. V. 1974 Leakey, Louis Seymour. Volume
2, pages 154—156 in Scienziati e Technologi Con-
temporanei. Edited by E. Macorini. Milan (Italy):
Mondadori.
TOBIAS, P. V. 1976a Louis Leakey: A Pioneer of Afri-
can Palaeoecology. Number 3, pages 3-6 in Studies
in Physical Anthropology. Edited by T. Bielicki. War- massive two volume Festschrift, on the occasion
saw: Polish Academy of Sciences.
TOBIAS, P. V. 1976Z? White African: An Appreciation
and Some Personal Memories of Louis Leakey.
Pages 55-74 in G. L. Isaac and E. R. McCown (edi-
tors), Human Origins: Louis Leakey and the East
African Evidence. Menlo Park, Calif.: Benjamin.
LEIBHOLZ, GERHARD
Gerhard Leibholz was born in 1901 in Berlin.
His life, in many ways interwoven with the fate
of twentieth-century Germany, is marked by
varied experiences of great significance to his
development as scholar, publicist, and jurist.
Jewish by heritage he converted in early life to
Christianity. Born into a family of industrial-
ists, he was attracted to the life of the mind, go-
ing on to earn doctoral degrees in philosophy
(Heidelberg University) and law (Berlin Uni- tional liberal, in the capacity of institutions to
versity) by the age of 23. Raised in the Wilhelm-
ian period of growing militarism and nation-
alism, he embraced the principles of democracy
and equality. Loyal to the Weimar Republic, he
witnessed its destruction from his chair in con-
stitutional law at Gottingen University. Forced
to abandon his professorship, he fled to England
in 1938, where as a refugee he turned to politi-
cal and religious subjects, becoming a close per-
sonal confidant of George Bell, Lord Bishop of
Chichester, and, during his years as a guest historical and structural basis of modern de-
lecturer at Oxford University, an intellectual
LEIBHOLZ, GERHARD 433
confrere of Christopher Dawson. Linked to the
anti-Nazi resistance movement through his
brother-in-law, Dietrich Bonhoeffer—the well-
known Protestant theologian imprisoned and ex-
ecuted on Hitler's order for his part in the con-
spiracy against him—he labored tirelessly but
unsuccessfully with Bell to convince the British
that it was necessary to cooperate with the re-
sisters inside Germany. Finally, notwithstand-
ing the execution of many close relatives—most
in the Bonhoeffer circle—at the hands of the
Gestapo, he returned to Germany in 1947 to re-
sume his professorship at Gottingen and to con-
tribute, as a scholar and jurist, to the recon-
struction of Germany's new constitutional order.
Leibholz served for twenty years (1951-1971)
as judge of the Federal Constitutional Court, the
Bonn Republic's highest tribunal. For 26 years
he was editor of the Jahrbuch des offentlichen
Rechts, a distinguished annual review of con-
stitutional law and development around the
world. Leibholz' international reputation was
underscored in 1966 with the publication of a
of his 65th birthday, that included contributions
by noted philosophers, theologians, political
scientists, historians, international lawyers, and
public servants from 23 nations (Bracher et al.
1966). The Festschrift was appropriately sub-
titled "Modern Constitutionalism and Democ-
racy," the main theme of more than two hun-
dred articles, monographs, and books that Leib-
holz had written in the course of his career.
Although Leibholz' publications fall neatly
into three stages—those of the rising young Ger-
man jurist and scholar, of the refugee in En-
gland, and of the distinguished professor and
judge in the Bonn Republic—they are marked by
an uncommon unity and continuity of thought.
They reflect his philosophical opposition, as a
legal theorist, to the prevailing positivism and
nominalism of his time; his faith, as a constitu-
shape the politicolegal order; and his conviction,
as a Christian intellectual, that the principles of
liberty and equality could not be maintained
without their anchorage in the spiritual and re-
ligious tradition of the West.
His most important early works were Die
Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz (1925) and Das
Wesen der Reprdsentation (1929), both ar-
dently debated among the legal and political
theorists of the Weimar Republic. Analyzing the
mocracy, these studies examined the evolution
 434 LEIBHOLZ, GERHARD
of the idea and reality of political equality and
traced the transformation of parliamentary de-
mocracy from its early modern, indirect forms
of representation to what Leibholz perceived as
its contemporary plebiscitary form, dominated
by mass political parties. What distinguished
this theory from the prevailing view of Western,
and especially American, political scientists was
his contention that "plebiscitary mass party par-
liamentary democracy"—in Leibholz' view a
historically determined and irreversible reality
—was a variant of direct (not indirect) democ-
racy, with a clear potential for tyranny. Thus
for him the central problem of politics was to
keep democracy from becoming totalitarian
with the consequent crushing of personal liberty
despite equal representation of citizens in par-
liament. Rejecting Western models of political
representation based on interest-group liberal-
ism as well as egalitarian models based on class
rule, he proposed a system of responsible party
government buttressed by election procedures
and constitutional devices calculated to guaran-
tee both limited government and political equal-
ity for all citizens.
During his exile in England, Leibholz reflected
more deeply on the meaning of constitutional
government. Writing a series of articles and
lectures on Germany and its rebuilding after the
war, he turned also toward the larger issues of
power, justice, and world order. From the pages
of the Contemporary Review, the Hibbart
Journal, the Fortnightly, and the Dublin Re-
view, the main vehicles for publication of his
work between 1938 and 1948, he sought to de-
velop a political science based on an explicitly
Christian understanding of man and history.
The influence of Dawson and Reinhold Niebuhr
seemed evident in his tracing of the rise of
"secular totalitarianism" to the growth of moral
relativism and the total separation of religion
and politics in the public life of Western nations.
The essence of his thought is captured in his
1946 essay "Politics and Natural Law," re-
printed in his Politics and Law (1965), in which
he used the term "theonomic thinking" to de-
scribe his approach to political power. Such
thinking "requires that political power be
brought into the service of God to fulfill His
purposes" (p. 20). Although an adherent of
natural law, he no longer believed it possible,
because of the erosion of common values, "to
derive the conception of justice from human
reason and morality alone," for "theonomic
thinking requires that [the principles of natural
law] be not separated from their dependence on
the eternal and sacred justice which has been
revealed by God" (p. 21). He argued at length
for the reconstruction of politics on a Christian
basis and, with Bonhoeffer clearly in mind, for
a vigorous reassertion of the political role of the
Christian church.
Back in Germany, Leibholz remained firm in
these convictions but adopted a more institu-
tionalist perspective in his defense of consti-
tutional procedures—one that would protect the
vitality of the nation and the moral order on
which it was presumably based. He became at
length the Bonn Republic's most persistent ad-
vocate of the juridical democracy created by the
Basic Law (the West German Constitution).
Controversial on and off the bench, he ardently
defended the institutions of judicial review, fed-
eralism, the multiparty state, proportional repre-
sentation, and the Federal Constitutional Court
as preeminent guardians of liberty, equality, and
political democracy. Many of his early views on
political parties and equal representation he
helped to write into ruling constitutional law,
although he was only partly victorious in his
long fight to win the court's approval for the
public financing of political parties. Several re-
views of his works during this period, while
praising him for his judicial pragmatism, tended
nonetheless to find large gaps between his ju-
ridical theory of the party state and empirical
theories of democracy advanced by leading po-
litical scientists. But his main intellectual tour
de force of this period was doubtless Das
Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land (Leibholz & Rinck 1966), a comprehensive
commentary on the Basic Law, based entirely
on the decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court.
DONALD P. KOMMERS
WORKS BY LEIBHOLZ
1921 Fichte und der demokratische Gedarike: Ein
Beitrag zur Staatslehre. Freiburg (Germany):
Boltze.
(1925) 1959 Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz: Eine
Studie auf rechtsvergleichender und rechtsphilos-
ophischer Grundlage. 2d ed. Munich: Beck.
1928 Zu den Problemen des fascistischen Verfas-
sungsrechts. Berlin: de Gruyter.
(1929) 1973 Das Wesen der Reprdsentation und der
Gestaltwandel der Demokratie im 20. Jahrhundert.
4th ed. Berlin: de Gruyter. —> First published with
the title Das Wesen der Reprdsentation unter
besonderer Beriicksichtigung des Reprasentivsys-
terns: Ein Beitrag zur allgemeinen Staats- und
Verfassungslehre.
1933 Die Auftosung der liberalen Demokratie in

Deutschland und des autoritdre Staatsbild. Munich:
Duncker & Humblot.
1942 Christianity, Politics, and Power. London:
Sheldon.
(1958) 1977 Strukturprobleme der modernen Demo-
kratie. 4th ed. Karlsruhe (Germany): C. F. Miiller.
1965 Politics and Law. Leiden (Netherlands): Sythoff.
(1966) 1975 LEIBHOLZ, GERHARD; and RINCK, HANS-
JUSTUS Das Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland: Kommentar an Hand der Recht-
sprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. 5th ed.
Cologne-Marienburg (Germany): Schmidt.
1968 LEIBHOLZ, GERHARD; and RUPPRECHT, REINHARD
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz: Rechtsprechungs-
kommentar. Cologne-Marienburg (Germany):
Schmidt.
1973 Verfassungsstaat, Verfassungsrecht. Berlin: Kohl-
hammer.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BELL, GEORGE KENNEDY ALLEN 1974 An der its theoretical innovations but because of its
Schwelle zum Gespaltenen Europa: Der Briefwech-
sel Zwischen George Bell und Gerhard Leibholz,
1939-1951. Edited by Eberhard Bethge and Ronald
C. D. Jasper. Stuttgart (Germany): Kreuz.
BRACHER, KARL DIETRICH et al. 1966 Die moderne
Demokratie und ihr Recht. 2 vols. Tubingen (Ger-
many): Mohr. —> A bibliography of all of Leib-
holz's published works, prepared by Franz
Schneider, is on pages 963-999 of volume 2.
LEIBHOLZ-BONHOEFFER, SABINE (1968) 1972 The
Bonhoeffers: Portait of a Family. New York: St.
Martins. —> First published as Vergangen, erlebt,
•iiberwunden: Schicksale der Familie Bonhoeffer.
LEONTIEF, WASSILY
Wassily Leontief, the father of input-output
analysis, was born in St. Petersburg (now Len-
ingrad) on August 5, 1906. Educated at the 1947 issues of the Monthly Labor Review. With-
University of Leningrad and the University of
Berlin, he received his PH.D. from the latter in- dustry economics—had become a major spe-
stitution in 1928. Leontief was a research econ-
omist at the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft at the
University of Kiel in 1927/1928. He moved to
Nanking the following year to become an eco-
nomic adviser to the Chinese government, and
to the United States in 1931 to join the National his immediate successors—had dealt with the
Bureau of Economic Research as a research as-
sociate. That year he became an instructor in
economics at Harvard University, moving
through the ranks to achieve a full professorship
in 1946. He was appointed Henry Lee professor dominant method was that of partial equilib-
of economics in 1953 Leontief established the
Harvard Economic Research Project (HERP) in
1946 and served as its director until it was
closed in 1972. After resigning from Harvard in
1975, he became professor of economics at New
York University. Leontief was awarded the
French Legion of Honor in 1967, the Bernhard-
Harms prize by West Germany in 1970, and the or with general equilibrium. He was a pure
Nobel Prize in economic science in 1973.
Leontiefs first publication on input-output
LEONTIEF, WASSILY 435
analysis was the article entitled "Quantitative
Input-Output Relations in the Economic Sys-
tem of the United States" (1936). This was fol-
lowed by other journal articles and his first
book, The Structure of the American Economy,
1919-1929 (1941). Leontiefs early work at-
tracted relatively little attention. His first article
appeared less than a year after the publication
of Keynes's General Theory of Employment, In-
terest and Money (1936), and the pressing
problem of the day was chronic, long-term un-
employment, which appeared endemic to all
mature capitalist economies. Keynes's work, ad-
dressed to this problem, attracted immediate
and widespread attention, not only because of
policy implications.
World War 11 solved the unemployment prob-
lem, at least temporarily, and convinced many
economists of the correctness of Keynes's views.
But it was widely believed that after the war
capitalist economies would once again slide into
chronic depression unless appropriate policy
measures were taken. Concern about postwar
full employment led to the first application of
input-output analysis to an important policy is-
sue. Input-output tables for 1939 were con-
structed by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
under Leontiefs direction and were used to
project full employment patterns to 1950. These
were published in the February and March
in a decade, input-output analysis—or interin-
cialty. New developments appeared with in-
creasing frequency, often stimulated by the
publication of seminal papers by Leontief and
his associates at HERP.
The classical economists—Adam Smith and
economy as a whole. However, for more than a
century before the appearance of Keynes's Gen-
eral Theory, the focus of neoclassical economics
had been on the household and the firm. The
rium analysis—that is, the changing of variables
one at a time on the assumption that everything
else remained constant. When Leon Walras pub-
lished his Elements d'economie politique pure
(1874-1877), it was a major departure from the
traditional approach. Walras was concerned
with the interdependence of economic activities,
theorist, however, and did not attempt to
develop an empirical model. Leontiefs input-
436 LEONTIEF, WASSILY
output model is a lineal descendant of the Wal-
rasian theory of general equilibrium. It repre-
sents a quantum jump in the evolution of
economic thought, however, because Leontief
produced empirical versions of his theoretical
model. Today, input-output models are used to
analyze a wide variety of economic problems.
Leontief was critical of abstruse mathemati-
cal models that had no counterpart in the real
world. In his presidential address to the 83rd
meeting of the American Economic Association,
he criticized the use of models based on highly
simplified assumptions. "By the time it comes to
interpretation of the substantive conclusions"
he stated, "the assumptions on which the model
have been based are easily forgotten. But it is
precisely the empirical validity of these assump-
tions on which the usefulness of the entire ex-
ercise depends" (1971, p. 2). Himself a skilled
mathematician, and an acknowledged theorist,
he preferred to devote his talents and energy to
the development of models that could be statis-
tically implemented and applied to the analysis
of significant policy issues.
The original input-output model. The first
tables constructed by Leontief, for 1919 and
1929, represented a closed model. The basic
table—now called a transactions table—divided
the economy into 44 sectors. These were listed
along the left-hand side and across the top to
form a two-way grid. Each row recorded sales
from the sector at the left to the sectors at the
top. Each column recorded inputs purchased by
the sector at the top from sectors at the left.
The sum of each row was that sector's total
gross output; the sum of each column was its
total gross outlays.
From the transactions table Leontief derived
a second grid of technical coefficients. Each
column shows how much is required by the
sector at the top from sectors at the left to pro-
duce one dollar's worth of its own output. The
coefficients were assumed to be stable. Finally,
these technical coefficients were inserted in a
system of equations that were solved simultane-
ously to obtain what is now called a Leontief
inverse. This table, which completes the basic
set comprising a static input—output model,
shows the direct and indirect requirements each
sector needs to produce an additional dollar's
worth of output. Because the equations in Leon-
tief s original model were solved by desk calcu-
lators, the 44-order tables were reduced to 10
rows and columns for computation.
The 1939 table, constructed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics under Leontief s direction, was
larger than his original tables. It had 96 pro-
cessing industries—that is, industries for which
intermediate transactions were recorded as de-
scribed above. A much larger table, for 1947,
with data collected for 500 industries (later ag-
gregated to 190) was also constructed by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. This table was com-
pleted in 1952. By that time digital computers
were available to solve the system of equations,
and the era of applied input-output analysis
had arrived.
The 1947 table represented a new departure.
It described an open, static input-output sys-
tem. This system distinguishes between interin-
dustry sales and final sales (to households, gov-
ernment, and export). There are corresponding
rows showing purchases of primary inputs
(from households and imports, as well as pay-
ments to government). The final sales columns
are referred to collectively as final demand, the
primary inputs as value added. Changes in final
demand are determined by forces "outside" the
system. Once these are given, the equations are
solved again to show how each sector is affected
by any specified change in final demand—in
one, two, or any number of sectors. In practice,
changes in final demand are estimated by con-
ventional statistical forecasting procedures.
Static, open input-output models are used to
make detailed forecasts and to calculate various
types of multipliers. The basic model yields
output multipliers. If households are treated as
an "industry," however, the model can generate
income multipliers. It is also possible to calcu-
late labor coefficients from employment-output
functions and, from these, to derive sets of em-
ployment multipliers. These various multipliers
show total changes in output, income, and em-
ployment, by industry, after the economy has
reached a state of equilibrium following speci-
fied changes in final demand.
Later innovations. After the 1947 tables were
published (in 1952), there was a hiatus during
which the federal government was not involved
in preparing input-output tables. Later, an In-
terindustry Economics Division was established
in the U.S. Department of Commerce, which
publishes sets of tables at approximate five-year
intervals. The most recent tables were for 1967.
During the hiatus, Leontief and a growing num-
ber of research associates were working on the
Harvard Research Project. The result was a
major book by Leontief and nine associates,
Studies in the Structure of the American Econ-

omy (1953). It includes a chapter by Leontief
discussing changes in technical coefficients over
time. Early input-output studies had been
criticized because they assumed constant co-
efficients. This was not a necessary assumption,
however, and some later models allowed co-
efficients to vary as they were affected by
changing technology, relative prices, and in
some cases by changing trade patterns.
Two major advances were made by Leontief
in the new volume. One was the development of
dynamic input-output theory, the second a
lengthy exposition of interregional theory. A
dynamic input-output model is more complex
than the static model. It includes a matrix of
capital coefficients relating expansion invest-
ment requirements to changes in each sector's
capacity. The static model is represented by a
system of ordinary linear equations. But a dy-
namic model consists of a system of linear dif-
ference equations—or, in Leontiefs original
form, a system of linear differential equations.
Systems of difference or differential equations
may or may not be stable. After the publication
of Leontiefs theoretical paper, there was some
discussion in the literature about the feasibility
of constructing operational dynamic models.
Such models have been constructed, however.
They have proved to be stable and have been
used for a variety of analytical purposes. Dy-
namic models extend the application of input-
output to a number of new uses, including
analysis and simulation of the processes of eco-
nomic growth and development.
Leontiefs paper on interregional theory
(printed in Leontief et al. 1953), together with a
companion piece on regional input-output anal-
ysis by Walter Isard (1953), had an immediate
and widespread impact on regional economics
and the newly emerging discipline of regional
science. Within two decades, scores of input-
output tables had been constructed for cities,
states, and regions. Regional and interregional
input—output analysis has become a major sub-
division of interindustry economics, with a
burgeoning literature of its own.
Other evidence of progress in input—output
analysis is found in the proceedings of a series
of international input-output conferences. The
1st, held in the Netherlands in 1950, was at-
tended by only 15 participants. The 6th, with
320 participants, took place in Vienna in 1974.
Their respective proceedings show a gradual
shift from an early preoccupation with defini-
tions and measurement to the development of
LEONTIEF, WASSILY 437
sophisticated theoretical models, and the appli-
cation of input-output techniques to a wide
variety of social and economic problems. Among
other contributions to these conferences was a
paper by Leontief demonstrating the use of an
input-output model for the economic analysis
of air pollution abatement.
The most ambitious interindustry study con-
ducted to date was made by Leontief and several
associates for the United Nations. The results
were presented in The Future of the World
Economy (Leontief et al. 1977). The nations
of the world were divided into 15 regions and
economic activity into 45 sectors; thus the glo-
bal model belongs to the family of interregional
models. Among the objectives of the study was
estimating the economic and environmental im-
pacts of alternative development strategies on
the world economy to the year two thousand.
Conventional economics, whether neoclassi-
cal or Keynesian, presupposes a market econ-
omy. Interindustry economics, however, is not
constrained in any way. It can be used for the
analysis of any type of economic system from
laissez-faire capitalism to a controlled, centrally
planned economy.
Not all planning is centralized. France, for
example, has experimented with indicative (as
opposed to coercive) planning. Production goals
needed to reach the target levels of output were
set by a committee representing business, labor,
and government. An input-output model was
used to calculate the inputs, including invest-
ment requirements, that were needed to reach
the stated goals. Some American economists
have argued that the next stage in the develop-
ment of capitalism will require comprehensive
national planning. Leontief has been a leader
of this group. Input-output analysis would play
a central role in such planning, which would be
noncoercive. In Leontiefs words: "Choice among
alternative scenarios is the cue to rational na-
tional economic planning" (1976, p. 8).
For many years input-output analysis was
considered to be an esoteric subject of limited
interest to most economists. Today, interindus-
try economics is an integral part of graduate
training in economics, generally as part of
econometrics, where mathematical and statisti-
cal analysis are conjoined with economic theory.
Increasingly, the rudiments of input-output
analysis are being taught at the undergraduate
level.
Interindustry economics is anything but static.
Input-output models are being merged with
438 LERNER, ABBA P.
other types of econometric models. New tech-
niques for estimating coefficients appear; some
are tried and discarded, others are modified by
additional research findings. New theoretical
developments and applications are regularly re-
ported in the literature. It is a vibrant and ex-
panding branch of economics. Leontief now
ranks with Adam Smith, Keynes, and other lead-
ing economists whose ideas have left a per-
manent imprint on the history of economic
thought.
WILLIAM H. MIERNYK
WORKS BY LEONTIEF
1936 Quantitative Input-Output Relations in the Eco-
nomic System of the United States. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 18:105—125.
(1941) 1951 The Structure of the American Economy,
1919-1939: An Empirical Application of Equilib-
rium Analysis. 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press. —»The first edition covered only the years
1919-1929.
1953 LEONTIEF, WASSILY et al. Studies in the Struc-
ture of the American Economy: Theoretical and Em-
pirical Explorations in Input-Output Analysis. New
York: Oxford Univ. Press.
1966 Input-Output Economics. New York: Oxford
Univ. Press. —» Contains 11 essays by the author
published over a period of 20 years.
1966—1977 Essays in Economics. 2 vols. White Plains,
N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. —> Volume 1 was first pub-
lished in 1966 with the subtitle Theories and Theo-
rizing and was reprinted in 1977 as volume 1 of
Leontief's Essays. Volume 2 was subtitled Theories,
Facts and Policies and was first published in 1977.
1968 Input-Output Analysis. Volume 7, pages 345-
354 in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
ences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmil-
lan and Free Press.
1971 Theoretical Assumptions and Nonobserved Facts.
American Economic Review 61:1-7.
1976 National Economic Planning: Methods and Prob-
lems. Challenge, July-Aug. :8 only.
1977 LEONTIEF, WASSILY (editor) Structure, System
and Economic Policy. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1977 LEONTIEF, WASSILY et al. The Future of the
World Economy: A United Nations Study. New
York: Oxford Univ. Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CHENERY, HOLLIS B.; and CLARK, PAUL G. 1959 In-
terindustry Economics. New York: Wiley.
ISARD, WALTER 1951 Interregional and Regional In-
put-Output Analysis: A Model of a Space-economy.
Review of Economics and Statistics 33:318—328.
ISARD, WALTER 1953 Some Empirical Results and
Problems of Regional Input—Output Analysis. Pages
116—181 in Wassily Leontief et al., Studies in the
Structure of the American Economy. New York: Ox-
ford Univ. Press.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARB 1936 The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —> A paperback edition was published by
Harcourt in 1965.
MIERNYK, WILLIAM H. 1965 The Elements of Input-
Output Analysis. New York: Random House.
RICHARDSON, HARRY W. 1972 Input-Output and Re-
gional Economics. New York: Wiley. —» A paper-
back edition was published by Halsted in 1975.
WALRAS, LEON (1874-1877) 1954 Elements of Pure
Economics: Or, the Theory of Social Wealth. Trans-
lated by William Jaffe. Homewood, 111.: Irwin; Lon-
don: Allen & Unwin. —» First published as Elements
d'economie politique pure. The definitive French
edition appeared in 1926.
LERNER, ABBA P.
Abba P. Lerner was born in Bessarabia in
1903. Shortly after his birth his family immi-
grated to England and he grew up in London.
After a series of false starts to a career, he be-
came a student at the London School of Eco-
nomics (L.S.E.) in 1929. His ability was recog-
nized by J. R. Hicks and was called to the
attention of Lionel Robbins. Lerner entered the
L.S.E. as a convinced socialist and was to be-
come a leading, and early, exponent of Key-
nesian economics. Yet it was Robbins, an advo-
cate of market mechanisms based on private
property, and, in the 1930s, one of Keynes's most
able opponents, whom Lerner later credited with
having "made me an economist." Robbins, still
in his early thirties, though skeptical of the role
of empirical testing in economics, was convinced
of the social relevance of rigorous deductive
economic theory. During the 1930s his depart-
ment attracted as staff and students an array of
extraordinarily talented young economists: Fried-
rich A. von Hayek, Hicks, Roy Allen, Marion
Bowley, Victor Edelberg, Nicholas Kaldor, and
Tibor Scitovsky, among many others, not to
mention Lerner himself. Lerner's own enthusi-
asm for economic theory, his concern that it be
applied to problems of social importance, and
his passionate advocacy of individual freedom,
clearly mark him as Robbins' student, as in-
deed do his lucid exposition and the absence of
any predominantly quantitative work in his
contributions.
Lerner has made important contributions to
the pure theory of international trade, welfare
economics, the economics of socialism, theo-
retical macroeconomics, and the policy applica-
tion of Keynesian economics. His earliest papers,
written within three years of his taking up eco-
nomics, were exercises in the application of geo-
metric techniques, which were then at the
technical frontier of economics, to problems in
the pure theory of international trade. What
might have become the most influential of these
papers went unpublished for 19 years. In it
Lerner derived a set of conditions under which,

in the absence of factor mobility, the existence
of free trade in outputs between two countries
would serve to equalize factor rewards between
them. It was only after Paul A. Samuelson's
publication of similar results in 1948 that
Robbins rediscovered Lerner's paper in his files
and in 1952 had it published in Economica.
The most typical of Lerner's early papers is
his "Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement
of Monopoly Power" which appeared in the 1934
Review of Economic Studies, a journal that he
helped found, and also, with Ursula Webb (Lady
Hicks), edited between 1933 and 1937. His pro-
posal that monopoly be measured not in terms
of some purely descriptive statistic such as a
concentration ratio, but rather in terms of the
effect of its existence on economic welfare, is
notable in two respects. First it contains the
germ of the idea that a policy or institution
should be judged by its effect on the well-being
of individuals, a notion that was later explicitly
to underpin his writings on "functional finance."
Second, Lerner explained that monopoly main-
tained the market price of a good (the amount
that consumers were just willing to pay for a
marginal unit of output and hence a measure
of the social benefit conferred by that unit)
above its marginal cost of production (this in
its turn being a measure of the benefit being
sacrificed elsewhere to obtain that marginal
unit). Competition on the other hand forced
output to expand until marginal costs and bene-
fits were equated, with a net gain in consumer
satisfaction arising from this expansion. For
Lerner, the amount by which a monopolist sets
his price above marginal cost was thus an index
of the social harm that he did and hence an
appropriate measure of his power. This was a
particular application of the general principle
that deviations between marginal cost and mar-
ginal benefit lower economic welfare, a concept
developed extensively in Lerner's most impor-
tant book, The Economics of Control (1944).
This work had first been proposed in 1932 as
a PH.D thesis. An early version of it did earn
Lerner his doctorate, but the book itself was not
published until 1944, seven years after Lerner's
first arrival in the United States from Britain.
Lerner at first intended, as a contribution to the
economics of socialism, to develop the rules
whereby the managers of collectively owned en-
terprises could act so as to ensure that scarce
resources would be allocated to promote the gen-
eral economic welfare of the community. In the
course of developing his analysis, Lerner be-
LERNER, ABBA P. 439
came involved, along with Oskar Lange and
H. D. Dickenson among others, in a debate with
Ludwig von Mises and von Hayek about the very
possibility that a collectivist society could or-
ganize its economic life coherently. The upshot
of the debate was that the possibility did exist,
provided that managers of socialist enterprises
were instructed to adopt the principles of mar-
ginal cost pricing—principles that profit-maxi-
mizing competitive firms under capitalism,
would automatically adopt—a solution that
von Hayek remarked would probably not appeal
to socialists who were not also trained econ-
omists.
Lerner's involvement in this debate con-
vinced him that a system based either on private
or on collective ownership of resources could
conceivably produce a coherent solution to the
fundamental problem of scarcity. The perfor-
mance of National Socialism in Germany and of
communism in the Soviet Union led him to fear
the totalitarian potential of collectivism. Thus,
by 1944, Lerner's socialism stressed the ends of
individual freedom and democracy rather than
the means of collective ownership of property.
Lerner had come to conceive of the "economics
of control" as a set of general principles, based
on the equation of marginal cost and benefit,
that could be applied by policy makers to im-
proving the performance of any economy, collec-
tivist, capitalist, or mixed.
The bulk of The Economics of Control provides
a thorough working out of the principles whereby
a Pareto optimal allocation of resources, under
which no one can be made better off without
someone being made worse off, can be achieved.
It is notable for the stress that it places on the
ways in which a laissez-faire economy can fail
to achieve such an optimum and on the design
of state intervention to help to solve these prob-
lems. Such matters had of course been analyzed
by Arthur Pigou in his Economics of Welfare
(1920), but he had used Marshallian partial
equilibrium techniques. Lerner used the more
powerful general equilibrium tools that had been
developed on the Continent and brought into
English economics by Robbins, Hayek, Hicks,
and their associates. Lerner's 1944 analysis pays
little attention to the relationship between the
extent to which unregulated market mechan-
isms can achieve an optimal allocation of re-
sources and the structure of property rights and
legal obligations prevailing at any time. This
disregard is surprising because pioneering work
on these matters was done at the L.S.E. in the
440 LERNER, ABBA P.
1930s by Arnold Plant and his associates. The
omission was made good in Lerner's later writ-
ings on consumer sovereignty, where the influ-
ence of Ronald Coase, one of Plant's students,
is evident. It is symptomatic nevertheless of
what some regard as an undue neglect on
Lerner's part of the political and institutional
background against which economic activity
takes place and economic policy is made. Al-
though The Economics of Control has come to
be thought of mainly as a contribution to theo-
retical welfare economics, Lerner himself was
inclined to regard it as a guide to practical
policymaking.
In addition to its exposition of the principles
of marginal cost pricing, The Economics of Con-
trol is also notable for an impressionistic argu-
ment, part probabilistic and part Benthamite,
to the effect that an equal distribution of income
is likely to maximize social welfare. Further-
more, its final chapters contain one of Lerner's
several accounts of his own particular version
of Keynesian macroeconomics. Lerner seems
to have been attracted to Keynesian economics
during a term spent at Cambridge University in
1935. Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson played
a role in convincing him of the importance of
Keynes's then unpublished work, but he gives
the major credit for this to Robert Bryce, Alec
Cairncross, and Lorie Tarshis, who were then
graduate students at Cambridge. Lerner wrote an
early (1936a) review of Keynes's The General
Theory (1936) and his theoretical papers on
Keynesian economics deal with the distinction
between a stock of capital and a flow of invest-
ment in models of the influence of interest
rate on the level of aggregate demand; they also
elaborate the insight that money wage rigidity,
inasmuch as it promotes price level predicta-
bility, is a desirable feature in a monetary econ-
omy. However, the policy doctrine of "functional
finance" is undoubtedly Lerner's main contribu-
tion to Keynesian economics.
"Keynesian economics" is often thought of as
a set of propositions concerning the use of fiscal
and monetary policy for the pursuit of high em-
ployment and price stability, but such proposi-
tions derive only indirectly from Keynes's
General Theory. They were, in fact, developed
by Lerner and also by Alvin Hansen. According
to Lerner the principles of "sound finance," un-
der which the government attempts to avoid in-
creasing its debt by matching its expenditures
with tax revenue, derive from a false analogy
with behavior appropriate to an individual
firm or household and serve no useful social
function. Internally held national debt is both an
asset and a liability to the community and hence
represents no burden to it. It is only debt held
overseas that is burdensome to a country in the
way that private debt is burdensome to an indi-
vidual. However, the scale of government ex-
penditure, and the extent to which it is financed
by taxes, borrowing, or money creation, do influ-
ence the community's welfare through their in-
fluence on income, employment, and prices. The
basic principle of "functional finance," then, is
that fiscal and monetary policy are to be judged
solely in terms of their effects on these variables.
Because Lerner believed that the automatic
forces tending to bring any actual economy to
full employment and price stability are weak,
he held that fiscal and monetary policies should
be actively and continuously deployed toward
the achievement of these goals.
Unlike most American Keynesian economists,
Lerner explicitly recognized that there could be
a conflict between achieving domestic goals and
maintaining balance-of-payments equilibrium
under fixed exchange rates. Hence, like Milton
Friedman, whose views on stabilization policy
were otherwise diametrically opposed to his, he
advocated exchange rate flexibility. Moreover,
Lerner recognized the interdependence of fiscal
and monetary policy that arises from the fact
that expenditure not financed by taxation must
be met by borrowing or money creation; and
when he dealt with inflation was always explicit
that money creation was a necessary condition
for it to persist. His stress on these matters, and
the absence from his work of any touch of the
pessimistic "secular stagnation" thesis, sharply
differentiate his contribution to Keynesian eco-
nomics from that of Hansen.
It was in the late 1940s that Lerner became
concerned with price stability problems. He paid
considerable attention to them in The Economics
of Employment (1951), in which he noted the
theoretical possibility that inflation, once under
way, could generate expectations that would
cause it to accelerate; thus to an important ex-
tent he anticipated the "accelerationist hypothe-
sis" of Friedman and Edmund S. Phelps. How-
ever, he doubted the empirical importance of this
effect. Moreover, he did not associate the onset
of accelerating inflation with the achievement
of a particular "natural" unemployment rate.
Rather, he conceived of two levels of "full em-
ployment equilibrium"—a "high" level that could,
in the absence of monopoly power and other in-

stitutional rigidities in output and labor markets,
be achieved without generating inflation; and a
"low" level, above which inflation would in fact
set in because of such rigidities. For Lerner,
for whom inflation that did not accelerate was
not in any event a major problem, this "low"
level of full employment involved an intolerably
large number of unemployed: six million was
his 1951 guess for the United States. Hence at
that early date he advocated the use of wage and
price controls, perhaps enforced by tax incen-
tives, to counteract what he later named the
"sellers' inflation" that would ensue if functional
finance were used, as he believed it should be,
to achieve a "high" level full employment target
of about two million.
Much subsequent Keynesian discussion, both
academic and practical, of anti-inflation policy,
clearly had its roots in Lerner's pioneering work.
Moreover, he continued to study these matters,
and during the 1970s inflation, when proposals
for tax-enforced incomes policies became popu-
lar, he was again involved in debates about them.
Becoming skeptical of their feasibility, he put
forward an alternative plan in 1978. The gov-
ernment would issue to firms a limited number
of marketable vouchers permitting a certain rate
of money wage increase during a specific period.
Firms wishing to grant increases beyond their
initial allocation would be free to buy vouchers
from others, who would thereby give up the right
to increase wages. Whatever view one takes of
the administrative feasibility of this plan, there
can be no question about its ingenuity.
Throughout his career there have been detrac-
tors who have found Lerner naive about the
political practicalities of implementing economic
policy, but his defenders would argue that his
only fault, if indeed it is a fault, has been op-
timism about the power of rational argument
to influence politicians and bureaucrats to act
in socially desirable ways. However, there has
always been complete agreement about his ana-
lytical work: it has consistently been of the
highest quality. Though many an economics de-
partment is decorated with one or more of
Lerner's elegant mobile sculptures, a legacy of
his stay there, he never settled long enough in
one university to create a readily identifiable
group of disciples to develop and propagate his
ideas (Milton Friedman at the University of
Chicago and Paul A. Samuelson at the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology come to mind
as examples). It is all the more a tribute to the
quality of his work then, that he has nevertheless
LERNER, ABBA P. 441
had an unquestionable influence on the develop-
ment of economics during the middle decades of
the twentieth century.
DAVID LAIDLER
WORKS BY LERNER
1932 The Diagrammatical Representation of Cost Con-
ditions in International Trade. Economica 12:346—
356.
1934a The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement
of Monopoly Power. Review of Economic Studies
1:157-175.
1934£> The Diagrammatical Representation of Demand
Conditions in International Trade. Economica New
Series 1:319-334.
1936a The General Theory. International Labour Re-
view 14:435-454.
1936b The Symmetry Between Import and Export
Taxes. Economica New Series 3:306-313.
1937 Statics and Dynamics in Socialist Economics.
Economic Journal 47:253-270.
1943 Functional Finance and the Federal Debt. Social
Research 10:38-51.
1944 The Economics of Control: Principles of Welfare
Economics. New York: Macmillan.
1951 The Economics of Employment. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
1952a The Essential Properties of Interest and Money.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 66:172—193.
1952k Factor Prices and International Trade. Eco-
nomica New Series 19:1-15.
1953a Essays in Economic Analysis. London: Mac-
millan.
1953b On the Marginal Product of Capital and the
Marginal Efficiency of Investment. Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 61:1-14.
1958 Inflationary Depression and the Regulation of
Administered Prices. Pages 257-268 in U.S. Con-
gress, Joint Economic Committee, The Relationship
of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth: Com-
pendium of Papers. 85th Congress, 2d Session.
Washington: Government Printing Office.
1961 Everybody's Business. East Lansing: Michigan
State Univ. Press.
1967 Employment Theory and Employment Policy.
American Economic Review 57:1-18. —» The
Richard T. Ely lecture.
1968 Capital. Volume 2, pages 270-278 in Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1972a The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sov-
ereignty. American Economic Review 62:258—266.
1972b Flation. New York: Quadrangle. —» A paper-
back edition was published by Penguin in 1973.
1975 LERNER, ABBA P.; and BEN-SHAHAR, HAIM The
Economics of Efficiency and Growth; Lessons From
Israel and the West Bank. Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger.
1978 A Wage-increase Permit Plan to Stop Inflation.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2:491-505.
—» Special issue entitled Innovative Policies to Slow
Inflation.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BREIT, WILLIAM; and RANSOM, ROGER L. 1971 Abba
P. Lerner—The Artist as Economist. Chapter 10 in
William Breit and Roger L. Ransom, The Academic
Scribblers: American Economists in Collision. New
York: Holt.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory
442 LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
rnillan. —» A paperback edition was published in
1965 by Harcourt.
PIGOU, ARTHUR (1920) 1960 Economics of Welfare.
4th ed. London: Macmillan.
SAMUELSON, PAUL A. 1964 A. P. Lerner at Sixty.
Review of Economic Studies 31:169-178.
LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE
Claude Levi-Strauss was born on November
28, 1908, in Brussels, where his parents were
residing temporarily; his father, a painter, was
then completing a series of portraits. The family
returned to Paris two months after his birth.
Levi-Strauss lived in Paris continuously until
1935, with the exception of the World War I
years, which he spent in Versailles with his
mother and other relatives in the home of his
maternal grandfather, who was the city's chief
rabbi.
The roots of the Levi-Strausses were Alsatian
(deriving from Strasbourg and its vicinity). The
men were mostly rabbis or merchants. Isaac
Strauss, Levi-Strauss' great-grandfather, was an
orchestra conductor and composer, who had
moved to Paris at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century. Despite the prominence of rab-
bis in the family, Levi-Strauss and his parents
were never believers.
Levi-Strauss took, simultaneously, a licenciate
in law and one in philosophy, and became
agrege de philosophic in 1931. During his grad-
uate studies he was militant in the Socialist
party (S.F.I.Q,) and he wrote his first publica-
tion, Gracchus Eabeuf et le communisme (1928).
After his military service, Levi-Strauss taught
lycee for a little more than two years. In 1934
he was appointed lecturer in sociology at the
University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. There, the time
not taken up by his teaching was spent on field
work among the Amerindians of Brazil. A first
ethnographic contribution (1936) and an ex-
hibition in the Musee de I'Homme (Paris) of
artifacts he had collected won him recognition
as an ethnologist by the French masters of the
time—Marcel Mauss, Paul Rivet, Lucien Levy-
Bruhl. As a result, he was able to obtain a re-
search grant for further field work in Brazil in
1938-1939. Drafted in 1939, Levi-Strauss left
for New York after the Nazi occupation of
France. There, he joined the forces francaises
libres while teaching at the Ecole libre des
Hautes Etudes. His New York associates in-
cluded the surrealists Andre Breton and Max
Ernst and his colleague, the linguist Roman
Jakobson, with whom he established a lasting
friendship resulting in a deep reciprocal influ-
ence. Levi-Strauss returned to Paris briefly in
1944 before being sent back to New York as
cultural counsellor of France.
In 1943 Levi-Strauss had begun what became
his first monumental work, Les structures ele-
mentaires de la parente (1949). He had by then
already published the "charter" paper of struc-
turalism, "L'Analyse structurale en linguistique
et en anthropologie" (1945, printed in 1958,
chapter 2) and the Nambikwara ethnography
(1948). Back in Paris, he was appointed assis-
tant director of the Musee de 1'Homme, a post he
held until 1950 when he took a chair of direc-
teur d'etudes at the prestigious Ecole Pratique
des Hautes Etudes. He published the widely
known and acclaimed Tristes tropiques in 1955
and the important collection of essays, Anthro-
pologie structurale, in 1958. Along with Les
structures elementaires, these books made him
the "father" of structuralism in anthropology.
Levi-Strauss had planned to continue his
analysis of kinship—he had been preparing a
second volume, on the complex structures—
when he was appointed at the Ecole. Since the
chair was of religions of preliterate peoples, he
shifted the main focus of his research to mythol-
ogy and religion (1958, chapters 9-12: see
especially chapter 11, the pathbreaking paper
"La structure des mythes").
In 1959 the chair of social anthropology was
created for him at the highest French academic
institution, the College de France. Shortly there-
after, he completed what could be seen as the
second phase of his work with the publication of
Le totemisme aujourd'hui (1962Z?) and La
pensee sauvage (1962a). The onset of a third
phase, which combined and broadened the two
previous ones, was marked with the publication
in 1964 of Le cm et le cuit, the first volume of
a series of four (Mythologiques, 1964-1971)
devoted to the analysis of almost one thousand
Amerindian myths. Anthropologie structurale
deux (1973) appeared the year he became a
member of the Academic francaise. And Mythol-
ogiques was extended in La voie des masques
(1975), a two-volume analysis of Northwest
Pacific Coast Amerindian art and ritual; the
second edition (1979) will include ground
covered in later articles.
Levi-Strauss holds several doctorates honoris
causa-, he was awarded the Huxley memorial
medal (Royal Anthropological Institute of Great
Britain and Ireland) in 1965, the international

gold medal and Viking Fund prize in 1966, the
golden medal of the Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique in 1967 and of the presi-
dent of Italy in 1971, and the Erasmus prize in
1973. In 1954, he married Monique, who
has authored Shelia Hicks (1973), a book on
the works of an American artist living in France;
she also contributes to anthropological trans-
lations.
Intellectual orientation. The most important
early influences on Levi-Strauss' thought were
the science of geology and the writings of
Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx:
Marxism seemed to me to follow the same pro-
cedure as geology and as psychoanalysis as denned
by its founder: all three demonstrate that under-
standing consists in reducing a type of reality to
another one; that true reality is never the most
evident; and that the nature of what is true trans-
pires already in its very evasiveness. It is the same
problem in all cases, that of the relationship be-
tween the sensory and the rational, and the sought-
for goal is the same: a kind of superrationalism
aiming at integrating without loss the former into
the latter. (1955, p. 44)
This epistemological orientation was more
satisfactory to him than that suggested by the
stream of academic training at the time of his
graduate studies, which he characterized as fol-
lows: "In the last analysis, the point was not
so much to discover the true and the false as to
understand how mankind had little by little over-
come contradictions" (1955, p. 38). This posi-
tion he repudiated: "Knowledge . . . consists in
the selection of true aspects, i.e., those that
coincide with the properties of my thought," not
in a neo-Kantian way but "because my thought
is itself an object. Being 'of this world', it par-
takes of the same nature" (1955, p. 42; see also
1964-1971, vol. 4, p. 621).
Despite exposure in college to the writings of
the French school, Levi-Strauss had remained
impervious to ethnology. So his reading of Rob-
ert H. Lowie's Primitive Society (1920) "in 1933
or 1934" was a revelation. He found in that
work a "lived experience of indigenous societies
whose meaning had been preserved by the par-
ticipation of the observer" in contrast to the
French "metamorphosis into metaphysical con-
cepts" of data coming from published sources
(1955, pp. 45-46). Thus, Lowie, Franz Boas,
A. L. Kroeber were the most important influ-
ences on Levi-Strauss' formative years as an-
thropologist.
LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE 443
Later, through the guidance of Jakobson,
Levi-Strauss was influenced by Prague and Saus-
surian linguistics (1958, chapter 2). But since
Ferdinand de Saussure's structuralism derived
essentially from the principles laid out by the
members of L'annee sociologique (especially
Durkheim and Mauss), the French sociologists
did mark Levi-Strauss' thought, albeit indirectly.
Among social anthropologists, the British A. R.
Radcliffe-Brown is probably the one with whom
Levi-Strauss has argued most extensively, both
privately and in print, on several basic issues
(1949; 1958; 1962a). Radcliffe-Brown's intelli-
gent functionalism captivated, irritated, and
stimulated Levi-Strauss' own reflection. Among
modern colleagues, Meyer Fortes, Edmund R.
Leach, and V. W. Turner were most challenging
to him.
Levi-Strauss has characterized his own cogni-
tive pattern as "neolithic"; by his own descrip-
tion (1955, p. 39), he has practiced the "slash
and burn" method of cultivation of ideas. Clear-
ing "sometimes unexplored grounds" he "grows
and hastily harvests a few crops, leaving behind
a waste land." Actually, this waste land is in the
last analysis eschatological. Referring back to
chapter 7 of Tristes tropiques (1955), where he
used a sunset dissolving into darkness as a
"model of the facts I was to study later on,"
Levi-Strauss wrote in L'homme nu (1964-1971,
vol. 4, p. 620): "Is not this image [of a sunset]
that of mankind itself and beyond mankind of
all forms of life . . . which evolution develops
and diversifies in order that they abolish them-
selves and that, in the end, of nature, of life, of
man, of all those subtle and refined deeds that
are languages, social institutions, customs, art
masterpieces, and myth, after their last fire-
works, nothing remains?"
Levi-Strauss' structuralism. In the introduc-
tion to Mythologiques: Le cm et le cuit, Levi-
Strauss stated: "We are not therefore claiming
to show how men think the myths, but rather
how the myths think themselves out in men and
without men's knowledge" (Yale French Studies
translation, quoted in Leach 1970, p. 51).
Eleven years later, a similar proposition formed
the conclusions of La voie des masques (1975,
vol. 2, p. 124): "Wanting to be apart, the artist
is lulled by an illusion that may be fruitful, but
the privilege that he endows himself with, is
unreal. When he believes that his expression is
spontaneous and his work original, he echoes
other creative artists past or present, actual or
potential. Whether one knows it or ignores it,
 444 LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE
one never moves alone along the path of cre-
ation."
The major components of Levi-Strauss' struc-
turalism are culture-specific semantic systems
and the universal rules that underlie them.
These have structural "inertia," permanence
over time, and resistence to change. They ex-
hibit themselves through the people who are
largely unconscious carriers. Myth makers, poets,
and other creators are those in whose works
"collective representations" emerge and are re-
molded to neutralize history—that is, to reduce
the randomness of contemporary events to cul-
turally acceptable patterns (1962b; 1964-1971).
Social units derive their identities from, and can
communicate between themselves through, com-
mon paradigmatic rules that enable them to
build taxonomies: to agree on resemblances, on
resemblances between resemblances, and on
resemblances between differences (1962fo).
In other words, cultures are conditioning
mechanisms that structure context-bound hu-
man minds according to a syntax of compati-
bilities (e.g., French cuisine and frogs' legs)
and incompatibilities (e.g., taboos on eating dog
flesh or on marrying one's own sibling), which
it is the task of the analyst to map out and
interpret.
Such syntaxes and semantic structures are
never directly perceivable. They manifest them-
selves in all sorts of more or less homomorphic
institutions and customs—kinship, marriage,
Father Christmas, astronomy, music, cuisine,
science fiction, anthropology itself, etc. Levi-
Strauss tackles these diverse dimensions of hu-
man culture. He raises such questions as: Does
the syntax of encoding operations vary in kind
or only in degree from society to society? Does
the same set of logical rules control both the
"scientific" and the "savage" mind? What are
the parameters within which societies are able,
and without which they fail, to reproduce them-
selves? If there are fundamental structures of
mankind, what are the models that can best
represent them? Are not these structures, in the
final analysis, fragile systems of loose opposi-
tions generating dialectic and creative disequi-
libria that drive the slow growth of cultural
helices patterning the fates of human groups
until, their ideologies or infrastructures becom-
ing exhausted, they collapse and become mental
fossils stored in museums and in history books?
Levi-Strauss investigates these issues in his
continuing research. The structure of his quest
has remained consistent from its inception until
today. The principle of inverted symmetry seems
to be the dialectic operator constituting the ele-
mentary structure of mankind. It was the fun-
damental proposition of Les structures elemen-
taires to explain the passage from nature to
culture, and it recurs in La pensee sauvage, in
Mythologiques, in La voie des masques.
For example, mankind is the only animal
species to have mastered mating relationships
and fire (1949; 1964-1971, vols. 1, 4). Cooking
and the management of reproduction forces
transformed nature—the raw, the incestuous, the
wild—into culture by modifying eating patterns
and by defining marriage rules. Accordingly, the
incest taboo must be understood first not as a
prohibition but rather as a prescription—that of
"marrying out." Because of it, humans form and
consolidate alliances between groups that are
broader than isolated cells. This foundation of
political systems rests on the dialectics of in-
verted symmetry. For a man, the incest taboo
means in effect: "The woman I have (my daugh-
ter or my sister) I cannot keep for myself (as a
wife). The woman he (another man) has, he
cannot keep either. Thus we must enter into an
exchange, elementary though it be (e.g., sister
exchange). This exchange forces us into a
partnership." In this way, two symmetrical, un-
acceptable and inverse propositions (to have a
woman and not to keep her—that is, to have a
woman yet at the same time not to have her)
become complementary when combined with
another similar set of propositions, so as to form a
structure stronger than each previously isolated
one (one does not keep one's own women in
order to have women).
Different strategies are available to and used
by different societies. Some will opt for a safe,
minimal-risk exchange strategy so that immedi-
ate return is insured, A giving to B and receiving
from B. This strategy Levi-Strauss has called
"restricted exchange." It results in small, rela-
tively stable, low-risk and low-return political
structures. Or partners may be bolder. Their
network will have at least three nodes. A gives
to B, who gives to C, C to N (N ^ B, N = / ^ A),
and C, or N, to A. This "generalized exchange"
generates higher-risk and higher-return, com-
plex, and large political units.
Restricted and generalized exchange charac-
terize nontechnological societies, but strategies
are more blind in complex societies. We "give
away" our daughters and sisters—that is, we com-
ply with the incest rule—but without the assur-
ance, other than statistical, that we will get an-

other woman in return. We can only trust to the
demographic pool that our move will be recipro-
cated.
In this light, our own marriage patterns be-
come interpretable within a broader framework.
So do many of our other institutions and even
everyday trivial activities—for example, such a
simple gesture as the striking of a match, in
which "are symbolically arbitrated the most
pregnant primeval oppositions, between heaven
and earth in the physical world, between man
and woman in the natural world, between af-
fines in the world of society" (1964-1971,
vol. 4, p. 558).
Responses to Levi-Strauss' structuralism. Levi-
Strauss' books have been translated into all
the major languages and have generated a bibli-
ography of commentary in articles and books.
According to a compilation by Francois Lapointe
of the Tuskegee Institute, there are more than
one thousand pieces of writing devoted to Levi-
Strauss' works. He has been acclaimed by
Amerindians of the Northwest Pacific Coast.
The intelligentsia of literate countries acknowl-
edge his influence in the definition of a philos-
ophy for modern times. Numerous articles in
news magazines (Time, Newsweek, etc.) and
newspapers; a poem by Robert Lowell ("Levi-
Strauss in London"); a movement in a sym-
phony by Berio, the lyrics of which contain ex-
cerpts from Le cru et le cuit; even a reference
in Agatha Christie's Passenger to Frankfurt,
which takes it for granted that Levi-Strauss is a
prophet of youth. These instances and many
similar ones indicate that Levi-Strauss has be-
come a culture hero.
As would be expected, antihero reactions are
not lacking (for a compendium of both positive
and negative reactions up to 1970, see Hayes &
Hayes 1970). But Levi-Strauss' sternest critics
subscribe to the words of one of the best among
them: "The structure of relations which can be
discovered by analysing materials drawn from
any one culture is an algebraic transformation
of other possible structures belonging to a com-
mon set and this common set constitutes a
pattern which reflects an attribute of the mech-
anism of all human brains. It is a grand con-
ception; whether it is a useful one may be a
matter of opinion" (Leach 1970, p. 53).
Levi-Strauss has been said to be, along with
Freud and Marx, one of the major architects of
the thought of our times (Steiner 1972). After
Freud's microscopic investigations of individual
history and Marx's macroscopic investigations of
LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE 445
social history, Levi-Strauss reminds us that his-
tory, like anthropology itself and all other social
sciences, is a mythopoeic operation that tries to
make sense of mankind.
PIERRE MARANDA
WORKS BY LEVI-STRAUSS
1928 Gracchus Eabeuf et le communisme. Brussels:
Editions du Parti ouvrier beige.
1936 Contribution a 1'etude de 1'organisation sociale
des Indiens Bororo. Journal de la Societe des Ameri-
canistes New Series 28:269-304.
1948 La vie familiale et sociale des Indiens Nambik-
wara. Paris: Societe des Americanistes.
(1949) 1969 The Elementary Structure of Kinship.
Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon. —» First published in
French.
(1952) 1968 Race and History. Paris: United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
—» First published in French.
(1955) 1968 Tristes tropiques. 2d ed., rev. Paris: Plon.
—> A paperback edition was published in English
in 1974 by Atheneum.
(1958) 1963 Structural Anthropology. New York: Basic
Books. —> First published in French.
(1962o) 1969 The Savage Mind. Univ. of Chicago
Press. —>First published in French.
1962b Le totemisme aujourd'hui. Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France. —> An English translation by
Rodney Needham, Totemism, was published as a
paperback by Beacon in 1963.
1964-1971 Mythologiques. 4 vols. Paris: Plon. —»
Volume 1: Le cru et le cuit, 1964; published in
English as The Raw and the Cooked. New York:
Harper, 1969. Volume 2: Du miel aux cendres,
1967; published in English as From Honey to
Ashes. New York: Harper, 1973. Volume 3: L'ori-
gine des manieres de table, 1968; published in En-
glish as The Origin of Table Manners. New York:
Harper, 1978. Volume 4: L'homme nu, 1971.
1973 Anthropologie structurale deux. Paris: Plon.
1975 La voie des masques. 2 vols. Geneva: Skira.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BACKES-CLEMENT, CATHERINE 1970 Claude Levi-
Strauss. Paris: Seghers.
BOON, JAMES A. 1972 From Symbolism to Structural-
ism: Levi-Strauss in a Literary Tradition. London:
Blackwell; New York: Harper.
CHARBONNIER, GEORGES (1961) 1969 Conversations
With Claude Levi-Strauss. London: Cape. —> First
published in French.
CRESSANT, PIERRE 1970 Levi-Strauss. Paris: Editions
Universitaires.
GARDNER, HOWARD 1973 The Quest for Mind: Piaget,
Levi-Strauss and the Structuralist Movement. New
York: Knopf.
HAYES, E. NELSON; and HAYES, TANYA (editors)
1970 Claude Levi-Strauss: The Anthropologist as
Hero. Cambridge, Mass, and London: M.I.T. Press.
KONGAS-MARANDA, ELLI; and MARANDA, PIERRE 1971
Structural Models in Folklore and Transformational
Essays. Paris and The Hague: Mouton.
LEACH, EDMUND R. 1970 Levi-Strauss. London: Fon-
tana.
MARC-LIPANSKY, MIREILLE 1973 Le structuralisme
de Levi-Strauss. Paris: Payot.
MERQUIOR, JOSE G. 1977 L'esthetique de Levi-Strauss,
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
446 LEWIS, OSCAR
NEEDHAM, RODNEY 1962 Structure and Sentiment.
Univ. of Chicago Press.
PAZ, OCTAVIO 1970 Claude Levi-Strauss: An Intro-
duction. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. —> A
paperback edition was published in 1974 by Dell.
PIAGET, JEAN (1968)1970 Structuralism. New York:
Basic Books. —> First published in French.
POUILLON, JEAN; and MARANDA, PIERRE (editors) 1970
Exchanges et Communications: Melanges offerts a
Claude Levi-Strauss. 2 vols. Paris and The Hague:
Mouton.
Rossi, INO 1974 The Unconscious in Culture: The
Structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss in Perspective.
New York: Button.
SIMONIS, YVAN 1968 Claude Levi-Strauss ou la "pas-
sion de Vinceste." Paris: Aubier-Montaigne.
STEINER, GEORGE 1972 Claude Levi-Strauss. Toronto:
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
LEWIS, OSCAR
Oscar Lewis (1914-1970), at his death pro-
fessor of anthropology at the University of Illi-
nois in Urbana, was renowned for his studies of
poverty in Mexican and Puerto Rican families,
and for his often misunderstood and politically
significant concept of a "culture of poverty." He
died suddenly in New York City of a heart at-
tack on December 16, 1970, leaving for posthu-
mous publication a wealth of similar material on
the people of postrevolutionary Cuba. Not quite
56, he had also achieved among anthropologists
recognition for his earlier studies of cultural
change; for important innovations in field work
methods; and for the richness of his descriptive
data on communities, families, and newly bur-
geoning studies of urban life.
Lewis was born in New York City on Decem-
ber 25, 1914, to a family recently arrived from
Poland with three daughters and a son. He was
the only child born in America. His father, a
rabbi and cantor, soon moved the family for
reasons of health to a small farm in Ferndale
in the New York Catskill Mountains, where he
served an Orthodox congregation. Here Lewis
grew up, familiar with both rural and city life.
He enjoyed sports and was also a devotee of
music and the performing arts. He had a tenor
(later a baritone) voice of operatic quality, and
often expressed regret that his parents had dis-
suaded him from following a musical career.
When he graduated from high school in 1932,
he entered the City College of New York, where
he majored in history but his teachers included
Abraham Edel and the philosopher Morris R.
Cohen. These were the deepest years of the
economic depression, and while pursuing his
studies—then and as a graduate student—he
learned firsthand about poverty. In 1936, having
earned his B.S.S., he entered Columbia Uni-
versity's department of history.
While an undergraduate, he had met Ruth
Maslow, a student of psychology and education
at Brooklyn College, and they were married in
1937. She took an M.A. in special education at
Columbia's Teachers College, and spent three
years teaching the handicapped while her hus-
band completed his doctorate. They went to-
gether on his first field trip in Canada, and their
careers thereafter were professionally joined.
After she was widowed, Ruth Lewis undertook
the task of completing the publication of their
most recent data from Cuba.
At Columbia, Lewis was quickly dissatisfied
with history and, on the advice of his brother-
in-law Abraham H. Maslow (then a postdoctoral
fellow in psychology at Columbia), he consulted
Ruth Benedict and turned to anthropology.
Columbia was at a turning point. Franz Boas
had retired (though he was still in residence
and taught a class that Lewis attended), and
Ralph Linton had moved from the University of
Wisconsin to join Benedict and a faculty that
included Duncan Strong, Margaret Mead, Alex-
ander Lesser, Gene Weltfish, Gladys Reichard,
George Herzog, and others. Among Lewis' fellow
students were Joseph Bram, Irving Goldman,
Jack Harris, Natalie Joffee, Bernard Mishkin,
Marvin Opler, Morris Siegel, and Charles Wag-
ley. Interest in psychological and personality
studies was strong in the department, sparked
by Benedict (always much admired by Lewis)
and Mead, and also by Linton, Abraham Kardi-
ner, Cora DuBois, and others who participated
in what became an influential interdisciplinary
seminar. Along with Freudian, there were strong
Marxist interests at Columbia and in the wider
community; these, too, were shared by Lewis.
But Columbia then was still the center of
Boasian eclecticism, and political commitments
to socialism were generally separated from an-
thropological theory—in the case of Oscar Lewis,
throughout his life.
Lewis' talents and promise became evident
with his first professional work on Blackfoot
Indian culture. In the summer of 1939, the
Lewises did their first field work with the North-
ern Piegan in Manitoba (other Blackfoot groups
in Montana were simultaneously studied by
other students from Columbia). They found a
special personality type, the "manly-hearted"
woman, which was the subject of Lewis' first
article in the American Anthropologist (1941).

In it, he related the personality type to Piegan
social institutions and to sex and age roles. For
his doctoral dissertation, he then undertook an
ethnohistorical study of the effects of United
States and Canadian expansion on the Blackfoot
peoples. Completed and published in 1942, the
thesis was exemplary in method, with precise
documentation showing that the much-discussed
influence of the horse on Plains culture needed
to be balanced by that of the fur trade.
In 1943/1944, after brief interim positions
with the Human Relations Area Files project at
Yale University and with the U.S. Department
of Justice, Lewis first studied what was destined
to be his major field of research, the people-
mainly the poor families—of Mexico, Puerto
Rico, and Cuba. The newly founded National
Indian Institute sent him to Mexico City to
represent the United States on the staff of the
also new Interamerican Indianist Institute. Un-
der its director, the distinguished anthropologist
Manuel Garnio, the institute launched a program
of publication and encouragement of the applica-
tion of social science knowledge to the welfare
of Indian peoples. As an extra task, Lewis
agreed to study an Indian village to learn better
what might be involved in applied work. He
chose Tepoztlan because Robert Redfield had
published (1930) what was then the best mono-
graph on a Mexican village; and Lewis proposed
to build his own studies of personality on this
foundation. In the end, however, the project
became his renowned "restudy," Life in a Mexi-
can Village (1951), a landmark in ethnographic
method. It also involved him in his first collec-
tion of interviews of entire families, which
were to be the basis of most of his later work.
Before his Tepoztlan restudy was published,
another useful experience intervened. In 1944-
1945 he undertook studies of rural communities
in the United States for the Department of Agri-
culture. In contrast to Tepoztlan, he found here
rich statistical sources to lighten the burdens of
field work; his excellent study of Bell County,
Texas, thus required only 11 weeks in the field.
It was also a useful contrast, after the Piegan
and Tepoztecans, to work in a segment of his
own society. As a result of this variety of experi-
ences, the Wenner-Gren Foundation invited
him to write two major methodological reviews,
"Controls and Experiments in Field Work"
(1953) and "Comparisons in Cultural Anthro-
pology" (1955).
In 1946 Lewis was appointed associate pro-
fessor at Washington University in St. Louis,
LEWIS, OSCAR 447
and in 1948 he was called to the University of
Illinois to develop its first independent depart-
ment of anthropology, which began with the
addition of Joseph Casagrande and moved into
a high rank when Julian H. Steward was added
in 1952. By then, Lewis' reputation was unex-
celled, and the Ford Foundation asked for his
counsel in its programs in India. Lewis wel-
comed another opportunity for a comparative
research experience (he had also spent some
time in Spain in the summer of 1949), and as
usual made the most of only one year, man-
aging to include extensive field work (Novem-
ber 1952-May 1953) that resulted in Village
Life in 'Northern India (1958), as well as to
conduct an "applied" study of factions that was
published by the India Planning Commission in
1954. As in Mexico and later in Puerto Rico
and Cuba, in India, the Lewises received excel-
lent cooperation from local institutions and
were joined by colleagues and students in their
complex interdisciplinary field work.
In 1963 Lewis began his study of one hun-
dred Puerto Rican families in San Juan and
their kin in New York. At the time of his death,
full publication of the data on only one of these
families had appeared (1966). In the 1960s,
especially with President Lyndon B. Johnson's
war on poverty, Lewis' concept of a culture of
poverty—to which his Puerto Rican studies were
relevant—was timely, controversial, and the sub-
ject of much debate. The fullest discussion ap-
peared in Current Anthropology, in multiple
reviews first of Lewis' work (Book Reviews . . .
1967) and then of his critic, Charles Valentine
(Lewis 1969i>).
In 1946 Lewis had visited prerevolutionary
Cuba briefly and in February 1968 Fidel Castro
invited him to study families in Havana. With
funding from the Ford Foundation, he and his
staff were able successfully to interview hun-
dreds of poor and not-so-poor. Although the
Cuban government withdrew its sponsorship,
and the project ended prematurely in 1970,
shortly before Lewis' death, most of the field
materials were available for study. Posthumously
published under the over-all title Living the Rev-
olution: An Oral History of Contemporary Cuba
(1977-1978) were three volumes (Four Men;
Four Women-, Neighbors} bearing Oscar Lewis'
name as senior author. Neighbors reports the
lives of five families living in an apartment
building in a formerly upper-class Havana sub-
urb. Virtually emptied during the revolution by
thousands of homeowners, the furnished houses
 448 LEWIS, OSCAR
and apartments had reverted to the state, which
turned them to public purposes and rental hous-
ing. Where Lewis' first "family" book had de-
scribed a day in the life of each of five separate
Mexican families isolated from each other, his
last described the lives and relationships through
time of close neighbors.
Lewis' contribution. Lewis' most lasting
achievement may have been to give a voice to
people and to families of people. Any doubts
that the English sentences of the first published
biographies accurately expressed thoughts orig-
inally spoken in Spanish were dispelled as soon
as the same life histories were published in
Spanish directly from the tapes. Lewis was com-
pletely honest—his professional interest being to
perfect replicable field methods—and was also
unusually suited to conduct such personal inter-
views successfully. Even more remarkable was
his apparent ability to select and train staffs to
do so, too. The printed interviews have been
criticized for not providing information on the
questions that had elicited the narratives or on
circumstances that might explain the changing
moods of the biographees. The number of
printed pages of the primary material probably
exceeds the volume of primary data published
by any other ethnographer in the second half of
the twentieth century; yet even the published
material is a small fraction of the total corpus
of tapes, transcripts, and other materials avail-
able to scholars in the Lewis archives at the
University of Illinois. At present, there is no
richer source to document the thoughts of hun-
dreds of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans
in a period of change. And since the subjects
were selected as "ordinary" people, the inter-
views suggest the paradox that humans are
somehow all extraordinary.
Before his death, Lewis completed a sample
of his contributions up through 1965 in Anthro-
pological Essays (1970). The book suggests
that Lewis was satisfied with his life's work. He
did not regret a lack of interest in grand theory
and was proud of being a careful craftsman.
He felt that he understood social—historical-
cultural processes and their interactions with
larger and smaller events, and he was satisfied
to explain, at a level close to the data and with
a minimum of jargon, the phenomena uncov-
ered by careful reading and field work. He was
proud to have developed family biographies as
a contribution to method and thought it proper
that they should speak for themselves. He
worked in the tradition of teachers he admired:
Cohen, Boas, Benedict, and Linton had sought
ways to approach the largest human problems,
confident that each researcher could provide
perspectives that were the pieces that would
ultimately produce the larger perspectives of
future Darwins, Marxes, and Freuds.
The phenomena that Lewis dealt with were
largely societies and people in the process of
change from village to city; and he took off from
Redfield's construct of the folk-to-urban con-
tinuum. It was largely coincidental that Lewis,
like Redfield, did his major field work in Mexico
and the Caribbean, and that both had a later
interest in India. The fact that Lewis' main start
was in "Redfield's town," Tepoztlan, itself led
to a special interest in Redfieldian thought. In
1926 Redfield had discovered "folk" in Tepoztlan
who contrasted with his own people not only in
the particular qualities given to each by cultural
background (Nahuatl-Spanish versus North
European-American) but also by sociodemo-
graphic circumstance. Redfield sensed that his
own experience with rural life, then rapidly dis-
appearing, had something in common with
Tepoztecan village life. When in 1930 he began
his research in Yucatan, his discussions with
Robert E. Park suggested systematic study of
the processes of change from more to less folk-
like with the transition from hinterland to city.
Applying concepts that had been developed by
Tonnies, Weber, Simmel, and others, Redfield
constructed a model that posed at one pole
of a theoretical continuum an ideal folk type
of community and at the other pole an ideal
urban type, theorizing that all actual societies
could be placed along that continuum. Lewis
in Tepoztlan found himself not only restudying
a town, with new perspectives, but also re-
thinking Redfield's theoretical conceptions, par-
ticularly since he soon began to study Tepozte-
cans (and others) in Mexico City as well. Lewis'
development of Redfield's folk-urban theory
gained from coincidence of their areas of field
work and from personal communication and
friendship with Redfield until Redfield's death
in 1958. By then, however, Lewis was more and
more absorbed in urban family studies and in
polemics over his concept of the culture of
poverty.
Like most anthropologists, Lewis empathized
with and respected the people he came to know
in his field work, presumably even those who
despised themselves. Like most anthropologists
he therefore took a positive view of their beliefs
and behavior. Whether they were poor or rich,

their culture differed from his own. Those who
were very poor behaved differently from those
who were less poor, and Lewis described them
as having a subculture of the general culture.
A subculture was no less a positive way of life
than a culture; and Lewis used the phrase "the
culture of poverty" only to avoid pejorative as-
sociations. After studying very poor families in
Tepoztlan and in Mexico City, he noted similari-
ties to published data on slums elsewhere. The
configuration of traits that seemed to be associ-
ated with the poor he called the culture of pov-
erty. The term first appeared in the subtitle of
Five Families (1959). His last explanation of this
configuration was published in A Study of Slum
Culture (1968):
(1) The traits fall into a number of clusters
and are functionally related within each cluster.
(2) Many, but not all, of the traits of different
clusters are also functionally related. For example,
men who have low wages and suffer chronic un-
employment develop a poor self-image, become
irresponsible, abandon their wives and children,
and take up with other women more frequently
than do men with high incomes and steady jobs.
(3) None of the traits, taken individually, is dis-
tinctive per se of the subculture of poverty. It is
their conjunction, their function, and their pat-
terning that define the subculture. (4) The sub-
culture of poverty, as defined by these traits, is a
statistical profile; that is, the frequency of distribu-
tion of the traits both singly and in clusters will be
greater than in the rest of the population. In other
words, more of the traits will occur in combination
in families with a subculture of poverty than in
stable working-class families. Even within a single
slum there will probably be a gradient from culture
of poverty families to families without a culture of
poverty. (5) The profiles of the subculture of
poverty will probably differ in systematic ways
with the difference in the national cultural contexts
of which they are a part. It is expected that some
new traits will become apparent with research in
different nations.
Several criticisms leveled at the popular phrase
would have been avoided had Lewis with its
first use in 1959 clarified what he meant by it.
For example, ink was wasted on his use of the
word "culture" (implying to some that the poor
constituted an independent society) rather than
a subculture. He would also have disarmed many
critics had he indicated how the biographies in
his published works matched or diverged from
the poverty pattern—even at the expense of
spoiling the drama. However, he could not have
avoided criticism associating his views with
LEWIS, OSCAR 449
those of reactionaries who blamed the poor for
their poverty. Although Lewis thought positively
of the poor, he hated poverty, and of course he
saw the poor as victims. But he was criticized
for publishing a view that was being misused
against the poor. Even more difficult were critics
who, wishing to disarm those who blamed the
poor, exaggerated small weaknesses in Lewis'
concept and his data.
Lewis answered answerable critics briefly in
his reply to reviewers (Book Reviews . . .
1967, p. 499) as follows:
. . . it is a serious mistake to lump all poor people
together, because the causes, the meaning, and the
consequences of poverty vary considerably in differ-
ent sociocultural contexts. There is nothing in the
concept which puts the onus of poverty on the
character of the poor. Nor does the concept in any
way play down the exploitation and neglect suffered
by the poor. Indeed, the subculture of poverty is
part of the larger culture of capitalism whose social
and economic system channels wealth into the hands
of a relatively small group and thereby makes for
the growth of sharp class distinctions.
But the genuine issue remains. A culture (or
subculture) perpetuates itself, and Lewis indeed
meant to affirm that it does so in the case of
poverty. Although the pressure exerted by the
larger society was the main reason for the per-
sistence of the subculture, he wrote:
. . . this is not the only reason. The subculture devel-
ops mechanisms which tend to perpetuate it, espe-
cially because of what happens to the world view, as-
pirations, and character of the children who grow up
in it. For this reason, improved economic opportuni-
ties, though absolutely essential and of the highest
priority, are not sufficient to basically alter or
eliminate the subculture of poverty. Moreover, it is
a process which will take more than a single genera-
tion, even under the best of circumstances, including
a socialist revolution. (Book Reviews . . . 1967,
p. 499)
The opportunity to test this thesis by examin-
ing the validity of the last sentence came with
the Cuban socialist revolution, which changed
the social structure that had borne down on the
poor. Among the families studied were many
who had lived in poverty. What happened to
them? Lewis did not live to tell. His co-worker,
Douglas Butterworth (1972) writes that at his
death Lewis had not yet formulated a final opin-
ion on whether the culture of poverty had sur-
vived the revolution, "but my impressions from
conversations with him and my own experi-
450 LICHTHEIM, GEORGE
ences in Cuba. . . . [indicate] that through in-
doctrination of socialist and nationalist ideals
and incorporation into revolutionary organiza-
tions, perhaps about a third of those families we
studied who had been in the culture of poverty
were now outside it" (p. 753). The three post-
humous volumes of Living the Revolution con-
tain 15 long and 13 partial biographies, too
few of whom had lived in poverty to draw
statistical conclusions; but the archives contain
many more. Oscar Lewis himself (who returned
frequently to his Mexican families, as for A
Death in the Sanchez Family [1969a]) would
have advised continuing field work with the
younger generations of his families in Cuba,
hoping, very probably, that economic security
would produce more rapid effects than the cul-
ture of poverty thesis predicted. Even as he tried
to correct misunderstandings about the concept,
he often indicated that for him it had never
been a grand theory and was certainly not im-
portant enough to overturn his egalitarian social
ideals.
SOL TAX
WORKS BY LEWIS
1941 Manly Hearted Women Among the North Piegan.
American Anthropologist 43:173-187.
1942 The Effects of White Contact Upon Blackfoot
Culture. Monographs of the American Ethnological
Society, Vol. 6. New York: Augustin.
1948 On the Edge of the Black Waxy: A Cultural Sur-
vey of Bell County, Texas. Washington University
Studies, New Series, Social and Philosophical Sci-
ences, No. 7. St. Louis: The University.
1951 Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztldn Restudied.
Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1963.
1953 Controls and Experiments in Field Work. Pages
452-475 in Anthropology Today. Univ. of Chicago
Press.
1954 Group Dynamics in a North-Indian Village: A
Study of Factions. New Delhi: Programme Evalua-
tion Organization, Planning Commission.
1955 Comparisons in Cultural Anthropology. Pages
259-292 in William L. Thomas (editor), Yearbook
of Anthropology. New York: Wenner-Gren Founda-
tion.
1958 Village Life in Northern India: Studies in a Delhi
Village. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. —» A paper-
back edition was published by Vintage in 1965.
1959 Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Cul-
ture of Poverty. New York: Basic Books. —> A paper-
back edition was published by the New American
Library in 1965.
1961 The Children of Sanchez: Autobiography of a
Mexican Family. New York: Random House. —> A
paperback edition was published by Vintage in 1966.
1964 Pedro Martinez: A Mexican Peasant and His
Family. New York: Random House. —> A paperback
edition was published by Vintage in 1964.
1966 La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of
Poverty—San Juan and New York. New York: Ran-
dom House.
1968 A Study of Slum Culture: Backgrounds for La
Vida. New York: Random House.
1969a A Death in the Sanchez Family. New York:
Random House. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1970.
1969b Review of Culture and Poverty: Critique and
Counter-proposals by Charles A. Valentine. Current
Anthropology 10:189-192.
1970 Anthropological Essays. New York: Random
House.
1977-1978 LEWIS, OSCAR; LEWIS, RUTH M.; and RIG-
DON, SUSAN M. Living the Revolution: An Oral His-
tory of Contemporary Cuba. 3 vols. Urbana: Univ.
of Illinois Press. —» Volume 1: Four Men, 1977. Vol-
ume 2: Four Women, 1977. Volume 3: Neighbors,
1978.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Book Reviews of The Children of Sanchez, Pedro Marti-
nez, and La Vida. Current Anthropology 1967
8:480-500. —» Fourteen reviews by different authors.
BUTTERWORTH, DOUGLAS 1972 Obituary of Oscar
Lewis. American Anthropologist 74:747-757.
REDFIELD, ROBERT 1930 Tepoztldn, a Mexican Vil-
lage: A Study of Folk Life. Univ. of Chicago Press.
LICHTHEIM, GEORGE
George Lichtheim (1912-1973) was a younger
member of the illustrious group of Jewish upper
middle-class scholars and intellectuals whose
outlook was formed under the Weimar Republic.
Hitler's accession to power drove them into ex-
ile, with the result that they made invaluable
contributions to the cultural and intellectual life
of the various countries in which they settled,
as well as to German culture itself when the
broken thread was picked up again after 1945.
Unlike such older figures as Hannah Arendt,
Walter Benjamin, Gershom Scholem, and the
philosophers and sociologists of the Frankfort
Institute for Social Research, Lichtheim had not
even completed his university education at
Heidelberg at the time of the Nazi revolution,
and, except for brief visiting appointments at
Columbia and Stanford universities in the
1960s, he never returned to the academic world
despite many opportunities to do so in the last
decade of his life.
Lichtheim joined his parents in Palestine in
1934 and became a journalist on the staff of the
English-language Palestine Post, writing chiefly
about European and world politics in the
shadow of the approaching war. He belonged in
the 1930s to an unusual intellectual circle of
fellow exiles in Jerusalem that included
Scholem and the philosopher Hans Jonas,
who encouraged him to persevere in his inter-
rupted formal studies of philosophy and the
history of Western political thought. In 1943

Lichtheim moved to London, where, except for
two long visits to America, he remained for the
rest of his life. Writing for a time under the
name of "G. L. Arnold" as well as under his own
name, he became in the 1940s and 1950s a
prolific writer of essays, reviews, and com-
mentaries on current affairs for a variety of
journals in England and the United States. He
also served for a time as editor in chief of the
London magazine Twentieth Century and as an
associate and later a contributing editor of Com-
mentary in New York. His mastery of English
prose (rare among German refugees, but he had
spent two years in England as a child), his
mordant wit, his remarkable but lightly worn
erudition, and, most of all, his utter indepen-
dence and originality of judgment became fa-
miliar to a small circle of readers of Anglo-
American intellectual journals. These qualities
were fully in evidence in his first book, The Pat-
tern of World Conflict (1955), published under
the name of G. L. Arnold, which was an exami-
nation of the cold war and the rise of the under-
developed countries that anticipated a great
many themes later to enter common intellectual
parlance.
The publication in 1961 of his major book,
Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study,
brought Lichtheim wide acclaim. This magis-
terial study of Marxism as a developing corpus
of social theory shaped by nineteenth-century
European history drew on sources that had pre-
viously been scarcely known to English-speaking
readers. Lichtheim followed it up with a shorter
study, Marxism in Modern France (1966), be-
fore turning to the history of socialism—essen-
tially of socialist ideas in the widest sense rather
than of movements—which resulted in The Ori-
gins of Socialism (1969) and A Short History
of Socialism (1970b). He also published The
New Europe: Today, and Tomorrow (1963), a
masterful assessment of the trend toward Eu-
ropean integration, and two shorter books,
Lukdcs (1970a), a volume in the Fontana Mod-
ern Masters series, and Imperialism (1971b), a
brilliantly far-ranging treatment of that ideo-
logically overburdened subject. No less than
three essay collections appeared in the last six
years of Lichtheim's life: The Concept of
Ideology, and Other Essays (1967), From Marx
to Hegel (1971a), and Collected Essays (1973).
His extraordinary productivity is indicated by
the fact that only a single essay appears more
than once among the selections reprinted in
these volumes. His range is most fully displayed
LICHTHEIM, GEORGE 451
in the last and longest collection, which in-
cludes, along with much else, portraits of Win-
ston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle, assess-
ments of Leninism and Maoism, and critiques
of Jean-Paul Sartre's existential Marxism and of
Simone Weil's religio-political reflections.
Despite Lichtheim's long residence in Pales-
tine and England and the fact that he wrote
almost entirely in the English language, he al-
ways defined himself as a central European in-
tellectual from "the old European heartland of
Marxism" rather than as a Jew or an Anglo-
American. His last book, Europe in the Twen-
tieth Century (1972), was an attempt to sum
up the rich and complex political, intellectual,
and aesthetic history of Europe in the troubled
twentieth century, which had long been his
primary subject and the ground of all his work.
The book is an encyclopedic compendium but
suffers from its effort to cover too much too
briefly, especially in its treatment of philosophy,
Lichtheim's original field of interest to which he
increasingly returned in the final years of his
life. He is likely to be most remembered for the
histories of Marxism and socialism in which he
brilliantly succeeded in emulating their chief
protagonist, Marx himself, in uniting intensive
knowledge of German philosophy, French poli-
tics and political thought, and British economics
and political culture.
How should we classify George Lichtheim?
Was he an intellectual and political historian?
A political theorist? A sociologist of knowledge?
An interpreter of German and French thought
to a parochial English-speaking audience? He
was often all of these, but at his best he
achieved the stature of an original social theo-
rist in his own right if not quite that of a
full-fledged philosopher. He reserved his highest
admiration for the creative philosophical syn-
thesis of universal idea and historical insight-
Hegel, of course, was his prototype—and was
inclined to deprecate his own achievements
when measured by so exalted a standard. His
modesty, combined with the fluent allusiveness
of his style, its lack of any straining toward
oracular utterance, and a preference for ironic
understatement that perhaps owed something to
his partial acculturation to England, tended to
obscure his originality. He sometimes dismissed
himself as a "mere" recorder and chronologist
of other people's thoughts, and his scrupulous
concern for the intellectual pedigree of the ideas
he articulated may have falsely conveyed this
impression to his less learned readers. But his
452 LICHTHEIM, GEORGE
gift for seeing the exact conjuncture between an
idea and its historical setting made him much
more than a narrow historian of ideas. He
possessed an extraordinary sensitivity to the
way in which the fate of ideas and political
doctrines was shaped by "the exact moment on
the time curve, and the historical situation of
which such moments are part" (1973, p. 141).
His sense of the interaction of individual cre-
ativity, the constraints of social structure, and
historical change raises his own work to the
level of creative interpretation, although he
never embodied his understanding in a formal
conceptual apparatus or set of general propo-
sitions.
Lichtheim had been a Hegelian and a Marxist
since his youth in Berlin; he had studied the
heretical Marxist writings of Gyorgy Lukacs and
Karl Korsch when they first appeared in the
1920s; and he forthrightly rejected both the of-
ficial Social Democratic and the Soviet versions
of Marxism. His intellectual and political affini-
ties resembled those of the Frankfort School,
both in the 1920s and much later in his life.
His closeness to public events during his jour-
nalistic career and his years in Britain, however,
imbued him with an antiutopian political real-
ism and considerable respect for "bourgeois"
democracy that were alien to the Frankfort
theorists, especially Herbert Marcuse and his
youthful "New Left" followers in the 1960s. Al-
though he was often linked to the Frankfort
tradition, only in the last few years of his life
did Lichtheim establish a direct contact with its
heirs when he became close to Jiirgen Haber-
mas, whose work he enormously admired and
regarded as overshadowing his own, once again
minimizing the value and distinctiveness of
his special gifts.
Lichtheim advocated and exemplified a subtle,
antipositivistic Marxism grounded in the history
of the modern West since the French revolu-
tion—this at a time when Marxism was still
largely identified with the materialistic and de-
terministic philosophy of progress it had become
in the hands of Friedrich Engels and Georgi
Plekhanov, or, even worse, with the crude Marx-
ism-Leninism of official Soviet ideology. Licht-
heim wrote about the ideas of Lukacs, Korsch,
Antonio Gramsci, and T. W. Adorno at a
time when they were scarcely known in England
or America, although their writings later be-
came central to the canon of "Western Marx-
ism" embraced by a considerable number of
young academic men and women in both the
social sciences and the humanities. It is an
irony of intellectual history that the belated ap-
pearance of "Marxists of the chair" in British
and American universities tended to eclipse
Lichtheim's role in preparing the ground for this
overdue development. Lichtheim's increasing
pessimism and melancholy in the last few years
of his life doubtless owed something to the ten-
sion between the Utopian and revolutionary
temper of the post-New Left Marxist epigoni
and his own strong rejection of Soviet and
Maoist totalitarianism, his skepticism about the
achievements of "Third World" revolutions, and
his reverence for the cultural grandeur of Euro-
pean bourgeois civilization. This tension sur-
faced in the hostile reactions to his short book
on Lukacs, which was sharply critical of the
Hungarian thinker for his conformist apolo-
getics on behalf of Stalinism and his hostility to
aesthetic modernism.
At a concrete historical level, Lichtheim's
prescience in discerning major trends well in
advance of other observers was striking. At the
peak of the cold war he insisted that, barring
nuclear holocaust, Soviet-American rivalry was
essentially a mere incident in the larger struggle
of the underdeveloped countries to achieve
modernization. Long before the label "techno-
crat" had entered political debate, Lichtheim
argued that the scientific and managerial intel-
ligentsia was the most rapidly expanding and
politically important stratum in advanced in-
dustrial societies and that socialist movements
must appeal to this "new class" and abandon
their primary identification with the old work-
ing class, or else become obsolete. Lichtheim
saw that after World War n Britain and the
United States were beginning to suffer the
"crisis of values" resulting from the disintegra-
tion of bourgeois civilization that had wracked
central Europe after 1914. The widespread
malaise giving rise to abortive new cults and
"countercultures" in the 1960s and 1970s later
strongly confirmed this diagnosis. Lichtheim's
characterization of the late twentieth century
as a "postbourgeois" age was more apt and ac-
curate than the other popular labels with the
"post" prefix that were widely applied to it—
"postindustrial," "postcapitalist," "postmodern,"
et al.
Without ever having held a regular university
post or having become a frequent public lecturer
or a mass media performer, George Lichtheim
was the teacher, with his pen alone, of a gen-
eration of English-speaking intellectuals. In

contrast to some of his more famous Weimarian
contemporaries, he did not provide them with a
system of thought or even a new vocabulary.
He taught them, rather, how to discern histori-
cal depths, continuities with the formative
events of modern history, in the most ephemeral
of cultural and political fashions. He gave tan-
gible reality to the much-vaunted notion of
"historical perspective."
DENNIS H. WRONG
WORKS BY LICHTHEIM
1955 The Pattern of World Conflict, by G. L. Arnold
[pseud.]. New York: Dial; London: Allen & Unwin.
(1961) 1964 Marxism: An Historical and Critical
Study. 2d ed., rev. New York: Praeger.
(1963) 1964 The New Europe: Today, and Tomorrow.
2d ed. New York: Praeger.
1966 Marxism in Modern France. New York: Columbia
Univ. Press. —> Sponsored by the Research Institute
on Communist Affairs of Columbia University.
1967 The Concept of Ideology, and Other Essays. New
York: Random House.
1968a Alienation. Volume 1, pages 264-268 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1968& Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Volume 6,
pages 341—344 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
1968c Lukacs, Gyorgy. Volume 9, pages 488-492 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1969 The Origins of Socialism. New York: Praeger;
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
1970a Lukdcs. London: Fontana.
1970Z? A Short History of Socialism. New York: Prae-
ger; London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
1971a From Marx to Hegel. New York: Herder; Lon-
don: Orbach & Chambers.
1971b Imperialism. New York: Praeger.
1972 Europe in the Twentieth Century. New York:
Praeger; London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
1973 Collected Essays. New York: Viking.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIRNBAUM, NORMAN 1971 A Modern Master. Com-
mentary 52:72-77.
LAQUEUR, WALTER 1973 George Lichtheim, 1912-
1973. Commentary 56:45-52.
LIKERT, RENSIS
Rensis Likert was born in Cheyenne, Wyo-
ming in 1903. After receiving his A.B. from the
University of Michigan in economics and so-
ciology in 1922, he studied psychology at Colum-
bia University, where he received his PH.D in
1932. While a student at Columbia, he married
Jane Gibson whom he had met as an under-
graduate in Ann Arbor.
LIKERT, RENSIS 453
Rensis Likert's contributions to social psy-
chology and the social sciences can be sum-
marized under five rubrics: (1) the measure-
ment of attitudes; (2) the development of
methodologies of survey research; (3) the crea-
tion of the Institute for Social Research at the
University of Michigan; (4) the theory of par-
ticipative management; and (5) human resource
accounting.
Measurement of attitudes. In graduate school,
Likert gradually moved away from the more
traditional fields of psychology toward the newly
emerging area of social psychology. He was par-
ticularly impressed by Gardner Murphy, who
became chairman of his dissertation committee.
With Murphy, Likert conducted an extensive
study of the attitudes of college students and of
the variables affecting these attitudes. Part of
this research became his dissertation, which was
published under the title A Technique for the
Measurement of Attitudes (1932). During the
course of this research, Likert developed what
has become the most widely used procedure for
attitude measurement, the well-known "Likert
scale." In the late 1920s, L. L. Thurstone had
pioneered in the field of attitude measurement
with a procedure based on the psychophysical
method of equal-appearing intervals. Likert
found that a much simpler method, the con-
struction of an attitude scale ranging from
favorable to unfavorable, with a neutral mid-
point, gave almost the same results as the more
cumbersome Thurstone procedure and achieved
the same reliability with half as many items.
Development of survey research methodologies.
From 1930 to 1935, Likert taught in the depart-
ment of psychology at New York University. In
1935, he became director of research for the Life
Insurance Agency Management Association in
Hartford, Connecticut, where he launched a pro-
gram of research on the effectiveness of differ-
ent styles of supervision. In September 1939,
he was appointed director of the Division of Pro-
gram Surveys in the Bureau of Agricultural Eco-
nomics of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
in Washington.
The Division of Program Surveys had been
established to provide a conduit through which
farmers and other citizens could communicate
to the department their experiences with the
various federal programs that affected them.
When Likert entered the division, the procedures
of information gathering were crude and in need
of improvement. Likert, along with Morris H.
Hansen and others from the Department of
 454 LIKERT, RENSIS
Agriculture, the Bureau of the Census, and Iowa
State University collaborated in developing a
method of sampling households and individuals
that was based on the identification and listing
of small units of land area throughout the coun-
try. The theory underlying this procedure, and
the specific techniques of selection, was the
basis of what later became known as "probability
sampling."
More reliable methods were also needed for
obtaining information from individual respon-
dents. Likert discovered that government agen-
cies had been using a "reporting form" that spe-
cified only the types of information desired; the
interviewers were expected to ask whatever ques-
tions they thought best to obtain that informa-
tion. When the serious problem of interviewer
bias, which was inherent in this technique, was
demonstrated, the Division of Program Surveys
adopted formalized questionnaires which the
interviewers were instructed to follow without
deviation. Likert introduced the use of "open-
ended questions" in these interviews when it was
desirable to let the respondent interpret the ques-
tion in his own terms rather than choose among
specified alternatives. These procedures have
since become standard practice in survey
research.
Establishment of the Institute for Social Re-
search. In the summer of 1946, the University of
Michigan invited Likert to Ann Arbor to set up an
interdisciplinary institute for research in the
social sciences. The Institute for Social Research,
which Likert founded and directed, was not the
first such institute in the United States, but it
differed in critical ways from those that preceded
and followed it. Intended from the beginning
to be truly interdisciplinary, it was located ad-
ministratively outside the established schools
and departments so that it could achieve this
breadth of research interest. The research staff
of the institute held their primary appointments
in the institute rather than in the teaching de-
partments. Grants and contracts from founda-
tions, governmental agencies, and private profit
and nonprofit organizations provided the basis
for the institute's support. With the advice of a
faculty executive committee, the institute ac-
cepted only such research activities that seemed
clearly appropriate to the university's general
interests and that could be published.
The role of Rensis Likert in the establishment
of the institute, particularly during its early,
uncertain years, was critical. His engaging per-
sonality and talents of persuasion were crucial
in representing the institute—occasionally to
skeptical individuals with the university, but
constantly in the world of grants and contracts
where competition for research support was
always brisk. His unfailing optimism and refusal
to believe that any obstacle could impede the
growth and progress of the institute often left
his associates a little breathless, but ultimately
his expansive predictions proved realistic. Under
Likert's direction, the institute grew rapidly and
within a few years became the largest university-
based organization for research in the social
sciences in the United States.
Theory of participative management. Shortly
after he had established the Institute for Social
Research in 1946, Likert continued the research
program that he had initiated before the war, the
study of management. Assisted at first by a grant
from the Office of Naval Research, and sup-
ported later by contracts with private corpora-
tions, he directed a series of studies in business
and government that were aimed at discovering
the principles used by managers who achieved
the highest performance and employee satisfac-
tion and the ways in which these principles dif-
fered from those used by managers who ob-
tained only mediocre results. Likert and his
major associates, Robert Kahn, Floyd Mann,
Stanley Seashore, and David Bowers, directed
surveys and experiments that ultimately led to
Likert's well-known series of books on partici-
pative management.
Likert believed that styles of management
went through four phases, evolving from what
he called exploitive authoritarian, through be-
nevolent authoritarian, to consultative manage-
ment, and eventually, to participative manage-
ment. The central principles of participative
management, or System 4, as he described it,
were.- (1) supportive relationships between or-
ganizational members and the avoidance of
demeaning punitive behavior; (2) multiple over-
lapping group structure, with each organiza-
tional "family" consisting of a superior and his
subordinates; (3) group problem solving by
consensus within organizational families; (4)
high performance goals; and (5) overlapping
memberships between organizational families by
individuals who serve as "linking pins." Likert
found that organizations operating under these
principles were more responsive to basic human
motives than more authoritarian organizations
were likely to be, and that they were conse-
quently better able to mobilize their human re-
sources to achieve organizational goals. These

concepts and the associated research were laid
out by Likert in New Patterns of Management
(1961) and subsequently in The Human Orga-
nization (1967). The concepts were developed
further and additional research reported in
New Ways of Managing Conflict (Likert &
Likert 1976).
Human resource accounting. In 1967, Likert
argued that current methods of accounting gave
corporate management inadequate and mislead-
ing information on the relative effectiveness of
different management styles. To expand these
sources of information, Likert proposed that
human resource accounting be adopted, and he
suggested several possible methods, which he
later refined. Human resource accounting com-
putes in dollars the investment a firm has in its
people and the changes in the productive capa-
bility of these people from one accounting period
to another.
Likert's theories of participative management
did not revolutionize management practices in
American business and industry. Likert himself
described the typical business organization in
this country as falling within the category of
System 2, or benevolent authoritarian. But there
is no doubt that his research and writing, along
with that of other scholars, raised fundamental
questions about the nature of organizational life
and contributed to a gradual change toward less
authoritarian practices in American manage-
ment.
Rensis Likert retired as director of the In-
stitute for Social Research in 1970 after 25 years
in that position. He continues to work as a pri-
vate consultant on problems of organization and
management, and is engaged in further research
on the comparative effectiveness of participative
management.
ANGUS CAMPBELL
WORKS BY LIKERT
1932 A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes.
Archives of Psychology, No. 140.
1961 New Patterns of Management. New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill.
1967 The Human Organization: Its Management and
Value. New York: McGraw-Hill.
1976 LIKERT, RENSIS; and LIKERT, JANE GIBSON New
Ways of Managing Conflict. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
LORENZ, KONRAD
Konrad Lorenz, an Austrian zoologist and
ethologist, was born on November 7, 1903. In
accordance with his father's wishes, he studied
LORENZ, KONRAD 455
medicine at the University of Vienna, but his
interests were always primarily in zoology. As a
boy in Altenberg, he built aquaria and bird
cages, and soon turned the garden with its ponds
and animal enclosures into a small zoo. Thus,
after receiving his M.D. in 1928, he studied zool-
ogy and received his PH.D. at the University of
Vienna in 1933.
Throughout his research, Lorenz emphasized
the importance of gestalt perception. In his
opinion, the knowledge acquired by artists and
scientists through gestalt perception transcends
by far what "rational thought" makes available
to us. He disagreed with those who viewed quan-
tification as the only legitimate source of knowl-
edge. This reliance on intuition provides one of
the keys to understanding Lorenz' personality.
As a scientist, he had an artistic nature; it was
his gift to see in ethology relationships that led
to new scientific insights.
In medical school, Lorenz kept meticulous
notes on his charges, and in 1927, while still a
student, he published his first work on jackdaws.
He worked as an assistant to the anatomist
Ferdinand Hochstetter, whom he revered, and
gained a comprehensive knowledge in compara-
tive and functional anatomy. His simultaneous
observations on animals taught him that their
behavior repertoire included stereotyped move-
ment coordinations that were constant in form
and could be used to identify species in the same
way as bodily structures. These behavior pat-
terns can be compared across species, just like
morphological characteristics, and if one applies
the criteria of homology as used in morphologi-
cal homologies, the evolutionary history of some
behavior patterns can be reconstructed. In his
papers on the ethology of the social corvidae
(1931), the species-specific behavior patterns
of birds (1932), and the companion in the bird's
world (1935), he presented the first detailed
outline of a biology of behavior.
In these original works, Lorenz discussed the
concept of the instinctive behavior pattern,
which is distinguished from all acquired be-
havior patterns in that it matures "independent
of experience" during the course of embryonic
and ontogenetic development. Lorenz empha-
sized the dichotomy between inborn and acquired
behavior, and although he always acknowledged
that Charles Darwin, Oskar Heinroth, and others
had expressed similar ideas, he was the first to
incorporate these ideas into a new and consistent
theoretical structure. Much later, when he con-
sidered the origin of the adaptiveness of be-
456 LORENZ, KONRAD
havior, he arrived at an even clearer definition
of these concepts.
Instinctive behavior patterns were first
thought of as reflex chains. Lorenz pointed out,
however, that Wallace Craig had already stated
that the readiness to perform a particular in-
stinctive behavior pattern increased if the be-
havior had not occurred for some time. In an
extreme instance, the behavior can run off as a
vacuum activity in the absence of the appropri-
ate stimulus situation. This is not the case with
instinctive behavior patterns, which in contrast
to simple reflexes, are accompanied by feelings
and affects that are subjectively experienced.
While this cannot be actually proven, no one
familiar with animals can overlook the homolo-
gies that exist between humans and animals.
Lorenz emphasized the stereotypic, automatic
character of instinctive behavior patterns and
the fact that animals act instinctively because
they are not guided by insight into the purpose
of their actions. Instead they react rather blindly,
which often leads to inappropriate behavior, par-
ticularly in the actions of captive animals.
Instinctive behavior patterns are released by
stimuli and stimulus combinations that are
simple and unmistakable, and reflect the natu-
ral, releasing situation. Lorenz called behavior
patterns that serve as signals releasers. The re-
leasing stimuli affect an innate releasing mecha-
nism, which is seen as a perceptual correlate
to the stimulus. This is a kind of stimulus filter
which, not unlike a lock, responds to only spe-
cific key stimuli. The stimulus receiver can be
thought of as possessing a schematic (simpli-
fied) picture of its companion, which can appear
as a distinct entity in several functional systems,
for example, as a child, sexual, or parent com-
panion. The conspecific is not perceived as total-
ity, but as the bearer of signals appropriate to
the release of various behaviors in distinct
functional systems. A female muscovy duck
(Cairina) will react to the lost call of a mallard
duckling by attempting to rescue it from the
hands of the experimenter. But if this duckling
joins the flock of her own young she will kill it,
since she recognizes it as another species by
distinct visual or acoustic signals.
In describing the phenomenon of imprinting,
however, Lorenz (1935) found that in some
species of birds the innate schema of the sexual
or parent companion is not very specific. In
these cases, the young animal learns during a
short, sensitive period by the appearance of its
parents what the appearance of its sexual com-
panion will be later in life. Ducklings and gos-
lings follow practically any moving object after
hatching, including humans, but if they are ex-
posed to humans during a relatively short
period, they retain their preference for them
and are unwilling to follow their own species.
In contrast to the classical reflex concept,
according to which all behavior is a reaction to
stimuli, the recognition of action-specific fatigue,
lowering of thresholds, intention movements,
and vacuum activities led to inconsistencies that
at first Lorenz was unable to reconcile. Then in
1937 he met Erich von Hoist, who had shown
in a number of experiments that movements do
not always need a stimulus to trigger them in
reflexlike fashion. Furthermore, he had shown
that coordination of muscle movements is al-
ready centrally coordinated and that they can
occur without the participation of external and
internal stimuli.
The discovery of central excitatory potential
by von Hoist basically changed our conception
of the function of the central nervous system.
Behavior was no longer viewed only as a re-
sponse to external stimuli, because spontane-
ously active groups of neurons whose coordina-
tion occurs without sensory input are also
present in the central nervous system. Behavior
is thus centrally activated, and the continuously
and spontaneously active groups of neurons
must be prevented from continuous discharge by
some inhibiting mechanism. Von Hoist con-
cluded that no stimuli are needed to activate an
organism; rather, its internal drive must be
inhibited.
Lorenz immediately recognized the signifi-
cance of this discovery, which enabled him to
explain the phenomena of the lowering of
threshold, vacuum activity, and action-specific
fatigue by assuming that not only locomotor
patterns but instinctive behavior patterns in
general are activated by motor neuron groups.
Lorenz postulated an action-specific energy for
specific behavior patterns and thought tl^is
energy was used up during the performance of
the behavior, thus leading to action-specific fa-
tigue. The concept of action-specific energy did
not imply that each movement was based on
qualitatively different biochemical processes.
Lorenz placed more weight on the specificity of
the active groups of neurons. The conception
of a continuous production of excitation implied
further that there had to be inhibiting mechan-

isms that prevented the continuous discharge of
the continuously produced impulses. Such an
inhibitory block is only removed when adequate
releasing stimuli are mediated by an innate re-
leasing mechanism. Lorenz made one additional
assumption, namely that this reflexlike inhibition
would lead to a storing of action-specific energy.
In this he was supported by the observations of
C. S. Sherrington, who had described a storing
of excitatory potential for reflexes in the phe-
nomenon of "spinal contrast." This storing of
excitatory potential was thought to motivate the
animal by means of appetitive behavior to ac-
tively seek out the proper releasing stimulus
situation. It would react to increasingly less
specific stimuli, until finally the behavior would
appear as a vacuum activity in the absence of
any detectable stimuli. The strength of a reac-
tion would then depend not only on the quality
of the releasing stimuli, but also on the internal
drives. Lorenz published this synthesis of his
ideas with the results of von Hoist's experiments
in Folia Biotheoretica (1937a*). With this new
concept, the year 1937 thus brought a major
advance for ethology.
At the same time, Lorenz developed friendly
contacts with Nikolaas Tinbergen who carried
out studies in the biology of behavior in Holland.
Specifically, he studied the releasing and direct-
ing stimuli as well as certain behavior patterns
that occur in conflict situations. These he inter-
preted in line with the new ethological model as
a central sparking over of a central excitation
that was prevented from running its normal
course. He called it displacement reaction.
Tinbergen and Lorenz collaborated on an ex-
periment that demonstrated that instinctive be-
havior patterns consist of a rigid component,
the inherited movement pattern (later called a
fixed action pattern), and a less rigid taxis com-
ponent that is controlled by external stimuli and
is called an orienting movement. Further inves-
tigations by Tinbergen led to the recognition of
the fact that the Lorenz-Craig hypothesis was
too simple. The consummatory action could be
preceded by a chain of appetitive behavior pat-
terns that led from general to more specific
behaviors.
In the years after the discovery of the spon-
taneity of instinctive behavior patterns, Lorenz
concerned himself increasingly with the be-
havior of humans. Although in 1940 he pub-
lished his comparative study on the movement
patterns of swimming ducks, most of his works
LORENZ, KONRAD 457
thereafter focused on man, even when animal
observations provided the basis on which his
conclusions were built.
The new drive concept and the concepts of in-
nate behavior patterns, releasers, key stimuli,
and innate releasing mechanisms seemed ideally
suited to explain certain aspects of human be-
havior. The fact that humans react rather auto-
matically in the realm of social behavior sug-
gests that inborn constraints may affect the
degree of freedom of our actions. The contrast
between our achievements in dealing with prob-
lems presented by the physical environment and
our failure to solve problems arising from hu-
man interactions is awesome. In 1943 Lorenz
published "Die angeborenen Formen moglicher
Erfahrung" in which he pointed out that hu-
mans may well respond to stimuli prior to all
experience with them on the basis of innate re-
leasing mechanisms in an adaptive, species-
preserving manner. This applies to certain basic
cognitive structures with respect to space and
time as well as to certain reactions to other
people. Here too man reacts to very simple
stimuli that can easily be imitated in an experi-
ment. Thus, experiments using models show
that relatively simple characteristics of human
babies elicit emotionally toned approach be-
havior. Objects that have these cues are con-
sidered cute. The baby schema consists of sev-
eral components that can be presented singly
as well. They may be exaggerated, and when
several components are combined their effec-
tiveness in releasing a response is additive. For
example, babies have comparatively large heads
in relation to their bodies and their extremities
are short and chubby. Industry produces cute
dolls and illustrations for stories in which the
head-body proportions are exaggerated as the
sole cue of "babyishness." We respond in a sim-
ilar fashion to stimuli emanating from sexual
partners and to certain facial expressions that
can be sketched with relatively few lines, and
respond blindly to animal facial expressions and
consider them friendly, sad, brave, and noble if
they include components contained in our own
facial expressions. Lorenz also hypothesized that
we classify fellow humans quite generally accord-
ing to such criteria as well-proportioned and
beautiful, and that we like people who appeal to
our aesthetic sense. Such a sense of values is also
projected onto other species as for example
when we consider a gazelle noble and the plump
hippopotamus ugly.
 458 LORENZ, KONRAD
Besides these aesthetic schemata, Lorenz also
suspected the existence of ethic schemata.
These provide the blueprints for social behavior
by giving people a foreknowledge of what
behavior is good and bad.
During his comparative studies of domesti-
cated and wild animals, Lorenz found that the
process of domestication resulted in a number
of changes in body structures and behavior that
are similar in mammals and birds. In domesti-
cated animals, where rapid reproduction is de-
sirable, there is a decrease in the fine nuances
of expressive behavior found in the wild an-
cestral forms. Wild geese are monogamous and
mate only after an elaborate courtship cere-
mony; the domesticated goose is promiscuous
and shows little courtship. In the absence of
predatory pressure, quick reactions are no longer
the basis of selection. The senses, muscles, and
even intelligence may atrophy. Weakness of
connective tissues and a tendency to deposit fat
results. This loss of specificity is adaptive if one
considers domesticated animals as symbionts of
man. Nevertheless, we still judge these changes
subjectively as degenerate. Why? Lorenz saw
the reasons for this in the fact that civilized
man is also subject to self-domestication, which
leads to changes in body structure and behavior.
Only our inborn sense of values counteracts
these degenerative changes.
Finally Lorenz speculated about the decline
of cultures, but not along the lines proposed by
Oswald Spengler, who spoke of quasipsycho-
logical aging processes. Instead, Lorenz sus-
pected that degenerative changes that result
from the process of domestication might be the
cause. Humans who have fewer scruples in
their dealings with others and are ruthless to-
wards their fellows will at first gain an advan-
tage in certain civilizations. The increase in
people who have no consistent set of values,
who are incapable of close bonds with others,
who do not identify with their community, and
who lack the courage to defend their group, will
lead to the demise of such civilizations, thus
making room for those with more adaptive be-
haviors. However, Lorenz did not see this as the
inevitable fate of civilized peoples, since man
can control his fate by insight into these
processes.
As a result of these findings, critics in recent
years have accused Lorenz of racism. The
charge is unwarranted since Lorenz spoke of
domestication effects in all civilizations and felt
an obligation to call attention to the problem.
The genetic deterioration of civilized mankind
cannot be denied in view of the increase in in-
herited illnesses. As a result of modern medical
practices many people, who in the past would
not have been able to have children, now reach
the reproductive phase of their lives and are
acceptable as marriage partners. In presenting
these controversial ideas, Lorenz concluded that
education was the best means of regulating hu-
man reproduction. People should be educated to
make an appropriate choice of partners and to
exercise self-control in the realm of reproduc-
tion in order to avoid tragic afflictions in off-
spring (Lorenz 1961).
In this same study, Lorenz also discussed the
functional analogies of moral behavior in ani-
mals. He showed that dangerous animals possess
inhibitions against using their weapons against
conspecifics in a damaging way. They fight in a
ritualized manner and have special submissive
postures with which to placate the victor. In
man the invention of weapons led to a situation
in which such inborn inhibitions cannot always
be effective. Possessing an aggressive drive and
having weapons that kill quickly, before the
opponent has time to make a submissive plea
for mercy, man must frankly confront the cate-
gorical question posed by his own self-destruc-
tive behavior, for example by the development
of cultural patterns based on codes of honor.
At the time Lorenz wrote this paper, he was
appointed to the chair of philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Konigsberg, where he became one of
the successors to the chair once held by Imman-
uel Kant. World War n interrupted his scien-
tific activities. Lorenz was an army doctor from
1942 to 1944, when he became a Russian pris-
oner of war. In 1948 he was released and re-
turned to his native Austria. That same year, he
presented a lecture at the Biological Research
Station at Wilhelminenberg outside Vienna; his
ideas were unsurpassed in freshness and im-
agination.
After a period of professional uncertainty,
Lorenz was given a research station in Buldern,
Westphalia, in West Germany by the Max
Planck Society, which in 1957 became the Max
Planck Institute for Behavioral Physiology at
Seewiesen near Munich in southern Germany.
He headed the institute with his friend Erich
von Hoist, and became the focal point of a
European school of ethology.
Following World War n, Niko Tinbergen took
the initiative in spreading the ideas of European
ethologists to the English-speaking world. In his

book The Study of Instinct (1951) he combined
the morphology of behavior with the physiology
of behavior. When Tinbergen moved to England
another focal point of ethology was created.
Soon Lorenz' ideas became the focus of inter-
national discussions. Some of his ideas pro-
voked vigorous responses from behavioristically
oriented American psychologists. Learning the-
ories had exercised a great influence on Ameri-
can students of behavior ever since J. B. Wat-
son. The notion that man is shaped primarily
by his environment and is born with his brain
as a kind of blank slate was for a long time the
accepted creed in psychology, sociology, and an-
thropology. Lorenz' findings were in direct con-
trast to these ideas, for he claimed that the be-
havior of animals and people was affected by
biological inheritance. In addition, classical re-
flex theory had many adherents in the United
States, and those who studied animal behavior
by various conditioning techniques were not
likely to agree with Lorenz' theory of the spon-
taneity of behavior. Finally, many American
behavioral scientists lacked Lorenz' background
in comparative research. In contrast to Ameri-
can psychologists, American zoologists had little
difficulty in understanding Lorenz' ideas, since
they were familiar with the comparative mor-
phology and behavior of many species.
Most American psychologists, however, were
critical of or rejected the ethology of Lorenz
and Tinbergen. There were exceptions, such as
Eckhard H. Hess, who discovered in his studies
on chickens that Lorenz' ideas had great ex-
planatory value. Of all the critics, Daniel S.
Lehrman gained the greatest prominence with
his article "A Critique of Konrad Lorenz's The-
ory of Instinctive Behavior" (1953). This critique
proved to be of great heuristic value. Lehrman
contended that the innate-learned dichotomy
had no heuristic value since it can never be
proven that a behavior is inborn. All behavior
patterns develop continuously and an embryo
cannot be isolated from environmental influ-
ences even in the egg. Therefore, raising an
animal free of external influences is impossible.
The growing organism is subject to influences
during any stage of its development and can
thus have "experiences." Lehrman thought that
Lorenz' concept of the innate was negatively
defined as "not learned," and since learning ex-
periences could not be excluded, the concept
had no value.
This critique pointed out a weakness in the
ethological concept of the innate. Actually every
LORENZ, KONRAD 459
biologist knew what was meant by "innate," but
there was no clear definition of the word. This
critique caused Lorenz to reexamine his entire
system of ideas. In 1961 he replied with his
Evolution and Modification of Behavior, where
he defined "inborn" in a positive way according
to the origin of the adaptation.
Lorenz took for granted that behavior pat-
terns, just like morphological characteristics,
mirror certain features in the environment to
which they are adapted. Such adaptations pre-
suppose that the adapted system copies, how-
ever crudely, at some time, the information
about the environmental situation. This "acqui-
sition of information" can take place during
phylogeny through the mechanism of natural
selection of mutations. Thus, proven experi-
ences are preserved in the genome and are de-
coded during ontogenesis. However, informa-
tion can also be acquired in the course of
cultural and individual development through
various learning processes. Information can be
stored by the central nervous system, and for
man, in written records and by other technical
means. The manner in which the adapted sys-
tem acquired the information for a specific
adaptation can be assessed by raising an animal
in the absence of specific experiences or in-
formation. It is neither necessary nor desirable
to withhold all information from an animal dur-
ing its development. Instead it is important to
design an experiment so that only the specific
adaptation being investigated is interfered with.
If one wanted to find out, for example, whether
a stickleback innately reacts to the red under-
side of a conspecific, it will suffice to withhold
the specific stimulus situation from the animal.
To raise the animal in complete darkness would
be inappropriate, since this would lead to retinal
degeneration and subsequent disruptions at an
entirely different level of adaptation.
The same is true with respect to motor pat-
terns. If one wanted to know if a bird had ac-
quired its song as a phylogenetic adaptation, it
would not be necessary to raise the bird in com-
plete isolation from all stimulation. It is enough
to isolate it from all sound. If the bird still sings
its species-specific territorial and courtship song
when it is sexually mature, the proof has been
obtained that the information about the song
patterns must have been stored in the genome.
This is a logical conclusion and is not depen-
dent on knowledge as to how in the specific case
the genetic information is decoded during the
course of development.
460 LORENZ, KONRAD
Lehrman accepted the validity of this argu-
ment, but also called for an analysis of the de-
velopmental process. Lorenz agreed. In prac-
tice, the answer to the question as to whether a
behavior pattern owes its specific adaptive-
ness to a phylogenetic or cultural or individual
process is only the first step toward a complete
analysis. There exists no logical argument based
on the issues against this position. However,
there is no lack of the monotonous reiteration
of the comment that "the nature-nurture issue
is dead." Such remarks merely show that the
authors have not understood the issues in-
volved. It is, in fact, very much alive. Lorenz
made a decisive contribution to the consolida-
tion of ethological thought with the clear defini-
tion of phylogenetic adaptations, and has pro-
vided a positive statement of the meaning of
"innate."
In the years following World War n, Lorenz
also studied ducks, geese, various species of
cichlid fish, and coral fish. Among other things,
he was interested in the questions of intraspe-
cific aggression, and collected his observations
and thoughts in On Aggression (1963). The
title showed that Lorenz approached the topic
from a biologist's perspective. Quite outside of
any value systems he unhesitatingly asked the
question, what is the biological function of ag-
gressive behavior. He was always searching for
the selection pressure responsible for a particu-
lar behavior. As with all biologists, he was in-
terested in learning how a particular behavior
contributes to the preservation of the species
and was not interested in technical explana-
tions. He studied the various forms of aggres-
sive behavior and his main points can be sum-
marized as follows:
(1) Intraspecific aggression evolved as a
means of "spacing out" and is found in various
functional systems. Feeding and breeding ter-
ritories are established and maintained; rivals
are overcome and temporarily excluded from
the reproductive process. Rank-orders are es-
tablished.
(2) Intraspecific fighting behavior is, with
few exceptions, arranged so that the conspecific
is not killed. Animals capable of doing great
damage usually have ritualized, nondamaging
fights. Where this is not the case, means exist to
prevent the destruction of or serious damage to
a conspecific. Thus many animals are able
to prevent further attacks by means of appease-
ment postures.
(3) These behavior mechanisms are already
present as phylogenetic adaptations with respect
to perceptual as well as motor pattern organiza-
tion.
(4) Most higher vertebrates are motivated
by an aggressive drive to fight. However, this
drive is only one of many in the "parliament of
instincts."
(5) The bond uniting individuals who know
one another develops during the course of evol-
ution for mutual defense and protection. Love
is, in a manner of speaking, the offspring of
aggression.
(6) Humans are also imbued with an ag-
gressive drive. It leads to an increased readiness
to fight if not discharged through the perfor-
mance of aggressive actions.
(7) While humans possess, analogous to
higher vertebrates, inhibitions against killing
conspecifics, the balance between the ability to
kill and the inhibition to do so has been dis-
turbed by the invention of the first weapon.
Modern weapons technology further insulates
soldiers even more against situations in which
compassion for an enemy could be elicited.
(8) Man was evolved for life in individual-
ized bands and the anonymous mass society
places excessive demands on people. Thus,
"man is not bad from his youth up, he is just
not quite good enough for the demands placed
upon him by modern society" (1963, p. 372).
(9) The drive to enthusiastically participate
in fighting determines the structure of human
society and its political organizations. Mankind
is not aggressive and ready to fight because it is
divided into parties and factions. Instead, man-
kind is organized to provide the stimulus situa-
tion necessary for the discharge of social ag-
gression.
(10) Personal acquaintance and the unify-
ing effect of an enthusiasm for shared ideals
tend to blunt the aggressive drive. Furthermore,
ritualized forms of fighting, such as sports, may
serve to prevent the damaging effects of ag-
gressions.
(11) At the same time, man feels friend-
ship and love only on an individual basis and
will power cannot change this. But Lorenz be-
lieves in "the power of natural selection . . .
reason can and will exert selection pressure in
the right direction" (1963, p. 299).
There was a strong reaction to this book. It
was criticized by psychologists, sociologists, and
behavioristically oriented anthropologists, and
one is struck by the highly emotional tone of
their rebuttals. They said that Lorenz' refer-

ences to inborn behavior in humans could be
used to support arguments in favor of the status
quo in human societies, and that Lorenz' hypo-
thesis served as an excuse for past and future
aggression. Thus, Erich Fromm wrote (1974):
"What could be more welcome for those who
are afraid, and who feel unable to change the
destructive course of events, than Konrad
Lorenz' theory that violence emanates from our
animal nature and is the result of an untame-
able drive for aggression."
The accusation that Lorenz defends aggres-
sion and that his position is one of fatalism in
the sense that what is inborn cannot be
changed, can be refuted by his own statements.
Lorenz never spoke of an "untameable" drive for
aggression. Instead he pointed out the need for
its control, which would require an investiga-
tion of the phenomenon: "We have good reason
to consider intra-specific aggression in the pres-
ent cultural and technological situation of man-
kind as the greatest of dangers. However, we
shall not improve our chances to deal with it if
we accept it as something metaphysical and un-
avoidable. However, we may succeed if we can
unravel the causal chain of its natural causes.
Whenever man attained the power to direct a
natural phenomenon into a particular direction,
he was able to do so because of his understand-
ing of the underlying causes. The study of
normal, species-preserving life processes, called
physiology, provides the pre-requisite basis for
the study of their pathology" (1963, p. 47).
Clearly, Lorenz was not an apologist for ag-
gression as his critics charged. He did, how-
ever, point out that the control of aggression
cannot be accomplished simply by its suppres-
sion because the drive is too strong. Thus, harm-
less or even useful outlets for the aggressive
drive need to be found.
Lorenz is also accused of drawing conclu-
sions based on false analogies, but it is signifi-
cant that he prefaced his remarks about human
behavior with the following self-critical passage:
"I may claim that the preceding chapters are
natural science: the recorded facts are verified,
as far as it is possible to say this of the results
of a science as young as comparative ethology.
Now, however, we leave the record of facts
evidenced by observations and experiments on
the aggressive behavior of animals and turn to
the question of whether they can teach us some-
thing applicable to man and which is useful in
circumventing the dangers arising from his ag-
gressive drives" (1963, p. 220). Omission of
LORENZ, KONRAD 461
references to such statements by his reviewers,
with the exception of Theodosius Dobzhansky,
indicates that they attempted to build their
cases by ignoring relevant facts.
It is unfortunate that Lorenz' critics did not
contribute to a constructive evaluation of his
hypotheses, since there are a number of points
that do need to be questioned. That Lorenz
would be the last to object to such criticism is
indicated by his reaction to Lehrman's critique
of the concept of "innate behavior." He never
objected to criticism of his work as long as it
dealt with the issues at hand. He continuously
exhorted his students that as natural scientists
they must be ever ready to throw favorite hypo-
theses overboard when they are no longer sup-
ported by the facts.
Any critical evaluation of Lorenz' ideas on
aggression must call attention to the lack of a
clear distinction between individualized aggres-
sion within and between groups. He later stated
that if he were to write On Aggression again, he
would draw a sharper distinction between indi-
vidual aggressivity within a society and the col-
lective aggressivity of one ethnic group against
another. This is illustrated in Eibl-Eibesfeldt,
Krieg und Frieden aus der Sicht der Verhaltens-
forschung (1975). Some of Lorenz' statements
are far too general, such as the assertion that
"the personal bond love arose in many cases
from intra-specific aggression by way of ritual-
ization of a redirected or threatening attack."
Another such statement is that man's over-all
psychological make-up is not suitable for mod-
ern mass society and thus a new man needs to
evolve to fit the new condition. True, aggression
is an important element of social bonds, but a
good argument can be made that individual
bonds have their origins in the mother-child
relationship. The behavior patterns that main-
tain bonds within groups seem to derive pri-
marily from behavior patterns involved in the
care of the young and from infantile behaviors.
With respect to aggression between groups, one
can argue that it is possible, through an identi-
fication with shared symbols, to become friends
with initially strange people; therefore one need
not wait for a new man.
The focal point of many of the attacks on
Lorenz was his concept of an aggressive drive.
Although not all species have such an inborn
drive, many do. The behavior of a species de-
pends on its specific ecological demands. Even
within the cichlid family, for example, there are
great differences from one species to the next.
462 LORENZ, KONRAD
It is therefore not valid to say that Lorenz' ideas
concerning aggression in humans have been
disproven merely because it has been discovered
that in one species of fish aggressivity is a re-
action to stimuli rather than a spontaneous
reaction.
In examining the situation in humans, much
evidence supports the existence of an aggressive
drive (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1975). Numerous experi-
ments have shown that anger can be dissipated
by the expression of aggressive behavior. In
addition, many societies have evolved customs
that harmlessly channel the expression of ag-
gressive behavior, and the results of neuro-
physiological studies have provided evidence in
support of the hypothesis. In humans, the tem-
poral lobes and the amygdaloid nuclei are im-
plicated in aggressive behavior. If stimulated
electrically, rage is exhibited. In temporal lobe
epilepsy spontaneous rage occurs, and it is ac-
companied by an increased electrical activity in
this region. It is a fact that neurons fire spon-
taneously, perhaps because transmitter sub-
stances are continuously produced and accumu-
late. At first, this may merely increase the
readiness to respond, as evidenced in von Hoist's
experiments. The objection has been raised that
if aggression were based on a spontaneous,
neural motivation for an animal, this would be
inappropriate since an animal may be driven to
leave a territory in search of an opponent or an
opportunity to fight. However, this does not
necessarily follow, because the tie to a territory
may be so strong that it prevents the animal
from leaving. As a rule, spontaneous behavior
is also subject to controls. Aggressive behavior
is used, in a certain sense, like a tool. It is used
in various functional systems to overcome ob-
stacles, just as locomotor behavior can be used
for various purposes. Perhaps this explains the
similarities in their neural motivation.
Independent of these theoretical interpreta-
tions, Lorenz pointed out the need to study the
species-preserving function of aggression in
order to understand the aberrations of this drive
in man in the hope of eventually controlling it.
Most of Lorenz' hypothesis listed earlier do with-
stand critical examination and Lorenz has thus
contributed significantly to understanding the
phenomenon.
During the last two decades, Lorenz has had
extensive contacts with psychoanalytically ori-
ented physicians and behavior students. John
Bowlby, for example, based his investigations
into the mother-child relationship on ethologi-
cal theories, as did Erik H. Erikson. These inter-
actions have led to much mutually rewarding
discussion.
In common with Freud's psychoanalysis,
ethology shares the view of a dynamic drive
model. Freud seems to have been the first to
recognize the importance of the dynamic as-
pects of behavior. Lorenz, building on von
Hoist, provided a physiological explanation.
Furthermore, he interpreted the aggressive drive
as an evolutionary adaptation, while Freud saw
it as a quasimystical drive toward self-destruc-
tion. Besides the death wish Freud postulated
the concept of the libido. All pleasurable expres-
sions from sucking in infants to adult sexuality
were thought to derive from this drive.
Freud's much quoted passage that a mother
would be shocked if she knew that she behaved
sexually toward her infant when she fondled
and kissed him is wrong. Freud correctly
noticed certain connections, but he erred in the
direction of the course of evolution. We are
witnessing here true parental care behavior
which secondarily became a part of the bonding
behavior that is part of sexual behavior (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt 1970). In fact, no physiological basis
has been found for the existence of only one
primal, libidinal drive. Lorenz spoke instead of
a "parliament of instincts."
Other areas of similar concern shared with
psychoanalysis are based on the ethological con-
cept of imprinting. Freud already pointed out
one sensitive period during early development
as well as the regularities of developmental
stages that can be thought of as a kind of pro-
gram that will run its course. With respect to
specifics, ethologists' ideas about the developing
human infant have gone beyond Freud's origi-
nal formulations.
Ethologists find it hard to accept some psy-
chological explanations. Thus, they interpret
the Oedipal phase differently from classical psy-
choanalysts. During this phase of development
children certainly experience conflicts based on
rank-order, which in boys centers on their rela-
tionship with their fathers. To conclude, how-
ever, that each boy latently fears castration by
his father as punishment for his Oedipal desires
is farfetched, especially since there is probably
an innate incest taboo. Humans, like other ani-
mals living in permanent family groups, seem
to possess an inhibition against falling in love
with a member of the opposite sex with whom

they grew up during a certain sensitive period
in their development (Bischof 1972). A girl
may, during this developmental phase, learn
that in a patriarchical society boys are pre-
ferred. This may lead to conflicts in sensitive
girls, but to postulate penis envy is probably
more in the realm of a pathologic aberration
than a norm. This is undoubtedly true also for a
number of other psychoanalytical interpreta-
tions, which are reflected in a rather unfortu-
nate terminology that many find objectionable.
Thus, psychoanalysts speak of an anal—sadistic
phase. With this allegorical terminology an at-
tempt is made to characterize a phase in which
the child learns to control his anal sphincter
muscle, and employs his exploratory drive de-
structively by tearing up paper, toys, etc. What
actually takes place can hardly be appropriate
for the terms used. The term "sadistic" coming
from pathology is not appropriate to describe
normal exploratory behavior in a child, nor is
control of the sphincter muscle the main con-
cern during this period. However, we are deal-
ing with a phase in which first attempts are
made by the child to assert independent action
by the active exploration of the environment.
Curiosity, play, the beginning of speech are
much better suited to characterize this stage of
a child's life (Hassenstein 1973).
Another important area in which ethological
and psychoanalytical theory differ is concerned
with ethics. According to Freud, people act
altruistically because they are afraid of their all-
powerful fathers. According to Lorenz, certain
ethical norms are inborn. The conscience and
empathy with which people appreciate the situ-
ation of a companion are based in part on
phylogenetic adaptations.
In his most recent book Behind the Mirror
(1973), Lorenz attempted to understand the
natural history of man's cognitive abilities.
This is his most mature and probing work.
Based on a kind of "hypothetical" realism, Lor-
enz tried to show that each adaptation reflects
some external reality, however crude the model
may be: "Life is not an image of something,
it is knowing reality itself" (p. 326). With in-
creasing differentiation, one speaks of higher
development; the impressions that an organism
has of its environment are also correspondingly
more differentiated. This is true for physical
characteristics as well as for sensory capacities
and the capabilities of the central nervous sys-
tem. "Adaptation is a kind of growth of the
LORENZ, KONRAD 463
transformation taking place in the organism
and its environment," where the genome
"learns" by a kind of teleonomic probing from
successes and failures, just as the inquiring hu-
man mind learns, especially from its errors.
Both processes can be seen as a cognitive
matching with a reality that exists outside the
organism.
Of course, it is possible to distort an adapta-
tion, as in the case of errors in visual perception
as a result of optical illusions. There are pre-
conceptions in perception as well as in thought
processes of which people need to be aware.
Lorenz traced the evolution of cognitive func-
tions through phylogenesis and cultural history
and pointed out their achievements and limita-
tions. Lorenz considered this work the basis for
a contemplated critical examination of human
societies, which should be provocative in its un-
conventional approach. Its biological epistemol-
ogy will open new paths to philosophy.
Lorenz' work has left a deep and lasting im-
print in the intellectual landscape. Almost all
works about man have to deal with his ideas.
The line of scientific inquiry that he, Tinbergen,
and von Hoist developed has long since been
recognized, and in 1973, Lorenz, Tinbergen,
and Karl von Frisch received the Nobel Prize
for physiology and medicine for their work in
ethology.
What Lorenz saw as the most important task
of ethology, namely the biological investigation
of human behavior, has meanwhile begun in a
systematic fashion. Psychologists, psychiatrists,
psychoanalysts, anthropologists, and pedagogues
have had to come to grips with his ideas and
an ethology of humans has begun to grow as a
new area of scientific inquiry (Eibl-Eibesfeldt
& Hass 1966).
IRENAUS EIBL-EIBESFELDT
(Translated by Erich Klinghammer)
WORKS BY LORENZ
1927 Beobachtungen an Dohlen. Journal fur Orni-
thologie 75:511-519.
1931 Beitrage zur Ethologie sozialer Corviden. Journal
fur Ornithologie 79:67-127.
1932 Betrachtungen iiber das Erkennen der arteigenen
Triebhandlungen bei Vogeln. Journal fur Orni-
thologie 80:50-98.
1935 Der Kumpan in der Umwelt des Vogels. Journal
fur Ornithologie 83:137-215, 289-413.
1937a trber den Begriff der Instinkthandlung. Folia
Biotheoretica Series B 2:17-50.
1937b liber die Bildung des Instinktbegriffes. Natur-
wissenschaften 25:289-300, 307-318, 324-331.
 464 LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O.
1938 LORENZ, KONRAD; and TlNBERGEN, NlKOLAAS
Taxis und Instinkthandlung in der Eirollbewe-
gung der Graugans. Zeitschrift fur Tierpsychologie
2:1-29.
1940 Durch Domestikation verursachte Storungen ar-
teigenen Verhaltens. Zeitschrift fur angewandte
Psychologic und Charakterkunde 59:1-81.
1941 Vergleichende Bewegungsstudien an Anatinen.
Journal fur Ornithologie 89:194-293. —» Festschrift
in honor of Oskar Heinroth.
1943 Die angeborenen Formen moglicher Erfahrung.
Zeitschrift fur Tierpsychologie 5:235-409.
1949 Er redete mit dem Vieh, den Vogeln und den
Fischen. Vienna: Borotha-Schoeler.
1950a Ganzheit und Teil in der tierischen und mensch-
lichen Gemeinschaft. Studium Generate 9:455-499.
(1950b) 1965 Man Meets Dog. New York: Penguin.
—> First published in German.
1959 Gestaltwahrnehmung als Quelle wissenschaft-
licher Erkenntnis. Zeitschrift fur experimented
und angewandte Psychologic 6:118—165.
(1961) 1967 Evolution and Modification of Behavior.
Univ. of Chicago Press. —» First published as
"Phylogenetische Anpassung und adaptive Modi-
fikation des Verhaltens."
(1963) 1974 On Aggression. New York: Harcourt.
—> First published as Das sogenannte Bose: Zur
Naturgeschichte der Aggression. A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1970.
(1973) 1977 Behind the Mirror. New York: Harcourt.
—» First published in German.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BISCHOF, N. 1972 Die biologischen Grundlagen des
Inzesttabus. In G. Reinert (editor), Bericht iiber
den 27. Gottingen (Germany): Verlag fur Psycho-
logie.
EiBL-EiBESFELDT, IRENAUS (1967) 1974 Grundriss
der vergleichenden Verhaltensforschung. 4th ed.
Munich: Piper.
EIBL-EIBESFELDT, IRENAUS 1970 Liebe und Hass: Zur
Naturgeschichte elementarer Verhaltensweisen. Mu-
nich: Piper.
EIBL-EIBESFELDT, IRENAUS 1973 Der vorprogram-
mierte Mensch: Das Ererbte als bestimmender Fak-
tor im menschlichen Verhalten. Vienna: Molden.
EIBL-EIBESFELDT, IRENAUS 1975 Krieg und Frieden
aus der Sicht der Verhaltensforschung. Munich:
Piper.
EIBL-EIBESFELDT, IRENAUS 1976 Menschenforschung
auf neuen Wegen: Eine naturwissenschaftliche
Betrachtung kultureller Verhaltensweisen. Vienna:
Molden.
EIBL-EIBESFELDT, IRENAUS; and HASS, H. 1966 Zum
Projekt einer ethologisch orientierten Untersuchung
menschlichen Verhaltens. Mitt Max Planck-Ges
6:383-396.
ElBL-ElBESFELDT, IRENAUS; and WlCKLER, WOLFGANG
1968 Ethology. Volume 5, pages 186-193 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
FROMM, ERICH 1974 Die Anatomic der menschlichen
Destruktivitat. Stuttgart (Germany): DVA.
HASSENSTEIN, B. 1973 Verhaltensbiologie des Kindes.
Munich: Piper.
LEHRMAN, DANIEL S. 1953 A Critique of Konrad
Lorenz's Theory of Instinctive Behavior. Quarterly
Review of Biology 28:337-363.
TINBERGEN, NIKOLAAS (1951) 1969 The Study of
Instinct. Oxford: Clarendon. —»Based on a series
of lectures given at the American Museum of Natu-
ral History in 1947.
LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O.
Arthur Oncken Lovejoy (1873-1962), ac-
knowledged founder of the discipline of the his-
tory of ideas, organizing spirit of the American
Association of University Professors, and for
many years America's leading critical philoso-
pher, was born in Berlin, Germany, on October
10, 1873, to a family with a long New England
ancestry; his father, Wallace W. Lovejoy, a
physician, had gone to Germany to continue his
medical studies. Shortly after the family had
returned to Boston, Love joy's mother died from
overdoses of a drug. In grief and guilt, his
father, abandoning medicine, undertook the-
ological studies and became an Episcopalian
minister. He educated his son along strict re-
ligious and classical lines, having him study
Hebrew as well as Latin and Greek. During his
four years as an undergraduate at the Uni-
versity of California from 1891 to 1895, Lovejoy
was an editor of a student publication, wrote
poetry, and above all, was inspired to the voca-
tion of historical scholarship and philosophical
thinking by his teacher George Holmes Howi-
son. Howison was a spokesman for "personal-
istic idealism," which Lovejoy later described
as an intellectual effort to introduce democracy
into metaphysics. Resisting steadfastly his
father's plea that he enter the ministry, Lovejoy
attended Harvard University, studying for three
years until 1898, most notably under William
James and Josiah Royce. Love joy's first intellec-
tual standpoint resembled Royce's absolute
idealism, but gradually James's influence deep-
ened; an eternal idealistic absolute came to
seem inconsistent with the temporal character
of experienced realities. Lovejoy never took a
PH.D. degree; a devoted researcher and a prolific
though careful writer, he nonetheless took to
heart James's polemic against "the PH.D. octo-
pus." A year in Paris in 1898/1899, spent
largely in studying the history of religions, was
followed in 1899 by an appointment to his first
academic post, as assistant professor at Stan-
ford University in California.
As a result of events at Stanford, academic
freedom became a primary theme in Lovejoy's
life. In 1900 the sociologist Edward A. Ross was
dismissed from the faculty after he had advo-
cated prohibiting the importation of Chinese
laborers. Despite the urging of David Starr Jor-
dan, the president of Stanford, that the faculty
approve the dismissal, Lovejoy, after studying the
evidence, concluded that Ross's academic free-

dom had indeed been violated. All Ross had
done was offend Mrs. Leland Stanford, whose
husband, a leading railroad builder, had em-
ployed imported Chinese labor. To make his
protest significant, Lovejoy resigned from his
post, but was thereupon summarily dismissed
from the university in disregard of his effective
date of resignation. He secured a post as pro-
fessor at Washington University in St. Louis,
where he taught from 1901 to 1908. He spent
two years at the University of Missouri, then
accepted an appointment at the Johns Hopkins
University in Baltimore, where from 1910 to
1938 he was professor of philosophy. In 1932/
1933 he went to Harvard University as visiting
professor to give the William James lectures
that subsequently became his great book The
Great Chain of Being (1936); he was again visit-
ing professor in 1937/1938.
While at Johns Hopkins, Lovejoy was the
architect of the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors. In November 1913, he con-
vened a handful of professors from seven uni-
versities to plan the organization of a society
dedicated to the freedom and well-being of the
academic profession. Finally, in January 1915,
the organization was formally founded. Lovejoy
became its first secretary; John Dewey its presi-
dent. Soon Lovejoy was serving as a one-man
committee, investigating reported infractions of
academic freedom across the United States; he
became president of the A.A.U.P. in 1919. Be-
cause of these activities, a proposal to appoint
Lovejoy to the Harvard philosophy department
was vetoed by President A. Lawrence Lowell;
it had been argued by W. E. Hocking that Love-
joy could not be "domesticated."
The outbreak of World War i evoked a deep
moral response from Lovejoy. His sympathies
were strongly with the Allied cause; he thought
that the famous 1914 manifesto of the 93 Ger-
man intellectuals was a betrayal of their scien-
tific and scholarly vocation. He availed himself
of the pages of The Nation, for which he had
frequently reviewed philosophical works, to ex-
press his views in several long letters. After
the United States declared war against Germany
in April 1917, Lovejoy worked with the morale
section of the War Department and the Young
Men's Christian Association in their respective
educational activities. His chief contribution
was to edit with Albert Bushnell Hart a Hand-
book on the War for Public Speakers (1917).
Love joy's concern at that time to awaken "the
moral vision and the moral passion of the entire
LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O. 465
people" has been criticized in recent years, espe-
cially by leftist writers, as a departure from his
principles, but to Lovejoy the threat to democ-
racy presented by German militarism in 1917
was as real as the threat posed to world civiliza-
tion in the next generation by Adolf Hitler and
the Nazis. As early as 1933, Lovejoy warned the
American Jewish Conference in a speech in
Baltimore that Hitler was a menace to world
peace. When war came again to Europe in
1939, he joined the Committee to Defend
America by Aiding the Allies, and became leader
of a group referred to as the "Hopkins war-
mongers."
To Lovejoy, as a guardian of academic free-
dom, America's entry into World War I raised
difficult issues. In its first four months, at least
six cases arose of professors discharged upon
alleged grounds of "disloyalty." Lovejoy warned
that patriotic zeal should not be used as "a
mantle for private intolerance," and as a vehicle
for "hysteria" and "spiritual retrogression."
Under his chairmanship, the A.A.U.P. Commit-
tee on Academic Freedom in Wartime con-
demned the trustees of Columbia University,
whose actions against James M. Cattell in Oc-
tober 1917 for advocating a purely voluntary
army resulted in his dismissal. Nevertheless,
Lovejoy felt that professors who opposed Amer-
ican military actions should preserve silence
during wartime, and he admonished American
colleges in March 1918 against "facilitating the
efforts of those who would repeat in America
the achievement of the Lenines and the Trotz-
skys in Russia."
With World War i over and the cultural
stocktaking of the 1920s in progress, the Johns
Hopkins University, under Lovejoy's leadership,
became a center for the study of the history of
ideas. A group of scholars began in 1922 to
meet for "interdisciplinary" discussions; the
next year Lovejoy was chairman of a committee
to organize a History of Ideas Club. Its consti-
tution defined the field as "the historical study
of the development and influence of general
philosophical conceptions, ethical ideas, and
esthetic fashions, in occidental literature, and
of the relations of these to manifestations of the
same ideas and tendencies in the history of
philosophy, of science, and of political and so-
cial movements." Lovejoy served as president
from 1927 to 1929 and 1938 to 1939; more im-
portant, he presented eight papers during the
twenty years from 1923 to 1952. He became the
patriarch of scholarship, the symbol of scholarly
 466 LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O.
truth-seeking. A distinguished series of scien-
tists, philosophers, and historians came to
present their ideas on ideas, including Niels
Bohr, John von Neumann, Marjorie Nicolson,
George Boas, Jacob Hollander, Gilbert Chinard,
Charles A. Beard, Dorothy Stimson, Carl Becker,
and William F. Albright. The Johns Hopkins
History of Ideas Club was one of those "invisible
colleges" that from time to time fructify the
advancement of science and scholarship. When
the organizational initiative came from the City
College of New York, chiefly from an instructor,
Philip P. Wiener, for the founding of the
Journal of the History of Ideas, Lovejoy served
for a year as editor in chief after it began pub-
lication in 1940.
Lovejoy's philosophical work revolved around
three "unit-ideas": temporalism in metaphysics,
dualistic realism in epistemology, and emergent
evolution in cosmology. The first was directed
against the philosophical idealism that domi-
nated American academic thought at the end of
the nineteenth century as the last residue of
New England transcendentalism. The tenet of
dualistic realism, on the other hand, led Lovejoy
into a powerful critque of the pragmatic theo-
ries of both James and Dewey. In his essay
"Thirteen Pragmatisms" (1908, in 1963), Love-
joy began to develop a remarkable method for
distinguishing the ambiguities in the pragmatic
thesis; some of its variants, he held, led to doc-
trines that confused sociological utility with ob-
jective truth, while others confused mental with
physical events, implying either solipsistic or
extreme physicalistic consequences. The method
was most trenchantly used in Lovejoy's volume
of Carus lectures, The Revolt Against Dualism
(1930a), in which he analyzed with the skill of a
logical anatomist the efforts of Bertrand Russell
and Alfred North Whitehead to overcome the
distinction between mental and physical en-
tities and to achieve "the unification of mind
and matter." Lovejoy reiterated his standpoint
of epistemological dualism—that the knowing
event remains existentially distinct from the
known—and his psychophysical dualism—that
is, the irreducible distinction between mental
and physical entities.
The human race, according to Lovejoy, had
at a very early stage in its intellectual evolution
arrived at "an unformulated working episte-
mology," its natural realism. Men founded their
lives on five assumptions: that known objects
were external to their own bodies; that in their
memories and anticipations they were conceiv-
ing of events in a past and future not presently
coexistent; that their knowledge did correspond
to objective realities; that social experience
brought them indirect knowledge of other peo-
ple's feelings and ideas; and that phenomena,
such as dreams, that did not satisfy a common
verifiability belonged to a private, nonphysical
domain. Such later discoveries as Olaus Roemer's,
in 1675, of the finite velocity of light simply re-
inforced the dualistic distinction between sense
data and their objects. These epistemological
discoveries of mankind were for Lovejoy a heri-
tage not to be discarded lightly for some philos-
ophical fashion.
Lovejoy's psychophysical dualism meshed
naturally with a third tenet that he called
"emergent materialism." Lovejoy believed that
there were "absolute emergences" in nature,
that cosmic history was not a repetitious "bar-
ren shuffling-about of the same pieces." With the
advent of living organisms and physical events
a "transphysical emergence" had taken place.
Although Lovejoy could accept no "generalized
or cosmic meliorism," he expressed the hope
that "there may yet emerge out of the latent
generative potencies of matter . . . new and
richer forms of being, such as no prescience of
ours could foresee" (1927, p. 32). The notion
of irreducible, absolute emergence was basic to
Lovejoy's conception of human behavior and
the social sciences. The human desire for ap-
probation, which was based on self-conscious-
ness, was, Lovejoy held, an emergent not deriva-
ble from antecedent physical or biological
events; it was a "biological singularity" consti-
tuting a "great chasm" between simply conscious
and self-conscious organic creatures. The emer-
gence of self-consciousness itself he regarded as
a "pure mutation" not genetically explicable, "one
of the great points of discontinuity in nature"
(1961b, pp. 85, 92, 106). Lovejoy's conception al-
lied him with such social inquirers as Adam
Smith and Thorstein Veblen, who had regarded
the chief incentive to the accumulation of
wealth as the pursuit of honor or as emulation.
During the first part of his life Lovejoy, like
many contemporaries, was much devoted to
work in social settlement houses. He worked
with a Boys' Club and the Manse in Oakland in
1895, with workingmen's classes in Cambridge,
with the Boston Children's Aid Society in 1896
and 1897, and as president of the St. Louis
Settlement a few years later; at Johns Hopkins
he served in a similar, if more "grandfatherly"
capacity, with the Baltimore Boys' Clubs, and

afterwards participated in the National Child
Labor Committee. Although he would not per-
mit his philosophical views to be shaped by such
activities, in the manner for instance of Dewey
and George Herbert Mead, he concluded by 1911
that equality of opportunity could be restored
only by reforms that "could hardly fall far short
of a thoroughgoing system of nationalized in-
dustry." He criticized the schemes for profit
sharing that became current after World War i;
they would not, he wrote in 1921, affect the
deeper causes of industrial unrest, and he con-
cluded sadly that "nothing in modern history"
encouraged the belief that the more privileged
class would have the "civic virtue" to enact the
necessary reforms in the distribution of wealth.
In The Great Chain of Being, Lovejoy expli-
cated his seminal concept of "unit-ideas" as the
basis for his method in the history of ideas. He
defined them as "the elements, the primary and
persistent or recurrent dynamic units, of the
history of thought," the "implicit or incom-
pletely explicit assumptions, or more or less un-
conscious mental habits, operating in the
thought of an individual or a generation." Their
exploration involved a "philosophical seman-
tics," "a study of the sacred words and phrases
of a period or movement." Lovejoy meticulously
traced the way the notion of a great chain of
being, with all the possible varieties of existence
actualized, had controlled much of Western
philosophical and scientific thought for two
thousand years. Several principles were axio-
matic in this approach: specifically plenitude,
continuity, gradation. In other words, it involved
the notion that the entire range of the con-
ceivable diversity of things—species, particles,
or societies—had to be realized; that any possi-
ble intermediate type between two neighbors
had to be exemplified; and that all would be
arranged according to a scale of perfection. This
model, long employed for a theistic cosmology,
had been "temporalized" or secularized in the
philosophy of evolutionary progress in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The history of ideas, according to Lovejoy,
was moved by a combination of temperamental,
irrational motives interacting with logical "con-
siderations." Lovejoy never developed a theory
of what these irrational motives were, but he
felt that what made a philosophy attractive to
many adherents was the feeling it inspired that
they were being initiated into a kind of Eleusin-
ian mystery. Moreover, from one generation to
the next, basic shifts in philosophical propensity
LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O. 467
would take place, as when his generation, for
instance, rebelled against the dominant absolute
idealism. "The need for a new sort of philo-
sophic Eleusinia is recurrent among the culti-
vated classes every generation or two; it is a
phenomenon almost as periodic as commercial
crises," wrote Lovejoy in 1913 (p. 254). Lovejoy,
regrettably, never undertook to explain in the
1930s what type of edifying Eleusinian motive
was the mainspring of the growing vogue of
logical positivism. His conception of human na-
ture was indeed that of a student of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century moralists: men,
in his view, were mainly irrational; La Roche-
foucauld had been right in saying that the head
was the dupe of the heart and John Adams
correct in asserting that men's arguments were
mostly rationalizations. The task of the history
of ideas, according to Lovejoy, was akin to that
of psychopathology, which helps alleviate com-
plexes by making conscious their origins (1948,
p. 234).
It was probably the strange phenomenon of
anti-intellectualism among intellectuals, ex-
hibited in such writers as Henri Bergson and
Georges Sorel, that led Lovejoy and his col-
laborator George Boas to probe the varieties of
"primitivism" in their book Primitivism and Re-
lated Ideas in Antiquity (1933). Cultural primi-
tivism articulated "the discontent of the civilized
with civilization" and could take "soft" or "hard"
forms, a longing either for the idyllic or the
harsh. Tracing the protean meanings of the
"state of nature," Lovejoy noted the way all
left-wing movements included among their ideo-
logical ingredients a combination of such long-
ings—whether for the propertyless, stateless,
spouseless, sinless, machineless states of na-
ture, and, in a case like Bernard Shaw's, for a
vegetarian overcoming an estrangement from
animals.
Lovejoy died on December 30, 1962, after
stoically enduring several years of total blind-
ness, during which he continued to work with a
graduate assistant in preparing his last books.
The next decade saw a widespread recrudescence
of various forms of primitivism in the New
Leftist ideologies.
Convinced that the progress of philosophy
depended on cooperative discussion, Lovejoy
during his life engaged in some notable debates.
A literary controversy with the Harvard human-
ist Irving Babbitt on the meaning of "roman-
ticism" in 1920-1922 led Lovejoy to argue in
behalf of the romantics that "there can be im-
468 LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O.
moderation even in the preaching of restraint;
. . . [in] the contrary error of an apotheosis of
inhibition." Against behaviorism, highly fash-
ionable in the mid-1920s, Lovejoy directed his
"paradox of the thinking behaviorist." He de-
bated logical positivism with Rudolf Carnap at
the 1935 Baltimore meeting of the American
Philosophical Association and critically ana-
lyzed historical relativism when that doctrine
was becoming influential in the latter 1930s.
After World War n he parted company with
the A.A.U.P., for he had concluded by 1949 that
confirmed communists, as enemies of academic
freedom, had no right to membership in the
academic community. He felt that the A.A.U.P.
had been caught up by the "trick phrase" of
"guilt by association" into failing to think
through the significance of allegiance to the
Communist party. For Communist party mem-
bers, Lovejoy reiterated in 1952, "are collaborat-
ing with an organization which demonstrably
seeks to destroy academic freedom wherever it
can, and has already succeeded in doing so
throughout a large part of the civilized world;
and that such collaboration is an act of dis-
loyalty to the first and fundamental obligation
of the scholar's profession" (1952, p. 88).
A lifelong student of all climates of opinion,
winds of doctrine, slogans, and ideologies,
Lovejoy tried as a scholar to maintain a cool,
critical detachment from all. He did not believe
a scholar should join a trade union or be a
partisan activist or office seeker, for he felt that
any such affiliation would adversely affect the
impartial analysis that was the duty of the
scholar and scientist. He argued this standpoint
vigorously in the pages of professional journals.
When in 1933 he delivered the lectures that
became The Great Chain of Being, the audience
dwindled to a handful; logical positivism was
becoming the fashion, and even historians in that
Marxist era were indifferent. His book became
recognized as a classic only after World War n.
His dualistic realism, rejected as "meaningless"
by positivists in the 1930s, also returned like-
wise after World War n in the writings, for ex-
ample, of Karl Popper on scientific method and
the interpretation of theories. Arthur E. Murphy
called Lovejoy "the Edmund Burke of the ep-
istemological revolution" (1931); yet Lovejoy
thought of himself as more like David Hume,
unswervingly loyal to the understanding and
determined not to discard the hard-earned epis-
temology of the plain man unless the evidence
was convincing. In 1976 the logician Jaakko
Hintikka characterized Lovejoy's The Great
Chain of Being as "the most influential single
work in the history of ideas in the United States
during the last half century." In philosophy,
history, and social theory, Lovejoy was probably
the least ideological of American thinkers. That
is why his work, though never acquiring a vogue
like that enjoyed by some contemporaries, may
prove to be more enduring. It embodied, as did
Lovejoy in his personality, the principle of in-
tegrity in American scholarship.
LEWIS S. FEUER
WORKS BY LOVEJOY
1913 The Practical Tendencies in Bergsonism. Inter-
national Journal of Ethics 23:253-275, 419-443.
1917 HART, ALBERT BUSHNELL; and LOVEJOY, AR-
THUR O. (editors) Handbook on the War for Public
Speakers. Washington: National Security League.
1927 The Meanings of "Emergence" and Its Modes.
Pages 20-33 in International Congress of Philos-
ophy, Sixth, Proceedings. Edited by E. S. Brightman.
New York: Longmans Green.
(1930a) 1960 The Revolt Against Dualism. 2d ed.
LaSalle, 111.: Open Court. —> Paul Carus lecture
series.
1930b A Temporalistic Realism. Volume 2, pages 85-
104 in G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague (editors),
Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal State-
ments. New York: Macmillan.
(1933) 1965 LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O.; and BOAS, GEORGE
Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity. New
York: Octagon .
(1936) 1961 The Great Chain of Being: A Study of
the History of an Idea. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press.
(1948) 1960 Essays in the History of Ideas. New
York: Capricorn.
1952 On a Supposed Resurgence of Vicious Intellec-
tualism. Journal of Philosophy 49:85-89.
1961a The Reason, the Understanding, and Time. Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins.
1961Z? Reflections on Human Nature. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins.
1963 Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arthur O. Lovejoy at Seventy-five: Reason at Work
1948 Journal of the History of Ideas 9:403-446.
—» Includes the following five articles: George Boas,
"A. O. Lovejoy as Historian of Philosophy," pp. 404—
411; Maurice Mandelbaum, "Arthur O. Lovejoy and
the History of Historiography," pp. 412-423; Wil-
liam Pepperell Montague, "My Friend Lovejoy," pp.
424-427; Marjorie Nicolson, "A. O. Lovejoy as
Teacher," pp. 428-438; Theodore Spencer, "Review:
Lovejoy's Essays in the History of Ideas," pp. 439—
446.
BARNES, HARRY ELMER; and BECKER, HOWARD (1938)
1961 Social Thought From Lore to Science. Vol. 1.
3d ed. New York: Dover.
BECK, LEWIS WHITE 1973 Lovejoy as a Critic of
Kant. Journal of the History of Ideas 33:471-484.
BOAS, GEORGE 1960 Portrait: A. O. Lovejoy, Reason-
in-Action. American Scholar 29:535-542.
BOAS, GEORGE 1963 Memorial Minutes: Arthur On-

. cken Lovejoy, 1873-1962. American Philosophical
* Association, Proceedings and Addresses 36:116-117.
BYNUM7 WILLIAM F. 1975 The Great Chain of Being
After Forty Years: An Appraisal. History of Science
13:1-28.
COLLINSON, JOHN (compiler) (1948) 1960 Bibliog-
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EDELSTEIN, LUDWIG 1963 In Memory of A. O. Love-
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ELLIOTT, ORRIN LESLIE 1937 Stanford University:
The First Twenty-five Years. Stanford Univ. Press.
FEUER, LEWIS S. 1977 Arthur O. Lovejoy. American
Scholar 46 -.358-366.
HINTIKKA, JAAKKO 1976 Gaps in The Great Chain of
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HOFSTADTER, RlCHARD; and METZGER, WALTER P.
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METZGER, WALTER P. 1961 The First Investigation.
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MOHR, JAMES C. 1970 Academic Turmoil and Public
Opinion: The Ross Case at Stanford. Pacific His-
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MORRIS, CHARLES W. (1932) 1950 Six Theories of
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MURPHY, ARTHUR E. 1931 Mr. Lovejoy's Counter-
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WIENER, PHILIP P. (1953) 1968 Lovejoy's Role in
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WIENER, PHILIP P. 1973 Towards Commemorating
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An Intellectual Biography. Ph.D. dissertation, The
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LURIA, A. R.
Alexander R. Luria (1902-1977) was born
in the provincial Russian commercial center of
Kazan. His father, Roman A. Luria, was a phy-
sician with a strong interest in problems of
LURIA, A. R. 469
psychosomatic medicine. Before the revolution
of 1917 the Luria family was precluded, by vir-
tue of its Jewish origins, from moving to St.
Petersburg, where the elder Luria had been in-
vited to a prestigious medical institute. After the
revolution both elder and younger Luria moved
to Moscow, each in turn taking up a career in
medicine. But medicine was not Alexander
Luria's first passion. Despite his father's judg-
ments, he was influenced by current enthusi-
asms to take up a career closer to the affairs of
men as he had experienced them.
When Luria entered the University of Kazan,
the institution was in turmoil produced by the
advent of Soviet authority and its need to recon-
ceptualize higher education in a new Commu-
nist society. Classes were held irregularly; pro-
fessors (especially in the humanities and social
sciences) had to reconstruct their courses, dis-
carding a classical education for an unknown,
but assuredly radical, future. Many students
passed on the strength of their instructors' ac-
tivism; standards were uncertain. But the chaos
also encompassed great energy. A serious stu-
dent with determination could fashion his own
education and construct his own career.
The education that Luria constructed was
heavily tilted toward that amorphous set of
topics in the social and biological sciences that
spanned the discipline now defined as psychol-
ogy. He was strongly impressed by two seem-
ingly contradictory schools of thought. First, he
endorsed the objective methods of study that
were just appearing in the writings of Vladimir
M. Bekhterev and Ivan P. Pavlov in Russia, Wil-
helm Wundt in Germany, and Edward L.
Thorndike in the United States. Yet much of the
objective psychological research he encountered
seemed arid and devoid of the complex, emo-
tion-ridden, highly organized behaviors that
make people exciting objects of analysis. Read-
ing Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, he was
struck by the possibilities of psychoanalysis as a
link between documentary accounts of living
individuals and the generalizing, law-seeking
goals of experimental, natural sciences. What
science needed was an objective reale psychol-
ogie (a term he borrowed from the German ro-
mantics) that submitted Freudian dynamic
mechanisms to experimental analysis. Inspired
by this goal, he and several fellow students
founded the Kazan Psychoanalytic Circle. As a
student he conducted research using modified
psychoanalytic techniques, combining them with
reaction time measures and indices of physical
 470 LURIA, A. R.
fatigue as he sought the synthesizing technique
to support his early vision.
Only one qf these early works on "objective,
dynamic, reale psychologic" has been translated
into English (1978), but this line of research
was the basis for the first two-thirds of Luria's
first work in English, The Nature of Human
Conflicts (1932). The central idea of the book
is extremely simple. Human emotions are diffi-
cult to study in the laboratory for two reasons.
First, real emotions cannot be simulated by such
artificial events as firing a gun behind some-
one's head. These evoke only phasic excitation,
not the tonic motivation that organizes actual
behavior for hours, days, and months. Second,
emotions should not be studied directly, as psy-
chological phenomena, but rather through their
effects on ongoing, voluntarily controlled be-
havior—in the way that emotions affect behavior
outside of the laboratory.
To overcome the difficulty of such empirical
study, Luria developed first a laboratory tech-
nique designed to trace the influence of emo-
tions on voluntary behavior which he called the
"combined motor method." The procedure
started with a simple voluntary response on the
part of the subject—squeezing a pneumatic rub-
ber bulb—to a signal from the experimenter.
When this response to a simple command
("squeeze") was stabilized, more interesting ver-
bal stimuli were introduced, and the subject was
required to free associate while continuing to
respond to each stimulus by squeezing the bulb.
Luria's intent was to determine the way in
which emotion aroused by the verbal stimulus
disrupted the smooth flow of the voluntary re-
sponse.
On the basis of this technique, Luria went on
to develop laboratory models of real-life con-
flict situations. When educational authorities at
Moscow University decided to purge the student
body of those whose poor academic work or
whose family backgrounds disqualified them,
Luria and his colleagues conducted their re-
search by taking students who were on line
awaiting interrogation and plying them with
verbal stimuli whose emotion-inducing effects
seemed certain; "examination," "expelled,"
"purge." Later, the same technique was used
with criminals who were to be questioned by the
district attorney. These studies amply illustrated
the objective reale psychologic that would be
one of Luria's unique contributions to psy-
chology.
Aside from its intrinsic value, the third part
of The Nature of Human Conflicts is especially
interesting in presenting the earliest formula-
tion in English of the concerns that would domi-
nate the remainder of Luria's scientific career:
the role of speech in the development and orga-
nization of mental processes; the development
of intellect; mental retardation; the brain cor-
relates of behavior; and even the cultural his-
tory of mind. In retrospect it is clear that Luria
here was introducing the American reader to
basic concepts brought into psychology by
Luria's mentor and colleague, Lev Vygotsky.
Beginning in 1924, Vygotsky, Luria, and Alexei
N. Leont'ev had set about to reconstruct psy-
chology on a far broader scale than Luria's ef-
forts to combine laboratory and real-life psy-
chology. Vygotsky's unique contribution was to
set psychology in a historical and cultural
framework. Psychological processes ordinarily
thought of as special "mental" functions were
treated as complex forms of activity, the struc-
ture of which is provided by the structure of
one's social milieu, which in turn has been
shaped by the social history of one's culture.
The psychologist's task became the study of
complex functional systems constrained on the
one hand by biology and on the other by
society.
In the early 1930s the cultural and historical
context of psychological activity was the object
of Luria's research in two expeditions to central
Asia, where traditional pastoral culture was be-
ing transformed by massive collectivization,
literacy campaigns, and formal schooling.
Luria's reports of a qualitative shift in psycho-
logical functioning as a result of the cultural
shifts that the peasants were undergoing were
consistent with Vygotsky's theory and seemed to
justify the Soviet government's program of pro-
viding the material basis for modernization in
its outlying areas. But critics emphasized the
other side of the coin: Luria and Vygotsky were
severely criticized as Great Russian chauvinists
who had denigrated the status of national mi-
norities. A small volume describing some of this
research was published in Russian in 1974 and
translated into English in 1976.
The years immediately following Vygotsky's
death in 1934 were especially difficult for Luria.
Partly as a result of the furor over the work in
central Asia, partly because of strong reaction
against psychological testing in general, and
partly because of repressive measures associ-
ated with the "cult of personality," Luria's work
veered in a number of unexpected directions.
 LYND, ROBERT S. AND HELEN MERRELL 471
For a while he worked at the Medico-Genetic
Institute in Moscow, where he conducted pio-
neering studies with identical and fraternal
twins in an effort to disentangle natural and
culturally shaped psychological processes as
they interact over the course of human on-
togeny. When this line of work also ran into
political difficulties, Luria decided to complete
his medical training (he had taken medical
school courses on and off since his university
days in Kazan). Upon completing medical
school in Moscow in 1936, he worked in the
neurological clinic.
These vicissitudes in his training prepared
Luria to make maximum use of the tragic op-
portunities for brain research that arose when
Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941.
For the next several years he worked in surgical
wards, improving methods for diagnosing and
restoring disrupted brain functions caused by
head wounds. This experience established his
reputation as a neuropsychologist.
In the late 1940s events again intervened,
and Luria turned from neuropsychology to the
study of developmental abnormalities associated
with mental retardation. This period coincided
with an era in Soviet medical and social sci-
ences when the use of Pavlovian neurophysio-
logical concepts was virtually demanded of all
researchers, and Luria's writings reflect the in-
fluence of this requirement. Fortunately, some
of Pavlov's speculations about the influence of
language on the structure of reflex processes in
human beings could be construed as similar to
Vygotsky's ideas about the mediated nature of
higher psychological processes. Luria found
enough similarity to permit him to pick up a
line of research that had been dormant for
many years.
In the late 1950s, the times again permitting,
Luria returned to the area of neuropsychology,
which remained his major concern until his
death in 1977.
MICHAEL COLE
WORKS BY LURIA
1932 The Nature of Human Conflicts. London: Live-
right. —> A paperback edition was published in
1976.
1959 LURIA, A. R.; and YUDOVICH, F. Y. Speech and
the Development of Mental Processes in the Child:
An Experimental Investigation. London: Staples.
1961 The Role in Speech in the Regulation of Normal
and Abnormal Behavior. Oxford: Pergamon; New
York: Liveright.
1963 Restoration of Function After Brain Injury. Ox-
ford: Pergamon; New York: Macmillan.
1966a Higher Cortical Functions in Man. New York:
Basic Books.
1966i> Human Brain and Psychological Processes.
New York: Harper.
1968 The Mind of a Mnemonist: A Little Book About
a Vast Memory. New York: Basic Books. —> A
paperback edition was published in 1976 by Con-
temporary Books.
1970 Traumatic Aphasia: Its Syndromes, Psychology,
and Treatment. The Hague: Mouton.
1972 The Man With a Shattered World: The History
of a Brain Wound. New York: Basic Books —> A
paperback edition was published in 1976 by Con-
temporary Books.
1973 The Working Brain: An Introduction to Neuro-
psychology. New York: Basic Books.
(1974) 1976 Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and
Social Foundations. Harvard Univ. Press. —> First
published in Russian.
1976 Basic Problems of Neurolinguistics. The Hague:
Mouton.
1978 The Early Writings of Alexander Luria. Soviet
Psychology 12:3-114.
LYND, ROBERT S. AND
HELEN MERRELL
Robert Staughton Lynd might be described as
the Sinclair Lewis of sociology. His books Mid-
dletown (Lynd & Lynd 1929) and Middletown
in Transition (Lynd & Lynd 1937) provide the
sociological flesh that makes Lewis' satiric clas-
sics, Babbitt and Main Street, comprehensible as
studies in the culture and mores of midwestern
America.
Lynd was born in New Albany, Indiana, on
September 26, 1892. His major research works,
undertaken and coauthored with his wife Helen
Merrell, were actually performed in Muncie,
Indiana, not far from his birthplace. His back-
ground was modest, but he graduated from
Princeton University in 1914, and from there
went on to earn a Bachelor of Divinity degree
at Union Theological Seminary in 1923. A doc-
torate from Columbia University was granted in
1931, after the publication and in recognition of
the first Middletown study. Until his retirement
in 1965, he was associated with Columbia. He
died on November 1, 1970.
Lynd's first major job was as managing editor
of Publisher's Weekly, the trade magazine of the
publishing industry. His next position was di-
rector of the small city project of the Institute
of Social and Religious Research, which directly,
albeit modestly, underwrote the Muncie re-
search. Middletown may be the first sociological
work to be distributed and promoted to the gen-
eral public as a trade book. According to Helen
Lynd, the book was displayed in bookstore win-
 472 LYND, ROBERT S. AND HELEN MERRELL
dows alongside the leading novels of the time.
The relationship between his sociology and the
quality of writing was at least partially due to
his vocational background in publishing, then a
rare training ground for a sociologist. Recalling
him at the time of his death in 1970, Seymour
Martin Lipset noted that Lynd not only "devoted
an enormous amount of time to his students,"
but that he was always available to help them
rewrite, edit and even restructure their papers.
His publishing experience clearly remained with
Lynd as pedogogue and as researcher.
Today, Lynd would probably be described as
an anthropologist of complex organizations.
Certainly his work defies easy labeling. Not
since Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in
America (1835) have we had such a careful
analysis of the daily life of America; middle
America in this case. The book subjects one
Indiana community to the same kind of intense
scrutiny that de Tocqueville gave the entire
United States. Middletown illumined, for a gen-
eration of social science, the essence of the
American way of life. Probably no other single
work published between World War I and World
War ii so precisely and devastatingly delineated
what the nation had become. Middletown was
described by H. L. Mencken as "one of the
richest and most valuable documents ever con-
cocted by an American sociologist" (1929, pp.
379-381); and by Stuart Chase as "an unparal-
leled work: nothing like it has ever been at-
tempted; no such knowledge of how the average
American community works and plays has ever
been packed within the covers of one book"
(1929, p. 164).
Middletown makes little conscious effort to
posit the centrality of one variable or factor over
another. It is divided into six large sections.
The first, on the economy, documents "Getting
a Living." The second and third sections are
concerned with family life, linking problems of
housing, child rearing, food, clothing, and
schooling. The fourth, and probably the most
innovative section, is on leisure. This material
includes early mass communication research. It
analyzes the leisure activities of middle Amer-
icans in pictures and periodicals, selecting and
viewing, precisely in terms of mass communica-
tion. The fifth section concerns religious obser-
vance and practices, analyzing varieties of
Protestant worship, but also, showing how or-
ganizations such as the YMCA (Young Men's
Christian Association) link religion to com-
munity. The notion of community organizes the
final section, showing how community is related
to the machinery of government. The very frag-
mentation of community points out the insignifi-
cance of bureaucracy in the social life of Middle-
town. These last sections clearly owe much to
Lynd's activities in the mid-1920s as a mission-
ary preacher in the oil fields of Montana.
The book took several years to produce. Rob-
ert Lynd lived in Middletown with his wife
Helen for one-and-a-half years; their assistants
lived there for an additional half year. Tables
imaginatively illustrate the book; and while
some of the data provide only a careful rework-
ing of state and national data, other tables con-
cern sources of disagreement between children
and their parents, and books borrowed in the
adult department of the public library. These
show an imaginative concern with intimate de-
tail rare in the annals of sociology up to that
time.
What gives added character to Middletown is
its historical specificity. The Lynds provide a
documentary accounting of the life of a town
at two selected periods: 1890 and 1924, rather
than attempting to do a detailed study of the
history of the intervening years. Such cross-
sectional analysis provides a sensitive apprecia-
tion of the cultural tension between past and
present generations. Middletown is in retrospect
best seen as an analysis of the secularization
process in American society: a veritable model
of why modernization occurs and how social
change takes place in an advanced industrial
society.
Middletown in Transition is another path-
breaking effort in a tradition of reevaluating and
reanalyzing data. It examines what happened
in the decade between 1924 and 1935. The
Lynds took seriously critiques of their earlier
work. Their follow-up study, while lacking some
of the historical possibilities of the earlier effort,
builds upon that earlier work and attempts to
apply techniques that had evolved in social sci-
ence in the intervening decade in sociological
history. As John Madge (1962, p. 149) sagaciously
noted: "If Middletown had changed it is also
necessary to substantiate the claim . . . that
there had been a profound development in the
thinking of the Lynds."
Not only did the Lynds return to study the
same town; doing so they clearly changed their
own estimates of what was important. The ma-
chinery of government, for example, was no
longer subsumed under community activities,
nor was religion given a whole section. It was
 LYND, ROBERT S. AND HELEN MERRELL
reduced to a chapter. This reflected changing
mores of American society: namely, progress in
the secularization process that the Lynds dis-
cussed at the end of Middletown, and also a
sense of new problems emerging in the depres-
sion of the 1930s. The world of Sinclair Lewis'
early novels had broken down. Class bias gave
way to class antagonisms, stating the facts
yielded to making clear the sources of power.
While Middletown's citizenry continued to retain
the values by which it lived, the impact of eco-
nomic chaos at home, and fascism and social-
ism abroad, compelled Middletown to face both
ways. Trade unionism became acceptable; re-
luctant adaptation to the new world became
inevitable. If the follow-up study ends on a note
of uncertainty, taken together the Middletown
studies remain a most significant record of this
period in American social life. The Lynds's
ability to weave ethnography, stratification, and
quantitative data into a meaningful whole has
rarely been equalled in sociological literature.
One might wonder if their open-ended choice
of methodologies makes such broad-ranging
work currently suspect. There is strong evidence
that Lynd himself had serious questions about
how generalizable such field researches actually
are.
In Knowledge for What? (1939), a book sub-
titled: The Place of Social Science in American
Culture, Lynd attempted to come to terms, indi-
rectly at least, with a new methodological em-
phasis in American sociology. He argued that
scholars have become technicians who would
lecture on navigation while the ship goes down.
This book has a bitter tone; it reveals pessimism
that even if the new methodological sociologists
should take the wheel, they would not really
know how to steer a meaningful course. It is not
that Lynd thought social scientists should go in
for "pretentious soothsaying," still he recognized
that a sense of the fragility of the future should
not result in the sorts of inhibitions that make
broad-ranging social science research unpalata-
ble.
Lynd clearly was a sociological pragmatist,
urging a careful middle course between what
C. Wright Mills was later to call "abstract em-
piricism" and "grand theory." This approach was
underwritten by a strong Columbia tendency to
emphasize culture over society—a tendency that
Lynd very much shared. From John Dewey in
philosophy to Franz Boas and Ruth Benedict in
anthropology, the emphasis was on a cultural
framework, subsumed under society, economy,
473
and the polity. In a special way, Lynd was like
a swan in a department where he seemed to be
increasingly perceived, by some at least, as an
ugly duckling. It was his philosophical anthro-
pology, rather than a lack of statistical method-
ology, that ultimately frustrated Lynd and led
him to shift his priorities from intellectual pur-
suits to departmental matters.
Lynd was involved in bringing the best
scholars to the sociology department of Colum-
bia, even when he doubted the efficacy of the
methods used. The methodological wing repre-
sented by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the Bureau of
Applied Social Research had Lynd's unwaver-
ing support. Although they were intellectually
on different wave lengths, Lazarsfeld and Lynd
remained close personal friends. Lazarsfeld
never forgot the role of Lynd in securing him a
position at Columbia in 1940, nor the place of
the Middletown study in his own community re-
search efforts of the 1930s (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld,
& Zeisel 1933). Lynd, for his part, made fre-
quent reference to Lazarsfeld's study of the
Austrian village of Marienthal in Middletown in
Transition (Lynd & Lynd 1937, pp. 146, 179,
201, 254-255, 385). Lynd also shared with Rob-
ert K. Merton a concern for the middle range of
social research. He was probably intellectually
closer to Merton than to anyone else among the
senior staff in the department of Columbia, and
they worked closely on decision-making levels
in the department. Lynd was also largely instru-
mental in bringing Mills to Columbia from the
University of Maryland. He was central in a
postwar crop of social scientists, headed by
Lipset, who in many ways continued the dia-
logue about culture and democracy in new
forms and in a postwar crisis period. Lynd, how-
ever, broke his silence between 1939 and 1956
long enough to write an extremely provocative,
even crucial, critique (1956) of Mills's Power
Elite (1956).
When one takes into account the paucity of
Lynd's writings between Knowledge for What?
in 1939 and his review essay on Mills in The
Nation in 1956, the importance of the critique
becomes self-evident. Lynd had been preoccu-
pied with the development of a theory of power
and democracy ever since Middletown. For
Lynd, power as a social resource was absolutely
necessary for the operation of society. Like
physical energy, power could be harnessed for
human welfare or corrupted by misuse. The de-
velopment of democratic goals and the enhance-
ment of a pluralistic national culture is, there-
 474 LYND, ROBERT S. AND HELEN MERRELL
fore, a responsibility of any sociological critique
of power. Jeffersonian emphasis on democratic
life is precisely the most outrageous hypothesis
contained in Knowledge for What? Lynd
shared with Mills a concern for the proper use
and applications of power which he too had
found much abused by elite groups. Yet he
chides Mills for failing to undertake an analysis
of power that extends its meaning for democ-
racy. According to Lynd, the chief task for the
observer of power is developing a theory of
power for a given society. But according to
Lynd, this was not what Mills aimed at. He was
sorely out of sympathy with Mills's lack of com-
mitment to a liberal democratic ethos and conse-
quently finds that his ambiguous "expose" lacks
concreteness with relation to America as well as
any sense of meaningful alternatives. Lynd also
found elite analysis in social science limited,
if not distasteful, because it obscured or ignored
the basic characteristics of a given social sys-
tem. It bred a superficial analysis that amounted
to a way out of dealing with capitalism, social-
ism, and class structure. In this sense, Lipset
picked up on this sense of Lynd's frustration,
and his The First New Nation (1963) in some
sense proceeded along the lines indicated by
Lynd in his critique of Mills.
It would be unfair to think of Lynd's contribu-
tion as residing solely in the work of his stu-
dents. Lynd was close to present-day Marxist
analysis of American society; certainly his
claims that Mills overlooked important evidence
linking present-day American capitalism and
the capitalism of the nineteenth century struck
that note. Lynd indicates that Mills did not sys-
tematically analyze the American economy, and
that by focusing on great changes, Mills failed
to account for property as a power base linking
the centuries. For Lynd, social science needed to
understand the chief characteristics of the
American system and not a given institution
within the social order. Finally, Lynd breaks
with Mills by assuming that the capitalist char-
acter of the United States defines the quality of
society in the United States from the outset.
By all reports, Lynd was fair and tough,
deeply committed to the idea of graduate educa-
tion and to sociology itself as a cultural trans-
mission belt. He also had a lifelong commitment
to the Columbia style of education as a civiliz-
ing process, civilization itself being measured by
its advanced educational institutions. He was a
plebeian comfortable in a world of patricians.
To his lasting credit, the values he espoused and
lived by remained consistent and consonant. He
linked the sociological tradition and the prob-
lems of social science with the democratic cul-
ture and the larger problems of society.
Helen Merrell Lynd, two years his junior and
his co-worker, carved out a career in many dis-
ciplines. She was born on St. Patrick's Day in
1894. Her parents were devoutly religious, with
that element of social justice characteristic of
many midwestern Congregationalists. She grad-
uated from Wellesley College in 1917, where
the strongest single influence was Mary S. Case
who introduced her to philosophy, particularly
Hegel, and according to her colleague at Sarah
Lawrence, Bert J. Loewenberg, "gave her an
abiding zest for both" (1965, p. vi). She mar-
ried Lynd in 1921, taught for many years at
Sarah Lawrence College, and has remained in
the New York City area since her retirement in
1965. If the word polymath, someone learned
in many fields, has any meaning, it certainly
applies to her. Not only is she coauthor of the
famed Middletown series, which alone would
make her a figure to contend with in sociology,
but she can also claim a place in the disciplines
of history, psychology, and philosophy. She was
entirely at home with the poetry of Shelley,
the plays of Shaw, and the novels of Dostoevsky.
She was versed in the technical literature of an
amazing variety of fields—from the philosophy
of science to experimental psychology. Perhaps
this breadth was essential to a work like Middle-
town, which in its very nature transcended
many disciplines and many imageries.
After the completion of Middletown in Tran-
sition, Helen Lynd carved a path of her own,
starting with her remarkable book England in
the Eighteen-eighties (1945), a work in social
history done initially as a doctoral thesis under
the supervision of the dean of history at Colum-
bia, Carleton J. H. Hayes. The impact of Middle-
town showed in the organization of England in
the Eighte en-eighties. It is divided into "Material
Environment," "Environment of Ideas," "Politi-
cal Parties," "Organized Labor," "Religious Ed-
ucation," and "Organization for Change." There
is the same dialectical tension between the old
and the new; the discrepancy between material
abundance and satisfaction of human wants on
the one hand, and the continued poverty of the
masses on the other. Helen Lynd understood
England in the 1880s as being involved with
problems of social organization compatible with
 LYND, ROBERT S. AND HELEN MERRELL
democratic individualism, a problem in England
then and in the United States fifty years later.
Helen Lynd's style is wide-ranging, with a
transparent clarity that disguises the seriousness
of her efforts. She worked out the essential ten-
sion between freedom and authority in a series
of discussions of party life: namely, the tension
between conservatives and liberals, between or-
ganized labor and what might be described as
agitators and reformers, and between the High
Church and Methodist Quakers and other non-
conformists, between the crude barbarism of the
private schools and the tragedy of lower-class
education, what were called the ragged schools
for the ragged classes. The work is informed by
a strong sense of the social contradictions in
British society; a series of unresolved conflicts
looked at from a decade involving the principal
political actors, writers, and playwrights of the
time, who illuminated the central themes of
freedom and authority.
While this work seems remote from her classic
volume a decade later, On Shame and the
Search for Identity (1958), in a way it reveals
the same sense of dialectical tension in con-
crete settings. Even in discussing such psy-
chological categories as shame and guilt, the
nature of language, and clues to identity, she
retained a lively sense of the concrete, con-
stantly illustrating her theme with wide-ranging
references to the scientific and literary leaders
of the time. It remained characteristic of Helen
Lynd that she referred to work as wide-
ranging as that of C. P. Snow, Norbert Wiener,
and Alfred Korzybski, all with a gracious weav-
ing of information and ideas that in lesser
hands could easily have fallen apart. This book
shares with her earlier work a strong democratic
impulse. The authority of the earlier work be-
came a search and realization of identity. Helen
Lynd distinguishes between guilt, which is a
response to standards that have been internal-
ized, and shame, which is a response to criticism
or ridicule by others. Guilt, she argues, is cen-
trally a result of a transgression, a crime, a vio-
lation of a specific taboo or legal code by a
definite voluntary act, whereas shame is linked
to uncovering, to exposure, to wounding, to ex-
periences of expose, and to peculiarly sensitive
and vulnerable aspects of the self.
This work is far more than a purely psycho-
logical account of pleasure and pain, and re-
ward and punishment. It involves a general
theory of personality development, linked to the
475
evolution of historical thought. The work of
Georg Simmel and Dorothy Lee plays a large part.
Helen Lynd appreciated the extent to which con-
cepts of psychological analysis are linked to
mechanisms of social control intended to mini-
mize conflict. But whether such reduction of
conflict is good is warranted not by personality
adjustment but by historical tendencies. This
made Lynd's work quite different from conven-
tional neo-Freudian writings of the 1950s. Her
approach to questions of: "Who am I?; Where
do I belong?" was strongly linked to sociology
and history. Showing how such questions are
formulated in ancient, medieval, and modern
times, she observed that notions such as pride
or shame are linked to general theories of re-
ligion, theology, and ideology. For Lynd, it is not
the sin of pride but the capacity of pride to
transcend shame, and therefore, to reach a new
level of identity or even lucidity, that becomes
central in raising consciousness. Unfortunately,
she provided few clues as to how the guilt axis
and the shame axis can be resolved by creating
a pride-humility axis. Still, because at the time
the social sciences emphasized intense social
control and negative reaction to deviance, On
Shame and the Search for Identity is more than
a product of a generation in itself. It is also part
of Helen Lynd's long-standing commitment to
the idea that individual freedom is integrally
linked to social democracy.
Critical acclaim for On Shame and the Search
for Identity was widespread. Psychiatrists felt
her work to be of seminal importance. Franz
Alexander noted that "Mrs. Lynd's study goes
further in depth and in comprehensiveness than
any other contemporary writing on the subject.
It is a sensitive, highly suggestive discourse on
that most human of all faculties—reflection of
the self on the self" (1958, p. 7). And Theodor
Reik added that "her perceptiveness and sensi-
tiveness, especially felt in her differentiation of
guilt and shame, as well as her intellectual sin-
cerity and the originality of her observation,
made her book a remarkable work" (1958,
p. 19). He might have added doubly so, since
Helen Lynd was trained in history, did a pio-
neering work in sociology, and taught in philos-
ophy. Helen Lynd, like Robert Lynd, revealed
that powerful element of free-thinking autodi-
dacticism that was a family trademark.
A number of her important occasional writ-
ings were collected in Toward Discovery (1965b).
In his introductory essay, Bert J. Loewenberg
 476 LYND, ROBERT S. AND HELEN MERRELL
properly notes that "Helen Lynd is concerned
with the context of discovery; the environment
of ideas; education in contemporary society; and
the nature of historical objectivities" (1965, p. vi).
He also understands that ultimately, for Lynd,
discovery was really a way of growth as well
as a technique of inquiry, and that to dis-
cover in a true sense also involves a diversity of
methods. In this collection of papers all of these
themes are amply illustrated.
In the 1950s, Helen Merrell Lynd achieved
political notoriety by becoming courageously in-
volved in the response to McCarthyism within
university life. Her essay "Truth at the Univer-
sity of Washington" (1949) took to task uni-
versity administration and faculty supporters.
Various tenured professors were found to be
competent scholars, objective teachers without
academic fault, but members of the Communist
party and hence incapable of objectivity. Such
issues deeply divided the academic community.
Helen Lynd was always on the side of the
victims of McCarthyism; even her occasional
papers showed the same tension between free-
dom and authority, identity and guilt. Her writ-
ings went far beyond placid formalism. During
a period when nearly any defense of Communist
party members was tantamount to inviting dis-
aster, she was able to write:
Freedom and truth must be sought in the world we
live in, not in a vacuum. With the worst that any-
one can say about the Communist Party, I cannot
discover any reading of this evidence about what
has happened at the University of Washington that
supports the belief that there can be more dicta-
torial power over teachers in the United States by
the Communist Party than by Boards of Regents;
or that the search for truth is more threatened by
Communists than by arbitrary action of Boards of
Regents and Canwell Committees. I cannot discover
any readings of this evidence which supports the
belief that purging Communists is in the interests
of independent teaching, or of democracy. ([1949]
1965, p. 135)
If Robert Lynd had a clear impact on his in-
tellectual progeny, Helen Lynd had an equally
powerful impact on familial progeny. They had
two children, Andrea and Staughton. The latter
in particular, as evidenced through his own
writings in history and social science, and his
involvement in everything from the anti-Vietnam
War movement to legal advocacy of organized
labor in the midwest, exhibits a fusion of radical
ideas and social action. Helen Lynd's final state-
ment to the graduating class at Sarah Law-
rence in 1964, stands a fit epithet to her careers
and writing and those of her husband: "So we
cross the bridge into a new country. We go
alone. But we take with us some knowledge of
what it means to probe deeply into new worlds
of learning and to glimpse all that lies beyond
and is yet unexplored. And we take with us the
gaiety, the delight, the sustenance of having
known each other here—a knowing that will
continue with us. We go in expectation of what
may lie ahead" (1965a, p. 275).
IRVING Louis HOROWITZ
BIBLIOGRAPHY
WORKS BY ROBERT S. LYND
1939 Knowledge for What?: The Place of Social Sci-
ence in American Culture. Princeton Univ. Press.
—» A paperback edition was published in 1969.
1956 Power in the United States. The Nation 182:408-
411.
WORKS BY HELEN MERRELL LYND
1945 England in the Eighteen-eighties: Toward a So-
cial Basis for Freedom. New York and London: Ox-
ford Univ. Press.
(1949) 1965 Truth at the University of Washington.
Pages 125-138 in Toward Discovery. Bronxville,
N.Y.: Sarah Lawrence College.
1958 On Shame and the Search for Identity. New
York: Harcourt. —» A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1970.
1965a Some Requirements of Learning. Pages 269-
275 in Toward Discovery. Bronxville, N.Y.: Sarah
Lawrence College.
19651? Toward Discovery. Bronxville, N.Y.: Sarah Law-
rence College.
WORKS BY ROBERT S. AND HELEN MERRELL LYND
(1929) 1930 Middletown: A Study in Contemporary
American Culture. New York: Harcourt. -» A
paperback edition was published in 1959.
1937 Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural
Conflicts. New York: Harcourt. —> A paperback
edition was published in 1963.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALEXANDER, FRANZ 1958 Who, Where, What, and
Why. The New York Times Book Review Mar. 30:7,
22. —» Book review of Helen Merrell Lynd 1958.
CHASE, STUART 1929 Book Review of Middletown.
The Nation 128, no. 3318:164 only.
JAHODA, MARIE; LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and ZEISEL,
HANS (1933) 1971 Marienthal: The Sociogra-
phy of an Unemployed Community. Chicago: Al-
dine. —> First published as Die Arbeitslosen von
Marienthal. The 1971 edition contains a new fore-
word by Lazarsfeld and an afterword by Zeisel en-
titled "Toward a History of Sociography."
LIPSET, SEYMOUR M. 1963 The First New Nation.
New York: Basic Books.
LOEWENBURG, BERT J. 1965 Curved and Rendered
by Reason. Introduction in Helen Merrell Lynd,
Toward Discovery. Bronxville, N.Y.: Sarah Law-
rence College.
MADGE, JOHN H. 1962 Life in a Small Town. Pages
126-161 in The Origins of Scientific Sociology.
New York: Free Press.
 LYND, ROBERT S. AND HELEN MERRELL 477

MENCKEN, H. L. 1929 Book Review of Middletown.
American Mercury 16, no. 63:379-381.
MILLS, C. WRIGHT 1956 The Power Elite. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press.
REIK, THEODOR 1958 Awareness of the Self. Satur-
day Review of Literature 41:19 only. —> Book re-
view of Helen Merrell Lynd 1958.
TOCQUEVILLE, ALEXIS DE (1835) 1945 Democracy in
America. 2 vols. Translated by Henry Reeve, re-
vised by Francis Bowen, and edited by Phillips
Bradley. New York: Knopf. —> First published in
French. A new edition, translated by George Law-
rence, edited by J. P. Mayer, and with an introduc-
tion by Max Lerner, was published by Harper in
1966. Paperback editions were published in 1961
by Vintage and Schocken.
 McDOUGAL, MYRES S.
Chronology. Myres Smith McDougal, the
founder of the New Haven school of jurispru-
dence, was born in 1906 in the farming com-
munity of Burtons, Mississippi. His father was
a country doctor and something of a local politi-
cal boss. McDougal's childhood blended close,
trusting family ties with prudent cautions
against the machinations of strangers, and
these early impressions seem to have become
tenets of McDougal's thought, in his emphasis
on the importance of stable relationships on
which one can rely, the human agency in politi-
cal organization, the continuous relevance of
power, and the practical importance of learning.
McDougal's father wanted him to enter state
politics and become a U.S. senator. After at-
tending local schools, McDougal studied classics
and then law at the University of Mississippi,
earning a B.A., M.A., and LL.B. After a brief stint
teaching Latin and Greek at Mississippi, he de-
voted his academic career entirely to law. As a
Rhodes scholar, he studied law at St. John's
College, Oxford, came under the influence of
W. S. Holdsworth, and received his B.C.L. in
1930. Though invited to teach at Oxford, he
elected to return to the United States to take his
doctorate (1931) at the Yale Law School.
McDougal arrived at Yale in 1930, trained in
a formal positivism that viewed law as a body
of rules and principles and that employed a
method of rudimentary, though often elegantly
expressed, syntactics not advanced yet to even
the crude and exaggerated empiricism of C. C.
Langdell's case method. Yale was then the cen-
ter of legal realism, a diversified jurisprudential
movement most of whose members sought to
annihilate positivism, expose rules as camou-
flage, and reveal law as no more than decisions
of human beings who responded, with varying
degrees of consciousness, to political, economic,
psychological, and even organic stimuli. Mc-
Dougal was converted to realism and published
prolificacy, with a convert's zeal and intimate
knowledge of the enemy's mind.
As the realists demolished the traditional
tools of the law, those who wished to rebuild
turned to the social sciences for new ones. Yale
became particularly hospitable to anthropolo-
gists and social psychologists. McDougal, who
returned there in 1934 as an associate pro-
fessor after three years at the University of
Illinois, came under the influence of the an-
thropologist Bronislaw Malinowski and, to a
lesser extent, the psychologist Edward S.
Robinson, and continued to read widely in the
social sciences and philosophy. By the late
1930s he had concluded that realist iconoclasm
was only prologue. Now that the inadequacies
of the traditional theories had been exposed, it
was necessary to create a jurisprudential sys-
tem appropriate to democracy and to facilitate
the performance of the intellectual tasks that
he believed lawyers would perform in the post-
war reconstruction of American and world
society.
In 1935 he became associated, quite for-
tuitously, with Harold D. Lasswell, and the two
began a close collaboration. McDougal was in-
strumental in bringing Lasswell to Yale, and
in 1943 they published "Legal Education and
479
480 McDOUGAL, MYRES S.
Public Policy," their first joint exposition. Lass-
well's insistence on contextuality, his wide-
ranging and creative use of methodology, his
psychoanalytic applications, and his refined
conception of power, combined with his prob-
lem-solving orientation, provided myriad points
for common interest and collaboration.
During World War n McDougal worked in
the departments of State and Justice and in the
Lend-Lease Administration, an experience that
gave him firsthand knowledge of the methods
of mobilization, manipulation, and control in
modern society. He was greatly influenced by
Oscar Cox, lawyer for Harry Hopkins. The Lend-
Lease experience rekindled, among other things,
his interest in international law, dormant since
he had studied with James Brierly at Oxford.
Thereafter, he devoted more and more time to
what he called the public order of the world
community.
McDougal was never the model of the retir-
ing scholar. At different times he was active in
politics at the state and national levels, and he
took keen interest in the power struggles that
often seem to be the raison d'etre of scholarly
organizations. He served as president of the
American Society of International Law and of
the Association of American Law Schools, was
active in the American Law Institute, and was
elected to the Institut de Droit International. He
was counsel in a major international arbitra-
tion, represented the United States at diplomatic
conferences, and advised corporations. Since
his retirement from Yale in 1975, he has visited
at other law schools and has continued to write
and practice law.
His relationship to his students was close,
usually dominating, always protective. He put
a tremendous premium on loyalty, giving it un-
stintingly to friends, colleagues, and students.
As a matter of course he expected it in return
and could be deeply puzzled and hurt when he
felt betrayed. He followed closely the careers
of many students who achieved high positions
in the United States and abroad. McDougal
married Francis Lee of Virginia in 1933.
Publications. McDougal's key areas have
been property law, jurisprudence, and interna-
tional law, but many of his monographs have
also made recognized contributions to consti-
tutional law and legal education. With the ex-
ception of his innovative property law casebook,
most of the work he did before his fifties was
monographic. His major collaborative treatises
in international law were all produced after that
period, and in his view represent the applica-
tion of his matured theory to major problems.
His oeuvre is enormous, a fact due as much to
his energy as to his capacity to attract gifted
younger scholars in collaborations on which his
intellectual imprint is always evident. He has
also been able to work simultaneously on sev-
eral projects, each with a separate team. This
influence has been further extended by the work
of many students who wrote under his strict
supervision in virtually all fields of law.
Many of his early international monographs
were events in themselves, prompting rebuttal
and often angry debate. His work on the law-
fulness of testing hydrogen bombs over the
Pacific, a detailed study of the basic traditional
policies governing the law of the oceans, was
immediately attacked. His theories on aggres-
sion and self-defense, now widely accepted,
occasioned angry debates at the American So-
ciety of International Law. Part of the excite-
ment and antagonism may have derived from
the issues he chose; he always wrote on topical
and explosively controversial subjects, for he
was concerned with the application of law to
current problems. Although he explored all
issues thoroughly, he always reached conclu-
sions about the lawfulness of contemporary acts
that many colleagues rejected. His methodology
stung some, for it focused not on rules and their
logical interrelations, but on claims and deci-
sions, the latter tested by their contribution to
all the public policies raised in that particular
instance. This was a distinctive approach, and
McDougal insisted that it be viewed not merely
as an alternative, but as the only meaningful
way of approaching law. He set out in detail
and with fairness the theories, methods, and
conclusions of others, but indicated with preci-
sion where he differed and why he believed they
were wrong.
Legal theory. McDougal called his jurispru-
dence "configurative" and "policy-oriented"; the
theory and its proponents are generally referred
to as the New Haven school. His theory of law
can best be appreciated by contrasting it with
the operational jurisprudence of most lawyers.
The latter define a "problem" as essentially a
dispute between parties. Analysis teases out the
legal issues, and answers are found by reference
to given rules of varying origin, applied through
logical derivation. Law in this traditional anal-
ysis is taken as a body of rules. The origin of
the rules, the political agitation that may estab-
lish, maintain, or change them, and the quality

of the rules as tested against other criteria are
"political" and not legal problems. McDougal,
by contrast, views law not as a body of rules
but as a process of making decisions about how
values—power, wealth, enlightenment, skill,
well-being, affection, respect, and rectitude—are
to be produced and distributed in the commu-
nity studied. A problem is a disparity between
goals and achievements. The function of the
lawyer, as advocate or decision-maker, is to in-
fluence the process in order to achieve desired
results; the scholar's function is to understand
and appraise this process in its totality.
Scholar and lawyer share a number of intel-
lectual tasks. Each must identify problems and
objectives, chart pertinent past decisions, and
determine their conditioning factors in order to
assess whether past trends approximated or de-
viated from goals or objectives. Both scholar
and lawyer must also assess likely future deci-
sions, assuming that they do not intervene.
According to some views, the advocate is dis-
tinct from the scholar in that he must clarify
or adopt goals and invent alternatives, but in
devising them he may not go beyond the inter-
ests of his clients. McDougal, however, requires
the most encompassing goal clarification of the
scholar, refusing to discharge him from the
civic obligations flowing from his potential or
actual "impact."
Thus, all who engage in these intellectual
operations must postulate and make known the
goals to which they are committed. McDougal's
goals are those of a public order of human dig-
nity, an order in which concern for realization
of individual potential is central, and one that
secures a production and distribution of values
sufficient for individual growth.
McDougal's emphasis on goal clarification
and the testing of past or prospective decisions
in terms of their contribution to goal realization
has led some commentators to call him a natu-
ralist, since this has been one of the classic
functions of natural law. McDougal, however,
rejects any natural or transempirical content
to law and specifically postulates the goals of
human dignity; he does not attempt to discover
or derive them. However, while he concedes
that his goal choices are the products of his past
and are basically existential, he believes that
they are part of the trend to enlightened de-
mands traceable to the pre-Socratics and that
they are widely demanded at the present time.
The goals and five intellectual tasks are a
central concern for McDougal. In developing
McDOUGAL, MYRES S. 481
methods for their performance, he has rejected
much of the inherited language and conceptual
apparatus of lawyers, redefining, in Kantian
fashion, the questions and concepts to be used,
and reaching deep into the social sciences for
appropriate tools. In performing these tasks, a
key focus is on decision, on choices about how
values are to be produced and distributed or
"shaped and shared" in a given community.
Values are things people want—"desired events"—
and for their analysis McDougal uses a de-
lineation developed largely by Lass well, which
seeks to identify desired events comprehensively
by using the eight categories of values men-
tioned above. To identify the component opera-
tions involved in making a decision, McDougal
and Lasswell have developed a sequential anal-
ysis of decision-making that yields seven "func-
tions": intelligence, promotion, prescription, in-
vocation, application, termination, and appraisal.
By using these and other concepts, Mc-
Dougal aims at improving the performance of
scholar and lawyer. To be useful, a system
must, he believes, be contextual—i.e., take ac-
count of all the features of the social process
of immediate concern, relating them to the
larger context of events. It must be problem
oriented, and, given its emphasis upon contex-
tuality, it must employ multiple method or in-
terdisciplinary skills. The framework of inquiry
for this endeavor is critical, for it must yield
realism, permit application to dissimilar situa-
tions, and be sufficiently general to meet the
requirement of contextuality, but at the same
time be economical enough to permit implemen-
tation. McDougal is distinctive, even among
sociologically oriented colleagues in jurispru-
dence, in insisting on detailed attention to social
and power processes.
Since the conventional study of formal or-
gans and branches of government never tests
whether authoritative bodies are actually effec-
tive, McDougal uses a functional model. It
identifies participants; perspectives (the value
demands, expectations, and identifications of
participants); situations of interaction; base
values or the bases of power upon which par-
ticipants draw; the strategies or modes by which
the bases are used; the outcomes or immediate
value allocations of the interactions observed;
and the longer term effects of the outcomes.
This model is used to study community process
(explained below). It is also cross-cut by value
analysis, which permits the observer to examine
in more detail the interactions and value dis-
 482 McDOUGAL, MYRES S.
OBSERVATIONAL
STANDPOINT
PROCESS
•— OF WORI D r ONSTITUTIVfc
WORLD
SOCIAL PROCESS CLAIM PROCESS

/ Claimants 1 . Decision-Makers
/*
ECOSOCIAL Arenas Officials
PROCESS
Strategies B. Int'l. Organiza-
tions
' COMMUNITY PROCESS C. NGO's
Intelligence
D. Private Associa-
Promotion
tions
Effective Prescription
E. Political Parties
Power Constitutive Invocation
F. Individuals
Process Process Application
2. Perspectives
Termination
1 . Participants 1. Participants Intelligenc e 3. Situations
Appraisal
2. Perspectives 2. Perspectives Promotion 4. Bases of Power
3. Situations — >. 3. Situations Prescriptio n A. Authority

y 4. Bases
5. Strategies
6. Outcomes
^_ 4. Bases
5. Strategies
6. Outcomes
Invocation
Applicatio n
Terminatio n
B. Control
5. Strategies
6. Outcomes
\ \ Appraisal 1
y\
\ \
V
Pow 3r
Wealth

PUBLIC ORDER
\ Enlightenment
Skill
CIVIC ORDER Well-being
Affection WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

Respect
Power
Rectitude
Wealth
Enlightenment
Skill
Well-being
Affection
It A
M
it •- Respec T
Rectitu de

