Analytical Report ‍ ‍

Africa Spectrum

Cooperation and
2021, Vol. 55(3) 339–350
© The Author(s) 2021
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​DOI: ​10.​1177/​0002​0397​20936689
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Bloc Between Ethiopia,

Eritrea, and Somalia and Its
Consequences for Eastern Africa

Ingo Henneberg ‍ ‍and Sören Stapel

Abstract
In January 2020, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia proposed to form a new regional bloc,
occasionally referred to as the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC). This article assess-
es which factors have contributed to making this proposal and contemplates potential
effects for the complex security challenges, political tensions among the neighbours,
and existing institutional environment in the region. Drawing on the scholarship on
comparative regionalism and overlapping regionalism, we show that a genuine interest
to independently address security challenges in the Horn of Africa, as well as domestic
concerns, are core motivations for the leaders in all three states. However, the HoAC
proposal bears the risk of further alienating partners in the region and undermning se-
curity efforts of other regional organisations, most importantly the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development, the African Union, and the Eastern Africa Standby Force.
Thus, the promises and pitfalls of this new bloc could shape the regional architecture
and cause new political challenges in the region.

Manuscript received 8 April 2020; accepted 5 May 2020

Albert-­Ludwigs-­Universität Freiburg, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany

Corresponding Author:
Ingo Henneberg, Albert-­Ludwigs-­Universität Freiburg, Belfortstraße 20, 79085 Freiburg im Breisgau,
Germany.
Email: ​ingo.​henneberg@​politik.​uni-​freiburg.​de

Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 License (https://​creativecommons.​org/​licences/​by/​4.​0/) which permits any use,
reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is
attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://​us.​sagepub.​com/​en-​us/​nam/​open-​access-​at-​sage).
340 Africa Spectrum 55(3)

Keywords
Horn of Africa, security, regional cooperation, regional organization, overlapping
regionalism, forum shopping, regime complexity, Intergovernmental Authority on
Developmentx

Introduction
On 27 January 2020 the heads of state and government of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia
– President Isaias Afwerki, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and President Mohamed
Abdullahi Farmajo – held their third trilateral meeting (Horn Diplomat, 2020) after the
2018 peace deal in Asmara, Eritrea. They agreed on a Joint Plan of Action for 2020,
which focuses on consolidating peace, stability, and security as well as promoting eco-
nomic and social development in the region (Eritrea - Ministry of Information, 2020).
They also proposed to form a new regional bloc at the Horn of Africa (HoA), occasion-
ally referred to as the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC).
The proposal came as a surprise to the casual observer of regional politics in the HoA.
Cooperation between the three states was unthinkable until very recently. With Ethiopian
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s historic visit to Eritrea in 2018 (Associated Press, 2018),
the state of conflict between the two countries came to an end – and Abiy Ahmed was
later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. Ethiopia and Somalia also share a
violent history, not the least in Ogaden (Vaughan, 2019). Moreover, neighbours Kenya,
Sudan, and South Sudan further aggravate and complicate regional politics. Relations at
the Horn are complex, complicated, and characterised by deeply ingrained rivalries
between the countries in a conflict-­ridden region.
Regional cooperation affects the everyday life of people. It helps to address cross-­
border challenges, such as trade and sustainable environment, and is key to tackle peace
and security threats. Yet, states need to provide resources, for example, staff, to make
regional cooperation work. The new bloc would be an addition to the three states’ mem-
berships in several existing regional organisations (ROs),1 including the continental
African Union (AU) and the regional Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), and Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD). Additionally, Somalia applied for membership in the East African
Community (EAC) in 2012.
Following the developments in early 2020 and in light of the complex political con-
text in the HoA, it is worthwhile to reflect on why the three states, nonetheless, suggest
to pursue the path of regional cooperation – and what this means for people from the
region. Two interrelated aspects deserve special attention in this regard. On the one hand,
why do the three states at the HoA consider establishing yet another African RO in the
first place? On the other hand, what are the potential consequences of establishing
another RO and which challenges need to be addressed upfront in this respect?
In order to address these questions, we draw on the pertinent scholarship on regional-
ism and overlapping regionalism. We reflect on the motivations and rationales of the
Henneberg and Stapel 341

three leaders to push for the creation of yet another RO in Africa and the potential con-
sequences that arise for the regional context and institutional environment in the HoA.
We proceed as follows. First, we discuss the potential reasons why the three states
consider forming the HoAC organisation. We consider prominent explanations in the
literature and assess to which extent they apply in this particular case, in particular
domestic considerations in the three participating states and potential benefits in their
security and economic relations. Second, our analysis shifts to the potential conse-
quences that would arise from a new RO. We take into account both the political context
with neighbouring states in the HoA and the existing institutional environment on the
continent. We elaborate on the first reactions to the HoAC proposal from both neigh-
bours and the media in the region and conclude with possible scenarios for the near
future.

