Art. 19-21.
ABUSE OF RIGHT Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and
HERBERT C. HENDRY vs.CA and RESTITUTO M.
TOBIAS (Petition for review on certiorari)
FACTS: Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner
Globe Mackay in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and
administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager.
In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases
and other fraudulent transactions. According to private
respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies
and reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate
superior Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who
was then EVP and GM. Hendry confronted him by stating that
he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one
week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to
leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
when Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, Hendry
called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then
ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to
submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for
examination by the police investigators. the Manila police
investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing
private respondent of participation. Not satisfied with the
police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, who
found Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that
further investigation was still to be conducted. Hendry issued
a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to
the filing of criminal charges. Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro
Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, submitted a second
laboratory crime report reiterating his previous finding that the
handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks
and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions
were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on
Tobias also yielded negative results. Notwithstanding the two
police reports, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila
a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, later amended to just estafa. . All of the six
criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. on January
17, 1973, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his
employment has been terminated effective December 13,
1972. Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA-
NLRC-Sec of Labor-Office of the Pres. (comp. ag.)
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic
Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner
Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to
the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias filed a civil case for
damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive,
and abusive acts of petitioners. Hendry, claiming illness, did
not testify during the hearings. RTC of Manila rendered
judgment ordering petitioners to pay eighty thousand pesos
(P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed
to the CA. Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. The
CA affirmed in toto. Petitioners' MR having been denied, the
instant case was filed.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioners are liable for damages?
RULING: Petitioners contend that they could not be made
liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to
dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of
petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for
the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
excessive. the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner
for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making
a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six
criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were
dismissed.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was
improper, invoking the principle of damnumabsqueinjuria.
According to the principle of damnumabsqueinjuria, damage
or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or
amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. even granting that
petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from
work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be
held liable.
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in
Article 21 of said Code.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by
petitioners.," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA
1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of
exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition
justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and
tainted with bad faith.
VELAYO (assignee of CALI) vs. SHELL
FACTS: After the creditors present knew the balance sheet
and heard the explanations of the officers of the CALI, it was
their unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to
present suits against this corporation but to strive for a fair
pro-rata division of its assets. on that very day of the meeting
of the working committee, August 9, 1948, which Mr.
Fitzgerald attended, Defendant effected a telegraphic transfer
of its credit against the CALI to the American corporation
Shell Oil Company, Inc., assigning its credit, amounting to
$79,440.00. On August 12, 1948, the American corporation
Shell Oil Company, Inc., filed a complaint against the CALI in
the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. in and for
the County of San Bernardino, for the collection of an
assigned credit of $79,440 and a writ of attachment was
applied for and issued on the same date against a C-54 plane.
On September 17, 1948, an amended complaint was filed to
recover an assigned credit of $85,081.29 and a supplemental
attachment for a higher sum was applied for and issued against
the C-54 plane, plus miscellaneous personal properties held by
Pacific Overseas Air Lines for the CALI and on January 5,
1949, a judgment by default was entered by the American
court. Unaware of Defendant’s assignments of credit and
attachment suit, the stockholders of CALI resolved in a special
meeting of August 12, 1948, to approve the memorandum
agreement of sale to the Philippine Air Lines, Inc, and noted
“that the Board had been trying to reach an agreement with the
creditors of the corporation to prevent insolvency proceedings,
but so far no definite agreement had been reached”. The
CALI, also prompted by Defendant’s action in getting the
alleged undue preference over the other creditors by attaching
the C-54 plane in the United States, beyond the jurisdiction of
the Philippines, filed on October 7, 1948, a petition for
voluntary insolvency. Velayo, as assignee instituted a case of
Injunction with the CFI of Manila on December 17, 1948,
against the Shell Company of P. I., Ltd. restraining Defendant,
from prosecuting in and for the County of San Bernardino in
the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Court dismissed the
complaint with costs against the plaintiff. Plaintiff prays that
the judgment of the lower court be reversed and that the
Defendant be ordered to pay him damages in the sum of
P660,000 (being double the value of the airplane as
established by evidence, i.e., P330,000), with costs, and for
such other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in
