MODELS IN LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY* 0.0 Introductory Remarks On another occasion (Koerner 1976a) I have outlined what I believe to be the importance of the history of linguistics — if properly treated — to the field of linguistics itself, and I will not repeat the full argument here. It will suffice to summarize its main lines. First of all, there seems to be general agreement about the usefulness of history when it comes to introducing the neophyte to the field. More importantly, both the practitioner and the discipline as a whole can benefit in several respects from a thorough acquaintance with earlier theories and accomplish- ments. To begin with, historical knowledge of one’s own field will make the prac- titioner a true scientist in the original sense of the term; cf. the Latin scientia ‘knowledge’. This means that the scientist knows the origin of the general assump- tions, methods, and theories of his area of study as well as their limitations. This historical knowledge as opposed to mere technical expertise in the particular science, consisting of the mere operation of machinery and the manipulation of data in accordance with prescribed rules and established procedures, offers the prospective investigator the flexibility that may be required should unforeseen problems or a shift in the interpretation of the subject of investigation occur. The technician, when confronted with important changes in methodology or with an unexpected result in his research, may be quite incapable of adapting himself to the new situation, particularly if it turns out that the procedures and rules he once learned have been rendered invalid. In addition to being the source of a certain intellectual flexibility, which may permit him to evaluate alternative proposals or a competing theory, there is another reason why historical knowledge can benefit the practitioner of the craft: It fosters, together with the consciousness of the relative truth of any particular methodology or theory, the avoidance of excessive claims, and may lead to moderation in the scientist’s attitude toward competing theories. Kristeller (1964:6), for instance, argues in favor of the importance of the history of philosophy for philosophy itself in the following terms: If we are trying to overcome certain current views which we consider false, we may find historical criticism a powerful weapon that will lay bare the sources and theories behind some present modes of speaking and of think- ing. While I may not share the militancy with which the argument is advanced, there is48 PRACTICING LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY no doubt in my mind that genuine historical knowledge helps to distinguish true advances in the field from variations on the same theme, and might thereby reduce the, at times, annoying frequency of (re-)discoveries of phenomena which have been known to many in the past under different names. In addition to these intellectually or socially beneficial effects, there may be other reasons why the study of the history of a particular subject could prove to be an asset to the discipline itself. For example, it may be argued that in an age of increasing specialization the history of linguistics, by showing the general lines of scientific endeavors in the past and their relevance to present-day activities, may give unity to the discipline as a whole. 1,0 Toward the Establishment of a Methodology in Linguistic Historiography Much still needs to be done before benefits accrue from the history of lin- guistic science. It is my belief that the history of linguistics must establish a coherent framework for research and a perspicuous format for the presentation of past periods, ideas and events in order to become a serious enterprise. However, before discussing this important part of linguistic historiography as I have tried to do in the past ten years or so, something may be said about the background and the training a historian of linguistics should have, Malkiel (1969:432) speaks about the ‘dual expertise’ that the historian of linguistic science should have acquired. He must know ‘a good deal about intel- lectual history (embedded within the matrix of general history) and about the more technical aspects of linguistics’. Of particular importance is Malkiel’s emphasis on the historian’s ability to ‘demonstrate the specialized knowledge of the scientific .. domain’ (ibid.); in other words, the historian of linguistics must be a linguist after all, and not a historian, philosopher, or philologist. This seems to be a very reasonable requirement. However, we may infer from Kristeller’s (1964:4-6) pro- grammatic statement concerning the relationship between the history of philosophy and the history of ideas that the former subject should be treated by philosophers, and not, as appears to have been the rule, by scholars from other fields, such as his- tory, literature or classical philology. Indeed, it appears that the history of science, for instance, has traditionally been the domain of philosophers rather than natural scientists. Thomas Kuhn — and this may have been one of the reasons why his proposals have been so thoroughly scrutinized by his colleagues — who moved from physics to history of science, is the exception rather than the rule. The other aspect of the historian’s ‘dual expertise’ is hardly less important. Kristeller (1964:6-7) is very emphatic about the prerequisites of a historian of philosophy, though these have less to do with the historical background and training of the scholar. Kristeller holds that historians of