Cicero Matos Arrais - CIRIA Report C688 - Flood Resilience and Resistanc

C688
This publication is the main output from CIRIA project RP913 Flood resilience and
resistance for critical infrastructure. It provides an overview of the regulatory
framework and outlines the main issues now faced by the industry in this area. A
brief introduction is given to the principles of flood risk management to place flood
resilience and resistance into a wider context. A range of case studies is provided
that describes the lessons identified by infrastructure owners and operators who
have suffered flooding problems in the past. Flood risk management for CI (critical
infrastructure) across the UK is then considered with respect to flood risk
assessment, adopting resilience and resistance measures and investment
prioritisation.
The publication states that flood resilience measures should be adopted as an

integral part of individual organisations’ business continuity management
processes, whole-life asset management plans and climate change adaptation
strategies. CI owners need to develop long-term strategic investment approaches
Flood resilience and resistance
Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure

that allow for optimised investment decision making. The economic regulators
should aim to provide a framework to achieve this objective.
for critical infrastructure
Environment
Agency
9 780860 176886
C688
CIRIA
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CIRIA C688 London, 2010
Flood resilience and

resistance for critical
infrastructure
Will McBain Arup
David Wilkes Arup
Matthias Retter Arup
Griffin Court, 15 Long Lane, London, EC1A 9PN

TEL: 020 7549 3300 FAX: 020 7549 3349
EMAIL: enquiries@ciria.org WEBSITE: www.ciria.org
Summary
This publication is the main output from CIRIA project RP913 Flood resilience and resistance
for critical infrastructure. It provides an overview of the regulatory framework and outlines
the main issues now faced by the industry in this area. The publication states that flood
resilience measures should be adopted as an integral part of individual organisations’
business continuity management processes, whole-life asset management plans and climate
change adaptation strategies. CI (critical infrastructure) owners need to develop long-term
strategic investment approaches that allow for optimised investment decision making. The
economic regulators should aim to provide a framework to achieve this objective.
McBain, W, Wilkes, D, Retter, M
CIRIA
C688 © CIRIA 2010 RP913 ISBN: 978-086017-688-6
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record is available for this book from the British Library
Keywords
Asset and facilities management, building envelope, construction process, flood risk
management, surface water drainage and flooding, sustainability
Reader interest Classification

Flood risk AVAILABILITY Open publication
management, CONTENT Factual record, original research,
asset management recommendations
STATUS Committee-guided
USER Experienced asset managers, engineers and
technical managers new to the principles of
flood risk management, consultants, regulators
and decision makers, business continuity
managers, commercial and contract managers
with an interest in flood risk management
Published by CIRIA, Griffin Court, 15 Long Lane, London, EC1A 9PN, UK
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information on the subject matter covered. It is
sold and/or distributed with the understanding that neither the authors nor the publisher is thereby engaged in
rendering a specific legal or any other professional service. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy
and completeness of the publication, no warranty or fitness is provided or implied, and the authors and publisher
shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage arising from
its use.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
including photocopying and recording, without the written permission of the copyright-holder, application for which
should be addressed to the publisher. Such written permission must also be obtained before any part of this
publication is stored in a retrieval system of any nature.
If you would like to reproduce any of the figures, text or technical information from this or any other CIRIA
publication for use in other documents or publications, please contact the Publishing Department for more details on
copyright terms and charges at: publishing@ciria.org or tel: 020 7549 3300.
ii CIRIA C688
Acknowledgements
This publication was produced as part of CIRIA’s continuing work in developing a suite of
documents for both infrastructure asset management and flood risk management. The
project RP913 was carried out under contract to CIRIA by Arup.
Authors
Will McBain MA (Hons) PGDip CSci CWEM MCIWEM FRSA

Will McBain is an associate at Arup with 15 years experience of flood risk and water
resources management in the UK and overseas. He was lead editor of the living draft
practice guide to Planning Policy Statement 25 (PPS25). Will manages Arup’s National
Engineering and Environmental Consultancy Agreement 2 (NEECA2) Framework with the
Environment Agency.
David Wilkes BSc(Hons) CEng CWEM MICE FCIWEM

David is an associate director at Arup with over 30 years experience of flood risk and water
resources management. He has worked in a technical design capacity, at operational level,
and as a public sector regulator. Before joining Arup, David spent over 20 years with the
Environment Agency and its predecessors, including six years managing the Thames
Barrier.
Matthias Retter MSc PhD Cert CII

Matthias joined Arup in early 2008 following academic study in Germany, the US and
Switzerland. Matthias specialises in flood risk assessment, hydrological trends and
sustainability.
Following CIRIA’s usual practice, the research was guided by a project steering group,
which included:
Richard Ashley Pennine Water Group and University of Sheffield

Alex Back Veolia Water Central (formerly Three Valleys Water)
Mat Barber Cabinet Office
Beth Bear Institution of Civil Engineers
Derek Bell Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council
Emma Culleton United Utilities
Paul Ditchfield Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
Douglas Dodds National Grid
John Dora (chair) Network Rail
Ian Folkard RWE npower plc
David Gibson Hull City Council
Oliver Grant Environment Agency
Ian Harrison Newark and Sherwood District Council
David Hart Environment Agency
Steve Baldrance BT
Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 iii

Ian Hogg Scottish Water
Peter Jones Welsh Assembly Government
David Lloyd Business Continuity Institute
Shanti Majithia National Grid
Jim Moriarity London Underground
Fola Ogunyoye Royal Haskoning
Malcolm Payne London Underground
Peter Phipps Mott MacDonald Group
Mike Powell City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council
Paul Reeves Environment Agency Wales
David Sisson Lindsey Marsh Drainage Board and Association of
Drainage Authorities
Bridgette Sullivan-Taylor Warwick University
Claire Sunshine Environment Agency
David Mason South West Water
James Mason Environment Agency
Michael Whitehead Highways Agency
Jonathan Wright Mouchel
Project funders
CIRIA Core members

Environment Agency
Highways Agency
London Underground
National Grid
Network Rail
Scottish Water
South West Water
United Utilities
Veolia Three Valleys Water
CIRIA would also like to thank Arup for their substantial in-kind contribution in the
production and dissemination of this publication.
CIRIA Project team
Ben Kidd Project manager

Supported by Philip Charles, Chris Chiverrell and Paul Shaffer
Other contributors
The development of this publication also used contributions from:
Tim Allmark Nuclear Installations Inspectorate

David Anderson Network Rail
Jonathan Aylwin Arup
iv CIRIA C688
Rob Bailey Welsh Assembly Government
Steve Ball Homes and Communities Agency
Dean Beaumont BT
Colin Berghouse Environment Agency
Lee Bosher Loughborough University
Layla Branicki Warwick University
Alan Bromage Concrete Centre
David Brook Independent consultant
Andy Brown Anglian Water Services
Edward Bunting Department for Transport
Paul Buttery CE Electric
Alex Carter National Grid
Graham Cave Chartered Institute of Loss Adjustors
Tim Chapman Arup
Colin Church Severn Trent Water Ltd
Paul Conroy Halcrow
Steve Coupe Environment Agency
Gordan Davies Environment Agency
Mary Dhonau National Flood Forum
Manuela Escarameia HR Wallingford Ltd
Andy Ewens Gloucestershire Constabulary
Graham Fardell Arup
Mark Fletcher Arup
Randy Freed ICF International
David Funchall URS Corporation Ltd
Gavin George Flood Guards Systems Ltd
John Gibbs EDF Energy Networks
Colin Harris Arup
David Higginson Mouchel
Zoe Hutchinson Mouchel
Alan Hodder National Grid
Caroline Jackson Mouchel
Tony Jackson Network Rail
Mike Johnson Department for Communities and Local Government
Keith Jones University of Greenwich
Mari Jones Faber Maunsell
Mike Jones GHD (formerly Arup)
Russell Knight BAA Airports Ltd
Andy Limbrick Association of Electricity Providers
Andrew Mack United Utilities
Steven Male University of Leeds
Mark Maloney University of Leeds
Jim Marshall Water UK
Brian McGinnity London Underground
Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 v

John McRobert Roads Service (Northern Ireland)
Jane Medforth Hull City Council
Ian Moodie Association of Drainage Authorities
Brian Morrow United Utilities
David Murphy Cabinet Office
Chris Netherton National Flood School
John Newman Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
Mick O’Malley Veolia Three Valleys Water
Will Owen Weather Intelligence
Mark Parker Gloucestershire County Council
Steven Parsley Yorkshire Water Services
Ian Peacock Arup
Andy Phillips Welsh Assembly Government
Arthur Philp Association of British Insurers
Frazer Rhodes Environment Agency
Nigel Riglar Gloucestershire County Council
Will Rogers URS Corporation Ltd
Santi Santhalingam Highways Agency
John Scoot Flood Control Ltd
Annette Senior National Grid
Robert Sharpe Tube Lines Ltd
Tim Spink Mott MacDonald
David Suddards Anglian Water Services
Bridgette E Sullivan-Taylor SOLAR unit, Warwick Business School,
Warwick University
Paul Swift Mouchel
Andy Tagg HR Wallingford Ltd
Bruce Trayhurn RWE npower plc
Anna Trippitt CE Electric
David Turnbull Tyne and Wear Emergency Planning Unit
Andy Turner Environment Agency
Rosalind Turner Mott MacDonald Group
Gary Tustin Environment Agency
Kim Vanstone South West Water
Britt Warg Geodesign Barriers Ltd
Noel Wheatley Ofwat (formerly Environment Agency)
David Whensley Energy Network Association
Ron Whitehead Total Flood Solutions and Flood Protection Association
Doug Whitfield Environment Agency
Rod Wilkinson Severn Trent Water Ltd
Kate Zabatis United Utilities
Front cover image: National Grid switching station in Walham, Gloucester, the day after the flood
inundation in July 2007 (courtesy Geodesign Barriers Ltd)
vi CIRIA C688
Executive summary
CIRIA project RP913 Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure builds on previous
CIRIA-managed collaborative research on property-level flood resilience (CLG, 2007) and
with the aim of addressing some of the critical infrastructure (CI) issues raised by recent
severe flooding in the UK. This publication, which is the main output from the project,
provides an overview of how the risk posed to CI systems by flooding is now managed
across the UK.
CI comprises: “those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of
the country and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in the UK
depends” (CPNI, <http://www.cpni.gov.uk/glossary.aspx#01>). Flood resilience involves
designing an infrastructure asset, or adapting an existing infrastructure asset so that
although it comes into contact with floodwater during floods, no permanent damage is
caused, structural integrity is maintained and, if operational disruption does occur, normal
operation can resume rapidly after a flood has receded. Flood resistance involves designing
an infrastructure asset, or adapting an existing infrastructure asset so that floodwater is
excluded during flood events and normal operation can continue with no disruption
occurring to the essential services the asset provides. These two techniques have a central
role to play in managing the flood risks associated with CI systems.
The publication provides an overview of the regulatory framework and outlines the main
issues now faced by the industry in this area. A brief introduction is given to the principles
of flood risk management (FRM) to place flood resilience and resistance into a wider
context. A range of case studies is provided that describes the lessons identified by
infrastructure owners and operators who have suffered flooding problems in the past.
Flood risk management for CI across the UK is then considered with respect to:
flood risk assessment

adopting resilience and resistance measures
investment prioritisation.
The conclusions and recommendations to this publication are summarised as follows:
The majority of flood risk assessment work undertaken to date by CI operators has made
use of national flood maps prepared by the Environment Agency (EA), Scottish
Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) and Northern Ireland Rivers Agency (NIRA).
These maps provide information on a limited number of annual probabilities of events for
river and coastal flooding only, ignoring the presence of flood defences. These maps do
not factor in an allowance for climate change (except in Northern Ireland). Now it is
challenging for operators to assess the degree of exposure to surface, groundwater and
infrastructure-failure flood hazards. The next generation of flood maps, and their
associated hazard registers, need to address this issue, making better use of existing
information and ensuring that new data is collated in a consistent format.
The main issue with adopting resilience and resistance measures is which standard to use.
Sir Michael Pitt recommended that resistance to a 0.5 per cent (1 in 200) annual
probability flood would be a proportionate starting point for critical infrastructure. It is
easier to protect new infrastructure from flooding than it is to adapt and upgrade existing
legacy infrastructure. The 0.5 per cent (1 in 200) annual probability standard will be
Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 vii

particularly challenging to achieve for roads and legacy rail infrastructure. It is
recommended that guidance on appropriate resilience/resistance standards is developed
for different categories of CI, which recognises the existing variations in both flood hazard
exposure and resistance/resilience levels. This publication suggests a possible risk-based
framework for these standards.
Flood resilience measures should be adopted as an integral part of individual

organisations’ business continuity management processes, whole-life asset management
plans and climate change adaptation strategies. CI owners need to develop long-term
strategic investment approaches that allow for optimised investment decision making. The
economic regulators should aim to provide a framework to achieve this objective.
This publication is supported by two documents, which are available to download from the
CIRIA website: <www.ciria.org/service/c688>
Supporting document 1: Overview of questionnaire survey results (May 2009)
Supporting document 2: Consultation workshop report (April 2009)
viii CIRIA C688

Contents
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii
Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .viii
Boxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii
Case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii
Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiv
Acronyms and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1.2 The Pitt Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
2 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
3 Target audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
4 Detailed definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
4.1 Critical infrastructure (CI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

4.2 Criticality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
4.3 Interdependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
4.4 Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
4.5 Flood resistance and resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
4.6 Design standards and performance levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
5 Regulatory context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

5.2 Planning for civil contingencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
5.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
5.2.2 England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
5.2.3 Scotland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
5.2.4 Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
5.2.5 Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
5.3 Flood risk management (FRM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
5.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
5.3.2 England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
5.3.3 Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
5.3.4 Scotland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
5.3.5 Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
5.4 Regulation of private utility companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
5.5 Regulation of publicly-owned service providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
5.6 The spatial planning system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 ix

6 The principles of flood risk management (FRM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
6.1 The components of flood risk: sources, pathways and receptors . . . . . . . . .16
6.2 The importance of strategic context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
6.3 Flood frequency terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
6.4 Flood frequency and design flood level estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
6.5 The management of uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
6.6 The flood risk management hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
6.7 Standards of protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
6.8 Taking account of climate change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
6.9 Flood risk management measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
6.10 The importance of whole-life asset management principles . . . . . . . . . . . .21
6.11 Off-site effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
6.12 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
7 Issues in FRM for resilient infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
7.1 Questionnaire responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

7.2 Workshop outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
7.3 Wider perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
7.3.1 Council for Science and Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
7.3.2 The ICE report: State of the nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
7.3.3 Expecting the unexpected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
7.4 Joint policy statement on urban flood risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
8 Historic incidents and lessons identified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
8.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

8.2 United Utilities and the Carlisle and Cumbria 2005 floods . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
8.2.1 What happened? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
8.2.2 Lessons identified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
8.3 National Grid and the June 2007 floods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
8.3.1 What happened? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
8.4 Ulley reservoir and the June 2007 floods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
8.4.1 What happened? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
8.5 Network Rail and the summer 2007 floods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
8.5.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
8.5.2 What happened? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
8.6 Hull City Council and the June 2007 floods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
8.6.1 What happened? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
8.7 Disruption of the M1 and M5 in summer 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
8.7.1 What happened? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
8.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
x CIRIA C688
8.8.1 Flood sources and mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
8.8.2 Escalation of flood warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
8.8.3 Multi-agency emergency preparedness and incident
management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
8.8.4 Interdependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
8.8.5 Built-in resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
9 Current practice in the assessment of flood risk to critical infrastructure . . . . . . . . . .41
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

9.2 Emerging issues in risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
9.3 International experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
9.3.1 United States of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
9.3.2 European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
9.3.3 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44
9.4 UK experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44
9.4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44
9.4.2 National flood maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
9.4.3 FRA for new development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
9.4.4 FRA for existing infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
9.4.5 Assessing the consequences of flooding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
9.5 Energy sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52
9.6 Communications sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
9.7 Transport sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
9.7.1 Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
9.7.2 Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
9.8 Water sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
9.8.1 Privatised water utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
9.8.2 Scottish Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58
9.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
10 Current practice for adopting resistance and resilience measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63
10.1 The FRM hierarchy for critical infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

10.2 Existing guidance on FRM for critical infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63
10.3 Non structural measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
10.3.1 Hazard identification, mapping and avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
10.3.2 Substitution and provision of reserve capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
10.3.3 Flood forecasting and warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
10.3.4 Incident management and business continuity planning . . . . . . . .65
10.3.5 Emergency exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
10.4 Structural measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
10.4.1 Fixed flood defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
10.5 Flood resilient and resistant construction for buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
10.6 Temporary and demountable flood defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
10.7 Design standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69
10.8 Energy sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70
10.9 Transport sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73
Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 xi

10.9.1 Highways Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73
10.9.2 London Underground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74
10.9.3 Network Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74
10.10 Water sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76
10.11 Communications sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78
10.12 Publicly-funded FRM capital works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78
10.13 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81
11 Examples of FRM investment prioritisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82
11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82

11.2 Environment Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82
11.3 The approach advocated by Ofwat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83
11.4 The approach adopted by Scottish Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84
11.5 National Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
11.6 Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
11.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88
12 Interdependencies and cross-sector collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89
13 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96
13.1 Regulatory regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

13.2 Historic incidents and lessons identified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96
13.2.1 Flood sources and mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96
13.2.2 Escalation of flood warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96
13.2.3 Multi-agency emergency preparedness and incident
management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97
13.2.4 Interdependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97
13.2.5 Built-in resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97
13.3 Flood risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97
13.4 Adopting resistance and resilience measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98
13.5 Prioritisation of investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98
13.6 Interdependencies and cross-sector collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99
14 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100
14.1 Next generation flood maps and hazard registers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100

14.2 Guidance on resistance and resilience standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100
14.3 Incentivisation of collaborative approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
14.4 Understanding whole-life costs and benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
14.5 Investment planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102
14.6 Alignment of public/private sector spend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102
14.7 Improving the effectiveness of the emergency response . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102
14.8 Training in flood risk management for critical infrastructure . . . . . . . . . .102
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103
Acts, Codes, Regulations etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .110

Other useful websites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112
xii CIRIA C688

Boxes
Box 10.1 Design standards adopted by the Highways Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

Box 10.2 Design standards adopted by Network Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70
Case studies
Case study 9.1 A pilot in the use of GIS by the HA’s Network Resilience Team . . . .55
Case study 9.2 United Utilities assessment of flood risk for water assets . . . . . . . . .57
Case study 9.3 Anglian Water’s assessments of sites threatened by sea level rise . . .57
Case study 9.4 Yorkshire Water Services Limited strategic level assessment . . . . . .58
Case study 9.5 Flood risk assessment by Veolia Water Central . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58
Case study 9.6 Asset flood risk classification at Scottish Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59
Case study 10.1 Experience of flooding at Great Yarmouth power station . . . . . . . .72
Case study 10.2 Highways Agency Exercise Extend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73
Case study 10.3 Network Rail’s use of flood outlines for siting of telecommunications
installations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76
Case study 10.4 Consideration of flood resilience versus resistance at the
Mythe WTW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77
Case study 10.5 Flood resistance measures installed at Safeway superstore, Lewes . .80
Case study 11.1 Prioritisation of spending on flood risk for the 2010 to 2015 asset
management period for Veolia Water Central . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84
Case study 11.2 Defence facility flood mitigation strategy and investment
planning 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
Case study 12.1 Strategic infrastructure delivery plan in Gloucestershire . . . . . . . . .92
Case study 12.2 The Integrated Strategic Drainage Board in Hull . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92
Case study 12.3 Local resilience forum in Hull . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93
Case study 12.4 Flood risk and resilience in North Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94
Case study 12.5 The Highways Agency working in partnership with the
Environment Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95
Case study 12.6 Scope for collaboration between Network Rail and regional
resilience forums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95
Examples
Example 6.1 Use of demountable defences in place of fixed defences . . . . . . . . .21

Example 6.2 Use of flood defences in place of spatial planning measures . . . . . .21
Figures
Figure 4.1 The three dimensions of the criticality scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Figure 4.2 Design standards versus performance levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Figure 6.1 Flood sources, pathways and receptors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Figure 6.2 Design exceedance probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Figure 8.1 Temporary defences used at Walham substation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
Figure 8.2 Flood impact on the electricity grid in South Yorkshire during
June 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
Figure 8.3 Emergency stabilisation work undertaken at Ulley Dam (a) and a
visualisation of the proposed new spillway designed by Arup for
Rotherham MBC (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 xiii

Figure 8.4 Flooding of rail tracks at Adlestrop (River Evenlode) . . . . . . . . . . . .35
Figure 8.5 Analysis of significant asset failures of Network Rail caused during
the summer 2007 floods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
Figure 8.6 Flooding in Hull, June 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Figure 9.1 Continuous improvement to protect critical infrastructure . . . . . . .42
Figure 9.2 The risk management process within “emergency preparedness” . .45
Figure 9.3 National infrastructure assets (transport and utilities infrastructure)
in floodplain areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
Figure 9.4 Screen grab of GIS interface developed in NRT pilot study . . . . . .55
Figure 9.5 Risk matrix for prioritisation of investigations into the viability of
resilience measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56
Figure 9.6 Schematic of Anglian Water assets at risk from sea level rise . . . . . .57
Figure 9.7 Flood risk exposure using the red, amber and green classifications 59
Figure 9.8 Scottish Water survey template example (WTW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60
Figure 10.1 The basic components of a flood defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
Figure 10.2 Flood water penetration into buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
Figure 10.3 An example of flood resistance measures used by members of the
Energy Networks Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71
Figure 10.4 Hesco temporary barriers erected at Mythe WTW following the flood
events of 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77
Figure 10.5 Actual flood resistant measure employed at the Mythe WTW (a)
and a 3D model showing the site protected from flood water (b) . . .77
Figure 10.6 Examples of flood resistance measures installed at Safeways
superstore, Lewes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
Figure 12.1 Visualisation of a major flood affecting an urban conurbation . . . . .89
Tables
Table 4.1 Criticality scale for national infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Table 4.2 Infrastructure criticality matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Table 6.1 Flood frequency terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Table 6.2 Flood risk management hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Table 6.3 Indicative standards of protection for land-use types . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Table 6.4 Flood risk management measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Table 7.1 Summary of issues identified in questionnaire survey . . . . . . . . . . .23
Table 9.1 Levels of flood risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Table 9.2 Typical sources of information for flood risk assessments . . . . . . . . .47
Table 9.3 Flood zones in PPS25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48
Table 9.4 Flood zones in Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48
Table 9.5 Flood risk vulnerability classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
Table 9.6 National Grid’s assets at risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
Table 10.1 The flood risk management hierarchy for critical infrastructure . . .63
Table 11.1 Outcome measures summary table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82
Table 11.2 Datasets used to provide an initial ranking of priority flood
alleviation projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83
Table 11.3 Asset flood risk protection categories and aligned solutions . . . . . . .86
Table 11.4 Short, medium and long-term investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86
xiv CIRIA C688

Table 12.1 Examples of infrastructure asset vulnerability and functional
dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90
Table 14.1 Concise definition of asset categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100
Table 14.2 Examples of resistance/resilience standards and performance levels
that may be appropriate for CI assets in some sectors . . . . . . . . . .101
Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 xv

Acronyms and abbreviations
AMP Asset management plan

ALA American Lifeline Alliance
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
BAP Biodiversity action plan
BGS British Geological Survey
BH Borehole
BBK Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (US)
BRC British Red Cross
BT British Telecom
CCA Civil Contingencies Act
CCS Civil Contingencies Secretariat
CFMP Catchment flood management plan
CI Critical infrastructure
CIKR Critical infrastructure and key resources (US)
CIWEM Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management
CLG Communities and Local Government
CNI Critical national infrastructure
CPNI Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure
CRR Community Risk Register
CST Council for Science and Technology
DARD (NI) Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (Northern
Ireland)
Defra Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DFE Design flood elevation
DfT Department for Transport
DHS Department of Homeland Security (US)
ECW Emergency customer welfare (HA)
ENA Energy Networks Association
EPCIP European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection
EPM Emergency planning manager (HA)
EPO Emergency planning officer (HA)
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (US)
FHM Flood hazard maps
FRM Flood risk management
FRMP Flood risk management plans
GIS Geographical information systems
GSS Guaranteed standards scheme
HA Highways Agency
ICE Institution of Civil Engineers
IDB Internal Drainage Board
xvi CIRIA C688

IPC Infrastructure Planning Commission
IPPC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LI Landscape Institute
LiDAR Light detection and ranging
LPA Local planning authority
LRF Local resilience forum
LTAS Long-term asset strategy
LV Low voltage
MVA Megavolt amperes
NADB National Assets Database (US)
NaFRA National flood risk assessment
NAP New approaches programme
NFIP National Flood Insurance Program (US)
NHS National Health Service
NHT Natural Hazards Team
NIPP National infrastructure protection plan (US)
NIRA Northern Ireland Rivers Agency
NOS National Occupation Standards
NPV Net present value
NRD National Receptor Database
NRR National Risk Register
NRT Network Resilience Team (HA)
NSAC National Security Advice Centre
OCA Overall critical assessment
OHL Overhead line
OPA Overall performance assessment
OPM Output performance measures
ORR Office of Rail Regulation
PAN Planning Advice Note (Scotland)
pFRA Preliminary flood risk assessment
PMF Probable maximum flood
PPS Planning Policy Statement (England and Northern Ireland)
RAMCAP Risk assessment methodology for critical asset protection
RFRA Regional flood risk appraisal
RIBA Royal Institute of British Architects
RICS Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
RRF Regional Resilience Forums
RSPCA Royal Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
RTPI Royal Town Planning Institute
RUSI Royal United Services Institute
RWPS Raw water pumping station
SEPA Scottish Environment Protection Agency
SFRA Strategic flood risk assessment
SHIRA Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (US)
Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 xvii

SMP Shoreline management plan
SPP Scottish Planning Policy
SRP Sector resilience plans
SS Substation
SSSI Sites of special scientific interest
STWL Severn Trent Water Ltd
SWMP Surface water management plan
TAN Technical Advice Note (Wales)
TOC Train operating company
TWPS Treated water pumping station
UKCIP United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme
WAG Welsh Assembly Government
WICS Water Industry Commission for Scotland
WTW Water treatment works
WwTW Wastewater treatment works
YWSL Yorkshire Water Services Ltd
xviii CIRIA C688

1 Introduction
This chapter provides context to the publication, how and why it was initiated and where
it sits in relation to Sir Michael Pitt’s review of the 2007 floods.
1.1 BACKGROUND
Project RP913 Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure was established by
CIRIA, building upon previous CIRIA-managed collaborative research on property-level
flood resilience (CLG, 2007) and with the aim of addressing some of the critical
infrastructure issues raised by recent severe flooding in the UK. The project sits within
the Environment Agency Flood Risk Science Programme as part of the Environment
Agency’s joint Flood and Coastal Risk Management Programme with the Department of
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). CIRIA established a project steering group
comprising 26 organisations (see Acknowledgements) and chaired by John Dora of Network
Rail.
1.2 THE PITT REVIEW

Sir Michael Pitt’s Review published in December 2008 made several recommendations
regarding the need to increase the flood resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure
(Pitt, 2008). The review’s three recommendations pertinent to this publication were:
Recommendation 51: relevant government departments and the Environment Agency

should work with infrastructure operators to identify the vulnerability and risk of assets to
flooding and a summary of the analysis should be published in sector resilience plans
(SRPs).
Recommendation 52: in the short-term, the UK Government and infrastructure

operators should work together to build a level of resilience into critical infrastructure
assets that ensures continuity during a worst-case flood event.
Recommendation 53: a specific duty should be placed on economic regulators to build

resilience in critical infrastructure.
Pitt suggested that the Government’s National Security Strategy should aim to reduce the
most substantial known risks to critical infrastructure resulting from natural hazards
through careful assessment of vulnerability and prudent action based on new centrally
defined standards.
Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 1

2 Scope
This publication aims to identify lessons learnt from historic incidents, current practice
and research needs related to improving the flood resilience and resistance of critical
infrastructure assets in general. The scope was to:
plan, arrange and manage a consultation workshop

undertake a questionnaire survey
collate the workshop outputs and questionnaire responses and provide reports
summarising the results of these two exercises
undertake a literature review providing:
an overview of the problems of infrastructure flood risk
a review of information from post-flood incident reports
a review (primarily signposting) of current approaches from other sectors and
their applicability to infrastructure assets
a review of measures adopted by infrastructure asset owners using current,
publicly available information on costs and benefits of resilience and resistance
measures.
A questionnaire was completed and returned by 35 organisations and a copy of the

feedback report is included in Supporting document 1. Supporting document 2 gives
information from a consultation workshop that was held in April 2009 and attended by
over 40 organisations.
Numerous case studies were later provided by the participants. The questionnaire
responses, workshop outputs and case studies have been supplemented by a literature
review to provide the supporting evidence for this publication. Following consultation
with the Steering Group, in the energy, communications, transport, and water sectors, this
publication has focused on:
the assessment of flood risk to infrastructure assets

experience to date of adopting resistance and resilience measures
the prioritisation of investment in these measures
the identification of research needs.
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3 Target audience
It is foreseen that the outputs will be of primary interest to:
all relevant government bodies and regulators

utility providers (eg electricity, gas, water)
waste management operators (eg treatment and disposal)
telecommunications companies
transport asset owners (eg Highways Agency, Network Rail, local authorities, airports,
ports and navigation operators)
local planning authorities
local authority contingency/emergency planners
public services (eg emergency services)
consultants and designers
facilities managers
National Health Service Trusts
the insurance industry
the planning inspectorate.

