SYMPOSIUM

studying policy advocacy through

social network analysis
frédéric varonea,*, karin ingoldb and charlotte jourdaina
a
Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva,
Unimail – 40 Bvd du Pont d'Arve, Genève CH-1211, Switzerland
b
Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, Fabrikstrasse 8, Bern CH-3012, Switzerland

*Corresponding author.

doi:10.1057/eps.2016.16; published online 27 May 2016

Abstract
Social Network Analysis (SNA) conceptualizes a policy-making process as a
network of actors. It can assess if an interest group (IGs) occupies a leading
central position within this policy network, if it belongs to various ad hoc
coalitions or if it plays a brokering role between different stakeholders. Such
network variables are crucial to capture how IGs mobilize and gain access to
policymakers, and to explain their goal achievements and potential policy
influence as well. This article reviews recent studies applying the methodo-
logical tools of SNA. It then proposes an innovative research design to
investigate how IGs seek to influence the course of a policy-making process
across many institutional venues.

Keywords interest group; policy network; advocacy strategy; coalitions;

venues; lobbying

INTEREST GROUPS (IGs) IN IGs influence on public policies. These

POLICY NETWORKS studies dedicate some attention to the
context of the policy-making process
meta-analysis of interest groups when explaining IGs strategies, access to

A (IGs) research, assessing 110 arti-

cles and books published between
1996 and 2011 (Hojnacki et al, 2012),
found that about two-thirds of recent
empirical studies focus on IGs advocacy
activities and/or on the measurement of
322
decision makers and, eventually, policy
success. Concretely, IG scholars take into
account, beyond IGs features (e.g., goals,
membership and resources), the charac-
teristics of the policy issue at stake
(e.g., saliency, scope and size) and the
european political science: 16 2017

