Bi-weekly Analysis

No. 17/2023; August 10, 2023 Kyiv, Ukraine

Navigating Geopolitical Currents: Evolving Policies in

the Black Sea Region Amidst the Russo-Ukrainian War
By Marharyta Hlybchenko

Located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, the Black Sea region is one of the most promising trade
zones. The littoral states include Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Türkiye, Georgia, and the Russian
Federation.

The region is quite fragmented due to historical tensions over territories and cultural distinctions. The fact
of being divided between two hostile blocks during the Cold War left a trace on countries' political
orientation, and even today the competing interests of NATO and Russia influence each country's identity
to varying degrees.

Because the region lacks cohesion, littoral states face these and many other challenges separately, in their
own way. Therefore, when the full-scale invasion began, the political elites found themselves at a
crossroads, urged to clarify their positions on a range of issues. And among them, the relationship with
Russia and its presence in the region gained the main focus. In this article, we analyze how the domestic
policies of Türkiye, Bulgaria, and Romania have changed and what are the prospects of their foreign
policies regarding recent developments.

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 No. 17/2023, August 10, 2023

Regional Dynamics and Security in the Black Sea Region

Region's economic ties can be characterized by the prevalence of bilateral treaties as they provide more
space for agreement in terms of differences in economic and political models. This approach weakens
effective interaction within initiatives, which encompasses the whole region (mainly Black Sea Economic
Cooperation - BSEC). Besides, the EU membership of several regional countries increases market
competition.

However, despite seeming reluctance to deepen regional ties, the shared sea binds all countries,
underscoring their dependence on the Black Sea security. Needless to say, a full-scale invasion launched
by Russia marked the deterioration of regional safety. Attacks on Ukraine affected freedom of
navigation in the Black Sea, strained the capacity of grain export, and made it possible to see explosions
and missile work near the NATO borders. In particular, a recent series of Russian drone attacks on Ukrainian
grain elevators and ports is taking place dangerously close to Romania. Furthermore, the act of blowing
up the Kakhovka Dam by Russian forces in southern Ukraine raised concerns about the potential disregard
for environmental consequences in the pursuit of military objectives in the affected region.

It's hard to overestimate the impact of the war on the region. The reduction in the number of available
Ukrainian ports and the ban on access to EU ports for Russian vessels led to the decline of the maritime
industry. In contrast, the importance of other regional states grew amid the success of the Black Sea Grain
Initiative and the EU’s diversification of energy imports, emphasizing the vitality of the Black Sea as a transit
corridor. The desire to devise new trade routes bypassing Russia has given impetus to the trend of
increasing trade flows between Europe and Asia. Moreover, the increase in NATO's military mobility in the
Black Sea contributes to the militarization of the region and tensions between the states (e.g., Russia's
damage to the American MQ-9 Reaper drone).

Despite the fact that all the states of the region are under the influence of the consequences of the war,
the internal politics of each country demonstrates a unique reaction to large-scale geopolitical changes
due to its background of interaction with Russia.

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 No. 17/2023, August 10, 2023

From East to West: Tracing Bulgaria's Political Journey Amidst Russian

Influence

Bulgaria is one of the EU countries most influenced by Russia. A number of reasons caused such a tough
situation. Bulgaria relied deeply on gas and oil imports from Russia (in 2022, 77% of the imported gas was
Russian). This fact, like in many cases of other countries, determined Russia’s successful political
penetration in Sofia. Bulgaria is one of the most corrupt countries in the EU, and Russia's influence can be
spotted in the judicial and other branches of government. Besides, the historical attachment of Bulgaria to
Russia is one of the strongest within the former Eastern Bloc. During the Cold War, Bulgaria was one of the
most trusted allies of the Soviet Union.

The war in Ukraine has actualized the issue of excessive Russian influence and contributed to the
deterioration of domestic political stability, climaxing in the political crisis of 2022-2023. The aggravating
volatility, resulting from the failure to form a government, was fueled, among other matters, by conflicting
views on the extent of support to be provided for Ukraine and views on how to deal with Russia. The gravity
of the situation was emphasized by the fact that Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic. Finally, after the fifth
attempt, the two leading parties in elections GERB-SDS and We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria
reached an agreement, though instead of a coalition the rotation of governments was established.