Figure 1. The configurative map

tributions in specialized institutions of power,
wealth, respect, and so on. Schematically,
McDougaFs framework of inquiry can be por-
trayed as above (see figure 1).
In the use of this model, a number of opera-
tions are critical. The first task is to establish
an observer's standpoint distinct from the
process under scrutiny; otherwise, it is impos-
sible to set criteria for appraisal. An appropriate
perspective also requires self-scrutiny to correct
for cultural and psychological bias, distortions
that are particularly frustrating in transna-
tional and cross-cultural contexts. Sigmund
Freud's influence here is manifest, and use of
free association techniques in this and other
intellectual tasks is acknowledged.
The second task is to delimit the focus on
authoritative decisions in their context, a step
akin to the scientist's choice of the proper lenses
for his observational instruments. Some lenses
magnify key features of the object of inquiry,
some distort it, and some, once serviceable,
may be too crude for current needs. Hence it is
important to have a repertory of lenses and to
appreciate the specific functions of each. It is
in his choice and evaluation of the components
of his focus that McDougal rejects much tradi-
tional legal theory, creating new categories,

many of which stress features that jurispru-
dence ordinarily ignores.
McDougal's focus has two main components—
the relevant communities to be studied and the
conception of law to be deployed. McDougal in-
sists on a globally comprehensive conception of
community, for his work is premised on the
interdependence of the entire earth-space arena
in which people interact; a corollary of this
premise is that efforts to understand or in-
fluence decisions cannot succeed without keep-
ing that interdependence in mind. In his com-
munity focus, he insists that processes of
effective power as well as those of authoritative
decision be incorporated. Both of these focal
elements represent radical departures from tra-
ditional jurisprudence. Positivism and his-
toricism have tended to be national in focus,
even questioning the possibility of law between
groups, and while natural law theory speaks in
universal terms, the content of its focus on
community tends to be general and imprecise.
Almost all schools of jurisprudence focus only
on authoritative decision, the formal institutions
of the law, either ignoring processes of effective
power or isolating them in closed categories,
such as "political question," and then dismissing
them as inappropriate subjects for jurispru-
dence.
McDougal insists that law, the second com-
ponent of his focus, be conceived as processes
of authoritative decision by which people clarify
and implement their common interests. This
process is investigated by special focal com-
ponents, some original with McDougal, some
incorporated from methodologies of other social
sciences. Thus McDougal rejects behavioralism
by insisting on a balanced emphasis on both
perspectives and operations: what people say
and think as well as what they do. He rejects
formalism by insisting on a conception of law
that incorporates both authority and control—
i.e., the normative expectations of relevant ac-
tors as well as their actual participation in de-
cision making. He emphasizes the processes by
which the institutions for making indispensable
decisions are established, maintained, and
changed, but in studying this he dismisses the
notion of a constitution as a document, insisting
instead on a theory of "constitutive process" in
which authority and control actually operate.
He distinguishes this constitutive process from
the public order of a community, the aggregate
of decisions about the production and distribu-
tion of all values other than power, and dis-
McDOUGAL, MYRES S.
tinguishes in turn, within the public order, a
civic order or domain of privacy, in which pro-
duction and distribution are effected through
less severe sanctions.
These focal components have been designed
with an intellectual task or a humanitarian goal
in mind. The distinction between public and
civic order is animated by McDougal's concern
for the maintenance of private domains pro-
tected by the coercive power of the organized
community but insulated from its operation.
Here McDougal shares concerns with philosoph-
ical radicals and liberals and some common
ground with writers like H. L. A. Hart. Con-
versely, a Marxist conception of jurisprudence
might consider civic order a bourgeois atavism
and a pathological condition in a just society.
But many of the other focal emphases are radi-
cal jurisprudential revisions. The insistence on
an integration of authority and control as pre-
requisite to a meaningful conception of law is
distinctive and may be one of McDougal's major
contributions to legal theory. The conception of
the constitutive process is almost Copernican
in its insistence that many postulates of right
conduct in secular societies be tested with full
attention to contemporaneous practices, rather
than by reference to a totemized text.
International law. McDougal's treatises in
international law are rigorous applications of
his jurisprudential theory. In each, a careful
statement of the factual problem is followed by
a comprehensive critical review of scholarship
in the area and a postulation of the goals
that should guide decision makers if com-
munity responses to that resource or practice
are to contribute to a public order of human
dignity. McDougal then details with great speci-
ficity the factual claims with regard to the re-
source in question and the aggregate interna-
tional decision processes that respond to those
claims. The heart of each treatise is a meticu-
lous review of the decisions for each claim, the
environmental and predispositional factors that
conditioned those decisions, projections of
likely future decisions, and the alternatives
thought to give a greater approximation to com-
munity goals. The result in each treatise is a
picture of the processes that make and apply
the law under study, their past and probable
future productions, the impact of the decisions
on the values concerned, an appraisal of the
aggregate performance of the decision process,
and recommendations for improved future per-
formance. Legal and social science literature
 484 McDOUGAL, MYRES S.
are incorporated, documentation is enormous,
and the total impact of each book is magisterial.
To date McDougal has produced treatises on
the regulation of international coercion (Mc-
Dougal & Feliciano 1961), the oceans (McDougal
& Burke 1962), outer space (McDougal, Lasswell,
& Vlasic 1963), interpretation of treaties (Mc-
Dougal, Lasswell, & Miller 1967); forthcoming
treatises are on human rights, with Lasswell
and Chen, and constitutive process, with Lass-
well and Reisman. A bibliography published in
1976 listed 17 international treatises by other
scholars that were strongly influenced by Mc-
Dougal and that can be considered products of
his school.
Property law. While McDougal's interest in
jurisprudence has been consistent, his shift
to international law from the field of property
law, in which he worked for 25 years and has
attained great prominence, is more puzzling.
Property law is extremely localized; moreover,
the common law variant is a strand in the
unique web of English political history and
hence shares little with other property law sys-
tems. In fact, McDougal's approach to property
was radically different from that of his prede-
cessors and exhibits many of the distinctive
features that mark his work in international
law. His conception of property was not "land"
but the aggregate of a community's spatial re-
sources, and he viewed the function of law as
the planning and implementation of the uses
of these resources in ways that would optimize
the common interests of the community. In co-
operation with Maurice Rotival, a planner who
had worked in many parts of the world, Mc-
Dougal wrote a book on planning for a river val-
ley (McDougal & Rotival 1947). He published a
study of land planning for Connecticut and,
with David Haber, a textbook of cases and
materials on property law that placed land use
in a global context (1948). The book was a pop-
ular teaching text, enjoying a long run, but it
was so controversial that efforts were made to
ban it in two states.
Legal education. Throughout his career Mc-
Dougal has been concerned with improving legal
education. In 1943 he published, with Lasswell,
one of his most famous articles, "Legal Edu-
cation and Public Policy." He argued that
one could not speak rationally of professional
training without a theory of law and society
and a conception of the preferred functions that
the lawyer-in-training was to perform in his pro-
fessional career. He applied his method to these
issues, dismissing much of the inherited cur-
riculum as obsolete and inappropriate for pro-
fessional training in a free society, and sug-
gesting a detailed radically innovative curricular
process that might better secure the social ob-
jectives he had postulated. The article was
widely discussed and republished many times.
For 25 years, McDougal chaired the graduate
program at the Yale Law School and trans-
formed it into an international teacher's train-
ing program. Through it he played a major role
in staffing law schools in the United States and
abroad and in influencing the choice of deans.
He traveled in the United States and abroad
frequently, lecturing on legal education and
public policy. He was also an active member of
the Association of American Law Schools and
served as its president in 1966.
Impact and evaluation. Intellectually, Mc-
Dougal's perspective incorporates major con-
temporary concepts in several disciplines. His
contextualism echoes in Alfred North White-
head, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, David Easton, and
many others. His commitment to social science
techniques and to empiricism is contemporary.
His theories of purposive decision resemble
those in organization theory and in the policy
sciences, of which he can be considered a
founder, and his rigorously contextual instru-
mentalism in social design, a feature traceable
to his early work in property law, is Gropian,
as is his emphasis on teamwork. His skepticism
about objectivity, sensitivity to psychological
factors, and commitment to action are recog-
nizable components of the twentieth-century
intellectual's dilemma. Yet in the field of legal
scholarship, a fortress that has long withstood
intellectual change, McDougal's work is utterly
distinctive. Although he purports to find the
origins of his work in pre-Socratic Greece and
in some of the medieval Pandectists, the gene-
alogy is hard to trace.
McDougal's intellectual enterprise is at core
a method that has yielded insights and spun
off some new terminology. In a profession that
charges by the hour and is impatient for results,
there is a tendency to overlook the methodolog-
ical component and to concentrate on the ex-
ploitable insights. Virtually every lawyer in the
United States knows his name, though many
older lawyers still attribute his fame to his
seminal work in property law. International
lawyers around the world consult his work and

respect him. Representatives of his ideas can
be found in most leading law schools in the
United States, though in many schools his ex-
ponents are likely to be considered eccentric by
their colleagues.
Some aspects of McDougal's theory, however,
have enjoyed wide acceptance. Conceptions of
law as a process of decision are common, and
policy analysis has become a fixture in much
of legal education. Though both of these de-
velopments are attributed to McDougal, he has
been critical of the style and method with which
they are executed. Despite talk of empirical re-
search in law, much research has merely in-
corporated various types of economic analysis
and transformed them into a neoscholasticism.
The over-all influence of McDougal's method-
ology on professional consciousness has been
subtle, yet it is evident. One can say of Mc-
Dougal, as W. H. Auden said of Freud in 1939,
that "he is no more a person/Now but a whole
climate of opinion/Under whom we conduct
our differing lives."
Intellectual innovation always generates re-
sistance. In the case of the New Haven school,
language may be a factor. Although law as a
discipline is notorious for its jargon, there has
been great resistance and confusion about some
of the metalanguage McDougal created or
adopted from other social sciences. Ironically,
many of his metaterms have become common
parlance, precisely because they refer to aspects
of modern society for which there were no
terms in the traditional lexicon. Some contend
that resistance is due to the absence of a simple
manual setting forth his ideas, though he has
in fact published a number of short and simple
statements. The engagement of scholarship in
contemporary political events, central in Mc-
Dougal's thought, may also generate resistance,
for it challenges the myth of the university's
separation from practical life, which has pro-
vided it some autonomy. Historically, lawyers
have cultivated a comparable technique of self-
protection in the notion of the neutral tech-
nician, one that McDougal, like many legal
realists, explodes. McDougal's open partisanship
has generally alienated at least one side in a de-
bate and has at times led to the charge that his
theory is no more than an apology for American
foreign policy.
Basically, this resistance may be less a matter
of intellectual comprehension (his ideas are
current and consistent with contemporary so-
McDOUGAL, MYRES S. 485
phisticated thinking) than of distaste for the
task he sets for lawyers. For in the final analysis
McDougal demands that lawyers look at phe-
nomena and themselves in a radically different
way. Instead of an orderly world of rules and a
simple system of logic for their application, he
presents a dynamic and shifting process in
which certainties are few and the agency and
responsibility of the lawyer great. Those who
enlist in the legal profession may demand pre-
cisely the myth of certainty that McDougal has
undercut.
W. MICHAEL REISMAN
"WORKS BY MC DOUGAL
1943 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; and LASSWELL, HAROLD D.
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest. Yale Law Journal
52:203-295. -» Reprinted in McDougal et al. 1960,
pp. 42-154.
1947 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; and ROTIVAL, MAURICE
The Case for Regional Planning, With Special Refer-
ence to New England. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press; Oxford Univ. Press. —» Report of the Yale
University Directive Committee on Regional Plan-
ning.
1948 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; and HABER, DAVID Prop-
erty, Wealth, Land: Allocation, Planning, and Devel-
opment—Selected Cases and Other Materials on the
Law of Real Property. Charlottesville, Va.: Michie
Casebook Corp.
1952 The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Pur-
poses-. Value Clarification as an Instrument of Demo-
cratic World Order. American Journal of Compara-
tive Law 1:24-57. —> Reprinted in McDougal et al.
1960, pp. 947-986.
1954 International Law, Power, and Policy: A Con-
temporary Conception. Recueil des Cours 82:133-
259.
1955 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; and SCHLEI, NORBERT A.
The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security. Yale Law Journal 64:648-
710. -» Reprinted in McDougal et al. 1960,
pp. 763-843.
1960 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S. et al. Studies in World
Public Order. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1961 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; and FELICIANO, FLOREN-
TINO P. Law and Minimum World Public Order:
The Legal Regulation of International Coercion.
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1962 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; and BURKE, WILLIAM T.
The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary
International Law of the Sea. New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press.
1963 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; LASSWELL, HAROLD D.;
and VLASIC, IVAN A. Law and Public Order in
Space. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1966 Legal Education for a Free Society: Our Collec-
tive Responsibility. Association of American Law
Schools, Proceedings Part 2:33-75.
1967 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; LASSWELL, HAROLD D.;
and REISMAN, W. MICHAEL The World Constitutive
Process of Authoritative Decision. Journal of Legal
Education 19:253-300, 403-437.
1967 MCDOUGAL, MYRES S.; LASSWELL, HAROLD D.;
and MILLER, JAMES C. The Interpretation of Agree-
 486 MACHLUP, FRITZ
ments and World Public Order: Principles of Con-
tent and Procedure. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1968 McDouGAL, MYRES S.; LASSWELL, HAROLD D.;
and REISMAN, W. MICHAEL Theories About Interna-
tional Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurispru-
dence. Virginia Journal of International Law 8:188-
299.
1971 McDouGAL, MYRES S.; and LASSWELL, HAROLD D.
Criteria for a Theory About Law. Southern Califor-
nia Law Review 44:362-394.
1972 McDouGAL, MYRES S.; and LASSWELL, HAROLD D.
Trends in Theories About Law: Comprehensiveness
in Conceptions of Constitutive Process. George
Washington Law Review 41:1-22.
1974 McDouGAL, MYRES S.; LASSWELL, HAROLD D.;
and CHEN, LUNG-CHU Nationality and Human
Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External
Arenas. Yale Law Journal 83:900-998.
1975 McDouGAL, MYRES S.; LASSWELL, HAROLD D.;
and CHEN, LUNG-CHU Human Rights for Women
and World Public Order: The Outlawing of Sex-
based Discrimination. American Journal of Inter-
national Law 69:497-533.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CASPER, GERHARD 1967 Juristischer Realismus und
Politische Theorie im Amerikanischen Rechtsdenken.
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
DANIEL, DONALD C. 1972 Clarification and Appraisal
of the Policy-oriented Framework for International
Legal Analysis: Inquiry into the Work of Myres S.
McDougal. Ph.D. dissertation. Georgetown Univ.
DILLARD, HARDY CROSS 1964 The Policy-oriented Ap-
proach to Law. Virginia Quarterly Review 40:626-
633.
FALK, RICHARD A. 1970 Gaps and Biases in Contem-
porary Theories of International Law. Chapter 1 in
Richard A. Falk, The Status of Law in International
Society. Princeton Univ. Press.
GOTTLIEB, GIDON 1968 The Conceptual World of the
Yale School of International Law. World Politics
21:108-132.
LITTLE, DAVID 1974 Toward Clarifying the Grounds
of Value-clarification: A Reaction to the Policy-
oriented Jurisprudence of Lasswell and McDougal.
Virginia Journal of International Law 14:451-461.
REISMAN, W. MICHAEL 1976 A Theory About Law
From the Policy Perspective. Pages 75-101 in David
N. Weisstub (editor), Law and Policy. Downsview,
Ontario: York University Osgood Hall Law School.
REISMAN, W. MICHAEL; and WESTON, BURNS H. (edi-
tors) 1976 Toward World Order and Human Dig-
nity: Essays in Honor of Myres Smith McDougal.
New York: Free Press. —> In addition to a detailed
bibliography of all of McDougal's works, prepared by
Frederick S. Tipson, and original essays applying
his theories, this volume includes notes on
McDougal by Harold D. Lasswell and Eugene V.
Rostow.
ROSENTHAL, BENT 1970 Etude de I'oeuvre de Myres
Smith McDougal en matiere de Droit International
Public. Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de
Jurisprudence.
SUZUKI, EISUKE 1974 The New Haven School of In-
ternational Law: An Invitation to a Policy-oriented
Jurisprudence. Yale Studies in World Public Order
1:1-47.
TIPSON, FREDERICK S. 1974 The Lasswell-McDougal
Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human
Dignity. Virginia Journal of International Law
14:535-585.
TUNKIN, GRIGORII IVANOVICH (1970) 1974 Theory of
International Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press. —> First published in Russian.
MACHLUP, FRITZ
Fritz (Friedrich Eduard) Machlup was born in
Wiener Neustadt, south of Vienna, on December
15, 1902, into the family of Berthold Machlup.
He was raised and went to school in Vienna,
spending his summers in the village of Tim-
mersdorf, Styria, where he worked in the family
cardboard-manufacturing business. In 1920 he
enrolled at the University of Vienna and studied
under Friedrich von Wieser and Ludwig von
Mises. He wrote his dissertation on the gold-ex-
» ~
change standard under von Mises; it was com-
pleted in 1923 and published in 1925.
In 1922, while still a graduate student, Mach-
lup had become a partner in a cardboard-manu-
facturing firm, the Ybbstaler Pappenfabriken
Adolf Leitner & Bruder, which owned two card-
board mills in lower Austria. After receiving his
doctor's degree in December 1923, he and some
of his partners founded a corporation for the
production of paperboard in Budafok, near Buda-
pest, Hungary, under the protection of a high
tariff. In 1927 he became a member of the
council of a cartel of Austrian cardboard pro-
ducers, assuming responsibility for setting up
its accounting system. While pursuing this ac-
tive business career, which involved weekly
visits to the cardboard mills, this "businessman
in Vienna," as he was then known (Ellis 1934),
also continued research in economics and be-
came treasurer of the Austrian Economic So-
ciety, whose other officers were Hans Mayer
(president), von Mises (vice president), and Fried-
rich A. von Hayek (secretary). From 1924 to
1933 he formed a close association with Hayek,
Gottfried von Haberler, and Oskar Morgenstern,
as well as with the philosophers Felix Kaufman
and Alfred Schutz, from whom he derived his
lifelong interest in methodology and philosophy
of science. These scholars all participated in the
biweekly meetings of the von Mises Circle and the
monthly meetings of a small group of interdisci-
plinary intellectuals, the Geistkreis. During this
period Machlup published his second book on
the "New Currency Systems of Europe" (1927),
describing how one country after another adopted
the gold-exchange standard; two articles (1928;
1929) on the German transfer problem and, in
1931, The Stock Market, Credit and Capital
Formation, a central theme of which was an

analysis of the alleged tendency of stock-ex-
change speculation and brokers' loans to tie up
or absorb funds that might otherwise flow into
real capital formation. This early work and, still
more, the expanded 1940 English edition, dis-
played the unique combination of talents that
was to characterize all Machlup's later work: a
penchant for abstracting the relevant aspects of
the situation being analyzed, and for combining
clear logical reasoning with an intimate, first-
hand knowledge of the workings of economic
institutions.
Following the collapse of the Austrian Kred-
itanstalt in 1931, Austria as well as other Euro-
pean countries introduced foreign-exchange
restrictions, making it difficult to carry on a
business. During this period Machlup wrote
some 150 articles for the newspaper Neues
Wiener Tagblatt dealing with current economic
issues and advocating trade liberalization. As
business conditions became progressively worse,
he obtained leave from his partners to accept,
early in 1933, a Rockefeller fellowship for 1933/
1934, subsequently renewed for an additional
year. He visited Columbia University, Harvard
University, the University of Chicago, and Stan-
ford University. At Harvard he associated chiefly
with Frank W. Taussig and Joseph A. Schum-
peter, as well as with Edward H. Chamberlin
and Edward S. Mason, from whom he derived a
lasting interest in the theory of the firm and of
industrial organization. At Chicago he was
closest to Jacob Viner and Frank H. Knight, and
shared an office with three graduate students:
W. Allen Wallis, George J. Stigler, and Milton
Friedman. Upon receiving an appointment as
professor at the University of Buffalo in May
1935, he returned to Austria to liquidate his
business interests. He spent the first term of the
new academic year on leave from Buffalo,
spending October 1935 to January 1936 in
Cambridge and London, where he saw much of
John Maynard Keynes, Joan Robinson, R. F.
Kahn, Piero Sraffa, and J. R. Hicks. He began
teaching at Buffalo in February 1936, and re-
mained there, except for the four war years,
until June 1947.
At Buffalo Machlup wrote his seminal 1939-
1940 papers introducing the concepts of supply
and demand for foreign exchange, and relating
the forms of these functions to underlying credit
conditions and the elasticities of supply and
demand for exportables and importables. Dur-
ing these years he also completed the 1940
English-language edition of his book (1931) on
MACHLUP, FRITZ 487
the stock market, adding three new chapters
that traced with great precision the financial
flows in and through the stock market and their
relation (or lack of relation) to the aggregate
of brokers' loans. It was a logical step to pursue
next his concern with the transmission of money
flows in terms of the then fashionable Keynesian
concept of the multiplier. In his two contribu-
tions on this subject (1939; 1943), he enriched
multiplier theory by stamping on it his charac-
teristic imprint: an insistence on providing a
precise description of an institutional frame-
work consistent with the formal theory; and of
the effects of money flows on the balance sheets
and income statements of individuals, firms,
and monetary authorities. This led him to a
healthy awareness of the model's limitations,
which he described in the last chapter of Inter-
national Trade (1943), causing Viner to praise
it good-humoredly as the best chapter in the
book (cf., John Williamson's chapter in Dreyer
1978). From an analytic point of view the book
had considerable influence; its concept of "ac-
commodating capital movements," for example,
was subsequently adopted by James E. Meade.
With his lively polemic (1946) against Rich-
ard A. Lester (1946), Machlup entered a long
period of concern with the theory of the firm
and industrial organization, as well as enhanced
preoccupation with methodology. To some, the
main issue of the debate was the question
whether the profit-maximizing theory of the firm
was empirically secure; it was presumably this
interpretation that led to the widely quoted quip
by Schumpeter: "Lester was right but Machlup
won the argument." The central issue stressed
by Machlup, however, was one that he would
later raise to the status of a fundamental prob-
lem in philosophy of science (1969): In a field
where the objects studied (in this case, firms)
themselves have theories (or notions) concern-
ing their own actions, these theories cannot be
accepted at face value. The influence of Mach-
lup's 1946 paper can be gauged by the fact that
subsequent empirical investigations have rarely
made uncritical use of information obtained
from questionnaires. Machlup later went on to
outline a theory of theories—that is, a theory of
the kind of theory economic agents might be
expected to adopt in describing their own roles;
accordingly, he points out (1960a) that unions
"reject the wage-push diagnosis because, under-
standably, they do not wish to take the blame
for the inflation. But they also reject the de-
mand-pull diagnosis, because this . . . would
488 MACHLUP, FRITZ
militate against the use of fiscal and monetary
policies to bolster employment. . . . The only
way out of this logical squeeze is to blame the
consumer-price increase on prices 'administered'
by big business" (p. 126). Thus, one must un-
derstand and be able to explain agents' theories
about their own behavior in order to know how
much weight to place on these theories as evi-
dence. Machlup's methodological position is
here remarkably close to that of Vilfredo Pareto's
Sociology (1916), although there is no reason
to believe there was any direct influence.
In 1947 Machlup became Hutzler professor of
political economy at the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, where his main research (and teaching)
interest continued to be in price theory. A tour-
de-force was his 1949 book on the basing-point
system, in which the reader is put through
his paces to obtain a complete understanding of
delivered-price systems from almost every
angle. The book contains a sizable methodologi-
cal component in its attention to persuasive defi-
nitions and theories and to the different mean-
ings attached to the same terms by lawyers and
economists. The book was written in the wake
of the Supreme Court's decision against basing-
point pricing in the cement case, and just as
Congress was passing a law to legalize the prac-
tice; it came out strongly and unabashedly
against uniform delivered pricing, and a copy
of it was on President Harry S Truman's desk
when he vetoed the bill later in 1949. Machlup
continued unrelentingly in his analysis of in-
dustrial organization and published two major
treatises in 1952. These, especially The Political
Economy of Monopoly (1952b), illustrate and
carry out Machlup's methodological position to
the effect that there can be no reliable factual
inference without good theory, and that accounts
pretending to be purely factual and empirical
invariably contain hidden theory.
A major subject of Machlup's attention during
these years was the economics of the patent
system and its dual role as restrainer of compe-
tition and as promoter of invention (Machlup
& Penrose 1950; Machlup 1958a; 1958c; 1960£>;
1968a). This work had begun when he was on
leave from Buffalo at the Brookings Institution
in 1942 and in the office of the Alien Property
Custodian from 1943 to 1946. As always, Mach-
lup started by acquiring a thorough acquaint-
ance with the facts, and set forth a program for
a cost-benefit analysis of the patent system
(1958a). He perceived (1958c) that innovation
must spread to be effectual, but not so rapidly
as to wipe out the gains to the innovators. He
came to realize that, given the interdependence
of education and research, a precondition of a
cost-benefit analysis of the production and dis-
semination of knowledge was a scheme of cost
accounting and the accompanying statistics.
The outcome was The Production and Distribu-
tion of Knowledge in the United States (1962fr),
a comprehensive work covering all phases of
knowledge and what he styled "knowledge indus-
tries." He measured knowledge using two ap-
proaches : type of output (the industry approach)
and type of labor input (the occupations ap-
proach), and found that according to both
approaches the production of knowledge had
been increasing twice as rapidly as the gross
national product. Throughout this period, Mach-
lup was active in the American Association of
University Professors and contributed articles
on education, tenure, academic freedom, faculty
salaries, and (later, in 1976) the organization
of libraries, to its Bulletin:, he was its president
from 1962 to 1964.
Perhaps the most significant of Machlup's
contributions were those to international mone-
tary economics, a subject to which he returned
in 1950 when many countries were experiencing
what they considered to be "chronic" deficits in
their balance of payments. He coined the term
"elasticity pessimism" (1950a) for the belief,
based on statistical regressions, that exchange-
rate changes would have little corrective effect
on payments balances, and sorted out and clari-
fied the confused issues surrounding the concept
of "dollar shortage" (1950b). In his second
major controversialist foray (1955k), he took
on Sidney S. Alexander's 1952 attempt to re-
place the "elasticity approach" to the theory of
balance-of-payments adjustment by the "absorp-
tion approach," which treats a country's balance
of payments analytically as an excess of its ex-
penditures (absorption) over its receipts. Mach-
lup argued that what was correct in Alexander's
account in no way contradicted the traditional
approach, properly understood. He returned to
the question of disequilibrium in the balance of
payments in a brilliant and penetrating meth-
odological essay (1958b).
With his appointment in 1960 to succeed
Jacob Viner as Walker professor of economics
and international finance at Princeton Univer-
sity, Machlup entered a decade in which his at-
tention was to be absorbed very largely in the

problem of international monetary reform. As
director of the International Finance Section
and editor of its unique series of publications,
he was in constant touch with the ablest anal-
ysts of international monetary problems. Robert
Triffin in 1961 sounded the warning that, with
continued deficits on the part of reserve-cur-
rency countries as the only way to satisfy the
growing needs for international "liquidity," a
collapse of the gold-exchange standard was
bound to ensue. In two works (1962a;
1963fr), Machlup provided his assessment of
the situation and an analysis of five alternatives:
extension of the gold-exchange standard (by
multiple-reserve currencies); mutual credit fa-
cilities (swap arrangements) among central
banks; creation of an international reserve as-
set; an increase in the price of gold; and flexible
exchange rates. He saw fatal objections to the
first, recalling bimetallism and Gresham's Law
(1963&); long-run inadequacy in the second; and
inequitable distributional problems and chronic
speculation in the fourth (since the price of gold
would have to keep increasing). Only the third
and fifth were left as viable alternatives. In
1963, when Secretary of the Treasury Douglas
Dillon announced that a thorough review of the
international monetary system would be under-
taken without seeking the views of academics
(who could never agree among themselves),
Machlup's professional pride was challenged.
He proceeded to organize a series of conferences
in Princeton and Bellagio, calling together aca-
demics who became known as the "Bellagio
Group." So successful was its report (Machlup
& Malkiel 1964), with its distinction of three prob-
lems (adjustment, liquidity, and confidence),
that officials asked to be included in future meet-
ings. The subsequent joint conferences of of-
ficials and academics that Machlup organized
resulted in two volumes of papers (Machlup
et al. 1966; 1970). The flavor and accomplish-
ments of these meetings have been richly de-
scribed by Triffin and Williamson in Dreyer
(1978). Machlup became, in Triffin's words, "the
unquestioned intellectual leader and mentor of
our vain efforts to reform the crumbling inter-
national monetary system of the postwar years,"
and he attributed this leadership to "the unusual
blend of theoretical rigor and pragmatic realism
which characterizes Professor Machlup's meth-
odology and is the key to his unique achieve-
ments in this area as well as in ... many
others. . . . "
MACHLUP, FRITZ 489
These years saw a number of significant
contributions to the field of international mone-
tary economics. There was the startling theory
(1966a; 1966fc>) that the central banks' need for
ever-increasing international reserves is politi-
cally based and must be met if restrictions on
trade and capital movements are to be avoided.
There were penetrating analyses of the nature
of international reserve units (1965a; 1965b;
1967&; 1967Z?) and special drawing rights
(1968b), as well as of the seigniorage problem
(1965a). One senses Machlup's striving to com-
municate when he writes in exasperation with
the attitudes of central bankers toward ex-
change-rate flexibility (1966a): "their apodictic
claim that it is impractical may . . . be trans-
lated into the statement, 'I am against it, but
cannot give any good reasons'" (p. 173). So
great, however, was the respect that Machlup
gained in central banking circles that he was
twice offered the presidency of the Nationalbank
of his native Austria (in 1967 and 1972). Great
was the disillusionment (1976a) when, with the
Jamaica accord, events forced the recognition
of floating exchange rates, but the carefully laid
plans for reform (effective adjustment processes
and establishment of the SDR as principal re-
serve asset) were forgotten. Machlup had done
all he could.
He had assumed the presidency of the Amer-
ican Economic Association in 1966, and took on
that of the International Economic Association
from 1971 to 1974. Retiring from Princeton in
1971, he accepted a professorship at New York
University. The 1970s saw his brilliant analysis
of the way in which the actions of European
central banks in what he called the "Xeno-
currency markets" led to the creation of addi-
tional dollar deposits and official reserves
(1970k; 1971; 1972b; 1972C; 1972d), furnishing
proof of the success of Machlupian methodol-
ogy: he was way ahead of "practical men" in
understanding how the Eurodollar system ac-
tually functioned. His organization of the IE A
World Congress in Budapest in 1974 led him to
"toss off" an encyclopedic History of Thought
on Economic Integration in 1977.
Renowned for his teaching, Machlup was also
a man of great culture, who would follow radio
performances of Wagner operas and Mahler
symphonies with the score in front of him. At
age 75, a volume was presented in his honor by
Dreyer (1978). Far from resting on his laurels,
he embarked on the most ambitious project of
490 MACHLUP, FRITZ
his career: the second edition of The Production
and Distribution of Knowledge in the United
States—in eight volumes.
JOHN S. CHIPMAN
WORKS BY MACHLUP
1925 Die Goldkernwdhrung. Halberstadt (Germany):
Meyer.
1927 Die neuen Wdhrungen in Europa. Stuttgart (Ger-
many): Enke.
1928 Wahrung und Auslandsverschuldung: Bemer-
kungen zur Diskussion zwischen Schacht und
seinen Kritikern. Mitteilung des Verbandes oster-
reichischer Banken und Bankiers 10:194-208. —>
A translation, with the title "Foreign Debts, Repara-
tions, and the Transfer Problem," is in (1964) 1976,
pages 396-416.
1929 Transfer und Preisbewegung. Zeitschrift fur
Nationalokonomie 1:555—560. —» A translation,
with the title "Transfer and Price Effects," is in
(1964) 1976, pages 417-424.
(1931) 1940 The Stock Market, Credit and Capital
Formation. London: Hodge; New York: Macmillan.
—» First published as Borsenkredit, Industriekredit
und Kapitalbildung.
1934 Fiihrer durch die Krisenpolitik. Vienna: Springer.
1939 Period Analysis and Multiplier Theory. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 54:1—27. —> Reprinted in
1976b, pages 263-289.
1939-1940 The Theory of Foreign Exchanges. Eco-
nomica New Series 6:375-397; 7:23-49. —» Re-
printed in (1964) 1976, pages 7-50.
1943 International Trade and the National Income
Multiplier. Philadelphia: Blakiston.
1946 Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research.
American Economic Review 36:519—554. —> Re-
printed in (1963a) 1975, pages 147-190.
1949 The Basing-point System: An Economic Analysis
of a Controversial Pricing Practice. Philadelphia:
Blakiston.
1950a Elasticity Pessimism in International Trade.
Economia Internazionale 3:118-141. —> Reprinted
in (1964) 1976, pages 51-68.
1950i» Three Concepts of the Balance of Payments
and the So-called Dollar Shortage. Economic Jour-
nal 60:46-68. -» Reprinted in (1964) 1976, pages
69-92.
1950 MACHLUP, FRITZ; and PENROSE, EDITH The
Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century.
Journal of Economic History 10:1-29.
(1952a) 1964 The Economics of Sellers' Competition:
Model Analysis of Sellers' Conduct. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins.
1952b The Political Economy of Monopoly: Business,
Labor, and Government Policies. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins.
1955a The Problem of Verification in Economics.
Southern Economic Journal 22:1—21. —> Reprinted
in 1976b, pages 57-77.
1955b Relative Prices and Aggregate Spending in the
Analysis of Devaluation. American Economic Re-
view 45:255-278. -» Reprinted in (1964) 1976,
pages 171-194.
1958a An Economic Review of the Patent System.
Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Study No. 15. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office.
1958b Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Misplaced
Concreteness and Disguised Politics. Economic
Journal 68:1-24. —> Reprinted in (1963a) 1975,
pages 43-72 and (1964) 1976, pages 110-135.
1958c The Optimum Lag of Imitation Behind Innova-
tion. Pages 239-256 in Til Frederik Zeuthen 9
September 1958. Copenhagen: National0konomisk
Forening. —> Reprinted in 1976b, pages 485-502.
1960a Another View of Cost-Push and Demand-Pull
Inflation. Review of Economics and Statistics 42:
125-139. —» Reprinted in (1963a) 1975, pages
241-268.
1960i» The Supply of Inventors and Inventions.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 85:210-254. —> Re-
printed in 1976b, pages 439-483.
(1962a) 1964 Plans for Reform of the International
Monetary System. 2d ed. Princeton University, In-
ternational Finance Section, Special Papers in In-
ternational Economics, No. 3. Princeton: The Uni-
versity. —> An expanded version was published in
(1964) 1976, pages 282-366.
1962b The Production and Distribution of Knowledge
in the United States. Princeton Univ. Press.
(1963a) 1975 Essays in Economic Semantics. New
York Univ. Press. —» First published as Essays on
Economic Semantics.
1963b Reform of the International Monetary System.
Pages 253-260 in Herbert G. Grubel (editor),
World Monetary Reform, Plans and Issues. Stanford
Univ. Press.
(1964) 1976 International Payments, Debts, and Gold:
Collected Essays. 2d ed. New York Univ. Press.
1964 MACHLUP, FRITZ; and MALKIEL, BURTON G.
(editors) International Monetary Arrangements: The
Problem of Choice. Princeton University, Interna-
tional Finance Section. Princeton: The University.
1965a The Cloakroom Rule of International Reserves:
Reserve Creation and Resources Transfer. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 79:337-355. —» Re-
printed in 1976b, pages 381-394.
1965t» Involuntary Foreign Lending. Stockholm: Alm-
qvist & Wiksell.
1966a International Monetary Systems and the Free
Market Economy. Pages 153-176 in International
Payments Problems. Washington: American Enter-
prise Institute for Public Policy Research.
1966& The Need for Monetary Reserves. Banca Nazi-
onale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 1966:175-222.
-^•Reprinted in 1976b, pages 333-380.
1966 MACHLUP, FRITZ et al. Maintaining and Restor-
ing Balance in International Payments. Princeton
Univ. Press.
1967a Credit Facilities or Reserve Allotments? Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 1967:135—
156.
1967£> From Dormant Liabilities to Dormant Assets.
The (London) Banker 117:788-797.
1968a Patents. Volume 11, pages 461-472 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1968& Remaking the Internatonal Monetary System:
The Rio Agreement and Beyond. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins.
1968c The Transfer Gap of the United States. Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 1968:195—
238. —» Reprinted in (1964) 1976, pages 465-503.
1969 If Matter Could Talk. Pages 286-305 in Sidney
Morgenbesser et al. (editors), Philosophy, Science,
and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel.
New York: St. Martins. —> Reprinted in 1976b,
pages 3-26.
(1970a) 1975 Education and Economic Growth. New
York Univ. Press.
1970& Euro-dollar Creation: A Mystery Story. Banca

Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 1970:219-
260. -> Reprinted in 1976b, pages 395-436.
1970 MACHLUP, FRITZ et al. Approaches to Greater
Flexibility of Exchange Rates: The Biirgenstock
Papers. Princeton Univ. Press.
1971 The Magicians and Their Rabbits. Morgan
Guaranty Survey May:3—13.
1972a The Alignment of Foreign Exchange Rates.
New York: Praeger.
1972b Euro-dollars, Once Again. Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro Quarterly Review 1972:119-137.
1972c The Eurodollar System and Its Control. Pages
3-36 in International Monetary Problems. Wash-
ington: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research.
1972d Five Errors About the Eurodollar System.
Euro-money July:8-10, 12, 14.
1973 Exchange-rate Flexibility. Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro Quarterly Review 1973:3-25.
1976a Between Outline and Outcome the Reform Was
Lost. Pages 30-38 in Edward M. Bernstein et al.,
Reflections on Jamaica. Princeton University, Inter-
national Finance Section, Essays in International
Finance, No. 115. Princeton: The University.
1976b Selected Economic Writings of Fritz Machlup.
Edited by George Bitros. New York Univ. Press. —=>
Includes a bibliography of Machlup's writings.
1977 A History of Thought on Economic Integration.
London: Macmillan; New York: Columbia Univ.
Press.
1978 Methodology of Economics and Other Social Sci-
ences. New York: Academic Press.
1978 MACHLUP, FRITZ et al. Information Through the
Printed Word: The Dissemination of Scholarly, Sci-
entific, and Intellectual Knowledge. 3 vols. New
York: Praeger. —» Volume 1: Book Publishing. Vol-
ume 2: Journals. Volume 3: Libraries.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALEXANDER, SIDNEY S. 1952 Effects of a Devalua-
tion on a Trade Balance. International Monetary
Fund, Staff Papers 2:263-278.
DREYER, JACOB S. 1978 Breadth and Depth in Eco-
nomics: Fritz Machlup—The Man and His Ideas.
Lexington, Mass.: Heath.
ELLIS, HOWARD S. 1934 German Monetary Theory:
1905-1933. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
LESTER, RICHARD A. 1946 Shortcomings of Marginal
Analysis for Wage-Employment Problems. Ameri-
can Economic Review 36:63-82.
PARETO, VILFREDO (1916) 1963 The Mind and So-
ciety: A Treatise on General Sociology. 4 vols. New
York: Dover. —» First published as Trattato di
sociologia generale. Volume 1: Non-logical Conduct.
Volume 2: Theory of Residues. Volume 3: Theory
of Derivations. Volume 4: The General Form of
Society.
TRIFFIN, ROBERT 1961 Gold and the Dollar Crisis:
The Future of Convertibility. New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press.
MAHALANOBIS, P. C.
Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis (1893-1972)
was born on June 29, 1893, in a family that
traced its roots to the landed aristocracy in
Vikrampur in Bangladesh. His grandfather
moved to Calcutta in the middle of the nine-
MAHALANOBIS, P. C. 491
teenth century and became involved in the
Brahmo Samaj, a Hindu reformist movement,
started by Raja Ram Mohan Roy in 1828 and
revived in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century by Devendranath Tagore, father of the
poet Rabindranath. Mahalanobis had his early
education in the Boys' School run by the Samaj
and later got his Bachelor's degree with honors
in physics from the Presidency College of Cal-
cutta. He left for England in the summer of
1913, joined King's College in Cambridge, took
part i of the Mathematical Tripos in 1914 and
passed the National Science Tripos, part n, with
a first class in 1915. He was elected senior re-
search scholar and returned to India for a short
vacation, intending to go back to England to
work with C. T. R. Wilson at the Cavendish
Laboratory in Cambridge. But on his return, he
accepted a teaching position at the Presidency
College. He gave up the idea of pursuing his
research in physics at Cambridge and became
deeply involved in his teaching and in the af-
fairs of the Brahmo Samaj. He was active in the
Samaj until his death. He was closely associated
with Rabindranath Tagore during the poet's
long life, and with Visva-Bharati, a university
established by the poet embodying his universal
vision. These activities reflected Mahalanobis'
deep commitment to public service. He con-
tributed significantly to the Bengali literature on
Tagore, of which his pioneering work in the
textual criticism of Tagore may be mentioned.
Mahalanobis' interest in statistics was stimu-
lated by his tutor in King's College, who asked
his opinion of some volumes of the journal
Biometrika presented to the college by its editor,
Karl Pearson. He became so interested that he
bought a complete set of the journal and
brought it with him to India. This started his
long scholarly career in statistics that was to
result in contributions to several branches of
natural and social sciences, meteorology, anthro-
pology, educational psychology, sample surveys,
and finally to planning for economic develop-
ment. He founded the Indian Statistical Insti-
tute (ISI) in 1931 and served as its honorary
secretary-director almost to the end of his life.
He was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in
1945.
The ISI, nurtured in no small measure from
its early years by the resources of Mahalanobis
and his wife Nimal Kumari, came to occupy a
unique position among institutions of research
and teaching in statistics in India and abroad:
unique in that teaching and research in many
492 MAHALANOBIS, P. C.
branches of natural and social sciences, and not
merely statistics, are carried on within the insti-
tute. This was due to Mahalanobis' view that
not merely statistical tools are essential in any
empirical research; it was equally essential that
research and training in statistics be informed
by research in the sciences.
Mahalanobis' name will always be associated
with the emergence of a statistically competent
technique of sample surveys. He was instru-
mental in the adoption in India of statistical
sampling on a large scale in the estimation of
area devoted to, and yield per unit area of,
agricultural crops. He introduced the technique
of "interpenetrating subsamples" by which two
or more independent random samples were
chosen from the population, data from each
sample being collected by a different investi-
gator. Each sample provided a statistically valid
estimate of the population characteristic and
the variance between the estimates from the dif-
ferent samples provided an easily calculated
estimate of the sampling and nonsampling er-
rors. In the days before modern electronic com-
puters, this saved the substantial computing
effort involved in calculating sampling errors,
particularly when complex multistage sampling
designs were being used. Following his lead, the
statisticians of ISI have contributed significantly
to the theory and practice of survey sampling.
He was also a pioneer in the area of multi-
variate analysis. The statistic Mahalanobis dis-
tance or Mahalanobis D2, as it is known in the
statistical literature, is used for testing the hy-
pothesis that the vectors of means of two multi-
variate populations are the same. This statistic
was first used for problems of taxonomical
classification based on anthropometric measure-
ments. It has also been used by some economists
for grouping countries according to their state
of economic development as measured by more
than one indicator.
Mahalanobis was not formally trained in
economics, nor did he make any systematic
study of it himself. Yet his conviction that sta-
tistical methods constituted "a new technology
for increasing the efficiency of human efforts in
the widest sense" led him to a study of develop-
ment planning. In addition, he initiated studies
in development planning in the ISI and invited
economists and planners to the ISI from all over
the world, East as well as West. Some of the
earliest multisector planning models applying
techniques of linear programming were built at
the ISI. As a by-product, several input-output
tables for the Indian economy, with differing
degrees of disaggregation and for different
years, were generated.
While recognizing the utility of formal
models in understanding an economic system
without getting bogged down in its details, he
repeatedly emphasized that a model was only "a
scaffolding to be dismantled once the building
was erected." His own contributions were the
two- and four-sector models. The two-sector
model, while similar to those developed by G. A.
Feldman in the Soviet Union and Evsey Domar
in the United States, was independently formu-
lated by Mahalanobis. The two sectors consisted
of an aggregate consumption goods producing
sector with an output-capital ratio of fic and an
investment goods producing sector with its out-
put-capital ratio /?,-. Given an initial investment
rate of alt, a one period lag between investment
and production and constant proportions \c, At
(Af + A/ = 1) of aggregate investment going to
consumption and investment goods sectors, he
showed that national income at point t will be
given by
Y^Yc.tl + oo A 'fr + x"fr' {(1 + A</?0<- 1}]
and consumption by
C,=Y,,[(1 - 0 0 ) - I}]
A,-/?/
It is then easily seen that, given the output-
capital ratios, the long-run growth rate of in-
come and consumption is (1 + A,-/?,-), implying
that the long-run growth rate of consumption
will be higher the greater is the proportion of
investment devoted to building up investment
goods industries. This, given the potential of
small-scale village industries in India, led
Mahalanobis to propose a strategy of develop-
ment that gave priority to basic and heavy in-
dustries in large-scale manufacturing, while
labor-intensive small-scale industries were to be
the suppliers of consumption goods and genera-
tors of employment. This strategy, accepted by
the government, has been followed for two
decades since the middle of the 1950s to the
present with only minor changes in emphasis.
But Mahalanobis characteristically resisted be-
coming formally a member of the Planning
Commission, preferring to be a de facto member.
His four-sector model is an elaboration of the

above with the consumption goods sector fur-
ther subdivided into modern industry, small-
scale industry, including agriculture, and ser-
vices. This model was used by Mahalanobis to
explore the employment implications of alterna-
tive investment allocations.
The Mahalanobis strategy of development has
been criticized for its formal inadequacies, its
ideological bias, its economic inefficiency, and
especially for its neglect of foreign trade. It
would appear however that the strategy was
appropriate at the time it was formulated. Many
of the industries established under the strategy
would have been desirable socially, as well as
efficient from the point of view of India's long-
run comparative advantage. The only major
criticism of the government, rather than of
Mahalanobis, is that the strategy was inflexibly
adhered to for too. long a period in the context
of technical change in agriculture and the op-
portunities offered by international trade. Be
that as it may, there is no denying the funda-
mental contribution of Mahalanobis in building
a firm foundation for India's industrialization.
Mahalanobis was concerned not merely with
economic growth but also with its impact on
different socioeconomic groups. In order to
monitor the changes in the levels of living of
the population brought about by planned de-
velopment, he initiated an annual household
consumer expenditure survey in 1950. Aware of
the conceptual and measurement problems in
defining household income in economies where
self-employment is the dominant mode of em-
ployment, these surveys canvassed consumer
expenditure instead. A large number of studies
based on these surveys have been done at the
ISI. These had a direct bearing on the formula-
tion of national development plans. His con-
cerns about distributional aspects of develop-
ment were shared by Prime Minister Nehru,
who appointed him chairman of a committee to
inquire into these aspects. The committee sub-
mitted its report in 1964, long before such con-
cerns were espoused by international agencies.
Worth mentioning is that Mahalanobis empha-
sized the inequality of access to educational op-
portunities far more than the inequality of the
distribution of physical assets in explaining in-
come inequalities.
In analyzing data on consumer expenditure,
Mahalanobis developed a new methodological
tool, "Fractile Graphical Analysis," for compari-
son of socioeconomic groups at two different
places or points of time. This tool has since been
MANNHEIM, HERMANN 493
applied in demography, psychology, and bi-
ometry.
Mahalanobis laid the foundations for contin-
uing collection of socioeconomic data for policy
purposes in his many functions, such as chair-
man of the National Income Committee, honor-
ary statistical adviser to the Indian Cabinet, and
the organizer of the Central Statistical Unit.
Indeed, because of him, the data base of the
Indian economy is far more extensive and re-
liable than that of many countries, developed
as well as developing.
Mahalanobis' interest in science and world
affairs was broad. He was a founder member of
the Indian Pugwash Committee and was active
in the nuclear disarmament movement.
T. N. SRINIVASAN
WORKS BY MAHALANOBIS
1925 Analysis of Race-mixture in Bengal. Asiatic So-
ciety of Bengal, Journal of Proceedings New Series
23:301-333.
1936 On Generalised Distance in Statistics. National
Institute of Science, India, Proceedings 2:49-55.
1944 On Large Scale Sample Surveys. Royal Society
of London, Philosophical Transactions Series B
231:329-451.
1949 MAHALANOBIS, P. C.; MAJUMDAR, D. N.; and
RAO, C. RADHAKRISHNA Anthropometric Survey of
United Provinces, 1941: A Statistical Study. Sankhya
9:89-324.
1955 The Approach of Operational Research to Plan-
ning in India. Sankhya 16:3-62.
1960 A Method of Fractile Graphical Analysis. Econo-
metrica 28:325-351.
1961 Experiments in Statistical Sampling in the In-
dian Statistical Institute. Calcutta: Asia Publishing
House and Statistical Publishing Society.
1965 Statistics as a Key Technology. American Statis-
tician 19, no. 2:43-46.
1971 Some Observations on Recent Developments in
Sample Surveys. International Statistical Institute,
Bulletin 44:247-261.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
LAHIRI, D. B. 1973 Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis
and Large Scale Sample Surveys. Sankhya 35 (sup-
plement) :27-44.
MUKHERJEE, M. 1973 Professor Mahalanobis' Con-
tributions to Economics: A Condensed Survey of
Research. Sankhya 35 (supplement):45-50.
RAO, C. RADHAKRISHNA 1973 Prasanta Chandra Ma-
halanobis, 1893—1972. Biographical Memoirs of the
Fellows of the Royal Society 19:445-492.
SANYAL, H. 1973 Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis:
A Biographical Sketch. Sankhya 35 (supplement):
3-11.
MANNHEIM, HERMANN
Hermann Mannheim was born in Berlin in
1889 and died in London in 1973 at the age of
84. His obituary notice in The (London) Times
 494 MANNHEIM, HERMANN
described him as the "father of modern English
criminology," a title that reflected the im-
mensely influential role he played in the devel-
opment of the discipline not only in the Uni-
versity of London, where he had taught at the
London School of Economics (L.S.E.), but
throughout the academic world and in public
life and affairs. An early refugee from Hitler's
Germany, Mannheim had been one of a trio of
emigre criminologists; his fellow countryman
Max Grunhut became reader in criminology at
Oxford University, while Leon Radzinowicz
from Poland was later to become the first Wolf-
son professor of criminology at Cambridge Uni-
versity.
Mannheim's life had been divided into two
parts. Born into a family with mercantile inter-
ests in east Prussia, his early education followed
the typical bourgeois pattern of private tutorial
education at home, moving on to the classical
Gymnasium and the university. Although a tal-
ented pianist from his earliest years, who might
have made his name in the concert hall, he
chose to study law and political science. It was
in fact in his student days that the polymathic
interests that were to be so distinctive a feature
of his later academic life became initially evi-
dent. At Munich, Freiburg, Strasbourg, and
Konigsberg he followed courses in economics,
philosophy, sociology, psychology, and psychia-
try. He was, of course, a student in a world as
yet undisturbed by the shattering social conse-
quences of World War I, in which scholars such
as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber were con-
temporary figures. There can be little doubt that
in his education Mannheim benefited not merely
from the advantages of the continental system,
which permitted greater academic flexibility
than did the universities of the English-speaking
world, but from the stimulation of an intellec-
tual curiosity that was to distinguish him from
most lawyers. Although he read Schopenhauer,
Kant, and Dostoevsky, and developed an interest
in psychiatry, his interests increasingly focused
on criminal law and on the phenomena of crime
and the penal system. These he approached not
simply in the context of "scientific" criminology,
but in relation to the study of ethics and social
justice.
Mannheim underwent the usual forensic ap-
prenticeship in the courts and lawyers' cham-
bers. His thesis for the degree of DR. JUR. at
Konigsberg in 1912 was the subject of criminal
negligence. Although he was to go on to a dis-
tinguished career as a practical lawyer, his aca-
demic training had been substantial. Franz von
Liszt, probably the most influential figure in late
nineteenth-century German criminology, had
established a following of successful teachers
whose lectures Mannheim attended. If their
names are now less well known, the same can-
not be said of Max Weber, whose influence on
Mannheim's thinking was as important as that
of Durkheim, although the latter addressed him-
self more directly to problems of social path-
ology.
When World War I erupted, Mannheim be-
came an artilleryman, first on the Russian front,
then, after the collapse of the Czar's armies, in
France. For many of his generation, nurtured
in a climate of scholarship and culture that was
European rather than nationalistic, the war was
a negation of values, conducted by interests as
Philistinic as they were morally suspect. In later
years, in private conversation, Mannheim de-
scribed his intellectual and moral despair, not
only at his proximity to the horrors of the war,
but with the company of professional soldiers
with whom he had so little in common. Toward
the end of the war he was made a judge of
courts-martial.
The end of the war, the collapse of the
Hohenzollern Empire, and the establishment of
the ill-fated Weimar Republic gave Mannheim
the chance to exercise his practical talents. He
served as a legal adviser to local governments
and engaged in the practice of labor law. In this
area he gained experience in administrative
work and with the pressing social problems of
postwar Germany. But by 1923 he had returned
to academic life at the University of Berlin,
where he was appointed Privatdozent in the law
faculty. At the same time he became a magis-
trate in Berlin. Although his teaching was es-
sentially restricted to criminal law, his work in
the courts provided more scope for his crimi-
nological interests. He was progressively pro-
moted toward the superior courts, and his
experience along the way as an examining mag-
istrate—a position that has no counterpart in the
Anglo-Saxon legal system—gave him unique op-
portunities to enlarge his criminolc-gical inter-
ests. By 1929 he had become professor extraor-
dinarius at the university and in 1932 he was
promoted to a judge of the Kammergericht, the
supreme court of Prussia, sitting in the criminal
division.
Thus, at the age of 44, Mannheim had gained
a senior judicial post and a professorship and
had completed some 14 major publications.

Then, in 1933, the course of European history
changed, and with it, the whole of Mannheim's
life. It was clear that men of his moral and in-
tellectual stature were soon to become the prime
targets of the beerhall thugs and Jew-baiters
who, having brought Hitler to power, ruled Ger-
many. He was soon deprived of his academic
post, and rather than accept a transfer from
Berlin to the Rhineland—which he knew was but
a prelude to his eventual dismissal from office-
he retired from the bench and went as an
emigre to England. In 1951, although by now a
British subject, the West German government
conferred on him the rank of retired president
of a division of the court of appeal.
Mannheim was only one of many refugees to
arrive in England in the mid-1930s, and his
position was not easy. He was not only in a
foreign country but had been deprived of both
academic and judicial status. Thus, in addition
to being a refugee he experienced a dramatic
degree of downward social mobility. This, then,
was his challenge. In England he found an en-
tirely different intellectual tradition of social
inquiry, essentially empirical rather than the-
oretical, and directed toward social reform
rather than the accretion of knowledge. It was
a tradition of long standing and, surprisingly
soon, he found a place among its contemporary
exponents. For a man of lesser intellectual sta-
ture this adaptation might not have been possi-
ble, but Mannheim had always been open to
ideas in criminology. Among lawyers of his day
he was distinctly avant-garde in his thinking
about the nature of crime and criminal respon-
sibility, and in his last years in Berlin, moving
between the university and the courts, he had
always based his teaching on his work in the
courts.
Criminology in England was, to all intents
and purposes, a "fringe" interest of the intel-
lectual establishment. It had no base in any
university. The legal profession, officially, was
quite unaware of it. Psychiatrists interested in
the treatment of mentally disordered offenders
were few and were generally regarded as
"cranks" by their fellows in the medical pro-
fession. As for the work of European criminolo-
gists, the natural insularity of British culture
ensured for it a place on the hazy margins of
academic consciousness.
Mannheim quickly made contact with several
influential figures in the world of social work
and social reform and, perfecting his knowledge
of English, he became involved for a while in
MANNHEIM, HERMANN 495
several practical projects, including teaching in
Pentonville Prison, London. In 1935 the L.S.E.
appointed him a lecturer in criminology, but the
post was both honorary and part time. Not until
he was awarded a Leon fellowship at the Uni-
versity of London the following year could he
devote his time to uninterrupted research. The
result of this fellowship was a book entitled
Social Aspects of Crime in England Between the
Wars (1940). Social Aspects reflected not only
the rapidity with which Mannheim had come to
grips with the crime problem in his country of
adoption, but the extent to which he had become
familiar with the work of sociologically oriented
criminology in the United States, exemplified in
the work of the Chicago School. Mannheim gave
further lectures at the L.S.E. and by 1940 had
become a British subject. The L.S.E. had, in the
meanwhile, been evacuated to Cambridge, and in
its wartime atmosphere Mannheim had the op-
portunity to develop and expand his criminologi-
cal teaching with a growing number of stu-
dents. His researches into juvenile delinquency
among the evacuees in wartime Cambridge, pub-
lished under the somewhat inappropriate title
of Juvenile Delinquency in an English Middle-
town (1948), date from that time. Not until
1944 was he appointed to a full-time lectureship,
but two years later he was promoted to reader
in criminology, the first such named academic
post in Britain, which he retained until his re-
tirement in 1955.
He had in the meantime continued to publish
research materials, notably Young Offenders
(1942), a study of juveniles that had been car-
ried out jointly with A. M. Carr-Saunders, the
leading demographer of his day who would
later become director of the L.S.E., and E. C.
Rhodes, then reader in statistics. In 1946 he
published what was probably his most widely
read and, perhaps, most influential book, Crimi-
nal Justice and Social Reconstruction. In its
preface he wrote: "So far, Criminal Justice has
often remained too much behind and out of
touch with the progressive elements of social
thought, and its approach to the problems of
society has been too one-sided to make it a
really living force." His observations on such
subjects as euthanasia, sterilization, and abor-
tion are astonishingly contemporary after three
decades. White-collar crime, the crimes of motor-
ists, they are all scrutinized in a fashion which
is all the more interesting when one considers
how much of what was then "radical" has be-
come the substance of contemporary orthodoxy.
496 MANNHEIM, HERMANN
In the last ten years of his teaching career,
Mannheim made his mark not merely as an
undergraduate teacher, but as a supervisor of
research students. Indeed, it is possible to trace
a kind of "genealogy" of his PH.D. students com-
parable to the "line" established by Edwin H.
Sutherland. The impact of his teaching in En-
gland and the British Commonwealth was im-
mense, not merely in raising a new generation
of academics, but in influencing public servants
concerned with the administration of criminal
justice and with the social policies allied to it.
Although deeply suspicious of positivism,
particularly of the theories of so-called "social
defense" that had been attractive to the totali-
tarian regimes of fascist Italy and Nazi Ger-
many, he had a lifelong desire to see a greater
degree of rationality in criminal policy, not least
in sentencing. To this end he pursued his re-
searches into prediction techniques published as
Prediction Methods in Relation to Borstal Train-
ing (Mannheim & Wilkins 1955). Since Mann-
heim fought long and valiantly against the
arrogance of a judiciary that considered its
prejudices to be encapsulated in the moral con-
science of society, it is hardly surprising that he
argued continually for sentencing with credible
objectives and credible results. That end was
entirely consistent with his liberal social demo-
cratic philosophy. Perhaps he did not foresee the
conflict that would inevitably result from the
ascendancy of the "treatment" ideology and its
challenge by the guardians of the "rule of law,"
per Gault (387 U.S. 1 [1967]).
Mannheim's thinking had a strong utilitarian
bias. His objections to short prison sentences,
for example, were based upon their proven in-
effectiveness. Yet he would probably have op-
posed much current thinking about the need
to shorten sentences on the ground that such
policies were largely instrumental in character.
As an executive member of the Howard League
for Penal Reform he played an important part
in the campaigns for various penal reforms,
notably the fight against capital punishment. He
was also a strong public supporter of reforms in
the laws relating to abortion and homosexuality.
His liberal views were not, however, libertarian.
He opposed abortion on demand, and his close
association with the forensic psychiatrists of his
day confirmed him in the view that homosexu-
ality was an abnormal condition and a proper
subject for psychological treatment.
He wrote prefaces to many of the published
works of his former students, but his last major
work was the 2-volume textbook Comparative
Criminology (1965) published when he was 76.
An Italian translation appeared shortly after his
death. This text, though not of the didactic
quality of much of his earlier work, is an im-
portant source book, not least of crime in the
context of wartime England, a subject that is
poorly documented elsewhere. Mannheim also
founded, together with some of his prewar col-
leagues at the Institute for the Study and Treat-
ment of Delinquency, the British Journal of
Delinquency (later the British Journal of Crimi-
nology}, and he was involved in the formation
of the group that would become the British
Society of Criminology. He traveled widely in
Europe and the United States after World War H.
He was awarded the coronation medal in 1953,
an honorary doctorate in law at Utrecht in
1957, and the Order of the British Empire in
1959.
Mannheim never achieved professional status
at the L.S.E., a fact indicative more of academic
parsimony than lack of merit. As an academic
politician (rather than a scholar), he was con-
spicuously unsuccessful, both in winning pro-
motion himself and in founding an elaborate
empire of research organizations. A proud man,
he suffered his pretentious inferiors less well
than would have served his interests. The
traumata of his demotion from academic and
judicial eminence at the peak of his first career
also left its mark. Yet his coolness toward some
of his academic colleagues could be contrasted
with the warmth that infused his relations with
students.
The volume of Mannheim's published work is
small compared with his spoken output. His
two-hour lectures at the L.S.E. were legendary;
he addressed innumerable public meetings to
every kind of interested audience. He spoke to
social workers, probation officers, prison staff
and prisoners, magistrates and judges. It is a
measure of his contribution that he reached so
wide an audience in his enduring concern to
articulate the academic study of crime with the
practical operations of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Although he never penetrated the inner
fastness of the legal establishment or the so-
cially exclusive circuits of Oxford and Cam-
bridge, his ascendancy in the world of social
administration and sociology was nearly com-
plete. Without his contribution, criminology in
Britain would have been retarded for a gener-
ation.
TERENCE MORRIS

WORKS BY MANNHEIM
1939 The Dilemma of Penal Reform. London: Allen &
Unwin.
1940 Social Aspects of Crime in England Between the
Wars. London: Allen & Unwin.
1941 War and Crime. London: Watts.
1942 MANNHEIM, HERMANN; CARR-SAUNDERS, A. M.;
and RHODES, E. C. Young Offenders. Cambridge
Univ. Press.
1946 Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(1948) 1970 Juvenile Delinquency in an English Mid-
dletown. Montclair, N.J.: Smith, Patterson.
(1955) 1972 Group Problems in Crime and Punish-
ment. 2d ed., enl. Montclair, N.J.: Smith, Patterson.
1955 MANNHEIM, HERMANN; and WILKINS, LESLIE T.
Prediction Methods in Relation to Borstal Training.
London: H. M. Stationery Office.
(1960) 1972 MANNHEIM, HERMANN (editor) Pioneers
in Criminology. 2d ed., enl. Montclair, N.J.: Smith,
Patterson. —> Mannheim wrote a major introduc-
tion.
(1965) 1970 Comparative Criminology. 2 vols. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
MARCUSE, HERBERT
No twentieth-century philosopher, with the
possible exception of Jean Paul Sartre, has been
the object of such lively public controversy as
Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979). Unlike Sartre,
Marcuse remained in relative obscurity until well
into his seventh decade, when he suddenly
emerged as the most potent intellectual force
behind the New Left in the United States and
much of Europe. Enormously popular with the
student generation of the 1960s, he was reviled
by a wide variety of political opponents from
conservative defenders of capitalism to orthodox
Marxists. At the height of the controversy in
1968 he was briefly forced to go into hiding be-
cause of threats from right-wing extremists.
In contrast, the earlier decades of Marcuse's
life were generally uneventful. He was born in
1898 in Berlin, the first of three children of a
Jewish businessman, Carl Marcuse, and his wife,
Gertrud Kreslawsky. He studied at the Mommsen
Gymnasium in Berlin until conscripted into the
German army in 1916. At the end of the war,
he was caught up in the short-lived German
revolution and was elected a member of the Sol-
diers' Council for the Berlin suburb of Reinicken-
dorf. Disappointed by the revolution's outcome,
he quit the Social Democratic party, to which he
had belonged for a short time, and returned to
his studies. In 1919, he entered the University
of Berlin, where he concentrated on German
literature; two years later, he moved to Freiburg
and the study of philosophy. In 1922, he received
his doctorate with a thesis on the Kiinstlerroman,
MARCUSE, HERBERT 497
novels in which artists played central roles. After
a short career in bookselling and publishing, he
returned to Freiburg in 1929 to work for his
Habilitation under Martin Heidegger. His project
was a study entitled Hegels Ontologie und die
Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlich-
keit (1932), which clearly showed his mentor's
influence. In a number of long articles published
in those years, Marcuse attempted to reconcile
Heidegger's version of existentialism with the
Marxism he had recently come to adopt as his
political and theoretical orientation. Although
some later commentators would persist in find-
ing residues of that attempt in his subsequent
work, in particular his critique of technology,
Marcuse soon abandoned the effort.
Because of the Nazi regime's ascent to power,
Marcuse had no chance to receive his Habilita-
tion. He left Freiburg in 1933 to join the staff of
the Institute for Social Research, then head-
quartered in Frankfort. He was immediately as-
signed to its Geneva office, where he remained
until he followed the institute in its migration
to New York and Columbia University in 1934.
Under the leadership of Max Horkheimer, the
institute was then engaged in the formulation
of a radical critique of advanced capitalist so-
ciety, in particular of its fascist and protofascist
forms. This critique was grounded in a variant
of Hegelian Marxism that became known, after
a 1937 essay by Horkheimer, as "Critical Theory."
Marcuse's major task was the development of
the theory itself, which he pursued in a number
of essays in the institute's Zeitschrift fur Sozial-
forschung treating such topics as hedonism
(1938) and philosophy and "Critical Theory"
(1937). Among his initial colleagues at the in-
stitute were Frederick Pollock, Leo Lowenthal,
Erich Fromm, Karl A. Wittfogel, and Henryk
Grossmann. By the end of the 1930s, they were
joined by T. W. Adorno, Franz L. Neumann,
and Otto Kirchheimer. The inner circle of the
institute around Horkheimer would later be
known as the Frankfort School, which achieved
public recognition after the institute returned
to Frankfort following World War u. Although
Marcuse chose to remain in America, he con-
tinued to be identified with his former col-
leagues as a founding member of the school.
During the war, Marcuse was a senior analyst
for the Office of Strategic Services, and then
after 1945, the chief of the research division of
the Department of State's Central European sec-
tion. In 1950, he became a senior fellow at the
Russian Institute of Columbia University; two
498 MARCUSE, HERBERT
years later, he moved to Harvard University's
Russian Research Center, and then in 1954 he
joined Brandeis University as professor of poli-
tics and philosophy. In 1965, he accepted a posi-
tion in the philosophy department at the Univer-
sity of California at San Diego, where he was
compelled to retire in 1970.
As a writer and teacher rather than as a
political activist, Marcuse influenced American
political life. His first full-length study in Amer-
ica, written during his tenure with Horkheimer's
institute, was Reason and Revolution: Hegel and
the Rise of Social Theory (1941). It sought to
rescue G. W. F. Hegel from his alleged connec-
tion with Nazism and to establish his crucial im-
portance for Marx's dialectical thought. Influ-
enced by the recently discovered Paris Manu-
scripts (Marx 1844), whose significance he had
been among the first to recognize, Marcuse
stressed the subjective, critical, humanist dimen-
sions of Marxism as opposed to the scientific and
economistic interpretation of both orthodox
Marxists and most anti-Marxists. He linked their
distorted interpretation to the success of posi-
tivist social theories such as Auguste Comte's
and F. J. Stahl's, which developed in response
to the "negative" philosophy of Hegel and Marx.
He charged positivist social theory in particular
with suppressing the crucial negative tension
between the Classical German Idealists' notion
of Reason (Vernunft*) and the irrationalities of
the given reality. The radical impulse of Hege-
lian thought lay in the drive to rationalize the
world, as the young Hegelians of a century be-
fore, with whom Marcuse was sometimes to be
linked, had understood.
Marcuse's next book, written after his long
hiatus in governmental service, sought to do for
Sigmund Freud what Reason and Revolution
had done for Hegel: rescue him from his con-
servative interpreters. Eros and Civilization
(1955) advanced a boldly imaginative thesis
about the social and political implications of
psychoanalysis, turning even such seemingly
pessimistic concepts as the death instinct in a
radical direction. The crux of Marcuse's argu-
ment lay in his historicization of repression and
the reality principle, which allowed him to posit
the concept of "surplus repression" produced by
the specific reality principle of modern industrial
society. He called the latter the "performance
principle" whose most basic characteristics were
the reification of the body in the service of the
work ethic and the concentration of mature
sexuality in the genitals alone. Despite Freud's
approval of this condition, Marcuse contended
that the current technological capacity to end
scarcity rendered the performance principle
functionally obsolete and with it the surplus re-
pression entailed by genital sexuality. The al-
ternative he proposed was the release of what
Freud had called "polymorphous perversity," a
return to an undifferentiated eroticism that
would approximate the tensionless state of nir-
vana that Freud had seen as the goal of the death
instinct. What had hitherto been tied to aggres-
sion and destruction would thus be rerouted in a
life-fulfilling direction and the ultimate unity of
the life and death instincts would be achieved.
What Friedrich Schiller had called the "play
drive" would become the new reality principle of
a liberated mankind.
In an epilogue to the book, Marcuse attacked
the neo-Freudian revisionists, including his for-
mer colleague Erich Fromm, for their desexual-
ization of psychoanalysis and their premature
attempt to smooth over the contradiction be-
tween society and psyche. For Marcuse, Freud's
seemingly conservative stress on biological
drives had an ultimately radical function be-
cause it implied that corporeal gratification was
a necessary component of full human emanci-
pation. Accordingly, Eros and Civilization earned
him a reputation as a radical Freudian and
placed him, at least in the popular conscious-
ness, alongside Norman O. Brown and Wilhelm
Reich, whose somewhat overlapping readings of
psychoanalysis also nurtured the countercultural
impulse of the 1960s.
Three years later, the publication of Soviet
Marxism (1958), the fruit of Marcuse's tenure
at the Columbia and Harvard Russian Research
Centers, showed even more clearly than his
previous work the extent of his disillusionment
with orthodox Marxism and its alleged realiza-
tion in the Soviet Union. Through an immanent
critique based on Marxist principles, Marcuse
analyzed Stalinism's systematic betrayal of the
promise of socialism. Probing the consequences
of trying to build socialism in one country in a
hostile world, he showed the ways in which the
Soviet Union had come to resemble the societies
it allegedly opposed. Perhaps his most telling
discussion concerned socialist realism, which he
castigated as a harmonistic aesthetic grounded
in the fallacious assumption that social contra-
dictions had already been reconciled. Without
holding out a promise of future happiness, that

"promesse de bonheur" of which Stendhal had
spoken, art would become no more than "affirma-
tive culture" serving the preservation of the
status quo. True art, Marcuse claimed, must con-
tain a critical, negative moment, even in an
allegedly postrevolutionary society.
The disturbing weakening of that moment in
prerevolutionary societies, in particular that of
the contemporary United States, was the subject
of Marcuse's next and perhaps most influential
work, One Dimensional Man (1964). Subtitled
Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial
Society, it analyzed the means through which
potential social protest was contained by ap-
parently noncoercive cultural mechanisms. An
outgrowth of Horkheimer and Adorno's earlier
work on the "culture industry," One Dimensional
Man provided a phenomenology of false con-
sciousness in mass society. The term "one-
dimensionality" referred to the suppression of
that multidimensional dialectic of reason and
reality which had characterized the "negative"
philosophies of Hegel and Marx as well as the
"negative" political practice of the working class
in its classical phase. On the level of academic
philosophy, it signified the triumph of posi-
tivism; on the level of popular ideology, it meant
the acceptance of technological rationality as the
answer to political problems; on the level of per-
sonal happiness, it meant the shortsighted and
shallow hedonism Marcuse called "repressive de-
sublimation." Against the pervasive power of
one-dimensionality, Marcuse could offer little
more than an exhortation to think critically and
preserve the negative moment of art in its still
uncorrupted form. Only through a "great refusal"
of the repressive totality of the present might
the possibility of a future liberated society be
maintained.
The irony of One Dimensional Man's essential
pessimism lay in its influence on the movement
it unexpectedly helped spawn, whose very emer-
gence contradicted Marcuse's belief that the uni-
verse of political discourse had been closed to
radical challenges. Taking seriously his widely
discussed argument in his essay, "Repressive
Tolerance" (Wolff, Moore, & Marcuse 1965,
pp. 81-117), the more militant members of the
New Left practiced the liberating intolerance of
denying the right to speak of conservative
spokesmen, especially those defending the Viet-
nam War. Marcuse's justification of a " 'natural
right' of resistance for oppressed and over-
powered minorities to use extralegal means if
MARCUSE, HERBERT 499
the legal ones have proved inadequate" was cited
as support for acts as disparate as civil rights
sit-ins and terrorist bombings, even though he
explicitly condemned the latter.
In part because of the notoriety won him by
this stance, several volumes of his earlier essays
were reissued as Kultur und Gesellschaft
(1965), Negations (1934-1938), and Studies in
Critical Philosophy (1932-1969); they were sup-
plemented by newer writings entitled An Essay
on Liberation (1969) and Five Lectures (1957-
1967). In the latter he returned to the specu-
lative optimism of Eros and Civilization and
combined elements of the erotic and aesthetic
themes of his previous work to call for a more
Utopian emphasis in radical theory. Outlining a
defense of basic human needs, which he
grounded in a loosely defined notion of biology,
Marcuse attempted to articulate and crystallize
the often inchoate desires of the movement he
had helped inspire.
Within a few years, however, Marcuse came
to recognize the very serious limitations of the
negative impulses he had praised in the 1960s.
Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972) dealt with
the strength of the preventive and cooptive
powers of advanced capitalism into whose hands
the anti-intellectualism of much of the New
Left had played. The emancipation of sensibility
he had celebrated in An Essay on Liberation had
to be accompanied by an emancipation of ra-
tional consciousness, which could only be nur-
tured through rigorous education. To those who
had understood him to say that universities were
solely the instruments of repression, he replied
that without an active intellectual life no serious
threat to the status quo could be mounted. And
once again, he cited art as a repository of nega-
tion in an era of counterrevolutionary consolida-
tion, an argument he elaborated in his 1978
extended essay, The Aesthetic Dimension, which
repudiated the instrumentalization of art in the
name of immediate political efficacy.
However one may contest certain of Marcuse's
specific arguments—and there has been no short-
age of controversy over their validity—it cannot
be doubted that he played a highly crucial role
in the reorientation of radical thought in the
second half of the twentieth century. By stress-
ing cultural and aesthetic issues, he helped free
Marxism from its economistic bias. By develop-
ing psychological and biological themes, he en-
riched our appreciation of personal gratification
as an ineradicable goal of drastic social change.
 500 MARSCHAK, JACOB
By insisting on the Utopian moment in the
socialist dream, he gave voice to the discontents
of those resisting the false comforts of institu-
tionalized socialist regimes. As a result he will
remain long identified with the extraordinary
generation of the 1960s, whose ideals and stra-
tegies he helped formulate. And paradoxically,
he will be remembered as well by those eager to
understand the ways in which those ideals were
thwarted and those strategies undermined. For
there have been few Utopian writers with as keen
a sense of the obstacles to Utopia as Herbert Mar-
cuse, at once the bold essayist on liberation and
the somber analyst of one-dimensional man.
MARTIN JAY
WORKS BY MARCUSE
1932 Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer
Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit. Frankfort (Ger-
many): Klostermann.
(1932-1969) 1972 Studies in Critical Philosophy.
Translated by Joris de Bres. London: New Left
Books. —^ Contains studies originally written in Ger-
man and English between 1932 and 1969.
(1934-1938) 1968 Negations: Essays in Critical The-
ory. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston: Bea-
con. —> Contains essays originally published be-
tween 1934 and 1938.
1937 Philosophic und kritische Theorie. Zeitschrift fur
Sozialforschung 6:631-647.
1938 Zur Kritik des Hedonismus. Zeitschrift fur So-
zialforschung 7:55-89.
(1941) 1968 Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the
Rise of Social Theory. 2d ed. New York: Humanities
Press.
(1955) 1966 Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical In-
quiry into Freud. Boston: Beacon. —» A paperback
edition was published in 1974.
(1957-1967) 1970 Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Poli-
tics and Utopia. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro
and Shierry Weber. Boston: Beacon. —» Contains
lectures originally delivered in German (with one
exception) between 1957 and 1967.
(1958) 1961 Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis.
New York: Vintage. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1968 by Random House.
(1964) 1968 One Dimensional Man: Studies in the
Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston:
Beacon.
1965 Kultur und Gesellschaft. 2 vols. Frankfort (Ger-
many): Suhrkamp.
1965 WOLFF, ROBERT PAUL; MOORE, BARRINGTON, JR.;
and MARCUSE, HERBERT A Critique of Pure Toler-
ance. Boston: Beacon.
1969 An Essay on Liberation. Boston: Beacon.
1972 Counterrevolution and Revolt. Boston: Beacon.
1978a The Aesthetic Dimension. Boston: Beacon.
1978b Gesprdche mit Herbert Marcuse. Frankfort (Ger-
many): Suhrkamp.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BREINES, PAUL (editor) 1970 Critical Interruptions:
New Left Perspectives on Herbert Marcuse. New
York: Herder.
COHEN, ALAIN J. 1974 Marcuse: Le scenario freudo-
marxien. Paris: Editions Universitaires.
HABERMAS, JURGEN (editor) 1968 Antworten auf
Herbert Marcuse. Frankfort (Germany): Suhrkamp.
HOLZ, HANS HEINZ 1968 Utopie und Anarchismus:
Zur Kritik der kritischen Theorie Herbert Marcuses.
Cologne (Germany): Pahl-Rugenstein.
JAY, MARTIN 1973 The Dialectical Imagination: A
History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of
Social Research, 1923-1950. Boston: Little, Brown.
KING, RICHARD 1972 The Party of Eros: Radical
Thought and the Realm of Freedom. Chapel Hill:
Univ. of North Carolina Press.
LAPOINTE, FRANCOIS H. 1973 Herbert Marcuse: A
Bibliographic Essay. Journal of the British Society
for Phenomenology 4:191-194. —» Contains a com-
prehensive bibliography of commentaries on Mar-
cuse published before 1973.
LIPSHIRES, SIDNEY 1974 Herbert Marcuse: From
Marx to Freud and Beyond. Cambridge, Mass:
Schenkman.
MAC!NTYRE, ALASDAIR C. 1970 Herbert Marcuse: An
Exposition and a Polemic. New York: Viking.
MARKS, ROBERT W. 1970 The Meaning of Marcuse.
New York: Ballantine.
MARX, KARL (1844) 1964 Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844. New York: International Pub-
lishers; London: Lawrence & Wisehart. —» First
published in German in 1932. Sometimes referred
to as the "Paris Manuscripts of 1844."
MATTICK, PAUL 1972 Critique of Marcuse: One Di-
mensional Man in Class Society. London: Merlin;
New York: Herder.
NICOLAS, ANDRE 1969 Herbert Marcuse ou la quete
d'un univers transprometheen. Paris: Editions Seg-
hers.
ROBINSON, PAUL A. 1969 The Freudian Left: Wil-
helm Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse. New
York: Harper.
SLATER, PHIL 1977 Origin and Significance of the
Frankfurt School: A Marxist Perspective. London:
Routledge.
VIVAS, ELISEO 1971 Contra Marcuse. New York: Dell.
WOLFF, KURT H.; and MOORE, BARRINGTON, JR. (edi-
tors) 1967 The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor
of Herbert Marcuse. Boston: Beacon. —> Includes a
complete bibliography of Marcuse's works up to
1967.
MARSCHAK, JACOB
Jacob Marschak was born in 1898 in Kiev,
capital of the Ukraine, and died in 1977 in Los
Angeles, California, still in active service as
professor of economics and business administra-
tion at the University of California at Los
Angeles and as president-elect of the American
Economic Association. These bare facts suggest
the long and varied odyssey of his career and
his high, though slowly developing, position in
American economics.
Marschak's scholarly career spanned 55 years
and 3 very different environments: Ger-
many of the Weimar period, the United King-
dom of the great depression, and the United
States from World War n on. The world econ-

omy and economists' perceptions and theories
were altering rapidly, and Marschak experi-
enced the additional variance due to interna-
tional differences in academic environment,
especially in traditions and modes of economic
thought. To all these influences must be added
the fact that he was a Russian and a Jew, whose
educational and political formation derived
from a particular period of Russian history that
had little in common with the life of his host
countries.
It is not surprising therefore that his focus as
an economist should have showed considerable
changes of direction over his long and produc-
tive lifetime. His early empirical and practical
interests yielded increasingly to theoretical and
methodological themes; his youthful political
interests subsided, and he became increasingly
aloof from political affairs and even from spe-
cific proposals of economic policy.
But there was an underlying continuity of
purpose and approach through all the changes
in Marschak's thought and work. At all times, it
was marked by an extraordinary ability to syn-
thesize. The problem in hand, whatever it might
be, was to be approached from every useful
angle. Every good idea and theoretical presup-
position was to be drawn upon while being sub-
jected to severe criticism of its utility, clarity of
expressions, and contribution to the understand-
ing of economic issues.
The process was marked by a remarkable
openness to new ideas and methods, to which
Marschak would add his own improvements and
clarifications. These talents enabled him to be-
come a leader of research organizations, first
at a relatively young age in Germany, and, with
increasing importance, as director of the Oxford
Institute of Statistics (1935-1939) and as di-
rector of the Cowles Commission for Research
in Economics at the University of Chicago
(1943-1948), a fertile period of great influence
on the course of economic analysis in several
diverse fields.
Only after 1948 did Marschak begin to make
the contributions to economic analysis that are
most distinctively his own. Yet in curious ways
the subject matter of his studies was consonant
with the characteristics of his earlier career. An
organizer of economic research, he became a
theorist of organization. A student and critic of
new developments in economic analysis, he de-
veloped the economics of information. A skeptic
distrustful of received dogma, he studied the
economics of uncertainty.
MARSCHAK, JACOB 501
Another characteristic of Marschak's work is
its recurrent interdisciplinary tendency. Some
of his early papers dealt with class structure
and with the emerging phenomenon of Italian
fascism. From 1928 to about 1953, the titles of
his papers were more narrowly within the field
of economics as currently understood, though
not infrequently their content referred to
broader notions derived from politics, sociology,
and, later, individual psychology. But his work
on information and organization led to a series
of experimental and theoretical studies on the
psychology of decision making. During his last
15 years, he organized an interdisciplinary
seminar in the behavioral sciences that provided
a main source of contact among mathematical
modelers with widely divergent substantive in-
terests.
A more detailed account of Marschak's evolv-
ing contributions and career demands a chrono-
logical framework. His parents were well-to-do
Russian Jews, assimilated in culture; he learned
German and French from his governesses. He
received some formal religious education but
was never religious. His family sympathized
with the revolution of 1905; Marschak in later
life remembered the pogrom that followed. Re-
fused admittance to Gymnasium at age nine be-
cause of the very small Jewish quota, he was
admitted instead to the First Kiev School of
Commerce.
After engaging in the very common group
discussions about which revolutionary group to
join, he became a Marxist in 1915, at the same
time that he entered the Kiev School of Tech-
nology. He joined the Menshevik Internation-
alist (antiwar) faction, was arrested with others
in December 1916, and was released with the
fall of the Czar in February 1917. He joined the
municipal government, a coalition that broke
up in October in a three-cornered battle among
supporters of the Kerensky government, the
Bolsheviks, and the Ukrainians, who wanted a
separate state; the last group won.
Marschak and his entire family left for a re-
sort in the Terek region in the northern Cau-
casus. There political activity was also intense.
The Bolsheviks took the lead in organizing all
the Russian political parties against the Moslem
mountaineers; the coalition was also intended
as a counterweight to the Cossacks, with whom
there was an uneasy alliance. Marschak became
secretary of labor in this government. Within
it, he led the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolu-
tionaries in opposing recognition of the Bolshe-
502 MARSCHAK, JACOB
vik government in Petrograd until the elected
constituent assembly was allowed to meet. By
June 1918, there was a three-sided conflict
among the Mensheviks, the Cossacks, and the
Bolsheviks, now allied with the mountaineers.
Marschak was essentially a press relations of-
ficer, composing manifestos explaining the Men-
shevik government's aims. The government
gradually fell under the control of a local dic-
tator. Marschak eventually rejoined his family,
and they all returned to Kiev, still under the
Ukrainian government.
Like other friends and political colleagues, he
felt there was no longer any viable political
cause with which to associate. After some brief
study of statistics at the Kiev Institute of Eco-
nomics, he decided to take up economics in
Germany. He studied for some six months at the
University of Berlin in 1919. According to his
later accounts, this was an important period;
he attended the lectures of the economist and
statistician Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz, and first
learned from him the importance of mathe-
matical and statistical methods in economic
analysis. He then moved to the University of
Heidelberg, where he received his PH.D. in 1922.
Economics in Germany was a broad subject;
Marschak studied not only with the economist
Emil Lederer, a strong advocate of quantitative
analysis, but also with the philosopher Karl
Jaspers and the sociologist Alfred Weber.
A number of Mensheviks were among the
Russian immigrants into Germany. Because of
the good relations between the Mensheviks and
the German Social Democrats, the latter helped
Marschak get started on his career. He was an
economics reporter for the famous newspaper
the Frankfurter Zeitung from 1924 to 1926,
after which he joined the staff of the For-
schungsstelle fur Wirtschaftspolitik (Research
Center for Economic Policy) in Berlin, sponsored
by the labor unions and the Social Democratic
party. He also spent some months in England
in 1927 on a Rockefeller Foundation travelling
fellowship, the first of several occasions when
he was granted support from that source. His
interests and aspirations shifted increasingly
toward the academic. His Russian accent and
Jewish origin were obstacles eventually over-
come. He joined the staff of the University of
Kiel's Institut fur Seeverkehr und Weltwirt-
schaft (Institute for World Economics), headed
by Bernhard Harms, a skillful academic entrepre-
neur with a good eye for quality in those who
had difficulty finding academic posts. In 1930
he was appointed Privatdozent at the University
of Heidelberg.
His work during the 1920s outside of journal-
ism was largely devoted to industry studies; at
Kiel he directed a large study on export indus-
tries for the Reichstag. Among the papers with
the greatest permanent interest were his first
(1923), on the raging debate started by Ludwig
von Mises on the possibility of a rationally
planned socialist society; he argued that the
market system could not only be used under
socialism but was likely to work better there
than under the monopolistic distortions of ac-
tual capitalism. It is interesting to see here the
earliest manifestation of his later interests in
organization theory. The other major paper of
this period was a study of the "new middle class"
(1926), the white-collar workers who, it was
argued, were economically workers but socio-
logically middle class. It was a detailed empiri-
cal study, a pioneer in its field.
His empirical work led him into studies of
demand. He began to participate in the growing
econometric movement (not yet so-named) in
which formal statistical methods and economic
theory were used jointly to interpret empirical
economic data. His careful work on the elas-
ticity of demand (1931b) was, with the con-
temporary works of Wassily Leontief and
Ragnar Frisch, a major contribution to the de-
velopment of the field. He also started, with
Walther Lederer, a major empirical study of
capital formation financed by the Rockefeller
Foundation; because of the political upheavals,
it was not published until 1936 in England, in
the original German. In response to the depres-
sion, he was among the younger German econ-
omists who advocated compensatory public
works policy years before the publication of
Keynes's The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money (1936).
In 1933 he immediately perceived the conse-
quences of the Nazi accession to power. He had
by this time achieved sufficient international
reputation to have been invited to write two
articles in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sci-
ences (193la; 1935). Through the good offices
of Redvers Opie, he was appointed Chichele
lecturer at All Souls College, Oxford, a position
designed for refugees. In general, English eco-
nomics was far in advance of German, but
Marschak's quantitative skills brought an ele-
ment that Oxford lacked. Two years later, the
Oxford Institute of Statistics was created, again
with Rockefeller Foundation support, for sys-

tematic empirical work. Through Opie and Roy
F. Harrod, Marschak was made director. Though
treated with great reserve by most of the Oxford
economics faculty, the institute became a world-
recognized center of empirical analysis in eco-
nomics. Marschak himself, with Helen Makower
and H. W. Robinson, carried out a study of the
geographical mobility of labor that represented
probably the first true fusion of theoretical rea-
soning with formal statistical analysis in this
area (1938). As befits the period, differentials
in unemployment rates among cities were found
to be a chief determinant of mobility.
His work on demand and on capital forma-
tion deepened and developed into more theoreti-
cal and methodological studies. The earliest of
his papers that are still influential today were
two on money and the theory of assets, one with
Makower, in which he introduced the portfolio
approach to the demand for mony as one among
a set of assets (Marschak 1938; Marschak &
Makower 1938). He therefore stressed the re-
lationship of money holdings to wealth, rather
than income, as had the Cambridge and Fisher
approaches, and above all, derived the demand
for different kinds of assets from the uncertain-
ties connected with their holding. Although
ideas of this kind had long been informally ex-
pressed, this was their first true modeling. Since
the expected-utility theory of behavior under
uncertainty was then in limbo because it ap-
peared to conflict with the ordinal concept of
utility, Marschak had an alternative criterion
function, an indifference map in the space of
the first two or three moments of the probability
distribution of returns.
In 1939 some methodologically and practically
important papers on demand analysis appeared
in several journals. In particular, they studied
the usefulness of budget studies in developing
the consumption function, showed how to com-
bine budget and time series studies, and studied
the aggregation of individual demand functions
into a national total.
Marschak spent the period from December
1938 to August 1939 in the United States as a
Rockefeller Foundation travelling fellow. An-
ticipating the outbreak of World War n, he ar-
ranged for his family to be brought over. In
1940 he was appointed professor of economics
in the graduate faculty of the New School for
Social Research, a faculty created largely to ac-
commodate the flood of German refugee schol-
ars and make use of their talents. At the same
time he organized, through the National Bureau
MARSCHAK, JACOB 503
of Economic Research, a seminar in mathe-
matical economics and econometrics that served
as a clearing house for a flood of new ideas,
primarily, though not exclusively, for the grow-
ing group of European scholars; after the out-
break of the war they came not only from Ger-
many but also from such occupied countries as
Norway and the Netherlands.
One of the great motivating forces in quanti-
tative research in this period was Jan Tinber-
gen's massive study (1939) of business cycles,
conducted for the League of Nations. Like many
large-scale studies, its most important scientific
effects occurred after it was completed, in the
reflections by participants and critics on the
ways in which it could be done better. Ragnar
Frisch had perceived while the investigation was
under way that statistical inference in the case
of simultaneous relations posed new problems
not dreamed of in the philosophy of regression
analysis. His student Trygve Haavelmo, in the
United States during the war, developed the
principles of maximum likelihood estimation of
simultaneous equations (1943); this was among
the papers presented at Marschak's seminar.
The importance of Haavelmo's work was im-
mediately recognized within a small circle in
New York. Marschak wrote a paper on its gen-
eral philosophy as early as 1942; the theoretical
statisticians Henry B. Mann and Abraham Wald
(1943) proved a fundamental consistency
property of the estimates; and Tjailing Koop-
mans, who had earlier worked on Tinbergen's
study and had found the distribution of the
serial correlation coefficient (a closely related
statistical problem), was drawn into the field
of simultaneous-equations estimation.
At this moment there occurred an unusual
conjunction of opportunities. In 1943 Marschak
was appointed director of the Cowles Commis-
sion for Research in Economics and professor
of economics at the University of Chicago. The
commission had been founded and supported
by Alfred R. Cowles, 3rd, an investment man-
ager who had also been treasurer of the Econo-
metric Society in its early days and contributed
to its support. The commission had pioneered in
the use of econometric methods; in particular,
its prewar summer conferences at Colorado
Springs attracted the leaders in the then small
sect of econometricians. Marschak had attended
the 1937 summer conference and then been
offered the directorship.
During Marschak's directorship (1943-1948),
the central focus of the commission's work was
 504 MARSCHAK, JACOB
the development of economy-wide models for
predictive and structural analysis. For this two
elements were needed; the further development
of the appropriate statistical methods, and the
economic theory for the equations to be fitted.
For the latter the impetus came from John May-
nard Keynes and his American followers. Mar-
schak's receptivity to arguments about purchas-
ing power enabled him to accept the Keynesian
theory with little of the difficulties that many
others had; but by the same token he lacked the
dogmatism of many of the newly converted
English and American economists. Several pa-
pers in 1940 and 1941 expounded Keynesian
policies and theories and related them to earlier
European thought, especially Knut Wicksell's;
many of the methodological confusions in the
literature on identities, equilibrium, and stabil-
ity were cleared up in an important paper of
1942 (Marschak 1942£>). Marschak supervised
Franco Modigliani's dissertation at the New
School, for a long time the most influential ex-
position of Keynes. But the highly specific disci-
pline of fitting a complete model meant that the
Keynesian apparatus had to be specified in far
more detail than had been needed for more
general expositions and vague policy statements.
There was a small but increasing band of
young economists who found mathematics and
formal thinking important tools. Moreover, sta-
tistical theory was just beginning to be taught
and to attract significant numbers of students.
Neither of these groups was in great demand.
The academic market during the war and the
immediate postwar period was not strong; math-
ematical economics was little regarded, and
theoretical statistics had yet to find a suitable
academic home. Marschak seized the opportun-
ity to attract a remarkable staff at bargain
prices. He secured a tenure faculty appointment
for Koopmans, but the rest were appointed on a
purely research basis. Lawrence Klein developed
the model and the data. Haavelmo was there for
a few years, working on both model develop-
ment and statistical methodology. The main de-
velopments in theoretical statistics were carried
out by Koopmans and the theoretical statisti-
cians Theodore W. Anderson, and Herman
Rubin. Kenneth J. Arrow and Leonid Hurwicz
worked on problems of economic theory and sta-
tistical inference suggested by the basic model-
ing effort, though sometimes going far afield.
Among the University of Chicago graduate stu-
dents drawn into the work, mention must be
made of Don Patinkin, whose thesis under
Marschak's supervision was a milestone in the
integration of Keynesian and monetary theory
with neoclassical general equilibrium analysis;
his subsequent appointment at the Hebrew Uni-
versity of Jerusalem, where he refashioned the
economics department, stemmed from a recom-
mendation by Marschak to Fritz Naphtali, who
had headed the Forschungsstelle fur Wirtschafts-
politik during Marschak's stay. Indeed, the com-
mission in this period had scholars as well as
scholarship as an output, and it is a close ques-
tion which was the more valuable.
Marschak's role was to give vision and drive.
He did not impose direction; rather, he released
the energies of the research associates and saw
that they flowed in their own most productive
channels. He insisted,on understanding the es-
sence of the most technical developments, and,
by requiring explanations, forced the staff to
understand their own work and its significance
better. His introductions to the volumes in
which the statistical methodology was presented
penetrated remarkably deeply, clearly, and
tersely to the essentials of the issues.
He also carried out one major study of his
own, with William H. Andrews (1944), the first
application in fact of the simultaneous equa-
tions technique to the estimation of production
functions. Difficulties of interpretation had been
found in the pioneering work of Paul Douglas;
these were shown to be resolvable by the new
statistical approaches.
During the same period Marschak reverted
once to his old field of industry studies, though
in a new context. Through his personal relations
with Leo Szilard and the other European scien-
tists at Chicago who had participated in the Man-
hattan Project, he came to feel that the econo-
mist's perspective was important in assessing
the future of atomic energy. He initiated such a
study at the Cowles Commission and wrote a
summary introduction. The bulk of the actual
study was done by others, particularly Sam
Schurr and Herbert Simon, but Marschak's judg-
ment was amply confirmed. Straightforward
economic analysis showed that the impact of
atomic energy could be nothing like the total
transformation envisaged by the technologists
and by many intellectuals.
Upon turning the directorship of the Cowles
Commission over to Koopmans in 1948, Mar-
schak moved very rapidly into pure scholarship,
indeed into more abstract and theoretical work
than anything before. He was greatly excited by
the revival by John von Neumann and Oskar

Morgenstern of the expected-utility theory in its
axiomatic form; by Abraham Wald's exploration
of the foundations of statistical decision theory;
and by the axiomatic development of subjective
probability theory by Leonard J. Savage and by
Rubin and Herman Chernoff at the Cowles
Commission. His most immediate application
was to his old subject, the demand for money
and other assets (1949).
But his interests found new focus. Attempts
to clarify the concept of liquidity showed the
importance to economic behavior of anticipating
new information. He was led to a series of
studies on the economics of information. The
value or demand price of information in any
context was governed by the additional benefit
that could be obtained by its optimal use. The
approach was initiated in a paper of 1954 and
summarized in 1971. The subject broached by
Marschak has become a major research area, his
most noteworthy immediate influences being
on his student Roy Radner and on his colleague
at the University of California, Jack Hirshleifer.
The importance of communication and its
limits in the transmission of information led to
a new approach to the study of organization, a
simplification of the theory of games known as
the theory of teams. It appeared in the same
1954 paper as the evaluation of information (an
earlier version had appeared in French the pre-
ceding year at an extraordinarily interesting
conference on the theory of risk bearing). A
team is an organization in which the members
have the same preferences and prior beliefs, but
have different information and choose different
actions. The problem is the choice of optimal
decision rules, prescribing for each member his
action as a function of his information. This
framework makes precise the meaning of in-
formational decentralization, a concept of such
central importance in the controversy on social-
ist planning which was the subject of his first
paper. Characteristically, the analysis does not
so much solve the problem as put it in an en-
tirely different and much more varied setting.
His work in the theory of teams, with Radner,
was embodied in a book (1972).
The third major area of his research after
1948 was stochastic decision. It is recognized
that individuals are not thoroughly consistent,
and yet the theory of rational behavior has some
foundation. Individuals are assumed to make
choices randomly about a rational (transitive
and connected) pattern. This thesis has been
developed both theoretically and experimentally;
MARSCHAK, JACOB 505
typical papers appeared in 1960 and, with
G. Becker and M. DeGroot, in 1963. This work
so far has had greater impact on psychologists
than on economists, though it has recently be-
come the basis of Daniel McFadden's work
(1976) on choice among alternative transpor-
tation modes.
In 1955 Marschak left Chicago for Yale Uni-
versity along with the Cowles Commission, now
renamed the Cowles Foundation for Research in
Economics. He did not stay long; in 1960 he
accepted the post of professor of economics and
business administration at the University of
California at Los Angeles, where he remained.
Official retirement did not change his activities
at all; he remained as active in teaching and
research when emeritus as he had been before.
For most of his American career, Marschak
had had a reputation as being rather esoteric; and
his later broad interests did not change that
view. But widespread recognition grew, espe-
cially as his former students and junior col-
leagues themselves became information dissem-
inators. He was elected fellow of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1962, distin-
guished fellow of the American Economic As-
sociation in 1967, and member of the National
Academy of Sciences in 1972; he received hon-
orary degrees from the University of Bonn in
1968, his old University of Heidelberg in 1972,
and Northwestern University in 1977. In 1976
he was finally nominated and elected president-
elect of the American Economic Association for
the year 1977. According to the custom of the
association, the president-elect prepares the an-
nual meeting and becomes president the follow-
ing year. Marschak had completed all arrange-
ments for the December 1977 meeting when he
died in the summer of that year.
KENNETH J. ARROW
BIBLIOGRAPHY
This article was based largely on personal communi-
cations and reminiscences of Lawrence Klein, Tjalling
Koopmans, Karl Lachman, Carl Landauer, Walther
Lederer, Adolph Lowe, Helen Makower, Redvers Opie,
Don Patinkin, Roy Radner, Hans Speier, and the author.
Important material on Marschak's early life is found in
an oral history interview with him, "Notes on Recollec-
tions of Kiev and the Northern Caucasus, 1917-18,"
conducted by Richard A. Pierce and on file at the Re-
gional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, University
of California, Berkeley.
WORKS BY MARSCHAK
1923 Wirtschaftsrechnung und Gemeinwirtschaft. Ar-
chiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 51:
488-500.
506 MARSCHAK, JACOB
1924 Der korporative und der hierarchische Gedanke
im Fascismus. Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und
Sozialpolitik 52:81-140.
1926 Der Neue Mittelstand. Grundriss der Sozialo-
konomik 9, no. 1:120-141.
1926 MARSCHAK, JACOB; and LEDERER, EMIL Die Klas-
sen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und ihre Organisationen.
Grundriss der Sozialikonomik 9. no. 2:106-258.
1930 Berichte des Enquete-ausschusses des Reichstags
uber exportierende Industrien: Pflanzenole, Marga-
rine, Gold- und Silberverarbeitung, Uhren, Glas-
waren, Porzellan und Steingut, Kosmetik, Spiel-
waren, Ledererzeugung und -verarbeitung, Schuhe,
Handschuhe. Prepared at the Institut fiir Weltwirt-
schaft, Kiel. Berlin: The Institute.
1931a Consumption: Problems of Measurement. Vol-
ume 4, pages 295—301 in Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences. New York: Macmillan.
1931b Einige Thesen zur Krisenpolitik. Wirtschafts-
dienst 16, no. 51:2041-2042.
1931c Elastizitdt der Nachfrage. Tubingen (Ger-
many): J. C. B. Mohr.
1935 Wages: Theory and Policy. Volume 15, pages
291-302 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.
New York: Macmillan.
1936 MARSCHAK, JACOB; and LEDERER, WALTHER Kap-
italbildung. London: Hodge.
1938 Money and the Theory of Assets. Econometrica
6:311-325.
1938 MARSCHAK, JACOB; and MAKOWER, HELEN Assets,
Prices and Monetary Theory. Economica New Series
5:261-288.
1938 MARSCHAK, JACOB; MAKOWER, HELEN; and ROB-
INSON, H. W. Studies in the Mobility of Labor: A
Tentative Statistical Measure. Oxford Economic
Papers 1:83-123.
1939a Family Budgets and the So-called Multiplier.
Canadian Journal of Economics 5:358-362.
1939b On Combining Market and Budget Data in De-
mand Studies: A Suggestion. Econometrica 7:332-
335.
1939c Personal and Collective Budget Functions. Re-
view of Economic Statistics 21:161-170.
1939 MARSCHAK, JACOB; MAKOWER, HELEN; and ROB-
INSON, H. W. Studies in the Mobility of Labour:
Analysis for Great Britain, Part I. Oxford Economic
Papers 2:70-97.
1940 MARSCHAK, JACOB; MAKOWER, HELEN; and ROB-
INSON, H. W. Studies in the Mobility of Labour:
Analysis for Great Britain, Part II. Oxford Economic
Papers 4:39-62.
1941a Lack of Confidence. Social Research 8:41-62.
1941fe Wicksell's Two Interest Rates. Social Research
8:469-478.
1942a Economic Interdependence and Statistical Anal-
ysis. Pages 135-150 in Oscar Lange et al. (editors),
Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econo-
metrics in Memory of Henry Schultz. Univ. of Chi-
cago Press.
1942b Identity and Stability in Economics: A Survey.
Econometrica 10:61-74.
1944 MARSCHAK, JACOB; and ANDREWS, WILLIAM H.
Random Simultaneous Equations and the Theory of
Production. Econometrica 12:143-205.
1949 Role of Liquidity Under Complete and Incom-
plete Information. American Economic Review 39:
182-195.
1950 Statistical Inference in Economics: An Introduc-
tion. Pages 1-50 in T. C. Koopmans (editor), Sta-
tistical Inference in Dynamic Economic Models.
New York: Wiley.
1950 SCHURR, SAM; and MARSCHAK, JACOB (editors)
Economic Aspects of Atomic Power: An Exploratory
Study. Princeton Univ. Press.
1951 MARSCHAK, JACOB; ARROW, KENNETH J.; and
HARRIS, THEODORE E. Optimal Inventory Policy.
Econometrica 19:250-272.
1953a Economic Measurements for Policy and Predic-
tion. Pages 1-26 in W. C. Hood and T. C. Koop-
mans (editors), Studies in Econometric Method.
New York: Wiley.
1953k Equipes et organisations en regime d'incertitude.
Pages 201-211 in Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, Econometric: Collogues Internationaux
du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,
No. 40. Paris: The Center. —> Colloquia held May
12-17, 1952 in Paris.
1954 Towards an Economic Theory of Organization
and Information. Pages 187-220 in R. M. Thrall
and R. L. Davis (editors), Decision Processes. New
York: Wiley.
1960a Binary-choice Constraints and Random Utility
Indicators. Pages 312-329 in Kenneth J. Arrow,
S. Karlin, and P. Suppes (editors), Mathematical
Models in the Social Sciences. Stanford Univ. Press.
1960b Remarks on the Economics of Information.
Pages 79—98 in Contributions to Scientific Research
in Management. Los Angeles: Western Data Pro-
cessing Center, Graduate School of Business Admin-
istration, University of California.
1963 MARSCHAK, JACOB; BECKER, GORDON; and DE-
GROOT, MORRIS An Experimental Study of Some
Stochastic Models for Wagers. Behavioral Science
8:199-202.
1968 Decision Making: II. Economic Aspects. Volume
4, pages 42—55 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
1968 MARSCHAK, JACOB; and MIYASAWA, KOICHI Eco-
nomic Comparability of Information Systems. Inter-
national Economic Review 19:137—174.
1971 Economics of Information Systems. Pages 32-
107 in Michael Intriligator (editor), The Frontiers
of Quantitative Economics. Amsterdam: North-Hol-
land.
1972 MARSCHAK, JACOB; and RADNER, ROY Economic
Theory of Teams. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1975 Entropy, Economics, Physics. Pages 30-37 in
Norman A. Chigier and Edward A. Stern (editors),
Collective Phenomena and the Applications of Phys-
ics to Other Fields of Science. Fayetteville, N.Y.:
Brain Research Publications.
1977a Economic Information, Decision, and Prediction.
3 vols. Dodrecht (Netherlands): Reidl. -» A bibli-
ography of Marschak's publications through 1975 is
on pages xvii—xviii in volume 1.
1977b Guided Soul-searching for Multi-criterion De-
cision. Pages 1-16 in Milan Zeleny and Martin K.
Starr (editors), Multiple-criteria Decision-making.
New York: Springer-Verlag.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GARVEY, GEORGE 1975 Keynes and the Economic Ac-
tivists of pre-Hitler Germany. Journal of Political
Economy 83:391-405.
HAAVELMO, TRYGVE 1943 The Statistical Implications
of a System of Simultaneous Equations. Econo-
metrica 11:173-220.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmil-
lan. —» A paperback edition was published in 1965
by Harcourt.
MCFADDEN, DANIEL 1976 Quantal Choice Analysis: A

Survey. Annals of Economic and Social Measure-
ment 5:363-390.
McGuiRE, C. B.; and RADNER, ROY (editors) 1972
Decision and Organization: A Volume in Honor of
Jacob Marschak. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
MANN, HENRY B.; and WALD, ABRAHAM 1943 On the
Statistical Treatment of Linear Stochastic Difference
Equations. Econometrica 11:173-220.
TINBERGEN, JAN (1939) 1968 Statistical Testing of
Business Cycle Theories. 2 vols. New York: Agatha
Press. —» Volume 1: A Method and Its Application
to Investment Activity. Volume 2: Business Cycles
in the United States of America, 1919-1932. First
published for the Economic Intelligence Service of
the League of Nations.
MARSHALL, T. H.
Thomas Humphrey Marshall, a British so-
ciologist, was born in London on December 19,
1893. He was the son of a successful architect
and grew up in a well-to-do professional en-
vironment. He attended a public school with
children of a similar class background. His
genuine and enduring interest in class inequal-
ity and social problems did not emerge until
he attended Cambridge University to study his-
tory. There he "first became aware of meeting
young men of working-class origin on equal
terms" (1973, p. 88). During his undergraduate
years, the two teachers who influenced him
most decisively were the economic historian
John Harold Clapham and the American medi-
eval scholar Gaillard Lapsley. As a result of
his close reading of the classics of medieval
social structure, he received a thorough train-
ing in the use of sociological categories. Then,
during his four years as a civilian prisoner of
the Germans during World War i in the camp
at Ruhleben, he began to take a serious interest
in the analysis of the development of organiza-
tional bonds and social institutions. In his brief
autobiography, he wrote that "Ruhleben breached
the defences of the secluded world of the bour-
geois intelligentsia in which I had been brought
up, but the full effects of this were not realized
until I had engaged in another adventure after
my return to England" (ibid., p. 90).
This second great adventure was political in
nature. Although Lapsley and Clapham helped
Marshall to secure a six-year fellowship at
Trinity College, Cambridge, he was unable to
retreat into the cloistered world of academic
history. He was persuaded to enter into electoral
politics and was an unsuccessful Labour candi-
date in an overwhelmingly Conservative con-
stituency in Surrey in 1922. Although he did
MARSHALL, T. H. 507
surprisingly well, considering the odds against
him, he decided not to pursue his political
career any further.
Marshall returned to Trinity College and did
a fair amount of writing in eighteenth century
economic history (e.g., 1925; 1929). He would
probably have continued in this field if he had
not received an appointment at the London
School of Economics (L.S.E.) in 1925, where
William Henry Beveridge, the director of the
L.S.E., wanted him primarily to tutor students
in social work. He lectured on English economic
and constitutional history, but was soon at-
tracted to the comparative analysis so charac-
teristic of the two great sociologists then at the
L.S.E., L. T. Hobhouse and Morris Ginsberg.
When Hobhouse died in 1929 and Ginsberg
succeeded to his chair, Marshall was invited to
enter the department of sociology and teach the
discipline known as "comparative social insti-
tutions." "And that," he wrote, "is how I became
a sociologist" (1973, p. 91). He was not at all
trained in any of the fields of sociology as de-
fined at that time, had not done any work in
sociological theory, and his methodological
skills were essentially those of the historian.
In his early work, he concentrated exclu-
sively on developments in England. After 1949,
his work shows the influence of several years
of intensive analysis of conditions in Germany.
His early experiences as a prisoner had stimu-
lated his interest in German affairs, and when
World War n broke out, he enrolled in an or-
ganization established to monitor the foreign
press for the British Foreign Office. He became
an expert on German society and politics, and
after the war spent 18 months as an adviser on
educational affairs with the British Control
Commission in Germany.
In fact, he devoted the best part of the ten
years from 1939 to 1949 to administrative tasks.
At the L.S.E., for example, he was the head of
the department responsible for training social
workers. It was only after this long period of
administrative work had ended that he found
the leisure time to concentrate on what he
gradually saw as his primary task: the sys-
tematization of a historical perspective in the
analysis of social structures. His outstanding
contribution came in 1949 in the form of a lec-
ture at Cambridge University in honor of the
economist Alfred Marshall. Entitled Citizenship
and Social Class (1950), this lecture established
his reputation internationally. But this period of
creative scholarship was to be brief. In 1956 he
 508 MARSHALL, T. H.
became the director of the Social Sciences Divi-
sion at the United Nations Educational, Cultural
and Scientific Organization. In the four years he
served UNESCO, he was involved in the world-
wide development of sociology as a scholarly
discipline, and in 1959 succeeded Georges Fried-
mann as president of the International Sociologi-
cal Association. In 1960 he completed his term at
UNESCO, retired from the L.S.E., and re-
turned to his academic home in Cambridge. He
lectured part time in the economics faculty,
was active in establishing the discipline of so-
ciology within that university, and continued
his writing. He published Social Policy (1965),
which offered ample illustration of the impor-
tance of a comparative historical perspective in
the analysis of key concepts of social inquiry.
Citizenship and social class. Thomas Mar-
shall will primarily be remembered for his con-
tributions to historical sociology, and Citizen-
ship and Social Class will remain a classic
example of lucid conceptual analysis within the
framework of an elegant scheme of develop-
mental explanation.
The scheme caught the imagination of a wide
range of scholars because of the great simplicity
of the historicist linkup of a Marxian analysis
of class position with a Weberian emphasis on
the universalization of territorial citizenship.
The quarrels within international Marxism had
alerted the scholarly world to the difficulties of
reconciling the claims of loyalty to the class
with the obligations of citizenship in the nation-
state. Marshall concentrated his analysis on the
class-state, class-nation polarity, and tried to
analyze the history of the extension of citizen-
ship rights as the result of a sequence of coun-
terstrategies in the struggle to maintain terri-
torial—national unity in the face of the increasing
bitterness of class conflicts under capitalism.
The ascendency of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction had increased the potential for open
conflict; the extension and the equalization of
citizenship rights represented a crucially impor-
tant complex of counterstrategies.
As a result of his research, Marshall estab-
lished a simple typology of citizenship rights
and an equally simple historical sequence of
change:
(1) the eighteenth century brought civil
citizenship: equality before the law, liberty of
the person, freedom of speech, thought, and
faith, the right to own property and conclude
contracts;
(2) the nineteenth century expanded polit-
ical citizenship: the right to take part in elec-
tions, the right to serve in bodies invested with
political authority, whether legislatures or cabi-
nets;
(3) the twentieth century gave us elements
of social citizenship: the right to a modicum
of economic and social welfare, the "right to
share to the full in the social heritage and to
live the life of a civilized being according to the
standard prevailing in the society" (1963, p.
74).
This three-step sequence was primarily based
on the history of institutional change in Great
Britain. Marshall was well aware that the
sequences of change differed from country to
country, but he did not try to work out any
systematic scheme of explanation for the varia-
tions observed in the sequencing of steps.
Scholars following in Marshall's footsteps have
developed this three-step analysis into a broader
comparative perspective, but have not found
any reason to challenge his basic intuition (e.g.,
Bendix & Rokkan 1964; Rokkan et al. 1970;
Flora et al. 1977). Marshall linked his analysis
of citizenship with the concept of social class.
He asked: How is it that the growth of citizen-
ship coincided with the rise of capitalism, which
is a system of inequality? What made it possible
for these two processes to be reconciled with
one another and to become, for a time at least,
allies instead of antagonists? Marshall found
that class prejudices and an unequal distribu-
tion of wealth were barriers to the full enjoy-
ment of rights. Lack of economic opportunity
curtailed civil rights. He argued that the capi-
talist class system and citizenship were at war
in the early twentieth century. The development
of rights did not occur without conflicts. Gradu-
ally, a dilution of class monopoly in the legal
profession as well as the increase in all classes
of a sense of social equality dampened—if not
eradicated—social conflicts, and made citizen-
ship rights more real.
In his lecture in honor of Alfred Marshall,
T. H. Marshall first presented his three-step
scheme. He took as his starting point Alfred
Marshall's lecture, "The Future of the Working
Classes" (1873 in Memorials . . . 1925), and
discussed his reasons for believing that the
widening of educational opportunities and the
expansion of political rights would gradually tie
the workers more closely to the fate of their
nation-state and, as a consequence, reduce the
revolutionary potential of class polarity. Mar-
shall developed Alfred Marshall's analysis in

further depth and showed how the extension of
political and social rights had "nationalized" the
working class.
Marshall pursued his analysis of class
and status in a number of articles, most of them
reprinted in Sociology at the Crossroads (1963).
His discussion did not go much beyond Weber's
famous "class-status-party" trichotomy, but he
wrote lucidly and persuasively about the his-
torical changes in the weight of these distinc-
tions, particularly in light of developments in
Britain. He also contributed one or two impor-
tant analyses of the trends toward greater pro-
fessionalization and their consequences for the
stratification systems of contemporary societies.
Studies of welfare and social policy. Marshall
had taken a keen interest in problems of social
welfare ever since his first appointment at the
L.S.E. He wrote a number of papers on the de-
velopment of the welfare state in the 1940s and
1950s (reprinted in Marshall 1963). He pur-
sued this line of research in greater detail after
his retirement in Social Policy. The questions
he asked were essentially those of a historian:
How did the elites of the Western political sys-
tems arrive at the conviction that the State
should interfere in the market mechanism?
What were the social and ideological tensions
at the time of the breakthrough of modern so-
cial policies at the turn of the century? Marshall
concentrated on the evolution of social reforms
in Britain, but put this development in a broader
European perspective, from the initiation of so-
cial insurance programs in Germany in the
1880s to their temporary culmination after
World War n. He concentrated on the principles
and aims of social policy and discussed a pat-
tern of shifting aims over time, from an em-
phasis on the elimination of poverty, through a
phase focusing on the maximization of welfare,
to a phase of greater concentration on the pur-
suit of equality.
Marshall's historical-institutional approach
has inspired many scholars to follow up his re-
search with systematic, and at times, quantita-
tive comparative analyses of the development
of the welfare state (Flora et al. 1977; Kuhnle
1978). His interpretations of the processes
shaping social policy have had a significant im-
pact on the works of contemporary scholars.
Social policy is increasingly viewed as part of a
broader process, and not as a separate area of
political action.
STEIN KUHNLE AND STEIN ROKKAN
MASLOW, ABRAHAM H. 509
WORKS BY MARSHALL
1925 James Watt, 1736-1819. London: Leonard Par-
sons; Boston: Small, Maynard.
1929 Jethro Tull and the "New Husbandry" of the
Eighteenth Century. Economic History Review 2,
no. 1:41-60.
1935 The Population of England and Wales from the
Industrial Revolution to the World War. Economic
History Review 5, no. 2: 65-78.
1937 L'aristocratie britannique de nos jours. Annales
d'historie economique et sociale 9:236—256.
1938 Class Conflict and Social Stratification. Lon-
don: Le Play House Press.
1938 MARSHALL, T. H. et al. The Population Problem:
The Experts and the Public. London: Allen &
Unwin.
1947 Sociology at the Crossroads. London: Longmans
Green.
1950 Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays.
Cambridge Univ. Press. —> Reprinted in Sociology
at the Crossroads, 1963.
1960 International Comprehension in and Through
Social Science. Oxford Univ. Press.
1961 The Welfare State: A Sociological Interpretation.
Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 2:284-300.
(1963) 1964 Class, Citizenship, and Social Develop-
ment: Essays. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
—» With an introduction by Seymour Martin Lipset.
Originally published with the title Sociology at the
Crossroads—and Other Essays.
(1965) 1975 Social Policy in the Twentieth Century.
4th ed., rev. London: Hutchison. —» Originally pub-
lished with the title Social Policy.
1972 Value Problems of Welfare-capitalism. Journal
of Social Policy 1, no. 1:15-32.
1973 A British Sociological Career. International So-
cial Science Journal 25:88-100. —» Also published
in 1973 in the British Journal of Sociology 24:399-
408.
1975 Introduction. In Sidney and Beatrice Webb (edi-
tors), Methods of Social Study. Cambridge Univ.
Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENDIX, REINHARB; and ROKKAN, STEIN (1964) 1977
The Extension of Citizenship to the Lower Classes.
Pages 89-126 in Reinhard Bendix (editor), Nation-
building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing
Order. New & enl. ed. Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press.
FLORA, P. et al. 1977 Zur Entwicklung der West-
europaischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Politische Viertel-
jahresschrift 18, no. 4. —> First delivered as a paper
at the International Political Association World
Congress in Edinburgh in 1976.
KUHNLE, STEIN 1978 The Beginnings of the Nordic
Welfare States: Similarities and Differences. Acta
sociologica 21 (Supplement).
LIPSET, SEYMOUR MARTIN 1973 Tom Marshall—Man
of Wisdom. British Journal of Sociology 24:412-
417.
Memorials of Alfred Marshall. Edited by A. C. Pigou.
London: Macmillan, 1925.
ROKKAN, STEIN et al. 1970 Citizens, Elections,
Parties. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
MASLOW, ABRAHAM H.
Abraham H. Maslow (1908-1970) first dis-
tinguished himself in psychology with his Uni-
 5JO MASLOW, ABRAHAM H.
versity of Wisconsin doctoral dissertation on
"The Role of Dominance in the Social and Sex-
ual Behavior of Infra-human Primates" (1936).
Its research was carried out under the supervision
of Harry F. Harlow, who nearly forty years later
wrote: "Abe's most significant contribution was
the [surprising] finding that dominance is usu-
ally established by visual contact, without the
need to fight. . . . Maslow's data on dominance
in monkeys was the final definitive research in
this area for approximately thirty years, and to
say that he was ahead of his time is [a vast]
understatement" (Maslow 1973, p. 1). Harlow
added that when Maslow left the University of
Wisconsin in 1935, "he indicated that he was
going to work strictly with people" (ibid.'). Har-
low was not, however, surprised by this decision;
after all, he "knew all along that Abe's interests
surpassed the simians" (ibid.).
Maslow's interests did indeed surpass the
simians, extending to what he described in later
years as the "farther reaches of human nature."
As an undergraduate he was convinced that
there were "wonderful possibilities and inscru-
table depths in mankind" and that the world
much needed a "larger, more wonderful con-
ception of the greatness of the human species
and the wonderful vistas of progress just faintly
glimpsed against the future" (Lowry 1973,
p. 15). By the late 1930s Maslow, then a profes-
sional psychologist, had begun to see that such
a conception had to begin with a reconstruction
of the conventional psychological understanding
of human motivation. It was toward this end
that he published his landmark paper "A Theory
of Human Motivation" (1943c).
The conventional psychology of motivation
held that only motives conducive to the preserva-
tion of the individual or the propagation of the
species could be regarded as "primary," "basic,"
or "instinctive." All other motives—love, knowl-
edge, beauty, and the like—could be regarded
only as "secondary" and "derivative." In part
this view was an extrapolation from classical
Darwinian evolutionary theory. But in part it
also stemmed from the assumption that a mo-
tive could be basic or instinctive only if it ap-
peared universally in the species. Inasmuch as
only the "gut drives"—hunger, thirst, sexuality,
and the like—do appear universally in the hu-
man species, only these, ex hypothesi, could be
basic motives.
Maslow's argument in "A Theory of Human
Motivation" was that the "higher motives" fail
to appear universally in the human species not
because they are less basic, but because they
are less "prepotent." Even among physiologically
based needs that are clearly basic and instinc-
tive, some take precedence over others. Thus,
if a very hungry man is suddenly deprived of
breathable air, his hunger motive will vanish as
though it never existed, utterly eclipsed by his
prepotent and now urgent need for oxygen. But
hunger does not cease to exist, nor is it "secon-
dary" or "derivative." It is merely masked, or
inhibited, by an unsatisfied need that happens to
be more prepotent in the need-motive hierarchy.
What is more, once the more prepotent need
has been satisfied, the formerly masked need
will return in full force.
Maslow applied the same line of reasoning to
several classes of human needs that, despite
failure to appear universally, seemed nonethe-
less to be "instinctoid" in nature. These were (1)
safety and security, (2) love and belongingness,
and (3) self-esteem. The need for safety and
security was "basic" to human nature, but it
could make its appearance only after the more
prepotent physiological drives had been fairly
well satisfied. So, too, with the need for love and
belongingness, save that it had to wait as well
for a moderate satisfaction of the more prepo-
tent safety-security need; the same held for
self-esteem.
This hierarchical scheme of human motiva-
tion could have been extended to include other
classes of "instinctoid" human motives, but Mas-
low did not do so in the 1943 paper, except by
brief allusion to the possibility of basic cognitive
and aesthetic motives and to something that he
rather vaguely described as "self-actualization
. . . man's desire . . . to become actualized in
what he is potentially." By 1950, however, these
further possibilities had become much clearer
to him. This was the year in which he published
his famous "Self-actualizing People: A Study
of Psychological Health" (1950). Although Mas-
low's concept of "self-actualization" soared at
times to some rather dizzying heights, it began
its flight with a perfectly straightforward obser-
vation concerning the effects of motivation on
perception, cognition, and behavior. Few things
are certain in psychology. One thing that is cer-
tain, however, is that "needs, drives, and mo-
tives" can rule behavior and distort perception
and cognition. Maslow pursued that observation
to its logical conclusion. What would happen if
all of a person's "deficiency needs"—physiologi-
cal, safety-security, love-belongingness, and
self-esteem—were well satisfied? To Maslow the

answer seemed plain: behavior would no longer
be "driven," and perception-cognition would no
longer be distorted. Such a person, no longer
laboring under the constraints of deficiency mo-
tivation, would be free to actualize his or her
higher potential—provided, of course, that such
a "higher potential" existed. Maslow was pro-
foundly convinced that this potential did exist,
not only in a gifted few but in everyone.
He was also convinced that he had actually
found persons in whom this higher potential
had been actualized. The announced aim of his
1950 paper was to describe empirically the char-
acteristics of these self-actualizing persons. Al-
though this description may have been strongly
colored by Maslow's extra-empirical vision of
what human nature is really all about (see
Lowry 1973), for present purposes, one may
take the "empirical description" at face value.
As Maslow saw it, the central characteristic
of self-actualizing persons was that they had a
"more efficient perception of reality and more
comfortable relations with it." The more efficient
perception was first noticed "as an unusual
ability to detect the spurious, the fake, and the
dishonest in personality, and in general to judge
people correctly and efficiently." As Maslow got
more deeply into the study of these persons,
however, "it slowly became apparent that this
efficiency extended to many other areas of life—
indeed all areas that were tested. In art and
music, in things of the intellect, in scientific
matters, in politics and public affairs, they
seemed as a group to be able to see concealed
or confused realities more swiftly and more
correctly than others" (1954b, pp. 203-204).
They saw reality more clearly because their
perceptions of it were undistorted by deficiency
motivation: "They are therefore far more apt
to perceive what is there rather than their own
wishes, hopes, fears, anxieties, their own the-
ories and beliefs, or those of their cultural
group" (ibid., p. 205). For the same reason
they could also relate to reality more comfort-
ably and acceptingly. Placing no unrealistic
"neurotic demands" upon reality, they were able
to accept and deal with external reality, and the
reality of human nature: "As the child looks out
upon the world with wide, uncritical, innocent
eyes, so does the self-actualizing person look
upon human nature in himself and others. . . .
All (natural things) are accepted without ques-
tion as worth while, simply because these people
are inclined to accept the work of nature rather
than to argue with her for not having con-
MASLOW, ABRAHAM H. 511
structed things to different pattern" (ibid.,
p. 207). This was not to say that self-actualizing
persons never feel discontent. Indeed they could
feel it quite often and intensely. The difference,
however, was that their's was not a "neurotic"
but a healthy discontent: "The general formula
seems to be that healthy people will feel bad
about discrepancies between what is and what
might very well be or ought to be" (ibid.,
p. 208).
Maslow also noted that his self-actualizing
persons tended to have far more "peak-experi-
ences" than the average person. Being more
open to reality and less threatened by it, they
have "the wonderful capacity to appreciate again
and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods
of life, with awe, pleasure, wonder, and even
ecstasy, however stale these experiences may
have become to others. Thus for such a person,
any sunset may be as beautiful as the first one,
any flower may be of breath-taking loveliness,
even after he has seen a million flowers" (ibid.,
pp. 214-215). This, of course, was only to re-
peat that self-actualizing persons saw reality
more clearly, through a lens unclouded by
wishes, prejudices, and preconceptions.
The other characteristics that Maslow at-
tributed to these healthy, self-actualizing per-
sons all revolved around this central trait of
"more efficient perception of reality and more
comfortable relations with it." Thus the self-
actualizing person was "resistant to encultura-
tion"; identified with all of humanity (Gemein-
schaftsgefuhl); had a sense of privacy and
preferred a few close friendships to many super-
ficial ones; had a "democratic character struc-
ture"; exhibited a philosophical, unhostile sense
of humor; was spontaneous and creative; and
was "problem-centered" rather than "means-
centered" in dealing with reality.
Maslow knew that such descriptions might
make his self-actualizing persons seem too good
to be true. This was contrary to his intention,
for he did not want them to be seen as "stuffed
shirts or marionettes or unreal projections of
unreal ideals" but rather as the "robust, healthy,
lusty individuals they really are." He therefore
made a special effort to point out that self-
actualizing persons were still, after all, only
human: "Our subjects show many of the lesser
human failings. They too are equipped with
silly, wasteful, or thoughtless habits. They can
be boring, stubborn, irritating. They are by no
means free from a rather superficial vanity,
pride, partiality to their own productions, fam-
 572 MASLOW, ABRAHAM H.
ily, friends, and children. Temper outbursts are
not rare" (ibid., p. 228). Maslow went on to
mention another characteristic that might seem
at first to be a major human failing—that these
persons were "occasionally capable of an extra-
ordinary and unexpected ruthlessness." But it
must be remembered, he added, "that they are
very strong people. This makes it possible for
them to display a surgical coldness when this is
called for, beyond the power of the average
man" (ibid., pp. 228-229).
Although self-actualizing persons were by no
means "typical," "normal," or "average," Mas-
low nonetheless saw them as the truest repre-
sentation of human nature and human poten-
tial. The self-actualizing person differed from
the "average" only in that his/her instinctoid
potential was no longer masked or suppressed
by unsatisfied deficiency needs. Let these needs
be satisfied in the average person and self-
actualization would begin to appear there, too.
Maslow had held this view for many years, at
least as far back as the time of his doctoral
studies of primate dominance, probably earlier:
"People are all decent underneath. . . . People
are good, if only their fundamental wishes are
satisfied, their wishes for affection and security.
. . . Give people affection and security, and
they will give affection and be secure in their
feelings and behavior" (Lowry 1973, pp. 17-18).
Similar reflections can be found in Maslow's
unpublished writings even as far back as his
high-school years. In a sense he had been
working on his "self-actualization" concept since
early adolescence, before the thought of be-
coming a psychologist crossed his mind.
Most of the remainder of Maslow's psycho-
logical career was devoted to extending and
refining the conceptions put forward in his
1950 paper on self-actualization. A brief, par-
tial list of his post-1950 publications will show
the many paths that radiated from this
central point: "Love in Healthy People" (1953);
"The Instinctoid Nature of Basic Needs"
(1954a); "Deficiency Motivation and Growth
Motivation" (1955); "Creativity in Self-actual-
izing People" (1959k); "Cognition of Being in
the Peak Experiences" (1959a); "Eupsychia:
The Good Society" (1961); Toward a Psychology
of Being (1962); "The Need to Know and the
Fear of Knowing" (1963Z?); Religions, Values
and Peak-experiences (1964); Eupsychian Man-
agement (1965); The Psychology of Science
(1966); "A Theory of Metamotivation: The
Biological Rooting of the Value-life" (1967); The
Farther Reaches of Human Nature (1971).
In the last year of his life, Maslow began
work on a book that was to summarize his view
of human nature as it had ripened over twenty
years, planning to call the book "Higher Ceilings
for Human Nature." Although he died too soon
after he began to develop his ideas extensively,
he did leave a brief statement of what he would
have written, had he been able: "If I had to
condense this whole book into a single sentence,
I [would say] that it spells out the consequences
of the discovery that man has a higher nature
and that this is part of his essence; or more
simply, that human beings can be wonderful
out of their own human and biological nature"
(Lowry 1973, p. 77).
RICHARD LOWRY
WORKS BY MASLOW
1936 The Role of Dominance in the Social and Sexual
Behavior of Infra-human Primates. 4 parts. Journal
of Genetic Psychology 48:261-277, 278-309, 310-
338; 49:161-198. —» Part 1: "Observations at Vilas
Park Zoo." Part 2: "An Experimental Determination
of the Dominance-behavior Syndrome"; in col-
laboration with Sydney Flanzbaum. Part 3: "A
Theory of Sexual Behavior of Infrahuman Pri-
mates." Part 4: "The Determination of Hierarchy
in Pairs and in Groups."
1937 Dominance Feeling, Behavior and Status. Psy-
chological Review 44:404-420.
1941 MASLOW, ABRAHAM H.; and MITTELMANN, BELA
Principles of Abnormal Psychology: The Dynamics
of Psychic Illness. New York: Harper.
1942 Self-esteem (Dominance-feeling) and Sexuality
in Women. Journal of Social Psychology 16:259-
294.
1943a The Authoritarian Character Structure. Journal
of Social Psychology 18:401-411.
1943i> A Preface to Motivation Theory. Psychosomatic
Medicine 5:85-92.
1943c A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological
Review 50:370-396.
1946 Problem-centering vs. Means-centering in Sci-
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1948a Cognition of the Particular and the Generic.
Psychological Review 55:22-40.
1948b Some Theoretical Consequences of Basic-need
Gratification. Journal of Personality 16:402-416.
1949 The Expressive Component of Behavior. Psy-
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1950 Self-actualizing People: A Study of Psychological
Health. Pages 11-34 in Personality Symposia. New
York: Grune & Stratton.
1953 Love in Healthy People. Pages 57-93 in Ashley
Montagu (editor), The Meaning of Love. New
York: Julian.
1954a The Instinctoid Nature of Basic Needs. Journal
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(1954b) 1970 MASLOW, ABRAHAM H. (editor) Motiva-
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1955 Deficiency Motivation and Growth Motivation.
Pages 33—42 in M. R. Jones (editor), Nebraska

Symposium on Motivation: 1955. Lincoln: Univ. of
Nebraska Press.
1959a Cognition of Being in the Peak Experiences.
Journal of Genetic Psychology 94:43—66.
1959b Creativity in Self-actualizing People. Pages 45-
50 in H. H. Anderson (editor), Creativity and Its
Cultivation. New York: Harper.
1959c MASLOW, ABRAHAM (editor) New Knowledge
in Human Values. New York: Harper. —> A paper-
back edition was published in 1970 by Gateway
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(1962) 1968 Toward a Psychology of Being. 2d ed.
New York: Van Nostrand.
1963a Fusions of Facts and Values. American Journal
of Psychoanalysis 23:117-131.
1963& The Need to Know and the Fear of Knowing.
Journal of General Psychology 68:111-124.
1964 Religions, Values, and Peak-experiences. Colum-
bus: Ohio State Univ. Press.
(1965) 1973 Eupsychian Management: A Journal.
Homewood, 111.: Dow Jones-Irwin.
1966 The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance.
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SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTERNATIONAL STUDY PROJECT 1972 Abraham H.
Maslow: A Memorial Volume. Monterey, Calif.:
Brooks/Cole.
LOWRY, RICHARD 1973 A. H. Maslow: An Intellectual
Portrait. Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole.
MEAD, MARGARET
A few minutes ago I stood at the edge of the sea,
looking out toward the reef where twenty canoes,
black silhouettes against the pale dawn sky, are out
fishing. Very soon, the canoes, with their crews of
people of all ages, will begin to come in with a
catch of fish for early-morning breakfast. Half a
mile away, rising above the water of the salt lagoon,
a cluster of trees marks the site where in the old
days the people of Peri village lived in houses set
high on stilts. . . . That was where I also lived—
in a Manus house with a high, thatched roof and
a slatted floor through which small objects fell into
the water—when I first studied the Manus
people. . . .
This is my third field trip to Manus. On my first
trip I studied the children; and now, thirty-six years
later, these children are middle-aged. In 1928 I
went to study the Manus because they had pre-
served their old, savage ways and had not yet taken
on the ideas and the religion of the West. Twenty-
five years later, in 1953, I returned to find out how
MEAD, MARGARET 513
much they had changed over a lifetime of a genera-
tion and what had become of them as they changed.
And now, eleven years later, I have come back a
third time to follow their racing course toward
modernization. . . .
Here in Peri, talking and listening, where a whole
people have moved without losing their sense of
continuity, I realize again how important it is to
recognize both our common human capacity for
change and for creating continuity in change. . . .
Each day I go about the ordinary business of
field work . . . one person, all alone, face-to-face
with a whole community. . . . [W]hereas the child
learns as a part of growing up and becomes what
he learns, the anthropologist must learn culture
without embodying it, in order to become its accu-
rate chronicler. . . . (Mead & Metraux 1970,
pp. 299-311)
Such "letters from the field" are part of the
record that Margaret Mead kept and shared
through the past fifty years with "kith and kin,"
with the "peoples" whom she studied, with her
fellow anthropologists, and with a planet-wide
public of children, parents, and grandparents.
Out of the obligation she felt to be a "chronicler"
of anthropology, as well as an observing partici-
pant in its history and development, out of her
willingness to give as full an account of her
own life as that of the peoples she described, out
of her belief that "nothing one has ever seen or
heard, smelled or tasted is meaningless or un-
connected with other things" emerged Mead's
extensive and interlocking chronicles of her
"working life" and her "personal life" (1965,
p. 134). She not only provided rich field ma-
terials on Samoans, Manus, Arapesh, Mun-
dugumor, Tchambuli, Balinese, latmul, and
Americans ("the eight peoples who have ad-
mitted me to their lives"), but also on the an-
thropologist and person who lived and worked
among them. She has left an Odyssean account
of how she changed "with each step of the jour-
ney, with each new image . . . and each day in
the field" (1977k, p. 15), and of her growing
awareness of her own culture—given to her by
her parents and grandmother, clarified by an-
thropologist "ancestors" and teachers, and
"sharpened by many years of work among South
Sea peoples." She hoped, moreover, that this
dual revelation would help Americans "under-
stand themselves" (1972b, p. 1).
Mead's lifetime as an anthropologist was
virtually coterminous with the emergence and
evolution of American anthropology as a social
science—or "human science," as she preferred
514 MEAD, MARGARET
to call it. In her senior year at Barnard College
(1921/1922), she took her first anthropology
course with the man who subsequently became
her mentor: Franz Boas, a founder of modern
anthropology and the father of American an-
thropology. Boas' teaching assistant in that
course was Ruth Benedict, then a graduate stu-
dent, who later achieved renown in her own
right as a pioneering anthropologist. She be-
came one of Mead's closest colleagues and most
intimate friends, and in 1948, upon Benedict's
death, Mead became her biographer, and the
custodian of her field notes and papers (1949b;
1959a; 19680).
Mead's decision to enter anthropology, rather
than to be a psychologist, sociologist, writer, or
politician (each of which she considered during
her college years), was made "in the excitement
of a genuine vocational choice." The sense of
vocation that anthropology aroused in her was
quasireligious. She had been searching for the
best way to "make a contribution" through the
medium of science; to use fully whatever her
"talents" and "special gifts" (in the Biblical
sense of the term); to do "work that mattered,"
that "had to be done now," that would further
"understanding of human behavior, and that
would be effective in the world of human
events" (1962). In these fundamental ways,
anthropology "called" Mead, and in 1924, after
completing an M.A. in psychology at Columbia
University, she committed herself to the dis-
cipline. Her vision of anthropology was deeply
influenced by her two major teachers, Boas
and Benedict, both of whom "were able to
convey a sense of urgency, of the need to record
those unique primitive cultures which once
gone could never be recovered. . . . When I
was a graduate student I used to wake up saying
to myself, The last man on Raratonga who
knows anything about the past will probably die
today. I must hurry' " (1972a, p. 320).
Mead took seriously the Boasian dictum that
irrespective of what special phenomena an an-
thropologist may single out to study, he or she
has both an intellectual and a moral responsi-
bility to describe each precious, vanishing cul-
ture in enough detail so that it is "kept for all
mankind, including that particular people"
(1974a, p. 298). Several of her early monographs
—"Social Organization of Manu'a" (1930b); "Kin-
ship in the Admiralty Islands" (1934); The
Mountain Arapesh (1938-1949)—were written
in the comprehensive, whole culture way advo-
cated by her mentor. In all of her work,
throughout her career as an anthropologist,
Mead's ardor about collecting and recording cul-
tural data was noteworthy.
Out of Mead's commitment to anthropology
as a human science, an "unmapped country"
(1962, pp. 120-121), and a "giant rescue opera-
tion" (1959b, p. 30), there not only came 44
published books (18 of them coauthored), more
than 1,000 articles and monographs, and the
manuscripts of countless lectures and confer-
ences, but also carefully preserved and syste-
matically catalogued field notes, notebooks, ver-
batim interviews, drawings, maps, genealogical
charts, photographs, films, tape recordings, and
artifacts. Mead prepared these archives and
made them available to interested scholars so
that those who came after her might "begin
their explorations where [her own] mapmaking
ceased" (1962, pp. 120-129). But in addition
to being an exceptionally rich source of ethno-
graphic data, these materials comprise a first-
hand record of a seminal period in American
anthropology. They are the "living stuff out of
which anthropology . . . developed as a science"
(1977b, p. 1); the body of assumptions, theories,
methods, and facts on which Mead drew during
the half-century that her work spanned, and to
which she so significantly contributed.
These same archives also constitute a unique,
three-generational cultural biography and his-
tory of the numerous peoples among whom
Mead was a long-term, recurrent participant ob-
server. Her dedication and endurance, her
"capacity to perceive and abandon herself to
raw data," her "miraculous memory" (Lee 1954,
p. 1109), and her prolificacy enabled her to set
down and transmit extraordinarily detailed,
massive, and long-term accounts. But above all,
it was her continuous field work that made these
chronicles distinctive.
When Margaret Mead left Manus in 1928, at
the end of her first visit, the slit drums sounded
the tattoo for the dead, as her canoe pulled away
from the shores of Pere village. The people
mourned her as they mourned for their dead, be-
cause they sorrowfully believed that she would
never return. And this would have been an ac-
curate prediction to make about the majority of
anthropologists, who come to know one, or at
most several peoples, through a single, pro-
longed field experience. A few will make a
subsequent, follow-up trip to the site of their
original work; others will carry out restudies of
places observed by previous field workers. But,
in contradistinction to these general field pat-

terns, Mead returned "again and again . . . to
the same place[s] and the same people[s]"
(1972a, p. 12), making some 24 trips to do so,
and visiting one site—Pere village, Manus Is-
land, Papua, New Guinea—6 times, over the
period 1928 to 1975, to study the remarkable
cultural transformation the community under-
went as it moved "from the end of the Stone
Age to the Electronic Age" (1976b, p. 64) in a
single generation.
Mead's major field expeditions, as listed in
her curriculum vitae, were: Samoa (1925—1926);
Manus, Admiralty Islands, New Guinea (1929);
an American Indian tribe (1930); Mountain
Arapesh, Mundugumor, and Tchambuli, New
Guinea (1931-1933); Bali, latmul in Tambunan,
New Guinea (1936-1938); lecture tour of war-
time England (1943); lecture tour of Australia
(1951); restudy of Manus, Admiralty Islands,
New Guinea (1953); return to latmul, Sepik
(May-July 1967); return to Admiralty Islands
for a National Educational Television film (Au-
gust-September 1967); return to Manus, Ad-
miralty Islands, New Guinea (July-August
1971); return to Mundugumor, latmul, New
Guinea (1971); return to Samoa (1971); re-
study of Mountain Arapesh group resettled in
New Britain (1973); and return to Manus, Ad-
miralty Islands, New Guinea (1975).
The fact that Mead considered her lecture
tours in England and Australia as field trips was
consistent with her concept of field work as a
continuous activity to be conducted wherever
one went: "in the office . . . down the hall . . .
in a small village in Europe" (1965, p. 134),
lecturing, and through correspondence with her
vast readership. She saw her audiences as in-
formants whose questions and comments taught
her how to "write a book which will make the
life of a remote island people meaningful" to
American readers, or conversely how to "explain
Americans" to other peoples (1965, p. 126). Al-
though she claimed to be equally at home in
each "far away place" that she visited during
her many years of field work, America was the
place to which she always returned at the end
of each journey, and Americans were the pri-
mary people for whom she lectured and wrote.
Mead's earliest works were published at a
time when the anthropological concept of cul-
ture was relatively new, and the wide variability
of culture patterns from one society to another
was just being discovered and documented. In
Coming of Age in Samoa (1928a), Growing Up
in Neiv Guinea (1930a), and Sex and Temper-
MEAD, MARGARET 575
ament in Three Primitive Societies (1935,), she
attempted to show the important role that cul-
ture plays in shaping human attitudes and be-
haviors, both within and between societies,
focusing descriptively and analytically on ado-
lescence, child rearing, and sex roles.
Mead was the first anthropologist to deal with
women in a cross-cultural perspective. She did
so within the larger framework of her studies of
how "different peoples can cast males and fe-
males now for one role, now for another"
(1949a, pp. 31-32). In Sex and Temperament
in Three Primitive Societies, she concluded that:
"If temperamental attitudes which we have tra-
ditionally regarded as feminine . . . can so
easily be masculine in one tribe and in another
outlawed for . . . women as well as ... men,
we no longer have any basis for regarding such
aspects of behavior as sex-linked" (1935,
pp. 279-280). In a later work, Male and Female
(1949a), she shifted her perspective, placing
greater emphasis on biological aspects of the
behavior of girls and boys, and women and men
than she had in the past, and on the "essentials"
and "regularities [in] maleness and femaleness
with which every society must reckon" (p. 32).
Mead was one of the founders of the culture
and personality school of anthropology, and the
first to do psychologically oriented field work.
Within the area of culture and personality, she
created the subfield of socialization and encul-
turation. She was the first anthropologist to
study child-rearing practices (1930a). Over the
years, she systematized and consistently refined
methodological procedures for the precise ob-
servation and fine recording of child behavior
(1946b) and enculturation: "the actual process
of learning as it takes place in a specific culture"
(1963, p. 185). Among anthropologists, Mead is
best known for her insistence on "the most
minute correspondence between the over-all
patterns of a culture and the patterns of child
rearing in that culture" (ibid.).
Mead made important contributions to the
study of national character as well (1946b;
195Id; 1954; 1961; 1963), primarily as a de-
fender of the way that Benedict, Geoffrey Gorer,
and others described and delineated the modal
character structure of a culture, and its infant
care practices. In response to criticism, Mead at-
tempted to make clear that "the theory . . . does
not trace the origins of the culture" (1954,
p. 404), but only the process of enculturation,
adding that it was not discrete acts such as
swaddling or weaning that communicated cul-
 516 MEAD, MARGARET
ture to children, but rather the cultural context
in which these acts were embedded (1963,
p. 186).
From the outset of her research, and in every
subsequent phase and facet of her work, Mead
was consistently concerned with methodological
issues. She devoted a great deal of attention to
anthropological sampling procedure (195Id;
1953a; 1954; 1955; 1961; Mead & Metraux
1953), and to the philosophy and techniques of
field work (1930a; 1939a; 1951a; 1952; 1960;
1970a). She was one of the first American an-
thropologists to rely more on participant obser-
vation than on interviews with informants. In
New Guinea, she wrote, "we built our house
without walls, so that we could always see what
was going on" (1949a, p. 41). She recommended
that the anthropologist learn relevant native
languages, and she considered it useful to
acquire key native skills, such as paddling a
canoe or dancing (1939a). In these respects,
her style of field work was highly participatory,
involving as close to total immersion in the cul-
ture as possible. Mead's approach to field work
accorded with her conviction that anthropology
should be a data-based discipline, in which
"loving preservation of the actual detail con-
trasts with the . . . abstractions and generaliza-
tions of the scientist" (1951Z?, p. 151). "Our
data," she wrote, "are hypothesis forming, not
theory validating," and the anthropologist
should avoid "tight taxonomic systems . . .
[which] cramp and distort the necessary uncom-
mittedness of our approach" (1960, reprinted in
1964<2, p. 6). In fact, she felt that learning a
culture was like learning a language whose
grammar had not been previously described:
both required the ability to "recognize pattern"
(1952).
Mead pioneered in the use of photography
and film in the field. She regarded them as
media that enriched and refined the perceptions
of the participant observer, and enhanced their
validity and reliability. Cues that were once im-
perceptible could now be isolated and studied
on the screen. Furthermore, the existence of a
photographic record permitted reinterpretation
after a period of field work had been completed
(Mead & MacGregor 1951). Balinese Character
(1942), coauthored with Gregory Bateson, was
Mead's pathbreaking contribution to the use of
photography not simply as ethnographic illus-
tration, but as a detailed and rigorous form of
cultural analysis. The book included more than
seven hundred candid photographs by Bateson
of behavioral sequences, highly organized and
integrated to depict major features of Balinese
life, and certain theoretical concerns of the
authors. Mead and Bateson went on to make
numerous films, and to create a huge library of
"filmic description." Of these, "Bathing Babies
in Three Cultures" became an anthropological
classic. "In the history of the discipline," an-
thropologist Hildred Geertz has written, "it may
be said that this film was the starting point of
the whole field of kinesics" (Geertz 1976,
p. 725).
Mead was equally crucial to the development
of methods for studying cultures that are spa-
tially or temporally -inaccessible. She did this
primarily through the Columbia University Re-
search in Contemporary Cultures project, of
which she became the director upon Benedict's
death. This project involved the study of cul-
tures "at a distance," by interdisciplinary teams
that collected and analyzed interviews and liter-
ary and other documentary materials in order to
prepare ethnographies where direct field work
was not feasible. Out of this research came
many volumes of verbatim interviews with
French, Czechoslovakian, Polish, Russian, east
European Jewish, and other immigrant infor-
mants that constitute a valuable source of data
for contemporary ethnohistorians.
Mead was also ahead of her time in a number
of applied areas of research that involved the
forging of interdisciplinary links between an-
thropology and other fields. Among her most
outstanding contributions in this regard was the
work that she did on nutrition. In 1941, at
Benedict's request, Mead took charge of the
United States government's Committee on Food
Habits. Although her research was policy-
oriented, Mead's work on food anticipated cer-
tain recent, basic developments in the field of
biomedical anthropology (Montgomery & Ben-
nett, forthcoming). She defined food habits as a
"culturally standardized set of behaviors" (1943£>,
p. 20), and presented a systematic and detailed
methodology for their study (1945), empha-
sizing the concept of a cultural definition of
food, and the psychodynamics and cultural con-
text of food habits (1950).
Mead's interest in what today would be called
biomedical anthropology extended beyond the
area of nutrition to the cultural patterning of
biological processes (1947c), maturation and
aging, and growth and development (1950). She
was the first scientist to discover that women
who had never borne children could lactate

(1957, p. 375), and her discussion of the Gesell-
Ilg approach (1947d) to the study of matura-
tion—in which she hypothesized significant
differences between those cultures that elabo-
rate normal biological rhythms and those which
disrupt them—was one of the first attempts to
incorporate biology into culture and personality
theory.
No other anthropologist has described child-
birth, lactation, and infant care practices in as
much detail as Mead. In Male and Female, she
wrote that "the mother's nurturing tie to her
child is apparently so deeply rooted in ...
actual biological conditions that only fairly
complicated social arrangements can break it
down entirely. . . . Women may be said to be
mothers, unless they are taught to deny their
child bearing qualities" (1949a, pp. 191-192,
230-231). Later, Mead stressed the significance
of ethological studies of maternal-infant be-
havior within the framework of human evo-
lution. She described her "continuing attempt
to treat mothers and infants as a single
transactional system, biologically, psychologi-
cally, culturally, and situationally defined"
(1974a, p. 316; Mead & Newton 1967, pp. 142-
144). She condemned modern "methods of ob-
stetrical and pediatric care . . . [which] were
invading the neonatal period . . . separating
. . . mother . . . from the newborn . . . and en-
forcing methods of feeding and care which did
not take into account the delicate circular rela-
tionship between . . . mother and child" (1957,
p. 370; 1949a, p. 192). And she even sug-
gested that through cultural rules "enjoining
upon the mother active or placid behavior, the
process of learning may begin within the
womb . . ." (1949a, p. 61).
It was Mead's interest in maternal-infant
interaction which led to her work on nonverbal,
tactile, kinaesthetic, and symbolic modes of
learning. In Bali (1936-1939), Mead had
noticed that infants responded not to the "sur-
face expressions" of their mothers, but to
kinaesthetically experienced emotions and clues
(1957, p. 375). ". . . The mother smiles and
bows as she greets . . . the stranger . . . but
the baby in her arms screams with terror. . . .
It is reacting to a kinaesthetically experienced
fear which the mother expresses neither ver-
bally nor in her face or posture" (ibid.}. Mead
felt that she had discovered an entirely new
kind of learning, a process akin to the etho-
logical concept of imprinting (1958). Such
learning, unverbalized and inarticulate, "can
MEAD, MARGARET 517
only occur when the . . . model is present"
(1958, p. 487), she affirmed, and is as different
from adult learning as is "learning to speak and
later learning a second language" (1954,
pp. 402-404). Mead's work on learning theory
may well be her most significant contribution to
the study of enculturation, and only in recent
years have other anthropologists begun to focus
on learning through imprinting-type processes
(Wallace [1961] 1970, pp. 157-158).
Mead commented that her interest in the
"perception of nonverbal cues was later ex-
tended from the original impetus [of kin-
aesthetic learning] . . . to the elaboration of the
whole field of semiotics and the use of audio-
visual recordings of behavior" (1974a, p. 314).
It made her sympathetic to research on psychic
phenomena—which she viewed as part of "a
whole continuum of communication phenom-
ena" (1977a, pp. 49-50)—as early as 1943
(1974a, p. 314), and she was instrumental in
gaining scientific recognition for the American
Society for Psychic Research (Long 1977). For
Mead, enculturation itself was a process of
communication, and experience might be trans-
mitted through symbolic means:
. . . simultaneity of impact is carried not only by
the behavior of each individual with whom the
child conies in contact, but it is also mediated by
ritual, drama, and the arts. The shape of a pot, the
design on the temple door, the pattern of the court-
yard . . . are . . . reinforcements . . . of the
same pattern which the child is experiencing seri-
ally. (1947e, p. 634)
In ... societies where change is very slow . . .
each child has a chance to learn from different
parts of his experience. Some children will learn
from the shape of the roof, as they lie on their
backs looking up at the thatch, others from the fee]
of the pot in their hands, still others from the
cadence of voices, but. . . these things are all part
of a whole, shaped and polished, ground down and
tuned up through the generations. (1957, p. 376)
Mead was the first anthropologist to introduce
the symbolic interpretation of culture later
elaborated by anthropologists such as Victor
Turner and Clifford Geertz. Ritual, art, and the
body itself were metaphors for culture (Mead &
Bateson 1942; Mead & Wolfenstein 1955; Mead
& Metraux 1953). In Mead's view, because of
the correspondence between childhood experi-
ences, interpersonal relationships, and ritual
and symbolic forms (1947a; 1949a), analysis
could start at any point, but symbols which
embodied distilled and multiple meanings pro-
 518 MEAD, MARGARET
vided keys for understanding the pattern. Mead
began her work with Benedict's (1932; 1934)
concept of culture as pattern. Her interest in
the individual led to a redefinition of culture
as the "plot" which underlay human behavior
(1935; 1939£>). And her work in communication
further refined her concept of culture until in
1974 (1974a) she wrote of culture as "intricate
and . . . improbable . . . shaped by thousands
of imaginations through the centuries . . . a
work of art, multisensory and multidimensional
in multimedia."
Throughout her work, regardless of its empiri-
cal focus or the theoretical and methodological
issues it addressed, Mead was always "interested
in applying the knowledge gained through com-
parative studies to effective responsible inter-
vention in our own culture" (1962, p. 121). This
was true even in her earliest studies: Coming
of Age in Samoa, Growing Up in New Guinea,
and Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive
Societies. She was increasingly certain that be-
cause anthropologists are trained in a compara-
tive perspective, they have a particular obliga-
tion to avoid the "arrogant," "trivializing," and
"parochial" overspecialization that, in her opin-
ion, had fragmented the social sciences, and
made them "relatively impotent in a time when
[their] insights . . . are grievously needed"
(1964b, p. 6; Webb 1972, p. 108).
World War n reinforced her convictions in
these regards, and greatly intensified and ex-
panded her commitment to "applied anthro-
pology": "The atomic bomb exploded over Hiro-
shima in the summer of 1945. At that point I
tore up every page of a book that I had nearly
finished. Every sentence was out of date"
(19720, p. 296).
In Mead's perspective, the war had precipi-
tated extraordinarily rapid and pervasive cul-
ture change on a global scale: change fraught
with great "hope" and "promise," and at the
same time, with potential "chaos" and "disaster."
It was these historic developments that sent her
back to Pere, the Manus village in the Admiralty
Islands, and from there, to other Oceanic vil-
lages, to make restudies. Now she went to ob-
serve and record the "incredibly" accelerated
change that these people were undergoing, as
they took on "new lives for old" (1956a), and
to analyze the larger significance of their cul-
tural transformation. It seemed to her that what
was happening in Manus was both a microcosm
and a paradigm of the world-wide change that
was occurring:
. . . The Manus simply moved themselves from a
Stone Age culture into the present. They looked their
culture over. They inventoried it. They thought
about it. They decided what they would keep and
what they would discard. . . .
When anthropologists started looking at the way
in which the Manus used American society as a
model, we began to realize . . . what it is like to
build a society when you have no model. . . . We
have no models of how to build a planetary so-
ciety. . . .
As we looked to people like the Manus, . . . I
began to realize what we will be up against in the
future and why we had the generation gap of the
mid-1960s. . . . For the first time we saw young
people who had no models—they would never be
the people their parents and teachers were. For the
first time in human history all the older people had
to look at all the young ones and realize that they
were not their successors as they had been in the
past. There would never be young people just like
them. (1976a)
The war and her return to Manus had altered
significantly the assumptions about change that
were inherent in her earlier work (1928b; 1932).
The idea that change must be slow to be effec-
tive no longer seemed tenable, nor did the
notion that it took at least two generations to
occur. Furthermore, in contrast to Mead's insis-
tence in Growing Up in New Guinea that change
had to take place in adult society first if it was
to have lasting effects on the lives of children,
it now appeared that the opposite had been true
in Manus: it was the children, not yet com-
pletely involved in the old adult roles, who were
the chief transformative agents in the society,
changing themselves and bringing about changes
that they conveyed to the adults.
Galvanized by the Manus case, throughout
the 1950s and into the 1960s, Mead moved back
and forth, observationally and analytically as
well as geographically, between Oceanic villages
and mainland United States, with shorter trips
to a number of other countries. She was im-
pressed by the "terrible division between the
elders . . . and the young" in virtually every
society (1972a, p. 122). And it was the phe-
nomenon of the "generation gap" that she ex-
amined in Culture and Commitment (1970b), a
panoramic summing-up of her post-World War n
insights about cultural development, evolu-
tion, and change. In this work, she further de-
veloped a triad of interrelated concepts she had
first used in 1961: "prefigurative," "postfigura-
tive," and "cofigurative" culture. At the present
time, Mead wrote, many societies have under-

gone such fast and extensive change that they
have a prefigurative culture, in which the ex-
perience of children and elders is so different
that elders learn from the children, as much as
the reverse. This sharply contrasts with the post-
figurative culture of more stable and traditional
societies, in which the behavior of elders is an
exact model of what the young are expected to
be and will learn to become. Falling somewhere
between these two polar types is the cofigurative
culture, characteristic of a society in fairly rapid
change, in which both the children and adults
learn from their peers, who are their contem-
porary role models.
It was not only Mead's empirical insights and
theoretical formulations concerning cultural
change that underwent modification during and
after the war, but also her world view. What
took place was not so much a discontinuity in
her outlook as a magnification of it. At the end
of her presidential address to the American As-
sociation for the Advancement of Science, Mead
speculatively suggested that in the future, "we
shall need still newer kinds of instrumentation—
macroscopes that can simplify without distort-
ing the complexity of our knowledge of the bio-
sphere and the cosmos within which a recogni-
tion of all disciplined human endeavor must
now take place" (1976c, p. 909). Mead seemed
to be visualizing the consequences of the
world-wide cultural change through such a
macroscope. This imagined instrument enlarged
her sense of scientific urgency and anthropologi-
cal mission so that they became both more
cosmic and more apocalyptic. One of the major
themes that appeared in her publications and
lectures throughout the 1960s and the 1970s is
the notion of how interdependently vulnerable
we have become on this "small," "precious,"
"fragile," and imperiled earth that we inhabit,
where not only our collective "future," but our
very "survival" is threatened. Mead's affirmation
in the face of what she considered this ulti-
mate but very real possibility was an amplified
version of the scientific, religious, and social
action convictions that had always been funda-
mental to her vocation as an anthropologist.
But for Mead, the original mission with which
she entered anthropology—Boas' "giant rescue
operation"—had become planetary:
. . . Knowledge joined to action . . . can protect
the future. . . . [KJnowledge about mankind sought
in reverence for life, can bring life. (1972a,
p. 296)
MEAD, MARGARET 519
Within the new possibilities of analysis and pro-
cedure provided by science, humanity can begin to
face the overwhelming responsibilities of this period
of human history, when the great religious truth
of the unity of all mankind must be actualized, or
the people perish—all of them everywhere in the
world. . . . [E]ach man is indeed his brother's
keeper, and the need to love our enemies must be
given new concrete scientific and religious mean-
ing. . . . [Fjaith and the human sciences are
needed to erect a social order in which the children
of our enemies will be protected as surely as our
own children, so that all will be safe. (1972&,
pp. 2-3)
Children and young people were always at the
center of the analyses of socialization, educa-
tion, and enculturation, and of cultural con-
tinuity, evolution, and change with which Mead
was continually concerned. In the 1970s phase
of her work, they became even more symbolic
for her, signifying our "trusteeship for the fu-
ture of all peoples" and of our "endangered
planet." The children are the raison d'etre for
"growing chaos . . . to be ordered again upon a
greener earth." They are also the vehicles of
survival, for there is the hope that in them and
through them, what has been, what is, and what
will be will not only be perpetuated, but also
united. "Peace and Blessing for all our children's
children" read the inscription on Margaret
Mead's Christmas card for 1973, alongside of a
photograph of her own granddaughter; on her
1975 Christmas card there was a photograph of
her grandchild and herself together, with the
message, "To Cherish and Protect the Life of
the World." And in her "rap on race" with James
Baldwin (1971), she made the following affirma-
tion: "I can take any people in my arms. . . .
If we start off with . . . commitment to the
future and the unborn, and these are the people
that we hold in our arms . . . then what we
make of the past is what we give them as part
of the future . . ." (pp. 202, 220, 237).
Because of her belief in the importance of
making anthropological findings available to all
who might use them, Mead devoted an ex-
ceptional amount of attention to presenting her
field to nonanthropologists—to specialists in re-
lated fields, and to "the public." This commit-
ment underlay her conscious decision to write in
"ordinary English," eschewing the "technical
jargon" and omitting the "many native terms"
(1965, pp. 121-122) traditionally employed in
professional monographs. It also motivated her
to write and lecture widely on a vast range of
topics and concerns, including her field experi-
 520 MEAD, MARGARET
ences, the birth and raising of children, birth
control and abortion, adolescence, sex and mar-
riage, the position of women in society, the
future of the American family, women and chil-
dren, education, race and ethnicity, mental and
spiritual health, religion in the modern world,
aging and death, science and technology,
ekistics (the study of habitats and human
settlements), the problems and ethics of overpop-
ulation, food and hunger, ecology and environ-
mental pollution, community planning, culture-
building, transnational relations, and peace.
Mead participated, and assumed leadership,
in countless scientific, civic, humanitarian, and
service organizations. She lectured to all kinds
of audiences—in schools, before scientists'
groups, and in women's clubs, in as many parts
of the country as possible (1965, p. 126), pub-
lished numerous articles in newspapers and
popular magazines, prepared a monthly column
for Redbook Magazine, wrote and narrated an-
thropological films, and made herself widely
available to the mass media, through her will-
ingness to be interviewed, photographed, and to
appear on television. Her books are sufficiently
well-written, with "extraordinary vividness and
semblance to life" (Kroeber 1931) for several
of them to have become best sellers, notably:
Coming of Age in Samoa, Cultural Patterns and
Technical Change (1953b), and Culture
and Commitment. In and through these roles,
"for almost a generation," she not only "sym-
bolized and represented an entire scientific dis-
cipline to the general public" (Webb 1972,
p. 102), but also (to quote from the citation that
accompanied the presidential medal of freedom
that she was awarded posthumously), "a teacher
from whom all may learn." In the words of
Jacquelyn Anderson Mattfield, president of Bar-
nard College: "Her classroom was the world
and its citizens her students. . . . She was an
educator for all seasons."
Margaret Mead may well have been the most
famous of anthropologists, and she "achieved
a degree of eminence rare in the history of
science" (Webb 1972, p. 102). She was ac-
corded 28 honorary degrees from various uni-
versities and colleges, both in the United
States and abroad—many of them institutions
where she had taught or lectured. In addition,
she received more than forty awards. These in-
cluded academic and scientific honors, such as
the Viking medal in general anthropology of
the Wenner-Gren Foundation, honorary fellow
in the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great
Britain and Ireland, and the omega achievers
award in the field of education; membership in
the National Academy of Sciences, the Ameri-
can Philosophical Association, the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the World
Academy of Arts and Sciences; and election to
the presidencies of the American Anthropologi-
cal Association, the American Association for
the Advancement of Science, the Scientists' In-
stitute for Public Information, the Society for
General Systems Research, the World Federa-
tion of Mental Health, and the World Federation
of Ekistics. She was also the recipient of num-
erous public and media awards, among them,
those that cited her as "woman of the year in
science and research," "woman of conscience,"
"outstanding woman of the twentieth century,"
"world citizen," and "mother of the world."
The fact that Mead chose to become a public
and applied, as well as an academic anthropolo-
gist, that she had the intellectual and literary
ability, motivation, energy, charisma, and know-
how to do so on a national, international, and
global scale, and that as a consequence, she
became an almost legendary figure, made her
the target of criticism and controversy, as well
as the subject of praise and esteem. She was
"lambasted and lampooned" by the media and
the public, "lionized and mythologized, called
an institution and a stormy petrel, and car-
tooned as a candidate for the presidency wear-
ing a human skull around [her] neck" (1972a,
p. 288).
Many of her fellow anthropologists responded
ambivalently to her personality, her publica-
tions, and her pronouncements. This ambiva-
lence was continually expressed, for example,
in the reviews of Mead's books that appeared in
American Anthropologist over the years:
. . . [A] piece of work need not be ethnographically
unreliable because it is aesthetically effective. And
an artist Margaret Mead surely is. ... When she
leaves her vein to intellectuarize about American
educational tenets of 1930, or to compromise be-
tween the amount of cultural fact that ethnologists
want and the public will stand, her own peculiar
quality rapidly evaporates. . . . (Kroeber 1931,
pp. 248-250)
It is useful. . . for the insights it provides into
one of the most productive and controversial, and
certainly most widely known, members of our pro-
fession. One is the buoyant enthusiasm with which
she urges everyone into the anthropological swim,
holding forth promise of unlocking the secrets of
man's behavior to anyone willing to spend time in

anthropological studies. . . . [S]he appears to make
the assumption that anyone who has mastered
anthropology can do all the things that she has
done. . . . Few are likely to be deceived by this
assumption, and meanwhile her enthusiasm is in-
fectious and often charming. . . . (Gladwin 1956,
pp. 764-767)
The way that Margaret Mead's contribution to
basic and applied anthropology has been per-
ceived by anthropologists was not only influ-
enced and complicated by the intricate social
and cultural role that she played, and by the
ethos of the discipline that she pioneered, but
also by her status as a singular woman in her
profession. At the January 1979 memorial pro-
gram for Mead in the American Museum of
Natural History, Jacquelyn Mattfield pointed
out that:
. . . in spite of publications of acclaim and wide
readership, Margaret Mead's academic career looks
on paper very like that of any other person in the
small number of able women affiliated with major
universities between 1930 and 1965. The out-of-
main-stream titles "Lecturer," "Guest Professor,"
"Adjunct Professor," "Visiting Professor," which
Margaret Mead, like those other academic women
of her generation, carried for all but the last phase
of her career, in no way reflect the distinction of
her career as an educator or anthropologist.
One of the least understood aspects of Mead's
commitment was the degree to which she was
willing to offer up her work, her resources, her
whole person, and all aspects of her life as
"instruments" on behalf of the scientific-
humanistic anthropological goals to which she
was dedicated. In the prologue to her autobi-
ography, Blackberry Winter (1972a), she ad-
dressed herself to "young people, young enough
to be my own great-grandchildren," saying: "I can
try to lay my life on the line, as you speak of
laying your bodies on the line" (1972a, p. 5).
She did so in many ways, with clear-sighted
willingness, for example to accept whatever the
consequences might be of appearing in public
clad in her familiar red cape, carrying her
famous black lacquered, shoulder-high forked
staff or "thumb stick"; or of testifying before a
U.S. Senate committee that, in her opinion,
legalizing marijuana would do something to-
ward correcting the dangerous amount of drug
use.
This is not to portray her as the vigorous nun-
become-saint that she thought she might like to
be when she was ten years old. Nor is it to deny
that she thoroughly enjoyed being Margaret
MEAD, MARGARET 521
Mead, including the public figure and "personal-
ity" aspects of her role, and the ways in which she
stage-managed them. But perhaps the best in-
dicator of the extent to which she gave of her
"talents," and of her "generosity" (one of her
frequently articulated values) is the Institute
for Intercultural Studies, a nonprofit organiza-
tion that she established in 1944, and of which
she was secretary (Dillon 1979). The main
purposes of the institute as expressed in its cer-
tificate of incorporation are to "stimulate . . .
research . . . dealing with the behavior, cus-
toms, psychology, and social organization
of ... various peoples and nations . . . [em-
phasizing research which is] most likely to affect
intercultural and international relations"; and
to offer fellowships and other aid, including
publicity and publication, for such research. The
major source of the institute's funds were Mead's
own earnings, not only as curator of the Amer-
ican Museum of Natural History and adjunct
professor at Columbia University, but also from
her royalties, lectures, newspaper and magazine
articles, and television appearances. The greater
part of her income was donated to this institute
and redistributed to persons and groups engaged
in the types of activities for which it was
founded. Mead was especially interested in giv-
ing small grants to young persons (particularly
young women) and to other newcomers in the
early stages of their behavioral science careers,
and in promoting the kinds of research for which
there are "few funds and few supporters" avail-
able. A good deal of her own research was also
supported by the institute. Although in energy as
well as in monies it amounted to far more than
one-tenth of her resources, what Mead donated
of herself in this way is perhaps best thought of
as a tithe—a religious offering that grew out of
her sense of calling, and out of the old Amer-
ican, Protestant Christian tradition in which she
was raised.
Mead was a devout, practicing Episcopalian,
who (in the words of the Reverend William F.
Starr, Episcopal chaplain of Columbia Univer-
sity) "brought to her faith the same incisive,
direct, probing intellect that animates her scien-
tific work. She had the keenest possible sense of
our present peril, and of humanness, not as a
given, but as a task." She was not only an active
laywoman in the Episcopal Church, but also in
many ecumenical committees, conferences, and
activities of both the National Council and the
World Council of Churches.
Mead wrote repeatedly about the significant
522 MEAD, MARGARET
and lifelong extent to which she felt her family
influenced her attitudes and values, beliefs and
ideas:
All my forebears came to this country before the
Revolutionary War, and seven of the eight lines can
be traced to ancestors who fought in the Revolution;
the eighth were Tories from upper New York State
who migrated to Canada. . . . I knew that we were
of mixed English, Scotch, Irish, and Welsh stock,
and was told that my ancestors had all suffered in
the cause of religious liberty, as pilgrims, puritans,
and covenanters who had had to hide to escape
persecution. . . . (Mead 1974a, p. 299)
Mead's mother (Emily Fogg Mead) and father
(Edward Sherwood Mead), as well as her pater-
nal grandmother (Martha Adaline Ramsay
Mead), who came to live with her parents when
they were married, are especially well known to
readers because she has written so fully and
movingly about them. Mead was born Decem-
ber 17, 1901, in Philadelphia, the first of five
children and, in her perception, a thoroughly
wanted and loved child. During her childhood,
the family lived in a series of places in and
around Philadelphia, and in Holicong in the
Buckingham valley of Bucks County, Pennsyl-
vania. Her father, an economist, was a professor
of finance at the Wharton School of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. Her mother, a graduate of
Wellesley College and a teacher, had met and
married him when they were both graduate
students at the University of Pennsylvania. The
couple moved to Hammonton, New Jersey, so
that Emily Mead could study Italian immigrants
for her dissertation in sociology. She was a de-
voted wife and mother, an early feminist, a suf-
fragist, and she was always actively engaged in
numerous social causes and organized com-
munity efforts "to make this a better world."
Because Mead's parents—"educational enthu-
siasts"—disapproved of schools that kept children
indoors and chained to their desks all day, until
her high school years she was taught, principally
at home, by her grandmother, also a college
graduate and a certified teacher.
The "pattern my family made for me," as
Mead has described and analyzed it, "was re-
lated comparatively to the past, vigorously and
ethically to the present, and hopefully to the
future. . . ." From her father, mother, and
grandmother, and the sense of heritage that
they conveyed to her, came "enjoyment of the
intellect"; an "enormous respect for facts"; "the
academic ethos"; an interest in "real processes"
and in "real children"; the association of obser-
vation with "an act of love"; trustworthiness and
"strength of conscience"; egalitarian principles;
a "sense of responsibility for society" and for
justice; austerity; domesticity; generosity and
compassion; affection and love. She also believed
that she inherited her almost photographic
memory from them. In all these ways, Mead felt
that her work was significantly influenced by
the three people who raised her.
In addition, an extensive web of family rela-
tions—including even mother's sisters and father's
cousins—remained important to her throughout
her life. She was close to her siblings: Richard,
an economist, transportation specialist, and pro-
fessor at the University of Southern California;
Elizabeth, a professor of art at Lesley College
and wife of William Steig, artist and cartoonist;
and Priscilla, wife of Leo Rosten, political scien-
tist and writer, who studied social work in the
last years of her life. Another sister, Katherine,
who died at the age of nine months, was always
a living presence for Mead.
In adult life, kinship for Mead included three
successive husbands, all of them anthropologists.
Her first marriage, in 1923, was to Luther Cress-
man, who was studying for the ministry at
General Theological Seminary at the time that
Mead began her graduate work in anthropology.
On her way home from her first field trip to
Samoa, she met Reo Fortune. They were married
in 1928, on shipboard, en route to the Admiralty
Islands in New Guinea to study the Manus. Five
years later, when she and Fortune were studying
the Tchambuli in New Guinea, she met Gregory
Bateson, then working among the latmul. They
were married in 1935. Their daughter, Mead's
only child, was born in 1939. Mead had always
planned to have many children—six, she had
thought—when she first married. But because of
a tipped uterus, it was only possible for her to
have one, Mary Catherine Bateson, named after
"the most distinguished [of Bateson's] maternal
aunts, a pioneer historian, who died young," and
Mead's "lost little sister" (1972a, p. 257). For
Mead, her daughter's birth—"after many years of
experience as a student of child development and
childbirth in remote villages"—represented
the miraculous arrival of a "new person," and a
"completely happy" and fulfilling experience as
a woman, for which she had hoped all her life
(1972a, pp. 249, 258-259).
Mead and Bateson's collaborative research in
Bali (1936-1939) produced Balinese Character,
one of Mead's most original and generative works,
both in terms of its impact on anthropological

methods, and on Mead's own future theoretical
perspectives. With her divorce from Bateson in
1945, her "years as a collaborating wife, trying
to combine intensive field work with an intense
personal life . . . came to an end" (1972a, p. 27).
Mary Catherine Bateson became a linguist
and anthropologist, specializing in Middle East-
ern languages and culture, and married an
Armenian engineer, Barkev Kassarjian. For
Mead, the birth of her granddaughter Sevanne
Margaret Kassarjian in 1970 "rounded out [her]
understanding of something for which [she had]
pleaded all her life—that everyone needs to have
access to both grandparents and grandchildren in
order to be a full human being" (19720, p. 282).
But it was not only relatives with whom Mead
maintained close ties over time and space. She
acknowledged that her entwined personal and
professional life "depended to an enormous
degree" on continuing contact with a wide range
of persons, from many social backgrounds, age
groups, and occupations, in different parts of the
world, and also on "face-to-face close work with
collaborators." At the 1976 meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of
Science (of which Mead was president that
year), Wilton S. Dillon, an anthropologist and
director of symposia and seminars at the Smith-
sonian Institution, referred to the vast and
varied Mead circle as a big "kula ring," through
which, in an ever-widening, gift-exchange kind
of way, human and intellectual services and
ideas are continually given and received. Mead
had a concept of "kinship by choice," and her
"ring" included kin-like friend-colleagues, such
as Benedict, Gorer, Jane Belo, Marie E. Eichel-
berger, and Edward Sapir; Lawrence K. and
Mary Frank and their children, with whom
Mead and her daughter shared a joint house-
hold during most of Mary Catherine Bateson's
childhood; and Rhoda Metraux, her frequent
collaborator and coauthor. The circle also en-
compassed persons from numerous other dis-
ciplines, such as writer James Baldwin, philoso-
pher of science Jacob Bronowski, geneticist
Theodosius Dobzhansky (Mead et al. 1968),
inventor and philosopher R. Buckminster Fuller,
and photographer Ken Heyman (Mead & Hey-
man 1965; 1975); several generations of
younger anthropologists who were once her
students, like Theodore Schwartz, Barbara
Honeyman Roll, and Lenora Shargo Foerstal;
former members of her staff of young assistants
at the American Museum of Natural History;
nonanthropologist social scientists in whose
MEAD, MARGARET 523
work Mead took a long-term interest; informants
and respondents from among the peoples she
studied; and an "amazingly diverse group" of
other persons to whom her professional activi-
ties and "her celebrity status" were relatively
unknown (Dillon 1974, p. 492).
Although Mead stated that "moving and stay-
ing at home, traveling and arriving [were] all of
a piece" for her (1972a, p. 9), there were places
as well as people in her life that had special sig-
nificance for her: childhood homes in Hammon-
ton and Holicong; Barnard College, from which
she graduated in 1923, where she not only found
the kind of student life that "matched [her]
dreams," but also her vocation as an anthropolo-
gist; Columbia University, where she received her
graduate training in anthropology and became
an adjunct professor in 1954; Samoa, Manus,
and Bali. But it was her "attic office" in the
American Museum of Natural History in New
York City that was her professional home. Here
she lived her work when she was not in the field,
did most of her writing, and stored all of her
field materials.
One day about midway in my field trip [to Samoa
in 1925-1926], a cable came offering me the Mu-
seum job. I remember that there was no one to
understand what it meant and no way to celebrate.
I just walked along the beach, alone, thinking what
it would be like. . . . (1965, p. 116)
Then, in 1926, after my return from Samoa, I
came to the . . . Museum, . . . where I was given
as my office an attic room under the eaves up in
the west tower of the old Seventy-Seventh Street
building. . . . Perhaps it was because I was given
that little attic room with a view over the city roofs
that I decided within a few months that I was going
to stay at the Museum all my life. . . . (1972a,
pp. 14-15)
In 1969, Mead became curator emeritus of
ethnology at the museum. In 1971, her 45
years of work there culminated in the opening of
the Hall of the Peoples of the Pacific, an exhibit
that she largely planned and assembled. In 1976,
on the occasion of her 50th year at the mu-
seum and her 75th birthday, a Margaret Mead
Fund for the Advancement of Anthropology was
established to endow a newly-created Margaret
Mead chair in anthropology, to relocate, expand,
and maintain the Hall of the Peoples of the
Pacific, to provide for training younger anthro-
pologists, and to preserve irreplaceable museum
collections.
Two years later, on November 15, 1978, one
524 MEAD, MARGARET
month before her 77th birthday, on the
first day of the annual meeting of the Amer-
ican Anthropological Association, and on the day
that the World Almanac named her one of the
world's 25 most influential women, Margaret
Mead died of cancer of the pancreas. Her illness
had lasted a year. As she had requested, she had
been told "the full truth about [her] physical con-
dition without any protective evasions or opti-
misms whatsoever," so that she could "use . . . a
limited and definite period before death . . .
responsibly and constructively" (Modell 1974,
pp. 907-908). On August 7, 1978, she had re-
newed and renotarized the "Living Will: On
Medical Intervention" document that she had
originally drafted in 1962. Characteristically,
Mead's "statement of intent in case I am in-
capacitated from making such a decision at the
time that a decision is called for," both ante-
dated and anticipated the current "right to die"
and "death with dignity" issues that have become
so acute and pervasive in American society dur-
ing the 1970s. Her statement not only included
a "recital of choices" to guide the physicians who
might care for her, but also some general, cul-
tural insights into what she identified as the
"crisis . . . we have reached . . . because med-
ical advances have outdistanced our expected
forms of ethical behavior" (Modell 1974,
pp. 907-908). Several years earlier, when her
health was still intact, Mead's Living Will had
been published, "without identification," in the
New England Journal of Medicine by Walter
Modell (ibid., pp. 907-908), to whom (in a letter
dated January 30, 1974), she had given permis-
sion to do so. "I would be happy to have that
piece published, with or without my name," she
had written to him, "whichever you thought
would have the most effect. I believe that death
with dignity is a fairly pressing agenda, and any-
thing that can be done to help it along should
be done."
Until she entered the hospital, Mead con-
tinued to hope that she could return to Manus
in December 1978, for a planned, seventh visit.
Although this became impossible, she remained
a field-working anthropologist to the end: a
participant observer of her own final illness, and
of the hospital where she spent the last six weeks
of her life; a probingly interested interviewer of
the nurses and physicians who cared for her;
and the voluntary client and collaborator-sub-
ject of a faith healer, whom she regarded as a
modern version of the many "shamans" that she
had known and studied in more primitive cul-
tures.
Margaret Mead was buried privately and re-
ligiously in the graveyard of what she had de-
scribed in Blackberry Winter as "the little Epis-
copal church" in Buckingham, Pennsylvania,
where, as a young woman, "I had been baptized
of my own choice with godmothers summoned
by myself" (1972a, p. 116). But her death was
experienced and reported as a major public,
American, international, and symbolic event. It
was covered by virtually every local and national
radio and television station in the United States,
and by numerous European ones as well, and it
was announced on the morning news of Papua
New Guinea National Broadcasting Company.
The news of her death and the story of her life
and work appeared on the front pages of Amer-
ican, British, and French papers, and feature
essays and editorials about her were printed in
popular magazines such as Time and Newsweek,
and in scientific and professional journals like
Science and American Anthropologist. A bul-
letin about her death arrived in Peking one day
after it had occurred, where it was relayed to
the American Association for the Advancement
of Science's board of directors who were visiting
the People's Republic of China.
Memorial services and programs were con-
ducted for Mead at St. Paul's Chapel at Columbia
University; the Washington (D.C.) Cathedral
(with assistance from New Directions, the na-
tional citizens' lobby on global issues of which
she was founding chairperson); at the Univer-
sity of Cincinnati College of Medicine (where
she had been a visiting professor every year
since 1957); in the "combined" anthropology de-
partment of Columbia University, Teacher's
College, and Barnard College; at the annual
meetings of the American Anthropological Asso-
ciation, the Society for Applied Anthropology,
the American Association for the Advancement
of Science, the American Orthopsychiatric Asso-
ciation; and at the American Museum of Na-
tural History.
When the people of Pere village in Manus
learned of the death of "Margarit Mit," they
closed their school and remained in their houses
for 24 hours. Then came five days of mourning
ceremonies, reserved for the passing of a great
chief. The official mourners for these cere-
monies, 26 women who had known Mead well,
went to the house that had been built for her in
1965, where they chanted dirges, some of

which were especially composed to recount the
history of "Margarit's" visits to Pere and her
career in the outside world. On November
22, Francis Paliau, the councilor (mayor) of
the village sent the following cable to Theo-
dore Schwartz and Barbara Roll (anthropolo-
gists) and Frederick Roll (photographer) who
worked closely with Mead in Manus: "People
sorry of Margaret Mead's death. With sympathy,
respect. Rested seven days. Planted coconut tree
memory of great friend" (Roll 1979).
A Margaret Mead memorial Community Cen-
ter was established in Manus. At the Museum of
Natural History in New York, the Hall of the
Peoples of the Pacific was renamed the Mar-
garet Mead Hall. Many letters arrived in Mead's
office from various of the voluntary associations,
scientific organizations, and schools for which
she had spoken, requesting permission to ar-
range a Margaret Mead Day, create a Margaret
Mead lecture series, establish a Margaret Mead
award, start a Margaret Mead memorial fund,
or to name their institution after her. On Janu-
ary 6, 1979, she posthumously received the
Philip A. Hart award from the Urban Environ-
ment Conference, "for fostering alliances be-
tween labor, minority and environmental inter-
ests." And on January 20, 1979, Mead was post-
humously awarded the presidential medal of
freedom, the nation's highest civilian honor,
which was presented to her daughter by Andrew
Young, United States Ambassador to the United
Nations, on behalf of President Jimmy Carter,
in a ceremony at the museum.
Less than a month after her death, a volume
that Mead had planned as a Christmas remem-
brance, and coauthored with Rhoda Metraux,
was published as a book. An Interview With
Santa Claus ([1977] 1978), dedicated and ad-
dressed to Kate (her goddaughter and Metraux's
granddaughter), contains Mead's final, allegori-
cal statement about some of the basic moral
convictions and transcendent spiritual beliefs
that animated her life and her work:
Why shouldn't there be a whole clan of gift-giving
figures? Don't they all, in some way, convey a
special message to children? . . . All of them have
appeared on some day close to the shortest day of
the year, when the very sharpness of a cold, barren
winter gives promise of spring, so that long ago, in
the midst of winter, human hearts rejoiced and
were moved to generosity and gaiety, especially for
children.
Santa Claus is but the newest of these gift-givers.
MEAD, MARGARET 525
From him, as from the others, children can learn
that giving as well as receiving is joyous, and that
the gifts that seem to be freely given by wonderful,
benign visitors are tokens of the happy care given
by mothers and fathers.
Now it is enough for Kate, and all small children,
to learn the legends of Santa Claus. Later, when
legend and reality meet in a new way, she will begin
to understand, we think, that giving is itself a kind
of thank offering, (pp. 43-48)
RENEE C. Fox
WORKS BY MEAD
(1928a) 1961 Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychologi-
cal Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civiliza-
tion. New York: Morrow. —» The 1961 edition has
a new preface. This book has been translated into
several foreign languages. A paperback edition was
published in 1971.
(1928b) 1969 An Inquiry Into the Question of Cul-
tural Stability in Polynesia. New York: AMS Press.
—•> First published as volume 9 of the Columbia
University Contributions to Anthropology. Mead's
doctoral dissertation.
(1930a) 1976 Growing Up in New Guinea: A Com-
parative Study of Primitive Education. New York:
Morrow. —> Translated into Dutch, French, and
Hebrew.
1930& Social Organization of Manu'a. Bernice P.
Bishop Museum, Bulletin No. 76. Honolulu: The
Museum.
1931 Education, Primitive. Volume 5, pages 399-403
in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York:
Macmillan.
1932 The Changing Culture of an Indian Tribe. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press. —•> A paperback edi-
tion was published by AMS Press in 1969.
1934 Kinship in the Admiralty Islands. American
Museum of Natural History, Anthropological Papers
34:183-358.
(1935) 1963 Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive
Societies. New York: Morrow. —» The 1963 edition
has a new preface. This book has been translated
into several foreign languages.
1937 MEAD, MARGARET (editor) Cooperation and Com-
petition Among Primitive Peoples. New York and
London: McGraw-Hill. —> An enlarged paperback
edition was published by Beacon in 1961.
(1938-1949) 1968-1971 The Mountain Arapesh. 3 vols.
Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press. —»
Volume 1: The Record of Unabelin With Rorschach
Analyses. Volume 2: The Arts and Supernatural-
ism. Volume 3: Stream of Events in Alitoa.
1939a Native Languages as Field Work Tools. Ameri-
can Anthropologist 41:189-205.
1939b On the Concept of Plot in Culture. New York
Academy of Sciences, Transactions Series 2 2:24-
27. —> Issue entitled Researches in Bali, 1936-1939.
(1942) 1965 And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthro-
pologist Looks at America. New York: Morrow. —>
The 1965 edition includes a new chapter. This book
has been translated into several foreign languages
and is available in Braille. A paperback edition was
published in 1971.
(1942) 1962 MEAD, MARGARET; and BATESON, GREGORY
Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis. New
York Academy of Sciences.
526 MEAD, MARGARET
1943a Our Educational Emphasis in Primitive Per-
spective. American Journal of Sociology 48:633-
639.
1943k The Problem of Changing Food Habits. Na-
tional Research Council, Bulletin 108:20-31. —>
Report of the Committee on Changing Food Habits,
1941-1943.
1945 Manual for the Study of Food Habits. National
Research Council, Bulletin No. 111. Washington:
The Council. —> Report of the Committee on Food
Habits.
1946a Personality, The Cultural Approach to. Pages
477-488 in The Encyclopedia of Psychology. Edited
by Philip Lawrence Harriman. New York: Philo-
sophical Library.
1946£> Research on Primitive Children. Pages 667-706
in Manual of Child Psychology. Edited by Leonard
Carmichael. New York: Wiley.
1947a Age Patterning in Personality Development.
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 17:231-240.
1947b The Application of Anthropological Techniques
to Cross-national Communication. New York Acad-
emy of Sciences, Transactions Series 2 9:133-240.
1947c The Concept of Culture and the Psychosomatic
Approach. Psychiatry 10:57-76. —> Reprinted on
pages 594—622 in Douglas Haring (editor), Personal
Character and Cultural Milieu. 3d ed. Syracuse
University Press, 1956.
1947d On the Implications for Anthropology of the
Gesell-Ilg Approach to Maturation. American An-
thropologist 49:69-77. —» Reprinted on pages 585-
593 in Douglas Haring (editor), Personal Character
and Cultural Milieu. 3d ed. Syracuse University
Press, 1956.
1947e The Implications of Cultural Change for Per-
sonality Developments. American Journal of Ortho-
psychiatry 17:633-646. —» Reprinted on pages
623-636 in Douglas Haring (editor), Personal
Character and Cultural Milieu. 3d ed. Syracuse
University Press, 1956.
1949a Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a
Changing World. New York: Morrow. —> This book
has been translated into 11 foreign languages.
1949£> Ruth Fulton Benedict, 1887-1948. American
Anthropologist 51:457-468.
1949c Psychologic Weaning: Childhood and Adoles-
cence. Pages 124-135 in Paul Hoch (editor), Psy-
chosexual Development in Health and Disease. New
York: Grune & Stratton.
1950 Cultural Contexts of Nutritional Patterns. Pages
103-111 in Centennial: Collected Papers Presented
at the Centennial Celebration, Washington, D.C.,
September 13-17, 1948. Washington: American
Association for the Advancement of Science.
1951a Anthropologist and Historian: Their Common
Problems. American Quarterly 3:3—13.
1951b The School in American Culture. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1951c Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority: An Inter-
disciplinary Approach to Problems of Soviet Char-
acter. New York: McGraw-Hill. —» A paperback
edition was published by Schocken in 1966.
(1951d) 1968 The Study of National Character. Pages
70-84 in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell
(editors), The Policy Sciences: Recent Develop-
ments in Scope and Method. Stanford Univ. Press.
1951 MEAD, MARGARET; and MACGREGOR, FRANCES C.
Growth and Culture: A Photographic Study of Bali-
nese Childhood. New York: Putnam.
1952 The Training of the Cultural Anthropologist.
American Anthropologist 54:343-346.
1953a National Character. Pages 642-667 in A. L.
Kroeber (editor), Anthropology Today: An En-
cyclopedia Inventory. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1953i> World Federation for Mental Health. In Cul-
tural Patterns and Technical Change. Paris: United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization.
1953 MEAD, MARGARET; and CALAS, NICHOLAS (edi-
tors) Primitive Heritage: An Anthropological Anthol-
ogy. New York: Random House.
1953 MEAD, MARGARET; and METRAUX, RHODA (edi-
tors) The Study of Culture at a Distance. Univ.
of Chicago Press.
1954 The Swaddling Hypothesis: Its Reception.
American Anthropologist 56:395-409.
1954 MEAD, MARGARET; and METRAUX, RHODA Themes
in French Culture. Stanford Univ. Press.
1955 Effects of Anthropological Field Work Models on
Interdisciplinary Communication in the Study of
National Character. Journal of Social Issues 11:
2-11.
1955 MEAD, MARGARET; and WOLFENSTEIN, MARTHA
(editors) Childhood in Contemporary Cultures.
Univ. of Chicago Press.
(1956a) 1975 New Lives for Old: Cultural Transforma-
tion—Manus, 1928-1953. New York: Dell. -» The
1975 edition has a new preface. This book has been
translated into several foreign languages and is
available in Braille.
1956b Some Uses of Still Photography in Culture and
Personality Studies. Pages 79-105 in Douglas G.
Haring (editor), Personal Character and Cultural
Milieu. 3d ed. Syracuse Univ. Press.
1957 Changing Patterns of Parent-Child Relations in
an Urban Culture. International Journal of Psy-
choanalysis 38:369-378.
1958 Cultural Determinants of Behavior. Pages 480-
508 in Ann Roe and George Gaylord Simpson (edi-
tors), Behavior and Evolution. New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press.
(1959a) 1973 An Anthropologist at Work: Writings of
Ruth Benedict. New York: Avon.
1959& Apprenticeship Under Boas. American Anthro-
pologist 61, part 2:29-45.
1959c People and Places. New York: World Publish-
ing. —» A paperback edition was published by Ban-
tam in 1963.
(1960) 1964 Anthropology Among the Sciences. In
Anthropology: A Human Science. Princeton: Van
Nostrand. -» Delivered as the presidential address
at the annual meeting of the American Anthro-
pological Association in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
November, 1960.
1960 MEAD, MARGARET; and BUNZEL, RUTH (editors)
The Golden Age of American Anthropology. New
York: Braziller.
1961 National Character and the Science of Anthro-
pology. Pages 15-26 in Seymour M. Lipset and Leo
Lowenthal (editors), Cultural and Social Charac-
ter: The Work of David Riesman Reviewed. New
York: Free Press.
1962 Retrospects and Prospects. Pages 115-149 in
Thomas Glad win and William C. Sturtevant (edi-
tors), Anthropology and Human Behavior. Wash-
ington: The Anthropological Society.
1963 Socialization and Enculturation. Current An-
thropology 2:184-188.
1964a Anthropology: A Human Science. Princeton:
Van Nostrand.
1964b Continuities in Cultural Evolution. New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1966.
1964c Food Habits Research: Problems of the 1960's.

National Academy of Sciences, National Research
Council, Publication 1225. Washington: The
Council.
(1965) 1969 Anthropologists and What They Do. Eau
Claire, Wise.: Hale.
1965 MEAD, MARGARET; and HEYMAN, KEN Family.
New York: Macmillan.
1966 MEAD, MARGARET; and BROWN, MURIEL The
Wagon and the Star: A Study of American Com-
munity Initiative. St. Paul, Minn.: Curriculum
Resources.
1967 MEAD, MARGARET; and NEWTON, NILES Cultural
Patterning and Perinatal Behavior. Pages 142-144
in Stephen A. Richardson and Alan F. Guttmacher
(editors), Childbearing—Its Social and Psychologi-
cal Aspects. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins.
1968a Benedict, Ruth. Volume 2, pages 48-52 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968b Conferences. Volume 3, pages 215-220 in In-
ternational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan
and Free Press.
1968c The Importance of National Cultures. Pages
89-105 in Arthur S. Hoffman (editor), International
Communication and the New Diplomacy. Bloom-
ington and London: Indiana Univ. Press.
1968d Incest. Volume 7, pages 115-122 in Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1968 MEAD, MARGARET; and BYERS, PAUL The Small
Conference: An Innovation in Communication. Pub-
lications of the International Social Science Coun-
cil, No. 9. Paris and The Hague: Mouton.
1968 MEAD, MARGARET; DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS;
TOBACH, ETHEL; and LIGHT, ROBERT E. (editors)
Science and the Concept of Race. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1969.
1969 Research With Human Beings: A Model Derived
From Anthropological Field Practice. Daedalus 98:
361-386.
1970a The Art and Technology of Fieldwork. Pages
246-265 in Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen (edi-
tors), A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthro-
pology. Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press.
(1970b) 1978 Culture and Commitment: The New Re-
lations Between the Generations in the 1970's. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press; Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday. —» Translated into ten foreign lan-
guages and available in Braille. The revised and
updated 1978 edition contains a new preface, sev-
eral new chapters, and new appendices. First pub-
lished with the subtitle: A Study of the Generation
Gap.
1970c Hunger, Food, and the Environment. Pages 3—5
in Hunger: A Scientists' Institute for Public In-
formation Workbook. New York: The Institute.
1970 MEAD, MARGARET; and METRAUX, RHODA A Way
of Seeing. New York: McCall. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published by Morrow in 1974.
1971 Cross-cultural Significance of Space. Ekistics
32:271-272.
1971 MEAD, MARGARET; and BALDWIN, JAMES A Rap
on Race. Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott.
—» A paperback edition was published by Dell in
1974.
1972a Blackberry Winter: My Earlier Years. New
York: Morrow. —» A paperback edition was pub-
lished by Pocket Books in 1975.
MEAD, MARGARET 527
1972i> Twentieth Century Faith: Hope and Survival.
Edited by Ruth N. Anshen. New York: Harper. .
1972 CAROTHERS, J. EDWARD; MEAD, MARGARET;
MCCRACKEN, DANIEL D.; and SHINN, ROBERT L.
(editors) To Love or to Perish: The Technological
Crisis and the Churches. New York: Friendship
Press.
1974a Autobiography. Volume 6, pages 293-326 in
A History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited
by Gardner Lindzey. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren-
tice-Hall.
1974b Education 94, no. 4:289-406. —» The entire
issue is devoted to Mead. Section 1: "What I Think
I Have Learned About Education, 1923-1973." Sec-
tion 2: "Selected Reprints." Section 3: "Epilogue."
1974c Ruth Benedict. New York: Columbia Univ.
Press.
1975 MEAD, MARGARET; and HEYMAN, KEN World
Enough: Rethinking the Future. Boston: Little,
Brown.
1976a New Lives for Old: The Effects of New Com-
munication on Old Cultures in the Pacific. Papers
of the East-West Communication Institute (Hono-
lulu) 1976:1-10.
1976b Return to Manus. Natural History 85, no. 6:
60-69.
1976c Towards a Human Science. Science 191:903-
909.
1977'a An Anthropological Approach to Different
Types of Communication and the Implications of
Differences in Human Temperaments. Pages 47—52
in Joseph P. Long (editor), Extrasensory Ecology:
Parapsychology and Anthropology. Metuchen, N.J.:
Scarecrow Press.
1977b Letters From the Field: 1925-1975. New York:
Harper.
(1977) 1978 MEAD, MARGARET; and METRAUX, RHODA
An Interview With Santa Claus. —» First published
in December 1977 issue of Redbook Magazine.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENEDICT, RUTH 1932 Configurations of Culture in
North America. American Anthropologist 34:1-27.
BENEDICT, RUTH 1934 Patterns of Culture. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin. —» A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1961.
DILLON, WILTON S. 1974 Margaret Mead: President
Elect, 1974. Science 194:490-493.
DILLON, WILTON S. 1979 Margaret Mead, 1901-
1978. Grants Magazine 1:290-293.
Ethos. 1975 3: Whole volume. -» This issue is de-
voted to Margaret Mead in honor of her contribu-
tions to socialization and enculturation.
GEERTZ, HILDRED 1976 Review of "Trance and
Dance in Bali," "Bathing Babies in Three Cultures,"
and "Karba's First Years." American Anthropologist
78:725-726.
GLADWIN, THOMAS 1956 Review of Childhood in
Contemporary Cultures. American Anthropologist
78:764-767.
GORDAN, JOAN (editor) 1976 Margaret Mead: The
Complete Bibliography, 1925-1975. The Hague:
Mouton.
KROEBER, A. L. 1931 Review of Growing Up in New
Guinea. American Anthropologist 33:248-250.
LEE, DOROTHY 1954 Review of Primitive Heritage:
An Anthropological Anthology. American Anthro-
pologist 56:1109-1111.
LONG, JOSEPH (editor) 1977 Extrasensory Ecology:
Parapsychology and Anthropology. Metuchen, N.J.:
Scarecrow Press.
 528 MEADE, JAMES E.

