ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR

SUSTAINABLE RURAL FINANCE

Demand and Supply Analysis in

Guizhou Province of the People's Republic of China

Xie Ping
Xu Zhong

Cheng Enjiang
Shen Minggao

April 2005
© 2005 Asian Development Bank

All rights reserved. Published 2005.

Printed in the People’s Republic of China

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN: 971-561-586-4
Publication Stock No. 021305

ISBN
1. Asian Development Bank.
2. Rural Finance.
3. PRC.

The views expressed in this book are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of
the Asian Development Bank or its Board of Governors
or the governments they represent.

The Asian Development Bank does not guarantee the

accuracy of the data included in this publication and
accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their
use.

Use of the term “country” does not imply any judgment

by the authors or the Asian Development Bank as to the
legal or other status of any territorial entity.
This report used the survey supported under the technical assistance project, TA4095-PRC: Policy Reform Support.
The project is being administered by Ms. Xuechun Zhang, Financial Economist, Asian Development Bank Resident
Mission in the People’s Republic of China. The report was produced by Mr. Xie Ping, former Director General,
Financial Stability Department, the People’s Bank of China; Mr. Xu Zhong, Financial Stability Department, the
People’s Bank of China and Post-Doctorate Fellow of Nanjing University; Mr. Cheng Enjiang, Senior Research
Fellow, Victoria University, Australia; and Mr. Shen Mingao, Associate Professor, Peking University. Ms. Xuechun
Zhang edited and translated the report from Chinese into English.
 Foreword

Despite rapid economic development, issues with the agriculture sector, rural areas, and
farming households remain challenges for the Government of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). There are still serious shortages in credit and other types of financial services in the rural
areas, especially in the central and western regions of the country. Establishing a commercially
sustainable rural finance framework in the PRC will benefit around 1 billion residents. This remains
an arduous task for the government.

This report comes at a time when rural finance reform is high on the government’s agenda as
a top priority in financial sector reform in 2005 and at a time when the microfinance industry
itself is rapidly changing its scope and outlook. It is based on a survey supported by a small-scale
technical assistance project (TA4095-PRC: Policy Reform Support) under the Asian Development
Bank financing and is a good example of one of its knowledge products. The project provided a
platform to combine the expertise and experience of policymakers, practitioners, academicians,
and international donor agencies. The authors expect that many of their recommendations will
be seriously considered by relevant government agencies and that some recommendations will
be implemented when conditions are ripe.

The authors have wide-ranging experience in policymaking, policy implementation, and

academic research. Mr. Xie Ping (former Director General of the People’s Bank of China) and Mr.
Xu Zhong ( Financial Stability Department of the People’s Bank of China) have many years of
policy-making experience in rural finance in the PRC. Both are key members of the Secretariat for
the Leading Group of Rural Finance and Rural Credit Cooperative Reform led by the People’s
Bank of China and joined by many line ministries. Mr. Cheng Enjiang (Senior Research Fellow at
Victoria University, Australia) has many years of research and extensive publications on this
topic and has done substantial consulting work for international organizations. Mr. Shen Minggao
(Associate Professor at Peking University) has also conducted a significant amount of survey and
research in rural financial markets of the PRC.

Mr. Toru Shibuichi

Country Director
Asian Development Bank Resident Mission
in the People’s Republic of China
Beijing
28 March 2005
 Acknowledgements

We would like to express special appreciation for the leadership and guidance of Madame
Wu Xiaoling, deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and Mr. Li Jun, assistant
governor of Guizhou Province. In addition, contributions from the Financial Stability Department
of PBC, its Guizhou branch, many representatives of rural credit cooperatives in Guizhou, the
Guizhou provincial government, and from ADB, whose comments and suggestions have been
valuable during revisions were instrumental in formulating this study. Equally important, the
continuous support of Mr. Bruce Murray (former Country Director, ADB Resident Mission in the
PRC), and Mr. Min Tang (Principal Economist, ADB Resident Mission in the PRC) was essential.
Finally, Ms. Xuechun Zhang (Financial Economist, ADB Resident Mission in the PRC) managed
the project and translated the report enabling this small project to produce solid outcomes.

Xie Ping
Xu Zhong
Cheng Enjiang
Shen Minggao

ii
 Contents

Foreword ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ i
Acknowledgements ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ii
Abbreviations and Acronyms ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
v
Executive Summary ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
vi

Introduction ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
1

Rural Financial Services: Demand ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

3
Major Fund Flows in Rural Areas ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
4
The Survey: Rural Households ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
6
The Survey: Demand for Financial Services ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
10

Rural Financial Services: Supply ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

15
Rural Financial Institutions ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
15
Government-Supported Rural Financial Services ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
18
Issues in Rural Financial Markets ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 23

Rural Credit Cooperative Pilot Programs and Evaluation ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

26
Rural Credit Cooperatives in Guizhou: Status and Pilot Programs ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
26
Financial Innovations ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
29
Evaluation of Rural Credit Cooperative Pilot Programs ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
32

Policy Suggestions ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
36

Bibliography ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
43

Appendix. Pilot Scheme to Deepen Reform of Rural Credit Cooperatives ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

45

iii
 List of Tables

Table 1. Basic Economic Indicators: Guizhou (2002) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 3

Table 2. Rural Household Survey: Sample Distribution ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 4
Table 3. Inflows of Funds in Sample Counties (End of 2003) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 5
Table 4. Outflows of Funds in Sample Counties (End of 2003) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 5
Table 5. Sample Households: Ethnicity ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 6
Table 6. Sample Households: Family Size and Laborers ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 7
Table 7. Heads of Households ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 7
Table 8. Family Houses ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 8
Table 9. Other Household Assets ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
9
Table 10. Reasons Given for Not Depositing in Financial Institutions ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
10
Table 11. Net Income and Cash Incomes ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
10
Table 12. Farm Land Contracted to Households ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
11
Table 13. Average Farming Expenses per Household ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
11
Table 14. Distances to the Nearest Financial Institutions ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
12
Table 15. Demand for Credit ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
12
Table 16. Borrowing Sources (2003) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
13
Table 17. Rural Credit Cooperative Loans (January 2001 - October 2004) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
13
Table 18. Complaints about Rural Credit Cooperative Lending Operation ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
14
Table 19. Deposits Outstanding: Postal Savings in Guizhou ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
16
Table 20. Deposits and Loans Outstanding: Rural Credit Cooperatives in Guizhou ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
16
Table 21. Loans Outstanding: Agricultural Development Bank of China in Guizhou ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 16
Table 22. Deposits and Loans Outstanding: Agricultural Bank of China in Guizhou ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
17
Table 23. Key Performance Indicators of Rural Credit Cooperatives ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 19
Table 24. Rural Credit Cooperatives in Guizhou: An Overview ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 27
Table 25. Rural Credit Cooperative Pilot Programs in Guizhou ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 28

iv
 Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABC — Agricultural Bank of China

ADB — Asian Development Bank
ADBC — Agricultural Development Bank of China
NPL — nonperforming loan
PADO — Poverty Alleviation and Development Office
PBC — People’s Bank of China
PRC — People’s Republic of China
RCC — rural credit cooperative
RCCU — rural credit cooperative union
SME — small- and medium-sized enterprise
SOCB — state-owned commercial bank
TVE — township and village enterprises

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(as of 21 March 2005)

Currency Unit - yuan (CNY)

CNY1.00 = $0.1208
$1.00 = CNY8.2766

v
 Executive Summary
I
n recent years, the extensive losses of rural
financial institutions and farmers’ increasing
difficulties in getting loans have inspired
people to reflect on the following questions. What
are the real effects of government-subsidized
microfinance loans provided by rural credit
cooperatives (RCCs) and the poverty alleviation
loans of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)? What
is the coverage of RCC microfinance loans? Have
such loans met the demands for credit of rural
households? What is really needed in rural finance,
an ample supply of funds or a good funding
mechanism? Can the rural financial system meet the
demands of the Chinese rural economy in transition?
Is the current supervisory framework for RCCs
effective?
In July 2004, with technical assistance funding
from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), a large-
scale field survey was conducted in six counties in
Guizhou Province—two relatively well off, two
average, and two very poor. The survey targeted
ABC, the Agricultural Development Bank of China
(ADBC), RCCs, and rural households. The survey
of ABC, ADBC, and RCCs was done by the county
branches of the People’s Bank of China (PBC), and
the survey of rural households (about one thousand)
was done by the rural survey teams of county
statistical bureaus. The main objective of the surveys
was to examine the demand for financial services
from rural households, the extent to which their
demands have been met, and the uses of financial
supplies of rural financial institutions.
Understanding all of these is critical in designing
reform programs for RCCs and rural finance.
Some conclusions can be drawn from the initial
analysis of the survey data. First, poverty-stricken
areas are in need of funds but are in even greater
need of efficient financial mechanisms. The earnings
of many farmers working in other provinces are
remitted to the rural financial institutions in their
hometowns, but those funds flow back to the eastern
and more developed regions through the purchase
of Treasury bonds and deposits in upper-level
organs by these institutions. The survey indicates
that it is not sustainable for RCCs to use PBC on-
lending1 for agriculture to provide microfinance
loans because of the lack of institutional guarantees
and because ABC’s poverty alleviation funds have
disrupted financial market order. For many RCCs,
funds are not the problem; rather, the lack of an
efficient credit allocation mechanism is. An efficient
mechanism will enable RCCs to make good use of
idle money and will attract investors. Therefore,
current reforms should first establish an efficient
mechanism to attract funds and should then use a
sustainable mechanism to keep the funds in the
province.
Second, poverty-stricken areas should explore
new ways that rural financial institutions can fit into
local circumstances. A large portion of rural
household borrowing in Guizhou is from friends,
neighbors, and relatives. RCC performance indexes
such as expenses per employee, nonperforming loan
ratios, and rural household coverage demonstrate
that the current RCC model is very expensive and
is too costly for impoverished areas. A less expensive
form of financial organization more suitable for
deprived areas should be explored.
1
Funds that are lent to financial institutions and are then to be used
explicitly for new loans.
vi
 In fact, with commercialization, ABC has closed
some loss-making branches, and RCCs have closed
branches in remote, poor areas in Guizhou or
withdrawn their power to authorize loans. Many
villages are not far away from RCCs and postal
savings offices, 2 but it takes hours to travel in
mountainous areas. Some householders have to
walk a long way to get financial services. It is the
limited coverage of the formal rural financial
institutions—the RCCs—that gives rise to usury in
some remote areas. Sole reliance on formal financial
institutions for services not only means high cost
but also means a great deal of inconvenience for
farmers in many areas.
Third, the single RCC model cannot meet
diversified rural finance demands. On one hand,
RCCs do not have sufficient funds to meet the credit
demands of households with large-scale aquaculture
businesses. On the other hand, RCCs are short of
staff to cover poor households scattered in
widespread areas that are large in number but have
small demands thus resulting in high transaction
costs for RCCs.
Fourth, public finance has to play its proper role
in poor areas to enable rural finance to operate in a
normal manner. Guizhou does not have a sound
rural social security system or a reliable rural
cooperative health system, so many RCC loans are
used for medical care that should have been covered
by public finance. In such circumstances, RCCs are
bound to make losses. The rural household survey
shows that children’s education, agricultural
production, and house construction are the most
frequent uses of funds, and that the extension of
credit is closely linked with the ability to pay debts.
Although short-term returns on education are
meager, it is essential for households to invest in
education for the good of the country. Therefore,
the government should invest more in primary
education in poor areas and should provide public
goods such as a rural social security system. These
will help to sustain rural financial systems in
vii
deprived areas.
Fifth, in RCC reform, a top-down approach
should be combined with a bottom-up approach.
Guizhou’s practices have illustrated that many low-
cost financial innovations exist; the key is how
current RCC pilot programs can draw on them.
Analysis of the Guizhou survey leads to the
following policy recommendations.
● Reform of rural finance cannot succeed with
only isolated RCC reforms. The country’s
economic development calls for diversified
rural financial institutions and systems.
● At the heart of rural finance reform is
breaking the monopoly of the RCCs on the
rural financial market, establishing a
competitive, efficient market; and then
implementing an appropriate supervisory
framework. It is the market that will
determine the organizational form of financial
institutions.
● So far in the current pilot programs, RCCs
have, with financial support from PBC, got
rid of their historical burdens and have
become financially healthy. To prevent RCCs
from falling back to financial difficulties in
future operations, their governance structure
should be improved. For this, the following
measures are suggested: (i) separate fiscal aids
from commercial credit, (ii) open up rural
financial markets, (iii) establish a deposit
insurance system, (iv) take prompt corrective
actions when the need rises, and (v) adopt a
market-based interest rate regime.
2
Postal savings offices are subsidiaries of the post office that accept
deposits. They make no loans; they redeposits the funds with the
People’s Bank of China.

E
normous changes have taken place in the
rural financial system of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) following the
commercialization of state-owned commercial banks
(SOCBs) that began in the mid-1990s and the
restructuring of their ownership initiated in 2003.
The increasing differences in regional economic
structure have led to changes in rural finance supply
and demand in different regions of the country. In
the more developed coastal areas, demand for credit
for nonfarm activities is soaring, leading to the
convergence of rural and urban finance. In the
central region, noncropping activities such as
aquaculture and agricultural processing are
becoming more important. As specialized
production has become the major source of demand
for credit, the trend of specialized rural financial
supply has emerged. In the western region, credit is
basically used for alleviating poverty and smoothing
consumption. This is because of limited investment
opportunities due to scarce natural resources, poor
market conditions, and uncertain weather and other
natural conditions.
Regarding the supply of rural financial services,
the SOCBs have gradually withdrawn from rural
areas, although the Agricultural Bank of China
(ABC) maintains a large but dwindling branch
network and manages poverty alleviation loans in
many counties and townships. Rural credit
cooperatives (RCCs) have become the dominant
providers of credit, and in many places, the sole
supplier. Meanwhile, because of limited funds for
rural credit, agriculture-supporting on-lending1
from the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has become
Introduction
one major funding source in some places.
This report analyzes rural financial services in
Guizhou Province which shares many similarities
with other western provinces in the PRC. Because it
was one of the provinces to undertake an RCC pilot
program, RCC reform in Guizhou is ahead of other
provinces in many ways. The pilot program will
have an enormous impact on the future rural
financial framework in Guizhou as well as on the
capability of rural financial institutions to provide
efficient, sustainable support to agriculture, rural
areas, and farmers (san nong).2 These will, in turn,
have far-reaching impacts on developing local
economies, enhancing the incomes of farmers, and
establishing an all-around prosperous society.
Moreover, these pilot programs will affect future
rural finance reform programs in other, especially
poor, provinces as well as the overall progress of
financial reform.
The main objectives of this report are to (i)
examine the current status of demand for and supply
1
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) started to provide low interest
agticulture-supporting on-lending in 1999 to encourage rural credit
cooperatives to provide microfinance loans. The initial interest rate
was 2.25% per annum, 0.99 percentage points lower than the base
on-lending rate. The rate was adjusted to 3.24% per annum on 1
January 2005, the same as the base on-lending rate. The quota for
the on-lending has been increasing over years, and reached
CNY128.8 billion by the end of 2004. PBC decided not to increase
the quota, but to adjust the geographic location of the on-lending
from eastern to central and western, northeast, and grain-
production regions. In fact, the total outstanding on-lending has
been around CNY90 billion.
2
San nong 三农 literally means three “nong”. The word “nong”
in Chinese is combined with other words to form phrases such as
nongcun (rural villages or rural areas), nongmin (farmers or
peasants), nongye (agriculture or agricultural industry).
1
of rural finance, (ii) identify existing issues and
constraints, evaluate ongoing RCC pilot programs
and emerging financial innovations, and (iii) explore
suitable roadmaps for needed rural financial reforms
and innovations. Building on this, the report provides
policy recommendations for the development of a
rural financial system in the 3- to 5-year term. Some
of the views and recommendations are rather general
and can be applied to other provinces while others
relate to the special features of the Guizhou RCC
pilot program.
From the point of view of development
economics, poor areas are likely to be stuck in a
poverty trap that is a vicious cycle of low levels of
economic development, low per capita incomes, low
savings rates, low investment levels, and a lack of
dynamic for development. To break this cycle, a well
functioning financial system capable of channeling
internal savings and external funds into productive
investment is necessary.
A new paradigm in development finance
emerged in the 1980s. In this paradigm, to promote
rural development and improve farmers’ welfare it
is critical to establish an efficient and commercially
sustainable financial system and to provide timely,
reliable, and convenient financial services for a wide
range of economic activities. This requires that
public funds for subsidizing interest rates and
bailing out rural financial institutions be allocated
2
to improving the profitability of farming (e.g.,
investment in education and infrastructure) which
in turn improves the capacity of farmers to repay
loans. This is a more efficient way for alleviating
poverty that at the same time improves self-
sustainability of rural financial institutions. Four
elements are key to establishing such a paradigm
and creating an enabling environment for an
efficient rural financial market. They are (i) removal
of interest rate controls, (ii) establishment of a proper
supervisory framework, (iii) improvement of
operational procedures and capacity building of
institutions and human resources, and (iv) targeted
government interventions and timely impact
evaluation.
This report is drawn from a rural finance
demand and supply survey in Guizhou and is
formulated on this paradigm. We have integrated
the essence of the speeches by PBC Deputy
Governor Wu Xiaoling in her visits to Guizhou. The
remainder is organized as follows. Chapter II
provides a descriptive analysis of the demand of
rural financial services in Guizhou, and Chapter III
describes the supply. Chapter IV reviews and
evaluates the RCC pilot programs as well as financial
innovations. Policy recommendations are
summarized in Chapter V. This report reflects only
the views of the authors, not of the institutions in
which we work.
 Rural Financial Services: Demand
G
uizhou Province is located on the Yun-gui
Plateau featuring mountains and hills but
few flat areas. The old saying goes that the
land in the province consists of 80% mountains, 10%
rivers, and 10% paddy areas. The province, although
rich in energy, mines, and tourism resources, is one
of the poorest in the PRC. Urbanization is low as
81% of the population lives in rural areas. The
average annual income per rural resident was a
mere CNY1,490 ($179.50) in 2002, the lowest in the
country. One third of fiscal expenditures are from
central government transfer (Table 1). The major
industries are mining, energy, cigarettes, liquor, and
tourism; secondary industries are underdeveloped.
The agricultural sector consists of region-specific
agriculture and animal husbandry. Most workers
go to coastal provinces such as Guangdong and
Table 1. Basic Economic Indicators: Guizhou (2002)
(In CNY100 million unless otherwise specified)
Indicators
GDP 1,180.00
Of Which: First Industry
Second Industry
Tertiary Industry
Total Population (10,000)
Rural Population (10,000)
Rural/Total Population (%)
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (CNY)
Urban Disposable Income Per Capita (CNY)
Rural Net Income Per Capita (CNY)
Provincial Fiscal Revenue
Provincial Fiscal Expenditure
Provincial Fiscal Balance
Zhejiang; few stay in the Guizhou. Thus remittances
from migrant workers have become the major source
of income growth for farmers.
In July 2004, PBC organized a large field survey
on the demand for and supply of rural financial
services in six counties of Guizhou Province. The
main purpose was to understand the behavior of
rural households and rural financial institutions and
household demand for credit and other financial
services. This knowledge is critical for the design of
future RCC pilot programs in the province and
useful for improving the rural financial system in
the future. The surveys targeted rural financial
institutions and households. Surveys of ABC, the
Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC)
and RCCs were done by county PBC branches, and
the household surveys were done by the local rural
survey teams of the county statistical bureaus.
The samples covered typical households in
Guizhou (Table 2). Two of the six counties in the
sample, Fenggang and Meitan are from Zunyi
Prefecture which is well off. Danzhai and Taijiang
280.52 counties from Qiandongnan Miao and Dong
474.45
425.13
Autonomous prefectures are average. The remaining
two counties, Dafang and Zhijin, are from Bijie, the
3,837 poorest prefecture in Guizhou. The sample in each
3,108 county was selected randomly, and within counties,
81
a random distribution of households was assumed.
3,075
6,107 Using descriptive statistics, this report analyzes
1,490 the characteristics, income, wealth, and demand for
236.77
credit of the households as well as their degree of
331.36 satisfaction with the supply of finances. The report
-94.59 also provides simple statistical analyses and
recommendations for reforms of RCCs and the
3
overall rural financial system in poor areas of the
PRC. Future work should be a further analysis of
RCC survey data using more advanced statistical
and econometric techniques.
Table 2.
Rural Household Survey: Sample Distribution
County Sample Size
Fenggang 189
Meitan 120
Danzhai 178
180
Taijiang
Dafang 179
Zhijin 186
Total 1,032
Major Fund Flows in
Rural Areas
It is clear from Table 3 that the six counties listed
mostly depend on outside funds which come
through four channels, namely fiscal transfers, PBC
on-lending for agriculture, loans from ADBC, and
remittances from migrant workers. Fiscal transfers
are around one to five times the fiscal revenue and
make up short falls for expenditures. PBC’s on-
lending normally stands at 20-30% of outstanding
RCC loans. If nonperforming loans (NPLs) of RCCs
are not considered, PBC on-lending is actually the
major funding source for new loans. With the rising
number of migrant workers, the deposits in RCCs
have increased. Some RCCs even have idle funds
that reduce their demand for PBC on-lending. For
example, in 2003, Meitan County recorded deposit
increases of CNY70 million and idle capital of more
than CNY100 million, some of which was lent out
on a short-term basis. In Fenggang and Taijiang, the
4
deposits increased by CNY40 million and CNY14
million, respectively. Although there was a
moderate increase in the number of loans, RCCs
were not willing to expand lending rapidly. This has
reduced the demand for PBC on-lending for
agriculture. The outstanding loans of ADBC are
decreasing, illustrating its dwindling role as a policy
bank in less-developed areas such as Guizhou.
Remittances from migrant workers accounted for
around 33-60% of the outstanding deposits of RCCs,
several times the amount of deposit increases. In fact,
remittances have been the major source of income
growth for rural households in poor areas.
Generally, there are three channels for the
outflow of funds namely, SOCBs, postal savings,
and RCCs. The size of loans from ABC has become
smaller in all counties except Taijiang where a
matching fund for an expressway drastically
increased the amount. Outflows through postal
savings vary. In Fenggang and Meitan of the more
developed Zunyi district, the growth of RCC
deposits was three times that of postal savings; in
Dafang and Zhijin in the poorest Bijie district, RCC
deposits decreased. In terms of postal savings, the
more developed counties have higher increases in
both absolute amounts and rates.
Table 4 shows that both the increases in ABC
loans were less than those of desposits, meaning that
the new deposits were not used for loans in the
observed period. Postal savings offices do not make
loans, so deposits are simply net outflow. In
addition, the loans from ADBC were also shrinking
(Table 3). Only RCCs showed increased lending,
indicating that new demand for funds in these
counties was met mostly by RCCs. 3 Moreover,
government-supported loans could not meet
expected targets. Remittances from migrant workers
3
Note that it is impossible to breakdown data of ABC in urban and
rural areas, and some loans of ABC are for urban infrastructure projects.
Table 3. Inflows of Funds in Sample Counties (End of 2003)

(in CNY10,000)
Meitan Fenggang Taijiang Danzhai Dafang Zhijin
Fiscal Revenue (1) 8,200 3,981 2,150 2,066 15,018 14,998
Fiscal Expenditure (2) 19,600 15,000 10,000 7,000 29,634 32,515

PBC On-Lending
2002 2,700 2,200 2,320 2,100 4,800 3,500
2003 600 3,000 1,800 1,900 4,300 3,200
Increase - 2,100 800 - 520 - 100 - 500 - 300

Postal Savings
Remittances* 15,248 9,000 3,000 2,700 17,082 13,566

ADBC
Loans (2002) 7,028 11,487 2,072 1,711 7,021 4,772
Loans (2003) 6,940 11,382 1,526 1,659 6,275 5,236
Increase - 88 - 105 - 546 - 52 - 746 464

*Remittances are estimated post office remittances from migrant workers.

Table 4. Outflows of Funds in Sample Counties (End of 2003)

(in CNY10,000)

Meitan Fenggang Taijiang Danzhai Dafang Zhijin

RCC Deposits
Outstanding (2002) 31,564 11,117 8,540 4,222 22,153 20,069
Outstanding (2003) 38,665 14,946 9,926 5,577 20,779 18,780
Increase 7,101 3,829 1,386 1,355 - 1,374 1,289

DCC Loans
Outstanding (2002) 25,179 9,915 8,095 5,247 17,815 19,311
Outstanding (2003) 27,751 12,796 8,855 6,200 22,062 20,640
Increase 2,542 2,881 1,435 758 4,247 1,329

Postal Savings
Deposits (2002) 13,214 11,059 3,022 3,629 5,465 3,306
Deposits (2003) 15,720 12,204 3,267 4,429 7,031 6,046
Increase 2,506 1,145 245 800 1,566 2,740

ABC
Deposits (2002) 24,555 15,373 43,640 7,775 21,425 28,451
Deposits (2003) 24,455 15,432 43,757 8,784 22,059 35,105
Increase - 100 59 117 1,009 634 6,654
Loans (2002) 15,623 23,458 62,039 11,912 28,990 30,728
Loans (2003) 15,525 8,179 101,504 11,908 646 4,119
Increase - 98 - 15,279 39,465 -4 - 28,344 - 26,609

5
have become the largest reason for farmers’
increased income and for the increase in deposits in
RCCs and postal savings. Although the inflow of
funds through government transfers and
remittances far exceeded the outflow, the demand
for credit still could not be met. This shows that rural
finance in Guizhou is in more urgent need of an
efficient credit mechanism than it is of more funds.
The Survey:
Rural Households
Guizhou is a province in southwestern PRC with
a considerable ethnic population. Our sample data
indicate that the population is 48.4% Mandarin and
33.8% Miao ethnic groups (Table 5), with the Miao
more concentrated in the poor and mountainous
areas.
both the welfare system and for financial
arrangements. More studies are warranted in this
regard. Second, off-farm employment and income
are becoming more important for rural households
in Guizhou as over a third of rural labors are
engaged in off-farm production. More importantly,
of the of total off-farm laborers, 45% have worked
as migrant workers in other provinces (inter-
province labor transfer), and over 40% work at
home. This suggests a considerable lack of
employment opportunities in the counties and large
cities of Guizhou. This is rather different from the
rural labor transfer that occurs in more developed
areas of the PRC where there has been a much higher
proportion of migration from rural to urban areas
within a province. The two plausible contributing
factors are poverty and the lack of large urban
centers that provide employment opportunities. In
other words, the spread-over effect of urban
development in Guizhou is very limited. A high
ratio of inter-province migration also indicates the
importance of remittances and other financial
services for rural financial institutions.

Table 5. Sample Households: Ethnicity It is important to single out heads of households,

the decision makers, from the rest of the family. As
shown in Table 7, heads of households are
Ethnicity No. Percentage
predominately male (94.7%) indicating the lower
Mandarin 502 48.6
Miao 349 33.8 social and economic status of women. Our field
Other 88 8.5 survey found that only household heads had been
No reply 93 9.0 granted access to microfinance loans in some poor
Total 1,032 100.0 areas and that their partners had no access without
their consent. The table also shows that over half of
Table 6 describes the sample size and the widowed households are headed by women
characteristics of the sample households. First, the (single-mother households). A policy implication is
family size in Guizhou is relatively small (4.1 per that RCC reforms should pay attention to gender.
household), which is contrary to many people’s That is, the reforms should better understand
perceptions that poor rural households in the PRC women’s demands for financial services, and should
comprise large families. This indicates possible cater to them in order to enhance women’s access
changes in the tradition of extended families in the to financial support and to improve their social and
poor areas of Guizhou, which has implications for economic status.

6
Table 6. Sample Households: Family Size and Laborers

Item No. Percentage

Total Rural Population 4,222
Average Family Size 4.1

Total Rural Laborers 3,080 73.0% (of total population)

Full Laborers1 2,443 57.9% (of total population)
Semi Laborers 2 637
Off-Farm Labor 951 38.9% (of full labor)
Of Which: Of Off-Farm Labors
Work at Home 416 43.7%
Work within the County 46 4.8%
Work in the Province 61 6.4%
Work outside of Guizhou 3 428 45.0%

Notes: 1. Full laborers are defined as laborers between 18 and 55 years of age.
2. Semi laborers are defined as laborers from 16-18 and 56 to 65 years old.
3. Inter-province migrant workers.

Table 7. Heads of Households

Number Percentage
Total Number of Household Heads 1,032
Male 977 94.7
Female 55 5.3

Rural Residence 1,003 97.2

Non-Rural Residence 29 2.8
Average Age 46.6

Marital Status
Married 952 92.2
Divorced 11 1.1
Widowed 53 5.1
Of Which: Headed By Female* 29 54.7
Never Married 11 1.1
No Reply 5 0.5

Education Level
Illiterate 98 9.5
Primary School (1-4 years) 309 29.9
Primary School (5-6 years) 165 16.0
Middle School (7-9 years) 385 37.3
High School (10-12 years) 60 5.8
College and Above 9 0.9
No Reply 6 0.6

Months at Home 11
Days of On-Farm Work 191.5

7
 Number Percentage
Off-Farm Occupation
Transport 37 3.6
Construction 69 6.7
Textile 1 0.1
Manufacturing 37 3.6
Services and Restaurant 11 1.1
Farming away from Home 30 2.9
Other Off-Farm Employment 188 18.2

Notes: * Percentage of the widowed household heads.