4 Detailed definitions
This chapter provides a rationale for critical infrastructure and defines the following
terms as used in the context of this publication:
criticality
interdependency
resilience
flood resilience
flood resistance.
4.1 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CI)

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) was formed from the
merger of the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) and a part
of MI5, the National Security Advice Centre (NSAC). CPNI is the government authority
for protective security advice to the national infrastructure relating to national security
threats. The UK’s national infrastructure is defined by government as (CPNI, 2010):
“those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the country
and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in the UK depends”.
The sectors that are considered to deliver “essential services” are:
communications
energy
finance
food
government
emergency services
health
transport
water.
This publication focuses on the energy, water, transport and telecommunications sectors.
4.2 CRITICALITY
There are certain “critical” elements of national infrastructure: “the loss or compromise of
which would have a major impact on the availability or integrity of essential services
leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life in the UK. These
critical elements make up the critical national infrastructure (CNI)” (CPNI, 2010).
Categorisation of criticality is done using the Government criticality scale, which assigns
categories for different degrees of severity of impact. Table 4.1 provides broad
descriptions of the types of infrastructure that would be categorised at the different levels
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(more detailed and specific criteria for each sector is captured in the scale). For example,
Category 5 (CAT 5) indicates infrastructure that would have the most severe impact when
it is disrupted. CAT 0 indicates infrastructure whose loss would be minimal when
considered in the national context.
Table 4.1 Criticality scale for national infrastructure (courtesy Cabinet Office)
Criticality
Description
scale
The loss of infrastructure that would have a catastrophic effect on the UK. These assets
CAT 5 will be of unique national importance and their loss would have national long-term effects
and may affect several sectors. Relatively few are expected to meet the Cat 5 criteria.
Infrastructure of the highest importance to the sectors should fall within this category. The
CAT 4 effect of loss of these assets on essential services would be severe and may affect
provision of essential services across the UK or to millions of citizens.
Infrastructure of substantial importance to the sectors and the delivery of essential

CAT 3 services, the loss of which could affect a large geographic region or many hundreds of
thousands of people.
Infrastructure whose loss would have a significant affect on the delivery of essential
CAT 2 services leading to loss, or disruption, of service to tens of thousands of people or
affecting whole counties or equivalents.
Infrastructure whose loss could cause moderate disruption to service delivery, most likely
CAT 1
on a localised basis and affecting thousands of citizens.
CAT 0 The loss of infrastructure that would be minor (on national scale).
The criticality scale includes three impact dimensions: impact on delivery of the nation’s
essential services, economic impact (arising from loss of essential service) and impact on
life (arising from loss of essential service). These are illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Infrastructure may be classified using any one of these factors. The designation should
reflect the highest criticality category reached in either of the impact dimensions.
The following three factors provide the means to distinguish between different degrees of
severity of impact on essential services:
the degree of disruption to an essential service

the extent of the disruption, in terms of population affected or geographical spread
the length of time the disruption persists.
Figure 4.1 The three dimensions of the criticality scale (Mann, 2009)

A “critical threshold” has been set on the scale and is the level above which the impacts of
loss are considered so severe that infrastructure falling into these categories should be
considered to form part of the critical national infrastructure (CNI). The threshold is set
at Category 3 (CAT 3).
Sponsor departments lead on identifying what infrastructure in their sector may be

considered critical, in conjunction with sector experts at the Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure (CPNI). Sponsor departments also lead on setting the essential
service impact criteria (criticality) for their sector.
A criticality matrix, such as that shown in Table 4.2, can be used to assess the relative
importance of the various components of an infrastructure system. The probability of
failure and the nature of the consequences, or effects, of such a failure, can be used to
attribute a relative priority for use in, for example, prioritising investment.
Table 4.2 Infrastructure criticality matrix
Virtually certain Significant Significant High High High

Failure probability
Probable Intermediate Significant Significant High High
Possible Low Intermediate Significant High High
Improbable Low Low Intermediate Significant High
Highly unlikely Low Low Intermediate Significant Significant
Trivial Low Moderate Extensive Catastrophic
Effects/degree of damage
4.3 INTERDEPENDENCY
Infrastructure can be highly interconnected and failure of one asset system can have a
direct and damaging knock-on effect on other essential services. For example, water
cannot be treated or pumped without power, so a loss of power may result in a loss of
water supply (see examples in Chapter 8). Scale effects can also be important – failure of
some systems may have devastating effects on a local scale. Others might have milder
effects but on a regional or national scale. In determining the criticality of an asset system
these scale effects and interdependencies need to be factored into the analysis.
4.4 RESILIENCE
Resilience, in the context of critical infrastructure, can be defined as the ability of an asset,
or system of assets, to continue to provide essential services when threatened by an
unusual event (such as an extreme flood, terrorist attack or flu epidemic), as well as its
speed of recovery and ability to return to normal operation after the threat has receded.
As the nature of threats can change with time, resilience is closely related to a system’s
“adaptive capacity”, which is its ability to adapt to a changing environment and continue
to provide the essential services it was originally designed for. Climate change, and its
knock-on effects, is one such threat. Indeed climate change, and uncertainty about its
future consequences, is seen by many as the greatest threat faced by modern society. This
issue is discussed further in Chapter 6.
6 CIRIA C688
Resilience is also related to the durability of a network or asset. Durability is a measure of
how long an asset will last before it needs to be repaired or replaced. Further information
is provided in Chapter 10.
Resilient infrastructure can be defined as:
“those systems of assets that will be able to survive and perform well in an increasingly
uncertain future” (Male, 2009)
4.5 FLOOD RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE

The CLG publication Improving the flood performance of new buildings – flood resilient
construction (CLG, 2007) defines flood resilience and resistance for buildings. These
definitions are adapted here to apply to infrastructure assets:
1 Flood resilience involves designing an infrastructure asset, or adapting an

infrastructure asset so that although it comes into contact with floodwater during
floods, no permanent damage is caused, structural integrity is maintained and, where
operational disruption occurs, normal operation can resume rapidly after a flood has
receded.
2 Flood resistance involves designing an infrastructure asset, or adapting an existing
infrastructure asset, such that floodwater is excluded during flood events and normal
operation can continue with no disruption occurring to the essential services the asset
provides.
It should always be remembered that flood avoidance is the most effective means of
managing the flood risks associated with new infrastructure, ie that infrastructure and
assets should be situated in locations outside of flood risk areas.
4.6 DESIGN STANDARDS AND PERFORMANCE LEVELS

Sir Michael Pitt recommended that a level of resilience be built into critical infrastructure
assets to ensure continuity during a worst-case flood event. His review suggested that a
minimum standard of 0.5 per cent (1 in 200) annual probability flood would be a
proportionate starting point. He identified that the resilience of critical infrastructure to
low-probability, high-consequence events is a fundamental point of public interest. He
recommended that the government issues interim guidance to the regulators in the form
of resilience obligations to be met by utilities companies that are based on government
standards to ensure essential services are appropriately protected.
Traditionally in the UK the one per cent (1 in 100) annual probability flood was
considered an appropriate standard of flood defence for dense urban areas at risk of river
flooding. A 0.5 per cent (1 in 200) annual probability flood was considered appropriate
for dense urban areas at risk of flooding from the sea. These index floods are used in the
design of a range of infrastructure. For example, the one per cent (1 in 100) annual
probability flood is still used in the Highways Agency design manual (HA, 2006) to set
bridge soffit levels. The Environment Agency uses this as the minimum acceptable
standard for protection of new residential property, although they expect this to include
climate change over the development’s lifetime. In Scotland, the 0.5 per cent (1 in 200)
annual probability flood is already adopted as the index flood for new property.
Where the consequences of flooding are particularly serious, for example, flooding of
nuclear installations or reservoir embankment failure, higher design standards have been

specified. For example, large raised reservoirs are categorised according to the risk posed
by their failure. High risk (Category A) reservoirs are designed to safely pass the probable
maximum flood – a more onerous event than the 0.01 per cent (1 in 10,000) annual
probability event used for the design of lower risk Category B reservoirs.
Where the consequences of flooding are less onerous, less stringent standards have been
applied. For example, in WRc (2006) specifies that sewers should accommodate the 3.3
per cent (1 in 30) annual probability event, but surface water flooding is acceptable during
storms that exceed this probability.
A risk-based approach is implicit within the existing design standards used in the design
of infrastructure. Recently, certain sectors have adopted a more explicit risk-based
approach that also reflects cost-benefit considerations. For example, since 1999, Defra has
considered the appropriate standard for flood protection for dense urban areas to be
anywhere between a two per cent (1 in 50) to 0.5 per cent (1 in 200) annual probability
flood, depending on the costs and benefits of the options identified. However, the design
event approach is still prevalent within much of the industry.
The issues associated with making changes in design standards, or shifting more fully
towards a risk-based approach, are summarised by Meyer (2006) as:
“Changing design practice from assuming a 100-year storm to a 500-year storm would
certainly cause much discussion and debate among the professional community, but at least
the concept of a design storm is well known and accepted. If evidence can be found to
suggest the validity of making such a change, engineering practice would be
changed…eventually. However, something more traumatic to engineering practice, say, for
example, adopting a risk-based design approach to all infrastructure components could be
debated and discussed for a long time. Thus, it seems likely that the lead time needed for
making changes to design standards that reflect potential climate change-induced
environmental conditions could be very long. This further suggests that the research needed
to lay the groundwork for such changes needs to be done even earlier than this”.
The approaches to designing for climate change advocated by Defra, the precautionary
and managed adaptive approaches, are being successfully adopted by some sectors already
in the UK and provide a good framework for the future. These approaches, which are
explained further in Section 6.8, have been built into PPS25 and are described in the
accompanying practice guide (CLG, 2009).
The Natural Hazards Team (NHT) of the Cabinet Office is consulting on the development
of a sliding-scale approach to resilience standards for CNI (Mann, 2009). There is likely to
be significant discussion on this issue because bringing all existing CNI assets into line
with mandatory standards may have major cost implications. It may not be viable to
develop consistent standards that apply to all sectors. The transport sector in particular is
more exposed to the flood hazard than the other sectors. It would be disproportionately
expensive to upgrade roads and rail systems to be unaffected by levels of storm events
that a power station, water treatment works (WTW) and associated distribution networks
would not be affected by.
For critical infrastructure assets, design standards may need to be considered with regard
to the overall level of performance expected of the assets during a range of design
standard events. It will seldom be realistic to expect even CAT 5 assets to be fully
operational during very rare floods, but these assets may be designed to provide basic
functionality during such events and certainly not to fail altogether. Figure 4.2 provides a
rationale for the consideration of design levels versus performance levels. In principle, it
would be possible for both design standards and performance levels to be set for assets
8 CIRIA C688
with varying degrees of criticality. However, if these standards are to be mandatory, the
thresholds will need to be carefully considered to ensure that the cost of achieving these
mandatory standards is realistic.
Performance level
Fully Near
Operational Life safe
operational collapse
Frequent
Unacceptable
performance for
Ba new construction
Occasional Es sic
se
nt ob
ial jec
Design level /h tiv
az e
Sa ar
fet do
Rare y us
cri ob
tic jec
al tiv
ob e
jec
tiv
Very rare e
Figure 4.2 Design standards versus performance levels (Male, 2009)

5 Regulatory context
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In 2005 the Council of Europe published an analysis of inter-ministerial management of
major hazards (Council of Europe, 2005). The recommendations included the need for an
interdisciplinary approach to risk and the avoidance of “specialist mentality”. The
document advocated more common terminology, the need for risk inventories and inter-
ministerial and government departmental management. These recommendations seem to
apply without exception to the UK’s critical infrastructure.
This chapter provides a brief overview of the UK regulatory regime, outlining the roles
and responsibilities in the following areas:
civil contingency planning

flood risk management
regulation of the privatised utilities’ asset management activities
regulation of publicly owned essential service providers
planning and building regulations related to the construction of new infrastructure.
Section 5.7 introduces some of the issues associated with the regulatory regime, which is
discussed further in Chapter 7.
5.2 PLANNING FOR CIVIL CONTINGENCIES
5.2.1 Introduction
The legislative framework for civil protection across the UK is defined in the Civil
Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004, which defines roles and responsibilities for emergency
planning. The Act divides local responders into two categories. Category 1 responders are
at the core of the response to most emergencies. They include the emergency services,
local authorities, National Health Service (NHS) bodies and environmental regulators.
They are subject to the full set of civil protection duties. The majority of critical
infrastructure owners and operators are Category 2 responders who are less likely to be
involved in planning work but are heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector.
They have a lesser set of duties including co-operating and sharing relevant information
with other Category 1 and 2 responders.
5.2.2 England
In England the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) sits within the Cabinet Office and
has overall responsibility for civil contingency planning. They work in partnership with
government departments, the devolved administrations (Scottish Government, Welsh
Assembly Government and the Northern Ireland Office) and main stakeholders to
improve the UK’s ability to prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies.
The NHT within the CCS provides a focal point for the provision of policy and guidance
in this area in England. Sector sponsor departments are responsible for deciding the
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appropriate security approach to be taken in their sectors and for preparing sector
resilience plans (SRPs). Category 1 and 2 organisations form regional resilience forums
(RRFs) and local resilience forums (LRF), which are based on police areas. These are
designed to help co-ordination and co-operation between responders at the local level.
The NHT has produced a draft strategic framework and policy statement, which is out to
consultation (Mann, 2009). The Government’s expectations, defined standards and
guidance on good practice will be set out in a resilience plan for critical infrastructure to
be published in late 2010.
5.2.3 Scotland
The Scottish Parliament consented to Part 1 of the CCA being extended to Scotland.
Scottish Resilience is a new body set up to co-ordinate civil contingencies in Scotland,
supported by eight multi-agency strategic co-ordinating groups: Strathclyde, Lothian and
Borders, Tayside, Grampian, Central, Fife, Highlands and Islands, and Dumfries and
Galloway, similar to the LRFs in England.
5.2.4 Wales
In Wales, UK ministers make legislation and issue guidance in relation to CCA

responders, but they require the consent of the Welsh Assembly before taking action in
relation to a responder that falls within devolved competence. The Wales resilience forum
has been established to provide a forum for chief officers to discuss strategic issues of
emergency preparedness with Welsh Ministers. The PAN Wales Utility Group, with
membership of all main utility providers in Wales as well as Category 1 responder
representatives from Welsh LRFs, sits under the Wales resilience forum umbrella. Further
information on the PAN Wales Utility Group can be found in Chapter 12. Information on
the Wales resilience forum can be found at the Wales prepared resilience website:
<www.walesprepared.org>.
5.2.5 Northern Ireland
In Northern Ireland, Part 1 of the CCA only applies to certain bodies who exercise non-
devolved functions (eg Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and the Police Service of
Northern Ireland). The Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (2005) has
developed a civil contingencies framework.
5.3 FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT (FRM)
5.3.1 Introduction
Asset owners have primary responsibility for managing the flood risks associated with
their property. However, the UK Government can make provision for publicly-funded
flood risk management measures including:
hazard mapping
development control
flood forecasting and warning
incident management and emergency response
flood alleviation infrastructure.
These publicly funded measures are largely focused on the protection of vulnerable

communities. However, the eligibility criteria for funding involve consideration of costs
and benefits. Schemes that also protect critical infrastructure, and may have a high
benefit-cost ratio, should have an increased chance of receiving funding. In circumstances
where a particular infrastructure asset owner significantly benefits from construction of a
publicly funded flood alleviation scheme, they may be asked to provide a contribution
towards the cost.
Responsibilities for FRM across the UK are summarised in Sections 5.3.2 to 5.3.5.
5.3.2 England
In England, Defra is the lead government department for the management of flood risk
with the Environment Agency as its executive agency. The Floods and Water Management
Bill is expected to receive assent during the parliamentary session 2009–2010. The Act
will seek to create a more comprehensive and risk-based regime for managing flooding
and coastal erosion compared with the existing legislation, which mainly addresses the
provision of hard-engineered protection measures.
This Bill will give the Environment Agency a strategic overview for all types of flooding
(from the sea, main rivers, other watercourses, surface water runoff and from
groundwater). Also, the Agency will have powers to set up flood warning systems for
flooding from all sources, and new enforcement duties in respect of reservoir safety. The
Agency will retain the permissive powers to build maintain and operate flood protection
works where the flood risk is from the sea or from a main river.
Unitary or county local authorities will set the local strategy for managing flooding from
surface water, ordinary watercourses and from groundwater. These authorities will also
have permissive powers to undertake flood protection work associated with these types of
flooding. Internal drainage boards (IDB) will have similar duties and permissive powers
in their areas specifically in relation to land drainage matters.
It is worth noting that the term “permissive powers” provided to the Environment
Agency, unitary and county councils and IDB’s do not give an absolute responsibility to
undertake flood risk management works in the general interest of a community.
Ultimately it is the owners of land and property who have the primary responsibility for
managing the flood risks associated with their assets.
5.3.3 Wales
The Environment Agency also operates in Wales, but policy in Wales is set by the Welsh
Assembly Government (WAG), which is also the funding body for FRM activity. The WAG
has recognised the need for change and in 2007 launched the New Approaches
Programme (NAP), coinciding with some of the worst summer flooding experienced in
England, and to a lesser extent in Wales. The programme was initiated to tackle the
problems of both inland and tidal flooding, and coastal erosion, setting out an approach
that takes more account of changing risks and encourages use of a wider range of
solutions than just constructing flood defences. The NAP aims to do much more to
manage the consequences of flooding by involving vulnerable communities in discussions
about causes, issues and solutions, so that they are better able to respond effectively to
flooding events.
A review undertaken by the Welsh Audit Office (Wales Audit Office, 2009) identified that
the NAP has the potential to help develop an effective integrated response, but has so far
been constrained by a lack of capacity and by unclear objectives, roles and processes. The
report sets out seven main recommendations that detail the requirement for more
12 CIRIA C688
inclusive leadership from WAG, greater co-ordination with the Environment Agency in
both England and Wales and greater collaboration with stakeholders including local
authorities, private-sector organisations, the insurance industry and the public, to deliver
the NAP.
5.3.4 Scotland
Scotland has seen changes in its approach to the management of flood risk in recent
years, culminating in the new Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009. This Act
received Royal Assent on 16 June 2009, and repeals the Flood Prevention (Scotland) Act
1961. As with changes to legislation in England and Wales, the Act seeks a more
comprehensive risk-based approach to flood risk management.
The Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) is responsible for the production of
the preliminary flood risk assessment (pFRA), flood hazard maps (FHM) and flood risk
maps. Local authorities will be responsible for delivering flood risk management plans
(FRMP). The emerging flood risk management plans will be subject to approval by
Scottish ministers. Local authorities will have permissive powers to maintain and improve
flood defences. SEPA will become the enforcement authority under the Reservoirs Act
1975 (in place of the local authorities from mid 2011).
5.3.5 Northern Ireland
The lead department on flood risk in Northern Ireland is the Department of Agriculture
and Rural Development (DARD), with the Rivers Agency as its executive agency. The
Northern Ireland Assembly is preparing draft secondary legislation for flood risk
management. The direction of flood risk management over the period to 2021 is outlined
in the document by DARD (2008) and the Water Environment (Floods Directive)
Regulations Northern Ireland 2009. Under the draft regulations the Department is
required to:
prepare river basin district flood risk assessments and flood hazard maps
publish appropriate flood risk management plans by December 2015 that take account
of flood risk assessments, hazard maps and costs and benefits of possible work
review and update flood risk management plans before 2021.
5.4 REGULATION OF PRIVATE UTILITY COMPANIES

In the UK, private utilities operate under licences issued and economically regulated by
independent agencies. These agencies control monopoly power, protect consumers and
promote competition. The principal utility regulators are Ofwat (water), Ofgem (energy)
and Ofcom (telecommunications). The utility regulator regulates the electricity, gas and
water and sewerage industries in Northern Ireland. These agencies take the policy and
guidance issued by the relevant government department into account in their regulatory
activities.
All essential service providers are required to provide continuity of service. For example,
the statutory guaranteed standards scheme (GSS) establishes minimum standards of
service that each water company is required to provide consumers. A supply interruptions
indicator (DG3) shows the number of properties experiencing interruptions to their water
supply without advance warning for: between three and six hours, between 6 and 12
hours, between 12 and 24 hours, and longer than 24 hours.

In deciding whether to impose a penalty for failure to achieve these performance levels
“each enforcement authority will take account of the particular facts and circumstances of
the case under consideration. This will include the extent to which the circumstances
under which the contravention or failure arose were, or were not, outside the control of
the undertaker or licensee” (statement of policy with respect to financial penalties
pursuant to Section 22A of the Water Industry Act 1991, Ofwat). In general water
companies are not held liable to pay compensation in circumstances that are beyond their
reasonable control and extreme flooding is likely to fall in to this category (as noted in the
Pitt Review). This also highlighted that Ofgem requires electricity providers to
compensate customers for certain types of severe weather event.
In England and Wales, Network Rail is regulated by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR).
When disruption is experienced on the rail network, Network Rail is liable for the time
railway lines are not available to train operating companies (TOCs). Business interruption
is measured and payments are made to TOCs as a form of compensation as required by
Network Rail’s operating licence. When damage to Network Rail assets occur material
damage is accounted for as the cost for repairs. Costs for business interruption and
material damage are recorded routinely.
5.5 REGULATION OF PUBLICLY-OWNED SERVICE PROVIDERS

Important publicly owned service providers in the UK include the highways network and,
in Scotland, the rail network. Water services are also publicly owned in Scotland and
Northern Ireland. The regulatory framework is outlined as:
The Highways Agency (HA) is an executive agency of the Department for Transport
(DfT), and is responsible for operating, maintaining and improving the strategic road
network on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport. In Wales this work is
undertaken by Transport Wales acting for the Welsh Assembly Government and in
Northern Ireland by the Roads Service within the Northern Ireland Executive. Transport
Scotland is the national transport agency for Scotland working directly for the Scottish
Government.
In Scotland and Northern Ireland, the water industry is still publicly owned. The Water
Industry Commission for Scotland (WICS) is a non-departmental public body with
statutory responsibility for regulation of water and sewerage services. Scottish Water is
responsible for providing water and waste water services, delivering the investment
priorities of Scottish ministers within the funding allowed by the Water Industry
Commission for Scotland. Northern Ireland Water provides similar services in Northern
Ireland, economically regulated by the utilities regulator.
5.6 THE SPATIAL PLANNING SYSTEM

Sir Michael Pitt was generally complimentary about the role played by the planning
system in avoiding the creation of new flood risks in England, with some reservations,
which will be discussed further in Chapter 9. This section contains a brief overview of the
existing regulatory framework.
In England, Communities and Local Government set the policy agenda for spatial
planning, which is then adopted by regional planning bodies and local planning
authorities. Planning Policy Statement 25 (PPS25) provides a comprehensive framework
for the national, regional and local consideration of food risk. Welsh planning policy is
contained in Planning Policy (Wales) to which Technical Advice Note 15 (TAN15) (Welsh
Assembly Government, 2004) provides guidance in respect of FRM. In Scotland, Scottish
14 CIRIA C688
Ministers are responsible for the national planning framework. Policy is set out in Scottish
Planning Policy 7 (SPP7) (Scottish Government, 2004) and Planning Advice Note (PAN)
69 (Scottish Government, 2004) provides practical advice on planning and building
standards in areas where there is a risk of flooding (Scottish Government, 2004). In
Northern Ireland, the Department of the Environment is responsible for spatial planning
and its policies on flood risk are set-out in Planning Policy Statement 15 (PPS15)
(Northern Ireland Planning Service, 2006).
An important consideration is that much infrastructure development is covered by other

legislation, such as the Electricity Act, Highways Act and Transport and Works Act, which
means that it is not subject to the normal planning process. Also, a wide range of
construction activity in the infrastructure sector is classified as “permitted development”
and does not require planning permission, unless the planning authority withdraws
permitted development rights on flood risk grounds.
5.7 SUMMARY
In 2005 the Council of Europe published an analysis of inter-ministerial management of
major hazards. The recommendations included the need for an interdisciplinary
approach to risk and the avoidance of a “specialist mentality”. The document advocated
more common terminology, the need for risk inventories and inter-ministerial and
government departmental management. These recommendations seem to apply without
exception to the UK’s critical infrastructure.
The regulatory regime in the UK is complex when considered across all sectors. The
complexity is heightened by the public-private sector mix. However, the Civil
Contingencies Act 2004 provides a common framework across the UK for civil
contingency planning. The issues raised by the Wales Audit Office regarding the need for
clarity on the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders for all aspects of flood risk
management are common to all nations within the UK.
The Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009 provides an improved framework for
co-ordinated action on flood risk. The enactment of the Floods and Water Management
Bill in England and Wales will provide an opportunity to simplify and rationalise how
flood risk is managed and should clarify responsibilities and actions for improvement,
particularly in respect of surface water flooding and groundwater flood risk. Also, in
Northern Ireland the changes in legislation signal a move to more complete and
sustainable flood risk management, with greater transparency on the actions and
commitments to improvements from appropriate organisations and individuals.
There is a clear focus within the economic regulation of essential service provision on
value for money for the customer. The focus of investment is on optimising the efficiency
of the service to the standards set by the regulator. This focus on economic efficiency
means that there is little spare capacity within modern infrastructure systems. One of the
obstacles for those considering measures to improve flood resilience within critical
infrastructure is the customer’s willingness to pay for improvements, including provision
of further redundancy, through the regulated charging mechanisms.
PPS25, TAN15, SPP7 and PPS15 provide frameworks for ensuring that new
infrastructure, which requires planning permission, is flood resilient. However, there may
be a need to review the extent to which permitted development rights undermines the
effectiveness of these spatial planning policies. The primary issue with increasing the
resilience of the UK’s infrastructure will relate to consideration of existing assets and not
construction of new ones, thereby limiting the influence that the planning system can have.

6 The principles of flood risk management
(FRM)
6.1 THE COMPONENTS OF FLOOD RISK: SOURCES, PATHWAYS

AND RECEPTORS
Flood risk is a product of the likelihood of a flood event occurring and the severity of the
consequences:
Flood risk = Likelihood of a flood occurring × Severity of consequences
The severity of the consequences of a flood will depend on how vulnerable a receptor is to
flooding. The components of flood risk can best be analysed using the source-pathway-
receptor model. “Sources” constitute flood hazards (anything with the potential to cause
harm through flooding). “Pathways” represent the mechanisms by which the flooding
hazard would cause harm. “Receptors” comprise the people, property, infrastructure and
ecosystems potentially affected should a flood occur. Assessing and managing flood risk
can involve consideration of all of the components listed in Figure 6.1.
Sources Pathways Receptors

Rainfall Overtopping and failure of flood People
River flows defences Domestic and commercial
Artificial drainage systems Breaching of natural or property
manmade coastal defences Emergency services
Extreme sea levels
Failure of flood defence installations
Wind-generated waves components, eg barriers and Infrastructure
Tidal storm surges gates
Agriculture
Tsunamis Inundation of floodplains
Ecosystems
Lakes/reservoirs Inadequate drainage
Canals
Groundwater
Mines/quarries
Figure 6.1 Flood sources, pathways and receptors
6.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Flood risk at a particular site should not be considered in isolation of an appreciation of
the processes occurring at a wider catchment or coastal sediment unit scale. An
appreciation of these wider processes can help to ensure that the FRM solutions are
strategic and do not increase flood risk elsewhere. For example, the effect of numerous
small interventions undertaken in isolation may have a cumulative effect on flood risk
elsewhere in a catchment or along a coastline. Strategic solutions, such as construction of
flood storage reservoirs, may be a more cost-effective and environmentally acceptable
means of reducing flood risk to several sites, rather than installing local protection
measures. The location of a site within a catchment can also be a crucial consideration in
assessing the likely effectiveness of temporary flood defence measures, for which timely
flood warnings and good access are crucial.
16 CIRIA C688
In England and Wales, the Environment Agency’s catchment flood management plans
(CFMPs) and the shoreline management plans (SMPs) prepared by the Environment
Agency and maritime local authorities are examples of studies designed to ensure that the
management of flood risk to existing properties is undertaken strategically. To ensure that
the planning of new development also takes adequate account of strategic flood risk
issues, regional planning bodies prepare regional flood risk appraisals (RFRAs) and local
planning authorities (LPAs) prepare strategic flood risk assessments (SFRAs). For areas
with critical drainage problems, unitary or county authorities will also now prepare
surface water management plans (SWMPs) that are designed to address flood risks from
all sources and especially from surface water runoff and from groundwater. Strategic
drainage partnerships are also being set up, for example in Hull, and a case study is
provided in Chapter 12 (Case study 12.2).
In Scotland, the Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009 requires flood risk
assessments, hazard and risk maps to be prepared for river basin districts by SEPA. Local
authorities will support SEPA by becoming responsible for delivering local flood risk
management plans, comprising flood risk assessments and hazard maps for flooding from
all sources, including the sea, rivers, surface waters, sewers and ground water. These plans
will involve Scottish Water to obtain information on the capacity of sewerage systems.
In Northern Ireland the new regulations will require production of preliminary flood risk
assessments that will consider flooding from the sea, rivers, sewers and surface water.
6.3 FLOOD FREQUENCY TERMINOLOGY

Flood risk is generally expressed in terms of annual probability, ie the probability that a
flood of a given magnitude will occur, or be exceeded, in any one year. This can be
expressed as a percentage (eg a one per cent annual probability) or chance (eg 1 in 100).
This is illustrated for a range of annual probabilities in Table 6.1. This definition has
largely replaced the traditional, and potentially misleading, expression of return period.
Table 6.1 Flood frequency terminology
Annual probability of occurring or being Annual chance of occurring or being

exceeded in any one year exceeded in any one year
2% 1 in 50
1.3% 1 in 75
1% 1 in 100
0.5% 1 in 200
0.1% 1 in 1000
A low probability flood may have a significant likelihood of occurring over an extended
period. For example, a one per cent (1 in 100) annual probability event has a 53 per cent
probability of occurring at least once within a 75 year period. So, if a structure or asset
has a 75 year design life, there is very good chance that it will be exposed to a one per
cent (1 in 100) annual probability event during its lifetime. This concept is illustrated in
Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2 Design exceedance probabilities
6.4 FLOOD FREQUENCY AND DESIGN FLOOD LEVEL ESTIMATION