(322 – 336) © 2016 European Consortium for Political Research. 1680- 4333/17 www.palgrave.com/journals
institutional, political and economic envir-
onment. This is a noticeable improvement
in comparison to Baumgartner and Leech’s
(1998: 174) rather critical evaluation of the
context insensitivity in most IGs research
published between 1950 and 1995. At that
time, most studies about IGs advocacy
tactics were conducted in isolation from
the specificities of the policy-making pro-
cess. Nevertheless, Hojnacki et al (2012)
conclude that future studies should con-
tinue to link IGs strategies, the policy pro-
cess and politics even more strongly (see
also, Beyers, 2008: 1206–1207; Halpin
and Binderkrantz, 2011: 207).
One promising research avenue point-
ing in that direction is the application of
Social Network Analysis (SNA): ‘Newly
emerging work (much of which is not
included in our sample) that explicitly
analyses organizations’ network affilia-
tions, including the strength of their ties
within broader partisan networks (Heaney
2006; Heaney and Rojas 2008, 2011;
Koger et al, 2009, 2010), has the poten-
tial to contribute important information to
a systematic understanding of groups’
policy-making activities. Similarly con-
structive are studies that consider both
organizations and policymakers as colla-
borators in advocacy (Mahoney, 2008;
Baumgartner et al, 2009)’ (Hojnacki et al,
2012: 11). The present article follows this
research dimension and proposes that
SNA offers several methodological tools
for putting IGs advocacy activities and
success into their policy context.
In a nutshell, SNA conceptualizes a pol-
icy-making process as a network of policy
actors and allows empirical measuring of
IG positions in this policy network. SNA
tools can thus assess if an IG occupies a
leading central position within collabora-
tive or adversarial policy networks, if it
belongs to different ad hoc coalitions
and/or if it plays a brokering role between
different stakeholders, for example. Such
network variables are crucial to capture
how IGs mobilize and gain access to
‘… network variables
are crucial to capture
how groups mobilize
and gain access to
policy-makers …’
policymakers, and to explain their goal
achievements and potential policy influ-
ence as well. We do not mean that SNA
offers new theoretical hypotheses about
the policy influence of IG. But we claim that
SNA is a valuable method to empirically
assess key variables, such as the IGs posi-
tion within a policy-making network, which
influence the likelihood of being successful
during the policy-making process.
We focus on three core aspects any
policy network consists of (Wasserman
and Faust, 1994; Pappi and Henning,
1998): actors, relations and the overall
network structure. Those core elements,
their identification and definition are on
one side strongly driven by theory, and on
the other side directly influenced by the
(institutional) context of the empirical
cases under investigation. The aim here
is to embed those three elements in IG
and policy network literature. This helps
us to highlight how SNA measures can
fruitfully inform researchers to under-
stand IG activities and success.
TYPE OF ACTORS AND NETWORK
BOUNDARIES
The first step in empirical network studies
is always to answer the question about
which actors to include (as ‘nodes’) in
the SNA. Different theoretical, but also
institutional elements are driving the
definition of network boundaries. One
fundamental difference between decision
makers and IGs is that the first have final
decisional control, whereas the second
can only try to impact decisions by acces-
sing decision makers and institutional
arenas (Pappi and Henning, 1999).
frédéric varone et al european political science: 16 2017 323
 Stokman and van den Bos (1992) there-
fore distinguish between an influence
stage and a voting stage in the policy-
making process. In the influence stage,
IGs enter into an exchange relationship
with formal authorities. IGs provide infor-
mation and expertise to decisions makers
(MPs, a regulatory agency, a court, etc.) in
exchange of access to a formal venue
(a parliamentary committee, a rule-making
procedure, an audition by judges, etc.)
(see also, Binderkrantz and Pedersen,
2016). Derived from that, network bound-
aries are strongly driven by institutiona-
lised power devices and would typically be
drawn around all active IGs as well as the
responsible decision makers (e.g., MPs,
elected officials, high civil servants,
judges, head of regulatory agencies, etc).
A SNA can be even more restrictive and
only consider those IGs that have effec-
tively been successful in accessing to the
targeted venue. While some venues might
be open to a broader range of politically
active actors (e.g., a pre-parliamentary
consultation procedure), other venues are
rather closed (e.g., hearings in parliamen-
tary committee). Furthermore, and
depending on a country’s political system,
some venues remain informal (e.g., a tem-
porary working group led by the adminis-
tration, a self-regulation body, neo-
corporatist arrangements, etc.), even
though they might play a key role in the
policy-making process and, thus, intro-
duce an important bias in the actors’ repre-
sentation (Culpepper, 2011). Therefore,
the policy network literature mostly draws
boundaries very broadly, and includes all
sorts of public or private actors, formal and
informal venues, and at all jurisdictional
levels (Kenis and Schneider, 1991; Klijn
and Koppenjan, 2000).
TYPE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
ACTORS
The theoretical background of any SNA
drives the choice about which relations
