CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN

AFTER THE US WITHDRAWAL

SUBMITTED BY Firdous Shafi

ROLL NO. S21BPOLS1M01035

SUBMITTED TO Sir Shah Nawaz

Lecturer

BS Political Science
Session Spring 2019-2023
 Department of Political Science
The Islamia University of Bahawalpur
CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN
AFTER THE US WITHDRAWAL

BS Thesis

By
FIRDOUS SHAFI

Roll No. S21BPOLS1M01035

Session Spring 2019-2023

Supervised by:
Sir Shah Nawaz

A thesis submitted in the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of BS
in
Political Science

Department of Political Science

The Islamia University of Bahawalpur
 Declaration

I, Firdous Shafi, daughter of Muhammad Shafi, am currently a BS student in the

Department of Political Science at The Islamia University of Bahawalpur. I hereby
declare that the thesis entitled "China's Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan after the US
Withdrawal," which I am submitting as partial fulfillment of the requirements for my BS
degree in Political Science, is my original work. I affirm that this work has not been
previously submitted or published and will not be submitted in the future for any degree
or academic qualification to any other university or institution.

Firdous Shafi

ii
 Forwarding Certificate
This is to certify that the thesis titled "China's Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan after
the US Withdrawal," presented by Firdous Shafi, daughter of Muhammad Shafi, fulfills
all the requirements for the degree of BS in Political Science in the Faculty of Social
Sciences at The Islamia University of Bahawalpur.

The author has confirmed that no portion of this work has been submitted for a higher
degree in this university or any other institute of learning. Furthermore, the author has
acknowledged all sources used in the thesis that are not her own work. Based on these
facts, the author is qualified to submit this thesis in partial fulfillment for the degree of
BS in Political Science.

Sir Shah Nawaz

Lecturer
Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
The Islamia University of Bahawalpur

iii
 Approval Certificate

The thesis entitled "China's Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan after the US
Withdrawal," submitted by Firdous Shafi, daughter of Muhammad Shafi, in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of BS in Political Science at The Islamia
University of Bahawalpur, is approved.

Candidate’s Name of Signature: ______________________________

Supervisor: ______________________________

Member 1: ______________________________

Member 2: ______________________________

Member 3: ______________________________

iv
Chairman: ______________________________

DEDICATION

Dedicated

To

My Loving Parents

&

My Relatives and Friends

v
 Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I express my gratitude to Almighty Allah, the most merciful and
compassionate, who has bestowed upon me countless blessings and enabled me to gain
knowledge and overcome challenges. I am immensely grateful to my loving parents,
elder brother and sister, and dear friends for their unwavering support and
encouragement.

I also offer my utmost respect to the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), whose
teachings have enlightened me and guided me towards the right path. He is the ultimate
role model for all of humanity, and I am grateful for his guidance.

I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Lecturer Shah Nawaz, whose guidance and

global exposure in Political Science have been invaluable in completing this study. I
express my sincere appreciation for his encouragement, technical discussions, inspiring
guidance, remarkable suggestions, keen interest, and constructive criticism that have
helped me throughout this research. He has broadened my professional horizons and
supported me every step of the way.

Furthermore, I extend my thanks to my esteemed faculty members, Prof. Dr. Syed

Musawar Hussain Bukhari, Dr. Shakil Akhtar, and Dr. Safdar Hussain, who provided me
with guidance and assistance during my Master's program's coursework.

Lastly, I want to acknowledge the support of my family and friends who have been a
constant source of love, encouragement, and prayers. I am grateful for their unwavering
support and devotion.

Firdous Shafi

vi
 Contents
Declaration ......................................................................................................................... ii
Forwarding Certificate ...................................................................................................... iii
Approval Certificate .......................................................................................................... iv
Dedication .......................................................................................................................... v
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... vi
Contents ............................................................................................................................ vii
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. ix
Chapter 1 ........................................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Historical Context ................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Significance of the Study ..................................................................................... 1
1.3 Statement of the Problem .................................................................................... 3
1.4 Research Objectives ............................................................................................ 3
1.5 Research Question ............................................................................................... 3
1.6 Research Techniques ........................................................................................... 3
1.7 The Research Procedure ...................................................................................... 3
1.8 Organization of the Study .................................................................................... 3
Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 5
LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................ 5
2.1 Afghan-China Relations an Overview ................................................................. 5
2.2 Post Relations – 2001 .......................................................................................... 6
2.3 Three Dynamics of China's Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan ....................... 6
2.4 Security ................................................................................................................ 6
2.4.1 Chinese Approach towards Afghanistan in Terms of Security Threats ........... 7
2.4.2 Chinese Efforts to Maintain Stability and Peace in Afghanistan ..................... 7
2.4.3 Commercial and Economic Interests ............................................................... 7
2.4.4 China’s Approach towards Afghanistan in Trade, Economy and Investment . 8
2.4.5 Two Important Investment Projects by China ................................................. 8
2.4.6 Infrastructural Developments and Penetration of Chinese companies in
Domestic Market of Afghanistan ..................................................................... 8

vii
 2.4.7 Economic Aids ................................................................................................. 8
2.4.8 One Belt One Road Initiative ........................................................................... 9
2.4.9 Implications of Chinese Investment in Afghanistan ........................................ 9
2.5 Public Diplomacy ................................................................................................ 9
2.6 Strategy of China in Afghanistan ........................................................................ 9
2.7 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 10
Chapter 3 ......................................................................................................................... 12
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION................................................................................... 12
3.1 Stats and Factors ................................................................................................ 12
3.1.1 Terrorism ........................................................................................................ 12
3.1.2 Strategy .......................................................................................................... 13
3.1.3 The ‘Great Game’ .......................................................................................... 14
3.1.4 Economics ...................................................................................................... 15
3.2 Polices towards Afghanistan ............................................................................. 15
3.2.1 Conditionality ................................................................................................ 16
3.2.2 Facilitator ....................................................................................................... 17
3.2.3 Aid and Assistance ......................................................................................... 17
3.2.4 The United States ........................................................................................... 18
Chapter 4 ......................................................................................................................... 21
EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE ............. 21
4.1 Launch of the One Belt, One Road Initiative .................................................... 21
4.2 Challenges and Barriers to the Belt and Road Initiative ................................... 21
4.3 Regional and Global Rivalries ........................................................................... 22
4.4 Terrorism and Insecurity ................................................................................... 24
4.5 Other Challenges and Barriers ........................................................................... 24
Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................... 26
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 26
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 28

viii
 Abstract

With the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, several regional powers,
including China, Pakistan, and Russia, are facing new challenges and trying to adapt to
the resulting security vacuum. China's relationship with Afghanistan has undergone three
distinct phases, starting from disengagement during the Cold War to evolving
engagement following the US-led invasion. Since the US withdrawal in August 2021,
China has adopted a new five-point strategy for Afghanistan. This strategy involves
recognizing the Taliban's dominance while preventing the resurgence of terrorism,
promoting inclusive politics, exhibiting humanitarian concern, and highlighting the
United States and the West's negligence of their responsibilities.China's policy towards
Afghanistan is shaped by four main factors. The first is ensuring security and stability in
Xinjiang and China's western line district. The second factor is Afghanistan's place in
China's overall global dominance. The third is great power politics involving the United
States, and the fourth is Afghanistan's economic value. As China increases its economic
investment in Afghanistan through the One Belt, One Road initiative, it is also playing a
more prominent role in promoting a peaceful resolution to the conflict and addressing
security challenges.

ix
 Chapter 1
1. INTRODUCTION
Following the US's abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, China has
emerged as a key player in the region capable of exerting significant influence over the
country's future affairs. To this end, China has developed a five-pronged policy approach
towards Afghanistan, which involves cautiously accepting the Taliban's dominance,
preventing terrorism, promoting inclusive politics, showing humanitarian concern, and
criticizing the US and the West for abandoning their responsibility. Despite these efforts,
China's policy towards Afghanistan is still subject to certain limitations, including
concerns about the Taliban's rule and its ongoing rivalry with the US.

