isl ck cal Life ‘The Development of Turkish Democracy CH Data British Journal of Middle Eastern Stuies, Wl, 19, No 1. (1992), pp 16-30. subi: ps jo nisi 353. 019281 972RZOISRIALEACEHIATDONDIE2OCORIH.Q rh tara of Mie Easter Sar ica pie by Taylor Pri Yow tf he JSTOR achive nics or ocptog fS 18's Ter nd Conn of Use ae at biplanes JSTOR Tons ol Camo ipo ners tae ‘tech ri rion Jo yt a a et ou or lp ce ried soos we oto be JSTOR ie oa Your een, ne emer Pree cnct th pebs eparig ay Frere fener Pb cont frat ay edt pt sree coy any pt STOR tannin mn coin th ae copyright th pes te en 1708s indpent not or oft ogi detd a ing pong edi ane tty jum Perma infomation rpg STOR pews cn pn ote pwr Mon et 9h 05‘THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY CH. Dodd A number of sspects of Turkish democracy are under continual attack, 2s, for example, the alleged neglect of human rights, the denial of autonomy to the Kurdish minority, and the sometimes threatening role of Islam, Concentration fon these immediate problems of Turkish democracy, important thougt they are, inevitably eads to some restriction of vision in thote able to look only intermittently at Turkish affairs. This article attempts to provide a broader understanding of Turkish democracy by concentrating on the nature ofits evelopment. -Modernizationand Democracy in the Ottoman Empire Turkey is no rewcomer to liberal and democratic ideas. Togeter with much else the ideas of liberalism and democracy were imported into the Ottoman Empire from the West after the French Revolution, They were part of a universal ered neither French nor Christian 0 they could be accepted all he sore easily, eten if their basis in natural rights could not inthe long ran be casily oconcilad with Islam = ‘The modersization of the Ottoman Empire began in the ealy nineteenth entury, but it was not unopposed. In particular the Janisares had 10 be destroyed in 1926 to allow change to proved, Also bythe eighteenth ceatury powerful notables had arisen inthe provinsyfhey dominated the county side 4s ta farmers und, in defiance ofthe Ottoman cstom, contrived succestlly to pas om their Tease land to thee sons4n 1808 they even forced the Sultan, Mahmud Ml, © grant a charter recognizing their status and power in the countryside, Nevertheless, they were not sufisiently motivated to isi on establishing institutions through which to control government. The Ottoman Empire aid not have an established aristocracy to challenge government, Nor was there an assertive bourgeoisie ‘The great ceforming and modernizing sultans and grand yezis of the nineteenth century for the most part did not welcome eer iberlism or deioaricy, they simply wished to import the technology and the bureaucratic eflioncy ofthe West, However, thir histe tO MGTETHBS at all costs TET to seve the Otoman sate fstrd the growth ot iteral Sppoaton, een among fustrated officials. This Voung Ottoman ertique was both liberal and traditional, deploring. 3° modernization, or “Westerization, which was destroying Otioman values and institutions as well as suppressing dent Liberalism was also promoted bythe Wester powers who were Keen t set the non-Musiim minorities provided with a greater measure of equality and freedom Authoritarian Westernzation)and the liberal eique by an ever-widening dntligensia dominated the intelectual scene, More practically. great stides were made in introducing Buropean codes of law in the 16 of commerce, %crime and praperty regulation to supplement oF replace existing provision. A Wesiem system of education was aso set up alongside, or in pce of, ‘Ostoman Islamic institutions. The new higher school intended to teach new seratlons sinc, Ieclinology, comers and Roverment, Bene ex for the propagation of Wester ideas generally. and particulary those of liberalism and democracy. This intellectual ferment affected Oxtoman government itself. As early as 1839 an important advisory council worked in accordance with the rules of ree speech and majority vote. From these beginnings a Coucl of State emerged by 1869, not too dissimilar fom its French model, These bodies sought to pve effect tothe principles of equality, and secriy of fe, honour and property frst forimally accepted in 1839. Later, in 18%, under the frst Ottoman Constitution, a parliament was convened. Is powers were limited, ut its dchates were lively and quite well informed. Shar-lived though twa) it ws revived ater the Young Turks souessfolrevoluton agains despotic Sultanie fle. Fora few yeats