the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendants acted in bad faith by
reason of betrayal of confidence and trust, Whether Defendant
may be made under the law to answer for the damages and if
so, what should be the amount of such damages.
RULING:SC reversed. the Defendant — taking advantage of
his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be
instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an
understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent
asset among them, and believing it most probable that they
would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the
case — schemed and effected the transfer of its sister
corporation in the United States, where CALI’s plane C-54
was by depriving the latter and the Assignee of the
opportunity to recover said plane. While article 19 only
contains mere declarations of principles, such declaration is
implemented by Article 21. “Art. 21.  Any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage”.
PNB vs. CA, TAPNIO, GUECO & PHIL. AM. GEN. INS.
CFI-CA-SC Certiorari to Review
FACTS: It is not disputed that defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio
was indebted to the bank in the sum of P2,000.00, plus
accumulated interests unpaid, which she failed to pay despite
demands. She claims, however, when demand was made upon
her by plaintiff for her to pay her debt to the Bank, that she
told the Plaintiff that she did not consider herself to be
indebted to the Bank at all because she had an agreement with
one Jacobo Tuazon whereby she had leased to the latter her
unused export sugar quota for the 1956-1957 agricultural year,
consisting of 1,000 piculs at the rate of P2.80 per picul, or for
a total of P2,800.00, which was already in excess of her
obligation guaranteed by plaintiff's bond. The contract of lease
of sugar quota allotment at P2.50 per picul between Rita
Gueco Tapnio and Jacobo C. Tuazon was executed on April
17, 1956. This contract was submitted to the Branch Manager
of the PNB at San Fernando, Pampanga. This arrangement
was necessary because Tapnio's indebtedness to petitioner was
secured by a mortgage on her standing crop including her
sugar quota allocation for the agricultural year corresponding
to said standing crop. The latter required the parties to raise
the consideration to P2.80 per picul, the minimum lease rental
acceptable to the Bank, or a total of P2,800.00. Tuazon
informed the Branch Manager, thru a letter dated August 10,
1956, that he was agreeable to raising the consideration to
P2.80 per picul. He further informed the manager that he was
ready to pay the said sum of P2,800.00 as the funds were in
his folder which was kept in the said Bank. This referred to the
approved loan of Tuazon from the Bank which he intended to
use in paying for the use of the sugar quota. The Branch
Manager submitted the contract of lease of sugar quota
allocation to the Head Office on September 7, 1956, with a
recommendation for approval, which recommendation was
concurred in by the Vice-President of the Bank, Mr. J. V.
Buenaventura. This notwithstanding, the Board of Directors of
petitioner required that the consideration be raised to P3.00
per picul. On February 22, 1957, Tuazon wrote a letter,
informing the Bank that he was no longer interested in
continuing the lease of sugar quota allotment. The crop year
1956-1957 ended and Mrs. Tapnio failed to utilize her sugar
quota, resulting in her loss in the sum of P2,800.00 which she
should have received had the lease in favor of Tuazon been
implemented.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is liable for the damage
caused.
RULING: While petitioner had the ultimate authority of
approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the quota
was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape
its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest
of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving
or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. The law makes
it imperative that every person "must in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, 4
This petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it knew that the
agricultural year was about to expire, that by its disapproval of
the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the
sugar quota in question. In failing to observe the reasonable
degree of care and vigilance which the surrounding
circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is consequently
liable for the damages caused on private respondents under
Art. 21.
BALANE vs. YU CHIANG
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING: Where a man by virtue of a notarized agreement,
convinced the 19-year old daughter of petitioner, to live with
him, and later on left her when she got pregnant, he can be
made to recognize his child and is liable for damages under
Art. 21 of the Civil Code for inducing the daughter to live with
him in a manner contrary to morals and good customs.
Under the New Civil Code, it is not necessary that there be a
breach of promise of marriage in order that the plaintiff in an
action for acknowledgment of natural child and support may
recover damages. The reason given by the Code Commission
is that in case a girl is already of age and was seduced, no
action for Seduction under the RPC would lie, however, the
girl and her family would have suffered incalculable damages,
which must be compensated.
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
1. Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
2. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
3. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
4. Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
LAGUNZADvs.MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES, CA
Petition for Review by certiorari
FACTS: Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of
a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based
mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty.
Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in
Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story." It narrates the
murder of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the
Nacionalista Party (then the minority party) for the
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the
November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a
member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were
tried and convicted for that murder in People vs. Lacson, et al.
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of
Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his
private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes,
of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private
respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend.
Parties executed a "Licensing Agreement". petitioner paid
private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 but contends that
he did so not pursuant to their Agreement but just to placate Art. 29. When the accused.. is acquitted on the ground that his
private respondent. Because petitioner refused to pay any guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, responded action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted a suit for sum of money. instituted.