Identifying flood frequency at a particular site and identifying what this means in terms of
depth, duration and velocity is not straightforward. As a guide to the likely scope of
specialist input a basic overview of these activities is described here:
Flood frequency: how often a flood of a given size is likely to occur, or be exceeded, is
best estimated using statistical analysis of long records of annual maxima measured data
of, for example, river flow, wave height or sea level. Where direct measurements are not
available for a particular site, techniques exist for transferring or “pooling” data from
nearby or similar locations. In the case of rivers and sewers, several techniques also exist
for estimating the runoff and peak flows generated by particular rainfall events based on
the characteristics of the areas (catchments) draining to them.
Hydraulic modelling: hydraulic modelling is regularly used to assess the flood levels and
flooding mechanisms resulting from river/sewer flows or tidal events of a given annual
probability. Physical models and/or computational fluid dynamics software packages can
be used to assess highly complex hydraulic problems. More commonly, flood levels and
mechanisms are investigated, and design flood levels derived, using commercially
available one- or two-dimensional hydraulic modelling packages.
Establishing reliable flood frequency and depth data for surface and groundwater
flooding is particularly challenging. This is because historic records, of a type amenable to
statistical analysis, or that can be used to calibrate models, are often unavailable.
6.5 THE MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY

Even with river and coastal flooding, the derivation of flood levels for design purposes can
be associated with high levels of uncertainty unless high-quality calibration data is
available. The sensitivity of designs to errors in flow and level estimation should be
considered and an appropriate margin to allow for uncertainty (freeboard) should always
be provided above an adopted design flood level. Professional consulting engineers and
scientists have a duty of care to explain uncertainties and the potential implications of
those uncertainties. They also need to consider the effects of floods that exceed the design
standard adopted, to ensure that the residual risks to people and property are
appropriately managed.
18 CIRIA C688
6.6 THE FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT HIERARCHY
Once the nature of the flood hazard is understood, there are numerous techniques that
can be used to manage the associated flood risk. The hierarchy in Table 6.2 provides an
indication of the effectiveness of different flood risk management measures.
Table 6.2 Flood risk management hierarchy
Flood risk
management Description Examples
measure
Flood risk assessment to identify the A strategic flood risk assessment of an

sources of flooding, the mechanisms of area earmarked for regeneration that
Assess the cause of flooding and the considers all sources of flood risk, their
consequences for the receptor in likelihood of occurrence and their
question. potential impact on receptors.
Critical infrastructure, such as power

Locate land-uses vulnerable to the impact
Avoid stations, should be located in areas
of flooding within areas at least risk.
where the risk of flooding is negligible.
In the regeneration of a riverside urban

Substitute land-uses incompatible with
area, existing housing within floodplain
Substitute flooding with less vulnerable or water
areas could be partially or wholly
compatible land-uses.
substituted with amenity open space.
Reduce the likelihood of a site flooding by Construction of floodwalls and

installing new infrastructure or by embankments to contain river or tidal
modifying the design of a development to waters.
Control
protect it from flooding. Adopt a Installing an attenuation basin to reduce
sustainable drainage strategy to control the rates at which runoff enters
runoff from the site. downstream drainage systems.
Re-assess residual flood risks (the risks

Educate affected parties on the nature
that remain after the control measures
of the residual risk. Provide a flood
Mitigate have been adopted) and adopt mitigation
warning service. Ensure emergency
measures to minimise the impact of
evacuation plans are in place.
these.
6.7 STANDARDS OF PROTECTION

An indication of the standards of protection that may be appropriate for different types of
asset is provided in Table 6.3. This is considered further in Section 10.8.
Table 6.3 Indicative standards of protection for land-use types
Indicative standard of protection

Land-use type
(annual probability)
Residential/commercial property <1% (1 in 100)

Emergency service installations <0.1% (1 in 1000)
Large raised reservoirs (above an urban area) <0.01% (1 in 10 000)
6.8 TAKING ACCOUNT OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The design for flood risk management measures to improve the resilience of existing
assets should take climate change into account over the anticipated residual lifetime of the
asset. There are two generic approaches to designing flood risk management measures to
take account of climate change:

1 Precautionary approach: this involves incorporating mitigation measures for potential
climate change now.
2 Managed-adaptive approach: this involves making provision for mitigation measures
to be undertaken at a future date when there will also be greater certainty regarding
the likely affects of climate change on parameters, such as river flow and rainfall.
For new-build river bridges or culverts the precautionary approach is recommended

because of the potential for further costs on future adaptations. However, where a system
to reduce flood risk can be modified in the future, the managed-adaptive approach is a
more sustainable solution.
In the UK precautionary allowances for net sea-level rise are provided by the Government
based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPPC’s) third assessment
report, the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP, 2009) and research into regional
variations in vertical land movement. “Indicative sensitivity ranges” are provided for
parameters, such as off-shore wind speed, wave height, river flow and rainfall intensity.
This guidance will be updated shortly to take into account further outputs from the
UKCIP.
6.9 FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT MEASURES

The options in Table 6.4 can be taken to avoid, substitute, control or mitigate flood risk
associated with sources, pathways and receptors:
Table 6.4 Flood risk management measures (non-structural measures are shown in bold)
Flood risk management measures
SOURCE CONTROL PATHWAY MODIFICATIONS RECEPTOR RESILIENCE

Measures that reduce the Measures that modify or Measures that reduce the
likelihood of high block the pathways taken by vulnerability of receptors to
flows/water levels occurring floodwater to a site the impacts of a flood.
land-use policies ground raising business continuity

management
sustainable drainage construction of floodwalls
and embankments flood risk identification and
detention basins mapping
construction of diversion
filter drains/strips channels or tunnels planning policies and
flow control systems development control
removal or modification of
infiltration basins/ existing structures risk transfer (eg flood
trenches insurance)
demountable flood
permeable paving defences flood forecasting and
warning
retention ponds temporary flood defences
improved emergency
soakaways/swales designing drainage response procedures
networks for exceedance, eg
wetlands overland flow routing improved preparedness
greenroofs/walls managed realignment to desktop incident
rainwater harvesting “make space for water” management exercise
attenuation reservoirs flood resistance measures feedback from lessons

(dry-proofing). identified
river regulation
flood resilience measures
river restoration and (wet-proofing).
floodplain rehabilitation
oversized pipes/attenuation
tanks within the drainage
network.
20 CIRIA C688
Details of measures appropriate to improving the flood resilience and resistance of critical
infrastructure assets are provided in Chapter 10.
6.10 THE IMPORTANCE OF WHOLE-LIFE ASSET MANAGEMENT

PRINCIPLES
The adoption of whole-life asset management principles is vital in the planning, appraisal,
use, operation and maintenance of flood risk management measures of all kinds.
Sustained investment is required to ensure that measures remain effective over their
lifetime and that sufficient resources are available for routine maintenance operations.
The adoption of some measures will impose more operation and maintenance burden
than others. Two examples are:
Example 6.1 Use of demountable defences in place of fixed defences
The capital cost of demountable defences can be less than that of fixed defences. However, it is
important that such measures are adopted in conjunction with a fully developed set of operational
procedures. The frequency that they will need to be brought into operation, and the costs, should be
carefully considered by scheme appraisers and provision should be made for routine practice drills. The
probability of the measures not being successfully deployed during a flood should be minimised, but the
residual risk of such a failure to deploy should be factored into the whole-life cost-benefit analysis,
together with the full cost of maintaining such a system.
Example 6.2 Use of flood defences in place of spatial planning measures
Avoiding the flood hazard is a very effective means of reducing liabilities for future generations. Any
decision to place an asset within an area that is prone to flooding, but to protect it with flood risk
management measures, should be made only on the basis of a full understanding of the whole-life
operation and maintenance burden associated with the measures adopted. The flood damages
associated with design exceedance events should also be factored into the whole-life cost-benefit
analysis.
Further guidance on whole-life asset management is provided in CIRIA C677 (Hooper et

al, 2009).
6.11 OFF-SITE EFFECTS

Sustainable development should seek overall reductions in flood risk as well as improving
the environment. An assessment should always be made of the potential off-site impacts of
FRM measures. For example, ground-raising operations may affect the capacity of a river/
floodplain system, or reduce the areas available to temporarily store floodwater during a
flood event. Such losses of conveyance and flood storage may result in the need for
measures to mitigate, or compensate for, off-site issues. Similarly, improving drainage to
reduce flood risk at one location can have negative consequences downstream unless
specific measures are adopted, such as the use of sustainable drainage systems.

6.12 SUMMARY
The principles discussed are incorporated into existing guidance on flood risk
management for new development. Specifically, the practice guide to PPS25 covers:
the assessment of flood risks of all kinds associated with new developments
techniques for avoiding flood hazards
the design of control measures, where new developments are unavoidably exposed to
flood hazards
the mitigation of off-site impact
the assessment and management of residual risks.
RIBA (2009) provides a concise and well illustrated overview of the process of designing
new developments that are resilient to the impact of flooding, which embraces the
principles discussed in this chapter. These principles apply equally to existing assets.
However, making retrospective changes to existing assets to improve flood resilience is
more challenging than designing them to be flood resilient in the first place. Practical use
of such measures is further confounded by a range of wider issues discussed in the next
chapter.
22 CIRIA C688
7 Issues in FRM for resilient infrastructure
7.1 QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

The questionnaire survey requested participants to comment on what they see as the main
issues and constraints related to improving the flood resilience of critical infrastructure.
The results are summarised by sector in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Summary of issues identified in questionnaire survey
Sector Issues identified
The low degree of collaboration between Civil Contingencies Act 2004

Category 1 and 2 responders was raised as an important issue. There is a
Regional government lack of understanding of the role of the parties involved and an unwillingness
to share vital information. Further information on the CCA is provided in
Chapter 4.
No single organisation has been given the responsibility of co-ordinating the

parties.
Co-ordination at present, although beneficial, has required significant
resource allocation. It has been complex to achieve and has required a high
degree of management. This led to some companies being unable to afford to
co-operate/collaborate.
A lack of standardisation and formatting was found to make collation of basic
Transport data (eg location, duration, cause or severity of surface water flooding events)
difficult.
Lack of shared understanding and valuation of community risk and the need
to avoid risk-shifting between organisations.
The different rules, regulations and standards company work under hinder co-
operation and co-ordination.
Commercial reasons not to co-operate.
The lack of sharing of information for security, commercial and financial

Power reasons. Reluctance to share resources during floods.
The lack of a formalised and established forum for such issues.
Further constraints on sharing data and the importance of all sectors having
visibility of interdependencies.
Water utility providers Time constraints will slow the process with funding being a problem.
Legislation/guidance would need to be enforced and embedded across all
sectors by regulators/government/organisations.
Funding scarcity, legal and security issues.

Environmental
regulators Building trust among organisations and the use of information- sharing
protocols where appropriate.
The lack of a forum probably at a reasonably local level to discuss strategy

Communication
being employed by different sectors.
Differences in legislation, policies, aims and different sectors.

Engineers/consultants Lack of sharing due to competitive concerns and intellectual property rights.
Lack of real knowledge and tools.

7.2 WORKSHOP OUTPUTS
There were several important learning points from the workshop as follows:
it was agreed that physical resilience, such as the use of temporary or demountable
barriers, should be considered as a separate aspect to organisational resilience, which
would be achieved through business continuity and contingency planning.
Organisational resilience also includes the resilience of staff and operatives, which is
vital for the effective operation of critical infrastructure assets
individual sectors are at different stages of flood risk strategy development for their
critical infrastructure assets. Many sectors have already identified their sites most at
risk from flooding and are now involved in the process of selecting appropriate
measures to improve resilience and resistance
current co-ordination between sectors in the development of strategies and
approaches to improve flood resilience and resistance is low. Where co-ordination has
occurred this has been via local and regional resilience forums, as well as in the
development of strategic flood risk assessments (SFRA), catchment flood management
plans (CFMP) and surface water management plans (SWMP)
fragmented governance is a significant barrier to collaboration between sectors. There
is a need for co-ordination and leadership, potentially from the newly-formed NHT
within the Cabinet Office, align the policies and approaches of different sector
regulators (Ofwat, Ofgem, Ofcom, ORR)
there is a shortage of resources (funding, skills, people), as well as a shortage of
political and public will, inhibiting many infrastructure asset owners from adopting
good practice. Investment decisions have been and are based largely upon commercial
aims and consumer pressure. Further information will be provided in Chapter 11
the Floods and Water Management Bill 2009–2010 should contain provisions for
managing knowledge and information sharing, focused particularly on overcoming
barriers to information and knowledge sharing that arises through commercial and
national security sensitivities.
A full copy of the workshop outputs is provided in Supporting document 2.
7.3 WIDER PERSPECTIVES
7.3.1 Council for Science and Technology
In its recent report, the Council for Science and Technology (CST) identified that the
resilience of the nation’s infrastructure is weakening due to (CST, 2009):
its ageing infrastructure components

greater complexity and interconnectivity between the different infrastructure sectors
the fact that it is nearing maximum capacity because of increased social and economic
pressures.
7.3.2 The ICE report: State of the nation
The recent Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) report concluded that “very little is
currently being done to ensure service continuity and security of supply and no agency
has overall responsibility for defence against system failure” (ICE, 2009). Also, the UK’s
regulatory systems are not driving delivery of sufficient new or upgraded critical
24 CIRIA C688
infrastructure – not all infrastructure is governed by a regulator, and maintenance
funding is rarely ring-fenced. The planning application process is highly protracted, and
there are few incentives in place to support increased private investment in reserve
network capacity.
The report continues to state that: “impacts of climate change – flooding, rising
temperatures, wind, drought, rising sea level and heat waves – are a serious threat to
critical infrastructure, with flooding identified as the greatest threat to the UK”. The
report also outlines that system failure can be caused by a lack of proper day-to-day
maintenance, or failure to recognise long-term delivery issues in the past.
The ICE’s recommendations are:
establishing a new single point of authority for infrastructure resilience to co-ordinate

the work of the agencies responsible for defending critical infrastructure against all
threats
that the newly created Natural Hazards Team is given the power to provide strong
leadership to asset owners and ensure legislation is properly enforced
that government revises the remit for sector regulators, such as Ofgem and Ofwat, to
address asset resilience as well as consumer interests and empower them to ensure
asset owners build in reserve capacity to critical infrastructure so they are prepared for
any emergency scenario
that government ensures that the new Planning Act and the Infrastructure Planning
Commission (IPC) effectively reform the planning system for major infrastructure
(ICE, 2009).
7.3.3 Expecting the unexpected
In June 2008, a group of over 30 industry-leading experts convened at St George’s

House, Windsor Castle, to debate the topic of ”expecting the unexpected”. The purpose
of the workshop was to explore ideas about infrastructure resilience – or lack of it,
examining the inter-dependence of infrastructure assets, the need for integrated
management of infrastructure assets, and how to develop communities better able to
survive both natural and manmade disasters. The result from the workshop was a set of
principles for overcoming the barriers to improving resilience as follows:
1 Planning not plans

Planning for the consequence, rather than the cause, is more important. This leads to
adaptation, not just mitigation, and a reduction in the likelihood of the unexpected
occurring.
2 Remove the silos
Failures, both physical and organisational, mostly occur at the interfaces and are due
to lack of integrated thinking.
3 “Did you hear the one about”?
The need to communicate and imagine lives in a carbon-reduced world and how they
react faced by threats to their world is best achieved by telling stories, not setting and
enforcing rules and regulations.
4 Paradigm shift
There is a critical need for a major paradigm shift towards a new economy of paying
the true cost of peoples’ actions, of taking ownership of risks and of being accountable.

5 Follow the leader
A paradigm shift will require individual and multiple-leadership in communities,
regions and nations.
6 Changing behaviours
The effect of human behaviour, both individually and in communities, needs more
research and recognition, especially in relation to its preparation for, and reaction to,
threats on future prosperity.
These are highly relevant to this publication.
7.4 JOINT POLICY STATEMENT ON URBAN FLOOD RISK

Against a background of creating a more collaborative approach to the management of
urban flood risk, the need for sustainable solutions and the difficulties posed by climate
change a number of professional institutions have created a joint policy statement to
inform and guide their members and the wider industry. Those institutions involved are
the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE), Chartered Institution of Water and
Environmental Management (CIWEM), Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), Royal
Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), the
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Landscape Institute (LI). The six core
policies of the approach are:
1 The role and responsibility of each stakeholder organisation involved with urban flood
risk should be clear and unequivocal, and there should be a clear hierarchy and line of
responsibility between these organisations.
2 Responsible bodies should provide measures to manage flood risk within a national
framework of performance standards. Drains, sewers and watercourses should be
recognised as having a finite capacity and once this capacity is exceeded flooding will
occur.
3 For consistency and comparability common methodologies and terminologies for the
assessment of flood risk in urban areas should be shared by all professionals.
4 The results of urban flood risk assessment should be available in a form that enables
members of the public to understand the risk they personally face.
5 Flood risk management should tackle all forms of flooding in an integrated way and
should fully exploit the amenity potential of water, waterways and wetlands in the
urban environment.
6 New development should not increase the risk of flooding either locally or elsewhere.
There should be a presumption against development within areas of significant flood
risk.
26 CIRIA C688
7.5 SUMMARY
The questionnaire and the workshop outputs support the findings of the CST and ICE
reports. The main issues relate to:
the growing risk of flooding associated with ageing infrastructure and increased flood
frequency resulting from climate change
a high degree of interdependence between different infrastructure systems, which is
not well understood
a high degree of fragmentation associated with:
infrastructure ownership
responsibilities for managing flood risk
regulatory guidance on how to manage flood risk
poor co-ordination between sectors
obstacles to the effective sharing of knowledge and data
a shortage of resources (funding, people and skills).
The ICE report (ICE, 2009), the outputs from the Windsor Castle event and the joint
policy statement on urban flood risk indicate that there is already some consensus within
the industry regarding what is required for flood risk to be managed more effectively. But
unfortunately, there is relatively little evidence that the silo mentality and commercial
confidentiality barriers are likely to be overcome.

8 Historic incidents and lessons identified
8.1 OVERVIEW
Every river, stream and artificial drainage system is sensitive to different types of storm
event. Localised summer storms can cause extreme flooding on sewers and minor
watercourses without causing problems on main river systems. Similarly, long-duration,
relatively low-intensity storms can cause major floods on large rivers, while causing few
problems for urban drainage systems. It should be no surprise that the flooding type that
attracts national media attention occurs on a reasonably regular basis.
In recent years, floods at Easter 1998, autumn 2000, autumn/winter 2005, summer 2007
and winter 2009 have caused widespread disruption to critical infrastructure systems. The
2007 floods however caused disruption on a more significant scale than the other events.
The direct impact on the nation’s infrastructure were as follows:
drinking water was cut-off from 138 194 people for 17 days due to flooding of Mythe
WTW in Gloucestershire (Ofwat, 2008a)
40 000 people were without electricity for 24 hours in Gloucestershire due to
disruption of electricity transmission and distribution assets
9000 customers were on rota disconnection for several days in South Yorkshire and
Humberside
there were 148 flooding or bank-slip incidents on the rail network, causing widespread
delays and temporary line closures
closures also affected the motorway network (M1, M4, M5, M18, M25, M40, M50, and
M54) and many local and trunk roads were also disrupted with repair costs estimated
at £40m–£60m (Pitt, 2008)
The following are two of the more notable near misses:
1 Ulley Dam, an amenity reservoir owned by Rotherham Metropolitan Borough

Council, suffered severe damage, the consequent breach risk resulting in the need to
evacuate significant areas of Rotherham and close the M1. A breach was also perceived
to place a major electricity sub-station and Sheffield’s gas supply at risk.
2 Walham sub-station (which supplies 450 000 people in Gloucestershire) nearly
flooded. However, a plan was developed to sustain electricity supplies from other
sources. Temporary defences were also deployed to protect the station against any
later flood peaks.
This chapter presents selected post-flooding incident reports that have been supplied by
members of the project steering group and other collaborators. These case studies reflect
the impact of specific floods on a particular organisation and the lessons that organisations
identified following their post-incident reporting procedures. The Mythe WTW is
included later in Section 10.10.
28 CIRIA C688
8.2 UNITED UTILITIES AND THE CARLISLE AND CUMBRIA 2005
FLOODS
Evidence submitted by: Emma Culleton, United Utilities
This included the combined treatment and network incident report (United Utilities,
2005a) and the operations and maintenance department incident report (United Utilities,
2005b).
8.2.1 What happened?
United Utilities (UU) provide water supply and wastewater treatment services to the
North West Region as well as operating the electricity distribution network. Heavy rain
between 6 to 8 January 2005 resulted in the highest ever recorded flows in the Rivers
Eden, Caldew, Petteril and Kent (records to 2005). The flooding in Carlisle was the
highest recorded since at least 1771. It was described by the Meteorological Office as a 0.5
per cent (1 in 200) annual probability event and resulted in several rivers overtopping
their banks.
There was major flooding of UU’s wastewater infrastructure across Cumbria and North
Lancashire, with 117 sites affected and the network in Carlisle flooded. By the early hours
of 9 January, UU’s water supply operations were affected and 18 WTW out of a total of
137 were disrupted.
The electricity sub-station at Willowholme was under 1.5 m of water on 8 January, which
cut off power to 60 000 properties. The M6 was closed for some hours and many roads
were closed due to fallen trees. This affected diesel fuel delivery, which was partly needed
to run power generators. Train services suffered significant disruption. For 24 hrs there
was very poor network coverage for mobile phones. All these interdependencies hindered
the operational response.
8.2.2 Lessons identified
Following the flooding UU carried out an analysis of the resilience of their major facilities.
The objectives of the study were to assess the current levels of flood protection available at
each of the company’s water treatment and sewage treatment facilities (including
pumping stations and combined sewer overflows) and to determine the most appropriate
measures to mitigate flood risk at these sites.
Further recommendations were identified within UU’s post incident report, including the
following:
review company mobile generators to ensure service level and reliability

review provision of procurement work orders for out-of-hours incident management
using external sources
review water operational sites against asset standard to ascertain any deficiencies in
fuel storage levels
better sharing of information on affected areas required with other agencies.

8.3 NATIONAL GRID AND THE SUMMER 2007 FLOODS
Evidence submitted by: Alex Carter and Doug Dodds, National Grid
Several substations (SS) and power stations in South Yorkshire were affected by flooding
in June 2007. Brinsworth SS was nearly flooded (see Section 8.4 on the Ulley dam).
Neepsend sub station
National Grid had no advance warning of the flash flooding at Neepsend substation. Field
staff became aware of the situation when they returned to site at lunchtime on 25 June
and raised the issue with their local management at 12.30 pm. Water levels were rising
rapidly and the site was evacuated for safety reasons at about 1.15 pm. Due to the risk of
loss of supply caused by the flooding, National Grid Control staff and CE Electric
Distribution Network Operator Control co-ordinated efforts to transfer as much demand
as possible away from the Neepsend substation. During the period when demand was
being transferred, at 3.23 pm, the low voltage circuit-breakers on the two transformer
circuits at Neepsend substation opened without instruction, most probably due to the
effects of flood water on control or protection equipment. This disconnected 41 Megavolt
amperes (MVA) of demand (apparent power), amounting to about 36 000 CE Electric
domestic customers and loss of one of the three main in-feeds to the Sheffield area from
the main interconnected transmission system. Following further reports from site staff that
the floodwaters inside Neepsend substation had reached a depth of 1.2–1.5 m, the high-
voltage circuits into the substation were switched off and the full substation made dead for
safety reasons. This operation started at about 6.00 pm on Monday. By 8.00 am on 26
June Neepsend substation was again accessible and field staff attended site to assess the
damage and develop a recovery strategy.
Thorpe Marsh sub station
In parallel, flood risk at Thorpe Marsh was monitored through communication with field
staff and involving the Environment Agency. At this time the best advice of the Agency was
that Thorpe Marsh was secure. However, water levels at Thorpe Marsh continued to rise
and by the evening of 26 June concern rose as levels were approaching the level of the
control and protection systems that, if inundated, could cause uncontrolled equipment
operations at the site, as had occurred at Neepsend. Sandbags were ordered to protect the
most critical parts of the site and the Army was contacted, via Gold command, to provide
boats to assist with movement around the site.
By early morning on 27 June, flood waters occupying part of the Thorpe Marsh
substation were affecting the site’s auxiliary systems. Starting at 7.30 am the site was
made dead (the high-voltage substation was de-energised) in a controlled manner. The
de-energising of the substation did not result in loss of supplies to any customers. Military,
fire brigade and site staff were set to work putting flood defences in place around critical
plant and equipment.
During the day, the essential site auxiliary and protection and control systems at Thorpe
Marsh were protected from flooding by the actions of field staff and the emergency
services and the risk of failure was considered reduced. Thorpe Marsh was restored to
service by 3.00 pm.
30 CIRIA C688
Walham sub station
Field staff at Walham substation worked over the weekend of 21–22 July to carry out
planned repair work. National Grid control staff were aware of the risk posed by rising
river levels and were monitoring water levels at various locations, including Walham,
through telephone contact with field staff. There is a history of flooding around Walham
substation and the field staff reported water levels as high, but not abnormal for the site.
On 22 July water levels started to gain height. Instructions were given to staff on site to
place sandbags around the critical circuit control cubicles and entry points to the
protection (relay) rooms at about 2.00 pm. The Fire Brigade was also in attendance to
provide pumping kits.
Gold Command was established by the authorities in Gloucester at about 3.45 pm, and
the first meeting was held at 4.10 pm with National Grid in attendance from 5.15 pm.
Following the meeting the Environment Agency provided temporary emergency flood
defence systems for use at Walham that arrived on site by 9.00 pm. The military attended
Walham to assist in the installation of this system. This system was later replaced with
flood bastions, as shown in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1 Temporary defences used at Walham substation
These geodesign barriers provided by the Environment Agency withstood the peak flood
level, which occurred at around 5.30 am on 23 July.

A decision was made at the Gold Command meeting on the morning of 24 July to provide
a more robust flood defence system at Walham (Hesco Bastion) as further flooding was
predicted. This structure, shown here, was completed at 9.15 pm on 28 July and remains
in place until a joint permanent security and flood fence is installed.
During the evening of 21 July, National Grid control staff had developed a strategy that
could be adopted in case the Walham protection relay room became affected by rising
water levels and the protection systems were rendered inoperable. This strategy was
achieved by configuring Walham substation to make the through route to South Wales
independent, allowing power to continue to be routed through Walham substation even
in the event of Walham flooding. This contributed to the security of the South Wales
network. Switching operations required to adopt the strategy were completed by 9.00 pm
and the network at Walham was run in this configuration throughout the event. No
further flooding was experienced after the floodwater subsided on 24 July.
Cascading effects
These events had cascading effects in the national grid network. At one point, the demand
in the Sheffield area was only supplied via Brinsworth SS. Figure 8.2 summarises the
events.
Figure 8.2 Flood impact on the electricity grid in South Yorkshire during June 2007
Because of these events (and flooding events that occurred in 2000 and 2005), network
owners have carried out several individual reviews of flooding resilience and this has
resulted in better contingency planning and, in some areas, investment in improved flood
defences. The four substations affected by flooding in South Yorkshire have been protected
by recently installed defences. These measures are discussed further in Chapter 10.
32 CIRIA C688
8.4 ULLEY RESERVOIR AND THE SUMMER 2007 FLOODS
Evidence submitted by: Mark Maloney (University of Leeds), Annette Senior and Doug Dodds
(National Grid)
Ulley reservoir is an earth embankment reservoir owned by Rotherham Metropolitan

Borough Council and used as a recreational amenity. Following heavy rainfall and high
flood outflows, one of the spillways at the reservoir failed. Masonry walls to the lower
spillway were partially destroyed allowing erosion of the embankment toe, leading to
stability concerns. The reservoir contains 580 million litres of water.
A rapid response by the council, their professional advisers, the emergency services and a
local civil engineering contractor meant that the upstream end of the spillway was
blocked-off, water levels were lowered and 2500 tonnes of coarse limestone were inserted
into the scour hole within a relatively short period of time. However, the threat of a dam
breach meant that a range of precautionary steps had to be taken to reduce the damage
that could have occurred if the embankment had failed. This included the evacuation of
about 1000 people in the direct path of inundation. Roads were closed, most notably the
M1 between junctions 32 and 36. National Grid reduced the pressure in a gas pipeline,
which crosses the valley downstream of the dam. A railway line also runs due west of the
dam and is the main line connection from Sheffield to Rotherham. Disruption of this
service could have resulted in commuters being stranded and not being able to get to
work, this is particularly important considering the location of Sheffield City Airport (a
base of many rescue aircraft) and Rotherham District General Hospital.
One major perceived consequence of the Ulley dam collapse would have been the loss of
power. Brinsworth sub station located North West of Ulley supplies electricity to large
areas of Sheffield and Rotherham. At 1.15 am on 26 June, Police sought representation
from National Grid at Gold Command. National Grid staff were alerted to the risk to
Brinsworth substation in the event of a breach of the nearby Ulley dam. Field staff were
evacuated from the substation and the local area but the substation remained live and
operational. The effect of dam breach on the substation was considered and options for
making the substation dead were prepared. An overhead line tower close to the M1 and
in the direct path of the dam-water in the event of breach was identified as at risk, both to
the system and to the M1 (which had been closed). By the evening of 27 June, water levels
in the Ulley dam had dropped significantly, the risk of flooding at Brinsworth substation
had reduced and the risks to the overhead line (OHL) tower near to the M1 were re-
assessed.
The primary recommendation within a report later prepared under Section 10 of the
Reservoir Act 1975, was that a spillway should be constructed to current design standards
to accommodate the probable maximum flood. Construction of a new spillway is now
under way (Figure 8.3).
This incident however has influenced the Environment Agency’s forthcoming guidance to
reservoir owners on the preparation of reservoir flood plans, something covered by the
Floods and Water Management Bill. It has been agreed by Defra, the Security Services
and Water UK that undertakers can now release information on the areas at potential risk
due to dam failure to Category 1 responders.

a
Figure 8.3 Emergency stabilisation work undertaken at Ulley Dam (a) and a visualisation
of the proposed new spillway designed by Arup for Rotherham MBC (b)
8.5 NETWORK RAIL AND THE SUMMER 2007 FLOODS
Evidence submitted by: John Dora, Network Rail (submitted in 2007)
8.5.1 Background
Network Rail delivers a reliable and safe rail network for train operating companies
(TOCs) and ultimately, passenger and freight customers. Safety is the primary concern and
£14m a day is spent on maintaining, improving and upgrading every aspect of the railway
infrastructure. Network Rail owns some 40 000 bridges and 23 000 culverts on 16 000
route-kilometres of railway.
Train operations can be disrupted when communication, signalling, control and power
distribution systems come in contact with water, and when civil engineering assets are
damaged by water. Lines are closed where safety may become compromised. Modern
rolling stock is susceptible to damage when passing through water, because of the
dependence on electronics, use of small diameter wheels, under-slung air conditioning
and power units, and roller bearings.
34 CIRIA C688
In June and July 2007, 265 individual Network Rail sites were recorded as being affected
by flooding, extreme rainfall and high water tables. Of these sites, 107 were where
performance was affected, meaning that no damage was experienced, only delays and
cancellations. At the remaining 158 sites, only 42 sites were subject to significant damage
suggesting that the 16 000 route kilometres of railway in Great Britain are remarkably
robust when subjected to extreme rainfall. Examples of significant asset failures are shown
in Figure 8.4.
Figure 8.4 Flooding of rail tracks at Adlestrop (River Evenlode), 21 July 2007
(courtesy Network Rail)
The costs associated with the June and July floods amounted to £10.5m of material
damage and £25.6m of business interruption. These costs do not reflect the economic
costs to the country as a whole. The sources of flooding were estimated to be as shown in
Figure 8.5.