parliament lived again, cheugh much dominated by the Young Turks, who concentrated more on the urgent matier of saving the Ottoinain Empire fom its enemies than on promoting democracy This absorption of Western, pully liberal and. democratic ideas and instttions inthe late Ottoman Empige should rot be overtooked (Under the influence of mainly French example the whole structure of government and administration was modernized. Leadership was nthe hands ofa Westerized elite In thi elite there were two stands of thougt. One strand was posit, Figorously modernizing, secularist, nationalist, and revolutionary. The other vas liberal eformist, but in favour of developing a participatory Ottomenism in which religion would have a place. Islam had meanwhile declined in ‘eorans ding th nce ctu inthe ea af goverment whee is influence and financial independence had been greatly diminished, though there was a strong revival of fslamiefeting inthe late neteenth century under Abdathamsid The Atatirk Fra ‘The tradition of government, as it developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was, therefore, one of modemizing, and often ideals, ‘authoritarianism, modified by some concessions Hberalism and democracy. Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) inherited this Tate Ottoman tradition, but ils politcal content was insifcently radical for him-on three grounds, First, he Irie ‘that the remgining Ottoman insittons, notably those which provided for religious participation in the state, should be liminated Secondly, he associated Sultanie rule with despotsm and desired to sti is Place a liberal and democratic system of the sort which, n hs percept, was embraced by the civilized world of the West. Til, and-most important he wanted to moderize Turkey socially and economically, ata faster rate than hitherto, ce To achieve these ends it was declared that sovereign'y now/lay squarely with} the people and was Fepresented by the Grand National Acsombly. Sultanate 0and Caliphate were both abolished. Religion was Mnally placed under he control of the state—not freed from the slats, as secularism would strictly reali. Religious law was replaced by a” Swiss code, The religious brotherhoods were abolished, though the state was insufiently pentrative to eradicate Islam fom the hearts and minds of large sections ofthe populace.” Coyeiout itera nd democrat constitution as tabled wasnt allowed to operate in accordance with is inherent principles. The poliial party which emerged in November 192dqthe Progrestve Republican Party —# ‘which logked for reform, not revolution, and clearly had’ a good deal of ‘upporte-was-lossd down on she grounds that ts policies hil encouraged Oe ‘Kurdish and regious uprising, AtaNek waited radical chang® sh, democracy'guly aftes!Turks had come 0 elie, Unrough his party's eadership and eivation py Atatitk’s idgaf democracy vassal pind required acceptance of the noed for revolution firs Political opposition would then_be properly principio and one could “Then expect Teiders of opposing parties to debate i-a civic way.n 1980 he teed a domocratic experiment by encouraging his fiend and supporter, Feth ‘Okyar, t0 set up an opposition party, the Free Party. He ‘assumed that the cultural revolution (however vaguely defied) had. been completed and accepted"! and he was worried about reports of “severely autocratic ‘behaviour by his own Republican People’s Party government under Ismet ‘non. Had the new party’s membership ben strictly controlled, and the new party remained merely a parliamentary party for a period, then Atatirk might have been able to have brought about # measure of democracy. However, the new party was overwhelmed with demands for membership: its popularity also encouraged mass demonstrations and revealed deep-seated animosity in the ‘country to the Republican People’s Party. At these sign of reaction Atak withdrew his suppor, with the result that the People's Party's opposition became bitter and personal. The new party dissolved isl Te was ckar that AtaiGrk was deeply disappointed by this failure of ddemoeracy and had to console himself thereafter with atemps to create some internal demccracy in the Republican People’s Party. State and party now became closely entwined. A serious attempt to move in a more dictatorial (and totalitarian) divetion was foiled, but after Atatirk’s death in 1938 his successors “resumed authoritarian policies with a vengeance” though liberal elements rtaised some infkence within the