CASES ON ARTICLE X

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Pimentel vs Ochoa
City of Gensan vs COA
Villafuerte vs Robredo
Fernando vs St. Escolastica College
SJS vs Lim
Aquino vs Municipality of Malay
League of Provinces vs DENR
Abundo vs COMELEC
Umali vs COMELEC, Ermita
Republic vs Bayao
NPC vs City of Cabanatuan
Lim vs Colet
FDCP vs Colon Heritage
MCIAA vs City of Lapu-Lapu Peza
Ferrer vs Bautista
Alta Vista Golf & Country Club vs Cebu City

Pimentel vs Ochoa, GR 195770 July 17, 2012

FACTS:
In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target
beneficiaries. On July 16, 2008 the DSWD launched Administrative Order No. 16 setting the guidelines
for the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programa (4Ps). The government intervention scheme also known as
CCTP “provides cash grant to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to meet
certain human development goals.” A MOA was signed executed by the DSWD with each participatory
LGU outlining in detail the obligation of both parties during the five year intended implementation of the
CCTP.
ISSUE:
Did the PHP21 billion CCTP budget allocation under the DSWD violate Sec. 3, Art. X of the 1987
constitution by providing for the recentralization of the national government in the delivery of basic
services already devolved to the LGUS?
RULING:
No, the essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished
all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over
local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. A complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a
direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it
is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

City of General Santos vs COA,

GR 199439 April 22, 2014

FACTS:
Then mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., issued Executive Order No. 40, series of
2008, creating management teams pursuant to its organization development program. On August 13,
2009, the city of General Santos also enacted Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009 or “An Ordinance
Establishing the GenSan Scheme on Early Retirement for Valued Employees Security (GenSan
SERVES). However, on January 2011, respondent Commission on Audit (COA) affirmed the findings of
its Legal Services Sector in its Opinion No. 2010-021 declaring the said ordinance as illegal.
ISSUE:
Does the constitutional mandate for local autonomy grant local governments the power to streamline and
reorganize as well as the authority to create a separate or supplementary retirement benefit plan?
RULING:
Yes. The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner city’s issuance of GenSan’s
Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams as an initial step for its
organization development masterplan. Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to
streamline and reorganize. This power is inferred from Section 76 of the Local Government Code on
organizational structure and staffing pattern, and Section 16 otherwise known as the general welfare
clause.

Villafuerte vs Robredo, GR 195390 Dec. 10, 2014

FACTS:
Villafuerte filed a petition assailing the three memorandum circulars issued by Robredo. The circulars
pertain to full disclosure of local budget and finances and other guidelines regarding budget. Villafuerte
argues that the circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy of the LGU.
(a) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83 dated August 31, 2010, pertaining to the full disclosure of
local budget and finances, and bids and public offerings;
(b) MC No. 2010-138 dated December 2, 2010, pertaining to the use of the 20% component of the annual
internal revenue allotment shares; and
(c) MC No. 2011-08 dated January 13, 2011, pertaining to the strict adherence to Section 90 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 10147 or the General Appropriations Act of 2011.
ISSUE:
Do the assailed DILG memorandum circulars violate LGU's local and fiscal autonomy?
RULING:
No. The assailed memorandum circulars do not transgress the local and fiscal autonomy granted to LGUs.
As in MC No. 2010-138, the Court finds nothing in two other questioned issuances of the respondent, i.e.,
MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08, that can be construed as infringing on the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. The
petitioners claim that the requirement to post other documents in the mentioned issuances went beyond
the letter and spirit of Section 352 of the LGC and R.A. No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act, by requiring that budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and procurement
plans of LGUs be publicly posted as well.
The Court ruled that the circulars merely reiterated what was already provided in the law and that the
order on public disclosure is consistent with the policy of promoting good governance through
transparency, accountability and participation. The action of the respondent is certainly within the
constitutional bounds of his power as alter ego of the President.