Figure 8.5 Analysis of significant asset failures of Network Rail caused during the summer 2007 floods
At a tactical level, as well as undertaking immediate repairs, Network Rail engineers have
worked to understand why the railway was affected, what measures the company can take
itself to improve asset resilience and where co-operation with other organisations is
necessary. In-house solutions, such as making drainage systems more robust and
increasing the number of mobile pumps, are being examined.
London North Western Territory engineers have met with Environment Agency staff to
understand the Agency’s River Tame flood risk management strategy because five
Network Rail sites were affected within the Tame catchment. Network Rail is examining
opportunities for joint working and information sharing with the Agency that, in terms of
efficiencies and influence over capital works, should eventually deliver benefits to railway
infrastructure. One of the potential barriers to success is the system of prioritisation used
by the Environment Agency, which is based on the number of houses protected, and not
infrastructure. Nevertheless in terms of progressing initiatives in this river corridor,
working closely with the Agency and developing joint capital schemes is favoured.
In future, Network Rail is working to improve the resilience of its infrastructure to

flooding and water action at local tactical, rail industry and national strategic levels. As
well as using self-funded solutions, the organisation is in dialogue on strategic flood risk
management at specific sites with the Environment Agency. Network Rail provided the
Pitt Review team with comments on a range of issues including: the use of railway
embankments as flood defences, critical infrastructure and cross-sector common
standards, achieving a sustainable balance in developing technical solutions and on local
and regional resilience forums. These issues are described in more detail in Chapter 10.
Particular needs for the future, to aid contingency and engineering planning to improve
rail performance and to reduce the risk of asset failures, include:
guidance for the Environment Agency, when developing flood risk investment
proposals, on appraising the risk (in economic terms) to transport infrastructure, and
on balancing environmental with social and economic needs
the development of common standards across sectors for critical infrastructure
Network Rail access to the Environment Agency surface water flood risk susceptibility
maps
improved forecasting tools built around the risk maps and real-time and short-term
forecasts
methods to prove that bridge foundations are sound while river flows prevent divers
from undertaking inspections
further clarification and strengthening of the role of the regional resilience forums
transport sector expertise on the Climate Change Committee
participation in various studies and reports that will follow the Pitt Review.
36 CIRIA C688
Network Rail believes that more emphasis needs to be placed on routine maintenance.
8.6 HULL CITY COUNCIL AND THE SUMMER 2007 FLOODS
Evidence submitted by: David Gibson, Hull City Council
During the summer of 2007, much of the Yorkshire region and other areas of the country
were hit by severe flooding. Hull was one of the cities worst affected with an estimated
8649 properties and other infrastructure damaged.
The city of Hull is 95 per cent at or below sea level and is vulnerable to all forms of
flooding, but especially tidal flooding. The city has significant and effective flood defences.
However, these are designed to protect the city from flooding from the River Hull or
from the Humber Estuary, not from pluvial flooding. On 25 June, the city began to
experience prolonged and heavy rainfall. This followed earlier heavy rain on 15 June that
had already resulted in elevated groundwater levels. Surface water flooding started at
about 9.00 am and consisted of surface runoff with volumes of water exceeding the
capacity of the drainage system, leading to the drains rapidly becoming overwhelmed.
Across several areas of the city, 240 streets were flooded, meaning that potentially 15 961
homes could have been affected. A major incident was declared at 9.30 am on 25 June
and the Council immediately initiated emergency plan arrangements, establishing its own
incident room and sending a liaison officer to the multi-agency Silver Command, which
had been established by the emergency services. City centre rest centres were quickly set
up and many people were evacuated from their homes. Schools and roads were closed
and the Council alone pumped away 65 million litres of excess surface water. The incident
room remained staffed 24 hours a day for the next seven days.
Figure 8.6 Flooding in Hull, June 2007
In total 8649 homes in Hull were flood damaged, 91 of the city’s 99 schools were affected
along with 1300 businesses. House-to-house surveys were carried out by Council staff

(totalling 27 000+ visits in all including repeat visits). Questionnaires were completed with
householders to assess the level of support needed, a database was established and cases
were graded gold, silver, bronze or not affected. Cases with a gold priority were those in
greatest need and each family with gold priority was assigned a case worker to support
them through the recovery. Homes were cleaned and dried while some families stayed in
temporary accommodation – over 21 000 gullies were cleared. The Hull Flood Fund was
established, a mobile advice service was set up and hardship relief funds were raised and
allocated. Despite the devastation, vital pieces of infrastructure did not fail – drinking water
was kept flowing, telephones and other utilities worked throughout. Hull swiftly moved to
the reconstruction phase, with pupils finally returning to all schools by February 2008.
As Hull recovered on the ground the Council established an independent review body
and undertook a “lessons identified” exercise. More widely the Council played a vital role
in the debrief processes conducted by the Humber LRF and the Government Office for
Yorkshire and the Humber and worked very closely with the Pitt Review team. The
internal review revealed that staff, many of whom had experienced flooding,
demonstrated commitment, perseverance and creativity in finding solutions to problems
with little accessible training. People worked together well across traditional service
boundaries and outside of their normal roles.
Some scope for improvement was identified and the Council wanted to improve its
emergency planning arrangements to increase its effectiveness in responding to incidents.
The internal review recommended that a more robust system was needed to respond to
and escalate emergency warnings. For example, although Meteorological Office warnings
are frequent and not always relevant to the city, the process for escalating warnings was
unclear. This was due to the frequency of severe weather warnings. There was no
suggestion that Hull was about to be flooded. The review identified that the warning on
24 June was not escalated quickly enough. The review also showed that more clarity was
needed for incident management and a stock of materials, such as sandbags, was required
for easy and early distribution.
The review of the LRF focused on areas where multi-agency working could be
strengthened in any future major incident. The regional process considered issues that
have wider application and may require discussions at a national level.
Hull City Council seized the opportunity to integrate its large-scale regeneration
programmes, such as Building schools for the future (TeacherNet, 2009), and the housing
market renewal pathfinder into its plans to improve the city’s infrastructure, defend
against future flooding and continue improving the life of residents.
8.7 DISRUPTION OF THE M1 AND M5 IN SUMMER 2007
Evidence submitted by: Michael Whitehead, Highways Agency
In June 2007 heavy rainfall in the Sheffield area caused the dam at Ulley reservoir to
show signs of failure. As a precaution the police closed a length of M1 that would flood if
the dam were to fail. In the event, engineers were able to prevent failure of the dam, but
the incident showed that the M1 is at risk of flooding from this source.
In July 2007 heavy rainfall in Gloucestershire led to flooding of the M5, with an estimated
38 CIRIA C688
10 000 motorists stranded overnight. The flooding was caused mainly by surface water
flows running off nearby land and collecting in such quantity on the motorway that the
drainage system was overwhelmed.
These incidents showed that flooding from sources, such as surface water and
infrastructure failure, can be as much of a threat to roads as flooding from rivers or high
tides. As recommended in the Pitt Review the incidents showed that the HA needed to
identify the roads that were especially vulnerable to flooding from all possible sources, to
consider how flood warnings could be improved and how to support road users who
become stranded.
8.8 SUMMARY
8.8.1 Flood sources and mechanisms
Effective management of flooding problems requires a good understanding of the sources

and mechanisms responsible. While flooding from rivers and the sea is a major cause of
infrastructure disruption, surface water, groundwater and the threat of infrastructure
failure are also important contributory factors. Localised surface water drainage problems
are a major issue for the transport sector in particular. Network Rail disruptions are more
often caused by local drainage problems than by major fluvial flood events. The flooding
in Hull was caused by complex mechanisms related to groundwater and urban drainage,
rather than the more obvious risks of river and coastal flooding that threaten the city. In
the case of Ulley Dam, infrastructure failure would have been the source of flooding had
this structure actually failed. The Ulley Dam case study (see Section 8.4) also shows how
the threat of flooding can cause as much disruption as an actual flood.
8.8.2 Escalation of flood warnings
It is important that flood warnings are contextualised for discrete locations. In Hull,
severe weather warnings are received fairly regularly from the Meteorological Office, but
because the flood mechanisms are complex, the appropriate response is not always clear.
Similarly, if the consequences of a particular event are not clear, as in the case of the Ulley
Dam incident, the approach to evacuation of affected parties has to proceed on a
precautionary basis, which may cause more disruption than if a detailed flood plan had
already been in place for the reservoir.
8.8.3 Multi-agency emergency preparedness and incident management
The case studies illustrate how the contingency planning process worked reasonably well.
It was most stretched where the flood mechanisms and consequences were poorly
understood, as at Ulley. Category 1 responders under the CCA are reliant on the
knowledge of Category 2 responders when it comes to adopting appropriate actions on
the ground.
8.8.4 Interdependencies
Nearly all of the case studies illustrate the high level of interdependence between different
asset systems. Utilities were forced, often successfully, to work together with Gold
Command to buffer communities from the worst effects of the disruption. The highway
system provides a robust alternative to the rail network for car users and many
commercial operations. However, when both systems are inoperable this causes major

disruption. The provision of generators at critical facilities may buffer these from the
effects of power outage, but if roads are impassable, such generators will be vulnerable if
fuel supplies cannot be replenished.
8.8.5 Built-in resilience
The effects of the events described could have been worse. Property flooding caused
months of misery and disruption to householders and businesses. However, in most cases
essential services lost because of flooding were restored within days. The National Grid’s
experience during the 2007 floods illustrated how a network can be managed to minimise
interruptions to supply, even when vital assets were temporarily out of action. Similarly,
the provision of independent power systems at UU’s main water treatment facilities is a
good example of how existing business continuity processes, within organisations
previously affected by flooding, are managing these issues.
The Hull case study shows how a heightened awareness of flooding issues resulting from
such events can have a positive effect on future regeneration and spatial planning decision
making (see Section 8.6). Solutions that combine new infrastructure provision with
improved flood protection are what policies, such as PPS25, aim to achieve. One aim for
increasing the flood resilience of the UK’s infrastructure will be to reinforce the
importance of this process in areas that are at risk of flooding, but have not experienced a
flood in recent years.
40 CIRIA C688
9 Current practice in the assessment of
flood risk to critical infrastructure
9.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of emerging issues in risk assessment and the
methodologies adopted in the United States and mainland Europe. The UK experience is
then described, with particular reference to established practice in the assessment of flood
risk to new development (including infrastructure). A description is then provided of
flood risk assessment work undertaken to date in each sector. Conclusions can be made as
to how the process of assessing risks to critical infrastructure could be improved.
9.2 EMERGING ISSUES IN RISK ASSESSMENT

The results of risk assessments are frequently used by others to define an appropriate
management response. Some of the important emerging issues in risk assessment and
management are related to the complex and changing nature of risks and how this
evolving “risk landscape” can be communicated to wider stakeholders, eg politicians,
company directors, managers, funders, operatives, the media, pressure groups and
taxpayers/customers. The Centre for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology (ETH Zürich) makes a range of recommendations that are relevant to this
study (Brunner and Sutter, 2008):
Develop a nuanced understanding of risk: the handbook acknowledges that stakeholders

perceive risks differently, not necessarily because they face different threats, but due to
varying vulnerability assessments. It recommends that analysts should understand the
essential elements of the risk concept and develop a comprehensive picture of the risks
that are potentially relevant to their organisation. They should also be aware of the
complexity and accelerated dynamic of a changing risk landscape. Finally, they should
recognise that risk analysis and management involves a long-term commitment and
requires a clear definition of values and objectives, a meaningful evaluation and
prioritisation of identified risks and a lucid appreciation of the resources needed for
mitigating them.
Learn to think in alternative futures: risk experts need to consider many futures so that
they can manage uncertainty by presenting alternative scenarios. They should confront
decision makers with the reality of complexity and uncertainty, while aiming at reducing
both to a degree that allows formulating meaningful policy choices. A good example of
this is the socio-economic scenarios developed by UKCIP in 2002 and updated in 2009.
Conceive uncertainty as a matter of degree: risk analysts should avoid classifying the
world as either certain, and open to precise prediction, or uncertain and completely
unpredictable. A sophisticated analysis identifying degrees of uncertainty is more likely to
allow decision makers to choose the appropriate strategic responses.
Develop and use international networks of risk experts: sharing knowledge within and
across professional communities should be managed and encouraged. The cross-sector
nature of critical infrastructure flood resilience means that there is significant scope for
improvements in the analytical frameworks being adopted by flood risk practitioners.

Zero risk is neither feasible nor desirable: it is usually impossible to cut the risks. The
objective of risk mitigation is not to cut every single risk, but to aim for an adequate and
justifiable degree of residual risk.
Cultivate an open risk dialogue with the public: the final recommendation is that “a
systematic and patient risk dialog that generates public awareness and understanding of
the complexity of the risk landscape is crucially needed”. Given the customer focus of
service providers and the fact that the customer will ultimately pay for any resilience
measures adopted, this recommendation is particularly pertinent.
9.3 INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
9.3.1 United States of America
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has recently developed a national

infrastructure protection plan (NIPP) with the aim of increasing the protection afforded
to, and resilience of, their critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). This plan is
supported by 18 sector-specific plans. Both the national plan and sector plans are based
on risk assessments and flooding is one of the risks considered. The NIPP risk
management framework is illustrated in Figure 9.1.
Figure 9.1 Continuous improvement to protect critical infrastructure
The NIPP framework calls for CIKR partners to assess risk from any scenario as a
function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat:
Risk = f (C,V,T)
where:
C = Consequence: the social, economic and environmental effects of an event
V = Vulnerability: degree of susceptibility to disruption
T = Threat: something with the potential to cause harm (a hazard).
NIPP provides a framework and guidance on the preparation of threat, vulnerability and
consequence assessments by each sector. This framework is central to the strategic
homeland infrastructure risk assessment (SHIRA) process. The SHIRA involves an annual
collaborative process conducted in co-ordination with interested members of the CIKR
protection community to assess and analyse the risks to the nation’s infrastructure from
terrorism, as well as natural and manmade hazards. The DHS maintains and is improving
its comprehensive catalogue that includes an inventory and descriptive information about
the assets and systems that comprise the nation’s critical infrastructure. The National
Assets Database (NADB) allows analysis of consequences, specific and common
vulnerabilities, dependencies, and interdependencies within and across sectors and
geographic regions.
42 CIRIA C688
Risk assessments are undertaken using the risk assessment methodology for critical asset
protection (RAMCAP) as outlined in the NIPP. As part of the risk assessment, utilities
develop an inventory of asset components including physical, cyber, IT and staff and they
identify the components that are most critical to their continued operation. The process
proceeds broadly as follows:
characterisation of the system, including its objectives and the services it provides
identification and prioritisation of adverse consequences to be avoided
determination of critical assets that might be subject to malevolent acts that could
result in undesired consequences
assessment of the likelihood (qualitative probability) of such malevolent acts by
adversaries
evaluation of existing countermeasures
analysis of current risk and development of a prioritised plan for risk reduction.
In terms of flood-related threats, there are few countries that have assessed and mapped
flood hazards (or threats) as comprehensively as has been undertaken in the UK. The
United States is a notable exception. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), which is part of the DHS, co-ordinates production of detailed flood maps for the
entire US. Flood zones are geographic areas that the FEMA has defined according to
varying levels of flood risk. Each zone reflects the severity or type of flooding in the area
taking into account the presence and status of Federal flood control systems.
In the US most home insurance policies do not cover flood risk. The National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP), administered by FEMA, works closely with about 90 private
insurance companies to offer flood insurance to property owners and renters in flood risk
areas. To qualify for flood insurance, a community is required to join the NFIP and agree
to enforce sound floodplain management standards. The effort associated with keeping
these maps fully up-to-date should not be underestimated – some maps are reputedly
over 20 years old and, given their importance in setting insurance premiums, the maps
cause occasional controversy.
9.3.2 European Union
The Council of the European Union adopted a Council Directive (2008/114/EC) on the
identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of
the need to improve their protection. This is supported by the European Programme for
Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). The programme is heavily focused on
terrorist-related threats.
The Council of Europe Major Hazards Agreement aims to develop disaster prediction
research, risk management, post-crisis analysis and rehabilitation. Conferences, reports
and good practice guidance are outputs from their activities:
<http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/majorhazards/default_EN.asp?>.
Perhaps of more direct relevance to this study is the EU Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) on
the assessment and management of flood risks which entered into force on 26 November
2007. This Directive requires Member States to undertake a national preliminary flood
risk assessment by 2011 to identify areas where significant flood risk exists or might be
likely. It also requires the preparation of catchment-based flood risk management plans by
2015 setting out flood risk management objectives, actions and measures for those areas.
This directive is driving advances in flood risk assessment and hazard mapping across
Europe and the majority of Western European countries have now produced flood maps.

A handbook prepared by the European Exchange Circle on Flood Mapping provides an
overview of current practice across Europe (EXCIMAP, 2007). The flood mapping
referred to focuses on flooding from rivers and the sea. “Torrent flows” are discussed with
regard to mountainous areas and a methodology developed in Austria is outlined.
Groundwater flooding is discussed with reference to research by Defra, the Environment
Agency and the British Geological Survey (BGS). No examples are provided of
groundwater flood hazard mapping on continental Europe. Flash flooding is discussed,
but mainly in the context of Mediterranean ephemeral watercourses. The handbook
advocates meteorological and geomorphic analysis as the primary means of identifying the
flash flood hazard.
9.3.3 Germany
Many European nations have prepared guidance on risk assessment for critical
infrastructure. For example, the Federal Ministry of the Interior published a guide on
protecting critical infrastructures (2007), and Germany’s National Strategy for the
protection of critical infrastructure was published in June 2009. The following criteria are
used to determine the criticality:
life and health: if the process is disrupted, what will be the effect on human life and
health?
timeframe: if the process is disrupted, how long will it take to have an effect on the
organisation’s overall product/service? The shorter the time, the more critical the
process
magnitude: how much of the overall product/service will be affected if this process is
interrupted or completely stopped?
contractual, regulatory or legal relevance: if the process is disrupted, what contractual,
regulatory or legal consequences will this have for the organisation?
economic damage: if the process is disrupted, what is the estimated financial damage
to the organisation? The Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance
(BBK) is finalising a vulnerability assessment for critical infrastructure during floods to
be published in early 2010. This will be co-authored by the United Nations University.
9.4 UK EXPERIENCE
9.4.1 Overview
Under the CCA, the UK government has prepared a National Risk Register (NRR) and
guidance to regional and LRFs on risk assessment and the preparation of Community
Risk Registers (CRR), and many are now publicly available. These are developed on a
regional and local scale by Category 1 responders. The process is summarised in the HM
Government document (2005), and summarised in Figure 9.2.
44 CIRIA C688
Figure 9.2 The risk management process within “emergency preparedness” (HM Government, 2005)
The risk registers prepared by LRFs cover all civil contingencies and are necessarily high
level. In preparing SRPs, a more detailed assessment of the components of flood risk is
required. Fortunately, the assessment of flood risk in the UK is a well established
professional discipline.
9.4.2 National flood maps
All parts of the UK have prepared hazard maps that show areas likely to flood from rivers
and the sea.
The Environment Agency’s flood map, accessible through their website, shows the areas at
risk from a one per cent (1 in 100) annual probability flood (inland), a 0.5 per cent (1 in
200) annual probability flood (in tidal areas) and the 0.1 per cent (1 in 1000) annual
probability flood across England and Wales. This map shows the existing hazard
associated with rivers and the sea only. It does not take account of the presence of flood
defences, nor of potential climate change effects. The map is constantly updated to reflect
the outputs of the Agency’s ongoing detailed local hydrological and hydraulic modelling
and mapping studies. The Environment Agency also has a historic flood map, which is
updated as floods occur.
SEPA’s indicative river and coastal flood map indicates the areas likely to flood from a 0.5
per cent (1 in 200) annual probability event in Scotland under existing climatic conditions.
The Northern Ireland Rivers Agency’s (NIRA) strategic flood map of Northern Ireland
provides an indication of areas that have flooded historically, areas likely to flood under
current climatic conditions (one per cent (1 in 100) annual probability events for rivers,
0.5 per cent (1 in 200) annual probability for the sea) and also areas potentially affected by
climate change to 2030.

The BGS has produced maps showing susceptibility to groundwater flood risk and the
Environment Agency has recently produced pluvial flood risk susceptibility maps for
England.
Flooding probability from rivers and the sea is relatively well defined across the UK,
although further work is required to assess the nature of the flood hazard in areas
protected by flood defences. The main issue at present is how this information can be
accessed by CI operators, who only make use of 2D flood maps. Current areas of research
and development include urban drainage, reservoir breach, groundwater and pluvial
flood risk.
9.4.3 FRA for new development
Flood risk assessments are required in support of the majority of applications for new
development in the UK. PPS25, SPP7, TAN15 and PPS15 provide guidance to planning
bodies on how they should take account of flood risk, as a material consideration, in their
spatial planning exercises. In England, regional planning bodies are responsible for
preparation of RFRAs and local authorities have to prepare SFRAs. Both levels of study
should include flood risk from all sources.
CIRIA C624 (Lancaster et al, 2004) and the practice guide to PPS25 (CLG, 2009) refer to
three levels of site-specific flood risk assessment as described in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1 Levels of flood risk assessment (from CIRIA C624)
FRA level Description
Screening study to identify whether there are any flooding or surface water
management issues related to a development site that may warrant further
Level 1
consideration. This should be based on available existing information, including
national flood maps, advice from the Environment Agency, SEPA or rivers agency.
Scoping study to be undertaken if the Level 1 FRA indicates that the site may lie
within an area that is at risk of flooding or that the site may increase flood risk due to
increased runoff. This study should confirm the sources of flooding that may affect the
site and should include:
an appraisal of the availability and adequacy of existing information
a qualitative appraisal of the flood risk posed to the site, and potential impact on
Level 2
the development on flood risk elsewhere
an appraisal of the scope of possible measures to reduce the flood risk to
acceptable levels.
The scoping study may identify that sufficient quantitative information is already
available to complete a flood risk assessment appropriate to the scale and nature of
the development.
Detailed study to be undertaken if the Level 2 FRA concludes that further quantitative
analysis is required to assess flood risk issues related to the development site.
The study should include:
quantitative appraisal of the potential flood risk to the development
Level 3
quantitative appraisal of the potential impact of development site on flood risk
elsewhere
quantitative demonstration of the effectiveness of any proposed mitigation
measures.
Typical sources of information used in FRA are summarised in Table 9.2. These are
elaborated on in both CIRIA C624 (Lancaster et al, 2004) and the practice guide to PPS25
(CLG, 2009).
46 CIRIA C688
Table 9.2 Typical sources of information for flood risk assessments
FRA level Typical sources of information
Ordnance Survey maps

National flood maps
National, regional and local planning guidance and policy statements
1 Regional and/or strategic flood risk assessments

Consultation with flood risk consultants to identify what, if any, flood risk issues need to
be considered.
Strategic studies, eg catchment flood management plans/shoreline management plans
and surface water management plans.
Historic maps
Local libraries and newspaper reports
Interviews with local people
Walkover survey by a professional FRA practitioner to assess:
potential sources of flooding
likely routes for flood waters
2
the site’s main features, including flood defences, and their condition.
Site survey to determine:
general ground levels across the site
levels of any formal or informal flood defences relevant to the site.
More detailed consultation with the LPA, Environment Agency and other bodies, which may
have relevant information on flood risk.
Detailed topographical and/or hydrographic survey

Hydrological and hydraulic modelling (using existing models where these are available and
3 suitable)
Monitoring to assist with model calibration/verification
Continued consultation with the LPA, Environment Agency and other flood risk consultants.
Level 3 studies can be relatively expensive. However, hydraulic models are increasingly
available for river systems. The Environment Agency invests heavily in hydrological and
hydraulic modelling exercises and is increasingly able to provide model output data, for
discrete locations, with an accompanying report, including
all model node X/Y co-ordinate locations, levels and flows

1D model reservoir units
2D flood model grid data (not z-point data)
model extents
hydrographs
breach location and widths
velocity data (where already generated)
dry access routes (where already generated)
time of onset/duration of flooding (where already generated)
hazard mapping and depth (where already generated).
The models are primarily river models, but coastal breach models are also becoming more
available. This facility, which applies to England and Wales, is not yet available in Scotland
or Northern Ireland.

Flood zones
For the purposes of planning new development, planning policy in the UK defines flood
zones according to areas with a given probability of flooding. One of the primary tasks of
an FRA is to establish which zone a site lies within. The zones defined in PPS25 are
outlined in Table 9.3.
Table 9.3 Flood zones in PPS25 (based on Table D1 in PPS25)
Flood zone Annual probability of a flood occurring or being exceeded
1 Less than 0.1% (1 in 1000)
Between 0.1% (1 in 1000) and 1% (1 in 100) for river flooding, between 0.1% (1 in 1000)
2
and 0.5% (1 in 200) for flooding from the sea
Greater than 1% for river flooding and greater than 0.5% (1 in 200) for flooding from the
3a
sea
3b Functional floodplain
In Scotland the risk framework in SPP7 is similar, but refers to flood risk areas and uses a
0.5–0.1 per cent (1 in 200 to 1 in 1000) annual probability banding for the medium risk
area (zone 2 equivalent) for both rivers and the sea. High risk areas, defined as those at
risk from a 0.5 per cent (1 in 200) annual probability flood, are divided into areas which
are already built-up and those which are undeveloped/sparsely developed, with different
guidance provided on each.
In Northern Ireland PPS15 defines floodplain as per zone 3a in PPS25, but distinguishes
between developed and undeveloped floodplain. In Wales the zones are defined within a
precautionary framework as shown in Table 9.4.
Table 9.4 Flood zones in Wales (from TAN15)
Flood zone Definition
A Little or no risk of river/coastal flooding
Areas known to have flooded in the past due to presence of sedimentary deposits shown
B
on BGS maps
Areas within the 0.1% floodplain as shown on the Environment Agency flood map, sub-
C
divided in C1 (developed) and C2 (undeveloped) floodplain
Matching land-use to degree of flood risk
Policies for England and the devolved administrations all provide an indication where
land-uses may be appropriate in the different flood zones. Perhaps due to pressure for
development in England, the guidance in PPS25 is the most detailed. The sequential test
in PPS25 requires local planning authorities to locate new development within areas
where the risk of flooding is lowest. If no sites are available within flood zone 1, then the
next lowest site should be considered and so on, in sequence. The exception test in
PPS25, which should also be applied by the local planning authority (LPA), allows certain
types of development to proceed in spite of being in areas at heightened risk of flooding
provided:
the flood risk is outweighed by wider sustainability benefits

the site has been developed previously (ideally)
48 CIRIA C688
the proposed development is protected to an acceptable standard and does not
increase flood risk elsewhere.
Further details of the sequential and exception tests can be found within Annex D of
PPS25.
Table 9.5 is based on PPS25 and indicates what land-uses are considered appropriate in
each flood zone (subject to no sites at lower risk being reasonably available). This could be
used to infer what English government policy considers to be an “acceptable risk” for
different types of development. However, it would be wrong to make this inference. All
new development located in areas at risk of flooding should be protected to an
appropriate standard, which is discussed in the next chapter. A government consultation
on minor amendments to PPS25 closed on 3 November 2009. In particular the following
changes were proposed:
“Water treatment and sewage treatment plants shown as less vulnerable would be moved to
the essential infrastructure category, plus a clarification to the definition of this category.
Insertion of additional text providing for police, ambulance and fire stations which are not
required to be operational during flooding to be treated as “less vulnerable”.
Insertion of additional text in the “highly vulnerable” category to clarify that where there is
a need to locate bulk storage facilities requiring hazardous substances consent with port or
other waterside facilities, or installations requiring hazardous substances consent that are
associated with energy infrastructure which need to be sited in coastal locations or high
flood risk areas, these facilities and installations should be classified as “essential
infrastructure”, rather than highly vulnerable.
Clarification that wind turbines for generating renewable energy should be treated as
“essential infrastructure.”
There has been considerable debate about the precise definition of “functional
floodplain”, which is defined in PPS25 as:
“land which would flood with an annual probability of 5 per cent (1 in 20) or greater in
any year or is designed to flood in an extreme (0.1 per cent) flood, or at another
probability to be agreed between the local planning authority and the Environment Agency,
including water conveyance routes”. The latest version of the accompanying practice guide
clarifies that: “the definition allows flexibility to make allowance for local circumstances
and should not be defined on rigid probability parameters. Areas which would naturally
flood with an annual probability of 1 in 20 (5 per cent) or greater, but which are
prevented from doing so by existing infrastructure or solid buildings, will not normally be
defined as functional floodplain” (CLG, 2009).