Party. “These events have been deseribed at some length because they help understand how iteame about that party and bureaucracy togsther developed and administered the policies derived from Atatrkst ideology (which became ‘uch less Hera than Atatrk would have wished)* This government by party 8nd bureaucraey in unison resulted ina tightly controlled state but one which 1 WA, Weer. The Free Party, 1930 ie Pola Paes and Democracy Turkey, Metin Heper an Jacob Landau (Londo 9919.8, 2b 531, Kemal H. Karp, "The Republican People's Puy 923.194, 8 44 This kelogy nis develope round the princes of elation, sceulrsn reformien, poplin, ‘ana, ad epubicanm, ep he rt the ofthe. ented Kart, 18was fully involved in polities in the sense that the party-state made all significant policy. Matt-ParyPoties ‘ia egies When in 1946 the, Republican People's Party's government took steps to cstablsh mulicparty democracy, the banful legacy ofthe Atairkist state tradition the confusion of state, government, party and bureaucracy Becime apparent, Although the main opposition party to emer, the Democratic Party recruited its members internally (om the Republican People’s Party), i Soon began to attract te srt of support from society that was reminiscent of that witnessed in Free Party times, though it was not allowed to get out of hand by the new Democratic Party leaders, (Religion was not given fre rein, for instance) Most important, however, was the fact thatthe bureaveray was senerally behind the Republican Peoples Party. They resented the new Democrat Party, whieh was fast mobilaing into poliial actly those previously on the periphery of Turkish polis. With» system of direct (Gksions nov in force the partes could be more drety in ontact with those ~ wo wanted return to more Islamic ways, and albo with new entrepreneurs | ‘iting for encouragement. By those staffing the Atatekist sate this appeal 10 felPinterest was seen a6 reactionary and manifestly antAtatikis OF this ideology they saw themselves as the guardans.* This was highly unfrtuna,— ‘Shee ina democracy a distinction Between stale“and- poss has To be ‘nainiained All save purist group theorists (to be discussed later) accept some ‘eed fora good riasie of independence forthe state Where, more than mere impartiality, a public interest dimension is accepted for Te bureaucracy, this has Io be exerted inthe most subtle ways and with the general, i implicit, agreement of the politcal partes For the public interest is usually what politcal partes themselves are ostensibly seeking to represent. In fact, its Eivantaggous if policans accep certain Tinitations on the range of eit actntieyoo as not to disrupt the foundations of the liberal and democratic Siate in which they are operating. That the bureaucracy in Turkey was closely ‘dentiied with the Republican People's Party was unfortunate, but could hardly. have been otherwise. Nevertheless, it was an inflcitous star for > Heepor observes that the Ottoman Empire had a statist political culture— Political attitudes and beliefs about political organization focus on the state, ‘ot on society. This reflects the fact, already mentioned, that the Ottoman Empire had no significant intermediate groups, notably an aristocracy and ¢ ‘bourgeoisie. Heper notes that ‘the basic cleavage turned out to be one etmece 8 dominant centre and a fragmented, particularisic and. segmented periphery’ Nor was religion a dominant influence. The state was supreme ia ‘both Otioman and Atatirkist times, Mult-party polities was launched on the swell of this tradition, one in hich potitcal compromises were always dificult 1o make. Since the state, on this view, has had litle oF no purchase in society, the politcal parties whieh emerged ‘have been nothing more than a means of elite conflict?" The military, when they have intervened, have tried to reconsolidate democracy ‘along ‘rationalist rather than ‘empirical’ ines, (They didnot, for example, ty when they were in power from 1980-83 to promote the activities of secil groups in polities, but to suppress them.) Promotion of such groups in Turkey could be futile if Heper is right that Turkish society sil lacks autonomous groups of any strength or confidence vi-d-vis the state. Essentially it seems, ‘Turkey has never hed a ‘civil society’, which may be defined, following Hegel as & powerful assemblage of independent associations, institutions, and communities, In Hegel's thinking a powerful sate and a developed civil socety an work in a fruitful