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    Internal aids to interpretation

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    23 views33 pages

    Internal Aid

    Uploaded by

    Avar Lamba
    Internal aids to interpretation

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 33
    (ikke INTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION Besides its various sections, a statute has many oe Parts, such ag , short title, long title, preamble, marginal Cee eadings, definition A interpretation clauses, provisos, illustrations, EIce tions ane SAVINg clauise explanations, schedules ‘and punctuation. It is import ant to know as to whethe these parts can be of any help to the courts in the interpretation of a section 4 other words, the question is whether they can act/as internal aids ,, interpretation. Short Title The short title of the Act_is only its name and is given solely for the purpose of facility of reference!)It is merely a name given for identification of the ‘Act and generally ends with the year of passing of the Act, such as the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Indian Evidence ‘Act, 1872, etc. In some modern statutes the short title is sometimes given ina section near the end of the Act with the use of the language ‘this Act may be cited as the.....’ even though generally it continues to be given in the beginning with the words : This Act may be called... For instance, Section 1 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 inter alia says: This Act may be called the Indian Evidene ‘Act, 1872, and Section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 inter alia says: ‘This Act may be called the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988". Even though it is a part of the statute, it has no role to play while interpreting 1 provision of the Act. Neither can it extend nor can it delimit the clear meaning of a particular provision. Long Title G statute is headed by a long title whose purpose is to give a genet description about the object of the Act)Normally, it begins with the words 4n Act to....... For instance, the long title of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19% says ‘An Act te consolidate and amend the few relating 12 criminal _procedut, and that of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 says : ‘An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and for matters connected therewith.’ In the olden days the long title was not considered a part of the statute and was, therefore, not considered an aid while interpreting it. There has been @ change in the thinking of the courts in recent times and there are numerous occasions when help has been taken from the long title to interpret certain provisions of the statute but only to the extent of removing confusions le ambiguities(If the words ina statute are unambiguous, no help is derived 0" the long s ‘AStwini Kuma? Wa"ArabindayBose)! the petitioner who was an Advo“e of the Calcutta High Court also the errene coun filed in the Registry in 1, AIR 1952 SC 369. (196) _ —=-, a 0 INTERPRETATION “197 Al rrant of authority executed in his favour to appear for his ind that under the High Court Rules and Orders, Original uld not act but only plead, the warrant of authority was ner argued that he being an Advocate of the Supreme ght to act and plead all by himself withcut any instructions from a Mie Supreme Court looked at the long title of the Supreme Court mice in High Courts) Act, 1951, which said : An Act to authorise ee Supreme Court to practise as of right in any High Court and iO whe contention of the petitioner.) apt wa a} side & Bai arson the BON e petitio interpretation of Section 4 of the spkeial Criminal Law Amendment Act, 199 was involved. Under this Wet BEES ate Government was empowered to choose as to which particular asd go for reference to the Special Court to be tried under a special. adureXfhis was challenged as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. fe Court rejected the contention and held, inter alia, that the long Me of the Act which said An Act to provide for the more speedy trial and = effective punishment of certain offences was clear enough to give the gute Government a discretion as to which offences deserved to be tried by the special courts under a special procedure) In interpretation of the words ‘obtained credit’ in Section 13 (1) of the Debtor's Act, 1869 was involved. The House of Lords looked at the Jong ttle of the Act which reads ‘An Act for the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt, for the punishment of fraudulent debtors, and for other purposes’ and held that the words refer to credit for the payment of money) Preamble ible contains the main objects of the Act and is, therefore, a part of the statute)On the basis of this reason, it deserves to be considered by the Courts a5 an internal aid to intecpretation. It is said that preamble is the key to open the mind of the legislature (Ithas, however, been unequivocally observed that lf the language of an enactment is clear and unambiguous, the preamble ‘esto part to play in interpretation) But(if more than one interpretation are pee ot a particular provision, Kelp can be taken from the preamble of the find out its true meaning) The modern trend generally is not to have a meee aac Asa consequence, the importance of preamble as an aid to is declining Maxwell quotes the observation of Lord Normand in AttormeyGeneralys Benerally ; When there is a preamble ‘t is deta ts ee eae a a the mischief to 7 remedied and the scope of the are i ; aid pao tis therefore clearly permissible to have recourse to it as an tne Weight ing the enacting provisions, The preamble is not, however, of the ‘vant Acts, enact nn Zid 10 construction of a section of the Act as are other There a8 Words to be found elsewhere in the Act or even in related There z May be no exact correspondence between preamble and enactment, 3 ARISSS Sc ao9, 1a £ Menage. 