Table 7 also shows that the level of education Table 8. Family Houses
for household heads is very low, as about 10% are
illiterate and another 35% have only a primary When the Family House was Built Number Percentage
school education. In other words, about half of Before 1911 (Qing Dynasty) 9 0.9
heads of households had received fewer than 6 years From 1901-1949 (Prior to PRC) 30 2.9
of formal education and some went to school around 1950-1978 (Before the Reforms) 213 20.6
1979-1999 480 46.5
20 years ago.4 The educational level of their spouses 19.0
2000-Oct. 2004 196
would most likely be lower than that of the No Reply 104 10.1
household heads. The low educational level of
household heads and their spouses may negatively
affect the application of new technology in In Table 9, we classify household assets as
agriculture, or may deprive them of off-farm physical and financial and productive and non-
employment and income-earning opportunities productive. The table shows that, on average,
which in turn affects their children’s educational financial assets (cash and deposits) account for
opportunities. Our survey shows that of 868 about 40% of non-house assets, and physical assets
children of school age, 55 were out of school account for the remainder. Assuming an average
indicating a high dropout rate. family house is worth CNY5,000, an average rural
household in the province holds about one third of
The assets and incomes of the sample its assets in the form of financial assets. This ratio is
households are shown in tables 8-11. In rural areas not low given their levels of income and wealth. It
of the PRC, family houses are usually the most would be interesting to examine further the
important assets as families do not own the land. determinants of the proportion of financial to total
Many rural households in Guizhou still live in very assets and to consider the links among income,
old houses over 20% of which were built 25 years wealth, and the extent of savings. Of total financial
or more ago, and some of which were built in the assets, about one third are in cash and two thirds in
Qing Dynasty. Survey data showed that the average bank deposits. Interestingly, rural households hold
cost for building a house in the sample after the year
2000 was CNY17,320, and that the older the houses,
the poorer the housing conditions. Poor housing
4
conditions are an important indicator of poverty in Considering that most household heads are in their forties, they
received their education at the time of the Great Cultural Revolution
the province. when the quality was considered low.

8
a high proportion of their physical assets in animals
(nearly 50%). Many households have used animals
(mainly pigs, cattle, and poultry) as stores of wealth;
whenever needed, animals can be converted into
cash at a relatively low cost. This also implies that
there are few suitable financial instruments for rural
households, indicating that reforms of the rural
financial system should consider not only credit but
also other instruments such as securities and
insurance.
There is limited growth potential for savings
deposits of rural households (Table 10). For those
without deposits, about half had no extra cash
because their incomes are used for basic living
expenses, and over 20% used up their incomes for
important items of consumption and investment.
Another 15% of wealth was in the form of livestock
instead of bank and RCC deposits. Only a few
households complained that the deposit interest rates
were low and that the services were too far from
home. It is expected that increased interest rates on
deposits and added service providers may bring
moderate increases in household deposits, although
this needs to be confirmed with further research.

Table 9. Other Household Assets

Amount Percentage
Physical Assets
Value of Animals1 2,824.5 47.8
(3,178.2)
Value of Productive Assets 2 1,568.7 26.5
(14,765.1)
Value of Grain in Storage 847 14.3
(824)
Color TV
Number of Households with Color TVs 505
Estimated Value of Color TV per Unit 1,000
Phone
Number of Households with Telephone 285
Estimated Value of Phone 100
Cell Phones
Number of Households with Cell Phone 142
Estimated Value of Cell Phone 1,100
Subtotal: Physical Assets 5,908.5 100.0

Financial Assets
Cash 1,063.1 27.7
Total Deposits 2,773.3 72.3
Time Deposits 722.7 18.8
Demand Deposits 2,050.6 53.5
Subtotal: Financial Assets 3,836.5 100.0

Total Assets (Excluding Houses) 9,745.0

Notes: 1. The value of all the animals kept by a household at the current market value at the time of survey.
2. Value of tractors, motorcycles, pumps and other transport equipment owned by the households.
Figures in brackets are standard deviations.

9
 Table 10. Reasons Given for Not Depositing in Financial Institutions

Reason Number of Observations Percentage

1. No Surplus Cash 296 49.7
2. Interest Rate for Deposits too Low 44 7.4
3. Poor Deposit Services 4 0.7
4. Long Distance from Institution 14 2.3
5. Difficult to Withdraw 4 0.7
6. Have Lent to Others 9 1.5
7. Have Lent through Agents 2 0.3
8. Used Money for Big Events 136 22.8
9. Store the Value in Animals 87 14.6

Total 596 100.0

Compared with the assets of rural households,
income levels as shown in Table 11 are not low. In
2002, the average net income per household was
CNY6,709.1, of which CNY5,841.9 was cash. Possible
reasons may be that much of the income growth was
from migrant workers and off-farm activities: each
counted for more than 20% of net cash income while
farming activities only generated one third of net
cash income. Income growth from migrant workers
and off-farm activities is quite recent; it took time
for cash earnings to be transformed into physical
assets.

Table 11. Net Income and Cash Incomes

Mean Standard Deviation Percentage

Total Net Income per Household 6,709.1 18,002.8 100.0

Total Cash Income per Household 5,841.9 33,909.7 87.1

Of Which:
From Migrant Workers 1,221.8 3,357.4 20.9
From Farming 1,934.7 2,920.3 33.1
From Off-Farm Activities 1,428.3 11,970.9 24.4
From other Sources except Remittances 893.5 2,778.1 15.3

The Survey: irrigated (Table 12). For many households, their

Demand for Credit cultivated land is scattered over 10 plots which

increases costs and labor for farming. Land scarcity
and poor quality are important reasons why farmers
seek off-farm employment.
The demand for credit from rural households
arises from their farm and off-farm production and
investment. The cultivated land per capita in
Guizhou is 1.16 mu 5 of which nearly half is not 5
15 mu equal 1 hectare.

10
 Household farm expenses are shown in Table Table 12. Farm Land Contracted to Households
13. The major cost is for fertilizer, followed by seeds,
pesticides, and plastic film. Accordingly, purchase Area (Mu)*
on credit (trade credit) and borrowing are greater Irrigated land per household 2.50
for fertilizer than for other farm inputs as Non irrigated land per household 2.20
approximately 20% of households may need to
borrow to buy fertilizer. Total cultivated area per household 4.80
Total cultivated area per capita 1.16

Note: * 1 hectare equals 15 mu.

Table 13. Average Farming Expenses per Household

Unit No. Amount

Item %
(kilogram) Households (CNY)
Average Costs per Household 550.1

1. Fertilizer 505.6 343.9 62.52%1

Purchased on Trade Credit 24.8 4.9%2
Households that Borrowed for Fertilizer 177 21.0%3

2. Chemicals 7.0 48.5 8.81%1

Amount Bought on Credit 1 0.3 4.3%2
Households that Borrowed for Chemicals 31 5.2%

3. Seeds 35.4 82.8 15.06%1

Amount Bought on Credit 1 0.1 0.3%2
Households that Borrowed for Seeds 39 5.7%

4. Plastic Film 13.2 37.5 6.81%1

Amount Bought on Credit 1 0.1 0.8%2
Households that Borrowed for Plastic Film 29 7.0%

Average Aquaculture Cost per Household

Animal Feed 1,573 443.7
Amount Bought on Credit 1 10.7 0.7%
Households that Borrowed for Feed 23 6.0%

Notes: 1. As per percentage of total cropping costs per household. It is important to note that the sum of the
costs for fertilizers, chemicals, seeds, and plastic film does not add up to 100% as cropping costs
include other costs as well such as the costs for hiring labor and farm machinery, electricity bills, etc.
2. The percentage of the total quantity the farm input in question procured.
3. The percentage of total households that procured the farm input in question.

11
 Distance to providers is an important factor in hampers good service provision and increases
financial services for rural households in remote, operational costs. This limited coverage of formal
mountainous areas. This has become a significant institutions including RCCs has led to usury in
issue as ABC has been closing loss-making branches counties like Fenggang.
and offices in poor rural areas, and RCCs are closing
some branches in poor and remote areas of the
country or withdrawing their power to authorize Table 14.
loans. As shown in Table 14, the average distance Distances to the Nearest Financial Institutions
from rural households to RCCs and postal savings Average Distance (kilometers)
offices is not great, but it may take ten minutes to an Distance to RCC
hour to cover in mountainous areas. Moreover, some Average 5.7
Farthest 30.0
households have to walk a long distance for financial
Distance to Postal Savings
services. For example, many villages in Danzhai Average 10.3
County do not have access to roads. RCCs there have Farthest 54.0
to cover large areas with limited staffing which

Table 15. Demand for Credit

Item 1st Priority % 2nd Priority % 3rd Priority %

Deposits 255 30.6 58 7.1 40 5.0
Education 120 14.4 224 27.3 106 13.2
House 116 13.9 78 9.5 30 3.7
Farm Production 78 9.4 156 19.0 212 26.3
Off-Farm Production 60 7.2 62 7.5 94 11.7
Weddings and Funerals 55 6.6 56 6.8 11 1.4
Debt Repayment 37 4.4 18 2.2 36 4.5
Food 32 3.8 51 6.2 52 6.5
Cash 25 3.0 3 0.4 5 0.6
Sickness 14 1.7 24 2.9 16 2.0
Vehicle 12 1.4 22 2.7 10 1.2
Daily Necessities 12 1.4 39 4.7 59 7.3
Borrowing for Profit 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 0.5
Others 17 2.0 31 3.8 131 16.3

Total 833 100.0 822 100.0 806 100.0

In the field survey, we asked the rural
households what they would do with an extra
CNY10, 000. The answers to the question are in Table
15. After deposits, children’s education, farm
production, and houses were the next three
priorities. The use of credit is closely related to
returns on the investment and to the ability to repay.
Nevertheless, although investment in education is
very important for the households and for the nation
as a whole, the immediate return on the investment
is relatively low. Accordingly, the government
should invest more for primary and secondary
education in poor areas to help to develop a
sustainable financial system.

12
Table 16. Borrowing Sources (2003)

Source Value %
Total Number of Loans 381 100.0
From Relatives, Friends and Neighbors 244 64.1
From State-Owned Commercial Banks 18 4.7
From RCCs 119 31.2

Total Average Value of Loans per Household* 1,910.6 100.0

From Relatives, Friends and Neighbors 873.1 45.7
From State-Owned Commercial Banks 245.4 12.8
From RCCs 792.1 41.5

Note: * The average value is the average of all sample households

Table 17. Rural Credit Cooperative Loans (January 2001 – October 2004)

Item Percent
Number of Loans 245
Average Size of RCC Loans 1 6,240.8
Average Amount Borrowed per Sample Household 2 1,560.2
Amount Received / Amount Applied For 82.4%

Of All Loans Number

Loans with Collateral and Guarantees 42 18.1
Loans with Collateral 127 54.7
Loans with Guarantees 58 25.0
Loans with Deposits as Collateral 5 2.2
Subtotal 232 100.0

Guarantor
Village Officials 25 20.2
Relatives and Friends 71 57.3
Enterprises and Wealthy Individuals 13 10.5
Village Committee 2 1.6
Group Guarantee 13 10.5
Subtotal 124 100.0

Loan Repayment
On Time 104 46.2
Rescheduled but Repaid 52 23.1
Rescheduled for Over 6 Months 3 1.3
Rescheduled for Over 12 Months 35 15.6
Others 31 13.8
Subtotal 225 100.0

Notes: 1. The total amount of RCC loans divided by those households with RCC loans.
2. The total amount of RCC loans divided by all the sample households.
3. The amount of loan granted as a proportion of the loan amount applied.

13
 Table 16 shows the sources of loans to sample
households. Households borrowed most from their
relatives, friends, and neighbors (64.1% in terms of
frequency, and 45.7% in terms of total value). An
RCC was the second most important source of funds
(31.2% in terms of frequency and 41.5% in terms of
total value) while loans from SOCBs stood last in
line at less than 5% in frequency and less than 13%
in value. This is consistent with the April 2004
survey conducted in other areas by the National
People’s Congress. Further study is needed to
explain the reasons why families borrow more from
informal channels. What can RCCs learn from
informal finance providers in terms of the loan
application procedures, conditions, scale, tenure,
and interest rate structure? Are there any other
financial organizations with lower operating costs
than RCCs?
Table 17 provides a detailed account of RCC loans
from 2001 to October 2004. During field visits, we
asked farmers to list their largest loans from RCCs
after 2001. Of the 245 recorded, the average loan size
was above CNY6,000, larger than most microfinance
loans provided by donor-supported microfinance
institutions in the PRC (around CNY1,000-2,000).
Most loans from RCCs also required collateral and
guarantees; those guarantees were mostly provided
b y re l a t i v e s a n d f r i e n d s . M o re o v e r, l o a n
rescheduling was common. Less than 50% of the
loans were paid on time which is consistent with
the survey of RCCs in the province.
Although the average loan size for RCCs is not
small in Guizhou, many sample households needed
even larger loans of extended tenure (Table 18). On
one hand, RCCs cannot meet the demands of
households with large aquaculture businesses. On
the other hand, there are many poor households
with small funding demands, but the transaction
costs for small loans are high. These households, that
should be the target clients of RCC microfinance
loans, demand simplified loan application
procedures. This also suggests that RCCs cannot
meet diverse rural finance demands.

Table 18. Complaints about Rural Credit Cooperative Lending Operations

1st % 2nd % 3rd %

1. Loan Size too Small 247 34.2 56 8.0 91 14.4
2. Loan Tenure too Short 138 19.1 226 32.4 43 6.8
3. Interest Rates too High 215 29.8 136 19.5 114 18.0
4. Cost for Loan Application too High 23 3.2 41 5.9 20 3.2
5. Procedures too Complicated 60 8.3 175 25.1 167 26.3
6. Loan Provision Not on Time 31 4.3 52 7.4 179 28.2
7. Too Far from Home 8 1.1 12 1.7 20 3.2
Total 722 100.0 698 100.0 634 100.0

14
 Rural Financial Services: Supply
T
he suppliers of rural financial services in
Guizhou include institutions such as RCCs,
ABC and ADBC, and postal savings. In
recent years, postal savings in Guizhou have
accelerated the outflow of funds, many RCCs have
had to operate with PBC on-lending, and ADBC has
been reducing the amounts of loans. Although ABC
outstanding loans exceed outstanding deposits, the
increase in loans is less than the increase in deposits,
and its loans are mainly for infrastructure. Since
2001, even most poverty reduction loans have been
directed to project lending. Without considering
government transfer and remittances from migrant
workers, Guizhou suffers from a large outflow of
funds, from heavy losses by rural financial
institutions, and from a government-supported
microfinance scheme and poverty reduction on-
lending program that have become the major
funding sources. In other words, the rural financial
system has entered a vicious cycle.
Rural Financial Institutions
Postal Savings Office
Postal savings deposits have expanded rapidly
in recent years in Guizhou. From 2000 to 2003, total
deposits increased from CNY4.5 billion to more than
8.8 billion, of which deposits below the county level
(townships and villages) increased from CNY846
million to around CNY2.2 billion (Table 19). In the
PRC as a whole, postal savings below the county
level accounts for around 60% of the total. Compared
to those in more developed provinces, the network
of postal savings offices in Guizhou is relatively
small with 548 branches, and the farmers are
relatively poorer resulting in around 20% of postal
savings below the county level. However, the rate
of increase is high with added savings ranging from
CNY371 billion to CNY571 billion per year. The
added deposits of postal savings are roughly
equivalent to added deposits of RCCs.
RCC
With 85 branches and around 2000 outlets, RCCs
have more than more than doubled total deposits
and loans in Guizhou during the period 2000-2003.
Deposits increased from CNY9.17 billion to CNY21.7
billion for a net increase of CNY12.5 billion, and rural
loans grew from CNY4.41 billion to CNY9.80 billion
for a net increase of CNY5.39 billion. It is also clear
that loans to township and village enterprises (TVEs)6
increased moderately from CNY764 million to
CNY1,012 million yielding a net increase of CNY248
million. This shows that TVEs in Guizhou are less
developed and have low levels of industrialization.
Part (40%) of the increase in loans was from PBC
on-lending, which increased from CNY531 million
to CNY2.48 billion. The importance of PBC on-
lending varied, however, with some districts almost
completely dependent on it for funding.
6
Township and village enterprises are those enterprises established
by town or village governments.
15
 The amount of medium- to long-term loans from
RCCs was less than 10% of the total at CNY433
million in 2000 and CNY1,072 million in 2003 (Table
20). In fact, Guizhou lacks financial institutions that
offer medium- and long-term loans for agriculture
and agricultural projects. ADBC provides all grain
procurement loans which are short-term, and only
ABC and the Construction Bank of China are willing
to provide medium- and long-term loans to
government-guaranteed state projects.

Table 19. Deposits Outstanding: Postal Savings in Guizhou

(Year-end figures, in CNY10, 000)

Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 September 2004

Number of Branches 548 548 548 548 548

Deposit 452,278 594,141 716,185 887,078 1,007,352

Of Which:
Below the County Level 84,623 121,741 158,535 215,699 266,055
Increase 37,118 36,794 57,164 50,356

Table 20. Deposits and Loans Outstanding: Rural Credit Cooperatives in Guizhou

(Year-end figures in CNY10, 000)

Item 2000 2001 2002 2003

Number of Branches 85 85 85 85
Number of Outlets 2111 2001

Total Deposits 917,450 1,145,212 1,779,600 2,168,884

Total Loans 711,722 921,851 1,254,961 1,485,934
Short-Term Loans 668,423 862,530 1,163,717 1,378,580
(1) To Rural Households 441,034 579,532 838,891 980,251
(2) To TVEs 76,442 89,360 92,003 101,237
Mid-/Long-Term Loans 43,299 58,912 91,164 107,246
PBC On-Lending 55,130 113,714 240,000 248,068

Table 21.
Loans Outstanding: Agricultural Development Bank of China in Guizhou

(Year-end figures, in CNY10, 000)

Item 2000 2001 2002 2003

Number of Branches 56 56 56 56

Total Loans 663,913 627,113 594,055 585,510

1. Short-Term 657,097 620,837 588,360 580,484
for Procurement 655,935 618,719 584,864 577,001
2. Mid-/Long-Term Loans 6,816 6,276 5,695 5,026

16
Agricultural Development Bank
of China
The total amount of loans outstanding has been
decreasing for ADBC although the total number of
branches remains at 56. In 2000, the amount
outstanding was CNY6.64 billion (Table 21); three
years later, this figure decreased by CNY784.3
million to CNY5.855 billion of which medium- and
long-term loans accounted for a small but dwindling
portion falling from CNY68.2 million in 2000 to
CNY50.3 million in 2003.
Agricultural Bank of China
With the acceleration of commercialization in
recent years, the operations of ABC have been
moving towards big cities and large projects. This
is shown in reduced number of outlets, increased
lending for medium- and long-term state projects
and reduced lending for agriculture and TVEs, in
other words, reduced lending to rural areas (Table
22). Even poverty reduction loans have been directed
to project loans. Combined with the lending
structure of RCCs, we can see that total lending to
TVEs is low reflecting the economic structure of
Guizhou. With the reduction in ABC lending except
for projects financed by state debt, the repayment
ratios dropped from 90.26% in 2000 to 76.32% in 2001
and to 78.18% in 2002.7 In 2003, ABC’s repayment
ratio of 69.84% in Guizhou was the third lowest
among those of all provinces in the country.
In terms of the total rural credit supply from
financial institutions, it is a commonly held view
that there are large outflows of funds from rural,
especially poor, areas. This is not the case in Guizhou
where the inflow of funds is far larger than the
outflow after accounting for government transfer
and remittances of migrant workers. Data from the
National Statistics Bureau show that in 2003, total fiscal
expenditures in Guizhou were CNY33.24 billion, 2.7
times the total fiscal revenues of CNY12.46 billion that

Table 22. Deposits and Loans Outstanding: Agricultural Bank of China in Guizhou

(Year-end figures in CNY10, 000)

Item 2000 2001 2002 2003

Number of Branches 78 77 84 90
Number of Outlets 598 509 452 394

Total Deposits 2,100,100 2,442,900 3,017,900 3,633,100

Total Loans 3,141,388 3,405,366 3,658,478 4,249,191
Short-Term Loans 1,474,722 1,273,445 1,307,680 1,351,683
(1) Industry 94,625 100,429 168,446 277,960
(2) Agriculture 81,777 70,332 64,153 60,807
(3) TVEs 68,069 66,529 61,891 61,487
Mid- Long-Term Loans 1,562,855 1,999,555 2,278,857 2,591,200
(1) Infrastructure 293,343 420,025 475,153 732,683
(2) Technology Improvements 98,608 138,700 132,719 118,072
(3) Others 1,170,904 1,440,830 1,670,985 1,740,445

7
Repayment ratio is calculated as the ratio of total amount of payment on time to the total amount of payment due.

17
year, indicating a net fund inflow of more than
CNY200 billion through fiscal transfers. Even if we
assume that all fiscal transfers were used at the
county level and above, that leaves a huge inflow of
funds below the county level. The major channels
of the flow include loans from ADBC and on-lending
for agriculture from PBC. In terms of flow, loans
from ADBC are shrinking, while on-lending from
PBC is increasing from CNY0.5 to 1 billion per year.
In terms of stock, the total amount of outstanding
loans of ADBC stood at CNY5.86 billion in 2003;
these are all net inflow because ADBC does not take
deposits. In the same year, total on-lending from
PBC was CNY2.48 billion, which yields a total inflow
of CNY8.34 billion when added to the ADBC figure.
In rural areas, the outflow of funds also has three
channels: the gap between deposits and loans in
ABC and other SOCBs, in RCCs, and in postal
savings. From December 2000 to September 2004,
the total amount of postal savings outstanding in
the province more than doubled, of which
incremental savings below the county level also
more than doubled. Even so, total postal savings
outstanding below the county level was CNY2.16
billion as of end 2003, and the gap between deposits
and loans in RCCs was 6.8 billion given their total
amount of outstanding loans of CNY14.8 billion. The
gap between deposits and loans in ABC in Guizhou
was very small. Without taking into account the gaps
between deposits and loans in other SOCBs, the total
outflow of funds from postal savings, RCCs and
ABC was around CNY9 billion.
This preliminary assessment shows that the total
inflow of funds in this period was more or less
equivalent to the outflow of funds in terms of stock.
Considering that SOCBs other than ABC have net
outflows of funds, the outflow from all financial
institutions should be larger. However, the direction
of the flow could reverse after taking into account
remittances from migrant workers. It was estimated
that total annual remittances from migrant workers
18
in Guizhou were around CNY8 billion, indicating
that even with large outflows from financial
institutions, the total inflow of funds should be greater
than the outflow. Claims of funding shortages in the
rural areas of Guizhou are therefore due to the lack
of profitable investment opportunities and to
inefficient credit allocation mechanisms.
Government-Supported
Rural Financial Services
Rural Credit Cooperative
Microfinance Loans
PBC initiated microfinance loans in 1999 using
on-lending for agriculture to support RCC
operations. This section analyzes the sustainability
of microfinance loans of RCCs using panel data from
1999 to 2003 that includes deposits, loans, and key
financial performance indicators from 48 RCCs in
Fenggang, Danzhai, Dafang and Zhijin (data from
the other two counties were not available).
Table 23 shows that between 1999 and 2003, the
deposits and savings of RCCs increased rapidly while
microfinance loans to rural households without
collateral increased at an even faster pace. Specifically,
growth rates were higher from 1999 to 2002 but declined
in 2003. The ratio of microfinance loans to outstanding
RCCs loans increased from 22.5% in 1999 to nearly 40%
in 2003. That indicates that the proportion of
microfinance loans without collateral in poverty-
stricken rural areas kept growing. Because of the rapid
increase in loans, no provisions for future NPLs were
made as it takes a year or more to see whether any
NPLs emerge; therefore financial indicators could not
correctly reflect real financial performance.
Table 23. Key Performance Indicators of Rural Credit Cooperatives

(Year-end data in CNY10, 000 unless otherwise specified)

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1. Outstanding Loans Rural to Households 221 327.5 371.2 599.7 705.7
Growth Rate (%) 48.3 13.1 61.6 17.7
2. Outstanding Microfinance Loans to Rural Households 50 76.7 138.0 244.9 279.0
Growth Rate (%) 54.5 80.0 77.4 13.9
3. Outstanding Microfinance Loans / Outstanding 22.5 23.4 37.2 40.8 39.5
Loans to Rural Households (%)
4.Total Deposits 274 340.6 467.5 644.7 769.4
Growth Rate (%) 24.1 37.3 37.9 19.3
5. Loans to Rural Households / Deposits (%) 80.5 96.2 79.4 93.0 91.7
6. PBC On-Lending 13 45.6 88.7 158.0 176.6
Growth Rate (%) 248.2 94.5 78.1 11.8
7. Nonperforming Loan Ratio (%) 59 61.0 65.9 37.6 34.4
8. Owner’s Equity -14 -11.5 -27.9 -10.8 6.8
9. Annual Net Profits -96,589 19,708 -33,166 46,433 -120,671

Note: Nonperforming loans are all loans with payments overdue.

Net profits are income after tax minus operational expenditures without considering provisions for nonperforming loans.

RCC microfinance loans without collateral differ
from microfinance loans piloted in the PRC under
the Grameen model in terms of interest rates, gender
of the clients, and repayment schemes. First, the
interest rates on RCC microfinance loans were lower
than the interest rates charged by RCCs on other
loans, which are also much lower than the interest
r a t e s c h a rg e d b y o t h e r g r a n t - s u p p o r t e d
microfinance projects. Note that the interest rates
of microfinance loans under the Grameen Model,
not subject to PBC regulations, are normally
between 15-20%, while those of RCC microfinance
loans are below 10%. Second, the Grameen model
prefers to extend loans to women while the
microfinance loans extended by RCCs on a
creditworthy basis mainly target heads of
households more than 95% of who are males. Third,
Grameen ensures high repayment with frequent
installments and group guarantees while RCC loans
have a single repayment on the due date.
The microfinance loans of RCCs have large
coverage, but RCCs have limited staff. In 2003, an
average RCC staff of 4 to 5 had to serve 9,272 rural
households in areas with 100.4 households per
square kilometer (around 400 people). As required
by regulatory authorities, RCCs conducted
household creditworthiness evaluations using
rating committees consisting of RCC staff, village
officials, and RCC members; village officials played
an important role. However, the fact that
evaluations are conducted once every 2 years has
undermined their value. Moreover, the evaluations
lack a scientific, uniform system.
For the 148 rural households with credit lines and
loan certificates in 2003, the average loan size was
CNY4, 756 and the maximum was CNY20, 000, far
exceeding the typical initial credit line of CNY1, 000
under the Grameen model pilot projects in the PRC.
More importantly, the ratio between rural
household credit and its expected annual cash
income was 107%. With excessively high credit lines
and without a loan repayment incentive system, the
default rate for microfinance loans without any
collateral will inevitably be high.8 Microfinance
loans without collateral began in land and loan
markets in rural areas where land ownership was