Fernando vs St. Scholastica College,

GR 161107 March 12, 2013

FACTS:
Respondent St. Scholastica College (SSC) owns a property enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence
built some 30 years ago. On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted
Ordinance No. 192, entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of
Marikina." In pursuant to the said ordinance, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the
respondents on April 2, 2000, ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property
to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking
space for vehicles to park.
ISSUE:
Is Marikina Ordinance No. 192, insofar as imposing a five-meter set back, a valid exercise of police
power?
RULING:
No. Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the
State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The Court, thus, finds
Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the
beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No.
192 is invalid.

SJS vs Lim, GR 187836, etc., Nov. 23, 2014

FACTS:
On 12 October 2001, the oil companies and the DOE entered into a MOA "in light of recent international
developments involving acts of terrorism on civilian and government landmarks," "potential new security
risks relating to the Pandacan oil terminals and the impact on the surrounding community which may be
affected," and "to address the perceived risks posed by the proximity of communities, businesses and
offices to the Pandacan oil terminals, consistent with the principle of sustainable development.
Where the Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone (I-1),
Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) and a Heavy Industrial Zone (I-
3), where petroleum refineries and oil depots are now among those expressly allowed.
The enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power because the measures
provided therein do not promote the general welfare of the people within the contemplation of the
following provisions of law
The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate the legislative intent to repeal all
prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No. 8027, a special enactment, since
the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in the Sanggunian) actually indicated the
clear intent to preserve the provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.
ISSUE:
Is amendatory Manila Ordinance No. 8187, which would allow the continued stay of oil depots in
Pandacan, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No, the Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the
absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance
No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose
billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected
rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few
individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.

Aquino vs Municipality of Malay,

G.R. 211356 Sept. 29, 2014

FACTS:
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit covering the
construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest
Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131.
ISSUE:
Do LGUs have the power to establish “no-build-zones” and to demolish structures which are nuisance per
se and per accidens?
RULING:
Yes, the LGU have the power to establish no-build zones for the protection of the public because the
stability of the ground’s foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body of water and demolish
structures in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
League of Provinces of the Philippines vs
DENR, GR 175368 April 11, 2013

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court order the following:
( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as
The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known
as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control
over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and
Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits
issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
ISSUE:
Did the act of respondent [DENR] in cancelling the small-scale mining permits amount to executive
control, not merely supervision, and usurpation of the devolved powers of provinces?
RULING:
No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power
of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24
of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the
DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be
given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor,
emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the
validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended
by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what
the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis
thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. The DENR Secretary exercises
quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent
necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function
of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor
in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a
determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
Abundo vs Comelec, G.R. No. 20171 Jan. 8, 2013

FACTS:
For four successive regular elections (2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010), Abundo vied for the position of
municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he was proclaimed as the
winning mayoralty candidate. In the 2004 election, however, the board of canvassers initially proclaimed
his opponent Jose Torres as winner. Abundo protested Torres’ proclamation and was eventually declared
the winner, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 for a period of a little over
one year and one month.
In the May 2010 elections, Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his
certificate of candidacy, Torres sought for the former’s disqualification to run predicated on the three-
consecutive term limit rule.
ISSUE 1:
Is the service of a term less than the full three years by Mayor Abundo, in view of an election protest,
considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit
for elective local officials?
RULING:
No. The almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought
to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary
interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes
of counting the three-term threshold.

ISSUE 2:
Under what instances are the consecutive terms not “involuntary broken or interrupted?
RULING:
The following instances do not constitute to involuntary interruption:
1. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city (Latasa
vs. Comelec)
2. Preventive suspension (Aldovino, Jr. vs. Comelec)
3. Defeat in an election protest after one had already served the full term (Ong vs. Alegre, and
Rivera III vs. Comelec)

Umali vs COMELEC, Ermita, GR 203974 Apr. 22, 2014

FACTS:
On July 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed resolution No. 183-2011,
requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of a
province of Nueva Ecija into a Highly Urbanized City.
ISSUE:
In the plebiscite for the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City to a highly urbanized City, who are
qualified to cast their votes, the registered voters of Cabanatuan city only or the registered voters of
Nueva Ecija?
RULING:
All the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite
called for that purpose. To limit the plebiscite to only of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the
province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the sessionists vote. This would nullify the basic
principle of majority rule.

