Islamist Notions of Democracy

Author(s): Gudrun Kramer

Source: Middle East Report, No. 183, Political Islam (Jul. - Aug., 1993), pp. 2-8
Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc. (MERIP)
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There

Islamist Notions
of Democracy
Gudrun Kramer

Most towards
ment observers, in attempting
pluralism, to and
liberalism explain why the move?
democracy
has been relatively weak in the Arab world, have concluded
that it must have something to do with culture, and more
particularly with Islam. Growing interest and research in
the subject have not shaken the widespread notion that
there is one single political doctrine of Islam, more or
less identical with the historical caliphate and incompat?
ible with pluralist democracy as it first developed in the
West. Islam, it is said, has not in the past been democra?
tic and is unable to become so in the future.
This is, of course, an ahistorical view, and it focuses on
what Leonard Binder referred to as a "cluster of absences":
the missing concept of liberty, the lack of autonomous cor?
porate institutions, the absence of a self-confident middle
class, etc.1 Recent studies on militant Islam reinforce
the conclusion that it is only through emancipation from
Islam (passing through the stages of enlightenment and
secularization) that Muslims can hope to advance on the
road to liberty and democracy. Daniel Lerner popularized
this theme in his seminal work on modernization in the
Middle East. What Muslims were facing, he wrote, was
the choice between "Mecca or mechanization."2
The debate about Islam and democracy in the region
has, over the last decade, witnessed some fresh thinking
and considerable movement on the ground.3 A growing
Gudrun Kramer is Senior Research Fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik in Germany, and is the author of Egypt Under Mubarak:
Identity and National Interest [in German] (Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986) and The Jews in Modern Egypt, 1914-1952
(University of Washington Press, 1989).

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number of Muslims, including a good many Islamist
activists, have called for pluralist democracy, or at least
for some of its basic elements: the rule of law and the pro?
tection of human rights, political participation, govern?
ment control and accountability. The terms and concepts
used are often rather vague and imprecise. Some speak
ofshura, the idealized Islamic concept of participation-
qua-consultation; others do not hesitate to call for democ-
to focus on the theoretical aspects of the issue: Assuming
that they are acting in good faith and that they have adopt?
ed democracy as their "strategic option," is there an Islamic
path to a pluralist democratic society? And how can it be
analyzed?
There is among Muslims an explicit debate on the sub?
ject which directly compares Islamic modes of political
organization to Western-style pluralist democracy, usu-

racy; and others still may qualify it to be "Islamic democ? ally with the intent of proving Islam's superiority to Western
racy," just as in the 1950s and 1960s they would have talked concepts in moral as well as practical terms, and that indeed
about "Arab" or "Islamic socialism." Islam served as the source and model from which democ?
The phenomenon raises serious questions, political ratic as
essentials such as the rule of law or the concept of the
social contract were taken by European thinkers of the
well as methodological. Are Islamist activists sincere when
they declare their democratic convictions, or do they Middle
mere? Ages and the Enlightenment.5 There is in fact a
ly hope to gain popular support and reach power throughsizable number of comparative studies looking at specific
democratic elections? In either case it is significant that such as sovereignty, the social contract or the sep?
concepts
they should think such pronouncements can help them. arationI of powers "in Islam," in the West and in contem?
have examined this question elsewhere.4 Here I would likeArab politics.6
porary

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 The fact that they are so numerous suggests that there usul al-hukm), published in 1925, shortly after the abo?
is considerable demand, and yet, while of considerable lition of the caliphate. Almost three generations later, his
interest, their apologetic thrust reduces their value to an claims?that Muhammad was a prophet and not a states?
outside observer. More rewarding is a look at the large man, that Islam is a religion and not a state, and that
body of books, pamphlets, draft constitutions, published Islam should have nothing to do with politics?still pro?
talks and conference proceedings that discuss the rela? voke outrage.
tionship of Islam, the state and politics without direct The vocal denunciation of secularism, however, does
reference to the West. Do these reflect basic notions, insti? not imply that these authors make no distinction between
tutions and procedures characteristic of pluralist democ? the spheres of religion proper and of worldly affairs, between
racy? To what extent have they been integrated into Islamic the sacred and the profane, the eternal and the tempo?