324 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA
‘… network ties can be
conceived as exchange
relations …’
between actors to look at. In the classical
resources exchange models also devel-
oped in the literature on IGs (e.g.,
Hansen, 1991; Wright, 1996; Berkhout,
2013), lobbying is for instance interpreted
as a transaction where relevant infor-
mation, technical expertise or another
‘access good’ (Bouwen, 2002) is
exchanged for venue access. Thus, when
thinking conceptually about this exchange
between actors, network ties can be
conceived as exchange relations or
‘channels’ within which flow those goods
or resources. It is not a direct relationship
engaging two actors, but rather a directed
tie (going from one actor to the other) that
does not – a priori – have to be recipro-
cated or mutually activated by both par-
ties. From a lobbying perspective, this is
important, as IGs can try to exchange
resources, but are not necessarily suc-
cessful (e.g., by receiving anything in
return such as venue access). One promi-
nent example is Pappi and Henning’s
(1999) study in European agricultural
policy where they convincingly demon-
strate that the provision of knowledge and
support (operationalised as resource
exchange relations) does not have to be
perceived in equal terms between IGs on
one side, and the European Commission
on the other. And going one step further,
Henning (2009) then relates this resource
exchange relations to IGs political influ-
ence at the micro level and to policy out-
comes at the macro level (Henning,
2009). Leifeld and Schneider (2012) also
focus on information exchange relations,
and thus on networks as dependent vari-
ables. They come to the conclusion that
exchange relations among political actors
are strongly driven by institutional oppor-
tunity structures and transaction costs. All
those studies show, in a different way,
how exchange relations between IGs sup-
plying an access good and the targeted
policymakers (e.g., MPs, bureaucrats,
judges) impact IG activity, institutional
access,1 or lobbying success.
Some governance and network scholars
conceptualise decision making less as a
conflict driven game, but rather as a col-
laborative network and cooperative set-
ting (Calanni et al, 2015). In such a
perspective, direct collaborative relations
rather than resource exchange seem to be
the appropriate structural device. But
similar to the above, these studies help to
identify political actors’ embeddedness in
the overall policy process (Ibarra, 1993;
Henry et al, 2011), or to assess what
impact collaborative structures have on
network performance and outputs (Lubell
and Fulton, 2007).
While exchange relations are very much
driven by formal institutions and decision
rules, collaborative network structures
seem to be more informally driven. Simi-
lar to the former, the choice of institutional
venue(s) by IGs is always constrained by
institutional access rules, cognitive bar-
riers and resource availability. IGs select a
venue or set of venues depending upon its
receptiveness to the IGs policy claims
(Pralle, 2006: 26–27). ‘Venue shopping’
occurs not only horizontally (e.g., IGs
lobbying the administration, the govern-
ment, the parliament or courts), between
branches of power, but also vertically,
between levels of government. The IGs
strategic choice of the relevant advocacy
level is one key issue in multi-level gov-
ernance in general, and in Europeanized
public policies in particular (Pappi and
Henning, 1999; Beyers and Kerremans,
2012; Bolleyer and Börzel, 2010).
When assessing such strategic choice
as a network relation, researchers tend to
rely on so-called two-mode network data.
More concretely, a network can be created
between IGs on one side, and ‘events’ on
the other. For example, a tie is created
between an IG (as first ‘mode’) and an
institutional venue (as ‘second mode’) if
this IG gained access to this institutional
venue. Besides venues, such ‘events’ or
‘second modes’ can also consist of formal
or ad hoc coalitions, as IGs have the
tendency to pool their resources and
share the advocacy costs (see Gray and
Lowery, 1998; Holyoke, 2003; Mahoney,
2007). For example, IGs can share the
financial costs for hiring an external lob-
byist or for funding a voting campaign or
they combine their legal expertise for
writing an amicus curiae brief to be
sent to the Supreme Court. To answer
research questions about the extent or
intensity two IGs coordinate actions and
co-participate within the same venues or
coalitions, a co-occurrence network can
then be created where a relation indi-
cates the number of shared events
between two IGs.
NETWORK STRUCTURES AND
ACTORS’ POSITIONS
Depending on the underlying theory, one
may wish to assess specific network con-
figurations or single actors’ positions in
order to answer research questions about
single or multiple IGs activity in policy
networks, or about their lobbying success.
Typically, researchers might be interested
in the identification of so-called ‘advocacy
coalitions’ driving policy change (Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In contrast to
formal IGs coalitions discussed above,
they include a much broader range of
policy actors (IGs, decisions makers, poli-
tical parties, experts, journalists, etc.)
and try to impact decision making deci-
sively based on shared beliefs and policy
preferences. To identify such advocacy
coalitions, IGs and other actors in the
network can be grouped into clusters or
blocks based on similar attributes
(homophily2) or similar structural posi-
tions (structural equivalence3). When
further assuming that coalition members
display a certain degree of coordination