MODELL, WALTER 1974 A "Will" to Live. New En- discussed below. Brought into the Cabinet Office
gland Journal of Medicine 290:907-908. on Keynes's recommendation, he worked with
MONTGOMERY, EDWARD; and BENNETT, JOHN Anthro-
pological Studies of Food and Nutrition: The 1940'sRichard Stone on the early national income ac-
and the 1970's. In The Uses of Anthropology. Editedcounts, an endeavor that led to their National
by Walter Goldschmidt. —> Forthcoming. Income and Expenditure (1944). During this
ROLL, BARBARA H. 1979 Pere Mourns for Margaret
Mead. Natural History. —» Forthcoming publication. period, Meade was concerned with planning and
WALLACE, ANTHONY F. C. (1961) 1970 Culture and public enterprise policy, interests that were re-
Personality. 2d ed. New York: Random House. flected in several articles and in Planning and
WEBB, MALCOLM C. 1968 The Culture Concept and
Cultural Change in the Work of Margaret Mead. the Price Mechanism (1948).
Louisiana Academy of Sciences, Proceedings 31, The single most important period in Meade's
Dec.: 148-165. career was the decade spent as professor of
WEBB, MALCOLM C. 1972 Margaret Mead: Anthro-
pologist and Social Reformer. Pages 102-113 in commerce at the London School of Economics
1972 Britannica Yearbook of Science and the Future.(1947-1957), where he made his most lasting
Chicago: Ben ton. contributions to international economics and
welfare economics. The two volumes of The
Theory of International Economic Policy—The
MEADE, JAMES E. Balance of Payments (1951) and Trade and
Welfare (1955)—are landmarks in economic
James Meade shared the Nobel Prize in theory. This fruitful period also yielded a num-
economic science in 1977 for his work on inter- ber of subsidiary books, of which the most influ-
national trade and capital movements, but his ential has been The Theory of Customs Unions
contributions covered a wider field. As a (1955b).
professional economist he has written on macro- The two new features of The Balance of Pay-
economics, national income accounting, eco- ments were its integration of income and price
nomic planning, welfare economics, public effects in a general equilibrium framework, and
finance, growth theory, population policy, and its policy orientation. In both respects there was
the distribution of income and wealth. a departure from previous theory, which had
Meade was born on June 23, 1907, went to tended to keep income and price mechanisms
school at Malvern College, and then attended in watertight compartments and had dealt
Oriel College, Oxford (M.A. Oxon). After grad- mainly with automatic processes of balance-of-
uating, he spent a formative and creative year payments adjustment. Keynesian income anal-
in Cambridge, one of the youngest of the "cir- ysis had previously been separated from the
cus" around John Maynard Keynes who were analysis of exchange rate changes, with the
thinking through the central issues of what was latter based on the assumption of constant
to become The General Theory of Employment, money incomes, and analyzed in terms of Mar-
Interest and Money (Keynes 1936). His contri- shallian partial equilibrium.
butions in this crucial period are acknowledged The core of The Balance of Payments is a
in Richard Kahn's pioneering article on the multi- policy model. The policy objectives are taken
plier (1931). Meade returned to Oxford as a to be internal and external balance. The avail-
fellow of Hertford College (1930-1937). During able types of policy are income adjustments,
this period he synthesized with great clarity which operate through fiscal and monetary
the new ideas in macroeconomics and in imper- policies, and price adjustments through ex-
fect competition in An Introduction to Economic change rate variations or wage flexibility. If two
Analysis and Policy (1936), the first systematic objectives of policy are to be achieved simul-
textbook to embody the essential Keynesian taneously, two policy variables are required.
framework. Here Meade was applying the principle, devel-
The subsequent ten years spent outside of oped independently by Jan Tinbergen, that the
academic life at the League of Nations (1937- number of instruments must equal the number
1940) and in the Economic Section of the Cabi- of targets. Meade showed that if only one policy
net Office (where he was director in 1946/ variable was used, conflicts between objectives
1947) had a profound influence on his writing. could arise, yielding what have later been called
The experiences of international economic prob- "dilemma cases."
lems and of postwar reconstruction were prob- Meade's model has become part of the lug-
ably an important stimulus to The Theory of gage of every economist. It represents the first
International Economic Policy (1951-1955), systematic exploration of the relationship be-

tween domestic and international equilibrium.
There are a number of other significant contri-
butions in this book. Balance-of-payments
theory at the time had tended to ignore capital
movements; Meade integrated these into his
model. The book contains the seeds of what has
come to be known as the "theory of optimum
currency areas" and an original analysis of
speculative capital movements. A generally ne-
glected chapter introduces home-trade (non-
traded) goods into the analysis of devaluation;
it was the precursor of an extensive literature
analyzing balance-of-payments policy in terms
of traded and nontraded goods.
A key contribution of The Balance of Pay-
ments was to explain that, starting in internal
balance, a devaluation would be inflationary un-
less it was accompanied by appropriate expendi-
ture reduction. In considering various relative
price policies—notably devaluation—designed to
improve the balance of payments, Meade gen-
erally assumed that an internal balance policy
was being simultaneously pursued by appropri-
ate adjustments of financial policies. He did not
discuss to what extent a devaluation would
bring about automatic expenditure reduction or
how the balance of payments would be affected
if internal balance were not simultaneously
maintained. This gap in his analysis was filled
in the 1950s by the "absorption approach" to
balance-of-payments theory. In addition, he did
not succeed fully in integrating real and mone-
tary theory. He assumed a flexible money supply
policy designed to maintain a given rate of in-
terest, monetary policy changes being expressed
in terms of interest-rate changes. In the mone-
tary approach to balance-of-payments theory
subsequently developed, either the money supply
or domestic credit creation is held constant, the
interest rate being endogenous. Exchange-rate
changes affect the balance of payments through
the real balance effect. In this and other re-
spects, balance-of-payments theory has advanced
since The Balance of Payments. But subsequent
contributors, notably Robert Mundell and Harry
Johnson, have built upon Meade's work.
In Trade and Welfare, Meade presented a
systematic analysis of arguments for trade and
factor controls. The analysis of factor controls
and factor movements is highly original. It in-
cludes a model of the effects of migration on
the terms of trade and a contribution to opti-
mum population theory. But the whole concept
of embracing trade and factor controls in one
methodology was novel.
MEADE, JAMES E. 529
Trade and Welfare has contributed to much
more than international economics, represent-
ing an innovative development of welfare eco-
nomics. In particular, the "theory of second
best" shows that arguments for trade or factor
controls can be made on the basis that there
are various constraints, whether originating in
government policies (for example, a tax) or in
a feature of the private market economy (an
entrenched monopoly) that must be taken as
given. Optimizing trade policies subject to these
constraints can yield a different policy result
from that in a first-best world.
The theory of the second best was given a
rather nihilistic interpretation, mostly under the
influence of a celebrated article by Richard G.
Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster (1956) that de-
rived from Trade and Welfare. It was suggested
that nothing in general could be said about the
nature of optimal policies because of the exis-
tence of "distortions." But in Trade and Welfare
itself the emphasis is characteristically much
more positive: the optimal second-best tax or
tariff would usually partially offset some other
given distortion, even while creating, at the
margin, new distortions. Meade used the prin-
ciple of the second best to analyze the effects of
domestic divergences from the first best, initiat-
ing the "theory of domestic distortions." He ap-
plied the methodology to the welfare economics
of customs unions, where he also made signifi-
cant contributions to the positive theory, The
Theory of Customs Unions being the first sys-
tematic analysis of this subject based on the
pioneering work by Jacob Viner (1950).
Meade's constructive approach was also re-
flected in his rejection of the "new welfare eco-
nomics." Even though he had drafted a greater
part of Trade and Welfare in terms of potential
welfare and the compensation principle, the
very negative conclusions they yielded led him
to revert to the older tradition, which allowed
for interpersonal comparisons as expressed in
explicit distributional weights. The attraction of
this common-sense approach was that it pro-
vided a methodology sufficiently general to allow
different weighting systems to be applied. In
addition, Meade introduced a general method for
measuring small changes in welfare, which was
a variation on Marshallian consumers' surplus,
with its attendant limitations.
These developments built on earlier literature;
but the three aspects of his welfare metho-
dology taken together—second best, distribu-
tional weights, and the measurement of small
530 MEADE, JAMES E.
changes—constitute fundamental contributions
to a number of modern subjects. They include
cost-benefit analysis, even though this form of
applied welfare economics actually developed
independently, Meade's methodology being re-
discovered in more operational contexts. The
same pattern applies to the economics of taxa-
tion. The "Mathematical Supplement" to Trade
and Welfare contains valuable analyses of the
efficiency effects of direct and indirect taxation
and of the general equilibrium incidence of tax-
ation. They foreshadow later literature on opti-
mal taxation and tax incidence.
When Meade's two great volumes and the
various associated books are examined as a
whole, it can be said that the policy model of
The Balance of Payments was very influential
and that the work had a fairly rapid impact on
policy-makers and key writers in the field. Simi-
larly, the Theory of Customs Unions was widely
noted, possibly because of the topicality of its
subject. By contrast, the influence of Trade and
Welfare was more delayed, and to a great ex-
tent many of its original ideas were rediscovered
independently later. Its principal impact was
probably through the theory of second best. Both
books, but especially Trade and Welfare, are
written in a taxonomic and rather heavy style,
with no footnote references to the literature and
a failure to highlight the author's original con-
tributions. Although the books are immensely
rewarding to serious students, their messages
often reach a wider audience only through the
intermediation of more succinct, if less original,
writers.
Meade initially half-promised a "Theory of
Domestic Economic Policy." This has not ma-
terialized as a full-length work, but much of his
writing has been concerned with this subject,
especially since 1957, when he went to Cam-
bridge as professor of political economy. Two
themes dominate much of his work. The first is
the importance, in the allocation of resources,
of the market mechanism, coupled with an ac-
tive government ensuring effective competition.
This theme was set out clearly in Planning and
the Price Mechanism (1948), and Meade re-
turned to it again nearly thirty years later in
The Intelligent Radical's Guide to Economic
Policy (1975). Both books have had wide influ-
ence in Britain, particularly on debates about
economic planning. Meade's belief in market
forces, however, is tempered with a concern for
the redistribution of income—the second main
theme of his writings on domestic policy. The
two books referred to contain extensive dis-
cussions of schemes to reduce inequality. At a
more theoretical level, he has contributed sig-
nificantly to the development of models of in-
come distribution. Efficiency, Equality and the
Ownership of Property (1964a) provides a very
suggestive account of the forces underlying the
accumulation of capital and the relationship be-
tween earned and unearned incomes. This es-
say stimulated much of the revival of interest
in this subject, at least in the United Kingdom;
and Meade has himself developed the model in
The Inheritance of Inequalities (1974a) and
The Just Economy (1965-1976, vol. 4).
Finally, although Meade never returned to
full-time government service, he did not remain
totally removed from issues of policy. He
chaired an influential committee of enquiry into
The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius
(Meade et al. 1961) and in 1975-1977 a com-
mittee on The Structure and Reform of Direct
Taxation (Meade et al. 1978). Both reports,
while the joint products of committees, bear the
unmistakable stamp of his high intellectual
standards and distinctive literary-arithmetical
style.
Meade's attitude to economics is clearly stated
in the preface to The Balance of Payments-. "My
interest in economics has always been in con-
sidering the contribution which pure economic
analysis can make to the formation of economic
policy. . . . This volume is the work neither of
a tool-maker nor of a tool-user, but of a tool-
setter" (p. vii). This approach stems from a
deep-felt concern for social reform and from
liberal-radical values close to those of the "rea-
sonable citizen" for whom he wrote The Intelli-
gent Radical's Guide to Economic Policy. This
belief in the role of reason, or at least in the
possibility that persons of power or influence
can be influenced by cogent arguments, places
him very much in the English tradition. It also
explains his style of writing and why he em-
barked on the Principles of Political Economy
(1965-1976), of which four volumes have ap-
peared to date. He has seen his role as "the
modern equivalent of the old Political Econo-
mist, namely the worker who, in the interests of
those whose task it is to apply economic theory
in policy decisions, specialises in generalisation"
(preface to vol. 1, p. 8). He has written books
to sort out systematically his own ideas on sub-
ject after subject, rather like his great Cam-
bridge predecessor, Arthur C. Pigou.
Meade's independent approach has meant

that he effectively opted out of the mainstream
of many of the relevant scholarly debates. The
failure in his writing to show how his work fits
into the development of the subject has reduced
his influence, especially in North America. His
literary style, while clear and rigorous, tends
to conceal the great originality of his contribu-
tions. From his writings the reader, in fact, ob-
tains a remarkably coherent vision of the
principles underlying the economic system and
of the ways in which, within the confines of a
mixed economy, economic policy might be bet-
ter directed. He has thought through problems
from their basic principles in the context of ab-
stract models without losing sight of their appli-
cation to particular issues. His work is domi-
nated by an open-minded search for truth and
the highest standards of intellectual honesty.
W. M. CORDEN AND
A. B. ATKINSON
WORKS BY MEADE
1934 The Amount of Money and the Banking System.
Economic Journal 44:77—83.
(1936) 1938 An Introduction to Economic Analysis
and Policy. 2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press.
1937 A Simplified Model of Mr. Keynes' System. Re-
view of Economic Studies 4:98—107.
1940 The Economic Basis of a Durable Peace. Oxford
Univ. Press.
1944 Price and Output Policy of State Enterprise. Eco-
nomic Journal 54:321-328, 337-339.
(1944) 1952 MEADE, JAMES E.; and STONE, RICHARD
National Income and Expenditure. 3d ed., rev. Cam-
bridge: Bowes. —» Later revisions were prepared by
Richard and Giovanna Stone.
(1948) 1962 Planning and the Price Mechanism: The
Liberal—Socialist Solution. London: Allen & Unwin.
1950 Degrees of Competitive Speculation. Review of
Economic Studies 17, no. 3:159-167.
1951-1955 The Theory of International Economic Pol-
icy. 2 vols. with mathematical supplement. Oxford
Univ. Press. —> Volume 1: The Balance of Payments,
1951. Volume 2: Trade and Welfare, 1955.
1952a External Economies and Diseconomies in a
Competitive Situation. Economic Journal 62:54-67.
(1952&) 1969 A Geometry of International Trade. New
York: Kelley.
1955a The Case for Variable Exchange Rates. Three
Banks Review 27:3-27.
(1955k) 1968 The Theory of Customs Unions. 3d ed.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
1957 The Balance-of-Payments Problems of a Euro-
pean Free-trade Area. Economic Journal 67:379-
396.
1958a The Control of Inflation. Cambridge Univ. Press.
—> Inaugural lecture.
1958& Is the National Debt a Burden? Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers New Series 10:163-183. —> Correction
on pages 109-110 of volume 11.
1961a Mauritius: A Case Study in Malthusian Econom-
ics. Economic Journal 71:521-534.
(1961b) 1962 A Neo-classical Theory of Economic
Growth. 2d ed. London: Allen & Unwin; New York:
MEADE, JAMES E. 531
Oxford Univ. Press. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1964.
(1961) 1968 MEADE, JAMES E. et al. The Economic
and Social Structure of Mauritius. London: Cass.
(1962a) 1970 The Commonwealth & Common Mar-
ket: A Reappraisal. Hobart Paper, No. 17. 3d ed.
London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
1962Z? The Effect of Savings on Consumption in a
State of Steady Growth. Review of Economic Studies
29:227-234.
1962 MEADE, JAMES E.; LIESNER, H. H.; and WELLS,
S. J. (editors) Case Studies in European Economic
Union: The Mechanics of Integration. Oxford Univ.
Press.
1963c The Adjustment of Savings to Investment in a
Growing Economy. Review of Economic Studies 30:
151-166.
1963& The Rate of Profit in a Growing Economy. Eco-
nomic Journal 73:665-674.
(1964a) 1965 Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership
of Property. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1964b International Commodity Agreements. Lloyds
Bank Review 73:28-42.
1965-1976 Principles of Political Economy. 4 vols.
London: Allen & Unwin. —> Volume 1: The Station-
ary Economy, 1965. Volume 2: The Growing Econ-
omy, 1968. Volume 3: The Controlled Economy,
1971. Volume 4: The Just Economy, 1976.
1966a Exchange-rate Flexibility. Three Banks Review
70:3-27.
1966fo Life-cycle Savings, Inheritance and Economic
Growth. Review of Economic Studies 33:61—78.
1966c The Outcome of the Pasinetti Process: A Note.
Economic Journal 76:161-165.
1967 Population Explosion, the Standard of Living and
Social Conflict. Economic Journal 77:233-255.
1970 The Theory of Indicative Planning. Manchester
(England) Univ. Press. —> Lectures given at the
University of Manchester.
1972a Poverty in the Welfare State. Oxford Economic
Papers 24, no. 3:289-326.
1972b The Theory of Labour-managed Firms and of
Profit Sharing. Economic Journal 82:402-428.
1973 The Theory of Economic Externalities: The Con-
trol of Environmental Pollution and Similar Social
Costs. Leiden (Netherlands): Sijthoff.
1974a The Inheritance of Inequalities: Some Biologi-
cal, Demographic, Social and Economic Factors. Ox-
ford Univ. Press.
1974b The Optimal Balance Between Economies of
Scale and Variety of Products: An Illustrative
Model. Economica 41:359-367.
1975 The Intelligent Radical's Guide to Economic Pol-
icy: The Mixed Economy. London: Allen & Unwin.
1978 MEADE, JAMES E. et al. The Structure and Reform
of Direct Taxation. London: Allen & Unwin.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CORDEN, W. MAX 1965 Recent Developments in the
Theory of International Trade. Princeton, N.J.: In-
ternational Finance Section, Princeton University.
JOHNSON, HARRY G. 1951 The Taxonomic Approach
to Economic Policy. Economic Journal 61:812—832.
JOHNSON, HARRY G. 1978 James Meade's Contribu-
tion to Economics. Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics 80:64-85.
KAHN, R. F. 1931 The Relation of Home Investment
to Unemployment. Economic Journal 41:173—198.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —» A paperback edition was published by
Harcourt in 1965.
532 MEANS, GARDINER C.
LIPSEY, RICHARD G.; and LANCASTER, KELVIN 1956
The General Theory of the Second Best. Review of
Economic Studies 24:11-32.
MUNDELL, ROBERT A. 1968 International Economics.
New York: Macmillan.
ROBINSON, AUSTIN 1977 Keynes and His Cambridge
Colleagues. Pages 25-38 in Don Patinkin and
J. Clark Leith (editors), Keynes, Cambridge and the
General Theory. London: Macmillan.
VINER, JACOB (1950) 1961 The Customs Union Issue.
Washington: Kramer. —» Originally published by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in the
series entitled, Studies in the Administration of In-
ternational Law and Organization.
MEANS, GARDINER C.
Gardiner Coit Means, born in 1896, is respon-
sible for introducing into social science litera-
ture two concepts that are critical for under-
standing the role of large corporations in the
American and world economies. In his classic
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(Berle & Means 1932), Means showed how the
dispersion of stockholdings in the two hundred
largest nonfinancial corporations had led to a
separation of ownership and control. Two years
later, in a memorandum written for the secre-
tary of agriculture, he pointed to the widespread
existence, within the industrial sector, of "in-
flexible administered prices" which rendered the
market largely ineffective as the economy's self-
correcting mechanism and destroyed the under-
lying basis for a laissez-faire policy. These two
findings—the increasing separation of control
from ownership and the pervasiveness of ad-
ministered prices—have since served as the
starting point for those who, mainly outside the
major graduate departments of economics, have
wished to understand the social consequences
of what Means himself has termed "the corpo-
rate revolution." Relative to the influence which
he has had, both on public policy and on the
social sciences generally, Gardiner Means is
probably America's least honored economist.
Means, the son of a Congregational minister,
was born in Windham, Connecticut, in 1896
and grew up in Winchester, Massachusetts, and
Madison, Maine, where he attended public
school. After a year at Exeter Academy he en-
tered Harvard University at the age of 18 and
majored in chemistry. In his junior year, the
United States declared war on Germany and,
like many of his classmates, Means enlisted in the
military. He was assigned to an infantry officers'
training camp in Plattsburg, New York, where
he first met Adolf Berle, Jr. After receiving his
commission, he transferred to the Air Corps and
completed flight training, but not in time to
serve overseas. Still seeking experience, he
joined the Armenian relief program in Turkey,
where he spent a year and a half working in that
country's interior.
When he returned to the United States in
1920, Means studied at the Lowell (Massachu-
setts) Textile School and, two years later, started
a textile business in that city. Then, while con-
tinuing to run his business, Means moved to
Cambridge and entered the Harvard Graduate
School, prompted by the desire to understand
the workings of the United States economy in
more general terms. He soon realized that the
economics he was being taught was more rele-
vant to a preindustrial country like Turkey than
it was to the United States. Conditioned by his
scientific training, he sought evidence to test the
applicability of the theories he was being taught
to the American economy.
The opportunity to do this arose in 1927
when, after receiving his master's degree in
economics, Berle, then at the Columbia Uni-
versity Law School, asked him to join in an
interdisciplinary research project, funded by the
Social Science Research Council, to study the
legal and economic implications of the growing
separation between ownership and management
in large corporations which Berle, as a corpora-
tion lawyer, had observed. During the next four
years, Means gathered the empirical evidence
necessary to demonstrate not only the increas-
ing separation of ownership and management
but also the key role played in the economy by
the two hundred largest nonfinancial corpora-
tions, where this process of separation was most
advanced. The results of this collaborative effort
were first published under the title The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.
The significance of the study for public policy
was immediately recognized, as it helped lay the
groundwork for the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934. A parallel study, The Holding Com-
pany: Its Public Significance and Its Regulation
(Bonbright & Means 1932), played a similar role
in advancing passage of the Holding Company
Act of 1935. The implications for economic
theory, however, were ignored or resisted in
many academic circles.
Prior to the publication of The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property, Means had reported
his findings in three articles published in
scholarly journals. The Harvard economics de-
partment suggested that he combine these arti-

cles with an interpretation of their significance
and submit them as his doctoral dissertation.
In the theoretical section, Means argued that
the empirical evidence did not support four
major postulates of received economic theory,
namely, the trading character of the market,
the determinacy of cost, the unity of the process
of real saving, and the efficacy of the profit
motive; and that these postulates needed to be
replaced, insofar as corporate enterprise was
concerned, with an alternative set of formula-
tions. Although Means received his PH.D. from
Harvard based on the three published articles,
the theoretical section, and thus the dissertation
itself, was rejected.
In the summer of 1933, soon after receiving
his doctorate, Rexford G. Tugwell recruited
Means to serve in the Roosevelt administration
as an economic adviser on the relations between
agriculture and other sectors of the economy to
the secretary of agriculture, Henry A. Wallace.
In this capacity, Means prepared a memoran-
dum for the secretary pointing out that "inflexi-
ble administered prices" had "produced highly
disrupting effects in the functioning of the
economy" and were largely responsible for the
failure of the economy to recover on its own
from the depression. Means produced a set of
statistical charts showing that "there are two
essentially different types of markets in opera-
tion—the traditional market in which supply and
demand are equated by a flexible price and the
administered market in which production and
demand are equated at an inflexible adminis-
tered price." The charts revealed that, where
flexible market prices prevailed, production fell
only slightly in response to the decline in over-
all demand as that which had occurred between
1929 and 1933; but that in those industries char-
acterized by inflexible administered prices, the
primary response to such a decline in demand
was a reduction in production and employment.
Means argued that this lack of responsiveness
of prices in the administered markets made a
laissez-faire policy no longer tenable in the
American economy.
To other economists brought to Washington
by the New Deal, the memorandum written by
Means and then distributed among high level
administration officials seemed to offer not only
an explanation for the continuing economic
crisis but also evidence in support of that ex-
planation. Senator William E. Borah, learning
of the memorandum and erroneously suspecting
that it was being suppressed, pushed through a
MEANS, GARDINER C. 533
Senate resolution requiring that it be made
public; it was published in 1935 as a Senate
document, entitled "Industrial Prices and Their
Relative Inflexibility." Borah and other propo-
nents of a more vigorous antitrust policy seized
upon Means's findings as support for their posi-
tion, and the memorandum played a key role
in the subsequent launching of the Temporary
National Economic Committee (TNEC) hearings
in 1938—the most comprehensive congressional
inquiry into the concentration of economic
power since the Industrial Commission's hearings
at the turn of the century. The inquiry con-
firmed Means's factual evidence but interpreted
it in terms of the traditional paradigm with its
bias toward antitrust remedies.
For Means himself, however, antitrust was
not the answer to the problems revealed by his
findings. The productivity of modern industrial
organization would be lost, he felt, by the effort
to break up the largest corporations and restore
classically competitive markets in the industrial
sector. He therefore passed up the opportunity
to serve as economic coordinator of the TNEC
and remained instead in the position he had
held since 1935 with the National Resources
Planning Board (later renamed the National
Resources Committee).
As director of the industrial section of that
agency, and with the aid of an advisory com-
mittee of leading government economists, Means
carried forward the research that would lay the
foundation for what was then known as "demo-
cratic planning." In Patterns of Resource Use
(1939i»), he developed the first statistical tech-
niques for projecting, at varying levels of total
demand, the interrelated patterns of production
and employment. In The Structure of the Amer-
ican Economy (1939a), he provided the most
detailed statistical analysis of the American
economy's organizational structure then avail-
able. However, World War 11 intervened before
he could complete his projected companion
study of the economy's operating characteristics.
Means then moved to the newly established
fiscal division of the Bureau of the Budget as a
chief fiscal analyst. There he persuaded the
price control administration to delay freezing
prices until flexible and administered prices
reached a full-employment balance and price
controls could be more easily maintained. He
also used the techniques described in Patterns
of Resource Use to estimate the capacity of the
American economy to engage in total war. Dur-
ing the war, these same techniques were ex-
534 MEANS, GARDINER C.
tensively employed by the War Production Board
to estimate civilian demand and thus to deter-
mine what wartime restraints were needed to
control nonmilitary consumption.
Wartime full employment and the problems
of a war economy temporarily turned the atten-
tion of economists away from the questions of
cyclical stability. However, as the prospect of
peace emerged, a sharp disagreement arose be-
tween those who predicted a severe postwar
depression and those who feared a postwar in-
flation. Many government economists, together
with an increasing number of Keynesians, ex-
pected at least a slump in the economy, possibly
a return to depression levels. Means, on the other
hand, had earlier pointed to the importance of
monetary policy as a stabilizing influence (1935),
and he now argued that the doubling of the
money stock during the war would lead to a
major inflation when price controls were re-
moved, a prediction subsequently confirmed by
events.
As a result of this disagreement, Means left
the Bureau of the Budget and became associate
director of research for the Committee for
Economic Development (CED), a business-
sponsored, private research group originally con-
cerned with government policies to assure a
full-employment transition to a peacetime econ-
omy. While at the CED, Means began the col-
lection of the statistical series on money flows
now regularly published by the Federal Reserve
Board in its Flow of Funds Accounts, an impor-
tant supplement to the more widely used Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts.
In 1957, Senator Estes Kefauver, chairman of
the subcommittee on antitrust and monopoly,
undertook a series of hearings on "administered
price," which, after receiving testimony from
Means and other economists, led to a detailed
examination of the steel, auto, drug, and other
industries. The hearings, under the direction of
John Blair, a former student of Means (when
Means taught at the American University's
graduate school) provided an intimate portrait
of industrial pricing policies. Together with
studies carried out simultaneously for the Joint
Economic Committee, they played a role in con-
vincing a minority group of economists that in-
flation might be produced by the exercise of
market power as well as by excess demand. This
unorthodox viewpoint, which Means set forth in
a pamphlet, Administrative Inflation and Public
Policy (1959), became the basis for the presi-
dential guideposts announced by President John F.
Kennedy in 1962 and later continued by Pres-
ident Lyndon B. Johnson. Under the guideposts,
which worked successfully for three years before
collapsing because of a flaw in the labor aspect
of their design, large corporations were to hold
their prices at existing levels and trade unions
were to limit their demands for wage increases
to the general productivity trend.
In 1962, two books by Means appeared.
Pricing Power and the Public Interest, based in
part on the Kefauver committee hearings, ana-
lyzed the role of the steel industry in the admin-
istrative inflation of the 1950s. The Corporate
Revolution in America, meanwhile, brought to-
gether the most important of Means's scattered
essays. And yet Means continued to be largely
ignored by academic economists, both Keynes-
ians and monetarists. The majority still held to
the belief that inflation was caused by excess
demand; and the pricing paradigm which was
taught to students remained essentially the same
as that to which Means himself had been ex-
posed at Harvard in the 1920s, with the focus on
classically competitive markets governed by sup-
ply and demand factors. The only exception to the
general lack of recognition which Means's work
has received from his fellow economists in the
academic community has been the action of
the Society for Evolutionary Economics in pre-
senting him with its Veblen-Commons award
in 1974 "in recognition of outstanding contri-
butions in broadening and enriching the dis-
cipline of economics."
ALFRED S. EICHNER
WORKS BY MEANS
(1932) 1968 BERLE, ADOLF A., JR.; and MEANS, GARDI-
NER C. The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty. Rev. ed. New York: Harcourt. —•> A paperback
edition was published in 1969. Translated into
Portuguese, Japanese, and Italian.
(1932) 1968 BONBRIGHT, JAMES. C.; and MEANS,
GARDINER C. The Holding Company: Its Public Sig-
nificance and Its Regulation. New York: Kelley.
1935 Price Inflexibility and the Requirements of a
Stabilizing Monetary Policy. Journal of the Ameri-
can Statistical Association 30:401-413.
(1939a) 1966 The Structure of the American Economy.
New York: Kelley.
1939b MEANS, GARDINER C. (study director) Patterns
of Resource Use. Washington: National Resources
Committee.
1959 Administrative Inflation and Public Policy.
Washington: Anderson Kramer Associates.
1962a The Corporate Revolution in America. New
York: Crowell.
(1962&) 1976 Pricing Power and the Public Interest:
A Study Based on Steel. New York: Arno.
1975 MEANS, GARDINER C. (editor) The Roots of In-
flation. New York: Franklin. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1977.

SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GRUCHY, ALLAN G. 1947 Modern Economc Thought:
The American Contribution. New York: Prentice-
Hall. —> See especially chapter 7.
SELIGMAN, BEN B. 1962 Main Currents in Modern
Economics: Economic Thought Since 1870. Glen-
coe, 111.: Free Press. —» See especially pages 243-
247.
MONTAGU, ASHLEY
Ashley Montagu, born in 1905, is one of those
rare men of learning who have succeeded in
making substantive scholarly contributions to
their academic disciplines while at the same
time maintaining contact with the educated lay-
man, indeed contributing substantively to the
latter's learning. In addition, he is a dedicated
and articulate social critic, concerned with
bringing to bear the findings of the social and
biological sciences toward the betterment of
man's lot, while subjecting some of those very
findings to critical social scrutiny. His accom-
plishments in these three domains, the scien-
tific, the public-educational, and the socioethi-
cal, will be treated as a unity in what follows,
in accordance with what is evidently the spirit
of the program that has guided his life's work.
Although Montagu's contributions span a
variety of fields in the social and biological sci-
ences—including work on problems as diverse
as Australian aborigines' concepts of sexuality
and reproduction, the measurement of internal
anatomical landmarks on the heads of intact
living human beings, adolescent infertility in
girls, the role of cooperative behavior in evolu-
tion, and the biological and cultural factors in
aggression and in sex roles—his principal legacy
will indisputably consist of his critical analysis
of the concept of race.
The problem of race preoccupied Montagu
from the beginning of his intellectual career
(Montagu 1925; 1926), more than a quarter
century before the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court
desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation of Topeka (347 U.S. 483), which
heralded the civil rights activism that has since
followed in America. Montagu's work played a
role in that Supreme Court decision, as well as
in shaping the social consciousness that ushered
it in and has attended it ever since. If some of
his ideas, as they are discussed below, appear to
be relatively uncontroversial and a matter of
common knowledge and assent, let it not be
forgotten that that very knowledge and assent
is in some measure due to the work and efforts
MONTAGU, ASHLEY 535
of Montagu, and that he was also forcefully
expounding those ideas at an earlier time, when
they were far from accepted, and indeed being
brutally violated on a scale unparalleled in hu-
man history (Montagu 1939; 1941a).
Montagu's papers on race in the late 1930s,
culminating in his book Man's Most Dangerous
Myth: The Fallacy of Race (1942a) and fol-
lowed by a series of works (including Montagu
1951; 1964; 1975), had the effect of upsetting
the traditional concept of "race" accepted by
most anthropologists in that it challenged the
reality of anything corresponding to that notion.
Montagu emphasized that gene-frequency anal-
ysis of traits would tell us more about the evolu-
tion of human populations, arguing that the
"omelet" conception of "racial mixing" was
totally artificial and did nothing to explain the
origins and consequences of the differences be-
tween populations. Since men were all originally
gatherer-hunters, wherever they were, the en-
vironmental challenges faced by different pop-
ulations tended to be very similar; hence, one
would not expect mental differences. This
theory, as set forth in an article coauthored with
the geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky (1947),
subsequently became generally accepted by an-
thropologists. Montagu was also asked to draw
up the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization's Statement on Race
(1951) in 1950.
In addition to his work on race, Montagu was
also among the first to present a number of
views, since widely accepted, on such familiar
social and psychological themes as aggression
and war (1946b; 1976), social factors in crime
(Montagu & Merton 1940), women's rights
(1953i»), psychoanalysis and psychiatry in an-
thropology (1941b), love (1953a), home birth
and prenatal care (1950; 1962), Afro-American
studies (1944), sociobiology (1940), birth order
(1948), privacy (1956a), and even smoking
(1942b) and natural foods (1958). In these and
other works Montagu was always a strong advo-
cate of gene-environment interactionism (1926;
1940; 1956k; 1959; 1962), stressing that he-
redity is not biologically "given" in the genes,
and that man's constitution is a dynamic process
arising out of the interaction between his unique
experiential history and the constraints and
potential encoded in his genetic material.
This interactionist stance allowed Montagu
to be an effective exponent of the often polarized
realms of cultural and biological anthropology.
He could adduce evidence on behalf of the bio-
536 MONTAGU, ASHLEY
social nature of man (1956b) while at the same
time showing the virtually limitless capacity of
education and culture to shape that very nature
(1962). His interactionism attempted to recon-
cile these two poles, not only in terms of the
history of the dual influences acting during one
man's lifetime, but also those in mankind's
evolutionary history. Montagu emphasized social
cooperation and love (1953a; 1974), as critical
selectional factors in evolution—ideas that con-
siderably predated the sociobiological preoccupa-
tion with "altruism" (in the new inclusive fitness
sense) in the late 1970s.
Other works by Montagu had fewer social re-
percussions, but still represented important con-
tributions to anthropology. Coming Into Being
Among the Australian Aborigines (1937) is one
of the classic works on this subject and con-
tinues to be a useful source, treating such topics
as awareness of the facts of maternity and pa-
ternity and the significance of ritual sexual mu-
tilation. This was not only a pioneer study which
served to stimulate many students and research
workers, but its approach systematized a field
which, aside from Bronislaw Malinowski's Sex-
ual Life of Savages (1929), had been only
vaguely and poorly understood previously. In
addition, Montagu's work on the adolescent
sterility period (1946a) solved a perplexing
problem encountered by many anthropologists-
most notably by Malinowslci in his studies on the
Trobrianders (1929)—that although adolescent
girls engaged in extensive premarital sexual
relations, they rarely became pregnant.
Montagu also worked on technical problems
in anthropometry. He established certain cranio-
metric reference points on the scalp and devised
measuring instruments to determine homolo-
gous points on the underlying skull in living
subjects (1960). His anatomical work on non-
human primates and on fossils culminated in
the publication of one of the earliest textbooks
of physical anthropology (1945), which con-
tinued for a long time to be a widely-used and
authoritative work on the subject. Montagu's
other texts include reference works on heredity
(1959) and anatomy and physiology (Montagu
& Steen 1959), an excellent biography of Ed-
ward Tyson (1943), and a large variety of ele-
gant and informative books written for the
educated layman.
Montagu's doctorate in anthropology was con-
ferred by Columbia University in 1937. His early
academic and intellectual background had been
as richly varied as his later contributions. After
a long-standing childhood interest in skulls,
fossils, and medical matters, fostered by en-
couragement from the anatomist-anthropologist
Arthur Keith, of the Royal College of Surgeons
in London, Montagu enrolled at 17 years of age
at University College London, for a diplomate in
psychology, with a view to transferring to an-
thropology. Among his professors in psychology
were C. E. Spearman and the father of modern
statistics and biometrics, Karl Pearson; in an-
thropology he was taught by Elliot Smith and
C. G. Seligman. At that time in Europe the new
anthropology was just developing, with the func-
tional school of Malinowski. The earlier sticks/
stones/bones approach was being replaced by
an analysis of the functional interrelations
among the elements of culture. Montagu be-
came Malinowski's first student, and surely
bears the latter's imprint (along with an even
stronger one, some feel, from his other great
teacher, Franz Boas); but he soon diverged in
favor of a strong biological orientation, particu-
larly in matters pertaining to psychology. (Mon-
tagu was one of the first exponents of Sigmund
Freud in anthropology, although he later be-
came a critic of the psychoanalytic approach.)
C. Loring Brace, an anthropologist at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, feels that Montagu "has
done more than anyone except Margaret Mead
to bring the findings of anthropology to the at-
tention of the public." Weston LaBarre of Duke
University describes him as "the most prolific
and effective popularizer of humanistic sub-
jects since H. G. Wells." Not all anthropologists
take such a favorable view of popularization,
however; and this may have adversely affected
Montagu's own intradisciplinary popularity; yet
more than one of his colleagues have suggested
that this negative attitude may well reflect "sour
grapes."
Popularization has not been the only factor
diminishing Montagu's professional popularity.
According to Marcus Goldstein of Tel Aviv Uni-
versity :
The reason for this, in my opinion, has been his
forthrightness, his fearless and blunt attack on
works and issues that he felt were scientifically
wrong, and perhaps more important, were or could
be socially harmful. Two examples come to mind.
At one of the early meetings of the American As-
sociation of Physical Anthropologists, he sharply
criticized Prof. E. A. Hooton's work on a typology
of U.S. criminals, a virtual return to Lombrosoism.
One must remember in this connection that Hooton
was the revered teacher of nearly all of the young

physical anthropologists of the day I In a subsequent
paper co-authored with Robert Merton ("Crime and
the anthropologist," 1940), Hooton's premises and
methodology were systematically demonstrated to
be invalid. At another meeting of the Association,
Montagu proposed a motion to censure the German
anthropologists who were patently misusing the
discipline to conform with the vicious Nazi ideol-
ogy. The motion was defeated, yet the following
year the very man instrumental for its defeat pro-
posed the same motion, which passed unanimously.
The final arbiter as to the value of populariza-
tion will of course have to be history. Whether in
the mid to later part of the twentieth century, with
its unprecedently well-educated and well-in-
formed general population and its pervasive and
powerful communications media it was still pos-
sible for scientists, particularly social scientists,
to pursue their research, particularly on socially
sensitive or otherwise significant topics, without
simultaneously assuming an advocate's, or at
least an exegete's role vis-a-vis the educated pop-
ulace, is an empirical question that only the
actual turn of events can answer. In any case, it
is clear that Ashley Montagu cast his lot with
the new dual role of the social scientist, and ful-
filled both aspects of it admirably.
STEVAN HARNAD
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Personal communications from C. Loring Brace, Wes-
tern LaBarre, and Marcus Goldstein to the author have
been quoted, with permission, in this article.
WORKS BY MONTAGU
1925 The Colour Question. Vincula (Journal of the
University of London's Student Union) Dec. 14:
66 only.
1926 Intelligence Tests and the Negro in America.
Wasu (Journal of the West African Students Union
of Great Britain) 1, no. 1:5-7.
(1937) 1938 Coming Into Being Among the Australian
Aborigines. New York: Dutton. —» Includes a fore-
word by Bronislaw Malinowski.
1939 Race and Kindred Delusions. Equality 1, no. 7:
20-24.
1940 The Socio-biology of Man. Scientific Monthly
50:483-490.
1940 MONTAGU, ASHLEY; and MERTON, ROBERT K.
Crime and the Anthropologist. American Anthro-
pologist 42:384-408.
1941a The Concept of Race in the Light of Genetics.
Journal of Heredity 32:243-247.
1941b Nescience, Science, and Psycho-analysis. Psy-
chiatry 4:45-60.
1942a Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of
Race. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. —» A paper-
back edition was published in 1974 by Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
1942b Nothing Can Be Said in Favor of Smoking. In
Fact 4, no. 10:2-3.
1943 Edward Tyson, M.D., F.R.S., (1650-1708), and
MORENO, JACOB L. 537
the Rise of Comparative Anatomy in England. Phil-
adelphia: American Philosophical Society.
1944 The African Origins of the American Negro and
His Ethnic Composition. Scientific Monthly 58:
58-65.
1945 An Introduction to Physical Anthropology.
Springfield, 111.: Thomas.
1946a Adolescent Sterility. Springfield, 111.: Thomas.
1946b Racism, the Bomb, and the Peoples of the
World. Asia and the Americas 46:533-535.
1947 MONTAGU, ASHLEY; and DOBZHANSKY, THEO-
DOSIUS Natural Selection and the Mental Capacities
of Mankind. Science 105:587-590.
1948 Sex-order of Birth and Personality. American
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 18:351—353.
1950 Constitutional and Prenatal Factors in Infant
and Child Health. Supplement 2, pages 1-30 in
Problems of Infancy and Childhood. New York:
Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation.
(1951) 1972 Statement on Race. 3d ed. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press.
1953a MONTAGU, ASHLEY (editor) The Meaning of
Love. New York: Julian.
(1953b) 1974 The Natural Superiority of Women. Rev.
ed. New York: Macmillan.
1956a The Annihilation of Privacy. Saturday Review
Mar. 31:9-11, 32.
1956b The Biosocial Nature of Man. New York:
Grove Press.
1958 Are We Forgetting How to Eat? House and Gar-
den 114:178-179.
1959 Human Heredity. New York: World Publishing.
1959 MONTAGU, ASHLEY; and STEEN, EDWIN B.
Anatomy and Physiology. 2 vols. New York: Barnes
& Noble.
1960 A Handbook of Anthropometry. Springfield, 111.:
Thomas.
1962 MONTAGU, ASHLEY (editor) Culture and the
Evolution of Man. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
1964 The Concept of Race. New York: Free Press.
1974 Culture and Human Development. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1975 MONTAGU, ASHLEY (editor) Race and IQ. New
York: Oxford Univ. Press.
1976 The Nature of Human Aggression. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1929) 1962 The Sexual
Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia: An
Ethnographic Account of Courtship, Marriage, and
Family Life Among the Natives of the Trobriand
Islands, British New Guinea. New York: Harcourt.
MORENO, JACOB L.
Jacob Levy Moreno (1889-1974) had a
revolutionary goal to change society by bringing
together individuals who are capable of har-
monious interpersonal relationships and so to
create social groups that can function with
maximum efficiency and with minimum dis-
ruptive processes (1934, p. xii).
The concept of "role" was central to Moreno's
theory and he played many himself. He was a
psychiatrist, dramatist, theologian, poet, phi-
losopher, inventor, group psychologist, psycho-
538 MORENO, JACOB L.
dramatist, sociodramatist, sociometrist, soci-
atrist, and educator. Although he made
significant contributions in all of these roles, the
three areas in which he was most creative, and
that have had a major impact on the theory
and practice of social science and group psy-
chotherapy, are psychodrama, sociodrama, and
sociometry.
Background. Moreno was born in Bucharest,
Romania, on May 20, 1889, the son of Nissim
and Pauline (Wolf). He went to school in
Vienna, where his family moved when he was
five, until his early teens, when his parents mi-
grated to Germany. Moreno was unable to ad-
just to German culture and schooling, and he
moved back to Vienna, earning his keep as a
tutor.
Early professional years in Vienna (1908-
1925). During the first part of this period,
Moreno was a student at the University of Vienna,
first in philosophy and then in medicine, receiv-
ing his medical degree in 1917. From 1915 to
1917 Moreno held the posts of superintendent
and medical officer at a refugee camp in Mittern-
dorf, where he made his first observations of
the importance of interpersonal bonds for a
viable community. Then from 1918 through
1925 he served as public health officer in Vos-
lau, Austria, and engaged in private psychiatric
practice in Voslau and Vienna.
All of his papers during this period were pub-
lished in German. The major themes can be
seen in Einladung zu einer Begegnung (1914)
and Das Stegreif'theater (1923). As editor and
publisher of the magazine Daimon, he brought
to public attention many new writers, one of
whom was Martin Buber. Moreno felt that he
was creating a new positive religion that would
take up the task of building a creative society
where Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud had left
off. He tried to do through sociometry what
"religion without science" had failed to accom-
plish in the past and what "science without re-
ligion" had failed to accomplish in Soviet
Russia.
Psychodrama. In 1911, while he was a medi-
cal student, Moreno began to develop his psy-
chodramatic insights as he watched children
play in the gardens of Vienna. He became a
special kind of teacher or catalyst as a teller of
tales. Children would gather around him to
listen and would spontaneously act out the
themes of the stories. As the interaction pro-
gressed, hostility decreased and creativity
flowered.
In 1921, Moreno founded a "Theatre of
Spontaneity" which reflected in part the con-
temporary interest in experimental theater in
Vienna. He would appear on the stage and
warm his audience up to a theme by discussing
current items of news. First actors, then mem-
bers of the audience would enact these events,
and a postenactment discussion would follow.
He discovered that unlike conventional theater,
where the actors do not have their own personal
catharsis through the action, these actors of
real-life situations experienced a relief from
personal pressures or pain during both the en-
actment and the ensuing discussion.
As Moreno went on to develop the "classical"
form of psychodrama as a method of group
psychotherapy, he identified five basic ele-
ments: (1) the protagonist, the person who
portrays his or her own life situation on the
stage; (2) the director, usually a trained psy-
chodramatist who leads the session; (3) aux-
iliary egos, persons who play parts that are
significant for the protagonist, as other persons,
parts of the self, objects, or symbols; (4) the
audience, those present who serve as a pool
from which the auxiliaries are chosen and par-
ticipate in the initial warm-up and the sharing
at the end of the session; and (5) the stage or
action area, which can be a three-tiered circular
stage (invented by Moreno in 1922), where the
protagonist can present his or her world, reality,
or life space.
Although a number of techniques can be
used, it is primarily through reversing roles with
significant others that the protagonist achieves
an emotional catharsis, and then, new insights
in a catharsis of integration. In the final scenes
of the drama an opportunity may be provided
for role training, behavioral practice, or the
protagonist to experience an ideal situation. For
Moreno these techniques went beyond reality to
create a "surplus reality."
Sociodrama. Moreno defined sociodrama as
a deep action method dealing with intergroup
relations and collective ideologies ([1934] 1953,
p. 87). In contrast to psychodrama with its
focus on the individual, the true subject of
sociodrama is the group. For Moreno, the con-
cept underlying this approach is that humans
are role players and that every culture is char-
acterized by a certain set of roles which are
imposed with varying degrees of success upon
its members. The sociodramatic approach deals
with social problems arising from role conflicts
and aims at social catharsis. In its methods and

over-all format sociodrama is similar to psycho-
drama.
Sociometry. The elements of sociometric,
psychodramatic, and sociodramatic theory are
essentially the same, since all three sets of con-
cepts are part of one over-all theory. The differ-
ences are mainly a matter of emphasis, derived
from the way in which they are used. For so-
ciometry the goal is the creation of societies
that make it possible for each individual to sur-
vive as a creative human being. The practice
of bringing social health to whole societies
Moreno sometimes called "sociatry."
Moreno saw individuals in groups as parts of
"social atoms," in which the individual was sur-
rounded by persons with whom she or he had
positive or negative relationships. He used the
term "tele" to refer to the two-way bond that
combined elements of empathy and transfer-
ence. Individuals were also seen as the focal
point in a pattern of role relations that they
share with others, their "cultural atom." If
groups could be rearranged so that each individ-
ual was surrounded by persons with relation-
ships of positive "tele" and with minimal conflict
of roles, then the individuals could be more
spontaneous. On occasion this spontaneity
would generate creative responses to situations
that might then be passed on to others in the
form of "cultural conserves."
Developing sociometry in the United States.
In 1925 Moreno left Vienna for the United States
to promote an electromagnetic recorder he had
invented. It was a radio film to record sound on
discs for radio transmissions and reception. For
the first two years in the United States (1925-
1927), he continued working on his invention
in Ohio. He then settled in New York where he
became a licensed physician in 1927, began pri-
vate psychiatric practice, and introduced psy-
chodramatic work in several institutions. He
also organized a new version of the spontaneity
theater, the "living newspaper." Performances
were given at Carnegie Hall (1929-1931),
where the news events of the day were acted
out. His ideas about spontaneity and creativity
were published in the magazine Impromptu in
1931, and later reprinted in the first volume of
Psychodrama (1946-1969). His work in socio-
metry at Sing Sing prison led to monographs on
the group method for the classification of pris-
oners, collected in The First Book on Group Psy-
chotherapy (1932).
During this period his wife, Zerka Moreno,
notes that he was a problem for the psychiatric
MORENO, JACOB L. 539
fraternity: "His views of man, and his interper-
sonal and intergroup relations flew in the face
of all that was being taught. He was just too
controversial, too personally difficult to accept:
a maverick, a loner, a narcissistic leader, cha-
rismatic but aloof, gregarious but selective, lova-
ble but eccentric, unlovable and appealing"
(1976, p. 132). Despite this he received support
from Dr. William Alanson White, who made it
possible for Moreno to construct a theater for
psychodrama at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in
Washington, where White was superintendent.
White also encouraged Moreno's sociometric
reorganization of the Hudson School for girls
from 1932 to 1938. Some of the results of this
study were published in 1936 as a report to the
board of directors of the school in the Socio-
metric Review, but the major report, with a fore-
word by White, was published under the title
Who Shall Survive? (1934). The revision and
expansion of this book, in which he added dis-
cussions of all of the important concepts in psy-
chodrama, sociodrama, and sociatry, was Mo-
reno's magnum opus.
Promoting group psychotherapy. During the
next 18 years (1936-1953) Moreno wrote
largely on the major concepts and methods of
sociometry and psychodrama. In 1936 he
opened his sanitorium at Beacon, New York,
and in 1940 he founded the Psychodramatic In-
stitute in the same city. He was a special lec-
turer at the New School for Social Research in
1937/1938, and at Teachers College, Columbia
University, in 1939/1940. From 1951 through
1966 he was an adjunct professor in the depart-
ment of sociology in the Graduate School of Arts
and Sciences at New York University.
Moreno was also active in promoting group
psychotherapy. In 1945 he edited a special com-
bined issue of Sociometry on the subject, pub-
lished under the title: Group Psychotherapy:
A Symposium. In 1951 he organized the Inter-
national Committee on Group Psychotherapy,
later enlarged and called the International
Council of Group Psychotherapy, which became
responsible for arranging and sponsoring a
series of international congresses on group psy-
chotherapy. The first one took place in 1954 in
Toronto. Before his death he was able to trans-
form the council into an incorporated Interna-
tional Association of Group Psychotherapy
numbering almost eight hundred members from
many countries. This was his last achievement;
it took place during the fifth international con-
gress in Zurich in August 1973.
540 MORENO, JACOB L.
Twenty-six years after he had departed from
Europe, Moreno began a series of trips to bring
group psychotherapy and other areas of his
concern to the attention of his overseas col-
leagues. The Sorbonne honored him with the
establishment of a Sociometric Institute in the
sociology department, then under the guidance
of Georges Gurvitch. In 1954, he was invited by
the U.S. State Department to undertake a tour
of various universities and America Houses in
West Germany. Similar tours were later under-
taken at regular intervals throughout Europe;
several included invitations by the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga-
nization. The countries, some of which were
visited repeatedly, were France, Germany, Nor-
way, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Russia, Greece, Yugoslavia,
Turkey, and Israel.
The third psychiatric revolution. During the
seven years from 1954 to 1960, Moreno saw the
spread of his ideas in social science literature
throughout the world. "The third psychiatric
revolution," as he termed it, had now arrived.
The group had become both doctor and patient.
Moreno's articles on psychodrama were in wide
demand for collections of readings and hand-
books. From 1956 through 1960 he edited five
volumes in Progress in Psychotherapy, first with
Frieda Fromm-Reichmann as senior editor and
then with Jules H. Masserman. He also pub-
lished Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psycho-
drama (1959), which is similar to the third
volume of Psychodrama (1946-1969), but also
contains original material that was never trans-
lated into English.
Review and evaluation. The last period from
1961 until his death on May 14, 1974 was one
in which Moreno reviewed the history of the
movements he had initiated and evaluated their
impact. Additional articles appeared in collec-
tions, handbooks, and foreign publications, as
his work continued to spread. Moreno does not
give much space in his writing to acknowledg-
ments of the persons whose work influenced his
own creativity. He was much more concerned
about how his own ideas were being used by
others, often he thought, without due credit. As
a social reformer he saw himself in the tradition
of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Johann H. Pestalozzi,
and Friedrich Froebel, although he wished to
keep the initiative for reform in the hands of
the people.
The Medical Society of the State of New York,
of which he was a life member, gave him a ci-
tation in 1967 in recognition of fifty years of
medical practice. In 1968 he received an hon-
orary doctorate from the medical faculty of the
University of Barcelona (Spain), and in 1969 a
golden doctor diploma from the University of
Vienna. In the same year a plaque was placed
on the house in Voslau near Vienna to com-
memorate his work there as a public health
officer from 1918 to 1925.
He was a fellow of the American Psychiatric
Association, a life member of the American
Medical Association, and a member of the
American Society for Group Psychotherapy and
Psychodrama and the American Sociometric
Association, of which he was president in 1945.
Moreno's legacy. By 1976 thousands of social
scientists had used sociometric methods in their
research, many of them without any realization
of the part Moreno had played in developing the
method that had since become part of the public
domain. However, a record had been kept of
persons who trained as psychodrama directors,
either directly with Moreno or in one of the
institutes established by his pupils. There were
approximately fifteen hundred practitioners of
psychodrama, primarily in the United States.
Some of these practitioners were active on the
staffs of institutes involved in teaching and
training in psychodrama, sociometry, and group
processes. There were 23 institutes in the
United States and 11 in other countries. Practi-
tioners gave courses on psychodrama and socio-
metry in 14 universities in the United States
and 12 in other countries.
During his professional career Moreno pub-
lished more than three hundred books and arti-
cles. Many of his articles were republished in
whole or in part in other journals in English, in
foreign journals, handbooks, and other edited
collections. He also founded and edited a num-
ber of journals: Daimon-, Impromptu; Socio-
metric Review, which later became Sociometry
and was turned over to the American Sociologi-
cal Association in 1956; and Sociatry, which
became Group Psychotherapy and later Group
Psychotherapy and Psychodrama. In 1956 he
founded the International Journal of Sociometry
and Sociatry which became the Handbook of
International Sociometry in 1971. Moreno was
working on the manuscript of an autobiography
when he died, and he also left a number of un-
published articles.
Thus it was likely that even after his death,
the list of Moreno's publications would continue
to grow. Given the number of creative contri-

butions he had made during his lifetime it was
certain that his impact on social science and on
various forms of group psychotherapy would
continue to expand.
A. PAUL HARE
WORKS BY MORENO
1914 Einladung zu einer Begegnung. Vienna: Anzen-
gruber. —> First formal publication of two papers,
"Das Kinderreich" and "Homo juvenis," both writ-
ten in 1908.
(1923) 1947 The Theatre of Spontaneity. Beacon,
N.Y.: Beacon House. —> First published as Das
Stegreif theater.
(1932) 1957 The First Book on Group Psychotherapy,
1932. 3d ed. Beacon, N.Y.: Beacon House.
(1934) 1978 Who Shall Survive'? Foundations of
Sociometry, Group Psychotherapy and Sociodrama.
3d ed. Beacon, N.Y.: Beacon House. -» This book
has been translated into many European languages.
Pages cited in the text refer to the 1953 edition.
1945 MORENO, JACOB L. (editor) Group Psychotherapy:
A Symposium. Beacon, N.Y.: Beacon House.
1946-1969 Psychodrama. 3 vols. Beacon, N.Y.:
Beacon House. —* Volume 1 was republished in
1948, 1964, 1970, and 1972. Volumes 2 and 3
were written in collaboration with Zerka T. Moreno.
Volume 2, published in 1959, is subtitled Founda-
tions of Psychotherapy. Volume 3, published in
1969, is subtitled Action Therapy and Principles
of Practice.
1951 Sociometry, Experimental Method and the Sci-
ence of Society: An Approach to a New Political
Orientation. Beacon, N.Y.: Beacon House.
1956 MORENO, JACOB L. (editor) Sociometry and the
Science of Man. Beacon, N.Y.: Beacon House.
1956-1960 MORENO, JACOB L. et al. (editors) Progress
in Psychotherapy. 5 vols. New York: Grune & Strat-
ton. —> Volume 1 was edited with Frieda Fromm-
Reichmann. Volumes 2-5 were edited with Jules H.
Masserman.
1959 Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psychodrama. Stutt-
gart (Germany): Thieme.
1960 MORENO, JACOB L. et al. (editors) The Sociometry
Reader. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
1964 MORENO, JACOB L.; MORENO, ZERKA T.; and
MORENO, JONATHAN The First Psychodramatic Fam-
ily. Beacon, N.Y.: Beacon House.
1966 MORENO, JACOB L. et al. (editors) The Inter-
national Handbook of Group Psychotherapy. New
York: Philosophical Library.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BLATNER, HOWARD 1973 Acting-in: Practical Appli-
cations of Psychodramatic Methods. New York:
Springer.
HASKELL, MARTIN R. 1967 The Psychodramatic
Method. Long Beach, Calif.: California Institute of
Socioanalysis.
HOLLANDER, CARL 1969 A Process for Psychodrama
Training. Denver, Colo.: Evergreen Press.
MORENO, ZERKA T. 1976 In Memoriam: J. L.
Moreno. Group Psychotherapy, Psychodrama &•
Sociometry 29:130-135.
STARR, ADALINE 1977 Psychodrama: Rehearsal for
Living. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
YABLONSKY, LEWIS 1976 Psychodrama: Resolving
Emotional Problems Through Role-playing. New
York: Basic Books.
MORGENSTERN, OSKAR 541
MORGENSTERN, OSKAR
Oskar Morgenstern was born in Goerlitz in
Silesia, Germany, on January 24, 1902. He was
the son of a small businessman and an illegiti-
mate daughter of Emperor Frederick in of Ger-
many. He died on July 26, 1977, in his house in
Princeton, New Jersey.
He was a man of great tenacity, fortitude,
and optimism. The two intellectual centers of
his life were Vienna and Princeton; not the uni-
versities alone or even primarily, but the many
individuals and institutions, such as the Insti-
tute for Advanced Study at Princeton, that were
active at these locations.
His family moved to Vienna when he was
young, and he attended high school and uni-
versity in Vienna, where he obtained his doc-
torate in 1925. He was greatly influenced by
Karl Menger and Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk,
whose work stimulated his lifetime interest in
the problem of the division of product between
cooperating agents and in the problem of ex-
change.
After receiving his doctorate he was able to
obtain the Laura Spelman Rockefeller fellow-
ship, which enabled him to study in London,
Paris, Rome, and at Harvard and Columbia uni-
versities for a period of three years. During this
period he had the opportunity to meet with
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth; Antonio de Viti de
Marco; Luigi Einaudi; Alfred North Whitehead;
and several others. One of his earliest publica-
tions was an obituary of Edgeworth that ap-
peared in 1927.
His first major work, Wirtschaftsprognose
(1928), served as his Habilitation thesis, which
enabled him to become a Privatdozent at the
University of Vienna in 1929. In this book Mor-
genstern considered the difficulties and para-
doxes inherent in economic prediction. He was
particularly concerned with the influence of
prediction upon the event predicted. He illus-
trated the difficulty with the example of the
pursuit of Sherlock Holmes by Professor Mor-
iarty, showing that an "I think, that he thinks
that I think . . ." chain of reasoning does not
yield a satisfactory solution.
He was promoted to professor at the Univer-
sity of Vienna in 1935. In that year he published
"Vollkommene Voraussicht und wirtschaftliches
Gleichgewicht," which dealt with the funda-
mental difficulties in the assumption of perfect
foresight in the study of economic equilibrium.
The mathematician Edward Cech heard Morgen-
 542 MORGENSTERN, OSKAR
stern lecture in Vienna on this topic and pointed
out that the problems raised by Morgenstern
were related to those treated by John von Neu-
mann in "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele"
(1928).
During the years 1929-1938 his life was filled
with both pure research and applied activities.
He was editor of the Zeitschrift fur Nation-
alokonomie, an adviser to the national bank of
Austria, and from 1931 to 1938 held the posi-
tion of director of the Austrian Institute for
Business Cycle Research. He was a member of
the League of Nations advisory group of statis-
ticians until its dissolution in 1945. He was also
active in the "Vienna Circle," an important in-
tellectual group led by the philosopher Moritz
Schlick. Karl Menger, Karl Popper, Kurt Godel,
and Rudolf Carnap were among his friends and
acquaintances.
In January 1938, Morgenstern, invited by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
visited the United States to give a series of
lectures. While he was in the United States the
Nazis occupied Austria and he was dismissed
from the University of Vienna as "politically
unbearable." He was offered several posts at
American universities and accepted the offer
from Princeton, partly because of the presence
of John von Neumann at the Institute for Ad-
vanced Study. He and von Neumann first re-
membered meeting each other at a meeting on
February 1, 1939, where Morgenstern gave a
talk on business cycles. They quickly became
close friends and remained so until von Neu-
mann's death on February 8, 1957.
The theory of games. The friendship and in-
tense discussions between Morgenstern and von
Neumann led the two to embark upon a joint
work that would show economists the potential
of an approach to the study of social behavior
in general, and economic behavior in particular,
by means of formal mathematical models of
games. They soon realized that they had set
themselves a major task that would require at
least one book of considerable size. In 1944 they
published the Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. This major work contained a basically
important novel approach to utility theory. The
approach used three different representations of
a game of strategy—"the extensive form," "the
strategic form," and "the cooperative form," of
a game—and two solution concepts—the maxmin
solution for two-person zero-sum games (von
Neumann's way of resolving the problem that
Morgenstern had posed in his discussion of
Holmes and Moriarty), and the stable-set solu-
tion. In many ways Morgenstern was a master
modeler, with a sensitivity to relevant paradox;
and von Neumann was a master analyst. They
appreciated each other's strengths and weak-
nesses.
Morgenstern and von Neumann were aware
of the limitations of their initial work in game
theory. In the first chapter of their book, they
stressed that they were beginning by trying to
provide a sound basis for a static theory and
that the history of science indicated that a satis-
factory dynamics might look completely differ-
ent. This concern was manifested in the model-
ing of the three different forms of a game.
The extensive form describes a game in
complete detail. It provides a total anatomy in
which subtle differences in information con-
ditions and the details of moves can be identi-
fied. The now familiar "game tree" is closely
related to the decision tree used in statistics and
is of considerable influence in mathematical
psychology.
The extensive form is of great use in laying
out the details of process and exploring con-
ditions on information, but the strategic form
provides a natural and powerful way to illus-
trate the essential aspects of strategic control
over the environment by different individuals.
The latter can be deduced from the former, but
not vice versa.
It is to the two-person game of pure op-
position (that is, the winnings of one player
are completely negatively correlated with the
winnings of the other) that the rnaxmin solution
theory of von Neumann was first applied. The
brilliant work of John F. Nash, Jr. (1951) pro-
vided a solution theory for general n-person
games (games with any number of players
whose goals can contain any mixture of coin-
ciding or conflicting interests). However, al-
though Morgenstern recognized that Nash had
forced a link between the early mathematical
economics of Antoine Augustin Cournot (1838)
and the theory of games, neither he nor von
Neumann was particularly taken with the "non-
cooperative equilibrium point" solution.
Their major interest was in cooperative solu-
tions, and to that point the cooperative form of
a game was proposed. The device used was the
"characteristic function" of an n-person game.
This describes the potential gains that any one
of the 2" coalitions that can be formed among
n-persons can obtain.
The characteristic function can be deduced

from the strategic form of a game but not vice
versa. The solution theory they proposed was
that of the "stable set." Although the stable set
has great mathematical sophistication and in-
teresting interpretations, it has not proved to be
as good a solution concept as had originally
been expected. In particular, the conjecture that
the stable-set solution would exist for all games
was proved false by William Lucas.
In his years at Princeton, from 1938 until his
retirement in 1970, Morgenstern's relationship
with the department of economics was far from
smooth. There was little interest in the theory
of games. Students in economics who special-
ized in game theory were few. However, through
a combination of the economics research project
sponsored by the Office of Naval Research and
the active interest in the mathematics depart-
ment in combinatoric methods and game theory,
a distinguished roster of younger scholars began
to work on the theory of games.
Among the Princeton students with some in-
terest in game theory in the 1950s and 1960s
were Donald Gillies, John Milnor, John Nash,
Lloyd Shapley, Martin Shubik, and Gerald
Thompson. Later there were Robert Aumann,
Ralph Gomory, William Lucas, Herbert Scarf,
and many others. These individuals represent
only a fraction of those who by the time of
Oskar Morgenstern's death had contributed to
the growth of more than six thousand books
and articles on the theory of games.
In spite of the steady growth of literature on
game theory, honors and recognition were rela-
tively slow to come. Even at Morgenstern's death
a large part of the economics profession was
highly skeptical of, or indifferent to, the uses
or potential uses of game theory in economics.
Nevertheless, in 1971 the Musee de la Monnaie
in France commissioned the artist Georgeo
Mathieu to create a medal in honor of the theory
of games, as part of a series of 17 medals to
commemorate important stages in the develop-
ment of Western thought. Morgenstern was
made a corresponding member of the Institute
of France; in 1976 he was made a distinguished
fellow of the American Economic Association;
he was a member of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences. In 1976 he was awarded the
great golden cross of the Republic of Austria,
and in 1977 was made an honorary member
of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. These
honors, together with several honorary doc-
torates, did not cause him to change his be-
lief that the theory of games was such a radical
MORGENSTERN, OSKAR 543
departure from the accepted ways of economic
thought that the speed of its acceptance was
bound to be slow.
If anything, judged by the growth of the
game theory literature in economics, political
science, experimental gaming, and even law and
biology, Morgenstern's predictions were prob-
ably too pessimistic. In particular, neither he
nor von Neumann, apparently, saw the prolif-
eration of solution concepts and their applica-
tion that took place in the development of game
theory. These include the "core" of Shapley,
Gillies, Shubik, Scarf, and Debreu; the "value"
of Harsanyi, Nash, and Shapley; the "noncooper-
ative equilibrium" of Nash, and the "bargaining
set" of Aumann and Maschler.
Other later works. The theory of games was
undoubtedly Morgenstern's greatest contribu-
tion and collaboration. However, his interests as
an economist were far more wide ranging. In
particular, he maintained throughout his life a
keen interest in the way in which economic
information is gathered and in the use and mis-
use of economic statistics. In 1950 he published
On the Accuracy of Economic Observations, and
in 1970 he published jointly with C. W. J.
Granger a searching study entitled the Predicta-
bility of Stock Market Prices.
He had a considerable interest in matters of
national defense and felt strongly (as did von
Neumann) that it was important for senior
scientists to participate actively in helping to
analyze and formulate policy. In 1959 he pub-
lished The Question of National Defense, and
in 1973, in collaboration with Klaus Peter Heiss
and Klaus Knorr, Long Term Projections of
Power: Political, Economic, and Military Fore-
casting.
Virtually to the end he regarded himself as
an outrider in economic theory, and in 1972 he
published in the Journal of Economic Literature
a highly critical article entitled "Thirteen Criti-
cal Points in Contemporary Economic Theory."
He had a deep interest in the elegant work that
von Neumann put forth as early as 1932 on the
expansion of an economic system, and in the
early 1950s he encouraged von Neumann to
present his thoughts to a somewhat nonrecep-
tive economics department at Princeton. That
model became one of the keystones of modern
growth theory.
Morgenstern remained fascinated with the
ideas of von Neumann on growth, and he ex-
panded them to include ideas on contracting
and decomposable economies. Knowing for a
 544 MORGENTHAU, HANS J.
considerable time that he had incurable cancer,
he was concerned to live long enough to finish a
book written with Gerald Thompson entitled the
Mathematical Theory of Expanding and Con-
tracting Economies (1976). He remained in-
tellectually vigorous, curious, and active to the
last.
Other contributions. Morgenstern was an en-
trepreneur of talent, who was particularly con-
cerned with attracting powerful mathematicians
to the consideration of problems in the social
sciences. He was deeply grateful to the Office of
Naval Research for the support it gave to his
research program over many years, and was an
editor of the Naval Logistics Research Quarterly.
Because he believed that a good economist
should be able to do applied work, he was one
of the founders in 1959 of Mathematica, a
highly successful and sophisticated consulting
firm, remaining chairman of the board until his
death. He was also instrumental in the founding
of the Institute for Advanced Study in Vienna.
In 1948, Morgenstern married Dorothy Young
and they had two children.
MARTIN SHUBIK
WORKS BY MORGENSTERN
1927 Francis Y. Edgeworth. Zeitschrift fur Volkswirt-
schaft und Sozialpolitik 5:646-652.
1928 Wirtschaftsprognose: Eine Untersuchung ihrer
Voraussetzungen und Moglichkeiten. Vienna:
Springer.
1932 Viti de Marco, Antonio de. Grundlehren der Fi-
nanzwirtschaft. Edited by Oskar Morgenstern. Tu-
bingen (Germany) : J. C. B. Mohr. —» German trans-
lation of Principii di economia finanziaria.
1933-1934 MORGENSTERN, OSKAR (editor) Beitrdge
zur Konjunkturforschung. Vols. 4 and 5. Vienna:
Springer.
1934 Die Grenzen der Wirtschaftspolitik. Vienna:
Springer.
1935 Vollkommene Voraussicht und wirtschaftliches
Gleichgewicht. Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie 6:
337-357.
(1944) 1964 VON NEUMANN, JOHN; and MORGEN-
STERN, OSKAR Theory of Games and Economic Be-
havior. 3d ed. New York: Wiley.
(1950) 1963 On the Accuracy of Economic Observa-
tions. 2d ed., rev. Princeton Univ. Press.
1954 MORGENSTERN, OSKAR (editor) Economic Activ-
ity Analysis. New York: Wiley.
(1959a) 1975 International Financial Transactions
and Business Cycles. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Studies in Business Cycles, No. 8. West-
port, Conn.: Greenwood.
(1959b) 1961 The Question of National Defense. New
York: Vintage.
1963 Spieltheorie und Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Vi-
enna: Oldenbourg.
1967 MORGENSTERN, OSKAR; and HEISS, KLAUS PETER
General Report on the Economics of the Peaceful
Uses of Underground Nuclear Explosions. Prepared
for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Princeton:
Mathematica.
1968a Game Theory: Theoretical Aspects. Volume 6,
pages 62—69 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
1968b Schlesinger, Karl. Volume 14, pages 51-52 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968c Viti de Marco, Antonio de. Volume 16, pages
343—345 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1968d von Neumann, John. Volume 16, pages 385-387
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1970 GRANGER, C. W. J.; and MORGENSTERN, OSKAR
Predictability of Stock Market Prices. Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books.
1972 MORGENSTERN, OSKAR; and HEISS, KLAUS PETER
Economic Analysis of the Space Shuttle System.
4 vols. Prepared for the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. Princeton: Mathematica.
1973 MORGENSTERN, OSKAR; HEISS, KLAUS PETER; and
KNORR, KLAUS Long Term Projections of Power:
Political, Economic, and Military Forecasting. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Ballinger.
1976 Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgen-
stern. Edited by Andrew Schotter. New York Univ.
Press.
1976 MORGENSTERN, OSKAR; and THOMPSON, GER-
ALD L. Mathematical Theory of Expanding and Con-
tracting Economies. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
COURNOT, ANTOINE AUGUSTIN (1838) 1960 Re-
searches Into the Mathematical Principles of the
Theory of Wealth. New York: Kelley. —•» First pub-
lished in French.
NASH, JOHN F., JR. 1951 Non-cooperative Games. An-
nals of Mathematics 53:286-295.
SHUBIK, MARTIN 1979 Oskar Morgenstern: Mentor
and Friend. International Journal of Game Theory.
—> Forthcoming.
VON NEUMANN, JOHN (1928) 1959 On the Theory of
Games of Strategy. Volume 4, pages 13—42 in A. W.
Tucker and R. Duncan Luce (editors), Contribu-
tions to the Theory of Games. Princeton Univ. Press.
—» First published in German.
MORGENTHAU, HANS J.
Hans J. Morgenthau was born in 1904 in
Coburg, a small town in central Germany that is
now part of northern Bavaria. The ruler of the
duchy, a grandson of Queen Victoria, was
known for his public display of German nation-
alism and, later, for his support of Hitler's cruel
practice of anti-Semitism. As a schoolboy during
World War i and its aftermath, Morgenthau
witnessed the defeat of a powerful German army
once confident of early victory, the flight of the
leaders of the Imperial government and their

replacement by a Weimar regime that suffered
the lack of a sense of power and a too-narrow
political base and that drew its support pri-
marily from the working class and the bour-
geoisie.
Because the war had ended with no foreign
troops on German soil, the enemies of Weimar
promulgated the legend that Germany had been
defeated because of a "stab in the back." First
the former ruling class (overwhelmingly the
most influential group in such a community as
Coburg) and then the Nazis propagated the
myth that Germany had not actually lost the war
but had been undermined by traitors within,
such as the trade unions, socialists, Jews, Cath-
olics, liberals, and freemasons. The Nazi party
founded in 1919 turned this legend into a
powerful instrument of political propaganda.
For the young Morgenthau, the Weimar era
demonstrated the importance of political power
and its interplay with swiftly flowing currents
of irrationalism in politics. The German people
needed a scapegoat in order to account for mili-
tary defeat and rampant inflation, and they
found it in the Jews. In such an environment,
Morgenthau learned early that a government
must have the capacity of governing, including
the ability to maintain economic stability.
As an only child, Morgenthau suffered from
profound loneliness and frequent illness caused
or aggravated by family circumstances. His
father was tyrannical and authoritarian; his
mother warm and highly intelligent. His father's
influence helped to create in him an inferiority
complex, a fear of rejection, and an undisguised
shyness that have endured throughout his life.
Family relationships may help to explain the
paradox later observed by many of his students:
no professor was more actively involved in ad-
vancing their future, yet none appeared more
reserved and detached.
Morgenthau's commitment to the creation of
a Jewish homeland, and particularly the opin-
ions in his later writings, strongly supporting
Israel's quest for security, also go back to his
formative years. He remembers having been spit
upon while marching in the German equivalent
of the American Boy Scouts, having been denied
admission to an upper class fraternity in a clas-
sical Gymnasium, and being ridiculed and
ostracized when he graduated first in his class
and spoke at a founders' day ceremony celebrat-
ing the crowning of the duke of Coburg.
Morgenthau's early interest in literature,
which his father discouraged, was a harbinger
MORGENTHAU, HANS J. 545
of his lifelong preference for the concrete in
history. His aspirations had been to become a
writer, perhaps a professor, and possibly a poet.
In September 1922, he wrote as a senior Gym-
nasium student: "My hopes for the future move
in two directions. I hope for the lifting of the
pressure to which I am exposed by the social
environment, and I hope to find a direction and
a purpose for my future activities. The latter
cannot be realized before the former is fulfilled"
(Thompson & Myers 1977, p. 1). In this essay
he observed that his relationship to his environ-
ment was determined by three facts: he was
a German, he was a Jew, and he had matured
after World War i. He resolved not to play the
role of suffering martyr but to oppose the pres-
sures of anti-Semitism which he asserted shat-
tered all foundations of morality: "The stronger
the pressure from outside becomes, the more
violent and one-sided will be my reaction to this
movement. . . ." He saw himself as approach-
ing a choice between two activities, the amass-
ing of riches or the service of a higher cause.
As a guide to his choice he quoted a passage
from Goethe's autobiography, Poetry and Truth:
"Our desires are presentiments of the abilities
that lie within ourselves. . . . We feel a longing
for what we already possess in silence. . . . If
such a direction is decisively presented by our
nature, every step in our development fulfills
a part of the original desire. . . ."
Morgenthau began his university studies in
1923 at the University of Frankfort but soon
transferred to the University of Munich. His
professors at both institutions included learned
men but not internationally recognized scholars.
He studied philosophy, which along with liter-
ature, had dominated his intellectual interests.
His early studies in philosophy, however,
were disappointing, except for the writings of
Benedetto Croce. The young student was re-
pulsed by the pedantry of minute epistemologi-
cal distinctions that went so far even as to
dissect individual sentences in philosophical
writings. So he moved to the University of
Munich and the study of law, and came under
the influence of two outstanding teachers,
Heinrich Wolfflin, an art historian who had
founded a school of aesthetics, and Hermann
Oncken, a diplomatic historian who discussed
the relationships between history and person-
alities and lectured on Bismarck and nineteenth-
century foreign and military policy. Looking
back, Morgenthau wrote in "Fragment of an In-
tellectual Autobiography: 1904-1932": "For the
546 MORGENTHAU, HANS J.
first time, I felt the impact of a coherent system
of thought, primarily a distillation of Bismarck's
Realpolitik, that . . . [supported] my isolated
and impressionistic judgments on contemporary
issues of foreign policy" (Thompson & Myers
1977, p. 6). At Munich, he was also introduced
by Karl Rothenbucher to Max Weber's political
and social philosophy; he later wrote: "Weber
was everything most of his colleagues pretended
to be but were not . . . a passionate observer
[as a citizen] of the political scene and a frus-
trated participant in it, as a scholar . . . [view-
ing] politics without passion . . . [or] political
purpose beyond the intellectual one of under-
standing" (ibid., p. 7). Weber became
for Morgenthau the model of the political
scientist.
Two other schools of thought had largely
negative influences on Morgenthau: Marxism
and psychoanalysis. Marxism had attracted
many younger intellectuals as an instrument for
hastening the disintegration of an unjust post-
war society and rebuilding it on more equitable
foundations. Its focal point in Germany was
the Institut fiir Sozialforschung at the Univers-
ity of Frankfort, whose more prominent mem-
bers were avowed Marxists. Morgenthau, though
acknowledging a limited indebtedness to Marx-
ian sociology, was repelled, as the Nazi enemy
stood at the gate, by Marxists who split hairs,
pedantically picked at true meaning of phrases,
clauses, and sentences. Listening to Karl Mann-
heim appealing for "free-floating intelligence"
against the Nazis, Morgenthau understood
Marx's declaration to his son-in-law: "Moi, je
ne suis pas Marxiste." As for psychoanalysis, he
had no doubt that Freud, like Marx, had opened
new vistas of human understanding, and at one
stage he tried to construct a theoretical system
of politics based on Freudian concepts and in-
sights. He abandoned the effort, however, with-
out publishing the results, concluding: "What
defeats a psychoanalytical theory of politics is
what has defeated a Marxist theory of politics:
the impossibility of accounting for complexities
of political experience with the simplicities of a
reductionist theory, economic or psychological"
(Thompson & Myers 1977, p. 4).
Morgenthau pursued postgraduate work at the
Graduate Institute of International Studies in
Geneva, was admitted to the bar, and served
as acting president of the Labor Law Court in
Frankfort. In 1932 he joined the University of
Geneva to teach public law, and, because of Hit-
ler's rise in 1933 remained in Geneva until 1935,
proceeding then to Madrid, where he taught
until 1936. He moved to the United States the
following year without friends or sponsors, but
his persistence and intellectual vitality won him
successive faculty appointments at Brooklyn
College (1937-1939) and the University of
Kansas City (1939-1943). He went on to ap-
pointments at the University of Chicago (1943-
1971) and the City College of New York (1968-
1975). In 1975, he began teaching at the New
School for Social Research in New York.
Morgenthau's study of international politics
is marked by a dual emphasis on philosophy and
politics. His first major work, Scientific Man vs.
Power Politics (1946), was an original and
forceful criticism of the social, political, and
moral philosophy of modern Western thought
and its consequences for political life. Making
reference to the rise and fall of the Roman
Empire, he traced the crises of the first half of
the twentieth century and the general decay in
political thought, reflected in "the belief in the
power of science to solve all problems and, more
particularly, all political problems" (1946, p. vi).
Although pessimistic about the future, espe-
cially the failures of liberalism, Morgenthau, in-
fluenced by Reinhold Niebuhr, called for a re-
newalof faith in "those intellectual and moral
faculties of man to which alone the problems
of the social world will yield" (ibid.). The
study also challenged the scientific approach to
politics prevailing in the United States, going
back to New Aspects of Politics (1925) by
Charles E. Merriam. When Leonard White, a
supporter of Merriam who was Morgenthau's
superior at the University of Chicago, read Sci-
entific Man, he suggested the author teach a
course in administrative law to put him on the
right track. At Chicago, Morgenthau contended
with an intellectual atmosphere in political sci-
ence hostile at the time to philosophy (the dom-
inant interest of the Chicago department was
public administration and international law).
His main encouragement came from the uni-
versity's top leadership, particularly Robert M.
Hutchins, a few of his younger colleagues, and
most of all from his students, who entered his
classes with skepticism and generally left with
enduring respect for his approach. The empiri-
cists and behaviorists saw in him a threat to
their generously endowed research and, not by
accident, the severest critics of President Hutch-
ins (whose own neo-Thomism and world gov-
ernment crusade later caused a breach with
Morgenthau) opposed his devotion to philosophy.

By 1948 with the publication of his epoch-
making text, Politics Among Nations, criticism
of his work was redirected at the second element
in his approach—his definition and concept of
politics. The subtitle described his purpose as
an inquiry into The Struggle for Power and
Peace and in it he wrote: "Whatever the ulti-
mate aims of international politics, power is al-
ways the immediate aim" (1948, p. 13). Then
he added: "the struggle for power is universal
in time and space and is an undeniable fact of
experience . . ." (1948, p. 17). It would be
difficult today to imagine the sense of concern
and alarm touched off by his formulation. Power
politics at the time was a questionable and con-
troversial phrase at Chicago. It was what world
government and public administration were to
eradicate and epitomized all that was evil and
had to be uprooted if men were to live in a
civilized world. American political theorists con-
demned Morgenthau's "Germanic way of look-
ing at things." Practical politicians, whose pop-
ularity depended on their appearing to stand for
less ignoble ends than power, were quick to
dissociate themselves, publicly at least, from his
definition of politics.
Ironically, critics overlooked Morgenthau's
early emphasis on the limitations and proper use
of power, its integral relation to national pur-
pose and the constraints of national interest.
Also overlooked was his extended analysis of
international morality and the role of ethics,
mores, and laws. He wrote: "From the Bible to
the ethics and constitutional arrangements of
modern democracy, the main functions of these
normative systems has been to keep aspirations
for power within socially tolerable bounds"
(1948, p. 169). The fundamental error to which
he called attention in 1951 in his first compre-
hensive treatise on American foreign policy, In
Defense of the National Interest, was to oppose
moral principles and the national interest. He
insisted that "the choice is not between moral
principles and the national interest, devoid of
moral dignity, but between one set of moral
principles divorced from political reality, and
another set of moral principles derived from
political reality" (1951, p. 33). He called on
Americans to relearn the principles of state-
craft and political morality which had guided
the Founding Fathers and had continued, often-
times in moralistic disguise, through the first
century of the republic's existence.
Morgenthau continued thereafter in a vast
outpouring of articles and books on American
MORGENTHAU, HANS J. 547
foreign policy to examine, test and apply his
central principles of power, interest, and moral-
ity. In The Purpose of American Politics (1960),
he wrote: "In order to be worthy of our lasting
sympathy, a nation must pursue its interests for
the sake of a transcendent purpose that gives
meaning to the day-to-day operations of its
foreign policy" (1960, p. 8). Such moral prin-
ciples must be applied in the international en-
vironment prudently, and with careful regard to
their political consequences. Military and eco-
nomic power were not to be employed to serve
diverse universal humanitarian missions, but
must be measured against the imperatives of
the national interest. He warned against letting
the fear of communism influence foreign policy
too strongly and he maintained that indiscrimi-
nate anticommunism could not provide the basis
for sound policy. In a steady stream of writings
directed to specific foreign policy problems, in-
cluding Vietnam and the United States (1965),
A New Foreign Policy for the United States
(1969), and Truth and Power (1970), he criti-
cized a crusading foreign policy based on moral
abstractions and the transfer of American poli-
cies successfully employed in Europe to Asia
and the Third World. By the mid-1960s he had
become America's major critic of the Vietnam
War, basing his criticism on a principle enunci-
ated in Politics Among Nations-. Never put
yourself in a position from which you cannot
retreat without a loss of face, and from which
you cannot advance without undue risk. He
engaged in public debates with such American
officials as national security advisers, McGeorge
Bundy and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. He entered
the public arena reluctantly, for at one stage he
seems to have agreed with J. Robert Oppen-
heimer, who warned that if in politics one tried
at the same time to be both actor and observer,
one would fail in both respects. Whatever Mor-
genthau may himself have written about the
limitations of the philosopher in politics, he
defied in practice. A successful classroom
teacher, he sought to make the Congress, suc-
cessive administrations, and every available
public an extended classroom. He traveled to
every corner of the globe, unsparing of himself
and unyielding in his criticism of what he con-
sidered false teachings and prevailing nostrums.
It is difficult to measure Morgenthau's influ-
ence, and writers such as Raymond Aron have
pointed to his tragic failure to reshape American
foreign policy. His impact on foreign policy has
been greatest in the realm of principles, not of
548 MOWRER, O. H.
tactics or day-to-day decisions. By the 1970s,
however, no responsible leader in American
public life dared scorn the need to consider
the national interest in the formulation of
American foreign policy. No secretary of state
could pretend that the world was rid of inter-
national rivalries or power politics. No liberal
journalist could ignore the counterforces of na-
tionalism and internationalism. Morgenthau
was not alone in his teachings, but realist prin-
ciples would not have been so powerfully com-
municated without his voice. In two personal
respects, moreover, he seems to have realized
his mission. First, he succeeded in discovering
what he had sought as an 18-year-old: a cause
that would survive him and that would justify
his moral and intellectual journey. Second, he
has held firm to a goal that he himself has best
described:
Our aspirations, molding our expectations, take ac-
count of what we would like the empirical world
to look like rather than what it actually is. Thus
endlessly, empirical reality denies the validity of
our aspirations and expectations . . . We expect
the oracle to give us a clearcut answer. What we
get is an enigma compounding the riddle. What
remains is a searching mind, conscious of itself
and of the world, seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking,
and speaking—seeking ultimate reality beyond
illusion." (Thompson & Myers 1977, pp. 16-17)
KENNETH W. THOMPSON
WORKS BY MORGENTHAU
(1946) 1974 Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. Univ.
of Chicago Press.
(1948) 1974 Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace. 5th ed., rev. New York: Knopf.
1951 In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical
Examination of American Foreign Policy. New
York: Knopf.
1958 Dilemmas of Politics. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1960 The Purpose of American Politics. New York:
Knopf.
1962 Politics in the Twentieth Century. 3 vols. Univ.
of Chicago Press. —» Volume 1: The Decline of
Democratic Politics. Volume 2: The Impasse of
American Foreign Policy. Volume 3: The Restora-
tion of American Politics.
1965 Vietnam and the United States. Washington:
Public Affairs Press.
1969 A New Foreign Policy for the United States.
Published for the Council on Foreign Relations.
New York: Praeger.
1970 Truth and Power. New York: Praeger.
1972 Science: Servant or Master? New York: New
American Library.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
THOMPSON, KENNETH W.; and MYERS, ROBERT J.
(editors) 1977 Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to
Hans Morgenthau. Washington: New Republic.
MOWRER, O. H.
O. Hobart Mowrer was born in 1907. He is re-
search professor of psychology emeritus at the
University of Illinois, and has been a creative
and provocative force in the last forty years of
dialogue in the behavioral sciences. His knack
for arousing either immense acclaim or intense
reproof from both scientific and lay audiences
stems from two factors. In a day of single-
minded specialization, he has been something
of a Renaissance scholar, unwilling to remain
"at home" with his specialty; moreover, whether
"at home" or "afield," he has had an instinct for
the sacred matched only by a skill for incisive
irreverence. Such a thinker is likely to appear
either boldly refreshing and enlightening or
heretical and intrusive.
Mowrer began his career as an undergraduate
at the University of Missouri (1925-1929) un-
der the tutelage of Max F. Meyer, a strict be-
haviorist antedating, though overshadowed by,
John B. Watson. Meyer's emphasis on the me-
chanics of behavior was reflected in Mowrer's
initial research on vestibular reflexes, first as a
graduate student under Knight Dunlap at the
Johns Hopkins University (PH.D., 1932), and later
as a fellow at Princeton, Northwestern, and Yale
universities. Paradoxically, the choice of this
area of research also reflected a characteristic
that became more apparent as Mowrer's career
advanced: his readiness to attend to his own
subjective experiences. It was an inability to
shake off his own confusion about directions
while in Baltimore that helped spur his interest
in vestibular and orientational phenomena.
In 1934 he went to Yale, ostensibly to study
further the vestibular functions under Raymond
Dodge. But Yale was a beehive of crossdiscipli-
nary exchange because of its recently estab-
lished (1929) Institute of Human Relations.
Under this stimulus Mowrer's interest in mech-
anistic psychology was soon to end, and he
returned to questions verboten to the behaviorist
that had haunted him as an undergraduate. Is
not "preparatory set" something different from
observable behavior (1938)? Do we not have
to postulate a motivational state (fear) to ex-
plain anticipatory avoidance behavior, which,
though functional, fails to replicate the "uncon-
ditional (escape) response" (Mowrer 1939;
1940; Mowrer & Lamoreaux 1942; 1946)?
Though now heralded as one of the first to
apply "behavior modification" (Mowrer &
Mowrer 1938), Mowrer has never been a be-

haviorist in the strict sense. He has been more
interested in understanding and explaining
than in predicting behavior. And while he has
readily acknowledged that intervening variables
are inventions of convenience, he has tried to
render them as plausible hypothetical con-
structs. He has quoted in appreciation Gordon
Airport's criticism of stimulus-response-behav-
iorism as the "psychology of the empty organ-
ism" and noted that the challenge for him has
been to fill that emptiness with persuasive con-
structs about the nature of animals and man as
learning, cognating, and deciding entities.
Even as Mowrer moved toward a "mentalis-
tic" rather than a "motoric" conception of prepa-
ratory set, he was entertaining another depar-
ture from orthodoxy. His association with Clark
L. Hull was most cordial, and his initial notions
were consonant with Hull's monistic theory of
learning. In this theory, fear was viewed as a
response with motivating properties, but one
learned, like any other response, as a function
of immediate reinforcement. Soon, however,
Mowrer strongly questioned this theory. It asks
us, he noted, to assume that rewarding a fear
response (e.g., giving comfort to a fearful child)
will strengthen the fear, while punishing the
fear (e.g., scolding the fearful child) will weaken
it. Surely the opposite is more nearly true.
He concluded that fear involves a principle of
reinforcement different from motoric habits and
expounded his now famous two-factor theory of
learning (1947). Recognizing that a similar bi-
furcation had been proposed by a number of
thinkers-C. S. Sherrington (1906), B. F. Skin-
ner (1935), Jerzy Konorski and Stefan Miller
(1937), and Harold Schlosberg (1937)-
Mowrer nevertheless formulated a distinctive
thesis resting on and reconciling a considerable
body of prior research. He later attempted to
demonstrate conclusively that fear did not ob-
serve reward reinforcement principles, but did
observe conditioning (Pavlovian) principles
(Mowrer 1950; Mowrer & Aiken 1954; Mowrer
& Solomon 1954). In the judgment of many, he
succeeded.
However, these supporting researches were
no sooner public than Mowrer himself expressed
critical concern. The impetus was again a per-
sonal experience, this time in the laboratory of
Grant Fairbanks, a University of Illinois col-
league and professor of speech who had invented
an audio delayed feedback apparatus. Curious,
Mowrer submitted to the apparatus and tried to
speak and read. Hearing his own words delayed
MOWRER, O. H. 549
about .25 seconds after uttering them had a
characteristic, but to Mowrer, a shockingly un-
expected result: his normally fluent speech was
reduced to stuttering incapacity! How could a
well-practiced series of motoric habits richly
prompted by preceding cues be undone by a
simple displacement of the audible sensory
aftereffect? From that moment, Mowrer knew
he could no longer support the Thorndike—Hull
"bond" theory of motor learning that had been
advanced in his own two-factor theory.
Shortly thereafter, he published a "revised
two-factor theory" (1956) in which he swung
to a Pavlovian rendering of all learning but re-
tained the notion that there were two reinforc-
ing conditions: drive onset (fear learning) and
drive reduction (hope learning). Reminiscent of
Edward C. Tolman, Mowrer now held that overt
(motoric) behavior is not learned or fixed in
hierarchical S-R categories. Instead, what is
learned are a series of positive or negative emo-
tional-attitudinal states associated with (cued
by) the stimulus aftermath (kinesthetic, visual,
auditory, etc.) of any action. Behavior as such
is fluid, variable, "nonmechanical," and spon-
taneous. "Habits" emerge only because the
sensory aftermath of "correct" behavior regu-
larly elicits maximum hope and minimum fear
reactions. To explain the initiation and efficient
selection of behavior guided by such a servo-
feedback concept, Mowrer expanded consider-
ably upon a cognitive psychology in Learning
Theory and the Symbolic Processes (1960b), the
second of the two-volume set in which his work
on learning culminated.
Since then Mowrer has been absorbed in the
question of human behavioral disorder and re-
covery—a matter that has been of interest for a
considerably longer period than his published
work indicates. Mowrer's readiness to use and
disclose his personal experience has been par-
ticularly evident in this arena. In autobio-
graphical accounts (1966a; 1974) he has traced
his struggles with depression and his initial
search for relief through psychoanalytic
therapy.
In 1945 a seminar with Harry Stack Sullivan
illuminated a direction leading away from an-
alytic psychology. Mowrer's break with Freudian
tradition was made formal in the now classic
paper (1948) proposing the "neurotic paradox."
There and subsequently (1953) he rejected the
"overlearning" (trauma) thesis embraced by
Freud and others to explain self-defeating but
self-perpetuating behavior (the "neurotic para-
 550 MOWRER, O. H.
dox"). He believed the "paradox" to be an arti-
fact of conceptualization: Neurosis, he noted,
is a form of "ignorance," of wnderlearning rather
than ox>erlearning. The neurotic has learned, in
the guise of secretive, deceptive behavior, how
not to learn (the full measure of appropriate
concern and guilt). His actions are understand-
able, for he does what we are all tempted to do
in the interest of immediate gratification. The
mystery, if there is one, resides in the normal
individual who manages by adulthood to de-
velop the integrity to resist momentary gratifi-
cations in the interest of remote goals.
The frustrations of man's moral promptings,
rather than of his biological urges, thus produce
his inner disquiet. To drive home this point,
Mowrer asserted that he preferred "sin" to "sick"
as a term characterizing disordered persons
(1960c). He could not have chosen a more sensi-
tive nerve; the reaction was intense, even
vitriolic. Though his point may have been lost
on some respondents, the article has often been
cited and is included in several edited works.
Then came a grand experiment. If human
disorder was interpersonal and moral in es-
sence, why not seek help from the huge existing
capital, in both manpower and real estate, of
the institutional church? Many colleagues
viewed Mowrer's effort as a desertion of pro-
fessionalism at best and a surrender to mysti-
cism at worst. Meanwhile, many religious per-
sons smarted under his biting analysis (1961)
of the church's abrogation of ancient principles,
preoccupation with theism at the cost of broth-
erhood, and abandonment of the "soul sick" to
the secular healing of psychoanalysts.
The church was not unmindful of Mowrer's
campaign, but he soon concluded that too much
inertia was inherent in its structure. With char-
acteristic willingness to abandon the impracti-
cal, he began to examine the domain of self-
help groups (1966b). A review of research
(1968) showed consistent support for his posi-
tion that troubled individuals have customarily
violated their community with significant
others. His appreciation has steadily grown for
the power of Alcoholics Anonymous and other
nonprofessional enterprises to address such hu-
man issues effectively.
At the age of 69, Mowrer undertook another
revision of his theory, again prompted by per-
sonal experience. Although he had been free,
for the most part, of depression for 13 years, a
returning episode in 1966 introduced him to
antidepressant drugs and prompted him to
study the new research on genetic predisposi-
tion and to modify his strict social-learning view
of disorder. He has concluded from both his
own experience and research reviews that a
"diathesis-stress" concept is more nearly correct
(1976).
In the 1960s, Ivar Lovaas, a prominent psy-
chologist, observed to the author: "You think
you have a new idea—the use of punishment with
children, learned helplessness, or whatever.
You go to the literature, and Mowrer has been
there. It is amazing the range of virgin territory
he has explored." No doubt he will continue to
explore and revise.
V. EDWIN BIXENSTINE
WORKS BY MOWRER
1934 MOWRER, O. H.; and FEARING, FRANKLIN The
Effect of General Anaesthesia Upon the Experi-
mental Reduction of Vestibular Nystagmus. Journal
of General Psychology 11:133-144.
1938 Preparatory Set (Expectancy): A Determinant
in Motivation and Learning. Psychological Review
45:62-91.
1938 MOWRER, O. H.; and MOWRER, W. M. Eneuresis:
A Method for Its Study and Treatment. American
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 8:436-459.
1939 A Stimulus-Response Analysis of Anxiety and Its
Role as a Reinforcing Agent. Psychological Review
46:553-565.
1940 Anxiety-reduction and Learning, Journal of Ex-
perimental Psychology 27:497-516.
1942 MOWRER, O. H.; and LAMOREAUX, R. R. Avoid-
ance Conditioning and Signal Duration: A Study of
Secondary Motivation and Reward. Psychological
Monographs, Vol. 54: Whole no. 5.
1946 MOWRER, O. H.; and LAMOREAUX, R. R. Fear as
an Intervening Variable in Avoidance Conditioning.
Journal of Comparative Psychology 39:29-50.
1947 On the Dual Nature of Learning: A Reinter-
pretation of "Conditioning" and "Problem Solving."
Harvard Educational Review 17:102—148.
1948 Learning Theory and the Neurotic Paradox.
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 18:571—610.
1950 Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics:
Selected Papers. New York: Ronald.
1953 Neurosis: A Disorder of Conditioning or Prob-
lem Solving? New York Academy of Sciences, An-
nals 56:273-288.
1954 MOWRER, O. H.; and SOLOMON, L. N. Contiguity
vs. Drive-reduction in Conditioned Fear: The Prox-
imity and Abruptness of Drive-reduction. American
Journal of Psychology 67:15-25.
1954 MOWRER, O. H.; and AIKEN, E. G. Contiguity
vs. Drive-reduction in Conditioned Fear: Temporal
Variations in Conditioned and Unconditioned
Stimulus. American Journal of Psychology 67:26-38.
1956 Two-factor Learning Theory Reconsidered, With
Special Reference to Secondary Reinforcement and
the Concept of Habit. Psychological Review
63:114-128.
(1960a) 1973 Learning Theory and Behavior. Hunt-
ington, N.Y.: Krieger.
1960b Learning Theory and the Symbolic Processes.
New York: Wiley. -» Companion book to 1960a.
1960c "Sin," the Lesser of Two Evils. American Psy-
chologist 15:301-304.
 MUMFORD, LEWIS 551

1961 The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion. Prince- call to arms against fascism or his warnings
ton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. about atomic bombs.
1966a Abnormal Reactions or Actions'? An Autobi-
ographical Answer. Dubuque, Iowa: Brown. Mumford's pervasive thrust has been histor-
1966& Integrity Therapy: A Self-help Approach. Psy- ical criticism; seeking to learn from the lessons
chotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice 3:114- of the past as a basis for choosing directions
119.
1968 New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psycho- into the future. His evaluative characterizations
pathology. Volume 1, pages 113-193 in Marvin J. of the major periods of Western civilization
Feldman (editor), Studies in Psychotherapy and search out the evolving meanings of humanness,
Behavior Change. Volume 1: Research in Individ-
ual Psychotherapy. Buffalo Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2. the good life, and the best societal and environ-
Buffalo, N.Y.: State University of New York at mental settings for such a life. His books may
Buffalo. conveniently be grouped according to their sev-
1974 Autobiography. Volume 6, pages 329-364 in
The History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited eral themes: (1) critical reviews of nineteenth-
by Gardner Lindzey. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: century American literature, arts, and architec-
Prentice-Hall. ture; (2) broad humanistic reviews of the evolu-
1976 Changing Conceptions of "Neurosis" and the
Small-groups Movement. Education 97:24—62. tion of Western man; (3) critical history of tech-
nology as it relates to human development; and
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
(4) critical history of cities and city planning.
KONORSKI, JERZY; and MILLER, STEFAN 1937 On The first grouping represents an early and rela-
Two Types of Conditioned Reflex. Journal of Gen- tively separate period, the second encompasses
eral Psychology 16:264-272. his central theme, while the third and fourth
SCHLOSBERG, HAROLD 1937 The Relationship Be-
tween Success and the Laws of Conditioning. Psy- represent concurrent themes embellishing that
chological Review 44:379-394. central theme. In addition, Mumford has pub-
SHERRINGTON, C. S. (1906) 1948 The Integrative lished numerous collections of articles, and in
Action of the Nervous System. 2d ed. New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press. recent years, autobiographical notes. An auto-
SKINNER, B. F. 1935 Two Types of Conditioned Re- biography covering his first eighty years is forth-
flex and a Pseudo Type. Journal of General Psy- coming (1978).
chology 12:66-77.
While still in his thirties, Mumford wrote four
books—Sticks and Stones (1924), The Golden
Day (1926), Herman Melville (1929), and The
MUMFORD, LEWIS Brown Decades (1931)—dealing selectively with
American literature, and with less emphasis,
Lewis Mumford was born in Flushing, New American architecture and painting, during the
York, in 1895. Although he attended the City thirty years after the Civil War. Along with Van
College of New York, Columbia University, and Wyck Brooks, Randolph Bourne, Waldo Frank,
the New School for Social Research, with Thor- and other contemporaries, he "helped to place,
stein Veblen an influential professor, Mumford not only himself, but an entire generation in
never received an undergraduate degree. He possession of its usable past" (Dow 1977,
married Sophia Wittenberg in 1921, and they pp. 37-38).
came to divide their residence between New At the same time, Mumford began his ap-
York City and a farmhouse near Amenia, which praisal of the condition of Western man. With
after 1930 increasingly served as home for them The Story of Utopias (1922) providing a dom-
and their children, and as his writing base. inant motif—to the effect that people's ideas
As a writer, Mumford's career, spanning 65 about improving their community settings are
years, has been characterized by an intensive powerful guides for action—Mumford went on in
and sustained intellectual exploration—a self- The Condition of Man (1944), The Conduct of
directed, continuing education that he shares Life (1951), and The Transformations of Man
with readers through his outpouring of writings. (1956) "to show [man] what changes in his plan
Most readers have been exposed selectively to of life are necessary if he is to make the most of
those Mumford writings that relate to their in- the vast powers he may now command" ([1944]
terests. Thus, some have read his early books on 1963, p. v). Mumford is convinced that the per-
nineteenth-century American literature, some vasive inroads of the machine, the city, bureauc-
his architectural criticism, some his history of racy, centralized power, and competitiveness
technology, some his history of cities, some his have led to excessive specialization, fragmented
accounts of man's search for his own human- personalities, and a fundamental loss of human-
ness and of man's Utopian images, and some his ness. Thus, in his words: "The central effort in
552 MUMFORD, LEWIS
the renewal of life today must be to bring back
the possibility of wholeness and balance, not in-
deed as goods in themselves, but as the condition
for renewal and growth and self-transcendence.
We must break down the segregation of func-
tions and activities, both within the personality
and within the community" ([1951] 1952,
p. 187). Mumford seeks to give "emphasis pre-
cisely to those aspects of man's life that are
usually neglected: his dreams, his purposes, his
ideals, his Utopias" (1944, p. 10). He judges the
most important needs to be those that foster
spiritual growth, and he repeatedly affirms the
idea of organic growth. Skeptical of any system
that promotes the great truth or the grand design,
his organicism would encourage the harmonious
and balanced coexistence of the fullest variety
of approaches. Led off by Technics and Civiliza-
tion (1934) and The Culture of Cities (1938),
both to be discussed below, The Condition of
Man and The Conduct of Life rounded out a
tetralogy designated by Mumford as the renewal
of life series. His prophetic message that by
renewal of life we could recapture the human-
ness we have lost has brought him a world-wide
following, not the least among younger readers.
In Technics and Civilization, perhaps his most
original book, Mumford demonstrates that our
technology, particularly the machine, is to be
understood as an integral component and ex-
pression of the larger society and not as deter-
ministic or external. He stresses those evolu-
tionary innovations that were undramatically
brought into service, such as physical containers
(for grain or other food stuffs) and the orga-
nization of complex human collective effort (for
the construction of public works). Fundamen-
tally optimistic, Mumford concludes that "the
next step toward re-orienting our technics con-
sists in bringing it more completely into har-
mony with the new cultural and regional and
societal and personal patterns we have co-
ordinately begun to develop" (1934, p. 434). He
expands his previous work on the history of
technological development in his two-volume
study, The Myth of the Machine (1967-1970).
Again interpreting the emergence of technology
within the broader context of man's continuing
efforts to develop his human capabilities, he
urges us to subordinate scientific discovery to the
ends of fostering the kinds of human beings and
the kind of society we want to become. Mumford
urges us to displace "the mechanical world pic-
ture with an organic world picture, in the center
of which stands man himself in person . . ."
(1967-1970, vol. 2, p. 393). Although less op-
timistic than in his 1934 book, he suggests that
there are "already many indications, though
scattered, faint, and often contradictory, that a
fresh cultural transformation is in the making"
(ibid., p. 429).
To many social scientists, however, Mumford
is best known for his writings on the city. His
work on urban history and his views on urban
development relate integrally both to his central
concern that man renew his humanness and
also to his special interest in the shaping of the
urban environment as exemplified by his volu-
minous contributions to architectural criticism.
Patrick Geddes, the Scottish sociologist-biolo-
gist-regionalist-planner,, exercised a profound
influence on Mumford, particularly regarding
the concept of organic growth and various ideas
about regionalism. The Culture of Cities as
well as The City in History (1961) provide
synoptic accounts of some five thousand years
of city development, together with ideas for
improving cities. Mumford strongly approves of
Greek cities and medieval towns because he ad-
mires their association with the qualities of com-
munity life. He wants cities to be of a form and
at a scale such that they provide a sense of order
for, and never overpower, their residents. He is
strongly drawn to the ideas of new towns (ad-
miring Ebenezer Howard's "garden cities"), or-
ganic growth (the natural splicing in of the new
so as to provide continuity from the old), and
gridtype regional organization (smaller com-
munities able to draw upon regional resources).
He has had an extensive following among city
planners and architects, although perhaps less
in America (e.g., Friedmann 1962) than in
Britain, where he provided philosophic support
(e.g., Mumford 1943) and where he was
awarded highest honors by the town planning
and architectural professions, a university hon-
orary degree, and a rare honorary knighthood.
Some critics in both countries have accused him
of overlooking inner-city problems in his advo-
cacy of new towns, of failing to identify more
fully the programs actually necessary to renew
cities, and of furthering a long tradition of sus-
picion about large cities (e.g., Goist 1969; Starr
1976).
Seemingly self-confidently, Mumford has
largely fashioned his own methodology. He es-
chews sharp contradictions between the "is," the
"likely," and the "ought to be." He merges em-
pirically-based reporting with intellectual ex-
ploration, while also drawing upon speculation

and intuitive understanding. In fashioning broad
comparisons, involving distant time periods and
divergent cultures, he is not above invoking
poetic convenience. For example, he described
his interpretation in The Transformations of
Man as "the continued interplay between a mass
of well-sifted specialized knowledge, a sprinkling
of free but circumspect speculations, and the
cumulative reports of personal observation and
experience. . . . As a generalist I have taken
advantage of a license too often self-denied by
the specialized scholar: that of assembling data
from widely different areas in order to bring out
a larger pattern that otherwise escapes observa-
tion . . ." ([1956] 1972, pp. 1-2).
Not surprisingly, Mumford's work has evoked
varied reactions from social scientists. Some
question his disdain for empirical methodology,
as did Richard C. Wade in his review of The
City in History (Riesman, Wade, & Mandelker
1962, p. 297). Others, such as David Riesman,
commend him for his generalism and his capac-
ity for transcending specialties (ibid., pp. 288,
293).
Lewis Mumford's original and enormous
scholarly output will long be recognized as a
remarkable interpretive exploration of our
human evolution and a continuing search for the
conditions conducive to the good life and the
good community. His historical criticism stands
in distinct contrast to the specialization and the
empiricism characterizing so much of contem-
porary social science.
DONALD L. FOLEY
WORKS BY MUMFORD
1922 The Story of Utopias. New York: Boni and Live-
right. —» Paperback editions were published by Vik-
ing in 1962 and 1966.
(1924) 1955 Sticks and Stones: A Study of American
Architecture and Civilization. 2d ed. New York:
Dover.
1926 The Golden Day: A Study in American Experi-
ence and Culture. New York: Boni and Liveright. —»
Paperback editions were published by Beacon in
1957 and Dover in 1968. In these later editions, the
subtitle was changed to A Study in American Litera-
ture and Culture.
(1929) 1963 Herman Melville. Rev. ed. New York:
Harcourt.
1931 The Brown Decades: A Study of the Arts in
America, 1865-1895. New York: Harcourt. —» Paper-
back editions were published in 1955 and 1971
by Dover. The 1971 paperback edition includes a
new preface by the author.
(1934) 1963 Technics and Civilization. Rev. ed. New
York: Harcourt.
1938 The Culture of Cities. New York: Harcourt. —>
A paperback edition was published in 1970.
MUMFORD, LEWIS 553
1943 The Social Foundation of Post-war Building. Re-
building Britain Series, No. 9. London: Faber.
(1944) 1963 The Condition of Man. London: Mercury
Books. —> A paperback edition was published by
Harcourt in 1973.
(1947) 1973 Green Memories: The Story of Geddes
Mumford. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
(1951) 1952 The Conduct of Life. London: Seeker and
Warburg. —» Paperback editions were published by
Harcourt in 1960 and 1970.
(1955) 1956 The Human Prospect. Edited by Harry T.
Moore and Karl W. Deutsch. London: Seeker and
Warburg. —> A paperback edition was published in
1965 by Southern Illinois University Press.
(1956) 1972 The Transformations of Man. New York:
Harper. —» A paperback edition was published in
1962 by Collier.
1961 The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transforma-
tions, and Its Prospects. New York: Harcourt. —»
Paperback editions were published by Penguin in
1966 and by Harcourt in 1968. Ten different foreign
language editions have also been published.
1967-1970 The Myth of the Machine. New York: Har-
court. —* Volume 1 is subtitled Technics and Human
Development, 1967. Volume 2 is subtitled The Pen-
tagon of Power, 1970. A paperback edition of both
volumes was published in 1974.
1968a City: I. Forms and Functions. Volume 2, pages
447-455 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1968k Geddes, Patrick. Volume 6, pages 81-83 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1970 The Van Wyck Brooks Lewis Mumford Letters:
The Record of a Literary Friendship, 1921-1963.
Edited by Robert E. Spiller. New York: Dutton.
1971 The Letters of Lewis Mumford and Frederic J.
Osborn: A Transatlantic Dialogue, 1938-1970. Ed-
ited by Michael R. Hughes. Bath (England): Adams
& Dart.
1973 Interpretations and Forecasts, 1922-1972: Studies
in Literature, History, Biography, Technics, and
Contemporary Society. New York: Harcourt.
1975 Findings and Keepings: Analects for an Autobiog-
raphy. New York: Harcourt.
1978 My Works and Days: 1895-1975. New York: Har-
court. —•» Forthcoming book; not available to the
contributor at the time of the writing of this article.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dow, EDDY 1977 Lewis Mumford's Passage to India:
From the First to the Later Phase. South Atlantic
Quarterly 76:31-43.
FRIEDMANN, JOHN 1962 The City in History. Town
Planning Review 33:73-80.
GOIST, PARK DIXON 1969 Lewis Mumford and "Anti-
urbanism." Journal of the American Institute of
Planners 35:340-347.
NEWMAN, ELMER S. 1971 Lewis Mumford: A Bibli-
ography, 1914-1970. New York: Harcourt.
RIESMAN, DAVID; WADE, RICHARD C.; and MANDELKER,
DANIEL R. 1962 Symposium on "The City in
History" by Lewis Mumford. Washington University
Law Quarterly 1962:285-330.
SHAW, PETER 1973 Mumford in Retrospect. Commen-
tary 56:71-74.
STARR, ROGER 1976 Mumford's Utopia. Commentary
61:59-62.
 554 MURDOCK, GEORGE P.
MURDOCK, GEORGE P.
George Peter Murdock, American anthropolo-
gist, was born in 1897 on a prosperous farm
near Meriden, Connecticut, the eldest of three
children of George Bronson Murdock and Har-
riet Elizabeth Graves. His parents provided a
background that was politically democratic, in-
dividualistic, and religiously agnostic, and that
valued education and the cultivation of knowl-
edge as the path to personal and social fulfill-
ment. Murdock was educated accordingly. After
attending Phillips Academy, Andover, he en-
tered Yale University, where he earned the A.B.
with honors in American history in 1919. His
studies at Yale were interrupted by military ser-
vice as a member of the National Guard in the
Mexican border incident of 1916 and, again, in
World War i, when he was commissioned a sec-
ond lieutenant of field artillery. Following his
graduation, from Yale, Murdock studied law at
Harvard University, from which he withdrew
in his second year to travel in Asia and Europe.
His travels, especially in Asia, rekindled a boy-
hood fascination with geography and led him
to enroll for graduate study in a combined
anthropology-sociology program under Albert
G. Keller at Yale, where he received the PH.D. in
1925. In the same year he married Carmen
Emily Swanson.
After teaching sociology and anthropology at
the University of Maryland for two years, Mur-
dock returned to Yale in 1928 as an assistant
professor in Keller's department of the science
of society, which later became the department
of sociology. Three years later, he received a
joint appointment in the newly founded depart-
ment of anthropology. He became fully affiliated
with the latter department when he assumed its
chairmanship in 1938. He was made professor
of anthropology in the following year and re-
mained at Yale for another 21 years, with time
out for service as lieutenant commander (1943-
1945) and commander (1945-1946) in the
U.S. Naval Reserve during World War n. In
1960 he went to the University of Pittsburgh as
Andrew Mellon professor of social anthropol-
ogy, and he retired from this position in 1973
at the age of 75.
From Keller and Keller's predecessor, William
Graham Sumner, Murdock derived an abiding
interest in discovering ordered processes in so-
cial organization and in exploring social and
cultural change. Out of his boyhood interest in
geography came a great love for world ethnog-
raphy, a subject in which he achieved un-
equaled mastery. These interests were evident
in his early works: an edited translation from
the German of Julius Lippert's The Evolution of
Culture (1931); Our Primitive Contemporaries
(1934c), a book of ethnographic summaries
widely used for many years in the teaching of
anthropology; and an edited volume of essays
in honor of Keller, entitled Studies in the Sci-
ence of Society (1937c). Not having done field
ethnography under Keller's tutelage, he set out
after joining Yale's anthropology department to
make up for this deficiency. Accordingly, he un-
dertook a field study of the Haida in the summer
of 1932 (1934a; 1936a) and of the Tenino in
the summers of 1934 and 1935 (1938; 1958;
1965Z?). This experience convinced him that
field study is essential in the training of anthro-
pologists, a conviction he continued to hold
throughout his career.
At the same time, he was preparing to pursue
further his search for regularities in social and
cultural phenomena. To do this required com-
parative study on a massive scale, and such
study could not be undertaken until ethno-
graphic data were first assembled and processed
so that information could be retrieved readily
for study purposes. The absence of such an
archive of processed data had been a major ob-
stacle to systematic comparative study in the
past. In 1937, drawing on his experience in pre-
paring Our Primitive Contemporaries, Murdock
conceived and organized the massive cross-
cultural survey (1940a; 1950a; 1950c; 1953) at
Yale's Institute of Human Relations, of which
he was a member. The psychologists, psychia-
trists, sociologists, and anthropologists in the
institute were committed to developing a gen-
eral unified theory of behavior. They saw the
creation of an organized body of data on human
societies and cultures as essential and gave
strong support to the cross-cultural survey. The
first task for the survey was to prepare a com-
prehensive system for indexing cultural ma-
terials, which Murdock and his associates pub-
lished as Outline of Cultural Materials (Mur-
dock et al. 1938).
At the same time it was necessary to review
the status of ethnographic information in order
to develop a satisfactory working sample of cul-
tures to be processed. Out of the accompanying
bibliographic work came Ethnographic Bibliog-
raphy of North America (1941). The latter

was republished in two revised editions and
then, in collaboration with Timothy O'Leary, in
a massively expanded edition (1975), that re-
mains the definitive bibliography.
The problem of providing materials for com-
parative study continued to occupy Murdock's
attention for the remainder of his active career.
With C. S. Ford and J. W. M. Whiting, he ap-
plied the cross-cultural survey's indexing system
to the processing of data for the U.S. Navy on
all islands of the Pacific held by Japan prior to
World War n. He and his colleagues then pre-
pared twenty "Civil Affairs Handbooks" for the
guidance of government administrators in these
islands during and after the war. The indexing
system was also used to organize information
on a number of countries of strategic interest
to the United States. Subsequently, Murdock
was a prime mover with C. S. Ford in creating
the Human Relations Area Files, Inc. (HRAF),
established in 1949 as an interuniversity con-
sortium to reorganize the cross-cultural survey
and put it on a continuing basis (Ford 1970).
Murdock served as its scientific consultant until
1961 and then as a member of its board of di-
rectors until 1972, when he was made an hon-
orary director for life. He was board chairman
in 1964.
To facilitate cross-cultural research further,
Murdock set out to code a large sample of the
world's cultures with respect to many items of
interest to cultural and behavioral theorists. The
results were published in preliminary form as
"World Ethnographic Sample" (19571?). Then
came the much fuller "Ethnographic Atlas"
(1967) and for computer use a data bank on
tape, on which Murdock continued to work
until he retired. Other works arising from
these data-processing activities were Outline of
South American Cultures (1951£>) and Outline
of World Cultures (1954a), as well as papers
on South American culture areas (1951c),
sampling (1966; 1968; Murdock & White 1969),
coding of particular subjects (Murdock & Mor-
row 1970; Murdock & Wilson 1972), the mea-
surement of cultural complexity (Murdock &
Provost 1973b), and the world distribution of
theories of illness (Murdock, Wilson, & Fred-
erick 1978).
Murdock's cross-cultural interests made him
acutely conscious of the need for anthropol-
ogists to publish the results of their ethno-
graphic field researches. To encourage such pub-
lication, he established in 1962 what soon
MURDOCK, GEORGE P. 555
became the highly regarded international journal
Ethnology, which he continued to edit with the
help of his colleagues at the University of Pitts-
burgh until he retired.
His wartime researches and service as a mili-
tary government officer in Okinawa led Mur-
dock to take an active interest in promoting
ethnographic research in the Pacific, especially
in Micronesia. He played a leading role in or-
ganizing and overseeing the Coordinated Investi-
gation of Micronesian Anthropology (CIMA), a
program conducted under the Pacific Science
Board of the National Research Council and
funded by the Office of Naval Research (1948a).
Under this program 33 anthropologists and
linguists went to Micronesia; Murdock himself
led a team of 5 researchers in 1947 to Truk,
where he spent 5 months studying the social
organization (Murdock & Goodenough 1947;
Murdock 1948k; 1948c).
The CIMA program had several important se-
quels. One was that for almost a decade anthro-
pologists were regularly included on the admin-
istrative staff of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific. Another was that ethnographic and lin-
guistic study continued to a point where Micro-
nesia has become one of the best described areas
of the Pacific. A third sequel was a program of
ecological studies of atolls, including their hu-
man and cultural ecology, undertaken by the
Pacific Science Board of the National Research
Council. Murdock was an active member of this
board and of the international Pacific Science
Association until 1966. Called in as special ad-
viser to the Bernice P. Bishop Museum in 1952,
after the death of its director, Peter Buck,
he made a number of important recommenda-
tions regarding administrative reorganization,
exhibitions, developing financial support, and
enlisting public interest (Bryan 1953, pp. 5-6).
He later served as acting director of the mu-
seum in the spring of 1956. Representing Yale,
he joined with Alexander Spoehr, the Bishop
Museum's new director, and Leonard Mason, of
the University of Hawaii, in organizing the Tri-
institutional Pacific Program (TRIPP), which
from 1953-1964 supported ethnographers, lin-
guists, and archeologists in what were judged to
be most critically needed and hitherto neglected
areas of study. A paper on the ecosystems of
high islands (1963) and another on develop-
ments in Oceanic linguistics (1964a) reflect
Murdock's involvement in this program.
Murdock's concern to bring order to the world
 556 MURDOCK, GEORGE P.
ethnographic picture led him in the 1950s to
turn his attention to Africa. There was a mass
of ethnographic literature in French, German,
English, Dutch, and Italian that had never been
synthesized into a satisfactory overview. To deal
with the problem, Murdock set himself a sched-
ule of questions of general anthropological in-
terest. He then went systematically through the
literature on every known society to answer
those questions. The results of this endeavor
were published as Africa: Its Peoples and Their
Culture History (1959a). Although the book
was much criticized by Africanists, it put con-
sideration of African ethnography on a new
footing, and as a general synthesis it has not yet
been superseded. A major contribution of the
book and a companion paper (1960c) was the
evidence he presented for the ancient develop-
ment in west Africa of a distinctive food-produc-
ing tradition that was independent in origin
from the one that originated in the ancient
Near East.
In all the foregoing work, Murdock held so-
cial organization as a major interest, especially
modes of family and kinship organization. He
focused on social organization in his own field
studies and made it a major concern in his
comparative research. Early comparative stud-
ies dealt with descent and descent groups
(1937k, 1940k), the division of labor by sex
(1937a), and bifurcate merging kinship termi-
nology (1947). These were followed by what was
immediately recognized as a major work, Social
Structure (1949c). Using a sample of 250 cul-
tures, drawn in part from the cross-cultural
survey, Murdock formulated and tested what
remains the most carefully worked out theory
of the determinants of kinship classification
and descent reckoning. Building on the work of
his predecessors, he produced a new typology of
forms of social organization and proposed a
theory of how these forms change one into an-
other. This theory, according to Naroll, "ex-
plains much—though by no means all—of the
variation in residence, descent, and kinship
terminology among human societies. Its estab-
lishment is a major accomplishment of cross-
cultural surveys" (1970, p. 1240). In the same
book Murdock presented a new theory of the
determinants of incest taboos.
Social Structure laid to rest a number of is-
sues that had preoccupied students of family
and kinship in the preceeding decades. At the
same time, the refinement of concepts and the
greater degree of order Murdock brought to the
subject raised new problems. It stimulated yet
further refinement of concepts and led to recog-
nition of new forms of organization involving
cognatic descent groups, in regard to which
Murdock made a significant contribution of his
own, including the volume Social Structure in
Southeast Asia (1960k), which he edited and
to which he contributed an important intro-
ductory paper (1960a).
His many other contributions to the study of
social organization included analyses of the lit-
erature on the Inca (1934k), the Witoto (1936k),
the Murngin (Murdock & Lawrence 1949), the
peoples of Nigeria (1962), and the Natchez
(Murdock, White, & Scaglion 1971). They also
included cross-cultural and topical papers on
the social regulation of sexual behavior (1949k),
family stability (1950k), parental attitudes
(Murdock & Whiting 1951), social organization
in North America (1955k), parental kin terms
(1959k), the distribution of kin term patterns
(1970), cross-sex kin behavior (1971), and the
division of labor by sex (1937fl; Murdock &
Provost 1973a). More general or theoretical
papers dealt with changing emphases in the
study of social organization (1955a), political
moieties (1956k), the evolution of social orga-
nization (1959c), typology in social organiza-
tion (1960d), and the kindred (1964k).
In all of his work, Murdock maintained a
broad behavioral orientation. It is evident in the
explanatory propositions he put forth in his
cross-cultural studies. It is also a consistent
theme in his theoretically oriented papers, deal-
ing with culture as an object of scientific study
(1932), the role of anthropology in the study
of human relations (1941), the constants in
otherwise diverse cultures (1945), how learn-
ing, society, culture, and personality must all be
studied in the context of a unified science of
behavior (1949tf), the limitations of British so-
cial anthropology (1951a), intergroup antago-
nisms (1952), the interrelation of sociology and
anthropology (1954k), culture change (1956a),
anthropology as a comparative science (1957a),
myths that have misguided anthropological
theory (1972), and the scientifically appropriate
approach to comparative research (1977).
Murdock's breadth of interest is also indi-
cated in the range of his organizational activity.
In addition to the activities already mentioned,
he was president of the Society for Applied An-
thropology, a society he helped found, in 1947,
of the American Ethnological Society in 1952/
1953, and of the American Anthropological As-

sociation in 1955. He played a leading role in
establishing the Society for Cross-Cultural Re-
search in 1972. He also was influential in bring-
ing linguists and social scientists into the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, to which he was
elected in 1964, and he was chairman of the
division of behavioral sciences of the National
Research Council in 1964-1966. Recognition of
his many accomplishments came with the Viking
fund medal in 1949, the Herbert E. Gregory
medal in 1966, the Thomas H. Huxley medal in
1971, and election to the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy
of Sciences.
Murdock did not found a personal school of
anthropology in the name of a particular theory
or approach. His achievements and influence
were of a different kind. He saw himself as
sharing with his colleagues and students in a
vast cooperative undertaking to develop a uni-
fied science of society, culture, and human be-
havior. In this endeavor, his role was to apply
himself to what seemed to him to be the most
urgent immediate tasks for anthropologists.
He often said that he learned as much from
his students as he taught them. He encouraged
them to follow their own individual interests,
the fruits of which were evident in the volume
of their papers dedicated to him as Explorations
in Cultural Anthropology (Goodenough 1964).
He reached out among his contemporaries for
new perspectives and approaches: in linguistics
to Edward Sapir, in psychology to John Dollard,
Clark L. Hull, Neal E. Miller, and Earl Zinn,
and in anthropology to Fred Eggan, John Gillin,
A. Irving Hallowell, Clyde Kluckhohn, and
Ralph Linton for meaningful syntheses of cul-
tural, historical, psychological, and sociological
approaches. He kept pace with his students and
younger colleagues as well, modifying his
thinking in the light of their work, and follow-
ing and contributing to new developments in
the study of social organization and to new and
more rigorous methods of cross-cultural re-
search, as is evident in a collection of his essays,
Culture and Society (1965a).
His own continuing intellectual odyssey was
dramatically demonstrated in 1971, when, on
giving the Huxley memorial lecture in En-
gland, he announced a major rethinking of his
views about the relationship of the individual,
society, and culture (1972). Like many Amer-
ican anthropologists, he had considered the be-
havior of individuals in society to be explained
in significant part by the society's culture. On
MURDOCK, GEORGE P. 557
this occasion, however, he rejected culture as
an explanatory concept and aligned himself
with those social and behavioral scientists who
see both culture and social structure as ex-
plained by processes taking place within indi-
viduals as they pursue their interests in inter-
action with one another.
This renunciation of a particular, long-held
theoretical position illustrates his conception of
the obligations of science. It does not diminish
his singular and enduring contribution, which
came from his recognition of the need to orga-
nize the vast body of ethnographic data for
efficient scientific use. He undertook the enor-
mous task of organizing it, and he demonstrated
in his own work the possibilities it afforded for
social and behavioral science.
WARD H. GOODENOUGH
WORKS BY MURDOCK
1931 LIPPERT, JULIUS The Evolution of Culture.
Translated and edited by George P. Murdock. New
York: Macmillan.
1932 The Science of Culture. American Anthropolo-
gist 34:200-215.
1934a Kinship and Social Behavior Among the Haida.
American Anthropologist 36:355—385.
1934b The Organization of Inca Society. Scientific
Monthly 38:231-239.
1934c Our Primitive Contemporaries. New York: Mac-
millan.
(1936a) 1970 Rank and Potlatch Among the Haida.
Yale University Publications in Anthropology, No.
13. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files.
1936£> The Witoto Kinship System. American Anthro-
pologist 38:525-527.
1937a Comparative Data on the Division of Labor by
Sex. Social Forces 15:551-553.
1937b Correlations of Matrilineal and Patrilineal In-
stitutions. Pages 445-470 in George P. Murdock
(editor), Studies in the Science of Society. New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1937c MURDOCH, GEORGE P. (editor), Studies in the Sci-
ence of Society. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
—» Festschrift prepared for Albert Galloway Keller.
1938 Notes on the Tenino, Molala, and Paiute of
Oregon. American Anthropologist 40:395-402.
(1938) 1967 MURDOCK, GEORGE P. et al. Outline of
Cultural Materials. 4th ed., rev. New Haven:
Human Relations Area Files.
1940a The Cross-cultural Survey. American Sociolog-
ical Review 5:361-370.
1940& Double Descent. American Anthropologist
42:555-561.
1941 Anthropology and Human Relations. Sociometry
4:140-149.
(1941) 1975 MURDOCK, GEORGE P.; and O'LEARY,
TIMOTHY Ethnographic Bibliography of North
America. 4th ed. 5 vols. New Haven: Human Re-
lations Area Files.
1945 The Common Denominator of Cultures. Pages
123-142 in Ralph Linton (editor), The Science of
Man in the World Crisis. New York: Columbia
Univ. Press.
1947 Bifurcate Merging: A Test of Five Theories.
American Anthropologist 49:56-68.
558 MURDOCK, GEORGE P.
1947 MURDOCH, GEORGE P.; and GOODENOUGH,
WARD H. Social Organization of Truk. Southwestern
Journal of Anthropology 3:331-343.
1948a Anthropology in Micronesia. New York Acad-
emy of Sciences, Transactions Series 2, 2:9—16.
1948i> Baseball: It's Waged in Truk. Newsweek 32,
no. 9:69-70.
1948c New Light on the Peoples of Micronesia. Sci-
ence 108:423-425.
1949a The Science of Human Learning, Society, Cul-
ture, and Personality. Scientific Monthly 59:377-
381.
1949i> The Social Regulation of Sexual Behavior.
Pages 256-266 in American Psychological Associa-
tion, Psychosocial Development in Health and Dis-
ease. Edited by Paul H. Hoch and Joseph Zubin.
New York: Grune & Stratton.
(1949c) 1965 Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
1949 MURDOCH, GEORGE P.; and LAWRENCE, WIL-
LIAM E. Murngin Social Organization. American
Anthropologist 51:58-65.
1950a The Conceptual Basis of Area Research. World
Politics 2:571-578.
1950b Family Stability in Non-European Cultures.
American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Annals 272:195-201.
1950c Feasibility and Implementation of Comparative
Community Research, With Special Reference to
the Human Relations Area Files. American Socio-
logical Review 15:713-720.
195la British Social Anthropology. American Anthro-
pologist 53:465-473.
1951fo Outline of South American Cultures. Behavior
Science Outlines, Vol. 2. New Haven: Human Rela-
tions Area Files.
1951c South American Culture Areas. Southwestern
Journal of Anthropology 7:415-436.
1951 MURDOCH, GEORGE P.; and WHITING, J. W. M.
Cultural Determination of Parental Attitudes: The
Relationship Between the Social Structure, Particu-
larly Family Structure, and Parental Behavior.
Pages 13-34 in Milton J. Senn (editor), Problems
of Infancy and Childhood. New York: Josiah
Macy, Jr., Foundation.
1952 Intergroup Antagonisms. Pages 95-102 in James
E. Hulett, Jr., and Ross Stagner (editors), Problems
in Social Psychology: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry.
Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.
1953 The Processing of Anthropological Materials.
Pages 476-487 in A. L. Kroeber (editor), Anthro-
pology Today: An Encyclopedic Inventory. Univ. of
Chicago Press.
(1954a) 1975 Outline of World Cultures. 5th ed. New
Haven: Human Relations Area Files.
1954b Sociology and Anthropology. Pages 14-31 in
John Philip Gillin (editor), For a Science of Social
Man: Convergences in Anthropology, Psychology,
and Sociology. New York: Macmillan.
1955a Changing Emphases in Social Structure. South-
western Journal of Anthropology 11:361-370.
1955& North American Social Organization. Davidson
Journal of Anthropology 1:85-97.
(1956a) 1971 How Culture Changes. Pages 319-332
in Harry L. Shapiro (editor), Man, Culture, and
Society. Rev. ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
1956b Political Moieties. Pages 133-147 in Leonard
D. White (editor), The State of the Social Sciences.
Univ. of Chicago Press.
1957a Anthropology as a Comparative Science. Be-
havioral Science 2:249-254.
1957& World Ethnographic Sample. American Anthro-
pologist 59:664-687.
1958 Social Organization of the Tenino. Miscellanea
Paul Rivet Octogenario Dictata (Mexico City)
1:299-315.
1959a Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture History.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
1959Z? Cross-language Parallels in Parental Kin Terms.
Anthropological Linguistics 1.9:1-5.
1959c Evolution in Social Organization. Pages 126-
143 in Anthropological Society of Washington,
Evolution and Anthropology: A Centennial Ap-
praisal. Edited by Betty J. Meggers. Washington:
The Society.
1960a Cognatic Forms of Social Organization. Pages
1-14 in George P. Murdock (editor), Social Struc-
ture in Southeast Asia. Viking Fund Publications
in Anthropology, No. 29. New York: Wenner-Gren
Foundation for Anthropological Research.
1960b MURDOCH, GEORGE P. (editor) Social Structure
in Southeast Asia. Viking Fund Publications in An-
thropology, No. 29. New York: Wenner-Gren Foun-
dation for Anthropological Research.
1960c Staple Subsistence Crops of Africa. Geographi-
cal Review 50:523-540.
1960d Typology in the Area of Social Organization.
Pages 183-188 in International Congress of An-
thropological and Ethnological Sciences, Men and
Cultures: Selected Papers. Edited by Anthony F. C.
Wallace. A conference held in Philadelphia, 1956.
Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press.
1962 The Traditional Socio-political Systems of Ni-
geria: An Introductory Survey. Pages 1—16 in Rob-
ert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole (editors), The
Nigerian Political Scene. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ.
Press.
1963 Human Influences on the Ecosystems of High
Islands of the Tropical Pacific. Pages 145-154 in
Francis R. Fosberg (editor), Maw's Place in the
Island Ecosystem. Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press.
1964a Genetic Classification of the Austronesian Lan-
guages: A Key to Oceanic Culture History. Ethnol-
ogy 3:117-126.
1964i> The Kindred. American Anthropologist 66:129-
132.
1965a Culture and Society. Univ. of Pittsburgh Press.
—> Includes an autobiographical paper.
1965b Tenino Shamanism. Ethnology 4:165-171.
1966 Cross-cultural Sampling. Ethnology 5:97-114.
1967 Ethnographic Atlas: A Summary. Ethnology
6:109-236.
1968 World Sampling Provinces. Ethnology 7:305-
326.
1969 MURDOCH, GEORGE P.; and WHITE, DOUGLAS R.
Standard Cross-cultural Sample. Ethnology 8:329-
369.
1970 Kin Term Patterns and Their Distribution. Eth-
nology 9:165-207.
1970 MURDOCH, GEORGE P.; and MORROW, DIANE O.
Subsistence Economy and Supportive Practices:
Cross-cultural Codes 1. Ethnology 9:302-330.
1971 Cross-sex Patterns of Kin Behavior. Ethnology
10:359-368.
1971 MURDOCH, GEORGE P.; WHITE, DOUGLAS R.; and
SCAGLION, RICHARD Natchez Class and Rank Recon-
sidered. Ethnology 10:369-388.
1972 Anthropology's Mythology. Royal Anthropologi-
cal Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Proceed-
ings 1971: 17—24. —•» Huxley memorial lecture.
1972 MURDOCH, GEORGE P.; and WILSON, SUZANNE F.
Settlement Patterns and Community Organization:
Cross-cultural Codes 3. Ethnology 11:254-295.
1973a MURDOCH, GEORGE P.; and PROVOST, CATERINA
Factors in the Division of Labor by Sex: A Cross-
cultural Analysis. Ethnology 12:203-225.
1973b MURDOCH, GEORGE P.; and PROVOST, CATERINA

Measurement of Cultural Complexity. Ethnology
12:379-392.
1977 Major Emphases in My Comparative Research.
Behavior Science Research 12:217—221.
1978 MURDOCK, GEORGE P.; WILSON, S. F.; and FRED-
ERICK, V. World Distribution of Theories of Illness.
Ethnology 17:449-470.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BRYAN, EDWIN H., JR. 1953 Report of the Director
for 1952. Bishop Museum Bulletin (Honolulu), bia University in 1923. He was a Hodgson fel-
No. 210.
FORD, C. S. 1970 Human Relations Area Files,
1949-1969: A Twenty Year Report. Behavior Sci-
ence Notes 5:1-61.
GOODENOUGH, WARD H. (editor) 1964 Explorations
in Cultural Anthropology: Essays in Honor of
George Peter Murdoch. New York: McGraw-Hill.
—» A bibliography of Murdock's writings is on pages research department at the Menninger Founda-
599-603.
NAROLL, RAOUL 1970 What Have We Learned From
Cross-cultural Surveys? American Anthropologist
72:1227-1288. -» Contains a review of the many
cross-cultural surveys stimulated by Murdock's
work.
MURPHY, GARDNER
A few scientists achieve fame as theoreti-
cians, such as Isaac Newton; others achieve
fame as inventors, such as Thomas Edison; but
a rare scientist achieves eminence essentially
as a teacher. Gardner Murphy was such a sci-
entist. He taught several generations of psy-
chologists through his brilliant formal lectures
and invited addresses; he taught many whom
he never met through his books which spanned
virtually the whole domain of psychology; and
he taught how to do careful, systematic research
by doing such research in parapsychology, social
psychology, personality dynamics, and cogni-
tive-perceptual functioning.
Here was a man whom colleagues, students,
and friends instinctively trusted as he led them
on expeditions in the search of knowledge. It
did not matter if the knowledge was from Odys-
seus in the original Greek, Shakespeare, Sig-
mund Freud, Jean Piaget, William S. Gilbert and
Arthur Sullivan, Mohandas K. Gandhi, the comic
strips, or research publications. His teaching at
various times embraced all of these and more.
His students felt his encouragement to explore
everywhere and they often found themselves
going further than they ever dreamed they
would go.
The official facts about the career of Murphy
are really only markers or points of achievement
or change but do not tell us the most interesting
and important "in-betweens." However, they do
MURPHY, GARDNER 559
provide landmarks which help locate the roots
or foundations of Murphy's ideas and ways of
relating to others which influenced the develop-
ment of other psychologists.
Gardner Murphy (1895-1979) was born in
Chillicothe, Ohio. He received his A.B. from
Yale University in 1916, his A.M. from Harvard
University in 1917, and his PH.D. from Colum-
low at Harvard from 1922 to 1923, and taught
at Columbia University from 1921 to 1940. From
1940 to 1952 he was professor and chairman
of the psychology department at the City Col-
lege of New York. He became director of the
tion in Topeka, Kansas in 1952, where he re-
mained until 1967, when he was named visiting
professor emeritus at George Washington Uni-
versity in Washington.
Throughout his life, Murphy was an eclectic,
a liberal borrower from a variety of sources.
Even his birth involved a union of diversity. His
father was an Episcopalian minister from Texas
and a liberal who founded the National Child
Labor Committee. His mother was a New En-
gland Yankee and a schoolteacher. He was
raised partly in the South but mostly in Con-
cord, Massachusetts, with the maternal side of
the family. Murphy was fond of telling stories
about his problems of identity. He told about
the Boston and Maine Railway that separated
the blue collar, Irish, stay-at-home Catholics
from the while collar, Anglo-Saxon, commuting
Protestants. With a name like "Murphy" he
ought to have been on one side of the track, but
being Episcopalian he was on the other side. As
a consequence, he often claimed that he suf-
fered from an identity problem. But in reality
he suffered from a diversity problem. He
had a maternal grandfather who often quoted
Shakespeare, poetry, or the Bible; he had a
grandmother who was warm, gentle, and stoic.
The rich profusion of ideas and feelings that
surrounded him required a complex integration.
It is small wonder that in all the things he did
Murphy was an integrator. He could seize upon
and integrate everything he encountered, no
matter how diverse, to form new connections
and unions between would-be islands of knowl-
edge.
The major areas in which Murphy has made
contributions in either writing, research, or
teaching were the history of psychology, social
psychology, personality theory, parapsychology,
and education. Although his fields of endeavor
560 MURPHY, GARDNER
were diverse, he always referred to himself as
primarily a social psychologist. He always began
with the premise that to understand man one
must always perceive man as a social creature,
in a social world, with a social history.
Parapsychology. The earliest field of psychol-
ogy to attract Murphy was parapsychology. His
father had planned before his early death to
write a book on problems in this area as they
related to Christianity, and his maternal grand-
father, George A. King, had been the attorney
for the psychic medium, Mrs. Piper, whom Wil-
liam James had studied. These family interests
stirred the mind of the young Murphy and di-
rected him to a path he would always follow.
However, outside of his own readings, he was
left unguided until his graduate work at Har-
vard, where L. T. Troland asked him to be his
assistant in research on parapsychology fi-
nanced by the Richard Hodgson fund. This
gave him a chance to immerse himself thor-
oughly in readings on telepathy. It was natural,
then, for him to join the Society for Psychical
Research in London while in France with the
American Expeditionary Forces during World
War i. It was there that he met the great French
parapsychologist Rene Warcollier with whom
he maintained a warm and lasting friendship,
following his work and visiting him again in
1929. Returning from the war, Murphy went
to Columbia University where he remained until
1940. While working on his doctorate at Colum-
bia, Murphy traveled back and forth to Harvard,
where William McDougall had arranged for him
to have a Richard Hodgson fellowship so that
he could continue his research on parapsychol-
ogy, particularly in the area of long-distance
telepathy. His collaborators in this research
were Harry Helson and George Estabrooks. This
double life, this back and forth travel between
the scientifically credible and the outer limits or
frontiers of science, continued all his life.
Although his own personal research over the
years with such people as J. G. Pratt, Ernest
Taves, J. L. Woodruff, and especially Gertrude
Schmeidler did not yield the consistently signifi-
cant outcome that he expected, Murphy came
more and more firmly to believe that our usual
conceptions of space, time, and personal ident-
ity have been challenged by parapsychological
research, that there are transspatial, transtem-
poral, and transpersonal relationships that go
beyond the usually accepted concepts of space,
time, and self. As president of the American
Society for Psychical Research, he initiated and
supported a wide range of rigorous research,
always demanding that both the spontaneous
cases of paranormal experience and the con-
trolled outcome of experiments be examined.
He also added to the historical background of
the field by editing with Robert O. Ballou (1960)
the writings of William James on this contro-
versial area.
Other major areas of long-term interest. Mur-
phy's contributions to psychology followed a
crooked path, but all were bound together by
certain general assumptions that he sum-
marized in his autobiography (1967, p. 261).
These are:
1. "Things are best understood through the
study of their origins and evolution."
2. "Psychology is only separable from the
biological sciences on the one hand, and the so-
cial sciences on the other, through some sort of
arbitrary compartmentalization which is likely
to do much more harm than good."
3. "If psychology is seriously the study of
the whole organism, the whole individual, it is
necessarily a study of experience, attitude, im-
mediacy, as well as a study of what is observed
from outside."
4. "Behavioral studies are good, and be-
havioristic beliefs are bad for science."
5. "Inclusiveness, and an accent on the
positive, necessitates encouraging many primi-
tive, groping efforts which might sometimes
become science, though it will be a long way to
get there."
A sixth general assumption that was implicit
in Murphy's approach to research and teaching is:
6. "Always treat others with dignity and re-
spect as human beings. You may not agree with
another person but listen to what he or she has
to say and do not deprecate another's ideas or
dreams."
These assumptions are more of a credo for
the understanding of psychology than just a set
of implicit assumptions. In a remarkable sense
they provide an overview of Murphy's contri-
butions. For example, to understand the ways
things are we must study their origins and
evolution. This idea probably dates back at least
to the anthropology course taught by Albert G.
Keller, whom Murphy admired, at Yale Uni-
versity. It was fitting that the first book by Mur-
phy was his Historical Introduction to Modern
Psychology (1929), prepared first as a set of
lecture notes for a class in the history of psy-

chology that he began to teach at Columbia in
1923. His eyes failed him badly about this time,
and a handful of faithful students and his wife
read the manuscript and the revisions to him.
In spite of these physical difficulties, Murphy
traced the history of psychology from the early
Greek and Indian philosophers to the most im-
mediate date possible. Later, he included Ed-
ward B. Titchener, George T. Ladd, Robert S.
Woodworth, William James, and John B. Wat-
son. In 1972 he added the remarkable advances
of Russian psychology as well as up-to-the-
minute developments in such broad areas as the
psychology of learning; sensory, perceptual, and
cognitive functions; comparative, ethological,
and physiological psychology; life-span psy-
chology; personality; and social psychology; he
even took a tentative look at where the whole
area was going in the future. The magnificent
sweep of history as the science of psychology
unfolds as well as the continuity from early
Greek and Indian thought to the most modern
developments really sustained Murphy's first
credo. One cannot find a finer and more sensi-
tive perspective of where we have been, where
we are, and where we are going. In his histori-
cal writings he provided exceptional insights
with the sequential development of psychologi-
cal ideas, and all too often he showed how little
we have learned from our history.
Of course, origins and evolution also apply to
the evolution of the species of man, including
the subtle and pervasive factors of social struc-
ture and the development of each individual
child. This includes a keen awareness of how
our cognitive and affective functions resemble
those of less complex animal species. Murphy,
however, did not hesitate to assert that the
human species has capacities and potentialities
which are distinctive, species specific, and not
to be reduced to the simpler phenomena of apes,
rats, and pigeons. This refusal to see things on
a reduced time-space scale was natural to Mur-
phy, but it was heavily reinforced and extended
by his wife. He met Lois in 1924 through a
student of his, Ruth Munroe, and they were
married in 1926. She was interested in person-
ality development in children, psychoanalytic
theory, education, and comparative religion. To-
gether they discovered and explored the writ-
ings of Gandhi, Freud, and others. She sus-
tained those interests Murphy had to begin
with, but went on to shape his views on per-
sonality functioning by adding a clinical and
MURPHY, GARDNER 561
developmental dimension to the multifaceted
view he had already evolved.
Lois Murphy was, of course, a coauthor of
Gardner Murphy's second book—Experimental
Social Psychology (1931)—which was based
largely upon his lecture notes for his class in so-
cial psychology at Columbia. It was the first
modern, experimentally oriented textbook in this
vital area. True to his second rule, that the social
and the biological can be separated only arbitrar-
ily and often with great harm, this book managed
to incorporate behavioral studies without being
behavioristic. It took the lead already pushed
by Floyd Allport much earlier. Indeed, Murphy
knew Allport from their student days at Har-
vard, as also in France, and indeed he had sub-
stituted as a teacher for Allport's course in
social psychology at Syracuse University during
the summer of 1927. However, Murphy de-
emphasized the behavioral point of view and
built up the importance of the individual, his
cultural matrix, and his role as a social initiator
and responder, ideas later developed more fully
by Muzafer Sherif. The institutional notions of
Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd's Middletown (1929)
were incorporated into a fuller view of social psy-
chology, along with personality and cultural dif-
ferences, often with encouragement from his
wife. This book won the Butler medal at Colum-
bia in 1932.
Through his students and his associates Mur-
phy contributed greatly to social psychology. His
student, Rensis Likert, developed the Likert
method of scaling attitudes, and the resulting
research appeared in 1938 as Public Opinion
and the Individual. Murphy was active in the
group (David Krech, Ross Stagner et al.) that
developed the Society for the Psychological
Study of Social Issues (SPSSI), now division 7
of the American Psychological Association.
Murphy was chosen to edit a volume on peace
initiatives and problems published as Human
Nature and Enduring Peace in 1945.
Murphy went to India in 1949 for the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization to examine the conflict between
the Hindus and the Moslems. As usual, this led
to a deeper study of Indian religions, as well as
the establishment of educational conferences
and research groups throughout India. All of
this was consolidated in 1953 in the book In the
Minds of Men. They were the ones who en-
couraged Erik H. Erikson to go to India, from
which emerged Erikson's study of Gandhi. At
562 MURPHY, GARDNER
the time of his death Murphy was still con-
sulting with people interested in problems of
international peace, still hoping to make a small
dent in the problem of how to achieve a lasting
peace.
Murphy's broad vision was best illustrated by
his theory of personality, which began with lec-
tures at Columbia University on abnormal psy-
chology, later published as An Outline of Ab-
normal Psychology (1929). Later this developed
into Approaches to Personality (Murphy & Jen-
sen 1932). Encouraged by his wife, he explored
Freud, Jung, Eugen Bleuler, Charlotte Biihler,
and William James, among others, during the
1930s. Developmental notions increasingly im-
pressed him, and he began fusing and extending
psychoanalytic notions. This whole line of de-
velopment eventuated in his Personality (1947),
and later he included field theory notions and
larger possibilities in Human Potentialities
(1957fl) and Outgrowing Self-deception (Murphy
& Leeds 1975).
Murphy had early rejected what he consid-
ered to be naive behavioristic conceptions in
favor of a phenomenological approach to per-
sonality and social phenomena. As such he was
one of the founders of the American school of
perceptual-cognitive psychology. In particular
he believed that perception was always need-
relevant and usually need-directed. This formed
the basis for a concept of autistic perception,
in which contacts with reality were often
blunted and confused, and it intertwined cog-
nitive development in children through the
canalization of motives via biofeedback systems.
Indeed, the importance of feedback, both mus-
cular and visceral, for the direction and sta-
bilization of perception was being stressed by
Murphy during the early 1950s, almost a decade
before these notions really became fashionable.
The early work on autistic perception was car-
ried out by senior honors students at City Col-
lege. Students such as Robert LeVine, Harold
Proshansky, Roy Schafer, Jerome Levine, and
Leo Postman did much of the data gathering,
and (as usual), Gardner gave them most of the
credit. Julian Hochberg (Murphy & Hochberg
1951) helped delimit the early theory of autistic
perception and postdoctoral students, such as
Douglas N. Jackson and Samuel Messick, at the
Menninger Foundation, helped to refine the re-
search and theory which was consolidated in
Development of the Perceptual World (Solley &
Murphy 1960), a major attempt to deal system-
atically with perceptual learning and develop-
ment.
The lecture skills of Gardner Murphy were
legendary. He credited much of that skill to his
sophomore English teacher and debate coach at
Yale, John Chester Adams. Year after year the
graduating seniors at City College of New York
voted Murphy the most outstanding teacher in
their experience. Most of his contributions to
writing and research began as a part of his
teaching, sometimes as formal lectures but most
frequently with bits and pieces of casual con-
versation that inspired and directed the listener.
This capacity to excite, to direct, and to make
the listener feel important has been amply de-
scribed by Eugene Hartley in the Festschrift
volume prepared for Murphy in 1960 (Peatman
& Hartley 1960). Indeed, in a survey of psychol-
ogists by Kenneth E. Clark (1957), Murphy was
ranked second only to Sigmund Freud in terms
of the number of persons whom they inspired
to go into psychology. The number of his stu-
dents who went on to receive a PH.D. and
who achieved eminence in psychology is re-
markable. His classes were means of exploring,
questioning, expanding, trimming, and solidify-
ing through his students. However, Murphy
would say that he was always the one who
learned through such encounters. He continu-
ally insisted that his students, his colleagues,
and his friends were his teachers.
He was honored by being elected president of
the American Psychological Association from
1943 to 1944. He was also given the gold medal
by that association in 1973 for outstanding
contributions to the development of theory and
research in psychology.
CHARLES M. SOLLEY
WORKS BY MURPHY
(1929) 1969 MURPHY, GARDNER; and BACHRACH,
ARTHUR J. (editors) An Outline of Abnormal Psy-
chology. Rev. ed. New York: Modern Library.
—> Murphy was the sole editor of the first edition.
(1929) 1972 MURPHY, GARDNER; and KOVACH, JO-
SEPH K. Historical Introduction to Modern Psychol-
ogy. 3d ed. New York: Harcourt. —» Murphy was
the sole author of the first two editions.
(1931) 1937 MURPHY, GARDNER; MURPHY, Lois B; and
NEWCOMB, THEODORE M. Experimental Social Psy-
chology. Rev. ed. New York: Harper. —> Gardner
Murphy and Lois B. Murphy were the authors of the
first edition.
1932 MURPHY, GARDNER; and JENSEN, F. Approaches
to Personality. New York: Coward-McCann.
1935 A Briefer General Psychology. New York: Harper.
(1938) 1967 MURPHY, GARDNER; and LIKERT, RENSIS

Public Opinion and the Individual. New York:
Russell.
1945 MURPHY, GARDNER (editor) Human Nature and
Enduring Peace. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
1947 Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and
Structure. New York: Harper .
1951 An Introduction to Psychology. New York:
Harper.
1951 MURPHY, GARDNER; and HOCHBERG, J. E. Per-
ceptual Development: Some Tentative Hypotheses.
Psychological Review 58:332-347.
1953 In the Minds of Men: A UNESCO Study of Social
Tensions in India. New York: Basic Books.
1957a Human Potentialities. New York: Basic Books.
—*• A paperback edition was published in 1975 by
Penguin.
1957k Notes for a Parapsychological Autobiography.
Journal of Parapsychology 21:165-178.
1960 MURPHY, GARDNER; and BALLOU, ROBERT O.
(editors) William James on Psychical Research. New
York: Viking.
1960 SOLLEY, CHARLES M.; and MURPHY, GARDNER
Development of the Perceptual World. New York:
Basic Books.
(1961) 1977 Freeing Intelligence Through Teaching:
A Dialectic of the Rational and the Personal. West-
port, Conn.: Greenwood.
1961 MURPHY, GARDNER; and DALE, LAURA A. Chal-
lenge of Psychical Research: A Primer of Parapsy-
chology. New York: Harper.
1967 Autobiography. Volume 5, pages 253-282 in A
History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited by
E. G. Boring and Gardner Lindzey. New York: Ap-
ple ton.
1968 Psychological Thought From Pythagoras to
Freud: An Informal Introduction. New York: Har-
court.
1968 MURPHY, GARDNER; and SPOHN, HERBERT En-
counter With Reality. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
1975 MURPHY, GARDNER; and LEEDS, MORTON Out-
growing Self-deception. New York: Basic Books.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CLARK, KENNETH E. 1957 American Psychologists:
A Survey of a Growing Profession. Washington:
American Psychological Association.
LYND, ROBERT; and LYND, HELEN M. (1929) 1930
Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American
Culture. New York: Harcourt. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1959.
PEATMAN, J. G.; and HARTLEY, E. L. (editors) 1960
Festschrift for Gardner Murphy. New York: Harper.
MURPHY, LOIS B.
Lois Barclay Murphy was born in 1902 to
well-educated parents who provided an intellec-
tually and culturally stimulating home environ-
ment for their five children and who expected
high levels of achievement from them. Early
visits with her minister—father to slum areas in
Chicago created in her an awareness that not
all children were as fortunate as she and her
siblings, and helped generate in her a lifelong
concern for the welfare of underprivileged chil-
dren. Similarly, the early assumption of respon-
MURPHY, LOIS B. 563
sibility for the younger children in the family
due to progressive illness in her mother helped
Murphy acquire skills in child care that would
prove invaluable in her later scientific and pro-
fessional work.
The stimulation she found at home, supple-
mented by contact with a number of stimulating
secondary teachers, caused her at first to find
college life at Vassar disappointing. She found
stultifying some of her early contact with women
professors who seemed to model the attitude
that cognitive achievement necessitated aban-
donment of all warmth and intuition and sensi-
tivity to people. The ideas of John B. Watson
dominated the thinking of the psychology fac-
ulty, and Murphy, with a background that in-
volved dinner-table discussions of William James
and John Dewey, found this approach sterile and
uninspiring. Her interests were still broad at this
time, as they have remained throughout her life,
and she majored in economics and only minored
in psychology at Vassar. A course in compara-
tive religion at Vassar provided the most power-
ful stimulus for thought and involvement and
motivated her to do graduate work in this area
at Union Theological Seminary, where she spe-
cialized in the religions of India. This study un-
doubtedly provided the kind of philosophical
background that later enabled her to coauthor
with Gardner Murphy a book on the psychology
of the East.
In reviewing Murphy's undergraduate career,
the impression is of a student who provided max-
imum challenge to professors; in the balance, it
might be difficult to determine whether she
gained as much from the experience as she con-
tributed to it. It was a time for the maturation
and ripening of her own intellectual powers and
one of strengthening the convictions about life
and human development which had developed
during her earlier formative years and which
were to influence countless students and col-
leagues in later years.
Upon her graduation from Vassar in 1923,
Murphy was "avid about getting experience" and
briefly did some volunteer work in the child
guidance service of the Board of Education of
Cincinnati which quickly turned into a full-time
job. However, in the fall of 1924 she returned to
New York and enrolled as a student of compara-
tive religion at Union Theological Seminary, at
the same time taking courses in psychology at
Columbia Teachers College and planning to get
an M.A. along with her degree from Union Sem-
564 MURPHY, LOIS B.
inary. However, as her prior level of sophistica-
tion again made some of the courses seem
naive, she abandoned the psychology project.
One of her associates whose own courses were
far from naive, was the brilliant and compas-
sionate Gardner Murphy, who was to become her
husband in 1926. In a masterpiece of under-
statement, she described their 54-year union by
saying: "It was an extraordinarily congenial
marriage." From the time of the birth of their
son in 1930 until the Murphys joined the staff
of the Menninger Foundation in 1952, Lois
Murphy showed how important her family was
to her by working only part time. This fact
makes her productivity over the years even more
impressive.
The real launching of Lois Murphy's career
began in 1928 when she became affiliated with
the fledgling Sarah Lawrence College. She began
her work there by teaching comparative religion
but gradually spent more and more time train-
ing the undergraduate students in how to study
young children and how to understand their
development. In 1937 she helped launch the
Nursery School at Sarah Lawrence and con-
tinued her involvement with it until 1952. At
that time Lois and Gardner Murphy moved to
the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas, where
they worked until 1970. Since that time Lois has
continued analyzing data collected at Menninger's
and has served as consultant to a host of national
and international projects concerned with young
children.
Throughout her career, Lois Murphy's inter-
ests have not wandered far afield from the early
study of sympathy which she began at Sarah
Lawrence during the early 1930s. That is, she
has remained close to the socio-affective domain
and has been concerned with positive rather
than with negative behavior—how children de-
velop and utilize their own strengths in adapting
to challenge and conflict, how they interact with
significant others in their intimate and distal
interpersonal environments, how they reveal
their adaptive vulnerability and their resilience,
how they react to different patterns of early child
care, how they can be helped to regain com-
petency when something goes wrong, and so on.
To describe this process, Lois introduced a down-
to-earth, nonjargonistic word to the vocabulary
of psychology: "coping." The term "coping" was
not used as an index term in Psychological
Abstracts at the time Murphy began using it. But
it was an excellent choice, for she was interested
in the process, not in some outcome such as
adaptation or maladjustment. Use of the term
coping increases "awareness of the individuality,
spontaneity, even creativity characterizing the
new patternings of response we see, as well as
the gallant persistence and repetitive efforts
which are often necessary in the struggle toward
mastery" (Murphy et al. 1962, p. 7).
At least three scientific strictures are man-
dated by Murphy's approach: (1) longitudinal
study, (2) observational methodology, and (3)
concern with individuality. How can one observe
effective coping if only a narrow slice of a child's
life is taken? If only a short-term response to
any sort of crisis is assessed, how can correct
judgments of resilience and invulnerability be
made. According to Mupphy, we take the as-
sumption of continuity of effect too much for
granted and do not allow for the mobilization of
internal strengths which can ensure adequate
coping with experience to become manifest.
Only sustained follow-up of children into sub-
sequent developmental periods will allow an
adequate assessment of potential coping strength
to be made. Murphy remarked that in both our
research and in our daily lives we see both
children and adults whose resilience makes
some of our predictions of doom appear ri-
diculous.
Her commitment to observation in relevant
life settings has also been consistent throughout
her professional life, and it appears that she
seldom gets the credit due her on this issue. In
the early book on Experimental Social Psychology
([1931] 1937), that she coauthored with Gardner
Murphy and Theodore Newcomb, there is a
long section on observational methods that can
be used to assess the behavior of young children.
The same theme is carried through her lengthy
two-volume series, Personality in Young Chil-
dren (1956). If Murphy has any intolerance
which has found its way into her writings, it is
of scientists who rely on narrow experimental
procedures without adequately observing the
domain in which their experiments belong.
Thus, although she never used the term to my
knowledge, Lois Murphy was advocating "eco-
logical relevance" for psychological experiments
long before that term became fashionable.
A third overriding concern that appears
throughout Murphy's work involves apprecia-
tion of and respect for individuality. Recogniz-
ing that there are not only individual differences
in internal coping capacities and styles but also

in terms of the patterns of environmental de-
mands likely to be encountered during the
process of development, she consistently stressed
the need for adults to be aware of and to respect
these differences. When child care outside the
home became an important political issue in the
United States, Murphy had some concerns that
large-scale efforts to develop programs would
of necessity overlook this need for individual-
ization of care. In a paper prepared for people
who were attempting to design infant day care
programs, she urged programmatic caution
based on this need for an idiographic approach:
Whether we are talking about very depriving group
care for babies or about some of the better exam-
ples, we still find that there is a need for a far more
systematic and sensitive assessment of the needs of
individual babies as a basis for planning the care,
the environment, the materials, and the opportuni-
ties which would meet the needs of the specific
baby and make possible a more adequate realization
of the potentialities of each one. For every baby
there is a level of both quality and quantity of
stimulation which evokes a response that leads to
interaction with adults or other children and thus
to integrative development, communication, and
active experiencing and mastery of the environ-
ment. The level must be ascertained for each baby
if we are to protect him from personality distur-
bances. (Murphy 1968, pp.122-123)
To these three scientific strictures—longitudi-
nal work, observational methodology, individu-
alization—one would have to add a fourth major
theme of her work—the celebration of the posi-
tive characteristics within the individual. Her
psychology has always been one of searching
for and paying tribute to strengths rather than
always being blinded by evidence of psychologi-
cal weakness and experiential trauma. And yet
it is not a Panglossian psychology which ignores
signs of vulnerability within the organism or of
potential devastation by the environment.
Rather the coping process is one through which
compromises are achieved—but always accord-
ing to the pattern which characterizes each in-
dividual. The scientist who is comfortable only
when human beings can be reduced to a set of
figures, whose only way to work is to test hy-
potheses derived from other hypotheses, and
who moves relentlessly toward the derivation of
nomothetic laws of behavior will not be com-
fortable within the framework created by her
approach to psychology. On the other hand, the
scientist who has time to take time as a variable,
MURPHY, LOIS B. 565
who is committed to the necessity of obtaining
knowledge in real-life environmental settings,
and for whom developmental successes com-
municate as much information about laws of
behavior as do dysfunctions, will consider her a
theorist of major proportion.
As an epilogue, it should be noted that
Murphy has moved for fifty years in a circle
of intellectually exciting individuals. She and
her husband related equally well to experi-
mental psychologists, psychoanalysts, nursery
educators, students, and persons from the full
array of the humanities. And through all the
intellectual and social excitement, they ap-
peared to relate so well to each other and to
learn so much from one another. Murphy thus
appears to be one of the fortunate persons for
whom personal and professional satisfaction
came together through a lifelong experience of
being cared about and caring for others in such
a way that a keen intelligence developed within
a context of strong social concern. Her life and
her work seem to comprise an integrated pack-
age, undoubtedly because Lois Murphy is a
truly integrated person.
BETTYE M. CALDWELL
WORKS BY MURPHY
(1931) 1937 MURPHY, GARDNER; MURPHY, Lois B.;
and NEWCOMB, THEODORE M. Experimental Social
Psychology, Rev ed. New York: Harper. —» Gardner
Murphy and Lois B. Murphy were the authors of
the first edition.
1956 Personality in Young Children. 2 vols. New
York: Basic Books. —» Volume 1: Methods for the
Study of Personality. Volume 2: Colin: A Normal
Child.
1962 MURPHY, Lois B. et al. The Widening World of
Childhood: Paths Toward Mastery. New York:
Basic Books.
1964 Some Aspects of the First Relationship. Inter-
national Journal of Psychoanalysis 45:31-44.
1968 Assessment of Infants and Young Children.
Pages 107-138 in Caroline A. Chandler, Reginald
S. Lourie, and Anne DeHuff Peters (editors),
Early Child Care: The New Perspectives. New
York: Atherton.
1968 MURPHY, GARDNER; and MURPHY, Lois B. (edi-
tors) Asian Psychology. New York: Basic Books.
1969 Children Under Three: Finding Ways to Stim-
ulate Development. Children 16:46-62.
1973a Some Mutual Contributions of Psychoanalysis
and Child Development. Psychoanalysis and Con-
temporary Science 2:99-123.
1973b The Stranglehold of Norms on the Individual
Child. Childhood Education 49:1-6.
1974 MURPHY, Lois B.; and MURPHY, GARDNER
A Fresh Look at the Child. Theory Into Practice
13:343-349.
1976 MURPHY, Lois B.; and MORIARTY, ALICE E. Vul-
nerability, Coping, and Growth: From Infancy to
Adolescence. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
 566 MURRAY, HENRY A.
MURRAY, HENRY A.
Henry A. Murray is a major twentieth-century
contributor to the theory and empirical study of
human personality. His varied background in
medicine, biological science, literature, psycho- mitted to psychology, but spent another year at
analysis, and academic psychology has provided
an appropriate base for his contributions to the
broad and encompassing field of personality
psychology. Murray is clearly associated with a
general approach to the study of personality, as
well as with the development of specific instru-
ments for measuring aspects of personality,
particularly the Thematic Apperception Test.
His theoretical conceptions have changed sub-
stantially over a period of more than thirty
years, but they have generally reflected a con-
viction that the individual personality should be
studied and represented in its full complexity.
He introduced the term "personology" to refer
to the work of those who focus on the study of
the individual case and also to minimize the
tendency to develop a cult or movement associ-
ated with a particular individual, as in the case
of Freudianism. He has also specified a wide
variety of variables or dimensions for describ-
ing the individual and his or her significant en-
vironment.
Born in New York City in 1893, Murray was
educated at the Groton School and at Harvard
College. Subsequently, he received medical
training at Columbia University, worked briefly
as an instructor in physiology at Harvard Uni-
versity, and then served a two-year surgical
internship at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital in
New York City. He next joined the staff of the
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in
New York City, where he conducted embryologi-
cal research for two years. Then came a period
of study at Cambridge University where he re-
ceived his PH.D. in biochemistry in 1927. Dur- enormous impact upon the future of the field.
ing this interval of European study, his interests Explorations in Personality (Murray et al. 1938)
first turned definitely toward psychology.
Even in his medical experience and biological
research, Murray showed an unusual interest
in the details of human experience, in the per-
sonality characteristics of patients, and in the
complex interaction between the physical-bio-
logical and the psychosocial. Murray read with
fascination Carl Jung's Psychological Types
(1921) and found himself drawn to the myster-
ies of the unconscious. He became convinced
that Jung's work provided a powerful means of
gaining insight into the basic determinants of
human behavior. While studying at Cambridge
he visited Zurich for what turned out to be a
fateful encounter with Jung—this experience
was the turning point in Murray's transition
from biomedicine to the behavioral sciences.
Murray returned to the United States com-
the Rockefeller Institute before taking the step
that would determine the rest of his career. In
spite of his unorthodox background, Murray
had influential admirers at Harvard who were
convinced that regardless of his training, he
would succeed at whatever he set his mind to.
He thus came to Harvard University as an in-
structor in psychology, joining a distinguished
traditional department at just the time that
Morton Prince had founded the Harvard Psy-
chological Clinic. The clinic was endowed for
the purpose of studying and teaching abnormal
and dynamic psychology, and Prince, searching
for a young and promising scholar to guide the
future of the clinic, clearly saw Murray as filling
these qualifications. In 1928 Murray was ap-
pointed director of the Psychological Clinic, and
in 1937 he was promoted to associate professor.
He was one of the charter members of the Bos-
ton Psychoanalytic Society and by 1935 had
completed his training in psychoanalysis under
Franz Alexander and Hans Sachs. A detailed
and revealing account of his training analysis
and his attitudes toward psychoanalysis is con-
tained in a symposium concerning psychologists
and psychoanalysis (Murray 1940).
During the roughly 15 years before World
War ii interrupted, the Harvard Psychological
Clinic, under Murray's personal and intellectual
leadership, was the scene of an exciting theo-
retical and empirical enterprise. Murray gath-
ered about him a group of able scholars, young
and not so young, whose joint efforts to formu-
late and investigate the human personality had
contains an incomplete record of the creativity
of this era, but the most important effects were
carried away in the form of convictions, ques-
tions, conceptions, and plans by individual par-
ticipants. For the first time psychoanalytic
theory was given a serious academic audience,
and earnest efforts were made to find ways of
translating the brilliant clinical insights of
Freud, Jung, and other psychoanalysts into ex-
perimental operations that would permit some
degree of empirical confirmation or rejection.
Not only did Murray create a sense of excite-
ment and imminent discovery among his own

students, but the clinic opened its doors to ma-
ture scholars from a variety of fields, such as
Erik H. Erikson, Cora DuBois, Walter Dyk, and
H. Scudder McKeel, so that the enterprise had a
marked interdisciplinary flavor.
In 1943 this period ended as Murray left
Harvard to join the Army Medical Corps. There,
as a major and subsequently, a lieutenant col-
onel, he established and directed an assessment
service for the Office of Strategic Services. He
and his colleagues were assigned the difficult
task of screening candidates for secret and
dangerous missions by evaluating their emo-
tional stability, capacity to withstand stress, and
interpersonal skills. The activities of this group
have been summarized in Assessment of Men
(Office . . . 1948). For his work with the army,
he was awarded the legion of merit.
In 1947 he returned to Harvard on a part-
time basis as a lecturer on clinical psychology
in the newly formed department of social rela-
tions. There is no doubt that his intellectual and
personal ties with distinguished Harvard an-
thropologists and sociologists played a signifi-
cant role in legitimizing this interdisciplinary
venture. In 1950, he was appointed professor
of clinical psychology. He declined to resume
direction of the Psychological Clinic, and in
1949 established the Psychological Clinic Annex
at Harvard University, where he and several
colleagues and graduate students conducted
further studies of personality until his retire-
ment in 1962. Since then, Murray has contin-
ued to lead an active scholarly life. Among
many other awards, Murray has received the
distinguished scientific contribution award of
the American Psychological Association and the
gold medal award of the American Psychologi-
cal Foundation for a lifetime of contribution to
the discipline.
The number and diversity of theoretical
models to which Murray has been exposed are
so great that one can do no more than select a
few of the most prominent. Clearly psycho-
analysis, in the broadest sense of the term, has
had great influence on his intellectual develop-
ment. In a direct and personal sense, Jung,
Alexander, and Sachs have all influenced him,
and Freud, primarily through his writing, had
great impact. The depth of the influence of psy-
choanalysis upon Murray's view of behavior is
shown clearly not only in his own work but in
that of many students and collaborators, such
as R. Nevitt Sanford, Saul Rosenzweig, Robert W.
White, Silvan S. Tomkins, Erik H. Erikson,
MURRAY, HENRY A. 567
Robert R. Holt, and Gardner Lindzey, all of
whom, together with their students, have con-
ducted empirical studies relevant to psycho-
analysis.
Murray's medical and biological research and
training have contributed to the deep respect he
has consistently shown for the importance of
the physical and biological substrate. His ex-
perience in medical diagnosis has resulted in
his belief that personality should ideally be as-
sessed by a team of specialists and that in this
assessment the subject's statements about him-
self should be given serious audience. His interest
in problems of taxonomy or classification, as
well as his conviction that the careful study of
individual cases is essential to future psycho-
logical progress, is also highly congruent with
his medical background.
His thorough knowledge of contemporary and
classical literature, and particularly his expert
knowledge of Herman Melville and his works,
has provided a rich source of ideas about man
and his potential for good and evil. In Alfred
North Whitehead, he found a model of logical
and synthetic thought, while the truculent, but
brilliant, Lawrence J. Henderson served as a
model of rigor and critical orientation. His
thinking has absorbed much from academic psy-
chologists, including Kurt Lewin and William
McDougall, from his long-time friend and col-
league, Gordon W. Allport, also a major con-
tributor to the field of personality who served
for many decades as a source of stimulation and
friendly disagreement, and from Clyde Kluck-
hohn in cultural anthropology. From such a
complex lineage it is no wonder that the evolved
product is luxuriant, elaborate, and ever chang-
ing. His debt to the scholars identified above
and to numerous others, including several gen-
erations of students, is amply acknowledged in
three very personal documents (1940; 1959;
1967) and in a volume of essays written in
honor of Murray (White 1963).
It is clear to all who have known him that
Murray's talent and devotion to the study of the
human personality are only partially revealed in
his published works. His casual remarks and
free-ranging speculations on an endless variety
of topics have provided fruitful research ideas
for his students and colleagues. Unfortunately
not all these messages have fallen on fertile
ground, and one regrets that the spoken word
has not been preserved to enrich the written
record. Murray's tendency to publish only oc-
casional fruits of his intellect is demonstrated
568 MURRAY, HENRY A.
in the few publications that have stemmed from
his years of intensive study of Melville. These
years of dedicated scholarship have earned him
an unparalleled reputation among students of
Melville, yet he has thus far published but two
papers dealing with this engrossing topic: a
brilliant analysis of the psychological meaning
of Moby Dick (Murray 195la) and an introduc-
tion to and penetrating analysis of Pierre (Mur-
ray 1949), one of Melville's most baffling novels.
Murray's analysis of Moby Dick rests upon
his sophistication in psychological theory, par-
ticularly psychoanalysis, but also derives from
his detailed knowledge of Melville's life and
major novel. It is difficult to summarize a com-
plex psychological analysis of an intricate liter-
ary product, particularly when much of the per-
suasiveness of Murray's piece is associated with
his rich and powerful writing style.
In starkly oversimplified terms, Murray ex-
amines, then rejects, the thesis that there may
be no psychological meaning to Moby Dick,
Much of his paper presents evidence to support
the hypothesis that Captain Ahab represents the
devil and his forces of evil—hence in psychologi-
cal terms, the primitive and uncontrolled forces
of the id. In contrast, the white whale, Moby
Dick, represents the superego—the moral and
restraining forces within the individual and also
the social conventions and sanctions that are a
part of Melville's society.
Granted the inadequacy of the written record,
Murray's psychological theorizing and research
are best represented in Explorations in Person-
ality (Murray et al. 1938), which summarizes
the thought and research of the Psychological
Clinic staff at the end of its first decade of ex-
istence. A partial record of Murray's subsequent
research is contained in A Clinical Study of Sen-
timents (1945), which Murray wrote with his
long-time collaborator Christiana Morgan. The
major changes in his theoretical convictions
undergone in subsequent years are best repre-
sented in a chapter written jointly with Clyde
Kluckhohn (1948), a chapter published in
Towards a General Theory of Action (1951c),
an article published in Dialectica (1951k), a
chapter written for Psychology: A Study of a
Science (1959), and an article written for the
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
ences (1968). The Thematic Apperception Test
Manual (1943) serves as the best introduction
to this personality instrument, devised jointly
with Morgan (Morgan & Murray 1935),
which has become one of the most important
and widely used empirical tools of the clinician
and personality investigator. The great sensi-
tivity and ingenuity which Murray has shown in
developing means of appraising and analyzing
man's capacities and directional tendencies are
vividly revealed in Assessment of Men (Office
. . . 1948).
Methods of personality assessment. Murray
has been actively involved in the creation of many
different instruments for measuring or assess-
ing personality. A number of publications, par-
ticularly Explorations in Personality, provide
partial or detailed accounts of a wide variety of
methods for studying personality under more
or less standardized conditions.
Undoubtedly the best known of these devices
is the Thematic Appreception Test (TAT),
which together with the Rorschach technique
dominates the field of projective testing. This
instrument, when used conventionally, involves
presenting to the subject twenty pictures, each
of which is open to many interpretations, with
the request that the subject incorporate the pic-
ture into a story of his or her own creation. The
stories produced by the subject can then be in-
terpreted in a variety of ways, although tradi-
tionally the emphasis has been placed upon the
potential of the stories for revealing aspects of
the individual of which he or she is unaware.
One may view the test, when used to reveal
unconscious or covert aspects of personality, as
providing a substitute for or supplement to
dreams used in traditional psychoanalysis.
Murray was fully aware of the fact that the
TAT also revealed overt or known aspects of the
individual, so that the conscious and uncon-
scious were intricately blended.
Many other psychologists have devised scor-
ing systems for arriving at quantitative scores
from TAT stories for particular variables, such
as achievement, affiliation, dominance, and sex-
uality (Atkinson 1958). Indeed, a vast literature
on achievement motivation, its origins, cor-
relates, and consequences, is based upon Mur-
ray's initial conceptions and methods.
The test has been used in hundreds of em-
pirical studies of human personality as well as
in clinical settings for arriving at a psycho-
diagnosis or an understanding of the individual
personality. The instrument is used not only in
situations focusing on the diagnosis and treat-
ment of a subject with impaired capacity, but
also in assessment settings where the goal is
to predict the capacity of the individual to func-
tion satisfactorily in industrial or military roles.