political thinking and thus been authenticated and ren? ral. In fact, just this distinction is reflected in Islamic legal
dered acceptable to a Muslim audience? theory (fiqh), which distinguishes between the 'ibadat,
Contrary to much of the literature on the subject, it is involving a person's relation with his or her creator (essen?
not possible to talk about Islam and democracy in gener? tially the five pillars of Islam?the profession of faith,
al, but only about Muslims living and prayer, fasting, almsgiving and the
theorizing under specific historical -|- pilgrimage), and the mu'amalat, cov-
circumstances. This may sound evi- I , . , .77 , + Th ermS aU other aspects of economic,
dent enough, and yet it is all too often ?t lS n0t P?* SSW te tO taiH political and family life. While the
ignored, not least because many of about Islam a Yid democracy 'ibadat are eternal and immutable,
the Muslim authors themselves pre- . 7 , , , the mu'amalat can be adapted to the
sent their views as "the position of ^ g?1Z?rCLL,Ut
ul OH ty CLO OUt changing requirements of time and
Islam" on any given matter. There Muslims Iwin ? CLlld thcoriz- locality, provided the results con-
are certainly essentials of the faith # form to the word (nass) and spirit
(al-'aqida, al-ma'lum min al-din bil- mg UTlClCr sp?(
ziftC historical (maqasid) of the shari'a. What they
darura) accepted by all who consid- circumstanc? >9 Th 7 <? J7)nv envisage> then, are two differenti-
er themselves to be Muslims and J ated spheres of human life and activ-
who are recognized as such by their SOUYld evideTli
t enough, and ity: one revolving around faith and
coreligionists. But these thinkers , ft?,*rr
? jj
ri ,worship and the other around world-
differ considerably as to how an yetojten
U lS aU W0
ignorea. ly affairs> both of them subject t0 the
Islamic society should be orga? precepts of Islam. Islam in turn com?
nized. What is required, therefore, is specificity. prises faith, ethics and law as it was set forth in the Quran,
exemplified by the life of the Prophet Muhammad and
I base the following remarks on those whom I consid?
er to be voices of the Sunni Arab mainstream. Some of them his Companions (the sunna), and later developed by Muslim
are generally ranked as conservative, others as progres?theologians and jurists (the 'ulamaf and fuqaha') into the
sive or "enlightened" thinkers. They include members of shari'a.
the Egyptian and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhoods and There is further agreement that the hallmark of the
of the Tunisian Islamist movement led by Rashid al- truly Islamic system (al-nizam al-islami) is the appli?
Ghannushi (formerly the Movement de la Tendance cation of the shari'a and not any particular political
Islamique and Hizb an-Nahda) as well as individual authorsorder?the historical caliphate included. What matters
committed to the so-called Islamic awakening (al-yaqza is the purpose of the state and the principles it rests upon.
or al-sahwa al-islamiyya), like Muhammad 'Ammara, These principles are to be found in the Quran and sunna,
Muhammad Salim al-'Awwa, Fahmi Hawaidi, Fathi and they include, most notably, justice Cadi), mutual con?
'Uthman and others.7 They clearly speak only for certain sultation (shura), equality, freedom, and the struggle
segments of the broad Islamic movement, representing in the path of God (jihad). The militants go even fur?
the male educated urban elite and at the same time scrip? ther, declaring that any Muslim who does not apply God's
tural rather than mystical or so-called popular Islam.judgment
But and follow divine law (man lam yahkum bima
it is in these circles that the question of Islam, shuraanzala
and 'lah) is to be considered, and fought as, a sinner,
democracy is being discussed. a tyrant and an infidel.8
No sharp distinction is usually made between Islam
and the shari'a, and as a rule both terms are used inter?
Religion and State
changeably. In accordance with what might be called the
There is general agreement among these authors that functional theory of government, which sees the shari'a
Islam is comprehensive or, as the commonly used mod? as the cornerstone of an Islamic order and government
ern formula has it, that it is religion and state (al-islam
as merely the executive of God's law, the debate has shift?
din wa-dawla) or religion and world (din wa-dunya). This ed as to how the shari'a is to be defined?whether as a
formulation signals the rejection of secularism as it comprehensive
was set of norms and values regulating human
advocated by the Egyptian scholar 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziqlife in down to the minutest detail, or as a set of general
his book Islam and the Roots of Government (al-islam wa- rules of good life and moral behavior aiming at people's

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welfare on earth and their salvation in the hereafter its needs and aspirations. Government and politics are
(which still leaves room for human interpretation). part of the muamalat that are to be regulated so as to real?