19
not clearly defined and where formal financial
institutions set the interest ceiling on loans. The
initial objective of this product was to encourage
RCCs to extend microfinance loans to rural
households using PBC funds and charging low
interest rates. However, if the product is not
profitable under the current system, it cannot be
sustained commercially.
There are three qualitative requirements for
microfinance loans from RCCs in Guizhou: they
should go to rural households, the amounts should be
small, and they should be based on creditworthiness.
These criteria by their very nature can help mitigate
risks. From a macro point of view, highly diversified
loans can diversify risk and can reduce overall
operational risks. Experience in microfinance
operations shows that risks still exist. Inaccurate
credit ratings for borrowers, neglecting the rural
credit system, lax loan management, excessive
pursuit of speed in operations, and oversupply of a
single microfinance product will lead to large
volume of NPLs in circumstances where there is
no agricultural insurance. The result would be
similar to what happened with loans to TVEs in
the mid-1990s. 9
Our survey shows that the RCC loan officers
regard microfinance loans as unworthy because of
their small scale and because they carry no collateral
or guarantee. In comparison, guaranteed or
collateralized loans are more sustainable. Many RCC
credit officers think that their microfinance operations
incur high operational risks, agricultural risks, and
other risks from sources such as natural calamities.
The operational costs are relatively high because of
the small lending scale and scattered clients. RCCs
therefore prefer enterprise loans to microfinance loans
because of the interest rate differences between the
two. Even though PBC controls RCCs’ lending
directions and percentages of microfinance loans as
requirements for obtaining on-lending for agriculture,
these may not sustain microfinance loans.
20
Many factors discourage microfinance lending
by RCCs. It is not cost-effective for RCCs because
of (i) its small scale, (ii) the large numbers of
transactions, (iii) the large numbers of clients, (iv)
difficult transportation conditions in rural areas, (v)
manual operations, (vi) the low efficiency of RCCs,
and (vii) heavy workloads for RCC staff.
Furthermore, RCCs do not have sufficient human
resources for microfinance operations as most of
them suffer from serious shortages of credit officers.
In addition, the technical design of microfinance
loans cannot meet the demands for credit and other
financial services.
Presently, the effective interest rate of RCCs
loans to rural households has reached its ceiling of
10.28%, doubling the base rate of 5.14% per annum.
In other words, even if the maximum interest rate
is charged, it is still difficult for commercialized
financial institutions to recover their costs because
of small loan amounts, high risks, and consequently
high lending costs. The 100% upward float margin
is not large enough for RCCs to recover their costs.
Our survey found that the effective interest rate on
microfinance loans to rural households has reached
15% per annum through imposing interest
penalties, deducting interest in advance, and
compulsory shareholding requirements. The only
way to transform rural credit loans from a
government requirement to a valued RCC product
is to improve the design of microfinance credit
loans, liberalize interest rates, and make loans to
rural households profitable.
8
In the short run, significant amounts of microfinance loans without
collateral can improve loan quality and financial performance
indexes.
9
Many TVEs went bankrupt in mid-1990s under the competition
arised from the emergence of private enterprises, the entry of
foreign-owned enterprise, the reform of state-owned enterprises.
This has left rural financial institutions with huge amount of non-
performing loans.
Poverty Alleviation Loans
Poverty alleviation loans counted for more than
half of the state’s poverty alleviation funds. They were
established to support economic development in core
poor areas and to lift poor rural residents out of
poverty. These policy-oriented loans are managed by
government-appointed financial institutions and
receive interest subsidies through fiscal transfers. The
most recent poverty alleviation loan policy is the
“Implementation Regulation of Poverty Alleviation
Interest-Subsidized Loan Management” jointly issued
by PBC, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Council
Leading Group for Poverty Alleviation and
Development Office (PADO) in 2001. The regulation
specifies the following.
(i) The major funding source is ABC deposits;
the remaining can be financed from PBC
on-lending.
(ii) Relevant commercial banks (i.e., ABC) shall
select projects and disburse loans inaccordance
with credit regulations.
(iii) The scale of poverty alleviation loans was
changed from government planning to
window guidance.10
(iv) Poverty alleviation loans include project and
household loans.
In practice, ABC has few choices for making
household loans as it normally selects clients from
the project pool made from lists provided by local
PADOs. By the end of 2000, outstanding poverty
alleviation loans stood at CNY70.5 billion; by 2001,
at CNY79.2 billion; and by 2003, at CNY96 billion
with interest subsidies of CNY620 million.
Of the 592 poverty-stricken counties recognized
by the central government, 48 (8.1%) are in Guizhou.
Because of the conflict between the objectives of a
poverty alleviation loan and those of a commercial
bank, the loans from ABC to rural households have
been decreasing since May 1998. Although ABC is
given a subsidy by the central government to cover
the difference between interest on poverty alleviation
loans and standard loans, it manages the poverty
alleviation loans in accordance with commercial
standards. With the commercialization of SOCBs, the
operational focus of ABC has shifted from rural areas,
counties, and towns to cities. In the process, it has
closed and merged some small, loss-making offices
with small transaction volumes and weak
management in an effort to streamline its
organizational structure and to reduce staff to cut costs
and increase efficiency. Offices in poverty-stricken
areas are most likely to be closed and their staff
dismissed. Fewer offices and employees will make
it more difficult for ABC to continue offering poverty
alleviation loans, especially microfinance loans to
poverty-stricken households. From 1995 to 2001,
ABC cut more than 13% of staff and 34% of branches,
most of which were in rural areas.
Interest-subsidized poverty alleviation loans are
mainly provided to support the aquaculture
businesses of poor households. These loans are
subject to strong seasonal sensitivity, tight processing
schedules, large numbers of transactions, large
numbers of borrowers, and small loan sizes requiring
sufficient institutional and human resources. For
instance, of the 874 townships in the 48 poverty-
stricken counties in Guizhou, fewer than 200 have
ABC offices, and each office has only two or three
credit officers who have to disburse poverty
alleviation loans and manage daily operations in four
to five townships. Day-to-day loan management is
totally neglected when the county RCC staff are called
to help gather rural households during the poverty
10
Suggestions of the authority to the institutions under supervision;
they are not compulsory.
21
alleviation loan disbursement period. The ABC
branch in Changshun County has 13 loan officers
covering 23,000 clients, which is nearly impossible
because it normally takes several days to visit each
client in an average village of 100 households.
To ensure that poverty alleviation loans reach
rural households, local governments and PADOs
required that 85% of these loans be allocated to core
poor counties and that 85% of their funds go to poor
households. In addition, the maximum amount per
loan is set at CNY50,000, with most below CNY2,000.
This small scale coupled with the large amount of
retail lending in geographically scattered poor
households has added to already high operating costs.
In 2000, the rocky roads shortened the life of a four-
wheel drive vehicle used for developing poverty
alleviation loans by ABC’s Libo County branch. For
the Guizhou branch of ABC, the costs for processing
CNY1 million worth of poverty alleviation loans was
CNY58, 500 which was CNY39,000, or nearly 60%
higher than that of other types of loans. In other
words, the cost of disbursing poverty alleviation loans
was 5.85% or 3.9 percentage points higher than that
for other products. Taking into account the costs of
funding, management, and repayment, the operating
costs of poverty alleviation loans exceed 10%, even
without considering NPLs. ABC gauged that average
costs of processing and managing poverty alleviation
loans is 7% of the loan amount. Even if interest is paid
in full and the interest subsidy is received on time,
this business is still a loss-making one.
Funding is another issue. Funds for poverty
alleviation loans are provided by ABC; the
government provides only interest subsidies.
Because these loans mainly target deprived counties
where ABC has more loans than deposits, these ABC
offices have to request funds from other ABC organs.
The prevailing inter-bank lending rate within ABC
is 4.32% per annum, while the interest rate on
poverty alleviation loans is 3%, plus the government
subsidy of 5.85 or 5.94% (after the increase in the
22
PBC base rate). This implies that if funds are
borrowed from higher-level ABC branches, the
county branch will incur a net loss of 5.38-5.47%11
per year for disbursing poverty alleviation loans
even without considering expenses for processing,
management, and repayment. Currently, ABC’s
management system for poverty alleviation loans
is the same as that for regular loans, and the
evaluation system for the branches and their
managements is also the same. This naturally leads
to low incentives for local ABC offices to process
poverty alleviation loans.
Local governments have intervened excessively
in disbursing poverty alleviation loans, and a large
number of household loans have been made in some
areas where those loans are not suitable. For making
poverty alleviation loans to rural households, ABC
generally uses the client list provided by the local
PADO. It has neither the ability nor the means to
examine whether borrowers meet the lending
criteria or to manage the loans on a daily basis.
In some places, the government even requires ABC
to provide loans to projects with outdated techniques,
low levels of technology, and limited competitiveness.
By the end of 2000, over 85% of ABC loans to
processing enterprises in impoverished counties in
Guizhou were nonperforming. In addition, many local
governments emphasize only the disbursement of
poverty alleviation loans but neglect the management
and servicing of the loans and support and education
of borrowers. There is a widespread misconception
among local officials and borrowers that poverty
alleviation loans are public funds that do not need to
be repaid. Some local governments view poverty
alleviation loans as public aids and distribute them
freely, at times even to the deceased. In some places,
the local governments take advantage of the loans and
use them to collect various taxes and charges.
11
Loan processing and managing costs (7%) plus fund opportunity
costs (4.32%) minus government subsidy rates (5.85% - 3% =
2.85%, or 5.94%-3%=2.94%).
 All these problems have, to various extents,
undermined the incentive of local ABC branches to
process poverty alleviation loans. By the end of 2001,
the cumulated nonperforming poverty alleviation
loans of ABC reached CNY32.82 billion, equivalent
to 41.4% of the total. Our data also show that the
value of outstanding interest-subsidized poverty
alleviation loans in Guizhou was CNY7.76 billion
by October 2001, of which CNY3.26 billion, or 42%,
were nonperforming. For household loans, the
repayment ratio (number of loans / number of loans
paid in time) was a mere 21%. Since 2001, ABC has
stopped its special evaluation of poverty alleviation
loans and has started to combine it with the
evaluation of other types of loans. This has linked
employee remuneration to loan performance,
strengthened the accountability for NPLs, and
strengthened the assessment of poverty alleviation
loans. This has also seriously affected ABC branch
incentives for processing poverty alleviation loans
and has exposed related problems.
Since 2001, ABC has instead made commercial
loans for infrastructure construction using poverty
alleviation funds. Of ABC’s close to CNY10 billion
for poverty alleviation loans in Guizhou, only
CNY400 million have been extended to rural
households. Some local governments and other
SOCBs have expressed serious concerns about this.
Issues in Rural Financial
Markets
The major obstacle to rural finance reform
originates in the traditional financial system in the
PRC which is designed to use cheap credit to
support agricultural production through ABC and
RCCs. Such a system consists of highly centralized
institutions with structures similar to government
agencies. Because of these monotypic institutions,
rural financial markets lack competition, and
demands for diversified financial services cannot be
met. Furthermore, government credit supplies
cannot reverse large outflows of funds from rural
areas or relieve the difficult access to credit of
farmers. At the same time, the “reform” of rural
financial institutions under senior management that
makes decisions without even consulting
shareholders has diverted loan decision making
from the interests of rural households.
Lack of Competition in Rural
Financial Markets
Rural finance reforms since 1996 have failed to
enhance competition in rural credit markets; on the
contrary, ABC has been withdrawing from poor
rural areas, and other competitors of RCCs such as
agriculture credit foundations and informal finance
providers have been closed by the government. This
has strengthened RCC’s monopoly in rural credit
markets which naturally inhibits efficiency. With the
dwindling number of ABC branches in townships,
the narrowing of the scope of operations of ADBC
for loans for procurement of grain, cotton and edible
oil, and the abolishing of rural credit foundations,
RCCs have been forced to play the role of primary
credit providers in rural financial markets.
However, the conflict between such duties and the
capability to perform was soon revealed. Because
of the large volume of accumulated NPLs, the
controlled interest rate regime, and the low
operational efficiency in certain regions, RCCs still
suffer huge losses despite their status as monopolies.
The losses are especially heavy for RCCs in the
central and western regions of the PRC which makes
them unsustainable as the only service provider in
the rural financial market in the long run.
23
Monotypic Institutions are
Unable to Meet Diversified
Demand
One consequence of the lack of competition in
rural financial markets is that the monotypic rural
financial system cannot cope with the differences in
services demand among the eastern, central, and
western regions. A system with the RCC as the sole
player cannot meet the demands from farmers and
enterprises in different regions. With the
development of local economies and urbanization,
demands for financial services have been evolving.
Moreover, different economic structures in different
areas have also produced different demands for
financial services. However, with their similar
operational structures, lending modes, internal
management and incentive systems, RCCs are
unable to meet these demands in a timely fashion.
Government Credit Inputs are
Unable to Reverse Outflows of
Rural Funds or to Increase
Farmers’ Access to Credit
Since the mid-1990s, the sluggish and volatile
nature of agricultural product prices, the low
productivity of small-scale, self-sufficient rural
households, and the large number of closures of
township enterprises have contributed to the lack
of investment opportunities in rural areas. This has
forced many farmers to migrate to other provinces.
The earnings of these farmers are remitted back to
the rural financial institutions in their hometowns
but then flow to the eastern and more developed
regions through purchases of Treasury bonds by
these institutions and deposits in their upper-level
organs. The end result is that the agricultural sector,
24
rural areas, and farming households cannot obtain
sufficient funds, and rural economic development
enters a viscous cycle.
Rural funds flow out through three channels:
SOCBs, postal savings, and RCCs. SOCBs have shrunk
their branch networks and tightened credit controls.
Most county and lower-level offices of the four SOCBs
are required to redeposit funds in their upper level
organs. Postal savings enjoys very high redeposit
interest rates at PBC which translates into a
hemorrhage of rural funds into other areas. In addition,
many RCCs purchase Treasury bonds, deposit funds
in other financial institutions, and lend to urban clients,
all of which mean additional outflows.
Most rural households, especially rural SMEs,
h a v e d i f f i c u l t i e s a c c e s s i n g c re d i t . Wi t h
commercialization, ABC has abandoned some
branches and merged others. The mode and means
of RCC services cannot meet the demands of rural
households and rural economic development.
Although RCCs have increased microfinance
lending to rural households, loans to rural SMEs
have been shrinking significantly. In addition,
because microfinance loans largely depend on PBC
on-lending for agriculture, they carry high
transaction costs and small loan sizes. With the fixed
interest ceiling, RCCs can hardly sustain their
microfinance operations in the long run. In many
central and western provinces, loss-making RCCs
are unable and unwilling to lend to rural
households, while PBC on-lending for agriculture
is too small compared with the demand for credit,
forcing farmers to depend on borrowing from
relatives, friends, or informal sources. The
government’s poverty alleviation loans through
ABC can hardly accommodate rural households,
while their persistently high NPL ratio has
undermined poverty reduction objectives.
It is impossible to solve the problem of outflow
of rural funds and to ease the difficulties in accessing
credit in rural areas with PBC on-lending and
poverty alleviation loans, both of which are fiscal in
nature. Key factors widening the gap between urban
and rural areas are their access to fiscal funds,
investments from national and local governments,
and the different returns on investment in various
regions. Although support for san nong is important,
the function of finance cannot replace the function
of fiscal policy. In the past, the central and local
governments have misconstrued finance, making it
shoulder too many fiscal functions. This has resulted
in huge losses, shrinking rural financial services,
increasing outflows of rural funds, and serious
moral problems.
Reformed Rural Financial
Institutions under Insider
Control have Increasingly
Alienated their Lending Policies
from the Interests of Farmers
The advantages of local rural financial
institutions lie in their access to local information
that can lower costs of monitoring clients and reduce
asymmetry in information. However, with no
significant changes in ownership arrangements and
governance structures of rural financial institutions,
the reforms remain under the control of RCC
management that benefits from the current system.12
With weak governance, risk control can only be
strengthened by administrative measures, i.e.,
through concentrating decision-making power. This
is done in ABC by depriving lower-level branches
of decision-making power for loans and in RCCs
through concentrating decision-making power for
lending and treasury functions to rural credit
cooperative unions (RCCUs). Nevertheless,
concentrated decision-making power can hardly
solve the problems of asymmetric information and
timely responses to changes in demand.
Past reform has not fundamentally changed the
basic rural finance structure in the PRC. First, the
government still controls rural finance. The
commercialization of financial institutions has been
limited by both lending policy and low interest rates.
Second, the market structure has not changed as RCCs
still dominate rural financial markets. Third, the
performance of financial institutions has not
fundamentally improved. This represents a sharp
contrast with the robust economic growth, particularly
rural economic growth, of the past two decades.
Comprehensive rural finance reform has become
imperative. The traditional rural financial system
has contributed to rural economic growth, but
financial resource “overdrafts” from rural areas can
hardly be sustained. The delay in reform has
hampered the ability of rural finance to support the
rural economy, and its inefficiency will obstruct
rural economic growth.
Lack of an enabling operation
environment for development of
rural financial institutions
There are insufficient risk sharing mechanisms
for rural loans. The waning agriculture insurance,
preliminary futures market for agricultural
products, and various legal and policy constraints
have prevented rural financial institutions from
efficient substitutes for collateral and guarantee. At
the same time, rural financial institutions have few
incentives to resolve the difficulties in collateral and
guarantee through financial innovation. Moreover,
the sustainable development of these institutions is
also hampered by the “cookie-cutter” tax policies,
and the constroled interest rates.
12
Under the current system, RCC management assumes little
responsibility for RCC performance.
25
 Rural Credit Cooperative Pilot
Programs and Evaluation
Rural Credit
Cooperatives in Guizhou:
Status and Pilot
Programs
The eight-province RCC pilot program initiated
in the later half of 2003 is a milestone in the financial
reform of the PRC. Compared with previous
reforms, the pilot programs have (i) money for
robust mechanisms and (ii) power for the provincial
governments. The government is paying to get rid
of the historical burdens of the RCCs and is
delegating the power to implement reforms to
provincial governments. This bottom-up approach
marks a fundamental change from the top-down
approach in previous financial sector reforms. If
successfully implemented, future RCCs will better
suit local economic development, the degree of
penetration of markets, geographical location,
effective financial demand and supply, and the
performance of financial institutions. The objectives
are to reform the RCCs while at the same time
searching for financial innovations and to provide
credit support to rural areas while ensuring financial
sustainability.
Guizhou province is one of the eight pilot
provinces. By the end of 2002, the total assets of RCCs
in Guizhou reached CNY24.11 billion including
outstanding loans of CNY12.55 billion and total
liabilities of CNY24.1 billion including CNY14.35
26
billion in outstanding deposits. In addition,
accumulated aggregate loss reached CNY910
million with a loss of CNY4 million in 2002. NPLs
were CNY3.49 billion, accounting for 27.8% of total
loans outstanding. Of all the NPLs outstanding,
CNY150 million or 4.29% were bad loans, and
CNY2.8 billion or 80.23% were idle (loans overdue
for more than 6 months). With an overall capital
adequacy ratio of -0.9%, 969 RCCs, or 17.2%, had
negative equities. In this round of reform, the central
bank has granted CNY719 million in central bank
notes to Guizhou (see Table 24). According to central
government regulations, RCCs need to pay only 3%
of business taxes, and income taxes were exempted
starting 1 January 2003. The Ministry of Finance
approved CNY38.67 million in interest subsidies to
RCCs that paid interest on indexed deposits for the
period 1994-1997.
Under the pilot program, 84 county RCCUs in
Guizhou (39 of them insolvent) were consolidated
with RCCs into new legal entities in accordance with
Document 15 of the State Council (see Appendix)
following the principle of “taking into consideration
the institutional capability, piloting in different
batches, and accomplishing within a specific period.”
Three RCCUs, Yunye District Credit Cooperative
Union in suburban Guiyang, Huaxi District Credit
Cooperative Union in the outskirts of Guiyang, and
Meitan County Credit Cooperative Union of Zhunyi
City (a national commodity grain production base),
were selected to pilot rural cooperative banks. By
the end of June 2004, the paid-in capital from
Table 24. Rural Credit Cooperatives in Guizhou: An Overview

(In CNY100 million unless otherwise specified)

Total Assets as of End 2003 298.84 Outstanding Non-Performing Loans as of End 2002 34.87

Total Liability as of End 2003 279.43 Aggregate Loss as of End 2002 9.13

Total Deposits as of End 2003 177.96 Capital Adequacy Ratio as of End 2002 -0.4%

Total Loans as of End 2003 148.58 Central Bank Note under the Pilot Program (2003-2004) 7.19

Number of Employees 1.19 Ministry of Finance Subsidy for Interest Loss from Indexed 0.3867
(In 10,000) Savings (2003-2004)

Average Expenses per 76,600 Estimated Income Tax Exemption and Reduction (2004) 0.13
Employee in 2003
Business Tax Exemption and Reduction (2004) 0.3

Outstanding Agriculture 24 Additional Capital Required to Qualify for PBC Note 0.4127
On-Lending as of 2003

Outstanding Loans Extended 7.6527 Additional Capital Required to Qualify for Cashing PBC Note 0.9382
to Peasant Households as of 2003

member shareholders of all RCCs in the province
reached CNY1.124 billion, CNY754 million more
than that in 2002. The capital adequacy ratio was
3%, up from -0.9% before the structural reform
(excluding the PBC notes factor).
Even under tight budget constraints, the
governments at all levels in Guizhou strengthened
their support for RCCs. Relevant measures include
the following.
(i) Establishing RCC Development and
Support Funds: Under the funds, the
provincial finance department allocates
CNY8 million per year from 2003 to 2007 to
support development and risk management
in RCCs. Statistics show that such funds have
been established in 20 counties, cities, and
districts.
(ii) Supplementing Capital: Twenty counties,
cities, and districts have provided land,
buildings, and budgetary support to
supplement RCC capital.
(iii) Arranging Budget Allocations: In some
counties, cities, and districts, allocations
subsidize RCC business taxes, real estate
taxes, tenure taxes, and stamp duties from
2004 to 2010.
(iv) Promoting Operations of RCCs: The
provincial government has decided to
entrust the management of microfinance
poverty alleviation loans (formerly
managed by ABC) to qualified RCCs. To
implement the “Urgent Notice from the
State Council on Improving Grain
Production and Supply” (State Council
Circular [2004] No. 9) and measures of the
provincial government, the provincial
RCCU issued a circular together with the
provincial agricultural department and the
provincial finance department to authorize

27
 RCCs to handle business related to
agriculture tax exemption of farmers and
reductions and direct subsidies for hybrid
fine rice production.
(v) Strengthening RCCs’ Deposit Base: Most
counties, if applicable, have deposited
agriculture-related funds, education funds,
off-budget funds of government agents, and
special agriculture funds from the central
government into RCCs.
(vi) Exempting or Reducing Certain Fees or
Charges: This is done in coordination with
relevant regulations of government
authorities such as the Industry and
Commerce Administration Bureau.
The provincial RCCU was established on 30
December 2003, and its affiliates in nine districts,
prefectures, or cities were also set up and began
operations upon approval of the provincial
government. This signified the completion of the
initial phase of RCC administrative reform in
Guizhou. As Table 25 illustrates, in three counties
or cities, rural cooperative banks have been
chartered, and RCCUs in the other 84 counties have
merged into county cooperative unions, with one
for each county. The total paid-in capital of the
provincial RCCUs reached CNY972 million, with
Table 25. Rural Credit Cooperative Pilot Programs in Guizhou
Total Paid-In Capital
Newly Added Capital to RCC in 2004
Structure
(i) Number of Rural Commercial Banks
(ii) Number of Rural Cooperative Banks
(iii) Number of County Level RCCU/Bank (After Merger)
(iv) Number of 2-Level RCCU
28
CNY327 million in newly added capital in 2004 from
fundraising and from issuing shares.
One key component of this round of the RCC
pilot program is administrative reform, i.e., to
transfer administration to the provincial
government. However, as the provincial RCCU is
inclined to maximize its own interests, the hidden
danger is that the provincial RCCU will emphasize
its operations while neglecting RCC sector
management. This means measures are needed to
minimize the role of the provincial RCCU and to
limit its management responsibilities while
improving RCCs at the grass-roots level. The key to
resolving conflicts between respecting shareholders’
rights and strengthening self-regulation is the power
of senior management: the shareholder should
extend a helping hand, not a controlling hand. In
this respect and in line with the implementation of
Document No.1 (2004) of the central government,
the provincial authorities have:
(i) issued “Guizhou Provincial RCCU’s Opinion
on Supporting the Agricultural Sector, Rural
Areas and Farmers” which emphasized that
after the RCC pilot programs, better services
should be provided to san nong by rural
financial institutions irrespective of
ownership and organizational structure;
Amount (CNY100 Million)
9.72
3.27
No.
0
3
84
0
(ii) guided the provincial RCCU to draft
“Guizhou Provincial RCCU Operation
Objectives and Business Development Plan
(2004-2006),” and signed “Commitment to
Attaining Comprehensive Objectives for
2004” with county, city, and district RCCs;
(iii) guided the provincial RCCU in drafting and
implementing over 40 sector-specific rules
and regulatory documents, including
“Rules on Financial Management for RCCs
in Guizhou Province” and “Temporary
Management Rules for Employees of RCCs
in Guizhou Province”;
(iv) issued “Contingency Plan for Risk
Prevention and Disposal for RCC Pilot
Programs” which defined the
responsibilities of government authorities
at all levels on risk prevention and
mitigation;
(v) issued “Opinions on Assisting RCC to
Collect Loan Repayment and to Punish
Debt Evasion and Abrogation” which
required that government authorities at all
levels take effective legal, economic, and
administrative measures to collect NPLs
and to punish debt evasion and abrogation
(with the government’s efforts, the RCCs
had collected NPLs up to CNY350 million
by the end of June 2004); and
(vi) normalized the relationship between city
and county governments and RCCs. The
administrative power of the RCC has been
vested in the provincial government that
has to motivate the county and city
governments to support RCCs without
delegating power to them. For this, the
provincial government has clearly defined
the duties of the county and city
governments. These include, among others,
(a) to take practical measures to support the
RCC, create a credit culture, and prevent
and mitigate risks in a timely fashion, (b)
not to intervene in RCC operations and
human resource management, and (c) not
to use RCCs for direct lending. These will
support RCC development within their
respective administrative areas and
effectively prevent excessive intervention.
The provincial government is drafting
“Administrative Regulations for RCCs in
Guizhou Province” to regulate the
relationship between governments at all
levels and RCCs.
Financial Innovations
RCCs in Guizhou have experimented with
numerous low-cost financial innovations. Whether
such innovations can be adopted in the pilot programs
would be important for the success of reform.
Market-Based Risk Disposal
Mechanism
Establishing a market-based risk disposal
system can enable risk sharing among various
players. Aquaculture businesses in Guizhou have
huge market potential thanks to the province’s
unique natural conditions, distinctive seasons, and
low pollution levels. To turn potential benefits into
material gains requires a supportive environment
in which credit support is the key. However, huge
risks beyond the scope of credit such as natural
calamities, plagues, and the adoption of new
technology need to be addressed. Under the fixed
interest rate regime, such risks are beyond RCCs’
capacities. Without a proper risk sharing mechanism,
an RCC can only avoid risks through credit rationing
29
under which even farmers with profitable projects
are unable to obtain credit. Without financial
support, these farmers have to miss opportunities.
In some areas in Guizhou (e.g., Danzhai
County), the risk-sharing mechanism established by
local governments, insurance companies, rural
households, and financial institutions has
contributed to overcoming excessive risks in
agricultural loans. This has also reduced the risks
of RCC loans which enabled their relatively low
interest rates to cover their costs. More importantly,
this mechanism has facilitated agricultural
specialization and has helped form a reliable credit
clientele. Under this win-win arrangement, farmers’
incomes have increased, and RCCs have cultivated
a high-quality customer base. The operation of the
mechanism is simple. First, the local governments
need to allocate part of their budgets or fiscal funds
for poverty alleviation to subsidize rural
households’ insurance premiums with insurance
companies. Then insurance companies need to
introduce special agricultural insurance products.
With insurance coverage, RCCs can lend to insured
borrowers without collateral or with the insured
products (e.g., livestock) as collateral.
Information and Risk Sharing
with Local Institutions
Making use of local institutional resources such
as Farmer Professional Associations and Production
Cooperatives can increase lending quality and
improve client relationships. In the days of the
collective economy, RCCs made loans backed by the
goodwill of the village or by collectively owned
enterprises. The adoption of the household
responsibility system with remuneration linked to
outputs has forced RCCs to deal with individual
households based on their own credit worthiness.
This has increased credit risk and the cost of
30
collecting credit information. With some farmers
leaving their land and with increased agricultural
specialization, scattered farmers have begun to
organize themselves. It will be important for RCCs
to deal with a variety of farmers’ organizations.
Through these specialized organizations, RCCs can
gather useful, accurate information on farmers.
Some RCCs in Guizhou have coordinated with local
farmers’ professional associations or production
cooperatives and have successfully used their
information to improve loan quality.
In some towns in Meitan County, RCCs have
taken advantage of the presence of local aquaculture
businesses to sign feed procurement and sales
contracts with suppliers on their behalf. This links
rural household loans directly with feed supply
assuring the loans are put to good use and that
valuable information is collection. At the same time,
RCCs have established lending risk funds that use
wholesale and retail price differences to enable
sharing of credit risks. RCCs have also established
a risk sharing mechanism with local quarantine
authorities. In some places, RCCs, local quarantine
authorities, and village officials have established an
accountability mechanism. Under this mechanism,
if livestock die of disease, the local quarantine
authority will bear 50% of the loss, village officials
10%, and rural households the remainder.
Group Guarantees and
Microfinance Lending
Group guarantees and microfinance lending can
help resolve issues of credit rationing caused by
asymmetric information and can expand credit
coverage. The bottleneck of rural finance is the
asymmetry between returns to and the costs and
risks of RCCs. If the costs and risks of RCC loans
can be reduced by group guarantees or credit
ratings, the RCC model can become commercially
sustainable even under a relatively low interest rate
scenario. Of course, feasibility depends on local
tradition, culture, and individual relationships. In
Fenggang County, group guarantees among hog
raisers have been frequent because of the close
cooperation among hog raisers, quarantine
authorities, and RCCs.
Collateral Substitutes
Lack of effective collateral is the prime obstacle
for rural households in obtaining loans. Property
such as land and houses cannot be used for
collateral, and agricultural production is seasonal.
These factors have increased lending risks for RCCs.
Moreover, group guarantees and microfinance are
applicable only to rural households with small
demands. To overcome such difficulties, some RCCs
have begun to introduce effective collateral
substitutes (those not legally recognized but that can
serve as collateral) such as bills of lading, plant
harvest rights, and livestock. More RCCs have
gathered information on clients through direct
involvement in production and sales activities of
local quarantine stations and leading enterprises
which is another substitute for collateral.
Nevertheless, due to the lack of a legal base, the
development of this type of operation is limited. A
possible future direction can be that when made-to-
order farming emerges, orders can serve as a form
of collateral. Furthermore, loans can be made against
credit ratings of individual guarantors.
Government Interest-Subsidized
Loans
These loans can also diversify credit risks of rural
households. In Guizhou, some local governments
have introduced a variety of special interest-
subsidized loans for raw silk production, hog
raising, tea production, and the like. Some local
governments share 50% of the interest, and some
discount the interest rate to the level of ordinary RCC
loans which makes the effective interest rate for rural
households 2.4‰ per month. These special interest-
subsidized loans have reduced the default ratio of
rural households without affecting effective resource
distribution and have turned the implicit demand
of rural households into effective demand.
Informal Finance
Informal finance has two advantages over
formal finance: low information and collateral
requirements. First, informal finance can effectively
utilize informal information to identify the effective
financial demand of rural households through local
networks. Second, informal finance can discover
substitutes for collateral such as a wide array of
social relationships among individuals, business
ties, and other informal relationships to ensure
timely repayment of loans. However, the status of
informal finance is not normally recognized because
of the traditional financial management system.
Some financial institutions tend to treat informal
finance providers as competitors and brand them
as usurers. In fact, the scarcer the RCC funds and
the higher the NPL ratios are, the more insistent the
efforts to discourage informal financiers become.
Informal finance has become an important
supplement to formal finance. On the one hand, the
borrowers of informal finances are those formal
financial institutions are prejudiced against. These
clients have small financial demands but require
flexible timing and are associated with high risks.
The growth of informal finance can help these
borrowers. On the other hand, informal finance can
support profitable projects, the success of which can
31
help rural households to become quality clients of
RCCs. It may be useful to issue local regulations to
allow informal finance to exist under certain
conditions and to compete with financial
institutions. In addition, the criminal code should
be amended to address the crimes of illegal
fundraising and the offenses of disrupting financial
order. These crimes or offenses should be addressed
by laws and regulations cracking down on usury.
For example, regulations can be issued to set interest
rates and lending ceilings for informal finance
according to the local situation. Through these,
informal finance can be developed to supplement
formal finance. In some places, informal finance can
even become the major player in rural finance.
India’s experience in combining formal and informal
finance can serve as an example. In India, an average
of 10 to 20 rural households form self-help groups
which can engage in lending activities through
formal financial institutions. Financial institutions
provide loans to the self-help groups according to
their credit records, and disbursements are based
on a positive incentive principle. The initial amount
is small but increases with timely repayments.
Target Moderately Poor Rural
Households
The demand of rural households for funds can
be categorized into commercial demand and social
welfare demand. The former may be met by formal
or informal financial service providers and the latter
by government agencies. Some local governments
(e.g., Taijiang County) and RCCs have realized that
loan support should be mainly provided to
moderately poor rural households with effective
demands for funds that they are capable of repaying.
These households will then be able to help relieve
destitute farmers by offering employment
opportunities. This can partially reduce the pressure
on RCCs to provide loans to the agricultural sector.
32
Evaluation of Rural Credit
Cooperative Pilot Programs
The RCC pilot programs initiated in the second
half of 2003 in eight provinces are important
experiments to correct the serious mismatch
between rural realities and financial sector reform
and development in the past two decades. The main
objectives of the reforms are to encourage financial
innovations that suit local economic development
and to establish a modern rural finance system to
meet the financial demands of localities, industries,
and households with varying income levels.
Different economic and market structures have
resulted in a variety of demands for financial
services from different regions of the PRC. In the
eastern region, demand for rural finance mainly
comes from the non-agricultural sector while in the
central region it comes from aquaculture. In the west,
most financial demand is for protecting livelihoods
generated by uncertainties in agricultural
production. Different regions have different san nong
problems. The main issue to resolve rural financial
problems in the eastern region is with rural areas,
in the central region, with the agricultural sector,
and in the west, with farmers.
One key to successful RCC reform lies to a great
extent in eliminating the RCC monopoly in rural
financial markets. Monopolies, a by-product of the
planned economy, are by nature rigid in the face of
changing demand and have to be abolished in order
to establish an efficient and sustainable market with
a variety of useful products. In other words, the RCC
pilot programs should adopt different approaches
in different provinces. That is, different types of
financial institutions or service providers that suit
local socio-economic and geographical situation
should be adopted. Unfortunately, the design and
progress of pilot programs in Guizhou do not seem
to have addressed this core issue.
Moral Hazards in the Rural
Credit Cooperative System
Remain to be Addressed
An efficient system should balance rights and
responsibilities, efforts and incentives, and
investment returns and risks. In the present system,
county RCCUs (the managers) need to expand their
capital bases to meet capital adequacy requirements,
but they do not need to report to their shareholders.
The shareholders, deprived of their rights as
principals, want to pursue high short-term returns
with minimum risks. Each provincial RCCU has the
right to appoint the director of a county RCCU (one
director per county), but it is not responsible for the
county RCCU’s performance.
The RCC pilot programs heavily emphasized
merging and changing titles of institutions but
ignored much-needed reforms of mechanisms.
When an RCC director was asked about the
differences before and after reform, he replied that
the two-level legal entity system had become a
unified legal entity at the county level and that the
regulator had changed from PBC to the provincial
RCCU. Although some RCCs have expanded their
capital bases and have introduced membership and
investment shares, the directors of RCCs and county
RCCUs are still appointed by the regulatory
authorities. The shareholders do not have the right
to appoint senior management, and the
shareholders’ meeting and the supervisory board are
still rubber stamps. The asymmetry between
shareholders’ rights and responsibilities has created
stocks of time deposits with high interest rates, as
the main objectives of the shareholders have turned
out to be convenient borrowing and preferential
interest rates.
The pilot programs have not addressed
operational issues such as incentives, supervision,
and exit mechanisms of RCCs. The moral hazard
problem has not been resolved as RCCs still use
credit support for san nong as an excuse for their
losses. This deviates from the intended objective of
“money for better mechanisms” of the pilot
programs. In addition, the RCC model is still the
only model in operation, RCCs still have a
monopoly in the market, and their operational
environments remain the same. Simply put, the pilot
programs continued to follow a top-down approach
that is not in line with the guiding principles
advocated in Document 15 of the State Council.
With the same RCC system and staff, it is hard to
discern the changes the pilot programs have made.
Loans for Supporting Agriculture
Incur High Costs that Undermine
their Sustainability
The organizational structure and weak
corporate governance of RCCs have resulted in high
average costs per employee, a high NPL ratio, and
low rural household coverage making it too costly
for poverty-stricken areas. The reasons for NPLs
include moral hazards, government interventions,
and agricultural risks. Because of asymmetric
information, it is difficult to differentiate risks from
natural cause from risks due to human causes. In
fact, loans classified as supporting agriculture have
become an excuse for moral risks. Although RCCs
cannot avoid losses from natural calamities, people
responsible for losses do not take responsibility
because the losses were made to support farmers.
More importantly, no one seems to be concerned
about the huge amount of NPLs of RCCs. Credit
support for san nong needs a new approach, i.e.,
efficiency should come first, and support should be
market based. Otherwise, it would be like draining
the pond to catch a fish.
33
Much of the PBC’s On-Lending
is Used to Benefit Rural Credit
Cooperative Employees before it
Benefits San Nong
The objective of rural finance reform is not limited
to protecting benefits for RCC employees. Without a
proper governance structure, RCC development
cannot go hand in hand with support for san nong. In
many areas of Guizhou, the average annual expenses
for an RCC employee are CNY60,000-80,000, higher
than those in the eastern region. This indicates that
preferential policy treatment and PBC on-lending
have failed to achieve their intended objectives, i.e.,
on-lending was used to benefit RCC employees
rather than san nong.
Reforming Finance and
Nationalizing Risks
On one hand, Guizhou suffers from inadequate
social security and cooperative medical systems in
rural areas. Some medical expenses that are covered
by RCC loans should have been covered by fiscal
expenditures. When RCC funds are used as public
finance, losses are inevitable. On the other hand,
much of the local government budget is used to
cover employee expenses. Under heavy pressure to
develop the local economy, the local government
will naturally instruct RCCs to use their funds at
the government’s discretion because RCCs are the
only financial institutions under the local
government’s influence. When the local supply of
funds is insufficient, PBC on-lending has become the
sole funding source, and the central government has
to bear the subsequent risks.
34
The Main Constraint of Rural
Credit Cooperatives is Not a
Shortage of Funds but a Lack of
Mechanisms
The only focus of RCC pilot programs is money,
and all efforts are centered on the special 2-year PBC
notes (see Appendix). This is off target. Outstanding
PBC on-lending to RCCs in Guizhou was CNY2.4
billion at the end of July 2004 while funding for the
pilot programs was less than CNY800 million. If the
vast amount of PBC on-lending can not resolve RCC
issues, it is difficult to believe that a PBC
contribution of one third that amount can make
much difference.
In our field interviews with RCC directors, we
asked two questions: (a) if you were the owner of
an RCC, would you operate it in the present mode,
and (b) if you were the owner of an RCCU, could
you make money? The answers to the first question
were all negative while the answers to the second
one were all positive. The major problem with many
RCCs lies in their lack of efficient mechanisms to
activate idle capital and attract investors, not in a
shortage of funds. The establishment of an efficient
mechanism should have been a high priority in this
round of pilot programs, that is, using an efficient
mechanism to attract capital and using a sustainable
mechanism to retain capital.
The Arrangement of Provincial
Rural Credit Cooperative
Unions Can Barely Meet
Diversified Rural Financial
Demands
 The one-size-fits-all approach in establishing
county and provincial RCCUs may be convenient
for RCC management, but it concentrates risks on
county and provincial RCCUs. If the central
government required the provincial government to
shoulder the risks inherit in reforms, it would still
be a question of whether Guizhou would be able to
do so.
The weaknesses in the provincial RCCU system
are numerous. First, the system uses management
to replace regulation. Regulators bear no risk while
the manager has no one to blame. Second, provincial
RCCUs may be suited for other provinces but may
not be suited for Guizhou. Areas in Guizhou differ
in their levels of economic development and
financial demands, and the same provincial RCCU
policy may not apply to all. Third, the provincial
RCCU arrangement is likely to inhibit financial
innovation. This is because county RCCU operations
have to follow the directives of the provincial RCCU,
but some directives may neglect local financial
demands. Moreover, all RCCs have to become
members of the provincial RCCU which constitutes
a de facto monopoly and precludes any outside
competition. Monopoly is the natural enemy of
financial innovation.
The Selection of New
Mechanisms is Not Done by
Shareholders
The key to success in RCC pilot programs is who
should decide on new mechanisms. The impact of
the pilot programs and the local capability for
innovation will be restricted if the pilot programs
must delegate decision-making power to provincial
governments to decide the model for the pilot. In
this way, it is difficult to avoid following the same
path as previous attempts in the past decade, and
concerns of “old medicine in a new bottle” will still
need to be addressed.
To resolve the issue of who determines a new
mechanism, the role of the government should be
transformed. Instead of directing reform models, the
provincial government should design a new
mechanism that is both adaptive and flexible with
self-correcting capability. In other words, the duties
of the government are to set the principles that will
allow RCCs to operate and innovate on a market
basis according to local situations. Specifically, all
types of RCCs and investors should be allowed to
make decisions about merging and restructuring.
RCCs should decide for themselves whether or not
to join county RCCUs, to be independent, to form
another alliance, or even to form a rural commercial
bank. Potential investors should also be allowed to
form new financial institutions. Only in this way
can there be effective competition among financial
institutions and will farmers be able to find reliable
institutions for financial services. In short, an
efficient mechanism will encourage diversification
of financial institutions and competition among
them and will protect the interests of borrowers and
depositors.
35