frédéric varone et al european political science: 16 2017 325
 (Henry, 2011), clique analysis allows
controlling direct and indirect relations
among IGs within the same coalition
(Fischer, 2014; Box-Steffensmeier and
Christenson, 2014). The here cited
authors then explained, based on coali-
tion identification, IG success, policy
change and outputs.
In addition, classical indicators of SNA
may also be used to identify the roles
played by some IGs either within a coali-
tion or across coalitions. For instance, an
IG might be the leader of a coalition,
occupy a ‘bonding position’ and represent
the coalition’s homogeneous policy pre-
ferences. By contrast, an IG linking differ-
ent coalitions (i.e., bridging or brokering
position) is able to stimulate information
exchanges between heterogeneous
policy positions and, so doing, produce
new ideas about problem-solving or even
negotiated agreements (Beyers and
Braun, 2013; Ingold and Varone, 2012).
In one word, SNA offers many opportu-
nities to assess the strength of strong ties
within a coalition, and the strength of
weak ties between coalitions (Carpenter
et al, 1998).
Our review of the three network core
elements – actors, relations and struc-
tures – has demonstrated that the
design of network analysis for IG studies
strongly depend upon research ques-
tions, theoretical assumptions and insti-
tutional or context-related factors of the
empirical cases. Some of the presented
researchers applied SNA in a rather
descriptive way (see typically Pappi and
Henning, 1998; Ingold, 2011), whereas
others developed network modeling
further (see typically Henry, 2011;
Leifeld and Schneider, 2012). Further-
more and again mostly driven by
research questions, networks can be
defined as a driver of policy change and
thus conceptualized as an independent
variable, or network can be seen as the
aim and output, thus conceived as the
dependent variable.
326 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA
But to what extent can future IG studies
apply SNA further and benefit from analy-
tical and methodological strength? To
bring first answers to this question, the
next section reviews three new SNA appli-
cations in IG research and published after
the meta-analysis of Hojnacki et al
(2012). They were selected for their illus-
tration of innovative conceptual and
methodological combinations of actors,
relations and network structures to study
IG activity and success.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE:
POSITION IN POLICY
NETWORK MATTERS
A study by Heaney (2014) argues that the
embeddedness of IGs in multiplex net-
works pays off in terms of their influence
reputation. On the basis of document
analysis and personal interviews, the
author operationalises influence reputa-
tion and various network relations of IGs
within the US health policy domain.
Besides direct relations among IGs such
as communication, indirect relations
through joint participation in coalitions
and common issues are also assessed
(for coalitions’ participation, see also
Heaney and Lorenz, 2013). Heaney
(2014: 78) concludes that being con-
nected through communication, coalition
and issue overlap, significantly impacts
whether one IG cites another IG as being
influential.
In contrast to Heaney (2014) who
is predominantly interested in tie crea-
tion and activity among IGs, Box-
Steffensmeier et al (2013) highlight the
impact of IG activity on IG advocacy suc-
cess. The authors assess how the position
of an IG within the network of all IGs co-
signing amicus curiae briefs (from 1946 to
2001) has an impact on the US Supreme
Court’s decisions. It claims that IGs who
are more connected to other IGs, who
collaborate with other well-connected IGs
and, who frequently co-sign amicus cur-
iae briefs have a greater effect on the
probability that a justice vote in their
favor. In other words, the network posi-
tion of an IG is more important, for influ-
encing judicial decisions, than the
number of briefs it signs and the number
of IGs filling these briefs. Empirically,
‘eigenvector centrality’ of actors is used
to capture pivotal IGs in the amici net-
work.4 This study is limited to the judicial
venue: However, the authors suggest
that, if networks of amici are also active
in other policy-making venues (i.e., leg-
islature or government), then one might
reasonably expect a disproportionate
policy impact of well-connected IGs
within these venues also.
The third study reviewed here focuses
on network positions as well, which should
foster strategic information gathering and
policy brokerage activities. In the Eur-
opean context, Beyers and Braun (2013)
look at how IGs coalition membership
impacts their respective access to deci-
sion makers. They measured both strong
ties between IGs belonging to the same
coalition and weak ties bridging more
distant IGs that are members of alterna-
tive coalitions. Interviews with represen-
tatives of IGs, MPs and Government
agencies participating to the Dutch trade
policy (2003–2006) were conducted to
identify exchange relations between
actors. A block-modeling procedure is
then applied to identify coalitions of struc-
turally equivalent actors, and indicators of
density, reciprocity and transitivity,5 both
within and between coalitions, are mea-
sured to grasp the IGs network positions.
The overall findings demonstrate that IGs
positions within the coalition network are
as important as IGs internal resources
(e.g., members and staff) to explain IGs
access to elected MPs or administrative
officials. Furthermore, being a central
node within a coalition is important for
gaining access to MPs, while occupying
a bridging position between coalitions
‘… to be influential, a