There is general consensus that the sharia isizecompre? the common good (al-maslaha al-1 amma) which, if prop?
hensive but at the same time flexible and therefore suit? erly understood, coincides with the purposes (maqasid)
ed, as the formula goes, to all times and places. That of
leads
the shari'a. The logic of this argument takes them quite
to the crucial distinction between an untouchable and close to the conclusions of'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, whose theo?
immutable core (al-asl or, in modern usage, al-thabit)
retical
that
premises, in what is probably an attempt to estab?
lish orthodox
has been decisively defined by God's word (nass), and flex? credentials for what might otherwise be
considered
ible elements (al-furu or, in modern terminology, al- a dangerously modern approach, they so
mutaghayyir) derived by human reason from this emphatically
core, fol? denounce. For them, unlike for him, Islam
is religion and state, and yet, for them as for him, the
lowing the rules of Islamic jurisprudence (ijtihad).
This distinction provides one of the criteria precise
by which
form of government is left to human reason to define.
to delineate radicals and progressives, conservatives
This and
line of argument results in an apparent paradox
modernists, and it is vital to the debate about Islam
which and
has not gone unnoticed by thoughtful observers:
While the state is considered to be central to having Islamic
the state. The aim of "enlightened," modernist reformers
lawinter?
has of necessity been to define the scope of human enforced, its form and organization are declared to
pretation as extensively as possible, an endeavor which
be secondary, a matter not of substance but of technique.10
This has to be seen in relation to the common assertion
was characterized somewhat uncharitably by Malcolm
Kerr as the attempt to define the sharia primarily by itsis no prohibition for Muslims to adapt techniques
that there
"empty spaces."9 and modes of organization of non-Islamic origin, provid?
When it comes to politics, even Muslim Brothers and
ed they do not adopt any un-Islamic values. If government
organization
ulama who, according to their social views, would qualify is a matter of convenience and mere tech?
as conservatives hold remarkably modern ideas: The nique,
shari'a
then the adoption of democracy, or of certain demo?
to be applied requires social organization and a state. cratic elements, may be acceptable, recommended or even
But God in his wisdom left the details of political organi? mandatory?provided it does not lead to the neglect or vio?
zation to the Muslim community to decide according to lation of Islamic norms and values.

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 of law, but also the (only genuine) liberation of man from
Sovereignty and Authority
servitude to man ('ubudiyyat al-insan).
At the core of much contemporary writing are a number of Seen from this perspective, Islam serves as a theology
shared assumptions: that all people are born equal, hav? of liberation. And it is in this sense that the writings of Abu
ing been installed as God's viceregents on earth (istikhlaf); 1-A'la al-Maududi, Sayyid Qutb or Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani
that government exists to ensure an Islamic life and enforce have been understood by men and women in search of jus?
Islamic law; that sovereignty (siyada, hakimiyya) ulti? tice and disillusioned with the signs of all-pervading despo?
mately rests with God alone, who has made the law and tism and corruption. For the critical observer, by contrast,
defined good and evil (al-ma'rufwal-munkar), the licit and the utopian character and very real authoritarian streak
the illicit (al-halal wal-haram); that the authority (sulta) of this argument is all too obvious. For who is it, after all,
to apply God's law has been transferred to the communi? who hears and applies God's law, if not men and women
ty as a whole, which is therefore the source of all powers ruled by their passions and subjected to the limitations
(asl al-sultat); and that the head of the of their understanding? Law, it has
community or state, no matter whether _ been stated often enough, does not
he (and they specifically exclude women J ll apply itself, but is applied by fallible
from that function) be called imam, J. he dcbdi e is how the human beings.11 Still, it remains that
caliph or president, is the mere repre- , .< . h ri 4n ri *?r contemporary Islamists, both rad-
De aejineCL ^cal an(j reformist? tyranny is the main
sentative, agent or employee of the com- ?nari a IS IO
munity that elects, supervises and if ^g q COJTIDri
ihensive Set enemy, no matter whether it be defined
necessary deposes him, either direct- in strictly secular terms (istibdad) or
ly or via its representatives. Of YIOVTYIS
ind( Va tues 0n religious grounds as the taking of
human life other gods than God alone (taghut),
This simplified scheme of govern- rpaii J ri fi yip
ment does not constitute a sharp break ? s and therefore as one form of polythe-
with classical Sunni doctrines which, CLOW Tl to ethminutest ism and apostasy (shirk, ridda, kufr).
