The Multinormative Management of State Intervention: Expropriation and the

Downfall of Liberal Thought in Brazilian Law (1826-1930)

Arthur Barrêtto de Almeida Costa1

Abstract
The relation between State and individual can be better understood in the 19th and early 20th
century through the analysis of their most frontal clash: expropriation. I looked at the main
laws enacted by parliament on the issue, law books and ca. 450 judicial decisions. I could
determine that there were three different normative orders in the governance of expropriation:
the first one was made of the imperial laws on the matter and their judicial and doctrinal
interpretations; the second was made of the provincial/state laws and their application; the
third, customary level, was made of the daily negotiations between administrative agents and
private citizens. Those orders interact in a tense fashion, and two main disputes among them
arised: one on the possibility of judiciary intervention on the settling of compensation, and the
other on the very possibility of negotiations between the State and citizens. The legal and
philosophical reasoning of the 19th century thought of expropriation as an opposition between
property and the State – that was how the doctrine and courts framed it, frequently relying on
ethical remarks. But some cases show powerful citizens negotiating with State agents and
benefiting from the expropriations. This is evidence of the influence of another normativity on
law: the philosophical ideas of liberalism, that regarded property as the most important right.
This worldview was unable to explain the negotiated practices, and this inability started to be
perceived at the beginning of the 20th century. This lead to a relativization of liberal thought
and the incorporation of “social function” into the concept of property.

Table of contents:
1 – Introduction; 2 – The federal legislation on expropriation: legislative path; 3 – The jurists
on expropriation: the animosity between state and property; 4 – Was property in true
opposition with expropriation? Evidence from case-law; 5 – State-level expropriations: a
complex system; 5.1 – First difference between the systems: appeals on indemnity; 5.2 –
Second difference between the systems: competence of fiscal judges; 6 – A multi-tier system:
conclusions

1 – Introduction

To better understand the relationship between State and individual in a given historical
period, we must look at the moments when both are in most stark contrast. For the nineteenth
and early twentieth century, this occurs in the most dramatic way possible in the case of
expropriation. Since at that time the citizen was primarily conceived as an owner, it is
precisely the seizure of his possessions by the State that puts these two entities in maximum
tension.
The legal historiography has shown two capital trends in 19th century legal thought.
On the one hand, there is an overvaluation of property: it starts to define the action of man in

1
Master student in Law at Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Brazil). Bachelor at the same institution.
Member of Studium Iuris – Research Group on the History of Legal Culture.
the world (GROSSI, 2014, p. 130), in a kind of "owner anthropology" (antropologia
dominical) (CLAVERO, 1998, p. 279). On the other hand, the State seizes the law, in what
has been called legal absolutism (GROSSI, 1998). The project of classical liberalism
(COSTA, 1974) of a society of "equals" - even if only a formal equality - is realized and the
State is elevated to a superior position, from which it can change the past order to achieve the
dreams of the ruling elite (HESPANHA, 2009, p. 17). Expropriation is the result of these two
great forces - state and property - on a collision course. The purpose of this article is to
understand how Brazilian legal culture treated this very fundamental institute – and, by doing
so, to grasp how the liberal thought was confronted with the administrative State and was
ultimately changed by it.
It is not possible to understand the legal community as a homogeneous body: each
actor has its own interests, knowledge and intentions, which condition its worldview.
Therefore, this article will seek to identify how the different jurists who could say something
about expropriation positioned themselves regarding the institute - particularly with the
theoretical framework of the opposition between State and property. But even if I start from
this viewpoint as guidance for collecting data, we will see in due time that the research itself
has questioned such a simplistic opposition.
Another fundamental concept here is that of multinormativity. It corresponds to the
understanding that different forms of regulation of individual and collective action can coexist
in the same space. As Thomas Duve (2017) puts it, this concept allows us to see the different
forms of interaction between the regulatory regimes, which are not restricted to a constant
opposition. Collaboration, although tense, is very important - Peter Collin (2017a) showed
how ideas of honor can be incorporated into legal arguments to determine the application of
state law. Similarly, my text will work on how the moral conceptions and philosophical
anthropology underlying the idea of property were fundamental to the formation of
interpretative parameters for the application of law. The notion of multinormativity
emphasizes precisely the existence of regulatory bodies that are beyond the state 2, but which
are relevant even to state actors during the decision making process (MOHNHAPT, 2017). At
the same time, by avoiding the term "legal", it fulfills John Griffiths' (1984) concern not to
over-open the concept of law, letting the empirical data itself define what is or is not
considered law in each context.

2
Peter Collin (2017b) analysed how the state itself can foster this interaction, inclusively through legitimation of
the decision-making process.
 The sources I used in this work were, first and foremost, the texts of the legal experts
who discuss expropriation and the parliamentary records, which show the ideas at stake
during the law creating process. Secondly, I analyzed the judicial decisions related to
expropriation in 12 Brazilian legal journals of the period, which allowed me to confront the
ideas discussed by the intellectuals with the effective application made by the Brazilian State.
This investigation was complemented by the analysis of newspaper, which eventually gave
indications about the daily functioning of the public administration.

2 – The federal legislation on expropriation: legislative path

The first important law to address expropriation in Brazil at the federal level was
enacted on September 9, 1826. The chronology is relevant: this year corresponds to Brazil's
first legislative session. It means that the definition of the legal framework of expropriation
was considered an unavoidable priority, to be carried out as soon as possible. The procedure
defined by the law was quite restricted: property could be taken on the basis of public utility
or need. These two different foundations were common in 19th century Europe (LACCHÈ,
1995; GASPARRI, 2004), and meant an opportunity for argumentative dispute. The
expropriation, when made through the first criterion, should be preceded by authorization
from the Brazilian parliament, which made it very difficult to make expropriations.
The heavy level of restriction of this act was quickly realized. In a debate in the
Imperial Senate, Senator Carneiro Leão even stated that no expropriation had ever been made
in accordance with the law in Brazil (BRAZIL, 1845, p. 4). The solution was legislative
decree no. 353 of July 12, 1845. With it, a new procedure was created for expropriation for
public utility. On the one hand, there was facilitation: it would be possible to expropriate
without the need for approval by the legislative power. However, on the other hand, the
procedure was quite complex and involved the intervention of the municipal council, the
province's presidency and the central authorities. And the amount of compensation would
have to be determined by a jury of expropriation, in a very bureaucratic process, openly
inspired (Brazil, 1876 [1854], p. 259) by the French law of 1841 on the same subject.
Almost ten years later, in 1854, began a process of legislation renewal would align
expropriation with the country's new economic needs. The city of Rio de Janeiro, the imperial
capital, sought to widen and enlarge a street in the center, known as Rua do Cano. To do so,
the congress discussed a special law. In addition to creating a company for the works, it
developed a special expropriation process, much more simplified, in which only government
approval was required, and the jury was replaced by a group of five arbitrators. It was initially
a restricted reform that would later became a recurring model.
The following year, the government issued a law regulating certain aspects of the
construction of the Dom Pedro II Railroad, the future Central do Brasil (BRASIL, 1855). In
the previous year, the first Brazilian railroad had been built (FINGER, 2013, p. 51), and the
expansion of coffee required a robust railway network (MATOS, 1974). But the lengthy
expropriation procedure established in 1845 was not sufficient to cope with these needs. In
1855 a decree expanded the procedure used on Rua do Cano to the railroads, with minor
modifications. The deputies showed strong resistance; they claimed that the various
exceptions that were been made undermined the authority of the legislation (BRAZIL, 1875
[1855], p. 197). Despite complaints from the owners, the model was consolidated and the
law, approved. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, it was used again, but now, to provide water
supply of Rio de Janeiro. In the 1860s, management supply in the imperial capital was
approaching collapse, which led the government to seek new solutions to bring the liquid to
the carioca population (ALMEIDA, 2010, p. 64).
The republic, proclaimed in 1889, confirmed the legal regime of expropriation through
the consolidation of laws relating to Federal Justice (Brazil, 1898). But the situation was still
one of relative confusion: the 1826 regulation that dealt with public need coexisted with the
1845 regulation regarding public utility and with the exceptions of 1855 (railroads) and 1888
(waters). At the beginning of the 20th century, the urban reforms carried out in Rio de Janeiro
demanded certainty and modern legal instruments (CANTISANO, 2016, pp. 405-406). It was
in this spirit that, in 1903, the National Congress issued the legislative decree 1021,
authorizing the government to consolidate the provisions relating to expropriation; this was
done through decree 4.956, of 9 September 1903. The text is composed of articles literally
copied from the several laws then in force, agglutinated in a new and rational order. But the
main modification was the generalization of the simplified procedure of 1855 for all cases.
This event was part of the preparation for the urban reforms that took place between 1903 and
1906, which became famous under the leadership of Mayor Pereira Passos.
This complex legislation formed the basis on which jurists interpreted the law and
which the State used to define its actions.