philosophy who are not primarily philosophers present the history of philosophy in a way different from what may be of especial interest to the philosopher. As a result, the historian of philosophy must go back to the primary sources and not rely, in the treatment of a particular philoso- pher, a particular school, or a particular concept, on the work of other historians. Accordingly, the historian of philosophy must be able to read the texts and docu- ments in their original language. Translations and reliance on seoondary sources are pensable to theMODELS IN LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY 49 The history of linguistics, however, is not dealing with a subject like philoso- phy that has to do exclusively with ideas, intellectual activities and commitments. Since the object of linguistics, namely the study of language in all its manifestations, is much more concrete, its history is in some way similar to the development of the sciences. However, as I have stated repeatedly (e.g., Koerner 1975:119-20; 1976b: 690, and 1981: 162-163), the historian of linguistics must understand the ‘climate of opinion’ of a given period if his assessment of a particular phase in the development of linguistics is to make sense to a present-day practitioner in the field. This being said, the history of linguistics may be in need of more than scholars equipped with the above twin expertise. Since the science of language is much closer than any other of the social and behavioral sciences to having a well-defined, con- crete object of investigation, its rigor of analysis is closer to that of the natural sciences. As a result, it seems natural that the historian of linguistics would be interested in knowing what the historian of science does. If we are to believe Kvastad (1977), then the history of ideas, for example, has little to offer in terms of methodological insight. Arthur O. Lovejoy’s (1873-1962) important life-work notwithstanding, there do not seem to be any well-established principles of research: On the whole, the methodology of the history of ideas is in its infancy. The field is in this respect behind general history, of which it is a part. One may therefore suggest that the interest of historians of ideas should be more directed towards the methodological problems of their field than has hitherto been the case. The reason is that when the foundation of a house is shaky, it does not make much sense continuously to add new stories to it. (Kvastad 1977:174) Unfortunately, Kvastad’s own proposals are far from satisfactory; the pseudo-formal apparatus and the ‘logical’ definitions that he is presenting do not seem to lead, at least in his paper, to any new insights. Similarly, the history of philosophy does not seem to have developed much of a methodology. Although much work, ‘polemical’, ‘doxographical’, ‘critical’, etc., has been done in the field ever since Theophrastus (c. 350 B.C.) and Diogenes Laertus (c. 200 B.C.), the focus appears to have been on epistemological and ‘attitudinal’ problems rather than on methodological ones. Passmore (1967:229) feels that the philosopher writing the history of his own sub- ject is ‘likely to distort it, just because he has strong views of his own’. If this is correct, it would weaken Kristeller’s (1964) argument in favor of the philosopher rather than a historian writing the history of philosophy. However, the result of strong personal views may not have to be a whiggish type of history. Frederick Copleston’s 9-volume A History of Philosophy (1948 ff.), for example, remains a serious scholarly work, though the reader must be aware of the author’s Catholic views. On the other hand, Passmore (ibid.) notes that the ‘pure historian with no philosophical enthusiasm is almost certain to compose a doxography’, i.e., an entirely detached chronological and biographical account of past philosophical schools of thought. If my assessment is correct, namely, that both the history of philosophy and the history of ideas have little to offer to the historian of linguistics, except for some generalities (which he might well have discovered without reading their writings), there seem to be only two options left to the person concerned with the establishment of the history of linguistics as a serious scholarly undertaking. He may either acquaint himself with the work of historians and philosophers of science and see to what extent their findings might be applicable to the history of linguistics,50 PRACTICING LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY or try to develop a methodology of his own, adapted to the particular nature and demands of linguistic historiography. Where the history of science is concerned, Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, first published in 1962, has proved to be particularly sug- gestive, partly, it would seem, because Kuhn applied ideas to the subject that he himself had drawn from the humanities and the social sciences. Few, if any, have ever seriously argued that the observations or proposals of historians of science, whether they be of a Popperian, Kuhnian or any other type,! could be directly applied to the history of fields other than those for which they have been developed. It is therefore regrettable that Percival (1976) has assumed the position of a ‘prae- ceptor historiographiae linguisticae’ and, after a serious distortion of the ideas of Kuhn as well as of the development of 19th-century linguistics,? advocated the rejection of any of Kuhn’s suggestions. I for one still believe that the concepts of ‘paradigm’ (or, perhaps better, ‘disciplinary