in contrast to Shi'i positions, declared ? , ? j a Qot nfaon In this logic' {t is no lonSer veiT
that the caliphate was based on the aet^^h Or u bVL uj gen- important whether the ruler (al-
CIS
consensus of the Muslim community eral rillcS (
jf good life hakim) be called caliph, imam or sim-
(ijma*), not on any preordained divine _ 7, , . ply head of state or president (ra 'is al-
order. But compared even to the wide- CLTICL TYlOVCLljenaVWr. dawla). While certain groups like the
ly quoted treatises of Ibn Taimiyya Islamic Liberation Party or leading
(d. 1328), with their emphasis on the centrality of the
Algerian Islamists still propagate the restoration of the
shari'a, modern positions mark a definite shift of empha? caliphate, many Muslim Brothers will use the term
sis away from the person of the ruler and the duty of obe?caliphate for what in fact is nothing more than a mod?
dience and acquiescence for the sake of peace and order,
ern presidency. The underlying conception is in all cases
even under unjust rule, to the authority of the communi?similar: The ruler is the agent and representative of the
ty and the responsibility of every individual believer. ThisMuslim community, entrusted with executing God's law.
shift no doubt reflects the impact of modern liberal ideas He has no religious authority whatsoever, though some
as well as the decline and eventual abolition in 1924 of the
of his tasks, such as the implementation of the shari'a
historical caliphate. or the propagation of jihad, would by Western standards
What emerges as a core concern of modern Muslims be is classified as religious. While the state rests on a reli?
to check and limit arbitrary personal rule and to replace gious foundation, its leadership carries no religious sanc?
it with the rule of law. That had already been the preoc? tion. It is to emphasize this distinction, which is not all
cupation of 19th century Arab and Ottoman constitution?that difficult to make but often neglected, that many
alists, ranging from 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi and Khair Muslim authors insist on saying that the ideal Islamic
al-Din al-Tunisi to Namik Kemal. It is basic to the advo? state is not a theocracy, which would be ruled by men of
cates of hakimiyya, God's sole sovereignty, who radically religion or a ruler of divine grace, but that it is a civil or,
deny the capacity of men and women to distinguish, by tothe
be more precise, a lay state (dawla madaniyya).
light of their intelligence, between right and wrong, licitCompared to classical treatises then, the role and func?
tion of the ruler have been re-evaluated and distinctly
and illicit. In an interesting twist, they frequently present
devalued. At the same time, there is heavy emphasis on
their argument in democratic guise: given that all people
are created equal and that consequently no one hasthe theneed for strong leadership (qiyada), though this is usu?
ally justified in strictly secular terms. The preoccupa?
right to impose their will on others", and given that peo?
tion with forceful leadership, unity, strict loyalty and obe?
ple are too weak to control their passions and desires (hawa),
a higher authority is needed to keep them in check. dience
This is mirrored in the organizational structure of
higher authority is divine law, binding on all?high virtually
and all Islamist movements, from the relatively mod?
erate
low, rich and poor. The submission to God's sovereignty as Muslim Brotherhood to the militant underground,
demonstrated in the strict and exclusive application of which
the in their internal affairs do not adhere to democra?
sharia, therefore, signifies not just the (only genuine) tic
ruleprinciples.12

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 law as well as in other fields. What they have in mind, then,
The Challenge of Pluralism
is a council of experts deciding on the grounds of "objec?
