RULE 128

G.R. No. L-2068             October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of

Pampanga, Respondent.

TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner
might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the
strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that
denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library1

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in
support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that
investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or
not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of
rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his
intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to
the court of first instance.

Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and
by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we
are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein.
In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the
respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the
complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we
sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound
discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the
bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law
restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated
to bring out the truth."chanrobles virtual law library

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his
witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the
issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an
accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the
absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter
of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right
of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and
denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary
investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

1
Bustos v. CA, G.R. 22333, May 2, 2922
G.R. No. L-25785 February 26, 1981

SATURNINO BAYASEN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on November
17, 1965, in CA-G.R. N.. 05105-CR affirming and modifying the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Mountain Province, Second Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. 1056 entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Saturnino Bayasen" 2 convicting the accused, petitioner herein, of the crime of Homicide Thru
Reckless Imprudence.

The records show that the petitioner was charged in December 1963 by the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain
Province of the crime of Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of August, 1963, at Langtiw, Municipality of Sagada,
Province of Mountain, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then the driver and person in-charge of Rural health Unit Jeep
bearing Plate No. 5735, Philippines, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drove, managed
and operated the said jeep along Suyo Municipal Road, Sagada, Mountain Province in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner, lack of foresight and skill, without due care
and absolute disregard of traffic laws, rules and regulations and other conditions of the
road, making it to run in an unreasonable rate of speed, without taking the necessary
precaution to prevent accident to persons and damage to property in violation of law, and
as a result of which said jeep driven and operated by the herein accused fell over a
precipice in the abovementioned place causing thereby the death of Elena Awichen
shortly thereafter.

Contrary to law. 3

After trial, the petitioner was found guilty of the charge and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of arresto mayor as minimum. to One (1) Year, Seven (7) Months and
Ten (10) Days of prision correccional  as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Elena Awichen
the amount of P3,000.00 as compensatory damages and P1,000.00 as fees of the attorney contracted by
the said heirs and P1,886.00 for burial expenses of the deceased, and to pay the costs. 4 From this
decision, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals 5 which affirmed the decision of the trial court
with the following modifications: the indemnity was increased to P6,000.00; the award of attorney's fees
was set aside, and the maximum of the prison term was raised to One (1) Year, Seven (7) Months, and
Seventeen (17) Days of prision correccional. 6

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by Justices Angeles, Capistrano, Mojica and
Soriano. Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan voted to grant the said motion. 7

From the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, the petitioner has appealed to this Court assigning
the following errors: 8

I
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED-
PETITIONER SATURNINO BAYASEN WAS NEGLIGENT IN DRIVING HIS JEEP,
AFTER TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALLEGED PREVIOUS INCIDENTS IN WHICH
THE ACCUSED WAS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED, THEREBY DECIDING A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE — THAT OF PRESUMED NEGLIGENCE — NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW OR ESTABLISHED RULES OF EVIDENCE SPECIFICALLY THE RULE OF RES
INTER ALIOS ACTA.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF

THE DEATH OF AWICHEN WAS THE PETITIONER'S "NEGLIGENCE IN DRIVING AT
AN UNREASONABLE SPEED," WHICH FINDING IS OPENLY CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-

PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are:

On the morning of August 15, 1963, Saturnino Bayasen, the Rural Health Physician in
Sagada, Mountain Province, went to barrio Ambasing to visit a patient. Two nurses from
the Saint Theodore's Hospital in Sagada, viz., Elena Awichen and Dolores Balcita, rode
with him in the jeep assigned for the use of the Rural Health Unit as they had requested
for a ride to Ambasing. Later, at Ambasing, the girls, who wanted to gather flowers, again
asked if they could ride with him up to a certain place on the way to barrio Suyo which he
intended to visit anyway. Dr. Bayasen again allowed them to ride, Elena sitting herself
between him and Dolores. On the way, at barrio Langtiw, the jeep went over a precipice
About 8 feet below the road, it was blocked by a pine tree. The three were thrown out of
the jeep. Elena was found lying in a creek further below. Among other injuries, she
suffered a skull fracture which caused her death. 9

The Court of Appeals concluded:

It is not therefore improbable that due to lack of sufficient skin and confidence in driving,
he lost his nerve when confronted by an emergency due to his negligence in driving at an
unreasonable speed on a narrow and slippery road and was at a loss what to do —
indeed, at no time did he step on the brakes — he failed to control the jeep after it
skidded. On the whole, we are, satisfied that the fatal and unfortunate accident was due
to appellant's failure to exercise due diligence under the circumstances. 10

The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not he is entitled to acquittal on the ground that the
finding of the Court of Appeals that the proximate cause of the death of Awichen was the petitioner's
"negligence in driving at an unreasonable speed" is openly contrary to the evidence of the prosecution.

The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals is that the accused- petitioner was negligent in driving his
jeep because he was driving at "an unreasonable speed".

A careful examination of 'he evidence introduced by the prosecution shows no "legally sufficient" proof
that the accused was negligent in driving his jeep. The star witness of the prosecution, Dolores Balcita
who was one of the passengers in the jeep, testified that the accused-petitioner, Saturnino Bayasen was
driving his jeep moderately just before the accident and categorically stated that she did not know what
caused the jeep to fall into the precipice.

The pertinent portions of her testimony are:

ATTY. GOMEZ:

Q From Ambasing to the place where the jeep fell over the precipice,
was the driver running fast or slow?

A He was with moderate speed, sir. 11

In the course of the cross-examination, the Court asked the witness the following:

COURT: to the witness)

Q Could you inform this Court as to what caused the jeep to fall into the
embankment?

A I do not know, sir. 12

When asked whether the jeep hit anything before it fell into the precipice, the witness answered that she
did not feel any bump or jolt. Her testimony on this point reads:

COURT (to the witness)

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did the jeep hit anything before it fell into the embankment ?

A I did not feel any bump, sir.

Q Going to Suyo you were passing by a mountain is that right?

A Yes, sir.

Q On what side was that mountain?

A On the left side.

Q And while the jeep was going toward Suyo, how far was it from the
mountain along the left side?

A I do not know, sir.

Q Where was the jeep nearer to while it was on the way to Suyo — to the
embankment or the mountain?

A I do not know, sir. I was not aware of that.

 Q During the time that the jeep was traversing toward Suyo, was there
any conversation transpiring?

A Just before the accident, I did not hear anything, sir. 13

It is clear from the last part of the Testimony of the witness, Dolores Balcita, that there was no
conversation between the passengers in the jeep that could have distracted the attention of the accused
while driving the jeep. As to the condition of the jeep itself, the same witness testified that she "did not
notice anything wrong" 14 with it from the time they drove from Sagada to Ambasing, and from there to the
place where the jeep fell off the road. Regarding the road, she said that it was fair enough to drive on, but
that it was moist or wet, and the weather was fair, too. 15 As to whether the accused-petitioner was under
the influence of liquor at the time of the accident, she testified that he was not. 16 In the light of the
testimony of Dolores Balcita, the eyewitness of the accident presented by the prosecution, there is
absolutely no evidence on record to show that the accused was negligent in driving his jeep.

The petitioner testified that before reaching the portion of the road where the jeep fell he noticed that the
rear wheel skidded, while driving from 8 to 10 kilometers per hour; that as a precautionary measure, he
directed the jeep towards the side of the mountain, along the side of the mountain, but not touching the
mountain; that while doing so, the late Elena Awichen suddenly held the steering wheel and he felt that
her foot stepped on his right foot which was pressed then on the accelerator; and that immediately after,
the jeep suddenly swerved to the right and went off. 17

In rebuttal to this testimony, Dolores Balcita, testified thus:

COURT

Witness may answer.

A When I said I was [not] looking at him, I did not see and with the space
of time that I was still conscious, I did not feel any movement from my
side.

COURT

Your answer is not responsive. Is it true what the accused said?

A I did not see, sir. 18

From the foregoing testimony of Dolores Balcita, it is apparent that she "did not see" what Elena Awichen
suddenly did, and she "did not feel any movement from (her) side". These answers of Dolores Balcita are
all in the negative and equivocal. They do not deny or preclude the truth of the positive testimony of
the accused. As held by this Court:

The testimony of a credible witness that he saw or heard at a particular time and
place is more reliable than that of an equally credible witness who with the same
opportunities, testified that he did not see or hear the same thing at the same time and
place. 19

Hence as to the relative weight to be given to the positive and consistent. testimony of the accused and to
the negative and equivocal answers of Dolores Balcita, the former is more worthy of credence.

Furthermore , the statement of Dolores Balcita that the accused was driving at moderate speed and not
"an unreasonable ,speed' is bolstered by the testimony, of Pablo Lizardo. then mayor of Sagada,
Mountain Province, who found the jeep at second gear when he examined it not long after the
incident. 20 Such fact shows that the accused-petitioner could not have been driving the jeep at a fast rate
of speed.

Mr. Justice Gatmaitan, in voting to grant the motion for reconsideration, said:

... but that statement of the Majority would most clearly show that its position is that
appellant's negligence, the proximate cause of the tragedy, was appellant's unreasonable
speed which has been refuted by the very evidence of prosecution, for here, it can hardly
be debated that the proximate cause was the skidding of the rear wheels, — there is
nothing, absolutely nothing in the entire record which would pin upon him the fault for
that, prosecution witnesses concede that he was driving moderately, — the skidding of
the rear wheels was to my mind, undisputably an unforeseen cause, because of this, I
cannot rest easy on conviction and therefore register my final vote for acquittal. 21

It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep and
not the "unreasonable speed" of the petitioner because there is no evidence on record to prove or support
the finding that the petitioner was driving a at "an unreasonable speed".

It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the instant case,
without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of
control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without fault.

No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the petitioner. In fact, the moment he felt
that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded, he promptly drove it to the left hand side of the road, parallel to
the slope of the mountain, because as he said, he wanted to play safe and avoid the embankment. 22

Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner- driver who skidded could not be
regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the petitioner had a valid excuse
for his departure from his regular course. The negligence of the petitioner not having been sufficiently
established, his guilt of the crime charged has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He is,
therefore, entitled to acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and the
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the information in Criminal Case No. 1056 of the Court
of First Instance of Mountain Province, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168644               February 16, 2010

BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 876001 dated April 20, 2005, which reversed and set aside the September 13,
20042 and November 5, 20043 Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 364 in Criminal
Case No. 02-202158 for qualified theft. The said orders, in turn, respectively denied the motion filed by
herein respondent Sally Go for the suppression of the testimonial and documentary evidence
relative to a Security Bank account, and denied reconsideration.

The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.

Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its herein
representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally
Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayan’s wife, who was employed in the company as a cashier, and
was engaged, among others, to receive and account for the payments made by the various customers of
the company.

In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutor’s Office a complaint for estafa and/or qualified
theft5 against respondent, alleging that several checks6 representing the aggregate amount of
₱1,534,135.50 issued by the company’s customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of being
turned over to the company’s coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to her personal
banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila
Branch.7 Upon a finding that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city prosecutor
recommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft against respondent.8

Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, in an
Information, the inculpatory portion of which reads:

That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic) between January 1988 [and] October
1989, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent [to] gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take,
steal and carry away cash money in the total amount of ₱1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP OF
COMPANIES represented by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the
aforesaid amount of ₱1,534,135.50, Philippine currency.

That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave abuse of confidence, being
then employed as cashier by said complainant at the time of the commission of the said offense and as
such she was entrusted with the said amount of money.

Contrary to law.9

Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned.10 The trial ensued. On the premise that respondent
had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her
personal banking account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad
testificandum against the respective managers or records custodians of Security Bank’s Divisoria Branch,
as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad
Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch.11 The trial court granted the motion and issued the corresponding
subpoena.12

Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003, addressed to Metrobank,
noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of
the said bank account, to which respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account identified as
Account No. 01-14-006, allegedly deposited the proceeds of the supposed checks. Interestingly, while
respondent characterized the Metrobank account as irrelevant to the case, she, in the same motion,
nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the Security Bank account mentioned in the same
complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly willing to address the allegations with respect
thereto.13

Petitioner, opposing respondent’s move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank account on the
ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which respondent
allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank. 14 To this, respondent filed a supplemental
motion to quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank account under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405.15 The trial court did not sustain respondent; hence, it denied
the motion to quash for lack of merit.16

Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan),
the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigan’s testimony sought to prove that between
1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with
the checks issued to the company by its customers, endorse the same, and credit the corresponding
amounts to her personal deposit account with Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject
checks were presented to Marasigan for identification and marking as the same checks received by
respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her personal account with Security Bank.17 But before the
testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress,18 seeking the exclusion of
Marasigan’s testimony and accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on the subject
Security Bank account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of
confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.

The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004 Order. 19 A motion for
reconsideration was subsequently filed, but it was also denied in the Order dated November 5,
2004.20 These two orders are the subject of the instant case.

Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in acting the way it did,
respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Finding
merit in the petition, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the trial court in its
April 20, 2005 Decision.21 The decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders dated September 13, 2004 and
November 5, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC representative is
ordered stricken from the records.

SO ORDERED.22

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,23 petitioner is now before the Court pleading the same
issues as those raised before the lower courts.

In this Petition24 under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court of Appeals had seriously
erred in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect striking out Marasigan’s testimony
dealing with respondent’s deposit account with Security Bank. 25 It asserted that apart from the fact that
the said evidence had a direct relation to the subject matter of the case for qualified theft and,
hence, brings the case under one of the exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality under R.A.
1405.26 Petitioner believed that what constituted the subject matter in litigation was to be determined by
the allegations in the information and, in this respect, it alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order of
the trial court, which declared to be erroneous the limitation of the present inquiry merely to what was
contained in the information.27

For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank account was neither
relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the criminal information suggested that the
money therein deposited was the subject matter of the case. She invited particular attention to that
portion of the criminal Information which averred that she has stolen and carried away cash money in
the total amount of ₱1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion that the term "cash money" stated in the
Information was not synonymous with the checks she was purported to have stolen from petitioner and
deposited in her personal banking account. Thus, the checks which the prosecution had Marasigan
identify, as well as the testimony itself of Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at least for
violating respondent’s right to due process.28 More in point, respondent opined that admitting the
testimony of Marasigan, as well as the evidence pertaining to the Security Bank account, would violate
the secrecy rule under R.A. No. 1405.29

In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the criminal Information for qualified
theft, as the same has sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense charged. It posits that through
Marasigan’s testimony, the Court would be able to establish that the checks involved, copies of which
were attached to the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, had indeed been received by
respondent as cashier, but were, thereafter, deposited by the latter to her personal account with Security
Bank. Petitioner held that the checks represented the cash money stolen by respondent and, hence, the
subject matter in this case is not only the cash amount represented by the checks supposedly stolen by
respondent, but also the checks themselves.30

We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue for resolution is whether the
testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether they
are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by operation
of R.A. No. 1405. The question of admissibility of the evidence thus comes to the fore. And the Court,
after deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence to be indeed inadmissible.

Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense
must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and only
requisite to a finding of guilt. 31 Theft is present when a person, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, takes the personal property of
another without the latter’s consent. It is qualified when, among others, and as alleged in the
instant case, it is committed with abuse of confidence. 32 The prosecution of this offense necessarily
focuses on the existence of the following elements: (a) there was taking of personal property belonging to
another; (b) the taking was done with intent to gain; (c) the taking was done without the consent of the
owner; (d) the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things;
and (e) it was done with abuse of confidence.33 In turn, whether these elements concur in a way that
overcomes the presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of relevancy and
competency in accordance with Section 334 Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case  the testimony of
Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been stolen and deposited in respondent’s Security
Bank account  are relevant, is to be addressed by considering whether they have such direct relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence; or whether they relate
collaterally to a fact from which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as to the
existence or non-existence of the fact in issue.35
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount of ₱1,534,135.50
from the coffers of petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks to establish the existence of the
elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that respondent, at several times between 1988 and 1989,
deposited some of its checks to her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the
incongruence between the allegation of theft of cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the
evidence that respondent had first stolen the checks and deposited the same in her banking account, on
the other hand, by impressing upon the Court that there obtains no difference between cash and check
for purposes of prosecuting respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.

In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by another
with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended party has already ensued from
such act of execution.36 The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented
must have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to another.
Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a connection between the evidence subject
of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information by claiming that respondent had
fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But this line of argument works more prejudice than
favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the commission, not of theft, but rather of some other crime
 probably estafa.

Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other instances. In estafa by
conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check, is immaterial in relation to the
formal allegation in an information for that offense; a check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is
normally accepted under commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit it represents in stated
monetary value is properly capable of appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the offender does
with the check subsequent to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes material inasmuch as this offense is
a continuing one.37 In other words, in pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its
cause by the presentation of the checks involved. These checks would then constitute the best evidence
to establish their contents and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of the proposition that
the offender has indeed indorsed the same in his own name.38

Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in this case accuses
respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent has actualized her criminal
intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not
only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.

We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigan’s testimony on the particulars of
respondent’s account with Security Bank, as well as of the corresponding evidence of the checks
allegedly deposited in said account, constitutes an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405.

It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of specifically addressing
privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there, nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate
expectation of privacy governing such accounts. The source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it
is found in R.A. No. 1405,39 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. 40

R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding and at the same time
encourage the people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be utilized by way of
authorized loans and thereby assist in economic development.41 Owing to this piece of legislation, the
confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic state policy in the Philippines.42 Section 2 of the law
institutionalized this policy by characterizing as absolutely confidential in general all deposits of whatever
nature with banks and other financial institutions in the country. It declares:

Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.1avvphi1

Subsequent statutory enactments43 have expanded the list of exceptions to this policy yet the secrecy of
bank deposits still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the legally recognized zones of
privacy.44 There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing these primary and supplemental exceptions in a
manner that would authorize unbridled discretion, whether governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these
exceptions as authority for unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the present
legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.45

The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking Corporation v.
Ortega.46 That case principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition against an examination of
bank deposits precludes garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative,
the Court found guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351
and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute
confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection from unwarranted inquiry or investigation if
the purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely to determine the existence and nature, as well as
the amount of the deposit in any given bank account. Thus,

x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the
court whether or not the defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the
conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977which later became Republic
Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place banks deposits beyond the reach of
execution to satisfy a final judgmentThus:

x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways
and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)] or, say, ₱1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the
deposit of this individual [has been] attached by the [BIR].

Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability
of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring
about a proper assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is not allowed by this proposed law.

Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of
money deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there is a preliminary attachment which is for
garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such
attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by...
the law?

Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry... is made only for the purpose of satisfying a
tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object
is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by
the law. x x x

Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit.

Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x47

In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the instant case posits that
the account maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the proceeds of the checks that she
has fraudulently appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 1405  that the money kept in said account is the subject matter in litigation. To highlight this
thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., 48 that the subject matter of the
action refers to the physical facts; the things real or personal; the money, lands, chattels and the like, in
relation to which the suit is prosecuted, which in the instant case should refer to the money deposited in
the Security Bank account.49 On the surface, however, it seems that petitioner’s theory is valid to a point,
yet a deeper treatment tends to show that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This, because, while
Mathay did explain what the subject matter of an action is, it nevertheless did so only to determine
whether the class suit in that case was properly brought to the court.

What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been
pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 50 in which the Court
noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that
the money deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action.51 Given this perspective, we deduce
that the subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that
charges respondent with the offense, and not from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be
admitted into the records. In the criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent,
unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioner’s trust
and confidence and stealing cash in the amount of ₱1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no
factual allegation that in some material way involves the checks subject of the testimonial and
documentary evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information
make mention of the supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks have
allegedly been kept.

In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security Bank account is the
ostensible subject of the prosecution’s inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly
alleged in the Information, the subject matter of the action in this case is the money amounting to
₱1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of the checks
which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with
its evidence, and no other.

It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to respondent’s
Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of such account, its nature
and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a
bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which is protected by law. On this score alone, the
objection posed by respondent in her motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to the
controversy at the very first instance it was raised before the trial court.

In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondent’s supposed bank
account with Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in support
thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise
irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to
the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondent’s objection to
the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct in reversing the assailed
orders of the trial court.

A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its scope to include an individual’s
financial privacy rights and personal financial matters, there is an intermediate or heightened scrutiny
given by courts and legislators to laws infringing such rights.52 Should there be doubts in upholding the
absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such
accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. This attitude persists unless congress
lifts its finger to reverse the general state policy respecting the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits.53
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600
dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ADM. CASE NO. 5151             October 19, 2004

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D.

EVANGELISTA, SR., complainants,
vs.
ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr.,
Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral
Conduct and Gross Misconduct.

Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court Judge,
abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in
turn, married to one Ramon G. Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly
and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered
two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the
birth certificates of their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that
their two children are legitimate, while in respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC
during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondent’s
certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated; such declarations
in the birth certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of
public documents; and respondent’s acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute grounds
for his removal as a member of the bar.

Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who are his political opponents in
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge on him for his filing of criminal
charges against them; complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule
24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence;
respondent did not participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of subject birth
certificates; respondent never declared that he had two wives, as he has always declared that he is
separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and complainants have used this issue against him
during elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence,
respondent has not offended the public’s sense of morality.

The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
conducted hearings.

Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo, submitted their affidavits as their
direct testimony and were subjected to cross-examination by respondent’s counsel.

Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows: He knows respondent for they both reside in
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer and a former Municipal Trial Court
Judge. Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing
themselves to be husband and wife, and from their cohabitation, they produced two children, namely,
Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza.
Sometime in 1995, he (witness Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing him that
respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but
respondent abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the letter was a
photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage between respondent and
Felicitas Valderia. He also received information from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also
legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a Certification from the Office of the Civil
Register. Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is
still legally married to Felicitas Valderia. In respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC
in 1998, he declared his civil status as separated. Respondent has represented to all that he is married to
Marilyn dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent holds the position of
Chairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as husband to
Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.

On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He was the former mayor of Naujan and he
and respondent belong to warring political parties. It was not respondent who told him about the alleged
immoral conduct subject of the present case. Although he received the letter of a concerned citizen
regarding the immoral conduct of respondent as far back as 1995, he did not immediately file a case for
disbarment against respondent. It was only after respondent filed a criminal case for falsification against
him that he decided to file an administrative case against respondent.1

On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people who were against the open
relationship between respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent had been publicly introducing
the latter as his wife despite the fact that they are both still legally married to other persons, and so
someone unknown to him just handed to their maid copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.2

The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony, is practically identical to
that of witness Melgar. On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified that he was not the one who
procured the certified true copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza
and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as somebody just gave said documents to Nelson
Melgar. He was a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a concerned citizen regarding
respondent’s immorality was sent to Melgar, but he did not take any action against respondent at that
time.3

Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted
by respondent’s counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit:
a letter of one Luis Bermudez informing Nelson Melgar of respondent’s immoral acts,4 the Certification of
the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the celebration of the marriage between
respondent and one Felicitas Valderia,5 the Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza,6 the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza,7 the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent dated March 9, 1995,8 the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March
25, 1998,9 Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998,
attesting to the marriage celebrated between Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos, 10 and the editorial
page of the Naujanews (February-March 1999 issue),11 wherein it was stated that respondent has two
daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.

Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a memorandum
expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of complainants’ witnesses are mere hearsay, thus,
said testimonies and their documentary evidence have no probative weight.

On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading
as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report

and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
 evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is
hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof
that he is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such
immoral course of conduct.

Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, upon which the
above-quoted Resolution was based, read as follows:

FINDINGS:

The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a) the testimonies
of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits executed under oath and affirmed
before the Commission and b) their documentary evidence consisting of their Exhibits "A" to "H".

Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or offer any
evidence. Respondent opted not to present his evidence anymore because according to him
"there is none to rebut vis-à-vis the evidence presented by the private complainants." Respondent
instead submitted a memorandum through counsel to argue his position. As can be seen from the
comment and memorandum submitted, respondent’s counsel argues that the complaint is
politically motivated since complainants are political rivals of respondent and that the birth
certificates Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which were offered to show that respondent sired the children
namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza out of his cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible because they were
allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. The rest of the
exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to respondent.

The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand, categorically state in their
affidavits [Exhibits "A" and "B"] particularly in paragraph 2 that "Respondent has been cohabiting openly
and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife." In paragraph 10
of said affidavits the witnesses also categorically state that "respondent has even represented to all and
sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife." These categorical statements made under oath by
complainants are not hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not to rebut them.

Exhibit "E," the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows that respondent is married to one,
Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit "H", a marriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to
one, Ramon G. Marcos. Duly certified true copies of said exhibits have been presented by complainants.

With respect to Exhibits "D" and "D-1", we believe that they are competent and relevant evidence and
admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary rule which bars admission of illegally obtained evidence
applies more appropriately to evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. The instant
case cannot be analogous to an illegal search or seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of Administrative
Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine
but it does not make the document so issued inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the
present case. Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore competent
evidence to show paternity of said children by respondent in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Nelson Melgar and
Romeo Laygo, and corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that indeed respondent has been
cohabiting publicly with a certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and that out of said cohabitation
respondent sired two children. These facts we repeat have not been denied by respondent under oath
since he chose to just argue on the basis of the improper motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and
self-serving nature of the documents presented. Complainants have presented evidence sufficient
enough to convince us that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not his
wife. The evidence taken together will support the fact that respondent is not of good moral character.
That respondent chose not to deny under oath the grave and serious allegations made against him is to
our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped his position before the Commission. As between the
documents and positive statements of complainants, made under oath and the arguments and comments
of respondent submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under oath by respondent himself,
we are inclined and so give weight to the evidence of complainants. The direct and forthright testimonies
and statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn
de la Fuente is not hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted that respondent Mendoza did not tell them
that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why would respondent admit that to
complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their affidavits under oath that respondent was
cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is not respondent’s wife. Again their categorical statements
taken together with the other documents, are enough to convince us and conclude that respondent is not
of good moral character.

Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral character is a
continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral
character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586
(1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)]. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which
makes "mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage" [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)].

In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the fundamental institution of
marriage. Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit "F" that he is separated from his wife. This fact and
statement without any further explanation from respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral
character which good moral character we repeat is a continuing condition for a member to remain in good
standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent has violated this rule against engaging in
immoral conduct.

We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs. Dischoso, 84 SCRA
622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private persons particularly disgruntled opponents to vent
their rancor on members of the Bar through unjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant
case the charges can hardly be considered as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence presented.
The evidence presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral character
necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He is therefore not
entitled to continue to engage in the practice of law.

We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the pleadings and evidence
on record, and, hence, approve and adopt the same.

The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in administrative
proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction.12

Witness Melgar’s testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife
is corroborated by the contents of an article in the Naujanews, introducing respondent as one of Naujan’s
public servants, and stating therein that respondent has been blessed with two beautiful children with his
wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.13 It should be noted that said publication is under the control of respondent, he
being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it could be reasonably concluded that if he contested the
truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn
dela Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered that the damning portions of said article to be edited
out.
With regard to respondent’s argument that the credibility of witnesses for the complainants is tainted by
the fact that they are motivated by revenge for respondent’s filing of criminal cases against them, we
opine that even if witnesses Melgar and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot
be discounted as they are fully supported and corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for
themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M.
Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an entry of a marriage between respondent and one
Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public documents and are prima facie evidence of
the facts contained therein, as provided for under Article 41014 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza
and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990,
respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having
been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, which provides as
follows:

Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. –

(1) The records of a person’s birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information
relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the following:

a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;

b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in

administrative, judicial or other official proceedings to determine the identity of
the child’s parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and

c. in case of the person’s death, the nearest of kin.

(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at least
two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the
discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the
subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the
rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation
of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth
records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand,
the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a
result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the
government or the state.15 In People vs. Hipol,16 we explained that:

The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between
the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power
and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of
 appellant at the treasurer’s office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription
on unwarranted searches and seizures.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records
as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not
apply.

Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not
provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are,
therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this
administrative case against respondent.

Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995
wherein respondent himself declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor
rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by
Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.

In Bar Matter No. 1154,17 good moral character was defined thus:

. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.

In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,18 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:

. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards
and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards
of morality required of every lawyer.19

We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that respondent continues to publicly and
openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of good
moral character. Respondent should keep in mind that the requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to
maintain one’s good standing in the legal profession.20 In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr.,21 we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of
the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this
Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar,
to withdraw the privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in violation
of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the
practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.

Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last known address and entered in
his record as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the Court Administrator be furnished also a
copy of this resolution for their information and guidance as well as for circularization to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

 G.R. No. 172971               June 16, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SITTI DOMADO, Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.: (Drugs Case)

Rationale: In People v. Hernandez,43 we held that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he
must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first
time on appeal.

Presumption of Regularity:The presumption that they properly discharged their duties should already
apply.49 As the foregoing discussion shows, the integrity of the adduced evidence has never been tainted,
so that it should retain its full evidentiary value. not excluded by the law or these rules.

Admissibility: Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there
should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be
admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded it by the courts. x x x

Testimony: PSI Lizardo testified that at around 2:30 p.m. of December 31, 2003, a group from the Second
Ranger Company based in Tagudin, Ilocos Sur came to his office at Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando,
La Union, and referred to Augustus D’Vince Castro (Augustus) for the filing of a case; Augustus was
arrested earlier that day at a checkpoint in Tagudin for violation of R.A. No. 9165.5

In the course of the investigation that followed, Augustus disclosed that he could order shabu from his
source in Dagupan City. PSI Lizardo responded by asking him to contact his source. Augustus obliged
and contacted his source by cell phone. He reported to PSI Lizardo that his source agreed to meet him at
Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union, for the delivery of shabu. On the basis of this information, PSI Lizardo
conducted a briefing and ordered his officers to undertake an entrapment operation.6

The entrapment team went to Damortis in two vehicles. PSI Lizardo and Augustus were on board a Besta
van, while the back-up team (composed of the Second Ranger Company members) used a Toyota Revo.
The team reached Damortis at 7:30 p.m. of December 31, 2003. PSI Lizardo and Augustus parked the
van at a Petron station, while the back-up vehicle strategically parked nearby.7 Augustus received word
by cell phone from his source that they were already at Damortis. Augustus relayed this information to
PSI Lizardo and that three (3) persons would deliver the shabu. At a little past 8:00 p.m., three women
alighted from a mini-bus, and went to the parked van. Augustus waived at the three women and bidded
them to board the van, which they did; the appellant sat in front, while Jehan and Violeta Fernandez
(Violeta) occupied the

The marking of the seized shabu at the police station rather than at the exact scene of the
warrantless arrest of the accused and the seizure of evidence, to our mind, should be appreciated
under the unique attendant circumstances of the case.

We note that the entrapment undisputably took place and the sachets of shabu were seized inside a
vehicle where all the actors – the accused, the informant, and the police – were riding together. They
were effectively on the road at that time and the records do not indicate that the van went to any other
place after the arrest and seizure. Only PSI Lizardo also appeared to have handled the seized items while
the van was on its way to the police station. Thus, there appeared no possibility for the "planting,"
switching, and tampering of evidence during the whole travel time from the place of seizure to the police
station. In fact, the case of the defense did not even suggest these possibilities as its defense was one of
avoidance, i.e., the accused did not know that what the delivered envelope contained was shabu.

All these indicators tell us that the main concern of the authorities at that time was simply to bring the
accused in for investigation and appropriate proceedings. Thus, they cannot be faulted if they opted, after
the warrantless arrest, to prioritize the delivery of the accused to their station and to undertake the
required marking and inventory of the seized items there. With the continued presence of all the accused
in the vehicle while the seized items remained unmarked, and the immediate marking and inventory of
these items upon reaching the police station, the law’s feared planting, tampering, and switching of
evidence were substantially negated. The fact that the accused were all at the police station when the
marking and inventory took place immeasurably strengthens the validity of our conclusion.

From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not beating any new path by holding that the failure to
undertake the required photography and immediate marking of seized items may be excused by the
unique circumstances of a case. In People v. Resurreccion,50 we already stated that "marking upon
immediate confiscation" does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at the police station or office
of the apprehending team. In the cases of People v. Rusiana,51 People v. Hernandez,52 and People v.
Gum-Oyen,53 the apprehending team marked the confiscated items at the police station and not at the
place of seizure. Nevertheless, we sustained the conviction because the evidence showed that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized had been preserved. To reiterate what we have held in
past cases, we are not always looking for the strict step-by-step adherence to the procedural
requirements; what is important is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. We succinctly
explained this in People v. Del Monte54 when we held:

We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the
inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs
inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when
it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible,
there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must
be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded it by the courts. x x x

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-
admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but
of weight – evidentiary merit or probative value – to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the
courts on

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-9181. November 28, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO
PANGANIBAN, Respondents.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman, City Attorney Pedro R. Revilla
and Assistant City Attorney Julian E. Lustre for Petitioner.

Estanislao A. Fernandez, Augusto Ilagan, Claro T. Almeda and Rufino Navarro for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE; EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION; ADMISSIBLE AS

EVIDENCE OF DECLARANT’S GUILT. — Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if an
accused’s confession may not be competent as against his co-accused, being hearsay as to the
latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence,
the confession is nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant’s own guilt (U.S. v. Vega, 43 Phil.,
41; People v. Bande, 50 Phil., 37; People v. Buan, 64 Phil., 296), and should be admitted as such.

2. ID.; ID.; ACT OR DECLARATION OF CONSPIRATOR; SECTION 12, RULE 123, IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO CONFESSION MADE AFTER CONSPIRACY HAS ENDED. — Section 12 of Rule 123,
providing that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration," refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the
unlawful enterprise ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made
long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U.S. v. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U.S. v.
Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People v. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People v. Napkil, 52 Phil., 985).

3. ID.; ID.; OBJECTIONS, WAIVER OF; COURT HAS NO POWER TO DISREGARD EVIDENCE "MOTU
PROPRIO." — The exclusion of the proffered confessions was no made of the basis of the objection
interposed by defense counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu
proprio. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a privilege which the parties may
waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not seasonably made, the objection is deemed waived
and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).

4. ID.; ID.; RULE ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. —

m of the question should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance,
in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is
relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the
evidence, the court may as a rule safety accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the
proof offered will be connected later." (Prats & Co. v. Pheonix Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817.) At
any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to
distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be
excluded. There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arises as to
admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer
appeal.

DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji,
Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired
together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been
presenting its evidence. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection
with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan
Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general
objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore
incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the
evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to
introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy
between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and
circumstances. Thereafter, according to the transcript, the following remarks were made"FISCAL

LUSTRE:

May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as
against the accused Consunji himself?

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a
confession unless yon prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances as required by law." Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9

The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the
motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor
General, for the review and annulment of the lower Court’s order completely excluding any evidence on
the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of
conspiracy.

We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion
of the prosecution’s evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the
trial when the ruling was made.

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an
accused freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

"SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as
to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji’s confession may not be competent
as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between
them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was,
nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant’s own guilt (U. S. v. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People v.
Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People v. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule
123, providing that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration."cralaw virtua1aw library

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in
this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. v. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. v.
Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People v. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People v. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).

Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two
accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in
tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the
purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the
prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban
before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123
also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude them
completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proffered confessions was not made on the basis of
the objection interposed by Panganiban’s counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the
Court issued motu-proprio. Panganiban’s counsel objected to Consunji’s confession as evidence of the
guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court,
instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not be
admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such
conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the
confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege
which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the
objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence
(Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).

We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial
confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the
identity of the confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not
even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have
allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and
admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into
the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final
determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the admissible
from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.

Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. v. Phoenix
Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously
administered in the courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor.
The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the
form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first
instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether
testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney
offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the
attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat
of the battle over which he presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the
relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and
the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and
possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, — a step which
this Court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first
instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much
harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final
consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If
this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then
has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment."cralaw virtua1aw library

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to
admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer
appeal.

Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is
annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law
and this opinion Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and
Concepcion, JJ., concur.
RULE 129

Atienza vs. Board of Medicine, G.R. No. 177407, Feb. 9, 2011

G.R. No. 177407               February 9, 2011

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn,
assailed the Orders2 issued by public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No.
1882.

The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.

Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for
check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr.
Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed
that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and
non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.

On February 18, 2000, private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint
for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly
participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo
Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.

It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said
doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent’s fully functional right kidney,
instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.

The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private
respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary
evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she
offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the
time she was operated. She described her exhibits, as follows:

"EXHIBIT ‘A’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996,
which is also marked as Annex ‘2’ as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin,
III’s counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal
complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are
the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to
be the same as or identical to the certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex ‘2’ to the
Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with
this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint;
 "EXHIBIT ‘B’ – the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997, which
is also marked as Annex ‘3’ as it was actually likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III’s counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection
with the criminal complaint filed by the herein complainant with the said office, on which are
handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this
exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of the document
marked as Annex ‘3’ which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended as such Annex
‘3’ to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4,
2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.

"EXHIBIT ‘C’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996, which is
also marked as Annex ‘4,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the
results of the examination.

"EXHIBIT ‘D’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which is
also marked as Annex ‘16,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the
results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten final
report of the same examination which is the document appended as Annexes ‘4’ and ‘1’
respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in
answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is marked as
Annex ‘4’ is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document marked as
Annex ‘1’ is a certified photocopy. Both documents are of the same date and typewritten contents
are the same as that which are written on Exhibit ‘D.’

Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondent’s [Editha Sioson’s] formal offer of exhibits.
He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly
identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the
exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

Dispositions of the Board of Medicine

The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the
[BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:

"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of [herein
petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of [therein]
respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they may serve in the
resolution of this case.

"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the
respondents.

"SO ORDERED."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons stated
in his comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.

The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It
concluded that it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value
when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can determine whether the evidence is relevant or not
if it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x x x.3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA, assailing the BOM’s Orders which admitted Editha Sioson’s (Editha’s) Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:

WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED

THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26
MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND

DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE
ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD,
WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE – A PROPERTY
RIGHT OR ONE’S LIVELIHOOD.4

We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.

Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Orders
of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were interlocutory, these
cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that completely or finally disposes of the
case.5 At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CA’s finding that the BOM did
not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits of Editha
contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.

Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence
rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are
incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence.

We disagree.

To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the BOM.6 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement
of the rules of evidence,7 in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy,
incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them
unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond
the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely
discarding them or ignoring them.8
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative
weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court
of Appeals9 teaches:

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be
considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or
not it proves an issue.

Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights
leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I
of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:

Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The Rules of
Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do not prejudice the
substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.10

As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights
of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha
were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxxx

(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30,
1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha’s medical case. The documents
contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits were actually
attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the
doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her
case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.

The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by
mandatory judicial notice.11

Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter
of fact.12 Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such
as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary.13 Laws of nature involving the
physical sciences, specifically biology,14 include the structural make-up and composition of living things
such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys before, and at the
time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.

Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable.1awphil Section 3 of
Rule 130 provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.

The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross
negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not
the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical
locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through
the exhibits offered in evidence.

Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys.
To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Editha’s kidneys, and
the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her
abdominal area.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.15 Witness Dr.
Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits
"because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building."16 Ultimately, since the
originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of evidence and,
thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

G.R. No. 187917               January 19, 2011

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES EDMUNDO MIRANDA and JULIE MIRANDA, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the June 30, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87775,
affirming the June 16, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Branch 35, as
well as its subsequent Resolution dated May 7, 2009,3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Respondents, spouses Edmundo Miranda and Julie Miranda, applied for and obtained a credit
accommodation from petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank). On August 27, 1996,
respondents obtained a ₱4,000,000.00 loan from Metrobank and executed a real estate mortgage4 over a
parcel of land in Poblacion, Santiago, Isabela, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 202288.
Upon respondents’ request, Metrobank increased the loan from ₱4,000,000.00 to ₱5,000,000.00. The
real estate mortgage executed on August 27, 1996 was thus amended5 to increase the principal amount
of loan secured by the mortgage to ₱5,000,000.00.

Subsequently, respondents obtained additional loans from Metrobank - ₱1,000,000.00 on December 3,

1996, and ₱1,000,000.00 on May 8, 1997. The additional loans were secured by mortgage6 over lands
situated in Dubinan and Mabini, Santiago, Isabela, covered by TCT Nos. T-202288, T-180503, T-260279,
and T-272664.

Respondents encountered difficulties in paying their loans. They requested for a longer period to settle
their account and further requested for the restructuring of their loans, which requests Metrobank granted.
Respondents then signed Promissory Note (PN) No. 5997737 for ₱6,400,000.00, and PN No. 5997728 for
₱950,000.00, both payable on February 24, 2002, with interest at 17.250% per annum. They also
amended the deeds of real estate mortgage they executed in favor of Metrobank to increase the amount
of loans secured by mortgage to ₱6,350,000.00. The amendment was inscribed on TCT Nos. T-
202288,9 T-260279,10 and T-180503.11

On August 25, 2000, Metrobank sent respondents a demand letter12 to settle their overdue account of
₱8,512,380.15, inclusive of interest and penalties; otherwise, the bank would initiate "the necessary legal
proceedings x x x, without further notice." Respondents, however, failed to settle their account.
Consequently, Metrobank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of the mortgaged
properties on November 16, 2000. The Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Santiago City sold the
mortgaged properties at public auction for the sum of ₱9,284,452.00 to Metrobank, as the highest bidder.
A Certificate of Sale13 was issued in favor of Metrobank on November 27, 2000, which was registered with
the Registry of Deeds on November 29, 2000.

Claiming that the extrajudicial foreclosure was void, respondents filed a complaint for Nullification of the
Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction14 with the
RTC of Santiago City. They alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
107915 and Act No. 3135,16 particularly the publication requirement. Respondents further asserted that
Metrobank required them to sign blank promissory notes and real estate mortgage, and that they were not
furnished with copies of these documents. Later, they discovered that the terms and conditions of the
promissory notes and of the mortgage were entirely different from what was represented to them by the
bank. The right to fix the interest rates, they added, was

exclusively given to the bank. Respondents, thus, prayed for the annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings.

Metrobank answered the complaint, denying its material allegations and asserting the validity of the
foreclosure proceedings. Specifically, it averred compliance with the posting and publication
requirements. Thus, it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.17

Meanwhile, on December 20, 2001, Metrobank caused the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of
respondents and the issuance of new ones in its name. On December 21, 2001, the Ex-Officio Sheriff
executed a Final Deed of Sale.18
On June 16, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision19 annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. The
RTC reviewed the records of the foreclosure proceedings and found no proof of publication of the sheriff’s
notice of sale; there was no affidavit of publication attached to the records. This fatal defect, it held,
invalidated the auction sale and the entire foreclosure proceedings. The RTC further held that, when
Metrobank foreclosed the mortgaged properties, respondents’ loan account was still outstanding for there
was an overpayment of interests amounting to ₱1,529,922.00. Thus, the foreclosure proceedings were
without factual and legal basis. The RTC further noted that Metrobank consolidated its title even before
the issuance of the sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale. The trial court considered it an irregularity sufficient to
invalidate the consolidation.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondents] and against
[petitioner] Metrobank as follows:

1) DECLARING as null and void the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, dated November 27, 2000,
Exhibit "11";

2) DECLARING as null and void the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale, dated December 21, 2000,
Exhibit "12";

3) CANCELLING [Metrobank’s] TCT Nos. T-319236 (Exhibit "13"); T-319235 over Lot 6-B-18
(Exhibit "14"); T-T-319235 over Lot 4-F (Exhibit "15"); and T-319237 (Exhibit "16");

4) RESTORING [respondents’] TCT Nos. T-260279 (Exhibit "E"); T-202288 (Exhibit "F"); T-
180503 (Exhibit "G"; and T- 272664 (Annex "E"); and

5) ORDERING x x x Metrobank to pay PHP50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 20

Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on July 31, 2006.

Metrobank then appealed to the CA, faulting the RTC for annulling the foreclosure proceedings. It insisted
that the bank complied with the publication requirement. Metrobank also disagreed with the trial court’s
finding of overpayment of interests amounting to ₱1,529,922.00, claiming that the applicable interest rates
on respondents’ loans were 17% and not 12% as computed by the trial court. It further asserted that a
final deed of sale is not necessary for purposes of consolidating its ownership over the subject properties.
Finally, Metrobank assailed the award of attorney’s fees for lack of basis.

On June 30, 2008, the CA resolved Metrobank’s appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated June 16, 2006 of the RTC of
Santiago City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 35-3022 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.21

Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration also suffered the same fate, as the CA denied it on May 7, 2009.22

Before us, Metrobank insists on the validity of the foreclosure proceedings. Essentially, it argues that
foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the party alleging irregularity has the
burden of proving his claim. Metrobank asserts that, in this case, the presumption of regularity was not
disputed because respondents failed to prove that the notice of sale was not published as required by
law.

At the outset, it must be stated that only questions of law may be raised before this Court in a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court is not a trier of facts, and it is
not the function of this Court to reexamine the evidence submitted by the parties.23

It has been our consistent ruling that the question of compliance or non-compliance with notice and
publication requirements of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual issue, and the resolution thereof
by the trial court is generally binding on this Court. The matter of sufficiency of posting and publication of
a notice of foreclosure sale need not be resolved

by this Court, especially when the findings of the RTC were sustained by the CA. Well-established is the
rule that factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the
said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court.24

The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that there was non-compliance
with the publication requirement bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting them with our
own. Metrobank has not shown that they are entitled to an exception to this rule. It has not sufficiently
demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review.

Metrobank makes much ado of respondents’ failure to present proof of non-compliance with the
publication requirement. It insists that respondents failed to discharge the requisite burden of proof.

Apparently, Metrobank lost sight of our ruling in Spouses Pulido v. CA,25 Sempio v. CA,26 and, recently, in
Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo,27 viz.:

While it may be true that the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite publication has the burden
of proof, still negative allegations need not be proved even if essential to one’s cause of action or defense
if they constitute a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the other party.

It would have been a simple matter for Metrobank to rebut the allegation of non-compliance by producing
the required proof of publication. Yet, Metrobank opted not to rebut the allegation; it simply relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

Unfortunately, Metrobank’s reliance on the presumption of regularity must fail because it did not present
any proof of publication of the notice of sale. As held by this Court in Spouses Pulido v. Court of
Appeals:28

[P]etitioners' reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties falls in the face
of a serious imputation on non-compliance. The presumption of compliance with official duty is rebutted
by failure to present proof of posting.

Further, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo,29 this Court
rejected a similar contention, viz.:

Petitioner's invocation of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of
Sheriff Castillo is misplaced. While posting the notice of sale is part of a sheriff's official functions, the
actual publication of the notice of sale cannot be considered as such, since this concerns the publisher's
business. Simply put, the sheriff is incompetent to prove that the notice of sale was actually published in a
newspaper of general circulation.
As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the records30 of the foreclosure proceedings lacked any proof
of publication. This explains why Metrobank could not present any proof of publication.

We take this occasion to reiterate that the object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature
and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given
for the purpose of securing bidders and preventing a sacrifice sale of the property.

The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a "reasonably wide publicity" of the auction sale. This is
why publication in a newspaper of general circulation is required. The Court has previously taken judicial
notice of the "far-reaching effects" of publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, the publication of the notice of sale was held essential to the validity of foreclosure
proceedings.31 In this case, Metrobank failed to establish compliance with the publication requirement.
The RTC and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for nullifying the foreclosure proceedings.

Metrobank next questions the authority of the RTC and the CA to take cognizance of the records of the
foreclosure proceedings as basis for annulling the auction sale. It claims that the trial court may not take
judicial notice of the records of proceedings in another case, unless the parties themselves agreed to it.
Metrobank asserts that it did not give its consent to the trial court’s examination of the records of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Further, the RTC did not even set a hearing for the purpose of
declaring its intention to take judicial notice of the records of the extrajudicial proceedings, as required by
Section 332 of Rule 129. Metrobank, thus, contends that the RTC exceeded its authority in taking
cognizance of the records of the extrajudicial proceedings.

We disagree.

As a rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. This rule, however, is not
absolute.

In Juaban v. Espina33 and "G" Holdings, Inc. v. National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local 103
(NAMAWU),34 we held that, in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in
other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely
interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice.

The RTC, therefore, acted well within its authority in taking cognizance of the records of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, and the CA cannot be faulted for sustaining the RTC.

Metrobank further questions the trial court’s finding of overpayment of interests. But like the issue on
compliance with the publication requirement, the issue on overpayment of interests involves the
ascertainment of facts not subject of review by this Court. We reiterate that our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latter’s findings of fact being
conclusive and not reviewable by this Court.35

Besides, we find nothing erroneous in this factual finding of the RTC. As explained by the RTC in its
decision:

[T]he Court notes that the original promissory notes evidencing the various loans of the plaintiffs were not
presented in court by either party; they are needed to determine the stipulated interest rate. The Court is
thus left to determine the same based on the testimony of the plaintiffs that the agreed interest rate is
12% per annum; amazingly, this was not denied or refuted by the [petitioner] bank, in which case, 12%
interest rate is applied at least for the period beginning 1997 until 1999, when the loan was renewed
under the two (2) new promissory notes which indicated a higher rate of interest of 17.250% per annum.
As mentioned above, the interest payments made by the [respondents] were already admitted by
[Metrobank] in its answer to the complaint as well as in its comment to [respondents’] formal offer of
evidence, and such interest payments are duly reflected and contained in the passbook account of the
[respondents], Exhibit "H," "H-1" to "H-10." But, in order to determine whether [respondents’] account has
become past due or not, as the [petitioner] bank represents, the Court deems it necessary to undertake
some mathematical computation the result of which would decisively guide the Court to arrive at a rightful
conclusion, thus:

1) Total interest payments by [respondents]

from May 7, 1997 to June 30, 1999 - ₱3,332,422.00
2) Interest due
from May 7, 1997 to June 30, 1999 - ₱1,802,500.00
computed as follows:
a) 1st year (₱7 M x 12%), from May 7, 1997 to May 28, 1998 - ₱ 840,000.00
b) 2nd year
i) from June 3, 1998 to Feb. 24, 1999 (8 mos.) - ₱ 560,000.00
ii) from March, 1999 to June 30, 1999 (4 mos.) - ₱ 402,500.00
3) Total Interest paid - ₱ 3,332,422.00
Less Interest due - ₱ 1,802,500.00
Overpaid interest - ₱ 1,529,922.00

From the foregoing, it is evident that [respondents] overpaid interests for the period of two (2) years, from
May 1997 to June 1999, in the total amount of Php. 1,529,922.00. Thus, the Court is convinced that it is
just and equitable that such an overpayment be construed as advance interest payments which should be
applied for the succeeding period or year of their contract. Otherwise, [Metrobank] would unjustly enrich
itself at the expense of [respondents]. In such a case, it was premature then for [Metrobank] to declare
[respondents’] account as past due, because at that juncture[, respondents’] loan obligation was
outstanding and in declaring otherwise, [Metrobank’s] action was without basis as there was no violation
of their loan contract. Consequently, it follows that the foreclosure proceedings subsequently held on
November 26, 2000 was without factual and legal basis, too. For, indeed, when the foreclosure
proceedings in question was conducted, [respondents’] loan account with [Metrobank], as it is said, was
still outstanding, because [respondents] were able to pay the interest due. Therefore, the Court is again
convinced that the nullification prayed for is in order.36

We need not say more.

In fine, the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor's failure to pay his obligation must
be exercised according to its clear mandate, and every requirement of the law must be complied with, or
the valid exercise of the right would end. The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others.37

As further declared by this Court in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad
Geronimo:38

While the law recognizes the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor's failure to pay
his obligation, it is imperative that such right be exercised according to its clear mandate. Each and every
requirement of the law must be complied with, lest, the valid exercise of the right would end. It must be
remembered that the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused especially to the prejudice of others.1avvphi1

We, therefore, affirm the CA and sustain the RTC in nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage and sale, including Metrobank’s title.
With this disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the issue of the validity of the consolidation of title
by Metrobank.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 87775 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 170575               June 8, 2011

Spouses MANUEL and FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners,

vs.
GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, Inc., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of the nature of the
action1 and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.2

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the Petition for Review before it. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution4 dated November 15, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina Del Rosario

and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed by
the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative thereto as summarized by the CA in
its assailed Decision are as follows:

The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974 located in
Roxas City which is described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397 of the Registry
of Deeds for the City of Roxas.

Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession and occupancy of said
land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by and between it and the City of Roxas. Its
possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being lessee thereof.

In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the respondent to vacate the premises
of said land. The respondent did not heed such notices because it still has the legal right to continue its
possession and occupancy of said land.5

On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint6 for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-2391. Said complaint
contains, among others, the following significant allegations:

3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of land, situated at Dayao,
Roxas City and covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18397 issued to the
plaintiffs by the Register of Deeds for Roxas City as evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is
hereto attached as Annex "A".

4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control
and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial
purposes.

xxxx
7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any
contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendant’s possession of the subject property is only by
tolerance.

8. But [plaintiffs’] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last quarter of 2002,
plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of
the property.

xxxx

10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused, as it continues to
fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy of the land, and to
vacate the subject premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said
demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the subject
property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof.7

Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer8 dated July 31, 2003 where it averred that:

3. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Complaint to the effect
that the defendant "took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same"
and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and
the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the
part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years; the defendant specifically DENIES the
allegations contained in the last part of this paragraph 4 of the Complaint that the defendant has
used the property leased for commercial purposes, the truth of the matter being that the
defendant has used and [is] still using the property only for civic non-profit endeavors hewing
closely to purposes of the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc., inter alia, devoted to general
welfare, protection, and upliftment of the people of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and
elsewhere in the Philippines; that the Foundation has spent out of its own funds for the
compliance of its avowed aims and purposes, up to the present, more than P25M, and that all the
improvements, including a beautiful auditorium built in the leased premises of the Foundation
"shall accrue to the CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation whatsoever, upon the
expiration of this Lease" (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex "2" hereof), eighteen (18) years
hence;

xxxx

5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint,
the truth being that the defendant took possession of the subject property by virtue of
Memorandums of Agreement, photo-copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "1" and "2"
and made integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant and the City of Roxas, which is the true
and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject property by the defendant
foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof;

xxxx

8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the Complaint that
defendant refused to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs and to vacate the premises, but
specifically DENIES the rest of the allegations thereof, the truth being that defendant has no
obligation whatsoever, to the plaintiffs, as they are neither the owners or lessors of the land
occupied by defendant;

xxxx
 As and by way of –

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further that:

12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant.

The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee] of the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having
acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs way back on February 19, 1981, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale which is hereto attached as Annex "3" and made an integral part hereof. While, admittedly,
the said certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the ownership of the property
covered therein has already transferred to the City of Roxas upon its delivery to it. Article 1496 of the Civil
Code provides that, ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered
to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an
agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. It is also provided under
Article 1498 of the Civil Code that, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, which is the object of the contract, if from the deed
the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
(Annex "3"), the plaintiffs have relinquished ownership of the property subject thereof in favor of the
vendee, City of Roxas. Necessarily, the possession of the property subject of the said Deed of Absolute
Sale now pertains to the City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right, whatsoever, to the
possession of the same. It is defendant foundation by virtue of the Memorandums of Agreement
(Annexes "1" and "2" hereof), which has the legal right to have possession of the subject property;9

After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference, respondent filed on October
20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of Cause of Action. Records
show that before the instant case was filed, the City of Roxas had already filed a case against petitioners
for "Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107, [Presidential Decree No.] 1529"
docketed as Special Case No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City.
Subsequently, on October 27, 2003, petitioners filed their Opposition to the said Motion.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order10 resolving the respondent’s Motion. In the said
Order, the MTCC held that:

The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The defendant is the lessee of the City
of Roxas of the parcel of land in question. There has been no previous contractual relationship between
the plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. affecting the title of the land
leased by the [Gerry] Roxas Foundation. The Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld
the possession of the land it is leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical possession of the land
leased by it from the City of Roxas subsists and continues to subsist until the termination of the contract
of lease according to its terms and pursuant to law.

The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property was already sold by the plaintiffs to
the present lessor of the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 19,
1981 executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors.

Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist;
rather, they contend that said document is merely defective. They had not even denied the signatories to
the said Contract of Sale; specifically the authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs signatures; all that plaintiffs
did merely referred to it as null and void and highly questionable without any specifications.
When the parties’ pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either because all the factual allegations have
been admitted expressly or impliedly; as when a denial is a general denial; there is no need of conducting
a trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence anymore. The case is then ripe for judicial
determination, either through a judgment on the pleadings (Rules of Court, Rule 34) or by summary
judgment under Rule 35, Rules of Court.

In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the
plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and
use[d] it for commercial purposes. x x x for so many years, plaintiffs patiently waited for someone to make
representation to them regarding the use of the subject property, but the same never happened.
Plaintiff[s] have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual
or legal basis. Hence, defendant’s possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.

xxxx

Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant "took full control and possession of
the subject property, developed the same" and has been using the premises in accordance with its
agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or
opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years.

That the defendant’s possession of the subject property is by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by
the defendant foundation with the City of Roxas which is the true and lawful owner, the latter having
acquired said property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale as early as February 19, 1981, long before
the defendant foundation’s occupation of the property. In Alcos v. IAC 162 SCRA 823 (1988), Buyer’s
immediate possession and occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and
authenticity of the deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum shopping interposed by the defendant to
be untenable and unmeritorious, and hence, denied; this Court still finds the pleadings filed by the
plaintiffs-spouses to be without a cause of action and hence, dismisses this instant complaint. With cost
against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision12 dated July 9, 2004 affirming the
MTCC Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA, in a Decision13 dated April
26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the RTC.

Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 which was, however, denied in a Resolution15 dated
November 15, 2005.

Issues

Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the
following issues:
 I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should limit itself in
interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint; and,

II. Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.16

Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The allegations in petitioner’s Complaint constitute judicial admissions.

Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1) sometime in 1991, without
their consent and authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject property,
developed the same and used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for
several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners thus conclude
that respondent’s possession of subject property is only by tolerance.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x

"A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the
introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be
observed and complied with."17 Correspondingly, "facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions
of the plaintiff and binding upon him."18 "The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader."19

In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and possession of subject
property without their consent and authority and that respondent’s use of the land was without any
contractual or legal basis.

Nature of the action is determined by the judicial admissions in the Complaint.

In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,20 citing Cañiza v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court held that "what
determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought."

This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,22 differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry
vis-à-vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the
prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by
the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one
decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of
action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.23

"The words ‘by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth’ shall include every situation or condition
under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior
possession, therefrom."24 "The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original
possessor by a person who has entered without right."25

"The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary."26 The employment of force, in this
case, can be deduced from petitioners’ allegation that respondent took full control and possession of the
subject property without their consent and authority.1avvphi1

"‘Stealth,’ on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to
gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission,"27 while strategy connotes
the employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property.28 The CA found
that based on the petitioners’ allegations in their complaint, "respondent’s entry on the land of the
petitioners was by stealth x x x."29 However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is
not availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent into the property appears to be with the
knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners’ allegation in their complaint that "[c]onsidering the
personalities behind the defendant foundation and considering further that it is plaintiff’s nephew, then
the vice-mayor, and now the Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any
legal or contractual right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities
of the foundation using their property."30 To this Court’s mind, this allegation if true, also illustrates
strategy.

Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible entry, and not
for unlawful detainer.

"In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."31 "[W]here the defendant’s possession of the property is illegal ab
initio," the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.32

In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject
property without any contractual or legal basis.33 Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence follows
that respondent’s possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners’
complaint is one for forcible entry – that is "the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person
who has entered without right."34 Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as
petitioners alleged that respondent’s possession was illegal at the inception.35

Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in

petitioners’ Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that
the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant suit for
unlawful detainer.

Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry within the reglementary one-year period from
the time of dispossession.

Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of subject
property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the time
of dispossession,36 the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners filed their
Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the
respondent.

In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA correctly affirmed said
order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and the Resolution dated
November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 159328               October 5, 2011

Heirs of ANTONIO FERAREN, represented by ANTONIO FERAREN, JR., JUSTINA FERAREN-

TABORA, LEAH FERAREN-HONASAN, ELIZABETH MARIE CLAIRE FERAREN-ARRASTIA, MA.
TERESA FERAREN-GONZALES, JOHANNA MICHELYNNE FERAREN YABUT, SCHELMA
ANTONETTE FERAREN-MENDOZA and JUAN MIGUEL FERAREN YABUT, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former 12th Division) and CECILIA TADIAR, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the May 21, 2003 Decision1 and the July 17, 2003 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71372. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decisions
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 2 in Civil Case No. 34633 and
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26 in Civil Case No. 6617,4 while
the questioned CA Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On May 25, 1999, herein private respondent Celia Tadiar (Celia) filed with the MTC of San Fernando, La
Union a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against herein petitioners Heirs of Antonio Feraren. In said
Complaint, Celia alleged that she and her three brothers are co-owners of a 1,200 square meter parcel of
land located in the poblacion of San Fernando City in La Union; that on September 21, 1960, the said lot
was sold by their father to the spouses Antonio and Justina Feraren (Spouses Feraren) on pacto de retro;
it was stipulated that the right to repurchase may be exercised within ten years; on August 31, 1970, Celia
and her co-heirs re-acquired the subject property; thereafter, the lot was leased on a month-to-month
basis to the Spouses Feraren who have constructed a residential house thereon; that sometime in March
1992, Celia and her co-heirs informed the Spouses Feraren of their intention to terminate their lease
contract; the Spouses Feraren, in turn, offered to sell them their house or buy the subject lot, which offers
were declined by Celia and her co-heirs and, instead, allowed the Spouses Feraren to continue renting
the property; after the death of Antonio in 1995, herein petitioners requested Celia and her co-heirs to
extend the lease until June 30, 1997 and even volunteered to temporarily vacate the said property; Celia
and her co-heirs agreed and they did not even increase the rentals; nonetheless, petitioners failed to
comply with their commitment to temporarily vacate; they continued to stay within the premises of the
subject property and refused to vacate the same notwithstanding repeated demands from Celia and her
co-heirs.5

In their Answer, herein petitioners contended that a 128-square-meter portion of the lot being claimed by
private respondent is their property; even before the Spouses Feraren entered into a contract of sale
with pacto de retro with the father of Celia, the former were already in possession of the remaining portion
of the subject property on the strength of a lease contract executed in their favor by the latter in 1949;
their construction of a residential house on the subject property was by virtue of a right granted under the
said contract of lease; petitioners were very much willing to vacate the disputed lot but only upon payment
of the value of all the improvements that they have legally introduced as builders in good faith on the said
lot, which includes the house presently standing thereon as well as the concrete fence surrounding the
said house; in the alternative, they offered to buy the parcel of land subject of the complaint.6

For failure of the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, the MTC, in its Order7 dated November 3,
2000, directed them to submit their position papers and other evidence within ten (10) days from receipt
of a copy of the said Order.
Private respondent did not file a position paper.

On the other hand, petitioners filed their Position Paper8 on March 15, 2001. Petitioners alleged therein
that their parents are builders in good faith having built their house on the lot in question during the time
that they were the owners of the disputed lot.

On June 15, 2001, the MTC rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer. The trial
court gave credence to petitioners' contention that their parents built the house in controversy on the
subject lot while they were the owners of the said lot. As such, the MTC held that as long as private
respondent refuses to reimburse petitioners of the value of the improvements they have introduced on the
lot in question, they (petitioners) may not be compelled to vacate the same.

On appeal, the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, in its Decision dated January 28, 2002, affirmed in
toto the judgment of the MTC.

Private respondent then filed a petition for review with the CA.

On May 21, 2003, the CA promulgated its presently assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of San
Fernando City, La Union in Civil Case No. 3463 and the Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
La Union in the same case are both REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the respondents not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of their residential house
built on the land owned by the petitioner; and

2. Directing the respondents to vacate the premises and restore possession thereof to the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.9

The CA based its Decision on its finding that the subject residential house was built during the time
petitioners' parents were lessees of the lot in question.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA via its Resolution
dated July 17, 2003.

Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ADMITTED
IN THEIR ANSWER THAT THEIR RESIDENTIAL HOUSE WAS CONSTRUCTED DURING THE
LIFETIME OF THE LEASE CONTRACT AND NOT DURING THE 10-YEAR PERIOD WHEN THE LOT
WHERE IT STOOD WAS SOLD UNDER PACTO DE RETRO TO THE PETITIONERS' PARENTS AS
SHOWN BY UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE D E C I S I O NS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION.10
Petitioners allege in the instant petition that the house presently standing on the subject parcel of land is
different from the house built on the same lot in 1949. Petitioners insist on their claim that the house built
at the time that their parents were lessees of the subject property in 1949 was demolished to give way to
the construction of the present house which was erected sometime in the late 1960's when the said lot
was then owned by their parents by virtue of the pacto de retro sale executed in the latter's favor on
September 21, 1960.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

At the outset, the Court notes that the issues raised in the present petition are essentially questions of
fact. It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari  filed with this Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court shall, as a general rule, raise only questions of law and that this Court is not duty-bound to
analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below.11 However,
there are recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.12

In the present case, the findings of the MTC and the RTC are contrary to those made by the CA. The
RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC that the subject house which is presently standing on the disputed
parcel of land was built at the time that the ownership of the said lot was in the name of petitioners'
parents. The CA, on the other hand, ruled that the abovementioned house was constructed when
petitioners' parents were in possession of the lot in question as lessees. Thus, this Court's review of such
findings is warranted.

A careful review of the records and the evidence presented in the instant case shows that the CA did not
commit error in finding that the house in question was built at the time petitioners' parents possessed the
subject lot as lessees.
Firstly, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' Position Paper and the affidavits of its witnesses
should not have been considered by the trial courts since these were filed beyond the 10-day
reglementary period required under Section 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 9 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.13 Petitioners do not dispute the appellate court's finding that they
submitted their position paper and affidavits more than three months after the deadline set by the
abovementioned rules. In this regard, this Court, in Teraña v. De Sagun,14 held as follows:

x x x By its express terms, the purpose of the RSP [Revised Rule on Summary Procedure] is to "achieve
an expeditious and inexpensive determination" of the cases they cover, among them, forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases. To achieve this objective, the RSP expressly prohibit[s] certain motions and
pleadings that could cause delay, among them, a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits
or any other paper. If the extension for the filing of these submissions cannot be allowed, we believe it
illogical and incongruous to admit a pleading that is already filed late. Effectively, we would then allow
indirectly what we prohibit to be done directly. It is for this reason that in Don Tino Realty Development
Corporation v. Florentino [G.R. No. 134222, September 10, 1999, 314 SCRA 197], albeit on the issue of
late filing of an answer in a summary proceeding, we stated that "[t]o admit a late answer is to put a
premium on dilatory measures, the very mischief that the rules seek to redress."

The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP is due to the essence and
purpose of these rules. The law looks with compassion upon a party who has been illegally dispossessed
of his property. Due to the urgency presented by this situation, the RSP provides for an expeditious and
inexpensive means of reinstating the rightful possessor to the enjoyment of the subject property. This
fulfills the need to resolve the ejectment case quickly. x x x15

As noted by the CA, petitioners did not even bother to file a motion asking the trial court to admit their
position paper which was belatedly filed. Indeed, the record is barren of any evidence to show that
petitioners, at least, tried to offer any explanation or justification for such delay. They simply ignored the
Rules. This Court has previously held that technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of
justice and to benefit the deserving.16 Moreover, rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants.17 These rules are established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial
system.18 They are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of invoking
"substantial justice."19 In a long line of decisions, this Court has repeatedly held that, while the rules of
procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business.20 In the instant case, petitioners' complete disregard of the Rules of
Court and of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure only shows that they are not deserving of their
relaxation. Hence, the MTC erred in admitting petitioners' position paper and taking the same into
consideration in rendering its judgment.

In any case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that petitioners' statement in their Answer, that
their parents built the subject residential house as lessees under the authority given to them by private
respondent's father in their contract of lease executed in 1949, is a judicial admission. Under Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,21 petitioners may not contradict this judicial admission unless they are
able to show that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. In the
instant case, petitioners' subsequent claim in their Position Paper that their house was built during the
time that their parents were the owners of the disputed lot is a direct contradiction of their judicial
admission in their Answer. However, petitioners failed to prove that such admission was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Hence, they may not contradict the same.

Aside from the abovementioned admission made by petitioners in their Answer, there is nothing in the
said Answer which claims that the subject house was constructed when petitioners' parents were the
owners of the disputed lot. Neither was there any allegation nor even a hint that a house was first built on
the lot in question in 1949 and that the same was demolished in the late 1960s to give way to the
construction of the house which is presently standing on the disputed lot.1avvphi1
Thus, it appears from all indications that petitioners' claims and allegations in their Position Paper
contradicting their admission in their Answer are mere afterthought subsequent to realizing that they could
not recover the full value of the house based on their acknowledgment that the same was erected at the
time that their parents were lessees of the disputed parcel of land.

At this juncture, it would not be amiss to reiterate that the rights of a lessee, like petitioners in the present
case, are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which
the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the
termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even
though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment
upon the property leased than is necessary.

With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may
remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does
not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.

Hence, under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying one-half of the value of the improvements
that the lessee made in good faith, which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, and
which have not altered the form and substance of the land. On the other hand, the lessee may remove
the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.22

It appears, nonetheless, that in her Complaint, private respondent prayed for the demolition of petitioners'
residential house constructed on the subject lot. It is, thus, clear that private respondent does not want to
appropriate the improvements. As such, petitioners cannot compel her to reimburse to them one-half of
the value of their house. The sole right of petitioners under Article 1678 then is to remove the
improvements without causing any more damage upon the property leased than is necessary.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 154430 : June 16, 2006]

Spouses JOSE N. BINARAO and PRECIOSA BINARAO, Petitioners, v. PLUS BUILDERS,

INC., Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,  J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision1 dated July 19, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68921, entitled "Sps. Jose N. Binarao and Preciosisima Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc."

The facts are:

Bahayang Pag-asa, Inc., and its sister corporation, Delfin Hermanos, Inc., are the owners and developers
of Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision in Cavite City. Plus Builders, Inc., herein respondent, is in charge of the
construction and sale of the houses therein.

On April 19, 1990, spouses Jose and Preciosisima N. Binarao, petitioners, purchased a house and lot in
Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision for a total price of P327,491.95.

Petitioner Jose Binarao executed an Affidavit of Undertaking on Equity whereby he agreed to pay

respondent P96,791.95 in the following manner: P5,000.00 upon signing of the contract, and the
remaining P91,791.95 within 15 days thereafter.

However, petitioners failed to comply with their undertaking, prompting respondent's counsel to send
them a demand letter.

On July 6, 1998, petitioners paid respondent P20,000.00, leaving a balance of P65,571.22 payable in

three installments.

On March 10, 1999, respondent's counsel sent petitioners another demand letter, but they refused to pay.

Consequently, respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 25, Manila a complaint for
a sum of money against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 163822-CV.

On June 11, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision2 in favor of respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Plus Builders,
Inc. and against defendants Spouses Jose and Preciosisima Binarao ordering the latter jointly and
severally to pay the former the sum of P65,571.75, plus interest thereon at the stipulated rate of 16% per
annum computed from March 22, 1990, and a sum equivalent to 25% of the amount due as liquidated
damages until the same is fully paid, and the sum equivalent to 25% of the unpaid balance as and by way
of attorney's fees and the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila, rendered a Decision3 dated November 23, 2001,
affirming in toto the MTC Decision, holding that petitioners, in their answer, did not deny respondent's
allegation in its complaint that they have still an outstanding balance of P65,571.22.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC in an Order 4 dated January 15,
2002.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review .

On July 19, 2002, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in toto the RTC Decision.

The Court of Appeals held:

x x x Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:

Sec. 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. - Material averment in the complaint, other
than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied
under oath.

And, Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as to the manner of making denials, provides:

Sec. 10. Specific denial. - A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he
does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall
specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in
the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.

In the instant case, petitioners did not deny the allegations as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the complaint of
herein respondent corporation. In fact, petitioners even admitted the allegations thereon. xxx

Petitioners, in their answer, specifically paragraph 1 thereof, stated:

1. Defendants admit paragraphs 1 and 4 of the complaint.

While it is true that paragraph 7 of petitioners' answer to the complaint qualified the fact that they didn't
sign any payment plan, this qualification however neither denies nor negates the other facts, as admitted,
that were stated in paragraph 4 of the complaint which actually states three facts: (1) that petitioner paid
the amount of P20,000.00 to respondent; (2) that petitioner still has a balance of P65,571.22; and (3) that
such unpaid balance is to be paid in three (3) agreed payment plan. What is denied by petitioners in
paragraph 7 of their answer, if at all, is the fact that there is no agreed payment plan. But, as to the fact, to
repeat, that petitioners still owe P65,571.22, as balance after payment of P20,000.00, is admitted by
petitioners as this fact is never denied by them.

Such admission, being made in the pleading, is considered as judicial admission. Being so, the
allegations, statements, or admissions contained in the pleading are conclusive as against the pleader, in
this case, petitioners. By admitting therefore that petitioners still owe P65,571.22 to respondent
corporation, such is conclusive to petitioners. Petitioners, on the other hand, may be relieved, as provided
for in Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, of the effects of such admission in their pleading if they
can show that the admission had been made through palpable mistake. However, petitioners failed to
show any palpable mistake on their part.

xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed Order dated January 15, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila, and its Decision
dated November 23, 2001 in Civil Case No. 01-101401, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this Petition for Review raising this basic issue:

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ADMITTED ABSOLUTELY IN THEIR ANSWER THEIR LIABILITY

UNDER THE PROPOSED PAYMENT PLAN DATED 06 JULY 1998.

Petitioners contend that they did not agree to pay respondent P96,791.95 and that they did not admit in
their answer they are liable to respondent.

Respondent maintains that petitioners' admission of liability in their answer binds them.

The petition lacks merit.

Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.5

Here, petitioners admitted in their answer the allegation in paragraph 4 of respondent's complaint. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners admitted that: (a) they paid the amount of P20,000.00;
(b) they still have a balance of P65,571.72; and (c) the unpaid balance is to be paid in three installments.
It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party
himself6 and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru
palpable mistake (as in this case), no amount of rationalization can offset it.7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 19, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68921 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.