Human motivation. At the heart of Murray's
psychology lies a deep interest in conceptualiz-
ing and measuring motives. The many person-
ality instruments he devised should be seen
primarily as an attempt to provide a means of
assessing the motivational variables he con-
siders essential determinants of human behav-
ior. Though not alone in his interest in motiva-
tion, and deeply indebted to Freud and Jung
for his emphasis on covert as well as overt
motivation, he is distinctive in the detailed iden-
tification of what he views as key motives and
in his attempts to provide careful definitions,
methods of measuring concepts and relating
them to one another as well as to the environ-
mental context in which they operate.
Although his theoretical conceptions have
undergone many changes, the concept of "need"
is generally regarded as his primary motiva-
tional concept, and his careful enumerations
and definitions in Explorations in Personality
are probably the most influential of any of his
writings. In this work he identifies twenty prin-
cipal needs, several of which are listed here
with abbreviated definitions: abasement (To
submit passively to external force. To accept
injury, blame, criticism, punishment. To sur-
render. To become resigned to fate. To admit
inferiority, error, wrongdoing, or defeat. To con-
fess and atone. To blame, belittle, or mutilate
the self. To seek and enjoy pain, punishment,
illness, and misfortune.); achievement (To ac-
complish something difficult. To master, manip-
ulate, or organize physical objects, human
beings, or ideas. To do this as rapidly and as
independently as possible. To overcome ob-
stacles and attain a high standard. To excel
oneself. To rival and surpass others. To increase
self-regard by the successful exercise of talent.);
affiliation (To draw near and en joy ably cooper-
ate or reciprocate with an allied other [an other
who resembles the subject or who likes the sub-
ject]. To please and win affection of a cathected
object. To adhere and remain loyal to a friend.);
aggression (To overcome opposition forcefully.
To fight. To revenge an injury. To attack, in-
jure, or kill another. To oppose forcefully or
punish another.); autonomy (To get free, shake
off restraint, break out of confinement. To re-
sist coercion and restriction. To avoid or quit
activities prescribed by domineering authorities.
To be independent and free to act according to
impulse. To be unattached, irresponsible. To
defy convention.); dominance (To control one's
human environment. To influence or direct the
MURRAY, HENRY A. 569
behavior of others by suggestion, seduction,
persuasion, or command. To dissuade, restrain,
or prohibit.); nurturance (To give sympathy and
gratify the needs of a helpless object: an infant
or any object that is weak, disabled, tired, inex-
perienced, infirm, defeated, humiliated, lonely,
dejected, sick, mentally confused. To assist an
object in danger. To feed, help, support, con-
sole, protect, comfort, nurse, heal.); succorance
(To have one's needs gratified by the sympa-
thetic aid of an allied object. To be nursed,
supported, sustained, surrounded, protected,
loved, advised, guided, indulged, forgiven, con-
soled. To remain close to a devoted protector.
To always have a supporter.).
In addition to identifying these major needs,
Murray also subdivided them in many ways,
distinguishing covert and overt needs, viscero-
genic as against psychogenic needs, proactive
and reactive needs, and focal and diffuse needs.
Although Murray's concept of "need" has
many parallels in the writings of other psy-
chologists, including such familiar terms as
trait, instinct, motive, and disposition, his com-
plementary concept of "press" lacks comparable
similarity to the concepts of other psychologists.
Need is a dispositional concept that represents
the motivational origins of behavior, whereas
press refers to the significant aspects of the
environment as they influence or determine be-
havior. Thus, the two concepts in combination
provide a systematic representation of both the
psychological-biological and the environmental
determinants of behavior. Press concepts rep-
resent persons or objects with real or potential
implications for the satisfaction of needs. In
Murray's words, "the press of an object is what
it can do to the subject or for the subject—the
power that it has to affect the well-being of the
subject in one way or another" (Murray et al.
1938, p. 121).
Although many psychologists have stressed
the importance of recognizing and representing
the perceived environment within which hu-
mans function, few have gone beyond exhorta-
tion or naturalistic description. Murray's em-
phasis and concepts are important forerunners
of what is sometimes referred to as environ-
mental psychology or psychological ecology.
Illustrative of Murray's press concepts are:
family discord; capricious discipline; parental
separation; absence of either parent; parental
illness; inferiority of either parent; dissimilar
parent; poverty; unsettled home; physical in-
support, height; water; aloneness, darkness; in-
570 MURRAY, HENRY A.
clement weather, lightning; fire; accident; lack
or loss of nourishment, possessions, companion-
ship, or variety; nurturance, indulgence; suc-
corance, demands for tenderness; deference,
praise, recognition; and affiliation, friendships.
Discussions of the relative importance of
traits or other enduring dispositions, as opposed
to the importance of situational determinants
of behavior, are leading to a general acceptance
of an "interactionist" position. This position im-
plies that the significance of a trait or disposi-
tion must always be assessed in conjunction
with the particular set of situational or envi-
ronmental factors that operate. As the above
discussion implies, Murray was precise in
specifying the interaction of needs and press
and thus of "interactionism," suggesting more
than three decades ago, a position that is cur-
rently fashionable.
Study of the individual. Murray is a staunch
defender of an approach to the study of human
behavior that is based on the detailed study of
a small number of individual cases rather than
on a casual or focused approach to large num-
bers of subjects. He believes that more is to be
learned through intensive, long-term examina-
tion of individual lives from multiple perspec-
tives than through delimited and objective study
of many subjects.
His concern for the careful, longitudinal
study of individual cases is congruent with All-
port's emphasis upon the life history. His dis-
trust of findings that describe group results but
do not necessarily describe accurately the be-
havior of any single individual is consonant
with B. F. Skinner's emphasis upon reporting
results for individual subjects rather than group
findings.
Not only did Murray believe in studying in-
dividuals, but he also thought more could be
learned from studying normal as opposed to
abnormal behavior. Maintaining that the indi-
vidual should be studied by more than one
observer, he has used the term "diagnostic
council" to refer to a procedure in which a num-
ber of skilled observers study a single individual
with different methods and perspectives, ulti-
mately synthesizing and integrating their di-
verse findings into an over-all picture of the
person. As a consequence, Murray's research
has involved small numbers of subjects, who
are studied intensively for years, with the use
of multiple observers. The results of these in-
quiries often appear in the form of detailed life
histories. Some of the best examples of this
approach are "'American Icarus" (1955) and a
series of life histories published with Christiana
Morgan under the title, "A Clinical Study of
Sentiments" (1945).
Murray's importance to the field of psy-
chology seems assured so long as interest con-
tinues in human motives and their individual
differences. Four decades after its publication,
Explorations in Personality is still one of the
most influential volumes in the field of person-
ality and there is no reason to expect this to
change in the next four decades.
GARDNER LINDZEY
WORKS BY MURRAY
1935 MORGAN, CHRISTIANA D.; and MURRAY, HENRY A.
A Method for Investigating Fantasies: The Thematic
Apperception Test. Archives of Neurology and Psy-
chiatry 34:289-306.
1938 MURRAY, HENRY A. et al. Explorations in Per-
sonality: A Clinical and Experimental Study of
Fifty Men of College Age. New York: Oxford.
1940 What Should Psychologists Do About Psycho-
analysis? Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychol-
ogy 35:150-175.
1943 Thematic Apperception Test Manual. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1945 MURRAY, HENRY A.; and MORGAN, CHRISTIANA D.
A Clinical Study of Sentiments. Genetic Psychology
Monographs 32:3-311.
(1948) 1953 MURRAY, HENRY A.; and KLUCKHOHN,
CLYDE Outline of a Conception of Personality. Pages
3-49 in Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray
(editors), Personality in Nature, Society, and Cul-
ture. 2d ed., rev. & enl. New York: Knopf.
1949 Introduction. In Herman Melville, Pierre, or the
Ambiguities. New York: Hendricks House.
195la In nomine diaboli. New England Quarterly
24:435-452. —> Address delivered at Williams Col-
lege at the centenary celebration of the publication
of Moby Dick.
1951b Some Basic Psychological Assumptions and
Conceptions. Dialectica 5:266-292.
1951c Toward a Classification of Interactions. Pages
434-464 in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils
(editors), Towards a General Theory of Action.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. —» A
paperback edition was published in 1962 by Harper.
1955 American Icarus. Volume 2, pages 615-641 in
Arthur Burton and Robert E. Harris (editors), Case
Histories in Clinical and Abnormal Psychology.
Volume 2: Clinical Studies in Personality. New
York: Harper.
1959 Preparations for the Scaffold of a Comprehen-
sive System. Volume 3, pages 7—54 in Sigmund
Koch (editor), Psychology: A Study of a Science.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
1967 Autobiography. Volume 5, pages 283-310 in
A History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited
by E. G. Boring and Gardner Lindzey. New York:
Apple ton.
1968 Personality: Contemporary Viewpoints: II. Com-
ponents of an Evolving Personological System.
Volume 12, pages 5-13 in International Encyclo-

pedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David
L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ATKINSON, JOHN W. (editor) 1958 Motives in Fan-
tasy, Action, and Society. Princeton, N.J.: Van
Nostrand.
JUNG, CARL G. (1921) 1971 Collected Works. Vol-
ume 6. Psychological Types. Princeton Univ. Press.
—> Originally published in German.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES ASSESSMENT STAFF
1948 Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel
for the Office of Strategic Services. New York: Rine-
hart.
WHITE, ROBERT W. (editor) 1963 The Study of
Lives: Essays on Personality in Honor of Henry A.
Murray. New York: Atherton.
MYRDAL, GUNNAR
Gunnar Myrdal was born in 1898 in the vil-
lage Solvarbo, in the parish of Gustafs, in the
Swedish province of Dalarna. He attributes his
faith in the Puritan work ethic and his egalitar-
ianism to his sturdy farming background.
His early interests were in the natural sci-
ences. However, at Stockholm University he
started to read law in the belief that he would
learn about how society functioned, but was
disappointed and soon changed to economics,
the method of which was more like that of the
natural sciences. He was a student of the giant
figures Knut Wicksell, David Davidson, Eli F.
Heckscher, Gosta Bagge, and above all (Karl)
Gustav Cassel. His personal friendship was
warmest with Cassel, to whose chair in political
economy and financial sciences at Stockholm
University he succeeded.
At first a pure theorist, Myrdal's year in the
United States as a Rockefeller fellow, following
the crash of 1929, turned his interest to politi-
cal issues. On his return from America he, to-
gether with his wife Alva, a pioneering emanci-
pator of women and in many ventures a partner
of her husband, became active in politics. Labor
came to power in Sweden in 1932. He was in-
volved in the work of a number of Royal com-
missions and public committees, and in 1935,
became a member of Parliament. Together with
his wife he pioneered modern population policy.
His work in Sweden between 1931 and 1938
turned him from a "theoretical" economist into
a political economist and what he himself de-
scribed as an institutionalist. In 1938 the Car-
negie Corporation selected him for a major in-
vestigation of the black problem in America, a
project that resulted in An American Dilemma
MYRDAL, GUNNAR 571
(1944a). He returned to Sweden in 1942 and for
five years was involved in political activities.
He headed the committee that drafted the Social
Democratic postwar program. He returned to
Parliament, and became a member of the board
of directors of the Swedish Bank, chairman of
the Swedish Planning Commission, and Min-
ister for Trade and Commerce (1945-1947). As
minister he arranged for a highly controversial
treaty with the Soviet Union and was also in-
volved in controversy over the dismantling of
wartime controls. In 1947 he became executive
secretary of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe, to which he recruited an
outstandingly able team of colleagues and
where he inspired young people to give their
best. After ten years with the commission in
Geneva he embarked on a ten-year study of de-
velopment in Asia, the result of which was the
monumental Asian Drama (1968).
Methodological questions occupied Myrdal's
thoughts throughout his life. They were already
present in the young Myrdal's iconoclastic The
Political Element in the Development of Eco-
nomic Theory (1930). It was under the influence
of the remarkable Uppsala University philoso-
pher Axel Hagerstrom that he had begun to
question the economic establishment.
Myrdal's doctoral dissertation on price forma-
tion and economic change, Prisbildningsprob-
lemet och fordnderligheten ("Price Formation
and Economic Change"; 1927), systematically
introduced expectations into the analysis of
prices, profits, and changes in capital values.
The microeconomic analysis focused on plan-
ning by the firm. Many of these ideas were used
in his later microeconomic work, such as
Monetary Equilibrium (1931).
Much confusion had been caused by the lack
of distinction between anticipations and results.
The concepts ex ante and ex post greatly clari-
fied the discussion of savings, investment, and
income, and their effects on prices. In anticipa-
tion, intention, and planning, savings can di-
verge from investment; after the event they
must be identical, because the community can
save only by accumulating real assets. It is the
process by which anticipations ex ante are ad-
justed so as to bring about the bookkeeping
identify ex post that explains unexpected gains
and losses as well as fluctuations in prices. Only
in equilibrium are ex ante savings equal to ex
ante investment, so that there is no tendency
for prices to change. Myrdal saw the chief con-
572 MYRDAL, GUNNAR
tribution of this book as the formulation of this
distinction.
By introducing expectations into the analysis
of economic processes, Myrdal made a major
contribution to liberalizing economics from a
static theory in which the future is like the past
or "other things remain equal," and to paving
the way for dynamics, in which time, uncer-
tainty, and expectations enter in an essential
way.
What is common to his subsequent three im-
portant books, The Political Element, An Ameri-
can Dilemma, and Asian Drama is the emphasis
on realistic and relevant research, whether on
economic problems, race relations, or world pov-
erty, and with it, the effort to purge economic
thinking of systematic biases.
The work for An American Dilemma was done
for the Carnegie Corporation of New York, at
the invitation of its trustees. They had turned to
Myrdal as a student from "a non-imperialist
country with no background of discrimination
of one race against another." They requested
that he produce "a comprehensive study of the
Negro in the United States to be undertaken in
a wholly objective way as a social phenomenon."
Starting on the study almost completely igno-
rant, he soon discovered that, in order to under-
stand the black people in the United States, he
had to study "the American civilization in its
entirety, though viewed in its implications for
the most disadvantaged population group" (in-
troduction to section 4 of 1944). The way to
reach objectivity was to state explicitly the value
premises of the study. These premises were
not chosen arbitrarily, but were what Myrdal
called the "American Creed" of justice, liberty,
and equality of opportunity. But while these
value premises were chosen for their relevance
to American society, they corresponded to Myr-
dal's own valuations. As a result, he became
closely identified with America's ideals and the
study turned into a deep personal commitment.
Indeed, he came to regard it as his war service.
And the war gave additional importance to race
relations as a source of national concern. The
book, published before the end of the war, at-
tempts to present a comprehensive, well-docu-
mented account, and an intensive scientific
analysis of the facts and the causal relations
between facts at the end of the 1930s and early
1940s, with the discernible trend of future
changes. The major contribution of the book is
the analysis of the more than six decades after
Reconstruction as "a temporary interregnum,"
not a "stable equilibrium," and of the incipient
changes on which the prediction of the black
revolt in the South was based.
Myrdal has never been easy to typecast. On
many issues, he fires at both sides of the con-
ventional barricade and likes to emphasize the
false shared premises of the combatants. Thus
in the discussion of the role of the purely
economic factors in development, to the exclu-
sion of cultural, social, political, and psycho-
logical, he criticizes liberal and conservative
economics for assuming the noneconomic fac-
tors to be fully adapted to economic progress,
and therefore bundled away under ceteris pan-
bus clauses, and the Marxists for believing that
these factors are responsive and automatically
adaptable, as a result of changes in what Marx-
ists call the economic substructure, and there-
fore also beyond analysis and policy. From
diametrically opposed premises, liberals—conser-
vatives and Marxists-revolutionaries therefore
arrive at the same conclusion: there is no need
for direct action on noneconomic variables (ad-
ministration, educational systems, labor mar-
kets), for in the one case they are fully suited
for the required change and in the other they
will inevitably and automatically be shaped by
the underlying economic change. Liberals and
revolutionaries share common ground, which
prevents them from seeing the need for the
conscious planning of institutions.
While highly critical of the results of a free
market system, Myrdal is not among those who
dismiss economic progress as irrelevant or
detrimental to human life. In his view, eco-
nomic advance is a necessary condition for
achieving social ends and he disagrees with
those conservationists who believe that a better
quality of life is possible only by abandoning
economic growth.
The options before us, in Myrdal's view, are
not confined to the models of capitalist or Soviet
development. Social objectives can be pursued
by a system of decentralized decision making
in which planning is combined with freedom.
But here again, the added option is not one of
the apolitical possibilities of the futurologists
or science fiction writers, but is anchored in
political feasibility. He stands nearest to the so-
called "utopian" socialists, whom Marx and En-
gels contemptuously dismissed as "unscientific,"
but who paid careful attention to shaping social
institutions and even human attitudes for a bet-
ter society. According to the Marxists such plan-
ning was impossible or unnecessary: impossible

before the revolution, because they formed part
of the superstructure determined by economic
conditions; unnecessary after the revolution,
when human attitudes and social institutions
would be automatically adapted to the socialist
society.
Apart from his work on racial problems, Myr-
dal is best known for his critique of conven-
tional economic theory applied to underdevel-
oped countries. He calls for a reconstruction of
such theory. First, we must free ourselves from
the limitation imposed on our thinking by Euro-
centricity. Many of our concepts, models, the-
ories, paradigms are "Western" (and "Western"
for this purpose includes Marxist and Soviet) in
the sense that they fit, more or less, the reality
of advanced industrial societies, but are quite
"inadequate to the reality" of underdeveloped
societies. (It is interesting to note that Myrdal's
critique of the application of "Western" concepts
to poor countries has caused a reappraisal of
the applicability of these concepts to Western
societies themselves. In development studies, as
in history, there are bonuses.) Both the concepts
singled out as strategic variables, like "capital,"
and the issues ignored, like "corruption," reject
the experience of "Western" societies and are
opportunistically motivated schemas.
Myrdal's appeal for realism, or as he calls it,
"adequacy to reality," is not primarily a critique
of abstraction or selection or simplification. As
a most sophisticated social scientist, he is, of
course, not only aware but also insists that all
theorizing must abstract and select. His criti-
cism is that the abstractions follow the wrong
lines, that the irrelevant features are selected.
It is pouring out the baby instead of the bath
water. He subjects the commonly used concepts
of employment, unemployment, income, con-
sumption, savings, investment, capital, output,
capital/output ratio, etc., to close scrutiny and
finds that in large measure they dissolve when
applied to underdeveloped societies.
Having dissolved them, the question arises
whether they can be reassembled: whether cap-
ital, for example, cannot be given a new and
wider meaning, including investment in forms
conventionally accounted as consumption, or
investment in a program of family planning or
in a land reform; and whether employment can-
not be replaced by a richer and more realistic
concept of "labor utilization." This would allow
for the different attitudes of different castes to-
ward work; it would allow for the effects of the
components of the level of living, like nutrition
MYRDAL, GUNNAR 573
and health, on intensity of effort; and it would
allow for the different types of labor markets.
Myrdal has been less successful in this reformu-
lation and reconstruction than in his critique of
existing concepts. His critique is often not ac-
companied by the presentation of useful alterna-
tives. He has often remarked that "facts kick"
against the hard crust of established models or
paradigms. But the powerful hold of these para-
digms, and the need to demolish established
paradigms by providing alternative ones rather
than simply by pointing to facts inconsistent
with them, may explain why Myrdal's critique
has not been more widely accepted in the pro-
fession.
A second line of Myrdal's criticism has been
directed at the narrow definition of development
as economic growth. He replaces it by the con-
cept of the modernization ideals. The emphasis
here is again on actual needs and valuations
(much more than narrow interests) of real peo-
ple and groups of people. The ideas must be
relevant to the actual valuations of men and
women and not the created abstractions of
philosophers, statisticians, and economists. The
United Nations accepted this approach in 1969
as the integrated or unified strategy of develop-
ment, and the United Nations Research Insti-
tute for Social Development, on the governing
council of which Myrdal sat, was entrusted with
further research on it. The social indicator
movement has also derived strength from it.
His third criticism is directed at the narrow
definitions and limits of disciplines. The essence
of the institutional approach, advocated by Myr-
dal, is to bring to bear all relevant knowledge
and techniques on the analysis of a problem.
According to this institutional approach "history
and politics, theories and ideologies, economic
structures and levels, social stratification, agri-
culture and industry, population developments,
health and education and so on must be studied
not in isolation but in their mutual relation-
ships" (1968, vol. 1, p. x). In an interdependent
social system, there are no economic problems,
political problems, or social problems, there are
only problems. ^
His fourth line of criticism is directed at
phony objectivity, which under the pretense of
scientific analysis conceals political valuations
and interest. Myrdal argues that this pseudosci-
ence should be replaced by explicit valuations,
in the light of which analysis can be conducted
and policies advocated. He is not so naive as to
believe that simple specification of these value
574 MYRDAL, GUNNAR
premises is easy or even possible at all, and has
shown how complicated and complex the nexus
between valuations and facts can be. But he
has constantly fought the inheritance of natural
law and utilitarianism, according to which we
can derive certain recommendations from pure,
theoretical analysis. "The greatest good for the
greatest number" or the "maximization of social
welfare" are targets for his critique.
A fifth line of criticism throughout his writ-
ings is directed against biases and twisted term-
inology. He examines not only economic con-
cepts such as unemployment, but also such
expressions as "United Nations," "interna-
tional," "values," "developing countries," "bilat-
eral aid," and "the free world," and lays bare the
opportunistic interests underlying such use of
language.
The features against which these lines of
criticism are advanced are combined in the
technocrat. He isolates economic (or other tech-
nical) relations from their social context; he
neglects social and political variables and there-
by, unconsciously, ministers to the vested in-
terest that might otherwise be violated; he pre-
tends to scientific objectivity and is socially and
culturally insensitive. Certain types of planners
and so-called experts who try to impose their
technical models on a living society fit the
picture.
But scholars may ask: Is this not simply a
question of method? Can the narrow technocrat
not be replaced by one who introduces social
variables openly into his formal models? Jan
Tinbergen, Horn's B. Chenery, and Irma Adel-
man have tried to do precisely this. Cannot
the "Western" approach be saved in this way?
Myrdal's answer is yes and no. In certain
areas, a widening or redefinition of concepts can
be allowed for. The productive effects of better
nutrition can, in principle, be studied and the
line between investment and consumption be
redrawn for poor societies. The influence of
climate (much neglected by most economists),
of attitudes, and of institutions can be intro-
duced either as constraints or as variables. An
agricultural production function can be postu-
lated in which health, education, distance from
town, etc., figure as "inputs." "Capital" can be
redefined so as to cover everything on which the
expenditure of resources now raises the flow of
output later, so that it is greater than it would
otherwise have been.
But there are limits to such revisionism.
These limits apply both to the analysis of facts
and to the recommendations of policies. On the
factual side, the reformulation runs into diffi-
culties if the connection between expenditure
of resources and "yield" is only tenuous, as in
the initiation of a birth control program or a
land reform.
In the analysis of values, the construction of
a social welfare function in Myrdal's view is not
a logical task. The unity of the social program
of a party or a movement is not like that of a
computer program or a logical system, but more
like that of a personality. It is discovered not
only by deductive reasoning and the applica-
tion of syllogisms, but by empathy, imagination,
and even artistic and intuitive understanding.
Just as we may ask "what would a person like
this do or want if the situation were different in
specified ways from what it is," so we may ask
similar questions about classes, parties, groups,
or even whole societies. Means and ends, tar-
gets and instruments, are very misleading ways
of grasping this type of question, for the unity
from which we infer recommendations is not
logical but psychological.
It is important here to return to Myrdal's call
for expressing our valuations explicitly before
embarking on social analysis, precisely in order
to make research more objective. What are
these valuations in the modernization ideals?
They constitute a complex system that includes
rationality, planning the future, raising produc-
tivity, raising levels of living, social and eco-
nomic equalization, improved institutions and
attitudes, national consolidation, national inde-
pendence, political democracy, and social dis-
cipline. All of these value premises and the
valuations derived from them are subsumed
under the quest for rationality. As we examine
them, we cannot fail to become aware that these
are the valuations of the Swedish welfare state,
writ large. High material standards of living
must be combined with welfare care for the ill,
the poor, and the victims of the competitive
struggle. They are the liberal values of a mixed
economy, part public, part private. Myrdal, the
great critic of the transfer of inappropriate
"Western" concepts and values, has been ac-
cused of assessing, if only unconsciously, the
experience of the underdeveloped countries
against that of the modern welfare state, and of
a certain lack of empathy for the possibility of
doing things differently, by providing alterna-
tive roads to development. The Indian anthro-
pologist T. N. Madan charged him with failure
to practice what he proclaims, when Myrdal

complains that "large numbers of South Asians
have only one set of clothing which is seldom
washed, except in bathing. Typically, the same
clothes are worn day and night since pajamas
and even underwear are luxuries a great many
people can ill afford. The hygienic consequences
are easy to imagine" (1968, vol. 1, p. 552; Madan
1969, pp. 289-290). In particular, he has no
place for what some of his critics regard as benign
forms of corruption and nepotism. Traditional
valuations are acceptable only if they do not
conflict with the modernization ideals, other-
wise they represent "obstacles and inhibitions."
No doubt, there is some justification for this
accusation. As a proud, somewhat un-Swedish
Swede (he is admired and revered by some and
detested by other Swedes, and the award of the
Nobel Prize in 1973, in its fifth year, is regarded
by some as too late, by others as too early), he
finds it easier to identify with liberal Americans
than with the English or French, and easier
with Englishmen than with the Indian masses.
It is partly for this reason that An American
Dilemma is an optimistic book, and Asian Drama
a pessimistic one. He once said how kindred
American aspirations and ideals, and the "Amer-
ican creed," were to his own beliefs, and how he
could identify with these ideals when writing
the book on the black problem; and how, in con-
trast, when he visited an Indian textile factory,
the thin, half-naked brown bodies struck him as
utterly alien. But more profound than this dif-
ference in personal allegiance is Myrdal's view
that the American creed was not only the set of
value premises chosen for An American Di-
lemma, it also represented the historical trend;
whereas the modernization ideals, though al-
most a state religion, do not necessarily reflect
the trend of the future.
Optimism and pessimism, Myrdal would be
the first to emphasize, should have no place in
an objective analysis because they are wishful
thinking or biased positions, convenient to those
who hold them, and reflect "opportunistic" be-
liefs in what they select and "opportunistic" ig-
norance in what they omit. The scholar should
be concerned with realism. In particular Myrdal
brought out clearly the origins of and the in-
terests behind the swings from colonial pessi-
mism about the "idle natives" to the postinde-
pendence optimism of the 1950s and early
1960s, and back to the pessimism of the 1970s.
He was an early critic of the euphoria of the
"Green Revolution" (the use of high-yielding
varieties of. grain in agriculture), a euphoria
MYRDAL, GUNNAR 575
which ran against the stark critique of Asian
Drama.
Asian Drama is an odd book. And it is odder
still that no reviewer pointed out this oddity. A
recurrent theme in the main body of the book is
the reasons for biases in economic theorizing
about south Asia. Some issues concerning sub-
stantive economic analysis of Asian develop-
ment, on the other hand, are relegated to ap-
pendixes. Myrdal once said it is like a stocking
turned inside out. For Myrdal, the important
task is to purge, to cleanse of biases before an-
alyzing and reconstructing. He regards the ex-
isting structure as deeply contaminated by bias,
behind which stand vested interest.
How then are biases related to interests? Ac-
cording to the colonial ideology, a hot climate, a
backward social structure, and ethnic inferiority
prevent economic advance. Economic progress
is the privilege of a few races. The pessimism
about the possibility of development was oppor-
tunistic for it lifted responsibility for promoting
development from the colonial administration.
Independence saw the rapid growth of the
"development industry." A massive body of re-
search and communications grew up in the
1950s and 1960s, and the mood changed to one
of optimism. The new independence, the desire
of the ruling elites to emulate the West, and the
rivalries of the cold war fed this optimism. The
false analogy of European reconstruction under
the Marshall Plan was used as the paradigm for
development. Since the communists had blamed
the colonial powers for lack of development, the
response was to drop the colonial doctrine. The
existing body of economic analysis came in very
handy. It neglected climate, it ignored attitudes
and institutions as strategic variables, it re-
garded consumption as not productive, and it
treated the state as exogenous. The conclusion:
pour capital into the sausage machine, turn the
growth handle, and out comes evergrowing out-
put. The optimism is reflected in the changing
terminology: from backward regions (not yet
countries!) to underdeveloped countries to de-
veloping countries. "Diplomacy by terminology,"
Myrdal calls it. There is assumed to be a "trade-
off" between equality and growth, and therefore
equality, which hinders growth, has to be sacri-
ficed or postponed, and with it goes any deep
analysis of land reform, education, corruption,
social discipline, and the interest and efficiency
of the state.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, there occurred a
return to a pessimistic mood, rationalized by the
576 MYRDAL, GUNNAR
ineffectiveness of aid, by "wrong" domestic eco-
nomic policies, and by reduced need for aid. At
the same time, the undeveloped countries
called for a "New International Economic
Order." Myrdal had stressed throughout his
work the need for reforms inside the underde-
veloped countries themselves, though the devel-
oped countries and international reform can
make contributions to overcoming internal dif-
ficulties. In the prescient An International Econ-
omy (1956k) he had developed the idea that
national integration led to international disin-
tegration.
An important idea in Myrdal's arsenal is that
of circular or cumulative causation (or the
vicious- or virtuous-circle), first fully developed
in An American Dilemma. Traditional theory
explains inequality between individuals, re-
gions, and countries as the results of differential
resource "endowments." But resources are the
result, not the cause of income and wealth. Un-
improved land, which is an endowment, is im-
portant for resource-based industries, but not
for processing and manufacturing. It is the
resource poor countries, like Israel, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea,
that present the success stories of development.
Capital, an important factor of production, is
also much more the result than the cause of
economic growth. The principle of cumulative
causation postulates increasing returns through
specialization and economies of scale, and
shows how small advantages are magnified.
The principle goes back to Wicksell, who, in
Interest and Prices (1898), had analyzed diver-
gences between the natural and the market
rates of interest in terms of upward or down-
ward cumulative price movements, until the
divergence was eliminated. Wicksell pointed out
that if banks keep their loan rate of interest be-
low the real rate of return on capital, they will
encourage expansion of production and invest-
ment in plant and equipment. As a result, prices
will rise and will continue to rise as long as the
lending rate is kept below the real rate.
The principle of cumulative causation can be
used to show movements away from an equilib-
rium position as a result of the interaction of
several variables. But not every form of circular
or mutual causation or interaction is cumulative
and hence disequilibrating, for a series of mutu-
ally caused events can, after a disturbance,
rapidly converge either on the initial or on some
other point of stable equilibrium. In order to
create instability, the numerical values of the
coefficients of interdependence have to be above
a critical minimum size. For example, an in-
crease in consumption will raise incomes which
in turn will raise consumption, and so on. But
the infinite series will rapidly converge on a
finite value. Only if the whole of the extra in-
come or more were spent on consumption would
the process be cumulative and disequilibrating.
The notion was applied by Myrdal most
illuminatingly to price expectations in Monetary
Equilibrium (1931) and to the relations be-
tween regions in Economic Theory and Under-
developed Regions (1957). He showed how the
advantages of growth poles can become cumu-
lative, so that "unto those who have shall be
given," while the backward region may be rela-
tively or even absolutely impoverished.
Myrdal applied the notion also to sociological
variables and their interaction with economic
ones, like discrimination against blacks, their
incomes, and their level of performance (low
skills, low morals, crime, disease, etc.). In the
analysis of development the relation between
better nutrition, better health, better education,
and higher productivity, and hence the ability
to further improve health, education, and nu-
trition, shows that the inclusion of noneconomic
variables in the analysis opens up the possibility
of numerous cumulative processes to which
conventional economic analysis is blind. It also
guards against unicausal explanations and uni-
versal remedies or panaceas. The revolutionary
character of the concept of cumulative causa-
tion is brought out by the fact that interaction
takes place not only within a social system in
which the various elements interact, but also in
time, so that memory and expectations are of
crucial importance. The responses to any given
variable, say a price, are different according to
what the history of this variable has been. It is
this dynamic feature of analysis and its impli-
cations for policy that distinguish Myrdal's
approach from that of economists who think in
terms of general equilibrium.
In Economic Theory and Under-developed Re-
gions (delivered as the Cairo lectures), and
later in Asian Drama, he used the concepts
"backwash" and "spread" effects to analyze the
movement of regions or whole countries at dif-
ferent stages of development and the effects of
unification. It is a highly suggestive, realistic,
and fruitful alternative explanation to that of
stable equilibrium analysis, which is usually
based on competitive conditions and diminish-
ing returns, and concludes that gains are widely

and evenly distributed. Some might consider
these concepts as one of Myrdal's most impor-
tant contributions.
Like the Marxists, Myrdal emphasizes the un-
equal distribution of power and property as an
obstacle not only to equity but also to growth.
But his conclusion is not Marxist. He regards a
direct planning of institutions and shaping of
attitudes (what Marx regarded as part of the
superstructure) as necessary, though very diffi-
cult, partly because the policies which aim at
reforming attitudes and institutions are them-
selves part of the social system, part of the
power and property structure.
This brings us to Myrdal's critique of the kind
of government he calls the "soft state." This
critique has sometimes been misunderstood. It
is plain that "softness" in Myrdal's sense is quite
compatible with a high degree of coercion, vio-
lence, and cruelty. The Tamils in Sri Lanka, the
Indians in Burma, the Chinese in Indonesia, the
Hindus in Pakistan, the Moslems in India, the
Biharis in Bangladesh—to take six states he calls
"soft"—would not complain about excessively
soft treatment. "Soft states" also use military
violence, both internal and external. Their
"softness" lies in their unwillingness to coerce
in order to implement declared policy goals. It
is not the results of gentleness or weakness, but
reflects the power structure and a gap between
real intentions and professions.
Myrdal has also applied his method to the
analysis of inflation combined with widespread
unemployment in the developed countries of the
West in the 1970s. He attributes "stagflation"
to the organization of producers as pressure
groups and the dispersion and comparative
weakness of consumers, to the tax system which
encourages speculative expenditures, to the
structure of markets, and to the methods of
oligopoly administrative pricing, and he con-
demns inflation as a socially highly divisive
force.
The approach favored by Myrdal is one of
neither Soviet authority and force nor of capital-
ist laissez-faire, but of a third way: that of using
prices for planning purposes and of attacking
attitudes and institutions directly to make them
the instruments of reform. The difficulty is that
any instrument, even if used with the intention
to reform, within a given power structure may
serve the powerful and reestablish the old equi-
librium. Even well-intentioned allocations, ra-
tioning, and controls may reinforce monopoly
and big business. What looks like socialism in
MYRDAL, GUNNAR 577
the first round feeds monopoly capitalism in
the second or third. How does one break out of
this lock? Myrdal does not draw revolutionary
conclusions but relies on the admittedly difficult
possibility of self-reform that arises, in both the
American creed and in the modernization
ideals, from the tensions between proclaimed
beliefs and actions.
On the one hand, he thus stands more firmly
in the neoclassical tradition than he might be
prepared to admit and attributes considerable
importance to avoiding "distortions" of interest
rates and prices. On the other hand, there is an
inconsistency in his advocacy of central plan-
ning and his contempt for most politicians and
bureaucrats, which reveals an anarchistic streak.
Both An American Dilemma and Asian Drama
are books about the interaction and the conflict
between ideals and reality, and about how,
when the two conflict, one of them must give
way. Much of conventional economic theory is
a rationalization whose purpose it is to conceal
that conflict. But it is bound to reassert itself
sooner or later. When this happens, either the
ideals will be scaled down to conform to the
reality or the reality will be shaped by the ideals.
Even if the chances of success are only one in
a hundred, Myrdal, never afraid to express un-
conventional and unpopular views in plain lan-
guage, will have been a leader, in thought and
action, toward a reality shaped by enlightened
ideals.
PAUL STREETEN
WORKS BY MYRDAL
1927 Prisbildningsproblemet och fordnderligheten
(Price Formation and Economic Change). Uppsala
and Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell. —> Myrdal's
doctoral dissertation.
(1930) 1953 The Political Element in the Develop-
ment of Economic Theory. Translated by Paul
Streeten. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. —> First pub-
lished in Swedish.
(1931) 1939 Monetary Equilibrium. London: Hodge.
—> First published in Swedish. An expanded version
was published in German in 1933 as "Der Gleich-
gewichtsbegriff als Instrument der geldtheoretischen
Analyse" in Friedrich A. von Hayek (editor),
Beitrdge zur Geldtheorie.
1933 Konjunkturer och offentlig hushdllning (Cycles
and Public Finance). Stockholm: Kooperativa for-
bundets bokforlag.
1934 Finanspolitikens ehonomiska verkningar (The
Economic Effects of Fiscal Policy). Stockholm:
Norstedt.
1934 MYRDAL, ALVA; and MYRDAL, GUNNAR Kris i
befolkningsfrdgan (Crisis in the Population Prob-
lem). Stockholm: Bonnier.
578 MYRDAL, GUNNAR
1940 Population: A Problem for Democracy. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
(1944a) 1962 An American Dilemma: The Negro Prob-
lem and Modern Democracy. New York: Harper.
—» A paperback edition was published in 1964 by
McGraw-Hill.
1944b Varning for fredoptimism (Warning Against
Postwar Optimism). Stockholm: Bonnier.
1955 Realities and Illusions in Regard to Intergovern-
mental Organizations. Oxford Univ. Press.
1956a Development and Under-development: A Note
on the Mechanism of National and International
Inequality. Cairo: National Bank of Egypt .
1956b An International Economy: Problems and Pros-
pects. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
1957 Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions
London: Duckworth; New York: Harper.
(1958) 1968 Value in Social Theory: A Selection of
Essays on Methodology. Edited by Paul Streeten.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(1960) 1963 Beyond the Welfare State: Economic
Planning in the Welfare States and Its International
Implications. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1961 Value-loaded Concepts. Pages 273-288 in Hugo
Hegeland (editor), Money, Growth and Methodology
and Other Essays in Honor of Johan Akerman. Lund
(Sweden): Gleerup.
(1962) 1965 Challenge to Affluence. Rev. ed. New
York: Vintage.
1968 Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of
Nations. 3 vols. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.
1969 Objectivity in Social Research. New York:
Pantheon.
1970a The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-
poverty Program in Outline. New York: Pantheon.
—> A paperback edition was published in 1971 by
Random House.
1970b The "Soft State" in Underdeveloped Countries.
Pages 227-243 in Paul Streeten (editor), Unfash-
ionable Economics. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
1973 Against the Stream: Critical Essays on Eco-
nomics. New York: Pantheon. —> A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1974 by Random House.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOHRN, HARALD (editor) 1976 Gunnar Myrdal: A
Bibliography, 1919-1976. Stockholm: Acta Bib-
liothecae Regiae Stockholmiensis.
MADAN, T. N. 1969 Caste and Development. Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly 4:285-290.
WICKSELL, KNUT (1898) 1936 Interest and Prices.
With an introduction by Bertil Ohlin. London: Mac-
millan. —» First published in German.
 NAGEL, ERNEST
Ernest Nagel is one of the most distinguished
philosophers of science of this century. He is
also widely recognized as a leading spokesman
for a critical naturalism and a refurbished em-
piricism, and as a defender of some leading
themes in the pragmatic approach to knowledge
and science. But he is also critical of some prag-
matic theses, e.g., that it is the function of sci-
entific theories to predict and not explain, and
that scientific theories and laws should not and
cannot coherently be construed as statements-
true or false—but must be described only as use-
ful or useless rules of inference.
Many of the themes and interests just indi-
cated are conceptually interconnected for Na-
gel. He buttresses his defense of naturalism by
reference to the outcome of scientific inquiry,
and believes that his version of empiricism is
supported by reference to scientific procedures
and claims. Thus he does not think that scien-
tific practice and theories lend credence to some
distinctive rationalistic theses, among them, the
thesis that scientific laws express necessities or
necessary truths, or that science supposes the
truth of determinism. He further accepts and
develops the Piercean claim that scientific pro-
cedures are self-corrective, that science is dis-
tinguished by its method, and that there are no
premises that are certain and indubitable and
that serve as the foundation for knowledge. He
is therefore critical of some traditional versions
of empiricism, hence the previously used term
"refurbished empiricism." He has no sympathy
with the view that there is an indubitable ob-
servational language that supports scientific
theories or by appeal to which scientific theories
are tested. It is equally obvious that he is critical
of some recent approaches to the philosophy of
science developed by Paul Feyerabend and
others, which challenge, in John Dewey's
phrase, the thesis of the supremacy of method.
And as against Thomas Kuhn, he takes it as
given that despite revolutionary changes, sci-
entific advances and the growth of knowledge
are cumulative, at least in many areas of re-
search, and certainly in the physical sciences.
Nagel has written extensively on issues in
the philosophy of science, theory of knowledge,
philosophy of law, and moral theory, and has
written papers that fall squarely into the area of
the history of science. His writings include The
Logic of Measurement (1930); An Introduction
to Logic and Scientific Method (Cohen & Nagel
1934); Principles of the Theory of Probability
(1939); Sovereign Reason (1954); Logic With-
out Metaphysics (1956); and The Structure of
Science (1961). He has also coedited a number
of books, among them Induction: Some Current
Issues (Nagel & Kyburg 1963) and Meaning
and Knowledge: Systematic Readings in Episte-
mology (Nagel & Brandt 1965). Another book,
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the His-
tory and Philosophy of Science, is now in press.
His writings exhibit the influence of the work
of various scientists on his thinking: Jules H.
Poincare, Pierre Duhem, Norman R. Campbell,
James C. Maxwell, Paul F. Lazarsfeld. Morris
Cohen and John Dewey were the teachers who
influenced him the most. He often expresses in-
debtedness to the writings of Philipp Frank and
579
580 NAGEL, ERNEST
Rudolf Carnap. Nagel has been very influ-
ential both as writer and teacher, and countless
students have expressed indebtedness to him.
He was born in Czechoslovakia in 1901, and
received his B.S. in social science at the City Col-
lege of New York in 1923, his M.A. from Colum-
bia University in 1925, and his PH.D. in 1930.
He was an instructor in philosophy at City Col-
lege in 1930/1931, and taught at Columbia
University until his retirement in 1970. In
1965, he was named John Dewey professor of
philosophy. He became university professor in
1967, and after his retirement was a special
lecturer from 1970 to 1974. He has been widely
honored, and has served as president of the As-
sociation of Symbolic Logic (1941-1943), the
American Philosophical Association (1954),
and the Philosophy of Science Association
(1961-1963).
It is distinctive of Nagel's approach that he
formulates his theses with extreme care, and
defends them only after suitable qualifications
have been made. What follows is therefore a
sketch of some aspects of Nagel's views, par-
ticularly as they relate to issues in the philos-
ophy of the social sciences.
Nagel's naturalism is in part a thesis that
defines what there is—it denies that there are
disembodied entities or states. It also includes
a correlative thesis about explanation, namely
that all explanations exist by reference to
the behavior of organized bodies. Nagel fur-
ther claims that the results of modern science
lend credence to a version of contextual natural-
ism that he thinks is the most distinctive contri-
bution of American philosophical thought of
this century. As suggested, Nagel views natural-
ism not as a body of a priori truths, but as
leading principles which are in accord with
scientific theories and procedures. It therefore
follows that for Nagel nonnaturalistic, even
theological, theses are not cognitively mean-
ingless.
Notice that contextual naturalism as con-
strued by Nagel does not deny the reality of
mental events or occurrences or states. Again,
Nagel's naturalism does not entail the thesis
that mental states—e.g., pains—are to be identi-
fied with brain states, or with dispositions to
behave; or, to use the formal mode, that state-
ments about mental states are synonymous with
statements about behavior. Nagel's naturalism
is therefore to be distinguished from most ver-
sions of materialism, and from some recent
versions of extreme behaviorism (see "Natural-
ism Revisited" in Logic Without Metaphysics,
and "The Perspective of Science and the Pros-
pects of Men" in Sovereign Reason).
Some epistemological views on these issues
deserve review. Nagel's naturalism and empiri-
cism allow him to admit that agents may have
privileged knowledge of or about their mental
states, but not exclusively so. That is to say, he
does claim that some mental terms or predicates—
e.g., terms denoting attitudes—may be viewed
as behavioral dispositional terms, which denote
dispositions to behave, and hence, when people
talk about their attitudes, they may not be in a
privileged position to know about them. Grant-
ing that agents may be in a privileged position
about some mental states—e.g., pains—he adds
that others, however, may also be in a position
to confirm or disconfirm statements about them
as well. Statements about pain may be directly
or indirectly confirmable by reference to be-
havior, verbal or otherwise, of agents (1956,
chapter 2; 1961, pp. 447-454).
Social scientific theories and terms or subject
matter may be subjective in a number of senses.
Explanations frequently refer to intentions of
agents; social scientific theories are frequently
about inner states. Again, agents may be privi-
leged in their knowledge of the truth about
some sentences describing their psychological
states; and many psychological statements are
not synonymous with statements about brain
states or equivalent in meaning with statements
about behavior, but are, nevertheless, partially
reducible to them. In general, mental terms ap-
plied by A to B may be, as far as B is concerned,
partially reduced to statements about A's be-
havior, or may function as theoretical terms to
B. It is therefore readily apparent that Nagel
does not want to continue as significant for the
purposes of understanding—not merely in social
scientific discourse, but in scientific discourse
in general—some distinction between observa-
tional and theoretical terms. More generally,
Nagel has little patience with philosophical
theses that claim that theoretical terms are syn-
onymous with conjunctions or disjunctions of
observational terms. Although Nagel is sym-
pathetic to the verification theory of meaning,
he does not subscribe to any specific formula-
tion of that theory. When he does dismiss some
specific claims as pointless, or cognitively mean-
ingless, he tries to give specific reasons for his
dismissal. More often than not, as in his well-
known critique of some versions of Freudian
theory, he argues that it is difficult to specify

clearly the empirical significance of the claim
in question and to know what evidence counts
for or against it, as distinguished from the evi-
dence for or against the contrary theory. Need-
less to say, he often adds that it is otiose to ask
for the testing of scientific hypotheses in isola-
tion, and admits that scientific terms get their
meaning in part from the lawlike sentences in
which they are embedded. Critiques for him are
therefore critiques of systems of thought (1961,
chapters 6, 13; 1954, chapters 4, 5, 6).
The distinction just alluded to between obser-
vational and theoretical is for Nagel neither a
precise nor an absolute one. As already sug-
gested, both terms get their meaning, or, per-
haps better, their significance, from the laws
and generalizations in which they appear. Ob-
servational terms do not describe the momen-
tarily given, and therefore, in a sense, are
theoretical, and thus not certain. Still, for Nagel
a functional distinction exists between observa-
tional and theoretical terms. By and large, the
former are terms about which there is wide-
spread agreement as to their applicability to the
experience to be encountered, and they have re-
mained of stable use despite changes in scien-
tific beliefs and theories. And since he believes
that there is wide agreement about the direct
applicability of some terms to collectives and
groups, he does not agree with those versions
of methodological individualism that claim that
all statements in the social sciences must be
tested by reference to the behavior of individ-
uals or be reduced to statements about the be-
havior of individuals. Although he is sympa-
thetic to the thesis that terms about collectives
are often clarified when reduced to terms about
individuals, he does not claim that they must
be. A term S may be reduced to T even if S is
not explicitly definable by reference to T, but is
only partially so (1956, pp. 361-369; 1961, pp.
473-485, 535-546).
According to Nagel, methodological individ-
ualism must be distinguished from psycholo-
gism, or the thesis that all theories in the social
sciences are reducible to psychology—a thesis
Nagel is hesitant to accept. On all accounts,
he has very little sympathy with some classic
versions of psychologism—e.g., that of John
Stuart Mill, which has been proven untenable
by Dewey, Thorstein Veblen, and Franz Boas,
and others. Psychologism, in turn, must be dis-
tinguished from social scientific reductionism,
or the thesis that ultimately the basic laws or
theories of the social sciences, whatever they
NAGEL, ERNEST 581
may be, are reducible to biology or perhaps ulti-
mately to the physical sciences. Nagel does not
believe that social scientific reductionism is
hopeless, even if it may be a speculative thesis.
At any rate, he has argued at length for the
reducibility in principle of biological theories to
theories in the physical sciences. It should be
noted that Nagel does not think it is helpful to
discuss the reducibility of one type of phenom-
enon to another, or even the reducibility of one
discipline to another. He thinks it is essential
for the purposes of clarity to discuss the reduci-
bility of one theory to another, and has stipu-
lated various conditions that must be achieved
before one theory may be said to be reduced to
another. For him, theory A is reduced to theory
B if (but not only if) theory B contains terms
which theory A does not, the terms of theory A
are suitably related to the terms of theory B
and the laws of theory B are deduced from the
laws of theory A. In some writings, he allows
that theory B may be reduced to theory A even
if the laws are not deduced from theory A, but,
let us say, made probable by them. It is of some
moment to remember that the terms of theory
B are not considered by him synonymous with
terms in theory A, the terms in theory B still
apply to phenomena directly. Should the laws or
theories about headaches, for example, be re-
duced to the laws about brain states, it does not
follow that there are no headaches but only
brain states. Nagel has stipulated the semantic
conditions that obtain between the terms of
theory A and B, and how these conditions figure
in the deduction of the laws of theory B from
theory A (1961, chapter 11).
Nagel's naturalism therefore supports some
theses about the social sciences which stress
their continuity with the natural. Nagel espe-
cially argues for the thesis that the criteria for
the acceptability of claims as warranted, or as
worthy-of-belief, are the same in the natural
and the social sciences. This does not require
Nagel to deny that there is no obvious simple
way to avoid bias or "relativity" in the social
sciences, and he does not deny that values fre-
quently play a role in the genesis of observa-
tional reports. These admissions do not dimin-
ish the force of Nagel's contentions about
method, for it is not the genesis of the reports
that matter, but their subsequent history. Re-
ports once made can be publicly checked and
criticized, bias possibly can be checked by the
self-corrective method of the sciences. He also
tries to show that some extreme claims about
 582 NAGEL, ERNEST
the sociology of knowledge made by Karl Mann-
heim and others are incoherent and self-defeat-
ing (1961, pp. 485-503).
There is another invariance between the na-
tural and social sciences stressed by Nagel. All
the sciences aim at presenting comprehensive
explanations and aim to formulate and test law-
like statements and theories. These aims are
interconnected for Nagel since he accepts the
nomological model for explanation. Let us use
the term "explanandum," for the sentences or
set of sentences describing that which we want
to explain; a member of that set therefore might
describe an event or, if lawlike, a regularity.
Again, let us use the term "explanans," for the
set of sentences which afford us the explana-
tion. Nagel defends the thesis that the ex-
planans must contain a law. Notice, therefore,
that Nagel does not defend what has occasion-
ally been called the covering-law model. That
model claims that we have a satisfactory expla-
nation if, and only if, the explanans contains a
law, and the explanandum is deduced from the
explanans. One might add here that a sentence
is a law if it is lawlike and true, a sentence is
lawlike if it is general and satisfies other re-
quirements about the conditions which Nagel
develops in The Structure of Science. We shall
use the word "theory" to apply to a set of laws
which may be used to systematize a discipline,
and a theory generally contains theoretical
terms. Nagel tries to specify in many of his
writings a way of understanding the structure
of most theories, especially in the natural sci-
ences. He has written at length about three dis-
tinguishable elements that play a role in the
formation and interpretation of scientific
theories: the implicit formalism, the coordinat-
ing definitions, and the model for the theory.
It is only by understanding all three together
that we can see how theories will afford us ex-
planations of laws or, if one wishes, the regu-
larities which laws express (1961, chapters 1,
13, pp. 459-466).
The aims suggested for the sciences, social
and otherwise, are long-term ones. It does not
follow that it is the immediate aim of any social
scientific discipline to try to test and confirm
comprehensive theories at once. The immediate
aims of a discipline for Nagel can only be
specified fruitfully by reference to the history
of the discipline, and an awareness of the prob-
lems faced by the discipline. But if one accepts
Nagel's long-range aim, one need not accept
any version of determinism. And certainly one
need not accept determinism as a metaphysical
thesis to the effect that every event must have
a cause; or that every event—no matter how
fine a description we may have of that event—is
explainable in a way that satisfies the covering-
law model of explanation, namely, that the sen-
tence describing the event is deducible from a
set of laws and the relevant initial conditions.
Two points may be added. Nagel thinks that
determinism is best formulated not as a state-
ment true or false, but as a leading principle or
directive to inquiry which may turn out to be
useful or useless. He does not, however, agree
with the claim that has frequently been made
that our claims about human actions, our as-
signments of guilt and, responsibility, commit
us to indeterminism, a position he finds dubi-
ous. So although Nagel does not think that his
approach to explanation presupposes accep-
tance of determinism as a truth about nature
or man, he does not think that any argument has
been shown that coherent discourse about hu-
man action requires commitment to indetermin-
ism or libertarianism. It should be added that al-
though Nagel thinks that the social sciences will
most likely at best be able to confirm and test
statistical laws and theories, he does not think
it helpful to say on that account that human
action or behavior is "inherently statistical." He
claims that a deterministic account may be
available only if we allow ourselves to use phys-
iological terms and theories, but adds that if
we do so, we may be using terms of no interest
to us as social scientists (1961, pp. 316-324,
592-606; 1954, chapter 15; 1956, chapter 4,
pp. 95-103).
Nagel distinguishes between four types of
explanation: deductive, probabilistic, genetic,
and functional. In a deductive explanation, the
explanandum is deduced from the explanans;
in a probabilistic one, it is made probable. In a
genetic explanation, an event or an institution
is explained, in part or as a whole, by tracing its
genesis or history. In a functional explanation,
an item within a system, such as an organ or
institution, is explained by showing the role it
plays within the system of which it is a part.
Nagel then tries to show how these four types
of explanations appear in the sciences, social
and natural, and the problems each one of these
types encounters.
As already noted, all these explanations may
be of the nomological kind, and Nagel tries to
show that indeed they are. Given this, a cor-
ollary follows: Nagel's approach does not deny

that many but not all explanations are of a
causal account; that we explain an event e by
showing that it was caused by event f. The link
between causal and nomological explanations
is provided by David Hume's thesis which Nagel
develops. Hume's view was that a statement to
the effect that event e is caused by event f, is
short for a body of statements of the following
type: Event e manifests property P, event f
property Q, all events that manifest property P
are succeeded by events that manifest property
Q (1961, chapters 2, 3, pp. 73-78; 1956,
chapter 11).
It has on occasion been claimed that the ap-
proach suggested by Nagel, and others sympa-
thetic to the views he develops, forget that it is
the aim of the social sciences to enable us to
understand human action. But there is no in-
compatibility between the quest for understand-
ing and the adoption of the types of naturalism
espoused by Nagel. Compatibility is at hand if
we adopt the thesis that S's action is made un-
derstandable by a certain type of explanation,
one in which the explanans, or the set of sen-
tences explaining S's actions, contains sentences
about S's beliefs, intentions, and attitudes, and
lawlike sentences. There is incompatibility if
one argues that A can know about B's intentions
or beliefs only by a special mode of confirma-
tion. Nagel shows that some who have argued
against his view are committed to the unaccep-
table thesis that A can understand B, only if A
attributes "experiences" to B which A has had
as well. This thesis would lead to the result
that only a schizophrenic can "understand" a
schizophrenic or, more germane, can explain a
schizophrenic's behavior (1961, pp. 535-546).
Nagel, as indicated, tries to show the applica-
bility of his approach to the work of the social
scientist, and especially to show how various
statistical explanations in the social science are
in accord with the deductive model. He also ap-
plies his analyses in an attempt to reconstruct
historical explanations, many of which are only
of the inductive kind (1961, pp. 508-520, 551-
576).
Functional statements and functional expla-
nations play a role both in biology and the social
sciences. Nagel first tries to show that func-
tional statements are eliminable. That state-
ments to the effect that the function of x is y,
can be rephrased to read that x is necessary in
order for the organism of which it is a part to
be in a certain state. A functional explanation
then tries to show that x is necessary for the
NAGEL, ERNEST 583
accomplishment of a goal of the organism of
which it is a part. We have functional explana-
tions when we can clearly indicate the condi-
tions under which an organism or entity can
exist when it has clear goals, and when certain
conditions are necessary for the accomplish-
ment of these goals. And Nagel tries to show
that diverse proposed functional approaches in
the social sciences, especially those offered by
British functionalists—e.g., Bronislaw Malinow-
ski and others—fail to satisfy these require-
ments (1956, chapter 10).
The term "goal," or rather, the longer term
"goal-directed" behavior, requires elucidation.
At least two cases have to be distinguished. The
one where an agent acts with a conscious end in
view, and tries to behave in a way which would
at least make probable the accomplishment of
his or her end. The other, where no conscious
intention is attributable to the entity. In such
cases, we may say that an organism or entity O,
behaves teleologically toward goal G, if at least
four conditions are satisfied (1) O can be in a
G-state under some but not all conditions; (2)
O exhibits a certain persistence, it is or can be
in a G-state even if there are variations in the
environment in which O finds itself; notoriously,
there are ranges within which this may occur;
(3) O exhibits plasticity, its internal states
change mainly, but not only, in response to
changes in environmental changes to enable it
to be in a G-state; (4) There is nomic-indepen-
dence in the relative state variables. Assume,
for the sake of argument, that O can be in a
G-state only if it is in a suitable Z-state; assume
further, that a Z-state is one in which Q has two
characteristics which admit of degree, or that
there are two state variables P, Q. (O is in a
Z-state if P! and Q,, or P2 and Q2, etc.). The
fourth condition then maintains that there is no
general law which requires an organism to be
in a specific PT condition at t, if it is in a specific
Qi condition at t. These are the four conditions
defended by Nagel in his approach to functional
explanation, and in some of his articles he tries
to show how various attempts at functional ex-
planations and functional theories come close
to satisfying these conditions, but frequently
fail. His analyses of the logic of functional ex-
planations, as given by Robert Merton, has played
an important role in the development of the
logic of the social sciences (1961, pp. 401-427).
In addition to his work in the philosophy of
the social sciences Nagel's philosophy is replete
with analyses of many problems in the areas of
584 NEWCOMB, THEODORE M.
science in general. In The Structure of Science,
he deals with the notion of convention, with the
role of conventions in physical theory, the na-
ture of physical theory, the rise and decline of
mechanical explanation, the status of geometry,
and kindred topics which have received a great
deal of attention. His monograph on Principles
of the Theory of Probability is a defense of the
frequency view of probability—or at least the
applicability of the frequency view in many con-
texts of scientific investigation. Nagel adds,
however, that the frequency view cannot eluci-
date the various contexts in which we speak of
one theory being more probable than another,
or one theory being more probable as evidence
for it accumulates. His early text, written with
Cohen, has remained a classic text in the philos-
ophy of science, and in the logic of the scientific
method.
SIDNEY MORGENBESSER
WORKS BY NAGEL
1930 The Logic of Measurement. New York: Harcourt.
1934 COHEN, MORRIS R.; and NAGEL, ERNEST An In-
troduction to Logic and Scientific Method. New
York: Harcourt. —» A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1962.
1939 Principles of the Theory of Probability. Univ. of
Chicago Press.
1954 Sovereign Reason. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
1956 Logic Without Metaphysics, and Other Essays in
the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
1961 The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic
of Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcourt.
1963 NAGEL, ERNEST; and KYBURG, HENRY E. (edi-
tors) Induction: Some Current Issues. Middletown,
Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press.
1965 NAGEL, ERNEST; and BRANDT, RICHARD B. Mean-
ing and Knowledge: Systematic Readings in Epis-
temology. New York: Harcourt.
NEWCOMB, THEODORE M.
When Theodore M. Newcomb received his
doctoral degree at Columbia University, the field
of social psychology was beginning to be identi-
fiable as a subdiscipline of the fields of psy-
chology and sociology. The development of that
field since that time has been importantly in-
fluenced by his contributions as a researcher
and theorist and also by his role as a mentor of
graduate students who became noted behavioral
scientists. Newcomb began his graduate studies
at Union Theological Seminary where he ex-
perienced the open mindedness, intellectuality,
and social concern of his professors (particu-
larly Harrison S. Elliot and Harry Ward). How-
ever, the courses he took "across the street" at
Columbia's Teachers College shifted his inter-
ests to psychology. He transferred to Columbia
where he received his PH.D. in 1929. There, he
was strongly impressed by the measurement and
methodological approaches of Robert S. Wood-
worth and Edward Lee Thorndike. His ground-
ing as a psychologist can be attributed in large
measure to his graduate work with Gardner Mur-
phy with whom he developed a lifelong personal
friendship and intellectual relationship. New-
comb's orientation and perspectives in psychol-
ogy were also formed by the teaching and guid-
ance of Goodwin Watson, who became a close
friend as well.
Born in 1903, the son of a Congregational
minister, Newcomb's early years were spent in
a rural Ohio setting. He attended Oberlin Col-
lege, earning his B.A. in 1924. After teaching
French and English for one year, he entered
Union Theological Seminary with the intention
of becoming a college teacher of religion. His
transfer to Columbia University Teachers Col-
lege took place during his second year at Union
Seminary.
After receiving his doctorate, Newcomb's first
academic appointment was as assistant pro-
fessor in psychology at Lehigh University. After
a year at Lehigh he joined the psychology fac-
ulty at the Cleveland campus of Western Re-
serve University where he spent the next four
years (1930-1934). While at Western Reserve
he carried out a research study with one of his
graduate students. This study (Newcomb &
Svehla 1937), which in its method and content
presaged the character of much of his later
work, was concerned with similarities and dif-
ferences of attitudes among dyads (in this case
parent-child comparisons), used measurement
techniques that were advanced for its time, and
related two-person interpersonal influences to
the effects of larger social groupings. Specifi-
cally, the study showed that the contexts of
ethnic and religious memberships were vehicles
for the transmission of attitudes from parent to
child. Another quality of this study, which be-
came somewhat typical of Newcomb, was the
detailed and painstaking statistical analysis of
data leading to unpredicted and unexpected
findings.
During his last year in Cleveland, Newcomb
coauthored, with Gardner Murphy and Lois B.
Murphy, a revision of their book, Experimental
Social Psychology (1937). This revision was
probably influential in setting the future aspect

of American social psychology as an experi-
mental and quasiexperimental field.
Newcomb moved to Bennington College in
1934, only two years after the college admitted
its first freshman class. This was hardly a
typical place of higher education. It was new,
small, isolated in the Green Mountains of Ver-
mont, innovative, and college-community ori-
ented. In addition, its student body was entirely
female and disproportionately from upper in-
come families. Yet it was here that Newcomb
collected data on the student population for the
"Bennington Study" that became a landmark re-
search study of theoretical significance and gen-
eralizability. It appeared as a publication en-
titled Personality and Social Change (1943).
The research involved a longitudinal study of
political-social attitude change. The findings
showed a prevailing shift toward declining con-
servatism among students during the college
years largely attributable to peer group associa-
tions and community norms. The exceptions
tended to be students who were more passive
and dependent on family and outside commu-
nity norms, and/or who belonged to small cam-
pus friendship groups that were relatively iso-
lated from or negativistic toward the larger
campus community.
In 1941 Newcomb was appointed an associate
professor in the sociology department of the
University of Michigan. He remained at Michi-
gan until his retirement in 1973, with the ex-
ception of four years he spent in Washington in
various war-related positions. When he returned
to Ann Arbor in 1945, he received the rank of
professor in both the psychology and sociology
departments. In 1955, during his tenure at
Michigan, he was elected president of the Amer-
ican Psychological Association.
The Doctoral Program in Social Psychology
was created at Michigan in 1946, and in 1947
Newcomb became its director. Until its dissolu-
tion in 1963, which he deeply regretted, the
program gained the reputation of turning out
top quality PH.D.S in social psychology, many of
whom have had outstanding careers. In addition
to his role as a graduate program administrator
and mentor of doctoral candidates, Newcomb
was highly esteemed as an undergraduate lec-
turer.
Two of Newcomb's books, closely related to
his teaching perspectives, had considerable im-
pact in shaping the content of social psychology,
both in its influence on colleagues and on the
education of students. These were Readings in
NEWCOMB, THEODORE M. 585
Social Psychology (1947), edited with Eugene L.
Hartley, and Social Psychology (1950). The
Readings in Social Psychology presented to the
student a selection of research articles and con-
ceptual essays reflecting the state of advance-
ment of social psychology. An appendix was
included to acquaint the student with the rudi-
ments of hypothesis testing inferential statistics.
Social Psychology, while serving as a text-
book, presented a comprehensive theory of so-
cial psychology which drew together and inte-
grated several conceptual frameworks, including
the social self theories of Charles Horton Cooley
and George Herbert Mead; frame of reference
theory largely based on the work of Muzafer
Sherif; and the structure-function definitional
system as outlined by Ralph Linton. Linton's
concepts of role and status especially gave New-
comb's book the quality of an interface between
social structure and behavior at the individual
psychological level.
In the early 1950s Newcomb's interests fo-
cused on theoretical formulations of the nature
of interaction between individuals' attitudes to-
ward each other and their attitudes toward ex-
ternal objects (other people or ideas). The
prototype of his formulations along these lines
appeared in an article in the Psychological Re-
view (1953). The following year he began re-
search on students who were housed together
for one academic year with their understanding
that they would serve as subjects of study. Two
groups were studied, one group in each of two
successive years. Newcomb's research aims were
to test empirically his theoretical propositions
and to refine them in terms of the results. This
research was reported in his book, The Ac-
quaintance Process (1961). He found that while
there was no appreciable change in attitudes
toward the external objects, a balancing effect
did take place whereby the students' attitudes
toward each other and accompanying interper-
sonal grouping did change as the acquaintance
process proceeded. These results were in line
with Newcomb's disposition toward Fritz Heider's
notions of "balance theory." This study led to a
concern for understanding the nature of sta-
bility in individuals and in groups, which New-
comb discussed in two subsequent papers (1963;
1965).
Nearly 25 years after the original Bennington
study, Newcomb began follow-up research on
the former students, comparing them to the
Bennington students of the middle 1960s. This
research was published as Persistence and
 586 NEWCOMB, THEODORE M.
Change: Bennington College and Its Students
After Twenty-five Years (Newcomb et al. 1967).
Perhaps surprisingly, it turned out that the
alumnae tended to persist in their liberalism
rather than "regress" toward conservatism. His
data on the students at Bennington in the 1960s
showed that an important difference from the
students of the 1930s was that even before en-
tering college, the students of the early 1960s
held markedly liberal views. The Bennington
experience, therefore, had no appreciable effect
in shifting their attitudes. Newcomb interpreted
the effects, rather, in terms of reinforcing al-
ready existing attitudes. However, sociopolitical
attitudes were not found to be the salient dimen-
sion of concern in the early 1960s Bennington
environment. Instead, the more personal atti-
tudes of individualism, unconventionality, and
intellectualism were relevant to the college com-
munity norms.
The general phenomena of college student
peer groups was taken up by Newcomb in two
essays which appeared in two collections, one
edited by Nevitt Sanford, The American College
(1962) and a related volume edited by Newcomb
and Everett K. Wilson, College Peer Groups
(1966). In these articles Newcomb theorized
about the variables which determine peer forma-
tion and more particularly dealt with the dis-
juncture between peer group interests and
values on the one hand and the academic in-
tellectual functions of the college on the other.
Newcomb acknowledged that this concern is
certainly not a new one for the colleges, but he
ascribed an exacerbation of this condition in
more recent times to the largeness of colleges
and the growing breakdown of community
qualities :
I believe that college faculty members, by and large
are nowadays no less capable of offering intellec-
tual excitement than they used to be. But for the
most part they now operate in social systems such
that whatever excitement they offer tends not to
be caught up, re-enforced, and multiplied by virtue
of being shared outside the classroom. Time was
when colleges were typically small, their student
bodies relatively homogenous, and their general
atmosphere community-like. Most of the changes of
the past few decades have tended to deprive large
numbers of colleges of these characteristics. The
result has been that peer-group influences are as
potent as ever, but increasingly divorced from in-
tellectual concerns. (Newcomb & Wilson 1966,
p. 484)
In collaboration with Kenneth A. Feldman,
Newcomb wrote an extensive review and syn-
thesis of the research on the effects of attending
college, The Impact of College on Students
(1969). In this work the authors point up a
process which they call "accentuation"—the fixa-
tion and intensification of values and motiva-
tional orientations which already exist in the
individual. Accentuation is particularly affected
by college environments when the size of the
college unit or the subunit is small enough to
allow for a community atmosphere. The intel-
lectual goals of the college can be enhanced
when the size and organization of the college
unit makes for informal faculty-student social
contact. Belief in this kind of proposition led
to the establishment in 1967 of the Residential
College at the University of Michigan, with an
initial class of 220 freshmen. Newcomb, who
participated in the advocacy and planning of
the college, became its associate director for
assessment and research.
Upon his academic retirement to emeritus
status, Newcomb's research activity remained
undiminished. He continued in the analysis of
data emanating from the Residential College
research and undertook the analysis of data ob-
tained from a sample of two thousand inmates
drawn from all the juvenile correctional insti-
tutions in the United States. The purpose was to
try to discern why "corrections" took place for
some of the children and not others. This shift
of interest from the most to the least favored
youth in our society is testimony both to the
general applicability of Newcomb's thoretical
formulations and his lifelong concern with so-
cial issues.
LLOYD BARENBLATT
WORKS BY NEWCOMB
1937 MURPHY, GARDNER; MURPHY, Lois B.; and NEW-
COMB, THEODORE M. Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy. Rev. ed. New York: Harper. -^Gardner Murphy
and Lois B. Murphy were the authors of the first
edition, published in 1931.
1937 NEWCOMB, THEODORE M.; and SVEHLA, GYULA
Intra-family Relations in Attitude. Sociometry 1:180-
205.
(1943) 1957 Personality and Social Change: Attitude
Formation in a Student Community. New York:
Dry den.
1947 NEWCOMB, THEODORE M.; and HARTLEY, EU-
GENE L. (editors) Readings in Social Psychology.
New York: Holt.
1950 Social Psychology. New York: Holt.
1953 An Approach to the Study of Communicative
Acts. Psychological Review 60:393-404.
1961 The Acquaintance Process. New York: Holt.
1963 Stabilities Underlying Changes in Interpersonal
Attraction Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy-
chology 66:376-386.
1965 Interpersonal Constancies: Psychological and
Sociological Approaches. Pages 38-49 in Otto Kline-

berg and R. Christie (editors), Perspectives in So-
cial Psychology. New York: Holt.
1966 NEWCOMB, THEODORE M.; and WILSON, EVER-
ETT K. (editors) College Peer Groups: Problems and
Prospects of Research. Chicago: Aldine.
1967 NEWCOMB, THEODORE M. et al. Persistence and
Change: Bennington College and Its Students After
Twenty-five Years. New York: Wiley.
1969 FELDMAN, KENNETH A.; and NEWCOMB, THEO-
DORE M. The Impact of College on Students. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
NEYMAN, JERZY
Jerzy Neyman, director of the Statistical Lab-
oratory, University of California, Berkeley, is a
leading figure in the field of statistics. He is
known for his fundamental contributions to
theoretical statistics and for his extensive in-
volvement in applications to astronomy, biology,
health, and meteorology.
Neyman was born on April 16, 1894, to a
Polish family then living in Bendery, Russia. In
his early years, he became fluent in Polish,
Ukrainian, Russian, German, French, and clas-
sical Latin. After attending school in Simferopol
(1904-1906) and Kharkov (1906-1912), he
studied physics and mathematics at the Uni-
versity of Kharkov. As a result of his studies in
physics, he volunteered to prospect for radioac-
tive minerals in an expedition to Outer Mon-
golia.
Neyman's mathematical development was in-
fluenced by the Russian probabilist Serge
Bernstein and especially by Henri Lebesgue's
book Lemons sur I'integration et la recherche des
fonctions primitives (1904). His candidate
thesis at the University of Kharkov (1916) was
on the integral of Lebesgue. His first paper
(1923a) deals with a covering problem for the
Lebesgue measure. Other influences of a more
philosophical nature include Karl Pearson's
Grammar of Science (1892), which Neyman
discussed at length in Kharkov with Otto Struve,
then a budding astronomer. In 1917, he re-
turned to the university for postgraduate study,
and for one year he was a Docent at the Insti-
tute of Technology, Kharkov.
The Russian-Polish war eventually led to his
incarceration as an enemy alien. He was sent to
Poland as part of an exchange of prisoners of
war. In Warsaw, Neyman worked for a time on
mathematical problems, under the guidance of
Waclaw Sierpinski. However, in postwar Poland
other problems were pressing and from 1921 to
1923 Neyman worked as a statistician at the
Agricultural Institute of Bydgoszcz. His doctoral
NEYMAN, JERZY 587
thesis (1923a) concerns applications of proba-
bility to the solution of questions of agricultural
experimentation.
From 1923 to 1925 he was a lecturer at the
Central College of Agriculture Warsaw. In 1924
Neyman went to Karl Pearson's Biometric Lab-
oratory, University College London (as holder
of a postdoctoral fellowship) and in 1928 he
became head of the Biometric Laboratory at the
Nencki Institute in Warsaw. At University Col-
lege, he made the acquaintance of E. S. Pearson,
son of Karl Pearson. Their scientific collabora-
tion started only in 1925. Except for occasional
meetings in 1925-1926, when Neyman studied
in Paris under Lebesgue and Jacques Hada-
mard, the collaboration was carried out by mail
until Neyman's return to University College in
1934.
Neyman and Pearson succeeded in placing
the theory of testing statistical hypotheses on a
firm logical and mathematical basis. A crucial
idea was that statistical hypotheses are formu-
lated mathematically by elaborating probabilis-
tic models of the phenomenon under study. The
qualities of a statistical test of validity of one
model cannot be judged unless the possible al-
ternatives are considered. This idea was not
accepted easily by the authorities in the field.
R. A. Fisher opposed it bitterly to the end of his
life.
The 1928 paper which proposes this funda-
mental idea investigates in this light the per-
formance of several known tests and of a class
of likelihood ratio tests. Subsequent papers
(Neyman & Pearson 1933a; 1933b; Neyman
1934) approach the task of finding tests which
are optimal in that they control the probability
of rejection of a correct hypothesis and maxi-
mize the "power" of the test, that is, the
probability of rejection when the hypothesis is
false. The optimization problem has unique so-
lutions in certain simple cases. In other cases
further restrictions must be imposed to obtain
an answer. Several articles on this subject
appeared in the Statistical Research Memoirs
(Neyman & Pearson 1936).
The impact of the Neyman-Pearson ideas
was felt throughout the field of statistics. After
their appearance it became inconceivable that
one could design an experiment, be it a clinical
trial or a weather modification experiment, with-
out regard to considerations of power. They
determine the length or size of the experiment.
The framework provided by Neyman and
Pearson's description of statistical problems has
588 NEYMAN, JERZY
become the basis for the practical totality of
theoretical work in statistics. For instance, the
widely acclaimed "theory of statistical decision
functions" due to Abraham Wald (1950) is en-
tirely dependent on this framework.
In the early 1930s, Neyman also investigated
estimation problems and proposed his theory of
confidence intervals. In the case of a one-
dimension parameter, 0, confidence intervals
are a pair (©, ©) of functions of the observa-
tions so selected that the probability that the
random pair (0, 0) covers the (nonrandom)
true point 0 has a preassigned value I — a, with
a small.
The theory is expounded in detail in two
papers published in 1937. At first there was a
suspicion that Neyman's confidence intervals
were a variation of what Fisher called "fiducial
intervals." This suspicion was quickly put to
rest by Fisher himself. The logical arguments
underlying the two approaches were incompati-
ble. Eventually numerical differences between
the two were noted (1941). A clear exposition
of all these ideas can be found in Neyman's
Lectures and Conferences (1938c).
From the start of his career as a statistician
in Bydgoszcz, throughout the period of collabo-
ration with Pearson, and continuing after his
creation in 1938 of the Statistical Laboratory at
Berkeley, Neyman was involved with the study
of practical problems. Among those which led to
publications one may mention the problems of
counting the number of viruses or bacteria
needed to cause disease (Neyman & Iwaszkie-
wicz 1931), the accuracy of the dilution method
(Neyman et al. 1935), sickness due to industrial
exposure (Neyman & Iwaszkiewicz 1934), and
health insurance. In some of the problems Ney-
man became, as he says, "emotionally involved."
One of the deepest involvements, in astron-
omy, resulted in more than twenty years of
collaboration with Elizabeth L. Scott, C. D.
Shane, and many astronomers on problems
arising from the clustered appearance of photo-
graphs of extragalactic bodies. The problems of
interest involved, among other things, the possi-
bility of using statistical procedures to deter-
mine (1) whether the observed red-shift was
in fact due to recession velocities; (2) whether
clusters of galaxies were expanding or recessing
as rigid bodies; and (3) whether the evolution
of galaxies proceeds from elliptical to spiral, to
irregulars.
The statistical tools needed led to an exten-
sive theory of the process of clustering (1955;
Neyman & Scott 1972). Neyman had already
encountered clustering earlier in his descrip-
tion of abundance of larvae in the field, leading
him to introduce the distributions called con-
tagious distributions (1939).
In another domain, weather modification,
Neyman's involvement started in 1951. Methods
of evaluation of the effects of cloud seeding
proposed by commercial operators could not be
considered scientific. After a few years and a
few experiments nothing remarkable could be
asserted. However, a review of the Swiss
hail suppression experiments and a detailed ex-
amination of other properly randomized experi-
ments led to the conclusion that cloud seeding
may have positive or negative effects often ex-
tending downwind for a hundred miles or more
(Neyman et al. 1971; Neyman & Osborn 1971).
Since 1960, Neyman has devoted a substan-
tial part of his time to the study of cancer and
problems of carcinogenesis. The initial effort
was to find out whether one could devise an
experiment and statistical procedures which
could differentiate between the one-step and
two-step theories of carcinogenesis (1961). The
study branched out to experiments on the
mechanism by which urethan induces lung
tumors in mice (Neyman & Scott 1967a; Ney-
man 1974£>) as well as to elaborate models of
the action of radiation on cells.
In a related domain Neyman has been deeply
involved in statistical studies of the effects of
pollution (Neyman et al. 1972) and the possi-
bility of sorting out the effects of individual
pollutants and of their synergistic combinations
(1977£>). Part of the necessary statistical frame-
work was provided earlier by Neyman's theory
of competing risks (1950; Neyman & Fix 1951).
It is a domain where much caution is necessary.
A volume of the sixth Berkeley symposium de-
voted to the effects of pollution on health indi-
cates how little is known and how necessary is
the large-scale effort recommended by Neyman.
Along the way, Neyman met many other prob-
lems. A series of papers (Neyman & Bates 1952)
deals with the possibility of distinguishing be-
tween variability of proneness to disease and
contagion. Some deal with models of epidemics
(Neyman & Scott 1964). Another series of
papers prompted in part by T. Park's observa-
tions on flour beetles, deals with population
dynamics (Neyman et al. 1956; Neyman & Scott
1959). Two different species (T. confusum and
T. castaneum} survive happily and indefinitely
if raised separately. On the contrary, when

raised together, one of the two species disap-
pears rapidly the probability of survival of either
being a function of the temperature, humidity,
and other environmental conditions.
The studies of a practical nature would not
have been able to proceed without adequate
statistical methods. One large class of proce-
dures introduced by Neyman around 1945 is
given by his theory of best asymptotically
normal estimates (1949). One may regard this
theory as an asymptotic equivalent of the theory
of least squares. It provides computable answers
in many complex situations. The mathematical
justification involves using so-called "nearby
alternatives" that move toward the given hy-
pothesis at the rate (l/^/n) when the number
n of observations increases. The procedure, in-
troduced by Neyman (1937b), has invaded
much of asymptotic statistical theory.
The best asymptotically normal estimates can
be used for estimation purposes and also for
testing purposes. In the latter case, Neyman has
also provided another technique by his theory of
C(a)-tests (1954), which are applicable to situa-
tions which involve nuisance parameters and
yield test functions which are often readily
obtainable from logarithmic derivatives of the
probability densities.
Neyman is also known for his organization of
the Berkeley symposia on mathematical statis-
tics and probability. These occurred every five
years from 1945 to 1970. Other works of a dif-
ferent nature include the publication of the
volume Heritage of Copernicus: Theories "More
Pleasing to the Mind" (19740).
Neyman is a member of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, the Royal Swedish Academy, and
the National Academy of Poland. He is a fellow
of the Royal Society, London, and is honorary
president of the International Statistical
Institute.
LUCIEN LE CAM
WORKS BY NEYMAN
1923a Justification of Applications of the Calculus of
Probability to the Solution of Certain Questions of
Agricultural Experimentation. Polish Agriculture
and Forestry Journal 10:1—51.
1923fo Sur un theoreme metrique concernant les en-
sembles fermes. Fundamenta Maihematicae 5:
328-330.
1928 NEYMAN, JERZY; and PEARSON, E. S. On the Use
and Interpretation of Certain Test Criteria for
Purposes of Statistical Inference. Biometrika 20A:
175-240, 263-294.
1931 NEYMAN, JERZY; and IWASZKIEWICZ, K. Count-
NEYMAN, JERZY 589
ing Virulent Bacteria and Particules of Virus. Acta
Biologiae Experimentalis 6:101-142.
1933a NEYMAN, JERZY; and PEARSON, E. S. On the
Problem of the Most Efficient Tests of Statistical
Hypotheses. Royal Society of London, Philosophical
Transactions Series A 231:289-337.
1933b NEYMAN, JERZY; and PEARSON, E. S. The Test-
ing of Statistical Hypotheses in Relation to Proba-
bilities a priori. Cambridge Philosophical Society,
Proceedings 29:492-510.
1934 On the Two Different Aspects of the Represen-
tative Method. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society 97:558-625.
1934 NEYMAN, JERZY; and IWASZKIEWICZ, K. Pre-
liminary Report on the Investigation Into the Sick-
ness Experience of Workers in Certain Industries.
Warsaw: Polish Institute for Social Problems.
1935 Sur la verification des hypotheses statistiques
composees. Societe Mathematique de France, Bulle-
tin 63:246-266.
1935 NEYMAN, JERZY; MATUSZEWSKI, T.; and SUPIN-
SKA, J. Statistical Studies in Questions of Bacteriol-
ogy. Part 1: The Accuracy of the "Dilution Method."
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 2 (Supple-
ment): 63-82.
1936 NEYMAN, JERZY; and PEARSON, E. S. Contribu-
tions to the Theory of Testing Statistical Hypoth-
eses: I. Unbiased Critical Regions of Type A and
Type AT. Statistical Research Memoirs 1:1—37.
1937a Outline of a Theory of Statistical Estimation
Based on the Classical Theory of Probability. Royal
Society of London, Philosophical Transactions
Series A 236:333-386.
1937b "Smooth" Test for Goodness of Fit. Skandina-
visk Aktuarietidskrift 20:149-199.
1938a Contribution to the Theory of Sampling Human
Populations. Journal of the American Statistical
Association 33:101-116.
1938& L'estimation statistique traitee comme un
probleme classique de probabilite. Actualites sci-
entifiques et industrielles 739:25-57.
(1938c) 1952 Lectures and Conferences on Mathe-
matical Statistics and Probability Theory. 2d ed.,
rev. & enl. Washington: U.S. Department of Agri-
culture.
1939 On a New Class of Contagious Distributions,
Applicable in Entomology and Bacteriology. An-
nals of Mathematical Statistics 10:35-57.
1941 Fiducial Argument and the Theory of Confidence
Intervals. Biometrika 32:128-150.
1949 Contribution to the Theory of the Chi-square
Test. Pages 239-273 in Berkeley Symposium on
Mathematical Statistics and Probability, First, Pro-
ceedings. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
1950 First Course in Probability and Statistics. New
York: Holt.
1951 NEYMAN, JERZY; and Fix, EVELYN A Simple
Stochastic Model of Recovery, Relapse, Death, and
Loss of Patients. Human Biology 23:205-241.
1952 NEYMAN, JERZY; and BATES, GRACE E. Contribu-
tions to the Theory of Accident Proneness. 2 parts.
University of California, Publications in Statistics,
Vol. 1, Nos. 9-10. Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press. —> Part 1: "An Optimistic Model of Cor-
relation Between Light and Severe Accidents." Part 2:
"True or False Contagion."
1954 Sur une famille de tests asymptotiques des hy-
potheses statistiques composees. Trabajos Estadistica
5:161-168.
1955 Sur la theorie probabiliste des amas de galaxies
et la verification de I'hypothese de 1'expansion de
Funivers. Annales de I'lnstitut Henri Poincare Sec-
tion B 14:201-244.
590 NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD
1956 NEYMAN, JERZY; PARK, THOMAS; and SCOTT,
E. L. Struggle for Existence. The Tribolium Model:
Biological and Statistical Aspects. Volume 4, pages
41-79 in Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical
Statistics and Probability, Third, Proceedings.
Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
1959 NEYMAN, JERZY; and SCOTT, E. L. Stochastic
Models of Population Dynamics. Science 130: SOS-
SOS.
1961 A Two-step Mutation Theory of Carcinogenesis.
Institut International de Statistique, Bulletin 38:
123-135.
1962 Alternative Stochastic Models of the Spatial
Distribution of Galaxies. Pages 294-314 in G. C.
McVittie (editor), Problems of Extra-galactic Re-
search. New York: Macmillan.
1963 Stochastic Approach to Cosmology. Pages 135—
174 in Conference on Mathematical Models in
Physical Sciences, Proceedings. Edited by Stefan
Drobot and Paul E. Viebrock. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1964 NEYMAN, JERZY; and SCOTT, E. L. A Stochastic
Model of Epidemics. Pages 45-83 in Stochastic
Models in Medicine and Biology. Madison: Univ.
of Wisconsin Press.
1967a NEYMAN, JERZY; and SCOTT, E. L. Statistical
Aspects of the Problem of Carcinogenesis. Volume
4, pages 745-776 in Berkeley Symposium on Math-
ematical Statistics and Probability, Fifth, Proceed-
ings. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
1967b NEYMAN, JERZY; and SCOTT, E. L. Some Out-
standing Problems Relating to Rain Modification.
Volume 5, pages 293-350 in Berkeley Symposium
on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, Fifth,
Proceedings. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
1971 NEYMAN, JERZY; LOVASICH, J. L.; SCOTT, E. L.;
and WELLS, M. A. Further Studies of the Whitetop
Cloud Seeding Experiment. National Academy of
Sciences, Proceedings 68:147-151.
1971 NEYMAN, JERZY; and OSBORN, H. B. Evidence
of Widespread Effects of Cloud Seeding at Two
Arizona Experiments. National Academy of Sci-
ences, Proceedings 68:649-652.
1972 NEYMAN, JERZY; and SCOTT, E. L. Processes of
Clustering and Applications. Pages 646—681 in
P. A. W. Lewis (editor), Stochastic Point Processes:
Statistical Analysis, Theory and Applications. New
York: Wiley.
1972 LE CAM, LUCIEN; NEYMAN, JERZY; and SCOTT,
E. L. Epilogue of the Health-pollution Conference.
Volume 6, pages 575-589 in Berkeley Symposium
on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, Sixth,
Proceedings. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of
California Press.
1974a NEYMAN, JERZY (editor) The Heritage of Co-
pernicus: Theories "More Pleasing to the Mind"
Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. —> A paperback
edition was published in 1977.
1974b A View of Biometry: An Interdisciplinary Do-
main Concerned With Chance Mechanisms Operat-
ing in Living Organisms; Illustration: Urethan
Carcinogenesis. Pages 183—201 in Frank Proschan
and R. S. Serfling (editors), Reliability and Bio-
metry: Statistical Analysis of Life-length: Papers.
Philadelphia: Society for Industrial and Applied
Mathematics.
1976 NEYMAN, JERZY; and PURI, P. S. A Structural
Model of Radiation Effects in Living Cells. Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, Proceedings 73:3360—
3363.
1977a A Statistician's View of Weather Modification
Technology: A Review. National Academy of Sci-
ences, Proceedings 74:4714-4721.
1977b Synergistic Effects and the Corresponding
Optimal Version of the Multiple Comparison Prob-
lem. Pages 297-311 in S. S. Gupta and D. S. Moore
(editors), Statistical Decision Theory and Related
Topics. New York: Academic Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
FISHER, R. A. (1956) 1973 Statistical Methods and
Scientific Inference. 3d ed., rev. & enl. New York:
Hafner.
LEBESGUE, HENRI L. (1904) 1950 Lemons sur ['inte-
gration et la recherche des fonctions primitives. 2d
ed. Paris: Gauthier-Villars.
PEARSON, KARL (1892) 1937 The Grammar of Sci-
ence. 3d ed., rev. & enl. New York: Dutton. —» A
paperback edition was published in 1957 by
Meridian.
WALD, ABRAHAM 1950 Statistical Decision Functions.
New York: Wiley.
NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD
Helmut Richard Niebuhr was born in Wright
City, Missouri, in 1894. At the time of his sud-
den and unexpected death in 1962 he was with-
in one year of retirement as Sterling professor
of theology and Christian ethics at Yale Divinity
School. After an academic career spanning
more than forty years, during which he and his
older .brother Reinhold were leaders in reshap-
ing the religious consciousness of America,
Niebuhr had looked forward to having time to
write his magnum opus on Christian ethics.
Despite this unfulfilled dream, Niebuhr, through
his gifted teaching and a written legacy of
seven books and numerous articles, has exer-
cised increasing influence on the theological
and ethical thinking of the American church
and beyond.
A son of German immigrants who had settled
in the Midwest, Niebuhr followed his father and
elder brother into the ministry of the German
Evangelical Church. He prepared for the minis-
try at two schools of his denomination, Elm-
hurst College (1908-1912) and Eden Theologi-
cal Seminary (1912-1915). After ordination in
1916 he served as a pastor in St. Louis while
completing a master's degree in history at
Washington University. In 1919 Niebuhr ac-
cepted an invitation to teach theology and ethics
at Eden, where he remained for the next three
years. During this period he married and also
spent a valuable summer of study at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, where he was introduced to
the social philosophy and psychology of George
Herbert Mead. Mead's conception of the self as
arising from a social matrix had a lasting in-
fluence on the young theologian.

In 1922 Niebuhr resumed full-time theologi-
cal studies at Yale Divinity School, earning both
a B.D. and a PH.D. by 1924. He then served as
president of Elmhurst College for three years
but in 1927 returned to theological education at
Eden. In 1930 he had sabbatical leave in Ger-
many, with a side trip to Russia, and upon re-
turn to the United States received an offer to
teach at Yale Divinity School; he began one year
later.
Like others of his generation, Niebuhr experi-
enced the trauma of war, revolution, and social
upheaval that shook the foundations of Western
liberalism in the second and third decades of
the twentieth century. Although reared in
the atmosphere of liberal theology with its an-
thropocentric focus on the basic goodness of
humanity and its belief in the progress of the
kingdom of God as a social entity on earth, Nie-
buhr's sensitive spirit was soon attracted to
those advocates of a more realistic view of
Christianity and the world: the empirically
oriented religious realists of America, above all
his chief mentor at Yale, Douglas Clyde Macin-
tosh, and the Biblically oriented crisis theolo-
gians of Europe, especially Karl Earth and Paul
Tillich. However, Niebuhr never lost the social
concern characteristic of liberalism or suc-
cumbed to the pessimistic otherworldliness he
detected in some of the realists. His career
might be described as a bold attempt to forge a
middle way that blended the ethical passion of
the liberal tradition with the theocentric per-
spective of what came to be called neoorthodoxy.
Niebuhr once referred to Ernst Troeltsch and
Earth as theologians who had been his teachers
through their writings. Troeltsch's philosophy of
religion was the subject of Niebuhr's doctoral
dissertation at Yale, and it was from Troeltsch
that he inherited the problem of historical
relativism, along with the importance of so-
ciological analysis. The latter is evidence in
Niebuhr's first book, The Social Sources of
Denominationalism (1929), in which he demon-
strated that the divisions represented by Ameri-
can denominations are due primarily to socio-
historical rather than doctrinal differences—
that is, to such factors as national background,
race, class, and economic status.
Niebuhr utilized Troeltsch's and Max Weber's
distinction between the church and the sect to
show how important the differences in the so-
ciological structures of religious groups are in
determining their doctrine. Whereas churches
are inclusive, socially established, culture ac-
NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD 591
commodating institutions into which members
are born, sects are exclusive, discipline demand-
ing, often persecuted associations of minorities
that require joining. Niebuhr pointed out that in
Protestant history it has been the sects, made
up of the poor and the disenfranchized, whose
revolts have brought about religious change, but
that by their very nature sectarian types of
organization are valid for only one generation.
As children are born and disciplined asceticism
increases wealth, compromise with the world
becomes inevitable. So the sect becomes a
church. Illustrations of the phenomenon, Nie-
buhr indicated, are rampant in American de-
nominational history.
Unlike Troeltsch, who remained a not un-
critical liberal, Earth was the Swiss theologian
who during the 1920s led an all-out assault on
the presuppositions of liberal theology, stressing
that the God of the Bible is wholly other than
humanity and is known only through his self-
revelation in the history of Israel and defini-
tively through Jesus Christ, a revelation re-
ceived through the eyes of faith alone. Although
Niebuhr appreciated Earth's prophetic protest
against the anthropocentricity of liberalism and
his powerful recovery of the Reformation themes
of human sin and divine grace, he was more
attracted to the "belief-ful realism" of Paul
Tillich, who while emphasizing the transcen-
dence of God related him to historical experi-
ence in a way the early Earth did not. Niebuhr
helped to introduce Tillich's theology to America
by translating his The Religious Situation
(1932). Later Niebuhr launched his own attack
on liberalism in a book entitled The Church
Against the World (1935a; 1935b). In it he
called for the church to cast off its bondage to
the cultural gods of capitalism, nationalism,
and humanism, and to return to faith in God
alone.
If in his first book Niebuhr disclosed the so-
cial factors underlying the formation of Protes-
tant denominations, in The Kingdom of God in
America (1937) he sought to understand the
theological dynamic that propelled the Protes-
tant movement itself. This dynamic he dis-
covered to be the idea of the kingdom of God,
understood in the sweep of American history as
the sovereignty of God (early Puritan period),
the reign of Christ (the Great Awakening and
revivals of the eighteenth century), and the king-
dom on earth (nineteenth century social gospel).
Helped by his study of American Protestantism
as well as by the great theological tradition of
592 NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD
Augustine and Aquinas, Luther and Calvin,
Pascal and Edwards, Niebuhr himself became
convinced of the absolute sovereignty of God,
and, concomitantly, of the universal sinfulness
of humanity and the mystery of divine grace.
Moreover, he came to the conviction that Chris-
tianity must be understood not as an institution
or a series of institutions but as a dynamic
movement involving both worship and work, a
continual dialectical movement toward God and
toward the world that demands of the church a
constant metanoia or revolution.
Many consider Niebuhr's finest theological
treatise to be The Meaning of Revelation (1941),
in which he dealt with the problem of how the
absolute God can be revealed within the rela-
tivities of history. Following Luther's dictum
that God and faith belong together, Niebuhr
argued that revelation is not an event of ex-
ternal history that any disinterested observer
can see, but an event of inner history that illu-
mines and makes intelligible the entire history
of the self. That is, revelation involves faith, but
Niebuhr pointed out that although the perspec-
tive of faith is historically and culturally relative,
the objectivity of the God perceived is corrobo-
rated by the experience of others in the com-
munity. For the Christian community the God
who is revealed in Jesus Christ is the infinite
person who is its knower, its author, its judge,
and its only savior. God, insisted Niebuhr, is the
solely absolute One to whom all else is intrinsi-
cally related, the One whose power is shown in
the weakness of Jesus and whose goodness is the
simple everyday goodness of love.
Ten tumultuous years of war and reconstruc-
tion passed before Niebuhr published Christ
and Culture (1951), his best-known work. In it
he analyzed the differing interpretations given
by Christians to the interplay between revela-
tion and cultural forces, between the claims of
Christ and the demands of the world. Niebuhr
expanded the Troeltsch-Weber sociological
typology of the church and the sect into a five-
fold pattern, ranging from those Christians who
set Christ against culture to those who accom-
modate Christ to culture. Between these ex-
tremes of radical separation and cultural ac-
commodation, Niebuhr proposed three mediating
positions that represent the majority of Chris-
tians: the synthesist position, which affirms
both Christ and culture but makes clear Christ's
exalted position above culture; the dualist,
which holds Christ and culture in the tension of
a paradoxical relationship; and the conversion-
ist, which believes that Christ transforms cul-
ture. In setting forth the strengths and weak-
nesses of each position, Niebuhr made clear his
own preference for the conversionist type of
Christianity.
In 1953 Niebuhr, in collaboration with Daniel
D. Williams and James M. Gustafson, directed
a major study of theological education in the
United States and Canada. Of the three volumes
and numerous bulletins that resulted, Niebuhr
himself authored The Purpose of the Church
and Its Ministry (1956), in which he defined
the purpose of the church as the increase
among humans of the love of God and the love
of neighbor, and indicated an emerging con-
ception of the minister as pastoral director,
whose task was both to edify the congregation
and to enable it to carry out its ministry in the
world.
The theocentricity of Niebuhr's theology is
best depicted in Radical Monotheism and West-
ern Culture (1960), in which he showed that
monotheism in Western history is in constant
battle with the polytheistic and henotheistic cul-
tural faiths. Niebuhr's final work, published
posthumously from sets of lectures, was The
Responsible Self (1963). In this essay in Chris-
tian moral philosophy he centered his under-
standing of human life around the symbol of
responsibility and advocated an ethics in terms
of the fitting as a response to the action of an
other, rather than of the good as a goal or the
right as a duty.
In summary, the distinguishing elements of
Niebuhr's thought are radical monotheism, his-
torical relativism, and ethical transformation-
ism. His confessional theology always involves
God, the self, and the self's companions. It is
based upon the revelation of God in Christ and
calls for the response of a radically theocentric
faith that transforms the world's idolatrous
faiths and evokes loyalty to the divine cause of
reconciliation.
JOHN D. GODSEY
WORKS BY NIEBUHR
(1929) 1957 The Social Sources of Denominational-
ism. New York: Meridian. —» A paperback edition
was published by World Books in 1972.
(1932) 1956 TILLICH, PAUL The Religious Situation.
Translated by H. Richard Niebuhr. New York:
Holt. —» First published in German.
1935a The Question of the Church. Pages 1-13 in
H. Richard Niebuhr et al., The Church Against the
World. Chicago: Willett.
1935Z? Toward the Independence of the Church. Pages
123-156 in H. Richard Niebuhr et al., The Church
Against the World. Chicago: Willett.

(1937) 1959 The Kingdom of God in America. New
York: Harper.
1941 The Meaning of Revelation. New York: Macmil-
lan. —> A paperback edition was published in 1970.
(1951) 1956 Christ and Culture. New York: Harper.
1955 BEACH, WALDO; and NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD (edi-
tors) Christian Ethics: Sources of the Living Tra-
dition. New York: Ronald. —> Niebuhr wrote chap-
ters 1, 8, 9, and 13.
1956 The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry: Re-
flections on the Aims of Theological Education.
New York: Harper. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1977.
1956 NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD; and WILLIAMS, DANIEL D.
(editors) The Ministry in Historical Perspectives.
New York: Harper.
1957 NIEBUHR, H. RICHARD; WILLIAMS, DANIEL D.; and
GUSTAFSON, JAMES M. The Advancement of Theo-
logical Education. New York: Harper.
(1960) 1970 Radical Monotheism and Western Cul-
ture, With Supplementary Essays. New York:
Harper.
1963 The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian
Moral Philosophy. New York: Harper. —» Includes
an introduction by James M. Gustafson. Published
posthumously.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
FADNER, DONALD E. 1975 The Responsible God: A
Study of the Christian Philosophy of H. Richard
Niebuhr. Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press.
FOWLER, JAMES W. 1974 To See the Kingdom: The
Theological Vision of H. Richard Niebuhr. Nash-
ville, Tenn.: Abingdon.
GOOSEY, JOHN D. 1970 The Promise of H. Richard
Niebuhr. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
HOEDEMAKER, LIBERTUS A. 1970 The Theology of
H. Richard Niebuhr. Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press.
KLIEVER, LONNIE D. 1977 H. Richard Niebuhr. Waco,
Tex.: Word Books.
RAMSEY, PAUL (editor) 1957 Faith and Ethics: The
Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr. New York: Harper.
—» A paperback edition was published in 1965.
NIEBUHR, REINHOLD
Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) was a domi-
nant Protestant social philosopher of North
America in the twentieth century. His many
works stressed the relationship between religious
sources of wisdom and practical social action.
George F. Kennan, referring to a group of politi-
cal thinkers identified as "realists," called Nie-
buhr "the Father of us all," and Hans J. Morgen-
thau, leading theorist of international relations,
said Niebuhr was "the greatest living political
philosopher of America."
Niebuhr was born in Wright City, Missouri, on
June 21,1892, and christened Karl Paul Reinhold
Niebuhr. His father, Gustav Niebuhr, who had
emigrated from Germany, was a pastor in the
Evangelical synod of North America. His
mother, Lydia Niebuhr, was the daughter of
Edward Hosto, also a pastor of the Evangelical
NIEBUHR, REINHOLD 503
synod. In 1931, Niebuhr married Ursula M.
Keppel-Compton. His sister Hulda became a
professor at McCormick Theological Seminary,
and his younger brother H. Richard Niebuhr
became a professor of ethics at Yale Divinity
School and to this day remains his only rival
for influence in the field of Protestant ethics
in the United States.
Reinhold Niebuhr graduated from Elmhurst
College and Eden Theological Seminary, then
unaccredited schools of the Evangelical synod.
In 1914 he received his bachelor of divinity de-
gree from Yale University and in 1915 received
the Yale M.A. with a thesis entitled "The Contri-
bution of Christianity to the Doctrine of Im-
mortality."
From 1915 to 1928 he served as pastor of
Bethel Church in Detroit where, after the De-
troit race riots of 1925, he became involved in
the struggle for social justice, serving as the
chairman of the mayor's race committee. His
experience with the plight of industrial workers
led to the publication of several articles critical
of the Ford Motor Company in the liberal Chris-
tian Century. His first book, Does Civilization
Need Religion? (1927), criticized the liberal
and social gospel movement thought that he
had learned at Yale as inadequate to the social
crisis of industrial civilization. His diary of his
years in the parish, Leaves From the Notebook
of a Tamed Cynic (1929), shows his great love
for pastoral work and his early wrestling with
issues of social concern. In World War i, he
identified with Woodrow Wilson's politics and
wartime aims and served as chairman of the
Evangelical synod's war welfare commission,
which involved him deeply in support of the
war.
He joined the faculty of Union Theological
Seminary in 1928 and remained until his retire-
ment in 1960. His social thought took on depth
and power during the late 1920s and 1930s. In
the depression of the 1930s, he used many
Marxist categories to express his pessimism
about capitalist society. His most important
book, Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932fc),
is a critique of liberal—capitalist culture and an
appeal for a realist ethic adequate to inspire
social action. The work stresses sharply the
need to distinguish between the contribution of
religion to a personal ethic and to social ethics.
He was a friend of Norman Thomas and vice
chairman of the Socialist party.
Reflections on the End of an Era (1934) is
his most Marxist-influenced work. His affirma-
594 NIEBUHR, REINHOLD
tion of key conceptions of Marxist social philos-
ophy was always balanced by a religious and
ethical critique of the weakness of Marxism.
In 1940 he turned from socialism to support
the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt. From that
time on he labored for liberal-radical causes
within the Democratic party. He was a founder
and chairman of Americans for Democratic Ac-
tion and vice chairman of the Liberal party in
New York state.
His most important theological work, The Na-
ture and Destiny of Man, was published in two
volumes in 1941 and 1943. The work stresses
the grandeur and misery of the human con-
dition and criticizes the one-sided optimism of
liberal culture. These volumes of Christian an-
thropology earned him the reputation of chief
American spokesman for a theology called
Christian realism. Using an Augustinian-Re-
formation perspective, he tried to ground social
ethics and political action on a new foundation.
He continued this emphasis in volumes on the
philosophy of history, Faith and History (1949)
and The Self and the Dramas of History (1955),
and in a volume on democratic political philos-
ophy, The Children of Light and the Children
of Darkness (1944).
In addition to teaching, lecturing, and preach-
ing almost every Sunday, Niebuhr founded the
Fellowship of Socialist Christians, which evolved
into Christian Action as his political philosophy
changed. In 1935 he founded the quarterly
Radical Religion, which became Christianity
and Society, lasting until 1956. He also founded
Christianity and Crisis, a biweekly journal that
dealt with cultural and political interpretation;
it continues to be published with some of his
former students serving on the editorial board.
Niebuhr suffered a stroke in 1952 that left
him partially paralyzed and slowed down his
active involvement in social movements, politi-
cal activities, and church affairs. He continued
to write at least two articles or editorials each
week. As the cold war developed he wrote such
interpretations of American history as The
Irony of American History (1952), Pious and
Secular America (1958a), A Nation So Con-
ceived (Niebuhr & Heimert 1963), and The
Democratic Experience: Past and Prospects
(Niebuhr & Sigmund 1969). He became a po-
lemical opponent of communism particularly in
Christian Realism and Political Problems (1953).
While a fellow of the Institute for Advanced
Study in Princeton he wrote his major work on
the theory of imperial politics, The Structure of
Nations and Empires (1959£>). In all these
works he attacked the tendency of liberalism to
trust too easily in historical progress. He re-
garded the defense of democracy as a worthy
cause and one that required sober judgments
about the illusions of the self and one's own
nation. As he had served briefly as an adviser to
the Foreign Policy Planning Staff Committee in
1947, he was deeply committed to the necessity
of countering Soviet power. He was enthusias-
tic about John F. Kennedy's foreign policy, both
in its policies of strength and in its search to
eliminate nuclear weapons. An early critic of
the war in Vietnam, he spoke out against it
during the Lyndon Johnson administration.
He criticized his friend Hubert H. Humphrey
sharply for going along with it and the vice
president left Niebuhr's New York apartment
stung by the criticism. In his later years, he
spoke at Union Theological Seminary; though
he needed assistance in walking, his scathing
humor and irony inspired the students to acts of
resistance to the war. He opposed the war on
the grounds of natural law, including just war
theory, political prudence, and moral failure.
The theological foundations of Niebuhr's per-
spective are most obvious in the published col-
lections of his sermons, Beyond Tragedy (1937),
Discerning the Signs of the Times (1946), and
Justice and Mercy (1974). He characteristically
applied insights from the prophets and the New
Testament to illumine the sin, tragedy, and
irony of the human situation. He defended the
essential truth of the Biblical perspectives on
humanity while using the insights of secular
human wisdom. A pragmatist in epistemology,
he was not as concerned about the source of a
perspective as he was about its verifiability in
the light of broad historical evidence. He con-
tinually stressed the distortion of human ac-
tions by human anxiety. The ultimate answer to
human anxiety was the acceptance of self as
finite and limited but loved by God. Anxiety pro-
duced pride, and the antidote to prideful self-
assertion was basic trust, which could be re-
stored by the acceptance of grace.
In the struggles of history, however, the
structures of human nature, nation-states, and
international relations were rooted in anxiety
and insecurity. Justice, or a fair distribution of
the opportunities of human relations, could best
be secured by a balance of power that prevented
the inordinate aggrandizement of anyone or
any group. Niebuhr did not expect peace within
history or justice within any nation. Peace and

justice were goals to be sought, but they could
be completely fulfilled only in the Kingdom of
God. In history, peace and justice would only be
realized fragmentarily. His life was a testimony
to the style of ethics he taught—that one acts
for justice because one is obligated to because
it is part of true human nature so to strive. A
bit more justice may be realized, but one acts
for justice because it is right to do so, not be-
cause one expects to achieve it. The realism
with which his name is associated is the recog-
nition that the very structure of human nature
resists the realization of justice while promoting
the search for justice.
In his last years he published Mans Nature
and His Communities (1965) as a summary
and review of the major themes of his work.
The book is less explicitly theological than his
magnum opus, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
but it presents the same view of human nature
in terms close to those of the ego psychology of
Erik H. Erikson. Social theory is the interaction
between the ideal possibilities that humanity
projects and the struggling communities in
which it lives. He applied this analysis in 1969
in "The King's Chapel and the King's Court,"
an essay attacking the injustice and religious
pretensions of the Nixon administration, which
drew more critical response from his political
opponents than anything else he had written.
Niebuhr died on June 1, 1971, in his home at
Stockbridge, Massachusetts.
RONALD STONE
WORKS BY NIEBUHR
1927 Does Civilization Need Religion? New York: Mac-
millan.
1929 Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic.
New York: Richard R. Smith.
(1932a) 1971 The Contribution of Religion to Social
Work. New York: AMS Press.
1932b Moral Man and Immoral Society. New York:
Scribners.
1934 Reflections on the End of an Era. New York:
Scribners.
(1935) 1956 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics.
New York: Meridian. —» Includes a new preface by
the author.
(1937) 1976 Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian
Interpretation of History. New York: Arno.
(1940) 1969 Christianity and Power Politics. Ham-
den, Conn.: Archon.
(1941-1943) 1951 The Nature and Destiny of Man.
2 vols. New York: Scribners. —» A paperback edi-
tion of each volume was published in 1949.
(1944) 1960 The Children of Light and the Children
of Darkness. New York: Scribners.
1946 Discerning the Signs of the Times. New York:
Scribners.
1949 Faith and History. New York: Scribners.
NOTESTEIN, FRANK W. 595
1952 The Irony of American History. New York: Scrib-
ners.
(1953) 1975 Christian Realism and Political Prob-
lems. New York: Kelley.
1955 The Self and the Dramas of History. New York:
Scribners.
1957 Love and Justice: Selections From the Shorter
Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr. Edited by D. B. Rob-
ertson. New York: Meridian.
(1958a) 1979 Pious and Secular America. New York:
Kelley.
(1958&) 1974 The World Crisis and American Re-
sponsibility: Nine Essays. Edited by Ernest W.
Lefever. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
1959a Essays in Applied Christianity. Edited by D. B.
Robertson. New York: Meridian.
(1959b) 1972 The Structure of Nations and Empires.
New York: Kelley.
1960 Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: His Political Phi-
losophy and Its Application to Our Age as Expressed
in His Writings. Edited by Harry R. Davis and Rob-
ert C. Good. New York: Scribners.
1963 NIEBUHR, REINHOLD; and HEIMERT, ALAN A Na-
tion So Conceived. New York: Scribners.
1965 Man's Nature and His Communities. New York:
Scribners.
1968 Faith and Politics: A Commentary on Religious,
Social, and Political Thought in a Technological
Age. Edited by Ronald H. Stone. New York: Braziller.
1969 The King's Chapel and the King's Court. Chris-
tianity and Crisis 29:211-212.
1969 NIEBUHR, REINHOLD; and SIGMUND, PAUL E. The
Democratic Experience: Past and Prospects. New
York: Praeger.
1971 Young Reinhold Niebuhr: His Early Writings,
1911-1931. Edited by William G. Chrystal. St. Louis,
Mo.: Eden.
1974 Justice and Mercy. Edited by Ursula Niebuhr.
New York: Harper. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1976.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BINGHAM, JUNE (1961) 1972 Courage to Change:
An Introduction to the Life and Thought of Rein-
hold Niebuhr. Rev. ed. New York: Scribners.
HARLAND, GORDON 1960 The Thought of Reinhold
Niebuhr. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
KEGLEY, CHARLES W.; and BRETALL, ROBERT W. (edi-
tors) 1956 Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, So-
cial, and Political Thought. New York: Macmillan.
—> Includes interpretive essays, an intellectual au-
tobiography, and a bibliography.
MERKLEY, PAUL 1975 Reinhold Niebuhr: A Political
Account. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press.
ROBERTSON, D. B. 1954 Reinhold Niebuhr's Works:
A Bibliography (1916-1953). Berea, Ky.: Berea Col-
lege Press.
STONE, RONALD 1972 Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to
Politicians. Nashville: Abingdon.
STONE, RONALD; and STONE, JOANN M. 1971 The
Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, 1953-1971. Union
Seminary Quarterly Review 27, no. 1:9-29.
NOTESTEIN, FRANK W.
Frank W. Notestein was born on August 16,
1902, and retired from his last full-time position
in 1968. During these 66 years, demography
developed from a subject of occasional notice
596 NOTESTEIN, FRANK W.
by statisticians and economists to a flourishing
discipline with its own journals, research or-
ganizations, and national and international pro-
fessional societies. This coincidence in timing
between Notestein's career and the growth of
demography is not wholly accidental. The ideas
he contributed are at the core of modern think-
ing about population; he was the first to intro-
duce a program of research and graduate train-
ing at an American university, and he instilled
a scientific attitude and professional competence
in a long list of advanced students from many
countries. He also created, or helped to create,
several of the institutions that provide leader-
ship in scholarship, the formation of policy, and
technical assistance in matters relating to popu-
lation.
One can never judge what would have hap-
pened if a particularly creative person had not
existed; it is always possible that his accom-
plishments would have emerged from other
hands. Thus there are two interpretations of
what Notestein has contributed to the better
understanding of human populations: either he
has been an indispensable catalyst, who greatly
accelerated the development of the field, or he
was fortunate enough repeatedly to be the right
man at the right place at the right time.
Although he was born and raised in Alma,
Michigan, Notestein's family background is too
intellectual by far to be considered typical of a
small midwestern town. His father, Frank New-
ton Notestein, was a professor of mathematics
and dean of the faculty of Alma College; and
his grandfather, Isaac Notestein, taught at an
academy that his great-grandfather, Jonas Note-
stein, had founded. His mother, Mary Eliza-
beth Wallace, was the daughter of a generous
founding contributor to Wooster College.
Frank Notestein spent his freshman year at
Alma College, but he transferred to Wooster Col-
lege to study economics. Upon his graduation
in 1923, he entered Cornell University. In his
last year at Wooster, he became engaged to his
classmate, Daphne Limbach. They were married
four years later when Notestein completed his
thesis, for which she drew the charts.
The dominant figure in economics at Cornell
in the 1920s was Herbert J. Davenport, an out-
standing exponent of the neoclassical utilitarian
theory of value and price, which Notestein found
uncongenial because he thought it tautological
and futile. He respected the rigor of Davenport's
thinking and the skill of his teaching, and ap-
parently Davenport supported Notestein with en-
thusiasm in spite of their differences. Notestein
found the more institutional and empirical ap-
proach of Morris Copeland (then an assistant
professor) more congenial. The professor at
Cornell who influenced Notestein the most was
Walter F. Willcox, who taught statistics and
sociology. Willcox, who had developed an inter-
est in statistics after his own formal graduate
training was completed, did not know mathe-
matics or modern statistics. For training in
statistics, Notestein had to take work with Frank
A. Pearson at the College of Agriculture. Willcox
did appreciate the value of simplicity, and the
importance of knowing one's basic data, atti-
tudes that Notestein later implanted in his own
graduate students and that his own work always
reflected.
Willcox was an adviser to the Milbank Me-
morial Fund, which was claiming success in
dropping the death rate from tuberculosis in
Catteraugus County, New York, an area the
fund had selected for health demonstrations.
Willcox asked Notestein (while the latter was
still a graduate student) to review these claims.
To the annoyance of the head of the fund,
Notestein found that death rates from tubercu-
losis were dropping about as fast in control coun-
ties, with no special program, as in Catteraugus.
A short time later Edgar Sydenstricker joined the
fund, having just completed pioneering statis-
tical work in the U.S. Public Health Service and
the League of Nations. Sydenstricker offered
Notestein a summer job compiling historical
vital statistics for Catteraugus and Syracuse
counties. These data formed the basis of Note-
stein's PH.D. thesis.
With the thesis completed the Notesteins
sailed to Europe where he had a one-year Social
Science Research Council fellowship to study
occupational mortality in London, Frankfort,
and Geneva. Just before the fellowship was to
end, Notestein was offered a job at the Milbank
Memorial Fund. In the fall of 1928, as a re-
search associate, he began a study of differential
fertility by occupational class.
In his years at the Milbank Fund (1928-
1936) Notestein began to formulate some of his
most influential contributions to demographic
thought. These contributions yielded a better
understanding of the large reduction in birth
and death rates that had occurred in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries in the eco-
nomically and technologically more advanced

countries. Notestein foresaw, before almost any-
one else, that a similar transformation would
occur if and when the less advanced areas ex-
perienced economic and technological progress.
In the 1920s and 1930s there was still dis-
agreement between biologists and biometricians
(such as Raymond Pearl and Corrado Gini) who
thought that population trends responded mostly
to biological influences, especially population
density, and social scientists who looked for so-
cial explanations for the decline in fertility that
was evident throughout Europe, North America,
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The social
scientists in turn were divided between those
like William Fielding Ogburn and Henry Pratt
Fairchild, who attributed the decline in fertility
and class differences in fertility to the diffusion
of effective contraceptive technology throughout
society, beginning within the more educated and
better informed urban upper classes and grad-
ually spreading to less educated, lower socio-
economic categories, and those like Rene Du-
mont, LeRoy Beaulieu, and Alfred Landry, who
emphasized the changing attitude toward pro-
creation in societies less dominated by tradi-
tion, more open to social advancement, providing
more opportunities for women outside the home,
and with newly established traditions (and
laws) of universal education.
Notestein's particular contribution was to use
direct evidence to show the importance of atti-
tude rather than biology or contraceptive tech-
nique. He analyzed the records he gathered in
a follow-up study of patients from the Margaret
Sanger Clinic in New York (Stix & Notestein
1940). This study showed that after allowance
for gross pathology, there was no significant
group differences in conception rates in the ab-
sence of contraception, and that in the absence
of contraception twentieth-century American
women would have had birth rates as high as
any on record. Most significantly, they found
that coitus interruptus was widely used in pre-
and postclinic experience, and was quite effec-
tive. Another piece of empirical information was
derived from an experiment conducted by Gil-
bert Beebe in an Appalachian coal mining area
with the support of the Milbank Fund. Beebe
made a simple contraceptive method available
and found some accepters, but there was no de-
tectable residual effect in a follow-up three years
later.
From these observations Notestein concluded
that it had been a change in attitude, not tech-
NOTESTEIN, FRANK W. 597
nological invention alone, that had led to lower
rates of childbearing. Enhanced motivation to
restrict fertility could just as well be called the
cause of modern methods as modern methods
could be called the cause of the restriction.
Clearly both were important. These inferences
from the analysis of the records of birth control
clinics led Notestein to a clearer and more
soundly based statement of "the demographic
transition" than the earlier formulations by
Dumont, Beaulieu, Landry, Charles P. Blacker,
and Warren S. Thompson. Notestein's first state-
ment appeared in chapter 15 of Controlled
Fertility (Stix & Notestein 1940); his most fully
developed version is contained in "Economic
Problems of Population Change" (1953).
Notestein perceived at an early date that the
relation between social change and population
trends (the demographic transition) that he
and others found in the history of the econom-
ically more advanced countries created a poten-
tial for very rapid growth in the less developed
countries. His graduate students before World
War ii learned that the expected effect of eco-
nomic progress in areas such as India or Indo-
nesia was a reduction in the death rate long
before there was any fall in the birth rate, and
a resultant period of very rapid increase in
population. Because some of the areas in which
rapid growth was a prospect were very poor and
already very densely settled, he feared that these
demographic tendencies would themselves be an
impediment to progress (Notestein 1944;
1945). These prophetic ideas were published
long before most of the world had any no-
tion that an explosive growth of numbers in
the less developed countries was about to begin.
A special instance of his foresight was his study
of population problems in Palestine (Notestein
& Jurkat 1945). Notestein and his colleague
Jurkat noted that although the current rates of
increase were about the same for Jews and
Arabs, the potential for growth was much greater
for the Arab populations. The Jews were rapidly
increasing in number because new migrants had
brought a concentration of young adults of child-
bearing age. Their lifetime reproductive be-
havior, however, was European, not Asian. The
death rates of the Arabs were falling rapidly as
a result of the new prosperity and health pro-
grams of the British Mandate established by the
League of Nations, but their birth rates were
high because of the continuation of traditional
attitudes and practices. Notestein was asked to
598 NOTESTEIN, FRANK W.
testify before the Anglo—American Commission
on the Future of Palestine. Years later the at-
torney for the Zionists told him that his testi-
mony had helped the Jewish leaders decide in
favor of the partition of Palestine.
The most distinctive feature of Notestein's
career is his quiet success in building institu-
tions of exceptional quality and influence, most
notably the Office of Population Research at
Princeton University, the Population Division of
the United Nations, and the Population Council.
The Office of Population Research was
founded in 1936 when Notestein came to Prince-
ton from the Milbank Memorial Fund to become
the first director of the office. It was the first
university-based unit for research and graduate
training in demography, and began with its
director, a secretary, a research assistant, and a
graduate student who held a newly established
Milbank Memorial Fund fellowship. Although it
never had a very large staff (a maximum of 10
or 12 professional demographers; at most times
fewer), the office established a solid reputation
for innovative work on diverse aspects of demog-
raphy: the causes and consequences of popula-
tion trends, particular studies of the population
of many countries and regions, contributions to
formal and mathematical demography, methods
of measurement and projection, and analytical
and empirical research on fertility, mortality,
nuptiality, and age structure. The staff that
Notestein recruited over the years at Princeton—
among them Irene Taeuber, Frank Lorimer,
Dudley Kirk, Kingsley Davis, John Hajnal, Rob-
ert Potter, and Charles Westoff—and the stu-
dents he trained—among them John Durand,
Norman Ryder, Harvey Leibenstein, Alvaro
Lopez, and Paul Demeny—would find a place in
any history of the development of the modern
study of population. Both colleagues and stu-
dents were in some degree infected by his skep-
ticism, respect for evidence, and insistence on
rigor and technical competence.
In 1946 Notestein, on half-time leave of ab-
sence from Princeton for two years, helped to
establish, as its first director, the Population
Division of the United Nations. He somehow
succeeded in having fact-gathering and scientific
analysis accepted as major functions of the
division, in spite of the usual predominance of
procedural and political matters within the large
bureaucracy of the United Nations Secretariat.
He fostered within the division the standards
of preciseness and objectivity that he tried to
maintain at the Office of Population Research.
Partly as the result of the impetus he gave to the
division, some of the world's leading demog-
raphers have served with it and they have made
discoveries and enriched the literature with some
of the most important contributions of the
period.
The Population Council cannot be counted as
Notestein's creation. It was founded in 1952 by
John D. Rockefeller, 3d, who assumed the presi-
dency of this small organization limited at first
to modest support for demographic research,
biomedical research on human reproduction, and
providing fellowships for advanced training both
in demography and the biomedical field, pri-
marily to candidates from less developed coun-
tries. The next president of the council, Fred-
erick Osborn, shares with Notestein an out-
standing record of successful promotion and
statesmanship in demography. When Osborn
retired in 1959, Notestein succeeded him as
president of the council.
Notestein came to the Population Council at
an opportune moment. In its early years most of
its funds were personal contributions by John
Rockefeller, but by 1959 it was receiving sup-
port from the Ford and Rockefeller foundations.
In 1959, and for the first few years of Note-
stein's presidency of the council, the United
States government and the United Nations were
still barred from technical assistance in family
planning, and the Population Council was the
only organization in the world from which coun-
tries could ask for help.
Under these conditions, and with Notestein's
leadership, the Population Council became a
critical component in the expansion of technical
assistance, in the extension of training both in
demography and the biomedical aspects of re-
production, and in the development of these two
scientific fields. It was of great assistance in
launching family planning programs in South
Korea, Taiwan, and many other countries. It set
up systems of continuing evaluation of these
programs that were effective and have been use-
ful models for others. The biomedical research
program at the council provided intellectual
leadership in an area that in 1959 had few re-
sources in money or personnel. Now that finan-
cial support is on a much larger scale, and many
laboratories are working in the field, the council
program is still influential. An instance of the
practical impact of this program is its funding
(about 95 per cent) of the development of the
intrauterine contraceptive device. In 20 years the
cumulative number of Population Council fel-

lows reached approximately 1400, of whom
1150 were from Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer-
ica. A substantial fraction of the professional
demographers in the less developed countries are
Population Council fellows. Other, larger pro-
grams financed by governments are building on
the foundations established by the Population
Council.
ANSLEY J. COALE
WORKS BY NOTESTEIN
1936 Class Differences in Fertility. American Acad-
emy of Political and Social Science, Annals 188,
Nov.: 26-36.
(1937) 1964 NOTESTEIN, FRANK W.; and CHIAO, CHI-
MING Population. Volume 1, pages 358-399 in J.
Lossing Buck (editor), Land Utilization in China.
New York: Paragon.
1939 Intrinsic Factors in Population Growth. Ameri-
can Philosophical Society, Proceedings 80:499-511.
1940 STIX, REGINE K.; and NOTESTEIN, FRANK W.
Controlled Fertility: An Evaluation of Clinic Service.
Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
1944 Problems of Policy in Relation to Areas of Heavy
Population Pressure. Milbank Memorial Fund Quar-
terly 22:424-444.
1944 NOTESTEIN, FRANK W.; TAEUBER, IRENE B.; KIRK,
DUDLEY; COALE, ANSLEY J.; and KISER, LOUISE K.
The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet
Union: Population Projections, 1940—1970. Geneva:
League of Nations.
1945 Population—The Long View. Pages 36-57 in
Theodore W. Schultz (editor), Food for the World.
Univ. of Chicago Press.
1945 NOTESTEIN, FRANK W.; and JURKAT, ERNEST.
NOTESTEIN, FRANK W. 599
Population Problems of Palestine. Milbank Memo-
rial Fund Quarterly 23:307-352.
1946 The Facts of Life. Atlantic Monthly 177:75-83.
1948 Summary of the Demographic Background of
Problems of Undeveloped Areas. Milbank Memorial
Fund Quarterly 26:249-255.
1950 The Analysis of International Population Prob-
lems. Volume 2, pages 215-235 in William J. Bruce
(editor), International Demographic Statistics and
Population Problems. 5 vols. Calcutta: Elka Press.
—» Papers presented at the United Nations World
Statistical Congress, held on September 6-18, 1947,
in Calcutta.
1950 BALFOUR, MARSHALL C.; EVANS, ROGER F.; NOTE-
STEIN, FRANK W.; and TAEUBER, IRENE B. Public
Health and Demography in the Far East: Report of
a Survey Trip, September 13-December 13, 1948.
New York: Rockefeller Foundation.
1951 Population. Scientific American 185, Sept.: 28-35.
1953 Economic Problems of Population Change. Pages
13-31 in International Conference of Agricultural
Economists, Eighth, Proceedings. Oxford Univ.
Press.
1954 Some Demographic Aspects of Aging. American
Philosophical Society, Proceedings 98:38-45.
1957 As the Nation Grows Younger. Atlantic Monthly
200, Oct.: 131-136.
1959a Knowledge, Action, People. Princeton Alumni
Weekly 60, Sept.: 8-11.
1959Z? Poverty and Population. Atlantic Monthly 204,
Nov.: 84-8 7.
1960 Conference on Mortality, Fertility, the Size-Age
Distribution and the Growth Rate, Princeton, 1959.
Pages 261-284 in Universities—National Bureau
Committee for Economic Research, Demographic
and Economic Change in Developed Countries.
Princeton Univ. Press.
1968 Wilcox, Walter F. Volume 16, pages 553-555
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
 OAKESHOTT, MICHAEL
Michael Oakeshott is a political theorist who
does not fit into any of the usual categories; he
is a traditionalist with few traditional beliefs,
an "idealist" who is more skeptical than many
positivists, a lover of liberty who repudiates
liberalism, an individualist who prefers Hegel
to Locke, a philosopher who disapproves of
philosophisme, a romantic perhaps, and a mar-
velous stylist. He was born in England in 1901,
the son of a Fabian-socialist writer, Joseph Oake-
shott. He was educated at St. Christopher's, a
coeducational school, and at Gonville and Caius
College, Cambridge. He took a first class honors
degree in history (1923) and became a fellow
and history tutor at this college (1924-1939).
After army service in World War n, he taught
at Oxford University, becoming a professor of
political science at the London School of Eco-
nomics (1952-1969). It was during private
visits to Germany during the interwar years that
he developed his interest in Hegelian philosophy.
The argument of his earliest important work,
Experience and Its Modes (1933), undoubtedly
owes a certain amount to Hegel and to the theory
of truth as coherence. Oakeshott depicts the
philosopher's task as the resolution of the in-
consistency in any set of concrete images so as
to make it more intelligible. Ordinary or com-
mon-sense views may be used as a point of de-
parture, but they are adopted only to be ex-
amined and criticized, with the aim of moving
beyond them to a more comprehensive per-
spective. Philosophy, in this view, neither seeks
nor desires a stopping place. It is not the con-
struction of a complete system of knowledge,
but rather a method or way of thinking. Its ob-
jective is nothing more ambitious than under-
standing. Philosophy, for Oakeshott, is "expla-
nation."
Oakeshott notes that men have an incurable
tendency to look at the world through limited
perspectives known as "modes" of experience.
Each "mode" constructs a specific and homo-
geneous picture that is not a part of the real
world, but of the whole of experience as it is
seen from a given point of interest. Oakeshott
sees no theoretical limit to the number of such
abstract worlds, but he distinguishes four as
being particularly familiar and fully formed:
practice, science, history, and poetry. Each of
these "modes," Oakeshott suggests, has its own
validity, but all are in different ways limited,
and none is able, in its own terms, to understand
its limitations. Only the philosophical perspec-
tive is able to transcend the shortcomings of
these several "modes," and reinterpret them from
the standpoint of experience as a totality. The
philosopher seeks to bring out the logical form
of each particular "mode" with a view to per-
ceiving the degree and limitations of the co-
herence achieved. But, Oakeshott adds, philos-
ophy is "useless to men of business and trouble-
some to men of pleasure. . . . Philosophy is
not the enhancement of life" (1933, p. 355).
In his later writings, notably Rationalism in
Politics (1962) and On Human Conduct (1975),
Oakeshott applies his philosophical method to
the study of politics, so that his first question
becomes: What is the principle of coherence to
be sought in the interpretation of political ac-
601
602 OAKESHOTT, MICHAEL
tivity? Oakeshott considers, and rejects, two
well-known ways of characterizing political be-
havior. First, he repudiates the notion of politics
as an ad hoc activity, for this, he thinks, is to
represent politics as something entirely capri-
cious, which it is not. Secondly, he rejects the
more exalted and very fashionable belief that
politics is an activity which may be guided by
an independently premeditated plan or set of
principles. Some of the most telling, and often
quoted, passages in Oakeshott's writings are di-
rected against this vision of politics, which he
likes to call "rationalist."
Since the word "rationalism" has several
meanings, it is hardly surprising that these argu-
ments of Oakeshott have been misunderstood.
He is certainly not attacking reason, but rather
a kind of intellectualism or what he has some-
times called philosophisme. The kind of ration-
alist Oakeshott criticizes is the man who thinks
he can apply intellectual blueprints to the world
of politics, who imagines he can solve concrete
problems by the light of abstract generalizations,
and who seeks, in effect, to introduce into poli-
tics the method of the polytechnicien or en-
gineer.
Against such belief in the sovereignty of tech-
nique, Oakeshott insists on the importance of
practical knowledge, which, he claims, is largely
traditional knowledge. Political understanding
comes as a result of being apprenticed to and
participating in an activity, and so "using the re-
sources of a traditional manner of behaviour in
order to make a friend of every hostile occasion"
(1962, p. 127).
Oakeshott speaks of politics as "the activity of
attending to the general arrangements of a set
of people whom chance or choice has brought
together" (1956, p. 2). Any group may have its
politics, but the word "politics" is used primarily
in connection with those associations known as
states. Like all procedures among men, the rules
and institutions of states are most useful when
they are familiar and are not altered excessively.
Not that he sees anything sacrosanct in such
rules and institutions; all are "susceptible of
change and improvement." But such possible
improvements are prompted neither by caprice
nor by abstract principles, but derive from the
recognition of specific and ascertainable defects
in what already obtains. Thus political activity
is a matter of amending existing arrangements
to make them more coherent.
An example Oakeshott takes from contem-
porary history is the enfranchisement of women
in England. He suggests that this was not en-
acted because Parliament recognized any natural
or human right to equality of suffrage, but be-
cause Englishwomen had already, 3fe a result
of the Married Women's Property Act and of
various wartime changes, achieved by 1918
equality with Englishmen in so many other fields
that it was anomalous, or inconsistent, for them
to remain excluded from the voting register.
Their enfranchisement was a result of Parlia-
ment's recognition of "an incoherence in the ar-
rangements of the society which pressed con-
vincingly for remedy" (1956, p. 13). He in-
sists that "there is of course no place in civil
association for so-called 'distributive' justice.
. . . Civil rulers have nothing to distribute"
(1975, p. 153).
This emphasis of Oakeshott on the "politics
of repair" and on statesmanship as "choosing
the least evil" has prompted some readers to see
him as another Edmund Burke. But this is a
mistake. Burke, like most conservative political
theorists, is a champion of the Christian order,
natural law, and the right to property. Oakeshott,
who carries the skepticism of his philosophy into
his politics, has no belief in such metaphysical
abstractions. His kindred spirit is not Burke, but
David Hume. Like Hume, Oakeshott is conserva-
tive as a result of his doubt. Hume relied on tra-
dition, habit, and custom precisely because he
could see nothing else to rely on: no God, no
natural law, no rights. But Hume did not make
the mistake of elevating custom and tradition
into sacred substitutes for God and natural law.
His skeptical conservatism was open, undog-
matic, and splendidly tolerant.
This is equally true of Oakeshott's conserva-
tism. Opposed to all ideology, he cannot, and
does not, share the ideological conservatism of
Burke and his successors. This attitude, which is
required by Oakeshott's theory, is clearly also
part of his natural disposition. No one can read
his writings without being struck by his mani-
fest devotion to freedom. Whatever his debt to
Hegel in other fields, Oakeshott owes nothing to
Hegel in his understanding of freedom. Oake-
shott's notion of freedom is the plain man's, or
rather the plain Englishman's notion. Freedom
is something to be defended against the regime
and against any other great concentration of
power. Although Oakeshott has sometimes criti-
cized forms of theoretical individualism, his
freedom is the freedom of the individual. "The
'masses' as they appear in modern European
history," Oakeshott writes, "are not composed of

individuals, they are composed of 'anti-individ-
uals' united in revulsion from individuality"
(1970, p. 113).
He argues that freedom emerged in medieval
times with the sense of individuality. Individu-
ality demanded a government strong enough to
enable the individual to escape from communal
or other established pressures; a government
that could maintain order and create new rights
and duties appropriate to the interests of in-
dividuality, but which at the same time was not
so powerful that it would itself constitute a new
threat to those interests. Legislative bodies arose
to make laws favorable to the individual and to
establish spheres of private activities (or liber-
ties) in which the individual could act without
interference. Government acted like an um-
pire, administering the rules of the game with-
out taking part, intervening only to settle col-
lisions of interest among the players. Such is the
chief characteristic of what Oakeshott speaks
of as "parliamentary government."
The rise of the "anti-individual" goes together
with what Oakeshott calls "popular" (as opposed
to "parliamentary") government. The popular
system looks to the establishment of universal
adult suffrage to confirm the authority of mere
numbers or the mass man. The parliamentary
representative is seen, not as an individual, but
as an instructed delegate whose function is to
assist the creation of a society appropriate to
his masters; mass parties grow up composed of
"anti-individuals" and are dominated by their
leaders. But in all this the mass man does not
make his own choice; he does not really give a
mandate to his leaders. The so-called representa-
tive draws up his own mandate and "by a famil-
iar trick of ventriloquism" put it into the mouths
of his electors (1970, p. 105). Similarly, the
favorite device of "popular" government, the
plebiscite, is not a method by which the mass
man finally achieves release from the burden of
individuality; he is told emphatically what to
choose. Oakeshott adds that the style of general
political discourse most suited to "popular" (as
opposed to "parliamentary") government tends
naturally to be the idiom of ideology or, as he
calls it, rationalism.
Oakeshott's belief in the superiority of the
parliamentary form of government goes together
with his special feeling for England and the
English tradition of parliamentary government.
But he is not, as is often said, the successor of
T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, and F. H. Brad-
ley in the English idealist school. Green, in par-
OHLIN, BERTIL 603
ticular, is an example of the high-minded ideo-
logue that Oakeshott most mistrusts. Oakeshott's
"Hegelianism" comes straight from Hegel with-
out any mediation from Victorian Oxford. Oake-
shott's affinities are altogether closer to several
continental theorists, to Wilhelm Dilthey, for
example, and Benedetto Croce. And just as
Croce, who always reckoned himself a liberal,
proved when it came to the test surprisingly
conservative, so Oakeshott, the professed con-
servative, turns out to be remarkably liberal (or
"libertarian" as he would rather have it), in the
sense of one who loves liberty for the sake of
liberty.
MAURICE CRANSTON
WORKS BY OAKESHOTT
1933 Experience and Its Modes. Cambridge Univ.
Press.
(1939) 1941 Social and Political Doctrines of Con-
temporary Europe. 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1956 Political Education. Pages 1-21 in Peter Laslett
(editor), Philosophy, Politics and Society. Oxford:
Blackwell; New York: Macmillan.
1959 The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Man-
kind: An Essay. London: Bowes.
1962 Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. Lon-
don: Methuen; New York: Basic Books.
1970 The Masses in Representative Democracy. Pages
102-123 in William F. Buckley (editor), Did You
Ever See a Dream Walking?: American Conservative
Thought in the 20th Century. New York: American
Heritage.
1975 On Human Conduct. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1976 Hobbes on Civil Association. Oxford: Blackwell.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
AUSPITZ, J. L. et al. 1976 A Symposium on Michael
Oakeshott. Political Theory 4:261-367.
GREENLEAF, WILLIAM H. 1966 Oakeshott's Philosoph-
ical Politics. London: Longmans; New York: Barnes
& Noble.
KING, PRESTON; and PAREKH, B. C. (editors) 1968
Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to Michael
Oakeshott on the Occasion of His Retirement. Cam-
bridge Univ. Press.
OHLIN, BERTIL
Bertil Gotthard Ohlin (1899-1979) grew up
in Klippan, Sweden, where his father was a
lawyer and a district police superintendent.
At the University of Lund, to which he was
admitted at the age of 16, he studied eco-
nomics, statistics, and mathematics. In 1917,
he transferred to the Stockholm School of Eco-
nomics and Business Administration, where Eli
F. Heckscher was professor of economics. One
year later, he became a member of the National-
ekonomiska Klubben, an exclusive club of
604 OHLIN, BERTIL
economists, whose most prominent members
were Heckscher, David Davidson, Knut Wick-
sell, and Gustav Cassel. After passing his ex-
amination in 1919, Ohlin wrote reports for a
government committee on the development of
three Swedish industries, with special reference
to the effects of tariff policy.
In the early 1920s, Ohlin completed his mili-
tary service and continued his studies under
Cassel at the University of Stockholm. In 1922,
he presented a brief outline of the theory of
international trade, which Cassel approved as
a qualification for the licentiate degree. Ohlin
subsequently attended Cambridge University
for a few months, and Harvard University for
the academic year 1922/1923. At Harvard, he
met and was influenced by Frank W. Taussig
and John Williams. Having returned to the Uni-
versity of Stockholm, he defended his doctoral
dissertation in 1924. In this thesis (1924), he
extended the Walras-Cassel mutual interde-
pendence price system so as to hold for a system
of two or more regions trading with each other.
From 1925 to 1930, Ohlin held a chair as
professor of economics at the University of
Copenhagen. In 1930, he returned to Sweden to
succeed Heckscher at the Stockholm School of
Economics and Business Administration; he
held this chair until 1965. During 1930 and
1931, Ohlin completed his magnum opus, In-
terregional and International Trade (1933a),
and wrote a study on the world economic de-
pression for the League of Nations (193la). A
government committee on unemployment also
commissioned him to prepare a theoretical
monograph on monetary policy, public works,
subsidies, and tariffs as means against unem-
ployment (1934). This report shows the influ-
ence on Ohlin of the works of Wicksell, Erik
Lindahl, Gunnar Myrdal, and John Maynard
Keynes. Central traits of the theory in Ohlin's
study were similar to Keynes's analysis in The
General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money (1936).
In Sweden, Ohlin is probably better known as
a politician than as an economist. He was chair-
man of the Folkpartiets Ungdomsforbund (Lib-
eral Youth Federation), 1934-1939; a member of
the Swedish parliament, 1938-1970; leader of
the Folkpartiet (Liberal party), 1944-1967; and
minister of trade, 1944-1945. From 1946 to
1967, except for one brief period, the Folkpartiet
was the leading opposition party. As a politician,
Ohlin characterizes himself as a social liberal.
Ohlin's intense preoccupation with politics
since the middle of the 1930s has not prevented
him from making new contributions to eco-
nomics. In 1947, he lectured at Oxford Univer-
sity and at Columbia University on the theory of
economic stabilization (1949). He contributed
to the discussions concerning the possibility of
harmonizing social legislation and the system
of taxation within economic unions (1956;
1958; 1965), and demonstrated facts versus
popular views on income distribution between
labor and capital.
In 1977, Bertil Ohlin and James E. Meade
were awarded the Alfred Nobel memorial prize
in economic science "for their pathbreaking
contributions to the theory of international
trade and international capital movements."
Interregional and International Trade was men-
tioned as Ohlin's principal contribution.
Interregional and international trade. The
theoretical model given by Ohlin in Interre-
gional and International Trade is based on the
simplified Walrasian equilibrium model for a
closed economy presented by Cassel in his
Theoretische Sozialokonomie (1918). In the
early 1920s, Ohlin set out to extend Cassel's
mathematical model by analyzing the effects of
trade on two regions or countries. The first re-
sult was a model that is published in Ohlin's dis-
sertation (1924). In this model, commodities
can move without cost between regions, but the
factors of production of one region cannot move
to the other region; each region has its factor
endowment. Differences between the regions
with regard to "the relative scarcity" of produc-
tive factors cause differences in relative prices
when the regions are isolated from each other.
These price differences, in turn, make interre-
gional trade profitable, unless impediments to
commodity movements prevent it. The trade
causes an equalization between regions not only
of commodity prices but, to some extent, also
of factor prices.
In the preface to his dissertation, Ohlin
pointed out that in several essential respects,
these results coincide with those in an article
by Heckscher (Heckscher 1919). He remarked
that although his point of departure (the com-
bination of two-price systems of mutual inter-
dependence using Cassel's one-market equilib-
rium model) was different from Heckscher's
comparative cost analysis, he had been much
influenced by Heckscher's article.
On the basis of his mathematical model, Oh-
lin developed a more comprehensive theory of
trade in his dissertation. He discussed the sup-

ply reactions of the factors of production as
well as the economies of scale; he studied the
effects on trade of import duties and the cost of
transportation between regions; he dropped the
assumption that factors of production cannot
move from one region to another; and in partic-
ular, he analyzed the causes and effects of cap-
ital movements under various conditions, in-
cluding fixed and flexible exchange rates.
Finally, he indicated what he viewed as the de-
fects in the classical theory of international
trade and criticized the classical value theory as
a basis for a theory of trade.
In 1929, Keynes wrote an article on the Ger-
man transfer problem in which he concluded
that the Germans had to reduce the prices of
their exports if they were to increase the sale
of their products, and thus be able to pay
larger indemnities (Keynes 1929). To this,
Ohlin (1929) replied that Keynes had ignored
the importance of the transfer of "buying
power." Germany had borrowed much more
than it had paid in reparation payments. This
meant a considerable net addition to its buying
power. Thus, one of the results of Germany's
borrowing was to reduce its exports and in-
crease its imports. In the absence of any further
borrowing, Germany's reparation payments
would lead to a transfer of buying power in the
opposite direction, which would have an effect
on trade.
In Interregional and International Trade, the
basic mathematical model, which has since
been widely referred to as "the Heckscher-Ohlin
model," is developed in the first two chapters
and in a mathematical appendix. Essentially, it
is identical with the mathematical model in
Ohlin's dissertation. In the remaining 23
chapters, the theory is modified and extended
in various respects, and tested against em-
pirical material. For example, the assump-
tion of complete divisibility is dropped and
large-scale economies are shown to be a cause
of trade; exceptions to the rule that trade tends
to equalize factor prices are given; the influence
of trade on demand for goods and on supply of
productive factors is studied; costs of transfer
of commodities and interregional factor move-
ments are introduced; theoretical aspects of lo-
cation within a region are given; effects of
dumping and import duties are analyzed; and
the mechanism of international trade variations
and capital movements is studied. As regards
capital movements, the role of changes in buying
power is stressed. Ohlin also discussed earlier
OHLIN, BERTIL 605
theories of international trade in two ap-
pendices.
Not long after its publication, Interregional
and International Trade was recognized as a
major contribution to international economics.
For example, the Heckscher-Ohlin model was
already an essential element in the first edition
of Paul Ellsworth's well-known textbook (1938).
Then, in an article in 1941, Wolfgang F. Stolper
and Paul A. Samuelson discussed the effects of
tariffs on real wages. As a point of departure
they used the following proposition: "A country
will export those commodities which are pro-
duced with its relatively abundant factors of
production, and will import those in the pro-
duction of which its relatively scarce factors are
important. . . . And as a result of the shift
towards increased production of those goods in
which the abundant factors predominate, there
will be a tendency—necessarily incomplete—to-
wards an equalization of factor prices between
the two or more trading countries" (pp. 58-59).
Later, Samuelson (1948; 1949) analyzed this
theorem more closely and found that the reser-
vation "necessarily incomplete" is not strictly
correct; under certain specified conditions, trade
will lead to complete factor price equalization.
However, among these conditions is at least one
that is obviously unrealistic: that all commodi-
ties move perfectly freely in international trade,
without encountering tariffs or transport costs.
The first proposition of what Stolper and
Samuelson (1941) referred to as the Heckscher-
Ohlin Theorem was subjected to an empirical test
by Wassily Leontief in the early 1950s. Since it
could hardly be disputed that the United States
possessed more productive capital per worker
than any other country, the theorem suggested
that American relations with other countries
should be based mainly on the export of "capital
intensive" goods in exchange for "labor inten-
sive" products. But Leontief's analysis of statis-
tical material suggested the opposite. America's
participation in the international division of
labor was based on its specialization in labor
intensive, rather than capital intensive, lines of
production. Several alternative explanations of
this so-called Leontief paradox have been given.
Some of the most interesting have been ac-
counted for by Bo Sodersten (1970), who con-
cludes that the discussion has provided a good
deal of insight into the foreign trade position of
the United States, but that it has hardly helped
to establish or refute the Heckscher-Ohlin
model of international trade.
606 OHLIN, BERTIL
Ohlin's Interregional and International Trade
has influenced not only the development of in-
ternational economics but also that of location
theory and regional economics. Walter Isard
(1956) referred to it as the first serious attempt
to integrate trade and location theories. How-
ever, in Isard's opinion, Ohlin started at the
wrong end. He should have developed a general
localization theory first. Then, by focusing upon
certain forms of immobilities of factors and
goods, he could have developed his theory of
interregional and international trade as a
special case.
Theory of money, employment, and economic
fluctuations. In his analysis of international
trade variations and capital movements, Ohlin
pointed out the role of changes in the buying
power of the trading countries. He used the no-
tion of buying power—or total monetary demand
—also in his analysis of employment and price
fluctuations within a country. It appeared in a
pamphlet on stimulating production (1927fc>),
where he also anticipated a part of R. F. Kahn's
multiplier theory (Kahn 1931). In a paper on
monetary theory (1933fc>), Ohlin also connected
it with the then widespread idea that a dis-
crepancy between savings and investment
causes changes in the general price level. He
referred to a situation where "the planned sav-
ings falls short of the planned investment," and
made the important statement that a more
straightforward way of describing this situation
is to say that the sum of planned investment
and planned consumption (i.e., total demand)
exceeds total planned supply. In his application
of the concept of total demand, which he found
was due to the influence of Wicksell, Ohlin an-
ticipated one of the aspects of Keynes's theory
of 1936 (c.f., Ohlin 1974; Steiger 1976; Keynes
1936).
For Ohlin the comparisons between total de-
mand and total supply were only the point of de-
parture for a much more detailed analysis, which
he presented in his 1934 report on employment
policy. He realized that an extreme aggregation
can be misleading, and made further comments
in an article some years later (1941b).
Ohlin stressed the importance of process
analyses combining what he, following Myrdal,
called ex post and ex ante analysis. The main
features of such a process analysis can be de-
scribed as follows: Actual events during one
period affect expectations for the future. The
expectations more or less govern actions during
the next period. These actions may be such that
the expectations for this second period do not
all come true. The surprises affect expectations,
which, in turn, influence actions during the third
period, and so on (Ohlin, Robertson, & Hawtry
1937).
Critics of Ohlin's contributions to dynamic
theory have pointed out that process analysis
must be casuistic. In Ohlin's opinion, this is a
true, but not a relevant, objection. He declared
that a principal task of monetary theory is to
describe processes (1933i>), and some years
later he wrote (1941i») that if we want to attain
insight into economic reality, it is necessary to
construct and study a set of typical cases where
the economic development can be described and
predicted on the basis of assumptions about the
speed of reactions and the strength of ten-
dencies.
Ohlin also contributed to macroeconomic
theory by sketching alternative theories of the
rate of interest (Ohlin, Robertson, & Hawtry
1937); anticipating Keynes's idea of a "liquidity
trap" (193la); contributing to the theory of
public works as a means against unemployment
(1934); and discussing the effects of overem-
ployment (1949). Unfortunately, most of these
books are only available in Scandinavian lan-
guages. Therefore, in contrast to Interregional
and International Trade, they have not attracted
the attention that they deserve.
HARALD DICKSON
WORKS BY OHLIN
1924 Handelns teori (The Theory of Trade). Stock-
holm: Centraltryckeriet. —» Ohlin's dissertation.
1927a 1st eine Modernisierung des Aussenhandels-
theorie erforderlich? Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
26:97-115.
1927b Saet Produktionen i Gang (Get Production Go-
ing). Copenhagen: Aschehoug.
1929 Transfer Difficulties, Real and Imagined. Eco-
nomic Journal 39:172-178. —» Part of a larger
article, entitled "The Reparation Problem: A Dis-
cussion," that includes "A Rejoinder" by John May-
nard Keynes on pages 179-182.
1930 Die Beziehungen Zwischen internationalem Han-
del und internationalen Bewegungen von Kapital
und Arbeit. Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie 2:161—
199.
1931a The Course and Phases of the World Economic
Depression: Report Presented to the Assembly of
the League of Nations. Geneva: The Secretariat of
the League of Nations. —> Reprinted in 1972 by
Arno.
1931b Protection and Non-competing Groups. Welt-
wirtschaftliches Archiv 33:30—35.
(1933a) 1967 Interregional and International Trade.
Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1933b Till fragan om penningteoriens upplaggning
(To the Question of the Structure of Monetary
Theory). Ekonomisk Tidskrift 35:45-81. —» Pub-
lished with comments by Hans Brems, Don Patin-
kin, Otto Steiger, and Ralph S. Yohe in 1978 in
volume 10 of History of Political Economy.

1934 Penningpolitik, offentliga arbeten, subventioner
och tullar som medel mot arbetsloshet (Monetary
Policy, Public Works, Subsidies and Tariffs as
Means Against Unemployment). Stockholm: Statens
offentliga utredningar.
1937 Some Notes on the Stockholm Theory of Savings
and Investment, I and II. Economic Journal 47:53-
69, 221-240.
1937 OHLIN, BERTIL; ROBERTSON, D. H.; and HAWTRY,
R. G. Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest:
Three Rejoinders. Economic Journal 47:423-443.
—» Ohlin's rejoinder is on pages 423-427.
1941a Kapitalmarknad och rdntepolitik (Capital Mar-
ket and Interest Rate Policy). Stockholm: Koopera-
tiva forbundets bokforlag.
1941b Professor Lindahl om dynamisk teori (Professor
Lindahl on Dynamic Theory). Ekonomisk Tidskrift
43:170-181.
(1949) 1977 The Problem of Employment Stabiliza-
tion. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
1956 Taxation and Foreign Trade. Appendix 2, pages
153-159 in Social Aspects of European Economic
Cooperation. International Labor Office, Studies and
Reports, New Series, No. 46. Geneva: The Office.
1958 Problemes d'harmonisation et de coordination
de politiques economiques et sociales. Revue
d'Economie politique 68:264-290.
1965 Some Aspects of Policies for Freer Trade. Pages
82-92 in Richard E. Caves, Harry G. Johnson, and
Peter B. Ken en (editors), Trade, Growth, and the
Balance of Payments: Essays in Honor of Gottfried
Haberler. Chicago: Rand McNally; Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
1967 Reflections on Contemporary International Trade
Theories. Appendix 2, pages 305-319 in Inter-
regional and International Trade. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press. —» This article was not in-
cluded in the 1933 edition of Interregional and
International Trade.
1969 International Trade and Industrialization of De-
veloping Countries. Pages 50-63 in David Wirmark
(editor), Europe and the Developing Countries.
Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren.
1970 On Model Construction in International Trade
Theory. Pages 325-333 in W. A. Eltis, M. F. G.
Scott, and J. N. Wolfe (editors), Induction, Growth,
and Trade: Essays in Honour of Roy Harrod. Lon-
don: Clarendon.
1972-1975 Bertil Ohlin's Memoarer (Bertil Ohlin's
Memoirs). 2 vols. Stockholm: Bonnier.
1974 On the Slow Development of the "Total Demand"
Idea in Economic Theory. Reflections in Connec-
tion With Dr. Oppenheimer's Note. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 12:888-896.
1977 Some Aspects of the Relations Between Inter-
national Movements of Commodities, Factors of Pro-
duction, and Technology. Pages 25-56 in Bertil
Ohlin, P. O. Hesselborn, and P. M. Wijkman (edi-
tors), The International Allocation of Economic
Activity. London: Macmillan.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CASSEL, (K.) GUSTAV (1918) 1932 The Theory of
Social Economy. New rev. ed. New York: Harcourt.
OHLIN, BERTIL 607
—> Translated fiom the fifth edition of Theoretische
Sozialokonomie.
CAVES, RICHARD E. 1960 Trade and Economic Struc-
ture: Models and Methods. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard Univ. Press. —» Contains a penetrating account
of Ohlin's contributions to international trade
theory.
CAVES, RICHARD E. 1978 Bertil Ohlin's Contribution
to Economics. Scandinavian Journal of Economics
80:86-99.
CAVES, RICHARD E.; and JONES, RONALD W. (1973)
1977 Worid Trade and Payments: An Introduc-
tion. 2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown.
CAVES, RICHARD E.; and JOHNSON, HARRY G. (editors)
1968 Readings in International Economics. Lon-
don: Allen & Unwin; Homewood, 111.: Irwin.
—> See particularly the preface, and the chapters
by Romney Robison, Lloyd A. Metzler, Paul A.
Samuelson, T. M. Rybczynski, Harry G. Johnson,
and Wassily Leontief.
ELLIS, HOWARD S.; and METZLER, LLOYD A. (editors)
(1949) 1950 Readings in the Theory of Interna-
tional Trade. Homewpod, 111.: Irwin.
ELLSWORTH, PAUL T. 1938 International Economics.
London: Macmillan.
ELLSWORTH, PAUL T.; and LEITH, J. CLARK (1950)
1975 The International Economy. 5th ed. New
York: Macmillan.
HECKSCHER, ELI (1919) 1950 The Effect of Foreign
Trade on the Distribution of Income. Pages 272-
300 in Howard S. Ellis and Lloyd A. Metzler (edi-
tors), Readings in the Theory of International
Trade. Homewood, 111.: Irwin. —> First published
in Swedish.
ISARD, WALTER 1956 Location and Space-economy: A
General Theory Relating to Industrial Location,
Market Areas, Land Use, Trade, and Urban Struc-
ture. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press; New York:
Wiley. —> A paperback edition was published by
M.I.T. Press in 1972.
KAHN, R. F. 1931 The Relation of Home Investment
to Unemployment. Economic Journal 41:173-198.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1929 The German Transfer
Problem. Economic Journal 39:1-7.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —> A paperback edition was published by
Harcourt in 1965.
SAMUELSON, PAUL A. 1948 International Trade and
the Equalisation of Factor Prices. Economic Journal
58:163-184.
SAMUELSON, PAUL A. 1949 International Factor-
Price Equalisation. Economic Journal 59:181—197.
SODERSTEN, Bo 1970 International Economics. New
York and London: Harper.
STEIGER, OTTO 1976 Bertil Ohlin and the Origins of
the Keynesian Revolution. History of Political Econ-
omy 8:341-366.
STOLPER, WOLFGANG F.; and SAMUELSON, PAUL A.
1941 Protection and Real Wages. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 9:58-73.
URH, C. C. 1977 Economists and Policymaking
1930-1936: Sweden's Experience. History of Polit-
ical Economy 9:89-121.
 PARSONS, TALCOTT
The leading theorist in American sociology
since World War n, Talcott Parsons (1902-1979)
pioneered a new framework called action theory
for thinking about modern man, culture, society,
and their evolution. Its conceptual scheme con-
nects Max Weber's and Emile Durkheim's
contrasting sociological approaches to large-scale,
modern society with learning theory, anthro-
pological functionalism, and Sigmund Freud's
psychodynamics. This unprecedented theoretical
synthesis is the generative core for the many-
sided development of action theory. Later in his
career, Parsons also linked action theory with
cybernetics, structural linguistics, input-output
economics, and microgenetics, and he hoped
that action theory would help strengthen the
relationship between sociology and the other
social-behavioral sciences in spite of growing
specialization.
Parsons' sociology focused on the common
and developmental features of the governing
institutions of society; his conceptual notion of
society was based on his more generic model
of social systems, which sought to specify the
self-maintaining elements of any organized form
of human interaction. Any such interactive or-
ganization requires personal commitments by
the prevailing participants to shared cultural
norms that they spontaneously act to enforce
and reinforce.
In the 1940s, Parsons devised a structural-
functional strategy (a label he later eschewed)
to simplify the modeling of the organizational
complexities of societies. This approach is cen-
tral to all of his later work, and has been widely
applied in sociology since the mid-1950s, when
it spawned a vigorous school that made "Par-
sonian" a standard term in academic diction-
aries. It has also been selectively used in anthro-
pology, history, political science, and psychology,
some areas of the humanities, and in applied
fields ranging from psychiatry and administra-
tive science to city planning, social work, and
policy science.
Yet his "functionalism" is the most controver-
sial part of Parsons' work, and it has generated
a large body of critical literature. Opposition has
been steadily voiced from every rival theoretical
camp, varyingly criticizing its alleged untesta-
bility, overly analytical character, ahistoricism,
oversocialized and conformist view of man, psy-
chological reductionism, idealistic view of starker
political realities, unreadability, static emphasis,
status-quo bias, and anti-Marxism. But Parsons
continued to develop his theories within the
storm center, and his influence grew until the
Vietnam War and the rise of the New Left in
the late 1960s. As protests shook academia and
debates became angry confrontations, criticism
became politicized and polarized. Many of the
growing number of Marxian social scientists
(especially in sociology) in the West singled out
Parsons' "functionalism" for "demonization," as
the leading theoretical "enemy of Marxism."
His works were condemned in wholesale fashion
as capitalist apologetics, and his school was
vilified as a hegemonic agency of American im-
perialism. Most criticisms written in this vein
are best forgotten.
This view persisted in fervent "Marxist" cen-
609
 610 PARSONS, TALCOTT
ters in the 1970s, and many non-Marxian social
scientists who came of age at that time remain
closed to anything associated with Parsons'
theory. Since this included the theories of Weber
and Durkheim from which his program crucially
devolved, special efforts have been made in the
1970s to dissociate these theories from those of
Parsons. But since the "New Left" subsided in
the mid-1970s, a revived sociological interest
in Parsons developed. This partly reflects the
work of some of his younger students, who mod-
ified action theory to better fit the temperament
of their peers, and that of Parsons himself, who
gave more attention to the more neglected as-
pects of his theories. There has also been a not-
able growing interest in Parsonian theory among
eminent social scientists in Poland, Yugoslavia,
and other East European communist countries,
and more selectively, among such leading neo-
Marxists as Louis Althusser, Ernest Mandel, and
Jiirgen Habermas in the West. The past debate
continues, but there have been important rap-
prochements.
Background and early career
Talcott Parsons was born in 1902, in Colorado
Springs, the youngest of five children. His
father, Edward S. Parsons, who was descended
from a line of Yankee merchants, broke with
family tradition by attending Yale Divinity
School, where he was ordained a Congregational
minister. Shortly before the outbreak of World
War i, the family moved to New York City,
where Talcott Parsons attended Horace Mann,
the experimental boys' high school of Columbia
University. He described his home environment
as liberal for that era. His mother, Mary A.
Ingersol Parsons, was a suffragist who also
supported other progressive causes, and his
father was a "social gospel" Protestant of broad
academic interests, who accepted the theories of
Charles Darwin and viewed science as supple-
mental to religion. In the fall of 1920, Parsons
entered Amherst College, which his father and
two older brothers had attended.
It is important for his later work that both his
college and postgraduate studies were unusually
broad and diverse for a sociologist of his gen-
eration. Parsons was exposed to the major
trends in the natural and social sciences, and
studied with many remarkable teachers. Al-
though he majored in biology at Amherst, he
became interested in the social sciences during
his junior year as a result of a course he took
with Walton Hamilton, an institutional econo-
mist. In graduate school, Parsons thus decided
to clarify the relationship between economics
and sociology, the problem that launched his
theoretical program.
Parsons began his graduate studies as a non-
degree student at the London School of Eco-
nomics (L.S.E.) in 1924/1925. He was initially
attracted to the L.S.E. because of two of its
leading social democrats: the political economist
Harold Laski and the economic historian
R. H. Tawney. He also attended the lectures of
L. T. Hobhouse, the noted evolutionary sociol-
ogist who had modified Herbert Spencer's
laissez-faire doctrine; Hobhouse's younger, more
empirical protege, Morris Ginsberg; and the con-
servative monetary theorist, Edwin Cannan
(1977c, chapter 2). But his most important
experience was a seminar with the great func-
tional anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, in
which the anthropologist previewed his 1925
essay, "Magic, Science and Religion" (Parsons
1977c, p. 83). Parsons became interested in
Malinowski's attack on evolutionary positivism
(found in both classical economics and soci-
ology) for its conceit in minimizing the ration-
ality of "savages," his stress on the ultimate
limits of science in the face of unalterables such
as death, and the correlative universal need for
religion. Malinowski's functional view of cul-
tures as systems of interdependent parts and
his emphasis on the universal biopsychological
and social needs underlying cultural differences
also made lasting impressions on Parsons, who
retained them (in much altered form) in his
own structural functionalism.
Before he completed his first year at the
L.S.E., Parsons received an exchange fellowship
to study at the University of Heidelberg in Ger-
many. This was where Max Weber had spent
most of his academic years, and though Weber
had died in 1920, his influence was widespread.
In contrast with the L.S.E., the University of
Heidelberg was deeply divided on the value of
science in general, and social science in particu-
lar. The prevailing view, with roots in German
social thought going back to Hegel, has been
called historical idealism. This view was "ide-
alist" in seeing human actions as culturally de-
termined, and "historicist" in seeing each culture
as uniquely reflecting a ruling "spirit" (Geist),
which was not susceptible to lawful scientific
analysis. The rival view was a form of Marxism
that accepted the uniqueness of historical sys-
tems, but saw their ruling ideals as sequentially

determined by the evolution of material forces.
Max Weber's approach was significant as a neo-
Kantian "third force," in which Parsons became
interested soon after his arrival (Parsons 1937,
chapter 13; Martel 1977, pp. 4-7).
Parsons enrolled in the philosophy faculty
and studied sociological and economic theory.
In sociology, his main teacher and examiner was
Alfred Weber, Max Weber's younger brother, an
eminent scholar in his own right who was some-
what more historicist than his more famous
sibling. But he also took a seminar on Max
Weber with Karl Mannheim and discussed
Weber's work with Alexander von Schelting, a
young sociologist who did much to clarify
Weber's methodology, and with Edgar Salin, an
iconoclastic economist close to both Weber
brothers, who became Parsons' dissertation ad-
viser. In addition, he studied Marxian theory
with fimil Lederer, a noted socialist economist,
and he personally delved into Das Kapital and
those of Marx's related theoretical works that
were then available.
Parsons' other important teacher at Heidel-
berg was Karl Jaspers, with whom he took an
intensive minor on Immanuel Kant's philosophy.
Jaspers, a non-Freudian psychiatrist who be-
came a philosopher under Max Weber's influ-
ence, is usually thought of as a phenomenologist
and a founder of "existentialism." But to Par-
sons, he stood for a sensitive, qualified defense
of "objective" social science and a "Verstehen"
approach that helped Parsons clarify his own
developing methodology. Jaspers also spoke ap-
preciatively of Durkheim, who had been dis-
missed by Ginsberg in London for allegedly
having a mystical "group-mind" concept, and
by Malinowski for more ambivalent reasons
(Parsons 1979).
For Parsons, his encounter with Max Weber's
works was his most important experience at
Heidelberg. He decided to write his dissertation
on the issues raised by Marx's approach to
capitalism. At Salin's suggestion, he confined it
to recent German works and the final work was
a comparison of the approaches of Marx and
Weber with that of Werner Sombart, a leading
sociological historicist, whose three-volume tome,
Der moderne Kapitalismus (1902) and other
writings were prominent in the debates. Parsons
completed his thesis, "The Concept of Capital-
ism in the Recent German Literature," and re-
ceived his DR. PHIL, in 1929.
Before returning to the United States in 1926
to teach economics at Harvard University, the
PARSONS, TALCOTT 611
university with which he has been identified
ever since, he married Helen B. Walker, a New
Englander who had also studied economics at
the L.S.E.
In 1928-1929, Parsons published two articles
in English, based on his thesis, which indicated
several of his future positions. First, he favored
the position of Marx, Weber, and Sombart that
Western capitalism is a historically distinctive
system, whose market laws and salient motives
(e.g., profit seeking) reflect cultural conditioning,
and he agreed with their broad rejection of more
universal claims by classical economists. Sec-
ond, he rejected both Sombart's idealistic view
of capitalism's uniqueness and indeterminate
origins and Marx's concept of its materialist,
unilinear evolution. Instead, he supported
Weber's attempt to reconcile the two theories in
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism (1904—1905), which Parsons translated
into English in 1930. He also endorsed Weber's
effort to combine historical and comparative
analysis (rejecting the historicist dogma of their
exclusiveness), as well as his multilinear evolu-
tionism, viewing history as a "branching tree"
(1928-1929, vol. 37, p. 45). But his support
of Weber was not unqualified, and he criticized
Weber's failure consistently to distinguish be-
tween historical and analytical concepts, his
ad hoc use of "ideal types," and his lack of a
system model of societies. On the other hand,
he praised Marx's systemic view of capitalism
and the notion that "abuses only could be
remedied by changes in the fundamental basis
of class interests within the system" as "a great
advance over Utopian social (ism)" (1928-1929,
vol. 36, p. 659). He concluded that the "analysis
of the moving forces in social life . . . in Ger-
man sociology . . . has its starting point to a
very large extent in Marx. Here is a set of prob-
lems which sociology cannot afford to neglect"
(ibid., vol. 37, p. 50).
Although Parsons was exposed to economic,
sociological, and philosophical thinking during
his studies abroad, his background was more
limited in the technical economic theories de-
veloping in England and the United States when
he joined the Harvard economics department.
The department included leaders in the classical
tradition, such as F. W. Taussig, T. N. Carver,
and W. Z. Ripley, the economic historian, Edwin
Gay, who had studied in Germany, and Joseph
Schumpeter, who had just arrived from Austria.
He audited Taussig's graduate course on eco-
nomic theory, which emphasized the works of
 612 PARSONS, TALCOTT
the neo-classicist Alfred Marshall. These studies
led Parsons to a more technical consideration of
the links between economic and sociological
theory. As he later wrote, the idea dawned on
him that both "should be conceived as standing
within some sort of theoretical matrix" (1970,
p. 828). This was the beginning of his general
theory of action.
But Parsons still was working in the unde-
fined area between the two fields. In 1931, when
the sociology department was founded at Har-
vard (with Pitirim Sorokin as chairman), Par-
sons became a charter member. Among his
graduate students during these early years were
Robert K. Merton, Kingsley Davis, Robin M. Wil-
liams, Jr., and Wilbert E. Moore. They were
attracted by his rare combination of analytical
brilliance, scholarly breadth, and personal
warmth. The effects were interactive, and stu-
dent support proved essential to the growth of
his theoretical program.
First major work. With his shift into the
newly formed sociology department, Parsons' in-
terests in the noneconomic assumptions of eco-
nomic theory broadened, and led him into a
much wider investigation of social theories. This
study resulted in his first major work, The Struc-
ture of Social Action (1937), which was hailed
as a work of rare genre and is now regarded as a
classic, even though some of its findings have
become extremely controversial.
In this book, Parsons extended his study of
German approaches to capitalism to include
British, French, and other European writers.
Detailed attention is given to a comparison of
Marshall, Durkheim, Weber, and Vilfredo Pareto.
It was the first book to introduce Durkheim,
Weber, and Pareto for serious and detailed con-
sideration to English-speaking sociologists and,
in the absence of any other English work com-
parable in quality, it became a standard source.
This was not Parsons' aim. In his introduction
he explained that while the aspects of their work
that he discusses are "of great, sometimes cen-
tral importance to their work as a whole," his
approach was selective (p. 15).
The volume has four central and related aims.
First, it is an empirical study in the sociology
of science, concerned with changing views of
individualism and rationality in the leading so-
cial and economic theories of the Western world
since the emergence of modern economies and
social science in the eighteenth century. Writing
during the depression of the 1930s, when so-
cialist, fascist, and Keynesian remedies were
being tried to revive fallen capitalist economies,
Parsons sounded his opening theme:
A basic revolution in empirical interpretation of
some of the most important social problems has
been going on. Linear evolution has been slipping
[and] various kinds of individualism have been un-
der increasingly heavy fire. In their place have been
appearing socialistic, collect!vistic, organic theories
of all sorts. The role of reason and the status of
scientific knowledge as an element of action have
been attacked again and again. We have been over-
whelmed by a flood of anti-intellectualistic theories
of human nature and behavior, (p. 5)
Parsons further presumed that "an equally
radical change in the structure of theoretical
systems . . . of society" (p. 11) has occurred
over several centuries, which is not only "an
ideological reflection of certain basic social
changes" (p. 5), but partly reflects genuine
scientific progress. The second aim, then, is a
critical as well as descriptive examination and
appraisal of trends in the leading theories.
Third, the book seeks to arrive at the most de-
fensible theoretical framework and methodologi-
cal basis for future theories of social action.
Finally, it uses both its sampled theories, along
with their supporting data and logic, to justify
its analysis of future theoretical directions.
Parsons' much debated conclusion was that
as the research and thinking of Marshall,
Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber evolved, a broad
convergence is shown in their works toward a
common theoretical and methodological position
that Parsons called the "voluntaristic theory of
action." It combined important features of both
classical economics and historical idealism.
Parsons' claim was dramatic, especially since
scholarly opinion then placed each of the four
theorists in a different corner of the theoretical
map. They also came from four different coun-
tries and had contrasting social backgrounds,
ideologies, and temperaments. As Parsons wrote:
"More violent contrasts are scarcely imaginable
than between Marshall, the strongly moralistic
middle-class Englishman; Durkheim, the Alsa-
tian Jewish, radical, anticlerical French pro-
fessor; Pareto, the aloof, sophisticated Italian
nobleman; and, finally, Weber, a son of the most
highly cultured German upper middle class . . ."
(p. 13). They reached their positions indepen-
dently, with little awareness of each other's
paths.
But what counted most to Parsons was their
contrasting methodological starting points. Par-
sons analyzed the four theorists against the de-

velopmental backdrop of idealism and posi-
tivism, the two dominant Western outlooks on
rationality and individualism in the study of
man. Each outlook is denned as an ideal type,
and then the two approaches are traced up to
the early twentieth century in a series of bril-
liant sketches of their outstanding exponents.
Part of the unusual power, even excitement, of
The Structure of Social Action comes from the
vivid, incisive way that Parsons pointed up
critical theoretical problems in each of the two
dominant traditions in his brief sketches of
Thomas Hobbes and Thomas R. Malthus on the
positive side and Georg Hegel and Wilhelm
Dilthey on the idealist side. On one level, Par-
sons traced the modern idealist breach with
positivism from Kant's dualistic attempt to de-
fend Newtonian science and yet preserve a con-
cept of human moral responsibility. As he wrote:
Kant's answer to Hume . . . reestablished the va-
lidity of physical science by reducing physical bodies
and events to ... 'phenomena'. . . . Man, to be
sure, participated in (this physical) world, not only
as a knowing subject but also as an object, as a
physical body. But this did not exhaust man (who
also was) an active, purposeful being, an actor
. . . . In this sphere man was not subject to law in
the physical sense but was free. (pp. 474-475)
Parsons goes on to say: "The tendency of
Kantian thought was thus toward a radical
dualism . . . in relation to man (favoring) a
reduction of all (physical) aspects of man, es-
pecially the biological, to a 'materialist' basis.
(It) produced a radical hiatus between . . . the
natural sciences and the sciences of culture or
mind (Geist) in Germany" (p. 474).
Positivism in Western Europe sought an ap-
proach to social life closely modeled on natural
science. Acting units were restricted to individ-
uals, since no physical group links existed be-
tween them after birth. All subjective properties-
definable by their meanings to various actors
or culture groups—were virtually excluded. In
the extreme (radical positivism), this was a
biosocial view of men as organisms adapting to
environments like any animals. This view was
epitomized by Darwin, behaviorist psychology,
and instinct theories. By comparison, the more
tempered positivism of utilitarians Hobbes and
John Locke, who set the framework for classical
economics with their ends-means scheme, was
preferable. Here men were at least seen as con-
scious beings, who had the ability to choose
from various means available the ones better
PARSONS, TALCOTT 613
suited to their ends; their choices had some
causal weight. Objectivity was upheld by assum-
ing that men had common ends in the public
sphere (e.g., seeking the lowest market prices)
and that means could be judged by the sci-
entist's own rational norms. Thus, the actors'
meanings were residualized and ignored, and
discrepancies were the result of their ignorance
or errors. Hobbes initially saw a problem of
"order" in any such individualistic model of so-
cial behavior, but Locke more optimistically
added a "prop" of a natural identity of interests.
By contrast, idealist approaches (especially
those developed in Germany) stressed precisely
the subjective, symbolic qualities of men that
set them apart from other species. Theoretically,
the distinctive contribution of historicism is its
concept of cultural organization as a system of
interdependent meanings. In contrast to the
physical systems treated by positivist science,
the historicists called attention to the "ideal
reality" of cultures (1937, pp. 482-483), whose
comprehension required a method of Verstehen
(interpretive "understanding" of a unique system
of symbolic connections) rather than explana-
tion by causal laws. As Parsons emphasized,
such symbolic links contrast with causal rela-
tions in being timeless (in the sense that by the
norms of a system of logic, a "proof" once
achieved retains its acceptability). Historicism
in its relativism also challenged the uncritical
rationalism of positivism, and argued for the
unique integrity of each subcultural mode (e.g.,
arts, politics, science, etc.) as well as for the
integrity of each total cultural system. But the
difficulty was that cultural meanings, and indi-
vidual or collective actions relating to them,
were set totally apart from the physical realm
of action.
The "convergence" that Parsons attributed to
Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber depends
as much on their links to these traditions as to
trends in their individual writings (pp. 697-
719). Thus Marshall, who was deeply commit-
ted to British utilitarian economics, found diffi-
culties in its treatment of ends and was led to
take account of the concrete wants of men in
their daily lives. Pareto, who had come into
economics from mathematics and physics, ar-
rived at similar criticisms, but sought to answer
them with a broad analytical theory. He argued
that the problem with classical market models
was not that they were abstract, but that they
were too narrowly and crudely abstract. Thus,
in portraying "workers seeking highest wages"
614 PARSONS, TALCOTT
or "merchants seeking top profits," they ignored
other aspects of motivation that powerfully af-
fect economic systems and are important in
their own right. He strongly attacked positivistic
economics for uniformly imposing common
ends and rational norms on actors whether they
fitted or not. In later work, he developed a
sociological scheme that gave a central place to
nonlogical sentiments, which could affect the
varying emphases given to economic self-inter-
est (e.g., respect for tradition or the desire for
group approval). Parsons convincingly showed
that the sentiments Pareto discussed are more
closely linked to norms and values than many
readers had thought.
The sociologist Durkheim, starting from the
more organicist positivism of Auguste Comte,
moved toward a similar position that he de-
veloped much further. This is first seen in his
early book, The Division of Labor (1893), where
he discussed Spencer's utilitarian vision of eco-
nomic relations in future industrial societies as
increasingly based on voluntary contracts. To
Durkheim, who was trained in jurisprudence,
this naively ignored the problems of making
and enforcing contracts without a system of
legal codes and common law guidelines. His
argument concerning the essentiality of shared
norms for social order was strengthened in his
later notion of "collective conscience" as the
regulative mechanism for stable groups. This
was extended in his book on religion to include
sacred moral values.
Complementing these trends from the idealist
side is Weber, who began his studies in eco-
nomic and legal history. He never abandoned
the historicist doctrine that each culture had to
be understood in its own terms by a method of
Verstehen, but he argued that such understand-
ing was only descriptive, and that the explana-
tion of cultural formation, persistence, and
change required a scientific approach with the
same logical kind of comparative variables and
causal propositions as the explanations of
physics. In his view, the difference was that in
cultural explanations at least some of the com-
parative variables had to have categories that
contrasted the different values and beliefs of
actors in different culture groups (e.g., the
"otherworldliness" of early Christians versus
the aim of "making a Kingdom of Heaven on
earth" in the Puritan ethic). This meant that
Verstehen was essential in formulating cate-
gories and hypotheses, but was not a method of
explanation or proof. More basically, he argued
that science and history were distinct but inter-
dependent ways of studying any phenomenon
(e.g., astronomers who study the history of solar
systems), and their relative importance depends
on the interests of researchers and not on the
subject matter. Thus, strongly concerned with
the issues raised by Biblical criticism, he main-
tained that evidence of historical errors in a
sacred gospel might be irrelevant to a believer,
but of great interest to a religious historian—an
argument that in some ways parallels Pareto's
critique of dogmatic economic rationality and
Durkheim's stress on the power of contrasting
forms of "collective conscience" in different
groups.
Outline of the action framework. The final
chapter of The Structure of Social Action maps
an approach for future work in line with the
common directions that Parsons identified in his
sources. This approach derives most directly
from Weber's "action framework," which sought
a grounding for the comparative analysis of
large-scale institutions, conceptually anchored
in individually motivated acts. In Parsons' ver-
sion, like Weber's, the "end-means" scheme is
retained, but modified to emphasize cultural
norms and beliefs. An act is defined by its end,
which is assumed to reflect cultural ideals that
an investigator must know in order to under-
stand the situation. The contrast between means
(manipulable aspects) and conditions (unalter-
ables) in an actor's situation is similarly im-
portant in reflecting cultural values and beliefs.
Thus, one culture group may know how to con-
vert gold ore into coinage and use it as money;
a second may know the process but restrict it to
religious use; a third (not knowing metallurgy)
may simply react to it like any other part of
their environmental conditions.
Parsons then tentatively suggested a more
rational method of distinguishing between and
uniting economics, political science, and soci-
ology using the basic action scheme. He postu-
lated that each is concerned with a partly dis-
tinct, emergent system of aggregational action,
definable by a distinctive set of "effect variables"
(not causes). Thus, analytically speaking, eco-
nomics is concerned with the rationality of
means in relation to scarce, valued ends; politi-
cal analysis with Hobbesian power struggles and
their resolutions; and sociology with the inte-
gration of social action through shared values or
norms defining over-all goal priorities (ultimate

ends) and institutionally acceptable means in
various situations. Concretely, all three systems
are completely intertwined, which also implies
that the abstracted systems have complex causal
links. Thus, all social institutions are partly af-
fected by economic and political processes and
vice versa. This implies that a theory limited to
any one system will be limited in its explanatory
power. Parsons made this argument across the
board as a case against "single factor" theories
and for theoretical unity.
In terms of later controversies, two points
should be noted concerning Parsons' stress on
the normative aspects of action. One is that
values and norms are emphasized because they
unite people without physical links or social in-
stincts into cohesive groups, and identify some
of the key patterns that make one human group
different from another. This process is never
without important strains, and Parsons asserted:
"Action must always be thought of as involving
a state of tension between two different orders
of elements, the normative and the conditional"
(p. 732). A second point is that the groups are
not limited to societies, and the normative thesis
is applied to subcultural groups. This is seen,
for example, in Parsons' discussion of Marx,
whose views receive a more ambivalent treat-
ment than those of any other major theorist.
Commenting on the idea of class formation,
Parsons suggested that the conversion of a
dormant class into an active, class-conscious
group involves "what looks very much like a
common value element," and wonders why this
"does not play a part in Marx's general view of
history" (p. 494).
Analytical realism. Equally important, in the
final chapter of The Structure of Social Action,
Parsons outlined an "analytical—realist" meth-
odology that attempts to synthesize positivist
and idealist concerns; it is the most consistent
feature of Parsons' subsequent work. For ex-
ample, it underlay his more specific "functional"
approach a decade later, and is one reason why
his functionalism differs from that of Durkheim
and Malinowski. Most crucially, he linked
Weber's critique of historicism and Pareto's
critique of economic positivism with Alfred N.
Whitehead's critical analysis (1925) of materi-
alism in nineteenth-century physics. He argued
that the "facts" of science or history are never
simply "observations," but rather are classifica-
tions of objects using language concepts that
various trained observers can share. The "ob-
PARSONS, TALCOTT 615
jectivity" of science, then, critically depends on
building conceptual schemes that many re-
searchers can reliably use, and not on the direct
observability of the properties of interest. White-
head had shown, in fact, that as physics devel-
oped it gave much less emphasis to directly
observable properties, and more to properties
involving complex inferences from empirical
classifications. This clarification bolstered Durk-
heim's argument that cultural meanings ex-
pressed in symbolic form (collective representa-
tions ) could be studied in as scientific a manner
as any other phenomena.
As did Weber and Whitehead, Parsons stressed
that conceptual schemes, at best, provide selec-
tive portrayals of objects. Whitehead had labeled
the failure to understand this selectivity "the
fallacy of misplaced concreteness," which is mis-
taking a partial description of objects for their
"essence" or entirety (racism and sexism are
important social examples). In effect, Parsons
showed that Weber's critique of historicism and
Pareto's of economic positivism illustrated the
same point. Like Whitehead and Pare to, he then
drew the "emergentist" conclusion that multiple
frameworks and theories can be applied to the
same objects without contradiction. In British
positivism the aim traditionally had been to
unify all scientific variables into a single, closed
system, but Parsons rejected this view. Instead,
for human action at least, he argued in favor of
multiple theoretical systems that vary in their
degree of independence. This converts the con-
cept of system from an attribute to a variable
(degrees of systemness), which established the
groundwork for Parsons' much more rigorous
development of action systems in later works
(Martel 1971, pp. 178-185).
In one sense, Parsons' analytical realism is an
argument for a broader positivism that gives
social science a central place in the defense of
rationality against anti-intellectual forces. But
his key postulate on the rationalism he defended
bears quoting: "The central fact—a fact beyond
all question—is that in certain aspects and to
certain degrees, under certain conditions, hu-
man action is rational" (1937, p. 19). This highly
qualified defense by Parsons, as heir to the En-
lightenment, typified his defense of other values
as his work unfolded, such as individual free-
dom and moral integrity. Starting with a mini-
mum state of realization of a given value, his
strategy partly was to ask which other socially
essential values limit its further realization
616 PARSONS, TALCOTT
under various social conditions. Axiologically,
his was a quest to specify a total system of basic
human values, and to clarify how practically
they might be optimized in varied human cir-
cumstances.
Note on critical reactions. For years, Parsons'
The Structure of Social Action was his most
widely respected book. Disputes were never lack-
ing (see Parsons 1978c), but they were discrim-
inate. With the rising tide against Parsons in
the late 1960s, a special attack was launched
against the application of the convergence thesis
to Durkheim and Weber, with criticisms, begun
in Britain, of Parsons' selective reading or un-
holy marriage of the French and German theo-
rists (see Parsons 1978fc>). Much of this line of
criticism ignores the aims, context, logic, and
qualifications of Parsons' study and reacts more
to the impact of the book than its contents. Be-
fore its publication, few sociologists saw any
important affinities between Durkheim and
Weber. It is a mark of Parsons' success that we
now have a literature asserting their partial
differences. The more important criticisms often
concern his later development, which retains
important but selective and increasingly diver-
gent ties with his starting sources.
Later career and work (1937-1973)
In his first book, Parsons presented a broad
unifying program for action theory that in-
cluded analytical-realist guidelines. It remains
his best source on his relations to precursors and
basic methodology. But his action framework,
which began to take detailed form in the 1940s,
was blueprinted in two major works in the early
1950s, and has been steadily expanded and re-
fined ever since. The expansion of the scheme
is closely tied to the development of a distinctive
modernization theory that is also rooted in Durk-
heim and Weber. The theory focused on the
rationalization of modern societies in Weber's
sense, with the growth of market exchange,
specialized occupations, and a secular outlook
on life. Since the mid-1960s, this concern has
broadened into a full-scale neo-evolutionary
quest, with closer attention to ancient societies,
and a search for sequential stages tc help order
historical variations.
After World War n, Parsons' writing was
marked by his increased attention to anthro-
pology and psychology. This grew out of his as-
sociations with anthropologists Clyde Kluckhohn,
Elton Mayo, and W. Lloyd Warner, and psychol-
ogists Gordon Airport and Henry Murray. They
interested him in pursuing an intensive study of
Freud's theories, as well as anthropological cul-
ture and personality approaches. A study of the
medical profession, which Parsons began before
the war, put him in touch with Stanley Cobb,
founder of the Psychoanalytical Institute in
Boston. In 1946, despite his lack of a medical
degree, Parsons applied to the Institute for Psy-
choanalytic Training and was accepted. From
then on, Freudian theory was central to his
work.
Another important event in 1946 was the
formation of the department of social relations
at Harvard, which brought together a noted
group of sociologists, psychologists, and anthro-
pologists for more than two decades. Parsons
was a prime mover in this merger and was
chairman for its first decade. During this post-
war period, when the United States reached its
apex in world affairs, its universities and aca-
demic fields had their greatest expansion. Top
students from all over came to Harvard's unique
experimental program. Parsons' fame and in-
fluence grew in this expansionist, multidisci-
plinary climate, which provided the structural
support, stimulus, and team diversity necessary
to accommodate a major theorist with his talent
and breadth. By the later 1950s, although his
theories remained controversial, he became the
most celebrated sociologist in academic life. In
1967 he was the first social scientist elected to
the presidency of the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences. His postwar writings in many
ways reflect the ascendancy of the United States
and its universities, as well as his own rising
star.
In tracing the complex growth of Parsons'
postwar theory and conceptual scheme, two
main points of crystallization in his work will
be stressed: first, his functionalism of the early
1950s, and second, his functional-evolutionary
model of the later 1960s. This approach is taken
because his theory grew like a rapidly widening,
oscillating spiral. His universe of problems ex-
panded, and each problem was periodically reex-
amined on a broader basis. Partly this also is be-
cause much of Parsons' writing was in essay
form, the more important of which now fill
seven volumes. In these essays one finds a whole
series of middle-range theories reflecting the
many facets of his modernization argument—an
argument that grew by installments as his
scheme developed. They include major argu-
ments about modern professions, economic or-

ganization, education, stratification, families,
age-sex roles, socialization of children, sick
roles and mental health, countercultures, devi-
ance, democratic processes and the law, bureau-
cracy, ethnicity, religious secularization, and sci-
ence. All are partly linked to his broader theory.
But it is his smaller arguments, presented more
accessibly in his essays, that have most inter-
ested specialists and influenced (sometimes al-
tering) many fields. Often the specialists con-
cerned have not understood the larger contexts
of Parsons' theses, and many fields of sociology
have lost much time refuting their interpretation
of Parsons' theories of sick roles, changing
functions of families, stratification functions, or
conforming behavior. The most frequent error
has been to test Parsons' arguments concerning
the institutions of societies on smaller groups in
local communities for which convenient data
could be secured.
Only a few of these middle-range theories are
explicitly noted below, and no work exists that
begins to distill their riches. Parsons' own ex-
ceptional summary (1970) and the books by
Rocher (1975) and Bourricaud (1977) give
some idea of their scope; Mitchell (1967) is ex-
cellent on his political writings; and three recent
Festschrifts (Barber & Inkeles, 1971; Loubser
et al. 1976; Hallen et al. 1977) summarize and
extend his main theories. Of these, the Loubser
volumes give the most complete summary and
critique for the more technically interested
reader. The present article mainly seeks to trace
the growth of the basic theory and the frame-
work that ties the many essays together.
The three-system model. Parsons' more de-
veloped framework first appeared in his second
major book, The Social Systein (1951) and a
companion essay with Edward Shils (1951),
whom Parsons brought to Harvard from the
University of Chicago. All ingredients of the
earlier prospectus (1937) were retained, but
with different accents. The focus was now on
social, cultural, and personality systems as the
three main interpenetrative types of action or-
ganization (with political and economic systems
viewed as special kinds of social systems).
While all the systems are viewed as emergent
organizations of basic action elements, there is a
shift from the individual actor making choices
to the interdependence of choices of socialized
actors. On the whole, the new version better
expresses Parsons' earlier aims, by taking ad-
vantage of his newer anthropological and psy-
chological resources.
PARSONS, TALCOTT 617
The generic action unit is no longer the ele-
mentary act, but rather the more complex notion
of an "actor-orienting-to-a-situation." The actor
may be either an individual or a collectivity,
with each viewed as equally real. In some ways,
individuals as carriers of energy are still the
basic action units, but to be an actor, an indi-
vidual must be a socially enculturated person,
who in many ways is a product of his/her up-
bringing (whether conformist or not), so the
relation is complex. Whether individual or col-
lective, action is defined as "behavior oriented
to the attainment of ends in situations, by
means of normatively regulated expenditures of
energy" (Parsons & Shils 1951, p. 53). But be-
havior includes the decision-making process
leading to an action choice as well as the overt
activity, and should not be confused with be-
havior in stimulus-response psychology. In con-
trast with the latter, action again is purposeful-
seeking out and defining its environmental
stimuli in terms of motives and values, rather
than merely responding to them. It includes the
alternatives an actor rejects or defers for a later
time and the imagined responses by others to
his various action alternatives. This becomes
more important since the Freudian concepts of
repression and taboo are added to the action
model. The familiar fact that a psychoanalyst
listening to a patient pays close attention to
subjects not discussed, as signs of important
motivational conflicts, is a case in point.
In Parsons' view, each of the three main types
of action systems—culture, personality, and so-
cial systems—has a distinctive coordinative role
in the action process, and therefore has some
degree of causal autonomy. Thus, personalities
organize the total set of learned needs, demands,
and action choices of individual actors, no two
of whom are alike although they may speak the
same language and share many cultural values
and beliefs. Social systems have an interper-
sonal focus, and organize the divergent and
often conflicting action tendencies of individuals
into coordinative forms of relations. In more com-
plex cases, they organize social groups into
larger organizations through hierarchies or
representatives. Culture, by contrast, is defined
more systematically and narrowly by Parsons
than by most anthropologists. To Parsons, it
consists of norms, values, beliefs, and other
ideas relating to action, which have been ob-
jectified in symbolic codes and can be transmitted
from one individual, group, or generation to
another. In a strict sense, while it originates in
678 PARSONS, TALCOTT
interaction and provides symbolic resources
through which action can be structured, it is a
system of symbolic patterns rather than a sys-
tem of action, and it serves to organize such
patterns into configurations which have sym-
bolic as well as behavioral coherence, as in the
idealist notions discussed above (Parsons 1937).
Most importantly, culture provides the scripts
(systems of rules or norms) for organized action,
like dramatic plays which can be performed
over and over again once they have been
memorized or written down. It also provides
the broader value standards for justifying why
certain scripts should (or should not) be per-
formed, their priorities, and guidelines for
proper staging and performance. In this con-
ception, culture is an information bank that be-
comes operative in action when individuals
internalize its patterns or groups make com-
mitments to them.
The scheme's further basic novelty is found in
the idea that the three action systems are "inter-
penetrating," and their elements importantly
overlap. Some key elements in one system also
have necessary counterparts in the others. The
idea is used to clarify systematically the impor-
tant concepts of social roles and institutions as
well as many others. Thus, social systems are
conceived as being composed of social roles
consisting of the norms or script an actor is
expected to follow in a particular situation.
These norms are derived from the culture(s) to
which the actors in the social system relate. But
Parsons also argued that a role for a given
person (termed ego) should only be counted as
socially operative when it is internalized by the
definers of ego's role (called alters) as operative
motives in their individual personalities. This
means in effect that alters have a need for ego's
conformity to their role definitions, and that
ego's conformity rewards this need and signifi-
cant deviations violate it. Adding a frustration-
aggression hypothesis from Freud, Parsons
further assumed that if ego rewards alters by his
conformity, they are likely to reward him in
return, and the reverse if ego deviates. Thus,
extending the argument to a pair relation where
each party is both ego and alter, it is assumed
that where compatible role definitions exist, the
sheer continuation of the relationship within
acceptable bounds is interreinforcing, and no
other special sanctions or rewards are required.
And under these conditions, the system of role
relations becomes self-regulating. Thus, the con-
cept of social role takes on a much more sys-
tematic meaning in Parsons' model than before,
as the linkage concept between culture and per-
sonality in interaction.
In more complex social systems, every party
does not have to be strongly committed to every
role, but some prevailing set of alters must ex-
hibit such a commitment. This means not only
that separate alters are likely to sanction ego
negatively if he or she steps out of line, but
that alters will sanction one another as sanc-
tioners to ego. Thus, if the norm is upheld in a
church that parents must keep children quiet
during services, when a child (ego) acts up and
his parent (alter) fails to quiet him, other
people close by (the parent's alters) are likely
to show disapproval to the parent. This is be-
cause their needs include not only ego's behavior
but alter's proper response to such behavior.
Where a prevailing group commitment is made
to a set of roles, with some awareness that these
commitments are widely shared, Parsons re-
ferred to the role norms as being institution-
alized in that group, and to the organized systems
of such roles as an institution. An institution in
this sense represents the internalization of
cultural norms in the personalities of alters (the
role definers), but it is also an interactional
emergent referring to inter alter relations. In
societies and other highly complex social sys-
tems, part of the job of defining and sanction-
ing social roles may be assigned to specialized
officials or agencies (legislatures, courts, police,
etc.). It was Parsons' assumption, however, that
such officials could only function effectively
where they are generally backed by a public
consensus of their alters. He was quite aware
that in large groups anything like perfect con-
census is impossible, and that some disputes
must be resolved through force or the threat of
its use. But he argued that widespread and con-
tinued reliance on force is very costly, and over
time has great limits as a basis for stable
organization. The use of force in larger groups,
moreover, depends on some institutional com-
mitments, at least within the power group, and
his model makes terrorist dictatorships seem
relatively vulnerable.
The pattern variables. Conceptually, Par-
sons' second main innovation is the pattern-vari-
able scheme, an idea that has been widely ac-
cepted and used. It was his insight that several
main contrasts between traditional and modern
societies found in earlier theories (from Comte
to Ferdinand Tonnies, Weber, and Durkheim)
could be redefined in more universal and basic

action terms. This led to the formulation of five
key variable properties of action patterns, later
reduced to the four listed below. Each is pre-
sented as a binary choice that arises in every
social relationship and which must be resolved
by a clear priority selection before the relation
can be stabilized. The first two choices pertain
to ego's orientation to others, while the last two
choices concern the way alters (individuals or
status groups) are defined:
(1) affectivity vs. neutrality. Whether ego
seeks immediate gratification in the situation
(e.g., expresses feelings freely), or exercises
restraint toward alter.
(2) diffuseness vs. specificity. Whether ego
seeks a broad range of gratification from alter,
or maintains a narrower orientation.
(3) particularism vs. universalism. Whether
ego defines alter in terms of a special relation
they have (friends, kin), or in terms of alter's
membership in a broader status class (fellow
citizen, male or female, human). The contrast
is relative to a system of reference, and within
a family a parent may be particularistic toward
a favored or unfavored child.
(4) ascription vs. achievement (later gener-
alized to "qualities" vs. "performance"). Whether
alter is defined by criteria independent of his
actions in a situation, or is defined on the basis
of his actions and how well he performs them.
(Age, sex, and race illustrate the former, and
"merit norms" the latter.)
Each pair of choices refers to aspects of an
actor's definition of a role or relation—the refer-
ence is highly abstract in order to permit broad
comparisons. In empirical applications they re-
quire a content analysis of meanings, but theo-
retically they make it possible to build up ideal
types of action patterns using the alternative
choices as conceptual molecules. For example,
the first terms in the four variables define wide-
spread elements of the norms of friendship rela-
tions which often are held to be affective, dif-
fuse, particularistic, and ascriptive (despite
many variations in their detailed meanings). By
contrast, the second terms define widespread
elements of professional and official roles to-
ward clients. Thus, a teacher often is expected
to be neutral/specific/universalistic/perform-
ance-oriented to students in classroom situa-
tions, although the student side is more variable
and often more affectivity is encouraged. As
Parsons' theories developed, each of these four
pairs of choices blended into a scale and he used
them less dichotomously.
PARSONS, TALCOTT 619
Part of the power of this scheme is that its
categories can apply to cultural values and per-
sonal needs as well as to role norms, and they
can also be used to portray aspects of behavioral
conformity or deviation from social roles. Using
this scheme, Parsons introduced a very general
hypothesis about social systems: that every social
relationship of any complexity must include all
value combinations of the paired choices. Thus,
every friendship relation must give some atten-
tion to certain tasks where universal achieve-
ment standards (of abilities) are recognized,
and every professional or work relationship must
include some moments when affective particu-
laristic meanings are expressed. In part, this
generalizes a finding in several different so-
ciological fields. Industrial sociologists had
called attention to the importance of human
relations (personal relations) even in the most
formal work groups, and researchers on friend-
ship and love were pointing up utilitarian as-
pects of even the most intimate relations. Par-
sons' argument was that all stabilized relations
are made up of all the important social values,
and differ in the priorities each receives. The
thesis is applied most importantly to societies.
Types of societies and value priorities. In The
Social System the pattern variables are most
basically used in an experimental typology of
societies (chapter 5) that gives a first sketch of
Parsons' modernization theory. In very simple
terms, he uses the object variables (particular-
ism-universalism and ascription-achievement)
to contrast broadly four major types of societies,
identified by their dominant values (e.g., type
of Geist). Only the two extremes are mentioned
here. At one extreme, traditional societies are
identified as "particularistic-ascriptive," where
the emphasis is on kinship relations, and most
important activities (work, education, leisure
pursuits, religious practices, etc.) are carried
out by family members or by actors in related
families. At their core, the relations between
kinsmen reflect the dominant particularistic—
ascriptive values of the society and also are
likely to be affective and diffuse. But Parsons
stressed that where kinship pervades all of social
life, there must be some differentiated role re-
lations between kinsmen where the other value
priorities are stressed. This is especially likely in
economic production where some minimum
standards of competence must often be ob-
served, but it is also important in child raising,
recreation, and religious observance. Where kin-
ship attachments and related values prevail,
620 PARSONS, TALCOTT
contrasting values are likely to be constrained
by the dominant commitments (e.g., you do not
fire kinfolk). This sets great limits on the possi-
bilities for economic, political and other forms
of sociocultural development, which must be
overcome before modernization can begin to
develop.
By contrast, in the more modernized societies,
there is a tendency for universalistic—achieve-
ment standards to become dominant as the ra-
tionalization of social life develops, and in many
ways the value priorities reverse. Within the
public sphere of political and economic life uni-
versal merit standards are stressed, and nepotis-
tic preferences in assigning jobs, tax rates, li-
censures, or judicial decisions are tabooed. The
norm in one type of society becomes serious
deviance in the other, and such taboos tend to
be extended against favoritism to friends, fellow
members of ethnic groups, and other particu-
laristic ties. Weber had feared that rationaliza-
tion could pervade the entire modern social
fabric and threaten all spontaneous human re-
lations with destruction. Instead, Parsons argued
that rationality as a principle has limits just as
kinship values have, and he posited that kinship
and personal relations still will be maintained,
cherished, and protected in the private sphere.
Four main points about this approach should
be mentioned which, with many added com-
plexities, remain central to Parsons' subsequent
development of his theory. First, despite their
many differences, it is argued that all stable
societies have certain basic values in common,
hinted at by the pattern-variables. They must
also have some specialized structures and oc-
casions in which each value pattern can be ex-
pressed. In extreme contrast to cultural rela-
tivism, Parsons' believed in the cultural unity
of man, and the pattern variables (in combina-
tions) gave a starting point for identifying im-
portant universals. Second, the major differ-
ences between cultures are seen as a matter
of degree, in the priorities and nuances given to
the same basic concerns. While differences of
degree are by no means unimportant, he ex-
tended his earlier argument that doctrines of
unique cultural spirits mislead by only identify-
ing the dominant values and beliefs of a culture,
ignoring its lower priority values and over-
particularizing their meanings.
Third, the dominant values of a society set
the priorities for the organization, resources, and
locations given to its various role activities,
which concretely limit their respective develop-
ment. Thus, where kinship is stressed, work and
other activities are located, whenever possible,
near the home to facilitate (and minimize dis-
ruption) of family relations. This greatly limits
economic, educational, and even recreational de-
velopment. By contrast, in modern societies
where economic development and public life
rate highest, factories and other economic or-
ganizations receive choice locations for their
needs (resources, labor, transportation, etc.),
prime time and energies are given to the work
sphere, and family as well as other role systems
are contracted and adapted to fit these priorities.
In both cases, however, each essential differ-
entiated sphere will receive at least minimum
attention.
Fourth, all societies (indeed, all social sys-
tems) are intrinsically beset by contradictions,
strains, and conflicts of all kinds, at the most
basic level of values and meanings. But to Par-
sons this did not support any dialectic view of
history (Hegelian or Marxian), if taken to
mean that such basic conflicts can be essentially
resolved. This is perhaps his most basic and con-
sistent contrast with Marx—the idea that im-
portant contradictions are adventitious only to
certain types of societies, and that one can hope
realistically for their virtual elimination. Any
hope of this kind is Utopian in Parsons' view,
and he further contended that there are strong
forces in all social systems making for com-
mitment to such Utopian patterns (1951, p. 166).
This relates to a theory of countercultures in-
cluded in the discussion of the four types of
societies. His key argument was that Utopian
countercultures are generated by the strains of
the universal values suppressed in a given so-
ciety. Thus, men in kin-dominated societies may
dream of Utopias in which merit standards and
individual freedom are more fully appreciated,
while modernists may yearn for communal
Utopias in which kinsmen and personal identi-
ties are reunited again. Such strains also may
lead to active and successful attempts to change
the system, but then another compromise will
be established.
Parsons retained the basic action scheme pre-
sented in The Social System and its companion
essay in all his later work, although it was
quickly augmented. By the 1960s he had de-
veloped a vastly superior model of action sys-
tems and societies. As his scheme expanded, his
theory improved and the analysis in The Social
System now seems less sophisticated by com-
parison. However, the core ideas noted above

are included in his later developments, and the
book retains special importance for two reasons.
First, it shows Parsons at the height of his
search for an organizational framework, before
several advances began to narrow his explora-
tion. Second, the book considers a wider range
of possible forms of societies than perhaps any
work in the literature since Herbert Spencer's
Principles of Sociology (1876-1896).
Development of Parsons' structural functional-
ism. In methodological terms, Parsons' approach
to action systems in The Social System relied on
a structural—functional strategy that was greatly
extended in the next few years. This approach,
with antecedents going back to Comte and
Durkheim, is concerned with the organizational
properties of emergent systems which: (1) are
dependent on environmental resources for sur-
vival, as a human organism is for oxygen and
food, and (2) also depend for survival on com-
plex internal coordination of specialized parts
or subsystems. Questions about functions for
such organized systems concern the effective-
ness with which the system adapts to its en-
vironment, and the related question of how its
internal coordination is effected. The structural
aspect of the approach is modeled after anatomy
in biology, and seeks to simplify complex ques-
tions of processual relations by using typological
concepts stressing a few main qualitative con-
trasts (e.g., vertebrates vs. nonvertebrates in
older biology) rather than continuous variables.
The value of such a structural approach de-
pends on identifying fairly stable features of a
system that correlate with many other important
properties, as the vertebrate category did for its
time. In Parsons' work, dominant values have
been stressed in defining structural types, as
shown in the types of societies categorized by
pattern variables in the last section.
Parsons' structural functionalism and his ar-
gument for its sociological use was first pre-
sented in several essays in the 1940s (1949,
chapters 1, 2), and was extensively illus-
trated in The Social System (1951, pp. 19-22).
There he maintained that societies can be taken
as the focal systems in human action because
they are the human survival groups. That is,
they have the cultural and institutional resources
to perpetuate themselves across generations. At
the same time, it is made clear that any other
action system can also be taken as a reference
for functional analysis in its own right, as long
as the system reference is clear. But in the main,
Parsons' work (like that of Durkheim and
PARSONS, TALCOTT 621
Weber) begins with the analysis of societies,
and other social systems are positioned by the
societies in which their members are implicated.
The functional analysis of a system depends
on some systematic listing of its organizational
problems and needs, and at the time of The
Social System, Parsons was groping for such a
list. Previous functional analysts had usually
settled for fairly concrete and spontaneous
classifications, but Parsons was seeking a more
systematic and theoretically integrative ap-
proach. In the next few years he began to pro-
vide for this need with his famous four-function
scheme, which has had a commanding place in
his work ever since. It was introduced in three
collaborative papers with Robert F. Bales in
Working Papers in the Theory of Action (Par-
sons, Bales, & Shils 1953), where its explicit use
was limited to small task groups. But it then
was rapidly extended to societies and other so-
cial systems in two other collaborative works:
Family, Socialization and Interaction Process
(Parsons et al. 1955) and Economy and Society
(Parsons & Smelser 1956).
The four-function paradigm. The four-func-
tion paradigm posits that every social system
must continually confront and solve the four
sets of organizational problems indicated below.
The first two concern its external relations with
its environment, including its physical habitat,
the bodily needs of its members, and other social
systems with which it must contend. The second
pair of problems concern its internal organiza-
tion as a human group of socialized persons
with cultural commitments in interaction. The
four organizational problems are depicted
roughly as follows:
(1) adaptation. The external organizational
problems of relating effectively to the physical
and action environments. Most crucial here are
procurement of resources needed for its activi-
ties, protection against physical and social
threats, and developing information relating to
these.
(2) goal attainment. The external organi-
zational problem of effectively coordinating in
any collective tasks directed outside the system
itself.
(3) integration. The internal problem of
maintaining gratifying relations between the
members in their interaction, and avoiding dis-
ruptive conflicts. For small groups this concerns
interpersonal relations, but for larger organiza-
tions it concerns intergroup relations.
 622 PARSONS, TALCOTT
(4) latent pattern maintenance. The inter-
nal organizational problem of legitimating the
membership and activity patterns of the system,
and also of adjusting the role demands on mem-
bers so they are compatible with their other role
commitments.
The paradigm has become known as the
"AGIL" scheme by the acronym of the first let-
ters of the names for these four functions. The
importance of the scheme derives from an argu-
ment Parsons and Bales first made for small
groups (Parsons, Bales, & Shils 1953): that the
motivational and perceptual requirements for
effectively dealing with each set of problems are
inherently incompatible. A further suggestion
was that the contradictory orientations needed
could be partly indicated by the pattern varia-
bles. To simplify a complex thesis, it was
argued that affectivity was facilitative for inte-
gration and goal attainment, but disruptive for
pattern maintenance and adaptation, where
neutrality (and detachment) were needed (cf.,
Parsons, Bales, & Shils 1953, especially p. 182).
Parsons qualified and greatly extended this hy-
pothesis in later works, but the core rationale
was maintained. Because of the contradictory
orientations needed for coping effectively with
these problems, Parsons argued that small
groups tend to differentiate into four somewhat
distinct subsystems of role relations, each of
which links the members in a somewhat differ-
ent manner. For example, Bales had found in
experimental task groups that different members
tended to serve as leaders when the group focus
was on a task (goal attainment) rather than
personal relations (integration). In more com-
plex organizations, specialized groups are likely
to develop for dealing with each problem.
In Economy and Society, Parsons and Smelser
boldly extended this idea to the organization of
societies, arguing that an economy analytically
could be thought of as the adaptive subsystem
of an organized society, and the political system
(termed polity) as the goal-attainment subsys-
tem. They also began to develop a more fully
evolutionary approach to societal variations,
which centered in the functional differentiation
hypothesis that: "total societies tend to differen-
tiate into subsystems (social structures) which
are specialized in each of the four primary func-
tions" (1956, p. 47). At that time, the structural
subsystems corresponding to the other two main
functions only were discussed in relation to the
economy as a focal concern. In the 1960s, how-
ever, Parsons identified these internal systems of
society more clearly, and they were called the
societal community (integrative) and fiduciary
(pattern-maintenance) systems (1971, p. 297).
One other central idea that crystallized in
Economy and Society is that certain basic eco-
nomic analogies can be applied to the other
three sectors, and that each is a production sys-
tem. Thus, Parsons contended that the polity
subsystem dealt with the production of effective
political decisions, while the integrative system
was concerned with producing social solidarity.
Most importantly, he viewed the four production
systems interdependently, with each of their
products seen as a necessary factor for the pro-
ductive goals of the other systems.
Levels of society. While Parsons formally ex-
tended the four-function scheme from small
groups in Economy and Society, the idea gained
clarity and precision soon after when he more
clearly identified four main organizational levels
in developed societies. These levels were seem-
ingly derived by extension generalizing the fea-
tures of a work group in a factory (an organiza-
tion of work groups) within an institutionally
organized economy, to the other functional sec-
tors. But there are also ties to Weber's analysis
of bureaucratic organization in the moderniza-
tion process. In Parsons' model, three main
levels were distinguished in each functional sec-
tor: primary-technical or direct interactional;
managerial or formal organizational; and insti-
tutional or supramanagerial level. Society itself
then was viewed as the system at the highest
level which served to link the various institutions
together (1958; Hills, in Loubser et al. 1976,
chapter 33).
The result is a levels-and-sectors model of
developed societies, where differentiation must
be seen in both its horizontal and vertical as-
pects. At each level, any social system is multi-
functional, and has to develop adequate sub-
systems for all basic functional problems. But,
as societies become more complexly organized
and specialized, the social systems within them
become more variegated in ways that the four-
function system can partly portray. For example,
in a small firm all members deal directly with
each other, even though some begin to specialize
more in procurement (part of adaptation) and
others informally in morale problems (integra-
tive). As the firm grows, it may form a personnel
division of full-time specialists, some of whom
deal with hiring (part of procurement) and
some with morale problems. If it becomes suffi-
ciently large, it may even develop a fiduciary

division of its own, with a board of trustees.
From society's standpoint, the firm as an organi-
zation has adaptive (economic) functions; but
taken as a reference point, some of the firm's
divisions may give primacy to each of the other
functions. In a comparable way, a small church
(with pattern-maintenance functions for society)
may grow to need full-time specialists for teach-
ing, fundraising, bookkeeping, and custodial
tasks.
Further extensions of the four-function scheme.
Shortly after he sketched the outlines of the
levels of social organization, Parsons extended
the functional differentiation thesis to person-
ality (1959a) and to culture (Parsons et al.
1961, pp. 963-996; Parsons 1967, chapter 5). For
personality theory, the most important result
was the systematic introduction of role learning
into a Freudian-based socialization theory. Thus,
as societies become more complexly differenti-
ated, children must acquire the basis for taking
part in roles increasingly different from those
first presented in their family experience. While
specialized organizations, such as schools, can
provide for much of this, the prototypes must be
set within the family if a drastic transition is to
be avoided (Johnson, in Hallen et al. 1977, pp.
372-383). On the cultural side, more general-
ized, discriminate, and flexible systems of cog-
nitive, expressive, as well as moral concepts and
values are needed to guide individual and inter-
active choices. Individuals also require more
complex interpretations of human existence
(grounds for meaning) as social and psychologi-
cal contingencies grow. In more traditional so-
cieties, a more limited set of morally sanctioned
alternatives for proper role behavior in family,
work, and other important relations can be de-
limited, but modernization is constrained unless
more varied and flexible forms of relationships
are made legitimate.
A fourth system of action. In the late 1950s,
Parsons added a fourth major system of action
to his roster, initially called the behavioral or-
ganism, to bridge the gap between personality
and its biological base. Recently, however, two
of his associates convinced him that this system
could be better formulated in more cognitive
terms, drawing on Jean Piaget, and it has been
relabeled the behavioral system (1978a, pp.
352-353; Lidz & Lidz, in Loubser et al. 1976,
pp. 203-205). The newer terms and concept
will be used in the remaining discussion.
General action systems and cybernetic control.
By the 1960s, with the addition of the fourth
PARSONS, TALCOTT 623
behavior system, Parsons extended his four-func-
tion scheme still further, generalizing it to a
general-action level of analysis. The result was
a broader, more integrative concept of a general-
action system that was concerned with the sys-
temic links between the four major action sys-
tems (1960, reprinted in 1967, chapter 7). With
this broader organizational sphere as a refer-
ence, social systems (and especially societies)
can be seen as performing the chief integrative
function for all action systems, while culture
provides pattern maintenance, and personality
and behavioral systems respectively provide goal
attainment and adaptive functions. There are
clear affinities between this functional argument
and Parsons' differentiation thesis for societies
that become especially important a few years
later in his explicit evolutionary theory.
Along with this, Parsons moved toward a
clearer model of action systems—their subsys-
tems and intersystemic relations—which paved
the way for a more flexible and expanded con-
cept of functional analysis. This gave even
greater emphasis to action systems as shown in
his contributions to Theories of Society (Parsons
et al. 1961, pp. 30-41) and were further re-
fined a decade later (1970, reprinted in 1977c,
chapter 10). As this model matured, the pattern
variables and other structural classificatory vari-
ables became subordinate to the four functions
and other system properties, and action pro-
cesses and functions were viewed more explicitly
as part of the continuum of life, with functions
seen as problems of all living systems. While his
analysis of action still maintained the distinctive
feature of action theory—in viewing action from
both the observer's and the actor's point of view
—the latter came to occupy a somewhat smaller
place in Parsons' total scheme.
At the same time, Parsons moved in the later
1950s toward a clarified model of relations be-
tween action systems on different levels. A
major step was the introduction of cybernetic
concepts into his scheme to clarify the causal
relation between various types of action systems
(1956; Parsons et al. 1961, pp. 36-41, 72). This
led to the idea of a cybernetic hierarchy of
conditions and controls as a vertical principle
of intersystemic links to be paired with the
horizontal principle of functional differentiation.
Cybernetic theory was stimulated in the 1940s
by the invention of computers, which posed
serious anomalies for theoretical physics. Here
was a clear-cut case in which the behavior of a
machine in some way was clearly influenced by
 624 PARSONS, TALCOTT
an idea system, and could not be fully explained
without taking this into account. But, exist-
ing concepts in physics could not even depict
the organizational pattern of a program. The
cybernetic solution was to add the concept of
information and to view the process as one of
informational control. In this view, a system
high in information but low in energy (like
culture) could, under some conditions control a
system with the reverse feature (like a social
system ).
To Parsons this was a move from a positivist
heartland (physics) toward confronting idealist
problems, since an information system was ac-
cepted as an emergent organization not reduci-
ble to properties of energy or matter (1978a, pp.
374-380). Some cyberneticists had begun to draw
analogies with the rational behavior of individ-
uals, but Parsons was one of the first to extend
cybernetic concepts to social and cultural sys-
tems.
The evolution of societies. By the mid-1960s,
Parsons had developed an explicit evolutionary
approach to the comparative analysis of socie-
ties that integrated and expanded most of his
previous arguments about societal moderniza-
tion. In his earlier discussions, he occasionally
suggested contrasts between modern societies
and their earlier forms, but now he tried to
portray the major stages of sociocultural de-
velopment in a systematic and encompassing
manner. In part, this represented his attempt to
rework the classic nineteenth-century theories
of Spencer and Comte as well as Weber and
Durkheim. But Parsons drew on a much im-
proved data base from anthropology, history,
and other fields, also bringing a vastly more
sophisticated framework to the task.
His model of social evolution was most fully
presented in two small paperbacks on pre-
modern societies (1966) and modern societies
(1971), which are combined with a new intro-
duction in The Evolution of Societies (1977a).
Written for the general college student, the
latter may be the best place for a reader inter-
ested in Parsons' developed theory to delve into
his work. While the main focus is on the de-
velopment of societies, his general-action system
(linking societies to culture and personality) is
used to avoid numerous traps that plagued
earlier social evolutionists.
Parsons distinguished three main growth
stages of societies—primitive, intermediate, and
modern—but these are by no means thought to
portray all or most known societies. Rather, they
are seen as major growth phases of the "trunk
of a branching tree," revising a metaphor Par-
sons applied in his dissertation to Weber's evolu-
tionism (1928-1929, vol. 37, p. 43). Some
diverging and transitional types are also noted.
In contrast to some of the nineteenth-century
unilinear evolutionists, Parsons did not assume
that any modern society had gone through the
earlier "pre-adult" growth phases before reach-
ing maturity. Instead, he saw the evolutionary
process as a general evolutionary process that
applies to the entire cultural development of
mankind. This process is related first to human
general-action systems, and second to specific
societies. Thus, Parsons traced Western societies
culturally from ancient Greece, Israel, and
Rome, the first two of which were destroyed as
political entities for a long period, but are still
seen as cultural seedbeds for later develop-
ments. And, the old debates about evolution
versus diffusion are simply put to rest, along
with those about evolution versus functionalism.
In each case, the alternatives are deftly and
sensibly combined.
Broadly, Parsons defined evolution for any
living system as growth in its generalized adap-
tive capacity. Specialized parts are progressively
differentiated in a way that permits their more
flexible mobilization for more varied purposes.
Parsons' approach, then, was one of evolutionary
functionalism, and his four-function model is
applied to human action systems at all historical
phases. Primitive societies are portrayed above
all by their limited differentiation, and also by
the predominance of kinship in their social or-
ganization and of religion in all phases of their
culture. In this view, such primitive systems
begin to evolve (to what he terms an advanced
primitive stage) when they developed political
and economic relations partly free from kinship
and tribal control.
In Parsons' three-stage model, social evolution
involves two basic, complex transformations,
each of which centers on a cultural innovation.
The conversion from primitive to intermediate
society is linked to the introduction of writing,
the importance of which is routinely assumed in
the common anthropological reference to simple
societies as nonliterate. Using his four-system
model, however, Parsons gave this idea a more
systematic grounding. The onset of the inter-
mediate stage requires the differentiation of
culture from the specific social systems and per-
sonalities with which it is associated. In an ac-
tion system limited to an oral tradition, this

separation is difficult, but with writing, cultural
values and beliefs are more easily disassociated
from their adherents, and objectified (e.g., in-
stead of "they believe," one can say, "it is writ-
ten"). This eases cultural diffusion to larger
groups, whether initiated by conquest, prosely-
tization, or absorbtion, and greatly aids the inte-
gration of larger populations with more diver-
gent roles into the same social system. Writing
also helps to standardize the basis for cum-
mulative growth in every aspect of culture, and
creates a new basis for individual socialization
and learning.
The main cases of intermediate societies that
Parsons analyzed were the empires of ancient
China, India, Islam, and Rome. While literacy in
all these cases was limited to certain elites
(especially the clergy and some political of-
ficials), they contributed to the growth of more
universal laws, and in time, to scientific and
technological developments as well. Parsons did
not ignore that each of these empires was
initially formed in part through military con-
quest. But expanding an earlier theme, he argued
that conquest alone is a limited basis for main-
taining a complex division-of-labor over cen-
turies and for fostering cultural growth.
Against the comparative background of the
four empires mentioned, Parsons took up
Weber's question of why modern industrializa-
tion first developed in the West rather than in
China, which, until the fourteenth century, tech-
nologically surpassed the West. While many
factors are cited, Parsons argued that this was
crucially linked to the more universal character
of Roman law that introduced the concept of
modern citizenship on which nation-states were
later built. The Christian concept of membership
in a universal church and the separation of the
spiritual and temporal spheres, which partly
preserved and augmented the Roman legal con-
cept after its empire dissolved, were also im-
portant. The fall of Rome as a political system
was seen by Parsons as a regression from an
evolutionary standpoint as the Western world
broke up into smaller units for centuries. But
culturally, Roman Catholicism maintained and
expanded the larger membership boundaries in
the West, and important features of Roman law
survived in the church and in various common
law traditions. Again, the argument echoes
Comte, Weber, Toynbee, and others, but the
difference lies in the much greater conceptual
discrimination and unity maintained.
This sets the stage for the second transforma-
PARSONS, TALCOTT 625
tion, which is historically sketched for certain
parts of the Western world (and should be read
with Parsons' article on "Christianity" [1968a]).
Modern societies first emerged in the northwest
corner of Europe after the Renaissance and Ref-
ormation, especially in England, Holland, and
France. Of many factors complexly intertwined,
Parsons singled out the growth of universal legal
systems in the emergence of these three nations.
However, the development is attributed to the
European cultural system rather than to specific
societies, with different sectors and nations al-
ternatively taking the lead at different points.
But the main initiative, modifying Weber's
thesis, is attributed to the Protestant nations
and to France.
Where the transformation to ancient civiliza-
tions centered in the differentiation of culture
from social systems, the modern transformation
involves the differentiation of the four main
sectors of society defined in four-function terms.
This occurs in a complex series of changes
extending over centuries. An early step is when
the restrictive controls of kinship and church
over the societal community are reduced so that
people of varied ethnic and religious back-
grounds can more flexibly join in larger and
more diverse divisions of labor and other enter-
prises. The separation of church and state and
the emergence of modern concepts of citizenship
are assumed to aid this process. As extended
kinship obligations of the past contract in im-
portance, it is important that the smaller nuclear
family emerges as the main operative kinship
unit. This relates to the decline in kin groups
as the organizing units of economic production,
and the emergence of factories and business
firms more flexibly combining workers on the
basis of skills rather than family ties. The re-
duction in importance of more distant kinship
ties increases mobility and aids the development
of a more fluid labor force. Colonial resettlement
in America by Europeans, which involved the
break-up of larger families in Europe, is a main
example of Parsons' point. Culturally, another
important aspect of the process is a seculariza-
tion trend, in which science and technology are
differentiated from religious constraints, as sym-
bolized by the Renaissance.
On another level, Parsons argued that anal-
yses of modernization have given undue impor-
tance to the industrial revolution, particularly to
the economic side of the process. Instead, he
claimed that three revolutions of comparable
importance were involved: the democratic, edu-
 626 PARSONS, TALCOTT
cational, and industrial. He further maintained
that each is dependent on the other two at each
successive phase of development. The educa-
tional revolution ties to the secular trend, but
especially involves the separation of occupa-
tional training from family and church. This
first occurred with the guild apprenticeship sys-
tem and the development of training centers for
professional careers in law and medicine. As
industrial and political developments proceeded,
a more differentiated, specialized, and flexible
educational system was needed, and universities
arose to meet this need. These provided a
broader scientific basis for the increasingly di-
versified and changing occupations that modern
organizations require. But they also aided the
more complex process of role socialization and
moral orientation entailed by growing social
complexity (Parsons & Platt 1973).
Especially in its later twentieth-century de-
velopments in the most advanced societies, Par-
sons concluded that modernization required a
new kind of man and an unprecedented system
of values or morality. The new man envisioned
is not the organizational man conceived by
many critics of modern society who must fit
into gigantic bureaucratic machines, nor is it
the other-directed person who shifts with every
riptide of fashion in a rootless manner. To Par-
sons, the former conception applied to earlier
stages of modernization where regimentation
was often needed to begin the process. At more
advanced stages, however, the occupational sys-
tem becomes increasingly professionalized, and
larger numbers can find creative challenges in
their work if they have the proper training. In
contrast to critics of mass culture, Parsons saw
industrialization as providing greater leisure
time, and he saw mass cultural production as
making the fine arts and other cultural benefits
(previously confined to the privileged elites)
available to larger numbers. Thus, a substantial
upgrading in consumption as well as production
standards occurs, at least in potentiality. But
education is needed to provide the appreciative
frameworks needed for increasing numbers to
take advantage of this potentiality.
If this brief synopsis makes Parsons' view of
modernization sound idyllic, it misleads. Parsons
believed that compared to societies of the past,
modern societies—and especially democratic,
post-Keynesian, capitalist societies—have an un-
precedented material standard and more poten-
tial freedoms for their members. But he was
acutely aware that modernization is highly aliena-
tive for many, creating new anxieties and frustra-
tions. In part this is due to the institutional-
ization of greater individual freedom itself, a
point Durkheim had centrally raised in his
studies. Many are bewildered by the enormous
menu of choice preferred, and seek refuge in
more traditional, simpler alternatives. Parsons
interpreted various twentieth-century move-
ments, including aspects of German Nazism
in the 1930s and the New Left in the 1960s,
partly as fundamentalist reactions against the
new demands of modern freedoms (1977a,
pp. 193-195).
Parsons argued that the new freedoms of
modernization place an unprecedented moral
burden on individuals. In past and traditional
societies, people often live their lives surrounded
by long-standing acquaintances and guided by
fairly detailed standards of proper behavior.
Their choices are largely restricted to a small
number of alternatives. By contrast, advanced
modernization opens up vast ranges of alterna-
tives, and presents individuals with frequent
changes that require flexible moral codes and
complex moral judgments. In his view, the edu-
cational revolution above all is needed in this
later phase to prepare individuals for living
adequately with such complexities.
Parsons' evolutionary model has come in for
various kinds of criticism. Many claim that he
uncritically accepted the standards of his own
society in his own time as a standard of human
development, a point of which he was well
aware. More specifically, some argue that he
was narrow in his view of primitive societies and
tended to residualize them. A second criticism
is that he assumed democratic societies in-
herently have greater productive capacities than
socialist alternatives, which may not continue
to be true in the future (Bialyszewski, in Hallen
et al. 1977, pp. 395-405). Even if he is right
on the economic side, another argument is that
he may have underestimated the social and per-
sonal costs of technocratic societies, and over-
estimated the flexibility of socialization (Lasch
1977). This is one specific aspect of the recur-
rent criticism that Parsons holds an "over-social-
ized view" of man. It becomes more pertinent
when applied to his recent evolutionary argu-
ments than to mistaken interpretations of his
"static functionalism" in the past. Thus, as Guy
Rocher—a former Parsons student and one of
his best expositors—suggests: "Parsons' func-
tionalism in itself is a dynamic approach. But
it is thwarted by [his] evolutionist interpretation

of [capitalist] industrial society as the final peak
after a long and difficult climb" (1975, p. 158).
This writer does not believe that Parsons saw
any existing society as anything like a "final
peak" of human evolution. Analytically, his
ideological-historical preferences (or those of
any other theorist) can be separated from his
theoretical model and empirical claims. His de-
veloped action scheme and his basic moderniza-
tion analysis do not uniquely lead to diagnostic
conclusions about the merits of various societies,
and his theory might best be further developed
by opening it again to a wider range of empirical
possibilities. By his own basic criteria, this
would seem to be the more modern way.
Parsons in retirement
After his retirement from Harvard in 1973,
Parsons continued his writing and other activi-
ties. He taught at the University of Pennsyl-
vania, Brown University, Rutgers University, the
University of California at Berkeley, and Kwansei
Gakuin University in Japan. In addition, he gave
numerous special lectures that included every
continent except South America.
His continuous flow of essays is partly ex-
hibited in his most recent collection (1978a),
the majority of which first appeared after 1973.
At the time of his death, he was working on a
major book, tentatively entitled "The Integration
of Modern Societies," in which he sought to
integrate his many-sided analysis of moderniza-
tion over the past three decades.
He also continued to expand his theoreti-
cal universe, extending his "media of inter-
change models" to a much broader realm. This
model first was developed in the mid-1960s to
characterize the key symbolic standards needed
to maintain effective links between economic,
political, community, and fiduciary sectors of
highly differentiated societies. His well-known
argument (still poorly understood) is that the
role of money in economic markets has counter-
parts in standard symbolic codes for power, in-
fluence, and value commitments in the other
three sectors (1967; 1969, part 4). A key hy-
pothesis is that all four symbolic standards must
be combined for any of the four sectors to retain
its functional distinctiveness. Thus, economic
transactions require that adequate investments
of power, influence, and value commitments as
well as money must be made. This means for
example that without a sufficient basis of politi-
cal, social, and moral support, an economic
venture like the opening of a privately owned
PARSONS, TALCOTT 627
nuclear energy plant cannot succeed no matter
how much money and materiel is put into it.
It also means that in complex societies, a
government or church sponsored program needs
monetary resources as well as support in terms
of the other media. A related hypothesis, more-
over, is that organizations in each of the four
sectors depend most on a distinctive mix of the
four symbolic media corresponding to their re-
spective functional priorities.
By the early 1970s, Parsons began to extend
his concept of symbolic media from societies to
general action systems. This involved the argu-
ment that before standardized symbols, like those
of money, power, or influence, could gain accept-
ance in a society, more basic symbolic codes
must be instilled in the collective and indi-
vidual consciousness of its members. Thus, the
acceptance of money (a set of monetary codes)
as a measure of the value standards for in-
numerable goods and services, is hypothesized
to depend on prior acceptance of more general-
ized symbols of "intelligence" or rationality.
Similarly, the credibility of symbols of power or
influence is thought to depend on the acceptance
of more basic standards of "performance" and
of "affect" (Parsons & Platt 1973, appendix). In
1975, Parsons made another leap and broadened
the media concept to include relations between
human action in its totality (i.e., historical ex-
perience) to the physical and organic worlds
beneath it, and to a "telic" realm of human
potentialities above it. The later side removes
the very fine membrane separating the most
ambitious scientific efforts from the philos-
opher's quest. His extended meta-metatheoreti-
cal framework here was called a paradigm
of the human condition, and is the subject of
three provocative essays in his last collection
(1978a), including its culminating title essay.
It opens up whole new possibilities for the ex-
ploration of the dynamic links between biology
and human action, with more ultimate implica-
tions for the kind of "moral science" that
Hobbes, Locke, Comte, and other founders of
the social sciences once envisaged.
Parsons' theoretical work clearly always has
reflected strong ideological or moral concerns.
In his writings, however, he mainly was negative
in his explicit value positions. That is, while he
publicly opposed certain ideological positions
which deal too narrowly with human social
realities as Utopian (e.g., overly stressing equal-
ity or social unity or individual freedom, while
ignoring many other values and conditions on
 628 PARSONS, TALCOTT
which these depend), he stopped short of explicit
moralizing himself. Having started by stressing
the selectivity of theoretical concepts in science
(especially social science), he strove for a more
comprehensive "sampling" in social theories and
research. As he put it a decade ago, "[any]
regularity of relationship can be [better] under-
stood if the whole complex of interdependencies
of which it forms a part is taken into account"
(1968f, p. 458).
Concluding note. Parsons' conceptual and
theoretical effort to restore the connection be-
tween the increasingly differentiated social-
behavioral sciences is unparalleled by any con-
temporary. He created a framework for the
analysis of social processes in the broadest sense
that places more different organizational pro-
cesses (psychological as well as cultural and
social) on the same theoretical map than any
other existing scheme. He has also broken
through numerous philosophical and disciplin-
ary barriers, and has succeeded remarkably in
forging a bridge between science and history as
well as between positivism and idealism.
His developed scheme succeeds better by posi-
tivistic standards than is generally recognized,
not as a precise operational framework, but as
a generative corpus for social inquiry. This is
best shown by the thousands of studies and
dozens of middle-range theories it has inspired,
and by the innovative ways they often trespass
established boundaries (Barber & Inkeles 1971;
Loubser et al. 1976). But like other pioneering
theorists of the past, Parsons has developed one
special version of his theory with many impor-
tant restrictions, and it is likely to undergo
significant modifications in the future.
In 1979, the University of Heidelberg spon-
sored a special program to celebrate the fiftieth
anniversary of Parsons' receiving his PH.D. Both
Parsons and some of Germany's leading soci-
ologists gave papers. It was a rare tribute to
a foreign alumnus. On May 8, 1979, the day
after the program, Parsons died in Munich.
MARTIN U. MARTEL
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Parsons 1949; 1960; 1964; 1967; 1969; 1977c;
1978a are collections that contain most of Parsons'
major articles. Extensive bibliographies are in Parsons
1977a; 1978a, and in the footnotes to Loubser et al.
1976. For Parsons' review of his own work, see Parsons
1970.
WORKS BY PARSONS
1928-1929 "Capitalism" in Recent German Literature:
Sombart and Weber (I & II). Journal of Political
Economy 36:641-661; 37:31-51. —» Based on his
dissertation at the University of Heidelberg.
1930 WEBER, MAX The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons, with a
foreword by R. H. Tawney. London: Allen &
Unwin; New York: Scribners. —» First published
in German in 1904-1905. The 1930 edition has
been reprinted frequently. A paperback edition was
published in 1958 by Scribner.
1934 Society. Volume 14, pages 225-231 in Encyclo-
paedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Mac-
millan.
(1937) 1949 The Structure of Social Action: A Study
in Social Theory With Special Reference to a Group
of Recent European Writers. Glencoe, 111.: Free
Press. —» A paperback edition was published in
1968.
1939 The Professions and Social Structure. Social
Forces 17:457-467. —> Reprinted in Parsons 1949.
1940 Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social
Stratification. American Journal of Sociology 45:
841-862. -» Reprinted in Parsons 1949.
(1947) 1957 WEBER, MAX The Theory of Social and
Economic Organization. Translated and edited by
A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Glencoe, 111,:
Free Press. —> First published in German in 1922
as volume 1, part 1 of Weber's Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie.
A paperback edition was published in 1964.
(1949) 1954 Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and
Applied. Rev. ed. New York: Free Press.
1951 The Social System. New York: Free Press.
1951 PARSONS, TALCOTT; and SHILS, EDWARD (editors)
Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. —> Parsons and Shils
wrote part 2, entitled "Values, Motives and Systems
of Action." A paperback edition was published in
1962.
(1953) 1967 PARSONS, TALCOTT; BALES, ROBERT F.;
and SHILS, EDWARD Working Papers in the Theory
of Action. New York: Free Press.
1955 PARSONS, TALCOTT et al. Family, Socialization
and Interaction Process. New York: Free Press.
1956 Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior.
Edited by Roy M. Grinker. New York: Basic Books.
—> Includes discussions with Alfred Emerson, Anatol
Rapoport, and others. See especially chapter 5, "A
General Theory of Action," chapter 15, "Small
Groups and the Larger Social System," and chapter
23, "Boundary Relations Betwen Sociocultural Sys-
tems and Personalities."
1956 PARSONS, TALCOTT; and SMELSER, NEIL J. Econ-
omy and Society. New York: Free Press.
1958 General Theory in Sociology. Pages 3-38 in
Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S.
Cottrell (editors), Sociology Today. New York:
Basic Books.
1958 PARSONS, TALCOTT; and KROEBER, A. L. The
Concepts of Culture and of Social System. Ameri-
can Sociological Review 23:582-583. —> Comments
by Richard H. Ogles and Marion J. Levy, Jr., with
Parsons' rejoinder, appear in volume 24, pages
246-249.
1959a An Approach to Psychological Theory in Terms
of the General Theory of Action. Volume 3, pages
612-711 in Sigmund Koch (editor), Psychology: A
Study of a Science. New York: McGraw-Hill.
1959b Some Problems Confronting Sociology as a Pro-
fession. American Sociological Review 24:547—559.
1960 Structure and Process in Modern Societies. New
York: Free Press.
1961 Some Considerations on the Theory of Social
Change. Rural Sociology 26, no. 3.