Sino-Afghan relations have undergone significant changes over the years, from a period
of estrangement during the Cold War to a more active engagement following the US
invasion. Chinese policymakers' perceptions of their country's interests and
vulnerabilities in Afghanistan are influenced by four key factors: security and stability in
China's western border region, Afghanistan's role in China's overall international
strategy, great power politics involving the US, and Afghanistan's economic value.

While China's rising importance in Afghanistan is undeniable, its ability to contribute to

the country's reconstruction will be hampered by the Taliban regime's nature and
competence, as well as the US's strategic posture. Moreover, the growing rivalry between
China and the US has impeded any meaningful cooperation on Afghanistan, despite the
urgent need for such collaboration.

1.1. Historical Context

In January 1955, Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with the People's

Republic of China, becoming one of the first countries to recognize Beijing's new
Communist-led government. However, the relationship became more distant in the late
1970s to the end of the 1980s as Afghanistan fell under Soviet influence, and China
broke away from its alliance with the Soviet Union. During the 1980s, Afghanistan
became a battleground, and China collaborated with the US to thwart the Soviet invasion
of the country, providing Soviet-style arms to Afghan insurgents with assistance from
Pakistan.

1
After the Cold War, the Sino-Afghan relationship can be divided into three stages.
During the first phase from 1991 to 2001, Beijing's interest in Afghanistan was mainly in
protecting Xinjiang from terrorist threats and developing relations with post-Soviet
Central Asian republics. However, the Taliban's rise to power in 1996 heightened
Chinese anxiety as they provided a safe haven for various radical Islamists, including the
East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which demanded independence for Xinjiang.
China implemented bilateral and multilateral measures to deal with this, including
attempting to deal directly with the Taliban through Pakistan and establishing the
Shanghai Five with Russia and Central Asian states.

The second phase of China's post-Cold War policy toward Afghanistan lasted from 2001
to 2021, during which China had limited engagement with the new US-backed Afghan
government and rejected any direct security involvement in the country. However, after
the US announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, China increased
its diplomatic, security, and economic engagement with Kabul. In 2012, China obtained
observer status for Afghanistan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, upgraded the
bilateral relationship to a strategic and cooperative partnership, and increased security
and counterterrorism cooperation with the Afghan government.

After the US withdrew the majority of its combat troops in 2014, China significantly
increased its bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activities, including sending its People's
Armed Police troops to patrol the northeastern Afghan province of Badakhshan and
supporting an Afghan National Security Forces Mountain brigade. Trilateral mechanisms
between China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as well as China, Russia, and India, emerged
on the multilateral front. China also hosted the fourth ministerial conference of the
Istanbul Process on Afghanistan, attended by 46 countries and international
organizations, with the US participating as a "supporting nation". Finally, China joined
the Quadrilateral Coordination Group in January 2016, along with Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and the US.

1.2. Significance of the Study

The current economic conditions in Afghanistan are being severely impacted by the
ongoing political situation. Thus, this study aims to provide a thorough understanding
of China's policies regarding the One Belt One Road initiative towards Afghanistan,
as well as their role in the current situation. By shedding light on these policies, this

2
 study can help to provide insights into the challenges posed by the current political
crisis and how it may affect Afghanistan's national politics.

1.3. Statement of the Problem

Chinese foreign policy has placed greater emphasis on Afghanistan since 2012. The
rise of terrorism and extremism in the country following the US military withdrawal
has created economic and political obstacles for China, while Chinese businesses
operating in Afghanistan are also confronted with security risks.

1.4. Research Objectives

1. To analyze China’s policies towards Afghanistan after the US withdrawal.

2. To analyze political and economic impacts on Afghanistan china policies

1.5. Research Question

2. What is the impact of Afghanistan's instability on China's One Belt One Road
initiative?
3. How do security concerns in Afghanistan influence the future of economic
cooperation in the region?
4. What are China's policies towards Afghanistan?

1.5. Research Techniques

The main objective of this study is to evaluate China's foreign policy towards
Afghanistan from different perspectives, including social, political, economic, and
defense. The research will incorporate statistical data to analyze China's investments in
Afghanistan. This project will investigate several factors that could establish Afghanistan
as a strategic and economic partner for China. The research methodology will be
descriptive and analytical, using secondary data sources, such as newspapers, research
articles, and organizational websites. Only credible and reliable sources will be consulted
for this study.

1.6. The Research Procedure

In order to achieve the objectives of this study, a qualitative research approach is being
utilized. The aim of qualitative research is to identify and analyze patterns of thought and
opinion regarding China's foreign policy towards Afghanistan after the US withdrawal.

3
The primary advantage of qualitative research is that it comprehensively describes and
analyzes a research problem without limiting the scope of the study or the type of
participant response. Given the nature of the research topic, the qualitative approach was
deemed appropriate by the researcher.

1.7. Organization of the Study

The first chapter of this thesis focuses on the historical background of the relationship
between Afghanistan and China. The Soviet Union invasion and Taliban rule
significantly impacted the relations between the two countries. This chapter also includes
the problem statement and research methodology used in this work.

The second chapter examines how China's foreign policy towards Afghanistan has
evolved over recent years. Recognizing the geostrategic and economic significance of
Afghanistan, China has attempted to engage in negotiations with Afghan government
officials to promote their national interests at different levels. The chapter also explores
the factors influencing the continuation and changes in Chinese policy towards
Afghanistan.

The third chapter analyzes China's overall foreign policy towards Afghanistan, including
its diplomatic, economic, and security policies. It also discusses the factors that have
influenced the continuation and change in Chinese policy towards Afghanistan.

In the fourth chapter, we discuss the challenges and barriers in the relationship between
China and Afghanistan, including terrorism and security issues and regional rivalries.
This chapter lays the groundwork for future developments.

Finally, the fifth and last chapter offers conclusions on how to establish win-win
situations for both countries and provides recommendations for future cooperation.

4
Chapter 2
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Afghan-China Relations an Overview
Afghanistan and China have a shared border that spans 92.45 kilometers. Diplomatic
relations between Afghanistan and China were established on January 20, 1955, with the
appointment of Afghanistan's first ambassador to China, Abdul Samad. The relationship
between the two countries grew stronger as their leaders began to exchange visits.
Premier Zhou and Vice Premier He Long visited Afghanistan in January 1957, where
they met with King Zahir Shah, Prime Minister Mohammad Daud Khan, and other
Afghan leaders. This visit proved to be a significant milestone in the Sino-Afghan
relationship, strengthening mutual understanding between the two nations (Daveed,
2014).

Afghanistan's Prime Minister Mohammad Daud Khan visited China in October 1957 at
the invitation of the Chinese government. During this visit, he held discussions with
China's top leaders, aimed at enhancing mutual understanding and trade relations
(Derven, 2000). The relationship continued to evolve over time, and on November 22,
1963, Afghanistan and China signed a boundary treaty in Beijing to resolve a territorial
dispute over the Wakhan - Afghan-controlled border between China's Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region and Afghanistan's Badakhshan province.

However, the relationship was strained on December 27, 1979, when Soviet troops were
deployed in Afghanistan. China refused to recognize the Soviet-backed Karmal
government, resulting in bloody border disputes and mutual support for each other's
enemies during the Sino-Soviet split. Relations between the two countries remained
neutral during the reign of kings. The relationship between the two countries began to
improve after the takeover of power by the pro-Soviet Afghanistan Communists in 1978
(Daveed, 2014).

5
 2.2. Post Relations – 2001
After the Taliban regime fell in 2001, Afghanistan's relations with China improved
significantly. China sent a delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to attend the
ceremony for the formation of the interim administration in Afghanistan and to
congratulate newly elected President Hamid Karzai in 2001 (James, 2013). The
following year, in January 2002, President Karzai visited China and met with President
Jiang Zemin and other high-ranking officials. China provided one million dollars in cash
and thirty million yuan worth of materials, and also announced a contribution of
USD150 million towards Afghanistan's reconstruction (Routledge, 2016).