A
n improved rural financial system is
needed for efficient rural financial
intermediation to serve the rural
population effectively. Efficiency is one of the most
important criteria for a rural financial model, be it
cooperative, commercial, or informal finance. For
example, if the government insists on the so-called
cooperative system and requires RCCs to make all
loans locally, we may end up with NPLs as large as
two thirds of loan amount. On the other hand, if the
government requires that only 50% of RCC loan
amount be allocated locally, RCCs may be able to
sustain themselves commercially. If commercial
operation is allowed, 50% of the deposits from rural
areas can be used locally, the support for rural areas
will be much stronger, and local governments can
then be freed from “paying” for NPLs made by
commercial institutions. Therefore, the guiding
principles of rural finance reform are to open the
rural financial markets and encourage various forms
of financial institutions to compete on a level playing
field. This should also be the major difference
between this round of reform and the previous ones.
Rural financial markets in Guizhou province
have tremendous potential. First, the province has
a large number of migrant workers, and their
remittances are an inexhaustible source of funds for
financial institutions. Second, with appropriate
mechanisms, reforms in the near future will retain
part or all of postal savings. Third, Guizhou has
become an integral part of the national economic
system over the past 20 years, and regional division
of labor is emerging. If it can take the initiative, the
province will be able to catch and create
opportunities. Fourth, financial institutions have
36
Policy Suggestions
tremendous potential for innovation. Various types
of credit guarantee and risk sharing arrangements
such as microfinance, and group guarantees will
greatly enhance credit quality. Financial institutions
can be profitable if the financial markets open up, if
fair competition is allowed, and if exit mechanisms
are available for under-performing institutions.
Fifth, the withdrawal of SOCBs from rural areas has
provided a large platform for the development of
grass-roots financial institutions. Sixth, PBC is
adjusting on-lending to the central and western
regions under the fixed total volume of loans
supporting agriculture. Lastly, some RCCs are
making innovations with support from local
governments in an effort to reduce credit risks. Some
RCCs have also made good efforts to meet the credit
demands of specialized agriculture as the incomes
of the rural households engaged in agricultural
industrialization are much higher than those of
other households.
New mechanisms must be designed to curb the
present outflow of human and financial resources
from poverty-stricken areas. Such mechanisms
should enable RCCs to make profits on loans to rural
households and to achieve economies of scale while
satisfying local demand for financial services.
However, it is not desirable to have a mechanism
that only sustains RCCs but that does not satisfy
local needs and creates a vicious cycle of low levels
of economic development, low per capita incomes,
low savings rates, low investment levels, and a lack
of dynamic for development. Financial institutions
in poverty-stricken areas need preferential policy
and capital support, but more importantly, they
need efficient mechanisms. Rural financial reform
requires systemic efforts, concerntrating only on
RCC reform cannot succeed.
Market-Based Interest Rates
will Induce Flows of Funds to
Poor Areas
With large numbers of clients spread over
extensive areas, small loan sizes, and high
transaction costs and risks, rural financial
institutions can survive only with an adequate
interest spread. Liberalization of interest rates on
loans is one prerequisite for the sustainability of
rural financial institutions and for the flow of funds
to rural areas. Our survey shows that when rural
households have to choose between high interest
rates and accessibility of loans, they prefer the latter.
However, liberalizing interest rates for loans may
be used by RCCs to transfer their low efficiency to
farmers given their monopoly status in the current
rural financial market. In addition, liberalizing
interest rates for deposits may also cause fierce
competition among financial institutions if those
with high risks increase their rates to hide
operational losses.
Nevertheless, liberalizing interest rates is the
only way to go in the future, and it has to be done in
parallel with opening markets. Without adequate
interest rates, suppliers will not enter the market.
Only when interest rates are sufficient to cover costs
and risks, competition among market players may
be able to drive the rates down. Bolivia is a good
example. When interest rates were first liberalized,
the rates climbed rapidly but were then were pushed
down to a reasonable level by microfinance market
competition. This is called the competitive
equilibrium of interest rates, but it cannot be
achieved in the PRC where there are many counties
with one RCC as the only financial institution.
Introduce New Types of
Financial Institutions and
Explore New Forms of Financial
Organizations
Preconditions for successful RCC reform include
opening rural financial markets, introducing various
types of financial institutions, and establishing a
competitive environment. In addition to formal
financial institutions, regulated and commercially
oriented microfinance institutions (engaging in
lending only and initially prohibited from taking
deposits), village-based cooperative associations,
privately owned banks, and informal finance
providers should all be considered. Options for
organizing RCCs should not be restricted to the
types stipulated in Document 15 of the State Council.
The keys to their success are their fitness in local
markets and ability to create financial innovations.
I n ru r a l a re a s i n G u i z h o u w i t h d i ff i c u l t
transportation conditions, the management costs of
the provincial RCCU, the supervisory costs of the
Bank Supervision Bureau, and the operational costs
of the county RCCU are high. Community-based
financial institutions with good governance
structures will help serve the local economy
including san nong. Therefore, each area should be
allowed to develop new forms of financial
institutions and let the markets decide the winners.
In the near term, several potential directions in
promoting competition in rural financial markets
include RCC reform, pilot tests of regulated
microfinance and cooperative finance in real sense,
and legalization of informal finance. In the early
stages, provincial pilot programs for regulated
microfinance agencies that do not accept deposits
can be considered. These institutions can initially
use their own funds and those donated by
international organizations. At a later stage, funds
from wholesale institutions (e.g., postal savings) can
37
be a major revenue source. These institutions can
avoid possible moral hazard problems from taking
public deposits without prudential financial
supervision. This is different from institutions
accepting deposits that are backed by implicit state
guarantees against loan losses which can lead to
moral hazard problems. The development of
regulated microfinance institutions can not only
introduce competition in the rural financial market,
it can also play an important role in legalizing
informal finance.
Implement Market-Based Rural
Credit Cooperative Pilot
Programs
Based on the theory of financial hierarchy,
different financial institutions have their advantages
and disadvantages, and the market should select the
survivors. In the PRC, cooperative finance is not
cooperative finance in a real sense as it has to address
policy issues. In fact, neither cooperative nor
commercial finance can be sustained with
government intervention. The government should
not preempt any form of financial institution; the
market and investors should have the final say. To
achieve this, policymakers should answer the
following questions. Is it possible to allow some
RCCs to stay out of a county RCCU? Is it possible to
allow two RCCUs in one county? Is it possible to
allow some county RCCUs to stay out of a provincial
RCCU?
Establishing cross-regional RCCs should be
allowed. Interventions in RCC operations mostly
come from local governments, especially county and
town governments. Establishing cross-regional
RCCs would avoid the current overlapping of
administrative and business regions. That is, one
RCC could cover several towns, and if needed, an
38
RCCU could cover a number of counties. The
number of towns and counties covered by each local
RCC or RCCU may not be large, but should not be
fewer than three. Using the game theory, it is highly
possible for two county and town governments to
collaborate in rent-seeking from RCCs, but the
possibilities for collaboration are much lower if three
or more than three towns and counties are involved.
This is in line with the PBC strategy of establishing
cross-province regional centers to prevent local
government interference.
Profitable RCCs should be allowed to choose to
join an RCCU or to stay outside at their own
discretion. Under the present pilot program, RCCs
have no choice but to join the RCCU system which
will prevent any external competition. This has
essentially led to monopolies, the natural enemy of
innovation. If profitable RCCs are allowed to join
RCCUs or to stay outside, a competitive
environment will be created. This will also resolve
the problem of exit mechanisms and subject RCCs
to market discipline.
Create an Enabling Environment
for the Sustainable Development
of Rural Credit Cooperatives
Most areas in Guizhou are inhabited by
minorities and are underdeveloped. Although
reforms and policies of the central government that
support them have helped to innovate systems,
transform mechanisms, and enhance support for
agriculture, RCCs in the province still face a set of
particular difficulties due to weak agriculture
infrastructure, a large poverty-stricken population,
and a high incidence of poverty. These difficulties
include heavy historical burdens and the lack of an
exit mechanism.13
 By the end of 2003, the cumulated losses of all
provincial RCCs reached CNY1.45 billion, in
addition to CNY2 billion in NPLs due to policy and
system changes14 and to political interventions.
Statistics from supervisors show that total
outstanding RCC liabilities were CNY1.438 billion
more than their capital by the end of 2002. About
50% of the amount, or CNY719 million, has been
covered by funds from the central government,
while the rest needs support from RCCs and local
governments. As an underdeveloped province with
many poverty-stricken areas, RCC development
should be on a progressive, long-term course as it
is almost impossible to resolve all historical
problems in the short-term.
Many RCCs are unable to make ends meet but
cannot be closed, and they are unable to get out of
their difficulties by themselves. Among the 959
RCCs at the grass-roots level, 748 have deposits of
less than CNY2 million per RCC employee, of which
234 have deposits per employee of less than CNY1
million and can hardly survive but cannot be closed.
Most of these RCCs are in remote areas where ethnic
minorities live. They have to cover extensive service
areas with difficult transportation conditions and
poor operating environments. Although current
policies permit their merger and closure, this will
at the same time create a financial service vacuum
in serving san nong that is unimaginable for both
the farmers and the governments.
To get RCCs out of difficulty, party committees
and governments at all levels of Guizhou Province
have made great efforts that have boosted RCC
development and smoothed implementation of the
pilot programs. However, the provincial
government cannot solve the fundamental
problems faced by RCCs. It is worth noting that
RCCs in the western region differ from their eastern
counterparts in business size, NPL size, operating
environment, and sustainability. Although the
policy on the pilot programs is set according to the
level of local economic development and to the
geographical and social environment, the actual
result of implementation shows that those RCCs in
the western region in need of support have not
benefited much.
In addition, except for those not-so-significant
preferential taxation treatments and “policy fund
selections”, other support policies are uniform. In
the long run, the resolution of issues of RCCs in
Guizhou depends on the development of the local
economy and the deepening of reform efforts,
especially transforming operating mechanisms and
improving RCC institutional capacity. Nevertheless,
in the short term, it is necessary for the central
government to introduce further supporting policies
and measures. These can include, among others,
prolonging the exemption period for corporate
income tax in the western region, removing business
taxes, and establishing an RCC development fund
in the western region to build an electronic network,
purchase an armored car, and train employees.
Other elements of an enabling environment
include the development of agriculture insurance
and futures market for agricultural products,
promotion of financial innovation of rural financial
institutions, and provision of substitutes for
collateral and guarantee for rural households and
SMEs.
13
PBC only shared half of the costs, and some local governments of
poor areas could not afford the remaining half. In addition, the
rural financial markets are monopolies, and there is no deposit
insurance mechanism.
14
When RCC management was separated from ABC in 1999, ABC
transferred a large amount of NPL to RCCs. In addition, RCCs
suffered huge losses when the central government decided to close
five types of small enterprises (hydropower, etc.) and when the
central bank required indexed loans to guard against inflation.
39
Role of the Government: Create
an Environment to Attract
External Funds to Poverty-
Stricken Areas
The central government should increase inputs
into infrastructure in poverty-stricken areas
including transportation, communication, water
conservation, education, and health care. A social
security system in rural areas should also be created
to enable RCCs to conduct commercial operations.
Presently, many RCC loans have been used for
public aid and as public finance funds. A healthy
public finance system in rural areas is the basis for a
sound rural financial system and a prerequisite for
preventing local government intervention in the
operations of rural financial institutions. The
provincial government should regulate the behavior
of local governments. Regulations are also needed
to punish debt evasion and to establish standards
for creditworthiness for households, villages, and
townships15 in order to create an enabling credit
environment. Only with a good credit environment
can more external funds be attracted.
In addition, the government should change the use
of poverty alleviation funds for interest-subsidized
loans to a risk-sharing fund to mitigate some financial
risks of RCCs or to distribute subsidies directly to
households. This will leverage fiscal funds and
strengthen awareness of finance and risks in rural
households. Many rural households regard interest-
subsidized poverty loans as aid that does not need
to be repaid. This has distorted market order.
Financial awareness can only be strengthened when
the poverty alleviation loan is renamed, when there
are no preferential interest rates, and when risk
premiums are decided by creditworthiness.
Meanwhile, rural households will acquire risk
awareness when families with high credit ratings
can borrow at low interest rates while families with
40
poor ratings will have to pay more and will have
little bargaining power. This does not mean that
subsidies will be completely abolished; instead,
direct fiscal subsidies can be provided to destitute
rural households. The only difference is that support
is provided by the government through fiscal aids
rather than by financial institutions through loans.
The establishment of a risk-sharing fund can also
help to maintain order in financial markets. With
such a fund, loans from financial institutions can
carry only market-based interest rates. This will
prevent potentially destructive competition among
financial institutions that use interest-subsidized
funds to invest in commercial projects thus creating
an unequal playing field. Some ABC branches in
certain areas have used poverty alleviation loans16
to compete with other commercial banks on small
hydropower and express road projects, thus
distorting the markets. In the future, interest-
subsidized loans should be stopped, and loans
should carry only normal interest rates aligned with
risk and creditworthiness. The government will
provide direct support to destitute households.
These measures will effectively keep the financial
markets in order. Moreover, preferential tax
treatment can also reduce operation cost of financial
institutions, and encourage them to set up more
outlets in poor areas.
15
For example, if the repayment rate of the village as a whole is
more than 95%, the village can be qualified as a “creditworthy
village.” This will enable the village to get lower interest rates for
PBC-supported microfinance lending. Or an RCC can choose to
let the village rate the households of the village which will enable
them to get loans more easily. Nevertheless, RCCs in practice set
the lending limits of the households within the limit of their own
deposits and PBC on-lending.
16
The poverty alleviation fund is distributed mainly through the
Agricultural Bank of China.
Promulgate a Community Re-
Investment Law and Establish a
Mechanism to Reduce the
Outflow of Postal Savings
Rural areas suffer from large outflows of funds.
Many state-owned financial institutions take
deposits but make few loans in these areas, and
postal savings has extracted large amounts of funds
from rural areas by re-depositing them in PBC. Such
outflows over a long period of time will inevitably
hamper the growth of the rural economy. The PRC
should learn from international experience to
promulgate laws and regulations on community re-
investment. The community re-investment law in
the United States requires financial institutions to
meet credit demands of their communities if
operations are based on sound and prudential
criteria, though no compulsory ratio is specified.17
In comparison, Thailand requires all financial
institutions to lend 20% of all deposits to the
agricultural sector. More research is warranted on
which model the PRC community re-investment law
should adopt, and more time is needed to formulate
regulations or directives.
Nevertheless, pumping postal savings back into
rural areas and increasing rural financial inputs
17
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), enacted by Congress
in 1977 (12 U.S.C. 2901) and implemented by Regulations 12 CFR
parts 25, 228, 345, and 563e, is intended to encourage depository
institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in
which they operate, including low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound banking
operations. The CRA requires that each insured depository
institution’s record in helping meet the credit needs of its entire
community be evaluated periodically. That record is taken into
account in considering an institution’s application for deposit
facilities, including mergers and acquisitions. (http://www.ffiec.
gov/cra/about.htm) Most depository institutions have at least
one CRA officer responsible for implementing CRA and meeting
the regulatory requirements.
18
Starting 1 August 2003, PBC reduced the interest rate for new re-
deposits from postal savings to the level of interest rate of reserves
of financial institutions and allowed postal savings to use the new
deposits at their discretion. Prior to the date, the interest rate for
re-deposits from postal savings was 4.131%.
through ADBC can be implemented in the near
future. In the PRC, one third of postal savings comes
from rural areas, one third from counties and towns,
and the remainder from cities. In Guizhou, CNY800
million in new deposits have been added since
August 2003 which can be used at the discretion of
postal savings authorities.18 Without opening rural
financial markets, keeping postal savings where
they originate will only strengthen the monopoly
status of RCCs and will present a significant moral
dilemma. In addition, in the absence of a deposit
insurance system, the inflow of postal savings to
rural areas through RCCs still presents an
asymmetric risk, i.e., the borrower is the provincial
RCCU but the actual user is the county RCCU.
Therefore, liberalization of rural financial markets
has to be integrated into the determination of a
potential market-based mechanism to induce
additional postal savings back to rural areas. Also,
the internal control mechanism of ADBC should be
improved, and its operational transparency should
be enhanced. With this, the operational scope of
ADBC can be expanded according to its capability.
Separate Regulation from
Management and Implement
Minimum Regulatory
Requirements
The current financial supervision system in the
PRC is an integral part of the traditional government
administration system; administrative intervention
or micro-management is the main means of
supervision. Financial supervisors lift market entry
criteria for financial institutions especially for
private financial institutions through administrative
approvals. They direct the lending of financial
institutions under the name of supervision. They
set the goal of supervision as reducing NPLs, not as
safeguarding the soundness of the financial system.
41
They apply uniform supervisory standards for all
financial institutions. These practices, combined with
limited supervisory capacity, have limited the
diversification of financial institutions.
Therefore, the success of RCC pilot programs
also depends on the reform of supervision. First, a
f i re w a l l b e t w e e n s u p e r v i s i o n a n d m i c ro -
management should be built. Such a firewall can
prevent moral hazards in RCC operations as well as
excessive supervision. Second, minimum regulatory
requirements should be implemented. A rigid
supervisory legal framework may suffocate financial
innovations; this is particularly true in transitional
economies. The main objective of supervisory
authorities is to prevent financial risks while
avoiding rigidity in supervision. Minimum
regulatory requirements can ensure basic financial
safety while leaving room for financial innovation.
Enhancing Regulatory
Mechanisms and Establishing a
Deposit Insurance System
Supervision of RCCs is relatively difficult
because RCCs are normally in scattered geographical
locations which makes collecting information more
expensive. To ensure efficient supervision, it is
imperative to strengthen the governance structures
of rural financial institutions and to improve their
operational transparency. An efficient supervisory
mechanism should be a positive incentive
mechanism at the heart of which are prompt
corrective actions. Under such a system, the
supervisor should take actions such as restricting the
business scope and dividend distribution of a
financial institution whose capital adequacy ratio,
leverage ratio, and/or other performance indicators
are beyond certain initial thresholds. These actions
may prevent managers from taking more operational
42
risks or other actions that endanger the interests of
the shareholders. If performance indicators reach the
second threshold, the regulator may request
acquisition or merger of the financial institution to
maximize its value and protect the interest of
shareholders. If performance keeps on deteriorating,
the regulator should take actions to close the
institution when its assets are still at least equivalent
to its liabilities.
In the PRC, it is also necessary to establish a
timely and effective exit mechanism under which
small and medium-sized depositors can be properly
protected and compensated in case of failure.
Therefore, a deposit insurance system should be
established as soon as possible. While opening rural
financial markets, the regulator should take
corrective measures to strengthen regulation in
accordance with the development of rural financial
institutions. Meanwhile, a deposit insurance system
should be established to ensure the effective
operation of the rural financial markets.
Establish an Evaluation System
for Rural Credit Cooperative
Pilot Programs
The results of any reforms will vary in different
regions and external environments; this is
particularly true of financial sector reform. An
evaluation system can be used to alleviate risks in
reform, to summarize experience, and to improve
reforms in the future. The evaluation system for RCC
reform should cover, among others, the following
three aspects: (i) the post-reform sustainability of
RCCs; (ii) the compatibility between the post-reform
rural financial system and the local economy; and
(iii) the post-reform capacity for financial
innovation. Only with such an evaluation system
will PBC notes with futures options be valuable.
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44
Appendix

Pilot Scheme to Deepen Reform

of Rural Credit Cooperatives
State Council
3 July 2003

Guidelines and General Principles

The main requirements are to clarify ownership structures, intensify checks and balances,
with a view to improving RCCs’ service functions. The state shall provide reasonable support
and delegate responsibility to local governments. The objective is to accelerate reforms in RCC
management and in ownership transformation in order for RCCs to become true community
financial institutions providing services to san nong (rural areas, agricultural production, farming
households).19

The principles to be observed in further deepening RCC reform are as follows.

● Improve corporate governance and operations through ownership transformation,

based on market principles, with the objective of enabling RCCs to become autonomous,
disciplined market participants responsible for their own losses and developments.

● Improve service functions and service quality to agricultural production and farming
households in rural areas.

● Explore all possible ownership structures and organizational forms including shareholding,
cooperative shareholding, and cooperatives, taking local circumstances into consideration.
The objective is to establish organizational forms and operating mechanisms that are
compatible with local conditions.

● Give full play to initiatives from all parties involved in accordance with the principle of
matching responsibilities with rights and interests, and clarify the managerial and su-
pervisory systems of RCCs. The responsibilities to prevent undue risks assumed by
RCCs and to resolve problem RCCs should also be clarified.

19
San nong 三农 literally means three “nong”. The word “nong” in Chinese is combined with other words to form phrases
such as nongcun (rural villages or rural areas), nongmin (farmers or peasants), nongye (agriculture or agricultural industry).

45
 Pilot Details

There are two main issues to be dealt with in further deepening RCC reform. One is ownership
transformation to improve corporate governance through various ownership structures; the other
is to restructure the managerial regime with the objective of handing RCC management to local
governments.

Ownership transformation will occur in each RCC with legal entity status.