1961 PARSONS, TALCOTT et al. Theories of Society.
New York: Free Press. —> Parsons' contributions
include "An Outline of the Social System," pages
30-84; "Differentiation in Social Structures," pages
239-266; and "Culture and the Social System,"
pages 963-996.
1963 Introduction. In Max Weber, The Sociology of
Religion. Translated by Ephraim Fischoff. Boston:
Beacon. —» Weber's book was first published in
German in 1922 as volume 2, chapter 4 of Weber's
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verste-
henden Soziologie; also, in the same year, as Re-
ligionssoziologie.
1964 Social Structure and Personality. New York:
Free Press.
1966 Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Per-
spectives. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. —>
Published (without chapter 1) with Parsons 1971
in Parsons 1977a.
1966 PARSONS, TALCOTT; and CLARK, KENNETH The
Negro American. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
1967 Sociological Theory and Modern Society. New
York: Free Press. —» See chapter 4, "Comments on
the Sociology of Karl Marx," which appears for the
first time in this collection.
1968a Christianity. Volume 2, pages 425-447 in In-
ternational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968b Durkheim, £mile. Volume 4, pages 311-320 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968c Interaction: I. Social Interaction. Volume 7,
pages 429-441 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press. —> Reprinted in Parsons
1977c; 1978a.
1968d Pareto, Vilfredo: II. Contributions to Sociology.
Volume 11, pages 411-416 in International Ency-
clopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L.
Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1968e Professions. Volume 12, pages 536-547 in In-
ternational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968f Systems Analysis: II. Social Systems. Volume 15,
pages 458—472 in International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New
York: Macmillan and Free Press. —> Reprinted in
Parsons 1977c; 1978a.
19680 Utilitarianism: II. Sociological Thought. Vol-
ume 16, pages 229-236 in International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L.
Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1969 Politics and Social Structure. New York: Free
Press.
1970 On Building Social Systems Theory: A Personal
History. Daedalus 99:826-878.
1971 The System of Modern Societies. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. —> Published with Par-
sons 1966 in Parsons 1977a.
1973 PARSONS, TALCOTT; and PLATT, GERALD M. The
American University. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press. —» Written with the collaboration of
Neil J. Smelser.
1977a The Evolution of Societies. Edited with an
introduction by Jackson Toby. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall. —» Combines Parsons 1966
and 1971.
1977k Comment on Burger's Critique: A Reply to
Thomas Burger, "Talcott Parsons, the Problem
of Order in Society, and the Program of an Analy-
PARSONS, TALCOTT 629
tical Sociology." American Journal of Sociology
83:335-339.
1977c Social Systems and the Evolution of Action
Theory. New York: Free Press.
1978a Action Theory and the Human Condition. New
York: Free Press.
1978i» Comment on Warner's, "Toward a Redefinition
of Action Theory." American Journal of Sociology
83:1317-1349, 1350-1358.
1978c A 1974 Retrospective Perspective (on Debates
With Schutz). Pages 115-125 in Richard Grathoff
(editor), The Theory of Social Action: Correspon-
dence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons.
Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press.
1979 Jaspers, Karl. Volume 18, pages 341-345 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Free Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALEXANDER, JEFFREY C. 1978 Formal and Substan-
tive Voluntarism in the Work of Talcott Parsons: A
Theoretical and Ideological Reinterpretation. Amer-
ican Sociological Review 43:177-198.
BARBER, BERNARD; and INKELES, ALEX (editors) 1971
Stability and Social Change: A Volume in Honor of
Talcott Parsons. Boston: Little, Brown.
BELLAH, ROBERT N. 1970 Beyond Belief: Essays on
Religion in a Post-traditional World. New York:
Harper.
BERGER, BENNETT 1962 On Talcott Parsons. Com-
mentary 34:507-513.
BERSHADY, HAROLD J. 1973 Ideology and Social
Knowledge. New York: Wiley.
BLACK, MAX (editor) 1961 The Social Theories of
Talcott Parsons: A Critical Examination. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. —» A paperback edition
was published in 1976 by Southern Illinois Uni-
versity Press.
BOURRICAUD, FRANCOIS 1977 L'individualisme insti-
tutionnel: Essai sur la sociologie de Talcott Parsons.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
DURKHEIM, SMILE (1893) 1960 The Division of
Labor in Society. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. —» First
published as De la division du travail social.
EISENSTADT, S. N.; and CURELARU, M. 1976 The
Form of Sociology: Paradigms and Crises. New
York: Wiley.
GOULDNER, ALVIN W. 1970 The Coming Crisis of
Western Sociology. New York: Basic Books.
HALLEN, G. C.; BELOK, MICHAEL V.; MARTEL, MARTIN U.;
and PRASAD, RAJESHWAR (editors) 1977 Essays
on the Sociology of Parsons: A Felicitation Volume.
New Delhi: Indian Journal of Sociology.
JOHNSON, BENTON 1976 Functionalism in Modern
Sociology: Understanding Talcott Parsons. Morris-
town, N.J.: General Learning Press.
LASCH, CHRISTOPHER 1977 Haven in a Heartless
World: The Family Besieged. New York: Basic
Books.
LOUBSER, JAN J. et al. (editors) 1976 Explorations
in General Theory in Social Science: Essays in Hon-
or of Talcott Parsons. 2 vols. New York: Free Press.
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1925) 1948 Magic, Sci-
ence and Religion. Pages 1-71 in Bronislaw Mali-
nowski, Magic, Science and Religion, and Other
Essays. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. —» A paperback
edition was published in 1954 by Doubleday.
MARTEL, MARTIN U. 1971 Academentia Praecox:
The Scope of Parsons' Multi-systemic Language Re-
bellion. Pages 175-211 in Herman Turk and Rich-
ard L. Simpson (editors), Institutions and Social
Exchange: The Sociologies of Talcott Parsons and
George C. Homans. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
 630 PEARSON, E. S.
MARTEL, MARTIN U. 1977 Dialogues With Parsons
(1973-1974). Pages 1-34 in G. C. Hallen, Michael
V. Belok, Martin U. Martel, and Rajashwar Prasad
(editors), Essays on the Sociology of Parsons: A
Felicitation Volume. New Delhi: Indian Journal of
Sociology.
MENZIES, KEN 1977 Talcott Parsons and the Social
Image of Man. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
MITCHELL, WILLIAM C. 1967 Sociological Analysis
and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
ROCHER, GUY 1975 Talcott Parsons and American
Sociology. New York: Barnes & Noble.
SCOTT, JOHN G. 1963 The Changing Foundations of
the Parsonian Action Scheme. American Sociologi-
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SMELSER, NEIL J. 1962 Theory of Collective Behav-
ior. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
SOMBART, WERNER (1902) 1924-1927 Der moderne
Kapitalismus: Historisch-systematische Darstellung
des gesamteuropdischen Wirtschaftslebens von
seinen Anfdngen bis zur Gegenwart. 2d ed. 3 vols.
Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. —> Vol-
ume 1: Die vorkapitalische Wirtschaft. Volume 2:
Das europdische Wirtschaftsleben im Zeitalter
des Friihkapitalismus. Volume 3: Das Wirtschafts-
leben im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus.
SPENCER, HERBERT (1876-1896) 1925-1929 The Prin-
ciples of Sociology. 3 vols. New York: Apple ton.
TURK, HERMAN; and SIMPSON, RICHARD L. (editors)
1971 Institutions and Social Exchange: The So-
ciologies of Talcott Parsons and George C. Homans.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
WHITEHEAD, ALFRED N. (1925) 1960 Science and the
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Macmillan. —> A paperback edition was published
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WILLIAMS, ROBIN M., JR. (1952) 1970 American So-
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New York: Knopf.
WRONG, DENNIS 1961 The Over-socialized Concep-
tion of Man in Modem Sociology. American Socio-
logical Review 26:183-193.
PEARSON, E. S.
Egon Sharpe Pearson was born in London in
1895 and is now living in retirement in Sussex.
As the son of Karl Pearson and as one of the
most eminent statistical figures of this century,
Pearson has enjoyed a unique vantage point
from which to view the development of statis-
tics. Educated at Winchester and at Trinity Col-
lege, Cambridge, he joined Karl Pearson's
department of applied statistics at University
College London in 1921 and attended all of
Karl Pearson's lecture courses. The father in-
fluenced the son deeply, but mainly by force of
example and by providing him with many of
the tools for future work. E. S. Pearson's statis-
tical philosophy was shaped to a much greater
extent by W. S. Cosset ("Student"), particularly
by Cosset's pioneering work in small-sample
theory which was later put on a rigorous footing
and much extended by R. A. Fisher. Pearson
was excited by these developments with which
his father never felt wholly comfortable. A few
years later Pearson began the extraordinary ten-
year collaboration with Jerzy Neyman for which
both men are best known despite their numerous
important individual contributions.
When Karl Pearson retired in 1933 his de-
partment was split in two; Fisher was appointed
Galton professor of eugenics, Pearson reader
and in 1935 professor of statistics. This arrange-
ment inevitably resulted in jurisdictional prob-
lems, but Pearson never allowed such matters
to interfere with his high regard for most of
Fisher's work. With his father's death in 1936,
Pearson took over the editorship of Biometrika,
retaining it until his retirement in 1966; he
continued until 1975 as editor of Biometrika
auxiliary publications.
Endowed with a sense of history and an ex-
ceptionally lucid style, Pearson has contributed
much to an understanding of the issues in
which he or his father were principals. His bio-
graphical accounts in the 1930s of Karl Pearson
and Cosset are masterly. In 1955 he instituted
in Biometrika, with the help of Maurice Kendall,
a still ongoing series of articles, by different
authors, on the history of probability and sta-
tistics, a first collection appearing in Pearson
and Kendall (1970). In 1978 he completed the
editing of lectures delivered by Karl Pearson
from 1921 to 1933, on the history of statistics
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Robustness, experimental sampling, and Pear-
son curves. These three rather different topics,
all of which proved to be long-term interests of
Pearson, were first united in a short paper en-
titled "The Distribution of Frequency Constants
in Small Samples from Symmetrical Popula-
tions" (1928). Using L. H. C. Tippett's random
numbers to generate 1000 samples of size 2 and
500 samples of 5, 10, and 20 from symmetrical
Pearson-type distributions with various coeffi-
cients of kurtosis /?2 (= /^/o4), Pearson (assisted
by N. K. Adyanthaya) obtained estimates of
mean, standard error (s.e.), /?i (— //J/o 6 )> and
/3'2 of the range and also of the s.e. of midpoint
and median. Supplementing these experimental
sampling values with exact results for rectangu-
lar and normal populations, he was able to con-
clude inter alia-, "where it is known that the
population is leptokurtic [(32 > 3], the use of
the median rather than the mean as a central
estimate certainly appears to be worth consid-
eration . . . it is not a satisfactory estimate in

the case of platykurtic [(32 < 3] distributions"
(1928, p. 358).
It is clear that Pearson is concerned here with
what would today be called the robustness of
estimation, more specifically with the effects of
nonnormality. His approach is a direct pre-
cursor of the current Monte Carlo studies of ro-
bustness of estimators of location and scale.
The article, labelled "Preliminary Notice," was
soon followed up by extensive similar studies
of the effects of skewness as well as kurtosis
(a) on Student's t—the statistic and the test—
and (fo) more generally in the analysis of
variance. In 1929 Pearson put two of the key
questions with typical directness: "How sensi-
tive are 'normal theory' tests to changes in the
population form? May I use some with less
hesitation than others?" (1929, p. 259). Such
questions were never far from his mind when a
new test was developed and some answers were
usually provided. Later, mainly through Monte
Carlo methods, more detailed results could be
presented in a readily appreciated form (Pear-
son & Please 1975).
The use of Karl Pearson's system of curves to
represent underlying populations was character-
istic of time and place. E. S. Pearson was also
frequently to employ the system as a means of
approximating theoretical distributions too com-
plex to be handled exactly.
Random numbers were developed by Tippett
at Karl Pearson's suggestion as an adjunct to his
well-known 1925 paper on the range in order to
"illustrate and confirm" the theoretical results he
had obtained. The use of these numbers in ro-
bustness studies appears to have been the result
of Pearson's influence, with some encourage-
ment from Cosset. Both had become concerned
with the too ready assumption of normality
which followed Fisher's great success in de-
veloping an elegant small-sample distribution
theory under population normality.
Collaboration with Neyman. From 1928 to
1938 ten papers by Neyman and Pearson ap-
peared, the essence of which has become an inte-
gral part of every statistician's education and vo-
cabulary. One can discern in them the evolution
of many familiar concepts and methods, begin-
ning with the notion of the two types of error.
Employing Fisher's representation of a sample
(xl5 XL>, . . ., xn) as a point in n-dimensional space,
and building on his use of the likelihood function
in the theory of estimation (Fisher 1922), Ney-
man and Pearson developed the likelihood ratio
criterion as a unifying method of test construc-
PEARSON, E. S. 631
tion. Basic to this was the consideration of hy-
potheses HI , H2 , . . . as alternatives to the
hypothesis H() under test. An error of type I oc-
curs when Ho is rejected although true, an error
of type ii when H0 is accepted although one of
HI , H2 , . . . holds. Balancing these errors de-
pends on the seriousness of their consequences
and is an important but not a statistical prob-
lem. The procedure advocated is first to control
the type i error—in the sense that repeated ap-
plications of the test used lead to false rejection
of H0 in a specified proportion a of cases; and,
second, to choose a test with good power proper-
ties—i.e., one that can effectively keep down the
probability of a type n error.
The likelihood ratio criterion, put forward
without any claim of optimality, gained in
strength by its ability to reproduce many of the
existing tests as well as by providing ap-
pealing new tests. A major breakthrough oc-
curred in 1933 with the search for optimal
procedures. It was shown that in testing a
simple (i.e., fully specified) hypothesis against
a simple alternative HI, the likelihood ratio test
is optimal, among all tests with the same a, in
the sense of minimizing the probability of ac-
cepting H0 when H! is true. This result, arrived
at by a calculus of variations argument, has
become known as the Neyman-Pearson funda-
mental lemma. Matters were shown to be more
complicated when either or both of H0 and HI
are composite (i.e., when one or more para-
meters are unspecified). Under favorable circum-
stances the best critical region (the best region
for rejection of H 0 ) may be common to all mem-
bers in the specified class of alternatives. In
such cases the resultant test is said to be uni-
formly most powerful (UMP). In the absence
of an UMP test, other criteria, such as unbiased-
ness, were proposed to help one choose from
possible tests.
Both technical and personal aspects of the
Neyman—Pearson collaboration, much of which
was carried out by mail, have been well de-
scribed by Pearson. He was the initiator of the
partnership, having arrived through the study
of special cases at some of the main early ideas
including the likelihood ratio criterion and what
was later termed the power function. It required
Neyman, however, to provide mathematical
refinement and generality, and to take the lead
in the pursuit of optimal approaches.
Biometrika tables and other activities. In the
1930s Pearson became interested in the use of
statistical methods in industry. One upshot was
 632 PHILLIPS, A. WILLIAM
a major publication (1935) issued by the British
Standards Institution, for which he has long
been a consultant. During World War n,
Pearson, together with most of his University
College staff, was attached to the British Ord-
nance Board.
The year 1954 saw the publication, joint
with H. O. Hartley, of Biometrika Tables for
Statisticians (BTS), volume 1, a project for
which Pearson had been preparing since the
late 1930s. This collection of what were deemed
the more commonly used tables was supple-
mented in 1972 by a second volume providing
more specialized tables as well as more exten-
sive tabulations of the main distributions. The
influence of Karl Pearson is unmistakable, and
not only because the tables were conceived to
replace his largely obsolete Tables for Statis-
ticians and Biometricians. Nearly all the tables
in volume 1 of BTS had first appeared in Bzo-
metrika, many suggested or coauthored by Pear-
son. Most notable among the latter are the
Clopper-Pearson charts providing confidence
limits for the binomial parameter; percentage
points of Pearson curves; and a number of
tables related to the range, a perennial favorite
of Pearson's. The well-known Pearson-Hartley
charts for determining the power of the t and F
test in a fixed effects model are reproduced in
volume 2 which contains tables from many
sources besides Biometrika.
Biometrika Tables have been widely recog-
nized as models of their kind. Throughout,
meticulous attention is paid to ensuring an at-
tractive layout and a form of tabulation per-
mitting easy interpolation. The volumes gain
immeasurably from invaluable extensive intro-
ductory material in which the use of each table
is clearly explained and richly illustrated.
Pearson continues to be active in retirement
and is at present putting together some ninety
letters he exchanged with Cosset from 1926
until Cosset's death in 1937.
HERBERT A. DAVID
WORKS BY PEARSON
1928 The Distribution of Frequency Constants in Small
Samples From Symmetrical Populations. Biometrika
20A:356-360. —» Prepared with the assistance of
N. K. Adyanthaya. Reprinted in Pearson (1928-
1963) 1966, pages 2-6.
(1928-1963) 1966 The Selected Papers of E. S. Pear-
son. Cambridge Univ. Press. —> Contains a selection
of Pearson's papers, other than those written with
Jerzy Neyman, up to 1966. Also includes a bibliog-
raphy of Pearson's works up to 1966.
(1928-1938) 1967 NEYMAN, JERZY; and PEARSON,
E. S. Joint Statistical Papers. Berkeley and Los An-
geles: Univ. of California Press.
1929 The Distribution of Frequency Constants in Small
Samples From Non-normal Symmetrical and Skew
Populations. Biometrika 21 .-259-286. —> Prepared
with the assistance of N. K. Adyanthaya and others.
Reprinted in Pearson (1928-1963) 1966, pages
7-34.
1935 The Application of Statistical Methods to Indus-
trial Standardization and Quality Control. British
Standards Institution, Report No. 600. London: The
Institution.
1938 Karl Pearson: An Appreciation of Some Aspects
of His Life and Work. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1939 William Sealy Cosset: "Student" as a Statisti-
cian. Biometrika 30:210-250.
1954-1972 PEARSON, E. S.; and HARTLEY, H. O. Bio-
metrika Tables for Statisticians. 3d ed. 2 vols. Cam-
bridge (England): Published for the Biometrika
Trustees at the University Press. —> The third edi-
tion of volume one was published in 1966. It was
reprinted with additions in 1970.
1970 PEARSON, E. S.; and KENDALL, M. G. (editors)
Studies in the History of Statistics and Probability:
A Series of Papers. London: Griffin.
1975 PEARSON, E. S.; and PLEASE, N. W. Relation
Between the Shape of Population Distribution and
the Robustness of Four Simple Test Statistics. Bio-
metrika 62:223-241.
1978 PEARSON, E. S. (editor) The History of Statistics
in the 17th and 18th Centuries Against the Chang-
ing Background of Intellectual, Scientific, and Re-
ligious Thought. London: Griffin. —> Lectures by
Karl Pearson at University College London during
the academic sessions 1921-1933.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
FISHER, R. A. 1922 On the Mathematical Foundations
of Theoretical Statistics. Royal Society of London,
Philosophical Transactions Series A 222:309-368.
TIPPETT, L. H. C. 1925 On the Extreme Individuals
and the Range of Samples Taken From a Normal
Population. Biometrika 17:364-387.
PHILLIPS, A. WILLIAM
Alban William Housego Phillips (1914-1975),
known by the second and simplest of his given
names, received no university education until
he was past thirty (and then the subject was
sociology rather than economics); had a short
professional life of less than twenty years before
suffering a crippling stroke; and produced fewer
papers than many American assistant pro-
fessors have needed to gain tenure. Yet his
name became a household word among econo-
mists, students of economics, and readers of the
financial sections of newspapers through his
depiction of the "Phillips curve"—the relation-
ship between the rate of inflation and the level
of unemployment.
Phillips was born to a New Zealand farm-
ing family and was educated at New Zealand
state schools until the age of 16. He became an

electrical engineer by the practical route and
embarked on a wandering career that included
an interlude of crocodile hunting in an Aus-
tralian mining camp, a journey across the
Soviet Union on the trans-Siberian railroad, and
a period as a prisoner of war. This last episode
occurred after he had arrived in London,
worked for the London Electricity Board, joined
the Royal Air Force as a technical officer (1940),
and been posted to the Far East. For his ac-
tivities while a prisoner of war he was made a
member of the Order of the British Empire
(1946).
His academic career began when, after World
War n, he enrolled as a student at the London
School of Economics (L.S.E.). Like many others
after the war, he felt the need to understand more
about "society," and thus he chose to study
sociology. It was the required course in eco-
nomics that caught his imagination, however,
and in particular the stock-flow relationships
depicted in Kenneth E. Boulding's text Eco-
nomic Analysis (1941). He felt that important
aspects of the working of the economic system
could be demonstrated, at least for teaching
purposes, by a machine in which flows and
stocks of economic variables were represented
by visible flows and stocks of liquids, and he
devoted his time and considerable ingenuity to
the design and construction of such a machine.
The prototype, built in collaboration with W. T.
Newlyn of the University of Leeds, was installed
in the University of Leeds. Its design, together
with a general analysis of the potential use of
mechanical and other analog models in eco-
nomics, formed the subject matter of Phillips'
first published paper (1950).
Phillips had shown the prototype to James E.
Meade of the L.S.E., who was considerably im-
pressed and arranged for Phillips to demonstrate
his machine before the prestigious research semi-
nar conducted by Lionel Robbins at the school.
The tale is told of how this ordinary and slightly
impoverished looking man, already ten years
older than most of the graduate students and
bright young teachers who filled the seminar, an
unknown figure with no apparent professional
credentials, appeared with his machine and also
with his proud landlady, and of how he stood
up under the ferocious attack and cross-exami-
nation that was one of the seminar's traditions.
Within a short time Phillips was offered a teach-
ing post at the school, which also financed the
construction of a machine for its own use. This
second version was more sophisticated than that
PHILLIPS, A. WILLIAM 633
at Leeds and, at Meade's suggestion, repre-
sented the working of two separate economies
linked through a balance-of-payments mecha-
nism.
His 17 years at the L.S.E. constituted the
whole of his effective professional career. In the
first four he obtained his doctorate and rose
from assistant lecturer to lecturer to reader.
Within four more years he became the occupant
of the Tooke chair of economic science and
statistics (a chair, last held by Arthur Lyon
Bowley, that was revived specifically for him).
In this period, too, he married and became the
father of two daughters.
All of Phillips' work at the L.S.E. was devoted
to a single objective, understanding the econ-
omy as a dynamic system and learning how best
to maintain it on an even course. He took a
macroeconomic perspective and had little in-
terest in relative prices or other microeconomic
concerns. His thinking was always influenced
by his engineering background, which led him
to take a somewhat mechanistic approach to
economic modeling but gave him a much
healthier respect for the importance of lags and
delays in response than was usual in the 1950s.
His second published paper (1954) was devoted
to the problem of stabilization policy in an econ-
omy with response lags. In this paper he made
the important distinction between "proportional"
policy, in which corrections were made in re-
sponse to current errors in economic variables;
"integral" policy, in which the response was
related to the cumulated deviations from the
desired state; and "derivative" policy, in which
response was related to the rate of change in
the target variables. He showed that the optimal
policy would depend on the response lag proper-
ties of the system, and that it would consist of
a mix of proportional, integral, and derivative
components.
As he further probed the dynamic properties
of economic systems, often by simulation stud-
ies on the analog computers at the National
Physical Laboratory and elsewhere (the digital
computer revolution was just around the corner,
but had not yet arrived in Britain), Phillips be-
came convinced that there was little to be said
about the specifics of policy unless the lag
structures in the economy could be determined.
He became more interested in the statistical
problems of estimation, as was apparent in his
1956 and 1957 papers.
The famous "Phillips curve" paper of 1958
emerged from this increasing empirical interest.
 634 PIAGET, JEAN
It began as a simple study of the relationship
between wage rate changes and unemployment,
designed to provide one set of dynamic para-
meters for use in his studies and chosen be-
cause of the availability of the data that had
been assembled by his colleague, E. H. Phelps
Brown. After plotting the data, Phillips noted
that a curve fitted better than the straight line
he had expected. The curve showed that zero
wage change occurred at a positive level of un-
employment; that wages increased at an in-
creasing rate as unemployment fell below this
level; and that the rate of increase became very
large as unemployment approached zero. How-
ever, unemployment above the zero wage
change level caused little downward change in
wages, and the rate of fall in wages was rela-
tively small even as unemployment became very
large. The published paper formalized the re-
sults obtained from the freehand curve by esti-
mating the parameters of a specific nonlinear re-
lationship, using ingenious but entirely ad hoc
methods devised by Phillips, discussing the fit of
the data (those for the United Kingdom from
1861 to 1957) in detail, and providing some
underlying theory. Phillips noted, but did not
stress, the aspect of the curve that was to be-
come famous—the portion showing the tradeoff
that must apparently occur between reducing
inflation and reducing unemployment.
The impact of the paper undoubtedly gained
strength from the rapid follow-up by R. G. Lip-
sey (1960), one of Phillips' colleagues at the
L.S.E., who reestimated the relationship by less
eccentric methods and provided a firmer theo-
retical foundation. Within a few years, "Phillips
curves" had been estimated for many countries,
had been incorporated into the eighth (1970)
edition of Samuelson's widely used basic text,
and had appeared in the President's economic
report to Congress in 1969. The first 20
years of the Phillips curve literature, surveyed
by Santomero and Seater (1978), shows no less
than 228 references. The reader is directed to
this survey for a detailed account of the Phillips
curve and its significance.
Phillips published only three more papers, in
1961, 1962, and 1968. They reiterate his con-
stant theme—the problems of formulating eco-
nomic policy in a dynamic context. He became
increasingly aware of the difficulties of estimat-
ing the relationships he considered necessary
for policy design and of the fact that the neces-
sary techniques were beyond his grasp. His in-
tellectual integrity was such that he felt he
could not continue to "profess" an area in which
he felt he had no further contribution to make,
and he believed that he could contribute more
by taking up the study of the economy of China,
a country of which he had firsthand knowledge
from his early wandering days and in which
interest was growing rapidly. In 1967 he left the
L.S.E. to accept a chair at the Australian Na-
tional University, hoping to develop his new in-
terest in Canberra. He had barely started in his
new field when, in 1969, he suffered a severe
stroke from which he never fully recovered. He
retired from his Australian chair in 1970 and
returned to his native New Zealand. There he
taught part time, conducting a seminar on the
economic development of China until his death
in 1975 at the age of 60.
KELVIN LANCASTER
WORKS BY PHILLIPS
1950 Mechanical Models in Economic Dynamics.
Economica New Series 17:283-305.
1954 Stabilisation Policy in a Closed Economy. Eco-
nomic Journal 64:290-323.
1956 Some Notes on the Estimation of Time-forms of
Reactions in Interdependent Dynamic Systems.
Economica New Series 23:99-113.
1957 Stabilisation Policy and the Time-forms of
Lagged Responses. Economic Journal 67:265-277.
1958 The Relation Between Unemployment and the
Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United
Kingdom, 1861-1957. Economica New Series
25:283-299.
1961 A Simple Model of Employment, Money and
Prices in a Growing Economy. Economica New
Series 28:360-370.
1962 Employment, Inflation and Growth. Economica
New Series 29:1-16.
1968 Models for the Control of Economic Fluctuations.
Pages 159—165 in Mathematical Model Building in
Economics and Industry. New York: Hafner.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOULDING, KENNETH E. (1941) 1966 Economic Anal-
ysis. 4th rev. ed. New York: Harper.
LIPSEY, R. G. 1960 The Relation Between Unem-
ployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage
Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957: A Fur-
ther Analysis. Economica New Series 27:1—31.
SAMUELSON, PAUL A. (1949) 1976 Economics. 10th ed.
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PIAGET, JEAN
Jean Piaget was born on August 9, 1896, in
Neuchatel, Switzerland, where his father taught
medieval literature at the local university. Al-
though Piaget received his doctorate from the

University of Neuchatel in biology (1918)—an
interest he has continued in his experimental
and theoretical work—he was also a student of
philosophy and the history of science, as well
as a participant in a practicum of experimental
psychology and in a didactic psychoanalysis. In
1920, Piaget became an assistant at the Alfred
Binet Institute in Paris, where he collaborated on
the standardization of an intelligence test for
children. As he analyzed the answers of children
to the probing questions used in this project, he
realized that a judicious use of the clinical inter-
view could become the key to exploring the
thinking of the child. While his supervisors in
the test-and-measurement tradition focused on
the statistical distribution of correct responses,
Piaget was fascinated by the explicit or implicit
reasoning behind the children's responses,
whether they were right or wrong. A faithful
description of the formal characteristics of chil-
dren's thinking, of how it changed progressively
from childhood to adulthood, would, Piaget
thought, go a long way toward answering ques-
tions about the development of the intellect that
had engaged philosophical thinking for cen-
turies. By that time Piaget had already decided
what his life's work would be: he would attempt
to turn epistemology—the heretofore philosoph-
ical theorizing on the nature of knowledge and
scientific truth—into an empirical investigation
with controlled observation and appropriate
logical consistency.
From the start it was clear to him that this
would be an interdisciplinary task, involving
philosophy, biology, the history of science, and
psychology. Philosophy is indispensable because
it poses the decisive questions and provides cri-
teria of logical analysis, while biology, standing
at the opposite pole from philosophy, anchors
the epistemological task in the behavior of a
living subject. The history of science and its
relation to common sense knowledge are clearly
relevant; unfortunately historical records are
often incomplete, particularly in those formative
periods when new ideas are being discovered
and elaborated. As a consequence, Piaget saw
psychology, or more specifically, the study of the
child's development of thinking, as the most
direct way of approaching the epistemological
problem empirically, and that is where the bulk
of his research has been conducted. It is not
surprising, therefore, that Piaget is generally
considered to be a psychologist, even though he
prefers to see himself as the originator of a
new empirical discipline: genetic epistemology.
PIAGET, JEAN 635
A brief overview of past epistemological trends
will place Piaget's work in historical perspective.
Rene Descartes had set the scene by splitting
sense knowledge from the rational intellect.
Having thus severed the intellect from its bi-
ological base, its origin and capacity for
engendering objective truth about the world be-
came an acute problem. Philosophers of ration-
alist tendencies, such as Leibniz, ascribed the
universal and necessary characteristics of logical
thinking to the God-given nature of the intellect
and explained its conformity to the objective
world by the happy coincidence of a divine provi-
dence. The British empiricists objected to these
views as altogether too speculative and void of
any observable account. Instead, they postulated
sense experience as the sole base of intellectual
knowledge. The dilemma created by these op-
posing epistemologies was brought to a head by
Kant with his discovery of the epistemic subject.
Kant argued that scientific knowledge is not
something absolute or thinglike, but the relation
between a subject and an object. Thus "objec-
tive" knowledge—its name notwithstanding—has
two components, an objective component ne-
glected by the rationalists and a subjective com-
ponent denied by the empiricist. Kant referred
to the objective component as a posteriori and to
the subjective component as a priori. The source
of the a posteriori component is experience and
it provides the specific content of knowledge,
while the a priori component is illustrated in
logical categories, such as space, class, and
causality, and is the conceptually prior condition
of knowledge.
Kant's epistemological revolution was seen as
the culmination of a philosophical inquiry into
the nature of knowledge at a time when philoso-
phy and science were still largely undifferen-
tiated. Piaget (1965) points out that all philoso-
phers of the past had been scientists, acquainted
with the business of patient empirical discovery
and controlled observation. After Kant, as more
and more sciences split off from their philosoph-
ical matrix, philosophy itself became one among
other academic disciplines. The bridge Kant had
built was widely acclaimed as solving the epis-
temological dilemma. However, it proved to be
quite precarious as philosophers turned to other
problems and reenacted the previous extremes of
rationalism and empiricism in a different ver-
sion. The young Piaget grew up in a world of
ideas where science flourished and expanded in
unparalleled progress. Darwin had established the
evolutionary origin of biological species; Hegel
636 PIAGET, JEAN
and Marx had pointed out the historical origin
of particular societies; and Freud had described
the individual origin of personal mental dis-
turbances. A philosophical school, almost slav-
ishly subject to a particular view on science,
arose and proclaimed positive "facts" as the only
legitimate objects worthy of knowledge. Ad-
herents of this positivist approach quickly came
to realize that in addition to "facts" a language is
needed to articulate the facts and make them
communicable. In the perspective of this logical
positivism, and its more recent form of analytic
philosophy, knowledge is an internal representa-
tion of an objective reality and logical thinking
is reduced to, and for all practical purposes
identified with, the proper use of a conventional
language. As a reaction against this empiricist
approach in philosophy, and also against aca-
demic psychology which had developed in a
blatantly positive framework, vitalistic and phe-
nomenalistic philosophers stressed the subjective
side of human experience. They went so far as
to suggest that the "objective" knowledge of
science and the "subjective" knowledge of per-
sonal experience are radically different and per-
haps even irreconcilable.
When Piaget began his own research, he was
responsive to all of these epistemological trends,
but his stance is in stark contrast to all of them.
By using the clinical interview technique as a
tool to probe into the origin of Kant's a priori
categories, Piaget opened up Kant's system of
philosophical theorizing to empirical verification.
When Piaget asked, how does knowledge come
about?, rather than, what is the nature of
knowledge?, he had effectively turned a philo-
sophical quest into an empirical investigation.
In doing this he merely followed Bacon's notion
that to understand something we have to know
its method of construction.
In 1921, the renowned psychologist fidouard
Claparede, who had read one of Piaget's first
articles in psychology, offered him the post of
director of studies at the Jean Jacques Rousseau
Institute. Piaget at once embarked upon a career
of research, teaching, and publishing, which over
the years has resulted in more than sixty books
and many more monographs and articles. In
1925, Piaget became professor of psychology, so-
ciology, and philosophy of sciences at Neuchatel,
and four years later he returned to Geneva where
he still resides. After teaching the history of sci-
ence at the University of Geneva for ten years,
the university established the chair of experi-
mental psychology, which Piaget occupied from
1940 until his retirement in 1971. During the
entire period from 1921 onward, he continued
his research activities at the institute, and even-
tually became its director. In addition, he taught
at the University of Lausanne (1938-1951) and
at the Sorbonne (1952-1963). In 1956 he
founded an interdisciplinary Center for Genetic
Epistemology in Geneva, which organizes yearly
symposia and issues a series of monographs.
When his three children were born between
1925 and 1931, he searched meticulously for
behavioral signs of the growing intellect in the
action of the infants, and extended the radical
constructivism of his first five books on child
thought, published between 1924 and 1932.
He noted that such notions as object, space,
time, causality were not present at birth, but
constructed in a gradual fashion during the
first two years of life. In three books of this
period he described six developmental substages
of what he came to call the sensorimotor period,
from stage i, which is almost entirely reflexive
(or innately programmed), to stage vi, which
precedes the period of operatory activity. Reflex
activity relates to the logic of physiology and the
nervous system; sensorimotor activity is the
logic of action, and the "usual" logic of adult
reflective thinking is the logic of operations.
These represent the three basic developmental
stages, and it is important to grasp both what all
these stages have in common and how they
differ. Sensorimotor is a means-end intelligence
that benefits from past experience and is a
coordination of external actions to reach present
goals. This is contrasted with reflex activity that
is preprogrammed (by evolution) in its goal and
external action and operatory activity that deals
with concepts, representations, and mental
(rather than merely external) action. The bridge
Piaget wanted to build between biology and logic
(operations), he discovered in the sensorimotor
logic of action. There is logic in action because
all action implies an assimilation of external re-
alities to what Piaget calls schemes. Develop-
ment is precisely the gradual construction of
these schemes of assimilation.
Consider the notion of "objects"; for instance,
this book you are reading. This notion does not
refer to your knowledge of what a book is
(the "concept" of book), but rather the more
primitive notion that the book is an object of
knowledge, with a permanent existence, separate
from your sensorimotor actions on the book.
Piaget demonstrated that infants at first do not
at all search for a vanishing object. Later on,

when they begin to search, they look for it in a
place where they had previously found it, even
though they perceive that it is being hidden in a
new place. Apparently for these infants, people
and things in their environment are not separate
entities, but extensions of their own activity.
Only toward the end of the sensorimotor period
is there systematic search for a hidden object,
from this Piaget infers that infants have now
acquired the notion of a permanent object to-
gether with a framework of space, causality,
and time; but all that is as yet limited to sensori-
motor action knowledge.
Conceptual knowledge, along with the ability
to represent absent events, begins at this point.
With the help of an increasing number of stu-
dents and collaborators, such as Barbel Inhelder,
Piaget devoted a whole series of researches and
publications, beginning around 1940, to the
detailed description of the development of vari-
ous general concepts, such as number, quantity,
time, movement and speed, space, geometry,
chance, experimental operations, classes, and
relations. In addition, Piaget's research on per-
ception was integrated in one book (1961),
which was followed by works on mental images
(Piaget & Inhelder 1966b) and memory (Piaget
& Inhelder 1968). In these works Piaget demon-
strated how the action knowledge of sensori-
motor intelligence is slowly transformed into
conceptual knowledge (without losing its action
character). As an illustration, two-year-old chil-
dren have a fairly stable framework of space (as
shown in their movements and perceptions),
but it takes almost ten years for them to recon-
struct this framework on a conceptual level.
He refers to the frameworks of stable concep-
tual knowledge as "operations." They imply a
logically self-consistent system within which
a person can mentally move from any point
of the system to another and return. In psy-
chological terms, thinking based on opera-
tions is "reversible" and therefore stable. For
example, when a ball of clay is transformed into
a thin stick, we perceive changes but we know
that the quantity of clay remains the same. This
illustrates Piaget's best-known experiment: con-
servation of quantity. A first stage of operations
is achieved between ages seven and ten; they
are called concrete operations because they
focus on real, or imaginable, events. The more
complete stage is "formal" operations through
which a person can deal with logical reality as
such (in the form of propositions) and consider
the concretely real as one among many theo-
PIAGET, JEAN 637
retical possibilities. Even though the operations
are individual constructions, they are not in-
dividualistic. On the contrary, for Piaget logic
expresses what all human minds have in com-
mon; it makes true cooperation between so-
cialized adults possible. Note that the stages
Piaget describes (reflex, sensorimotor, preopera-
tions, and concrete and formal operations) apply
to action coordinations and concepts rather than
to the child. The notions are "in" stages, not the
people. Within a person all of these stages inter-
mingle and people will operate at their most ad-
vanced level only if internal dispositions and
social conditions favor it.
Alongside these "psychological" investigations
Piaget continued his more specialized preoccu-
pations with epistemological problems of logic,
history of science, and biology. In his Biology
and Knowledge (1967a) he attempted a syn-
thesis between lower and higher forms of knowl-
edge and between evolutionary and develop-
mental processes. Logique et connaisance scien-
tifique (1967£>) presents Piaget's perspective on
epistemological problems underlying the main
branches of contemporary scientific thinking and
includes contributions from 18 specialists in
these fields.
Piaget's later works can all be said to revolve
around the concept of equilibration which has
been central to this thinking from the very be-
ginning of his career. That it took him almost
fifty years before he published a book (1975)
on it that he considered halfway satisfactory (in
which he criticized the shortcomings of his
earlier descriptions) is a witness both to Piaget's
single-minded scientific persistency and to the
centrality of this concept. What gravity is to
Newton's system, equilibration is to Piaget's sys-
tem. From one viewpoint, knowledge is a rela-
tion. On a biological level, it is a relation between
organism and environment; on the human plane,
a relation between person and society (the pri-
mary human environment); and on the concep-
tual plane, a relation between subject and ob-
ject. From another viewpoint, knowledge is a
structured totality in which the parts and the
whole of a person's intellect are reciprocally in-
terrelated. Both viewpoints are amply confirmed
by Piaget's multitude of psychological observa-
tions on children's thinking. The relational ap-
proach is illustrated by the concepts of assimila-
tion and accommodation as two complementary
functions in all knowing. Assimilation is the
process by which knowledge structures take in
information; accommodation is the adjustment
638 PIAGET, JEAN
of these structures to the particular information.
The structural approach is apparent in his de-
scription of developmental stages. However, both
viewpoints become distorted if one fails to re-
alize that in knowing, the relations are primary
and the two poles of the relations secondary and
derivative. In other words, Piaget's is not a theory
that postulates merely the interaction between a
pre-existing subject and object. It is much more
radical and asserts that what we call subject and
object are the products of the relations. If we
can talk of an object of knowledge (e.g., a his-
torical fact, a mathematical proof) as if it had
an absolute existence, this is an illusion created
by our mental capacity for separating subject
and object. In Piaget's perspective a historical
fact or mathematical proof exists only in rela-
tion to a mind that can produce and understand
it. Similarly this "mind" is the product of years
of individual development and at the same time
the common possession of socialized adults
(relative to a given historical society).
Imagine subject and object as the two poles
that knowledge constructs and relates. We can
then see that the two poles have to be in balance
toward each other. Equilibration is the process,
intrinsic to a person's intellect, that coordinates
these relations, and makes them productive in
the construction of a (relatively) rational per-
son and of a (relatively) coherent society and
world of knowledge. As a living process the
balance of knowledge is not static (as is a physi-
cal equilibrium) but dynamic and expanding.
By its own functioning knowledge tends to
construct ever new perspectives. These new con-
structs create new internal conflicts which in
turn are compensated for by new constructs.
In this manner development proceeds in an
ever expanding dialectical spiral of subject and
object, of empirical observation and theoretical
construction. Equilibration explains how physi-
ological conditions (maturation, heredity) and
environmental experiences (society) contribute
to development even though they are not a pri-
mary cause of that development. In fact equili-
bration does away with the need to postulate
external causes of intellectual development, just
as gravity did away with the need to postulate
an external cause of planetary motion.
Piaget's perspective does not easily fit into the
predominant paradigms of current academic psy-
chology, such as stimulus—response models, be-
havioral control, information processing, mea-
surement of individual differences, and social and
verbal learning. Although Piaget's ideas are now
frequently quoted, at times to demonstrate their
apparent inadequacy and at other times to sup-
port novel developmental approaches, attempts
to fuse Piaget's and other paradigms are usually
more confusing than clarifying. The major criti-
cisms of Piaget are that his theories are not sup-
ported by precise measurements and that his
concepts lack clarity. On the first point, it is note-
worthy that Piaget's results have been among the
most replicable and stable observations of
human behavior. There are now literally hun-
dreds of replication studies to be found in the
psychological literature. Moreover, the practical
relevance of Piaget's ideas is most apparent in
the applied field of education. His revolutionary
perspective on knowledge, and its development
provides a powerful base to many modern ap-
proaches to the teaching of mathematics and
science and to an overall atmosphere of intellec-
tual health in school. Most misunderstandings
are clearly related to a clash of paradigms, and
for that reason alone it is imperative to stress
the radical differences rather than the superfi-
cial similarities among the prevailing paradigms.
It would help to single out five specific differ-
ences: (1) Intelligence. Intelligence tests mea-
sure individual differences against a given norm,
and theoretically determine to what extent cer-
tain conditions, such as a specific environment,
contribute to a person's measured intelligence.
Piaget's investigations focus on the characteris-
tics of general intelligence that are common to
all people and he describes both structural
changes, as revealed in developmental stages,
and common functions at all stages; he postu-
lates equilibration as the main cause of intel-
lectual development while heredity and environ-
ment are occasions but not explanatory causes
of that development. (2) Development. Piaget
rejects the traditional dichotomy of development
into maturation (heredity) and learning (en-
vironment); he separates the physiological pro-
cess of maturation on the one hand, and the
learning and storing of information on the other
hand, from the internal process of development.
(3) Memory. For Piaget memory is not a process
separate from the intellect; rather he distin-
guishes at least three forms of memory, de-
pending on its relation to intellect: one, the sta-
bility of the framework of understanding (which
is not really memory since this is our stable in-
telligence); two, sensorimotor recognition, which
is limited to present action; and three, operatory
recall which is an internal reconstruction.
(4) Knowledge. For Piaget the intellect and its

resulting knowledge are coextensive with human
life: all behavior partakes of knowledge; there
is no radical split between action and knowledge,
between perception and action, between the
conscious or the unconscious, between personal
and social actions. There is a knowledge compo-
nent in all these forms of behavior. (5) Language.
In Piaget's system social relating and communi-
cating is essential in providing the environmen-
tal occasions for development. Moreover, serious
(in contrast to playful or submissive) concep-
tual thinking by its own functioning takes on a
social character of an inner dialogue. For Piaget
this "inner" language is a result of overcoming
an egocentric attitude and taking account of
other reasonable viewpoints; the actual "lan-
guage" in which it is carried out is quite secon-
dary and can be wholly fragmentary or idiosyn-
cratic. Hence, society's language, to the extent
that it serves the communicative function, facili-
tates development. However, by itself, it is at
best an occasion for learning information and is
in no way supportive of structural understand-
ing. In fact, up to and inclusive of the stage
of concrete operations, children's most advanced
knowing is beyond what they can handle ver-
bally. Even in adult thinking society's language
is frequently inadequate so that a formal lan-
guage (e.g., algebra) has to be invented.
In conclusion, Piaget's work spans a period
of more than sixty years, during which various
trends in the thinking of the biological and so-
cial sciences as well as in philosophy came into
prominence or went into decline. Because of the
innovative character of Piaget's work, which
did not move along traditional academic lines,
his research continued steadily and expanded
organically, but largely apart from other aca-
demic research. The response to, and recognition
of, its scientific value was very much a function
of these various trends: thus, after an initial
enthusiastic acceptance, Piaget's ideas were gen-
erally neglected in American psychology until
the revival of interest in developmental issues
in the early 1960s. Yet, as was pointed out all
along, to regard Piaget primarily as a psycholo-
gist is to misjudge his most basic work, which is
both more and less than psychology, since it in-
cludes other disciplines related to his research,
such as philosophy, biology, the history of ideas,
sociology, education, and psychiatry. While
Piaget either did not want, or was not able, to
found a school in the sense of Freud or other
innovators who sent their followers across the
academic landscape, the ultimate test of the
PIAGET, JEAN 639
soundness of his approach is probably not mea-
sured in terms of its acceptance by academia as
an autonomous discipline. What counts is the
continuous openness and relevance of Piaget's
ideas to the more advanced trends and issues in
these various disciplines which constitute pre-
cisely Piaget's original concept of an interdisci-
plinary and scientific genetic epistemology.
HANS FURTH
WORKS BY PIAGET
(1923) 1967 The Language and Thought of the Child.
3d ed., rev. & enl. London: Routledge; New York:
Humanities Press. —> First published in French.
(1924) 1965 Judgment and Reasoning in the Child.
London: Routledge. —» First published in French. A
paperback edition was published in 1976 by Little-
field.
(1926) 1960 The Child's Conception of the World.
London: Routledge; New York: Humanities Press.
—> First published in French. A paperback edition
was published in 1975 by Littlefield.
(1927) 1966 The Child's Conception of Physical Caus-
ality. New York: Humanities Press. —> First pub-
lished in French. A paperback edition was published
in 1972 by Littlefield.
(1932) 1965 The Moral Judgment of the Child. New
York: Free Press. —> First published in French.
(1936) 1963 The Origins of Intelligence in Children.
New York: Norton. —> First published in French.
(1937) 1954 The Construction of Reality in the Child.
New York: Basic Books. —» First published in
French. A paperback edition was published in 1975
by Ballentine.
(1941) 1964 The Child's Conception of Number. New
York: Humanities Press. —> First published in
French.
(1946) 1962 Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood.
New York: Norton. —> First published as La forma-
tion du symbole chez I'enfant.
(1955) 1958 PIAGET, JEAN; and INHELDER, BARBEL
The Growth of Logical Thinking From Childhood to
Adolescence: An Essay on the Construction of For-
mal Operational Structures. New York: Basic Books.
—> First published in French.
(1959) 1969 INHELDER, BARBEL; and PIAGET, JEAN
The Early Growth of Logic in the Child: Classifica-
tion and Seriation. New York: Norton. —> First pub-
lished as La genese des structures logiques elemen-
taire.
(1961) 1969 The Mechanism of Perception. London:
Routledge. —» First published in French.
(1965) 1971 Insights and Illusions of Philosophy.
New York: World Books. —> First published in
French.
(1966a) 1971 PIAGET, JEAN; and INHELDER, BARBEL
Mental Imagery in the Child: A Study of the Devel-
opment of Imaginal Representation. New York:
Basic Books. —» First published in French.
(1966k) 1969 PIAGET, JEAN; and INHELDER, BARBEL
The Psychology of the Child. New York: Basic
Books. —> First published in French.
(1967a) 1971 Biology and Knowledge: An Essay on
the Relations Between Organic Regulations and
Cognitive Processes. Univ. of Chicago Press. —» First
published in French.
1967i> Logique et connaisance scientifique. Encyclo-
pedic de la Pleiade, Vol. 22. Paris: Gallimard. —»
640 POLANYI, MICHAEL
Volume published under the direction of Jean
Piaget.
1968a Claparede, fidouard. Volume 2, pages 501-502
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968Z? Developmental Psychology: II. A Theory of De-
velopment. Volume 4, pages 140—147 in Interna-
tional Encyclopedia ofthe Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1968c (1970) Structuralism. New York: Basic Books.
—» First published in French.
(1968) 1973 PIAGET, JEAN; and INHELDER, BARBEL
Memory and Intelligence. New York: Basic Books.
—» First published in French.
(1975) 1977 The Development of Thought: Equilibra-
tion of Cognitive Structures. New York: Viking. —>
First published in French.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cognitive Development and Epistemology. Edited by
Theodore Mischel. 1971 New York: Academic
Press.
EVANS, RICHARD I. 1973 Jean Piaget: The Man and
His Ideas. New York: Dutton. —» Includes an auto-
biography of Piaget and a list of his major pub-
lished works.
FLAVELL, JOHN H. 1963 The Developmental Psychol-
ogy of Jean Piaget. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. institute and accepted the chair in physical
FURTH, HANS 1969 Piaget and Knowledge: Theoreti-
cal Foundations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-
Hall.
GARDNER, HOWARD 1973 The Quest for Mind: Piaget,
Levi-Strauss, and the Structuralist Movement. New
York: Knopf.
Piaget and His School: A Reader in Developmental Psy-
chology. Edited by Barbel Inhelder et al. 1976
New York: Springer.
ROTMAN, BRIAN 1977 Jean Piaget: Psychologist of
the Real. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press.
POLANYI, MICHAEL
Michael Polanyi was born in Budapest, Hun- His interests had always been broad and his
gary, on March 11, 1891. One of his older
brothers was Karl Polanyi. His early interests
centered on chemistry, but, because his family istic ideas of his peers and of the prevailing
was Jewish and he feared that he might not be
able to obtain a university post, he studied medi-
cine at the University of Budapest and became
a physician in 1913. The pull of chemistry re-
mained strong, however, and he very shortly
thereafter entered the Technische Hochschule
at Karlsruhe in Germany to study chemistry. He
then began a correspondence with Albert Ein-
stein that continued throughout World War I.
During the war Polanyi served in the Austro—
Hungarian army as a medical officer; but he
continued his studies in physical chemistry and
wrote several papers during this time. One
paper, developing his own theory of adsorption,
became his doctoral dissertation, accepted by
the University of Budapest in 1919.
He then returned to teach at Karlsruhe. There
he met another chemist, Magda Kemeny, whom
he married in 1921 in Berlin, where he had
joined the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute fur Faser-
stoffchemie. They had two sons: George, an
economist, and John, a chemist. At the institute,
Polanyi made many contributions in the X ray
analysis of fibrous structure and crystals, espe-
cially metallic crystals.
In 1923, at the invitation of Fritz Haber, he
became head of one of the departments in
Haber's Institute fur Physikalische Chemie und
Electrochemie. There he did much significant
work on crystals and in reaction kinetics. In
1926 he received a professorship at the Uni-
versity of Berlin and a life membership in the
Kaiser Wilhelm Society (which had become the
Max Planck Gesellschaft after World War i).
In 1933, threatened with Nazi interference in
academic matters, Polanyi resigned from the
chemistry at the University of Manchester. He
continued his research in reaction kinetics until
1948 when he was transferred to a chair in so-
cial studies. He was elected a fellow of the Royal
Society in 1944.
The transition from physical chemistry to so-
cial science and philosophy had been a gradual
one. For 15 years he had published papers in
both physical chemistry and in economics, as
well as on social questions generally and in
philosophy. His last chemistry paper was pub-
lished in 1949, his first publication in econom-
ics appeared in 1935.
This transition was a natural one for him.
thoughts reflexive. From the days of his youth
in Hungary, he had been critical of the social-
positivism of the time. At the Kaiser Wilhelm
Institute, he and his collaborators in chemical
research had regularly discussed political theory
and economics as well as chemistry.
In England he found that Marxist concepts of
science as a class-based ideology were rather
common, as were complementary utilitarian no-
tions that science should be organized to serve
social purposes. Polanyi realized, from his own
understanding of how science worked, that
planned science was an absurdity. But he also
saw that such ideas were dangerous to the very
existence of science. It became clear to him, too,
that those scientists who wished to resist these

ideas had no philosophic position from which
to argue against planning. Accordingly, he be-
came active in several societies working to de-
fend or restore freedom in the pursuit of sci-
ence.
But he came to see that two lines of intellec-
tual attack also were essential: one economic
and one philosophical. Since the strongest sup-
port for the idea of a science subservient to
social needs was Marxism, he felt that he had
to show first that Marxist economics erred, spe-
cifically when it assumed that a modern indus-
trial economy could be managed without mar-
kets, pricing, and profits—i.e., through centrally
planned production and distribution. He was
therefore concerned to show how a modern in-
dustrial economy—with or without private capi-
tal—had to use a decentralized system of markets
and profits, because it had to solve what was
essentially a polycentric problem, the continual
readjustment of resources to productive and
consumptive needs and vice versa. There had to
be many centers simultaneously making mutual
readjustments. The effective span of deliberate
corporate control, he showed, would always be
too narrow to permit the myriad adjustments re-
quired in an entire economy in the time re-
quired for such adjustments.
He also had to show, he felt, that there were
means for controlling business cycles and thus
eliminating periodic large-scale unemployment
—the major source of criticism of a free econ-
omy. He was the first economist to propose that
Keynesian economic theories provided the
means, through deficit spending, for maintain-
ing full employment.
Accordingly, he attempted (1) to reverse the
tendency among many economists to propose
socialistic remedies for the West's economic
problems, and (2) to educate the public gen-
erally on the way a free (unplanned) economic
system worked—and could be made to work bet-
ter. From the 1930s to the 1950s, he wrote a
number of articles and books on these matters
and produced a popular cartoon film showing
how a free economy works.
Polanyi broadened this general position to
demonstrate that a free society depended upon
the working of many polycentric systems (in-
cluding that of science) generating spontaneous
orders of mutual adjustment, and that the con-
tinued existence of such a pluralistic, liber-
tarian society depended upon general popular
commitment to the values of truth, beauty, and
justice, along with trust that the communities
POLANYI, MICHAEL 641
of scientists, artists, and jurists were developing
and defining these ideals through their own sys-
tems of free and mutual adjustment.
He realized that this tenet flew in the face of
the generally accepted philosophic stance that
true knowledge was utterly detached and ob-
jective, that it rested upon the absence of belief,
and that social science was qua science, essen-
tially value free, since no sets of values could
be positively established as objectively true.
Polanyi thus moved easily and necessarily to his
second task: the development of a new philo-
sophical epistemology that he called "personal
knowledge." Knowledge (even scientific knowl-
edge), he held, proceeded from nonexplicable,
tacit commitments and convictions (in which
the knowers "dwelt") to the synthesizing (by
a personal act of the knower's mind) of focally
grasped, integrated wholes made up of particu-
lars of which we could only be subsidiarily
aware. Such constructed wholes or meanings
were, however, constructed with "universal in-
tent" and so were not whimsical, arbitrary, or
subjective, even though they could never be
given wholly explicit or objective expression or
defense.
Belief in such a view of man's knowledge ca-
pacities would, he held, restore to us belief in
the ideals essential to mutual trust in a free so-
ciety. Individuals would once again have a basis
for respecting each other's ideas and efforts and
thus for allowing the various communities of
mutual adjustment to operate freely, rather
than supposing that men could and should be
controlled in a totalitarian manner by those
with objective, "scientific" knowledge of the
needs of society and the "causes" of men's ideas
and actions, who could thus program or plan a
whole society. The sciences of man, he held,
could only be understood by fully committed
participation in men's activities and thoughts,
not through observational aloofness from this
subject matter in the service of a false ideal of
total objectivity.
The chair of social studies at Manchester re-
quired no teaching. This freedom, plus a grant
from the Rockefeller Foundation, enabled Po-
lanyi to give full expression to these social and
philosophical views in his magnus opus, Per-
sonal Knowledge (1958). In this same year
Polanyi was appointed a senior research fellow
at Merton College, Oxford. From this base he
continued to write and lecture at many of the
world's universities until his last illness and
death on February 22, 1976.
642 POPPER, KARL R.
Polanyi's last few years were spent in show-
ing how man could understand himself and
achieve a rich meaning in his life through par-
ticipatory knowledge in poetry, the arts, rites,
and religion, as well as in science. He also at-
tempted to demonstrate that recent achieve-
ments in biology, such as the discovery of DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid), indicated that living
organisms are not reducible to physical and
chemical events, but that they must be under-
stood as hierarchically structured. Specifically,
he found that living things have, at bottom, two
levels of being: that of interaction between their
atomic and molecular parts, and that of bound-
ary principles structuring or harnessing these
parts in the service of achievements impossible
without them. Neither level is reducible to the
other; thus, neither reductionism in biology nor
behaviorism in psychology is possible, since
hierarchical structuring continues into and
through the higher levels of man's behavior.
Man, Polanyi maintained, finds his meaning
in the service of these higher levels, which cre-
ate obligations and lead to a richer existence
than is possible on any lower level of being. A
free society, which is essential to the aims of
these higher levels, can be created and main-
tained only by mutual authority, mutual trust,
and mutual dedication. Conversely, such au-
thority, trust, and dedication will be permitted
an existence only in such a free society.
HARRY PROSCH
WORKS BY POLANYI
1917 A bekeszerzokhoz (The Peacemakers). Budapest:
Benko Gyula Cs.
1932 Atomic Reactions. London: Williams & Norgate.
1935 U.S.S.R. Economics: Fundamental Data, System
and Spirit. Manchester School Nov. 2:67-89.
1936 U.S.S.R. Economics: Fundamental Data, System
and Spirit. Manchester Univ. Press.
1937a Popular Education in Economics. Unpublished
manuscript. —> Available in the Collected Papers of
Michael Polanyi in the Joseph Regenstein Library,
University of Chicago.
19371? Visual Representation of Social Matters. Un-
published manuscript. —> Available in the Collected
Papers of Michael Polanyi in the Joseph Regenstein
Library, University of Chicago.
(1940a) 1975 The Contempt of Freedom. New York:
Arno.
1940b Economics by Motion Symbols. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 8, Oct.: 1-19.
1940c Economics on the Screen. Documentary News
Letter Aug.: 5-6.
1941 Extract From a Letter of 27th June, 1941: Reply
to a Memorandum Circulated by the Cabinet Officers
(Jewkes-Robbins). Unpublished manuscript.
(1945) 1948 Full Employment and Free Trade. 2d ed.
Cambridge Univ. Press; New York: Macmillan.
(1946) 1964 Science, Faith and Society. Univ. of
Chicago Press. —> Includes a new introduction by
the author.
1949 Experimental Proofs of Hyperconjugation. Jour-
nal of Chemical Physics 46:235 only.
1951 The Logic of Liberty. Univ. of Chicago Press.
(1958) 1964 Personal Knowledge. Rev. ed. New York:
Harper. —> A paperback edition was published by
the University of Chicago Press in 1974.
1959 The Study of Man. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1960 Beyond Nihilism. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1965 Account of His Activities as a Scientist. Unpub-
lished manuscript.
1966a Autobiographical Note. Unpublished manuscript.
1966b The Tacit Dimension. Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday. —> A paperback edition was published in
1967.
1969 Knowing and Being. Edited by Marjorie Grene.
Univ. of Chicago Press. —» Collection of essays by
Polanyi.
1975 POLANYI, MICHAEL; and PROSCH, HARRY Mean-
ing. Univ. of Chicago Press. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1977.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Logic of Personal Knowledge 1961 London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul; Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
MAYS, WOLFE 1978 Michael Polanyi: Recollections
and Comparisons. Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology 9:44-55.
WIGNER, E. P.; and HODGKIN, R. A. 1977 Michael
Polanyi, 1891-1976. Biographical Memoirs of Fel-
lows of the Royal Society 23:413-448.
POPPER, KARL R.
Karl Raimund Popper, philosopher and metho-
dologist of natural and social science, was born
on July 28, 1902, in Vienna, the son of a lawyer
of Jewish descent. Although his family was im-
poverished at the end of World War i, Popper
managed to continue his studies at the Univer-
sity of Vienna, where he was exposed to the
various forms of Marxism then current. His
teachers included the psychologist Karl Biihler,
who had a lasting influence on Popper's ideas
about language and on Popper's decision to
write his doctoral dissertation, completed in
1928, on the psychology of thinking. After re-
ceiving his doctorate, Popper taught mathe-
matics and physics in a secondary school.
During the 1920s, Popper was in contact with
several members of the Vienna Circle of logical
positivists, notably Rudolf Carnap and Herbert
Feigl. Although the circle sponsored Popper's
early publications—an article in its periodical
Erkenntnis, and in 1935, a book entitled Logik
der Forschung—he was not a member of the
circle and his main philosophical convictions
explicitly rejected the principles of logical posi-
tivism. In 1937, with the approach of Hitler's

Anschluss, Popper accepted a post teaching
philosophy at Canterbury University College in
New Zealand.
Theory of scientific knowledge. Popper dis-
sented in three main ways from the account of
the relation between experience and scientific
knowledge given by the Vienna positivists. First,
while they contended that the statements of a
language are meaningful or scientific only if
verifiable in experience, Popper argued that the
relevant property is falsifiability, and that this
quality serves to demarcate science from pseudo-
science. Empirically unfalsifiable statements,
which are either tautologies or metaphysical
statements, are not meaningless and should not
be shunned absolutely, but they must be dis-
tinguished from empirically scientific statements
of fact. Metaphysics, Popper admitted, often
anticipates science, and is only to be deplored
when it pretends to be science, as in astrology,
alchemy, and in what Popper saw as their con-
temporary equivalents, Marxism and psycho-
analysis.
Second, Popper disagreed with the positivists'
belief that science moves in fact from observa-
tion to theory in an inductive manner. What is
more, he contended that science cannot be justi-
fied inductively because theories cannot be sup-
ported by observation, which, by its nature, is
selective and guided by antecedent theoretical
presumptions. There is no such thing as pure,
theory-free observation. As for justification,
Popper endorsed Hume's argument that no gen-
eral assertion is conclusively verified by an
accumulation of particular instances of the
regularity it asserts; in fact, he argues such an
accumulation does not even confer any prob-
ability on the assertion.
According to Popper, scientific knowledge de-
velops by a process of conjecture and refuta-
tion. First, a conjecture, as substantial as possi-
ble, is put forward. Observation is then called
upon by way of a resolute search for states of
affairs that would falsify the conjecture. If it
survives these attempts at falsification it is so
far corroborated. If it does not, a revised con-
jecture, compatible with what is known so far,
is put forward and the attempt to falsify begins
anew. By such refinement of successive conjec-
tures through the elimination of errors, Popper
contends, advance is made. At first, he took the
advance to be simply the acceptance of the most
substantial theories not yet refuted by experi-
ence. No claim about their truth was involved.
But later, he came to interpret the advance as a
POPPER, KARL R. 643
continuous approximation to truth, an increase
in verisimilitude.
Popper argued that the measure of the extent
to which a conjectured hypothesis is substantial
is its falsifiability. Of any two hypotheses, the
one that is more falsifiable—the one that rules
out the greater number of logically possible
states of affairs—has the greater substance or
empirical content. Thus, a tautology, which does
not rule out any possible states of affairs, is em-
pirically vacuous. Popper ingeniously identifies
degree of falsifiability, and therefore of empiri-
cal content, first with simplicity (often proposed
as a criterion for choice between competing hy-
potheses consistent with what is known), and
secondly, with improbability. The paradox in-
volved in his rule "choose the least probable
hypothesis" is only apparent. It does not mean
that the least corroborated hypothesis should be
accepted and acted on, but that the hypothesis
which is antecedently least probable is the one
to choose for testing.
The third respect in which Popper's views dif-
fered from those of the Vienna positivists con-
cerns their respective notions of the empirical
foundations of science. Most of the positivists,
under the influence of Moritz Schlick, and more
remotely, Ernst Mach, took that basis to be re-
ports of immediate, subjective experience. Pop-
per, on the other hand, argued that basic em-
pirical statements report facts about the exis-
tence and properties of straightforwardly ob-
servable ("middle-sized") material bodies in cir-
cumscribed regions of space and time. The de-
cision to adopt those statements is motivated,
but not authorized, by perceptual experience,
and can be revised at any time. Basic state-
ments are only the relative limits to the process
of observational testing. They can themselves
be tested by the further basic statements which
can be derived from them with the aid of ac-
cepted theories. Carnap's conversion to this point
of view was brought about partly by Popper's
arguments.
In general, Popper's ideas about scientific
knowledge add up to a major redirection of tra-
ditional empiricism, one which was not content
to recast the principles of Locke, Hume, and Mill
in a more up-to-date and logically sophisticated
form. Although his ideas evoked interest, they
did not seriously catch the attention of philoso-
phers for a long time. Today, however, the con-
ception of scientific theory as hypothetico-de-
ductive, anticipated by William Whewell and
Charles Sanders Peirce and directly opposed to
 644 POPPER, KARL R.
the orthodoxy of Bacon and Mill, is widely ac-
cepted. Popper's more extreme inferences from
this doctrine, in particular of the conclusion
that there is no such thing as inductive confir-
mation, remain controversial, but his work has
been widely endorsed by scientists such as the
biologists Peter B. Medawar and John Eccles,
the cosmologist Hermann Bondi, and people
working in other fields, such as the distinguished
art historian E. H. Gombrich.
Antihistoricism. During the years Popper
spent in New Zealand before and during World
War u, he was preoccupied with the application
of his doctrines to history and to social and
political theory. His aim was the refutation of
what he idiosyncratically describes as "histori-
cism": the view that there is a discoverable law
of the over-all development of history. In under-
taking this research, Popper was motivated by
his belief that totalitarian movements typically
justify themselves with historicist theories. He
waged his campaign in two main works, The
Poverty of Historicism (1957) and The Open
Society and Its Enemies (1945).
In The Poverty of Historicism, Popper main-
tains that historicism is supported both by those
who believe that the social sciences use the
same methods as the natural sciences and by
those who believe that the social sciences have
distinct and characteristic methods of their own.
The former, the pronaturalists, endorse histori-
cism because they misunderstand the true char-
acter of natural science and believe that induc-
tion is the essential scientific method. An im-
portant application of this view sees the evolu-
tionary conception of the development of the
animal species as a major achievement of induc-
tive thinking. Popper contends that the evolu-
tionary history of animal life is a trend, not a
law, and that in general, the extrapolation of
trends, however inductive it may be, is not scien-
tific and is altogether different from the kind
of prediction, which is always conditional, that
is made on the basis of scientific laws. The anti-
naturalists, on the other hand, though correct
in recognizing that history is not an inductive
science, wrongly imagine that it can arrive at
predictions by intuitive or holistic methods of its
own.
History, as Popper sees it, is a descriptive and
explanatory, but not a generalizing, discipline.
It does not propound laws, but tries to give a
rationally coherent narrative in which events are
explained and inferred with the assistance of
laws supplied largely by the social sciences.
Many of the laws used in history are so trivial
and obvious as hardly to be recognized as laws
at all, but such truistic pieces of common knowl-
edge are not a part of history; rather, they are
drawn on by it. As an afterthought, Popper adds
an a priori argument against the possibility of
large-scale, unconditional predictions about the
course of history in general. What happens in
history is strongly influenced by the state of
knowledge of historical agents at the time, but
future knowledge cannot be predicted in relevant
detail now. If it could be, it would be present
knowledge. Therefore, the future course of his-
tory is unpredictable.
In The Open Society, a book that is remarkable
for its scope, variety, and eloquence, Popper sur-
veys three major bodies of historicist theory:
those of Plato, Hegel, and Marx. The critique of
Plato, a hero to so much of modern European
culture, is an impressive scholarly tour de force.
The pessimistically destructive character of
Plato's conservatism is traced through all of its
manifestations: from the theory of forms, seen
by Popper as the metaphysical counterpart of
political hostility to change, by way of Plato's
theory of the necessarily degenerating sequence
of political systems in time, to the part he played
in the political life of his own epoch. The attack
on Hegel is weakened by insufficiently controlled
antipathy, but the critique of Marx, to whom
in many ways Popper is sympathetic, is of mem-
orable power. The examination of the exemplary
historicists is accompanied by illuminating di-
gressions into philosophy, and is illustrated, par-
ticularly in the discussion of Marx, by Popper's
recollections of the experiences of the Austrian
social democratic movement in the years be-
tween World War I and World War n.
Popper draws a number of directly political
implications from his examination of histori-
cism. The first is that in view of the very limited
and conditional predictability of the historical
future, planning should always be piecemeal,
gradualistic, and ready to be revised in the face
of unexpected developments. Another is the
political counterpart of falsificationism. The
fundamental problem of politics, Popper main-
tains, is not that of who should rule, but that of
how can we design institutions so that bad rulers
can do as little harm as possible and be replaced
as easily as possible. Thirdly, Popper draws on
studies of self-refutation as a problem in formal
logic to argue that various sorts of politically ab-
solutist doctrines are implicitly self-refuting.
Against the absolute principle that every opinion

should be tolerated, Popper urges the qualified
variant: tolerate what does not seek to destroy
tolerance.
Later developments. At the end of World
War n, Popper accepted a position as head of
the department of philosophy, logic, and scien-
tific method at the London School of Economics,
and stayed there until his retirement in 1970.
In this postwar period, he returned to the field
of his earlier work. He has written, but not yet
published, a large "postscript" to his Logik der
Forschung. Two particular lines of development
are significant. He has continued his critique
of induction, which represented the mind as
creatively active in the acquisition of knowledge,
and developed that line of thought into first, an
antideterminist metaphysics, and more specifi-
cally, in The Self and Its Brain (Popper & Eccles
1978), into an account of the mind on Cartesian
lines as quite different in nature from the body,
but as in causal interaction with it.
Secondly, as a result of the view of scientific
progress as a matter of trial and error (the out-
come of a kind of controlled struggle for ex-
istence between hypotheses), Popper has elab-
orated the conception of knowledge as an evolu-
tionary product. He conceives of it as something
produced by the minds of men, but once pro-
duced, as existing independently of them
(1972).
ANTHONY QUINTON
"WORKS BY POPPER
(1935) 1959 The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Lon-
don: Hutchinson; New York: Basic Books. —> First
published as Logik der Forschung and translated by
Karl Popper, Julius Freed, and Lan Freed.
(1945) 1966 The Open Society and Its Enemies.
5th ed., rev. 2 vols. Princeton Univ. Press.
1957 The Poverty of Historicism. London: Routledge;
Boston: Beacon. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1964 by Harper.
(1962) 1969 Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth
of Scientific Knowledge. 3d ed., rev. London: Rout-
ledge.
1968 Plato. Volume 12, pages 159-164 in Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1972 Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1978 POPPER, KARL; and ECCLES, JOHN The Self and
Its Brain. Berlin: Springer.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ACKERMANN, ROBERT JOHN 1976 The Philosophy of
Karl Popper. Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press.
MAGEE, BRYAN 1973 Popper. London: Collins/Fon-
tana.
SCHILPP, PAUL A. (editor) 1974 The Philosophy of
Karl Popper. 2 vols. La Salle, 111.: Open Court.
WELLMER, ALBRECHT 1967 Methodologie als Erkennt-
nistheorie. Frankfort (Germany): Suhrkamp.
POTTER, DAVID M. 645
POTTER, DAVID M.
David M. Potter (1910-1971), one of the
most influential American historians of his
time, was born and grew up in Augusta, Geor-
gia. He attended Emory University in Atlanta
and was a member of its debate team along with
C. Vann Woodward, another future historian of
distinction. In Atlanta, new voices were by then
challenging some of the old Southern myths,
and Potter later made special mention of Glenn
Rainey, the young debate coach "whose probing
questions led a good many Southern youths to
reflect for the first time that segregation was
perhaps not a necessary part of the order of na-
ture, like sunrise and sunset" (Potter 1973,
p. 137). Potter entered Yale University as a grad-
uate student in 1932, working first under the
guidance of the noted Southern scholar, Ulrich
B. Phillips, and then, after Phillips' death, under
the intellectual historian Ralph H. Gabriel. His
PH.D. dissertation, completed in 1940 and pub-
lished two years later with the title Lincoln and
His Party in the Secession Crisis, won much
critical acclaim. Potter was promptly appointed
to the Yale history faculty and by 1950 had risen
from an assistant professorship to an endowed
chair.
His second major book, People of Plenty: Eco-
nomic Abundance and the American Character
(1954), in which he used the insights of social
psychology and cultural anthropology to inter-
pret the whole of American history, established
Potter's reputation as a scholar of broad vision
and analytic power. In 1961 he accepted appoint-
ment to a chair in history at Stanford University,
where his principal publications were articles
and essays exploring a variety of historical sub-
jects. Most of these shorter pieces were even-
tually gathered together in two volumes, The
South and the Sectional Conflict (1968) and
History and American Society (1973). Mean-
while, he also continued work on his longest
book, a general study of the coming of the Civil
War. Begun in 1954 and still unfinished when
he died, it appeared in 1976 as The Impending
Crisis, 1848-1861, and was awarded a Pulitzer
Prize.
Potter was also a prolific reviewer, a highly
successful teacher, and a leader in university
affairs. Enjoying the give and take of commit-
tees and conferences, he played an active part
in the work of a number of professional orga-
nizations. At the time of his death he was presi-
dent of the American Historical Association and
646 POTTER, DAVID M.
the Organization of American Historians. To
many persons who knew him, Potter seemed the
very model of a true scholar: urbane, reflective,
critical, open-minded, eloquent, and wise. His
professional reputation, unaccompanied by pop-
ular fame, probably resulted as much from the
personal force of his character as from the qual-
ity and significance of his publications.
The predominant and often interconnected
themes in Potter's writing were the sectional
conflict over slavery, the American national
character, the "enigma" of the South, and the
nature of the historian's craft. As a Southerner,
he was naturally drawn first to the study of the
Civil War era, but in choosing to write his dis-
sertation on Lincoln and the Republican party,
he broke with the Southern perspective and as-
sumed the role of a national historian. Later in
his career, he turned more to Southern history,
having come to regard himself as "no longer a
Southerner" and thus able to view the South
"with detachment, though not without fondness"
(Potter 1968, p. vi). The experience of outgrow-
ing his Southern heritage, while retaining a clear
memory of what it meant to be a Southerner,
may help account for his rare ability to com-
bine sympathy with tough-mindedness and for
his subtle perception of the complexity of the
past.
The writing of People of Plenty was also, in a
sense, an act of self-liberation—this time from
the bounds of conventional history. Yet the book
did not originate in a deliberate decision to be-
come an interdisciplinary scholar. Potter's inter-
est in the problem of national character was
sparked during the 1940s when he was deeply
involved in teaching the introductory course in
American history at Yale, and when world events
were inspiring much new reflection on the na-
ture of American democracy. The people of the
United States, he thought, were much too sure
of the superiority of their national ideals and
should be made aware that nations usually have
"the kind of ideals which they can afford." Free-
dom and democracy were expensive ideals that
Americans had been able to afford because of
the favorable set of "conditions" in which they
lived (Garraty 1970, vol. 2, pp. 315-316). Thus,
in what amounted to a modification and expan-
sion of Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier
hypothesis, Potter developed his thesis that eco-
nomic abundance, deriving not only from the
physical riches of the continent but also from
the cultural factor of technology, "has exercised
a pervasive influence in the shaping of the Amer-
ican character" (Potter 1954, p. 208). As he
wrestled with the problem of defining national
character, Potter found himself relying primarily
upon the work of various behavioral scientists, in-
cluding Karen Homey, Abram Kardiner, Ralph
Lin ton, T. W. Adorno, Margaret Mead, and
David Riesman. Gradually, this preliminary task
assumed greater importance than the theme of
abundance, and his essay on "The Behavioral
Scientists and National Character" grew to be
the longest and perhaps most significant in the
volume.
With its materialistic assumptions and over-
argued thesis, People of Plenty was not Potter's
most representative book, but it revealed the
exciting quality of his mind and earned him
recognition as an authority on the disciplinary
connections between history and the social sci-
ences. Actually, he had little interest in master-
ing the methodology and literature of other disci-
plines but was satisfied merely to use their in-
sights, concepts, and conclusions in his own
enterprises. He remained a conventional his-
torian in his research methods and disapproved
of efforts to force history into the mold of social
science. Historians, he said, were fundamentally
different from social scientists in having to work
largely with heterogeneous instead of homo-
geneous factors. The historian's generalizations
were therefore not conclusions arrived at scien-
tifically but rather more like the judgmental de-
cisions of statesmen.
Appointed in 1956 to the Committee on His-
torical Analysis of the Social Science Research
Council, Potter contributed an essay to the com-
mittee's report, Generalization in the Writing of
History (1963). In it he argued that historians
must recognize and systematically examine the
implicit and often subconscious theoretical as-
sumptions that shape their ostensibly factual
statements about the past. Committee discussion
extending over six years stimulated him to write
also "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and
Vice Versa" (Potter 1968, pp. 34-83). In this,
his best-known essay, he distinguished between
the "psychological" and the "institutional" forms
of nationalism—that is, between the subjective,
collective sense of being one people and the or-
ganized, independent exercise of power over the
population of a defined area. Historians, he said,
are disposed to define the phenomenon in psy-
chological terms, treating it descriptively as one
kind of group loyalty. But the concrete and

overwhelming presence of institutionalized na-
tionalism "does violence to the historian's theory,
for it pulls him in the direction of treating na-
tionality as objective rather than subjective, ab-
solute rather than relative, and total rather than
partial" (ibid., p. 41). As a consequence, nation-
alism is set off against other forms of group
loyalty, and the attribution of nationality be-
comes valuative instead of descriptive. "Indeed,
where the concept of nationality is involved, the
virtue or the evil of a man's act may not be de-
termined by the character of the act itself, nor
even by the motives for which it was executed,
but entirely by the status of the group in whose
behalf it is undertaken. . . . The attribution of
nationality therefore involves a sanction—a sanc-
tion for the exercise of autonomy or self-deter-
mination" (ibid., p. 45). In the second half of his
essay, he then proceeded to demonstrate how
valuative elements in the concept of nationalism
have affected and often "warped" historical writ-
ing about the South and the sectional conflict.
"The Historian's Use of Nationalism" thus em-
braced all of Potter's major thematic interests,
and it was in many ways typical of his scholar-
ship. The essay combined broad conceptualiza-
tion with detailed illustrative analysis of a par-
ticular historical problem. It was professionally
self-conscious. Its tone tended to be cautious in
the reading of evidence and cautionary in ad-
dressing other historians. Furthermore, it re-
flected the author's fascination with the polari-
ties, paradoxes, and dilemmas of history and
historiography. To be faced with an imperative
and difficult choice was, in Potter's view, a
characteristic predicament of man and of the
working historian. In his receptiveness to con-
flicting interpretations and his preference for
uncategorical conclusions, some critics saw evi-
dence of indecisiveness and even moral diffi-
dence. But Potter regarded the integrity of the
past as an ethical matter in itself. There was
POTTER, DAVID M. 647
"public virtue," he insisted, in extending the
range of one's historical understanding beyond
the limits of one's approval; and there was
"moral value" in helping others realize "how cir-
cumstances enhance or limit human potentiali-
ties" (Potter 1968, p. 28; Garraty 1970, vol. 2,
p. 330).
DON E. FEHRENBACHER
WORKS BY POTTER
1942 Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis.
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. —» A paperback edi-
tion with an extensive new preface was published
in 1962.
(1945) 1962 POTTER, DAVID M. (editor) Trail to Cali-
fornia: The Overland Journal of Vincent Geiger and
Wakeman Bryarly. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1954 People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the
American Character. Univ. of Chicago Press. —> A
paperback edition was published in 1968.
1963 Explicit Data and Implicit Assumptions in His-
torical Study. Pages 178-194 in Louis Gottschalk
(editor), Generalization in the Writing of History:
A Report of the Committee on Historical Analysis
of the Social Science Research Council. Univ. of
Chicago Press.
1968 The South and the Sectional Conflict. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press.
1972 The South and the Concurrent Majority. Edited
by Don E. Fehrenbacher and Carl N. Degler. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press.
1973 History and American Society: Essays of David
M. Potter. Edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher. New
York: Oxford Univ. Press. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1975.
1976a Freedom and Its Limitations in American Life.
Edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher. Stanford Univ.
Press. —> Includes a bibliography of Potter's works
compiled by George Harmon Knoles.
1976k The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861. Completed
and edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher. New York:
Harper.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BROGAN, DENIS 1969 David M. Potter. Pages 316-
344 in Marcus Cunliffe and Robin W. Winks (edi-
tors), Pastmasters: Some Essays on American His-
torians. New York: Harper.
GARRATY, JOHN A. 1970 Interpreting American His-
tory: Conversations with Historians. 2 vols. New
York: Macmillan.
 RADZINOWICZ, LEON
Leon Radzinowicz was bom into a well-to-do
family in Lodz, Poland, on August 15, 1906. His
father, a man of property, was also a distin-
guished doctor, the head of a hospital, who led a
cultivated social life. Radzinowicz attended
school in Lodz and from an early age exhibited
an interest in history and languages, and a lack
of skill in mathematics. Immediately upon leav-
ing school he studied at the faculty of law at the
Sorbonne, then at the height of its reputation
with Paul Girard in Roman law, Rene Demogue
in civil law, and Donnedieu de Vabres in crimi-
nal law. During his 12 months in Paris, Rad-
zinowicz read widely in sociology, political
theory, and history, and took a keen interest in
political affairs. He then moved to the University
of Geneva's highly regarded faculty of law
and economic sciences, whose professor of crim-
inal law, Paul Logoz, later became judge of
the Supreme Court of Switzerland. There he
developed an interest in criminology, which was
taught by a rather obscure Yugoslavian Docent.
Radzinowicz read widely in German and French-
Gabriel Tarde, Alexandre Lacassagne, and
Franz von Liszt. Even at that age he refused to
specialize, insisting upon the interdependence
of the social, individual, and legal conceptions of
crime, and taking a catholic interest in all de-
partments of the subject. He taught himself
Italian and, after graduating in 1927 with an
M.A., he decided to study in Rome under Enrico
Ferri, leader of the most advanced and con-
troversial criminological school in the world.
Radzinowicz studied in the faculty of law and
at the famous criminological institute, which
embraced all approaches to the subject: biologi-
cal, psychiatric, sociological, police, penological,
and comparative law. In one year (and in
Italian) at the age of 22, he received his doc-
torate, cum maxima laude. It is not surprising
that he fell under Ferri's spell. Ferri combined a
remarkable personality, presence, and eloquence
with a burning belief in his conception of crime.
His new positivist school was at the time re-
garded—uncritically—as a revelation. It married
the sociological perspective on crime as a prod-
uct of economic inequality (a view fundamental
to Ferri's early and strong socialist beliefs) with
individualistic views of the endogenous nature
of persistent criminality. Radzinowicz embraced
the positivist perspective and policy on the
etiology, prevention, and control of crime, favor-
ing its advocacy of indeterminate sentences, its
concept of the state of danger, and other ele-
ments of the doctrine. His Italian studies were
rounded off with a survey of Italian criminal law
and criminology from Cesare Beccaria to Cesare
Lombroso.
Ferri supported Radzinowicz' return to Ge-
neva, where in 1929 he was made a Docent,
lecturing for two years on positivist criminology.
From there he went to the faculty of law at the
University of Cracow to obtain a doctorate on
problems of penal policy under Vladislav
Wolters.
In 1930 Radzinowicz traveled to Belgium to
study the new experiments in the penitentiaries-
absolute solitary confinement; the introduc-
tion of a biological service to study the person-
ality and to classify prisoners; Merxplas, a spe-
649
650 RADZINOWICZ, LEON
cial institution for young adults; and the new
law of social defense for habitual criminals and
psychopaths. His resulting report was widely
acclaimed as a bold and perceptive account of
these changes. Naturally, for someone so young
and so committed to the positivist cause, en-
thusiasm prevailed over criticism. The work was
presented by Count Carton de Wiart to the
Belgium Academy and Radzinowicz was made
Chevalier de 1'Ordre Leopold. He followed this
with a study of crimes passionel, in which he
challenged the positivist doctrine that these
crimes should not be punished.
Radzinowicz' travels, which took him through-
out Europe, gave him firsthand insight into the
relationship between penal ideas and policy and
the wider political and social environment. He
experienced the France of Leon Blum, the de-
veloping fascism in Italy, and the Weimar Re-
public in Germany. Returning to Poland in
1932, he was appointed assistant professor at
the Free University of Warsaw. The senior pro-
fessor of criminology, Adam Ettinger, had, be-
fore Willem Bonger, attempted to replace posi-
tivism with a Marxist interpretation of crime.
Radzinowicz' approach now became less doc-
trinaire, and although still positivistic in its
assumptions and approaches, concentrated on
methodology rather than on ideological tenets.
Radzinowicz' work now became empirical,
historical, and comparative. He published, in
Polish, works on the principles of penitentiary
science and on the state of crime. When the gov-
ernment stopped the publication of criminal
statistics, he managed to obtain them and pro-
duced important articles on the "Variability of the
Sex Ratio of Criminality" (1937) and on "The
Influence of Economic Conditions on Crime"
(194la), the latter being regarded as a classic
of its kind. His several critical articles on the
crisis of the Polish penal system did not always
endear him to the regime. He continued to
travel, giving public lectures in universities, to
the Societe Generate des Prisons, to the Crimi-
nological Institute of Paris, and to other
audiences.
Radzinowicz' connection with England began
when, as a young student in Geneva, he had
visited London for three months. When, in
1937, he returned to England to prepare a re-
port on English penal policy for the Polish gov-
ernment, he encountered a climate of great opti-
mism. The crime rate was low and serious crime
rare. The reformative theory of punishment was
in the ascendancy and seemed to be vindicated
by the remarkable success of the enlightened
borstal system, by the successful experiments
with open prisons, by the progress made under
the Children and Young Persons Act, and by the
expansion of probation and aftercare. Hopes ran
high that the bulk of recidivism could be cut
off at the roots and that a transformed prison
system could effectively treat and train those
who persisted in crime. The criminal justice bill
introduced in 1938 embodied the idealism of the
times. Radzinowicz spelled out the guiding prin-
ciples: "the avoidance, whenever possible, of
deprivation of liberty, particularly for short
terms. When, however, it is considered useless
or dangerous to release an offender, even under
certain conditions, the detention should be pro-
longed and of such a nature as to provide means
for his re-education and to ensure the better
protection of society" (1945&, p. 32). In a series
of perceptive lectures and papers, later brought
together as his contribution to The Modern Ap-
proach to Criminal Law (1940-1978, vol. 4), he
described and analyzed the trends in sentencing
and in penal thought and practice. He made
plain his view on the scope, purpose, and value
of what he called "criminal science." As in all
his later works, he blended historical with con-
temporary analysis, the abstract principles with
the problems to be faced by political reality, the
quest for a scientific approach with a fervent
adherence to humanity, and liberalism. In an
essay, written with his great friend J. W. C.
Turner, on the meaning and scope of criminal
science, he expounded his belief in the neces-
sary connection between criminology and crimi-
nal policy. For him, the main purpose of all
criminal science was "to ascertain how best to
fight against crime" (Radzinowicz & Turner
1945a, p. 21). At that time he held that crimi-
nological knowledge about the causes of crime
was the only basis for a rational policy: "It is
the function of criminal policy to adopt the
classification of criminals formulated by crimi-
nology and to decide on the appropriate treat-
ment for them" (ibid., p. 23). This necessitated
not only inquiry into the social conditions and
personality types conducive to crime, but the
study of the nature and efficacy of the methods
of punishment and their effects on offenders.
His essays on criminal statistics were eloquent
pleas for a program of research. But throughout
all these essays ran another theme—that crime,
criminal law, and punishment were all inter-
related, and that they could not be studied sep-
arately since they owed their origins to the same

social conditions. To him, the study of crimi-
nology, shorn of the study of law and policy,
was both arid and dangerous, and particularly
dangerous when it ignored the wider questions
of social and political values. Characteristically,
in a lecture in Paris in 1940, he vigorously at-
tacked the criminal policy of Nazi Germany,
not only for its disdain for legality, but also
for being "strikingly anti-humanitarian" (ibid.,
pp. 34-35). Despite his unabashed enthusiasm
for what he saw as the English ability to combine
liberal ideals with social welfare in a "humane
and rational" system, he warned that the ten-
dency toward indeterminate sentences would, if
allowed to go too far, "become an instrument
of social aggression and weaken the basic prin-
ciple of individual liberty" (ibid., p. 167).
He has always insisted that matters of penal
policy, "the systematic study of all the measures
to be taken in the spheres of prevention (direct
and indirect), of legislation, of the enforcement
of the criminal law, of punishments and other
methods of treatment, constitute an indispu-
table and integral part of criminology" and that
"to rob it of this practical function is to divorce
criminology from reality and render it sterile"
(1961o, p. 168).
This deeply held belief underlies Radzinowicz'
distinctive contribution to the development of
criminological studies in England. It is apparent
everywhere in his work: in his monumental his-
torical studies, in the impetus he gave to crimi-
nological teaching and research, in his efforts
to bring practitioners into the academic setting,
in his contributions to government as a power-
ful figure on committees of inquiry, in his inter-
national work at the United Nations and
the Council of Europe.
When World War n broke out, Radzinowicz
was still in England, and he remained to make
it his home. He settled in Cambridge and by
1940 had edited, with J. W. C. Turner, volume
one of English Studies in Criminal Science
(1940-1978), published under the auspices of a
committee set up by the law faculty, under the
chairmanship of Percy Winfield, to consider the
promotion of research and teaching in criminal
science.
His many-faceted career from this point on
may, for purposes of convenience, be divided
into his scholarship, his promotion and direction
of teaching and research, and his role as ad-
viser and stimulant to national and interna-
tional committees and organizations.
From the beginning Leon Radzinowicz was
RADZINOWICZ, LEON 651
fascinated by the peculiar English blend of prin-
ciple and pragmatism in penal matters. He soon
discovered the fascinating sources of the "Blue-
books," the reports of commissions, committees
of inquiries, inspectors, governmental depart-
ments, accounts and papers, returns, statistics,
and the rest, all of which had lain almost un-
touched by historians of criminal law. He em-
barked on a colossal task—one on which he is
still engaged—to trace the developments in En-
glish criminal and penal policy since the middle
of the eighteenth century. It was an extraordi-
nary enterprise for one brought up with neither a
close knowledge of English history and institu-
tions, nor with English as a natural tongue, al-
though with his gift for languages and his feel for
language and idiom this was soon more than
mastered. Volume one of A History of English
Criminal Law and Its Administration from 1750
(1948-1968), The Movement for Reform, was
hailed as a work of outstanding scholarship and
originality. It ensured him a fellowship at Trinity
College, Cambridge, and won him the James
Barr Ames prize of the Harvard Law School. Its
main theme was the place of capital punish-
ment in the enforcement of criminal law. In
tracing the complex movement for the ameliora-
tion of the severity of punishment, it described
the application of the death penalty to a vast
range of offenses in the eighteenth century; the
place of the death penalty in the law of larceny;
its use under the notorious Waltham Black Act;
the attitudes of courts and juries; and the ex-
ercise of the Royal prerogative of mercy. It
vividly portrayed the statutes in operation and
the nature, forms, and customs of execution.
The work is also a history of ideas and currents
of opinion. It analyzes the conflict between the
doctrine of suspended terror or maximum
severity and the doctrines of the liberal enlight-
enment as expounded by Montesquieu and Bec-
caria and taken up in various ways by the
English reformers, William Eden and Samuel
Romilly, and in his own inimitable way, by
Jeremy Bentham. It is also a history of the social
and political movement for reform beginning
with the efforts of Henry Fielding and culminat-
ing in the arduous campaign of Romilly, the
Committee of 1819, and Robert Peel's reforms.
It is this combination of precise history of leg-
islative change, history of ideas, history of social
movements, history of public and political opin-
ion, all informed by a critical analysis of the com-
plex relationship between penal theory, penal
practice, and social and political change, which
652 RADZINOWICZ, LEON
also marks the following three volumes. These
volumes deal with the emergence of public police
out of a system of private initiative founded on
the doctrine of laissez-faire and fear of state
control. In the fourth volume, both the cam-
paigns for reform of capital laws and the es-
tablishment of regular and efficient police are
followed to their culminations in the 1860s.
Radzinowicz brought this historical and com-
parative perspective to bear in all his other
writings. Outstanding among them is his essay
Ideology and Crime (1966), which surveys the
movement of criminological ideas from the clas-
sical liberal perspective through the "determin-
istic" position of the positivist school to what he
called a "pragmatic position" inherent in much
contemporary sociological thought and penal
practice. His latest book, The Growth of Crime
(Radzinowicz & King 1977), surveys, on an in-
ternational scale, the main currents of crime,
criminal law, criminological thought, and dilem-
mas in the administration of criminal justice
and the penal system. None of the optimism of
Radzinowicz' views in the 1940s remains; the
work is a somber assessment of a penal pessi-
mism that in the intervening years, perhaps
paradoxically, had been revealed and generated
partly by criminological thought and research.
As early as 1961 Radzinowicz had sounded a
more cautious note to those who looked to crim-
inological research as a means of discovering
effective and efficient penal tools. His survey of
European and American criminology, published
as In Search of Criminology (196la), persuaded
him that no false hopes should be engendered.
He was by then skeptical that any useful pro-
gress could be made in the search for "causes"
of crime, preferring instead "descriptive analytic
accounts of the state of crime, of various classes
of offenders, of the enforcement of the criminal
law, of the effectiveness of various measures of
treatment, of the working of the penal system—
in a word, of all the matters which come within
the orbit of penal policy and penology. Such
applied research, if well conducted, will not only
increase the social utility of criminology, but
bring a refinement of method and a more exact
perception of the things that matter" (196la,
pp. 177-178). He warned that criminclogy could
not solve the problem of crime, since crime was
an integral part of society, and cautioned that
"the connection between criminological research
and penal reform should not be too dogmatically
insisted upon." Most important, he warned crim-
inologists of the dangers of placing reliance on
narrow expertise: "There are deep-rooted and
far-reaching issues of public morality, of social
expediency, of the subtle but vital balance be-
tween the rights of the individual and the pro-
tection of the community, which underlie de-
cisions of penal policy, and must often override
the conclusions of the experts." The role for
criminology was to give "a new vitality, a better
purpose and an increased effectiveness to the
law and its specific function, which is that of
dispensing criminal justice" (196la, pp. 178—
179).
As Lord Butler pointed out in his contribution
to Crime, Criminology and Public Policy: Essays
in Honour of Sir Leon Radzinowicz (Hood 1974),
Radzinowicz was the obvious choice to be the
first director of the Institute of Criminology es-
tablished in Cambridge in 1959 on the initiative
of the government. The other two leading fig-
ures in British criminology, Hermann Mann-
heim at the London School of Economics and
Max Griinhut at Oxford University, were at the
end of their academic careers. The University
of London was barely lukewarm about establish-
ing such an institute, while Cambridge, where
Radzinowicz was already director of a small
department of criminal science, was enthusias-
tic and determined in its negotiations. With the
establishment of the institute, the Isaac Wolf son
Foundation endowed the first chair of crimi-
nology in England, and Radzinowicz was ap-
pointed the first Wolf son professor. His energy,
determination, persuasiveness, foresight, and in-
sistence on the highest standards ensured the
international reputation of the institute and the
establishment of criminology as an academic
discipline not only in Cambridge but in many
universities in England and overseas.
The institute became a center for teaching
and research. In its early years the program of
research followed the lines of inquiry that
Radzinowicz favored, and was concerned mainly
with charting the nature of crime and assessing
the effects of penal sanctions. Under his guid-
ance the department of criminal science had
already published a survey of sexual crime car-
ried out by F. H. McClintock and F. J. Odgers.
At the institute, McClintock conducted further
investigations into crimes of violence and rob-
bery and surveyed the state of crime in the
country as a whole. Other studies in the vigor-
ous research program carried out by the assis-
tant directors of research included J. P. Martin's
inquiries into the social consequences of con-
viction and the cost of crime; R. F. Spark's sur-

vey and analysis of local prisons and of victims
of crime; A. E. Bottoms and F. H. McClintock's
evaluation of the regime of a borstal institution;
R. G. Hood's studies of borstal and the sen-
tencing of motoring offenders; D. J. West's psy-
chiatrically oriented inquiries into murder and
suicide, and his comprehensive "cohort" study of
the relationship between delinquent behavior and
the personal and social backgrounds of young
Londoners. Some criticized the institute for its
close connections with the Home Office; its con-
centration on empirical research; its overreli-
ance in many studies on official records as a
source of data; and, more generally, its scant
attention to the new sociology of deviance that
appeared in the late 1960s—the so-called label-
ing, interactionist, and radical perspectives. In-
deed, a rival "deviancy symposium" was set up
to redress what were considered to be the con-
servative tendencies in the Cambridge "crimino-
logical establishment." But in reality, the insti-
tute remained independent of the Home Office,
its permanent university posts protecting it from
interference from any grant-giving agency. Yet
its program did remain faithful to Radzinowicz'
view that criminology, especially empirical re-
search, should never divorce itself from the con-
cerns of public policy.
On his world-wide travels Radzinowicz had
been struck above all by the lack of formal teach-
ing in criminology at both undergraduate and
graduate levels, particularly in law schools, and
tried to remedy this oversight. The subject was
introduced into the Cambridge Law Tripos and
soon became one of the most popular options.
Perhaps more important, he established a post-
graduate course leading to the Diploma in Crim-
inology in order "to give a chance to young people
in this country to start to specialise in criminol-
ogy." In fact, it also attracted many good stu-
dents from overseas, including those brought
from Columbia Law School under a highly suc-
cessful exchange scheme. Over the years it has
provided a substantial proportion of scholars
teaching or carrying out research in British uni-
versities as well as in several overseas. But teach-
ing and the exchange of information were not
confined to students planning academic careers.
A senior course in criminology was established
as a biennial seminar for senior practitioners in
various branches of the criminal justice and
penal systems; a biennial national conference
acted as a focus for discussions of both teaching
and research; fellowships were endowed to en-
able practitioners to record and interpret their
RADZINOWICZ, LEON 653
experiences. Priority was given to the establish-
ment of a first class library—now known as the
Radzinowicz Library of the Institute.
And Leon Radzinowicz, himself, branched out
to encourage an interest in criminology in the
law schools of the United States. In 1962 he had
been Walter Meyer research professor at Yale
University and a few years later, when many
others would have been contemplating a quiet
retirement, he vigorously launched a new career
at Columbia Law School, where he was adjunct
professor from 1968 to 1976. In addition, he
lectured at the law schools of the University of
Virginia and Rutgers University, and at the
Center for Criminology of the University of
Pennsylvania, where his close collaboration with
Marvin E. Wolfgang produced the three volume
collection Crime and Justice (1971). In recent
years he has been distinguished visiting pro-
fessor at the University of Minnesota, the Ben-
jamin Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University,
and the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of
the City University of New York. His gift of ex-
position and his unusual personal magnetism
ensured the establishment of criminology where
many feared it could never flourish.
Leon Radzinowicz' conception of the scope and
potential value of criminology naturally led him
to take an active part in public life both in En-
gland and overseas. He was a member of the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment; of
the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offen-
ders; of the Royal Commission on the Penal Sys-
tem, where his resignation was a decisive factor
in causing this ineffective inquiry to be dissolved;
of the Advisory Council on the Penal System,
being particularly influential as chairman of the
subcommittee that rejected Lord Mountbatten's
plans for a British "Alcatraz" in favor of a more
humane environment for long-term dangerous
prisoners. In 1945 he was in charge of the
United Nations section for social defense which
produced important reports on probation and on
international collaboration in criminal science.
He was an important influence in making such
collaboration a reality during his long tenure as
the first chairman of the scientific council of the
division of crime problems established by the
Council of Europe. In 1970, as the first general
rapporteur of a United Nations congress on
crime from outside governmental circles, he
fearlessly delivered a scathing indictment of the
appalling standards of criminal justice and penal
administration still endemic among the member
nations. He inspired collaboration between
 654 RADZINOWICZ, LEON
Scandinavian and English criminologists. In
New York he was called upon by the city Bar
Association and the Ford Foundation to present
a blueprint for an independent institute of crim-
inology, later published as The Need for Crim-
inology (1965k). He traveled not merely to attend
conferences, but as an adviser to governments
and institutes, in an endeavor to promote crim-
inological studies. He aided the establishment
of an independent institute of criminology at
the University of Cape Town; he was adviser to
President Lyndon B. Johnson's Commission on
Violence; he visited South America, the Far East,
Yugoslavia, Australia, and his native Poland.
When Leon Radzinowicz retired from the
Wolf son chair in 1973, a collection of essays
written by colleagues and students under the title
Crime, Criminology and Public Policy (Hood
1974) was published in his honor. He was
knighted in 1970 and in 1973 was elected a
fellow of the British Academy and honorary
foreign member of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences in acknowledgment of a career
that has embraced the best of scholarship,
academic enterprise, and public service.
ROGER HOOD
WORKS BY RADZINOWICZ
1937 Variability of the Sex Ratio of Criminality. So-
ciological Review 29:76-102.
1939a The After Conduct of Convicted Offenders in
England. Canadian Bar Review 17:558-578. —» A
revised article, entitled "The After Conduct of Dis-
charged Offenders," is in Radzinowicz 1940-1978,
vol. 4, pp. 142-161.
1939b The Evolution of the Modern English Prison
System. Modern Law Review 3:121—135. —> A re-
vised article, entitled "English Prison System," is
in Radzinowicz 1940-1978, vol. 4, pp. 123-141.
1939c A Note on Methods of Establishing the Con-
nexion Between Economic Conditions and Crime.
Sociological Review 31:260-280.
1939ci The Persistent Offender. Cambridge Law Jour-
nal 7:68-79. —» A revised article is in Radzinowicz
1940-1978, vol. 4, pp. 162-173.
1939e The Present Trend of English Penal Policy.
Law Quarterly Review 55:273-288. —> A revised
article, entitled "The Assessment of Punishments
by English Courts," is in Radzinowicz 1940-1978,
vol. 4, pp. 110-122.
1940 English Criminal Statistics: A Critical Analysis.
Law Quarterly Review 56:483-503. —> A revised
article is in Radzinowicz 1940-1978, vol. 4,
pp. 174-194.
1940 RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and TURNER, J W. C. The
Language of Criminal Science. Cambridge Law
Journal 7:224-237.
1940-1978 RADZINOWICZ, LEON (editor) Cambridge
Studies in Criminology. 40 vols. Volumes 1-19: Lon-
don: Macmillan; Volumes 20-40: London: Heine-
mann. —* The first seven volumes were edited with
J. W. C. Turner. The first ten volumes were pub-
lished with the series title, English Studies in Crim-
inal Science.
1941 a The Influence of Economic Conditions on
Crime. 2 parts. Sociological Review 33:1-36, 139-
153.
1941fo International Collaboration in Criminal Science.
Law Quarterly Review 58:110-139.
1941 RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and TURNER, J. W. C. Con-
viction and Probation. Canadian Bar Review 19:
500-507.
1942 RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and TURNER, J. W. C. In-
ternational Commission for Penal Reconstruction
and Development. Canadian Bar Review 20:503—
504.
1943 Some Sources of Modern English Criminal
Legislation. Cambridge Law Journal 8:180-194.
1943 RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and TURNER, J. W. C.
A Study on Punishment. Canadian Bar Review 21:
91—101. —•» A revised article, entitled "Punishment:
Outline of Developments Since the 18th Century,"
is in Radzinowicz 1940-1978, vol. 4, pp. 39-50.
1945a Lombroso. Pages 103-108 in The Saturday
Book. London: Hutchison.
1945b Present Trends of English Criminal Policy: An
Attempt at Interpretation. Pages 27-38 in Leon
Radzinowicz and J. W. C. Turner (editors), English
Studies in Criminal Science. Volume 4: The Modern
Approach to Criminal Law. London: Macmillan. —*
See Radzinowicz 1940-1978.
1945c The Waltham Black Act: A Study of the Legis-
lative Attitude Towards Crime in the Eighteenth
Century. Cambridge Law Journal 9:56—81.
1945a RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and TURNER, J. W. C.
The Modern Approach to Criminal Law. London:
Macmillan.
1945b RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and TURNER, J. W. C.
The Social Problem Group. Canadian Bar Review
23:177-181.
1947 An Early Stage in the Movement for the Reform
of Criminal Law. Law Quarterly Review 63:94—
111.
1948-1968 A History of English Criminal Law and
Its Administration From 1750. 4 vols. London:
Stevens. —> Volume 1: The Movement for Reform,
1948. Volume 2: The Clash Between Private Initia-
tive and Public Interest in the Enforcement of the
Law, 1956. Volume 3: Cross-currents in the Move-
ment for the Reform of the Police, 1956. Vol-
ume 4: Grappling for Control, 1968.
1952 The Criminal Justice Act, 1948. Volume 2, pages
405-418 in Studi in memoria di Arturo Rocco.
Milan (Italy): Juffre.
1954 First Steps Towards Government Control Over
Police Before Peel. Law Quarterly Review 70:88—
108.
1956 The Ratcliffe Murders. Cambridge Law Journal
14:39-66.
1957 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen 1829-1894 and
His Contribution to the Development of Criminal
Law. London: Quaritch. —» The Selden Society
lecture.
1959 Changing Attitudes Towards Crime and Punish-
ment. Law Quarterly Review 75:381-400. —» Lec-
ture delivered at the Royal Institute of Great Britain
on February 28, 1958.
1959 ANCEL, MARC; and RADZINOWICZ, LEON (editors)
Introduction au droit criminel de I'Angleterre.
Paris: Les Editions de FEpargne.
1960 Criminal Law, Criminology and Forensic Sci-
ence. Medicine, Science and the Law 1:7—15.
1960 RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and MCCLINTOCK, F. H.
Robbery in London. Economist 197:860-861.
(196la) 1962 In Search of Criminology. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1961b New Departures in Maintaining Public Order

in the Face of Chartist Disturbances. Cambridge
Law Journal 18:51-88.
1961c Public Opinion and Crime. Medicine, Science
and the Law. 2, no. 1:24-32.
1961d The Study of Criminology in Cambridge.
Medico-legal Journal 29:122-133.
1963a Introduction. In Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
English Prisons Under Local Government. London:
Cass.
1963b Report on Problems of Administration and
Organisation of Criminological Research. Unpub-
lished manuscript. —» Given to the first European
conference of directors of criminological research
institutes in Strasbourg, December 9—12, 1963.
Mimeo DPC/CDIR (64), pp. 5-26.
1964a Cesare Beccaria and the English System of
Criminal Justice: A Reciprocal Relationship. Pages
57—66 in Estratto dagli atti del Convegno Inter-
nazionale su Cesare Beccaria. Turin (Italy): Ven-
cenzo Bona.
1964fc The Criminal in Society. Journal of the Royal
Society of Arts 112:916-929. —» The Peter le Neve
Foster lecture.
1964c Criminology and the Climate of Social Re-
sponsibility. Cambridge: Heffer. —> An address to
the Howard League for Penal Reform, May 7, 1964.
1964d Sentencing Policy in Criminal Cases. The
(London) Times, May 30, 1964.
1965a Ideology and Crime: The Deterministic Posi-
tion. Columbia Law Review 65:1047-1060.
1965b The Need for Criminology. London: Heine-
mann.
1966 Ideology and Crime. London: Heinemann; New
York: Columbia Univ. Press.
1968a The Dangerous Offender. Police Journal 41:
411-447. —> The Frank Newsam Memorial lecture,
given at the Police College, Bramshill, August 1,
1968.
1968& Economic Conditions and Crime. Unpublished
manuscript. —» Presented to the National Com-
mission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.
Reprinted as "Economic Pressures" in Radzinowicz
& Wolfgang 1971, vol. 1, pp. 420-442.
1968c Impressment Into the Army and the Navy: A
Rough and Ready Instrument of Preventive Police
and Criminal Justice. Pages 287-313 in Marvin E.
Wolfgang (editor), Crime and Culture: Essays in
Honor of Thorsten Sellin. New York: Wiley.
1969 Hanging: Has Abolition Worked? Sunday Times,
September 21, 1969.
1971a A Foreseeable Failure. Sunday Times, January
24, 1971.
1971t> The Police: Is the Get-tough School Right?
Sunday Times, August 19, 1971.
1971c Some Current Problems and Future Pros-
pects of International Collaboration in Penal
Matters. Pages 387-406 in J. P. Buhl et al. (edi-
tors), Liber amicorum in honour of Professor
Stephen Hurwitz LL.D. Copenhagen: Juristfor-
bundets Forlag.
1971d The Vision of Ramsey Clark. Virginia Quar-
terly Review 71:459-464.
(1971) 1977 RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and WOLFGANG,
MARVIN E. (editors) Crime and Justice. 3 vols.
Rev. ed. New York: Basic Books. —» Volume 1:
The Criminal in Society. Volume 2: The Criminal
in the Arms of the Law. Volume 3: The Criminal
in Confinement.
1972a The Criminal Law Explosion: Can It Be Con-
trolled? Columbia Journal of Law and Social Prob-
lems 9:88-130.
1972fo Them and Us. Cambridge Law Journal 30:
260-279. —» A lecture given under the auspices of
RHINE, J. B. 655
the New Bridge at the Mansion House, April 26,
1972.
1976 RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and HOOD, ROGER Crimi-
nology and the Administration of Criminal Justice:
A Bibliography. London: Mansell.
1977 RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and KING, J. F. S. The
Growth of Crime: The International Experience.
London: Hamish Hamilton; New York: Basic Books.
1978 RADZINOWICZ, LEON; and HOOD, ROGER An
English Attempt to Reshape the Sentencing Struc-
ture. Columbia Law Review 78:1145-1158.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
HOOD, ROGER (editor) (1974) 1975 Crime, Criminol-
ogy and Public Policy: Essays in Honour of Sir
Leon Radzinowicz. New York: Free Press.
RHINE, J. B.
J(oseph) B(anks) Rhine, born in 1895, is the
man who transformed psychical research into
modern parapsychology, and made ESP (extra-
sensory perception) a household term. His ca-
reer spans more than fifty years of research,
writing, and administration, directed toward es-
tablishing parapsychology as an experimental
science.
Rhine and his wife, Louisa E. Rhine, whose
work paralleled and furthered his own, were
botanists who received their doctorates in bi-
ology from the University of Chicago. Rhine
taught plant physiology both before and after
he received his PH.D. in 1925, but his thinking
turned increasingly toward broader issues of
the nature of life, especially the questions of
whether mental activity transcended physical
laws and whether the mind could survive death.
The heritage of the Darwinian revolution made
him hope that scientific inquiry could resolve
these questions, but investigating them would
require him to leave biology for psychical re-
search. Although the Rhines were idealistically
willing to sacrifice security for work they
thought important, they first consulted three
eminent men involved with psychical research:
one vitriolic critic of it, Joseph Jastrow, and
two proponents, Gardner Murphy and William
McDougall.
McDougall's advice determined Rhine's ca-
reer, though it was given only in a hurried inter-
view as McDougall began a one-year leave from
chairing the department of psychology at Har-
vard University. Rhine, in 1926, studied psy-
chology and philosophy at Harvard and worked
with Walter Franklin Prince, former research
officer of the American Society for Psychical Re-
search, primarily in helping to uncover medium-
656 RHINE, J. B.
istic fraud. In 1927 McDougall (who now was
chairman of the psychology department at Duke
University) accepted Rhine as an honorary grad-
uate fellow there. In 1928 Rhine became an in-
structor in psychology and philosophy at Duke,
but his work centered increasingly in parapsy-
chology. After a few years he withdrew from offi-
cial ties with philosophy, and by 1950 gave up his
professorship in psychology to assume the full-
time directorship of the Parapsychology Labora-
tory. He retired as professor emeritus in 1965 and
transferred the laboratory's functions to the
Foundation for Research on the Nature of Man,
whose chief publication for research was the
Journal of Parapsychology, founded in 1937
with McDougall and Rhine as editors.
Rhine's first major contribution was to
standardize an experimental method of investi-
gating "telepathy." Anecdotal evidence for tele-
pathy was challengingly persuasive but method-
ologically weak, since even well-authenticated
cases might be only coincidental. Rhine de-
manded an objective baseline to assess coinci-
dence, as in earlier experiments in which sub-
jects guessed playing cards or colors. But earlier
methods had two difficulties. One was that sub-
jects grew discouraged when odds against
chance were long, as with 1 -. 52 for cards, while
with short odds, subjects grew impatient at the
many guesses needed for evaluation. Rhine de-
cided on odds of 1:5 as an appropriate compro-
mise. The second difficulty was that subjects'
preferences for certain targets or sequences
might distort their guesses. Rhine developed
targets that elicited minimum response bias.
Modifying the suggestion of a colleague, Karl
Zener, he introduced what became known as
ESP cards: circle, square, star, cross, and
waves.
His initial procedure was to shuffle a deck of
25 of these symbols, look at the first, ask a sub-
ject to guess it, and continue playfully but
challengingly. Several subjects had extraordi-
narily high average scores over thousands of
guesses, and also showed meaningful declines
with boredom or lessened motivation, but up-
swings with a new challenge. Rhine and his
students soon introduced variations, both to
tighten the controls and to study the limits of
success. They found no limits then or later.
Scores stayed high even with cards 250 miles
from the subject or when no one looked at the
cards. This latter was not telepathy, but clair-
voyant response to the concealed symbols,
and they realized that clairvoyance could ac-
count for the apparent telepathy data. Rhine
coined the term ESP as a noncommittal designa-
tion for his findings.
After the publication of his first book, Extra-
sensory Perception (1934), he was immediately
embroiled in controversy. Initially, as in 1938,
when a meeting of the American Psychological
Association discussed his work, arguments cen-
tered on possible methodological flaws. Rhine
took them as constructive criticisms and
changed his methods to eliminate the flaws.
With double blind techniques, a prestated num-
ber of items per series, careful target random-
ization, etc., research from his laboratory be-
came so rigorous that intelligent criticism
ceased. Even then, however, some who would
not accept his conclusions continued to attack
him. They suggested that data contradicting
conventional theories were necessarily wrong;
that statistical analyses were useless; that repli-
cations were insufficient. Later, when indepen-
dent replications grew impressive, they disre-
garded the body of careful laboratory research
and denigrated Rhine's findings because stage
or amateur magicians used fraud.
Others responded favorably to the careful
technical reports or to Rhine's stream of persua-
sive popular writings. His frequent lectures con-
veyed his care in controlling conditions and his
caution in interpreting preliminary findings.
These, plus the revolutionary impact of his
replicated findings, encouraged young scholars
to work with him, and other laboratories began
to do similar work.
In 1943 the Rhines described a second major
methodological innovation: an objective way of
assessing PK (psychokinesis), the influence of
mental activity on physical processes. The
method, as it later became refined, was to re-
lease dice mechanically while subjects hoped
for a particular face. To control for dice bias,
subjects hoped equal numbers of times (ordi-
narily 24) for each face. Results showed over-
all success beyond chance expectation and also
an even stronger internal pattern: successes
clustered significantly at the beginning of each
new page of 24 calls for a single face, then
dwindled progressively. This decline in score
with boring repetition, and upswing with
novelty, was like the declines repeatedly ob-
served in ESP tests and of course in more con-
ventional tasks. It supported the thesis that PK
represented mental activity.
After the Rhines introduced their procedure,
others invented variants—e.g., the placement

technique whereby subjects hope that objects
released at a medial line will fall left or right,
and the method most in use in the 1970s,
whereby subjects hope that radioactive emis-
sions will slow down or speed up, and a ma-
chine registers output. PK effects were repeat-
edly confirmed.
Further research from the Duke laboratory
examined precognition (extrachance effects
when targets are randomly selected in the fu-
ture). Results were as high as for clairvoyance.
Other experiments attempted to study "pure
telepathy": an experimenter mentally translated
randomized digits into arbitrarily chosen ESP
symbols but never wrote or spoke those symbols.
Although subjects succeeded in guessing the
symbols, Rhine considered the method un-
satisfactory because it could not eliminate clair-
voyance of the experimenter's brain processes.
Gradually research emphasis shifted, in
Rhine's laboratory and others, from demon-
strating extrachance effects to examining the
conditions that influence success. Many were
found: attitude toward the task, mood, target
preference, drug intake, etc.—and especially the
subject—experimenter relationship, which so
often is a modulating variable. Independent
replications with varied techniques have sup-
ported the earlier findings and begun to flesh
out the information.
Rhine's mature conclusions (1977a; 1977b)
are, briefly, that ESP and PK are mental abili-
ties, distinctively different from all known physi-
cal processes because they are uninfluenced by
physical screening, spatial distance, or time.
They cannot be consciously controlled. Their ef-
fectiveness, like that of other unconscious
processes, depends largely on motivation, and
especially on the subject-experimenter relation-
ship. Rhine has relinquished his hopes for
studying telepathy because no technique dis-
tinguishes it from clairvoyance. Similarly, he
thinks research on survival and on mind-body
separation should be shelved, because evidence
for either can be reduced to ESP or PK. Since
ESP and PK vary with psychological processes,
psychologists are welcome to study them; since
they vary with physiological factors like drug
intake, biologists are welcome; since, eventu-
ally, general laws to include these phenomena
may be discovered, physicists are welcome. But
because ESP and PK are distinctive they con-
stitute a separate science, parapsychology.
To further parapsychology, Rhine in 1957 or-
ganized the Parapsychological Association, an
RHINE, J. B. 657
international professional society that in 1969
became affiliated with the American Association
for the Advancement of Science. Its annual con-
ventions include dozens of research reports, yet
after twenty years its full members number
barely more than one hundred. Funding is
meager; estimates of full-time parapsychology
positions range around twenty; and few who
enter the field are able to stay in it. Although
more than seventy colleges offer parapsychology
courses, most are taught by nonspecialists.
Rhine's work nevertheless has had substan-
tial impact. Psychical research has become an
experimental science and variants of his meth-
ods its norms. His detailed conclusions are con-
troversial, but his basic contentions—that ESP
and PK do occur—are well supported. Popular
acceptance of ESP is widespread, though, un-
fortunately, occult claims are sometimes con-
founded with laboratory findings. Within the
scientific community, the dualistic implications
of Rhine's thesis arouse emotional resistance,
and outdated criticisms from the 1930s are still
cited to justify disregard of them. But the few
scientists who examine contemporary research
tend to treat parapsychology with increasing
respect, as a topic that deserves further investi-
gation, or as a field that is already well estab-
lished.
GERTRUDE R. SCHMEIDLER
"WORKS BY RHINE
(1934) 1935 Extra-sensory Perception. 2d ed. Boston:
Humphries.
(1937) 1972 New Frontiers of the Mind. Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood.
(1940) 1967 RHINE, J. B. ; PRATT, J. G.; SMITH,
BURKE M.; STUART, CHARLES E.; and GREENWOOD,
JOSEPH A. Extrasensory Perception After Sixty
Years. Boston: Humphries.
1943 RHINE, J. B.; and RHINE, L. E. The Psycho-
kinetic Effect. I: The First Experiment. Journal of
Parapsychology 7:20-43.
1947 The Reach of the Mind. New York: William
Sloane Associates.
1953 New World of the Mind. New York: William
Sloane Associates. —» A paperback edition was pub-
lished by Morrow in 1971.
1957 RHINE, J. B.; and PRATT, J. G. Parapsychology:
Frontier Science of the Mind. Springfield, 111.:
Thomas.
1968 RHINE, J. B.; and BRIER, R. (editors) Parapsy-
chology Today. New York: Citadel.
1971 RHINE, J. B. (editor) Progress in Parapsychol-
ogy. Durham, N.C.: Parapsychology Press.
1977a Extrasensory Perception. Pages 163-174 in Ben-
jamin B. Wolman (editor), Handbook of Parapsy-
chology. New York: Van Nostrand.
I977b History of Experimental Studies. Pages 25-47
in Benjamin B. Wolman (editor), Handbook of
Parapsychology. New York: Van Nostrand.
658 RICHARDS, AUDREY I.
RICHARDS, AUDREY I.
Audrey I. Richards, an English social anthro-
pologist who was born in 1899 and spent her
early childhood in India, brought a vivid sense
of the ethnographic present to the understand-
ing of hierarchic, authoritarian societies in
south and east Africa. Her career was not nar-
rowly academic. Indeed, it might be said that it
was her wider, personal experience of the higher
echelons of public administration, both govern-
ment and academic, which gave such a ring of
authenticity to her descriptions of the political
culture of palace politics, elitist councils, and
colonialism among the Bemba of Zambia (I960;
1969; 1971) and the Ganda of Uganda (1964;
1969). Trained initially in biology, she main-
tained a lifetime interest in interdisciplinary
work. She deliberately addressed her own work
to administrators and the general public as well
as to sociologists, and she led teams of field-
workers in interdisciplinary and applied re-
search, first as director of the Institute of Social
Research in East Africa from 1950 to 1956, and
later as founder of the African Studies Centre
in Cambridge, where she was Smuts reader
from 1962 until her retirement in 1967. Much
of her early research was done, she later ex-
plained, in "The Colonial Office and the Organi-
zation of Social Research" (1977), at a time
when "the Colonial Office and the colonial gov-
ernments made little use of anthropologists,
viewed them with some suspicion and starved
them of finance" (p. 187). During the early part
of World War n, she worked to change this
attitude and to get finance for field research by
social scientists, when she became a principal
in the British Colonial Office and secretary of
the Colonial Social Science Research Council.
Even after her retirement, she never lost her
zest for field work, and continued to study an
English village.
Richards was one of Bronislaw Malinowski's
first students at the London School of Economics,
along with E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Raymond
Firth, Isaac Schapera, and Hortense Powder-
maker. With them and some of their immediate
successors, Meyer Fortes, S. F. Nadel, Godfrey
Wilson, and later Phyllis Kaberry, she carried
forward the debates that transformed function-
alism as a method and approach in anthropol-
ogy, After Malinowski's death, she recalled that
he had tended to regard his students, at least un-
til they broke openly with him—which Richards
never did—"rather as a team engaged on a joint
battle than as a number of individuals with
different interests and needs. . . . Students
worked at any problem in which he was at the
moment intensely absorbed" (Richards 1943,
p. 3). His influence was naturally most immedi-
ate and evident in her first work, but it remained
fundamental throughout, and she was always a
Malinowskian anthropologist. Thus, his Sex and
Repression in Savage Society (1927; see also
Malinowski 1929) led to her Hunger and Work
in a Savage Tribe (1932, based on her PH.D.
thesis [1931]). The shift in focus was from sex
to food, from reproduction to production, but
their functional methods were parallel: teacher
and student alike stressed "primary social wants"
and the satisfaction of biologically based "cul-
tural needs." Again, following his Coral Gardens
and Their Magic (1935), she wrote, about the
Bemba, Land, Labour and Diet in Northern
Rhodesia (1939). In this monumental work,
which she continued in the brief monographs
on marriage, fertility, and female initiation ritual,
Bemba Marriage and Modern Economic Condi-
tions (1940) and Chisungu (1956), she adhered
to the view of tribal life as an integrated whole:
major change and the threat to integration came
from outside. Her functional system, if more
changeable than Malinowski's initial one, was
still a total system and had to be described com-
prehensively. This meant including agricultural
activities along with as many correlated aspects
of culture as possible. The result was the first
major anthropological study in Africa of re-
ciprocal food sharing and underproduction in a
redistributive economy undergoing rapid change
as a result largely of sharply increased labor
migration from the countryside to towns.
For a period after the early 1940s her ap-
proach became somewhat unfashionable in Brit-
ish social anthropology. There was a reaction
against description that left institutions, as a
leading critic put it, "overloaded with reality"
(Gluckman [1947] 1963, p. 226). The call was
for greater abstraction from the total cultural
context, for the dissection of institutions into
smaller units more susceptible to comparative
analysis. In "A Problem of Anthropological Ap-
proach" (1941), Richards anticipated the re-
action and raised objections to it that were to
be rediscovered, as if for the first time, in a
counterreaction decades later. The initial break-
through was made by Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer
(1940), and, fittingly enough, Richards put her
objections in a deeply considered review article
about it. Doubting the validity of a "rigid re-

striction of generalisation to the problem of so-
cial structure alone," she insisted on the rele-
vance of various kinds of cultural data to the very
problems Evans-Pritchard posed (1941, p. 49).
She rejected the sharp distinction between do-
mestic and political systems which, until the
counterreaction, became an axiom in much so-
cial anthropology: "The two systems seem to me
to grow one out of the other, and in the dynam-
ics of a social situation constantly to overlap"
(ibid., p. 51). She criticized the utility of Evans-
Pritchard's basic model, with its "segment simile"
that conveyed "a more equal and logical division
into sub-groups than actually occurs" (ibid.,
p. 47). She based her objections on her experi-
ence of societies with great inequalities in status
and variability in organization, according to a
"number of different principles of grouping such
as age, local attachment, rank etc., each with
its own ideology culturally defined. These prin-
ciples may reinforce each other, exist side by
side, or even come in conflict with each other"
(ibid., p. 51). Her contention was that the
segmentary model was static and could not cope
with history and with change in the relationship
between these principles over time.
Richards became a regional specialist par ex-
cellence. Among anthropologists the most sig-
nificant others she considered, repeatedly, be-
sides her fellow students of Malinowski, were the
Africanists, especially Monica Wilson, Max
Gluckman, and Hilda Kuper. An apparent ex-
ception was Gregory Bateson, of whose decoding
of the symbolic functions of transvestism in
New Guinea (1936) she wrote "rather sardoni-
cally" (Firth 1973, p. 183). Hers was, in effect,
a backwards translation into Bateson's views
from those of an Africanist. She equated the
quite different, if historically linked, views of
Bateson and Gluckman with an admittedly
"crude" version of unconscious compensation as
an explanation of role reversal in ritual (1956,
pp. 119, 154). As a consequence, Richards' own
explication in Chisungu of the sequential pat-
terns in the ritualization of sex roles suffered a
lack of fully systematic decoding.
Her method demanded the highest standard
of field work. This she sustained among the
Bemba, though less so among the Ganda. In her
Bemba studies, above all, she counterbalanced,
quite rigorously, informants' accounts of what
was and ought to be, according to traditional
dogma and values, with close and long-term ob-
servation of what recognizable individuals ac-
tually did. Among the Ganda, she became too
RICHARDS, AUDREY I. 659
involved in large-scale statistical surveys that
were no match for the quality of her own first-
hand observation, and the administrative duties
of her institute left her little time for anything
else. Hence, the books she edited or wrote about
Uganda, Economic Development and Tribal
Change (1954), The Changing Structure of a
Ganda Village (1966), Subsistence to Com-
mercial Farming in Present-day Buganda (Rich-
ards et al. 1973), had less of her earlier rigor,
though they did give much detailed and insight-
ful information on changes in labor migration
and land tenure with the introduction of indi-
vidual freehold.
The wider breadth of her influence is reflected
in the two books of essays in her honor. The
first (Schneider & Gough 1961) took up the
comparison of matrilineal kinship structures
that she had pioneered in her taxonomy of the
central Bantu (1950)—an approach which had
evoked Edmund Leach's backhanded compli-
ment and sharp condemnation that it was Rad-
cliffe-Brownian and tautological (1961, p. 4).
The second (La Fontaine 1972) was a tribute to
her argument, most explicit in Chisungu and
much indebted to Malinowski's "Baloma: The
Spirits of the Dead in the Trobriand Islands"
(1916), that symbolic behavior, by its very na-
ture, is multiple in significance (Malinowski's
"orthodox," "popular," and "individual" inter-
pretations [1916, p. 429]), and must be the
subject of multiple explanations, with a view
to variation in sentiments, emotions, and values.
RICHARD P. WERBNER
WORKS BY RICHARDS
1932 Hunger and Work in a Savage Tribe: A Func-
tional Study of Nutrition Among the Southern
Bantu. London: Routledge. —» A paperback edition
was published in 1964 by World Books.
(1939) 1961 Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rho-
desia: An Economic Study of the Bemba Tribe. 2d ed.
Published for the International Institute of Afri-
can Languages and Cultures. Oxford Univ. Press. —>
Includes a new foreword and bibliography.
1940 Bemba Marriage and Modern Economic Condi-
tions. Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No. 4. Livingstone
(Zambia): Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.
1941 A Problem of Anthropological Approach. Bantu
Studies 15:45-52.
1943 Bronislaw Kaspar Malinowski. Man 43:1-4.
1950 Some Types of Family Structure Amongst the
Central Bantu. Pages 207-251 in A. R. Radcliffe-
Brown and Daryll Forde (editors), African Systems
of Kinship and Marriage. Published for the Inter-
national African Institute. Oxford Univ. Press.
(1954) 1973 RICHARDS, AUDREY I. (editor) Economic
Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immi-
grant Labour in Buganda. Rev. ed. Published for the
East African Institute of Social Research. Nairobi:
Oxford Univ. Press.
 660 ROBBINS, LIONEL
1956 Chisungu: A Girl's Initiation Ceremony Among
the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia. London: Faber;
New York: Grove.
1960 Social Mechanisms for the Transfer of Political
Rights in Some African Tribes. Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ire-
land 90, part 2:175-190.
1961 African Kings and Their Royal Relatives. Journal
of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great
Britain and Ireland 91, part 2:135-150.
1964 Traditional Values and Current Political Be-
haviour. Pages 294-335 in Lloyd A. Fallers (editor),
The King's Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda
on the Eve of Independence. Published for the East
African Institute of Social Research. Nairobi: Ox-
ford Univ. Press.
1966 The Changing Structure of a Ganda Village:
Kisozi, 1892-1952. Published for the East African
Institute. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
1969 Keeping the King Divine. Royal Anthropological
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Proceedings
1968:23-35.
1971 The Conciliar System of the Bemba of Northern
Zambia. Pages 100-129 in Audrey I. Richards and
Adam Kuper (editors), Councils in Action. Cam-
bridge Univ. Press.
1973 RICHARDS, AUDREY I.; STURROCK, FORD; and
FORTT, JEAN M. (editors) Subsistence to Commercial
Farming in Present-day Buganda: An Economic and
Anthropological Survey. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1977 The Colonial Office and the Organization of So-
cial Research. Anthropological Forum 4:168-189.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BATESON, GREGORY (1936) 1958 Naven: A Survey of
the Problems Suggested by a Composite Picture of
the Culture of a New Guinea Tribe Drawn From
Three Points of View. 2d ed. Stanford Univ. Press.
—> Includes an epilogue.
EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. (1940) 1963 The Nuer: A
Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political
Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Clarendon.
—* A paperback edition was published in 1968 by
Oxford Univ. Press.
FIRTH, RAYMOND 1973 Symbols: Public and Private.
London: Allen & Unwin; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press. —» A paperback edition was published in 1975
by Cornell University Press.
FIRTH, RAYMOND 1975 An Appraisal of Modern So-
cial Anthropology. Volume 4, pages 1-26 in Bernard
J. Siegel et al. (editors), Annual Review of Anthro-
pology. Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews.
GLUCKMAN, MAX 1945 How the Bemba Make Their
Living: An Appreciation of Richards' Land, Labour
and Diet in Northern Rhodesia. Rhodes- Livingstone
Institute, Journal 3:55—75. —> Reprinted by Bobbs-
Merrill in 1963.
GLUCKMAN, MAX 1947 Malinowski's "Functional" An-
alysis of Social Change. Africa. 17:103-121.-H»
Quotes in the text are from the reprint on pages
207—234 in Max Gluckman, Order and Rebellion in
Tribal Africa, published by Cohen & West in London
in 1963.
LA FONTAINE, J. S. (editor) 1972 The Interpretation
of Ritual: Essays in Honour of A. I. Richards. Lon-
don : Tavistock. —» A bibliography of the principal
writings of Richards, prepared by P. H. Gulliver, is
on pages 285-289.
LEACH, EDMUND R. 1961 Rethinking Anthropology.
London School of Economics and Political Sci-
ence, Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 22.
London: Athlone Press. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1968.
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW 1916 Baloma: The Spirits
of the Dead in the Trobriand Islands. Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and
Ireland 46:353-430.
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1927) 1953 Sex and Re-
pression in Savage Society. London: Routledge; New
York: Harcourt. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished by Meridian in 1955.
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW 1929 The Sexual Life of
Savages in North-western Melanesia: An Ethno-
graphic Account of Courtship, Marriage, and Family
Life Among the Natives of the Trobriand Islands,
British New Guinea. London: Routledge. —» A paper-
back edition was published by Harcourt in 1962.
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1935) 1965 Coral Gar-
dens and Their Magic. 2 vols. Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press. —•> A paperback edition was published
in 1978 by Dover.
SCHNEIDER, DAVID M.; and GOUGH, KATHLEEN (editors)
1961 Matrilineal Kinship. Berkeley: Univ. of Cal-
ifornia Press. —^ A paperback edition was published
in 1974.
WERBNER, RICHARD P. 1969 Constitutional Ambigui-
ties and the British Administration of Royal Careers
Among the Bemba of Zambia. Pages 245-281 in
Laura Nader (editor), Law and Culture in Society.
Chicago: Aldine.
ROBBINS, LIONEL
Lionel Charles Robbins, born in 1898 and
created a baron in 1959, entered the London
School of Economics (L.S.E.) in 1920 after ser-
vice in World War I. Apart from short interludes
in Oxford (1924-1925 and 1927-1929) and the
years of World War n, he has been associated
with that institution as, successively, under-
graduate (1920-1923), research assistant (1923/
1924), lecturer (1925-1927), professor of eco-
nomics (1929-1961), honorary lecturer (1961—),
and chairman of the Board of Governors (1968-
1974).
When Robbins first studied economics after
World War i, the subject, in Britain at least,
was in a slump. Although important work was
going on, the 1920s may be seen as a lull before
the storm of the great depression and the en-
suing upheavals. At the L.S.E., Robbins' teacher
was Edwin Cannan, who represented a healthy
common-sense approach, deepened by a critical,
scholarly study of the history of economic
thought, particularly the English classical econ-
omists. But in Britain generally the subject was
dominated by the somewhat blinkered orthodoxy
of the school of Alfred Marshall, and though
Cannan was critical of Marshall he hardly
managed or sought to establish alternative
theoretical ideas.
From an early stage Robbins sought to break

out from these narrow intellectual horizons. Be-
ginning with Cassel's Theory of Social Economy
(1918) he went on to explore the leading recent
and contemporary American and European
writers. Important influences were those of
Philip H. Wicksteed, a kind of London prede-
cessor, and of the Austrian school, especially
Ludwig von Mises. Robbins' early articles are
critical of Marshall and introduced such Aus-
trian ideas as opportunity cost—as against Mar-
shallian "real" cost. Much of Robbins' intellec-
tual development at this time is reflected in his
introductions to new editions of Wicksteed's
The Common Sense of Political Economy
([1910] 1950), and of Knut Wicksell's Lectures
on Political Economy ([1901-1906] 1935-1951).
Although his choice of influences may be criti-
cized, Robbins helped powerfully in dispelling a
certain parochialism that had descended on the
subject in England, opening up, in the 1930s,
alternative intellectual vistas. If, as has been
suggested, a "neoclassical synthesis" emerged in
orthodox economics in the second or third
quarter of the twentieth century, then, so far as
England is concerned, the early work of Rob-
bins played a significant part in the process.
The intellectual influences outlined above
were apparent in Robbins' first major work An
Essay on the Nature and Significance of Eco-
nomic Science (1932). The essay opens with a
discussion of the definition of the subject mat-
ter of "Economic Science." Robbins argues
against definitions like those maintained by
Cannan and Marshall, in terms of material
wealth and "the ordinary business of life," pro-
posing, rather, scarcity as the central, organiz-
ing concept of economics in his much-quoted
definition: "Economics is the science which
studies human behaviour as a relationship be-
tween ends and scarce means which have al-
ternative uses" ([1932] 1935, p. 16). A second
theme of the Essay, which follows Max Weber's
defense of Wertfreiheit, is a sharp distinction
between ends and means, and between ethical
or normative propositions regarding what ought
to be and positive propositions about what is or
what follows what. Robbins criticized especially
the ambiguous concept of economic welfare as
involving invalid interpersonal comparisons of
utility. He was later misrepresented as having
attempted to exclude or limit the discussion and
advocacy of policies by economists. A third fea-
ture of Robbins' Essay was his analysis of the
nature of economic generalizations (chapters 4; 5).
Here the influences of von Mises and
ROBBINS, LIONEL 661
other Austrians, together with that of later En-
glish classical economists, such as J. E. Cairnes,
are very apparent. Robbins seemed to assert that
significant, nonempty economic theories could
be based on postulates that were beyond dispute
and testing: "These are not postulates the exis-
tence of whose counterpart in reality admits of
extensive dispute once their nature is fully
realized" (p. 79). Moreover, such economic
postulates provided a sounder base than that
available for the natural sciences: with regard
to economic generalizations, "there is less rea-
son to doubt their real bearing than that of the
generalisations of the natural sciences" (p. 105).
Robbins' Essay on the Nature and Signi-
ficance of Economic Science has remained much
his best-known and most-quoted book, in spite,
or because of, its controversial features. Notwith-
standing his insistence on distinguishing be-
tween the normative and positive elements in
economic advice, there was much in Robbins'
Essay that economists would have found ap-
pealing—for example, his claims that "Economic
Science" could contain "a body of generalisa-
tions whose substantial accuracy and impor-
tance are open to question only by the ignorant
or the perverse" (p. 1), while its methods "may
be regarded as settled as between reasonable
people" (p. 72).
After the second edition of his Essay (1935),
Robbins did not return at length to the contro-
versial questions it had raised, and after World
War ii his writings were concerned largely with
economic policy and the history of economic
thought. On economic policy one of his earliest
and most controversial contributions came in
1930, with the onset of the great depression,
when he was invited by John Maynard Keynes
to join a five-man committee of the Economic
Advisory Council set up to propose remedies for
unemployment, which was approaching twenty
per cent in Britain. Robbins, influenced by the
Austrian theory of the business cycle, found
himself in a minority of one in opposing the
expansionist policies advocated by Keynes,
Arthur C. Pigou, and the others. However, he
subsequently came to regard his views at this
time as mistaken, and in the later 1930s and
during World War n, moved in favor of mod-
erate Keynesian policies. As director of the Eco-
nomic Section of the Offices of the War Cabinet,
he contributed to the White Paper of 1944,
which is usually taken to mark a turning point
in Britain in laying down the duty for govern-
ments of maintaining "a high and stable level
662 ROBBINS, LIONEL
of employment." In the postwar world he stood
for the multilateral principles of the Bretton
Woods agreements, which he, with Keynes, had
assisted in negotiating. But he was critical of
many of the trends and underlying ideas of
British economic policies in the 1950s and
1960s, such as the abandonment of monetary
policy. He also warned against the risks in-
volved in trying to push employment and growth
up to too high levels. Robbins contributed nota-
bly to the discussion of the broader principles of
economic policy in The Economic Problem in
Peace and War (1947), and in his lecture "Free-
dom and Order" (1955), which presents a
balanced survey of the economic functions of
government in a free society as including "the
maintenance of aggregate demand," but exclud-
ing redistribution beyond "mitigations of in-
equality in the interests of greater freedom."
Much of Robbins' later writings have been
devoted to the history of economic thought. Al-
though his earlier essays in this field, in the
1930s, had been mainly concerned with the neo-
classical economists, he later came to concen-
trate on the English classical economists.
Probably his best-known work on the history of
thought is The Theory of Economic Policy in
English Classical Political Economy (1952), the
main theme of which is a defense of the classi-
cal economists (defined to include Hume and
Bentham) against the charge that they advo-
cated laissez-faire. Robbins' argument was illus-
trated by many telling quotations but was per-
haps too comprehensive in seeking to exonerate
all the classical economists from reproach. In
1958 came a scholarly monograph, Robert Tor-
rens and the Evolution of Classical Economics,
which included a learned bibliographical ap-
pendix. Since Torrens had contributed to many
of the main controversies on theory and policy
in the first half of the nineteenth century, Rob-
bins' review covered most of the important
themes in the history of the subject from the
Ricardian period through to the later classical
writers. Generally Robbins' work on the history
of economic thought set an example of scholar-
ship and erudition at a time when such qualities
were passing out of fashion. He deplored the
decline of interest in the history of economics as
compared with the generation of Marshall and
Cannan, and wrote:
I do not think that we can hope to understand the
problems and policies of our own day if we do not
know the problems and policies out of which they
grew. I suspect that damage has been done, not
merely to historical and speculative culture, but
also to our practical insight, by this indifference to
our intellectual past—this provincialism in time—
which has become so characteristic of our particular
branch of social studies. (1952, p. 1)
From the late 1950s on, though continuing to
lecture on the history of economic thought at
the L.S.E., Robbins devoted himself increasingly
to extra-academic interests, as chairman of the
Financial Times newspaper; as a director of
British Petroleum and of the Royal Opera
House, Co vent Garden; and as a trustee of the
National Gallery and the Tate Gallery. Notable
was his chairmanship of the Committee on
Higher Education (1961-1963) which recom-
mended a massive expansion in Britain. His
later works on the history of economic thought
include The Theory of Economic Development
in the History of Economic Thought (1968);
The Evolution of Modern Economic Theory
(1970); and Political Economy: Past and Present
(1976); as well as his fascinating Autobiography
of an Economist (1971).
TERENCE W. HUTCHISON
WORKS BY ROBBINS
1928 The Representative Firm. Economic Journal 38:
387-404.
1930 On a Certain Ambiguity in the Conception of
Stationary Equilibrium. Economic Journal 40:194-
214.
(1932) 1969 An Essay on the Nature and Significance
of Economic Science. 2d ed., rev. & enl. London:
Macmillan; New York: St. Martins. —» Quotations
in the text are from the 1935 edition.
(1933) 1950 Introduction. In Philip H. Wicksteed, The
Common Sense of Political Economy, and Selected
Papers and Reviews on Economic Theory. New
York: Kelley.
1934 Remarks Upon Certain Aspects of the Theory of
Costs. Economic Journal 44:1—18.
(1934-1935) 1967 Introduction. In Knut Wicksell,
Lectures on Political Economy. Translated by E.
Classen. New York: Kelley.
1947 The Economic Problem in Peace and War: Some
Reflections on Objectives and Mechanisms. London:
Macmillan.
(1952) 1978 The Theory of Economic Policy in English
Classical Political Economy. 2d ed. Philadelphia:
Porcupine.
1955 Freedom and Order. Pages 131-157 in Econom-
ics and Public Policy. Washington: Brookings Insti-
tution.
1958 Robert Torrens and the Evolution of Classical
Economics. London: Macmillan; New York: St.
Martins.
1968 The Theory of Economic Development in the His-
tory of Economic Thought, Being the Chichele Lec-
tures for 1966. London: Macmillan; New York: St.
Martins.
1970 The Evolution of Modern Economic Theory. Chi-
cago: Aldine

1971 Autobiography of an Economist. London: Mac-
millan; New York: St. Martins.
1976 Political Economy: Past and Present. London:
Macmillan.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
WICKSELL, KNUT (1901-1906) 1935-1951 Lectures
on Political Economy. Edited by Lionel Robbins. 2
vols. London: Routledge; New York: Macmillan. —>
First published in Swedish. Volume 1: General The-
ory. Volume 2: Money.
WICKSTEED, PHILIP H. (1910) 1950 The Common
Sense of Political Economy, and Selected Papers and
Reviews on Economic Theory. Edited by Lionel Rob-
bins. 2 vols. London: Routledge; New York: Kelley.
ROBINSON, JOAN
Joan Violet Robinson is the rebel with a cause
par excellence. She has been at the forefront of
most major developments, some of them revolu-
tionary, in modern economic theory since the
late 1920s. She has always believed in eco-
nomics as a force for enlightenment and has
coupled that belief with an equally passionate
hatred of social injustice and oppression. She
has thrown in her lot with the wretched of the
earth, whether they be the unemployed of the
capitalist world in the 1930s, or the poverty
stricken and militarily oppressed of the Third
World in the postwar era, or students cheated
of the living fire by their professors in the 1970s.
Robinson was born on October 31, 1903, into
an upper middle-class English family character-
ized by vigorous dissent and independence of
mind. Her great grandfather was F. D. Maurice,
the Christian Socialist; her father was Major-
General Sir Frederick Maurice, victim of the in-
famous Maurice debate in 1918, who later be-
came principal of what is now Queen Mary Col-
lege in the University of London. Her mother was
Helen Margaret Marsh, the daughter of Fred-
erick Howard Marsh, professor of surgery and
master of Downing at Cambridge University. An
uncle was Edward Marsh, civil servant, patron
of the arts, and scholar. Robinson was educated
at St. Paul's Girls' School and Girton College,
Cambridge, where she was Gilchrist scholar.
She read for the Economics Tripos, 1922-1925,
graduating in 1925 with second-class honors
("a great disappointment"). The next year, she
married Austin Robinson, the Cambridge econ-
omist. After a period in India, the Robinsons re-
turned to Cambridge in 1929. Joan Robinson
joined the Cambridge faculty as a faculty as-
sistant lecturer in economics in 1931; she be-
came a university lecturer in 1937, reader in
1949, and professor in 1965. She was elected
to a professorial fellowship at Newnham and
ROBINSON, JOAN 663
made an honorary fellow of Girton in 1965, and
she became an honorary fellow of Newnham in
1971. She "retired" from her chair in 1971,
remaining as active as ever. Although Cam-
bridge has always been her geographical as well
as her intellectual home, she is an intrepid and
enthusiastic traveler, regularly visiting places
as disparate as China and Canada.
Robinson has an incisive mind which allows
her to cut to the heart of the matter and to
detect the logical fallacy of an intricate theoret-
ical argument or the political realities of a com-
plex situation. She can distill the essence of a
thesis into a few sharp crystal clear sentences and
can translate technical literature, despite—or, as
she says, because of—her innocence of mathe-
matical training. These qualities explain why
she is an outstanding theoretician. They also
explain why her political analyses and judg-
ments are sometimes simplistic and distorted,
by-products of the good theoretician's ability to
abstract and simplify. She is also one of the
toughest people in the trade; she neither avoids
nor minds confrontation. As the late Harry G.
Johnson described a visit to Chicago (not recom-
mended as a place for the timid): "Once she
came to Chicago to talk to my students there;
they looked at her and decided, 'Well, we'll cer-
tainly show this old grandmother where she gets
off.' . . . [T]hey picked their heads up off the
floor, having been ticked off with a few well-
chosen blunt squelches . . ." (Johnson 1974,
p. 30). Her barbs are spiced with a robust and
civilized sense of humor, combined, it must be
said, with what John Vaizey calls "bleak Cam-
bridge rudeness." For example, she has written:
"They [the professors of M.I.T.] now admit . . .
that there is no logical reason why the pseudo-
production function should be [well behaved].
They just assume that it is so. After putting the
rabbit into the hat in full view of the audience
it does not seem necessary to make so much fuss
about drawing it out again" (Robinson 1966a,
p. 308). "This model was described as a parable.
A parable, in the usual sense, is a story drawn
from everyday life intended to explain a mys-
tery; in this case it is the mystery which is ex-
pected to explain everyday life" (Robinson
1977c, p. 10). As we shall see, she has the
ability to cast off and start anew; she is no
respecter of vested interests, certainly not her
own, though at any moment of time she will
argue fiercely in defense and in favor of her
current position.
Among her mentors and sources of inspira-
664 ROBINSON, JOAN
tion, four close associates hold pride of place:
John Maynard Keynes, Piero Sraffa, Michal
Kalecki, and, over many years, Richard Kahn,
whose "remorseless logic [has been] an ideal
complement to her innovative enthusiasm"
(Eatwell 1977, p. 64). In the foreword to her
first major book, The Economics of Imperfect
Competition (1933a, p. v), she wrote: "Of not
all the new ideas, however, can I definitely say
that 'this is my own invention/ In particular I
have had the constant assistance of Mr. R. F.
Kahn. The whole technical apparatus was built
up with his aid, and many of the major problems
. . . were solved as much by him as by me."
In the preface to her magnum opus, The Ac-
cumulation of Capital (1956, p. vi), she again
affirmed Kahn's importance. Piero Sraffa was
the inspiration for at least two of her major
contributions: The Economics of Imperfect
Competition and her contributions to the theory
of value, distribution, capital, and growth. Her
initial "theory of imperfect competition [was]
inspired by Sraffa's [1926] article" (Kregel
1973, p. x), and for her "generalisation of the
General Theory" especially her analysis of the
meaning of the rate of profits, "Piero Sraffa's
interpretation of Ricardo provided the most im-
portant clue and the long-delayed publication of
his book, the Production of Commodities by
Means of Commodities [1960], put into a sharp
form the ideas that I had been groping for" (Rob-
inson 1951-1973, vol. 4, p. 125). Her debt to
Keynes is documented in many places; Kaleckfs
influence is discussed below. Other contem-
porary influences include Ester Boserup, Roy
Harrod, Nicholas Kaldor, Gunnar Myrdal, A. C.
Pigou, and Gerald Shove, whose "teaching in
Cambridge for many years past . . . influenced
. . . the whole approach to many problems of
economic analysis" (Robinson 1933a, p. vi).
Of the older thinkers, the most important to
her development have been David Ricardo, Karl
Marx, Alfred Marshall, and Knut Wicksell. She
sees herself today as in tune more with the
former two than with the latter, and her lasting
contribution may be her attempt to form a uni-
fied system of political economy that is classical-
cum-Keynesian-Kaleckian in inspiration, directly
applicable to the analysis of policy problems in
the modern world. She admires Wicksell, not so
much for his contributions or approach, as for
his candor and honesty, which she contrasts
with Marshall's attitudes (Robinson 1951-1973,
vol. 4, pp. 125, 259).
Her first major work was The Economics of
Imperfect Competition. In writing the book, she
was inspired by Sraffa's 1926 article and his
"sacrilege in pointing out inconsistencies in
Marshall . . . [who] was economics" when she
came up to Cambridge in 1922. As Robinson
has come to see it, the inconsistencies related to
a deep-seated conflict in Marshall's Principles
(1890) between the analysis, which is purely
static, and the conclusions drawn from it, which
apply to an economy developing through time
with accumulation taking place. Sraffa, and pre-
sumably Robinson, saw at the time that the
inconsistencies related to the internal logic of
static partial equilibrium analysis, especially the
dilemma of reconciling the simultaneous ex-
istence of falling supply price and competition.
Looking back forty years later, Robinson states
that her "aim was to attack the internal logic
of the theory of static equilibrium and to refute,
by means of its own arguments, the doctrine
that wages are determined by the marginal pro-
ductivity of labour" (Kregel 1973, p. x).
Although the latter part of the statement may
reflect Robinson's hindsight and present atti-
tudes, it is not sustained by either her stated
objectives at the time or by her work in these
areas up to the 1940s, especially her papers on
"Euler's Theorem" (1934a), "What is Perfect
Competition?" (1934£>), and "Rising Supply
Price" (1941)—that "excellent article . . . which
has not attracted the attention . . . it eminently
deserves" (Viner 1953, p. 227). Probably Keynes,
in his report on the book to Macmillan
in November 1932, came closest to the correct
assessment. He referred to "a very considerable
development of the theory of value in the last
five years," developments that were found in
journals and in "oral discussion at Cambridge
and Oxford," and to the fact that there was "no
convenient place" in which could be found "a
clear statement of the nature of modern tech-
nique, or a summary of the recent work on the
subject. Mrs. Robinson aims at filling this gap
. . .has done it very well. . . . [T]he book will
be for a little while to come an essential one for
any serious student of the modern theory of
value."
In The Economics of Imperfect Competition,
Robinson explored systematically the implica-
tions, for firms in a competitive environment, of
facing downward-sloping demand curves for
their products, so that the profit-maximizing
prices and quantities are determined by the in-
tersections of their marginal cost and marginal
revenue curves. This analysis illuminated the

real-world facts (alluded to by Sraffa) that busi-
nessmen felt it was demand conditions rather
than rising costs that limited their sales, and
that firms could still make profits with plants
running well below capacity—facts that were in-
comprehensible within the framework of the
Marshallian-Pigovian theories that preceded it.
In the preface to the second edition of the
book, Robinson rejected much of the analysis:
"to apply the analysis to the so-called theory of
the firm, I had to make a number of limitations
and simplifications which led the argument
astray" (Robinson [1933a] 1969, p. vi). Her
main dissatisfaction was with the static method
and its inability to handle time. She regarded as
a "shameless fudge" the notion that business-
men could find the "correct" price by a process
of trial and error, because it assumed that the
equilibrium position toward which a firm is
tending at any point in time is independent of
the path it is actually taking. Thus, she sub-
jected her own analysis to what she sees as the
most fundamental criticism of the general
method of analysis by comparison of static
equilibrium positions, a critique that she had
developed in other areas in the ensuing years.
She still approves of the section on price dis-
crimination, but is distressed that certain critical
aspects of the book, especially the critique of
the marginal productivity theory of wages with-
in its own theoretical framework, have been
ignored while its weaknesses have been frozen
into orthodox teaching.
In the early 1930s, Robinson was also playing
a significant part in the formation and propaga-
tion of what has come to be known as the
Keynesian revolution. Keynes was attempting
theoretically to explain why the capitalist world
had fallen into a deep and sustained slump, in
the process (as it turns out) mounting "a power-
ful attack on equilibrium theory." As is now
clear from volumes 13 and 14 of The Collected
Writings of John Maynard Keynes (1973), the
people who were most influential in persuading
Keynes both to modify and to expand his origi-
nal analysis (Keynes 1930) and helping to de-
velop his ideas with criticisms and contributions,
included Harrod, Kahn, James Meade, Sraffa,
and Austin and Joan Robinson. The last five
constituted the "circus," whose members argued
out Keynes's Treatise and helped formulate what
was to become the General Theory (Keynes
1936). The fascinating exchanges that took
place as Keynes moved toward the final draft of
the General Theory indicate clearly his respect
ROBINSON, JOAN 665
for Joan Robinson's contributions and judg-
ment. She was important for both her critical
grasp and her expository powers in making the
new theory widely accessible to students and
others. Her little book Introduction to the Theory
of Employment (1937&) is still one of the most
lucid accounts of the essentials of Keynes's
theory, as are her "Essays 1935" (Robinson
1951-1973, vol. 4, part 2). Furthermore, she
was one of the first to extend Keynes's analysis
to an open economy.
In her essay, "Kalecki and Keynes" (1951-
1973, vol. 3, pp. 92-93), Robinson described
how in the early years of the depression Keynes,
who was groping for a theory of employment
(which he ultimately found in his theory of effec-
tive demand, the possibility of sustained under-
employment equilibria or rest states), set Kahn
to work out properly the impact of a rise in
investment on employment and saving in order
to back up Keynes's argument supporting Lloyd
George's scheme for public works. Kahn's fa-
mous article on the multiplier came out in 1931.
The Treatise went to the printers for the last
time in September 1930. It contained no theory
of employment, being concerned mainly with
fluctuations in the general level of prices, though
it did have the "highly significant conception"
of a relationship between investment and saving
via profits. A three-year argument that churned
over these ideas followed. Austin Robinson
(1977, p. 35) recalled that by the end of 1931,
"the questions [which] the General Theory set
out to answer" had begun to be asked by Keynes
and his junior colleagues. "In 1933 [Joan Rob-
inson] published an interim report which
clears the ground for the new theory but does
not supply it." That, of course, had to wait until
the publication of the General Theory itself in
early 1936. Even then, there were "moments
when [there was] some trouble in getting May-
nard to see what the point of his revolution
really was. . . . [However,] when he came to
sum it up [Keynes 1937] after the book was
published he got it into focus" (Robinson 1973,
p. 3). For Robinson, the central themes of the
General Theory were the theory of effective de-
mand in which is integrated a theory of money
and the interest rate; a theory of the general
price level; and an analysis of the impact of an
uncertain future on the present, which occurs
through investment expenditure, thus locking
Keynes's analysis securely into actual historical
time.
Important as her contribution to Keynesian
 666 ROBINSON, JOAN
(of the General Theory) analysis has been, the
most significant step in her thought occurred
when she decided to graft Marx onto Keynes,
partly through the influence of Kalecki, a Polish
Marxist contemporary who independently dis-
covered the main propositions of the General
Theory. She dates this effort at 1940, but with
Sraffa and Maurice Dobb as colleagues, and
given her interest in generalizing the General
Theory, her interest was probably aroused
sooner. Similarly, she claimed that "in 1940, as
a distraction from the news, I began to read
Marx. . . . For me, the main message of Marx
was the need to think in terms of history, not of
equilibrium" (Kregel 1973, p. x). Again this
view benefits from hindsight; it was Harrod's
work, Towards a Dynamic Economics (1948),
which she reviewed in 1949, that really brought
this message home. She thus found in Marx
what she also found in Keynes. As she has said
elsewhere of the Keynesian revolution; "[O]n the
plane of theory, the revolution lay in the change
from the conception of equilibrium to the con-
ception of history; from the principles of ra-
tional choice to the problems of decisions based
on guess-work or on convention" and "once we
admit that an economy exists in time, that his-
tory goes one way, from the irrevocable past
into the unknown future, the conception of
equilibrium based on the mechanical analogy
of a pendulum swinging to and fro in space be-
comes untenable" (1973, pp. 3, 5). Thinking
in terms of history also involves always asking
what sort of society (and its accompanying
institutions) is being examined and what its
ruling social relationships are. It involves,
moreover, distinguishing between theories
that deal with logical time and those which
deal with historical time: "Logical time can be
traced from left to right on the surface of a
blackboard. Historical time moves from the dark
past behind it into the unknown future in front"
(1971 a, p. 57). Analyses in logical time are at
best the flexing of intellectual muscles, some-
times in a framework in which to sort out doc-
trinal puzzles, usually as a preliminary to the
real thing, the analysis of processes occurring
in historical time. This approach also implies
that economics is very much a "horses for
courses" discipline, rather than a general theory
into which particular situations may be fitted
as special cases.
Her book on Marx (1942) is still one of the
best introductory pieces to be found, despite its
idiosyncrasies and even though, or perhaps
because, it contains a few heresies that infuriate
the faithful. Especially is this true of her atti-
tude to the labor theory of value, which has
hardened over the years; "[w]e are told that it is
impossible to account for exploitation except in
terms of value, but why do we need value to
show that profits can be made in industry by
selling commodities for more than they cost to
produce, or to explain the power of those who
command finance to push around those who
do not?" (1977a, p. 51). To learn from Marx's
ideas we do not have to remain "stuck in the
groove that led him to them." Nevertheless, the
book was not written "as a criticism of Marx
[but] to alert my bourgeois colleagues to the ex-
istence of penetrating and important ideas in
Capital that they ought not to continue to ne-
glect" (ibid., p. 50). It abounds in insights and
produces a lucid sketch of the skeleton that sus-
tains Marx's system, a skeleton too often ob-
scured by the flesh of Hegel, by polemic, and by
the lack of time and health to polish and rewrite
that characterizes much of Marx's own writing.
It is a constructive and sympathetic critique of
Marx's work. The same may be said of her sub-
sequent writings on Marx, attitudes that con-
trast with the impatience she sometimes shows
toward Marxists themselves.
This book led Robinson into her two main
preoccupations of the postwar period: on the
positive side, the attempt to provide a "general-
isation of the General Theory, that is, an exten-
sion of Keynes's short-period analysis to long-run
development" (1956, p. vi), found largely in
The Accumulation of Capital and interpretative
books and articles that have grown up around
and from it: Exercises in Economic Analysis
(1960), Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth
(1962k), Economic Heresies (1971). A further
influence on the way may well have been Rosa
Luxemburg's book (1913) of the same title, to
the English edition of which Robinson contrib-
uted the introduction (Robinson 1951-1973,
vol. 2, pp. 59-73). Robinson's own work pro-
vides us with a Keynesian-Marxist framework
(derived in structure from Kalecki's adaptation
of the Marxian schemes of reproduction) with
which to interpret the process of growth in capi-
talist economies and to tackle the grand prob-
lems of classical political economy: the possi-
bilities of growth in output per head, and the
course of the distribution of the national product
between broad classes in capitalist society as
capital goods are accumulated over time, as these
processes are influenced by the nature of the

"animal spirits" of the businessmen, as well as
by population growth and technical advances.
In this area, Robinson shares with Harrod, and
possibly, with Kaldor and Pasinetti, the credit
for the most influential contributions of the
Keynesian school to the modern theory of eco-
nomic growth and distribution.
The Accumulation of Capital has sometimes
been misunderstood. Robinson starts the anal-
ysis with an examination of the conditions nec-
essary for steady growth, a search for the
characteristics of what she calls "golden ages."
Too often this has been taken for descriptive
analysis rather than the careful setting out of
logical conditions and relationships, one of the
principal purposes of which, as is hinted at by
the very name, is to show how unlikely it is
that they will ever be realized in fact. "I used
the phrase 'a golden age' to describe smooth,
steady growth with full employment (intending
thereby to indicate its mythical nature)" (1962b,
p. 52). In the subsequent clarifications and ex-
pansions of her findings, she has emphasized
more the lessons of the later chapters on the
short period and the interconnections of short
periods over time. She also has reiterated what
she stated in the original work, that the sections
on the choice of techniques of production at the
level of the economy as a whole occupy more
space than their importance (as opposed to
their difficulty) warrants. Moreover, they relate
largely to the realm of doctrinal debate associ-
ated with the vast literature on the aggregate
production function rather than to that of posi-
tive analysis.
Her second postwar concern has been a sus-
tained attack on the currently received paradigm
of economics, the neoclassical theory of value,
production, and distribution. Its focus has been
centered in the last 25 years in the theory of
capital, mainly because of her celebrated article
"The Production Function and the Theory of
Capital" (1953-1954), which started what have
become known as the "Cambridge controversies"
in the theory of capital. The main protagonists
in the controversies have all been associated,
either temporarily or permanently, with the two
Cambridges—Cambridge, England, and Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, where M.I.T. and Paul
Samuelson and Robert Solow, are situated. On
the surface, the argument is over whether or
not it is possible to measure "capital" as a factor
of production; what units to use; whether there
is a unit that is independent of distribution and
prices; and whether any sense can be made of
ROBINSON, JOAN 667
the proposition that the marginal product of
capital equals the rate of profits. But, as Robin-
son has stressed continually, the argument
really has nothing to do with the problem of
measuring and valuing "capital," as opposed to
the meaning of "capital," but involves the at-
tempt of those she dubs "bastard Keynesians" to
reconstruct "pre-Keynesian theory after Keynes":
"[I]t has nothing to do either with measurement
or with capital; it has to do with abolishing time.
For a world that is always in equilibrium there
is no difference between the future and the past,
there is no history and there is no need for
Keynes" (1973, p. 6). Nor has it anything to
do with Marx: "The controversies over so-called
capital theory arose out of the search for a
model appropriate to a modern western econ-
omy, which would allow for an analysis of ac-
cumulation and of the distribution of the net
product of industry between wages and profits.
. . . Long-run accumulation became the cen-
tre of interest, [so making] it necessary to come
to grips with concepts of the quantity of capital
and the rate of profit in the economy as a whole"
(1977c, pp. 5, 6—7). Robinson sees the response
to her criticisms as the outcome of an ideological
tide that reacts continually against the damag-
ing criticisms of Marx, Keynes, and Sraffa; and
that attempts to create an economic theory sup-
porting, by implication at least, the status quo-
in particular, democratic capitalist free market
institutions and, in at least some influential
quarters, a doctrine of laissez-faire.
Here Robinson may have aimed at too many
targets at once. The groups most favorably dis-
posed to laissez-faire, Milton Friedman and the
Chicago School, and their burgeoning offshoots
elsewhere, have been vigorously attacking what
they take to be the exposed flanks of the Ameri-
can or "bastard Keynesians," who are led from
M.I.T. and Yale University, while Robinson has
been attacking what she takes to be other vul-
nerable areas. The attacked themselves could,
with justice, claim not only that they are staunch
advocates and defenders of middle-of-the-road to
leftish Keynesian policies, but also that they
have provided much of the ammunition that has
been used over the years to destroy the more
grandiose claims for a free-rein market economy
as an efficient allocator of resources and maxi-
mizer of community welfare. As Tobin (1973,
p. 106, note 1) remarks, "[Samuelson's] work on
the theory of public goods . . . is only an out-
standing example of the attention modern theo-
rists, in America and overseas, have paid to the
 668 ROBINSON, JOAN
allocative failures of laisser-faire." Thus, Robin-
son's simplicity of vision, though faulted in de-
tails, is nevertheless, in its general argument,
largely valid; hence the irritation and anger she
arouses, especially in conservative academic and
political circles.
In the Cambridge debates, Robinson has tena-
ciously and consistently returned to the theme
that orthodox equilibrium analysis cannot han-
dle the essential facts of a capitalist economy—
the fact that it exists in real historical time;
that investment decisions by capitalist business-
men (and not the saving decisions of house-
holds) are the dynamic driving force of the
economy; that uncertainty and unrealized ex-
pectations about the future are inescapable facts
of life that must find a place in any theory of
the development of a capitalist economy over
time; that "interest [is] the price that a business-
man pays for the use of finance to be committed
to an investment [while] profit [is] the return
that he hopes to get on it, [and that] wage rates
are settled in terms of money [while] the level
of real wages depends upon the operation of
the economy as a whole" (1977c, p. 5). An
index of her success in these endeavors is that
both Samuelson (1975) and F. H. Hahn, in a
number of places, including his inaugural lec-
ture (1973), have either explicitly or implicitly
conceded the validity of many of her claims.
Tobin, in an otherwise rather pained review of
her Economic Heresies and the Cambridge de-
bates, nevertheless praises her repeated stress
on the treatment of expectations and her objec-
tion that "Walrasian general equilibrium, even
when enlarged to postulate markets in all com-
modities in all contingencies at all future dates,
is no real solution" (1973, p. 109). John
Hicks, having partly repudiated the versions of
Keynesian theory that are peculiarly associated
with him through his 1937 paper "Mr. Keynes
and the 'Classics'" now takes approaches that
closely parallel Robinson's (see, for example,
Hicks 1976; 1977). In addition, Robinson, along
with others, especially Sraffa, has exposed the
logical inconsistencies in those versions of neo-
classical theory that attempt to provide a theory
of distribution to take the place of classical,
especially Ricardian, theory and also, of course,
of Marxian theory. These particular criticisms
came to a head in the reswitching and capital-
reversing debates of the mid-1960s. The debates
themselves were the culmination of earlier dis-
cussions of whether certain results that were
rigorously true of simple one-commodity neo-
classical models would continue to be so in
more complex heterogeneous capital-good mod-
els. Robinson now regards these particular criti-
cisms and results as "unimportant" (1975). She
prefers to rest her critique on her more general
methodological arguments, and her insistence
that one must always postulate the social rela-
tionships and institutions of the economy being
modeled and specify the stage in its history at
which the analytical story is taken up. Finally,
in her Richard T. Ely lecture to the American
Economic Association Meeting in 1971 (a per-
sonal triumph in which the main room over-
flowed into subsidiary rooms and for which she
received a standing ovation), Robinson identi-
fied a second crisis in economic theory (the first
being its inability to handle the interwar slump):
the lack of a suitable framework with which to
tackle the terrible problems of modern economic
life—poverty, racism, urban puzzles and pollu-
tion, excessive population growth, and war.
Her latest work on these questions is her com-
prehensive paper "What Are the Questions?"
(1977d). She starts by arguing that ideology and
economic analysis are indissolubly mixed, and
that the dominant ideology exerts disproportion-
ate power in the discipline at any moment of
time; she quotes Benjamin Ward (1972, pp.
29-30) in support. She then blasts Lionel Rob-
bins' definition of economics when it is set
in the context of a capitalist economy: "The
question of scarce means with alternative uses
becomes self contradictory when it is set in his-
torical time, where today is an ever-moving
break between the irrevocable past and the un-
known future. At any moment, certainly, re-
sources are scarce, but they have hardly any
range of alternative uses" (1977d, p. 1322). She
deplores the major distinction in modern ortho-
dox economics between micro and macro. One
cannot exist without the other, for "[m]icro ques-
tions . . . cannot be discussed in the air without
any reference to the structure of the economy
in which they exist [or] to the processes of
cyclical and secular change. Equally, macro
theories of accumulation and effective demand
are generalizations about micro behaviour. . . .
If there is no micro theory, there cannot be any
macro theory either" (p. 1320). Moreover, the
macro setting for orthodox micro theory is a
kind of vague Say's Law world which, until very
recently anyway, is not the macro world that is
analyzed in its own separate compartment.
Robinson has also made several contributions
to the theory of international trade. She was

among the first systematically to apply the
Keynesian mode of thought to the problems of
an open economy; she wrote a seminal article
on the theory of the foreign exchanges (1937a),
and in her inaugural lecture, The New Mercantil-
ism (1966c), and lectures at Manchester Univer-
sity (reprinted in Robinson 1951-1973, vol.4),
she applied her general critiques of orthodox
theory to the special area of international trade
and suggested alternative avenues of approach.
In a "half-way house" paper (1946-1947), she
critically expounded the classical theory of inter-
national trade as it came down from Marshall,
"to try to see what basis it offers for the belief in
a natural tendency towards equilibrium" (p. 98).
She returned to this theme again in "What Are
the Questions?," pointing out that Ricardo ("[i]n
the famous story which begins with England
and Portugal both producing both cloth and
wine") was the first to commit the cardinal sin
(in her eyes) of analyzing a process going on
through time by the comparison of two equilib-
rium positions—an invalid procedure that is, as
we have seen, the center piece of her critique of
orthodoxy (though Ricardo, as a pioneer, is ab-
solved). It must be said that Samuelson, whom
she has repeatedly criticized along with Solow
for doing this, courteously but firmly denies it,
producing chapter and verse in support (Sam-
uelson 1975). Furthermore, Pierangelo Gareg-
nani, an influential ally of Robinson and Sraffa
in their attack on neoclassical theory, also takes
issue with her on this point. He argues that
comparisons of long-run positions (not, note,
equilibrium ones, for equilibrium is a notion
intimately related to supply and demand) are
fundamental to economic methodology. How-
ever, he maintains, the neoclassicals err when
they try to incorporate the method with their
overriding emphasis on the forces of supply
and demand. Their theories, he argues, then run
into insuperable logical difficulties, especially
in the depiction of the demand curve for "capi-
tal" and the consequent existence and stability
of long-run equilibrium positions (see Gareg-
nani 1958; 1970; 1976). That is to say, Gareg-
nani wishes to preserve the tradition that began
with the classicals of relating key concepts—for
example, natural prices—to sustained and fun-
damental forces. He feels that Robinson's attack
on orthodoxy threatens this tradition too. Robin-
son also wishes to retain the key classical con-
cepts but scrap the method.
There is a puzzle that often emerges in dis-
cussions of Robinson's contributions—namely,
ROBINSON, JOAN 669
her lack of empirical work of at least the con-
ventional kind. The answer probably lies in two
areas: first, she has been concerned mainly with
such fundamental theoretical questions as the
necessary setting out of definitions, concepts,
and logical relationships; the provision of a
framework that must precede good empirical
work. Secondly, her close associates over the
years, Kahn and, of course, Keynes and Kalecki,
were applied economists in the old-fashioned
sense par excellence. They made it their busi-
ness to know intimately the institutions, the his-
torical sequences, and the orders of magnitude
of particular situations, and they had a feel for
the limits of particular policy recommendations.
Robinson's work, therefore, was often comple-
mentary to theirs, as theirs was to hers. More-
over, much of her theoretical work is based on
Marshallian-type empirical generalizations—that
is to say, broad qualitative statements that con-
stitute either the basis for the development of a
logical argument or the puzzles that are to be
explained by theoretical reasoning.
Robinson's admiration for, and extensive
writings on the Chinese experiment are well
known, probably to an audience wider than that
for any of her other works. She is always stim-
ulating, full of insights, putting a complicated
and changing scene into a manageable frame-
work. Her writing in this area contains a leaven
of advocacy, a conscious effort to try to offset
what she believes to have been unsympathetic
critiques of Chinese policies emanating from
orthodox circles. In addition, she has written
extensively on the theoretical and practical as-
pects of planning in socialist societies, on the
basis of her experience with, and criticisms of,
the Russian and eastern European experiments.
Her championship of Kalecki's independent
discovery of the main propositions of the Gen-
eral Theory is well known from a number of de-
lightfully written and absorbing articles (espe-
cially Robinson 1976; 1977k; the latter is also a
fine introduction to, and exposition of, Kalecki's
analysis of capitalism). Moreover, time is con-
firming her judgment that "[i]n several respects
Kalecki's version is more robust than Keynes'"
(Robinson 1977b, p. 10). Nor has she neglected
the involved intellectual's task of communicat-
ing to a wider circle than those in their disci-
pline. She contributed a charming and influ-
ential book, Economic Philosophy (1962a), to
the New Thinkers Library although it is,
perhaps, too Popperian for most Marxists' taste.
For a wide audience she has written Economics:
670 ROBINSON, JOAN
An Awkward Corner (1966b), which diagnosed
Britain's economic ills, and Freedom and Ne-
cessity (1970), which is a model for a challeng-
ing introductory course in the social sciences.
Last, but certainly not least, her concern for
students and what they are taught has been
expressed in a number of areas. Generations of
Cambridge undergraduates and research stu-
dents have paid tribute to her as a demanding
but devoted supervisor. She has lectured to stu-
dents across the world, often at their request.
In 1973, she wrote, with John Eatwell, An Intro-
duction to Modern Economics, a new type of
textbook that she fervently hoped would herald
a new dawn in the teaching of economics. Al-
though splendid in conception, it is rough in
execution, and too ambitious. Robinson tried to
distill her lifelong ponderings into one work for
first-year students. Even the cream of the British
intelligentsia whom she and Eatwell are accus-
tomed to teach find it more than hard going.
Nevertheless, it is a noble experiment that
should not be ignored, and that may serve to
produce the "generation well educated, resistent
to fudging, imbued with the humility and the
pride of genuine scientists [making] contribu-
tions both to knowledge and to the conduct of
affairs that no one need be ashamed of" (Robin-
son 1957-1973, vol. 3, p. 6). But whatever the
outcome of this particular venture, Joan Robin-
son herself has much more than fulfilled her
own modest aim of doing "a little good here
and there to set in the scales against all the
harm" (ibid.).
G. C. HARCOURT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The letter from John Maynard Keynes to Harold Mac-
millan is quoted with permission from Lord Kahn.
WORKS BY ROBINSON
(1933a) 1969 The Economics of Imperfect Competi-
tion. 2d ed. London: Macmillan.
1933b The Theory of Money and the Analysis of
Output. Review of Economic Studies 1:22-26.
1934a Euler's Theorem and the Problem of Distribu-
tion. Economic Journal 44:398—414.
1934i> What is Perfect Competition? Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 49:104-120.
(1937a) 1947 Essays in the Theory of Employment.
2d ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
(1937&) 1969 Introduction to the Theory of Employ-
ment. 2d ed. London: Macmillan.
1941 Rising Supply Price. Economica 8:1-8.
(1942) 1966 An Essay on Marxian Economics. 2d ed.
London: Macmillan.
1946-1947 The Pure Theory of International Trade.
Review of Economic Studies 14:98-112.
1949 Mr. Harrod's Dynamics. Economic Journal 59:
68-85.
1951-1973 Collected Economic Papers. 4 vols. Oxford:
Blackwell.
1953-1954 The Production Function and the Theory
of Capital. Review of Economic Studies 21:81-106.
(1956) 1969 The Accumulation of Capital. London:
Macmillan.
1960 Exercises in Economic Analysis. London: Mac-
millan.
1962a Economic Philosophy. London: Watts.
1962b Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth.
London: Macmillan.
1966a Comment on Samuelson and Modigliani. Re-
view of Economic Studies 33:307-308.
1966b Economics: An Awkward Corner. London:
Allen & Unwin.
1966c The New Mercantilism: An Inaugural Lecture.
Cambridge Univ. Press.
1970 Freedom and Necessity. London: Allen & Unwin.
1971 Economic Heresies: Some Old-fashioned Ques-
tions in Economic Theory. London: Macmillan.
1973 ROBINSON, JOAN (editor) After Keynes. Oxford:
Blackwell.
1973 ROBINSON, JOAN; and EATWELL, JOHN An Intro-
duction to Modern Economics. London: McGraw-
Hill.
1975 The Unimportance of Reswitching. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 89:32-39.
1976 Michal Kalecki: A Neglected Prophet. New York
Review of Books Mar. 4:28-30.
1977a The Labor Theory of Value. Monthly Review
29:50-59.
1977b Michal Kalecki on the Economics of Capital-
ism. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
39:7-17.
1977c Qu'est-ce que le capital? Pages 5-19 in Arnold
Heertje (editor), "Cambridge controverse sur la
theorie du capital: Aspects sociaux et economiques."
Revue d'Economie Politique. Paris: Editions Sirey.
1977d What Are the Questions? Journal of Economic
Literature 15:1318-1339.
1978 Morality and Economics. Challenge 21:62-64.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
EATWELL, JOHN 1977 Portrait: Joan Robinson. Chal-
lenge 20:64-65.
GAREGNANI, PIERANGELO 1958 A Problem in the
Theory of Distribution from Ricardo to Wicksell.
PH.D. dissertation, Cambridge Univ.
GAREGNANI, PIERANGELO 1970 Heterogeneous Cap-
ital, the Production Function and the Theory of
Distribution. Review of Economic Studies 37:407-
436.
GAREGNANI, PIERANGELO 1976 On a Change in the
Notion of Equilibrium in Recent Work on Value
and Distribution: A Comment on Samuelson. Pages
25-45 in Murray Brown et al. (editors), Essays in
Modern Capital Theory. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
HAHN, F. H. 1973 On the Notion of Equilibrium in
Economics: An Inaugural Lecture. Cambridge
Univ. Press.
HARROD, ROY F. (1948) 1956 Towards a Dynamic
Economics: Some Recent Developments of Eco-
nomic Theory and Their Application to Policy. Lon-
don: Macmillan.
HICKS, JOHN 1937 Mr. Keynes and the "Classics":
A Suggested Interpretation. Econometrica 5:147—
159.
HICKS, JOHN 1976 Some Questions of Time in Eco-
nomics. Pages 135-151 in Anthony M. Tang et al.
(editors), Evolution, Welfare, and Time in Eco-

nomics: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
HICKS, JOHN 1977 Economic Perspectives: Further
Essays on Money and Growth. Oxford: Clarendon.
JOHNSON, HARRY G. 1974 Cambridge in the 1950s.
Encounter 42:28-39.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD (1930) 1958-1960 A Trea-
tise on Money. 2 vols. London: Macmillan. —> Vol-
ume 1: The Pure Theory of Money. Volume 2: The
Applied Theory of Money.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Mac-
millan. —» A paperback edition was published in
1965 by Harcourt.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1937 The General Theory
of Employment. Quarterly Journal of Economics
51:209-223.
KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1973 The Collected Writ-
ings of John Maynard Keynes. Edited by D. E. Mog-
gridge. Vols. 13 & 14. London: Macmillan.
KREGEL, J. A. 1973 The Reconstruction of Political
Economy. London: Macmillan. —-» Foreword by
Joan Robinson.
LUXEMBURG, ROSA (1913) 1964 The Accumulation
of Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press. —»
Joan Robinson wrote the introduction to the 1951
English translation. First published in German.
MARSHALL, ALFRED (1890) 1961 Principles of Eco-
nomics. 9th ed. 2 vols. New York and London:
Macmillan. —» A variorum edition. The eighth
edition is preferable for normal use.
ROBINSON, AUSTIN 1977 Keynes and His Cambridge
Colleagues. Pages 25—38 in Don Patinkin and
J. Clark Leith (editors), Keynes, Cambridge and
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ROGERS, CARL R.
Carl R. Rogers is best known as the founder
of client-centered psychotherapy, which was
first identified as nondirective counseling or
therapy. The movement originated by Rogers is
currently labeled the "person-centered approach."
As such, it applies to interpersonal behavior and
relationships in many fields, not only psycho-
therapy, but education, marriage and other types
of partnership, leadership, organizational de-
velopment, conflict resolution, and the facilita-
tion of a large group process in which individuals
ROGERS, CARL R. 671
come to realize their own power and use it in
the interest of the community. The latter is
seen by Rogers and his associates as having
revolutionary implications for resolving some of
the life-and-death issues of our times. Indeed,
because of the everwidening scope of his in-
fluence, as well as the nature of his original
impact on the field of psychotherapy, Rogers has
become known increasingly as a "quiet revolu-
tionary," and a father of the "third force," or
humanistic psychology, as distinguished from
the psychoanalytic and behavioral approaches.
Rogers' influence stems from his profound
belief in and his success in communicating cer-
tain basic values. The most central of these is
the hypothesis that all living organisms contain
within themselves powerful intrinsic forces for
orderly growth. These may be inhibited under
certain conditions or, on the other hand, facili-
tated by the provision of other conditions. In the
human being, a central organizing tendency is
related to the person's concept of self, and the
drive for self-actualization. Rogers, individually
and with many associates, has developed and
tested extensively the theory that, with the
creation of therapeutic conditions such as em-
pathy, congruence (or genuineness), and uncon-
ditional positive regard (or nonpossessive caring),
the actualizing forces within the individual or
group will be released. These activities have
been carried out under live, natural conditions
and with increasingly large numbers of people.
With origins in the Midwest and identified at
first as a logical positivist in the American scien-
tific tradition, Rogers' outlook and practice have
broadened to include much of Eastern philos-
ophy as well as European existential thought.
At the same time, his activities and recognition
have become more and more international in
scope, including the European, Asian, South
American, and Australian continents.
In his own country, Rogers' position has been
paradoxical. On the one hand, he has been the
recipient of the highest honors of the academic
and professional psychology and psychotherapy
establishment. He has been president of the
American Psychological Association (1947); first
president of the American Academy of Psycho-
therapists (1956-1958); one of the first group
of three recipients (with Wolfgang Kohler and
Kenneth W. Spence) of the American Psycho-
logical Association award for distinguished sci-
entific contribution, the first recipient of the
APA award for distinguished professional con-
tribution. He has been professor of psychology
 672 ROGERS, pARL R.
at Ohio State University and the University of
Chicago as well as professor of psychology and
psychiatry at the University of Wisconsin. He
has been awarded a doctor of science from
Northwestern University and many other hon-
orary degrees.
At the same time, Rogers is regarded as a
rebel, a revolutionary, and an iconoclast, and
has voluntarily removed himself from the aca-
demic and professional establishment; instead of
being a university professor or institutional
president, he has chosen to be a "resident fel-
low" of a forward-looking group that is marked
by flexible organization and close personal rela-
tionships. While institutions continue to turn to
him, he has consistently marched to his own
tune, forming fresh associations and generating
new experiences and ideas concerning the
facilitation of personal power and community
actualization.
Carl Ransom Rogers was born on January 8,
1902, the son of Julia Gushing and Walter
Rogers, a contractor and engineer. He was the
middle son among five brothers, and had one
sister, in a family characterized by devotion and
religious fundamentalism.
Rogers attended public schools and entered
the Agricultural College of the University of
Wisconsin in 1919. During his first two years,
he attended some religious conferences, became
very involved, and decided to become a minister.
To prepare himself better for this, he became a
history major and in his junior year, he was
selected as one of a dozen American students to
attend the World Student Christian Federation
Conference in China. He graduated in 1924,
and on August 28th of that year he and Helen
Elliott were married; their children are David
and Natalie.
Graduate training. After graduation, Rogers
entered Union Theological Seminary in New
York City. Particularly influenced by experiences
in a student organized seminar and in a course
on "Working with Young People" taught by pro-
gressive educators and the psychologist Goodwin
Watson, he transferred "across the street" to
Columbia University's Teachers College, where
he studied clinical psychology and received his
PH.D. in 1931. For his doctoral dissertation,
Rogers developed a test, Measuring Personality
Adjustment in Children Nine to Thirteen Years
of Age (1931), which was marketed by the
Psychological Corporation and is still a highly
successful and distinctive clinical instrument.
It was an early demonstration of Rogers' prefer-
ence for understanding people through a phe-
nomenological approach, his appreciation of the
importance of self-concept, his clinical sensi-
tivity, and his talent for devising objective
methods for the measurement of subjective data.
At the same time, Rogers' education at Columbia
and his internship at the psychoanalytically
oriented Institute for Child Guidance in New
York City contributed to a professional stance
characterized by objectivity and personal dis-
tance, noteworthy because of the contrasting
ideology that he developed later.
Rochester. From 1928 to 1940, Rogers worked
in Rochester, New York, starting as a psychol-
ogist in the child study department of the So-
ciety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.
In 1930, he became the director of this depart-
ment and, in 1939, of its replacement, the
Rochester Guidance Center.
In this setting, Rogers continued to perfect
his skills by practicing traditional child guidance
based on the clinician's assessment of the situa-
tion. In the latter half of the 1930s, this ap-
proach took an extremely significant new turn
—the recognition of the client's capacity for
insight and innovation—which Rogers has re-
lated to several factors.
One of these was that the new Rochester
Guidance Center had more self-referrals, so that
the helping process was more dependent on the
development of a relationship between clinician
and client. Another influence was Rogers' ex-
perience that listening and following the client's
lead often obtained better results than did the
clinician's guidance. Rogers has cited one par-
ticularly significant case of a problem child who
had not responded to the traditional diagnostic-
prescriptive approach. The mother in question
asked to be seen, and in the ensuing interviews,
she became stronger as an individual. This was
associated with improvement in her marital re-
lationship and her son's behavior. Rogers de-
scribed this experience as a crucial one in chang-
ing his clinical approach, which was furthered
by a two-day seminar with Otto Rank and his
relationship with a social worker on his staff
who had trained with Rank at the Philadelphia
School of Social Work. This period was capped
by the publication of The Clinical Treatment of
the Problem Child (1939), a comprehensive
book covering both traditional approaches to the
child guidance field and the newer "relationship
therapy."
Ohio State University. Rogers accepted a po-
sition as professor of psychology at Ohio State

University in 1940. Here he taught courses in
counseling practice and theory, began systemati-
cally to develop and write about counseling,
psychotherapy, and personality theory, and
started to build rewarding relationships with
graduate students. Virginia Axline, Arthur
Combs, Bernard Covner, Thomas Gordon, Don-
ald Grummon, Nicholas Hobbs, E. H. Porter, Jr.,
Victor Raimy, William U. Snyder, and Bernard
Steinzor exemplify students who worked with
Rogers at Ohio State and then became outstand-
ing authors, teachers, therapists, and profes-
sional leaders. As Rogers moved on to other uni-
versities and institutions, this process of mutual
stimulation and growth multiplied and grew into
a legion, not of followers, but of distinctive con-
tributors to personality theory, clinical and edu-
cational practice, parent-child relationships,
concepts of leadership, the development of pro-
fessional standards, and other areas.
It became clear to Rogers and others, soon
after he came to Ohio State, that he was de-
veloping a new way of practicing counseling
and psychotherapy, and his book entitled Coun-
seling and Psychotherapy was published in
1942. This included the verbatim typescript of
an electrically recorded eight-interview case, a
precedent breaking contribution that initiated
the objective study of the therapy process.
Rogers and his students rapidly developed
methods of classifying client statements and
counselor responses and of measuring self-
regarding attitudes. The significance of the Ohio
State period, then, in Rogers' career and in the
history of the person-centered approach, in-
cludes the emergence of the self-concept as a
central construct of personality organization, the
refinement of recognition and clarification of
feeling as a basic therapeutic technique, and
the enormous advances made in the objective
study of personality change in therapy and of
therapist and client behavior in psychotherapy.
In a more general way, it was dawiiing on
Rogers and his students that the nondirective
approach had far-reaching implications for all
types of interpersonal relationships.
The University of Chicago. During World
War n, Rogers was on leave from Ohio State as di-
rector of counseling services for the United
Service Organization. In 1945, he accepted a
position as professor of psychology and head of
the counseling center at the University of Chi-
cago. Rogers remained at Chicago for 12 years,
a period of tremendous growth in client-centered
theory, philosophy, practice, research, applica-
ROGERS, CARL R. 673
tions, and implications. Central to this expan-
sion in scope and depth was the organization of
the counseling center. As an extension of the
trust that was working so successfully with his
clients, Rogers deliberately set out to empower
the staff of the center to assume full responsi-
bility for its functioning. The result was not a
smooth, conflict free operation, but a highly
successful and gratifying one, regarded by many
of its constituents as the best institutional experi-
ence of their careers. This staff group phe-
nomenon was paralleled by training workshops
that included the elements of the basic en-
counter movement. Student-centered learning
became the basic educational process in the
teaching of personality theory and psycho-
therapy; in this approach, the student was given
the opportunity to decide what and how he
wished to learn and how he should be graded.
Congruence and unconditional positive regard
were added to empathy as "necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for therapeutic personality
change" in a classic article published by Rogers
in 1957. The therapist was recognized clearly
as a person in the psychotherapeutic process,
rather than as a narrowly skilled, professionally
involved practitioner. Great interest was shown
in Martin Buber, S0ren Kierkegard, and other
existentialist thinkers and, at the same time,
Rogers contrasted his free choice philosophy
with the deterministic values of B. F. Skinner
and behavior modification. The client-centered
approach was applied broadly to interpersonal
communication and relationships. Sophisticated
research methodology was designed and carried
out in large-scale research projects on per-
sonality change in psychotherapy. Among
Rogers' students and collaborators at Chicago,
in addition to many who had also been with him
at Ohio State, were Godfrey Barrett-Lennard,
Oliver Bown, John M. Butler, Rosalind Dymond
Cartwright, Eugene Gendlin, Gerard Haigh,
Jules Seeman, John Shlien, Stanley Standal, Eu-
gene Streich, Ferdinand van der Veen, and Fred
Zimring.
The University of Wisconsin. Rogers was pro-
fessor of psychology and psychiatry at Wisconsin
from 1957 to 1963. Again with many collabo-
rators, he designed and executed a massive re-
search project to test the basic hypothesis that
the provision of and perception by the client of
the therapeutic conditions of congruence or gen-
uineness, acceptance or unconditional positive
regard, and empathic understanding would lead
to significant personality change. In this case,
674 ROGERS, CARL R.
the clients were state hospital patients diagnosed
as schizophrenic, so a significant factor was that
the client-centered hypothesis was being tested
on both a highly disturbed and often unmoti-
vated population. The central construct em-
ployed in the study of the personality change of
these individuals was termed "experiencing,"
and scales were developed by Rogers and Rab-
len, and by Gendlin and Tomlinson, to see if
therapy resulted in an approach to experience
less rigid, fixed, and remote, and more fluid,
changing, responsive, and "owned" by the indi-
vidual. A vast array of both existing and newly
devised tests and rating scales were employed
to measure both the conditions and effects and
the results were generally positive, but also very
complex because of the multiplicity of the mea-
sures. The tremendous research achievement,
represented by the volume, The Therapeutic Re-
lationship and Its Impact: A Study of Psycho-
therapy With Schizophrenics (1967), was ac-
companied by subjective advances in learning to
relate to extremely withdrawn individuals. They
were approached no less as persons than people
functioning in the community, and both Rogers
and Gendlin described intense relationships that
included sitting with patients during many
hours of silence as well as initiating thoughts
and feelings to try to understand what patients
were experiencing and to express their own car-
ing. Such therapist activity sometimes resulted
in dramatic responses and exchanges.
La Jolla. In La Jolla, California, at the West-
ern Behavioral Sciences Institute, beginning in
1964, and at the Center for the Study of Per-
sons, since 1968, Rogers has generalized and
extended the principles of client-centered psy-
chotherapy to "the person-centered approach" on
a large scale. Several arenas of this application
can be cited: entire school systems, the insti-
tution of marriage, community process in large
groups. Rogers has written major books on the
"freedom to learn," "becoming partners," and
"personal power." In addition, he has given
talks and made films and audiotapes that have
had great impact on these and related areas,
such as intercultural conflict resolution. He has
shown deep concern for the position of indi-
viduals disadvantaged by reason cf economics,
race, sex, and status. He has traveled on a
world-wide scale to work with people in small
and large groups in Asia, Europe, South Amer-
ica, and Australia. In all these enterprises, he
has espoused the basic principles that have
made his reputation, and which may be para-
phrased in this way:
I understand that you may see me as an authority
but, like you, I am a person who can feel doubtful
and fearful as well as strong and confident. I am
more comfortable seeing myself as a facilitator
rather than therapist or teacher or other kind of
expert. I think I can help you most by being real
myself, by prizing you and your individuality and
by trying to understand the way you look at and
feel about yourself and others. I hope I can help you
to be yourself as much as possible and to realize
all your possibilities. I am willing to be an under-
standing and empathic partner as you struggle
to do this.
Perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of this
philosophy is that it is the one with which
Rogers enters into any new relationship. The
person may be a stranger, an executive or
laborer, an old person or a child, a completely
unthreatening member of the majority or a
possibly hostile minority group member, an
individual who is fluent or one who is halting, a
person with a "perfect record" or a convicted
murderer.
Rogers implements his philosophy by making
himself part of a sharing support group, which
in turn will facilitate the development of a
community in a group of perhaps hundreds. A
few of the people with whom Rogers has been
associated in this way include Maria Villas-Boas
Bowen, Maureen Miller, Natalie Rogers, and
John Wood. Richard Farson, who was instru-
mental in bringing Rogers to California, is a
colleague who has most effectively articulated
his revolutionary impact.
NATHANIEL J. RASKIN
WORKS BY ROGERS
1931 Measuring Personality Adjustment in Children
Nine to Thirteen Years of Age. New York: Colum-
bia University, Teachers College, Bureau of Pub-
lications.
1939 The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child.
Boston: Hough ton Mifflin.
1942 Counseling and Psychotherapy: Newer Concepts
in Practice. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
1949 ROGERS, CARL R.; RASKIN, NATHANIEL J. et al. A
Co-ordinated Research in Psychotherapy. Journal of
Consulting Psychology 13: Whole no. 3.
1951 Client-centered Therapy: Its Current Practice,
Implications, and Theory. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
1954 ROGERS, CARL R.; and DYMOND, ROSALIND F.
(editors) Psychotherapy and Personality Change:
Coordinated Research Studies in the Client-centered
Approach. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1957 The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Ther-
apeutic Personality Change. Journal of Consulting
Psychology 21:95-103.

