BASILSICO, JALEFAYE

JAIME SORIANO ET. AL VS. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

FACTS:
Before the court are four Petitions pertaining to the oath-taking of Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Because they involve the same subject matter, they are
hereby consolidated. In GR No. 146528, the Petition asks the Court to enjoin Joseph Ejercito Estrada
"from exercising the powers and authority of the President under the Constitution" and "to yield the
Presidency to his constitutional successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo". In GR No 146549, petitioner prays
that the Court declare that "the occupation of the Office of [the President] of the Philippines by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is constitutional and legal with the full support of the Filipino people
and other foreign countries.’ In GR No. 146579, the Petitio asks the Court to issue a "definitive ruling on
whether or not Joseph Estrada is still the President" and, hence. "exempt from all criminal suits." In GR
No. 146631, the Petition prays "that the proclamation and oath-taking of Madame Arroyo be declared null
and void " or that she be "declared acting President and President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President-on-
leave " .
 
ISSUE: Whether/not all petitions are with merits?
RULING:
All four Petitions are plainly without merit. First, the four Petitions are essentially for declaratory
relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
129, this special civil action falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and is not
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme court. Although the Petition in GR No.146528 labels itself
as a "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus," it fails to allege, much less show, lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or grave abuse of jurisdiction on the part of "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions," which Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court requires to be alleged and proven before the extra-ordinary writ of prohibition may be issued.
Neither have petitioners sufficiently alleged, much less shown, that respondent or anyone else "unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty," to entitle them to the writ
of mandamus. In any case, petitioners themselves admit that their plea is really one for declaratory relief,
(par. 6.1. of Petition) and that they "fully understand the well-settled doctrine that this Honorable Court is
bereft of jurisdiction to entertain cases for declaratory relief."
Second, petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits. They have now shown any direct and personal
injury as a result of President Arroyo’s oath-taking. Specifically, Petitioner Lozano’s alleged interest as a
taxpayer is far to detached from the ultimate objective of his Petition: nullify the oath-taking of Arroyo
and declare Estrada as "President-on-leave." The other petitioners have not even alleged, not to say
shown, any prima facie legal interest to qualify them as proper parties. Kibitzers, however well-meaning,
have no locus standi. Third, none of the Petitions can be treated as actions for quo warranto. Under Rule
66 of the Rules of Court, a plea for quo warranto must be commenced (1) by the solicitor general, (2) by a
public prosecutor, and (3) by "a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another." None of the petitioners qualify in law to commence the action.
At bottom, the Court stands by its Resolution in AM No. 01-1-05 SC, promulgated on 22 January 2001,
which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC.-In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to take her Oath of
Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice.-Acting on the urgent
request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001,
which request was treated as an administrative matter, the Court resolved unanimously to CONFIRM the
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20,
2001 to administer the Oath of Office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001. "This Resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any
justiciable case which be filed by a proper party. Clearly, the herein Petitions have miserably failed to
present justiciable controversies brought by the proper parties to deserve further considerations by this
Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

REPUBLIC V. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

Facts:

This is a Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void
respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude
respondent therefrom. On August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as Chief Justice,
an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon (Atty. Gadon) against respondent with the
Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives (House Committee on Justice) for culpable
violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also
alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. During the impeachment
hearings of the House, it was revealed that respondent purportedly failed to file her SALNs while she was
member of the faculty of the U.P. College of Law and that she filed her SALN only for the years 1998,
2002 and 2006. The Republic seeks to oust respondent from her position as Chief Justice on the ground
that the latter failed to show that she is person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification
for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. the Republic
contends that respondent's failure to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the
outset, from being candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs, respondent has not
proven her integrity which is requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that since
respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right to
hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto. Republic justifies its resort to the
unconventional method of quo warranto by stating that it seeks respondent's ouster, not on account of
commission of impeachable offenses, but because of her ineligibility to assume the position of Chief
Justice. Respondent argues that, on the strength of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment. Respondent argues that the present
petition is time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 provides that petition for quo warranto must be filed within
one (1) year from the "cause of ouster" and not from the "discovery" of the disqualification. Moreover,
respondent stresses that the failure to file SALNs or to submit the same to the JBC has no bearing on
one's integrity. The submission of SALNs was simply among the additional documents which the JBC
had required of the applicants for the position of Chief Justice. It is respondent's position that the non-
filing of SALN is not ground for disqualification unless the same was already the subject of pending
criminal or administrative case or if the applicant had already been finally convicted for criminal offense
involving said failure to file SALNs. In this case, respondent points out that the JBC was made aware as
early as July 20, 2012 that respondent had not submitted to the JBC her SALNs as U.P. professor and yet
none of them invoked Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the "integrity rule." Respondent likewise
contends that the issue of whether an applicant for the position of Chief Justice is person of "proven
integrity" is question "constitutionally committed to the JBC" and is therefore political question which
only the JBC could answer, and it did so in the affirmative when it included respondent's name in the
shortlist of nominees for the position of Chief Justice. The Republic cites respondent's gross
misrepresentation in stating that her reason for non-submission of SALNs was because she could no
longer retrieve all of such SALNs. According to the Republic, respondent's allegation seems to imply that
she did file her SALNs when the Certifications from the U.P. and the Ombudsman state otherwise.
Integrity, the Republic claims, is simply faithful adherence to the law, and the filing of SALN is
qualification implied from the requirement of integrity. The filing of SALN is not an additional
requirement unduly imposed on applicants to positions in the Judiciary. When respondent failed to file
her SALN, she did not comply with the Constitution, laws and appropriate codes of conduct. There is no
need to allege or prove graft and corruption in order to prove an aspiring magistrate's lack of integrity.
Respondent maintains that whether respondent was person of "proven integrity" when she applied for the
position of Chief Justice is political question outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, which only
the JBC and the President as the appointing authority could determine. She avers that the application of
the political question doctrine is not confined to the President or Congress, as the Republic supposedly
argues, but extends to other government departments or officers exercising discretionary powers, such as
the JBC which uses its wisdom and discretion in determining whether an applicant to the Judiciary is
person of "proven" integrity.
Issue:

1. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:

a. Whether the determination of candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination partakes of the character
of political question outside the Court's supervisory and review powers to and whether
the issuance of the writ of quo warranto a valid exercise of Court’s power
Ruling:

1. Respondent is INELIGIBLE as Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief Justice.

a. NO. Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by the
JBC . Issuance of quo warranto is valid.

In interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it is consistently held
that the Court’s supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own
rules and procedures. Furthermore, while a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening
aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional
and legal requirements. The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the requisite
qualifications is determined based on facts and therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the
exercise of discretion on the part of the nominating body. Proceeding from this, qualifications
under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by the JBC — one such qualification
is the requirement of possession of proven integrity required not only in the Constitution, but also
mentioned in administrative cases, in the Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct as a
continuing requirement, the Code of Professional Integrity, and in the JBC009 Rules. The Court
invoked the doctrine of the "transcendental" importance of judicial review, ruling that the quo
warranto petition was a valid exercise of the Court's power, there was an actual controversy, and
the Republic had standing. The Court ruled that quo warranto cases and impeachment
proceedings can proceed independently and simultaneously due to the fact that they are based on
different causes of action; quo warranto questions the eligibility and valid exercise of a position;
whereas, impeachment is removal for committing crimes specified by the Constitution.
Furthermore, it ruled that if it wished, Congress may have continued to impeachment without
prejudice from the Court on the principle of the separation of powers. Tijam wrote that "to
[require Congress to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment
proceedings[against] a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified [would be a]
waste of time."[3] The Court ruled that impeachment is not the exclusive legal remedy by which
the legitimacy of exercise of power may be challenged. The Court ruled that so severe was
Sereno's failure to declare her assets that she has no integrity. As integrity is an enumerated
requirement of Article VIII of the Constitution, she was therefore, by the Court's logic, never
eligible once it was destroyed at the time of her not filing her SALNs