3 – The jurists on expropriation: the animosity between state and property

 I have already discussed how historiography has shown that property is absolutized in
the nineteenth century, at the same time that the state distances itself from the individual. But
how does the relationship between both happen, especially in the view of Brazilian jurists?
The absolutized idea of property shows itself even in the rooms of the Brazilian
parliament. In several moments when the expropriation laws described in the previous section
were been drafte, the deputies and senators expressed great concern about the protection of
the owners. When the first law of expropriation was drafted, for example, the Viscount de
Caravelas said: "If in all laws we must proceed with great maturity, this one deserves even
greater attention from us than any other, because its object is the most important for the
citizen, which is to take away his property"3 (BRAZIL, 1826, 3, p. 30). Property is at various
moments equated to life or freedom as the greatest right that the citizen can have 4. It is treated
with respect and deference - it is also described in judicial decisions as a "sacred" (sagrado)
right and as "most respectable" (respeitabilíssima)5 (TJSP6, 1918, p. 399).
As a result, expropriation is faced with the utmost distrust. It is described as a
"violence" (violência) applied to property7. It is a "hateful" (odiosa) interference with the
rights of the individual; therefore, when doubts arise about its application, the interpretation
should always be restrictive8. There should be an "iron circle" (círculo de ferro) protecting
property against probable state exaggerations9. Brazilian legislation was modified frequently
in the middle of the 19th century, which generated deep dissatisfaction: because it was an
3
Portuguese original: “Se em todas as leis devemos proceder com muita madureza, esta ainda maior attenção nos
merece, do que qualquer outra, porque o seu objecto é o mais importante do cidadão, é o tirar-lhe a sua
propriedade”.
4
“A propriedade depois da vida vem a ser o direito mais sagrado que nós temos: a propriedade é garantida pela
nossa constituição de uma forma muito expressa” (BRASIL, 1855, 2, p. 190).
5
“não podião e nem devião consentir nas escavaçóes e devastaçóes praticadas sem o menor sinal de deferencia
ao proprietário e de respeito ao sagrado direito de propriedade” (TJRJ, 1886, p. 158); “não era menos digna de
toda atenção a defesa do sagrado direito da exequente, que representava uma santa instituição, criada com o
obolo da caridade” (STJ, 1889, p. 40).
6
The references to the court rulings are made through the abbreviation of the court they come from. Federal
courts: STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal – Supreme Federal Court); STJ (Supremo Tribunal de Justiça –
Supreme Court of Justice). The state/provincial courts are referred by their current name, since their designations
varied widely during the period we are dealing with: TJSP (Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo – Court of Justice
of São Paulo); TJRJ (Tribunal de Justiça do Rio de Janeiro – Court of Justice of Rio de Janeiro); TJMG
(Tribunal de Justiça de Minas Gerais – Court of Justice of Minas Gerais); TJRS (Tribunal de Justiça do Rio
Grande do Sul – Court of Justice of Rio Grande do Sul).
7
The Viscount of Olinda says with regard to the Rua do Cano: “os particulares que têm casas naquelas ruas
sofrerão também violência no seu sagrado direito de propriedade” (BRASIL, 1854, 4, p. 744); quase 70 anos
depois, o STF se expressa em termos semelhantes (STF, 1922c).
8
“O Dr. ajudante não póde ignorar que, por ser excepção, e unica, contra o sagrado direito de propriedade, a
desapropriação é odiosa e de applicação restrictissima” (TJRJ, 1882, p. 579).
9
“a desapropriação, fica desde logo subentendido que uma tal excepção, odiosa como todas as excepções, é que
deve ter um circulo de ferro inquebrantavel traçado em volta de si, além do qual não possa ir mais uma linha, e
que, inversamente, ao principio geral é que deve ser facultada, na medida possivel, toda a amplitude de garantias
e de movimentos” (STF, 1904, p. 77).
attack on such an important right, the laws should be fixed and stable 10. Only in this way a
true respect for that fundamental right would be guaranteed.
Essentially, property should be unlimited and absolute; therefore, expropriation placed
the State in opposition to that sacred right11 in order to achieve the public interest. State
takeover of private property is described alternatively as derogation 12, limitation
(WHITAKER, p. 9), sacrifice 13 or as a form of time-limited property (TRIGO DE
LOUREIRO, p. 225). An eloquent example of this "opposition mentality" is the work of Paul
Deleuze (1923, pp. 3-4), in which he proposes that the expropriation should be the result of a
"balance" between individual and collective rights: a sign that, in principle, State and property
are in opposition in this procedure. The whole book is structured around the idea of giving
"guarantees to property" against the interference of public power.
There were, however, attempts to reconcile the two sides, although maintaining some
tension between them: during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was common to
define expropriation as a sort of forced sale (venda forçada). In fact, in Italy, these private
conceptions were constantly employed in the second half of the 19th century (GASPARRI,
2004, p. 7 et seq.). The reference to the contract can be understood, in the view of Wladmiro
Gasparri (2004, p. 5) when one remembers a doctrinal tendency typical of the time that placed
at the center of the contract not the consensus between the parties, but the obligation that
came from it. Hence, it was not strange to think of a contract of forced sale, such as
expropriation, in which the will of the private was replaced by the legal command. This
allows a fictitious preservation of the will of the private individual, even it did not come from
a declaration of the owner, but was defined by law, which decreed the public utility of the
property.
Some Brazilian authors embraced this understanding, such as Vicente Pereira do Rego
(1860, p. 132). Until the 1920s one can read that "expropriation takes on the form of a forced
sale"14 (STF, 1923b), or that "expropriation really implies a sale" 15 (TJRJ, 1876, p. 59).
10
“a propriedade não é um qualquer direito, não é uma medida transitória, é preciso portanto que a
desapropriação seja matéria fixa, que assente em uma verdadeira base constitucional” (BRASIL, 1855, 2, p.
190).
11
Solidônio Leite (1928, p. 7): “é da essência do direito de propriedade ser livre e exclusivo”; o Estado é que lhe
impõe limitações: “a desapropriação é o direito que tem o Estado de extinguir, limitar ou restringir, mediante
justa indenização, o direito individual” (LEITE, 1928, p. 12).
12
“O domínio é um poder absoluto e exclusivo sobre a coisa (...). Este princípio fundamental sofre apenas uma
derrogação, determinada por motivo de interesse público — a da desapropriação” (PEREIRA, 1877, pp. 112-
113).
13
“É ella pois um sacrificio que a sociedade impõe aos particulares, tendo por fim o interesse geral” (REGO, p.
132),
14
Portuguese original: “a desapropriação assume a feição de uma venda forçada”.
15
Portuguese original: “[importa] a desapropriação uma verdadeira venda”.
Sometimes, provisions concerning sale were employed to solve expropriation-related legal
matters16. This way of thinking, however, began to be disputed from the beginning of the
twentieth century. There were even explicit confrontations of the old theory17. Nevertheless,
they took a long time to be accepted, as shown by a case judged by the STF (Supremo
Tribunal Federal – Supreme Federal Court) in 1906: in the initial petition, the lawyer strongly
rejects the idea that expropriation is a forced sale 18; the court, however, in the final opinion,
decides that the legislation on sale should apply to expropriation19.
This conciliation attempt, however, did not succeed. This experimental compromise
between the owner-oriented anthropology and the interventionist state did not satisfactorily
explain what was happening in the Brazilian reality. It was only possible to reach a more
adequate perspective on the changes that were taking place in the Brazilian legal system when
the notion of property was relativized. Pedro Cantisano (2018) links this process to the
implementation of major urban reforms in Rio de Janeiro, in which systematic expropriations
and a reduction in the home protection provided the conditions for a more state-centered view.
There is also an incorporation of the concept of social function, which was gradually been
more used by Brazilian public opinion since the late 19th century (MALDANER, 2015).
Viveiros de Castro (1914, p. 279) is one of the first important jurists to suggest the
neet to overcoming the opposition between State and property, as Cantisano himself points
out: "the formula (...) of a dispute between private property and public interest is not happily
drafted, because there can be no collision but among equal or similar rights" 20. For him, the
basis of expropriation is the supremacy of the public interest over the private one; therefore,
in his point of view, there is a difference of nature between these two elements, which means
that it makes no sense to think of them in opposition. As a matter of fact, between the years
1910 and 1920, there is a change in the language of the sources. Eurico Sodré (1928, p. 3), for
example, rejects that expropriation can be considered a destruction of property, and the
existence of compensation would prove this: state takeover of property only transforms the