Republic vs Bayao, GR 179492 June 5, 2013

FACTS:
EO No. 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN
Region. A subsequent memorandum by the DA Undersecretary for Operations and Regional Executive
Director states that all departments, bureaus and offices of the National Government on the
SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat of operations to Koronadal City but
respondents opposed the memo. Former President Gloria Arroyo made a pronouncement that the regional
seat of Region 12 shall remain in Cotabato City. Only three departments were not covered by the
suspension of EO No. 304.
They appealed to the DA Secretary that EO No. 304 be held in abeyance for the huge costs the physical
transfer will entail and the plight of employees who have already settled and established their homes in
Cotabato City. Respondents justified their appeal saying that a building was constructed in Cotabato City
that can accommodate the whole staff of DA-RFU XII.
ISSUE:
Does the President have the power to merge administrative regions and transfer the regional center and
regional offices?
RULING:
Yes, while the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for expressly in the Constitution, it
is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments. This power of supervision is found in the Constitution as
well as in the Local Government Code of 1991 in Section 25, stating:
(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision
over local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and
independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities;
and through the city and municipality with respect to barangays.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, we held further that the power of the President to reorganize administrative
regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.

NPC vs City of Cabanatuan, GR177332 Oct. 1, 2014

FACTS:
The City of Cabanatuan (the City) assessed the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) a franchise tax
amounting to 808,606.41, representing 75% of 1% of its gross receipts for 1992. NAPOCOR refused to
pay, arguing that it is exempt from paying the franchise tax. Consequently, on November 9, 1993, the
City filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, demanding NAPOCOR to pay
the assessed tax due plus 25% surcharge and interest of 2% per month of the unpaid tax, and costs of suit.
Petitioner submits that from the foregoing provision, the surcharge should only be 2,571,617.14,
computed by applying the 25% surcharge against the total amount of taxes not paid on time, which is the
total amount of tax due from 1992 to 2002, or 10,286,468.57. In imposing a surcharge of 13,744,096.69
instead of 2,571,617.14, the trial court allegedly “varied and/or exceeded the terms of the judgment
sought to be executed.”
ISSUE 1:
Can local governments impose interest and surcharges of taxes due?
RULING:
Yes. Section 168 of the Local Government Code categorically provides that the local government unit
may impose a surcharge not exceeding 25% of the amount of taxes, fees, or charges not paid on time.

ISSUE 2:
Did the City of Cabanatuan impose the correct surcharge?
RULING:
No. Respondent’s computation of the surcharge is oppressive and unconscionable. Respondent’s yearly
imposition of the 25% surcharge, which was sustained by the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
resulted in an aggregate penalty that is way higher than petitioner’s basic tax liabilities. Generally, tax
statutes are construed strictly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.

Lim vs Colet, GR 120051 Dec. 10, 2014

FACTS:
The Manila Revenue Code was enacted on June 22, 1993 by the City Council of Manila and approved on
June 29, 1993 by then Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Lim). The City of Manila, through its City
Treasurer, began imposing and collecting the business tax under Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue
Code, as amended, beginning January 1994.
ISSUE:
Is Section 21(B) of Manila City Ordinance No. 7794, aka Manila Revenue Code, as amended, insofar as it
imposes business tax on businesses already assessed with percentage taxes, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of
taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality,
cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the municipality.
Inferences, implications, deductions – all these – have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power of
a municipal corporation. Therefore, the power of a province to tax is limited to the extent that such power
is delegated to it either by the Constitution or by statute. Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution is
clear on this point:
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to
levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the local governments.
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on
Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges."
Nevertheless, such authority is "subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide".