957 Ac a 7 Sualutes, 12th ed., p. 7. PP: 467-468 (HL), — —— lc tt 198 THE INTERPRET, TION Op: ¢ TATU, and the enactment may go beyond, or it ma fall short of the indicat may be gathered from the preamble, Again(the preamole ANOE be of mt any @ssistance in construing provisions Which embody Quallificay exceptions from the operation of the general Purpose of the Act, It jg Fy it conveys a clear and definite meaning in comparison with relatively a ey indefinite enacting words that the preamble may legitimately Prevaity Courts are concerned with the practical business of deciding a tis, and wpe™ plaintiff puts forward one construction of an enactmen and the defen another, it is the courts business in any case of some difficulty, after infor itself of what I have called the legal and- factual Context including 4 Preamble, to consider in the light of this knowledge whether the o,°,! words admit of both the rival constructions put forward Jif they admit of a one construction, that construction will receive effect even if i. is inconsisten with the preamble, but if the enacting words are capable of either of thr Constructions offered by the parties, the construction which fits the preambs may be preferred”) The court ruled that since the enacting words were capable of any one construction, the meaning was clear and the Preamble, which itse was vague, and no role to play. In enactin the Supreme Court was as (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 according to which ‘whenever it appears to Central Government that coal is likely to be obtained from land in any locality it may by notification in the official gazette, give notice of its intention to Prospect for coal therein’. The Preamble of the Act, however, reads, ‘An Act to establish in the economic interest of India greater public control over *he coal pyer such land for the existinguishment or modification ot such rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease, licence or otherwise, and for mate's connected therewith. It was argued that on the basis of Section 4 (1) acquisition of only virgin land could be begun in view of the use of the words ‘unworke land’ in the preamble. Rejecting the argument it waheld that help from the Preamble could not be taken to distort the clear intention of the legisla . found out from the unambiguous language of the provision. Therefore, = Provision empowers the government to isstie notificarion showing its intentio to prospect any land including virgin lan fin, the constitutionality of Section ‘4 the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was involved vis-a-vis Article i. the Constitution. This provision authorised the State Government to selec uy particular cases which deserved to be tried by the special courts havin} followed special procedure. The preamble of the Act reads ; Wiereas the expedient to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences... Supreme Court held that the language of the particular provision » State ambiguously vested discretion in the faa Government to choose as to which cases should §0 before .ne specia! courts 6 AIR 1961 SC 954. 7. AIR 19528675, JOINTERPRETATION = ex a special procedure and, therefore, the particular provision d constitutional. ais peter wl y Jegitimate a" oe the question was whether Section in icriminal Law Amendment Act, 1949 was violative of Article 14 West mitution iP that it gave arbitrary power to the government to chonse ne COPS vp were to be tried by the special courts under a special procedure ges’ tain benefits Which could be had if the cases were tried in ordinary jen jer normal procedure. The Supreme Court observed that the preamble aut whch which stated, Whereas tts expedient to provide for more speedy aie AST iective punishment of certain offences clearly points out that pal a at res were to be tried speedily under a special procedure by the sts wha he goverment Nad a right to choose which cases were press vied Conseaentiv. there WS no violation of Article 14 of the 2 i esncannsiteoheReisa the preamble of the Rajasthan (oection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1957 promulgated by the Rajpramukh of the Sate reads—Whereas with a view to putting a check on the growing tendency Gilindholders to eject or dispossess tenants from their holdings, and the wiser © onal interest of increasing the production of foodgrains it is expedient to make provision for the protection of tenants in Rajasthan from ejectment or : from holdings.’ The appellant contended that the Ordinance was Native of article 14 of the Constitution because restrictions were placed on fick landholders only who had tenants on April 1, 1948 while other landholders were not subjected to any such restrictions. It was further argued that Section 15 of the panne gave absolute discretion to the government to determine which person or classes of persons were exempted from the operation dlthe Ordinance¢The Supreme court held that the preamble clearly set about he of the Ordinance and the legislature was fully competent io decide date on which the law had to come into existence as well as the discretion es in the government to decide cases of exemption from the Speration of the law __lnKangsari v. State of West Bengal,! a specified area was declared a cued atea through a notification issued under the West Bengal Tribunals tinal Jurisdiction Act, 1952 and the appellants were prosecuted before a constituted under the Act for having committed certain offences. The ants prayed before the High Court that proceedings against them be Mts denn the government had been given an absolute power under the fee tis a, an area a disturbed area in which there was disturbance in the Cn eee camunatory between those persons whose trials had already and those who had to be tried under the special procedure Prescribe oa the Act. It wasffeld by the Supreme Court that the Act was ; a ie Article 14 of the Constitution. The preamble clearly defined tNeaicning az tatute as making provisions for dealing with the disturbances se security of the State, maintenance of public peace and ifthe ach is ghalloged tte eel fran tl. ~ 200 ; THE INTERPRETA Tio OF gy, i tranquillity, and protecting business and industries by provi trial in such case) The legislature was fully competent ¢ objectives and as Such there was nothing which violates Article Peet Constitution. OF th tn 1 Supreme Court disregarded the preamble while interpreting the worg ‘a_i “Dion gf in the Bihar Annual Finance Act, 1950 which had amend the that word as given in the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 19. The lang amendment was clear but the preamble to the 1950 Act reads, “ expedient to amend the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 and. to lay di sales tax payable under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 for th. F beginning on the Ist day of April, 1950 and to make furthe: OVvisions connection with the finances of the State of Bihar. (t was. helt ga nt ridiculous to think that the amendment was meant for only one year as show, by the preamble even though the language of the amended definition of the Word ‘dealer’ is unambiguous. Since the preamble cannot have Precedence over the clear language of the section, it has to be rejected) In petenrenananezae the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1922 was extended to the area of a tenant against whom a suit of eviction was pending. An application under Section 9 of the Act was moved by the tenant, who had constructed a building op the land, praying for an order against the lessor to sell the land to him.