16
“P. que regulando-se em geral a desapropriação pela compra e venda, uma vez entregue a cousa e recebido ou
depositado o seu preço, não cabe .ao terceiro que vem reclamar a mesma cousa, á vista da Ord. liv. 4°, tit. 6° e
tit. 7-, outra acção senão a de reivindicação” (STJ, 1889).
17
“a desapropriação por utilidade pública não é equiparável ao contrato de compra e venda, por ser um caso de
força maior de todo estranho à vontade do locador” (TJRJ, 1907).
18
“é bem verdade que devido á perniciosa influencia do direito civil não faltaram escritores que, em tempos
passados, fizeram tentativas para explicar a desapropriação como um contrato de compra e venda” (STF, 1906,
p. 169)
19
“sendo o instituto da desapropriação por utilidade publica regulado pelos principios do contracto de compra e
venda embora seja esta forçada pelos direitos da soberania nacional ou JUS IMPERII” (STF, 1906, p. 185).
20
Portuguese original: “a fórmula (...) um litigio entre a propriedade privada e o interesse publico não é feliz,
porque não é possível haver collisão senão entre direitos iguaes ou semelhantes”.
good, which cease to be a specific thing and become a certain amount of money. Astolpho
Rezende even speaks of a new "social conception" of property21.
However, these visions of property remained in tension for a while. Some described
this flexibilization of private property as a form of "state socialism" (socialismo de Estado)
(TJSP, 1918, p. 399). A decision issued by the court in Rio de Janeiro is quite eloquent in this
regard, and not only revisits the issue of expropriation as socialism, but also describes it as
confiscation22.
We can understand these disputes as reverberations of changes in the philosophical
and moral normativity that guided the interpretation of law. Throughout the nineteenth
century, a worldview that placed property in a privileged place conditioned the way jurists
read legislative texts and understood legal concepts. Between the decades of 1900 and 1920,
transformations in the way the State acted began to affect the way jurists faced the law itself.
Property continued to be highly valued, but it was not the only relevant value anymore: it was
necessary to absorb the consequences of the progress stimulated by the interventionist state.

4 – Was property in true opposition with expropriation? Evidence from case-law

It is true that the various doctrinal texts established an understanding of expropriation

often based on the dialectic between freedom and authority. But the historian cannot restrict
himself to the opinions of the actors of the past in order to reconstruct a certain process: it is
necessary to collect additional evidence, to eventually challenge the sources themselves. In
this section, we will see that, contrary to what the doctrine hoped to see, expropriation often
did not mean opposition between state and private individuals. To perceive this capture the
insufficiencies of the liberal discourse, which emphasized the role of the individual and saw
freedom as protection against the state. Historically, the perception of the insufficiencies of
this vision led to the adoption of other parameters to explain the law. Furthermore, case-law

21
“O conceito moderno de propriedade não corresponde mais à concepção rígida e individualista dos romanos; é
um conceito social, que se opõe a que o proprietário possa fazer da propriedade um exercício tão ilimitado
quanto a sua vontade. Assim também a liberdade” (REZENDE, 1929, p. 427).
22
“E note-se como tem crescido com o tempo o menosprezo do Estado pelo direito de propriedade particular. A
lei n. 553 de 12 de julho de 1845 confiou sem peias, ao critério do júri de indenização a avaliação da
propriedade. Passado um decênio, veio o decreto 1.664, de 1855, inventor do novo sistema de socialismo do
Estado, determinar que nenhuma indenização poderia ser inferior nem superior para os prédios urbanos
desapropriados, ao valor de 20 anos do rendimento respectivo (...). Agora a República, menos cerimoniosa que o
Império, aperfeiçoou o sistema, estabelecendo na lei 1.021, de 1903, o máximo do valor locativo de 15 anos, e
ainda por cima desfalcado da importância do imposto predial. Neste andar, prosseguia, se os tribunais de justiça,
no desempenho da mais elevada e salutar das suas funções, não puserem freio à disparada do corcel legislativo,
dentro em pouco chegaremos talvez à sublimidade do quase confisco” (TJRJ, 1927).
shows how the official normativity embedded in the doctrine and in the rooms of parliament
is not capable of explaining another, underground normativity, built in the daily life of the
courts and the administration. Let us look at some emblematic cases judged by the Brazilian
courts that could hardly be satisfactorily explained by the doctrine of the time.
In one of them, a public office in Ouro Preto had used parts of a property without the
owner's authorization to create a building; the owner then applied to the courts for the act to
be considered as expropriation (TJMG, 1897), rather than simply bringing a damages action.
The judge understood that this would be equivalent to the person requesting the expropriation
of his own good, which was not feasible. He cites that the only authorities authorized to carry
out expropriation are the Fiscal Attorney of the National Treasury (general utility), that of the
Provincial Treasury (provincial utility), and the Municipal Councils (municipal utility), or the
companies authorized by concessions to expropriate. The judge states that arbitration is a
means of proof that should only be used when extremely necessary and authorized by the
judge. The plaintiff, by proposing an expropriation action, tried to start with arbitration,
subverting the process. This may be an explanation of why he preferred to resort to the
expropriation procedure: in it, the arbitration would come automatically, whereas in an action
for damages, it would be necessary to request the arbitral evidence, leading to further delay.
In addition to this case in which the party asked to be expropriated, there is an
interesting set of at least four lawsuits in which landowners try to prevent the State from
giving up the expropriation it has already begun (TJRS, 1885; STF, 1905a; 1911c; 1913d): a
sign that the taking of property would probably be profitable for the citizen it fell upon. In
one of those suits (TJSP, 1917b), the government gives up expropriation, and the tenant starts
to pay the rent to the former owners; however, the latter refuse to receive, suspicious that this
attitude would mean recognition of the end of the expropriation, which he tried to avoid.
Some rulings are surprising due to the audacity of the party, which eagerly seeks to be
expropriated. In one case (STF, 1923b), the government described in an incomplete way the
property that should be taken, and a neighbor requested in court that his good, and not the one
that the government originally had in mind, should be incorporated into public property. In
another case (TJRJ, 1884; STJ, 1887), the administration promoted a friendly expropriation,
but did not continue to drive the process. The expropriated citizen went to court, which
decided that this type of transaction was equivalent to a quasi-contract and, therefore, the
public power could not have unilaterally given up on it.
In the situations I just mentioned, the government gives up on expropriation, but it
remains in the interest of the citizen. There is still a confrontation between the State and the
owner, although in inverted places in relation to what we would normally expect. But it is
possible to revolve the liberal assumptions even further: there are judgments that show
evidence of negotiations between the public power and the individual, in which the latter
seeks to obtain some advantage in exchange for expropriation.
A case from the end of the 1910's (STF, 1918), for example, shows a great
entanglement between the actions of infrastructure companies authorized to expropriate and
private individuals expropriated by them. In this lawsuit, the Leopoldina Railway Company
had negotiated a reduction in the price of compensation in exchange for buying certain
materials from the expropriated and passing the railway near the soap factory of one of the
former owners of the terrain it would take. In another case (TJSP, 1912a), the state of São
Paulo had promised, in a contract, to extend the tramway line to the tissue factory of a private
individual in exchange for the free transfer of a plot of land. Another trial (TJSP, 1904) shows
the owner giving part of his land to the city council for the renovation of a street in exchange
for favors not related to expropriation. A final example is a report that several landowners had
ceded parts of their land to carry out sanitation works, in the hope that the valuation of the
remaining part of the property would compensate for the donation made to the state (TJSP,
1926c).
These are all events that go beyond the legally established friendly expropriation. This
institute made it possible for the private individual to accept the pecuniary offer of the State
and to transfer the property without the need for legal proceedings; in other words, it was a
sale carried out under the threat of expropriation. The four cases I mentioned in the previous
paragraph are not based on that premise: they show that, underneath the legal constructions,
there was an exchange of favors involving expropriations. Public works, especially railroad
works, could suffer deviations in their route so that they could help in the flow of production
of some local member of the elite: expropriation was a legal form that guaranteed this merger
between public and private that would be beneficial for both - and, at first, without involving
money, which was the mark of friendly expropriation.
What this all indicates is that in the Brazilian reality of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, there was not exactly an opposition between state and private citizens, as the
classical liberal thought proposes. The exercise of state power is not always reduced to a pure
and simple opposition between superior authority and the freedom of the administered. In
fact, the individual, in many moments, benefits from the takeover of his property.
Expropriation and property are not in necessary opposition: they are part of the same
continuum. As one newspaper said at the end of the nineteenth century: "for the sale, if it was
attempted, the imminent expropriation, very far from being a threat, would certainly be a
promise"23 (JORNAL DO COMÉRCIO, 1881, p. 230). And, in several moments, the
expropriation renders property effective. It makes property real and transforms it. An asset of
little use, or in a precarious situation, could be converted into money through the providential
aid of the State. The crossing of a railway line, the sanitation of a region, the opening of a
street: all public actions encamped by the State that, especially in the partial expropriations,
contributed to increase, and not to damage the property. Expropriation was often an
opportunity:

Beyond the circumstances that we have just pointed out, the commission does not
ignore that there are unscrupulous landlords, who just after becoming aware that
their buildings would be expropriated for public use, have increased the rent of these
buildings, although paying the land tax for some time, for the sole purpose of
obtaining greater profit, when the expropriation would have to be carried out24.