In order to clarify ownership structure, there is a need to appropriately deal with historical losses. In
the case of those RCCs with positive net worth, the surplus will first be distributed as dividends
and will fulfill obligations including unpaid interest payments and various insurance premiums.
The remainder shall be set-aside as loan loss provisions (100% for lost loans; 50% for doubtful
loans; 20% for overdue loans, and 1% for normal loans), which shall be counted as subsidiary
capital. Any remaining amount shall be added to the original value of equity. In the case of RCCs
that are insolvent yet difficult to close, their retained earnings shall be used to write off accumulated
losses. The remaining losses shall be delegated as part of managerial responsibilities to be absorbed
gradually through improved incentives and management as well as policy support.

Build new ownership structures to improve corporate governance. The pilot scheme shall allow
various ownership structures based on local circumstances. In localities where conditions permit,
RCCs shall be transformed into shareholding banks; in those localities where conditions are not
adequate, cooperative shareholding20 shall be tested; in those localities where conditions are
appropriate for cooperatives but not for shareholding, then cooperatives shall be tried. In parallel
with ownership transformation, organizational forms shall also be determined.

First, in advanced localities with a high degree of urbanization, shareholding banks shall be
established based in the RCCs if they are sufficiently large and commercially oriented. Specific criteria
are: (a) management is strong; (b) total assets exceed 1 billion RMB; (c) NPL ratio is below 15 %; (d)
initial capital after restructuring exceeds 50 million RMB, and capital adequacy reaches 8%.

Second, in densely populated localities or prefectures/municipalities/counties designated

as grain or cotton production bases, RCCs and RCC unions shall be consolidated into a unified
legal entity. Specific criteria are: (a) positive net worth on consolidated basis; (b) consent by grass-
roots level RCCs; (c) relatively strong management at the RCC union; (d) capital after ownership
consolidation exceeds 10 million RMB, and capital adequacy reaches specified ratios.

20
In this hybrid structure, decision-making in the RCC will be by one member one vote thereby preserving the cooperative
nature. In the contract, dividends will be paid out according to shares held by members. As an experiment, a rural cooperative
bank was recently created in Ningbo by merging the RCCs.

46
 Third, in other localities, the current two-tier system where RCCs and RCC unions are both
legal entities shall be continued to make them better cooperatives.

Fourth, effective measures shall be adopted to accelerate resolution of distressed and highly
risky RCCs (no definition given), through mergers and acquisition. Those deeply insolvent RCCs
that are located in urban or peri-urban areas shall be closed according to the Regulations on
Withdrawal of Financial Institutions.

No matter what ownership structure is adopted, due diligence should be conducted to verify
assets and to expand equity participation with the objective to inviting local residents, individual
entrepreneurs, and economic organizations to participate. Corporate governance and internal
checks and balances shall be effected in accordance with the requirements to establish modern
enterprise systems. The new regional financial institutions (RFIs) shall adhere to the orientation
serving san nong.

The management of RCCs shall be handed over to local governments.

The provincial government shall assume the following responsibilities over RCC management.

(1) It will make sure the RCCs observe financial policies and guidelines set by the state
and will guide their operations in the direction of serving san nong. Local party
committees shall step up their leadership over RCC party membership and ideological
work.

(2) It will provide guidance to RCCs in accordance with laws and regulations to
strengthen their self-discipline and supervise the election and appointment of RCC
senior managers in accordance with laws and regulations.

(3) It will take leadership in preventing and resolving financial risks of RCCs in its
jurisdiction. The central bank shall provide temporary support in failure resolution,
and fiscal authorities shall withhold future transfer payment to the provincial
government should it fail to repay the central bank loans.

(4) The provincial government will assist the RCCs in collecting old loans and in fighting
willful default, in investigating and punishing fraud, and in creating a healthy credit
culture and maintaining order and stability in rural finance.

In pilot areas where conditions are appropriate, an RCC union shall be established at the
provincial level through which the provincial government can manage, guide, coordinate, and serve
the RCCs. The provincial government shall adhere to the principle of separating government from
enterprise and refrain from interfering in the business activities and operations of the RCCs. The
managerial power shall not be delegated to lower levels of government, and no RCC union or other
forms of independent managerial units shall be established at the prefecture/municipality level.

47
 The China Banking Regulatory Commission shall assume regulation and supervision of the
RCCs. Responsibilities include:

(1) formulating regulations over RCCs in accordance with state laws and regulations;

(2) authorizing the establishment, change and suspension of (rural finance) institutions
as well approving their business scope;

(3) conducting on-site examinations and off-site surveillance, collecting statistical

information and conducting risk evaluation as well as investigating and penalizing
violations of laws and regulations;

(4) conducting fit-and-proper tests of senior managers;

(5) providing regulatory data and relevant information to provincial governments and
early-warnings on risky institutions and assisting provincial governments in dealing
with risks;

(6) providing training to specialized managerial staff designated by provincial governments;

and

(7) evaluating performance of provincial governments in managing RCCs and reporting

findings to the state council.

In order to facilitate absorption of losses from the past and to pave the way for smooth
implementation of the pilot, the central government, mindful of the need to avoid moral hazard,
shall provide the following support.

(1) Losses from indexed deposits during 1994–97 shall be verified and reimbursed in
stages by the fiscal authorities.

(2) From January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2005, income tax shall be exempted for all
participating RCCs in the western region; it shall be halved for participating RCCs
in other areas. Business tax shall be levied at 3% for all participating RCCs in all pilot
areas.

(3) Two options of financial support shall be provided to participating RCCs. One is for
the central bank to set up a special facility to fund 50% of the negative net worth
based on end-2002 data at half of the interest rate applied to required reserves with
maturities ranging from 3, 5, and 8 years depending on specific local circumstances.
Insolvency data shall be calculated based on each individual RCC and consolidated
at the provincial level. The central bank facility shall be accessible only to provincial
governments which will assume repayment responsibilities. The formula for

48
 calculating negative net worth is: cumulative losses plus actual asset loss minus
owner’s equity minus loan loss reserves, of which actual asset loss is calculated by
applying 40% to the sum of lost loans and doubtful loans, 10% to overdue loans,
10% to investments, and 50% to foreclosed assets.

The other option is for the central bank to issue special 2-year notes in exchange
of the non-performing loans of RCCs at interest rates no lower than those on required
reserves. The special notes shall not be tradable, endorsable, or used as collateral,
but can be redeemed ahead of maturity with conditions attached. The disbursement
of central bank notes shall be conditioned upon improvement in RCC reforms and
shall be verified based on performance of individual RCCs at the county (municipal)
level. The criteria set for disbursement include: clear ownership structure, paid-up
capital, corporate governance in place, etc. Monitoring of performance criteria shall
be conducted by local offices of PBC and CBRC as well as local governments.
Participating localities shall be free to choose between the two options, details of
which shall be specified by the PBC.

(4) In those areas where informal finance is active, more flexible interest rates shall be
applied. Lending rates shall be floated within a range of 1 to 2 times of the regulated
rates; lending rates for micro loans to farmers shall not float upwards except in rare
cases of high risk but then no more than 1.2 times regulated rates. In areas plagued
with natural disasters, lending rates to farming households shall be floated downward
as appropriate.

Implementation

Organization and leadership

The pilot to deepen RCC reform shall be organized and implemented by CBRC. Provincial/
municipal governments can apply to participate in the pilot on voluntary basis. CBRC shall screen
the applications and submit a short list to the state council for approval. The pilot starting in 2003
shall select 3-5 provinces from the eastern, middle, and western parts of China. Selected provinces
shall formulate their own implementation plans for consideration by CBRC and final approval
by the state council.

Timing

The pilot shall start in the second half of 2003, and efforts shall be made to strive for completion
of the experimentation on managerial regime change. In the pilot areas, managerial functions

49
shall be handed over to the local government, and committed supportive policies shall be put in
place. Ownership transformation tests shall be summarized and replicated throughout the whole
country.

Issues for attention

● Avoid opportunistic behaviors to squander money, extend loans, and hire staff by taking
advantage of the shifts in regime.

● Participating areas shall strictly observe the requirements set in this pilot scheme, and
information exchange shall be maintained between central government agencies and
local governments. Major problems during the pilot shall be reported promptly.

● Appropriate balance shall be maintained between pilot and non-pilot areas. In the areas
not participating in the pilot, CBRC and its local offices shall continue to regulate and
supervise the RCCs vigilantly to make sure services to san nong are maintained.

● Attention should be paid to avoiding payment risks. Local governments, PBC, and CBRC
shall study mechanisms to deal with disruptive payment risks.
建立可持续的农村金融框架
中国农村金融需求与供给研究

谢 平

徐 忠

程恩江

沈明高

亚洲开发银行
2005 年 4 月
本报告的完成与出版得到了亚洲开发银行技术援助项目(TA4095: 支持政策改革)支持 该项目由亚洲开发银行驻中国代表处
金融学家张雪春女士管理 报告由中国人民银行金融稳定局前局长谢平 中国人民银行金融稳定局 南京大学博士后徐忠
澳大利亚维多利亚大学资深研究员程恩江 北京大学副教授沈明高完成 张雪春女士编辑并翻译
 目 录

序言 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
55

前言 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
56

第一章 概述 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
58

第二章 农村金融需求 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
60
一 农村主要资金流动 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
61
二 农村家庭基本情况 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
62
三 农业及非农业生产和投资 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
65

第三章 农村金融供给 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
70
一 贵州农村金融机构 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
70
二 政府支持的农村金融服务 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
73
三 农村金融市场中存在问题 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
76

第四章 贵州农村信用社改革及评价 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
79
一 贵州农村信用社的现状与改革进展 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
79
二 值得借鉴和推广的金融创新与制度安排 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
81
三 对贵州省农村信用社改革的基本评价 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
83

第五章 展望与政策建议 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
86
 表格目录

表一 贵州省 2002 年基本经济指标 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 60

表二 农村家庭调查样本分布 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 60

表三 贵州省样本县 2003 年主要资金流量 资金流入 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 61

表四 贵州省样本县 2003 年主要资金流量 资金流出 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

62

表五 样本家庭的民族成份 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
62

表六 样本家庭的人口和劳动力 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
63

表七 户主的特征 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
63

表八 房屋结构和建成年份 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
64

表九 其他家庭资产 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
64

表十 不在金融机构存款的原因 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
65

表十一 样本家庭的净收入和现金收入 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
65

表十二 家庭承包的农地 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
66

表十三 每户家庭的平均农业投入 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
66

表十四 与最近的金融机构的距离 公里 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
67

表十五 对于信贷的需求 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
67

表十六 样本家庭在 2003 年的借款来源 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

68

表十七 2001 年以后信用社的最大借款 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

68

表十八 农户对农村信用社贷款的建议 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
69

表十九 贵州省邮政储蓄存款 年末余额 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

71

表二十 贵州省农村信用社 年末余额 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

71

表二十一 贵州省中国农业发展银行贷款结构表 年末余额 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

71

表二十二 贵州省农行各项存 贷款结构 年末余额 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

72

表二十三 样本地区农村信用社的平均存贷款和主要业绩指标 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
73

表二十四 贵州省农村信用社概况 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
79

表二十五 贵州省农村信用社改革试点情况 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
80

54

尽管中国经济已保持了二十多年的高速增长 三 前局长 和徐忠先生 人民银行金融稳定局 均有多年
农 问题仍然是中国政府面临的重大挑战 在农村地区
尤其在中西部农村地区 农户还存在严重的信贷和其他
农村金融服务的短缺 在中国建立商业可持续的农村金
融体系将会使十亿中国农民受益 但对中国政府而言这
是一个非常艰巨的任务
本报告出版很及时 农村金融改革已提上中国政府
的议事日程 是 2005 年金融改革的重头戏 本报告是
基于亚行小额技术援助项目 TA4095-PRC: 支持政策改
革 的研究成果 本项目提供了一个政策制定者 学者
实际工作者和国际机构合作的平台 包括人民银行官
员 当地金融机构代表和学者共同参与问卷设计 案例
研究和数据收集 也使本项目研究成果不同于其他项
目 农户的调研是由当地农调队做的 他们对农户熟悉
调研专业 更为重要的是 本报告是由长期参与政策制
定和农村金融领域研究的政策制定者和学者共同完成
的 本报告在修改过程中也吸收了贵州省政府 人民银
行贵州中心支行 贵州农村信用社省联社 农发行贵州
分行对本报告的评论 本报告运用关于农户收入 生产
活动 信贷需求 接受金融服务和信贷满足程度的第一
手调研数据 分析金融需求和供给的基础上 提出了政
策建议 我们期望这些政策建议能为有关政府部门所考
虑 并能在时机成熟时实施
本报告区别其他研究还在于本报告的作者有丰富的
政策制定和研究经验 谢平先生 人民银行金融稳定局
序 言
涩市彻
亚洲开发银行驻中国代表处首席代表
农村金融政策制定和研究的经验 程恩江先生 澳大利
亚维克多大学高级研究员 有多年农村金融的研究 在
项目中参与了问卷设计 沈明高先生 北京大学中国经
济研究中心副教授 做过多年农村金融研究 参与了项
目的调研 正是他们的共同努力才使我们能看到这一本
高质量的研究报告
我们想特别感谢吴晓灵女士 中国人民银行副行
长 和李军 贵州省长助理 对本项目的指导 此外 尤
其要感谢人民银行金融稳定局 人民银行贵州中心支行
提供的协助 同时还应感谢莫利先生 亚洲开发银行中
国代表处前首席代表 和汤敏先生 亚洲开发银行中国
代表处首席经济学家 对本项目一直的支持 最后 要
感谢张雪春女士 亚洲开发银行中国代表处高级金融学
家 对该项目的管理和研究成果的翻译 正是她付出的
巨大的心血才使这一小额项目能有如此高质量的成果
2005 年 3 月于北京
55

过去我们一直认为贫困地区农民的投资回报率低,
农村金融只能是政策性金融 基于这一认识提出的政策
措施主要为:多给农业融资 低利率贷款 而且农业资金
一有问题 就批评 责怪农村金融 要求农村金融机构
多贷款 而较少注意农村金融机构的健康和可持续发
展,以及农村资金大量外流等现象 近年来 随着农村金
融机构大面积亏损问题的暴露 农民贷款难的问题日趋
严重 促使人们思考以下几个问题 目前依靠政府补贴
的农村信用社的小额信用贷款和农行的扶贫贷款效果如
何？农村信用社提供的小额信用贷款的覆盖率究竟有多
高 是否已满足农户的金融需求？农村金融是缺资金还
是缺机制？农村金融体系能否满足正在转型的中国农村
经济的融资需求？目前对农村信用社的监管体制是否有
效?只有基于对大面积调查的分析 才能回答这些问题
我们利用亚洲开发银行的研究资金于2004年7月在
贵州省好 中 差各选择了 2 个县组织了一个大型实地
调查 这个实地调查的主要目的是了解农村家庭融资需
求及满足程度和农村金融机构的供给行为 了解这些行
为和需求对于设计农村信用社和整体农村金融改革的方
案非常关键 这个实地调查对象包括了农村信用社 农
行和农村家庭 其中农户 1000 户左右 的问卷调查是
委托当地农调队进行的 金融机构的调查是由当地人民
银行县支行实施的
通过对贵州省有代表性的农村家庭和农村金融机构的
调查数据所做的初步分析 我们得出了以下一些结论
56
前 言
谢平
中国人民银行金融稳定局局长
第一 贫困地区农村金融缺资金 更缺机制 贵州
大量农民外出打工 但其挣得的钱汇回家乡 存在贵州
农村金融机构 又通过农村金融机构购买国债 上存资
金等方式回流到东部和发达地区 贵州调查表明信用社
利用人民银行支农再贷款发放的小额信贷不具有可持续
发展的制度保证;农行的扶贫贷款扰乱金融秩序,效率低
下 在贵州省农村地区 输血 的强度远远超过 抽
血 的强度 如果说 农村地区仍然面临资金紧张的话
主要是当地造血功能不足 这一方面与当地盈利机会匮
乏有关 另一方面也与农村信贷资金的分配方式低效率
紧密相关
贵州省人民银行再贷款余额为 24 亿 而这次改革
获得资金支持不足 8 亿元 如果数额庞大的人民银行再
贷款都不能帮助农信社脱困 我们很难相信 没有农村
信用社治理结构的根本改善 这一次的专项票据可以扭
转乾坤 对相当一部分信用社而言 主要不是缺资金
而是缺一个有效率的机制 一个有效率的机制可以将死
钱变活钱 也可以吸引投资者 因此 这一轮的改革应
该先机制后资金 以有效率的机制吸引资金 以可持续
的机制留住资金
第二 在贫困地区应探索适合当地的金融组织形
式 从信用社的人均经费 不良贷款占比 农户覆盖率
等指标均可以发现 现有农村信用社模式是一个非常昂
贵的机构 在贫困地区这样的制度安排过于奢侈 贵州
农村家庭从他们的亲戚 朋友和邻居处借款最多 因此
应探索更适合贫困地区的比信用社成本更低的金融组织 低成本的制度创新 现在的关键是这一轮农村信用社改
形式 革试点能否吸纳这些创新 使之成为改革的助力而不是
阻力
事实上随着中国农业银行的商业化改革 中国农
业银行关闭了一些在贫困农村地区的亏损网点 信用 从贵州的调查分析结果 我们初步得出以下政策建
社也正把中国贫困边远地区的分支机构降级 贵州许 议 单单依靠农村信用社的改革 单兵突进无法取得整
多地方与信用社和邮政储蓄的平均距离并不远 但由 体农村金融改革的成功 多元化的农村金融机构和体制
于是山路 实际也要花费几小时 此外还有某些家庭 才能适应我国的经济实际 因此我国农村金融改革最关
必须走很长的路才能得到金融服务 正是由于农村正 键的一步就是要打破农村金融市场的垄断格局 建立一
规金融机构——信用社的服务范围有限 一些边远地 个有效竞争的农村金融市场 各地金融组织的形式应由
区出现了高利贷 单一依靠唯一正规金融机构 不但成 市场选择 然后再提出相适应的监管体制 此次农村信
本高 而且对许多地区农民也不方便 用社改革 通过人民银行资金支持后 农村信用社只是
转变成一个财务上健康的金融机构 要防止其今后经营
第三 农户金融需求也反映农村金融单单依靠农村 上的道德风险 并完善其治理结构 必须有以下配套措
信用社这一组织形式无法满足多元化的农村金融需求 施 公共财政在农村地区发挥其应有作用 开放农村金
一方面信用社从资金上难以满足农村钟养殖大户的资金 融市场 建立存款保险制度 采取有效的及时校正监管
需求 另一方面大量面广量大的贫困户资金需求不大 措施 利率的市场化等 当然 更大面积的跨省实证调
但交易成本高 相对来说信用社的人手又显得不够 查将有助于我们制定更符合实际的改革政策

第四 在贫困地区公共财政发挥应有作用 农村金
融才能正常运行 贵州省农村的社会保障体系不健全
农村合作医疗体系不完善 许多信用社的贷款用于农户 2004 年 12 月
治病救人 显然这应该是财政的支出 信用社亏损也就
必然 从农户的金融需求调查也看出 除存款之外 孩
子的教育 农业生产和房屋是最常被回答者选择的用
途 信贷的用途与还债紧密结合 尽管教育投资对于家
庭非常重要 对于国家整体也同样如此 但从教育投资
上获利的直接收益是低的 因此 国家政府应该对于贫
困地区的教育进行更多的投资 完善农村社会保障体系
等公共产品 这对中国贫困地区金融体系的可持续发展
有好处

第五 自上而下的改革应与自下而上的改革方式结
合 从贵州省的农村金融改革与实践来看 存在着大量

57

随着我国金融改革的不断深入 特别是自上个世纪
九十年代中期的银行商业化改革和 2003 年开始的股份
制改造以来 我国农村金融体系的内涵已经发生了巨大
的变化 由于地区间经济结构的差异越来越大 相应地
农村金融需求和供给的差异也日益明显 在经济较为发
达的沿海地区 非农产业的发展使得农业以外的金融需
求所占的比重越来越大 农村金融与整个金融体系日渐
融为一体 在中部地区 农业中包括养殖业和农产品加
工业在内的非种植业的比重在不断提高 专业化生产是
农村金融的主要需求 农村金融供给的专业化趋势也已
经逐渐显现出来 在西部地区 由于盈利机会稀少 自
然资源相对匮乏 市场条件和气候条件等带来的不确定
性因素较多 对农村金融的需求大多出于解除贫困和平
滑消费的需要 而在农村金融供给方面 商业银行已经
逐渐淡出农村地区 农业银行虽然仍在许多县乡从事扶
贫贷款 但在农村的庞大分支机构正逐渐减少 农村信
用社在不少地区已经成为金融供给的唯一力量 同时
由于受资金来源的限制 这些地区资金供求矛盾比较突
出 中央银行支农再贷款 1 已经成为信贷资金的主要来
源之一
本报告分析的对象 - 贵州省是中国西部省份之一
农村金融的现状与中国西部其他省份有很大的相似之
处 作为第一轮农村信用社改革的八个试点省份之一
贵州省农村信用社改革走在了其他试点省的前列 这一
轮改革将会对贵州省今后农村金融体系新框架的形成
以及农村金融机构能否持续地 高效率地支持 三农
58
第一章 概述
带动当地经济的发展 增加农民收入以及最终在我国西
部地区全面建设小康社会产生深远的影响 这些改革举
措也将对其他各省特别是贫困地区各省农村金融改革试
点乃 整个金融改革的进程产生重要的影响
本报告的主要目的是分析贵州省目前农村金融的供
求现状和存在的问题 特别是对当前正在推行的农村信
用社改革试点与相关创新进行评价 并探讨适合我国西
部地区需要的农村金融改革与创新的路线图 本报告将
立足于现在 着眼于今后三 五年贵州农村金融的发
展 以这一轮的改革试点为契机 为不远的将来建立一
个现代农村金融体系奠基 我们的判断和建议 一部分
是针对这一轮改革试点的设计提出的 具有一般性 另
一部分则是结合贵州省的实际 探讨贵州省农信社改革
和农村金融体系建设的特殊性
从发展经济学的角度看 贫困地区处于发展的贫困
化陷阱 当地经济发展水平低 人均收入不高 储蓄率
低 储蓄转化为投资少 经济发展缺少活力 形成恶性
循环 因此 外部资金的注入 是贫困地区经济和金融
形成良性循环的基础 自从二十世纪八十年代以来 在
农村金融领域出现了一种新的范式 这一范式认为 建
立高效和具有商业可持续的农村金融体系 向借款人提
供及时 可靠 方便的金融服务 以及为广泛的经济活
动提供融资 对于促进农村发展和改善农民的福利水
平 是 关重要的 按照这一范式 以前用于补贴利率
和救助农村金融机构的公共资金 可以用在改善农民的
盈利能力 提高农民的信用质量等方面 例如教育和基 神 报告结构安排如下 第二 三部分分别介绍了贵州
础设施建设等等 从而更有效地减轻贫困和提高农村金 农村金融服务的供给与需求 第四部分对贵州农村信用
融机构的自我发展能力 总起来看 这一新的范式有四 社改革以及值得借鉴和推广的金融创新与制度安排进行
个要素 综合起来使用可以为建立高效的农村金融市场 回顾与评价 最后是政策建议的总结 本报告的结论只
提供有助益的环境 这四个要素是 放开利率管制 建 反映作者的看法 不反映所在机构的观点
立良好的监管框架 完善微观制度建设和机构能力建设
以及更有针对性的政府干预和及时的效果评估

本报告是以这一范式为理论基础 结合我们在贵州
１
省所做的金融需求和金融供给的调查形成的 同时吸收
了中国人民银行吴晓灵副行长在贵州省调研时的讲话精
中国人民银行自1999年起为鼓励农村信用社发放小额信贷提供低息支农再贷
款 当时年利率为 2.25% 比基准再贷款利率低 0.99% 从 2005 年 1 月 1 日
起 支农再贷款利率调整为 3.24% 与基准利率一 人民银行的支农再贷
款额度在逐年扩大 到 2004 年为 1,288 亿 人民银行决定总额度不再增加
只作地区调整 向中西部 东北和产粮地区倾斜 目前 实际支农再贷款余
额为 900 多亿

59
 第二章 农村金融需求

贵州省地处云贵高原,以山地 丘陵为主 平坝地较 求 这些行为和需求对于设计该省农村信用社改革试点

少 素有 八山一水一分田 之称 能源 矿产和旅游 项目极为重要 也有利于今后进一步完善农村金融体
资源丰富 贵州省也是我国最贫困的省份之一 城市化 系 这个实地调查对象包括了农村金融机构和农村家
水平很低 81%为农村居民 2002年农民人均收入只有 庭 其中农户的问卷调查是委托当地农调队进行的 金
1490元 全国倒数第一 财政支出的近三分之一依靠中 融机构的调查是由当地人民银行县支行实施的
央转移支付 表一 贵州省第二产业不发达 工业主
要为原材料 能源工业 烟酒和旅游业 农业主要为特 在进行实地调查的六个县中 凤岗县和湄潭县 是
色农业和畜牧业 农民在省内打工较少 主要前往广东 从经济状况较好的遵义市抽取的两个样本县 黔东南苗
浙江等沿海地区打工 农民的打工收入已成为农民增收 族侗族自治州的台江县和丹寨县是贵州省中等收入的地
最主要来源 区 大方县和织金县是从毕节地区抽取的两个县 毕节
地区是贵州经济状况最差的市级地区 可以认为这些样
表一、贵州省 2002 年基本经济指标 本是贵州省人口中有代表性的农村家庭 在每一个县
指标 我们抽取了 100 多个家庭样本 在村这一级上 家庭的
GDP(亿元) 1,180 分布是随机的
其中 第一产业(亿元) 280.52
第二产业(亿元) 474.45
第三产业(亿元) 425.13 表二、农村家庭调查样本分布
总人口(万人) 3,837
农村人口比重 81% 凤岗县 189
农村人口(万人) 3,108 湄潭县 120
人均 GDP(元) 3,075 丹寨县 178
城市居民人均可支配收入(元) 6,107 台江县 180
农民人均纯收入(元) 1,490 大方县 179
全省财政收入(亿元) 236.77 织金县 186
全省财政支出(亿元) 331.36
全省财政收支相抵(亿元) -94.59 样本家庭总数 1032

为了了解贵州省农村金融的供求现状 2004年7月 本报告运用描述性的统计技术 分析家庭特征 收

我们在贵州省六个县组织了一个大型实地调查 这个实 入 财产和他们对于信贷需求 以及目前信用供给对需

地调查的主要目的是了解农村家庭和农村金融机构的行 求的满足程度 本报告也提供了简单的数据分析 并得

为 理解农村家庭对于信贷和其他金融服务的家庭需 出对于农村信用社和中国贫困地区整个农村金融体系改

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革的建议 运用更多统计和经济计量技巧并结合贵州农 凤冈县 台江县信用社存款分别增加近4000万和1400万
村信用社调查的数据进行更进一步的数据分析是下一步 尽管贷款也有所增加 但从控制风险考虑 信用社也不
要做的工作 愿大量增加贷款 必然减少了对人民银行支农再贷款的
需求 第三 农发行的贷款余额不断减少 作为政策性
银行在贵州这样的贫困落后地区作用逐年下降 第四
打工寄回的收入 据估计 这一部分收入相当于信用社
一、农村主要资金流动 存款余额的三分之一 60% 是存款增量的几倍 事实
上 外出打工已成为贫困地区农户增收最主要的手段
样本六县基本依赖于外部资金的流入 这主要包括
四个渠道 第一 财政转移支付 各县财政支出一般是其 一般地说 农村资金外流的渠道主要有三方面 国
收入的二 六倍 第二 中国人民银行支农再贷款 占信 有银行 邮政储蓄和信用社 农业银行的贷款除台江
用社贷款余额的 20-30% 如果剔除信用社贷款中的不良 县均出现了不同程度的下降 由于一条高速公路配套
贷款 人行再贷款实际上已经是新发放贷款的主要资金 贷款导 台江农行贷款大幅度增加 不同地区每年邮
来源 随着农户外出打工收入不断增加 信用社的存款 政储蓄抽逃资金有所不同 经济较发达的遵义地区的
增加很多 一些信用社甚 出现了闲置资金 对人民银 风冈县和湄潭县农村信用社存款增量是邮政储蓄的 3
行的再贷款需求也减少了 如 2003 年湄潭县信用社存款 倍左右 而最贫困毕节地区的大方县和织金县信用社
增加了 7000 多万 闲置资金达 1 个多亿 还将部分资金 的存款出现下降 邮政储蓄无论增量还是增幅均较其
拆借出去 使用人民银行再贷款大幅减少 同样 2003 年 他相对发达县要大

表三、贵州省样本县 2003 年主要资金流量 资金流入

单位 万元
湄潭县 凤岗县 台江县 丹寨县 大方县 织金县

财政收入(2003) 8,200 3,981 2,150 2,066 15,018 14,998

财政支出(2003) 19,600 15,000 10,000 7,000 29,634 32,515

人行再贷款(2002) 2,700 2,200 2,320 2,100 4,800 3,500

人行再贷款(2003) 600 3,000 1,800 1,900 4,300 3,200
新增 - 2,100 800 - 520 - 100 - 500 - 300

邮政寄回资金 估计数 15,248 9,000 3,000 2,700 17,082 13,566

农发行贷款余额(2002) 7,028 11,487 2,072 1,711 7,021 4,772

农发行贷款余额(2003) 6,940 11,382 1,526 1,659 6,275 5,236

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表四、贵州省样本县 2003 年主要资金流量 资金流出
单位 万元

湄潭县 凤岗县 台江县 丹寨县 大方县 织金县

信用社存款余额(2002) 31,564 11,117 8,540 4,222 22,153 20,069
信用社存款余额(2003) 38,665 14,946 9,926 5,577 20,779 18,780
新增 7,101 3,829 1,386 1,355 - 1,374 1,289

信用社贷款余额(2002) 25,179 9,915 8,095 5,247 17,815 19,311

信用社贷款余额(2003) 27,751 12,796 8,855 6,200 22,062 20,640
新增 2,542 2,881 1,435 758 4,247 1,329

邮政储蓄存款余额(2002) 13,214 11,059 3,022 3,629 5,465 3,306

邮政储蓄存款余额(2003) 15,720 12,204 3,267 4,429 7,031 6,046
新增 2,506 1,145 245 800 1,566 2,740