matrix’), ‘normal science’, ‘revolution’, etc., proposed by Kuhn may still be useful to the historian of linguistics if he does not press the argument to a point where it no longer makes sense. Concerning the usefulness of the concept of ‘scientific revolutions’, Stephen Murray (1980:84) has recently made the following comment pertinent to my argument: Absolute novelty is not such a realistic criterion, nor is total victory. No paradigmatic community has ever been coterminus with an entire disci- pline, whether in behavioral, biological, or physical science. In spheres other than science, we speak of revolutions that were partly successful (the Reformation did not annihilate Catholicism, the Bolshevik Revolution did not lead to an end of social inequality, nor to a withering away of the "| am thinking, for example, of the sociological model of history of science as advocated by Robert K. Merton since the late 1930s (cf. Merton 1973), which, according to Hall (1963:1) conceives of science as ‘a cultural artefact, a manifestation of intellectual energy that is stimulated, checked or modified by the structure, beliefs and aspirations of the society with which this scien- tific activity is associated.’ — Murray (1980) bases part of his argument on the writings of Mullins (1973, 1975) on the social structure of scientific groups. *Nothing needs to be said here about Percival’s assessment of the 19th century in linguis tics, since he seems to be basing his argument entirely on secondary information (Percival 1976: 290-91). By contrast, his interpretation of the essential ideas in Kuhn (1970) is largely misleading and cannot pass unanswered, especially since many readers may, for a variety of reasons (including intellectual laziness), be tempted to take Percival’s analysis at face value. To begin with, nowhere in Kuhn can the statement be found that progress of a scientific field shows itself in ‘periodic quantum leaps’ (Percival 1976:286). More importantly, Kuhn has never claimed that a scientific revolution is ‘an event brought about by the striking achievement of a SINGLE scientific genius’ (ibid.) or that ‘revolutions are precipitated by SINGLE individuals’ (p. 287; emphasis in the original), Such a misinterpretation does not become true by repetition; cf. Percival’s assertion (p, 286) that the ‘role of the lone innovator is essential to Kuhn’s conception of a scientific revo- lution’, (In note 11, p. 290, we find yet another reference to this erroneous interpretation.) In fact, Kuhn repeatedly speaks of the difficulty of identifying a particular discovery with the name of one individual and a given date. Nor did Kuhn press the argument (as Percival does, pp. 291, 292); the fact that some do not approve of the change does not, in Kuhn’s view, invalidate the occurrence of a paradigm change. In short, it is difficult to see why Percival’s argument against the application of Kuhn’s concepts and principles to the history of linguistics should carry any weight since they are in fact based on a distorted picture of Kuhn’s proposals. (The fact that historians of linguistics cannot agree on when and where a paradigm change occurred during the past 150 or so years (Percival, pp. 290-91] may shed a light on the sorry state of linguistic historiography, but cannot be taken as an indication that Kuhn’s ideas apply ‘at best vacuously’ to events in the history of linguistics, as Percival wants us to believe.) - yiMODELS IN LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY 51 state) or failures (the 1848 European revolution, or post-World War I revolutions in Central Europe). There is no reason to expect “purer” cases in science than in the situations to which they are supposed to be analogous, However, I have restated my views on the matter elsewhere (Koerner 1981: 158-164), and do not wish to reiterate them here. Instead, I would like to explore in the present paper the possibility of developing models for the historian of linguistics which may help him clarify the points at which significant changes in the develop- ment of the science of language took place, and, above all, identify the various aspects that he should be aware of and try to account for in his analysis. 2.0 Models for an Understanding of the History of Linguistics’ 2.1 The traditional, somewhat naive, and certainly overly optimistic conception of the development of science, was expressed by no less a scholar than Leonard Bloomfield (1887-1949), who stated: The man of science (but not always the amateur) surveys the results of earlier students and applies his energies at the point where they left off. Instead of always starting over again from the beginning, science progresses cumulatively and with acceleration, (Bloomfield 1933:40) Still 34 years later the linguist William Samarin maintains that ‘progress is spiral and cumulative’, adding, with a reference to Lyons (1962), the following illustration of his claim: -..the history of science is full of examples to support the opinion that the actual cannot be properly described, perhaps not even recognized, except in the framework of what has previously been envisaged as possible. At the same time, of course, the sphere of what is thought of as possible is being constantly revised under the impact of discoveries made in the description of actual languages. (Samarin 1967:4) Probably without realizing it, Samarin in this way provides an example of how the history of science has traditionally been depicted, a view which, at least since Kuhn’s book of 1962, has become discredited. This fairly inadequate picture of the develop- ment of science may be depicted as follows: oe Figure 1 With reference to Kuhn (1970:2), I may term this model, which shows a unilinear progression, with the line becoming stronger with time, the Progress-by-Accumula- tion Model. 