1959 A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interper-
sonal Relationships as Developed in the Client-
centered Framework. Volume 3, pages 184-256 in
Sigmund Koch (editor), Psychology: A Study of a
Science. New York: McGraw-Hill.
1961 On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of
Psychotherapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
(1967) 1976 ROGERS, CARL R. (editor) The Therapeu-
tic Relationship and Its Impact: A Study of Psycho-
therapy With Schizophrenics. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
1969 Freedom to Learn: A View of What Education
Might Become. Columbus: Merrill.
1970 Carl Rogers on Encounter Groups. New York:
Harper. —» A paperback edition was published in
1973.
1972 Becoming Partners: Marriage and Its Alterna-
tives. New York: Delacorte.
1977 Carl Rogers on Personal Power. New York:
Delacorte.
ROPER, ELMO
The 1936 presidential election marked the
first national application of modern sampling
methods to preelection polling. Instead of rely-
ing upon the weight of large numbers to pro-
vide accuracy, which was the method used by
straw polls, such as the up to then prestigious
Literary Digest poll, Elmo Roper, George Gallup,
and Archibald Crossley based their polls on
relatively small samples selected in a manner
intended to yield representative cross-sections of
the electorate. All 3 correctly forecast Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt's landslide victory over Alfred
Landon (Roper being within 1 percentage point
of the actual vote), while the Literary Digest
predicted a Landon victory margin of 19 per-
centage points. This demonstration of the ac-
curacy of small representative samples was the
start of the now flourishing political polling in-
dustry, which has become an integral part of
the "managerial" style of political campaigning
characteristic of the 1970s.
Little in Roper's prior career presaged his
eminence in election and public opinion polling.
A former jewelry salesman who had entered
market research, Roper had no specific back-
ground in public opinion. Born July 31, 1900, in
Hebron, Nebraska, he had studied at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota and the University of Edin-
burgh without completing his degree. After leav-
ing Edinburgh, he opened a jewelry store in
Creston, Iowa, where he discovered that he
could increase sales by talking to customers to
determine their styling preferences. In early
1929, he closed his store and went to work as a
route salesman first for the Thomas Clock Com-
ROPER, ELMO 675
pany, later the New Haven Clock Company, and
then the Traub Manufacturing Company. As he
advanced into sales management, Roper applied
his earlier experience in talking to retail cus-
tomers to sales forecasting by seeking retailer
reactions to the various product lines under
consideration. He discovered that this method
yielded far more accurate sales forecasts than
did the "informed" judgments of his associates.
By 1933 he was in New York, where he soon
teamed up with Paul Cherrington, of the Har-
vard Business School, and Richardson Wood, an
advertising writer from the J. Walter Thompson
Company, to form a market consulting firm.
(Wood left the firm in 1936 and Cherrington in
1938. In 1952, Carol Crusius and Elmo Roper's
son, Burns, became partners in the firm. Elmo
Roper retired from the firm in 1967, four years
before his death on April 30, 1971.)
Roper's primary responsibility with the new
firm was to conduct market studies in which he
applied the techniques that he had used in de-
veloping jewelry sales forecasts. These tech-
niques became a hallmark of his approach to
both marketing and public opinion research-
namely, reliance upon a small, highly trained
interviewing staff, most of whom worked only
for him, and upon a relatively qualitative prob-
ing of attitudes. Initially, Roper did all the field
work himself, but heavy work loads soon made
it necessary to hire a small staff to supplement
his own field investigations. To be sure that the
staff covered all the points that he would, Roper
prepared lists of questions for them to ask. To
control the selection of the subjects whom the
field investigators would interview, he developed
guidelines from a careful examination of census
data. Out of this process emerged the survey
method of using formal questionnaires with
quota samples.
A combination of commercial utility and
Roper's long-standing interest in politics led to
the founding of the Fortune poll and Roper's
successful entry into preelection polling. In
1935 Henry Luce engaged Roper's firm to con-
duct the first of a series of public opinion sur-
veys, which became a regular feature in For-
tune magazine through September 1950. As the
1936 election approached, Roper felt that these
surveys provided him with an excellent oppor-
tunity to demonstrate the accuracy of the
methods he had been using in his market
studies.
A particular method Roper employed in the
676 ROPER, ELMO
1936 polls, and one that he continued to use in
subsequent election years, was a four-point ver-
bal attitude scale, which he preferred to a direct
preference question. Roper's use of verbal atti-
tude scales contrasted with the characteristic
Gallup method, which relied upon dichotomous
questions designed to measure the way public
opinion splits during an election or on an issue.
Roper believed that in the tense political climate
of 1936 many working-class Roosevelt adher-
ents would be reluctant to admit a voting prefer-
ence for Roosevelt. In fact, the method did
produce a low undecided vote, apparently be-
cause many were willing to rate Roosevelt
moderately favorably on a scale, even though
they were hesitant to say they would vote for
him.
Roper's use of quota sampling methods was
common to public opinion polls throughout the
1930s and 1940s and was the target of intense
criticism from researchers such as Rensis
Likert, who were pioneering the application of
area probability sampling to surveys of human
populations. These criticisms, however, had
little impact as long as polls based on quota
samples produced results that were close esti-
mates of actual voting behavior. In 1940 Roper's
final preelection poll was one-half of one per
cent off the mark, and in 1944, two-tenths of
one per cent. In September 1948 Roper an-
nounced that in light of Thomas E. Dewey's
then sizable lead over Harry S. Truman, there
was no purpose in conducting another poll of
voter preference; Roper's decision was based on
his experience in the 1936, 1940, and 1944
elections, which had indicated that most voters
had decided early in the campaign whether they
would vote for Roosevelt or for his Republican
opponent. (In October, Gallup and Crossley also
decided not to conduct a final survey.) How-
ever, postelection analyses indicated that Tru-
man's victory was the result of many voters
either changing their minds or deciding late, so
that it was not until the final week of the cam-
paign that Truman took the lead.
The fact that all the major preelection polls
had forecast a Dewey victory created a storm of
public criticism and placed the entire survey
profession in question. The Social Science Re-
search Council established a special committee
to investigate the polls and their methods.
Roper, along with Gallup and Crossley, co-
operated fully in this investigation. The pollers
themselves became most concerned with ways
of measuring last-minute trends, identifying
likely voters, and allocating undecided voters,
while outside critics, like Likert, focused much
of their criticism on the use of quota sampling
methods. The lasting results of the 1948 experi-
ence included the eventual acceptance of the
superiority of probability sampling over quota
sampling, though various versions of "modified
probability" sampling continued to be used by
some. More generally, the 1948 experience led
to a more sober appreciation of the methodologi-
cal pitfalls of election polling—especially the
need to measure changes in voter preferences
during the course of a campaign, rather than
to treat poll results as forecasts.
Roper's role in public opinion research. It
was probably through his network of personal re-
lationships that Roper made his greatest impact
on the developing field of public opinion re-
search. This is manifest in the roster of people
who worked with and for him over the years,
including Raymond Franzen, Solomon Dutka,
Louis Harris, John Kraft, Alfred Politz, Oliver
Quayle, Robert Pratt, Robert Petty, Julian L.
Woodward, and Elmo Wilson. He wrote little
for the academic world, preferring rather to
direct his writing to national business and opin-
ion leaders and to the general public in such
publications as Fortune, the New York Herald
Tribune, and the Saturday Review of Literature.
Although Roper's formal relationship with
academia was limited to a short period in the
1940s, when he served as an assistant professor,
giving occasional lectures, at the Columbia Uni-
versity Graduate School of Journalism, he al-
ways maintained close personal ties with the
academic world, most notably with Paul F.
Lazarsfeld, who served as a consultant to Roper
during the late 1940s and early 1950s. These
contacts had a dual impact. On the one hand,
they provided a channel whereby Roper was
kept up to date on theoretical developments; on
the other hand, the academic world was en-
riched by access to Roper data. A major contri-
bution to academic research was his founding
of the Roper Research Center at Williams Col-
lege, a data archive that has made commercial
research data available for secondary analysis.
During the years immediately preceding
World War n and during the war itself, policy
makers first made effective use of public opin-
ion polls. An early instance was Roosevelt's de-
cision in 1941 to sell destroyers to Great Britain
for its campaign against the German U-boats.
In the intense conflict between interventionists
and isolationists, there was considerable doubt

as to congressional acceptance of this sale. Pub-
lic opinion polls were conducted by Roper and
Gallup, and on the basis of these polls Roosevelt
decided that it was politically safe to complete
the sale.
The early war years were also marked by
Roper's association at high policy levels with
such government agencies as the Office of Pro-
duction Management and the Office of Facts
and Figures. He served as deputy director for
the Office of Coordinator of Information and,
later, as deputy director for the Office of Stra-
tegic Services. He was a "dollar-a-year" man for
the Office of War Information and was instru-
mental in setting up its survey operations. An
important contact made during this period was
Henry Ford n whom he served briefly as an
unpaid consultant. A strong internationalist,
Roper joined the Atlantic Union after the war
and campaigned vigorously in favor of the Sen-
ate resolution that sent a lay group to the 1951
North Atlantic Treaty Organization conference.
In all of his associations with those in de-
cision-making positions, Roper endorsed the
application of survey research in the search for
solutions to problems of public and business
policy. Thus his association with Ford led to his
membership on the Fund for the Republic's
board of directors, where he was instrumental
in obtaining funding for Samuel A. Stouffer's
monumental study of the McCarthy era, Com-
munism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (1955).
Similarly, his interest in population problems
led to his active promotion of survey research in
this area.
Roper's personality was perhaps the greatest
source of his influence. His dedication to prin-
ciple persuaded others of his integrity whether
or not they agreed with him. Friendly, gregar-
ious, an effective "soft-sell" salesman, he could
also be an aggressive critic of those who he felt
had in some way violated professional standards
of performance and ethics—in marketing as well
as public opinion research. This concern en-
gaged him in bitter controversy and on occasion
disrupted amicable and even profitable associa-
tions. While a director of the Fund for the Re-
public, Roper voted with the other members of
the board to retain Robert M. Hutchins as presi-
dent of the fund, in direct opposition to Henry
Ford n. This move led to a personal break with
Ford and the eventual loss of what had been a
lucrative business relationship between Roper's
research firm and the Ford Motor Company.
Another instance was his criticism of Louis
ROPER, ELMO 677
Harris' role in the 1960 presidential primaries,
which culminated in a heated exchange at the
1960 annual conference of the American Asso-
ciation for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR).
In the commercial field, Roper presented a
dramatic criticism of what he felt were the ex-
cesses of motivation research, this time at the
1956 annual conference of AAPOR.
Roper did not believe that the role of the
researcher was that of uninvolved observer and
analyst. He felt that his role as researcher would
be most effectively implemented if he was in-
volved in the policy-making process itself. This
posture did not reflect a desire to bias or influence
results but stemmed rather from his feeling
that the effective use of research was contingent
upon the researcher's involvement in the policy-
making process. He sought out people who were
involved and interested in the important issues
facing society and business. He took people seri-
ously and felt a responsibility for solving client
problems not by conducting "interesting" re-
search, but by providing them with straightfor-
ward answers and explanations. Not a method-
ologist or theoretician himself, he was eager for
the guidance of sophisticated professionals.
Most significantly, Roper was a highly effective
salesman for the application of survey research
in decision making at the highest policy levels.
IRVING CUES PI
WORKS BY ROPER
1936 Forecasting Election Returns. Review of Reviews
94, Oct.: 58-59.
1937a Neutral Opinion on the Court Proposal. Public
Opinion Quarterly 1, no. 3:17-20.
1937k Supreme Court Opinion. Literary Digest 124,
July 31:23-24.
1940a Wording Questions for the Polls. Public Opinion
Quarterly 4:129-130.
1940k Classifying Respondents by Economic Status.
Public Opinion Quarterly 4:270-272.
1941 Checks to Improve Polling Accuracy. Public
Opinion Quarterly 5:87—90.
1942a So the Blind Shall Not Lead. Fortune 25, Feb.:
102 only.
1942k What Americans Believe. Rotarian 60:1 Off.
1943 So the Willing Shall Not Want. Survey Graphic
32:169-170,233.
1944a Polls and the Election. New Republic 111:662-
663.
1944b What American Labor Wants. American Mer-
cury 58:180-184.
1944 ROPER, ELMO; and DAVENPORT, WALTER Can the
GOP Win? Colliers 114, July 1:20, 68.
1945 Tenth Anniversary of Fortune Survey of Public
Opinion. Fortune 32, July:263 only.
1946 New York Elects O'Dwyer. Public Opinion Quar-
terly 10:53-56.
1947 Survey Pitfalls. Fortune 35, April: 6, 12, 16, 25.
1949 Only Hope for the G.O.P. Nation 168:297-299.
1951 ROPER, ELMO; and WOODWARD, JULIAN L. The
678 ROSE, ARNOLD M.
Effective Public for Plant-Community Public Rela-
tions Effort. Public Opinion Quarterly 15:624-634.
1953 American Attitudes on World Organization.
Public Opinion Quarterly 17:405—442.
1957 The Client Over the Years. Public Opinion Quar-
terly 21:28-32.
1959 Lightly Travelled Road to Wisdom. NEA Journal
48, April:9 only.
1965a College Ambitions and Parental Planning. Pub-
lic Opinion Quarterly 25:159-166.
1965b The Politics of Three Decades. Public Opinion
Quarterly 29:368-376.
ROSE, ARNOLD M.
Arnold Marshall Rose (1917-1968), presi-
dent elect of the American Sociological Associa-
tion and professor of sociology at the University
of Minnesota at the time of his death, was born
in Chicago on July 2, 1917, to Frank A. and
Ruth (Wilamsky) Rose, pharmacists. At the
University of Chicago, he earned his A.B. in so-
ciology (1938), his A.B. in economics (1939),
and his M.A. (1940) and PH.D. (1946) in soci-
ology.
As a graduate student assistant to Samuel A.
Stouffer, Rose was employed on the Carnegie-
Myrdal study of the American Negro as well as
on the War Department study of the American
soldier. Thus, even before he earned his PH.D.
Rose had been one of the coauthors of an out-
standing study of America's foremost social
problem, and had gained experience on the most
famous research project of the immediate post-
war period. In December 1942 he married
Caroline Baer, a Chicago graduate student, who
had also been employed on the Myrdal project.
The shaping influences on Arnold Rose were
Herbert Blumer, under whom he prepared his
master's thesis and who supplied his symbolic
interactionist perspective; Samuel Stouffer, who
provided his basic research experience in the
use of field data gathered by questionnaire;
Gunnar Myrdal, who instilled in him the habit
of exploring social issues by the survey of major
authorities and the collection and collation of
published facts; and Louis Wirth, his doctoral
sponsor, who inspired an enduring interest in
power and politics.
Rose established his lifetime pattern of re-
search, writing, and teaching early in his career.
After teaching at Bennington College for one
year, he accepted an appointment as associate
professor of sociology at Washington University
in St. Louis. With a grant from the American
Jewish Committee, he researched Studies in Re-
duction of Prejudice (1947). The following year
he published The Negro in America (1948), a
popular condensation of An American Dilem-
ma (Myrdal 1944), and with Caroline Rose,
America Divided (Rose & Rose 1948), in which
they applied the skills they had acquired on the
Myrdal project to the problems of all minorities.
After joining the faculty of the University of
Minnesota in 1949, he continued his research
into prejudice and discrimination, publishing
The Negro's Morale (1949), The Roots of Preju-
dice (1951/?), and a book of readings, Race,
Prejudice and Discrimination (195 la). He
spent 1951 in France on a Fulbright research
scholarship.
Arnold Rose was catapulted to prominence by
An American Dilemma, the single most im-
portant book of his career. Nine of his other
books developed directly from it, either by con-
tinuing exploration of its themes or by applying
its method to closely related problems. In time,
he applied the methods he learned as a member
of Myrdal's team to other social issues.
By 1957, at the age of 40, Rose had reached
the fullness of his powers, and though he con-
tinued to publish at the same rate as previously,
he decided to enter active politics. Rose's role in
the Myrdal study was a major factor in his
successful election to the Minnesota legislature
for a two-year term beginning in 1962. As a re-
sult of attacks upon him by an extremist group
for his role in An American Dilemma, he filed
a libel suit in 1964, which he won in district
court but lost on appeal to the Minnesota su-
preme court (Rose 1968a). He died of cancer on
January 2, 1968.
As Myrdal understood the assignment from
the Carnegie Corporation, it was to provide a
status report on the black minority in the United
States. He corresponded with and interviewed
hundreds of authorities on all aspects of black
life, commissioned dozens of special mono-
graphs, and with his assistants, including Rose,
undertook the integration of all published and
especially collected material. Myrdal then con-
fronted the American liberal ethos, a combina-
tion of moralism and rationalism that was
largely a cultural product of its Protestant heri-
tage, with the social, economic, political, and
educational realities of American Negro life.
The American liberal had either to face up to
the public policy implications or remain pub-
lically convicted of hypocrisy.
An American Dilemma was a challenge to
liberals and opened a new era in American mi-
nority relations. Hubert H. Humphrey launched

a career in national politics in 1949 on a plat-
form supporting civil rights for blacks, partly
in response to the challenge of the book. In
1954 the Warren Court cited the book in a foot-
note to its landmark decision in Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka (347 U.S. 483).
It is hardly surprising that Rose's association
with the book opened all doors to him.
The character and quality of Rose's personal
contribution to the understanding of race, mi-
norities, and prejudice may be seen in his con-
clusions to The Negro's Morale and The Roots
of Prejudice. He claimed that a growing group
identification with accompanying self-conscious-
ness among blacks had increased their self-
confidence and aided in their development of
effective protest organizations. They had be-
come aware of events that affected them both at
home and abroad, had learned to make their
vote count, and had stated their intention to
demand their full rights in a democracy (1949,
pp. 141-145). Prejudice, Rose maintained,
harms its supporters financially and psycho-
logically. Its influence may be reduced by the
dissemination of accurate information, by the
elimination of racial stereotypes, by legislation
to prohibit discrimination, by education, by the
solution to major social problems, by the demon-
stration that fears of minorities are groundless,
and by the cultivation of a healthy personality
(1951k, pp. 39-41).
In the 1950s Rose branched out and applied
similar methods—summarizing current knowl-
edge and presenting it for consideration to the
liberal conscience—to the problems of the men-
tally ill and the elderly. As in the case of the
blacks, he was one of the first to bring these
issues to the attention of researchers and policy
makers.
In the 1960s, he studied power and politics,
areas of interest that dated back to his work
under Louis Wirth. In The Power Structure
(1967) Rose challenged the contention by
C. Wright Mills (1956) and Floyd Hunter
(1953; 1959) that power in America is elite
dominated, with a view similar to that of politi-
cal scientists Robert A. Dahl and Nelson Polsby
that power in the United States is diffuse, multi-
dimensional, and more political than economic
in character. Again Rose had adopted the cen-
tral liberal position.
While Rose did not contribute to or transform
a single major idea in contemporary sociology,
he became the most eminent sociologist at the
University of Minnesota, president of the So-
ROSE, ARNOLD M. 679
ciety for Social Problems (1956), president of
the Midwest Sociological Society (1962), and
president elect of the American Sociological As-
sociation (1968). He was interested in prob-
lems and issues, not in theories or methodolo-
gies. He was a liberal with faith in principles
rather than in people. Although he was preoc-
cupied with the new, he studiously avoided the
avant-garde. In social issues, always his primary
concern, Rose quickly found the conventional
liberal center. He saw in legislation and educa-
tion the source of orderly progress, was an un-
wavering apostle of the welfare state, and
looked to the law for a resolution of all conflicts.
He was the paradigm of the liberal social sci-
entist who found his primary mission in the
organization of known facts on social issues for
policy consideration and the identification of
spheres where further research may be needed.
During his academic life Arnold Rose advised
or coadvised 16 people through the doctorate.
His bibliography comprises more than 20 books
and 150 articles. The ultimate idealist, he
placed public service even above family and
gave the bulk of his estate for the establishment
of the Arnold and Caroline Rose Fund for the
Publication of Scholarly Monographs.
DON MARTINDALE
WORKS BY ROSE
(1947) 1948 Studies in Reduction of Prejudice: A
Memorandum Summarizing Research on Modifica-
tion of Attitudes. 2d ed. Chicago: American Council
on Race Relations.
(1948) 1956 The Negro in America. 2d ed. Boston:
Beacon..—> A paperback edition was published in
1964 by Harper.
1948 ROSE, ARNOLD M.; and ROSE, CAROLINE B.
America Divided: Minority Group Relations in the
United States. New York: Knopf.
1949 The Negro's Morale: Group Identification and
Protest. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press.
1950 MERRILL, FRANCIS E:, et al. Social Problems.
New York: Knopf. —» Written in collaboration with
H. Warren Dunham, Paul W. Tappan, and Arnold M.
Rose.
195la ROSE, ARNOLD M. (editor) Race, Prejudice and
Discrimination: Readings in Intergroup Relations
in the United States. New York: Knopf.
1951k The Roots of Prejudice. Paris: UNESCO.
1952 Union Solidarity: The Internal Cohesion of a
Labor Union. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota
Press.
(1954) 1974 Theory and Method in the Social Sci-
ences. New York: Greenwood.
1955 ROSE, ARNOLD M. (editor) Mental Health and
Mental Disorder: A Sociological Approach. New
York: Norton.
(1956) 1970 Sociology: The Study of Human Rela-
tions. 3d ed., rev. New York: Knopf. —> Revised by
Caroline B. Rose.
1958 ROSE, ARNOLD M. (editor) The Institutions of Ad-
680 ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, PAUL N.
vanced Societies. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota
Press.
1962 ROSE, ARNOLD M. (editor) Human Behavior and
Social Processes: An Interactionist Approach. Bos-
ton: Hough ton Mifflin.
1963 MINNESOTA, PLANNING COMMITTEE FOR THE
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING Aging in
Minnesota. Edited by Arnold M. Rose. Minneapolis:
Univ. of Minnesota Press.
1964 Assuring Freedom of the Free: A Century of
Emancipation in the USA. With an introduction by
Lyndon B. Johnson. Detroit: Wayne State Univ.
Press.
1965 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE, PHILADELPHIA The Negro Protest. Edited
by Arnold M. Rose. Philadelphia: The Academy.
—> Its Annals volume 357.
1965 ROSE, ARNOLD M.; and PETERSON, WARREN A.
(editors) Older People and Their Social World: The
Sub-culture of the Aging. Philadelphia: Davis.
(1965) 1972 ROSE, ARNOLD M.; and ROSE, CAROLINE B.
(editors) Minority Problems: A Textbook of Read-
ings in Intergroup Relations. 2d ed. New York:
Harper.
1967 The Power Structure: Political Process in Ameri-
can Society. New York: Oxford.
1968a Libel and Academic Freedom: A Lawsuit Against
Political Extremists. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minne-
sota Press.
1968k Minorities. Volume 10, pages 365-371 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1969 Migrants in Europe: Problems of Acceptance and
Adjustment. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
HUNTER, FLOYD 1953 Community Power Structure:
A Study of Decision Makers. Chapel Hill: Univ. of
North Carolina Press.
HUNTER, FLOYD 1959 Top Leadership, U.S.A. Chapel
Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press.
MILLS, C. WRIGHT 1956 The Power Elite. New York:
Oxford.
MYRDAL, GUNNAR (1944) 1962 An American Di-
lemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democ-
racy. New York: Harper. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1964 by McGraw-Hill.
STOUFFER, SAMUEL A. et al. 1949 The American Sol-
dier. 2 vols. Studies in Social Psychology in World
War II. Prepared and edited under the auspices of
a special committee of the Social Science Research
Council. Princeton Univ. Press. —> Volume 1: Ad-
justment During Army Life. Volume 2: Combat and
Its Aftermath.
ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, PAUL N.
Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, who was born in
1902, helped found and became one of the
leaders of the field of development economics
that emerged at the end of World War u. He
began his professional career in 1925, working
on the frontiers of the Austrian theory of con-
sumer demand. However, starting in the early
1940s, Rosenstein-Rodan concentrated on eco-
nomic development issues. The change also
marked a shift from pure economic theory to
applied economics. The series of hypotheses that
he later offered to characterize growth problems
in developing countries contrasted sharply with
the stylized economic facts conventionally ac-
cepted, and led development analysis in new
directions. He became one of the leading ad-
visers on economic policy toward and within
developing countries, and in that role dealt in-
creasingly with financial and international de-
velopment assistance issues. Yet in many of his
contributions to the development literature, it is
possible to trace the working out of several
fertile concepts that were among his first pre-
occupations in economics: complementarity in
consumption and production, the time sequence
of economic adjustments, economies of scale in
production, and economic planning.
Rosenstein-Rodan began his studies in physi-
cal chemistry at the University of Lausanne, but
returned to the University of Vienna to study
economics. His early training in a physical sci-
ence gave him a familiarity with mathematics
and an analytic approach that was then rare
among economists. While earning his doctorate
in economics at the University of Vienna, he
became one of the proteges of Hans Mayer, the
resident heir to Friedrich von Wieser as a leader
of the Austrian school. As the practical director
of the project that produced the massive four-
volume survey of the status of current economic
analysis, Wirtschaftstheorie der Gegenwart,
Rosenstein-Rodan acquired the wide knowledge
of the history of economic thought that became
a hallmark of his career.
Understandably following the interests of his
teachers, Rosenstein-Rodan's attention turned
first to the theory of consumer demand and
price determination. His first article, "Marginal
Utility" (1927), was a comprehensive, analyti-
cal review of consumer utility and demand
theory. The article devoted particular attention
to complementary relationships among goods
demanded by consumers and was further elab-
orated in "La Complementarieta" (1933). Such
goods are "cooperating" in the sense that a de-
crease in the price of one good will shift the
entire demand schedules of its complements,
tending to increase quantities demanded at any
price.
Rosenstein-Rodan's early work also showed
the influence of Philip H. Wicksteed on the Aus-
trian school, especially Wicksteed's stress on
understanding economic phenomena as pro-
cesses occurring over time rather than as static

configurations. Following ideas raised by this
line of thought, Rosenstein-Rodan in 1929 pub-
lished "Das Zeitmoment in der Mathematischen
Theorie des Wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichtes."
This was elaborated in "The Role of Time in
Economic Theory," after Rosenstein-Rodan
moved to the University College of the Univer-
sity of London in 1934. Although the argument
is somewhat sketchy and the conditions for
alternative possible patterns of behavior are not
worked out, the article lends support to the con-
jecture by Lionel Robbins that Rosenstein-Rodan
was the first to develop the theory of cobweb
price-quantity adjustments over time. In this
theory, prices in one period determine the quan-
tity supplied in the subsequent period, and those
quantities, with demand, determine prices at a
level that will clear the amount supplied in the
market. Rosenstein-Rodan himself credits a num-
ber of predecessors for independently formulat-
ing the theory and describing the conditions for
stable or unstable price-quantity behavior.
On his arrival in England in 1931, after a
period as a Rockefeller fellow in Italy, Rosen-
stein-Rodan was exposed to the intense discus-
sion of the nature and significance of economies
of scale and external effects. These concepts,
which were subsequently to become central ele-
ments in the intellectual structure with which
Rosenstein-Rodan approached development eco-
nomic issues, had been the central focus of a
famous speech and article by Allyn Young shortly
after he took a chair in 1928 at the London
School of Economics. The first concept associ-
ates reductions in unit costs with increasing
levels of production. The latter related changes
in revenues or costs in a particular firm with
activities outside the firm whose influences are
not fully transmitted through conventional mar-
ket channels.
A further element, one that appeared in
Rosenstein-Rodan's first article, was submerged
for some time and then reappeared often in the
context of development policy. It is contained
in his early sentence, "An economic plan aims
at the selection of the most suitable allocation
of goods. Since the allocations of all goods are
closely linked by the latter's psychological and
technical complementarity the process of se-
lection must be unitary and systematic" ([1927]
1960, p. 76). Although this sentence was writ-
ten with respect to the formulation of consump-
tion decisions by an individual, it has a natural
extension to planning on a national scale; read
in that way, it could have appeared in any of
ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, PAUL N, 681
Rosenstein-Rodan's writings on development
policy after 1940. The reasoning is much like
that expressed by Irving Fisher in The Rate of
Interest (1907), a classic well known to the
Austrian school.
The concepts of complementarity, economies
of scale, externalities, and planning were
brought together in the seminal article on eco-
nomic development, "Problems of Industrializa-
tion of Eastern and South-eastern Europe"
(1943), written during World War n, when
Rosenstein-Rodan was a member of the Eco-
nomic Group of the Committee on Reconstruc-
tion of the Royal Institute of Economic Affairs.
He argued that development requires a program
that, by encompassing the entire economy,
would satisfy the requirements of complemen-
tarity in consumption and production; the broad
range of outputs generated would guarantee
that the production of any single type of com-
modity would be met by consumption and/or
production demands created in other sectors of
the economy. According to Rosenstein-Rodan,
the economy-wide growth of output would also
generate positive externalities through the re-
duction of the risk and uncertainty of individual
producers. However, Rosenstein-Rodan argued
that development programs, rather than pro-
ceeding in small, though widespread, incre-
mental steps, should be on a scale large enough
to benefit from the lower costs that accompany
higher rates of production. Finally, it was
deemed necessary to have a minimum amount
of over-all development planning for coordina-
tion of investment programs in order to achieve
the benefits of complementarities, external econ-
omies, and economies of scale.
In 1947 Rosenstein-Rodan moved from his
position as head of the department of political
economy at the University College of the Univer-
sity of London, to the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (IBRD), where he
became the assistant director of the economics
department and head of the economic advisory
staff. While at the bank, he concentrated first on
the economic issues in the reconstruction of the
war-damaged European economies and then,
increasingly, on the problems of developing
countries. Again, his emphasis on the comple-
mentarities in consumption and production was
evident in his advocacy within the bank of "pro-
gram" loans, rather than restriction of bank
lending to "project" loans. The former support
over-all development plans and projects that are
conceived within such plans, while the latter
682 ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, PAUL N.
rest only on the viability of the individual un-
dertakings.
Rosenstein-Rodan's move in 1952 to the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) gave
him the opportunity to consider development
issues from an even broader viewpoint. He form-
ulated more explicitly, in the theory of the "Big
Push," the argument that development success
required an effort large enough to achieve the
advantages of both economies of scale and the
requirements of complementarity. He also fur-
ther elaborated the concept of "disguised unem-
ployment," the absorption of labor in activities
with low, even negligible productivity that, how-
ever, would hide or disguise the lack of oppor-
tunities for productive employment.
Rosenstein-Rodan's research, even after leav-
ing the IBRD, was tied closely to development
policy. In his role as director of the Italy Project
of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies,
he contributed to the analysis that formed the
basis for the Vanoni Plan, prepared in 1955 to
guide Italy's development for the next ten years.
As director of projects in India and Chile, he
similarly concentrated on the basic macroeco-
nomic forecasting and accounting of the ag-
gregate demand for and supply of investible
resources. In these activities Rosenstein-Rodan
played the role of informal adviser as well as
independent research director. His article "Al-
ternative Numerical Models of the Third Five
Year Plan of India" (1964) reflects this dual po-
sition well. It formulated the essential macro-
economic balance equations that formed the
rationale for the Third Plan and drew on his
extensive experience to evaluate the plan's feasi-
bility. The analysis in the article helped to pro-
vide the basis for the intensive debate waged
over the Third Plan.
In 1961 Rosenstein-Rodan developed a new
estimate of the amount of foreign economic as-
sistance that could be used with reasonable
levels of productivity in developing countries.
He reviewed the position and potential perfor-
mance of each of the developing countries, tak-
ing into account their "absorptive capacity"—
that is, their ability to use capital effectively—as
well as the marginal productivity of capital
and the growth of domestic savings with in-
come. The new estimate was within the range
of the assistance that might plausibly be forth-
coming and, as a result, helped transform for-
eign aid policy from a somewhat hopeless hu-
manitarian gesture to a realistic means of
ameliorating poverty in developing countries.
Rosenstein-Rodan also contributed more di-
rectly to economic policy formation in develop-
ing countries by serving on a number of national
and international bodies concerned with these
issues, such as the panel of experts, the "Nine
Wise Men," of the Alliance for Progress from
1961 to 1966. After retiring from M.I.T. he
moved to the University of Texas in 1968 and
then in 1972 to Boston University, where he
founded the Center for Latin American Develop-
ment Studies and continued his work in de-
velopment policy.
RICHARD S. ECKAUS
WORKS BY ROSENSTEIN-RODAN
(1927) 1960 Marginal Utility. Pages 71-106 in Inter-
national Economic Papers, No. 10. London and New
York: Macmillan. —» First published as "Grenznut-
zen" in volume 4 of the Handworterbuch der Staats-
wissenschaften.
1929 Das Zeitmoment in der Mathematischen Theorie
des Wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichtes. Zeitschrift
fur Nationalokonomie 1:129-142.
1933 La Complementarieta: Prirna delle Tre Fase del
Progresso della Teoria Economica Pura. Riforma
Sociale 44:257-308.
1934 The Role of Time in Economic Theory. Econo-
mica New Series 1:77-97.
1943 Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and
South-eastern Europe. Economic Journal 53:202-
211.
1956 Disguised Unemployment and Under-employment
in Agriculture. Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, Center for International Studies, Publications
List, No. 13. Cambridge, Mass.: The Center.
1961 International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries.
Review of Economics and Statistics 43:107-138.
1963 Notes on the Theory of the "Big Push." Pages 57-
67 in International Economic Association, Economic
Development for Latin America: Proceedings of a
Conference Held By the International Economic As-
sociation. Edited by Howard S. Ellis. London: Mac-
millan; New York: St. Martins. —» Conference held
at Rio de Janeiro, August 19-28, 1957.
1964 Alternative Numerical Models of the Third Five
Year Plan of India. Pages 23-32 in Paul N. Rosen-
stein-Rodan (editor), Capital Formation and Eco-
nomic Development. Studies in the Economic Devel-
opment of India, No. 2. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.
Press.
1969 Criteria for Evaluation of National Development
Effort. Journal of Developmental Planning 1:1-13.
1972 The Have's and the Have-Not's Around the Year
2000. Pages 29-42 in Jagdish N. Bhagwati (editor),
Economics and World Order From the 1970's to the
1990's. New York: Macmillan.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BHAGWATI, JAGDISH N.; and ECKAUS, RICHARD S. (edi-
tors) (1972) 1973 Development and Planning:
Essays in Honour of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
FISHER, IRVING 1907 The Rate of Interest: Its Na-
ture, Determination and Relation to Economic Phe-
nomena. New York: Macmillan.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND
Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-
1970), British philosopher, mathematical logi-
cian, social theorist, and social activist, has
exerted an enormous influence on philosophers
of the twentieth century. From 1890 to 1894
Russell studied mathematics and philosophy at
Trinity College, Cambridge. Henry Sidgwick,
James Ward, and G. F. Stout were his philos-
ophy teachers. Russell was a fellow of Trinity
College from 1895 to 1901 and lecturer in phi-
losophy from 1910 to 1916. Because of his op-
position to World War i, he was dismissed from
Trinity College and later served a term in jail.
During the last years of his life, Russell was
an energetic opponent of United States involve-
ment in Vietnam. From 1916 to 1938, when
Russell held no academic post, he wrote and
lectured extensively.
Influenced by J. M. E. McTaggart, who for a
time was a close friend of Russell, and F. H.
Bradley, an Oxford University philosopher whose
work he came to know through Stout, Russell
started out more or less as a disciple of the British
version of Hegelian idealism. Under Ward's guid-
ance Russell learned to respect Kant as well,
but he was soon led away from absolute idealism
and Kant by his fellow student, G. E. Moore.
For a time, Russell shared Moore's Platonism
with respect to universals and sympathized with
Moore's realism and reliance on common sense
regarding the existence and properties of the
external world. Russell's little classic, The Prob-
lems of Philosophy (1912), and the much
longer, Principles of Mathematics (1903), were
written during Russell's Platonistic period.
Russell's own distinctive philosophical style
may be called "logical constructionism." Logical
constructionism has an epistemological and a
metaphysical application. The fundamental
principle of Russell's logical constructionism
is: "Whenever possible, substitute constructions
out of known entities for inferences to unknown
entities." Logical constructions are Russellian
philosophical analyses. The epistemological ap-
plication of the principle constitutes Russell's
philosophy of science; its metaphysical applica-
tion yields Russell's version of logical atomism,
which differs in important ways from the logical
atomism in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus
logico-philosophicus (1921).
According to Russell, epistemological prob-
lems arise whenever we find we do not have
adequate justification for believing what we
RUSSELL, BERTRAND 683
believe with respect to a certain domain of en-
tities. We may be unclear about the nature of
the entities involved, and we may not be con-
fident that they exist. The aim of the epis-
temologist is to construct this body of knowledge
in terms of relations among entities that are
simpler, less questionable, and less puzzling.
The body of putative knowledge can thereby be
better understood and justified.
In order to see Russell's epistemological ap-
plication of the principle of logical construc-
tionism in its proper setting, it is necessary to
note, first, that for Russell, as for a number of
his illustrious predecessors, such as Descartes,
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, the funda-
mental problems of epistemology are to be
located in what either science or common sense
suppose to be true. For philosophers of this per-
suasion, epistemology is the critique of science
and common sense. As to science, and this is
the second point to keep in mind, there is, on the
one hand, science as a body of putative knowl-
edge, and, on the other hand, science as scien-
tific method, i.e., a congeries of procedures,
presuppositions, assumptions, reasonings upon
which science as a body of putative knowledge
rests. Until 1948 Russell's epistemology almost
exclusively addressed itself to logically recon-
structing science as a body of knowledge. In
1948 Russell published Human Knowledge: Its
Scope and Limits. The principal task of that
book is to examine the method of science, and
most importantly to look into the problem of
the nature and justification of nondemonstra-
tive inference, e.g., induction.
The first application of the technique of logi-
cal constructionism is in Principia Mathematica
(1910-1913) which Russell coauthored with
Whitehead. This landmark of mathematical
logic attempts to show how all of the concepts
of pure mathematics are "reducible to," "an-
alyzable into," "constructive from," a very few
logical concepts. Logic, as conceived in Prin-
cipia Mathematica, is that realm of discourse
the basic vocabulary of which can be reduced
to three locutions: "all," "neither-nor," and "is
a member of." These three expressions are suf-
ficient for defining every expression that counts
as a logical expression and also for defining
every expression that belongs to pure mathe-
matics. Assuming that the basic concepts of
logic are clearer, less puzzling, and less prob-
lematic than those of pure mathematics, the
construction of mathematics from logic is an
instance of what Russell would view as a philo-
684 RUSSELL, BERTRAND
sophical step in the right direction. Thus, num-
ber is defined as a class of classes. The number
one is the class of all classes each of which is
such that if x and y are members of it, then
x and y are identical. Zero is the class that has
no members. There may be philosophical pro-
gress here, even if we are not entirely com-
fortable with classes as entities. Russell himself
was somewhat uneasy about them. In Principia
Mathematica classes in turn are constructed
from propositional functions, and these seem to
be themselves just as abstract as classes, and
perhaps just as puzzling. Nonetheless, progress
has been made provided that misgivings about
abstract entities, be they classes or propositional
functions, are less strong than confusions about
such things as numbers.
Next Russell applied the technique of logical
constructions to scientific and common sense
notions about physical objects. He attempted to
construct such theoretical scientific entities as
protons, quanta, mass, energy, and such com-
mon sense entities as sticks and stones, from
sense data of which we are supposed to be
immediately aware, so that there should be no
question about their existence and properties.
Russell attempted a similar reduction to sense
data of mental entities.
The metaphysical application of the principle
of logical constructionism resulted in logical
atomism. As a metaphysical thesis this is es-
sentially the claim that all of the ultimate fac-
tual constituents of reality are expressible in
atomic sentences and their truth-functional
compounds. An atomic sentence is exemplified
by: This is red.' A truth-functional compound
of two atomic sentences would be: This is red
and that is blue.' Russell's methodological com-
mitment to logical atomism did not prevent him
from seeing its shortcomings very early on.
When he came to the problem of understand-
ing the nature and justifiability of nondemon-
strative inference characteristic of the natural
sciences, Russell declared the inadequacy of
pure empiricism. His contribution consists of a
list of postulates that he does not try to defend
on empirical grounds alone. These postulates
entail a restricted form of the principle of in-
duction. The principle of induction itself may
be stated as follows: On the evidence that a
number of instances of As have been Bs, it is
probable that the next instance of A will be a B
or that all As are Bs. Russell's postulates are
meant to provide limitations on being A and
being B so as to make the principle true.
Russell's work in metaphysics and epistemol-
ogy is controversial. His great influence on
many of the most important philosophers of the
twentieth century is the result of the pro-
foundly stimulating way in which he conceived
of philosophical problems, the ingenuity and
technical virtuosity that he exercised, and the
clarity with which he spoke and wrote.
Russell was also seriously interested in peda-
gogy and social theory. In 1926, he published
On Education, Especially in Early Childhood,
and in 1927, with the help of his second wife,
Dora, he established a school for twenty chil-
dren, including two of his own. Its purpose was
to strike a balance between undue restraints on
the freedom of the children and complete ab-
sence of discipline, to provide instruction in
substantive subject matter, and to avoid re-
ligious instruction and prudery. Russell was
disappointed with this experiment.
Russell's social theory is in the liberal tra-
dition of John Stuart Mill, but with differences.
Russell believes that economic and political re-
form are sufficient for improving human rela-
tionships. He does not agree with Marx that
economic arrangements determine the political
order. Russell's liberalism is a theory about
means and ends. The end is to achieve "some
new system of society by which life may become
richer, more full of joy and less full of prevent-
able evils than it is at present." This quotation
from Proposed Roads to Freedom ([1918] 1919,
p. viii) is a representative statement. The
means is a social organization that performs
these functions efficiently. Such a society must
be socialist in its economy, for only thus can
the possessive (bad) impulses of man be curbed
and the creative (good) ones released. Here
Russell differs from Mill, who considered so-
cialism with care but did not adopt it. Russell
agrees with Mill that the politics of the good
society must be democratic.
In The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism
(1920), Russell predicted in detail the repres-
sive and reactionary features of the Soviet sys-
tem that developed under Stalin, and this at a
time when hardly anyone in the West had even
heard of Stalin. In 1929 Russell published Mar-
riage and Morals, in which he defended all of
the freedoms about sexual customs that liberals
take for granted nowadays. For his outspoken
good sense in these matters Russell was vilified
publicly and denied appointment at the City
College of New York. He was elected a mem-
ber of the Royal Society in 1908, and in 1950 he
was awarded the Nobel prize, nominally in lit-
erature, actually in well-deserved recognition of

his philosophical contributions. They are part
of the permanent record of achievement in
Western philosophy.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
WORKS BY RUSSELL
(1900) 1951 A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy
of Leibniz. 2d ed. London: Allen & Unwin.
(1903) 1938 The Principles of Mathematics. 2d ed.
New York: Norton.
(1910-1913) 1957 WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH; and
RUSSELL, BERTRAND Principia Mathematica. 2d ed.
Cambridge Univ. Press.
(1912) 1919 The Problems of Philosophy. Rev. & enl.
ed. New York: Holt.
(1914) 1929 Our Knowledge of the External World
as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. 2d ed. came a lecturer in philosophy at Christ Church
New York: Norton.
(1918) 1966 Proposed Roads to Freedom. New York:
Barnes & Noble. —> First published with the title
Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism, and Syn-
dicalism. Pages in the text refer to the 1919 edition.
(1919) 1920 Introduction to Mathematical Philos-
ophy. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan.
(1920) 1949 Bolshevism: Practice and Theory. 2d ed.
New York: Harcourt. —> First published as The
Practice and Theory of Bolshevism.
1921 The Analysis of Mind. London: Allen & Unwin.
1926 On Education, Especially in Early Childhood.
London: Allen & Unwin: New York: Boni & Live-
right. —» The New York edition has the title Educa-
tion and the Good Life and was published by Live-
right in a paperback edition in 1970.
(1927a) 1954 The Analysis of Matter. New York:
Dover.
(1927£») 1957 Why I am Not a Christian. New York:
Simon & Schuster.
(1929) 1950 Marriage and Morals. New York: Live-
right.
(1930) 1971 The Conquest of Happiness. New York:
Liveright.
(1940) 1961 An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth.
London: Allen & Unwin.
(1945) 1962 A History of Western Philosophy. Lon- himself German on the way, he moved to the
don: Allen & Unwin.
1948 Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. New
York: Simon & Schuster.
1967-1969 The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell.
3 vols. London: Allen & Unwin; Boston: Little,
Brown. —» A paperback edition was published by
Allen & Unwin in 1975.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
NAKHNIKIAN, GEORGE (editor) 1974 Bertrand Rus-
sell's Philosophy. New York: Barnes & Noble.
SCHILPP, PAUL A. (editor) (1946) 1963 The Philos-
ophy of Bertrand Russell. 3d ed. New York: Harper.
WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1921) 1963 Tractatus log-
ico-philosophicus. New York: Humanities Press.
—> First published in the Annalen der Naturphilos-
ophie. The first English edition was published in
1922 by Harcourt.
RYLE, GILBERT
Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) was Waynflete pro-
fessor of metaphysical philosophy in Oxford
from 1945 to 1968 and editor of the British
RYLE, GILBERT 685
philosophical periodical Mind from 1948 to
1971. He was probably the most conspicuous,
fertile, and influential British philosopher dur-
ing a period in which the status and quality of
philosophy in Britain, and particularly in Ox-
ford, were extremely high; and in earlier years
he had played a crucially important part in the
reanimation, particularly in Oxford, of the
philosophical scene.
Ryle was born in Brighton, the son of a doctor
and the grandson of a bishop, and educated at
Brighton College. In 1919 he went to Queen's
College, Oxford, where he read successively
"greats" and "modern greats"; in 1924 he be-
and remained at that college (with a period of
absence on military service during World War n)
until he moved to Magdalen on election to the
Waynflete professorship.
In his early years, as Ryle put it himself (Ryle
1971) "the philosophic kettle in Oxford was
barely lukewarm." Though philosophers there
were numerous, they did not very actively dis-
pute even with one another and were scarcely
at all interested in their contemporaries else-
where. There were idealists in the tradition of
F. H. Bradley, realists in the tradition of J. Cook
Wilson, and some good classical scholars, but
there was little sense of living research or con-
troversy. Ryle felt that the problem was paro-
chialism; and this he set himself, then and al-
ways, deliberately to overcome. As a student he
took seriously, as his teachers did not, the work
of Bertrand Russell; and from there, teaching
study of Alexius Meinong, Franz Brentano, Ber-
nard Bolzano, and Gottlob Frege—and also Lud-
wig Wittgenstein, whom he met for the first time
in 1929. By that date he was preoccupied chiefly
with the question of what philosophy itself is.
If it was, as he felt and found it to be, a living
subject, and not merely (as his teachers had
made it appear) the respectful, scholarly study
of other people's texts, what were its problems?
What was it about? What would be appropriate,
distinctively philosophical methods?
His first thought was that philosophy investi-
gates the meanings of expressions. This defini-
tion seemed close to the idea made current at
that time, principally by the work of G. E. Moore
and afterwards by the logical positivists, that
the proper business of philosophy was "analy-
sis." But further questions arose. If philosophy's
concern is with the meanings of expressions, is
it just lexicography? In any case, as Moore him-
self insisted, when philosophical problems are
 686 RYLE, GILBERT
stated, are not the meanings of the expressions
often, even usually, perfectly well known? What
told a philosopher which expressions are in
need of his investigations, and why? Quite soon
Ryle came to the conclusion, which substan-
tially he never abandoned, that the business of
a philosopher was not directly with meanings
but rather with a certain kind of meaningless-
ness; not with what expressions in general
mean, but with why certain expressions make
no sense. Thus the earliest paper that is fully
characteristic of his work is "Systematically
Misleading Expressions" (1932, in Ryle 1971,
vol. 2, pp. 39-62). The thesis of that paper is
that certain forms of expression, often quite
ordinary ones, are "improper" to the states of
affairs they actually record; that they thereby
invite misassimilation to other expressions from
which they in fact radically differ; and that such
misassimilation tends to generate perplexity, or
even flat nonsense, from which it is the business
of philosophical argument to rescue us.
Shortly thereafter, notably in his paper "Cate-
gories" (1938, in Ryle 1971, vol. 2, pp. 170-
184), Ryle abandoned the rather obscure notion
of an expression's being "improper" to a state of
affairs. His reformulated thesis was that ex-
pressions can be grouped into "types" or "cate-
gories," and that philosophical perplexity arises
from handling, or attempting to handle, an ex-
pression of one category as if it belonged to
another. In this view the characteristic genesis
of philosophical puzzlement is a "category-mis-
take"; and the curative business of philosophy is
to exhibit and correct categorial misassign-
ments, it being the distinctive mark of such mis-
assignment that it results in a "certain kind" of
meaninglessness—or, as Ryle often also put it,
of "absurdity." This reintroduction of the an-
cient notion of categories gave Ryle a good deal
of trouble—he never really produced a satis-
factory general account of just what a category,
or derivatively a category-mistake, was supposed
to be. He was always ready, however, to illus-
trate his general doctrine with particular ex-
amples, and indeed explicitly defended his talk
of categories as late as 1971 (Magee 1971,
pp. 108-109).
Ryle's most famous and most impressive work
is unquestionably The Concept of Mind (1949).
It is interesting that this immensely influential
book had its origin, not in a particular interest
in its topic, but in the general theory of philo-
sophy that it was meant to illustrate. Ryle said
that having debated for a decade or so what a
philosophical problem was and what philosoph-
ical argument should be, he felt it was time to
put his views to actual work in the large-scale
handling of some large philosophical problem.
It was time to exhibit in practice a good, big
"category-mistake" that actually issued in recog-
nizable, preferably traditional and familiar,
philosophical quandaries. He first thought that
the problem of free will would best answer his
purpose, and it was only after he had found that
unsatisfactory that he hit upon mind-and-body
problems instead. His readers and critics have
for the most part reversed this emphasis. His
general theory of mind, and even more his ac-
counts of particular mental concepts, have
proved both fascinating and fertile, while his
general theory of philosophy, never very clear
and perhaps not particularly important, has
been not much regarded, and has often been
regarded with disfavor.
The Concept of Mind, though certainly im-
pressive, is not a wholly coherent book. In it at
least two distinct theses are sporadically at war.
The milder thesis is that the very many ways
in which we speak, in broad terms, about "the
mind" are potentially misleading; that philos-
ophers, notably those Ryle calls "the Carte-
sians," have constantly been misled; and that
they have been misled in particular into repre-
senting the mind, mental states, and happen-
ings on the model of the body, physical states,
and happenings—as if, the body being a physical
thing existing and acting in the physical world,
the mind were a nonphysical thing performing
nonphysical acts, but in some mysterious way
"in" a physical object, the body. There constantly
obtrudes, however, a cruder, more extreme, ap-
parently ontological thesis—that, contrary to
what our ordinary ways of speaking would sug-
gest, there really are only physical objects and
physical happenings, and that all talk seemingly
"about" minds and mental happenings is really
no more than a certain way of talking about
bodies. Ryle often denied, and his critics often
asserted, that his book preached "behaviorism";
the fact is that it both did and did not, in differ-
ent places.
Ryle's concern with the question of what
philosophy is, and indeed his answers to that
question, have a clear kinship with the work of
his slightly older contemporary Wittgenstein,
by whom he must have been influenced, even
though it was only after Wittgenstein's death in
1951 that most of his work became accessible
to the public. But between the two men there

were vast and vital differences. Ryle, as an ef-
fective and stimulating teacher, liked students
and an audience (an early student was A. J.
Ayer); but he did not want disciples, and par-
ticularly not a tiny circle of overreverent disci-
ples. He was by temperament and on principle a
philosophical expansionist and was chiefly re-
sponsible—through his writings, his travels, his
editorship of Mind, his energetic activity as pro-
fessor, and his immense friendliness as a person
—for making Oxford in his time both the largest
and the liveliest philosophical center in the
world. Further, though he had made philosophy
come alive in Oxford, he never had, or gave, the
impression that it had never been alive any-
where else; he wrote a book on Plato (1966),
and more than twenty papers from time to time
on other philosophers, whom he saw no reason
to disregard or undervalue simply because they
had antedated his own appearance. He was
occasionally regarded, perhaps not without a
touch of jealousy, as a man of one book, The
Concept of Mind; but that dismissive suggestion
could not well survive the publication, in 1971,
of his Collected Papers, 57 articles (to which he
RYLE, GILBERT 687
afterwards added a few more) over a period of
50 years, which leave few areas of philosophy
untouched and unenlivened.
G. J. WARNOCK
WORKS BY RYLE
1949 The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.
—•> This book has been translated into Italian,
Spanish, German, French, and Afrikaans. A paper-
back edition was published by Barnes & Noble in
1969.
1954 Dilemmas. Cambridge Univ. Press. —» The Tarner
lectures, 1953. A paperback edition was published
in 1966.
1966 Plato's Progress. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1971 Collected Papers. 2 vols. London: Hutchinson.
—> Volume 1: Critical Essays. Volume 2: Collected
Essays 1929-1968.
Ryle. Edited by Oscar P. Wood and George W. Pitcher.
London: Macmillan,' 1971. —> First published in
1970 with the title Ryle: A Collection of Critical
Essays.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
MAGEE, BRYAN (editor) 1971 Conversation With Gil-
bert Ryle. Pages 100-115 in Modern British Philos-
ophy. London: Seeker and Warburg.
WARNOCK, G. J. (1958-1969) Chapter 7 in English
Philosophy Since 1900. 2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press.
 SAUVY, ALFRED
Alfred Sauvy was born on October 31, 1898,
in Villeneuve-de-la-Rabo, a village in the extreme
south of France. He was the second eldest of a
family of seven children, whose parents were
wine producers. After leaving secondary school
in Paris, Sauvy was called up to serve in the
army during World War i. In the last year of the
war, he was wounded at the battlefront. In 1932,
he married Marthe Lambert.
In 1920, Sauvy was admitted to the Ecole
Poly technique, and in 1922, he started upon a
career as a statistician at the Central Statistical
Office of France, known as La Statistique Gen-
erale. At that time, the national statistical offices
were not as important as they have since be-
come. Their activities were confined to census
taking and to the tabulation of vital events. Data
collection on production, foreign trade, prices,
employment, and so on, was almost nonexistent,
and the international statistical yearbooks were
not yet begun. In 1929, the resignation of a
statistician working on short-term forecasts pro-
vided a vacant post for Sauvy—one that he soon
turned into a remarkable source of information.
In this new position, Sauvy was asked for in-
formation on price indexes by an assistant to a
prominent French political figure, Paul Reynaud.
Sauvy was amazed that a leader in French poli-
tics should be so poorly informed on such a basic
subject as price indexes. "From that day," Sauvy
later wrote, "the objective of all my life was
settled: enlightening action" (1972, p. 12). This
encounter prompted Reynaud's interest in Sauvy,
and their meeting marked the beginning of a
long collaboration.
In March 1937, the Ministry of National
Economy was created as a separate agency from
the Ministry of Finance, and Sauvy was drafted
to work for it part time. The creation of the new
ministry was itself an important event because
it marked the first recognition that a national
economy could be run by people other than
financiers and accountants. But the new minis-
try was, in fact, established without any real
power, and Sauvy began his work without any
precise assignment. He decided to translate into
everyday language the tables published weekly
and monthly by La Statistique Generale, and
issued a small bulletin that had an immediate
and spectacular success. "For me," wrote Sauvy,
"the astonishment was great. I understood that
it was necessary to speak to the people in their
own words" (ibid., p. 47). This concern with
popular enlightenment is characteristic of Sauvy
and is his original contribution to demography
as a social science.
The new ministry lasted only a few months,
and disappeared, along with most of its workers.
Sauvy remained at the head of a small group of
people who were in charge of monitoring the
French economy. This Service d'Observation
Economique was the first step toward the crea-
tion of a real institute, the Institut de Con-
joncture.
In November, 1938, just after the Munich
agreement, Paul Reynaud was nominated Minis-
ter of Finance in a government that had full
power, for only a short period of time, from the
689
690 SAUVY, ALFRED
parliamentary assemblies to enact new decrees.
Reynaud instructed Sauvy to prepare, in one
week, a series of decrees aimed at transforming
the economy of France. The main objectives
were to reduce unemployment and increase pro-
duction. Sauvy was convinced that the only way
to accomplish these aims was to increase the
work week, which was fixed by law at forty
hours. Such a measure seemed to contradict
common sense, but the decree passed in spite
of strong protests from people who predicted
disaster for the French economy. The following
months, however, confirmed Sauvy's views. From
then on, he concluded that a population increase
could only be beneficial, and he tried to convey
that idea to the rest of the world. Among Sauvy's
other decrees was one that would be of major im-
portance for the future of France: the decree
that institutionalized family allowances and thus
helped spur the baby boom that followed World
War ii. Another important decree created the
Institut de Conjoncture, with Sauvy as director.
The work Sauvy had originally envisaged for
the institute was interrupted by World War n.
As director of the newly created institute, Sauvy
worked in 1939/1940 with Jean Monnet, the
chief of the commission in charge of economic
cooperation between the United Kingdom and
France. Then came the defeat and occupation of
France by the Germans. During that period,
Sauvy took the initiative in carrying out a survey
to estimate the cost of the German occupation.
He succeeded in organizing a network of infor-
mation with foreign countries, and rapidly be-
came one of the best informed people in France
on the trend of the war. He started writing a
bulletin that evaded French and German censure
and that was sent confidentially to important
figures in France. Perhaps even the Germans
found news in the bulletin that official papers
did not provide. At the same time, Sauvy con-
tinued to develop his theory on population prob-
lems and wrote two important works for popula-
tion specialists (1943; 1945). For the first time,
the concept of an optimum population was
clearly defined, and the interrelationships be-
tween population trends and economic and social
development were clarified. That field, familiar
today, was almost totally unexploied at that
time.
In April 1945, after the war, General Charles
de Gaulle appointed Sauvy as Secretary General
for Family and Population. Sauvy, however, soon
preferred to return to his research, and in De-
cember 1945 he created the Institut National
d'Etudes Demographiques (INED), a multidisci-
plinary agency that rapidly became, under his
direction, a leading research institution in
France and abroad. The new institute issued a
quarterly review, Population, for which Sauvy
wrote an editorial on world population trends.
The subject was treated in simple terms from
many perspectives, and Population became, in
fact, a platform for discussions of economic,
social, and cultural development and even of
environmental issues. From 1945 to 1962, Sauvy
was director of INED, and he continued to be
editor in chief of Population until 1975.
With all his research activity, Sauvy continued
his interest in government action. In 1945 he
became a member of the Haut Comite de la
Population, chaired by de Gaulle. In 1947 he
was nominated a member of the French Eco-
nomic and Social Council, the government ad-
visory agency. He was, until 1974, a member of
this assembly and was for many years chairman
of the Committee for Planning and Conjunc-
tural Studies. In 1957 he created the Institut de
Demographie de I'Universite de Paris (IDUP),
a teaching institute preparing postgraduate stu-
dents for careers in demography. His research
had convinced him that the increasing average
age of the population was the most insidious
trend in the developed world, and he came to
feel that it was only by involving the younger
generation in national leadership that the diffi-
culties created by the aging process could be
solved. The creation of IDUP was the first action
taken along these lines; it was followed two
years later by the publication of Sauvy's book,
La montee des jeunes (1959).
In 1959 he was also coopted by his peers to
become a professor at the College de France,
where until 1969 he occupied the chair of social
demography. In this capacity, he was named
professor emeritus.
In the international scene, Sauvy became a
member in 1946 of the newly created Nuclear
Commission of Statistics of the United Nations.
A year later he was chosen by the French gov-
ernment to represent France at the UN Popula-
tion Commission, of which he was chairman
from 1951 to 1953; he still represents France on
that body. Through his contributions to the de-
bates of the commission, he became a well-
known expert in international circles. In 1952
he created the expression the "Third World" to
designate developing countries.
In addition to his active public life, Sauvy
found time for other activities, including the

restoration of a medieval village and old
churches in his native region. Before World
War n, he was a film critic and even a play-
wright, with Jacques Tati.
Throughout his life, Sauvy has been partic-
ularly interested in multidisciplinary studies and
has always given preference to observation and
experiment over theoretical considerations. He
has made great efforts to disseminate demo-
graphic and economic knowledge among lay-
men. His emphasis on observation and experi-
ence has kept him from becoming involved in
the creation of ideological or political schemes.
In his writing, he has shed new light on his
subjects without formulating imperative conclu-
sions. He uses technical formula only rarely, and
when absolutely necessary, to specify ideas more
precisely. In such cases, he provides commen-
taries that attenuate a possibly forbidding math-
ematical approach.
Sauvy feels that democracy does not yet exist,
or more precisely, that it exists only in the politi-
cal framework, since the so-called sovereign
masses know so little about their own affairs.
However, he believes that any sociopolitical
problem has a chance of solution as long as facts
are widely disseminated.
JEAN BOURGEOIS-PICHAT
WORKS BY SAUVY
1938 Essai sur la conjoncture et la prevision econom-
iques. Paris. Editions du Centre polytechnicien
d'etudes economiques.
(1943) 1944 Richesse et population. 2d ed. Paris:
Payot.
1945 Bien-etre et population. Paris: Edition Sociale
Franc aise.
(1952-1954) 1970 General Theory of Population. 2
vols. New York: Basic Books. —> First published in
French.
(1958) 1963 Fertility and Survival: Population Prob-
lems from Malthus to Mao Tse-Tung. New York:
Collier. —» First published as De Malthus a Mao
Tse Toung.
1959 La montee des jeunes. Paris: Calmann-Levy.
1962 Population Explosion: Abundance or Famine?
Geneva: Edition Alpha.
1965-1975 Histoire economique de la France entre les
deux guerres. 4 vols. Paris: Fayard.
(1965) 1971 Mythologie de noire temps. Paris: Payot.
1968 Population: II. Population Theories. Volume 12,
pages 349-358 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
1970a La revolte des jeunes. Paris: Calmann-Levy.
(1970i») 1974 Le socialisme en liberte. Rev. ed. Paris:
Denoel.
1972 De Paul Reynaud a Charles de Gaulle: Scenes,
tableaux et souvenirs. Tournai (Belgium): Caster-
man.
(1973) 1976 Zero Growth1? New York: Praeger. -»
First published in French.
SAVAGE, LEONARD JIMMIE 691
1974 SAUVY, ALFRED et al. Vers I'enseignement pour
tons. Paris: Elsevier Sequoia.
1975 La fin des riches. Paris: Calmann-Levy.
1976 L'economic du diable: Chomage et inflation.
Paris: Calmann-Levy.
1976 SAUVY, ALFRED et al. Elements de demographic.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
1977 Cout et valeur de la vie humaine. Paris: Her-
mann.
1978a La tragedie du pouvoir: Quel avenir politique
pour la France? Paris: Calmann-Levy.
1978fe La vie economique des Francois, 1939-1945.
Paris: Flammarion.
SAVAGE, LEONARD JIMMIE
Leonard Jimmie Savage (1917-1971) was,
at the time of his death just before his 54th
birthday, a leader of the personalistic school of
probability, a school that regards probability as
the means by which a person expresses his un-
certainty about the world as he sees it. He was
particularly interested in the use of the person-
alistic view in both the theory and application
of statistics.
His congenitally poor eyesight affected his
early education, and it was not until he reached
college that his high mathematical abilities were
recognized. From then on all of his work was
in mathematics, if we interpret that word in its
broadest sense; for Savage was interested in
everything and contributed to more fields than
his published work suggests. He had the habit
of taking a statement that most would regard as
intelligible and straightforward and dissecting
it to clarify the problems it hid or determine its
precise meaning. This habit infuriated some,
but most welcomed it as an enormous aid to
their understanding. Moreover, his dissections
did not lead to heterogeneous complexity but
pushed forward to produce a synthesis that was
often so overwhelmingly simple and obvious
that one wondered how it could have been over-
looked. These comments apply not only to his
little paper on glottochronology (Dobson et al.
1972), but to his major interest, personal proba-
bility, which is essentially very simple but em-
braces a world of thought.
His statistical life began when he joined the
Statistical Research Group at Columbia Univer-
sity in 1943 under the direction of W. Allen
Wallis. There he met many people who subse-
quently became famous. Indeed it was unusual
for a member of the SRG not to become well-
known. In Savage's own words, it was "one of
the greatest hot-beds statistics has ever had."
Among his colleagues were Milton Friedman
 692 SAVAGE, LEONARD JIMMIE
and Abraham Wald. Friedman was influential
in Savage's development, acting as a stimulus,
forever questioning and encouraging new
thoughts, discussing probability and utility
theory with Savage. Friedman also had a bene-
ficial effect on Savage's writing style; Savage's
later writings have a lucidity unusual in con-
temporary science. They also coauthored a semi-
nal paper on utility theory (1948) that has often
been reprinted. Another important influence
was John von Neumann, with whom Savage had
worked before coming to the SRG. Von Neu-
mann had just completed his work on the
axiomatization of utility, and it was Savage's
extension of this theory that led to his most
famous work.
On leaving the SRG he went with Wallis to
found the excellent statistics group at the Uni-
versity of Chicago. Initially he wrote papers that
were immediately influential on point estima-
tion, using the concepts of unbiased and mini-
mum variance that he would later abandon. He
also wrote a beautiful (the adjective is carefully
chosen) paper on sufficiency with Paul R.
Halmos (1949). But his major work undertaken
there was The Foundations of Statistics (1954),
which was original, important, and influential.
Von Neumann's notion of the axiomatization
of utility, mentioned above, takes probability as
a basic concept. Indeed, to say that something
has utility (u, 0 ^ u ^ 1) means that the as-
sessor is indifferent between that something and
a gamble that has probability u of obtaining a
reference quantity of utility 1, and complemen-
tary probability I — u of another reference hav-
ing 0 utility. Savage conceived the idea of axioma-
tizing the notion of a person faced with making
decisions under uncertainty in a formulation
that would incorporate the qualities of the con-
sequences through utility, and the uncertainty at-
tached to obtaining those consequences through
probability. He was extremely successful and
proved that, subject to mild and apparently rea-
sonable restrictions on behavior expressed
through axioms, a person conforming to those
axioms acts as if he had a probability for an un-
certain event, a utility for a consequence, and
selects that decision of maximum expected util-
ity. Savage called such a person "rational"; to-
day the term "coherent" is more often used. He
used the term "Thou" to represent such a coher-
ent man; the archaism has been replaced by
"You." Note the capital letter.
The result is extremely important not just in
statistics (as will be seen below), but wherever
it is necessary to select one from among a num-
ber of courses of action—for example, in de-
termining energy policies over the next decade;
in decisions in a court of law; in warfare; and
in applied science generally. The result may be
as important in its sphere as was Newton's dis-
covery of the basic laws of classical mechanics.
For a single decision-maker, the result is com-
pelling. It fails only where it was never intended
to succeed—in dealing with two or more de-
cision-makers. A second Savage is needed to
study this problem. The results at the present
stage of theorizing are either negative (Kenneth
J. Arrow's theorem) or very restricted (zero-sum
two-person games). Despite the compelling na-
ture of Savage's result and the lack of con-
vincing counterarguments, much work is still
being done in statistics and elsewhere that is
demonstrably "incoherent." The demonstration
proving this contention would take the form of
a Dutch book (that is, a series of gambles that,
whatever the situation, are certain to lose the
decision-maker money) constructed against the
person.
During the period in which he was writing the
Foundations, Savage was not greatly interested
in these wider applications, but he was con-
cerned with the use of his ideas in statistics.
The first seven chapters of the book develop the
formulation of decision making under uncer-
tainty; the rest is devoted to statistical concepts.
Savage had been enormously impressed by the
success of modern statistics based on ideas of
R. A. Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, E. S. Pearson, and
others, but he had recognized that these ideas
lacked a convincing framework and took the
form of a series of loosely connected techniques,
like maximum likelihood estimation and confi-
dence intervals. He saw his ideas as providing
the needed framework, and in the latter part of
the book sought to justify the common statisti-
cal techniques by a coherent analysis. The re-
sult was a failure. His preface to the second
edition (1972) admits this, and earlier (1962)
he said: "As I wrote, I became increasingly deaf
to my own leitmotif." For ironically, his demon-
stration achieved the opposite of his intent; as
it turned out almost all the techniques he had
sought to justify with his coherent analysis
failed to meet his test. The techniques them-
selves were incoherent. The revolution implied
by this result is only just beginning to be felt,
but it is enormous.
The social sciences depend on data that must
often be handled more delicately than experi-

mental data in the natural sciences, which are
obtained under controlled conditions. For this
reason, statistics plays an important role in the
social sciences, as is evidenced by the frequent
use of statistical tests in the psychological litera-
ture. Yet such tests are incoherent. For example:
Let x denote the data and 0 the unknown para-
meter. When the data are at hand, the only
uncertain quantity is 6 and therefore, by Sav-
age's result, it is described probabilistically, con-
ditional on the data: we have p(0 x), the prob-
ability of 0 given x. But a hypothesis test uses
p ( x \ 0 ) , the probability of x given 6, and calcu-
lates a tail area of the form J Kp(x\ff)dx, where
R is a rejection region of x-values. The two
probabilities, p ( 0 \ x ) and p(x 0), are connected
by Bayes' theorem, p ( 0 \ x ) < x p ( x \ 0 ) p ( 0 ) , which
clearly shows that in the coherent view no inte-
gration, no tail area, is involved. This is the
famous likelihood principle that says that once
the data are available, their only contribution
is through the likelihood p ( x \ 9 ) , and that any
further use, say through integration, is irrele-
vant. This irrelevance typically introduces inco-
herence, and Dutch books can usually be con-
structed against significance testers.
Savage did not at first recognize this implica-
tion, but over the years he began to appreciate,
more quickly than others, the revolutionary
nature of his ideas. For example, although
G. A. Barnard had, as early as 1947, formulated
the likelihood principle, it was not until Allan
Birnbaum's paper of 1962 that he began to take
the idea seriously. In the disappointingly few
years of life that remained to him, he lectured
and wrote about the ideas. To follow these
papers in sequence is to experience a great sci-
entist discovering for himself simple but im-
portant ideas; basic ideas that have important
consequences.
In his other major book, with Lester Dubins
(1965), Savage treated several formidable
mathematical ideas. The problem here is how
to play in a casino where the odds are against
you to maximize your chances of reaching a
target sum. The answer is by bold play: stake
everything you have. The main importance of
the book may be the recognition that many prob-
ability problems can be expressed as gambling
problems, and the discovery and application of
powerful and simple methods for solving them.
Other important papers of Savage's that use
powerful mathematical tools spring from the
work of Bruno de Finetti. As Savage worked on
Foundations, he investigated the work of earlier
SAVAGE, LEONARD JIMMIE 693
writers—particularly F. P. Ramsey's brief paper
(1926) in which the ideas had been presented
earlier but not understood, and, more important,
the rich writings of de Finetti. In the 1930s de
Finetti had introduced the concept of a sequence
X i , X 2 , . . . Xn , . . .of quantities that were ex-
changeable in the sense that the joint distribu-
tion of any finite set of them was invariant under
any permutation of their suffixes. Where the X's
were all either zero or one, he had shown that
such a sequence must be a mixture of Bernoulli
sequences. Savage, with Edwin Hewitt (1955),
had extended this result from 0-1 to more
general sequences. This entire field is important
because it provides an essential link between
personalistic ideas and the frequency ideas that
dominate most statistical thinking: exchange-
ability is the personalistic equivalent of fre-
quency stability, and most statistical techniques
today deal with exchangeable, or partially ex-
changeable, sequences. For many years Savage
worked closely with de Finetti and helped the
English-speaking world appreciate the enormous
contributions of this original and difficult writer.
A man who unintentionally, and even at first
ignorant that he is doing so, knocks down an
established view rarely has an easy time. Savage
was always patient with discussants, but eventu-
ally, for personal as well as academic reasons,
he left Chicago to go first to the University of
Michigan in Ann Arbor and then to Yale Uni-
versity, where he was Eugene Higgins professor
of statistics at the time of his death. He con-
tinued to give advice to colleagues on statistical
matters, and he wrote at least two important
papers. One of the problems in the personalistic
approach is how "You" are entitled to determine
"Your" probabilities. De Finetti had earlier in-
troduced the idea of a scoring rule that would
score "Your" performance and improve "Your"
probability assessment. The two worked to-
gether on this problem and Savage wrote the
seminal paper in the field (1971). He also gave
a quite remarkable Fisher memorial lecture
(1976). Although one could have expected
Savage and Fisher to be completely opposed to
each other, Savage expressed a truly scholarly
appreciation of the work of this statistical giant.
He clarified Fisher's achievements and showed
how valuable most of his ideas are within the
coherent view.
Savage, at the very least, made statisticians
aware of problems in the frequency viewpoint.
In a broader sense, however, he may well have
created a new paradigm for statistics: the co-
694 SCHAPERA, ISAAC
herent, or Bayesian, view. If that paradigm is
ultimately accepted, it will revolutionize the
handling and interpretation of data in the social
sciences.
DENNIS V. LINDLEY
WORKS BY SAVAGE
1948 FRIEDMAN, MILTON; and SAVAGE, LEONARD J. The
Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk. Journal
of Political Economy 56:279-304. —»Often re-
printed.
1949 HALMOS, PAUL R.; and SAVAGE, LEONARD J. Ap-
plication of the Radon-Nikodym Theorem to the
Theory of Sufficient Statistics. Annals of Mathemat-
ical Statistics 20:225-241.
(1954) 1972 The Foundations of Statistics. Rev. ed.
New York: Dover.
1955 HEWITT, EDWIN; and SAVAGE, LEONARD J. Sym-
metric Measures on Cartesian Products. American
Mathematical Society, Transactions 80:470-501.
1962 Bayesian Statistics. Pages 161-194 in Symposium
on Information and Decision Processes, Purdue Uni-
versity, Third, 1961, Recent Developments in Infor-
mation and Decision Processes. New York: Mac-
millan.
1965 SAVAGE, LEONARD J.; and DUBINS, LESTER E.
How to Gamble If You Must: Inequalities for Sto-
chastic Processes. New York: McGraw-Hill. —> A
paperback edition was published by Dover in 1976
with the title Inequalities for Stochastic Processes:
How to Gamble If You Must.
1971 Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expecta-
tions. Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion 66:783-801.
1972 DOBSON, ANNETTE J.; SANKOFF, DAVID; KRUSKAL,
JOSEPH B.; and SAVAGE, LEONARD J. The Mathe-
matics of Glottochronology Revisited. Anthropologi-
cal Linguistics 14:205-212.
1976 On Rereading R. A. Fisher. Annals of Statistics
4:441-500.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARNARD, G. A. 1947 Review of Sequential Analysis
by Abraham Wald. Journal of the American Statisti-
cal Association 42:658-664.
BIRNBAUM, ALLAN 1962 On the Foundations of Sta-
tistical Inference. Journal of the American Statisti-
cal Association 57:269-306.
KRUSKAL, WILLIAM H. 1978 Savage, Leonard Jimmie.
Volume 2, pages 889-892 in International Encyclo-
pedia of Statistics. Edited by William H. Kruskal
and Judith M. Tanur. New York: Free Press.
LINDLEY, DENNIS V. 1979 L. J. Savage: His Work in
Probability and Statistics. Annals of Statistics. —»
Forthcoming.
RAMSEY, F. P. (1926) 1964 Truth and Probability.
Pages 63-92 in Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., and Howard
E. Smokier (editors), Studies in Subjective Proba-
bility. New York: Wiley.
SCHAPERA, ISAAC
Isaac Schapera is one of a small band of
South African social anthropologists whose work
was directly influenced by the physical, politi-
cal, and social conditions in the country of their
birth. His intellectual curiosity was directed
less to the remote and exotic than to describ-
ing and interpreting the social and cultural lives
of peoples who appeared familiar from child-
hood.
He was born in 1905 in Caries, an isolated
dorp in Little Namaqualand south of the Orange
River in the Northwestern Cape. An arid region,
it was sparsely populated by people classified
according to the racial stereotyping of South
Africa as "whites," who were almost entirely
Boers (descendants of early Dutch settlers), and
Coloureds, most of whom were products of
miscegenation between Boers and Nama (ear-
lier inhabitants of the country, commonly la-
beled Hottentots). Remnants of the so-called
Bushmen lived in the adjacent area of Little
Bushmanland and of the pure Nama on mission
stations and farms. There were no English-
speaking people and no Bantu-speaking Afri-
cans in the vicinity.
Schapera's parents moved from Caries to
Cape Town when he was seven years old. In
Cape Town, he was sent to an English medium
school, but retained his fluency in Afrikaans
and his contact with people in Caries. On a holi-
day visit in the early 1920s he was befriended
by the district surgeon, an amateur folklorist
and archeologist, who owned a fine anthro-
pological library that opened new vistas to
Schapera and stimulated his interest in ethnog-
raphy.
When he enrolled at the University of Cape
Town, he intended to study law, but after at-
tending a course of lectures by A. R. Radcliffe-
Brown, who had recently returned from Australia
and was the first professor of social anthropol-
ogy in South Africa, switched to anthropology
and began his professional apprenticeship. Rad-
cliffe-Brown inducted him into the classics of
anthropology and sociology, and Radcliffe-
Brown's systematic and empirical Durkheimian
structuralism left a permanent imprint.
Having completed his master's degree in
1925, Schapera was accepted as a doctoral
candidate at the London School of Economics
(L.S.E.) where Bronislaw Malinowski was at the
peak of his creative teaching and functionalism
was his formula. Schapera attended Malinow-
skfs seminars and served for a time as his re-
search assistant, but his supervisor was C. G.
Seligman, a scholar in the more traditional
school of ethnography with a record of survey
work in Ceylon and Africa.

With a PH.D. from L.S.E. (1929), Schapera
returned to South Africa to teach and do
research. For a year he lectured at the Wit-
watersrand University in Johannesburg, and
then, at the age of thirty, was appointed to the
post formerly held by Radcliffe-Brown. The Uni-
versity of Cape Town remained his base until
1950, when he accepted a chair of anthropology
at the L.S.E. As a teacher he did not found any
particular school, but gave his students a broad
and thorough training in structuralism and
functionalism, with an emphasis on ethno-
graphic description. He retired from teaching in
1969 and remained in England working mainly
on material collected in Africa.
It was not random choice or chance that his
earliest articles were on the Bushmen (1925a;
1925£>); that his master's thesis was a "Prelimi-
nary Consideration of the Relationship of Bush-
men and Hottentots," and that his first book,
based on his doctoral dissertation, was titled
The Khoisan Peoples (1930), the nomenclature
he established in anthropological literature to
replace the more pejorative labels for Hotten-
tots (who called themselves Khoi) and Bush-
men (whom the Khoi termed San).
His major field work was in Bechuanaland
(now Botswana), a British protectorate until
it became independent in 1966. The vast ma-
jority of the population were Tswana (Bantu-
speaking Africans); the minority included San
and whites. Most anthropologists stay in the
field for a single stretch of one or two years,
some return after a long absence to study
changes, but in part because Bechuanaland was
easily accessible—it is bounded on the east by
the Transvaal and on the south by the Cape
Province—and in part because of his particular
interests and commitments, Schapera made
numerous field trips, some of several months,
some of a few weeks, spanning more than twenty
years (1929-1950). In this way he was able to
observe the process of change in all its com-
plexity.
His data on the Tswana are unsurpassed in
range and detail. In addition to the material of
a keen observer, they include a rich corpus of
texts (he mastered the language and recorded
much in the vernacular), and numerous case
studies culled from unpublished court records
and old documents. Unlike many fieldworkers,
his notes are meticulous and kept in such a way
that they may be used as references by future
scholars. His bibliography is extensive, each
piece carefully researched and written with an
SCHAPERA, ISAAC 695
eye for precision and lucidity. His major con-
tributions are in the field of politics, law, and
kinship, approached as systems.
Schapera was always a historian as well as a
social anthropologist. The Khoisan Peoples was
based on library research, and though the
material was presented under somewhat con-
ventional ethnographic chapter headings, the
presentation already indicated a historical per-
spective at a time when there was a strong trend
among British structural and functional anthro-
pologists to think and write only in the ethno-
graphic present. He was one of the first anthro-
pologists in Africa to collect and publish oral
history data and to appreciate and edit the
journals and letters of early missionaries (1951;
1959; I960; 1961; 1963; 1974). He has been
less concerned with the continuing debate on
whether social anthropology is more an art, like
history, or a science, like mathematics, than in
using both to increase knowledge and under-
standing of changing customs and social rela-
tions, an approach he articulated most cogently
in his presidential address to the Royal Anthro-
pological Institute, "Should Anthropologists Be
Historians?" (1962).
Schapera's view of anthropology, particularly
in the pre-World War 11 period, was influenced
by his sensitivity to the racial problems of South
Africa and by a current assumption that anthro-
pology could be effective in their resolution.
Courses especially designed for administrators
and others engaged in practical work were part
of the curriculum at the University of Cape
Town as well as at the L.S.E. Addressing the
South African Association for the Advancement
of Science in 1939, Schapera described anthro-
pology as "an instrument for the promotion of
human welfare" (1939, p. 89), and recom-
mended increasing the use of professional
anthropologists and the training of others for
"applied anthropology."
In Bechuanaland where he worked closely
with British authorities as well as with Tswana
chiefs and subject people, three books, A Hand-
book of Tswana Law and Custom (1938), Native
Land Tenure in the Bechuanaland Protectorate
(1943), and Migrant Labor and. Tribal Life
(1947a), were written with their full coopera-
tion and dealt specifically with controversial
policies. Although he believed that an anthro-
pologist's opinion of public policies is a per-
sonal and not a professional problem, he felt
that as an anthropologist, he was "certainly
justified in discussing the methods" (1939,
696 SCHAPERA, ISAAC
p. 93). He assumed that "facts" could be "objec-
tive," and that knowledge was the first essential
for dealing with all difficulties. The information
he provided, particularly in his studies of mi-
gration and land tenure, revealed the often un-
foreseen and unpremeditated effects of govern-
ment decisions.
Schapera was the first British anthropologist
to document the view, initially suggested by
Radcliffe-Brown, that to understand the process
of social change required an inclusive analysis
not of items or traits but of the interaction be-
tween persons as members of groups within "the
whole structure" (1928). District commissioner
and chief, missionary and magician, doctor
and diviner interacted in a single social
system contained within an overarching politi-
cal control that did not eliminate conflict and
cultural differences. Over the years this ap-
proach, which was contrary to both the interpre-
tation of acculturation prevalent in America and
to the ahistorical model of culture change de-
vised by Malinowski, has been widely accepted
and theoretically elaborated.
Schapera's "theories" are usually embedded
in his data. As an empiricist aiming at objec-
tivity and believing in rationality, he avoided
abstractions and conjecture. His contribution to
the development of anthropology as a discipline
lies largely in the way he focused his facts on
specific topics within the context of different
systems of social life. Thus in politics (a per-
sistent and major interest) he analyzed the
structural tensions within the political consti-
tution of a southern African nation (1938); the
influence of kinship ties on dynastic disputes
(1947a; 1949b); the historiography surround-
ing chiefs (1965); and, in one of his most
original works, the development of new legisla-
tion, introduced since 1795, by traditional
leaders, who were responding through their
own cultural values and interests to outside
ideologies and technological pressures (1970).
In the field of kinship, his focus included
genealogies, kinship terminology, types of mar-
riage, and marriage strategies. The effect of his
rationalist orientation is most obvious in his
work on religion which deals with ritual as ac-
tion and avoids speculation into rtie meaning
and value of symbols (1955a; 1955b; 1958).
Meticulous in his own scholarship, Schapera
is suspicious of generalizations, and skeptical of
the value of large-scale, cross-cultural compari-
son (1953a, p. 353). For him, as for Radcliffe-
Brown, valid comparison begins in a defined
local region and is built on limited variations
on a few major themes. A comprehensive typo-
logical survey (such as Schapera made for the
peoples of South Africa and Botswana) is a
necessary preliminary. To select examples from
any part of the world invites distortion. His
most adventurous comparative study, Govern-
ment and Politics in Tribal Societies (1956), uses
material from the Khoi, the San, and the Bantu-
speaking peoples of southern Africa to exam-
ine the nature of government in the light of
interpretations by others. Paradoxically, while
Schapera is pessimistic about cross-cultural
comparison, the solid worth of his work is being
recognized by scholars increasingly using his
data for comparative purposes.
HILDA KUPER
WORKS BY SCHAPERA
1925a Bushmen Arrow Poisons. Bantu Studies 2:199-
214.
1925k Some Stylistic Affinities of Bushmen Art. South
African Journal of Science 22:504-515.
1928 Economic Changes in South African Native Life.
Africa 1:170-188.
1930 The Khoisan Peoples of South Africa: Bushmen
and Hottentots. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul;
New York: Humanities Press.
1933 SCHAPERA, ISAAC (editor) The Early Cape Hot-
tentots Described in the Writings of Olfert Dapper
(1668), Willem ten Rhyne (1686) and Johannes
Gulielmus de Grevenbroek (1695). Cape Town: Van
Riebeck Society.
(1934) 1967 SCHAPERA, ISAAC (editor) Western Civi-
lization and the Natives of South Africa: Studies in
Culture Contact. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(1937) 1956 SCHAPERA, ISAAC (editor) The Bantu
Speaking Tribes of South Africa: An Ethnographical
Survey. London: Routledge.
(1938) 1970 A Handbook of Tswana Law and Cus-
tom. 2d ed. London: Cass.
1939 Anthropology and the Native Problem. South
African Journal of Science 36:89-103.
(1940) 1966 Married Life in an African Tribe. Lon-
don: Faber; Evanston, III.: Northwestern Univ.
Press.
1943 Native Land Tenure in the Bechuanaland Pro-
tectorate. Lovedale (South Africa): Lovedale Press.
1947a Migrant Labor and Tribal Life: A Study of Con-
ditions in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Oxford
Univ. Press.
1947b SCHAPERA, ISAAC (editor) The Political Annals
of a Tswana Tribe: Minutes of Ngwaketse Public
Assemblies 1910-1917. Cape Town: School of Afri-
can Studies.
1949a Some Problems of Anthropological Research in
Kenya Colony. London: Oxford Univ. Press.
(1949&) 1963 The Tswana Conception of Incest.
Pages 104-120 in Meyer Fortes (editor), Social
Structure: Studies Presented to A. R. Radcliffe-
Brown. New York: Russell.
1951 SCHAPERA, ISAAC (editor) Apprenticeship at
Kuruman—Being the Journals and Letters of Rob-
ert and Mary Moffat (1820-1828). London: Chatto
& Windus.
1952 The Ethnic Composition of the Tswana Tribes.

London School of Economics and Political Science,
Monographs in Social Anthropology, No. 11.
1953a Some Comments on the Comparative Method
in Social Anthropology. American Anthropologist
55:353-362.
(1953b) 1968 The Tswana. London: International
African Institute.
1955a The Sin of Cain. Journal of the Royal Anthro-
pological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
85:33-43.
1955b Witchcraft Beyond Reasonable Doubt. Man
55:72 only.
(1956) 1967 Government and Politics in Tribal So-
cieties. London: Watts; New York: Schocken.
1957a Marriage of Near Kin Among the Tswana.
Africa 27:139-159.
1957k The Sources of Law in Tswana Tribal Courts:
Legislation and Precedent. Journal of African Law
1:150-162.
1958 Christianity and the Tswana. Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain
and Ireland 88:1-9.
1959 LIVINGSTONE, DAVID Family Letters, 1841-1856.
Edited with an introduction by Isaac Schapera.
2 vols. London: Chatto & Windus.
1960 LIVINGSTONE, DAVID Private Journals, 1851-1853.
Edited with an introduction by Isaac Schapera.
London: Chatto & Windus; Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press.
1961 LIVINGSTONE, DAVID Missionary Correspondence,
1841-1856. Edited with an introduction by Isaac
Schapera. London: Chatto & Windus; Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press.
1962 Should Anthropologists Be Historians? Journal
of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great
Britain and Ireland 92:143-156.
1963 LIVINGSTONE, DAVID African Journal, 1853-1856.
Edited with an introduction by Isaac Schapera.
2 vols. London: Chatto & Windus.
1965 Praise Poems of Tswana Chiefs. Oxford: Claren-
don.
1970 Tribal Innovators: Tswana Chiefs and Social
Change, 1795-1940. London: Athlone Press; New
'York: Humanities Press.
1974 LIVINGSTONE, DAVID South African Papers
(1849-1853). Edited by Isaac Schapera. Cape
Town: Van Riebeck Society.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
FORTES, MEYER; and PATTERSON, SHEILA (editors)
1975 Studies in African Social Anthropology.
London: Academic Press. —> Essays presented to
Isaac Schapera.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E.
Elmer Eric Schattschneider (1892-1971) was
born in Bethany, Minnesota, August 11, 1892,
and spent his early years in Wisconsin. If his
political consciousness was nurtured in that seat
of Progress!vism, his adult life was spent op-
posing many of its central tenets. Progressives
and Schattschneider shared a distaste of ma-
chine politics and corruption, and both ap-
proached democratic politics as a moral crusade.
From there they parted company. Schatt-
schneider spent his professional life in the anal-
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E. 697
ysis and advocacy of political parties, precisely
the institutions so successfully attacked by such
Progressive legislation as nonpartisan elections,
city manager government, at-large districts, and
the direct primary. In the minds of United States
legislators and citizens alike, the Progressives
carried the day. Most political scientists disa-
gree. The antiparty spirit that animated Progres-
sive legislation is responsible, many believe, for
the decline of American political parties in the
twentieth century.
Schattschneider believed that the mass of
citizens could participate effectively in govern-
ment only through party competition. This theme
is developed in each of Schattschneider's books
spanning 34 years: Politics, Pressures and the
Tariff (1935), Party Government (1942), The
Semisovereign People (1960), and Two Hundred
Million Americans in Search of a Government
(1969). His political theories are of an intellec-
tual piece. That consistency of outlook put him
in and out of phase with the central concerns
of political scientists during the four decades
of his professional life.
One reason for the cohesiveness and consis-
tency of his views is perhaps that Schatt-
schneider was a mature man when he published
his first book. Between his University of Wis-
consin B.A. in 1915 and his Columbia University
PH.D. twenty years later, Schattschneider spent
a year in the navy, two years working with the
Young Men's Christian Association, and eight
years as a high school teacher. He was 43 when
he completed Politics, Pressures and the Tariff.
Since the principal arguments of his political
theory had evolved by the time his first book
was published, his work can be discussed con-
ceptually rather than chronologically.
Nature of man. Schattschneider was not a
Hobbesian, not even a Madisonian. He thought
people were, in their fundamental aspects, be-
nign. If Madison believed that all men, given the
opportunity, would tyrannize over other men
(Dahl 1956), Schattschneider could reply with-
out embarrassment that "democracy is about the
love of people" (1969, p. 43). According to
Schattschneider, "democracy is both a moral
system and a form of government." That moral
ideal was equality: "Democracy begins as an act
of imagination about people. . . . Democracy
does not turn its back on anybody. It takes a lot
of indiscriminate affection for people as people
to run a democracy" (p. 46). A realist, Schatt-
schneider knew that many people are hard to
love. The second law of politics? "It is impos-
698 SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E.
sible to get all of the S.O.B.'s into one party"
(p. 53).
Two Hundred Million Americans contains an
ingenious demonstration of the progress toward
an egalitarian political culture in the United
States. Working on the assumption that lan-
guage reflects a value system, Schattschneider
used nineteenth-century dictionaries to show the
degree to which our language has been democ-
ratized. In those early dictionaries common peo-
ple were often characterized with the pejoratives
vulgar, ordinary, mean, low. Now, "the vocabu-
lary of indignities has been cleaned up to make
the language fit for use in a democratic
society" (p. 51).
As an egalitarian, Schattschneider was an
unapologetic majoritarian, and he labeled Madi-
son's Federalist No. 10 a philosophical curiosity,
embodying serious inconsistency. Madison be-
lieved that social pluralism—a large, diverse re-
public—would render it unlikely for any popular
majority to unite to deny political liberties to a
minority. Why, then, Schattschneider wondered,
did Madison defend the necessity of a constitu-
tional separation of powers as well? (1942,
p. 18). Madison could have replied that divided
constitutional authority was intended less to
solve the problem of a tyrannical majority
among the citizenry than it was to solve another
problem, the abuse of constitutional authority
by government officials themselves. Still, Schatt-
schneider's pique at Madison's defense of separa-
tion of powers is understandable. Madison had
helped establish a division of constitutional
authority that was incompatible with Schatt-
schneider's ideal of party government.
If Schattschneider's assumptions about the
nature of political man begin with an act of
democratic imagination, he does not imagine
that political man is an informed civic activist.
His views on the political knowledge of citizens
are quite consistent with those of such political
economists as Downs (1957) and Schumpeter
(1942). Extensive knowledge is a scarce re-
source, expensive for the expert to obtain and
not to be expected of citizens. Nor is it necessary
either: "Economists, trying to explain the opera-
tion of the economy, use a political expression
when they speak of the 'sovereignty of the con-
sumer,' precisely because they realize that it is
not necessary to know how to make a television
set in order to buy one intelligently. Democracy
is like nearly everything else we do; it is a form
of collaboration of ignorant people and experts"
(1960, p. 137).
Socialization of conflict. In Schattschneider's
world, conflict is endemic in political life. All
politics revolves around the exploitation of en-
ergy that is based on conflict. People turn to
government when they want to ensure that the
balance of power among competing private in-
terests does not prevail. When the loser in a
battle among private interests seeks reinforce-
ments among the previously uninvolved, the
competition for popular support enhances peo-
ple's knowledge of what they have at stake in
the contest: "To a great extent, the whole dis-
cussion of the role of government in modern
society is at root a question of the scale [of] con-
flict. Democratic government is the greatest
single instrument for the socialization of conflict
in the American community" (ibid., p. 13).
When Schattschneider wrote these words,
most political theorists viewed conflict as a
danger to civil liberties and to democratic gov-
ernment. Against the historical backdrop of the
world-wide authoritarian mass movements of
the 1930s and 1940s, McCarthyism in the
1950s, and a growing research literature that
seemed to discover public ignorance of the sub-
stance and procedure of democratic government,
pluralist theories emphasized the importance of
protecting consensus and limiting conflict.
The importance attached to nonvoting is an
example of the intellectual distance between
Schattschneider and many pluralists of the time.
Some pluralists followed Berelson's position
(1952) that apathy could reflect people's satis-
faction with the political system, and that sud-
den increases in turnout were often associated
with an antilibertarian movement destructive of
a tolerant political system. Schattschneider's
concern was starkly different. He worried that
"nonvoting is a characteristic of the poorest,
least well-established, least educated stratum of
the community," and he lamented the failure of
the parties to compete on issues that would re-
veal to this nonvoting population what interests
it had in political conflicts (1960, p. 105).
As a "conflict theory" published during the
vogue of pluralist consensus theories, The Semi-
sovereign People was not well received at the
time of its publication. As conflict theories
have gained in respectability, so has the impact
of Schattschneider's work on contemporary the-
ory. But it must be remembered that, for Schatt-
schneider, democratic conflict requires a moral
consensus. Without its "moral basis" Schatt-
schneider emphasized, without a belief in equal-
ity and tolerance, "democracy as a form of gov-

ernment may be a dangerous instrument for
generating destructive conflict" (1969, p. 45).
Private versus public interests. The distinc-
tion between public and private interests is one of
the most important of Schattschneider's con-
cepts. It is also one of his most problematic. He
defines the public interest as those "general or
common interests shared by all or by substan-
tially all members of the community" (1960,
p. 23). If, however, he means by common inter-
ests beliefs and goals actually shared in common,
then the concept is inconsistent with the rest of
the theory, which is based on competition and
conflict of values.
Schattschneider's distinction between public
and private interests must be understood in
terms of some broader theory. For Schatt-
schneider that theory would be liberal major-
itarianism. A sensible interpretation of his argu-
ment is that the public interest is what an ideal
democracy produces. When conflict is high,
when parties compete for votes in terms of al-
ternative programs, when a high proportion of
the electorate becomes sufficiently aroused by
the contest to consider the arguments and to
vote its preferences, we are then willing to as-
sume that people reasonably know their inter-
ests—at least as much as these interests can be
known in a world in which information about
the present is limited and the future cannot be
predicted. In short, party government produces
the public interest.
We can now begin to understand the basis of
Schattschneider's faith in human nature. A
democratic society encourages the sustenance
of democratic citizens—people who know and
act on their interests but who also come to ap-
preciate that people of opposing interests should
be treated with respect and tolerance.
Party politics versus pressure politics. Schatt-
schneider (1948a) saw parties and pressure
groups as antithetical. Parties exist to control
government, and formulating policies and nomi-
nating candidates are means to that end. But
groups are interested only in particular policies.
Supporting candidates, lobbying legislators and
bureaucrats, financing litigation—these are, in
Schattschneider's view, simply means for groups
to obtain policy goals.
Pressure groups also differ from parties in
the proportion of the public each includes. As
electoral organizations, parties engage mass fol-
lowings. In contrast, "the law of the imper-
fect political mobilization of interests" (1942,
p. 50) underlines the fact that the vast majority
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E. 699
of people are not members of any interest
group. Hence Schattschneider's famous .state-
ment: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that
the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper
class accent" (1960, p. 35).
Schattschneider's belief that the bias of the
pressure system is probusiness and upper class
was undoubtedly influenced by his choice of his
first research project. An analysis of the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Politics, Pressures
and the Tariff is a notable demonstration of the
activity of producer groups, and the passivity of
consumer groups (1935, p. 285). Smoot-Hawley
reflected an age of protectionism in which tariff
rates for thousands of products were written by
Congress directly into legislation. In 1934 the
Roosevelt administration enacted the Reciprocal
Trade Act, which authorized the president to
negotiate mutual tariff reductions with other
countries. By the 1950s, the ideology of protec-
tionism had waned. The responsibility for tariff
rates had passed to the executive branch, and
as Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) report in
their landmark study of the Reciprocal Trade
Extensions of 1954, 1955, and 1962, pressure
groups ceased to dominate tariff rates. Never-
theless, they gave high praise to the enduring
importance of Schattschneider's Politics, Pres-
sures and the Tariff: "Schattschneider's book set
the tone for a whole generation of political
writing on pressure groups. The present volume
is in some ways a dissent from Schatt-
schneider's position. We find that what hap-
pened in 1929 is not a general model of the
legislative process. We do not deny the facts of
the case as Schattschneider presents them. He
has reported an episode in the legislative drama
during which selfish interests treated the halls
of Congress as their own" (p. 25).
Party government. Schattschneider concluded
his study of the tariff by stating: "To manage
pressures is to govern; to let pressures run wild
is to abdicate" (1935, p. 293). If it is the re-
sponsibility of government to control pressures,
he believed, then only responsible parties are
sufficient to the task. The doctrine of responsi-
ble parties long predates (Ranney 1954) Schatt-
schneider's defense in Party Government. Many
observers had previously argued that a political
culture of individualism and a constitutional
separation of powers made a hostile environ-
ment for cohesive parties. If responsible parties
seem an impossible achievement, Party Govern-
ment has remained important nonetheless.
Many scholars have elaborated on its ideas of
 700 SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E.
the consequences of electoral systems for par-
ties. To Schattschneider, the electoral system is
a major cause of the two-party system (1942;
cf., Duverger 1950). It exaggerates the repre-
sentation of the winning party (cf., the "cube
law," March 1957-1958) and produces mod-
erate parties that move toward the "political
center of gravity" (p. 86; cf., the convergence
theorem in Downs 1957). What maintains com-
petition between the parties? "It would be un-
profitable to accumulate an excessive majority
. . . a landslide is a political extravagance"
(p. 95; cf., the theory of a minimum winning
coalition in Riker 1962).
In 1946 the American Political Science Asso-
ciation created the Committee on Political Par-
ties, with Schattschneider as its chairman. Its
report, Toward a More Responsible Two-party
System (1950), was widely praised and fiercely
criticized. On the significant point of internal
party democracy, the report departs strikingly
from Schattschneider's own views. In contrast
to the report's defense of internal party democ-
racy, Schattschneider believed that "democracy
is not to be found in the parties but between the
parties" (1942, p. 60). A party is not a mass
association of voters; it is "a political enterprise
conducted by a group of working politicians
supported by partisan voters" (ibid., p. 59).
Ranney (1975, p. 144) argued that one's defini-
tion of a party member determines one's po-
sition on nearly all issues of party reform and
internal party democracy. So it was with Schatt-
schneider. He consistently opposed the direct
primary, which the Report defended, because he
believed primaries to be destructive of party
organizations and irrelevant to the broader
question of democracy.
Democracy. What then is democracy? It is
"a competitive political system in which com-
peting leaders and organizations define the al-
ternatives of public policy in such a way that
the public can participate in the decision-
making process" (I960, p. 141). Government
officials take the initiative for policy proposals
and accept responsibility for the conduct of pub-
lic business. The opposition party stands as a
critic of the government and as an alternative
government. Between the two the public makes
its sovereign judgment, "a sovereign whose vo-
cabulary is limited to two words, 'Yes' and 'No'"
(1942, p. 52). It is a theory of democracy that
places consent rather than participation at its
core. Americans, who value participation almost
as much as they mistrust political parties, have
remained hostile to democracy defined as party
government. Schattschneider's works failed
then as public advocacy. Since he wrote The
Semisovereign People, changes in party rules
and election laws have increased internal party
democracy at the same time that party govern-
ment has withered even further. Progressivism
has thus far had the last word.
Civic and professional life. One aspect of Pro-
gressivism that Schattschneider never rejected
was a commitment to public advocacy and civic
participation. He was elected to his city council
and served on a number of town and state com-
missions. He won a Freedom Foundation
award for a television broadcast with Julian
Hart of Yale University on democracy as a
moral system, the topic that became a major
portion of Two Hundred Million Americans. He
was also active in the American Political Sci-
ence Association, serving as president in 1956/
1957. Schattschneider taught at Columbia Uni-
versity from 1927-1930 while working on his
doctorate, at the New Jersey College for Women
in 1929/1930, and at Wesleyan University from
1930 until his retirement in 1960. He continued
to teach and publish through his retirement
years until his death at 78 in Old Saybrook,
Connecticut, March 4, 1971.
RICHARD W. Bo YD
WORKS BY SCHATTSCHNEIDER
(1935) 1963 Politics, Pressures and the Tariff. Ham-
den, Conn,: Anchor Books.
(1942) 1977 Party Government. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
1945 Party Government and Employment Policy.
American Political Science Review 39:1147-1157.
1948a Political Parties and the Public Interest. Amer-
ican Academy of Political and Social Science, An-
nals 280:18-26.
1948& The Struggle for Party Government. College
Park: University of Maryland, Program in Amer-
ican Civilization.
1951 Congress in Conflict. Yale Review 41:181-193.
(1952) 1973 SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E.; JONES, VICTOR;
and BAILEY, STEPHEN K. A Guide to the Study of
Public Affairs. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
1957 Intensity, Visibility, Direction, and Scope. Amer-
ican Political Science Review 51:933-942.
(1960) 1975 The Semisovereign People: A Realist's
View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt.
1969 Two Hundred Million Americans in Search of a
Government. New York: Holt.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADAMANY, DAVID 1972 The Political Science of E. E.
Schattschneider. American Political Science Review
66:1321-1335.
ADAMANY, DAVID 1975 Introduction. In E. E. Schatt-
schneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's
View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt.
—> Adamany did not write the introduction for the
1960 edition of The Semisovereign People.

BAUER, RAYMOND A.; POOL, ITHIEL DE SOLA; and DEX-
TER, LEWIS ANTHONY (1963) 1972 American
Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign
Trade. 2d ed. Chicago: Aldine.
BERELSON, BERNARD R. 1952 Democratic Theory
and Public Opinion. Public Opinion Quarterly 16:
313-330.
COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL PARTIES 1950 Toward a
More Responsible Two-party System. New York:
Rinehart.
DAHL, ROBERT A. (1956) 1967 A Preface to Demo-
cratic Theory. Univ. of Chicago Press.
DOWNS, ANTHONY 1957 An Economic Theory of
Democracy. New York: Harper.
DUVERGER, MAURICE (1950) 1969 Political Parties:
Their Organization and Activity in the Modern
State. 3d ed. London: Methuen. —> First published
as Les partis politiques dans Vetat contemporain.
KIRKPATRICK, EVRON M. 1971 Toward a More Re-
sponsible Two-party System. American Political
Science Review 65:965-990.
MARCH, JAMES G. 1957-1958 Party Legislative Rep-
resentation as a Function of Election Results. Pub-
lic Opinion Quarterly 21:521-542.
RANNEY, AUSTIN 1954 The Doctrine of Responsible
Party Government: Its Origin and Present State.
Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. —» Revision of
Ranney's PH.D. thesis at Yale University.
RANNEY, AUSTIN 1975 Curing the Mischiefs of Fac-
tion: Party Reform in America. Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press.
RIKER, WILLIAM H. 1962 The Theory of Political
Coalitions. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1942) 1954 Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy. 4th ed. New York:
Harper.
TRUMAN, DAVID B. 1951 The Governmental Process:
Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York:
Knopf.
SCHEFFE, HENRY
The life and career of Henry Scheffe (1907-
1977) cover the period when the study and de-
velopment of statistical methods emerged as the
recognized discipline of statistics or mathemati-
cal statistics (Owen 1976). He was one of the first
and finest pioneers of the new species, "math-
ematical statistician." Until World War n, the
subject was developed in the United States and
abroad by those whose research required it.
Thus, even if they were mathematically trained,
the developers of the discipline usually had some
other profession (e.g., biology, economics, etc.)
than statistics.
Scheffe was born to German parents on April
11, 1907, in New York City. He initially studied
engineering at the Cooper Union Free Night
School, the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, and
Bell Telephone Laboratories, where he also
worked for a short time. In 1928, he entered the
University of Wisconsin, taking a B.A. in math-
SCHEFFE, HENRY 701
ematics in 1931. He remained there as a doctoral
student of R. E. Langer, receiving his degree in
1935 for work on differential equations.
The great developments in statistics, by Karl
and E. S. Pearson and R. A. Fisher in the
United Kingdom and Jerzy Neyman in Poland,
the United Kingdom, and then at Berkeley, had
been picked up by Harold Hotelling at Columbia
University and S. S. Wilks at Princeton Univer-
sity. In addition, Abraham Wald arrived at Co-
lumbia in 1938. When Scheffe decided in the
late 1930s to leave mathematical analysis for
statistics, he naturally went first to Princeton
and Columbia, and inevitably Berkeley, which
became the world center of mathematical sta-
tistics. He was at Princeton (1941-1944), Co-
lumbia (1946-1963), and the University of
California at Berkeley from 1953 until his re-
tirement in 1974. In 1954 he was president of
the Institute of the Mathematical Statistics and
from 1954 to 1956, vice president of the Amer-
ican Statistical Association. He died of injuries
sustained in a bicycle accident in Berkeley on
JulyS, 1977.
By the early 1940s, Wilks's enthusiasm and
the pioneering possibilities of the new subject
had gathered many young people to Princeton.
The outbreak of World War n and the need to
apply mathematics and statistics to urgent na-
tional problems brought a further concentration
of statisticians to Columbia and Princeton.
Scheffe, like many others who subsequently had
distinguished careers in statistics, worked during
this period for the Office of Scientific Research
and Development in the New York area. His
mathematical talents were the more useful for
his engineering background and growing knowl-
edge of statistics.
In the 12-year period, from 1941 to 1953,
Scheffe was almost literally in close contact with
everyone and with every idea that has subse-
quently affected the course of statistics in the
United States. These influences were diverse and
conflicting—statistics as a guide to the elucida-
tion of immediate practical problems; statistics
as something to be studied in an orderly and
elegant mathematical manner; the decision-
theoretic formulation versus the more inferential
mode; the polar interests of Wilks in nonpara-
metric methods and multivariate (normal) anal-
ysis. One area of statistics that seems to have
been underrepresented in this group and perhaps
overrepresented elsewhere was the design and
analysis of comparative experiments.
Scheffe was quiet and modest and very much
 702 SCHEFFE, HENRY
his own man. He was content that others should
see his point of view by reading and reflecting on
his words and writings, not by powerful advocacy.
What, then, was his contribution to, and how
was he affected by, the statistical revolution of
the 1940s? In retrospect, he seems to have
chosen to pursue what his colleagues did not—
the design and analysis of comparative experi-
ments. His other work, is, however, so often
quoted that future scholars may make a dif-
ferent assessment. At present, the user of statis-
tical methods most likely associates Scheffe with
the multiple comparison problem; in the future,
his treatment of the calibration problem may
be better known. But Scheffe wrote for the pro-
fessional statistician. The serious student of
statistics may well learn the analysis of variance
from his famous text. Graduate students of
mathematical statistics will learn his name in
connection with the concept of "completeness"
and the convergence of a sequence of probability
densities. Anyone reading the literature on the
Behrens-Fisher problem will find that it was a
lifelong interest of Scheffe's.
Scheffe published 37 very carefully considered
and written works, which are discussed in serial
order by Daniel and Lehmann (1979). The latter
was Scheffe's colleague in Berkeley and coauthor
of the great Sankhyd (1950; 1955) papers on
"Completeness, Similar Regions, and Unbiased
Estimation." There, they introduced the notion
of a complete sufficient statistic to clarify the
problems of finding unbiased estimators with
uniformly minimum variance and of finding
tests whose size does not vary with nuisance
parameters. Cuthbert Daniel, a well-known ap-
plied statistician, discussed, over a period of
many years, problems in applying statistical
methods to industrial problems, particularly
those related to the analysis of variance. Being
a consultant to a consultant suited Scheffe's
personality and directly or indirectly inspired
much of his later work on the analysis of vari-
ance, multiple comparions, mixture designs, and
calibration. The fact that he was a statistician's
statistician makes it difficult to discuss his best
work, because it is necessarily technical. For
example, he foresaw clearly, in a 1943 review,
the future and the theoretical requirements of
nonparametric statistics. He had been on the
west coast for two years before E. J. G. Pitman's
Columbia lectures in 1948 began to fill in some
of these gaps.
The applied statistician constantly analyzes
and isolates sources of variability or variance
in data. The technique is the analysis of vari-
ance. This logic has led to experimental designs
which enable more sensitive treatment com-
parisons to be made; the analysis of variance
eliminates irrelevent sources of variation.
Scheffe's book (1959) summarized, for the first
time fifty years of research in this basic area from
the viewpoint of mathematical statistics. The
traditional intuitive-numerical example style
is abandoned in an effort to get the logic and as-
sumptions in full view. It is a difficult book to
read, the result of Scheffe's efforts to reconcile
what was practically important with his exact-
ing mathematical standards. Chapter ten of his
book is still a good—and for many years has been
almost the only—reference on the robustness of
the methods of analysis of variance.
The classical statistical methods of hypothesis
testing and confidence intervals assume that the
data collection has been planned to test hypoth-
eses or to estimate specified quantities regardless
of what the data, once collected, may suggest.
In reality, however, though "set-piece" experi-
ments may ocassionally be run, data are often
examined after collection for interesting pos-
sibilities. It is clearly improper to use a clas-
sical test to check the reality of an effect found
in this manner, since if we keep looking at even
purely random data, a significant result is guar-
anteed to appear. This problem had been rec-
ognized for many years (and even solved in
some cases [e.g., Fisher 1929]), but in the early
1950s, both J. W. Tukey and Scheffe (1953)
derived important results by restricting the
problem. They initially considered a set of k in-
dependent means i, each of r observations, all
with the same variance, s-/r the typical situa-
tion in analysis of variance. Sc^i is called a
"comparison" if ?c(- = 0. For example, xi — x-2
is a comparison because c3 = 1, c2 = — 1, c(•. = 0,
ij^ 1, 2. Let x be the mean of all the xi and
observe that Sc^ = ^Ci (x( — x). Now Cauchy's
inequality says that always
(x, -
so that
r s 2 /r s2/r
The lefthand side is the square of the i-test
statistic that would be used to test whether
^CjXj. is significantly different from zero. To
make this test safely, we have only to see
whether the righthand side is significantly

large; but this is the F-test of the associated
analysis of variance. If the class of comparisons
is smaller—say only pair-wise differences of
means, too much is given away by the Cauchy
inequality and a better procedure may be
found. A full account is given by Miller (1966)
with an update (1977).
In 1951 Scheffe considered some special
analysis problems that arise in sensory prefer-
ence tests where only paired comparisons arise;
the results have been widely adopted. In 1958
he opened up a new field by considering the de-
sign of chemical experiments where the out-
come depended only upon the proportion xt of
the constituents, SX; = 1. These designs are
very symmetric. The resulting literature has
provided many alternatives similar to his origi-
nal suggestions.
In his last major paper, Scheffe (1973) at-
tempted to clarify and refine the ancient calibra-
tion method. According to this method,
(1) experiments with various values of x are con-
ducted in order to estimate a relation y = f(x~);
(2) then, the easy measurement y is made and
the difficult x determined by reading the graph
of y — f(x) backwards. Even if we assume cor-
rectly that f(x) = a + fix and that y — a -f fix
-\- u, where the w's are normally and indepen-
dently distributed, there is a problem. Clearly,
we can estimate a, (3, a2 and give a distribution,
depending on x, to any possible y. To give an
interval estimate for the unknown x evidently
requires that we invert this knowledge—roughly,
it will contain every x that does not make the
observed y too unlikely. An interval may or may
not be "correct"—that is, it may or may not
cover the true x. But the same calibration line
is to be used again and again for different y's.
Scheffe provides a method ensuring a probabil-
ity of at least 1 - 8 that indefinitely frequent
usage of the method, for any (unknown) se-
quence of ^-values will lead to a fraction of cor-
rect statements in excess of 1 — a. Work con-
tinues to make this method more available to
users.
G. S. WATSON
WORKS BY SCHEFFE
1936 Asymptotic Solutions of Certain Linear Differ-
ential Equations in Which the Coefficient of the
Parameter May Have a Zero. American Mathemati-
cal Society, Transactions 40:127—154.
1940 At What Level of Rigor Should Advanced Cal-
culus for Undergraduates Be Taught. American
Mathematical Monthly 47:635-640.
1942a An Inverse Problem in Correlation Theory.
American Mathematical Monthly 49:99—104.
SCHEFFE, HENRY 703
1942fo Linear Differential Equations With Two-term
Recurrence Formulas. Journal of Mathematics and
Physics 21:240-249.
1942c On the Theory of Testing Composite Hypotheses
With One Constraint. Annals of Mathematical Sta-
tistics 13:280-293.
1942d On the Ratio of the Variances of Two Normal
Populations. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 13:
371-388.
1943a On Solutions of the Behrens-Fisher Problem,
Based on the t-Distribution. Annals of Mathemati-
cal Statistics 14:35-44.
1943k On a Measure Problem Arising in the Theory
of Non-parametric Tests. Annals of Mathematical
Statistics 14:227-233.
1943c Statistical Inference in the Non-paramet-
ric Case. Annals of Mathematical Statistics
14:305-332.
1944a A Note on the Behrens-Fisher Problem. Annals
of Mathematical Statistics 15:430-432.
1944b Note on the Use of the Tables of Percentage
Points of the Incomplete Beta Function to Calcu-
late Small Sample Confidence Intervals for a Bino-
mial p. Biometrika 33:181 only.
1944 SCHEFFE, HENRY; and TUKEY, J. W. A Formula
for Sample Sizes for Population Tolerance Limits.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics 15:217 only.
1945 SCHEFFE, HENRY; and TUKEY, J. W. Non-para-
metric Estimation: I. Validation of Order Statistics.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics 16:187-192.
1947a The Relation of Control Charts to Analysis of
Variance and Chi-square Tests. Journal of the
American Statistical Association 42:425—431.
1947b A Useful Convergence Theorem for Probability
Distributions. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 18:
434-438.
1947 LEHMANN, E. L.; and SCHEFFE, HENRY On the
Problem of Similar Regions. National Academy of
Sciences, Proceedings 33:382-386.
1949 Operating Characteristics of Average and Range
Charts. Industrial Quality Control 5, no. 6:13-18.
1950 LEHMANN, E. L.; and SCHEFFE, HENRY Com-
pleteness, Similar Regions, and Unbiased Estima-
tion, Part 1. Sankhya 10:305-340.
1951 Theoretical Backgrounds of the Statistical Meth-
ods: Some Basic Concepts of Probability and Sta-
tistics. Industrial and Engineering Chemistry 43:
1292-1294.
1952 An Analysis of Variance for Paired Comparisons.
Journal of American Statistics 47:381-400.
1952 CHERNOFF, H.; and SCHEFFE, HENRY A Gener-
alization of the Neyman-Pearson Fundamental
Lemma. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 23:
213-225.
1953 A Method for Judging All Contrasts in the Anal-
ysis of Variance. Biometrika 40:87-104.
1954 Statistical Methods for Evaluation of Several
Sets of Constants and Several Sources of Varia-
bility. Chemical Engineering Progress 50:200—205.
1955 LEHMANN, E. L.; and SCHEFFE, HENRY Com-
pleteness, Similar Regions, and Unbiased Estima-
tion, Part 2. Sankhya 15:219-236.
1956a A "Mixed Model" for the Analysis of Variance.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics 27:23-37.
1956& Alternative Models for the Analysis of Vari-
ance. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 27:251—
271.
1958a Experiments With Mixtures. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society 20:344-360.
1958& Fitting Straight Lines When One Variable Is
Controlled. Journal of the American Statistical As-
sociation 53:106-117.
1959 The Analysis of Variance. New York: Wiley.
704 SCHLOSBERG, HAROLD
196la Reply to Mr. Quenouille's Comments About My
Paper on Mixtures. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society 23:171-172.
196lb Simultaneous Interval Estimates of Linear
Functions of Parameters. Bulletin of the Interna-
tional Statistical Institute 38:245-253.
1963 The Simplex—Centroid Design for Experiments
With Mixtures. Journal of the Royal Statistical So-
ciety 25:235-263.
1970a Multiple Testing Versus Multiple Estimation;
Improper Confidence Sets; Estimation of Directions
and Ratios. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 41:
1-29.
1970k A Note on Separation of Variables. Techno-
metrics 12:388-393.
1970c Practical Solutions of the Behrens-Fisher
Problem. Journal of the American Statistical Asso-
ciation 65:1501-1508.
1973 Statistical Theory of Calibration. Annals of
Mathematical Statistics New Series 1:1-37.
1977 A Note on a Reformulation of the S-method of
Multiple Comparison. Journal of the American Sta-
tistical Association 72:143-146.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
DANIEL, CUTHBERT; and LEHMANN, E. L. 1979 Henry
Scheffe. Annals of Statistics 7, Nov. —» Forthcom-
ing publication.
FISHER, R. A. 1929 Tests of Significance in Har-
monic Analysis. Royal Statistical Society, Proceed-
ings Series A 125:54-59.
MILLER, RUPERT G., JR. 1966 Simultaneous Statisti-
cal Inference. New York: McGraw-Hill.
MILLER, RUPERT G., JR. 1977 Developments in Mul-
tiple Comparisons, 1966-1976. Journal of the
American Statistical Association 72:779-788.
OWEN, DONALD B. (editor) 1976 On the History of
Statistics and Probability. New York: Dekker.
SCHLOSBERG, HAROLD
Harold Schlosberg (1904-1964) was an ex-
perimental psychologist who made contributions
to the study of conditioning, perception, emotion,
and psychological theory.
Biography
Schlosberg was born in Brooklyn, New York,
the son of an electrical contractor. As a youth
he served an informal apprenticeship to his
father, helping to install electrical circuits. As a
result of this early experience, many of his ex-
perimental studies were carried out with the aid
of electrical equipment that he designed himself.
He was also widely known as an inventor of psy-
chological gadgets of the "rubber band and paper
clip" variety. Some of his publications were ap-
paratus notes (1937).
Schlosberg received his A.B. (1925), M.A.
(1926), and PH.D. (1928) from Princeton Uni-
versity. His doctoral dissertation on the condi-
tioned knee jerk in man was the topic of some
of his further early research. In 1928, Schlosberg
became an instructor of psychology at Brown
University, where he remained until his death.
Partly as a result of Schlosberg's experimental
work, but perhaps more importantly as a result
of his sage advice, Brown University was soon
to move into the ranks of the top departments
of psychology in the United States. In 1936,
Walter S. Hunter came from Clark University
to be chairman of the department, and he soon
attracted a strong group of scholars. During the
next two decades, in addition to Hunter and
Schlosberg, the Brown psychology department
included such people as Leonard Carmichael5
Clarence Graham, Donald B. Lindsley, Lorrin A.
Riggs, Carl Pfaffmann, J. McVicker Hunt, David
Zeaman, and G. Robert Grice. In 1954 Schlos-
berg succeeded Hunter as chairman.
During his career, Schlosberg contributed to
the science and profession of psychology and
received many honors in return. He served on
several committees of the American Psycho-
logical Association, including the Policy and
Planning Board. In addition, he was a member
of a panel of consultants on psychophysiology
for the Surgeon General for ten years, a member
of the editorial board of the Annual Review of
Psychology, a consulting editor for Psychological
Review, and, as chairman at Brown, Schlosberg
was an active member (and chairman for one
year) of the National Council of Chairmen of
Graduate Departments of Psychology. During the
summer of 1960, he toured laboratories in Rus-
sia and Poland under a grant from the Society
for the Investigation of Human Ecology, accom-
panied by Neal E. Miller and Carl Pfaffmann.
Schlosberg was among the first to assist in bring-
ing the psychologies of America and eastern
Europe closer together (Miller, Pfaffmann, &
Schlosberg 1962).
Schlosberg received many honors. At different
times, he was president of the Divisions of Ex-
perimental and Physiological Psychology of the
American Psychological Association, chairman
of the section on psychology of the American As-
sociation for the Advancement of Science, presi-
dent of the Eastern Psychological Association
(1953/1954), a member of the Society of Ex-
perimental Psychologists, and a fellow of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
From a fairly early age (in his thirties),
Schlosberg suffered from arthritis in the neck
and back. Because of this painful condition,
which severely limited his physical activity,

Schlosberg spent little time in the laboratory and
many of his contributions were of a theoretical
nature.
Scientific contributions
At Princeton, Schlosberg was strongly influ-
enced by the behavioristic psychologist and phi-
losopher, Edwin B. Holt. This influence persisted
throughout Schlosberg's career, which was de-
voted to the experimental study and theoretical
interpretation of objectively observable behavior.
Although he was an objectivist, Schlosberg re-
sisted, and objected to, the most restrictive ver-
sions of operationalism. For the last decade or
so of his life, he refused to submit articles to the
journals that were most heavily dominated by
this theme.
Studies of conditioning. In keeping with this
liberalized objectivism, Schlosberg's earliest work
(1932) was on conditioning in. human beings.
In 1902 Edwin B. Twitmyer had discovered that
the patellar reflex (knee jerk) is conditionable.
Although Twitmyer's dissertation was not pub-
lished for more than seventy years (Twitmyer
1974), there was a report of the work at a meet-
ing of the American Psychological Association
in 1905. The general facts of such conditioning
thus became common knowledge and stimulated
further attempts to study the phenomenon.
By and large the results were disappointing.
Schlosberg, for example, found that the patellar
reflex was difficult to condition in anyone and
that there were enormous individual differences
in the degree to which people could be condi-
tioned. Attempts to uncover the bases for these
individual differences were unsuccessful. No
correlation could be discovered between these
differences, and measures of suggestibility
(which have since yielded more positive results)
were too crude to be useful. All of this led
Schlosberg, in his later work, to turn to the
laboratory rat as a subject for conditioning.
These early studies did produce one line of
interpretation that was to become significant in
Schlosberg's important paper (1937) on the dis-
tinction between classical and instrumental con-
ditioning. The behavior of the subjects in the
experiment supported the view that the condi-
tioned reflex belonged in a special category of
learning, "split off from the rest of the subject's
activity, like an automatism." The evidence for
such a statement was that the conditioned reflex
appeared to develop apart from voluntary con-
trol. Some subjects seemed to be unable to con-
SCHLOSBERG, HAROLD 705
trol the knee jerk voluntarily. Others showed
that they could, but that they were also able to
assign the reflex to a separate psychological
compartment and let it function according to
its own rules. Interesting as such observations
are today, they would not have been much ap-
preciated in a psychology dominated by Wat-
sonian behaviorism, which had ruled out of the
field everything even faintly tainted with mental-
ism. Probably this is what led Schlosberg to turn
to lower organisms for his next studies.
These studies (Schlosberg 1936; Ka^pauf &
Schlosberg 1937) represent Schlosberg's major
contribution to the factual literature in the area
of conditioning. The general procedure in these
studies was to pair an unconditioned stimulus,
such as a shock to the tail or leg, with a condi-
tioned stimulus, such as a light or buzzer at an
interval of approximately 0.35 to 7.00 seconds.
Three types of responses were measured:
changes in breathing, tail or leg movements, and
squeals. Some of the important findings in these
studies were the following:
(1) The different responses were condi-
tioned in a particular order. Changes in breath-
ing appeared first, followed by tail or leg move-
ments, and finally squeals. In extinction (pre-
senting the conditioned stimulus without the un-
conditioned stimulus) they dropped out in the
reverse order. This led Schlosberg to develop a
concept of depth of conditioning, a notion that
has never received the attention it deserves.
(2) Variations in the interval separating
conditioned and unconditioned stimuli some-
times produced a gradient of effectiveness, with
the best conditioning occurring at intervals of
2/3 or 1.0 seconds. At long intervals, little or no
conditioning occurred. The most favorable inter-
vals were much shorter than those reported by
Ivan Petrovich Pavlov as effective, a fact that
was confirmed in numerous later experiments
by many others. At the same time, however,
Schlosberg also observed that very strong shocks
obliterated the gradient and longer intervals
were effective. This came about by the condi-
tioning of diffuse excitement which delayed the
waning effectiveness of the conditioned stimu-
lus.
(3) Crowding practice trials close together
had an effect. Fifteen or twenty trials per day
led to better conditioning than two hundred trials
per day.
(4) There is a small loss in the strength of
the conditioned response between daily sessions.
706 SCHLOSBERG, HAROLD
With a two month delay the conditioned re-
sponse practically disappears.
(5) If more than a few unreinforced "test
trials" are used in a daily session, the conditioned
response is seriously weakened through extinc-
tion.
Conditioning theory. This last result, which
Pavlov had also obtained, had an important im-
plication. It called into question Edward L.
Thorndike's most important principle, the so-
called "law of effect," which holds that re-
sponses that result in "satisfaction" (Schlosberg
substituted the word "success") are "stamped
in"; those that result in "annoyance" or "failure"
are "stamped out." In more ordinary terms, suc-
cessful responses are learned; unsuccessful re-
sponses are lost.
Now, from the rat's point of view, the admin-
istration of a test trial should constitute an ex-
perience of "success," because making a response
seems to avoid the shock. Aware of this point,
Schlosberg ran a number of tests under condi-
tions where a response would always prevent or
terminate the shock. He found, contrary to the
"law of effect," that the successful response was
not learned quickly, but rather, that it needed
reconditioning at established intervals. The re-
sponse weakened with avoidance (success) to
the point where it failed to avoid the shock; this
led to shock again and the re-establishment of
the response. Such observations led Schlosberg
to the view that the "law of effect" does not apply
to conditioned avoidance and to the suspicion
that the classical conditioned reaction is only one
type of learning and not the basis of all learning
experiences. He developed these ideas more
completely in his important 1937 paper, "The
Relationship Between Success and the Laws of
Conditioning."
Largely as a result of Pavlov's tendency to de-
scribe all learned behavior in terms of condi-
tioned responses, the notion that there might be
more than one form of learning was revolu-
tionary in 1937. Nevertheless, the data had
begun to indicate to a number of theorists that
this might be the case. Probably the first of these
were Stefan Miller and Jerzy Konorski (1928).
B. F. Skinner proposed the same idea in 1935.
Thorndike, in various places, suggested that
classical conditioning might be a special form of
learning, governed by a law of associative shift-
ing. Schlosberg's statement, however, probably
had the greatest impact.
The common theme that runs through all of
these writings is that two experimental arrange-
ments employed in the laboratory involve differ-
ent relationships between a to-be-conditioned re-
sponse and its consequences. This meant that
the different procedures may possibly have pro-
duced different kinds of learning. In one experi-
ment, commonly called instrumental (or oper-
ant) conditioning, the response delivers some
positive stimulus, e.g., food, or avoids a negative
one, e.g., shock. In the maze, for example, the
rat receives food only if it performs the correct
series of responses. In the second laboratory set-
ting, often called classical conditioning, the re-
sponse has no effect upon the positive or nega-
tive stimulus. It appears no matter what the
learner does. In Pavlov's experiments, for exam-
ple, food is delivered whether or not the dog
salivates.
Schlosberg referred to these two forms of
learning, respectively, as "trial-and-error learn-
ing" or "problem solving" and "conditioning."
Conditioning, he said, applies to diffuse prepara-
tory responses which may correspond to what
Edward C. Tolman (1933) was calling expec-
tancies. They require only relatively simple neu-
ral processes and can be established by the mere
pairing of conditioned and unconditioned stim-
uli. The "law of effect," or reinforcement, is
specifically not involved. "Trial-and-error learn-
ing," by contrast, obeys the law of effect. It leads
to the acquisition of very specific skeletal re-
sponses and requires more elaborate nervous
mechanisms.
Other contributions. The detailed formula-
tion of this distinction was Schlosberg's most sig-
nificant contribution. With the outbreak of World
War n, Schlosberg served as acting chairman of
the department of psychology at Brown Univer-
sity while Hunter, involved in the war effort,
was on leave. After the war Schlosberg did addi-
tional work on conditioning, but gave more of
his attention to other projects. He set up a bank
of aquariums in his office to study the instinctive
behavior of tropical fish, but not much ever
came of this work.
He published a simple mathematical model
(1948), which described grossly the probability
of seeing from two to seven dots exposed tachis-
toscopically. The probability of seeing N dots,
according to his model, was the Nth power of the
probability of seeing one dot under the same
conditions. Although this was one of Schlosberg's
favorite papers, he did no further work on the
topic.
The results of these two projects were meager
because of Schlosberg's decision, in about 1949,

to devote most of his time to collaborating with
Robert S. Woodworth of Columbia University
on the revision of Woodworth's Experimental
Psychology. This massive work appeared in
1954. In the same year Schlosberg published
his last important scientific paper. It was a
dimensional analysis of the facial expression,
which Schlosberg saw as a key problem in the
psychology of emotion. In this paper he showed
that people could locate facial expressions in a
three-dimensional cone defined by three con-
tinua: sleep-tension, acceptance-rejection, pleas-
ant-unpleasant.
As this description of Schlosberg's work may
suggest, his contribution was largely one of
bringing good sense and clear thinking to bear
on a variety of topics. He created no school of
psychology and gathered no cadre of disciples
around him, although he was an influential
teacher and administrator. He was more of a
synthesizer than a creator and will be remem-
bered in the history of psychology for that.
GREGORY A. KIMBLE
WORKS BY SCHLOSBERG
1932 An Investigation of Certain Factors Related to
the Ease of Conditioning. Journal of General Psy- economics a part of general economics was ex-
chology 7:328-342.
1936 Conditioned Responses in the White Rat: II,
Conditioned Responses Based Upon Shock to the
Foreleg. Journal of Genetic Psychology 49:107-138. department of economics and sociology, which
1937 Reaction-time Apparatus. Journal of Genetic Psy-
chology 50:47-61.
1937 KAPPAUF, WILLIAM E.; and SCHLOSBERG, HAROLD
Conditioned Responses in the White Rat: III, Con- ciology. He brought to the department some of
ditioning as a Function of the Period of Delay.
Journal of Genetic Psychology 50:27—45.
1948 A Probability Formulation of the Hunter-
Sigler Effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology
38:155-167.
1954 Three Dimensions of Emotion. Psychological Re-
view 61:81-88.
1954 WOODWORTH, ROBERT S.; and SCHLOSBERG, HA-
ROLD Experimental Psychology. Rev. ed. New York:
Holt.
1962 MILLER, NEAL E.; PFAFFMANN, CARL; and
SCHLOSBERG, HAROLD Aspects of Psychology and
Psychophysiology in the U.S.S.R. Pages 189-252 in
Raymond A. Bauer (editor), Some Views on Soviet
Psychology. Washington: American Psychological
Association.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
MILLER, STEFAN; and KONORSKI, JERZY 1928 Sur une
form particuliere des reflexes conditionels. Comptes portant and influential books from 1943 to
rendus, Societe de Biologie. Paris 99:1155-1157.
SKINNER, B. F. 1935 Two Types of Conditioned Re-
flex and a Pseudo Type. Journal of General Psychol-
ogy 12:66-77.
TOLMAN, EDWARD C. 1933 Sign Gestalt or Condi-
tioned Reflex? Psychological Review 40:246-255.
TWITMYER, EDWIN B. 1974 A Study of the Knee
Jerk. Journal of Experimental Psychology 103:1047-
1066.
SCHULTZ, THEODORE W. 707
SCHULTZ, THEODORE W.
Theodore W. Schultz has been a major con-
tributor to the field of agricultural economics.
Born in 1902, he grew up on a South Dakota
farm in a community of German settlers. He
received his bachelor's degree in 1926 from
South Dakota State College and his doctorate in
agricultural economics in 1930 from the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin. During his professional
academic career at Iowa State College and the
University of Chicago, he served extended
periods as chairman of each department and
had a major role in the development of both.
One of Schultz's major tenets is his emphasis
that the field of agricultural economics was an
integral part of economics, and that price and
value theory could be fruitfully applied to prob-
lems of interest to agricultural economists.
Much work in agricultural economics, despite
some important exceptions, fell into such speci-
fic fields as farm management, marketing, land
tenure, and credit, with little interrelationship
among them and without much benefit of the
insights and methods derived from economic
theory. Schultz's effort to make agricultural
pressed not only in his own writing and research
but in the way he molded the Iowa State College
in the 1930s and early 1940s included general
economics, agricultural economics, and rural so-
the brightest young economic theorists avail-
able, including George J. Stigler, Albert G. Hart
and Kenneth E. Boulding. Empirical research
was also greatly strengthened by close associa-
tion between economic theorists and statisticians.
In the late 1930s and the 1940s Schultz
turned his attention to the analysis of agricul-
tural policies. The many New Deal agricultural
programs provided numerous research oppor-
tunities, and one important interest was to de-
termine the effects of particular programs, such
as acreage limitations, upon the actual output
of farm products. His interest in agricultural
policy resulted in the publication of four im-
1953: Redirecting Farm Policy (1943), Agri-
culture in an Unstable Economy (1945a), Pro-
duction and Welfare of Agriculture (1949), and
The Economic Organization of Agriculture
(1953). One of his major points was that gov-
ernmental policies that increased output prices
or distributed subsidies that were highly corre-
 708 SCHULTZ, THEODORE W.
lated with inputs or outputs would do little or
nothing to improve the economic position of
low-income groups in agriculture. He argued
that the primary function of prices was to direct
the use of resources, and that their use to in-
crease, or modify the distribution of, income
resulted in a waste of resources and had little
or no effect on income.
His later interest and research in the analysis
of human capital followed from these earlier
works. His prescriptions for improving the wel-
fare of farm people included measures that
would reduce the supply of labor to agriculture
and increase public investment in human
agents.
It was primarily his emphasis upon the ob-
jective analysis of agricultural policies that led
to his move to Chicago in 1943. At the begin-
ning of World War n Schultz and his colleagues
at Iowa State College organized a series of stud-
ies, the Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series,
designed to indicate how agricultural policies
could be modified or designed to maximize agri-
cultural contributions to the war effort. One of
the studies, O. H. Brownlee's Putting Dairying
on a War Footing (1943), aroused so much con-
troversy within the state and was so mishandled
by the Iowa State College administration that
the bulletin was withdrawn from circulation.
The conclusion considered so offensive was that
margarine, a substitute for butter derived pri-
marily from vegetable fats, was nutritionally
equivalent to butter, and that taxes and other
restrictions—such as prohibitions on the sale of
margarine colored to resemble butter—should be
removed. This thesis threatened the interests
of the numerous dairy producers in Iowa who
depended for most of their income on the sale
of butter, and strong political pressure was
placed on Iowa State College to repudiate the
pamphlet (see Hardin 1955). After this viola-
tion of academic freedom, Schultz left Iowa for
the University of Chicago.
A second major thread in Schultz's interests
was economic growth—how to understand it
and promote it. In Food for the World (1945£>),
a volume of papers presented at a conference
that he had organized, he systematically devel-
oped the interrelationships of the factors affect-
ing demand (population, income, and elasticity
of demand) and supply (labor force, technol-
ogy, improvements in the skill of farm people,
and the rate of investment). His most significant
work on this topic was Transforming Traditional
Agriculture (1964), whose main points were
that traditional farmers were efficient in the use
of resources; that the marginal productivity of
farm labor was not zero; and that poor farmers
would quickly adopt new methods of produc-
tion if they were superior to the old. A primary,
though not the only, approach to increasing
food production and rural incomes in the low-
income countries was to develop new technolo-
gies that were superior to those derived from
centuries of practical experience. Schultz argued
strongly against policies in developing countries
that emphasized industry at the expense of
agriculture and urban consumers at the expense
of farm people and expanded food production.
The rapid adoption by low income countries in
the mid-1960s of the new high yielding varieties
of rice and wheat was fully consistent with his
conclusions.
Schultz had an uncanny knack for asking
relevant questions that often inaugurated new
lines of research for his students and colleagues.
For example, one question involved the unex-
plained residual in the growth of output—i.e.,
the increase in output not explained by the in-
crease in inputs as conventionally measured. In
effect, he asked if the size of the residual was
not more of an indication of our ignorance than
it was a measure of productivity change. This
question generated an enormous amount of re-
search, including research on improved mea-
sures of various inputs and on the measurement
of the returns to investment in research.
Although his article "Investment in Man: An
Economist's View" (1959) did not originate
the study of human capital, it did influence the
direction of much of the work in this area dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s. His influence stemmed
from his contributions to discussions with econ-
omists in the United States and abroad at the
workshops in economics that flourished at the
University of Chicago from the late 1940s on,
at professional meetings, and at colloquia and
symposia, some of which he organized. He has
the capacity to learn and teach others simul-
taneously.
Schultz's interest in human capital and his
belief that the social sciences had been ineffec-
tive in understanding the factors influencing the
rate of population growth led him to turn to
the economic analysis of fertility. To some de-
gree this interest tied in with his earlier work on
agriculture and world food and his succeeding
efforts to analyze the potential for increasing
income in low-income or developing countries.
While contributing to the analysis of human

capital and fertility, Schultz continued to make
important contributions to the literature of agri-
cultural economics. One of his continuing con-
cerns has been the adverse impact of food and
agricultural policies in the developing countries
upon the growth of agricultural production.
Distortions of Agricultural Incentives (1978),
the paper presented at a 1977 conference, was
one important result of this interest. He has
also continued to emphasize the role of agri-
cultural research in expanding production, and
the contribution of investment in people in
rural areas to the improvement of the welfare of
those people.
Schultz has received many honors. He was
one of the first fellows of the American Farm
Economic Association (1957), president of the
American Economic Association (1961), dis-
tinguished fellow of the American Economic
Association (1965) and recipient of its Francis
A. Walker medal (1972), and a member of the
National Academy of Sciences and the Ameri-
can Academy of Arts and Sciences.
D. GALE JOHNSON
WORKS BY SCHULTZ
1943 Redirecting Farm Policy. New York: Macmillan.
1945a Agriculture in an Unstable Economy. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
(1945£>) 1976 SCHULTZ, THEODORE W. (editor) Food
for the World. New York: Arno.
1949 Production and Welfare of Agriculture. New
York: Macmillan.
1953 The Economic Organization of Agriculture. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
1959 Investment in Man: An Economist's View. Social
Service Review 33:109-117.
1963 The Economic Value of Education. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press.
(1964) 1976 Transforming Traditional Agriculture.
New York: Arno.
1965 Economic Crises in World Agriculture. Ann Ar-
bor: Univ. of Michigan Press. —* The William Cook
lectures on American institutions, given at Ann
Arbor, April 13-16, 1964.
1968a Capital, Human. Volume 2, pages 278-287 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968i> Economic Growth and Agriculture. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
1971 Investment in Human Capital: The Role of Edu-
cation and Research. New York: Free Press.
1972 SCHULTZ, THEODORE W. (editor) Investment in
Education: The Equity-Efficiency Quandary. Univ.
of Chicago Press. —> Also published in the Journal
of Political Economy, volume 80, number 3, part 2.
1973 SCHULTZ, THEODORE W. (editor) New Economic
Approaches to Fertility. Univ. of Chicago Press. —•»
Also published in the Journal of Political Economy,
volume 81, number 2, part. 2.
1974 SCHULTZ, THEODORE W. (editor) Economics of the
Family: Marriage, Family, Human Capital, and Fer-
SEARS, ROBERT R. 709
tility. Univ. of Chicago Press. —> Also published in
the Journal of Political Economy, volume 82, num-
ber 2, part 2. The proceedings of a conference, June
4—5, 1973, sponsored by the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research and the Population Council. In-
cludes several articles published in Schultz 1973.
1978 SCHULTZ, THEODORE W. (editor) Distortions of Ag-
ricultural Incentives. Bloomington: Indiana Univ.
Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BROWNLEE, O. H. (1943) 1976 Putting Dairying on
a War Footing. Wartime Farm and Food Policy,
Pamphlet No. 5. New York: Arno.
HARDIN, CHARLES M. (1955) 1976 Freedom in Agri-
cultural Education. New York: Arno.
SEARS, ROBERT R.
Robert R. Sears, a leader in the revival of
developmental psychology in the mid-twentieth
century, was born in Palo Alto, California, in
1908, of parents recently arrived from the
American Midwest. He grew up in Palo Alto,
studied literature and drama at Stanford Uni-
versity, found his interest in psychology piqued
by the enthusiasm of his fiancee (Pauline Sned-
den, soon to be his wife and lifelong research
colleague) and by the teaching of Paul Farns-
worth. In 1929 Sears left Palo Alto for the 24
years—at Yale University, the University of Illi-
nois, the University of Iowa, and Harvard Uni-
versity—that would be the most innovative and
productive times of his research career. He
returned to Stanford in 1953, first as head of
psychology, then as dean of the School of Hu-
manities and Science, and, in the years before
his retirement in 1975, as David Starr Jordan
professor of psychology.
Like most American psychologists, Sears was
prepared for his career by a curious amalgam of
accident, Zeitgeist, and personal predilection.
The defining accidents were his appointment in
1932 as instructor at Illinois, where he was sud-
denly required to work up a course in person-
ality psychology, and his later appointment in
1942 as director of the Iowa Child Welfare Re-
search Station, where he became "a child psy-
chologist by fiat." The Zeitgeist was best
represented by the heady and intellectual club
at Yale's confident Institute of Human Relations
during Sears's years there (1929-1932 and
1936-1942). Sears studied hypnosis with Clark
L. Hull, served as a subject in Ernest R. Hil-
gard's research on classical conditioning, pre-
pared a dissertation on learning in the decorti-
cate goldfish, worked with Leonard W. Doob,
710 SEARS, ROBERT R.
John Dollard, O. Hobart Mowrer, and Neal E.
Miller in the presentation of the frustration-
aggression argument, and learned the varieties
of psychological thinking in his colloquies with
Carl I. Hovland and Kenneth W. Spence.
Chance and times came together in Sears's
personal devotion to several principles that
guided his life work. Never free of his ground-
ings in literature and drama, always open to
Pauline Sears's experience as clinical and edu-
cational psychologist, Sears for forty years prac-
ticed and taught with a rare conjunction of
rigor and relevance in psychological research.
He entered unexplored territory in develop-
mental psychology with a strong theoretical pre-
disposition (usually drawn from psychoanalysis
or the work of Kurt Lewin), and, perhaps most
consequentially for his students and his disci-
pline, he insisted on the importance of close
direct observation of human action in research
settings as natural as he could arrange.
A Fourier analysis of Sears's professional life
would reveal three principal components of his
work. Two of them—public service in his pro-
fession and his original scholarship—show clear
peaks. The third, his participation in the crea-
tion of settings for research and teaching, has
a steadier and more persistent form. George
Stoddard roughly denned the Iowa Child Welfare
Station; Sears invested it with a commitment
to research that joined intricate puzzles—the
stability of personality, the variations of early
parenting—with tough-minded clean research
procedures. In his short stay at Harvard, Sears
established a laboratory for the study of human
development that, in several transformations,
remained a setting for the study of children and
families for many years after his departure. It
was at Stanford, however, that Sears best
worked his skills in the creation of settings. He
brought the department of psychology to pre-
mier eminence in the world; as dean, he super-
vised the elevation of Stanford's faculty to
renown; he was a moving force in the establish-
ment of the Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavioral Sciences; and, in his last years at
Stanford, he joined in the design of the uni-
versity's Boys Town Center for Youth Develop-
ment.
The curve of Sears's public service to develop-
mental psychology shows two peaks: first, his
leadership in the revival and redefinition of the
field after World War n, a cycle that was
marked by his election in 1951 to the presidency
of the American Psychological Association;
then his return to national service in the 1970s,
with his leadership of the Society for Research
in Child Development and his service as editor
of the society's monograph series.
Sears's scholarly work over the years had a
surface diversity that masks an underlying sim-
plicity and wholeness. Aside from his student
flirtation with Yale's biopsychology (he called
his work with Hull on hypnosis and pain "mus-
cle-twitch psychology with a vengeance," and
his career as neuropsychologist ended when a
dog he was conditioning at Illinois died), Sears's
research and theorizing have represented an at-
tempt to maintain the tension of content be-
tween biography and technical psychology, the
tension of method between clinical methods and
precise experimentation.
Sears was the first of the Yale group to stake
out the possibilities of translating the principles
of psychoanalysis (especially the psychoanalysis
of defense) into the principles of contemporary
learning theory. His summary of the potential
relation between repression and Hull's antic-
ipatory goal response (Sears 1936) was the
first of a long series of papers that grew from
the Wednesday night seminar that Hull later
led at Yale on the connections between learning
theory and Freud. Publications on aggression,
on conflict, on repression, and, perhaps most
seminally, on social learning flowed from the
source that Sears had dug; in 1943, he pub-
lished his Survey of Objective Studies of Psycho-
analytic Concepts, a review that joined Frustra-
tion and Aggression (Dollard et al., 1939) and
Social Learning and Imitation (Miller & Dol-
lard 1941) in the statement of " . . . a remark-
ably influential set of concepts that were to
dominate theoretical formulations in child psy-
chology over the next two or three decades"
(Cairns & Ornstein 1979).
With his move to Iowa City and his resultant
translation into child psychologist, Sears con-
tinued in a new empirical domain his program
of hardheaded examination of propositions
about crucial events in everyday life. With
George Bach, he initiated the use of systemati-
cally observed doll play as a window on the
thinking of young children. Although the re-
sults of the Iowa studies were not as clear-cut
as Sears had hoped, they represented his early
concern with aggression and dependency in
children and, long before it was fashionable,
with the early social definition of what it meant
to be male and female in the United States.
Near the end of his stay at Iowa, Sears gathered

a group of talented young psychologists to ad-
dress, through interviews with mothers and ob-
servations of their children, questions about the
social development of human personality. Pub-
lished in 1953 (Sears et al.), his report of the
research is marked, once again, by his mixture
of openness and precision, of simplicity of
formulation and complexity of problem. The
work on social learning in children and on the
exchanges between mother and child in early
development determined a major line of re-
search for child psychology at mid-century.
Reviewing the period between 1946 and 1979,
Cairns and Ornstein observed that "the begin-
ning [of the period] is easy [to summarize] be-
cause Robert R. Sears can readily be recognized
as the person whose influence dominated the
applications to child psychology of the original
psychoanalytic-learning synthesis for the first
half of the period" (1979). And so it was to be
at Harvard. With many of the same colleagues,
Sears began a much more ambitious study of
early rearing patterns and personality in kinder-
gartners that produced Patterns of Child Rear-
ing in 1957 and Identification and Child Rear-
ing in 1965.
Administrative service at Stanford slowed
Sears's scholarship. When he left the deanship,
however, he continued in systematic form the
studies of Mark Twain (Sears 1976) that well
represent the pattern of his life work. The
Twain studies had their origins in his under-
graduate interest in literature, in his reading
of Bollard's Criteria for the Life History (1935)
in the 1930s, and in his singular conviction
that the intricacies of art, like the intricacies
of human pathology and of human develop-
ment, can be clarified, dissected, made to be
countable, and brought under the control of
simplifying propositions by a careful applica-
tion of the rules of positive psychological sci-
ence.
WILLIAM KESSEN
WORKS BY SEARS
1936 Functional Abnormalities of Memory With Spe-
cial Reference to Amnesia. Psychological Bulletin
33:229-274.
1943 Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic
Concepts. Social Science Research Council, Bulletin
51. New York: The Council.
1953 SEARS, ROBERT R.; WHITING, J. W. M.; NOWLIS,
V.; and SEARS, P. S. Some Child-rearing Antece-
dents of Aggression and Dependency in Young
Children. Genetic Psychology Monographs 47:135—
236.
1957 SEARS, ROBERT R.; MACCOBY, E. E.; and LEVIN,
SELLIN, THORSTEN 711
HARRY Patterns of Child Rearing. Evanston, 111.:
Row, Peterson.
1965 SEARS, ROBERT R.; RAU, LUCY; and ALPERT,
RICHARD Identification and Child Rearing. Stanford
Univ. Press.
1976 Episodic and Content Analysis of Mark Twain's
Novels: A Longitudinal Study of Separation Anx-
iety. Volume 7, pages 198-206 in Joseph Strelka
(editor), Yearbook of Comparative Criticism: Liter-
ary Criticism and Psychology. University Park:
Pennsylvania State Univ. Press.
1979 Autobiography. In Gardner Lindzey (editor), A
History of Psychology in Autobiography. Worcester,
Mass.: Clark Univ. Press. —» Forthcoming.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CAIRNS, R. B.; and ORNSTEIN, P. A. 1979 Develop-
mental Psychology. In E. Hearst (editor), Experi-
mental Psychology at 100. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
—-» Forthcoming.
Distinguished Scientific Contribution Awards for 1975.
1976 American Psychologist 31: 59-62.
DOLLARD, JOHN (1935) 1971 Criteria for the Life
History, With Analyses of Six Notable Documents.
Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press.
DOLLARD, JOHN; DOOB, LEONARD W.; MILLER, NEAL E.;
MOWRER, O. H.; and SEARS, ROBERT R. 1939
Frustration and Aggression. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press.
MILLER, NEAL E.; and DOLLARD, JOHN 1941 Social
Learning and Imitation. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press. —» A paperback edition was published in
1964.
SENN, M. J. E. n.d. Oral History of Child Study:
Interview With Professor R. R. Sears. Unpublished
manuscript. —» Available at the National Library
of Medicine in Bethesda, Maryland.
SELLIN, THORSTEN
Thorsten Sellin was born on October 26, 1896,
in the small northern Swedish town of 6rn-
skoldsvik, to Jonas and Martha Sellin. During
his elementary and secondary schooling in
Sweden, he became an avid reader and developed
an early and abiding interest in history, litera-
ture, and modern languages.
At age 17, Sellin emigrated to Fort William,
Ontario, with his mother and younger sister, to
join his father, who had emigrated to Canada
several years earlier. Urged by his parents to
pursue his studies, he enrolled in Augustana
College, a small Swedish-American institution
of higher learning in Rock Island, Illinois, in
1914. Because of his advanced academic stand-
ing, he received his B.A. in just three semesters.
In 1915, Sellin became a graduate sociology
student at the University of Pennsylvania, where
he received his M.A. in 1916.
Over the next several years, he continued his
graduate studies on a part-time basis at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota while teaching full-time in
the secondary schools of Minneapolis. On
712 SELLIN, THORSTEN
June 10, 1920, he married Amy J. Anderson, his
Augustana College classmate; they had three
sons.
In the fall of 1920, after returning to Phila-
delphia, Sellin received a Harrison fellowship to
resume his full-time graduate studies in sociol-
ogy at the University of Pennsylvania. He was
awarded his PH.D. in 1922; his doctoral disserta-
tion was entitled "Marriage and Divorce Legisla-
tion in Sweden." This marked the beginning of
his 46-year tenure at the university; he rose
from instructor to professor, and served as chair-
man of the sociology department from 1945 to
1959. Since 1967, he has been professor emeritus.
As scholar and teacher, Sellin is best remem-
bered as a man of extraordinary erudition and
scientific rigor, with an exceptional memory and
a special talent for languages: Swedish, English,
German, and French, with working knowledge
of all Romance and Germanic tongues. One of
his colleagues remarked that Sellin is "to crim-
inology what encyclopaedists or philosophers
were, in their time, to the sciences in general."
His scholarly excellence has been given formal
recognition in several honorary degrees (Uni-
versity of Leiden, I960; University of Copen-
hagen, 1968; University of Pennsylvania, 1968;
and University of Brussels, 1979) and in awards
that he has received from the Swedish and
French governments and from any number of
national and international organizations.
Although teaching and research in criminol-
ogy at the University of Pennsylvania engaged
most of Sellin's time and energy, he was, as an
activist by inclination and an internationalist
by orientation, drawn to other activities at home
and abroad. From 1929 to 1968, for example,
he served as editor of the Annals of the Amer-
ican Academy of Political and Social Science.
In 1949 he was elected to the distinguished and
exclusive American Philosophical Society where
he remains active on its publications committee.
He was also an active member of the Osborne
Association and served as its president until
1971; a member of the American Society of
Criminology; member of the executive board of
directors and legislative committee of the Amer-
ican League to Abolish Capital Punishment;
chairman of the Pennsylvania Committee on
Penal Affairs; member of the Board of Inspectors
of the Philadephia County Prisons from 1939
to 1950; and chairman of the Philadelphia
Police Advisory Board (1958-1963).
The importance that he attaches to an inter-
nationalist, comparative approach to criminology
is also apparent in his willingness to lecture at
foreign universities (e.g., Paris, Brussels, Cam-
bridge, Lund, Stockholm, Uppsala); his partic-
ipation in various colloquia or special courses for
international specialist and student groups (e.g.,
Paris, 1952; Fuchu, 1978); and his active partic-
ipation in foreign learned and professional
societies (e.g., the Society of Legal History in
Paris; the Royal Society of Humanistic Knowl-
edge in Lund, Sweden; and the International
Society of Criminology, of which he was presi-
dent from 1956 to 1965). Special mention
should also be made of his long years of service
to such intergovernmental organizations as the
International Penal and Penitentiary Commis-
sion (which he served a§ secretary-general), the
International Penal and Penitentiary Founda-
tion (of which he was president from 1965 to
1971), and the United Nations Social Defense
Section which, for example, he served as
rapporteur, member, or chairman of the first five
ad hoc international committees of experts in
the prevention of crime and treatment of of-
fenders.
Concerned that Americans knew little of
European research literature in criminology, and
vice versa, and convinced of each side's igno-
rance of the contributions made by the other
to penal reform, Sellin spent much time in both
Europe and America browsing among the libraries
and archives, attending courses and colloquia,
giving lectures, meeting other criminologists,
and visiting penal institutions. His interest in the
history of punishment and the evolution of penal
practices became particularly acute, however,
toward the end of the 1930s with the publication
of a German work by Gustav Radbruch (1938)
and a book on Punishment and Social Structure
by George Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer (1939).
Sellin's works over the years on the history of
punishment included the biographies of such
reformers as Filippo Franco, Dom Jean Mabil-
lion, Charles Goring, and Zebulon Reed Brock-
way; and such detailed descriptions of early
penal institutions as the Hospice of St. Michael's
in Rome, the Walnut Street Jail, and the early
Amsterdam houses of correction in his now
famous book, Pioneering in Penology—The Am-
sterdam Houses of Correction in the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries (1944). Sellin's fas-
cination with the development of penal prac-
tices, however, culminated in a comprehensive
book on Slavery and the Penal System (1976),
but his interest extended far beyond the chron-
icling of political, social, economic, and institu-

tional forces that molded and determined the
character and form of punishment. He is par-
ticularly concerned with the nature and extent
of social progression in the area of penal policies
and with assessing their effectiveness in light of
the objectives they are meant to achieve. He
has written "Trends in Penal Treatment: Have
We Overdone Punishment?" (1948), "A Quarter
Century's Progress in Penal Institutions for
Adults in the United States" (1933), "Prison
Tendencies in Europe" (193 lib), and "Correc-
tion in Historical Perspective" (1958a).
In the area of the efficacy of punishment,
Sellin's best-known works, and those that have
probably had the most direct effect on public
policy, are his writings and testimony concern-
ing the ineffectiveness of capital punishment.
Particularly noteworthy is his memorandum on
"The Death Penalty and the Problem of Deter-
rence" submitted to the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment (Great Britain) in 1951, his
1954 testimony before the joint committee of
the Canadian Parliament on capital and cor-
poral punishment and lotteries, his report on
The Death Penalty prepared for the American
Law Institute in 1959, and the various articles
on capital punishment he has written since that
time. In each of these works he has maintained
his conviction, supported by statistical and ex-
periential evidence, that capital punishment, as
it is presently applied, is neither an effective
deterrent to murder nor even an effective instru-
ment of retributive justice. Sellin's most recent
work on the subject was a lecture on general
deterrence which he delivered in January 1979
to the Institut des Hautes Etudes in Brussels.
During his career, Sellin has devoted con-
siderable time and energy to an area that is of
great importance in the advancement of the
science of criminology: criminal statistics. Since
1931, when he first became consultant and spe-
cial agent to the U.S. Census Bureau, then re-
sponsible for the national criminal statistics
program, Sellin has made numerous and signifi-
cant contributions to the development and im-
provement of criminal statistics on a local, state,
national, and international level. His belief in
the importance and utility of criminal statistics
and their necessity for measuring changes over
time in the volume, trend, and character of
crime are evident in his articles on "The Basis
of a Crime Index" (193la), "The Importance of
Criminal Statistics" (1936), and "Criminal Sta-
tistics—An Urgently Needed Resource" (1967).
His efforts to assist in the development and
SELLIN, THORSTEN 713
maintenance of a comprehensive national crim-
inal statistics program in the United States are
demonstrated in the Uniform Criminal Statistics
Act which he drafted in 1944 at the invitation
of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (ultimately approved by
the conference and the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1946 and endorsed for adoption in all
states by the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration of the U.S. Department of Justice
in 1969). His continuing efforts to accelerate
progress in this area and to demonstrate the
deficiencies of the current statistical programs
at the state and national levels are best illus-
trated in such articles as "The Status and Pros-
pects of Criminal Statistics in the United States"
(1958t>) and in "Problems and Prospects of
Criminal Statistics in the United States" (1954).
For almost half a century, Sellin has actively
supported the creation of effective state bureaus
of criminal statistics and the establishment of a
single federal agency to assume responsibility
for the collection, collation, and reporting of
national comparative criminal statistics. Toward
this end, he has served on a number of state
and national committees and commissions and
has provided expert testimony on the subject in
1968 to a subcommittee of the House of Repre-
sentatives Committee of the Judiciary. In 1977,
Sellin was again asked to assist the government
by reviewing its draft plans for the establish-
ment of a Bureau of Justice Statistics and is
currently prepared to testify once more on the
subject before a committee of the Congress.
It is in the area of the measurement of crime,
however, that Sellin has made what is popularly
regarded as one of his principal contributions to
the advancement of the social sciences. The
Sellin-Wolfgang index represents the culmina-
tion of years of thought regarding the difficulties
in measuring the nature and extent of criminal
behavior (Sellin & Wolfgang 1964). Some of
these difficulties and the inherent problems en-
countered in the development and use of a
crime index were carefully illustrated and ex-
amined by Sellin in "The Measurement of Crim-
inality in Geographic Areas" (1953), "The Basis
of a Crime Index" (193la), and "The Signifi-
cance of Records of Crime" (1951/?). The Sellin-
Wolfgang index, and its application in their
later book, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (Wolf-
gang, Figlio, & Sellin 1972), constituted a sig-
nificant departure from earlier measurement
techniques and a major contribution to the de-
velopment of new and sophisticated research
714 SELLIN, THORSTEN
techniques for measuring the volume and char-
acter of crime, identifying the characteristics of
offenders, and evaluating the effectiveness of
efforts to prevent and control crime and de-
linquency.
Another of Sellin's significant contributions
was in social theory, particularly in his mono-
graph on Culture Conflict and Crime (1938).
Between 1933 and 1936, Sellin served as a
director of the Social Science Research Council,
an organization interested in investigating the
etiology of crime from a number of different
perspectives, including the effects of such so-
cial crises as war (Sellin 1942) and economic
depression. The council was particularly inter-
ested in the interrelationship between an indi-
vidual's personality, as reflected in his behavior,
and his cultural environment, and in 1935
Sellin and his colleague, Edwin H. Sutherland,
were invited to form a subcommittee on delin-
quency of the committee on personality and cul-
ture to investigate the question. After consider-
ing a number of alternatives, the subcommittee
focused on the problem of culture conflict and
its role in the causation of crime.
As it turned out, however, the monograph,
Culture Conflict and Crime, was much more
than an elaboration of the culture conflict thesis
then already known and widely discussed
among sociologists. It was, perhaps more im-
portantly, a treatise on the need for and require-
ments of a science of criminology and a scienti-
fic basis for the study of crime.
The importance of Sellin's work on culture
conflict and crime has been widely recognized
and acclaimed on an international scale by most
prominent contemporary authorities. It has
served as the basis for much of the sociological
research and conceptualization, particularly in
regard to criminal and delinquent subcultures,
that has emerged in the forty years since its
publication, and has totally changed the face of
traditional criminology by expanding the field
to embrace what is now commonly known as
the sociology of deviance. It has also provided
the path for pursuit of a science of criminology.
Sellin is in semiretirement at his home in
Gilmanton, New Hampshire, where, with the
aid of his enormous (more than ten thousand
volumes) private library he continues to engage
in research and to prepare books and articles
for publication.
MARVIN E. WOLFGANG AND
LENORE KUPPERSTEIN
WORKS BY SELLIN
193la The Basis of a Crime Index. Journal of Crimi-
nal Law and Criminology 22:335—356.
193lb Prison Tendencies in Europe. Pages 118-132 in
Proceedings of the National Conference of Social
Work, 1930. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1933 A Quarter Century's Progress in Penal Institu-
tions for Adults in the United States. Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 24:140—160.
1936 The Importance of Criminal Statistics. In Pro-
ceedings of the Attorney General's Conference on
Crime, 1934. Washington: Government Printing
Office.
1938 Culture Conflict and Crime. New York: Social
Science Research Council.
1942 War and Crime: A Research Memorandum.
Committee on Research on Social Aspects of the
War. New York: Social Science Research Council.
1944 Pioneering in Penology—The Amsterdam Houses
of Correction in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania
Press.
1948 Trends in Penal Treatment: Have We Overdone
Punishment? Recueil de documents en matiere
penale et penitentiare 13:285-292.
195la The Death Penalty and the Problem of Deter-
rence. Volume 30, pages 467-478 in Royal Com-
mission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evi-
dence. London: H.M. Stationery Office.
1951b The Significance of Records of Crime. Law
Quarterly Review 67:489-504.
1953 The Measurement of Criminality in Geographic
Areas. American Philosophical Society, Proceedings
97:163-167.
1954 Problems and Prospects of Criminal Statistics in
the United States. Correction 19, Feb.:3-9.
1958a Correction in Historical Perspective. Law and
Contemporary Problems 23:585-593.
1958k The Status and Prospects of Criminal Statistics
in the United States. Pages 290-307 in Festskrift
tilldgrad Karl Schlyter. Stockholm: Svenski Jurist-
tidning.
1959 The Death Penalty. Philadelphia: American Law
Institute.
(1964) 1978 SELLIN, THORSTEN; and WOLFGANG,
MARVIN E. The Measurement of Delinquency. Mont-
clair, N.J.: Smith, Patterson.
1967 Criminal Statistics—An Urgently Needed Re-
source. Pages 123—137 in President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
Task Force Report on Crime and Its Impact—An
Assessment. Washington: Government Printing
Office.
1968 Criminology. Volume 3, pages 505-510 in In-
ternational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan
and Free Press.
1972 WOLFGANG, MARVIN E.; FIGLIO, ROBERT M.; and
SELLIN, THORSTEN Delinquency in a Birth Cohort.
Univ. of Chicago Press.
1976 Slavery and the Penal System. New York:
Elsevier.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
RADBRUCH, GUSTAV (1938) 1950 Der ursprung des
strafecths aus dem stande der unfreien. In Ele-
gantiae Juris Criminalis: Vierzehn studiem zur
Geschuchte des Strafechts. 2d ed., rev. Basel
(Switzerland): Verlag fur Recht und Gesellschaft.
RUSCHE, GEORGE; and KIRCHHEIMER, OTTO 1939
Punishment and Social Structure. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press.

SHELDON, WILLIAM H.
William Herbert Sheldon was born in 1898 in
Warwick, Rhode Island, and died in 1977 at his
Biological Humanics Center for Research in
Human Constitutional Variation in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. While known professionally as
a constitutional psychologist, he was every bit
as much a philosopher of the pragmatic school,
who was destined to be in conflict with the main
stream of American psychology.
Sheldon's first book, Psychology and the Pro-
methean Will (1936), was a philosophical as
much as a psychological treatment of the
sources of conflict and the role of religion in
modern life. This book was presented with the
optimistic proposition that psychology would in
the course of time prove useful (Sheldon et al.
1940). The book justified this optimism, ex-
emplifying one of the principal tenets of prag-
matism, that the truth of a proposition is mea-
sured by its practical outcome, as well as
supporting the view of the great pragmatist
William James that in vital matters of faith the
criterion for acceptance is the will to believe.
This book, written while Sheldon was in psychia-
tric study abroad on a fellowship from the Na-
tional Council on Religion in Higher Education,
provided the philosophical foundation for Alco-
holics Anonymous (Bill Wilson, cofounder of
AA, personal communication, 1954).
Sheldon's philosophies and the unique intel-
lectual path he followed throughout his life
clearly built upon early influences. His first
teacher was his father, to whom he was very
close and about whom we know little other
than that he was a naturalist, hunting guide,
professional judge of hunting dogs, and ap-
parently a close friend of William James. How
else at the age of 56 would William James have
become Sheldon's godfather? While James died
when Sheldon was only 12 years old, he has to
be viewed as Sheldon's second teacher. In many
respects, Sheldon's life interests were modeled
on those of James and his protege Martin Peck,
whom James sent to study with Sigmund Freud.
As an undergraduate at Brown University, Shel-
don traveled to Harvard Medical School to at-
tend a seminar by Peck: "He considered Freud
the foremost emancipator of mankind but em-
phasized that the job was still only half done;
that somebody now must bring descriptive order
to comprehending the constitutional patterns
underlying the psychiatric patterns" (Sheldon,
Lewis, & Tenney 1968, p. 848). In essence,
SHELDON, WILLIAM H. 715
Sheldon received his mission in life from Peck.
How he was to pursue this mission had already
been determined by his earlier orientation and
training.
Sheldon's cousin, George Arnold, was a well-
known Providence numismatist and coin dealer.
By the age of 12, Sheldon was a recognized
numismatist, traveling as far as Philadelphia
on the senior circuit of numismatics. He was
fascinated with the classification of coins, and
in the years ahead collected and then sold out-
standing coin collections for the purpose of
advancing his education and carrying out his
research in constitutional psychology. He also
wrote two of the most important books in numis-
matics ever written, Early American Cents
(1948) and Penny Whimsey (1958). Much of
his precision in description and classification of
the human body must have had its beginnings
here. What he wrote about coin collecting also
reveals another important side to this complex
man. He was a great romantic: "We always live
in a valley lying between the nostalgic past and
unknown future. To own a family of the early
cents is in some measure to command a cause-
way between the past and the future" (Sheldon
1948). He was also an authority on and had
one of the most extensive collections of litera-
ture on the Knights of the Round Table and the
Age of Chivalry.
Most important was the orientation he re-
ceived as a child from his father as a naturalist
and as a judge and classifier of living things.
He was an authority on the classification and
natural history of moths. This bent and its im-
portance to his classification of human physique
and temperament in works published in 1940
and 1942 respectively is seen in his explanation
of the somatotype concept:
. . . the somatotype offers an early and rather
crude tool fashioned to reflect a basic structural
orderliness which can be perceived in human life.
Despite the confusion now rampant in the social
interrelationships of the species, underlying the
social chaos is a matrix of organic order, which is
to say, of beauty and truth. We are still being born
into a world of such beauty as staggers imagina-
tion and beggars speech, and the physical reality
that a man is carries the stamp of truth even when
the beauty is obscure to perception. In such a
world it seems reasonable to suppose that there
should be a way of so truthfully reflecting a man's
structural self that the reflection will blend with
the continuum of order like faint music. The soma-
totype is therefore a groping for a reflection in man
 716 SHELDON, WILLIAM H.
of the orderly continuum of nature. (Sheldon
et al. 1954, p. 3)
We see the naturalist, the romantic, and the
philosopher whose first book was Psychology
and the Promethean Will (1936) and last was
Prometheus Revisited (1974).
Sheldon received an A.B. from Brown in 1918,
an A.M. from the University of Colorado in
1923, and from the University of Chicago a
PH.D. in 1925 and an M.D. degree in 1933, thus
acquiring what he referred to as the tools of the
trade and union cards. Between 1925 and 1933,
he practiced his trade of psychology by teaching
at the University of Texas, the University of
Wisconsin, and the University of Chicago. It
was after this period that he went on his travel-
ing fellowship from 1934-1936, bringing his
individualism into full bloom, and received great
stimulation from Carl Jung and Ernst Kret-
schmer. It was while in Darlington, England,
living with Leonard Elmhirst that he and his
close friend Gerald Heard met Bill Wilson and
influenced the philosophical basis upon which
AA was founded.
He returned to the position of professor of
psychology at the Chicago Theological Semi-
nary. By 1938, Sheldon became a full-time re-
searcher, first at Harvard University, where his
contacts with Ernest Hooton and S. S. Stevens
were important to the technological develop-
ment of his classifications of physique and tem-
perament (Sheldon et al. 1940; 1942). At this
time he also established two of his most impor-
tant friendships and intellectual relationships
that were to last for the rest of his life. These
were with Nolan Lewis and Emil Hartl. His
tireless, almost relentless, research and data col-
lecting saw him in research positions at Colum-
bia's College of Physicians and Surgeons, the
University of California at Berkeley, the Uni-
versity of Oregon, with his friend Nolan Lewis,
and Rockland State Hospital in New York, with
one of his strongest and most tolerant sup-
porters in American psychiatry, Nathan Kline.
One of Sheldon's most fortunate associations
was with Eugene McDermott, a founder of
Texas Instruments. McDermott not only pro-
vided financial support for Sheldon's research
after 1948, but also contributed importantly to
the objectifying of the somatotyping technique
and its final modification by about 1966 (Shel-
don, Lewis, & Tenney 1968).
Throughout his life, Sheldon was an individ-
ualist and perhaps too frequently wore it like a
badge. He rejected publication in refereed sci-
entific journals for he saw them as the organs
of prosaic minds and structured to protect the
"establishment" from the threat of original
thought. He was intolerant of those he viewed
as slow-witted or pompous. He called everyone
"Doctor," using as his definition the old-fashioned
term for a turkey-feather duster. In his later
years he managed in this way to isolate himself
from all but his closest and most dedicated
friends and alienated many of those actually
necessary to the promotion and practical ap-
plication of his ideas.
His terms endomorphy, mesomorphy, and
ectomorphy for the three components of phy-
sique have become household words, but the
evidence is not yet in on his formulation of the
unity of his morphologic and psychiatric com-
ponents. Did he succeed in the mission he set
for himself in Martin Peck's seminar: putting
descriptive order to Freudian theory? In time
we will know. Those who remained close to him
(Emil Hartl, Dorothy Pascal, Edward Monnelly,
and Roland Elderkin) are putting this evidence
together and will share it with the scientific
community as it had become impossible for
Sheldon to do. But this much is certain. Psy-
chology and the Promethean Will went as far
as anything written in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury to make psychology useful. More than
half a million members of AA in the United
States alone have been helped to cope more
successfully with the stress of modern life be-
cause of the work of this man.
RICHARD H. OSBORNE
WORKS BY SHELDON
1936 Psychology and the Promethean Will. New York:
Harper.
1940 SHELDON, WILLIAM H.; STEVENS, S. S.; and
TUCKER, W. B. The Varieties of Human Physique:
An Introduction to Constitutional Psychology. New
York: Harper.
1942 SHELDON, WILLIAM H.; and STEVENS, S. S. The
Varieties of Temperament: A Psychology of Consti-
tutional Differences. New York: Harper.
1943 Use of the Somatotype in Standardizing and Ob-
jectifying the ARM A (Adaptability Rating for Mili-
tary Aeronautics). School of Aviation Medicine,
Project No. 127, Report No. 2. Randolph Field,
Tex.: The School.
1944 SHELDON, WILLIAM H. et al. Validity of the
Somatotype and Anthropometric Variables in Flying
Training. Office of the Air Surgeon, AAF: Abstract
No. 126, Aviation Abstract Series. Randolph Field,
Tex..- School of Aviation Medicine.
1948 Early American Cents. New York: Harper.
1949 SHELDON, WILLIAM H.; HARTL, E. M.; and MC-
DERMOTT, EUGENE Varieties of Delinquent Youth.
New York: Harper.

1954 SHELDON, WILLIAM H.; DUPERTUIS, C. W.; and
McDERMOTT, EUGENE Atlas of Men: A Guide for
Somatotyping the Adult Male at All Ages. Lawrence,
Mass.: Quarterman.
(1958) 1976 Penny Whimsey. New York: Harper.
1968 SHELDON, WILLIAM H.; LEWIS, N. D. C.; and
TENNEY, A. M. Psychotic Patterns and Physical
Constitution: A Thirty Year Follow-up of Thirty-
eight Hundred Psychiatric Patients in New York
State. Hicksville, N.Y.: PJD Publications.
1974 Prometheus Revisited. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenk-
man.
SHERIF, MUZAFER
Muzafer Sherif was born in Turkey in 1906.
He received an M.A. (1929) from the University
of Istanbul, and continued his graduate studies
at Harvard University (M.A., 1932) and Colum-
bia University (PH.D., 1935). Following publi-
cation of his first treatise on The Psychology of
Social Norms (1936), he accepted teaching
positions in Turkey. In 1945 he returned to the
United States, and completed the research that
resulted in a systematization of social psychol-
ogy. For this enterprise, Sherif attracted several
talented coworkers, not the least of whom was
Carolyn Wood, whom he married in 1945.
Sherifs lifelong motivation was to help es-
tablish a science in the social sciences. Accord-
ing to Sherif, social psychology, the scientific
study of experience and behavior in sociocul-
tural settings, had a critical contribution to make
in establishing a science of man. Individuals,
with their processing capabilities, are not only
affected by the sociocultural properties of the
groups into which they are born, in which they
are raised and function, and to which they relate
through time and space, but are also the makers
of culture and historical events—war, peace, and
revolution. Thus, to understand human events,
it is necessary to understand the properties and
processes by which Homo sapiens reacts and re-
sponds to his entire environment, but especially
to his sociocultural environment.
Influenced by gestalt psychology in percep-
tion, and by those aspects of psychophysics con-
cerned with scaling and judgment, Sherif went
on to "apply" (sometimes making his own con-
tributions) the principles of cognition to under-
standing individuals in societies. A conception
of the properties of societies and cultures was
derived from the naturalistic work (of the 1930s
and 1940s) in anthropology and sociology as
well as from older works in the social sciences
(e.g., the work of Bronislaw Malinowski), which
attempted to define problems carefully while
SHERIF, MUZAFER 717
tying generalizations to supportive observations
and other data.
Sherif derived a view of the program of sci-
ence from such naturalistic works in the phi-
losophy of science as Einstein and Infeld's The
Evolution of Physics (1942). According to Sherif,
scientific methods and generalizations were to
be formulated in the process of knowing phe-
nomena. To avoid ethnocentric bias, the scien-
tist had to gather findings from the study of a
variety of cultures and societies and had to be
concerned with how (rather than what) individ-
uals perceive, remember, judge, and think, and
how groups evolve and change. From such di-
rected study—seeking to isolate and understand
process in a variety of situations—it was possible
to generalize and attempt to formulate invariant
lawful relations which, like those in physics,
would constitute a set of timeless hypotheses.
His earliest work, The Psychology of Social
Norms (1936), concentrated on making limited
generalizations about times of social transition
where "the transition is not simply from the
orderliness of one set of norms to chaos, but
from one set of norms to a new set of norms,
perhaps through a stage of uncertainty . . ."
(p. 86). It dealt with universal phenomena (all
known groups have norms which regulate social
life) with the aim of formulating a verifiable
scientific hypothesis concerning the conditions
which require that new norms emerge by psy-
chologically deterministic processes (ibid.). It
was well received in part because Sherif, in a
laboratory experiment that has been replicated
in one form or another around the world, was
able to show that under certain conditions indi-
viduals in interaction with one another do
formulate a norm that regulates their behavior
when they are apart from each other. Funda-
mentally, Sherif hypothesized that because there
is a psychological tendency to reduce uncer-
tainty, individuals, if allowed to interact, are
bound to influence one another and formulate
a norm (that will not be merely the "average"
of their separate judgments from previous ex-
perience with the same situation), which sub-
sequently will influence their own separate be-
havior. The very idea of using the laboratory to
verify a hypothesis derived from the study of
large-scale social phenomena created much ex-
citement among those researchers in sociology
and psychology who had confidence in the liber-
alizing force of science.
Sherif proceeded in a series of experiments
and books to make contributions to every im-
718 SHERIF, MUZAFER
portant aspect of social psychology. Repeatedly
he followed the paradigm first used in the study
of norm formation. Generalization concerning
sociological structures was always based upon
empirical work and historical reports. General-
izations concerning culture were made from the
reports of field studies and from the work of
linguists and other scientists. The generaliza-
tions were always subject to verification, some-
times by constituting abstract experiments such
as the one employed to verify the conditions for
norm formation, sometimes by formulating
more "real-life" experimental situations, and
sometimes by employing observational methods
in field experiments which had all the complex-
ity associated with sustained human interac-
tions.
It was in the field studies that Sherif applied
his methodological paradigm to "real-life" inter-
actions. Until these studies were undertaken
the essential abstracted features of sociological
conditions were simulated in the laboratory. For
example, a phase of a sociocultural process,
such as "a period of uncertainty," was repre-
sented by an unstructured task, and differential
status was manipulated by representing the
views of high to low prestige sources. However,
in the Robbers Cave study (Sherif et al. 1961) on
the formation of groups and the establishment
and resolution of intergroup conflict, Sherif used
laboratory findings to verify the existence and
change of sociological conditions. After a state
of established intergroup conflict (for inter-
group conflict is also governed by norms or con-
ventions) was made to exist through the intro-
duction of competitive events, laboratory results
were used to verify that in- versus out-group re-
lationships affected cognition. Thus, laboratory
findings, like a series of snapshots, were used to
confirm that sociocultural processes were in mo-
tion and/or to confirm that some steady state,
such as established conflict, had been achieved.
In all his works, Sherif never sacrificed sig-
nificance for experimental rigor in a mechanical
sense. His experiments were always important,
and the hallmark of his designs involved setting
up situations where there were a great variety
of ways to disconfirm but only one way to
confirm a hypothesis. Although Sherif was in-
fluenced by probabilistic thinking, he only occa-
sionally found the opportunity to apply statisti-
cal tests to his data. Usually his experimental
data, even with a small number of subjects,
were overwhelmingly conclusive even without
statistical evaluation.
Although Sherif devoted a great deal of effort
to the verification of hypotheses in the social
sciences, he contributed very few sociological
generalizations. However, one generalization de-
rived from his study of intergroup conflict has
had a lasting impact upon the social sciences.
He hypothesized that a series of superordinate
goals—objectives desired by all but beyond the
resources and capabilities of any one group—is
required to reduce intergroup conflict, since one
superordinate goal by itself is not sufficient to
bring enough individuals belonging to separate
groups into a set of novel interactions. It is in
novel situations, for which there are no estab-
lished intergroup mores to govern behavior, that
new (and presumably favorable) attitudes to-
ward individuals in various groups can be de-
veloped. In turn, these new attitudes eventually
make older ones inapplicable, since there is a
tendency for humans to resolve conflicts be-
tween attitudes in order to be consistent in
response to others.
Sherif viewed the ego or self as a develop-
mental subsystem of interrelated attitudes in the
individual's make-up. The self-construct was
used to account for consistency in behavior, and
because ego attitudes are not necessarily inte-
grated into a coherent system, it is possible to
account for a variety of conflicts including, for
example, role conflicts and conflicts with oneself
over matters of personal consistency.
Apart from aiding in the formulation of a
verifiable theory of self, Sherif made several
contributions to the theory of attitude forma-
tion and change. Borrowing heavily from a body
of findings in psychophysics concerning scaling
and judgment, Sherif hypothesized the means
by which individuals organize attitudes or refer-
ence scales. In a series of experiments he veri-
fied the structure of such scales by predicting
responses to communications in accord with and
at variance from an individual's own point of
view. In addition, processes of attitude change
were verified.
In all his work on attitude formation and
change, Sherif employed psychological con-
structs concerning the processes of perception
and judgment which he hoped would continue
to be shown to apply universally. Rather than
relying upon particular mechanisms learned in
given cultures for resolving or managing con-
flict, Sherif attempted to formulate a theory that
would allow for such learning but which also
allowed individuals alone and in interaction to
invent an infinite number of alternative ways
to resolve conflict. Thus, his theory of attitudes
and self reflects his persistent belief that it is

possible to formulate deterministic laws con-
cerning the processes by which individuals learn
and form percepts, judgments, norms, and self-
concepts, but not the nature of the norms, val-
ues, or products of cognition.
Gardner Murphy ([1929] 1972) noted in his
Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology
that Sherifs definition of social psychology in
cognitive terms had profound implications. Not
only were the long-standing methods of experi-
mental psychology brought successfully to bear
upon understanding the behavior of individuals
in social situations, but the psychological labora-
tory was also made significant, for it became
the major (experimental) means of verifying
how man is affected by and transforms culture.
BERTRAM L. KOSLIN
WORKS BY SHERIF
(1936) 1965 The Psychology of Social Norms. New
York: Octagon.
1947 SHERIF, MUZAFER; and CANTRIL, HADLEY The
Psychology of Ego-involvements: Social Attitudes
and Identifications. New York: Wiley. —» A paper-
back edition was published in 1966.
(1948) 1956 SHERIF, MUZAFER; and SHERIF, CAROLYN
W. An Outline of Social Psychology. Rev. ed. New
York: Harper. —> Muzafer Sherif was the sole
author of the first edition.
1953 SHERIF, MUZAFER; and SHERIF, CAROLYN W.
Groups in Harmony and Tension. New York: Har-
per.
1961 SHERIF, MUZAFER et al. Intergroup Conflict and
Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. Nor-
man, Okla.: University Book Exchange.
1961 SHERIF, MUZAFER; and HOVLAND, CARL I. Social
Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in
Communication and Attitude Change. Yale Studies
in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 4. New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1964 SHERIF, MUZAFER; and SHERIF, CAROLYN W.
Reference Groups: Exploration Into Conformity and
Deviation of Adolescents. New York: Harper.
1965 SHERIF, CAROLYN W.; SHERIF, MUZAFER; and
NEBERGALL, ROGER E. Attitudes and Attitude Change:
The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach. Phila-
delphia: Saunders; London: Rube.
1966 In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of
Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation. Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin. —» A British edition was published by
Routledge as Group Conflict and Cooperation: Their
Social Psychology.
1968a Groups: III. Group Formation. Volume 6, pages
276—283 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1968& Self Concept. Volume 14, pages 150-159 in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
EINSTEIN, ALBERT; and INFELD, LEOPOLD 1942 The
Evolution of Physics. New York: Simon & Schuster.
—> A paperback edition was published in 1961.
MURPHY, GARDNER (1929) 1972 Historical Introduc-
tion to Modern Psychology. New York: Harcourt.
SHRYOCK, RICHARD H. 719
SHRYOCK, RICHARD H.
Richard Harrison Shryock (1893-1972) was
in the front rank of American historians in the
use of social science concepts and methods. His
scholarship and research, expository and inter-
pretive in character, illuminated relationships
between time, environment, and culture on a
broad historical canvas. He delineated the his-
torical development of medicine by showing how
it interacted over time with psychological, social,
and economic factors. By actively participating
in committees of professional organizations and
advisory agencies, he made his specialized
knowledge available when technical and social
questions were under consideration.
Personal circumstances explained Shryock's
varied interests in historical scholarship, aca-
demic statesmanship, and, especially, the history
of medicine. Financial problems thwarted his
hope of becoming a physician. With a degree in
education from the University of Pennsylvania
he taught in Philadelphia public schools. This
early experience contributed to his constructive
and enduring interest in education on every
level. As a private at the Army Medical School
in World War i he began his self-education in
medicine, and deepened his conviction concern-
ing the importance of health and illness for both
individuals and society. As a candidate for the
PH.D. in history at the University of Pennsyl-
vania he proposed writing a dissertation on the
development of public health in the United
States. Though encouraged by the department's
European and English historians, William E.
Linglebach and Edward P. Cheyney, Shryock
was told by the American constitutional histor-
ian, Herman V. Ames, that the topic was un-
suitable. Choosing instead to investigate Geor-
gia's relations with the federal government in
1850, he received the PH.D. in 1924 and two
years later published his dissertation (1926). In
this research his initial interest in public health
was whetted by using the manuscripts of Dr.
Richard D. Arnold, the first secretary of the
American Medical Association and mayor of
Savannah. Later, while teaching history at Duke
University (1925-1938), he learned a good deal
from his colleagues in the medical school.
Shryock's interest in the history of medicine
developed at an opportune time. He was en-
couraged by Dr. William H. Welch, founder of
the Institute of the History of Medicine at the
Johns Hopkins University, and by the director
who succeeded him, Dr. Henry E. Sigerist. In
contrast with traditional work in the field, largely
720 SHRYOCK, RICHARD H.
written by practitioners in biographical and tech-
nical or "internal" terms, Welch and Sigerist took
cognizance of environmental, social, and human-
istic influences on medical developments.
Shryock's edition of the Letters of Richard D.
Arnold, M.D. (1929a), together with carefully
researched articles on the origins of the public
health movement (1929&), on medicine in the
Old South (1930a), and on the course of public
relations of the profession in Britain and Amer-
ica (1930k), established his credentials for lec-
turing on the history of medicine at Duke. His
preparation continued with the study of the so-
ciology of knowledge and with the history of
medicine during a research leave in Germany
in 1932/1933. Two years before leaving Duke
for a professorship of history at the University of
Pennsylvania, his pathbreaking synthesis, The
Development of Modern Medicine (1936a) was
published. Its subtitle, An Interpretation of the
Social and Scientific Factors Involved indicated
its distinctive character. The book won praise
from prestigious physicians and distinguished
historians, though the historical profession as a
whole recognized its importance only after its
publication in England and in Germany.
In Shryock's view, the history of medicine in-
volved everything that affected the maintenance
and improvement of individual and public
health. Thus The Development of Modern Medi-
cine and monographic contributions that fol-
lowed took account of the various factors in-
volved in the "logic" or "internal" aspects of medi-
cine and the developing sciences related to it.
In both the book and the articles Shryock also
probed social factors affecting the transition
from guild to profession; medical education and
practice, and the psychological and economic in-
teractions between doctor and patient; rivalries
and cults; and the challenge of popular health
nostrums and fads to the prestige and profits of
the profession. In subsequent works he explored
the role of tradition, authority, and the innova-
tions affecting distinctive achievements in Brit-
ain, Germany, France, and Italy. Giving due
credit in still other articles to American inno-
vators (1936b; 1945; 1946a; 1953), he offered
explanations for the relative paucity of basic
research in nineteenth-century America (1948).
Shryock further assessed the influence of such
movements of thought as democracy, humani-
tarianism, laissez-faire, philanthropy, social con-
trol, Marxism, the body-mind issue, vitalism,
Freudianism, and especially, rationalism and
empiricism on technical developments and con-
troversies in medicine (1969). Above all, he doc-
umented interactions between medicine and
public health with such social factors as race
(notably slavery), class structure, sex roles, in-
dustrialism, wealth and poverty, urbanism, tech-
nological contributions to the measuring instru-
ments in clinical practice, improvements in com-
munication, and the development of medical
libraries and journals. He also emphasized the
role of such social institutions as teaching
hospitals, research centers, sanitary commis-
sions, licensing boards, and nonofficial agencies
for spreading the practice of immunization, im-
proved health care, and sanitation (1929k; 1957;
1967). His interest in the "state of health" led
to critical assessments of available vital statis-
tics (1946£>). Shryock's broad frame of reference,
well-documented investigations, disciplined in-
sight, precision in the use of terms, and regard
for chronology resulted in important generaliza-
tions. For example, he concluded that "by the
end of the 1800s, medical success was about to
reduce mortality and to increase life expectancy
on a mass scale. For the first time in history,
medicine was destined—for better or worse—to
exercise a major influence upon society" (1959b,
p. 146).
In 1949 Shryock resigned his professorship of
history at the University of Pennsylvania to be-
come director of the Institute of the History of
Medicine at the Johns Hopkins University. In
broadening the institute's program, by emphasiz-
ing the history of the sciences and the relation
of the history of medicine to social science, its
influence was extended both in the United States
and abroad. Meantime, he also prepared papers
and monographs on women in American medi-
cine (1950), the role of Cotton Mather as "the
first significant figure in American medicine"
(1953), the National Tuberculosis Association
(1957), and the history of nursing in its social
aspects (1959a). His interest in Benjamin Rush
continued until the publication of his last notable
paper on Rush's changing reputation during his
life and long after his death (1971).
Having reached the age of retirement at the
institute in 1958 he returned to the University
of Pennsylvania where he taught social and cul-
tural history, promoted interdisciplinary pro-
grams in American civilization, trained able and
devoted students, lectured on the history of
medicine at several institutions, and continued
to publish, largely in the American field. Always
concerned with the discovery and accessibility of
primary sources, as librarian of the American

Philosophical Society for several years, he ex-
panded its holdings in the history of science and
medicine.
Convinced that social scientists should con-
tribute their specialized knowledge to public use,
Shryock actively participated in committees and
organizations. His persuasiveness and judicious-
ness increased his influence in convincing
scholars that the problems of sickness and health
needed to be brought into the mainstream of
historical knowledge. As a member of the New
York Academy of Medicine's Committee on Medi-
cine and the Changing Order, he took a leading
part in preparing the report describing the com-
mittee's findings (New York Academy of Medi-
.cine 1947). Both here and in his work on com-
mittees of the National Science Foundation, the
Russell Sage Foundation, and the National In-
stitutes of Health, Shryock showed how knowl-
edge of medical history, if taken seriously, could
help avoid mistakes. His retrospective view made
plain the need of the cooperation of all interests
in policy formation and of avoiding efforts to
find quick and easy solutions to complex ques-
tions. In terms of American contexts and experi-
ence he indicated in what ways European efforts
to provide health care insurance were relevant or
irrelevant. He was sure that there were neither
simple causes nor simple solutions for complex
problems.
Shryock's interest in the problems of educa-
tion in general and of academic life in particular
was no less marked. His intensive study of the
current problems of the University of Pennsyl-
vania was notable for its acumen, fertile sugges-
tions, and statesmanship (1959c). As president
of the American Association of University Pro-
fessors in 1951/1952 he vigorously upheld aca-
demic freedom at a critical time and evaluated
the strengths and weaknesses of the academic
profession on both sides of the Atlantic (1952;
1961Z?). His presidency of the International As-
sociation of University Professors and of the
International Association of the History of Medi-
cine testified to the widespread appreciation of
his scholarship and understanding of academic
issues.
The problems of historiographical theory in
relation to philosophy and social science also en-
gaged Shryock's active interest. As a member of
the Social Science Research Council committee
on historiography, he drew on his broad and
detailed knowledge of American historical writ-
ing (1943a) in helping resolve controversies
over "causation," "presentism," and "relativism,"
SHRYOCK, RICHARD H. 727
and in suggesting ways of bringing history into
more fruitful relations with the social sciences
(1946i>). Having always used statistics in his
own work, he organized a conference on quanti-
fication in 1960. His report assessed the con-
tributions of quantification to the history of sci-
ence and medicine and urged that its limitations
in history and the social sciences should not dis-
courage efforts to extend the boundaries of its
use (1961a).
Among American historians Shryock was a
pioneer in the use of the culture concept and in
bringing precision to the comparative method.
He proposed the contextual analyses of slavery
in the South, Brazil, and the West Indies that
other scholars undertook. He showed the value
of microscopic studies of local history (1939b),
and in broad comparative approaches he revised
accepted views about the reputations of the
major regions of the United States for achieve-
ments in literature, science, and medicine
(1940; 1943b). His studies of the Pennsylvania-
Germans as a subculture clarified perplexing
problems involving "self-identity" and inter-
cultural perceptions (1939£>; 1942). Even more
telling was his comparison of the agricultural
practices and achievements of Pennsylvania-
Germans and their English-speaking neighbors.
Since the soil in contiguous areas might be re-
garded as a constant, success or failure seemed
to result from different cultural values and cus-
toms. The Pennsylvania-Germans rotated crops,
nurtured the soil, displayed high motivation,
frugality, and willingness to forego immediate
returns for long-range satisfactions, whereas
English-speaking tobacco farmers, with little
agricultural experience, exhausted the soil in
quick-paying one-crop planting and in careless
cultivation. Precise figures on yields per acre,
degree of soil exhaustion, and costs of slave and
of free labor, indicated the feasibility of manip-
ulating factors in a way roughly comparable to
methods in a laboratory experiment (1939a).
Shryock modestly claimed no originality for
his scholarly innovations. He offered fresh and
provocative hypotheses. His lucid, urbane prose
was sprinkled with wit. He was a major figure
in showing that medicine and public health,
viewed historically, were social functions and in
bringing the history of medicine, broadly viewed,
into the main current of the social and cultural
aspects of developing civilization. In doing this
and in examining other aspects of American
culture and historiography, he promoted by pre-
cept and example the growing rapport of his-
722 SKINNER, B. F.
torical theory and practice with the social
sciences.
MERLE CURTI
WORKS BY SHRYOCK
1926 Georgia and the Union in 1950. Philadelphia:
Duke Univ. Press.
(1929a) 1970 SHRYOCK, RICHARD H. (editor) Letters
of Richard D. Arnold, M.D., 1808-1876. Mayor of
Savannah: First Secretary of the American Medical
Association. New York: AMS Press.
1929& The Origins and Significance of the Public
Health Movement in the United States. Annals of
Medical History New Series 1:645-665.
1930a Medical Practice in the Old South. South Atlan-
tic Quarterly 29:160-178. —» Reprinted in Medicine
in America 1966.
1930b Public Relations of the Medical Profession in
Great Britain and the United States, 1600-1870: A
Chapter in the Social History of Medicine. Annals
of Medical History New Series 2:308-339.
(1936a) 1969 The Development of Modern Medicine:
An Interpretation of the Social and Scientific Fac-
tors Involved. New York: Hafner. —> Translated into
many foreign languages.
1936k William Charles Wells (1757-1817). Volume 19,
pages 644-645 in Dictionary of American Biog-
raphy. New York: Scribners.
1939a British versus German Traditions in Colonial
Agriculture. Mississippi Valley Historical Review
26:39-54. —» Published in German in 1940 as
Englische und Deutsche Betriebsformen des Land-
wirtschaft: Eine Gegeniiberstellung fur die Kolonial-
zeit. Deutsches Archiv fur Landes- und Volksfor-
schung 4:438-449.
1939& The Pennsylvania Germans in American His-
tory. Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biogra-
phy 63:261-281.
(1940) 1965 Boston's Puritan Heritage and Its "Flow-
ering" in Literature and Theology. Pages 264-267 in
Caroline F. Ware (editor), The Cultural Approach
to History. New York: Kennikat.
1942 The Pennsylvania Germans as Seen by the His-
torian. Pages 237-258 in Ralph Wood (editor), The
Pennsylvania Germans. Princeton Univ. Press.
1943a American Historiography: A Critical Analysis
and a Program. American Philosophical Society,
Proceedings 87:35-46.
1943b Historical Traditions in Philadelphia and in the
Middle Atlantic Area: An Editorial. Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography 67:115-141.
1945 The Psychiatry of Benjamin Rush. American
Journal of Psychiatry 101:429-432.
1946a The Strange Case of Well's Theory of Natural
Selection (1813): Some Comments on the Dissem-
ination of Scientific Ideas. Pages 195-207 in M. F.
Ashley Montagu (editor), Studies and Essays in the
History of Science and Learning Offered in Homage
to George Sarton on the Occasion of His 60th Birth-
day. New York: Schuman. —> Reprinted in Medicine
in America 1966.
1946i> Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Re-
port of the Committee on Historiography. Social Sci-
ence Research Council, Bulletin 54. New York: The
Council.
1948 American Indifference to Basic Science During
the Nineteenth Century. Archives Internationales
d'Histoire des Sciences 5:50-65. —* Reprinted in
Medicine in America 1966.
1950 Women in American Medicine. Journal of the
American Medical Women's Association 5:371-379.
—> Reprinted in Medicine in America 1966.
1952 The Academic Profession in the United States.
American Association of University Professors, Bul-
letin 38:32-70.
1953 Cotton Mather: First Significant Figure in Ameri-
can Medicine. American Antiquarian Society, Pro-
ceedings 63:37-274.
1957 National Tuberculosis Association, 1904—1954: A
Study of the Voluntary Health Movement in the
United States. New York: The Association.
1959a The History of Nursing: An Interpretation of the
Social and Medical Factors Involved. Philadelphia:
Sanders.
1959fo Medicine and Society in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury. Cahiers d'Histoire mondiale 5:116-146. —» Re-
printed in 1963 as Medicine and Public Health. Part
2, pages 221-253 in Guy S. Metraux and Francois
Crouzet (editors), The Nineteenth Century World:
Readings from the History of Mankind. New York:
New American Library.
1959c The University of Pennsylvania Faculty: A Study
in American Higher Education. Philadelphia: The
University.
1960 Medicine and Society in America 3660-1860.
New York Univ. Press. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1972 by Cornell University Press.
1961a The History of Quantification in Medical Sci-
ence. Isis 52:215-237.
1961b SHRYOCK, RICHARD H. (editor) The Status of
University Teachers: Reports from Sixteen Coun-
tries. Ghent (Belgium): International Associa-
tion of University Professors and Lecturers. —»
Shryock wrote the report on the United States on
pages 179-194.
1966 Medicine in America: Historical Essays. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins. —> Foreword by Merle Curti.
1967 Medical Licensing in America, 1650-1965. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins.
1969 Empiricism versus Rationalism in American Med-
icine 1650-1950. Worcester, Mass.: American Anti-
quarian Society.
1971 The Medical Reputation of Benjamin Rush: Con-
trasts Over Two Centuries. Bulletin of the History
of Medicine 45:507-552.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BELL, WHITFIELD, J., JR. 1974 Richard H. Shryock:
Life and Work of a Historian. Journal of the History
of Medicine and Allied Sciences 29:15-31.
CURTI, MERLE 1974 The Historical Scholarship of
Richard H. Shryock. Journal of the History of Medi-
cine and Allied Sciences 29:7—14.
DURLING, EVELYN 1968 Bibliography of Richard H.
Shryock, Brought Up to Date by Others Through
1967. Journal of the History of Medicine 22:8-15.
NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON
MEDICINE AND THE CHANGING ORDER 1947 Medi-
cine in the Changing Order. New York: The Com-
monwealth Fund.
RHEINGOLD, NATRAM 1973 Richard Harrison Shry-
ock. Isis 64:96-100.
STEVENSON, LLOYD G. 1968 A Salute to Richard
Shryock. Journal of the History of Medicine and
Allied Sciences 23:1-7.
SKINNER, B. F.
B(urrhus) F(rederic) Skinner, born March 20,
1904, in Susquehanna, Pennsylvania, and since

1974 professor emeritus in the department of
psychology and social relations at Harvard Uni-
versity, is one of the most influential, contro-
versial, and publicly visible of living American
psychologists ("Skinner's Utopia . . . " 1971,
p. 47; Goodell 1977, pp. 4ff., 106-119). A bio-
physicist and a pharmacologist have each called
him "great," the former stating that "Skinner may
have had the worst press of any great scientist
since Darwin" (Platt, as quoted in Goodell 1977,
p. 107); and the latter that he was "one of the
great men of our times. . . . Skinner's discov-
eries in the field of the transactions of a higher
organism with its environment will have a greater
and more enduring effect on man's view of him-
self than the views of Freud" (Dews 1970,
pp. ix-x).
Skinner's many publications (Epstein 1977)
pertain to four areas of major concern to the
behavioral and social sciences: (a) philosophi-
cal and theoretical analyses of behavior and
behaviorism; (b) experimental analyses of be-
havior in controlled environments; (c) technol-
ogy of behavior analysis and modification based
on procedures and laws abstracted from his
philosophical, theoretical, and experimental an-
alyses; and (d) behavioral analyses of cultural
practices.
A life goal and a method for its fulfillment.
The son of a lawyer, Skinner described his life
from 1904 to 1928, when he entered graduate
school, chronologically in Particulars of My Life
(1976a) and topically in a brief autobiography
(196.7). During high school and college, Skin-
ner repeatedly strengthened his resolve to make
his life goal the furthering of the understanding
of human behavior. By 1922, when he gradu-
ated from high school, he had read widely and
written many creative works under the guidance
and inspiration of Mary I. Graves, "my teacher
in many fields for many years" ([1967] 1970,
p. 2). Skinner credited Graves for his decision
to major in English in college, to try to be a
writer, and to dabble in art (ibid., p. 3).
From 1922 to 1926 at Hamilton College in
Clinton, New York, Skinner studied literature
and philosophy in order better to understand
human behavior. There he was briefly exposed
to psychology, the discipline he later chose as
his specialty. A biology teacher taught him ad-
vanced biology, dissection, and introduced him
to Jacques Loeb's Physiology of the Brain and
Comparative Psychology and The Organism
as a Whole (Skinner 1976a, p. 295); from a
philosophy teacher he learned the two-point
SKINNER, B. F. 723
limen and some Wundtian psychology (ibid.,
p. 292).
After receiving his A.B. (1926), Skinner tried
writing as a career for approximately 18
months. After reading an H. G. Wells article
contrasting the works of Ivan P. Pavlov and
George Bernard Shaw in the November 1927
New York Times Magazine, he decided "to aban-
don literature and turn to psychology" (ibid.,
p. 300). He then applied to Harvard University
and was accepted as a graduate student in the
department of psychology in the fall of 1928.
Skinner had acquired the skill of self-observa-
tion by reading the literary work of Marcel
Proust (ibid., p. 296). He had also developed
a new orientation to philosophy and animal be-
havior from reading popular articles as well as
Bertrand Russell's Philosophy (1927) (1976a,
p. 298ff.). Skinner noted that Russell: (a) repu-
diated the philosopher Immanuel Kant; (fo)
termed John B. Watson's behaviorism a philos-
ophy and a desirable method; (c) arrived at facts
rapidly; (d) like Watson, assigned importance to
Pavlov's principle of the conditioned reflex by
the presentation of two approximately simul-
taneous stimuli; and ( e ) again like Watson
tried to interpret Edward L. Thorndike's law of
effect as an example of stimulus substitution.
Years later (Skinner 1938) he corrected what
he then termed Russell's and Watson's error in
interpreting Thorndike's work and abandoned
"the unproductive path of stimulus-response
psychology" (Skinner 1976a, p. 299). In the
meantime, Russell's work inspired him to read
Watson's Behaviorism (1925) and Pavlov's
Conditioned Reflexes (1927).
Pre- and postdoctoral training. At Harvard
University, Skinner immediately placed himself
on a strict daily work schedule with severely
curtailed activities. He adopted an independent
approach to graduate study (Skinner 1967;
Keller 1970), but did make some important so-
cial contacts. Two fellow graduate students, the
behavioristically sophisticated Fred S. Keller
(Keller & Schoenfeld 1950; Keller & Sherman
1974) and the writer turned psychologist,
Charles K. Trueblood, rather than faculty mem-
bers, strengthened what Skinner called his
"hodge-podge of interests" ([1967] 1970, p. 9).
During his first two years of graduate study, he
also met the philosophers William Ernest Hock-
ing and Alfred North Whitehead, learned of
Percy Williams Bridgman's Logic of Modern
Physics (1927), read Ernst Mach, Henri Pom-
care, and immediately relevant works in psy-
724 SKINNER, B. F.
chology and physiology (Skinner [1967] 1970,
p. 10), coauthored one article, and authored
two articles (Epstein 1977, p. 103).
As a doctoral dissertation proposal, Skinner
combined a Machian-Russellian analysis of the
reflex concept (Skinner 1931) with analyses of
drive, reflex strength, and data on eating be-
havior (Skinner [1967] 1970, p. 10). Although
Edwin G. Boring rejected the proposal, a com-
mittee without Boring approved it. Skinner
passed his orals and received his PH.D. from
Harvard in 1931.
He stayed on at Harvard for five postdoctoral
fellowship years, gathering data largely on rat
behavior and writing data and theoretical pa-
pers. During his first postdoctoral year he
worked in part on a study of the central nervous
system with Alexander Forbes and Hallowell
Davis and in part on animal behavior using his
own equipment in space provided by W. J.
Crozier. In 1936 he moved as an instructor to
the psychology department of the University of
Minnesota. There he first learned and taught
college level introductory psychology. Classes
were small but Skinner was proud that five per
cent of his students went on to obtain the PH.D.
in psychology, among them William K. Estes
and Norman Guttman (ibid., p. 11).
Parallels in Skinner and Mach. Skinner's ap-
proaches to the science of organismic behavior
and to the philosophy guiding it parallel in
many ways Ernst Mach's (1883) approaches to
the science of physical mechanics. To under-
stand the full import of Skinner's major sys-
tematic works and his place in Western science,
therefore, it is essential to indicate these par-
allels :
(1) Method of historical analysis. In his
first major theoretical publication, a paper on
the concept of reflex, Skinner (1931) deliber-
ately adopted Mach's method of historical an-
alysis of fundamental scientific concepts. Skin-
ner started with Descartes' original definition of
the reflex, indicated the role of accident in its
discovery, then documented its falls and rises in
favor, its accretions and losses, and ultimately
redefined it in terms of its one continuing posi-
tive aspect—"the observed correlation of two
events, a stimulus and a response" ([1931]
1972, p. 457). Experimental analysis then could
proceed along two lines: the study of correla-
tional characteristics such as latency, and the
study of effect of third variables such as drive
(food deprivation) level. Thus, Skinner's his-
torical analysis of a behavioral concept, like
Mach's historical analysis of Newton's force,
generated a new way of looking at an old con-
cept. Menger (1960) notes that even contempo-
rary mathematics and physics could profit from
presentation "a la Mach," thereby indicating
the power and contemporaneity of Mach's
method of historical analysis.
(2) Method of critical analysis. In his pa-
per on the reflex concept, Skinner (1931) ulti-
mately retained only observable properties, re-
jected unobservable ones, and then assigned
reality status to correlations completely on a par
with the reality status others had assigned to
structures presumed to intervene between stim-
ulus and response (cf., Russell 1927, pp. 114ff.;
Item 4 below).
Mach's (1883; Menger 1960) own use of the
method of critical analysis led to antimeta-
physicalism and positivism in philosophy, to
Albert Einstein's relativity theory, and to Bridg-
man's (1927) operationalism in physics, and
through Bridgman to the Stevens-Boring oper-
ationism in psychology (cf., Mackenzie 1977,
p. 187).
Skinner (1945Z?), speaking and writing with
the authority of one who had drunk from the
original Machian fountain of knowledge, as-
serted that operationism was not "a new the-
ory or mode of definition" ([1945b] 1972, p.
370), but was simply "the practice of talking
about (1) one's observations, (2) the manipu-
lative and calculational procedures involved in
making them, (3) the logical and mathematical
steps that intervene between earlier and later
statements, and (4) 'nothing else'" (ibid.).
(3) Rule-governed behavior compared with
contingency-controlled behavior. Experimental
analysis of contingencies of operant reinforce-
ment, according to Skinner (1966, p. 13), may
be viewed as an objectification of purpose, and
the resultant behavior purpose-governed in an
objective sense. Natural contingencies, how-
ever, may be formulated into rules including
scientific laws. These "rules [and laws] can usu-
ally be learned more quickly than the behavior
shaped by contingencies they describe" (Skinner
1974, p. 125).
Mach's version of a similar idea, "the econ-
omy of science," is generalized as the aim of
science. He states that "it is the object of science
to replace, or save, experiences, by the repro-
duction and anticipation of facts in thought.
Memory is handier than experience, and often
answers the same purpose" ([1883] 1960,
p. 577).