Characteristic of much contemporary political writing is tive" (Islamically valid) right and wrong, judging on the
its individualistic, activist bent and the attempt to trans? basis of the common good (al-maslaha al-'amma) only, and
late ethical and religious duties into principles of politi? not a political assembly representing conflicting opinion
cal responsibility and participation. Three elements are and interest. The ideal amounts to an expertocracy head?
basic to this effort: the Quranic injunction to enjoin good ed by the Just Ruler.
and prohibit evil (al-amr bil-ma'ruf wal-nahy 'an al-
munkar), the Prophet's appeal to give counsel (al-din al-
nasiha), and the duty to consult (shura) that is based on
both the Quran and sunna. They are interpreted so as to
make political commitment and participation the religious
duty (fard or farida) of every single individual as well as
the entire community. As a result, politics is literally sacral-
ized, and at the same time ethical and religious duties and
injunctions are systematically politicized, extended and
institutionalized. In a process that clearly betrays the
impact of modern (Western) political ideas, the transi?
tion is made from a limited involvement of the communi?
ty in selecting the leader via shura and the oath of alle?
giance (bai'a) to a constitutional system involving
continuous consultation and permanent control over the
ruler and over government in general, which are now held
responsible not only to God but also to their electorate.
Considerable thought has been given to the potential
means and instruments of political control. Going beyond
al-Mawardi's (d. 1058) concept of a separation of functions
via delegation from the ruler (tafwid), more and more
authors are inclined to accept the need for a separation
of powers in which the executive (the ruler) and the leg?
islature (the shura council, or parliament) effectively keep The point is an important one, for it highlights the dif?
each other in check. In accordance with the theory of divine
ficulties most contemporary Muslim authors have in envis?
sovereignty, though, they often add that in an Islamic con?aging consultation and participation as a genuinely polit?
text legislation (tashri') is in actual fact confined to the
ical process involving interest representation, competition
mere "application" (tatbiq) of the shari'a. The indepen? and contestation. It reflects the continued prevalence of a
dence of the judiciary is generally acknowledged, and some moral rather than a political discourse, strictly speaking.
writers suggest the institution of a higher constitutional
The ideals of unity (wahda), consensus (ijma*) and a bal?
court or council to guarantee the rule of law. anced harmony of groups and interests (tawazun), often
Much attention is given to the principle of shura, which
associated with the theological concept oftawhid (the one?
in the early history and tradition of Islam meant nothing ness of God), are still paramount. In the debate about plu?
more than consultation in all matters private and public. ralism, there is general recognition that God created peo?
It is now presented as the functional equivalent of Western
ple to be different, and that therefore differences of opinion
(ikhtilaf) are natural, legitimate and even beneficial to
parliamentary rule, and as the basis of an authentic Islamic
humankind and the Muslim community?provided they
democracy. A wide range of questions remain controver?
sial?whether consultation is a duty of the ruler, andremain within the confines of the faith and common decen?
whether he is bound by the decisions of those consulted;
cy. There is great reluctance to allow for unlimited freedom
whether they are men (there is in general little mention of
of speech and organization of those different opinions.13
women) of his own choice or the elected representativesMost authors would protest that Islam protects human
of the community, individuals only or members of formal
rights, and that it fully guarantees the freedom of thought
institutions such as political parties, religious specialists
and conscience (la ikrahafi l-din)?within the framework
only or other experts and community leaders as well; of Islam. They generally concede that it is legitimate and
whether they decide by majority rule; and whether all mat?may even be necessary to organize opinion, consultation
ters of general import have to be subjected to consultation.
and control so as to make them effective upon a strong exec?
Most authors tend to regard shura as both required and utive, and that there are therefore grounds for legitimiz?
binding (wajiba and mulzima), to accept the principle ing
of associations and political parties, on condition that
majority decision, and to see it as a formal process and
they do not represent particular whims, passions and inter?
an institution?that is, a shura council made up of elect?
ests?again within the framework of Islam only. The bot?
ed members, who ought to include specialists in Islamic
tom line remains: there can be no toleration of, nor free-

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dom for, the enemies of Islam?the hypocrite, the skeptic
and the atheist, the libertarian and the subversive. As long
as there is no certainty as to who defines the "framework
of Islam," and where exactly power and interest come into
play, pluralism and democracy remain in jeopardy.