Table 9.5 Flood risk vulnerability classification
Essential
Highly vulnerable More vulnerable Less vulnerable Water compatible
infrastructure
Essential transport Emergency service Hospitals Shops, offices, Flood control

infrastructure stations cafes and infrastructure
Residential restaurants,
Strategic utility Basement institutions general industry, Water supply
infrastructure dwellings storage and infrastructure
Dwellings, hotels,
Caravans mobile halls of residence distribution Sewage systems
homes etc etc Buildings and land
permanent Sand and gravel
Nightclubs, pubs for agriculture and workings
residences
Typical developments
etc forestry
Hazardous Docks marinas and
Non residential Waste treatment wharves
substances
installations healthcare, Mineral working
nurseries and Navigation facilities
and processing
education facilities. Mod defence
Water and sewage
Landfill and waste plants (3) Ship building and
sites repairs
Caravan, camping Water based
etc temporary recreation (4)
residence (2)
Lifeguard and
coastguard stations
Amenity, nature
conservation,
outdoor sports
Essential sleeping
facilities for the
above (2)
Zone 1
Zone 2 Exception Test
Flood zones
Zone 3a Exception Test × Exception Test

Zone 3b Exception Test × × ×
Notes
Development is appropriate, subject to satisfying the sequential test

× Development should not be permitted
1 Table based on Tables D1, D2 and D3 of PPS 25. Refer to original tables for full descriptions.
2 Subject to a specific warning and evacuation plan.
3 If adequate pollution control measures are in place.
4 Excluding sleeping accommodation.
9.4.4 FRA for existing infrastructure
The three levels of site-specific flood risk assessment used for assessing and managing the
flood risks associated with new development are equally applicable to assessing the risks to
existing infrastructure.
NaFRA
A possible starting point for those undertaking flood risk assessments for existing
infrastructure in England is the national flood risk assessment (NaFRA). NaFRA was
prepared by Defra and the Environment Agency and identifies the indicative number and
type of existing infrastructure assets in floodplain areas, as summarised in Figure 9.3.
50 CIRIA C688
Figure 9.3 National infrastructure assets (transport and utilities infrastructure) in floodplain areas
(Environment Agency, 2009)
This data, like the national flood maps for Scotland and Northern Ireland, covers
flooding from rivers and the sea and is only available in two dimensions.
NaFRA uses the National Property Database to identify assets at risk. The National
Receptor Database (NRD), now at scoping stage, will compile a single dataset with a wide
range of receptors against a range of natural hazards. The output will be of use for other
projects, including NaFRA, to use the database to assess risk. The Environment Agency
fully expects that one of the aspects to be included will be critical infrastructure. The
scoping phase has considered:
1 Technical options for deployment, eg database, security, user interface.

2 Needs analysis, eg what receptors, who holds the data, how much it costs and will
provide further clarity on these issues.
3 Surface water, groundwater and reservoir breach inundations risks
New techniques to establish susceptibility to surface water flooding have now been used to
map England, Wales and Scotland. These techniques use digital terrain models (often
based on aerial light detection and ranging (LiDAR) survey data) in conjunction with 2d
hydraulic models to provide an indication of the flood paths likely to be taken by rainfall-
runoff and to identify where there is a risk of ponding. An exercise is also now in progress
to assess reservoir breach inundation risks in England and Wales. The outputs of these
studies, like the British Geological Survey’s maps of groundwater flooding susceptibility,
are in 2 dimensions and are indicative only. Importantly, none of these maps provide
depth, velocity or level information. This data can only be used to identify whether a site
is within an area at potential risk of flooding.
9.4.5 Assessing the consequences of flooding
As clarified in Chapter 6, flood risk is a product of the probability of a flood occurring

and the consequences when it does occur. Assessing the consequences of flooding is a vital
component of risk assessment. There is a wealth of data and research related to the
impact of flooding on residential and commercial property. This data is used by the
Environment Agency and their consultants to assess the benefits of publicly funded flood
alleviation projects. The guidance available includes:

Penning-Rowsell (2005) The benefits of flood and coastal risk management manual
EFTEC (2007) Flood and coastal erosion risk management, economic valuation of
environmental effects
Defra (2004) Revisions to economic appraisal on: reflecting socio-economic equity in appraisal
and appraisal of human related intangible impacts of flooding
Defra (2008a) Assessing and valuing the risk to life from flooding for use in appraisal of risk
management measures
Defra (2008b) The valuation of agricultural land and output for appraisal purposes.
This guidance may be useful to infrastructure owners and operators. However, there is a
lack of specific guidance related to the social, economic and environmental impact of
disruption to essential services.
The questionnaire and workshop (see Supportings documents 1 and 2) considered what
the consequences of flood-related interruptions in the provision of essential services were
for essential service providers. The information collated indicated that loss of revenue and
financial penalties, while a consideration, were less important factors than the effect on
reputation.
The consequences of interrupted supply may be far more serious for the economy,
communities affected, or for the environment and emergency services, than for the
organisation providing the service. Ofwat guidance (Ofwat, 2009b), for example, lists the
following as potential consequences of flooding-related disruption of water infrastructure:
inconvenience of interruptions due to service loss

anxiety and stress due to loss of service
health risk due to contamination of water supply and the environment
loss of production for non-household customers
extra clean-up costs due to waste water mixing with flood water and entering property
anxiety and stress due to wastewater entering customer property
environmental pollution due to wastewater mixing with floodwater
loss of state revenues due to non-functioning of the private sector
costs associated with state support for provision of emergency supplies if interruption
is substantial
tourism and commercial benefits from avoiding extended interruptions
other.
Whether mandatory standards are imposed by central government or investment decision

making by infrastructure operators is wholly motivated by cost-benefit analysis, the
valuation of costs and the economic, social and environmental benefits of avoiding them,
need to be quantified. Ultimately this will be decided by people’s willingness to pay.
Further research is required in this area.
The following sections provide examples of flood risk assessment work being undertaken
in each sector.
9.5 ENERGY SECTOR

Energy is required to ensure continued operation of the majority of critical infrastructure
systems. In 2005, partly in response to the Carlisle floods, the government ordered a
52 CIRIA C688
study to identify the top 1000 substations most at risk from flooding. The Energy Network
Association (ENA) has completed a study of substation vulnerability using data on flood
risk from rivers and the sea provided by the Environment Agency and SEPA.
The ENA has issued a report that formalises the approach to risk assessment and flood
defence prioritisation and recommends investment in mitigation (ENA, 2008). As Ofgem
have been involved in the development of this publication it is likely that proposals for
improvements in flood resilience included in the next price control submission will be well
received.
It has been identified that much of the vulnerable high risk equipment in substations,
such as the primary circuits, are at a safe height but many control circuits and secondary
wiring are at a lower level that can still cause the circuit to trip. A major design issue is the
location of the switch board. Although much of the equipment is remotely operated, if
staff cannot access the switch board due to flood water, and the substation is inundated,
then there is still a possibility of failure.
A summary of the results of a risk assessment of National Grid’s assets using the national
flood maps is provided in Table 9.6.
Table 9.6 National Grid’s assets at risk (courtesy National Grid)
With known Without known

Category
defences defences
Shown not at risk or above 0.1% annual probability flood 154 167
Site protected up to a 0.1% annual probability flood 46 18
Site at risk from flooding from 0.5% to 0.1% annual

19 16
probability flood
Site at risk from flooding from 1% to a 0.5% annual

22 7
probability flood
Site at risk from a 1% annual probability event or higher 14 47
255 255
National Grid is in discussions with the Meteorological Office and Environment Agency
about the risk from surface water flooding and reservoir inundation. They have identified
that several of their towers are also at risk.
National Grid is aware that, unless the mechanisms responsible for flooding are
understood, there is a risk that the investment in flood risk management measures will be
inefficient. The organisation is in the process of obtaining LiDAR data to better
understand pluvial flood mechanisms, for example, where water is likely to flow and
pond. Such site-specific studies help to better plan and design both temporary and
permanent solutions, as described in Chapter 10.
In the light of climate change and expected sea level rise British Energy is concerned with
coastal flooding of their production sites. Their assessment of coastal flood risk used the
most severe high-emissions scenario published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, including an allowance for increased storm surges. British Energy concluded that
sea-level at their plants will rise by 0.9 m to 1.7 m over the coming century.

9.6 COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
British Telecom (BT) has around 7000 to 8000 sites including telephone exchanges that
may be at risk. These systems are vital for issuing flood warnings and co-ordinating
emergency responses. About 500 BT major assets are known to be within floodplain areas.
These are commonly situated in the centre of towns. The telecoms sector has legacy
infrastructure in a similar way to the transport sector. BT is starting the process of the
assessment of flood risk and mitigation measures for their asset portfolio.
9.7 TRANSPORT SECTOR

Moving people, plant and resources around the country will be an essential component of
any flooding incident and post-event recovery. The strategic components of transport
network are inevitably the roads and the rail network. A general expectation is that these
services will still be available during most extreme situations.
9.7.1 Highways
The HA is responsible for the construction, maintenance and operation of England’s

motorways and major trunk road network (strategic road network). The strategic road
network is used to carry around 80 per cent of national goods and services. Loss of the
strategic road network, or vital sections could have a significant effect on England’s ability
to operate, especially in times of crisis. The HA responds as a CCA level 2 responder and
has the duty to share data and information with other Cat 1 and Cat 2 responders.
The HA Network Resilience Team (NRT) is responsible for understanding and improving
the resilience of the strategic road network. The team does this by engaging in the
different aspects of emergency management:
anticipating and assessing risks

preventing emergencies
preparing for emergencies
responding to emergencies.
The HA, in consultation with its service providers and the Environment Agency, has
identified parts of HA network vulnerable to flooding. Early flood hotspot maps have
been developed along with draft guidance for operational staff on how to use and develop
flood risk management strategies. Work is also being progressed into investigating and
identifying culverts posing a potential flooding risk together with a review of risks to
flooding posed by climate change. The project is due to be completed in 2009.
The above hotspot assessment involved comparing details of past flooding incidents with
mapping showing the theoretical risk of flooding from overland runoff, river or tidal
flooding. The work showed how little information there is regarding the cause of the
flooding, and a new flood register is being launched by the HA that will require its road
managers to record not only details of the flood and its effect on road users, but also the
main cause of the flood.
The HA is also giving priority to the work needed to survey its drains, as any lack of asset
knowledge will affect the response to a flood, compromise the necessary maintenance and
retrofitting of systems to reduce flood risk.
54 CIRIA C688
Case study 9.1 A pilot in the use of GIS by the HA’s Network Resilience Team
The issues that need to be considered in emergency management are explicitly geographical: roads,
rivers, floodplains, industrial hazards, infrastructure and cities are all geographically distributed in a
way that is of clear relevance to emergency planning. In short, knowing where things are and why it
is essential to rational decision making. Geographical information systems (GIS) have been
identified as the enabling technology for the NRT to support the organised use of geographical
information and provide a tool to easily analyse, access and share data and information with other
stakeholders. This means that data could not only be accessed and visualised through a GIS
interface, but also new information, contingency plans and data could be created as and when
required.
Figure 9.4 shows a flood analysis example carried out in an initial pilot study for a NRT GIS tool. The
next phase of the project includes an end user requirement capture exercise to identify who the end
users of a GIS tool for emergency planning would be, what interfaces to other initiatives are required
and what functionality the systems need to provide.
Figure 9.4 Screen grab of GIS interface developed in NRT pilot study
(source Mike Whitehead, Highways Agency)
9.7.2 Rail
Network Rail is adopting a new communications system for the railway network. The
engineering team used flood plain maps in the Network Rail corporate GIS, which show
flood outlines for 10 per cent (1 in 10), four per cent (1 in 25), two per cent (1 in 50), one
per cent (1 in 100) and 0.4 per cent (1 in 250) annual probability fluvial floods. These
were developed in 2003 by JBA Consulting. Using this information they avoided locating
transmission masts and their associated equipment buildings in flood plain areas.
Network Rail has also assessed their bridges over water for the likelihood of scour
damage, using their internal management procedures (Network Rail, 2008).
9.8 WATER SECTOR
9.8.1 Privatised water utilities
The water sector has a large number of assets close to rivers, because rivers often
comprise both a source of supply and a sink for effluent disposal. Locating these assets
outside of floodplain areas would result in the need for far greater levels of pumping,

which would both increase the carbon footprint of their operations and the vulnerability
of their systems to failures in power supply.
Ofwat states in their methodology paper for 2010–2015 that each company should review
how its critical assets are at risk from surface water flooding and how it will meet the
needs of supplying consumers in extreme situations (Ofwat, 2009a). Each company should
assess the risk to service in its application of common framework principles for asset
management.
General guidance on risk-based prioritisation of flood resilience measures has been

prepared for Ofwat by Halcrow (Ofwat, 2009c). The guidance refers to the flood risk
assessment process in PPS25, provides guidance on calculating flood damages (see
References) and recommends the rationale for prioritisation based on the risk matrix
shown in Figure 9.5.
Moderate risk (low High risk (high

consequence, high consequence and
High risk: existing
probability): existing probability): existing
measures should be in
measures should be in measures should be in
place and hazards well
place and hazards well place and hazards well
defined. Review climate
defined. Review climate defined. Review climate
impacts and pluvial risks.
Hazard impacts and cost benefit impacts and wider
opportunities. benefits.
probability
Moderate risk: do High risk: do risk

detailed risk assessment assessment including
Low risk: do pluvial including surface water pluvial flooding. Review
flooding appraisal. Check flooding. Review contingency planning,
contingency planning. contingency planning, review climate impact.
Re-appraise in 10 years. review climate impact. Consider resilience
Consider resilience measures and wider
measure. benefits.
Moderate risk (high

consequence, low
Lowest risk: risk probability): do risk
Low risk: do pluvial
assessment sufficient – assessment including
flooding appraisal. Check
do nothing, maintain pluvial flooding. Review
contingency planning.
existing resilience. Re- contingency planning.
Re-appraise in five years
appraise in +10 years. Review climate impact.
Consider resilience
measures.
Service consequences
Figure 9.5 Risk matrix for prioritisation of investigations into the viability of resilience measures
(Ofwat, 2009c)
56 CIRIA C688
Case study 9.2 United Utilities assessment of flood risk for water assets
United Utilities (UU) identified the facilities to be included in their flood resilience programme using
the following methodology.
A desktop study was completed using the Environment Agency flood map data to identify the type
and number of water facilities within flood zones 2 and 3. The Environment Agency’s flood zone
layers were overlaid on the company GIS, which maps the locations of all UU facilities. Facilities
within the GIS include all water and waste WTW, boreholes, service reservoirs, pumping stations
and pipe bridges. This study did not consider surface water flood risk, nor did it consider the risk of
impounding reservoir failure due to flooding. A separate Dam portfolio risk assessment study has
however ensured that the overflow capacity of all UU’s impounding reservoirs is in-line with current
standards.
Analysis was then carried out of the facilities identified as being at risk of flooding using UU’s
regional network model. The model was used to identify the number of properties which would be
affected by an outage of each asset taking into account the flexibility in the network and the
opportunities for re-zoning (ie using other water sources). A significant number of these facilities
could be supported by other sources were there to be an outage. The remainder of these facilities
were deemed “critical” as they would lead to significant loss of supply were there to be an outage.
The impact of a loss of the energy supply to critical assets because of flooding was also assessed.
In general the critical facilities were found to already have on-site generation to cater for loss of
energy supply resulting from any event, including substation failure or loss of overhead lines.
The risk assessment process was concluded with a site visit to assess the current levels of flood
protection in place at each of the facilities identified as being at risk. While the assessment did not
consider climate change effects, it is intended that the design of flood resilience measures will.
Source: Emma Culleton, United Utilities
Case study 9.3 Anglian Water’s assessments of sites threatened by sea level rise
Climate change is a particularly serious issue in the east of England. Due to the extensive areas of
low-lying terrain, net sea-level rise is expected to affect this area more severely than elsewhere in
the UK. Anglian Water identified all areas within flood zone 2 (the 0.1 per cent (1 in 1000) annual
probability floodplain) and has produced a map of wastewater treatment works (WWTW) and WTW
affected by 0.4 metre rise in sea levels.
Figure 9.6
Schematic of Anglian Water
assets at risk from sea level rise
Source: Andy Brown, Anglian Water

Case study 9.4 Yorkshire Water Services Limited strategic level assessment
Mouchel undertook strategic level flood risk assessments for Yorkshire Water Services Limited
(YWSL). The study was required to provide YWSL with cost estimates for defending their critical
assets against flooding for their five year asset management plan (AMP5). Two concurrent studies
were undertaken: one for the clean water division and one for the wastewater division. The
wastewater study comprised two parts:
1 Initially 10 sites (WwTW and sewage pumping stations) were identified based on those with
a history of flooding or which were particularly critical to YWSL’s operations. Site visits were
then undertaken to gather more specific information on the layout and flooding mechanisms.
The site inspections assessed the following:
the nature of the assets, their degree of criticality, site layout and general topography of
the site and adjoining land
details of the sources of flooding and any defences protecting the site
possible future flood defences and any constraints which may impair their development
and maintenance,
the effect that future flood defences may have on nearby developments, as required by
PPS25.
A database was developed to present and store all the data.
2 A range of other wastewater assets was identified as being at risk of fluvial or tidal flooding
using Environment Agency flood map (with a buffer zone added), supplemented by other sites
with a history of flooding from pluvial and groundwater sources.
A risk matrix was then developed based on the guidance by Ofwat (2009c) to determine the severity
of flood risk to the assets. This took into account the probability of flooding and the consequences
of an asset being flooded. This matrix was later used to prioritise the investment planning.
Source: Caroline Jackson, Mouchel
Case study 9.5 Flood risk assessment by Veolia Water Central
Veolia’s assessment process adopted Ofwat’s service risk framework, which is an analytical
framework for assessing asset resilience to flooding (Ofwat, 2009c). Initially desktop analysis using
the Environment Agency flood map identified that 109 sites were at risk. More detailed
assessment, using information obtained from the Environment Agency’s flood mapping and data
management teams, coupled with on-site surveys of all 109 sites, identified that 61 sites were
already adequately protected. The site survey work included considering possible mitigation
measures with the costs of which then factored into the overall cost.
The effect on customers was then assessed using Veolia’s established criticality rating for each site.
This rating had already been developed for capital maintenance planning. The rating reflects
the population served by each asset
whether alternative supplies would be available and at what cost
how long it would take to restore supplies by re-zoning, if this option is available.
The criticality ratings have been developed, however, on the assumption that single sites are
affected independently of each other. For some groups of sites this is unlikely to be the case
because flooding of a valley might well affect many sites. Veolia carried out a simple assessment
based on the criticality rating coupled with knowledge from the operations control staff. Their
knowledge of the physical relationship between sites and the availability of alternative supplies
reduced the list of sites where mitigation measures were required from 48 to 23. A further review
was undertaken focusing on the risk value of sites which resulted in a further three sites being
added to the list. During the process described here, further Environment Agency maps based on
rainfall became available via the local resilience forums.15 sites were surveyed and five considered
to be at risk of surface water flooding.
Alex Back, Veolia Water Central (formally Three Valleys Water)
9.8.2 Scottish Water
Scottish Water initially undertook a preliminary flood risk assessment of its above-ground
water assets in 2007–2008, as a result of an overall investigation to target investment for
asset resilience measurable failure modes. The primary focus for asset flood resilience
centred on continuity of supply of wholesome potable water, resulting in the examination
of WTW, boreholes (BHs), raw water pumping stations (RWPS) and treated water
pumping stations (TWPS).
58 CIRIA C688
Case study 9.6 Asset flood risk classification at Scottish Water
In considering flood risk exposure, three levels were identified using the red, amber and green risk
exposure classification as indicated in Figure 9.6.
Figure 9.7 Flood risk exposure using the red, amber and green classifications
Source: Ian Hogg, Scottish Water
For this flood risk study “critical” assets were previously identified by Scottish Water, using
an existing defined rule set for criticality. This rule set being based around the following
internally derived framework criteria:
size, complexity and storage/standby capacity at the site

performance of the site in terms of quality/compliance
impact that the site has on costs, overall performance assessment (OPA) score and
reputation
quality of pro-active maintenance planning.
Each of these areas has varying degrees of weightings affecting ranking, from which an
overall critical assessment (OCA) score was derived. Assets are classed as high, medium or
low criticality. All assets that feature as high criticality (scored greater than 60 points out of
a possible 100) are considered to be “critical”.
Following on from a risk screening exercise a risk analysis was undertaken, which
comprised of a vulnerability analysis via desktop surveys and impact analysis via site visits.
A pro-forma questionnaire was used to gather information on the sites identified as being
at risk from the SEPA 0.5 per cent (1 in 200) annual probability floodplain analysis. An
extract is shown in Figure 9.8. This example is for a WTW.

Asset process Vulnerability Probability of Consequence of Population Asset flood
component score failure failure score risk score
Screening 10 10 10 10 40
Coagulation 1 1 10 10 7
Flocculation 1 1 10 10 7
Disinfection 1 1 10 10 7
Primary filtration 1 1 10 10 7
Secondary filtration 1 1 10 10 7
Treated water storage 1 1 1 10 4
Backwash water
1 1 10 10 7
treatment
Chemical dosing 1 1 10 10 7
Sludge disposal 1 1 3 10 5
Electrical panels 3 10 10 10 33
Electrical installation 3 10 10 10 33
Electricity supply 1 1 3 10 5
Access 1 10 10 10 31
Pumps 1 1 10 10 7
Buildings 3 10 3 10 26
Totals Total 235.27
1 = Not vulnerable 1 = Low 1 = Insignificant Asset flood risk 37%

3 = May be 3 = Medium 3 = May be a
(aligned)
vulnerable 10 = High problem
10 = Very vulnerable 10 = Significant
problem
Figure 9.8 Scottish Water survey template example (WTW)
The questionnaire contained a matrix for particular asset processes, with each component
being assessed on vulnerability, probability of failure and consequence of failure. This
matrix varied depending on the type of asset, with a different risk matrix used for WTW,
water pumping stations and borehole components. Further text boxes were used in the
questionnaire to capture background information on the consequence of failure, current
protection measures planned and recommendations for further actions.
For initial ranking purposes, an “asset flood risk score” was produced, where:
Asset flood risk score = ∑ (vulnerability score + probability of failure score +

consequence of failure score + population score) × probability of failure weighting
factor
The probability of failure weighting factor uses 33 per cent for low probability, 75 per cent
for medium and 100 per cent for high probability. Further refinements to align all the
various asset types to a common risk currency were achieved by presenting the total asset
flood risk score in percentage terms, independent of asset type where:
Asset flood risk (aligned) (%) = total asset flood risk score/maximum total asset flood
risk score
60 CIRIA C688
By reviewing the information gathered at this interim stage, sites that featured highly in
terms of probability of failure were considered for further site visit investigations. The
investigations determined the potential impact should a water asset fail and were focused
on:
all historically flooded water assets

critical WwTWs and TWPS considered to be “at risk”
BHs, RWPs and electrical substations associated with critical WwTWs considered to be
“at risk”.
This resulted in a hierarchy of exposure to flood risk being established based upon the
following criteria:
potential impact (population affected, availability of alternate supplies (storage and

tankering)
current exposure to flood risk (historic or predicted)
time to start of outage (loss of supply).
This hierarchy was developed in preference to the initial ranked scoring system, due to
the uncertainties over the information contained in the SEPA flood maps, which are
indicative only. As data improvements are recognised for flood mapping and climate
change, it is anticipated that a return to a risk-scoring approach to rank the assets most
vulnerable to flooding and most probable to affect customer service and environmental
pollution.

9.9 SUMMARY
Flood risk assessment to identify the precise nature of the risks is fundamental to any plan
to improve flood resilience. Unless those designing resilience measures have a good
understanding of the nature of the risk there is a danger that the measures will be
inadequate or worse still be a complete waste of money. A review of international
experience of flood risk assessment implies that the flood hazard is better defined in the
UK than elsewhere, with the possible exception of the United States.
The majority of organisations who have contributed to the development of this

publication have, in varying degrees, assessed the risk to their assets using national flood
hazard maps such as those provided by the Environment Agency, SEPA and NIRA. These
maps provide indicative information on a limited number of annual probabilities of event
for flooding from rivers and the sea only and do not generally include information on
flood depths, the benefits afforded by existing defences or, except in Northern Ireland,
variations that may occur due to climate change.
Some organisations have used the national flood maps to prioritise their investigations
and have then obtained more detailed information, including flood levels, at specific sites.
This more detailed information is again largely pertaining to flooding from rivers and the
sea, although some use has now been made of data on surface water flood susceptibility.
Obtaining this data often required specialist consultants with knowledge of how to abstract
the necessary information from the Environment Agency’s flood mapping and data
management teams.
It is challenging for operators to assess the degree of exposure to surface, groundwater

and infrastructure failure flood hazards. SFRAs are a mechanism for providing
information of this kind in England. SFRAs should also include an assessment and
mapping of the implications of climate change. However, often local authorities, who are
responsible for producing SFRAs, as well as SWMPs, in areas with critical drainage
problems, face the same problems as infrastructure operators in generating this
information. Mapping of flood hazards from first principles is expensive. A risk-based,
prioritised approach is required and the three levels of FRA advocated in the practice
guide (CLG, 2009) to PPS25 (screening, scoping and detailed study) provides a useful
framework when considered in conjunction with data on asset criticality.
Often information on flood levels for a wide range of annual probabilities, as well as
quantitative data of use in assessing the implications of climate change has already been
derived by flood risk agencies or water companies, but accessing this information can be
difficult. There is a need for a national flood hazard register collating information on
flood hazards from all sources in a consistent format and linked to a geographical
information system accessible to all operators of essential infrastructure.
To develop asset risk-rankings based on both probability and consequence, operators have
usually considered the direct consequences of flooding for their own operations and
customers. Where exposure is slight, this may be sufficient. However, where assets systems
are highly exposed to the flood hazard, and high levels of investment are potentially
required, valuing the full consequences may require a wider consideration of economic,
environmental and social factors, as well as people’s willingness to pay. This process would
benefits from further research and guidance. This is discussed further in Chapter 11.
62 CIRIA C688
10 Current practice for adopting resistance
and resilience measures
10.1 THE FRM HIERARCHY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Providers of essential services, who are unacceptably exposed to the flood hazard, will
need to adopt a range of measures to manage the risks. A suggested hierarchy of
measures was introduced in Chapter 6, based on the practice guide to PPS25 (CLG,
2009). This is adapted in Table 10.1 for the consideration of critical infrastructure.
Table 10.1 The flood risk management hierarchy for critical infrastructure
FRM measure Example
Flood risk assessment for a network of inter-connected CI systems commissioned by a

Assess partnership of asset owners and undertaken as an extension to a strategic flood risk
assessment undertaken for a local authority
Ensure that the critical components of the asset system are not unacceptably exposed
Avoid
to the flood hazard by removing them from areas that are likely to flood
Where facilities are found to be at unacceptable risk, ensure that the essential
Substitute services they provide can be substituted with alternatives during the period of
disruption
Adopt structural measures to make the asset flood resistant or flood resilient using
Control
temporary, demountable or permanent flood defences
Adopt measures, such as flood forecasting, warning, incident management and

Mitigate emergency response procedures and business continuity plans, to mitigate residual
risks
10.2 EXISTING GUIDANCE ON FRM FOR CRITICAL

INFRASTRUCTURE
No specific guidance on flood risk management for critical infrastructure is available in
the UK, which this publication aims to address. The most comprehensive design guidance
on flood resistance and resilience measures uncovered by the literature review is included
in a report by the ASCE (2006). This document categorises all structures on a grade of I
to IV where Category I structures are those that would cause minimal risk to human life if
they failed and Category IV are essential facilities. The code covers all aspects of the
design of civil structures in areas prone to flooding with a range of risk-based freeboards
relative to the design flood elevation (DFE) for different types and categories of structure.
The American Lifeline Alliance (ALA) has developed three new publications (ALA, 2005a,
b and c) providing utility system owners and operators with guidance on defining the
scope of actions necessary to assess system performance during and after hazard events to
support risk management decisions.
In Germany, a policy statement on flood risk management and critical infrastructure has
been prepared (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, 2006), with a
follow-up guide that contains a checklist of flood resistance and resilience measures for
buildings and facilities (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2007).