(4) Acausal functional analysis. Skinner's
magnum opus, The Behavior of Organisms
(1938), is, like Newton's Principia . . . (1686-
1729 ), a difficult book for many to read and un-
derstand because Skinner, like Newton, takes a
functional or relational, as opposed to a simple
causal, approach to his subject matter. New-
ton's functional analysis was communicated
textually, graphically, and mathematically, while
Skinner's was communicated only textually and
graphically.
The eminent psychologist, Clark L. Hull
(1943), deliberately modeled his theoretical
efforts, in part, on Newton's Principia (Stanley
1965; personal communication to author, 1943).
However, he erroneously assumed Newton's
method was bold theoretical postulation. Skin-
ner (1944), on the other hand, preferred an
inductive functional approach which is much
more comparable to Newton's method than is
Hull's theorizing.
(5) Phenomenal reality. Skinner (1953)
and his students and colleagues see all be-
havioral qualities (processes) as equally real.
Thus, for example, learning and conditioning
are as real to them as performance is to posi-
tivistically oriented theorists who use intervening
or hypothetical variables.
Analogously, Mach ([1886] 1959, p. 6) re-
garded phenomena as real and Kantian nou-
mena (things-in-themselves) as unreal (i.e.,
nonexistents). Moreover, Mach saw all sensory
qualities as equally real, and argued that bodies,
for example, become increasingly familiar as
reals, while colors, sounds, and odors are er-
roneously assigned only secondary status be-
cause of their relative transience; hence their
unfamiliarity as reals ([1883] 1960, p. 611). For
Mach, however, no sensory quality was truly
secondary; all existed on a par with so-called
primary qualities.
(6) Dangers of overspecialization in sci-
ence. Skinner has repeatedly exhorted his col-
leagues not to waste time on such specialized
scientific techniques as statistics and mathe-
matics, which although useful under special
conditions are dangerous in that they may carry
one away from the direct study of observable
behavior itself. He also, probably more than any
other behaviorist or psychologist, felt that we
should be applying an already existent tech-
nology of behavior. Compare this with Mach
([1883] 1960, p. 609), who wrote, "science has
its origin in the needs of life" and stressed the
value of specialized concepts, while simultane-
SKINNER, B. F. 725
ously warning of their danger if erroneously
overextended.
(7) Relating special to general knowledge.
Skinner believed that a science of behavior that
analyzes the environment and finds controlling
functions in it has the advantage of working
with accessible controlling variables. Mentalistic
and physiological approaches, in contrast, as-
sign a determining role to inaccessible variables
and thus retard the study of that which can be
directly studied. Mach argued that every investi-
gator needs a philosophy relating his branch of
science to knowledge in general in order to pre-
clude absurd questions and pseudoproblems
wherein the "complicated and remote" of one
narrow field are used to try to explain the
"simple and immediate" in another field.
(8) Need for independent development of
each science. Skinner (1938, p. 432) has argued
for the need to study organismic behavior inde-
pendently and in its own right before seeking
integration with other disciplines and quotes
Mach on the same points approvingly.
A scientific magnum opus. From 1930 to 1937
Skinner published some 19 papers, which pro-
vided him with material for The Behavior of
Organisms: An Experimental Analysis (1938).
Looking back years later ([1967] 1970, p. 10)
he stated: "Russell and Watson had given me
no glimpse of experimental method, but Pavlov
had: control the environment and you will see
order in behavior." Pavlov (1927) controlled the
environment of his subjects by repeatedly pre-
senting a response-eliciting stimulus contingent
on prior presentation of another stimulus, and
studied the formation (conditioning) of a new
reflex consisting of the first stimulus and the
response originally elicited only by the second
or reinforcing stimulus. Pavlov also studied the
extinction of conditioned reflexes resulting from
omission of the reinforcing stimulus.
Behavior as studied by Pavlov can be divided
into two classes, conditioned and unconditioned
reflexes. Skinner (1938) accepted this classifi-
cation, but then defined a still broader classifica-
tion, that between respondent and operant be-
havior. The former is stimulus-elicited behavior,
while the latter is emitted behavior where no
eliciting stimuli can be observed when the be-
havior occurs. Implicit in this schema, but not
made explicit in 1938, is a fourfold functional
classification of behavior. The four functional
classes are conditioned and unconditioned (i.e.,
phylogenically selected) respondents and con-
ditioned and unconditioned (i.e., phylogenically
726 SKINNER, B. F.
selected) operants. Although no one has made
this fourfold classification explicit, it is clearly
implied by Skinner (1938; [1975] 1978b,
pp. 169ff.).
Conditioned operants are formed when a con-
tingency of a reinforcing stimulus exists on the
emission of an operant. Thus operant behavior
is conditioned "when it acts upon the environ-
ment in such a way that a reinforcing stimulus
is produced" (Skinner 1938, p. 22), while re-
spondent behavior is conditioned by something
done to the animal, not by how the animal acts
upon the environment.
Eliciting, reinforcing, discriminative, and
other functions of stimuli are not postulated
hypothetico-deductively, but determined by ob-
servational and experimental analysis. A rein-
forcing stimulus is such by its demonstrated
production of behavioral change, e.g., increase
in frequency of an operant. Analysis has estab-
lished two classes of reinforcing stimuli: posi-
tive because their presentation acts as a rein-
forcement operation, and negative because their
cessation acts as a reinforcement operation.
In The Behavior of Organisms Skinner con-
centrated on conditioned operant reflexes and
their frequency (rate) of occurrence over time
under various conditions of environmental con-
trol. Conditioned respondent reflexes had al-
ready been well studied by Pavlov, but no one
had studied operant reflexes with equal inten-
sity. Skinner later derogated as "dogged" his
continued use of the term reflex for both op-
erant and respondent behavior, presumably be-
cause many readers restricted its meaning to
respondents only. But, reflex is an excellent
term if one thinks of it as meaning reflection of,
rather than push-pull causation by, stimulus
functions. Thus, unconditioned respondents
and operants reflect a history of phylogenic con-
tingencies of survival, while conditioned re-
spondents and operants reflect a history of
ontogenic contingencies of reinforcement (cf.,
Skinner 1975; 1977a; Herrnstein 1977).
From rats to pigeons and the planning of a com-
munity. Skinner remained on the staff of the
department of psychology of the University of
Minnesota until 1945, when he moved for three
years to the department of psychology of the
University of Indiana. There he was not only
chairman but also a departmental colleague of
J. R. Kan tor, whose many articles and books on
interbehavioristic philosophy and psychology
are excellent for the exorcism of "spooks" from
one's thinking, to paraphrase Skinner ([1967]
1970, p. 19).
While still at Minnesota, Skinner (1960)
bought some pigeons with the idea that surface-
to-air missiles might be guided by appropriately
conditioned animals, and he laid the basis for
an immense future data output from his lab-
oratory. He also invented (1945a) the air crib
to aid in the care of his second daughter,
Deborah, and was well along on two book-length
manuscripts, Walden Two (1948) and Verbal
Behavior (1957b), all of which he carried with
him to Indiana.
At Indiana, he did experimental work with
pigeons, administered the department, and also
devoted time to professional organizational
chores. Students and colleagues at other uni-
versities, notably Fred S. Keller and William N.
Schoenfeld at Columbia, were now doing re-
search and teaching based on his Behavior of
Organisms. There were meetings that culmi-
nated in the formation of division 25 of the
American Psychological Association, which
represented their scientific interests, and then
in the establishment in 1958 of the Journal of
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, which
provided an archival place of publication for ar-
ticles by members of the group and kindred
investigators.
A planned community and the problem of ver-
bal behavior. Skinner delivered the William
James lectures at Harvard in 1947 based on his
material on verbal behavior. He moved in 1948 to
Harvard's department of psychology and pub-
lished a Utopian novel Walden Two. The novel
described a planned community where positive
rather than negative reinforcers served directly
to maintain appropriate behavior. The novel
stimulated some founding of experimental com-
munities ("Skinner's Utopia. . . ." 1971) and
also second thoughts by Skinner (1976b).
When Verbal Behavior was published, it was
vigorously attacked by a young linguist Noam
Chomsky (1959). Although popular with critics,
the review is a scientific overkill in that the
critique is more relevant to simpler causal
stimulus-response psychologies than to func-
tional and operant analyses of behavior.
The unique contribution of the analysis in
Verbal Behavior is (a) to define verbal behavior
first as behavior controlled by the listener or
audience as a source of reinforcement and then
as behavior controlled by the behavior of the
listener or audience specifically conditioned to

act that way; (b) to equate the "languages" of
the linguist to the reinforcing practices of verbal
communities (1957-b, p. 461); and (c) to con-
centrate on the first point while largely ignoring
the second. Small wonder the book is a puzzle
to linguists.
Teaching and basic experimental analysis. At
Harvard in the 1950s Skinner developed an in-
troductory course on human behavior and wrote
an appropriate text, Science and Human Be-
havior (1953). Here the terms and laws that
first emerged from his laboratory analyses of
rat and pigeon operant behavior were extended
to human behavior and cultural practices. The
text provided an introductory treatment com-
plementary to that contained in the Keller and
Schoenfeld book (1950).
Skinner worked closely with postdoctoral fel-
low Charles B. Ferster and with others compris-
ing the pigeon group. The work with Ferster
culminated in a widely used and cited book,
Schedules of Reinforcement (1957). Here the
pigeon is star performer as reflector in its be-
havior of simple and complex contingencies of
reinforcement. A favorite, however, is the glos-
sary of the book, where most basic terms are
defined by an implicit instance-class-operation-
process logic adumbrated in Skinner's early ar-
ticles in the 1930s (1931; 1935).
From science to technology and cultural prac-
tices. Skinner's impact on colleagues, both basic
and applied, has been great. This impact is doc-
umented, in part, in a Festschrift (Dews 1970)
and in three editions (1959, 1961, 1972) of
Skinner's Cumulative Record. Areas of impact
or of new interest include problems in method-
ology (Sidman I960); experimental analysis in
speciality areas of psychology and related disci-
plines (Skinner 1978a; Honig 1966; Honig &
Staddon 1977; Ferster 1978); education (Hol-
land & Skinner 1961; Skinner 1968<2; Keller &
Sherman 1974); clarification of Contingencies
of Reinforcement (Skinner 1969) and About
Behaviorism (Skinner 1974), and the writing
of the first volume of his autobiography (Skin-
ner 1976a; Ferster 1977).
Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) made
Skinner's name a household word. The title is
slightly reminiscent of Nietzsche's Beyond Good
and Evil (1885). Its thesis is that only a tech-
nology of behavior can save Western democracy
from continually failing to solve the many indi-
vidual and social problems that plague it. In
effect, it is the knowledge of self- and social-
SKINNER, B. F. 727
control of human behavior through appropriate
manipulation of controlling environments by
the people that Skinner (1977b) recommends
as superior to the many cultural practices cur-
rently involving freedom of choice of individual
action and individual dignity resulting from so-
cially assigned credit for apparent personal
achievement.
Critical summary. Skinner is an articulate
and controversial scientist who has not only made
original technical and theoretical contributions
to psychology and to the behavioral and social
sciences (e.g., Hilgard & Bower 1948), but
has extended scientific analyses to many facets
of individual and social life. He has done so
without apparent inhibition or reservation con-
cerning belief in the ultimate victory of a
radical behavioristic methodology over other
methods for study and understanding of human
behavior.
Perhaps it is the very intensity with which he
has extended his analyses to society at large
that makes him unique and a target for many,
especially the conservative and/or the timid. He
certainly adheres to the general goals of Western
democracy. But he would have us reach those
goals sooner and more efficiently than many
seem to desire at this time.
Skinner's behavioristic system of psychology
is scientifically a system of psychology wherein
spontaneity is seen as an observable property of
the emission of behavior. The strength of such
operant behavior is measured empirically by its
frequency of occurrence and theoretically by a
probability value.
In actual research, a previously established
lawful relationship is examined as to its gen-
erality or specificity (Sidman 1960) or a new
lawful relationship is discovered and reported
with suggestions as to its generality or spe-
cificity. The fundamental procedure of func-
tional analysis is to let one's subject matter, in
this case behavior and its processes, be the
measure of all the operations one performs.
Having done this in a highly simplified and
contrived situation under experimental condi-
tions, one is then more educated as to what to
look for when one looks at naturally occurring
behavior (cf., Mackenzie 1977, pp. 165ff.). What
one finds there may be similar, vastly different,
or identical to what one sees in other places.
One then extends or restricts previously known
laws or reports the new laws one discovers. A
functional system is simply not to be confused
728 SKINNER, B. F.
with a hypothetico-deductive one and clearly
cannot be evaluated as such. Rather, a func-
tional system must always be evaluated on how
well its laws (rules) work in real situations,
both contrived and natural.
WALTER C. STANLEY
WORKS BY SKINNER
1931 The Concept of the Reflex in the Description of
Behavior. Journal of General Psychology 5:427—458.
—» The quotations in the text are from the reprint on
pages 429-457 of Skinner (1959) 1972.
1935 The Generic Nature of the Concepts of Stimulus
and Response. Journal of General Psychology
12:40-65. —*• The instance-class logic of Skinner's
system is specifically discussed here for the first
time.
1937 Two Types of Conditioned Reflex: A Reply to
Konorski and Miller. Journal of General Psychology
16:272-279. —» The distinction between operant
and respondent behavior appeared here for the first
time.
(1938) 1966 The Behavior of Organisms: An Experi-
mental Analysis. New York: Appleton.
1944 A Review of Hull's Principles of Behavior. Jour-
nal of American Psychology 57:276-281.
1945a Baby in a Box. Ladies' Home Journal Oct.: 30ff.
1945b The Operational Analysis of Psychological
Terms. Psychological Review 52:270-277. —> The
quotations in the text are from the reprint on pages
370-384 of Skinner (1959) 1972.
1948 Walden Two. New York: Macmillan. -> A
paperback edition was published in 1962.
1953 Science and Human Behavior. New York: Mac-
millan. —» A paperback edition was published by
the Free Press in 1965.
1957a The Experimental Analysis of Behavior. Amer-
ican Scientist 45:343-371.
1957b Verbal Behavior. New York: Appleton.
1957 FERSTER, CHARLES B.; and SKINNER, B. F. Sched-
ules of Reinforcement. New York: Appleton.
(1959) 1972 Cumulative Record. 3d ed. New York:
Appleton.
1960 Pigeons in a Pelican. American Psychologist
15:28-37.
1961 HOLLAND, J. G.; and SKINNER, B. F. The Analysis
of Behavior: A Program for Self-instruction. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
1966 Operant Behavior. Pages 12-32 in Werner K.
Honig (editor), Operant Behavior: Areas of Re-
search and Application. New York: Appleton.
1967 Autobiography. Volume 5, pages 387-413 in A
History of Psychology in Autobiography. Edited by
E. G. Boring and Gardner Lindzey. New York: Ap-
pleton. —•» The quotations in the text are from the
reprint on pages 1-21 of Dews 1970.
1968a The Technology of Teaching. New York: Ap-
pleton.
1968b Utopianism: II. The Design of Experimental
Communities. Volume 16, pages 271-275 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1969 Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical
Analysis. New York: Appleton.
1971 Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York: Knopf.
—> A paperback edition was published in 1972 by
Bantam.
1974 About Behaviorism. New York: Knopf. —> A
paperback edition was published by Random House
in 1976.
1975 The Shaping of Phylogenic Behavior. Journal of
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 24:117—120.
—» The quotations in the text are from the reprint on
pages 163-170 in Skinner 1978b.
1976a Particulars of My Life. New York: Knopf.
(1976Z?) 1978 Walden Two Revisited. Pages 56-66 in
B. F. Skinner, Reflections on Behaviorism and So-
ciety. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1977a Herrnstein and the Evolution of Behaviorism.
American Psychologist 12:1006-1012.
(1977Z?) 1978 Human Behavior and Democracy.
Pages 3-15 in B. F. Skinner, Reflections on Behav-
iorism and Society. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall. —> The article concludes with a complete re-
jection of fascism and totalitarianism.
1978a The Experimental Analysis of Behavior (A His-
tory). Pages 113-126 in B. F. Skinner, Reflections
on Behaviorism and Society. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall. —> Paper presented in April 1976 at
a conference of the New York Academy of Sciences.
1978i> Reflections on Behaviorism and Society. Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1979 The Shaping of a Behaviorist. New York: Knopf.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BRIDGMAN, PERCY W. 1927 Logic of Modern Physics.
New York: Macmillan.
CHOMSKY, NOAM 1959 Review of Skinner's Verbal
Behavior. Language 35:26—58.
DEWS, PETER B. (editor) 1970 Festschrift for B. F.
Skinner. New York: Appleton.
EPSTEIN, ROBERT 1977 A Listing of the Published
Works of B. F. Skinner, With Notes and Comments.
Behaviorism 5:99-110.
FERSTER, CHARLES B. 1970 Schedules of Reinforce-
ment With Skinner. Pages 37-46 in Peter B. Dews
(editor), Festschrift for B. F. Skinner. New York:
Appleton. —> Contains a picture of Skinner's pigeon
staff.
FERSTER, CHARLES B. 1977 The Ultimate Behaviorist:
Review of B. F. Skinner's Particulars of My Life.
Contemporary Psychology 22:102—103.
FERSTER, CHARLES B. 1978 Is Operant Conditioning
Getting Bored With Behavior? Journal of the Ex-
perimental Analysis of Behavior 29:347-349.
GOODELL, RAE 1977 The Visible Scientists. Boston:
Little, Brown.
HERRNSTEIN, RICHARD J. 1977 Doing What Comes
Naturally: A Reply to Professor Skinner. American
Psychologist 32:1013-1016. —> A former member
of the pigeon staff defends his own position on
Skinner's early work.
HILGARD, ERNEST R.; and BOWER, GORDON H. (1948)
1975 Theories of Learning. 4th ed. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
HONIG, WERNER K. (editor) 1966 Operant Behavior:
Areas of Research and Application. New York: Ap-
pleton.
HONIG, WERNER K.; and STADDON, J. E. R. (editors)
1977 Handbook of Operant Behavior. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
HULL, CLARK L. 1943 Principles of Behavior: An In-
troduction to Behavior Theory. New York: Appleton.
KELLER, FRED S. 1970 Psychology at Harvard (1926-
1931): A Reminiscence. Pages 29-36 in Peter B.
Dews (editor), Festschrift for B. F. Skinner. New
York: Appleton.
KELLER, FRED S.; and SCHOENFELD, WILLIAM N. 1950
Principles of Psychology. New York: Appleton.
KELLER, FRED S.; and SHERMAN, J. GILMOUR 1974

PSI: The Keller Plan Handbook: Essays on a Per-
sonalized System of Instruction. Menlo Park, Calif.:
Benjamin. —> Note especially chapter 5, "PSI and
Reinforcement Theory," by Keller, and chapter 7,
"Developments in Brazil," by Carolina Martuscelli
Bori.
MACH, ERNST (1883) 1960 The Science of Me-
chanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its
Development. LaSalle, 111.: Open Court. —> With an
introduction by Karl Menger. First published in
German.
MACH, ERNST (1886) 1959 The Analysis of Sensa-
tions and the Relation of the Physical to the Psy-
chical. New York: Dover. —> First published in
German.
MACKENZIE, BRIAN D. 1977 Behaviourism and the
Limits of Scientific Method. Atlantic Highlands,
N.J.: Humanities Press.
MENGER, KARL 1960 Introduction. In Ernst Mach,
The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical
Account of Its Development. La Salle, 111.: Open
Court.
NEWTON, ISAAC (1686-1729) 1934 Principia: Sir
Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles on Natural
Philosophy and His System of the World. Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press.
NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH WILHELM (1885) 1964 Be-
yond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the
Future. New York: Russell. —> First published in
German.
PAVLOV, IVAN P. (1927) 1960 Conditioned Reflexes:
An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the
Cerebral Cortex. New York: Dover. —» First pub-
lished as Lektsii o rabote bol'shikh polusharii golov-
nogo mozga.
RUSSELL, BERTRAND 1927 Philosophy. New York:
Norton.
SIDMAN, MURRAY 1960 Tactics of Scientific Re-
search: Evaluating Experimental Data in Psychol-
ogy. New York: Basic Books.
Skinner's Utopia: Panacea, or Path to Hell? 1971
Time: The Weekly Newsmagazine Sept. 20:47—53.
STANLEY, WALTER C. 1965 Review of monograph
supplement, Passages from the "Idea Books" of
Clark L. Hull. Educational and Psychological Mea-
surement 25:945-946.
WATSON, JOHN B. (1925) 1970 Behaviorism. New
York: Norton.
SPENCE, KENNETH W.
Kenneth W. Spence was bom in Chicago on
May 6, 1907, and died in Austin, Texas, on
January 12, 1967, at the age of 59. He was then
professor of psychology at the University of
Texas. Recognized as the logical successor to
Clark L. Hull, who had died in 1952, Spence
had been deeply involved for practically all his
professional life, including his graduate student
years, in the development of an empirically
based behavior theory within the general frame-
work of Hull's neobehaviorism.
Spence has been so closely identified with
Hull's systematic behavior theory that treat-
ments of both their points of view have often
SPENCE, KENNETH W. 729
been combined and referred to as the Hull-
Spence approach (Logan 1959). Spence was first
exposed to Hull's views when he attended the
latter's 1930/1931 seminar as a graduate stu-
dent at Yale University. At the time he was
assistant to Robert M. Yerkes with whom he did
his doctoral dissertation research, a study of
visual acuity in the chimpanzee. After obtaining
his PH.D. degree in 1933 (his other degrees
were received at McGill University), Spence
spent several years at the Yale Laboratories of
Primate Biology in Orange Park, Florida. He
then served for a year on the faculty of the Uni-
versity of Virginia and joined the University of
Iowa as associate professor in the fall of 1938.
In 1942 he became professor and chairman of
the Iowa department of psychology and re-
mained in that capacity until 1964, when he
went to Texas.
When Spence arrived in Iowa City in 1938,
the stage was already set for one of psychology's
more significant and creative periods during
which the major efforts of individuals like Hull,
Kurt Lewin, Edward C. Tolman, Edwin R.
Guthrie, and B. F. Skinner were directed toward
the development of broad systematic theories or
conceptions of behavior. Tolman's Purposive Be-
havior in Animals and Men had appeared in
1932. Skinner's The Behavior of Organisms be-
came available in 1938. Hull, since his arrival
at Yale in 1929, had been intensively engaged
in the development of his behavior theory. Kurt
Lewin, a faculty member of the Iowa Child Wel-
fare Research Station, was pursuing the de-
velopment of his field theory or topological psy-
chology. Herbert Feigl, a philosopher of science
identified with logical positivism or empiricism,
was also at Iowa, but it was Gustav Bergmann,
philosopher of similar persuasion, who had fol-
lowed Feigl to Iowa, who had the greater influ-
ence on Spence.
Bergmann and Spence developed a strong and
mutually satisfying intellectual relationship and
coauthored a number of articles explicating the
philosophical-logical underpinnings of Hull's
theoretical efforts, as well as more general is-
sues and problems involving methodology in
psychology. In a paper concerned with opera-
tionism and theory construction in psychology,
Bergmann and Spence (1941) analyzed the
character of Hull's early theorizing and showed
that Hull was actually following Tolman's in-
tervening variable approach to theory construc-
tion, a conclusion accepted by Hull. Spence
maintained a continuing interest in such mat-
 730 SPENCE, KENNETH W.
ters, and his methodological contributions were
made explicit in a number of independent pub-
lications (1944; 1948; 1952; 1957).
Spence's early promise as a brilliant experi-
mental and theoretical psychologist had been
shown in a number of significant papers that
had appeared before his arrival at the University
of Iowa. They included an influential paper de-
scribing his theory of discrimination learning in
animals (1936) and a related theoretical anal-
ysis of transposition phenomena (1937). Using
simple conditioning principles of reinforcement
and what he then called inhibition or frustration
associated with nonreinforcement (extinction),
and making quantitative assumptions about the
ways in which reinforcement and frustration af-
fect the growth of independent excitatory and
inhibitory processes respectively, Spence was
able to explain or predict a variety of discrimi-
nation-learning phenomena, including the de-
velopment of systematic position responses and
the seemingly sudden and insightful character
of learning that followed the disappearance of
lengthy and consistent position habits. Further,
postulating generalization gradients of excita-
tion and inhibition of a particular form, Spence
was able to deduce the basic transposition phe-
nomenon as well as additional related implica-
tions. With this theory, Spence replied to Gestalt
psychologists who argued that transposition
represented a response to the relationship be-
tween two stimuli—e.g., larger than—and that
it could not be accounted for by absolute stimu-
lus-response theory, which emphasized the
acquisition of specific associations to stimuli.
These papers are interesting not only for their
substantive contributions and their early dem-
onstration of Spence's systematic orientation
but also in relation to Spence's later thinking.
One example is his subsequent, more system-
atic, treatment of inhibitory phenomena associ-
ated with the effects of nonreinforcement for
previously rewarded responses and the role of
emotional factors (frustration) in such pro-
cesses (see 1960).
On a quite different level, these papers were
referred to by Spence in his later writings to
point up the importance of what he called the
boundary conditions of a theory. As Spence tried
to make clear to his critics, his theories of dis-
crimination learning and transposition held only
under specified boundary conditions—i.e., for
nonarticulate organisms alone. He chided those
who attempted to refute these theories on the
basis of experiments using college students as
subjects.
Despite a continuing interest in discrimina-
tion learning, Spence, in accordance with Hull's
broad strategy for the development of a sys-
tematic behavior theory, soon turned to other
experimental situations. Spence agreed with
Hull that the discovery of a set of basic or pri-
mary laws of molar behavior, expressed in
quantitative form, could best be attained
through the study of simple (inarticulate?) or-
ganisms in simple situations. Simple situations
include classical and instrumental conditioning,
with the former probably the simpler of the two.
It was assumed that the basic laws derived from
simple situations wou/d hold for more complex
ones—although, conceivably, new variables
would be operating in the latter. Interaction
laws, as Spence (1959) called them, would be
required to specify the relationship of the basic
variables to the new variables operating in the
more complex contexts.
In a relevant entry, dated September 16,
1950, in his "Idea Books," Hull (1962, p. 881)
referred to a conversation with his colleague
Carl I. Hovland. Ho viand had asked how one
might proceed to discover new laws applicable
to social psychological situations. Hull had
doubted that there were any new primary laws,
implying that these had already been isolated:
"The main task is to verify the working out of
the recognized laws of individual behavior in
purely social situations."
This comment exemplifies a difference in
theoretical "style" between Hull and Spence.
Spence was much more conservative about the
degree of progress made in the discovery of
basic laws, and he was guided by and remained
close to the data. Hull was more speculative
about more complex situations in the sense that
he was willing to address them, even though the
basic (primary) laws of behavior had not been
adequately specified, or perhaps because he as-
sumed—prematurely and in the absence of ade-
quate data—that they indeed had already been
isolated. Not until some 25 years after the pub-
lication of his 1936 discrimination learning
theory did Spence (1960) feel that enough
progress had been made in the development of
a theory of simple conditioning to justify further
efforts to extend the theory to the more complex
discrimination or selective learning situation.
On occasion, Spence (1956; 1959) took issue
with those who stressed the application of psy-

chology to the solution of practical problems,
and who criticized the concepts, experimental
arrangements, and subjects used by psycholo-
gists like Hull and himself. Such criticism, in
his judgment, reflected a misunderstanding of,
and served to retard, the scientific enterprise.
Although he did not preclude the possibility that
significant research could be done in the more
complex, applied, real-life setting—for example,
the school, hospital, military, or industrial
setting—he insisted that a more fruitful strategy
was to search for basic behavior laws in simple
situations, rather than attend prematurely to
practical or applied matters. Moreover, he re-
peatedly emphasized that the pursuit of primary
laws in simple situations represented only a first
phase in an over-all strategy for developing a
broad theory of behavior that was applicable to
a wide range of complex situations.
Spence interpreted Hull's position with ex-
ceptional clarity, at the same time modifying
and elaborating it with his own unique contri-
butions. The most systematic over-all presenta-
tion of Spence's position is given in Behavior
Theory and Conditioning (1956), a volume
based on his Silliman lectures at Yale in 1955.
The work begins with a historical—methodo-
logical introduction, after which Spence pre-
sented an experimental and theoretical analysis
of conditioning, ending with a consideration
of the extension of conditioning theory to com-
plex learning. Although in the Hullian tradition,
the volume is interesting in pointing up a num-
ber of methodological and substantive differ-
ences between Hull and Spence. For example, in
contrast to Hull's monistic reinforcement posi-
tion, Spence tentatively proposed a version of a
two-factor theory in which reinforcement was
necessary for classical conditioning but not for
instrumental reward conditioning. This view
was in direct opposition to earlier two-factor
proposals—for example, Mowrer's (1947), which
held that reinforcement was necessary for in-
strumental learning but not for classical con-
ditioning. Other differences between Hull and
Spence related to motivation and incentive
variables and their interaction. Technical and
space considerations preclude their discussion
here. Significant, however, is that the formula-
tions of both men were expressed in quantita-
tive form and could be tested experimentally.
Spence spent 26 highly productive years at
the University of Iowa as a researcher and
teacher. At Iowa, 73 students completed their
SPENCE, KENNETH W. 731
doctoral dissertations under his supervision,
and his students remember his strong commit-
ment to teaching and his success in that role.
He was a teacher both of students and of his
peers and produced significant chapters analyz-
ing the theorists of his day (195la; 1951b).
Spence was honored during his lifetime and
posthumously. He was elected to the National
Academy of Sciences and was the only psycholo-
gist invited to present the Yale Silliman lectures.
He was also among the first group of three
psychologists to receive the distinguished sci-
entific contribution award from the American
Psychological Association in 1956. In connec-
tion with the award, he prepared a paper (1958)
in which he elaborated Hull's multiplicative
drive theory to include as an additional source
of drive a hypothetical emotional response as-
sociated with aversive stimulation. After his
death Howard H. Kendler and Janet T. Spence
(1971) edited a memorial volume which in-
cluded contributions by many of his students.
On November 5, 1969, the University of Iowa
dedicated and accepted in his memory the
Spence Laboratories of Psychology, a new six-
story structure in close proximity to the building
in which he had spent so much of his pro-
fessional life.
GEORGE J. WISCHNER
WORKS BY SPENCE
1936 The Nature of Discrimination Learning in Ani-
mals. Psychological Review 43:427-449.
1937 The Differential Response in Animals to Stimuli
Varying Within a Single Dimension. Psychological
Review 44:430-444.
1941 BERGMANN, GUSTAV; and SPENCE, KENNETH W.
Operationism and Theory in Psychology. Psycho-
logical Review 48:1-14.
1944 The Nature of Theory Construction in Contem-
porary Psychology. Psychological Review 51:47-68.
1948 The Postulates and Methods of "Behaviorism."
Psychological Review 55:67-78.
(195la) 1966 Theoretical Interpretations of Learning.
Pages 690-729 in Stanley S. Stevens (editor),
Handbook of Experimental Psychology. New York:
Wiley.
(1951fe) 1971 Theoretical Interpretations of Learning.
Pages 239-291 in Calvin P. Stone et al. (editors),
Comparative Psychology. 3d ed. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood.
1952 Mathematical Formulations of Learning Phe-
nomena. Psychological Review 59:152-160.
(1956) 1978 Behavior Theory and Conditioning. West-
port, Conn.: Greenwood.
1957 The Empirical Basis and Theoretical Structure
of Psychology. Philosophy of Science 24:97—108.
1958 A Theory of Emotionally Based Drive (D) and
Its Relation to Performance in Simple Learning
Situations. American Psychologist 13:131-141.
1959 The Relation of Learning Theory to the Tech-
732 SPROUT, HAROLD AND MARGARET
nology of Education. Harvard Educational Review
29:84-95.
1960 Behavior Theory and Learning: Selected Papers.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
1966 Cognitive and Drive Factors in the Extinction
of the Conditioned Eye Blink in Human Subjects.
Psychological Review 73:445-458.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
HULL, CLARK L. 1962 Psychology of the Scientist:
4. Passages from the "Idea Books" of Clark L. Hull.
Perceptual and Motor Skills 15:807-882. —> Pub-
lished posthumously.
KENDLER, HOWARD H.; and SPENCE, JANET T. (editors)
1971 Essays in Neobehaviorism: A Memorial Vol-
ume to Kenneth W. Spence. New York: Appleton.
LOGAN, F. A. 1959 The Hull-Spence Approach. Vol-
ume 2, pages 293-358 in Sigmund Koch (editor),
Psychology: A Study of a Science. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
MOWRER, O. H. 1947 On the Dual Nature of
Learning: A Reinterpretation of "Conditioning" and
"Problem Solving." Harvard Educational Review
17:102-148.
SKINNER, B. F. (1938) 1966 The Behavior of Or-
ganisms: An Experimental Analysis. New York:
Appleton.
TOLMAN, EDWARD C. (1932) 1951 Purposive Behav-
ior in Animals and Men. Los Angeles: Univ. of
California Press.
SPROUT, HAROLD AND MARGARET
The academic study of international relations
during the 1920s and 1930s in the United States
had its roots in diplomatic history and interna-
tional law. The subject matter and the perspec-
tives brought to it were largely dominated by
the legacy of Woodrow Wilson, the Paris Peace
Conference, and the establishment of the
League of Nations. With remarkably few excep-
tions, American teachers and writers on inter-
national subjects anticipated a new era of
international cooperation, the abolition of secret
diplomacy, and a stable peace into the indefinite
future. These were key presuppositions that
prevailed widely in academia when Harold
Sprout, born in 1901, and Margaret Sprout,
born in 1903, were pursuing their formal edu-
cations in the 1920s.
Not every teacher accepted this optimistic
scenario. One who did not was Karl Frederick
Geiser of Oberlin College. His inquiring mind
and amiable skepticism left a deep imprint on
many students who went on to become academi-
cians, public officials, and business and civic
leaders. The Sprouts were among those students
profoundly influenced by Geiser, and always re-
garded themselves as his "proteges."
After their marriage in 1924, the Sprouts
studied law first at the University of Wisconsin
and then at Western Reserve University. Un-
happy, however, with the sanguine formalisms
of the legalistic approach to international rela-
tions which Geiser had taught them to question,
they soon shifted into graduate study in polit-
ical science at the University of Wisconsin. In
1929 that institution awarded Harold Sprout a
doctorate in political science and law, and con-
ferred on Margaret Sprout a master of arts
degree in political science and geography.
They spent the 1926/1927 academic year at
Miami University of Ohio, where Harold Sprout
obtained a fill-in faculty appointment, and
1929-1931 at Stanford University, where he
obtained another similar position. Margaret
Sprout never seriously considered continuing
her formal education beyond the master's degree,
knowing that a doctorate would not increase her
professional opportunities, given the general
unavailability of joint appointments for hus-
band-and-wife teams—or, for that matter, fac-
ulty appointments for single women in most
disciplines—at any major college or university
in the country.
In 1931, when the great depression virtually
wiped out the academic job market, Harold
Sprout had the good fortune to receive an in-
structorship at Princeton University which—
although it seemed a most unlikely prospect at
the time—was to remain the base for the rest of
their professional careers stretching out for ap-
proximately half a century. Throughout the
desperate early and middle 1930s, Harold
Sprout clung precariously to the lower rungs on
the faculty ladder in Princeton's department of
politics. Thanks largely to Tyler Dennet (then
a senior faculty colleague, earlier a public offi-
cial, and later president of Williams College),
he escaped the professional unemployment that
destroyed the careers of so many of his con-
temporaries. He finally reached the rank of full
professor, served as department chairman
(1949-1952), and was then appointed to the
endowed Bryant chair in geography and inter-
national relations in the department of politics.
In 1969 that position was translated to profes-
sor emeritus when he reached the mandatory
retirement age of 68.
Along the way, Harold Sprout filled visiting
appointments at the University of Pennsylvania
(1938), Columbia University (1948-1950), the
University of Denver (1950), Nuffield College,
Oxford (1955), and Rutgers University (1970).
In the mid-1940s he was briefly a member
of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study.
 SPROUT, HAROLD AND MARGARET
He conducted most of the negotiations that
successfully resulted in the movement of an
organizational structure and a number of
professional scholars from Yale University
in the context of the establishment of the
Center of International Studies at Princeton
University (1951). His own membership in the
center was continued by appointment to a re-
search position coincident with his retirement
from the teaching faculty (1969). During 1955,
1957, and 1962, the Sprouts spent several
semesters abroad in connection with research
on which they were then engaged.
Margaret Sprout's career followed a different
but related course. She demonstrated superior
teaching and research abilities at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin nearly two generations before
the thrust of events and federal policies forced
American colleges and universities to modify
their traditional discrimination against female
teachers and scholars. During the 1930s, she
was a member of Edward M. Earle's faculty
seminar at the Institute for Advanced Study.
Though denied official university status, she
was explicitly named (with her husband) as
corecipient of the Shreve fellowship in history
administered by Princeton University. Again,
without any university status, she taught one of
her husband's courses during his absence for
governmental service in Washington during
World War n. Along the way, she was a key
participant in several professional conferences.
She wrote the essay on "Mahan" for Earle's still
widely-read symposium volume, Makers of Mod-
ern Strategy (1943). Prior and subsequent to
that, she coauthored with her spouse eight books
and numerous journal articles in the fields that
they helped to create and to develop in polity
science. Finally, in 1969, she acquired fori
university recognition when, through the cour-
tesy and efforts of Cyril E. Black (then the newly
installed director of the Princeton Center of In-
ternational Studies and professor of history)
she was appointed research associate, a posi-
tion that she then held for virtually the re-
mainder of her academic career.
In addition to her scholarly work as a political
scientist, Margaret Sprout early became a civic
leader with a predominant commitment to im-
proving the delivery of public services (particu-
larly services related to human health) at the
level of individual homes and families. She
served on the executive board of the New Jersey
League of Women Voters (1936-1946), and
was president of the league's Princeton area
733
chapter (1942-1946). She was cofounder and
twice president of the Princeton Council of
Community Services, and was founder and first
president of the Princeton Homemaker Service.
In 1971, she accepted an official public position
as chairman of the Princeton Township Board
of Health. From that point of departure, she
became cofounder of the Princeton Regional
Health Commission, serving in top executive
positions in that agency in the late 1970s.
The Sprouts over the course of their long pro-
fessional careers in academic life were again
and again (metaphorically speaking) "seers
ahead of their time." In 1931 Harold Sprout
published a plea in the American Political Sci-
ence Review for recognition of political geog-
raphy as a field of political science—a suggestion
that went unheeded until after World War n.
That experience was symptomatic of other
things to come. Repeatedly they took positions
that went virtually unnoticed for years and then
suddenly became "ideas whose time has come."
For example, they persistently emphasized the
political relevance of concepts and insights
evoked by wide reading in the literature of ge-
ography, historiography, ecology, and sociology,
explicitly stressing the importance of interdis-
ciplinary contact and cooperation. In this way
they were some two decades ahead of the inter-
disciplinary movement that began to be evident
across many of the social sciences (particularly
among those fields focusing on international be-
havior) in the middle to late 1950s. For another
example, they gave careful attention from the
beginning of their careers to an effort to under-
stand and apply theories of knowledge—espe-
cially distinctions in the implications and re-
quirements for testing various types of scientific
statements such as description, explanation,
and prediction—to the discipline of political sci-
ence. In this way they were similarly some two
decades ahead of a parallel movement in the
middle to late 1950s to introduce a stronger
sense of self-conscious rigor into the study of
international relations. But at the same time
they always understood that the full meaning of
"being scientific" was not exhausted by the use
of statistical methods with quantified data, and
this understanding was not substantially shared
until two more decades had elapsed as of the
mid-1970s.
Finally, as environmental pollution became a
major new public concern in the 1970s, the
Sprouts were "rediscovered"—as it were—in their
role as pioneer researchers and teachers on the
 734 SPROUT, HAROLD AND MARGARET
crucial interplay among the following sets of
variables in any nation-state (but with special
reference to the modern industrial state) •* (1) the
nature of the social system in terms of an
appetite and effective demand for consumer
goods and services; (2) the nature of the eco-
nomic system in the creation and delivery of
those goods and services; (3) the nature of the
political system in applying public authority to
the demand for and supply of consumer goods
and services while at the same time expressing
the demand and attempting to supply collective
goods and services such as are exemplified in
the expectation of national security and military
defense; and (4) finally—what could be regarded
as the chief dependent variable in this set of
four—the progressive deterioration of the hu-
man habitat.
These generalizations about the numbers of
important ways in which Harold and Margaret
Sprout were pathfinders over forty to fifty years
can be illustrated most effectively in a review
of their major publications. Those books and
related studies reveal yet additional ways in
which they were innovative trailblazers.
The Sprouts' first major work was The Rise
of American Naval Power (1939). Carefully
researched during the 1930s when American
naval power was a highly controversial political
issue in many dimensions, but avoiding those
debates in order to stress scholarship, the book
focused on the domestic and external milieu—or
context—that affected naval design, legislation,
administration, and strategy over the period
from the 1780s to the end of World War I.
Charles A. Beard characterized it as the first
significant "parliamentary history of the Navy."
A sequel, Toward a New Order of Sea Power
(1940), reconsidered the Washington Naval
Conference of 1921-1922 from this perspective,
and in addition provided a concise explanation
of the rise and decline of British naval primacy
in the context of Mahan's ideas on seapower.
These two books, still in print and enjoying
steady if small annual sales into the last years
of the 1970s, stood the test of four decades. In-
deed, as the Soviet-American naval rivalry
spurred younger scholars to a new interest in
research on the origins of modern navies, the
Sprouts' books re-emerged more securely than
ever as the foundation signposts for this kind of
inquiry. They themselves had much earlier pre-
pared the beginnings of a third volume on naval
policy when World War n diverted their efforts
into other channels.
While Margaret Sprout wrote the previously
mentioned essay on Mahan for the Earle book,
Harold Sprout wrote the text of A War Atlas
for Americans (1944). He also performed
a variety of wartime assignments for the War
Department, the Navy Department, and the
State Department. Both of the Sprouts played a
major role in a project sponsored by then newly
designated Secretary of the Navy James V. For-
restal, designed to achieve a more broadly
focused classroom course on international rela-
tions for use in the postwar curriculum of the
Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC)
program. That project culminated in a book of
original text materials and selected readings,
coauthored and coedited by the Sprouts, entitled
Foundations of National Power (1945). It was
adopted as the basic textbook in many college
and university courses having no connection
with the naval ROTC, and in retrospect
seems to have exerted considerable influence in
turning the teaching of international relations
toward a much broader and richer mixture of
conditions and events than were previously con-
sidered appropriate in such courses. This in turn
fueled the movement toward the interdisci-
plinary perspectives that had been part of the
Sprouts' intellectual orientations all along.
An almost entirely new version of the original
Foundations of National Power was published
by the Sprouts some 17 years later (1962) un-
der the title Foundations of International Poli-
tics. But over that period a theme that had run
through all of the Sprouts' works had become
for them a dominant new emphasis, and this
was the focus on broadly environmental as well
as more narrowly political and economic con-
cerns in the study of national behavior in the
context of international statecraft. In 1954 the
Rockefeller Foundation joined with Princeton
University to provide more substantial continu-
ing support for their further studies along these
lines that were to preoccupy them for the re-
mainder of their careers.
The first publication resulting from this domi-
nant new thrust was a set of two theoretical
essays in Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses
in the Context of International Politics (1956).
Subsequent refinements and developments of
these ideas tumbled forth in a rich profusion of
publications over the years, including "Environ-
mental Factors in the Study of International
Politics" (1957), The Ecological Perspective on
Human Affairs (1965), An Ecological Paradigm
for the Study of International Politics (1968£>),
 SPROUT, HAROLD AND MARGARET
"The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insuffi-
cient Resources" (1968a), Toward a Politics of
the Planet Earth (197lb), "The Environmental
Crisis in the Context of American Politics"
(1971a), and a chapter in Environmental Poli-
tics (1973).
In 1978 the Sprouts published The Context
of Environmental Politics, a book that they re-
garded as perhaps their culminating master-
work embracing and synthesizing the dominant
and evolving themes in their research and
writing for more than two decades since the
middle 1950s. Some of those themes can be
briefly summarized in the following statements
excerpted almost verbatim from their works:
(1) Political scientists should be severely
reprimanded for sitting on their hands, leaving
so many political aspects of environmental de-
terioration to be dealt with by insensitive nu-
clear physicists, aerospace engineers, and ar-
rogant technocrats.
(2) Any program for spending large sums of
public money for cleaner air, cleaner water,
and other environmental improvements is likely
to run into grave political trouble if these values
are put ahead of comparable outlays for the
equally commendable and necessary purposes
of eradicating poverty and the conditions and
consequences of underprivileged status in a
modern society.
(3) A salient feature of the present situation
is the simultaneous peaking of demands for
social and environmental reform. Politically ex-
pressed demands of these magnitudes would
present formidable difficulties under any cir-
cumstances, but they appear even more for-
midable when viewed in the light of the over-all
crisis of priorities represented by the clash be-
tween foreign threats perceived as military se-
curity dangers and domestic needs perceived as
absolutely necessary requirements for tolerable
lives at home. Military defense issues in most
modern industrial societies are likely never
again to be considered without dramatically
more simultaneous regard for the impact of de-
fense spending on conditions within those so-
cieties.
(4) Business executives, necessarily driven
by profit motives, tend to exploit the natural
environment and to put domestic social circum-
stances into a low-priority category, such that
only governments can assert a broader public
need and demand for environmental mainte-
nance and restoration.
(5) But governments, particularly the gov-
735
ernment of the United States, will find it
exceedingly difficult if not impossible to offset
the pressures for environmental exploitation
from the business community, because many
other interest groups and the public at large re-
tain the hallowed American dream of a hedon-
istic Utopia. Yet, it is a dream that will turn into
a nightmarish mirage unless an effective public
and political coalition can emerge which will
put the maintenance of a sustainable human
habitat at the top of social, economic, and
political priorities.
If these themes from the work of the Sprouts
now sound commonplace, in view of the grow-
ing numbers of scientists and scholars and
other publicans who emerged stressing the same
or similar messages in the 1970s, it remains
true that the Sprouts were virtually alone for
several earlier decades in reaching these con-
clusions from their interdisciplinary social sci-
ence research, extensively and repeatedly sup-
ported by the Rockefeller Foundation and other
benefactors. Their work heavily influenced sev-
eral generations of students many of whom
subsequently achieved great academic distinc-
tion in the social sciences and/or in public ser-
vice. Their teaching was often in the context of
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and In-
ternational Affairs, alongside their research in
the Center of International Studies at Princeton
University, where faculty colleagues as well as
students were influenced not only substantively
but in terms of the Sprouts' strong commitment
to interdisciplinary research designs and meth-
odologies. Indeed, it is probably not too much
to say that the Sprouts were the steady beacons
that largely guided in informal but powerful
ways both the Woodrow Wilson School and the
center, especially when these paired institutions
and their journal World Politics served as the
"intellectual capital" for the interdisciplinary
field of international studies throughout the
1950s and the early 1960s. The field itself fell
into some disarray in the later 1960s largely as
a consequence of the inflamed emotions and
arguments engendered by the U.S. involvement
in southeast Asia. Yet, through those painful
years, the Sprouts remained steady on their
long-run course, and thus were ready to supply
the scholarly foundations when environmental
issues largely displaced defense issues in many
scholarly circles in the 1970s and beyond. As
long as social scientists address themselves to
the question of how political processes can be
used to save the planetary biosphere as a viable
736 SRAFFA, PIERO
and aesthetically appealing human habitat, the
work of the Sprouts will provide guidance and
inspiration.
VINCENT DAVIS
WORKS BY THE SPROUTS
WORKS BY HAROLD SPROUT
1931 Political Geography as a Political Science Field.
American Political Science Review 25:439—442.
1944 A War Atlas for Americans. New York: Simon
& Schuster.
1968 Geography: II. Political Geography. Volume 6,
pages 116-123 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
WORKS BY MARGARET SPROUT
(1943) 1970 Mahan: The Evangelist of Sea Power.
Pages 415-445 in Edward M. Earle (editor),
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From
Machiavelli to Hitler. New York: Atheneum.
WORKS BY HAROLD AND MARGARET SPROUT
(1939) 1942 The Rise of American Naval Power.
Rev. ed. Princeton Univ. Press.
(1940) 1943 Toward a New Order of Sea Power:
American Naval Policy and the World Scene,
1918-1922. 2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press.
(1945) 1951 SPROUT, HAROLD; and SPROUT, MAR-
GARET (editors) Foundations of National Power:
Readings on World Politics and American Security.
Rev. ed. Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand.
1956 Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Con-
text of International Politics. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University, Center of International
Studies.
1957 Environmental Factors in the Study of Interna-
tional Politics. Journal of Conflict Resolution
1:309-328. -* Paper prepared for the 1956 con-
vention of the American Political Science Associa-
tion.
1962 SPROUT, HAROLD; and SPROUT, MARGARET (edi-
tors) Foundations of International Politics. Prince-
ton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. —» New version of their
1945 book.
1965 The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs,
With Special Reference to International Politics.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, Center of
International Studies.
1968a The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insuffi-
cient Resources. World Politics 20:660-693.
1968b An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of In-
ternational Politics. Princeton University, Center of
International Studies, Research Monograph No. 30.
1971 a The Environmental Crisis in the Context of
American Politics. Pages 41-50 in Leslie L. Roos,
Jr. (editor) The Politics of Ecosuicide. New York:
Holt.
1971b Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth. New
York: Van Nostrand.
(1973) 1974 Environmental Politics: What Role for
Political Scientists? Pages 3-13 in Stuart S. Nagel
(editor), Environmental Politics. New York:
Praeger. —> First published in a shorter form as
"Public Policy and Environmental Crisis: What
Role for Political Scientists?" in volume 1 of the
Policy Studies Journal.
1974 Multiple Vulnerabilities: The Context of Envi-
ronmental Repair and Protection. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University, Center of International Studies.
1978 The Context of Environmental Politics: Un-
finished Business For America's Third Century.
Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ROSENAU, JAMES N.; DAVIS, VINCENT; and EAST,
MAURICE A. (editors) 1972 The Analysis of In-
ternational Politics: Essays in Honor of Harold and
Margaret Sprout. New York: Free Press.
SRAFFA, PIERO
Piero Sraffa is one of the most controversial
theoretical economists of the twentieth century.
A friend of Antonio Gramsci, the founder of the
Italian Communist party, and a protege of John
Maynard Keynes, the great English economist,
Sraffa spent almost his entire active life, as an
unmarried don, in the quiet atmosphere of the
Cambridge colleges, rarely seen at academic
congresses or conferences around the world. His
writings, nevertheless, have twice been at the
center of major breakthroughs in economic
theory in this century.
Piero Sraffa was born in Turin (northern
Italy) on August 5, 1898, the only child of
Angelo Sraffa, a well-known Italian university
professor of commercial law, and of Irma Tivoli,
who came from a rather matriarchal Jewish
family. In Turin, Sraffa attended the lycee and
the university. Among his teachers was Umberto
Cosmo, a complex person with socialist ten-
dencies, whose lectures on Italian literature had
been attended by Gramsci. At the university,
Sraffa wrote his dissertation on "Inflation in
Italy During and After the War," supervised by
Luigi Einaudi, the Italian economist and
public finance expert, later to become the sec-
ond president of the Italian Republic. Sraffa
met Keynes on an occasional visit to Cambridge
in 1921, and seems to have made a strong im-
pression on him. Keynes commissioned him to
write an article on the Italian financial markets
and banking crisis. The article was published in
two versions: in the Economic Journal (1922a),
and in a section on the "Reconstruction of
Europe"—edited by Keynes—in the weekly Man-
chester Guardian Commercial (1922k). This
event turned out to be important in Sraffa's life.
Mussolini, who had just seized power in Italy,
was enraged by the article. For Sraffa this inci-
dent was the beginning of a series of troubles
with the fascist regime, but, at the same time,
of increasing contact with Keynes.

Sraffa became a professor of political econ-
omy at the University of Perugia in 1924 and
at the University of Cagliari (Sardinia) in 1926.
But the fascist regime was increasing in
strength, and when in 1927 Keynes was able to
offer him a lectureship at the University of Cam-
bridge, Sraffa accepted. He emigrated to En-
gland and remained there.
By the time Sraffa arrived in Cambridge, he
had already established himself, at 29, as a
theoretical economist of international standing.
In an article written in Italian (1925), he had
carried out a meticulous criticism, centered on
the question of returns to scale, of Alfred Mar-
shall's theory of the firm, arguing that the only
logically consistent assumption to make in that
theory is that of constant returns to scale. Al-
most simultaneously, in a remarkably concise
article (1926), Sraffa had exposed the glaring
weaknesses of the perfect competition model
that traditional economics until then had gen-
erally used. By stressing the importance of
monopolistic market situations and the consis-
tency of increasing returns to scale with limited
production, when the single firm demand curve
was negatively sloped, he had laid the founda-
tions of an entire branch of new theories of
value and pricing. That branch developed a few
years later, especially with the works of Joan
Robinson (1933) in England and Edward
Chamberlin (1933) in the United States, though
the latter started from quite an independent
line of thought.
In Cambridge, Sraffa was soon a major pro-
tagonist, with Gerald Shove and Dennis Robert-
son, in a famous symposium on increasing re-
turns (1930). Shortly afterwards, he launched
a devastating critique (1932) of the traditional
theory of money and capital as proposed by
Friedrich A. von Hayek (1931). But he also de-
voted time to more leisurely activities. He loved
collecting first editions of rare books, especially
of eighteenth-century economists and philoso-
phers. He did this, sometimes in competition
with, and sometimes jointly with, Keynes. A re-
markable example was their finding and jointly
attributing and editing An Abstract of a Treatise
of Human Nature (1938), a previously un-
known pamphlet by David Hume. Yet this was
no more than a hobby. A much bigger task was
ahead. Cambridge University made it possible
for Sraffa to realize a great ambition: the col-
lection and editing of the Works and Correspon-
dence of David Ricardo (1951-1973), the
classical economist whom Sraffa admired so
SRAFFA, PIERO 737
much. This was a lifelong undertaking. Sraffa
began it in the early 1930s and carried it
through World War n. The accuracy of the
collation of the texts, the richness of the edi-
torial notes, and, most important, the analyses
contained in the prefaces and introductions
have made this work an almost unique master-
piece in economics publications. Sraffa provided
a new reinterpretation of classical economics
and at the same time set a high standard of ex-
cellence in editorial scholarship.
Few people expected anything more from
Sraffa after the publication of Ricardo's works.
But in 1960, at age 62, Sraffa published an ad-
mirably concise 99-page book, on which he had
been working for more than 30 years. The title
was baffling—Production of Commodities by
Means of Commodities: Prelude to a Critique of
Economic Theory—the content was even more
so. In it, Sraffa abandoned the "marginal meth-
od" of analysis, which had characterized estab-
lished economic theory for more than a century,
and went back to the older approach of such
classical economists as Adam Smith and David
Ricardo.
The problem that Sraffa explored in this in-
vestigation concerns the properties of an eco-
nomic system in which there is no change in the
scale of production or in the proportions among
the "factors" of production. Like Frangois Ques-
nay in his Tableau oeconomique (1758), Sraffa
considers the net national product as a "surplus"
over and above what is required to replace the
means of production, and he regards produc-
tion as a "circular process" in which the same
commodities appear both as means of produc-
tion and as final products. This approach may
look very similar to Leontiefs input-output
analysis. But Sraffa goes deeper, by resuming a
more classical line of thought, about the theories
of value and income distribution—which began
with Ricardo and can be traced through Karl
Marx, Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz, and Vladimir
Karpovich Dmitriev. The classical theories had
been abandoned at a certain stage because a few
basic concepts on which they were built seemed
to contain deficiencies and ambiguities. Sraffa's
contribution consists precisely in dispelling
those deficiencies and ambiguities. Three ex-
amples may suffice to illustrate the point:
(1) All classical economists, from Adam
Smith onwards, had made a sharp distinction
between necessary (or wage) goods and luxury
goods. The distinction was important because
it led to radically different conclusions for the
738 SRAFFA, PIERO
two kinds of goods; but it had later to be aban-
doned because it seemed arbitrary. Sraffa shifts
the ground for the distinction back to technol-
ogy, drawing the line between commodities that
are technologically required for the production
of all commodities—"basic" commodities—and
commodities that are not so required—"non
basic" commodities. In these terms, a mathe-
matical notation can be used, and concepts be-
come unambiguous.
(2) Ricardo had considered the distribution
of income as "the principal problem of political
economy" but he had encountered insuperable
difficulties when he tried to investigate income
distribution independently of prices. He realized
that he could overcome these difficulties only if
he found an "invariable standard of value," de-
fined as a commodity whose value does not
change when income distribution changes. But
he never succeeded in finding such a com-
modity. Sraffa demonstrates that an "invariable
standard" can in fact be constructed analytically
in the form of a composite commodity—the
"standard commodity"—that characterizes any
given technique. Interestingly, this "standard
commodity" coincides with the composition of
production in von Neumann's growth model
(1945).
(3) Finally, economists for years debated
whether Marx's problem of the "transformation
of values into prices of production" did or did
not make any sense. Sraria's analysis solves all
the analytical difficulties. A relationship between
quantities of embodied labor (i.e., Marxian
"values") and prices is indeed shown to exist,
but is much more complex than Marx
imagined. It is, in any case, such as to give no
analytical ground for the claim that Marxian
"values" have any logical priority over competi-
tive prices, or, for that matter, that competitive
prices have any logical priority over Marxian
"values."
A puzzling, and perhaps unsatisfactory, fea-
ture of Sraffa's book is that the author ex-
plicitly presents his propositions as preparatory
to a critique of the marginal theory of value and
income distribution; yet he does not himself
carry out such a critique. This has led many
economists, especially in the United States, to
regard Sraffa's analysis as a merely abstract ex-
ercise in pure theory. More recent developments,
however, point in quite different directions. In
the late 1960s, a debate on capital theory, origi-
nating from a few propositions of Sraffa's (see
Pasinetti et al. 1966), led to the discarding of
concepts—for example the aggregate neoclassi-
cal production function—that had for almost a
century formed the basis of the marginal theory
of capital and income distribution. Another de-
bate among Marxists, also originating from
Sraffa's book, has led many of them to the con-
clusion that Marx's pure labor theory of value
must be abandoned (see Morishima 1973; Steed-
man 1977).
It is curious that Sraffa's analysis should
emerge as the basis for a critique and discard-
ing of well-established concepts both in margi-
nal economic theory and in Marxian economic
theory. Yet it is clearly in relation to develop-
ments of this kind that the significance of Sraf-
fa's book will eventually have to be assessed.
LUIGI L. PASINETTI
WORKS BY SRAFFA
1922a The Bank Crisis in Italy. Economic Journal 32:
178-197.
1922& Italian Banking Today. Manchester Guardian
Commercial: Reconstruction in Europe. Edited by
John Maynard Keynes. Section 11, Dec. 7:675-676.
1925 Sulle relazioni fra costo e quantita prodotta.
Annali di economia 2:277-328.
1926 The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Condi-
tions. Economic Journal 36:535—550.
1930 SRAFFA, PIERO et al. Increasing Returns and the
Representative Firm: A Symposium. Economic
Journal 40:79-116.
1932 Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital. Economic
Journal 42:42-53. —» Rejoinder is on pages 249-
251.
(1938) 1965 HUME, DAVID An Abstract of a Treatise
of Human Nature [1740]. Edited and with an intro-
duction by John Maynard Keynes and Piero Sraffa,
Hamden, Conn.: Archon.
1951-1973 SRAFFA, PIERO (editor) Works and Cor-
respondence of David Ricardo. With the collabo-
ration of Maurice H. Dobb. 11 vols. Published for
the Royal Economic Society. Cambridge Univ. Press.
1960 Production of Commodities by Means of Com-
modities: Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory.
Cambridge Univ. Press. —» A paperback edition was
published in 1975.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD H. (1933) 1962 The Theory
of Monopolistic Competition. 8th ed. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A. VON (1931) 1978 Prices and
Production. New York: Kelley.
LEONTIEF, WASSILY (1941) 1951 The Structure of
American Economy, 1919—1939: An Empirical Ap-
plication of Equilibrium Analysis. 2d ed. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press. —» The first edition covered only
the years 1919-1929.
MORISHIMA, MICHIO 1973 Marx's Economics: A Dual
Theory of Value and Growth. Cambridge Univ.
Press. —» A paperback edition was published in 1978.
PASINETTI, LUIGI L. et al. 1966 Paradoxes in Capital
Theory: A Symposium. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 80:503-583.-> Pasinetti wrote the first of
the six articles included in the symposium.

PASINETTI, LUIGI L. 1977 Lectures on the Theory of
Production. Columbia Univ. Press.
QUESNAY, FRANCOIS (1758) 1766 The Oeconomical
Table: An Attempt Towards Ascertaining and Ex-
hibiting the Source, Progress, and Employment of
Riches, With Explanation by the Friend of Mankind,
the Celebrated Marquis de Mirabeau. London:
Owen. —> First published as Tableau oecononiique.
Published also as part of Mirabeau's L'ami des
hommes.
ROBINSON, JOAN (1933) 1969 The Economics of
Imperfect Competition. 2d ed. London: Macmillan.
STEEDMAN, IAN 1977 Marx After Sraffa. London:
New Left Books.
VON NEUMANN, JOHN 1945 A Model of General
Equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies 13:1-9.
STAHL, HENRI H.
Henri H. Stahl was born in Bucharest, Ro-
mania, in 1901. He turned in 1926 to the study
of social science at the University of Bucharest,
after a legal education and a brief career as a
lawyer. The 1920s and most of the 1930s were
a golden, free period in Romanian intellectual
history, a period of continual, lively debate on
the merits of the ideologies contending for power
in Europe. The best of these debates combined
ideology with social theory in an effort to re-
evaluate the nature of Romanian history and to
study the causes of Romania's relatively back-
ward condition. Stahl turned to socialism and to a
Marxist analysis of Romanian social history long
before it became politically expedient to do so.
At the University of Bucharest Stahl's intellec-
tual mentors were the conservative nationalist
historian Nicolae lorga and the moderate reform-
ist, liberal sociologist Dimitrie Gusti. By work-
ing with both of them, Stahl gained a unique per-
spective on Romanian agrarian history. He com-
bined extensive field research in villages that
were still among the least modernized in Europe
with detailed knowledge of documentary sources
in Romanian history. He also joined in contem-
porary ideological debates and in the Gusti
group's formulation of reform programs to help
the peasantry.
Stahl began to teach at the University of Bu-
charest in 1928, and became a full professor in
1939, the year he received his doctorate in so-
ciology. His most important work that led to his
degree was the direction of research teams in the
mountains of the Vrancea, one of the last re-
maining areas of Europe with communal villages
(1940). He also conducted research in villages
whose populations had been subjected to serf-
dom and in villages which had been free, but
STAHL, HENRI H. 739
had adopted institutions of private, rather than
communal property. The comparison of these
different types of rural communities—communi-
ties differing in field shapes, social organization,
and ecological circumstances—led Stahl to a
theoretical reconstruction of Romanian agrarian
history. Buttressing his thesis with documentary
evidence, he concluded that Romania had never
passed through a feudal stage, but had moved
from something akin to egalitarian communal-
ism directly to capitalist exploitation. Capitalism,
however, had turned Romania's peasants into
serfs and had created a backward, stagnant rural
economy.
Independently, Stahl developed a method of
historical research similar to the one that Marc
Bloch pioneered in France during the interwar
years. It involved "reading history backward,"
starting from the physical, cultural, and social
evidence of the present. This was the first time
that such a perspective had been used in Ro-
mania, and it cast into doubt all that had pre-
viously been written about Romania's supposedly
"feudal" past. In 1947 Stahl summarized some
of these findings in "The Sociology of the Ro-
manian Communal Village."
In 1948 the Romanian Communist party out-
lawed sociology as a "bourgeois science." Stahl
lost his position as well as the right to publish.
He was, however, allowed to continue his work
on documentary sources. In 1958 permission
was granted for publication of the first volume
of his great work, "Contributions to the Study of
Romanian Communal Villages." The second vol-
ume was published in 1959, but its ideas—es-
pecially the theory that there had been no "slave"
or even "feudal" modes of production in Romania
prior to capitalism—were considered unortho-
dox because they challenged the orderly, dog-
matic interpretation of history that was practiced
in the Communist world. The third volume was
not published until 1965.
These works, together with dozens of accom-
panying articles and conference papers, consti-
tute one of Europe's foremost empirical studies
on prefeudal and prestate modes of production.
They also explain in great detail the changes that
occur when such modes come into contact with
capitalism. In demonstrating the limitations of
the standard interpretation of feudalism, Stahl
also proposed conclusions that may be useful in
analyzing other eastern European and many
Third World societies. If these conclusions oc-
casionally caused him trouble with the authori-
ties, they also enabled him to make a lasting,
 740 STAHL, HENRI H.
original contribution to Marxist historiography
(for an example of the importance of these
topics, see especially Hobsbawm's introduction to
the 1965 translation of part of Marx 1857-
1858).
In 1969 Stahl expanded his arguments in
"Controversies of Romanian History." In a series
of essays he discussed the agrarian history of
"Old Romania" (Wallachia & Moldavia) and
compared it with that of Transylvania, which,
under Hungarian rule, followed a more Western
type of evolution. In 1972 he published "Studies
in Historical Sociology" which confronted the
problem of the Asiatic mode of production. He
concluded that the concept was useful, but had
to be modified for the Romanian case. Trade and
tribute, not irrigation and despotism, were its
main ingredients, and underneath the superficial
state structures of thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century Romania, villages remained largely pas-
toral, free, and communal.
After 1948 it proved impossible for Stahl to
continue his social activism in villages, but with
the ideological relaxation which began in the
early 1960s, sociology was rehabilitated and
Stahl's professorial chair was restored to him
in 1966. He now set out to train a whole new
generation of practically oriented sociologists,
showing his students how to pose worthwhile
questions, introducing them to classical socio-
logical theory, and teaching some of them how
to write. The two most important works pro-
duced by these efforts were volumes that he
coauthored with his students to train them in
field work techniques. "Two Villages" (1970)
written with Mihail Cernea and Gh. Chepes,
compared a collective farm that worked well
with one that did not. While the authors were
unable to explain why this was the case, the book
provided a great deal of information and data
about collective farms. The second work, edited
with Miron Constantinescu, detailed the
spectacular growth of a typical new industrial
city in Romania (1970) and analyzed some of
the special problems and benefits of this kind
of mushrooming growth. In order to help his
teaching, Stahl then wrote a text on methods of
social research (1974-1975).
In his long career Stahl taught and deeply in-
fluenced several generations of social science
students. Some, like Miron Constantinescu, be-
came high Communist party officials. Others,
like Mattei Dogan, fled to the West and became
distinguished sociologists. In Romania itself, the
best post-1948 work in sociology (Cernea 1974)
acknowledges a great debt to Stahl. Even abroad,
in France and the United States (e.g., Chirot
1976) Stahl's work and teaching have influenced
social historians. Some of his students who sur-
vive in Romania continue to write, study, and
maintain the tradition of distinguished sociologi-
cal and historical research that he created. Un-
fortunately, the cosmopolitan, free intellectual
environment of which Stahl was a product has
ceased to exist in Romania. To its own loss Ro-
mania no longer tolerates Stahl's kind of open
inquiry, which was so fruitful in the domain of
social history, and which might have proved
equally useful in solving pressing contemporary
problems.
DANIEL CHIROT
WORKS BY STAHL
1940 Nerej: Un village d'une region archaique. 3 vols.
Bucharest: Institut de Sciences Sociales de Rou-
manie.
1947 Sociologia satului devalma$ romdnesc (The So-
ciology of the Romanian Communal Village). Bu-
charest: Editura Institutului Social Roman.
1958-1965 Contributii la studiul satelor devalma§e ro-
mdnesti (Contributions to the Study of Romanian
Communal Villages). 3 vols. Bucharest: Editura
Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania. —> A sum-
mary of these volumes, under the title Les ancien-
nes communautes villageoises roumaines: Asservis-
sement et penetration capitaliste, was published in
Paris in 1969 by the Centre National de la Recher-
che Scientifique. The French work was translated
into Italian in 1976.
1969 Controverse de istorie sociala romdneasca (Con-
troversies of Romanian History). Bucharest: Editura
Stiintifica.
1970 STAHL, HENRI H.; CERNEA, MIHAIL; and CHEPES,
GH. Doua sate: Structuri sociale si progres technic
(Two Villages: Social Structures and Technical
Progress). Bucharest: Editura Politica.
1970 STAHL, HENRI H.; and CONSTANTINESCU, MIRON
(editors) Procesul de urbanizare in R. S. Romania,
zona Slatina-Olt (The Process of Urbanization in
the Socialist Republic of Romania: The Slatina-Olt
Area). Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii
Socialiste Romania.
1972 Studii de sociologie istorica (Studies in Historical
Sociology) Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica.
1974—1975 Teoria §i practica investigafiilor sociale
(The Theory and Practice of Social Investigations).
2 vols. Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica. —> Volume 1
is subtitled Metode $i tehnici (Methods and Tech-
niques). Volume 2 is subtitled Cercetdrile interdisci-
plinare zonale (Interdisciplinary Area Research).
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
CERNEA, MIHAIL 1974 Sociologia Cooperativei Agri-
cole (The Sociology of Agricultural Cooperatives).
Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste
Romania.
CHIROT, DANIEL 1976 Social Change in a Peripheral
Society: The Creation of a Balkan Colony. New
York: Academic Press.

MARX, KARL (1857-1858)1953 Grundrisse der Kritik
der politischen Okonomie. Berlin: Dietz. —> Written
in 1857-1858; first published posthumously by the
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, in 1939-1941.
A partial English translation, with an introduction
by Eric J. Hobsbawm, was published in 1965 as
Pre-capitalist Economic Formations by International
Publishers.
STEPHEN, JAMES F.
James Fitzjames Stephen (1829-1894) was
an unusual man who came from an unusual
family. His father, James Stephen, was an
earnest evangelical. He belonged to that circle
of influential men and women, known as the
Clapham Sect, who rallied behind William Wil-
berforce, Zachary Macaulay, and Henry Thorn-
ton, and generated that remarkable movement
for the moral reform of the nation based on
religious revival. Evangelism indeed permeated
the whole family background. As under-secre-
tary of state for the colonies, when he "literally
ruled the colonial empire" for many years,
James Stephen earned the nicknames of "King
Stephen" and "Mr. Over-Secretary Stephen." He
had joined the department, however, chiefly in
a zealous effort to hasten the final abolition of
slavery. His grandfather, James Stephen, was
master in chancery and an influential member
of Parliament.
But, all-pervading and consistent as these
domestic influences undoubtedly were, they did
not operate on a submissive or an impression-
able nature. James Fitzjames Stephen came of a
temerarious Aberdonian stock. His great-great-
grandfather, James Stephen, had dealt a good
deal in contraband importations. And his great-
grandfather had found the King's Bench prison,
where he was detained as a bankrupt, a rather
weak position from which to denounce the sys-
tem of imprisonment for debt. When all his
efforts to gain justice failed, he excited such a
riot in the prison that the army had to be called
in to restore order. From these forbears, James
Fitzjames Stephen inherited a sturdy indepen-
dence, a resolute energy, an urge to go his own
way regardless of obstacles, a disposition to
form opinions according to his tested standards
of right and wrong, and an individualistic and
searching mind; there was something of the
expert wrestler in his intellectual tenacity. His
father had married a daughter of John Venn,
rector of Clapham, who could trace his descent
through a long line of clerical ancestors to the
time of Elizabeth i and was one of the original
founders of the Church Missionary Society, a
STEPHEN, JAMES F. 741
characteristic product of the evangelical revival.
Leslie Stephen, the inventor of the Dictionary of
National Biography, was his brother and Vir-
ginia Woolf was his niece. He belonged to what
Noel G. Annan so aptly described as the "intel-
lectual aristocracy."
Not unexpectedly, he was sent to Eton, but he
was far from being a typical Etonian. "Public
schools," Courtenay Ilbert has remarked, "are
said to be useful in rubbing off angles," but "Ste-
phen's angles were not of the kind that rub off."
After a period at King's College, Oxford, where
he found life more congenial, he came up to Trin-
ity College, Cambridge, in 1847. Here again he
followed his own bent. He plunged at once into
the intellectual life of Cambridge and enjoyed
it to the full. His incessant search for truth im-
pressed his contemporaries and he was long
remembered as one of the company of "Apos-
tles," and in the Union debates was often the
formidable opponent of William Harcourt, the
future Liberal statesman and home secretary.
He was regarded as belonging to the outspoken
Johnsonian genus and his friends knew him as
the "British Lion." Yet in terms of conventional
academic progress he was a failure; he was
twice disappointed in attempts to gain a schol-
arship at Trinity, and in the May term of 1851
he went out in the "poll," in other words, with-
out taking honors.
An academic life was closed to him; there
remained the Church, the bar, or the medical
profession. He entered at the Inner Temple and
was called to the bar in January 1854. He then
read for a law degree in the University of Lon-
don, and not only completed the course but also
gained his only academic prize, a scholarship.
He joined the Midland Circuit. The only two
marks of distinction that fell to him during this
period were the recordership of Newark in
1859 and the taking of silk in 1868.
In 1868, his life acquired a more concen-
trated and meaningful purpose. Henry Maine
suggested that he might be appointed legal
member of the governor-general's council in
India. India had for long captivated Stephen's
imagination. When he was a boy, Thomas Mac-
aulay's Essays had been his favorite book and he
almost knew by heart those on Clive and Warren
Hastings. The conquest of India fitted naturally
into his conception of the destiny of the English
which, to quote his own words, "has girdled the
world with its empire, which rules those who
submit, and strikes down those who resist, with
more than Roman force and Roman justice."
742 STEPHEN, JAMES F.
The spread of the English legal system and of its
mode of administration was to him not only an
indispensable concomitant of the British rule
but a principal means in its civilizing mission.
He served the British Empire and regarded him-
self as one of its rulers. He served it in a field
that was particularly congenial to him and to
his temperament. He shaped the laws which
were to control the destiny of the Indian people.
He was very good at it; maybe not as good as
his illustrious predecessor, Lord Macaulay, but
good enough to leave a distinctive mark. The
influence of Jeremy Bentham on his work there
was unmistakable.
In 1873, a year after he returned home, he
stood for Dundee as a Liberal candidate in sup-
port of William Gladstone's government; never-
theless, later, Benjamin Disraeli thought of him
as a leader of the Conservative party. And Dis-
raeli was right in his assessment of his real
political convictions, though he was wrong in
thinking that he had the qualifications for a
political career. In 1879, after twenty years of
slow progress at the bar, he was suddenly pro-
moted to a high and coveted position; he was
appointed judge of the Queen's Bench Division.
For his initial session he presided at the Old
Bailey, the very court at which 25 years
earlier he had held his first brief; a man accused
of matricide was on trial for his life, and Ste-
phen sentenced him to death. On the bench his
portly figure, tall and solidly built, must have
filled impressively the judicial robes. An air of
critical deliberation was natural to his large,
rather stern, features, the eyes narrowed by the
constant exercises of probing things, the nose
betokening a rational masculinity of character,
the mouth set in determined lines and framed
to pronounce judgments, the massive chin
evincing the willed fulfillment of purpose that
had given the man his power.
During this period, from 1879 to 1891, his
capacity for achievement surpassed itself. After
his busy and exacting duties in court—and many
of the trials must have taxed him severely—he
turned for recreation to be an author, a pub-
licist, a member of commissions of inquiry, a
codifier. Honorific recognition came his way and
he enjoyed it with an unconcealed and fresh
pleasure such as sometimes gives a surprising
air of youth to those who toil hard and unremit-
tingly. He was made an honorary fellow of
Trinity College, an honorary doctor of laws of
the universities of Oxford and Edinburgh, a cor-
responding member of the Institut de France,
an honorary member of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, and a Knight Commander
of the Star of India.
In 1887, his mental health seemed to be
breaking down. This was made apparent during
the trial of I. Lipski, charged with murder and
whom he sentenced to death, and two years
later, much more conspicuously, when he was
a judge in a cause celebre, that of Mrs. Florence
Maybrick, an American by birth, accused of
murdering her English husband by poisoning.
A few months later, when Stephen was at as-
sizes at Exeter, he was striken by yet another
similar attack. Questions began to be asked in
parliament about a "certain judge of the queen's
Bench Division" and comments became current
in legal circles. Public anxiety was expressed in
an article in The (London) Times, couched in
grave and outspoken terms. Stephen at once
took advice and tendered his resignation.
It must be a terrible experience for a once
powerful man to become aware that his mental
faculties are disintegrating. Stephen was spared
this terrible awareness. He was also spared ser-
ious suffering and he died peacefully three
years later. "I am surprised," he wrote towards
the close of his life,
to find that, when I look back to that happiest and
most blessed of days through the haze of upwards
of thirty-two years, I do not feel in the least degree
disposed to be pathetic over the lapse of life or
the near approach of old age. I have found life
sweet, bright, glorious. I should dearly like to live
again; but I am not afraid, and I hope, when the
time comes, I shall not be averse, to die.
When the end came, he was only on the
threshold of old age, yet the sweetness and
brightness had gone out of life.
Stephen's permanent contribution related to
the criminal law, and his history of it stands
out as a monument. The History (1883) suffers
from certain limitations, but what he did must
evoke our unqualified admiration, and it strikes
one as ungracious and unfair to pick holes in a
unique work of this magnitude. He was the first
to interpret the present state of the criminal law
by an examination of its antecedents and to
blend the historical and the expository mode of
analysis; the first to turn his back upon the
amorphous and disjointed structure of all the
current textbooks in which case was heaped
upon case and statute upon statute, leaving the
reader confused and bored. His statements are
always lucid, succinct, and almost invariably

correct; and many passages of the History are
brilliant. He could vividly communicate the maj-
esty and pathos of a judicial process in which is
wielded the power to affix guilt or rescue in-
nocence when failings of human nature have
led to crime, when tensions in society have
jeopardized its peace, or when the vital interests
of the state hang in the balance. He also re-
garded the history of punishments as "part of
the history of the criminal law," and indeed per-
haps "the most curious" part. He would be the
first to raise his voice in dissent from those who
even at the present day class such a treatment
of criminal law as pure social history; as though
a determination of the essence of an object can
be reached by the simple dissection of its com-
ponent parts, without a study of its growth. The
History was saluted with respect by the learned
of all nations, for it silenced at last the reproach
against England for not possessing a key to the
understanding of its criminal law. His labors
have borne ample fruit.
His magnum opus was supplemented or ac-
companied by a number of other publications,
especially his renowned Digests: it was reflected
in several leading judgments of his which
earned him the title "great master of criminal
law"; and last but not least, it was enriched by
his remarkable tour de force, the attempt to
codify the criminal law of England. The Ben-
thamite idea of codification nearly triumphed
through his efforts, and although the code was
ultimately thrown out, it exercised a tangible
influence on penal legislation in several parts of
the English speaking world.
His penal doctrine was monolithic; one might
even be inclined to say, merciless. He has raised
the hatred of criminals to the level of a peno-
logical principle. He expressed it in a forceful
and clear cut way, and no survey of penal
thought during the Victorian period can be com-
plete without giving a prominent place to his
views. But with all his conservative bent, he also
made many proposals for the amendment of the
criminal law and firmly upheld the liberal char-
acter of the English laws of evidence, and of the
presumption of innocence.
The Victorian period was, in the main, stable;
but subtle changes were taking place in moral
attitudes, in religious beliefs, and in the social
and political structure of society; and Stephen,
acutely aware of them all, came forward as an
umpire, often as a contestant, in many of the
great controversies of his time. He certainly did
not possess the intellectual and creative power
STEPHEN, JAMES F. 743
of John Stuart Mill, the dramatic, almost super-
human, pathos and literary genius of Thomas
Carlyle, the sensitive and civilized mind of
Matthew Arnold, the profound originality of
Henry Maine, or the massive learning of Wil-
liam Lecky. He is far from deserving a place
among the greatest of the Victorian writers, but
he was in many ways a very remarkable prophet
and a singular critic and interpreter whom no
student of the trends of thought and phases of
opinion then prevailing or germinating can
afford to ignore.
There was a puritan side to Stephen; and his
puritanism derived viability from an almost
physiologically reasoned acceptance of the sur-
vival of the fittest. He was convinced of the
damned unworthiness of mankind and of their
incurable apathy towards salvation. He was a
preacher of the inevitability of pain and sorrow,
our everlasting companions from the cradle to
the grave, and of the individual insignificance
of human life, especially when conceived, felt,
and assessed in terms of a pleasurable experi-
ence. That he preferred William Thackeray to
Charles Dickens was not remarkable, just a mat-
ter of individual taste in literature; but his tirade
against Dickens' novels and their political and
social implications reads like the indictment of
a man guilty of sedition.
His book, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1873b),
which first appeared in installments in the Ga-
zette, was intended as a reply to Mill's lofty and
moving essay On Liberty. Written hastily, it dis-
plays several of the defects usually associated
with polemical writings. Nevertheless, the perma-
nency of its merits is incontestable. It is de-
scribed by Ernest Barker as the "finest exposi-
tion of conservative thought in the latter half
of the nineteenth century," and it is listed by
Hugh Cecil among the 13 works "instructive
in the study of Conservative principles." But
it goes beyond a statement of political align-
ments and ideologies. It is a contribution of
lasting value to English political thought, and,
to quote Lord Annan, though "a now neglected
book," it deserves to be re-read; for it is in some
ways even more topical today than when it first
appeared.
Like Maine and Lecky, Stephen was one of
the most mordant and persistent critics of de-
mocracy. Utilitarianism in his time was the
R.adical doctrine; and Stephen was strongly in-
clined to these views, yet so as to stop short of
full allegiance. The utilitarians' empirical method
of examining problems affecting the individual
744 STEWARD, JULIAN H.
and society, each on its own merits and accord-
ing to the criteria of pain and pleasure and the
principle of the greatest possible happiness of
the greatest number, appealed to his case-
trained mind, distrustful of generalizations. He
also acknowledged the fertile contribution which
they made to political thought, to political econ-
omy, and to criminal and civil jurisprudence.
But in the formulation of his own opinions in
any of these fields, though he was ready enough
to apply their tests, yet more often than not
they led him to conclusions which were much
more akin to the tenets of Thomas Hobbes, Ed-
mund Burke, or Thomas Carlyle than to those
maintained by Jeremy Bentham and the two
Mills. He was a realist and worked from a set of
factors, largely immutable, which he recognized
as deeply engrained in human nature, regulat-
ing social life, moulding the condition of a na-
tion and determining the fate of mankind. Even
Jeremy Bentham, for whom he had an un-
bounded admiration, was criticized by him for
his lack of historical sense, for his disregard of
the fact that the past contains a permanent
legacy which the present cannot repudiate but
must honor and, while modifying it to a certain
extent, should not fail to transmit to posterity.
LEON RADZINOWICZ
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The number of unsigned articles written by Stephen
is enormous. As many as 250 articles contributed to 10
leading periodicals are listed in Radzinowicz 1957,
pp. 56-62. References about Stephen's work are ibid.,
pp. 54-56.
WORKS BY STEPHEN
1850 Choice of One of the Three Learned Professions,
Law, Physic and Divinity. Unpublished manuscript.
—» Available at University Library, Cambridge.
1862a Essays by a Barrister. London: Smith. —> Con-
tains reprints of 33 articles contributed to the Sat-
urday Review.
1862b The Nature of Belief. Unpublished manuscript.
—» Available at University Library, Cambridge.
(1863) 1890 A General View of the Criminal Law of
England. 2d ed. London and New York: Macmillan.
1866 The Definition of Murder Considered in Rela-
tion to the Report of the Capital Punishment Com-
missioners. London: Longmans, Green.
1868 STEPHEN, JAMES F. (editor), H. Roscoe's Digest
of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases. 7th ed.
London. —» Stephen was not the editor of the first
six editions.
1873a The Law of Evidence: A Speech, etc. London.
(1873b) 1874 Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. 2d ed.
London: SmithSv
1875 Statement W His Religious Opinions in an Un-
finished Letter to His Children. Unpublished manu-
script. —» Available at University Library, Cam-
bridge.
(1876) 1893 A Digest of the Law of Evidence. 4th ed.
London: Macmillan.
(1877) 1887 A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes
and Punishments). 4th ed. London: Macmillan.
1883 A History of the Criminal Law of England.
3 vols. London: Macmillan.
1883 STEPHEN, JAMES F.; and STEPHEN, HERBERT
A Digest of the Law of Criminal Procedure in In-
dictable Offences. London: Macmillan.
1884 Autobiographic Fragment. Unpublished manu-
script. —> Available at University Library, Cam-
bridge.
1892 Horae Sabbaticae. 3 vols. London: Macmillan.
—» Contains reprints of 55 articles contributed to
the Saturday Review.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ANNAN, NOEL GILROY (1951) 1952 Leslie Stephen.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
BIRKENHEAD, FREDERICK 1926 Fourteen English Judges.
London: Cassell. —•» For Stephen, see page 299.
COLAIACO, JAMES 1976 James Fitzjames Stephen:
The Great Dissenter. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
Univ. —> Completed under the direction of Jacques
Barzun.
LIPPINCOTT, BENJAMIN EVANS 1938 Victorian Critics
of Democracy. Oxford Univ. Press; Minneapolis:
Univ. of Minnesota Press.
MAITLAND, F. W. 1906 The Life and Letters of Leslie
Stephen. London: Duckworth; New York: Putnam.
RADZINOWICZ, LEON 1957 Sir James Fitzjames Ste-
phen. London: Quaritch. —> The Selden Society
lecture.
RYAN, B.; and HAVERS, M. 1977 The Poisoned Life
of Mrs. Maybrick. London: Kimber.
STEWARD, JULIAN H.
Julian Haynes Steward (1902-1972), a lead-
ing theorist in cultural anthropology, was the
founder of the method of cultural ecology, a
key figure in the neoevolutionist approach to
cultural change, a pioneer in area studies, and
an influential student of the social transforma-
tion of peasant populations. In keeping with
these interests, his work was broad and syn-
thetic, embodying a search for a general theory
of culture. The method and direction of inquiry
that he established has remained alive and fruit-
ful to the present day.
Steward's vocation for anthropology began
when, at the age of 16, he left his native Wash-
ington, D.C., to attend a private school in Owens
Valley, California. There he first met the north-
ern Paiute and Shoshoni Indians among whom
he would later do research. After a year as an un-
dergraduate at the University of California at
Berkeley, he went to Cornell University, where
he majored in zoology and geology—a concentra-
tion that formed the background for the natural-
istic positivism of his subsequent work. He re-
turned to Berkeley for graduate work in anthro-
pology under Alfred L. Kroeber and Robert H.
Lowie, both students of Franz Boas and tower-

ing figures in the anthropology of the first half
of the twentieth century. He received his PH.D.
in 1929 on the basis of library research on the
clown theme in North American Indian cere-
monialism.
Berkeley's anthropology department during
the 1920s was small but its orientation diffuse,
and some of Steward's earliest work was in ar-
cheology. He took this interest to the University
of Michigan, where from 1928 to 1930 he
founded anthropological instruction, and he con-
tinued it in earnest during his subsequent stay
at the University of Utah. His archeological re-
search in northern Utah opened the field of Great
Basin prehistory, but his most important work
was carried out in the southern part of the state,
on the northern fringes of extinct Pueblo cul-
tures. Using archeological, historical, and ethno-
graphic materials, Steward traced the develop-
ment of Pueblo social structure from its begin-
nings in hunting and collecting horizons through
early agriculture up to the full development of
classical Pueblo society. His approach was evo-
lutionary, for it stressed the orderly emergence
of institutions, but it also brought a functional-
ist perspective to archeology. In this respect, he
can be credited with having made the study of
prehistory a social science.
Steward left Utah to teach at Berkeley in
1933/1934, and spent the following year in eth-
nographic research among the western Shoshoni
of Nevada and Utah. The Shoshoni research pro-
duced the theory of cultural ecology, probably
Steward's most important contribution to the
social sciences and the cornerstone of his later
thought. The theory of cultural ecology is an at-
tempt to explain social systems in terms of their
accommodations to environmental and techno-
logical circumstances. It states simply that when
a group of people bring a certain kind of tech-
nology to bear upon certain natural resources,
then characteristic patterns of labor will emerge.
This organization of work will, in turn, have a
pronounced determining effect on other modes
of social alignment; in this way, the material
conditions of life have a causal relationship to
the rest of culture.
The theory of cultural ecology was a product
of Steward's training, the history of the time,
and the study of the Shoshoni. Steward's concern
with the environment followed the interests of
Kroeber, and the stress on kinship and social
organization was consistent with Lowie's orien-
tation. His emphasis on economic and techno-
logical determinants of culture went far beyond
STEWARD, JULIAN H. 745
his mentors, however, and reflected more the
intellectual climate of the depression period. His
environmental focus was influenced largely by
the nature of Shoshoni society, which from
aboriginal times had been characterized by a
simple technology, a harsh environment, and
bare survival. Steward's classic monograph,
Basin-Plateau Aboriginal Sociopolitical Groups
(1938), demonstrated that thinly dispersed re-
sources, unstable food yields, and a meager tech-
nology produced a fragmented organization of
work and small, migratory bands of shifting
membership among the Shoshoni. The result was
a society in which the only stable and continuing
social unit was the conjugal family and in which
there were neither political offices nor larger
corporate groups. That the Shoshoni experienced
severe ecological constraints did not, however,
result in a position of simple environmental de-
terminism, for Steward cautioned that in more
complex societies the impact of nature would be
less pronounced.
In 1935 Steward moved to Washington where
he spent the next 11 years in research and ad-
ministration with the U.S. Bureau of American
Ethnology and the Smithsonian Institution.
There, Steward edited and contributed articles to
the seven-volume Handbook of South American
Indians (1946-1959), a work that set the stage
for much subsequent ethnographic research in
South America. His interests then branched from
the Indian population of the continent to modern
Latin American cultures, and he became instru-
mental in initiating and promoting community
and regional studies. Many scholars shifting
from one research area to another simply keep
each topic separate and compartmentalized.
Steward, however, always sought to expand his
framework of inquiry, synthesizing new topics
with older theories. His attempt to integrate the
study of the modern nation with his earlier work
resulted in his Area Research: Theory and Prac-
tice (1950), which issued a call, and produced
a design, for interdisciplinary area research; the
volume was a major impetus for the establish-
ment of area institutes during the next two
decades.
Steward's new interest in complex societies
led him to a theory of cultural evolution that
had two sources. The first, delineated in his
book on area research, saw hierarchies of social
complexity, or levels of sociocultural integration,
to be emergent with the development of human
society. Thus, the Shoshoni are at a family level
of integration, whereas the family in complex
746 STRAUSS, LEO
societies is imbedded h communities which, in
turn, are parts of natioi-states. The other source
of Steward's evolutionsm came from the theo-
ries of Karl A. Wittfcgel and the evidence of
archeology. Adopting the view that irrigation
agriculture is conduct to the growth of social
stratification and ceitralized social control,
Steward demonstrated that climatic aridity and
irrigation were associited in a causal manner
with the rise of the stite in a half dozen areas
of the New and Old Worlds. The idea that aridity
encouraged the develojment of irrigation which,
in turn, required collective labor and centralized,
coercive authority for ts construction and main-
tenance, fit closely wih the cultural ecological
method. It produced an evolutionary theory,
however, which applid to limited locales and
societies. Social change and development could
take a number of different directions, depend-
ing on setting and history, and for this reason
Steward referred to Us theory as "multilinear
evolution."
In 1946 Steward le:t government service for
a professorship at Coumbia University, where
he remained until 1922. He guided the work of
a large number of gnduate students, some of
whom did doctoral 'esearch as members of
Steward's Puerto Ricin project. The Steward
group divided the island into subareas charac-
terized by types of economic activity, each re-
searcher producing a community study within
his district; the totality of the studies yielded a
composite portrait of .\ierto Rican culture in its
ecological dimension) and in historic depth
(Steward et al. 1955). Steward pursued the
study of complex socety as research professor
at the University of Ilinois in Urbana, where he
remained until his death in 1972. During the
late 1950s, he undertok a massive cross-cultural
study of the modernization of traditional peasant
societies in which 11 mthropologists carried out
studies on 4 continent;. In his introduction to the
three-volume projec report, Contemporary
Change in Traditiond Societies (1967), Stew-
ard outlined reguhrly recurrent processes
wherein peasant farrrers are drawn increasingly
into world markets aid become alienated from
their lands and neighbors, a trend that has since
become even more evdent.
Some of Steward's nost important theoretical
and methodological vorks were in the form of
scholarly articles, which have been anthologized
in two volumes: Theory of Culture Change
(1955) and Evolutioi and Ecology.- Essays on
Social Trans formatioi (1977). All of them, with
his book-length products, are oriented to the
consistent theme that the trinity of technique,
habitat, and work form a nexus upon which
societies are molded and their histories influ-
enced. Steward saw anthropology as a science on
an equal footing with the natural sciences, shar-
ing a common assumption that there are under-
lying forms of order and that we live in a deter-
mined and determinate universe. He saw in an-
thropology's comparative method and in its his-
toricism the conceptual tools for probing the
human aspect of this universe.
ROBERT F. MURPHY
WORKS BY STEWARD
1938 Basin-Plateau Aboriginal Sociopolitical Groups.
U.S. Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin No.
120. Washington: Government Printing Office. —»
A paperback edition was published by the University
of Utah Press in 1970.
(1946-1959) 1963 STEWARD, JULIAN H. (editor) Hand-
book of South American Indians. 7 vols. New York:
Cooper Square.
1950 Area Research: Theory and Practice. Social Sci-
ence Research Council, Bulletin No. 63. New York:
The Council.
1955 Theory of Culture Change: The Methodology of
Multilinear Evolution. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois
Press. —» A paperback edition was published in
. 1972.
1956 STEWARD, JULIAN H. et al. The People of Puerto
Rico: A Study in Social Anthropology. Urbana:
Univ. of Illinois Press.
1959 STEWARD, JULIAN H.; and FARON, Louis C. Na-
tive Peoples of South America. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
1967 STEWARD, JULIAN H. (editor) Contemporary
Change in Traditional Societies. 3 vols. Urbana:
Univ. of Illinois Press.
1968 Ecology: II. Cultural Ecology. Volume 4, pages
337-344 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1973 Alfred Kroeber. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
1977 Evolution and Ecology: Essays on Social Trans-
formation. Edited by Jane C. Steward and Robert F.
Murphy. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. —> In-
cludes an introduction by Robert F. Murphy.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
HARRIS, MARVIN 1968 The Rise of Anthropological
Theory: A History of Theories of Culture. New York:
Crowell.
MANNERS, ROBERT (editor) 1964 Process and Pattern
in Culture: Essays in Honor of Julian H. Steward.
Chicago: Aldine.
STRAUSS, LEO
Leo Strauss (1899-1973) was born in Kirch-
hain (Hesse), Germany. In 1921 he received his
PH.D. from the University of Hamburg for a
dissertation, sponsored by Ernst Cassirer, on the

epistemology of F. H. Jacob!. His studies had
been in philosophy, mathematics, and natural
science, with little if any academic attention to
the social sciences. He left Germany in the early
1930s, residing briefly in France and then in
England before emigrating to the United States.
He taught in the graduate faculty of the New
School for Social Research in New York until
1949, when he left to join the political science
department of the University of Chicago. After
retiring from Chicago in 1967, he taught first at
Claremont Men's College in California and then,
until his death, at St. John's College, Annapolis.
Strauss is best known to social science as a
critic of what he identified as its decisive in-
gredients or premises: a historicism that implied
progress without a fixed frame of reference by
which to recognize progress; and a scientism
that lost contact with its phenomena, pro-
claimed itself normless, and fell into a dilemma
of skepticism and dogmatism. Out of this me-
lange, he argued, grew both an incapacity for
perceiving the fundamental issues and a convic-
tion that they had all been disposed of. In-
evitably, Strauss was controversial.
Strauss was not in the mainstream of aca-
demic social science practice, and he arrived at
his conceptions of, and his reservations about,
social science from without. Whether his de-
tachment vitiated or fortified his judgments can
be argued, but it is clear from his criticisms that
he understood social science to have drawn its
most important premises from sources outside
itself but well within the theoretical regions in
which he moved with assurance. A case in point
is the appeal of social science to history as both
a principle of explanation or causation and a
species of surrogate for moral norms. The belief
that the work of a thinker or artist cannot be
understood except as a product of his times,
like the view that standards of judgment and
of morality are inseparable from their historical
circumstances, presupposes a certain priority of
change over permanence. This presupposition
was not shared by Strauss, who had learned
from theology to take eternity seriously and from
classical philosophy the insight that led it to
refer the changing to the unchanging for veri-
fication. His acknowledgment of this ancient
understanding guided his judgment of histori-
cism at the same time that it illustrated and
thus confirmed his conviction that progressivist
historicism must be, qua complacent about
the past, mistaken, while, qua diffident before
the future, merely hypothetical.
STRAUSS, LEO 747
Just as the historicism of social science bore
the impress of philosophy of history, so did the
positivism and relativism that Strauss criti-
cized in social science draw upon modern nat-
ural science for its conception of nature. The
adoption of that antiteleological view of nature
had prepared the way for the self-distinction of
science from philosophy, the former the domain
of facts and the latter of values. In its client or
derivative relation to science, social science was
seeking to develop a value-free knowledge of
individual and social man, a project that Strauss
criticized before generations of students as be-
ing both impracticable and harmful. It is im-
practicable, he maintained, because there is no
way to pronounce on human affairs, except on
a level of banality or technicality, without intro-
ducing what are called judgments of value. It is
also harmful to attempt to do so, because the
attempt itself induces an inability or unwilling-
ness to recognize the wicked and the noble as
they are bound to emerge in human action.
Generally thought of as a political conservative,
he feared for a liberalism that he saw as
threatened with confusion by its own theory at
a time when its survival demanded a capacity to
call good and bad by their names and to act
accordingly with conviction. The "scientific" dis-
paragement of questions as being metaphysical
or meaningless cannot effectually expel them
from human concern or prevent them from
arising out of the human condition, he argued,
nor does the distinction of facts and values
necessarily lead to the consignment of the moral
issues to regions of arbitrary choice or insipid
vagueness. Strauss believed classical political
philosophy to be in itself a demonstration that
social science was mistaken in this point.
The criticism of social science, though one of
the most noticed of Strauss's activities, was not
the major part of his work. Of his earliest writ-
ings, some half-dozen articles of the early 1920s,
most were on the Jewish themes of Zionism
and the problems of the Diaspora. In this con-
text, his mind was led simultaneously to religion
and politics—the nature of each and their mutual
relation. The position of dispersed Jewry sharp-
ened the question of how a people could exist
without a political life and whether they could
exist well with only a political life. The issue
was complicated in this context by the fact that
the people in question had perhaps had the
alternative of remaining constituted by a re-
vealed law attached to no earthly location and
being a political body constituted by positive
748 STRAUSS, LEO
and artificial law. Whether the alternative was
effectual depended on whether the civil emanci-
pation of Jews could lead to their acceptance
and assimilation, and whether it might not lead
to their ultimate absorption, more or less in
spite of themselves. The question whether ab-
sorption should be welcomed or resisted at-
tached itself urgently to the question of the
status of revelation; for if revelation is what it
declares itself to be, then assimilation should be
resisted—unless revelation can somehow be in-
terpreted to demand the reunion of all mankind
through the supersession of each particular
faith as merely sectarian. But if revelation is
what it declares itself to be—namely, an emana-
tion from a supreme source that must be forever
mysterious to human reason wherever it has not
disclosed itself—then the claims of reason and
the pretensions of philosophy are decisively
limited. By an uninterrupted course of reflec-
tion, Strauss moved from the problems of a
Jewish existence, which was his primary experi-
ence, to the question of the standing of reason
or philosophy, which was his abiding preoccupa-
tion. He approached similar issues by a collateral
route that he sketched in a note, published in
1923, entitled "Das Heilige," a comment on
Rudolf Otto's book of the same name. Beginning
again with the absolute transcendence or un-
knowability of God, he emphasized the location
of that "irrational" not in the human subject's
religious, psychological, or sociological experi-
ences or conditioning but in the object itself;
and he distinguished an older theology (of
divine attributes, or of the object) from a newer
theology (of man and his experiences, or of the
subject) in a way that did not quite parallel,
but did to some extent employ, the distinction of
ancient and modern thought. Very early in his
career Strauss conceived his reservations against
subjectivism, against an unquestioned faith in
modernity, and against a rationalism or scien-
tism that was lax about establishing its own
foundations or inexact in its self-understanding.
Perhaps it is fair to say that the underlying ques-
tion throughout is the relation of the rational
and the irrational—whether they are necessarily
mutually invulnerable and hence not subject to
a ranking based on the suppositions of either;
and whether philosophy constitutes, or points
to, a clear victory for the unassisted human
reason.
Strauss's first book, Die Religionskritik Spi-
nozas (1930), pursued these themes in detail.
Strauss examined Spinoza's foundation of the
higher criticism of the Bible in order to discover
whether the explicit confrontation of Biblical
revelation with liberal rational philosophy had
produced the triumph of reason that philosophy
was claiming, and he concluded that it had not.
He approached Spinoza's work by surveying the
ancient and modern critiques of religion, be-
ginning with the Epicurean, that formed the
tradition in Spinoza's background, and he de-
tected in each case a theoretical or moral pre-
supposition or intention that might be defensible
or plausible but which was in some degree arbi-
trary, hence not capable of commencing an
absolutely apodictic argument. In passing from
the Epicurean "presupposition" in the form of a
practical intention to banish fear of certain in-
visible powers to the modern grounds of critique
of religion, Strauss anticipated in this early
work not only the antithesis of antiquity and
modernity that he elaborated in many writings,
but also the division of modernity into phases
or, as he would say some forty years later,
"waves." While still viewing modernity in the
context of critique of religion, he saw a distinc-
tion between the moderns who resisted religion
in the name of the present world and its gifts of
fame and opportunity for heroism, and those
other moderns whose interest was freedom to
live and to think without accepting revelation-
freedom to philosophize. The distinction be-
tween Machiavellian and Spinozistic modernity
does not disturb the progress of the argument
regarding "the rational" and its claim of priority
in relation to revelation: the post-Biblical critics
of religion contradicted but did not refute their
opponents, having refused to take seriously the
possibility that God has the attributes of omni-
potence ascribed to him by Scripture. This
means that the case for the unassisted reason,
or the case for philosophy, either had yet to
be made, or had already been made by the
pagans, who were not constrained by contention
with revelation or by any avowed intention to
criticize religion or gods. Those pagans would
be Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.
Strauss pursued similar themes in Philosophie
und Gesetz (1935), but in the meantime he had
been at work also on Hobbes, and in 1936 he
published The Political Philosophy of Hobbes,
the first of his books on leading figures in the
tradition of political philosophy. The intention
behind his work on Hobbes was to develop his
reflections on the ancient and modern rational-
isms, keeping in sight the question of the self-
sufficiency of reason in its successive self-under-

standings but concerned also with the ground
that reason alone thought itself able to furnish
or discover for morality. In Hobbes, Strauss
found reason surrendering its claim of domi-
nance over human life to the passions, which
are more powerful, thus primary and more au-
thoritative; but he found also the assertion of a
claim on behalf of reason to be the arbiter of
any dispute that may arise between it and any-
thing representing itself as revelation. The
manifest tension between the self-abnegation
and the pretension of reason found an apparent
resolution on the plane of morals and politics
in the form of natural right. That is, the over-
riding human motive of fear of death at other
men's hands, or, more positively, the supreme
impulse toward self-preservation, pointed to the
inalienable natural right to life and the means
to it. In order to give effect to the right of
nature, a political order in which the sovereign
was also the chief priest, saving man from na-
ture here on earth, would control our common
existence. The banishment of "superstition" is
rationalistic, to be sure, but it is in the interest
of civil peace, not of philosophy. This manner
of advancing yet profoundly diminishing the
claims of reason, and at the same time apotheo-
sizing preservation, was decisive for what
Strauss referred to as the lowering of the sights
of human aspiration characteristic of the birth
of modernity. Strauss saw a manifestation of
this moral retreat in the bourgeoisification of
the moral perspective, a falling away from the
typical identification of virtue with aristocratic
virtue in proportion as man's fear of man was
openly confessed to rule the human estate. It is
worth noting that, as Strauss found the presup-
positions or prejudgments of the critics of
religion to have dominated those thinkers' ration-
alism, so he found that " [Hobbes's] moral atti-
tude does not by any means appear only at the
end of a long process, but directs this process
from the beginning" (1936, p. 129). This view
led Strauss to maintain, contrary to the position
of many interpreters, that Hobbes's moral and
political principles were not derivative from his
natural science but were independent or pri-
mary in their own right.
After the publication of The Political Philos-
ophy of Hobbes, Strauss began his academic
career and also his residence in America. Dur-
ing a period of approximately ten years, he de-
veloped, through courses at the New School
and in a succession of articles and reviews, a
comprehensive conception of the relation of
STRAUSS, LEO 749
ancient and modern thought that he brought to-
gether in the six Walgreen lectures in October
1949 that served as his inaugural at the Uni-
versity of Chicago. Those lectures, enlarged,
appeared in 1953 as what is perhaps his best
known book, Natural Right and History. In this
work, Strauss contrasted classic and modern
natural right, showing the penetration of the
latter not only by the "lowering of the sights"
but also by the historicization of the moral
norms. Strauss's lifelong orientation upon the
unchanging, his rejection of relativism, and his
inclination to classical philosophy might suggest
that he adopted some form of moral "absolut-
ism" drawn from the strong teachings of Plato
and Aristotle. However, a leading theme of
Natural Right and History, and of Strauss's
work altogether, is that classical moral norms,
or the right by nature, avoided both the rigors
of Thomism, which straitly links the moral law
to perfect divinity, and those of Averroism,
which radically linked morality to occasions and
judgments. The Thomist and Averroist branches
of Aristotelianism missed the intermediate mark
of the natural right that is subject to differentia-
tion or change according to circumstances, but
that nonetheless has a shape. Its shape or direc-
tion is given ultimately by the telos or end of hu-
man activity, of human life as such, which is an
end indicated by man's rationality as his natural
essence. If man's highest function is thought,
and his most human act is to philosophize, then
the norms of morality are those norms that di-
rectly or indirectly best conform to, or least of-
fend against, that natural end. It may also be
said that the "end" or point of orientation for
man is the unchanging truths, around which
everything merely human, including tlie rules
of moral and political existence, flows in a state
of changeableness. Whatever else they contain,
those truths include an ordering of the goods
that are available to man, and by the light of
that unchanging natural teleology men axe
charged with the task or endowed with the free-
dom of arranging their affairs in the myriad
contexts of human life. Writing about classic
natural right, Strauss declared, "There is a uni-
versally valid hierarchy of ends, but there are
no universally valid rules of action" (1953,
p. 162). The best political order, that cynosure
of classical political philosophy, was understood
by Strauss as the regime in which the ascen-
dancy of philosophy is the guarantee that justice
be accompanied by the discretion of wisdom.
Strauss published a number of important
750 SWISHER, CARL B.
books after 1953, including Thoughts on Machi-
avelli (1958) and a series on the ancients, but the
preoccupation that he evinced in the article on
the book Das Heilige with transcendence of the
mutable by an eternal, and with the arbitrari-
ness that silently enters the "rationalistic" dis-
missal of the eternal same itself remained the
same. With this in mind, one could say with-
out grave distortion of the facts that Jerusalem
and Athens (the theme of his Frank Cohen lec-
ture at the City College of New York in 1967)
were and remained the poles of his life and
thought. In his last years, devoted largely to the
problem of Socrates, he published books ad-
dressed to the Aristophanic and the Xenophontic
presentations of Socrates (1966; 1970; 1972)
and completed an interpretation of Plato's Laws
(1975) that was published posthumously.
Strauss philosophized in the medium of his-
tory of philosophy. It was open to him to do so
because the critical history of philosophy is
necessarily on the plane of its own object. His
inclination toward the ancients could not be
characterized, as such an orientation sometimes
is, as affectation or nostalgia. As a historian of
the tradition of philosophy in pagan antiquity,
in Christendom, Judaism, and Islam, Strauss
perceived that many authors expressed them-
selves cautiously if their words could harm
either themselves or others. He employed and
taught what came to be called "careful reading,"
but he did not use or impart a "method," for by
the nature of the case there cannot be one, since
reticent writing that could be made explicit
through the application of rules would be a mere
cipher and the interpretation of philosophic
texts would be a form of cryptography. Strauss
explained himself on this surprisingly provoca-
tive subject in several articles, including "Perse-
cution and the Art of Writing," which gave its
name to a collection of essays published in
1952. This merely instrumental aspect of his
work gave rise to controversy that apparently
must defy final resolution.
JOSEPH CROPSEY
WORKS BY STRAUSS
1923 Das Heilige. Der Jude 7:240-242.
(1930) 1965 Spinoza's Critique of Religion. New York:
Schocken. —»First published as Die Religionskritik
Spinozas als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft:
Untersuchungen zu Spinozas Theologisch-politi-
schem Traktat.
1935 Philosophie und Gesetz: Beitrdge zum Verstdndnis
Maimunis und seiner Vorldufer. Berlin: Schocken.
1936 The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and
Its Genesis. Oxford: Clarendon. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published by the University of Chicago
Press in 1963.
(1948) 1963 On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xeno-
phon's Hiero. Rev. & enl. New York: Free Press. —>
Includes Alexandre Kojeve's critique and Strauss's
"restatement." A paperback edition was published by
Cornell University Press in 1968.
(1952) 1973 Persecution and the Art of Writing. West-
port, Conn.: Greenwood.
1953 Natural Right and History. Univ. of Chicago
Press.
1958 Thoughts on Machiavelli. Glencoe, 111.: Free
Press. —» A paperback edition was published by the
University of Chicago Press in 1978.
(1959) 1973 What Is Political Philosophy? and Other
Studies. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
1964 The City and Man. Chicago: Rand McNally. -*
A paperback edition was published by the Univer-
sity of Chicago Press in 1977.
1966 Socrates and Aristophanes. New York: Basic
Books. —» A paperback edition will be published by
the University of Chicago Press in 1980.
1968a Liberalism: Ancient and Modern. New York:
Basic Books.
1968b Natural Law. Volume 11, pages 80-85 in Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1970 Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An Interpretation
of the Oeconomicus. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press.
1972 Xenophon's Socrates. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press.
1975 The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws.
.Univ. of Chicago Press. —» Published posthumously.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BLOOM, ALLAN 1974 Leo Strauss, September 20,
1899-October 18, 1973. Political Theory 2:372-392.
CATON, HIRAM 1973 Der hermeneutische Weg von
Leo Strauss. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 80:171—182.
GOUREVITCH, VICTOR 1968 Philosophy and Politics.
Review of Metaphysics 22:58-84; 281-328.
GUNNELL, JOHN G. 1978 The Myth of the Tradition.
American Political Science Review 72:122-134.
MILLER, EUGENE F. 1975 Leo Strauss: The Recovery
of Political Philosophy. Pages 67-99 in Anthony de
Crespigny and Kenneth Minogue (editors), Con-
temporary Political Philosophers. New York: Dodd,
Mead.
MOMIGLIANO, ARNALDO 1967 Ermeneutica e pensiero
politico classico in Leo Strauss. Rivista Storica
Italiana 79:1164-1172.
SWISHER, CARL B.
Carl Brent Swisher (1897-1968), American
political scientist and constitutional historian,
was a pioneer in the fields of judicial biography
and American constitutional development. Born
in rural West Virginia, the second child and
only son of farmer parents with Methodist and
Republican leanings, he studied at West Vir-
ginia Wesleyan College and Pomona College,
California, before receiving his PH.D. degree
from the Robert Brookings Graduate School of

Economics and Government in Washington in
1929. After serving as an instructor at Columbia
University and as a special assistant to the at-
torney general of the United States, he joined the
faculty of the Johns Hopkins University, where
he succeeded W. W. Willoughby as Thomas P.
Stran professor until his retirement. He held
lectureships at other universities, including
Chicago and London, and was elected president
of the American Political Science Association.
Swisher secured his reputation in public law
with several classic studies at opposite ends of
the social science spectrum: life histories of
individual judges and institutional histories of
the United States constitution and Supreme
Court. As a scholar he joined a distinguished
group of political scientists, including Edward
S. Corwin and Charles G. Haines, who in dif-
ferent ways pioneered recognition of the politi-
cal functions of the Supreme Court in American
society (Corwin 1938; 1964; Haines 1922).
Both strands of his work were influenced by the
sociological jurisprudence and legal realism
that were fashionable during his formative pro-
fessional years, though he was more interested
in economic and social class analysis than in
the Freudian interpretations advanced by Jerome
Frank (1930) and Harold D. Lasswell (1948).
A teacher at Pomona, Russell M. Story, and the
interdisciplinary program at Brookings, includ-
ing Walton H. Hamilton's seminar in law and
economics, broadened S wisher's viewpoint. His
work with Carl McFarland in the Justice De-
partment stimulated a lifelong interest in judi-
cial administration and administrative law
(Sobeloff 1968). Challenges to constitutional
government during two world wars and the
great depression also affected his outlook.
Central to his thought were faith in the prin-
ciples of American constitutionalism and skep-
ticism of the myths of a fixed constitution and
an objective judiciary. The student who failed
to understand that the constitution was a living
charter of government, and that the Supreme
Court was "a broker between ancestry and pos-
terity," had much to learn about judicial review
and the character of American institutions
(1946b, p. 560; 1946a, p. 17). Swisher's goal
was to explain processes of constitutional
change, and his search led him far beyond legal
materials to the study of party politics, inter-
governmental relations, social interests, and
personalities. Yet he took a dim view of universal
theories and uniformity. Microcosm, for him,
was macrocosm (Rourke 1968, p. 56; Swisher
SWISHER, CARL B. 751
1946a, pp. 48-49). He also expected the scholar
to evaluate as well as understand the perfor-
mances of those who wielded public power. His
own judgments were the more powerful for
their dignity and fairness.
Treating Supreme Court decisions as political
events within a broad historical and social con-
text necessarily shifted emphasis from legal
doctrines onto judges and other participants in
the process of constitutional interpretation
(Pritchett 1969, p. 35). Even his master's
thesis, a study of state constitution making, em-
ployed this broad perspective (1930a). That the
general revealed itself in the particular was
strikingly demonstrated in his first major works,
judicial biographies of Stephen J. Field (1930Z?)
and Roger B. Taney (1935). Although Albert J.
Beveridge's magisterial Life of John Marshall
(1916-1919) had opened the way, Swisher's
biographies were more daring in showing the
union of judicial values with those of dominant
social interests during the Jacksonian era and
the age of enterprise. By exposing the inner
workings of the high court, moreover, he demon-
strated the potential of biographies as case
studies in judicial politics (Murphy 1968;
Murphy & Tanenhaus 1972). The two life his-
tories rank among the best judicial biographies
ever written.
The extended treatment of the national bank
issue in Taney also marked Swisher's shift from
biographies to constitutional history. His most
influential work was the monumental American
Constitutional Development (1943), the first
full account of American constitutional growth
in the stream of national history. For a genera-
tion, this concept of constitutional development
pervaded undergraduate teaching of public law.
Several books of lectures, in which he ap-
praised modern constitutional problems in the
light of history, revealed much about Swisher's
own values (1946a; 1948; 1958b). Taking seri-
ously the notions that law and legal process
constrain judicial discretion, he found it easier
to justify the demise of old judicial activism in
behalf of private property than to endorse the
rise of judicial activism in behalf of eco-
nomic underdogs and civil rights. While gen-
erally sympathetic with the goals of the Stone
and Warren Courts, he criticized the centraliza-
tion, self-assertion, and craftsmanship of their
decisions. The growth of judicial policy making
at the expense of legislatures and executives,
where leadership properly belonged, also trou-
bled him. But he acknowledged that political
752 SWISHER, CARL B.
default was largely responsible for judicial ac-
tivism and that history's verdict would rest on
the justice rather than the process of judge-
made law (1946a, pp. 48-49; 1958b; 1960b,
pp. 885-886).
The capstone of his career was his selection,
alone among nonlawyers, to write one of eight
official histories of the Supreme Court under the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise (1974). Pub-
lished after his death, The Taney Period was a
prodigiously researched study that ranks among
the leading histories of the Supreme Court from
the death of Marshall to the Civil War. The
analysis, largely independent of revisionist in-
terpretations by historians, ranged broadly be-
yond constitutional issues into admiralty, pat-
ents, and judicial administration. Some readers
may miss the grand sweep and succinct sum-
maries of his earlier works.
As behavioralism spread to the study of pub-
lic law, Swisher's approach came under at-
tack, in part for not having gone far enough.
Judicial biography fell in popularity among
political scientists, who by and large also left
the field of constitutional development to histo-
rians. Behavioralists criticized historical studies
as descriptive, antitheoretical, and nonquantita-
tive, and above all for focusing on ideas and
institutions rather than patterns of political be-
havior (Schubert 1967; 1968). Champions of
the group approach criticized judicial biogra-
phies as emanations of the cult of the robe
(Peltason 1964). Swisher, to be sure, had little
interest in empirical theory as distinct from
normative political thought. Moreover, as an
organizing device constitutional development
risks saying both too much and too little about
the policy functions of the American judiciary,
to the neglect of questions of compliance with
and impact of judicial decisions, and of issues
pertaining to statutes, administrative review,
and lower courts. Although Swisher was less
vulnerable to criticism on these counts than
were most contemporaries, his linkages between
individual and institutional levels of analysis
were crude causal explanations like "social
forces" or personal "will to power."
Nevertheless, his writings reveal unusual sen-
sitivity to the determinants of judicial behavior
in their profound complexity. If anything, his
work suffered most from attempting to explain
too much. Advancing a broad, functional view
of constitutions, even as he held a restrictive
view of the judicial function, he saw judging
as a highly complex travail (1946a; 1946£>).
In personality he was a reserved man of courtly
manner who warred not against his critics. Yet
just as he had bathed the Supreme Court in the
acid of historical realism, so he warned against
the reverse emphasis on adjudication as "merely
politics" (1960b, p. 879). To treat judging with-
out law was to obscure what made courts and
constitutions unique (Pritchett 1969; Shapiro
1964).
Swisher was thus an important transitional
figure who made classic contributions to an un-
derstanding of the constitution and the Supreme
Court in American political life. His studies of
individual justices made him, willing or not,
"one of the first . . . 'judicial behaviorists'"
(Pritchett 1968, p. 708). His constitutional
histories built bridges across time and among
disciplines. He helped to return the study of
public law to the mainstream of an emerging
discipline of political science, while mapping
essential relationships among courts and larger
processes of constitutional government. The
bedrock of his teaching was that law and
politics were entwined in the government of the
American people.
J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR.
WORKS BY SWISHER
(1930a) 1969 Motivation and Political Technique in
the California Constitutional Convention, 1878—79.
New York: Da Capo.
(1930£>) 1971 Stephen J. Field: Craftsman of the
Law. Washington: Brookings. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1969 by the University of
Chicago Press.
(1935) 1961 Roger B. Taney. Hamden, Conn.:
Archon.
1939a Federal Organization of Legal Functions. Amer-
ican Political Science Review 33:973-1000.
(1939b) 1972 SWISHER, CARL B. (editor) Selected
Papers of Homer Cummings, Attorney General of
the United States, 1933-1939. New York: Da Capo.
1939c The Supreme Court in Transition. Journal of
Politics 1:349-370.
1940a Civil Liberties in War Time. Political Science
Quarterly 40:321-347.
1940Z? The Control of War Preparations in the United
States. American Political Science Review 34:1085-
1103.
(1943) 1978 American Constitutional Development.
2d ed. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. —* Published
in two volumes in 1958 as El Desarrollo Constitu-
cional De Los Estados Unidos by Editorial Biblio-
graphica Argentina in Buenos Aires.
1946a The Growth of Constitutional Power in the
United States. Univ. of Chicago Press. —> The
Charles R. Walgren lectures. A paperback edition
was published in 1963.
1946b Research in Public Law: Report of the Panel
on Public Law. American Political Science Review
40:552-562. -> Included in the Bobbs-Merrill Re-
print Series in the Social Sciences.
1948 The Post-war Constitution. Boston University

Law Review 28:113-172. —> Reprinted in 1953 on
pages 309—378 in The Caspar G. Bacon Lectures on
the Constitution of the United States, 1940-1950
published by Boston University Press.
1949 The Judge in Historical Perspective. Indiana
Law Journal 24:381-386.
1951 The Theory and Practice of American National
Government. Boston: Hough ton Mifflin.
1954 The Supreme Court—Need for Re-evaluation.
Virginia Law Review 40:837-851.
(1956) 1964 Mr. Chief Justice Taney. Pages 35-62
in Allison Dunham and Philip B. Kurland (editors),
Mr. Justice. Rev. ed. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1957 Dred Scott One Hundred Years After. Journal of
Politics 19:167-183.
(1958a) 1969 SWISHER, CARL B. (editor) Historic
Decisions of the Supreme Court. 2d ed. New York:
Van Nostrand. —» The first edition was published
in 1965 as Decisiones Historicas da Corte Suprema
by Companhia Editoria Forense in Rio de Janeiro.
(1958Z?) 1965 The Supreme Court in Modern Role.
Rev. ed. New York Univ. Press. —» James Stokes
lectureship in politics.
1960a The Supreme Court and the Forging of Federal-
ism, 1789-1864. Nebraska Law Review 40:3-15.
1960b The Supreme Court and "The Moment of
Truth." American Political Science Review 54:879-
886. —» Presidential address to the American Polit-
ical Science Association.
1967 History's Panorama and Justice Black's Career.
Pages 1-38 in Stephen Parks Strickland (editor),
Hugo Black and the Supreme Court: A Symposium.
Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill.
1974 The Taney Period, 1836-64. New York: Mac-
millan. —» Fifth volume of the Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Published posthumously.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BEVERIDGE, ALBERT J. (1916-1919) 1975 The Life
of John Marshall. 4 vols. Dunwoody, Geo.: Berg.
CARDOZO, BENJAMIN N. (1921) 1971 The Nature of
the Judicial Process. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
CORWIN, EDWARD S. (1914) 1963 The Doctrine of
Judicial Review: Its Legal and Historical Bases, and
Other Essays. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith.
CORWIN, EDWARD S. (1938) 1957 Court Over Con-
stitution: A Study of Judicial Review as an Instru-
ment of Popular Government. Gloucester, Mass.:
Peter Smith.
CORWIN, EDWARD S. 1964 American Constitutional
History: Essays by Edward S. Corwin. Edited by
SWISHER, CARL B. 753
Alpheus T. Mason and Gerald Garvey. New York:.
Harper.
FRANK, JEROME 1930 Law and the Modern Mind.
New York: Brentano's. —» A paperback edition was
published by Doubleday in 1963.
HAINES, CHARLES G. 1922 General Observations on
the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic
Influences in the Decisions of Judges. Illinois Law
Review 17:96-116.
HOWARD, J. WOODFORD, JR. 1971 Judicial Biography
and the Behavioral Persuasion. American Political
Science Review 65:704-715.
LASSWELL, HAROLD D. (1948) 1976 Power and Per-
sonality. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
MURPHY, WALTER F. 1968 Judiciary. II: Judicial
Values. Volume 8, pages 315-320 in International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by
David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
MURPHY, WALTER F.; and TANENHAUS, JOSEPH 1972
The Study of Public Law. New York: Random
House.
PELTASON, J. W. 1964 Supreme Court Biography and
the Study of Public Law. Pages 215-227 in Gott-
fried Dietze (editor), Essays on the American Con-
stitution: A Commemorative Volume in Honor of
Alpheus T. Mason. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall.
PRITCHETT, C. HERMAN 1968 Carl Brent Swisher: In
Memoriam. Villanova Law Review 13:708-709.
PRITCHETT, C. HERMAN 1969 The Development of
Judicial Research. Pages 27-42 in Joel B. Grossman
and Joseph B. Tanenhaus (editors), Frontiers of
Judicial Research. New York: Wiley. —> Shambaugh
Conference on Judicial Research, University of
Iowa, 1967.
ROURKE, FRANCIS E. 1968 Carl Brent Swisher: In
Memoriam. Political Science I, no. 4:56 only.
SCHUBERT, GLENDON 1967 Ideologies and Attitudes:
Academic and Judicial. Journal of Politics 29:3-40.
SCHUBERT, GLENDON 1968 Judiciary. I: Judicial Be-
havior. Volume 8, pages 307-315 in International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by
David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
SHAPIRO, MARTIN 1964 Law and Politics in the Su-
preme Court: New Approaches to Political Juris-
prudence. New York: Free Press.
SOBELOFF, SIMON E. 1968 Carl Brent Swisher: In
Memoriam. Villanova Law Review 13:710 only.
SWISHER, ROBERT E. 1974 The Swisher Family of
Harrison and Lewis Counties, West Virginia. Rich-
mond, Va.: Whittet & Shepperson.
 TAEUBER, IRENE B. AND CONRAD
Few marriages have combined social scien-
tists as productive as Irene Barnes Taeuber
(1906-1974) and Conrad Taeuber, born in
1906, both leading figures in the field of demog-
raphy over a span of some forty years. Intellec-
tual products of the early depression years, they
both maintained a pragmatic empiricism
throughout their careers. However, their contri-
butions to demography, and more generally to
the social sciences, were divergent. Irene Taeu-
ber was a "pure" scholar, totally committed to
scientific research. Conrad Taeuber combined
scholarship with major administrative responsi-
bilities in the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations, and the U.S. Bureau of the
Census, in each of which he was a vital, if often
anonymous, contributor to both the collection
and the interpretation of data.
A remarkably productive scholar, Irene Taeu-
ber was author, joint author, or editor of 18
books and monographs and some 168 articles
and contributions to books, the great majority
under her exclusive authorship. She had much
to do with the growth of the fledgling science of
demography in the 1930s and 1940s. She was
an editor of the bibliographical Population In-
dex, then the only regular publication in the
field in the United States; it was largely her
responsibility and product for the first 17 years
of its existence (1937-1954). She regularly
wrote what was in effect a research article,
somewhat misnamed "Current Item," in each
quarterly issue. Although she was engaged in
other major research after 1954, she continued
frequently to contribute leading articles to Pop-
ulation Index.
From 1937 to the end of her career Irene
Taeuber, though physically located at the Li-
brary of Congress in Washington, was research
associate (and from 1962 senior research de-
mographer) of the Office of Population Research
at Princeton University.
Like her husband, Irene Taeuber did her
graduate work at the University of Minnesota
(PH.D. in 1931) under the influence of such
social scientists as Stuart Chapin and Lowry
Nelson. She belonged to the tradition of data-
oriented empiricists, mellowed by an anthro-
pological viewpoint gained in her early training.
Her work also reflected the feminist humanism
that flourished in the United States before
World War n and largely disappeared in the
1940s and 1950s, to emerge again in the more
strident feminism of the 1970s. Although her
research reflected rigid devotion to scientific ob-
jectivity, her underlying values were clearly
humanistic.
The substantive content of her work included
diverse subjects, such as "Heredity Factors in
Mental Disease" (1938), but from 1940 on her
many publications were almost exclusively in
demography, though often in a broader so-
ciological context. Her frequent research on the
United States population was related to, or con-
ducted in collaboration with, that of Conrad
Taeuber at the Bureau of the Census. They were
joint authors of two major and unique studies
of the American population in historical, socio-
logical, and economic context.
755
 756 TAEUBER, IRENE B. AND CONRAD
Although many aspects of demographic re-
search were influenced by Irene Taeuber's con-
tributions, perhaps the most important were
international population studies, in which she
displayed a strong interest. Her own background
was purely Middle American, but her intellec-
tual interests, professional contributions, and
personal associations came to be world wide.
She did much to bring an international and
comparative perspective to a discipline too pre-
occupied with the United States and with local
data. Certainly no demographer, perhaps no
social scientist, has written serious research
articles on so many countries, as diverse in size,
population, climate, and culture as the islands
of Micronesia, with their miniscule populations,
China, Alaska, and Singapore, and covering one
or more countries and regions in every conti-
nent. During World War n she wrote a series of
studies, each based on in-depth research, of
countries then affected by the war.
Her chief interest, however, was in the de-
mography of east and southeast Asia. Her mag-
num opus was The Population of Japan (1958).
In depth of research, breadth of focus, and de-
tailed analysis of a non-European country un-
dergoing expansion, war, defeat, and demo-
graphic transition, there is certainly no parallel
or peer in demographic literature. It was trans-
lated into Japanese and widely used in that
country. In her later years her principal re-
search was devoted to Chinese demography in
and outside mainland China, an area that en-
gaged much of her attention at the time of her
death. Unfortunately, the inevitable fragmenta-
tion of research on Chinese demography and
Irene Taeuber's untimely death precluded pub-
lication of a work that might well have had an
impact equal to that of her work on Japan.
She belonged to an era preceding the empha-
sis on mathematical models in demography and
theory in sociology. Skeptical of orthodox de-
mographic transition theory, she wrote fre-
quently of qualifications and exceptions. Her
lively suspicion of careless generalization was
attributable in part to her early anthropological
training. A meticulous scholar, she was given
to imaginative and thorough analysis rather
than to generalization and theory construction.
Irene Taeuber can be credited also for having
nurtured an infant science in its most formative
years. She played a major part in guiding its
growth in scientific objectivity within a human-
itarian value system. As a result, demography,
as a science, has remained relatively free from
the wild rhetoric and popular exaggeration that
have swirled around it in the media and in
popular discussion.
Conrad Taeuber was one of the able and
dedicated professionals attracted to Washington
in the early days of the New Deal. At the Bureau
of Agricultural Economics in the Department of
Agriculture (1935-1946) he early established
a reputation as an authority on the statistics of
rural population and population movements in
the United States. This focus broadened when
he became chief statistician in the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
(1946-1951). In later years (1951-1973), as as-
sociate director of the U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, he was a major architect of both the
methods and the data used in the 1960 and
1970 censuses of the United States and of its
publication program. This role, though usually
anonymous, gave him a central position in the
largest demographic, social, and economic survey
in the world, providing data that were collected
and processed with great care, to be used, often
a bit cavalierly, by those unaware of the care
and research involved in this vital service.
Taeuber was the primary force in the Census
Bureau for promoting middle-level analysis of
the prodigious census output. Largely through
his initiative the bureau (in cooperation with
the Social Science Research Council) undertook
programs of census monographs for the 1950
and especially the 1960 censuses. In coopera-
tion with his wife, Taeuber prepared major vol-
umes on The Changing Population of the United
States (1958), an historical survey of the census
results from 1870 through 1950, and on People
of the United States in the 20th Century (1971),
which in turn placed the census of 1960 in broad
historical context. The former was the first sys-
tematic monograph since that based on the 1920
census that analyzed and organized the major
results of a population census in readable yet
scientific form. The second work written pri-
marily by Irene Taeuber, is a monumental vol-
ume of more than a thousand pages in which the
statistical results are examined within a broad
framework of historical, sociological, and eco-
nomic change.
The latter volume in particular views the cen-
sus as a statistical documentation of the vast
social changes that have occurred in this coun-
try's history since 1790. It is the most ambitious
extant first-level analysis and interpretation of
the prodigious and sometimes confusing publi-
cations of the census, summarizing in socially

meaningful categories the enormous wealth of
data whose significance is often concealed by
their very abundance. The volume organizes the
unwieldy mass of census figures into such topics
as the changing geographical distribution of the
population; urbanization; population structure
(especially age); economic activity, education
and income; the family; marriage; fertility; mor-
tality; migration, mobility and stability; the
dynamics of metropolitan population; and the
dimensions and perspectives of the future.
Inevitably such a work is to some extent
shaped and limited by the data it summarizes.
But it provides a very solid foundation for more
specific problem-oriented work. This is the heart
of the Taeubers' contribution—to provide first a
solid data base, and then first-level interpreta-
tion of the meaning and significance of the
data. They built a solid foundation, in quality
and usability, for both the decennial population
census and the increasing volume of intercensal
studies and surveys.
Conrad Taeuber's extensive contributions in
more than one hundred publications are largely
confined to data from the United States, but his
interests and activities have included wide in-
ternational contacts. He has served as presi-
dent of the Inter-American Statistical Institute
and participated in innumerable international
meetings and consultations.
Although his scholarly contributions have
been noteworthy, Conrad Taeuber's role could
best be described as the professional promotion
of better basic census data in the 1950s, 1960s,
and the early 1970s. One of his many innova-
tions to advance the usefulness of census data
was the preparation of sample census tapes
(e.g., one in a thousand) suitable for, and now
widely used for, research and teaching purposes
in the United States. The procedure is now
adopted in many other countries.
After his formal retirement in 1973, Conrad
Taeuber continued as director of the George-
town University Center for Population Re-
search and as a vigorous proponent of the
application of the census in the measurement
and identification of social problems, expressed
in America in the Seventies: Some Social
Indicators (1978).
The expertise of Irene and Conrad Taeuber
is also a family affair. Their two sons and
daughters-in-law have followed them in their
profession of demography and related fields.
DUDLEY KIRK
TANNENBAUM, FRANK 757
WORKS BY THE TAEUBERS
WORKS BY IRENE B. TAEUBER
1938 Hereditary Factors in Mental Disease. Pages
156-161 in United States National Resources Com-
mittee, Committee on Population Problems, The
Problems of a Changing Population. Washington:
Government Printing Office.
1939-1973 Population Index. —> Includes 47 research
articles by Irene B. Taeuber. A substantial number
of her publications in other scholarly journals were
spin-offs, translations, and especially presentations
of further research based on these articles, which
covered a wide range of demographic subjects.
1958 The Population of Japan. Princeton Univ. Press.
—» This book was preceded and followed by some
thirty publications in scholarly journals, Japanese
translations, symposia, etc., relating to the Japa-
nese population.
WORKS BY CONRAD TAEUBER
(1939) 1971 TAEUBER, CONRAD and LIVELY, C. E. Ru-
ral Migration in the United States. New York: Da
Capo.
1968 Census. Volume 2, pages 360-365 in Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1978 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE America in the Seventies: Some Social
Indicators. Edited by Conrad Taeuber. Annals,
Vol. 435. Philadelphia: The Academy.
WORKS BY IRENE B. AND CONRAD TAEUBER
1958 The Changing Population of the United States.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census Monograph
Series, 1950. New York: Wiley.
1971 People of the United States in the 20th Century.
Washington: Government Printing Office.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BURKMAN, SARAH-ALICIA W. (compiler) 1974 Popu-
lation Index 44:5—17. —> Contains a complete
bibliography of Irene B. Taeuber's works.
TANNENBAUM, FRANK
Born in Brod, a small town in Austrian Galicia,
Frank Tannenbaum (1893-1969) emigrated to
the United States in 1904. The America he grew
up in was also an America growing up. The
frontier may have closed in 1890, but it still
possessed its mystique; the first decade of the
new century was the age of Theodore Roosevelt
and the great influx of immigrants, who hoped
that the burdens of Europe would be lifted by
the special grace of the New World. Although
American history was presented as a chronicle
of progress, there was another, darker side that
the muckrakers exposed, including the sins of
the city and the excesses of capitalism. Most
Americans, however, considered these problems
to be temporary and remediable once recognized
and approached with planning and energy di-
rected toward their solution.
 758 TANNENBAUM, FRANK
In 1906, Tannenbaum began to attend night
classes at the Ferrer School, "the first institution
devoted to the constructive side of anarchism."
There anarchist intellectuals, radical labor
leaders, and social activists met together and
were able to learn from each other about the
world as it was and could be, sharing millennial
visions and the feeling that by proselytizing they
could realize them. Among the faculty of the
Ferrer School were Emma Goldman, Lincoln
Steffens, and Alexander Berkman (see The New
York Times, 1911, Jan. 6, p. 20, col. 2; Jan. 15,
part 5, p. 10; Jan. 17, p. 8, col. 3).
By the middle of the second decade of the
century, Tannenbaum's interests centered on
the problems of the poor workingman and the
unemployed. He joined the "Wobblies," the In-
dustrial Workers of the World, and soon became
a local leader. For Thorstein Veblen, the IWW
was an "exuberant" and "untidy" vanguard of
dissent. It was a radical labor group that sought
to effect social changes by sporadic violence and
strikes. In the winter of 1913/1914, thousands
of unemployed workers roamed the streets of
New York, hungry and desperate, in vain search
of jobs and the IWW message held out a
promise of immediate relief. On March 1, 1914,
Tannenbaum led a group of three hundred
homeless poor into the First Presbyterian
Church and demanded money for food and
shelter. After some negotiation, he persuaded
the church leaders to provide each of the "sit-
down strikers" with thirty Cents. This technique
worked and was to be repeated at different
churches; Tannenbaum exhorted his followers
to organize and demand an 8-hour workday
and a minimum daily wage of $3 and to con-
tinue their sit-downs in churches until these
basic demands were met.
Radicalism was essential to Tannenbaum's
social philosophy; violence was not. His experi-
ences with radical reform ideas, organized labor,
arrest, and imprisonment became subjects of
intellectual inquiry. His radical thinking, al-
though close in some respects to the socialism of
Eugene V. Debs, never developed or converted
into a set ideology. He retained the Wobblies'
goals of improving the worker's condition and
his compassion for the underdog, but he came
to distinguish between reform and apocalypse,
to recognize the complexities of human organi-
zation, and to see law, as both an instrument
of and an obstacle to progress.
Tannenbaum's activist role in labor developed
into a lifelong concern with the labor movement
and the union. Surprisingly, for a radical who
ran afoul of the law—ex-convict as he referred
to himself on occasion—he did not have a politi-
cal axe to grind, and his writings are free of
venom or invective. He looked upon his involve-
ment reflectively. When he wrote of labor and
of most other subjects, he wrote as a historian
with a sociological bent. The trade union, he
believed, had a special purpose in industrial so-
ciety; it was an institution with its own makeup
and morale and mission; paradoxically, one of
its major contributions was to ensure social
stability. In his first book, The Labor Movement:
Its Conservative Functions and Social Conse-
quences (1921), which was "humbly dedicated
to John Dewey," Tannenbaum wrote: "It is the
ideal aim of the labor movement to abolish
revolutions. It aims to eliminate the cost of
human sacrifice due to social change by making
change a pragmatic and deliberate thing"
(p. 167). None of his writings on labor was pure
economic history or mere sociological interpreta-
tion. His analysis of labor was an alloy of these
and more. Although his viewpoint became in-
creasingly detached, he never forgot his per-
sonal experience as a labor leader.
When he wrote his first book on crime and
society, Wall Shadows: A Study in American
Prisons (1922), Tannenbaum was concerned
with the complex nature of crime and commu-
nity organization in prisons. The book describes
what happens to the criminal after conviction
and, though the focus may appear narrow,
Tannenbaum's attitude is nonetheless that of a
reformer who hoped that the book would "help
some few to take up the cause of society against
our medieval prisons." Tannenbaum's most de-
tailed study of the general problem was Crime
and the Community (1938). Although he did
not write it as a textbook, it soon became a basic
source, widely adopted in criminology and so-
ciology courses in colleges and universities
throughout the United States; later, parts of the
book were made required reading for the Chicago
police. Crime and the Community was for the
study of the organization of crime what A Phi-
losophy of Labor (1951) was later for the study
of labor. Both were written after many years of
direct experience and firsthand knowledge; both
represent a summing up of Tannenbaum's
studies, reflections, and, to a degree, predictions
about these two different subjects. He believed
that prisons could, with difficulty, be improved,

but that crime itself was an inevitable problem
permeating all levels of society.
Tannenbaum's experiences and studies in
labor organization and in crime (as a necessary
and natural aspect of society) taught him much
about institutional structures; the habits people
adopt and the roles they assume; the pressures
placed on the human personality by the group
or groups within which an individual acts; and
the difficulties that attend any effort to change
any institution radically. He held that we live
in an "intractable" and "recalcitrant" universe
(words that frequently recur among his writ-
ings), and interpreted the meaning of "utopia"
in its etymological, literal sense as "not a place."
"Until I went to school I thought there was only
one way to accomplish an end," he once said.
"Now I know that there are many ways. The
study of history is dangerous to radicalism. One
of the greatest blows I suffered in college was
the realization that the world had a past as well
as a present and a future."
Columbia College, to which he had been ad-
mitted in the fall of 1916, was a new and stimu-
lating experience for Tannenbaum, and his
attachment to the institution and its members
continued to the end of his life. His first appetite
for history was aroused by Carlton J. H. Hayes.
His interest in economics developed from
courses taken with E. R. A. Seligman, and his
concern with education and the philosophy of
experience grew from his friendship with John
Dewey. He became good friends with these and
other Columbia luminaries.
The university seminars at Columbia, over
which Tannenbaum presided as director for 25
years, may be seen as an outgrowth of his con-
tacts with friends and professors at Columbia.
Near the end of World War n, the Columbia
University administration asked the faculty to
make suggestions for improving the intellectual
quality and relevance of the institution. It was
in response to this canvas that Tannenbaum,
by then professor of Latin American history,
came up with his suggestion of "University"
(i.e., interdisciplinary) seminars for faculty
members and invited outside associates, to con-
centrate on the discussion of selected lasting
problems. In part, the seminars grew out of
Tannenbaum's experiences with regular lunch
meetings with friends. Partly, too, they evolved
from his feeling that a classroom or traditional
research situation had many obstacles to the
free play of the intellect. And, finally, they de-
TANNENBAUM, FRANK 759
veloped out of his conviction that "the world
could not be divided into political science, eco-
nomics, sociology or history. . . . The sub-
tleties, complexities, and interlacing of the
threads that tied life together and made it
meaningful lay beyond the reach of the special-
ized disciplines" (1965, p. 3).
All of Tannenbaum's works on Latin America
had an underlying theme: a concern with the
processes and mechanisms by which a stable
political system functions—legitimacy, transfer
of power, political parties, constitutionality,
local government, and political culture. He was
intrigued by both the British and American
models of government, but considered the Brit-
ish system the better example of continuing
effective political stability. Indeed, among his
posthumous papers is a long unfinished manu-
script on elements in the British system that
allow it to operate with such uncommon
smoothness.
Mexico and its revolution interested him for
most of his academic life. He wrote three im-
portant books on various aspects of change in
Mexico: The Mexican Agrarian Revolution
(1929), Peace by Revolution: An Interpretation
of Mexico (1933ib), and Mexico: The Struggle
for Peace and Bread (1950). The central theme
in all was the course of the revolution, but Tan-
nenbaum also took into account the history and
the economic, social, racial, and cultural con-
ditions of Mexico. In the first work, Tannen-
baum closely examined the landholding pat-
terns, especially the hacienda, as they changed
under the impact of the revolution. As he was
writing Peace by Revolution, he felt that "the
social revolution that has intermittently torn
Mexico during the last twenty years may be best
understood as an attempt to liquidate finally the
consequences of the Spanish Conquest. This ex-
planation of the revolution is at the same time
the best key to Mexican history" (1933b, p. 3).
Tracing the dominant trends in the Mexican
experience, he was not wedded, as he took pains
to make clear, to a single or unitary explanation
of historical or social phenomena.
Perhaps Tannenbaum's most important book,
in terms of its impact on the scholarly world
and American society, is Slave and Citizen
(1947). Three leading contemporary historians,
Stanley M. Elkins, David Brion Davis, and Eu-
gene Genovese, have assessed it as a "pioneer-
ing essay" in the historiography of black slavery.
The book developed out of an interdisciplinary
760 TAX, SOL
seminar on slavery held at Columbia in the late
1930s and early 1940s in which this peculiar
institution was studied comparatively, as a com-
mon theme in the historical experience of dif-
ferent cultures.
The Latin American seminar at Columbia,
over which Tannenbaum presided from its in-
ception in 1944 to its end in 1969, was itself a
peculiar institution. Over its 25-year life, it wel-
comed many important Latin Americans as
guests, participants, and speakers. Professors,
ex-presidents, journalists, poets, artists, econo-
mists, students, labor leaders, and diplomats
were among those who came to the seminar,
drawn by its reputation among Latin Americans
as their forum in the United States.
Frank Tannenbaum was a man of diverse
intellect. It is impossible to categorize him as a
Latin American historian, for he was many
things more than that. Perhaps the best label for
him would be that of social philosopher. His
focus basically was upon institutions singly and
in competition with each other and he under-
stood that all human experience takes place
within an institutional framework of one kind
or another. As he wrote in The Balance of Power
in Society:
The road to social peace is the balance of the social
institutions, and a wise statesman would strengthen
those institutions that seemed to be losing ground,
even if he were not addicted to them: for the only
way to peace in this world of fallible human
nature is to keep all human institutions strong,
but none too strong; relatively weak, but none so
weak as to despair of their survival. It is only
thus that peaceful irritation and strife, so essential
to social and individual society, can be maintained.
(1969, p. 23)
JOSEPH MAIER
WORKS BY TANNENBAUM
(1921) 1969 The Labor Movement: Its Conservative
Functions and Social Consequences. New York:
Arno.
(1922) 1975 Wall Shadows: A Study in American
Prisons. New York: AMS Press.
(1924) 1969 Darker Phases of the South. New York:
Negro Universities Press.
(1929) 1968 The Mexican Agrarian Revolution. Ham-
den, Conn.: Archon.
1933fl Osborne of Sing Sing. Chapel Hill: Univ. of
North Carolina Press.
(1933k) 1971 Peace by Revolution: An Interpretation
of Mexico. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press.
1934 Whither Latin America? An Introduction to Its
Economic and Social Problems. New York: Crowell.
(1938) 1963 Crime and the Community. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press.
1947 Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas.
New York: Knopf. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished by Vintage in 1963.
1950 Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread. New
York: Knopf.
1951 A Philosophy of Labor. New York: Knopf.
1955 The American Tradition in Foreign Policy. Nor-
man : Univ. of Oklahoma Press.
1962 Ten Keys to Latin America. New York: Knopf. —>
A paperback edition was published by Vintage in
1966.
1965 A Community of Scholars: The University Sem-
inars at Columbia. New York: Praeger.
1969 The Balance of Power in Society, and Other Es-
says. New York: Macmillan. —> The essay, "The
Balance of Power," first appeared in the December,
1946 issue of the Political Science Quarterly.
1974 The Future of Democracy in Latin America. New
York: Knopf.
TAX, SOL
Sol Tax, born in 1907, has been involved in
the principal dialogues of anthropology span-
ning four decades of association with the Uni-
versity of Chicago's department of anthropology,
from the commencement of his graduate study
in 1931. Where these dialogues have concerned
the role of anthropology in assisting indigenous
peoples in maintaining cultural identity he has
been a central figure, and in advocacy of self-
determination for American Indians he has
been the acknowledged leader.
Working in contexts of persistent culture con-
tact, where values, vested interests, and levels
of power vary markedly, and where concerns
with identity and self-determination produce
factionalism and conflicting group interests,
Tax and his students have focused research and
assistance to Indians on communication, lead-
ership, and strategies for achieving the con-
sensus requisite for action. Tax has addressed
with equal dedication the challenges Indians
face in uniting on goals and the obstacles those
goals confront in the larger arena of negotiation
with non-Indians. In the process he has learned
much about the use and abuse of power and
the wisdom of its self-limitation by those in
positions of authority.
Tax's career began in the traditional way,
with study of social organization relatively di-
vorced from the issue of how the presence and
status of the anthropological observer influences
the observed society, but a turning point oc-
curred in the late 1940s with his decision to
place the anthropologists' knowledge and influ-
ence at the service of the Mesquakie (Fox) In-
dians he and students were studying. Two
related convictions formed the basis of a phi-

losophy of applied anthropology which came to
be known as "action anthropology" (Tax 1952a;
Gearing, Netting, & Peattie 1960). One is the
conviction that the anthropologist's influence
and interaction with the observed society con-
stitute an ever-changing and inescapable object
of study for the responsible ethnologist, the
more so given the origins of anthropology in
colonialism and the power and brokering capa-
bility the anthropologist usually is perceived to
have. The second conviction is that this inter-
action should be utilized to expedite the learning
inherent in decision making, and, through feed-
back, to enhance effective action by the less
powerful subcultures of pluralistic societies in
pursuing self-determination.
In questioning the wisdom of distinguishing
sharply between pure and applied research, ac-
tion anthropology departed from the main
stream of post-World War n applied anthropol-
ogy, wherein the objective of easing accultura-
tive strain was seldom tied to a theory of knowl-
edge acquisition and development. In action
anthropology, helping and learning are coequal
goals in observing how feedback of what is
known and happening to people changes their
perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. Tax's in-
sights into the cybernetic character of knowl-
edge development may be his most lasting con-
tribution to the social sciences, but during his
career his more readily acknowledged contribu-
tions have been in championing the rights of
indigenous peoples to self-determination and
mobilizing anthropologists to this end. His phil-
osophy of action prescribes "participant-inter-
vention" by helping to identify options available
to people, helping to clarify the implications of
any given course of action, and helping to im-
plement decisions once appropriately made. The
philosophy of action anthropology parts com-
pany with much of applied anthropology in
steadfastly refusing to let the authority and
greater comparative knowledge of the observer
lead to his interference in deciding what course
of action is in the best interests of the observed.
Tax has followed this philosophy of action to
a remarkable degree in his ever-expanding ad-
ministrative and leadership roles, even when he
has been as much an insider as his associates.
From intratribal contexts, he moved to the
arena of pan-Indian organization, experiment-
ing with administrative mechanisms acceptable
to Indians for communicating and addressing
those objectives on which agreement could be
TAX, SOL 761
reached. He coordinated the first nationwide
congress of Indians in 1961, and directed the
Carnegie Cross-cultural Education Program for
Indians in Oklahoma from 1962 to 1967. Simul-
taneously his ideas about effective action were
brought to bear on other groups of diverse con-
stituencies : the volatile university neighborhood
of Hyde Park and the city of Chicago (1968);
the national community of anthropologists
(serving terms as president of the American
Anthropological Association and editor of its
journal); and the international community of
anthropologists (founding and editing Current
Anthropology in 1958 and organizing the ninth
International Congress of Anthropological and
Ethnological Sciences in 1973). In all these con-
texts Tax invited, indeed insisted upon, more
grass roots participation in deliberation and
feedback in decision making and publication of
findings than most would have deemed either
logistically feasible or desirable in terms of ef-
fective action. And yet feasible and effective
these undertakings indeed proved to be. His
success in these endeavors has encouraged him
to explore late in his career the potential for
revitalization of institutions and groups of many
kinds through self-help and enlightened politi-
cal leadership, notably the family and neighbor-
hood in the United States (1976a; 1976b).
These experiments in action anthropology
have overshadowed Tax's early and continuing
interests in the training of anthropologists and
the more central theoretical and methodological
concerns of the discipline. Ralph Lin ton intro-
duced him to anthropology in his undergraduate
years at the University of Wisconsin, and Ruth
Benedict supervised his first field work among
North American Indians. His introduction to
social anthropology and structural-functional
analysis imported from Europe came at the
hands of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, who as a visiting
professor at Chicago launched Tax and future
colleague Fred Eggan on their respective doc-
toral studies of social organization among the
Mesquakie and the Hopi Indians in the early
1930s. In his analysis of the Fox variant of the
Omaha kinship system (1937b), Tax pioneered
in developing the technique of transformational
analysis (Coult 1967), anticipating the work of
Floyd G. Lounsbury and others two decades
later. While the influence of Radcliffe-Brown
was apparent in his study of Mesquakie social
organization, his principal guidance in graduate
study came from Robert Redfield, his mentor
762 TAX, SOL
and close friend until the latter's death in 1958.
It was Redfield who introduced Tax to research
among Mayan Indians in Guatemala following
Tax's marriage to Gertrude Jospe Katz and
completion of his doctoral study at Chicago in
1934.
Tax's commitment to "one hundred per cent
ethnography" in kinship analysis among the
Mesquakie (i.e., gathering genealogical data
from all the members of the Mesquakie com-
munity, checking them against earlier records
of William Jones, and obtaining the kinship
system from at least twenty individuals in order
to uncover and explain discrepancies) was fol-
lowed by comparably ambitious data gathering
in Panajachel, Guatemala. The results in the
area of Panajachel economy (1953), where Tax
measured community income and expenditures
for a full year, ordered all households by wealth,
and examined the functions of those wealth
differences, are as well known among econo-
mists as anthropologists. The Taxes' eight years
of research in Guatemala, followed by four
years of research and training of anthropolo-
gists in Mexico, were undertaken as part of the
Carnegie Institution's research on contemporary
Mayan Indians begun with Redfield's studies in
the Yucatan. Separated from the Yucatec Maya
by extensive rain forests were large Mayan pop-
ulations in the highlands of western Guatemala
and Chiapas, Mexico. In two papers (1937a;
1941) Tax provided the definitive statement of
cultural patterning among the western Maya,
reporting more impersonalism in social inter-
action than Redfield had found in Yucatan com-
munities of comparable size, and raising ques-
tions about the origins of impersonal, atomistic,
and pragmatic social relations in urban, indus-
trial society given the same qualities of social
interaction among the highland Maya. In a
broader context, the status of Mesoamerican
ethnology was first systematically assessed in a
symposium chaired by Tax, whose proceedings
he edited in the Heritage of Conquest (1952£>).
In 1940, while involved in the Mesoamerican
research, Tax was appointed a research associ-
ate at the University of Chicago, and following
a year as visiting professor at the National Insti-
tute of Anthropology and History (1942/1943),
he joined the faculty of Chicago's department of
anthropology. His research among the Mesquakie
Indians of Iowa resumed, producing the tenets
of action anthropology, and he took charge of
the revision of the graduate curriculum, pro-
viding an integration that distinguished Chi-
cago's program for two decades. He first became
a national figure during the reorganization in
1945/1946 of the American Anthropological
Association, of which he became editor in 1953
and president in 1959; and an international
figure as editor of the 29th International Con-
gress of Americanists in 1949, and in 1952 as a
participant in the Wenner-Gren Foundation's
"Anthropology Today" symposium and the prin-
cipal editor of An Appraisal of Anthropology
Today (Tax et al. 1953). These endeavors led
to his appointment as a research associate
of the Wenner-Gren Foundation, from which
flowed the international associations that pro-
duced Current Anthropology. As its first editor
(1958-1974), Tax was instrumental in develop-
ing a truly international journal, promoting
dialogue effectively through printing the reac-
tions of ten to twenty international scholars
together with the author's response with each
article.
The journal has also remained distinctive in
its commitment to the integration of the sub-
fields of anthropology. Tax has promoted such
integration in a number of his other publication
ventures as well, notably in his editorship of
Evolution After Darwin (1960), Horizons of An-
thropology (1964), and the World Anthropology
series of nearly one hundred books of selected
papers from the ninth International Congress of
Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences.
Two publications provide commentary on
Tax's contributions to anthropology. Action an-
thropology was the subject of a symposium and
review by the international community of an-
thropologists in Current Anthropology in 1975.
A Festschrift, Currents in Anthropology (Hin-
shaw 1979), contains papers by 27 students
and colleagues of Tax, including his two daugh-
ters, Marianna Tax Choldin, and Susan Tax
Freeman. The papers deal principally with
North and Mesoamerican Indians and action
anthropology. One of the papers, by David Blan-
chard, traces the formative influences and prin-
cipal junctures in Tax's career in more detail
than is permitted here.
ROBERT E. HINSHAW
WORKS BY TAX
1937a The Municipios of the Midwestern Highlands
of Guatemala. American Anthropologist 39:423-444.
(1937&) 1962 Some Problems of Social Organization.
Pages 3-32 in Fred Eggan (editor), Social Anthro-
pology of North American Tribes. 2d ed., enl. Univ.
of Chicago Press.

1941 World View and Social Relations in Guatemala.
American Anthropologist 43:27-42.
1952a Action Anthropology. America Indigena 12:
103-109.
(1952b) 1968 TAX, SOL (editor) Heritage of Conquest:
The Ethnology of Middle America. New York:
Cooper Square.
1953 Penny Capitalism: A Guatemalan Indian Econ-
omy. Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social
Anthropology, Publication No. 16. Washington:
The Institution.
1953 TAX, SOL et al. (editors) An Appraisal of Anthro-
pology Today. Univ. of Chicago Press. —» Papers
presented at the International Symposium on An-
thropology in New York in 1952.
1960 TAX, SOL (editor) Evolution After Darwin. Univ.
of Chicago Press.
(1964) 1977 TAX, SOL; and FREEMAN, LESLIE G. (edi-
tors) Horizons of Anthropology. 2d ed. Chicago: Al-
dine. —> Tax was the sole editor of the first edition.
1968 TAX, SOL (editor) The People vs. the System: A
Dialogue in Urban Conflict. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1968 TAX, SOL; and KRUCOFF, LARRY S. Social Dar-
winism. Volume 14, pages 402—406 in International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by
David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
1976a Proposal for a New Institution: The Family as
a Corporate Entity. Center for the Study of Demo-
cratic Institutions, Center Report, February. Santa
Barbara, Calif.: The Center.
1976b Self-help Groups: Thoughts on Public Policy.
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 12:448—454.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Action Anthropology Symposium 1975 Current An-
thropology 16:507-540.
COULT, ALLAN 1967 Lineage Solidarity, Transforma-
tional Analysis, and the Meaning of Kinship Terms.
Man 2:26-47.
GEARING, FRED; NETTING, ROBERT McC.; and PEATTIE,
LISA 1960 Documentary History of the Fox
Project. University of Chicago, Department of An-
thropology.
HINSHAW, ROBERT E. (editor) 1979 Currents in An-
thropology: Essays in Honor of Sol Tax. The Hague:
Mouton.
THOMAS, DOROTHY S.
Dorothy Swaine Thomas was born in Balti-
more, Maryland, in 1899, and died in 1977.
Trained as an economist, she became a leading
demographer and sociologist, and a pioneer in
the development of social statistics. Her work,
however, cannot be classified under any of these
headings, for it was always interdisciplinary, re-
lating materials from different fields.
Her childhood was a difficult one. The only
child of an improvident father, she was fre-
quently separated from her mother. Always a
good student, she won a scholarship to Barnard
College and began her studies there in 1919.
At Barnard she continued her interest in the
humanities but was increasingly drawn into
THOMAS, DOROTHY S. 763
movements for social reform, becoming known
as a "young radical." These interests led her
into the social sciences and she applied for ad-
mission to the combined department of soci-
ology and economics, then headed by William F.
Ogburn. As an undergraduate she published two
papers with Ogburn: "Are Inventions Inevita-
ble?" (1922o), and "The Influence of the Busi-
ness Cycle on Certain Social Conditions"
(1922£>). Thus, as an undergraduate she had
already set the stage for decades of pathbreak-
ing work, and her successful collaboration with
Ogburn left her willing to undertake joint stud-
ies with a succession of leading scholars in
several fields.
Graduating from Barnard in 1922 she turned
to Great Britain for better data to examine the
relationship between economic fluctuations and
social events. At the London School of Eco-
nomics (L.S.E.), she studied with Arthur L.
Bowley, the statistician, and William Beveridge,
the director of the L.S.E. In 1924, along with
her PH.D., she was awarded the Hutchinson re-
search medal, and her dissertation, Social As-
pects of the Business Cycle (1925), was pub-
lished. Using data from the United States and
Britain, she had explored the relationships of
birth, death, marriage, divorce, and crime rates,
as well as pauperism and migration, to the
business cycle. At the age of 24, she had thus
established herself as a leader in an important
area of research.
Even so, she found it difficult, as a woman,
to obtain a position in a good university. Rather
than settle for a professorship in a women's col-
lege, she became an economic statistician for
the Federal Reserve Bank, remaining there until
she received a postdoctoral fellowship from the
Social Science Research Council in 1925. Intend-
ing to study the relationships between economic
cycles and convictions for crime in New York
State, she found that the necessary data were
not available. William I. Thomas, the renowned
sociologist to whom she turned for advice, was
unable to help her with this project, but he
offered her a job on a study of child develop-
ment that he was beginning under Rockefeller
sponsorship. Thus began an association that
lasted until Thomas' death in 1947. They were
married in 1938.
Both their personalities and their styles of
work were complementary rather than similar.
Dorothy Thomas was quick and impulsive; her
husband was calm and reflective. He reveled in
the analysis of documents, enjoyed speculation,
764 THOMAS, DOROTHY S.
and was inclined toward theory, while she, al-
ways suspicious of armchair theorizing, de-
manded statistical proof and was reluctant to
generalize. Together they wrote The Child in
America: Behavior Problems and Programs
(1928), for which she prepared the statistical
materials, while he pursued the situational ap-
proach for which he was noted. This was the
only work they coauthored, and W. I. Thomas
continued to exercise a powerful influence on
her work, partly in the selection of topics and
partly in broadening her approach to include
nonquantifiable materials.
In 1927 Dorothy Thomas accepted a position
at Columbia's Teachers College, where she di-
rected studies of the behavior of nursery school
children—a project she continued at the Yale
University Institute of Human Relations to
which she moved in 1931. While the techniques
and approach that she and her colleagues de-
veloped were influential in the evolution of
small group and observational studies, she al-
ways felt that the project was an attempt to
"quantify the unquantifiable." She did not
greatly value the two books and the articles that
emerged from these studies, and welcomed the
opportunity to return to the study of economic
and social relationships.
From 1930 to 1936, the Thomases worked
with Gunnar and Alva Myrdal on a study of the
Swedish people that would be modeled after
The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,
(W. I. Thomas & Znaniecki 1918-1920), but
that would also use statistical and economic
data. Although the Thomases spent part of each
year in Sweden, collecting materials and super-
vising a research staff, the study as envisioned
never materialized—the Myrdals were drawn off
into politics and W. I. Thomas became absorbed
in the study of Swedish behavior documents.
Dorothy Thomas, therefore, took over a study
that Gunnar Myrdal had begun on population
movements and industrialization in Sweden,
broadening its historical context. With data avail-
able as far back as 1750, she was able to relate
demographic movements to harvest cycles in
the early years and to business cycles from the
late nineteenth century onward (1941). Con-
current with her work in Sweden was her survey
of the state of knowledge about migration in
Research Memorandum on Migration Differen-
tials (1938). Scholars immediately recognized
the value of both works.
In 1940 Dorothy Thomas became a full pro-
fessor at the University of California at Berkeley
—a life-long ambition—and for the first time she
had students to teach. She began a research
training program that resulted, within the first
year, in joint publications with students. With
the attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent
internment of Japanese living on the west coast,
she began a series of studies that form the
major record of this segment of American his-
tory. Working with students and internees she
amassed day-to-day records of life in the camps,
along with life histories of the internees. She
credits W. I. Thomas for being the guide in the
collection and interpretation of the behavioral
documents and for saving her from premature
quantification. In 1946 the first volume from
this study, coauthored by Richard S. Nishimoto,
Japanese-American Evacuation and Resettle-
ment: The Spoilage, appeared.
Before the second volume, Japanese-American
Evacuation and Resettlement: The Salvage
(Thomas, Kikuchi, & Sakoda 1952) was com-
pleted, W. I. Thomas died, and in 1948, Dorothy
Thomas joined the sociology faculty of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. Although she was in-
dignant at the treatment of the Japanese, both
The Spoilage and The Salvage were restrained,
almost cold, accounts of a massive human trag-
edy and the efforts of a rejected people to rees-
tablish themselves as patriotic Americans. These
books were meticulously documented and the
statistical record was as complete as possible.
Again, she had completed a model study, but
this one went beyond the quantifiable. Her rela-
tionship with W. I. Thomas had resulted in a
broader, more insightful work than she other-
wise would have attempted. For her, the greatest
accolade was the acceptance of these books by
the Supreme Court of the United States as evi-
dence of the wrongs inflicted on the Japanese.
At the University of Pennsylvania, she and
Simon Kuznets undertook a series of studies on
population redistribution and economic growth
that occupied her for the rest of her career.
With Kuznets she supervised a massive data
collection from old censuses and other statisti-
cal sources that are basic to the economic and
demographic history of the United States. As
soon as they were assembled the data were made
available to scholars and thus became the basis
for many later studies. Along with a talented
group of younger scholars, she and Kuznets pub-
lished three volumes, Population Redistribution
and Economic Growth: United States, 1870-1950

(1957-1964), and supervised the research for
many articles, reports, and data sets. When she
retired from the University of Pennsylvania in
1970, the basic data for an economic-demo-
graphic history of the United States since the
Civil War had been assembled and the main
development set forth. Dorothy Thomas realized
that the economic and demographic analyses
had not been fully integrated and, until her re-
search was interrupted by a stroke in the sum-
mer of 1974, she worked toward a fourth and
integrative volume for the series.
After retiring from Pennsylvania she became
a professorial lecturer at Georgetown Univer-
sity. There, as at Berkeley and Pennsylvania, she
attracted the best students. A reluctant lecturer,
she emphasized research and taught by precept
or by the apprentice method. She was kindly,
even protective of students, but for the best she
erected the highest standards and subjected
them to merciless criticism.
Her work habits were irregular. She worked in
fits and starts, alternating periods of quiescence
with furious activity. She carefully checked
every calculation and statement repeatedly. Her
prose was spare and graceful and, when in the
mood, she could write pages of text in a few
hours. She regarded herself as an inveterate
procrastinator and always regretted the many
things she had started but had not finished.
A great strength was her ability to discern im-
portant problems and then to find and organize
neglected materials that bore upon them. The
succeeding analyses were direct and simple. At
the same time, the major shortcoming of her
work stemmed from her unwillingness to gen-
eralize and to speculate beyond the data. Never-
theless, her work remains basic for further
studies along the lines she blazed.
EVERETT S. LEE
WORKS BY THOMAS
1922a THOMAS, DOROTHY S.; and OGBURN, WILLIAM F.
Are Inventions Inevitable? A Note on Social
Evolution. Political Science Quarterly 37:83-98.
1922k THOMAS, DOROTHY S.; and OGBURN, WILLIAM F.
The Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain
Social Conditions. Journal of the American Statisti-
cal Association 18:324-340.
(1925) 1927 Social Aspects of the Business Cycle. New
York: Knopf.
1926 An Index of British Business Cycles. Journal of
the American Statistical Association 21:60-63.
1928 THOMAS, W. I.; and THOMAS, DOROTHY S. The
Child in America: Behavior Problems and Pro-
grams. New York: Knopf.
1929 Statistics in Social Research. American Journal
of Sociology 35:1-17.
THOMAS, DOROTHY S. 765
1930 THOMAS, DOROTHY S.; CLARK, WILLIAM; and
DOUGLAS, W. O. The Business Failures Project: A
Problem in Methodology. Yale Law Journal
39:1013-1024.
1930 THOMAS, DOROTHY S.; and DOUGLAS, W. O. The
Business Failures Project, II: An Analysis of
Methods of Investigation. Yale Law Journal
40:1034-1054.
1933 THOMAS, DOROTHY S.; LOOMIS, A. M.; and AR-
RINGTON, R. E. Observational Studies of Social Be-
havior. New Haven: Yale University, Institute of
Human Relations.
1935 Economic and Social Aspects of Internal Migra-
tions: An Exploratory Study of Selected Swedish
Communities. Pages 447—476 in Economic Essays
in Honor of Wesley Clair Mitchell. New York: Co-
lumbia Univ. Press.
1936a Internal Migrations in Sweden: A Note on
Their Extensiveness as Compared With Net Migra-
tion Gain or Loss. American Journal of Sociology
42:345-355.
1936k The Swedish Census of 1935-6. Journal of the
American Statistical Association 31:541—544.
1937a The Analysis of Internal Migration in the
Swedish Census of 1930. Journal of the American
Statistical Association 32:124-130.
1937b Streams of Internal Migration: A Further Ex-
ploration With Swedish Data. Rural Sociology
2:148-166.
1938 Research Memorandum on Migration Differen-
tials. Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 43.
New York: The Council.
1941 Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish Popula-
tion Movements: 1750-1933. New York: Macmillan.
(1946) 1973 THOMAS, DOROTHY S.; and NISHIMOTO,
RICHARD S. Japanese-American Evacuation and Re-
settlement: The Spoilage. Berkeley: Univ. of Cali-
fornia Press. —> A paperback edition was published
in 1969.
(1952) 1975 THOMAS, DOROTHY S.; KIKUCHI, CHARLES;
and SAKODA, JAMES Japanese-Amercan Evacua-
tion and Resettlement: The Salvage. Berkeley: Univ.
of California Press.
1957-1964 KUZNETS, SIMON; and THOMAS, DOROTHY S.
(editors) Population Redistribution and Eco-
nomic Growth: United States, 1870-1950. 3 vols.
Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society. —»
Volumes 45, 51, and 61 of the Memoirs of the
American Philosophical Society.
1958 International Migration. Pages 137-161 in Philip
Hauser (editor), Population and World Politics.
Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
1963 THOMAS, DOROTHY S.; LAZARUS, JUDITH; and
LOCKE, BEN Z. Migration Differentials in Mental
Disease: State Patterns in First Admissions to
Mental Hospitals for All Disorders and for Schizo-
phrenia, New York, Ohio, and California, as of
1950. Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 41:25-42.
1963 THOMAS, DOROTHY S.; and LOCKE, BEN Z. Mari-
tal Status, Education and Occupational Differentials
in Mental Disease: State Patterns in First Admis-
sions to Mental Hospitals for All Disorders and for
Schizophrenia, New York and Ohio, as of 1950.
Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 41:145-160.
1967 Prefatory Note to Symposium on Population
Problems. American Philosophical Society, Pro-
ceedings 3:133-135.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
THOMAS, W. I.; and ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN (1918-
1920) 1958 The Polish Peasant in Europe and
America. 2d ed. 2 vols. New York: Dover.
 766 TINBERGEN, JAN
TINBERGEN, JAN
Jan Tinbergen, economist, was born in The
Hague, the Netherlands, in 1903, as the oldest
son in a family with four sons and one
daughter, all intellectually gifted. His brother
Nikolaas, professor in animal behavior at Oxford
University since 1949, shared the 1973 Nobel
Prize in biology with Konrad Lorenz and Karl
von Frisch for his contributions to ethology. The
youngest brother Luuk, who died at age forty,
was a professor of zoology. The parents provided
a stimulating environment for the development
of their children's scientific interest. The father,
Dr. D. C. Tinbergen, was a linguist and a lan-
guage teacher at a secondary school in The
Hague. He encouraged the use of simple lan-
guage in explaining scientific theories. Although
politics was not a major subject of discussion in
the family, a strong social interest prevailed.
Jan Tinbergen became a member of the socialist
youth association and later an active member
of the Social Democratic Labour party.
After attending secondary school, where he
met his future wife, Tine de Wit, a colonel's
daughter, Tinbergen studied physics from 1922
to 1926 at the University of Leiden, where Paul
Ehrenfest was his most influential teacher.
Ehrenfest's method of "successive approxima-
tion," for example, the method of reducing a
problem to its hard core and then introduc-
ing step-by-step complicating factors, can be
found often in much of Tinbergen's later work.
In 1929 Tinbergen received his doctorate in
physics with a thesis on "Minimum Problems
in Physics and Economics." The subject reflects
the shift in his interest, in the preceding years,
from physics to economics, a shift that Ehren-
fest had helped stimulate. The thesis also shows
Tinbergen's belief in the utility of applying
mathematics to economics.
Tinbergen's strong social feelings led him to
refuse serving in the army for his conscription.
As compensation, he worked first in the prison
administration in Rotterdam and later at the
Central Bureau of Statistics in The Hague. After
having served as an assistant to Ehrenfest, he
returned in 1929 to the Central Bureau of Sta-
tistics where he joined a new unit for business
cycle research. He became the leading spirit of
the unit, where he stayed, except for an inter-
ruption from 1936 to 1938 for work for the
League of Nations, until 1945. In 1931, he be-
came a part-time adjunct lecturer in statistics
at the University of Amsterdam. Then in 1933
the Netherlands School of Economics in Rotter-
dam appointed him as (part-time) professor.
Econometric business cycle research. Tinber-
gen's research at the Central Bureau of Statistics
provided the basis for his contributions to
econometrics, the combination of mathematical
economics and statistical analysis. The applica-
tion of mathematics to economics has a long
history that goes back to the nineteenth century,
but the empirical verification of economic theory
with the help of statistical data started only in
the late 1920s. It led to the development of this
new branch of economics in the 1930s, with
Tinbergen as one of its pioneers. In a long
series of articles in various international and
national periodicals Tinbergen contributed to
the empirical and quantitative knowledge of the
ways in which markets and economies operate.
Many of these studies were demand studies,
estimating the influence of changes in income
and prices on the demand for individual goods
and services, or for such aggregates as exports,
imports, and total consumption. His special in-
terest was in cyclical movements, particularly
the so-called "cobweb phenomenon," the move-
ment of prices and volumes in opposite direc-
tions with a certain periodicity, for example for
the shipbuilding market. This phenomenon
arises with a dynamic market mechanism where-
by supply reacts to prices with a certain time
lag, while demand reacts without such a lag.
These studies were the building stones for
more ambitious attempts to explain business
cycle fluctuations for an entire national econ-
omy, Tinbergen's main concern in the 1930s.
Although nonmathematical theories attempted
to explain different aspects and phases of the
cycle, Tinbergen, with other econometricians,
was in favor of explaining the cycle as a whole
through one set (model) of simultaneous causal
economic relations. His first attempt to build
such a model for the Dutch economy was pub-
lished in 1936. The model, containing 24 equa-
tions, provided the prototype for the models that
would be built for the Dutch economy in the
next decades. It foreshadowed elements of
Keynes's General Theory (1936) and of the
Phillips curve. Yet, the fundamental and pio-
neering significance of this Dutch publication
drew no international attention. An English
version became available only in 1959 (Tinber-
gen 1959). Tinbergen never aimed at great
publicity.
At the League of Nations in Geneva from
1936 to 1938, he continued his econometric

work on business cycles. He was asked to test
statistically the various business cycle theories
that Gottfried von Haberler had reviewed in an
earlier book for the League. Tinbergen's results
were published in 1939 in two volumes under
the general title Statistical Testing of Business
Cycle Theories. The first one, A Method and Its
Application to Investment Activity, described
the method of statistical analysis used with an
application to investment theory; the second
volume, Business Cycles in the United States of
America, 1919-1932, rather than test various
theories, provided a model explaining the eco-
nomic fluctuations of the United States. These
studies were received with great skepticism.
Keynes gave volume one a very critical review,
showing little understanding of the econometric
method. Partly because of the attention given
Keynes's General Theory and the outbreak of
World War n, it was not until the 1950s that the
historical value of Tinbergen's studies was rec-
ognized and an increasing number of econo-
metric models was built explaining economic
fluctuations in national economies. At the be-
ginning of the war period, Tinbergen himself
constructed a model for the United Kingdom
for the period 1870-1914 (1951), following the
same lines as the United States model.
During the German occupation of the Nether-
lands (1940-1945), Tinbergen continued his re-
search at the Central Bureau of Statistics and
published in international journals. He also
broadened his interest—for example, to prob-
lems of long-term development—on which he
wrote a pioneering econometric article explain-
ing the trend movements for Germany, Great
Britain, France, and the United States over the
period 1870-1914. Several books, partly of a
popularizing nature, were written during this
period and published before or soon after the
end of the war.
Economic policy and welfare economics. When
the war ended in 1945, Tinbergen was ap-
pointed director of the newly established Nether-
lands Central Planning Bureau. Originally in-
tended as an instrument for a more centrally
directed economic policy, it soon became an
advisory research agency for macroeconomic
government policies. In this new capacity, Tin-
bergen gave his full attention first to problems
of Dutch reconstruction, later, to short-term
policy problems and international economic co-
operation. These new fields of attention were
also reflected in the scientific, contributions that
he continued to publish in the next decade.
TINBERGEN, JAN 767
Close integration between major current eco-
nomic and social problems of the day and his
practical advice and scientific work has been a
continuing feature of Tinbergen's activities.
In this period, Tinbergen's contributions to
the theory of economic policy were formulated,
first in two short books, On the Theory of
Economic Policy (1952) and Centralization
and Decentralization in Economic Policy (1954)
and then, in his most important book on this
subject, Economic Policy: Principles and De-
sign (1956a). Although Tinbergen himself at-
tributes the essential ideas in these volumes to
Ragnar Frisch and Swedish economists, he un-
doubtedly reshaped their concepts and added
several new elements; th,us one may consider his
formulations as new and original. The hard core
of the theory states that in order to achieve a
set of quantitative targets of economic policy,
at least an equal number of quantitative instru-
ments (policy measures) must be used. A dis-
tinction is made between analytical and policy
problems. In the first category, policy instru-
ments are given (exogenous), and such varia-
bles as income, employment, and balance of
payments deficit are unknowns (endogenous)
to be determined in the framework of a mathe-
matical macroeconomic model. For policy studies
the same model can be used, but the role of
these variables is inverted: the latter variables-
income, employment, balance of payments-
become given policy targets, and the policy in-
struments—for example, government expendi-
ture, taxes—become the unknown (endogenous)
variables. Fixed targets are considered to be an
approximation of the optimal values of the
policy aims in an objective or welfare function.
The use of this quantitative framework for
studying policy problems was illustrated in Eco-
nomic Policy in a series of examples using wage,
price, and fiscal policies and their effects on
income, employment, and balance of payments
that were based on actual problems facing the
Dutch economy in the early 1950s.
More abstract but fundamental contributions
to the theory of economic policy have been Tin-
bergen's studies of welfare economics, particu-
larly of the theory of an optimum economic
regime. This theory translates the conditions un-
der which an economy's social welfare is maxi-
mized in terms of institutions, or degrees of
centralization of decision making. Tinbergen
concluded that an optimum regime must be a
mixed system, that is, while in principle decen-
tralized decisions are optimal, for production
 768 TINBERGEN, JAN
processes characterized by external effects or
economies of scale, more centralized decisions
are necessary.
This theory provided also the theoretical
background of his convergence theory, the view
that the economic systems of the communist
and Western countries are showing more simi-
larities. Inspired by the movement for economic
reforms in the early 1960s in the Soviet Union
and eastern Europe, movements that demanded
greater decentralization, and the increasing role
of the government in the West, Tinbergen found
in these trends support for his view on an
optimum regime.
Development planning. In 1955 Tinbergen
resigned as director of the Central Planning
Bureau in order to devote himself full time to
problems of the developing countries. After a
one-year visiting professorship at Harvard Uni-
versity he was elected to hold a new and full-
time chair in development planning at the
Netherlands School of Economics; since 1965
that chair has also included the economics of
centrally planned systems. At the Netherlands
Economic Institute, a small staff for funda-
mental and applied research on problems of de-
veloping countries was established under his
direction.
These changes mark the beginning of a period
lasting until the early 1970s during which Tin-
bergen concentrated his activities fully on the
problem he felt demanded highest priority in
research and policy making: the unequal distri-
bution of the world's welfare. His efforts to con-
tribute to the solution of this problem have been
broad in scope and nature. Through a continu-
ous stream of articles, reports, and several
books; through participation in conferences and
working and expert groups; through lecturing at
home and abroad for audiences ranging from
rural housewives to heads of state, he explained
and argued for the need for an ambitious inter-
national development policy. Through his re-
search and scientific work he contributed to the
theory of development, the methodology of na-
tional and international planning, and specific
policy issues.
The desire of the new states of the 1950s and
1960s to direct their policies through a medium-
term development plan created new planning
and policy problems, since the experience of the
communist and Western countries was of lim-
ited or no value in the circumstances of the
developing countries. Tinbergen contributed to
nearly every aspect of these planning processes.
His method of planning in stages is an attempt
to plan in a number of successive stages de-
cisions about the most desirable rate of growth
(and savings) of the economy (the macro stage),
the choice of industries and their distribution
over regions (the middle stage) and the selection
of projects and their location in centers of ac-
tivity (the micro stage). The semi-input-output
method was an original method to assist in the
selection of the industries that a country should
develop. This method calculates complementary
bunches of investments in an international in-
dustry, producing goods or services that are
internationally tradable, and national indus-
tries, producing goods that must necessarily be
produced domestically. The total effects of such
a bundle of investments can be compared for
alternative international industries on the basis
of some selection criterion.
In the early 1960s, when economists became
interested in planning education in relation to
economic development, Tinbergen, through his
contributions to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO), was one of the
first to develop quantitative models for the plan-
ning of education. The problem of planning the
best spatial distribution of production and in-
vestments over regions and centers of an econ-
omy led him also to elaborate methods and
models for spatial planning. On international
issues he emphasized, among others, the need
for an international division of labor between
the developed and the developing countries
based on the principle of (dynamic) comparative
cost. This emphasis led to his recommendation
that the latter group of countries develop labor-
intensive industries and technologies and the
former group, capital-intensive industries, in
order to provide maximum employment and in-
come opportunities for the developing world. As
coordinator of a study on the future world order,
undertaken at the initiative of the Club of Rome
and published in 1976 under the title Reshaping
the International Order (RIO), Tinbergen em-
phasized, as he had on many earlier occasions,
the need for supranational decision making in a
number of areas of global interest, a recommen-
dation based on the results of his work on wel-
fare economics.
During this period Tinbergen served as ad-
viser to the governments of various developing
countries, including India, Egypt, Turkey, Sur-
inam, Indonesia, Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and to

such international organizations as the World
Bank, OECD, and various UN agencies. As
chairman from 1966 to 1974 of the UN Com-
mittee for Development Planning, an advisory
group of independent development experts, he
had a large influence on the formulation of the
UN International Development Strategy for the
Second Development Decade (1971-1980), or,
rather, on the committee's proposal for this
strategy. For, to Tinbergen's deep disappoint-
ment, the proposal was accepted half-heartedly
and only after a reformulation that omitted the
commitments he felt were required. This ex-
perience in fact brought about a new phase in
his scientific work.
Income distribution. The subject that has
most concerned Tinbergen in his work as an
economist is probably income distribution, or,
more generally, inequality in welfare, conceived
as the most concrete expression of social justice.
His interest in the business cycle phenomenon,
in global development problems, and in welfare
economics finds a common denominator in this
theme. It is therefore not surprising that in the
early 1970s Tinbergen took up the theory of
personal income distribution for industrialized
countries as the topic of his major research. In
1946 he had already published a pamphlet in
Dutch on "Equitable Income Distribution,"
which was followed by a fundamental theoreti-
cal article in 1956 "On the Theory of Income
Distribution." The latter article provided the
basis for further elaborations and econometric
testing in a long series of articles, integrated in
his book Income Distribution: Analysis and
Policies (1975).
Tinbergen's theories of income distribution
have positive and normative components. His
positive theory of existing (labor) income dif-
ferences is based on a supply-and-demand anal-
ysis for labor demanding different qualifica-
tions. The price of labor (income) is assumed
to equalize supply and demand in the long run;
hence, income is dependent on supply and de-
mand factors. On the supply side, personality
traits and performance characteristics, such as
IQ's (intelligence quotients), level of educa-
tion, and noncognitive characteristics, play a
role. On the demand side, job characteristics, as
measured through job requirements, are de-
termining factors. Using data for the United
States and the Netherlands, Tinbergen tested
in various ways the influence of these factors.
Tinbergen's normative theory attempts to
determine an equitable income distribution.
TINBERGEN, JAN 769
Equity is defined as equal welfare for all indi-
viduals, but not necessarily as equal income, be-
cause welfare is assumed to depend not only on
income but also on factors such as occupation
chosen and number of years of schooling. The
"tension" between required and actual school-
ing, an element in the welfare function that
Tinbergen considers to be measurable and
similar for all human beings, should be mini-
mized in an equitable income distribution. In-
come differences, in his theory, can be reduced
by the deliberate creation of some oversupplies
of skilled labor and, correspondingly, shortages
of unskilled labor.
Both his analytical studies and, of course, his
normative theory have met criticisms of various
kinds, which he has accepted as challenges for
further research.
Concluding remarks. Any review of Tinber-
gen's work, as given above, must be highly selec-
tive. It cannot give an impression of his person,
his stimulating influence on those he worked
with or met in conferences or discussions, his
constructive and optimistic attitude, his confi-
dence in the forces of good will, his modesty
and simple life style, his humanity.
Tinbergen's outstanding and wide-ranging
activities as an economist have increasingly
been recognized through distinctions, awards,
and honorary degrees at home and abroad.
When in 1969, he received, together with Rag-
nar Frisch, the first Nobel Prize in economics
for "having developed and applied dynamic
models for the analysis of economic processes,"
a frequent opinion expressed was that he would
have been an equally worthy candidate for the
Nobel peace prize. Tinbergen's present grave
concern for the world's future peace, culture,
and welfare confirms this view of the driving
force of his great achievements as an economist.
HENK C. Bos
WORKS BY TINBERGEN
1929 Minimumproblemen in de natuurkunde en de
ekonomie (Minimum Problems in Physics and Eco-
nomics). Amsterdam: H. J. Paris.
(1939) 1968 Statistical Testing of Business Cycle
Theories. 2 vols. New York: Agatha Press. —» Vol-
ume 1: A Method and Its Application to Investment
Activity. Volume 2: Business Cycles in the United
States of America, 1919-1932. First published for
the Economic Intelligence Service of the League of
Nations.
1946a Beperkte Concurrentie (Imperfect Competition).
Leiden (Netherlands): Stenfert Kroese.
(1946&) 1953 Redelyke inkomensverdeling (Equitable
Income Distribution). 2d ed. Haarlem (Nether-
lands) : De Gulden.
770 TINBERGEN, NIKOLAAS
1951 Business Cycles in the United Kingdom, 1870-
1914. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
1952 On the Theory of Economic Policy. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
1954 Centralization and Decentralization in Economic
Policy. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
(1956a) 1967 Economic Policy: Principles and Design.
4th rev. Amsterdam: North-Holland; Chicago: Rand
McNally.
1956fc On the Theory of Income Distribution. Weltwirt-
schaftliches Archiv 77, no. 2:155-173.
1958 The Design of Development. Published for the
Economic Development Institute, International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins.
1959 Selected Papers. Edited by L. H. Klaassen, L. M.
Koyck, and H. J. Witteveen. Amsterdam: North-
Holland. —> A bibliography of Tinbergen's writings
is on pages 305—318.
1962 TINBERGEN, JAN; and Bos, HENK C. Mathemati-
cal Models of Economic Growth. New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill.
1964 Central Planning. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1965 TINBERGEN, JAN; and Bos, HENK C. et al. Econo-
metric Models of Education: Some Applications.
Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
1967 Development Planning. New York: McGraw-Hill.
—» First published in Dutch.
1968 Planning, Economic: I. Western Europe. Volume
12, pages 102—110 in International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New
York: Macmillan and Free Press.
1969 TINBERGEN, JAN; MENNES, L. B. M.; and WAAR-
DENBURG, J. GEORGE The Element of Space in De-
velopment Planning. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
1975 Income Distribution: Analysis and Policies. Am-
sterdam: North-Holland; New York: American Else-
vier.
1976 TINBERGEN, JAN (coordinator) Reshaping the
International Order. A Report to the Club of Rome.
New York: Dutton.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bos, HENK C. 1970 Tinbergen's Scientific Contribu-
tion to Development Planning. De Economist 118:
141-154.
DE WOLFF, P. 1970 Tinbergen's Contribution to Busi-
ness-cycle Theory and Policy. De Economist 118:
112-125.
DERKSEN, J. B. D. 1959 Aanvullingen by de bibliogra-
phie van J. Tinbergen. De Economist 107:798-799.
HANSEN, BENT 1969 Jan Tinbergen: An Appraisal of
His Contributions to Economics. Swedish Journal of
Economics 71:325-336.
HARTOG, F. 1970 Tinbergen on Prices, Incomes and
Welfare. De Economist 118:126-140.
PRONK, J. P. Bibliography 1959-1969 of Prof. Dr. J. Tin-
bergen. De Economist 118:155-173.
SELLEKAERTS, WILLY 1975 Jan Tinbergen. Challenge
18, Nov.-Dec.: 60-61.
TINBERGEN, NIKOLAAS
In 1973 Nikolaas Tinbergen shared the Nobel
Prize for physiology and medicine with Konrad
Lorenz and Karl von Frisch. He has also won
the Jan Swammerdam medal, awarded every
ten years to a Dutch biologist, and two honorary
degrees for his contributions to ethology. He be-
longs to a gifted family; his brother Jan Tin-
bergen won the Nobel prize in economics in
1969.
Tinbergen was born in 1907 in the Nether-
lands. From an early age he enjoyed sports,
which he almost chose over an academic career,
and a love of natural history that brought him
into touch with the work of J. Verwey and
A. F. J. Portielje, well-known ornithologists of
the 1920s and 1930s. At the end of his school
days he was still undecided on a career, but his
aptitude for biology was recognized by the the-
oretical physicist, Paul Ehrenfest, a friend of
the family, who gave him the opportunity to
spend several months at Vogelwarte Rossitten,
the observatory at which the scientific ringing
of birds was pioneered. Upon his return, he
decided to enroll for a degree in zoology at
the University of Leiden.
He was not a distinguished student. Most of
his energy was spent on hockey or his own
natural history pursuits, which did not always
coincide with the requirements of his discipline.
However, even his thesis of only 32 pages, the
shortest on record at the university, indicated
the route he would take. Studying wasps that fed
on bees and dug burrows in the sand, he in-
vestigated how they were able to relocate their
tiny burrows amid the sand hills. By using
simple field experiments with marked individ-
uals he was able to show that they found their
way visually, and that they learned appropriate
landmarks on short reconnoitering flights that
they made on leaving the burrow. In his doc-
toral dissertation, Tinbergen used an approach
that characterized much of his later work: care-
ful observation followed by simple but carefully
controlled experiments whose aim was to vary
one factor at a time—not in an impoverished
laboratory environment, but in the field. He
received his PH.D. in 1932.
In the same year Tinbergen married Elizabeth
Amelie Rutten, a chemistry student, and they set
off on a 14-month "honeymoon" with a meteoro-
logical expedition to Greenland. The Tinbergens
lived with the Eskimos, learned their language,
and acquired an interest in the hunter-gath-
erers' way of life. There, Tinbergen embarked
on several trails that he would follow persis-
tently. He concentrated on the snow bunting, a
small bird which arrived as the snows melted,
expended much energy in territorial battles
with rivals, and bred in the brief summer. The

observations he made formed the basis of much
of his later thinking on the function of territory,
on display, and even on the nature of war. He
also published extensively on the rednecked
phalarope and made diverse observations on a
variety of arctic animals, including Eskimo
dogs.
In 1933 Tinbergen became an instructor in
his old department at Leiden. In the laboratory,
he started to work with the three-spined stickle-
back, work which has since been carried on by
Gerard Baerends, his first student, who later led
a flourishing department at the University of
Groningen; by Jan van lersel, his successor at
Leiden; and by Piet Sevenster, van lersel's
student. The stickleback proved to be an ideal
choice: its natural environment could be imi-
tated in an aquarium where simple experi-
ments were possible. Tinbergen could map the
reproductive cycle, analyze the stimuli eliciting
attack and courtship from a territory-owning
male, and show that the complex zigzag court-
ship dance was a compromise between two in-
compatible response systems—leading the female
to the nest and attacking her. Tinbergen en-
couraged his students to engage in field re-
search, initiating work on wasps, butterflies,
hobbies, and herring gulls. He started an annual
summer camp among the sand hills near his
parents' home, a tradition that was reinstated
after World War n. Many classic studies of fish,
bird, and insect behavior were initiated at this
time.
In 1936 Konrad Lorenz, who was later to
share Tinbergen's Nobel Prize, visited Leiden,
and the two immediately recognized their com-
mon ground. Tinbergen spent the spring of
1937 working at Lorenz' father's home near
Vienna. Together they refined the methods of
early ethology, Lorenz elaborating his compara-
tive studies, Tinbergen inserting experimental
probes into Lorenz' observations of hand-
reared grey-lag geese. From this research came
two of the classic studies of early ethology, one
concerned with the manner in which a goose
retrieves eggs that have rolled out of its nest,
and the other with the way a goose recognizes
a flying predator. Both enterprises were made
possible by Tinbergen's skill in experimentation
under natural conditions.
Tinbergen and Lorenz were separated by
World War n. Tinbergen spent two years in a
German hostage camp for protesting against
the removal of Jewish professors from the uni-
versity and later joined the Dutch Resistance.
TINBERGEN, NIKOLAAS 771
Lorenz was drafted to serve as a doctor on the
Russian front, and became a prisoner of war.
After the war Tinbergen returned to Leiden, be-
coming a full professor in 1947. His work ex-
panded to include studies of camouflage in a
wide range of species.
By this time the earlier work of both Tinber-
gen and Lorenz was becoming known in the
English-speaking world. At the suggestion of
William H. Thorpe, the Society for Experimental
Biology organized a conference on physiological
mechanisms in animal behavior. This meeting
permitted renewed contact between Tinbergen
and Lorenz and led to the biennial ethological
conferences that have continued since. In ad-
dition Tinbergen and Thorpe enlisted Frank
A. Beach and others to start the journal Be-
haviour, which carried papers in English,
French, and German.
Tinbergen was convinced of the sterility of
much contemporary comparative and experi-
mental psychology. He was appalled at the far-
reaching generalizations made by experimenters,
who were largely ignorant of the diversity of
nature, on the basis of laboratory studies mainly
confined to a few species of rodents. He felt the
concentration on studies of causation to be un-
duly narrow. Deciding to teach in the English-
speaking world, he accepted a lectureship at
Oxford University in 1949. Although the facili-
ties he had hoped for never fully materialized,
he built up a research group that had a profound
influence on the growth of ethology around the
world. Leaving the bulk of the "stickleback prob-
lem" to his former pupils in Holland, he focused
on the adaptedness of behavior. His work on her-
ring gulls, started in Holland, blossomed into
comparative studies of many gull species, with
detailed data on a selected few. His most influ-
ential book, The Study of Instinct, based on a
series of lectures given at the American Mu-
seum of Natural History in 1947, appeared in
1951. Only 228 pages long, it had a tremendous
impact on the growth of ethology. Tinbergen's
writing style is very different from that of his
more ebullient colleague, Lorenz. Tinbergen
writes precisely and with great clarity, argu-
ing his points one by one. The book's impact
was increased by his thumbnail sketches of the
animals he was studying. In 1953, he published
Social Behaviour in Animals, written largely
while he was in the hostage camp.
One of Tinbergen's major contributions has
been to emphasize clearly the distinction be-
tween the four basic questions about behavior:
772 TINBERGEN, NIKOLAAS
its immediate causation, its development, its
consequences and function, and its evolution,
while at the same time showing how they are
interrelated. The Study of Instinct contained
112 pages on causation, but only 23 on develop-
ment, 34 on function, and 15 on evolution.
From then on, however, the emphasis changed.
Because the questions were interrelated, some
of the work on gulls was inevitably concerned
with the problem of causation, but the main
emphasis was on questions of function (what
is this behavior for?) and on evolution (how
did it evolve?). Properly critical of armchair
speculation on the functions of behavior, he
used the powerful technique of simple field ex-
periments. For example, noting that gulls re-
move the empty eggshells from the nest soon
after the chicks hatch, and that the parents' ab-
sence exposes the chicks to predation, he argued
that the removal must have an important func-
tion. By putting out eggs with or without empty
shells, Tinbergen and his pupils found that eggs
with empty shells nearby were more quickly
found by predators. Another major line of work
concerned the function of aggressive behavior
in the black-headed gull. First, by studying
the behavior of intruders onto territories in
which the owners were immobilized with a stupe-
fying drug, his student I. J. Patterson showed
that aggressive displays have a deterrent effect.
Territorial behavior promotes spacing out of the
nests, and by taking advantage of natural varia-
tion in spacing in the colony, it was possible to
show that spacing out reduces predation on
pipped eggs and on newly hatched chicks. In
this and other ways Tinbergen and his students
investigated one aspect after another of the
species under study.
Behavioral features can be as characteristic
of a species as morphological ones: they had
already been used by C. O. Whitman in the
United States of America and by O. Heinroth
and Lorenz in Germany to provide evidence of
evolutionary relationships between species. Es-
pecially valuable in this context were the
species-characteristic stereotyped movement
patterns used in threat and courtship. Tinber-
gen, though concerned with this problem, was
more interested in the related issue of the origin
of interspecies differences in behavior—that is,
of the way behavior had evolved. Since virtually
no fossil evidence on the behavior of extinct
species is available, scientific advance depends
on comparisons between present-day species.
Here, also, stereotyped movements proved valu-
able. If comparative studies reveal small differ-
ences between basically similar movement pat-
terns in related species, it is possible to con-
struct hypotheses suggesting which variants are
phylogenetically older. For this purpose addi-
tional information may be essential—for ex-
ample, knowledge about the function or causa-
tion of the movement. The differences between
the presumedly older forms and their modified
versions indicate the evolutionary changes un-
dergone by the latter. In this way, Tinbergen
was able to sketch the probable evolutionary
history of "derived movements"—movements
originally serving one function, such as walk-
ing, flying, or feeding, which had gradually
changed in evolution to serve as signals to other
individuals. The changes which such move-
ments had undergone to suit them for a signal
function were referred to as "ritualization." This
comparative research led to studies of the adap-
tive radiation of behavior as a concomitant of
speciation, and to the demonstration that the
invasion of a new niche led to modification of
diverse characters, including social structure.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the young
discipline of ethology was criticized by compara-
tive psychologists in the United States of Amer-
ica. The two principal issues concerned the de-
velopment of behavior and its evolution. While
American comparative psychologists had fo-
cused on the study of learning, and tended to
equate the study of development with the study
of the role of experience in development, Tin-
bergen, and also Lorenz, were impressed by
interspecies differences that could not be ac-
counted for by differences in experience. Such
a genetic emphasis was contrary to the Anglo-
American ideologies of the day (and perhaps
equally to those of the communists). Second,
while most American psychologists had equated
the problem of the evolution of behavior with
that of explaining the diverse levels of com-
plexity in the entire range of the animal king-
dom, Tinbergen had been concerned with prob-
lems of microevolution—the ways in which
closely related species came to differ from each
other. The chief criticism came from T. C.
Schneirla, at the American Museum of Natural
History, himself a prominent field naturalist.
Schneirla had an involved literary style and
published largely in journals that were not
widely read; but in 1953 Daniel S. Lehrman,
Schneirla's student, published a clearly written
summary of their views. Though Lehrman had
been persuaded to tone down his article by col-

leagues (especially Ernst Mayr and Frank
Beach), it contained a sharp and in parts hard-
hitting attack on many aspects of the ethologi-
cal approach. But, largely because of Tinber-
gen's ability to be hard-headed when sure he
was right, and yet to meet his critics half way
when he was not certain, this paper led to a
close friendship between the protagonists and a
rapprochement between most comparative psy-
chologists and ethologists. On the ontogeny
issue, both sides changed their emphasis; on the
evolutionary issue, the differences in approach
were explicitly acknowledged.
As his move to Oxford demonstrated, Tinber-
gen was as much concerned with establishing
the science of ethology as with his own contri-
bution to extending the frontiers of research.
He wrote freely in natural history journals and
for the Scientific American, and two of his best
books were written for the educated layman:
The Herring Gull's World (1953a) and Curious
Naturalists (1958). Recognizing that the quality
of his work could best be conveyed on film, he
put most of his energies in the 1960s into mak-
ing scientific films. One of these, "Signals for
Survival," made jointly with Hugh Falkus, won
the Italian prize for documentary television
films and the blue ribbon of the New York
Film Festival. Many of his films have not only
been widely shown on television, but have
formed an integral part of his colleagues' lec-
ture courses around the world.
In the late 1960s Tinbergen became increas-
ingly preoccupied with the implications of the
ethological approach for man. In 1968 he gave
his inaugural lecture as professor of animal be-
havior at Oxford on the theme of "War and
Peace in Animals and Man." He pointed out the
similarities between man and species that hold
group territories, in order to emphasize the pos-
sible consequences of the ineffectiveness in
man of some of the mechanisms that reduce
violence in nature. While believing that it is
impossible to eliminate man's propensity to
fight, he argued that the only hope is to find
less dangerous and more useful goals. He took
up this theme again in his Croonian lecture to
the Royal Society (1972).
In using his experience with animals to re-
flect on the problems of humanity, Tinbergen
did not fall into the trap of merely looking for
similarities. Rather, he constantly emphasized
the differences between animals and man and
argued that some of the methods and principles
derived from work with animals were ap-
TINBERGEN, NIKOLAAS 773
plicable to humans. For example, the compara-
tive method, applied by biologists to closely re-
lated species, could profitably be applied by
social scientists to human cultures.
Tinbergen also became concerned with the
reciprocal relationship between science and so-
ciety (1976). He had long seen that scientific
endeavor is a function of the attitudes in the
society in which it occurs, and he had, for ex-
ample, related the rise of behaviorism in the
United States of America to the pioneering ideal—
the belief that nature, including human na-
ture, can be tamed by appropriate environ-
mental manipulation. However, he later came
to emphasize that science should influence so-
ciety. He saw this as crucial in an era when,
"because of our one-sided appreciation and our
complacent acceptance of the blessings of our
civilization: of reduced infant mortality, of in-
creased affluence, of our 'spiritual life', and last
but not least of science itself" (1976), man
had failed to see the inevitable consequences of
technology, of the psychosocial pressures to
which he was subjected, and of his exploitation
of natural resources and pollution of the en-
vironment. Tinbergen advocated a two-pronged
attack, one aimed at making the environment
more suitable, the other at making citizens of
the future more capable of coping with their
habitat. Among the tools for the latter task he
placed first a more biologically balanced form
of education, with less emphasis on instruction
and more room for play and exploration. In
calling for a bloodless revolution in ways of us-
ing the environment and treating other hu-
mans, Tinbergen urged intellectuals in general
to help change the climate of world opinion,
and ethologists in particular to guide their work
toward increasing relevance to the human pre-
dicament.
The revolution in the study of animal be-
havior for which Tinbergen was largely respon-
sible was based on a number of hard-headed
attacks on a relatively few highly specific prob-
lems—for example, the nature of the stickle-
back's courtship, the stimuli causing a young
herring gull to beg, the functional explanation
of why gulls bother to remove empty eggshells
from the nest. It was natural that his wide-
ranging concern for the future of human so-
ciety would also find expression in the study of
a specific issue—the nature of early childhood
autism. Just as his observational methods had
shown gull threat postures to be the product of
conflicting tendencies to attack and to flee from
 774 TINBERGEN, NIKOLAAS
the rival, so also Tinbergen and his wife, watch-
ing their own and other children, came to be-
lieve that children could be caught in a conflict
between fear and a desire to make social con-
tact. In extreme cases, the Tinbergens believe,
this fear dominates the conflict unduly and can
give rise to childhood autism. Ironically, as ethol-
ogists, they have had to stress the decisive in-
fluence of the early environment. Their views
have been met with skepticism in medical
circles, where autism is believed to have a
strong congenital element. The Tinbergens' re-
ply lies in their careful study of the children's
nonverbal behavior and, concomitantly, of their
early environment. In practice, they attempted
to reduce the child's apprehension by permitting
him to make contact gradually, in his own time,
and thus to come slowly out of his shell.
From a life of observation, experiment, and
reflection with subjects ranging from hunting
wasps to autistic children, it is difficult to sum-
marize briefly what Tinbergen stands for. To
establish ethology as a scientific discipline?
Perhaps, but that raises the question of the
precise nature of ethology. Ethology, like
any healthily growing science, has no clear
boundaries. The best definition perhaps is that
it attempts to answer, on a basis of sound de-
scription, the four questions about behavior that
Tinbergen distinguished—the questions of cau-
sation, development, function, and evolution.
This definition carries with it the implications
first that observation must precede experiment,
and second, that complete understanding will
not come from the answer to any one of the
questions. In this respect, the study of behavior
is quite unlike physical science. Many issues
that an ethologist meets simply do not exist in
physics. No one thinks of asking "What is a
cloud for?" Furthermore, the ethologist must
always keep the whole system in mind as he
analyzes it, in order to understand the nature of
its parts. Thinking in terms of simple princi-
ples, or at one level of analysis, is unlikely to be
fertile for long. The student of behavior must
build links "downwards" to physiology (includ-
ing genetics and endocrinology), "upwards" to
psychology and psychiatry, social psychology,
and sociology, and laterally to ecology and evo-
lutionary studies. Moreover, because of man's
present situation, the ethologist must be in the
forefront of the battle against pollution, overex-
ploitation, malsocialization, and other excesses
of the modern world, constantly using the lessons
learned from the similarities, and the equally im-
portant differences, between animals and man.
The task of applying ethological approaches to
man is now, in Tinbergen's opinion, becoming
an important "growing point" of ethology—and
of biology.
However, as his students and colleagues have
known, Tinbergen's personal characteristics-
energy and enthusiasm, humility, stubborn
perseverance—have played as crucial a role in
the growth of ethology as his ideas. Without his
combination of obstinacy and flexibility, the
rapprochement with comparative psychology
might well have been delayed. Although this
rapprochement has led to differences of opinion
between the more conservative German ethol-
ogists and what Lorenz calls "English-speaking
ethologists," there can be no doubt that Tinber-
gen has been the cornerstone of the new ethol-
ogy. He has helped to promote a more balanced
development of ethology than its exuberant and
assertive early phases might well have inaugu-
rated, a development that reflects much of what
Tinbergen advocated as "the biological ap-
proach" to behavior.
R. A. HlNDE
WORKS BY TINBERGEN
1942 An Objectivistic Study of the Innate Behaviour
of Animals. Bibliotheca Biotheoretica Series D
1:39-98.
1948 Social Releasers and the Experimental Method
Required for Their Study. Wilson Bulletin 60:6-51.
(1951) 1969 The Study of Instinct. Oxford: Claren-
don. —» Based on a series of lectures given at the
American Museum of Natural History in 1947.
1952 "Derived" Activities: Their Causation, Biological
Significance, Origin, and Emancipation During
Evolution. Quarterly Review of Biology 27:1-32.
(1953a) 1961 The Herring Gull's World: A Study of
the Social Behaviour of Birds. Rev. ed. New York:
Basic Books. —> A paperback edition was published
by Harper in 1971.
1953i> Social Behaviour in Animals, With Special
Reference to Vertebrates. London: Methuen.
(1958) 1969 Curious Naturalists. Garden City, N.Y.:
Anchor Books.
1959 Comparative Studies of the Behaviour of Gulls
(Laridae): A Progress Report. Behaviour 15:1—70.
1963 On Aims and Methods of Ethology. Zeitschrift
fur Tierpsychologie 20:410-433.
1967 Adaptive Features of the Black-headed Gull
Larus ridibundus. Pages 43—59 in International
Ornithological Congress, Fourteenth, Oxford, 1966,
Proceedings. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publica-
tions.
1968 On War and Peace in Animals and Man: An
Ethologist's Approach to the Biology of Aggression.
Science 160:1411-1418.
1972 Functional Ethology and the Human Sciences.
Royal Society of London, Proceedings Series B
182:385-410. —» The Croonian lecture.
1972 TINBERGEN, NIKOLAAS; and TINBERGEN, E. A.
Early Childhood Autism: An Ethological Approach.
Zeitschrift fur Tierpsychologie Beiheft 10:1-53.