In May 2002, China's Foreign Minister visited Afghanistan and held meetings with the
president, the chairman of the interim administration, and other officials. The two
countries signed a contract for technical and economic cooperation, including a USD30
million aid package for Afghanistan (Opacin, 2014). Later that year, the Afghan Foreign
Minister visited China and received a material aid package worth one million dollars.
China was one of six neighboring countries to sign a declaration in Kabul pledging to
respect Afghanistan's sovereignty and regional integrity, and to support its peace and
reconstruction efforts. Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai, visited China twice in
February 2003, and the vice president, Newmatullah Sharhrani, also visited China to
meet with his counterpart, Zeng Qinghong, and other high officials. They signed a USD15
million agreement for economic and technical cooperation (Joshu. K., 2018).

Three Dynamics of China's Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan

China's approach to its foreign policy regarding Afghanistan can be broken down into
three distinct areas of focus: prioritizing security concerns above all else, protecting and
pursuing economic interests and opportunities, and utilizing public diplomacy tactics.

2.3. Security

As mentioned earlier, security holds significant importance in China's foreign policy

towards Afghanistan.

6
2.3.1. Chinese Approach towards Afghanistan in Terms of Security Threats
As per Reuters (2018), national security and state survival are critical concerns
for any country, and China's primary interest in Afghanistan is its security. Given that the
two countries share a 92.45-kilometer border, Afghanistan's instability poses a
significant threat to China. Afghanistan has become a hotbed for extremists and
terrorists, while China's Xin Jiang province is vulnerable to separatist and extremist
movements. China is worried about the spread of extremism and separatism from
Afghanistan to its northwestern Xin Jiang territories, as radical factions in Afghanistan
sympathize with Uighur Muslim minorities in Xin Jiang, who face restrictions in
practicing their religion (Starriditor, 2012).

The situation in Xin Jiang is increasingly complicated, and it has become a crucial aspect
of China's national security strategy. To address this security threat, a dual approach is
necessary. On the one hand, China must control and combat separatist and extremist
movements in the region. On the other hand, it must prevent external terrorism from
entering the region through Afghanistan by closing the narrow Wakhan corridor and
avoiding interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

2.3.2. Chinese Efforts to Maintain Stability and Peace in Afghanistan

Starting with Ashraf Ghani's election as the president of Afghanistan in 2014,

China has been gradually establishing "security relations" with Kabul. In February 2016,
China's chief of army staff pledged a $70 million donation to aid the Afghan government
in its fight against terrorism, and the Chinese army delivered the first batch of military
equipment to Afghan forces in July of that year. China is actively participating in
regional efforts to tackle Afghanistan's issues, including security, border control,
criminal networks, and terrorism, as seen in initiatives like the Heart of Asia process,
which involves China and other countries. Afghanistan became a member of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional alliance promoting peace,
stability, and cooperation in various areas, including security and defence, of which
China is a significant member. Additionally, China has contributed to development
assistance, investment projects, and even peace talks between the Afghan government
and the Taliban. Over the last two to three years, China has significantly increased its
support for Afghanistan's development, providing approximately $240 million in aid and
assistance between 2001 and 2013 and around $80 million in 2014 alone.

7
2.3.3. Commercial and Economic Interests

The second aspect of China's foreign policy towards Afghanistan is driven by its
commercial and economic interests. In recent years, China has been shaping its foreign
policy towards Afghanistan based on these interests. Afghanistan's abundant inorganic
resources present opportunities for Chinese public and private corporations to invest in
the country. (Xiangyu, & Chunyan, 2012).

2.3.4. China’s Approach towards Afghanistan in Trade, Economy and Investment

Huasheng, (2015) analysis suggests that China's approach towards Afghanistan has
evolved in recent years, particularly since Ashraf Ghani was elected as the country's
president. Despite initial hesitation, China has demonstrated an increasing interest in
Afghanistan, driven by both its strategic importance and its vast human and mineral
resources. According to a US report, Afghanistan's untapped resources are estimated to
be worth approximately $1 trillion, offering a wealth of potential opportunities for
Chinese corporations to invest in the country's mineral wealth.

2.3.5. Two Important Investment Projects by China

China's State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are actively involved in Afghanistan's mining
and energy sectors, aligning with China's investment priorities. Notably, the Aynak
copper mine project in Kabul's southeast, initiated in 2008, is one of the two major
Chinese investment projects in Afghanistan. This project involves two Chinese SOEs,
MCC and Jiangxi Copper Cooperation (JCCL), who are expected to invest around $3
billion to develop the mine jointly. Another significant project is the development of the
Amu Darya Oil Fields in Afghanistan's northern region by China National Petroleum
Company. These three companies aim to invest about $5 billion in Afghanistan,
facilitated by China's Exim Bank and China Development Bank.

2.3.6. Infrastructural Developments and Penetration of Chinese companies in

Domestic Market of Afghanistan

China is increasingly involved in the development of Afghanistan's infrastructure,

including the construction of a railway network. The China Railway Construction
Corporation is playing a key role in this effort, and there are plans to expand the network
throughout Afghanistan in the near future.

8
2.3.7. Economic Aids

China's economic support for Afghanistan has significantly increased in recent years.
While China provided Afghanistan with around $240 million in economic assistance
between 2001 and 2013, its economic assistance increased to $80 million in 2014. This
upward trend is expected to continue, with China's economic assistance to Afghanistan
potentially increasing even further in the next five years.

2.3.8. One Belt One Road Initiative

The implementation of China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and the
revitalization of the old Silk Road routes can offer opportunities for Afghanistan to
improve its economy, and China has shown interest in integrating Afghanistan into this
initiative. The Silk Road Economic Belt strategy includes the construction of
infrastructure such as railways and roads that connect the Middle East, Central Asia, and
South Asia. However, conflict in Afghanistan has made the plan difficult to implement,
and stability and security are crucial for the success of the OBOR initiative in the region
(Downs, 2012). If Afghanistan can achieve a certain level of security and economic
growth, it could become an attractive destination for Chinese manufacturers looking for
new markets and low-cost labor. Additionally, China has expressed interest in using
Afghanistan as a transit route for oil imports from Iran.

2.3.9. Implications of Chinese Investment in Afghanistan

China has recognized the importance of security in Afghanistan and is pursuing various
strategies to address it. China's investments in Afghanistan could potentially contribute
to the region's emergence as a global economic player, but at the same time, it is also
aware of the need to monitor security concerns in the country.

2.4. Public Diplomacy

China recognizes the importance of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan in advancing its
economic policies, and it is pursuing various strategies to achieve this. Unlike other
countries, China has avoided interfering in Afghanistan's internal domestic affairs and
has instead focused on promoting stability through soft power means such as

9
negotiations, dialogues, and mediation. China seeks to extend its soft power in
Afghanistan, especially in a country plagued by war and civil unrest. In this regard,
China has always favored dialogue and cooperation and has stayed out of contentious
issues to avoid being perceived as catering to Western interests. As part of its multilevel
rendezvous policy, China has established the Confucius Institute at Kabul University to
facilitate cultural exchange. It is a crucial time for China to spread its soft power as part
of its inclusive Afghan strategy.

2.5. Strategy of China in Afghanistan

China's foreign policy towards Afghanistan is based on Deng Xiaoping's declaration in

1992 that the country should maintain a low profile and focus on national development
(Shambaugh, 2013). This policy requires China to "bite time, conceal brightness, and
avoid becoming leaders, but act" (Shambaugh, 2013). However, implementing this
strategy in Afghanistan has been challenging, and China has had to find ways to keep its
profile low (Husaheng, 2009).