interdependence, the state inspiring evil society with aims and ideals. He had Germany in mind. In Britain, By comparison, the funetion of civil society could be said to generate the constitutional traditions conventions and norms which government has to respect in order to be regarded as legitimate 9° Lacking a civil society tradition, Turkey, once fre from state dominance, hhas degenerated into destructive party strife. In Turkey under the state. dominated polity the democracy that existed stumbled along: under a party. ‘entred polity, however, it collapsed’ There were no stat elites in postion ro ‘modify confit. Yet, when there were, and they tried to do so, they could «ersate political instability. This is because they ate inspired by a tational not an empirical, view of democracy, as noted above. Since 1980 the military have eared, however, to develop new norms, modifying some of their Atatarkist beliefs This is still not enough, however, for them to produce the best result, jamely a dynamic relationship between the sate and civil society. Tt seems that only such a development would stop polities from being party-centred ‘There is much to agree with inthis penetrative analysis—to which this brief 33,The tat ns bern rough back nt he ana of poli cent Jer. Sx fr instance, Kenete Dyson The State Train m Waser taro (Oxford, 1980) ahd Beraod Ba ed Phe Biba, The Scion fhe State (Cheapo a Londo, 19), 1M Stor raion pi 35 hd. 36 To Fes! this wassinpydepnerate feudalism to whic acbiniem mse adds 37. Sie Tration 9.30. 2%‘much to promote, and beyond that tothe radical democratic politial trating which located sovereignty in the people and Assembly, There are more recent factors, too, like the excessive influence of anti-systemic parties before 1080 ‘whose influence owed a good deal to the electoral system, Other factors ley politica culture o be taken into account Hepes undoubtedly correct in Blving thatthe mary can quite easy rete instability, This has partly to do wth thet Atatdriion bate tir general lack of confidence when In poner They ied ise Shange the polial system, but in the end they Warne dees fatiamentay rpme whch exe before 1980 In many mpovane eet They abo allowed the former politicians to relurn to po steam despite some extra power given tothe present, ater the gore ere Kenen Even asthe fit preset ture eeton nas to be by te meee which was to make ita matter of party choice The conta ees fille ito dea the constitution, fevered asa 96h eae Turkish democracy, without any Mierfrene by the mises, As has been explained, the trations of TuRish democracy are much steeper eats than-is-commTonly supposed The crucial Tegaey To moderh Turkey isnot from the clascaT but fom the wiodertzed., Ottoman Enis Tig whol panoply ofthe madera wate was place one ake Se ‘a Bur iaraccordunce with-r Frenci model which Balaneel ntinctan with {fe new liberal an demecratc Weals of the Revolion These wa urged, not by powerful social and econdthic groups it ety, since they hardly existed, but by qp_eversapanding. and infuential.paliteal ‘ned ingles ele for whom Hit and dsmoxatc govern wie aa, ‘Panacea for Ottoman troubles. The Preoccupation of This elite was first, the despot rb a They sav TOF the Sultan, and late, the nation annie thr country. These srugals diced Turkish denoeracs p's ran scn Weal, dvesion and fe toa couson of state and pany. Havin and the eas ofthese developments Terkey now shows sone sigs ofc these politcal tains to new conditions The seals more pune zor tly ei, society i indeed important, bol te eon Bulb ee by the more purely polis cies itsiam- fence Suivi overlooked, — ee The preferences ofthe state are at least as important as those of evil society in accounting for what the democratic state does and does not dor the democratic state is not only frequently autonomous in so far as it regularly sete ‘upon its preferences, but also markedly autonomous in doing so even when its preferences diverge from the demands of the most powerful groups in ev socity.38 38: Bs Novngr, he Anan ofthe Demat Ste Cambridge Muss 1861p 2The major question is whether these political elites, with the perty/state confit behind them, have learned from recent experience tc’ have the confidence to make institutional compromises in conditions of uncertainty. Democracy has been apily defined as ‘a process of instttionalizing uncertain.y’3* 2. thay Suni and Sabri Saya, Turkish Democracy: Changing sand Perens Proles:and ‘Prospects (Aas 198) pA (A mastery usu of Tuksh pail Sencupsesy 30