Sections 10.3 to 10.6 provide an overview of measures now used in the UK to manage
flood risk, many of which are already being deployed by CI operators, as shown in the
case studies. Section 10.7 gives an overview of the issues associated with design standards.
10.3 NON STRUCTURAL MEASURES
10.3.1 Hazard identification, mapping and avoidance
Hazard identification and mapping is the subject of the previous chapter. The spatial
planning of new essential infrastructure such that flood hazards are avoided wherever
possible is the most effective means of managing flood risk. UK planning policy guidance
promotes this principle and is also designed to ensure that, where new assets are
constructed in flood risk areas, they are not only protected to an acceptable standard
taking climate change into consideration, but also do not increase flood risk elsewhere.
Many infrastructure operators have powers to modify their assets, or construct certain
types of new asset, without obtaining planning permission. If such ‘permitted
development’ is to avoid creating new flood risks, it is important that operators
nevertheless adopt the principles in PPS25, SPP7, TAN15 and PPS15.
10.3.2 Substitution and provision of reserve capacity
Substitution involves use of alternative assets to fulfil the functions of any assets
temporarily out of action due to flooding. A good example of this was National Grid’s use
of alternative power generation facilities to feed the grid when Thorpe Marsh and
Neepsend were temporarily out of action.
Reserve capacity is the capacity available within a system of supply that is not strictly
required to meet demand. For example, a water company’s service reservoirs may have
extra “redundant” capacity such that, if an unexpected failure occurs in a WTW, there is
sufficient potable water available to continue supplying customers until the WTW is
repaired. Provision of such “buffer” storage is a common technique used by water
companies to reduce the risk of supply disruption.
10.3.3 Flood forecasting and warning
The Environment Agency, SEPA and NIRA provide a free forecasting and warning service
in the UK for river and coastal flooding. Coastal flood warnings can be provided several
days in advance of an event occurring. In the upper catchments of rivers however, warning
lead times can be very short, because the forecasts are based on rainfall-runoff models that
require measurements of actual rainfall depths to provide a forecast. Such forecasts are also
less reliable than those that can be provided further down a river system, where real time
measurements of river flow can be used to verify the outputs of rainfall-runoff models and
any necessary adjustments can be made in the forecast. These forecasts can be used to
trigger warnings using a variety of media directly to those in flood warning areas.
The need for appropriate escalation of these warnings to provide trigger levels for
appropriate actions at a local level is one of the main lessons identified from recent flood
events in the UK as discussed in Chapter 8. To understand what these warnings mean for
a particular asset can require further investigation to provide site specific triggers for
specific actions. Installing more river-level recorders close to a site may also help to
improve the accuracy of the forecasts.
Another important lesson identified was the need for better warnings of impending
pluvial and surface water flooding events. The Meteorological Office provides weather
64 CIRIA C688
forecasts and severe weather warnings. Weather radar can now be used to provide
indicative estimates of rainfall depths based on observations of cloud cover. Such forecasts
are not sufficiently reliable to provide accurate warnings of surface water flooding at a
particular location. However, if considered in conjunction with registers of known surface
water flooding hot spots, and well developed incident management procedures, such
warnings can be valuable to infrastructure operators.
10.3.4 Incident management and business continuity planning
Incident management procedures are designed to reduce the effects of a flood event by
optimising the response of all parties with a role to play in minimising the levels of
disruption caused. An accurate forecast and timely flood warning, even if it is escalated
appropriately, is of limited use, if the appropriate responses are not clearly understood by
those responsible for incident management. Infrastructure operators need to be aware of
the implications of flooding for their own assets as well as the systems on which they
remain functionally dependent, so that they can take appropriate actions to minimise the
risk of the asset being affected. They also need to identify those parties potentially affected
by outage of their systems so that timely warnings can be provided if there is a risk of
operational failure. An intimate knowledge of these effects and interdependencies is
similarly of little use, without a communication strategy designed to ensure that all parties,
including the general public, are aware of what actions are appropriate at any one time.
Incident management is closely aligned to business continuity planning. Business

continuity plans should include registers of all issues with potential to disrupt business
continuity, as well as well-developed contingency protocols (eg BS 25999 1:2006, which
covers business continuity management for extreme events). Such protocols may provide
very good value for money when compared to structural solutions for maintaining service
continuity during rare floods. Often the business continuity plan for an asset will be the
first port of call for those considering improvements in flood resilience.
10.3.5 Emergency exercises
Managing incident effectively cannot be achieved as an academic exercise. It frequently

requires co-operation between numerous organisations. Extreme events by their very
nature occur only infrequently and often beyond the individual career experience of staff
who may be faced with managing the situation. Properly designed emergency exercises
and simulated incidents can help these individuals prepare for situations they could face
in real time. Individual organisations often prepare and run their own exercises and
training events for flood and emergency situations. Experience shows there is much to be
learnt from flood emergency exercises where multiple agencies contribute and take part.
A range of examples of planned and recent emergency exercises follows with further
examples provided in Section 10.9.1.
The Environment Agency is planning to stage Exercise Watermark to test the

arrangements across England and Wales, and to respond to all aspects of severe, wide-
area flooding. This is expected to be hosted between the 7 and 11 March 2011. However,
as of September 2009, it is seeking support from Category 1 and 2 responders to assist
with the planning and development of the exercise.
In Wales, RAB Consultants were appointed via Environment Agency Wales to undertake
the development, delivery and review of exercise Watertight II, a strategic level, multi-
agency exercise that explored inter-agency recovery and considered the welfare and
economic issues that would arise when dealing with the recovery from major accidents.
The exercise took place on 22 October 2009 in Colwyn Bay. The exercise was developed
with input from a multi-agency exercise design team, which consists of specialists from

across North Wales. Technium CAST was commissioned by the Environment Agency
Wales to provide visualisation technology for the exercise.
In Scotland, Tayside strategic co-ordinating group tested the major flood incident
responses across Dundee City and Perth and Kinross Council’s Fire and Rescue, Police
and Ambulance Services. The exercise gave emergency planners a chance to test
procedures and assess what would be needed in a real emergency. The different stages of
a flooding incident were simulated, from rescuing and evacuating individuals to inter-
agency communication, command structures, and dealing with the aftermath and recovery.
At European level, EU FloodEx 2009 took place in September 2009 to test the co-
ordination of international civil protection. FloodEx is an EU co-financed exercise, in
accordance with the civil protection mechanism. The National Operations Centre was
assigned by the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to co-
ordinate the exercise (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2009). The
National Operations Centre’s mission is to co-ordinate the civil protection assistance of
several organisations during large scale incidents, disasters and events.
The development of the scenario used for FloodEx was based on the experiences and
input from the EU FloodCommand project, the storm surge flooding experienced in
Northern European countries in 1953 as well as worst conceivable flooding data. On
16–17 September, an international command post exercise was conducted, with all EU
member states invited to participate with their national contact points. This was followed
by an international field exercise that took place on 22–25 September – the objective was
to test the procedures during a request for assistance from The Netherlands to the EU.
The exercise was based on the European Community civil protection mechanism, with the
overall objective to improve and train in practice existing procedures for alerting,
mobilising and dispatching international emergency services in case of a serious flood.
10.4 STRUCTURAL MEASURES
10.4.1 Fixed flood defences
Fixed defences can include floodwalls or embankments, which are widely used across the
UK by flood defence operators. Figure 10.1 illustrates the components of a basic flood
defence wall. The basic principles apply to any system designed to exclude floodwater.
Figure 10.1 The basic components of a flood defence
66 CIRIA C688
The maximum water level constitutes the design flood level, with a given annual
probability of occurrence. The extra safety allowance above this level is known as
freeboard. In small, constrained watercourses water levels can be highly sensitive to small
increases in flow and estimating design flood levels can be an imprecise process –
freeboard allowances should be correspondingly generous. The Environment Agency has
provided guidance on calculation of appropriate margins using a range of techniques
(Kirby and Ash, 2000), which is being updated. Flood walls are seldom designed to be
fully watertight, but water seeping beneath and through a defence should be limited to
acceptable levels – this often requires use of a seepage cut-off.
Design and construction of flood defences is a specialist field requiring input from
hydrologists, geotechnical and civil/structural engineers. The Construction (Design and
Management) Regulations 2007 (CDM2007) is likely to apply to projects involving design
and construction of such measures.
The Concrete Centre has recently published guidance on the use of concrete for flood
protection (MPA–The Concrete Centre, 2009).
10.5 FLOOD RESILIENT AND RESISTANT CONSTRUCTION FOR

BUILDINGS
An important reference document by the Communities and Local Government establishes
two main strategies for achieving resilience: the applicability is dependent on the water
depth the property is subjected to (CLG, 2007). The following definitions are taken from
this publication:
Water exclusion strategy: where emphasis is placed on minimising water entry while
maintaining structural integrity, and on using materials and construction techniques to
help drying and cleaning. This strategy is favoured when low flood water depths are
involved (not more than 0.3 m). This strategy can be considered as a resistance measure
but it is part of the aim to achieve overall building resilience.
Water entry plan: where emphasis is placed on allowing water into the building,
facilitating draining and consequent drying. Standard masonry buildings are at significant
risk of structural damage if there is a water level difference between outside and inside of
about 0.6 m or more. This strategy is favoured when high flood water depths are involved
(greater than 0.6 m).
In the case of retrofitting of buildings to make them flood resistant, there are multiple
pathways by which floodwater can pass through a set of resistance measures (see Figure
10.3), that can make adopting a water exclusion strategy challenging. This is another
reason why this technique is not recommended for flood depths greater than 300 mm.

Figure 10.2 Flood water penetration into buildings (adapted from ODPM, 2002 and CIRIA C624)
Flood resilience and water-entry strategies will often be more appropriate for assets at
high risk of flooding. Guidance has been generated by the National Flood Forum (2009)
on a wide range of practical measures that can be undertaken to reduce the damage
inflicted by floodwater to residential property and minimise the period it takes to get back
to normal operation. Much of the CLG guidance on flood resilient buildings will also be
relevant. It is important that specialist structural advice is sought wherever water-
resistance measures, designed to retain more than 300 mm of water, are fitted to an
existing building.
10.6 TEMPORARY AND DEMOUNTABLE FLOOD DEFENCES

The definition of a temporary defence in Publicly Available Specification (PAS) 1188 (BSI,
2003) is: “a removable flood protection system that is wholly installed during a flood event
and removed completely when water levels have receded”. This can be differentiated from
demountable defences that have pre-prepared permanent foundations and/or mounting
systems. Full definitions and interim guidance are provided in the guidance by Defra and
the Environment Agency (2002). Suppliers and basic guidance on their use is provided
up-to-date on the Environment Agency and SEPA websites. Further detailed guidance
from the Environment Agency is being updated. There is now a range of BSI kite marked
products available.
The Environment Agency is particularly experienced in the use of temporary flood

defences and was instrumental in setting up a kite mark scheme for these products. The
Environment Agency has produced a policy statement on their use (Environment Agency,
68 CIRIA C688
2010). Important issues relate to the need to understand and minimise the obstacles to
their successful deployment and also recognising that operational costs are higher for
these systems than they are for fixed structures.
10.7 DESIGN STANDARDS

Sir Michael Pitt’s review recommended that a level of resilience be built into critical
infrastructure assets that ensure continuity during a worst-case flood event. The review
suggested that a minimum standard of 0.5 per cent (1 in 200) annual probability flood
would be a proportionate starting point. It identified that the resilience of critical
infrastructure to low-probability, high-consequence events is a fundamental point of public
interest. The review recommended that the Government issues interim guidance to
regulators in the form of resilience obligations to be met by utilities companies that are
based on the Government-set standards to ensure essential services are appropriately
protected.
In the US, unless a community specifies otherwise, the design flood elevation is the one
per cent (1 in 100) annual probability flood for bridges, buildings and other important
facilities and the 0.2 per cent (1 in 500) annual probability flood for critical facilities.
In the UK, there is a wide range of standards referred to in guidance and adopted by
different sectors, which generally reflects the level of risk involved. For example, large
raised reservoirs are categorised in the ICE’s document on flood and reservoir safety
(ICE, 2006) according to the risk posed by their failure. High-risk (Category A) dams are
designed to safely pass the probable maximum flood (PMF), unless overtopping of the
dam is tolerable, in which case the 0.01 per cent (1 in 10 000) annual probability flood
may be acceptable (for further reference see also Hughes et al, 2000). Where the
consequences of flooding are less onerous, less stringent standards are applied. For
example WRc Group (2006) specifies that sewers should accommodate the 3.3 per cent (1
in 30) annual probability event, and surface water flooding is acceptable during storms
that exceed this probability. Examples showing standards adopted by the Highways
Agency and Network Rail are provided in Boxes 10.1 and 10.2:
Box 10.1 Design standards adopted by the Highways Agency
The Design manual for roads and bridges sets out the design standards to be used on the Highways
Agency network (HA, 2006). For edge-of-pavement drainage this is the 100 per cent (1 in 1) annual
probability storm tested to the 20 per cent (1 in 5) annual probability storm. For attenuation/treatment
ponds the requirement is the one per cent (1 in 100) annual probability storm. This design flood is also
used to set bridge soffit levels. All of these design events should include an allowance of 20 per cent for
climate change for the rainfall intensities/river flows used in the design storm. This has been the case
since 2006.

Box 10.2 Design standards adopted by Network Rail
Civil engineering assets are:

designed and maintained to be robust so that they remain fully operational during periods of
normal and abnormal weather, and they do not fail catastrophically during periods of extreme
weather
designed so that they can be readily, and economically, repaired or replaced when their integrity or
performance is affected
managed so that the safety of their users, and of the general public, is not at risk during periods
of extreme weather.
The predicted effects of climate change are taken into account in the design, construction, maintenance
and operation of civil engineering assets that have a long service life.
In the design of most (but not all) renewal and improvement works for civil engineering assets of Network
Rail, abnormal weather can initially be considered as:
a 1 in 50 year event for primary routes
a 1 in 25 year event for secondary routes
a 1 in 10 year event for rural and freight only routes.
For all types of route, extreme weather can be considered as a 1 in 200 year event, but it may also be
prudent or instructive to consider the difference in effects of a 1 in 500 year event when designing some
types of asset, such as coastal defences.
Source: John Dora, Network Rail
In planning and designing measures to improve the resilience of existing infrastructure,

often the cost of achieving new build standards can be disproportionate. Defra guidance
specifies that the appropriate standard for flood protection for existing dense urban areas
at risk of fluvial flooding to be anywhere between a two per cent (1 in 50) to 0.5 per cent
(1 in 200) annual probability flood, depending on the costs and benefits of the options
identified (Defra, 2009c). However, this guidance does not extend to prescribing
appropriate indicative standards for critical infrastructure, which is discussed in the
recommendations (Chapter 14) of this publication.
The following sections illustrate some of the resilience measures being adopted within
each sector.
10.8 ENERGY SECTOR

Several electricity substation sites have been fitted with temporary, demountable and fixed
flood resistance measures following the work of ENA described in Section 9.4. A report
has been issued to the Energy Emergencies Executive by the Substation Resilience-to-
Flooding Task Group of the ENA, which outlines a variety of flood resistance measures
adopted and their associated costs (ENA, 2008). A range of data sheets for the products
they have used are included in Appendix C of the ENA report. An example is provided in
Figure 10.3.
70 CIRIA C688
Figure 10.3 An example of flood resistance measures used by members of the Energy Networks
Association (ENA, 2008)
Further to the guidance on the assessment and mitigation of flood risks discussed in
Section 9.4, the ENA has established an emergency planning manager’s forum that allows
senior managers across the electricity industry to plan and develop good practice to deal
with storm incidents. They are sharing experiences and supporting each other with
technical and manpower assistance during an emergency.
National Grid is developing a programme of resilience works based on development of

the following for all sites known to be at risk that are not already protected:
site-specific flood barrier deployment layout

plan showing civil work required on each site to maximise the effectiveness of the
temporary barrier system
long-term permanent defence options.

The results of surveys have refined the initial flood risk assessment, further reducing the
number of sites at risk from the one per cent annual probability flood. A full report on
each site is expected March 2010. National Grid is committed to having permanent
protection on site for all sites without reliance on mobile flood defence barriers by 2020.
They are seeking finance for permanent works through the 2012 price review. In the
meantime many sites remain reliant on temporary flood barrier systems. They are
continuing to develop their temporary flood barrier deployment capability. This has
included deployment exercises. National Grid has also adopted a flood risk monitoring
process at Wokingham.
Less information has been provided or collated on power generation facilities. However,
Case study 10.1 provided by RWE npower plc, demonstrates that even if the facilities are
not at risk, if supply routes are threatened this can have implications for continuity of
operation. The case study illustrates that a range of simple measures can be taken to
manage the risks, if enough warning is received of an impending flood. However
unexpected situations (in this case a police roadblock), can highlight issues that may need
to be taken into consideration in the future.
Case study 10.1 Experience of flooding at Great Yarmouth power station
Great Yarmouth power station is a 400 MW combined cycle gas turbine power station located in
Great Yarmouth, Norfolk. The station is situated on a sandy peninsula 130 m east of the estuarine
River Yare and 340 m west of the North Sea. The elevation of the site varies between 2.8 m and 5.6
m above Ordnance Survey Datum.
The Environment Agency Flood Map indicates that the western half of the site is at risk of flooding
from the River Yare and that the town of Great Yarmouth, including the station site, is at risk of
isolation from the mainland in the event of flooding.
On 8 Nov 2007 at about 16:00 hrs station staff received the first warnings of possible flooding from
the Environment Agency’s Floodline flood warning service. Warnings were received by telephone, fax,
email and SMS text message. The warning related to a predicted storm surge in the North Sea. It was
predicted that the main surge and highest threat of flooding would occur at high tide, about 07:00h
the next morning. Warnings were also received by radio (BBC Radio Norfolk) and a battery powered
radio was continuously monitored in the control room. Although adequate, it was noted that news on
the Environment Agency website was more useful than the announcements given over the radio,
which were very generic in nature.
It is believed that the station may be capable of operation for a period of up to five days unless
flooding of the Turbine Hall itself (at 5 m elevation) occurred, but after five days, it would become
increasingly difficult to operate the station without supplies of spares and consumables that are
normally transported to the station by road.
It was decided that in the event of the flooding, the security guard would evacuate from his
Gatehouse (at 2.8 m elevation) to the station control room located in the Turbine Hall (at 5 m
elevation), which is at relatively little risk of flooding. Should it be necessary he would switch off
power to the building at the main panel and would close the Gatehouse doors. It was agreed that he
would leave the main gate to the site open to help entry by the emergency services if necessary.
Access to the site could also be helped by unlocking and opening an emergency gate (5.6 m
elevation) located on the eastern boundary of the site close to South Beach Parade Road. This gate
was identified as the exit route should flooding occur and evacuation of the station was called for.
During the night, station staff filled sandbags and placed them in front of the doors of the gas
insulated switchgear building, the electrochlorination building and the circulating water pumphouse.
The sulphuric acid tank in the electrochlorination building was isolated to minimise the possibility of
an acid leak.
As it was predicted that station staff might be “cut-off” by flooding, a quantity of food and water was
purchased sufficient to last four persons for five days and this was stored in the control room. It was
also verified that sufficient clothing, toiletries, etc. was available for the station staff.
As the surge approached, flooding did occur in areas of Great Yarmouth both north and south of the
station, however this flooding was very localised in nature and did not result in serious damage or
inconvenience. There was a slight problem: station staff, attempting to enter Great Yarmouth to go
to work and relieve the night shift, were stopped from entering the town by a police roadblock.
However, this roadblock was lifted at about 07:30h. It is not known if police would have allowed
access to the station had flooding been more severe in nature.
Source: Bruce Trayhurn, RWE npower plc
72 CIRIA C688
10.9 TRANSPORT SECTOR
10.9.1 Highways Agency
Recommendation 45 of the Pitt Review states that:
The HA, working through LRFs, should further consider the vulnerability of motorways
and trunk roads to flooding, the potential for better warnings, strategic road clearance to
avoid people becoming stranded and plans to support people who become stranded. (Pitt,
2008)
In response to this recommendation the HA has introduced a range of measures outlined

as follows. These are in addition to the flood risk assessment and mapping work described
in Chapter 9.
Emergency planning managers and officers
In 2008, two new roles of emergency planning manager (EPM) and emergency planning
officer (EPO) for each region of the HA were introduced. These new roles are responsible
for regional emergency planning and ensuring the Highways Agency discharges its
statutory duties as a Category 2 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
The EPMs and EPOs are undergoing training to ensure that they are in-line with the
National Occupational Standards (NOS) for Civil Contingencies and the Emergency
Planning Society’s core competency framework, which maximise the potential capability of
staff.
The EPMs are responsible for meeting the aims outlined in Recommendation 45 by
formulating emergency plans and working closely with the LRFs, RRF and associated
working groups.
Emergency planning exercise
The HA developed and delivered Exercise Extend in conjunction with West Mercia LRF
as described in Case study 10.2.
Case study 10.2 Highways Agency Exercise Extend
This multi-agency exercise was delivered in September 2008 to validate the West Mercia LRF draft
evacuation framework and the HA emergency customer welfare (ECW) policy, as well as raising
awareness of the HMG evacuation and shelter guidance.
Exercise Extend focused on two flooding scenarios: evacuation of a major hospital and the in-situ
management of a nursing home. This exercise was attended by over 100 delegates from the civil
protection community, including representation from the emergency services, local authorities,
healthcare trusts, Government Office West Midlands, HA, DfT, military, British Red Cross (BRC) and
other voluntary and private sector organisations. Exercise Extend was opened by Paul West, chief
constable of West Mercia Constabulary, and chair of West Mercia LRF, who described the exercise
as a landmark event for the region.
Future exercises
One of the ways that the EPMs and EPOs are meeting Recommendation 45 is the development and
anticipated delivery of six future multi-agency emergency exercises. The HA are planning to
manage further exercises in the financial year 2009–2010 within each of the other six agency
regions to test plans and processes with LRF partners for response to flooding with themes
including strategic road clearance during an incident and the provision of ECW to stranded
motorists.
Source: Michael Whitehead, Highways Agency

Emergency customer welfare
In July 2006, following recommendations resulting from a detailed study, the HA Board
gave its approval for the development and later introduction of policy guidance and a
service capability for delivery of basic, emergency welfare to stranded motorists.
As part of a staged approach to emergency consumer welfare (ECW), interim

arrangements were introduced in January 2007, with the British Red Cross (BRC)
offering to provide voluntary assistance to the HA as part of their existing remit. Since
then, more formal arrangements have been developed for providing ECW.
During 2006 BRC and WRVS (formerly known as Women’s Royal Voluntary Service) were
approached by the HA to provide ECW support and in 2008 a memorandum of
understanding (MoU) outlining conditions was drafted and agreed for each organisation.
These current agreements officially ended on 31 March 2009. The RSPCA agreed to lead
on all animal welfare issues and will respond to provide emergency welfare to those
stranded on the HA’s network. Existing arrangements between the HA and RSPCA have
been suitably updated to incorporate these other commitments.
The HA commissioned further work in February 2009 to produce a validation report to

determine to what extent the HA needs to be supported by third party organisations.
Access and egress from the highway system
Recommendation 45 states the HA should, in collaboration with LRF, consider strategic

road clearance to avoid people becoming stranded. With this in mind the Highways
Agency secured funds to enable more access/egress points to be constructed on the
network. Area teams have been requested to identify suitable locations and a programme
of work will be developed for 2009–2010.
10.9.2 London Underground
London Underground applies demountable flood defences and also incorporates flood
resistant, flood resilient or flood repairable building measures. London Underground also
contributes towards publicly funded flood defences.
Tube Lines Limited operates an in-house flood forecasting and warning system, but also
applies temporary flood defences, demountable flood defences (ie removable systems with
permanent foundations and mountings) and permanent flood gates.
10.9.3 Network Rail
Current Network Rail guidance on flood resistance and resilience measures to take
account of the effects of climate change is as follows:
for assets that are subject to the effects of water, such as drains, scour protection
systems, retaining walls and earthworks, to be designed to the conditions described in
Table B2 of PPS25
for coastal and estuarine defences to be designed to the conditions described in Tables
B1 and B2 of PPS25
this advice could also be used when assessing the capacity of existing civil engineering
assets.
A guidance document by the Railway Group Standard (2004) is also used.
74 CIRIA C688
Network Rail made a submission to the Pitt Review team in 2007, in which three priority
areas are described:
1 The use of railway embankments as flood defences. Defra, the Environment Agency
and Network Rail have discussed this as a potentially economic way of protecting
communities against flooding. However recognition should be made that the age,
purpose and form of construction of railway embankments renders them unsuited to
acting as formal flood defences. Network Rail has an obligation to maintain its
embankments as fit-for-purpose for carrying the railway and would look favourably
upon approaches to formalise and make funds available for the use of the railway
corridor to help manage flood risks. Network Rail supports Pitt’s interim conclusion
for a local register of all the main flood risk management and drainage assets compiled
by local authorities. Councils should work closely with asset owners, DfT and Defra
over their local registers.
2 Network Rail has worked within the strategic flood planning framework run by the
Environment Agency, for both inland and coastal flood and erosion planning.
Experience of this process and evidence from the 2007 floods suggests to us that this
approach has led to ten or more years of good (and developing) advice and guidance
concerning people and property within the one per cent (1 in 100) annual probability
floodplain. However, this system has also led to a level of ignorance about the
consequences of more severe flooding events, the hindrance of recovery plans after
extreme events and a lack of attention to flood mitigation and national policy on
infrastructure, including rail.
Also, it is perceived that environmental considerations have affected the affordability
and delivery of sound technical solutions to flooding and coastal erosion. This runs
counter to the need to balance environmental concerns against social and economic
factors to achieve overall sustainability.
Pitt’s interim conclusion that the government should establish a systematic, co-
ordinated, cross-sector campaign to reduce the disruption caused by natural events to
critical infrastructure and vital services is particularly welcomed by Network Rail.
3 Network Rail also welcomed the Pitt Review recommendation that the government
should develop and issue guidance on consistent and proportionate minimum levels of
protection from flooding for critical infrastructure.
In their submission to the Pitt Review, Network Rail suggested that infrastructure is
assessed against weather-based criteria for resilience. Network Rail advocates
standards for infrastructure that set separate weather-based thresholds for traffic
operations and for structural integrity. For example, when the Network Rail primary
route network is renewed it should permit safe operations in weather events up to a
two per cent (1 in 50) annual probability flood, and all civil engineering assets (when
renewed) should be capable of withstanding adverse weather conditions for a 0.5 per
cent (1 in 200) annual probability flood. Consistent setting and application of weather-
based standards would allow sectors to plan for, and respond to, extreme events more
robustly and with a more predictable outcome.

Case study 10.3 Network Rail’s use of flood outlines for siting of telecommunications installations
The FTN/GSM-R (qv) programme represents a £1.7bn investment to improve the reliability,
availability, efficiency and safety of Britain’s railway through the adoption of proven modern digital
telecommunications technology. It is the largest telecoms project ever to be undertaken on Britain’s
railways. Over the six years from 2008 the project will provide a new, high functionality, digital radio
system that will allow train drivers to speak directly with signallers across the entire network. This
is GSM-R (global system for mobile communications – railway).
At the same time, the project is renewing the entire line-side fixed telecoms network that supports
all of the railway’s daily telecoms needs. This involves installing around 15 000 km of optical fibre
and copper cables, 3000 new transmission sites, over 2250 new radio sites, seven new operational
telephone exchanges and migration of circa 50 000 nr operational circuits. This is FTN (fixed
telecom network).
Why is this necessary?
Construction of the railway communications system (the collective name for FTN/GSM-R) will adopt
nationally standardised equipment, significantly improving reliability and replacing ageing
infrastructure. It will provide a modern, highly structured and robust fixed telecoms network
designed to meet the operational needs of tomorrow’s railway and cater for Network Rail’s business
communications requirements.
Avoiding flood risk
The programme identified significant risks to system reliability where critical line-side equipment
might become flooded. The programme’s engineering team approached the national structures
engineering policy team and sought access to the flood plain maps that reside in the Network Rail
corporate GIS. These maps show flood outlines for 10 per cent, four per cent, two per cent, one per
cent and 0.4 per cent annual probability fluvial floods and were developed in 2003 by JBA
Consulting. By avoiding the siting of, for example, transmission masts and their associated
equipment buildings in the flood plains as defined in the GIS the programme will achieve the
delivery of a flood-resistant communications system.
10.10 WATER SECTOR

Ofwat works with the industry and other stakeholders to develop a consistent and
coherent framework for assessing flooding risk and identifying cost-beneficial measures to
improve resilience of critical measures to improve the resilience of critical assets. In
particular, Ofwat expects companies to be able to demonstrate that they have identified
the right set of measures to improve resilience, along with the timeframe for taking action.
76 CIRIA C688
Case study 10.4 Consideration of flood resilience versus resistance at the Mythe WTW
Flooding of the Rivers Severn and Avon in July and August 2007 affected the Mythe WTW in the
Gloucestershire area. Temporary defences, such as Hesco barriers and demountable defences on the
main entrance and openings, were erected by Severn Trent Water Limited (STWL) following this event
to provide some level of protection should another such event occur (see Figure 10.4).
STWL commissioned Mouchel to undertake the design
of the flood defences to protect the site while ensuring
the site maintained operational capability during a flood
event. A flood resilience assessment was carried out to
determine the most appropriate strategic defence
technique.
The use of flood resilience techniques, such as local
flood defences, flood-proofing and the raising of
susceptible assets, were compared with the more
traditional approach of providing a flood defence barrier
(a flood resistant technique).
A flood-resistant type scheme was the recommended
option. As STWL requested that the site should remain
fully operational for a flood event, the adoption of flood
resilience techniques wholly or in part across the site will
compromise their operational capabilities. It would pose
significant health and safety risks to the operatives
during a flood event bearing in mind the potential depth
(up to above 1 m) and velocity of flood water.
Figure 10.4
The flood resistant type scheme would be a defence
Hesco temporary barriers erected at around the perimeter of the site comprising traditional
Mythe WTW following the flood events hard and soft defences where appropriate. As it is around
of 2007 the perimeter of the site resilience measures, such as the
use of perimeter buildings as flood barriers where suitable, were investigated. Assessments of these
structures and buildings across the site were undertaken to ascertain suitability for this purpose,
such as flotation calculations and structural stability checks to ensure they could withstand the
hydraulic forces.
a b
Figure 10.5 Actual flood resistant measure employed at the Mythe WTW (a) and a 3D model
showing the site protected from flood water (b)
STWL operational staff have been heavily involved with the choice of the final alignment so that the
defence does not impair their capability to operate the site during a flood event or otherwise.
Source: Paul Swift, Mouchel Ltd, Client: Severn Trent Water Limited. Principal contractor: Costain

10.11 COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
The UK’s major telecommunications companies including BT, Cable & Wireless, NTL and
THUS are all investing heavily in building “next generation networks” and are
collaborating on technical and commercial issues via the Ofcom sponsored NGNUK
(2008). It is not clear to what extent flood risk is being factored into the design of these
systems.
The HA, responsible for England’s motorways, has launched a ten year modernisation
plan that will spend close to £500m on a single data network for the whole country.
As in the energy sector, Scada systems using radio links are widely used in the water
industry to manage reservoirs and plants for monitoring and controlling water pressure,
flows and reservoir levels. But these systems are then open to jamming and security
problems relating to their use of the internet.
10.12 PUBLICLY-FUNDED FRM CAPITAL WORKS

Consideration of flood resilience for critical infrastructure needs to be undertaken within
the context of a wider understanding of developments in publicly funded flood risk
management activity. This section focuses on recent developments in England, many of
which are mirrored in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The forthcoming Floods and Water Management Bill is set to formalise evolutionary
changes in public sector flood risk management activity in England first set in motion by
the Easter 1998 floods. The intervening period has seen a move from flood defence
towards a “portfolio approach to flood risk management”. Defra’s strategy developed with
the Environment Agency was first put out to consultation in 2004. A programme of
activities has also been introduced under the following themes:
integrated approach: this theme focuses on the Environment Agency’s strategic

overview of flood risk from all sources. FRM policy is set strategically at river
catchment scale by CFMPs and along the coast by SMPs. Strategies for capital
investment in flood risk management measures are then developed in flood risk
management strategies, which consider short, medium and long-term investment
needs, taking climate change effects into consideration. There is a strong focus on
flood hazard mapping, including consideration of pluvial, groundwater and now
reservoir breach flood hazards. Urban flood risk and integrated drainage also falls into
this theme, with local authorities tasked with preparing SWMPs for areas with critical
drainage problems under the Environment Agency’s supervision
achieving sustainable development: this theme covers new approaches to flood risk
management, and the development of “outcome measures” (discussed in Chapter 11)
to prioritise expenditure. Also, sustainable techniques for achieving the government’s
development agenda, including improved risk management, land-use planning and
involving stakeholders. Flood alleviation projects are increasingly focused on working
in better harmony with natural processes, improving the environment and increasing
biodiversity. But the substantial focus is on community protection. The Environment
Agency has a target of increasing protection to 149 000 properties in the current
comprehensive spending review period
increasing resilience to flooding: climate change and coastal change adaptation and
on helping communities to become more resilient. This includes the preparation of
guidance on flood resilient buildings developed with the Communities and Local
Government (see Section 10.5) as well as a grant scheme for local authorities,
78 CIRIA C688
administered by Defra, to encourage using resilience measures by residential property
owners (Defra, 2009b). It also covers flood forecasting emergency preparedness and
response
funding: maximising funding opportunities. The majority of funding is from central
government and it is recognised that the direct beneficiaries of flood alleviation works
could contribute more to the costs of such measures.
The regulatory framework, as outlined in Chapter 4, is different in Scotland, Wales and

Northern Ireland, but many of the themes from the Defra strategy (2004a) are mirrored
in the approaches taken by the devolved administrations. This is important because:
considerable sums of public money are being invested in flood risk management
capital projects (>£250m pa in England and Wales)
the Environment Agency and Defra have a major R&D programme, many of the
outputs of which are directly relevant to improving infrastructure flood resilience.
Further details can be found at the Defra website www.defra.gov.uk
a system of framework agreements is in place across England and Wales between the
Environment Agency and consultants and contractors with specialist skills for adopting
flood resistance and resilience measures
publicly funded resilience measures are focused on communities, and particularly
vulnerable residential properties, rather than on protection of critical infrastructure
(discussed further in Chapter 11)
pressure on the HM Treasury means that commercial beneficiaries of government
spending on FRM activity may have to contribute directly towards the cost of schemes
that they benefit from.
The Environment Agency’s prioritisation of their capital spend takes the presence of CNI
into account, but information on the economic benefits of protecting this infrastructure
are not necessarily factored into the initial ranking process (see Chapter 11). Case study
10.5 is an example of flood resilience and resistance measures being adopted in other
critical infrastructure sectors.