Borys Boyko, leader of the political party GERB

If the government had not been formed again, the
likelihood of Russia-friendly forces joining the
ruling coalition would have increased. The entry
of such parties would mean the complication of
arms export to Ukraine. There have already been
precedents of pro-Russian parties obstructing
the decision-making beneficial for Ukraine. In
particular, the decision of Bulgaria to send
military aid to Ukraine secretly, not openly, was
also provoked by the presence of pro-Russian
forces in the coalition.
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As a result of the last election, European-oriented
forces have assumed power. However, the last
turbulent year of political struggle didn’t pass
without a trace for voters. The inability of GERB-
SDS and We Continue the Change-Democratic
Bulgaria (whose programs are similar and both
pro-western) to form a government due to
interparty squabbles has already led to certain
disappointment in the people. Political
uncertainty obstructed the decision-making
process necessary to mitigate the domestic
economic crisis. Amid the inability of pro-
western parties to cooperate, the ratings of the
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openly pro-Putin party "Renaissance" grew. The
crisis even reached the point when the
"Renaissance" rose to third place during the last
election poll (compared to a 2% rating in the 2021
general election).
Against this background, public opinion towards
Ukraine and the West has deteriorated. Almost
half of the respondents (49%) in 2023 stated that
sanctions against Russia are ineffective, while
only 44% put the blame on Russia for waging the
war (compared to 50% in 2022). The support for
NATO membership has always been low when
compared to other Central and Eastern Europe.
Today, polls show that only 34% of Bulgarians
perceive Russia as a threat.
policy, considering the results of the latest
surveys.
Nevertheless, the victory of pro-European parties
is a breakthrough and is paying off. By now,
recent political changes in Bulgaria had a positive
effect on aiding Ukraine. In fact, Sofia’s recent
decision to send arms directly to Ukraine is the
first official case of arms export since 2022.
Therefore, the prospects of new government
decisions are promising for Kyiv.
To sum up, the newly-found modus vivendi
decreases the impact of pro-Russian parties in
the government, though it does not mean its
leveling.

It's important to note that the latest political

crisis in Bulgaria is far from being exclusively a
confrontation between pro-Russian and pro-
Western forces. One of the characteristic
features of Bulgarian politics after the end of the
Cold War became “fluctuation” between the
West and Russia. Borys Boyko, three times Prime
Minister of Bulgaria, was following the politics of
compromising between pro-EU and pro-Russian Kirill Petkov and Asen Vaskov, leaders of the political
attitudes. Some time should pass to see whether party We Continue the Change
the new government will also stick to such a

Türkiye’s Delicate Balancing Act: A Mediation Game for the Sake of

National Interests

The position of Türkiye on the Russo-Ukrainian war remains twofold: while continuing unrestricted trade
with Russia, Türkiye provides Ukraine with important arms. Since the beginning of the invasion, President
Erdoğan has stated multiple times about a positive relationship between Türkiye and Russia and that he
does not intend to take sides in this conflict. The declared attitude of “satisfying the needs of all parties
involved” is caused by the peculiarities of the country's domestic and foreign policy.

The war in Ukraine coincided with the prolonged economic crisis in Türkiye. Against the background of
the economic crisis, the Turkish authorities try to find the most beneficial way to maintain the level of
support among the people. According to a survey conducted on the eve of the presidential elections,
Turkish people are more concerned over economic turmoil than war in Ukraine. Therefore, the leaders of
Türkiye deem it desirable to prioritize economic stability and growth. Apparently, cutting off economic
ties with Russia (the biggest importer for Ankara) while being dependent on imported Russian oil and gas
is not the way to improve the domestic situation.

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Besides, Türkiye fully understands its unique position between NATO and Asia, its distance from the Arab
world, and the value of controlling the main straits of the Black Sea, as it provides the possibility for Ankara
to follow its own path in-between. Undoubtedly, such an approach toward foreign policy influences public
opinion in Türkiye. Erdoğan’s previous hostile rhetoric towards the West led to the increase of sentiments
towards Russia among common people. In a 2023 poll concerning the attitude towards Russia, 14% said
that Russia is ally while the biggest share of Turkish people (55%) viewed Moscow as a necessary partner.
On top of that, although the perception of the United States as a threat was gradually decreasing (42% in
2022 compared to 64% in 2019), more people were hostile to the US than to Russia in 2022 (42% against
30,5%).