The many examples in which the treasury appeals against the indemnity evaluations
claiming that the price was excessive can also be remembered. All this indicates that, in fact,
the discourse of the opposition between property and the State was a mechanism that
contributed to create an image of suffering and enhance an attitude of piety towards the
owner. In other words, it was an absolutely convenient legitimation of astronomical
compensations made in the interest of private individuals. It is quite true that the legal
discourse on expropriation became more and more tempered as timed passed by, and jurists
stopped to talk about the seizure of property by public entities as hideous. At the beginning of
the 20th century, this trend received a new impulse with the incorporation of several new
technologies into the urban landscape. The installation of tramway lines, the placement of
electric lighting and, more dramatically, the reordering of the city network in the major
reforms between the 19th and 20th centuries: these are objectives that depend on expropriation
and on some degree of collaboration by private individuals. From then on, the vision of
expropriation as an opposition between the state and the individual begins to make even less
sense.
In addition to the subtle forms of collusion between the public administration and
private citizens, there was pure and simple corruption. A journalistic article in 1875, for

23
Portuguese original: “para a venda, se esta se tentasse, a expropriação iminente, muito longe de ser ameaça,
com certeza seria antes promessa”.
24
Portuguese original: Além das circunstâncias que acabamos de apontar, a comissão não ignora que há
proprietários pouco escrupulosos, que, apenas souberam que os seus prédios têm de ser desapropriados por
utilidade pública, elevaram o aluguel desses prédios, embora pagando por algum tempo maior décima, com o fim
único de obterem maior lucro, quando se tiver de efetuar a desapropriação. Jornal do Commércio, 26/03/1875.
example, criticizes the excessive compensation established in a process of expropriation - and,
more seriously, the fact that the crown prosecutor did not appealed against it. The owner was
apparently powerful and exerted influence over the judges25, for he had secured himself a
large compensation. The collusion between the state and the owner could occur in various
ways. This is exemplified by a case in which the municipality attacked the building before
completing the expropriation while the tenant of the land was still economically exploiting the
site. The tenant published a press release 26 against the city government's action and claimed
that the owner had gone to the government with a potentate, seeking in the municipality
guarantees that the tenant would not turn against him. In other words, the landlord seeks to
make a profit in association with the administration, even if it caused damage to his tenant.
Moreover, expropriation worked as a threat in favor to property owners. The
possibility of a procedure whose outcome tended to financially favor the landlord and whose
delay jeopardised the action of the public authorities stimulated public officials to offer large
sums of money for the purchase of the buildings, in the hope that the landowners land would
accept the offers and thus accelerate the action of the State. A newspaper report from 1903
shows this27. It reports that all the buildings in Rua da Prainha, in the city of Rio de Janeiro,
had been obtained amicably by the city hall, except for one, whose owners forced the
municipality to expropriate them. The newspaper believed that this would lead the
municipality to spend at least 20% less on compensation: this was the price of time that the
delay in the process imposed - and another of the channels through which property owners
could receive more money from the State.
It is true that this entanglement between the State and certain citizens does not rule out
situations in which oppositions are more obvious. But probably not in the same way that the
doctrine read the problem. This is shown by a case reported by the press in the early 1850s.
An anonymous article28 defends the construction of a square next to the Pequeno Rossio in
Rio de Janeiro. This region was close to a swamp, and needed more infrastructure for the sale
of foodstuffs. The author of the article states that the area was poor and occupied by
"miserable houses", which is why expropriation would become easy. He, however, does not
even mention the interests of the owners. Most likely because they were of low income - the

25
“Dizem mais que esse feliz, além de tudo, é protegido de um mandão que dispõe de grande preponderância e é
o tutu da freguesia, e acrescenta-se que até manda em juízes e desembargadores e faz o que quer”. A Reforma:
Órgão democrático. 04/11/1875.
26
O País, 04/09/1906.
27
Gazeta de Notícias, 18/11/1903.
28
Diário do Rio de Janeiro, 24/03/1852.
concern with the property, in some moments, appeared restricted to the goods of certain social
classes.
Even at the end of the 19th century, expropriation can still be employed as a form of
property protection. This appears in a press article in the penultimate year of the empire, in
which a citizen criticized the procedure adopted in the acquisition of land in the Cabeça de
Porco slum. He said the government was threatening the residents by saying that the addresses
were unhealthy and irregular – legal reasons for taking over the properties without indemnity.
As a result, the owners sold their property at derisory prices to the government. But the
accusations of irregularities were apparently false, and so the text called for expropriation as
the only legitimate procedure for the government to achieve its objectives. This shows how,
even at the end of the 19th century, the expropriation procedure could, in another dimension,
serve to guarantee and make property effective 29. As a matter of fact, the press itself viewed
favorably when the owners negotiated with city hall - letting things get to the point where the
lawsuit needed to be proposed was seen with suspicion and as the owner's fault30.
By now, we can understand that there is a lot of reality in the old doctrinal idea that
expropriation transforms property, instead of annihilating it. And it often does so making it
more interesting for the private individual. The conflict between public and private becomes
sometimes an alliance. But this marriage between state and owners, hidden under a cloak of
apparent violence and embedded in a discourse of justification, is perhaps not a great novelty.
It is the result of the difference that makes whether or not you have access to the ruling class,
and, with that, to be able to use the state in your favor or have to fight against it. The doctrine,
blind to those diversified uses, saw only opposition. It was incapable of realizing that, under
the generic name of "citizen", lied a multitude of concrete subjects belonging to different
social classes: each one would inevitably be treated in a different way. Reality did not fit in
the straitjacket of liberalism.

5 – State-level expropriations: a complex system

29
Jornal do Commércio, 03/05/1888.
30
Na owner had been submitted for a lengthy expropriation procedure for over a year. The newspaper said that
the most fault fell upon her, due to her refusal to amicably negotiate with city hall, as others had been doing.
(Gazeta de Notícias, 06/04/1905). She later published a text arguing against those observations and saying she
was a victim of abuse (Gazeta de Notícias, 21/04/1905).
 Brazil was founded as a unitary state in 1822. However, throughout the nineteenth
century, there were strong debates about administrative decentralization31. In 1834, when the
central power was weakening, the Additional Act to the Constitution was approved, which
increased the powers of the provinces. Provincial legislative assemblies were created, with
powers, among other things, to expropriate good if there was a provincial public interest.
Regional governments also had the power to create expropriation laws with their own
procedure.
The law books dealing with local government in the Empire did not pay much
attention to the problem of expropriation 32, which may be a sign that at that time, the tensions
between the national system and the provincial systems were not dramatic. In the republic
(1889), the form of government was changed to a federation, with more powers for local
governments. The new federal states continued to be able to expropriate, but there was a
heated debate about the constitutionality of this situation. This issue was discussed in several
judicial decisions (TJSP, 1912b; STF, 1912c; 1912d; 1912e; 1913a; 1919a). The main
foundation was article 34, 23 of the Constitution of 1891, which put at the hands of the union
the exclusive competence to legislate on civil, criminal and commercial law and the federal
justice procedure. Therefore, the only branches of law left to the states were the civil and
criminal procedures of their own courts. It was then argued that, since expropriation belonged
to civil law, it could not be regulated through state legislation. Therefore, their laws would be
unconstitutional and could not be applied. The STF's common response was divided into two
arguments. The first followed this reasoning: for the court, the expropriation consisted of two
parts: the abduction of property by the public administration, which was of an administrative
nature, and the determination of compensation, which was of a procedural nature. Neither of
them, therefore, was in the civil sphere. The second argued that the imperial, much less
autonomous than the federal states, were capable of legislating on expropriation; it would not
make sense to deny the latter what the former were allowed.
In addition to this debate, there were some other points of disagreement between the
federal government and the local powers regarding expropriation. There were two main points
of tension: the possibility of the judge to change the amount of compensation established by
the arbitrator and the competence of the judge of the facts of the farm to judge cases of

31
Para uma primeira observação historiográfica, cf o trabalho de Ivo Coser (2008).
32
The Viscount of Uruguay (1865, p. 205), in his “Studiues on the Administration of Provinces” (“Estudos sobre
a administração das províncias”), says only that the Additional Act created the difference between municipal
and general public utility. But his work, with over a 1000 pages, writes about expropriation for only two;
Tavares Bastos (1870) talks even less about it.
expropriation. The existence of those differences enable us to say that the federal and the state
regimes were part of different orders, despite some contact between them.