FDCP vs Colon Heritage, GR 203754 June 16, 2015

FACTS:
In 1993, respondent City of Cebu passed the “Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu.”
Chapter XI thereof requires proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres, cinemas, concert halls, and other
places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts of
admission fees to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City. On June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA
9167, creating the Film Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP). Section 13 entitles the producer
of A or B-graded films to an incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed while Section 14 states
that all revenue from the amusement tax on the graded film “shall be deducted and withheld by the
proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted xxx to the Council which shall
reward the corresponding amusement tax to the producers of the graded film”.
ISSUE:
Are Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 unconstitutional for violating local fiscal autonomy?
RULING:
Yes. Local fiscal autonomy includes the power of LGUs to allocate their resources in accordance with
their own priorities. By earmarking the income on amusement taxes imposed by the LGUs in favor of
FDCP and the producers of graded films, the legislature appropriated and distributed the LGUs’ funds
under the guise of setting a limitation on the LGUs’ exercise of their delegated taxing power. This,
undoubtedly, is a usurpation of the latter’s exclusive prerogative to apportion their funds, an
impermissible intrusion into the LGUs’ constitutionally-protected domain which puts to naught the
guarantee of fiscal autonomy to municipal corporations enshrined in our basic law.

MCIAA vs City of Lapu-Lapu PEZA,

GR 181756 June 15, 2015

FACTS:
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by Congress on July 31, 1990 under
Republic Act No. 69583. Upon its creation, petitioner enjoyed exemption from realty taxes. On
September 11, 1996, however, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in MCIAA vs. Marcos declaring
that upon the effectivity of The Local Government Code of 1991, MCIAA was no longer exempt from
real estate taxes. However, in Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, the Court
described MIAA as a government instrumentality. MCIAA thus alleged that the 1996 MCIAA case had
been overturned by the Court in the 2006 MIAA case. MCIAA thus prayed that it be declared exempt
from paying the realty tax, special education fund, and interest being collected by the City of Lapu-Lapu.
ISSUE:
Can the City of Lapu-Lapu tax MCIAA?
RULING:
No. Like in MIAA, the airport lands and buildings of MCIAA are properties of public dominion because
they are intended for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the
Republic of the Philippines, and are outside the commerce of man. Only those portions of MCIAA’s
properties which are leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real property tax by the
City of Lapu-Lapu.
Ferrer vs Bautista, GR 210551 June 30, 2015

FACTS:
Petition, a Quezon City owner, assails the constitutionality of two Quezon City ordinances, namely
Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 or the Social Housing Tax of Quezon City and Ordinance No. SP-2235,
S-2013 on garbage collection fees.
Section 3 of SP-2095 provides:
Section 3. Imposition. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the assessed value
of land in excess of Php 100,000.00 shall be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the
Socialized Housing Programs of the QC Government. The special assessment shall accrue to the General
Fund under a special account to be established for the purpose (i.e., programs and projects for low-cost
housing and other mass dwellings).
On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on garbage collection places the rates of the
imposable fee dependent on the land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot,
condominium, social housing project or apartment.
ISSUE:
Are Quezon City Ordinances Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized Housing Tax
and Garbage Fee, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
Yes SHT is constitutional, the Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of property bears a
social function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. Property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government
in the exercise of police power. In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that taxation may be made to
implement the state's police power.
But the garbage collection fee ordinance is unconstitutional as the rates are unjust and inequitable. The
classifications under this ordinance are not germane to its declared purpose of "promoting shared
responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present
resources and in generating waste."
Alta Vista Golf & Country Club vs. Cebu
City, GR 180235 Jan. 20, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioner was originally assessed deficiency business taxes, fees, and other charges for the year 1998, in
the total amount of P3,820,095.68, which included amusement tax on its golf course amounting to
P2,612,961.24 based on gross receipts of P13,064,806.20.
Through the succeeding years, respondent Cebu City repeatedly attempted to collect from petitioner its
deficiency business taxes, fees, and charges for 1998, a substantial portion of which consisted of the
amusement tax on the golf course. Petitioner steadfastly refused to pay the amusement tax arguing that
the imposition of said tax by Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, was
irregular, improper, and illegal.
ISSUE:
Is Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, imposing amusement tax on golf
courses within the authority of Cebu City to enact under the Local Government Code?
RULING:
No, Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, is null and void for being ultra vires
or beyond the taxing authority of respondent Cebu City. A local government unit may exercise its residual
power to tax when there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute; or when such taxes, fees, or
charges are not otherwise specifically enumerated in the Local Government Code, National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws. In the present case, Section 140, in relation to
Section 131(c), of the Local Government Code already explicitly and clearly cover amusement tax and
respondent Cebu City must exercise its authority to impose amusement tax within the limitations and
guidelines as set forth in said statutory provisions.