Why Do States Form Regional Organisations?

Regional cooperation and integration have been in the limelight of research for several
decades (overview: Bach, 2016; Söderbaum, 2016). The literature offers a multitude of
approaches to explaining why states seek to cooperate at a regional level in formalised
institutional settings. To name a few actors want to achieve substantive gains from coop-
eration in institutions, for example, trade and security (Mattli, 1999), governments seek
to gain legitimacy and reputation with domestic and international audiences (Söderbaum,
2004), powerful states within the region or outside facilitate or hamper the emergence
and maintenance of regionalism following their economic or geopolitical preferences
(Grieco, 1997; Katzenstein, 2005), and domestic and transnational coalitions request
deeper cooperation (Solingen, 1998).
The proposed HoAC promises to address transnational and cooperation problems of
the three countries and bring about gains especially in the area of peace and security. In
a conflict-­ridden region like the HoA, the establishment of a regional body dedicated to
peace and security issues could be beneficial for the three states. A new RO could bring
about substantive gains in peace and security matters, not least by further normalising
the relationship between them. It would help deal with negative externalities from
domestic security threats emanating from the three countries, especially the transna-
tional activities of Al-­Shabab and rebel groups. As a new outlet, HoAC would also help
to bring forward new regional norms and understandings of peace and security in line
with understandings and preferences of the three leaders.
In terms of economic gains, closer cooperation bears the potential to support econo-
mies and trade. However, it does not become immediately apparent how HoAC would
strengthen economic ties between the three states. A significant part of the trade in the
region is still small scale, local, informal, partly illegal, and shows very limited comple-
mentarity between the three states (Byiers, 2016). On the one hand, landlocked Ethiopia
as the most advanced economy has an interest in strengthening transportation links and
access to the sea in order to foster its integration into the world market; “Ethiopia wants
access to the sea […] and once it gets that, it will have diversified from reliance on
342 Africa Spectrum 55(3)

Djibouti” (Mutambo, 2020). Ethiopia could also use HoAC to export goods and energy
to its neighbours, for instance, from the new Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Reuters,
2019). On the other hand, Somalia and Eritrea do not benefit as much. Somalia has nei-
ther a reliable economic base to substantially export goods nor the financial resources to
import Ethiopian goods (Love, 2009). Due to the long-­lasting confrontation between
Eritrea and Ethiopia, economic ties have to be (re-­)established. Trade between Eritrea
and Somalia is negligible. Hence, the HoAC proposal does not seem to be motivated by
economic concerns.
A third potential explanation relates to domestic politics. The creation of a new
regional bloc could be an opportunity for state leaders to show their success on the
regional stage. With national elections in Ethiopia and Somalia approaching, both Abiy
Ahmed and Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo need to gain support to be re-­ elected.
Especially in Ethiopia, the transition process resulted in requests for more democratisa-
tion and liberalisation. Engaging in regional cooperation, not the least with a former
long-­term rival, could signal to both domestic and international audiences that Abiy
Ahmed indeed plans to fulfil his promises. Moreover, putting the HoAC proposal on the
table right before elections could deflect from ongoing domestic crises in both countries.
By contrast, Eritrean authoritarian ruler Isaias Afwerki reportedly pushed for the cre-
ation of the HoAC as an opportunity to gain regional reputation and side-­line IGAD,
which he has boycotted for several years due to IGADs stance on basic principles of
good governance and the influence of Kenya (Mutambo, 2020).
In contrast to the explanations related to security and trade gains as well as the quest
for domestic or international legitimacy, power-­based and domestic coalition-­oriented
explanations, do not provide expedient insights into why the three states proposed the
HoAC. None of the three states can be considered extremely powerful as such, despite
Ethiopia’s democratic, economic and military growth in recent years. The HoAC pro-
posal rather needs to be seen in the light of the states’ ongoing rivalry with Kenya, which
has been meddling in their domestic politics, which we will further discuss below.
Domestic and transnational coalitions at this point do not request deeper cooperation
between the three countries.
Taken together, the proposal to form the new HoAC, at this juncture, is motivated by
the concerns over and the potential to cooperatively address security issues in the region
as well as their domestic politics. With these potential benefits and intentions in mind,
however, the problem will lie in providing HoAC with sufficient resources. It is doubtful
that the three states provide necessary political and financial resources and send suffi-
ciently skilled personnel to staff the organisation. This holds especially true for Somalia.
Although regional efforts in the security domain heavily rely on external funding (Engel
and Mattheis, 2020; Stapel and Söderbaum, 2020), it is unclear whether and why exter-
nal actors, such as the European Union and Germany as the most prominent donors,
would fund another organisation in competition to the existing ones. From their perspec-
tive, the HoAC proposal could be seen as a simple rent-­seeking endeavour to attract
additional resources.
Henneberg and Stapel 343