China has played an important role in maintaining a low profile in Afghanistan while
also securing its interests in Xinjiang (Husaheng, 2009). China has supported
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan without engaging in supply direction via Pakistan
with NATO's Northern Distributing Network (Husaheng, 2009). Additionally, China
seeks peace and stability in Afghanistan by resolving issues with the Taliban, and it is
strongly opposed to war within Afghanistan (Zhao, 2014).

Experts believe that China is looking for opportunities to extend its reach in
Afghanistan's energy and mineral resources, which could provide a significant link for
business and infrastructure development in South and Central Asia, as well as strengthen
China's overall position in these regions (Xiangyu & Chunyan, 2012; Rozman, 2010).

Since 2001, China has been providing financial and physical assistance to Afghanistan to
aid in its reconstruction and development (An, 2012). However, China does not want to
be a part of the war in Afghanistan and has kept a low profile because its main goal is to
boost its economy, not to be a part of any conflict (An, 2012).

10
Conclusion

There have been several studies and analyses on China's foreign policy toward
Afghanistan in recent years, which support the statement made above. For instance, in a
report by the United States Institute of Peace, researchers discuss how China's foreign
policy toward Afghanistan has evolved from non-engagement to greater involvement in
the country's economic and security affairs. The report also highlights how China has
come to view Afghanistan as an important component of its Belt and Road Initiative,
which seeks to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa through infrastructure and economic
development projects (Rashid and Hagen, 2020). Similarly, a paper by the Asian
Development Bank Institute emphasizes how China's economic interests in Afghanistan
have motivated its increased engagement in the country. The paper argues that China's
investments in infrastructure development, such as the construction of the railway
network and the proposed extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to
Afghanistan, will allow China to access new markets and resources while also promoting
regional economic integration (Kawai and Cheong, 2019). Moreover, a study by the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute highlights how China's foreign policy
toward Afghanistan is shaped by its broader regional and global ambitions. The study
argues that China seeks to establish itself as a dominant power in the region and globally
by enhancing its economic and military capabilities, which requires a stable and secure
Afghanistan (Baranwal, 2021). These studies support the notion that China's foreign
policy toward Afghanistan has shifted toward greater engagement and involvement in
recent years. China has recognized the strategic importance of Afghanistan and is
pursuing policies that promote peace, stability, and economic development in the country
to protect its own interests.

11
 Chapter 3
3. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
3.1. Stats and Factors
These factors have influenced China's foreign policy toward Afghanistan for many years.
The security and stability of China's western frontier region, particularly Xinjiang, is a
primary concern for China. The region is home to a significant number of Uighur
Muslims, a population that China has been accused of suppressing through mass
internment camps and other repressive measures. The instability in Afghanistan has the
potential to spill over into Xinjiang, exacerbating the already volatile situation there.
Therefore, China has long been interested in maintaining stability in Afghanistan to
prevent the spread of extremism and violence in its western region.

Afghanistan's role in China's overarching international strategy is another key factor.

China's Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure development strategy, aims to
enhance connectivity and economic integration among countries in Asia, Europe, Africa,
and beyond. Afghanistan, as a crossroads between Central, South, and West Asia, can
serve as a vital link in this initiative. Therefore, China has been interested in
strengthening its economic ties with Afghanistan and developing infrastructure projects
in the country .Great power politics involving the US is the third factor that has
influenced China's foreign policy toward Afghanistan. China has been wary of the US
presence in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion. However, with the US withdrawal in
August 2021, China is now grappling with the potential consequences of a power
vacuum in the country. China has expressed concerns about the potential for instability
and terrorism in Afghanistan and the wider region, which could have negative
implications for its own security and economic interests. In conclusion, while
Afghanistan's economic value is a factor in China's policy, it is not the primary driver of
its foreign policy toward the country. Rather, China's concerns over security and stability
in Xinjiang, Afghanistan's role in its broader international strategy, and great power
politics involving the US have been the main factors influencing its policy toward
Afghanistan.

3.2. Terrorism

12
 The second factor influencing Chinese policy toward Afghanistan is
Afghanistan's role in China's overarching international strategy. China's economic
growth and increasing global influence over the past few decades have necessitated a
new foreign policy strategy aimed at protecting China's national interests abroad. This
strategy includes a focus on building strong economic and political relationships with
other countries in order to ensure China's access to key resources, markets, and
geopolitical influence. Afghanistan's strategic location at the crossroads of Central and
South Asia makes it an important country for China to engage with in pursuit of this
strategy. Afghanistan also sits at the heart of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's
flagship international infrastructure and investment project aimed at building a network
of trade routes and economic corridors connecting China with Europe, Africa, and the
Middle East. Afghanistan's inclusion in the BRI would provide China with access to
important trade routes and markets in Central and South Asia, as well as the potential for
resource extraction, such as lithium and rare earth minerals. As such, China has been
investing heavily in Afghanistan's infrastructure, including building a road linking
Afghanistan to Pakistan's Gwadar port, and the construction of a railway connecting
Afghanistan to China via Tajikistan. In addition, China has also been involved in
developing Afghanistan's oil and gas reserves, signing an agreement in 2011 to develop
the Amu Darya oil fields, and more recently, investing in a copper mine in Mes Aynak.

The third factor influencing Chinese policy toward Afghanistan is great power politics
involving the US. China has long been critical of the US military presence in
Afghanistan, viewing it as an example of American hegemony and interference in
China's backyard. However, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 has
presented both opportunities and challenges for China. On the one hand, the US
withdrawal has created a power vacuum in Afghanistan, which China sees as an
opportunity to increase its own influence in the country. On the other hand, the
withdrawal has also increased the risk of instability and terrorism in the region, which
could spill over into China's western frontier region. China has therefore been working to
fill the power vacuum left by the US by engaging in diplomatic talks with the Taliban
and other Afghan factions, and by providing economic and humanitarian aid to
Afghanistan. At the same time, China has also been taking steps to enhance its border
security and counter-terrorism capabilities in the region, including conducting joint
military exercises with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and increasing patrols along its border
with Afghanistan. Overall, China's policy toward Afghanistan is driven by a combination

13
of security concerns, economic interests, and great power politics, and is likely to
continue to evolve as events unfold in the region.

3.3. Strategy

China's policy towards Afghanistan is influenced by several factors, including its

historical relationship with Afghanistan and its position in China's overall international
strategy. In recent years, two key developments have increased Afghanistan's importance
in Chinese policy: the emphasis on neighborhood diplomacy and the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI).China's focus on neighborhood diplomacy was highlighted by President
Xi Jinping in 2013, when China hosted its first-ever conference on diplomacy towards
countries on its periphery. The conference was attended by representatives from various
sectors, and it marked a shift in Chinese foreign policy towards a more activist regional
strategy. This change in policy has had a greater impact on China's policy towards
Afghanistan than the BRI, as China seeks to create a favorable regional environment for
its own development. The BRI is a global connectivity program launched by President
Xi in 2013, which seeks to connect the entire Eurasian continent. While some observers
believe that Afghanistan could be a central hub for the Belt connecting Central Asia and
South Asia, Afghanistan's significance in the BRI is debatable. China has already
established two corridors that bypass Afghanistan: the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor and the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor. According to some
Chinese analysts, Afghanistan has no economic significance for the BRI. Overall,
Beijing sees Afghanistan as a problem to be managed and contained rather than an asset
to be exploited. While China has invested in Afghanistan's infrastructure and has sought
to maintain stability in the region, its policy towards Afghanistan is primarily driven by
security concerns. China's policy towards Afghanistan is likely to continue to evolve in
response to changing circumstances in the region.