ISSUE: Whether the CA, in upholding the right to privacy of

respondent as defined in Art. 26 NCC over the right of
petitioner to film the public life of a public figure, infringed
upon the constitutional right of petitioner to free speech and
free press.
RULING: Being a public figure ipso facto does not
automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. while
it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life
story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a
little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab
story of torture and brutality. right of freedom of expression is
not without limitations, "balancing-of-interests test." the
interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by
petitioner. The validity of the Licensing Agreement will have
to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of
expression are reached when expression touches upon matters
of essentially private concern.
AYER PRODUCTIONS vs. CAPULONG (PJ RTC MKTI) &
ENRILE
FACTS: Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his
movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned,
sometime in 1987, the for commercial viewing of the people
power entitled "The Four Day Revolution" The proposed
motion picture would be essentially a re-enactment of the
events that made possible the EDSA revolution. Local movie
producer Lope V. Juban who suggested they consult with the
appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel
V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played
major roles in the events proposed to be filmed. Enrile replied
no reference to him or his family. It appears that petitioners
acceded to this demand and the name of private respondent
Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture. respondent
filed a Complaint with TRO. McElroy flied a Motion to
Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary
Injunction contending that the mini-series fim would not
involve the private life of Enrile nor that of his family and that
a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on
their right of free expression. Petitioner Ayer Productions also
filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of
action as the mini-series had not yet been completed.
MENDOZA vs. ALCALA
Appealed from CFI Nueva Ecija, questions of law
FACTS: sometime prior to September 12, 1965, an
information, at the instance of the plaintiff, Gaudencio T.
Mendoza, filed in the CFI of Nueva Ecija charging the
defendant, Maximo M. Alcala, with the crime of estafa. The
charge was predicated upon a receipt issued by Alcala – of
P1,100 from Mr. Mendoza as dp for delivery of 100 cavans of
palay @ 56kgs/cavan on or before September 5, 1953. while
said criminal case was still pending, the plaintiff filed in the
Justice of the Peace Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, the
complaint by which this case was initiated. That complaint
was based on the very same receipt upon which the criminal
action was predicated. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
rendered judgment, dismissing plaintiff's complaint and
defendant's counterclaim, with costs against the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
RULING: It is true that said decision likewise contains no
express declaration that the acquittal of the defendant was
based upon reasonable doubt. Whether or not, however, the
acquittal is due to that ground may, under the above quoted
provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, be inferred from the
text of the decision, and a close consideration of the language
used in said decision, particularly the findings quoted above,
which are of similar import as the phrase "that the guilt of the
defendant has not been satisfactorily established," held in
Philippine National Bank vs. Catipon, supra, to be equivalent
to a declaration that the acquittal was based on reasonable
doubt, convinces us that the acquittal of the defendant in the
criminal case in question was predicated on the conclusion
that his guilt of the crime charged has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt and does not preclude a suit to enforce the
civil liability arising from the same transaction which was the
subject-matter of said criminal action.

ISSUE: whether the production and filming of the projected

mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his
privacy.

RULING: The production and filming by petitioners of the

projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not,
in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful
intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy." 1. The
motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not
exhibited to any audience, in other words, no "clear and
present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that
private respondent could lawfully assert. 2. The subject mater
does not relate to the individual life and not to the private life
of private respondent Ponce Enrile. It refers to the role played
by Enrile in the change of government in February 1986. 3.
the intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a
truthful historical account. 4. The right of privacy of a "public
figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
5. public facts of the EDSA Revolution, such portrayal may be
carried out even without a license from private respondent.