1972-1973 The Animal in Its World: Explorations of
an Ethologist, 1932-1972. 2 vols. London: Allen &
Unwin. —•» Volume 1: Field Studies. Volume 2:
Laboratory Experiments and General Papers, 1932—
1972.
1976 Ethology in a Changing World. Pages 507-529
in Patrick P. G. Bateson and Robert A. Hinde (edi-
tors), Growing Points in Ethology. Cambridge Univ.
Press.
TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J.
Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889-1975) was
born in London, educated at Winchester and
Balliol College, Oxford, as a classicist, and spent
the greater part of his professional life on the
staff of the Royal Institute of International Af-
fairs in London, charged with the task of writ-
ing an annual survey of world events. Gilbert
Murray, whose daughter Toynbee married in
1913, was the man who most influenced the
young Toynbee during his Oxford days, but even
as an undergraduate, Toynbee evidenced a
strong tendency to synthesize. In particular he
set out to master the whole sweep of ancient
Mediterranean literature and history, combining
Greek and Roman studies into a single whole.
His teachers recognized Toynbee's remarkable
abilities; accordingly he started an academic
career by teaching Greek to Balliol undergrad-
uates (1912-1915).
World War i interrupted Toynbee's scholarly
activity, and permanently altered its direction.
He was declared unfit for military service, be-
cause of a bad case of dysentery he had con-
tracted during a walking tour through Greece
in 1911-1912. Nearly all of his Oxford friends
and contemporaries volunteered, and many
were killed in the trenches. Thereafter, the ac-
cidental way in which he had been saved from
the fate of his fellows weighed upon his mind,
imposing a special obligation upon him to work
hard and do something meaningful with his life.
In 1915 Toynbee entered government service
as a war propagandist—a role of which he later
felt deeply ashamed. He wrote several popular
and inflammatory pamphlets denouncing Turk-
ish and German atrocities, and published a de-
tailed indictment of Turkish official efforts to
destroy the Armenians (1915a). His job brought
him into touch with the power elite of Great
Britain, and the young scholar was among the
experts who attended the Paris Peace Confer-
ence in 1919, where he played a minor part in
framing the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey.
In 1919 Toynbee returned to academic life,
TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. 775
accepting a newly established Korais chair in
modern Greek and Byzantine language, litera-
ture, and history at the University of London.
This chair had been endowed by men of Greek
descent who felt that English education had
concentrated attention on ancient Greece to the
exclusion of Byzantine and modern times, and
wished to correct the disbalance. In accepting
the appointment, Toynbee saw the possibility of
combining his interest in ancient Mediterranean
history with his new-sprung concern for con-
temporary international relations. But he had
scarcely taken up his new role when a harsh
collision between his ideas and those of the
donors caused him to resign his chair in 1924.
After some anxious months, Toynbee was ap-
pointed to the British (later Royal) Institute of
International Affairs, where for the next 14
years he was responsible for preparing an an-
nual survey of international affairs, while on
the side he worked at what would be his mag-
num opus, the multivolumed A Study of History.
The clash of ideas leading to his resignation
from the Korais chair was critical for Toynbee's
later work and deserves closer attention. During
and immediately after World War i, Toynbee
shared a vaguely liberal faith in the beneficence
of national self-determination. As was his wont,
he recorded his views in a book, Nationality and
the War (1915£>), which explored ways in which
self-determination could be reconciled with the
strategic interests of the great powers. The long
drawn-out agony of World War i may subse-
quently have called the virtues of nationalism
into question in Toynbee's mind; but the deci-
sive turn away from his previous outlook oc-
curred only in 1921. The occasion was a visit
to Anatolia, where in 1921 fighting between
Greeks and Turks had broken out anew.
On arriving in Smyrna, he found ample evi-
dence of Greek atrocities against Turks—brutal-
ity of exactly the sort that he had pilloried dur-
ing the war in chronicling Turkish atrocities
against the Armenians. Cruelty on such a scale
appalled him, and required explanation. How
could men, seemingly civilized and even charm-
ing in private encounters, engage in such besti-
ality, or condone it in others?
Toynbee's answer was conditioned by the fact
that in 1920 he had read Oswald Spengler's Der
Untergang des Abendlandes (1918-1922), and
there, for the first time, encountered the idea of
a plurality of civilizations, each following a
fixed, cyclical pattern of growth and decay.
Spengler's book affected him strongly, for Toyn-
 776 TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J.
bee himself, since 1914, had recognized a pro-
found parallelism between ancient Greco-Ro-
man history and that of modern Europe. World
War i had seemed to him like a reprise of the
Peloponnesian War, or perhaps, of the Punic
Wars. Human history, he felt, fundamentally
conformed to a tragic pattern, whereby pride
and excess led, sooner or later, to disaster. He
developed this theme in 1920 in a remarkable
lecture later published as The Tragedy of Greece
(1921). Here for the first time he used terms
that were to be constitutive for his Study of His-
tory, applying them to Greco-Roman civiliza-
tion, and using literary quotations to illustrate
the changing "state of the soul" which he was
analyzing. At this point in his thought, Toynbee
was concerned only with Greco-Roman and
modern European patterns of history and seems
to have conceived of civilization as a single, if
cyclical, creation, humanity's "supreme work of
art." His reading of Spengler suggested to him
that other peoples, perhaps, also exhibited the
cyclical patterning discernible in Greco-Roman
history, in which case civilization ceased to be
singular and instead became plural.
What Toynbee saw in Anatolia in 1921 con-
firmed this hypothesis. He came to believe that
the brutality he witnessed—Greek and Turkish
alike—was a result of the breakup of a newly-
discerned entity, Ottoman civilization. Moral
restraints and social rules that had regulated
human encounters in the heyday of that civiliza-
tion had lost their power over the heirs of that
dying civilization—Turks, Greeks, Armenians.
Instead, ideas imported from western Europe,
above all the idea of nationalism, sanctified the
mass brutality and amorality of the Greek-Turk-
ish War. Nationalism thus became an evil
rather than a good; and the intrusive West-
erners, who since 1699 had been exploiting their
superior power to disrupt the fabric of Ottoman
society and civilization, were partly (even
mainly) responsible for the atrocities Toynbee
had witnessed, as well as those he had accused
the Turks of perpetrating during World War i.
If civilizations were, indeed, plural, as his ex-
perience in Anatolia in 1921 seemed to prove,
the next question to ask was whether the tragic
pattern he had already discerned in Greco-
Roman history and glimpsed in modern Euro-
pean history was shared by other civilizations
in other parts of the world, as Spengler had de-
clared was the case. The death throes of Otto-
man civilization, as analyzed in his book, The
Western Question in Greece and Turkey (1922),
certainly predisposed Toynbee to suppose that
similar tragic patterns held throughout the
world; yet as an Englishman and self-styled
empiricist, he thought that he ought to test the
hypothesis by looking for analogues and paral-
lels in the history of the rest of the world be-
fore, like Spengler, dogmatically declaring the
truth of his new idea. Accordingly, as he was
returning to London by train from Constanti-
nople, he jotted down on a single sheet of paper
the 13 headings around which his Study of
History was later organized.
The ambition to test his great hypothesis was
thereafter always in the forefront of Toynbee's
mind, but during his years at the Royal Institute
of International Affairs, he had to reconcile this
project with the requirements of his job, which
were heavy enough. For Toynbee was expected
to write an annual volume of approximately five
hundred pages, surveying international affairs,
and to publish it as soon after the events as pos-
sible, so as to provide a basis for intelligent public
appraisal of the problems of foreign policy. At
first he had to catch up, twice publishing two
volumes in a single year. By 1930 he had come
abreast of events, and he could start work on
the current year in November, and then write
furiously until June, by which time the text had
to go off to the printer so as to appear within a
twelvemonth of the period being surveyed. This
regimen gave him free time in summers to start
writing A Study of History. Close interplay be-
tween current events and the sweep of world
history was built into Toynbee's rhythm of work.
He systematically shifted the geographical focus
of each annual survey, partly in response to the
drift of current events, but also in order to com-
pel himself to master the historical background
of each major part of the earth, preparatory to
both the upcoming survey and his Study of
History.
The first three volumes of his magnum opus
appeared in 1934, followed by the second three
volumes in 1939. Then came World War n,
when Toynbee's career was once again inter-
rupted by official duties in the Foreign Office.
He resumed work on A Study of History in 1946
and brought out the final 4 volumes in 1954,
32 years after its grand structure had first been
conceived.
During that length of time, Toynbee's ideas
underwent far-reaching change. In the 1920s
and early 1930s his mind was still fundamen-

tally shaped by his classical training. Civiliza-
tions were, in his eyes, the supreme achievement
of humankind—a state of the soul, shared by
millions, which defined what was good and
thereby gave humanity goals to strive for, and
made individual lives meaningful. All civiliza-
tions, he declared, were "philosophically con-
temporary" with each other and equally valu-
able. This was, indeed, one of the main thrusts
of his first volumes. He sought to correct the
myopia of Western minds which had previously
assumed that the values of their own civiliza-
tion were universal and uniquely valid.
Yet Toynbee's relativism had its limits: for
the other central proposition of these first vol-
umes was that all civilizations conformed to the
tragic pattern he had discerned in Greco-Roman
history, passing from growth to breakdown, fol-
lowed by the rise of a universal state and uni-
versal church. A church might, under propitious
conditions, serve as chrysalis from which a new
"affiliated" civilization could arise after the older
civilization had finally disappeared under the
blows of barbarian assault and proletarian re-
volt from within.
However entrancing such a grand structure
might be, as World War n announced its ap-
proach, Toynbee found it harder and harder to
believe that civilizations were the supreme cre-
ations of the human spirit. His distress was in-
flamed by family difficulties, climaxing with the
suicide of his eldest son (1939) and a separa-
tion from his wife (1942). This was followed
in 1946 by a divorce and remarriage to his long-
time research assistant. His private hurts were
matched by a sense of defeat in his professional
life, for the whole point of his study of inter-
national affairs had been to head off renewed,
suicidal war. Yet by 1938, Toynbee found him-
self urging the British government to resist Nazi
aggression, even at the risk of war!
Little by little, Toynbee worked his way to-
ward a revaluation of the human condition. Per-
sonal mystical experiences, three times renewed,
played a part in convincing him that a "supreme
spiritual reality" existed, beyond the world of
ordinary experience. Its gradual self-revelation
to humankind was what gave history meaning.
Such a vision can be understood as a shift away
from Toynbee's earlier classical, cyclical frame-
work for viewing human affairs to a fundamen-
tally Judeo-Christian, linear conception of his-
tory. The shift made his writing a faithful
mirror of the deepest bifurcation in Western
TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. 777
civilization itself. Both the acclaim and the
fierce attack that Toynbee's ideas generated
after 1947 reflected the provocative manner in
which his writings mirrored these deep-set and
fundamentally incompatible heritages of West-
ern thought.
A few passages in the volumes of A Study of
History published in 1939 reflected Toynbee's
new religiosity, but only after World War n did
his altered point of view achieve clear expres-
sion. Yet, oddly enough, the extraordinary fame
that came to him with the American publication
of a one-volume abbreviation of the first six
volumes of A Study of History (1947), rested
more on his older classical and cyclical vision
of the human condition than on his newer,
transcendental outlook.
Toynbee's renown was largely the work of
Henry Luce and his magazines, Time and Life.
Luce believed that Toynbee's work demonstrated
great rhythms of human experience that were
compelling the United States to what he had
already christened "The American Century."
Many Americans were in fact puzzled and dis-
mayed at the sudden emergence of their nation
as a great power, soon to be locked in cold war
with the Soviet Union. Why had such a thing
occurred? Who was responsible? Was the
United States caught up in some vast historical
process that worked independently of human
will? Toynbee's discussion of the genesis,
growth, breakdown, and dissolution of civiliza-
tions spoke directly to such concerns. It is not,
therefore, surprising that his ideas met with
extraordinary response in the United States.
His sudden fame, in turn, required intellec-
tuals in both Britain and the United States to
come to terms with Toynbee's ideas, and for the
first time professional historians and other
shapers of learned opinion began to pay atten-
tion to his grand synthesis. Their reaction was
to find fault with his generalizations and charge
him with carelessness about detail. Debate
spread to Germany and France as well; even
Poles and Russians felt compelled to criticize
Toynbee's ideas. Attacks on Toynbee became
especially virulent after 1952, when he de-
livered the Reith lectures on British Broadcast-
ing Corporation radio (published as The World
and the West, 1953). In these lectures, Toynbee
blamed Westerners for past aggressions against
other peoples of the world, and had nothing kind
to say about European achievements. Many in
Britain felt indignant. Their empire was in
778 TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J.
process of dissolution; the Soviet Union pre-
sented an ominous challenge to liberal values.
To his critics, Toynbee seemed like a traitor to
all that had made Britain and the Western world
great.
The appearance of the next four volumes of
A Study of History in the following year added
fresh fuel to the controversy, for here Toynbee's
religiosity became fully apparent. Unfriendly
critics accused him of overweening pride in
undertaking, like the prophets of old, to define
God's purposes for all mankind. Toynbee did not
respond directly to his critics, which enraged
them even more; but in retirement he did even-
tually publish a volume of Reconsiderations
(1961), reassessing his great work in the light
of what others had said. In this volume, Toyn-
bee freely admitted that he had made errors of
detail; and he also altered the roster of civiliza-
tions as presented in A Study of History, On
major points he stood firm, yet the grandeur of
his original synthesis was diminished by the
modifications and retractions he accepted in his
Reconsiderations. On the other hand, his modest
and irenic tone disarmed his fiercer opponents.
Toynbee, in effect, left the task of amending
his great work to others. Instead, after his re-
tirement in 1954, he returned to scholarly
themes he had been compelled to drop in 1915.
Two massive works resulted: Hannibal's Legacy
(1965) and Constantine Porphyrogenitus and
His World (1973). The first was a magistral
summation of all that scholars could find out
about Roman history between 266 and 133 B.C.
and rebutted in act rather than by words the
charges of those critics who accused him of
carelessness with detail. However, it offered
little in the way of new ideas; and the same was
true of Constantine Porphyrogenitus. Both works,
nevertheless, are admirable monuments of hu-
manistic scholarship.
In addition to these works, Toynbee continued
to write travel books, and many book-length
essays seeking to interpret the meaning of the
age in the light of both his metaphysical con-
victions and his continued observation of the
current scene. After 1961, debate over his ideas
waned in the Western world but in compensa-
tion his reputation mounted in Japan (and to a
lesser extent in Latin America and India).
There, Toynbee's critique of Western imperial-
ism met a readier acceptance than at home, and
his religious views struck a lively chord among
heirs of Asian traditions. Several of Toynbee's
conversations with questing spirits from the
non-Western world were published as books—
e.g., Surviving the Future (1971) and The Toyn-
bee-Ikeda Dialogue: Man Himself Must Choose
(1976b). They show that toward the end of his
life Toynbee became rather more cheerful than
he had been during and immediately after
World War n. The cold war did not develop into
the final catastrophe he once had feared; and
the open-endedness of history, upon which he
had always insisted, even when most convinced
that the troubles of his time attested the birth
pangs of a new universal state for Western
civilization, suggested to him that humanity
and civilization might yet succeed in surviving
the technical virtuosity of destruction that
modern technology had called into being.
He also cultivated a new interest in the design
and history of cities, inspired by encounters
with the architect Constantine Doxiades and his
Institute of Ekistics in Athens. This, too, pro-
duced several books, including Cities of Destiny
(1967) and Cities on the Move (1970). At the
very end of his life, Toynbee embarked on a
general study of the ecological history of hu-
manity; but the manuscript, published posthu-
mously as Mankind and Mother Earth (1976a),
fell far short of its programmatic goal.
Toynbee's ceaseless writing came suddenly to
a halt in August 1974, when he suffered a
disabling stroke. He died 14 months later, on
October 22, 1975. His fame and the controversy
that his writing provoked made him the best-
known historian of his age. Whether writing
history on the basis of civilizational units and
ventures into metahistorical speculation will
prove fruitful remains to be seen. Still, the sig-
nificance of Toynbee's ideas as part of the in-
tellectual history of the twentieth century can
scarcely be doubted. He provoked passionate
responses not merely among English-speaking
peoples and west Europeans, but in Japan and
other non-Western lands as well. No historian
before him ever made such a cross-cultural im-
pact within his own lifetime, and few worked
harder to achieve a truly global perspective.
WILLIAM H. MCNEILL
WORKS BY TOYNBEE
1915a Armenian Atrocities: The Murder of a Nation.
London: Hodder & S tough ton.
1915& Nationality and the War. London: Dent.
1921 The Tragedy of Greece. Oxford: Clarendon.
(1922) 1970 The Western Question in Greece and
Turkey: A Study in the Contrast of Civilizations.
2d ed. New York: Fertig.
1934-1954 A Study of History. 10 vols. Oxford Univ.
Press. —» Volume 1: Introduction: The Genesis of

Civilization, Part 1, 1934. Volume 2: The Genesis
of Civilization, Part 2, 1934. Volume 3: The Growth
of Civilization, 1934. Volume 4: The Breakdowns
of Civilization, Part 1, 1939. Volume 5: The Break-
downs of Civilization, Part 2, 1939. Volume 6: The
Breakdowns of Civilization, Part 3, 1939. Volume 7:
Universal States; Universal Churches, 1954. Volume
8: Heroic Ages; Contacts Between Civilizations in
Space, 1954. Volume 9: Contacts Between Civiliza-
tion in Time; Law and Freedom in History; The
Prospects of Western Civilization, 1954. Volume 10:
The Inspirations of Historians, 1954. A two-volume
abridgment of all ten volumes, edited by D. C.
Somervell, was published by Oxford University
Press in 1947 (volumes 1-6) and 1957 (volumes
7-10).
1953 The World and the West. Oxford Univ. Press. —»
Reith lectures on British Broadcasting Corporation
radio.
1961 Reconsiderations. Oxford Univ. Press.
1965 Hannibal's Legacy. 2 vols. Oxford Univ. Press.
TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. 779
1967 TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. (editor) Cities of Destiny.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
1970 Cities on the Move. Oxford Univ. Press.
1971 Surviving the Future. Oxford Univ. Press.
1973 Constantine Porphyrogenitus and His World. Ox-
ford Univ. Press.
1976a Mankind and Mother Earth. Oxford Univ. Press.
—» Published posthumously.
1976£> The Toynbee-Ikeda Dialogue: Man Himself
Must Choose. Edited and translated by Richard L.
Gage. New York: Kodansha. —» Published posthu-
mously.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
SPENGLER, OSWALD (1918-1922)1926-1928 The De-
cline of the West. 2 vols. Authorized translation with
notes by Charles F. Atkinson. New York: Knopf. —»
Volume 1: Form and Actuality. Volume 2: Perspec-
tives of World History. First published as Der Unter-
gang des Abendlandes.
 VANCE, RUPERT B.
Rupert Bayless Vance (1899-1975), who at
his death was Kenan professor emeritus of so-
ciology at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, grew up on a farm near Plumer-
ville, Arkansas. His father operated the farm
and kept a general store in town. His mother
taught school. When he was three years old an
attack of polio left his legs paralyzed, and he
moved on crutches and in wheelchairs for the
rest of his life. Crippled from early childhood,
he read omnivorously. His fascination with
books and with events around him was ency-
clopedic, probing, and analytical. He could not
do many of the things most boys did, but he did
not isolate himself from his peers.
Vance spent his entire career in the South
and identified strongly with the region. He be-
gan his sociological work in the great center of
Southern regional studies developed by Howard
W. Odum at Chapel Hill, where Vance's con-
temporaries included such scholars as Harriet
L. Herring, Katharine Jocher, and Guy B. John-
son. Vance's early years as a sociologist thus
coincided with the great depression of the
1930s.
The intersection of the great depression and
Vance's identification with his native rural
South profoundly affected the early writings
that made his reputation. He already had
studied Southern problems in his published dis-
sertation, written under Odum's direction. En-
titled Human Factors in Cotton Culture (1929),
it was a remarkable interweaving of analysis of
cotton farming as a social system and concrete
depiction of the lives of sharecroppers and small
farmers. His next book, Human Geography of
the South (1932), was a monumental treatise
drawing from geology, geography, ecology, eco-
nomics, sociology, and history to explain the
differing ways of life in Southern subregions.
Many of Vance's publications during the 1930s
dealt with what were then called "human" prob-
lems of the South. Examples include "Human
Factors in the South's Agricultural Readjust-
ment" (1934), How the Other Half Is Housed:
A Pictorial Record of Subminimum Farm Hous-
ing in the South (1936), and Farmers Without
Land (1937). Policy-oriented research on the
South was the primary emphasis of sociology at
Chapel Hill during the 1930s, and Odum stimu-
lated virtually all members of the department,
but Vance, no mere disciple extending Odum's
ideas, developed his own approaches.
Vance was not a narrowly disciplinary so-
ciologist but a broad-gauged social scientist and
a humanist. His boyhood reading had been
mainly in English and American literature. In
1920 he had earned his A.B. at Henderson-
Brown College in Arkansas, majoring in English
and social sciences. From there he went to
Vanderbilt University for an M.A. in economics.
He then taught English from 1921 to 1925, two
years in a high school in Talihina, Oklahoma,
and two as instructor at South Georgia College.
During these early years, Vance learned first-
hand about social conditions in several very
different parts of the South. He saw poverty,
pellagra, hookworm, rickety shacks, and worn-
out people tilling wornout land. This dismal
spectacle could have disheartened some sensi-
781
 782 VANCE, RUPERT B.
live observers; but Vance was an optimist.
Coming to believe that sociology could be a
vehicle for the betterment of the region, he re-
solved to become a sociologist. He learned of the
new department of sociology that had been
created by Odum in 1920 at Chapel Hill; of
Odum's Institute for Research in Social Science,
founded in 1924; and of Odum's journal, Social
Forces, which had begun publication in 1922
and at that time specialized in Southern prob-
lems. Vance went to North Carolina as a grad-
uate student in 1926, received his PH.D. and an
associate professorship in 1928, and remained
at Chapel Hill throughout his academic career.
Vance never ceased to acknowledge his deep
intellectual debt to Odum, but after the 1930s
he had growing doubts about the utility of
Odum's concept of regionalism as a tool for
social science and planning. Regionalism was
not an analytical concept or a theory, but an
eclectic empirical rubric under which the social
scientist brought to bear the facts and insights
of whatever disciplines seemed appropriate to
the solution or understanding of given prob-
lems. In the hands of a master like Vance, re-
gionalism could be a useful orienting device; but
a close reading of Human Geography of the
South and Vance's subsequent writings during
the heyday of Odum's regionalism leaves the
impression that he could have written them
whether or not he had been exposed to the con-
cept. In his later years he came to regard the
policy aspect of regionalism as essentially a
framework for organizing the kinds of reform
programs that were no longer essential in the
South after World War n, where, as Vance once
said, "the New Deal has been dealt."
From about 1940, Vance's research shifted
from Southern poverty to demography and hu-
man ecology, though his writings continued to
treat mainly the South. His third major work,
All These People: The Nation's Human Re-
sources in the South (1945), won acclaim from
demographers as a model of its kind. It pains-
takingly surveyed the population composition
and processes of the Southern people in 146
tables, 281 graphs, and 503 pages of text.
Vance's most influential contribution to human
ecology was his paper with Sara Smith, "Metro-
politan Dominance and Integration" (1954).
This paper succinctly analyzed the emerging
urban networks of the South. It used an em-
pirical study to show clearly and convincingly
how human ecology is a matter of social orga-
nization, not just of spatial arrangements, es-
pecially in an age of instant communication.
Vance was, in a sense, a "professional South-
erner," but decidedly not a parochial sectionalist
or an agrarian romantic. He was a sober realist
who believed that the South's destiny was, and
should be, to enter the mainstream of an ur-
banized national society. But he also believed
that the region could keep some of its rural and
small-town quality of life and avoid the worst
of the big-city problems that plagued other re-
gions (1954). These hopes were prophetic for
the North as well as for the South. Southern
industrialization remained chiefly in small
cities, small towns, and the countryside; and by
the time of Vance's death, Northern industry
was rapidly deconcentrating from central cities
to greener, less crowded (and less taxed) places.
The South made great strides during Vance's
career, and his writings pointed the way. In his
first major work he had surveyed King Cotton's
oppressive realm. Before his retirement he
wrote an article entitled "Beyond the Fleshpots"
(1965), in which he pronounced the Mason-
Dixon line "no longer an iron curtain against
the Affluent Society" and summoned the region
to the pursuit of high culture.
Vance's impact extended far beyond his writ-
ings. He served as a consultant to the National
Resources Planning Board, the Rosenwald Fund,
the Social Science Research Council, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health, the Bureau of the
Census, and the United Nations. His studies
directly influenced the farm tenancy programs
of the New Deal. He was editor of Social Forces
for 12 years, for 8 of them jointly with Guy B.
Johnson. He directed dozens of dissertations
and helped many graduate students launch their
scholarly careers with publishable research term
papers long before this practice was common.
He influenced the Bureau of the Census indi-
rectly, through the work of several former stu-
dents who held key positions there, as well as
through his own studies.
Vance was not a systematic theorist. Many of
his writings were aimed at solving concrete
social problems. In his more purely academic
writings, his objective was to enable readers to
see social life whole. In both kinds of work his
approach was eclectic; he was more interested
in understanding specific situations completely,
and in their complexity, than in developing
theory. He drew together whatever ideas and
facts he thought most pertinent and did not fit

them to procrustean beds of abstract theory that
would sacrifice their richness of detail. There-
fore his sociological legacy is more empirical
than theoretical. For anyone who wants to un-
derstand the South as it struggled under the
dead weight of a one-crop farm economy, suf-
fered through the great depression, then burst
swiftly into prosperity and urbanism, Vance's
writings are unsurpassed. He successfully
blended historical and statistical data, penetrat-
ing insight, and warmly human portrayal of the
lives of ordinary people.
RICHARD L. SIMPSON
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The author has occasionally quoted, with permission,
from a memorial resolution written by George B. Tin-
doll for presentation to the faculty of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He also has benefited
from John Shelton Reed's introduction to a forthcoming
collection of Vance's writings.
WORKS BY VANCE
1929 Human Factors in Cotton Culture: A Study in
the Social Geography of the American South.
Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press.
(1932) 1968 Human Geography of the South: A Study
in Regional Resources and Human Adequacy. 2d
ed. New York: Russell.
1934 Human Factors in the South's Agricultural Re-
adjustment. Law and Contemporary Problems 1 -.
259-274.
1936 How the Other Half Is Housed: A Pictorial
Record of Subminimum Farm Housing in the South.
Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press.
(1937) 1938 Farmers Without Land. . . . Rev. ed.
New York: Public Affairs Committee.
1945 All These People: The Nation's Human Re-
sources in the South. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press.
1954 VANCE, RUPERT B.; and SMITH, SARA Metropoli-
tan Dominance and Integration. Pages 111-134 in
Rupert B. Vance and Nicholas J. Demerath (edi-
tors), The Urban South. Chapel Hill: Univ. of
North Carolina Press.
1965 Beyond the Fleshpots: The Coming Culture
Crisis in the South. Virginia Quarterly Review 41:
217-230.
1968a Odum, Howard W. Volume 11, pages 270-272
in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan
and Free Press.
1968b Region. Volume 13, pages 377-382 in Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited
by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press.
VINER, JACOB
Jacob Viner (1892-1970), economist-scholar,
was born in Montreal of immigrant parents. He
graduated in 1914 from McGill University,
where Stephen Leacock was one of his teachers.
VINER, JACOB 783
In 1915 he began graduate studies at Harvard
University; he was awarded his M.A. in that year
and his PH.D. in 1922. While at Harvard he
formed a close friendship with Frank W.
Taussig, one of America's most distinguished
economists.
Viner joined the faculty at the University of
Chicago as an instructor for the year 1916/1917.
He left at the end of the year for government
service in Washington, but returned in 1919.
In 1925, at the age of 32, he was promoted to
the rank of full professor, and he assumed the
Morton Hull chair in 1940. As editor of the
Journal of Political Economy for 18 years, he
brought the Journal to the peak of its dis-
tinction. In 1946 he went to Princeton Univer-
sity, where he held the Walker chair from 1950
until his retirement in 1960.
In addition to his academic career, Viner had
a record of distinguished public service. Starting
with a post on the U.S. Tariff Commission under
Taussig in 1917, he served briefly with the U.S.
Shipping Board during World War I. As a spe-
cial assistant to the U.S. Treasury and consulting
expert under Secretary Henry Morgenthau dur-
ing the period 1934-1939 and again in 1942,
he gave advice on a wide range of monetary and
financial matters. He was also a consultant to the
Department of State and the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
Viner was noted for his wit, his independence
of mind, his lavish devotion of time and energy
to helping others, particularly younger scholars,
and his extraordinary erudition in an astonish-
ing variety of fields. As a bibliophile, his advice
was frequently sought by the great libraries. As
a student of economic history, philosophy, litera-
ture, and theology, he helped scholars in these
fields and conducted many seminars in depart-
ments other than his own. Donald Winch, one
of Viner's former students, has written:
. . . he did not conform to the specialist pattern of
the modern academic. Moreover, he cannot be as-
similated within any of the obvious doctrinal or
ideological groupings. He was not an orthodox neo-
classical economist, still less a member of what has
become known as the "Chicago School," in spite of
his long connection with the Department of Eco-
nomics at the University of Chicago during the
period when some of its doctrines were being
formed. By the same token, he was not an orthodox
anti-Keynesian on matters of theory or policy. If a
label must be applied it seems best to describe him
as a learned sceptic, distrustful of both technical
 784 VINER, JACOB
and ideological fashion, yet always constructive,
never merely an iconoclast.
Viner achieved his international reputation
early in his career. Virtually all of his books
broke new ground and set an example for later
analysis and research. While Viner's contribu-
tions spanned a remarkable range of subjects,
his most noted contributions lay in three fields:
the theory of cost and production, international
economics, and intellectual history with empha-
sis upon the history of economic ideas.
Though his writings in the first of these areas
are few, they constitute profound and lasting
contributions. In 1921 he published "Price Poli-
cies: The Determination of Market Price" (re-
printed in 1958, pp. 3-7), a remarkable essay of
five pages in which he anticipated many of the
ideas on monopolistic competition that Edward
H. Chamberlin and Joan Robinson were to write
about more than a decade later. In that pape^
he notes the rarity in the real world of markets
approximating the conditions of perfect com-
petition; the requirements for perfect competi-
tion of homogeneity of products and responsive-
ness of prices to changing conditions; the nega-
tive slope of the noncompetitive firm's demand
curve and the tendency toward stickiness of
prices where monopolistic elements are present;
the wide range and variety of market forms be-
tween the polar cases of pure competition and
pure monopoly; the use of trademarks, brands,
variety in styling and packaging as means to
achieve differentiation of products—the attribute
subsequently used to characterize monopolistic
competition; competition by means of instru-
ments other than price, such as advertising,
packaging, and supplementary services; the
manufacture and sale of consumers' goods as the
natural province of product differentiation; the
role of price leadership in the supply of pro-
ducers' goods; and the kinked-demand-curve
model of oligopoly pricing.
The kinked-demand-curve model achieved
general notice only some two decades after Viner
introduced it. It postulates an asymmetry in the
reactions of oligopolists to price reductions and
price increases by their competitors: price re-
ductions are imitated to prevent loss of cus-
tomers, but price increases are characteristically
ignored, so that the firm that initiates price
changes is likely to lose out in either case. This
is still the most widely held theoretical explana-
tion for the infrequency of price changes in oli-
gopolistic industries.
Besides this extraordinary little piece, Viner
wrote a far more noted article on cost and pric-
ing. His "Cost Curves and Supply Curves" (1931,
reprinted in 1958, pp. 50-84) introduced a set
of ideas and analytic tools that are now found
in every textbook. They include the definition of
the concept of marginal cost as the derivative of
the firm's total cost with respect to magnitude of
output and the analysis of the relation of mar-
ginal to average cost; recognition of the fact
that, in the absence of externalities, average cost
including rent must be the same as marginal cost
excluding rent (the basis of Joan Robinson's
analysis of her four cost curves); analysis of the
relation of constant and increasing costs to the
equilibrium of the firm; analysis of the role of
internal and external economies; the important
listinction between pecuniary and technological
externalities; the recognition that under imper-
fect competition marginal revenue must be less
than price; and the formulation, using the ter-
minology now universally employed, of the nec-
essary condition for profit maximization, that
marginal cost equal marginal revenue.
One of the major contributions of this article
occurred fortuitously. As part of his analysis of
the relation between the short- and long-run
average cost curves of the firm, Viner asked Y. K.
Wong, a young mathematician, to draw a dia-
gram whose specification involved a mathemati-
cal contradiction. From their discussion of the
problem emerged a fundamental result, now
called the Wong-Viner theorem, which shows
that the long-run supply curve is the envelope
of the short-run curves; that is, it is composed of
the lowest segments of the short-run curves cor-
responding to the different sizes of plant avail-
able to the firm when planning its construction
program. In the initial publication of the article
and even in its many subsequent reprintings,
Viner was careful to include his original error
and his report of the correction proposed by
Wong, which served as the basis for all later
analysis of the subject.
In the area of international economics, Viner's
work covers the entire subject from the pure
theory of international trade, through the theory
and practice of commercial policy, to interna-
tional monetary theory and policy.
His work on the pure theory of international
trade was distinguished by an effort to extend
and modernize the Ricardian doctrine of com-
parative costs—to show that it can be severed
from the labor theory of value and stated instead
in terms of generalized real costs (see, in partic-

ular, Studies in the Theory of International
Trade, 1937, chapter 8). It is for this reason, per-
haps, that Viner's contributions to pure trade
theory are not widely read or appreciated today.
Contemporary work on trade theory is cast in
terms of opportunity costs, not real costs, follow-
ing the contributions of Gottfried Haberler on
the one hand and Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin
on the other. Viner's presentation of classical
trade theory is, nevertheless, the definitive re-
statement of Ricardian doctrine.
His papers on commercial policy include a
study and critique of American practice in the
application of the most-favored-nation clause,
arguing in favor of the "unconditional" form of
that clause, a study of the problems of conduct-
ing trade between state-controlled national econ-
omies, and papers on trade policy in the postwar
period (all these are reprinted in 1951, see es-
pecially chapters 1, 5, 14, 20, 24, 25). His most
important work in this field, however, was his
study of customs unions (1950), which supplied
the conceptual framework for analysis that has
been used by almost every other study of the
problem, theoretical and empirical. (Often, how-
ever, that framework has been misapplied; its
users do not always realize that the notions of
"trade creation" and "trade diversion" introduced
by Viner are useful only for assessing the effects
of a union on the world as a whole, not on indi-
vidual participants. It was typical of Viner's
work to take a cosmopolitan rather than a
national view.) His work on this subject also
provided a remarkable example of the proposi-
tion that is now known as the theorem of the
second best, which asserts that satisfaction of
some subset of the conditions necessary for an
optimum may in fact yield a net loss in welfare.
Thus, Viner showed that a partial reduction in
restrictions upon freedom of trade in the form
of a customs union may not always prove bene-
ficial to the world as a whole.
Viner's work on commercial policy was colored
by his fear that governments would interfere in-
creasingly with market forces, domestically and
internationally, and the same concern colored
his principal contribution to the literature on
trade and development (1952). It is, in effect,
an attack upon theories and strategies of de-
velopment based upon production for the domes-
tic market—upon the notion of balanced growth
developed by Ragnar Nurkse and the import-
substituting strategies advocated by Raul Pre-
bisch. It attacks, in addition, the proposition that
the terms of trade of developing countries are
VINER, JACOB 785
bound to deteriorate and the assertion that de-
velopment must be based upon industrialization.
Viner's first book on international monetary
economics, Canada's Balance of International
Indebtedness, 1900-1913 (1924), was one of
the first thorough studies of balance-of-payments
adjustment. It examined the manner in which
Canada's trade balance adjusted the inflow of
borrowed funds, tracing the effects of capital
inflows on the Canadian money supply and
Canadian prices, and the effects of price changes
on Canadian trade. In his Studies (1937, pp.
413-414), Viner said of that Canadian study:
"I concluded that the Canadian mechanism cor-
responded in all of its important aspects to the
mechanism as formulated in the classical doc-
trine."
Viner's Studies in the Theory of International
Trade deals mainly with the monetary side of
international economics (although its best-
known chapters deal with pure theory). Com-
bining his interest in the history of economic
thought with his interest in the balance-of-pay-
ments adjustment process, he produced a de-
tailed history of the development of international
monetary theory from the bullionists through
neoclassical doctrine. During and after World
War n, moreover, Viner wrote extensively on
monetary reconstruction (1951, chapters 13, 15,
21, 22).
In his contributions to the history of ideas,
Viner put to good use his remarkable erudition
and his meticulous scholarship. Much of his
work in this area was devoted to the theological
writings of the Middle Ages and thereafter, to
the doctrines of the mercantilists, and to the
work of Adam Smith, with contributions on the
work of Bernard Mandeville, Jeremy Bentham,
John Stuart Mill, and Alfred Marshall. In style,
the works range from the easy reading of the
delightful lectures, The Role of Providence in the
Social Order (1972), to the tour de force of his
introduction to John Rae's Life of Adam,
Smith (1965), with its virtuoso display of infor-
mation about intellectual life in the eighteenth
century.
No small set of themes runs through these
writings. But Viner was perhaps most fascinated
by the influence of theological treatises upon the
notions of the early economists and by the eco-
nomic ideas of the theologians themselves. At
least two works, both posthumously published,
have as their central subject the relation be-
tween economic and religious ideas. The major
work, Religious Thought and Economic Society
 786 VINER, JACOB
(1978), is composed of four chapters of an un-
finished intellectual history of the economic as-
pects of Christian theology from the early church
fathers up to the seventeenth century. The study
deals with such groups as the scholastics, the
Jansenists, the Jesuits, and the early Calvinists,
and with topics such as private property, riches
and poverty, usury, just price, and the Weber-
Tawney thesis on religion and the rise of capital-
ism. The Role of Providence in the Social Order
(1972) goes on to seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century religious thought, particularly in Eng-
land, and the manner in which it dealt with the
threat to traditional beliefs posed by the con-
tinuing discoveries of science. Viner found that,
despite the challenge of new ideas, theological
thought continued to exert extraordinary power
on economic ideas well up to the end of the
eighteenth century. A striking example is the
work of Adam Smith, whose economic ideas are
taken by most modern readers to be entirely
secular in content. It is now rarely recognized
that "the Invisible Hand" was a phrase widely
used by eighteenth-century deists (and Adam
Smith was a deist) to refer to the "Author of the
Universe." Thus, in The Wealth of Nations this
term was not used as mere metaphor but as a
description of the means Providence had used
not only to constrain human selfishness but even
to harness that selfishness as an instrument
working for the general good. Viner also em-
phasized the extraordinary apologetic character
of religious and economic thought in England
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
and its view that social and economic inequality
—poverty and wealth—are divinely ordained and
not subject to question. Viner concludes that in
England "the period 1660 to the 1770's was . . .
a period of entrenched, unchallenged and com-
placent conservatism" (1972, p. 98).
Another major subject of Viner's meticulous
scholarship was the work of the mercantilists, a
group composed of "practical men" writing be-
tween the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries
about economic policy in its relation to interna-
tional trade. Viner showed that many of the re-
ceived characterizations of mercantilist doctrines
were misrepresentations or oversimplifications.
He demonstrated, for example, that mercantilists
did not consider prosperity to be merely an in-
strument to promote national power but rather
an end in itself, in general coequal with the ob-
jective of national power. He showed also that
mercantilists were no homogeneous, undifferen-
tiable group. Perhaps most striking is his evi-
dence of a strong strain of laissez-faire ideas
among the mercantilist writers, at least some of
whom questioned the competence of govern-
ments to regulate economic affairs. Others raised
the classic problem about governmental regula-
tion of the consequences of human selfishness—
who, in such an arrangement, is to regulate the
regulators? Thus, Viner concludes that "if
Adam Smith had carefully surveyed the earlier
English economic literature . . . he would have
been able to find very nearly all the materials
which he actually used in his attack on pro-
tectionist aspects of the mercantilist doctrine"
(1937, p. 92.)
But perhaps Viner's greatest contribution was
his role in providing standards of scholarship,
of meticulous care and accuracy, which have
served as goals for several generations of stu-
dents interested in the history of ideas. His con-
victions on this score led Viner to write A Modest
Proposal for Some Stress on Scholarship in
Graduate Training (1953), a paper noteworthy
for its balance and moderation and the wit that
serves to convey all the more effectively the
author's passionate belief in this subject.
Many honors were awarded to him during
his lifetime, including 13 honorary doctor's
degrees. To celebrate Viner's sixty-fifth birthday,
his friends and colleagues collected some of his
most original and influential articles in a volume
entitled The Long View and the Short (1958).
Viner was president of the American Economic
Association in 1939/1940, and in 1962 he re-
ceived the association's most distinguished
honor, the Francis A. Walker medal, which is
awarded only once in five years. Viner was made
a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, the British Academy, and the London
School of Economics and Political Science, and
he was also elected a member of the American
Philosophical Society, the Royal Academy of
Sweden, and the Accademia dei Lincei. The
American Council of Learned Societies gave him
a special award in 1958.
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL AND ELLEN VINER SEILER
WORKS BY VINER
1923 Dumping: A Problem in International Trade.
Univ. of Chicago Press. —> A paperback edition was
published in 1966 in Reprints of Economic Classics
by Kelley.
(1924) 1977 Canada's Balance of International In-
debtedness, 1900-1913: An Inductive Study in the
Theory of International Trade. Philadelphia: Porcu-
pine.
(1937) 1965 Studies in the Theory of International
Trade. New York: Kelley.
 VOEGELIN, ERIC 787

(1950) 1961 The Customs Union Issue. Washington: perience, which was extremely important to
Kramer. —> Originally published by the Carnegie
him, was the basis of his first book, Vber die
Endowment for International Peace in the series
Form des amerikanischen Geistes (1928).
entitled Studies in the Administration of Interna-
tional Law and Organization, Returning to Austria, Voegelin in time be-
1951 International Economics: Studies. Glencoe, 111.:
came an associate professor on the law faculty
Free Press. —» Collection of previously published
papers. at Vienna. During this period (1929-1938) he
1952 International Trade and Economic Development:published several works, including a critical
Lectures Delivered at the National University of
study of the Kelsen-inspired Austrian constitu-
Brazil. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press; Oxford: Clarendon.
1953 A Modest Proposal for Some Stress on Scholar-tion, a scholarly dissection of the biological
claims of National Socialist race thinking, and
ship in Graduate Training: Address Before the Grad-
uate Convocation, Brown University, June 3, 1950.
a treatise on totalitarian movements as "political
Princeton Univ. Press.
1958 The Long View and the Short: Studies in Eco- religions." Forced to retire from his post after
the Nazi annexation of Austria in 1938, Voe-
nomic Theory and Policy. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
—> Collection of essays and book reviews. Includes
gelin managed to escape to Switzerland. After
a complete bibliography of Viner's writings up to
that time. he was joined by his wife, he emigrated to the
1964 Problems of Monetary Control. Princeton Uni- United States, teaching for brief periods at Har-
versity, International Finance Section, Essays in
vard University, Bennington College, and the
International Finance, No. 45. Princeton, N.J.: The
University of Alabama, until he was invited in
University.
1965 Guide to John Rae's Life of Adam Smith. Intro-1943 to Louisiana State University. There he
duction to John Rae's Life of Adam Smith. New taught government for many years and was
York: Kelley. ultimately appointed Boyd professor. In 1958
1968a Economic Thought: II. Mercantilist Thought.
the University of Munich invited Voegelin to
Volume 4, pages 435-443 in International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L.
occupy its first chair in political science and to
Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press. found and direct its Institute for Political Sci-
1968b Smith, Adam. Volume 14, pages 322-329 in
ence. After his retirement from Munich in 1969,
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Voegelin, who had become a naturalized Amer-
Free Press. ican citizen, returned to the United States to
1972 The Role of Providence in the Social Order: An
reside in Stanford, where he accepted an ap-
Essay in Intellectual History. Philadelphia: Ameri-
can Philosophical Society. —» A paperback edition
pointment as senior research fellow at the
was published by Princeton University Press inHoover Institution. He continues to live in Stan-
1976.
1978 Religious Thought and Economic Society: Fourford.
Chapters of an Unfinished Work. Edited by JacquesEric Voegelin's publications reflect his as-
Melitz and Donald Winch. Durham, N.C.: Duke similation of materials that range from institu-
Univ. Press. —> Available in a paperback edition
tional and foreign policy studies to textual
as volume 10, no. 1 of the journal entitled History
of Political Economy, 1978. analyses in many ancient and modern lan-
guages. His linguistic gifts, and his knowledge
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ROBBINS, LIONEL 1970 Jacob Viner: A Tribute.
of the specialized literature of ancient cultures,
Princeton Univ. Press. have enabled him to pursue varied research in-
terests, unbound by disciplinary conventions,
in political science, philosophy, archeology,
VOEGELIN, ERIC comparative religions, the philosophy of history,
and literary criticism. He has also read widely
Eric Voegelin, a leader in the attempt to re- in the other social sciences and in physics and
cover a critical and comprehensive philosophy biology. Voegelin was relatively unknown in the
of man, society, and history, was born in English-speaking world until the 1950s, when
Cologne in 1901. His family soon moved to The New Science of Politics (1952) was pub-
Vienna, where he received his education. After lished, and his magnum opus, Order and His-
graduating in law from the University of Vi- tory (1956-1974), began to appear.
enna, he began his academic career as an as- Voegelin's openness to the implications of
sistant to Hans Kelsen. From 1924 to 1927 he newly discovered textual materials has led him
traveled abroad as a Laura Spelman Rockefeller substantially to revise his writing plans at criti-
fellow, largely in the United States, where he cal points. Thus, in 1943 he abandoned a
attended the lectures of John Dewey, Alfred lengthy "History of Political Ideas" that followed
North Whitehead, and John R. Commons at conventional chronological organization to work
their respective universities. His American ex- out an important new theory of experience and
 788 VOEGELIN, ERIC
its symbolization. This theory became the basis
for Order and History. Similarly, after publish-
ing the first three volumes of Order and History,
which in important respects preserved a histori-
cal time line from the ancients to the present,
Voegelin recast much of the work in terms of
principles spelled out in the introduction to the
fourth volume of the series. The older "History
of Political Ideas" remains today largely un-
published; however, in 1975 important portions
of it were published as From Enlightenment to
Revolution.
Voegelin's philosophy of political existence.
Voegelin insists that the task of contemporary
thought is, as written by T. S. Eliot, to "recover
what has been lost" in the understanding of
man, society, and history in the modern cen-
turies. It would be a mistake, however, to call
him a "traditionalist" or to apply any compara-
ble label to his work, first, because his teaching
can be criticized only on the basis of extensive
philosophical and textual knowledge, second,
because it cannot be encapsulated within one
philosophical or political category. Voegelin
himself has called such attempts "positionism,"
meaning that branding a thinker's teaching in
terms of some unfashionable or minority "posi-
tion" is a way of avoiding close and serious
examination of its tenets.
Voegelin is emphatic in claiming for his work
full "empirical" status. Initially, his philosophy
of existence stemmed not from "vain and per-
ishing curiosity," but from his experience of the
horrors of political disintegration in the Europe
of the 1930s. In order to understand how entire
societies could collapse, and how unprecedented
totalitarian regimes could replace them, Voe-
gelin argued it was necessary to widen and
deepen the inquiry of political science, moving
from the level of institutions to that of the lan-
guage symbols underlying the institutions. Nor
could one stop with the political culture of a
particular national community, for a given
nation-state was but a fragment of a larger
whole called a civilization. Finally, a civiliza-
tion itself was not an insular entity, but a par-
ticipant in the "drama of mankind" from its
unknown origins to its unknown end.
Although Voegelin's quest for a comprehen-
sive philosophy of human existence was initially
motivated by his conviction that only such a
philosophy could illumine the contours of the
crisis produced by twentieth-century totalitarian-
ism, he avoided the temptation to write a livre de
circonstance. Instead he proceeded carefully,
step by step, empirically to construct a theory of
order and history in relation to which the catas-
trophes of the present could more adequately be
understood.
Voegelin's task, then, was at once theoretical
and practical. The attempt to recover the reality
of human political and social existence, a real-
ity that had been overlaid and obscured by the
"second-reality" constructions of ideological fa-
naticism, was no mere academic enterprise. At
the same time, that quest could not rest with
the language of conventional wisdom, but had
to press on to a philosophical theory of the
structure and process of the reality in which
the human being participates. It thus could
scarcely dispense with the language symbols in
which past thinkers, engaged in a similar
search, had expressed their experiences. Voe-
gelin's complicated terminology is the result of
his careful reporting of the often forgotten or
misremembered language of past searchers.
Voegelin's mature political philosophy rests
upon a theory of equivalent experiences and
symbolizations of reality that he evolved after
1943, partly as a result of lengthy discussions
with his philosophical and personal friend Al-
fred Schutz. Through close study of representa-
tive texts in a variety of civilizations widely dis-
persed in space and time, Voegelin was able to
isolate key symbols relating to man's self-
interpretation, to relate them according to their
degree of "compactness" and "differentiation,"
and to discern the same "structure" of reality in
"equivalent" experiences and symbolizations dis-
persed throughout the historical process. As a
"trail of symbols" illumining the structure of
reality, history is seen as a process moving be-
tween the poles of a divine beginning and a
divine beyond.
The symbolism of the "between" (from Plato's
Metaxy} is of central importance to Voegelin.
An examination of "the material" of the "empiri-
cal" investigator will show that the human
being, far from experiencing political and social
reality as a set of phenomenal "facts" outside
his consciousness, senses that he participates,
from within, in a reality symbolized as a field of
contrasting forces. The human condition is one
of "tension" between life and death, openness
and closure, the love of God and the love of self,
immortality and mortality, eternity and time.
Any political theory that ignores this basic ex-
perience of reality and proceeds as if it were
possible to settle down on one of its two "poles,"
the beginning and the beyond, engages in a "de-

formation" of symbols and erects a "second
reality" or dream world. A major defect of con-
temporary political and social science is that it
has no basis for discriminating symbols that
illumine the participatory reality of the between
and those that reject or deform it; the latter
are the "ideologies," Ersatzreligionen, and de-
formed "gnostic" symbolizations that erupted
with murderous results in twentieth-century
totalitarian movements.
Gnosticism and modernity. One of the most
controversial aspects of Voegelin's work is his
analysis of modernity as "gnostic" in essence.
From a careful analysis of documents, Voegelin
concludes that the core of ancient gnosticism
was the drive toward self-redemption from evil
and imperfection in the world of the "between."
This drive to escape the world through a magi-
cal act of acquiring gnosis is transmuted by
modern ideologies into the drive to conquer the
world through one of a number of means rang-
ing from science and technology to the violence
of the "total revolution." In diagnosing moder-
nity as spiritually diseased, however, Voegelin
does not mean to overlook the strong persistence
of classical and Biblical influences in parts of
the modern world, together with an important
element of "common sense," especially in the
Anglo-Saxon political cultures. Nor does his
more recent thought neglect the alchemic tra-
dition and influences other than gnosticism that
produce modern disorder.
Theophany and the manifestation of reality.
According to Voegelin's analysis, both ancient
gnostic and modern ideological systems of
thought are closed to any experience beyond
the ego and its drive to subjugate reality to its
control and manipulation. In Volume 4 of Order
and History, Voegelin coins the term "egophany"
to represent this complex of experiences. By
contrast, if consciousness is open to the reality
of existing in the between, it will not fall prey
to the illusion that man is self-created, but will
recognize itself as dependent on an order of
being that exists out of a divine ground.
The structure of reality in the between is
illumined most vividly by key events described
as "theophanies," or manifestations of the di-
vine presence in and to the human conscious-
ness. Although the experience of divine pres-
ence in the cosmos is symbolized compactly in
the language of the myth, it is the great
theophanies inspiring Greek philosophy and
Israelite and Christian revelation that produce
the awareness that consciousness itself is the
VOEGELIN, ERIC 789
site of the interpenetration, the identity and
nonidentity, of the human and the divine. A
novel feature of Voegelin's work is his empha-
sis upon the "revelatory" character of both
Greek philosophy and Israelite and Christian
revelation. The Platonic vision of the Agathon,
the Mosaic encounter with the self-revealing
God in the burning bush, and the Pauline vision
of the resurrected on the road to Damascus, are
equivalent in their theophanic character.
Summary. To summarize, Voegelin's schol-
arly achievement has been to (1) set forth new
interpretations of ancient texts; (2) offer radi-
cally new interpretations of modern political
thought in the light of his understanding of pre-
modern (and non-Western) experiences of order
and their symbolization; (3) revise significantly
the conventional dichotomy of philosophical
"reason" and Biblical "revelation"; and (4) ar-
ticulate an original theory of experiences of
reality and their symbolization. This latter the-
ory maintains that nonmetric reality is not a
"something" external to the consciousness, but
has always been present to the unobstructed
experience of the participating consciousness.
This consciousness (of a concrete human being)
expresses itself in symbols; the symbols of the
various open, participating consciousnesses over
space and time may be compared for their com-
pactness and differentiation. Reality (as reality
experienced) unfolds itself in time, and the
"trail of symbols" is the substance of history.
What must not be forgotten, Voegelin insists,
is that the experiences and symbols constitute
a unit; the symbols (say in a Babylonian hymn
or a Platonic dialogue) must not be detached
from their motivating experiences and treated
literally as "doctrines." Voegelin is emphatic in
stressing that experiences of reality may be in-
ferred from the symbols articulated to express
them. Also, people in the present "reenact" the
experiences suggested by the symbols, thereby
"verifying" them by their own experiences of
open participation in the process of reality.
They may also "disprove," so to speak, the truth
claims of the ideological doctrinaire by reenact-
ing the "deformed" experiences of reality (say,
of a Bakunin or a Marx) suggested by his
language symbols.
Conclusion. Eric Voegelin has often baffled
his interpreters, one of whom has characterized
him as "radical and reactionary at once" (Altizer
1975). He may be described as "radical" because
of his theory of experiences and their symbol-
ization, for example, which appears to threaten
790 VOEGELIN, ERIC
orthodox Biblical criticism. Alternatively, he can
be called "reactionary" because of his asides
(often embedded in philosophical writing) on
certain contemporary political events and con-
troversies. Voegelin may be seen as resembling
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in that some of his spe-
cific judgments on American and international
politics are unacceptable to many readers who
nonetheless agree with the thrust of his philo-
sophical teaching. However, the comparison with
Solzhenitsyn, though partially accurate, fails to
reflect Voegelin's thorough knowledge of Amer-
ican politics and society. Regardless of their
different assessments of current practical politi-
cal controversies, fair-minded observers ac-
knowledge the intellectual power of Voegelin's
over-all theory of political reality, and feel com-
pelled critically to address themselves to the
fundamental questions which he has raised
again for our century.
DANTE GERMING
"WORKS BY VOEGELIN
1928 Uber die Form des amerikanischen Geistes.
Tubingen (Germany): J. C. B. Mohr.
1933a Rasse und Staat. Tubingen (Germany): J. C. B.
Mohr.
1933i> Die Rassenidee in der Geistesgeschichte von Ray
bis Cams. Berlin: Junker und Diinnhaupt.
1936 Der Autoritdre Staat. Vienna: Springer.
1938 Die politischen Religionen. Vienna: Bermann-
Fischer.
1952 The New Science of Politics: An Introduction.
Univ. of Chicago Press.
1956-1974 Order and History. 4 vols. Louisiana State
Univ. Press. —» Volume 1: Israel and Revelation,
1956. Volume 2: The World of the Polis, 1957.
Volume 3: Plato and Aristotle, 1957. Volume 4:
The Ecumenic Age, 1974. A fifth volume is in
preparation.
(1959) 1968 Science, Politics and Gnosticism: Two
Essays. Chicago: Regnery. —> First published in Ger-
man.
(1966) 1978 Anamnesis. Translated and edited by
Gerhard Niemeyer. Notre Dame Univ. Press. —> First
published as Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte
und Politik.
1975 From Enlightenment to Revolution. Edited by
John H. Hallowell. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ.
Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALTIZER, THOMAS 1975 A New History and a New
But Ancient God? A Review Essay. Journal of the
American Academy of Religion 43:757—764. —> Re-
view of volume 4 of Order and History.
ANDERSON, B. W. 1971 Politics and the Transcen-
dent: Eric Voegelin's Philosophical and Theological
Analysis of the Old Testament in the Context of
the Ancient Near East. Political Science Reviewer
1:1-29. —» Review of volume 1 of Order and His-
tory.
GERMING, DANTE 1971 Voegelin's Anamnesis. South-
ern Review New Series 7:68-89.
GERMING, DANTE 1975 Eric Voegelin: The In-
between of Human Life. Pages 100-119 in Anthony
de Crespigny and Kenneth Minogue (editors), Con-
temporary Political Philosophers. New York: Dodd
Mead.
GERMING, DANTE 1978 Eric Voegelin's Framework
for Political Evaluation, in His Recently Published
Work. American Political Science Review 72:110-
121.
HALLOWELL, JOHN H. 1972 Existence in Tension:
Man in Search of His Humanity. Political Science
Reviewer 2:162-184. -» Review of volume 3 of
Order and History.
HAVARD, WILLIAM C. 1961 The Method and Results
of Philosophical Anthropology in America. Archiv
fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 47:395-415.
HAVARD, WILLIAM C. 1971 The Changing Pattern of
Voegelin's Conception of History and Consciousness.
Southern Review New Series 7:49—67.
MCKNIGHT, STEPHEN A. (editor) 1978 Eric Voegelin's
Search for Order in History. Louisiana State Univ.
Press.
SANDOZ, ELLIS 1971 The Foundation of Voegelin's
Political Theory. Political Science Reviewer 1:30-73.
—> Discusses Anamnesis.
SEBBA, GREGOR 1967 Order and Disorders of the
Soul: Eric Voegelin's Philosophy of History. South-
ern Review New Series 3:282-310.
WEBB, EUGENE 1980 Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of
History. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press. —»
Forthcoming book.
WISER, JAMES L. 1972 Philosophy and Human Order.
Political Science Reviewer 2:137-161. —> Review of
volume 2 of Order and History.
 WARNER, W. LLOYD
William Lloyd Warner (1898-1970) is con-
sidered one of America's most eminent social
anthropologists of the twentieth century. He
was a brilliant researcher and a creative theore-
tician, who synthesized concepts from several
sources in his novel interpretation of social sys-
tems. He won deep loyalties from some and
critical rejection from others, and exerted an
unheralded but significant influence on the
course of events of several public issues.
A native Californian, he enlisted in the U.S.
Army in 1917, while still a senior in high
school. Afterwards he attended first the Uni-
versity of Southern California, and then the
University of California at Berkeley, where he
received his B.A. in anthropology in 1926. At
Berkeley, Robert H. Lowie aroused his interest
in the social practices of native peoples, and
Alfred L. and Theodora Kroeber became life-
long friends. In 1926, he was introduced to the
British school of social anthropology through
the sequential visits to Berkeley of Bronislaw
Malinowski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. The
latter was his mentor from 1927 to 1929, when
Warner went to Australia to study the Murngin
people of northeastern Arnhem land.
Warner's professional career breaks into four
periods. The first was his undergraduate and
graduate schooling at Berkeley and the three
years he spent in Australia. The Harvard phase
began with his appointment as assistant pro-
fessor of anthropology in 1929. There he be-
came acquainted with Elton Mayo of the Har-
vard Business School, with whose help he
launched his research on Newburyport, Massa-
chusetts, later to be known as the Yankee City
study. He also began a major research project
of a biracial community in Natchez, Mississippi,
with Allison Davis and Burleigh Gardner (Davis,
Gardner, & Gardner 1941), and a social anthro-
pological study of County Clare, Ireland, later
reported by Conrad M. Arensberg and Solon T.
Kimball (1940). Through Elton Mayo, Warner
and some of his students were involved in the
intellectual ferment centered in the Harvard
Business School. It was there that data from the
Western Electric study were being analyzed;
that L. J. Henderson held seminars on Vilfredo
Pareto and scientific method, and described
findings from the fatigue research; that Warner
and his students reported on the results of their
studies of the social structure of community;
and that business students were being taught
principles of industrial organization based on
Malinowski's study of ritual exchange in the
Trobriand Islands.
Warner's acceptance, in 1935, of a position
at the University of Chicago initiated the third
period in his career. Over the next quarter cen-
tury, he both reaped the harvest of the produc-
tive years at Harvard and turned his interests
in new directions. He published the results of
his Murngin research in the now classic A Black
Civilization (1937a) and the first of the Yankee
City series (Warner et al. 1941-1959). Although
Warner held a joint appointment in anthro-
pology and sociology, his research interests ac-
tively linked him with the committee on human
development. In conjunction with such like-
minded associates at the University of Chicago
791
792 WARNER, W. LLOYD
as Ralph Tyler, Allison Davis, Robert J. Havig-
hurst, Everett Hughes, David Riesman, and
Burleigh Gardner, he continued to study small
communities, but extended his search to urban
institutions. His explorations of a midwestern
community appeared in Democracy in Jones-
mile (Warner et al. 1949).
As knowledge of Warner's researches into
American society began to spread beyond aca-
demic circles, he found himself increasingly
sought out to participate in programs of major
foundations and some segments of government.
For example, Warner was among those social
scientists who worked with M. L. Wilson, di-
rector of the Federal Extension Service, to intro-
duce social science concepts into extension ed-
ucation. With Robert Redfield he was invited to
publish on anthropology and agriculture in the
U.S. Department of Agriculture Yearbook
(1940). When John Collier, in 1941, as Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs, contracted with the
committee on human development to conduct
a major study of Indian personality, education,
and administration, Warner assumed the major
responsibility. He planned research strategy,
selected the psychological tests, and interpreted
results. In another area, his description of the
adverse effects of the middle-class school en-
vironment on learning among lower-class chil-
dren, in conjunction with Havighurst and Mar-
tin B. Loeb, had considerable impact on edu-
cators (1944).
Warner's interest in the sociology of racial
and ethnic groups continued to expand. He be-
lieved that research could be a powerful weapon
in the elimination of civil and social inequities
by exposing such false disabilities as those
based on race. For example, his analysis and
publication of the caste-class structure of
southern race relations (Warner 1936; Warner
& Davis 1939) should be understood both as
scientific findings and as an instrument of hu-
man welfare. Years later his influence reap-
peared in Gunnar Myrdal's An American Di-
lemma (1944), a document that was powerful
in stimulating the great civil rights surge of the
1960s. He was research director of the Works
Progress Administration project that gathered
the data for Black Metropolis (1945). Just before
the outbreak of World War n, Warner, Gardner,
and Havighurst formed the Committee on Hu-
man Relations in Industry, designed to help
incorporate migrant black workers from the
South into industry. From this effort came So-
cial Research, Inc., a Chicago-based consulting
firm that Warner served as adviser until his
death. His interest in the origin and character-
istics of top executives in government and busi-
ness as well as in industrial workers emerged
after World War n. In effect, it was an exten-
sion of the theoretical interest in the relation-
ship between social personality and social sys-
tems that he first developed in the Murngin
study. Inevitably, his attention turned to the
institutional settings of his subjects—corpora-
tions and government agencies—and his focus
became large-scale organizations and the con-
comitant problem of their interconnections. The
reconciliation of the existing theory of commu-
nity with a societal system of large-scale enter-
prise became the central theoretical problem.
When in 1959 Warner accepted the position
as university professor of social research at
Michigan State University, he had already be-
gun the research that engaged him in the fourth
and final phase of his career. As a result of his
earlier work, he came to interpret America as a
society of large-scale organizations, and he
concluded that large-scale organization was part
of the process of an "Emergent American So-
ciety," a concept he used in the title to the Ford
Foundation lectures he delivered at New York
University in 1961. On the occasion of their
publication (1962), he wrote in a personal com-
munication to the author: "You will see that it's
a development of much earlier ideas that have
been greatly changed through time and taken a
new departure."
Combining a group drawn from his Chicago
days with colleagues at Michigan State, Warner
studied a variety of organizational systems in
terms of the concept of a continuously emer-
gent society. The Emergent American Society
(1967) represented the product of their efforts.
A second volume, analyzing data from the
agricultural sector and providing an overview
of American society, was never completed.
Contributions. Warner's conceptual influence
has been substantial. Some of his formulations
are so deeply embedded in current thought that
users are unaware of their origins. For example,
his comparison of the differential functions of
the family of procreation and the family of
orientation has long been an accepted idiom in
the literature on the family. His research plan
for the bank wiring room study in the Western
Electric Hawthorne plant, requested by Elton
Mayo, the director of the project, was the first
new approach to the study of work since the
time-and-motion studies of industrial engineers.

It has continued to be the prevailing model for
industrial studies. Warner also proved that
methods used in studying a primitive tribe could
be transferred to the study of a contemporary
community. The results reported in the Yankee
City series contain both methodological novel-
ties and substantive insights. His postulation of
an American social class system attracted wide
attention. Some protested that such divisions
were un-American, while others objected to the
methodological procedures. Administrators of
programs in government, industry, and institu-
tions harbored no such objections in applying
these new insights to their problems.
Warner believed, however, that the most dif-
ficult methodological problem in the Yankee
City study was the invention of an analysis that
would permit "seeing the society as a total sys-
tem of interdependent, interrelated statuses."
He believed that such an achievement would be
possible only if the basic unit of analysis was
the relationship rather than the individual: "If
the basic unit of analysis is the relation rather
than the individual, then it should be possible
in a community research to connect any given
relation with all others and thereby construct
an interconnected, interdependent system of
total interaction" (1941, p. 791). According to
Warner this end was first achieved in the Yan-
kee City study. The sequential steps as he de-
scribed them included an initial ranking of all
individuals by class; the determination of the
total number of statuses as a function of mem-
bership of an individual in different structures;
determination of the system of integrated rela-
tions by examining memberships; and determi-
nation of the amount of interconnection be-
tween statuses within a given social class. Such
an analytical operation results in "a map repre-
senting the social system of a community." It
does not, however, describe specific events or
their effects on the lives of individuals (1941).
During the latter half of the 1930s, Warner
made more explicit the relevance of his research
to race relations, the diagnosis and treatment
of mental illness, and education. Today, con-
ventional wisdom has incorporated his many
insights into the importance of cultural back-
ground as a variable in learning, psychic and
physical health, and relations among people.
He called attention to the caste-class nature of
race relations (Warner 1936; Warner & Davis
1939), demonstrated the relationship between
mental disorder and the social system (1937£>),
and described the differential response to edu-
WARNER, W. LLOYD 793
cation based on social class (Warner & Redfield
1940). The spread and incorporation of such
ideas, nevertheless, has proceeded slowly. Edu-
cators still often blame the child for learning
failure; psychoanalysts continue to look for in-
ner dynamics to explain erratic behavior; and
many explain race differences as genetic. Still,
change in perspective over the decades on these
and other matters has been massive.
Warner's enthusiastic and cooperative per-
sonal style seems to have been a factor in his
influence on both colleagues and students. As
examples, his discussions with Julian H. Steward
on the connection between environment, tech-
nology, and social system, with Talcott Parsons
on the family, with August B. Hollingshead on
education and social class, and with Robert
Havighurst on the method of community study
seem to be reflected in the later writings of
these men. Warner conveyed an appreciation of
disciplined research to his students and shared
with them the intellectual excitement of dis-
covering the transformation of empirical data.
An innovation of lesser importance, although
more widely known, was the Index of Status
Characteristics (ISC) and Evaluated Participa-
tion (EP). Through a formula that laymen could
use to calculate their own social standing and
that of others, Warner and his associates
brought the measurement of social class within
the grasp of the high school social studies
teacher (Warner, Meeker, and Eells 1949).
Theoretical perspective. Although Warner's
reputation as a social scientist derives primarily
from his research and findings about commu-
nity and institutions in the United States, his
theoretical base was formulated and validated
in his research on the Murngin of Australia
(1937a). These aborigines offered Warner an
initial opportunity to test the validity of ideas
derived from Lowie, Malinowski, Durkheim,
Simmel, and Radcliffe-Brown. The basic con-
ceptual framework that Warner developed con-
tinued to furnish the intellectual grounding for
all his subsequent research.
Warner's basic views on humanity resembled
those of most anthropologists, who postulated
encompassing universalities that transcended
variations of time and place, and believed that
humans inherit and transmit the specific adap-
tive learning of their species as both primates
and Homo sapiens. In other respects, however,
Warner differed markedly from the Boasian,
historical, diffusionist school that had domi-
nated American anthropology for a quarter cen-
794 WARNER, W. LLOYD
tury. Developmental questions of either an evo-
lutionary or a diffusionist sort never interested
him. Rather he was concerned with the func-
tioning of whole communities as ongoing sys-
tems. From the conventional division of culture
into the three segments of technology, social
organization, and religion, he formulated a func-
tional paradigm of interconnected subsystems
of a society. Through technology, humans con-
verted their physical environment to meet crea-
ture needs and provide comforts. Social organi-
zation ordered the relations among humans in
groups and provided the moral order that sanc-
tioned both social and technological behavior.
Finally, there were those social logics, rational
and nonrational, and the symbols of their ex-
pression, by which humans interpreted and de-
fined their relationship to each other and to the
uncertainties of the universe. This schema, in
differing contexts and degrees of elaboration,
was presented on four occasions. It appeared in
A Black Civilization (1937a, pp. 443-450); in
the first and fifth volumes of the Yankee City
series (1941-1959, vol. 1, pp. 3-37, vol. 5, pp.
447-506); and finally in The Emergent Ameri-
can Society (Warner et al. 1967, pp. 10-21).
Variations in the presentations are largely in
the degree of elaboration and the context of
explanation. In these discussions, Warner held
that methods of research in anthropology could
not be the criteria for distinguishing so-called
primitive and civilized societies if a compara-
tive sociology was to be achieved. Warner held
that his schema and approach to research ap-
plied as readily to a modern society as to a non-
literate one. As he phrased it, "the simple
Australian band and the vast metropolis in the
United States are but two extreme varieties of
the local community" (1941, p. 786).
The Murngin experience validated four addi-
tional concepts that Warner used in his later
research. These included emphasis upon a syn-
chronic and cross-sectional study of a society;
the structural positioning of individuals accord-
ing to status; and social personality as a func-
tion of participation. He also expressed the
belief that a dominant structure connected with
a pervasive theme could be found in each so-
ciety. Among the Murngin, £or example, the
dominant structure was kinship based. An indi-
vidual's status in a kinship system could ex-
plain to others his behavioral privileges and
obligations. The theme was one of cyclical re-
newal of the cosmic order through ceremonies
celebrating totems and death. The mythical
past and a recurring future were always a func-
tion of the behavioral present; hence social
reality was always synchronous. When this per-
spective determined the focus of field work and
data interpretation in Yankee City, social class
was seen as the significant organizing structure,
and social mobility, or as it was phrased years
later by the Eisenhower Commission on Na-
tional Goals, self-fulfillment, was the dominant
theme.
Those who were historically minded were
more than a little disturbed by Warner's find-
ings, and any assessment of his contributions
to social science, especially the Yankee City
series, must include the conflicting responses
that some of his writings precipitated. Indict-
ments by both sociologists and historians have
been particularly detailed and severe. Com-
ments by sociologist C. Wright Mills (1942)
and historian Stephan Thernstrom (1964) may
be considered representative of the negative re-
sponses from these two disciplines. In his re-
view of the first volume of the Yankee City
series, Mills identified the research as a study
in stratification and then listed a series of de-
ficiencies in theory, definition, and design. The
sociological criteria that he used as the basis of
evaluation suggest that he was unacquainted
with the functional approach to the study of
community.
Thernstrom was even more precise in his bill
of particulars, castigating both Warner's ap-
proach and findings. He accused Warner of an
"unwillingness to consult the historical record."
Such ahistoricity produced flaws in the con-
ceptualization of ethnicity and social class, and,
he asserted, Warner also failed to measure
mobility.
Actually, Mills's and Thernstrom's comments
express the methodological and conceptual sys-
tems of their authors. Unfortunately, criteria
derived from one discipline are seldom appli-
cable in cross-disciplinary evaluation. Darwin's
great insight that the observer sees only that
for which he has been trained has as its im-
portant and relevant corollary that research re-
sults are a function of the questions asked and
the operations performed—a proviso ignored by
these and other critics. A more serious defici-
ency, however, has been their failure to grasp
the interconnectedness of the conceptual pro-
cedures that Warner used in organizing and
interpreting his data. An appropriate basis for
criticizing Warner's research would be an eval-
uational approach based on criteria that mea-

sured the comparative effectiveness of diverse
social science presentations as descriptions of
the dynamics of social systems. One advantage
of the Warnerian approach was that it was, in
fact, applicable to such diverse societies as the
Murngin, Yankee City, the Deep South, Ireland,
Jonesville, or an emergent national community.
SOLON T. KIMBALL
WORKS BY WARNER
1930 Morphology and Functions of the Australian
Murngin Type of Kinship, Part I. American Anthro-
pologist 32:207'-256.
1931 Morphology and Functions of the Australian
Murngin Type of Kinship, Part II. American An-
thropologist 33:172-198.
1933a Kinship Morphology of Forty-one North Aus-
tralian Tribes. American Anthropologist 35:63-86.
1933k A Methodology for the Study of the Develop-
ment of Family Attitudes. Social Science Research
Council, Bulletin 18. New York: The Council.
1936 American Caste and Class. American Journal of
Sociology 42:234-237.
(1937a) 1964 A Black Civilization: A Social Study of
an Australian Tribe. Rev. ed. New York: Harper.
1937b The Society, the Individual, and His Mental
Disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry 94:275-
284.
1937 DAVIS, KiNGSLEY; and WARNER, W. LLOYD
Structural Analysis of Kinship. American Anthro-
pologist 39:291-313.
1937 HOWELLS, WILLIAM WHITE Anthropometry of
the Natives of Arnhem Land and the Australian
Race Problem: Analysis and Discussion. Data col-
lected by W. Lloyd Warner. Peabody Museum of
Archaeology and Ethnology Papers 16, no. 1:1-97.
1939 WARNER, W. LLOYD; and DAVIS, ALLISON A
Comparative Study of American Caste. Pages 219-
245 in Edgar T. Thompson (editor), Race Relations
and the Race Problem. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ.
Press.
1940 WARNER, W. LLOYD; and REDFIELD, ROBERT Cul-
tural Anthropology and Modern Agriculture. Part 5,
pages 983-993 in U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Yearbook. Washington: Government Printing Office.
1941 Social Anthropology and the Modern Commu-
nity. American Journal of Sociology 46:785-796.
(1941) 1970 WARNER, W. LLOYD; JUNKER, BUFORD;
and ADAMS, WALTER A. Color and Human Nature.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
(1941-1959) 1973-1976 WARNER, W. LLOYD et al.
Yankee City Series. 5 vols. Westport, Conn.: Green-
wood. —» Volume 1: The Social Life of a Modern
Community (1941) 1973. Volume 2: The Status
System of a Modern Community (1942) 1973.
Volume 3: The Social Systems of American Ethnic
Groups (1945) 1976. Volume 4: The Social System
of the Modern Factory (1947) 1976. Volume 5:
The Living and the Dead (1959) 1975. In 1963 an
abridged paperback edition of the series, entitled
Yankee City, was published by Yale University
Press, the original publisher of the series.
(1944) 1972 WARNER, W. LLOYD; HAVIGHURST, ROB-
ERT J.; and LOEB, MARTIN B. Who Shall Be Edu-
cated: The Challenge of Unequal Opportunities.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.
(1945) 1970 Methodological Note. Pages 769-782 in
St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton (editors), Black
Metropolis. New York: Harcourt.
WARNER, W. LLOYD 795
1946 WARNER, W. LLOYD; and Low, J. O. The Factory
in the Community. Pages 21-45 in William F.
Whyte (editor), Industry and Society. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
(1949) 1976 WARNER, W. LLOYD et al. Democracy in
Jonesville: A Study in Quality and Inequality. West-
port, Conn.: Greenwood.
(1949) 1960 WARNER, W. LLOYD; MEEKER, MARCHIA;
and EELLS, KENNETH Social Class in America: A
Manual of Procedure for the Measurement of Social
Status. Rev. ed. New York: Harper.
(1953) 1962 American Life: Dream and Reality. Rev.
ed. Univ. of Chicago Press.
1955 WARNER, W. LLOYD; and ABEGGLEN, JAMES C.
Big Business Leaders in America. New York:
Harper. —» A paperback edition was published by
Ameneumin 1963.
1955 WARNER, W. LLOYD; and ABEGGLEN, JAMES C.
Occupational Mobility in American Business and
Industry, 1928-1952. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minne-
sota Press.
1959 WARNER, W. LLOYD; and MARTIN, NORMAN H.
Industrial Man: Businessmen and Business Organi-
zations. New York: Harper.
(1961) 1975 The Family of God: A Symbolic Study
of Christian Life in America. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood. —> Includes revised and supplemented
sections of The Living and the Dead, the fifth vol-
ume in the Yankee City Series, 1941-1959.
1962 The Corporation in the Emergent American So-
ciety. New York: Harper.
(1963) 1975 WARNER, W. LLOYD et al. The American
Federal Executive: A Study of the Social and Per-
sonal Characteristics of the Civilian and Military
Leaders of the United States Federal Government.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1963 by Yale University
Press.
1967 WARNER, W. LLOYD et al. The Emergent Ameri-
can Society. Volume 1: Large-scale Organizations.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARENSBERG, CONRAD M.; and KIMBALL, SOLON T.
(1940) 1968 Family and Community in Ireland.
2d ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
DAVIS, ALLISON; GARDNER, BURLEIGH B.; and GARDNER,
MARY R. 1941 Deep South: A Social Anthro-
pological Study of Caste and Class. Univ. of Chicago
Press. —* An abridged paperback edition was pub-
lished in 1965.
DOLLARD, JOHN (1937) 1957 Caste and Class in a
Southern Town. 3d ed. Garden City, N.Y.: Double-
day.
DRAKE, ST. CLAIR; and CAYTON, HORACE (1945) 1970
Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a North-
ern City. Rev. & enl. ed. New York: Harcourt.
HOLLINGSHEAD, AUGUST B. 1949 Elmtown's Youth:
The Impact of Social Classes on Adolescents. New
York: Wiley.
KAHL, JOSEPH A. 1957 The American Class Struc-
ture. New York: Rinehart.
KORNHAUSER, RUTH ROSNER 1953 The Warner Ap-
proach to Social Stratification. Pages 224-254 in
Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (edi-
tors), Class, Status, and Power: A Reader in Social
Stratification. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
LYND, ROBERT S.; and LYND, HELEN M. (1929) 1930
Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American
Culture. New York: Harcourt.
LYND, ROBERT S.; and LYND, HELEN M. 1937 Middle-
town in Transition: A Study in Cul&iral Conflicts.
New York: Harcourt.
796 WECHSLER, DAVID
MARQUAND, JOHN P. 1949 Point of No Return. Bos-
ton: Little, Brown.
MILLS, C. WRIGHT 1942 Review of The Social Life
of a Modern Community. American Sociological
Review 7:263-271.
MYRDAL, GUNNAR (1944) 1962 An American Di-
lemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democ-
racy. New York: Harper. —> A paperback edition
was published in 1969.
PARSONS, TALCOTT (1949) 1959 The Social Struc-
ture of the Family. Pages 241-274 in Ruth Nanda
Anshen (editor), The Family: Its Function and
Destiny. Rev. ed. New York: Harper.
ROETHLISBERGER, FRITZ J. 1977 The Elusive Phe-
nomena. Boston: Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard Univer-
sity.
ROETHLISBERGER, FRITZ J.; and DlCKSON, WlLLIAM J.
1939 Management and the Worker. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
STEIN, MAURICE (1960) 1972 The Eclipse of Com-
munity: An Interpretation of American Studies.
Rev. ed. Princeton Univ. Press.
STEWARD, JULIAN H. 1938 Basin—Plateau Aboriginal
Sociopolitical Groups. U.S. Bureau of American Eth-
nology, Bulletin 120. Washington: Government
Printing Office. —> A paperback edition was pub-
lished by the University of Utah Press in 1970.
THERNSTROM, STEPHAN 1964 Poverty and Progress:
Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City. Cam-
bridge, Mass..- Harvard Univ. Press. —> A paperback
edition was published by Atheneum in 1970.
WECHSLER, DAVID
David Wechsler was born to Moses and Leah
(Pascal) Wechsler in Lespedi, Romania, on Jan-
uary 12, 1896, the last of seven children. He
married Ruth Ann Halpern on July 21, 1939,
arid they have two children. Alfred Binet, with
whom Wechsler much later would be ranked,
was already 39 years of age in 1896 and had that
year embarked on a program of research which,
in 1905 and after many failures, would provide
mankind with its first test of measured intelli-
gence, the Binet-Simon Scale. Wechsler's father
had been a scholar who emigrated to New York
City with his family when Wechsler was six. The
latter completed his primary and secondary edu-
cation in New York City, following which he
graduated from the College of the City of New
York with an A.B. degree (1916), and from
Columbia University with an M.A. degree (1917)
upon completion of a thesis under Robert S.
Woodworth. His other teachers included James
McKeen Cattell, Edward L. Thorndike, and
Thomas Hunt Morgan.
Wechsler's training in psychology was im-
mediately called upon with the entry of the
United States into World War i. While awaiting
induction, Wechsler went to Camp Yaphank on
Long Island where, under the direction of Edwin
G. Boring, he helped to score and evaluate the
performances of several thousand recruits on the
newly developed individual Army Alpha Test.
After induction and basic training at the School
of Military Psychology at Camp Greenleaf, Geor-
gia, Wechsler was assigned to the psychology
unit at Fort Logan, Texas. There his duties con-
sisted largely in assessing recruits with the Stan-
ford-Binet Intelligence Scale, the Yerkes Point
Scale, and the Army Individual Performance
Scales. While trying to evaluate the military
fitness of subjects who repeatedly failed on
standardized tests, but who nevertheless gave
histories of adequate work performance and
adjustment in civilian life, he first became aware
of the need for both (1) a broader concept of
intelligence than those then in vogue and (2) a
test of measured intelligence better suited to
adults, illiterate as well as literate.
As to the first issue, he became increasingly
convinced over the years that the historical
practice, which was espoused by Thorndike,
C. E. Spearman, Lewis M. Terman, and Henry
H. Goddard, of defining (and consequently of
measuring) intelligence solely in terms of intel-
lectual ability needed modification. Intelligence,
Wechsler concluded, could not be separated from
the rest of the personality. This view, one of his
most important contributions, eventually found
expression in his definition of intelligence
(1939Z?, pp. 3-12) as a global and not a unique
capacity, which involved affective and conative
as well as cognitive components. But this idea,
although developing even in his early years, was
not fully articulated until his publication of the
Bellevue-Wechsler Scale (1939a) and his book,
The Measurement and Appraisal of Adult Intel-
ligence (1939b), and then developed more fully
in his 1941, 1944, and 1958 revisions. The sec-
ond issue also was addressed in this 1939 Belle-
vue-Wechsler Scale and book with the inclusion
in that scale of five nonverbal, performance sub-
tests better suited to the assessment of New York
City's foreign and illiterate adult populations
than was the predominantly verbal Stanford-
Binet, which had been standardized primarily
on children. It would, however, be twenty years
from the time of his induction in World War I
to the publication of his first Bellevue-Wechsler
Scale before these two ideas would be fully
developed.
In the intervening time there was a long pe-
riod of diverse involvements and varied pur-
suits. The first, while he was still in uniform in
France, was his assignment (1919) as army

student to the University of London, which of-
fered Wechsler the unusual opportunity of
studying and working with Spearman and Karl
H. Pearson. Both had great influence on his
later thinking—Spearman by his concept of in-
telligence and Pearson by his innovative correla-
tional methods. In the environment he encoun-
tered there, Wechsler was quickly won over to
Spearman's "g" factor, a general factor common
to every intellectual ability and one directly
opposed to the competing argument of Thorn-
dike and others, who argued that intelligence
also consists of specific factors. Years later,
reacting to the studies of Truman L. Kelley and
L. L. Thurstone, as well as the impact of his own
clinical observations, Wechsler largely, though
reluctantly, abandoned Spearman's unique (by
then bifactor) constitution-genetic theory of
intelligence. Wechsler later explained his reason-
ing : "I look upon intelligence as an effect rather
than a cause, that is, the resultant of many in-
teracting abilities or factors" ([1939b] 1958,
pp. vii-viii). Viewing measured intelligence as
an effect instead of as a cause, as had Spearman,
Terman, and others, allowed Wechsler to intro-
duce the idea that later personality develop-
ment, and thus not only genetic constitution,
could influence measured intelligence. Although
he would be a lifelong proponent of the strong
role of inheritance in determining intelligence
quotients (IQ's), Wechsler was one of the earli-
est clinicians (1926; 1939Z?) to posit the strong
influence also of personality, educational, emo-
tional, and sociocultural factors as influences
on IQ's.
Soon after receiving his discharge from the
army (August 1919), he won a fellowship from
the Society of American Fellowships in French
Universities and spent the following two years
(1920-1922) at the University of Paris, com-
bining work under both Henri Pieron at the
ficole des Hautes Etudes and Louis Lapique in
the Laboratoire de Psychologic at the Sorbonne.
During this period, Wechsler carried on the
greater part of his researches on the psychogal-
vanic reflex, which formed the basis of his
later PH.D. dissertation, "The Measurement of
Emotional Reactions: Researches on the Psycho-
galvanic Reflex" (1925a), also under Wood-
worth at Columbia University. It was during this
period that he met Theodore Simon and Pierre
Janet.
Wechsler returned to the United States from
Paris in the spring of 1922, and soon after was
offered the position of psychologist to New
WECHSLER, DAVID 797
York City's newly created Bureau of Child Guid-
ance, which he held from 1922 to 1924. He spent
the intervening summer working with H. L.
Wells at the Psychopathic Hospital in Boston,
and attending William Healy's and Augusta F.
Bronner's conferences in the same city. This
summer experience and clinical training in Bos-
ton enabled him to participate effectively in the
new programs being developed at the bureau in
New York City, and also was highly useful in
his subsequent clinical position at Bellevue Hos-
pital. While at the bureau he also was attending
Columbia University part time and completing
his PH.D. degree, which was awarded in 1925.
Wechsler became chief psychologist at Belle-
vue Psychiatric Hospital in 1932, with a con-
current faculty appointment at New York Uni-
versity College of Medicine (1933). He held
both positions for 35 years until he became
emeritus in 1967. Between 1925 and 1932 he
was engaged in private clinical practice and
held a number of other positions, including a
brief stint as acting secretary of the Psychologi-
cal Corporation (1925-1927), which at the time
was still under the aegis of one of his earlier
teachers, Cattell. Like Binet, Wechsler managed
to combine research with clinical work. This is
reflected in the titles of his published papers
during this period. The most important of these
for Wechsler was "The Range of Human Capaci-
ties" (1930), a forerunner of his 1935 book of
the same title. Interestingly, he still considers
this book his major opus. In these books and
articles he showed that the range of most human
traits and abilities, including those pertaining to
intellectual performance, was relatively small.
Of particular historical significance are the con-
clusions regarding the growth and decline of
ability with age which he had reached by 1935
and included in his book.
Beginning with 1934, Wechsler's creative ef-
forts were largely directed to two more of his
most important contributions—the development
and standardization of the intelligence scales
that bear his name, and the substitution of a
deviation quotient (so important in evaluating
the intelligence level of adults), which related
each person's raw intelligence test score to his or
her own age group as a reference, rather than to
a mental age and an upper age limit of 15 years
for adults, as had been done by Binet, Terman,
and others. The immediate spur to these two con-
tributions was the need of a suitable instrument
for testing an increasingly multilingual and
otherwise diverse adult population referred to
798 WECHSLER, DAVID
him for psychological examination at Bellevue;
diverse not only as to facility in the use of
English but also as regards national origin, so-
cioeconomic level, and the wide age range of
subjects. And so, finding the Stanford-Binet
Scale (and Army Alpha and Beta Tests) not
clinically suitable for such adult patients, Wech-
sler began to experiment with a large number
of published individual intelligence tests that
seemed better suited to use with these adults.
By trial and error this effort would ultimately
culminate in a single battery called the Bellevue-
Wechsler Scale (1939a). Before deciding to de-
velop this first omnibus scale, however, Wech-
sler the clinician had had to examine a number
of the ideas that his academician mentors,
Spearman at London and Thorndike at Colum-
bia, were then so vigorously debating. Unlike
these theorists who, by the very nature of their
interests, examined large groups of more or less
anonymous students and normal individuals,
Wechsler's responsibilities at Bellevue brought
him into contact with the single patient for
whom the psychometric results would figure
prominently in the total psychological assess-
ment, and thus, subsequent psychiatric or legal
proceedings.
This broad, clinical knowledge of the unique
socioadaptive history of each such patient, who
of necessity was intensively examined at Belle-
vue, gave Wechsler the insight that, by itself, the
IQ score is a good, but far from perfect, index
of an individual's total adaptive-behavioral suc-
cess, and thus, that personality, motivation,
drive, cultural opportunity, presence of psycho-
pathology, etc., each could profoundly affect
such an individual's IQ score. Wechsler believed
that the ten widely differing verbal and per-
formance subtests with which he constituted the
1939 Bellevue-Wechsler i could not only pro-
duce a full scale IQ, verbal IQ, and performance
IQ, but by also permitting qualitative and quan-
titative analysis, could themselves, in terms of
subtest patterning and scatter, provide a rich
clinical insight into some aspects of the person-
ality of the individual under examination.
Wechsler considered this rich clinical poten-
tial of his multifaceted verbal and performance
Bellevue-Wechsler Scale so important that he
continued using a comparable multitest battery
(of 10 or 11 such subtests) in the develop-
ment of his (1) 1942 Army Wechsler (Bellevue-
Wechsler n) for use by the U.S. Army in World
War ii (1946); (2) Wechsler Intelligence Scale
for Children (1949); (3) Manual for the Wech-
sler Adult Intelligence Scale (1955); (4) Wech-
sler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence
(1967); and (5) Wechsler Intelligence Scale
for Children— Revised (1974b). He is still con-
tinuing this approach in the (6) Wechsler Intel-
ligence Scale for Adults— Revised, upon which
he and the Psychological Corporation began de-
velopment and standardization in the last half
of the 1970s. The development of his ideas about
the nature of intelligence, which provided the
framework for these Wechsler scales, can be
found in Wechsler's papers, many of which were
reprinted in a volume of his collected works,
which he and Allen J. Edwards compiled
During a rich and varied professional career,
many honors have come to Wechsler, including
the following. From the American Psychological
Association, he received (1) the award for the
distinguished contribution to clinical psychol-
ogy from the Division of Clinical Psychology
(I960); (2) a special tribute from the Division
of School Psychology (1973); and (3) the
distinguished annual professional contribution
gold medal award of the American Psychologi-
cal Association itself (1973). He also received
a special award for distinguished contributions
from the American Association on Mental De-
ficiency (1972), as well as comparable tributes
from universities and professional groups from
around the world.
In his early eighties, he is still a much sought
after speaker both in the United States and in
many countries of the world.
JOSEPH D. MATARAZZO
WORKS BY WECHSLER
(1917) 1974 A Study of Retention in Korsakoff Psy-
chosis. Pages 267-270 in David Wechsler, Selected
Papers of David Wechsler. New York and London:
Academic Press. —» First published in the Psy-
chiatric Bulletin of the New York State Hospital
(Utica) 2:403-451.
1925a The Measurement of Emotional Reactions: Re-
searches on the Psychogalvanic Reflex. Archives of
Psychology 12(76) :5-181. —» Published also as
PH.D. thesis, Columbia University.
1925i> What Constitutes an Emotion? Psychological
Review 32:235-240.
(1926) 1974 On the Influence of Education on Intelli-
gence as Measured by the Binet-Simon Tests. Pages
227-236 in David Wechsler, Selected Papers of
David Wechsler. New York and London: Academic
Press. —» First published in the Journal of Educa-
tional Psychology 17:248-257.
(1930) 1974 The Range of Human Capacities. Pages
101-105 in David Wechsler, Selected Papers of
David Wechsler. New York and London: Academic
Press. —» First published in the Scientific Monthly
31:35-39.

(1932) 1974 On the Limits of Human Variability.
Pages 106-109 in David Wechsler, Selected Papers
of David Wechsler. New York and London: Aca-
demic Press. —> First published in the Psychological
Review 39:87-90.
(1935) 1952 The Range of Human Capacities. 2d ed.
Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
1938 Mental Deterioration: Its Measurement and Sig-
nificance. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease
87:89-97.
1939a The Bellevue-Wechsler Scale, Form I. New
York: Psychological Corporation.
(1939&) 1972 The Measurement and Appraisal of
Adult Intelligence. 5th ed., rev. & enl. Baltimore:
Williams and Wilkins. —> First published as The
Measurement of Adult Intelligence. Fifth edition
written by Joseph D. Matarazzo. References in the
text sometimes refer to the 1958 edition.
(1943) 1974 Non-intellective Factors in General In-
telligence. Pages 36-38 in David Wechsler, Selected
Papers of David Wechsler. New York and London:
Academic Press. —» First published in the Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology 38:101-103.
1944 WEIDER, A. et al. The Cornell Selectee Index: A
Method for Quick Testing of Selectees for the Armed
Forces. Journal of the American Medical Association
124:224-227. -» Written in collaboration with Bela
Mittleman, David Wechsler, and Harold G. Wolff.
1945 A Standardized Memory Scale for Clinical Use.
Journal of Psychology 19:87-95.
1946 The Wechsler—Bellevue Intelligence Scale, Form
II: Manual for Administering and Scoring the Test.
New York: Psychological Corporation.
1949 Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children: Man-
ual. New York: Psychological Corporation.
(1950) 1974 Cognitive, Conative, and Non-intellective
Intelligence. Pages 39-48 in David Wechsler, Se-
lected Papers of David Wechsler. New York and
London: Academic Press. —» First published in the
American Psychologist 5:78—83.
1955 Manual for the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.
New York: Psychological Corporation.
1967 Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelli-
gence. New York: Psychological Corporation.
(1971) 1974 Concept of Collective Intelligence. Pages
55-60 in David Wechsler, Selected Papers of David
Wechsler. New York and London: Academic Press.
—» First published in the American Psychologist
26:904-907.
1974a Selected Papers of David Wechsler. With intro-
ductory material by Allen J. Edwards. New York
and London: Academic Press.
1974& Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Re-
vised (WISC—R). New York: Psychological Corpora-
tion.
1975 Intelligence Defined and Undefined: A Relati-
vistic Appraisal. American Psychologist 30:135-139.
WEINREICH, URIEL
Uriel Weinreich (1926-1967) was a major
contributor to the integration of empirical and
theoretical linguistics in the middle decades of
the twentieth century. His contributions united
the functional perspective of European linguis-
tics with the structural orientation of American
linguistics and gave strong impetus to the incor-
poration of semantics into the main body of
WEINREICH, URIEL 799
linguistic theory. His work established the
theoretical foundations for the study of multi-
lingualism and language contact in general; it
laid out the principles of a structural dialectol-
ogy and demonstrated ways of incorporating
structural, cultural, and social factors into the
explanation of dialect differentiation; it intro-
duced the principles of structural linguistics into
Yiddish studies; and it was a moving force in
the growth of sociolinguistic research and the
study of linguistic change in progress.
Weinreich was born in Vilna in 1926, into a
family strongly involved in the intellectual de-
velopment of secular Yiddish culture. His father
was Max Weinreich, a distinguished Yiddish
philologist and cultural historian who, born in
Latvia, spoke German as his native language.
Thus Uriel Weinreich grew up speaking stan-
dard Yiddish as his primary language, but at the
same time he acquired a command of Hebrew,
German, Polish, Byelorussian, and Russian. In
his later development of the principles of lan-
guage contact, he was able to draw upon a life-
time of experience in multilingual situations.
When the Russians invaded Poland in 1939,
father and son were stranded in Copenhagen
en route to the International Linguistic Confer-
ence, which was to have been held in Brussels
that year. They, and eventually the two other
members of the most immediate family, made
their way to the United States.
Uriel Weinreich attended Columbia College
as a Pulitzer fellow, then entered Columbia's
graduate program in linguistics, which had re-
cently been established by Roman Jakobson
and Andre Martinet. A year after receiving his
PH.D. in 1951, he joined the staff of the linguis-
tics department at Columbia. He held the Atran
chair of Yiddish language, literature, and cul-
ture and was chairman of the department from
1957 to 1965. Through his editorship of the
journal Word (1953-1960), he brought to
American linguistics a new sense of breadth and
explanatory possibility. Until his early death in
1967, he continued to work at Columbia, where
he developed research and teaching programs
in semantics, dialectology, and Yiddish studies,
instituted the Language and Cultural Atlas of
Ashkenazic Jewry, to be published under the
editorship of M. I. Herzog, and exerted a wide
influence on theoretical and empirical linguis-
tics in Europe and America.
Languages in Contact. Weinreich's first target
of linguistic investigation (1949/1950) was the
Romansh-speaking area of Switzerland, where
800 WEINREICH, URIEL
he developed many of his insights into language-
contact phenomena through the close examina-
tion of Romansh-Shwyzertutsch bilingualism.
The general principles and overview of the field,
presented in his 1951 dissertation on "Research
Problems in Bilingualism, With Special Refer-
ence to Switzerland," were condensed into a
volume entitled Languages in Contact (1953£>).
This book, translated into a number of Euro-
pean languages, continues to be the basic lin-
guistic resource for the study of bilingual and
multilingual communities.
Languages in Contact used the techniques of
descriptive linguistics to lay out a taxonomy of
ways in which one language can influence an-
other: in phonology, morphology, and lexicon.
But the entire discussion was firmly set in the
larger sociocultural context. Weinreich stated
and exemplified the ways in which one language
influenced another when they were both con-
trolled (and used) by a single speaker, but he
never assumed that these internal factors ac-
counted for such a large part of the total situa-
tion that they could have predictive power. The
main thrust of Weinreich's argument was to
show the promise of a combined sociolinguistic
and structural approach to the analysis of lan-
guage contact. Throughout the book, he gave
close attention to the psychological variables
that determine proficiency in acquisition of a
second language and switching between lan-
guages. Even more attention was given to the
sociolinguistic aspect: almost half the work is
devoted to an analysis of the factors operating
in the bilingual community. Weinreich showed
how language loyalty may operate to preserve a
language in spite of many unfavorable demo-
graphic factors, and distinguished this general-
ized language loyalty from the purism practiced
by the elite.
Weinreich's use of the term "interference" has
been criticized by those who approach every
multilingual situation as a communicative sys-
tem in itself. He would undoubtedly agree that
the negative connotations of "interference" can
be unfortunate, but his use of the term was
designed to stress, rather than underplay, the
systematic character of the resultant system.
For him, "the term interference implies the rear-
rangement of patterns that result from the in-
troduction of foreign elements into the more
highly structured domains of language" (1953fo,
p. 1). He also laid out the fundamental research
issues concerning the nature of coexistent sys-
tems—i.e., whether they are compounded, or exist
as coordinate structures (p. 9)—and stressed
the importance of dealing directly with these
systems as they are used: "the data must be
obtained, first and foremost, from the flowing
speech of bilinguals in the natural setting of
language contact" (p. 33).
Dialect geography. In the field of dialectology,
Weinreich's most influential paper (1954)
raised the question, "Is a Structural Dialectology
Possible?" His simple formalism for represent-
ing "diasystems" was widely utilized, but more
often than not, other dialectologists failed to
penetrate the deeper questions that Weinreich's
structural arguments were designed to raise. Al-
though the paper is most often viewed as a call
for a structural dialectology, Weinreich's final
statement was an appropriate and cautious
answer to the question of his title: a structural
dialectology promises "to be most fruitful if it is
combined with 'external' dialectology without
its own conceptual framework being abandoned"
(1954, p. 400). His own dialectological papers
were models of the way in which important
theoretical conclusions could be drawn when
structural issues were located in their historical
and spatial context. The paper (19520) that
first established Weinreich's reputation among
American linguists dealt with the apparent con-
tradiction that the distinction of hushing vs.
hissing sibilants was apparently restored in
northeastern Yiddish—in defiance of the funda-
mental structural principle that mergers cannot
be reversed. Weinreich demonstrated that the
reversal was in fact accomplished by a new
wave of immigrants from a territory that had
never lost the original distinction.
In Languages in Contact, Weinreich laid out
the great advantages of eastern European Yid-
dish as a research site for the study of the in-
fluence of bilingualism on language develop-
ment. Before World War n, Yiddish was a native
language in a vast territory of Europe ranging
from Alsace to the Ukraine. Although the lan-
guage had originally been formed in German-
speaking territory, one branch had matured in
a Slavic environment, while others had devel-
oped in contact with Rumanian, Hungarian,
Lithuanian, and Lettish communities. The Eu-
ropean Ashkenazic (Yiddish-speaking) Jewish
community (as distinguished from the Sephardic
community) was virtually destroyed in the Holo-
caust, but Weinreich believed that its linguistic
and cultural traditions could be recorded for

posterity and studied through interviews with
survivors of the Holocaust. The Language and
Culture Atlas of Ashkenazic Jewry was conceived
on a grand scale, over a larger and more com-
plex terrain than any earlier dialect atlas. Com-
putational resources were used at an early stage
of data collection, so that for the first time
phonetic records were taken in machine-readable
form. The early results showed the immediate
benefits of this modernization of dialectological
technique. From the preliminary results, Wein-
reich was able to make a number of searching
analyses that demonstrated the explanatory
benefits of combining historical and spatial evi-
dence. In "Four Riddles in Bilingual Dialectol-
ogy" (1964a) he showed how any attempt to
account for Yiddish phenomena in terms of di-
rect influence of coterritorial languages failed;
but, tracing the successive path of Jewish mi-
gration from Germany to Poland, Byelorussia,
and the Ukraine, he demonstrated the ways in
which the approach he had first used to explain
the restoration of the hissing-hushing distinc-
tion could be enlarged to account for an entire
series of baffling problems.
Yiddish studies. Throughout his career, Wein-
reich's extensive contributions to the study of
the Yiddish language, literature, and folklore
demonstrated his loyalty to his native tongue.
He wrote the basic textbook College Yiddish
(1949), and edited three volumes of The Field
of Yiddish (1954-1969). In 1959, with his wife,
Beatrice Silverman Weinreich, he coauthored
Yiddish Language and Folklore: A Selective Bibli-
ography for Research, which has become a stan-
dard reference in these fields. He and has wife
were also coeditors of Yid[d]isher Folklor (1954-
1963). In his course on semantics and dialectol-
ogy he brought a rich variety of Yiddish mate-
rials to bear on theoretical issues and inspired
many students to work actively in the Yiddish
language. A detailed analysis of "the syntax of
the Yiddish adjective" to be published in the
second volume of his collected works, demon-
strated that the transformational relationship
between the predicate and attributive adjectives
appeared much more closely in Yiddish than in
other Germanic languages. Weinreich's last Yid-
dish project, on which he worked from 1947 to
1967, was completed in his last years: the
Modern English—Yiddish, Yiddish—English Dic-
tionary (1968a). Here Weinreich turned his
long-standing commitment to the study of de-
scriptive semantics and lexicography to the ser-
WEINREICH, URIEL 801
vice of the Yiddish language and provided a
model for dictionary makers who sought to unite
semantic theory with lexicographic practice.
Semantics. Weinreich's early familiarity with
the logical analysis of linguistic form, and his
strong sense of social realism, made it inevitable
that he would reject the position of American
structuralism that semantic description lay out-
side of linguistics proper. Throughout the 1950s
he developed this area of linguistics almost
singlehandedly. The results of his work in this
early period are summed up in the essay "On
the Semantic Structure of Language" (1966, in
Weinreich 1979). His realistic assessment of
the state of the field sounded a note that ran
throughout his writings: "There exists a fatal
abyss between semantic theory and semantic
description, an abyss which dooms the former
to emptiness and the latter to atomization"
(p. 155). Weinreich's own work represents the
major bridge across this abyss.
In the 1966 paper, Weinreich developed Hans
Reichenbach's use of the predicate calculus to
describe the combinatorial semantics of lan-
guage. His analysis repeatedly called for a clear
separation of semantics from syntax, and a
restriction of "meaning" to a narrower range of
relations, rather than its expansion to include
all possible significata. He reduced semantic re-
lations to two fundamental types: linking, a
grammatical conjunction of two signs that
yields a product of their designata found in the
subject-predicate, adjective-noun, and adverb-
verb relations; and nesting, a nonadditive rela-
tionship characteristic of an even wider variety
of linguistic functions, such as verb-direct ob-
ject, determiner-noun, or tense-verb; the
operand to an operator fills an open slot in a
"harmonious but nonadditive way."
The most important universal proposed in
this paper was that in "all languages a combi-
nation of signs takes the form of either linking
or nesting. . . . no further patterns are intro-
duced by transformations" (p. 134).
The formalisms that Weinreich proposed
were intended to simplify the task of description
but never to reduce the richness of semantic
structure to a set of oversimplified examples.
He gave much attention to the properties of
idiomaticity and vagueness as essential compo-
nents of semantic structure. His realistic grasp
of semantic description was demonstrated in his
conclusion that languages were universally less
symmetrical and logical than they would be if
802 WEINREICH, URIEL
they used fully all the devices they contained.
The challenge to the linguist was to explain this
"limited sloppiness" in language: Why does
man fail to make full use of the linguistic
resources that he has?
Weinreich welcomed the advent of generative
grammar as a "rejuvenation" of linguistics after
the long senescence of American structuralism.
He developed semantic analyses that coupled
with the generative framework, even during the
early period when semantics was ignored by
others. His "Explorations in Semantic Theory"
(1966) was initially a critique of the first ef-
forts of generative writers to project a semantic
theory, but it was expanded into a large-scale
articulation of semantic and syntactic structure.
The formalism itself was too tightly coupled
with the then current Aspects model of Chom-
sky (1965) to survive, but many insights into
the relations of syntax and semantics have in-
fluenced later work. Weinreich's "transfer fea-
tures" were an effective way of dealing with the
problem that expressions like "give me some
pillow" cannot realistically be rejected as un-
grammatical. In Weinreich's treatment the fea-
ture of "mass noun" or [-count] is transferred to
"pillow" from "some," and a reinterpretation of
"pillow" follows. Weinreich's concern with meta-
phor and idiomaticity followed naturally from
his earlier attention to the "limited sloppiness"
of language and to the theoretical importance
of going beyond the special case of "humorless,
prosaic, banal prose" (p. 399). His final work
on "Problems in the Analysis of Idioms" (1969)
plunged more deeply into the kinds of indirect
and subtle calculations needed to select the
idiomatic rather than the literal meaning of
expressions.
Theory of language. Weinreich's most im-
portant works were produced in the last few
years of his life, when he realized that he had
only a limited time ahead of him. A cancerous
tumor removed in 1963 recurred in the fall of
1966. In the months that remained, Weinreich
set aside other concerns to work intensively on
the final version of a paper on "Empirical Foun-
dations for a Theory of Language Change"
(Weinreich, Labov, & Herzog 1968). He restated
the inadequacy of a linguistic tneory that took
as its object a homogeneous linguistic model,
and called for a theory that would account for
"the facts of orderly heterogeneity" (p. 100).
Perhaps his most important contribution to our
understanding of language was to show that
such heterogeneity is not a defect, but that the
absence of such orderly differentiation would be.
This fundamental sociolinguistic principle ap-
pears throughout Weinreich's work in multi-
lingualism, dialectology, and semantics.
Influence. Weinreich's own intellectual debts
are plainly acknowledged throughout his work.
The chief formative influences upon him were
Reichenbach, Jakobson, and Martinet; but, more
generally, his ability to enter into the work of
others and use it productively was phenomenal.
As a teacher he demonstrated this capacity to
submerge himself to an extraordinary degree,
and his influence on his students was even
stronger as a consequence. His dialectological
work was continued directly by M. I. Herzog;
the sociolinguistic impetus was developed by
William Labov; work in semantics was con-
tinued directly by Karl Zimmer (1969) and
Edward H. Bendix (1966) and less directly in
the semantic work of James McCawley; research
on language standardization was continued by
Paul Wexler (1974); Weinreich's approach to
Yiddish literature is exemplified in the work of
Dan Miron (1973), among others. Weinreich's
wider influence reached linguists and dialectolo-
gists in Europe, the Soviet Union, and Israel,
as well as the United States.
WILLIAM LABOV
WORKS BY WEINREICH
(1949) 1976 College Yiddish: An Introduction to the
Yiddish Language and to Jewish Life and Culture.
5th ed., rev. New York: Yivo.
1951a Research Problems in Bilingualism, With Spe-
cial Reference to Switzerland. Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia Univ.
1951fo Vegn a klalishn aroysreyd (How to Standardize
Yiddish Pronunciation). Yidishe Shprakh 11:26-29.
1952a Sdbesdiker losn in Yiddish: A Problem of Lin-
guistic Affinity. Word 8:360-377.
1952& Tsurik tsu aspektn (On the Aspects of the Yid-
dish Verb). Yidishe Shprakh 12:97-103.
1953a Di klangike struktur fun a podolyer reydenish
(The Phonemic Structure of a Podolian Yiddish Di-
alect). Yidishe Shprakh 13:121-131.
(1953Z?) 1966 Languages in Contact: Findings and
Problems. The Hague: Mouton. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1974.
1954 Is a Structural Dialectology Possible? Word 10:
388-400.
(1954-1969) WEINREICH, URIEL (editor) The Field
of Yiddish: Studies in Language, Folklore, and Lit-
erature. 3 vols. Vol. 1: New York: Linguistic Circle
of New York; Vols. 2-3: The Hague: Mouton.—»
Volume 3 was coedited with M. I. Herzog and
W. Ravid.
1955 Vegn filtrafikn gram (On Polysyllabic Rhyme in
Yiddish). Yidishe Shprakh 15:97-109.
1958a On the Compatibility of Genetic Relationship
and Convergent Development. Word 14:374-379.
1958b Travels Through Semantic Space: Review of
C. E. Osgood et al., The Measurement of Meaning.
Word 14:346-366.

1958c Yiddish and Colonial German in Eastern Eu-
rope: The Differential Impact of Slavic. Pages 369-
421 in American Contributions to the Fourth Inter-
tional Congress of Slavicists. The Hague: Mouton.
1959 WEINREICH, URIEL; and WEINREICH, BEATRICE
SILVERMAN Yiddish Language and Folklore: A Se-
lective Bibliography for Research. The Hague: Mou-
ton.
1960a Mid-century Linguistics: Attainments and Frus-
strations, Review of C. F. Hockett, A Course in
Modern Linguistics. Romance Philology 13:320-341.
1960b Nozn, nezer, nez: A kapitl gramatishe geografye
(The Plural of Noz: A Chapter in Yiddish Gram-
matical Geography). Yidishe Shprakh 20:81-90.
1960c Vegn a nayem yidishn shprakh- un kultur-atlas
(Concerning a New Jewish Language and Culture
Atlas). Di Goldene Keyt 37:47-57.
1961 Y-M Vaysnbergs nit-dershatst "Shtetl": Vegn
bafrayen a maysterverk fun zayn makhabers bio-
grafye (A Shtetl by Y-M Vaysnberg: On Freeing a
Literary Masterpiece From the Burden of Its Au-
thor's Biography). Di Goldene Keyt 41:135-143.
1962a Al mamadan bageografi shel leshonot yehudiot
veshel tarbut yisrael (On the Geographic Dimension
of Jewish Languages and Jewish Culture). Leshon-
enu 26:125-137.
1962b Culture Geography at a Distance: Some Prob-
lems in the Study of East European Jewry. Pages
27-39 in American Ethnological Society, Proceed-
ings. Edited by W. L. Chafe. Seattle: The Society.
1962c Lexicographic Definition in Descriptive Seman-
tics: Problems in Lexicography. Edited by F. W.
Householder and Sol Saporta. International Journal
of American Linguistics 28, no. 2, part 4:25-43.
1962d Multilingual Dialectology and the New Yiddish
Atlas. Anthropological Linguistics 4:6—22.
1963a On the Semantic Structure of Language. Pages
142-216 in Joseph H. Greenberg (editor), Uni-
versals of Language. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.
Press.
1963b [Russian] Lexicology. Volume 1, pages 60-93 in
T. A. Sebeok (editor), Current Trends in Linguis-
tics: Soviet and East European Linguistics. The
Hague: Mouton.
1964a Four Riddles in Bilingual Dialectology. Pages
335-359 in American Contributions to the Fifth In-
ternational Congress of Slavists. The Hague: Mou-
ton.
1964b Western Traits in Transcarpathian Yiddish.
Pages 245—264 in For Max Weinreich on His Seven-
tieth Birthday. The Hague: Mouton.
1965 Yiddish Poetry. Pages 899-901 in Encyclopedia
of Poetry and Poetics. Edited by Alex Preminger et
al. Princeton Univ. Press.
1966 Explorations in Semantic Theory. Volume 3,
pages 396-477 in G. A. Sebeok (editor), Current
Trends in Linguistics: Theoretical Foundations. The
Hague: Mouton.
1967 On Arguing With Mr. Katz: A Brief Rejoinder.
Foundations of Language 3:296-299.
1968a Modern English—Yiddish, Yiddish-English Dic-
tionary (Modern yidish-english un english-yidish
verterbukh). New York: McGraw-Hill and Yivo. —»
A paperback edition was published by Schocken
in 1977.
1968b Semantics and Semiotics. Volume 14, pages
164—169 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1968 WEINREICH, URIEL; LABOV, WILLIAM; and HER-
ZOG, M. I. Empirical Foundations for a Theory of
Language Change. Pages 97-195 in W. Lehmann
WHITE, LESLIE ALVIN 803
and Y. Malkiel (editors), Directions for Historical
Linguistics. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press.
1969 Problems in the Analysis of Idioms. In J. Puhvel
(editor), Substance and Structure of Language.
Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
1979 Weinreich on Semantics. Edited by William La-
bov and Beatrice Silverman Weinreich. Philadel-
phia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. —» A collection
of all of Weinreich's writings on semantics and lexi-
cography.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENDIX, EDWARD H. 1966 Componential Analysis of
General Vocabulary: The Semantic Structure of a
Set of Verbs in English, Hindi, and Japanese. Bloom-
ington: Indiana Univ. Press; The Hague: Mouton.
CHOMSKY, NOAM 1965 Aspects of the Theory of Syn-
tax. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
MIRON, DAN 1973 A Traveler Disguised: The Rise of
Modern Yiddish Fiction in the Nineteenth Century.
New York: Schocken.
WEXLER, PAUL 1974 Purism and Language: A Study
in Modern Ukranian and Byelorussian Nationalism
(1840-1967). Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press.
ZIMMER, KARL 1969 Psychological Correlates of Some
Turkish Morpheme Structures Rules. Language 45:
309-321.
WHITE, LESLIE ALVIN
Leslie A. White (1900-1975) was a leading
figure in the intellectual transformation under-
gone by American anthropology during the mid-
twentieth century. White's early views reflected
the antitheoretical outlook that dominated an-
thropology in the 1920s, when he was trained,
but he soon began to reject these views and to
pursue such theoretical approaches as cultural
evolutionism and culturology. By the late 1950s
or early 1960s he had restored these approaches
to scientific respectability and was generally
recognized as the foremost theoretician in
American ethnology.
From his early years, White was impelled by
the desire to understand the behavior of "peo-
ples." This quest led him to pursue history and
political science at Louisiana State University,
and then philosophy, sociology, and psychology
at Columbia University, but without finding in
them what he was seeking. After receiving his
master's degree in psychology from Columbia in
1925, he transferred to the University of Chi-
cago. Although he had taken his first course in
anthropology from Alexander A. Goldenweiser
at the New School for Social Research in New
York, it was not until he enrolled at Chicago
that he began formal training in this subject,
studying under Edward Sapir and Fay-Cooper
Cole.
804 WHITE, LESLIE ALVIN
White received his PH.D. in anthropology in
1927 after writing a dissertation based on field
work in the southwestern United States. Despite
his renown as a theoretician, White was deeply
interested in field work and continued to carry
it out for more than thirty years. Altogether, he
wrote five ethnographic monographs on the
Keresan-speaking Pueblos of Acoma (1932a),
San Felipe (1932b), Santo Domingo (1935),
Santa Ana (1942), and Sia (1962).
White's first teaching position was at the Uni-
versity of Buffalo (1927-1930). His proximity
to the Seneca Indian reservation, where Lewis
H. Morgan had studied the Iroquois, led him to
read Morgan's work, which he had previously
ignored because his teachers had considered it
"obsolete." Reading Morgan awakened in him
an interest in cultural evolution and convinced
him of the validity of this approach, despite its
continued rejection by Franz Boas and his
students.
In 1930 White moved to the University of
Michigan, where he continued to teach until his
retirement in 1970, and where he built the an-
thropology department into one of the strongest
in the world. He was an effective and stimulat-
ing teacher and attracted many students to his
courses. However, his unorthodox views, espe-
cially his strong opposition to organized reli-
gion, brought him into conflict with the uni-
versity community. Furthermore, the theoretical
positions he was developing in the 1930s and
1940s were considered heretical by most anthro-
pologists, and for many years he faced the al-
most solid opposition of his profession. This
engendered in him a strongly polemical attitude,
especially toward members of the Boas school.
This attitude continued to characterize his
writings even after most of the battles he was
fighting had been won (1963, 1966).
It was not until the late 1950s and early
1960s that anthropology as a whole began to
accept much of White's work and to accord him
a place of honor in the profession. He received
the Viking Fund medal in General Anthropology
in 1959 and was elected president of the Amer-
ican Anthropological Association in 1964.
White's major contributions to anthropology
(aside from his field work) can be considered
under the following headings: the symbol; cul-
turology; evolutionism; cultural determinism;
and cultural materialism.
The symbol. In a classic paper, "The Symbol:
The Origin and Basis of Human Behavior"
(1940£>), which has been reprinted many times,
White argued that it was the ability to bestow
meaning on things in which meaning did not
inhere that lay at the root of culture. He called
this ability the symbolic faculty and considered
it to be unique to the human species. Because
of its unique basis, he held that culture consti-
tuted an autonomous class of phenomena.
White devoted a great deal of attention to the
concept of culture and repeatedly criticized defi-
nitions of it that he regarded as inadequate. He
made several attempts to clarify the notion,
most notably in an article entitled "The Concept
of Culture" (1959a).
Culturology. An autonomous level of phe-
nomena called for an independent science to
study it, and White proposed to call this new
science "culturology." (He later discovered that
in naming it he had been anticipated by the
German chemist and philosopher Wilhelm Ost-
wald.) The task of culturology, as White saw it,
was to explain culture in terms of itself, with-
out reference to psychology. Thus the origin of
clans was not to be sought in the motives of
individuals but in the interplay of other cultural
elements, such as local exogamy, unilocal rules
of postmarital residence, a sharp division of
labor along sex lines, the accumulation of
property, and the like.
Although White elaborated culturology far be-
yond what anyone had attempted before, it was
by no means his own innovation. Its roots, as he
himself said, could be traced back to A. L.
Kroeber's (1917) notion of culture as "super-
organic" and to fimile Durkheim's (1895) as-
sertion that "social facts are things."
Evolutionism. As White began to cast off his
antievolutionism and to delve into the writings
of the classical evolutionists, he found much in
the work of Edward B. Tylor, Herbert Spencer,
and Lewis H. Morgan that struck him as sound
and illuminating. He was especially taken with
the writings of Morgan and over the years
edited some of Morgan's journals and letters for
publication (1937; 1940a; 1959) and brought
out the definitive edition of Ancient Society
(1964), for which he wrote a long introduction.
At his death White was regarded as the leading
Morgan scholar in the world.
White's earliest article on cultural evolution
was "Energy and the Evolution of Culture"
(1943), and its appearance marked the first ma-
jor step in the resurgence of cultural evolution-
ism in the United States. In this paper White

set forth the theory that culture evolves as the
amount of energy harnessed per capita per year
is increased, a proposition that today is often
referred to as "White's Law."
White went on to write a series of articles on
evolutionism (1945a; 1945b; 19470; 1947b;
1947c), taking issue with the antievolutionists,
especially Robert H. Lowie. Lowie had argued
that the facts of diffusion negated any theory
of cultural evolution. White replied that Lowie
had confused the culture history of peoples with
the evolution of culture as a whole. Diffusion
might explain how a particular society came to
have a certain trait, but not how the trait arose
in the first place. To account for this, White
said, an evolutionary approach was required.
The 1940s were the high-water mark of cul-
tural relativism in American social science, and
many anthropologists held, with Ruth Benedict,
that cultures were "incommensurable." Thus,
rating cultures as higher or lower or assigning
them to a particular stage of evolution was, they
said, subjective and invalid. To this claim White
replied (1947a) that the Boasians failed to dis-
tinguish between "subjective" and "arbitrary."
All standards of measurement are arbitrary, he
said, but they need not be subjective. Anthro-
pologists could legitimately rank cultures in
terms of such objective criteria as the degree of
differentiation and specialization in their social
institutions and the extent of their utilization
of energy.
White's major work on cultural evolution was
The Evolution of Culture (1959b). Although
this book presented White's evolutionism clearly
and vigorously, it did not appreciably extend
his theoretical contributions to the subject be-
yond what he had already done in previous
articles. The chief value of this volume, some
have argued, is the lucid and convincing way
in which it presents human societies as func-
tioning systems.
Cultural determinism. White denied the ex-
istence of free will and saw human behavior as
strictly determined. Going beyond that, he held
that the most powerful determinants of this be-
havior are cultural. What an individual regards
as his personal choice is more realistically seen
by the anthropologist as the outcome of an in-
terplay of cultural forces (1949b, chapter 7).
So deeply ingrained in a person's psyche are
these cultural forces, though, that ordinarily he
fails to recognize their external source.
White was a staunch opponent of the great
WHITE, LESLIE ALVIN 805
man theory of history, arguing that the accident
of being at the focal point of great cultural-
historical forces could make a "genius" or a
"hero" out of someone with only moderate na-
tural endowments (1949b, chapter 8). He cited
the many instances of simultaneous but inde-
pendent inventions as evidence that great ad-
vances in culture can best be understood as the
maturing of general trends in cultural develop-
ment, rather than as the inspired acts of su-
premely gifted individuals.
These views and others, which White ex-
pressed trenchantly in his collection of essays,
The Science of Culture (1949Z?), brought him
into sharp conflict with many of his profes-
sional colleagues who took a less deterministic
and more humanistic approach to the subject
matter of their science.
Cultural materialism. Although this term
was coined by Marvin Harris (1968), it was
Leslie White who first espoused this approach
in anthropology and who championed it most
vigorously. While White cannot accurately
be called a Marxist (he eschewed the dialectic,
for one thing), he was certainly influenced by
Marx and was, in Marxian terms, a historical,
even if not a dialectical, materialist. White saw
technology as constituting the most powerful
set of determinants of cultural systems and
went as far as to say that human societies
could be thought of as social ways of operating
technological systems (1949a). He thus ac-
cepted the Marxian view that the sociological
and ideological components of a society can be
thought of as a superstructure reared on a tech-
nological and economic base.
In applying his culturological approach to ex-
planations of culture as a whole, White held
that the effect of environment was averaged out
and could thus be eliminated from the equa-
tion. However, he was not unmindful of the
fact that environment, as one of the material
conditions of existence, played a significant role
in shaping particular cultures. Although his
own work was not, strictly speaking, "ecologi-
cal," his general point of view was nonetheless
sympathetic to this approach. In fact, it was a
decided stimulus to those of his students who,
like Elman R. Service (1960) and Marshall D.
Sahlins (1958), went on to contribute to the
field of cultural ecology. Through another of his
students, Lewis R. Binford (1972), who assimi-
lated both his evolutionism and his cultural
materialism, White was instrumental in giving
806 WHITE, LESLIE ALVIN
rise to what is generally termed the "new arche-
ology" (Willey and Sabloff 1974).
Besides dealing with broad theoretical issues,
White contributed to the solution of more spe-
cific anthropological problems. Thus, elabo-
rating on a theory first proposed by E. B. Tylor,
White (1948«) explained the origin of the in-
cest taboo by saying that extending the network
of kin ties, as would occur by marrying outside
the nuclear family, conferred a distinct advan-
tage in terms of survival on those societies that
hit upon it. White (1939) was also the first to
argue that the peculiar types of kinship systems
known as Crow and Omaha were not as baffling
as had been thought, but were a terminological
expression of strong clan organization, in which
the clan that a person belonged to sometimes
overrode in importance which generation he
belonged to.
White always regarded anthropology as a
science and was deeply interested in the phi-
losophy of science. In "Science is Sciencing"
(1938), he argued that science was a unified
approach to the study of nature that received
different names (e.g., physics, biology, anthro-
pology) as it came to be applied to different
orders of phenomena. Moreover, the three major
ways in which the phenomena of each science
could be studied—historical, functional, and
evolutionary—were all legitimate and comple-
mentary and in no way antagonistic to each
other. This, he said, held just as much for an-
thropology as it did for geology, and he looked
forward to the day when the fact would be
recognized within his own profession (1945£>).
In "The Expansion of the Scope of Science"
(1947d), White proposed the first major theory
of the filiation of the sciences since Comte and
Spencer had broached the problem in the nine-
teenth century. White's theory was that those
sciences developed first and matured earliest
that dealt with phenomena furthest removed
from the determinants of human behavior.
Thus, astronomy, which dealt with the distant
stars, was the first science to arise and find
acceptance, while culturology, which studied
the most intimate and subtle, but at the same
time the strongest, determinants of human con-
duct, had been the last. Indeed, so disturbing
to people's accustomed views of themselves and
their behavior was this new science that when
first put forward it was rejected and opposed.
And the fact that White's struggle to win a place
for culturology in the firmament of science is
still by no means completed may be taken as a
measure of the accuracy of his perception of
the evolution of the sciences.
ROBERT L. CARNEIRO
WORKS BY WHITE
(1932a) 1973 The Acoma Indians. Glorieta, N.M.:
Rio Grande Press. —> Includes a new publisher's
preface and a new foreword by the author.
1932£> The Pueblo of San Felipe. American Anthro-
pological Association, Memoir No. 38.
(1935) 1969 The Pueblo of Santo Domingo, New
Mexico. New York: Kraus.
1937 WHITE, LESLIE A. (editor) Extracts from the
European Travel Journal of Lewis H. Morgan.
Rochester Historical Society, Publications 16:219-
389.
1938 Science is Sciencing. Philosophy of Science
5:369-389. —» Reprinted in The Science of Culture,
1949b, pp. 3-21.
1939 A Problem in Kinship Terminology. American
Anthropologist 41:566-573.
1940a WHITE, LESLIE A. (editor) Pioneers in American
Anthropology: The Bandelier-Morgan Letters 1873-
1883. 2 vols. Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico
Press.
1940b The Symbol: The Origin and Basis of Human
Behavior. Philosophy of Science 7:451-463. —» Re-
printed in The Science of Culture, 1949k, pp. 22-39.
(1942) 1969 The Pueblo of Santa Ana, New Mexico.
New York: Kraus.
1943 Energy and the Evolution of Culture. American
Anthropologist 45:335-356. —> Reprinted in The Sci-
ence of Culture, 1949b, pp. 363-393.
1945a "Diffusion vs. Evolution": An Anti-evolutionist
Fallacy. American Anthropologist 47:339-356.
1945b History, Evolutionism, and Functionalism:
Three Types of Interpretation of Culture. South-
western Journal of Anthropology 1:221-248.
1946 Kroeber's Configurations of Culture Growth.
American Anthropologist 48:78-93.
1947a Evolutionary Stages, Progress, and the Evalua-
tion of Cultures. Southwestern Journal of Anthro-
pology 3:165-192.
1947b Evolutionism and Anti-evolutionism in American
Ethnological Theory. Calcutta Review Series 3
104:147-159; 105:29-40, 161-174.
1947c Evolutionism in Cultural Anthropology: A Re-
joinder. American Anthropologist 49:400—413.
1947d The Expansion of the Scope of Science. Journal
of the Washington Academy of Sciences 37:181—
210. —» Reprinted in The Science of Culture, 1949b,
pp. 55-117.
1948a The Definition and Prohibition of Incest. Amer-
ican Anthropologist 50:416—435. —> Reprinted in
The Science of Culture, 1949b, pp. 303-329.
1948Z? Man's Control Over Civilization: An Anthro-
pocentric Illusion. Scientific Monthly 66:235—
247. -» Reprinted in The Science of Culture, 1949b,
pp. 330-359.
1949a Ethnological Theory. Pages 357-384 in R. W.
Sellars, V. J. McGill, and Marvin Farber (editors),
Philosophy for the Future: The Quest of Modern
Materialism. New York: Macmillan.
(1949&) 1969 The Science of Culture: A Study of
Man and Civilization. 2d ed. New York: Farrar,
Straus. —> A paperback edition was published in
1958 by Grove.
1954 Review of A. L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture,
and Clyde Kluckhohn and A. L. Kroeber, Culture:
A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions.
American Anthropologist 56:461-468.

1959a The Concept of Culture. American Anthropolo-
gist 61:227-251.
1959b The Evolution of Culture: The Development of
Civilization to the Fall of Rome. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
1959 MORGAN, LEWIS HENRY The Indian Journals:
1859-62. Edited by Leslie A. White. Ann Arbor:
Univ. of Michigan Press.
1962 The Pueblo of Sia, New Mexico. Smithsonian In-
stitution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin,
Whole no. 184. Washington: Government Printing
Office.
1963 The Ethnography and Ethnology of Franz Boas.
Texas Memorial Museum Bulletin, No. 6.
1964 MORGAN, LEWIS HENRY Ancient Society. Edited
by Leslie A. White. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press.
1966 The Social Organization of Ethnological Theory.
William Marsh Rice University, Rice University
Studies 52, No. 4.
1968a Bandelier, Adolph. Volume 1, page 512 in In-
ternational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and
Free Press.
1968k Culture: III. Culturology. Volume 3, pages
547—557 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1968c Morgan, Lewis Henry. Volume 10, pages
496-498 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press.
1973 WHITE, LESLIE A.; and DILLINGHAM, BETH The
Concept of Culture. Minneapolis, Minn.: Burgess.
1975 The Concept of Cultural Systems: A Key to Un-
derstanding Tribes and Nations. New York: Colum-
bia Univ. Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARNES, HARRY ELMER 1960 Pages xi-xlvi in Ger-
trude E. Dole and Robert L. Carneiro (editors),
Essays in the Science of Culture in Honor of Leslie
A. White. New York: Crowell.
BEARDSLEY, RICHARD K. 1976 An Appraisal of Leslie
A. White's Scholarly Influence. American Anthro-
pologist 78:617-620 .
BINFORD, LEWIS R. 1972 An Archaeological Perspec-
tive. New York: Seminar Press.
DURKHEIM, £MILE (1895) 1958 The Rules of Socio-
logical Method. 8th ed. Edited by George E. G. Cat-
lin. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. —> First published in
French.
HARRIS, MARVIN 1968 The Rise of Anthropological
Theory. New York: Crowell.
HATCH, ELVIN 1973 Theories of Man and Culture.
New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
KROEBER, A. L. 1917 The Superorganic. American
Anthropologist 19:163-213.
KROEBER, A. L. 1948 White's View of Culture. Amer-
ican Anthropologist 50:405-415.
LOWIE, ROBERT H. 1946 Evolution in Cultural An-
thropology: A Reply to Leslie White. American An-
thropologist 48:223-233.
SAHLINS, MARSHALL D. 1958 Social Stratification in
Polynesia. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press.
SAHLINS, MARSHALL D. 1976 Culture and Practical
Reason. Univ. of Chicago Press.
SERVICE, ELM AN R. 1960 Sociocentric Relationship
Terms and the Australian Class System. Pages 416-
436 in Gertrude E. Dole and Robert L. Carneiro
(editors), Essays in the Science of Culture in
Honor of Leslie A. White. New York: Crowell.
WHITING, JOHN W. M. 807
STEWARD, JULIAN H. 1960 Review of Leslie A.
White, The Evolution of Culture. American Anthro-
pologist 62:144-148.
WILLEY, GORDON R.; and SABLOFF, JEREMY A. 1974
A History of American Archaeology. San Francisco:
Freeman.
WHITING, JOHN W. M.
John W. M. Whiting was born in 1908 in Chil-
mark, Massachusetts, on the island of Martha's
Vineyard. After graduating from Yale College in
1931, Whiting experimented with divinity school
and with secondary school teaching before de-
ciding to pursue his PH.D. at Yale in sociology,
a department then dominated by the anthropo-
logically oriented tradition of William Graham
Sumner and Albert G. Keller. He received his
PH.D. in 1938, and his dissertation, based on
field work in New Guinea, foreshadowed his
professional identity as a student of child de-
velopment and socialization, fusing perspectives
from anthropology and psychology (1941).
From 1938 to 1947 (except for a period as a
naval officer), Whiting was a researcher at
Yale's Institute of Human Relations. His work
furthered the institute's aim of advancing be-
havioral science by encouraging interdisciplinary
research. During this period, he extended his
background in anthropology by continuing as-
sociation with his teacher George P. Murdock,
his fellow student Clellan S. Ford, and Bronislaw
Malinowski during his years at Yale. He also
received training in psychoanalysis from Earl
Zinn and John Bollard and in the behavioristic
learning theory then being developed by Clark
L. Hull and Neal E. Miller. Expanding his mas-
tery of method, he helped plan the analysis of
culture ultimately used by the Human Relations
Area Files, collaborated with Irvin L. Child in
correlational studies of human responses to frus-
tration and goal attainment and of features of
human cultures, and with O. Hobart Mowrer
conducted an experiment on animal behavior.
Despite great diversity of method, these activities
had a common aim of testing ideas relevant to
Whiting's varied theoretical background.
As a researcher at the Iowa Child Welfare Re-
search Station from 1947 to 1949, Whiting col-
laborated with Robert R. Sears and Vincent
Nowlis on studies in child development. He spent
the rest of his academic career at Harvard Uni-
versity, at first primarily in the Graduate School
of Education's Laboratory of Human Develop-
ment (of which he was director from 1953 to
808 WHITING, JOHN W. M.
1963), and later primarily in the department
of social relations and of anthropology. From
1966 to 1973, as director of the Child Develop-
ment Research Unit of the University of Nairobi,
he supervised research on family life in various
groups in Kenya. His style of work continued to
be marked by collaboration with his colleagues,
with his graduate students, and especially with
his wife, the anthropologist Beatrice B. Whiting.
The main body of Whiting's work, beginning
with Child Training and Personality (Whiting &
Child 1953) has explored the several links in
the following chain: society's environment and
history shape its maintenance systems; these
systems influence the conditions under which
the infant and child develop; personal charac-
teristics thus established, though modified by
later pressures, have a constraining influence on
the projective-expressive systems of the culture.
The projective-expressive systems comprise
those customs that, because not strongly de-
termined by sheer survival needs, facilitate sym-
bolic expression of personal motives, or en-
courage projection of personal characteristics
into the interpretation of the world. Never deny-
ing other or reverse influences on each of the
variables in this chain, Whiting has sought to
develop specific testable hypotheses about this
particular sequence, and to bring to this aspect
of psychological anthropology the possibilities of
disconfirmation and of replication upon which
broad scientific generalization depends.
Whiting and his associates have especially
devoted themselves to the study of the child-
hood origins of the various self-control systems
found in adults. In "Sorcery, Sin and the Super-
ego" (1959), Whiting delineated three mecha-
nisms of self-control: fear of other people (in-
fluenced by severe anxiety about aggression),
fear of gods and ghosts (influenced by the in-
dividual's history of dependence and indepen-
dence), and conscience (influenced by identi-
fication with parents). A series of further studies
focused on identification and on male conflicts
of sexual identity. A person tends to identify
with those who have power over the psychologi-
cal and material resources that he desires; status
envy is the term Whiting applied to this motive
for identification. In some societies the care of
young children, and thus immediate power over
resources they desire, is almost exclusively as-
signed to women. The feminine identification
thus developed in boys, if not later replaced,
supports such adult male behavior as couvade
practices. Many societies whose early treatment
of boys favors feminine identification have de-
veloped ordeals and ceremonies initiating boys
into manhood; where these customs are found,
couvade is often absent. In societies less in-
clined toward early male identification with the
mother, initiation customs are less likely to be
developed. The facts and theories emerging from
this research go far beyond the question of self-
control mechanisms, and bear as well on broader
aspects of culture, especially on relations be-
tween the sexes and on the practical functions
of religious ceremony (Munroe, Munroe, & Whit-
ing 1979).
Whiting's research touches directly on biology
at two points: ( 1 ) In considering how mainten-
ance systems influence socialization practices, he
traces the importance of nutrition. If a group's
standard diet is low in protein content, a long
nursing period will help insure an infant's sur-
vival (Whiting 1964). (2) In his study of the
effects of socialization practices on later charac-
teristics, one surprising discovery was the sub-
stantial influence of infantile stress upon stature
and presumably other aspects of physical growth
(Landauer & Whiting 1979).
Despite his great originality in theory, Whiting
has always continued to emphasize empirical
testing. His writings on method pertain both to
cross-cultural correlations with their ethno-
graphic base and to interindividual correlations
with their base in the systematic observation of
individual behavior, and incorporate his own
contributions to a variety of studies of both
kinds.
IRVIN L. CHILD
WORKS BY WHITING
1941 Becoming a Kwoma: Teaching and Learning in
a New Guinea Tribe. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
1953 WHITING, J. W. M.; and CHILD, IRVIN L. Child
Training and Personality: A Cross-cultural Study.
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. —> A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1962.
1959 Sorcery, Sin and the Superego: A Cross-cultural
Study of Some Mechanisms of Social Control. Vol-
ume 7, pages 174-197 in Marshall R. Jones (editor),
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln: Univ.
of Nebraska Press.
1964 Effects of Climate on Certain Cultural Practices.
Pages 511-544 in Ward H. Goodenough (editor),
Explorations in Cultural Anthropology. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
1968a Methods and Problems in Cross-cultural Re-
search. Volume 2, pages 693-728 in Gardner Lind-
zey and Elliot Aronson (editors), The Handbook of
Social Psychology. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
l9Q8b Socialization: II. Anthropological Aspects. Vol-
ume 14, pages 545-551 in International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L.
Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.

1970 WHITING, J. W. M.; and WHITING, B. B. Methods
for Observing and Recording Behavior. Pages 282-
315 in Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen (editors),
A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology.
Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press.
1975 WHITING, B. B.; and WHITING, J. W. M. Children
of Six Cultures: A Psycho-cultural Analysis. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
1979 LANDAUER, THOMAS K.; and WHITING, J. W. M.
Correlates and Consequences of Stress in Infancy.
In Robert L. Munroe, Ruth H. Munroe, and B. B.
Whiting (editors), Handbook of Cross-cultural Hu-
man Development. New York: Garland. —» Forth-
coming book.
1979 MUNROE, ROBERT L.; MUNROE, RUTH H., and
WHITING, J. W. M. Male Sex-role Resolutions. In
Robert L. Munroe, Ruth H. Munroe, and B. B. Whit-
ing (editors), Handbook of Cross-cultural Human
Development. New York: Garland. —» Forthcoming
book.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ethos 1, no. 4 1973. -» This issue, dedicated to Whit-
ing on his 65th birthday, contains papers by 18 of
his former students and suggests the variety of his
interests and influence.
WINCH, ROBERT F.
Robert Francis Winch (1911-1977), Amer-
ican sociologist, made important contributions
to the sociology and social psychology of mate
selection, marriage, and the family, as well as
to social scientific methodology. He was born,
raised, and educated in the Midwest of the
United States and held university appointments
there throughout his career. Trained at the Uni-
versity of Chicago by Ernest W. Burgess, Wil-
liam F. Ogburn, Samuel A. Stouffer, L. L. Thur-
stone, and Robert E. L. Faris, Winch carefully
built innovative theories of mate selection, the
impact of family upon personality, and familial
organization which are basic to current work in
these areas.
Winch was born in Lakewood, Ohio. In 1935
he received his A.B. in English literature from
Western Reserve University in Cleveland. He
entered the sociology department of the Uni-
versity of Chicago in 1937, receiving his A.M. in
1939 and his PH.D. in 1942. From 1942 to 1945
he served with the United States Navy, and in
1945 returned to the University of Chicago to
carry out a year's research on a Social Science
Research Council fellowship. In 1946, he joined
the sociology department of Vanderbilt Univer-
sity, and taught there until 1948 when he
moved to Northwestern University. There he
continued to teach until his death. He became a
professor of sociology at Northwestern in 1955
WINCH, ROBERT F. 809
and served as department chairman from 1967
to 1970.
Winch is best known for his original theory
of complementary needs in mate selection and
for The Modern Family (1952), in which he
presented a general theory of the family applied
to an analysis of the family in the United States.
These accomplishments are aspects of a career
dedicated to the development of an understand-
ing of how the behavior of individual human
beings is affected by their social environments.
In his first published work, "Personality Char-
acteristics of Engaged and Married Couples"
(1941), Winch called for intensive case studies
to examine more deeply the questions raised by
the questionnaire findings of Lewis M. Ter-
man's Psychological Factors in Marital Happi-
ness (1938). In his second article, "The Rela-
tion Between Courtship Behavior and Attitudes
Toward Parents Among College Men" (1943),
Winch began to examine a question on which
he would continue to focus for more than a
decade: the importance of psychoanalytic theory
for explaining behavior differences. Winch
formally tested Flugel's (1921) hypothesis that
an excessively strong attachment of child to
parent inhibits the subsequent development of
normal courtship behavior. Although his find-
ings supported Flu gel's hypothesis, Winch drew
the careful conclusion that "the present study
demonstrates the difficulty, but also the possi-
bility, of dealing with categories of an intro-
spective social psychology in such fashion that
observation can be quantified and subjected to
statistical analysis" (p. 174). Winch's attempts
to clarify the contributions of psychoanalytic
thought in order to explain psychosocial devel-
opment continued through his examination of
the Oedipus hypothesis (1951) and the first
edition of The Modern Family (1952). After
this point, however, Winch questioned his early
stress on the links between early childhood ex-
perience and adult behavior and personality.
Beginning in 1954, Winch published a series
of articles setting forth a theory of complemen-
tary needs in mate selection and presenting data
in support of that theory. Drawing on Murray's
(1938) work on emotional needs, he developed
an introspective social psychological theory anc1
submitted it to an empirical test. He viewed his
theory as an operationalization of the concept
of love, defining love as "the positive emotion
experienced by one person . . . in an interper-
sonal relationship in which the second person
. . . either (1) meets certain important needs
810 WINCH, ROBERT F.
of the first, or (2) manifests or appears (to the
first) to manifest personal attributes (beauty,
skills, status) highly prized by the first, or both"
([1952] 1971, p. 483). According to the theory
of complementary needs in mate selection,
homogamy in social characteristics creates for
each person a field of eligible spouse candidates;
within the field of eligibles, mate selection pro-
ceeds on the basis of complementary needs.
Rather than selecting a mate psychologically
similar to oneself, a person tends to select a
mate whose pattern of needs is complementary
to one's own. Winch tested this theory in 1950
on a sample of 25 young married couples
through a complicated research design involv-
ing two interviews (one measuring the intensity
of the interviewee's needs, the second gauging
the connection between salient relationships in
the interviewee's life and psychosocial devel-
opment), plus the application of a Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT). Attempts to repli-
cate Winch's study have not equalled his
standard of methodological purity, and the the-
ory has consequently been a focus of debate for
students of mate selection for more than twenty
years (see Winch 1967).
Throughout his career, Winch was deeply
concerned with methodological issues. He used
a wide variety of measurement strategies and
analytic techniques in his work, often employ-
ing techniques that had previously been little
used. When he encountered a particularly
thorny problem in research he wrote about it.
In a 1947 American Sociological Review article
he explained how factor analysis could help
social scientists analyze data sets parsimoniously;
in 1953 he evaluated the way research on the
family reflected the application of the scientific
method (Winch et al. 1953, pp. 1-17); in 1956
he explained how qualitative techniques such as
the TAT can complement quantitative measures
(Winch & More); in 1967 (Winch & Anderson)
and 1969 (Winch, Mueller, & Godiksen), he
examined questionnaires and coding problems;
and in 1969 (Winch & Campbell) commented
on the utility of tests of statistical significance.
He wrote on these problems of methodology be-
cause, as a scientist, he believed that the clari-
fication of methodological issues is basic to
the explication of substance.
In 1957, together with Linton C. Freeman,
Winch published the first article that he consid-
ered sociological rather than strictly social-psy-
chological, "Societal Complexity: An Empirical
Test of a Typology of Societies." Over the next
twenty years he published more than twenty
articles and books on the family as a social sys-
tem and the determinants of its structure and
functions. Topics included marital stability
(Winch & Greer 1964), extended familism
(Winch, Greer, & Blumberg 1967), and societal
complexity and family organization (Winch &
Blumberg 1972-1973; Winch 1978). These
works represented an attempt to complement
the introspective social psychology that had be-
gun in an examination of psychoanalytic issues
with an examination of the impact of the larger
society on the family (a factor that retained his
interest as an important determinant of indi-
vidual personality).
Winch's focus on the sociology of the family
did not prompt him to abandon his interest in
personality development. In 1962 he published
Identification and Its Familial Determinants,
which examined the individual's acquisition
of behavior in the context of the family.
Winch clearly differentiated his concept, "iden-
tification," from the more psychological concept
of "socialization." He wrote that "socialization
emphasizes the behaviors acquired and does not
stress the model(s) from whom acquired, whereas
identification directs our attention both to the
behaviors acquired and to the interpersonal
feature of acquiring them" ([1952] 1971, p. 392).
This emphasis on processes of identification and
the impact of familial structure on that process
enabled Winch to develop a theory of behavior
acquisition and personality development that
took larger social forces into account much
more explicitly than had psychological-re-
inforcement learning theories like Skinner's
(1938), or sociological exchange-learning the-
ories such as those developed by Homans
(1961). First expounded in Identification and
Its Familial Determinants, this theory of be-
havior acquisition was further developed by
Winch in The Modern Family and in Famil-
ial Structure and Function as Influence (Winch
& Gordon 1974).
In addition to this scientific work, Winch
made important contributions as an educator.
For nearly thirty years he was continually re-
working three texts, The Modern Family ([1952]
1971); Selected Studies in Marriage and the
Family ([1953] 1974); and Family Form and
Social Setting (Winch & Adler 1971). The Mod-
ern Family presents a theory of the family that
is both structural-functional and develop-
mental. In it Winch identified a "basic societal
function" carried out by the family (replace-

ment) and five "derived functions" (control,
nurturance, parental, position conferral, and
emotional gratification) and related them to
functions principally carried out by other insti-
tutions (economic, political, religious, and so-
cializing-educational) throughout the life cycle.
The Modern Family is complemented by Se-
lected Studies, which presented for college stu-
dents the best current works in the sociology of
marriage and the family, and Family Form and
Social Setting, which presented basic concepts
of the sociology of the family to secondary
school students. All of these texts are among the
most widely used in their fields.
Winch had considerable impact on the so-
ciology of the family through both his writings
and his students. His patrician personal style
and his high standards for science dispelled
the doubts of students and colleagues alike of
the "importance of their enterprise." Of his 58
publications, 21 were written in collaboration,
most with students. His high standard for sci-
entific work and his concern for seeking broad-
ranging determinants of personality were com-
municated directly to his students and colleagues
through this collaboration.
The hallmark of Winch's research and writ-
ing was his stress on methodological rigor, hy-
pothesis testing, and theory building. Because
of this his texts formed a basis for the
integration and development of sociological
theories of the family, and his research broke
ground for new areas of inquiry in the fields of
behavior acquisition, mate selection, and so-
cietal evolution.
Louis WOLF GOODMAN
WORKS BY WINCH
1941 Personality Characteristics of Engaged and Mar-
ried Couples. American Journal of Sociology
46:686-697.
1943 The Relation Between Courtship Behavior and
Attitudes Towards Parents Among College Men.
American Sociological Review 8:164-174.
1947 Heuristic and Empirical Typologies: A Job for
Factor Analysis. American Sociological Review
12:68-75.
1951 Further Data and Observations on the Oedipus
Hypothesis: The Consequence of an Inadequate
Hypothesis. American Sociological Review 16:784-
795.
(1952) 1971 The Modern Family. 3d ed. New York:
Holt.
(1953) 1974 WINCH, ROBERT F. et al. (editors)
Selected Studies in Marriage and the Faviily. 4th ed.
New York: Holt. —» This book was coedited in 1953
by Robert McGinnis; in 1962 by Robert McGinnis
and Herbert R. Barringer; in 1968 by Louis Wolf
Goodman; and in 1974 by Graham Spanier.
WINCH, ROBERT F. 811
1954 WINCH, ROBERT F.; KTSANES, THOMAS; and
KTSANES, VIRGINIA The Theory of Complemen-
tary Needs in Mate-selection: An Analytic and De-
scriptive Study. American Sociological Review 19:
241-249.
1956 WINCH, ROBERT F.; and MORE, DOUGLAS M. Does
TAT Add Information to Interviews? Statistical
Analysis of the Increment. Journal of Clinical Psy-
chology 12:316-321.
1957 WINCH, ROBERT F.; and FREEMAN, LINTON C.
Societal Complexity: An Empirical Test of a Typol-
ogy of Societies. American Journal of Sociology
62:461-466.
1958 Mate-selection. New York: Harper.
1962 Identification and Its Familial Determinants. In-
dianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
1964 WINCH, ROBERT F.; and GREER, SCOTT A. The
Uncertain Relation Between Early Marriage and
Marital Stability: A Quest for Relevant Data. Acta
Sociologica 8:83-97.
1967 Another Look at the Theory of Complementary
Needs in Mate-selection. Journal of Marriage and
the Family 29:756-762.
1967 WINCH, ROBERT F.; and ANDERSON, R. BRUCE W.
Two Problems Involved in the Use of Peer-rating
Scales and Some Observations on Kendall's Coeffi-
cient of Concordance. Sociometry 30:316-322.
1967 WINCH, ROBERT F.; GREER, SCOTT A.; and BLUM-
BERG, RAE LESSER Ethnicity and Extended Familism
in an Upper-middle-class Suburb. American Socio-
logical Review 32:265-272.
1968 Marriage: I. Family Formation. Volume 10,
pages 1-8 in International Encyclopedia of the So-
cial Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
Macmillan and Free Press.
1969 WINCH, ROBERT F.; and CAMPBELL, DONALD T.
Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests
of Significance. American Sociologist 4:140-143.
1969 WINCH, ROBERT F.; MUELLER, SAMUEL A.; and
GODIKSEN, Lois The Reliability of Respondent-coded
Occupational Prestige. American Sociological Re-
view 34:244-251.
1971 WINCH, ROBERT F.; and ADLER, MURIEL A. Fam-
ily Form and Social Setting. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
—» Prepared for Sociological Resources for Secondary
Schools and the American Sociological Association.
1972-197& WINCH, ROBERT F.; and BLUMBERG, RAE
LESSER Societal Complexity and Familial Complex-
ity: Evidence for the Curvilinear Hypothesis. Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology 77:898-920; 78:1522
only.
1974 WINCH, ROBERT F.; and GORDON, MARGARET T.
Familial Structure and Function as Influence. Lex-
ington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
1978 Familial Organization: A Quest for Determinants.
New York: Free Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
FLUGEL, JOHN C. (1921) 1929 The Psycho-analytic
Study of the Family. 3d ed. London: Hogarth.
HOMANS, GEORGE C. (1961) 1974 Social Behavior:
Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harper.
MURRAY, HENRY A. et al. 1938 Explorations in Per-
sonality: A Clinical and Experimental Study of
Fifty Men of College Age. New York: Oxford.
SKINNER, B. F. (1938) 1966 The Behavior of Or-
ganisms: An Experimental Analysis. New York:
Appleton.
TERMAN, LEWIS M. 1938 Psychological Factors in
Marital Happiness. New York: McGraw-Hill.
 812 WITTFOGEL, KARL A.
WITTFOGEL, KARL A.
Karl August Wittfogel was born in Wolters-
dorf, Germany, in 1896. He arrived in the United
States in 1934, was naturalized in 1941, and
settled down in New York City. He thus grew up
and received most of his education in the de-
clining years of Imperial Germany, and the rest
during the short-lived Weimar Republic. He re-
ceived his PH.D. from the University of Frank- the Chinese classics. It was his conviction that
fort in 1928. He imbibed the grand old German
academic tradition as well as the radical politics
of the 1920s, an unusual and not always happy
combination. By the time Hitler came to power,
Wittfogel was already well known as a prolific
writer on political matters, an activist and the
author of several plays. The best known, per-
haps, was Wer ist der Dummste? (1923). His
literary interests led to the initiation, in the
1920s, of a Marxist critique of literature. Witt-
fogel joined the Communist party in 1921 by
way of his earlier membership in the radical
wings of the German youth movement. During
the 1920s he became more and more of a
Marxist, but even an early work, Geschichte
der burgerlichen Gesellschaft (1924), indicated
that he was going to be as controversial in the
history of Marxism as he was later to be in that
of the American social sciences.
Among the better-known teachers with whom
Wittfogel studied were Wilhelm Wundt, Karl
Lamprecht, Max Wertheimer, Georg Lasson, and
Alfred Vierkandt. Richard Ehrenberg turned
him in the direction of social sciences, but it
was Carl Griinberg, the economic historian,
who inspired him to work for a PH.D at the
University of Frankfort. Griinberg was the first
director of the Institut fur Sozialforschung,
which was founded by Felix Weil in 1922. Griin-
berg made it clear that the research method of
Marxism would determine the institute's scien-
tific task. This view suited Wittfogel but not
Max Horkheimer, who eventually turned the
institute away from "social science" and ended
Wittfogel's organic connection with what came
to be known as the Horkheimer "Frankfort
School."
A man of unusual intellect and passion, Witt-
fogel had wide ranging intellectual interests that
were always broader than his politics or the
fashions of the time. Political commitment
might initiate a given intellectual pursuit, but
his academic conscience, in the end, usually
dominated. The spectacular rise of the Chinese
Communist party in the 1920s added a further
incentive to his interest in China, but the Chi-
nese revolution did not initiate his involvement
with China. That was already there, and it con-
tinued to be a strong intellectual commitment.
Wittfogel had begun serious Sinological stud-
ies as early as 1921 under A. Conrady and Ed-
uard Erkes and like many others was strongly
influenced by Richard Wilhelm's translations of
an understanding of the phenomenon of China
was essential to an understanding of world his-
tory and of mankind.
Wittfogel's study of China was the occasion
rather than the cause of his conflict with Soviet
bureaucracy and its yiews of Marxism. In his
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas (1931)
Wittfogel expanded on Marx's suggestion that
Asiatic societies had social and economic struc-
tures radically different from those of western
Europe, a concept that Marx had never fully
developed. In this book Wittfogel elaborated the
hypothesis that China exemplified an Asiatic
mode of production. The Leningrad conference
of 1931 denounced the Asiatic mode of produc-
tion, possibly because it was an hypothesis that
implied that there could be a bureaucratic ruling
class that controlled but did not own the major
means of production. The Soviets were not in-
terested in even the theoretical possibility that
the elimination of strong private property and
private ownership of the means of production
could lead, not to socialism, but to centralized
despotic power.
Far from accepting the Stalinist theoretical
position, Wittfogel pursued his reexamination
of Marxism with increased passion in China,
where he traveled after his release from a
Nazi concentration camp in 1934. Clearly he
was an academic and a Marxist first and a com-
munist second. His main significance from the
academic point of view is that he took Marxism
as a starting point, not as a sacred text, and
applied it to non-Western societies. Almost single-
handedly he tried to universalize what he con-
sidered to be the scientific method of Marxism.
He challenged it to expand theoretically.
The development of the theoretical challenge
went forward in two stages. First, Wittfogel pre-
sented his concept of an Asiatic mode of pro-
duction in his 1938 article, "The Theory of
Oriental Society." This statement brought him
support for what was intended to be a massive
analysis of Chinese economic and political his-

tory on the basis of the dynastic histories. Out
of this effort came the "History of Chinese So-
ciety: Liao" (Wittfogel & Chia-sheng 1949), a
study of a conquest dynasty that introduced
such controversial new concepts as the dynastic
crisis cycle and the bureaucracy as a ruling
class.
In the second stage, Wittfogel's theoretical ap-
proach was decisively influenced during the
1940s by two concepts culled from his relentless
examination of Marxist literature—Marx's sug-
gestion that Russia was "semi-Asiatic" and
Georgii Plekhanov's warning that if the Bolshevik
revolution failed there might be an "Asiatic res-
toration"—a return to the old despotic order. The
search for "Asiatic" features in old and contem-
porary Russia led to a comparative study of all
oriental societies and thus to his magnum opus,
Oriental Despotism (1957). This construct at-
tempted to do for non-Western societies, includ-
ing pre-Columbian America, what Marx and
Engels had tried to do for Europe. It distin-
guished between the social structure of societies
based on industrialization and those based on
hydraulic agriculture. The impact on Marxists
was as startling as it was on non-Marxist social
scientists.
Wittfogel's contribution was first to Marxism,
second to the application of Marxism to non-
Western societies, and then to the social sciences
as we know them. Wittfogel accepted Marx's
concept that the mode of production is the key
to society and history, that the mode of produc-
tion is determined by the means of production,
and that the means are conditioned both by
nature and society. He systematized Marx's
basic concepts (such as the materialist concep-
tions of history, property, and property relations)
and organized them into a fully developed and
coordinated system that outlined a universal his-
tory of the development of mankind. He pointed
out that it is important to explain why so many
non-Western societies did not develop (stagna-
tion). He distinguished between the lateral and
vertical development of societies. He had to go
beyond Marx's concept of the mode of produc-
tion (mainly economic) because in his Oriental
society the relations of production are deter-
mined more by the state than by the economics
of the mode of production. In Oriental Despot-
ism, Wittfogel used his new concept of over-
whelming bureaucratic power to analyze the
Soviet industrialized despotism. This he saw
not as an '"Asiatic Restoration" or the perpetua-
WITTFOGEL, KARL A. 813
tion of a basically Oriental society but rather
as a new industrial apparatus society of a gen-
eral (state) slavery.
Wittfogel was one of the very few creative
Marxists of the twentieth century. In the 1960s,
the long dormant debate on the Asiatic mode of
production burst open again in Europe and led
to translation and republication of many of
Wittfogel's works. The impact on social science
in America is harder to measure because the
contemporary expansion of the disciplines into
the non-Western world followed a different pat-
tern. Wittfogel raised broad and significant
questions, contributed valuable insights to
nearly all the social science disciplines, and pro-
vided a challenge to which few could remain
indifferent. Critics of Marxism as such think
that Wittfogel's approach was too apocalyptic,
unitary, and awesome, and that the method was
stronger than the facts. Others have not sepa-
rated the scholarship from the alleged political
positions of the author. Most would agree that
even if the macrohistorical and ecological pat-
terns he established are not proven, many indi-
vidual insights have been seminal for American
social science.
GEORGE E. TAYLOR
WORKS BY WITTFOGEL
1923 Wer ist der Dummste'? Sammlung Revoluu'on-
arer Biihnenwerke, Vol. 8. Berlin: Malik-Verlag.
1924 Geschichte der biirgerlichen Gesellschaft: Von
Ihren Anfdngen bis zur Schwelle der grossen Revo-
lution. Vienna: Malik-Verlag.
1926 Das erwachende China: Ein Abriss der Ge-
schichte und der gegenwdrtigen Probleme Chinas.
Vienna: Agis Verlag.
1927 Probleme der chinesischen Wirtschaftsge-
schichte. Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozial-
politik 57:289-335.
1929 Geopolitik: Geographischer Materialismus und
Marxismus. Unter dem Banner des Marxismus 3, no.
1:17-51; no. 4:485-522; no. 5:698-735.
1931 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas: Versuch der
wissenschaftlichen Analyse einer grossen asiatischen
Agrargesellschaft. Vol. 1. Leipsig (Germany): C. L.
Hirschfeld Verlag.
1935a Dreissig Frauen vor dem KZ. Arbeiter Illus-
trierte Zeitung 9: Whole no. 47.
1935b The Foundations and Stages of Chinese Eco-
nomic History. Zeitschrift fiir Sozialforschung 4:26-
60.
1938 New Light on Chinese Society: An Investigation
of China's Socio-economic Structure. New York: In-
ternational Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations.
1947 Public Office in the Liao Dynasty and the Chinese
Examination System. Harvard Journal of Asiatic
Studies 10:13-40.
1949 WITTFOGEL, KARL A.; and CHIA-SHENG, FENG
History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125). Amer-
ican Philosophical Society, Transactions, Vol. 36.
Philadelphia: The Society.
814 WRIGHT, QUINCY
1950 Russia and Asia: Problems of Contemporary Area
Studies and International Relations. World Politics:
A Quarterly Journal of International Relations 2:
445-462.
1953 The Ruling Bureaucracy of Oriental Despotism:
A Phenomenon that Paralyzed Marx. Review of
Politics 15:350-359.
1955 Developmental Aspects of Hidraulic [sic] Soci-
eties. In Irrigation Civilizations: A Comparative
Study. Social Science Monographs, No. 1. Washing-
ton: Pan-American Union.
1956a Forced Labor. Volume 1, pages 777-816 in A
General Handbook of China. Compiled by the Far
Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Wash-
ington, Seattle. New Haven: Human Relations Area
Files.
1956b The Hydraulic Civilizations. Pages 152-164 in
International Symposium on Man's Role in Chang-
ing the Face of the Earth, Princeton, 1955, Man's
Role in Changing the Face of the Earth. Edited by
William L. Thomas. Published for the Wenner-
Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and
the National Science Foundation. Univ. of Chicago
Press.
1956c A Short History of Chinese Communism. Vol-
ume 2, pages 1122-1215 in A General Handbook of
China. Compiled by the Far Eastern and Russian
Institute, University of Washington, Seattle. New
Haven: Human Relations Area Files.
1957 Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of
Total Power. Yale Univ. Press. —» A paperback edi-
tion was published in 1973. This book was trans-
lated into Japanese (19.61), German (1962), French
(1964), Spanish (1966), and Italian (1969).
1960 The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolu-
tion. World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of Interna-
tional Relations 12:487-508.
1962 The Peasants. Pages 347-398 in Joseph M. Bo-
chenski and Gerhart Niemeyer (editors), Handbook
on Communism. New York: Praeger.
1964a Ideas and the Power Structure. Pages 86-97 in
William Theodore de Bary and Ainslie T. Embree
(editors), Approaches to Asian Civilizations. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press.
1964b Oriental Despotism. Pages 387-388 in Diction-
ary of Political Science. Edited by Joseph Dunner.
New York: Philosophical Library.
1969 Results and Problems of the Study of Oriental
Despotism. Journal of Asian Studies 28:357-365.
1971a Communist and Non-communist Agrarian Sys-
tems, With Special Reference to the U.S.S.R. and
Communist China: A Comparative Approach. Pages
3-60 in W. A. Douglas Jackson (editor), Agrarian
Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-com-
munist Countries. Seattle: Univ. of Washington
Press.
(1971b) 1972 Irrigation Policy in Spain and Spanish
America. Volume 2, pages 411-427 in A. R. Desai
et al. (editors), Essays on Modernization of Under-
developed Societies. New York: Humanities Press.
1972 The Hydraulic Approach to Pre-Spanish Meso-
america. Volume 4, pages 59—80 in The Prehistory
of the Tehuacan Valley. Published for the Robert S.
Peabody Foundation, Phillips Academy, Andover.
Austin: Univ. of Texas Press.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
DITTRICH, Z. R. 1964 Wittfogel en Rusland: Over de
Oorsprong van de russische Autocratie. Zeist (The
Netherlands) W. de Haan. —» An English trans-
lation was published in volume 1 of Acta neer-
landica in 1966.
HARRIS, MARVIN 1977 The Hydraulic Trap. Chapter
13 in Marvin Harris, Cannibals and Kings: The Ori-
gins of Cultures. New York: Random House.
LEWIN, GUENTER 1967 Von der "asiatischen Produk-
tionweise" aur "hydraulic society": Der Weerdegant
eines Renegaten. Jahrbuch fur Wirtschaftsge-
schichte part 4:205-258.
MASUBUCHI, TATSUO 1966 Wittfogel's Theory of Ori-
ental Society (or Hydraulic Society) and the Devel-
opment of Studies of Chinese Social and Economic
History in Japan. Developing Economies 4:316—333.
SOCHOR, LUBOMIR 1966 Karl August Wittfogel: Osud
jednoho sporu a jednoho intelektu (Karl August
Wittfogel: The Fate of a Controversy and an Intel-
lect). Literarni Noviny.-Tydenik svazu ceskosloven-
skych spisovatelu 15:8-9.
ULMEN, G. L. 1978 The Science of Society: Toward
an Understanding of the Life and Work of Karl
August Wittfogel. Paris: Mouton. —»Includes a
"Chronological Bibliography of the Published Writ-
ings of Karl August Wittfogel, 1917-1977."
ULMEN, G. L. (editor) 1978 Society and History: Es-
says in Honor of Karl August Wittfogel. Paris: Mou-
ton.
WRIGHT, QUINCY
Quincy Wright was born in Medford, Massa-
chusetts, December 28, 1890. His father, Philip
Green, a professor at Lombard College, taught
mathematics, astronomy, the financial history
of the United States, and English. His parents
held frequent literary gatherings in their home
and original poems, first presented at these
meetings by Philip Green and one of his stu-
dents, Carl A. Sandburg, were subsequently
printed on the press Philip Green had designed
and built in his basement.
These family influences, including that of a
great grandfather, Elizur Wright, who is con-
sidered the father of scientific life insurance
and who was a passionate reformer (opposing
slavery and high tariffs), were important in
shaping Quincy Wright's career. He chose politi-
cal science rather than one of the hard sciences
in part because he felt less qualified in mathe-
matics than either of his two brothers. Yet
Quincy's mathematical skills were sufficiently
sophisticated for him to pioneer in their use in
both his Study of War (1942) and Study of
International Relations (1955b).
A second family influence may well have
been the tradition of practical involvement in
community affairs. Quincy Wright's activism
was reflected in his work through professional
organizations in fostering the development of
international standards, through his popular-

izing of these standards, and by his direct par-
ticipation in such political activities as the Com-
mittee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.
Wright's effectiveness as an activist was enor-
mously enhanced by the assistance of his able
wife, Louise Leonard.
Closely related to this activism were Wright's
normative concerns in international relations.
They were best synthesized in his chapter on
"International Ethics" in his Study of Interna-
tional Relations. For a multicultured and in-
creasingly interdependent world of sovereign
states, Wright proposed a package of four
"isms": pragmatism (whatever works is good),
relativism (the value of tolerance), liberalism
(emphasizing individual liberty), and human-
ism (brotherly love). While these parameters
were broad and flexible, none could be ignored
in determining the ethical position on any inter-
national problem, although the weighting of
each depended upon the particular situation.
Implicit in this ethical approach is a quality
that is present in all of Wright's work—that of
balance. He examined problems of international
law in their political context. He interrelated
international with constitutional law and poli-
tics, just as he insisted on the balance of four
values in his international ethics, and tempered
his idealism with realism. In consequence, his
publications have a seminal quality and his
analyses acquire a historical importance for
their accurate perceptions.
Wright completed his PH.D. in 1915 at the
University of Illinois under the guidance of
James W. Garner, and spent the following year
as a research fejlow at the University of Penn-
sylvania. There, he prepared his dissertation for
publication under the title The Enforcement of
International Law Through Municipal Law in
the United States (1916). A three-year appoint-
ment (1916-1919) to the teaching staff of Har-
vard University brought him in close associa-
tion with the distinguished international lawyer,
George Graf ton Wilson, and for the next four
years, Wright was a member of the political
science faculty at the University of Minnesota.
In 1921, he wrote The Control of American
Foreign Relations (1922), in which he broad-
ened the scope of his dissertation to in-
clude the larger problem of maintaining a
viable democracy that would foster stable inter-
national relations. He recognized the need for
enlightened executive leadership in foreign
policy supported by Congress and public opin-
WRIGHT, QUINCY 8] 5
ion. The public, however, which is usually unin-
formed in foreign affairs, must never be allowed
to lead, but must be educated. The dilemma
of rigid and parochial national policies and
publicly unacceptable international policies can
therefore be resolved.
The national recognition thus accorded
Wright led to his appointment in 1923 to the
department of political science at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, where Charles E. Merriam was
assembling a faculty that was destined to revo-
lutionize the profession with its emphasis on
quantification. At the University of Chicago
Wright continued to expand his encyclopedic
approach to international relations. As the first
director of the Norman Wait Harris Founda-
tion, he assembled annual conferences of lead-
ing experts and edited their findings. He eagerly
sought out the insights of authorities outside the
discipline, such as William Fielding Ogburn in
sociology, Jacob Viner in economics, and his
brother Sew all, who joined the Chicago faculty
in 1926, in mathematics. In 1931, Wright's
increasingly interdisciplinary approach to inter-
national relations culminated in his founding
the first cross-departmental, degree-granting
academic body—the Committee on International
Relations.
Wright published his second major book,
Mandates Under the League of Nations, in 1930.
He had undertaken the research for the book
as the first recipient of the Guggenheim fellow-
ship. While he again employed the traditional
legal—institutional analytical approach, the book
nevertheless was judged the best in its field
by such knowledgeable experts as William E.
Rappard. The author viewed the mandate sys-
tem as an intermediate stage between colonial
government and sovereign states, in which the
interests of the mandated area were substi-
tuted for those of the imperial country. Wright's
restatement of this thesis in his chapter on
colonial government in the Study of Interna-
tional Relations provoked the sharp disagree-
ment of Harvard's specialist, Rupert Emerson,
although the evolution of world affairs since the
publication of that book has substantiated
Wright's judgment.
The quantity and quality of Wright's publi-
cations remained dazzling throughout his life.
(His bibliography, compiled by his wife in
1974, lists 23 books, 169 chapters or introduc-
tions of books, 424 journal articles, 332 book
reviews, 143 encyclopedia articles, and 56 pub-
816 WRIGHT, QUINCY
lished radio broadcasts. Two-thirds of his arti-
cles and book reviews appeared in legal and
international journals, but he also wrote for the
professional reviews of the national historical,
sociological, economic, and political science as-
sociations.) His social science insights contrib-
uted a welcome flexibility to the often rigid
interpretations of international law that char-
acterized the 1920s and 1930s, and his knowl-
edge of the law kept it from capitulating to
power politics in the 1950s and 1960s. Wright
was primarily interested in the problems of the
real world; his theories were developed to ana-
lyze and suggest solutions for these problems.
He was never tempted to develop abstract
theories; for Wright, theory was a tool, not an
end in itself.
Of all his publications, many consider
Wright's Study of War, first published in 1942,
his magnum opus. Karl W. Deutsch of Harvard
University claimed in his introduction to the
second edition (1965) that the work "marks
the beginning of much that nowadays has be-
come known as 'peace research'" in the way
that Hugo Grotius' On the Law of War and
Peace (1625) provided the basis for the study
of international law. Not only did Wright gather
a body of relevant facts, insights, and far-
ranging questions about war, but the book pio-
neered different methods of research and drew
upon vast scholarship in numerous disciplines.
Its conceptual base had been elaborated in
Wright's 1925 Geneva lectures entitled "The
Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,"
and his research on the subject continued
throughout the 1930s with the assistance of
graduate students and colleagues.
Wright added a chapter on World War n and
the postwar experience in his second edition.
He commented that people were growing more
insecure, frustrated, and pessimistic about the
future for themselves and their nations as they
witnessed the wasting of resources for nuclear
war. Yet Wright observed in the 1964 abridg-
ment of the book that even "realists" in inter-
national politics were now admitting that nu-
clear war was not a rational instrument of
policy, that lesser wars were likely to escalate,
and that a policy can only be realistic if it can
be achieved by peaceful means. It is relevant
to note here that Wright was quick to recognize
the importance of Lewis F. Richardson's un-
published manuscript on the mathematical study
of war, and he collaborated in editing Richard-
son's Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (1960).
Wright's introduction to the Richardson book
notes the many similarities and occasional dif-
ferences between his conclusions and those of
Richardson.
The Study of International Relations,
Wright's fourth major work, was comparable
in its encyclopedic dimensions to the Study of
War. Although Karl Deutsch described it as the
best and most comprehensive work in this field,
it did not receive the same acclaim as the Study
of War because the cold war climate of the mid-
1950s preoccupied scholars with research on
military and strategic affairs. It provides a mas-
terful ordering of the meaning and objectives
of international relations and a specific con-
sideration of ten "practical" analyses (e.g. inter-
national politics) and six "theoretical" analyses
(e.g. political geography). In the final chapters
Wright introduced the field conception as an
ordering idea in international relations. He re-
lated the field theory to earlier ordering con-
ceptions (the world as plan, equilibrium, organ-
ization, and community), and demonstrated
how the field theory incorporated all the others.
He not only suggested which research meth-
odologies might be expected to develop applica-
tions of the theory, but provided some specific
applications as well.
Wright's public service activities multiplied
during World War n. He had long been inter-
ested in the outlawing-of-war movement, having
counseled the Chicago attorney, S. O. Levinson,
whose efforts had culminated in the 1928 Kel-
logg-Briand Pact. This treaty provided Wright
with the legal justification for the otherwise
unneutral 1941 Lend-Lease Act, and during the
war years he became a full time consultant for
the lend-lease program. An insightful article
(1945) on war criminals prompted his appoint-
ment in 1945 as advisor to Francis Biddle, a
member of the war crimes tribunal, and he sub-
sequently counseled the U.S. High Commis-
sioner for Germany.
In the postwar years, Wright received many
academic honors. He was president of the
American Association of University Professors
from 1944 to 1946. He was elected president
of the American Political Science Association in
1949 and of the newly founded International
Political Science Association the following year.
He became president of the UN Association of
Greater Chicago in 1953 and of the American
Society of International Law in 1955. The Amer-
ican Counsel of Learned Societies voted him the
award for outstanding achievement in 1961,
 WRIGHT, SEWALL 817

and in 1970 scholars from many countries nom- Peace: Some Remarks in Memory of Quincy Wright,
inated him for the Nobel Prize for peace. 1890-1970. Maryland Historian 2:105-116.
WRIGHT, LOUISE 1974 A Bibliography of Quincy
Wright's death on October 17, 1970, precluded Wright (1890-1970). Pittsburgh Theological Semi-
him from consideration for this honor. nary.
MARTIN B. TRAVIS
WORKS BY WRIGHT
WRIGHT, SEWALL
(1916) 1967 The Enforcement of International Law
Through Municipal Law in the United States. New Sew all Wright was born December 21, 1889.
York: Johnson. —» Wright's dissertation. A man of unusual physical and intellectual
(1922) 1970 The Control of American Foreign Rela-
vigor, he has authored more than 200 scientific
tions. New York: Johnson. —» For this book, Wright
received an award from the American Philosophicalarticles and completed his major work, Evolu-
Society. tion and the Genetics of Populations (1968-
(1930) 1968 Mandates Under the League of Nations.
New York: Greenwood. 1978), in 1978 when he was 88 years old. His
1935 The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace. major contributions have been to genetics, evo-
London and New York: Longmans, Green. lution, and biometry, and he is uniformly re-
1941 The Legal Background in the Far East. Part 1
garded as one of the foremost geneticists of his
of Quincy Wright et al., Legal Problems in the Far
Eastern Conflict. New York: Institute of Pacifictime. As early as 1920 he had developed the
Relations. statistical method of path analysis which has
(1942) 1965 A Study of War. 2d ed. 2 vols. Univ. of
Chicago Press. —» A paperback edition was pub- become part of the standard methodology for
lished by Phoenix in 1965. quantitative animal and plant breeding. He also
1945 War Criminals. American Journal of Interna- applied the method to economic analysis of corn
tional Law 39:257-285.
1954a Criteria for Judging the Relevance of Researchand hog prices, but it was largely ignored by
on the Relevance of Research on the Problems of social scientists until the 1960s. As causal an-
Peace. Pages 1—94 in Research for Peace: Essays by
alysis has become more important in economics,
Quincy Wright, W. F. Cottrell, Ch. Boasson. Amster-
dam: North-Holland. sociology, political science, and psychology,
(1954b) 1976 Problems of Stability and Progress in Wright's methods have become increasingly
International Relations. Westport, Conn.: Green-popular, a half century after their invention.
wood.
(1955a) 1961 Contemporary International Law: A His father, Philip Green Wright, taught for
Balance Sheet. Rev. ed. New York: Random House. years at a tiny Universalist school, Lombard
(1955b) 1977 The Study of International Relations. College in Galesburg, Ohio. Although he was an
New York: Irvington.
1960 The Strengthening of International Law. Volume economist by training, he taught everything
98, pages 1-295 in The Hague, Academy of Inter- from mathematics to physical education. Later,
national Law, Recueil des cours 1959. Leiden in 1928, he wrote a book The Tariff on Animal
(Netherlands): Sythoff.
1960 RICHARDSON, LEWIS FRY Statistics of Deadly and Vegetable Oils, to which Sewall contributed
an appendix. As a child Sewall Wright demon-
Quarrels. Edited by Quincy Wright and C. C. Lienau.
Pittsburgh: Boxwood; Chicago: Quadrangle. strated his arithmetic precocity by knowing how
1968 War: I. The Study of War. Volume 16, pages
to extract cube roots before he entered the first
453-468 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
grade. He had two gifted brothers, Quincy, who
Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Mac-
millan and Free Press. became a leading student of international law,
1969a The Middle East: Prospects for Peace. Dobbs
and Theodore, later Civil Aeronautics adminis-
Ferry, N.Y.: Oceania. —> Working paper of the 13th
Hammarskjold forum, held in New York on De- trator. The three boys operated their father's
cember 4-5, 1968. printing press in their house and, among other
1969k On Predicting International Relations: The Year
2000. Social Science Foundation and Graduate things, printed Carl Sandburg's first book of
School of International Studies, University of poetry, long before he became known.
Denver, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 7, Sewall Wright's interest in genetics was kin-
No. 1. Univ. of Denver Press.
dled by Wilhelmina Key, a biology teacher at
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY Lombard College, who later became active in
DEUTSCH, KARL 1971 Quincy Wright. Political Sci- the eugenics movement. After graduating from
ence 4:107-109. Lombard and spending a year at the University
The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1970 14, no. 4.
—> Memorial issue to Quincy Wright. of Illinois, where he received a master's degree,
LEPAWSKY, ALBERT; BUEHIG, EDWARD H.; and LASS- he became a graduate student at Harvard Uni-
WELL, HAROLD D. 1971 The Search for World versity and an assistant to William E. Castle,
Order: Studies by Students and Colleagues of
Quincy Wright. New York: Appleton. who was involved in early research on the
SCHEIPS, PAUL J. 1971 On the Study of War and genetics of rats. In 1915 he received the SC.D.
818 WRIGHT, SEWALL
degree, based on an extensive study of coat
color inheritance in guinea pigs.
From 1915 to 1925 Wright was senior ani-
mal husbandman at the U.S. Department of
Agriculture in Washington. In this position his
major project was the clarification of the roles
of inbreeding and crossbreeding in the improve-
ment of livestock. He continued an extensive
experiment, already started, involving 23 lines
of guinea pigs, each maintained by brother-
sister mating. The decline of health, vigor, and
fertility, the large differences between different
inbred lines, the homogeneity within lines, and
the immediate recovery of vigor on crossing be-
tween lines were all explained, in quantitative
detail, as deducible consequences of Mendelian
inheritance.
Out of these studies also grew methods of
biometrical analysis that are now standard pro-
cedures in livestock and plant breeding. Appli-
cation of these methods to livestock breeding
required the measurement of inbreeding and
relationship in complex pedigrees. His coeffi-
cient of inbreeding, now universally used, is a
standard part of elementary genetics courses.
Wright used this to analyze the history of
Shorthorn cattle, a breed for which records were
available back to the foundation of the breed.
He noticed that substantial improvement of
breeds appeared to come, not only from selec-
tion within herds, but also by more or less ran-
dom changes leading to an occasional outstand-
ing herd, from which bulls were exported to
upgrade other herds. While still working for the
Department of Agriculture, he began to apply
this observation to the more general problem of
evolution by natural selection.
In 1925 Wright moved to the more academic
environment of the University of Chicago and
stayed there until 1955, when he moved to the
University of Wisconsin. He has been professor
emeritus at Wisconsin since 1960. Although he
continued his research on physiological and de-
velopmental genetics of guinea pigs while at
Chicago, the work for which he is best known
is in evolutionary theory. The science that is
now called population genetics was founded by
three men, R. A. Fisher, J. B. S. Haldane, and
Sewall Wright. The theory is essentially deduc-
tive. Starting with the rules of Mendelian in-
heritance, they worked out in great detail the
consequences of selection of many kinds, of the
mating system, of the mutation rate, and of
the effects of random variables on gene fre-
quency change, this being regarded by all three
as the elementary process of evolution.
Wright's unique contribution to evolution by
natural selection is his "shifting balance" theory,
which developed directly from his studies of
livestock improvement, and from his observa-
tion that each gene in guinea pigs affects sev-
eral characteristics and that the genes interact
in ways that are often unpredictable. He viewed
evolution as moving from one harmonious com-
bination of gene frequencies to another that is
even more harmonious and better adapted to
the environment. The difficulty is that it is often
impossible to move from one superior gene
combination to another without passing through
combinations that are worse than either. To
cross this fitness "valley" between two "peaks"
requires some process other than deterministic
natural selection. Wright visualized this as hap-
pening, at least partially, by the influence of
random factors. If one local population, like a
strain of livestock, happens to develop a su-
perior combination of genes, then this local pop-
ulation will grow faster, send out migrants, and
eventually change the whole species. In this
way, by a combination of random gene fre-
quency drift in a local population, selection be-
tween such local populations, and migration
from the best adapted, evolution can proceed
from one harmonious gene combination to an-
other. In Wright's view, local random gene fre-
quency fluctuations, rather than being trouble-
some noise in the process, are a part of
evolutionary creativity. Such a process will be
facilitated if the population has a geographical
structure or, for some other reason, mating
pairs come from a restricted neighborhood. This
view has led to much research on population
structure as a factor in evolution.
Wright's theory has not met with complete
acceptance. In particular it was opposed by
Fisher, who thought it unlikely that any popula-
tion would be located on a fitness peak such
that it could not be improved by any of the enor-
mous number of possible gene frequency or
environmental changes that could occur. He
thought that natural selection operates most
efficiently in a large, more or less unstructured
population where each Mendelian factor can be
tested with the greatest statistical efficiency in
the largest number of combinations. The ques-
tion of which population structure is most con-
ducive to evolutionary advance is still not
settled. But, in the mid-1970s data began to

appear suggesting that those species, particu-
larly among the mammals, where evolution has
been most rapid have been those where there
was independent evidence for considerable ran-
dom differentiation, as the Wright theory would
predict.
Unlike most biologists, Wright also has a
deep interest-in philosophy. His philosophy of
organism is somewhat in the tradition of Leib-
nitz and asserts that, there being no mystical
"emergence" of new properties with complexity,
such properties as consciousness must neces-
sarily reside in the most elementary particles.
As mentioned earlier, Wright's main contri-
bution to the social sciences is the method of
path analysis, used for genetic research from
the 1920s but not in the social sciences until
much later. The people primarily responsible
for its current popularity are Hubert M. Blalock,
Jr., Otis Dudley Duncan, and Arthur Goldberger.
The traditional method for analyzing data
that are subject to uncertainty and errors of
measurement is regression analysis, which leads
to equations that give the best prediction of the
values of the dependent variables from measure-
ments on the independent variables. Path an-
alysis differs from this in that its purpose is not
prediction per se, but is rather an attempt to
estimate the relative influence of different
causal paths. In distinction to factor analysis,
which employs similar mathematics, it assumes
that the causal factors and their chains of influ-
ence are known. One of the simplest, but most
useful aspects of the method is Wright's device
of diagramming causal sequences so that paths
of direct causation are indicated by directional
arrows and correlations between unanalyzed
anterior causes by two-headed arrows. Associ-
ated with each causal step is a path coefficient,
which is a partial regression coefficient stan-
dardized by being measured in units of the
standard deviation. These are the quantities to
be estimated from the data. With such stan-
dardization there are simple rules whereby one
can easily write the appropriate equations di-
rectly from a path diagram. The path coeffi-
cients then represent the relative influence of >
the corresponding path. If desired, the stan-
dardized partial regression equations can be
converted into ordinary partial regression co-
efficients measured in concrete units.
One of Wright's early applications of path an-
alysis was an attempt to measure the relative
importance of heredity and environment in the
WRIGHT, SEWALL 819
determination of intelligence quotient (IQ)
scores. This pioneering study, published in
1931, utilized some comparisons by Barbara
Burks of children reared by their own parents
with those reared by foster parents. Wright con-
cluded that heredity played a large role, but he
was concerned to point out the uncertainties
of both the measurements and the necessary
assumptions.
As economics, sociology, political science,
and psychology have become more concerned
with causal models, path analysis has come into
increasing prominence. In Wright's original
formulation no distinction is made between pop-
ulation parameters and sample estimates, nor
is any systematic or optimal method given to
use when the number of equations exceeds the
number of estimated parameters (that is, when
the system is overidentified). With modern sta-
tistical methods these difficulties can be sur-
mounted, and high speed computers have made
possible the solution of large numbers of simul-
taneous equations generated by complex mod-
els. Yet, for all that, Wright's 1925 paper on
corn and hog correlations is remarkably com-
plete in its analysis, and many decades ahead
of its time.
JAMES F. CROW
WORKS BY WRIGHT
1914 Duplicate Genes. American Naturalist 48:638—
639.
1920 The Relative Importance of Heredity and En-
vironment in Determining the Piebald Pattern of
Guinea-pigs. National Academy of Sciences, Pro-
ceedings 6:320-332.
1921 a Correlation and Causation. Journal of Agricul-
tural Research 20:557-585.
1921k Systems of Mating, I-V. Genetics 6:111-178.
1922 Coefficients of Inbreeding and Relationship.
American Naturalist 56:330-338.
1925 Corn and Hog Correlations. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Bulletin 1300:1-60.
1931a Evolution in Mendelian Populations. Genetics
16:97-159.
1931b Statistical Methods in Biology. Journal of the
American Statistical Association 26 (Supplement):
155-163.
1934 The Method of Path Coefficients. Annals of
Mathematical Statistics 5:161-215 .
1935 The Analysis of Variance and the Correlations
Between Relatives With Respect to Deviations From
an Optimum. Journal of Genetics 30:243-256.
1943 Isolation by Distance. Genetics 28:114-138.
1945 The Differential Equation of the Distribution
of Gene Frequencies. National Academy of Sciences,
Proceedings 31:382-389.
1953a Gene and Organism. American Naturalist
87:5-18.
(1953b) 1974 The Interpretation of Multivariate Sys-
tems. Pages 11—33 in Oscar Kempthorne et al.
820 WRIGHT, SEWALL
(editors), Statistics and Mathematics in Biology.
New York: Hafner.
1956 Modes of Selection. American Naturalist 90:5-24.
1960 Path Coefficients and Path Regressions: Alter-
native or Complementary Concepts? Biometrics
16:189-202.
1961 The Treatment of Reciprocal Interaction, With
or Without Lag, in Path Analysis. Biometrics
16:423-445.
1964 Biology and the Philosophy of Science. Monist
48:265-290.
1967 Surfaces of Selective Value. National Academy of
Sciences, Proceedings 58:165-172.
1968—1978 Evolution and the Genetics of Populations.
4 vols. Univ. of Chicago Press. —» Volume 1: Bio-
metric Foundations, 1968. Volume 2: The Theory of
Gene Frequencies, 1969. Volume 3: Experimental
Results and Evolutionary Deductions, 1977. Volume
4: Variability Within and Among Natural Popula-
tions, 1978.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BLALOCK, HUBERT M. (editor) 1971 Causal Models
in the Social Sciences. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
DUNCAN, OTIS DUDLEY 1975 Introduction to Struc-
tural Equation Models. New York: Academic Press.
GOLDBERGER, ARTHUR S. 1972 Structural Equation
Methods in the Social Sciences. Econometrica
40:979-1001.
Li, CHING-CHUN 1975 Path Analysis—A Primer. Pa-
cific Grove, Calif.: Boxwood.
WRIGHT, P. G. 1928 The Tariff on Animal and Vege-
table Oils. New York: Macmillan.