Copyright © 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1.15
Phenomenological, Existential,
and Humanistic Foundations for
Psychology as a Human Science
CONSTANCE T. FISCHER
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

1.15.1 INTRODUCTION 449

1.15.2 PHENOMENOLOGY 451
1.15.3 EXISTENTIALISM 453
1.15.4 PHENOMENOLOGICAL±EXISTENTIAL PSYCHIATRY 455
1.15.5 HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY 457
1.15.6 HUMAN SCIENCE PSYCHOLOGY 458
1.15.7 EMPIRICAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH METHOD 460
1.15.7.1 Procedures 461
1.15.7.1.1 Collecting instances 462
1.15.7.1.2 Organizing the data 462
1.15.7.1.3 Data analysis and forms of results 462
1.15.7.2 Clarifications 463
1.15.7.3 Example: Being in Privacy 464
1.15.7.4 Example: Being Impatient 464
1.15.7.5 Comments 464
1.15.8 HUMAN SCIENCE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 465
1.15.8.1 Developing and Contextualizing Issues for the Assessment 465
1.15.8.2 Using Tests 466
1.15.8.3 Collaborating and Intervening 467
1.15.8.4 Writing Reports 468
1.15.8.5 Judging Validity 469
1.15.8.6 Comments 469
1.15.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 469
1.15.10 REFERENCES 470

1.15.1 INTRODUCTION into account human characteristics that include

This chapter highlights the historical founda-
tions of psychology as a human science, a
rigorous, empirically-based study of humans as
humans. That is, its approach to humans takes
but go beyond those of the objects, materials,
and processes that are addressed by the natural
sciences. These human characteristics include
our experiencing and acting in accordance with
meanings, such as anticipated futures, pasts that

449
450 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
are alive in the present, and the world that we
relate to personally.
In contrast, for the most part psychology
has achieved its rightful status as a science by
adopting the assumptions and methods of early
twentieth century natural sciences, particularly
physics and physiology. As this Comprehensive
Clinical Psychology series attests, that adoption
has been beneficial for clinical psychology as
well as for our discipline's other specialties.
However, there has been a cost: the content
of traditional scientific psychology has been
limited to subject matter that is amenable to the
experimental and statistical methods of natural
science: ªIf we can't count it, it doesn't count as
psychology.º As practicing clinicians we often
have to figure out how to integrate the science
we were taught with what was left outÐhuman
striving, hope, moral sensitivity, and the likeÐ
which are not reducible to biology and inde-
pendent determinants. Although contemporary
cognitive psychology allows much more of life
into psychology, it both explains away some of
it and does not quite address how uniquely
human content is to be accounted for scienti-
fically. Even as researchers and theoreticians,
we find that we often have relied on aspects of
life not addressed by our science in order to
develop hypotheses and links among theoretical
themes.
Phenomenological and existential movements
have contributed philosophical foundations for
a human science psychology. Humanistic psy-
chology has promoted positive values in theory
and practice. Briefly, phenomenological philo-
sophy notes that the starting point of any science
is the direct appearance (phenomenon) of sub-
ject matter to human observation. Analysis of
appearances allows us to discover how humans
construe meaningsÐthe basis of all knowing,
including that of the natural sciences. From a
human science perspective, when we study bio-
logical (including neurological and physiologi-
cal) aspects of being human, it is appropriate to
use the procedures developed by those disci-
plines; but we should be mindful that these
procedures, observations, and sense-making are
all human undertakings and construals. More-
over, the studied biological aspects are always of
a person; each implies and influences the other.
Hence, we ought not automatically impose
experimental designs and explanations based
on theories and methods developed for studying
nonhumans. Again, from a human science per-
spective, when we study humans as such, we
ought to be faithful to human reality, and to
develop research methods explicitly suited to
that purpose.
Existential philosophy addresses the univer-
sal human condition of each individual having
repeatedly to make personal decisions and sense
of his or her existence, with no guarantees except
that everything human carries co-authored
meanings and that life ends. Human science
psychologists hold that when studying human
situations as such, at some point researchers
ought to attend to whatever existential themes
become apparent, rather than ªcontrollingº
them out for the sake of ªobjective science.º
The founding phenomenological and existen-
tial authors were European, primarily German
and French. Humanistic psychology is a un-
iquely North American movement, arising in the
1960s both as a popular protest against de-
humanizing trends in the culture at large, and as
a course championed by certain psychologists.
In its early years, it was characterized as the
ªhuman potential movement,º reflecting its
insistence that society in general and psychology
in particular ought to address not only dysfunc-
tions, limits, deficits, and their supposed causes,
but individuals' potential for growth and for
positive experiences such as joy, love, creativity,
and community. Contemporary humanistic psy-
chology continues to remind us that research,
theories, and practices bring consequences to
society and to individuals, and that we ought to
be mindful of values as we practice psychology.
Applied human science psychology occurs
within an existential±phenomenological or re-
lated hermeneutic frame. ªHermeneuticº here
implies an approach which acknowledges that
understandings necessarily are developed
through perspectival meaningsÐinterpreta-
tions. Human science practitioners are devel-
oping clinical and research methods, and bodies
of understanding, appropriate to humans as
beings who are always in relation to their
world(s). In that these beings are always in-
volved in interpersonal and societal, and hence,
moral undertakings, humanistic psychology's
concerns are ever present. Although a human
science approach to psychology respects, and
indeed in some instances counts on, the work of
natural science psychology, it understands that
work within a broader frame.
This chapter will now go on to address
phenomenological, existential, and humanistic
movements in more detail. Each section is
written for readers not particularly familiar with
its approach rather than for psychologists al-
ready working within this orientation. Intra-
orientation disputes are bypassed. The chapter
will then turn to human science psychology,
which draws on the above traditions. The
connections of human science psychology with
hermeneutics, the ªpostsº (postmodernism, pos-
tenlightenment, postpositivism), and construc-
tionism will be mentioned. Finally, because most
readers are not familiar with the implications for
 Phenomenology
the practice of a human science psychology,
separate sections are devoted to its mainstay
research method, empirical phenomenological
investigation, and to human science psycholo-
gical assessment. These sections describe prac-
tical differences that flow from this alternative
philosophy of science. Psychotherapy is not
addressed in a separate section because it
appears earlier in Section 1.15.4, and because
a chapter on existential psychotherapy appears
in a later volume of this series.
What follows is written in the United States,
to psychologists, in the last couple of years of
the twentieth century. This rendition is colored
by my long affiliation with the Psychology
Department of Duquesne University, which
began to develop its existential±phenomenolo-
gical approach to psychology as a human
science some 30 years ago. Other routes to a
human science psychology also could be
written. Certainly hundreds of additional
references could have been included.
1.15.2 PHENOMENOLOGY
The phenomenology addressed in this chap-
ter is only remotely related to two common uses
of the term in North America. The first refers
simply to taking experience seriously, in its own
right, as Carl Rogers did, or as a journalist does
when summarizing reported experiences. In the
present context these practices would be char-
acterized as phenomenal rather than as phenom-
enological. That is, they refer to experience, but
not to the further analysis of that experience
which would develop its structure and implica-
tions for understanding the human construction
of situations. ªPhenomenologyº in this chapter
refers to just such study of (ªologyº) how an
event or object appears (ªphenomenonº). The
second usage common in North America is a
medical one, in which ªphenomenologyº refers
to similar outward appearances despite diverse
etiologies. For example, we might encounter an
article on the phenomenology of schizophrenia,
only to find that it dealt with common externally
identifiable symptoms rather than with schizo-
phrenic experience.
So-called beginnings always have their pre-
decessors. Still, as we look back from con-
temporary phenomenology, its foundational
philosopher is Edmund Husserl (1859±1938).
Martin Heidegger (1889±1976), who addressed
existential themes in his own phenomenology,
has been more influential in contemporary
applied psychology. Their critiques of psycho-
logy's philosophy of science continue to chal-
lenge our assumptions about humans, about
ways of knowing, and about the nature of
science and of psychology.
451
Husserl earned his doctorate in mathematics,
and attempted in his first book, Philsophie der
Arithmatik, published in 1891, to demonstrate
that the basis of logic and mathematics was
psychological, that is, that they were based only
on the brain's operations. He later retracted and
refuted this position, known as ªpsychologism,º
which was in large part an effort to establish
absolute foundations for knowledge. In his
critique, Husserl noted that psychological laws
are generalizations from empirical observations;
that is, logic is used by psychologists to gather
data and validate findings. Logic thus turns out
to be more reasonably viewed as a human means
of checking on thinking, rather than being
reducible to brain functions. Biology is neces-
sary for thought, but not sufficient to account
for human reasoning and self-reflection.
Three centuries earlier Descartes, too, had
sought to establish a foundation for absolute
truth. His approach was to systematically doubt
all assertions until he reached the indubitable: ªI
think, therefore I am.º The cost of this proof,
however, was a radical separation of mind and
matter, a separation with which psychology still
contends. Husserl initiated phenomenology's
resolution to that artificial distinction. In a very
significant sense, Husserl unseparated mind and
material. In contrast to Descartes' method of
systematically doubting the existence of objects
until ultimate certainty was discovered in the
ªI who thinks and doubts,º Husserl's method
was to return respectfully to things in the
world, considering them in their own right. By
ªthingsº he meant any things of which we are
consciousÐphenomena. Experience thereby was
expanded beyond sense perception, another
shift of importance for psychology. Moreover,
Husserl contended that consciousness is not
isolated, separate from the world; consciousness
is always of something, and that ªsomethingº is
necessarily laden with meaning. The term
ªintentionalityº in philosophy often refers not
to purposiveness but to this inevitable attending
to, intending toward of consciousness. Although
we of course can distinguish our thought pro-
cesses or perception (a ªnoeticº focus) from
what we are conscious of (a ªnoematicº focus),
the two imply each other.
Husserl referred to the everyday ways in which
people are attuned to the world as the ªnatural
attitude,º a prephilosophical attitude. When we
are being scientific, we adopt a much narrower
stance. Within that specialized frame, we can
accomplish positive advances in conceptions
and technology. However, Husserl's critique
remains salient for today's Western psychology:
as we go about our lives as striving, hoping,
creative, disciplined scientists, we have forgotten
that we are more fully human than the
452 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
specialized attitude takes into account. Simi-
larly, we are quick to explain and treat de-
pression in terms of serotonin levels, while being
forgetful that even in instances of biological
predisposition, a person's struggles, losses, and
defeats are also essential for the development of
depression. In other words, we too readily
explain all human activity in terms of behavior,
sensation, neurology, or cognition, thereby
ignoring or explaining away the perceiving,
striving person. Working in terms of restrictive
concepts can be decidedly useful for particular
purposes, but our findings too are restricted
when we fail to return to the experiencing person.
Husserl's philosophical method avoids sever-
ing the world (e.g., in the form of scientific
categories and measurements) from the person
who is in relation to that world. The phenom-
enological epoche involves questioning and for
the moment putting aside (bracketing) one's
presuppositions related to both theory and the
natural attitude. As we then examine a pheno-
menon in its full variety, we become aware of
surprises and of instances that do not fit our
anticipations; we discover our assumptions,
which we bracket to look anew. Husserl ack-
nowledged, however, that although we can
bracket even the question of whether the world
is real, we cannot bracket our own conscious-
ness which is an integral aspect of whatever we
examine.
Husserl intended that phenomenology be-
come a science of essencesÐof what was essen-
tial for any phenomenon to be that particular
phenomenon. The eidos (essence) was known
through remaining actively present to the object
of consciousness and its variations, through
forming language about what appeared, and
through comparing these appearances to related
phenomena. ªConsciousnessº thus is our active
presence to whatever we are attending to.
Husserl anticipated that various disciplines
would pursue different phenomena and es-
sences. He meant for this project to retain the
unity of consciousness and world, in particular
to bypass both subjectivism and empiricism.
However, many of his contemporaries and many
of today's philosophers and psychologists have
regarded this eidetic phenomenology as moving
into idealism, that is, as emphasizing thought at
the expense of the world.
Nevertheless, Husserl's spelling out that con-
sciousness is necessary for any experience, and
that it is necessary for unifying our fleeting
impressions into coherent ones, has had an en-
during positive impact. In particular, in human
science contexts, consciousness is regarded as an
active contribution to our experience; never-
more is consciousness only a passive recipient of
input.
In part responding to criticism of his abstract,
detached concern with essences, Husserl in his
later years expanded his earlier view of the
importance of the LebensweltÐthe lived world.
The lived world is just that, the world as we live
it prior to theorizing. The hyphens in expres-
sions such as ªbeing-in-the-worldº are intended
to convey that humans are not in the world in
the same manner as coffee is in a cup, but rather
that humans are always in a unitary relation
with the world. That relation is the (necessary)
context or horizon within or against which we
perceive. In turn, as we study our perceptions of
objects we also draw out themes of, and better
understand, that lived background, world.
Husserl's most influential books on this con-
tinent have been Ideas: General introduction to
pure phenomenology (1913/1962) and The crisis
of European sciences and transcendental phe-
nomenology (1935±37/1970).
Heidegger studied with Husserl, was his
assistant, and later was awarded what had been
Husserl's chair at Freiburg University. How-
ever, Heidegger developed phenomenology in a
decidedly existential direction. That is, he left
behind Husserl's rather sterile focus on con-
sciousness and its objects, and instead centered
his study on being-in-the-world. Heidegger's
academic background and the cultural context
of his early adult years differed significantly from
those of Husserl. Heidegger's basic graduate
training was not in mathematics or science, but in
philosophy and the history of theology. His
historical context was a Europe coping with
World War I, concerned about the effects of the
industrial revolution, questioning society and its
notions of ªprogress,º and seeing both nation-
alism and finished philosophical systems as
stultifying and dangerous. Soren Kierkegaard's
(1813±1855) anguished and earnest writings,
which came to be known as Christian existential
works, were republished in this era. The edu-
cated public consumed Dostoyevsky's novels,
with their vivid accounts of complex motiva-
tions, people caught in circumstances, introspec-
tion about responsibility, and life's uncertainties
and agonies.
Within that context, Heidegger turned his
attention to questions of human existence be-
yond Husserl's concern with consciousness.
Heidegger explicitly eschewed metaphysical
philosophy with its various claims of ultimate
knowledge of the nature and organization of
matter and causes. Unfortunately, his ontologi-
cal philosophy is not as accessible to most
readers as are the writings of phenomenological
and existential psychologists and psychiatrists.
In addition, Heidegger's penchant for relying on
arcane etymological derivations for his distinc-
tive use of German words has made his works
 Existentialism
difficult to read even for Germans. Moreover,
translators, faced with the dilemma of having no
comparable terms in English, often have
retained his original German. Heidegger's
major, most influential, text is Being and time
(1927/1962).
Heidegger set himself the task of developing
an ontologyÐan explication of the meaning of
Being. The capitalization indicates concern with
the nature of existence and being, in contra-
distinction to concern with actual beings.
Heidegger's term for human Being, ªDaseinº
(ªdaº = there; ªseinº = being), emphasizes that
human reality is always situated, always in
relation to a surrounding ªthere,º never without
environment. However, Dasein does not refer to
individual humans, as has sometimes been
misassumed (understandably, and usually pro-
ductively). Rather, for Heidegger Dasein refers
to the character of existence as being both open
to the world's possibilities and as always finding
itself already in the world. We do, however,
explore human Being through examining actual
individuals' basic modes of being-in-the-world
(existenitiala).
Care is one such mode. We find that events
and things matter to us; we cannot help but to
care. But we care in authentic and in inauthentic
ways. When we are open to the depth, newness,
and possibilities of what we are attending to, and
when we heed our responsibility for choosing
that openness, we are living authentically. When
we turn other beings into fixed objects or adopt a
closed, unreflectively technological, or judg-
mental attitude, we are living inauthentically. Of
course it is impossible to go about life being
continuously or fully authentic. We are stuck
with always being at least partially inauthentic;
the challenge is to strive for authenticity. Our
finitude, our always being-toward-death, is an-
other of the basic modes of being-in-the world.
Our finitude reminds us of our responsibility to
make our choices within our limited time. We are
always caught within temporal moments, com-
ing from and going toward. Heidegger's distin-
guishing clock time from temporality is a
particularly influential theme for psychology.
As human-science researchers and clinicians we
are keenly aware that lived time differs mean-
ingfully from measured time (see Slife, 1993).
Heidegger extended his analysis of finitude
and temporality to include our being inevitably
historicalÐcaught in historical times and mo-
ments. Our language and understandings are
historically formed, hence we cannot arrive at
an absolute or final interpretation of Being.
However, Dasein is openness to future as well as
to past. This basic human way of being (toward
the future) has been ignored both by Husserl's
eidetic phenomenology and by contemporary
453
mainstream psychology. In addressing Being
beyond consciousness, Heidegger established a
hermeneutics (ªinterpretationº) of existence; his
philosophical hermeneutics also addressed the
assumptions of social sciences' methods.
While Heidegger focused on interpretation of
Being, other philosophers with similar interests
have focused on particular topics such as lan-
guage (e.g., Gadamer) and symbolism in psy-
choanalysis and religious experience (Ricouer).
Psychologists have employed the hermeneutic
philosophical tradition (see Hoy, 1978) both to
examine individuals' ways of taking up their
lives, and to research phenomenaÐto explore a
particular experience and its lived-world ground
across instances. The experiences as reported by
individuals are referred to as phenomenal in-
stances, instances of unexamined living of a
phenomenon (such as being anxious, or bored,
or whatever). A phenomenological comprehen-
sion is yielded by (hermeneutically) examining
instances, asking what becomes evident about
how phenomenal appearances reveal and instan-
tiate general human foundations of meaning-
making, such as caring and temporality, in the
case of a particular phenomenon. See Packer
and Addison (1989) for a broader range of
hermeneutic psychological studies, where ªher-
meneuticº refers to the interpretive (meaning-
making) character of the research, and where
researchers acknowledge perspective, ambigu-
ity, and the always unfinished aspect of under-
standing. That understanding begins in the life
world, where the researcher reflects on possible
understandings of the subject matter, then has a
dialog with his or her own and others' prior
understandings, and circles back to the life-
world phenomenon to deepen and revise the
earlier understanding. Hermeneutic interpreta-
tion does not explain the phenomenon in terms
of external or underlying, or any other, vari-
ables; it remains with what the researcher is
present to in the life world. This interpretation is
not a translation into established systems of
knowledge.
Readings in regard to Husserl, Heidegger,
and other phenomenological philosophers in-
clude: Edie (1987), Kockelmans (1985), Natan-
son (1966), and Spiegelberg (1965). Also see The
encyclopedia of phenomenology (Embree et al.,
1997).
1.15.3 EXISTENTIALISM
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905±1980), probably the
name North Americans associate most readily
with existential philosophy, wrote in close dialog
with the works of Husserl and Heidegger. In his
own way, he appropriated consciousness as a
constituting, construing character of being
454 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
human. He took up the notions of humans being
temporal and situatedÐalways in relation. His
Being and nothingness (1943/1956) addresses
consciousness, Being, and their relation. For
Sartre, consciousness is forever striving either to
be at one with Being or to become a concrete
something. Sartre's famous sentence, ªExistence
precedes essenceº refers to this necessity of
constructing one's meanings, because they are
not given in our merely existing. Hence also we
are ªcondemned to freedomº to perpetually
choose our meanings, especially through our
actions.
In much of his work, Sartre emphasized the
emptiness of our future being a ªnot yetº and of
our past being a ªno longer.º For him, the basic
character of consciousness is a perpetual dia-
lectic between Being and Nothingness. Sartre
certainly is not a philosopher of joy! Not all
existential writers stress the anguish of dealing
with the possibility of the void, but all do, in one
way or another, emphasize the bad faith of not
acknowledging both our situatedness and the
availability of at least some degree of choice.
Most existentially oriented philosophers and
psychologists are sympathetic with Sartre's
amplification of Heidegger's concerns about
our falling into a technological attitude, char-
acterizing others as ªthey,º and living as though
we too are objectsÐalready complete, determi-
nate. Sartre wrote primarily of such failures in
our efforts to be open to our own and others'
subjectivity, freedom, humanity. Others, espe-
cially Martin Buber in his I and thou (1958), have
emphasized that it is through recognizing
another person's humanity that we discover
our own. Our social context renders us radically
intersubjective. Authentic community is possible
only through the efforts to affirm our own and
others' openness to perspective and possibility.
This standpoint was at odds with psycho-
analysis, of which Sartre was a serious reader
and critic. He developed an alternative existen-
tial psychoanalysis, not as a system of treatment
but as a study of motivation, conflict, and of
what others identified as neurosis. He deci-
phered the dynamics of behavior in terms of a
person's earlier fundamental choices and of his
or her continuing existential projects. He pub-
lished compelling existential analyses of Genet,
Flaubert, and Baudelaire.
Sartre's impact on psychiatry and clinical
psychology, as well as on the educated public,
has been significant. Existential±phenomeno-
logical clinicians have emphasized that often
what we diagnose as pathological depression is
the state of a person struggling with choices that
he or she sees as determining who he or she will
be. In seeming paradox, it can be liberating to
acknowledge that one is struggling with, ªcon-
demned to,º an existential dilemma, rather than
with ªhaving a depression.º (As will be seen in
the following brief discussion of Merleau-
Ponty's work, the body's chemistry can be seen
as participating in the depressed state, rather
than as originating it.) Even a person caught in a
brain-damaged body, or living out a genetic
predisposition to schizophrenia, nevertheless
still participates in forming the meanings of his
or her circumstance, in making continuing
choices, and in shaping his or her brain-
damaged or schizophrenic life.
Sartre's (1948) analysis of emotion as a ªbad
faithº attempt to magically escape from the
meaning of one's situation has been useful in
ordinary life and in clinical practice. The
author's own empirical phenomenological re-
search on becoming angry, for example, echoes
Sartre in finding that the angry person's
seemingly powerful protest against whatever
is blocking his or her way is a self-deceptive
effort not to attend to a sense of being made
helpless or of feeling demeaned (Fischer, 1998).
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908±1961) was a
contemporary of Sartre's, but from his position
in psychology at the Sorbonne he addressed
different issues, in particular those of then
contemporary psychology: perceptual theory,
behaviorism, and neuropsychology. In The
phenomenology of perception (1945/1962),
Merleau-Ponty bypassed the old mind±body
split by describing persons as being embodied
consciousness. We are our bodies even as we
transcend their physicality. Our bodily being is
an opening onto things; our body and things
imply each other, for example, as one reaches for
a cup of coffee. Moreover, we perceive only
against horizons, against physical settings and
biographical contexts. As horizons shift in
accordance with our movement and our efforts
toward clarity, perception too shifts. In this
sense what we know through perception is
always ambiguous, never once-and-for-all; like-
wise knowledge. This state of affairs is not to be
lamented, but rather to be acknowledged against
claims of fixed meanings and of absolute
knowledge.
In the above work, and in his The structure of
behavior (1942/1963), Merleau-Ponty described
three interpenetrating orders of being. As bodily
beings, we are part of the physical order, just like
rocks, and other objects that ªobey the laws of
nature.º We also participate in the biological
order, just like other organic, animate beings.
Finally, we participate in the human order, which
is grounded in and limited by the other orders
but also surpasses them. The human order
affects the others: a strained life can occasion a
heart attack or clinical depression. Reciprocally,
meditation or a human-made pill can alleviate
 Phenomenological±Existential Psychiatry
biological strain. By now, as we enter the twenty-
first century, these ideas do not seem the least bit
controversial, but mainstream psychology has
not adopted a philosophy of science that can
accommodate such observations.
Let me mention a few other major existential
authors before moving on to address existential
psychiatry and psychology. Victor Frankl's
(1905±1997) short, readable Man's search for
meaning: From death camp to existentialism
(1946/1962) has been widely read. Its compel-
ling account of the psychiatrist's survival in a
Nazi concentration camp gave credence to the
importance of actively creating personal mean-
ing. Rollo May, as first editor of Existence: A
new dimension in psychiatry and psychology
(1958), although writing for a professional
audience, opened the way for English-speaking
readers to explore what was happening in con-
tinental philosophy and psychiatry. Although in
later years, May wrote from a more humanistic
concern to wider audiences, the introduction he
wrote for this book served as a solid introduc-
tion to existentialism and phenomenology for
many North Americans. Adrian van Kaam's
(1966) Existential foundations of psychology is a
classic text. In more recent times, Irving Yalom
(1980) has written a widely read version of
Existential psychotherapy that presents as its
guiding existential themes the necessity of
dealing with death, freedom, isolation, and
meaninglessness. The author's own, extended,
version of existential themes includes finitude
(limitation), choice and meaning, intersubjec-
tivity, and lived body (see Leder, 1990, in
addition to Merleau-Ponty, in regard to the
latter; see Fischer, 1991, for an overview of
phenomenological±existential psychotherapy).
1.15.4 PHENOMENOLOGICAL±
EXISTENTIAL PSYCHIATRY
From the 1920s to the 1960s, while North
American psychiatry imported psychoanalytic
theory and method, and North American psy-
chology developed behaviorism and diagnostic
assessment instruments, a significant segment of
European psychiatry created an approach that
addressed the work of both Freud and
Heidegger (see Spiegelberg's (1972) Phenomen-
ology in psychology and psychiatry: A historical
introduction). The two major figures were Swiss.
Ludwig Binswanger (1881±1966) and Me-
dard Boss (1903±1990) both described their
work as daseins-analysis in contrast to psycho-
analysis. In both cases Heidegger's DaseinÐ
humans' always being in relationÐwas taken up
at an existential rather than at an ontological
level. Binswanger later wrote of his productive
error in applying Heidegger's notions directly to
455
actual beings rather than understanding his
characterizations as being about the nature of
human Being. It was indeed productive.
Binswanger's early training was with Bleuler
and Jung at a clinic in Zurich. He opted out of
an academic appointment, and instead served as
director of a Swiss sanatorium (Bellevue), where
over the years he hosted such foundational
scholars as Husserl, Heidegger, Freud, Pfander,
Scheler, Cassirer, and Buber.
Binswanger remained steadfast in his concern
that psychiatry should be properly, rigorously,
scientific; that is, it should be open to person-in-
world rather than arbitrarily narrow its focus to
presumed internal states and historical causes.
His applied phenomenological method included
ªbracketing,º putting aside theory and philo-
sophy while allowing more and more of a
person's being-in-the-world to become appar-
ent through a respectful, caring presence to that
person. He collated his findings across instances
of those ways of being-in-the-world we call
schizophrenia, mania, and melancholia. Per-
haps his best known individual analyses are
ªThe Case of Ellen West,º found in May et al.'s
(1958) Existence, and ªThe Case of Lola Voss,º
found in Needleman's (1963) edited volume,
Being-in-the-world. Binswanger never regarded
his efforts as settled accomplishments nor even
as building toward a complete system, but
rather as explorations beyond the artificial
constraints of a mechanistic psychiatry. Many
of his adaptations of Heidegger's notions,
however, have provided readers with an alter-
native access to ordinary living as well as to
restricted or disordered existence.
Binswanger emphasized the we-relationship,
a we-hood, between the clinician and the other
person, and he studied not ªpersonalityº but
rather the patient's worldsÐhis or her multiple
relationships. Broadly, those worlds may be
addressed in terms of an umweltÐone's relation
to his or her nonpersonal environment, an
eigenweltÐone's private world or relations with
self, and a mitweltÐone's social relations.
Always he attended to temporal and spatial
unfoldings of personal topographies, such as
Ellen West's ethereal, tomb, and action worlds.
Binswanger described various ªfailures of
Dasein,º notably those of losing one's way,
finding one's meanings mixed up, and settling
for a life of mannerisms.
Binswanger did not attempt to develop a
system of therapy, but he did agree that his
Daseinsanalyse carried implications for helping
persons whose ways of being in the world had
become problematic. He advised allowing the
patient to explore how he or she had lost his or
her way, and he encouraged the patient's re-
exploring our shared world, both in and beyond
456 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
therapy sessions. He regarded therapy as an
interpersonal encounter, and transference as a
present encounter between the participants. He
regarded dreams as reflecting one's relations,
that is, one's lived worlds, and as indicating
openings to future choices.
Medard Boss's work is more systematic and
more widely published in English than that of
Binswanger (see Boss, 1949, 1958, 1963; Moss,
1978). He respectfully bridged Freud's psycho-
analytic method into phenomenological psy-
chiatry. He received his medical education at the
University of Zurich, worked with Bleuler,
received Freudian psychoanalytic training, and
continued his psychoanalytic studies in London
and Berlin with Ernest Jones, Horney, and
Fenichel. After a long collaboration with Jung,
Boss ultimately found himself dissatisfied with
the deterministic assumptions of both Freud's
and Jung's theories. During World War II Boss
studied Binswanger's work, delved into Hei-
degger's writing, and then consulted with
Heidegger directly. Boss held seminars in Zurich
at which Heidegger spoke to psychiatrists and
other physicians.
Boss noted common references in Freud and
Heidegger to openness and freedom. He
regarded his own phenomenologically inspired
Daseinsanalysis as remaining truer to Freud's
insights than was Freud himself when Freud
converted these insignts into the language of the
prevailing natural sciences. However, Boss
found psychoanalytic technique to be highly
compatible with Heidegger's writings. For
example, following the rule of free association
returns the patient to an openness to experience
and meanings, through which he or she loosens
self-imposed constrictions.
Free association and dream analysis uncover
not just the past, but previously resisted futures,
which now become newly possible in the context
of an authentic, caring relationship. Freud's
injunction to maintain ªevenly hovering atten-
tionº is affirmed, but is accompanied by an
injunction against translating the patient's
reports into reductive psychoanalytic concepts.
Reductive interpretations too often transfer the
patient out of his or her restricted under-
standings into the restrictive understandings of
the therapist.
Like Binswanger, Boss consistently attends to
the patient's matrices of meaning, or lived
worlds, as the place where the patient can
experience invitations for new possibilities. He
adopted Heidegger's distinction between ªinter-
vening careº and ªanticipatory care,º that is, a
distinction between intervening by making deci-
sions, providing interpretations, giving advice,
or administering medical treatment, and inter-
vening by alerting the patient to his or her
emerging possibilities. For example, a clinician
might inquire, ªSo might this dream be an
instance of your already relating to your family
as possibly becoming accepting of you?º The
clinician also guides the patient by noting
resistance to his or own desires. Note that the
goals are other than symptom removal or
conflict resolution.
Consonantly, Boss distinguishes between
neurotic guilt which originates in childhood
transgressions and existential guilt which is a
failure to remain open to one's possibilities. Both
can be terribly constraining, as one avoids
looking at continuing choice, lives in a past, and
dreads the future. Remaining open, as Heideg-
ger wrote, is not an achievement, but rather is a
feature of being human; we are less fully human
to the extent that we turn away from possibility
amidst the conditions in which we find ourselves.
Both attempting to override the limits of our
situations and settling for closed objectifications
of self or others are inauthentic. Patients are not
so much encouraged to form relationships with
others or to self-disclose, but rather are en-
couraged to allow fundamental ªworld open-
nessº to occur. Boss replaced the psychoanalytic
ªwhy?º (does the patient behave in self-defeating
ways, recapitulate earlier trauma, etc.) with an
existential ªwhy not?º (take your longings
seriously, move on from stultifying stances,
relate to others more intimately).
The above understandings contrast markedly
with psychoanalytic notions of conflicts occur-
ring internally. Rather than seeking internal
resolution, Boss encourages revised and opened
relationships (with self, other people, things,
places, the past and future). Boss regards
ªacting outº not as resistance but rather as
trying out possibilities in a new setting. Like-
wise, he regards ªtransferenceº as the patient's
bringing old ways and old perceptions to the
relationship going on in therapy now. For a
clinician to deny his or her additional part in the
therapy encounter is inauthentic and contrary
to the project of the client trying out revised
ways of relating. Boss, regards Daseins analysis
as especially demanding of the clinician, who
makes use of his or her experience with the
patient to encourage greater openness. He re-
gards therapy as a genuine encounter in which
the clinician is relatively selfless and restrained
and especially respectful of the patient's
individuality.
There are, of course, many other contributors
from this period in which Europeans sought to
develop psychological approaches that respected
humans' relational meaning-making. Among
these are Johannes Buytendijk, Henri Ey, Karl
Jaspers, Eugen Minkowski, Paul Schilder, Erwin
Straus, J. H. Van den Berg, and Victor von
 Humanistic Psychology
Gebsattel. Their work has been of interest to like-
minded psychiatrists and psychologists around
the world. However, historically there has been
little communication between these authors and
mainstream psychiatry and psychology, al-
though the former group generally has been
traditionally trained and makes use of a range
of theory and data. Indeed, my characterization
of my own orientation is probably accurate
for most phenomenological±existential practi-
tioners: our philosophical orientation is pheno-
menological±existential; we make pluralistic use
of developmental theories (such as those of
Erikson, Sullivan, Kohut, etc.); we integrate
research studies into our ongoing understand-
ings and questions; and within this frame we
make eclectic use of a range of techniques.
Unlike other major approaches, no basic
therapeutic method is identified with pheno-
menological±existential clinical practice, as the
case is for psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and
cognitive psychology. Several psychotherapists
have developed particular techniques, useful
within many frameworks; examples are
Frankl's (1946/1962) paradoxical intentionism
and Bugental's (1965) ªWhat's stopping you?º
In closing this section, I offer several correc-
tions of common misunderstandings. As re-
flected in the preceding sections, existential
philosophy and practice do not posit unfettered
free will. Nor do they emphasize dread and
anguish. A second point: Europe is no longer a
fountainhead of phenomenological±existential
psychology and psychiatry. North American
behaviorism and research design were quickly
imported by academicians in Europe, Great
Britain, and Scandanavia. Now, interest in
human science alternatives for psychology is
developing in all continents just as it is in North
America.
1.15.5 HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY
Humanistic psychology emerged as a full-
blown professional movement in the 1960s. The
California-centered countercultural ªhappen-
ing,º which protested society's suppressions, is
similarly named and is sometimes conflated
with a reflectively planned movement within
psychology (cf. Smith, 1990). The happening,
in which assorted citizens, professionals, and
many psychologists participated, also stressed
the importance of aspects of life neglected by
education and the social sciences: joy, creativ-
ity, love, self-affirmation, and spontaneous
expression of affect and belief. Overlap between
the popular and professional movements did
occur. American Psychological Association
(APA) annual conferences in those days were
457
attended by sandal-footed, knap-sacked,
openly breast-feeding members of the Associa-
tion of Humanistic Psychology (AHP), whose
meeting overlapped with the APA conference.
The establishment types were dismayed as some
members of the other organization interrupted
symposium speakers from the audience with
proclamations such as, ªI just have to tell you
that I love your soul!º One psychologist who
earlier had published in staid journals pro-
pounded nude group therapy in swimming
pools.
Unfortunately, for those psychologists who
have not kept up with the literature of
humanistic psychology, those earlier dramatic
times still color the movement. To the contrary,
the AHP's journal, The Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, has consistently been a major
source for well-considered work that explores
and supports central human phenomena that
are still underaddressed by mainstream educa-
tion and psychology: our spiritual, creative,
spontaneous, caring, transcendent, and trans-
personal moments (see Bynum, 1994, in regard
to transpersonal psychology). Even while
acknowledging the painful and darker sides of
existence, the AHP continues to champion
human potential for positivity and to promote
responsibility for self and to others. Other
positive legacies of the mixed beginnings of
humanistic psychology have been its contribu-
tions to the growth of self-help organizations,
and to education and psychology at least
nodding to notions of the ªwhole personºÐthe
experiencing, thinking, valuing, emotional,
bodily, spiritual, choosing, interpersonal, be-
having person.
Indeed, dissatisfactions with the 1950s parti-
tive, deductive, and reductive experimental
research model, with sterile and deterministic
behaviorism, and with pathology-oriented psy-
choanalytic theory, led Abraham Maslow to
form a mailing group of kindred professionals.
He referred to their efforts as the ªthird forceº in
psychology's evolution, following psychoana-
lysis and behaviorism. Their exchange of
writings eventually grew into the Journal of
Humanistic Psychology (founded in 1961).
Among the first board of editors for the journal
were Andras Angyal, Charlotte Buhler, Kurt
Goldstein, Dorothy Lee, Rollo May, Lewis
Mumford, and David Riesman. In 1963 the
founding meeting of the AHP took place in
Philadelphia, where nearly 100 like-minded
professionals confirmed the importance of
inserting the place of values into psychology's
subject matter and activities. Gordon Allport,
Jacques Barzun, George Kelly, Clark Mousta-
kas, Gardner Murphy, Henry Murray, and Carl
Rogers were among nationally known figures
458 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
who attended the Old Saybrook (CT) follow-up
conference in 1964. International meetings
followed. The first psychology departments de-
dicated to a humanistic approach were Sonoma
State College (CA) in 1966, West Georgia
College in 1969, and the Humanistic Psychology
Institute, HPI (San Francisco) in 1970. The HPI
has since become Saybrook Institute (see
deCarvalho, 1994, for an organizational history
of this period).
In the 1950s and 1960s, as psychology moved
increasingly out of academia and into practice,
Carl Rogers' Client-centered counseling (1951)
and On being a person (1961) were welcomed.
He emphasized persons' capacity for growth
through self-understanding, enhanced through
the empathic, authentic presence of the counse-
lor. He referred to ªcounselingº rather than to
psychotherapy or analysis in large part because
those terms belonged to the legally protected
domain of medicine. Rogers' work was in
striking contrast with psychiatry's emphasis
on psychoanalytic theory and psychopathology,
and with psychology's emphasis on learning
theory and behavior modification. In academia,
determinism dominated psychology, which
identified itself as a science that could ªpredict
and controlº behavior. Maslow's Toward a psy-
chology of being (1962) and his I-thou knowledge
in a psychology of science (1966) were welcomed
as alternative frameworks for thinking about
ourselves and our clients, see also Bugental
(1963).
In 1971, Division 32 (Humanistic Psychol-
ogy) of the APA was established, largely
through the efforts of AHP members. Its
purpose was to bring the concepts, theories,
and philosophy of humanistic psychology to the
research, education, and professional applica-
tions of scientific psychology. Among its
nationally known first board members were
David Bakan, Leonard Blank, Albert Ellis,
Carman Harari, James Klee, and Everett
Shostrom. Among the presidents of the APA
who have also been leaders within humanistic
psychology are Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow,
and Brewster Smith. The Division's journal, The
Humanistic Psychologist, publishes articles on
theoretical and philosophical issues, and on
methodological advances in human science
research. Many members are also actively
involved in the APA's Division of Theoretical
and Philosophical Psychology.
Accounts of the founders of this movement,
their writings, and the issues they dealt with can
be found in deCarvalho (1991b), Royce and Mos
(1981), and Welch, Tate, and Richards (1978).
Division 32's contribution to APA's centennial
publications on the divisions' histories and
contributions may be found in Wertz (1994).
This brief overview is concluded with a
backward- and a forward-looking note. By
now, the humanism of earlier centuries has been
a touch point for humanistic psychology, but in
fact it was not explicitly raised as a source of
inspiration in the founding years of the latter
movement. The phrase ªhumanistic psychol-
ogyº was adopted for the AHP's journal only
after rejection of options such as ªperson
psychology,º ªself psychology,º and ªorthop-
sychologyº (Greening, 1985; Sutich, 1962);
Gordon Allport had first used the term with
its present meaning in 1930 (deCarvalho,
1991a). From the Renaissance onward, ªhu-
manismº has referred to humans' unique values,
creativity, and reason, which exceed both
Church doctrine and our material nature (see
Bullock, 1985). Humanistic psychology has
helped to put psychology in touch with both
historical humanism and contemporary arts.
Humanistically informed psychologists con-
tinue to remind us both of the place of values
in our personal and work worlds, and of the
importance of examining the assumptions and
implications of our scientific practices.
1.15.6 HUMAN SCIENCE PSYCHOLOGY
Human science psychology is an approach to
psychology's subject matter. It is not a philo-
sophy or a theory. The approach is intended to
respect humans as a subject matter that differs
from nonhuman material. A thorough human
science approach would encourage study of, and
work with, humans' physical, biological, and
meaning-making character all at once. Many
clinicians attempt to practice in just that way,
but when they are not familiar with an explicit
foundational framework, their efforts are not as
consistent as they could be.
Many researchers could work within a human
science frame while continuing to pursue their
psychological studies through experimental and
other statistical designs, which are efficient for
dealing with large samples and with the biolo-
gical (and chemical, neurological, etc.) aspects of
being human. However, these studies would take
into account that variables do not explain
behavior or experience, but rather are super-
imposed grids for organizing the orderliness of
psychological matters. An analogy is the field of
economics, where explanations and predictions
are made in terms of unemployment rates, gross
national product, and so on, although the human
order underlies those created and imposed
measures. Ultimately the measures reflect the
actions of individuals living within various
circumstances and working, enjoying, compet-
ing, making decisions, spending, investing,
 Human Science Psychology
striving, risking, and so on. In both psychology
and economics, the imposed grids are definitely
useful, but they are most useful when we take into
account that we made them up, and that we
understand and serve people best when we return
from our constructions to reflect on individuals
going about their lives. These reflections allow us
to revise our constructions.
At this point human science psychology is a
critique and a call. It is a critique of mainstream
assumptions and practices for their being
forgetful of the fuller human context, and it is
a call to develop a thorough alternative.
Adopting a human science framework for
psychology's ongoing work would eventually
obviate the need for the term. Of course by then
other critiques would emerge, and psychology
would accordingly advance in new directions.
Positivism similarly was adopted as a corrective
to nineteenth and early twentieth century arm-
chair philosophizing, and much of the achieve-
ments of North American psychology are the
product of that adoption. By now newer
generations of psychologists ask ªWhat's
positivism?,º not because it is no longer around,
but because it is not being taught as such. Even
though many theorists say that positivism
served its purpose, and now has few strict
adherents, in the absence of widespread alter-
native views, implicit positivism determines the
research designs that are supported by grants,
publications, and so on. Positivism has become
the invisible approach of mainstream academic
psychology. Because psychology no longer has
to develop and prove itself as a science,
philosophy of science courses are rarely taught.
Slife and Williams (1997) have called for
specialty training in philosophical/theoretical
psychology so that departments will have such
expertise available and, once again even within
experimental programs, will engage in discus-
sions of assumptions and their implications.
Toward that end, let me briefly rehash the
historically-based approach of a human science
psychology, and some contemporary trends
with which it is joined. William Dilthey
(1833±1911) urged that psychology become a
rigorous and systematic science, a model for all
the Geisteswissenschaften (the disciplines of
mind, spirituality, and human affairs). He
argued against the new discipline modeling
itself on the highly successful disciplines of time,
mathematics, and the natural sciences (see
Dilthey, 1894/1977; Hodges, 1944). Neverthe-
less, even though Wilhelm Wundt also wrote a
social psychology that was closer to Dilthey's
proposed human science, and William James
wrote extensively on consciousness, it was their
fledgling laboratories in Germany and the
United States, respectively, that were taken
459
up by the new discipline. Their philosophical
essays and books were ignored in favor of
hands-on, technically-oriented practice. Never-
theless, a sampling of books and essays in
developmental, clinical, and social psychology
through the 1940s shows that most authors were
more holistic, and more historically and
philosophically minded, than is the case today.
Although North American psychology has
always housed a broad mix of theorists and
practitioners, by the 1950s ªscientificº psychol-
ogy was equated with experimental psychology.
By the 1960s, many of us who were not satisfied
with that situation discovered the translations of
existential phenomenology that were finding
their way from Europe. Within this country,
many critiques and calls for returning persons as
such to our studies were published, for example,
those by Gordon Allport, David Bakan, Roger
Barker, Joseph Lyons, Robert McLeod, and
Nevitt Sanford. In 1970 Amedeo Giorgi pub-
lished Psychology as a human science: A pheno-
menologically based approach. Trained in
experimental psychology, he had encountered
its limitations as a natural science, and turned to
Dilthey and phenomenological writers for
foundations appropriate to studying humans
as humans. His book has been a touch point for
diverse readers who have looked for support and
inspiration for their own kindred reflections.
Institutionally, Duquesne University's Psy-
chology Department, shaped in the 1960s by
Adrian van Kaam and Giorgi, has been a center
for the systematic development of psychology as
a human science. Its work, however, has been
foundational and corrective and has not yet
embodied a full human science research pro-
gram, which would include our cultural,
biological, etc., dimensions. Nevertheless, at
Duquesne alone, nearly 200 empirical phenom-
enological research dissertations have been
completed; gradually substantive content area
comprehensions are taking shape. Moreover, as
qualitative research methods are increasingly
practiced across disciplines and continents, their
practitioners are increasingly identifying them-
selves with a human science tradition.
Saybrook Institute, which also offers a
doctorate, stressing humanistic psychology,
offers substantive work in a human science
tradition. The masters degree psychology pro-
grams at West Georgia College and Seattle
University are dedicated to humanistic/human
science psychology. Other institutions include
clusters of colleagues pursuing this approach,
and of course there are hundreds of individual
faculty members doing likewise along with
thousands of nonacademics. Many individuals
do not use the ªhuman scienceº title, and many
are working within overlapping interest areas. A
460 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
small but representative sampling would include
constructivist psychotherapists, who have ad-
vanced George Kelley's (1955) analysis of how
we construct our worlds and can be encouraged
to construct them differently; narrative thera-
pists, who help clients to see how they have
storied their lives and might co-author them
differently; and action researchers, who not only
acknowledge but plan and track their influence
on their field subjects. Related areas of scholar-
ship include social constructionism, which
explores how science as well as society and
individuals are inevitably shaped by our ideas
and interactions, and which finds that we have
no access to truth aside from these constructions;
linguistic studies, which explore the inherent role
of language in our sense of reality and possibility
for action; and feminist studies, which in a
variety of ways highlight the culturally situated
social construction of gendered possibility.
(Leading sources on social constructionism
include Berger & Luckmann, 1967, and Gergen,
1985, 1994; sources on personal construct
therapy include Epting, 1984 and Leitner,
1985; linguistic and discourse studies include
Barnard, 1998, and Gavey, 1997; feminist works
include Harding, 1987; and Hawkensworth,
1989.)
Many other approaches and practices that
nowadays carry one of the ªpostº labels also
dovetail with human science psychology. ªPost-
enlightenmentº refers to orientations that
emerged in response to disenchantment with
the enlightenment era's assumption that God
had created a mathematically ordered world
which mortals could uncover through empiri-
cism and logic. ªPostmodernº refers similarly to
contemporary movements across the arts and
sciences that have ceased to look for absolute
Truth. Reality is always known only from
perspectives, which are necessarily local (not
universal). Contrary to some protests, this
position is not one of ªanything goesº relati-
vism, but rather one that respects subgroup
realities, and calls for accountability through
specifying the motives and history through
which particular understandings emerge (see
Aanstoos, 1990). Finally, ªpostpositivismº
refers to having superseded the notions that
science requires that its knowledge be based on
sense data that have been processed through
mathematics based on Aristotelian logic.
To review, human science psychology differ-
entiates itself from positivistic traditions by
drawing on broad hermeneutic traditions and/
or phenomenological descriptions of persons as
always being in relation to the world, always
temporally on the way from and toward, and on
existential extensions of those descriptions of
persons as always being in relation to lived body
and to the social world, and as inevitably par-
ticipating in making meaning and choices no
matter how constrained. The mind±matter split
is undone. The moral dimension of human
matters is more clearly proper to psychology.
The old goals of predict and control become
those of describe, understand, and influence.
Data developed using natural science methods,
including neurological and biochemical data,
are comprehended within this frame. To the
extent that a body participates in the human
order, its biological order is part of that
structure; even sciences of the body are human
constructions. Description of human percep-
tion, experience, and action is narrative rather
than reductive, and it respects ambiguity as
sometimes inherent to the subject matter rather
than as a deficient account. Accounts are
structuralÐretaining the mutuality of differ-
entiated aspects of whatever is described.
Understanding and influencing require respect-
ing persons as choosing in accordance with both
contingencies and personal meanings. Validity
and objectivity become matters of specifying
means and perspectives, and of sharing data,
comprehensions, and practical outcomes, to-
ward consensual agreement. Progress evolves as
new perspectives are continually brought to
bear.
Below are concrete illustrations of approaches
to research and to psychological assessment that
flow from a human science orientation. Repre-
sentative psychotherapeutic practices have been
described in Section 1.15.4 on existential
psychiatry and psychology. I have drawn on
work with which I have been intimately
connected, and which has been developed within
the Duquesne community for over 30 years, in
order to provide examples of what the foregoing
discussion might come down to. A wide range of
nonphenomenological substantive work can be
characterized as human scientific. Human
science psychology will develop and contribute
to the extent that variations and innovations are
undertaken and discussed.
Further examples of human science, broadly
conceived, can be found in the Duquesne Studies
series edited by Giorgi and colleagues (1971,
1975, 1979, 1983) and in the series edited by
Valle and colleagues (1978, 1989, 1997).
1.15.7 EMPIRICAL
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH METHOD
The term ªempiricalº in ªempirical phenom-
enological researchº refers to directly observed,
pretheoretical experience (one's own or an-
other's) in contrast to data derived from the
 Empirical Phenomenological Research Method
use of predetermined categories and through
measurement. ªEmpiricalº also refers to the
availability to other researchers of data and
analytic steps, so that they can check the extent to
which they come to similar findings. The basic
method, developed and elaborated for over 30
years at Duquesne University, is a systematic
means of addressing psychological phenomena
in their own terms, that is, in terms of how they
were lived. Empirical phenomenological ana-
lyses of ªbeing in privacyº and ªbeing impatientº
will be reported below. ªPhenomenologicalº
here refers both to the more immediately
accessible ªwhat it's likeº for individuals (to be
impatient, etc.) and also to what researchers
learn when they ask what else these phenomenal
descriptions can reveal about the process of being
human in that situation. In the latter regard
researchers repeatedly rediscover their subjects
as being temporal, always in relation and on the
way, restricted and choosing, and so on. At
Duquesne we have referred to a cohesive
representation of these themes as they appear
in, and shape, the phenomenon as its phenom-
enological structure.
Empirical phenomenological research is ex-
istential in that psychologists have departed
from a purer phenomenological philosophy, to
address people in their necessarily existential
situations. ªThe method,º moreover, is a great
variety of variations and innovations, as von
Eckartsberg (1986) helpfully described in Life±
world experience: Existential±phenomenological
research approaches in psychology. For other
examples and discussions of variations of the
method, see Aanstoos, 1987; Colaizzi, 1973,
1978; Giorgi, 1985; Richer, 1978; Walsh, 1995;
and Wertz, 1983.
Qualitative research in general addresses the
experience and action of persons as they engage
in particular situations. Findings are in terms
of the life world rather than transformations
into categories and measurements. Traditional
quantitative findings of course provide ground
for reflection in concert with qualitative des-
cription. Many nonphenomenological qualita-
tive research methods are also appropriate for a
human science psychology. These include
ethnography, linguistic and conversation ana-
lysis, case studies, ethnomethodology, and some
forms of grounded theory. Psychology has been
slow to become involved with qualitative
research methods in that they do not fit our
received, rather narrow, notions of science. In
contrast, sociology, education, gender studies,
human development, nursing, and counseling
all have established or are building major
qualitative research traditions. About a third
of the papers presented at the American
Educational Research Association conferences
461
are qualitative studies. At last count, five
nursing journals publish significant qualitative
research. About a third of the research
presentations at the Society for Psychotherapy
Research conferences is qualitative. Well over
half of the research papers presented at the
Association for Women in Psychology Con-
ferences use qualitative methods.
Many variations on the EP (empirical
phenomenological) research procedures de-
scribed here have been, and could be, under-
taken. Guy Kashgarian (1997) employed a
variety of linguistic analysis as part of his
phenomenological analysis of instances of
ªbeing criticizedº reported by persons diag-
nosed as narcissistic personality disorder and
those not diagnosed. Martin Packer (e.g.,
Packer & Scott, 1992) encourages EP analyses
based in part on ethnographic data.
A thorough human science research program
would accommodate biological, cultural, and
psychological dimensions of any studied cir-
cumstance. It is to be hoped that before long
psychologists will undertake studies of the
mutuality of biological and psychological
depression, for example. In the meantime, this
chapter focuses on Duquesne's EP research
method because it offers a crucial approach to
understanding human phenomena otherwise
missing from psychology's efforts. EP research
is the appropriate method when the question is
ªWhat is such-and-such a phenomenon?,º as in
ªWhat is privacy?º or ªWhat is being impa-
tient?º When our questions have to do with
absolute amounts and with amounts of change,
traditional measurement and experimental
methods are appropriate. Unfortunately, his-
torically psychology typically has not asked the
What question, and has instead resorted to
operational definitions (defining something in
terms of measurement criteria, as in hunger =
percentage of body weight loss, or of food
reduction).
1.15.7.1 Procedures
Long before beginning a formal study, one
has noted instances of the phenomenon in one's
own life, talked with colleagues and friends
about instances in their lives, and noted
occurrences in newspapers, novels, and so on.
Research and theoretical literatures have been
consulted for their accounts. As in all research,
formal participants for the study are chosen on
the combined grounds of practicality/availabil-
ity and of being appropriate for the issues and
literatures one hopes to address. Because EP
analyses are so arduous and time-intensive, a
dissertation study might involve only five or six
462 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
formal participants. One funded project with
multiple researchers included 50 formal subjects
(Fischer & Wertz, 1979). Regardless of the
number of formal participants, the study's
preliminary findings are compared with other
instances, both to reconsider one's work, and to
make comparisons with regard to differences
among participants in different situations.
1.15.7.1.1 Collecting instances
Although EP research need not be con-
strained to analysis of verbal reports, which is
the tradition that developed at Duquesne,
through faculty members' projects, more than
200 doctoral dissertations, the work of gradu-
ates, and the work of others who have based
their research on the Duquesne tradition.
Requests for descriptions from pilot partici-
pants result in a refined formulation of the
research request that is presented to the formal
participants. An example: ªPlease recall a
situation in which you became angry. Please
write out what was going on before that
situation, what happened as the situation
evolved, and what happened then. Include
details that will help us to understand what it
was like to be you throughout the situation.
Thank you.º Participants have agreed in
advance to provide a description, and hence
have been recalling long before they sit down to
write. Some researchers have recorded inter-
views rather than requesting written accounts;
usually those accounts are briefer on the one
hand or rambling on the other. Written reports
allow participants to organize and elaborate
their recollections.
The researcher types any recorded or hand-
written accounts, and reads and rereads them
before returning to the participant for a follow-
up interview, which is taped and later tran-
scribed. Typically, the researcher asks if there
are additions to the account that the participant
might have thought of since providing the
description. Then he or she is given a copy of the
transcript, from which the researcher reads
aloud any sections that seem to require clari-
fication. Open-ended requests for elaboration
are made, in the form of, ªCould you tell me
more about that?º Only at the end of the
interview might the researcher ask direct
questions such as ªDid that occur on the same
day?º or ªWould you say that this instance of
being impatient is typical for you?º
1.15.7.1.2 Organizing the data
The researcher typically recasts each account
into chronological order, inserting interview
elaborations (in a contrasting font) into the
relevant text. At this point the researcher
decides on a system for breaking the text into
workable form. Usually this involves number-
ing ªmeaning unitsºÐsegments of text that
seem to be cohesive and that are followed by a
shift in the reporter's account. Some researchers
number phrases, some entire paragraphs. The
point is both to have a way to check that one has
included all the text in the analysis, and to later
be able to cite sections in every report to
illustrate each finding.
1.15.7.1.3 Data analysis and forms of results
Some researchers have met regularly as a
group, exchanging their own descriptions, or
those that they have collected, working together
to formulate their findings. Others have met
regularly with the providers of accounts, to
collaboratively revise their findings in discus-
sion with the providers. Most researchers
working on dissertations have worked singly,
in consultation with a faculty committee. Of
course one can combine these approaches.
Although variously formulated, most of the
work at Duquesne includes the following
processes. One immerses oneself in the descrip-
tions, ªdwellingº in them, as we say, becoming
familiar with their internal cohesion and their
nuances at a prearticulate level. Of course at the
same time, one is noting recurrent themes, and
jotting down phrases and metaphors that hint at
what seems to be present in all the accounts. The
method section of the research report itemizes
the formal steps that were conducted and
documented, and that a reader may follow
along to see whether the reported findings are
evident, and whether the procedures seem to
have been followed. However, the formal steps
do not characterize all that goes on as one
becomes more deeply immersed in apprehend-
ing and giving expression to the phenomenon
under study. For example, while supervising a
student psychotherapist, I realize that a phrase
she has just uttered is perfectly suited to
characterize an aspect of what my research
participants have reported. While doing my
morning physical exercises, a just-right meta-
phor seems to come out of nowhere. Upon
rereading a transcription for the umpteenth
time, I realize this person's wording fits all my
participants' instances. While reviewing my
notes for a lecture on object relations, I
somehow realize that I have been forcing a
distinction on my data.
One is not discovering external, independent,
features of an object, but rather is making a
phenomenon visible and differentiable from
related phenomena. The process requires four
kinds of rigor: diligence in describing and
 Empirical Phenomenological Research Method
following formal procedures, faithful presence to
data, disciplined and systematic reflection on
what is appearing in instances of the topic, and
finally, creativity in expressingÐrepresentingÐ
making visibleÐthe unity and differentiations of
the phenomenon. We struggle with the limita-
tions and possibilities posed by language and by
our being historically and culturally situated.
The formal steps usually include uncluttering
each participant's report by dropping out
information not essential to that person's
experience for it to be an example of the
particular phenomenon. For example, in Ms.
Smith's account of being criminally victimized,
we might drop out the names of her children and
the color of her handbag. We might condense
references to having done three loads of
washing, made all the beds, and vacuumed to
ªafter a morning of heavy housework . . . º The
resulting condensation might be referred to as
an individual or situated description, and can
serve as one form of the study's results.
Next, each condensation is analyzed by asking
what is being said about where this person was
going in his or her life, how he or she was in
relation to self, others, and the world, and how
he or she was living a past and the future. The
researcher might then attempt to represent this
understanding by writing a narrative version
that stays close to the participant's own words
but draws out experienced meanings more
explicitly and in relation to the research question
(e.g., ªWhat is the experience of being criminally
victimized?º). Here, the researcher might say, in
part, ªHaving completed her planned morning
of heavy housework, Ms Smith gathered her
children into the family car, anticipating a
successful shopping trip.º This level of analysis
can be presented to the participant as a check on
having rendered her explicit and unarticulated
experience faithfully. This version of the findings
again is both one form of findings and a step
toward further analysis. This step, which might
be a half-page to two or three pages in length, is
referred to as an individual phenomenological
description or structure. By ªstructureº we mean
that the descriptive account is cohesive in its
explication of differentiable but essential as-
pects, and that none is made more basic than any
other; each aspect implies the others.
Finally, the researcher examines each indivi-
dual phenomenological structure, identifies the
themes that are shared by all, and formulates a
single phenomenological structure that ex-
presses what was necessary and essential for
all the accounts to be instances of the phenom-
enon under study. This level of finding is of
course more abstract than the preceding ones.
The researcher's implicit and explicit questions
to the data are evident in the findings. For
463
example, my own societal and clinical concerns
become evident to me at some point as I reflect
further on my findings. Levels of abstraction
vary among research authors, as does style of
representation. Some writers put greater stress
on evoking readers' lived sense of a phenomen-
on, and others place greater emphasis on
highlighting themes that lend themselves to
dialog with philosophy. In any case, the findings
must be demonstrable in every instance of
formal data, and in all instances encountered
outside of the study. No settling for probability
levels here! Quotations from the participants'
original accounts document and illustrate the
findings.
1.15.7.2 Clarifications
When undertaking a study, researchers first
put aside theoretical positions and what they
already know about their biases, and then
specify what they know about their guiding
interests (e.g., making a rape victim's experience
available to law enforcement, medical, and
court personnel). However, throughout these
steps and in the findings, the researcher
repeatedly discovers his or her preconceptions
(for example, that being impatient is a negative
stance, or that privacy is privacy-from). He or
she makes formal note of the discovery for later
discussion, and in the meantime tries to hold the
assumptions in abeyance. We recognize that we
cannot thoroughly separate ourselves from our
historical, cultural, biographical contexts nor
from motives for undertaking a study, but we
hold ourselves accountable for bracketing all
that we can, and specifying all that we identify
about the perspectives from which we have
viewed our data.
Researchers follow different steps and dif-
ferent exercises within those steps depending on
the subject matter, their own route into
phenomenology, and so on. In one way or
another, all follow what can be called a
ªdwelling and hermeneutic presenceº to their
data. Analysis does not occur in a finished step
by finished step fashion. Rather, the researcher
repeatedly immerses him- or herself in the
original descriptions and in the forms of
findings developed so far. Sometimes this
delving is a roaming around, noticing nuances.
Other times it is a reading of one account with
another account in mind, allowing synergistic
meanings to emerge. When a new insight or
understanding emerges, the researcher returns
to the earlier understandings, and reworks them
in the light of the newer perspective. This
systematic circling back to revise one's inter-
pretation, the hermeneutic movement, is diffi-
cult to represent in a procedures section.
464 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
1.15.7.3 Example: Being in Privacy
The following structure of being in privacy
has been useful in distinguishing privacy from
secrecy. It also makes a case for the importance
of solitude, even in public settings, for the
development of wonder, reflection, and so on.
Instances from which the analysis was
developed included being immersed in a novel
until interrupted by telephone solicitor, con-
sidering a painting in an art gallery until a tour
group came through, working on a math
problem until the teacher looked over one's
shoulder, enjoying a flower garden until chimes
reminded one of obligations.
These characterizations are paraphrased
from Fischer (1971) (pp. 153±154):
As we look back, it seems that in privacy one's
sense of self falls away, and one flows with
whatever is being attended to. One seems nearly,
but not quite, merged with that something. This
attending is recalled as including an aura of
familiarity, at-homeness, of things fitting even
when they do so unpleasantly or newly. In privacy
one's relation to subject matter may occur through
reflection, action, imagination, whatever. The
relation includes relative openness to and wonder
at the object's possibilities, facets, realities, even
when the person is in a problem-solving mode or is
reflecting on an unfortunate aspect of one's life.
One's attention eventually turns, seemingly in its
own course, to other matters, usually things to be
done. However, when privacy is disrupted prema-
turely, attention is torn from its prior focus, and
shifts repeatedly among intruder, self as caught by
the intrusion, the peripheral world, and the lost
focus. One now contends with contingenciesÐ
time, space, demands. Affect varies with desire and
felt capacity to deal with the intrusion, and to
recapture the disrupted presence to the previously
evolving subject.
1.15.7.4 Example: Being Impatient
The following Condensed General Structure
is taken from Donna Coufal's (1997) disserta-
tion. Among other themes, the dissertation
discusses the surprising discovery of a moral
dimension, and compares being impatient with
phenomenological analyses of being angry,
frustrated, and anxious. Instances provided by
her participants (Ps) included being stuck in an
automobile bank teller line, coping with a client
who seemed not to be hearing the counselor, and
being lost on a country road while trying to get
to a social event.
The awareness of time as protracted but immi-
nently fleeting is central to the experience of being
impatient. What was initially taken for granted,
that time is sufficient to meet P's goals and that the
future will unfold as P anticipates, is no longer
certain. P's sense of time feels distorted. An earlier
absence of concern about the future gives way to
intensifying affect in the face of waiting. In spite of
obstacles in the way, P is poised to move forward,
resisting the temptation to become emotional.
As P's focus narrows, the complexities of the
situation go unnoticed, particularly as P becomes
tired and frustrated. P tries to force the situation to
evolve as planned and cannot imagine alternative
courses of action. The situation is one that
demands something new of P who nevertheless
grasps at the familiar in the face of the unknown. P
overlooks evidence that would help in navigating
the situation more efficiently. In attempting to
avoid waiting, P creates further delays and finds
him- or herself frustrated or defeated.
In denying limitations of a habitual style, P is
confronted with the annihilation of previously
unchallenged assumptions about him- or herself.
P becomes vigilantly focused on preserving a shred
of his or her identity in failing to meet his or her
own expectations. P admonishes self and others
while waiting. Innocent delays are experienced as
moral affronts. P casts about for targets of blame,
alternatively believing delays to be purposive on
the part of others or reflecting inadequacies in P's
own participation.
In spite of the awareness that being impatient
worsens the situation, any attempts to relax are
defeated by P's rigid alertness. P tries to hurry in
order to feel less vulnerable, but remains tense or
becomes angry. Although P has restrained him- or
herself from becoming emotional, when looking
back on the situation, P identifies his or her
responses as disproportionate to the demands of
the situation.
Having failed, P reflects on the situation and
becomes open to its particular meanings and
possibilities. Now the present and each small step
P takes become more figural, while larger, future
oriented goals become horizonal. Nevertheless, P
arrives at destination too deflated or exhausted to
enjoy any sense of accomplishment except for the
modest satisfaction of having modified his or her
initial plan.
In contrast, when patient, P experiences open-
ness to unexpected events. Anticipation is tolerable,
even pleasurable, and P responds imaginatively
when action is not yet possible, appreciating the
limitations imposed by the situation, but not
assuming a catastrophic outcome.
1.15.7.5 Comments
Another researcher or reader may suggest a
more evocative, accurate, felicitous, or other-
wise preferable word or phrase, may identify
additional assumptions on the researcher's part,
may point out relations to other phenomena,
and so on. That is how bodies of understanding
evolve. Note that I have referred throughout to
ªunderstandingsº rather than to ªknowledgeº
in order to emphasize that what we know, even
 Human Science Psychological Assessment
though through our natural science or human
science methods it is always an interpretation.
What is phenomenological research good for?
It provides a means of addressing experience as
such. It enhances consideration of the human
order of events and how we participate in them.
Within such descriptions, we discover choice
points; we are freer than our psychology's
literature on determinants would lead us to
believe. Phenomenological research also helps
us to see the relations among phenomena, and
how one can turn into another, which again
helps to guide our choices. This type of
descriptive psychology puts us in touch with
the humanities, art, literature, and drama,
making them available to our psychological
theories.
Adrian van Kaam's dissertation (1958) at the
University of Chicago, on the experience of
feeling really understood in psychotherapy, was
a forerunner of the research method developed
at Duquesne, where van Kaam brought to-
gether the group who initially began the
department. Amedeo Giorgi took the lead in
developing conceptual and procedural founda-
tions for existential±phenomenological re-
search. Other faculty members and graduates
have contributed to and furthered their devel-
opment, for example, C. Aanstoos, S. Churchill,
P. Collaizzi, C. Fischer, W. Fischer, S. Halling,
and P. Richer. Among phenomenologically
oriented researchers who developed their re-
search approaches independently of Duquesne
are Howard Pollio at the University of
Tennessee and Joseph deRivera at Clark
University. Further illustrations of EP research
and writings on method can be found in the
Duquesne studies in phenomenological psychol-
ogy series (Giorgi et al., 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983),
in the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology,
and in the journal Methods: A Journal for
Human Science.
1.15.8 HUMAN SCIENCE
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
The author developed the following approach
and practices while teaching psychological
assessment within the human science psychol-
ogy program at Duquesne University. One does
not have to adopt the orientation of this chapter
to incorporate the practices into assessment. I
do think that accommodating this chapter to
one's own assumptions about the nature of
being human can allow one to engage a client
more fully and consistently as a co-assessor, and
to participate in developing tailored, viable
changes in his or her life. Stephen Finn (1996)
and his colleagues at the Center for Therapeutic
465
Assessment in Austin and Leonard Handler at
the University of Tennessee have developed
similar approaches from orientations that
overlap mine. Finn and others have published
research reports on the effectiveness of, and
client satisfaction with, assessment collabora-
tion and feedback. Slowly, my textbook
(Fischer, 1994), Individualizing psychological
assessment, originally published in 1985, is
increasingly referenced or adopted in graduate
courses. It seems to me and my colleagues that
our work in collaborative assessment validates
the private inclinations of practitioners, whose
university training, in contrast, had followed the
laboratory traditionÐin which one gathers data
and draws inferences, without consulting with
the subject. Availability of an explicit human
science framework encourages efforts to involve
clients as co-investigators.
1.15.8.1 Developing and Contextualizing Issues
for the Assessment
If an assessment referral has been made by a
third party, I ask that person to tell me more
concretely what the issues are. Often the referral
remains abstract until I ask what decisions
might be influenced by the assessment. For
example, in one instance, a director of an
adolescent program requested an assessment of
a youngster's ªpersonality structure.º Upon
discussion he initially revised his request to be
ªevaluate Axis II diagnoses,º and then after
further discussion, to ªassess capacity for
empathic relations.º When asked about what
decisions he was faced with in regard to the
young woman, he said that an immediate one
was whether she could be placed in a therapy
group that required mutual support among the
members and an ability to introspect. He agreed
with the assessor that he also was trying to
determine how psychologically developed the
client was so as to anticipate her level of
involvement with the overall program and to
determine whether several months of participa-
tion might or might not make a difference. The
assessor then asked for information and
observations that had been gathered on both
sides of the issues. It turned out that the client's
family had been unstable in many ways all her
life, and that she had been truant from school
regularly (and was failing most classes), had a
reputation for defending herself from insults
through physical retaliation, was suspected of
being responsible for items missing from the
school lunch room, and was seen as a loner at
school. On the other hand, she had earned a
ªB+º from an English teacher she seemed to
like, had taught a younger brother to read, and
466 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
had impressed the Program's social worker as
being sad rather than as defiant and as having a
definite, albeit dry, sense of humor.
Often, this ªgetting down to earthº process
suggests next steps that enable bypassing formal
assessment. On the other hand, just a few
consultations, such as that above, with referring
staff members, results in assessment requests
that are already accompanied by concrete events
from a client's life and by a clear notion of how
the assessment might address the client's
situation. The assessor encourages the referring
parties to discuss their dilemmas directly with
the client, and to ask for experiences that might
weigh on one side or the other. Inevitably, staff
members discover that clients are more capable
of entering these discussions than was assumed.
In addition, explaining and discussing issues
with clients, without professional jargon, clari-
fies staff notions while revealing the clients'
understandings and concerns. This process is
constructive in itself.
When a formal assessment is arranged,
whether on referral or from a direct request
from the individual, I continue the above
procedure. I ask the client for his or her
understanding of the referral, and I clarify
whatever I know about it. Later, after we have
developed ways of working together, I may ask
for the above clarifications again. At that point I
am sometimes told that a psychiatrist or
therapist wants to know whether the client is
really crazy, suicidal, or hopeless. Almost
needless to say, it is imperative that I have
previously obtained the referring party's per-
mission to discuss the presented issues with the
client, so that I can be honest, reassuring, and
exploratory, as called for.
I ask what the client would like to learn from
the assessment, and I ask what the client already
understands about his or her, and others',
concerns. As we talk, I try to use his or her terms
in order to keep us both grounded in the client's
life rather than in abstractions. I help the client
to ªdeconstructº any personality constructs,
and to provide examples of the ªwhen-notsº as
well as the ªwhensº of problematic reactions
and actions. For example, a woman tells me that
she shares her therapist's concern that she might
be pushing beyond her ªnatural ability,º that
she might not have ªenough intelligenceº to
pursue a promotion to a managerial position.
We discussed what the managerial job require-
ments would be, and agreed that we would look
into her styles of approaching problems and
would relate our observations to the managerial
position.
Before we began testing, we had discovered
that Fran has gotten along well with co-workers
and subordinates, and has been regarded as
efficient and conscientious. But she has backed
away from projects that seemed to require
ªjumping in and taking the ballº into ªunknown
territory.º A when-not, however, had occurred
when she decided to have an addition built on
her home. She had written numerous notes and
questions in a binder, consulted several con-
tractors, then consulted friends who had built
additions, and checked in regularly with the
contractor and subcontractors. We agreed that
with the freedom to consult she had indeed
taken the ball into previously unknown terri-
tory.
Fran offered another issue for assessment,
namely whether she was a ªdependent person-
ality.º We deªconstructºed that notion and
wound up discussing times that she had and had
not deferred to others' judgments when in fact
she could have acted on her own. From there we
went on to the Minnesota Multiphasic Person-
ality Inventory (MMPI) and Rorschach to see
what else we might find in regard to her
questions. I reminded Fran that I would
summarize our findings after our next meeting,
and then would send a copy of my written report
to both her and her therapist. The beginning of
the assessment process has already been
collaborative, individualized, and oriented to-
ward the life world.
1.15.8.2 Using Tests
Any assessor should be knowledgeable in the
realms of test selection, profiles, and norms, and
in their relations to theories of, and research on,
personality patterns, psychopathology diagnos-
tic systems, styles of coping and thinking, and
levels of effectiveness. This expertise allows the
assessor to form impressions, be surprised, and
form alternative understandings. To be most
useful, however, the assessor must also know
how to use this expertise to gain access to a
client's life. Within a human-science approach,
our primary data are life events. As above, after
locating referral issues in life situations, we then
turn to assessment tools, to theories, and to
research to gain access to and to explore those
life events. If written assessments end instead
with scores, categories, and diagnoses, I would
say that they are unfinished, that they have
reported our tools rather than findings pertinent
to an individual's life. The life world should be
our point of return from testing, as well as our
point of departure into testing.
Test scores do not reveal anything more basic
or explanatory than we could find by following a
person around through various contexts and
observing his or her reactions and actions. Of
course the latter ªoptionº is not efficient or
 Human Science Psychological Assessment
usually even feasible. At any rate, the assessor's
explorations with the client culminate in a
description of how the client has contributed
to his or her successes and failings, and how the
client might recognize alternative routes to
revised goals. Our understandings weave a story,
a narrative account, in contrast to assessments
that explain in terms of ªunderlying variables.º
Examples of using test patterns in discussion,
and then of using individual tests intervention-
ally, follow. I had been asked to conduct an
assessment of an electrical engineer whose
MMPI-2 had been too defensive to allow
immediate clearance into restricted areas of a
nuclear plant. He and I agreed that he had tried
to look as unproblematic as possible in order to
obtain clearance, but also that he has always
seen himself as ªa good citizen,º that he does not
look very deeply into personal matters, and that
a retest would probably result again in what
would look defensive to others. I remarked that
although he had not flagged in filling out several
pages of background forms I had given him, he
struck me as being tired. He said no, that it had
just been a long day. ªWell,º I asked, ªhow
about this possibility?: Although you aren't
depressed [he nods], this asterisk here [I point to
the subtle depression score on a computer print-
out] often happens when a person has been kind
of down, not as alert or enthusiastic as usual,
even though people at work and at home
haven't noticed.º Mr. Kern looked up at me
with surprise, nodded quizzically, but said he
did not know much more about it. I then
mentioned that on the Rorschach he had been
attuned to a lot of things ªjust happeningº
[inanimate m], like a leaf that was being blown
in the wind, and a lit candle melting. I reported
to him that when people are able to see that kind
of ªjust happening,º that their lives are often in
a holding pattern, that they know where they
would like to be going, but it is as though they
just have to tread water. To this, Mr. Kern
nodded decisively, and when I suggested that
most people know what that holding pattern is
all about, and that they also find themselves
tossing in their sleep about it, he explained to me
that his entire work unit had been waiting for
eight months to hear whether the corporation
was going to close them out of existence. He
volunteered that during the same time he and his
wife were waiting to see whether they would be
able send their son to the college he preferred.
Mr. Kern explained then that perhaps he was
feeling ªworn downº but that he was not
ªtired,º which meant to him beginning to lose
hope or not being able to pay attention.
Although Mr. Kern had not wanted to examine
his current life at all, he found that he had done
so in a way that affirmed his previously
467
nonconscious sense of his circumstances, and
that unburdened him a bit.
Individual tests and techniques allow both
client and assessor to observe the person going
about an activity. Similar past situations
become available to the client in ways that talk
alone would not have afforded. For example,
Ms. Rose had wanted to know if we might
discover how it was that her boss gave her low
performance ratings for efficiency, although she
gets more done than anyone else in the office by
the end of the day. As I watched her copy the
Bender designs, I wondered if my reaction was
similar to that of her boss. Ms. Rose looked at
each design for a good while, stretched, then
held her pencil lightly with one hand and
anchored the paper with just two fingers of the
other. She drew parallel lines for the square,
then half the circle, then finished the box, then
the circle. She continued in her unorthodox
manner through the nine designs. She never
looked at me, and never looked back at the
stimulus card after first observing it. When she
had finished the designs, I was astounded to see
that they were geometrically precise and neat,
and that she had finished in considerably less
than the average time. We laughed together as
she realized that she similarly has created her
own world in the busy office, where others
cannot see what she is up to as she does things
out of order, stretches, seems oblivious to the
clock, and so on; others had not noticed the
nicely completed projects among the part
projects arranged on her desk. Through our
work, Ms. Rose was already finding that she
could make sense of her circumstance; she had
discovered how she had been contributing to
others' perceptions of her. We then role-played
doing the Bender again with her making
comments that allowed me to know what she
was doing and that she was indeed following
directions. She remarked later that she was now
ªliberatedº both to be herself and to win the
approval of her boss.
1.15.8.3 Collaborating and Intervening
Finn has pointed out that this approach to
assessment can be undertaken as a therapeutic
activity in its own right. Note the therapeutic
process in the following examples of intervening
into the client's usual course. On the Rorschach,
Harrietthadhesitatinglyreportedafightbetween
two bears who were both injured. On the next
card, instead of the usual humans cooperating on
ordinary tasks, she reported ªwarriors from
another planet; they make me laughÐthey're too
stupid to know that they're hermaphrodites.º I
pointed out a similar sequence with other cards,
468 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
and asked her what she already knew about a
pattern of running from being afraid or from
being in touch with the danger of being injured,
and then trying to hide through being silly,
voicing put-downs, and so on. Harriett readily
provided examples within her family and her
personal relationships. We used life instances and
the Rorschach instances to help her to recognize
landmarks which could indicate that she had
entered frightening territory. She could then look
for turn-off points in order to change course if she
found herself veering into silliness or offensive-
ness. One landmark she identified was an
inclination to convert her fearfully tightened lips
into a sneer. We agreed that she might then
purposively transform the coming sneer into an
expression of determination to stay her course
while checking out whether she was indeed in
dangerous territory.
On other occasions an assessor might inter-
vene during a client's telling of a Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT) story. For example:
ªGeez, John, is this going to end dismally like all
the rest? Can you tell it so the fellow figures out a
plan?º This was John's first recognition that he
had been co-authoring his own dreary circum-
stances outside the assessment.
Note that this collaborative, interventional
approach affirms the client as an active agent,
sometimes self-defeating, but also capable of
changing course. It focuses on actual situations,
whether during assessment or the client's larger
life, rather than on drives, traits, cognitions,
determinants, and so on. The client is seen as
always in relation to goals, to pasts, to obstacles,
to invitations. We characterize the person in
terms of his or her construing situations and of
being formed through choices in those situa-
tions. Although not illustrated in this chapter,
assessor and client often agree to disagree, or
agree that they cannot spell out what it is they
are in touch with. In that process, they become
at least peripherally aware of both the necessity
for, and the inadequacy of, language. Shared
humanity and understandings between the
participants move the assessment along, despite
personal differences. The client knows he or she
has been met by someone attempting to deal
authentically with limits and possibilities, even
when the assessor comes to conclusions not in
the client's favor, such as findings of neurolo-
gical impairment, or of unsuitability for un-
supervised visits with a child.
1.15.8.4 Writing Reports
In human science assessment reports, ªfind-
ingsº are both clarifications of past life events
and identification of personally viable options
for the client. So reports are crafted to remind
readers of the client's agencyÐhis or her power
to initiate shifts in course. Constructs are
eschewed as implying that external factors
account for the person's actions. Any necessary
jargon is explained in everyday terms. When
psychologists cannot write their findings in
terms of everyday events, they literally do not
know ªwhat in the worldº they are talking
about. Reports are written in first or third
person (Mr. Jones, I, we) rather than referring to
ªthe examinerº or to ªthis patient.º We write
with verbs rather than nouns whenever possible,
in order to move from abstractions to actual
behavior. For example, instead of ªJohn's low
self-esteem keeps him from entering the con-
test,º we might write, ªFearing that he would be
made fun of, John has not entered the contest.º
Yes, it does take extra effort to locate and
contextualize the actual instances of what has
been abstracted into nouns, and it usually takes
more writing to describe them than to name
constructs. But the worthwhile outcome is
understandings of actual events shared by all
participants (client, family, teachers therapists,
etc.). We also write in the past tense rather than
in the present tense, to indicate situatedness and
the possibility of change. For example, instead
of ªJanine sees authority figures as demeaning,º
we might say, ªJanine has seen her bosses and
teachers as likely to demean her.º We try to own
our perceptions rather than attributing all
conclusions to test data. For example: ªAs
Ms Gertz glared at me when I asked personal
questions, I thought of the MMPI's references
to `nondisclosive' and `hostile,' which I see as a
defensive stance on her part.º
Some impressions are only implied or evoked
rather than spelled out, not reflecting deficient
understanding so much as respect for the
ambiguity inherent to the life world. A report
that is faithfully descriptive does not attempt
false clarity. For example: ªSomething about
the contrast between Mr. Hersh's stiff upper
body and his causally stretched out legs struck
me as being as disjunctive as was his account of
how he had been arrested.º
We may add a technical appendix to reports,
with commentary on assorted test features, for
psychologist readers. This information is re-
garded as a tool, data for further reflection, not
as findings. Again, ªfindingsº are clarifications
of life events. We explain any diagnoses con-
tained in the report, in the client's language. We
often provide the appropriate pages of the DSM
(Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders) for the client to read and then discuss.
The report is regarded by all as a progress
report, a report of progress to date in under-
standing the client's situations, and in develop-
ing concrete suggestions. After addressing any
 Concluding Remarks
referring party's concerns, the report ends with
a section itemizing suggestions that client and
assessor developed. For example, ª(2) When
you've arrived at a solution instantly, remember
to slow down to show others how you got there,
or how they might get there. You'll recall that
we talked about this in regard to my not seeing
your ªbattlefieldº on the Rorschach until you
guided me through it. We then related that to
times your co-workers and supervisor have
thought that you were just shooting from the
hip, until you helped them to find their way to
your insight.º
We include a section for the client to write
commentary about the report. Often we find
that the client has developed further under-
standings since our last meeting (usually two
meetings occur prior to reading the written
report). Even when the client does not want to
write much on the report, the invitation affirms
the client as a collaborator in the process.
Knowing that the client is going to read the
formal report also encourages the author to find
expressions that are true to the client's life.
1.15.8.5 Judging Validity
In that the report deals with direct observa-
tions and reports of actual events, we are not
faced with the task of justifying inferences.
Instead, the criterion is that client and readers
must recognize in the report's descriptions
touch points with their interpretations or
experiences of this client or similar clients,
and therein a consensual validity is formed.
Ambiguity of the life world is respected when
certain findings are implied or evoked rather
than spelled out. Differences in perspective are
respected as inevitable, and it is understood that
further observation and reflection will result in
continuing clarifications and revisions. No
portrait, description, or other interpretation
can be final. In the meantime, the practical
utility of the concrete, individualized, sugges-
tions is a strong form of validity.
1.15.8.6 Comments
Working within a human science frame does
not bypass the critical contributions of neu-
ropsychology, medicine, cognitive psychology,
object relations theory, diagnostic systems, and
so on. We take these contributions most
seriously but do not adopt the reductive
philosophies within which many of them were
developed and/or frequently are practiced. For
example, although it is definitely helpful to
know that a person matches criteria for
borderline personality disorder, that match
469
does not explain the person. Although various
knowledge domains do provide information
about a person's present restrictions and
possibilities, we still must explore that person's
ways of going about life, so we can locate when-
nots, help that person to develop personally
viable pivot points, and so on.
Even when intending to work within a human
science orientation, we find ourselves falling into
our culture's and our discipline's reductive
attitude all too easily. Hence, in my assessment
courses I include numerous exercises to remind
us of the primacy of the life world, and that test
data are always about a life that we are re-
sponsible for getting back to. On the blackboard
I draw the first Bender design, but with the circle
and square overlapping instead of adjacent. The
class offers ideas about how an overlapping
rendition might occur. The ensuing range re-
minds us not to rush to interpretation from
manuals, but rather to be open to a range of
possibilities: being in a rush, attending to just
getting through the task rather than trying to
be precise, resenting having to go through an
assessment, leaning on others for comfort or
support or to avoid the possibility of not
connecting, being unmindful of boundaries.
In another exercise, Rorschach students write
descriptions of their own situations in
ªRorschacheseº: ªThere I was, Maing toward
Fd, when a large H AG'd into the line in front of
me; I found myself Hxing (H) images, and
imagining him MOR.º To further ground
Rorschach ratios in life, we act out introversive
and extratensive styles of entering the classroom
late. In still another exercise, we observe slides
of the American painter Andrew Wyeth's
representational art, and talk about how we
too re-present our subjects. We do so without
ªartist's licenseº to change features, but with
awareness that we too are creating a portrait,
from our perspectives and with our lives as
points of access.
1.15.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Through emulation of the natural sciences,
psychology rightly has achieved status as a
rigorous discipline. From that secure place,
however, we now note that the experimental
method, when based on a residual positivistic
philosophy of science, is not fully adequate for
studying human affairs. An approach that
studies humans in terms of their being subjects
(agents) as well as objects is human science
psychology. This approach respects data
formed through natural science methods, but
looks more broadly to lived-world contexts to
reflect on their significance.
470 Phenomenological, Existential, and Humanistic Foundations for Psychology
As fewer psychologists identify with radical
behaviorism or a strict logical positivism, and
more hope for psychology to do greater justice
to human phenomena, psychologists increas-
ingly are adopting the term ªhuman scienceº to
characterize their own leanings. Simulta-
neously, qualitative research methods are find-
ing their way from other disciplines into
psychology. Through our national organiza-
tion, psychology advocates respect for cultural
and individual differences, and urges that we
become familiar with what it is like to be in other
people's situations. In these and many other
ways we find ourselves increasingly heeding
persons' unitary relations with their worlds. I
have written this chapter as an invitation to
revisit the human science literature, which
affords promising possibilities of unifying our
discipline. Although human science psychology
has been outside the mainstream, its history is as
long as that of prevailing psychology, and its
grounding philosophy is at least as formidable.
Studies exploring the mutuality of biology
and psychology, integrative research methods,
and transdiscipline cooperation are all still in
their beginning stages. However, their emer-
gence is now accelerating through the work of
diverse communities of scholars and practi-
tioners. The second edition of Comprehensive
Clinical Psychology will probably include in its
foundations volume the growing literatures of
hermeneutics, linguistics, feminist studies, con-
structionism, and other endeavors that ac-
knowledge human participation in what we
take to be reality. Indeed, perhaps the second
edition will explicitly summarize work exploring
how it is that our clinical practices necessarily
draw on our life worlds. These are exciting,
promising times.
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