5.1 – First difference between the systems: appeals on indemnity

As ironic as it may seem, at the federal level, expropriation actions did not discussed
the taking of private property itself: the debates should deal solely and exclusively with the
magnitude of compensation. More than that: there could be no appeal against the price
determined by the arbitrators, except to remedy eventual nullities. This architecture had a
clear objective: to set a straightforward procedure, without exposed flanks before the traps of
shrewd lawyers, always ready to delay any initiative from the public authorities when they
knew that their clients would invariably lose33. Speed was the foundation, so that the
government would not be delayed in obtaining the good34. The justification, diffused in
several judicial pronouncements (STF, 1926), was that the guarantee of the property and the
source of justice of the procedure did not lie in the content of the decision, but in the freedom
of the parties to choose the arbitrators. However, even with the constant and due care, there
were many debates involving the expropriation proceedings.
The strength of the restriction was well expressed in art. 29 of the 1903 decree: "From
the ruling that ratifies the arbitration, an appeal may be filed (...). The appeal will only have a
devolutive effect, and can only be provided to annul the process for lack of essential
formalities”35. In these last two words, lied all the opportunity and all the limit of the owners.
Depending on the more restricted or more open interpretation of the expression "essential
formalities", almost all of the arbitrator’s report could be re-discussed by the judge, or only
grotesque flaws would be taken into consideration. Let's see.
As the restrictions on the debate were very strong - at least judging by the letter of the
law - the STF had a looser interpretation than article 29 suggested. An example of this are
cases in which the court decided that the expression "essential forms" included the legal
commandments regarding the criteria for evaluating the compensation (STF, 1911a), and even
33
“O processo de desapropriação é rápido e expedito; não pode ser entravado por nenhum recurso suspensivo;
seus termos essenciais hão de correr normalmente, seguindo-se uns aos outros, sem procrastinações prejudiciais
ao direito da coletividade. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, ele assegura ao expropriado todas as garantias de defesa”
(SODRÉ, 1928, p. 77).
34
“O processo de arbitramento judicial para desapropriação por utilidade pública, sumaríssimo por sua natureza,
não admite exceção dilatória e protelatória, cabendo apenas o recurso de apelação uma vez findo o arbitramento”
(STF, 1909, p. 516).
35
Portuguese original: “Da sentença que homologar o arbitramento, poderá ser interposta apelação (...). A
apelação terá só o efeito devolutivo, e apenas poderá ser provida para anular-se o processo por falta de
formalidades essenciais”
what are the cases of total and partial expropriation (STF, 1913b). This type of less restrictive
position was expressly written by the court:

The annulment of arbitration, however, to which the legal text transcribed above
refers, is not limited to the omission of extrinsic formalities, but also extends to the
omission of intrinsic formalities required by law and to which the arbitrators'
objective criterion cannot be omitted. As long as it is proved that this criterion has
not been subordinated to the legal rules that guide the action of the experts, the
appeal must be heard, not for the arbitration to be reduced or expanded, but to rule
its nullity, in the same manner and for the same reason that it is annulled, in the
event of the breach of external formalities36.

Often, the idea of "essential formality" included the legal limits for the compensations
established by law37, though not in all cases38. But while it is true that the interpretation of
federal legislation was reasonably elastic, it also had its limits. At times, requests from
lawyers to discuss alleged substantial nullity were merely a disguise for dealing with the
justice of the arbitrator’s report. Examples of alleged nullities rejected by the STF in one case
were the lack of professional credentials 39 and the domicile of the arbitrators (1912b); that the
reports of two arbitrators had different dates; and that the amount of compensation was
incorrect. The suspicion of the experts was also not sufficient reason to void a case (STF,
1915). The examples could continue, showing the erratic nature of the case law40.
36
Portuguese original: “A anulação de arbitramento, porém, a que alude o texto legal acima transcrito, não se
limita à preterição das formalidades extrínsecas, e estende-se também à preterição das formalidades intrínsecas
exigidas pela lei e a que não pode fugir o critério objetivo dos arbitradores. Desde que, pois, se prove não se ter
subordinado esse critério às normas legais orientadoras da ação dos peritos, a apelação deve ser ouvida, não para
ser o arbitramento reduzido ou ampliado, mas para se lhe decretar a nulidade, da mesma maneira e pela mesma
razão por que ele é anulado, na hipótese da preterição das formalidades externas” (STF, 1925a, p. 107). The
court had already been following a similar position for a long time, though not expressily (STF, 1912a).
37
There was a case in which the arbiters took into consideration the legal minimum of compensation for a
building in ruins – and law sayd that in those cases thare should be no minimum. The evaluation report was
therefore annulled (TJRJ, 1912). In another, the annulment came because the experts failed to answer the
questions presented by the parties (STF, 1925b). A very explicit example of violation of formality leading to
annulment was a report that did not give a single value to the land, but established maximum, medium and
minimum (TJMG, 1929). There was one case in which the arbiter established a higher indemnity than that
requested by the owner, and therefore the court annulled the evaluation; one of the judges, however, considered
that this should not have been done, because the appeal should only deal with the lack of essential formalities
(TJRJ, 1908).
38
Article 33 of the 1903 decree established the formalities for the evaluation of the land subject to the
emphyteusis, and how the distribution among the holders of the useful domain and the direct domain should be
made. This issue was discussed in a case in Paraíba that reached the STF (1924a, 1924c, 1925c) through an ex-
officio appeal. The STF considered that failing to deduct the amount referring to the direct domain in the
indemnity was related to the justice of the report, and not the lack of essential formality.
39
In other case (STF, 1913c), the court took a similar position on the same argument.
40
The alleged undue inclusion of improvements in the evaluation report was also denied as nullity (STF, 1916a).
Appeals dealing with the distribution of lawyer’s payments were rejected on more than one occasion (STF,
1916b, 1921b) because it was not a true substantial nullity. The lack of the property plan was not considered as a
reason for annulment of the proceeding if there was in it a sufficiently detailed description that would allow the
land to be identifyed (STF, 1920). There was a case of partial expropriation in which the land was fully allocated
to the Federal Government (STF, 1921a); the party appealed, but the court rejected the appeal on the grounds
that this too was not a lack of essential formality. Naturally, there were those who tried to directly discuss the
 The debates so far mentioned deal with the federal legislation. In the states, however,
the possibilities for challenge within the process were broader.
In the state of Minas Gerais, for example, the state procedural code established, in its
article 1272: "in cases of expropriation, shall be admissible the exceptions of illegitimacy of
the plaintiff, suspicion and incompetence of the judge, with suspension of the process"41. The
illegitimacy of the plaintiff could be claimed against the state government if the individual
had filed an action for annulment of the decree of public utility, and it had not yet been judged
(TJMG, 1930b). But the violation of public utility should be explicit, and therefore was not
easily granted by judges (TJMG, 1930a).
But the most controversial situation could be found in the state of São Paulo. If, for the
federal process, such “essential nullities” caused controversy, the São Paulo process also had
a vague expression destined to generate discord; this time, in art. 5 of the 1836 expropriation
act: "this whole process [of expropriation] will be expedited administratively without judicial
formalities; and there will only be an ordinary appeal on the quantitative of compensation
arbitrated, and appeal to the legislative assembly for the restitution of property; one and the
other without suspension”42. The whole problem was in defining what this appeal on the
quantitative meant, because article 4 of the São Paulo law stated that "the decision of the
arbitrators will be final"43. The first provision made it appear that it was possible to modify in
court the value of the compensation, while the second did not.
To solve this dispute the judges discussed whether the evaluators (louvados) could be
interpreted as arbiters (árbitros) or arbitrators (arbitradores). The “Legal Vocabulary”
(Vocabulário Jurídico) of Teixeira de Freitas (1882, pp. 15-16) helps to understand the
distinction. "Arbitrators are evaluators chosen by the litigants to give their opinions on
disputes: opinions on facts only, and the Judges are not bound by their decisions" 44; on the
other hand, "arbitrator is the Judge chosen by the litigant parties to rule on their matters" 45. In
Cunha Salles’ (1882a, p. 268) words, the arbiters are persons who originally had no
jurisdiction, but who are chosen by the parties to decide the case. They decide both about
justice of the case; an example was a municipality that suspended a lawsuit claiming that the price was
excessive, and that the report did not take into account that the works would enhance the value of the building.
The STF (1924b), as expected, denied this claim.
41
Portuguese original: “nos processos de desapropriação, são admissíveis as exceções de ilegitimidade de parte,
suspeição e incompetência do juiz, com suspensão do processo”
42
Portuguese original: “todo esse processo [de desapropriação] será expedido administrativamente sem as
formalidades judiciárias; e somente haverá recurso ordinário sobre o quantitativo da indenização arbitrada, e
recurso à assembleia legislativa para a restituição da propriedade; um e outro sem suspensão”
43
Portuguese original: “a decisão dos árbitros será terminante”.
44
Portuguese original: “Arbitradores são Louvados escolhidos pelas partes litigantes para darem suas opiniões
em matéria de litígios: opinião de facto unicamente, e os Juízes não são obrigados a concordar”.
45
Portuguese original: “Arbitro é o Juiz escolhido pelas Partes Litigantes para julgar suas questões”.
facts and law, whereas the arbitrators rule only about facts. It is even possible for the plaintiff
to ask for a new opinion of the arbitrators if he feels undermined, something that would be
unthinkable for arbiters (CUNHA SALLES, 1882b, p. 473). Arbiters make decisions, whereas
arbitrators merely constitute evidence, which must be analyzed by the State judge 46. On the
one hand, the law of 1836 spoke of arbiters and of a final decision, which implied that their
pronouncement was definitive. On the other hand, it was argued that mandatory arbitration
had already been extinct decades earlier47.
From the question of whether the evaluators were arbiters or arbitrators, came one big
dispute: whether State judges could only nullify the evaluator’s reports with which they
disagreed and order a new evaluation or whether they could beyond that directly impose a
new value. Many of the second degree judges in the São Paulo court followed the second
option. An example of this is an expropriation brought by the Rio Claro City Council (TJSP,
1915a). For Judge Vicente de Carvalho, for example, the law determined that the evaluation
was final, but, according to him, only for the purpose of incorporating the property into the
expropriator's estate. For the other purposes, the judge is free to amend the evaluation.
The interference of the judges in the content of the evaluations was fought by Judge
Firmino Whitaker in several rulings, but he was always in the minority 48. An interesting case
allows us to see what he thought (TJSP, 1925). São João da Boa Vista Municipallity
expropriated a plot of land for the construction of a road. The owner appealed on two main
grounds: the first, that the purpose of the expropriation would only be to constitute a servitude
of passage on its land, and two public roads already passed through it; second, that the
administrative act in question aimed at the private interest, not the public. The Rapporteur,
precisely Firmino Whitaker, denied that the court could assess whether or not the case was in
the public interest: this task belonged solely to the public administration:

It always thought that the law of 1836 did not create, in the expropriation, simple
experts arbitrators. It created a true arbitral court, because the terms it uses
46
“Portanto, o arbitramento, nas desapropriações, não é prova subsidiária; é decisão, contra a qual há o recurso
para a segunda instância, como veremos” (AZEVEDO MARQUES, 1917, p. 91).
47
This extinction would have occured through the 1350 act of 14 September 1866, coupled with decree 3900 of
26 June 1867 (TJSP, 1915c). There was indeed room for discussion The act’s § 1º of art. 1º sayed that “o juízo
arbitral será sempre voluntário mediante o compromisso das partes”. But the caput of article 1º sayed “fica
derrogado o Juízo Arbitral necessário estabelecido pelo artigo 20, título único do Código Comercial”. It seemed
that the mandatory arbitration of the expropriation act still existed: the extinction only refered to the comercial
code (TJSP, 1917a).
48
“o processo de desapropriação não pertence à classe dos contenciosos, exigindo, apenas, formalidades que
garantam a legitimidade do juízo, o direito de defesa e a perfectibilidade do laudo. Toda discussão estranha e
toda prova que não se relacionem com esses fins devem ser dele banidas” (WHITAKER, 1925, p. 208).
 'arbitration, terminating, conclusive decision’, leave no doubt in this regard. It is
therefore his opinion, an old opinion, that the judge cannot, in such cases, modify
the 'quantum' of the arbitral process. He only must verify whether the arbitral
process has followed the prescriptions of the law49 (TJSP, 1925, p. 49).

The law, however, commands that the arbitrations cannot consider only the intrinsic
value of the good, but also the profit that was drawn from it, and the possible losses that might
arise from the expropriation. In the specific case, the experts only calculated the compensation
based on the value of the land: they left aside the fact that the road should pass through the
expropriated coffee plantations, the expenses he would have to pay to surround the area,
among others. For this reason, Whitaker voted for the annulment: "the indemnity awarded by
them is not complete, and the indemnity is only legal when it is complete" 50 (TJSP, 1925, p.
49). In other cases, he states that the annulment could only occur if the amount of the
indemnity was exaggerated, and because of ignorance or intentional misconduct of the
arbitrator (TJSP, 1915a).
Over time - and despite Whitaker – judges developed an intermediate interpretation
that reconciled both the fact that the arbitration decision was final and the fact that there was
an appeal on the quantitative of the compensation. The judges affirmed that the evaluation
report was final only for the first-level courts, and that, at the appeal level, the price to be paid
for the asset could be changed by the second level judges (TJSP, 1915b, 1917a, 1923, 1925d,
1926a). Azevedo Marques (1917), a supporter of this interpretation, states that the correct
word that the law should have used was not “terminating”, but “definitive”, which would
indicate that the arbiters’ report closes the discussion of the first level, but, like any report, is
subject to appeal. It was a bizarre interpretation even from the viewpoint of the very judges
who adopted it (TJSP, 1929), but it managed to reconcile the awkward and possibly even not
technical expressions of a law that was already almost 100 years old. Interference by the São
Paulo court in the values of compensations, which they considered to be either fair (TJSP,
1914b) or exaggerated (TJSP, 1926b), became commonplace. After all, in addition to the
error, the justice of the arbitration could now be evaluated (TJSP, 1916), and it was possible
to "prove that the amount arbitrated by the evaluators was insufficient to compensate the

49
Portuguese original: “Sempre pensou que a lei de 1836 não criou, na desapropriação, simples peritos
arbitradores. Criou um verdadeiro juízo arbitral, pois os termos de que usa ‘arbitramento, decisão terminante,
concludente’ não deixam dúvida a esse respeito. É por isso, sua opinião, opinião já antiga, que o juiz não pode,
em tais processos, modificar o ‘quantum’ do arbitramento. Ele só tem que verificar se no arbitramento foram
verificadas as prescrições da lei”.
50
Portuguese original: “a indenização por eles arbitrada não é completa, e a indenização só é legal quando é
completa”
damaged goods"51 (TJSP, 1876). The issue, however, remained controversial, with judges
voting differently from the dominant position of the court (TJSP, 1919d).