group needs first of all to
be situated between
other (well-connected)
groups …’
increases access to the bureaucratic
venue.
These three remarkable studies
focus on alternative institutional venues
(Court, Legislature, Government and
Administration), two very different politi-
cal systems (the United States and The
Netherlands), specific IGs advocacy stra-
tegies (litigation and lobbying) and differ-
ent policy domains and time frame (all
judicial issues since World War II, health-
care and trade policy of the last decades).
However, they share SNA as the main
approach and methodology, even if they
use different indicators (i.e., centrality,
structural equivalence, density, recipro-
city and transitivity) to capture the IGs
network position and test different
research hypotheses (see summary in
Table 1). It is noteworthy that they lead
to the same overall conclusion: quality
(i.e., the centrality in amici or coalitions
network) is much more important than
quantity (i.e., the number of amicus cur-
iae briefs and co-signers, or the number
and size of coalitions) to explain venue
access and policy influence exerted by
IGs. To be influential, an IG needs first of
all to be situated between other (well-
connected) IGs and not necessarily to
participate in many and large coalitions
or to have a disproportionate endowment
of internal resources. Taking into account
the very diverse research designs of the
three studies compared here, the external
validity of their common findings should
be high.
Table 1 highlights where the three stu-
dies systematically apply SNA tools to
operationalize the dependent and inde-
pendent variables and how they apply the
frédéric varone et al european political science: 16 2017 327
 three dimensions (actors, relations and
structure) presented above. This com-
parison demonstrates that none of these
studies fully capture the IGs advocacy
activities and success during the entire
policy-making process. For instance,
Box-Steffensmeier et al (2013) focus on
one institutional venue only. By con-
trast, Heaney (2014) compares different
venues involved during US health policy
formulation. However, he neither sys-
tematically compares the relative influ-
ence of IGs across venues, nor does he
aggregate the policy impacts of IGs
through their network position within the
three networks (communication, venue
and issue overlap). Finally, Beyers and
Braun (2013) aim at capturing simulta-
neously the ties between IGs on one
hand, and elected politicians and bureau-
crats on the other hand. However, they
retain venue access, and not policy influ-
ence, as dependent variable. Of course,
these limitations do not reduce the rele-
vance and highest quality of these stu-
dies, nor do they question the added
value of adopting a social network
approach in IGs research.
Nevertheless, we propose hereafter
to broaden the perspective by looking at
IGs mobilization, coalition participation
and network position across all institu-
tional venues activated during an entire
policy-making process. The following
proposal shows how SNA measure-
ments can be used in a research design,
which aims at capturing the policy con-
text of IGs advocacy, as suggested by
Baumgartner and Leech (1998). This
tentative proposal is also compatible with
the recommendation of Lowery and
Gray (2004: 169): their neo-pluralist
approach distinguishes various interde-
pendent steps in the ‘influence produc-
tion process’, namely the formation and
political mobilization of IGs, the competi-
tion between IGs belonging to the popula-
tion of active interest organizations, the
advocacy strategies they follow across
328 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA
venues and, eventually, the policy out-
come reflecting their influence efforts.
TRACING GROUPS’
ADVOCACY DURING AN
ENTIRE POLICY PROCESS
The research design proposed here tries
to better capture how IGs seek to influ-
ence the course of a policy across many
institutional venues. It encompasses
seven steps and starts with the selection
of several most different policy issues, for
example, economic, social, environ-
mental, individual rights or moral issues
(Step 1). For each policy issue, a docu-
mentary analysis shall reconstruct the
entire policy-making process and lead to
the precise identification of all binding
policy decisions that were made in the
different institutional venues over the
years: e.g., laws adopted by the Legisla-
ture, popular initiatives accepted by the
voters, rulings by judicial courts, vetoes
by the Governor or regulatory decisions
by executive agencies (Step 2). In addi-
tion, the case study shall make a sys-
tematic inventory of all IGs that have
tried to influence these binding decisions,
for example, through reported lobbying of
the Legislature, funding a voting cam-
paign, writing an amicus curiae brief to
support a party in a suit, sending a letter
to the Governor to request or oppose a
veto, or formulating comments to pro-
posed rules (Step 3) (on identifying
actors, see also Eising, 2016). Steps 1–3
are thus informing network boundary
definition, while Step 3 more specifically
identifies IGs as nodes and actors in the
network.
For the definition of relations, the pro-
posed research design adopts the above-
introduced two-mode approach where a
relation is identified when an IG is a
member of a formal coalition and this for
each decision in each venue. Formal coa-
lition membership can be empirically
 Table 1: Summary of three SNA studies on IGs’ advocacy activities
Author of the study Heaney (2014)
Research question Does the embeddedness of an
IG in multiplex networks affect its
influence reputation?