农业银行存款余额(2002) 24,555 15,373 43,640 7,775 21,425 28,451

农业银行存款余额(2003) 24,455 15,432 43,757 8,784 22,059 35,105
新增 - 100 59 117 1,009 634 6,654

农业银行贷款余额(2002) 15,623 23,458 62,039 11,912 28,990 30,728

农业银行贷款余额(2003) 15,525 8,179 101,504 11,908 646 4,119
新增 - 98 - 15,279 39,465 -4 - 28,344 - 26,609

以上分析表明 六个样本县的农行和邮政储蓄在抽 表五、样本家庭的民族成份

逃资金 农发行贷款也在减少 贵州农村贷款片面依靠 民族 样本家庭 占全部的百分比

农村信用社一家金融机构 但实际上 政府支持的贷款 汉族 502 48.6

苗族 349 33.8
也无法真正达到预期的目的 依靠外出打工挣回收入已 其他 88 8.5
没有回答 93 9.0
成为农户收入提高最大的驱动力 外出打工也带来了信
合计 1,032 100.0
用社和邮政储蓄存款的增加 尽管中央政府的转移支付
和通过外出打工流入的资金远超过资金外流 农户的金
融需求仍无法满足 信用社亏损累累 看来 贵州农村
金融缺资金 但更缺机制 表六描述了样本规模和样本家庭的特征 首先 该
表表明贵州省的家庭规模相当小 每户家庭 4.1 人 与
此形成对照的是 很多人都有这样的感觉 贫穷的中国
农村家庭是大家庭 这也表明 也许贵州贫困地区大家
二、农村家庭基本情况 庭的传统有了变化 这一点对于福利体系和金融安排都
是有意义的 为证明这一点需要进行更多的研究 第二
贵州省是中国西南地区的一个多民族省份 我们的 非农就业和收入在贵州农村家庭中的位置越来越重要
样本数据表明 农村人口主要由汉族 占比 48.6% 和 大约有超过三分之一的农村劳动力已经从事了某种程度
苗族 占比 33.8% 组成 见表五 可以注意到 在本 的非农业生产 更重要的是 在全部从事非农业生产的
次实地调查中 苗族更集中在贵州省的贫穷地区和山区 劳动力中 45% 的人作为民工在其他省份工作 省际之

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表六、样本家庭的人口和劳动力 表七、户主的特征

项目 数量 百分比
样本的全部农村人口 4,222
平均家庭规模 4.1 户主总数 1,032
农村劳动力总数 3,080 男性 977 94.7
农村劳动力占全部人口的比例 73.0 女性 55 5.3
完全劳动力的数目 1 2,443 农村居民 1,003 97.2
完全劳动力占全部农村人口的比例 57.9 非农村居民 29 2.8
半劳动力的数目 2 637 户主平均年龄 46.6
非农业劳动人口 951 户主婚姻状况
占完全劳动力的比例 38.9 已婚 952 92.2
从事家庭非农业劳动的人口 416 离婚 11 1.1
占总人口的比例 43.7 寡居 鳏居 53 5.1
在县内工作的非农业劳动的人口 46 其中 妇女持家的 29 54.7
占总人口的比例 4.8 未婚 11 1.1
在省内工作的非农业劳动的人口 61 没有回答 5 0.5
占总人口的比例 6.4 户主受教育水平
在省外工作的非农业劳动的人口 3 428 文盲 98 9.5
占总人口的比例 45.0 小学 (1-4 年) 309 29.9
小学(5-6 年) 165 16.0
说明: 1. 完全劳动力是指在 18 岁和 55 岁之间的劳动力 初中(7-9 年) 385 37.3
2. 半劳动力是指 16 岁 18 岁以及 56 岁 65 岁之间的劳动力 高中(10-12 年) 60 5.8
3. 省际之间的民工 大专及以上 9 0.9
没有回答 6 0.6
在家中月数 11
务农天数 191.5
从事非农业职业
间的劳动力转移 40% 的人从事家庭非农业 这说明 运输 37 3.6
建筑 69 6.7
贵州省县城和大城市的工作机会相当匮乏 这一点与中
纺织 1 0.1
国发达地区所发生的农村劳动力转移很不相同 在中国 制造 37 3.6
服务和餐饮 11 1.1
发达地区 在省内从农村流向城市的劳动力比率更高 离家务农 30 2.9
这里两个起作用的因素可能是 贫穷和缺少能够吸纳大 其他非农职业 188 18.2

量劳动力的大城市中心 换句话说 贵州城市发展的溢

出效应非常有限 一个很高的省际之间劳动力流动比率
也表明 提供汇款等金融服务对于满足当地农村金融需
求来说很重要
将户主从家庭中挑选出来分析非常重要
主通常做出主要的家庭决策 如表六所表明的那样 户
主几乎都是男性 占比 94.7% 很明显 贵州省的妇女
社会和经济地位仍旧比较低 在本次实地调查中 发现在
农村信用社所开展的小额信贷项目中 在一些贫困地区
只有户主才能从农村信用社获得小额信贷 除非户主同
意 户主的伴侣得不到小额信贷 该表还表明 超过半数
的寡居 或鳏居 家庭是由妇女持家的 单亲母亲家庭
农村信用社改革的任何试验性项目都应该注意性别问题
即更好的理解妇女对于金融服务的需求 按照她们的需要
因为户 为其量身定做金融服务 向妇女提供更多金融支持来提
高她们的社会经济地位 财政也应鼓励金融机构开设专
门针对妇女的小额信贷窗口 有利于提高妇女地位
从表七可以得到第二个信息是户主的受教育程度相
当低 大约 10% 的户主是文盲 另外 35% 只有小学教
育水平 换句话说 大约一半户主接受的正规教育少于

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6 年 并且其中一些教育是在 20 年前所接受的 2 可以 在表九中 我们将家庭资产分为物质资产和金融资
预期的是 户主配偶的受教育程度要比户主更低 户主 产 将家庭资产组合分为生产性资产和非生产性资产
和他们配偶的低教育水平对他们在农业中利用新技术有 表九表明 平均来说 家庭40%的非房屋资产以金融资
不利影响 或者使他们失去非农业生产的就业机会 由 产的形式持有 现金和存款 60% 的非房屋资产以物
此产生的收入效应剥夺了他们孩子的受教育机会 我们 质资产的形式持有 假定平均家庭房屋价值为 5000 元
的调查表明 868 名适学年龄的孩子中有 55 名失学孩 人民币 平均来说 贵州农村家庭三分之一的资产以金
子 说明这个地区的失学率相当高 金融机构很有必要 融资产的形式持有 给定他们的收入和财富水平 这个
简化其程序 方便农户接受金融服务 比率不低 继续研究家庭中金融资产与总资产比率的决
定因素将会非常有趣 并且可以把他们的收入 财富以
样本家庭的资产和收入如表八 十一所示 在中国 及储蓄服务的程度联系起来考虑 这是进一步研究的课
农村地区 由于家庭不拥有土地 家庭房屋通常是最重 题 在总的金融资产中 大约三分之一是以现金的形式
要的家庭资产 贵州很多农村家庭仍生活在很旧的房屋
中 超过 20% 的家庭生活在 25 年以前所建房屋中 一 表九、其他家庭资产
些家庭甚 生活在清朝所建的房屋之中 调查数据表明 单位 元
百分比
自 2000 年以后 家庭平均建房成本为 17320 人民币 在
物质资产
本次实地调查中 我们发现贵州农村的房屋越旧 该房
牲畜的价值 1 2,824.5 47.8
屋的状况就越差 贵州农村房屋很差的状况是该省贫困 (3,178.2)
状况的一个重要指标 贫困地区农户缺少抵押品和担 生产性资产的价值 2 1,568.7 26.5
(14,765.1)
保 这就要求监管机构鼓励农村金融机构充分利用当地 贮存的谷物的价值 847 14.3
(824)
制度资源 如农民专业技术协会 生产合作社等 改
彩电
善借贷关系 提高贷款的质量 同时利用有效的抵押品 拥有彩电的家庭数目 505
每台彩电的估计价值 1,000
替代 即没有具体的抵押品但事实上起到了抵押品的作 电话
用 扩大有效抵押品的范围 拥有电话的家庭数目 285
电话的估计价值 100
手机
表八、房屋结构和建成年份 拥有手机的家庭数目 142
手机的估计价值 1,100
房屋建成年份 家庭数量 占总数的比率 物质资产总价值 5,908.5 100.0
1911 之前 (清朝) 9 0.9 金融资产
1901-1949 (在中华人民共和国建立之前) 30 2.9
现金 1,063.1 27.7
1950-1978 (在改革开放以前) 213 20.6
总存款 2,773.3 72.3
1979-1999 480 46.5
定期存款 722.7 18.8
从 2000 以来 196 19.0
活期存款 2,050.6 53.5
没有回答 104 10.1
金融资产总价值 3,836.5 100.0

全部资产 (除房屋外) 9,745.0

说明: 1. 家庭拥有的牲畜的价值 调查时刻的当前市场价值

2. 家庭拥有的拖拉机 摩托车 抽水机和其他运输设备的价值
2
考虑到大多数家长已经四十多岁 他们实在文化大革命期间受的学校教育 在
那期间所受的教育质量被认为是低的 括号中的数据是标准差

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表十、不在金融机构存款的原因 庭存款的效果有限 这仍需要更进一步的研究

原因 观察到的数量 占总数的比率
与农村家庭所持有的资产相比 表十一所示的收入
1. 没有剩余现金 296 49.7
2. 存款利率太低 44 7.4 水平并不低 2002 年 户均净收入为 6709.1 元 其中现
3. 存款服务差 4 0.7
金收入 5841.9 元 可能的解释是 农民打工收入和家庭
4. 存款机构太远 14 2.3
5. 取款困难 4 0.7 非农收入增加较多 各占现金纯收入的20%以上 而来
6. 钱借给了别人 9 1.5
7. 通过代理人把钱借出去了 2 0.3
自农业的现金纯收入只占三分之一左右 但打工和非农
8. 在大事件中花了钱 136 22.8 收入增加只是近几年的事 要转化为房屋实物资产还需
9. 以牲畜的形式储存价值 87 14.6
要一段时间 显然 安全的存款服务对贫困地区农户与
合计 596 100.0
信贷一样重要

持有 三分之二是以银行存款的形式持有 有趣的是
农村家庭以牲畜形式持有的物质资产的比率很高 接近
50% 我们发现 很多家庭将牲畜 主要是猪 牛和家 三、农业及非农业生产和投资
禽 作为一种财富的储存形式 在需要的情况下 牲畜
能够以较低的成本变现 这也说明适宜贫困地区农户投 贵州非常缺乏耕地 并且耕地都是小块的 因为大

资的金融工具太少 农村金融改革应将证券 保险 汇 多数耕地都在山上 农村家庭必须走很长的路去耕作

款和信贷等金融服务综合考虑 样本农户人均耕地是1.16亩 其中 接近一半是旱地 表

十二 对于很多家庭来说 耕地分成10块不同的土地

农村家庭储蓄存款的增长潜力是有限的 见表十 这增加了耕作成本和劳力 土地稀缺和土地质量低劣将

对那些没有存款的人来说 大约一半没有多余的钱 超 是促使农民从事非农业就业的一个重要原因

过20%已经将钱用于消费和投资的大事情上 另外15%
已经以牲畜的形式储存了他们的财富 而不是以银行和 家庭农业投入见表十三 主要的种植成本是肥料

信用社存款的形式 只有一些家庭抱怨存款利率低 服 接下来是种子 杀虫剂 塑料薄膜 与此相应 以信贷

务离家太远 估计加息和设立更多的服务点对于增加家 贸易信用 形式购买和借款对于肥料来说比其他农业

表十一、样本家庭的净收入和现金收入
单位 元

平均值 标准差 百分比

每户家庭的纯收入 6,709.1 18,002.8 100.0

每户家庭的现金纯收入 5,841.9 33,909.7 87.1

从民工所得的现金收入 1,221.8 3,357.4 20.9
从农业所得的现金收入 1,934.7 2,920.3 33.1
从非农业所得的现金收入 1,428.3 11,970.9 24.4
除转移之外的从其他所得的现金收入 893.5 2,778.1 15.3

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投入更重要 20%左右的家庭需要借款来购买肥料 钟 一个小时 此外还有某些家庭必须走很长的路才能
得到金融服务 如丹寨县很多村不通公路 线长点多 加
与金融服务网点的距离是边远山区农村家庭取得金
融服务的一个重要指标 随着中国农业银行的商业化改 表十二、家庭承包的农地
革 中国农业银行关闭了一些在贫困农村地区的亏损网 项目 面积 亩

点 信用社也正把中国贫困边远地区的分支机构降级 每户家庭的水田 2.50

每户家庭的非水田 2.20
像表十四所示的那样 农村家庭与信用社和邮政储蓄的 每户家庭的耕地 4.80
平均距离并不远 但由于是山路 实际也要花费数十分 人均耕地 1.16

表十三、每户家庭的平均农业投入

项目 单位 百分比
每户家庭 平均 种植成本 人民币 550.1
1. 肥料
数量 公斤 505.6
总购买成本 人民币 343.9 62.52
以赊帐形式购买的数量 即贸易信用 公斤 24.8
占总数量的百分比 % 4.9
借款 人民币 117.0.
为购买肥料而借款所占的比率 % 21.0
2. 农药
数量 公斤 7.0
总购买成本 人民币 48.5 8.81
以赊帐形式购买的数量 即贸易信用 公斤 0.3
占总数量的百分比 % 4.3
借款 人民币 31
为购买肥料而借款所占的比率 % 5.2
3. 种子
数量 公斤 35.4
总购买成本 人民币 82.8 15.06
以赊帐形式购买的数量 即贸易信用 公斤 0.1
占总数量的百分比 % 0.3
借款 人民币 39
为购买肥料而借款所占的比率 % 5.7
4. 塑料薄膜
数量 公斤 13.2
总购买成本 人民币 37.5 6.81
以赊帐形式购买的数量 即贸易信用 公斤 0.1
占总数量的百分比 % 0.8
借款 人民币 29
为购买肥料而借款所占的比率 % 7.0
5. 牲畜饲料
数量 公斤 1,573.0
总购买成本 人民币 443.7
以赊帐形式购买的数量 即贸易信用 公斤 10.7
占总数量的百分比 % 0.7
借款 人民币 23
为购买肥料而借款所占的比率 % 6.0

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之职工人手少 服务条件差 服务成本高 正是由于农 表十四、与最近的金融机构的距离

村正规金融机构 - 信用社的服务范围有限 一些县如凤 平均距离(公里

岗的边远地区出现了高利贷 这也反映目前农村信用社 与信用社的距离

平均 5.7
改革 一刀切 的方式建立县联社和省联社 依靠省联 最远 30.0
与邮政储蓄的距离
社管理县联社 再由县联社管理信用社 统一法人后为
平均 10.3
其分支机构 是无法适应贵州复杂地理环境 如果没有 最远 54.0

当地社员和股东发挥有效监督作用 省联社和县联社有
效管理是不可能的 完善农村金融机构的治理结构和建
立适应当地条件的金融组织对健全贫困地区的金融体系
显得尤其重要
在实地调查中 我们问农户这样的问题 若你有额
外的10,000元人民币 你将如何处理这些钱？回答列在
表十五中 从第一用途 第二用途和第三用途来看 除
存款之外 孩子的教育 农业生产和房屋是最常被回答
者选择的用途 信贷的用途与还债紧密相关 尽管教育
投资对于家庭非常重要 对于国家整体也同样如此 但
从教育投资上短期获得的直接收益较低 因此 政府应
该对于贫困地区的初等和小学教育进行更多的投资 这
对中国贫困地区金融体系的可持续发展有好处
表十六列举了样本家庭的借款来源 农村家庭从他
们的亲戚 朋友和邻居处借款最多 接下来是从信用社
借款 从国有商业银行的借款的总数不到农户总数的
15% 这与全国人大 2004 年 4 月在其他地方的调查结果
是一 的 需要更进一步的研究来识别这背后的原因
为什么家庭从非正规渠道借款更多 从申请程序 借款
条件 规模 期限和利率上 信用社能从非正规金融中
学到什么？是否有比信用社成本更低的金融组织？
表十七提供了一个 2001 年以来信用社借款详细描
述 在调查中 我们请农户回忆自 2001 年以来从信用
社获得的最大一笔借款 第一 在有记录的 245 笔信用

表十五、信贷需求

项目 第一用途 百分比 第二用途 百分比 第三用途 百分比

存款 255 30.6 58 7.1 40 5.0
教育 120 14.4 224 27.3 106 13.2
房屋 116 13.9 78 9.5 30 3.7
农业生产 78 9.4 156 19.0 212 26.3
非农业生产 60 7.2 62 7.5 94 11.7
结婚和葬礼 55 6.6 56 6.8 11 1.4
偿还债务 37 4.4 18 2.2 36 4.5
购买食物 32 3.8 51 6.2 52 6.5
现金 25 3.0 3 0.4 5 0.6
疾病 14 1.7 24 2.9 16 2.0
交通工具 12 1.4 22 2.7 10 1.2
日用品 12 1.4 39 4.7 59 7.3
为赚钱而借款 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 0.5
其他 17 2.0 31 3.8 131 16.3

合计 833 100.0 822 100.0 806 100.0

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社借款中 信用社借款平均金额不小 在6000元人民币
以上 超过了大多数由捐赠所支持的中国小额信贷机构
所提供的小额信贷 1000 元 -2000 元
信用社借款要求抵押和担保 亲戚和朋友提供了大部分
担保 最后 对于信用社借款来说 重新设定还款期限
简化借款申请程序 这正是信用社小额贷款项目所针对
的 这也反映农村金融单单依靠农村信用社这一组织形
第二 大多数
式无法满足多元化的农村金融需求
表十六、样本家庭在 2003 年的借款来源

即借新还旧 是非常普遍的 不到 50% 的借款准时还 借款来源 笔数 / 价值 占百分比

款 这与在贵州所进行的信用社调查结果是相一 的 总借款笔数 381 100.0

从亲戚朋友邻居处 244 64.1
在国有银行 18 4.7
在信用社 119 31.2
尽管在贵州信用社平均借款金额不小 但很多样本
家庭需要信用社提高借款金额 延长贷款期限 见表十 总的平均借款 1 人民币 1,910.6 100.0
从亲戚朋友邻居处 873.1 45.7
八 出现这一矛盾结果是由于一方面信用社难以满足
在国有银行 245.4 12.8
农村养殖大户的资金需求 另一方面大量面广量大的贫 在信用社 792.1 41.5

困户资金需求量不大 但交易成本高 客观要求信用社 说明: 1. 平均价值是指所有样本家庭的平均水平

表十七、信用社的最大借款 2001-2004 年 10 月

信用社的最大借款 百分比
借款笔数 245
信用社借款的平均金额 人民币 1
6,240.8
每户样本家庭的平均金额 人民币 2
1,560.2
申请金额的平均比率 3 82.4
在 245 笔借款之中
有抵押和担保的借款笔数 42 18.1
有抵押的借款笔数 127 54.7
有担保的借款笔数 58 25.0
有存款作抵押的借款笔数 5 2.2
合计 232 100.0
谁提供担保
村干部 25 20.2
亲戚和朋友 71 57.3
企业和富有的个人 13 10.5
村集体 2 1.6
小组联保 13 10.5
合计 124 100.0
借款偿还
准时还款 104 46.2
重新设定还款时间但已经还款 52 23.1
重新设定超过 6 个月的还款时间 3 1.3
重新设定超过 12 个月的还款时间 35 15.6
其他 31 13.8
合计 225 100.0

说明 1. 信用社的总借款金额除以那些家庭后到信用社借款
2. 信用社的总借款金额除以所有样本家庭
3. 发放的借款金额与申请的借款金额的比率

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表十八、农户对农村信用社贷款的建议

第一位 % 第二位 % 第三位 %

1. 借款金额太小 247 34.2 56 8.0 91 14.4
2. 借款期限太短 138 19.1 226 32.4 43 6.8
3. 利率太高 215 29.8 136 19.5 114 18.0
4. 申请成本太高 23 3.2 41 5.9 20 3.2
5. 程序太复杂 60 8.3 175 25.1 167 26.3
6. 花时太长 贷款不及时 31 4.3 52 7.4 179 28.2
7. 信用社离家太远 8 1.1 12 1.7 20 3.2

总计 722 100.0 698 100.0 634 100.0

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 第三章 农村金融供给

一、贵州农村金融机构 71.1722亿元,增加到148.5934亿元, 净增加77.4212亿元;

其中,农村贷款从 44.1034 亿元,增加到 98.0251 亿元, 净
增加53.9217亿元 由于人民银行再贷款从5.313亿元增
贵州农村金融机构包括 农村信用社 农业银行 加到 24.8068 亿元 可以看出农村贷款中 40% 以上的资
农发行和邮政储蓄等 近年来 贵州省的邮政储蓄抽逃 金来源于人民银行再贷款 当然不同地区不一样 有一
资金加剧 许多信用社依靠人民银行再贷款维持运行 些地区甚 几乎完全依靠人民银行再贷款 乡镇企业贷
农发行贷款逐年下降 农业银行贷款尽管超过存款 但 款只从 7.6442 亿元增加到 10.1237 亿元, 净增加 2.4795
其贷款的增长仍然没有超过存款的增长 而且其贷款主 亿元,这反映了贵州乡镇企业很不发达,工业化水平非常
要用于基础设施的贷款 从 2001 年农业银行的扶贫贷 低 信用社的中长期贷款比较低 从 4.3299 亿元增长到
款也开始转向项目贷款 总的来说 贵州农村资金大量 10.7246 亿元,仍然不到其贷款的 10% 而农发行的粮食
外流 农村金融机构亏损严重 农村贷款主要依靠政府 收购贷款也是短期贷款 农行和建设银行只愿意对有政
支持 小额信贷 扶贫贷款 农村金融体系已出现恶 府担保的国债项目发放中长期贷款 事实上 贵州农村
性循环 金融中 缺乏对中长期农业和农村项目贷款的金融机
构 即存在供给上的空白
2000 年 -2003 年贵州邮政储蓄存款从 45.2278 亿元
增加到 88.7078 亿元;其中,县以下储蓄存款从 8.4623 亿 从农发行的贷款结构看 尽管其存量有58.551亿元,
元也增加到 21.5699 亿元 可以看出 尽管从全国来说 但 2000-2003 年其存量逐年下降,从 66.3913 亿元下降
县以下邮政储蓄存款占邮政储蓄存款的60%左右 但相 58.551 亿元,净减少 7.843 亿元 其中 中长期贷款比重
对于发达地区 在贵州的邮政储蓄县以下网点也比较少 很低 也从 6816 万元降 5026 万元 这反映了农发行
(548 个) 贵州农民较贫困 县以下邮政储蓄只占 20% 作为政策性银行在贵州这样的贫困落后地区作用是逐年
左右 但其增长速度很快 从每年新增 3.7 亿左右增加 下降 虽然其间农发行网点数保持在 56 个
到每年新增 5.7 亿左右 而邮政储蓄作为农村地区资金
的抽水机 其抽逃的资金与信用社每年新增的存款额大 近年来 农业银行随着商业化改革加快 贷款逐步
相当 见表十九 转向大城市 大项目 在贵州省的中长期国债项目的贷
款逐年增加 同时 短期贷款中农业贷款和乡镇企业贷
2000 年 --2003 年贵州农村信用社存款从 91.745 亿 款却逐年下降 即农业银行在农村的贷款是不断下降
元增加到 216.8884 亿元,净增加 125.1434 亿元;贷款从 扶贫贷款也转向项目贷款 结合信用社的贷款结构可看

70
 表十九、贵州省邮政储蓄存款 年末余额
单位 万元

项目 2000 年 2001 年 2002 年 2003 年 2004 年 9 月

支行 548 548 548 548 548

储蓄存款 452,278 594,141 716,185 887,078 1,007,352

县以下 84,623 121,741 158,535 215,699 266,055
县以下新增储蓄 37,118 36,794 57,164 50,356

表二十、贵州省农村信用社 年末余额
单位 万元

2000 年 2001 年 2002 年 2003 年

支行 85 85 85 85
网点 2,111 2,001

各项存款 917,450 1,145,212 1,779,600 2,168,884

各项贷款 711,722 921,851 1,254,961 1,485,934
短期贷款 668,423 862,530 1,163,717 1,378,580
1 农村贷款 441,034 579,532 838,891 980,251
2 乡镇企业贷款 76,442 89,360 92,003 101,237
中长期贷款 43,299 58,912 91,164 107,246
人行再贷款 55,130 113,714 240,000 248,068

表二十一、贵州省中国农业发展银行贷款结构表 年末余额
单位 万元

2000 年 2001 年 2002 年 2003 年

支行 56 56 56 56

各项贷款 663,913 627,113 594,055 585,510

短期贷款 657,097 620,837 588,360 580,484
其中 收购贷款 655,935 618,719 584,864 577,001
中长期贷款 6,816 6,276 5,695 5,026

出 贵州的乡镇企业贷款不高 这也与贵州的经济结构 最后 我们分析贵州省农村地区信贷资金供给总

是一 的 随着农业银行在贵州除国债项目以外的贷款 量 一般认为 我国农村地区特别是贫困地区存在着大
逐步减少 农业银行累放贷款的回收率也从 2000 年的 量的资金外流 但从贵州省的统计数据来看 农村地区
90.26% 降 2001 年的 76.32% 2002 年的 78.18%,2003 资金的流入远大于资金的流出 国家统计局的资料表
年的 69.84% 2003 年的回收率为农行在全国各省市的 明 2003 年贵州省财政支出为 332.4 亿元 是其当年财
倒数第三位 政收入 124.6 亿元的 2.7 倍 通过财政转移支付等渠道

71
 表二十二、贵州省农业银行各项存、贷款结构 年末余额
单位 万元

2000 年 2001 年 2002 年 2003 年

支行 78 77 84 90
网点 598 509 452 394

各项存款 2,100,100 2,442,900 3,017,900 3,633,100

各项贷款 3,141,388 3,405,366 3,658,478 4,249,191
短期贷款 1,474,722 1,273,445 1,307,680 1,351,683
1 工业贷款 94,625 100,429 168,446 277,960
2 农业贷款 81,777 70,332 64,153 60,807
3 乡镇企业贷款 68,069 66,529 61,891 61,487
中长期贷款 1,562,855 1,999,555 2,278,857 2,591,200
1 基建贷款 293,343 420,025 475,153 732,683
2 技改贷款 98,608 138,700 132,719 118,072
3 其它中长期贷款 1,170,904 1,440,830 1,670,985 1,740,445

的资金净流入高达200亿元 即使这一部分资金全部用 元 贵州省农业银行在农村的新增存贷差大 相当 甚

于县及县以上的财政支出 在县以下 也存在着巨额资
金净流入 农村地区资金流入的渠道主要包括中国农业
发展银行的贷款和中国人民银行的支农再贷款 尽管从
流量看, 农发行的贷款在减少 支农再贷款每年只增加
5 10 亿元 从存量看 2003 年农发行的贷款余额为
58.6 亿元 由于农发行不吸收存款 其贷款余额实为净
流入 同年 人民银行的支农再贷款为 24.8 亿元 两项
相加 资金净流入为 83.4 亿元
在农村地区 资金流出主要通过以下三个渠道 中
国农业银行以及其他商业银行的存贷差 农村信用社的
存贷差 和被称作 抽血机 的邮政储蓄 在 2000 年
底到 2004 年 9 月 全省邮政储蓄余额翻了一番多
中县以下的储蓄存款却增加两倍多 尽管如此 2003年
底县以下邮政储蓄存款仍然只有21.6亿元 农村信用社
的 2003 年底贷款余额为 148.6 亿元 存贷差约为 68 亿
为负 即在农村的贷款增量大于存款增量 因此 在
不考虑其他商业银行存贷差的情况下 在贫困地区 商
业银行的存贷差均为正 即资金净流出 邮储 农村
信用社和农业银行的资金净流出规模约为 90 亿元
根据以上的粗略推断 在贵州省农村地区 2003 年
以存量计算的资金流出与流入规模基本相当 考虑到其
他商业银行均为存差行 金融机构总体上讲确实存在着
资金净流出的现象 但是 如果将贵州省的打工经济考虑
在内 农村地区资金的流向可能会发生逆转 据有关方面
估计 贵州全省每年打工汇回的收入约在80亿元左右 也
就是说 即使存在着金融机构和邮储 抽血 的现象 农
其 村地区 输血 的强度仍然远远超过 抽血 的强度 如
果说 农村地区仍然面临资金紧张的话 主要是当地造血
功能不足 这一方面与当地盈利机会匮乏有关 另一方面
也与农村信贷资金的分配方式低效率紧密相关

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 来越高 由于信用社的存贷款增长太快 其财务指标无
二、政府支持的农村金融服务 法反映其真实的经营状况

农村信用社的无抵押小额信用贷款与格莱明
一 农村信用社小额信贷缺乏可持续发 Grameen Bank 模式在中国的试点的小额信贷是不同
展的能力 的 不同点在于 1 农村信用社小额信用贷款的利率
低于农村信用社的其他贷款利率 因此也比由捐赠所支

1999年 为解决农民贷款难的问题 人民银行开始 持的小额贷款项目所收取的利率要低得多 由于格莱明

使用支农再贷款支持信用社发放小额信用贷款 我们用 模式下的小额信贷不受人民银行利率限制 利率通常在

贵州省 4 个贫困县 凤岗县 丹寨县 大方县和织金县 15-20% 之间而农村信用社的小额信贷利率不超过 10%;