(The Supreme Court held that even though the preamble of the Act stated that the Act was passed to give Protection to tenants who had constructed buildings on lands of others in the hope that they would not be evicted, no reference to it could be made while interpreting Section 2 (4) which defined the word tenant or Sections 3.and9 since there is no ambiguity in these Provisions. A tenant entitled to buy under Section 9 must be a tenant entitled to compensation under Section 3 of the Act) The facts of 3 were that a appellant challenged his conviction under Section 5 of the Prevention 0 Corruption Act, 1947. His main ground was that after the establishment e) a Delhi Special Police Establishment, the anti-corruption department 0} oe Delhi Police has ceased to have power of investigating bribery cases ba the preamble of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 poonae to this effect. Rejecting this contention, fhe Supreme Court held ae preamble can interfere with the clear and unambiguous words of a oe Section 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 See eae Delhi Special Police also to investigate such cases and this pucerett el mentioned that the anti-corruption branch of the regular Delhi Polit ceased to have power of investigation. The 1946 Act is only a pe legislation. The Supreme Court in eo ndia;'4 se seized of the question of interpretinz Section 23 (1) of the 11. AIR 1962SC 660. 12 AIR 1966 SC 361 13. AIR 1973 SC.913. 14. AIR 1981 SC 234. ys INTERPRETATION 201 : and Regulation) Act 1975, By this provision the government is wt cae allot government land to any person for any purpose relating to or wpiyetstoalnign any industry or for providing such residential ‘ con on to employees of any industry as the State Government may comment preamble to the Act showed that the object of the Act is pr of concentration of urban land in the hands of a few and its renin Of re common good/Tt was held by majority, thatthe provision Faatnton 1" fred in the light of Section 23 (4) which provides that all 18 ne be distributed to subserve common good as well as the pant land shat interpreted it was clear that vacant land could be ean os, to subserve common good not otherwise, 5 the Supreme Court observed that ighether it is the ‘onstitution that is expounded or the constitutional validity ofastatute that 1s considered cardinal rule is to look to the preamble to the Consitution as the guiding light and to the Directive Principles of State Policy asthe book of interpretation) The preamble embodies and expresses the hopes aisaprations of the people. The Directive Principles set proximate goals, when it is the task of examining statutes against the Constitution, it is through flee glasses that the court must look ‘distant vision’ or ‘near vision’. The Constitution being sui generis, where constitutional issues are under ‘ensderation, narrow interpretative rules which may have relevance when legislative enactments are interpreted may be misplaced. In 1977 the forty- second amendment proclaimed India a Socialist Republic‘The word ‘socialist’ vas introduced into the preamble to the Constitution. The implication of this ‘word, which has now become the centre of the hopes and aspirations of the people—a beacon to guide and inspire all that is enshrined in the various aricles of the Constitution is clearly to set up a vibrant throbbing socialist welare society in place of a feudal exploited Pcie ah atever Article of the Constitution it is that the Court seeks to interpret, whatever statute it is ‘whose constitutional validity is sought to be questioned, the court must strive to Bi Sich an interpretation as will promote the march and progress oe ilist Democratic State’ In the pipes Court while interpreting certain provisions of the Textile ings (Take over of Management) Act, 1983 held that when the zie of an Act is clear, preamble cannot be invoked to In i 7 Sermon oe psn co eh nd apn ce a Area the expression ‘other milch an cattles’ in ees ‘ aaa was in question. The Supreme Court held that this Which js ich een used to describe a specie and not age. A specie of cattle Session Qe yo Crausht during its span of life is included within this ory of ne, to be milch or draught it cannot be pulled out from the ; ler milch and draught cattle.’ Prohibition on slaughters of cows 6 lll 202 THE INTERPRETATION Of ota TATU and calves—this expression does not limit prohibition to period thoy functional. (Ehe facts stated in the preamble and the Statements of Obj Reasons appended to any legislation are evidence of legislative jee These, therefore, constitute important factors which amongst others ay taken into consideration by the Court in judging the reasonableness a be restriction imposed on the fundamental rights of the individual ay In Rice RNC Ost a tea Supreme Court observed that the preamble to the Interest on Delay, Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 not exactly correspond with the enactment;@be enactment may go beyond the preamblé)Thus, @e expréssion “amount due from buyer, together with the amount of interest under Section 6 (1)" is not to be given a restricted meaning) The word ‘together’ in this provision would mean ‘alongwith’ or ‘as well as Thus, action under Section 6 (2) can be maintained for recovery of the principal amount or interest or only interest where liability is admitted or disputed in respect of goods supplied or services rendered. ce eS et the Supreme Court ruled that the preamble cannot control the enacting parf)This, read with the provisions of a statute, however, | makes the legislative Scheme clear and can be used to determine the true meaning of the enacting provision and whether given the other provisions of the Act, the enacting provision can be given effect to without defeating the scheme of the entire Act. Secticn 27(c)(iii) as amended in 2012 of the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2011 seeking to levy market fee even on those units which merely bring agricultural produce into the market area for carrying out manufacturing is against the scheme of the Act inasmuch as there is no sale or purchase of product within the market area per se. Entry 52 0’ List 1 governs process of manufacture and production and the State is incompetent to enact the said section. Thus, Section 27(c)(iii) as amended is liable to be struck down as ulira vires the Constitution. Section 27(c)(iv) of the Act as amended in 2012 is constitutionally valid. The purchaser must prove that agricultural produce '§ brought from the other State which is an inter-State sale and is in accordance with the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Marginal Notes Marginal notes are those notes which are inserted at the es sections in an Act and express the effect of the sections)These are also known" side notes. In the olden times Help used to be taken sometimes from 1” marginal notes when the clear meaning of an enactment was in doubt. But ay modern view of the courts is that marginal notes should have no role (0 Pit while interpreting a statute. The basis of this view is that the marginal NO" are not parts of a statute because they are not inserted by thé legislators en 5 they printed in the margin under the instructions or authority °' |, legislature (hese notes are inserted by the drafters and many times they Tr be inaccurate too. However, there may be exceptional circumstances — e side of the 18. AIR 2010SC 1625. 