MENDOZAvs.ARIETA(CFIManila),TIMBOL&SALAZAR
review on certiorari of Orders of respondent Judge in Civil
Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based
on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and
Rodolfo Salazar.
FACTS: the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of
any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the
collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the
result of the former having been bumped from behind by the
truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded
damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver
Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
petitioner filed Civil Case with the CFI of Manila against
Salazar and Timbol, for the damages sustained by his car as a
result of the collision. owner Timbol filed a MD on the
grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in
the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action.
Judge dismissed the complaint, petitioner sought for review.
Judge also dismissed case against Salazar, "while it is true that
an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the
criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New
Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires
an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the
criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred.”
ISSUE:
RULING: Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to
constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites
must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have
been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second
actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and
Identity of cause of action. petitioner's cause of action being
based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible
error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner,
as said case may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Art. 31.
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
In so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No.
80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve,
in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil
action based on quasi-delict.
Judgment-“Salazar cannot be held able for the damages
sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car.” It being clear from the
judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not
based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for
damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly
provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code. Art. 29. When the
accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence ...If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred
from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due
to that ground.
REPUBLIC vs. HON. BELLO and ARCEÑO
Appeal from an order of the respondent CFI of Capiz
dismissing Civil Case which it filed against private respondent
Romeo A. Arceño for the recovery of his alleged liability to
the government in connection with his employment as Cashier
and Disbursing Officer of Capiz Agricultural and Fishery
School.
FACTS: Arceño was charged for malversation of public funds
in the amount of P6,619.34. After due trial, the respondent
court rendered a decision acquitting Arceño. Fiscal filed Civil
Case for the recovery of P13,790.71 which represented the
accountability of Arceño due to his failure to issue official
receipts and to immediately deposit said funds with the
National Treasury. Arceño through counsel, filed a MD the
civil case alleging that "the cause of action had been decided
in a prior judgment." Respondent court dismissed civil case.
ISSUE: whether or not the acquittal of Arceño in the criminal
case bars the filing of the civil action against him.
RULING: Order of respondent court is reversed and set aside.
that his acquittal was upon the finding that "the evidence of
the prosecution was not sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.” It is also to be noted that
while the subject-matter of the malversation case was the
amount of P6,619.34, the sum sought to be recovered in the
civil action totalled P13,790.70. The latter amount included
the five items involved in the criminal action, as well as the
additional sum of P7,170.31 representing the income of the
school from its various projects for which the accused failed to
issue official receipts. At least insofar as the recovery of the
aforesaid amount is concerned, the private respondent cannot
place in defense his acquittal in the criminal action which did
not involve said amount.
PADILLA vs. CA
petition for review on certiorari of a CA's decision which
reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted
the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of
reasonable doubt but ordered them to pay jointly and severally
the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual
damages.
FACTS: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor,
and the rest of the accused being policemen were convicted of
grave coercion. The petitioners appealed to the CA. According
to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the
clearance of market premises and the removal of the
complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted
municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a
nuisance per se. The CA modified the judgment, acquitted on
ground of reasonable doubt, but they are ordered to pay jointly
and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as
actual damages. The petitioners filed a MR contending that the
acquittal as to criminal liability results in the extinction of
their civil liability. CA denied MR, holding that appellants'
acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of
coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was
committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing
(sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on
record established that complainants suffered actual damages,
the imposition of actual damages is correct.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a
reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the
criminal charge.
RULING: Affirmed. the civil liability which is also
extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability
arising from the act as a crime. What Article 29 clearly and
expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is
not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the
remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A
separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that
such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible
mode of recovering damages.
ZENAIDA CRUZ REYESvs.JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIO-DIY,
RTC, Br. 170, Malabon and SPS. CRISTINA MALICSI and
DANILO MALICSI
Direct appeal on a question of law
FACTS: Cristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of
intriguing against honor at MTC of Navotas. The aggrieved
party was Zenaida Cruz Reyes, represented by a private
prosecutor, Atty. Barayang. The accused pleaded guilty and
was sentenced to a fine of P50.00. Because of her plea of
guilty, the aggrieved party was unable to present evidence to
prove damages against the accused. Neither was she able to
make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action
for damages. Instead, she filed a new action against Sps.
Malicsi with the RTC for damages arising from the
defamatory words uttered against her. The RTC dismissed the
civil case relying on Roa vs. dela Cruz.
ISSUE: whether or not plaintiff by her being represented by a
private prosecutor in the criminal case and her failing to make
a reservation in said case to file a separate action was barred
from filing a separate civil action for damages against the
accused Cristina Malicsi.