Advances and Hesitations
These positions are ambiguous and less clear than one
would hope, but they are not as antagonistic to the val?
ues of equality, pluralism and democracy as the statements
of some of the most forceful advocates of radical political
Islam, such as the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb or the Algerian
Ali Belhaj, would suggest. The mainstream position is
remarkably flexible with respect to modes of political orga?
nization, providing for institutionalized checks on the ruler
in the form of a separation of powers, parliamentary rule,
and in some cases even multipartyism. It is more advanced
than is often acknowledged concerning the protection of
human rights, which are generally founded on the duties
towards God but nevertheless widely seen as part of the
common heritage of all humankind. Indeed, the protection
of individual rights and civil liberties from government
supervision and interference, repression and torture fig?
ures highly on Islamist agendas. But mainstream attitudes
remain highly restrictive with regard to the freedom of
political, religious and artistic expression, if that involves
the right to freely express one's religious feelings, doubts
included, and even to give up Islam altogether.14
Recent debates on the status of non-Muslims, empha?
sizing the shared rights and duties of all inhabitants of the
land, suggest that a concept of citizenship may be gradu?
ally evolving.15 It is possibly in the domain of gender rela?
tions that change is least perceptible. Mainstream posi?
tions on women continue to be strictly conservative. While
they subscribe to the equality of men and women as human
beings, they still consider women to be at the same time
threatening and vulnerable, in need of special protection
and ultimately inferior to men in terms of their mental
strength and physical condition.16 Whereas slavery is no
longer an issue in contemporary debate, polygamy and
divorce continue to be discussed on strictly traditional lines.
People like Belhaj and Qutb have tended to set the tone
of this discussion, amplified by Western media treatment
and by the strategy of repression pursued by the govern?
ments of Tunisia and Algeria. This is not the whole story,
especially in the Arab east (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Yemen). It is important to listen to the non-violent voices
of political Islam as well as to the radicals. The Muslim
Brothers, and similar movements, representing urban mid-
dleclass values, interests and aspirations, are at least as
important socially and politically as al-Jihad, and the blend?
ing approach they represent will likely become more gen?
eralized. Doubts about the credibility of certain actors,
while justified, should not invalidate efforts to discover
what the larger groups as well as influential intellectu?
als think. Their writings are as relevent, though certain?
ly not as rousing, as 'Abd al-Salam Faraj's "Forgotten Duty"
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or Qutb's "Milestones."
Put briefly, the Islamic mainstream has come to accept
crucial elements of political democracy: pluralism (with?
in the framework of Islam), political participation, gov?
ernment accountability, the rule of law and the protection
of human rights. But it has not adopted liberalism, if that
includes religious indifference. Change is more noticeable
in the domain of political organization than of social and
religious values. Having said this, it cannot be emphasized
strongly enough that what we are observing is thought
in progress, responding to a considerable extent to societal
conditions and government policies. It is to a large extent
not abstract but political, even activist, mobilizing thought,
shaped and influenced by a political environment that in
virtually all cases is neither liberal nor genuinely plural?
istic, let alone democratic. ?
Footnotes
1 Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicag
London, 1988), p. 225, discussing Bryan Turner's critique of Max Weber (Weber and
A Critical Study, London, 1974).
2 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (
York, 1958), p. 405.
3 Reviewed, e.g., in John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Is
in Middle East Journal Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 427-440; Gudrun Kra
"Liberalization and Democracy in the Arab World," inMiddle East Report, No. 174 (Janua
February 1992), pp. 22-25,35; and several contributions to Annals: Journal of the Ameri
Association of Political Science, No. 524 (November 1992), notably by Lahouari Add
I. William Zartman.
4 Gudrun Kramer, "The Integration of the Integrists: A Comparative Study of Egypt, Jordan
and Tunisia," in Ghassan Salame, ed., Socio-Economic Change and Political Mobilization
in the Arab World (forthcoming from I.B. Tauris, London).
5 For an interesting example, see Fahmi Huwaidi, "Al-islam wal-dimuqratiyya," in Al-
Mustaqbal al-Arabi, No. 166 (December 1992), pp. 5-37.