Having fewer disputes with Moscow and
occasionally dissenting with the West, Ankara
seems to be a perfect match to fulfill the role of
broker in what Russia calls “West-Russia
confrontation”. However, to safeguard its
balancing position, Türkiye should prove its
appropriateness to perform awaited tasks. Such
an approach to foreign policy requires tangible
results of mediation efforts. Hence, Turkiye's
notable achievements in mediation, exemplified
by the successful organization of the Grain Deal
Initiative and a fruitful exchange of prisoners of
war, stand as vital pillars of its foreign policy
strategy. Erdoğan’s “special relationship” with
Putin is another essential aspect of the strategy,
as it enables the use of geopolitical advantages
for Türkiye. Thus, Erdoğan’s “special relationship”
with Putin is essential for the state’s foreign
policy, enabling the use of its geopolitical
advantages. That's why when Russia declared its
exit from the Grain Deal, it dealt the blow to
Ankara.
As for the prospects, Türkiye is likely to continue
its ambiguous politics, especially since the West
is not pressing that hard on its officials regarding
the imposition of sanctions. One of the most
possible reasons why its politics might change is
the tightening of the West's position.

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Unhealed Wounds: Romania's Stalwart Support for Ukraine's Integrity

Despite disputes over Ukrainian-Romanian state borders, the climax of which fell on the first decade of the
21st century, Romania supported Ukraine’s integrity and officially refused Russian suggestion to divide
Ukraine. Relations between Moscow and Bucharest are darkened by the loss of the Bessarabia region
during the World War II and its attachment to the Soviet Union. The issue has not been resolved with
Moldova’s declaration of independence. In fact, the fight for influence continued with only one exception:
Russia uses forces to impose its order in Moldova. Although occasionally the unification of Moldova and
Romania emerges as an idea in Romanian political rhetoric, no action has been taken to set it in motion.

Not only is this due to Romania’s compliance with the appropriate behavior associated with membership
in the EU, but also because such a union may lead to a new conflict with Russia. After Transnistria,
supported by Russians, made a formal declaration of sovereignty from Moldova, the potential of this
frozen conflict hangs over Romania like a sword of Damocles. Fragmented multinational Moldova can be
easy prey for Russians to extend its influence even further, bringing instability to the region.

Russia's influence in Romania has been among the lowest in the region. Moscow lacks typical
instruments to impose its order: Russian ethnic minorities are not numerous, and corruption and related
pro-Russian political parties are not dominant issues of the domestic agenda. What's more important,
Romania is one of the most independent states in terms of gas import. The energy crisis in Europe
encouraged the increase of exploration of energy resources in the EU countries, and the idea of Romania
becoming an energy hub is gaining relevance. After all, it is Romania that exports gas to Moldova to
decrease Chișinău’s overreliance on Russia’s resources.

Romania sees NATO as the best guarantor of its integrity. Recent polls show that public confidence in
NATO partnership is steadily growing (89% in 2023).

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Since the 1990s, having chosen the course for
rapprochement with NATO, Romania has been
following the lead to democracy and
transatlantic unity. Russia’s invasion only caused
further deepening of these relations. On the
occasion of 25 years of strategic partnership
between Romania and the US, diplomats of both
sides appreciated its effects as highly beneficial.
Bucharest’s recent joining G7 joint declaration of
support for Ukraine is a direct consequence of
this trend. Hence, Romania's support for Ukraine
will continue to be one of the strongest.

Conclusion

By waging war, Russia attracted the attention of the world to the region, the extent of which was previously
unimaginable. Before the war, the region was not viewed as strategic, even for NATO. Hostilities against
Ukraine led to NATO adopting a course for strengthening military presence in the region - something
Russia claimed to be opposed to before waging the war.

Changes in the attitude towards Russia and its own security matters have been occurring in all countries
of the region. In most cases, Russian influence gradually decreases, though surveys show that the threat
is far from being fully eliminated.

With the ultimate election results, Bulgaria’s new government seems to be ready to continue fighting
against corruption while paying enough attention to the opposition. Türkiye’s balanced politics is part of
its way of using geopolitical features and therefore is less likely to change considerably. Among the
analyzed countries, Romania is the most hostile towards Russia. Russia’s attempts to obtain larger control
over Chișinău pose a threat to Bucharest. But the more Russia tries to change the balance of power in the
region, the more Romania is getting closer to NATO.

The war in Ukraine pushed littoral states to revise their attitude towards foreign policy and domestic
matters. The Black Sea continues to open opportunities for regional states, whether it be Grain Initiative
route or Gas Fields. In times of turmoil, states have become more adaptive, but they are still not fully ready
for a radical change. Therefore, the war has not led to a grand geopolitical shift in regional politics: the
conflict stimulated a deepening of the chosen policies as a first reaction, the results of which we have yet
to see.

Disclaimer: The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in the papers published on this site belong solely to the
authors, and not necessarily to the Transatlantic Dialogue Center, its committees, or its affiliated organizations. The
papers are intended to stimulate dialogue and discussion and do not represent official policy positions of the
Transatlantic Dialogue Center or any other organizations the authors may be associated with.

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