19. AIR 2016SC 394. TON ™ qo INTERPRET nserted by the legislatures and, therefore, while anent help can be taken from such marginal notes The cha case, The marginal notes were inserted by the therefore, while interpreting the Indian ible to seek guidance and help from the bly and, the Supreme Court, by {hat the marginal notes to Article 286 of the Constitution was tution and, therefore, it could be relied on to furnish a clue } The marginal note to Article 286 of he and meaning of that Article, Ms. Restrictions as to imposition of tax on the sale or purchase unlike the marginal notes in the Acts, in the British is part of the Constitution as passed by the Constituent Assembly "furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the . Venkatarama A’ yar, J. in his minority judgment held that ote fo Article 286 (1 (a) cannot be referred to for construing the is clearly inadmissible for cutting down the plain meaning of the Constitution sn gummi of fbicroseenionsy interpretation of Section 1 githe Official Secrets was in question under which it was an offence jperson to approach or be in the neighbourhood of or enter any for any purpose prejudicial for the safety or the interests of ‘The marginal note to the section was Penalties for spying’ ‘of Lords refused to interpret the section restrictively on the basis sinal note and held that the language of the provision was and must be given effect) In 2 the respondents had entered into a contract wit to supply electricity at certain rates. They sought to increase ‘on the ground that power generation, distribution and supply me costlier. Section 59 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 stated that a the rates of supply of power would remain the same and if we was desired, permission to that effect from the State ent would be needed. Supreme Court held that Section 59 of the did not empower the Electricity Board to enhance the rates of 8 a of contractual obligations and the marginal notes to this principles for Boards’ Finance, were of no value as aid to 23 theSupreme Court held that marginal of a statute and the titles of its chapters cannot a contained in the Act so as to render those provisions Lif they are otherwise within the competence of the i must principally have regard to the object of an Act in Whether the exercise of the legislative power is purposive, 0 204 THE INTERPRETATION of gy, A TUT unless, of course, the provisions of the Act show that the avowed of; object is a mere pretence for converting a veiled transgression committed deg legislature upon its own powers. Whether a particular object can be suse) achieved by an Act is largely a matter of legislative policy In 24 it was stated by the Suy Court that whileGt is undoubtedly true that the marginal note to 4 cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the section, it can certainly a | i on.ag indicating the drift of the secti Ww What the ae dealing witht cannot control the interpretation of the words of a see | particularly when the language of the section is clear_and unambiguous be being part of the statute, it prima facie furnishes some clue as to the meaning | -and_purpose of the-section. The marginal note to Section 52, Income Tax Act 1961 was originally a marginal note to what is presently sub-section (Q) and significantly enough, this marginal note remained unchanged even aiter the introduction of sub-section (2) suggesting clearly that it was meant by Parliament to apply to both sub-section of (2) is also intended to deal with cases where there is understatement of the consideration in respect of the transfer. In > the Supreme Court held thai({f the relevant provisions in the body of a statute firmly point towards a construction hich would conflict with the marginal note, the marginal note has to yiel> there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the provisions in the body of the statute, the marginal note may be looked into as an aid to construction.) Jn PiAlshayFoty av aeburningsO fiery Kollam Districts Panchayathz* the High Court of Kerala held that the marginal note of Article 2430 of the Constitution, namely, “Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters” zelied upon for interpretation of a provision only if there is ambiguity in the wording of the main provision, and_if on notice any ambiguity, the words of the main provision itself lends key to its interpretation and marginal note cannot control the sami ie neither this Article nor Section 88 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, there is no intention to oust jurisdiction of Civil Court from election matters. cess, | Headings | GGeadings are prefixed to sections or a group or a set of sections, es | headings have been by courts as preambles t or set sections. Naturally, the cules applicable to the preamble are followed in 9 SRseescigg5 ——— a AR BSC335," SC 2176, Bs THE INTERPRETATION of gy, TATU An the Supreme Court held g use of the word ‘means’ in a definition clause indicates.a conchisive qe But if the definition section of an Act in which various terms have bees 2&. opens with the words in this Act ‘unless the context otherwise requires! would indicate that the definitions which are indicated to be concent not be treated to be conclusive if it was otherwise required by the conte implies that a definition, like any other word in a statute, has to be read 2 light of the context and scheme of the Act as also the object for which the 4 was made by the legislature and as would aid the achievement of the pumps which is sought to be served by the Act. ia CREAR interpretation of Sections 2-h (i) and 13 (2) (i) along with its proviso of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was involved/In Section 2-h(i) a tenant is defined to means person by whom or on whose account