3.3.1. The ‘Great Game’

The third factor that impacts China's approach to Afghanistan is the dynamics of
great power politics in Central and South Asia, particularly its relationship with the
United States since 2001. Initially, Beijing was skeptical of US motives, consistent with
its suspicion of US attempts to restrict or contain China's rise. The military presence of

14
the US in Afghanistan was viewed as a threat to China's national security and a part of
America's strategy to encircle China by some hardliners in China's strategic community,
such as the PLA and security agencies. As a result, China has ignored requests from the
US for cooperation, such as helping to develop alternative supply routes to Pakistan.
However, with the US decision to withdraw its troops, China has become more favorable
towards the idea of a US presence in Afghanistan, seeing it as an opportunity to benefit
from Western efforts to stabilize the region. Chinese officials expressed concern that the
US should not withdraw too quickly as it could lead to the resurgence of Uighur militants
in Afghanistan, posing a threat to China's western border. This conflicted mindset
reflects China's perception of the US containment of the Taliban as a positive outcome
for Xinjiang's security, while simultaneously viewing the US strategic and military
presence in Afghanistan as a geopolitical threat to China's interests. To avoid alienating
any party and to rebuild the country, China made only token contributions to
Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. However, this conflicted mindset can only be
resolved by China's greater willingness to intervene in Afghan affairs and take matters
into its own hands, or by the occurrence of one of the two dreaded outcomes - a US
victory or a Taliban victory. The latter has become a reality for Beijing as a result of the
events in August 2021.

3.3.2. Economics

To fully understand China's approach to the new Taliban threat, it is essential to examine
the economic factors at play in China's Afghan policy. Afghanistan boasts abundant
natural resources, such as oil, natural gas, iron ore, gold, copper, cobalt, and lithium,
worth nearly $1 trillion. It is logical to assume that importing these resources through the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would allow China to diversify its imports away from
distant, unstable, or hostile countries. Trading with Afghanistan could also benefit the
economies of China's western provinces, as well as neighboring Pakistan and Central
Asian republics.

15
However, these economic opportunities must be weighed against the costs and risks of
doing business in Afghanistan. The Afghan economy is worth $20 billion, primarily
based on opium production and narcotics trafficking, along with international aid. In
comparison to China's trade with its neighbors, Sino-Afghan trade is insignificant,
amounting to only $550 million in 2020 [19]. Afghanistan's lack of political stability,
domestic security, and a sound economic system are significant barriers to Chinese
investment. Its persistent wars and civil conflicts, corruption, and dilapidated
infrastructure, among other challenges, would deter large-scale Chinese investment. It is
noteworthy that China's two most significant investments in Afghanistan to date—the
Metallurgical Corporation of China's $3 billion investment in the Aynak copper field and
the China National Petroleum Corporation's investment in the Amu Darya oil project—
have both stalled, with barely any operations, let alone profitability. The Aynak copper
field, located in Logar, one of Afghanistan's most volatile provinces, is widely regarded
as a failed investment. These lessons have taught Chinese companies to be as risk-averse
as their Western counterparts.

3.3.3. Polices towards Afghanistan

China's cautious acceptance of the Taliban's dominance in Afghanistan can be explained

by its desire to safeguard its own interests in the region, including its economic
investments and its goal of preventing the reemergence of terrorism. By engaging with
the Taliban, China hopes to exert influence over the group and prevent it from harboring
or supporting extremist groups that could threaten China's national security. In terms of
facilitating inclusive politics in Afghanistan, China has expressed support for an
"Afghan-led and Afghan-owned" peace and reconciliation process. It has called for a
broad-based, inclusive government that represents all ethnic and political groups in the
country, and has urged the Taliban to make concessions and respect the rights of women
and minorities. China's greater degree of humanitarian concern is evident in its recent
pledge of $31 million in aid to Afghanistan, including food, medicine, and emergency
supplies. China has also called on the international community to provide assistance to
Afghanistan and to support its reconstruction efforts. Overall, China's new engagement
with Afghanistan reflects its pragmatic approach to foreign policy, which prioritizes
stability and economic development over political ideology or values. While it remains
to be seen how successful China will be in its efforts to engage with the Taliban and

16
promote peace and stability in Afghanistan, its policy continuities and changes suggest
that it will continue to play an important role in the country's future.

3.3.4. Conditionality

It is also worth noting that China's new engagement policy towards Afghanistan includes
a greater degree of humanitarian concern, the fourth element. This is consistent with
China's growing role as a global leader and its desire to be seen as a responsible
stakeholder in international affairs. In the aftermath of the US withdrawal, China pledged
$31 million in emergency aid to Afghanistan and promised to work with the international
community to address the country's humanitarian crisis. China has also made it clear that
it wants to see the establishment of an inclusive government in Afghanistan that reflects
the country's ethnic and political diversity. In this regard, China has been engaging with
various Afghan factions, including the Taliban, and encouraging them to participate in an
inclusive political process. China has also expressed its support for the Afghan people's
right to determine their own future and has emphasized the need for a political settlement
that respects Afghanistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.In conclusion, China's
new engagement policy towards Afghanistan following the US withdrawal in August
2021 is a pragmatic and cautious approach that is based on a number of factors,
including China's longstanding relationship with the Taliban, its concerns about terrorism
and political stability in the region, its desire to be seen as a responsible global leader,
and its commitment to regional multilateralism. While China has accepted the Taliban's
dominance in Afghan affairs, it has also made it clear that it expects the group to combat
terrorism, establish an inclusive government, and respect Afghanistan's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. China's engagement with Afghanistan is likely to be a complex and
evolving process that will require careful management and coordination with other
countries in the region and beyond.

3.3.5. Facilitator

China's commitment to an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned political process and its

emphasis on non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs are consistent with China's
long-standing foreign policy principles. However, China's efforts to facilitate a political
settlement in Afghanistan have evolved in response to changing circumstances on the

17
ground. Prior to the Taliban's victory, China sought to bring warring parties together for
talks with the goal of achieving inclusive political reconciliation. Since August 2021,
China has accepted the Taliban's dominance and has positioned itself as a facilitator,
encouraging the Taliban to take political reconstruction seriously. China's discourse on
Afghanistan contains both continuities and changes. On the one hand, China continues to
emphasize its respect for Afghanistan's sovereignty, independence, and territorial
integrity, as well as its support for the Afghan people's choice of development path. On
the other hand, China has begun to promise that it has no geopolitical intentions in
Afghanistan and will not seek "private gains" or a sphere of influence in the country.
This reflects China's desire to pre-empt any outside speculation that it would seek to fill
the strategic void left by the US withdrawal. Overall, China's engagement with
Afghanistan reflects a pragmatic calculus based on its security interests in the region.
China's emphasis on counter-terrorism and political stability is driven by its concerns
about the potential for Uighur terrorists and separatists to operate from bases in
Afghanistan. While China's engagement with the Taliban is motivated in part by these
security concerns, it is also driven by its desire to maintain stable and friendly relations
with neighboring countries, including Pakistan, Russia, Iran, and the Central Asian
republics.

3.3.6. Aid and Assistance

It is worth noting that while China's humanitarian aid to Afghanistan is significant, it is

not entirely altruistic. As previously mentioned, China's interest in Afghanistan is
motivated by its own security concerns, particularly with regards to the ETIM and
potential terrorist threats emanating from the region. Additionally, China's engagement
in Afghanistan provides an opportunity for it to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
into the country, potentially gaining access to important resources and markets in Central
Asia. Nevertheless, China's humanitarian efforts should not be discounted, as they have
undoubtedly had a positive impact on the lives of many Afghans, particularly in terms of
healthcare, education, and economic development.

3.3.7. The United States

The new policy of China has several implications for the United States, which became
evident during the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. Initially,

18
China was concerned about the entrenchment of the US presence in Afghanistan, which
it viewed as an attempt to encircle China. Later, China became worried that a premature
or disorderly US withdrawal would allow terrorists to regroup and threaten China's
security. As the US withdrawal became a reality in August 2021, China's view of the US
shifted from scorn to indignation.