2.2 A somewhat more sophisticated view of the development of linguistics (and probably of any other science) will recognize that there are, at different points in *The substance of this section and, especially, the diagrams used herein were first presen- ted on 7 November 1976 at the Seventh Meeting of the North Eastern Linguistic Society held at Cambridge, Mass. (cf. Koerner 1977, esp. pp. 169-72), ie., several weeks before I received a copy of Stewart (1976), whose official publication date was in fact 20 December 1976, This stimulating account of the use of graphic designs and models in linguistics, from August Schleicher’s genealo- gical trees (1853 ff.) to the representations by Chomsky, Sydney Lamb, and others, suggests the importance of visual illustrations for the clarification of certain ideas or theoretical arguments.PRACTICING LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY % time, ‘mainstream’ lines of linguistic activity as well as ‘underground’ currents, or, in Hymes’ (1974:21) terminology, ‘central and peripheral traditions’. Ideological, social, political, and other reasons may decide which line of thought constitutes the ‘mainstream’ focus of attention (i.e., Hymes’ ‘cynosure’) at a given period. This Mainstream-vs.-Undercurrent Model may be represented as follows: Of course, there are intra-linguistic factors as well that have a determining influence on what may be the center of attention and represent the strongest paradigmatic community. One approach may be able to explain certain linguistic features more fully than another. This does not eliminate other approaches, but merely makes them less visible to the public eye. The Mainstream-vs.-Undercurrent Model (Fig. 2) remains essentially mono- dimensional in its vision of the development of science; in contrast to the Progress- by-Accumulation Model (Fig. 1) it at least suggests that there is usually more than one line of thought prevalent at any period in linguistics or any other discipline (though perhaps less noticeable in the natural sciences). During the 19th century, for example, especially during the period dominated by a materialist approach to language, first represented by August Schleicher, then by the Neogrammarians (roughly 1850 to 1900), the Humboldtian trend in linguistics (cf. Koerner 1973b, 1977b), characterized by a broader (‘mentalistic’) spectrum of interests in language, was at least part of the ‘undercurrent’ tradition kept alive by Heymann Steinthal (1823-1899), Georg von der Gabelentz (1840-1893), and others. At the turn of the century, however, Humboldtian (as well as Neo-Kantian) idealism became a much stronger current. Indeed, during the period between the two World Wars, especially in German-speaking lands and in Italy, and partly until the late 1950s in some quarters, this former ‘undercurrent’ had become something of a ‘mainstream’, (This explains why the ‘Saussurean Paradigm’ did not obtain a firm hold in these countries before the 1960s.) 23 The Mainstream-vs.-Undercurrent Model, however, cannot account for the change of more peripheral trends to central ‘cynosures’. It therefore appears neces- sary to devise a model that takes into account the dynamic aspect in the history of a discipline. Thus something like a Pendulum-Swing Model seems to be called for in recognition of the observation that, within the development of linguistics, for instance, a continuous alternation between contrastive approaches to the subject (‘empiricist’ vs. ‘rationalist’, ‘materialist’ vs. ‘idealist’, etc.) is to be reckoned with:MODELS IN LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY 53 One frequent form that the Pendulum-Swing Model assumes has been described as the perennial contrast between ‘theory-orientation’ and ‘data-orientation’ (cf. Robins 1974 for an illustration of this phenomenon in the classical Roman period, the middle ages, and later periods in the history of linguistic thought). Of course this model (as any model for that matter) is probably too rigorous to apply in many instances without ignoring other activities or trends of a given period. Perhaps we are still too much imbued with the Hegelian conception of the development of science (and of human affairs in general) in terms of a dialectical thesis-antithesis- synthesis alternation, Such a conception may blindfold us and disguise the fact that we have made an observation without having been able to understand, let alone to explain, the reason for certain recurrent changes of emphasis in linguistics. (The reason for our inability to explain such alternations is that we have restricted our attention to intra-disciplinary events; cf, 2,6 below.) 