rent is payable but does not include person placed in occupation by the tenant without the consent in writing of the landlord? Section 13 (2) (i) empowers a landlord to begin eviction proceedings against a tenant in the event of arrears in rent. The proviso to this section, however, enables a tenant to avoid eviction if he pays up the rent arrears along with interest and cost on the first day of the hearing. The Supreme Court gave no importance to the definition of tenant under Section 2-h (i) and held that a person who was inducted into the premises by the tenant but who was not admitted to be his tenant by the landlord was entitled to pay up the amount as stated by the proviso to Section 13 (2) (i) of the Act. a SEIT TEER gpm ED xthe question was whether prize money received by a participant in a motor rally was ‘income’ within the premise of Section 2 (24) of the Income-tax Act 156. The Supreme Court held that several clauses in Section 2 (24) were MO exhaustive in nature and, therefore, money received under any new head covered under the provision in income and so subject to income-tax under law) The issue before the Supreme Court in ia reiaiaiseaadiiiscaar mete ee wheter raison service of a probationer as per his contract of employment is a ee a within the meaning of Section 2 (00) of the Industrial Disputes Act, given 2 Court observed that the words ‘for any reason whatsoever’ had been 8 fi : trench ni retation in the ith a view to give ret eos benefits_to the workmen, But after the amendment effected by Act 47 on termination of service on SSIINE non eTaT AF onesact of employ of expiry of the period or termination under a stipulation in the com (fields employment have been excluded from the word ‘retrenchment’. It W204 therefore, that termination of the probationer’s contract w4° retrenchment> 49. AIR 1997SC. 50. AL& 1990 SC 808. 51. AIR 1993 SC 1671. 52. AIR 1994 SC 1343, _ eee 70 INTERPRETATION 21 NAL AIDS pre ane HeNEATTERITTERRCAIA tne question wa | » Oe was a ‘servi n the meaning of Section 2 ) whelhet et Aengumer Protection Act, 1986. The Supreme Court ruled that ‘housing, walt tion’ is a ‘service’ within that provision eyen though the provision castructjysive definition of the word ‘service’ This interpretation was sad as correct by the Parliament which amended the provision in 1993 and ey included ‘housing construction’ within the word ‘service’ one ‘the Supreme Court held that the fefniion of the word mineral’ under the Mines Act, 1952 had been teeporated in the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of YerinLand) Act, 1962 by reference, and that the context, scheme and object of the Act clearly points out that ‘water’ is a ‘mineral’ within the meaning of the Act. The question before the Supreme Court in SUMMA Seas. whether termination of service ef a seasonal worker amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of the definition of ‘retrenchment’ in Section 2 (00) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was observed by the court that the words ‘for any reason whatsoever’ are being given a very wide interpretation in the past so that retrenchment benefits could be made available to the workmen. But with the amendment of the provision by Act 49 of 1984 termination of service on account of non-renewal of contract of employment of expiry of the period or termination under a stipulation in the contract of employment have been excluded from the word ‘retrenchment’, Consequently, termination of service of a seasonal worker is not ‘Tetrenchment. In tng : the question a interpreting. x expression ‘sale price oo (@) of the ) West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 involved. The expre: aoe defined under the provision to_mean ‘money consideration for the sale’ Im that ilude ‘any sum charged for containers etc’. The Supreme Court held de i « tespect of freight and delivery charges by . the seller ies naturally within the meaning o let ey ne OF ne words “maney_consideration 1 clause, “even though the same has not been mentioned by the inclusive The Supreme Court in tone was seized of the question of compel the expression a ntl xy “ticle 236 (a) of the Con: According to tl ne | *pression ‘district ; | stitution. According to this p idge, joinp getist idge’ includes judge of a city civil court, additional district Joint district ed s SOU, chief pean, judge, assistant district judge, chief judge of a small cause Sess Mv Presidency magistrate, additional chief presidency magistrate, = ludge, Additional Sessions Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge. AIR 1994 50 Assy ne”. AIR SCo 42. ie = - THE INTERPRETA Tioy ON OF gp An, Observing that the enumerations after the word ‘includes’ are: yoy the Supreme Court held(that hierarchy of specialised civil ¢,,°uy labour courts and industrial courts also fall under the expression ‘4,0: under this provision even though these have not been express clu within the inclusive clause. In 8 the question was whether ‘watery. coconut’ is so subject to entry tax under the Madhya Prad . Ke PraveshParKar Adhiniyam, 1976. The Entry 5 provided for ane that is to say, coconut, i.e. copra and coconut including any other comma. enumerative and exhaustive and circumscribes to @ great extent the scop. 1, entry ©il seeds’ botanically mean seeds which are flowering plants uni reproduction or germ capable of developing into another such plan which can yield oil is an oil seed. If a commodity possesses all the qualities an oil seed it cannot be excluded from the ambit of the expression ‘oil seed’ 0 is generally extracted from dry coconut, but in some parts of India it is exinc even from copra recovered from fresh coconuts. Copra of watery coconut befor: dries up may not yield as dried copra. The oil which it yields may also cont: some wafety substance which have to be eliminated for the purpos« recovering pure coconut oil, At the same time, it yields sufficient quantiy oil. Thus, ‘watery coconut’ falls within the entry. In ERT Samet interpretation of the word ‘agriculture’ was in question under Section 30! Tamil Nadu Revision of Tariff Rates on Supply of Electrical Energy Act 7” Tne relevant entry in the Act as its historical background show was intended ® provide electricity at concessional rates or free of any charge to the fam observed the Supreme Court.