的 48 个农村信用社 1999 年 2003 年的面板数据 包括 2 格莱明模式小额贷款对妇女偏爱 农村信用社小额

农村信用社存款 贷款和金融业绩指标 分析了信用社 信用贷款通常都向户主发放 超过 95% 的户主是男性

小额信贷的可持续性 3 格莱明模式小额贷款还款的频率非常高 并通过小

组联保 动态贷款等激励机制确保高偿还率

该表表明 在 1999 年和 2003 年 农村信用社存款

和储蓄都得到了快速增长 无抵押的农户小额信用贷款 农村信用社的小额信贷面广量大 但员工人员有

增长速度更快 在1999年 2002年 增长速度很高 在 限 在 2003 年 在调查的每个农村信用社 4-5 人 服

2003 年有所回落 从 1999 年到 2003 年 小额信用贷款 务的农户平均数量是 9272 个 人口密度是每平方公里

与农村信用社农户贷款余额的比率从 1999 年的 22.5% 100.4 个农户 大约 400 名人口 农村信用社按照监管

增长到 2003 年的将近 40% 似乎表明中国贫困地区无 部门的要求对农户进行了信用评价 在评级过程中村干

抵押小额信用贷款与农村信用社农户贷款总额的比率越 部发挥了重要作用 由信用社职工和村干部和社员共同

表二十三、样本地区农村信用社的平均存贷款和主要业绩指标
单位 万元
项目 1999 年 2000 年 2001 年 2002 年 2003 年
1.农户贷款余额 221 327.5 371.2 599.7 705.7
年增长率 % 48.3 13.1 61.6 17.7
2.农户小额贷款余额 50 76.7 138.0 244.9 279.0
年增长率 % 54.5 80.0 77.4 13.9
3. 农户小额贷款余额 / 农户贷款余额 % 22.5 23.4 37.2 40.8 39.5
4.总存款 274 340.6 467.5 644.7 769.4
年增长率 % 24.1 37.3 37.9 19.3
5.农户贷款存款比 % 80.5 96.2 79.4 93.0 91.7
6.人民银行再贷款 13 45.6 88.7 158.0 176.6
年增长率 % 248.2 94.5 78.1 11.8
7.不良贷款 59 61.0 65.9 37.6 34.4
8.所有者权益 -14 -11.5 -27.9 -10.8 6.8
9.年净利润 -96,589 19,708 -33,166 46,433 -120,671

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组成评级小组 其中信用社职工以外的评级小组成员中
村干部作用较大 但这一评级是静态的 最短也要两年
才评一次 对农户信用评定也缺乏科学 统一的评价体
系 农户小额信用贷款由于额度较小 贷款对象分散 相对
对于调查的有贷款额度和贷款证的148个农村家庭
来说 贷款平均额度规模是4756元人民币 最大贷款额
度是 20000 元人民币 这个最大贷款额度远远高于格莱
明模式中国小额信贷试验性项目的 1000 元的初始贷款
限额 更重要的是 农户贷款额度与农户年现金收入的
期望比率是 107% 在信贷额度很高 缺乏有效的贷款
偿还机制的情况下 贷款人及时偿还无抵押小额信用贷
款的可能性就很小 将会有一个很高的违约率 无抵押 3
小额信用贷款的是农村土地和信贷市场扭曲的结果 土
地产权不明晰 正规金融机构对贷款利率设定最高限
最初政策是利用低利率的中央银行资金推动信用社发放
小额信用贷款来解决农户贷款难的问题 但如果在机制
上无法保证小额农贷业务有利可图 是不可能持续发展
的 说 在目前的贷款利率上限 5.14% 的基础上 虽然实际
农户小额信用贷款有三个质的规定性: 一是针对农
户 二是额度较小 三是信用放款 从这一贷款的规定
性来看 本身带有防范风险的要素 从宏观上分析 高
度分散化的放款 也分散了风险 带来总体上的贷款风
险度下降 目前推行小额信用贷款中出现的种种迹象表
明 小额信用贷款并不是没有风险 如果信用户的评定
工作不扎实 忽视农村信用体系的建设 放松贷款管理
片面追求进度 一哄而上 小额农贷的农户发展同一产
品 在缺乏农业保险情况下 照样会出现象乡镇企业放
款一样的大面积不良资产 绝不能掉以轻心
据调查 农信社外勤普遍认为小额农贷贷款额度
小 利率还要适当优惠 从利息收回考核上也划不来
倒不如发放有担保或抵押的贷款有保障 相当一部分信
74
用社信贷管理人员认为信用社目前尚处在风险经营阶
段 加上农村靠天吃饭 各种自然灾害造成的损失无法
预料 发放小额信用贷款自身承担的风险责任比较大
管理成本很大 农户小额信用贷款和企业放款的利益落
差 导 农村信用社更倾向于发放企业贷款 即使人民
银行以发放支农再贷款的条件来约束农村信用社的贷款
投向 要求农户小额信用贷款要占到一定比例 其效果
也难以持久 机制上的错位 会使小额信用贷款工作失
去动力
农户小额贷款金额小 笔数多 涉及到农村千家万
户 加上农村的交通不便 靠传统的手工操作 效率低
工作量大 农村信用社现有人力资源状况很难与之匹
配 剔除临柜人员后 信贷管理人员严重不足 此外小
额农贷技术设计安排明显 滞后 已难以适应农村信
贷投放和金融服务的需要 目前许多信用社农户贷款利
率 一浮到顶 贷款利率已上浮达到 100% 这也就是
年利率已扩大很多 但由于农户贷款金额小 风险大
相应的贷款成本也高 因此这个浮动范围还不足以使商
业性机构获得合理的资产和资本金回报来弥补其成本
事实上 在调查中 我们也发现一些信用社通过罚息
提前扣息 强制要求入股等措施使农户小额贷款的实际
贷款利率达到 15% 以上
尽快完善农村信用社小额信用贷款制度设计 放开
贷款利率 使农户贷款真正有利可图 才能使农户信用
贷款真正从政府推动变成信用社自觉自愿的业务
3
在短期 在无抵押小额贷款上大额支出可以导 贷款质量和金融业绩指标的
提高
 二 扶贫贷款政策扭曲了农村金融市场，
扶贫效率低下
信贷扶贫资金占国家扶贫资金的一半以上 扶贫信
贷资金是国家在特定时期内 为重点扶持贫困地区经济
发展和农村贫困人口摆脱贫困而设立 国家财政给予一
定利息补贴 由国家指定金融机构承办的 政策性较强
的商业性贷款 最新的扶贫贷款的政策是2001年中国人
民银行 财政部 国务院扶贫开发领导小组办公室和中
国农业银行联合下发的 扶贫贴息贷款管理实施办法
该办法明确规定 扶贫信贷资金的来源 主要是中国农
业银行通过组织存款解决 不足部分可向中国人民银行
申请正常利率的再贷款; 关于贷款的发放 中国人民银
行明确规定由有关商业银行 农行 按照信贷原则自主
选择项目 自主发放贷款; 扶贫信贷资金的规模也由指
令性计划改为指导性计划; 扶贫贴息贷款包括项目贷款
和到户贷款 在实践中扶贫贴息贷款项目的选择 农行
必须在当地扶贫办提出的项目库中选择 余地不大 尤
其是对小额到户贷款 基本是按扶贫办列单子 农行发
钱 到 2000 年底 扶贫贷款余额达 705 亿元,2001 年底
达到 792 亿元,2003 底达到 960 亿元(当年贴息 6.2 亿元)
在由中央政府确认的592个贫困县中 贵州省有48
个 占8.1% 由于农行扶贫贷款政策性金融的目标与商
业银行的目标相互冲突 1998 年 5 月以来 农行的到户
扶贫贷款逐年下降 实际上扶贫贴息贷款的政策性只体
现在中央财政对承贷人所付利率与正常利率之间利差的
补贴上 其管理与运营都按照商业化准则实施 随着国
有独资商业银行商业化改革的进一步推进 中国农业银
行的经营地域从农村 县城向地市级中心城市转移 在
此过程中 农行要撤并一批业务量小 经营不善 发生
严重亏损的小机构 通过减少机构 裁减冗员来减少成
本 增加效益 贫困地区的机构与人员往往是裁撤的重
点 机构与人员的减少客观上会增加农行开展扶贫贴息
贷款工作的难度 增加相应的费用 这在面向贫困户的
小额扶贫贷款发放上尤为突出 1995 年 2001 年 农
业银行人员减少 13% 机构减少 34% 其中大部分为农
村地区的支行或分理处 小额扶贫贴息贷款主要支持贫
困户发展种养业 具有季节性强 时间紧 量大面广
单笔金额小等特点 发放和管理要求配备足够的机构和
人员 比如贵州省有 48 个国定贫困县 乡镇 874 个 其
中设有农行营业所的乡镇不足 200 个 平均每个所 多
2-3名信贷员 要负责4-5个乡镇小额扶贫贷款的发放和
日常管理任务 在贷款发放时需要县支行抽调人手集中
时日召集贫困农户突击放款 日常管理根本无从谈起
贵州长顺县支行现有信贷人员 13 人 管理近 2.3 万户贷
款客户 人均要管理近 2000 贷款户 而走完一个村就
需要数天时间
在小额扶贫贴息贷款的发放实践中 为确保扶贫贴
息贷款资金能真正用到农户身上 贵州省的地方政府和
扶贫办提出了 两个 85％ 的贷款比例规定 即 85％的
扶贫贷款资金到贫困县 85％的资金到达贫困户手中
小额信贷单笔放款数量限制又在 50000 元以下 而多数
在2000元以内 这导 扶贫贷款在发放与管理上的 点
多量小 特征 属于银行的零售类贷款业务 运行成本
本身就比一般的批发贷款业务要高得多 更何况贫困地
区承贷户居住分散 交通不便 由此引起的运营成本会
更高 据贵州荔波县农行反映 2000年为发展小额信贷
业务 县行跑坏了一辆吉普车 据贵州省农行反映 它
们每发放 100 万元小额信贷要相应支出 5.85 万元 比其
他业务多支出 3.9 万元 即仅小额贷款发放费率就达到
5.85% 比其他的高3.9 个百分点 如果再考虑贷款的日
常管理和收回费用以及资金本身的来源成本 小额扶贫
信贷的运行本成费用率应当在10％以上 这还是假设所
有的贷款都是 发得出 收得回 的贷款 不考虑发生
不良贷款时引起的呆帐损失 据中国农业银行测算,发
放 管理扶贫贷款的平均成本为 7％ 即使银行能够全
75
额收息 同时及时得到利息补贴 经营扶贫贷款业务仍
要发生亏损
资金来源也是扶贫贷款面临的难题之一 扶贫贷款
的资金由农行提供,财政只提供贴息 由于扶贫贷款主
要面向贫困县 而贫困县的农行多为贷差行 资金来源
不足 信贷资金需要从系统内调剂资金 目前农行系统
内调剂资金的利率为 4.32% 农行的扶贫贴息贷款利率
为 3% 加上财政贴息只能贴到 5.85% 或 5.94% (由于人
民银行基准利率提高)的水平 这样 如果县行的资金是
从上级行调拨的 那么发放一笔小额贷款 农行县支行
少净亏损 5.38% 5.47% 贷款发放和管理成本 7%
减去机会成本 4.32%,减去政府补贴 2.85 或 2.94%
前农业银行在扶贫贴息贷款的管理上与其他项目贷款 4
采用同样的办法管理和考核下级分支行和责任人 由于
扶贫贷款本身局限而导 的低回收必然会进一步影响下
级分支行的积极性
扶贫贷款发放过程中 政府方面不合理干预大 在
一些不适合发放到户小额扶贫贷款的地区发放了大量的
到户小额扶贫贷款 比如 在实践中扶贫贴息贷款项目
的选择 农行必须在当地扶贫办提出的项目库中选择
余地不大 尤其是对小额到户贷款 基本是按扶贫办列
单子 农行发钱 金融机构没有力量 也无法一一考察
贷款对象是否符合贷款的基本原则 更不用说日常管
理 甚 在一些地方 政府要求农行对工艺水平落后
产品技术含量低 没有市场竞争力的项目进行支持 如
截止 2000 年底 贵州省农行支持贫困县加工企业的扶
贫贷款为 10 亿元 而其不良率超过 85% 此外
地方政府部门只强调发放扶贫贷款资金 而疏于对承贷
户其他方面的服务 管理 支持和宣传 使相当部分
的贫困地区干部群众误认为 扶贫贷款是国家扶贫资
金 等同于财政扶贫救济款 因而没有此款项是贷款
需要归还的概念 导 群众还款意愿差 有些基层政府
把扶贫贷款看成是国家救济 平均分配 甚 连已经过
世的人都可以得到一笔扶贫贷款 还有的地方借发放贷
款之机 巧立名目 收取各种税费
这些情况与问题不同程度上阻碍了农行基层行发放
扶贫贷款的积极性 总的来看 中国农业银行2001年末
扶贫贷款的不良贷款达328.2亿元 不良贷款比例41.4%
从我们调查贵州省数据来看 截止 2001 年 10 月 贵州
省扶贫贴息贷款余额 77.6 亿 其中不良贷款 32.6 亿 不
良率高达 42% 其中小额信贷的收回率只有 21% 从
2001年开始 农总行改变了以往对扶贫贷款进行专项考
核的做法 把扶贫贷款与其他贷款合并 一起考核 效
目 益与工资挂钩 并强化了贷款的责任追究制度 加强了
对扶贫贴息贷款不良率的考核 这就严重影响了基层农
行发放扶贫贷款的积极性 也使扶贫贴息贷款中存在的
问题充分地暴露了出来 2001年后农行开始减少到户贷
款发放 借扶贫贷款名义发放基础设施的商业贷款 农
行在贵州省发放的近一百亿扶贫贷款中只有4亿到户的
扶贫贷款 在我们调查过程中 一些地方政府和其他国
有银行对农行的这一做法很有意见
三、农村金融市场中存在问题
我国目前农村金融改革的主要问题源自传统的金融
管理体制 其目的是通过农业银行和农村信用社的体制
将廉价的资金用于支持农业生产 这样的体制设计必然
许多 要求农村金融体制高度集中 机构设置单一化 管理体
制行政化 我国传统的农村金融体系具有以下几个方面
的特征
4
农行称之为常规贷款

76

一 农村金融市场缺乏竞争
1996 年以来的农村金融改革并没有能促进农村信
贷市场的竞争 相反 改革使得农业银行逐步从农村市
场撤出其贷款业务 并关闭了农业合作基金会和其他非
正规金融机构 从而使农村信用社在我国农村贷款市场
处于垄断地位 而垄断的农村金融市场一般来说是低效
率的 随着农业银行在乡镇网点的减少 农发行业务缩
小为粮棉油收购贷款以及农村合作基金会全部撤并 客
观上赋予农村信用社独立支撑农村金融主渠道的职能
但农村信用社自身能力与所负责任不相称的矛盾很快暴
露出来 由于农村信用社巨额的历史包袱 利率管制和
部分地区经营管理的低效率 处于垄断地位的不少信用
社 特别是中西部地区的信用社仍然面临经营亏损 无
法名副其实地长期的承担农村金融 主力军 的作用
二 单一模式难以满足多样化的需求
与农村金融市场缺乏竞争相关的是 目前以农村信
用社为主体单一模式的正规农村金融体制无法兼顾我国
东中西部严重的地区差别 满足不同地区农户和企业对
金融服务的需求 在时间上 由于农村地区的不断发展
和城乡一体化水平的逐步提高 金融服务需求在不断发
生变化 在空间上 由于各地区经济发展的不平衡 地
区间金融服务需求也各不相同 而全国农村信用社的经
营模式 贷款方式 内部管理及激励机制相差不大 难
以对需求的变化迅速做出反应
三 政府信贷资金投入无法扭转农村资
金的大量外流趋势及解决贷款难问题
自上世纪九十年代中期以来, 我国农村, 特别是中西
部地区资金和劳动力的流动呈现以下特征 农产品市场
价格长期低迷和不稳定 加上小规模自给自足的农户极
低的劳动生产率 以及乡镇企业大量倒闭 导 贫困地
区和农业主产区缺乏投资机会 大量民工外出打工 但
其挣得的钱汇回去 存在农村金融机构 又通过农村金
融机构购买国债 拆借 上存资金等方式回流到东部和
发达地区 其结果是, 农村, 农业和农民难以获得足够的
发展资金 农村经济发展出现了恶性循环
农村资金外流渠道主要有以下三个方面 一是国有
商业银行集约化经营 收缩网点 上收贷款权 农村资
金回流城市 四大国有银行在县及县以下的机构也是农
村资金外流的重要渠道 二是邮政储蓄转存人民银行利
率过高 使大量农村资金外流 三是许多农村信用社通
过购买国债 存放同业和贷款给城市客户 也使资金流
向城市
农户特别是农村中小企业贷款难普遍存在 农业银
行逐步走向商业化经营 在农村地区撤并机构 减少网
点 信用社的服务方式 服务手段仍不能适应农户和农
村经济发展的需要 小额信贷增加了农户贷款 但对农
村中小企业的贷款显著减少 另外 农户小额贷款对人
行支农再贷款的依赖大,农户小额信贷的交易成本高 贷
款额度低 在贷款利率封顶的情况下 信用社发放小额
信贷的热情难以持久 在不少中西部地区 亏损的农村
信用社无力也不愿给农户提供贷款 人民银行的支农再
贷款只是杯水车薪 农民仍依赖亲戚朋友或民间借贷
政府的扶贫贴息贷款通过农行无法真正到户 扶贫贷款
的不良贷款率居高不下 难以实现扶贫的初衷
单单依靠带有财政职能的人民银行再贷款和扶贫贷
款无法根本解决农村资金外流和农村贷款难的问题 加
剧我国城乡差别的一个重要因素是城乡获得财政资金和
国家 地方政府投资的巨大差别, 及不同地区商业投资
回报率的差异 支持 三农 很重要 但金融不能代替
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财政职能 过去 国家和地方政府未将金融摆正位置 本改变 中国农业银行和信用社仍然垄断着农村信贷市
金融承担了过多的财政职能 不但无法完成任务 也造 场 第三 金融机构的绩效没有根本的好转 这与过去
成大量损失 使农村金融萎缩 资金外流 而且各种道 二十多年整个经济特别是农村经济的蓬勃发展极不相称
德风险严重
如果说传统的农村金融体系曾经支持了中国农村经

四 内部人控制下的农村金融机构改革 济的发展 那么这种 透支式 的金融支持方式已经很

难再持续下去了 农村金融改革的滞后不仅不能继续支
使贷款决策离农民渐行渐远
持农村经济的发展 其低效率还可能会成为农村经济发
展的障碍 因此 全面改革现有的传统农村金融体系已
基层农村金融机构的优势在于其小范围内的信息资
经刻不容缓
源 能降低监督成本 减少信息不对称性 但由于我国
农村金融改革在所有者权益和治理结构上没有取得任何
突破 今为止的改革仍然为内部人控制下的改革 治 五 缺乏农村金融机构商业可持续发展
理结构不完善条件下控制风险只能通过加强管理 --- 贷 的经营环境
款决策权的集中来解决 农行上收贷款权 农村信用社
贷款权和资金调动权日益集中到联社 但集中的贷款决 农村金融市场缺乏足够分散农村贷款风险的渠道
策权无法解决信息不对称问题,无法对需求变化作出灵 目前农村保险萎缩 大宗农产品期货市场不够发达 政
敏的反应 策法规的限制使农村金融机构无法寻找抵押和担保的有
效替代方式 当然 农村金融机构也缺乏足够的动力
过去的金融改革没有根本改变中国农村金融的基本 通过金融创新解决农户和中小企业贷款担保难和抵押难
格局 主要表现在 第一 政府控制农村金融的局面没 的问题 对不同地区金融机构 一刀切 的税收政策
有根本改变 金融机构的商业化仍然面临政策性贷款和 限制了农村金融机构商业可持续发展 此外 农村金融
低利率的双重制约 第二 农村金融市场的构成没有根 市场的利率管制是另一重要因素

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 第四章 贵州农村信用社改革及评价

一、贵州农村信用社的现状与改 贵州省农村信用社改革是八个试点省之一 2002

年底贵州省农村信用社总资产为 241.1 亿元,总负债为
革进展
241亿元,历年亏损9.1亿元,当年亏损400万元,存款余额
为 143.5 亿元,贷款余额 125.5 亿元 不良贷款余额为 34.9
亿元,占比为27.8% 资本充足率为-0.9%,资不抵债法人
这一次的农村信用社改革试点是我国金融改革进
社为 969 个,占 17.2% 农信社不良贷款余额中 呆帐贷
入攻坚阶段的一个重要标志 与以往的改革相比 从
款 1.5 亿元,呆滞贷款 28 亿元,分别占不良贷款余额的
国发15号文件(2003)和央行行长周小川的讲话可以看
4.29% 和 80.23% 这次改革贵州省从中央银行获得
出 农信社改革有以下两个基本特点 一是 花钱买
7.19 亿中央银行票据的补贴 表二十四 按国家规定
机制 二是改革权利下放到省 这意味着我国金融改
从2003年1月1日起 免收农村信用社所得税 并按3%
革的思路已经实现了从自上而下到自下而上的根本性
的税率征收营业税 财政部已审核批准 1994-1997 年间
转变 也就是说 中央政府希望农信社改革将充分体
亏损农村信用社实付保值储蓄贴补息 3867 万元
现各地经济发展水平 市场化程度 地理环境 有效
金融需求与供给和金融机构绩效等各方面的差异 走
贵州省对 84 个县级联社(其中 39 个资不抵债)按照
出一条改革与创新并举 信贷支农与商业运作兼备且
国务院 15 号文件精神和 " 照顾基础,分批进行 限期完
可持续发展的农村金融新路子

表二十四、贵州省农村信用社概况
单位 亿元

2003 年年底总资产 298.84 2002 年年底不良贷款余额 34.87

2003 年年底总负债 279.43 2002 年年底历年亏损挂帐 9.13
2003 年年底存款总额 177.96 2002 年年底资本充足率 % -0.4%
2003 年年底贷款总额 148.58 这次改革从中央银行获得的票据支持额度 7.19
总职工数 万人 1.19 这次改革从财政所获得保值补贴额 0.3867
2003 年人均费用 万元 76,600 估计 2004 年所得税减免额 0.13
2004 年营业税减免额 0.3
2003 年年底支农再贷款余额 24 达到人民银行票据发行条件需要增资扩股额 万元 4,127
2003 年底农户贷款额 7.6527 达到人民银行票据兑付条件需要增资扩股额 万元 9,382

79
成 " 的原则 选择以县 市 区 为单位的统一法人组 社中 除三个县 市 已经批准成立农村合作银行之外
织形式 按照 从严控制 先行试点 逐步发展 的原 其他 84 个县 市 均采用了县联社一级法人的模式 全
则 选择贵阳市市区的云岩区联社 城乡结合部的花溪 省信用社的总股金为 9.72 亿元 其中 3.27 亿元为 2004
区联社和全国商品粮基地县的遵义市湄潭县等3个联社 年以来通过增资扩股形式募集的新股金
试点组建农村合作银行 到 2004 年 6 月末 全省农村信
用社股本金总额为 11.24 亿元 比 2002 年末增加 7.54 亿 表二十五、贵州省农村信用社改革试点情况
元 资本充足率由改制前的 -0.9% 不含票据置换因素 省政府的管理模式 省联社
提高到 3% 省联社的资本金 亿元 0.26
全省股金总额 亿元 9.72
2004 年 1 8 月全省信用社股金增加额 亿元 3.27
贵州省各级政府在财力十分紧张的情况下 加大了
改革模式的选择
对农村信用社的扶持力度 一是建立农村信用社发展扶 (1)全省农村商业银行个数 0
持资金 从 2003 年起到 2007 年止 由省财政每年安排 (2)全省农村合作银行个数 3
(3)全省以县为单位统一法人个数 84
800 万元 用于扶持农村信用社发展和处置风险 据不 (4)全省保留两级法人个数 0

完全统计 有 25 个县 市 区 建立了发展资金 二是
补充资本公积 有 20 个县 市 区 通过实物或资金支
持等方式帮助农村信用社补充资本公积 三是一些县 这次农村信用社改革试点突出要解决的问题之一是
市 区 从财政安排部分资金 补助农村信用社 2004 管理体制改革 即将农信社交给省级政府管理 联社管
年到 2010 年期间的营业税 房产税 土地使用税 印花 理者重经营轻行业管理是一个最大的隐患 联社管理者
税等支出 四是帮助农村信用社发展业务 省人民政府 有利益最大化的冲动 应该把联社的资本金最小化 联
决定 把小额扶贫贷款 原为农行管理 委托给有条件 社的任务主要是管理 对基层信用社进行机制完善 要
的农村信用社管理 为落实 国务院关于抓好粮食生产 妥善处理尊重法人权利和加强行业自律之间的矛盾--关
做好粮食市场供应工作的紧急通知 国发[2004]9 号 键是在高管人员任职上的发言权的把握 伸出帮助之手
精神和省人民政府的相关工作部署 省联社与省农业 而不是控制之手 为规范省联社的行为 支持信用社
厅 省财政厅联合行文 将 2004 年对农民的农业税减 的发展 贵州省政府做了以下工作
免及种植杂交水稻良种实行直接补贴交由农村信用社办
理 五是帮助农村信用社充实和壮大资金实力 大部分 (一) 结合贯彻落实今年中央 1 号文件精神 贵州省委
县在有关政策许可的范围内 动员涉农资金 教育资金 办公厅 省人民政府办公厅转发了 贵州省农村信
及直属部门的预算外资金 国家投入的农业专项资金等 用社联合社关于做好服务 三农 工作的意见 强
存入农村信用社 六是协调工商等部门减免相关费用 调农村信用社改革后 无论采取哪种产权制度和
组织形式 都要更好地服务 三农
贵州省联社于 2003 年 12 月 30 日正式挂牌成立 经
省人民政府批准 省联社 9 个地 州 市 派出机构也 (二) 指导省联社制订了 贵州省农村信用社联合社
已成立 开始履行职责 这标志着贵州省农村信用社管 2004—2006年度经营目标和业务发展规划 与各
理体制改革基本完成 表二十五表明 在县级信用社联 县 市 区 联社签订了2004年度综合目标责任书

80
(三) 指导省联社制定了 贵州省农村信用社贷款财务 二、值得借鉴和推广的金融创新
管理办法 贵州省农村信用社员工管理暂行办
与制度安排
法 等40多个行业管理规章制度和规范性文件 并
督促省联社组织实施

从贵州省的农村金融改革与实践来看 存在着大量
(四) 制定下发了 农村信用社改革试点期间风险防范
低成本的制度创新 现在的关键是这一轮农村信用社改
与处置预案 落实了各级各有关部门防范和处置
革试点能否将吸纳这些创新 使之成为改革的助力而不
风险的责任
是阻力 这些创新包括以下几个方面

(五) 省人民政府办公厅转发了 关于帮助农村信用社

一 建立以市场为基础的风险化解机制 合理分担信
清收旧贷 依法打击逃废债的意见 要求各地运
贷风险 贵州省的特色种养业由于其独特的自然
用法律 经济 行政手段 采取切实有效措施 帮
条件 季节性差异和低污染而具有很大的市场潜
助农村信用社清收旧贷 依法打击逃废债 据不完
力 但如何将这些潜力转化为农户实际的效益需
全统计 到 2004 年 6 月末 帮助农村信用社清收
要很多环节的配合 其中信贷支持是重要的一环
旧贷 3.5 亿元
然而 这些经济活动均存在巨大的风险 如自然
灾害 疫情和新技术的采用等方面存在着大量的
(六) 规范地 县两级政府与农村信用社的关系 农村
不确定性 这样不确定性超出了信贷风险的范畴
信用社交由省级政府管理 省级政府既不能将管
在贷款利率给定的情况下 农村信用社难以独立
理权下放地 县政府 又要发挥他们的积极性 为
承担这样的风险 如果没有一个合理的风险分担
此 省人民政府明确了地 县政府的具体责任 就
机制 农村信用社只能通过信贷配给的方式规避
是 三要三不要 即要切实采取扶持措施 要大
这方面的风险 其结果是不少有盈利能力的农户
力培育信用环境 要及时帮助防范和处置金融风
由于得不到贷款而失去了脱贫 富的机会 解决
险 不要干预农村信用社的经营活动 不要插手农
这一问题的方法无外乎提高贷款利率和分担信贷
村信用社的人事安排 不要把农村信用社当成自
风险两种可能
己的 小金库 地 县政府遵循 三要三不要 的
原则开展工作 既有力地支持了辖内农村信用社
在贵州省的一些地区 如丹寨县 地方政
的改革与发展 又有效地防止了行政的过度干预
府 保险机构 农户和金融机构联合组建的风险
省政府正在组织力量起草 贵州省农村信用社管
分担机制可以有效地克服农业贷款中存在的超额
理办法 以政府规章形式规范各级政府与农村信
风险 使得农村信用社的低贷款利率政策得以维
用社的关系
持 更为重要的是 这样的制度安排可以支持农
业产业化发展 形成一个可靠的信贷客户群 既
提高了农民的收入 也为农村信用社培养了优质
客户 是一个双赢的制度安排 其操作方法是 地
方政府从地方财政或扶贫资金中划出一部分资金

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 用于补贴农户向保险机构投保的保险金 保险公 三 通过小组联保和小额信贷等形式解决由于信息不对
司开办特种农业保险业务 农户个人也分担一部 称带来的信贷配给问题 扩大了信贷覆盖面 小组
分的保险金 在一定的保险保障下 信用社可以 联保和小额信贷的重要瓶颈是信用社的收益与成
免除抵押品的要求或以受保对象 如牲畜 作为 本和风险不相称 如果能够通过小组联保或信用
抵押品向农户发放贷款 评级的方式降低信用社放贷的成本和风险 在低
利率之下 在一些地区还是有发展潜力的 当然
二 农村信用社充分利用当地制度资源 如农民专业 这与当地的传统 文化和人际关系等密切相关 在
技术协会 生产合作社等 改善借贷关系 提高 凤岗县 养猪专业户之间的小组联保做的有声有
贷款的质量 在集体经济时期 我国的农村信用 色 这与专业户 防疫部门和信用社之间的密切合
社依靠集体信用发放贷款 但联产承包责任制以 作分不开的
后 农村信用社必须以个体信用为基础直接与分
散的农户打交道 增加了信贷风险和信息搜集的 四 在抵押品替代方面的创新 农户贷款的主要问题
成本 随着部分农民从土地上转移出来 以及农 是缺乏有效的抵押品 土地 房产等农民较常拥有
村专业化的发展 分散的农户也以不同的形式组 的财产均不能用作抵押 加之农业生产的季节性
织起来 农村信用社如何与不同形式的农民专业 特点较为明显 这使得满足农户信贷需求的难度
组织联合起来 也是一项十分有意义的尝试 依 大大增加 也在一定程度上加大了农户贷款的风
托于农民专业组织 农村信用社可以通过该组织 险 而小组联保或小额信贷由于受额度限制 只适
掌握农户的经营情况 克服信息不对称问题 在 用于小规模的农户 因此 有效的抵押品替代 即
贵州省的一些地方 一些农村信用社通过与当地 没有具体的抵押品但事实上起到了抵押品的作用
的农民专业技术协会或农业生产合作社之间的合 也在一些地方的农村信用社中开始运用 这些抵
作 成功地利用当地制度资源的优势 提高了贷 押品替代包括仓单 地上作物的收获权 存栏牲畜
款质量 等 更多的地方以信用社直接介入农民生产和销
售的方式获得信息上的优势 是另一种形式的抵