2.4 Historians of linguistics are aware of continuities as well as discontinuities (cf. Grosse 1973; Robins 1976), There may be many reasons why a certain trend subsides, and it appears that sometimes a general change of perspective and direction may cause a particular tradition to fall into disrepute. Much has been said in favor of and against the ‘Chomskyan Revolution’ in linguistics (cf. Hymes 1974, Percival 1976); some have stressed the continuity aspect of transformational-generative linguistics (Gleason 1976), others have seen in it a definite break with earlier work in the discipline (most recently Newmeyer 1980). As it happens, there are indications that, while transformational-generative grammar may still be commanding much attention in linguistics, other trends, both older and newer ones, have been main- tained or established. There are, however, other examples to be found in the history of linguistics which may more clearly indicate the possibility of discontinuity of particular tra- ditions. One such tradition is that of the grammaire générale usually associated with the Jansenist Abbey of Port-Royal near Paris, and the ‘general and rational’ grammars of French as well as of other languages that its professors produced since the mid-1650s. It can be shown that this tradition, which dominated much of 18th- century work in linguistics, became less and less influential from 1800 onwards. Within France the general grammars written by Domergue, Silvestre de Sacy, and Sicard (all first published in 1799) were frequently reprinted, some as late as the mid-1840s and early 1850s. But outside the country of origin, general grammar fell into disrepute when empirically-oriented comparative grammars began to drive out the much more philosophical, argumentative and aprioristic types of grammar.* Probably somewhat more realistically the Discontinuity-vs.-Continuity Model may be depicted as follows: As it happens, even the Grammaire générale tradition was taken up to some degree a few generations later, producing a line from Bréal to Saussure (cf, Koerner 1976¢), *A full of this tradition and its discontinuity in the history Saeouees54 PRACTICING LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY and from there to Hjelmslev’s 1928 Principes de grammarie générale (Copenhagen: A. F, Host), not to mention the re-awakening of interest in this tradition following Chomsky’s Cartesian Linguistics (1966). This explains the use of certain dotted lines in the above diagram (Fig. 4). It does not take into account the Pendulum-Swing Model (Fig. 3), though the historiographer would have to reckon with a co-existence and a co-operation of these two factors, which at times (e.g., if ‘grammaire générale’ work is identified with ‘theory-orientation’) may coalesce. 2.5 If we abstract from the preceding two factors, namely, the possibility of dis- continuity and the dialectal relationship between data-orientation and theory- orientation, we might depict the development of linguistics, like any other dis- cipline, as a science advancing through time. To illustrate this development, we might use the graphic device of a spiral, with the horizontal (dotted) arrow indi- cating progress in time: Figure Sa Indeed, this (what we may call) Relative-Progress Model may be used to take into account the pendulum-swing kind of development, while at the same time suggesting that return to a particular emphasis on a particular approach will never be the same as before, but will have changed some of its ingredients due to advances in the field, The diagram (Fig. 5a) may be turned by 90 degrees to offer perhaps a better picture of the recurrence of (almost) the same outlook, preference in approach, or turn of events, each time on a more advanced level: MsMODELS IN LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY 5S common-place observation that disciplines do not operate in a vacuum but are dependent on a society that supports them and ideas (and, at times, ideologies) to sustain them. It goes without saying that the serious historian of linguistics would have to try to trace and to analyze these extra-linguistic factors. 2.6 In a programmatic paper (Koerner 1976b) I have tried to parallel particular ‘paradigms’, i.e., widely accepted frameworks guiding linguistic research during a given phase in the evolution of the field, with particular situations and ‘climates of opinion’, At least some of these extra-linguistic factors having a particular impact on these ‘paradigms’ associated with the work of Schleicher, Saussure, and Chomsky were identified in that paper. 19th-century work in linguistic science is especially characterized by what I have called (Koerner 1980) a ‘parasite’ tendency. Linguistics in the past century, trying to become as ‘scientific’ and rigorous as those disciplines that had already achieved wide acceptance as a field of science, borrowed terms as well as principles of analysis from these dominant fields of research. Thus, from about 1800 onwards, if not somewhat earlier (cf. Salmon 1975), botany (in particular Linnaen taxono- my), biology, and especially comparative anatomy (represented by Cuvier, Blumen- bach, and others) began offering models of analysis which the generation of Bopp, Rask and Grimm tried to imitate in their treatment of language. In the mid-19th century geology (cf. the work of Lyell) and (largely Lamarckian) evolution theory played an important role in contemporary theorizing, Schleicher being the most conspicuous and influential representative of the period. Towards the end of the 19th century, when linguistics began to free itself from conceptions supplied by the natural sciences, sociology, psychology, and political economy began exerting their influence on linguistic thinking (cf. Paul's Prinzipien, first published in 1880, which, curiously enough, had little impact on the neogrammarian practice of analyzing ‘dead’ languages). If one considers that Saussure’s reflections on ‘synchronic’ prin- ciples of language analysis date back at least as far as 1891, we may realize the in- fluence of the ‘climate of opinion’ on his linguistic views. A model taking into ac- count these extra-linguistic influences at different periods in the discipline’s develop- ment may assume the following graphic shape (incorporating here only the ‘pendu- lum swing’ [Fig. 3 above] of one major current): botany, comp. anatomy, evolut. theory, geology psychology, sociology, eth i56 PRACTICING LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY take into account other factors, which had a bearing on the development of linguis- tic science in the 19th century, for example, the political situation in Europe. Napoleon’s reign until 1815 made George Bolling speak of a linguistics after Water- loo; his Continental Blockade against Britain prevented the various Sanskrit gram- mars written by British scholars in the first decade of the 19th century from be- coming known on the Continent. It was sheer accident that Alexander Hamilton, the former member of the East Indian Company, who was visiting Paris in 1802, was forced to stay there after the rupture of the Peace of Amiens in 1803. Hamilton not only played a major role in the cataloging of the Sanskrit manuscript holdings of the Bibliothéque Nationale, but also in introducing Friedrich Schlegel to the study of Sanskrit. Indeed, if political and socio-economic factors are properly taken into ac- count, the analysis of the development of a field such as-linguistics becomes even more involved and complex. Bopp’s epoch-making Conjugationssystem appeared in 1816, one year after Waterloo, and so did Francois Raynouard’s (1761-1830) grammar of Old Provencal (as volume one of his 6-volume Choix de poésies origi- nales des Troubadours, Paris 1816-1821), which is commonly regarded as the beginning of Romance philology. Together with a rise of nationalism in Germany following the defeat of Napoleon’s armies, there was also an expansion of institu- tions of higher learning. This expansion could not fail to boost the study of lan- guages, in particular Latin and Greek, but also of modern vernaculars, and the study of language in general. In 1819, the first chair of Sanskrit was created at the Univer- sity of Bonn (A. W. Schlegel was the first incumbant); two years later, at the Uni- versity of Berlin (and with the support of Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt), Bopp received a university professorship for Sanskrit and Oriental Literature; the University of Munich established a chair in the same subject in 1826, and other universities in Germany followed their example. In short, the increasing profession- alization of linguistic studies could not fail to have an important impact on the development of the field. It is the task of the historian of linguistics to acquaint himself with these facts and factors in his description of a particular period in linguistic research. The analysis of extra-linguistic influences on the discipline itself is by no means an easy task, even in instances where we are ourselves witness to certain events in linguistics. Hymes (1974:21) has suggested a ‘sociolinguistic’ approach to the history of linguistics, but from his own account of the Chomskyan ‘revolution’ I gather that this is not as easy as it sounds. Where the development of 20th-century linguistics in the United States is concerned, it could be shown that certain changes in approach or wide-spread acceptance of on-going work was frequently related to the interest that the federal government and its agencies took in the study of lan- guage at various points in time. Compare the importance of the Army Language School during World War II for the structuralist approach during the 1940s and 1950s, and the support that transformational-generative linguistics received from the National Defense Education Act of late 1958 and other programs (cf. Meisel 1973). 3.0 Concluding Remarks In this paper I have ventured to explore other avenues than those already laid out for us by neighboring fields, such as the history and philosophy of science. I will be satisfied if the discussion has suggested to the (future) historian of linguistics that the adequate treatment of the subject is by no means something that can beMODELS IN LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY S7 done easily by anyone who has linguistic training and a knowledge of English. On the contrary, the demands on a historiographer must be more than knowing one’s sources and knowing how to count as Hobsbawm (1980:728) has recently suggested. As we have seen, there are a number of intra-linguistic and extra-linguistic factors that need to be accounted for. I submit that the so-called ‘Chomskyan Revolution’ in linguistics, for example, cannot be properly explained in terms of a wide-spread dissatisfaction with the mechanistic-behaviorist approach to language analysis during the 1950s. It is certainly true that the taxonomist tradition of the Bloomfieldian mold could not satisfy the highly intellectual mind; but to bring about a change within general linguistic thinking, many factors, including situa- tional ones, would have to be taken into account. The novelty of Chomsky’s ap- proach — he introduced for the first time notions into linguistics which had been developed outside the field, e.g., recursive mathematical models, symbolic logic, etc. — explains at best part of the success of his proposals; various socio-economic and political factors (cf. Hymes 1974:16-17; Gray 1976:48-49), and indeed psycho- logical-social phenomena, such as what Max Weber called ‘charisma’ (cf. Murray 1980:84-85), would have to be thoroughly investigated. REFERENCES Bloomfield, Leonard. 1933. Language. New York: H. Holt & Co. Gleason, Henry Allan, Jr. 1976. ‘Continuities in Linguistics’. The Second LACUS Forum 1975 ed. by Peter A. Reich, 3-16. Columbia, S.C.: Hornbeam Press. 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