@ person engaged in aguaculture or fish farm! would not be called a farm@) Agriculture has to be read in pone cult with the term aquaculture. is a branc! freely ust is not agriculture. Definitions given in other enactments cannot be I: ce used for finding out meaning to be assigned to a term of common parlane altogether different setting. A 1 ache a catalog the Supreme interpreted Section 12 of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent a nt Act, 1960. A landlord recovered possession of a premises fro" 9 1 reconstruction, After re-construction he offered the premises back angee? a ‘on enhanced rent. The Supreme Court held the same i P the section is unambiguous. The Court remarked that when | ambiguity in the language of a provision, heading or title of a se role to play in its interpretation. In c oper as # improper 2 ores jon the Supreme Court held that the wor AIR 2000 SC 1578. AIR 2004 SC 2341, ‘AIR. 2004 SC 3625, AIR 2007 SC 789. Z fSee ‘AIDS TO INTERPRETATION 213 urea ima facie thi it excludes limitation. The word ‘include’ is_ iy used in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring re tute. : Sie body of the stat ips BuNEBSBA ipa Unb GF WHeSupreme Court observed ay’_and non-inclusion of ‘dearness thal ae other allowances’ in the definition of ‘emoluments’ in Rule 62 of alofanttevice Rules, Part Ill is significant, The definition is intended to eal tonly pay and dearness pay would be considered as emolument for ae pension {The words ‘and includes’ in this rule mean ‘comprises’ or cahass of f pay, dearness allowance and other allowances were already faded in ‘emolument’ with reference to its general or normal meaning, there eso reason to specifically again include “pays of was ruled by the Supreme scare 3 ction 2 (1) (m) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which enumerates four categories, namely, (i) a firm whether registered or not, (ii) a Hindu undivided family, (iii) a Co- operative society, and (iv) every other association of persons whether registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or not while defining the word ' cannot be held to be restrictive and confined to these four ce is not said in terms that ‘person’ shall mean one or other of the igs which are enumerated, but that it shall ‘include’ them) Section 2 (1) (m) ‘saninterpretation clause and must have been intended by the legislature to be taken into account in construing the expression ‘person’ as it occurs in Section 2 (}) @Gvhile defining ‘pers ( ‘on’ in Section 2 (1) (m), the legislature never inlended-to exclude a juristic person like company) The resort to the word ‘includes’ by the legislature often shows the intention of the legislature that it a 'o give extensive and enlarged meaning to such expression, sometimes, desianey/ he Context may suggest that the word ‘includes’ may have been igned to mean ‘means’. The setting, context and object of an enactment may Provide sufficient gui i i ‘i §uidance for interpretation of the word ‘includes’ for the Purposes of such enactment. In iadader i the Supreme Court held that the phrase_‘and Ownersts tage’ in the bracket in Section 2 (a-1) of the Maharashtra anager 3'8 (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Bent and Transfer) Act, 1963 and the rules made thereunder does not by i ithin the meaning of the word ‘flat'(If ‘garage’ w. Sy legislature to be a ‘flat’, that could have been easil 1, Whar oe &xPression ‘or garage’ after the word business’ in Section 2 (a- ‘ and an "The words "covered /open garage’ in the Model Form V cannot Aras = ‘THE INTERPRET AT, ETATION op g Tay Mn override the true meaning of the term ‘garage’. Undue importance given to the word ‘open’ which has loosely been used. 1 aS aS important questions with respo Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 were to bert! ts ‘The Supreme Court ruled that use of the word “means” in the depen “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f)Gnakes the definition restr exhaustive) Domestic violence is a human Tights issue. Relationsh yf. nature of marriage means a relationship which has some inherent or characteristics of a marriage though not a marriage legally recognize; Relationship in the nature of marriage and marital relationship have na, distinctions. Relationship of marriage continues notwithstanding the fact, there are differences of opinions, marital unrest etc., even if they ate sharing a shared household being based on law. But live-in relationship; purely an arrangement between the parties unlike a legal marriage. Once: party to a live-in relationship determines that he/she does not wish to liveis such a relationship, that relationship comes to an end. Further, ini relationship in the nature of marriage the party asserting the existence of tv relationship at any stage or at any point of time, must positively prove tt & existence of the identifying characteristics of that relationship since the Thuis hues. legislature has used the expression “in the nature of’. Domestic relations between same sex partners (Gay an i ized by the Act Su a relationship cannot be termed as a relationship in the nature of marrig: 2AM Section 2(f) of the Act though uses the expression “any two perso . Ib § 4 ression “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) takes in only a woman UD mtegg: hence the Be same sex relationships and any act, omit eek ? “commission or conduct of any of the parties would not lead to domestic viele ried pers Should ng hie a se entitling any relief under the Act-Cive-in-relationship with a marr! Fe i onshio gs : uch relationsh? nate fis not a relationship in the nature of marriageParty to s' son havi adulterous relationship.(A woman entering into live-inet i simplicitor (not in nature of Marriage) is not entitled to reliefs neal pat the Act. Long enduring relationship of such type can, however, aes tine of dependency and gulnerability) (The Court, therefore, ae era Parliament to bring in proper legislation so that women and chil md pert relationship are protected) Live-in-relationship with a mari an amounts to intentionally alienating one spouse intentional tort and wife and children of married party ¢: to relationship for damages. would either be cane one practising polygamy or pe’ er, It i from the other ae an sue the of wor sa the Supreme while interpreting I a “forest” under Section 2 (c-t) of the Maharashtra Private Forest i Ret, 1975 ruled that the words “ des” Leon of t! 2 st faste land oS means buildings are constructed cannot be forest land either in its pr al 65, ALR 2014 SC 309. 