Independent (a) IGs only
variables: SNA tools (b) One-mode network: each IG is a
used to capture the node and an edge is created if an IG
network position of IGs communicates with another IG
(a) actors/boundaries Two-mode network of coalition and
(b) relations issue overlap: each IG, coalition or
(c) positions and issue is a node and an edge is
network structures created between two IGs linked
through the same coalition or the
same issue, respectively
(c) Exponential random graph
model (ERGM) assessing if
relational activity or homophily
leads to reputational power relations
Dependent variable: Indirect measures of political
political influence influence through IGs influence
reputation (SNA; influence
reputation as network)
Empirical basis US health policy between 2001 and
2003
Major findings IGs tied through communication
relations, coalition and issue
overlap tend to evaluate each
other as influential
frédéric varone et al european political science: 16 2017
329
Box-Steffensmeier et al (2013)
Does the position of an IG within the
amici network impact on justice
votes?
(a) IGs only
(b)Two modes network transformed
in one-mode network: each IG
co-signing an amicus curiae brief
is a node in the network of amici
An edge is created between two
IGs co-signing the same amicus
curiae brief
(c) Eigenvector centrality is used
to identify central IGs
IGs influence on justice’s vote
US Supreme Court cases from
1946 to 2001
Well-connected IGs collaborating
with other well-connected IGs have
a greater effect on the probability
that a justice votes in their favor
Beyers and Braun (2013)
Does the exchanges within and
between coalitions affect the
likelihood of access to policymakers?
(a) IGs, MPs, Government agencies
(b) One-mode network: each IG or
policymaker (elected politician or
bureaucrat) is a node in the decision
making network
An edge is created if an IG exchanges
information or tries to collaborate
with another IG or a policymaker
(c) Blocks of structural equivalent
actors form coalitions. Density,
reciprocity and transitivity measures
are used to identify IGs within and
across coalition activities
IGs access to policymakers (SNA;
access relations as network)
Dutch trade policy between 2003 and
2006
IGs with a bonding position within a
coalition gain more access to elected
politicians, while IGs with a bridging
position between coalitions gain more
access to bureaucrats
 grasped, for example, if several IGs use
the same lobbying firm during the legis-
lative year, if an IG co-signs a letter to the
Governor regarding his veto, or a letter of
comments about a proposed rule, if an IG
contributes financially to a ballot cam-
paign coalition or if the IG co-signs an
amicus curiae brief (Step 4).6
The next research step is dedicated to
the coding of the dependent variable (on
lobbying success, see also Vannoni 2016).
Concretely, the advocacy success of an IG
assesses if the IG was able, or not able, to
realize its policy preferences for each
binding decision (Step 5). For example, in
the legislative venue, this ‘preferred out-
come’ variable can be conceived as a
dichotomous measure of whether or not a
bill actively supported by an IG succeeded
in becoming a law. In a similar vein, the
measurement of ‘goal achievement’ can
be based on hard data in the direct
democracy venue (Is the ballot proposi-
tion supported by an IG eventually
accepted by the voters?), in the judicial
venue (Do the justices vote in favor of the
position supported by an IG?) or in the
governmental and administrative venue
(Does the Governor veto a bill an IG
opposes? Does a rule-making agency
modify the rule according to the changes
proposed by an IG?). Advocacy success
can then represent the dependent vari-
able of a study on IGs advocacy activities
in policy-making processes. This advo-
cacy success variable is compatible (even
if not identical) with dependent variables
studied previously by Box-Steffensmeier
et al (2013) and Heaney (2014), who
measured and explained (perceived) pol-
icy influence. Furthermore, this ‘preferred
outcome’ variable goes one step further
than the dependent variable used by
Beyers and Braun (2013), who basically
capture ‘venue access’ of IGs as precondi-
tion for any policy influence (Eising,
2007).
Of course, the concrete definition and
operationalisation of the four key research
330 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA
variables presented so far (i.e., binding
policy decisions, IGs advocacy activities,
IGs coalition and advocacy success) is
contingent upon the political system(s)
under investigation (e.g., existence or
absence of direct-democratic instru-
ments, jurisdictional power of courts, fed-
eralist structures, etc.). Independently
from these institutional specificities and
from the number and type of venues open
to IGs advocacy activities, SNA variables
can then be created to measure the inde-
pendent variables that should explain
advocacy success.
Once the empirical data are collected,
the SNA elaborates two different two-
mode networks, the first ‘mode’ being
IGs, the second ‘mode’ being binding
decisions and coalitions respectively
(Step 6). Subsequently, and much in line
with previous studies presented above,
complementary SNA indicators can be
calculated to capture the network central-
ity of an IG across different institutional
venues. The last research step consists in
testing various statistical models, for the
case studies selected in Step 1, and in
regressing variables measuring the IGs’
network position on the advocacy success
of IGs. Of course, these models and sta-
tistical tests shall also control for other
potential explanatory variables, such as