Case study 10.5 Flood resistance measures installed at Safeway superstore, Lewes
In the light of increasing flood awareness Safeway commissioned a risk assessment of all of their
outlets and several stores were identified as being high flood risk. The most severely affected store
was in the town of Lewes in East Sussex and it was identified as the first to be defended.
Figure 10.6
Examples of flood resistance
measures installed at Safeways
superstore, Lewes
Safeway’s requirements for the flood defence systems were stringent:

the flood defence system should blend seamlessly with the store
the flood barriers should not reduce any sales or warehouse space, should not obstruct
customers or trolleys and should be quickly operated by untrained staff
all store refrigeration units were to remain operational during a flood event.
One of the most complex aspects of the flood defence was protecting the floor to ceiling windows
which run along the entire supermarket front, these were not watertight and replacing them with a
permanent flood wall was not acceptable to the client or to the local planning authorities.
The solution employed was to install a demountable barrier system inside the building immediately
next to the windows. The system is left permanently in place, but it can be removed for cleaning and
maintaining the windows. The system is finished in Safeway corporate white to blend with the
building and incorporates an aluminium shelf running between the top of the barrier and the window
preventing rubbish from being dropped behind the barrier and creating valuable extra display space.
The wide main entrance to the store presented problems as the area had to be completely
unrestricted and the barrier would be the last to be closed once the building was evacuated and the
main doors locked.
The solution was to install an electrically operated drop-down barrier with manual over-ride. When not
in use the barrier is housed in the ceiling void above the entrance and is automatically lowered by
means of a secure key switch located outside the building.
Inside the store all emergency exit doors are fitted with slot-in barriers, with the flood boards
conveniently stored on wall brackets ready for immediate deployment in the event of a flood alert.
The warehouse loading bays are protected with slot-in barriers modified to clear the security roller
shutters and accommodate the load leveller mechanism, without reducing warehouse and unloading
space. In the plant room air intake and ventilation units are protected by semi-permanently installed
barriers that have been modified to give space around the units allowing free circulation of the
airflow.
The one external concession that the local planners allowed was the construction of a bunded
compound for the emergency generator fuel store. This area is much lower than the main store and
is at risk of flooding to a depth of two metres. A full height hinged watertight door was used to protect
the entrance to the compound.
Source: Flood Protection Association. Supplier: Flood Control Limited. Client: Safeway
80 CIRIA C688
10.13 SUMMARY
A hierarchy of measures has been developed that can be used to manage the flood risks
associated with critical infrastructure (Table 10.1). One such hierarchy, that of avoidance,
substitution, control and mitigation is embedded in latest spatial planning policy – most
explicitly with the practice guide to PPS25 (CLG, 2009). When planning new
infrastructure, and modifying existing infrastructure, adoption of the principles in
government spatial planning policy, regardless of whether planning permission is actually
required, should do much to improve flood resilience in the future. Industry guidance on
asset management, maintenance and repair would benefit from inclusion of these
principles.
There is a wide range of options for improving the resilience of existing assets in flood
risk areas. These are both structural and non-structural. The case studies in Chapter 10
illustrate that many non-structural measures are already being used including flood
warnings, incident-management procedures and business continuity plans.
There are several examples of where infrastructure operators have adopted physical
resilience measures. These comprise both fixed and demountable systems.
The standards of protection adopted have generally been aligned with existing industry
practice for new development: one per cent (1 in 100) annual probability in England, 0.5
per cent (1 in 200) in Scotland. However, much of this work will have comprised
permitted development.

11 Examples of FRM investment
prioritisation
11.1 INTRODUCTION
All infrastructure operators, whether public or private, are tightly regulated to ensure that
they provide value for money. Communicating the benefits of long-term investments in
businesses that do not reap immediate dividends for customers and/or shareholders is
difficult. There is little information available on people’s willingness to pay for measures
that reduce the risk of occasional temporary disruption due to future flood events.
Similarly, there are no rigorous studies available identifying what disruption to essential
services by flooding costs the UK economy. This chapter provides some examples of
current guidance and practice.
11.2 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY

As stated in Chapter 6, the focus of publicly funded flood risk management activities in
the UK is on the protection of existing residential properties and communities. The
outcome measures summarised in Table 11.1 are used in England to prioritise the capital
spend.
Table 11.1 Outcome measures summary table
Outcome measures Definition Minimum target
Average benefit cost ratio across the capital

OM1 5 to 1 average with all
programme based on the present value
projects having a benefit cost
Economic benefits whole-life costs and benefits of projects
ratio robustly greater than 1
delivering in the SR07 period
OM2 Number of households with improved 145 000 households of which

Household protected standard of protection against flooding or 45 000 are at significant or
(see Note 1) coastal erosion risk greater probability
OM3 Number of households for which the

probability of flooding is reduced from 9000 of the 45 000
Deprived households significant or greater through projects households in OM2
at risk benefiting the most deprived 20% of areas
OM4 Hectares of SSSI land where there is a

programme of measures in place (agreed
Nationally important 24 000 hectares
with Natural England) to reach target
wildlife sites condition by 2010
OM5 Hectares of priority biodiversity action plan

800 hectares – at least 300
UK biodiversity action (BAP) habitat including intertidal created by
hectares should be intertidal
plan (BAP) habitats March 2011
The schemes that achieve the highest scores are generally those that have a high benefit-
to-cost ratio, protect large numbers of residential property. They also create new
biodiversity action plan (BAP) habitat or protect existing sites of special scientific interest
(SSSI).
82 CIRIA C688
The Environment Agency uses a tool to prioritise flood alleviation schemes within its
capital programme. The ranking process is undertaken using a GIS-based system, the
primary input to which is the geographical area at risk from flooding associated with each
potential project. A range of databases are included within this prioritisation tool as listed
in Table 11.2. Those with an asterisk are used to establish an indicative outcome measure
score for the scheme, but information from the other databases, included the CNI
database, are taken into consideration in a review of the rankings.
Table 11.2 Datasets used to provide an initial ranking of priority flood alleviation projects
Dataset Needed for:
Economic damages
National flood risk assessment (NaFRA)*
Risk bands
National Property Database (NPD v2)* Property numbers
SOA ward deprivation* Indices of multiple deprivation at SOA level
Whole-life cost
System asset management plan* Viability
Cost profile
Indicator of possible legal constraints, needs or

Environmental* designations
opportunities under EC Habitats Directive (1992)
National flood and coastal defence database Residual life/condition grade
Critical national infrastructure (CNI) Presence of CNI
Catchment vulnerability Identify locations of more vulnerable communities
S/CFMP policy units Policy direction
Note
* Datasets used to establish an indicative outcome measure score.
The NaFRA database is used to calculate the economic damages associated with flooding
in a particular benefit area. At present, NaFRA does not take into consideration the
economic benefit of protecting critical infrastructure, such as roads, railway lines and
utilities.
Priority schemes are later introduced for full appraisal with scheme costs and benefits
considered in detail. Net present value costs and benefits are calculated for all shortlisted
options, discounted at rates specified in HM Treasury (2003), generally over a 100 year
appraisal period. The rationale for economic appraisal is to identify the option that
provides the highest overall benefit-to-cost ratio. However, this option often does not
provide an acceptable standard of protection. Defra issues guidance on indicative
standards of protection for different types of land-use and decision rules for the
consideration of options that have lower overall benefit-to-cost ratios but achieve an
appropriate standard of protection. These decision rules are designed to ensure that more
money is not committed to improving the standard of protection afforded by one scheme
that would be more effectively spent elsewhere.
11.3 THE APPROACH ADVOCATED BY OFWAT

An industry-wide review into the 2007 floods and the implications for water and
wastewater companies was presented by Water UK (2009). In analysing flood risk, Ofwat

expects companies to adopt as far as practicable established principles of economic (cost-
beneficial) risk-based analysis. Ofwat’s cost-benefit analysis methodology (Ofwat, 2009c)
can be summarised as follows:
1 Determine the current level of service being provided to customers and the risk costs
(all direct and indirect costs and benefits) for a particular asset.
2 Identify interventions aimed at improving service.
3 Quantify all economic costs and benefits for the relevant interventions being
considered (based on an economic valuation of impact), including wider economic
benefits and costs to society and the environment.
4 Rank options by net present value (NPV) calculated for the defined planning horizon.
5 Select the intervention with the largest, positive NPV (if there is not one, then do
nothing is the appropriate choice).
6 Assess and prioritise the scheme-level intervention at programme level.
One difficulty faced by those applying this methodology will be valuing the full economic
benefits of protection measures.
Case study 11.1 Prioritisation of spending on flood risk for the 2010 to 2015 asset management period for
Veolia Water Central
The on-site surveys and later option assessments outlined in Section 9.8.1 have determined the
design and cost for physical mitigation measures. Because of its unique layout and topography
each site requires a tailored solution. However the protection measures fall into generic categories.
Consideration of not only the flood risk to the sites but also risks to power supplies and the ability
to access the sites in flood conditions. Previous experience has also demonstrated the need to
provide stocks of sand bags and waders.
EDF the electricity supplier is involved in a similar risk assessment process but not so well
advanced. They could however identify two sites that had either their primary feed or substation
feed that could be at risk but could not identify mitigation measures or when these might be carried
out. One site had already been identified as being possible to support by rezoning of the water
network. The other, an important booster, already on the list to have remedial works carried out was
so important that it was decided to install a standby generator as part of the flood resilience plans.
Access to the sites has caused a problem in the past and would become a bigger problem under
climate change scenario. Included in the costs are the up-rating of two vans to flood proof vehicles
and provision of two inflatable boats. Also included are increases in stock levels of sandbags and
waders.
A cost-benefit analysis exercise has been carried out independently and shows a positive outcome
when the benefits were considered in terms of private costs, environmental and social
improvements and customers’ willingness to pay. The analysis has been carried out at three levels
of return period. The cost benefit analysis clearly supports the investment proposals.
Alex Back, Veolia Water Central (formally Three Valleys Water)
11.4 THE APPROACH ADOPTED BY SCOTTISH WATER

Scottish Water is committed to developing and maintaining a long-term strategic
approach to managing its asset base to ensure that customer requirements and
expectations are maintained or exceeded. When subjected to extreme weather, water
supply assets should be adequately protected to ensure a continuous supply of quality
drinking water to customers.
Current (short term) investment
For the SR10 investment period (2010–2015), Scottish Water has prioritised investment
against all “historic“, predicted “at risk associated” and “critical” assets (described in
84 CIRIA C688
Section 9.8.2), regardless of the magnitude of customer impact. This entails putting in
place contingencies as soon as practicable, followed by protection measures thereafter.
The situation regarding waste water assets is less clear. Scottish Water has identified its
position through alignment with SEPA 1:200 fluvial and coastal flood maps. Scottish Water
intends to clarify the risk position for the investment period 2010–2015 through a desktop
risk screening of all its WW assets. Also, it intends to carry out flood risk assessments of
critical WwTW and WwPS.
Future investment approach
Scottish Water is wholly reliant on government approved funding, which is broadly

categorised under “capital maintenance”, “quality”, “growth” or “enhancement”.
Prioritisation of investment is justified using Scottish Water’s Investment Support System
(SWISS) tool. This tool considers “risk”, which is then promoted to a “need” and scored
consistently against business output performance measures (OPMs). These are then
balanced against “benefit” with regards to the “need”. This allows investment scenarios to
be tested, ranked and optimised solutions to be derived against allocated funds.
When considering investment against flood risk, the mechanisms of SWISS typically
produce low benefit scores due to the large investment costs, with the potential for
deferred investment decisions.
The true extent of a 0.5 per cent (1 in 200) annual probability floodplain and further
climate change elements are still unclear, particularly for assets classified as “at risk”. So, it
is difficult to initially justify vast investment sums to adopt full-scale defence measures. An
ideal situation would seek to employ an avoidance solution that reduces all aspects of
flood-related risk but this is not always practical, either through cost-benefit or due to
strategic positioning of the asset affecting other stakeholders.
As investment cycles progress, a staged-solution investment approach that considers

increasing physical protection is possible through “mitigation”, “defence” or “avoidance”.
Such defences would be either Scottish Water only, or involving joint stakeholders.
Direction would be provided by SEPA acting as “competent authority” in response to
obligations set out in the Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009 (Scottish
Government, 2004). This will mean using the optimum level of flood resilience at the
earliest opportunity, while considering possible future measures as data confidence in
flood mapping and climate change impact predictions improves. Avoidance opportunities
may occur at an earlier stage within the 25 year strategy and planning window, as
identified through anticipated mid-life and end-of-life scenarios affecting assets. These
opportunities whether through capital maintenance, quality, growth or enhancement can
then be considered to support the flood resilience investment need as identified via other
linked long-term asset strategies (LTAS). For example:
1 Water quality enhancements to a vital process treatment sub-asset that allows the
opportunity to elevate sub-assets to a higher safe level.
2 Asset rationalisation brought about through savings in asset life cycle costs as Scottish
Water lessen leakage, or through stricter water quality legislation.
3 High capital maintenance anticipated through the need to replace ageing sub-assets.
The various increased levels of protection are categorised and aligned as shown in
Table 11.3.

Table 11.3 Asset flood risk protection categories and aligned solutions
Protection
Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 Cat 5
category
Solution(s)
Unprotected Contingency Mitigation Defence Avoidance
method
Do nothing – Protect Divert flood Upgrade/

Solution Secure
accept risk building fabric path elevate/remove
Investment prioritisation (25 year horizon)
In mapping out asset resilience LTAS, Scottish Water are considering the strategic
approach for flood resilience protection investment activities over the short, medium and
long-term. Flood protection methods to safeguard assets classified against flood risk
exposure are being considered with respect to an investment timeline as shown in
Table 11.4.
Table 11.4 Short, medium and long-term investment
Investment Solution(s) SW flood risk exposure

Comments
period method classification
“Previously affected”, and

Contingency Water assets
“near misses”

Mitigation Water assets
“near misses”
2010–2015
Unprotected All classifications Waste water assets
Opportunities – linked across other

Avoidance All assets
LTAS for water and waste water assets
Contingency “At risk” (1:200) Water assets

Contingency Waste water assets
“near misses”
2015–2020 Mitigation “At risk” Water assets

Mitigation Waste water assets
“near miss”

Contingency “At risk” (1:200) Waste water assets
Mitigation “At risk” (1:200) Waste water assets
2020–2025 “Previously affected” and

Defence Water assets
“near miss”

“Previously affected” and

Defence Waste water assets
“near miss
2025–2035
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11.5 NATIONAL GRID
National Grid plan to prioritise their investment in permanent flood defence measures
based on flood likelihood. Stage 1 of their programme will reduce risk to sites at risk from
a one per cent annual probability flood. Stage 2 will aim to reduce risk to sites at risk from
a 0.5 per cent annual probability flood. Flood risk will be managed with temporary flood
defence until permanent works can be installed.
11.6 OTHER
Case study 11.2 is for a defence facility and illustrates how other organisations, in a similar
fashion to Scottish Water, are developing short, medium and long-term options for
improving flood resilience.
Case study 11.2 Defence facility flood mitigation strategy and investment planning 2009
A high-value critical asset, situated on a floodplain has a history of severe flooding. Political and
operational demands meant this risk to the site had to be minimised, not only in the long-term but
also in the intervening period. As a result a programme was developed to reduce long-term-site
exposure to flooding while delivering maximum levels of site resilience with near-immediate effect.
Short-term solution
Retro-fit resistance measures to vulnerable buildings, which uses PAS 1188:1 (BSI, 2003),
accredited flood guards to doors and vents and non-return valves to drainage etc. Other measures
include locating and sealing leak paths and resolving building fabric issues. This will require a
minimal investment of £750 000 against 50+ buildings to be delivered within twelve months. The
solutions are simple and require no consultation or planning permission. They can also be deployed
by general staff with minimal training and warning. However, human intervention and maintenance
programmes are required and protection is limited by the structural strength of the buildings.
Medium-term solution
Build perimeter defences from a mixture of permanent and (rapidly-deployable) demountable flood
protection products as per PAS 1188:2 (BSI, 2003) accredited Rapidam. Underground seepage
paths and watercourses will require extra measures, such as penstocks and non-return valves. High-
volume pumps will deal with groundwater, rainfall and any seepage.
This will provide further (or primary) levels of protection requiring an investment of circa £2m and
will take in the order of one year to design and construct. Planning of the demountable components
will take into account the limitation of available flood warnings as well as emergency operation
plans including the availability of manpower resources 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
Maintenance programmes for both permanent and demountable components will be required.
Being of site scale, any displacement of floodwater may require the approval of the Environment
Agency. Hydrological modelling and consultation with various internal/external organisations will
be required to demonstrate that the measures will not increase flood risk elsewhere. It is possible
that provision of compensatory floodplain storage may be required.
Long-term solution
In the long-term, critical functions are to be relocated to above 0.01 per cent (1 in 1000) annual
probability flood level as part of a scheme to replace an ageing facility with a state-of-the-art asset
to take the organisation through the century. This will effectively remove the asset from exposure
to the hazard.
Source: Gavin George, Flood Guards Systems Ltd

11.7 SUMMARY
Adopting physical resilience and resistance measures in the aftermath of the 2007 floods
has occurred most rapidly in areas affected by flooding during that event. This initial
activity has been more reactive rather than risk-based. However, risk-based investment
plans have been developed by some, particularly in the water and energy sectors. For
privatised energy and water companies, this investment may need to be reviewed
following price determinations by the economic regulators.
Investment prioritisation requires adopting a long-term strategic approach. Flood

mapping information is constantly improving, as is the understanding and mapping of
climate change-related flood risks. These improvements need to be accompanied by a
growing understanding of costs, benefits and customer’s willingness to pay. Using this
information and taking a long-term view, owners will be better placed to balance risks and
ensure optimised investment decision making.
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12 Interdependencies and cross-sector
collaboration
Critical infrastructure is highly interdependent. Building a greater level of resilience into

the UK’s CI systems will not be achievable without high levels of collaboration within and
between sectors.
During the project workshop (see Supporting document 2), one session aimed to identify
the principal vulnerable components of the main assets as well as the functional
dependencies contingent to their continued operation. The visualisation in Figure 12.1
was used at the workshop as an aid to discussion.
Figure 12.1 Visualisation of a major flood affecting an urban conurbation (courtesy Arup)
The results of the workshop are contained in Supporting document 2, and the main
findings are summarised in Table 12.1.

Table 12.1 Examples of infrastructure asset vulnerability and functional dependencies
Asset Vulnerable components Functional dependencies
Pumps Power supply

Sand filters Water
Chemical stores Communications and IT systems
Control room Transport and access
Telemetry systems
Water treatment works
Screen filters and valves
M&E equipment
Staff/operatives
Transport vans etc
Supply pipes
Track Power (for M&E equipment)

M&E equipment including power Communication (internal and
transmission external)
Lighting Transport and access
Signals, fire alarms and telemetry Water
Railway line and station systems
Bridges, embankment, cuttings etc
Oil interceptors
Passengers
Trains
Back-up generators Power

All equipment at low level Communication
Diesel supply storage Transport
People Access
Telephone exchange
Access Water
Radio/mobile
IT software
Cables entry
People – staff and patients Power (mains and standby)

Equipment Water
Building services Communication
Access Transport
Hospital Supplies Emergency services
A&E theatres Staff
Chemical and fuel stores Food
Stores of medicine
Back-up systems and generators
Transmitters Power
Cables Mains on standby (fuel stores)
Broadband antennae IT software
Control systems (switch gear)
The structure itself
Power station Generation equipment Power

Cables People
Power supplies Access
Staff and operatives Communication and IT systems
Control room equipment Water
Fuel stores Transport
Transport for fuel
Communication to link to grid
Cooling system
Waste removal
Security systems
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Table 12.1 (contd) Examples of infrastructure asset vulnerability and functional dependencies
Electricity substation Back-up generators Power

Cables, transformers and other Communication and IT systems
equipment Transport and access
Access
Security (many are unmanned)
Supermarket Equipment (tills, fridges, freezers) Power

Power supply (lights) Access (transport)
Supply chain (transport) Water
Access for staff/customers People
IT systems
Security
Fire station Vehicles Communications and IT systems

Equipment Transport and access (highways)
Staff Power and fuel stores
Multi-agency control centre Staff
IT and telecom systems
Access
The workshop illustrated how cross-sector collaboration is the most effective means of
building an understanding of inter-dependencies. It also demonstrated how useful
accurate visualisation tools can be in highlighting the implications of flooding for networks
of interconnected infrastructure systems.
The questionnaire survey and workshop identified that there are numerous obstacles to
effective collaboration, including:
a lack of resources, ie funding, people and skills

concerns over data sharing and national security or commercial sensitivity
lack of a common technical vocabulary familiar to all parties
a lack of accessibility to detailed flood data beyond the national flood maps and the use
of non-standard formats for generation of the data that is available.
Also, there are instances where Category 2 responders have felt sidelined in the civil
contingency planning process. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 requires organisations to
co-operate and share information, assess the risk of emergencies and prepare emergency
plans, inform the public, provide business continuity advice and promote business
continuity management.
Case studies 12.1 to 12.6 illustrate the potential and actual benefits of collaborative
working. Category 2 responders have been heavily involved with several projects.

Case study 12.1 Strategic infrastructure delivery plan in Gloucestershire
Delivery and planning of infrastructure required a systematic approach that is flexible and
responsive to change. Collaboration ideally brings together infrastructure providers, local
planning authorities and local strategic partnerships. Addressing these issues Gloucestershire
County Council introduced their strategic infrastructure delivery plan. The plan is to co-ordinate
the work of service providers and other sectors and also covers the wider social, political and
environmental considerations. There is a strong link to GIS that allow production of infrastructure
maps. It also allows the analysis of options for co-location of services.
Source: Nigel Riglar, Gloucestershire County Council
Case study 12.2 The Integrated Strategic Drainage Board in Hull
The floods that affected Hull in June 2007 were devastating to the built environment, primarily
housing stock with well over 8000 properties affected and many others experiencing some damage
from secondary flooding. The flood had immediate and on-going social and economic consequences
for Hull and the wider region. The area is left with an indelible flood “memory”, with the direct
physical and social consequences still evident and continually emerging, together with an
embedded feeling of uncertainty within the city’s communities. Flood risk also presents uncertainty
to all forms of investor as well as local communities.
The Integrated Strategic Drainage Board for Hull was established following the floods. In December
2008 a sub group, the Integrated Strategic Drainage Task Group, was formed as a multi-agency
response to the risk of all forms of flooding in Hull and the surrounding area. The partner
organisations involved in the Partnership are Hull City Council, the Environment Agency, Yorkshire
Water Services and the East Riding of Yorkshire Council (as observer).
The focus of the partnership is to adopt fit for purpose investment programmes within the City of
Hull, maximising all available resources to mitigate risk with the greatest integration of actions. The
partners intend to use an evidence based approach to seek further funding from regional, national
and European sources. The overall objective of the project was to provide the business and
investment cases to mitigate the risk of all forms of flooding and create a flood mitigation
infrastructure programme for the City of Hull.
The Integrated Strategic Drainage Partnership is determining the scope for a comprehensive
integrated drainage study. This will inform the work of the Partnership and assist them in developing
risk mitigation strategies. The Partnership is also scoping the areas for joint working at a local level
to realise more immediate benefit from emergency planning.
Achievements to date have included:
securing bidding for £50 000 for pilot SWMP from Defra
securing £40 000 from Environment Agency partnership agreement to add value to SWMP
securing Environment Agency local levy funding for potential aqua-greens post SWMP
SWMP works commissioned to report in October 2009.
Source: David Gibson, Hull City Council
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Case study 12.3 Local resilience forum in Hull
In response to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 legislation Hull City Council, in partnership with
responders in the Humber sub-region, developed a new framework at a local level to provide civil
protection. The Humber local resilience forum is a chief officer led group made up of all Category 1
responders who collectively formulate local policies and protocols to meet the requirements of the
Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Several working sub groups have been established to consider specific
aspects of emergency planning and civil contingency. Above the local resilience framework there is
a regional resilience forum for Yorkshire and the Humber on which members of the Humber local
resilience forum sit. Collectively this body formulates regional policies in-line with the Civil
Contingencies Act 2004 that supports the national framework.
Hull City Council operates an emergency planning partnership with other local authorities in the
Humber area. In March 2007 the Humber Emergency Planning Partnership were awarded Beacon
status. The Beacon Scheme identifies excellence in local government and recognises innovation.
Each member of the Humber Emergency Planning Partnership has developed its own emergency
plan. Hull City Council’s emergency plan documents clear procedures for activating the Council’s
response to a major incident, provides actions for the Council’s strategic and tactical emergency
management teams and background information for use during the response to a major incident.
The plan covers all the Council’s generic and specific emergency plans and those of its partners.
The emergency plan was tested in June 2007 when Hull experienced severe flooding. Hull City
Council and its partners responded quickly to the crisis enacting their emergency plan. The
approach taken by the Humber Emergency Planning Partnership through the local resilience forum
allowed the Council and its partners to address emergencies in a more effective, consistent and
comprehensive way. During the emergency most of Hulls emergency plan arrangements worked
extremely well however adjustments were needed to take account of the nature of the flooding –
pluvial as opposed to tidal or estuarine flooding. For example, several rest centres were identified in
the emergency plan but all were flooded. Rest centres in the city centre have now been identified.
Valuable lessons were learned from the emergency and these have gone on to inform the
emergency plan and the work of the Humber Emergency Planning Partnership.
Source: David Gibson, Hull City Council

Case study 12.4 Flood risk and resilience in North Wales
In 1990 failure of the sea defences along the North Wales coast caused severe flooding at Towyn.
The flood water affected much of the low voltage network and also several of the 11kV substations
in the area. The flood waters caused loss of supply to a significant number of customers. The
recovery and restoration of electricity supplies took weeks rather than days and in the 12 month
period following the flood there was a huge increase in the number of low voltage (LV) cable faults
experienced.
It is difficult to translate from 1990 what the effect of such an event would be now. While the
situation in 1990 was bad, the extent of the flooding and the damage caused would have been far
worse if say for instance the weather had been worse or there had been a high spring tide.
Engineering staff present at the time of the Towyn floods recall that Manweb (along with many other
agencies) received a considerable amount of good press at the time for their response to the
situation. Repair work and multi-agency co-operation was clearly visible and Manweb’s presence was
seen by the public and the media alongside other agencies who were all based by the cross roads at
Rhyl at the time. Agencies, such as BT, Water Board and the council, were all closely based so were
in easy reach for communicating information. Multi-agency co-operation and communication was
particularly good possibly due to the small geographical area that most organisations operated
within at that time.
Examples of multi-agency support included:
regular information from the Water Board about the flood water. They then received
information from Manweb about the supply of electricity to their critical pumping stations. As
the flood water rose it was necessary to switch off supplies to certain areas for safety reasons.
This affected supply to some of the pumping stations. Once the flood water started to recede
the pumping stations that could be switched back on were prioritised
the police and other emergency services assisted in gaining access to properties so that staff
could make safe the supply intake positions
the Fire Brigade assisted in pumping-out certain area’s so that Manweb staff could assess
damage and carry out repairs to the network.
After the event Manweb staff attended reviews and debrief meetings. One issue identified was that
certain critical pumping stations were actually switched off due to where they were fed from on the
network.
This resulted in the Water Board reviewing the supply of electricity to some of their critical pumping
stations and in some cases installing generators.
Now customer expectations are far greater than 20 years ago. There is generally more reliance on
electricity and when power is lost the effects on the community are widespread. Industry and finance
are also affected so it is not just domestic properties that are involved. Everyday services, such as
cash machines, telecommunications, transport, media and retail outlets, may be severely affected
and this may also hinder the response and recovery process.
The future
In planning for future events some questions that may be considered include:
understanding the inter-dependencies – how will the loss of power affect the community and
other partner agencies?
how to make the most of multi-agency working and benefit all involved
the Environment Agency (and others) need to consider the resilience of their pumping stations
and other main assets particularly along the coast
much greater transparency is required from partners and service providers to ensure that
dynamic “risks” can be accurately assessed on a regular and routine basis and certainly, at
time of incident response and management.
The role of the local resilience fora and multi-agency partnership approach is embedded in to
mainstream service provision for emergency responders.
Source: Paul M. Reeves (Environment Agency Wales) and Linda Lewis (Scottish Power).
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Case study 12.5 The Highways Agency working in partnership with the Environment Agency
The Highways Agency are also continuing liaison with the Environment Agency regarding all
aspects of flooding through its memorandum of understanding. The Environment Agency has
exchanged information regarding techniques for assessing the condition of drainage assets in
support of the development of Highways Agency drainage database. This will support future flood
risk management strategies.
Source: Michael Whitehead, Highways Agency.
Case study 12.6 Scope for collaboration between Network Rail and regional resilience forums
Network Rail support the Pitt Review Recommendation 14 that local authorities should lead on the
management of surface water flooding and drainage at the local level with the support of all
responsible organisations. It would be most welcoming if Councils would involve Network Rail in
this exercise.
Network Rail support the Pitt recommendation for further clarification and strengthening of the
role of the regional resilience forums in contingency planning, and would welcome further
involvement in command and control arrangements for flooding.
Network Rail would like transport sector expertise, including rail, to be included in the Climate
Change Committee proposed in the draft Climate Change Bill (OPSI, 2007).
Network Rail welcomes knowledge sharing on areas at risk from surface water flooding. Network
Rail’s transport infrastructure managers would benefit from such information being available at a
regional level.