China criticized the haphazard US withdrawal and expressed hope that the US would
fulfill its post-withdrawal obligations to Afghanistan responsibly and orderly. China's
rebuke conveyed a clear dual message: a triumphant condemnation of the United States'
policy of armed intervention and nation-building, as well as a strong exhortation to
Washington to fulfill its post-withdrawal obligations to Afghanistan. China's position
revealed a strong sense of outrage toward the US that extended far beyond the fact that
Washington had left a total mess in Afghanistan for China and other regional countries to
clean up. There was also outrage that the Biden administration justified its exit from
Afghanistan on anti-China grounds, which would severely limit its activism in
Afghanistan and its cooperation with the US. Wang Yi noted the US assertion that its
withdrawal from Afghanistan was to better focus on the challenges posed by China and
Russia. Wang argued that this was not only an attempt to find an excuse for the US
failure in Afghanistan, but it also revealed the nature of US power politics around the
world. If the US did not learn from Afghanistan and completely change its foreign policy
approaches, it was doomed to suffer even more humiliations in the future. Regarding
Washington's position on Afghanistan in the context of its relations with China, two
schools of thought have emerged. One school of thought contends that the US
withdrawal fiasco demonstrated the decline of US power and competence, and a strategic
opportunity has arisen in Afghanistan, which China should seize as soon as possible. The
opposing school of thought is not nearly as upbeat. Instead, it presents a foreboding
analysis positing a pernicious anti-China US agenda .According to this viewpoint, the
US withdrawal from Afghanistan was a purposeful step in Washington's overall grand
strategic shift away from the Middle East and toward China in the Indo-Pacific region.
The US was deliberately leaving a gap in Afghanistan to entice China to move in and
devote more resources to its western borderlands, laying a strategic trap for China in the
west to derail its strategy on the eastern maritime front. The Biden administration was
thought to be lulling China into false cooperation with it over Afghanistan by
exaggerating China's role in the Afghan transition. The obvious conclusion is that China
should not fall into the US trap and foolishly shift its strategic resources to the west.

19
Instead, China should compete even harder with the US in the east. Despite the rhetoric
of stronger economic ties and assisting Afghanistan to join the BRI, there were no
specifics on how this might be accomplished, and all of the questions raised in the
previous section about extending the BRI to Afghanistan remain unanswered.

20
 Chapter 4
4. EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE BELT AND ROAD
INITIATIVE
4.1. Launch of the One Belt, One Road Initiative
In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared the Silk Road Economic Belt
as a project to unite China with Eurasia, promoting collaboration between nations in the
region. The announcement was the outcome of discussions among Chinese intellectuals
and politicians about China's assertive role in Asia. A professor from Beijing University,
an expert in Chinese studies, was among the first to recommend the revitalization of
three Silk Roads, namely South-East Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. Following this,
President Xi announced another initiative called the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,
aiming to connect China with other parts of the world. The Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) emerged from the merger of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century
Maritime Silk Road. Initially, the Chinese government did not provide much information
about the initiative, leading to widespread debate and research outside of China. The
Chinese leadership encouraged various organizations to host workshops and conferences
to promote discussion, despite the government's delay in officially defining the BRI's
scope. The flexible and inclusive nature of the initiative allowed it to benefit from the
literature and maps created during these debates. The BRI has grown into an ambitious
and grandiose initiative, connecting China with 64 other countries and a total population
of 4.4 billion. The initiative involves building infrastructure, strengthening financial and
trade ties, and has a GDP of 21 trillion US dollars. Despite its scale, the BRI is still in its
early stages of implementation. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the
One Belt, One Road Initiative, is a grand and ambitious plan to connect China with
Eurasia, Africa, and Europe. It was formed by merging two initiatives, the Silk Road
Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. The Chinese government
initially kept details about the BRI vague, which sparked debates and research outside of
China. However, it has grown into a massive undertaking, connecting China with 64
countries and a total population of 4.4 billion people, with an estimated GDP of 21
trillion US dollars. Some sources suggest that the BRI could cover 70% of the global
population and 75% of known energy reserves.

21
The BRI is not just about infrastructure and trade; it is a vision to build a comprehensive
cultural, economic, and political network that promotes connectivity and cooperation
among participating countries. It spans across multiple regions, including the Middle
East, West Europe, West Asia, North Africa, South Asia, South-East Asia, the
Commonwealth of Independent States, the Russian Federation, and Mongolia. The BRI
corridors connect major European cities like Rotterdam, Hamburg, Prague, and Madrid,
as well as East and North Africa, creating a continental network of roads, railways, and
ports. However, the BRI's implementation could take several decades, with some sources
estimating around 35 years to complete. The BRI is not just a key initiative of President
Xi's administration; it has evolved into an overarching policy involving all aspects of
Chinese politics, both domestic and foreign. The BRI framework encompasses a diverse
range of actors, including regional state and non-state actors, regional organizations,
provincial and city governments, banks, Confucius institutes, and national universities.
Despite the abundance of literature on the initiative, many specifics about the BRI
remain undefined. The BRI's primary goal, as stated in a 2015 white paper, is to promote
connectivity and cooperation across participating countries through land-based economic
corridors (the Belt), ocean-going blue economic passages (the Road), fiber optic
connectivity (the Digital Silk Road), and energy cooperation. People-to-people
connections and soft infrastructure are also important aspects of the initiative.

4.2. Challenges and Barriers to the Belt and Road Initiative

Despite some success, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) faces significant challenges and
barriers across the participating countries. These include terrorism and insecurity,
regional and global rivalries, political instability, poor governance, and a lack of
infrastructure and resources. These challenges vary in severity by region and often
reinforce each other, making it difficult to find immediate solutions. The two most
significant challenges to BRI implementation are global rivalries and a lack of
infrastructure. In China's immediate vicinity, which includes Central Asia, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan, terrorism and insecurity exacerbate the already existing infrastructure
deficits and global rivalries. These challenges present a difficult task for China and other
BRI countries to address.

22
 4.3. Regional and Global Rivalries

The region surrounding Afghanistan has been a site of global rivalries for centuries, with
major powers and ideological blocs waging bloody wars in what has been dubbed the
Great Games. Even today, the geopolitical interests of various global and regional actors
intersect and collide in South and Central Asia, with the involvement of major actors
such as Russia, the US, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the
European Union. These rivalries have a significant impact on the BRI, especially the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Silk Road Economic Belt. South
Asia is divided into two political and security blocs, with the US and India on one side
and China and Pakistan on the other. India views Pakistan's alliance with China as a
threat, particularly the plan for CPEC to pass through disputed Kashmir territory, and
considers the Sino-Pakistani alliance as dominating India's northern and western regions
and the Arabian Sea. According to experts, CPEC has the potential to exacerbate three
South Asian security fault lines, primarily between China and India, but also involving
their partners, such as the US and Japan, and to a lesser extent, Vietnam.India also has a
significant presence in Southeast Asia, where the BRI's China-Indochina Peninsula
Economic Corridor passes. This has left India feeling encircled by the BRI Road
segment and has prompted the launch of Project Mausam, an initiative aimed at
revitalizing India's ancient maritime routes and cultural linkages. Announced in June
2014 at the 38th World Heritage Session in Doha, Project Mausam aims to
counterbalance China's BRI by strengthening India's connectivity with Southeast Asia
and beyond. Project Mausam, an initiative led by India, aims to connect different parts of
the Indian Ocean littoral, as well as coastal centers to their hinterlands. Though smaller
in scale and scope compared to the Maritime Silk Road, it serves as an indication of
India's response to China's maritime initiative. India has also partnered with the US,
Japan, and Australia to provide a counterweight to the BRI in the Indo-Pacific region.
While talks began in February 2018, no clear strategy has emerged yet, but it highlights
the existence of regional and global rivalries. The Russian Federation and the United
States are expected to react to the Silk Road Economic Belt and other BRI-related
projects in Central Asia and Eurasia. With China's increasing assertiveness, analysts
predict that the US will be forced to pay more attention to Central Asia and China's
influence in the region. However, the US presence in Central Asia has been declining,
giving Russia and China more opportunities for influence. The Russian Federation is

23
wary of China's growing presence in Central Asia, which it considers its "backyard" and
zone of special interest since the republics' independence from the Soviet Union. In
January 2015, the Russian Federation established the Eurasian Economic Union, an
international organization for regional economic integration, with five members:
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. The Silk Road Economic Belt
and the Eurasian Economic Union signed agreements in the same year to coordinate their
activities. While the European Union initially welcomed the BRI, they became more
cautious and expressed concerns about China's "win-win" rhetoric about the project in
April 2018.