the types of IGs (e.g., business groups
versus public interests groups) or their
resources (e.g., political personnel,
money and expertise).
In sum, we claim that taking into
account a whole policy-making process
and focusing on all activated venues is
crucial to explain the advocacy activities
and the policy success of IGs in general,
and of multi-venues players in particular
(for an empirical application, see Varone
et al, 2016). However, this proposal
is just one research avenue among
others and IGs scholars still face many
challenges in applying SNA tools. We
mention two of them as concluding
remarks.
CHALLENGES
In order to develop cumulative knowl-
edge, a first challenge facing future SNA
studies of IGs advocacy and success is to
better integrate empirical findings and,
ultimately, to enhance their external
validity. To achieve this ambitious goal,
particular attention should be given to
the types of networks compared (commu-
nication, influence, etc.; one-mode, two-
mode networks), and to the selection of
SNA indicators used to measure the net-
work position of IGs. Beyond applying
similar measurement tools, there is also
an urgent need for comparative studies
across most different policy issues, across
government levels and across countries
with various institutional systems (e.g., in
the European Union or the United States;
see Knoke et al, 1996).
Second, we claim once again that a
comprehensive SNA study should follow
Baumgartner’ s (2007: 487) recommen-
dation to ‘study issues and leave it as an
empirical matter to find out which venues
deal with them’. Putting IGs strategies into
their policy-making context implies focus-
ing on all institutional venues where bind-
ing decisions are made (as proposed in
section ‘Tracing Groups’ Advocacy During
An Entire Policy Process’) and to conse-
quently apply a ‘process tracing’ method
(e.g., grasping a full law-making process in
the administrative and parliamentary
stages; see Pedersen et al, 2014). It cer-
tainly also implies looking at informal are-
nas without power of making binding
decisions (e.g., media, street protest, con-
sultative experts’ committee) and where
the advocacy strategies and policy influ-
ence of IGs is more indirect and difficult to
grasp (Binderkrantz et al, 2015).
Notes
1 To convincingly show that such exchanges occur for both access and influence, an empirical study
should always try to gather empirical data about the (reported or observed) behavior of both sides of the
exchange relationships (e.g., IGs and policymakers). This methodological challenge can be very well
‘… putting groups’
strategies into their
policy-making context
implies focusing on all
institutional venues
where binding decisions
are made …’
Last but not least, while SNA is a valuable
method for linking IGs, binding decisions
and institutional venues to a policy-making
process and, thus, for taking the complex-
ity and context sensitivity of advocacy
strategies into account, SNA will never be
better than the (valid) empirical data we
put into it. SNA does not offer per se a new
theory for explaining the advocacy activ-
ities, coalition behavior and policy influ-
ence of IGs. Nevertheless, the SNA
methodology strengthens the systematic
test of major theoretical hypotheses about
IGs mobilization, advocacy and influence.
We strongly believe that SNA is suitable for
IGs research and hope that these chal-
lenges will be addressed in a near future.
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the finan-
cial support of the Swiss National
Science Foundation (funding of project
100017_149689). A previous version of
this article was presented at the ECPR
Joint Session of Workshop in Salamanca
(April 2014). The authors thank Helene
Pedersen, Matia Vannoni, Rainer Eising
and the two anonymous reviewers for
their helpful comments.
frédéric varone et al european political science: 16 2017 331
 addressed by SNA tools, which are able to control for a double confirmation (from the sender and the
receiver, and vice versa) of existing ties (Ingold et al, 2013).
2 Homophily is the tendency to associate or create relations to similar others. Typically, and if two
nodes or actors share similar attributes (such as being of the same actor type, voting for the same
political party, etc.), they also have the tendency to share a tie among each other (see Hanneman and
Riddle, 2005).
3 Two actors are structurally equivalent if they display the same relational profile in the network. For
example, two actors share cooperation relations with actors A and B; and conflict relations with actors C
and D. They have thus the identical relational cooperation and conflict profile what makes them
completely structural equivalent.
4 The ‘eigenvector’ approach is an effort to find the most central actors (i.e., those with the smallest
farness from others) in terms of the ‘global’ or ‘overall’ structure of the network (Hanneman and Riddle,
2005; Bonacich, 1987).
5 Density, reciprocity and transitivity are three measures grasping the connection and connectivity
among actors within the network. Density is the observed number of ties divided by the maximum of
possible ties in the network. Reciprocity is given when an existing directed tie from actor A to actor B is
also present in the other direction (e.g., when B is replicating the relation back to A). And transitivity is
the tendency of two actors to be connected if they share a mutual neighbor or partner in the network
(see Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
6 One may additionally note that IGs coalition participation can also be asked through interviews such as
presented by Heaney (2014) or Heaney and Lorenz (2013).