13 Conclusions
13.1 REGULATORY REGIME

The regulatory regime for critical infrastructure is complex when considered across all
sectors. The complexity is heightened by the public/private sector mix. The Civil
Contingencies Act 2004 does however provide a common framework across the UK for
civil contingency planning. An overarching policy statement and strategic framework,
such as the draft prepared by the Cabinet Office (Mann, 2009) for England, has the
potential to provide more clarity.
There is a focus within the economic regulation of essential service provision on value for
money for the customer. The focus on economic efficiency means that there is little spare
capacity within modern infrastructure systems, which leaves them potentially vulnerable
to unexpected events.
The planning system provides a framework for ensuring that both new infrastructure and
modifications to existing infrastructure, which requires planning permission, is flood
resilient. When planning new infrastructure, and modifying existing infrastructure,
adoption of the principles in government spatial planning policy, regardless of whether
planning permission is actually required, should do much to improve flood resilience in
the future. Industry guidance on asset management, maintenance and repair would
benefit from inclusion of these principles.
13.2 HISTORIC INCIDENTS AND LESSONS IDENTIFIED
13.2.1 Flood sources and mechanisms
Effective management of flooding problems requires a good understanding of the sources

and mechanisms responsible. While flooding from rivers and the sea is a major cause of
infrastructure disruption, surface water, groundwater and the threat of infrastructure
failure are also important contributory factors. Localised surface water drainage problems
are a major issue for the transport sector in particular. Network Rail disruptions are more
often caused by local drainage problems than by major fluvial flood events. The flooding
in Hull was caused by complex mechanisms related to groundwater and urban drainage,
rather than the more obvious risks of river and coastal flooding which threaten the city. In
the case of Ulley Dam, infrastructure failure would have been the source of flooding had
this structure actually failed. The Ulley Dam case study also shows how the threat of
flooding can cause as much disruption as an actual flood.
13.2.2 Escalation of flood warnings
It is important that flood warnings are contextualised for discrete locations. In Hull,
severe weather warnings are received fairly regularly from the Meteorological Office, but
because the flood mechanisms are complex, the appropriate response is not always clear.
Similarly, if the consequences of a particular event are not clear, as in the case of the Ulley
Dam incident, the approach to evacuation of affected parties has to proceed on a
precautionary basis, which may cause more disruption than if a detailed flood plan had
already been in place for the reservoir.
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13.2.3 Multi-agency emergency preparedness and incident management
The case studies illustrate that the contingency planning process worked reasonably well.
It was most stretched where the flood mechanisms and consequences were poorly
understood, as at Ulley. Category 1 responders under the CCA are highly reliant on the
knowledge of Category 2 responders when it comes to adopting appropriate actions on
the ground.
13.2.4 Interdependencies
Nearly all of the case studies illustrate the high level of interdependence between different
asset systems. Utilities were forced, often very successfully, to work together with Gold
Command to buffer communities from the worst effects of the disruption. The rail
network provides a robust alternative to the highway system for car users and many
commercial operations. However, when both systems are inoperable this causes major
disruption. The provision of generators at critical facilities may buffer these from the
effects of power outage, but if roads are impassable, such generators will be vulnerable if
fuels supplies cannot be replenished.
13.2.5 Built-in resilience
The effects of the events described could have been worse. Property flooding caused
months of misery and disruption to householders and businesses. However, in most cases
essential services lost because of flooding were restored within a matter of days. The
National Grid’s experience during the 2007 floods illustrated how a network can be
managed to minimise interruptions to supply, even when vital assets were temporarily out
of action. Similarly, the provision of independent power systems at United Utilities’ water
treatment facilities is a good example of how existing business continuity processes, within
organisations previously affected by flooding, are picking-up these issues.
The Hull case study (see Section 8.6) shows how a heightened awareness of flooding issues
resulting from such events can have a positive effect on future regeneration and spatial
planning decision making. Solutions that combine new infrastructure provision with
improved flood protection are the aims of the policies set out in PPS25. An important
issue for increasing the flood resilience of the UK’s infrastructure will be in areas that are
at risk of flooding, but have not experienced a flood in recent years.
13.3 FLOOD RISK ASSESSMENT

The results of this study indicate that CI operators are highly reliant on the outputs from
flood mapping undertaken by the Environment Agency, SEPA and NIRA. Good progress
has been made in many sectors in the assessment of flood risk to their assets using these
maps, which demonstrates the value that such mapping brings. The majority of
organisations who have contributed to this study have assessed the risk to their assets
using the national flood hazard maps produced by these agencies. The maps however
provide information on a limited number of annual probabilities of event for river and
coastal flooding only and do not factor in an allowance for climate change (except in
Northern Ireland).
Some organisations have used the national flood maps to prioritise their investigations and
then gone on to obtain more detailed information, including flood levels, at specific sites. This
more detailed information is largely pertaining to river and coastal flooding. Obtaining this
data required use of specialist consultants with knowledge of how to abstract the necessary
information from the relevant Agency’s flood mapping and data management teams.

It is now difficult for operators to assess the degree of exposure to surface, groundwater
and infrastructure-failure flood hazards. SFRAs are a mechanism for providing
information of this kind in England. SFRAs are also intended to include an assessment
and mapping of the implications of climate change. However, often local authorities, who
are responsible for producing SFRAs, as well as SWMPs, in areas with critical drainage
problems, face the same problems as infrastructure operators in generating this
information. Mapping of flood hazards from first principles is expensive.
Often information on flood levels for a wide range of annual probabilities, as well as
quantitative data of use in assessing the implications of climate change, has already been
derived by flood risk agencies or water companies, but accessing this information is
challenging.
13.4 ADOPTING RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE MEASURES

There is a hierarchy of measures that can be used to manage the flood risks associated
with critical infrastructure. This hierarchy of avoidance, substitution, control and
mitigation is embedded in latest spatial planning policy – most explicitly with the practice
guide to PPS25 (CLG, 2009). When planning new infrastructure, and modifying existing
infrastructure, adoption of the principles in government spatial planning policy,
regardless of whether planning permission is actually required, should help improve flood
resilience in the future. Industry guidance on asset management, maintenance and repair
would benefit from inclusion of these principles.
There is a wide range of options for improving the resilience of existing assets in flood
risk areas. These are both structural and non structural. The case studies in Chapter 10
illustrate that many non structural measures are already being used including flood
warnings, incident management procedures and business continuity plans. There are
several examples of where infrastructure operators have used physical resilience
measures. These are primarily interim measures comprising temporary or demountable
systems as part of a short-term strategy to reduce exposure to the flood hazard. There are
inconsistencies across the UK in how design standards are being applied and allowances
made for potential climate change impacts.
13.5 PRIORITISATION OF INVESTMENT

Adopting physical resilience and resistance measures in the aftermath of the 2007 floods
has occurred most rapidly in areas affected by flooding during that event. This initial
activity has been more reactive rather than risk-based. However, risk-based investment
plans have been developed by some, particularly in the energy and water sectors. It
remains to be seen whether the investment proposed by privatised utility companies will
need to be reviewed following the price determinations by the economic regulators.
There is a lack of guidance to ensure consistent approaches are adopted for the
quantification of the benefits of increasing the flood resilience of CI. Similarly, specific
guidance on whole-life cost estimation for CI resilience and resilience measures for
business case preparation is unavailable. No research into people’s willingness to pay for
measures to reduce the frequency of disruption has yet been conducted.
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13.6 INTERDEPENDENCIES AND CROSS-SECTOR
COLLABORATION
Information on the nation’s critical infrastructure and the nature of the flood risks
associated with it is fragmented. There are issues around national security and
commercial sensitivity, but the principle of sharing knowledge from across sectors to build
a comprehensive picture is accepted by many stakeholders. Unfortunately there is
relatively little evidence that these barriers are being overcome.

14 Recommendations
14.1 NEXT GENERATION FLOOD MAPS AND HAZARD REGISTERS

As the agencies prepare the next generation of flood maps, there is an opportunity to
provide high resolution data on:
flooding from surface and groundwater

flooding from infrastructure failure, including flood defences and reservoirs
depths, velocities and rates of onset for a range of annual probabilities of flood
the likely effects of climate change on flood risk
the degree of uncertainty associated with the information provided.
It may be beneficial for the Environment Agency, SEPA and NIRA to collaborate further
on their respective mapping programmes to manage consistency across the UK.
However, these agencies are unlikely to be in a position to provide data on complex local
flood mechanisms originating in minor watercourses, sewer systems and drainage
networks. Data on these flood sources may be generated by others, such as local
authorities or CI operators. Formal, structured guidance is required on consistency,
quality, transparency and standardisation of data formats where this data may be of use to
others, such as local resilience forums. For example, privatised water companies should be
required to provide information on sewer flooding to Ofwat in a consistent, geo-
referenced format so that others can use this information to assess exposure to sewer
flooding hazards.
14.2 GUIDANCE ON RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE STANDARDS

It is recommended that guidance should be prepared on indicative design standards for
different categories of critical infrastructure. These standards should be developed
collaboratively, based on technical discussions within and between sectors. Tables 14.1 and
14.2 provide an example of a possible rationale for this undertaking. However, as
discussed in Section 5.6, development of these standards will need to take account of costs
and benefits, each sector’s relative exposure to the flood hazard and existing relative level
of flood resilience.
Table 14.1 Concise definition of asset categories (courtesy of Cabinet Office)
Asset category Concise definition
5 Assets, the loss of which would have catastrophic impact on the UK
4 Assets, the loss of which would affect millions of people
3 Assets, the loss of which would affect hundreds of thousands of people
2 Assets, the loss of which would affect tens of thousands of people
1 Assets, the loss of which would affect thousands of people
Note
See Table 4.1 for fuller definition.
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Table 14.2 Examples of resistance/resilience standards and performance levels that may be
appropriate for CI assets in some sectors
Indicative Target asset performance level

design standard
Restricted Safe but not
(1 in x annual Unaffected
operation operational Near failure
chance) (resistant)
(resilient) (resilient)
10–75 CAT 1
75–100 CAT 2 CAT 1
100–200 CAT 3 CAT 2 CAT 1
200–1000 CAT 4 CAT 3 CAT 2 CAT 1
> 1000 CAT 5 CAT 4 CAT 3 CAT 2
14.3 INCENTIVISATION OF COLLABORATIVE APPROACHES

There would appear to be significant scope to achieve efficiencies through collaboration
within and between sectors. The Energy Network Association work is a good example of
how one group acting for a substantial sub-sector has delivered results more effectively
than if separate studies had been undertaken for each operator. It is recommended that
research is undertaken into how collaborative activity of this kind might be encouraged.
This might include:
collating and publishing “good news” examples, such as how money has been saved, or
value added through collaborative working
financial incentives, such as “starter grants” that help to establish cross-sector technical
task groups, to assist resilience forums
a cross-sector awards scheme for partnership working.
Areas where further opportunities are likely to exist to deliver flood resilience measures
more efficiently through collaboration include:
preparation of guidance
flood risk assessment at UK-wide, national, regional and local levels
appraisal of multi-functional infrastructure (eg road/rail embankments acting also as
flood defences)
procurement of specialist services for the appraisal and design of resilience measures
procurement of construction works
emergency response exercises.
14.4 UNDERSTANDING WHOLE-LIFE COSTS AND BENEFITS

With such a large legacy of existing infrastructure, approaches to upgrade established
systems will inevitably be more difficult than justifying and designing new systems of flood
resilient infrastructure. There is a specific need to develop guidance on:
quantifying the whole-life benefits of flood resilience

unit cost data for estimating whole-life costs for construction, maintenance and
operation of resilience and resistance measures
people’s willingness to pay for flood resilience measures.

14.5 INVESTMENT PLANNING
It is recommended that industry sector regulators develop more substantial, price-based
incentives that stimulate investment in infrastructure resilience. CI owners need to
consider developing a longer-term strategic investment approach that allows for optimum
investment to be justified against the backdrop of assets that are identified as being within
areas likely to be affected by flooding. Flood resilience measures should be adopted as an
integral part of individual organisations’ business continuity management processes,
whole-life asset management plans (AMP) and climate change adaptation strategies. There
is a requirement for guidance to aid consistency of approach in the planning of long-term
investment in flood resilience measures.
14.6 ALIGNMENT OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE SECTOR SPEND

While publicly funded programmes of flood risk management measures are focused on
reducing flood risk to communities, the national and community benefits of protecting
critical infrastructure from flooding are often poorly quantified. It is recommended that
those responsible for setting policy, planning and delivering programmes of publicly
funded FRM schemes should consider the protection of CI assets more explicitly in their
initial prioritisation of capital schemes. For example, this might be achieved in England
using amended outcome measures. Working in partnership with CI owners and operators
at a strategic level is likely to help better alignment of overall investment in flood risk
management measures. This process would be made easier by guidance on whole-life
costs and benefits as recommended in Section 14.4.
14.7 IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EMERGENCY

RESPONSE
The lessons identified in Chapter 10 show that there is scope for improvements as follows:
business continuity plans need to include registers of all identified flood hazards at CI
sites and protocols for managing incidents when they do occur
flood forecasts need to be tailored to cover the specific flood hazards identified
flood warnings need to be escalated appropriately, with specific trigger levels for the
range of incident management responses detailed in a business continuity plan
integration of resilience into asset management systems.
Use of computerised 3D visualisation techniques can be a powerful tool for use in both
training exercises and potentially to aid co-ordination of resources during flood events in
real time. These tools are however only as accurate as the input data and, while
potentially applicable to simulation of real-time river or coastal flooding scenarios where
accurate forecasts are available, these tools are unlikely to be of use for real time
simulation of flash flooding.
14.8 TRAINING IN FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT FOR CRITICAL

INFRASTRUCTURE
It is recommended that remote learning and/or face-to-face training in flood risk
management for critical infrastructure is developed to ensure a common understanding
and reinforce consistency of technical approaches and vocabularies.
102 CIRIA C688

References
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Guideline for assessing the performance of oil and natural gas pipeline systems in natural hazard and
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Temporary and demountable flood protection – interim guidance on use
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Kitemark scheme for flood protection products – Environment Agency advice
Environment Agency, Bristol
<http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/floods/113219.aspx>
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2008)

Identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to
improve their protection
Council Directive 2008/114/EC

EXCIMAP (2007)
Handbook on good practices for flood mapping in Europe
European exchange circle on flood mapping, The Netherlands
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FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (2007)

Protecting critical infrastructures – risk and crisis management
Federal Ministry of the Interior, Germany <www.bmi.bund.de>
FEDERAL OFFICE OF CIVIL PROTECTION AND DISASTER ASSISTANCE (2006)

Flood risk management and critical infrastructures
Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK, Germany. Presentation
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<http://www.regionale2010.de/fileadmin/user_shares/2010_bildwelten/Rheinkonferenz_20
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HIGHWAYS AGENCY (2006)

Design manual for roads and bridges
Volume 4 Section 2 HD 33/06 Surface and sub-surface drainage systems for highways
<http://www.standardsforhighways.co.uk/dmrb/>
HM GOVERNMENT (2005)
Emergency preparedness
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Whole-life infrastructure asset management: good practice guide for civil infrastructure
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HARDING, A and TEDD, P (2000)
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ICE (2006)
Floods and reservoir safety
3rd edition, Institution of Civil Engineers, London (ISBN: 978-0-72772-503-5)
ICE (2009)
The state of the nation: defending critical infrastructure
Institution of Civil Engineers, London
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“Development and implementation of a new seismic design bridge criteria for South
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65–72
KIRBY, A M and ASH, J R V (2000)

Fluvial freeboard guidance note
R&D Technical Report W187978-1857053630, Environment Agency, Bristol
106 CIRIA C688

LANCASTER, J W, PREENE, M and MARSHALL, C T (2004)
Development and flood risk – guidance for the construction industry
MALE, S (2009)
Resilient infrastructure
Presentation to the Leeds asset management forum, Institute for Resilient Infrastructure,
University of Leeds, 12 May 2009
MALONEY, M (2009)
The effect of flooding on critical infrastructure and the systemic risks
Dissertation, University of Leeds
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Strategic framework and policy statement on improving the resilience of critical infrastructure to
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MASON, P J and HINKS, J L (2008)

“Security of stepped masonry spillways: lessons from Ulley dam”
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Design standards for US transportation infrastructure. The implications of climate change
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EU FloodEx 2009
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Netherlands)
<http://www.floodex.nl/about-floodex>
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Concrete and flooding
Ref: TCC/05/019, The Concrete Centre (ISBN: 978-1-904818-89-2)
<http://www.concretecentre.com/pdf/MB_Concrete_Flooding.pdf>
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Carlisle storms and associated flooding
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NATIONAL FLOOD FORUM (2009)

A guide to resistant and resilient repair after a flood
A collaboration between National Flood Forum, Environment Agency, Association of
British Insurers and Chartered Institute of Loss Adjusters. Go to:
<http://www.floodforum.org.uk/>
NETWORK RAIL (2008)

Management of responses to extreme weather conditions at structures, earthworks and other key
locations
Network Rail Standard NR/L3/TRL/1010 Issue 2 (internal document)

NGNUK (2008)
Next generation networks
Ofcom, London <http://www.ngnuk.org.uk/>
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Planning Policy Statement (PPS 15): Planning and flood risk
Department of Environment, Northern Ireland, Belfast
<http://www.planningni.gov.uk/index/policy/policy_publications/planning_statements/pps1
5.htm>
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The Northern Ireland civil contingencies framework
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Asset resilience to flood hazards: development of an analytical framework
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<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase2/ltr_pr0912_resilfloodhaz>
108 CIRIA C688

PENNING-ROWSELL, E, JOHNSON, C, TUNSTALL, S, TAPSELL, S, MORRIS, J,
CHATTERTON, J, COKER, A and GREEN, C (2003)
The benefits of flood and coastal defence: techniques and data for 2003
Out of print. Flood Hazard Research Centre, Middlesex University, Enfield, UK
PENNING-ROWSELL, E (2005)
The benefits of flood and coastal risk management manual
Libri Publishing, Oxfordshire (ISBN: 1-90475-051-6). Available from:
<http://www.libripublishing.co.uk>
PITT, M (2008)
The Pitt Review – learning lessons from the 2007 floods
Cabinet Office, London.
<http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/thepittreview/final_report.html>
RAILWAY GROUP STANDARD (2004)

Scour and flooding – managing the risk
GC/RT5143, Rail Safety and Standards Board, UK
<http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards/Infrastructure/Railway%20Group
%20Standards/GCRT5143%20Iss%201.pdf>
RIBA (2009)
Designing for flood risks
Royal Institute of British Architects, London
<http://www.architecture.com/Files/RIBAHoldings/PolicyAndInternationalRelations/Policy/
Environment/2Designing_for_floodrisk.pdf>
SAVAGE, W U, NISHENKO, S P, HONEGGER, D G and KEMPNER, L Jr (2006)

“Guideline for assessing the performance of electric power systems in natural hazard and
human threat events”
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TEACHERNET (2009)
Revised national programme for building schools for the future
Department for Children, Schools and Families, UK
<http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/management/resourcesfinanceandbuilding/bsf/rnp/>
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Scottish Planning Advice Note PAN 69: Planning and building standards advice on flooding
The Scottish Government, Edinburgh (ISBN: 0-7559-425-X).
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2004/08/19805/41594>
THE SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT (2004)

Scottish Planning Policy 7 (SSP7) Planning and flooding
The Scottish Government, Edinburgh <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Home>
UNITED UTILITIES (2005a)

Wastewater operations: combined treatment and network incident report
Ref 05/44, United Utilities, UK
UNITED UTILITIES (2005b)

Operations and maintenance department incident report
Ref 05/45, United Utilities, UK

WATER UK (2009)
One year on: report of the water UK flooding implementation group – lessons learned from the floods
of summer 2007
Water UK <http://www.water.org.uk/home/news/press-releases/flooding-report-one-year-
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WALES AUDIT OFFICE (2009)

Coastal erosion and tidal flooding risks in Wales
Report presented by the Auditor General to the National Assembly on 29 October 2009,
Cardiff <http://www.wao.gov.uk/news_2913.asp>
WELSH ASSEMBLY GOVERNMENT (2004)

Technical Advice Note (TAN) 15: Development and flood risk
Welsh Assembly Government, Cardiff
<http://wales.gov.uk/topics/planning/policy/tans/tan15?lang=en>
ACTS, CODES, REGULATIONS ETC
Acts
Civil Contingencies Act 2004

<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/ccact.aspx>
Electricity Act 1989

<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1989/ukpga_19890029_en_1>
Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009 (2009 asp 6) (2009)

<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2009/pdf/asp_20090006_en.pdf>
Highways Act 1980

<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1980/cukpga_19800066_en_1>
Reservoir Act 1975

<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1975/cukpga_19750023_en_1>
Water Industry Act 1991

<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1991/ukpga_19910056_en_1>
Bills
Floods and Water Management Bill 2009–2010

<http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2009-10/floodandwatermanagement.html>
Codes
International Building Code (2009)

<http://www2.iccsafe.org/states/2009ICodes/Building/Building_Frameset.html>
International Residential Code (2009)

<http://www.energycodes.gov/codedevelop/pdfs/2009_IRCvsIECC_ARRA_23Sep09.pdf>
BS 25999-1:2006 Code of practice for business continuity management

(ISBN: 978-0-58049-601-1)
<http://shop.bsigroup.com/en/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030157563>
110 CIRIA C688

Directives
EC Habitats Directive (1992): Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural

habitats and of wild fauna and flora
<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31992L0043:EN:HTML>
EU Floods Directive 2007/60/EC (2007)

<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/flood_risk/index.htm>
The Water Environment (Floods Directive) Regulations (Northern Ireland). Statutory

Rules of Northern Ireland 2009 (No 376)
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/sr/sr2009/nisr_20090376_en_1>
Orders
Transport and Works Act Orders Unit (TWAOU)
Regulations
Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 (CDM2007) (SI 320:2007)

<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2007/pdf/uksi_20070320_en.pdf>
Publicly Available Specification (PAS)
PAS 1188-2:2009 Flood protection products. Specification. Part 2: Temporary products

(ISBN: 978 0 580 62701 9).
<http://shop.bsigroup.com/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030180617>
PAS 1188-4:2009 Flood protection products. Specification. Part 4: Demountable products

(ISBN: 978 0 580 62703 3).
<http://shop.bsigroup.com/en/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030180619>

OTHER USEFUL WEBSITES
Business Continuity Institute
<http://www.thebci.org/>
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure

<http://www.cpni.gov.uk/>
Chartered Insitution of Water and Environmental Management

<http://www.ciwem.org/>
Defra
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/>
Environment Agency
<http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/>
Infrastructure Planning Commission

<http://infrastructure.independent.gov.uk>
Institute of Asset Management

<http://www.theiam.org/>
Institution of Civil Engineers

<http://www.ice.org.uk/homepage/index.asp>
Ofcom
<http://www.ofcom.org.uk/>
Office of Rail Regulation

<http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/>
Ofgem
<http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/>
Ofwat
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/>
Scottish Resilience (part of Scottish Government)

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/public-safety/emergencies>
UK Resilience
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience.aspx>
Wales Prepared (Wales Resilience)

<http://www.walesprepared.org/>
112 CIRIA C688

Core and Associate members
AECOM Ltd Morgan Sindall (Infrastructure) Plc
Arup Group Ltd Mott MacDonald Group Ltd
Atkins Consultants Limited Mouchel
Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering Ltd MWH
BAM Nuttall Ltd National Grid UK Ltd
Black & Veatch Ltd Network Rail
Buro Happold Engineers Limited Northumbrian Water Limited
BWB Consulting Ltd Rail Safety and Standards Board
Cardiff University Royal HaskoningDHV Ltd
CH2M RSK Group Ltd
Environment Agency RWE Npower plc
Galliford Try plc Scottish Water
Gatwick Airport Ltd Sellafield Ltd
Geotechnical Consulting Group Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd
Golder Associates (Europe) Ltd SLR Consulting Ltd
Heathrow Airport Holdings Ltd Tarmac
High Speed Two (HS2) Temple Group Ltd
Highways England Thames Water Utilities Ltd
HR Wallingford Ltd United Utilities Plc
Imperial College London University College London
Institution of Civil Engineers University of Reading
Laing O’Rourke Civil Engineering Ltd University of Sheffield
London Underground Ltd University of Southampton
Loughborough University WYG Group (Nottingham Office)
Maccaferri Ltd
Ministry of Justice November 2015
C688
This publication is the main output from CIRIA project RP913 Flood resilience and
resistance for critical infrastructure. It provides an overview of the regulatory
framework and outlines the main issues now faced by the industry in this area. A
brief introduction is given to the principles of flood risk management to place flood
resilience and resistance into a wider context. A range of case studies is provided
that describes the lessons identified by infrastructure owners and operators who
have suffered flooding problems in the past. Flood risk management for CI (critical
infrastructure) across the UK is then considered with respect to flood risk
assessment, adopting resilience and resistance measures and investment
prioritisation.
The publication states that flood resilience measures should be adopted as an

integral part of individual organisations’ business continuity management
processes, whole-life asset management plans and climate change adaptation
strategies. CI owners need to develop long-term strategic investment approaches
Flood resilience and resistance

that allow for optimised investment decision making. The economic regulators
should aim to provide a framework to achieve this objective.
for critical infrastructure
Environment
Agency
9 780860 176886
C688
CIRIA

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C688

The publication states that flood resilience measures should be adopted as an

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure

How to get involved

zzCore membership zzProject funding

Post Griffin Court, 15 Long Lane, London, EC1A 9PN, UK

Flood resilience and

Griffin Court, 15 Long Lane, London, EC1A 9PN

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure

McBain, W, Wilkes, D, Retter, M

C688 © CIRIA 2010 RP913 ISBN: 978-086017-688-6

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Reader interest Classification

Published by CIRIA, Griffin Court, 15 Long Lane, London, EC1A 9PN, UK

Will McBain MA (Hons) PGDip CSci CWEM MCIWEM FRSA

David Wilkes BSc(Hons) CEng CWEM MICE FCIWEM

Matthias Retter MSc PhD Cert CII

Richard Ashley Pennine Water Group and University of Sheffield

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 iii

CIRIA Core members

CIRIA Project team

Ben Kidd Project manager

The development of this publication also used contributions from:

Tim Allmark Nuclear Installations Inspectorate

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 v

flood risk assessment

The conclusions and recommendations to this publication are summarised as follows:

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 vii

Flood resilience measures should be adopted as an integral part of individual

Supporting document 1: Overview of questionnaire survey results (May 2009)

Supporting document 2: Consultation workshop report (April 2009)

viii CIRIA C688

4.1 Critical infrastructure (CI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 ix

7.1 Questionnaire responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

8.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

10.1 The FRM hierarchy for critical infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 xi

11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82

13.1 Regulatory regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

14.1 Next generation flood maps and hazard registers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100

Acts, Codes, Regulations etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .110

xii CIRIA C688

Box 10.1 Design standards adopted by the Highways Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

Example 6.1 Use of demountable defences in place of fixed defences . . . . . . . . .21

Figure 4.1 The three dimensions of the criticality scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 xiii

Table 4.1 Criticality scale for national infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

xiv CIRIA C688

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 xv

AMP Asset management plan

xvi CIRIA C688

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 xvii

xviii CIRIA C688

1.2 THE PITT REVIEW

Recommendation 51: relevant government departments and the Environment Agency

Recommendation 52: in the short-term, the UK Government and infrastructure

Recommendation 53: a specific duty should be placed on economic regulators to build

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 1

plan, arrange and manage a consultation workshop

A questionnaire was completed and returned by 35 organisations and a copy of the