66, AIR 2014 SC 1446, NAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION oh Q tended meaning) Private forest includes land in respect of which notice inits exter 35 of the Forest Act, 1927 is issued. The word “issued” has to be ander See the light of the scheme of Section 35 and so construed “issued” rele san mere issuance but includes service of notice. Notice under Forest mrehended in Section 2(f)(ili) of the 1975 Act can be notice issued in roximity of the 1975 Act and not notice that had passed its shelf-life, cose Prvect to Article 133 of the Constitution the Court said that illegal ee has to be erased. Such principle canrot be applied by broad brush to ST iliel, Even caveat emptor principle does not apply to extraordinary situations such as where State itself has had citizens to precarious situation where citizens are told that their investment is in unauthorised construction. does not ‘Act comp! In the Supreme Court ruled that the meaning of any legislative .g “taxes on lands and buildings” in Entry 49 of List II of the Constitution should not be understood by reference to the definition of the very same expression appearing in a statute traceable to a particular entry. In the present case, though the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 defines the expression “land” and “building”, it would be self defeating to understand the meaning and scope of Entry 49 by reference to the definition clauses in the Gujarat Act. The definitions contained in the statute may at limes be broad and expansive, beyond the natural meaning of the words or may even contain deeming provisions. A cardinal principle of interpretation of a legislative entry in any of the Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution is to treat the words and expressions therein as inclusive in meaning and give the same all possible flexibility instead of restricting such avaning to the perceptions contemporaneous with the times when the Constitution was framed. The Constitution, an organic document, has to be allowed a natural growth by such a process of interpretation. Interpretation of teueive entry has to grow and keep-up with the pace of times. Taxes on eS no “buildings” is not confined to residential buildings or structure raised Purpose of habitation. Mobile towers can be termed as “buildings” for iis ea of levy of property-tax under Entry 49. Section 145 of the Gujarat Snot ultra vires the Constitution. 1 Ge Provisos Aor ee ee toa section has the natural presumption that, but matt ‘he enacting part of the section wauld have included the subject that ot the tOvisd)The general rule about the interpretation of a proviso is it pes NOt to be taken absolutely in its strict literal sense bi f Snot be conte the ambit of the section wAr jualifiey: A proviso and Propert ied as enlarging the scope of an enactment when it can be fairly lear fro, COnsttued without attributing to it that effect. However, if it is the main ‘@nguage of the proviso that it had a more extensive operation "st be given pee which it immediately follows, such a wider effect erence thar ¢ ut if a reasonable interpretation of the proviso leads to the > contradicting the main enactment, the proviso should «NR 2617 SC 599 > a THE INTERPRETATION op Stay prevail over the main enactment on the principle that it speaks th intention of the legislature\Unless the words are cles the court shoutg interoret a proviso as to attribute an intention to the legislature to cen one hand and take away with the other,)A sincere attempt should be me reconcile the enacting clause and in proviso and to avoid repugnancy betve the two. In exceptional cases a proviso may even enact substantive pee, itself ®1t may always be kept in mind that a proviso must be considered win relation to the matter to which it exists as a proviso. \It has no independ, existence of its own; it is dependent on the main enactment) It must be bore in mind thaf with the repeal of the main enactment the proviso is also impliedly repealed. It has been held in ‘Rodi: rs (Gorn that the mai. Ce a ee cessa s proviso unnecessary v6 ¢ InlDevadasarilivi—Unionof India? the petitioner argued that he would have had a chance of promotion if the Union Public Service Commission had adhered to the reserved quota for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates. Instead, the Commission adopted the carry forward rule under which such reserved quota not filled in one year were carried forward to the next year thereby swelling the reserve quota to a stupendous sixty five per cen! in the next year, and this violated_Article 16 (1), of the Constitution under which equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating te employment or appointment to any officer under the State is guaranteed. The respondent argued that in view of Article 16 (4) of the Constitution which says : Nothing in this Article shall prevent Me State from making 2" provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of a) backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, if not adequate represented in the services of the State’, the carry forward rule was legally valid fThe Supreme Court held, by a majority, that the posture of the Union India was untenable because unlimited reservation of appointments a Article 16 (4) would destroy the spirit of Article 16 (1). The court fe observed that claus f this Ai was a sort of a proviso to the a enactment under clause (1) of the Article and could not be so interpreted 4s destroy the main provision. ) 2 ration & 1 ETERS ARERR” NT.“ Article 240-(1) and its proviso were in question. The Article reads ¢ armen Of President may make regulations for the peace, progress and good gover" jor Provided that when any body is create e the Union Territory of. rertitor? i -A_to function as a Legislature for the Union = for of.....Pondicherry........ the President shall not make any regulatio” "og sth effect peace, progress and good government of that Union territory with os re the date appointed for the first meeting of the Legislature...” The 8. _ Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Sreekishan, AIR 1968 SC 59- 69. (1964) 2 QB 625. 70. AIR 1964 SC 179, 71. AIR 1968 Sc 637. 1570 INTERPRETATION a nes 2 shot the language of the main part of the provision is unambiguous Gout ee plenary power to the President to make regulations, and, therefore, Caco id not be curtailed by the proviso. ivone ou P cieneraentaed the Supreme Court held that the In ding along with its equipment for cinema business was not an of building in the meaning of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and tion es 3947. The Court stated that if the principal enactment in a Bi " biguous the proviso can neither enlarge for restrict its meaning. cetute 18 una gmonieeemSatTePraSa, the Supreme Court held that a eynocannat DE permitted by construction to defeat the basic intent expressed Pie substantive provision. one of the questions was tne interpretation of Section 66 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations ‘Act, 1960 which says = “Revision—(1) The Industrial Court may on the rpplation by any party to a case which has been finally decided by the troour Court other than a case decided