4.4. Terrorism and Insecurity

The threat of terrorism is significant in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as in the Middle East,
Central Asia, and many African countries, all of which are areas where BRI projects are being
planned. Although the severity of terrorism and insecurity varies from country to country, it
cannot be ignored or underestimated as it can hinder BRI-related projects. China is concerned
about instability and insecurity in Afghanistan and Pakistan due to their proximity to Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous Region, which has been targeted by terrorists for nearly two decades. There
are more than a dozen active terrorist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with potential to cause
harm, making it a concern for China. In addition to terrorism, cross-border crime and drug
trafficking are also issues, with the potential to destabilize China, particularly in the Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous Region, as well as in other regions. The flagship corridor of the BRI is the
CPEC, which runs through Pakistan and connects the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region to the
port of Gwadar. However, terrorist groups in Pakistan pose a threat to the CPEC, and
maintaining it as a viable corridor is a long-term project, which cannot be guaranteed as long as
terrorist threats exist in the region. The Silk Road Economic Belt, the primary component of the
BRI, runs through Central Asia, which is also prone to insecurity. Although the threat of
destabilization from the south is still present, the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt
is not currently threatened. However, radicalization among young people in Central Asia is
increasing, and politically motivated attacks targeting Chinese assets and personnel in the region
may continue to be a concern. In summary, insecurity poses a significant threat to the
implementation or operation of the CPEC in Pakistan, and it has the potential to destabilize both
Central Asia and South Asia due to the insecurities of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

24
 4.5. Other Challenges and Barriers

The BRI's planned routes will traverse regions where many countries suffer from
underdeveloped market economies plagued by corruption and low administrative
efficiency. Furthermore, these countries also face infrastructure deficits, which pose an
additional challenge as the BRI lacks the resources to invest in infrastructure in every
country. The issues of political instability and poor governance also loom large in these
areas. Although the transitions in leadership in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan did not
result in expected political struggles, the Central Asian nations remain susceptible to
such instability due to the persistence of patrimonialism and corruption. Transparency
International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 reveals that Central Asian countries
rank low, between 131 and 154 out of 176, in terms of corruption perception. These
issues of corruption and poor governance may hamper the progress of Central Asia's Silk
Road Economic Belt. In fact, the BRI could exacerbate accountability and economic
governance issues instead of improving them, creating a vicious cycle. Other conflicts,
such as border and resource-sharing issues, especially water and energy, continue to
plague Central Asian countries. Pakistan presents a similar scenario, ranking 116th in the
2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, where a small elite group dominates the economy
with little accountability. Pakistan faces even greater challenges regarding political
stability than Central Asia, given the presence of over a dozen Islamist militant groups,
including Taliban elements, and the issue of its military becoming a "State within a
State." The CPEC implementation and operation stages could be threatened, depending
on how these scenarios play out.

25
 Chapter 5

5. CONCLUSION
The future role of Afghanistan in Chinese foreign policy is likely to increase due to the
priority given to neighborhood diplomacy since 2013. However, the extent of its
importance will depend on policymakers' perceptions of China's interests and
vulnerabilities in Afghanistan. China's primary interest in Afghanistan is to ensure its
own security and stability, particularly in the Xinjiang province and along its western
border with Central and South Asia. Combating terrorism and extremism, especially
Uighur separatism, will remain a central goal of China's Afghanistan policy. The timing
and substance of China's policy will depend on the gravity of these threats and the
Taliban regime's ability to control them. Contrary to popular belief, China's economic
interest in Afghanistan is not prominent and will not drive it to invest significantly in the
country. Instead, China's assessment of Afghanistan's economic value is strongly tied to
its internal stability and security. China will only begin large-scale investment, whether
BRI-related or otherwise, after Afghanistan has achieved a similar level of tranquility as
Pakistan or the Central Asian republics. China's security interests in Afghanistan require
a more assertive approach, but perceived vulnerabilities are likely to limit such
aggressiveness. China desires a moderate Taliban government that will maintain
domestic stability and foster friendly relations with neighbors, but it is aware of the
limitations of outside intervention in influencing the Taliban. China's approach to
Afghan reconstruction is markedly different from that of the US. It despises the US's
forceful, all-encompassing approach to armed intervention, democracy promotion, and
nation-building. While we can expect a greater Chinese contribution to Afghanistan's
reconstruction, it will be limited to the extent that Beijing is comfortable with. China has
long been concerned about the US presence in Afghanistan, fearing that Washington's
dominance of the country would help it complete its strategic encirclement of China in
the west. The vulnerability China felt following the US withdrawal in 2021 is that
Washington is planning to shift its strategic focus and compete with China in the Indo-
Pacific by leaving Afghanistan in shambles for China to clean up.

Afghanistan's tragedy is that its prospects for peace and prosperity are frequently at the
mercy of great powers. However, it has the potential to become a vital trade and transit
hub if it can revitalize its role as a critical crossroad or a land bridge. Afghanistan's
government has refocused its efforts on developing a new Silk Road with the help of its
26
international and regional partners. The development of infrastructure such as railways,
roads, and highways, as well as energy, water, and mineral resources, is central to this
vision. Afghanistan can connect its Silk Road vision to the Chinese BRI, benefiting both
China and the region economically and significantly contributing to the development of a
sustainable Afghan economy. However, the BRI's enormous ambitions, potential
geopolitical implications, and lack of clarity on what, why, and how leave plenty of room
for interpretation. While most observers in Afghanistan are largely positive about the
BRI's potential, global powers such as the US, Japan, India, and the European Union are
skeptical about China's leadership of the initiative and its potential geopolitical
ramifications. Afghanistan's government must be aware of the international and regional
interests that support such initiatives and work to carve out its own national interests
within them. The promotion of interconnectivity and regional economic cooperation is
critical to restoring security and stability to the war-torn country and is the cornerstone of
Afghanistan's foreign policy.

27
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Van Derven, H. (2000). Warfare in Chinese history, Brill.

An, Z. (2012). Zhonguo yu Afuhan guanxi shi yanjiu lue” [A Review of the History
Relationship between China and Afghanistan], Gaoxiao Sheke Dongtai [Social
Science Perspectives in Higher Education], no. (Anhui University and Renmin
University, Beijing).

Daveed .(2014). China’s Post-2014 Role in Afghanistan, Gartenstein-Ross, Daniel

Trombly & Nathaniel Barr, Foundation For Defense Of Democracies,
Washington DC, October 2014.

Derven H. J. Van (2000). Warfare in Chinese History. BRILL. pp. 122–ISBN 90-04-
11774-1.

Downs, E., (2012). China Buys into Afghanistan, SAIS Review, Vol XXXII no.2,
Summer-Fall

Huasheng, Z., (2015). What is behind Chinese growing attention to Afghanistan?,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International Boundary Study Afghanistan

(2015).

China Boundary, China: A History. Hackett Publishing. pp. 167. James, Brian C. (2013)
China's Interests in Afghanistan: Current projects and future prospects, Monterey,
California: Naval Postgraduate School.

Kucera, Joshu. (2018) "Report: China Building Military Base on Afghan-Tajik Border".

EurasiaNet. Opacin, N., (2014), China’s Role in Afghanistan: A Capitalist Peace

Approach, Anchor Academic Publishing.