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About the Authors

Frédéric Varone is Professor of Political Science at the University of Geneva. His research interest
include comparative public policy, program evaluation and management of public
organizations.

Karin Ingold is Professor of Political Science and a member of the Oeschger Center for Climate
Change Research at the University of Bern. She is also affiliated to the Swiss Federal Institute
of Aquatic Science and Technology (EAWAG). Her research focuses on policy process
theories, the sustainability of natural resource management and social network analysis.

Charlotte Jourdain is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Geneva and a visiting student
researcher at UC Berkeley, Institute of Governmental Studies. Her doctoral thesis investi-
gates the advocacy strategies and policy success of interest groups in California.

334 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA
comment on: studying policy
advocacy through social
network analysis
volker schneider
Chair of Empirical Theory of the State, University of Konstanz, Fach D 81 Konstanz
D-78457, Germany
Email: volker.schneider@uni-konstanz.de
arone and his colleagues provide a
V concise and knowledgeable review
on the use of social network analy-
sis in interest group studies focusing on
policy advocacy and influence. They
demonstrate how the different methods
and techniques can enhance the descrip-
tion and modeling of complex influence
relations and relational structures. If pol-
icy processes are modeled in a way that
actors, relations, and relational structures
are crucial components of policy systems,
then network analysis, in fact, is particu-
larly well-suited to investigate the effect
of this relational phenomenon. Network
analysis helps to identify central or per-
ipheral positions of interest groups in
policy networks and the relational infra-
structure of their advocacy strategies. The
short presentation of exemplary studies
in this article demonstrates this quite
impressively.
However, the added value of a network
analytical perspective in interest group
studies is presented in a too modest way.
First, the authors are not convinced that
network analysis can offer new theoretical
insights and hypotheses on interest
groups, and their influence in politics and
policymaking. Somehow, they reduce it to
a mere technical toolbox. As network ana-
lysis with graph theory, as its mathe-
matical foundation, provides important
concepts in the analytical description of
relational configurations, the authors’
perspective overlooks recent meta-
theoretical debates on relationalism
and the relational paradigm. In particular,
the authors neglect the new impetus
social network analysis has received by
the spectacular expansion of network
science within the last decade. Network
analysis offers precise theoretical con-
cepts and models for the study of complex
configurations and relationships. If we
associate specific effects with such con-
figurations in political processes, its con-
tribution is undoubtedly also of a
theoretical nature.
Second, as the title of the article already
indicates, the article applies a rather nar-
row focus on interest group studies. If we
take on the perspective of political science
in general and start from its division into
various subdisciplines such as compara-
tive politics, international relations, and
public administration, and so on, there is
a range of additional perspectives beyond
frédéric varone et al european political science: 16 2017 335
 the narrow angle of policy analysis. For
instance, in a comparative politics per-
spective, network analysis can be – and
also is – used to analyze the spectrum of
formal and informal relations between
interest groups and other components in
political systems, such as parties, govern-
ments, and administrations in a general
way. If we consider specific subdomains
such as ‘business and politics’ or ‘indus-
trial relations’, also studies on inter-inter-
est group relations are a fertile ground for
network analysis, for instance, when ana-
lyzing sectoral systems of (self-)govern-
ance. As important players in modern
democratic political systems, large com-
panies also constitute important research
objects with respect to their relational
profiles to traditional interest groups.
Another research orientation is – in Toc-
queville’s tradition – the contribution of
voluntary associations to the social capital
of modern democracies. Also this area is
heavily populated by network analysts.
Last but not least, in international
relations INGOs – international non-
governmental groups – have become
increasingly popular research objects
of relationalists who study global inter-
organizational networks and their contri-
bution to global governance.
The fact that modern democracies are
becoming increasingly complex in the
sense that both the heterogeneity of actors
– including interest groups – and also
their interdependency and interrelations
increase, creates a specific need for meth-
ods by which these relational structures
can be more accurately described and ana-
lyzed than by traditional methods. Interest
groups and their relational embeddedness
in national political systems and political
economies thus remain a fertile area for
network analysis in the coming years.

About the Author

Volker Schneider studied Political Science and Economics in Berlin and Paris, and obtained his
Ph.D. from the European University Institute in Florence (Italy), and his habilitation from
the University of Mannheim. Between 1986 and 1997, he was research fellow at the
Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany, and in 1997 he took up
the Chair of Empirical Theory of the State at the University of Konstanz.

336 european political science: 16 2017 studying policy advocacy through SNA