5.2 – Second difference between the systems: competence of fiscal judges

The second difference between the federal system and the state systems was the
competence of fiscal judges (Juiz dos Feitos da Fazenda). Once again, the point of discussion
was São Paulo on the one hand; on the other, the city of Rio de Janeiro, which was under the
jurisdiction of federal legislation due to its status as the capital of the republic.
The São Paulo court lived a situation of uncertainty regarding this problem. A Ruling
(TJSP, 1913b) reports that the Civil Chamber (Câmara Cível) of the court had been deciding
that the fiscal judges had no jurisdiction over expropriation cases, while the Chamber of
Agravos had been deciding otherwise. Judge Rodrigues Sette stated that, traditionally, the
fiscal judges dealt only with cases involving the state or national treasury, but never the
municipal one. The city halls had no privilege of court; a special law had granted it to the
municipality of the state capital, but it did not expressly mention the expropriation processes:
it dealt only with the collection of the debt of São Paulo. A restrictive interpretation should
then be made: the expropriations promoted by municipalities would run in the common
court52.
The debate about the competence of the fiscal judges continued for sometime in São
Paulo. The Chamber of Agravos of the São Paulo court again said several times that there was
competence (TJSP, 1913a). The Civil Chamber repeatedly stated otherwise (TJSP, 1913c;
1913d; 1913f; 1913g; 1914a; 1914c). A more reasoned opinion came in a 1913 ruling (TJSP,
1913e). In this specific fact, the judges affirmed that decree 123 of November 10, 1892, on
municipal expropriations, in its art. 124, § 4, letter b, no. 1, when it restricted the competence
of the fiscal judge, does so expressly, and does not cite at any time the expropriations. The
very wording of other letters of the same article implied this interpretation. For example, letter

51
Portuguese original: “provar que a quantia arbitrada pelos louvados era insufficiente para indemnisar as
bemfeitorias estragadas”. Morais de Melo defended passionately this way of intervention:: “A desapropriação
não é um simples processo administrativo, como se pode inferir da lei de 1836. Embora especial e sumário, sem
solenidades, é um processo contencioso. Nestas condições, é fora de dúvida que o juiz pode intervir nela e dar a
última palavra em relação ao quantum da indenização. Não seria lógico que direitos de menor importância
fossem resolvidos pela intervenção do juiz e na desapropriação, onde se debatem direitos importantes, o juiz
ficasse de mãos atadas” (TJSP, 1917a, p. 229).
52
“O Juiz dos Feitos da Fazenda do Estado não é competente para o processo de desapropriação decretada pela
Câmara Municipal. Juízo de competência restrita, as suas funções estão determinadas em lei e nenhuma
disposição há na legislação estadual, nem havia no anterior regime que lhe atribua competência para processo
desta natureza” (TJSP, 1913c).
c directly states that the competence for the incorporation of assets only occurs when they
belong to the state. The Chamber of Agravos considered that if there was any doubt regarding
the competence for expropriations, it should have been solved through that law - which, on
the contrary, was silent in this regard. Despite all this, the Civil Chamber continued to judge
against the express determination of the Chamber of Agravos, consistently annulling the
validity of the latter's decisions.
A similar discussion was undertaken in Rio de Janeiro, but this time with reference to
the federal legislation governing the republican capital (STF, 1922a; 1922b; 1922d; 1923a) 53.
A paradigmatic example of this is a case judged in the early 1920s by the STF (1923a). It is
an expropriation carried out in the capital where the plaintiff argues whether the federal or
local courts have jurisdiction. The STF cites art. 134, §§ 1 and 3 of decree 9,263 of 1911, by
which the fiscal judge must act in all cases in which the municipal treasury is interested. This
includes, of course, expropriation for municipal utility. The plaintiff, however, claimed
unconstitutionality of this section of the decree, since their case, in which there were
inhabitants of different states, should be tried before federal courts, according to art. 60, d of
the Brazilian Constitution of 189154. The STF considered, however, that this provision would
not apply, because the expropriation process, due to its merely administrative nature, could
not be considered a "litigation" (litígio) - and this requirement was present in the
constitutional text. Other cases (STF, 1922e; TJRJ, 1923), in which the competence of the
mayor of Rio de Janeiro to carry out the expropriation and that of the fiscal judge to verify it
were denied, ended up being resolved by Article 5 of Decree 4,956 of 190355.
At the federal level, this debate was solved more easily, with a change between the
monarchy and the republic. For the monarchic period, there is a case (TJRJ, 1881) of
expropriation promoted by the National Treasury. The competence of the fiscal judge to
prosecute it was discussed. The party claimed that there was no jurisdiction because the
regulation of the fiscal judge from January 12, 1842, stated that the judiciary could only rule
on the cases processed under the 1826 expropriation act56. As this act had been revoked by the

53
A much older case (TJRJ, 1876) had already dealt with this matter, though in a diferente context.
54
“Art 60 - Compete aos Juízes ou Tribunais Federais, processar e julgar: (...) d) os litígios entre um Estado e
cidadãos de outro, ou entre cidadãos de Estados diversos, diversificando as leis destes”.
55
“A verificação da utilidade pública terá lugar por (...) ato do conselho, ou do Prefeito do Distrito Federal, em
relação às obras de utilidade pública do município, por ele projetadas e executadas administrativamente, ou por
contrato”.
56
“Art. 1º. Ao juízo privativo dos feitos da fazenda compete conhecer e julgar definitivamente em 1ª instância
todas as causas cíveis, ordinárias ou sumárias, em que a fazenda nacional for autora ou ré, ou por qualquer
maneira interessada, em que deverem intervir os seus procuradores na conformidade das leis em vigor. Art. 2º.
Compreendem no número das ditas causas: (...) 4º Os processos para se verificar a desapropriação na forma dos
arts. 4, 5, 6 e 7 da lei de 9 de setembro de 1826”. Jornal do Commércio, 15/01/1842.
law of 1845 with respect to expropriations for public utility, the plaintiff claimed that the
fiscal judge was no longer competent. Moreover, the plaintiff also said that the regiment was a
simple ministerial order, and should not prevail over art. 3 of the law of 1826 and 11 of the
legislative decree of 1845, which were of higher normative instance. The state court agreed
with him. Later, in in Republican times, a ruling (STF, 1911b) established the competence of
Federal Judges based on art. 12, § 2 of law No. 221 of 1894, which transferred to federal
judges the cases that were previously processed before the extinct national fiscal judge,
among which was expropriation.

6 – A multi-tier system: conclusions

Expropriation in Brazil was managed by multinormative system with at least three

components. The first one, which I call the general level of normativity, is the set of federal
acts on expropriation and their interpretation by Brazilian courts and jurists. The second level,
which can be called the regional one, is composed of state laws and their application in court.
The third and last level is made of the daily practices of state agents, and the parameters that
they used to interact with citizens.
All these levels of regulation at least some degree of legal nature, since they are
harboured within the state. This leads to the first conclusion of this research: the ideas of legal
pluralism and multinormativity serve not only to explain the relationship between the State
and external entities, but also to rethink what is the law of the State itself, and how different
parts of the State interact with each other. The observation that there is a variety of legal
orders within public power would be prosaic if we thought only of federal states. However,
the Brazilian empire was unitary, and yet there are differences between the rights of each of
the provinces. Moreover, the effective application of the rules by the agents leaves room for
negotiated practices that would not be allowed if there were a direct application of the federal
laws. This corroborates Peter Collin's observation (2017, p. 148) that there can be multiple
normative levels in a legal order that is meant to be unitary, as it is the case for law of the
liberal world. At the same time, what opens this possibility is the practice of legal actors, and
not the contemporary theorizations about how the legal world works.
The second conclusion is that there was a fundamental divergence in how the jurists of
the period understood expropriation and how state agents used it. The former perceived it as
the result of a fundamental opposition between state and property, while the latter relied
extensively on negotiation. At stake in the way with which the doctrine dealt with
expropriation was the meddling of a parallel normativity at the side of law: the moral and
philosophical ideas that perceived property as the main expression of the individual in the
world, and that therefore saw it as the most important individual right. Legislation embodied
this normativity through the creation of time-consuming procedures that were difficult to
execute; judges applied it through the determination of high indemnities; and academics did
so through a widespread distrust of expropriation. However, from the beginning of the
twentieth century onwards, the discrepancy between this moral normativity and the new needs
of the state led to a crisis in this worldview, which was being replaced by a social conception
of property - and, consequently, by a less negative view of expropriation. In other words: the
tension between the general normative level and the customary normative level generated a
departure from the liberal vision embodied in the legislation. This, however, did not lead to a
replacement of the acts then in force, which continued to exist at the federal level until 1941 57:
what changed were the interpretative parameters applied to it by the courts and the public
administration.

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vol. 15, pp. 195-198, 1915b.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO. Desapropriação. Arbitramento. Redução.

Apelação cível n. 7973. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, a. 4, vol. 16, pp. 41-42, 1915c.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO. Desapropriação. Regularidade do processo.

Apelação cível n. 8199. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, a. 5, vol. 17, pp. 385, 1916.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO. Desapropriação. Redução do laudo. Faculdade

do juiz da apelação. Embargos n. 7973. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, a. 6, vol. 22, pp.
227-230, 1917a.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO. Desapropriação. Anulação. Efeitos. Pagamento

da renda do prédio. Apelação cível n. 8658. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, a. 6, vol. 22,
pp. 348-349, 1917b.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO; MARQUES, J. M. Azevedo (comentário).