Reuters (2018). "Afghan troops to train in China, ambassador says". The Straits Times.

Routledge, (2016). Chinese Foreign Relations with Weak Peripheral States:

Asymmetrical Economic Power and Insecurity, by Jeffery Reeves. London and
New York: .

28
Rozman, G., (2010) Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, .

Shambaugh, (204). Shambaugh finds no evidence that Deng ever made this statement.

Stanzel, A., (2016). China’s interests in Afghanistan, , China Policy Institute.

Sutter, G.R., (2007). Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War,
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers

Tanner, M. H., (2010). China: A History: Volume 1: From Neolithic cultures through the
Great Qing Empire 10,000 BCE–1799 CE.

Hackett Publishing Company. pp. 167 Xiangyu, Z., and Chunyan Z, (2012) He Jie (PLA
Foreign Languages Institute, Henan) “Zhongguo yu Afuhan youqi hezuo tanxi”
[An Analysis of China’s Oil and Gas Cooperation with Afghanistan], Zhongguo
Shiyou Daxue Xuebao (Sheke Kexue Ban) [Journal of China Petroleum
University (Social Sciences Edition)] 28, no. 6: 9.

Xiangyu, Z., (2011). Afghanistan and Regional Security: Implications for China, Policy
Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 65-72, Published by Pluto Journals

Starriditor S. F., (2012). Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland(illustrated ed.).

M.E. Sharpe. p. 157. ISBN 0-7656-1318-2. Retrieved May 22, 2012.

Starr S. F., (2004). Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland (illustrated ed.). M.E. Sharpe.
p. 158. ISBN 0-7656-1318-2. Retrieved May 22, 2012.

Tanner, M.H., (2009). China: A History. Hackett Publishing.

Garver JW. , (2015) China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s
Republic of China. Oxford: Oxford University Press.; 416. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:o so/9780190261054.001.0001

Clarke M.,(2016) “One Belt, One Road” and China’s Emerging Afghanistan Dilemma.
Australian Journal of International Affairs. 70(5): 563–579. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1183585

29
Hirono M. (2014) China’s Conflict Mediation and the Durability of the Principle of
Non-Interference: The Case of Post-2014 Afghanistan. The China Quarterly.
2019; 239: 614–634. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0305741018001753

Zhu Y., (2018) China’s Afghanistan Policy since 9/11. Asian Survey. 2018; 58(2): 281–
301. DOI: https://doi. org/10.1525/as.2018.58.2.281

Zhao H.,(2016) Afghanistan and China’s New Neighborhood Diplomacy. International

Affairs. 2016; 92(4): 891–908. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12654

Weitz R., (2019) China and Afghanistan after the NATO Withdrawal. Washington, DC:
The Jamestown Foundation; 2015.

Stanzel A. , (2018)Fear and Loathing on the New Silk Road: Chinese Security in
Afghanistan and Beyond. Berlin: European Council on Foreign Relations; 2018.

Yan X.,(2014) From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement. Chinese
Journal of International Politics. 2014; 7(2): 153–184. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pou027

Zhang F. ,(2016) China as a Global Force. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies. 2016; 3(1):
117–125. DOI: https:// doi.org/10.1002/app5.115 10. Wang Y. Offensive for
Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy. The
Pacific Review. 2016; 29(3): 455–463. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1154690

Fallon T. , (2015) The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia.
American Foreign Policy Interests. 2015; 37: 140–147. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2015.1056682

Roy MS.,(2017) Afghanistan and the Belt and Road Initiative: Hope, Scope, and
Challenges. Asia Policy. 2017; 24: 103–109. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2017.0027

Zhu Y & Wei L.(2017) Afuhan anquan xingshi jiqi dui sichou zhilu jingji dai de
yingxiang (Afghanistan’s Security Prospects and Implications for the Silk Road
Economic Belt). Nanya yanjiu (South Asia Zhang 12 LSE Public Policy Review
DOI: 10.31389/lseppr.52 Studies). 2017; 3: 100–116.

30
Mei X.,(2021) Dui houmeiguo shidai afuhan jingji buke mangmu kuanghuan (Do Not
Blindly Revel in Afghanistan’s Economy in the Post-American Era) [Internet];
2021 Aug 18 [cited 2022 Feb 10]. Available from:
http://www.aisixiang.com/data/128108.html.

Zhu Y. , (2022) Professor of Lanzhou University. Author Interview. January 2022.

Small A.,(2015) The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press; 2015: 160. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190210755.001.0001

Risen J. U.S.,(2010) Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan [Internet]; 2010 June
13 [cited 2022 Feb 07]. Available from:
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html.

Detsch J., (2022) ‘Not His Money’: Biden Splits Afghanistan’s Reserves [Internet]; 2022
Feb 11 [cited 2022 Feb 13]. Available from:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/11/biden-afghanistan-
currencytaliban/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Edi
tors%20Picks%20 OC&utm_term=39415&tpcc=Editors%20Picks%20OC. 26.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Wang Yi chuxi zhongebayi siguo afuhan wenti
feizhengshi huiyi (Wang Yi Attends China-Russia-Pakistan-Iran Informal
Meeting on Afghanistan) [Internet]; [posted 2021 Sep 17; cited 2022 Feb 09].
Available from: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/
xghd_673097/202109/t20210917_9883084.shtml.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Wang Yi zhuchi zhongaba sanfang waizhang duihua (Wang
Yi Chairs China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue)
[Internet]; [posted 2021 Jun 06; cited 2022 Feb 08]. Available from:
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202106/
t20210604_9175321.shtml.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Wang Yi tan afuhan wenti (Wang Yi on Problems in
Afghanistan) [Internet]; [posted 2021 Jul 03; cite 2022 Feb 09]. Available from:
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/
xghd_673097/202107/t20210703_9175385.shtml.

31
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Wang Yi: meiguo ruguo buneng chedi gaixiangengzhang,
jiu shibi cong zai afuhan de shibai zouxiang gengda de shibai (Wang Yi: the
United States Will Suffer Even Greater Defeat than Its Defeat in Afghanistan If It
Does Not Completely Change Its Approach) [Internet]; [posted 2021 Sep 04;
cited 2022 Feb 09]. Available from: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/
xghd_673097/202109/t20210904_9175495.shtml.
The White House: United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China
[Internet]; [posted 2020 May 26; cited 2022 Feb 10]. Available from:
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-
Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report5.24v1.pdf.
The White House: Interim National Security Strategic Guidance [Internet]; [posted 2021
Mar 03; cited 2022 Feb 10]. Available from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2. Zhang 13 LSE Public Policy Review DOI:
10.31389/lseppr.
Zhang F. ,(2022). China’s New Engagement with Afghanistan after the Withdrawal.
LSE Public Policy Review. 2022; 2(3): 10, pp. 1–13. DOI: https://
doi.org/10.31389/lseppr.52 Submitted: 12 February 2022 Accepted: 25 February
2022 Published: 02 May 2022 COPYRIGHT: © 2022 The Author(s). This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author
and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/. LSE
Public Policy Review is a peer-reviewed open access journal published by LSE
Press. pdf.
Zhou B.(2022). In Afghanistan, China Is Ready to Step into the Void [Internet]; 2021
Aug 20 [cited 2022 Feb 10]. Available from:
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/opinion/china-afghanistan-taliban.html.
Zhang J. ,(2021) Meiguo liuxia afuhan “sida” xianjing (The United States Has Left
Four Major Traps in Aghanistan). Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge). 2021; 8: 70–
71.
Sun Y. , (2020) China’s Strategic Assessment of Afghanistan [Internet]; 2020 Apr 08
[cited 2022 Feb 13]. Available from: https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/chinas-
strategic-assessment-of-afghanistan/.

32
Zhang F, (2020) Lebow RN. Taming Sino-American Rivalry. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. 2020; 1. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197521946.003.000

33