What are the Potential Consequences of Establishing a New

Regional Bloc?
Although organisations “are easier to maintain than to construct” (Keohane, 1984: 102)
and the creation of new institutions generates transaction costs, the number of ROs has
steadily increased in recent years. This trend goes hand in hand with a higher number of
member states per RO as well as broadening policy scopes (Panke et al., 2020). Today,
it has become almost inevitable that ROs simultaneously share member states and policy
competencies. The scholarly debates therefore increasingly focus on the complexity of
regionalism around the globe. The establishment of HoAC would create an additional
layer of complexity for regional politics in the form of overlapping regionalism and the
potential for forum shopping, and risk further complicating diplomatic relationships in
the HoA.
We speak of the phenomenon “overlapping regionalism” when a state is a member of
more than one RO and these ROs share at least one similar policy competency (Panke
and Stapel, 2018a). Other bodies of literature deal with this phenomenon as regime com-
plexity (Alter and Meunier, 2009) and inter-­ organisational relations (Koops and
Biermann, 2017). Overlapping regionalism is present around the world. All states and all
ROs are subject to these overlaps to some extent. Yet the phenomenon is particularly
prevalent in the African context with twenty-­two existing ROs as they additionally main-
tain quite similar mandates (Panke et al., 2020). The overlap between multiple organisa-
tions creates costs and coordination problems. Given that states’ financial, administrative,
and political capacities are ultimately finite, it remains puzzling why they end up being
members in several ROs with similar policy mandates at the same time (Panke and
Stapel, 2018a). Moreover, increasing overlaps between ROs significantly affect regional
governance since incompatible rules and norms of multiple ROs increase non-­compliance
(Panke and Stapel, 2018b).
Confronted with this complexity, the literature on forum selection and forum shop-
ping addresses why and under what conditions states choose a certain institution or
organisation over another, create a new one, or abandon existing ones. The scholarly
roots of the forum-­shopping literature can be found in law studies (e.g. Helfer, 1999;
Sykes, 2008) and later developed with a focus on trade and economic issues (e.g. Alter
and Meunier, 2006; Busch, 2007). The majority of these studies draw on rational-­choice
assumptions (implicitly or explicitly). States seek to minimise transaction costs by
selecting a forum that promises to efficiently solve a particular problem (e.g. Jupille
et al., 2013; Snidal et al., 2002). They choose the organisation that offers (1) the best
available degree of formal competencies within the respective policy area, (2) a rela-
tively strong influence within the organisation, and (3) the highest available degree of
institutional capacity and experience (Henneberg and Plank, 2019). States can select
between different suitable options (forum-­shopping), dramatically change an existing
institution, and create a new institution (Jupille and Snidal, 2006). They usually push for
the creation of a new institution when the existing ones are not open to reform or blocked
by other states (Urpelainen and Van de Graaf, 2015).
344 Africa Spectrum 55(3)

However, rational choice driven logics, as put forward in the forum-­shopping litera-
ture, cannot sufficiently explain forum selection in the security realm. Drawing on the
example of regional cooperation against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region, states’
preference for reducing transaction costs is partly overridden by the aim of seeking a
maximum of protection of national prestige and state sovereignty in security affairs.
Creating a new regional body provides domestic elites with the opportunity to reshape
the perception of their activities. They are enabled to introduce a narrative that lets the
state or the incumbent regime take a lead in building a new regional institution and
thereby a lead in addressing a particular security problem (Henneberg and Plank, 2019).
Once established, HoAC would become a direct competitor of IGAD and create addi-
tional overlaps with the AU, EASF, COMESA, and potentially the EAC. IGAD’s efforts
in managing conflicts in Somalia and Sudan have been quite successful in recent years.
In South Sudan, the conflicting parties within the government (Henneberg, 2013;
Henneberg and Plank, 2015), which have fought a civil war since 2013, finally reached
a power-­sharing agreement in February 2020 following a negotiation process facilitated
by IGAD (e.g. Gebru, 2020). However, IGAD lacks the structures for effective economic
integration. It also suffers from ineffective governance structures, poor communication,
insufficient resources, and a lack of qualified personnel (Byiers, 2016). HoAC might
further aggravate these challenges as IGAD member states Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia
might revert resources and political clout to the HoAC. At the same time, the proposal
could also be an attempt to put pressure on IGAD to reform, as suggested by Urpelainen
and Van de Graaf (2015). Yet as a new and small RO, HoAC would struggle to gain
significance vis-à-vis IGAD.
HoAC’s overlaps in the security realm would also be extensive with the AU and
EASF. It might further complicate inter-­organisational relations in the HoA as the AU
recognises IGAD as a central pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture
(African Union, 2012) and its Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
(Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 2020). Adding to this complex
and complicated situation, the establishment of HoAC would require all actors to develop
inter-­organisational relationships in order to sustain effective regional security.
As mentioned above, economic considerations do not seem to feature prominently
in the strategic calculations to propose the HoAC. The new RO would also add
another layer in the complex web of ROs in the economic and trade domains. IGAD
is one of eight Regional Economic Communities (African Union, 2020b) as well as a
building block for the African Economic Community and the African Continental
Free Trade Area (African Union, 2020a). Yet IGAD’s progress in the economic sphere
is bleak, and it has limited political traction in this area (Byiers, 2016). Several coun-
tries in the HoA, therefore, joined COMESA or consider joining the EAC in the
future. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent HoAC will venture into the
economic field and will then create frictions and fragmentation with COMESA and
the EAC.
With the HoAC proposal, the three countries potentially alienate regional neighbours
who need to face the loss of strategic influence in the region with their announcement to
Henneberg and Stapel 345

create a new organisation. The reactions, especially from Djibouti and Kenya, accord-
ingly did not signal that they would welcome the initiative with open arms.
Djibouti is a direct neighbour of all three states – and a potential candidate to become
an additional HoAC member. The three states uphold the possibility of Djibouti joining
them: “They also expressed their appreciation for, and their readiness to cooperate with,
their friends and partners, […] The three leaders agreed to closely consult with their
Brothers, Heads of State, for the realization of the aspiration of their peoples for effective
Horn of Africa” (Africa News, 2020). Bringing in Djibouti would be important for bol-
stering security governance in the HoA. Yet, Djibouti is also home to IGAD and hosts
the US Combined Joint Task Force – HoA. The HoAC proposal therefore threatens to
undermine Djibouti’s strategic position. Beyond security concerns, the Chinese-­built,
750- km-­long Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway (Agence France Presse, 2016) currently is
the only sea access for Ethiopia and generates significant income for Djibouti’s ports.
Djibouti likely fears that emerging transport links through Eritrea and Somalia that may
be created in the context of the HoAC initiative could undermine its position as an eco-
nomic and logistical hub in the region.
Regional powerhouse Kenya plays a prominent, to some extent even dominating, role
in IGAD. The HoAC initiative certainly is an attempt by Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia
to curtail Kenyan influence in their domestic affairs and broader regional politics. They
increasingly seek to protect national prestige and state sovereignty in security affairs,
and establishing an additional regional bloc certainly helps in this regard (Henneberg
and Plank, 2019). Moreover, Kenya’s Lamu Port Southern Sudan-­Ethiopia Transport
(LAPSSET) project with Ethiopia and South Sudan would lose insignificance once the
proposed HoAC takes on economic issues. As Kenya worries about losing influence in
the region, it does not come as a surprise that the HoAC proposal was criticised and
branded “anti-­IGAD” (Munene, 2020).
The new regional initiative also has implications for political relations beyond the
African continent. Since the “Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea
and Gulf of Aden” was only recently established under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, the
HoAC proposal presents an opportunity for Eritrea and Somalia to showcase once more
their political alternatives to their partners and neighbours (Verhoeven, 2020; Vertin,
2019).
Mixed responses to the HoAC proposal are evident beyond official statements. After
the announcement, former Minister for International Cooperation of the Somalian State
of Jubaland, Adam Aw Hirsi, initiated a survey on Twitter. He asked: “Do you think the
creation of a brand-­new regional body Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC) is a good
idea?” (Aw Hirsi, 2020). The 1022 respondents in the non-­representative results were
generally in favour of the proposed HoAC (Yes 57.5%, No 35.8%, and “I need to have
my say” 6.7%). Likewise, the ensuing discussion mirrored both the poll and the broader
media discussion where people from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia were slightly in
favour of the proposal, whereas commentators from Djibouti and Kenya showed a stron-
ger tendency to express their disapproval (e.g. Africa Intelligence, 2020; The Brief,
2020; Twitter, 2020).
346 Africa Spectrum 55(3)

Conclusion
Significant progress towards regional peace and development have characterised the
HoA in recent years. Domestic changes in Ethiopia, peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia,
and burgeoning cooperation attempts in the region all are promising. In addition, the
revolution in Sudan and the peace agreement in South Sudan open up new prospects for
the conflict-­ridden greater HoA. The proposal to form a HoAC regional bloc between
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia could be another step in this direction. Their cooperation
promises to bring about lasting peaceful relations among the states in the HoA. Regional
cooperation between the three states is urgently needed – also beyond the security
realm.
Moreover, such an institution could boost the prestige of all three state leaders and
foster regional trade and infrastructure, at least if Djibouti were to be included. Against
that backdrop, it is important to remember that the three states are far from stable.
Security risks could easily undermine soaring plans for cooperation. Especially in
Somalia, the security situation is still highly fragile. The federal government relies on
international forces to secure the country, fails to provide basic services, and is not well
positioned to invest in larger economic and security projects. As the new regional bloc
would create many problems, it is an optimistic domestic move and a signal to improve
and update economic cooperation in the region within existing, complex regional
frameworks.
Yet the potential disadvantages regarding funding, capacities, and overlap with other
existing institutions are substantial. In fact, only a few agree that a new RO is necessary.
An additional institution creates functional problems and alienates neighbours. The
potential risks for regional relations are evident. The HoAC proposal might create more
distrust; bring about additional conflicts in Eastern Africa; deteriorate the relations with
close neighbours, in particular, Djibouti and Kenya; and complicate cooperation in other
institutional settings. A weakened IGAD and fragmented security cooperation in the
region could negatively impact peacekeeping activities in the greater HoA region, most
imminently in Somalia and South Sudan.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

Note
1. ROs are international organisations from one geographical region with a set of primary rules,
secretariat, in which at least three states cooperate with one another in more than one specific
issue area (Goltermann et al., 2012: 5; Panke et al., 2020).
Henneberg and Stapel 347

ORCID ID
Ingo Henneberg ‍ ‍https://​orcid.​org/​0000-​0003-​1842-​8016

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Author Biographies
Ingo Henneberg is a research associate in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Freiburg. His research interests include strategic issues of foreign and security policy, civil wars
and peace agreements, regional and international cooperation and particularly regional security
cooperation with a focus on Africa. His publications have appeared in, among others, International
Studies Review, International Journal, Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, Politische
Vierteljahresschrift and the Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung.
Email: ​ingo.​henneberg@​politik.​uni-​freiburg.​de

Sören Stapel is post-­doctoral research associate in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Freiburg, where he currently co-­leads the research project “Overlapping Regionalism
in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe Compared”. His research interests include international
organizations and global governance, comparative regionalism, overlapping regionalism and
regime complexity, and the financing of international and regional organizations. His publications
have appeared in Bristol University Press, Journal of International Relations and Development,
and British Journal of Politics and International Relations.
Email: ​soeren.​stapel@​politik.​uni-​freiburg.​de

Zusammenarbeit und Konflikt am Horn von Afrika: Ein neuer

regionaler Block zwischen Äthiopien, Eritrea und Somalia und
seine Folgen für Ostafrika

Zusammenfassung
Im Januar 2020 schlugen Eritrea, Äthiopien und Somalia die Bildung eines neuen regionalen
Blocks vor, der gelegentlich als Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC) bezeichnet wird. Der
vorliegende Artikel bewertet, welche Faktoren zu diesem Vorschlag beigetragen haben und
betrachtet mögliche Auswirkungen auf die komplexen Sicherheitsherausforderungen, die
politischen Spannungen zwischen den Nachbarn und das bestehende institutionelle Umfeld
in der Region. Ausgehend von der Literatur des vergleichenden und des überlappenden
Regionalismus zeigen wir, dass ein echtes Interesse an der unabhängigen Bewältigung der
Sicherheitsherausforderungen am Horn von Afrika sowie innenpolitische Anliegen die
Hauptmotivation der Staats- und Regierungschefs in allen drei Staaten sind. Der Vorschlag
des HoAC birgt jedoch das Risiko, Partner in der Region weiter zu entfremden und die
Sicherheitsbemühungen anderer Regionalorganisationen, vor allem der IGAD, der AU und
der EASF, zu untergraben. So könnten die Versprechungen und Fallstricke dieses neuen
Blocks die regionale Architektur prägen und neue politische Herausforderungen in der
Region verursachen.

Schlagwörter
Horn of Africa Cooperation, regionale Sicherheitskooperation, Regionalorganisationen,
überlappender Regionalismus, Forum Shopping, Regimekomplexität, IGAD