6 These are frequently published theses previously submitted to the faculties of law or
shari'a). See, e.g., Sulaiman Muhammad al-Tamawi, Al-sultat al-thalath fi l-dasatir al-'ara-
biyya al-mu'asira wa fl l-fikr al-siyasi al-islami. Dirasa Muqarina (Cairo, 1967); Fathi
'Abd al-Karim, Al-dawla wal-siyada fi l-fiqh al-islami. Dirasa Muqarina (Cairo, 1976);
Ahmad Siddiq 'Abd al-Rahman, Al-bai'a fi l-nizam al-siyasi al-islami wa-tatbiqatuha fi l-
hayat al-siyasiyya al-mu'asira (Cairo, 1988).
7 Among the first category, see, e.g., 'Abd al-Qadir 'Auda, Al-islam wa-awda'una al-siyasiyya
and Al-islam wa-awda'una al-qanuniyya, (both Cairo, no date); 'Ali Garisha, I'lan dusturi
islami (al-Mansura, 1985) and Al-mashru'iyya al-islamiyya al-'ulya, 2nd ed. (al-Mansura,
1986) (both from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood); Rashid al-Ghannushi, Maqalat, 2nd
ed. (Tunis, 1988) and Mahawir islamiya (Cairo, 1989); see also a widely read article by the
leader of the Sudanese National Islamic Front, Hasan al-Turabi, "Al-shura wal-dimuqratiyya:
ishkalat al-mustalah wal-mafhum," in Al-Mustaqbalal-'Arabi, No. 75 (May 1985), pp. 4-22.
Among the second category, see, e.g., Muhammad 'Ammara, Al-dawla al-islamiyya baina
l-'almaniyya wal-sulta al-diniyya (Cairo and Beirut, 1988); Muhammad Salim al-'Awwa, Fi
l-nizam al-siyasi lil-dawla al-islamiyya, new ed. (Cairo and Beirut, 1989 [1975]); Fahmi
Hawaidi, Al-qur'an wal-sultan. humum islamiyya mu'asira (Cairo, 1982); Muhammad Fathi
'Uthman, Dawlat al-fikra, 4th ed. (Jidda, 1985). The debates of "enlightened" (mustanirun)
intellectuals are mainly to be found in a number of periodicals, notably Al-Muslim al-Mu'asir,
Al-Ijtihad, Al-Hiwar andAl-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi (all Beirut), Al-Fikr (Cairo), 15/21 (Tunis)
and Al-Insan (Paris).
8 For a refutation of this claim which is based on Quran 5:43-46, see 'Ammara, Al-dawla
al-islamiyya, pp. 31-82.
9 Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh
and Rashid Rida (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 210f
10 See, e.g., Khalid Muhammad Khalid, Difa' 'an al-dimuqratiyya (Cairo, 1985), pp. 267ff.
11 The best known but by no means the only proponent of this criticism has been Muhammad
Sa'id al-'Ashmawi; see, e.g., Al-islam al-siyasi (Cairo, 1987) and Al-shari'a al-islamiyya wal-
qanun al-misri (Cairo, 1988); for similar reflections by a conservative Indian Muslim, see
Kemal A. Faruki, Islamic Jurisprudence (New Delhi, 1988), pp. 12-19.
12 For a theoretical formulation of Islamist authoritarianism, see, e.g., Husain bin Muhsin
bin 'Ali Jabir, Al-tariq ilajama'at al-muslimin, 3rd ed. (al-Mansura, 1989); for its critique,
see notably 'Abdallah Fahd al-Nafisi, ed., Al-haraka al-islamiyya: ru'ya mustaqbaliyya:
awraq fi l-naqd al-dhati (Cairo, 1989).
13 For further details, see my "Islam et pluralisme" in Democratie et democratisations dans
le monde arabe (Cairo: Dossiers du CEDE J, 1992), pp. 339-351.
14 Apostasy (ridda) is generally equated with high treason and is at least theoretically pun?
ishable by death.
15 See, e.g., Center for Arab Unity Studies, ed.,Al-hiwar al-qawmi al-dini (Beirut, 1989)
esp. pp. 137-165.
16 See Fatima Mernissi, La Peur?modernite: Le conflit islam et democratie (Paris, 1991);
and Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London and
New York, 1991) pp. 35-47.
Middle East Report ? July-August 1993