Desapropriação. Terras e águas. Critério. Nulidade do laudo. Apelação cível n. 8885. Revista
dos Tribunais, São Paulo, a. 7, vol. 26, pp. 394-399, 1918.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO. Desapropriação. Lei municipal declarando de

utilidade pública a área total de um prédio. Desapropriação parcial. Agravo n. 12186. Revista
dos Tribunais, São Paulo, a. 12, vol. 45, pp. 290-291, 1923.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO. Desapropriação. Formalidades do laudo.

Apelação cível n. 13145. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, a. 14, vol. 54, pp. 239-240, 1925.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO. Desapropriação. Divergência entre os

arbitradores. Recurso sobre o quantitativo. Apelação Cível n. 13761. Revista dos Tribunais,
São Paulo, a. 15, vol. 57, pp. 140-141, 1926a.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO. Desapropriação. Desistência. Sentença

homologatória. Agravo n. 14182. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, a. 15, vol. 57, pp. 320-
321, 1926b.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO. Desapropriação. Como se deve calcular a

indenização. Revista de Direito Civil, Comercial e Criminal, vol. 80, Rio de Janeiro, p. 524,
jul., 1926c.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DE SÃO PAULO (Primeira Instância). Desapropriação.

Modificação do “quantum” arbitrado. A quem compete. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, a.
18, vol. 70, pp. 344-345, 1929.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. Revista cível nº 8830. Gazeta jurídica:

revista semanal de jurisprudência, doutrina e legislação, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, a. 4, pp. 57-
82, abr./jun, 1876.
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. Agravo cível de petição nº 2730. Gazeta
jurídica: revista semanal de jurisprudência, doutrina e legislação, Rio de Janeiro, v. 33, a. 9,
pp. 122-126, out./dez., 1881.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. Questão de desapropriação para o

abastecimento de água à capital do Império. Inteligência do decreto de 27 de outubro de 1855.
O Direito: Revista de Legislação, Doutrina e Jurisprudência, Rio de Janeiro, a. 10, v. 28,
mai./ago., pp. 539-593, 1882.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. Uma vez iniciado o processo de

desapropriação, tendo chegado os interessados a acordo sobre o preço, não é lícito ao
desapropriante desistir sem o consentimento do desapropriado, ao qual está vinculado por um
quase contrato. Revista Cível n. 10.240. O Direito: Revista de Legislação, Doutrina e
Jurisprudência, Rio de Janeiro, a. 12, v. 35, set./dez., pp. 550-551, 1884.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. Todo terreno do domínio particular tem a

seu favor a indenização. Entram na regra os terrenos outrora dados em sesmarias, salvo
cláusula contrária. Condições da validade das sesmarias. O Direito: Revista de Legislação,
Doutrina e Jurisprudência, Rio de Janeiro, a. 14, v. 40, mai./ago., pp. 155-170, 1886.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. Desapropriação por utilidade pública.

Contrato de compra e venda. Arrendamento. Pena convencional. Perdas e danos.
Inadmissibilidade. Segunda Câmara da Corte de Apelação e Juízo de Direito da Primeira Vara
Cível. Revista de Direito Civil, Comercial e Criminal, vol. 4, Rio de Janeiro, pp. 451-453,
1907.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. Desapropriação por utilidade pública.

Arbitramento. Terceiro árbitro. Como deve fixar o quantum da indenização. Seu limite.
Excesso. Redução. Revista de Direito Civil, Comercial e Criminal, vol. 8, Rio de Janeiro, pp.
151-153, 1908.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. Desapropriação pública. Processo.

Formalidade essencial. Propriedade em ruínas. Indenização. Como se procede. Arbitramento.
Inobservância de disposições legais. Nulidade do processo. Revista de Direito Civil,
Comercial e Criminal, vol. 26, Rio de Janeiro, pp. 166-167, out., 1912.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. Desapropriação por utilidade pública

municipal. Quem pode decretá-la. Juízo competente. Processo. Ação proposta para nulidade
do respectivo decreto. Litispendência. Inadmissibilidade. Segunda Câmara da Corte de
Apelação e Juízo dos Feitos da Fazenda Municipal. Revista de Direito Civil, Comercial e
Criminal, vol. 67, Rio de Janeiro, pp. 366-367, jan., 1923.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO DE JANEIRO. Desapropriação por necessidade ou

utilidade pública. A indenização deve ter por base o valor do imóvel pela sua renda provada
por ocasião do arbitramento, não prevalecendo o lançamento predial anterior.
Inconstitucionalidade do § 5º do art. 2.119 do Código Judiciário do Estado do Rio. Agravo de
petição n. 4.324. Archivo judiciário, v. 3, pp. 206-209, jul./set., 1927.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL. É lícito ao desapropriante desistir

do processo desapropriação que tiver promovido. Revista Cível n. 10.240. O Direito: Revista
de Legislação, Doutrina e Jurisprudência, Rio de Janeiro, a. 13, v. 37, mai./ago., pp. 573-574,
1885.

Laws

BRASIL. Lei de 9 de setembro de 1826 – marca os casos em que terá lugar a desapropriação
da propriedade particular por necessidade, e utilidade pública, e as formalidades que devem
preceder à mesma desapropriação. In: Coleção das leis do Império do Brasil de 1826, parte
primeira. Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia Nacional, 1880.

BRASIL. Decreto nº 353, de 12 de julho de 1845. Designa os casos em que terá lugar a
desapropriação por utilidade pública geral, ou municipal da Corte. In: Coleção das leis do
Império do Brasil de 1845, tomo VII, parte I. Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia Nacional, 1845.

BRASIL. Decreto nº 806 de 23 de setembro de 1854. Autoriza a Câmara Municipal da Corte a

incorporar Companhias para o fim de fazer abrir a rua do Cano, bem como para regularizar e
dar maior largura à rua dos Latoeiros, com as cláusulas, favores e obrigações abaixo
mencionadas. In: Coleção das leis do Império do Brasil de 1854, tomo XV, parte 1. Rio de
Janeiro: Tipografia Nacional, 1854.

BRASIL. Decreto nº 816 de 10 de julho de 1855. Autoriza o Governo a estabelecer o processo

para a desapropriação dos prédios e terrenos que forem necessários para a construção das
obras e mais serviços pertencentes à Estrada de Ferro de Dom Pedro Segundo, e a marcar as
regras para a indenização dos proprietários. In: Coleção das leis do Império do Brasil de
1855, tome XVI, parte I. Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia Nacional, 1856.

BRASIL. Decreto nº 1.664 de 27 de outubro de 1855. Dá Regulamento para execução do

decreto nº 816 de 10 de julho do corrente ano sobre as desapropriações para construção de
obras e serviços das Estradas de ferro do Brasil. In: Coleção das leis do Império do Brasil de
1855, tomo XVIII, parte II. Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia Nacional, 1856.

BRASIL. Lei nº 1.832 de 9 de setembro de 1870. Autoriza o governo a despender a quantia de

até mil contos de réis com o abastecimento d’água à capital do Império, e a desapropriar os
terrenos e prédios indispensáveis à aquisição, conservação e distribuição dos mananciais. In:
Coleção das leis do Império do Brasil de 1870, tomo XXX, parte I. Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia
Nacional, 1870.

BRASIL. Decreto nº 2.639, de 22 de setembro de 1875. Autoriza o Governo a despender até a

quantia de dezenove mil contos de reis com as desapropriações e obras necessárias ao
abastecimento d’água à capital do Império. In: Coleção das leis do Império do Brasil de
1875, tomo XXIV, partes I e II, volume I. Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia Nacional, 1876.

BRASIL. Lei nº 3.396, de 24 de novembro de 1888. Orça a Receita Geral do Império para o
exercício de 1889 e dá outras providências. In: Coleção das leis do Império do Brasil de
1888, parte I, tomo XXXV – parte II, tomo LI, volume I. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional,
1889.

BRASIL. Decreto nº 4.956, de 9 de setembro de 1903. Aprova o regulamento de consolidação

e modificação do processo sobre as desapropriações por necessidade ou utilidade pública. In:
Coleção das leis da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1903, volume II. Rio de
Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1907.

BRASIL. Decreto de 26 de agosto de 1903. Manda aplicar a todas as obras de competência da

União e do Distrito Federal o decreto nº 816, de 19 de julho de 1855, com algumas alterações.
In: Coleção das leis da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1903. Rio de Janeiro:
Imprensa Nacional, 1903.