under para (D) of sub-section (1) of section 61, call for and examine the record of such case and may pass order in reference thereto as it thinks fit Provided that the Industrial Court shall not vary or reverse any order of the Labour Court under the section unless— (i) itis satisfied that the Labour Court has— (@) exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (© acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity; (ii) notice has been served on the parties to the case and opportunity given to them for being heard. ag application under sub-section (1) shall lie to the Industrial Court fists made within thisty days from the date on which the case has been ly decided by the Labour Court : pices that in computing the period of thirty days, the period requisite blaining a copy of the order shall be excluded. ge held by the Supreme Court that the proviso to Section 66 does cut | Taine ambit of the main provision but it cannot be interpreted to denude the hye of any efficacy and reduce it to a paper provision. Both must be ican et*4 98 to permit interference which if not undertaken there would be z BE of justice. It, therefore, cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the a ae 1975 SC1758, 7% AIR1980 SC 992. 1984 SC 1164, a eS lll 28 THE INTERPRETATION op 5 AT tribunal is so circumscribed by the proviso as to bring to on par with Sect Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Therefore, if upon a wrong view of amy! jurisdiction the Labour Court approaches the matter as if it exercises n° revisional jurisdiction, the Industrial Court in revision can interfere on™ ground of failure fo exercise jurisdiction vested in the labour Cour gon! irregularity in exercising its jurisdiction. au x in * the Supreme Court obser, that a proviso may have three separate functions lormally, it is meant io, an exception to something within the main enactment or to qualify somethi, enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of enactment YA proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can itbe used to nullify the real object of the sam: ile interpreting a proviso cape must be taken that it is used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them separatel; Proviso is intended to limit the enacted Provision so as to except something which would have otherwise been within or in some measure to modify the enacting clause) Sometimes/a proviso may be embedded in the main provision and_becomes an integral part of it so as t amount to a substantive provision in To sum up, a proviso may serve four different purposes : (i) qualify or exception certain provisions from the main enactment; (i)Af may entirely change the very concept or the intendment of he enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable; we may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an inter Part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and yt may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision In 76 the Supreme Coutt held that it is not correct to say that by virtue of the proviso to section Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) te 1972 a landlord who was not in occupation was not entitled to oP It proviso puts an embargo of seven days in making the application for ee ihe can only apply to those who were in lawful occupation at the time 01 making of the original order. It cannot curtail the rights of the landlor ie such, it only affects any other person who was in lawful occupation: It is ° settled principle of construction that unless clearly indicated.& provis° ve i | not take away substantive rights given by a section or a sub-section Jane has a right to the property. The section should not be so construed a3 to Sono! the right to possession of property in appropriate cases unless the intention the legislature is mani: 75. AIR 1984 SC 582. 76. AIR 1989SC 155, 05 10 INTERPRETATION ae nb ren ep A TIER NENT the apparent discrepancy between In art of Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules and its proviso had ye mais Per The enacting part empowers the government to withhold or ee full of order for its recovery if it is be fe f ‘on in part or in to fficer’s pensi o wha an artmental or judicial proceeding that he was guilty of grave dina foun + negligence in performance of his duties.(fhe proviso reads, “No misconduct ore Tf not instituted while the officer was in service shal auch ae mespect of a cause of action Which arose or an event which took Seen four years, before such institution,” (The Supreme Court held or read as an exception to the main provision iS the Supreme Court held that of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous, the sion on the interpretation of the main enactment so F to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms unless the words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary effectThe scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and itexcludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule In Grete the language ovigo can have N10 repercus ° the Supreme Court held that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only ‘embraces the field which is covered by the main provision( The proviso has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear, the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify by implication what the enactment clearly says nor set at naught the real object of the'main enactment, unless the words of the proviso are such that itis its necessary effect: The Supreme Court in \MatainatveMisnkay tron Works ont 4d: 3 held that the proviso to Section 13 (3) (i) (b) of the Haryana Urban (Control of e a Eviction) Act, 1973 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the part ee one hardship to the landlords in some cases but that is the Peak ae Legislature which ye have to take to its logical end so henge ae in the statute book\Merely because a law causes hardship, tic: in a manner so as to defeat its object} Since the Bree validity of the provision was not in question no ruling on that sary and even though the law has been interpreted in a uniform ‘manner With, ince 1978, that by itself does not justify that it should not be interfered sa ise ap aca BKOpaS IMIS! =SKelly "Predicts the Ce een: Aa 1g, cpt While interpreting the proviso to Section 240 of the Income tax > ied that where a proviso consists of two parts, one part may bi mm AR i989 SCs, %, ARI51 SC 1405 A 95 my ARSC 1535, Ba wtOsc 1261 2003 SC 253) > Ol | 220 THE INTERPRETATION, OF Sth Un declaratory but the other part may not be so. Therefore, merely becay, at of the proven hes ben ald to he dssaatory, it dos no! foi fe

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