在湄潭县的一些乡镇 信用社以当地一些特 押品替代 然而 由于缺少类似的规定 这方面的

色种养业专业化发展为契机 与饲料供应商签订 业务的开展受到了一定的制约 一个可能的发展

了饲料供销合同 将农户的贷款与饲料供应直接 方向是 当订单农业开始出现的时候 订单抵押也

挂钩 既确保了贷款的用途 又掌握了农户的相 应该成为抵押品替代的一种形式 此外 还可以包

关信息 同时 还利用批量采购的价格与市场价 括以个人信用为基础担保的担保贷款

格之差设立了贷款风险基金 用以分担信贷风险
另外 信用社还通过与防疫部门建立风险分担机 五 政府贴息贷款 政府贴息贷款也是分散农户信用

制 化解农业风险 在一些地方 信用社与当地 风险的一种形式 在贵州省的不少地方 地方政府

防疫部门和村干部建立责任机制 如发生牲畜得 已经开展了形式多样的专项贴息贷款 其中包括蚕

病死亡 当地畜牧站将承担 50% 的责任 村干部 桑专项贴息贷款 生猪专项贴息贷款 茶叶专项贴

承担 10% 的责任 其余的风险由农户承担 息贷款等 有些地方政府承担了贷款的 50% 的利

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 息 有些地方贴息到信用社的常规贷款利率水
平 农户实际支付的利息低到月息2.4‰ 专项贴
息贷款在不影响信贷资源配置的基础上 降低了
农户违约的概率 将农户的隐性需求变为实实在
在的有效需求
六 民间金融的发展问题 与正规金融相比 民间金
融在两个方面具有比较优势 一是信息优势 通
过当地的信息网络 民间金融可以有效地利用非
正规的信息判别农户的有效金融需求 二是抵押 七 信贷重点支持对象应为次贫困农户 对农户的有
品的灵活性 民间金融是抵押品替代的发现者
它可以利用个人之间建立的各种社会关系 业务
关系和其他非正规的关系为确保贷款的按时归还
服务 由于受传统的金融管理体制的影响 民间
金融在金融分层中的合理位置往往得不到承认
并且正规金融容易把民间金融简单当作正规金融
的竞争对手 与高利贷一视同仁加以打击 而且
是农村信用社资金越紧张 不良贷款占比高的地
方打击的力度越大
部地成为农村金融的主力 此外 还可借鉴印度
模式 采用非正规金融与正规金融相结合的方式
放款 由一 二十个农户组成类似于互助会形式
的自我帮助小组 开展类似互助会性质的贷款活
动 只不过其帐户开在正规金融机构 正规金融
机构根据其信贷记录决定给自我帮助小组一定数
量的贷款 贷款也是按动态激励原则发放的 即
最初不多 但按时偿还再逐步增加
效需求可以划分为两个部分 一是商业性需求
二是福利性需求 前者由正规或民间金融提供
后者由民政部门予以必要的支持 在贵州省的一
些地方 地方政府 如台江县 和农村信用社已
经意识到应该将信贷支农的对象限定在次贫困农
户上 这些农户既有有效的资金需求 同时还可
以带动极端贫困农户 如提供就业机会 的脱贫
富 部分减轻农村信用社信贷支农的压力 防
止信贷中的道德风险

事实上 民间金融是正规金融的重要补充
一方面 民间金融的贷款对象是正规金融歧视的
对象 这些金融需要的规模较小 时间上的灵活 三、对贵州省农村信用社改革的
性较大 相应的风险也较大 民间金融的发育有 基本评价
利于解决逆向选择的问题 另一方面 民间金融
可以扶持一些盈利机会 这些农民当其规模到一 自 2003 年下半年开始的八省农村信用社改革试点
定程度的时候可以成为信用社的优质客户 有必 是我国金融改革的一个里程碑 也是为改变我国过去二
要制定一些地方法规 允许民间金融在一定的范 十多年金融改革和发展与实体经济改革和发展严重错位
围内存在 并与正规金融展开合理的竞争 具体 的一次重要尝试 改制和改革方式的转变的主要目的是
的做法是取消非法集资罪和非法扰乱金融秩序 鼓励适应当地经济发展需要的改革创新 建立一个可以
罪 代之于打击高利贷的法律 如对利率的最高 满足不同地区 不同行业和不同层次金融需求的多样化
限进行规定 也可视当地的具体情况对民间金融 的现代农村金融体系 我国东 中 西部地区经济结构
的融资额度进行限制 使之成长为一支健康的力 和市场结构迥异 地区之间农村金融需求千差万别 东
量 成为正规金融的有益补充 在一些地方 局 部地区农村金融的需求主要来自非农部门 中部地区农

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村的金融需求主要在种养业 而西部地区农村的金融需
求在很大程度上是用来满足由于产出的不确定性带来的
生活方面盈余调剂 同样的是 三农 问题 不同地区
之间的侧重点各不相同 东部地区的重点是农村问题
中部地区的重点是农业问题 而西部地区的重点是农民
问题 因此 从某种意义上说 这次农村信用社改革试
点是否成功 其中一个最重要的评价指标是这次改革能
否彻底改变计划经济时代形成的 以不变应万变 的农
村信用社一统天下的不正常现象 建设一个多样化的
有效率的和可持续的农村金融体系 换句话说 在各省
农村信用社改革试点中 改革的不同应该是常态 改革
的同应该是非常态
从现有改革方案的设计 改革的实施和贵州省农村
金融的现状来看 突出地存在着以下几个方面的问题
第一 原有农村信用社体制设计存在着明显的道德
风险漏洞 现有改革设计没有在微观基础上堵住这些漏
洞 一个有效的制度安排必须体现权利与责任对等 努
力程度与激励对等以及投资收益与所承担的风险对等
在现有的体制设计中 县联社 经营者 需要通过增资
扩股来满足监管当局的资本充足率要求 但却又不必对
股东负责 被剥夺了委托人权利的股东 追求的是不须
承担风险的短期高额收益; 省联社有权任命县联社的主
任 但无须也没有能力承担县联社经营不善的责任
这一次农村信用社改革的实施过程中过于强调机构
合并和换牌子 忽略的恰恰是最需要改革的机制 如果
问信用社的主任 改革前与改革后有什么不同 他会告
诉你 原来的二级法人变成了一级法人 原来县联社由
银监会 原为人民银行 主管 现在则归省联社主管
尽管有增资扩股 有资格股和投资股 但信用社主任和
县联社主任仍然由上级主管部门任命 股东无从置喙
股东大会 监事会等成了摆设 由于股东的权利与责任
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严重不对称 股金变成了高息的定期存款 股东的主要
目的是获得贷款上的便利和利息优惠 信用社的激励机
制 监督机制 退市机制等与信用社经营息息相关的微
观机制在改革设计中几乎没有提及 信用社还是有信贷
支农的挡箭牌 道德风险问题仍然没有根本解决 这与
花钱买机制 的初衷背道而驰 信用社还是单一模式
一统天下 垄断经营 信用社的经营环境一如既往 机
制创新乏善可陈 仍然是自上而下的改革 并没有遵循
国发 15 号文件 2003 所倡导的原则 机制还是旧机
制 人还是原来的人 很难有理由相信 这一轮实施的
改革与以往的改革有什么不同
第二 信贷支农成本高昂 难以为继 从信用社的
人均经费 不良贷款占比 农户覆盖率等指标均可以发
现 现有农村信用社模式是一个非常昂贵的机构 在贫
困地区这样的制度安排过于奢侈 不良贷款形成的原因
中 有不少是由于道德风险引起的 也有不少与政府干
预和农业风险相关 由于信息不对称 很难判断不良贷
款的形成是由于合理的风险造成的 还是人为造成的
实际上 信贷支农是道德风险的避风港 只要是农户贷
款 即使产生风险信贷人员也不用承担责任 自然灾害
产生的风险并不表示信用社经营不力 更为关键的是
面对农信社的巨额不良贷款 没有一个人为此发愁的
因此 信贷支农必须要有新思路 要先效率后支农 支
农应该建立在市场的基础之上 而不是竭泽而渔
第三 农村金融改革的目的不能仅仅是维护信用社
职工的利益 在农村信用社的治理结构没有形成前 信用
社的发展和支持 三农 无法形成良性循环 贵州许多地
区信用社的人均费用在6-8万元 高于东部发达地区 优
惠政策和人民银行再贷款的支持 只使信用社职工收益
未完全体现在服务 三农 上 一些信用社尽管亏损小
但其贷款覆盖率也很低 人民银行再贷款并未体现在服
务 三农 上 而体现在信用社职工的福利上
 第四 金融财政化 风险国家化 一方面贵州省农
村的社会保障体系不健全 农村合作医疗体系也不完
善 许多信用社的贷款用于农户治病救人 显然这应该
是财政的支出 金融财政化 信用社亏损也就必然 另
一方面政府的财政是吃饭财政 政府又面临着发展经济
的压力 信用社是地方政府唯一可以影响的金融机构
政府发展经济的宏伟蓝图展开到什么地方 信用社的资
金就铺到什么地方 在当地资金跟不上的情况下 人民
银行再贷款就成了唯一的资金来源渠道 由此产生的风
险最后不得不由国家概括承受
第五 农信社主要不是缺资金 而是缺机制 如果
说现有的农信社改革有重点的话 那就是钱 所有的改
革工作都是围绕着人民银行的专项票据进行的 目前贵
州省人民银行再贷款余额为 24 亿 而这次改革获得资
金支持不足8亿元 如果数额庞大的人民银行再贷款都
不能帮助农信社脱困 我们很难相信 没有农村信用社
治理结构的根本改善,这一次的专项票据可以扭转乾坤
我们在实地访谈的时候问信用社主任两个问题 第
一 如果这个信用社是你的 能不能按现有的方式经
营？我们所得到的答案都是否定的 第二 如果这个信
用社是你的 能不能挣钱？我们所得到的答案都是肯定
的 对相当一部分信用社而言 主要不是缺资金 而是
缺一个有效率的机制 一个有效率的机制可以将死钱变
活钱 也可以吸引投资者 因此 这一轮的改革应该先
机制后资金 以有效率的机制吸引资金 以可持续的机
制留住资金
第六 省联社的设计难以适应农村金融需求多样化
的需要 以 一刀切 的方式建立县联社和省联社 或
许便于对信用社的管理 但是这样的做法也会将风险集
中到省和县 如果中央政府要求改革的风险由省一级承
担 问题是贵州省是否能够兜底 联社体制的弊端是
1 用管理代替监管 监管者不用承担风险 而管理者
却责无旁贷 2 省联社或许在其他省份适用 但并不
适用贵州省 这是因为贵州省各地经济发展水平差异较
大 各地金融需求形式多样 省联社的政策很难适用每
个地区 3 省联社的体制将会扼杀金融创新 县联社
唯省联社是听 而不是照顾到当地金融的需要 同时
在联社体制下 所有的信用社都无一例外地加入 难以
有体制外的竞争 形成了事实上的垄断 而垄断是创新
的天敌
第七 农村信用社改革的关键是要解决由谁来选择
新机制的问题 如果这次改革仅仅局限于决策权由中央
下放到省 并且由省级决策单位统一决定选择何种改革
模式 那么改革思路的转变效果将会受到限制 地方的
首创能力也将会是很有限的 难以完全避免重蹈过去十
多年农村金融改革成效不彰的覆辙 更不能消除 新瓶
旧药 之虑 要解决由谁来选择新机制的问题 应该要
实现政府角色的转换 省级决策单位更多地要从法律
法规上制定一个适应能力强 有弹性 有自我纠错能力
的全新管理体制 而不是直接决定农村信用社改革的具
体模式 换句话说 政府的主要功能是设计菜单 明码
标价 而让基层信用社或投资者根据菜单点菜 并且老
少无欺 既要允许 顾客 拼桌 也要允许 顾客 根
据其偏好分桌 就餐 也就是说 应该允许各信用社
及其投资者在自愿的基础上进行合并重组 由信用社自
行决定是加入县联社 还是独立存在 还是组织另外一
个联合体 甚 组织农村商业银行 也要允许潜在的投
资者自组新的金融机构 只有这样 金融机构才有良性
的竞争 农民才有可能找到更放心的 借钱存钱 的地
方 衡量 由谁来选择机制 的最好的办法是 新的机
制是不是多元化的 有竞争力的 并且能够照顾到存款
人和借款人的利益
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 第五章 政策建议

一个有效率的农村金融体系是将资金留在农村 用 结构调整 向中西部倾斜 7 在一些贫困地区农村信

于农业 惠及农民的最佳途径 无论合作金融 商业金 用社和政府各方协作创新 降低信用社贷款的风险 信

融 还是民间金融 只要有效率就是一种好的金融形 用社也尽力满足了农业产业化生产的资金需求 成功进

式 举例来说 坚持目前信用社所谓 合作金融 的结 行农业产业化生产农户的收入要远超过其他打工农户的

果是只有三分之一的贷款可以正常周转 如果允许商业 收入

金融存在 并要求其将从农村吸收的50%的存款用于当
地 商业金融的支农效率将明显高于 合作金融 而 目前 贫困地区人力和资金均外流 要改变这一趋

且地方政府也不用为商业金融的不良贷款 埋单 因 势 必须设计一种新的机制 使贫困地区农村信用社对

此 开放农村金融市场 鼓励多种形式的金融组织出 农户的贷款有利可图 信用社也能在经营的规模经济和

现 通过公平竞争的办法由市场决定孰优孰劣 是这一 满足当地金融需求上求得平衡 但要避免改革只使信用

轮金融改革应该坚持的信念 也是这一轮改革区别于以 社自身可持续发展 但其并没有满足当地经济金融需

往其他改革的关键 求 经济和金融没有形成良性循环 贫困地区金融机构

需要优惠政策和资金支持 但更重要的是建立良好的机

贵州省农村金融市场潜力巨大 这一判断主要是 制 农村金融改革是一个系统工程 农村信用社单并突

基于以下几个方面的原因 1 贵州省的打工经济十分 进的改革是无法取得成功的

活跃 每年汇回的资金量很大 这一部分现金流是金融
机构源源不断的活水 2 邮储改革在即 只要机制合
理 就有可能留住部分或全部邮储资金 3 经过二十 从长远看利率市场化有利于引导
多年的发展 贵州省与整个国家经济的联系越来越紧 资金投向贫困地区
密 地区分工和专业化势头开始显现出来 关键是如何
抓住机会 争取主动 4 金融机构的创新潜力很大
小额信贷 联户担保 政府贴息等多种形式的信用担保 农户贷款由于面广量大 交易成本较高 风险高
和风险分散机制可以大大提高信贷质量 如果开放金融 农村金融需要足够利差来弥补小额信贷的风险和成本
市场 允许多种形式的金融组织公平竞争 择优汰劣 因此贷款利率的放开是农村金融机构可持续发展和引导
金融机构没有不赢利的理由 5 国有商业银行从农村 资金用于农村的前提条件之一 调查表明农户对于高利
地区撤退为草根金融组织的发育提供了很大的空间 率和贷款可得性之间来选择的话 农户更倾向于后者
6 尽管支农再贷款总额不会扩大 但人民银行正在做 但现阶段由于农村金融市场垄断的格局 利率的放开可

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能成为信用社将其经营的低效率转嫁给农民负担的手
段 同样存款利率的放开也可能导 金融机构恶性竞
争 缺少资金 风险较大金融机构可能会抬高存款利率
吸收资金以掩盖其经营亏损
从长期看 利率的放开是发展的方向 利率市场化
与市场开放应同时进行 对于一个市场来讲 利率不能
达到一定的高度 供给者就不愿意进入这个市场 在利
率补偿了成本和风险之后 进入者之间的竞争会自动降
低利率 比如在玻利维亚 利率刚放开一下子达到较高
水平 随后小额信贷市场上竞争使得利率维持在一个合
理的水平 这是一个竞争均衡利率 而在我国县域只有
一家信用社的情况下 无法形成竞争均衡利率
鼓励竞争，引入新的金融机构，
探索新的成本更低、效率更高的
金融组织形式
农村金融市场开放 引入多种形式的金融组织 形
成良好的竞争环境 是信用社改革成功的前提条件 这
些金融组织形式包括 规范的 按照商业可持续原则运
作的小额信贷机构(初期只从事贷款业务 不得吸收存
款); 真正以村或生产单位为基础的互助合作组织; 真正
意义上的民营银行 以及民间金融组织等 农村信用社
的组织形式,不应只局限于国务院15号文件的几种形式
关键在于因地制宜 进行金融创新 在贵州交通不便的
农村 省联社的管理和银监局的监管 甚 县联社的管
理 均成本很大 只有建立真正互助性质 良好的治理
结构的社区金融机构 才能更好服务当地 服务于 三
农 因此 需要探索多种形式的金融组织 由市场选
择当地能生存和发展的金融组织形式
近阶段 农村信用社改革 规范小额信贷组织和真
正意义上的合作金融组织试点以及民间金融合法化是推
动农村金融市场良性竞争的几个可能的方向 特别是
可以先行以省为单位试点规范的 非公众存款类小额信
贷机构 这些机构初期以自有资金 捐赠资金为主要资
金来源 然后逐步放开批发资金 如邮储资金 进入小
额信贷业务 非公众存款类小额信贷机构的好处是 可
以避免存款类金融机构由于吸收公众存款可能带来的道
德风险 即由于存在隐性国家担保 金融机构不必承担
贷款失败的全部责任 因此 只需要非审慎金融监管
规范的小额信贷机构的发展不仅可以在农村金融市场引
进竞争机制 也是民间金融合法化的途径之一
按市场原则进行农村信用社改革
试点
按照金融分层的原则允许不同形式的金融组织平等
竞争 通过市场机制选择优胜者 过去的经验证明 政
府主导下的合作金融模式是名实难符 同时更赋予合作
金融额外的政策性任务 理所当然地认为只有合作金融
一定才能承担支农的任务 事实上 无论是合作金融还
是商业金融 只要存在政府干预 都难以可持续发展
事实上 不管采取何种形式 政府都不应该先入为主
而应该由市场和投资者来决定哪种形式更适合当地的需
要 要做到这一点 在设计上 在制度上和在操作上能
不能允许有的信用社不加入县联社？能不能允许一个县
有两个县联社？能不能允许有的县联社不加入省联社？
允许成立跨行政区划的信用社 实际上干预农信社
的行为主要在基层政府 尤其是县乡政府 应允许打破
现在信用社辖区与行政辖区 乡 县 完全相重的局面
使一个基层农信社包含几个乡 需要的话也可以让联社
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包含几个县 这实际上就是目前人民银行打破省界把全
国划分为几个中心分行区战略的延伸 每个基层农信社
或联社不要包括太多的乡与县 但也不要少于三个 从
博弈论的角度来说 两个乡或者县的政府仍然有很大的
可能性合作起来向信用社寻租 但三个或三个以上的乡
或县合作起来对付信用社的可能性就要小许多
允许赢利的信用社自主选择加入联社 或保留在联
社之外 在目前改革方案下 所有的信用社都无一例外
地被强制要求加入联社体制 难以有体制外的竞争 形
成了事实上的垄断 而垄断是创新的天敌 允许赢利的
信用社自主选择加入联社 或保留在联社之外 产生了
一个竞争的环境 同时有利于解决信用社的退出问题
对信用社的经营也产生了市场约束
创造农村信用社可持续发展的外
部环境
贵州省是中国西部欠发达省份 绝大部分是 老 收
少 边 穷 地区 虽然通过改革和落实中央扶持政策
在体制创新 机制转换和化解历史包袱 增强支农服务
功能等方面取得了明显的效果 但由于农业基础薄弱
农村贫困面大 贫困程度深 贵州省农村信用社的发展
仍然存在特殊的困难 主要表现在 一是改革后农村信
用社历史包袱仍然沉重 到2003年底 贵州省农村信用
社历年累计亏损 14.5 亿元 受政策 体制变化影响和行
政干预形成损失的不良贷款有 20 亿元 按监管报表数
据 2002 年末全省农村信用社的资不抵债额为 14.38 亿
元 中央资金扶持政策解决了 2002 年底资不抵债额的
50% 即 7.19 亿元 其余需要农村信用社和地方消化
贵州省作为西部欠发达省份和 老 少 边 穷 地区
农村信用社发展有一个渐进过程 近期难以完全消化历
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史包袱 二是还有相当数量的信用社处于 养不活 不
能撤 的境地 自身难以走出困境 全省 959 个基层农
村信用社中 人均存款 200 万元以下的有 748 个 尤其
有 234 个人均存款不足 100 万元难以生存 养不活 但
又不能撤的信用社 这些农村信用社大多地处边远少数
民族地区 服务半径大 交通不便 经营环境差 按照
有关规定 属于撤并对象 但如撤并 当地将出现 三
农 金融服务真空 农民不答应 政府不同意
为了帮助农村信用社走出困境 在改革过程中 贵
州省各级党委 政府采取了很多措施 作出了很大努力
对推动贵州省农村信用社发展 促进改革试点工作的顺
利进行起到了积极的作用 但难以从根本上解决贵州省
农村信用社面临的特殊困难 特别需要指出的是 西部
地区农村信用社 无论在业务规模 历史包袱 经营环
境以及可持续发展等方面 都与中 东部地区农村信用
社有很大差异 而现行改革试点政策本身虽然明确了
因地制宜 分类指导 这一原则 但政策执行的实际
结果表明 恰恰需要多给予支持的西部地区农村信用社
反而没有得到更多的实惠 另外 现行扶持政策除 税
和 资金政策选择 上有所体现 也不明显 区
别对待 外 实际上仍然是 一刀切 从长远来看 解
决贵州省农村信用社的困难和问题有赖于地方经济发
展 有赖于深化改革 特别是在转换经营机制上练 内
功 持续地提高农村信用社的自我发展能力 但从近
期来看 还需要国家采取进一步的扶持政策和措施 如
延长对西部地区农村信用社免征企业所得税的期限 同
时营业税全免 建立西部地区农村信用社发展基金 用
于建立电子网络设施 运钞车和员工培训等
建立农村金融机构商业可持续发展的环境 还包括
发展农业保险和大宗农产品期货市场 鼓励农村金融机
构创新 解决农户和中小企业贷款中出现的抵押和担保
难的问题等
政府的作用：创造条件，增加外
来资金对贫困地区的投入
中央政府要加大对贫困地区的基础设施的投入 包
括对交通 通讯 水利 教育 卫生等基础设施的投入
完善农村社会保障制度 为信用社从事纯商业经营创造
条件 目前信用社的许多贷款被用作财政救济资金 金
融财政化 基层财政制度的健全是健全农村金融体系的
基础 也是避免地方政府干预农村金融的前提 政府应
为金融机构创造良好的经营和信用环境 省政府有必要
制定法规 规范地方政府的行为 开展信用村 信用户
信用乡镇建设 打击逃废债 建立良好的信用环境 只
有创造良好的信用环境才能吸引更多的外来资金
此外政府要改变财政扶贫资金的使用方式 由发放
贴息贷款转为设立风险基金给金融机构一定的风险补偿
或直接补贴到户 这能起到三个作用 一是可以发挥财
政资金的杠杆作用 二是在全社会树立起金融意识和风
险意识 许多地区的农户把贴息扶贫贷款视为不需要偿
还的 这破坏了信用环境 其实应该取消 扶贫贷款
的提法 当全社会不存在所谓的扶贫优惠利率 而是以
信誉好坏进行风险溢价时 社会的金融意识就树立起来
了 信誉好的就能够拿到低利率的资金 信誉不好 风
险大就只能拿到高利率的钱 没有讨价还价的余地 让
大家培养起一个风险意识 当然这不是说不补贴了 对
确实有困难的农户可以由扶贫资金直接补贴 只是说这
个角色由 财政 而不是 金融 去扮演了 三是维护
了金融市场的正常秩序 这样能防止某些金融机构由于
掌握贴息资金而到一些商业性贷款项目上进行恶性竞
争 引起不公平 有些地区农业银行的分支机构利用扶
贫贴息贷款与其他商业银行在小水电 高速公路等商业
性项目上进行恶性竞争 扰乱了金融秩序 今后金融机 5
构的贷款只有根据风险和信誉的正常利率 无贴息贷
款 对特困户 政府通过直补解决 这样一来就维护了
金融秩序 当然 政府对贫困地区的金融机构减免税
收 也有利于降低金融机构的经营成本 鼓励其在贫困
地区增设网点
制定社区再投资法，完善邮政储
蓄资金回流机制
国有金融机构在很多农村地区只存不贷 邮政储蓄
也通过转存中央银行大量抽逃农村资金 农村地区资金
外流严重 长期资金外流必然阻碍农村经济的发展 我
国也应借鉴国外的经验 制定中国的社区再投资法或条
例 美国的社区再投资法要求金融机构在符合安全和稳
健经营原则基础上 满足其所在社区的信贷需要 但没
有硬性比例要求 而泰国要求所有的金融机构必须将存
款额的 20% 用于农业
中国的社区再投资法采取何种模式需进一步研究
法规或条例的制定也需要一段时间 但如何解决邮政储
蓄资金回流农村和利用农发行增加农村投入问题是很快
可以实施的 从全国来看 邮政储蓄大 三分之一的存
款来源于乡以下 三分之一的存款来源于县城 还有三
分之一的存款来源于城市 从贵州来看 2003 年 8 月以
来邮政储蓄大约有8亿新增可自主使用的资金5 在不开
放农村金融市场情况下 邮政储蓄资金的回流只会强化
信用社的垄断地位 道德风险严重 此外 在存款保险
制度不存在的条件下 邮政储蓄资金要通过信用社回流
农村 还要解决风险不对称的问题 借款方省联社不是
用钱方 用钱方为县联社 因此 必须结合农村金融市
经国务院批准 自 2003 年 8 月 1 日起 人民银行下调了新增邮政储蓄的转存
利率 从 4.131% 分期调 金融机构准备金存款利率水平 并允许邮政储蓄
新增存款由储蓄机构自主使用
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场的开放 研究市场化的方式使邮政储蓄新增资金回流 由于农信社比较分散 监管起来比较困难 信息的
农村的机制 在完善农发行内控机制 增加经营透明度 真实性存在疑问 必须健全农村金融机构的治理结构,
的基础上 根据经营管理能力 适当放宽其经营范围 尤 增强其经营的透明度,有效的监管机制才能发挥作用
其是农村的中长期融资 有利于解决农村资金外流问题 有效的监管机制应是正向激励的机制 监管正向激励机
制最关键的政策是 及时校正措施 PCA Prompt
Corrective Action 具体来说 当金融机构资本充足率

划清监管与管理的界线，实施 或其他绩效指标超出某临界值 监管部门就应马上采取

措施限制其业务发展和限制分红等 使信用社感到非常
最低监管要求
强的紧箍咒作用 如果再往下滑 监管机构就应要求收
购兼并 最后要在资能抵债之前关闭问题机构 结合中
国的具体情况来看 还必须建立及时有效的退出机制
我国现有的金融监管体系是传统的政府体制的一个
建立退出机制的关键是对中小存款人如何保护和补偿的
组成部分 行政干预 或微观参与 是监管的主要手段
问题 因此需要我们及时建立存款保险机制 总之 开
金融监管部门以行政审批的方式人为抬高金融机构特别
放农村金融市场的同时,监管机构应根据被监管的农村
是民营金融机构的准入门槛 以监管的名义直接影响金
金融机构的发展趋势采取及时校正措施 强化对农村金
融机构的贷款方向 以降低不良贷款而不是以金融安全
融机构的监管,同时应建立存款保险制度,才能保证农村
如退市机制 为监管目标 以单一标准而不是差别化
金融市场有效运行
的标准对金融机构实施监管等 金融监管的能力和监管
理方式在很大程度上影响了金融机构的多元化 因此
农村信用社改革试点能否成功也取决于监管手段和监管
内容的变革 第一 在监管和微观参与之间划清界线 建立农村信用社改革试点的评估
在监管和管理之间建立起一堵 防火墙 这样既可以 体系
防止信用社经营中的道德风险 也可以防止出现过度监
管 第二 应该实施 最低监管要求 严格的监管立
法可能扼杀积极的金融创新 这对转型经济来讲尤其如
任何一项改革的结果都是不确定的 不同地区
此 监管当局的主要目标应该是既防止金融风险 又不
不同环境之下改革的结果也会不同 金融改革尤其如
把金融市场管死 让金融创新有一个成长的空间 这就
此 对这次农村信用社改革试点而言 建立评估体系的
是所谓的 最低监管要求
目的是要防止由于改革产生的风险 总结改革的经验
为下一轮的改革服务 农村信用社改革试点的评估体系
应该 少包括以下三个方面的内容 1 改革后信用社
监管机构建立正向激励机制，并 自身的可持续发展能力评估 2 改革以后的农村金融
及时建立存款保险机制 体系与当地实体经济的匹配程度评估 3 改革后的农
村金融体系的创新能力评估 在建立此评估体系的基础
上 具有期权性质的中央银行票据才能发挥作用

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