RULING: Granted appeal. In the Roa case there was a fall-
blown hearing where a private prosecutor participated
actively, while in this case the unexpected plea of guilt by the
accused and her being sentenced immediately to a fine of
P50.00 prevented petitioner from proving her claim for
damages and making a reservation to file a separate civil
action. The mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the
criminal case against the herein private respondents did not
necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the
aggrieved party because the accused had pleaded guilty upon
arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no
chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in support
of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the
record to file a separate civil action. Moreover, under Article
33 of the Civil Code there is no requirement that as a
condition to the filing of a separate civil action for damages a
reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal
case.
LIDELIA MAXIMOvs. JUDGE NICOLAS GEROCHI, JR.,
Circuit Crim.Court, Bacolod & CONCHITAPANGHILASON
Petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel the public
respondent Judge Nicolas Gerochi, Jr. to include in his
judgment of acquittal the civil liability which the private
respondent Conchita Panghilason admitted in court.
FACTS: On June 28, 1976, four (4) informations for estafa
were filed against Conchita Panghilason for willfully issuing
four (4) checks amounting to P35,586.00 drawn against the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in favor of the
petitioner; that the checks were dishonored for lack of funds or
that her account with said bank had been closed and that she
refused to make the necessary deposit within three (3) days
from receipt of notice to redeem the said checks. The
petitioner intervened in the case through her private prosecutor
on July 10, 1976. On December 5, 1977, the respondent judge
aquitted the accused. Petitioner filed MR praying that the
accused who had admitted her civil liability be ordered to pay
the sum of P33,586.00 plus 12% interest from the filing of the
information. The court denied the MR stating, "would not
have been a problem if the accused was convicted, for then,
this recovery of civil liability is deemed included in the
offense proved, but the question is not indubitable because the
accused was acquitted in all the four (4) informations she was
charged of."
ISSUE: Whether the lower court is correct.
RULING: The lower court is wrong. If an accused is
acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability
arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the
same judgment.
Art. 34
ABELLANA vs. MARAWE
petition for certiorari
FACTS: Petitioners insist that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in contention that he ought to have
dismissed an independent civil action filed in his court,
considering that private respondents failed to reserve their
right to institute it separately in the City Court of Ozamis City,
when the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was commenced. The dispute had its origins in a
prosecution of Abellana of the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting
a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers,
namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea,
Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeño. The criminal case
was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which found the
accused Francisco Abellana guilty as charged, damages in
favor of the offended parties likewise being awarded. The
accused, Abellana appealed to the CFI. The offended parties
filed with the CFI of Misamis Occidental, presided by
respondent Judge, a separate and independent civil action for
damages allegedly suffered by them from the reckless driving
of Abellana, including his ER. Both of them sought the
dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there
was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of
Ozamis.
ISSUE:
RULING: No. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear: "In
cases of ... physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence." 21 That is a substantive
right.
ESCUETA vs. FANLIALAN
MADEJA vs. CARO
Art. 36. Prejudicial questions, which must be decided before
any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed,
shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court
shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the
provisions of this Code.
MERCED vs. DIAZ
RULING: Where the husband files a civil case for annulment
of the second marriage on the ground of lack of consent, and
the second wife subsequently files a criminal case for bigamy
against him, the civil case for annulment is a prejudicial
question to be determined before the criminal case can
proceed. Consent is an essential element of a valid marriage.
Without consent, the marriage is void. But the question of
invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal action
for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the
validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for
bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case, and since
prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the
second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision
in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains
all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.
ROLANDO LANDICHO (CFI Batangas) vs. RELOVA
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction
FACTS: On February 27, 1963, Landicho was charged with
Bigamy. “being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay,
which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia.” On March 15, 1963, an
action was filed by Pasia before the CFI ofBatangas, likewise
presided by respondent Judge, seeking to declare her marriage
to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged
use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by
petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On
June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a
third-party complaint, against the first spouse, praying that his
marriage with her be declared null and void, on the ground
that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled
him to appear and contract marriage with her before the
Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal. on October 7, 1963,
petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case
pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two
marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent Judge
denied the motion for lack of merit. MR was likewise denied.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the
annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife
against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party
complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first
marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit
for bigamy against him.
RULING: in Zapanta v. Mendoza. "We have heretofore
defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case,
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question — we further
said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and
jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court.”
At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February
27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. , parties to a marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage
then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons
who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died
first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that
they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission
of rights from one to the other.

JOAQUIN vs. NAVARRO

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING: