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Team Code: T-14

UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT SELECTIONS, GRAND INTRA, 2021

Before

THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF NATIONAL

CAPITAL REGION OF CHARIZARD

FILED U/S 482 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

JAMES DOE & ANR. (WITH THE INTERVENTION OF THE STATE)…………….…..APPELLANT

VERSUS

BASH & ORS. ………………………………………………………...…………..RESPONDENT

CLUBBED WITH

FILED U/S 439 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

PRINCY………………………………………………………………………….….APPLICANT

VERSUS

STATE…………………………………………………………………...………..RESPONDENT

CLUBBED WITH

FILED U/S 439 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

DROC…………………………………………………………………………….…APPLICANT

VERSUS

STATE……………………………………………………………………….……RESPONDENT

CLUBBED WITH

FILED U/S 438 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

BASH………………………………………………………………………………..APPLICANT

VERSUS

STATE…………………………………………………………………………….RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL for APPELLANT/APPLICANT


UMCS, 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ I

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ III

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. VII

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................ VIII

STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................... IX

ISSUES RAISED................................................................................................................... XI

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................... XII

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .................................................................................................. 1

A: THE COMPLAINANTS JAMES DOE AND HIS WIFE JESSIE DOE HAD THE
LOCUS TO FILE PLEADINGS/APPEALS IN THIS MATTER .................................. 1

I. THERE WAS A DIRE NEED TO HEAR THE COMPLAINANTS AS THERE WAS AN ERROR APPARENT
ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD ............................................................................................... 1

II. NO ALTERNATIVE REMEDY WAS AVAILABLE AS IT WAS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER .............. 3

B: A PRE-ARREST NOTICE COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO BASH IN THE


ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION FILED BY HIM BEFORE THE LD.
SESSIONS JUDGE .............................................................................................................. 4

I. CONDITIONS UNDER SECTION 41 WERE NOT FULFILLED DUE TO WHICH COURT WAS

CORRECT IN PASSING PRE-ARREST NOTICE UNDER SECTION 41A............................................. 5

II. THE LD. SESSIONS COURT WAS WELL WITHIN THE POWERS WHILE GRANTING PRE-ARREST
NOTICE ................................................................................................................................ 7

C: THE PRESENT FRESH ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION FILED ON


BEHALF OF BASH could BE ALLOWED IN VIEW OF THE GROUNDS
MENTIONED ...................................................................................................................... 9

I. REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 438 CRPC GET FULFILLED .......................................... 9

II. NOT GIVING SAID BAIL IS A DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY & VARIOUS OTHER RIGHTS
.......................................................................................................................................... 10
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III. LARGER PUBLIC INTEREST WAS NOT GETTING DEFEATED .............................................. 12

D: THE FRESH BAIL APPLICATIONS FILED ON BEHALF OF DROC AND


PRINCY COULD BE ALLOWED IN VIEW OF THE GROUNDS MENTIONED IN
THE APPLICATION ........................................................................................................ 12

I. THE GROUNDS SPECIFIED FOR GRANTING BAIL HAVE BEEN MET ........................................ 13

II. THE ARRESTS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN GROSS PROCEDURAL VIOLATION OF CRPC ....... 14

III. THE ESSENTIALS OF SECTION 66C AND 420 HAVE NOT BEEN FULFILLED. ........................ 16

IV. THE GAME IS OF SKILL .................................................................................................. 18

PRAYER FOR RELIEF....................................................................................................... XI

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Indian Cases
A R Antulay v R S Nayak (1984) 2 SCC 500.............................................................................. 2
Adri Dharan Das v State of West Bengal (2005) 4 SCC 303 .................................................. 10
Ajay Mitra v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2003 SC 1069 .................................................... 17
Alpic Finance Ltd v P Sadasivan (2001) 3 SCC 513 ............................................................... 17
Amanullah & Anr v State of Bihar & Ors (2016) 6 SCC 699.................................................... 2
Amar Nath & Ors v State of Haryana & Ors AIR 1977 SC 2185 ............................................. 3
Amardeep Singh Brar v State of Punjab 2011 SCC OnLine P&H 15987 ................................. 8
Anil Sharma v State & Anr 1996 SCC OnLine HP 121 ........................................................... 13
ARG Outlier Media Pvt Ltd v State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 712 ................... 7
Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 .............................................................. 6, 14
Arun Kumar v State of Rajasthan 1995 SCC OnLine Raj 411 ................................................ 11
Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v State of Maharashtra (2009) 3 SCC 789 ......................... 1, 10
Bharat Inder Singh Chahal v State of Punjab & Ors 2007 Cri LJ 4490 ................................... 8
Bharati S Khandhar v Maruti Govid Jadhav & Ors 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 1901 ............... 16
Brij Nandan Jaiswal v Munna (2009) 1 SCC 678 ..................................................................... 2
Chaitanya Dalmiya v State of Rajasthan through PP AIRONLINE 2018 RAJ 101................. 7
Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd & Ors v State of Maharashtra & Ors AIR 2009 SC 1032 ..... 2
Dinkarrao v State of Maharashtra 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 1142 ............................................ 6
Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v CBI (2012) 4 SCC 134 ...................................................... 14
Directorate of Enforcement v PV Prabhakar Rao (1997) 6 SCC 647 ..................................... 11
Dr K R Lakshmanan v State of Tamil Nadu & Anr (1996) 2 SCC 226 ................................... 19
Gauri Shankar Roy v State of Bihar 2015 SCC OnLine Pat 2165............................................. 9
Girish Kumar Suneja v CBI (2017) 14 SCC 809 ....................................................................... 4
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 665 .................................................. 11
Gurcharan Singh & Ors v State (Delhi Admn) (1978) 1 SCC 118.......................................... 13
Gurpreet Singh v State of Punjab & Anr CRM No M-30342/2014 .......................................... 7
Harbanslal Premnath v State of Madhya Pradesh 1980 SCC OnLine MP 114 ...................... 20
Harish Jain v State & Ors 1994 (3) RCR 405 ......................................................................... 12

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In Re Charuchandra AIR 1917 Cal 253 .................................................................................... 5


Joginder Kumar v State of Uttar Pradesh (1994) 4 SCC 260 ............................................. 6, 15
Jokhro v Emperor AIR 1934 Sind 197....................................................................................... 5
Joseph Selvaraj v State of Gujarat AIR 2011 SC 2258 ........................................................... 17
Kajall Dye v State of Assam 1989 Cr LJ 1209 ........................................................................... 5
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v Rajesh Ranjan 2005 SCC (Cri) 489 .............................................. 13
Kavita Manikikar of Mumbai v Central Bureau of Investigation 2918 SCC OnLine Bom 1095
.............................................................................................................................................. 16
M C Abraham v State of Maharashtra (2003) 2 SCC 649 ........................................................ 6
Mahadeo Prasad v State of Bengal AIR 1954 SC 724 ............................................................ 17
Muhammad v Kannan AIR 1943 Mad 218 ................................................................................ 5
Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309 ............................................................. 12
PN Esvara Iyer & Ors v Registrar of Supreme Court of India (1980) 4 SCC 680 ................... 2
Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, Faridkot v Shree Durga Ji Traders AIR 2012 SC
700.......................................................................................................................................... 3
Puran v Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338 .................................................................................... 3, 4
R H Khatri v State of Maharashtra 1995 SCC OnLine Bom 389 ........................................... 10
R M D Chamarbaugawala v Union of India AIR 1957 SC 628 .............................................. 20
Ram Prapanna v State of Uttar Pradesh 2007 SCC OnLine All 1014 ..................................... 6
Ratna Mudali & Anr v King-Emperor (1917) ILR 40 Mad 1028 .............................................. 5
Ravindra Saxena v State of Rajasthan (2010) 1 SCC 684 ....................................................... 11
Renu Kumari v Sanjay Kumar (2008) 12 SCC 346 ................................................................... 1
Rini Johar v State of MP (2016) 11 SCC 703.......................................................................... 15
Saligram v Emperor AIR 1933 Cal 8 ...................................................................................... 19
Sanjaysinh Aniruddhsinh Rana v State of Gujarat 2021 SCC OnLine Guj 492 ..................... 11
Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr v Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329............................... 4
Shibi v State of Himachal Pradesh 1976 SCC OnLine HP 47 .................................................. 2
Shiv Kumar Jatia v State of NCT of Delhi Criminal Appeal No 1263/2019 ........................... 15
Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 SCC 694 ........................... 11
Siri Krishan Dass & Anr v State of Haryana 2000 SCC OnLine P&H 156...................... 11, 12
Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 443 ..................... 15
Som Mittal v Govt of Karnataka (2008) 3 SCC 753 .................................................................. 6

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Sona Kunwar v State of Bihar 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 45 .......................................................... 9


State of Andhra Pradesh v K Satyanarayana (1968) 2 SCR 387 ............................................ 19
State of Andhra Pradesh v Mohd Hussain (2014) 1 SCC 258................................................... 3
State of Orissa v Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540 ........................................................ 1
State Rep by the CBI v Anil Sharma JT 1997 (7) SC 651 ........................................................ 10
State v Digambar Vasant Kamat 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5645 ............................................... 2
State v N M T Joy Immaculate (2004) 5 SCC 729 ..................................................................... 3
State v Shehla Rashid Bail Application No 2925/2019, Case No 1524/2019 ........................... 7
Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v State of Maharashtra (2018) 6 SCC 454 ............................... 15
Subodh Chandra Roy Chowdhry v Emperor 1924 SCC OnLine Cal 104 ................................. 5
Subodh v Emperor (1925) ILR 52 Cal 319 ................................................................................ 5
Sunil Bharti Mittal v Central Bureau of Investigation (2015) 4 SCC 609 .............................. 15
Surath Chandra Giri v State of Orissa 1988 SCC OnLine Ori 169 .......................................... 4
Tanuja Roy v State of Assam 2016 SCC OnLine Gau 783 ...................................................... 16
Thakur Ram v State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 911 ........................................................................ 2
Tribhuwan v R AIR 1849 Oudh 74 ............................................................................................ 6
Union of India v K A Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713...................................................................... 14
Union of India v State of Maharashtra & Ors Review Petition (Crl) No 228/2018 ............... 10
Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v State of Gujrat (1988) 2 SCC 271..................................... 3
Vijay Bhagwaticharan Verma v State of Maharashtra AIRONLINE 2019 BOM 2168 ........... 8
Vinay Poddar v State Of Maharashtra 2009 (1) AIR BOM R 233 ........................................... 1

Foreign Cases
Rex v Fortier (1957) 13 QB 308 .............................................................................................. 20

Statutes
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 157(1) .............................................................................. 6
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 167 ................................................................................... 3
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 397(2) .............................................................................. 3
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 41 ............................................................................... 5, 15
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 41A .................................................................................. 5
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 436 ................................................................................. 18
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 439 ................................................................................. 13
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 46 ................................................................................... 16
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Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 46(4) .............................................................................. 16


Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 482 ................................................................................... 1
Indian Penal Code 1860, s 415 ................................................................................................ 17
Indian Penal Code 1860, s 420 ...................................................................................... 9, 14, 16
Information Technology Act 2000, s 66C ................................................................... 14, 16, 18
Information Technology Act 2000, s 77B ............................................................................... 18
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act 1887, s 13.............................................................. 18
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act 1887, s 4................................................................ 18
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act 1887, s 5................................................................ 18

Constitutional Provisions
Constitution of India, art 19(1)(g) ............................................................................................ 20
Constitution of India, art 21 ................................................................................................. 6, 16
Constitution of India, art 22(1) .................................................................................................. 6

Books, Articles & Publications


Durga Das Basu, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (6th edn, LexisNexis 2017) Ch V [9] ... 6
K D Gaur, Textbook on The Code of Criminal Procedure (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2020) Ch
XXXVII [4] ............................................................................................................................ 1
V R Kingaonkar, ‘Over Stretching the Scope of Provision for Bail u/s 167(2) of the CrPC’
Cri L J 1994 ......................................................................................................................... 10

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS EXPANSION
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Bom Bombay
Cal Calcutta
Govt. Government
i.e. That is
IO Investigation Officer
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
IPC Indian Penal Code
IT Information Technology
NCRC National Capital Region of Charizard
Ors. Others
PP Public Prosecutor
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
Sec. Section
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
P&H Punjab and Haryana
v Versus
Ch Chapter

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MEMORIAL for APPELLANT/APPLICANT LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

James Doe & Jessie Doe, the Appellants in the appeal under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 concerning the matter of James Doe & Anr. (With the intervention
of the State) v. Bash & Ors. (in Criminal Revision Petition No. 1 of 2021) humbly submits to
the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.

Princy, the Applicant in the application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 concerning the matter of Princy v. State (in Bail Matter No. 1 of 2021),
humbly submits to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.

Droc, the Applicant in the application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 concerning the matter of Droc v. State (in Bail Matter No. 2 of 2021), humbly submits
to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.

Bash, the Applicant in the application under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 concerning the matter of Bash v. State (in Anticipatory Bail Matter No. 1 of 2021),
humbly submits to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.

The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions, and arguments in the
present case.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Company: Backamon

Bash Tatum and Princy Latham lived in Pika-land. Bash and Princy incorporated Backamon
Inc. Pvt. Limited (Backamon). Whiterock purchased 60% stake in Backamon. Pursuant to
this, Mr. Droc Chu was appointed by Whiterock on the board of Backamon and was granted
extensive veto powers for decision-making while on the board. This was also incorporated in
SOP. However, resolution to adopt the SOP was pending approval.

The laws of Pika-land are pari materia to India. The laws of NCRC are pari materia to the
State of Maharashtra.

The Game: Backamon Go- Got to Catch Them All

The Game was free. The first 3 rounds could be played for free, post which tokens had to be
bought. The website only allowed a maximum recharge of 15,000 Kronas. No amount could,
however, be deducted without entering the CVV number & OTP. There are 4 types of
Backamons – Earth, Water, Fire & Space. Each Backamon could mutate and be trained by its
trainer and adapt to fight, and even defeat other Backamons stronger than it. To win, the
Backamon would not only need to possess strength but agility, strategy, and speed, some of
which also depend on its training/practice rounds.

To be eligible to enter into a fight, a user would have to collect 8 Backamons. GPS would
reveal the location of a Backamon. As users move, their device would vibrate to let them
know when they were near a Backamon. Each player would have to play and win 19 fight
rounds to reach the finale. Unless playing the initial practice round/free rounds, the amount
loaded by each player into the app wallet would be divided amongst the players in the ratio of
80:20 between the winner and the loser. Loading of money on the app can only happen
through a third-party payment gateway site after the user goes through two-factor
authentication/OTP feeding. The deduction would only happen post that on the payment
gateway site. Non-payment would result in the loser being banned from the Game app until
the payment of the losing amount plus a penal fee of 5% of the losing amount.

Mewoth, James & Jessie Doe

Mewoth was an 8-year-old son of police officers Jessie and James Doe. His parents had
already fed in their initial credit card details into his tablet. By 25 July 2020 at 8 p.m. PST,
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UMCS, 2021

Mewoth had downloaded the Game. He rushed out to the front of his house to scan the QR
Code being projected by the game. After scanning, the entire instruction manual was also
downloaded automatically. By the end of the week, he had played 7000 rounds and spent
15,00,000 Kronas. His classmates HJ Potter and DS Targareyn had also lost monies by
playing and becoming addicted to their screens. After 10 days, more than 15,00,000 Kronas
had been deducted from Mr. Doe’s account. He had not received any OTP and questioned the
bank and the payment gateway site, both of which pointed towards Backamon.

The FIR

James & Jessie filed a complaint against Bash, Droc, and Princy. They complained that the
accused had violated Sec. 4 and 5 of the NCRC Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887, Sections
66C of the Pika-land Information Technology Act, 2000, and Section 420 of the Pika-land
Penal Code, 1860. He also mentioned that Bash had been involved similarly before in another
controversy. ACP Mr. B. Singham and ACP Mr. B. Simba conducted the arrests. Only Princy
and Droc were arrested without notice at around 8 p.m. The matter was taken up by the
Crime Branch, NCRC, as the matter acquired high stakes & attention.

The Court Proceedings

Droc and Princy produced before the Sessions Court at 4 p.m. the next day. The Crime
Branch had moved an application seeking police custody of Droc and Princy for 14 days. The
Ld. Sessions Judge allowed police custody for 7 days and dismissed Droc and Princy’s bail
applications. Bash’s application for anticipatory bail was disposed of, with a direction that
any arrest that would be undertaken would be with a pre-arrest notice for 3 days. Then,
Jessie and James Doe moved pleadings before the NCRC High Court in terms of Section 482
of the CrPC, alleging that the police custody of Droc and Princy should have been granted for
14 days for investigation; (ii) the Ld. Sessions Judge could not have granted a direction for
pre-arrest notice to be issued when the anticipatory bail application was heard. Princy’s and
Droc’s lawyers filed fresh bail applications under Section 439 of the CrPC, 1973 before the
NCRC High Court. A fresh anticipatory bail application was also filed in respect of Bash
under Section 438 of the CrPC, 1973. Princy’s and Droc’s lawyers alleged that their arrest
had been conducted in gross procedural violation of CrPC, 1973.

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MEMORIAL for APPELLANT/APPLICANT STATEMENT OF FACTS
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ISSUES RAISED

A. WHETHER THE COMPLAINANT JAMES DOE AND HIS WIFE JESSIE DOE HAD
THE LOCUS TO FILE PLEADINGS/APPEALS IN THIS MATTER?

B. WHETHER A PRE-ARREST NOTICE COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO BASH IN


THE ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION FILED BY HIM BEFORE THE LD.
SESSIONS JUDGE?

C. WHETHER THE PRESENT FRESH ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION FILED


ON BEHALF OF BASH COULD BE ALLOWED IN VIEW OF THE GROUNDS
MENTIONED?

D. WHETHER THE FRESH BAIL APPLICATIONS FILED ON BEHALF OF DROC AND


PRINCY COULD BE ALLOWED IN VIEW OF THE GROUNDS MENTIONED IN
THE APPLICATION?

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MEMORIAL for APPELLANT/APPLICANT ISSUES RAISED
UMCS, 2021

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE A: THE COMPLAINANTS JAMES DOE AND HIS WIFE JESSIE DOE HAD
THE LOCUS TO FILE PLEADINGS/APPEALS IN THIS MATTER

It is humbly submitted that James Doe and his wife Jessie Doe do have the locus to file the
pleading in this matter under Section 482, CrPC. As the court gave an order without
appropriate reasoning while granting the pre-arrest notice of 3 days. It will create injustice for
the public at large because there are also other victims of the alleged fraud. Considering the
popularity of the game and the high stakes involved, the court must exercise its discretion and
admit the pleadings of the complainant. Moreover, as per Ld. Sessions Judge any other
interrogation to trace the money was not required. However, in reality, the accused only spent
20 hours, which is insufficient to investigate. The interrogation to trace money was not the
main question; the police wanted to investigate whether Backamon used illegal/unlawful
means to dupe the players by inducing them to spend their monies. Playing games all day is
affecting the health; it is corrupting the youth and their morality. Hence, the complainants
have the locus to come under Sec. 482 even for an interlocutory order.

ISSUE B: A PRE-ARREST NOTICE COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO BASH IN


THE ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION FILED BY HIM BEFORE THE LD.
SESSIONS JUDGE

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that a pre-arrest notice could have been
issued to Bash in the anticipatory bail application filed by him after considering the gravity of
the facts in the present case that pressed the need for such an order. Here, since the arrest was
not deemed necessary under Sec. 41(1) of CrPC by the Hon’ble Sessions Court, therefore the
option of passing a pre-arrest notice was open and the Court rightly passed the same in the
present circumstances. If special circumstance shown and in the extraordinary case and ample
materials placed, the Court has to pass an appropriate order including the one directing the
prosecution to give advance notice for a reasonable time. There were special circumstances
present in the case at hand, as the report has already been filed against Bash, Pricy and Droc;

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Bash, had a reputation to protect in the gaming industry which must not be tarnished just
because the police have a personal vendetta against the tech companies.

ISSUE C: THE PRESENT FRESH ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION FILED


ON BEHALF OF BASH COULD BE ALLOWED IN VIEW OF THE GROUNDS
MENTIONED

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the present fresh anticipatory bail
application filed on behalf of Bash should be allowed because requirements under Sec. 438
CrPC are fulfilled. Bash had reason to believe that he may be arrested, as an FIR was lodged
in the Main Police Station, & Princy and Droc were arrested without notice at around 8 p.m.
Also, since the matter was of high stakes and grabbed large media attention, it was even
taken up by the Crime Branch, NCRC; therefore, there is a very strong reason to believe that
he will get arrested in a similar manner. It is well-settled that bail and not jail is a normal
Rule. Not giving said bail is a deprivation of personal liberty & various other rights.
Requirements for granting anticipatory bail under Sec. 438 CrPC are fulfilled in the present
case. Therefore, we request the Hon’ble HC to grant the anticipatory bail.

ISSUE D: THE FRESH BAIL APPLICATIONS FILED ON BEHALF OF DROC AND


PRINCY COULD BE ALLOWED IN VIEW OF THE GROUNDS MENTIONED IN
THE APPLICATION

It is humbly submitted that the Bail Application filed by Droc and Princy should be allowed.
Sec. 439 CrPC gives the HC special power to grant bail to the accused. It is an established
principle that persons accused of non-bailable offences are entitled to bail if the court
concerned concludes that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against
him. In the present case scenario not only, arrests have happened in the blatant disregard of
Sec. 46 CrPC and the various SC Judgements. Furthermore, the essentials of the offences
alleged by the complainants are not tenable and lack clarity. Backamon-Go is also a game
predominantly based on skills and thereby would fall under the exception specified by Sec.
13 of NCRC Prevention of Gambling Act.

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MEMORIAL for APPELLANT/APPLICANT SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

A: THE COMPLAINANTS JAMES DOE AND HIS WIFE JESSIE DOE HAD THE
LOCUS TO FILE PLEADINGS/APPEALS IN THIS MATTER
¶1. It is humbly submitted that James Doe and Jessie Doe did have the locus to file the
pleading in this matter under Sec. 482, CrPC1 considering the rare circumstances in the case
at hand. In this argument, it is further submitted that (I) There was an error apparent on the
face of the record; (II) no alternative remedy was available as it was an interlocutory order.

I. There was a dire need to hear the complainants as there was an error apparent on
the face of the record

¶2. When an application for anticipatory bail is considered, the police may not place all
factual details before the Court as the investigation in most of such cases is at a prelim stage.
Therefore, some role can be played by the complainant by pointing out factual aspects.2
¶3. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any attempt is made to
abuse that authority to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse.3 It would
be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent the promotion of justice.4 When an effective alternative remedy is available, the
practice of HC in entertaining petitions under Sec. 482 has been deprecated.5
¶4. The Sessions Judge did not refer to any material circumstances on record and had just
said that the accused had already spent some time in custody. Moreover, any other
interrogation to trace the money was not required.6 However, in reality, the accused only
spent 20 hours, which is insufficient to investigate. The interrogation to trace money was not
the main question; the police wanted to investigate whether Backamon used illegal/unlawful
means to dupe the players by inducing them to spend their monies. Also, there was no reason

1
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 482.
2
Vinay Poddar v State Of Maharashtra 2009 (1) AIR BOM R 233, ¶ 13.
3
Renu Kumari v Sanjay Kumar (2008) 12 SCC 346, ¶ 9.
4
Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v State of Maharashtra (2009) 3 SCC 789, ¶ 8; State of Orissa v Saroj Kumar
Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540, ¶ 8.
5
K D Gaur, Textbook on The Code of Criminal Procedure (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2020) Ch XXXVII [4].
6
Clarification, ¶ 56.

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given while granting pre-arrest notice to Bash even after knowing that he is a very influential
person and had already been involved in a similar scandal.7
¶5. It is now a settled law that the complainant can always question the order granting bail if
the said order is not validly passed. The bail order can also be tested on merits if the judge
provided no reasons while granting bail. 8 Neither was given in our case by the Ld. Sessions
Judge while issuing the order of pre-arrest notice.
¶6. Under Sec. 482 of CrPC, this Court can examine the legality and correctness of the order
passed by the Ld. Special Judge.9 In Amanullah v State of Bihar,10 this Court has held that the
aggrieved party cannot be left to the mercy of the State to file an appeal. Applying the same
principle, the Ld. HC must listen to the aggrieved party, i.e., James & Jessie Doe.
¶7. The review of criminal judgments and orders is permissible on the grounds of error
apparent on the face of the record.11 The court can exercise discretionary power under Sec.
482 CrPC in deserving cases.12 The Sessions Court has granted only 7 days to the Crime
Branch for interrogation, which is evidently going to get over soon, considering that Bash is
not in custody, the company's CEO, and Droc is not involved in inventing the game. This
short period of 7 days will hamper the investigation and lead to catastrophic results.
¶8. In a case which has proceeded on a police report, a private party has no locus standi.13
The present appeal was not proceeded on a police report as per Sec. 173(2)14 as the police
have not investigated the case; it was just a preliminary issue. “It is a well-recognized
principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion
except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. Punishment
of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes
enacted for the larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled
down, circumscribed, or fettered by putting it into a straitjacket formula of locus standi
unknown to criminal jurisprudence save and except specific statutory exception.”15

7
Moot Proposition, ¶ 12.
8
Brij Nandan Jaiswal v Munna (2009) 1 SCC 678, ¶ 12.
9
State v Digambar Vasant Kamat 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5645, ¶ 31.
10
Amanullah & Anr v State of Bihar & Ors (2016) 6 SCC 699, ¶ 19.
11
PN Esvara Iyer & Ors v Registrar of Supreme Court of India (1980) 4 SCC 680, ¶ 34; Shibi v State of
Himachal Pradesh 1976 SCC OnLine HP 47, ¶ 2.
12
Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd & Ors v State of Maharashtra & Ors AIR 2009 SC 1032, ¶ 13-14.
13
Thakur Ram v State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 911, ¶ 9.
14
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 173(2).
15
A R Antulay v R S Nayak (1984) 2 SCC 500, ¶ 6.

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¶9. Hence, the Hon’ble Court must hear the complainants in the present case as the court gave
an order without appropriate reasoning. It will create injustice for the public at large because
there are also other victims in this. Considering the popularity of the game & the high stakes
involved, the court must exercise its discretion & admit the pleadings of the complainant.

II. No alternative remedy was available as it was an Interlocutory order

¶10. An order for granting or refusing bail is an interlocutory order.16 Sec.


167, CrPC17 empowers a Judicial Magistrate to authorize the detention of an accused in the
custody of the police. The order of remand has no bearing on the proceedings of the trial
itself, nor can it affect the ultimate decision of the case. A remand order cannot affect the
progress of the trial or its decision in any manner. Therefore, the order is a pure and simple
interlocutory order. Given the bar created by sub-section (2) of Sec. 397,18 CrPC, a revision
against the said order is not maintainable.19
¶11. Firstly, an alternative remedy for filing an appeal is not an absolute bar in entertaining a
petition under Sec. 482 of the Code.20 Secondly, as the current order was interlocutory, no
other remedy was available with the appellant. In the case of Amar Nath & Ors v State of
Haryana & Ors21 the following observations made by this Court: "…orders summoning
witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in
aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no
revision would lie under s. 397(2) of the CrPC.”
¶12. Even if it is an interlocutory order, the HC’s inherent jurisdiction under Sec. 482 is not
affected by the provisions of Sec. 397(3) CrPC. It cannot be denied that for securing the ends
of justice, the HC can interfere with the order which causes a miscarriage of justice or is
palpably illegal or is unjustified.22
¶13. Ld. HC has exercised its inherent power to deal with interlocutory orders in various
judgments. The Orissa HC cancelled an anticipatory bail granted by the Additional Sessions

16
State of Andhra Pradesh v Mohd Hussain (2014) 1 SCC 258, ¶ 17; Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v State
of Gujrat (1988) 2 SCC 271, ¶ 24.
17
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 167.
18
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 397(2).
19
State v N M T Joy Immaculate (2004) 5 SCC 729, ¶ 13.
20
Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, Faridkot v Shree Durga Ji Traders AIR 2012 SC 700, ¶ 12.
21
Amar Nath & Ors v State of Haryana & Ors AIR 1977 SC 2185, ¶ 6.
22
Puran v Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338, ¶ 17.

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Judge when he granted it by non-application of mind by invoking inherent power.23 The


Sessions Judge granted bail to an accused in a bride burning case by observing that grant of
bail by the Sessions Judge was arbitrary, and the order of bail though interlocutory, was set
aside by the HC by invoking inherent power. Therefore, an arbitrary and wrong exercise of
discretion by the trial court has to be corrected.24
¶14. This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for
grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed to promote public confidence in the
administration of justice in the larger public interest.25 Larger public interest is involved as
not just Mewoth, but others are also losing their monies by playing this game and becoming
addicted to their screens due to the kind of business model of the game.
¶15. The discretionary jurisdiction under Sec. 397(2) of the CrPC is to be exercised only in
respect of final orders and intermediate orders. The power under Sec. 482 of the CrPC is to
be exercised only in respect of interlocutory orders to give effect to an order passed under
the CrPC or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to serve the ends of justice.26
¶16. Hence, the court must entertain the matter as it involves the larger public interest as
there are more people like Mewoth, HJ Potter, and DS Targareyn are losing their monies.
Furthermore, even if, in some cases, Mewoth was not able to finish a complete round, then
also he must be playing for approx. 15-20 hrs., consider that each round is 75 seconds. For
this to be true, one has to play for at least 21 hours a day to complete 7000 rounds. This
figure is after excluding the time to collect the Backamons. Playing games all day is affecting
the health; it is corrupting the youth and their morality. Hence, the complainants have the
locus to come under Sec. 482 even for an interlocutory order.

B: A PRE-ARREST NOTICE COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO BASH IN THE


ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION FILED BY HIM BEFORE THE LD.
SESSIONS JUDGE
¶17. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that a pre-arrest notice could have
been issued to Bash in the anticipatory bail application filed by him after considering the
gravity of the facts in the present case that pressed the need for such an order. In this

23
Surath Chandra Giri v State of Orissa 1988 SCC OnLine Ori 169, ¶ 8.
24
Puran v Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338, ¶ 10, 17.
25
Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr v Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329, ¶ 49.
26
Girish Kumar Suneja v CBI (2017) 14 SCC 809, ¶ 38.

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argument, it is further submitted that (I) Conditions under Sec. 4127 were not fulfilled due to
which Court was correct in granting a pre-arrest notice under Sec. 41A28; (II) The Ld.
Sessions Judge was well within its powers while passing the pre-arrest notice.

I. Conditions under Section 41 were not fulfilled due to which Court was correct in
passing pre-arrest notice under Section 41A

¶18. The Pre-arrest Notice has been rightly issued to Bash in the Anticipatory Bail
Application filed by him because – Although the maximum punishment that could have been
brought against him was up to 7 years, the conditions under Sec. 41 CrPC were not fulfilled;
hence, an arrest without a warrant could not have been made.
¶19. Now, the arrest is not required according to Sec. 41(1) CrPC. There is a visible absence
of any ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘credible information’ but also that these words confer a
wide discretion upon police officers and must, therefore, be strictly construed. 29 The
limitations of credibility and reasonableness have been imposed to prevent abuse of power.30
On mere suspicion, police must not arrest any person under Sec. 41 of the Code unless
suspicion is well-founded.31 What is ‘credible’ information or a ‘reasonable’ suspicion must,
of course, depend on the circumstances of each case,32 but there must be definite facts or
averments, as distinguished from vague surmise or personal feelings,33 which the Police
officer must consider for himself before taking action under this section.34
¶20. The materials before him must be sufficient to cause a bona fide belief that an offence
has been committed or is about to be committed, necessitating the arrest of the person
concerned.35 There was no reasonable complaint as the money was divided among the
players only, and the Backamon did not profit from it. Also, it is a very far-fetched scenario
that Mewoth entered no CVV and OTP. Strong evidence may be required to discharge this

27
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 41.
28
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 41A.
29
In Re Charuchandra AIR 1917 Cal 253, ¶ 6.
30
Ratna Mudali & Anr v King-Emperor (1917) ILR 40 Mad 1028, ¶ 7.
31
Kajall Dye v State of Assam 1989 Cr LJ 1209, ¶ 3.
32
Subodh Chandra Roy Chowdhry v Emperor 1924 SCC OnLine Cal 104, ¶ 18.
33
Jokhro v Emperor AIR 1934 Sind 197, ¶ 9.
34
Subodh v Emperor (1925) ILR 52 Cal 319, ¶ 18.
35
Muhammad v Kannan AIR 1943 Mad 218, ¶ 7.

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burden where there was personal enmity between the Police officer and the person arrested.36
In the present case, there was personal enmity the police officers had a personal vendetta
against tech companies.37
¶21. The police officer further has to be satisfied that the arrest is necessary for one or more
purposes envisaged by sub-clauses (a) to (e) of clause (1) of Sec. 41 CrPC.38
¶22. Under Sec. 41(1)(b)(i),”…the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such
complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence.”
Suspicion must be based on “reasonable” credible information and not on fanciful
suspicion.39 Here, there was no credible information received. Mewoth was not asked about
how the transaction took place. It can be his fault also or that he deleted the OTP in fear of
his parents. There can be numerous possibilities as no credible information was received.
¶23. In Sec. 157(1) CrPC,40 its mentioned that a police officer shall investigate a case
relating to a cognizable offence, and if necessary, take measures for the arrest of the offender.
This again makes it clear that arrest is not a must in every case of a cognizable offence,41 and
there must be sufficient reasons for exercising such power by the police officers. 42 Since an
arrest is in the nature of an encroachment on the liberty of the subject and does affect his
reputation and status, the power has to be exercised with caution and circumspection.43
¶24. Under Sec. 41(1)(b)(ii)(b), the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary for
proper investigation of the offence; or (e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in
the Court whenever required cannot be ensured, and the police officer shall record while
making such arrest, his reasons in writing. The Hon’ble SC in Joginder Kumar’s case,44 after
considering the rights of the people guaranteed under Art. 2145 and 22(1)46 of the Constitution
of India, observed that ‘No arrest can be made because it was lawful for the police officers to
do so. The police officer must be able to justify the arrest apart from his power to do so.

36
Durga Das Basu, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (6th edn, LexisNexis 2017) Ch V [9]; Tribhuwan v R
AIR 1849 Oudh 74.
37
Moot Proposition, ¶ 17.
38
Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273, ¶ 7.
39
K D Gaur, Textbook on The Code of Criminal Procedure (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2020).
40
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 157(1).
41
Som Mittal v Govt of Karnataka (2008) 3 SCC 753, ¶ 44.
42
Ram Prapanna v State of Uttar Pradesh 2007 SCC OnLine All 1014, ¶ 33.
43
M C Abraham v State of Maharashtra (2003) 2 SCC 649, ¶ 14; Dinkarrao v State of Maharashtra 2003 SCC
OnLine Bom 1142, ¶ 20.
44
Joginder Kumar v State of Uttar Pradesh (1994) 4 SCC 260, ¶ 20.
45
Constitution of India, art 21.
46
Constitution of India, art 22(1).

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¶25. Firstly, any other interrogation to trace the money was not required.47 Secondly, Bash is
willing to let justice take its course. There is nothing to show that he will not appear before
the Hon’ble Court if notice is given. Since Sec. 41 CrPC was not applicable, a pre-arrest
Notice had to be given to Bash acc. to sec. 41A CrPC if his arrest had to be done.
¶26. It is given that Sec. 41A CrPC states that the police officer shall, in all cases where the
arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Sec. 41, issue a
notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible
information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a
cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified.”
¶27. Here, since the arrest was not deemed necessary under Sec. 41(1) of CrPC by the
Hon’ble Sessions Court, therefore the option of passing a pre-arrest notice was opened, and
the Court rightly passed the same in the present circumstances.

II. The Ld. Sessions Court was well within the powers while granting Pre-arrest notice

¶28. In State v Shehla Rashid,48 the sessions court granted 10 days pre-arrest notice while
rejecting the anticipatory bail application because the investigation was at a preliminary
stage. As here also, the investigation was at this stage, the Sessions Judge was right to grant
the pre-arrest notice of 3 days.
¶29. The Ld. Sessions Court did not want to take away the right of the Bash to approach the
Court for pre-arrest bail. In ARG Outlier Media case,49 the Bombay HC ordered that the
Mumbai Police give three days prior notice if they want to arrest the petitioner for facilitating
the Petitioner to approach the competent forum for appropriate reliefs. The Court has given a
similar pre-arrest notice in various anticipatory bail cases, such as in Chaitanya Dalmiya v
State of Rajasthan,50 where a direction was issued to the IO to serve a prior notice of ten days
upon the petitioner before affecting an arrest. In Gurpreet Singh v State of Punjab & Anr,51
the court directed the investigating agency to give four days' notice in advance before
effecting the arrest of the petitioner.

47
Clarification, ¶ 56.
48
State v Shehla Rashid Bail Application No 2925/2019, Case No 1524/2019, ¶ 3.
49
ARG Outlier Media Pvt Ltd v State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 712, ¶ 20.
50
Chaitanya Dalmiya v State of Rajasthan through PP AIRONLINE 2018 RAJ 101, ¶ 2.
51
Gurpreet Singh v State of Punjab & Anr CRM No M-30342/2014, ¶ 4.

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¶30. In the case of Vijay Bhagwaticharan Verma v State of Maharashtra,52 the petitioners
had twice approached the Sessions Court for grant of pre-arrest protection, which was
disposed of because each time, police filed a report that no offence is registered against the
petitioners. The police had received a concerned report, but it is still at the inquiry stage. In
such peculiar circumstances, the court found that certain directions are required to be issued
to the police to protect the petitioners' right to approach Court for prearrest bail. The Police
was directed to give 72 hours advance notice in this regard if they intend to arrest.
¶31. It is clear that even under Sec. 438 CrPC,53 if special circumstance shown and in the
extraordinary case and ample materials placed, the Court to strike a balance between
individual rights of personal freedom and the investigation right of the police, pass an
appropriate order including the one directing the prosecution to give advance notice for a
reasonable time.54 There were special circumstances present in the case at hand as the report
has already been filed against Bash, Pricy and Droc; Bash, had a reputation to protect in the
gaming industry which must not be tarnished just because the police has a personal vendetta
against the tech companies.
¶32. In Amardeep Singh Brar v State of Punjab,55 the petitioner under Sec. 438 of the CrPC
requested giving him seven days' prior notice if he is to be arrested in any FIR having been
registered against him. The court held that ‘the apprehension of the petitioner is well-
founded, it is of the considered view that he is entitled to the prayer made in the petition. He
shall not be arrested for any non-bailable offence in respect of any FIR to be registered
against him unless he is given seven days' prior notice.’
¶33. Hence, there exist special circumstances under which passing the pre-arrest order notice
was reasonable, and the court had the power to do the same to protect the right of the accused
to approach the court for anticipatory bail.

52
Vijay Bhagwaticharan Verma v State of Maharashtra AIRONLINE 2019 BOM 2168, ¶ 3.
53
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 438.
54
Bharat Inder Singh Chahal v State of Punjab & Ors 2007 Cri LJ 4490, ¶ 8.
55
Amardeep Singh Brar v State of Punjab 2011 SCC OnLine P&H 15987, ¶ 8.

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C: THE PRESENT FRESH ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION FILED ON


BEHALF OF BASH COULD BE ALLOWED IN VIEW OF THE GROUNDS
MENTIONED

¶34. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the present fresh anticipatory bail
application filed on behalf of Bash should be allowed because (I) Requirements under Sec.
438 CrPC are fulfilled; (II) Not giving said bail is a deprivation of personal liberty & various
other rights; & (III) Larger public interest was not getting defeated.
¶35. Mere appearance of an accused pursuant to notice under Sec. 41-A (1), CrPC would not
dis-entitle him from maintaining an application for grant of pre-arrest bail as the same cannot
be equated with the police powers to grant bail.” 56

I. Requirements under Section 438 CrPC get fulfilled

¶36. Bash had reason to believe that he may be arrested, as an FIR was lodged; & Princy and
Droc were arrested without notice at around 8 p.m.57 Also, since the matter was of high
stakes and grabbed large media attention, it was even taken up by the Crime Branch, NCRC;
therefore, there is a very strong reason to believe that he will get arrested in a similar manner.
¶37. Since Sec. 420 IPC58 is a non-bailable offence,59 he satisfies another condition required
to approach this Hon’ble Court. The Applicant has approached this Hon’ble Court to seek
anticipatory bail, which the Court of Session denied; the Applicant deserves to get his rightful
anticipatory bail as per Sec. 438(1)’s conditions:
i. Nature and Gravity were not that severe. The only non-bailable offence was Sec. 420
IPC and not the other two offences. Moreover, as alleged that Sec. 420 was only added
because of the Police’s witch-hunt against the tech companies.60
ii. Bash does not have any criminal record. Even in the past when an FIR was lodged
against Unglee Games, a settlement was made, pursuant to which the complainant had

56
Sona Kunwar v State of Bihar 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 45, ¶ 8; Gauri Shankar Roy v State of Bihar 2015 SCC
OnLine Pat 2165.
57
Ibid.
58
Indian Penal Code 1860, s 420.
59
Moot Proposition, ¶ 12.
60
Moot Proposition, ¶ 17.

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withdrawn his complaint.61 So, it cannot be a point which attributes guilt to Bash.
Antecedents of a person can act as an indication of whether a person deserves the bail or
not.62
iii. The likely object was to cause public humiliation & malign the reputation. The matter
had gained a lot of media attention.63 Even the Crime Branch got involved, which can
cause a great deal of harm to the reputation of the Applicants & their Company, which
had a powerful industry image. Through the FIR, James & Jessie, possibly with the
cooperation of the Crime Branch, wanted to tarnish the image of the company. In Union
of India v State of Maharashtra,64 as well as in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v State of
Maharashtra,65 it was argued that the complainant was intentionally insulted or
intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view.
iv. It cannot be reasonably assumed that the accused would have run away. The accused is
a law-abiding citizen and respects the country’s justice system and in no case would
abscond. Moving for anticipatory bail does not imply the guilt in this case.
¶38. According to Sec. 438(3),66 CrPC, the Sessions Court disposed of the Application,
therefore, it was not by any means an interim order. Hence, a seven-days’ notice was not
required to be given to the PP or the Commissioner of Police, etc. It is well-settled that bail
and not jail is a normal Rule.67 This slogan is often chanted like a religious mantra in
Criminal Courts.68 Hence, anticipatory bail filed by Bash could be allowed.

II. Not giving said bail is a deprivation of personal liberty & various other rights

¶39. The application for anticipatory bail can be moved by a person who has not been
arrested, and a direction thereunder can be issued by the court only at a pre-arrest stage to the
effect that in the event of his arrest, he shall be released on bail.69 Sec. 438 of the CrPC lays
down that when any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of
having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the HC or the Court of Session for

61
Clarification, ¶ 3.
62
R H Khatri v State of Maharashtra 1995 SCC OnLine Bom 389, ¶ 11.
63
Moot Proposition, ¶ 13.
64
Union of India v State of Maharashtra & Ors Review Petition (Crl) No 228/2018.
65
Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v State of Maharashtra (2009) 3 SCC 789.
66
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 438(3).
67
State Rep by the CBI v Anil Sharma JT 1997 (7) SC 651.
68
V R Kingaonkar, ‘Over Stretching the Scope of Provision for Bail u/s 167(2) of the CrPC’ Cri L J 1994.
69
Adri Dharan Das v State of West Bengal (2005) 4 SCC 303, ¶ 7.

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a direction under this Section; and that Court may if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of
such arrest he shall be released on bail.70 The object of Sec. 438 is to enable the Court of
Session and HC to direct the release of a person on bail prior to his arrest.
¶40. Anticipatory bail petitions should be decided on priority basis, and unnecessary and
long adjournment should not be granted because by doing so the very purpose of filing
prearrest-bail petition gets defeated.71 The dilatory tactics such as asking for 14 days of
remand in Police Custody72 on the part of the prosecution should not be ignored by the Ld.
Sessions Judge or even the Hon’ble HC judge, which inevitably amount to the abuse of the
process of the Court. Even the Sessions Court had reasoned that the accused had already
spent some time in custody. Any other interrogation to trace the money wasn’t required.73 A
wise exercise of judicial power inevitably takes care of the evil consequences which are
likely to flow out of its intemperate use.74
¶41. It is also contended that the petitioner is ready & willing to cooperate with the
investigation. There is nothing is to be recovered/discovered, and hence, custodial
interrogation of the petitioner isn’t necessary. The money is distributed between the players
themselves.75 Therefore, the company and, precisely, the people accused have no money with
themselves. Legal position concerning the grant of anticipatory bail requires no repetition
particularly in view of the decision in Gurbaksh Singh. Nonetheless, we remind ourselves
that the order contemplated u/s. 438 of the Code is to be granted or refused by the Hon'ble
HC or a Court of Sessions, after exercising its judicial discretion wisely.” 76
In Ravindra
Saxena v State of Rajasthan,77 it was held that Sec. 438 prevents the deprivation of personal
liberty. It cannot be permitted to be jettisoned on mere technicalities.

70
Siri Krishan Dass & Anr v State of Haryana 2000 SCC OnLine P&H 156, ¶ 6.
71
Arun Kumar v State of Rajasthan 1995 SCC OnLine Raj 411, ¶ 4.
72
Moot Proposition, ¶ 15.
73
Clarification, ¶ 56.
74
Sanjaysinh Aniruddhsinh Rana v State of Gujarat 2021 SCC OnLine Guj 492, ¶ 6; Siddharam Satlingappa
Mhetre v State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 SCC 694, ¶ 23; Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC
665, ¶ 21.
75
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8(h).
76
Directorate of Enforcement v PV Prabhakar Rao (1997) 6 SCC 647, ¶ 8.
77
Ravindra Saxena v State of Rajasthan (2010) 1 SCC 684, ¶ 7-11.

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III. Larger Public Interest was not getting defeated

¶42. In Harish Jain v State,78 the Hon'ble Court laid down a few guidelines such as nature
and seriousness of proposed charges; the context of events likely to lead to the making of the
charges; a reasonable opportunity of applicant's presence not being secured at trial, and
reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with the larger interests of public or
the State. Because of the growing tendency to involve innocent persons, the SC in Pawan
Kumar v State of Haryana79 has cautioned the Courts to act with circumspection. In the
words of the SC, “often innocent persons are also trapped or brought in with ulterior motives,
and therefore this places an arduous duty on the Court to separate such individuals from the
offenders.” Hence, the Courts have to deal such cases with circumspection, sift through the
evidence with caution, scrutinize the circumstances with utmost care.
¶43. The benefit of anticipatory bail should not be refused merely because the prosecution
claims that the accused is wanted in police custody for investigation. 80 The genuineness of
the alleged need in police custody has to be examined on merits depending upon the facts of
each case and while exercising the powers under Sec. 438 CrPC. It is the Courts'
responsibility that a balance must be struck so as to uphold the dignity of the law and to see
whether the interest of justice demands custodial interrogation or not.
¶44. Lastly, Bash’s lawyers argued that no offence had been made against him 81 for the same
reasons mentioned by the Counsels of Princy and Droc.82 We also complete the requirements
for granting anticipatory bail under Sec. 438 CrPC. Therefore, we request the Hon’ble HC to
grant the anticipatory bail.

D: THE FRESH BAIL APPLICATIONS FILED ON BEHALF OF DROC AND


PRINCY COULD BE ALLOWED IN VIEW OF THE GROUNDS MENTIONED IN
THE APPLICATION

¶45. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the fresh Bail Applications filed
on behalf of Droc and Princy should be allowed in view of the grounds mentioned in the

78
Harish Jain v State & Ors 1994 (3) RCR 405.
79
Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309, ¶ 1.
80
Siri Krishan Dass & Anr v State of Haryana 2000 SCC OnLine P&H 156, ¶ 6.
81
Moot Proposition, ¶ 18.
82
Moot Proposition, ¶ 17.

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application. In this argument, it is further submitted that (I) The grounds specified for
granting bail have been met; (II) The arrests have been conducted in gross procedural
violation; (III) Essentials of 66C IT Act, and 420 IPC were not met; (IV) The game is of skill.

I. The grounds specified for granting bail have been met

¶46. Sec. 439, CrPC83 gives the HC special power to grant bail to the accused. It is a well-
established principle that the successive applications of bail must receive serious
consideration at the hands of the Court entertaining bail application at a later stage when
same had been rejected earlier.84 It has been established by the SC through Kalyan Chandra
Sarkar v Rajesh Ranjan,85 that persons accused of non-bailable offences are entitled to bail if
the court concerned concludes that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case
against him and/or if the court is satisfied that despite the existence of a prima facie case
there is a need to release such persons on bail where fact situations require it to do so. In the
present case scenario, the prosecution has not only failed to establish any prima facie case
against Princy and Droc but has also included the non-bailable offence of cheating in the
form of Sec. 420 IPC in pursuance of their vendetta against the tech companies.86
¶47. Princy and Droc are eligible for bail and should have received the bail in the first
instance as in non-bailable cases in which the person is not guilty of an offence punishable
with death or imprisonment for life, the Court will/shall exercise its discretion in favour of
granting bail.87 Furthermore, the accused can in no way, shape or form can harm the
investigation; They have had no cases pending prior to this and would not flee from justice.
¶48. The SC in Gurchan Singh v State (Delhi Admn),88 while commenting on the essentials
of giving bail under Sec. 439(1) said that “…the overriding considerations in granting bail are
common both in the case of Sec. 437(1) and Sec. 439(1) CrPC of the new Code are the nature
and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the
status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood, of the
accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being

83
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 439.
84
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v Rajesh Ranjan 2005 SCC (Cri) 489, ¶ 19.
85
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v Rajesh Ranjan 2005 SCC (Cri) 489, ¶ 18.
86
Moot Proposition, ¶ 17.
87
Anil Sharma v State & Anr 1996 SCC OnLine HP 121, ¶ 7.
88
Gurcharan Singh & Ors v State (Delhi Admn) (1978) 1 SCC 118, ¶ 24.

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faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses;
the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in
view of so many valuable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out.” The same was recently
affirmed by the court in Union of India v KA Najeeb.89 The essentials set out by the court go
all in favour of the accused; hence the fresh bail applications should be accepted.
¶49. In Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v CBI,90 the SC clarified that the court granting bail
has to consider, among other circumstances, the factors such as (a) the nature of accusation
and severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence; (b)
reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the
complainant; and (c) prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.
¶50. The accusations in the present case are mere general mala fide allegations with no basis
and supporting evidence; the severity of punishment is only added by Sec. 420 of the Pika-
land Penal Code,91 which has no reasonable basis to be added by the police. Additionally,
there can be no reasonable apprehension of threat to the complainants as they have
connections withing the police officers. Furthermore, the court cannot have the satisfaction in
support of the charges under Sec. 66C of IT Act, 200092 and Sec. 420 of IPC are both not
attributable to Princy and Droc as the payments, sending of OTP are all undertaken by the
third-party payment gateway sites93 hence prima facie there does not exist any reasonable
case against the accused.

II. The arrests have been conducted in gross procedural violation of CrPC

¶51. It is humbly submitted that Princy’s and Droc’s arrests have been conducted in gross
procedural violation of CrPC, which violate the very fundamentals of law established by the
Courts over these years and are a clear example of police using their powers to go for
harassment, oppression, and pursuance of its vendetta against tech companies. The SC in the
landmark case of Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar94 had laid down that a person accused of an
offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years, or

89
Union of India v K A Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713.
90
Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v CBI (2012) 4 SCC 134, ¶ 32.
91
Indian Penal Code 1860, s 420.
92
Information Technology Act 2000, s 66C.
93
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8(i).
94
Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273, ¶ 7.

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which may extend to seven years with or without fine, cannot be arrested by the police officer
only on his satisfaction that such person had committed the offence punishable as aforesaid.
Before the arrest, the police officers should have reason to believe based on information and
material that the accused has committed the offence. Apart from this, the police officer
further has to be satisfied that the arrest is necessary for one or more purposes envisaged by
sub-clauses (a) to (e) of clause (1) of Sec. 41 CrPC.95
¶52. The Apex Court later, in the case of Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v Union of
India96 had reaffirmed that the directions issued in Arnesh Kumar are in accordance with the
legislative provision. In the present case scenario, the police did not even take the time to
consider the aforementioned grounds. No arrest should be made only because the offence is
non-bailable and cognizable and, therefore, lawful for the police officers to do so.97 Existence
of the power to arrest is one thing; the justification for its exercise is quite another. Apart
from it, the police officers must be able to justify the reasons thereof. No arrest can be made
in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person.
It would be prudent and wise for a police officer that no arrest is made without a reasonable
satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness of the allegation.98
¶53. Droc should not have been arrested as he is just a member of the Board of Directors.
The SC in Shiv Kumar Jatia v State of NCT of Delhi,99 quashed the criminal proceedings that
were initiated only on the ground that the accused was the managing director of the company.
The Court, in this case, reaffirmed its views outlined in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal v
Central Bureau of Investigation,100 where it inter-alia held that de hors any vicarious liability
provision, individual directors can be made accused only if there is sufficient material to
prove their active role coupled with criminal intent. Droc was not someone who invented the
game; and he was not the one who was playing an active role even after having extensive
veto powers as the Article of Association was not amended to adopt SOP.
¶54. It is a matter of grave concern that the Police acted in a biased manner and completely
disregarded the due procedure, especially in the case of Princy. As made abundantly clear in

95
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 41.
96
Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 443.
97
Joginder Kumar v State of Uttar Pradesh (1994) 4 SCC 260, ¶ 20; Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v State of
Maharashtra (2018) 6 SCC 454, ¶ 36; Rini Johar v State of MP (2016) 11 SCC 703, ¶ 16.
98
Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273, ¶ 6; Joginder Kumar v State of Uttar Pradesh (1994) 4
SCC 260, ¶ 20.
99
Shiv Kumar Jatia v State of NCT of Delhi Criminal Appeal No 1263/2019.
100
Sunil Bharti Mittal v Central Bureau of Investigation (2015) 4 SCC 609, ¶ 43.

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Sec. 46 of CrPC,101 no female shall be touched by any police officer for making her arrest
unless and until the police officer is a woman; herein, this very provision is violated since the
arrests were conducted by Mr. B. Singham and Mr. B. Simba102 and no female officer were
present. Furthermore, the police have also violated Sec. 46(4),103 which explicitly mentions
that no woman shall be arrested after sunset and before sunrise; the police officers have
entirely disregarded this section by arresting Ms. Princy at around 8:00 p.m.104
¶55. The Bombay HC, in Bharati S. Khandhar v Maruti Govid Jadhav & Ors,105 while
interpreting Sec. 46(4) had commented that the arrest made in contravention of this section
would constitute a gross violation of provisions of law. Similarly, the court in the case of
Kavita Manikikar of Mumbai v CBI,106 had accepted the well-settled position of law if initial
action is not in consonance with law, all the subsequent and consequential proceedings would
fall through for the reason that illegality strikes at the root of the order. Even in the present
case scenario, since the arrest itself is illegal, it cannot be legalized at a later stage by the
sessions court. Therefore, the order of dismissing the bail applications is liable to be set aside.
¶56. In Tanuja Roy v State of Assam,107 the Court had even commented that a violation of
Sec. 46(4) of CrPC would constitute a violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India,108 as
such illegal arrest had violated the personal liberty of the petitioner. Hence, the arrests have
been conducted in gross procedural violation of CrPC.

III. The essentials of Section 66C and 420 have not been fulfilled.

¶57. It is most humbly submitted that the complaints filed under Sec. 420 of Pika-land Penal
Code, 1860109 & Sec. 66C of the Pika-land Information Technology Act, 2000110 are not
applicable here, and none of their essentials have been met. Furthermore, it is alleged that
Sec. 420111 has only been added to make the case under the garb of non-bailable offences.

101
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 46.
102
Moot Proposition, ¶ 13.
103
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 46(4).
104
Moot Proposition, ¶ 13.
105
Bharati S Khandhar v Maruti Govid Jadhav & Ors 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 1901, ¶ 10.
106
Kavita Manikikar of Mumbai v Central Bureau of Investigation 2918 SCC OnLine Bom 1095.
107
Tanuja Roy v State of Assam 2016 SCC OnLine Gau 783, ¶ 28.
108
Constitution of India, art 21.
109
Indian Penal Code 1860, s 420.
110
Information Technology Act 2000, s 66C.
111
Indian Penal Code 1860, s 420.

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¶58. It is pertinent to note that to constitute the offence of Cheating under the IPC a dishonest
concealment of facts is necessary as described by Sec. 415.112 Furthermore the SC in various
instances has marked the following ingredients to be proven in order to prove the offence of
cheating:
i. There has to be a dishonest intention from the very beginning, which is a sine qua non
to hold the accused guilty for commission of the said offence.113
ii. Even if the allegations made in the complaint are accepted to be true and correct, the
appellants cannot be said to have committed any offence of cheating. Since the
appellants were not in the picture at any time when the complainant alleges to have
spent their money. Neither any guilty intention can be attributed to them, nor there
can be any intention on their part to deceive the complainant.114
iii. The offence of cheating is established when the accused thereby induced that person
to deliver any property or to do or to omit to do something he would otherwise not
have done or omitted.115
¶59. It is most humbly submitted that no conduct or actions were taken by the company, or
the directors can be attributed to the fact that there was indeed a dishonest intention.
Backamon, since the very inception of the game, made it a point to be accountable and open
in its policies and instructions.116 In its effort to be transparent, the company even made it
mandatory for the users to see the instruction video.117
¶60. The rulebook, among other important things, had mentioned how the payments had to
be done. It is clearly mentioned that a third-party payment gateway would handle the whole
process.118 Even if the Hon’ble court considers the allegations of this offence, such will not
amount to anything since sending of OTPs and collecting payment were done through a third-
party gateway. The SC in Alpic Finance Ltd v P Sadasivan119 had clarified that to deceive is
to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practicing
the deceit knows or believes to be false. It must also be shown that there existed a fraudulent

112
Indian Penal Code 1860, s 415.
113
Joseph Selvaraj v State of Gujarat AIR 2011 SC 2258, ¶ 15.
114
Ajay Mitra v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2003 SC 1069, ¶ 18.
115
Mahadeo Prasad v State of Bengal AIR 1954 SC 724, ¶ 4.
116
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8.
117
Moot Proposition, ¶ 5.
118
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8(i).
119
Alpic Finance Ltd v P Sadasivan (2001) 3 SCC 513, ¶ 10.

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and dishonest intention at the time of commission of the offence. Even now, there are no
allegations that the respondents made any willful misrepresentation to the complainants.
¶61. It is also pertinent to mention that Backamon in no way induced the Master Mewoth to
play the game in any way whatsoever; moreover, the company in no way, shape, or form had
coerced the complainants to pay for the game. Therefore, the allegations put forth by the
complainants are entirely baseless and lack any material quality. Even Sec. 66 of the IT Act,
2000120 by virtue of Sec. 77B121 is a bailable offence, meaning thereby that receiving bail is a
matter of right as mentioned in Sec. 436 of CrPC.122
¶62. Sec. 66C has two primary ingredients to make out an offence:
i. The action should have happened in a dishonest or fraudulent manner.
ii. An electronic signature, password, or any other unique identification feature must be
misused.
¶63. Once again, it is submitted that no dishonesty or fraud can be contributed to Backamon
since the company was not in charge of the payment. The payment could be made only
through a third-party payment gateway site, and the company had no role in sending OTP or
any other process. The company does not even receive any profit from the transactions taking
place to play the game on the app. The company could not have used any password or OTPs
since they were outside the purview of their working; therefore, the averments again lie in
baseless facts and help in proving the existence of the vendetta which the police has against
the tech companies.

IV. The game is of skill

¶64. Backamon Go is a game wherein high usage of skill is required for excelling. Even
though having elements of chance cannot be equated to a game of gambling as it is
predominantly dependent on the usage of skill.
¶65. Sec. 13 of the NCRC Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887123 clearly states that “Nothing
in this Act shall be held to apply to any game of mere skill wherever played.” So, any

120
Information Technology Act 2000, s 66C.
121
Information Technology Act 2000, s 77B.
122
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 436.
123
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act 1887, s 13.

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accusation based on Sec. 4124 and 5125 of the act is baseless. The mere act of having an
algorithm that randomly generates the Backamons would not make the game entirely based
on chance. As the SC in State of AP v K Satyanarayana126 while clarifying the legal position
on the game of Rummy, “…Rummy, on the other hand, requires a certain amount of skill
because the fall of the cards has to be memorised and the building up of Rummy requires
considerable skill in holding and discarding cards. We cannot, say that the game of rummy is
a game of entire chance. It is mainly and preponderantly a game of skill.” Therefore, the
further actions as to how the user uses the Backamons would render it as a skill.
¶66. A game of skill, although the element of chance necessarily cannot be entirely
eliminated, is one in which success depends principally upon the player's superior
knowledge, training, attention, experience, and adroitness.127 This definition falls upon the
Backamon game as it requires considerable skill to succeed as how the users catch the mutant
species and train to make them stronger is entirely dependent on the user's skills.
Furthermore, the skills of a Backamon would be enhanced/used to its advantage by the user
depending on the virtual arena in which the final fight is taking place.128
¶67. The points mentioned above would entitle the game to follow in the definition of the
word “mere skill” as described by the SC in the case of Dr. KR Lakshmanan v State of TN &
Anr,129 wherein the court had stated that “…(i) the competitions where success depends on
substantial degree of skill are not ‘gambling’ and (ii) despite there being an element of
chance if a game is preponderantly a game of skill it would nevertheless be a game of ‘mere
skill.’ We, therefore, hold that the expression ‘mere skill’ would mean substantial degree or a
preponderance of skill.” Backamon Go thereby comes under the exception established by the
SC and would not be liable for any gambling claims or accusations.
¶68. In the case of Saligram v Emperor,130 the Calcutta HC had asked to construe the word
“mere skill” a more liberal approach, the court held that the element of chance maybe small
or even infinitesimal, but in practically in all pastimes which can rightly be described as
games even though they are, undoubtedly, games of skill some element of chance might

124
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act 1887, s 4.
125
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act 1887, s 5.
126
State of Andhra Pradesh v K Satyanarayana (1968) 2 SCR 387, ¶ 12.
127
Dr K R Lakshmanan v State of Tamil Nadu & Anr (1996) 2 SCC 226, ¶ 3.
128
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8(b).
129
Dr K R Lakshmanan v State of Tamil Nadu & Anr (1996) 2 SCC 226, ¶ 20.
130
Saligram v Emperor AIR 1933 Cal 8, ¶ 10.

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creep in. It is very difficult to read the word “mere” as if it were synonymous with the word
“pure” one must give a reasonable interpretation to the expression “mere skill” and a game
of “mere skill” should be taken to mean one in which a person playing it, as far as possible in
any human affairs, has complete control over the result which he sets out to attain, provided
he is sufficiently expert in performance.”
¶69. The same viewpoint was taken by the court while classifying the game of dart as a game
of skill in the case of Harbanslal Premnath v State of MP.131 In the Canadian case of Rex v
Fortier132, the distinction between game of chance and game of skill was set out by the Court
stating that, “[A] game of chance and a game of skill are distinguished on the characteristics
of the dominating element that ultimately determines the result of the game.”
¶70. Hence Backamon game should not be considered a game of chance as the likelihood of
success is well within the control of any particular player; success in the game would demand
a high degree of skill, and the person playing must have an aptitude and must have a certain
amount of experience and expertness in the play of the particular game.
¶71. A player can alter the expected outcome in a game of skill, not so for a game of pure
chance. SC, in the case of R M D Chamarbaugawala v Union of India,133 relied on the ‘skill
test’ to decide whether an activity is gambling or not. The court held that competitions that
substantially involve skills are not gambling activities but are commercial activities,
protected under Art. 19(1)(g).134 The expected win in Backamon Go depends on the skill or
strategy employed by the player. In Backamon Go, specific knowledge can be brought to
bear on the decisions made during the game, resulting in a greater expected win.
¶72. Therefore, due to the above stated reasons it can be reasonably concluded that
Backamon-Go is indeed a game of skill, and it cannot be equated to gambling. Thus, it is an
exception under Sec. 13 of NCRC Prevention of Gambling Act.

131
Harbanslal Premnath v State of Madhya Pradesh 1980 SCC OnLine MP 114.
132
Rex v Fortier (1957) 13 QB 308.
133
R M D Chamarbaugawala v Union of India AIR 1957 SC 628.
134
Constitution of India, art 19(1)(g).

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore in the light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced, and
authorities cited, may this Hon’ble Court be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

I. JAMES DOE AND HIS WIFE JESSIE DOE HAVE THE LOCUS TO FILE
PLEADINGS/APPEALS IN THIS MATTER.

II. A PRE-ARREST NOTICE COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO BASH IN THE


ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION FILED BY HIM BEFORE THE LD.
SESSIONS JUDGE.

III. THE PRESENT FRESH ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION FILED ON


BEHALF OF BASH COULD BE ALLOWED.

IV. THE FRESH BAIL APPLICATIONS FILED ON BEHALF OF DROC AND PRINCY
COULD BE ALLOWED.

And /Or
Pass any other order that it may deem fit in the interest of justice, equity,
and good conscience.

s/d
On behalf of Appellants

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MEMORIAL for APPELLANT/APPLICANT PRAYER FOR RELIEF

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